Now showing items 1-7 of 7

    • ABC on Deals 

      Dufwenberg, M.; Servatka, M.; Vadovic, R. (University of CanterburyUniversity of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2012)
      We develop, and experimentally test, a behavioral model of deal­making which includes binding contracts and informal agreements as distinct but related special cases. The key assumptions: people are mostly honest; they ...
    • Saliency of Outside Options in the Lost Wallet Game 

      Cox, J.C.; Servatka, M.; Vadovic, R. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2009)
      This paper reports an experiment designed to shed light on an empirical puzzle observed by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) that the size of the foregone outside option by the first mover does not affect the behavior of the ...
    • Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission 

      Cox, J. C.; Vadovic, R.; Servátka, M. (College of Business and EconomicsUniversity of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2012)
      Intent to help or harm is revealed more clearly by acts of commission that overturn the status quo than by acts of omission that uphold it. Both the law and culture make a central distinction between the two types of acts. ...
    • Status Quo Effects in Fairness Games: Acts of Commission vs. Acts of Omission 

      Cox, J.C.; Servátka, M.; Vadovic, R. (College of Business and EconomicsUniversity of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2012)
      Intent to help or harm is revealed more clearly by acts of commission that overturn the status quo than by acts of omission that uphold it. Both the law and culture make a central distinction between the two types of acts. ...
    • Strategic Use of Trust 

      Servátka, M.; Tucker, S.; Vadovic, R. (University of ConnecticutUniversity of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2008)
      While most of the previous literature interprets trust as an action, we adopt a view that trust is represented by a belief that the other party will return a fair share. The agent’s action is then a commitment device that ...
    • Words Speak Louder Than Money 

      Servatka, M.; Tucker, S.; Vadovic, R. (College of Business and EconomicsUniversity of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2011)
      Should one use words or money to foster trust of the other party if no means of enforcing trustworthiness are available? This paper reports an experiment studying the effectiveness of two types of mechanisms for promoting ...
    • Words Speak Louder Than Money 

      Servatka, M.; Vadovic, R.; Tucker, S. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2008)
      This paper reports on an experiment studying the effectiveness of two types of mechanisms for promoting trust: pecuniary and non-pecuniary as well as their mutual interaction. Our data provide evidence that both mechanisms ...