

# The Scope for Strategic Asymmetry Under International Rivalry

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## Abstract

In the context of a model of international trade through reciprocal dumping with horizontally differentiated goods, we study the endogenous choice of quantities and prices as strategic variables. We show that while a Cournot outcome prevails under conditions of export rivalry, strategic asymmetry under foreign direct investment rivalry may be observed, especially when it is possible to initially deter FDI by committing to a price contract, and when switching is costly and/or takes time.

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**Keywords:** Exports vs. FDI; Horizontal Product Differentiation; Cournot-Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium

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## Abstract

In the context of a model of international trade through reciprocal dumping with horizontally differentiated goods, we study the endogenous choice of quantities and prices as strategic variables. We show that while a Cournot outcome prevails under conditions of export rivalry, strategic asymmetry under foreign direct investment rivalry may be observed, especially when it is possible to initially deter FDI by committing to a price contract, and when switching is costly and/or takes time.

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## 1 Introduction

It is well-known that when goods are substitutes, competition will be less intense when firms compete by quantities, and that given the choice firms would prefer to compete by quantities than prices (Singh and Vives, 1984; Cheng, 1985). Empirical evidence, however, suggests that even within the same market some firms set quantities, while other firms set prices (e.g., the US market for small cars and in the US aerospace connector industry, see Tremblay et al., 2013). Although there is a literature discussing the various factors (technological, institutional, and demand asymmetries) that may lead to Cournot-Bertrand competition (see Tremblay and Tremblay, 2011, and Gilbert et al., 2021, in international trade context) the implications of strategic asymmetry for trade and FDI have not yet been widely explored.<sup>1</sup> In a simple reciprocal dumping model (Brander and Krugman, 1983) with horizontally differentiated (substitute) goods, we consider firms' endogenous choice of quantities and prices as strategic variables under conditions of international rivalry. We show that a Cournot outcome prevails under export rivalry, but strategic asymmetry may occur under foreign direct investment (FDI) rivalry when it is possible to initially deter FDI by committing to a price contract, and when switching is costly and/or time-consuming.

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<sup>1</sup>There are some exceptions studying the endogenous choice of strategic variables in the context of strategic trade policy; e.g., Maggie (1996).

## 2 Basic setup with strategic symmetry

Consider two identical countries, Home ( $H$ ) and Foreign ( $F$ ), with one firm located in each, denoted respectively by  $h$  and  $f$ , producing a differentiated product. Each firm serves the local market in its own country, and potentially serves the other country via trade or horizontal FDI.<sup>2</sup> Exports incur per-unit trade costs ( $t$ ), which can be avoided by undertaking FDI and paying fixed investment costs ( $\Delta$ ).

Following Dixit (1979) by assuming a representative consumer with a quadratic utility function in each country, it can be shown that the inverse demand function is linear for each variety  $i$ :

$$p_i(x_i, x_j) = \alpha - x_i - \sigma x_j, \quad i \neq j \in \{h, f\}.$$

where the  $x_i$  is consumption of the variety produced by firm  $i \in \{f, h\}$  in each country (which equals sales since there is only one firm in each country).<sup>3</sup> Further, we assume demand symmetry across both goods, in that the highest willingness to pay for each variety (i.e., the intercepts of their respective inverse demand curves  $\alpha$ ) are common, and the degree of product substitutability between the goods measured by  $\sigma \in (0, 1)$  - interpreted in terms of horizontal product differentiation - is the same. Values of  $\sigma > 0$  imply the goods are imperfect substitutes, with the limiting case where  $\sigma = 1$  representing homogeneous goods. Also, the demand is symmetric across countries. Hence, we delete all subscripts for the demand parameters. Note that demand for variety  $i$  is decreasing in its own price, and increasing in the price of the rival's good (i.e., the goods are substitutes).

Under the segmented markets hypothesis (Brander and Krugman, 1983), each firm will maximize the profits from its own sales in the two countries independently, given its rival's sales in that market. Hence, we can solve for the outcome in the Home market and the Foreign market independently. Moreover, given the symmetry in demand, it does not matter whether we consider the market outcome in  $H$  or  $F$ , since they are symmetric. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the Home market.

