An Evaluative Norm for Belief

Type of content
Journal Article
Thesis discipline
Degree name
Publisher
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Language
Date
2017
Authors
Turp, Michael-John
Abstract

It is often argued that belief is partly constituted by a norm of truth. Most recent discussions have assumed that the norm is deontic; concerning what may or ought to be believed. I criticize two proposals, one canvassed by Krister Bykvist and Anandi Hattiangadi, and the other defended by Daniel Whiting. Instead, I argue in favour of an evaluative norm according to which we would do well to believe the truth. I show that an evaluative norm fares better than its deontic competitors with respect to the demandingness of truth, the aim of truth and epistemic blame.

Description
Citation
Turp M-J (2017). An Evaluative Norm for Belief. DIALOGUE-CANADIAN PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. 56(2). 227-239.
Keywords
truth, epistemic value, epistemic normativity, aim of belief, nature of belief
Ngā upoko tukutuku/Māori subject headings
ANZSRC fields of research
Fields of Research::50 - Philosophy and religious studies::5003 - Philosophy::500305 - Epistemology
Rights