

Cold War Nostalgia.... We can be ~~Heroes~~ Comrades– [even] Just for One Day?

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Recently, as we were driving to ballet class, my 13 year-old daughter asked me about the Cold War. As I attempted to explain that it was not just a political event but a cultural event, serendipitously, David Bowie's "Heroes" suddenly came on the classic rock radio station.¹ I told Iris to listen to the sound, that this was the sound of the Cold War (or at least the Cold War I could remember: 'I remember...'). I told her it was recorded in 1977 in a divided Berlin, almost literally in the shadows of the Berlin wall: 'beneath the wall'. Its soaring, sonic mythopoetics (I didn't use these words! – I said 'feel the sound') spoke of hope and despair, joy, and terror, meaning and nihilism while the elusive meaning of the verses were balanced by the transitory hope and offer of the chorus.

By 1984, my last year at High School, 'Heroes' seemed more pertinent than ever. The Cold War clock seemed to lurch ever closer to that midnight apocalypse we were all warned about. Nena's '99 Luftballons' (1983) was a naïve bubble-gum pop piece of Germanic kitsch, while Frankie Goes to Hollywood's 'Two Tribes' (1984) seemed heavy-handed agit-pop, especially compared to the scandalously decadent house funk of 'Relax'. But then even Bowie wasn't Bowie by 1984; the thin white duke

had become the thin bronzed yuppie, the avatar of the 70s had become the stadium sell-out of the 80s.

So, when dj-ing² the small country high school end of year dance in 1984, the final song, decided upon by our exiting final-year class, was 'Heroes' as it seemed to sum up both what we had lived through and what world we might next find ourselves in. Small town proto-versions of post-punks, art-schoolers, hip-hoppers (we had a couple), neo-yuppies – and of course farm kids and those already aspiring 'solid bourgeois citizens' all connected [briefly] over the six-minute album track of the sound of Berlin and the Cold War.

Cold War culture stretched everywhere, even into the backwaters of a small town in the South Island of New Zealand. In year 12 English class we read 'A Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich', Solzhenitsyn's grueling critique of the Soviet gulag. Looking back this seems a most incongruous choice for teenagers in a small rural town to read. We read it, most probably did not fully understand it; it acted as confirmation basis of anti-Soviet attitudes but did not push us any closer to an American position articulated by the president commonly known as "Ronnie Ray-gun" in reference to his incipient 'Star Wars' [Strategic Defence Initiative] missile programme. We were, for the most, non-aligned, in the west but not fully of it: separated by physical and cultural distance.

In general, it seemed the Cold War happened around us, not to us or for us. The few times it seemed to directly impact was due to Soviet support for the ANC in South Africa to overthrow the apartheid state. Somehow, playing rugby with racially - selected teams either in South Africa or here in New Zealand was regarded, by many, as a blow for cold war freedom against a totalitarian system. In many places, to be against playing rugby with apartheid-era South Africa was enough to get you labelled as – at minimum – a fellow traveler, and more often, 'a bloody commie'. To be a rugby player who opposed playing rugby with South Africa made you a traitor to both sides. New Zealand's pig-headed stubbornness that 'sport was free of politics' – especially if it was Rugby with South Africa had resulted in a 28-nation African boycott of the 1976 Montreal Olympic games. In turn, in the face of the USA-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics (to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979) only 5 New Zealand athletes competed as independents under the flag of the New Zealand Olympic and Commonwealth Games Committee, with the rest complying with New Zealand Government pressure not to compete.

Here, not to compete was regarded as a heroic 'sacrifice' for freedom' – whilst, 4 years earlier, to play rugby in South Africa and not 'kowtow' to what was commonly described as Soviet-inspired and funded pressure was regarded as an act of heroes acting for 'our' sporting (and less volubly, political) freedom. When the 1981 South

African (aka Springbok³) rugby team toured New Zealand, the protests which involved large scale civil disobedience, marches, police violence from long-batoned riot squads and ground occupation in effect split the country on local cold war lines.

