Now showing items 1-12 of 12

    • Are bureaucrats really paid like bureaucrats? 

      Boyle, G.; Raddemaker, S. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2016)
      In an influential paper, Hall and Liebman (QJE, 1998) ask if senior corporate executives are really paid like bureaucrats, and conclude that they are not. In this paper, we ask if senior public service bureaucrats are ...
    • Do Financial Incentives Affect the Quality of Expert Performance? Evidence from the Racetrack 

      Boyle, G. (University of Canterbury. Economics., 2008)
      Does the quality of performance by experts respond to financial incentives? I provide some new evidence on this question by examining the propensity of racehorse trainers to undertake effort-diverting actions. In a sample ...
    • Hedging the Value of Waiting 

      Boyle, G.; Guthrie, G. (University of Canterbury. Economics., 2006)
      We analyze the optimal hedging policy of a firm that has flexibility in the timing of investment. Conventional wisdom suggests that hedging adds value by alleviating the underinvestment problem associated with capital ...
    • Holding Onto Your Horses: Conflicts of Interest in Asset Management 

      Boyle, G.; Guthrie, G.; Gorton, L. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2010)
      Racehorse trainers operate unregulated asset management businesses in which the assets owned by outside clients compete with those owned by trainers for the latter’s time, care, and attention. However, market mechanisms ...
    • Human Capital and Popular Investment Advice 

      Boyle, G.; Guthrie, G. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2005)
      Popular investment advice recommends that the stock/bond and stock/wealth ratios should rise with investor risk tolerance and investment horizon respectively, prescriptions that are difficult to reconcile with the simple ...
    • Intra-Country Regulation of Share Markets: Does One Size Fit All? 

      Boyle, G.; Meade, R. (University of Canterbury. Economics., 2008)
      A large body of evidence suggests that financial development is greater in countries that impose stricter regulatory requirements on their major stock exchanges, but this leaves open the question of whether or not ...
    • New Zealand Corporate Boards in Transition: Composition, Activity and Incentives Between 1995 and 2010 

      Boyle, G.; Ji, X. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2013)
      We document changes in New Zealand corporate board characteristics between 1995 and 2010, a period centred around the 2003 governance-focused reforms of NZX list- ing rules and recommendations. Unsurprisingly, the ...
    • Pay Peanuts and Get Monkeys? Evidence from Academia 

      Boyle, G. (University of Canterbury. Economics., 2008)
      In most countries, academic pay is independent of discipline, thus ignoring differences in labor market opportunities. Using some unique data from a comprehensive research assessment exercise undertaken in one such country ...
    • Payback without Apology 

      Boyle, G.; Guthrie, G. (University of Canterbury. Economics., 2006)
      When interest rates are uncertain, the net-present-value threshold required to justify an irreversible investment is increasing in the length of a project's payback period. Therefore, slow-payback projects should face a ...
    • Risk, Expected Return, and the Cost of Equity Capital 

      Boyle, G. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2005)
      In applying the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to cost of capital calculations, practitioners treat the market risk premium as a free parameter to be estimated from data. However, this process ignores equilibrium in ...
    • Valuing Employee Stock Options: Implications for the Implementation of NZ IFRS 2 

      Boyle, G.; Clyne, S.; Roberts, H. (University of Canterbury. Economics., 2006)
      From 2007, New Zealand firms must report the cost of granting employee stock options (ESOs). Market-based option pricing models assume that option holders are unconstrained in their portfolio choices and thus are indifferent ...