

**CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN INDONESIA:  
THE EVOLUTION AND DISSOLUTION OF  
CONCORDANCE**

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# Contents

Acknowledgements.....	
Abstract.....	
Introduction.....	1
<b>Literature Review .....</b>	<b>2</b>
Military Professionalism- Samuel Huntington .....	4
Expertise .....	5
Responsibility .....	7
Corporateness.....	7
The Military Mind and the Professional Military Ethic.....	10
Huntington's Model for Civilian Control .....	12
Subjective Civilian Control.....	13
Objective Civilian Control.....	13
'The Man on Horseback' - Samuel Finer .....	16
The Disposition to Intervene - Motive.....	19
Manifest Destiny of the Soldier .....	19
'The National Interest' as a Motive .....	20
The Sectional Interest .....	21
The Corporate Self Interest of the Armed Forces .....	21
The Motive of Individual self Interest .....	22
The Mood.....	23
Nordlinger and the Praetorian Soldier .....	26
The Liberal Model- Eric Nordlinger.....	29
Concordance Theory - Rebecca Schiff .....	30
The Partners .....	32
Indicators of Concordance .....	33
<b>Chapter Two.....</b>	<b>37</b>
Political Leadership .....	46
Legal Domination .....	47
Charismatic Domination .....	48
<b>Chapter Three .....</b>	<b>50</b>
Colonial History.....	50
The Nationalist Movement .....	51
The Dutch Colonial Army .....	58
The Japanese Occupation.....	60
Revolution.....	69

The Revolution and the Creation of an Army.....	72
Analysis.....	84
The Military .....	84
Political Leadership .....	85
The Citizenry .....	86
The Social Composition of the Officer Corps .....	88
The Political Decision Making Process .....	88
Recruitment Method .....	89
Military Style .....	90
<b>Chapter Four</b> .....	94
The 17th of October Affair .....	97
The Lubis Coup Attempt .....	107
Regional Turmoil- PERMESTA and the PRRI .....	108
Corporateness.....	115
Martial Law.....	118
Konsepi and Guided Democracy .....	125
Analysis.....	128
The Military .....	128
Political Leadership .....	129
Citizenry.....	130
Social Composition of the Officer Corps.....	131
Political Decision Making Process .....	132
Recruitment Method .....	133
Military Style .....	133
<b>Chapter Five</b> .....	137
Guided Democracy .....	137
The Army's New Doctrine .....	149
Analysis.....	153
The Military .....	153
The Political Leadership .....	154
The Citizenry .....	154
Social Composition of the Officer Corps.....	156
The Political Decision Making Process .....	157
Recruitment Method .....	158
Military Style .....	159
<b>Chapter Six</b> .....	163
The Role of the Army in Suharto's Downfall .....	163

Middle Class Opposition.....	172
The PDI and Megawati Sukarnoputri .....	177
The Economic Crisis of 1998 .....	181
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN).....	183
Analysis.....	186
The Military .....	186
Political Leadership .....	187
The Citizenry .....	187
The Social Composition of the Officer Corps .....	189
The Political Decision Making Process .....	189
Recruitment Method .....	191
Military Style .....	191
<b>Conclusion</b> .....	193
Key Historic Legacies.....	202
Assessment of Schiff's Model.....	205
Contributions to theoretical work .....	211
Contemporary Indonesia.....	212
Reference List .....	214

## Table of Figures

Figure 1 - The Army's Military Territories (Tentera Dan Territorium, T & T), 1950 - 1957.....	111
Figure 2 - Continuum of Concordance .....	211

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## **Abstract**

Theoretical work on civil military relations has traditionally emphasised the separation of the military from the civilian spheres as the best means of insulating against military intervention. Rebecca Schiff's concordance model challenges this basic assumption by arguing that intervention can be prevented by the presence of agreement amongst the military, the political leadership and the citizenry, on four specific indicators; the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method and military style. Schiff's theory has been used to explore the post 1945 relationship that has existed between Indonesian army, citizenry and political leadership. The thesis argues, in line with Schiff's theory that the Indonesian army's participation in society and politics has been determined by its unique history and culture. Schiff's theory has been further applied to Indonesia to trace the gradual development of a concordance. The evidence from the Indonesian case indicates that Schiff's argument is undermined by its static nature due to the inability of her model to account for change within each of the partners. Schiff's theory overlooks the need for the partners to be coherent in order for agreement to form. In the case of this study Schiff's theory has been adapted to take into account change within the actors, introducing a dynamic element to the model. It is contended that the concordance which did eventually emerge was significantly different in nature to that defined by Schiff, namely an enforced concordance. This enforced concordance endured until 1998, when a fundamental change within the nature of the partners led to Suharto's downfall. It is argued further that the case of Indonesia demonstrates the need for her "concordant relationship" to be considered along a continuum, one stretching from agreement to enforced concordance backed by coercive means.

## **Introduction**

The study of civil military relations is of fundamental importance to the field of political science. It focuses on the role of the armed forces in society and the relationship between the military and political system. The military holds a unique place within society as the institution that is charged with the defence of the state; it is highly trained in the management of violence. The exclusivity of this role, gives the military a privileged status, one that can however be used to intervene against a government. In the case of new democracies, the position of the military in society is of the utmost importance. The army has the ability to generate powerful forces of instability inside new democracies, particularly when institutions and methods of control are in their infancy. It has been a common theme in the literature on civil military relations, that the best form of military control has been the subjugation of the military to civilian control. However, in the context of many developing nations there may be no history of this, the military may have played a significant role in the establishment of the state, as well as in its social and political life. Thus, it can prove difficult to bring once influential militaries under the control of civilians. This particular area of focus is relevant to many new democracies, developing nations and those countries with a colonial history, with a history of influential armed forces.

## Literature Review

The literature that is widely considered to be the backbone of the field of civil military relations grew from the writings of men such as Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz in the late 1950's and 1960's. The writings of these two men have largely directed and guided scholars and students since this time and remain extremely important. An outline of Huntington's seminal work, *The Soldier and The State*, serves as a useful milestone in this discussion. However, it is important first to briefly discuss the environment from which this debate grew and evolved.

The history of civil military relations dates back at least as far as Sun Tzu (544 BC-496 BC) however, much of the debate and scholarly work was undertaken in the pre World War Two era on anti-militarism.<sup>1</sup> In the wake of World War One when there was particular concern amongst the allies regarding what was perceived to be a militaristic Germany. Indeed, there were many writers and academics in Germany, who at the time of World War One, and immediately afterward, supported militarism. It is noteworthy that wider German society was seen as reflecting this militaristic viewpoint.<sup>2</sup> The reasons for these militaristic tendencies were due in large measure to what the population regarded as Prussian military virtues.<sup>3</sup> These militaristic tendencies carried on from World War One and extended on through the period of Nazi rule.

In 1937, a book published by Alfred Vagts contributed significantly to what became the field of civil military relations. In his book Vagts argues that militarism is best

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<sup>1</sup> Charles and Louscher Kennedy, David, "Civil-Military Interaction: Data in Search of a Theory," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 26, no. 1 and 2 (1991). p.1 See also Peter Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual review of political science*, (1999). p.212

<sup>2</sup> Volker Rolf Berghahn, *Militarism : The History of an International Debate, 1861-1979* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982). p.32-33

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. P.33



described as a “...‘tendency to extend dominion’...”<sup>4</sup> Vagts goes on to argue that modern militarism is fundamentally different from militarism of the past. He argues that the modern army is different to its predecessors, because he claims the modern military has become “...narcissistic...” Vagts also claims that the modern military exist for themselves.<sup>5</sup> Most importantly and most relevant to the theme of this chapter is the discrimination Vagts makes between an army that is maintained in a military way, and one which is maintained in a militaristic way. The military way could in some way be seen as a similar, far less refined notion of Samuel Huntington’s professionalism thesis. Vagts states that an army which is maintained in the ‘military way’, is one that is most concerned with securing objectives with the minimum of cost and with the highest level of efficiency. It is an army which “...is limited in scope and confined to one function and scientific in its essential qualities.”<sup>6</sup> By contrast, an army which operates in a militaristic manner may behave, and exhibit “...customs, interests, prestige and actions...” which could be associated with an army. Much of this behaviour however transcends “...true military purposes.”<sup>7</sup> Vagts states that a militarist army can have an influence which he describes as being “...unlimited...”, and one which can this come to “...permeate all society and become dominant over all industry and arts.”<sup>8</sup>

Vagts concern with the ability of the military to dominate society was followed by Harold Laswell’s contribution, in a similarly anti-militaristic vain. Laswell, like Vagts, notes the possibility that there may be a new type of military organisation emerging. Laswell argues that there was nothing fundamentally new about the idea of

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<sup>4</sup> A Vagts, *A History of Militarism. Romance and Realities of a Profession*. (London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1938). quoted in Berghahn. p.38

<sup>5</sup> Vagts. quoted in Berghahn. p.39

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. p.39

<sup>7</sup> Ibid. p.39

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. P.39

a military state; however, there was something unique about the way in which he viewed it.<sup>9</sup> Laswell claimed that military men who specialised in the application of violence would have a high degree of understanding of many skills that have been included as aspects of modern civilian management.<sup>10</sup> This would occur he argued due to the more technically demanding environment that these individuals now operate within. He points to these individuals having knowledge in the areas of "...administrative organization, in personal management, in public relations."<sup>11</sup> The crucial point of understanding to be taken from Vagts and Laswell are their arguments about the potential for soldiers to enter into politics, and in fact become specialised not only in what had been their traditional domain of warfare, but in a new skill set. Such a skill set, in their eyes, could lead to the establishment of these individuals in positions of authority. Thus arrives one of the fundamental discourses in civil military relations, namely how does one understand and explain the behaviour of those soldiers who involve themselves in coups and, likewise, how does a state ensure its own security territorially while also ensuring that it does not become the victim of military intervention.

### **Military Professionalism- Samuel Huntington**

Despite the relevance of contributions such as Vagts and Laswell, Samuel Huntington's work the *Soldier and the State* is one of the most important contributions to the field in explaining military intervention in politics. Peter Feaver states it became the "...capstone..." to the work before it, and has since remained hugely significant, because he argues that much of what has been written since *The*

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<sup>9</sup> Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State," *The American Journal of Sociology* 46, no. 4 (1941), p. 458-459

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 457-458

<sup>11</sup> Ibid. p.458

*Soldier and The State* has been an “...implicit or explicit response to his argument.”<sup>12</sup>

It is for this reason that so much of the literature in the discipline has focused on the institutional separation of the military from government, as being the best way to inhibit military intervention. Key to the point about the separation of institutions is Huntington’s notion of the Professional Soldier. Without the Professional Soldier it is unlikely, according to Huntington that an army would remain politically neutral and it should be expected that it would, at some point, engage in a coup or some other act to undermine the government’s authority. What was it according to Huntington that made a soldier professional? According to Huntington there were three criteria that distinguished the soldier professional from other vocations: expertise, responsibility and corporateness.

### **Expertise**

Huntington asserts that the professional soldier is an individual who has “...specialized knowledge and skill...”, and that this knowledge and skill can only be acquired through “...prolonged education and experience.”<sup>13</sup> Professional knowledge is also seen by Huntington as being intellectual in nature. This, according to Huntington, makes professional knowledge subject to preservation in writing. The preservation of this knowledge in writing ensures that the profession has a history; Huntington states that knowledge of the profession’s history is important for the competence of the professional.<sup>14</sup> Professional education, argues Huntington, consists of two distinct aspects: the first is a “...broad, liberal, cultural background...” this is usually handled by “...general educational institutions.”<sup>15</sup> The second form of

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<sup>12</sup> Feaver. p.212

<sup>13</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957). p.8

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p.8

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. p.9

education comes in the form of a technical phase, which is undertaken in institutions run by or affiliated with the profession itself.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid. p.9

## **Responsibility**

The professional, attests Huntington, is an expert whose work is essential to the ongoing functioning of society: “The client of every profession is society, individually or collectively.”<sup>17</sup> Flowing from this is the “...responsibility to perform the service when required by society.” Huntington argues that this responsibility to society separates the professional, “...from other experts with only intellectual skills.”<sup>18</sup> Huntington is also keen to point out that the professional is not only partly motivated by financial gain, but is also motivated by the “...responsibility to serve and devotion to his skill...”<sup>19</sup> Finally Huntington acknowledges that a profession is regulated by a set of values and ideals “...which guide its members in their dealings with laymen.”<sup>20</sup>

## **Corporateness**

Those who belong to a profession, argues Huntington, “...share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen.”<sup>21</sup> The sense of union amongst those whom comprise a profession stems from discipline and training, as well as the sense of responsibility.<sup>22</sup> This sense of cohesion results in the creation of a professional organisation “...which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility.” It is this membership to the professional body, the retention of expert knowledge and acceptance of special social responsibility that defines that individual as a professional and distinguishes him from the layman.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>18</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p.10

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. p.10

The military officer, asserts Huntington, meets the criteria of a professional vocation.<sup>24</sup> He argues, however, that there is an aspect of their vocation that separates them from the civilian world. The skill that Huntington claims separates these individuals from the civilian professional is what Laswell termed “the management of violence.”<sup>25</sup> The task of the military professional is to undertake successful combat operations. In order to be capable of undertaking these operations successfully, the officer must be capable of executing certain duties, for example the training and equipping of a military force.<sup>26</sup> Within the military there exist other specialty roles. These other experts may have the rank of officers, however they are seen as fundamentally different by Huntington because their area of expertise exists in some area other than in the immediate application of violence. These individuals are necessary to the success of combat operations, however Huntington makes the key point that such individuals do not have a sufficiently wide scope of expertise to successfully prosecute combat operations. Huntington considers that for the officer to have the ability to be capable of managing violence requires the individual to devote a significant portion of their life to academic education.<sup>27</sup>

The military officer, Huntington argues, is not primarily motivated by financial gain. He points out that in western countries it is a vocation which does not receive significant monetary reward. The motivation of the officer to engage in their chosen vocation is brought about by “...a technical love for his craft and the sense of social obligation to utilize this craft for the benefit of society.”<sup>28</sup> This mix, which Huntington speaks of, informs what he terms as the officer’s professional motivation. This is perhaps where the professional soldier differs from other vocations which are

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<sup>24</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>25</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p.13

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p.15

considered professional. The military officer is not motivated only by economic incentives or an increase in personal prestige. They are instead motivated by a complex mix of factors which contribute to ensuring that they remain apolitical. The professional military officer has a series of “...regulations, customs, and traditions.” which tightly prescribe “...an awareness that his skill can only be utilized for purposes approved by society through its political agent, the state.”<sup>29</sup> This statement encapsulates much of what Huntington believes about civil-military relations, namely that the military and the officers as the leadership of that institution should remain apolitical if they are professional. The military officer is responsible to the state, and responsible for ensuring the security of the state. Huntington however states very clearly that this is, in many ways, like other professional-client relationships, where the professional holds the position as expert advisor. The officer is able to advise on the action that should be taken, and become involved in the action taken as a result of his advice.

Huntington’s definition of military professionalism also includes what he defines as its “...corporate character...”<sup>30</sup> He points out that membership to a profession is limited, and that this is no different in the case of the military officer. Within a professional body the numbers admitted are controlled, and in the case of the officer, he is admitted through his commission. Once admitted to the corps, the officer joins a world which is largely removed from the rest of society; it maintains its own system of hierarchy which is based upon rank. Rank within the organisation is dependent upon the competency of the individual and is decided by the corps itself, based upon guidelines established by the state.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid. p.15

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. p.16

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. p. 17

At this point in his argument, Huntington also makes a distinction between the reservist officer and the full time officer, as well as between the officer and the enlisted soldier. The reservist officer does not have the level of skill that the full-time professional officer has, and therefore is more likely to inhibit lower ranks within the organisation.<sup>32</sup>

The individuals who comprise the enlisted ranks are viewed as not being as fully professional as the officer in relation to their level of skill and responsibility.

Huntington states that the enlisted soldier is an expert in the “...application of violence not the management of violence.” He also points out that the enlisted soldier can progress and in fact does in some cases. However, this is not common because the level of skill and education required by officership is generally above that of the enlisted soldier.

### **The Military Mind and the Professional Military Ethic**

Huntington asserts that as a professional, the military officer develops a particular and specific manner of thinking; this specific mode of thinking develops as a result of his performance of military functions. This way of thinking is what Huntington refers to as the military mind. It comprises the “...values, attitudes, and perspectives which inhere in the performance of the professional military function and which are deducible from the nature of that function.”<sup>33</sup> The “...professional military function...” that Huntington refers to is the performance of the functional imperative; this can be best described as the ongoing maintenance of state security by the armed forces.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid. p.17

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p. 61

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. p.61



The values and attitudes that make up the military mind are part of what Huntington has termed the military ethic. The military ethic in this context is different to that of a professional ethical code, (i.e. the rules which govern the behaviour of the professional individual in their dealings with the nonprofessional or client.)<sup>35</sup>

Huntington's military ethic is comprised of "...A value or attitude..." which has been "...implied by or derived from the peculiar expertise, responsibility, and organization of the military profession." Furthermore it can "...include any preferences and expectations which may be inferred from the continuing performance of the military occupational role."<sup>36</sup> The military ethic is based on the assumptions which the officer has about the world around him, and furthermore in the nature of warfare itself.

Huntington claims that the officer will adhere to the ethic so far as they are professional, and also that the professional officer will only adhere to this ethic so far as it is shaped by functional and not other societal imperatives.<sup>37</sup> The professional military ethic is furthermore non-dated and non-localized, Huntington states, "So long as there is no basic alteration in the inherent nature of the military function there will be no change in the content of the professional military ethic."<sup>38</sup> Thus, Huntington further argues that it is this ethic that becomes the standard by which to judge the professionalism of any officer corps at any particular time.<sup>39</sup>

Having explained the significance of the Military Mind and the Military Ethic to Huntington's theory of professionalism, it is pertinent to discuss what Huntington considered comprised this Military Ethic. He begins by making an assertion that the ethic itself is grounded in the underlying assumption that "...conflict is the universal pattern throughout nature...", and that violence itself is rooted in mans "...biological

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p.61

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p.61

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p.61-62

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p.62

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. p.62

and physical nature...”<sup>40</sup> Huntington, concludes that the military holds a negative view of human nature, and describes the man who adheres to the military ethic as being Hobbesian in his outlook.<sup>41</sup> He states that the military ethic emphasises the weakness of man and that any individual who follows it has a decidedly pessimistic view of man.<sup>42</sup> Huntington at this point further links his ideas about the military ethic and mind to his notion of professionalism by stating that

“Politics is beyond the scope of military competence, and the participation of military officers in politics undermines their professionalism, curtailing their professionalism competence, dividing the profession against itself, and substituting extraneous values for professional values. The military officer must remain neutral politically.”<sup>43</sup>

### **Huntington’s Model for Civilian Control**

Huntington claims that the notion of civilian control of the armed forces had been discussed but it was his contention that the term had never been defined. He contends “Presumably, civilian control has something to do with the relative power of civilian and military groups.”<sup>44</sup> Beyond the issue of relative power he suggests that civilian control will “...presumably...” exist to the extent that military influence is counteracted by civilians.<sup>45</sup> It would thus seem that in order to minimise the power of the military the power of civilian groups should be maximised. However there are as Huntington points out, a number of different methods by which this can be achieved.

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid. p.63

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. p.63

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p.63

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p.71

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. p.80

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p.80

### **Subjective Civilian Control**

Subjective Civilian Control is a form of control which emphasises the maximising of civilian power at the expense of the military. It is the “...civilianizing...” of the military.<sup>46</sup> The problem with this form of control, as Huntington points out, is knowing who within the ‘civilian group’ is doing the controlling, as he states that the disparate nature of civilian groups would make it difficult for conflicting interests to be settled.<sup>47</sup> This competition that exists between civilian groups results in a situation where it is difficult for the civilian groups to maximise their control “...as a whole...” over the military.<sup>48</sup> For Huntington, Subjective Civilian Control “...involves the power relations among civilian groups”, and the situation that results from this is the enhancing of a particular civilian group’s power over others.<sup>49</sup> Subjective Civilian Control has historically manifested itself in the maximisation of power in “...particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional forms.”<sup>50</sup>

### **Objective Civilian Control**

Objective Civilian Control, in contrast to Subjective Civilian Control, is the “...distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behaviour among the members of the officer corps.”<sup>51</sup> Where Subjective Control emphasises the control of the military by “...civilianizing...” the military, Objective Civilian Control seeks to

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid. p.83

<sup>47</sup> Ibid. p.80

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p.80

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. p.80

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. p.81

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p.83

maximise professionalism within the military.<sup>52</sup> Huntington outlined at an earlier point in his theory that it is the professionalization of the officer corps that results in the rendering of the military as a politically neutral entity. The professional military under Objective Civilian Control stands ready to serve the civilian group which possess the “...legitimate authority within the state”, and this according to Huntington ensures that no civilian group is able to gain leverage over the military for their own purposes.<sup>53</sup>

Huntington argues that the degree to which a group is “...structurally unified...” will directly impact upon their effectiveness in dealing with other groups or organisations.<sup>54</sup> He claims that a group with unity possesses a distinct advantage over a group which lacks it. In the case of the military, he claims that if the various military branches (land, sea and air) were to have a united leadership, (for example one overall commander); they would possess a significant advantage in dealing with the other institutions of government. Furthermore it would make it more difficult for other organisations to play the respective officer corps off against one another.<sup>55</sup>

The scope of authority which Huntington raises “...refers to the variety and type of values with respect to which the group is formally authorized to exercise power.” He considers that this scope of authority has particular relevance to the military, and as in the case of this thesis, also to the Indonesian military.<sup>56</sup> In many western nations the military’s authority would, in fact, be limited to purely military matters. However in many cases militaries have a scope of authority which goes beyond that of purely military matters. Political influence of the military is difficult to measure and evaluate, but is nevertheless significant, especially in the context of Indonesia.

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p.83

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. p.84

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. p.87

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. p.87

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.p.87-88

Political influence according to Huntington can be broken down according to four rough indices which can measure the influence of the officer corps.<sup>57</sup>

The affiliations held by the officer corps and its leaders, are one important measure. Huntington explains that it is the "...extent and nature of its affiliations with other powerful groups and individuals" that is significant.<sup>58</sup> The affiliations of officers prior to enlistment is significant, as Huntington points out that they may come from a particular social or geographical section. He argues that this can enhance the position of the corps within a particular class or area.<sup>59</sup> In Indonesia, for example, the military is predominantly Javanese. This has been an enduring pattern in the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI).<sup>60</sup> The officers may also develop affiliations with those with whom they interact in the course of their service. Huntington cites government committees or private companies as an example of this.<sup>61</sup>

The access that the military have to economic and human resources can also present the military with another form of influence. Huntington argues that the larger the military is, and the larger its funding is as a proportion of national product, the greater their influence may be.<sup>62</sup> Hierarchical interpenetration is the term Huntington uses to describe a situation in which the officer corps or elements of the military are able to gain positions of authority within "...non-military power structures."<sup>63</sup> Just as the military's authority maybe increased by the degree to which it is able to penetrate non-military power structures, the military's position may be weakened if non-military

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p. 88

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p.88

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. p.88

<sup>60</sup> Anonymous, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, September 2005-March 2008," *Indonesia*, no. 85 (2008). p.80

<sup>61</sup> Huntington. p.88

<sup>62</sup> Ibid. p.88

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. p.89

individuals are able to penetrate positions within the officer corps.<sup>64</sup> The “Prestige and popularity of the officer corps and its leaders.” are a further key determinant of influence according to Huntington.<sup>65</sup>

The concept of military professionalism is central to understanding Huntington's model of civil military relations. The officer is the professional within the military organisation; they are separated as professionals from other skilled individuals by their criteria which he lists as expertise, responsibility and corporateness. The military professional is however crucially separated from civilian professionals by their particular area of competence, namely the management of violence. As officers they are driven to undertake their functional imperative, which is to ensure the ongoing security of the state. Politics, Huntington states is beyond the realm of the military professional's competence and that participation in politics undermines their profession as a whole. Huntington describes two distinct models for control of the armed forces; the first is subjective civilian control, which emphasises civilian power at the expense of the military. This form of control, however suffers from competition between civilian groups about who will control the military, which ultimately makes it difficult for anyone group to exercise control. Ultimately this form of control see's one particular group achieve dominance over others civilian groups. Objective control emphasises the importance of enforcing military professionalism in the armed forces as the method by which to control the military.

### **‘The Man on Horseback’- Samuel Finer**

Samuel Finer is another scholar of central importance to the development of civil military relations theory; he became one of Huntington's early critic's. Finer's central

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid. p.89

<sup>65</sup> Ibid. p. 89

point of critique on Huntington's thesis begins with Huntington's argument about professionalism. Professionalism, as Finer points out, is the "...central concept..." for Huntington's argument, and is the "...decisive factor..." which prevents the military from intervening.<sup>66</sup> Finer suggests that Huntington's theory argues that in order for the military to remain politically neutral they must be encouraged to be fully professional. He makes the point however that professional militaries have indeed intervened in politics, as in the cases of Germany and Japan.<sup>67</sup> As Finer points out, Huntington has essentially set up a particularly specific and specialised definition of professionalism and the military mind, and that if the soldiers are seen to act in a manner which is not consistent with these definitions "...they are not completely 'professional', not purely military."<sup>68</sup> Finer suggests that Huntington's argument has become essentialist.<sup>69</sup>

Finer claims that instead of the military being "Professional" according to Huntington's definition, it is instead the principle of civilian supremacy which prevents the military from intervening in politics.<sup>70</sup> For Finer, the idea of a 'politically sterile' professional military is misplaced. He begins by claiming that the "...military's consciousness of themselves as a profession may lead them to see themselves as the servants of the state rather than the government in power", because, as he states, they may come to see the government as an entity which exists only temporarily, and therefore instead begin to identify with the nation.<sup>71</sup> This presents the danger that the military may become politicised, and begin to resist the authority of government. According to Finer, the military will then begin to "...invent their own

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<sup>66</sup> S. E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback : The Role of the Military in Politics* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1962). p.24

<sup>67</sup> Ibid. p.25

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. p.25

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. p.25

<sup>70</sup> Ibid. p.25

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. p.26

private notion of the national interest...”, and it only requires a small jump in thinking for the military to then intervene, according to their perceived idea of the national interest.<sup>72</sup>

Military professionalism according to Finer, emphasises the ‘specialist’ nature of the officer corps. This he claims can lead the officer corps to view themselves as being the expert in the “...size, organization, recruitment and equipment of the forces.”<sup>73</sup>

This may bring them into conflict with the civilian government.

The use of the military against domestic opponents by a government can create tension between the military and the government. Finer argues that the military views itself as the guardian of the state against foreign enemies, and that it does not view its fellow countryman as the enemy.<sup>74</sup> He also claims that the military would resent taking action against its fellow countrymen on the basis that to do so would devalue their status as a trained combat force to that of a police force.<sup>75</sup> As a result of being used against domestic opponents the military may come to dislike the politicians, and the loyalty of the officer corps may come into question. The result of this may be action by the military against the civilian government.<sup>76</sup>

Professionalism according to Finer cannot be the only force for preventing the military from intervening. He suggests that they must also have accepted the principle of the supremacy of civil power.<sup>77</sup> This, for Finer, falls outside the definition of professionalism, it is expected that the military remain loyal to the government’s authority they must accept “...the major policies and programmes of government...”

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid. p.26

<sup>73</sup> Ibid. p.26-27

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. p. 27

<sup>75</sup> Ibid. p.27

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. p.27

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. p.28



and these should be decided by “...the nation’s politically responsible civilian leaders.”<sup>78</sup>

Beyond the scope of professionalism and civilian supremacy, Finer postulates that a number of other phenomena “...deter...” the military from intervening.<sup>79</sup> He states that the possible politicisation of the military resulting in the factionalisation of the military instils a fear within the organisation that the capability and “...capacity...” of the military may be compromised. Civil war and the possibility of firing on fellow soldiers and countrymen is a further reason, according to Finer, which will limit the possibility of military involvement. Finer concludes by stating that the military would fear that in the wake of a failed coup not only would the lives of soldiers and the capacity of the armed forces be eroded, but that the existence of the military as an institution may also be threatened.<sup>80</sup>

### **The Disposition to Intervene - Motive**

In order for the military to undertake intervention, Finer states that the military must possess both the occasion on which to act as well as a disposition to intervene.<sup>81</sup> This disposition, is the “...combination of a conscious motive and of a will or desire to act.”<sup>82</sup> Each of these motives is described in the following discussion.

### **Manifest Destiny of the Soldier**

Sectional bodies, such as the military argues Finer, may all plead the national interest when it suits to advance their own interests.<sup>83</sup> Finer argues that the military have a particularly strong position from which to make this argument. He also suggests that

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<sup>78</sup> Burton M. Spain, and Snyder, Richard Carlton, *The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy* (New York: 1954). p.52 quoted in Finer. p.28

<sup>79</sup> Finer. p.30

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. p.30-31

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. p.23

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.p.23

<sup>83</sup> Ibid. p.33

the army is the very representation of a state's sovereignty and independence.<sup>84</sup> Furthermore, the military by virtue of its function is instilled with nationalism, and Finer emphasises that it is this which makes up the *esprit de corps* of the army and has the result of creating a unique consciousness within the institution.<sup>85</sup> The military thus comes to identify itself closely with the nation, and this combined with the military value of self sacrifice results in the belief that the army has the duty to intervene to "save the nation."<sup>86</sup> Finer argues that this creates the necessary but not sufficient belief amongst soldiers in their 'Manifest Destiny'.

### **'The National Interest' as a Motive**

Finer claims that when the army or sections within the military become politicised, they begin to view the national interest in a particular manner, namely that they have some special relationship with the national interest.<sup>87</sup> This identification with the nation's interest means different things to military's. It is, as Finer argues, by no means a uniform term. The military may come to see themselves as being responsible for the nation's interest and this, as Finer points out, can lead to varying levels of intervention on by the military.<sup>88</sup> The level of intervention could range, for example, from "...overt rulership of the nation and the establishment of a more or less complete political programme..." through to "... a duty to arbitrate or veto..."<sup>89</sup> The term 'National Interest' can however also be used as a pretext for the military to ensure its own interests. Finer is acutely aware of this point, and it will be discussed later in the course of this work.

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<sup>84</sup> Ibid. p.33

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. p.33-34

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. p.34

<sup>87</sup> Ibid. p.35

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. p.35-36

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. p.36

### **The Sectional Interest**

Military intervention may be executed against a government because of the particular makeup of social classes within the military, and because of those present in positions of power within the government. The theory of class interest as a driver of military intervention posits that the military will “...support the civil power when this is drawn from a similar social class, and overthrow it when it is drawn from a different and hostile class.”<sup>90</sup> Furthermore the military may become politically active when the officer corps are comprised of those of similar social backgrounds. This may bind them together in the eventuality that their interests become threatened. In the event that their interests do become threatened these soldiers may seek to intervene as a means of securing their interests. It could also transpire that the majority or at least a significant minority of officers may be drawn from within a particular geographical region of a given country. This, as Finer points out, can lead them to develop “...special ties with it...”, and this could then lead the officer corps toward intervention.<sup>91</sup>

### **The Corporate Self Interest of the Armed Forces**

Finer states that the military have a particular anxiety about ensuring their autonomy and privileges, and when threatened, this can become a powerful catalyst for intervention.<sup>92</sup> Finer also suggests that intervention by the military can emanate from two paths of ‘perceived’ intrusion by the government. The military have certain areas of interest which they may view as being their own to administer. Areas of interest are defined as things such as recruitment, level and scope of training as well as equipment. The military may argue that they alone should be left to preside over such

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid. p.40

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. p. 43

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. p.47

matters. Beyond simply demanding the right to autonomy over these areas, the military may well view these, and other areas that relate to the military such as foreign and economic policy, as being their responsibility. The clash over such interests may well lead the military to overthrow a civilian government if it comes to view the government as impinging in its area of interest. The most significant and crucial point that Finer makes in this discussion however is in relation to the idea of professionalism.<sup>93</sup> He states that claims to the control of areas such as arms acquisition or control of military training is bound up in the idea of military professionalism and is therefore a natural consequence of a military professionalism.<sup>94</sup> For Finer, the need to control aspects relating to their operational function stems from the fact that the professional military are functionally specialised. The function that they undertake separates them from the rest of society. It is the anxiety to “...safeguard and guarantee their success” that may cause the military to intervene if they perceive that their interests or their ability to carry out their function is impaired by a civilian government.<sup>95</sup>

### **The Motive of Individual self Interest**

Self interest amongst soldiers or officers can provide a motive for intervention, and some will choose to intervene when the opportunity for personal gain presents itself. If, for example, there is the opportunity for further career advancement or for material gain this may provide another justification for intervention by the military.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid. p.47

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. p.47

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. p.47

<sup>96</sup> Ibid. p. 57

## **The Mood**

The previous section describes Finer's ideas about which 'motives' may lead the military to intervention. His model also, however, points to the existence of a unique 'mood' within the military which permeates the institution. The military view themselves, according to Finer, as having an identity which is distinct to the civilian world around them.<sup>97</sup> Finer claims that this sense of "...self-awareness..." only needs to be combined with two further elements, to produce possible military intervention.<sup>98</sup> The first of these elements is that which Finer refers to as a sense of "...overwhelming power..." He further suggests that the military needs only to believe that at any given time it has the ability to enforce its will, and that there is nothing which would be able to prevent them from executing their desired action. The second element required is a grudge. Examples of this were covered in the section on motive, and may include such things as civilians impinging upon areas the military regard as being under their control and autonomous to the civilian government.<sup>99</sup> Humiliation and a sense of injury to the military's self-esteem present reasons for the execution of coups. The level of injury to both elements vary from case to case but Finer emphasises that in such cases the military will share "... a morbidly acute feeling of injured self-respect."<sup>100</sup>

Military's which can be seen as self important or those that possess what Finer terms a "morbidly high self esteem" can also present threats to a civilian administration. Finer claims that a self important military is one which has "...a good but not excessive opinion of themselves relative to the government or to civilians in general." This type of military may view themselves as being the equal of civilians unlike a military

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<sup>97</sup> Ibid. p.61

<sup>98</sup> Ibid. p.61

<sup>99</sup> Ibid. p.61

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. p.62

which has morbidly high self-esteem. This second group of militaries holds the view of themselves as being superior to civilians and civilian administrations. As Finer points out “Affronts or imagined affronts to their pride tend to spark such armies into intervention more quickly...” than those previously mentioned.<sup>101</sup>

The military, according to Finer’s model, must be afflicted with a particular mood and motivated to carry out an intervention. Finally, however, the military requires the opportunity to intervene. In a time of war, the civilian administration may come to depend more upon the military; this may be manifested by the civilian administration giving power to the military and may, for instance, take the shape of the military being involved in the economy.

Political crisis within a state may also present the military with circumstances which would enable them to carry out some form of intervention against the government and civilian institutions.<sup>102</sup> Finer points to a situation in which rival political forces have taken arms against one another. The state and its institutions then find themselves in the position where they are unable “...to rely on the support from any single one without drawing on itself the full violence of the rest.”<sup>103</sup> The armed forces may at this stage be relied upon by the government as the only means by which they are able to enforce their control. Similarly in a situation of *latent crisis*, a government or ruling elite may be widely disliked and unpopular, thereby creating political tension and demonstrations, and as such those in power come to rely upon the military to keep them in power.<sup>104</sup> The military may however choose to withdraw support for such a regime, and by doing this leave themselves with the option to step in to replace the

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid. p.67

<sup>103</sup> Finer. p. 75

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. p.77

civilian administration.<sup>105</sup> Flowing from this previous example, Finer raises the potential for the military to intervene in a situation that he terms the *power vacuum*. This is a situation in which there is “...no organized political movement of any strength, and singularly little if any political opinion at all.”<sup>106</sup> In a situation such as this, the military has the distinct advantage of possessing a monopoly on force, and as Finer argues, the lack of any form of government or organized political movement presents the armed forces with the opportunity to act as they wish.<sup>107</sup>

The popularity of the armed forces within a particular state may present the military with further opportunities for intervention. Finer states that is difficult to generalize about the reasons for civilian support for the military, but points to examples such as corrupt and inefficient civilian regimes juxtaposed with the organised and austere appearance of the military, which may prove popular to the people.<sup>108</sup>

All of Finer’s arguments outlined so far culminate in four potential outcomes.<sup>109</sup>

1. Neither disposition nor opportunity to intervene: No intervention will occur.
2. Both disposition and opportunity to intervene: Intervention will occur.
3. No disposition to intervene but the possibility of doing so: Finer points to four possible outcomes. Firstly that the armed forces do not take action because after all they lack the disposition to intervene. Secondly, that after much cajoling and pressure from others they intervene. Thirdly, that there is some form of invitation to intervene. Finally, that there may be the installation of a ‘legal’ but temporary military regime.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> Ibid. p.78

<sup>106</sup> Ibid. p.79

<sup>107</sup> Ibid. p.80

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. p. 80-81

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. p.83

<sup>110</sup> Ibid. p.83-84

4. Disposition but no opportunity: Under such circumstances military intervention will likely fail.

Samuel Finer's argument challenged Huntington's key assumption that military professionalism could restrict military intervention. For Finer, it is the acceptance amongst the military of the principle of civilian supremacy that restricts their intervention in politics. The acknowledgement of civilian supremacy ensures that the military maintain loyalty to governmental authority and that they accept the policies of the government. There are for Finer several reasons that military professionalism may not restrict military intervention. Military professionalism may lend itself to the development of an attitude amongst soldiers, which sees them identify their own view of the national interest; this according to Finer can lend itself to intervention. The specialist nature of the professional officer corps can result in the claim amongst officers that they are the experts in the equipping the army, in its organisation, its recruitment. This has the potential to draw them into conflict with the government. The use of the military against domestic opponents can also generate interventionist tendencies. Alongside a critique of professionalism, Finer states the military requires both a motive and a mood in order to execute intervention. The motive according to Finer can stem from the manifest destiny of the soldier, the national interest, sectional interest and the corporate self interest of the armed forces. Alongside mood and motive the military must be presented with an opportunity for intervention, this may stem from a crisis facing the ruling government or a power vacuum.

### **Nordlinger and the Praetorian Soldier**

Eric Nordlinger's study of Civil Military describes praetorian soldiers as those who engage in military intervention. The term 'Praetorian', to which Nordlinger refers, stems from the Praetorian Guard of the Roman Army. Formed as a special unit of the



military they were tasked with the protection of the emperor. However, they would later intervene against the emperor whom they were tasked with protecting.<sup>111</sup>

Praetorianism can be defined according to Nordlinger as:

1. The threat (overtly or otherwise) of a coup by officers against the government if a set of demands are not met.
2. The staging of an unsuccessful coup.
3. The staging of a coup which brings power to another civilian government.
4. The staging of a coup by military officers to replace the civilian government with a military one.