These splits and its legacy still exist 40 years on – often just beneath the surface of political and familial life. The populist centre-right Prime Minister John Key famously could not (or rather, would not) recall whether he had supported the Springbok tour of 1981 or not. Given he was 20 at the time of the tour and the protests, his silence made his position is abundantly clear. But such silence was – and is – increasingly common regarding the local battle grounds of the Cold War and the reason why is fascinating.

The 1981 Springbok was commonly, from the right viewed as ‘freedom’ versus ‘commie-inspired agitators’, while from the left it was ‘freedom’ versus ‘the forces of reaction’; what it actually involved was a visible seismic shift in politics and society.

The Cold War itself was crumbling – but we didn’t know it. 1981 in New Zealand was when the impact of the rise of the New Left in the rest of the West finally hit New Zealand. The 1981 protests pitted urban liberals versus provincial conservatives; it incorporated anti-racism and incipient pro-indigenous sovereignty protest from indigenous Māori; burgeoning gay-rights protests against a conservative homophobic society and rugby union culture; feminist protest against a local white patriarchal culture and society, and – too easily forgotten, liberal baby boomers and their gen-x children versus conservative baby boomers and their parents. While the tour continued amidst massive on-going protests, a change in Cold War society occurred. In effect, it was soon to be consigned to the dustbin of history by neoliberalism of both the right and the left.

In 1984 it was a Labour party Government who instituted a neoliberal revolution in New Zealand. Many of those in this government, many of those who supported the government, many of those who – at this stage at least – were supporters of this neoliberal turn had been anti-Springbok tour and saw themselves as urban liberals. What they were expressing was, I argue (having been one of them⁴) the anti-bourgeois sentiment of a crumbling Cold War culture.

Neoliberalism expresses a central anti-bourgeois sentiment, whether on the right in the economic neoliberalism arising from Hayek and Friedman, or on the left in the progressive neoliberalism that arose out New Left politics and its calls for greater agency against the forces of reaction. Something was happening more widely in society and in many ways the Cold War had been able, for about 30 years, to paper over the cracks.

The Late Cold War turn to Neoliberalism

In 1946, T.S. Eliot in a broadcast to post-war Germany emphasized that while the unity of European culture as expressed in arts and ideas arose out of a history of a common Christian culture, this did not necessitate nor mean there was a contemporary, unified Christian culture in the modern world. Rather, as he observed, the acknowledgment of a shared heritage did not necessarily involve a shared belief:

It is against a background of Christianity that all our thought has significance. An individual European may not believe the Christian faith is true, and yet what he says, and makes, and does, will all spring out of his heritage of the Christian faith for its meaning.⁵

Such thinking underwrote the Cold War because it was able to position a western heritage, Christian-derived meaning-making and bedrock on which, it was argued, could be built and defended a particular version of Cold War western, liberal capitalism. And yet the edifice was already crumbling and the Cold War could not disguise what was happening. It was in fact a classic Cold War liberal and culture warrior⁶ (and later neoconservative⁷) Irving Kristol who provided the diagnosis.

In *Two Cheers for Capitalism* (1978) Kristol positions his argument versus those “who indict bourgeois capitalism for not only failing to create a utopia for humanity to dwell in, but for even failing to try.”⁸ This ‘indictment’ was central to the turn versus Cold War society and its form of capitalism; by the mid-1970s there seemed little to have been gained by 30 years of the Cold War. The peace, if not ‘lost’ was seen to have stagnated. The exposure of CIA funding for Cold War culture – most infamously of the premier Cold War culture journal *Encounter* in 1967 – made many question what the Cold War and its version of liberalism actually stood for. The debacle of the Vietnam war compounded this, as did Watergate and then the widespread mid-1970s economic malaise and energy shortages. Similarly, the spreading impact of post-industrial society exacerbated existing social and class divides in many nations, reactions to these often-targeted immigrant populations who had provided the factory workforces. There was the sense that the post-war compact was aging and tired as were the generation who had served in World War Two who had created it. As the British Labour party politician and cold warrior Denis Healey recounted:

