

From Hubris to Reality

Neoconservatism and the Bush Doctrine's Middle East Democratisation Policies

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For Granddad Tony

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Abstract

Following the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001, the Bush administration articulated an anti-terrorism grand strategy of armed democratisation in the Middle East that constituted the heart of the “Bush Doctrine.” This strategy derived primarily from the framework of activist democracy promotion developed by neoconservatives, and reached its apex in 2003 when it served as the rationale for regime change in Iraq as the fulcrum for the democratic transformation of the Arab world. Yet by 2008, the Bush administration's democratisation policies and many elements of the broader neoconservative framework of democracy promotion have been significantly scaled back as a result of the challenges they have faced in the Arab world – to the extent that both are now entering a state of decline. In seeking to assess the development, assumptions and outcomes to date of the United States' post-September 11 anti-terrorism strategy in the Middle East, this thesis offers a critical account of the rise and decline of the “neoconservative moment” in American foreign policy as exemplified by the Bush Doctrine's Middle East democratisation policies. This thesis examines the origins, evolution and claims of the neoconservative paradigm of armed democracy promotion; it relates these to the justifications for interventionist democratisation in the Middle East present in the terms of the Bush Doctrine; and it assesses some of the key critiques made of these assumptions over the past five years. Unlike a number of studies of the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatism, this thesis takes seriously the Bush Doctrine's claims and neoconservative beliefs as a genuine intellectual framework for intervention, consistently examining their assertions on their own terms. Further, this thesis utilises an interdisciplinary approach of study, adopting a number of the methods and analytical tools of history and political science in making its arguments and reaching its conclusions.

Key terms: Neoconservatism. Democratisation--Middle East. United States--Foreign Relations--Middle East. Iraq War--2003--. United States--Foreign Relations--2001-2008.

Introduction

In a speech at West Point in New York on 1 June 2002, President George W. Bush laid out his administration's post-September 11 foreign policy framework, which was subsequently expanded and formalised in the September 2002 'National Security Strategy of the United States.'¹ These pronouncements quickly became known as the “Bush Doctrine” and established a new foreign policy grand strategy for the United States focused on four key pillars; American hegemony, pre-emptive war, unilateralism and democracy promotion in non-democratic states.² The last of these pillars – activist democratisation – was the heart of the Bush Doctrine and the cornerstone of a strategy for fighting and winning the war on terrorism through the democratic transformation of the Arab world by American intervention. The roots of the Bush Doctrine's conceptions of Middle East democratisation can be traced to a group of foreign policy intellectuals known as “neoconservatives.” Many members of this group, such as William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Richard Perle, Paula Dobriansky and Zalmay Khalilzad, among a number of others, spent much of the decade prior to the announcement of the Bush Doctrine developing and articulating a framework of interventionist democracy promotion for the Middle East in a variety of foreign policy think-tanks and publications.³

The election of George W. Bush and the influx of neoconservative intellectuals and policy makers into his administration in early 2001 meant that many neoconservatives held positions of influence when the September 11 terrorist attacks occurred. In their search for a strategy to comprehend and deal with the threats, crises

¹ 'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'. Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York, 1 June 2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>, accessed 2 February 2007; The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002'. (Hereafter NSS 2002) Washington, 17 September 2002, pp. iii, 1. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, accessed 1 May 2007.

² These four elements of the Bush Doctrine are drawn from Robert Jervis, who offers one of the best analyses of the doctrine as a whole. See Robert Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine'. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 118, No. 3, (Fall 2003), pp. 351-378; For further discussion of the claims of the Bush Doctrine, see Edward Rhodes, 'The Imperial Logic of Bush's Liberal Agenda'. *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 1, (Mar., 2003), pp. 131- 155; G. John Ikenberry, 'America's Imperial Ambition'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5, (Sept., 2002), pp. 44-60.

³ For a detailed discussion of the activities of neoconservative intellectuals and policy makers in the decade before the Bush administration came to power, see chapter two of this thesis.

and opportunities of the post-September 11 world, senior members of the Bush administration came to embrace many of the conceptual frameworks and foreign policy prescriptions developed over the previous decade by neoconservatives. These offered a compelling explanation for the origins of the attacks and provided clear guidelines for a new and 'revolutionary' anti-terrorism strategy of activist democracy promotion in the Middle East. By mid-2002 the Bush administration had formulated a strategy of armed democratisation considerably more grandiose, self-assured and ambitious than most foreign policy doctrines that had come before. This strategy served as the primary rationale for regime change and democratisation in Iraq as the fulcrum for bringing about the democratic transformation and pacification of the Arab world.

Since the invasion of Iraq, scholars of the Bush Doctrine have generally offered negative appraisals of its democracy promotion policies and the effects and consequences of these in practice. In his 2007 book, *A Pact with the Devil*, Tony Smith, a professor of political science at Rutgers University, contends that the “delusions of omnipotence” of the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies

Rested on its belief that America enjoyed both military primacy and a blueprint for world order thanks to its global experience fostering “free market democracies.” As a consequence, the United States could remake foreign countries – their state institutions, economic and civil orders, and basic cultural arrangements – so as to engender a peaceful international order under American control, a terror-free tomorrow.⁴

Echoing elements of Smith's argument, Francis Fukuyama of Johns Hopkins University writes in his 2007 book, *After the Neocons*, that events in the Middle East since 2003 show that “the Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters vastly overestimated the ability of America's conventional military power to achieve the political ends they sought in the Middle East, particularly the goal of bringing about a broad-ranging transformation toward democracy.”⁵ While there is not unanimity among scholars about the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies, there has since 2003 been a general shift towards criticism of this grand strategy and a decline in the number of those supportive of its claims and application.⁶ Indeed,

⁴ Tony Smith, *A Pact with the Devil: Washington's Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise*. New York, Routledge, 2007, p xxxviii.

⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at The Crossroads*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 2007, pp. viii-ix.

⁶ The views of neoconservatives and scholars who are supportive of the principles of the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies are primarily examined in the first half of the thesis. Although

important elements of the critical literature utilised in this thesis have been published by 'establishment' foreign policy journals and institutes, such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institute, *Foreign Affairs*, The RAND Corporation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; organisations that prior to 2003 had often been supportive of the Bush administration's goals in the Middle East.

In seeking to add to this growing critical literature and to assess anew the development, assumptions and outcomes to date of the Bush administration's anti-terrorism grand strategy of democratisation, this thesis offers a critical account of the rise and decline of the neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democratisation in relation to the Bush Doctrine's democracy promotion policies in Iraq and the wider Arab Middle East. This thesis critically assesses the most important intellectual, theoretical and historical sources of the neoconservative foreign policy framework of democratisation, and the interventionist policies that stemmed from this. It then examines to what extent this thinking influenced the Bush Doctrine's underlying assumptions about armed democratisation in the Middle East and how neoconservative ideas coloured many of the policies and strategies articulated in the documents that constitute the doctrine. Finally, it provides a detailed critical analysis of the theoretical and practical problems and challenges of such policies in the Middle East from 2003 to 2008.

Based on this critical analysis, this thesis argues that by 2008 the range of challenges posed to the assumptions of the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatism by critics and by developments in the Middle East have resulted in the scaling back, and in many cases the abandonment, of most aspects of activist democratisation. By 2008, the Bush administration and many neoconservatives have in practice exhibited a turn towards elements of foreign policy realism. With the adoption of new political and military strategies in Iraq, along with the revival of regional policies focused more on diplomacy and the balance of power than democratic transformation, the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies that were at their peak in 2003 have by 2008 entered a state of decline. Commensurate with these developments, much of the neoconservative democratisation framework from which the Bush Doctrine was derived has also been tempered by a resurgence of realism and has moved into eclipse. In addition to these changes, a new administration assumed office in January

some of these views will be again considered in chapters four and five, the main focus of these chapters is upon the critiques of the Bush Doctrine that have developed in the literature on American foreign policy in the Middle East over the past five years.

2009. The new American president, Barack Obama, and his foreign policy advisers have not been sympathetic towards the Bush Doctrine's democratisation strategy, and it appears unlikely at present that they will rehabilitate such policies.⁷ While some neoconservative ideas might retain residual influence in American foreign policy, the time has now passed when armed democratisation lay at the heart of the United States' anti-terrorism grand strategy in the Arab world.

It is essential to take the claims made about interventionist democratisation by neoconservatives and the Bush administration seriously on their own terms. A number of critics have argued that the assertions made by the Bush administration and its supporters about armed democracy promotion represent a Straussian 'noble lie' designed as a cover for ulterior agendas.⁸ Some critics contend that neoconservatives and the Bush administration employed the rhetoric of democracy promotion in order to rally domestic support around a supposedly idealistic foreign policy to foster national unity and "republican virtue" at home.⁹ Others hold that talk of democracy promotion served as a way in which to frame intervention in the Middle East on behalf of oil interests or the security of Israel in idealistic terms.¹⁰ Further, some argue that since the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies were not equally applied in practice to all of America's Arab allies after 2003, this shows that these policies were largely rhetorical and should not be taken seriously as the

⁷ See for example Barack Obama's discussion of Iraq and the war on terror in the second 2008 presidential candidate debate between Barack Obama and John McCain. Commission on Presidential Debates, 'The Second McCain-Obama Presidential Debate'. Commission on Presidential Debates, (7 Oct., 2008). <http://www.debates.org/pages/trans2008c.html>, accessed 18 December 2008. In this debate, Obama argues that "there are some things I don't understand. I don't understand how we ended up invading a country that had nothing to do with 9/11, while Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda are setting up base camps and safe havens to train terrorists to attack us." Later in the debate, Obama asserted more broadly that the United States needed to "fundamentally change... George Bush's foreign policy. It has not worked for America;" For an overview of Obama's approach to the Middle East and the war on terrorism, see Barack Obama, 'Renewing American Leadership'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4, (July/Aug 2007). <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20070701faessay86401-p0/barack-obama/renewing-american-leadership.html>, accessed 7 November 2008.

⁸ Many critics of the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatism hold that neoconservatives believe Leo Strauss supported the idea that public officials should engage in a 'noble lie' where self-interested aims should be framed by idealistic rhetoric for public consumption. A number of critics paint democracy promotion in the Middle East as a 'noble lie' that does not deserve serious contemplation, as this is apparently a cover for a hidden agenda. This is a tenuous argument that, while discussed by other critics of the Bush Doctrine, is not considered as important or relevant in this thesis.

⁹ See Anne Norton, *Leo Strauss and the Politics of the American Empire*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2004; For an older argument about the importance of the "noble lie" in neoconservative thinking about foreign policy, see Shadia B. Drury, *The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss*. New York, St Martin's Press, 1988, *passim*.

¹⁰ For this argument, see Noam Chomsky, Gilbert Achcar, *Perilous Power: The Middle East and U.S Foreign Policy*. New York, Hamish Hamilton, 2007.

framework through which the Bush administration rationalised its actions in the Middle East.¹¹

Despite on-going debate among scholars about the sincerity of the Bush Doctrine's claims, this thesis holds that the justifications neoconservatives and the Bush Doctrine put forward for armed democracy promotion nonetheless had real world consequences in practice. The interventionist propositions put forward by the Bush Doctrine acted as the way through which the use of violence by the United States in the Middle East for liberal ends was rationalised, understood and legitimised. Whether all who articulated them genuinely believed in such rationales is not such an important matter.¹² In their own right, neoconservative arguments for armed democratisation and the justifications for this strategy offered in the Bush Doctrine represented a fully-formed rationale for American military intervention abroad. These justifications deserve serious critical examination as they have significant theoretical, historical and intellectual depth, and offer a comprehensive ideology and policy framework for a strategy of activist democracy promotion. Taking these justifications seriously allows the assumptions put forward by the Bush Doctrine and neoconservatives to be criticised on their own terms and contrasted against the outcomes to date of democratisation in the Arab world.

To assess the rise and decline of the neoconservative democratisation paradigm in relation to the Bush Doctrine, it is useful to adopt an interdisciplinary approach of study. Unlike a number of studies of this topic, this thesis bases its analysis in both history and political science. The reason for this is that the neoconservative democratisation framework and the terms of the Bush Doctrine were at once historically grounded and tied to a number of major debates in contemporary international relations theory. Many current studies of neoconservatism and the Bush Doctrine are situated in political science and focus on examining various elements of the theoretical claims present in the Bush Doctrine. Accordingly, this thesis engages extensively with international relations theory – particularly liberal international relations theory and foreign policy realism – in its analyses and critiques. Further, it

¹¹ See Glenn E. Perry, 'Imperial Democratisation: Rhetoric and Reality'. *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 28, No. 3 & 4, (Summer/Fall 2006), pp. 55-86.

