This study examines the transformation of power in Thai politics, including how power has been produced and utilised by local-level networks in the Northeast region since the 2006 military coup. Considering uncertain regimes and complex circumstances necessitating networked collaboration, a single political actor or network cannot work alone. The central concern of the thesis is to examine the nature of local-level networks, as well as to assess how such networks operate under the contexts of political conflict and military rule. A framework is proposed to understand the ‘Thai local-level clientelistic cluster network’ and to further clarify how local-level networks function. It theorises a complex model of membership and connection controlled by clusters of brokers, clans, and machines.

According to a qualitative research methodology, this study mainly employs using a documentary survey, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions. Data collection in the Northeast region was concentrated on various aspects to describe the operations of networks with different modes of operation. These aspects include the colour-coded conflict between the Yellow Shirt and Red Shirt movements, budgetary politics and other policies in local-level government, and electoral competition. The research reveals that the nature of local-level networks is influenced by national politics, which is shaped by regime change and institutional dynamics resulting from the 2006 and 2014 coups. In a clientelistic cluster network, these conditions also affect the resources that the network requires and the interactions both between members and among the three clusters.

This study argues that new forms of local-level networks, which replaced traditional patron-client ties, are instigated by the motivational factors of decentralisation. Local-level networks also are enabled by economic expansion; the growth of new technology, which has led to a growing number of new political actors at the local level; and the new political

landscape with its higher levels of competition and cooperation. In addition, the outcomes of two coups created a growing gap between political parties and local-level politicians, as well as a new structure of clientelistic relationships composed of various clients, brokers, and patrons who work together and compete for political achievements and resources.

This thesis therefore argues that the nature of networks at the local level can be existed by both dependent and independent of other clusters of local clientelistic networks and national powers such as political parties and the government. Under partially democratic political conditions with supra-constitutional controls, local-level powers can not only maintain, but also expand, their influence through the utilisation of clientelistic cluster networks in which each cluster assumes a different leadership role for different functions. As such, the survival of local-level powers depends on their capacity to adapt and incorporate themselves into a network, thereby ensuring their continued existence and enabling them to expand their influence.