...postwar politics in both parties [Labour and Conservative] was largely shaped by men who had learned a new way of looking at problems as

a result of their practical experience in the services during the war. That is why 'Rab' Butler was able to convert the Conservative Party to economic planning and the welfare state. Thatcherism became possible when the wartime generation was passing from the stage.⁹

Or, increasingly elbowed aside by the baby boomer generation who had come to young adulthood in the 1960s. For a start, Eliot's call for the continuation of a common, religious-foundation culture made little sense for those who saw and experienced such culture as restrictive, conservative, sexist and Marx's opiate of the masses by another name. But neither did the alternative of Marxism hold much appeal, especially when 'in practice' it just seemed to be just a different form of conservative leadership: limiting freedom, unproductive, uneconomic, and the imposed reductive living of dull grey lives. It was no longer even 'the God that failed'¹⁰, for very few in the 1970s or 1980s could consider a return to the situation outlined by Richard Crossman at the start of the cold war in 1950 as to why there had been that previous turn to communism in the west. That was, for many, their turn to communism occurred out of "a disillusionment with western Democracy"¹¹ ... "[they] chose Communism because they had lost faith in democracy and were willing to sacrifice 'bourgeois liberties' in order to defeat fascism. Their conversion, in fact, was rooted in despair – a despair of western values."¹²

The 1960s counterculture had seen another expression of despair of western values, but the conversion here was a turn to new age eastern values alongside a rise in the belief of the 'inner voice' of individual autonomy and agency. In 1950 Crossman had been able to state that:

...the intellectual attraction of Marxism was that it exploded liberal fallacies – which really were fallacies. It taught the bitter truth that progress is not automatic, that boom and slump are inherent in capitalism, that social injustice and racial discrimination are not cured merely by the passage of time, and that power politics cannot be 'abolished', but only used for good or bad ends. If the choice had to be made between two materialist philosophies, no intelligent man after 1917 could choose the dogma of automatic progress which so many influential people then assumed to be the only basis of democracy. The choice seemed to lie between an extreme Right, determined to use power to crush human freedom, and a Left which seemed eager to use it to free humanity..¹³

By the 1970s, the failing of Cold War culture and society saw a turn to a new form of liberalism positioned as offering freedom from *both* the right and the left, arguing that the utopia bourgeois capitalism had failed to even try to attain was now within reach. The choice offered embodied the spirit of the counter-culture: *you* create *your* utopia by *your* agency: whether in a collectivist fashion/societally via what would become progressive neoliberalism or, economically – at the level of individuals and families or at state and globalized level – by neoliberal economics.

The last decade of the Cold War was therefore when we experienced the turn to neoliberalism in culture and economics. It was a widespread conversion undertaken by those who considered themselves in the main liberals, that is by those who felt a despair at contemporary western values which seemed to only offer an increasingly stagnating Cold War locked into post WW2 orthodoxies. Neither could many of those younger liberals on the left even align themselves with the post-Marxist version of Eliot's bedrock culture-call as expressed this rebuff to Marxist historian EP Thomson by Polish philosopher and historian of ideas Leszek Kolakowski [who wrote a 3-volume history of Marxist philosophy]:

If I admit nevertheless to keep thinking, in historical (yet not in philosophical) matters, in terms inherited in part from the Marxian legacy, do I accept an allegiance to the Marxist tradition? Only in such a loose sense that the same statement would be equally true when I substitute for "Marxist"- "Christian", "sceptical", "empiricist". Without belonging to any political party or sect, to any Church, to any philosophical school, I do not deny my debt to Marxism, to Christianity, to sceptical philosophy, to empiricist thought and to a few other traditions (more specifically Eastern and less interesting to you) I have in my background. Neither do I share the horror of "eclecticism" if the opposite of eclecticism is philosophical or political bigotry (as it usually is in the minds of those who terrify us with the label of eclecticism).¹⁴