Crucially relevant to the case of Indonesia is Nordlinger's assertion regarding the civilianisation of coups. This, he argues, is the case when the military leaders of the coup no longer don military uniform but take the offices of government.<sup>112</sup> This civilianisation of the coup depends on whether those who comprise the new government have served or continue to serve in the military. Nordlinger also states that civilianisation of the coup depends upon whether the new regime still relies heavily upon the support of the officer corps.<sup>113</sup>

Civilian control of the military stands in the way of praetorian urges. According to Nordlinger three distinct models of civilian military control exist, with one relevant only to one party states, and thus not pertinent to this discussion. The first of these is what he refers to as the traditional model. This model was largely present in the monarchies of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries. It was a system of civilian military control

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<sup>111</sup> Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics : Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977). p.3

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. p.3

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. p.3

in which there was an “...absence of civilian-military differences.”<sup>114</sup> This was due, Nordlinger claims, to the fact that the elites of these nations were the same elites which made up the civilian and military positions in these various states. Those who belonged to these elites shared similar values as well as family blood ties and often shared links between the civilian and military realms.<sup>115</sup> Nordlinger notes that on those occasions when tensions did appear between those comprising the elites, namely the aristocracy, they would view themselves as civilians first and soldiers second. These elites were more interested in preserving their positions and ensuring their own wealth.<sup>116</sup> This model is largely irrelevant today, due to the fact that in many states there is no common linkage between the civilian and military elites.<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>114</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. p.12

### **The Liberal Model- Eric Nordlinger**

The liberal model of civilian control according to Nordlinger "...entails the maximum possible depoliticization of the military."<sup>118</sup> The civilian elite (those holding positions within government) have a particular realm of expertise. Nordlinger states that this expertise relates to "...determining domestic and foreign goals, overseeing the administration of the laws, and resolving conflicts among social, economic, and political groups."<sup>119</sup> The military's area of expertise is in the application of violence, and their responsibility is the security of the state both internally and externally. The military must accept their subordinate position. Their role is within the area of national security only and is limited to providing advice to the civilians in charge. In the case of disagreement, the military must accept the views of its civilian masters. It is one thing to assert that the military be subservient, and quite another to ensure that civilian supremacy will be adhered to. Nordlinger argues that a series of beliefs and values around civilian authority that he terms the *civilian ethic* prevents the military from threatening a civilian regime, "Soldiers who are imbued with these beliefs and values-what might be referred to as the civilian ethic-are attitudinally disposed to accept civilian authority and to retain a neutral, depoliticized stance even when in sharp disagreement with the government."<sup>120</sup> Nordlinger states that it is the civilian ethic that will steer the military clear from engaging in interventionist activities.<sup>121</sup>

Civilians within this model must also respect the military, if it does so the military have less motivation for intervention. Civilians he believes must respect

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<sup>118</sup> Ibid. p.12

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. p.12

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. p. 13

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. p.13

"...the military's honour, expertise, autonomy, and political neutrality. It does not slur the officer corps, interfere in professional military affairs, interject political considerations into the armed forces (e.g., by promoting officers because of their political loyalties), or use the army for domestic political advantage."<sup>122</sup>

If civilian governments do not respect the military the result can be the generation of praetorian urges. The military may undertake a coup in order to protect its

"...autonomy, professionalism, cohesiveness, and pride in the face of civilian transgressions."<sup>123</sup>

Nordlinger presents the concept of praetorianism, which encapsulates the threat of a coup, the successful execution of a coup or the staging of an unsuccessful coup.

Civilian control of the military according to Nordlinger restricts praetorian urges and the ability of praetorian soldiers to execute coups. His liberal model results in the maximum depoliticization of the military. According to the model the civilian elite, those in government hold particular expertise, for example in "... determining domestic and foreign goals..."<sup>124</sup> The military also holds particular expert knowledge in the area of the application of violence. The military according to this model must always accept its subordinate position to the civilians in government. In order for the military to accept civilian supremacy the military must also recognize the concept of the civilian ethic. Both the military and the civilian government must exhibit respect for their respective spheres of influence. If they do not do so civilian control will be undermined and a coup may take place.

### **Concordance Theory - Rebecca Schiff**

In a more recent contribution, Rebecca Schiff has questioned much of the prevailing theoretical work in the area of Civil-Military relations. She begins by arguing that one

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<sup>122</sup> Ibid. p.13

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. p.13

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. p.12

school of thought within the field has achieved pre-eminence, namely that emphasising separation or what Huntington termed objective civilian control.<sup>125</sup> This theory she argues does not take into account "...a nation's unique and indigenous culture, or any culture at all, since it is a theory that focuses on replicating US civil and military institutions."<sup>126</sup> She claims that a nation's unique cultural and historical experience are both important to this study of civil and military institutions, and moreover that her theory incorporates this important background information as part of its analysis. As already noted, Schiff states that the existing body of work emphasises separation of the civil and military spheres as a means of preventing military intervention, and moreover that this be translated into policy.<sup>127</sup> In contrast to this, concordance she claims, can involve separation but does not require it.

Schiff's theory "...argues that three partners - the military, the political elites, and the citizenry - should aim for a cooperative relationship. For Schiff, Concordance may mean a high level integration between the military and the rest of society, although this is just one type of relationship she believes that no single type of relationship

"...is seen as necessarily leading to domestic military intervention. In essence civil and military institutions need not be separate (like the US model) to prevent domestic military intervention."<sup>128</sup>

The type of civil-military relationship, Schiff asserts, is far less important than the ability of her three partners to agree upon four key indicators.<sup>129</sup> Before continuing the discussion of her theory it is first necessary to define her actors and her indicators, as these are of central importance to her work.

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<sup>125</sup> Rebecca Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics* (Oxon: Routledge, 2009). p.11

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. p.11

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. p.32

<sup>128</sup> Ibid. p.32

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. p.32

## The Partners

The military, asserts Schiff,

"...encompasses the armed forces and the personnel who represent the military. The officers and the enlisted personnel are usually those most dedicated to the armed forces."<sup>130</sup>

The military is the institution, she states, which is recognized by the political elites and society in general as being responsible for the defence of the nation's borders.<sup>131</sup>

The political leadership is best defined by its function. Schiff believes that the particular "...nature of governmental institutions and the methods of their selection are less important when determining concordance."<sup>132</sup> Instead, Schiff states, it is the identification of elites who represent the government and have "...direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces" which is critical.<sup>133</sup> Examples of these elites include cabinets, presidents, prime ministers, party leaders, parliaments and monarchs.

The citizenry, Schiff asserts is also best defined by its function, "How do the citizens interact with the military? Is there agreement among the citizens themselves over the role of the military in society?"<sup>134</sup> The citizenry is broadly defined, "....it is comprised of individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban workers and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers, those who may have the right to vote, or other groups who may be disenfranchised."<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid. p.44

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. p.44

<sup>132</sup> Ibid. p.44

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. p.44

<sup>134</sup> Ibid. p.44

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. p.44

## Indicators of Concordance

Alongside these three distinct actors are four indicators which "...will determine whether relations among the military, the government, and the society take the form of separation, integration, or some other alternative."<sup>136</sup> Schiff emphasises that the nation's particular historical and cultural context shapes the relationship among the partners and the indicators.<sup>137</sup> The social composition of the officer corps, we are told by Schiff, represents her primary indicator of concordance, as it is responsible for the "...broad institutional and day-to-day functioning of the armed forces."<sup>138</sup> The officers

"...are the career soldiers who dedicate their lives to soldiering and to the development of the military and who help to define the relationship of the military to the rest of society. The officer is distinguished from the rank-and-file soldier; and, as leaders of the armed forces, the officer corps provides not only critical links between the citizenry and the military but also between the military and the government."<sup>139</sup>

Schiff states that within the officer corps of all modern militaries there are differing degrees of representation of various groups within society. Democratic nations, she argues, the officers will generally represent the various groups within society; these groups may be based on class, religious or ethnic background. However, representation of the various groups in society within the officer corps is less important than agreement on its particular composition amongst the three partners.<sup>140</sup> Thus concordance can prevail even if the representation of the various social groups within the officer corps of a given state is limited. It is the agreement amongst the partners which is of utmost importance.

Schiff's second indicator is the political decision-making process, which focuses upon the "...institutional organs of society..." that determine various factors such as its

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid. p.44

<sup>137</sup> Ibid. p.44

<sup>138</sup> Ibid. p.45

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. p.45

<sup>140</sup> Ibid. p.45

budget, material, size and structure.<sup>141</sup> The process by which this occurs is not dependent upon a particular type of government, for example democratic or authoritarian, it is rather, "... the specific channels that determine the needs and allocations of the military."<sup>142</sup> The needs of the military may be determined by "...parliaments, closed cabinets, special committees and political elites that may or may not involve the participation of military officers."<sup>143</sup> The specifics of the system that determine the military's needs are less important than the requirement of the partners agreeing to it.

The military's recruitment method is Schiff's third indicator of concordance. This covers the system by which citizens are enlisted in the military. Schiff refers to two different recruitment types, coercive and persuasive recruitment. Coercive recruitment "...refers to the forcible conscription or extraction of people and supplies for military purposes."<sup>144</sup> This form of recruitment makes harsh demands upon the population and as such it is unlikely that concordance between the military and the citizenry will exist. Persuasive recruitment, may according to Schiff, be either voluntary or involuntary, and based upon beliefs, namely that military service is a necessary sacrifice for patriotism and to ensure the state's security. Coercion is not a requirement of this form of recruitment because these individuals have made themselves available to serve. Persuasive recruitment implies agreement amongst the partners on the military's requirements.

Military style comprises Schiff's final indicator of concordance. This refers to the "...external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military:

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<sup>141</sup> Ibid. p.45

<sup>142</sup> Ibid. p.45

<sup>143</sup> Ibid. p.45

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what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it."<sup>145</sup> Style, Schiff asserts is about social boundaries and the ability to establish them or remove them. Style allows members of groups to differentiate themselves from one another. Style is also about the way a military looks, the signals that it conveys and its rituals; these things are all part of the relationship between soldiers, citizens and the body politic.<sup>146</sup> Military style Schiff believes is manifested within the military's traditions and symbol. Important examples of this are things such as uniforms, parades, marches and other ceremonies.<sup>147</sup>

Concordance, Schiff argues, will result if agreement is reached amongst the partners on the four indicators. Concordance, asserts Schiff acts as a deterrent to domestic military intervention, which can apply within a variety of different cultural contexts and may prove more appropriate to the particulars of a nation's cultural and historical experience. For Schiff, the scholarship which has focused upon the developing world has largely forgotten this, as well as the fact that much of the writing on the topic was derived from modern example of U.S military separation.

Schiff's framework will be used extensively throughout this work, in order to test the validity of her concept of concordance in the Indonesian context. An intrinsic part of this model is the examination and assessment of the role that Indonesia's unique culture and historic experience have had in determining the nation's civil military relationship. Schiff's framework will feature as the core analytical lens, it will however be complimented with the work of the other scholars highlighted in this chapter. Huntington's concept of professionalism and corporateness will be discussed. Samuel Finer's notion of precursive motivations for military intervention will be

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<sup>145</sup> Schiff. p.47

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. p.47

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. p.47

explored. Nordlinger's theory of liberal control of the armed forces will be discussed. In particular, emphasis will be placed upon Nordlinger's argument relating to the need for civilian respect of the military's sphere of autonomy and influence.

## Chapter Two

Schiff's work breathes new life into the field of civil military relations theory, an area which requires new work and reinterpretation. Schiff has introduced a number of new and contested ideas into the academic debate. Despite the injection of this new theory into the discourse, there are several structural issues that require re-examination and critique. Significantly this is centred on the issue of agreement, leading on from this it will be shown that her notion of concordance is static, and in order to resolve some of the issues with her theory, her ideas will be reinterpreted so they are able to take account of change over time and thus introduce some notion of dynamism or evolution.

Concordance we are told describes a cooperative relationship amongst its stakeholders. For Schiff, when there is agreement among the partners on a number of different indicators there is a state of concordance. When the civil military relationship is concordant argues Schiff the likelihood of military intervention is reduced. It should be clarified also at this point that when the relationship is concordant, that it is the likelihood of a coup d'état taking place that is reduced. It is somewhat unclear whether her idea of concordance can prevent other forms of intervention, or whether simply by definition these other degrees of involvement are removed. When the aforementioned partners disagree on the indicators of concordance, this is when a coup may occur. It is at this point that the theory appears to some to become tautological that is true by definition. When there is agreement amongst the partners there is no disagreement, and in turn there is no intervention. If however there is no agreement, the result we are told may be military intervention. A

second issue is that the model at this point becomes static. That is to say that concordance evolves, either stays in place, or collapses.

The model as it is currently structured cannot really account for or understand change, except in the case where events lead to a collapse in concordance. The model is incapable of explaining more subtle change and more importantly for the purposes of the current case study, of explaining and taking account of change in Indonesia's civil-military relations. By altering the model slightly, it will allow greater understanding of cases where the military has long had political influence and power, even though they may have officially relinquished political power or have failed to execute a coup. Change in the existence, or lack thereof, in concordance may be precipitated by a change in the nature of the actors themselves. We are told by Schiff that what is truly significant about her model and what makes it so different is the fact that it is the existence of agreement amongst three actors on her set of indicators that determines the nature of a state's civil military relationship. Just as a change in the nature of any agreement amongst the actors, can affect the concordance, so can a change in the nature of the actors themselves.

Change within the military can have a significant impact upon the existence of any concordance. The issue of cohesion within the military itself is of primary concern. Military factionalism, particularly at the level of the officer corps can have all manner of affects. It undermines the officer's professionalism, by undermining his responsibility and corporateness. This lack of cohesion may be driven by any number of factors, for example religion, ethnicity, recruitment and education amongst others. The destabilising force that factionalism generates can have significant effects within regimes relying on the support of the military. In the context of regimes experiencing pressure for political change the military may shift its support from backing the sitting

regime, to removing support and its control of the state's coercive instruments.

Factionalism may produce pressures on any existing concordance for a change in the nature of the relationship.

Hostility and division can be generated within the military due to structural factors present within the officer corps itself, particularly issues around age, the promotion system and the career paths open to officers. Newly created militaries such as those in newly independent states may often contain a large number of officers and soldiers from a similar age group. This can prove a major source of discontent and tension for junior officers who may be in the same age group as those of much higher rank. This can have the affect of undermining the system of discipline by "...reinforcing discrepancies in the perception of authority and competence within the military hierarchy."<sup>148</sup> Grievances can also come about due to the possible restriction in promotions. If the officer corps is made up of officers of a similar age it can restrict promotion.<sup>149</sup> Promotions may also be restricted by the sheer numbers of officers graduating from military academies. This is not a problem in itself, but it can become one if there are not adequate positions of command for the graduates to fill. A situation may be created in which there are too many officers and too few positions of command. This has the potential to undermine the career progression and prospects of officers, and can become a source of discontent.<sup>150</sup> Resentment and pressure for change within the military may be generated from the interference of political leaders in the promotion of officers.<sup>151</sup> Political leaders may seek to intervene in the process of promotion in order to ensure the loyalty of the military to themselves or their

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<sup>148</sup> A.R Luckham, "The Nigerian Military: Disintergration or Intergration," in *Nigerian Politics and Military Rule: Prelude to the Civil War*, ed. S.K Panter-Brick(London: University of London, 1970). p.64

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. p.64

<sup>150</sup> D Kammen and S Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990's*, 2010 Equinox Edition ed. (USA: Equinox Publishing, 1999).

<sup>151</sup> Nordlinger. p.72

regime. The creation of a functional rival can lead to a powerful disposition toward intervention within the military; once again this may motivate the military as an actor to challenge the government.<sup>152</sup>

In order to alter Schiff's model to allow for dynamic change, it has become necessary to include additional factors that may precipitate this change. It has long been argued within the literature that economics has played a role either in causing the military coup itself or explaining the life of a military regime. It is within this tradition that the role of economics is to be further explored. Of particular focus is the role that economic change can have in affecting the nature of the citizenry, thereby affecting the overall existence of a concord. It is particularly important to examine the role of economic growth in developing nations as this can have an overall impact upon the civil-military relationship of those nations.

The nature of these countries often means that the populations may be young, rurally based, poorly educated, with limited access to government services and with poor wealth distribution. The reality of this situation for the population of such a country is that politics may in fact take a back seat to immediate economic concerns. For those segments of the population that live on or close to the poverty line concerns of a political nature may well take a backseat to those which directly relate to immediate issues of food security, housing and employment.

Alternatively, if a country does experience economic growth it is possible for the middle class to swell in size, and crucially they may begin to "...make new political demands; and they spawn new political debates and tactics."<sup>153</sup> It is plausible to suggest that as the wealth and access to crucial resources increases, a growth in

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<sup>152</sup> Ibid. p.75

<sup>153</sup> Hagen Koo, "Middle Classes, Democratization, and Class Formation: The Case of South Korea," *Theory and Society* 20, no. 4 (1991). p.485

political participation may increase as those who previously were engaged in simply acquiring resources to survive, are now able to divert time into concerns over the political system. They may begin to make demands of political decision makers and of the political system as a whole. These demands may lead to instability within the political system, possibly culminating in political change.<sup>154</sup> Similarly Lipset argues for a link between average wealth, degree of industrialization, urbanization, and level of education with the degree of democratisation within a nation.<sup>155</sup> The development of the middle class changes the nature of the citizenry as an actor within Schiff's model. The middle class, now better off can expand their attention beyond subsistence.

The role of the middle class, as a component of the citizenry, cannot be underestimated, indeed much has been made of the role that the middle class can play in political change, Samuel Huntington in his book *The Third Wave*, attests to the significance of the middle class in explaining political change in developing nations during the 1970's and 1980's.<sup>156</sup> Huntington noted that the "...unprecedented economic growth of the 1960's..."contributed to the rise and growth of an urban middle class in a number of nations.<sup>157</sup> Just as the growth of the middle class is an important point to consider, it is also relevant to think about the impact that any contraction in the economy may have upon the middle class. As mentioned above the middle class is significant because it is this group within society that seeks "...consistently to promote change.", Lev also believes that historically it has been the middle class

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<sup>154</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave- Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993). p.67

<sup>155</sup> Seymour Lipset, *Political Man- the Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960). p.50

<sup>156</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave- Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. p.45

<sup>157</sup> Ibid. p.45

which has been a major driver of social, economic, cultural and political change.<sup>158</sup>

The middle class thus become very important when they are viewed in the context of the concordance relationship. They may come to play an important role in either establishing a military regime, prolonging the rule or become an organiser in the collapse of a military regime. It is for the impact that the middle class can have upon the political decision makers and upon the political process that they should be closely considered as a potential driver of change, and as a key element in creating dynamic change within this modified theory of concordance.

The structure of society is also a further factor to take into account and is one which can be considered as part of the group of factors that is driven by socio-economic change and can have profound impact upon the political system. This point is particularly relevant within those states that can be classified as developing nations.

For such nations rapid economic growth, while being hugely beneficial to the nation's economy may cause cleavages to emerge between social classes. This conflict could manifest itself in a variety of ways. Some examples of this particularly in South East Asia have evolved from rapid economic growth which has resulted in income inequality. The demand for improved pay and conditions of workers has led to clashes with authorities. Land and access to land has become a key issue around economic development. People particularly those in the rural areas who depend upon access to land for their livelihoods have been displaced by the requirements of economic development, leading to demonstrations and confrontation with governments.

Urbanisation is an important aspect of economic development, indeed the two often operate in an interdependent manner.<sup>159</sup> Those nations that have the most urbanised

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<sup>158</sup> Daniel Lev, "Intermediate Classes and Change in Indonesia: Some Initial Reflections," in *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, ed. Richard and Young Tanter, Kenneth, Monash Papers on South East Asia (Australia: Aristoc Press, 1990). p.26-27

<sup>159</sup> Yap Kioe Sheng, "Urban Challenges in South-East Asia Un Economic and Social Commission



populations also tend to have higher levels of economic development. Urbanisation, an increase in the proportion of the population living in urban areas, is often motivated by the possibility of better economic opportunities or access to service.<sup>160</sup> Urbanisation can, however, like those factors already mentioned, have a destabilising affect within society and upon the political system. Large numbers of those who move to urban centres may find that those opportunities they sought are actually not that accessible and become vulnerable to crime, exploitation and poverty. These can become powerful motivators for those who feel downtrodden to demand a change in their circumstances and to confront those in political power. Within cities these migrants may also engage in new forms of political participation, which was unavailable to them when they lived in rural areas. The greater population in urban centres allows people to take part in large strike and protest action, which may not have been possible within their smaller rural hometowns.

A sudden economic crisis may also create the ideal conditions to precipitate a shift in the civil-military relationship. Massive economic change, particularly in developing economies where a large percentage of the population may be living close to the poverty line, can have profound social and political consequences. In such cases, this particular segment of the population is likely to be particularly sensitive to fluctuations in the performance of the economy, for example through rapid rises in the cost of living, drop in incomes and increases in unemployment. These affects combine to impact upon society as a whole, of particular concern to this case is the influence that such a crises can have upon the political system and specifically upon the existing civil-military relationship. In cases where such a crises occurs in a country with some

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for Asia and the Pacific (Un Escap)," in *5th Asia-Pacific Urban Forum* (Bangkok: 2011). p.3

<sup>160</sup> OECD, "Oecd: Glossary for Statistical Terms" <http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=2819> (accessed 13/9/2012 2012).

form of military government or military backed regime, the military may become the target for the large numbers of the population who have been adversely affected by the change in the nation's economy. In such an instance those disenfranchised sections of the population may mobilise in frustration against the nation's political leaders and make demands upon the system and those individuals responsible for decision making.

Just as economic change can effect a concordance so too can change in the security environment, such as the shift from peace to war or vice versa. In the context of this study, the cold war was of major importance. South East Asia had been on the frontline in the confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States.

President Eisenhower introduced the concept of the Domino theory in Southeast Asia, which asserted the vulnerability of countries to communist expansion should one country fall to communism.<sup>161</sup> U.S military and political action in a raft of countries during the Cold War was driven out of the perceived threat of the spread of communism to American interests throughout the world.<sup>162</sup> During this time the conduct of regimes against their own populations was tolerated in the name of securing anti-communist allies. This situation did begin to change in the 1990's, as Western governments grew more critical of human rights abuses.<sup>163</sup> The conduct of the regimes who restricted political participation and perpetrated abuses against their population were no longer automatically tolerated within the context of the cold war. Military's involved in such activities could expect their conduct to be more closely scrutinised.

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<sup>161</sup> "Eisenhower National Historic Site", <http://www.nps.gov/features/eise/jrranger/quotes2.htm> (accessed 1/4/2014 2014).

<sup>162</sup> David Forsythe, "Democracy, War, and Covert Action," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992). p.392

<sup>163</sup> Geoffrey Robinson, "Indonesia: On a New Course?," in *Coercion and Governance*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). p.239

Alongside economic drivers of change there are also a number of changes that may take place within the military itself, in its structure or in the military's behaviour that can affect the relationship between the military the political system and the civilian populations. As is the case with a change in the economic situation of a given country, a change in the military can affect the nature of the civil-military relationship, and may alter the nature of the concord amongst the partners.

In the 21st century militaries have found themselves having to operate in a variety of different roles. They must be trained as war fighters and for the purpose of national defence, however they are expected and trained to operate in a variety of different roles and to fulfil a number of different missions. This has seen the training, doctrine and expertise of the soldiers and officers change from being purely devoted to fighting a war to being involved in peacekeeping operations, humanitarian relief and increasingly counter-insurgency and other low-intensity conflicts. Alfred Stepan in his study of military regimes in Latin America has discussed this point. For Stepan, the notion of the Huntingtonian politically sterile soldier is misplaced, "...the professionalization thesis was rooted in the assumption that armies develop their professional skills for conventional warfare against foreign armies."<sup>164</sup> Stepan believes that in order to deal with domestic threats, or operations such as COIN, the officers and soldiers involved require a distinct set of skills which transcend Huntington's idea of professional knowledge. These may for example include knowledge and understanding of political matters. For those military commanders who find themselves engaged in operations other than war (OOTW), for example peacekeeping, will need to be engaged in setting the scope and objectives of the operation, this leads to a blurring of the lines between the military and political

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<sup>164</sup> Alfred C. Stepan, *Authoritarian Brazil : Origins, Policies, and Future* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973). p.49

spheres.<sup>165</sup> Linked to the notion of Stepan's new professionalism and the blurring of civil-military boundaries as a result of OOTW, in Scobell's analysis of the 1987 Fijian coup, he discusses the importance of the Fijian military's participation in foreign peacekeeping operations in shaping their 'New Professionalism'.<sup>166</sup> Martial law operations may also affect the military, it presents it with considerable authority and power. The missions that the military must be trained for are increasingly broad, it is due to the variety of missions and the training required that a military may become politicised. The result of this politicisation may lead to a change in the civil-military relationship, a re-balancing or it may lead to an extreme situation in which the military take a politically active role or indeed overthrow a government.

### **Political Leadership**

Change within the political leadership is also a crucial addition to Schiff's original concept. This gives it the same characteristics of dynamism that has been noted missing from her original concept of concordance. Max Weber's forms of legitimate domination offer a manner of interpreting the change of leadership. Weber offers three types of legitimate domination to explain different forms of rule. He argues that there are three different types of rule, Legal, Charismatic and Traditional. If a power structure were to stand upon any of these systems alone it would be relatively unstable, thus argues Weber, "...both rulers and ruled uphold the internalized power structure as legitimate by right, and usually the shattering of this belief in legitimacy

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<sup>165</sup> C & Gow Dandeker, J, "Military Culture and Strategic Peacekeeping," *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 10, no. 2 (1999). p.70

<sup>166</sup> Andrew Scobell, "Politics, Professionalism, and Peacekeeping: An Analysis of the 1987 Military Coup in Fiji," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 2 (1994). p.196

has far reaching ramifications."<sup>167</sup> As will be shown the collapse in legitimacy that Weber refers to, did have far reaching consequences.

It should be noted that Traditional domination will be excluded upon the basis that it is not relevant to the current study. This type of domination did not exist within timeline of this study. Weber argues that "Traditional domination rests on the belief that the sacredness of the social order and its prerogatives as existing of yore."<sup>168</sup>

### **Legal Domination**

Legal domination is represented, claims Weber, by the bureaucracy.<sup>169</sup> Under such a system laws are implemented or changed according to a formal procedure, and there is a governing body which can be either elected or appointed.<sup>170</sup> There is an administrative staff appointed by the ruler, and the law abiding masses constitute the body politic.<sup>171</sup> Obedience under such a system is not granted to anyone personally, but instead to a series of rules and regulations which denote what the ruled owe obedience to.<sup>172</sup> The ruler is also obliged to act according to "the law" when giving a command, namely the law or laws "...which represent abstract norms."<sup>173</sup> The individual "...in command typically is the "superior" within a functionally defined "competency" or "jurisdiction", and his right to govern is legitimized by enactment."<sup>174</sup> On top of this bureaucratic system, sits the "....top positions of the

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<sup>167</sup> Richard Swedberg, ed. *Max Weber: Essays in Economic Sociology* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999). p.99

<sup>168</sup> Ibid. p.101

<sup>169</sup> Ibid. p.99

<sup>170</sup> Ibid. p.99

<sup>171</sup> Ibid. p.99

<sup>172</sup> Ibid. p.99

<sup>173</sup> Ibid. p.99

<sup>174</sup> Ibid. p.99-100

body politic..." which may come in the form of monarchs, presidents or rulers elected by parliaments.<sup>175</sup>

### **Charismatic Domination**

Bureaucracy, Weber argues can meet the quantifiable and repeating demands of 'normal' routine, however "...The provisioning of all demands that go beyond those of everyday routine has had, in principle, an entirely heterogeneous, namely, a *charismatic*, foundation..."<sup>176</sup> The leaders that possess this charismatic quality are distinct from those who serve in an occupational capacity. They are, by contrast, individuals who Weber claims hold particular gifts of the body and spirit.<sup>177</sup> Weber also states that those around the leader, the administrative staff, are chosen according to their own levels of charisma and devotion to the leader, not because of any particular qualification.<sup>178</sup> The charismatic leader is followed because of their "...non-routine qualities..." they are only followed to the extent that people ascribe these qualities to them.<sup>179</sup> The rule of the charismatic leader ends when the masses lose faith in their leadership potential. Charismatic leadership is according to Weber inherently unstable.<sup>180</sup>

Having made adjustments to Schiff's original model, we provide the model with the ability to explain change in concordance. The role that external events such as military conflict or economic crises can have upon the concord are examined, and it is suggested that the role of external crises can be significant to the continued existence of the concord. The model has been adjusted to take account of factionalism within

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<sup>175</sup> Ibid. p.100

<sup>176</sup> C Wright Mills and H.H Gerth, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958). p.245

<sup>177</sup> Ibid. p.245

<sup>178</sup> Swedberg, ed. p.104

<sup>179</sup> Ibid. p.104

<sup>180</sup> Wright Mills and Gerth, eds. p.248

the military, which can break the cohesion of the military as an institution, change it as a partner, and result in some possible form of intervention, whether coup d'état or some lower level intrusion. Changes to the citizenry has also been proposed as a further affecting the concordance, in particular, the effect of economic growth and urbanisation upon the masses. Schiff's definition of political leadership has been re-examined using Webers lens of Charismatic and Legal leadership. Change to the army's mission has also been explored as explaining potential intervention and thus affecting any existing concordance.

## Chapter Three

In order to understand the nature of the relationship which exists between the Indonesian military, government and wider society, it is necessary to discuss the history of Indonesia itself. This knowledge of the history is also needed to understand the Indonesian military and for the purposes of this study which focuses on the development of a concordance between the nation's citizens, political leadership and military.

### Colonial History

The Indonesian Archipelago lies between South East Asia and Australia and is comprised of around 17,508 islands sprawling some 5000km. Of these 17,000 islands approximately 6000 are inhabited.<sup>181</sup> The state is also very ethnically diverse. It is a country which has considerable natural resource wealth. It was the strategic and natural resource value which drew the Dutch and the Portuguese to the Archipelago in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.<sup>182</sup> The Dutch, founded the East Indies Company which was used to utilise the commercial opportunities available from the natural resource wealth in the Archipelago. The Dutch East Indies Company collapsed in 1798, which resulted in the Netherlands government stepping in to take control of the area. The Dutch, by the 20<sup>th</sup> century, had control over a large number of islands which stretched from Sumatra to New Guinea.<sup>183</sup> Like many colonial possessions, the borders of the Dutch East Indies were created in a largely arbitrary manner, stemming mainly from colonial negotiations. The result of this was the creation of a colony

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<sup>181</sup> CIA, "Indonesia", CIA <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html#Geo> (accessed 3 July 2008). p.5

<sup>182</sup> Robert J. McMahon, *Colonialism and Cold War : The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-49* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981). p.22

<sup>183</sup> R. B. Cribb and Colin Brown, *Modern Indonesia : A History since 1945*, The Postwar World (London ; New York: Longman, 1995).p.5



which largely ignored the ethnic and social differences present amongst its inhabitants.<sup>184</sup> It could be argued that the ramifications of this policy are still being felt today, with the ongoing ethnic tension and violence that has plagued areas of the country.

### **The Nationalist Movement**

Dutch colonial rule over the East Indies during the nineteenth century could be best described as a mix of exploitation and repression. There are a number of instances which can be used as proof of this, for example the nearly 200,000 Javanese believed to have been killed by the Dutch in an effort to retake Java in 1825.<sup>185</sup> There were a number of such incidents, not only in Java, but also elsewhere in the Archipelago which resulted in high numbers of casualties. This had two effects; firstly it built up resentment amongst the population, and secondly, it required the Dutch to extract increasing amounts of money out of the colony as a means to pay the increasing costs of administering the colony. It was at this point that the Dutch introduced their system of cultivation agriculture. This system was particularly harsh and exploitative on those whom were subjected to it and it was this system of production that was credited with the causing of several famines.<sup>186</sup> This system proved an enormously successful means of generating income for the colony's rulers, so successful in fact that it paid off all of the East India Company's debts by 1877. It was in the 1860's and 1870's that liberal entities in Dutch politics began to suggest that the colony should not be exploited economically to the benefit of Holland, and to the detriment of the local population. The system of cultivation was slowly dismantled as a result of the

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<sup>184</sup> Ibid. P.5

<sup>185</sup> McMahon. p.22-23

<sup>186</sup> Ibid. P.23

increasing criticism that the policy was being subjected to in Holland.<sup>187</sup> Despite the disassembly of the cultivation system, the peasants also found it difficult to profit under a system that was structured under liberal economic principles.<sup>188</sup> This was one of the grievances which Kahin described as leading to the formation of “...articulate nationalism...”<sup>189</sup>

The system of administration which the Dutch employed in the East Indies also initially served to limit the growth of Indonesian nationalism.<sup>190</sup> The Dutch installed a system of indirect rule. This system relied upon the local indigenous aristocratic rulers and provided what Kahin has described as a useful “...buffer...”<sup>191</sup> The merit of this system for the Dutch, was that it allowed the Indonesian masses to vent dissatisfaction at their Indonesian rulers. Kahin credits this system for allowing the Dutch to exploit the colony economically and politically for three centuries without incurring widespread opposition from the general population.<sup>192</sup>

The system of administration that was used by the Dutch created widespread resentment. It was seen as a system which had institutionalised racial discrimination.<sup>193</sup> The system of administration discriminated against the Indonesian masses in a number of different areas, namely, career and economic opportunities available to the Indonesians, access to the education system and protection afforded to them by the law.

The career opportunities that were available to the colonial subjects were also limited.

This was of course linked to the discrimination and inequality present within the

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<sup>187</sup> McMahon. P. 24

<sup>188</sup> Robert Van Neil, "The Course of Indonesian History," in *Indonesia*, ed. Ruth McVey, Survey of World Cultures (New Haven: Southeast Asia Studies Yale University, 1963). p.289 P.289

<sup>189</sup> George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952). p.44 P.44

<sup>190</sup> Ibid. p.56

<sup>191</sup> Ibid. p. 41

<sup>192</sup> Ibid. p.41

<sup>193</sup> See either Cribb and Brown.p.8 or Kahin. P.55

education system. This had the combined effect of reinforcing the sense of discrimination that they suffered at the hands of the Dutch, as well as limiting their economic potential and career options. A very small Indonesian middle class existed, and those who could be classed as middle class were largely employed as members of the civil service or some other salaried position.<sup>194</sup> There was an entrepreneurial class that was virtually non-existent in Indonesian society. In the cases where Indonesians were employed within the colonial service, they were subject to salaries which paid less than their European counterparts. Economic exploitation and discrimination would become a key factor in fuelling support for the nationalist cause.<sup>195</sup>

Access to education for Indonesians also became a significant source of grievance. It was generally observed that the facilities available to Indonesian students were far fewer than those available to Dutch students. Moreover the fees that were charged for the tutoring of Indonesian students also proved an area of contention. Dutch students were not charged fees. There were specialty technical, law and medical colleges being opened to Indonesian students, however these only allowed for small numbers of students. It is likely that this reinforced the sense of discrimination, and contempt for the Dutch government.<sup>196</sup> Kahin argues that for some nationalists these policies were part of a deliberate Dutch attempt to limit the educational opportunities available to the colonial subject. This policy was said to have developed in the 1930's from concern expressed by the Dutch authorities that too much education would be "...politically dangerous..."<sup>197</sup> Nevertheless education became one of the major aspects of Dutch policy which led ultimately to its own undoing. The unequal access

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<sup>194</sup> Kahin. p.29

<sup>195</sup> Ibid. p.53

<sup>196</sup> Ibid. p. 31

<sup>197</sup> Ibid. p.55

to the education system would create resentment and further strengthen the nationalist movement.

Discrimination against the Indonesian people within the Judicial system and the penal legislation was a continued source of grievance. The courts that the Indonesians had access to were of a lower standard than those accessible to the Dutch. The court system also offered less legal protection to Indonesians. Indonesians were able to be held in jail under preventative detention, despite the fact that no Judicial authorization had been given; this provision, however, did not apply to the Dutch citizens in Indonesia.

Within the Dutch East Indies there was also an all pervading sense of social discrimination and superiority practised by the Dutch and Eurasian members of the colony toward the Indonesians, despite the fact that in many cases the abilities and educational backgrounds of the Indonesians were superior.<sup>198</sup> This, Kahin notes, would continue to fuel nationalistic sentiment until 1949.<sup>199</sup> All of these factors combined to motivate the Indonesians to become determined to achieve independence by whatever means possible.