¹² For brief discussion on the importance of taking these liberal justifications for the use of violence abroad seriously on their own terms – whether they are reflective of genuine belief or otherwise – see Jeremy Moses, 'Humanitarianism and International Law: The 'Standard of Civilisation' in Contemporary International Relations'. Paper Prepared for the 46th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Honolulu, Hawaii, (1-5 Mar., 2005), p. 50.

utilises important elements of the voluminous material produced by foreign policy specialists on American Middle East policy during the Bush presidency, as well as many of the major works produced on neoconservatism over the past several years.

This thesis also seeks to provide a historical account of the origin, evolution and decline of the Bush administration's post-September 11 grand strategy of armed democratisation in the Arab world. It examines at length the longer-term development of neoconservative thinking on democratisation, places the Bush Doctrine's claims in a broader context of recent American foreign policy history, and seeks to maintain some historical distance from the events under examination. Further, this thesis treats documents produced by the Bush administration and neoconservatives as primary sources, assessing these as primary material produced by earlier administrations and their intellectual supporters would be examined by historians. An interdisciplinary method of study allows for greater flexibility of analysis, increases the variety of sources and interpretations available, and can offer more robust conclusions than a study based exclusively in one or the other discipline. Indeed, this method of analysis is integral to critically assessing the rise and decline of neoconservatism in relation to the Bush Doctrine's Middle East democratisation policies.

Chapter One

The Neoconservative Paradigm of Democratisation

Neoconservatives have long articulated a range of ideas about some of the most important questions facing American foreign policy. These include, among others, ideas relating to the need to uphold and enhance American hegemonic power, wariness about international institutions and the norms of international law, the importance of morality in foreign policy, as well as the need for the United States to expand liberal values and democratic government in other states. It was the last of these concepts – the need to promote liberal democracy abroad – that came to be associated more than all else with neoconservatism and which deserves serious contemplation and analysis. A number of scholars have examined neoconservative ideas about democracy promotion as a part of broader studies of neoconservatism and its relationship to the Bush administration's policies. Few, however, have paid attention exclusively to the origins, development and nature of neoconservative thinking about democratisation, and few have treated the claims made by neoconservative as constituting a serious interventionist paradigm. From where did neoconservative conceptions of promoting democracy and liberal values derive? What were the most important theoretical, intellectual and historical influences underlying neoconservative thinking on democratisation as a pillar of American foreign policy, and how did this thinking develop over time?

Neoconservative thinking about democratisation derived from a synthesis of the experiences and lessons neoconservatives gained from the Cold War with some of the most important recent debates in liberal international relations theory about the globalisation of liberal ideas and the link between democracy and peace. This synthesis facilitated the formulation of a historically informed and theoretically sophisticated argument for the promotion of democracy abroad through the application of American power. Neoconservatives held that the United States was a benevolent hegemon that possessed the ability, commitment and vision to bring about democratic change abroad, and they believed that the spread of democracy

offered the promise of peace, security and enhanced American power. Drawing from their experiences in the Cold War, particularly in relation to combating totalitarianism, pushing for democratic transformation and witnessing the collapse of communism, and from their embrace of the 'activist' versions of liberal international relations theories that developed in the 1990's, neoconservatives articulated a sophisticated framework for justifying interventionist democratisation abroad by the United States.

Examining the key theoretical, intellectual and historical influences that contributed to the neoconservative paradigm of democracy promotion is essential for understanding the policies advocated by neoconservatives and for examining the transmission of such thinking into the Bush Doctrine itself. Establishing the nature of neoconservative assumptions about activist democratisation is a prerequisite for assessing these claims on their own terms against their outcomes and consequences to date. Further, analysing the origins and evolution of neoconservative thinking about democratisation shows that their arguments and the interventionist terms of the Bush Doctrine were not made of whole cloth, but rather had deep roots in a number of important liberal academic theories and historical experiences embraced and interpreted by neoconservatives as their outlook developed.

The Neoconservative Foreign Policy Outlook: An Overview

In an issue of the *Weekly Standard* published in August 2003, Irving Kristol, the so-called 'god-father' of neoconservatism, opened an essay on what he termed the 'neoconservative persuasion' by asking "what exactly is neoconservatism?" Kristol's article was an attempt to lay out what constituted the neoconservative world view and the principles it espoused, particularly owing to the highly critical spotlight that had been turned on neoconservatives as a result of the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Kristol noted in the introduction to his article that "journalists, and now even presidential candidates, speak with an enviable confidence on who or what is "neoconservative," and seem to assume the meaning is fully revealed in the name."¹ Kristol commented that "those of us who are designated as "neocons" are

¹ Irving Kristol, 'The Neoconservative Persuasion: What it Was, and What it is'. *The Weekly*

amused, flattered, or dismissive, depending on the context. It is reasonable to wonder: Is there any "there" there?"² Kristol argued that neoconservatism existed not as a 'movement' or school of thought, but as a "persuasion."³ Neoconservatism was an outlook intimately associated with Cold War anti-communism, moral foreign policy and military intervention to foster democratic values abroad, and offered consistent critiques of modernity and what its members often described as the decadence and nihilism of liberal thinking within American politics and society.⁴

Kristol spent some time in his essay examining the distinctive neoconservative views about American foreign policy. According to Kristol, neoconservatives held that power and principles must be one in American foreign policy. Neoconservatives expressed an optimistic, moralistic and outward-looking foreign policy world view, that, among other things, held that promoting values of freedom and democracy abroad was also beneficial for American power and interests. In Kristol's view, there were four "attitudes" common to neoconservative foreign policy thinking, which together underpinned many aspects of the persuasion:

First, patriotism is a natural and healthy sentiment and should be encouraged by both private and public institutions. Precisely because we are a nation of immigrants, this is a powerful American sentiment. Second, world government is a terrible idea since it can lead to world tyranny. International institutions that point to an ultimate world government should be regarded with the deepest suspicion. Third, statesmen should, above all, have the ability to distinguish friends from enemies. This is not as easy as it sounds, as the history of the Cold War revealed. The number of intelligent men who could not count the Soviet Union as an enemy, even though this was its own self-definition, was absolutely astonishing. Finally, for a great power, the "national interest" is not a geographical term, except for fairly prosaic matters like trade and environmental regulation. A smaller nation might appropriately feel that its national interest begins and ends at its borders, so that its foreign policy is almost always in a defensive mode. A larger nation has more extensive interests. And large nations, whose identity is ideological, like the Soviet Union of yesteryear and the United States of today, inevitably have ideological

Standard, Vol. 8, No. 47, (25 Aug., 2003).

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

interests in addition to more material concerns.⁵

Kristol aptly captured a number of important aspects of neoconservative foreign policy thinking, emphasising that foreign policy always had a domestic context and was influenced by regime type. To Kristol, United States foreign policy should be infused with an outward-looking patriotism that rallied the American people around moral causes and therefore encouraged “republican virtue” and a healthy democratic system at home. In relation to other states, Kristol noted that neoconservatives believed that regime type was a primary determinant of foreign policy; that if a state was authoritarian or repressive at home, it was more likely to be so abroad as it externalised the violence inherent in its system of government against other states. Further, Kristol also made apparent that neoconservatives rejected what they deemed the overly materialist realist conception of the 'national interest.' As an 'exceptional' nation, neoconservatives held that the national interests of the United States extended beyond merely material matters to encompass support for the spread of democratic values abroad. In practice, this meant that promoting freedom was consistent with advancing American interests and power, as values and interests could not be realistically separated in United States foreign policy.

Neoconservatives viewed democracy as the surest form of government for promoting peace, ensuring security, and enhancing American interests. Kristol argued that neoconservatives believed the promotion of democracy was at once a moral act and a national security imperative, and that it was essential for the United States to use its power to advance its national interests and the values of humanity simultaneously.⁶ Through this argument, neoconservatives reinforced their claim that the academic dichotomy between foreign policy realism and idealism was faulty and that the United States could be both self-interested and altruistic at once.⁷ As Oxford University political scientist Patricia Owens put it in a 2007 article on neoconservatism, “its proponents speak of power *and* morality, credibility, interests *and* values,” and held that spreading democracy and encouraging human rights norms abroad was indivisible from the promotion of American national interests.⁸

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ For critical discussion of this key aspect of neoconservative foreign policy thinking, see Michael C. Williams, 'What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory'. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 11, No. 3, (Sept., 2005), passim.

⁷ For discussion of this view from a neoconservative perspective, see Joshua Muravchik, 'The Past, Present, and Future of Neoconservatism'. *Commentary*, Vol. 124, No. 3, (Oct., 2007), pp. 20-1.

⁸ Patricia Owens, 'Beyond Strauss, Lies and the War in Iraq: Hannah Arendt's Critique of Neoconservatism'. *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, (2007), p. 266.

In relation to the means of promoting democracy abroad, Kristol argued that neoconservatives placed important emphasis on the efficacy of American military power as a tool of foreign policy. Military power could be employed in the service of national interests, as with any great power; however, many neoconservatives also strongly believed that military power should be used to advance liberal values abroad.⁹ Younger neoconservatives, such as Irving Kristol's son, William Kristol, began arguing in the 1990's that America's military superiority was so manifest, and its intentions so clearly virtuous, that the United States could act as a "benevolent hegemon," employing its immense military power in the service of the national interest and humanity at once.¹⁰ Thus, American military power could be put to use not only to enhance pragmatic American interests and national security, but also to encourage the expansion of democracy, human rights and free trade as well, so as to make the world both a safer and a better place.¹¹

Irving Kristol's exposition of the key tenets of the neoconservative foreign policy outlook in 2003 came at a time when neoconservatism had achieved an unprecedented level of international attention and had engendered significant critical analysis and comment. Yet neoconservatism existed as a distinct and sophisticated body of thought before the election of George W. Bush, the promulgation of the Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq, having held a prominent place in American politics and foreign policy for a number of decades prior. Examining the origins, development and assumptions of the neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democratisation is key to understanding the policy prescription put forward by neoconservatives for armed intervention in the Middle East. Further, such an analysis is integral to appreciating the theoretical and historical depth of the Bush Doctrine's propositions about armed democratisation that emerged as the cornerstone of its post-September 11 grand strategy.

⁹ Kristol, 'The Neoconservative Persuasion'; For critical analysis of this view in brief, see Smith, pp. 27-9.

¹⁰ William Kristol, Robert Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 4, (Jul/Aug 1996), pp. 18-33.

¹¹ For brief critical discussion of this key neoconservative idea, see G. John Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neoconservative Moment'. *Survival*, Vol. 46, No. 1, (Spring 2004), pp. 9-10.

The Influence of the Cold War

The neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democracy promotion was in the first instance profoundly influenced by the experiences of neoconservatives during the Cold War.¹² Events during the Cold War and the collapse of communism decisively shaped neoconservative thinking on democracy promotion as integral to American foreign policy. Some of the key neoconservative propositions about regime change and democratisation that emerged during the 1990's and 2000's were drawn from the 'lessons' offered by the lengthy confrontation with the Soviet Union. Especially important was the neoconservative embrace of anti-totalitarianism and the belief that policies of regime change and rollback, rather than accommodation, containment and détente, were the most effective way to manage ambitious totalitarian states. These claims were also made in the Bush Doctrine, and there was clear intellectual lineage between neoconservative Cold War thinking and the Bush administration's anti-terrorism grand strategy.

Anti-Totalitarianism, Rollback and American Foreign Policy

At the core of neoconservative thinking about American foreign policy in the Cold War was a strong belief in anti-totalitarianism. Some of the leading members of the nascent neoconservative group of the late 1940's, such as Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Michael Novak and others began their careers as Trotskyite or left-leaning intellectuals at City College New York.¹³ Among leftist intellectuals, the early Cold War period was dominated by intense ideological competition between Trotskyites and Stalinists, and more broadly between liberals sympathetic to the aims of communism, and staunchly anti-communist Cold War liberals.¹⁴ Kristol,

¹² On the formative role of the Cold War in neoconservative thinking, see Gary Dorrien, *Imperial Designs: Neoconservatism and the New Pax Americana*. New York, Routledge, 2004, chapter 1; James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*. New York, Penguin, 2004, pp. xvi-xv, chapter four; John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals in Foreign Affairs, 1945-1995*. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1995, preface, chapter 1, chapter 5 passim; For analysis of this issue from a conservative position, see Stefan Halper, Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, chapter 2.

