It ain't over until it's over: English auctions with subsequent negotiations (2020)
Type of ContentJournal Article
CitationKoska OA, Stähler F (2020). It ain't over until it's over: English auctions with subsequent negotiations. International Review of Economics & Finance.
This citation is automatically generated and may be unreliable. Use as a guide only.
KeywordsEnglish auctions; negotiations; reserve prices
ANZSRC Fields of Research
38 - Economics::3801 - Applied economics::380107 - Financial economics
35 - Commerce, management, tourism and services::3502 - Banking, finance and investment::350208 - Investment and risk management
RightsAll rights reserved unless otherwise stated
Showing items related by title, author, creator and subject.
Hogan, S.; Kidd, H.; Meriluoto, L.; Smith, A. (University of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2010)The Fixed Price Offer (FPO) mechanism in Trade Me auctions allows sellers to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer at the conclusion of an unsuccessful auction. We investigate the effects of the FPO option on strategies and ...
Negotiating the New Zealand English curriculum : a qualitative model of eight secondary English teachers' classroom practice and response to the English curriculum. Morrison, Jennifer L. (University of Canterbury. School of Educational Studies and Human Development, 1997)Negotiating the New Zealand English Curriculum, opening with a contextualised look at the history and current educational environment surrounding secondary practice under the English Curriculum, describes how secondary ...
Rodenberg Ballweg, Julie (University of Canterbury. School of Forestry, 2013)The estimation of afforestation reservation prices for small landowners in New Zealand has not been the subject of much research despite its importance in predicting future land use. Reservation prices for planting represent ...
Optimising Reserve for Contingencies while Explicitly Including Response Speed of Reserve Providers Schipper, Josh (2020)None
Koska OA; Onur I; Stähler F (Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2018)© 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Austria, part of Springer Nature. We scrutinize the scope of auctions for firm acquisitions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities. We show that no mechanism ...
Hogan, S.; Meriluoto, L. (College of Business and EconomicsUniversity of Canterbury. Department of Economics and Finance, 2010)In a standard English auction in which bidders’ valuations are independently drawn from a common distribution, a standard regularity condition is that the survivor function of the distribution be log concave. In an auction ...