There were clearly a large number of grievances that drove Nationalist aspirations in Indonesia, and it is clear from the history that organised and aggressive nationalism was checked at various stages by the police and intelligence apparatus of the Dutch authorities. There were, alleges Kahin, a number of unique factors which both empowered and weakened the nationalist cause. Religion and language were both seen as powerful uniting influences within the Archipelago.<sup>200</sup> The People's Council or Volksraad was established in 1917, and partially comprised of Indonesians. It was

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<sup>198</sup> H Colijn, *Colonial Questions of Today and Tomorrow* (Amstredam: 1928). p.43-44 cited in Kahin. p.53

<sup>199</sup> Kahin. p.53

<sup>200</sup> Ibid. p.38-39

set up with advisory powers to the Dutch authorities. This avenue allowed for sitting nationalist members to express mild nationalistic aspirations to the public, as well as keeping nationalist grievances in view of this body.<sup>201</sup> The Volksraad was by no means an accurate expression of the entire nationalist movement. Any of the more radical nationalists refused to have anything to do with it. It was also set up in such a way that contact between those Indonesian members on the council and the wider public would be limited.<sup>202</sup> It should also be noted however that the Volksraad, was far from a venue that allowed for free expression. It was merely advisory, and its overall role in Indonesian independence should be viewed within such circumstances. The evolution of technology in the form of radio, and the increasing dissemination of both radio and press, also provided for a flow of ideas. When combined with the movement of people throughout Indonesia, the phenomenon of migration as well as media and press serve the Nationalists by further propagating their ideas and causes.<sup>203</sup>

Any discussion of Indonesian history and in particular the struggle for Independence and the nationalist movement cannot be complete without a discussion of Sukarno. He would become the leader of the nationalist movement and later, Indonesia's first president. Sukarno unlike many of his countrymen had the opportunity to attend school. His father was a teacher, and luckily for Sukarno this resulted his education at his father's school, and later finishing with further education at European schools. It was during this time that he was confronted with the discrimination that was inherent within the European education system. Combined with his own education and exposure to political ideas, this pushed a young Sukarno toward his anti-colonial

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid. p. 40

<sup>202</sup> Ibid. p.40

<sup>203</sup> Ibid. p.41

viewpoint.<sup>204</sup> He completed a degree in engineering in 1925. Along with his Western education, Sukarno also had a considerable Muslim education. This together with his knowledge of Javanese mysticism would enable him to translate "...this synthesis in terms which the peasant could understand."<sup>205</sup>

In 1927 Sukarno would become the head of the PNI or Indonesian Nationalist Party. The aim of this organisation was the gaining of independence from Holland (both political and economic), with an elected government by and for the Indonesian people. The PNI was anti-capitalist although not communist. As the head of the PNI, Sukarno would emphasise the importance of unity amongst the population in the drive to independence. Sukarno was acutely aware of the issue of Islam in the nationalist struggle. Kahin argues that he "...stressed that the party could not have an Islamic basis." This point is corroborated by Ricklefs, who describes the party as being secularly nationalist.<sup>206</sup> The PNI was combined with a number of student groups and religious parties and organisations to create an umbrella organisation known as the Agreement of Indonesian Peoples Political Associations (PPPKI).<sup>207</sup>

The PPPKI was significant because it was an attempt to amalgamate a number of disparate groups that comprised the factionalised Independence groups. However, Ricklefs argues that the unity the PPPKI created was largely inconsequential. There was a division which remained between those Muslim organisations which expressed secular opinions and those which did not.<sup>208</sup> Islamic groups were largely opposed to secular nationalism because it was a creation of man, while Muslims believed only the

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<sup>204</sup> M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia, C. 1300 to the Present* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981). p.173

<sup>205</sup> Kahin. p.91

<sup>206</sup> Ibid. p. 90 and Ricklefs. p.174

<sup>207</sup> Kahin. p.91

<sup>208</sup> Ricklefs. p.175

word of God. As Ricklefs notes they were unable to accept that within a Muslim society, unity of the country could occur through an absence of Islam.<sup>209</sup>

The growing strength of the PNI was noticed by the Dutch authorities. They became increasingly concerned about individuals such as Sukarno who were able to draw large crowds and who openly insulted the colonial authorities. Governor Andries C.D. de Graeff having already dealt with the Indonesian Workers Union, moved against the PNI and arrested Sukarno in 1929. He was tried in 1930, and found guilty.<sup>210</sup> Sukarno was sentenced to four years, but was released early at the end of 1931. In the wake of the dissolution of the PNI there would be other organisations established. However a split would emerge between those who espoused some cooperation with the Dutch and those who held more radical nationalist views.<sup>211</sup> Sukarno continued to present a challenge to Dutch rule. He commanded "...the respect and loyalty of many intellectuals while establishing wide rapport with the masses..." To counter this he was exiled to the island of Flores by the Dutch until 1942 when he was released by Japanese forces.<sup>212</sup>

The PKI or Indonesian communist party established in 1920, was involved heavily in nationalist activity as well as in trade unions. The Dutch were quick to realise the danger that this organisation represented to their authority and exiled the party's leaders.<sup>213</sup> The result of this was the emergence of a more radical group in the party who attempted a number of revolts in 1926 and 1927. At this time the party membership numbered around 3000. The Dutch crushed the revolts, imprisoning and

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<sup>209</sup> Ibid. p.179

<sup>210</sup> Ibid. p.176

<sup>211</sup> Kahin. p.92

<sup>212</sup> Ibid. p. 94

<sup>213</sup> Donald Hindley, *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963* (USA: University of California, 1964). p.18

interning those caught.<sup>214</sup> The party was declared illegal in 1927 and would "...put an effective end to Communist activity in the Indies for the remaining period of Dutch rule."<sup>215</sup>

### **The Dutch Colonial Army**

The KNIL or Koninklijke Nederlandsche Indische Leger was one of the coercive instruments used by the Dutch to control the East Indies. Concordance theory introduces Indonesia's own historical and cultural experience into the discussion of the nation's civil military relations. By doing this, it allows conclusions to be drawn about the particular patterns of civil military relations in Indonesia and to better understand the attitudes of the soldiers toward the politicians.

The colonial military period is significant because it directly affects the way in which the military in the post-colonial period behaved. Many KNIL officers would come to hold powerful positions in Indonesia's military. The types of appointments taken by these men would have profound impacts not only on the structure of the military and its doctrine, but also and most significantly for this study, on the way in which the military would view politicians and civilian government, and act toward civilian institutions, which are all important elements within a concordance.

The KNIL was primarily trained for internal operations, however this was to all change with the rapid Japanese headway made through the Pacific.<sup>216</sup> It quickly became obvious that the KNIL was going to be needed to defend the Indies. The defence of the colony had been predicated on the idea that the allied powers would help the Dutch defend the East Indies in the case of a military threat to the

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<sup>214</sup> Ibid. p.18

<sup>215</sup> Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006). p.353

<sup>216</sup> Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967* (Kuala Lumpur ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).p.1



Archipelago. The Dutch knew that their forces alone would prove incapable of defending the colony.<sup>217</sup>

The KNIL by 1940 had a professional Officer Corps numbering around 1300 and an enlisted force numbering around 37,000.<sup>218</sup> Complementing the Colonial Army was also a small Naval force and an Air force which had around 275 aircraft.<sup>219</sup> When the Japanese invasion did reach the East Indies, the Dutch did not contemplate a general mobilisation, nor did they employ asymmetric tactics. The KNIL was overrun and defeated relatively quickly by the Japanese forces, with around 65,000 members of the Dutch armed forces interned.<sup>220</sup>

The structure of the KNIL also reflected the Dutch policy of excluding Indonesians from positions of Authority. The KNIL Officer Corps was primarily filled with those of European or Eurasian extraction. There were however some important exceptions to this. One such exception was Lt. Gen. A.H Nasution, who attended the Royal Dutch Military Training academy. Nasution was one of a small minority of officers who attained senior ranks in the KNIL. His experience within the KNIL would come to have a significant impact on the development of the Indonesian military.

Like Nasution, Suharto would begin his career in the KNIL. Born to a poor family from Yogyakarta, after working a variety of jobs, Suharto joined the KNIL in 1940. In June he joined the KNIL aged 19. Following the completion of his military training in which he supposedly finished top of his class, he was posted to a battalion near Malang.<sup>221</sup> He was promoted to the rank of sergeant before the invasion of Indonesia by the Japanese. With the collapse of the Dutch forces, Suharto took off his KNIL uniform and returned to his village to avoid possible persecution by the Japanese

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<sup>217</sup> Robert Lowry, *The Armed Forces of Indonesia* (St Leonards, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 1996). p.26 P.26

<sup>218</sup> Sundhaussen.p1

<sup>219</sup> Lowry. p.26

<sup>220</sup> Ricklefs. p.187

<sup>221</sup> R.E Elson, *Suharto: A Political Biography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). p. 8

occupiers. During the occupation of Indonesia Suharto served initially as a policeman and was later recruited into PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, Protectors of the Fatherland). PETA was a volunteer army made up of local recruits for the defence of Indonesia against and Allied invasion.

### **The Japanese Occupation**

The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies began on the 10<sup>th</sup> of January 1942. By the end of January the Japanese had destroyed the combined naval power of the Dutch, American, British and Australian navies in the Battle of the Java Sea. The Dutch Forces stationed in Indonesia were quickly defeated by the Japanese forces. On the 8<sup>th</sup> March 1942, the Dutch Forces surrendered to the Japanese. The Dutch surrender amounted to a collapse of Dutch Authority. There was little sympathy amongst the local population for the plight of the Dutch. In some parts of Indonesia the local population attacked the Dutch military and Dutch civilians. The Europeans who remained (other than those who were allies of Imperial Japan) were interned in camps. As the Dutch forces were quickly defeated by the Japanese, the Indonesians witnessed the rapid collapse of their former colonial masters. The defeat of the Dutch by the Japanese discredited the former colonial masters in the eyes of those whom they had ruled.<sup>222</sup> The Japanese justified their invasion as liberation of the Indonesian people from their former white colonial masters.<sup>223</sup> Initially the Japanese were greeted with enthusiasm, however, this was quickly replaced with contempt, as everyday life in the Indies became increasingly miserable.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> Van Neil. p.298

<sup>223</sup> Salim Said, "The Genesis of Power: Civil Military Relations in Indonesia During the Revolution for Independence, 1945-1949" (Ohio State University, 1986). p.31

<sup>224</sup> Ibid. p.31

The Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies was to have a decisive impact upon the political development of Indonesia. The Japanese encouraged and developed political movements amongst the local population which would eventually lead Indonesia to independence, “By the time the Japanese surrendered, there had been so many extraordinary changes that the Indonesian Revolution was possible. The Japanese contributed directly to these developments.”<sup>225</sup>

Indonesia was divided into three separate regions by the Japanese; Sumatra under the 25th Army, Java and Madura under the 7th Army, and Kalimantan and East Indonesia under the control of the Japanese Navy. Each region yet was run differently. Java was seen as the least important in terms of resources. Despite this, Ricklefs notes that the administrative policies in the region had the effect of stimulating nationalism to a higher degree than that of the other two regions.<sup>226</sup> The area under control of the Japanese navy was ruled far more harshly due to its importance as a source of raw materials for the Japanese war effort.<sup>227</sup> The Japanese also militarised a significant number of young Indonesians, many of whom would later form the backbone of the guerrilla resistance to the Dutch. This would have profound consequences over time. Schiff's model allows us to take account of this history and demonstrates how the legacy of the Japanese trained military organisations would later impact upon the shape of Indonesia's future civil military relations.

The Japanese occupation forces encouraged the aspirations of those in the nationalist movement. This may seem surprising given the grand design that the fascist Japanese government held for their ever growing Asia-Pacific empire, nevertheless the decision to accommodate the Nationalist movement was driven more out of necessity and

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<sup>225</sup> Ricklefs. p.87

<sup>226</sup> Ibid. p.187

<sup>227</sup> Ibid. p.187

pragmatism than any wish to see the Indonesian people move toward self-determination.<sup>228</sup> By 1944 the Japanese were being confronted with an increasingly unfavourable strategic position, and as such the support of those leaders who were identified as having nationalist aspirations, became increasingly important. The Japanese required the support of the Indonesians to stave off the advance of allied forces. By supporting these leaders the Japanese hoped that they would be able to use the support of the indigenous population in their confrontation with the allies' forces. From the beginning of the occupation, the Japanese endeavoured to do away with all signs of European influence. A propaganda exercise was undertaken which sought to convince the Indonesian population of their status as members of a wider 'Asian Brotherhood', and that they too were part of the new order in Asia.<sup>229</sup> The occupiers tried to bury all trace of the Europeans. The use of the English and Dutch languages was banned, while encouraging the use of Indonesian. The Indonesian flag and national anthem were displayed publicly. As Ricklefs has noted, this propaganda campaign emphasised goodwill and a shared destiny but this was ultimately frustrated by the realities of occupation.<sup>230</sup> In the end it "...became clear that the Japanese were only another conqueror of Indonesia."<sup>231</sup> It has also been argued that the Japanese administration utilised policies which were by and large similar in nature to those utilised by the Dutch and that they were as equally despised by the Indonesians. An example of these policies was the fostering of racial superiority.<sup>232</sup>

The Japanese occupation authorities also worked closely with individuals such as Mohammed Hatta and Sukarno, men who became central to Indonesia's

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<sup>228</sup> Van Neil.p. 300

<sup>229</sup> Ricklefs. p.189

<sup>230</sup> Ibid p. 189-190

<sup>231</sup> Said.p. 36

<sup>232</sup> Benedict R. O'G Anderson, ed. *Japan the 'Light of Asia'*, ed. Josef Silverstein, Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays (New Haven: Yale University, 1966). p. 17-18

independence struggle. These relationships were utilised especially as the tide of war was increasingly turned against the Japanese. During 1943 and 1944 Indonesian involvement in the Japanese administration was increased through the inclusion of Indonesian advisers as well as an advisory board which was headed by Sukarno. There was division amongst the occupying administration, with the Army command in Java pushing for greater Indonesian participation. This was countered by the other military commands in other parts of the Archipelago, as well as the high command in Tokyo.

Japanese support for the nationalist aspirations of the Indonesian people cannot be viewed in any way as altruistic. Throughout 1943 and 1944, it was a calculation increasingly tempered by the requirements of the war effort. The Japanese were in an increasingly dire strategic position, and as such they needed the resources in Indonesia more than ever. The support for the nationalists was a careful calculation, one which was ultimately decided by the requirements of the war effort. As such, the increased support of the nationalist aspirations could be seen as means to an end; namely ensuring the support of the populace while at the same time ensuring their ongoing access to resources and support from the population.<sup>233</sup> It must be noted however that the Japanese were aware that they would eventually be unable to control Indonesian nationalism and would also be unable to keep the populations aspirations confined by the limits they placed upon the people.<sup>234</sup>

The Japanese, as well as encouraging nationalist aspirations, implemented policies which would see the formation of organisations in order to fill the ranks of the Indonesia Army. Although the Army was not directly formed by either of Indonesia's colonial masters, the para-military and military organisations founded by the Japanese

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<sup>233</sup> Ricklefs.p. 193

<sup>234</sup> Said. p. 39

and the Dutch would have a profound impact upon those who served in ranks of the Army as well as on the culture and conduct of the organisation in the post-independence period. In 1943, as the position of Japan's military was becoming increasingly precarious. It was confronted with a situation in which it was attempting to occupy a large number of different countries separated by the vastness of the Pacific Ocean. Japanese commanders in Indonesia were aware of their increasingly tenuous position. The forces which the Japanese had at their disposal in Indonesia were numerically insufficient, as well as in some cases, inadequately equipped. As such the overall defensive capability of the Japanese forces was severely compromised.<sup>235</sup>

The solution to this position of weakness that the Japanese found themselves in, would now be found in the Mobilisation policy. The Japanese had, from the beginning of their occupation of Indonesia, mobilised the local population in an effort to further enhance their war fighting capability.<sup>236</sup> 1943 saw the creation of an organisation which would aid the Japanese forces in their defence of Indonesia, and perhaps more significantly would become the “...nucleus of the future Indonesian republican army.”<sup>237</sup>

In December of 1943, the first battalions of the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air - The Defender of the Fatherland) were formed. While the Japanese created a number of youth organisations PETA was one of the largest and most significant. Estimates of

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<sup>235</sup> Several authors who have written about PETA, have argued that it was the increasingly weak defensive position of Japanese forces in Indonesia, which motivated the establishment of PETA and contributed to the wider mobilisation policy. See Nugroho Notosusanto, *The Peta Army During the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*, First ed. (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979). and Joyce Lebra, *Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977)..

<sup>236</sup> T.B Simatupang, *Pelpor Dalam Pernag Pelopor Dalam Damai* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1981). p.71-72 in Said. p.38

<sup>237</sup> Van Neil. p. 300, Similarly noted by Raden Gatot Mangkupradja, Harumi Wanasita Evans, and Ruth McVey, "The Peta and My Relations with the Japanese: A Correction of Sukarno's Autobiography," *Indonesia* 5, (1968). p.129

the organisation's size, vary from 40,000 to 120,000.<sup>238</sup> It should be noted that PETA was not the only organisation to receive training. As Salim points out, basic military training had become common in many of the other Japanese sponsored organisations.<sup>239</sup> Heiho was a similar initiative to PETA. It was set up to provide Indonesian assistance to regular Japanese forces. Unlike PETA, Heiho soldiers would assist Japanese forces directly, often by providing supplementary tasks to specific units.<sup>240</sup>

The typical PETA recruit was aged in their teens or early twenties.<sup>241</sup> The period and content of the training varied depending upon the trainee's rank in PETA.<sup>242</sup> Noted by those who took part in these programs was the intense discipline, emphasis upon self-reliance and the propensity to endure hardship.<sup>243</sup> PETA recruits were also heavily indoctrinated with ideas of Indonesian nationalism.<sup>244</sup> This indoctrination also consisted of what Sundhaussen has termed "...samurai..." type indoctrination.<sup>245</sup> This samurai type indoctrination concentrated upon the individual's fighting spirit. The Japanese believed very strongly that if they could instil these values in their Indonesian recruits they would fight for the Japanese in their coming confrontation with the allied forces.<sup>246</sup> The Japanese hoped that this type of indoctrination would create a force which would tenaciously oppose the inevitable allied invasion. The impact of the PETA experience upon those who served was considerable. It impacted

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<sup>238</sup> For the lower estimate see Notosusanto. For the higher estimates see Van Neil.

<sup>239</sup> Said. p. 40

<sup>240</sup> Lebra.

<sup>241</sup> Also referred to in sources as youth (Pemuda). The significance of the pemuda contribution to the independence of Indonesia is widely noted in the literature.

<sup>242</sup> Lebra. p.103-105

<sup>243</sup> Ibid. p. 106

<sup>244</sup> McVey argues that the PETA soldiers were indoctrinated with a belief that the individual's will was the "...essential soldierly ingredient..." and was more important than either the soldier's technical skill or their equipment. This reference to the importance of 'fighting spirit' also noted by Mangkupradja, Evans, and McVey: p.123-124. and Said, p.40.

<sup>245</sup> Sundhaussen. p.2

<sup>246</sup> Said. p. 40

greatly on these men's view of the military's place in society. Those who served in PETA were indoctrinated with a number of beliefs and perceptions which would later affect their perceptions of civilian leadership, as well as the other soldiers with whom they served.

The values and ideas that these men were indoctrinated with are an essential part of one of Schiff's indicators that of Military Style. Schiff refers to Military style as:

"...the external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it. Why is style so important? Style is about the drawing of social boundaries or their elimination."<sup>247</sup>

Military style particularly that of the PETA soldiers, is a very important element in explaining the behaviour and nature of these soldiers in the wake of the Japanese surrender and the struggle for independence. Kingsbury notes a number of the aspects of PETA and of the Japanese experience which would later inform the Post-Revolutionary Indonesian military mind.<sup>248</sup> Kingsbury claims that the system of Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function), which was the guiding principle prescribing Indonesia's civil military relations for many years, was inherited from the theoretical underpinnings prominent in Japanese Fascist ideology. The civilian leadership was unable to exercise any authority in the military arena. Increasingly however the military came to involve itself in the civil arena. This pattern somewhat mirrored the evolution of civil-military relations in Indonesia. This sentiment is similarly offered by McVey, who argues that "...in the PETA, future army leaders had been persuaded by their Japanese mentors of the need for military independence from civilian control."<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>247</sup> Schiff.

<sup>248</sup> Damien Kingsbury, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military* (London ; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003). p.27-29

<sup>249</sup> Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army. Pt I," *Indonesia* Vol.11, (1971). p.136



Pauker goes further to argue that the PETA soldiers were the “...intellectual captives...” of the training they had received from the Japanese, and as such they held a particularly entrenched unfavourable view of their civilian masters.<sup>250</sup> It has also been argued that the way in which the Indonesian military came to involve itself both in the domestic and foreign affairs of the nation was inherited from the example of the Japanese occupation forces.<sup>251</sup> Kingsbury argues that the Japanese forces had other impacts upon the fledgling Indonesian military. He suggests that the Japanese military's utilisation of mass organisations would also have a profound impact upon the Indonesian military.<sup>252</sup> A further significant argument from Kingsbury relates to the use of violence by the Japanese fascist government. According to Huntington this amounted to the “....superimposing of an extralegal system of violence upon the formal system of constitutional government.”<sup>253</sup> Kingsbury suggests examples of this can be seen in the history of the TNI. He specifically mentions for example the use of the TNI to suppress the communists in the mid 1960's and later the use of Kopassus (Indonesian Army Special Forces) to target and eliminate sources of domestic political dissent.<sup>254</sup>

The Japanese occupation forces and system of government administration may have also impacted upon the development of the TNI's Dwi Fungsi. It has been argued that during World War Two the Japanese had a civil-military relationship that was characterised by a high degree of military independence.<sup>255</sup> It is also claimed that the Japanese system of government during this time allowed for a level of separation

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<sup>250</sup> G.J Pauker, *The Bridge between Generations in Indonesian Military Politics* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1976), P-5655.p. 21

<sup>251</sup> Kingsbury. p.27-28

<sup>252</sup> Ibid. p.28

<sup>253</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. p.137 quoted in Kingsbury. p.28

<sup>254</sup> Kingsbury. p.28

<sup>255</sup> Ibid. p.27

between the military and the civil, according to their principle of *niju seif* (Dual Government). Kingsbury claims this idea was reflected in the TNI's doctrine of Dwi Fungsi.<sup>256</sup>

The KNIL, like the Japanese armed groups, also had an important legacy upon the development of the Indonesian armed forces. It was historically used by the Dutch in an internal security role, putting down uprisings and quelling resistance to their rule.<sup>257</sup> The importance of conducting internal operations has certainly been an important ongoing mission of the Indonesian army and the wider security forces. This mission to ensure the ongoing integrity of the country has often been perused with ruthless efficiency as can be seen in operations undertaken in Aceh and Papua. As noted, the KNIL leadership was mainly comprised of European officers. These individuals had been educated according to western military standards at Dutch military academies and brought with them notions of military professionalism different to those understood by members of Japanese founded organisations. The KNIL group of officers, though small in number, would become a powerful group in the new army and because of their educational background they were able to undertake staff duties.<sup>258</sup> This educational background was to be one of the major points of difference in the future between the KNIL soldiers and those from PETA and other mass organisations.

There were a number of individuals who served in the ranks of PETA who would come to have a significant impact upon the course of Indonesian history and hold significant roles in Indonesian politics and the military. Suharto is one such individual and possibly the most significant to this discussion. His intense patriotism was

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<sup>256</sup> Ibid. p.27

<sup>257</sup> Ibid. p.43

<sup>258</sup> Sundhaussen. p.14

fostered as part of the PETA indoctrination.<sup>259</sup> The PETA experience crucially would come to inform the opinions of those who had served in its ranks about the role of the military, the nature of the military, and the relationship between the military and civilians. Kingsbury, Elson and Pauker all suggest that the experience that PETA soldiers had during their time in the organisation pushed them to view civilians with a certain degree of suspicion and mistrust. Kingsbury argues that the PETA soldiers came to believe that there should be a relationship between the military and government, and that the military had a role in directing and controlling society.<sup>260</sup> Elson suggests that it was PETA's freedom from civilian control or authority that would come to have a major impact upon the post-independence Armed Forces.<sup>261</sup> Pauker, considered that it was the values that the Japanese instilled within the PETA soldiers which would lead to them holding contempt for "...scheming politicians..."<sup>262</sup>

### **Revolution**

The existence of PETA and other para-military groups gave the Indonesian Nationalists the means to resist the Dutch in the wake of Japan's defeat in Indonesia. Many of those whom had served in the Japanese Para-Military organisations would become fighters in the war against the Dutch, and this then led to the end of Dutch control over Indonesia. This episode in Indonesia's history became known as the revolutionary period. This period brought the further development of the Indonesian armed forces, as well as the further evolution of the philosophical and theoretical underpinnings that would later inform the behaviour of the TNI, and its relationship with the civilian government within the fledgling state.

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<sup>259</sup> Elson. p. 10

<sup>260</sup> Kingsbury. p.44

<sup>261</sup> Elson. p.10

<sup>262</sup> G.J Pauker, *The Role of the Military in Indonesia* (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, 1961), RM-2637-RC. p.199

When the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on the 15<sup>th</sup> August 1945, pressure began to mount upon the young nationalist leadership to declare independence. Sukarno and Hatta were however conscious of avoiding armed conflict with the Japanese forces remaining.<sup>263</sup> There were other individuals who were more determined to have independence declared immediately. One group in particular took matters into their own hands. *Menteng 31 Group* abducted Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to declare independence.

The pronouncement of Indonesian independence took place on the 17<sup>th</sup> August 1945. Despite proclaiming independence, Sukarno and Hatta knew that they would still have to be careful. Some armed Japanese troops remained in the country and, as the allies were about to land in Indonesia, they were keen to avoid a confrontation or an act which would in any way compromise their proclamation of independence. It is interesting to note that at this point, there were no plans for the creation of an Army. It has been pointed out that this may have been due to the divergent views held by the nationalist leadership, relating to the methods and strategy which were to be used in the independence struggle. It has been argued that those such as Hatta and Sukarno were keen to avoid direct conflict and therefore favoured a policy which would emphasise diplomatic negotiation. Those men, who had belonged to organisations such as PETA and the other youth para-military groups, believed that it was more likely that independence would be achieved as a result of armed struggle.<sup>264</sup> It was due to this cleavage that the new government had to be careful in the strategy it employed to gain self-determination. They were faced with a situation in which

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<sup>263</sup> Bilveer Singh and Australian National University. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre., *Civil-Military Relations in Democratising Indonesia : The Potentials and Limits to Change*, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence ; No. 141 (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre Australian National University, 2001), p. 47.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid. p.49

increasingly large numbers of men were determined to pursue an aggressive strategy toward the Dutch.

The new republic's leaders found themselves in a situation that was further complicated by the disarray which now confronted leaders in the wake of the Japanese military defeat. Despite the departure of many of the Japanese, armed Japanese soldiers remained and the para-military organisations which had been formed by the Japanese had been demobilised. This resulted in large numbers of young men with access to weapons. The Indonesians were also aware of the approaching landing of allied troops and the republic's leaders were keen to avoid a confrontation. As previously mentioned, the republic's leaders were grappling with the question of founding a military force. Simultaneously, many of the men who had been members of PETA and the other similar Japanese Para-military organisations were beginning to organise their own ad-hoc organisations. As Ricklefs notes, these organisations were often formed spontaneously by young charismatic leaders, who more often than not had access to arms.<sup>265</sup> Therefore one could argue, that it was at this time, that a proto and unofficial Indonesian army began to evolve, without submitting to the nascent republic's civilian leadership.

It was during the revolutionary period, and in its immediate aftermath, that the government struggled to bring the para-military forces to heel.<sup>266</sup> Jenkins stated that it was at this point in time which contained many of the origins of future conflicts that would break out between the civilian government and the military.<sup>267</sup> Salim Said, who has written on the Indonesian military and the leaders of the military, supports Jenkin's position by stating that it was the weakness of Indonesian governments to

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<sup>265</sup> Ricklefs, p.202.

<sup>266</sup> Ibid. p.202

<sup>267</sup> David Jenkins, "The Evolution of Indonesian Army Doctrinal Thinking," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 11, no. 2 (1983). p.16

establish effective civilian institutions as well as the military's involvement in politics from its birth that would result in a source for future conflicts between the military and the civilian government.<sup>268</sup> As previously noted the civilian leaders were taking a different path to those former PETA fighters and the Pemuda.<sup>269</sup>

### **The Revolution and the Creation of an Army**

With the proclamation of Independence, pressure was brought to bear upon Sukarno over the issue of raising a military force. This pressure was applied by the numerous Pemuda groups, who had been radicalised by the suffering and oppression of the Japanese occupation.<sup>270</sup> Representatives of the Pemuda and other groups met with Sukarno over the action that should be done about the PETA.<sup>271</sup> Pemuda were pushing to have a national army created. Sukarno and the government leaders were circumspect. As mentioned, they were concerned with the possible reaction of the Allies and the Japanese.<sup>272</sup> Despite this, on the 22nd of August 1945, the People's Security Agency, BKR, was created.

On the 4th of September 1945 Sukarno began naming ministers who would form his cabinet. One post was curiously absent that of the Defence minister. It was not until the 6th of October that a name was actually put forward. This is a further example of the government's concern about Allied reaction to the formation of the security services.<sup>273</sup> It is important to note that as the BKR came into existence, there were

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<sup>268</sup> Salim Said, *Genesis of Power : General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49* (North Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992). p.2

<sup>269</sup> Pemuda or youth came to play an important and violent role in the revolution. The importance of which can not be underestimated or ignored.

<sup>270</sup> Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946* (London: Cornell University Press, 1972). Anderson's book provides the reader with an excellent insight in the role of the Pemuda in the Indonesian revolution. The first chapter in particular describes the way in which the Pemuda were radicalised under Japanese occupation.

<sup>271</sup> Ibid. p.102

<sup>272</sup> Ibid. p.103

<sup>273</sup> Said, *Genesis of Power : General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49*. p.11

already armed groups forming spontaneously outside of Jakarta. It has been noted that there was a lack of control over those outside of Jakarta at this time, and as such these groups were created autonomously of any central direction.<sup>274</sup> It is also important to note that many of these armed groups began to align themselves to specific political parties or causes, and this would lead to conflict among various political interests. Those groups who chose to stay outside of the BKR, or later the army were encouraged to form partisan groups or Lasykar.

It became obvious that the BKR was ineffective. Because the BKR had proved difficult for the central government to control. Furthermore the number of Pemuda who had armed themselves and stayed outside of the BKR resulted in the political leadership looking to the creation of a "...hierarchical and purely military organization directly under its own control."<sup>275</sup> Thus the People's Security Army or TKR came into existence. The structure of the new force was improved, according to Sundhaussen by the inclusion of the former KNIL officers.<sup>276</sup> Even at the beginning, tensions were present over the leadership of the army. There was tension about the appointment of the Chief of the General Headquarters of the new army, because Urip Sumohardjo, the man chosen was a former KNIL officer. This action created resentment with those whom had served in PETA.<sup>277</sup>

This would form a flashpoint for tension in the new army as there was an inherent friction between those soldiers who had trained in the Dutch forces and those who were PETA recruits. In this created major issues at the leadership level, particularly because the KNIL officers had the ability to carry out staff duties.<sup>278</sup> Added to this mix were individuals who came from a Lasykar background. These individuals were a

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<sup>274</sup> Ibid. p.23

<sup>275</sup> Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*. p. 232

<sup>276</sup> Sundhaussen. p.7

<sup>277</sup> Ibid. p.7

<sup>278</sup> Ibid. p.14

disparate group who had a variety of different allegiances and beliefs. They were not career military officers like those individuals who had entered from the KNIL, but were instead motivated by other ideological causes or aligned with political parties.<sup>279</sup> Some of these Lasykar and Pemuda groups operated outside the military, others however were incorporated within the new army.

David Jenkins argues that, following this appointment of Urip Sumohardjo, the government virtually left the military alone, as they were unsure what to do next, "...there were no policy guidelines and no attempt was made to control the recruitment or promotion of officers or to bring the military structure under government control."<sup>280</sup> The TKR was organised on the basis of four Komandemens comprising Sumatra, West, Central and East Java. These Komandemens were responsible for both the TKR and the partisan or Lasykar groups. However as Sundhaussen observes, much of this organisation was superficial. In the case of the Sumatran command, he notes that the General in charge was resented by his troops for having no military training, and for his ethnic background.<sup>281</sup> The General was Javanese and had been put in charge of a Sumatran command.<sup>282</sup> Ethnic and religious diversity would also become a significant issue within the military.

Indonesia is a very ethnically diverse nation, and this diversity was not reflected in the officer corps during the army's establishment. Within the officer corps there was a high percentage of Javanese officers, which totalled approximately 70-80% of the total officer corps.<sup>283</sup> The next most significant group were the Sudanese, and alongside the Sudanese were a number of other smaller populations. The ethnic division within the military began to create tensions as the Javanese officers, who

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<sup>279</sup> Pauker, *The Role of the Military in Indonesia*. p.195

<sup>280</sup> Jenkins. p.16

<sup>281</sup> Sundhaussen. p.7

<sup>282</sup> Ibid. p.7

<sup>283</sup> Estimate taken from *ibid.* p.15



were over represented, were spread throughout the country in command roles, and were increasingly concentrated within the army's headquarters. This situation in the military also mirrored what was occurring more widely throughout the government.<sup>284</sup>

The prominence of Javanese officers within the military's senior positions would become a source of grievance for those who came from outside of Java. Sundhaussen notes that in the first few years of the army's existence, the ethnic issue was not to prove a serious flashpoint, however it became more serious in the 1950's.<sup>285</sup>

The TKR was divided further along religious lines. Indonesia is comprised of a number of different religious faiths, Islam of which is the most widely followed. In Indonesia Islam is divided between those who follow a more conservative faith and those who have a more secular outlook. This divide was replicated within the new army. Those, known as Santri adhere to a strict orthodox interpretation of Islam and its laws. This group was often in conflict with those known as Abangan. The Abangan belief system is more secular in orientation and comprised of mystic beliefs incorporating both Islam and Hinduism. The officers from within Java were shaped by this divide; those from central Java held the Abangan beliefs, while those from East and West Java along with the outer islands tended to hold Santri beliefs.<sup>286</sup>

Alongside Islam, Christianity and Hinduism are practised in Indonesia. During the early 1950's the most senior military officer, Simatupang, was a Protestant. Some officers were also Catholics, although they did not generally attain similar heights to those of other religious denomination.<sup>287</sup> There were very few Hindu officers amongst the ranks of the officer corps.

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<sup>284</sup> Point noted by *ibid.* p.15

<sup>285</sup> *Ibid.* p.16

<sup>286</sup> *Ibid.* p.14-15

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.* p.14

The nature of the fighting engaged by the Indonesian nationalists and the army would also have a fundamental impact upon the military. The independence struggle involved periods of guerrilla warfare involving irregular forces, such as the Laskar, as well as regular military units. It was a conflict that required both political action as well as military action. The guerrilla war that took place between the Indonesian nationalist army and the Dutch would have implications not only on the development of Indonesian military doctrine and strategy but also on the relationship between the military and the people. The military depended upon winning the hearts of the people to defeat the Dutch. General Nasution defined this in August 1948, when he outlined his strategy "*Executing total people's resistance*". This strategy involved a close relationship between the villagers and the soldiers who they depended upon. Nasution argued that in order for the strategy to work, a number of different command levels were put in place. The base level would require military personnel at village level to prevent infiltration or manipulation of the populace by the enemy.<sup>288</sup> McGregor describes this experience as being at the core of the military's claim to direct access to the people as well as their political role.<sup>289</sup> When the civilian leadership of the revolution were surrounded and captured on the 20th December 1948, the military fought on and viewed themselves as the saviours of the republic.<sup>290</sup> Jenkins argues that the military felt as though it had been betrayed by the actions of the civilian leadership; he also claims that civilians who fought with the army against the Dutch came to view the military as being the republic.<sup>291</sup> Sundhaussen goes further, claiming

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<sup>288</sup> Said, *Genesis of Power : General Sudirman and the Indonesian Military in Politics, 1945-49*. p.102

<sup>289</sup> Katharine McGregor, *History in Uniform: Military Ideology and the Construction of Indonesia's Past* (Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2007). p.136

<sup>290</sup> Ricklefs. p.218

<sup>291</sup> Jenkins. p. 17

that the military came to see themselves as being responsible for Indonesia's eventual independence.<sup>292</sup>

The guerrilla war and the surrender of the nationalist movement would have important consequences for the development of the evolving Indonesian military mind. Firstly, the military viewed itself as having had a shared experience with the population in winning independence, particularly in the guerrilla phases of the war. This would justify their belief that they had a social and political role to play. Secondly, the surrender of the independence movement's political leadership nurtured a sense that they had been let down by civilian politicians, and perhaps reinforced a sense of inherent civilian weakness in the minds of some of the soldiers. Thirdly, it was the military that won independence, when at the time the independence movement had looked its weakest yet had continued fighting and eventually won. It seems plausible to suggest that this engendered a sense of entitlement within them, as well as the view of superiority to those civilians who had surrendered.

The war for independence and the guerrilla struggle would also have an important side effect for the chain of command and the military hierarchy. It was a conflict which by its very nature was highly decentralised. Military officers in outer islands had limited contact with those in Java and vice versa. Nevertheless, the cause of independence bound this disparate group together. When the struggle ended, this bond no longer existed, and respect for the officer's rank was by no means guaranteed.<sup>293</sup> In Java, units operated with little contact between one another when they did operate together it was more "...collegial than hierarchical..." This was further strengthened by the fact that these units were drawn out of the local population and reflected the

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<sup>292</sup> Sundhaussen. p.45-46

<sup>293</sup> McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army. Pt I." p.141-142

local ethnic and cultural intricacies.<sup>294</sup> The revolutionary experience created an intense bond amongst these individuals which, as McVey argues, created alliances and relationships that endured after the revolution had ceased.<sup>295</sup>

The significance of shared experience during the revolution between the young men and their seniors cultivated a level of loyalty that was particularly intense. McVey suggests that this would create a bond between commanders and men that was more "...vivid and enduring..." than any subsequent, and "when torn between revolutionary loyalties and the authority of their current commander, soldiers were only too likely to choose their revolutionary chief or to avoid action altogether."<sup>296</sup>

The Indonesian army would also become involved in counter-insurgency operations from its foundation. The impact of these military operations would be profound and enduring, the significance of which cannot be underestimated. The nature of the struggle that took place in the wake of Independence would have a profound impact upon the development of the army's ethos and doctrine. The independence struggle involved a four year conflict with the Dutch. The Indonesian Army's experience in undertaking counter-insurgency operations against the Darul Islam or Negara Islam Indonesia. Darul Islam an early example was a parallel state to the republic, established in 1948 according to Muslim practice and law. It was located in Western Java where more modern interpretations of Islam had been unable to gain a significant following.<sup>297</sup> This state was headed by S.M Kartosuwirjo, who called for the Indonesian Republican Government to scrap the Renville agreement with the Dutch. If it did not, Kartosuwirjo advocated the removal of the republican government and its

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<sup>294</sup> Ibid. p.142

<sup>295</sup> Ibid. p.142

<sup>296</sup> Ibid. p.142-143

<sup>297</sup> Kahin. p.326

replacement by democratic means.<sup>298</sup> Darul Islam also possessed military capabilities, which it would use to continue its fight against the Dutch in West Java. Following the proclamation of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia in 1950, Kartosuwirjo appealed to Sukarno twice through letters calling for the establishment of an Islamic state. These letters were never responded to, and Indonesia remained a secular state. Darul Islam sought separation from the republic and control of its own territory.<sup>299</sup> As time passed the organisation attracted individuals who were more interested in lining their own pockets and who engaged in extortion to secure supplies and perpetrated violence against the local population.<sup>300</sup> Darul Islam would remain a significant challenge for the Indonesian security forces until its final collapse in 1962 with the capture of its leader.