¹³ For informative discussion of the genesis of early neoconservatism at City College, see Halper, Clarke, pp. 44-6.

¹⁴ Irving Kristol, 'My Cold War'. *The National Interest*, No. 31, (Spring 1993), pp. 141-145; For further discussion of the importance of anti-communism in the formation of the neoconservative outlook, see Fukuyama, pp. 15-17.

Podhoretz, and others became increasingly disillusioned with the American left's apparent sympathies for Soviet communism and the weak elite response to what they viewed as the evil and dangerous regime in Moscow. This disillusionment was heightened further as more became known about the horrors of Stalinist Russia, and many of these thinkers concluded that the promise of "real existing socialism" had been usurped by a totalitarian regime utilising Marxist-Leninism in an attempt to justify utopian violence that caused immense suffering.¹⁵ Owing to this, the intellectuals later deemed 'neoconservative' became staunchly anti-communist and committed to anti-totalitarianism as a pillar of American foreign policy.

On a theoretical level, the anti-totalitarian outlook expressed by neoconservatives was strongly influenced by Hannah Arendt's book, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Among other issues, Arendt examined the totalitarian ideology and expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union, deeming the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the Soviet state a primary cause of its belligerence and aggressive foreign policies.¹⁶ Arendt's exposition of totalitarian theory offered neoconservatives a cogent explanation for the origins of the Cold War, providing a compelling argument in which Marxist-Leninism and the very nature of the Soviet Union itself explained the ambitions and hostility of the enemy.¹⁷ While Patricia Owens notes that "Arendt was horrified that *The Origins of Totalitarianism*... became a staple of Cold War propaganda," and did not think that her book would provide an influential theoretical framework for conceiving of the Soviet threat,¹⁸ to neoconservatives, Arendt offered the most convincing explanation for the origins of the Cold War and further enamoured their belief in the necessity of principled anti-totalitarianism in American foreign policy. Subsequent analysis in chapters two and three shows that the assumptions made by neoconservatives about totalitarian regimes during the Cold War have been applied to repressive regimes during the 1990's and 2000's, and that these ideas also emerged as one of the Bush Doctrine's key claims about regime type and conflict.

¹⁵ For informative discussion on the importance of anti-Stalinism to early neoconservatism, see Norman Podhoretz, 'Neoconservatism: A Eulogy'. *Commentary*, Vol. 101, No. 3, (Mar., 1996), pp. 24-6, *passim*.

¹⁶ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Third Edition. London, Allen and Unwin, 1967; For good discussion of Arendt's work and its main themes and conclusions, see Ted V. McAllister, *Revolt Against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and the Search for a Postliberal Order*. Kansas, Kansas University Press, 1996, pp. 39-42.

¹⁷ Owens, p. 169.

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

As a result of their strong anti-totalitarian outlook, many neoconservatives argued that policies of “rollback” and “regime change” were among the most viable strategies for dealing with the threat and ambitions of the Soviet Union and its allies. The notions of rollback and regime change expressed in the Bush Doctrine can be traced to neoconservative debates about these interventionist strategies during the Cold War. One of the most important intellectual influences over neoconservative thinking about the utility of rollback and regime change in the Cold War was James Burnham, a conservative intellectual who regularly wrote in the *National Review*. From the late 1940's into the 1970's, Burnham strongly and consistently argued for policies aimed at the military rollback of the Soviet Union and its allies in order to bring the communist threat to a heel and win the Cold War.¹⁹ Burnham argued in his 1947 book *The Struggle for the World* that the United States was already losing the Cold War and that it was clear that if military action against the communists was not undertaken, Soviet world domination was assured.²⁰ Containment was not enough, and what was required was the 'rollback' of communist regimes by force, with the ultimate goal of bringing about the collapse of the Soviet regime. The United States should liberate the states of Eastern Europe from communism by force, Burnham contended, and this was to be a part of a broader strategy to rollback communist regimes in the developing world as well.²¹

Burnham's influence was apparent in a number of neoconservative stances on challenging Soviet power. Some neoconservative intellectuals, such as Norman Podhoretz and others at *Commentary*, derived from Burnham the idea of not merely 'managing' the Cold War, but rolling back communism itself.²² In addition, as neoconservatives turned away from the Democratic Party and towards the Republican Party during the 1970's, their developing notions of rollback meshed with the strongly anti-communist views of a minority of Republicans, led by figures like Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, who had never been satisfied with containment or détente and argued in favour of far more assertive policies aimed at liberating

¹⁹ James Burnham, *The Struggle for the World*. Oxford, Alden Press, 1947, part one, chapter 7; For discussion of Burnham's thinking about totalitarian regimes, see McAllister, pp. 37-8; For critical analysis of Burnham's claims about the nature and ambitions of the USSR, see Anatol Lieven, John C. Hulsman, 'Neo-Conservatives, Liberal Hawks, and the War on Terror: Lessons from the Cold War'. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 23, No. 3, (Fall 2006), pp. 67-8.

²⁰ Burnham, part one, chapter 7.

²¹ Dorrien, p. 22-3.

²² Lieven, Hulsman, p. 67; For further discussion of Podhoretz's views and their links to the Burnham tradition of rollback, see Ehrman, p. 143.

Eastern Europe and pushing back communism in the third world.²³ Burnham's thinking also influenced neoconservative responses to détente and the post-Vietnam reaction against anti-communism. Neoconservatives associated with the Committee on the Present Danger applied Burnham's ideas to argue that the Soviet Union and its satellites were not a constant fixture in world affairs, as realists like Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon presumed. Nor was the USSR a partner for peace that could be persuaded to accept the norms of the 'international community' through détente and "interdependence" as Jimmy Carter claimed. Rather it was possible, and indeed, necessary, to rollback Soviet gains through regime change in select communist states. This would help to diminish the Soviet threat and enhance peace and security in the world.²⁴

According to neoconservatives, the United States could transcend the international status quo through applying policies of rollback and regime change to totalitarian states. This notion that rollback and regime change were among the most decisive and effective ways to deal with hostile totalitarian regimes was carried into the realm of foreign policy making by neoconservatives on two occasions; the first of which was during the 1980's, and the second, examined in chapter three of this thesis, during the Bush administration's time in office from 2001-8.²⁵

The Reagan Doctrine: Rollback and Regime Change in Practice

The concepts of rollback and regime change first emerged as a key element of American foreign policy during the Reagan administration's time in office in the 1980's. A number of neoconservatives, such as Jeane Kirkpatrick, Eliot Abrams, Paul Wolfowitz, William Kristol, I. Lewis Libby, Richard Perle and Robert Kagan, gained a variety of policy making positions in the Reagan administration.²⁶ Many of these neoconservatives held reasonably hard-line stances on challenging the USSR through rollback and regime change, and their views became an important basis for the Reagan administration's fight against communism.²⁷ The experiences and 'lessons' of

²³ Jervis, pp. 368-9; For discussion on the Reagan faction of the Republican Party and their opposition to détente in the late 1970's, see Mann, pp. 72-3.

²⁴ Dorrien, pp. 23-4; For discussion of neoconservative opposition to détente and Kissinger's foreign policy realism, see Mann, chapter 4.

²⁵ Fukuyama, p. 114.

²⁶ Dorrien, p. 10; For discussion of the positions of individual neoconservatives in the Reagan administration, see Mann, chapter 7; Ehrman, pp. 139-141.

²⁷ Dorrien, p. 10.

putting ideas of rollback and regime change into effect – especially the rise of democracy that apparently resulted from such actions – did much to influence neoconservative optimism during the 1990's about the efficacy of regime change as a route for bringing about democracy in authoritarian states.

Ronald Reagan won a landmark election victory in November 1980. Reagan assumed power arguing that the policies of détente had failed and that the United States risked losing the Cold War if it did not adopt new strategies aimed not only at containing the USSR, but at reversing its gains in the third world and challenging its legitimacy to rule at home. President Reagan and senior administration officials, both neoconservative and otherwise, believed that the United States was at a crossroads in its battle against communism in the early 1980's. Accordingly, they sought to establish new anti-communist policies, which would later become formalised as the 'Reagan Doctrine.'

In its first year in power, the Reagan administration began to formulate new policies aimed at enacting rollback and regime change against the allies of the Soviet Union in the third world. Building on the existing policy of covert CIA support to the anti-Soviet Mujaheddin of Afghanistan begun by President Carter in 1979, Reagan administration planners decided that the most effective rollback strategy was to offer covert support to anti-communist proxy forces in pro-Soviet states in Latin America, Asia and Africa.²⁸ The United States would channel funding and arms to anti-communist insurgencies in these regions, utilising such forces to bring down ruling communist regimes. In the early months of 1981, CIA director William Casey, Secretary of State Alexander Haig, National Security Advisor Richard Allen and United Nations ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick proposed a broad “covert strategic offensive” against Soviet influence in the third world.²⁹ James Scott, a professor of political science at the University of Nebraska, notes that CIA director Casey, who, like the neoconservatives, was never satisfied with containment and détente, argued that the United States should support anti-communist insurgencies in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Cuba, Grenada and Laos, as well as programs aimed at the removal of the regimes of Iran and Libya to prevent Soviet gains in the Middle East.³⁰

²⁸ For a brief discussion of the Reagan Doctrine, see Mann, pp. 121-3; See also Halper, Clarke, p. 163.

²⁹ James M. Scott, 'Reagan's Doctrine? The formulation of an American Foreign Policy Strategy'. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4, (Fall 1996), p. 1048.

³⁰ Ibid.

The Reagan administration's anti-communist proxy war strategy became more formalised and systematic in 1983 with the publication of National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD 75).³¹ This internal planning document was written by neoconservative National Security Council staffer and Soviet scholar Richard Pipes, and became the Reagan administration's most significant and detailed statement on its anti-communist policies. In NSDD 75, Pipes contended that the United States should “contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas,” including “geographical regions of priority concern to the United States.”³² NSDD 75 held that the United States should “support effectively those third world states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures,” so as to “weaken, and where possible undermine the existing links” between third world communist regimes and the USSR.³³ It was this planning, more than anything else, which provided the basis on which the rollback policies of the Reagan Doctrine was formulated and implemented.

The language of freedom and democracy played an important role in framing the interventionist policies articulated in the Reagan Doctrine. This was highly significant for neoconservative conceptions of rollback and regime change, as it was at this juncture that these Cold War concepts became tied to the idea of democracy promotion. President Reagan argued in his famous speech to the British parliament in 1982 that the west “must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings.”³⁴ Reagan held that the American promotion of democracy could undermine communist ideology and bring the repressed people of the Eastern Bloc the liberty they deserved.³⁵ Similarly, in a 1987 speech on relations between the communist

³¹ Richard Pipes, 'US Relations With the USSR'. NSDD 75, 17 January 1983. <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-075.htm>, accessed 27 April 2007.

³² Ibid, p. 1.

³³ Ibid, pp. 4-5.

³⁴ Ronald Reagan, 'Address to Members of the British Parliament'. 8 June 1982. <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/60882a.htm>, accessed 16 July 2007; For brief discussion on neoconservative support for morality in Reagan's foreign policy, see Mann, p. 27; For analysis of Reagan's speech and the subsequent founding of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983, see Ehrman, pp. 162-3.

³⁵ 'Address to Members of the British Parliament'; For neoconservative views on the significance of Reagan's language of democracy in foreign policy, see Joshua Muravchik, Allen Johnson, 'The Neoconservative Persuasion and Foreign Policy'. *Demokratiya*, No. 12, (Winter 2007). <http://www.demokratiya.com/interview.asp?issueid=11>, accessed 25 March 2008; See also Natan Sharansky, 'Democracy for Peace'. Essential Essays, *AEI World Forum*, Washington, 20 June 2002. http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15187,filter.all/pub_detail.asp, accessed 15 March 2008; Richard Perle, 'Combating Terrorism'. Statement by Richard Perle Before the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, Committee on Government

world and the west, Reagan contended that “for the sake of peace and justice, let us move toward a world in which all people are at last free to determine their own destiny” through the principles of freedom and individual liberty enjoyed by the nations of the non-communist world.³⁶ This resurgence of the language of freedom and democracy in American foreign policy marked a milestone in the link neoconservatives made between regime change and democratisation. This was the point at which neoconservatives began to conceive of armed interventions aimed primarily at encouraging democracy.³⁷ This connection between coercive regime change and the promotion of democracy would subsequently emerge as a core element of neoconservative thinking about democratisation in the 1990's, and provided a key intellectual pillar for the claims made about regime change in the Bush Doctrine.³⁸

The Collapse of Communism and New Prospects for Democracy Promotion

Neoconservatives were staunch supporters of the Reagan Doctrine, doing much to influence the creation and implementation of this policy during Reagan's time in office. Yet like most observers of international relations, neoconservatives did not predict that the Soviet Union and communism would collapse by the early 1990's. Neoconservatives reasoned that the sudden collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War must have occurred because of the Reagan administration's policies; especially its strong support for rollback and democratic change.³⁹ This conclusion gave extraordinary vindication to the idea of regime change as a pillar of American foreign policy. Neoconservatives saw that the Reagan administration's rollback policies, coupled with the administration's strong support for democracy and freedom in authoritarian regimes of all stripes, including its unprecedented calls for freedom

Reform House of Representatives, 16 April 2002.

