Does Competition Resolve the Free-Rider Problem in the Voluntary Provision of Impure Public Goods? Experimental Evidence

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dc.contributor.authorNeugebauer, T.
dc.contributor.authorServátka, M.
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-23T04:52:16Z
dc.date.available2011-08-23T04:52:16Z
dc.date.issued2010en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we assume that a public project creates different payoffs to different contributors. Within this environment we study two institutions: Rank Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Rank-Order-VCM) and Random Order Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (Random-Order-VCM). In Rank-Order-VCM individuals compete with their observable contributions towards a public project for a larger share of the payoff that the project generates while in Random-Order-VCM the shares are assigned randomly. We observe that competition outweighs incentives to free-ride and find that Random-Rank-VCM elicits median contributions equal to the full endowment throughout the whole experiment, including the last period. In Random-Rank-VCM the contributions are significantly lower and decline over time.en
dc.identifier.citationNeugebauer, T., Servátka, M. (2010) Does Competition Resolve the Free-Rider Problem in the Voluntary Provision of Impure Public Goods? Experimental Evidence. No. 7/2010..en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10092/5353
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherDepartment of Economics & Finance, College of Business & Economics, University of Canterburyen
dc.publisherUniversity of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Financeen
dc.relation.urihttp://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/RePEc/cbt/econwp/1007.pdfen
dc.rights.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10092/17651en
dc.subjectcompetitionen
dc.subjectpublic goodsen
dc.subjectexperimenten
dc.subjectvoluntary contribution mechanismen
dc.subject.anzsrcFields of Research::38 - Economics::3801 - Applied economics::380114 - Public economics - publicly provided goodsen
dc.subject.anzsrcFields of Research::38 - Economics::3801 - Applied economics::380109 - Industry economics and industrial organisationen
dc.titleDoes Competition Resolve the Free-Rider Problem in the Voluntary Provision of Impure Public Goods? Experimental Evidenceen
dc.typeDiscussion / Working Papers
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