Nor could liberal baby boomers or gen-xers align themselves with what can be termed a Cold War Italian hermeneutics, somewhere between Ignazio Silone's "Christian without a church and communist without a party"¹⁵ and Benedetto Croce's "we cannot not call ourselves Christian"¹⁶ (or in this case, 'we cannot not call ourselves Marxists'). At this time, neoliberalism seemed to offer emancipation and hope for those increasingly post-Christian and seeking a new, 'modern' political identity of choice and agency. Everyone forgets that this last decade of the Cold War saw the ethos of Bowie's 'Heroes' enter mainstream 'liberal' culture in

neoliberal, entrepreneurial ways: Post-punk Joy Division reimaged itself as the dance-centric New Order; liberal culture journals had been elbowed aside by street culture and style magazines - no one read the lingering *Encounter* but everyone read *The Face* and *Blitz* [in fact it was in *Blitz* in the mid-1980s I first read an essay on Foucault and encountered 'post-modernism'] while *The Modern Review* turned high culture-tuned criticism on pop-culture society. This was the first version of 'start-up' culture, not in technology but in culture: lo-fi record labels, dance clubs, fanzines, small-run fashion labels, galleries, graffiti artists turned art-school darlings – all under the lingering, loitering shadow of 'the bomb'. It was exemplified, at the end of the decade by Sonic Youth's 1989 remake of Madonna's 'Get into the Groove' [under the nom de plume Ciccone Youth as 'Into the Groovey'.¹⁷]. The remake and sampling culture of hip hop was likewise a form of neo-liberal agency: you took from the past what was useful and remade it for the present.

Kristol, in abandoning his Cold War liberalism for a growing neoconservatism, had argued for an antiutopian capitalist order that "begins with the assumption that the word is full of other people, moved by their own interests and their own passions, and that the best we can reasonably hope for is a society of civil concord, not a community of mutual love."¹⁸ This meant, in Kristol's reading, that "Capitalism is the least romantic conception of a public order that the human mind has ever conceived"¹⁹ and this underwrote his critique of Milton Friedman as being "heir to modern romanticism"²⁰.

Kristol argues this from his conception of the central role of bourgeois virtue in bourgeois capitalism that began with "a kind of benign toleration of religion but a firm commitment to Judeo-Christian morality."²¹ In particular, bourgeois capitalism had arisen out of a protestant ethos and society that celebrated and endorsed "the domestic virtues" of 'prudence, diligence, trustworthiness – and the ambition to better one's condition.'²² While Kristol later expands this list to include honesty, sobriety and thrift²³ all of which, in the Puritan-Protestant origins of bourgeois capitalism are connected to worldly success, it is this central aim of 'the ambition to better one's condition' that underwrote the transition from Cold war liberal bourgeois culture and capitalism to neoliberal capitalism and society. I argue it was the failure of Cold War liberalism to provide inter-generational meaning that enabled the too-easy transition to neo-liberal society.

As identified by Kristol, the trouble is that late 20th century bourgeois capitalism was, for over 150 years "living off the accumulated moral capital of traditional religion and traditional moral philosophy, and that once this capital was depleted, bourgeois society would find its legitimacy ever more questionable."²⁴ If we remember Nietzsche, the death of God was not only that of God but of all that which had been

built on the claim of that God²⁵. We had already seen and experienced this on the Left with 'the God that failed'. Now it was the turn of the Right. If God dies, then bourgeois capitalism is exposed as now existing on the shadow of God²⁶ – as are the institutions of bourgeois capitalism. This is why we can again draw upon Kristol who observed: "The enemy of liberal capitalism today is not so much socialism as nihilism. Only liberal capitalism doesn't see nihilism as the enemy, but rather as just another splendid business opportunity."²⁷ This was the Cold War wasteland thrown open to the neoliberalism of the Right: the meaning-making of market forces as the *agential* action of the present moment. The entrepreneur, the corporate raider, were 'heroes' (if just for one day...).

Kristol also provides an unexpected entry point to understand neoliberalism by noting:

The inner spiritual chaos of the times, so powerfully created by the dynamics of capitalism itself, is such as to make nihilism an empty temptation. A 'free society' in Hayek's sense gives birth to in massive numbers to 'free spirits', emptied of moral substance but still driven by primordial moral actions. Such people are capable of the most irrational actions.²⁸

In Kristol's view "neoliberalism is the ethos of not only a post-Christian society but actually an anti-Christian society", this means central to neoliberalism is the rebellion against tradition: culturally, societally, religiously, morally, and economically. This tradition was all that which was held to underpin Col War culture and society- and cold War capitalism. Neoliberalism is, in many ways, nothing more and nothing less than the economic expression of the socio-cultural understanding and experience that we exist in a post-Christian culture.