Similarly, the Madiun affair of 1948 was a further example of the military engaging in an internal security role. Tensions were initially provoked by the proposal of a reduction in the size of the army. Nasution wished to reduce the size of the military from approximately 350,000 regulars and 470,000 Laskar in Java to a force of approximately 160,000. Consequently, there would be those who would suffer under the demobilisation plan, namely many of the local Javanese units, and the Laskar.<sup>301</sup> This would prove a source of grievance and one which would later be seized upon by the PKI in its confrontation with the republican government.<sup>302</sup> Amid this climate of tension and discontent, Musso, a PKI leader of the 1920's arrived in Indonesia from the Soviet Union. As the PKI began encouraging demonstrations by workers and

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<sup>298</sup> C. A. O. Van Nieuwenhuijze, "The Dar Ul-Islam Movement in Western Java," *Pacific Affairs* 23, no. 2 (1950). p.177

<sup>299</sup> Hiroko Horikoshi, "The Dar Ul-Islam Movement in West Java (1948-62): An Experience in the Historical Process," *Indonesia* 20, (1975). p.76

<sup>300</sup> Kahin. p.330

<sup>301</sup> See Ricklefs. p.216 and David Charles Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," *Indonesia* 21, (1976). p.2 and p.7

<sup>302</sup> Sundhaussen. p.39

peasants in the Surakarta area, Musso began challenging the republic's diplomatic strategy of trying to win American support for its independence.<sup>303</sup> The PKI also criticized the plans for the rationalization of the military which it viewed as turning the military into a first and second class army.<sup>304</sup> By the middle of September 1948, clashes were taking place between those elements of the armed forces loyal to the government and those loyal to the PKI. The government sent in the Siliwangi Division, which pushed the PKI forces into Madiun. On the 18 September 1948 the PKI won strategic sites in the city of Madiun and announced that a new National Front Government had been formed. Despite an offer of compromise made by the leaders of the PKI to the republican government, it was decided that the republic would not accept the offer.<sup>305</sup> Sukarno announced on the 19 September 1948 that the PKI's activities amounted to an attempt to topple the national government. The Siliwangi division now marched on Madiun. Vicious fighting took place between those forces loyal to the PKI and those of the national government. By the 30th of September, however, the uprising was over and the city had been recaptured.<sup>306</sup> The events in Madiun would have far reaching consequences for the military. The project of rationalising and reorganising the military would continue. The main proponent of this plan, General Nasution, whose Siliwangi division had been bought to fight the PKI, found his position was enhanced.<sup>307</sup> Following Madiun, the military was purged of the officers and soldiers who had taken sides with the PKI. This, argues Sundhaussen, was an attempt to remove a variety of extremists from the army.<sup>308</sup> The soldiers who remained loyal to the republic, the Madiun affair a treasonous and an

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<sup>303</sup> Ricklefs. p.216

<sup>304</sup> Sundhaussen. p.39

<sup>305</sup> Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair." p.26-28

<sup>306</sup> Ricklefs. p.217 and Kahin. p.300

<sup>307</sup> Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair." p.44-45

<sup>308</sup> Sundhaussen. p.40

extremely violent act, and one which resulted in soldiers regarding the political left and communism in particular, with a lasting sense of enmity.<sup>309</sup>

The examples of Darul Islam and the Madiun Affair both illustrate that from a very early stage the Army had a significant role to play as an agent for maintaining internal security. In the wake of the Madiun affair, Sukarno spoke about the danger of having sectional interests adopted above those of the people, and stated that there was only one ideology that the military should accept, that of Pancasila.<sup>310</sup> Both the handling of Madiun and the initial experience with Darul Islam would also lead to the military rejecting both militant Islam and communism.<sup>311</sup> For the Indonesian army the early experience of counter-insurgency and conducting of guerrilla style operations would come to permeate Indonesian strategic thinking and shape the relationship that the military would come to hold within the state as well as its relationship with the people. In November 1948, General Nasution issued operational order Number 1, which would come to be known as the territorial concept. Inherent within this, was the notion that there should be a territorial control network that exists from the village up.<sup>312</sup> Nasution also emphasised heavily the importance of the relationship between the people and the guerrilla. This, claims Cribb, was not only significant for the development of guerrilla strategies but also for the army to claim a "...direct relationship with the people, independent of the republican state, and so to establish a platform and justification for army involvement in politics."<sup>313</sup> The combined effect of this was to create a military which from its inception, would take a major role in

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<sup>309</sup> Both *ibid.* p.40 and Ricklefs. p.217 make the point that the violent actions of the PKI and its allies would create an enduring sense of animosity within the military toward the PKI.

<sup>310</sup> Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair." p.46

<sup>311</sup> Sundhaussen. p.46

<sup>312</sup> Leonard Sebastian, *Realpolitik Ideology- Indonesia's Use of Military Force* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006). p.40

<sup>313</sup> Robert Cribb, "Military Strategy in the Indonesian Revolution: Nasution's Concept of 'Total Peoples War' in Theory and Practice," *War and Society* 19, no. 2 (2001). p.145

maintaining internal security. This was developed from the early experience that it had in COIN operations. As Fairburn argues, this orientated the "...Indonesian army organisation and activities along police-action-cum-civic-action lines."<sup>314</sup> The experience of having prosecuted a guerrilla war and then having been engaged in COIN operations led the military to realise the significance of politics and maintaining a connection to society in order to execute its role in internal security, Jenkins considered that this was the formative period for its later doctrine of Dwi Fungsi, which would shape Indonesian civil military relationship under Suharto. Structurally the age distribution within the new army would have affected the stability of the new organisation in years to come. As Sundhaussen notes this is a problem typical of armies in new states.<sup>315</sup> In the case of the Indonesian army, the senior officers, were all very young. Sudirman, who was promoted to head the army in 1945, was 33 years old at the time of his appointment, and his divisional commanders were aged in their 20's.<sup>316</sup> The young age of those serving in the officer corps can have a number of negative impacts for the cohesion and discipline of the army. To begin with, it created tension and rivalries amongst the individuals serving. It was plausible to have two soldiers of a similar age and experience, but one receiving a more senior rank. This would create a situation in which the soldier of lower rank was likely to question his senior officer's appointment, and could as Luckham suggests "...weaken established patterns of discipline..."<sup>317</sup> The similar ages of officers in Indonesia

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<sup>314</sup> Geoffery Fairburn, *Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare: The Countryside Version* (London: Pelican Books, 1974). p.26 quoted in Emmet McElhatton, "Guerrilla Warfare and the Indonesian Strategic Psyche" *Small Wars Journal* (2008). [smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/59-mcelhatton.pdf](http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/59-mcelhatton.pdf) (accessed 4/4/2013). p.4

<sup>315</sup> Sundhaussen. p.16

<sup>316</sup> Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Military in Research on Indonesian Politics," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31, no. 2 (1972).

<sup>317</sup> Luckham. p.64



created an environment of "...envy and resentment..." between those in less senior positions.<sup>318</sup>

The military hierarchy and system of discipline was further undermined by individual officers who promoted themselves to higher ranks, or created their own regiments that were comprised of their friends and acquaintances.<sup>319</sup> The army tried to put an end to this practice in 1946 when, during a conference, it was agreed that senior ranks would only be given to a certain number of officers holding specific commands.<sup>320</sup> This breakdown in the system of military hierarchy and discipline also manifested itself in the election of acceptable commanders to leadership positions by their subordinates.<sup>321</sup> Soldiers were electing their commanding officers. This practice was completely undermining the system of military promotion which is based upon merit, experience and knowledge. It was being replaced by practice which was undermining military discipline and western concepts of military professionalism, with a chain of command that included those who had not earned their positions through merit. In the wake of independence, those officers who held command positions were uninterested in resigning their command; this created a situation in which the channels for promotion became jammed.<sup>322</sup> This not only had a negative impact upon the military's chain of command and the military's discipline, but it would also prove a source of future conflict.

The Indonesian Army from its very inception was beset by division. The importance of the backgrounds of officers and soldiers who would come to fill the rank and file of the TKR cannot be underestimated. This division manifested itself in the level of training of the soldiers and officers, their views on civilian leadership, tactics and

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<sup>318</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.16

<sup>319</sup> Ibid. p.16

<sup>320</sup> Ibid. p.16

<sup>321</sup> Ibid. p. 16-17

<sup>322</sup> Ulf Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army," *Asia quarterly* 2, (1971). p.187

strategy and their levels of education. There was hostility between the two groups as they struggled for control of the new organisation. Ethnic rivalry between the various groups recruited into the new army would also prove a source of tension, both at the time of its creation and at points in the future. The level of tension between these various factions was compounded by the overall lack of civilian control of the military in its early stages of existence. The military during the revolution often operated quite independently of those political leaders in charge of the new republican government. There were, for example, revolutionaries outside of Java who had very little contact with the politicians and leaders of the revolution.

## **Analysis**

### **The Military**

The military was far from evolving into a coherent actor, it slowly evolved from the remnants of the KNIL and the Japanese trained Indonesian auxiliary forces. These disparate coercive elements then combined together in the struggle for independence. The backgrounds of the individuals from these two organisations created significant division within this new army. Command was problematic, commanders acted outside of a unified chain of command. There was deep disagreement and resentment within the new organisation about the appointment of officers to positions of command. The KNIL officers took positions of command within the new army, including the position of the Chief of General Headquarters. Such appointments highlighted the division between those from the western 'professional' KNIL background, and those from the Japanese and other youth and religious based organisations. Cohesion in the army was further undermined in this early period by ethnic and religious diversity present within the officer corps as in its lower ranks. Religion also compounded the factionalism

present in the organisation, with a split amongst those officers from the Islamic faith, as well as those who held Hindu and Christian beliefs. As a result there was little or no cohesion within the army. Thus the military cannot be seen at this time as a coherent partner to any concord.

### **Political Leadership**

The basis of the political leadership was the Indonesian nationalist movement which had been in existence during the Dutch colonial period and later during the Japanese occupation. Under Dutch colonial rule, the PNI, headed by Sukarno was one of the organisations that comprised the movement. There were also other organisations such as labour unions and religious based organisations that were involved in the movement. Sukarno however was one of the individuals to emerge from the movement, who had a major impact upon politics of the nation in years to come. Sukarno's involvement and importance to the nationalist movement was not overlooked by the Dutch, as he was imprisoned and exiled. He commanded widespread support amongst the wider population as well as amongst a variety of elites. His nationalist credentials and charisma, made him influential in the later struggle with the Dutch. Despite being an influential leader within the nationalist movement, his ability to exert direct influence over the armed forces was limited, particularly during the guerrilla war with the Dutch. Independence was proclaimed on the 17th of August 1945, yet it took until the 4th of September for Sukarno to begin naming his cabinet. There was a high degree of caution exercised by the political leadership about creating an army; evidence of this can be seen in the time it took after the pronouncement of the BKR on the 22nd of August 1945, to name a defence minister, which eventually took place on the 6th of October. This demonstrates that the political leadership was largely ineffectual as partner.

As previously noted the army during this time often acted quite independently of its command structure. The ability of Sukarno to directly influence these operations was limited. The nature of the guerrilla war also meant that the soldiers were often living within close proximity of civilians and relying upon them for material support. The political leadership according to Schiff has "...direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces", however in the context of the war for independence this was limited.<sup>323</sup> It should also be noted that the fledgling military did not always have the highest degree of respect for the civilian leadership. When on the 20th of December 1948 the leadership of the revolution surrendered to the Dutch, the army continued its fight, this had the affect of deeply undermining the credibility of the leadership in the eyes of the army. There was a sense of betrayal and distrust of civilians that permeated relations between the army and the political leadership for many years to come. Despite Sukarno being appointed as president on 17th August 1945, the effectiveness of his leadership was undermined by the nature of events during the revolution and the pursuit of a guerrilla struggle. Thus, the political leadership was not a fully formed partner.

### **The Citizenry**

The citizenry under the Dutch generally held widespread resentment for their treatment by their colonial masters, with the obvious exception of those individuals who benefitted directly from the policies of colonial rule. The nationalist movement and the drive to independence drew widespread support from a number of different groups within Indonesian society, including unions, religious organisations, youth groups, communist and many others. These groups had disparate ideas about the

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<sup>323</sup> Schiff. p.44

political future of Indonesia; in particular there were divisions amongst secular nationalists and those with a religious bent.

Under Japanese rule, when the Indonesian citizenry were trained in military organisations such as PETA, nationalism was encouraged to the extent that it supported Japanese objectives, but was restricted from becoming a challenge to their authority. By the time the Japanese were defeated in Indonesia, there was a politically diverse nationalist movement alongside armed groups made up of Indonesian citizens. With the surrender of the Japanese, pressure was put by a variety of civilian groups onto the nationalist leadership to declare independence. It was one of these organisations, Menteng 31 Group, which abducted Sukarno and Hatta and forced them to declare independence. The civilian population had a particularly close relationship, during the revolution, as the army and civilian guerrilla groups fought a protracted war against the Dutch.

Evidence of this relationship and interdependence can be seen in the writings and strategy of General Nasution, who described the need for a close relationship between the army and the people to undertake successful resistance. Despite many instances of military and civilian cooperation and interdependence, there were also two glaring examples where this was undermined: the PKI uprising in Madiun and the Darul Islam insurgency. These episodes offered a foreboding vision of the future relationship between the military and the civilian population. In a final analysis of this partner, there were major divisions amongst the various groupings that comprised this partner. These divisions became only more pronounced in the wake of independence, and increased again after the conflict with the Dutch. Thus in similarity with the army, it is not possible to conclude that the citizenry were a cohesive group, thus any possibility for a concordant relationship emerging was not possible.

### **The Social Composition of the Officer Corps**

Indonesia's diverse ethnic composition was poorly reflected in the officer corps, there was an over representation of Javanese officers, this from the creation of the institution would have a profound impact upon Indonesia's civil military relations, it would also have major repercussions for the development of any concordant relationship. Within the army itself, there were ramifications for the chain of command, particularly when there were individuals from one particular ethnic group put in charge of soldiers from another.<sup>324</sup> There was also the religious division within the army and its officer corps. The domination of the officer corps by the Javanese became an issue for members of the citizenry who did not belong to this ethnic group, this would in time become a source of injustice for those outside of Java.

Similar to the issue of ethnicity, there were the religious divides amongst the officer corps. Muslim officers within the army made up the majority, with minimal numbers of those from other faiths being represented, this proved another source of grievance for those who felt disadvantaged by their religious faith. It has been noted earlier in this chapter that the composition of the political leadership was also mirroring that of the armed forces at this time, thus the predominantly Javanese administration was unlikely to disagree with the social composition of the officer corps.<sup>325</sup> Having examined the positions of the partners it is not possible to argue that there was any agreement on this indicator.

### **The Political Decision Making Process**

During the time period that has been discussed, there was a general lack in what Schiff would define as the organs of the political decision making process. There was

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<sup>324</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.7

<sup>325</sup> Ibid. p.15

a cabinet that was named on the 4th of September 1945, with the eventual naming of a defence minister on the 6th October. This demonstrates the initial indecision and complexity of the situation that confronted Indonesia's early political leadership. On the one hand they needed to get control of the highly disparate military force that had evolved largely spontaneously by 1945. On the other hand the political leadership, were concerned about the potential for a negative reaction from the allies. During the war with the Dutch that soon followed the declaration of independence the political leadership became estranged from the army. The nature of the guerrilla operations meant that units fighting the Dutch often acted in a manner independent of the political leaders and the political decision making process. The army for its part often operated alongside and amongst the local population which it depended upon. When the civilian leaders were captured and surrendered, the military came to view those civilians with distrust as well as the institutions that comprised the political decision making process. Once again the nature of events during this time stunted the ability of any stable political decision making organs to develop and there was a general lack of certainty about how such organs should operate. The military in particular became prejudiced toward such civilian institutions. Thus any agreement amongst the partners on this indicator was not possible and this prevented any concordant relationship.

### **Recruitment Method**

The recruitment indicator was not significant. The post-independence army that evolved did so out of a number of different armed groups, with those who participated doing so on the basis of a commitment to ensuring Indonesia's ongoing independence from the Dutch. It certainly could not be argued that coercive recruitment was at work so many of those that took part in the fighting were driven to participate out of

patriotism. Thus it could be termed persuasive recruitment. The significance of this indicator during this time by comparison to the others was negligible.

### **Military Style**

This early period of Indonesia's history had a formative impact upon the development of the army's military style and on the future of Indonesian civil military relations. As has already been discussed the origins of the TNI came from the Dutch colonial military, Japanese trained militia groups and lastly the guerrilla groups involved in the war against the Dutch. These groups had vastly different levels of professionalism, training, education and cohesion, ultimately they were brought together in one army; however, the historical legacy of these different groups had a distinct impact upon the newly formed Indonesian military. The KNIL officer group became important because of its ability to manage the military at the senior leadership level; PETA by contrast had a very different educational experience to the KNIL officers. This resulted in KNIL men holding higher rank, combined with the fact that most of the recruits to the new army were all of a relatively young age, there was a degree of resentment that began to build quickly amongst those who believed they had been passed over for higher ranks; typically this was those from a PETA background. This illustrates a characteristic of the Indonesian military that would become a big part of the ethos of the organisation, namely internal division. The participation of the army and the eventual victory of the nationalist's over the Dutch was also uniquely interpreted by many in the army. Firstly, the army as a result of the military campaign and their involvement in it came to view themselves as being the guardians of the new state. They had fought, sacrificed and had won independence. Secondly, there was a generally negative view held amongst the army regarding civilian leadership. The actions of those nationalist leaders who surrendered to the Dutch even as the army



continued to fight was resented deeply. The military by the end of the war with the Dutch came to view civilian political elites in a negative manner; this view would permeate military relations with the political elites for many years to come. The army's relationship with the wider population was close because of the nature of the guerrilla conflict and because of the view held amongst military men that the army had evolved from the people. Thus, they believed that they had a particularly unique and close relationship with the wider population.

The military's involvement in the defeat of the PKI in Madiun in 1948 would also have important consequences for its style. This early example of the army's participation in a counter insurgency style operation had a couple of important impacts upon the organisation. Firstly, the example of the PKI rebellion demonstrated to the army the danger of any uprising that had the potential to threaten the unitary nature of the Indonesian state. They had from their inception been exposed to the danger of dissent and demands for succession. Secondly, the Indonesian from its early days was operating in a counter insurgency type role, on which Alfred Stepan argues can create a style of military professionalism different from that of Huntington's politically neutral soldier.<sup>326</sup> Stepan argued that these soldiers in order to be successful within a counter insurgency role required political knowledge and skills that challenged Huntington's politically neutral argument.

Agreement amongst all the partners on military style was not possible. The military was imbued with an attitude of suspicion toward civilian politicians and the country's political leadership. Despite the close involvement between the army and much of the population during the war with the Dutch, the events in Madiun and the actions of Darul Islam, made the army suspicious of some groups in Indonesian society, namely

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<sup>326</sup> Stepan. p.49

the political left and radical Islam. This would impact upon the army's relationship with the citizenry. The political leadership for its part was cautious of the army which had emerged after the revolution as a self-confident entity, with a distrust of the nation's politicians. The civilians for their part had largely participated and operated alongside of the army during the revolution, with the exception of those groups who had supported the PKI and Darul Islam. Thus with the exception of the two groups who had fought against the army, the citizenry was largely accepting of the army's military style.

The period of colonial rule, Japanese occupation and then the revolution that culminated with the defeat of the Dutch forces had a profound impact upon the evolving civil military relationship. The military was evolving, but was far from cohesive, there were as a result of its experience in these events the seeds of conflict which led to intense factionalisation within its ranks for years to come. It had developed largely autonomously of any political leadership, and was comprised of individuals from a wide range of backgrounds, resulting in an army that had a number of officers with different levels of technical knowledge, command experience and professionalism. The chain of command suffered as a result of a young officer corps; there was resentment held by those officers who missed out on command positions despite their similar age to those successful candidates. Command and control also suffered as a result of those units that operated during the revolution largely autonomously of the centre. The commanders of such units had cultivated a close bond with their soldiers, one that the central command structure was often unable to affect. The conduct of the revolution's leaders resulted in this fledgling army becoming highly suspicious of civilian politicians. The army from its inception had operated in a role outside of that of a typical war fighting. This was because of the

nature of the conflicts in which it was participating, namely guerrilla operations and counter-insurgency operations. This resulted in the army developing a political role and expertise for itself from its very beginning.

Concordance didn't exist during this early period of the army's history. It has been demonstrated that the army as a partner was far from coherent, it was beset by factionalisation. The political leadership was symbolised by the charismatic Sukarno, however this partner was also divided. The citizenry for its part was made up of a number conflicting views about what independent Indonesia should like. The activities of Darul Islam and the PKI evidenced that there were groups within the citizenry willing to undertake violent action to impose their vision of the future. There could be no agreement on the indicators of concordance as long as the partners lacked cohesion.

## Chapter Four

Despite the army's successful contribution to the revolution it would soon find itself the victim of political interference, and internal division. Beginning in 1950 this chapter traces the development of a particularly dysfunctional time in the history of the army, the citizenry and Indonesia's political leadership. This chapter also focuses on the attempts made by the military's leadership to implement reform, and how in combination with the army's factionalism and political interference these factors contributed to a number of incidents involving officers challenging their senior commanders. It traces the development of the army's military style, through this division and its participation in internal operations, and the expansion of its political and social role as a result of martial law. It will demonstrate the lack of cohesion amongst the partners and discuss the repercussions that this would have on the emergence of any concordance. The chapter ends with the beginnings of Guided democracy in 1960.

The plans for military rationalisation and reorganization implemented by Nasution had contributed to the crisis in Madiun in 1948 and would continue to prove a source of tension in the 1950's. This tension culminated on the 17th October 1952 with an open confrontation between the factionalised post-revolutionary army and the political leaders of the newly independent Indonesia. The factors that contributed to this new crisis were to be found in the deep factionalisation within the military, factors stemming from the revolutionary war and the increasing interaction between soldiers and politicians in post-revolutionary Indonesia.

There were a number of reasons for the motivation of Nasution, the Chief of Army, in driving forward his plans for rationalization of the army. By 1948 the size of the army

and the aligned militias had grown to approximately 500,000 men. An army of that size did not sit within Nasution's vision for a smaller force that would gradually move away from its guerrilla roots toward a new smaller more professional force.<sup>327</sup> By 1950 the army had been cut down to approximately 200,000 men. Nasution was hoping to reduce this number further to around 150,000 over the next few years.<sup>328</sup> As part of this reorientation there would be a new concentration upon training and education within the army. This would all form part of Nasution's plan to change the nature of Indonesian military strategy and doctrine. Nasution had difficulty with the strategy of Guerrilla warfare as it was fundamentally defensive, and that they "...must grow in the direction of becoming a regular army so as to be able to carry out an offensive in order to defeat the enemy"<sup>329</sup> By 1951 it was proposed to reshape the training and education of the soldiers and officers. As part of this effort "...Inspectorates for the Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery were set up at headquarters level which established training centres for its particular weapon system."<sup>330</sup> In their efforts to improve the training and education of soldiers and officers the army was stymied by a lack of knowledgeable instructors. Consequently the Indonesian Army was relying heavily upon the Netherlands Military Mission to assist them in building their capacity to train and educate their soldiers.<sup>331</sup> Nasution warned that the army could ill afford to fall behind in its attempts to improve its education and training capacity. Furthermore, within this new and better trained Army, there would be little quarter given to those who were not prepared to engage in training and improve their skill sets. Nasution warned "...those who did not meet the requirements for higher

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<sup>327</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.61

<sup>328</sup> Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tjatan2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia* (Djakarta: 1955). p.318 quoted in Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*.p.61

<sup>329</sup> Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (New York: 1965). p.79 quoted in Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.61

<sup>330</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.61

<sup>331</sup> Ibid. p.61

positions must be prepared to fill lower positions."<sup>332</sup> Within this statement lie the seeds for future conflicts within the military: between the factions which pushed for a more professional, disciplined and smaller force and those factions which preferred the status quo. Those who had the most to lose were the PETA veterans and those of a Guerrilla background.

Before 1952, relations between the Army and Government were characterized by a level of mistrust and suspicion; nevertheless the military continued, despite its distrust of civilian leaders emanating from the experiences of the revolution, to accept the principle of civilian supremacy.<sup>333</sup> The top echelons of the military were comprised of those who Crouch terms 'military technocrats'; men who had been educated in the Dutch military academies, and who in the wake of the revolution had advanced at the expense of those who had inferior levels of training.<sup>334</sup> Men, such as Nasution, fitted the previous category and were more interested in creating a smaller better trained and more effective military than involving themselves in the issues of government.

Despite men within the military's leadership attempting to maintain an apolitical stance, there were still those who believed that due to their revolutionary contributions they were entitled to engage in politics. As alluded to at the end of chapter three, there were factions and elements within the army that chose to align themselves with certain political groupings. The difficulty in handling this issue was compounded by the problems of asserting control within the disparate regions, as the obedience to the headquarters of their own military commanders could not be guaranteed.

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<sup>332</sup> Nasution, *Tjatan2 Sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia*. p.320 quoted in Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.61

<sup>333</sup> Harold Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia* (Singapore: Equinox, 2007). p.28

<sup>334</sup> Ibid. p.28

## **The 17th of October Affair**

It was against this period of relative stability that the events of October 1952 unfolded. The plans of individuals such as Nasution, those who could be grouped into the category of that which Crouch calls the "...technocratic military leadership..." foresaw a smaller military with improved education and training.<sup>335</sup> These plans stood as a direct threat to the positions and careers of those officers who had entered the military through a Peta or guerrilla background. This group felt that they would be marginalised by the plans of Nasution and his allies. The cause of this group was taken up by a group of politicians who opposed the government; here lay the seeds for the first significant clash between the military and the government.

The general political environment during this time could be described as chaotic and in an embryonic stage of development. Within government itself, individual cabinets tended to have a short lifecycle. There was according to Sundhaussen little time

"...to develop recognized and widely-accepted political norms and procedures. Therefore, there was no understanding of what was, or was not proper in politics. Political institutions generally remained weak, and cabinets were seen as fair game to be hunted down. Parliament consisted of appointed politicians and lacked both legitimacy and quality."<sup>336</sup>

Against this backdrop of an evolving political system in 1952, there was still continuing dissent in the country. There was ongoing fighting in West Java, South Sulawesi and the South Moluccas, by groups who opposed the republic.<sup>337</sup> Economic conditions within Indonesia were also worsening in 1951 and 1952, as the Korean War boom was over and the value of Indonesia's main export of rubber had dropped. As part of their effort to improve the domestic economy, the government resolved to reduce spending. A reduction in the size of the military was seen as one way to

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<sup>335</sup> Ibid. p.29

<sup>336</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.64

<sup>337</sup> Ibid.p.62

improve the government's finances.<sup>338</sup> This policy of reducing the size of the military was driven as much by the designs of Nasution as it was by the increasingly desperate economic realities with which Indonesia was now confronted.

Nasution and the other individuals who supported him had support within government for their plan to begin a reduction and restructuring of the military. The plans for rationalisation and reorganisation of the military would see the overall size shrink from approximately 200,000 to 100,000. This plan was opposed by those army leaders and officers within the regions, many of whom stemmed from the PETA background discussed earlier. Along with the reduction in size and the resulting focal shift from numbers to improved training and education, Nasution also sought to minimise the influence of those officers who stood in opposition to his position and authority within the military.

The soldiers and officers who belonged to the PETA group did, however, have political allies, including President Sukarno himself. The personnel changes that had taken place throughout 1951 and 1952 had diminished his influence within the army. In 1952 he had objected to the new policy being pursued by the army leadership by refusing to sign a decree.<sup>339</sup> Of similar concern to Sukarno was the closure of the Chandramiuka Military Academy in Bandung, which has been described as a "...sort of ideological refresher school for army officers, where a number of his personal associates, men of the PETA group, occupied positions of leadership."<sup>340</sup>

Many Parliamentarians and politicians objected to the rationalization plans for a number of reasons. They resented the demands for new recruits to have "...certain

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<sup>338</sup> Ricklefs. p.233

<sup>339</sup> Herbert Feith, *The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953; a Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1958). p.110

<sup>340</sup> Ibid. p.110, Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.63 also makes mention of this point.



scholastic qualifications..."<sup>341</sup> Plans for changes in the outward appearance of the military caused concern, namely in the uniforms and the manner in which they marched and saluted. These criticisms fall inside Schiff's category of military style, indicating there was little consensus at this time in what the new army's style would be. The 'Rationalizers', such as Nasution, sought to pull the army away from its guerrilla and pre-revolutionary roots, and create an army that was similar to its foreign counterparts. It would seem that those who were opposed to this change in style feared, as a result, a reduction in their influence, a loss in their revolutionary bond that they had with their soldiers, and an overall decline of their influence within the army. A further reason for the political opposition to the reform plan in the army was due to the concern that the Socialist Party (PSI) was supporting the hierarchy and the 'rationalizer' camp within the military for their own reasons; namely that doing so would increase their influence within the army. The military's view of politicians was also at a low. They viewed the politicians and parliaments as being largely ineffective. In the seven years following Indonesia's independence there had been a total of twelve cabinets, a large number of which, argues Sundhaussen, had been bought down by Parliament.<sup>342</sup> The military viewed the politicians as weak and ineffective. They questioned the legitimacy of the parliament many of whom had attained their positions through the creation of the Dutch-created federal states, and a president who, at the height of the guerrilla struggle with the Dutch, had surrendered. All of these tensions came to a head in October when Parliament demanded that the Army's leadership be reshaped and, most significantly, that Nasution and others within the military hierarchy who were pushing for reform be dismissed. This demand was interpreted by Nasution and the military command as an unacceptable attempt at

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<sup>341</sup> Feith. p.112

<sup>342</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.69

interference in the military's affairs. Personnel appointments are, after all, one of the areas that Finer would include within the military's corporate self-interest. This would have offended their sense of military professionalism of the professional officers such as Nasution. This final insult to Nasution and his professional reformist minded colleagues was too much and they took action. On the morning of 17th October, 30,000 people stood in front of the Parliament and then demonstrated in front of the presidential palace demanding "...the dissolution of the sitting parliament and the holding of elections."<sup>343</sup> The protestors had been brought in with the assistance of army transportation.<sup>344</sup> The military also made their presence felt with the arrival of tanks, some of which trained their guns on the Presidential palace.<sup>345</sup> The military officers involved now made their demands known to the President/Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces; namely that parliament be dissolved and new elections be held. The Army officers who were present at this meeting made their belief known that Parliament was at fault for the ongoing instability in the country. They stated this was due to the frequent dissolution of cabinets by parliament.<sup>346</sup> Furthermore, these officers argued many of these so called parliamentarians had cooperated with the Dutch while the army was fighting for national independence. These politicians argued that the officers, did not have the "...moral right..." to criticise the army.<sup>347</sup> The meeting was described as tense. Officers stressed to Sukarno the resentment that had built within the high command for what they considered to be political interference with matters which they regarded as purely military. An example of this was the placement and deployment of troops.<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> Ibid. p.70

<sup>344</sup> McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army. Pt I." p.147

<sup>345</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.70

<sup>346</sup> Ibid. p.71

<sup>347</sup> Ibid. p.71

<sup>348</sup> Ibid. p.71

Those officers who had confronted Sukarno were clearly unhappy with what Schiff would call the political-decision making process. Such was the level of hostility between the military, Sukarno and the politicians, that any agreement would be extremely difficult to achieve. This indicates the degree to which the civil military relationship was discordant.

Sukarno managed to defuse the demands of the protestors by agreeing to fresh elections and claiming that if the parliament was dissolved it would amount to too much power being placed in the executive and himself being put in the position of a dictator.<sup>349</sup> He was able to disperse the crowd, and similarly in his dealings with the army "...promised them vaguely that their interests would be satisfied."<sup>350</sup>

It is quite clear also that each partner was highly factionalised, there was little agreement amongst the three partners on any of the indicators, particularly in the wake of independence. This is a serious issue which becomes apparent when applying this theory to the case of Indonesia because in the wake of independence the partners, who Schiff mentions, are far from united. They are fractious by nature and each of these factions often has its own independent goals. As has been shown in the time leading up to the 17th October affair, the military was beset by factionalism.

Politicians aligned their interests with some of those factions within the Army. Each of these various groups were able to mobilise the support of the masses, and manipulate them. There was next to no agreement on the political decision making process that would satisfy the military's needs. Indeed some of the politicians continued to push the boundaries, and began pushing into areas that the military viewed as being their prerogatives. Similarly, there was little agreement over the social composition of the officer corps. There were officers who had guerrilla and

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<sup>349</sup> Ibid. p.71

<sup>350</sup> Ricklefs. p.233

PETA background, and others, such as Nasution, who came from the KNIL pushed for reform. Both these groups had distinctly different experiences within the military and were pushing for the military to go in different directions.

There was no concordant civil military relationship that had yet emerged. Within days of the demands being made by the Army's leadership, Nasution and his colleagues had lost the momentum. The government and Sukarno moved to deal with the opposition from within the army by challenging the legitimacy of those Army officers who stood against them, claiming that because they had failed in their duty to Sukarno, they should be removed, even by their "...patriotic subordinates..."<sup>351</sup> This was devastating for the Army's chain of command which was now being subjected to further factionalisation and infighting as the leadership was removed and other officers were forced to gain the support of their subordinates to remain in command.<sup>352</sup> The power of those officers in regional commands was further enhanced by the weakening of the High Command and the side-lining of the group of reformist officers. By December of 1952 Nasution had been suspended and put on the inactive list, where he remained for three years. Along with Nasution, other individuals from the Army's High Command were removed from their positions. The newly weakened position of the Army's leadership also extended to the military's ability to provide for itself. Its budget was cut significantly in the wake of 1952, resulting in regional commanders fostering their own private business interests, thus enabling them to support their troops as well as guarantee the loyalty of those beneath them.<sup>353</sup>

Nordlinger's liberal model of military control warns of the potential for military intervention if civilians do not exhibit due regard for the military, he notes in

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<sup>351</sup> McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army. Pt I." p.148

<sup>352</sup> Ibid. p.148

<sup>353</sup> Ibid. p.153

particular the danger of civilian leaders interfering in the appointment of staff and system of promotions as well as in areas relating to its own expertise.<sup>354</sup> In the events of 17th October 1952 and June 1955 the military did assert itself, firstly 1952 by making direct demands of Sukarno and in 1955 by ignoring the appointment of a new senior officer. Despite these actions not constituting a military coup they do show that there were consequences for the Indonesian political leaders lack of respect for the military's domain and interests.

The army over the next few years was beset by factionalism. There was also a growing sense of dissatisfaction relating to the performance of successive governments both within and outside the army.<sup>355</sup> Crouch also states that there was a fundamental change in the military, from an "...apolitical tool of the state...to the older idea that the army was a guardian of the national interest with the responsibility to intervene in political affairs whenever the weaknesses of civilian government made it necessary."<sup>356</sup> This is an important point to recognise, because, as Finer argues, this can become a motive for intervention. It seems that at this time the army's style was changing. Schiff refers to this as the "...inner mental constructions associated with the military...what ethos drives it..." This view of itself as a Guardian to the state was being reinforced by the political instability at the time, as well its participation in ongoing regional instability. Ultimately it was the perception that successive governments had performed so inadequately that led the officer's corps, who had been divided in the wake of the 17th of October 1952, to begin reconciliation.<sup>357</sup>

Sundhaussen describes that in the years following the 17th of October 1952; those soldiers who had taken action against their superiors concluded that they had been

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<sup>354</sup> Nordlinger. p.13

<sup>355</sup> Crouch. p.30

<sup>356</sup> Ibid. p.30

<sup>357</sup> Ibid. p.31

used by the politicians to remove the army's leadership which had "...refused to be pushed around by quickly changing alliances in parliament."<sup>358</sup>

A meeting took place in 1955 which would begin the slow process of reconciliation amongst the Indonesian high command. The meeting was convened in Jogjakarta with the intention of dealing with some of the "...controversial issues involving military personnel..."<sup>359</sup> A charter was drawn up calling for an end to the factional infighting that had weakened the military in the past. It also called for military leaders to "...press basic army demands on the government."<sup>360</sup> Most significantly however was the meeting that occurred at the gravesite of the revered commander General Sudirman. Officers met at the gravesite and pledged to uphold the unity of the military. The outcome of this meeting was very significant because, as Sundhaussen suggests, the military was agreeing amongst itself to resist political interference in military affairs, and secondly, they were calling for a distinction to be "...drawn between the functions of the army headquarters and those of the government."<sup>361</sup> In June 1955, the government attempted to appoint a relatively junior ranking officer to the position of Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Bambang Utojo. His political sympathies lay with the ruling political party.<sup>362</sup> The military refused to accept this new appointment. Unlike previous times when unity within the military had undermined their position, this time their refusal was complete, to the extent that the official ceremony celebrating Utojo's appointment was only attended by five or six army officers and there was no army band in attendance to play the national anthem.<sup>363</sup>

These defiant actions by the Army resulted in the collapse of the Ali government, and

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<sup>358</sup> Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army." p.193

<sup>359</sup> McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army. Pt I." p.156

<sup>360</sup> Ibid. p.156

<sup>361</sup> Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army." p.193

<sup>362</sup> Ibid. p.193

<sup>363</sup> Herbert Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1962). p.399

a new "...self-confidence..." that in the future they could have a larger influence on politics.<sup>364</sup>

Feith makes some interesting observations, which are very significant when viewed in the context of later developments. He focuses on the reasons for the new found sense of unity within the army. Firstly, he points to conditions within the army itself, namely the issue of military budgets, access to equipment, welfare for the soldiers and the declining prestige of the military officers.<sup>365</sup> This point is significant because according to Samuel Finer, the corporate interests as well as the motive of individual self interest in the armed forces can be drivers of intervention. Furthermore, Finer's motives of Self Interest and Corporate Interest link into one of Schiff's indicators of concordance. This relevant indicator is the political-decision making process, which determines "...the needs and allocations of the military."<sup>366</sup> According to Feith this had the effect of unifying the military. After all, its corporate interests were being threatened; this however resulted in a deteriorating relationship between the government and the army. This relationship would make concordance, at this time, impossible to achieve.

Secondly, Feith affirms that it was the shared "...image of the army as the founder of the nation...", that the officers viewed themselves as holding a guardian role that was particularly significant. The military considered its role to be the protection of Indonesia, particularly if the country was undermined by political crisis or there was a challenge to the state's independence. Finer discusses the motive of the 'National Interest' as being a driver of intervention, which is what Feith refers to as the Guardian role, namely that the army could intervene if it perceived the nation was

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<sup>364</sup> Crouch. p.31

<sup>365</sup> Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. p.403-404

<sup>366</sup> Schiff. p.45-46

being threatened by the political elites that were running the country.<sup>367</sup> The significance of the term, which Feith refers to as the guardian role, is twofold. In the context of Schiff's theory, it has reference to both the indicators of concordance as well as the importance of history and culture. The military coming to view themselves as guardians of the nation informs the way the military think of themselves. It affects the military's style. Schiff also recites the importance of history and culture on the development of the civil military relationship. In Indonesia, the military began to see an exclusive and privileged role for itself. This consciousness developed early and would permeate the army's style for some time.

The military also witnessed the growth of corruption within the civil service and amongst the politicians. Feith affirms that by this time the military had come to hold an extremely dim view of the ability of the government to function and the interplay between the politicians and the institutions within the country.<sup>368</sup> There was also the increase in power of the communist party, which had grown considerably in numbers, something an officer corps described as "...decidedly anti-communist in orientation..." was an alarming development.<sup>369</sup>

In the wake of the affair involving the appointment of Utojo and the Army's defiant stand against the government, Colonel Nasution was reappointed to the position of Chief of Staff and was promoted to the position of Major General. On his resumption of command, Nasution implemented a new policy to tackle the problems within the military's hierarchy and the problems it had with maintaining military discipline. Nasution's answer to this was the creation of a 'Tour of Duty' system, which allowed him to rotate and replace regional commanders when it was considered necessary.<sup>370</sup>

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<sup>367</sup> Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. p.406

<sup>368</sup> Ibid. p.407

<sup>369</sup> Ibid. p.408

<sup>370</sup> Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army." p.194



Many of the regional commanders had groomed positions for themselves that were increasing their power and independence from the army's central hierarchy. They were doing this through alliances with local political parties or other groups.<sup>371</sup> These regional commanders had grown so much in standing that they were, according to Sundhaussen, able to "...obstruct almost any policy of the headquarters or the government if they so choose."<sup>372</sup> This Tour of Duty policy was once again creating tensions within the Army, as those officers who had the most to lose began to turn against Nasution and the military's command.

