Against Lewis on ‘Desire as Belief’ (2017)
David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory of desire he calls ‘Desire as Belief’. Lewis’ critics generally accept that his argument is sound and focus instead on trying to show that its implications are less severe than appearances suggest. In this paper I argue that Lewis’ argument is unsound. I show that it rests on an essential assumption that can be straightforwardly proven false using ideas and principles to which Lewis is himself committed.
ANZSRC Fields of Research50 - Philosophy and religious studies::5003 - Philosophy::500303 - Decision theory
50 - Philosophy and religious studies::5003 - Philosophy::500312 - Philosophy of cognition
50 - Philosophy and religious studies::5003 - Philosophy::500315 - Philosophy of mind (excl. cognition)
50 - Philosophy and religious studies::5003 - Philosophy::500308 - Logic
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