Belief, Truth and Virtue (2013)
Type of ContentJournal Article
- Arts: Journal Articles 
In this paper, I defend the view that truth is a constitutive norm of belief formation, argue in favour of a virtue-theoretic account of epistemic evaluation and respond to possible objections. In §I, I argue that belief necessarily aims at truth. In §II, I defend a virtue-theoretic approach to epistemic evaluation in response to concerns about epis- temic luck and doxastic control. In §III, I distinguish between evaluative and deontic norms in order to avoid the charge that we are subject to impossible epistemic de- mands. In §IV, I study the relationship between epistemic norms, practical interests and ascriptions of knowledge.
CitationTurp MJ (2013). Belief, Truth and Virtue. Teorema. 32(3). 91-104.
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KeywordsAim of Belief; Intellectual Virtue; Epistemic Evaluation; Doxastic Voluntarism; Knowledge
ANZSRC Fields of Research50 - Philosophy and religious studies::5003 - Philosophy::500305 - Epistemology
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Turp, Michael-John (2017)It is often argued that belief is partly constituted by a norm of truth. Most recent discussions have assumed that the norm is deontic; concerning what may or ought to be believed. I criticize two proposals, one canvassed ...
Turp, Michael-John (Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2020)
Turp, Michael-John (2012)