Foucault and the Neoliberal Cold War 'Hero'

To make sense of this, we need to consider the role played by Foucault's lectures published as *The Birth of Biopolitics* and his notions of agency that spread across liberal arts colleges and Ivy League universities in the 1970s and 1980s and beyond.

Consider the incendiary effect of this statement by Foucault from Lecture 5, 1979:

What is at stake is whether a market economy can in fact serve as the principle, form, and model for a state which, because of its defects, is mistrusted by everyone on both the right and the left, for one reason or another.²⁹

Foucault's social shift became the playbook of progressive neoliberalism:

...what is sought is not a society subject to the commodity effect, but a society subject to competition. Not a supermarket society but an enterprise society. The *Homo oeconomicus* sought is not the man of exchange or man the consumer; he is the man of enterprise and production.³⁰

This is agency for a purpose: the meaning offered by neoliberalism is the heroic agency expressed and experienced by the transcendence of doing and producing. Drawing his own conclusions from reformulating Hayek's *Why I Am Not A Conservative*, Foucault argues for a liberalism that can offer the type of utopia that socialism is unable to; for "it is up to us to create liberal utopias, to think in a liberal mode, rather than presenting liberalism as technical alternative to government."³¹ For Foucault, the neoliberal is "an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself"³² wherein Liberalism must be "a general style of thought, analysis and imagination."³³

Such a societal turn to entrepreneurship, notes Kristol in discussing neoliberalism, expands beyond economics because the more affluent and freer a society, the more the responsibility of coping with "'existential' human needs – with the life of the psyche, and of the spirit' falls to the individual."³⁴ Capitalism in itself doesn't provide the meaning humanity requires, and the underlying moral tradition is increasingly absent. Existential or transcendent meaning is now the 'work' of the individual within 'the spiritual malaise' of the end of liberal bourgeois society.

The 1970s had seen the growth and rise of 'the New Class' who, except in economics, were more truly libertarian than liberal. Arising out the New Left 1960s culture of action, hippies had become yuppies, neo-Marxists had become neo-liberals. Not wanting to be tied to any increasingly redundant Cold War economics, or culture, emancipation of the self now occurred as part of the neoliberal emancipation of society.

While neoliberal corporate capitalism provided abundant 'having' for those making choices [if not for those having choice made for them!] but did not, could not provide 'being', the New Class (where, during the end of the Cold War right and left neoliberalism met, mingled – and married), having taken care of 'having', now looked

for 'being'. That is, they sought the transcendental element that in the past was provided by the moral tradition in religion and culture. Having left religion and traditional high culture behind, the New Class turned to forms of Foucault's technology of the self. They now complimented 'capitalist having' with 'neoliberal being'.

It is useful here to turn to a discussion in the Cold War journal *Encounter* that pinpoints, at the time of the birth of the New Left, what issues may arise. In 1963 Alistair MacIntyre argued that the contemporary crisis of the underlying nihilism of modern society arises out of the failure of attempts to instigate a secular Utopia that in turn results in a mid-point that is neither religious nor secular-atheist. In this context religious belief does not survive and the religious institutions are viewed both as passé and with suspicion. Yet what does survive is religious language that while offering more possibilities than secular language is problematic in that we are unsure 'what to say in it.'³⁵ The result is a wider context of crisis concerning not only religion and religious belief but also what atheism can mean in contemporary times. The problem is that atheism itself becomes treated as 'the private creed of yet another minority religious group' when in fact, for MacIntyre it is the real experience of 'most of our social life.'³⁶ In commenting on MacIntyre's article, the Cold War theologian Will Herberg introduces the idea of modern man being supplanted by post-modern man. To be post-modern, according to Herberg, is to exist in a spiritual and moral vacuum, having lost faith in both oneself ('the religion of democratic Man') and in Science and Technology ('the religion of Scientific Method').³⁷ In Herberg's analysis it is important to note the difference between being post-Christian, and 'post-religious' or 'de-religionized'.³⁸ Post-modern humanity may be post-Christian but in not being post-religious they are increasingly open to the attraction of 'Ersatz-religion.'³⁹ Herberg's conservative interpretation arises out of Luther's belief in that humanity has either God or idolatry, there is no third way; so that '*on an existential level there are no atheists, there are only idolaters.*'⁴⁰[*Italics in original*].

