Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism (2018)
Type of ContentJournal Article
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC
- Arts: Journal Articles 
© 2016 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht How many attitudes must be posited at the level of reductive bedrock in order to reductively explain all the rest? Motivational Humeans hold that at least two attitudes are indispensable, belief and desire. Desire-As-Belief theorists beg to differ. They hold that the belief attitude can do the all the work the desire attitude is supposed to do, because desires are in fact nothing but beliefs of a certain kind. If this is correct it has major implications both for the philosophy of mind, with regards the problem of naturalizing the propositional attitudes, and for metaethics, with regards Michael Smith’s ‘moral problem’. This paper defends a version of Desire-As-Belief, and shows that it is immune to several major objections commonly levelled against such theories.
CitationCampbell DI (2018). Doxastic desire and Attitudinal Monism. Synthese. 195(3). 1139-1161.
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KeywordsPropositional attitudes; Belief; Desire; Motivational Humeanism; Cognitivism; Internalism
ANZSRC Fields of Research50 - Philosophy and religious studies::5003 - Philosophy::500305 - Epistemology
RightsAll rights reserved unless otherwise stated
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Campbell DI (2017)David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory of desire he calls ‘Desire as Belief’. Lewis’ critics generally accept that his argument is sound and focus instead on trying to show that its ...
Campbell, Douglas (Philosophy Documentation Center, 2017)David Lewis describes, then attempts to refute, a simple anti-Humean theory of desire he calls ‘Desire as Belief’. Lewis’ critics generally accept that his argument is sound and focus instead on trying to show that its ...