Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission

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dc.contributor.authorCox, J.C.
dc.contributor.authorServátka, M.
dc.contributor.authorVadovic, R.
dc.date.accessioned2014-04-14T21:27:35Z
dc.date.available2014-04-14T21:27:35Z
dc.date.issued2012en
dc.description.abstractIntent to help or harm is revealed more clearly by acts of commission that overturn the status quo than by acts of omission that uphold it. Both the law and culture make a central distinction between the two types of acts. Acts of commission elicit stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. In this paper we compare reciprocal responses to both types of acts and ask whether behavior of subjects in two experiments is consistent with existing theory. The design of the experiments focuses on the axioms of revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) that make it observationally distinct from other theories, Axiom R (for reciprocity) and Axiom S (for status quo). We find support for this theory in both experiments.en
dc.identifier.citationCox, J.C., Servátka, M., Vadovic, R. (2012) Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission. Department of Economics and Finance. 42pp..en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10092/9088
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherCollege of Business and Economicsen
dc.publisherUniversity of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Financeen
dc.relation.urihttp://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/1201.pdfen
dc.rights.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10092/17651en
dc.subjectexperimental economicsen
dc.subjectreciprocityen
dc.subjectrevealed altruismen
dc.subjectacts of commissionen
dc.subjectacts of omissionen
dc.subjectother-regarding preferencesen
dc.subjectstatus quoen
dc.subject.anzsrcField of Research::14 - Economics::1499 - Other Economics::149999 - Economics not elsewhere classifieden
dc.titleStatus Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omissionen
dc.typeDiscussion / Working Papers
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