Comment on 'Promises and Partnership'

Type of content
Discussion / Working Papers
Publisher's DOI/URI
Thesis discipline
Degree name
Publisher
College of Business and Economics
University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Language
Date
2011
Authors
Deck, C.
Servatka, M.
Tucker, S.
Abstract

Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find that promises increase cooperation and suggest that the behavior of subjects in their experiment is driven by guilt aversion. By modifying the procedures to include a double blind social distance protocol we test an alternative explanation that promise keeping was due to external influence and reputational concerns. Our data are statistically indistinguishable from those of Charness and Dufwenberg and therefore provide strong evidence that their observed effects regarding the impact of communication are due to internal factors and not due to an outside bystander.

Description
RePEc Working Paper Series: No. 14/2011
Citation
Deck, C., Servatka, M., Tucker, S. (2011) Comment on 'Promises and Partnership'. Department of Economics and Finance. 15pp..
Keywords
experiment, promises, partnership, guilt aversion, psychological game theory, trust, lies, social distance, behavioral economics, hidden action
Ngā upoko tukutuku/Māori subject headings
ANZSRC fields of research
Field of Research::14 - Economics
Rights