The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments

Type of content
Journal Article
Thesis discipline
Degree name
Publisher
Oxford University Press (OUP)
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Language
en
Date
2017
Authors
Deng Z
Campbell, Douglas
Copeland, B. Jack
Abstract

Famous examples of conceivability arguments include (i) Descartes’ argument for mind-body dualism, (ii) Kripke's ‘modal argument’ against psychophysical identity theory, (iii) Chalmers’ ‘zombie argument’ against materialism, and (iv) modal versions of the ontological argument for theism. In this paper, we show that for any such conceivability argument, C, there is a corresponding ‘mirror argument’, M. M is deductively valid and has a conclusion that contradicts C’s conclusion. Hence, a proponent of C—henceforth, a ‘conceivabilist’—can be warranted in holding that C’s premises are conjointly true only if she can find fault with one of M’s premises. But M’s premises are modelled on a pair of C’s premises. The same reasoning that supports the latter supports the former. For this reason, a conceivabilist can repudiate M’s premises only on pain of severely undermining C’s premises. We conclude on this basis that all conceivability arguments, including each of (i)–(iv), are fallacious.

Description
Citation
Campbell D, Copeland BJ, Deng Z (2017). The Inconceivable Popularity of Conceivability Arguments. The Philosophical Quarterly. 67(267). 223-240.
Keywords
conceivability argument, modal argument, zombie argument, ontological argument, physicalism
Ngā upoko tukutuku/Māori subject headings
ANZSRC fields of research
Fields of Research::50 - Philosophy and religious studies::5003 - Philosophy
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