The issues surrounding Antarctic mineral activity regulation demonstrate the political and legal complexity Of the Antarctic Treaty System. From 1982 — 1988 the Consultative Parties negotiated a Convention on the Regulation Of Antarctic Mineral Resoullte Activity (CRAMRA). It was adopted in 1988 but did not enter into force. Australia along with France and Belgium decided not to sign the Convention and encouraged the Consultative Parties to move towards a regime to protect the Antarctic environment. By 1991, the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection had been adopted. Regardless of the scientific and technical knowledge existing at the time, the mineral negotiations were a matter of principles and politics. The intrinsic and extrinsic pressures on the ATS created a significant evolutionary process for the ATS as well as the other communities such as the developing nations and NGO's. The legitimacy Of the ATS as an effective regime for Antarctic politics was criticized and consequently strengthened. The issues surrounding Antarctic mineral activity regulation demonstrate the political and legal complexity Of the Antarctic Treaty System. From 1982 — 1988 the Consultative Parties negotiated a Convention on the Regulation Of Antarctic Mineral Resoullte Activity (CRAMRA). It was adopted in 1988 but did not enter into force. Australia along with France and Belgium decided not to sign the Convention and encouraged the Consultative Parties to move towards a regime to protect the Antarctic environment. By 1991, the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection had been adopted. Regardless of the scientific and technical knowledge existing at the time, the mineral negotiations were a matter of principles and politics. The intrinsic and extrinsic pressures on the ATS created a significant evolutionary process for the ATS as well as the other communities such as the developing nations and NGO's. The legitimacy Of the ATS as an effective regime for Antarctic politics was criticized and consequently strengthened.