### **The Lubis Coup Attempt**

Nasution's appointment as the Chief of Staff would once again create problems within the army. His 'Tour of Duty' policy already had its opponents when Nasution came to be challenged directly by one of his fellow officers. The man who came to oppose Nasution was Colonel Zulkifli Lubis. His dislike of Nasution stemmed from Nasution's recent appointment to the position of Chief of Staff.<sup>373</sup> Lubis lost his position in Jakarta and was ordered to take over a position in Northern Sumatra.<sup>374</sup> Lubis and other officers now began planning a coup and the installation of a military junta. It was also decided that Nasution's 'Tour of Duty' policy had to be stopped.<sup>375</sup> Initially a group around Lubis attempted to arrest the Foreign Minister on charges of corruption. Lubis and his fellow conspirators along with sidelining Nasution were interested in overthrowing a democratic government which they believed was ineffective and corrupt. Furthermore, some Sudanese officers resented the Javanese

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<sup>371</sup> Ibid. p.194

<sup>372</sup> Ibid. p.194

<sup>373</sup> McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army. Pt I." p.159

<sup>374</sup> Cheng Goh Tiek, "Why Indonesia's Attempt at Democracy in the Mid-1950s Failed," *Modern Asian Studies* 6, no. 2 (1972). p.238

<sup>375</sup> McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army. Pt I." p.159

domination of government.<sup>376</sup> Lubis's next move took place on October 11th 1956 when army units loyal to him tried to enter Jakarta; they were stopped and the action resulted in several officers loyal to him being arrested.<sup>377</sup> On November 7th Nasution called Lubis to account for his activities by issuing a summons for him and two other officers suspected of involvement in his plans. The other officers appeared but Lubis did not. On November 16th another military unit attempted to enter Jakarta, and along with units based in the city they intended to arrest the Chief of Staff and take control of the capital. This plan also failed.<sup>378</sup> Following the failure of the actions on the 16th, Nasution's position was strengthened, and by the end of the month Cabinet had issued a statement condemning him for engaging in an attempted coup. He was suspended from his position and a warrant was issued for his arrest. However he was able to evade capture.<sup>379</sup>

### **Regional Turmoil- PERMESTA and the PRRI**

The island of Java and its inhabitants is often identified as the centre of Indonesia. Along with a demographic advantage, it had also been influenced by Javanese tradition and history. Javanese political thought emphasises the notion of the centre,

"The state was seen as a series of concentric circles, defined by the diminishing power of the ruler from its highest concentration in his court and capital, through outlying districts and allied kingdoms to the world beyond his reach."<sup>380</sup>

Java's central position was only reinforced by its colonial history and then subsequently occupation by the occupation of Japanese forces in World War Two. Throughout this time Java remained politically powerful but economically weaker

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<sup>376</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.99

<sup>377</sup> Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. p.505

<sup>378</sup> Ibid. p.506

<sup>379</sup> Ibid. p.506-507

<sup>380</sup> Barbara Harvey, *Permesta: Half a Rebellion*, Monograph Series: Publication No. 57 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 1977). p.2

than the outer lying Islands. In the outer Islands there were a number of grievances that had developed against the central government in Jakarta. There was dissatisfaction with Jakarta over the level of funding that had been provided for much needed development in the regions. Furthermore, for those in the regions the performance of successive governments in Jakarta had become a source of tension, particularly in the area of economic management.<sup>381</sup> Linked into the issue of economic mismanagement was anger at the government's policy toward regional exports, particularly copra. Regional farmers often found themselves suffering due to unequal terms of trade and this created deeper resentment toward the central government. Many of these farmers began smuggling products out of the regions. Army officers often participated in these activities for their own operational and material reasons.<sup>382</sup> As noted previously, ethnic tension also became a significant issue. There was in Indonesia a legacy of tension between the predominantly Javanese centre and the ethnically and religiously diverse outer regions, Feith notes that throughout 1956 these tensions continued to rise.<sup>383</sup> There were also calls for increased local autonomy for the outer islands in the handling of their affairs from Jakarta. Despite many of these underlying tensions in the regions it was the internal problems within the army that had a major impact on the course of the regional problems. In the case of Sulawesi, Harvey argues "...it was rivalries within the military which sparked off the challenge to central authority."<sup>384</sup>

In order to better understand the course of events during the regional rebellion it is necessary to explain the system that serves as the over-arching system for organisation of the military. This system evolved from experiences during the war for

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<sup>381</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.101

<sup>382</sup> Harvey. p.10

<sup>383</sup> Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*. p.491-493

<sup>384</sup> Harvey. p.39


independence, Indonesia's geographic particularities and the requirements of overall defensive strategy.<sup>385</sup> Between 1950 and 1957, seven military territories (Tentara dan Territorium or T & T) were established, comprising the following commands:

- T&T I- North Sumatra
- T&T II-South Sumatra
- T&T III-West Java, including Jakarta
- T&T IV-Central Java
- T&T V-East Java
- T&T VI-Kalimantan
- T&T VII-East Indonesia

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<sup>385</sup> Sebastian. p.185-186

Figure 1 - The Army's Military Territories (Tentera Dan Territorium, T & T), 1950 - 1957<sup>386</sup>



<sup>386</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.59

Commanders in the outer regions of Indonesia at this time were in a distinctly different position to their fellow officers in Java. Tensions prevailed between the regional commands and the central military command. There were a number of reasons for this. The territorial command structure and the way in which it was organised was partially responsible. The territorial commands themselves were designed to be able to carry out Guerrilla operations largely independent of central control in the event of conflict.<sup>387</sup> This is significant because of the Army's revolutionary experience, namely because as a Guerrilla force encouraged self-reliance and a symbiotic relationship with the people. The nature of this territorial structure and overall army strategy encouraged independence. As McVey notes these regional commanders came to hold a great deal of independence from the Army's leadership. McVey argues that the relationship between these individual commanders and headquarters could be characterised as "...one of negotiation" rather "...than command."<sup>388</sup> Furthermore, these officers came to see themselves as the "...equals of the officers on the general staff..." and that decisions of "...basic policy should be taken collegially, with them, rather than by the central authorities alone."<sup>389</sup>

Consultation and consensus were clearly important, if the high command hoped to carry out a particular course of action.<sup>390</sup> These powerful commanders had already faced down Nasution in 1952 when he attempted to restructure the army. Lubis and others had taken the same action in 1956, when Nasution had introduced the Tour of Duty system as a means to curb their power. During the years of regional crisis these same individuals were again bucking against their senior officers. The power of these

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<sup>387</sup> Ibid. p.60

<sup>388</sup> McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army. Pt I." p.147

<sup>389</sup> Ibid. p.147

<sup>390</sup> Sundhaussen, "The Fashioning of Unity in the Indonesian Army." p.191

officers also clearly demonstrates the importance of the revolutionary history in shaping Indonesian military professionalism and the Indonesian military's style. The relationship between the officers and the enlisted men in the regional commands was fundamentally different. In many cases it was closer than Officer-Soldier and was referred to as a *bapak-anak buah* relationship.<sup>391</sup> This made these regional commands and commanders harder for the central hierarchy to control because the Officers and enlisted men had a much closer relationship, one that transcended the bounds of the regular command structure. Recruitment within these commands was also drawn from the local area. This, along with a "...sensitivity to the desire to have a "native son" (anak daerah) in command of local troops..." compounded to further complicate efforts by high command in implementing any particular national personnel policy.<sup>392</sup> Some of the commanders in these regional areas were also engaged in smuggling operations, a prime example of which was Maludin Simblon. Not only was this a sense of irritation for the High Command, particularly as they attempted to deal with corruption amongst the nations politicians, but it also provided these officers and units under their command with a certain degree of autonomy from the Army's central command in Jakarta.<sup>393</sup>

Complementing the issues around the powerful independence of the territorial commanders, were the intense personal rivalries that developed within the Army during the 1950's. Harvey believes that the strength of these rivalries within the army during the 1950's were a key factor that led to the turmoil that erupted in regional Indonesia in the later part of the 1950's. These rivalries existed historically between the PETA officers and those from the KNIL. They were further entrenched by the

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<sup>391</sup> Bapak meaning Father, but also according to Harvey. p.8, has the connotation of referring to a respected leader or patron. The term anak buah refers to follower. Harvey cites Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*. p.43

<sup>392</sup> Harvey. p.9

<sup>393</sup> Ibid. p.11

creation of the territorial system and Nasution's plans for the restructuring of the army and led to the fear among many PETA officers that they would be side-lined at the expense of their KNIL colleagues. Harvey also states that the military in the early 1950's was comprised of young men of a similar age who all held similar claims to leadership positions.<sup>394</sup> Luckham argues that this flat age structure can weaken "...established patterns of discipline...", and this seems to hold true in the case of the Indonesian Army's officer corps in the 1950's.<sup>395</sup> In 1952, Nasution was faced with political pressure as well as defiance from the military itself which would generate animosity toward him personally as well as the high command in Jakarta. This led to a situation in regional areas where commanders loyal to Nasution were ousted by those who supported Sukarno and his stance against Nasution's program for military reform. Nasution lost his position as Army Chief. When he regained the position in 1955 he attempted to reduce the power of these regional officers through the introduction of the 'Tour of Duty System', and this, particularly in the case of powerful regional commanders, became an "...explosive issue...", that generated considerable opposition and rivalry.<sup>396</sup> This led to a situation in which a number of senior officers threatened by Nasution's personnel policies, took direct action against him in the form of a coup. When this coup failed these men, such as Lubis and Simblon, fled to the regions, and allied themselves to regional commanders in Sulawesi in Sumatra who had taken control of local governments. These regional commanders garnered considerable support from the local population for their defiance towards the central authorities. The result was a political crisis, during 1956-1958, culminating in 1958 with the declaration of the Revolutionary Government of

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<sup>394</sup> Ibid. p.9

<sup>395</sup> Luckham. p.64

<sup>396</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967.* p.97,



the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), based in western Sumatra.<sup>397</sup> This led to open conflict and resulted in Central Government occupying areas controlled by PRRI forces. Despite the relative speed with which these forces dealt with the PRRI, guerrilla operations continued until 1961.

### **Corporateness**

The period during the rebellion clearly demonstrated the lack of any cohesion within the military and would prevent the development of a concordant civil-military relationship. At the centre of this problem is Schiff's indicator that surveys the social composition of the officer corps. When the actions of the rebellious army leaders, such as Lubis and Simbolon, are considered in relation to Schiff's indicator, it is apparent that there could be no concordance. There were a number of issues relating to ethnicity, namely the relationship between officers who came from the regional ethnic minorities and the Javanese officers.<sup>398</sup> The animosity held by these regional officers toward the central command would undermine any sense of unity within the officer corps and would certainly prevent Schiff's partners from agreeing about the military's role.

Along with the rebellion undermining the military's unity and the social composition of the officer corps, the corporateness of the Army was compromised. Huntington argued that corporateness was a defining characteristic of a profession and thus, according to his argument, was a defining aspect of officership. According to Huntington "....members of a profession share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen."<sup>399</sup> On this point the Officer Corps of the Indonesian army had evolved in a manner that challenges any

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<sup>397</sup> Crouch. p. 33

<sup>398</sup> Harvey. p.28-33

<sup>399</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. p. 10

notion of corporateness. During the war for independence it had evolved within a popular guerrilla struggle where the boundaries between officer and layman were blurred. In relation to the actions of military officers during the regional rebellion, any notion of corporateness would also be challenged by the actions of those rogue officers who challenged their commanding officers by aligning themselves with civilian interests. There is Huntington also argues there is "The sense of unity manifests itself in a professional organization which formalizes and applies the standards of professional competence and establishes and enforces the standards of professional responsibility."<sup>400</sup> Any notion of unity in the Indonesian Army was extremely tenuous. It was undermined by rivalries, alliances, political interference as well as by a difficult and often troublesome revolutionary history. There were many examples of this disunity throughout the 1950s culminating perhaps in the complete breakdown of military unity during the regional crises, where rogue military commanders faced off against their officers in central command. In reference to Huntington's statement, standards of professional competence could, in the 1950's, be regarded as relatively low. In the early 1950's Nasution had tried to introduce policies which were aimed at improving the professionalism of the military by concentrating on the education and training of the soldiers. He also sought to reduce the influence of the PETA and guerrilla officers who, unlike the KNIL officers, had received training which had focused more on indoctrination and self-reliance than technical ability. Along with the significant issues present within the military at this time, there were also a number of issues relating to Indonesia's political system. As has already been described there were issues over the consistent performance of elected cabinets, with many of them collapsing. Harvey argues that the nation's leaders were also

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<sup>400</sup> Ibid. p.10

dissatisfied with the political system, pointing to their concern over the proliferation of political parties, who they largely viewed as self-serving. For Sukarno, Indonesian unity was being undermined. Harvey argues one of Sukarno's foremost concerns throughout his life was the maintenance of Indonesian national unity. Thus, it is easy to understand the concern that Sukarno must have felt at the ongoing political instability present in post-revolutionary Indonesia.<sup>401</sup> Throughout 1955 and 1956, Sukarno had spoken about the need for the inclusion of traditional values in Indonesia's system of democracy as well as the need for leadership and guidance in Indonesian democracy.<sup>402</sup> By 1956, Sukarno was talking of the need to "...end Western, liberal democracy in which '50 per cent plus one are always right', instead Indonesia should practise 'real Indonesian democracy', democracy with leadership..."<sup>403</sup> It was a mix of these political issues, as well as the problems within the military and the problems in the outer islands, that resulted in the regional rebellion.

The course of the regional rebellion highlighted the fact that there were serious internal issues within the military in terms of factionalism. Personal rivalries had developed as well as regional commanders who had entrenched power and could act independently from High command in Jakarta. This intersected with the grievances that were present in the regions, longstanding issues, development issues, ethnic issues. Politically, Indonesia throughout the 1950's was experiencing ongoing turmoil. They had suffered from a succession of weak Cabinets. Sukarno had begun to criticise the role of Political parties in Indonesia, and was looking for a new political system, which would become known as guided democracy.

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<sup>401</sup> Harvey. p.14

<sup>402</sup> Ibid. p.14

<sup>403</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.103

## **Martial Law**

In response to the increasingly chaotic situation in the regions it was recommended by General Nasution that a state of Martial Law be declared. The situation in Indonesia's regions was becoming increasingly serious for the central authorities. There had been a series of incidents in which dissident army officers had seized control of local government infrastructure. In December 1956 events in Sumatra caused these Army officers, with the support of local civilians, to take action against the local governments. On December 20th, the regimental commander in West Sumatra took over the local government, and on December 22<sup>nd</sup>, Simbolon announced his takeover in North Sumatra. On December 24<sup>th</sup>, the commander in South Sumatra "...forced the civilian governor there to begin introducing autonomy measures."<sup>404</sup> Throughout January 1957, more soldiers' councils were appearing throughout Kalimantan, North and South Sulawesi and Maluku, all of which were pushing "...for greater autonomy from Jakarta."<sup>405</sup> By March 1957 the situation was growing increasingly serious. On the 2nd of March the commander of Eastern Indonesia had declared martial law over his whole command. With the situation in the regions becoming increasingly serious, "...Nasution seized the initiative to end parliamentary democracy."<sup>406</sup> On the 14th March the Ali cabinet resigned and Martial law was proclaimed. This along with subsequent events now gave the military the opportunity for an expansion of its role in society, politics and the economy. It would affect the military corporateness and above all would lead to the development of a concordant relationship.

Martial law now gave the military the means to deal with the unrest in the regions, as well as giving it the legal backing for a role expansion in Indonesia. As a consequence

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<sup>404</sup> Ricklefs. p.242

<sup>405</sup> Ibid. p.242

<sup>406</sup> Ibid. p.243

"Nearly every civil office was subject to military control or the possibility of it."<sup>407</sup>

Furthermore, argues Lev, these new military authorities were now able create new regulations themselves. Civil Liberties and Human rights suffered as a result. The military had the ability to arrest and detain on the basis of a threat to security, and any protest to this in parliament was limited out of fear for engaging in political activity.<sup>408</sup> The military also restricted labour unions, particularly in the regional areas. Any planned union activity had to be sanctioned by the military authorities. Industries, which the military classed as being of vital significance, were also prevented from striking. Martial law also gave the army the opportunity to crack down upon the press. The military viewed the press as "...provocative, divisive, sensationalist and politically motivated..." the banning of newspapers and the arrest of journalists and editors was common, and the once "...lively and vital..." press was reduced to a state of self-censorship in which editors became increasingly cautious about the material which they were publishing.<sup>409</sup>

The period of martial law also provided the army with the unique opportunity to take forceful steps into the political system. The military came with certain perceptions about Indonesia's political system and its politicians. These had been shaped by its experiences during the war for independence and subsequent events in the 1950's. Lev argues the army held a political outlook that was based on "...national consensus, unity, obedience and discipline."<sup>410</sup> As time passed under martial law and the regional

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<sup>407</sup> Daniel Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2009). p.78

<sup>408</sup> Ibid. p.81

<sup>409</sup> Ibid. p.82

<sup>410</sup> Daniel Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 36, no. 4 (1963). p.352

rebellions had been successfully crushed, the army came to view itself as having a "...inalienable right to participate in the management of the nation."<sup>411</sup>

Political parties also had their activities restricted. Demonstrations and meetings were now blocked by the military. Political activity was not only restricted within the regions but also in Jakarta. Members of Parliament and regional legislative bodies were arrested. In regional areas legislative assemblies were ordered to "...refrain from discussing "political" topics."<sup>412</sup> The army, under Nasution's leadership, also took advantage of the opportunity that martial law presented to create civil-military cooperation bodies. These bodies were comprised of labour groups and peasant organisations amongst others. The purpose, according to Lev, for the military engaging in this was to "...loosen the parties grip on these "functional groupings", and to bring such organisations in-line with the army."<sup>413</sup> The army had mixed levels of success with these groups, however it was considerably more successful with the army veterans groups. These veteran groups "...had been organized under the political parties for several years.", however during 1957 and 1958 this group was brought under the control of the army.<sup>414</sup> Anderson argues that the reason for the takeover of the veterans organisations was the military attempting to protect itself from any "...linkages..." to political parties.<sup>415</sup> Nasution and the army also set up the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian (FNPIB) in 1958. This amounted to another attempt by the military to create a large national organisation of which it could take charge. It was also part of the vision the army shared with Sukarno for the

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<sup>411</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.124, Jenkins. p.19 also makes this point by arguing that the military's officers increasingly began to view themselves as the protector of the nation as well as inflating their sense of importance.

<sup>412</sup> Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. p. 83

<sup>413</sup> Ibid. p.83

<sup>414</sup> Ibid. p.84

<sup>415</sup> Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Language and Power- Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, 2006 ed. (Jakarta: Equinox, 2006). p.105

replacement of the political parties. Having established this organisation Nasution then sought to expand it "...into a multi-branched national structure..." with the intention of competing with political party's for popular support.<sup>416</sup> This was however opposed by other political parties and Lev argues that despite lasting until 1960, the FNPIB never became an "...effective political organization..."<sup>417</sup> Through these actions the military were attempting to curb the power of political parties and to build themselves their own bodies that would offer them support that would rival the political organisations. Political parties, such as the PKI, were keenly aware of the army's intentions to expand its role. It worked with other political parties during the period of martial law to curb the powers of the army. The role expansion into the political realm that the army undertook under martial law was a product of the organisation's historical experience. Schiff argues that the historical and cultural experiences of a particular nation are important in determining their civil military relations. The army had participated in a political and Guerrilla struggle against the Dutch as well as counter-insurgency operations. This had affected their views of politicians and politics. Indeed it also required the army to engage with people as well as to have an understanding of political issues in its effort to conduct successful counter-insurgency operations. Many in the army believed that it was their efforts that won them independence. The military during the 1950's witnessed the weakness and turmoil in the political system while also being the victim of political interference. This, along with a growing sense of entitlement emanating from the military's victory over regional separatists and its politically conservative outlook, led it to become engaged in a political role. The development of the army's political role represented a change in the military's style, and a realignment in military professionalism. Those

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<sup>416</sup> Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. p.85

<sup>417</sup> Ibid. p.85

KNIL educated officers, such as Nasution, who had been educated according to Western standards of officership, were developing a new indigenous professionalism under which a role in the nation's political life was permissible. During this time, Nasution and Army leaders were also engaged in efforts to improve the education of the officer corps. Not only was this education aimed at improving the officers' technical war fighting skills but also, McVey argues, at a broader attempt to develop "...a broader ideology."<sup>418</sup> Following exposure to American military training and education facilities, Indonesian Army commanders became aware of the importance of education in creating "...effective and ideologically compatible officers...", and McVey argues that they believed in instilling their soldiers with a revolutionary heritage as well as a western notion of military professionalism.<sup>419</sup> Despite the fact that the General staff were interested in improving the professionalism of the officer corps, this was tempered with the revolutionary experience and meant that there would be aspects which would challenge the notion of the apolitical 'professional' soldier.

Martial law also provided the military with the opportunity to intervene and to gain a place in the economic life of the nation. On the 13th December, following the seizure of Dutch owned businesses by demonstrators, Nasution placed Dutch enterprises under the control of the Army. The military then placed officers, many of whom Lev argues were far from the best in the military, in charge of the companies.<sup>420</sup> Crouch also makes the point that the army used its expansion into the economic sector as a

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<sup>418</sup> Ruth McVey, "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army: Pt Ii," *Indonesia* 13, (1972). p.163

<sup>419</sup> Ibid. p.166

<sup>420</sup> Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. p.87. Lev states that many of the officers that were put into these positions were ready for pensions or were those who the army did not have much use.



means by which to side-line personnel whom it viewed as being ineffective.<sup>421</sup> Along with the side-lining of inefficient members of its own organisation the army's new role expansion gave it the means to generate funding streams outside of official government channels. Many of these former Dutch businesses were extremely profitable, however also many began to be mismanaged by soldiers who simply did not possess the required skill set for the management of businesses. Corruption also found its way into the army's new business dealings. It gave many the opportunity to take their own cut and it also provided those of lower rank with "...a stake in the status quo and helped to ensure their loyalty to the army leadership."<sup>422</sup>

The army's expansion of its traditional roles under martial law amounted to a milestone in the history and the development of the institution, as well as the establishment of a concordant civil-military relationship. The role that the military played in conducting internal security operations against the regionalist challenge strengthened their self-image as the guardians and protectors of the nation. The army's participation in the events of the regional crisis was used by the military as backing to their claim for "...a more permanent role in the government."<sup>423</sup> The army had once again confronted a challenge that also had important political implications with its role as internal protector being further emphasised. The army and its commanders participated in the administration of military law and used it increasingly to move against the political elements that it viewed as divisive. Its functional imperative was changing. The function that the military increasingly considered to be theirs was one that maintained the security of the nation as well as participating in the economic and political life of the nation. As Crouch suggests, officers were now also

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<sup>421</sup> Harold Crouch, "Generals and Business in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 48, no. 4 (1976). p. 521

<sup>422</sup> Ibid. p.521-522

<sup>423</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.33

viewing themselves as managers and bureaucrats.<sup>424</sup> As a result of this expansion into the political and economic sectors the military and the officers, who were directly involved in these activities, now had interests to defend and they now sought to protect and maintain them.<sup>425</sup> Because the military had benefited under martial law, and army officers were now members of the social elite, their interests were served by the maintenance of the status quo.<sup>426</sup>

On the 12th of November 1958, recognition of this expansion in the army's role and status was made by the Army's Chief of Staff General Nasution. He termed this the 'middle way', arguing that the army was, "...not just the 'civilian tool' as in Western countries, nor a 'military regime' which dominates the state power, but as one of many forces in the society, the force for the struggle of the people [kekuatan perjuangan rakyat] which works together with other people's forces [kekuatan rakyat lainnya]."<sup>427</sup> Military officers, it was argued, should be able to participate in the government and to use their "...non-military skills in helping to develop the nation."<sup>428</sup> Nasution argued that officers should be permitted to "....participate in determining economic, financial, international and other policies.", and he also argued that they should be permitted positions within the state's institutions.<sup>429</sup> Nasution also hinted at the possibility of a violent reaction from the army if its officers were discriminated against.<sup>430</sup> Nasution was redefining Indonesia's civil-military relationship. Lev suggests that the response to the middle way was mostly favourable, even if this was largely due to the fact that it reassured people that there was unlikely to be a coup.

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<sup>424</sup> Crouch, "Generals and Business in Indonesia." p.522

<sup>425</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.41

<sup>426</sup> Ibid. p.41

<sup>427</sup> See Abdul Haris Nasution, *Tonggak Tonggak Dwi Fungsi* (Jakarta: mimeo, 1981). in Salim Said, "The Political Role of the Indonesian Military: Past, Present and Future," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* 15, no. 1 (1987). p.22

<sup>428</sup> Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. p.211

<sup>429</sup> Ibid. p.211

<sup>430</sup> Ibid. p.212

As a result of the events of martial law, there was a new civil-military relationship developing. It brought an expansion of army roles in the political and economic sector and a change in the political-decision making process. The nature of this developing relationship was evolving in such a way that to call it concordant in Schiff's terms is unsuitable. The military was becoming increasingly influential through its role in fighting insurgent groups during the regional crisis. It was becoming an increasingly powerful political actor as a result of martial law. It was able to deal with a parliamentary system which it perceived to be unstable and flawed. The political decision making process was also changing with the implementation of Sukarno's guided democracy. This period ushered in a far more authoritarian type of government.

### **Konsepi and Guided Democracy**

During the late 1950's there would be a number of changes which would reshape the political decision making process, and have a profound impact upon the nature of the civil-military relationship in Indonesia. As has already been described, the military was becoming a more influential actor within the political and social life of the country. Simultaneously Sukarno began reshaping the state's political institutions as well as the overall system of Government. Sukarno, like many of the military's leaders, had witnessed the weakness and successive failures of many Indonesian cabinets and this emphasised to him the need for a change in the political system. Sukarno, amidst an increasingly tumultuous political and social climate, gave a speech on the 28th October 1956 which would spell out his personal feelings about the state of the Indonesian political system. The speech which became known as the 'bury the parties' speech, attested to the view that parliamentary democracy was failing in Indonesia. In this speech he enunciated the idea that the fractious and flawed

system of multi-party participation in government should be suppressed. He argued that it should be buried. This was an indication of his belief in the need for change. Later he spoke of his *Konsepi* (idea), of how he believed politics could be changed for the better. This called for a political system which did not "...imitate..." western political systems and was based instead on an Indonesian model of decision making.<sup>431</sup> According to Lev, when his ideas were finally made public, they contained two basic proposals. Firstly, that a cabinet should be formed comprising the four major political parties, crucially ending the ostracizing of the PKI.<sup>432</sup> This new cabinet would operate according to the principle of *gotong-rojong* (mutual help), where these parties worked together for the benefit of the nation.<sup>433</sup> The second part of this vision called for the setting up of a national council which would contain functional groups from within society, one of these eventually being the Army.<sup>434</sup> Whether requested or not, this council would advise the Cabinet, and would, argues Lev, act "...to buttress the authority of a new government."<sup>435</sup> The national council was created in May 1957. Legge argues that despite Sukarno's pronouncement that the national council would act as a rival to Parliament it, in fact, became "...dependent upon it..." and came to act as an advisory body.<sup>436</sup> As Guided Democracy was becoming established so too was the rising influence of both the PKI and the army in the political sphere. The military, through the regional crisis and the implementation of martial law, played an increasingly significant role in the political life of the country, and were, according to Lev, the driving force behind guided democracy.<sup>437</sup> The position of the PKI was also

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<sup>431</sup> J.D Legge, *Sukarno: A Political Biography* (London: Penguin Press, 1972). p.283

<sup>432</sup> Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. p.29

<sup>433</sup> *Ibid.* p.29

<sup>434</sup> Legge. p.283-284 also see Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p. 131, Nasution was included within the council itself.

<sup>435</sup> Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*, p.29-30.

<sup>436</sup> Legge. p.289

<sup>437</sup> Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. p.77

strengthened. It had made gains in regional elections, and was using its organisational strength to support the implementation of guided democracy.<sup>438</sup> Both the military and the PKI's rise in influence would come to underpin guided democracy, and result in a tenuous relationship between the two adverse groups. Stemming from the chaos within the regions, Nasution banned a number of political parties which had supported the PRRI in the rebel areas. The role of the political parties, with the exception of the PKI, was on a downward trajectory.<sup>439</sup>

Under Guided democracy the aforementioned functional groups drawn from within society would come to form a new parliament, as they had in the national council.

This would minimise the number of political parties and reduce the amount of "...ideological deadlock."<sup>440</sup> Nasution and the army considered the issue of constitutional arrangements to also be of concern. He wanted a return to the 1945 constitution. This would provide a strong executive, and it would also prevent Sukarno from avoiding responsibility for governmental failures in either administrative or economic areas.<sup>441</sup> The reintroduction of the 1945 constitution would provide for the reduction of political parties and the creation of functional groups. Although there were concerns expressed from a number of avenues, the constitution was introduced on 5 July 1959.

Nasution wanted the military to have significant representation in the new government. He wanted the army to be represented as a functional group. Lev argues that the point of this "...was to give the army a responsible role while eliminating politically unstabilizing influences on it."<sup>442</sup> Sukarno, argues Lev, also believed that by including the army it would allow him to better control it and prevent the

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<sup>438</sup> See Legge. p.290 and Ricklefs. p.248

<sup>439</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.134

<sup>440</sup> Ibid. p.134

<sup>441</sup> Ibid. p.134

<sup>442</sup> Lev, *The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959*. p.243

possibility of any type of violent action which may affect the state.<sup>443</sup> The military was included as one of these functional groups despite the concerns of the PKI. It is important to note that all three branches of the military would be included within this body. The military would later claim 35 of the total 260 seats in Parliament, with the Army as the biggest beneficiary.<sup>444</sup> Crucially, seats of the military were by appointment, and not by election.

## **Analysis**

The 1950's were a particularly unstable period in Indonesian history. As has been discussed, in the early part of the decade the military was beset by factionalism and was subject to considerable political interference. The army responded by attempting to assert its authority with Sukarno; this effort ultimately backfired. Attempts were made in 1955 to improve the institution's cohesiveness; yet these efforts were not without their opponents and complications. The manner in which events unfolded and the way in which these events were handled involved a considerable amount of coercion. Martial law permitted the military to handle matters in the pursuit of dealing with the regional crises, as it saw fit. As mentioned previously, martial law allowed the army and Nasution to control the press and it also enabled the military to detain people as it deemed to be necessary. Political activity was also cracked down upon.

### **The Military**

The military as a partner in this concordance could not be considered a homogenous group. The army suffered throughout the 1950's with problems of disunity. There were a number of reasons for this. In the early 1950's, there were calls for the

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<sup>443</sup> Ibid. p.243

<sup>444</sup> Ibid. p.246

professionalization and reorganisation of the army, which would have impacted on the career opportunities of many officers. The pushing of these policies caused division between those in command, and those who would have suffered as a result. There were vestiges of power outside the military chain of command that preceded the regional crisis. This was highly problematic for the army's senior officers. During the regional rebellion the military, as an institution, was deeply split. Elements fought against the government. Schiff defines the military as "... the institution publicly recognized by society and the political elites as the institution that defends a nation's borders", however during the regional crisis elements within the army were no longer loyal to the government, and engaged in fighting for reasons other than defending the nation's borders.<sup>445</sup> It was not until the implementation of martial law and the suppression of the regional rebellion that the army was able to deal with some of its internal problems by purging those elements which had been involved in the rebellion, or had undermined the discipline within the army.<sup>446</sup>

### **Political Leadership**

Along with defining who the army was as a partner, defining the political leadership was also problematic. Throughout the 1950's, Sukarno maintained his position as a forceful presence in Indonesian politics. However, there was considerable weakness and instability within the various institutions which, alongside Sukarno, comprised the political leadership. Sukarno and these parliamentary cabinets comprised the elites that had "...direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces."<sup>447</sup> However successive cabinets collapsed, and it was thus not always clear who the political leadership was, who was exerting authority, or how much authority they

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<sup>445</sup> Schiff. p.43

<sup>446</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.111

<sup>447</sup> Schiff.

were able to bring to bear on the armed forces, and exactly what the nature of the relationship was. Therefore throughout the 1950's until the declaration of martial law and Sukarno's establishment of guided democracy, the political leadership remained fractured, unstable and ineffective. This course of events throughout the 1950's challenges Schiff's idea of the existence of a political partner. It illustrates that during the 1950's within the Indonesian context, no cohesive partner existed that was capable of being termed the political leadership.

### **Citizenry**

The chaotic events of the 1950's, culminating with the regional rebellions toward the end of the decade, also had repercussions for the third partner in Schiff's concordance model. This was the citizenry. Throughout the 1950's the citizenry was mobilised by various elements within the Indonesian elite, both civilian and military, to support their causes. As was seen in the October 17th affair, both Sukarno and Nasution, appealed to the civilians. Nasution actively mobilised civilians to support his position. During the regional rebellion there was a cleavage between those civilians who supported the PRRI and the central government, and those who supported the rebel commanders and the Army. During the time of martial law, the activities of trade unions were controlled. The activities of the press were suppressed. There were also elements of the civilian population who supported Sukarno and his efforts to establish guided democracy. As with the other two partners, the civilian population's views were divided on a number of political issues, including their views on the role of the military. They were not a coherent partner.

Schiff makes the argument in her theory that concordance will be reached if the three partners agree on four indicators of concordance. In the 1950's Indonesia differed. Agreement on issues related to the military was not possible. Because of the way in



which events transpired in the latter part of the decade, any agreement became very difficult. The implementation of martial law ruled out the possibility for agreement. It allowed the government and the army to exercise an almost total control over the press, political parties and wider society. In this context, the notion of agreement is misplaced because the army and the political leadership implemented martial law. A civil military relationship emerged, but it was far from concordant. It was a relationship where the military, and in particular the army, was able to gain a bigger role in the nation's political realm.

### **Social Composition of the Officer Corps**

During the 1950's, agreement amongst the partners as to the social composition of the officer corps proved difficult. Factionalism in the army had loomed as a spectre in the background since Independence. On successive occasions during the 1950's it came to the fore by creating instability within the military, wider society and the political system. This factionalism was used by a variety of actors in pursuit of their own goals. It was to the detriment of the military as a professional organisation as well as undermining any opportunity for an agreement on the social composition of the officer corps. There were a number of different cleavages that combined to undermine a stable social composition within the officer corps. Ethnic and religious divisions soon emerged within the officer corps. This would become one of the primary contributing factors to the highly factionalised military during the 1950's. Linked to the issue of ethnic and religious difference were hostilities that emanated from underlying regional tensions. This manifested itself in a divide between Java and the rest of the Indonesian islands. A divide which crossed both the military and the civilian political world and ultimately culminated with the regional crisis and a split between some regional based officers and those who occupied command positions in

Headquarters in Jakarta. A final division that had emanated from the pre-independence history of the army was now present. This would create a division that would last throughout the 1950's. This division stemmed from those officers drawn from the KNIL and those from PETA. Their backgrounds also affected their levels of training and education. All of these factors combined to create a highly divided officer corps. It was their own officers who could not agree on its social composition, nor its political leaders or the wider population. This was an indicator upon which the partners disagreed and therefore one that prevented concordance.

### **Political Decision Making Process**

The political decision making process that existed post-independence and until the implementation of the more authoritarian system of guided democracy, was highly unstable and contributed to the lack of a concordant civil-military relationship. The first thing to note concerning the political decision making process in Indonesian at this time was the inherent weakness within the political institutions themselves, as Indonesia saw the collapse of many cabinets in the 1950's, due to political infighting. The only constant was the figure of Sukarno, who was a highly adept political survivor and demonstrated his ability to manipulate numerous factions for his own benefit. There were numerous occasions when there was intense disagreement between the military and the political decision makers concerning the needs of the military. Perhaps the most enduring and problematic of these was the issue of how to integrate the PETA and other guerrilla fighters into the army. There was much controversy over this issue. Political interference in Army policy eventuated with a backlash by the military. An example of this was the tension that erupted and culminated with the 17th of October affair. This was a direct showdown between the government and elements within the Army's high command. It demonstrated the

volatility of the time and the dysfunctional political decision making process that precluded concordance.

### **Recruitment Method**

The recruitment method of the military during this period of time did not influence the establishment of concordance.

### **Military Style**

The Indonesian army's military style is a particularly significant indicator of concordance. Schiff states that military style refers to "...the external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it."<sup>448</sup> The TNI evolved out of a series of historical events that drove its development in a particular manner. The importance and influence of KNIL military thinking cannot be underestimated. These were soldiers who rose to hold positions as officers in the TNI and brought with them a 'western professional' military experience. By contrast there were those Indonesians who had either joined the TNI as former soldiers of the Japanese occupation forces or had partaken in the struggle for independence through Guerrilla organisations. The effect of this was a one army with a variety of influences and interests that were often diametrically opposed. The independence struggle had involved an extensive Guerrilla campaign against the Dutch. This struggle had, by its nature, required close coordination with civilians and the political leadership. Thus it developed with a mind-set for political issues. It also developed an early distrust and disdain for civilian politicians, as It had continued to fight for independence despite the revolution's political leadership having surrendered. This also instilled a belief that the military

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<sup>448</sup> Ibid. p.47

had a superior role in the revolution and in the life of the nation because of its actions in winning independence. Political interference in areas which the military believed to be its exclusive domain served as a further cause of mistrust and tension. This combined to create a military high command that was suspicious of civilian politicians and of civilian governments. In the late 1940's and throughout the 1950's, events transpired that led the TNI to hold an impression of itself as the nation's guardian. It had taken roles fighting insurgencies, ultimately culminating with its successful campaign in the regional rebellion. Stemming from the Madiun rebellion, as well as from the general threat that the army perceived to be coming from the communist party and its supporters, the TNI developed an inherently anti-communist disposition amongst many in the officer corps.<sup>449</sup> By the end of the 1950's all these factors combined to produce an army with growing political power, but also one which had a deep mistrust of politicians as well the PKI and its supporters. The civilian population tended to hold a positive view of the army. Despite there being times when the army cracked down on various parts of the politically active citizenry, it was viewed favourably due to its crushing of the secessionist regional challenges. It was also held in high regard for its role in the nation's independence struggle. The army was gradually developing a secondary function aside from that of national security and defence. The military became involved more heavily in the political life of the country during the period of martial law. This was clearly articulated in Nasution's 'middle way' speech. The army also had the opportunity to move into the nation's economic affairs with the nationalisation of Dutch assets during the martial law period. This suddenly put army officers in charge of large companies. It provided

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<sup>449</sup> Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia." p.353

the army with new avenues of revenue as well as the opportunity for personal enrichment through corruption.