If both firms compete in market shares, then each firm maximizes profit, which is defined

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<sup>2</sup>Throughout the paper, we concentrate only on horizontal FDI, in which the whole production process is duplicated in a host country (by incurring fixed costs) so as to benefit from proximity advantages.

<sup>3</sup>Here, assuming that the demand parameters are the same in both countries, we have cross-country symmetric demand. Hence, we have suppressed the subscript for country. See Appendix for derivation of this demand curve.

as  $\pi_i = (p_i(x_i, x_j) - c_i)x_i$ , where  $c_i$  is the per unit cost of supplying the Home market for firm  $i \in \{h, f\}, i \neq j$ , by choosing the quantity to sell, leading to the Cournot equilibrium for each firm:

$$x_i^* = \frac{(2 - \sigma)\alpha - 2c_i + \sigma c_j}{(4 - \sigma^2)}, \quad (1)$$

$$p_i^* = \frac{(2 - \sigma)\alpha + (2 - \sigma^2)c_i + \sigma c_j}{(4 - \sigma^2)}. \quad (2)$$

Using (2), we can show that  $(p_i^* - c_i) = x_i^*$ ,  $i \in \{h, f\}$ , and thus the equilibrium operating profits are  $\pi_i^* = (x_i^*)^2$ , where optimal quantities are given by (1).

If both firms compete in prices in the Home market, each firm maximizes profit  $\pi_i = (p_i - c_i)x_i(p_i, p_j)$ ,  $i \neq j \in \{h, f\}$  by choosing price. The Bertrand equilibrium quantity and price for firm  $i \neq j \in \{h, f\}$  are:

$$p_i^* = \frac{(2 - \sigma - \sigma^2)\alpha + 2c_i + \sigma c_j}{(4 - \sigma^2)} \quad (3)$$

$$x_i^* = \frac{(2 - \sigma - \sigma^2)\alpha - (2 - \sigma^2)c_i + \sigma c_j}{(4 - \sigma^2)(1 - \sigma^2)}. \quad (4)$$

Using (4), we can show that  $(p_i^* - c_i) = (1 - \sigma^2)x_i^*$ ,  $i \in \{h, f\}$ . Thus the equilibrium profits are  $\pi_i^* = (1 - \sigma^2)(x_i^*)^2$ , where optimal quantities are given by (4).

### 3 Strategic Asymmetry

If the two firms have chosen different strategies (firm  $i$  commits to a quantity contract but firm  $j$  commits to a price contract), then firm  $i$  maximizes  $\pi_i = (p_i(x_i, p_j) - c_i)x_i$ ,  $i \neq j \in \{h, f\}$  by choosing its quantity, whereas firm  $j$  maximizes  $\pi_j = (p_j - c_j)x_j(p_j, x_i)$ ,  $i \neq j \in \{h, f\}$  by choosing its price. Note that  $p_i(x_i, p_j) = (1 - \sigma)\alpha - (1 - \sigma^2)x_i + \sigma p_j$  and  $x_j(p_j, x_i) = \alpha - \sigma x_i - p_j$ . From the first-order condition of each firm's profit maximization problem, the best response functions are:

$$x_i(p_j) = \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha + \sigma p_j - c_i}{2(1 - \sigma^2)},$$

$$p_j(x_i) = \frac{\alpha - \sigma x_i + c_j}{2}.$$

Stability requires  $|\partial^2\pi_i/(\partial s_i)^2| > |\partial^2\pi_i/\partial s_i\partial s_j|$ ,  $i \neq j \in \{h, f\}$ , where  $s_i$  and  $s_j$  are each firm's strategic variable, respectively. This implies  $\sigma \in (0, 0.781)$ . We can solve for equilibrium prices and quantities set by each firm by solving  $x_i^* = x_i(p_j^*)$  and  $p_j^* = p_j(x_i^*)$  for  $x_i^*$  and  $p_j^*$ ,  $i \neq j \in \{h, f\}$ :

$$x_i^* = \frac{(2 - \sigma)\alpha - 2c_i + \sigma c_j}{4 - 3\sigma^2}, \quad (5a)$$

$$p_j^* = \frac{(2 - \sigma^2 - \sigma)\alpha + 2(1 - \sigma^2)c_j + \sigma c_i}{4 - 3\sigma^2}, \quad (5b)$$

