Now showing items 1-2 of 2

    • Dynamic Incentives in the Sport of Kings 

      Boyle, G.; Guthrie, G.; Gorton, L. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2006)
      Can the reputational incentives that arise in a dynamic setting mitigate standard agency problems, as Fama (1980) suggests? We examine this issue using data from the horse racing industry, where trainers have an incentive ...
    • Holding Onto Your Horses: Conflicts of Interest in Asset Management 

      Boyle, G.; Guthrie, G.; Gorton, L. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2010)
      Racehorse trainers operate unregulated asset management businesses in which the assets owned by outside clients compete with those owned by trainers for the latter’s time, care, and attention. However, market mechanisms ...