Gains from multinational competition for cross-border firm acquisition (2019)
Type of ContentJournal Article
PublisherZBW - German National Library of Economics
AuthorsKoska OAshow all
© Author(s) 2019. This study shows that when there is multinational competition for foreign acquisition, the strategic use of a consumer welfare argument in regulating foreign market entry leads to a preemptive foreign acquisition. Even under fierce competition, foreign acquisition will emerge as part of a non-cooperative equilibrium (although multinationals would have gained more had they been able to credibly commit to a cooperative equilibrium of independent foreign sales, either via greenfield investment or trade under complete liberalization) which increases local welfare by more than both the case without foreign market entry and the case with foreign market entry via independent foreign sales.
CitationKoska OA (2019). Gains from multinational competition for cross-border firm acquisition. Economics. 13.
This citation is automatically generated and may be unreliable. Use as a guide only.
KeywordsCross-border firm acquisitions; foreign market entry regulations; greenfield investment; trade; consumer welfare
ANZSRC Fields of Research38 - Economics::3801 - Applied economics::380107 - Financial economics
14 - Economics::1402 - Applied Economics::140210 - International Economics and International Finance
35 - Commerce, management, tourism and services::3502 - Banking, finance and investment::350208 - Investment and risk management