The scope for strategic asymmetry under international rivalry

Gilbert J; Oladi R; Koska, Onur A.

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Type of Content

Journal Article

UC Permalink

https://hdl.handle.net/10092/103688

Publisher's DOI/URI

http://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2022.02.013

Publisher

Elsevier BV

ISSN

1059-0560

Language

Collections

Business: Journal Articles [316]

Authors

Gilbert J

Oladi R

Koska, Onur A.

Abstract

In the context of a model of international trade through reciprocal dumping with horizontally differentiated goods, we study the endogenous choice of quantities and prices as strategic variables. We show that while a Cournot outcome prevails under conditions of export rivalry, strategic asymmetry under foreign direct investment rivalry may be observed, especially when it is possible to initially deter FDI by committing to a price contract, and when switching is costly and/or takes time.

Citation

Gilbert J, Koska OA, Oladi R (2022). The scope for strategic asymmetry under international rivalry. International Review of Economics & Finance.
This citation is automatically generated and may be unreliable. Use as a guide only.

Keywords

Exports vs. FDI; Horizontal Product Differentiation; Cournot-Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium

ANZSRC Fields of Research

38 - Economics::3803 - Economic theory
35 - Commerce, management, tourism and services::3502 - Banking, finance and investment::350203 - Financial econometrics

Rights

http://hdl.handle.net/10092/17651