In 1982, the New Zealand Meat Producers Board took control of all New Zealand sheep producers' meat for export. Although the Board had the statutory authority to control meat marketing when it was formed in 1922, this authority had not been exercised previously. The move raised a number of questions, both with regard to the desirability of monopoly control over export sheep meat : marketing, and the degree to which the Board took account of producers' interests in this decision. The stimulus for this thesis came from a well-qualified analyst of the meat industry who commented that the one group within the meat industry with the least understanding of, or influence upon, the Board's decision to become the sole marketer of meat, was the producers. This seems ironical when the Board is commonly perceived to represent producers' interests. Thus, this thesis represents an attempt to examine the evolving relationship between the Board representatives, and their constituents, all sheep and beef producers of meat for export, between 1922 and 1985. In particular, it reviews the question of whether the Meat Board's decision-making structure has provided primarily for a representation of producers' interests and if not, why not? If not, what other interest groups have influenced the Board? In an attempt to answer these questions, it is argued that the Meat Producers Board has, since its formation in 1922, developed in such a way that it has been less able to fully represent the interests of its constituents, meat producers. As Mascarenhas commented of producer boards generally: 'though they derive their authority by statute, and have been established by government, they are less amenable to either the interests of primary producers or the public interest'. It will be argued that this development is partially the result of the Board's evolving status as a corporate interest group where it has had a close and continuing relationship with government. A useful definition of corporatism as it applies to interest groups is offered by Caws on: 'An organisation's capacity to represent its members' interests and to discipline them as part of a negotiated interaction with other groups'. The Meat Board is formally recognised by government as the central representative institution in the meat industry, but increasingly in return, it has been required to consider a range of interests in the industry before formulating its policy to present to government. This is associated with the declining political influence of producers generally, the Board's increasing commercial activities, and the increasing political influence of certain vertically integrated meat companies. Therefore while the formal responsibility and accountability of the Meat Board has remained primarily to farmers, in reality they .are only one of' a number of groups which the Board is obliged to take into account in its dectsion-making process. Other groups with potential to influence the Board include shipping lines, meat processors, and exporting meat companies. While the Meat Board's corporatist nature has strengthened since the Second World War under the predominantly National governments, recent formal and informal challenges by the 1984 Labour government to the concept of 'producer control ' of the various agricultural sectors, through the producer boards, suggests the corporatist trend in the meat industry could be in danger of breaking down. It is not the function of this thesis to debate the political and commercial advantages of 'producer control'. Rather it is to challenge the common assumption of sheep and beef producers, that the mere existence of a producer board secures their control of the meat industry.