The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities

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dc.contributor.authorKoska OA
dc.contributor.authorOnur I
dc.contributor.authorStähler F
dc.date.accessioned2019-12-09T01:22:46Z
dc.date.available2019-12-09T01:22:46Z
dc.date.issued2018en
dc.date.updated2019-11-25T02:08:47Z
dc.description.abstract© 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Austria, part of Springer Nature. We scrutinize the scope of auctions for firm acquisitions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities. We show that no mechanism exists that allows an investor to acquire a low-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency is required as to qualify for a sequential equilibrium.en
dc.identifier.citationKoska OA, Onur I, Stähler F (2018). The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities. Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie. 125(2). 107-136.en
dc.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-017-0590-0
dc.identifier.issn0931-8658
dc.identifier.issn1617-7134
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10092/17761
dc.languageEnglish
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLCen
dc.subjectTakeoveren
dc.subjectAuctionen
dc.subjectExternalityen
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen
dc.subjectCommitmenten
dc.subject.anzsrcFields of Research::38 - Economics::3801 - Applied economics::380107 - Financial economicsen
dc.subject.anzsrcFields of Research::35 - Commerce, management, tourism and services::3502 - Banking, finance and investment::350208 - Investment and risk managementen
dc.titleThe scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalitiesen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
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