The Cold War paradoxically gave us something [a Manichean political and cultural battle] – and nothing [for the foundations of bourgeois capitalism had withered and crumbled]– to believe in. The supposed triumph of liberalism with the end of the Cold War soon found itself confronting a lack of solid foundations in a socio-economic and political landscape radically transformed by the secular Utopian claims [ersatz religion] of neoliberalism of both the right and the left. How then might we make a decision – any decision – that is of more than individual value? And as an aside, is this second iteration.⁴¹ of the culture wars we are currently living through nothing less than the end point of the neoliberal focus on the 'heroic' necessity of choice for individual agency?

Conclusion: A Possible Choice?

As we have seen, one outcome of the Cold War, the collapse of liberalism, the recognition of the unsustainability of liberal bourgeois capitalism and the rise of neoliberalism was the choice [we could say implicit demand] for us 'to be heroes'. Neoliberalism of both the right and the left is founded on and articulated through the heroic choice of the agent. This was, at the decline of the Cold War, a seemingly emancipatory offer, not least because it was the choice of 'action'. The entrepreneur – of the self, of society, of culture, of politics, of the economy – is a person of action. In this, often unacknowledged, is the influence of Marx's Thesis 11 and Lenin's role of the vanguard. For neoliberalism is a paradoxical revolution from both the right and the left simultaneously.

What can we do? What can we draw upon? I want to suggest that one option is that put forward in the early years of the Cold War, an option that involves a different type of choice: a choice of and for others. Writing in *Encounter* the Italian author and ex-Marxist Ignazio Silone in 'The Choice of Comrades' discussed the question of a beneficial alliance between liberals and religion.⁴² The issue Silone identifies in 1954 is that which proceeds in many ways from the [both then *and* now] still not yet fully acknowledged death of God:

The last forty years have witnessed the collapse of most of the great politico-social myths bequeathed to us from the 19th century. As a result, certain kinds of people who had relied on these myths as a compass find themselves in a state of spiritual vagueness and ambiguity that is still far from being clarified. This situation is one aspect of the general crisis of capitalism and anti-capitalism. We are confronted with the need for reassessment, not only of the question of how to behave but also the greater question of the meaning of our existence.⁴³

Silone identified Nietzsche as the first one to identify this as "the nihilism of modern times"⁴⁴, a world of spiritual crisis and nihilism in which modern progress, capitalism and communism are all found wanting, resulting in a world whereby "we are neither believers nor atheists, nor are we sceptics."⁴⁵ One importance of Silone's essay, in its signalling of a possible, provisional way out of post-war nihilism, is that it seems to have been most influential amongst North American Protestant liberals who became radical theologians; in particular it was a major influence on the American death of god theologian William Hamilton.⁴⁶ and can be seen as one of the

early expressions of secular theology. Hamilton describes Silone as expressing “the dilemma of the non-Catholic, non-Communist, non-humanist European intellectual”⁴⁷.

In considering what we may decide to do, we need to have the same degree of self-awareness (even if one expressed as a type of nostalgic irony) as expressed in this statement by Silone from 1962:

Now I consider myself to be a Socialist without a party and a Christian without a church. I still feel bound to the ethics and idealism of each but I can no longer have any part of what the State has made of Socialism and the Church has made of Christianity.⁴⁸

Such a context Silone saw as requiring ‘a choice of comrades’; for we are left with perhaps only “a few Christian certainties so deeply immured in human existence as to be identified with it.”⁴⁹ That is, “founded on the inner certainty that we are free and responsible, and it turns on the absolute need of finding a way towards the inmost reality of other people. This possibility of spiritual communion is surely the irrefutable proof of human brotherhood.”⁵⁰ This is not faith, but trust.

