More than a quarter of a century has elapsed now since British and French troops stormed the beaches around Port Said in a vain attempt to force the Egyptian Government into accepting a new international convention to govern the passage of shipping through the Suez Canal. From a military standpoint the assault was a complete success - yet the Suez Campaign was not destined to be won or lost on the field of battle. At the United Nations, the Soviet Union and the United States combined, and with the support of the overwhelming majority of the Organisation's membership, forced the British and French to abandon their Suez venture. Australia and New Zealand were the only countries not directly involved in the fracas in Egypt, to actively support the British and French action. New Zealand and the Suez Affair is an attempt to provide some new insights into the Government's decision to support Britain during the crisis, by challenging the generally accepted view that New Zealand's Suez Policy originated in the hearts, rather than the minds, of New Zealand's leaders. The modus operandi employed to achieve this objective is essentially quite simple. Firstly, the available small state literature was examined in an effort to isolate the behaviour patterns that small states generally exhibit. The Government's Suez Policy was then examined and compared with the behaviour patterns suggested by the small state theorists. If, in the course of the analysis, it was found that New Zealand's policy conflicted with what is generally considered to be typical small state behaviour, then it was felt that the accusation of an emotionally based Suez policy would probably be proven a valid one. If on the other hand, New Zealand's policy appeared consistent with the suggested patterns, then it seemed likely that some other explanation would have to be found to explain the Government's actions. It was intended that the theoretical aspect of this work should furnish answers to all these questions. The conclusions that were reached upon completion of the analysis, tended to indicate that New Zealand's Suez Policy was, in fact, typical of the suggested small state patterns, and that contrary to the generally held belief, it was economic necessity and a belief in the rule of inter­ national law, rather than sentimental attachment to Britain, that dictated the Government's Suez Policy.