in the region where prices and quantities are positive. Substituting the optimal quantities and prices given by (5) into  $x_j(p_j, x_i)$  and  $p_i(x_i, p_j)$  gives  $x_j^*$  and  $p_i^*$ ,  $i \neq j \in \{h, f\}$ , as:

$$x_j^* = \frac{(2 - \sigma^2 - \sigma)\alpha + \sigma c_i - (2 - \sigma^2)c_j}{4 - 3\sigma^2}, \quad (6a)$$

$$p_i^* = \frac{(1 - \sigma^2)(2 - \sigma)\alpha + (1 - \sigma^2)\sigma c_j + (2 - \sigma^2)c_i}{4 - 3\sigma^2}. \quad (6b)$$

Using (5b) and (6b), we can show that  $(p_i^* - c_i) = (1 - \sigma^2)x_i^*$  and  $(p_j^* - c_j) = x_j^*$ ,  $i \neq j \in \{h, f\}$ . Thus the equilibrium profits are  $\pi_i^* = (1 - \sigma^2)(x_i^*)^2$  for firm  $i$  and  $\pi_j^* = (x_j^*)^2$  for firm  $j$ , where equilibrium quantities are given by (5a) and (6a).

## 4 Strategic Choice and Exports vs. FDI

If firm  $f$  exports to  $H$ , then  $c_h = 0$  and  $c_f = t$  assuming that production cost is zero, since the foreign firm must pay shipping costs,  $t$ , on each unit. Given that both firms commit to quantity contracts ( $C$ ), using (1), (4), (5a) and (6a), we can show that:<sup>4</sup>

$$\pi_h^{CC} = \frac{((2 - \sigma)\alpha + \sigma t)^2}{(4 - \sigma^2)^2}; \quad \pi_f^{CC} = \frac{((2 - \sigma)\alpha - 2t)^2}{(4 - \sigma^2)^2}. \quad (7)$$

Assuming that firm  $h$  commits to a quantity contract while firm  $f$  commits to a price contract ( $B$ ), then equilibrium profits are:

$$\pi_h^{CB} = (1 - \sigma^2) \frac{((2 - \sigma)\alpha + \sigma t)^2}{(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2}; \quad \pi_f^{BC} = \frac{((2 - \sigma^2 - \sigma)\alpha - (2 - \sigma^2)t)^2}{(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2}. \quad (8)$$

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<sup>4</sup>Henceforth we denote by  $\pi_i^{nm}$ ;  $i \in \{f, h\}$ ;  $n, m \in \{C, B\}$  firm  $i$ 's profit when it chooses contract  $n$  while its rival chooses contract  $m$ .

If both firms commit to price contracts, then we have:

$$\pi_h^{BB} = \frac{((2 - \sigma - \sigma^2)\alpha + \sigma t)^2}{(4 - \sigma^2)^2(1 - \sigma^2)}; \quad \pi_f^{BB} = \frac{((2 - \sigma - \sigma^2)\alpha - (2 - \sigma^2)t)^2}{(4 - \sigma^2)^2(1 - \sigma^2)}. \quad (9)$$

Finally, if firm  $h$  ( $f$ ) commits to a price (quantity) contract, then firms earn:

$$\pi_h^{BC} = \frac{((2 - \sigma^2 - \sigma)\alpha + \sigma t)^2}{(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2}; \quad \pi_f^{CB} = (1 - \sigma^2) \frac{((2 - \sigma)\alpha - 2t)^2}{(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2}. \quad (10)$$

Using (7)-(10), it is straightforward to show that given firm  $h$  chooses to compete by quantities, or by prices, (i) both quantity and price contracts are viable strategies when  $t < (2 - \sigma - \sigma^2)\alpha/(2 - \sigma^2)$ , in which case a quantity contract is more profitable than a price contract for firm  $f$ ; (ii) only a quantity contract earns firm  $f$  positive profits when  $(2 - \sigma - \sigma^2)\alpha/(2 - \sigma^2) < t < (2 - \sigma)\alpha/2$ ; and (iii) neither a quantity contract, nor a price contract earns firm  $f$  positive profits when  $t > (2 - \sigma)\alpha/2$ , and thus staying out of country  $H$  is a better strategy for firm  $f$ . Similarly, we can show that irrespective of firm  $f$ 's choice of quantities or prices, for firm  $h$ , committing to a quantity contract is more profitable than committing to a price contract when it is profitable for firm  $f$  to enter the market. For sufficiently high trade costs (i.e.,  $t > (2 - \sigma)\alpha/2$ ), however, firm  $h$  is indifferent between a quantity and a price contract as it may maintain a monopoly position in country  $H$  (unless firm  $f$  opts for some other foreign market entry mode). This leads to the result:

**Proposition 1** *When trade costs are sufficiently low ( $t < (2 - \sigma)\alpha/2$ ), both firms opt to compete by quantities. If switching between contracts is costly and/or takes time, then the local firm opts for a quantity contract even when trade costs are initially sufficiently high ( $t > (2 - \sigma)\alpha/2$ ) such that there is local monopoly in country  $H$ .*

Thus, when goods are substitutes, irrespective of trade costs, a quantity contract is preferred, and a Cournot outcome prevails under export rivalry.

Next, consider a potential multinational's behavior. If firm  $f$  undertakes FDI in  $H$ , then  $c_h = c_f = 0$ , and firm  $f$  pays fixed investment costs,  $\Delta$ , to begin production operations. Using (1), (4), (5a) and (6a), given that both firms commit to quantity contracts they earn:

$$\pi_h^{CC} = \frac{\alpha^2}{(2 + \sigma)^2}; \quad \pi_f^{CC} = \frac{\alpha^2}{(2 + \sigma)^2} - \Delta. \quad (11)$$

If firm  $h$  ( $f$ ) commits to a quantity (price) contract, the firms earn:

$$\pi_h^{CB} = (1 - \sigma^2) \frac{(2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2}{(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2}; \quad \pi_f^{BC} = \frac{(2 - \sigma^2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2}{(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2} - \Delta. \quad (12)$$

Similarly, if both firms commit to price contracts, their profit will be:

$$\pi_h^{BB} = \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha^2}{(2 - \sigma)^2(1 + \sigma)}; \quad \pi_f^{BB} = \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha^2}{(2 - \sigma)^2(1 + \sigma)} - \Delta. \quad (13)$$

Finally, if firm  $h$  ( $f$ ) commits to a price (quantity) contract, profits will be:

$$\pi_h^{BC} = \frac{(2 - \sigma^2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2}{(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2}; \quad \pi_f^{CB} = (1 - \sigma^2) \frac{(2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2}{(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2} - \Delta. \quad (14)$$

Using (11)-(14), it is clear that when  $\Delta > \alpha^2/(2 + \sigma)^2$  FDI will not be profitable. In that case, firm  $h$  will be indifferent between a quantity and a price contract as it may maintain a monopoly position in country  $H$  (unless firm  $f$  opts for some other foreign market entry mode). When  $\Delta < \alpha^2/(2 + \sigma)^2$ , it is, however, best for firm  $h$  to commit to a quantity contract irrespective of firm  $f$ 's choice (so long as firm  $f$  is in the market). Similarly, firm  $f$ 's best response to firm  $h$  choosing to compete by quantities is to commit also to a quantity contract so long as  $\Delta < \alpha^2/(2 + \sigma)^2$ . If, however, firm  $h$  commits to a price contract, then firm  $f$ 's best response is either (i) to commit to a quantity contract when  $\Delta < (2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2 (1 - \sigma^2) / (4 - 3\sigma^2)^2$  (so that it is profitable to do so), or (ii) to refrain from FDI when  $\Delta > (2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2 (1 - \sigma^2) / (4 - 3\sigma^2)^2$ . This leads to:

**Proposition 2** *When  $\Delta < (2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2 (1 - \sigma^2) / (4 - 3\sigma^2)^2$ , both firms opt to compete by quantities. However, when fixed investment costs are sufficiently high such that  $\Delta > (2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2 (1 - \sigma^2) / (4 - 3\sigma^2)^2$ , a local firm may deter FDI if it commits to (i) a price contract whenever  $(2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2 (1 - \sigma^2) / (4 - 3\sigma^2)^2 < \Delta < \alpha^2 / (2 + \sigma)^2$ ; or (ii) price or quantity contract so long as  $\Delta > \alpha^2 / (2 + \sigma)^2$ . Moreover, if, in addition, trade costs are sufficiently high ( $t > (2 - \sigma)\alpha/2$ ), then the local firm will maintain a monopoly in the home market (i.e., it deters both FDI and imports).*