What really resonates with our present day situation is Silone’s positioning of what occurs:

..the spiritual situation I have just described admits neither of defence nor of arrogance. Frankly, it is merely an expedient. It resembles a refugee encampment in no-man's-land, an exposed makeshift encampment. What do you think refugees do from morning to night? They spend most of their time telling one another the story of their lives. The stories are anything but amusing, but they tell them to one another, really, in an effort to make themselves understood. As long as there remains a determination to understand and to share one's understanding with others, perhaps we need not altogether despair.⁵¹

In conclusion, it is not institutions, or politics, or economics, or neoliberal society that enable us *to live together* in the no-man’s land after the Cold War and after the death of liberal bourgeois capitalism and its society. The false claim that ‘we can be heroes’ was the siren call of incipient neoliberalism. Rather, a far less heroic possibility emerges via Silone whereby in taking a critical position against such ‘heroic’ demands, institutions and identities, the choice of comrades becomes of paramount importance.

Notes

¹ Intergenerational radio choice, in the car, between parent and children, and between siblings, is for me perhaps the most immediate and telling metaphor for both a cold war and a culture war. 'Don't touch that dial' is as much a warning as a demand. At this time, we had reached the detente of the classic rock radio station, a cold war balance between what are experienced as the sporadic outbreak of hot wars dependent on the choice made, what is playing and who is present. Many a time I have been reduced to the position of conscientious objector to all options.

² In this case, dj-ing involved mix-taping before the event, compiling a stash of LPs, EPs and singles from wherever and whomever you could, and then attempting as much of a mix-tape playthrough as you could so you could dance) interspersed by demands for certain songs that meant switching back and forth between mix tape, cassette albums, LPs, EPs and singles. It was 'one turntable, 2 tape-decks and a microphone' – and a wall of as many speakers as we could scrounge and load on the stage. At university, I discovered this was an experience many others in small town and provincial centre New Zealand undertook and it resulted in a huge mix-tape subculture at Otago University in the mid-1980s as mix-tapes provided the cheapest and easiest way to keep a dancing party (which is totally different from a dance party in ethos and intention) going. All you needed was one tape deck for playing and another for cueing tracks on other mix-tapes. It had the added bonus of no scratched Lps and could be done as one got progressively drunker – or less often, 'romantic'.

³ So named for the Springbok antelope emblem on their jerseys, while the New Zealand rugby team is universally known as the 'All Blacks' – now because of their all black playing uniform but originally from when the 1905 all-conquering New Zealand team to Great Britain was described in a London newspaper as playing like "all backs" i.e. those who primarily ran with the ball and scored compared to the forwards whose role was/is to win, gather and protect possession of ball, often in close combat play.

⁴ At the age of 14, as a representative rugby player the year before and as a current country team representative player [as a forward – see above], I marched with my family in the small provincial city of Timaru versus the 1981 Springbok tour. I stopped playing club rugby that year [and never returned to any club] and played football and also from 1983, high school rugby. In 1985 as an arts student social rugby player at Otago University [I played social rugby (again, as a forward) until I was 29] I marched versus the rebel Cavaliers rugby tour to South Africa. I was too young to vote in the 1984 election, but supported the freeing up of New Zealand society and economy under neoliberal reforms because the alternative appeared to be the return to the values and attitudes of a centralized, conservative, right wing – in politics and society – postwar cold war system that saw New Zealand commonly described as 'the Albania of the South Pacific' and 'run like a Polish shipyard': i.e. over regulated with a rapidly declining stagnant economy run by an autocratic leader.

⁵ T.S. Eliot, *Notes towards a Definition of Culture* (London: Faber & Faber Ltd, 1948): 122.

⁶ Kristol co-founded the leading cold war journal *Encounter* in 1953 with Stephen Spender. He was co-editor 1953-1958, also writing for *Commentary* and then establishing in 1964 *The Public Interest* journal. He was one of the dominant cold war public intellectuals, a New York city Trotskyite in his youth, then a cold war liberal, then a neoconservative.