The development of the TNI's military style did not automatically preclude a concordant relationship, but it did affect the role that the army would accept. The military would not accept a subservient role within the nation's political structure. By the end of the 1950's there was an attitude which would preclude civilian control, in any Western sense. The army had, in its opinion, shouldered much of the responsibility for the victory in the independence struggle despite the surrender of the revolution's civilian leaders. This feeling of animosity towards civilian leadership was added to because of the political interference in army affairs by civilian politicians. The result was that, by the middle of the 1950's, the army had a low opinion of the nation's political leaders. It would become increasingly more politically active whilst at the same time developing its secondary function outside that of national defence. These factors combined to create a perception amongst those in the military that they should have a more significant role in the control of their organisation, one which precluded interference from civilian politicians. It cemented a resolve amongst those in leadership positions that they would not submit, as they had in the past, to the civilian political interference. The development of their secondary function demonstrated the benefits of being involved in areas outside those which were deemed purely to be military matters. The combination of history and the course of events during the 1950's set the army on a course in which it began to seek more independence both politically and within society. The army was thus happy to enter into the relationship with Sukarno under Guided democracy because it would at least, in the short term, provide the military with the power that it desired.

The military during the 1950's was subject to intense factionalism within its ranks and political interference. Its commanders at the beginning of the decade attempted to undertake a reform program that proved unpopular amongst many officers, this led to a confrontation between the political leadership and the military. Resulting in the replacement of the army's commander Nasution by Sukarno. Following this episode Nasution's leadership was challenged by the attempted coup of Colonel Lubis. The military then became involved in suppressing regional rebellion's which were supported by dissident military officers. As a result of regional turmoil martial law was passed in 1957, resulting in an end to Indonesia's period of constitutional democracy and an expansion of the military's role into the economic, social and political life of the nation. Concordance at this time was not possible due to the divisions within the actors.

## Chapter Five

### Guided Democracy

In the wake of the collapse of Indonesia's constitutional democracy, Sukarno established a new political system, one which he believed was better suited to Indonesia. It was a system which comprised three powerful partners. All three of these partners had their own interests and reasons for wanting to be part of this conflictual and difficult relationship. Sukarno, as leader, required the backing of a sizeable and increasingly politically active army to remain in charge. To hold the army in check he, however, needed a partner who was capable of counterbalancing the strength of the army. This partner was the PKI, which had considerable popularity as well as an extensive grassroots organisation. The PKI's motivation in supporting Sukarno was to ensure that it was protected from the army, as the army largely viewed them with suspicion and disdain. The whole system of guided democracy was a finely balanced arrangement of partners with competing interests. Thus Anderson has described the system of guided democracy as "...a coalition of expediency that began to breakdown as soon as the immediate interests of the partners no longer coincided."<sup>450</sup>

There were a number of different institutional instruments that comprised Guided democracy. Sukarno resided at the top of this system; however there were a number of other bodies that he had to work with or around. At the top sat the Work Cabinet. This comprised Sukarno and a number of other senior ministers, as well as a number of junior ministers. There were also two deliberative bodies, the Peoples Deliberative Assembly (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat) or MPR and the Supreme Advisory

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<sup>450</sup> Anderson, *Language and Power- Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*. p.106

Council (Dewan Perimbangan Agung) or DPA. The MPR, a large body, was intended, "...to be the repository of popular sovereignty...."<sup>451</sup> The DPA was tasked with providing Sukarno with advice outside that of his cabinet. There was also a national planning council whose task it was to provide advice on the economic development of Indonesia. Legge argues that the "...complex cluster of councils was intended to provide an appropriate framework for the deliberation which, under Guided Democracy's rationale, was intended to secure a national consensus."<sup>452</sup> Sukarno appropriated the term Gotong Royong from traditional Indonesian society; a term which would become important within the rhetoric of guided democracy. The concept itself refers to "...moral obligation and generalized reciprocity...", however for Indonesian political leaders including Sukarno it came to mean more than this.<sup>453</sup> In his speech on the 1st of June 1945, Sukarno spoke of bringing people together, "Christians and Muslims, rich and poor, and native Indonesians and naturalized citizens in a mutually tolerant struggle against the enemy"<sup>454</sup> Sukarno's use of the term, argues Bowen, "...became an emblem of the Indonesian nation as an active joining of opposites."<sup>455</sup> The significance of the Gotong Royong parliament must be seen within this context as a vehicle intended to bring a diverse range of views together, and an attempt to unite them. Gotong Royong was a concept intended to unite the Indonesian masses as well as political groups in a manner which would contribute to a more effective system of government for the country. It would also contribute to the modernisation of the nation and improving the state's economic situation.

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<sup>451</sup> Legge. p.312

<sup>452</sup> Ibid. p.313

<sup>453</sup> John Bowen, "On the Political Construction of Tradition: Gotong Royong in Indonesia," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 45, no. 3 (1986). p.546

<sup>454</sup> Ibid. p.551

<sup>455</sup> Ibid. p.551



In 1960 the old parliament was replaced with the Gotong Royong parliament. This parliament contained representatives from the legal political parties PNI, PKI and NU (Nahdlatul Islam), as well as members from the armed forces, of which the army had the most. It also had representatives for "...workers, peasants, Islamic authorities, youth, women and the intelligentsia."<sup>456</sup> Through the establishment of these deliberative bodies, Sukarno now had the institutional machinery that would comprise guided democracy. Legge argues that as time went by the effectiveness of these bodies was gradually eroded to the point where the parliament was no longer a check on the president's power, and the other deliberative bodies, the DPA and MPRS, became "...submissive."<sup>457</sup>

Sukarno sought to hold this mix of competing interests by appealing to an overall sense of "...national purpose." spelt out in the concept of Pancasila.<sup>458</sup>

1. Belief in God
2. Nationalism
3. Humanitarianism
4. Democracy
5. Social Justice<sup>459</sup>

In 1959, alongside Pancasila, Sukarno announced what would become the ideology behind Guided Democracy, referred to as MANIPOL. This spoke of the "...revival of the spirit of the Revolution, for social justice and for 'retooling' of the institutions and organisations of the nation in the name of ongoing revolution."<sup>460</sup> This was combined in 1960 with the initials USDEK, which stood for the 1945 constitution, Indonesian

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<sup>456</sup> Legge. p.314

<sup>457</sup> Ibid. p.316-317

<sup>458</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.43

<sup>459</sup> This translation of the five principles taken from Anderson, *Language and Power- Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*. p.26

<sup>460</sup> Ricklefs. p.255

Socialism, guided democracy guided economy and Indonesian identity.<sup>461</sup>

MANIPOL-USDEK now becomes ideological orthodoxy; it was introduced into all levels of education and government as well as the press.<sup>462</sup> Nasakom also emerged as a crucial component of Guided Democracy, it argued for Nationalism, Islam and Communism to work together within government, represented by the PNI, NU and the PKI.

Guided democracy was characterized by the conflictual relationship that existed between President Sukarno, the armed forces and the PKI. The dynamics and balance of power between the three entities was subject to turbulent change over the period during which guided democracy existed. The army at the inception of Guided Democracy held influence due to its administration of martial law. Sukarno needed the support of the army to govern the country and to prevent the possibility of any threat to his own government. Sukarno's requirement for the support of the military was also tempered by the possibility that the military would challenge his leadership or his policies. Therefore throughout the five years of guided democracy he sought to find additional supporters to ensure that the military did not become too powerful. Herbert Feith has described the relationship between Sukarno and the army as being one of "...stable conflict..." driven by competition, tempered by common interest.<sup>463</sup> The army for its part was concerned with the maintenance of its political power and influence, as well as being interested in maintaining its status as a respected institution within society. The relationship that the army had with Sukarno was key to ensuring its legitimacy within the nation's social and political life.<sup>464</sup>

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<sup>461</sup> Ibid. p.255

<sup>462</sup> Ibid. p.255

<sup>463</sup> Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in *Indonesia*, ed. Ruth McVey and Herbert Feith (New Haven: United Printing Services, INC, 1963). cited in Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.45

<sup>464</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.46

Schiff's concordance framework provides for a means of understanding the events of the Guided Democracy period. By applying her framework to the case it will be demonstrated that the civil-military relationship was inherently unstable. Despite having a number of consultative bodies, ministers and others who made up the political leadership, it was really Sukarno who embodied the political leadership. His shrewd political balancing act between the army and the citizenry was undertaken to monopolise his control of the country. Schiff's third partner, the citizenry, is diverse and somewhat ill defined. Her definition of the citizenry is broad and non-exact.

"...it is comprised of individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban workers and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers...It is also best defined by function. How do the citizens interact with the military? Is there agreement among the citizens themselves over the role of the military in society?"<sup>465</sup>

The PKI became totally relevant to any discussion of the citizenry. It was engaged at a grass roots level, both in rural and urban areas. It also grew to considerable size and had a crucial relationship with the political leadership. The PKI and the army tended to have a conflictual relationship, however there were also some groups in society who feared the communists and thus supported the Army. Religious organisations, such as the NU, were an example of this.

The armed forces were well represented in senior positions within Sukarno's new system of government. Following the restoration of the 1945 constitution almost a third of all ministers were drawn from the armed forces. Similarly, a third of all ministers within the new parliament were also drawn from the armed forces.<sup>466</sup> In 1960 five army officers were appointed as provincial governors.<sup>467</sup> There was also confrontation, the army pushed back against the relationship that Sukarno was

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<sup>465</sup> Schiff, p.44

<sup>466</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.47-48

<sup>467</sup> Ibid. p.48

developing with the PKI, particularly in the wake of PKI's criticisms of the army's handling of the regional rebellion and the army's failure to finish it with force.<sup>468</sup> In 1960 the army arrested members of the PKI's politburo. Military commanders in South Sumatra, South Sulawesi and South Kalimantan banned the PKI and arrested communists. Sukarno was eventually able to broker an end to the conflict, and the leaders of the PKI were released. From the beginning of the martial law period through to its end, the PKI sought to have the powers that the army were prescribed lessened.<sup>469</sup> It should also be noted that Sukarno attempted to use the Air Force against the army. The air force had often been jealous of the powerful position of the army within the defence establishment. This example illustrates how politically active the military was, and how unwilling it was to tolerate the criticism or involvement of the citizenry, namely the PKI, in determining any civil-military relationship and therefore making any concordant relationship during this time highly unlikely. The matter of West Irian would become a factor of instability. Each partner had their own motivations for wanting to prosecute the campaign in Irian.<sup>470</sup> Sukarno's reasons behind his involvement in the campaign in Irian were to get the Indonesian masses behind his drive for a continuation of the revolution.<sup>471</sup> West Irian could also be seen as a piece of unfinished business following the revolution for Sukarno. It remained, after all, a possession of the Dutch. As well as being motivated by a powerful sense of nationalism it was also suggested that Sukarno was also able to use the West Irian issue as a useful distraction from domestic issues at various times throughout his leadership.<sup>472</sup> Similarly for the army it was a sense of humiliation that drove them

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<sup>468</sup> Ricklefs, p.256-257.

<sup>469</sup> Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965*, Equinox ed. (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006). p.105

<sup>470</sup> Ricklefs. p.258

<sup>471</sup> Ibid. p.258

<sup>472</sup> Legge. p.247

together to participate in West Irian with Sukarno.<sup>473</sup> The army also benefitted from an increase in its size as well as loans for new weaponry.<sup>474</sup> The PKI was supportive of the West Irian Campaign to support their protector, Sukarno, who in the early 1960's was protecting them from the army. The PKI was also motivated by a strong sense of nationalism and anti-imperialism, and the action in Irian it believed would create wider support for the party domestically.<sup>475</sup> This was successful, and in 1962 the PKI was estimated to have had around 2 million members, the largest communist party in any non-communist nation.<sup>476</sup>

In 1962 there was a crucial change in the army's leadership as Sukarno moved to gain tighter control over the army. He had been concerned by what he viewed as the lenient punishment of some of the PRRI's leaders. He undertook to replace Nasution with an individual who would be more amenable to his interests. According to Crouch part of the reason also resided in the fact that Sukarno perceived Nasution as being the most likely candidate capable of moving the army against him. Sukarno however had to exercise caution in his handling of Nasution, as he had been heavily involved in the army's rise to power and had considerable support within the officer corps.<sup>477</sup> Sukarno managed to achieve this by offering him a simultaneous promotion that ultimately became a demotion. Sukarno offered to make Nasution commander of the armed forces with authority over all four of the armed services; however, as it transpired he did not end up having operational control over those services. His new post was changed to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. This meant that his roles were limited to organisation and civil defence. Although he remained an important personality, he had limited operational control over the military, and in particular the army. It was

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<sup>473</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p. 46

<sup>474</sup> Ricklefs. p.257

<sup>475</sup> Mortimer. p.176

<sup>476</sup> Ricklefs. p.259

<sup>477</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.52

also crucial that Sukarno was able to find a replacement acceptable to the officer corps as well as to the departing army head. The candidate found was Major General Yani, who enjoyed the support of both the army's officer corps as well as Nasution. The choice of Yani gave Sukarno the security of weakening the powerful Nasution as well as undermining the army's position as a partner within the framework of guided democracy.<sup>478</sup>

The army's power was further diminished by the end of martial law. For Sukarno this was a further crucial tactic in minimising the political power of the army. Sukarno was able to justify this course of action with the quashing of a number of rebellions throughout Indonesia as well as the successful completion of the Irian campaign in August 1962.<sup>479</sup> Martial law was finally lifted on May 1 1963. General Nasution, who was Sukarno's largest potential threat within the armed forces had been side lined by Sukarno. Sukarno was also developing alliances within other branches of the armed forces which would also further his ability to control the influence of the army. The relationship between the army, political leadership and the citizenry that existed under Guided Democracy was one that was precariously balanced. The political leadership, personified by Sukarno, was acutely aware of the need to limit the influence of the military and the citizenry, in particular the communists. Sukarno had attempted to weaken the position of the army as a partner, and had succeeded to a certain extent through his replacement of its leader and his cultivation of alliances within the other branches of the armed services outside of the army. Sukarno was nevertheless still dependent upon the army. He could not remove them entirely, and furthermore he

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<sup>478</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.165

<sup>479</sup> See Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.54-55 and Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p. 166

needed to be mindful of the influence that the PKI had. If Sukarno permitted them too much leeway then the army may move to challenge the status quo.

Indonesia's confrontation in Malaysia would also have an important impact on the nature of the power relationship under Guided Democracy. Once again the army, the political leadership and the citizenry undertook courses of action that they believed would best serve their interests. The PKI was motivated to stand against the formation of Malaysia out of its nationalist and anti-imperialist ideology. More pragmatically, however, its support for the campaign in Malaysia was about strengthening "...its hand in internal politics at the expense of its rivals and enemies."<sup>480</sup>

Similar motives have to be taken into account to explain Sukarno's support for action against Malaysia. Stemming from this, Legge suggests that Sukarno's actions were underpinned by a sense of being slighted by colonial powers which were setting Malaysia up for the maintenance of their own interests.<sup>481</sup> As an aside, Mortimer argues that by 1963 Sukarno was becoming increasingly comfortable in relying upon the communists, and the relationship between the two parties was becoming closer.<sup>482</sup> The political leadership and the citizenry were moving closer together.

The army's involvement in the Malaysia confrontation was mixed from the outset. They were not interested in becoming involved in a large military operation; however this was tempered by other considerations.<sup>483</sup> The army, like Sukarno and the PKI, were nationalist in orientation. They aspired to see Indonesia become a regional leader. Crouch argues that the formation of Malaya was seen as a continuation of British influence.<sup>484</sup> More pragmatically part of this calculation may have been to see an end to British military bases in Malaya. There were also the memories amongst the

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<sup>480</sup> Mortimer. p.204

<sup>481</sup> Legge. p.363

<sup>482</sup> Mortimer.p.205

<sup>483</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.174

<sup>484</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.59

army of the period during which Malaya had been used as a transit point for material being smuggled into Indonesia to support regional uprisings. The new Malaysia would have a sizeable Chinese minority and it has been suggested that the army was concerned about the spectre of the Chinese Communist Party in the region.<sup>485</sup> Mainly though, this must be seen within the context of the changing place of the army. Martial law had reduced the army's power. There was the hope that events would transpire in such a way as to once again be of benefit to the army domestically.<sup>486</sup> While the confrontation with Malaysia was heating up the PKI increasingly began criticizing the army domestically. They labelled them as bureaucratic capitalists. The PKI also '...openly declared the Army and the Police to be 'anti-people' and recommended themselves to the poorer peasants by advocating land reform."<sup>487</sup> Once again, through the actions of criticizing what could be termed 'military style', the PKI was attacking the army and attempting to ingratiate themselves further amongst the population. The citizenry that can be termed as the PKI was thus clearly making a deliberate attempt to increase its support at the expense of the military, all the while criticizing it for its perceived evils.

The army was careful in its management of the confrontation with Malaysia. It was concerned about committing to a large scale confrontation. The issue of Malaysia also became one in which rivalry between the various branches of the armed services began to be tested. In particular the Air Force commander Omar Dhani, who was a supporter of Sukarno, was put in charge of the command (Koga) responsible for the military operations against Malaysia. The significance of Dhani's appointment to this position was that it gave Sukarno a man with whom he shared mutual interests;

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<sup>485</sup> See Howard Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971). in Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.59

<sup>486</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*.p.59-60

<sup>487</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*.p.176



beyond this, it was also further evidence of the trend that was developing under guided democracy, that being the increasing division of the armed forces. As Elson notes, this was undertaken by Sukarno with the intent of "...advancing and consolidating his own political purposes."<sup>488</sup> Following the poor performance of a number of military operations, Yani began pushing for more army involvement in the operations undertaken by Koga. The effect of this was that Koga was eventually reorganised with Dhani receiving a new deputy, Suharto.

The relationship between Nasution and his replacement Yani was also becoming increasingly strained due to a number of issues. Yani had taken over in 1962, and had sided with Sukarno in restricting Nasution from having operational control over the army in his new position as the armed forces Chief of Staff. Opinion diverged around the areas of the best way to deal with the PKI and the attitudes toward Sukarno.<sup>489</sup> A meeting between Nasution and Yani sided officers was held in January 1965 in an attempt to resolve issues between them. It failed to reach agreement on how to handle Sukarno. Despite these differences within the top echelons of the military there was the continuing commitment amongst members of the army to the principle of maintaining the army's political role.

Since 1957 the PKI had set about making a concerted effort to make closer contacts with the army. In 1957 they had assigned a number of party members to begin seeking out officers who would support their aims within the armed forces as a whole but in particular within the army.<sup>490</sup> Despite these efforts the number of army officers who held sympathy for the PKI was limited.<sup>491</sup> Sympathy for their position was more forthcoming in the Air Force. The Air Force was more closely aligned with Sukarno

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<sup>488</sup> Elson. p.90

<sup>489</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.80

<sup>490</sup> Ibid. p.83 Mortimer also notes that the PKI appealed to the Air Force see Mortimer. p.114

<sup>491</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.83

and leftist politics as a result of its initial Chief of Staff, Air Marshal Surjadi Surjadarma, who had been close to Sukarno and held leftist views.<sup>492</sup> The Air Force's leaders believed they had been treated as a junior service by the army and resented the army for this. Crouch suggests that despite the fact the PKI and the Air Force shared a mutual antagonism of the army, as well as the Air Force's leftist sympathies, it could still not be classed as being committed to the PKI.<sup>493</sup> The PKI's lack of influence within the Armed Forces meant they relied on the ongoing protection of Sukarno. The PKI's answer to this came in two forms. The PKI suggested that workers and peasants be given military training and arms and be turned into a 'fifth force' alongside the army, navy, air force and police. This presented a major challenge to the army in the form of a potential armed rival over which it would not have control. The PKI also sought to push for the Nasakomization of the armed forces. The major fear for the army was that Nasakomization would amount to communist penetration of the army. The PKI suggested that the elements of Nasakom be represented within the armed forces through the use of advisory teams.<sup>494</sup> This, it was hoped, would provide the PKI's leadership with more influence within the army.<sup>495</sup> The army was keen to block Nasakomization. They argued that being loyal soldiers they were dedicated adherents of Pancasila and that they "...upheld the spirit of both the Manipol/USDEK and the Nasakom concept."<sup>496</sup> The army also argued that the armed forces could not be expected to function effectively if Nasakom was introduced, and beyond this that the military was already imbued with the spirit of Nasakom.<sup>497</sup> By utilising this argument the army was able to ultimately resist the PKI's attempt for greater influence within

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<sup>492</sup> Ibid. p.84

<sup>493</sup> Ibid. p.84

<sup>494</sup> Ibid. p.87

<sup>495</sup> Ibid. p.87

<sup>496</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.193

<sup>497</sup> Ibid. p.193

the army, under the guise of Nasakomization. The army remained opposed to the fifth force idea, however by September of 1965; this would no longer be of any consequence. In theoretical context the citizenry was now beginning to influence the concordance by affecting the army's social composition within the officer corps. The PKI had always hoped to gain greater influence within the military and in particular the officer corps, however when that proved impossible they began to push for the concept of the 'fifth force'. This would have changed the nature of any concordance by introducing another security service of sorts into the partnership category. The PKI was also pushing hard for Nasakomization of the armed forces. This would have required that members of armed forces be taught the meaning of the doctrine through advisory teams. This represented hope for the PKI that they may be able to affect the social composition of the army's officer's corps.

### **The Army's New Doctrine**

During the 1950's the military slowly began to develop a role for itself outside of its security function. This was spelt out by Nasution, in his middle way speech. The military subsequently became involved in the nation's economy with the nationalisation of Dutch economic interests. Martial law and Guided democracy would increase their power and influence politically. However in the late 1950's and early 1960's the army went through important doctrinal changes that would have a significant impact on the nature of Indonesian Civil-Military relations and upon the concordance of which it was now a part. The army, under this new doctrine, would expand more into the social life of the nation as well as having a closer relationship with the citizenry.

Officially this change in doctrine took place in March 1960 with the adoption of 'Territorial Warfare', or Guerrilla warfare. Due to the nature of this overall strategy it

was determined that the soldiers of the TNI develop a close relationship with the population.<sup>498</sup> In order to achieve this, the army had to "...win the confidence of the people"<sup>499</sup> It was also argued that "...the Army should take an interest in the material welfare of the people..." the army established specialist units whose purpose it was to build a structure for war time resistance.<sup>500</sup> Sundhaussen argued that these groups were also to be used for the purpose of possible confrontation with the PKI.<sup>501</sup>

Within this strategy there was also the call for the TNI's increased penetration into the nation's economy. In order to improve the capability of the TNI there would have to be increased economic development; the military's economic activities would also provide for its aid programmes for the masses as well as establishing a wartime logistics system.<sup>502</sup> In 1959 the military territories, or T&T, were renamed (Military Area Command or KODAM) and increased from 7 to 16. Along with the increase in area commands, there was an enlargement in the size of the staff organization in each one of these KODAMS. This system of organisation was overhauled with District and Sub District commands renamed and staffing increased. By 1963 the military had representation all the way down to village level.<sup>503</sup> As part of this coordinated effort to establish its doctrine of territorial warfare and to encourage the symbiotic relationship between the masses and the army, the military began "...civic action programmes, conducted public indoctrination, and organized cultural events." The army used "...doctors, engineers and work gangs of soldiers..." in an effort to win the hearts and minds of those in the villages.<sup>504</sup> The army also made an effort to seek a closer relationship with a number of different civilian organisations as well as

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<sup>498</sup> Ibid. p.140

<sup>499</sup> Ibid. p.140

<sup>500</sup> Ibid. p.140

<sup>501</sup> Ibid. p.140

<sup>502</sup> Ibid. p.140

<sup>503</sup> Ibid. p.141-142

<sup>504</sup> Ibid. p.141-142

political parties at the local and regional level.<sup>505</sup> All of these efforts were of course not only to strengthen the relationship between the army and the masses but, as Sundhaussen suggests, they were part of a deliberate policy to contain the "...political advances of the PKI."<sup>506</sup> These efforts must be seen in the context of the army attempting to compete with the PKI at the grass roots level, where its organisation had particular strength.<sup>507</sup> The international environment also has to be taken into consideration. South East Asia during the 1960's was one of the frontlines for the ideological clash between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the U.S military provided the TNI with assistance at this time in the form of training, equipment and technical assistance.<sup>508</sup>

It has already been noted that in the wake of declaration of martial law, the TNI stepped into the economic realm. The participation of the army in the nation's economic affairs would become more significant and would enable the army to develop its own business and charitable interests which, in turn, provided the army with its own income stream. During the 1960's the economic performance of Indonesia declined as the nation was hit by high levels of inflation and economic mismanagement. This 'unofficial' funding became more important for the army as its budget was reduced by the central government.<sup>509</sup> As already noted, the military was able to install military personnel into those Dutch companies that had been nationalised; however other forms of funding also developed. Three examples of these forms of funding developed during the Sukarno era were partnerships, cooperatives

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<sup>505</sup> Ibid. p.141

<sup>506</sup> Ibid. p.142

<sup>507</sup> Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia." p.363

<sup>508</sup> Ibid. p.363

<sup>509</sup> Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, *The Military and Democracy in Indonesia- Challenges, Politics and Power* (Santat Monica: RAND, 2002). p.71

and foundations.<sup>510</sup> Military partnerships between commanders and local businessmen were one such source of income. The army would force local traders or businessmen to pay taxes or duty to the military for economic transactions.<sup>511</sup> Cooperatives were controlled by individual commands to supply goods to soldiers and their families.<sup>512</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Rudini was a specific example. He utilised military vehicles to transport commercial goods, as well as establishing a chicken farm and cooperative store which supplied his soldiers.<sup>513</sup> The army also created foundations (yayasan) which acted as holding companies for a variety of business interests.<sup>514</sup> The army's famous Diponegoro Division, headed by Suharto from 1957-1959 established two foundations. One of these supported the development of the local region and the other one supported retired military personnel.<sup>515</sup> The evolution of military business provided the opportunity for personal enrichment that would spur General Nasution to conduct an investigation into corrupt and fraudulent practices of soldiers. Post and Lindblad suggest however that by the time General Nasution had made this realisation it was already too late. Many activities and behaviours had become entrenched.<sup>516</sup> Ultimately, with greater economic instability the army's business interests became even more critical and sizeable. Developing financial concerns were providing the military with an increasing degree of independence from the government, as it was able to fund part of its own operations. This had repercussions for any emerging concordant relationship because, due to the army having obtained more political

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<sup>510</sup> Lex Rieffel and Jaleswari Pramodhawardani, *Out of Business and on Budget: The Challenge of Military Financing in Indonesia* (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). p.31

<sup>511</sup> J. Thomas Lindblad and Peter Post, eds., *Indonesian Economic Decolonization in Indonesia in Regional and International Perspective* (Netherlands: KITLV Press, 2009). p.50

<sup>512</sup> Rieffel and Pramodhawardani. p.31

<sup>513</sup> Indria Samego, *Bila Abri Berbisnis* (Bandung: Indonesia: Mizan, 1998). Quoted in Rabasa and Haseman. p.72

<sup>514</sup> Rieffel and Pramodhawardani. p.31

<sup>515</sup> Rabasa and Haseman. p.72

<sup>516</sup> Lindblad and Post, eds., p.54.

power and influence it was now able to operate in a more independently financial manner.

## **Analysis**

The period of guided democracy proved to be a time of considerable political upheaval despite the attempts of Sukarno to establish a system which would be better suited to Indonesian culture. The three partners within this system made the possibility for any enduring and stable concordance impossible.

### **The Military**

The Army was anti-communist in orientation. In 1948 it had fought the communists in Madiun. The Communist act of rebellion had left a deep impression on those soldiers involved in putting it down. It had affected the mindset of those involved and it contributed to the army's view of the communists as being a serious threat. The army at this time was also receiving training and assistance from the US army and government, which was deeply concerned about the spread of communism in South East Asia.<sup>517</sup> It should be mentioned that there was some sympathy within the army for the communists but this was very limited in nature. When the army began to challenge Sukarno, he began to look for other allies in the armed forces. He replaced the head of the army and sought support from the air force. This split the interests of the air force and army, and led to competition between the two groups during the Malaysian confrontation. The air force and its commander Omar Dhani were used by the political leadership at various times as a means of checking the army's influence. There was also the issue of the fifth force and Nasakomization which would have

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<sup>517</sup> Bryan Evans III, "The Influence of the United States Army on the Development of the Indonesian Army " *Indonesia* 47, no. April (1989).

severe repercussions on the army had these proposals been seen through in the manner in which they were originally intended.

### **The Political Leadership**

When it comes to defining the political leadership under Guided Democracy, as noted earlier it is primarily the personality of Sukarno that was most relevant in having "...direct influence over the composition and support of the armed forces."<sup>518</sup> There were cabinets and other consultative bodies that advised Sukarno, but the real power within the political leadership as it has been demonstrated was Sukarno himself. He was responsible for the establishment of Guided Democracy and its tenets of Gotong Royong. Later he called for the return to the revolution under MANIPOL, and for the competing strands of Nationalism, Islam and Communism to work together under Nasakom. Despite all these things that Sukarno introduced into the political system it was ultimately his own personality and his personal interests that would determine the nature of relations between the political leadership and the military and the citizenry.

### **The Citizenry**

For the purposes of this discussion the PKI has been focused on as the key group within society that represents the citizenry, due to its leading role in government, and its rivalry with the military. This may seem to neglect a considerable amount in the way of data, and much of the rest of society. Nevertheless as stated elsewhere in this thesis, Schiff's definition of her third partner is deeply flawed, namely in the fact that by her definition it includes almost everybody. The PKI during the period of guided democracy were large in numerical size while operating at a number of different levels throughout society. They also had by far the most important relationship with

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<sup>518</sup> Schiff. p.44



the armed forces. The political leadership relied upon them to counter the power and influence of the army. They were also aware of the danger that the staunchly anti-communist army presented to their attempts to gain more power and influence with the political leadership. The concepts of Nasakom and Gotong Royong also should be considered within the context of this actor. Nasakom was about bringing the divergent forces of nationalism, communism and religion together. These different sections of the population would be brought together for discussion and consensus. However the PKI was caught in with the other Nasakom members, it remained in direct competition with them. Similar to this was the Gotong Royong cabinet; it was another attempt to bring convergent forces within the citizenry together in the political realm. This gave the citizenry a kind of organisational coherence, with the PKI playing a leading role, although it remained ideologically disparate.

The army had come through the guided democracy period suffering from some factionalism, with some officers holding leftist sympathies. Nevertheless for the vast majority of these officers the rise of the PKI represented a serious threat and united much of the army. The army was challenged by the Air Force who had moved closer the PKI and Sukarno; it was more powerful and ultimately more influential. The army as an actor had grown more cohesive in a manner that had not been previously seen. The political leadership of Sukarno had moved closer toward the PKI and become increasingly dependent upon the communists support. The citizenry was far from cohesive; society was increasingly split between those who supported the communist and Sukarno, and those who sided with the military in its opposition to the PKI. Having established the three partners we are now able to assess the indicators of concordance.

### **Social Composition of the Officer Corps**

Schiff states that the social composition of the officer corps is the "...primary indicator of concordance.", and that the representation of the nation's particular constituencies within the officer corps is critical. She makes the point that it is not a requirement that there is broad representation of all those in society, but that there is agreement upon the social composition of the officer corps by the concordance partners. The exact ethno-religious makeup of the Indonesian army's officer corps has at times been problematic. It was the political affiliation of the officers that proved problematic for the citizenry and the political leadership to accept. As indicated throughout this chapter the Indonesian Army had a historical legacy of being anti-communist and suspicious of leftist elements. As an institution, it was deeply wary of the rise in popularity of the communist party. In the early 1960's it openly challenged the communists, by arresting members of its leadership. The citizenry criticized the military and began to challenge the army's powerful martial law role. It argued that the army as an institution opposed the people. The Army for its part was regularly challenged on points relating to the social composition of the officer corps. The political leadership directly challenged the army's leadership, appointing new commanders who were more amenable to their interests. It also challenged the army's commanders particularly during the Malaysian confrontation by supporting the role of Air Force commanders within the operations hierarchy. The result of this action was a further souring of relations between the Army and Air force. The citizenry for its part pushed the concept of Nasakom on the army, which would have pushed communism into the army. However there was little chance that officers within the Army were going to allow this. The military and in particular the army disagreed over the social composition of the officer corps with the political leadership and the

citizenry during the period of guided democracy, due to the interests that the citizenry and the political leadership had and were trying to push upon the military.

### **The Political Decision Making Process**

There were a number of different institutional organs that together comprised the political decision making process. Before discussing these, the nature of Sukarno's guided democracy system of government will be briefly described. As noted by Schiff, countries "...evolve differently and often encompass values that may challenge modern Western democratization."<sup>519</sup> This point is particularly relevant in the case of Indonesia during the Guided democracy period because it was one of the justifications that Sukarno used to shape his new political system. He spoke of the need to create a system based on consensus, and one that utilised traditional concepts of governance. As detailed earlier in the chapter there were a number of different institutions that comprised the political decision making progress. There were advisory bodies to the president, a parliament and a cabinet. The army for its part had considerable representation within the parliament and within the cabinet. It also held positions within regional administration. Within the nations "...cabinet the army had about a quarter of the places, including the key departments of defence and security and internal affairs...."<sup>520</sup> The army would also have significant representation within Koti (Supreme Command for the Liberation of West Irian), which, argues Crouch, "...was becoming a more important policy-making body than the cabinet."<sup>521</sup> In 1960, one of the government's advisory bodies passed a plan which laid down the concept of 'total peoples defence', which would rely on the coordination between the army and the population to defend the country. The citizenry for its part tested the army's powerful

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<sup>519</sup> Ibid. p.46

<sup>520</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.76-77

<sup>521</sup> Ibid. p.77

presence in the nation's political decision making. Some ministers were PKI affiliated, however the army was successful in blocking more PKI members to these government positions. For Sukarno, as well as the PKI, the goal of a Nasakom government was slowed down by the army.

Since the days of martial law the army had been developing its own streams of income outside of those officially sanctioned by the government. This changed the significance of the political decision making process as an indicator, because the army was able to obtain things to supplement the needs of its soldiers outside of that which the government was providing. This income stream was obviously not significant enough to self-fund the army. Nevertheless it did provide commanders with additional income that in many cases strengthened their bond with their own soldiers. During the confrontation with Malaysia the army was criticised domestically by the PKI. Despite this criticism they were able to step back into the political realm with the partial reestablishment of martial law in late 1964, thereby giving them the ability to detain people, impose curfews and restrict the movements of those deemed dangerous.<sup>522</sup>

There was little agreement amongst the three partners on the political decision making indicator. There was much disagreement between the military and the PKI over the amount of influence that each would have within the political decision making process. There was also the occasionally destabilising influence of the political leadership as Sukarno, at various times, bolstered the power of either the citizenry or the army in order to enhance his own position.

### **Recruitment Method**

This indicator has not proved relevant. There have not been issues stemming from the type of recruitment during the guided democracy period.

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<sup>522</sup> Ibid. p.76

## **Military Style**

During the period of guided democracy there was significant disagreement amongst the partners about its style, Schiff refers to military style as being "...the external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it."<sup>523</sup> Anti-communism became an important defining characteristic within the Indonesian army. They had been engaged in defeating a communist uprising in 1948, and this had led to the development of a staunch anti-communist attitude within the army. With the establishment of Guided Democracy and Sukarno's increasing contact and reliance upon the communist party, tensions were bound to develop. There were efforts to temper this strong anti-communist attitude. The first of these was the sacking of Nasution, and the subsequent replacement with a commander more amenable to Sukarno's interests and political programme. Next was the attempt by the PKI to have the communist influence within the army increased. Through Nasakomization in the armed forces, and later the suggestion of the creation of a fifth force. This however failed.

The Army was also developing as an increasingly potent force within both society and within politics. It had, since its inception, developed a close relationship to the wider population. It had fought as a Guerrilla force against the Dutch. The Army had also been used on a number of occasions as a force for internal security operations. It had twice been responsible for the administration of martial law in the country. The Army had also gained a foothold in the economy, and furthermore, under Nasution's 'middle way' doctrine, the groundwork was laid for a far more politically and socially embedded army. The adoption of territorial warfare, due to the government's military

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<sup>523</sup> Schiff. p.47

budget constraints, guaranteed that this relationship between the population and the military would endure. The PKI and the political leadership tried to challenge the army's anti-communist views by promoting the concept of Nasakom within the armed forces; however, this largely failed. In the end there was little agreement amongst the partners about military style. The army had an established style that the citizenry and the political leadership attempted to affect. However there was little change and the army retained its anti-communist views. The army as an institution only became more deeply embedded within the political and social life of the nation.

On the 1st October 1965, a radio announcement was made announcing the Thirtieth of September movement, led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung had arrested a council of generals. These individuals were described as "...power crazy, neglecting the welfare of their troops, living in luxury over the sufferings of their troops, degrading women and wasting the nation's money."<sup>524</sup> Untung claimed that this group of Generals were planning a CIA backed coup. The leaders of the Thirtieth September movement had issued a statement declaring the establishment of a Revolutionary Council which would hold authority. Later that day at 2pm, the names of those on the council were announced. A number of military officers were included as well as three representatives of the PKI, Sukarno's name was absent from this list. Major General Suharto made an announcement later that day declaring that there had been a counter-revolutionary action, and that this movement was responsible for the disappearance of six generals including the head of the army, General Yani. By this time Suharto was in charge of the powerful Kostrad unit, and it was within this unit that opposition to the Thirtieth September unit was based. All six of the Generals had been killed by the kidnapers in the process of arrest or killed later and their bodies dumped, at an air

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<sup>524</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.97

field on the outskirts of Jakarta. The situation in Jakarta was such that two battalions of soldiers from bases outside of Jakarta and loyal to the Thirtieth September movement held control of the presidential palace. Suharto was able to convince one of these units to change sides, while the other unit fled. Throughout the rest of the country other units that had been loyal to the Thirtieth September movement were turning, often due to the soldiers overthrowing their commanders. By the next day the leadership of the movement itself, had evacuated their base of operations at Halim air base. The PKI leader, D.N Aidit, and Air Force Commander, Omar Dhani, had fled. Untung was caught and later tried and executed for his role in the attempted coup. There are a number of different academic interpretations of those events in October 1965, particularly concerning the role of Suharto. The important and significant point for this discussion is that it was the means that brought Suharto and his New Order regime to power, and the affect that such an event had upon the concordance.<sup>525</sup> The army emerged as a stronger coherent actor, as it purged those with communist sympathies, and relentlessly pursued the PKI. Those members of the citizenry that had opposed the PKI joined the army in this orgy of violence, resulting in around 1,000,000 deaths.<sup>526</sup> The political leadership was essentially sidelined as Suharto, took power with the support of the army sidelining Sukarno. The outcome was the establishment of a new concordance, an enforced concordance, the New Order. Suharto attempted to civilianise his regime in 1967 when he was appointed to the position of president, the military still however remained important to the New Order, and to Suharto's maintenance of power. The military became directly involved in government with the inclusion of active officers inside the parliament.

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<sup>525</sup> Benedict R. O'G Anderson, Ruth Thomas McVey, and Frederick Philip Bunnell, *A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965, Coup in Indonesia*, Interim Reports Series (Ithaca, N.Y.: Modern Indonesia Project Cornell University, 1971)., Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*., Elson.