³⁶ Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin'. 12 June 1987. <http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1987/061287d.htm>, accessed 16 July 2007.

³⁷ Mann, pp. 128-131, *passim*.

³⁸ As chapter two of this thesis shows, some neoconservatives advocated interventionist policies in Iraq that drew heavily on the concepts of the Reagan Doctrine; especially its idea that regime change could be effectively brought about by supporting proxy forces, and that through such a strategy, the United States could help to bring about democracy in authoritarian societies.

³⁹ For critical analysis of this view, see Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neoconservative Moment', p. 17; For further discussion of the post-Cold War wave of optimism about the universal appeal of democracy and the centrality of American power to spreading democracy, see George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq*. London, Faber and Faber, 2006, pp. 18-19.

in the Eastern Bloc and to “tear down” the Berlin Wall, played a decisive role in bringing about momentous democratic changes abroad.⁴⁰

Among the 'lessons' neoconservatives gained from the Reagan Doctrine and the collapse of communism, one of the most enduring was a strong faith in the utility of coercive regime change as a strategy of democracy promotion. Leading neoconservative intellectuals William Kristol and Robert Kagan argued that in the post-Cold War world “a principal aim of American foreign policy should be to bring about a change of regime in hostile nations... and wherever tyrannical governments acquire the military power to threaten their neighbors, our allies and the United States itself.”⁴¹ Kristol and Kagan argued that by their very nature, authoritarian regimes pursued aggressive foreign policies.⁴² This was a fundamental lesson drawn from the experience of combating Soviet aggression during the Cold War. Echoing the logic of totalitarian theory, Kristol and Kagan wrote that “the source of confrontation between the two sides [the United States and Soviet Union] was not mutual misunderstanding, a lack of interdependence, or the military arsenals amassed by both sides. It was the nature of the Soviet regime.”⁴³ To Kristol and Kagan, only “when that regime came to an end, so did the arms race, so did Russian aggression beyond its borders, and so did the Cold War.”⁴⁴

This lesson had profound implications for American policy towards threatening totalitarian regimes in the post-Cold War era; the United States could not hope to 'manage' hostile states, but must seek to change the regimes themselves in order to end the threat they posed. Reflecting on their belief that regime change was an effective strategy for dealing with hostile states and fostering democracy where there was currently only tyranny, Kristol and Kagan concluded that:

To many, the idea of America using its power to promote changes of regime in nations ruled by dictators rings of utopianism. In fact, it is

⁴⁰ 'Remarks on East-West Relations at the Brandenburg Gate in West Berlin'. Despite their strong support for hardline stances against the Soviet Union, some neoconservatives in the Reagan administration, such as Richard Perle, and those outside of the administration, such as Norman Podhoretz, were suspicious of the warming of relations between Reagan and Gorbachev and the latter's calls for major reform in the USSR and Eastern Europe. For discussion of this point, see Dorrien, chapter one.

⁴¹ Robert Kagan, William Kristol, 'The Present Danger'. *The National Interest*, No. 59, (Spring 2000), p. 65; See also an expanded version of this argument in Robert Kagan, William Kristol, 'Introduction: National Interest and Global Responsibility' in Robert Kagan, William Kristol (Eds), *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defence Policy*. San Francisco, Encounter Books, 2000, pp. 3-24.

⁴² Kagan, Kristol, 'The Present Danger', p. 64.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 66.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

eminently realistic. There is something perverse in declaring the impossibility of promoting democratic change abroad in light of the record of the past three decades. After we have already seen dictatorships toppled by democratic forces in such unlikely places as the Philippines, Indonesia, Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Taiwan and South Korea, how utopian is it to imagine a change of regime in a place like Iraq? How utopian is it to work for the fall of the Communist Party oligarchy in China after a far more powerful and, arguably, more stable such oligarchy fell in the Soviet Union? With democratic change sweeping the world at an unprecedented rate over these past thirty years, is it "realistic" to insist that no further victories can be won?⁴⁵

The largely peaceful domino-like collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the increasing spread of democracy in the developing world helped to engender a surge of optimism among many neoconservatives that it was now possible to encourage the spread of democracy anywhere. Francis Fukuyama argues in *After the Neocons* that following the collapse of communism, a number of neoconservatives came to hold that the "experience of the East Europeans" could be extended "to other parts of the world."⁴⁶ Neoconservatives, writes Fukuyama, contended that they "had been fooled once by people who said that the East Europeans had learned to love their captivity; by this view, we should not underestimate the democratic impulse elsewhere."⁴⁷ This optimistic thinking was further reinforced by the rise of what Samuel Huntington calls the "Third Wave" of democratisation, where a number of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe, North East Asia, Latin America and Southern Africa became democratic during the 1980's and early 1990's.⁴⁸ A majority of neoconservatives concluded from the events of 1989-1991 that democratic government was the future for all of humanity, and that now was the time to harness America's new heights of global hegemonic military power to encourage the spread of liberal democracy everywhere.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Fukuyama, pp. 52-3.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late 20th Century*. Norman and London, Oklahoma University Press, 1991, pp. 94-6, 98; For a critical assessment of the neoconservative conception of the Third Wave, see Ehrman, pp. 160-1.

⁴⁹ Smith, p. 34; For further discussion of the self-confidence of democratic globalism at the end of the Cold War, see Claes G. Ryn, *America the Virtuous: The Crisis of Democracy and the Quest for Empire*. New Brunswick and London, Transaction Publishers, 2003, p. 130; See also Gary Dorrien, 'Imperial Designs: Theological Ethics and the Ideologies of International Politics'. *Cross Currents*, Vol. 54, No. 2, (Summer 2004), pp. 4-5. <http://www.crosscurrents.org/Dorrien0204.htm>,

Neoconservatism and Liberal International Relations Theory

Following the end of the cold war, a number of neoconservatives became closely engaged with some of the leading liberal international relations theories of the 1990's. Neoconservatives came to see many of these theories – in a simplified form in which their probabilistic elements had been marginalised by 'activist' liberal scholars – as compelling guidelines for a foreign policy of interventionist democracy promotion.⁵⁰ Alongside the influence of the Cold War, the framework of activist democracy promotion articulated by many neoconservatives during the 1990's, and central to the Bush Doctrine, owed much of its theoretical and empirical depth to the neoconservative embrace of select liberal theories of international relations and the implications taken from these as guides to action.

Democratic Globalism and Democratic Realism

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, two distinct strands of thought developed within neoconservatism over the question of democracy promotion in American foreign policy. The first of these strands, labelled 'democratic globalism,' took an expansive and optimistic view about the prospects for democratisation in the post-Cold War world, and in the United States' ability to bring about democracy in authoritarian states through intervention.⁵¹ One of the prominent early democratic globalists was Joshua Muravchik, who wrote in 1991 about the need to “fulfil America's mission” through spreading democracy in the post-Cold War world.⁵² Murvachik was joined during the early 1990's by, among others, Richard Perle, Paul

accessed 27 March 2008.

⁵⁰ For discussion of the links between neoconservatism and liberal international relations thinking, see Ehrman, p. vii, chapter 1; See also Michael C. Desch, 'America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S Foreign Policy'. *International Security*, Vol. 32, No. 3, (Winter 2007/8), pp. 19-20.

⁵¹ For good discussion by democratic globalist and democratic realist neoconservatives about the comparative merits of their stances, see the contributions by William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Charles Krauthammer, Michael Ledeen, Jeane Kirkpatrick and Francis Fukuyama in 'American Power- For What?: A Symposium'. *Commentary*, Vol. 109, No. 1, (Jan., 2000), pp. 21-48.

⁵² Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*. Washington, American Enterprise Press, 1991.

Wolfowitz, Norman Podhoretz, Michael Ledeen, and most prominently, William Kristol and Robert Kagan, who each began to argue for the globalisation of democracy as a cornerstone of American foreign policy.⁵³ Kristol and Kagan perhaps did the most to champion the democratic globalist position in the publication *The Weekly Standard* and in the think-tank, the Project for a New American Century, effectively establishing democratic globalism as the orthodoxy of neoconservative thinking about democratisation, and seeing much of this vision come to influence the formulation of the Bush Doctrine from 2001.

Despite democratic globalism becoming the mainstream of the neoconservative persuasion in the 1990's, there were nonetheless several neoconservative figures who articulated a more restrictive and cautious outlook on the centrality of democratisation in post-Cold War American foreign policy. Among these figures was neoconservative writer Charles Krauthammer, who following the collapse of communism called himself a 'democratic realist'.⁵⁴ While Krauthammer agreed with the principle of promoting democracy as a pillar of American foreign policy, he held that this could not be universal and must be based upon "criteria of selectivity;" namely the importance of democratisation for the advancement of strategic interests and national security.⁵⁵ Krauthammer contended that while the aim of encouraging democracy everywhere was a noble goal, it lay in the realm of aspiration, and in the real world the United States needed to be selective in its interventions to promote democracy, lest it squander its resources in democratising unimportant states.⁵⁶ Similarly, Irving Kristol and Jeane Kirkpatrick held that while commendable in principle, a foreign policy premised on activist democracy promotion was not always prudent or in the national interest in every instance.⁵⁷ 'Democratic realists' called for greater selectivity in deciding upon interventionist democratisation, and cautioned against expansive policies that might have only a

⁵³ Kristol, Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', *passim*; For further discussion, see Michael C. Desch, 'Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons'. *Orbis*, Vol. 45, No. 4, (Fall 2001), p. 525.

⁵⁴ Charles Krauthammer, 'In Defence of Democratic Realism'. *The National Interest*, No. 77, (Fall 2004), pp. 15-26. See also Charles Krauthammer, 'Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World'. American Enterprise Institute, Irving Kristol AEI Annual Dinner Speeches, (10 Feb., 2004). Krauthammer had previously been a strong supporter of bringing democracy to states under communist rule, but in the post-Cold War years, he took a more restrictive view about democratic promotion. Krauthammer believed democratisation must always be tied to American national interests, and could not be carried out simply for humanitarian reasons, or because it was the moral thing to do everywhere.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Dorrien, *Imperial Designs*, pp. 76-7.

tenuous relationship to the 'national interest.'

Discussion in chapters two and three of this thesis makes clear that the assumptions about democratisation that emerged in the Bush Doctrine were derived from democratic globalist beliefs. Indeed, the democratic globalist variant of neoconservative foreign policy thinking became so dominant in the persuasion that it is possible to use the term 'neoconservative' without the prefix 'democratic globalist' when discussing arguments for activist democratisation made from the 1990's to the last two years of President Bush's time in office.⁵⁸ This is because those neoconservatives that called for armed democracy promotion in the Middle East were almost invariably of a democratic globalist outlook. In this and subsequent chapters, unless otherwise indicated, the term 'neoconservative' and its derivatives refers to the democratic globalist majority of the group. 'Democratic realism' does occasionally enter into subsequent analysis, and it will be made clear where it is this strand of thought, rather than globalism, that is under examination. Nonetheless, when discussing activist democratisation, the term 'neoconservative' will be generally equated with 'democratic globalism' for accuracy, and ease of reading and analysis.