⁷ The classic cold war transition is exemplified by Kristol's famous phrase: "A neoconservative is a liberal who's been mugged by reality."

⁸ Irving Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), p. ix.

⁹ Denis Healey, Denis, *The Time of My Life* (London: Michael Joseph 1989), p.73. As he also notes, regarding the turn versus planning in government, “oddly enough, the magic of the marketplace on which they prefer to rely, usually depends on the uncoordinated plans of innumerable private groups.” (p.53)

¹⁰ *The God That Failed. Six studies in Communism.* By Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Andre Gide presented by Enid Starkie, Richard Wright, Louis Fischer, Stephen Spender, with an introduction by Richard Crossman, M.P. (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1950)

¹¹ Crossman in *The God That Failed*, p.9.

¹² Ibid., p. 10.

¹³ Ibid., pp.10-11.

¹⁴ Leszek Kolakowski, *My Correct Views On Everything* : A Rejoinder to Edward Thompson's " Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski". file:///Users/mpg35/Downloads/titusland,+SR_1974_Kolakowski.pdf [*The Socialist Register*, 1974]

¹⁵ Silone quoted in Gianni Vattimo (with Piergiorgio Paterlini) *Not Being God. A Collaborative Autobiography.* (trans: William McCuaig), New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, p.168.

¹⁶ Croce quoted in Gianni Vattimo in Rorty & Vattimo, *The Future of Religion.* Zabala, S. (ed.) New York: Columbia University Press, 2005 p.54.

¹⁷ See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pjiZ0-y82_0

¹⁸ Irving Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism*, p.x.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid., p.65.

²¹ Irving Kristol, *Neoconservatism. The Autobiography of an Idea.* Chicago: Elephant paperbacks 1999 p.133.

²² Irving Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism*, p. x.

²³ Ibid., pp.64-65.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.65-66.

²⁵ As Nietzsche noted in *The Gay Science* (1882): ‘After Buddha was dead, his shadow was still shown for centuries in a cave – a tremendous, gruesome shadow. God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. – And we – we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.’

²⁶ And the fact that death of God radical theology of the Cold War 1960s made the cover of *TIME* magazine on April 12, 1966, with the question ‘Is God Dead’ signaled that Cold War Liberal bourgeois society recognized something was changing – if not what exactly or with what impact.

²⁷ Irving Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism*, p.66.

²⁸ Ibid., p.268.

²⁹ Michel Foucault, in ‘Lecture 5, 7 February 1979’, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, ed. Michel Senellart; Trans. Graham Burchell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) p.117.

³⁰ Foucault, in Lecture 6, 14 February 1979, *The Birth of Biopolitics*, p.147.

³¹ Ibid., p.219.

³² Ibid., p.226.

³³ Ibid., p.219.

³⁴ Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism*, p. xi.

³⁵ Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘God and the Theologians’, *Encounter* 21.3 (September 1963), p.8.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

³⁷ Will Herberg, ‘God and the Theologians’, *Encounter* 21.5 (November 1963), p.58.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 57.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 58.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 57..

⁴¹ Perhaps the best 'field guide' to the first iteration of the post-Cold War culture wars is Robert Hughes' *Culture of Complaint. The Fraying of America* (O.U.P 1993)

⁴² Ignazio Silone, 'The Choice of Comrades', *Encounter* 3.6 (December 1954),pp. 21-28.

⁴³ Ibid., p.21.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ignazio Silone, 'The Choice of Comrades', *Encounter* 3.6 (December 1954), p.28.

⁴⁶ William Hamilton, 'On Doing Without Knowledge of God', *The Journal of Religion* 37.1 (January 1957), pp.37-43.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 37.

⁴⁸ Kenneth Allsop, "Ignazio Silone", *Encounter* 18 no.3 (March 1962) p.49.

⁴⁹ Ignazio Silone, 'The Choice of Comrades', *Encounter* 3.6 (December 1954), p.28.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.