<sup>526</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.155

There were times when there was infighting and factionalisation within the army, nevertheless Suharto's position was maintained due to the close relationship that existed with the army. The army had been engaged at various times in internal security operations and it would now become key to the establishment and maintenance of a relationship that supported Suharto and his elite while repressing any threat from the wider civilian population.



## Chapter Six

The end of Suharto's regime in 1998 was precipitated by a number of factors, some of which were longstanding and others were more sudden. This chapter analyses the change that took place within the partners of Suharto's enforced concordance. It is argued that the change within the partners was so fundamental that the New Order regime's brand of enforced concordance collapsed. The change that took place within each partner is explored, alongside the role that external factors played in the collapse of the regime and the concordance.

### **The Role of the Army in Suharto's Downfall**

The economic crisis that hit Indonesia in late 1997 and 1998 caused considerable damage to Suharto's regime by undermining a key aspect of its legitimacy, namely the ability of the government and Suharto to provide economic growth and an increase in wealth for its population. Despite the significance of this, over this period of crisis the army and the interaction between Suharto and the army would also have a defining impact on the outcome of events in 1998. The military had long backed Suharto, and the two had formed a partnership in which they were able to dominate the rest of society. What existed under the New Order was not a concordance in the manner described by Schiff. Indeed despite the civilianization of the New Order in its later years the military was still relied upon as the "...primary weapon for social control."<sup>527</sup> Things were changing within the military however, and despite the fact that Suharto continued to maintain influence over senior appointments within the Army, these changes would play a crucial role in his demise.

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<sup>527</sup> Dan Slater, "Altering Authoritarianism: Institutional Complexity and Autocratic Agency in Indonesia," in *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power*, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). p.141

Factionalism within the Indonesian Armed Forces and in particular the Army has been a recurring theme during the institution's history. From its inception the organisation was split between those who entered the military from the KNIL and those who came from the Guerrillas and the Japanese trained defence organisations. During the 1950's Indonesia suffered from a prolonged period of regional instability. Some of the causes that fuelled this period of rebellion found support within the army's rank and file.

Under Guided Democracy the Army was once again confronted by the spectre of factionalism within its ranks stemming from the split created by the close relationship between army, PKI and Sukarno. Sukarno was reliant upon the army for his position of power. Despite the importance of this relationship it was Sukarno's proximity to and support for the PKI that began to create resentment within the army's ranks. This would ultimately divide the army once again. In the events that precipitated the collapse of Suharto's regime in 1998, a similar phenomenon would develop between the so called 'green faction' and the 'red faction'.

Throughout this study factionalism within the Indonesian officer corps has proved a recurrent theme in the nation's civil-military relations. Factionalism does however expose a flaw within Schiff's framework. This flaw relates to the cohesion of this actor within her model. Schiff defines the military as being;

"...defined quite simply. It encompasses the armed forces personnel who represent the military. The officers and the enlisted personnel are usually those most dedicated to the armed forces. In some nations other security services may also compromise the armed forces. Generally, the military is the institution publicly recognized by society and the political elites as the institution that defends a nation's borders."<sup>528</sup>

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<sup>528</sup> Schiff. p.43-44

Cohesion within the military is critical to the armed forces as it provides "a structured pattern of positive social relationships (bonds) between unit members, individually and collectively, necessary to achieve the unit or group's purpose."<sup>529</sup> If the military is split at the level of its leadership and the officer corps, the purpose and effectiveness of the organisation as the entity tasked with the security of the state will be compromised. In regards to Schiff's framework, a factionalised army may no longer resemble the cohesive actor contained within her definition, but rather a series of competing groups who would no longer be capable of agreeing amongst themselves or any of her indicators, let alone amongst the other partners which, she argues, are a requisite of her theory.

Before moving on to describe the situation which unfolded within the Army in the late 1990's, it is relevant to discuss the work of Douglas Kammen and Siddharth Chandra who have conducted in depth studies of the military's personnel appointments and career patterns. Their studies provide relevant background material that helps to inform the situation that developed in the 1997 and 1998. Kammen and Chandra pointed to underlying structural factors and historical legacies within the Indonesian army as being key reasons for the collapse of Suharto's regime.<sup>530</sup>

In 1964 there began to be a significant growth in the number of graduating officer cadets. Kammen and Chandra record that there was now more than twice the number of officer graduates, with 280 graduating in 1964 compared to 113 in 1963.<sup>531</sup> In 1968 the number of officers sharply increased to 465, while up until 1975 the numbers of

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<sup>529</sup> G.L. Siebold and D.R. Kelly, *Development of the Combat Platoon Cohesion Questionnaire* (Alexandria, Virginia US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Manpower and Personnel Research Laboratory, 1988). p.1 Quoted in Terrence Lee, "Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, no. 1 (2005). p.84

<sup>530</sup> D Kammen and S Chandra, "Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and Consolidation," *World Politics* 55, no. 1 (2002). p.98

<sup>531</sup> Kammen and Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990's*. p.39

graduating officers remained between 300 and 400. Not only was there a huge growth in the number of officers graduating, but because of the army's personnel practice of allowing an officer who had completed his tour of duty posting to select his replacement, there was a "...virtual monopoly on staff and command positions." held by the first of these large classes.<sup>532</sup> To manage this problem the army standardized the total number of appointments to key command positions from each graduating class, thus preventing any one class from dominating these senior positions. The tenures of those officers who held the rank of Major and Major General were also reduced. According to Kammen and Chandra this change had the effect of reducing "The variation in command tenure..." as well as standardizing the career paths of officers and "...stabilizing expectations within the officer corps."<sup>533</sup> Kammen and Chandra also found that there were a number of side effects to the growth in size of the officer corps. Due to the fact that territorial commanders had their tenure reduced Kammen and Chandra argued that these officers would "...have less knowledge of both their responsibilities and of local dynamics, and therefore will be less well prepared to anticipate and respond to social unrest."<sup>534</sup> The size of graduating classes could also impact upon career prospects of army officers. Competition for positions was seen "...as a healthy means of encouraging professionalism..." and a means for evaluating the performance of the individual officers.<sup>535</sup> For the officers themselves however the smaller the class sizes the better the career prospects. Kammen and Chandra found that the worse the career prospects were, the less likely it was that the local command officers would have a "...incentive to take strong action against social

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<sup>532</sup> Ibid. p.107

<sup>533</sup> Ibid. p.107

<sup>534</sup> Ibid. p.108

<sup>535</sup> Ibid. p.87

unrest."<sup>536</sup> Kammen and Chandra have also traced the impact of these large graduating classes upon the military in the reform period, discovering that particular graduating years were more prone to reform than others.<sup>537</sup> They conclude that officers who had graduated in 1973 were more likely to support reform than those from the classes of 1970 and 1971.<sup>538</sup>

Appointment of military officers to Kekaryaan duties (non-military functional duties) was also an integral part of the army's middle way and Dwi Fungsi (Dual Function) doctrines.

"The appointment system involves placement of military officers in civilian posts since, according to BABINKAR, these posts are important to safeguard national political stability. The distribution system involves placement of retired officers or soon-to-retire officers in civilian positions. In so doing, the military retirees to secure a future job and income."<sup>539</sup>

Kekaryaan included positions such as "...ministers, parliamentarians, ambassadors, senior executives in government corporations, bankers, senior civil servants, university rectors, provincial governors, sub district heads, and even village headmen."<sup>540</sup> Providing Indonesian Army officers with business opportunities and employment post-retirement has been a concern for army leadership. In the late 1990's this became more significant. Providing retiring and retired officers with Kekaryaan positions was a similar problem to that confronted by the army in providing officers from large graduating classes with command positions, namely that there were not enough opportunities available. By 1997, there were murmurs of discontent amongst

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<sup>536</sup> Ibid. p.108

<sup>537</sup> Kammen and Chandra, "Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and Consolidation." p.111-117

<sup>538</sup> Ibid. p.114-115

<sup>539</sup> Sukardi Rinakit, *The Indonesian Military after the New Order* (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2005). p.153-154

<sup>540</sup> David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*, 2010 Equinox Edition ed. (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 1984), p.11.

those who had retired, and this discontent followed through in the events of May 1998 with former officers supporting the calls for political reform.<sup>541</sup>

In a more recently published article Kammen and Chandra once again conducted a detailed analysis of the size of the graduating classes of the Army academies.. They found that officers who had graduated in 1970, 1971 and 1972 had little reason to support reform. These individuals faced the loss of opportunities in the civil service, administrative posts and in the government's legislative branch. Facing the potential loss of these opportunities that were long enjoyed by the officer corps "...they responded with a transitionary monopolization of the senior posts in the territorial structure, the Army, and TNI headquarters."<sup>542</sup> For those officers who had graduated in 1973 and after, there was incentive to support reform. They would benefit from the freeing up of positions that would come from any personnel changes in classes who were monopolising career opportunities.<sup>543</sup> Kammen and Chandra argue that the divisions in relation to reform relate to fundamental structural issues within the Indonesian officer corps itself and that

"In the case of Indonesia, the division between those who favoured the status quo and those who supported reform was premised on the differential career prospects of more senior officers reluctant to relinquish their posts and influence and those of more junior officers who stood to benefit from leading reform and redefining civil-military relations. These differences were in part a function of class solidarity and the monopolization of key billets."<sup>544</sup>

Kammen and Chandra's work demonstrates the importance of the underlying structural issues present within the officer corps that generated powerful incentives for change and against it.

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<sup>541</sup> Kammen and Chandra, *A Tour of Duty: Changing Patterns of Military Politics in Indonesia in the 1990's*. p.101-102

<sup>542</sup> Kammen and Chandra, "Generating Reforms and Reforming Generations: Military Politics in Indonesia's Democratic Transition and Consolidation." p.126

<sup>543</sup> Ibid. p.126

<sup>544</sup> Ibid. p.126

The issue of military factionalisation in the 1990's is widely discussed within the literature relating to the role of the army in the events of 1998.<sup>545</sup> During the mid-1990's two rival factions began to develop, namely the 'red and white faction' and the 'green faction'. The red and white faction was generally seen as those officers who were "...anti-Suharto, secular, nationalist, 'professional'...".<sup>546</sup> It was also seen as generally not being "...aligned with the rise of political Islam, reflecting a more nominal Islamic (abangan) base..."<sup>547</sup> By contrast, those officers who were identified with the Green faction were described as being more supportive of Suharto, pro-Islam as well as being 'political' officers.<sup>548</sup> Due to this division there was intense competition between each faction for the best political positions within the army. They both attempted to increase their influence by expanding in size and recruiting officer cadets from the academy. "In contrast to the past, the split within the military in the last year of Suharto's rule was very serious."<sup>549</sup>

Individual officers came to hold particularly important positions in each of these competing camps. Two officers in particular would play a crucial role in the events of 1998. The first of these was General Wiranto, Commander of the Armed Forces in 1998, and member of the red and white faction. The second officer was Lt. General Prabowo Subianto who was Suharto's son-in-law and commander of the important and powerful KOSTRAD unit (Komando Strategis Nasional/Strategic Reserves

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<sup>545</sup> Kingsbury. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting- Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Singapore: Allen and Unwin, 1999). Rinakit. Tatik Hafidz, *Fading Away? The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia's Transition to Democracy 1998-2001*, Idss Monograph (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2006). Michael Vatikiotis, "Romancing the Dual Function: Indonesia's Armed Forces and the Fall of Soeharto," in *The Fall of Soeharto*, ed. Geoff Forrester and R.J May (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998). Terrence Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Phillippines and 1998 Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009).

<sup>546</sup> Kingsbury. p.155

<sup>547</sup> Ibid. p.155

<sup>548</sup> Ibid. p.155-156

<sup>549</sup> Rinakit. p.84

Command). He was also viewed as belonging to the Green faction of officers.

Prabowo had enjoyed a quick rise within the military hierarchy not only due to his proximity to Suharto, but also because of Suharto's increasing emphasis on promoting those officers with Islamic credentials.<sup>550</sup> The quick rise of Prabowo through the ranks added to the background tensions that he came to experience with Wiranto.<sup>551</sup>

Throughout the 1990's Prabowo rose in rank faster than any of his other military academy class graduates until, at the age of 44, he reached the rank of Brigadier General. Rinakit concludes that his pattern of promotion undermined the military's system of meritocracy that governs the promotional system.<sup>552</sup> By the end of 1997 it was concluded that there was a balance of power between the two camps. Wiranto and his followers dominated positions within the Armed Forces Headquarters, while Prabowo and his associates controlled the Army Headquarters within Jakarta itself alongside other strategic positions in the capital.<sup>553</sup>

Lee argues that Prabowo began to undermine the military chain of command in two ways. Firstly he advocated the dismissal of Wiranto and the promotion of himself to the position of Army commander to a "...number of important people...", and secondly because of his role in the kidnappings and disappearances of students in 1998.<sup>554</sup> It was also suspected that Prabowo had been involved in the shootings that took place at Triskati University on May 12 1998, which killed four people. Rioting that took place on the 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> of May was believed to have also been influenced

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<sup>550</sup> Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Phillippines and 1998 Indonesia." p.656

<sup>551</sup> Ibid. p.656

<sup>552</sup> Rinakit. p.87

<sup>553</sup> The Editors, "Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite: October 1, 1995-December 31 1997," *Indonesia* 65, (1998). Cited in Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Phillippines and 1998 Indonesia."

<sup>554</sup> Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Phillippines and 1998 Indonesia." p.657



by Prabowo, and it was thought that he had encouraged individuals to riot in order to discredit Wiranto and to "...gain ascendancy in the armed forces."<sup>555</sup>

Amidst the increasing tensions in Indonesia in 1998, the situation between Prabowo and Wiranto was coming to a head. The issue for these men now became one of surviving the political turmoil while ensuring that they were on the winning side.

Wiranto was remaining loyal to Suharto and he was also more supportive of reform than Prabowo and his supporters. Wiranto was moving closer to elements within the domestic opposition. For example, Wiranto courted the support of the NU and, according to Lee, Wiranto and those officers around him showed some support for and understanding of the student's position.<sup>556</sup> Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono who belonged to Wiranto's camp and held the position of Chief of Staff for Political affairs, was aiding Wiranto in his more conciliatory and pro-reform agenda.<sup>557</sup>

Yudhoyono, for his part, was involved in discussions with civilian intellectuals over plans for reform.<sup>558</sup> Despite the shootings that had taken place at Triskati University and the subsequent riots, Wiranto and other like-minded officers were "...refraining from, indeed rejecting, the path of extreme coercion."<sup>559</sup> Aspinall considered the decision by Wiranto to refrain from the use of coercion to protect Suharto as being crucial in bringing the presidency of Suharto to an end.

"Refraining from extreme force to keep Suharto in power effectively meant abandoning him, becoming a means to short-circuit the political

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<sup>555</sup> Edward Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia* (California: Stanford University Press, 2005). p.235

<sup>556</sup> Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Phillippines and 1998 Indonesia." p.658

<sup>557</sup> Aspinall. p.236

<sup>558</sup> Marcus Mietzner, "From Soeharto to Habibie: The Indonesian Armed Forces and Political Islam During the Transition," in *Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Renew or Chaos?*, ed. Geoff Forrester(Bathhurst, New South Wales: Crawford House, 1999). p.82 and Keith Richburg, "Seven Days in May That Toppled a Titan: Back-Room Intrigue Led to Suharto's Fall," in *The Last Days of President Suharto*, ed. Edward Aspinall, Gerry Van Klinken, and Herbert Feith(Clayton, Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 1999). p.77

<sup>559</sup> Aspinall. p.236

crisis and prevent further damage to the state as a whole. For Wiranto and his group, it was also a way to pre-empt a move for power or other precipitate action by Prabowo (and immediately after Suharto resigned, Wiranto secured Prabowo's dismissal as Kostrad commander)."<sup>560</sup>

Students, supported by soldiers who were loyal to Wiranto's faction, entered and occupied Parliament. The Commander of the Garrison in Jakarta claimed that he had an inadequate number of soldiers to enable him to prevent the students from occupying key government sites. In the wake of this Rinakit asserts that Suharto now believed that the military was no longer supportive of him.<sup>561</sup> In the wake of Suharto's resignation Prabowo and his allies demanded new positions both within cabinet and the military. Prabowo was pushing for Wiranto to be dropped from his position as Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and for his own promotion as Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Things did not go in Prabowo's favour. He and several of his followers were relieved of their positions. Prabowo in particular went from controlling Kostrad to being moved out of Jakarta to head the Army's staff and command school, a position which held no control of combat soldiers.

### **Middle Class Opposition**

As a developing economy Indonesia has historically not had a powerful middle class. During the 1950's and 1960's that which did exist was limited in size to "...a small coterie of intellectuals and professionals, the middle class was confined within the sprawling, chaotic and poorly paid state bureaucracy."<sup>562</sup> The formation of the middle class during the 1950's had been linked directly to the growth of the number of civil servants in Government, as these positions were required to be filled by educated

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<sup>560</sup> Ibid. p.236

<sup>561</sup> Rinakit. p.89

<sup>562</sup> Richard Robinson, "The Middle Class and the Bourgeoisie in Indonesia," in *The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald's and Middle Class Revolution*, ed. Richard Robinson and David Goodman(London; New York: Taylor and Francis, 2013). p.79

candidates.<sup>563</sup> During the politically and economic chaotic years of the late 1950's and early 1960's, events within the country began to affect this small middle class.

Economically, the country was undergoing a period of severe economic pain. By 1965-1966 the inflation rate within Indonesia itself was six hundred percent. Despite Sukarno's socialist ideology, which would have seen the nation's citizens in an even economic grouping, there was no improvement in the standard of living for

Indonesians.<sup>564</sup> The nationalisation of foreign enterprises that took place during the 1950's was an opportunity that could have presented Indonesia's citizens with better economic prospects. Instead, due to corruption, the number of people who did benefit was limited.<sup>565</sup> As mentioned earlier, by the end of Sukarno's rule in Indonesia, the nation faced a major problem with inflation, brought about by Sukarno's economic policies and in particular his policy of providing subsidies on goods and services.

There was also the increasingly strong influence of the left upon Sukarno and his policies. Over a period of time he had become much closer to the communists and this presented a threat to the small number of people who comprised the middle class.<sup>566</sup>

In the wake of the 30 September Affair the increasingly dire economic situation, coupled with Sukarno's pro-communist policies, pushed the small middle class to the side of the Army. Aspinall argues that the army was able to rely on the support of the middle class. Groups took to the streets against the 'old order'. They used their connections to the media to support the army and its position.<sup>567</sup> Aspinall also points out that some of these people also took up positions within the new order regime

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<sup>563</sup> Solvay Gerke, "Global Lifestyles under Local Conditions: The New Indonesian Middle Class," in *Consumption in Asia: Lifestyles and Identities*, ed. Chua Beng-Huat (London; New York: Routledge, 2000). p.140

<sup>564</sup> Ibid. p.139

<sup>565</sup> Ibid. p.139

<sup>566</sup> Edward Aspinall, "Indonesia: Broadening Oppositional Base," in *Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia*, ed. Garry Rodan (London; New York: Routledge, 1996). p.216

<sup>567</sup> Ibid. p.216

itself, taking places within GOLKAR, the governing party, or as technocratic ministers.<sup>568</sup>

The middle class has been looked at as an agent which can drive economic transition. One well known example of this argument is the work of Samuel Huntington.<sup>569</sup> He argues that in the "Third wave movements for democratization were not lead by landlords, peasants, or (apart from Poland) industrial workers. In virtually every country the most active supporters of democratization came from the urban middle class."<sup>570</sup> Huntington also makes the point that when the middle class is small, it may well prove to be an anti-democratic force, as it had been in the wake of the 30th September Coup, and in its support for Suharto.

"In its early phases, the middle class is not necessarily a force for democracy. At times in Latin America and elsewhere, middle-class groups acquiesced in or actively supported military coups designed to overthrow radical governments and to reduce the political influence of labour and peasant organizations."<sup>571</sup>

Suharto having established his New Order regime embarked on a range of policies to encourage economic development. The country had endured prolonged economic and social decline under Sukarno, and therefore it was key to Suharto's legitimacy to provide the nation with sustained development. For Liddle, the application of these policies "...produced results in the form of a growing economic and social infrastructure and increasing individual prosperity."<sup>572</sup> The ability of the New Order regime to continue to provide growth was the source of the regime's legitimacy, and this economic performance continued for some time. Thus many in the middle class continued to support Suharto. As Aspinall notes, the middle class "...support for

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<sup>568</sup> Ibid. p.216

<sup>569</sup> See Huntington, *The Third Wave- Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. or Samuel P. Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave," *Journal of Democracy* vol. 2, no. 2 (1991).

<sup>570</sup> Huntington, *The Third Wave- Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. p.67

<sup>571</sup> Ibid. p.66

<sup>572</sup> R Liddle, "The Middle Class and New Order Legitimacy," in *The Politics of Middle Class Indonesia*, ed. Richard and Young Tanter, Kenneth(Australia: Centre of Southeast Asia Studies-Monash University, 1992). p.50

democratization is often conditional and hesitant..."<sup>573</sup> In the case of Indonesia, Aspinall believes that despite a desire for political reform existing amongst the middle class, there was often "...erratic and irresolute forms of opposition." to Suharto, due to a concern about the potential for unrest and the loss of economic benefits associated with his regime.<sup>574</sup> Thus despite the growing middle class, serious opposition to his regime took some time to materialise.

Throughout the 1980's economic growth in Indonesia during the 1980's was responsible for the increasing size of the middle class. Aspinall notes that this group became "...larger, more amorphous, and confident social entity than the tiny and besieged group which had supported the army in 1965." He further stated that "Following the modernization thesis, it could be expected that the stronger middle class would support democratization." However, many of the factors that had tied the middle class to the regime in the 1970s continued to operate.<sup>575</sup>

By the 1980's capital in Indonesia had also begun to condense itself amongst local elites, namely those who had access to political and economic decision makers.

Unsurprisingly, the Suharto family was one of the prime benefactors of this. They profited greatly from their control of the nation's political system. Many of Suharto's friends and associates also benefitted greatly. When Suharto left power in 1998 the total wealth of his six children was estimated at around \$5 Billion.<sup>576</sup>

Economic growth had a profound impact upon those who were living a marginal existence in both rural and urban Indonesia through the 1980's and 1990's. In Jakarta there was the creation of a "...large industrial working class..." who experienced poor

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<sup>573</sup> Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.13

<sup>574</sup> Ibid. p.13

<sup>575</sup> Ibid. p.28-29

<sup>576</sup> Florence Lamoureux, *Indonesia: A Global Studies Handbook* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2003). p.88

working and living conditions, due to the large numbers of workers flooding in from outside of Jakarta.<sup>577</sup>

The economic growth and policy changes that took place during the 1980's had the effect of facilitating urban development. As a result of this, Indonesia's urban population increased in size.<sup>578</sup> The rate of growth between the years of 1980-1995 was 5.2 percent, with an overall increase in size from 32.8 million dollars to 70 million dollars.<sup>579</sup> As mentioned above many of the people who moved to the cities became members of the urban poor. As Aspinall notes, due to the urbanisation and population growth in Jakarta and other cities, there was a sizeable growth in the number of poor living in the cities. He argues that this class of people would become a significant political force in the following years.<sup>580</sup>

The population growth and increase of those within the middle class coincided with a period of openness (*keterbukaan*) in Indonesia. Although there was a growth in the middle class, the pressure from them and other groups opposed to the regime was still not adequate to force the regime to change.<sup>581</sup> Nevertheless there were a number of important developments within Indonesia during this time. The press became more open and more critical of the regime and its policies. From 1989 the press tackled increasingly controversial topics. Aspinall argues that this was due not only to the journalists and editors involved in testing the limits of the regime's tolerance, but also to a "...hunger of middle-class readers for provocative news, indicated by the rapid expansion of courageous journals like *DeTik*, which burst from nowhere to achieve

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<sup>577</sup> Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.29

<sup>578</sup> K.W Thee, " Economic Reform and Deregulation in Indonesia," *Indonesian Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (1995). p.137 quoted in Tommy Firman, "Urban Development in Indonesia, 1990–2001: From the Boom to the Early Reform Era through the Crisis," *Habitat International* 26, no. 2 (2001). p.232

<sup>579</sup> Firman. p.232

<sup>580</sup> Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.29

<sup>581</sup> Jacques Bertrand, "False Starts, Succession Crises, and Regime Transition: Flirting with Openness in Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* Vol. 69 no. 3 (1996). p.322 quoted in Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.42

circulation of almost a hundred thousand by August 1993."<sup>582</sup> There were also demonstrations undertaken by students and farmers in 1988 and 1989. This led to more protests in the early 1990's.<sup>583</sup> There was also a substantial growth in the number of NGO's from the end of the 1980's.<sup>584</sup> These NGO's were active in a number of areas such as legal reform and environmental protection. Middle class intellectuals often belonged to these groups.<sup>585</sup> Some of these NGO's became more politically active and began pushing for greater democratization.<sup>586</sup> This period of relative openness ended in 1994, with the banning of three news magazines, caused by their coverage and criticism of a recent military acquisition. Despite Suharto's return to coercive tactics in dealing with this opposition, the middle class become more involved in political activities and it was also becoming more assertive and powerful.<sup>587</sup> As a result of this crackdown by the authorities, there was a change amongst those who would have previously acquiesced. It was noted by Aspinall that there were large demonstrations, by those previous cautious members of the nation's middle class who were united against the new policies of the government.<sup>588</sup>

### **The PDI and Megawati Sukarnoputri**

At the end of 1993 there was a change in the leadership of the Democratic Party (PDI) which resulted in a change of leadership. The new leader was Megawati

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<sup>582</sup> Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.42

<sup>583</sup> Ibid. p.43

<sup>584</sup> Stefan Eklof, *Indonesian Politics in Crisis: The Long Fall of Suharto 1996-1998* (Padstow: TJ International Limited, 1999). p.22

<sup>585</sup> Edward Aspinall, "Transformation of Civil Society and Democratic Breakthrough," in *Civil Society and Political Change in Asia: Expanding and Contracting Democratic Space*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).p.72

<sup>586</sup> Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.43

<sup>587</sup> Arief Budiman, "From Lower to Middle Class: Political Activities before and after 1988," in *Democracy in Indonesia: 1950s and 1990s*, ed. David Bourchier and John Legge(Glen Waverly: Aristoc Press, 1994). p.234

<sup>588</sup> Ariel Heryanto, "Indonesia: The Middle Class in the 1990's," in *Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia*, ed. Garry Rodan(London: Routledge, 1996). p.245-253 Quoted in Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.48

Sukarnoputri. Suharto and the military had tried to control the election of the leadership, however by the end of the year this had failed. Attempts to control the decisions of the PDI had been stymied by serving military officers, influential retired army officers, the press and other politicians.<sup>589</sup> The rise of Megawati Sukarnoputri to the position of leader of the PDI was in no small part due to her lineage. Sukarno was Megawati's father, and Eklof argues that her popularity was due largely to the fact that her name represented "...the ideas and charisma of her late father."<sup>590</sup> The power of Sukarno as a symbol to the PDI and Megawati was significant. Sukarno, despite his tumultuous period of rule, represented much of what was seen as the antithesis to Suharto's new order.<sup>591</sup> Eklof believes Megawati was seen by her supporter as having inherited those virtues of her father that saw her associated with a simple lifestyle with a close relationship to the people. Beyond this she was seen as someone with a "...reputation for decency, patience, calm and righteousness..."<sup>592</sup>

Under Megawati the PDI was conveying a powerful, but simple message about the state of Indonesian politics and society. This would grow in popularity amongst a variety of different classes within Indonesian society. The PDI and Megawati rejected the states interference. In front of the party faithful Megawati asserted that they had the right to political participation and that they rebuff the use of intimidation and bribery by the regime.<sup>593</sup> Their wider political program was focused on a 'proper

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<sup>589</sup> Daniel Ziv, "Populist Perceptions and Perceptions of Populism in Indonesia: The Case of Megawati Soekarnoputri," *South East Asia Research* 9, no. 1 (2001). p.79 Names Brigadier-General Agum Gumelar and Colonel Zacky Makarim, both of which were members of army military intelligence are named by Ziv as having had a role in her gaining the leadership of the PDI. Schwarz.p.268 Refers directly to influential retired officers having played a role in Megawati's rise to the PDI's Leadership. Eklof. p.26 Also notes that military officers played a role in her rise to PDI leader, and argues that this was due to the divisions between Suharto and the army.

<sup>590</sup> Eklof. p.25

<sup>591</sup> Ibid. p.27

<sup>592</sup> Ibid. p.27-28

<sup>593</sup> Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.165



implementation' of Pancasila Democracy, which would provide for "...equal status of the parties, free and fair elections, party control of party affairs..."<sup>594</sup>

From the mid 1980's the PDI itself began to draw an increasing level of support from the growing middle class and urban professionals.<sup>595</sup> Professionals and intellectuals were drawn to the PDI in increasing numbers under Megawati as the political platform which she espoused enabled them to "...pursue reform "constitutionally" and avoid the dangers of being associated with challenging the system from outside."<sup>596</sup>

Although much of the PDI's support base was drawn from lower social classes, small to medium sized business owners also showed their support.<sup>597</sup> Its mass support was drawn from the youth small traders and those "...who constituted the urban informal sector..."<sup>598</sup> Sukarnoist popularity did much for the PDI. It attracted large numbers of people from the poorer social classes who looked nostalgically to the past when those from such classes held a higher place within the life of the nation.<sup>599</sup>

Megawati was ultimately removed from her position as PDI leader, courtesy of a PDI congress which had been organised as a result of Suharto's government and military officials.<sup>600</sup> This came about as a result of suggestions that were made about Megawati potentially standing in presidential elections.<sup>601</sup> The congress resulted in Megawati being removed from the leadership of the PDI, but with it came a wave of violence and protest. Supporters of Megawati took to the streets of Jakarta, demonstrating against the congress and the Government's support of it. A number of demonstrators, as well as soldiers and riot police, were injured during the confrontation. Megawati

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<sup>594</sup> Ibid. p.165

<sup>595</sup> Ibid. p.174

<sup>596</sup> Ibid. p.175

<sup>597</sup> Ibid. p.175

<sup>598</sup> Ibid. p.175

<sup>599</sup> Ibid. p.175

<sup>600</sup> Eklof. p.35

<sup>601</sup> Ziv. p.79

took legal action against those in the PDI who had supported her removal as well as various governments and military officials who had been involved in the arrangement of the congress. Support also came from a group of NGO's who banded together in response to the Government's involvement with the PDI.<sup>602</sup> Support for Megawati was building. A Free Speech Forum was established in front of the PDI's headquarters in Jakarta and this gradually became more critical of the government and attracted greater numbers of people. The military responded to this challenge by criticising the protestors and those participating in the forum, claiming that they were behaving unconstitutionally and that the speeches at the forum did not reflect "...Indonesian values..."<sup>603</sup> Eklof argued that the statements of the military illustrated "...jargon typical of the New Order: branding political opponents as subversive and un-Indonesian and accusing them of having links with the PKI, the government's political ghost *par excellence*."<sup>604</sup> The crackdown came on the 27 of July, with the covert and overt support of the military,<sup>605</sup> resulting in the deaths of five people, and widespread rioting throughout Jakarta.

Suharto and his military supporters proved once again adept at equating the demands of the protestors with the subversive PKI narrative that had been so well cultivated during the New Order. The political leadership and the military had survived in the face of demands for greater political participation, by using underhand methods to try to unseat Megawati, and then by using the myth of the chaotic, dangerous PKI legacy to target its opponents.<sup>606</sup> Despite the fact that the concord and the regime had survived, its "...shaky democratic credentials..." were demonstrated alongside its general unwillingness to accommodate any type of reform.

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<sup>602</sup> Eklof. p.39

<sup>603</sup> Ibid. p.40

<sup>604</sup> Ibid. p.40

<sup>605</sup> Ibid. p.42-46

<sup>606</sup> Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.191-192

## The Economic Crisis of 1998

Under the New Order, the Indonesian economy had experienced economic growth that would remain largely sustained throughout Suharto's rule. Indonesia went from a largely underperforming agrarian based economy in the 1960's to one in which the manufacturing sector contributed more to Gross Domestic Product (GDP).<sup>607</sup>

Indonesia's average growth rate between 1965 and 1997 was seven percent and its real gross national product (GNP) "...roughly doubled every ten years."<sup>608</sup> The performance of the economy during the New Order led to significant social change as well as structural change within the economy itself;

"These structural changes were reflected in a shift of production from agriculture to manufacturing and modern services; a reduction in the agricultural labour force and growth urban centres; an enhanced role for trade in the economy; and increasing role for the central government in the economy; and monetisation of the economy as a result of stable economic management."<sup>609</sup>

As a result of the performance of Indonesia's economy there were considerable social improvements. In 1965 the incidence of poverty in Indonesia was reduced considerably from approximately sixty percent of the population to approximately ten percent.<sup>610</sup> Health care was improved with a resultant decrease in infant mortality rates and there was also improved access to safe drinking water.<sup>611</sup> Access to basic education was improved with higher enrolment ratios. Aspinall argued that as a direct result of Indonesia's economic growth there was an associated demand for a

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<sup>607</sup> Thee Kian Wie, "Reflections of the New Order 'Miracle'," in *Indonesia Today: Challenges of History*, ed. Grayson Lloyd and Shannon Smith (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001). p.163

<sup>608</sup> Ibid. p.165

<sup>609</sup> World Bank, *World Development Indicators 1999* (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1999). p.31 Quoted in Wie, p.165.

<sup>610</sup> Hal Hill, "The Indonesian Economy: The Strange and Sudden Death of a Tiger," in *The Fall of Soeharto*, ed. Geoff Forrester and R.J May (Bathurst: Crawford House Publishing, 1998). p.94 Hill notes that despite the impressive numbers this was still a fairly 'modest' base line measurement.

<sup>611</sup> Wie. p.169

workforce that had a variety of skills and accordingly, one which required higher levels of education.

"Tertiary education is no longer the exclusive preserve of the upper reaches of the narrow, cosmopolitan elite of the big cities (many of whom, in any case, send their children overseas for study) as it arguably was in the 1960's and even in the 1970's. Instead, it has become more accessible to wider layers, including youths from lower middle class backgrounds (whether military, civil service, entrepreneurial, or professional) in the provincial centre's."<sup>612</sup>

Indonesia had clearly undergone considerable economic growth as a result of the New Order regime, yet by 1997 the situation within South East Asia amongst Indonesia and the other high performing Asian economies (HPAE) had begun to decline.

Huntington argued that during the 1960 and 1970's authoritarian regimes were driven to look to performance as a basis for legitimacy.<sup>613</sup> This argument could also be made

for Suharto's government, namely that in order to secure his New Order regime's legitimacy he sought to improve the economic performance of the country. Pabottingi argues that the New Order Government had perused with "...single minded..."

determination its goal of economic growth.<sup>614</sup> Alagappa argues that the claim to legitimacy through performance can be problematic for authoritarian governments

such as Suharto's.<sup>615</sup> On the basis of economic performance, legitimacy can quickly erode, particularly if the state and regime is faced with an economic crisis or

decreasing performance.<sup>616</sup> Alagappa also notes that even strong economic

performance can generate pressures that can destabilise a government. He argues that over a longer time period there are tensions generated between the government and

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<sup>612</sup> Edward Aspinall, "Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto Period," *Indonesia* 59, no. April (1995). p.31-32

<sup>613</sup> Huntington, "Democracy's Third Wave." p.50

<sup>614</sup> Mochtar Pabottingi, "Indonesia Historicizing the New Order's Legitimacy Dilemma," in *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia* ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). p.252

<sup>615</sup> Muthiah Alagappa, "Contestation and Crisis," in *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia*, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995). p.61-62

<sup>616</sup> Ibid. p.62

new groups within society, such as the middle class and an evolving civil society.<sup>617</sup>

Such groups then begin to demand greater participation and inclusion. These demands "...run counter to the interests of the power holders..." leading "....to the contestation of authoritarian rule."<sup>618</sup> In the case of Indonesia both of these points manifested themselves.

By 1998 the economic situation had become very serious. There was a drastic devaluation in the value of the Indonesian currency. In November 1998 the rate of exchange with the U.S dollar began dropping from around Rp 2,500 to Rp 4,000 and eventually dropped as low as Rp 17,000 by the middle of January 1999. Economic growth plummeted from eight percent in 1996 to negative fourteen percent in 1998.<sup>619</sup> Many of Indonesia's large companies were now facing collapse and unemployment rose as a result as did the cost of food and clothing. The Indonesian banking system also destabilised as foreign banks began to refuse credit. Indonesia's economy, that had once brought growth and raised living standards, was now faltering. This would soon have serious repercussions for Suharto's regime.

### **Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism (KKN)**

A defining characteristic of the New Order was widespread corruption. By the time of the economic crisis in 1997-1998, this corruption was seen as a reason for an end to the regime.<sup>620</sup> Issues of KKN had formed a part of life during the New Order regime, and in order to maintain control Suharto used the power of patronage.<sup>621</sup> Vatikiotis believes that Suharto's power was not so much maintained through the power of the

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<sup>617</sup> Ibid. p.62

<sup>618</sup> Ibid. p.62

<sup>619</sup> Harold Crouch, *Political Reform in Indonesia after Suharto* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). p.19

<sup>620</sup> Eklof. p.159

<sup>621</sup> Fiona Robertson-Snape, "Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism in Indonesia," *Third World Quarterly* 20, no. 3 (1999). p.592

gun as his, “power of the purse”<sup>622</sup> Suharto's control of the country enabled him to dispense favours and concessions to those whose loyalty he wished to secure. KKN also became a method by which Suharto and his family enriched themselves massively, Elson describes how Suharto viewed the enterprises of his children as tools of development for Indonesia, and that these could not be viewed as corruption if it was in the interest of the nation.<sup>623</sup> There were a myriad of ways in which this corruption was manifested. The Suharto family in particular benefitted from the imposition of monopolies. Through the use of states funds, Suharto’s son Tommy, was able to secure a monopoly position acting as a middleman between producers of cloves and cigarette manufacturers in the production of clove cigarettes.<sup>624</sup> Foreign businesses were also drawn into the web of KKN if they hoped to conduct business in Indonesia. Robertson-Snape details an example of such an episode when it was thought that one of the world’s largest gold deposits had been discovered in Indonesia.<sup>625</sup> She describes a situation in which members of the Suharto family became involved in the bidding process for the rights to extract the gold. Two rival companies, Bre-X and Barrick Gold Corporation, became involved in the bidding for the contract. In an effort to secure the rights for themselves each company secured the help of a member of the Suharto family. In Bre-X's attempt to secure a deal they had approached Sigit Suharto who asked for a payment of \$40 million rupiah upfront and a ten percent stake in the mine. Ultimately the discovery of the gold turned out to be a scam, however not before a close friend of Suharto, Bob Hasan had to be bought in to negotiate a deal to avoid an impending feud between the family members. Hasan for

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<sup>622</sup> Michael Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change* (London: Routledge, 1993). p.52 Quoted in Robertson-Snape. p.592

<sup>623</sup> Elson. p.278

<sup>624</sup> Ibid. p.278

<sup>625</sup> Robertson-Snape. p.596

his part was reported to have negotiated a thirty percent stake in the gold deposit.<sup>626</sup>

For friends and members of the Suharto family such deals could prove highly lucrative, however in the case of the mine the Indonesian people stood to gain nothing.<sup>627</sup>

Bob Hasan was an example of a Suharto associate who profited massively under Suharto's rule. He was a timber tycoon and personal friend of Suharto. In March 1998 he was appointed to the position of Minister of Trade and Industry. Described as 'one of Asia's best connected agents of crony capitalism', he controlled the Indonesian Wood Panel Association (Apkindo), which

"...not only set the price for wood exports, but determined export levels, and even decided which shipping and insurance companies would be used. Hasan's own timber company-built up on forestry concessions given to him by Suharto-as well as his shipping and insurance companies benefited greatly from his position in Apkindo."<sup>628</sup>

Hasan is but one example of KKN that was so widely resented by the student and middle class demonstrators that took to the streets in 1998.