The Liberal Character of Democratic Globalism

The foreign policy beliefs expressed by democratic globalists were clearly liberal in character. Democratic globalists did not themselves describe their foreign policy outlook as being 'liberal,' and their use of the term was more often restricted to a domestic context where it was employed as an epithet against political opponents. Rather, scholars external to the neoconservative persuasion identified democratic globalist thinking on democratisation as liberal. In an article published in the journal *Orbis* in 2001, University of Kentucky professor Michael Desch identifies some key elements of liberal foreign policy thinking. Desch writes in list form that, among other things, a foreign policy liberal

Is someone who believes that (1) individual rights hold primacy over national interests and sovereignty; (2) the natural state of man is peaceful; (3) the application of reason can resolve conflicts of interest among individuals and states; (4) human nature is malleable and

⁵⁸ For discussion of the state of democratic globalism during President Bush's last years in office, see the conclusion of this thesis.

improvable; [and] (5) human society is progressively improving.⁵⁹

Desch accurately captures many of the essential elements of liberal foreign policy thinking; especially its focus on the importance of human rights, its conceptions of the centrality of democracy as key to the resolution of conflict, and its underlying sense of optimism in human rationality and progress. Examining liberal foreign policy thinking in 2007, Tony Smith similarly writes that a central element of this school of thought is “the belief that fostering human rights and democratic governments abroad should enjoy a prominent role in the making of American foreign policy.”⁶⁰ Democracy was seen to embody a number of core liberal beliefs about the universal appeal of freedom and the continuity of human progress. Further, many liberals saw democracy as the last remaining legitimate form of government that would over time be embraced by all societies.⁶¹

The foreign policy outlook expressed by most neoconservatives was liberal in nature in three principle ways. The first of these was that neoconservatives strongly supported the notion that 'freedom' had universal appeal. Leading neoconservative intellectual Paul Wolfowitz held that freedom and democracy were universal aspirations to which culture and religion were no barrier.⁶² In a speech shortly before the invasion of Iraq, Wolfowitz contended that “the values of freedom and democracy are not just Western values or European values, they are Muslim and Asian values as well. Indeed, they are universal values. They are the bridge that span civilizations.”⁶³ Wolfowitz maintained that freedom was the natural condition of Iraq and the wider Arab world, and that it was condescending to believe that certain people or cultures were somehow incapable of realising this inherently universal aspiration.⁶⁴ Similarly, neoconservative writer Natan Sharansky argued that the appeal of freedom was universal in all nations, and that tyrannical governments that

⁵⁹ Desch 'Liberals, Neocons, and Realcons', p. 522.

⁶⁰ Smith, p. ix.

⁶¹ For further discussion of this important point, see the examination of Francis Fukuyama's *End of History* thesis later in this chapter. For analysis of how this idea was articulated by the Bush administration, see chapter three of this thesis.

⁶² 'Deputy Defense Secretary Addresses Iraqi-Americans in Michigan: Wolfowitz Says U.S. Would Seek to Liberate, Not Occupy, Iraq'. State Department Press Releases and Documents, 24 February 2003.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Mark Bowden, 'Wolfowitz: The Exit Interviews'. *Atlantic Monthly*, (Jul/Aug 2005). <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200507/bowden>, accessed March 11 2008. For discussion of how these ideas relate the Bush Doctrine's claims about the universality of freedom, see chapter three of this thesis. For discussion of the problems of conceiving freedom in this manner, see chapter four of this thesis.

repressed freedom were not only illegitimate, they were unnatural.⁶⁵ Liberal thinkers regularly emphasised the importance of freedom of speech, religion and self-determination, as well as freedom from arbitrary arrest, prosecution, discrimination based on gender, values or faith, and other denials of basic rights.⁶⁶ Many neoconservatives articulated a conception of freedom largely indistinguishable from that expressed by liberal scholars, showing one of the important ways in which their thinking on foreign policy was at its core liberal in nature.

The foreign policy beliefs expressed by neoconservatives were also liberal as they consistently championed democracy as the ideal and final form of government for all. Neoconservative intellectual Paula Dobriansky argued that “the United States has a moral imperative to advocate that individuals around the world have the freedom to pursue their dreams in a secure, prosperous and peaceful environment,” and that encouraging democracy was the best means to these ends.⁶⁷ Emphasising the importance of democracy as a way to promote human rights and uphold the freedom of all people, Wolfowitz similarly argued that “nothing could be less realistic than the version of the “realist” view of foreign policy that dismisses human rights” and support for democracy as an integral part of American foreign policy.⁶⁸ Wolfowitz argued that encouraging liberal democracy was essential to the advancement of peace, prosperity and security in all states.⁶⁹ While neoconservatives differed from many foreign policy liberals in their belief that military force could be an effective tool for promoting democracy abroad, their ideas did echo the claims made by some influential “liberal hawks” such as Paul Berman, Michael Ignatieff, Peter Beinart, and Christopher Hitchens. Each of these figures argued that military power could and should play a key role in helping to foster liberal democracy in non-democratic states.⁷⁰

Finally, the foreign policy beliefs expressed by democratic globalists were liberal in character as they argued that it was imperative for democratic states to

⁶⁵ Natan Sharansky, 'What Are We Fighting For? - Spread Freedom in the Mideast'. *The Wall Street Journal*, (10 Oct., 2001), A16.

⁶⁶ See Thomas M. Franck, 'Are Human Rights Universal?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 1, (Jan/Feb 2001), pp. 191-205.

⁶⁷ Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Advancing Democracy'. *The National Interest*, No. 77, (Fall 2004), p. 71.

⁶⁸ Paul Wolfowitz, 'Remembering the Future'. *The National Interest*, No. 59, (Spring 2000), pp. 44-5.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ For critical discussion of liberal hawk views on using military force as a tool of democracy promotion, see Barry Gewen, 'Why Are We in Iraq? A Realpolitik Perspective'. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 24, No. 3, (Fall 2007), pp. 14-15; See also James Atlas, 'Changing Minds; What It Takes to Be a Neo-Neoconservative'. *The New York Times*, (19 Oct., 2003).

uphold international human rights norms by protecting people in other states from abuse by their own government. In an interview published shortly before the invasion of Iraq, William Kristol and Lawrence Kaplan put forward a strong argument for humanitarian intervention in the state. When asked by the interviewer “is there anyone you can think of (nation, pol, constituency) the Bush administration has not convinced that going into Iraq is necessary who should and can be convinced?” Kristol and Kaplan replied:

Liberals. Not liberals at *The Nation* or *The American Prospect*, who can always be counted on to favor tyranny over anything that strengthens American power, however marginally. But liberals who supported the American interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo – humanists, in short. For if ever there was a humanitarian undertaking, it is the liberation of Iraq from a tyrant who has jailed, tortured, gassed, shot, and otherwise murdered tens of thousands of his own citizens.⁷¹

Kristol and Kaplan maintained that the Bush administration needed to publicise more effectively regime change in Iraq as aimed at saving the Iraqi people.⁷² A year after the invasion of Iraq, Robert Kagan and William Kristol similarly defended the war as a legitimate form of humanitarian intervention.⁷³ Kagan and Kristol wrote that “liberating the Iraqi people from Saddam's brutal, totalitarian dictatorship” was in its own right “sufficient reason to remove Saddam,” as “for the people of Iraq, the war put an end to three decades of terror and suffering.”⁷⁴ Indeed, Kagan and Kristol argued, “the mass graves uncovered since the end of the war are alone sufficient justification for [regime change,]” and removing Saddam Hussein meant that he could never again unleash pogroms of terror against his own people.⁷⁵

This democratic globalist support for humanitarian intervention echoes a number of ideas championed by leading liberal scholars. The notion that Iraq's sovereign rights became suspended owing to Saddam Hussein's domestic brutality,

⁷¹ Kathryn Jean Lopez, 'Closing In: A Conversation with Lawrence Kaplan and Bill Kristol on Iraq'. *National Review Online*, (24 Feb., 2003).

<http://www.nationalreview.com/interrogatory/interrogatory022403.asp>, accessed 6 May 2008.

⁷² Ibid; For further discussion on humanitarian intervention in Iraq by the same authors, see William Kristol, Lawrence Kaplan, *The War Over Iraq: Saddam's Tyranny and America's Mission*. San Francisco, Encounter Books, 2003.

⁷³ Robert Kagan, William Kristol, 'The Right War for the Right Reasons'. *Weekly Standard*, (27 Feb., 2004).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

and that armed intervention was a just way to end suffering in the state, have resonance in some of the rationales of humanitarian intervention contained in the “responsibility to protect.”⁷⁶ While this doctrine proposes a range of precautionary principles and a detailed set of criteria that must be satisfied before intervention can proceed, some liberal scholars such as Fernando Tesón, Eric Heinze and to some extent, Michael Ignatieff, have concluded that war in Iraq qualifies as a humanitarian intervention. To these scholars, it is clear that the humanitarian rationale for regime change was a strong one, and that such action did indeed satisfy all of the major criteria for intervention expressed in the “responsibility to protect.”⁷⁷ Further, neoconservative arguments for humanitarian intervention echo the claim of leading liberal scholars, Lee Feinstein and Anne Marie Slaughter, that there is a “duty to prevent nations run by rulers without internal checks on their power from acquiring or using WMD.”⁷⁸ Feinstein and Slaughter adapt the notion of sovereignty as responsibility to argue that dictatorial states that gain weapons of mass destruction forfeit their sovereign rights and therefore become legitimate targets for intervention.⁷⁹ In these ways, democratic globalist advocacy for intervention can be

⁷⁶ 'The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty'. Ottawa, International Development Research Centre for ICISS, 2001. <http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp>, accessed 10 November 2007.

⁷⁷ For a lengthy defence of regime change in Iraq as a form of humanitarian intervention, see Fernando R Tesón, 'Ending Tyranny in Iraq'. *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 19, No. 2, (2005), pp. 1-21; See also Eric A. Heinze, 'Humanitarian Intervention and the War in Iraq: Norms, Discourse, and State Practice'. *Parameters*, Vol. 36, No. 1, (Apr., 2006), pp. 20-30; For Ignatieff's somewhat more circumscribed views about Iraq and humanitarian intervention, see Michael Ignatieff, 'I am Iraq'. *The New York Times*, (23 Mar., 2003), p. 13; Michael Ignatieff, 'The Year of Living Dangerously'. *The New York Times*, (14 Mar., 2004), p. 13; By 2007 Ignatieff recanted his support for humanitarian intervention in Iraq and appears to have belatedly realised the way in which the ideas of humanitarian intervention bear some responsibility for enabling regime change. See Michael Ignatieff, 'Getting Iraq Wrong'. *The New York Times*, (5 Aug., 2007), p. 26; For critical discussion of the ways in which the neoconservative discourse of humanitarian intervention fits with, and indeed was enabled to some extent, by the “just war” arguments put forward by liberal advocates of humanitarian intervention and Cosmopolitan Theory, see Helen Dexter, 'The 'New' War on Terror, Cosmopolitan War and the 'Just War' Revival'. *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 43, No. 1, (2008), pp. 55-78. Despite the arguments made by neoconservatives, many liberals who supported humanitarian intervention in the Balkans and elsewhere in the 1990's were appalled that Iraq was considered as a humanitarian intervention, and disagreed that the ICISS's intervention criteria could be applied to justify the intervention. See S. Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, Thomas G. Weiss, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?' *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No. 5, (2004), pp. 977-992; James Kurth, 'Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities'. *Orbis*, Vol. 50, No. 1, (Winter 2006), pp. 87-101.

⁷⁸ Lee Feinstein, Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'A Duty to Prevent'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 1, (Jan/Feb 2004), pp. 137-8.

⁷⁹ Ibid. This is much the same argument as that made by some neoconservatives before the invasion of Iraq that Saddam Hussein's possession and past use of weapons of mass destruction was sufficient cause to topple his regime. Neoconservatives argued that Saddam Hussein posed a growing security threat and it was only a matter of time before he again used his weapons of mass destruction or provided these to a non-state group for use against the United States and its allies.

closely associated with many aspects of the arguments for humanitarian intervention put forward by some leading liberal scholars, and there is again a clear link between liberal internationalism and neoconservative foreign policy thinking.

Liberal International Relations Theories and Armed Democratisation

Liberal ideas regularly underpinned the foreign policy beliefs articulated by a majority of neoconservatives in the years after the collapse of communism, colouring a number of key concepts put forward by this group. Yet how was it that liberal international relations theories, that were not by nature interventionist in character, interpreted by neoconservatives as a guide to action? What elements of liberal thinking convinced neoconservatives that armed intervention could promote liberal democracy and that this action would have a range of beneficial effects for the United States and the world?

