This thesis has two primary aims. The first is to more fully understand the bounded rationality models are first applied to the Treasury's relationship with the Minister of Finance. The economic elite model is then applied to the NZBRT's relationship with the Minister. This thesis concludes with four significant findings. First, in light of the evidence presented, the power that the Treasury and NZBRT had in the formation of the privatisation programme is argued to have been less dominant than conventional wisdom has suggested. Second, the models are only of limited use in analysing the power held by both organisations. Third, significant analytical difficulties exist when attempting to view the concept of power in non-conflicting situations. Finally, power is found to be both an elusive and multi-dimensional concept; it can operate in a non-conflictual, covert and impersonal context. The political resources used by groups can be used not only to dominate and control, but also to facilitate and reinforce the status quo.