The scope for strategic asymmetry under international rivalry

dc.contributor.authorGilbert J
dc.contributor.authorOladi R
dc.contributor.authorKoska, Onur A.
dc.date.accessioned2022-05-16T21:39:12Z
dc.date.available2022-05-16T21:39:12Z
dc.date.issued2022en
dc.date.updated2022-03-04T20:08:56Z
dc.description.abstractIn the context of a model of international trade through reciprocal dumping with horizontally differentiated goods, we study the endogenous choice of quantities and prices as strategic variables. We show that while a Cournot outcome prevails under conditions of export rivalry, strategic asymmetry under foreign direct investment rivalry may be observed, especially when it is possible to initially deter FDI by committing to a price contract, and when switching is costly and/or takes time.en
dc.identifier.citationGilbert J, Koska OA, Oladi R (2022). The scope for strategic asymmetry under international rivalry. International Review of Economics & Finance.en
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2022.02.013
dc.identifier.issn1059-0560
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10092/103688
dc.languageen
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherElsevier BVen
dc.rightsAll rights reserved unless otherwise stateden
dc.rights.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10092/17651en
dc.subjectExports vs. FDIen
dc.subjectHorizontal Product Differentiationen
dc.subjectCournot-Bertrand-Nash Equilibriumen
dc.subject.anzsrcFields of Research::38 - Economics::3803 - Economic theoryen
dc.subject.anzsrcFields of Research::35 - Commerce, management, tourism and services::3502 - Banking, finance and investment::350203 - Financial econometricsen
dc.titleThe scope for strategic asymmetry under international rivalryen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
uc.collegeUC Business School
uc.departmentDepartment of Economics and Finance
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