An important implication of this result is that strategic asymmetry under FDI rivalry may be observed when it is possible to initially deter FDI by committing to a price contract, and when switching is costly and/or takes time. If fixed investment costs are initially such that  $(2 - \sigma)^2 \alpha^2 (1 -$

$\sigma^2)/(4 - 3\sigma^2)^2 < \Delta < \alpha^2/(2 + \sigma)^2$ , opting for a price contract to maintain a monopoly outcome is rationalizable for a local firm given that trade costs are also sufficiently high. Now if switching contract is costly (pecuniary or otherwise), then strategic asymmetry is a possibility. To see this, suppose that switching between contracts is costly or time-consuming. Moreover, let the condition of the proposition be met so that the local firm commits to a price contract. Then if an investment shock decreases the fixed FDI costs sufficiently making it profitable for a potential multinational to successfully enter the market and to commit to a quantity contract, strategic asymmetry may arise, whereby the local firm competes in price space while the multinational competes in quantity space.<sup>5</sup>

## 5 Conclusion

Although the literature discusses various factors (e.g., technological, institutional, and demand asymmetries) that may lead to Cournot-Bertrand competition, the question of the endogenous choice of strategic variables in the context of international rivalry in the absence of those factors has been overlooked. In a reciprocal dumping model with horizontally differentiated goods, we have shown that while a Cournot outcome prevails under export rivalry, strategic asymmetry under FDI rivalry may occur when it is possible to initially deter FDI by committing to a price contract, and when switching is costly and/or takes time.

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<sup>5</sup>One might ask if a fixed production cost, which is assumed away in the model, would play any potential role in the choice of strategies. Clearly, the fixed production cost plays no role on the marginal analysis in the second stage of the game when firms compete in price or quantity. While a non-zero fixed production cost will appear in equations (7)-(10) as well as in equations (11)-(15), it will not affect the boundary conditions that follow equations (10) and (14), so long as fixed production costs - be it for the foreign or the local firm - are the same under both price and quantity commitment in both countries, and are not prohibitive (such that both contracts are viable even after having paid the fixed production cost). That is, given the rival's choice (price or quantity), choosing/switching between contracts, the firm will have incurred the same fixed production cost.



## Appendix

Following Dixit (1979), consider a representative consumer in each country with utility function:

$$U_k(x_{kh}, x_{kf}, M_k) = \alpha_k(x_{kh} + x_{kf}) - x_{kh}^2/2 - x_{kf}^2/2 - \sigma_k x_{kh} x_{kf} + M_k, \quad k \in \{H, F\},$$

where the  $x_{ki}$  is consumption of the variety produced by firm  $i \in \{f, h\}$  in country  $k$  (which equals sales since there is only one firm in each country), and  $M_k$  is consumption of a composite (which plays the role of numéraire). As stated earlier in this paper, the demand is symmetric across goods in the sense that the highest willingness to pay (i.e., the intercepts of their respective inverse demand curves) is the same for both varieties,  $\alpha_k$ .  $\sigma_k \in (0, 1)$  is the degree of product substitutability between the goods.

Moreover, assume that the demand parameters are symmetric across the countries. Hence, we suppress the country subscript. Then, by solving the utility maximization problem, we can show that the demand function for each variety  $i = \{h, f\}$  of good  $x$  in each country is:

$$x_i(p_i, p_j) = \frac{(1 - \sigma)\alpha - p_i + \sigma p_j}{(1 - \sigma^2)}, \quad i \neq j \in \{h, f\},$$

in the region  $\{p \in R_+^2 : (1 - \sigma)\alpha - p_h + \sigma p_f > 0, (1 - \sigma)\alpha - p_f + \sigma p_h > 0\}$  where  $p_i$  is the price of variety  $i \in \{h, f\}$ . The inverse demand function is linear for each variety  $i$ :

$$p_i(x_i, x_j) = \alpha - x_i - \sigma x_j, \quad i \neq j \in \{h, f\}.$$

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