Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission

Type of content
Discussion / Working Papers
Publisher's DOI/URI
Thesis discipline
Degree name
Publisher
College of Business and Economics
University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Language
Date
2012
Authors
Cox, J.C.
Servátka, M.
Vadovic, R.
Abstract

Intent to help or harm is revealed more clearly by acts of commission that overturn the status quo than by acts of omission that uphold it. Both the law and culture make a central distinction between the two types of acts. Acts of commission elicit stronger reciprocal responses than do acts of omission. In this paper we compare reciprocal responses to both types of acts and ask whether behavior of subjects in two experiments is consistent with existing theory. The design of the experiments focuses on the axioms of revealed altruism theory (Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008) that make it observationally distinct from other theories, Axiom R (for reciprocity) and Axiom S (for status quo). We find support for this theory in both experiments.

Description
Citation
Cox, J.C., Servátka, M., Vadovic, R. (2012) Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission. Department of Economics and Finance. 42pp..
Keywords
experimental economics, reciprocity, revealed altruism, acts of commission, acts of omission, other-regarding preferences, status quo
Ngā upoko tukutuku/Māori subject headings
ANZSRC fields of research
Field of Research::14 - Economics::1499 - Other Economics::149999 - Economics not elsewhere classified
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