One of the primary reasons liberal theories acquired such salience in neoconservative conceptions of armed democratisation was due to an 'activist' turn among some leading liberal international relations scholars during the 1990's. Subsequent discussion on neoconservatism and liberalism takes up Tony Smith's argument that an 'activist' outlook developed in some key quarters of liberal international relations theory and practice in 1990's, and that this was central to understanding the way in which liberal theories were conceived and articulated by neoconservatives as a cornerstone of their armed democratisation paradigm. Examining what he views as a major shift in liberal international relations thinking after the collapse of communism, Tony Smith writes that

To become capable of seizing the times of the post-Cold War era, mainstream liberal internationalism needed to revise its doctrine so as to be relevant to a new era. Such an undertaking soon came to mean leaving behind the relative restraints of liberal hegemonism... what was called for was a new action-orientated ideology capable of expressing the new self-confidence of liberals everywhere and of engaging state power on their behalf. In a word, liberalism as a doctrine had to mature from hegemonism to imperialism in the sense

Thus pre-emptive war was a justified and sensible strategy for removing this threat, while democratisation would apparently ensure the pacification of Iraq and prevent it from ever again seeking weapons of mass destruction.

that concrete ideas were required to be put forward as to how the world was to be changed.⁸⁰

Thus in the 1990's, some influential liberal internationalists came to argue more strongly for the promotion of democracy by force of arms.⁸¹ This new imperative was given credibility at a theoretical level through the transformation of what had previously been qualified and cautious liberal theories of international relations into a reified and "action-orientated" form that seemingly provided empirical validation for the use of force as a route to expanding the boundaries of the democratic world.⁸²

During the 1990's, democratic globalists embraced Francis Fukuyama's End of History thesis and the democratic peace theory as the guiding liberal theoretical frameworks of their foreign policy outlook. Neoconservatives primarily encountered these theories in a form distilled by liberal activist scholars where the probabilistic caution and academic nuance of such theories had been replaced with simplistic and reified explanations of their conclusions and implications for action. From these simplified liberal theories, neoconservatives drew some major implications for American foreign policy: that democracy promotion through the use of American power, especially military power, could 'push' history forward, and that spreading democracy was good for the United States, good for the world and empirically proven to bring about peace and security.

Neoconservatives did not simply co-opt liberal internationalist thinking about intervention and claim it as their own. The 'activist' versions of liberal international relations theory were embraced and utilised by neoconservatives in such a way that they played a major role in providing theoretical and empirical depth to their assumptions and arguments about armed democratisation. Without liberal international relations theory, neoconservative arguments for democratisation could not have achieved the level of sophistication they did as the guiding foreign policy outlook of the persuasion, as a coherent grand strategy for dealing with the threats and challenges of the post-September 11 world, and as the core of the Bush Doctrine after 2001.⁸³

⁸⁰ Simth, pp. 90-1.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid, pp. 163-7, 190-1, *passim*.

Democratic Globalism and the 'End of History'

The first liberal theoretical framework embraced in a simplified form by many neoconservatives was Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis. A number of democratic globalists interpreted Fukuyama's teleological argument about liberal development as a guide to action, utilising his conclusions about the globalisation of liberalism as a theoretical basis on which to conceive of encouraging the spread of liberal democracy through intervention. Further, Fukuyama provided for neoconservatives, as for liberal thinkers more generally, a framework for interpreting liberal capitalist democracy as the sole remaining legitimate model of political, economic and social organisation for all states and societies.

The conclusions of the End of History thesis became a mainstay of liberal internationalist thinking about the spread of liberal democracy. Fukuyama's thesis provided a compelling framework for liberal thinkers that explained at a theoretical level how and why a global liberal order was now more possible than ever before. The End of History thesis became so ensconced in liberal international relations thinking that it is now indelibly associated with that school of thought. It has been regularly articulated in claims made by liberal scholars about the prospects for globalising liberal democracy in the post-Cold War world. Moreover, as the *End of History* was internalised and articulated by liberal scholars, many of its probabilistic elements were marginalised, and its assurances about the globalisation of liberalism were interpreted in a new light by some as a call to action to encourage this development at a more rapid pace.⁸⁴

It is in this context that many neoconservatives engaged with and embraced Fukuyama's thesis. While Fukuyama identified himself as a democratic realist at the time he wrote the *End of History*, he adopted a considerably more gradualist and academic outlook on the emergence of democracy than many neoconservatives who subsequently came to embrace his theory. Fukuyama's thesis contains extensive Hegelian political theory and ideas drawn from liberal internationalism in its pre-activist form. These are theoretical frameworks not generally associated with neoconservatism in almost any way.⁸⁵ Further, unlike many neoconservatives in the

⁸⁴ Ibid, pp. 44-52, passim.

⁸⁵ Fukuyama's End of History thesis is not a neoconservative theoretical framework for conceiving of the future of liberalism after the Cold War. Rather, it is a more wide-ranging, academic and theoretical enquiry into a centuries-long process of liberal development and modernisation towards the final state of government and the 'last man.' Fukuyama employs a variety of Hegelian theories and other European political philosophy that are not associated with the neoconservative outlook;

1990's, Fukuyama has consistently maintained that the 'End of History' thesis is a broad enquiry into prospects for the globalisation of liberalism which should have no implications for foreign policy actions such as spreading liberal democracy abroad.

Fukuyama's 'End of History' thesis was originally published as an article in the *National Interest* in 1989, at a time when fundamental political changes in the Eastern Bloc and Soviet Union offered the tantalising prospect of the victory of liberal democracy over communism. Fukuyama was at the forefront of the idea that liberal democracy was the victor in the Cold War and the teleological future of humanity, with his argument that 'History', as conceived in a Hegelian sense, will eventually come to an end though the universalisation of a western liberal political order.⁸⁶ In his End of History article, Fukuyama claims that

The century that began full of self-confidence in the ultimate triumph of Western liberal democracy seems at its close to be returning full circle to where it started: not to an “end of ideology” or a convergence between capitalism and socialism, as earlier predicted, but to an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism.⁸⁷

Fukuyama argues that “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passage of a particular era in post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”⁸⁸ While Fukuyama admits that “the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness,” and is yet incomplete in the real world, he believes that there are “powerful reasons for believing that it is the ideal the will govern the

especially not its foreign policy thinking. Fukuyama's theory can, however, be considered liberal in two senses. First, it articulates a highly theoretical and cogent explanation for the emergence of modern liberal society in optimistic terms based in a favourable view of human progress, rationality and the innate tendencies of people towards equality and liberty. Secondly, it quickly became one of the key theoretical frameworks utilised by liberal thinkers of many stripes to understand the potential for the globalisation of liberalism in the post-Cold War world, moving to hold pride of place among liberal theories of progress and modernisation - even though its author identified at least his political leanings as being neoconservative when he penned the theory.

⁸⁶ For a good overview of this key claim about the End of History, see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, Free Press, 1992, pp. xi-xiii.

⁸⁷ Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' *The National Interest*, No. 16, (Summer 1989), pp. 161-2.

⁸⁸ Ibid, pp. 161-4; See also Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, pp. 45-6, for further discussion of the universality of liberalism and how this values system is now the last remaining way through which people can organise their lives and governments. Compare Fukuyama's claims here with those of the Bush Doctrine in chapter three of this thesis to see the ways in which there are clear intellectual connections between Fukuyama's argument in 1992 and one of the most fundamental claims of the Bush Doctrine a decade later.

material world *in the long run*.”⁸⁹

Fukuyama holds that the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily because of the “total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western Liberalism.” In light of this, history is now moving towards an 'end' point where the sole ideology and form of the state guiding human affairs will be liberal in character.⁹⁰ Fukuyama contends that “the state that emerges at the end of history is liberal insofar as it recognises and protects through a system of law man's universal right to freedom and democratic insofar as it exists only with the consent of the governed.”⁹¹ According to Fukuyama, not only do the fundamental changes then occurring in the Soviet Union and to a lesser degree, in China, show the ideological bankruptcy of Marxist-Leninism as a viable alternative to the ideas of a liberal state,⁹² but the global spread of Western consumer goods, popular culture, ideas and consciousness is ever-increasing, leading Fukuyama to conclude that the future belongs to a universalised form of 'western' political and economic liberalism.⁹³

Fukuyama views the universalisation of liberal consciousness and the liberal state as a gradual organic process that will be spurred by desires for economic modernisation and to live in societies more akin to those of the existing liberal world. The liberal state at the end of history will come about through a modernisation process where, according to Fukuyama, “what is universal is *initially* not the desire for liberal democracy but rather the desire to live in a modern society, with its technology, high standards of living, healthcare and access to the wider world.”⁹⁴ Fukuyama believes that the desire for and then the progress of economic modernisation helps to bring about a middle class and fosters the drive for new goods and ideas, and “liberal democracy is one of the by-products of this modernisation process, something that *becomes* a universal aspiration only in the course of historical time.”⁹⁵ While there is reason to question this link between economic modernisation and the emergence of liberal democracy, especially in light of the examples of states like China and Singapore that have seemingly achieved the former

⁸⁹ Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', p. 162.

⁹⁰ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, pp. 42-3.

⁹¹ Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', p. 163.

⁹² For good discussion, see Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, pp. 39-40.

⁹³ Ibid, pp. 48-50; Fukuyama, 'The End of History?' p. 162; See also Francis Fukuyama, 'Reflections on the End of History: Five Years Later', *History and Theory*, Vol. 34, No. 2, Theme Issue 34: World Historians and Their Critics, (May., 1995), p. 29.

⁹⁴ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, p. 54; For further discussion, see Fukuyama, 'Reflections on the End of History', pp. 32-3.

⁹⁵ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, p. 54.

without the latter, Fukuyama maintains that this is not necessarily problematic to the achievement of the end of history, as “at the end of history it is not necessary that all societies become successful liberal societies, merely that they end their ideological pretensions of representing different and higher forms of human society.”⁹⁶ Fukuyama believes that over time, all societies will come to hold a liberal consciousness and ultimately develop into a “universal and homogeneous state” through an organic process of change.⁹⁷

According to Fukuyama, the gradual universalisation of liberalism will mean that over time, most of the states of the world will become 'post-historic'.⁹⁸ Fukuyama cautions that the growth of this 'post-historic' world will likely be rocky in the short to medium-term, as conflict will continue to occur between 'post-historic' states and the remaining 'historic' states until the former has overcome all of the latter.⁹⁹ Fukuyama warns that the route to the end of history will not be a smooth one, nor one that is necessarily linear or easily achievable in a short period. While the end of history will bring about the end of the majority of the contradictions in political life that other ideologies have been unable to resolve, Fukuyama maintains that the expansion of the post historic world should not involve the use of force to fast-track its development.¹⁰⁰

Despite Fukuyama's reservations, the 'End of History' thesis provided democratic globalists with a theoretical framework that bolstered their arguments for interventionist policies of democratisation. The activist interpretation of the theory embraced and articulated by many neoconservatives encouraged the idea that the globalisation of a liberal order could indeed occur through the agency of American military power.¹⁰¹ Examining the way in which Fukuyama's claims were reinterpreted as a guide to action by democratic globalists during the 1990's, Barry Gewen, an editor at the *New York Times* Book Review, writes in a 2007 article that

⁹⁶ Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', pp. 177-8.

⁹⁷ Ibid; For extended discussion of the “universal and homogeneous state” that Fukuyama believes will emerge at the end of history, see Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, chapter 19.

⁹⁸ Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, pp. 276-7.

⁹⁹ Ibid, pp. 259-60, 261-2, 276-7, 280-1. For discussion of the problematic implications of this observation as a motivation for intervention, see chapter four of this thesis.

¹⁰⁰ Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', pp. 168-9, 178 and passim; See also Fukuyama, 'Reflections on the End of History', p. 29 for further discussion of the potential for liberalism to resolve the majority of the contradictions of human life that non-liberal systems had been unable to address and satisfy. For Fukuyama's warnings about attempting to promote the end of history through intervention, see Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 54-5.

¹⁰¹ For good discussion of this key innovation on the End of History teleology by neoconservatives, see Gewen, p. 10.

