Extraordinary powers and political constitutionalism (2017)
AuthorsMueller SDshow all
During times of emergency situations extraordinary powers may be vested in the executive in order to prevent or reduce its impact. Emergency legislation is usually explicit about its extraordinary nature and requires triggers that enable the executive to use extraordinary powers. However, in recent times, New Zealand’s parliament has passed legislation that contains extraordinary powers, yet does neither draw attention to its extraordinary status, nor requires any triggers. As these acts did not directly deal with a threat to life or property, but instead likely had an economic purpose, it appears that Parliament created extraordinary powers out of convenience, rather than necessity. Due to New Zealand’s political constitution, acts of parliament cannot be challenged in court. This approach bears the danger of executive creep, where the executive gets more and more power in order to “get things done”, with little regard to constitutional safeguards.
CitationMueller SD (2017). Extraordinary powers and political constitutionalism. Canterbury Law Review. 23. 65-84.
This citation is automatically generated and may be unreliable. Use as a guide only.
ANZSRC Fields of Research48 - Law and legal studies::4807 - Public law::480702 - Constitutional law
48 - Law and legal studies::4899 - Other law and legal studies::489999 - Other law and legal studies not elsewhere classified