Suharto also had considerable wealth. It has been argued that he was not only rich but could be considered to be super rich, belonging to the category of the world's wealthiest people.<sup>629</sup> Suharto denied this claiming that his comparison to people such as the Sultan of Brunei or King Fahd of Saudi Arabia was inaccurate. He even challenged Indonesian citizens to prove the existence of foreign bank accounts.<sup>630</sup> It is interesting to note that Elson paints Suharto's interest in money as not being motivated by rampant greed, but rather being motivated by the ability that it gave him to

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<sup>626</sup> Ibid. p.596

<sup>627</sup> Ibid. p.596

<sup>628</sup> A Higgins, "Crony Moves from Cartel to Cabinet," *Guardian*, 8 April 1998. p.13 quoted in Robertson-Snape. p.596

<sup>629</sup> Damien Kingsbury, *The Politics of Indonesia* (USA: Oxford University Press, 2005). p.213 quoted in Elson. p.281

<sup>630</sup> Kees Van Dijk, *A Country in Despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 200* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2001). p.258

maintain his own power.<sup>631</sup> In the end however Suharto's corruption became central to demand from protestors that he step down from office, and ultimately the systemic corruption, that he had once relied upon to keep him in office, became a key factor in his downfall.

## **Analysis**

### **The Military**

One of the most significant factors in Suharto's downfall in 1998 was the emergence of serious factionalism within the army, and the relationship that this factionalism then played in the resulting lack of a military crackdown upon protestors. It would be inaccurate to state that Suharto's New Order army had never experienced factionalisation, as it most certainly had. Fundamentally different in 1998 was the factionalism that had translated into a split within the military's high command, and this lack of cohesion amongst the military's senior leadership translated directly into the military failing to mobilise at crucial points in order to rescue the regime. The factions were not only the products of increasing resentment amongst some Indonesian officers toward Suharto, but also arose from more historic structural issues within the armed forces. These factions were also separated by their ideological outlook with the green faction who were seen as more strongly Islamic and more supportive of Suharto. The red and white faction was seen as being secular with a nationalist and more professional outlook. Both of these groups had powerful officers within their ranks. The green faction had Prabowo who held KOSTRAD command. Command of this unit could have given the Pro-Suharto faction adequate force to crush protests in Jakarta. However, the actions of Wiranto and Yudhoyono sidelined

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<sup>631</sup> Elson. p.281



Prabowo from this potentially decisive position. The lack of cohesion amongst the military was of the utmost importance to the collapse of Suharto's regime. The change from a partially factionalised military to one that was now deeply factionalised undermined Suharto's ability to enforce his concordance. The change in this actor directly contributed to Suharto's collapse.

### **Political Leadership**

The ability of Suharto to control the army was gradually weakening. He had, in the intervening years, used his personal influence for the express purpose of maintaining loyalty within the officer corps. This was a key tactic in ensuring that the army would support his regime. However, by 1998 this policy had created resentment, and this contributed directly to the factionalisation in the officer corps. Suharto's ability to use the military to maintain his rule was one of the factors that was crucial to the longevity of the New Order. His regime was being undermined by KKN and a failing economy. Simultaneously there was the rise of a credible political opposition headed by the PDI and Megawati Sukarnoputri. These factors combined to weaken his hold on the Political Leadership, despite his determination to maintain control.

### **The Citizenry**

The citizenry's relationship with the military had changed radically since the time of the New Order's establishment. There were many groups within society which supported Suharto in his ascension to power. After the chaotic years of Sukarno, the middle class were motivated to support Suharto by a desire for political change and stability. However by the 1990's things had changed irrevocably. This once small middle class which had been concerned about maintaining its wealth, had grown in size and was beginning to make demands for greater political freedoms, a free press

and an end to KKN. It was becoming more confident and increasing in size. During 1989, members of the middle class were able to enjoy greater freedoms during the period of openness. Professionals, in particular journalists, made the most of this, and some newspapers responded by printing articles critical of the government. There was a growth in the number of NGO's. Membership within these groups included lawyers and intellectuals. This period of openness ended in 1994, when the more critical media outlets were banned. Crucially though, by the 1990's the middle class had grown in physical size and it had also tasted greater freedom. As a result of this period of openness, the problems in Indonesia were drawn into sharper focus as was the population's lack of freedom. The relationship between the citizenry and Suharto was changing. The urban poor and working class were suffering due to the prevalence of corruption. By 1998 a wide cross section of opposition had arisen to challenge Suharto. In challenging Suharto, the citizenry was challenging the role of the armed forces in the country. The military had supported Suharto, and now that the masses were mobilising against him the relationship of control that the military had over the population was being challenged. The confrontation between students, their middle class supporters and the military on the 27th of July showed that the opposition to Suharto had grown, and it would no longer accept the close relationship between political power and military power in Indonesia. As a partner within the concordance framework, the citizenry were cohesive, and united in opposition to Suharto. Prior to the 1990's the middle class had been considerably smaller and more conservative in nature, it had not actively challenged Suharto so openly or in such numbers. This partner who had been previously placated by Suharto and controlled using coercion no longer accepted him or the military's relationship with government. The change in the nature of this actor brought about the end of Suharto's enforced concordance.

### **The Social Composition of the Officer Corps**

It has already been noted that there was an increasing level of factionalism within the Indonesian army in the 1990's. As detailed earlier, there were divisions emerging along religious lines, namely those amongst the green officer group and the red and white faction. Schiff believes the social composition of the officer corps to be the primary indicator of concordance. However, in the context of collapsing enforced concordance it is not the indicators but the nature of the actors that has driven the change. The protest movement that brought Suharto down was not driven out of concern for an officer corps that was more representative. Instead it was the cohesion within the citizenry, the lack of cohesion in the military, a weakening political leadership, a credible political opposition and finally the impact of the economic crisis.

### **The Political Decision Making Process**

By 1998, there was widespread opposition to the government of Suharto. In opposing Suharto, the protestors and political opposition were also expressing a desire for change to Indonesia's civil military relations. Schiff states that the political decision making process are the channels that determine the requirements of the military.<sup>632</sup>

The military under the New Order held 75 seats in the Parliament. It also operated according to its doctrine of Dwi Fungsi, which enabled it to maintain a presence in the political, social and economic life of the country. Dwi Fungsi enabled the army to generate its own streams of income, outside that which was provided by the government, by using military owned businesses and foundations. Despite this power by the 1990's the military was increasingly losing influence in government due to the appointment of powerful civilians, such as the appointment of two of Suharto's

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<sup>632</sup> Schiff. p.45

children to the Golkar Central Executive Board. This caused discontent within the army.<sup>633</sup> Resentment was building within the officer corps at the interference that Suharto had within the military. In particular this resentment stemmed from his interference in the promotion system. According to Nordlinger's liberal model of civilian control, it is important that the military's independence is respected.<sup>634</sup> In particular Nordlinger notes that the interference of politicians in the military's promotions system can generate "...powerful praetorian motivations."<sup>635</sup> The military did not in its entirety seek to bring Suharto down, sections of it however became less supportive of him, and these elements, such as those led by Wiranto were key in restraining the military from a forcible crackdown on protestors. The PDI and Megawati were challenging Suharto's control of the political decision making process by calling for greater political participation and an end to the use of intimidation and bribery. The PDI argued for the proper implementation of Pancasila democracy, which they believed would lead to wider political participation and greater equality and fairness amongst political parties. Suharto and those who supported him however arranged for an end to Megawati as the head of the PDI. The removal of Megawati from the PDI led to demonstrations by the citizenry against the government's role in her removal from office. NGO's also supported the plight of the PDI. The government attempted to describe the actions of the protestors as subversive. They alluded to links existing with the PKI. These protests ultimately turned violent with police and military suppression resulting in five deaths and widespread rioting throughout Jakarta.

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<sup>633</sup> Aspinall, *Opposing Suharto- Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*. p.32

<sup>634</sup> Nordlinger. p.13

<sup>635</sup> Ibid. p.13

By 1998, there was disagreement amongst the partners on the political decision making process. The military was generally less supportive of Suharto, with its officer corps once again beset by factionalism. The citizenry wanted greater freedoms and political participation. In the meantime Suharto remained resolute in maintaining his hold on power. Megawati was removed from her position within the PDI when it appeared as though she would be a possible threat to his rule. This only served to harden the resolve of the opposition and this led to protests calling for an end to the regime.

### **Recruitment Method**

The recruitment method of the army at this time did not prove to be a significant indicator.

### **Military Style**

In the final years of Suharto's regime the military's style began to alter, the change in this indicator prevented the continuation of Suharto's enforced concordance. It has been noted the role that factionalism played in breaking up coherence in the army. This directly impacted upon the army's military style by changing the role of the military from being a supporter and enforcer of Suharto's regime, to one which failed to crush dissent. It was noted that Indonesia's armed forces had been used as Suharto's main tool for maintaining control of society.<sup>636</sup> The factionalism that emerged in the 1990's split the army into two powerful opposing groups, the red and white faction emerged as with some officers who favoured political reform. These officers held powerful positions in the army's high command, when tension began to mount in Jakarta in 1998 these officer's such as Wiranto restricted the opposing green faction

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<sup>636</sup> Slater. p.141

from taking more forceful action against the protestors. This example illustrates a change that took place in the army's style, one that saw it transform from enforcer to one that restricted the use of military force to crush protestors.

The change that took place in the military, citizenry and the political leadership brought an end to Suharto's regime. Factionalism in the army split the institution, resulting in dissension within the partner. This led to a change in the military's style, from enforcer, to one that did not actively attempt to crush the protest movement. The growth of the middle class altered the citizenry. Demands for political reform and more personal freedom transformed this partner from one that had supported Suharto, to one which opposed him. Suharto, who personified the political leadership, was increasingly undermined by his inability to deal effectively with the economic crisis, and close personal association and that of his family with KKN. There was no agreement amongst the partners on the indicators of concordance this resulted in the destruction of Suharto's era of enforced concordance.

## Conclusion

Indonesia's Armed Forces and in particular, the nation's army have played a significant role in the economic, social and political history of the nation. The military emerged as a powerful actor within the political and social life of the nation, in the wake of the revolution. It reached the zenith of its power and influence under Suharto, where its influence expanded directly into government and society under its doctrine of *Dwi Fungsi*. The role of the army in the wake of the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime has waned, however there have been aspects of the institution's influence which have endured and have proved problematic for the country's new democratic political system. The Indonesian military's relationship with government and the nation's population has been examined using Schiff's concordance framework. It emphasises the importance of culture in history within the civil military relationship. Her model challenges the importance of civilian control of the military in preventing military intervention, instead offering a different type of relationship. This relationship is based upon agreement amongst the citizenry, military and political leaders. When this agreement is present amongst the partners on four indicators, Schiff's theory predicts that concordance will emerge. However, it has been shown in the context of the Indonesian experience, that concordance has been extremely difficult to achieve, when it was achieved it was achieved in no small part through the use of coercive force. This concordance was maintained through the use of coercive force and the suppression of political activity and media freedom. Thus Schiff's very concept of concordance, an agreement must be treated with some scepticism. It will be suggested that it may be more accurate to assess this relationship along a

continuum, from cases such as Indonesia through to a concordance where the use of coercion is absent.

The period of time that culminated in the successful revolution against Dutch rule would prove important to the development of the army. During these early years the military developed in a way in which many of its early divisions became entangled within its structure, this prevented the military from developing as a coherent partner. Those recruited into its ranks came from vastly different backgrounds, there were those from the KNIL, PETA and Guerrilla groups. These officers had different levels of technical knowledge and professionalism. The KNIL members were trained according to the Dutch standards of education and professionalism. Those from PETA, where trained by the Japanese, they were heavily nationalistic, disciplined, their educational levels varied. KNIL soldiers often obtained senior ranks over other officer recruits despite their similar ages, as those from the KNIL background often had superior technical knowledge in the area of command. Factions between these two groups soon emerged, this would endure into the 1950's. The military's style also began to develop, the experiences of the soldiers from PETA under the Japanese and the conduct of the nationalist political leadership during the revolution resulted in a distrust of civilian politicians. The ethnic and religious diversity present in Indonesia also drove tension, with an overwhelming number within the officer corps being both Javanese and Muslim, this officer corps makeup did not reflect the nation's diversity. The army became beset from an early stage by problems in its command structure and factionalism. It also developed a view of itself as key to the foundation of the state, and had come to view itself as being closely linked with the citizenry. By the end of the revolution the army that had emerged was factionalised, lacked an effective command structure as well as an antagonistic view of the civilian political leadership.



The political leadership lacked control over the army, going right back to its origins the army had emerged largely spontaneously. The political leaders struggled in these early days to impose control over the army. Sukarno had emerged out of the war as a charismatic leader with wide appeal amongst the population, however in the years following the revolution he would endure a troubled relationship with the army. The pattern for this was established early in Indonesia's history and would result in a turbulent relationship between the army and its civilian masters in the future. The civilian population initially united in the pursuit of independence became less cohesive toward 1949. There was a communist uprising in Madiun in 1948, which the army was called into suppress. Division emerged amongst the nations Islamic groupings, some of whom had secular affiliations and some like Darul Islam who had more radical goals. These two uprisings demonstrated to the army the danger of both radical Islam and communism. Even with the conclusion of the successful revolution there was no agreement amongst the partners, no concordance was possible.

Beginning in 1950 the army's chief Nasution begin considering plans for reform and reorganisation, reductions in personnel, changes in training and doctrine and a change in the educational system. The goal of this reform was a smaller, more professional and effective army. This quickly became a source of tension, and contributed to a hardening of the factions already present in the army. In particular attitudes hardened amongst PETA soldiers who would have the most to lose should reform take place. The factionalism present within the army would soon become even more serious for Indonesia's civil military relations with the interference of the nation's political leaders. Sukarno and other politicians became involved siding with PETA soldiers, opposing Nasution and ultimately replacing him following an attempt to force Sukarno hand through the use of protestors. The government in 1955 would attempt to

appoint Colonel Bambang Utojo to the position of army chief of staff, based upon his political allegiances, resistance to the appointment quickly emerged. This was all evidence of political interference within the military's domain. In the wake of these events negative attitudes towards civilian politicians would harden amongst the officer corps.

Military unity was again undermined in November 1956, by the actions of Colonel Lubis, who motivated by a dislike of Nasution and his new 'Tour of Duty' personnel system, undertook action to attempt Nasution's removal. Problems within the military were not only limited to factionalism and political interference, but also issues of command and control and discipline. Some regional commanders outside of Jakarta during the mid 1950's had developed an increasingly hostile relationship with the central army command. Many of these commanders often enjoyed intense loyalty from their soldiers. This presented a challenge to the army's commanders in Jakarta, as well as undermining the hierarchy and chain of command. These problems within the army would soon align with civilian dissatisfaction amongst the population of Indonesia's outer islands, at the perceived lack of attention from the government. This resentment was manifested in an episode of instability in Indonesia's regions, which culminated with the declaration of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia. In response to the regional instability and increasing disobedience amongst its regional commanders, martial law was declared on the 14th of March 1957 ending Indonesia's parliamentary democracy. The introduction of martial law presented the army with the opportunity for role expansion, it quickly took over control of nationalised Dutch companies. Martial law also provided the army with the opportunity to expand its political role, partially in response to the political chaos of the time the army now pushed for involvement in government. This expansion in both

economic and political roles was articulated by General Nasution in his 'Middle Way' speech, he claimed that the army's participation in these areas would aid in the development of the nation.

The army in the late 1940's had participated in counter insurgency operations, this trend had continued into the 1950's with its involvement in operations suppressing regional uprisings. It had been involved in operations against religious groups, communists and dissident military officers. These operations changed the army, domestic operations in a counter insurgent role affected the military, by altering their skills and technical knowledge. It also had the effect of hardening army attitudes toward groups that were challenging the authority of the unitary state. The result was a more politically active army, more aware and sensitive to those groups it identified as being forces of divisiveness in society.

The 1950's was a period in Indonesian history that was characterised by political and social turmoil. The military was beset by issues which prevented the establishment of concordance. The army once again suffered internal division, and lacked the cohesion required to form a concordance. There were also repeated episodes of political interference within the army by the political leadership. The military resented this intrusion, and sought to prevent it. The political leadership was also a far from coherent partner during this time, Sukarno was able to maintain his prominent position within the political system. However, there were frequent changes of cabinet; this instability within the political reached its height with the regional crisis and the imposition of martial law in 1957, bringing an end to Indonesia's experience with constitutional democracy. There were similar levels of disunity within the citizenry. firstly elements of the citizenry were used by both the political leadership and the military in their confrontation with one another. Secondly, the upheaval in the regions

that culminated with the PRRI rebellion demonstrated that there was serious division between the population in Java and the outlying regions of Indonesia. None of these actors were united enough to consider them coherent, thus preventing the development of any concordance. There was similarly no agreement upon any of Schiff's indicators.

With the end of constitutional democracy came Indonesia's new political experiment, guided democracy. At the centre of guided democracy sat the competing interests of Sukarno, the PKI and an increasingly politically assertive military. The strain of the relationship between the PKI and the army would ultimately contribute to the collapse of guided democracy. Sukarno relied upon both of these mutually antagonistic groups to maintain his own power. Guided democracy attempted to gain consensus through a diverse range of political and social groupings. Sukarno introduced the concept of the Gotong Royong parliament which contained representatives from these diverse groupings, these were meant to provide the institutional machinery for guided democracy, however such bodies became increasingly ineffective. The military under guided democracy obtained considerable representation within parliament, this would become a source of tension with the PKI. The PKI's size and grassroots organisation made it a powerful opponent for the army. It began to assert itself during the confrontation with Malaysia by challenging the military domestically. Its support for the campaign in Malaysia was also had the affect of moving it closer to Sukarno. The army by 1963 was beginning to see a decline in its fortunes. Martial law was ended on May 1 1963, bringing to an end some of its influence in the countries social and political life. The military was also subject once again to political interference when Nasution was replaced in 1962, with Ahmad Yani, an officer who was more amenable to Sukarno's interests. The PKI also made a concerted effort to gain greater support

within the armed forces, through its suggestion of a 'fifth force' and the implementation of Nasakom within the army's ranks.

The army in 1960 had made official changes in its doctrine which brought it into closer contact with the population. There was the creation of military command areas, which covered different geographic areas within the country. The military under this new doctrine of territorial warfare soon had representation down to village level within the country. The army engaged in development projects in the villages and made a concerted effort to gain relationships with local political parties. This new doctrine that the army implemented should be viewed as a response to the challenge that the PKI presented with its sizeable membership. The expansion of the army's role within the economy has already been discussed, however in the 1960's the importance of the army's financial interests grew. Indonesia's economy in the 1960's was performing poorly, the importance of the army's business interests grew as a source of providing for itself and its soldiers. This had the affect of providing the army with greater independence from the government. It also changed the nature of the political decision making process by making the army slightly less dependent upon the government for its funding.

Indonesia's period of guided democracy was characterised by competition and conflict between the military, the political leadership and the citizenry. The army during this period was strongly anti-communist, bringing it into direct competition with the PKI, Sukarno's other major supporter during guided democracy. The PKI made various attempts to challenge the position of the military; Sukarno also changed removed Nasution, a figure who had come to challenge his dominant role under guided democracy. In contrast to earlier periods the army had managed to a certain extent to unify, particularly around the issue of the threat from the PKI. There was some

disagreement within the army's senior levels of command over how best to deal with the PKI. Nevertheless the military by 1965 was far more united than it had been at previous times. It could be considered by 1965 to be a coherent partner. The political leadership during guided democracy was ultimately controlled by the presence of Sukarno. There was considerable support during the period of guided democracy for the PKI amongst the citizenry, Sukarno had attempted to unite the divergent forces within society through the creation of his Gotong Royong parliament and his policy of Nasakom. There was resistance to the PKI from Islamic groups and member of the middle class whose interests were threatened by the PKI's policies. The division that existed between the PKI and the army prevented the partners from agreeing upon any concordance.

Guided Democracy was ended in 1965 by an attempted coup led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung, his attempted coup was defeated by Suharto. It was under Suharto that the first concordant relationship emerged. It however was not one based upon agreement. The army was purged of those individuals who had sided with Untung and held sympathies for the political left. Violent suppression of the PKI was undertaken, involving participants from within the citizenry itself, resulted in an end to communist support within the population. Sukarno's position as the charismatic leader of Indonesia was ended with Suharto's ascent to the position of president in 1967. The political leadership under Suharto changed from one that was characterised by Weber's Charismatic domination, to one of Legal Domination under Suharto. The New Order and Suharto would rule Indonesia until 1998.

Suharto's regime collapsed in 1998; there were a number of reasons for this occurring. Indonesia in 1998 was hit by the East Asian financial crisis. Under the New Order there had been a prolonged period of economic growth, this came to an end in 1998.

The financial crisis had devastating results for the Indonesian economy and the middle and working class of Indonesia. The middle class in particular that had benefitted as a result of the New Order's economic growth was hit by the devaluation in currency. The onset of this sudden economic crisis had the affect of destabilising the enforced concordance that had existed under the New Order.

There were a number of issues within the army, who under the New Order had been a key supporter of Suharto, which would gradually undermine the ability of Suharto to control the country. The army was subject to a number of structural issues that undermined the coherence of the actor. There were long standing structural issues within the officer corps that materialised in the 1990's the pushed some in the army to be more supportive of reform and change in the political system. Factionalism in the 1990's emerged between the red and white, green factions within the officer corps.

The struggle between the military elite in the late 1990's prevented the military from taking unified violent action to stop protestors. The lack of coherence within the military prevented the enforced concordance of Suharto continuing.

There was also a change within the citizenry in the final decade of Suharto's rule that led to the collapse of the New Order. The middle class had grown since the time of the Guided democracy period, once supporters of the New Order regime, their support began to diminish as demands for greater political participation and personal freedoms materialised. The demands of the middle class would align itself with the emergence of credible political opposition to Suharto. The PDI and Megawati Sukarnoputri presented a political a voice for the middle class and the working classes. KKN contributed to the undermining of Suharto's legitimacy. By 1998 the citizenry emerged by as a partner that was united against Suharto.

## Key Historic Legacies

Much of the work in the field of civil military relations theory has emphasised the separation of the military and civilian spheres. Theories such as Huntington's emphasised the importance of military professionalism, and the division of the military and civil spheres in preventing military intervention.<sup>637</sup> Huntington argued that a military whose professionalism is maximised will be rendered politically neutral, he termed this objective control.<sup>638</sup>

Others such as Finer and Stepan have challenged the notion that professionalism restricts the army from undertaking political intervention.<sup>639</sup> Sundhaussen has argued that in the context of states whose civilian politician's do not operate with the same levels of "...efficiency and performance..." as the military, high levels of military professionalism may threaten civilian supremacy.<sup>640</sup> Indonesia's military professionalism suggests Sundhaussen was affected by the performance of the economy, as the economy deteriorated he argues the more the army became concerned by its performance, ultimately he argues that many of the army's interests were tied to the performance of the economy.<sup>641</sup> Moreover Sundhaussen notes

"...the importance of economic factors within the overall framework of national politics and security, the defence doctrine of the Indonesian Army, both in its external defence and its internal security aspects, relied significantly on the application of economic measures to secure the support of the population for the government and the military, particularly when an army has to fight a guerrilla war against external aggressors and conduct anti-guerrilla warfare against internal dissidents."<sup>642</sup>

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<sup>637</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State : The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*.

<sup>638</sup> Ibid. p.83

<sup>639</sup> Finer. and Stepan.

<sup>640</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.259

<sup>641</sup> Ibid. p.260

<sup>642</sup> Ulf Sundhaussen, "Social Policy Aspects in Defence and Security Planning in Indonesia, 1947-1977," in *IXth World Congress of Sociology* (Uppsala: 1978). cited in Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*. p.261



Indonesian military professionalism and the expansion of the army's political role also evolved through its participation in internal operations, against Communist's, Islamist's and other regional dissidents. As Stepan has argued, the military's participation in domestic operations such as those in a counter-insurgency role can have the effect of expanding their knowledge and expertise into the realm of political issues.<sup>643</sup> Indonesia's military professionalism became linked to an expansion of its role into the political, economic and social life of the nation.

Schiff's argues that a nation's unique history and culture are fundamental to understanding the civil military relationship.<sup>644</sup> In the context of Indonesia the understanding and study of the nation's history and culture is of the utmost significance. It is problematic applying a model that emphasises separation of civil and military realms when the nation has no history of this having occurred. Schiff in her work stress's this point by stating that the imposition of a model which emphasises the separation of civil and military institutions is inappropriate in nations which have no history of separation.<sup>645</sup> The events during the revolution and immediately afterward also affected the manner in which the army viewed civilian politicians. The surrender of the civilian leadership during the revolution resulted in the army taking a negative view of the civilian leadership. This was further compounded by the political interference during the 1950's that led to factionalism within the officer corps. The military throughout the 1950's and 1960's and much later during Suharto's rule suffered from episodes of political interference. Interference from political leaders also became a recurring theme in Indonesia's civil military relations. Leaders of the country attempted to intervene in personnel appointments or attempted to alter

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<sup>643</sup> Stepan. p.49

<sup>644</sup> Schiff. p.33

<sup>645</sup> Ibid. p.7

internal army policies. This resulted in internal military issues and sometimes as was the case with the 17th October affair, open confrontation with the government. Political interference contributed to the army's disdain for civilian politicians. The army as a result of its involvement in the revolution came to hold a view of itself which justified it holding a special position in society. The army had been involved in a guerrilla style struggle that led to a strong bond within the citizenry of the nation. The nature of this war demanded that they work closely with the population. The military viewed their role in the revolution as being fundamental to gaining of Indonesia's independence, the army had after all continued to fight despite the surrender of the nationalist leaders. These factors engendered a sense of entitlement within the army. During the 1950's the army's perception of itself changed to one where it saw itself as a guardian of the national interest.<sup>646</sup> This was the result of a perception of the inherent weakness of the civilian politicians, political instability and unrest within the country. This perception that the army held of itself as a privileged institution and one that was a guardian of the national interest, helps explain why it became involved in the nation's political life.

Factionalism within the army has also been characteristic of Indonesia's civil military relations. This has been caused by a variety of factors. The diversity of Indonesia has been one contributing factor. Firstly the historic division that exists between Java and its outer islands led to division amongst those officers that served in the army's command in Java and those based in outer islands. Ethnic and religious background were also a major contributing factor to the factionalism that the army suffered, division in particular between Javanese officers and those from elsewhere on the archipelago. In the early days of the army there were strong divisions between those

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<sup>646</sup> Crouch, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*. p.30

from PETA and those who had Dutch military training in the KNIL. The levels of education, technical ability and disparate institutional cultures within the KNIL and PETA separated these two groups. In the context of this study factionalism has prevented the establishment of a coherent military partner, this explains why there was no concordance until the army became unified around Suharto in 1965. In 1998, disunity amongst the officer corps represented by the green faction and those from the red and white group of officers contributed to the collapse of the enforced concordance that existed at the time.

### **Assessment of Schiff's Model**

Schiff's concordance model approaches the problem of interpreting civil military relations in a manner unique too much of the existing work. Instead of arguing for a separation of the military and the political spheres, Schiff has focused her argument upon the notion of concordance. This contends that when agreement is reached on four indicators amongst three partners, military intervention will not occur. When agreement is not present intervention is more likely to occur. There however some problems with her theory that have been exposed in the Indonesian case. The first of these focuses upon the partners themselves.

There is an inherent assumption built into Schiff's theory that the partners in a concordant relationship already exist, and that these actors always remain in place. However, this study has illustrated that this point cannot be taken for granted. The case of the formation of the Indonesian army being an example of this. Schiff states that the military can be defined quite simply,

"It encompasses the armed forces and the personnel who represent the military. The officers and the enlisted personnel are usually those most dedicated to the armed forces....Generally, the military is the institution

publicly recognized by society and the political elites as the institution that defends a nation's borders."<sup>647</sup>

In the case of the Indonesian military it evolved slowly, with personnel coming from several different groups. Even when the armed forces had been formed in the shape of the TKR it is highly questionable the degree to which the personnel were committed to the armed forces. It has been noted many times that the army at this time was comprised of two major groups, those from the KNIL and those from the Japanese trained PETA. The degree of commitment that many of these men could be seen as having to the armed forces is questionable, because at this early stage there was a significant level of jealousy and animosity between these two groups. Thus the notion of these officers being committed to anything beyond their own group of soldiers and officers is questionable.

The creation of the Indonesian army took place in the wake of Dutch colonisation, Japanese occupation and then involvement in a war for independence. The military evolved throughout this period and went through several incarnations before the TKR was eventually established. In the case of the Indonesian army there was also indecisiveness in the Indonesian government over the creation the army.<sup>648</sup> The Indonesian government took some time in establishing the military structure or even creating "...an army owing allegiance or even a sense of obligation to them."<sup>649</sup> This illustrates that the Indonesian army took time to form as a partner, and in slowly evolved into what Schiff would define as a partner.

It is also clear from the Indonesian case that the partners do not always remain in place. In the case of the Indonesian citizenry in the wake of Suharto's seizure of

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<sup>647</sup> Schiff. p.44

<sup>648</sup> Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power : Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967*.

<sup>649</sup> Ibid. p.13

power large numbers of the citizenry were either killed or imprisoned for their support of the PKI.

"...the citizenry is by corollary even more heterogeneous than the political leadership. Usually it is comprised of individuals who are members of unions or associations, urban workers and entrepreneurs, rural farm workers, those who may have the right to vote, or other groups that may be disenfranchised. It is also best defined by function. How do citizens interact with the military? Is there agreement among the citizens themselves over the role of the military in society?"<sup>650</sup>

In the case of the PKI's supporter's they were many and varied, they came from rural areas as well as urban, they were involved in unions. Schiff also states the citizens can be defined by their relationship to the military and whether there is agreement amongst the citizenry over the role of the military. In the case of the mass killings of communist supporters there were as many as 1,000,000 members of the citizenry killed, this took place with the participation of other members of the citizenry. It does not seem possible that in the wake of these killings that the citizenry could still exist as a partner, those who did disagree with the military or its supporters were murdered. In doing this the military removed any opposition within the citizenry, through the use of extreme violence.

The coherence or unity of actors has also been demonstrated to be of crucial factor in the case of Indonesia's civil military relations. Schiff does not discuss the effect of cohesion amongst her partners. Change in the partners is important in understanding how a concordant relationship can either emerge or collapse. The issue of coherence within the armed forces has been a recurrent theme throughout this study. The issue of factionalism has been a recurring theme within Indonesia's civil military relations, the army has since the time of its creation suffered from varying levels of factionalism. Factionalism has resulted in a lack of coherent military partner. If the military is not

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<sup>650</sup> Schiff. p.13

coherent, it is unable to agree on any of the indicators. Thus, as long as there is division amongst the officer corps there is no possibility that they will be able to agree with the other partners on the indicators of concordance. The result of this is that no concordant relationship is possible. The problem of coherence within each partner has not been limited to the military. It has been shown that in the case of Indonesia, division within the other partners has also produced a lack of coherence. Schiff's model cannot take account for the variety of opinion within the citizenry and the political leadership, the diversity in opinion within these partners result in a lack of coherence, preventing concordance. As demonstrated in Indonesia, military factionalism and the diversity of opinion amongst the citizenry, and political leadership has precluded concordance.

Accounting for change using Schiff's model is also problematic. The presence of a concordant relationship is based upon the agreement amongst the three partners on the four indicators. If agreement is present a concordance will materialise, if agreement is not present concordance will not materialize, the model is static. Accordingly this cannot take account of more subtle changes that may take place over time. Change within the actors themselves can contribute to a change in the concord, thus by examining the actors it becomes possible to trace the evolution and account for change in a concord, in doing so the model become's dynamic.

This type of dynamic change occurred amongst the middle class in the 1990's, a growing segment of the Indonesian citizenry which had supported the New Order, however as their numbers grew, so did their demands upon the Suharto and the political leadership. The middle class had supported the New Order and Suharto for its economic policies which had seen their wealth grow and numbers grow. As the middle class grew there was corresponding demand for greater political and personal

freedom. In the case of Indonesia the political leadership did not respond to these demands by undertaking reform or allowing greater freedoms for this influential sector of the population. This change within the citizenry contributed to the end of the concordance in 1998. Middle class opposition to Suharto and the New Order grew, they participated in the protests in Jakarta that led to the toppling of the regime. This change in the citizenry demonstrates how dynamic change can occur through the change in the actors themselves. In particular the case of Indonesia has demonstrated the importance of economic change on the citizenry, and the ramifications that this had upon the political system and its political leadership, through an expansion of their demands for greater political participation.

Change in the Political leadership can also effect the concordance. In this study two distinct types of political leadership were identified utilising Webers model of legitimate domination.<sup>651</sup> Sukarno's period of leadership was identified as belonging to the charismatic category. Suharto's form of leadership has been characterised as Legal domination. In relation to charismatic leadership Weber notes that the leaders are followed due to their "...non-routine qualities...", and that people will only follow these leaders to the extent to which they ascribe these qualities to them.<sup>652</sup> In the case of Sukarno these non-routine qualities stemmed from his involvement in the independence movement. Weber also notes that the rule of charismatic leaders ends when the masses lose faith in their leadership potential. This loss of faith developed slowly as he moved gradually closer to the PKI, and ultimately he lost credibility following the attempted coup for which the PKI was blamed.

Dynamic change in the actors whether in the military, the citizenry or the political leadership can ultimately undermine the existence of a concord, resulting in the

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<sup>651</sup> Swedberg, ed. p.99

<sup>652</sup> Ibid. p.104

destruction of it. In Indonesia in 1998 change within two of the actors, the military and the citizenry resulted in the collapse of Suharto's enforced concordance. This change was also affected by two external factors, an economic crisis and a change in the security environment.


It was identified at the beginning of this study that the onset of a sudden crisis outside of the control of a nation's political leader can have a significant impact upon a concord. The 1998 East Asian financial crisis was an example of this. This event led to massive devaluation of the Indonesian currency, capital flight and raised living costs dramatically for many of those most vulnerable to a rise in prices for staple goods. This put pressure upon the Indonesian government to take steps to improve the situation in the country. The authorities however were incapable of dealing with the crisis, and anger continued to grow. This resulted in protests and demonstrations calling not only for an improvement to the economy, but calls for a change in the government itself.

Assessing exactly what constitutes a concordant relationship in the Indonesian case has also proved problematic. In the case of Indonesia, concordance was only established under the rule of Suharto and the New Order. The concordance that developed under Suharto has been termed enforced concordance because of the role that coercion and the use of violence played in his seizure of power and then in maintaining it. The New Order was established by a coherent military, citizenry and political leadership. In the case of the citizenry, mass killings of communists removed opposition to the military within the citizenry. There was agreement on the indicators of concordance. It is difficult to accept the notion that a concordance can be created through the use of extreme violence, as Wells notes, "How is one to distinguish between the absence of intervention and the presence of agreement? The argument



seems to presume that agreement/concordance is somehow unrelated to forms of coercion/persuasion."<sup>653</sup> Given this it would seem that the Schiff's framework must be modified so that concordance exists on a continuum, with concordance as defined by Schiff in the middle and enforced concordance such as Suharto's regime at the other.

**Figure 2 - Continuum of Concordance**



### **Contributions to theoretical work**

Schiff's theory is a relatively new piece of theory in the field of civil military relations, she claims her work is different to the prevailing separation theory because "...the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, the political elites, and society."<sup>654</sup> This study has contributed to the existing theoretical work by testing Schiff's theory in the context of Indonesia. The case of the Indonesian army is one in which the notion of separation between the civil and the military spheres is not clearly defined. Accordingly Indonesia's armed forces make an ideal case study for Schiff's model precisely because there has not been a significant history of civil military separation. This study has made several specific contributions to Schiff's work. Firstly, the level of unity within each actor has been shown to be a significant factor, in establishing concordance, accounting for change and in understanding the demise of concordance. Secondly, the issue of Schiff's model as a static model has been challenged, it has been shown that there can be a number of causes to account for this dynamic change.

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<sup>653</sup> Richard Wells, "The Theory of Concordance in Civil/Military Relations: A Commentary," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996). p.272

<sup>654</sup> Schiff. p.43

Finally, the issue of concordance has been reinterpreted and put on a scale. This work has emphasised the importance of a nation's unique culture and history in understanding civil military relations. It demonstrates the problems in taking theoretical models of civil military relations bound within a particular historical or cultural experience and applying them to nations such as Indonesia.

The field of civil military relations would benefit from future research using Schiff's work, as well as future research on Indonesia. In particular the role that old soldiers now play in the democratic system of Indonesia. Schiff's work has presented something that challenges the established order; it would be beneficial to the field of civil military relations to see her theory tested elsewhere. In particular those nations which do not have civil military relationship are based upon separation but may include some level of integration.

### **Contemporary Indonesia**

Indonesia today is a vastly different place to what it was in 1998. The military has seen its power curbed through a program of reform. It has lost its political and social role which was enshrined in Dwi Fungsi, this has resulted in a loss of seats in the legislature, business interests being bought under the control of the government.

There are troubling aspects that still remain however, particularly human rights issues.

This was highlighted in the case of the murder of four prisoners in Cebongan prison who had been accused of killing a Kopassus (Special Forces) member. Those responsible were found to be the murdered man's fellow soldiers. The Indonesian defence minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro stated that the attack did not amount to an abuse of human rights.<sup>655</sup> The ongoing existence of the territorial command system, which was a key part of Suharto's system of control, is a further example of the

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<sup>655</sup> Indra Wijaya, "Minister: No Human Rights Violation in Cebongan," *Tempo* 2013.

military's authoritarian past.<sup>656</sup> The participation of old soldiers such as Prabowo Subianto, who is banned from travel to the United States, for his suspected involvement in human rights abuses, is also concerning.<sup>657</sup> Indonesia's civil military relations under democracy are still in a state of change.

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<sup>656</sup> Fitri Bintang Timur and Puri Kencana Putri, "Military Reform Swept under the Rug " *The Jakarta Post*, April 28 2014.

<sup>657</sup> Joe Cochrane, "Indonesia Candidate Tied to Human Rights Abuses Stirs Unease," *The New York Times*, March 26, 2014

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