There was one misinterpretation of his book for whom Fukuyama had no one to blame but himself. Those not steeped in German philosophy as he was, those of more activist bent, were unlikely to share his timeless perspective. They wanted immediate answers to contemporary problems, and Fukuyama's book seemed to provide them. Didn't he say that liberal democracy was expanding everywhere around the world? Didn't he say that the principles of liberty and equality were intrinsic to the very nature of man? Didn't he say that liberal democracies rarely if ever went to war against one another, and that democracies had an interest in spreading their values to less-enlightened regions? It was not an unreasonable reading of the book to conclude that the road to history's end ran through Baghdad.¹⁰²

Interpreting the *End of History* under a light in which its probabilistic caution was extricated and its supposed implications for an activist foreign policy made clearer by activist liberal scholars, democratic globalists developed a simplified interpretation of the End of History thesis that became a guiding theoretical framework for their conceptions of armed democratisation. In the activist reading of the theory, the gradualist process of modernisation and the 'soft' determinism described by Fukuyama were viewed as out of step with the sense in the post-Cold War world that liberal democracy could emerge anywhere, and crucially, that American power could make this occur at a faster rate, thus bringing about the globalisation of democracy and the 'end of history' in the near term. There was a strong sense of urgency and impatience underpinning the democratic globalist interpretation of the End of History; a belief that Fukuyama correctly identified the direction of history's arrow, but that the post-Cold War era presented an unprecedented opportunity for securing a peaceful post-historic world that must be quickly seized by the United States. Accordingly, many neoconservatives believed that the developments required to make the end of history a reality could and must be fast-tracked by American agency. This idea played a key part in the Bush Doctrine's liberal interventionist outlook, as examined in chapter three of this thesis, and, as chapter four details, the policies it engendered were problematic in nature.

¹⁰² Ibid, p. 12.

Neoconservatism and Democratic Peace Theory

Along with an activist interpretation of the End of History thesis, the neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democracy promotion was also strongly influenced by a simplified form of democratic peace theory.¹⁰³ This theory was reconceived during the 1990's by activist circles of liberal scholars as implying a strong need for policies of democracy promotion to make its conclusions about the roots of peace a reality. The version of democratic peace embraced and articulated by democratic globalists was accordingly a simplified version of the theory in which democracy by definition equalled peace, and where it was imperative that leading liberal states engage in activist democracy promotion to bring about peace.

Democratic peace theory holds that a clear connection exists between democratic regimes and the absence of war among them. According to democratic peace theory, democratic states rarely, if ever, go to war with one another, owing to the domestic nature and structure of democratic government, the norms and values shared by democracies, and the tendency of such regimes towards compromise and negotiation when faced with a crisis.¹⁰⁴ Such are the conclusions of democratic peace theory that University of Minnesota political science professor Jack Levy famously describes it as being “the closest thing we have to an empirical law in international relations.”¹⁰⁵

In its early forms, democratic peace theory offered few implications for interventionist foreign policies, and was rather chiefly concerned with explaining in a theoretical sense the preponderance of peace among democracies. One of the first modern arguments about democratic peace was offered in 1983 by Michael Doyle, then a professor of politics at Princeton University, in two articles entitled 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs'.¹⁰⁶ In his first article on democratic peace, Doyle writes that “even though liberal states have become involved in numerous

¹⁰³ For discussion of the centrality of democratic peace theory in neoconservative arguments for interventionist democracy promotion, see John M. Owen IV, 'Iraq and Democratic Peace'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 6, (Nov/Dec 2005), pp. 122-5.

¹⁰⁴ For discussion of the basic propositions of the democratic peace theory see Piki Ish Shalom, "'The Civilisation of Clashes:' Misapplying the Democratic Peace in the Middle East'. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 122, No. 4, (Winter 2007/8), pp. 543-4.

¹⁰⁵ Jack Levy, 'Domestic Politics and War'. *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, (Spring 1988), p. 662.

¹⁰⁶ Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Summer 1983), pp. 206-235; Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part Two'. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Autumn 1983), pp. 323-353.

wars with nonliberal states, constitutionally secure liberal states have yet to engage in war with one another.”¹⁰⁷ This claim is based on the fact that “preliminary evidence... appear[s] to indicate that there exists a significant predisposition against warfare between liberal states,” as history shows that there are very few instances of two or more secure democratic states going to war.¹⁰⁸ What can explain this fact that liberal democracies have almost never gone to war with each other? Doyle believes that Immanuel Kant offers useful answers in his work, 'Perpetual Peace'.¹⁰⁹ Kant wrote that republican governments would establish among themselves a “perpetual peace” that would be based on shared norms and acceptance of the “definitive articles” of what Doyle describes as a “metaphorical treaty” of peace between democratic states.¹¹⁰ While Kant believed that this process of forging a perpetual peace would be slow and face significant challenges, he argued that over time a “pacific union” of states would develop.

Doyle's explanation of democratic peace is circumscribed in its claims and conclusions. Doyle emphasises that his evidence shows that states in a “pacific union” can still act aggressively against regimes outside this sphere.¹¹¹ Doyle worries that in its relations with the non-democratic world, liberal states might be prone to “ideological crusades” and risk undertaking imprudent actions, particularly in attempts to expand the reach of democratic peace by force.¹¹² Doyle holds that “the very constitutional restraint, shared commercial interests, and international respect for individual rights that promote peace among liberal states exacerbate conflict between liberal and non-liberal societies.”¹¹³ Indeed, “liberal states are as aggressive and war prone as any other form of government or society in their relations with nonliberal states.”¹¹⁴

Doyle's enquiry into the nature and causes of democratic peace helped to spur the development of modern democratic peace theory in liberal academia. As debate

¹⁰⁷ Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', pp. 213-14.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid; For critical discussion of Doyle's findings, see Smith, pp. 96-100.

¹⁰⁹ Immanuel Kant, 'Perpetual Peace' in Stephen E. Cahn, *Classics of Modern Political Theory: From Machiavelli to Mill*. New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 572-597.

¹¹⁰ Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', pp. 225-6.

¹¹¹ Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part Two', pp. 330-1; For further discussion on liberalism and democratic peace, see John M. Owen IV, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 2, (Autumn 1994), pp. 87-125.

¹¹² Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part Two', pp. 330-1.

¹¹³ Ibid, pp. 324-5.

¹¹⁴ Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', p. 225. For further discussion of this important observation in the context of the Bush Doctrine's understanding of democratic peace, see chapter four of this thesis.

over democratic peace theory progressed, two versions of the overarching theory developed.¹¹⁵ According to one version of democratic peace, domestic structures, checks and balances within liberal democratic states best explain why such regimes do not go to war with each other. The second version of democratic peace theory, by contrast, holds that normative factors are most important. This normative theory posits that accepted norms of international state conduct and shared values help to reinforce peaceful tendencies between democracies.¹¹⁶ Further, as democratic peace theory developed, it has also become more 'scientific' and rigorous in its methodology of study. The early studies of Yale University professor, Bruce Russett, exemplify this development, as he marshals large sets of statistical information on historical inter-state conflicts that aim to provide concrete empirical data about the near-absence of war among democracies.¹¹⁷ Thus, increasingly complex empirical frameworks have been devised to assess the causes of democratic peace and the relative merit of the structural or normative explanations for this phenomenon.

Despite its initially precautionary and scholarly nature, the intellectuals that make up the 'activist' elements of liberal internationalist thinking interpreted democratic peace as an article of faith that has clear implications for an interventionist foreign policy. Among activist circles of liberal internationalism, a view developed that the 'scientific' analysis of the connection between democracy and peace conclusively proved that democracies do not go to war.¹¹⁸ Thus, leading democratisation scholar, Larry Diamond, of Stanford University, writes in a 1994 article that “democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new order of international security and prosperity can be built.”¹¹⁹ Diamond holds that “democratic countries do not go to war with one another,” and rather they foster peace and uphold a more enlightened order than any other conceivable regime type.¹²⁰ Such sentiments are echoed in a number of studies published during the later 1990's and in the early twenty-first century by Bruce Russett, John Oneil, Andrew Moravcsik, Spencer

¹¹⁵ For brief discussion of this theoretical division, see Shalom, p. 544.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Bruce Russett et al, 'The Democratic Peace'. *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, (Spring 1995), pp. 169-72; See also Bruce M. Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993.

¹¹⁸ For critical analysis of this notion, see Piki Ish Shalom, 'Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism: The Democratic-Peace Thesis and the Politics of Democratization'. *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 4, (Dec., 2006), p. 585, passim.

¹¹⁹ Larry Diamond, 'The Global Imperative: Building a Democratic World Order'. *Current History*, Vol. 93, No. 579, (Jan., 1994), p. 1.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

Weart and a number of other influential liberal scholars.¹²¹

The activist proponents of democratic peace argue that since democracy always fosters peace, it is imperative that democracy be spread worldwide. Margaret G. Hermann, professor of politics at Syracuse University and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., of the University of South Carolina, write that “promoting the spread of liberal democratic institutions [is] consistent with the underlying logic of democratic peace.”¹²² By spreading democratic values, the existing liberal world makes itself more secure and ensures that an increasing number of states inhabit a 'zone of peace.' Hermann and Kegley observe that “interventions by democracies intended to protect or promote democracy have tended to lead to an increase in the democraticness [sic] of those target's political regimes.”¹²³ These findings “provide support for intervention as a tool of democratisation” and the promotion of peace, as increasing the number of democracies in the world is directly correlated to reducing instances of inter-state conflict.¹²⁴ Thus, activist scholars hold that existing liberal support for the globalisation of democracy must be wed with a willingness to use state power, including military force, to make democratic peace a reality.

The version of democratic peace embraced and articulated by neoconservatives during the 1990's was directly derived from the “action-orientated” interpretation of the theory promoted by activist liberals.¹²⁵ Leading neoconservatives asserted that democracy always resulted in peace. In an article published in 2001, Natan Sharansky argued that “only when the world is free will the world be safe,” and it was therefore an imperative to encourage the spread of democratic governments, as this was empirically proven to be instrumental in bringing about peace between nations.¹²⁶ Sharansky contended that “the logic of why democracies do not go to war with each other is ironclad. When political power is a function of popular will, the incentive system works towards maintaining peace and providing prosperity.”¹²⁷ These views were influential, as Sharansky's argument evidently

¹²¹ Bruce Russett, John Oneil, *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence and International Organisations*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001; Andrew Moravcsik 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics'. *International Organisation*, Vol. 51, No. 4, (Autumn 1997), p. 513; Spencer R. Weart, *Never at War: Why Democracies will not Fight One Another*. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998.

¹²² Margaret G. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 'Democracies and Intervention: Is There a Danger Zone in the Democratic Peace?' *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 38, No. 2, (Mar., 2001), p. 237.

¹²³ Ibid, p. 242.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Smith, chapter four, passim.

¹²⁶ Sharansky, 'What Are We Fighting For?'

¹²⁷ Ibid.

coloured President George W. Bush's views on democracy and peace; so much so that the President had Sharansky's 2004 book, *The Case for Democracy*, distributed among his top officials as recommended reading.¹²⁸ Like Sharansky, other neoconservatives likewise asserted that democratic peace really was a law of international relations. In a 1991 book, Joshua Muravchik argued that “the more democratic the world becomes, the more peaceful it is likely to be. Various researchers have shown war between democracies has almost never occurred in the modern world.”¹²⁹

Democratic globalists held that the application of American military power was key to encouraging the spread of democratic peace. Examining neoconservative support for the use of violence to achieve peace, Hebrew University of Jerusalem political science lecturer Piki Ish Shalom writes that “the democratic peace theory as a political conviction motivates and provides reasoning for the use of force.”¹³⁰ Shalom contends that

The theory in its neoconservative reading offered specific guidelines of enhancing the security of the United States; it manifested itself as a dogmatic and rigid strategic scheme, advocating the maxim of forcefully democratizing the Middle East. Put differently, what in the academic setting is taken modestly as a nuanced and contested theory that ought to be treated cautiously has become a totalistic and dogmatic political representation that acts as an undisputed and authoritative policy handbook.¹³¹

Shalom notes that by the logic of the democratic globalist interpretation of democratic peace theory, bringing about peace “requires regime change, after which the democratic structure can be built according to universal guidelines. Consequently, a foreign country can be democratized at bayonet point.”¹³² Promoting peace required war in some instances, and neoconservatives saw no tension between their overarching aim of peace, and a violent path to its achievement. As a justification for the use of force abroad, democratic peace theory added significant theoretical depth to neoconservative arguments for American military intervention in

¹²⁸ For discussion about President Bush's appreciation of Sharansky's work, see William Kristol, 'Honoring Democracy'. *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 10, No. 18, (24 Jan., 2005), pp. 7-9.

¹²⁹ Muravchik quoted in Shalom, p. 536.

¹³⁰ Piki Ish Shalom, 'For a Democratic Peace of Mind: The Politicization of the Democratic Peace Theory'. *Harvard International Review Online*, (2 May., 2007).
<http://www.harvardir.org/articles/1503/2/>, accessed 11 March 2008.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*

¹³² *Ibid.*

the pursuit of democracy, doing much to help engender a democratisation framework premised in large part on the conclusions and implications of liberal international relations theory.

