This thesis is concerned with defining the nature of European political cooperation as a political entity, commenting on the success of the procedure from a member state perspective and locating the place of EPC in the overall integration process. The role of the European Parliament in EPC is also examined using not only the context of direct accountability over this specific policy area but also the wider question of democratic sanction under conditions of on-going community integration.

An 'ideal type' is used to examine the development and success of EPC. The importance of national sovereignty, the lack of functional coherence between the European Communities and EPC, the use of consensus decision-making and the fairly low level of overall European integration clearly limit EPC. Member states exclusively determine the level of cooperation under the intergovernmental EPC, however. Apparent failures of EPC are thus generally cast as beneficial to member states.

Various integration theories are examined in order to assess the location of EPC in European union. Political cooperation is found to contribute to integration by assisting in the creation of preconditions for union. Foundational European Cooperation Reports are used to point to the considerable difference between abstract support for European union and actual member state commitment to using EPC as a means of furthering union.

The European Parliament's role in the intergovernmental EPC process is presently negligible. This is revealed in part through an empirical exercise involving Parliamentary questions relating to EPC which are addressed to the Council of Ministers. The significance of Parliamentary association with EPC is particularly low if considered in terms of growing EC integration. In order to take its rightful place in any European Union, Parliament, it is argued within, may attempt to use EPC as a means of heightening its overall position in the EC.