Conclusion

A combination of theory and historical experience decisively influenced the formulation of the neoconservative foreign policy paradigm of democratisation. Neither liberal international relations theory nor the experience of the Cold War alone can fully account for the nature of neoconservative thinking about democracy promotion. Only together do the various streams of theory and experience form the coherent neoconservative outlook on democratisation as a pillar of American foreign policy. Neoconservative thinking on totalitarianism, the importance of regime type and rollback was apparently vindicated by events, and in the subsequent heady optimism of the early post-Cold War era, an activist interpretation of Fukuyama's "End of History" thesis provided the framework for conceiving of the teleological future of the liberal world, while democratic peace theory offered an empirical basis for conceiving of activist democracy promotion as the best path to peace.

The influence of liberal international relations theory and the experiences of the Cold War were evident in the prescriptions neoconservatives put forward for American foreign policy. The ideas of totalitarian theory, democratic peace theory, the End of History, and the broader neoconservative assumptions made about the nature of international relations were not simply academic abstracts; they were guides to policy making and action. Neoconservatives have been adept at turning the conclusions of academic theories into pole stars for American foreign policies towards specific states and issues. This shows that when neoconservatives, and subsequently the Bush administration, articulated policies of interventionist democracy promotion in the Middle East, these stances were not made out of whole cloth, but were rather a reflection of a serious foreign policy outlook with deep roots in liberal international relations theory and the historical experiences of neoconservatives during and immediately after the Cold War.

Chapter Two

Rollback, Regime Change and Democratisation in the Middle East

During the 1990's neoconservatives were denied influence over the reins of American foreign policy. In this decade, foreign policy was first dominated by the realists of the George H.W. Bush administration, and then by the liberal internationalists of the Clinton administration from 1993 to 2000. Despite being in large part consigned to political exile, it was during the 1990's that neoconservatives developed and honed a range of arguments that called for policies of regime change and activist democratisation by the United States in the Arab world. On the basis of their broader paradigm of activist democratisation, neoconservative writers, think tanks, and study groups spent the 1990's producing a number of policy prescriptions and recommendations for a foreign policy of armed democracy promotion in the Middle East. Neoconservatives most often focused their attention on the need for regime change in Iraq as integral to bringing about regional political transformation beneficial to the Arab Middle East and the United States.

By the time George W. Bush assumed office in 2001, neoconservatives had produced a sophisticated set of prescriptions for policies of interventionist democratisation in the Middle East. A number of neoconservatives held positions of influence in the Bush administration when the September 11 attacks occurred. The neoconservative explanation for the origins of these attacks, and their proposed anti-terrorism grand strategy of forcibly transforming the political malaise of the Arab world through interventionist democratisation, were in the months after September 2001 largely embraced by senior policy makers as the most compelling way of dealing with the new threats and opportunities facing the United States. Neoconservatives could offer the clearest and most coherent pre-existing policy framework for an anti-terrorism strategy that would protect the United States by bringing about major political changes in the Middle East.

A number of long-time advocates of regime change and democratisation in Iraq and the wider Middle East gained influential positions in the Bush administration when it came to power in 2001. Important neoconservative figures in the Bush administration included; Deputy Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz, Defence Policy Board Chair Richard Perle, Undersecretary of Defence for Policy Douglas Feith, Ambassador to Afghanistan, Free Iraqis, Iraq and later the United Nations, Zalmay Khalilzad, Vice Presidential Middle East advisor David Wurmser, Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, National Security Advisor, and Assistant to the President, I. Lewis Libby, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs and Democracy Paula Dobriansky, and Deputy National Security Advisor from 2007-8, Elliot Abrams. Joining these figures were Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld, who shared much of the outlook of the neoconservatives but who were not identified as belonging to the group in 2001.

Examining the nature and evolution of the most significant neoconservative arguments made about armed intervention in the Middle East is key to understanding the intellectual origins of the Bush Doctrine's policies of regime change and democratisation in the Arab world. The neoconservative paradigm of democratisation offered a cogent framework for conceiving of and justifying armed democratisation on a theoretical level. This paradigm was, however, of limited use to policy makers if not distilled by its proponents into tangible policy prescriptions and specific guidelines for action in reality. It is therefore integral to examine the most important arguments made by neoconservatives for regime change and activist democracy promotion in the Middle East up to 2003, as these represented the essential link between the broad contours of neoconservative foreign policy thinking, examined in chapter one, and the specific claims about Middle East democratisation that were articulated by the Bush Doctrine and which are critically assessed later in this thesis.

The Development of Neoconservative Policy Advocacy in the 1990's

In the second half of the 1990's a number of neoconservative think tanks, study groups and publications began to formulate a variety of policy prescriptions for interventionist democracy promotion in the Middle East. Drawing from their broader

paradigm of democratisation, many neoconservatives conceived of policies of regime change in Iraq and the 'rollback' of hostile political forces in Lebanon and Syria as the heart of a strategy to enhance freedom, peace, security and American interests in the Middle East. The development of policy prescriptions aimed at the transformation of the Arab world was given additional impetus by neoconservative frustration at what they perceived as the failure and indecisiveness of the Clinton administration's policies towards Iraq, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the growth of Jihadist terrorism. Such frustration further encouraged neoconservatives to develop new strategies aimed at redefining the political realities of the Middle East through the application of American military power.

The Clean Break Report

One of the earliest systematic neoconservative arguments for the political transformation of the Middle East was the 1996 report entitled 'A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm.' The recommendations and conclusions of the Clean Break report served as the first template in which neoconservatives developed their specific policy prescriptions about regime change and interventionist democracy promotion in the Middle East. The Clean Break report was produced for the Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu by a study group at The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. The report included important contributions from Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, David Wurmser and Meyrav Wurmser, among others.¹ While the report centred on finding ways to circumvent the constraints imposed upon Israel's freedom of action against its perceived enemies by the Oslo Accords and the Clinton administration's 'peace process,' one of its key conclusions was that hostile authoritarian Arab regimes must be rolled back by military intervention in order to bring about a democratic and peaceful Middle East.²

The Clean Break report argued that the United States and Israel should engage in the rollback of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.³ This idea of rollback was

¹ Richard Perle et al, 'A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm'. The Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies, 1996, p. 7. <http://www.iasps.org/strat1.htm>, accessed 15 March 2007.

² Ibid, p. 1; For good discussion of the Clean Break report and its main authors, see Packer, pp. 30-2.

³ Perle et al, p. 1; For detailed critical discussion of the Clean Break report, see James Bamford, *A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq and the Abuse of America's Intelligence Agencies*. New York, Doubleday, 2004, pp. 262-3.

to some extent coloured by the Reagan Doctrine and the 'lessons' it offered for overthrowing hostile governments. Yet in relation to Iraq, the version of rollback articulated in the Clean Break was premised on using direct military force, rather than proxy forces, to bring about favourable political outcomes.⁴ The Clean Break report contended that a new pro-American and pro-Israeli regime in Baghdad would, among other things, allow the liberated Shia of Iraq to pressure their co-religionists in Lebanon away from Hezbollah and Syria.⁵ This would relieve Israel of the threat of Hezbollah, allowing Israeli leaders space to overcome the constraints of the Oslo peace process and to impose a solution on the Palestinians.⁶ A democratic and pro-American Iraqi regime would also reject terrorism as a tactic and would no longer be a hostile and destabilising force in the heart of the Middle East.

The Clean Break report also placed significant emphasis on rolling back the Ba'athist regime in Syria and changing the political order in Lebanon. The authors of the report held that Israel should begin “engaging Hezbollah, Syria, and Iran, as the principal agents of aggression in Lebanon.”⁷ According to the report, Israel should again utilise proxies to intervene in Lebanon, as it had in the 1980's, but with a new aim of using such forces to work towards regime change in Damascus.⁸ In addition, the Clean Break report recommended that Israel attack “Syrian military targets in Lebanon, and should that prove insufficient, [strike] at select targets in Syria proper.”⁹ The United States should support Israel in this endeavour as a part of a broader strategy aimed at rolling back hostile Arab states and securing freedom and peace in the region.¹⁰ As with Iraq, the Clean Break report argued that the Ba'athist regime of Syria should be replaced with a pro-American and pro-Israeli democratic regime, thereby helping to undermine the forces that engaged in violence against Israel and the United States in the region.¹¹

Among those who contributed to the Clean Break report, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser each gained influential policy making and advisory positions in the Bush administration. When in these positions, these

⁴ For discussion of the neoconservatives who did advocate rollback by proxy as the best strategy of regime change in Iraq, see the section on proxy war and the Iraqi National Congress later in this chapter.

⁵ Perle et al., pp. 2-3.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

individuals employed many of the ideas of the Clean Break in their calls for armed democratisation as the key to winning the war on terrorism.¹² Feith was the Undersecretary of Defence for Policy from 2001 to mid-2005, and was instrumental in planning the invasion of Iraq and post-war reconstruction and democratisation of the state, while Perle was until 2004 the head of the influential Defence Policy Board that advised Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld on foreign policy and defence matters.¹³ David Wurmser, meanwhile, was Vice President Dick Cheney's Middle East policy advisor, holding this post until mid-2007, and acting in this role to reinforce the hardline attitudes of those around him towards Iraq, the Israel-Palestine issue, and Syria.

In an article published in January 2001, shortly before he joined the Bush administration, Wurmser advocated policies of rollback across the Middle East that clearly drew on the thinking of the Clean Break report.¹⁴ Wurmser argued that “Israel and the United States should adopt a co-ordinated strategy to regain the initiative and reverse their region-wide strategic retreat.”¹⁵ This would require engaging in wars of rollback “to strike fatally, not merely disarm, the centres of radicalism in the region – the regimes of Damascus, Baghdad, Tripoli, Tehran and Gaza.”¹⁶ According to Wurmser, conducting wars of rollback “would re-establish the recognition that fighting with either the United States or Israel is suicidal,” and thus “many in the Middle East would then understand the merits of becoming an American ally and of making peace with Israel.”¹⁷ Wurmser reiterated this argument once a member of the Bush administration, contending in a June 2001 article that regime change in Iraq, Syria, Iran and elsewhere in the region was essential to undermining political radicalism and ensuring American and Israeli security.¹⁸ Such views were often shared by other neoconservative policy makers associated with Wurmser, as well as by Vice President Dick Cheney.

The Clean Break report offered an expansive strategy of regime change that was generally not accepted as a viable policy option before the September 11 attacks.

¹² Bamford, pp. 267.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ David Wurmser, 'Middle East “War:” How did it Come to This?' *AEI Online*, On The Issues, (1 Jan., 2001). http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.12266,filter.all/pub_detail.asp, accessed 6 June 2008.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ David Wurmser, 'The US Needs to Support Policies of Freedom in Iraq'. *Financial Times*, (7 Jun., 2001); For critical discussion, see Packer, pp. 31-2.

After September 2001, however, this report became an important conceptual framework for activist democracy promotion in the Arab world. At the time the Clean Break report was published in 1996, launching a series of 'pre-emptive' wars aimed at 'rolling back' the enemies of the United States and Israel was out of the question, as it would never be accepted by the American public and would fundamentally undermine the Oslo peace process to which the Clinton administration remained strongly committed. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks however, the concepts of rollback, pre-emption and regime change gained considerable traction within the Bush administration as it devised a grand strategy to strike at the roots of terrorism in the Arab Middle East. As discussion in chapter three of this thesis shows, the rationales of the Clean Break report served as an important intellectual basis of the Bush Doctrine's assumptions about promoting of democracy through intervention in the Arab world.

The Project for a New American Century

A year after the publication of the Clean Break report, a group of neoconservative intellectuals, policy makers and writers established a small but influential think tank at the American Enterprise Institute, called the Project for a New American Century (PNAC). The Clean Break report laid out the first systematic neoconservative argument for regime change and coercive democratisation in the Middle East. The Project for a New American Century advanced a number of interventionist arguments similar to those of the Clean Break report, and strongly advocated a foreign policy of armed democracy promotion that began with regime change in Iraq.

The Project for a New American Century was established by William Kristol, Robert Kagan, Gary Schmitt and Thomas Donnelly in July 1997. A significant number of neoconservatives that would later gain positions of influence in the Bush administration, such as Paul Wolfowitz, I. Lewis Libby, Zalmay Khalilzad, Eliot Abrams, Paula Dobriansky, John Bolton and James Woolsey, were signatories to a number of its public letters and policy papers. Other Republicans with a foreign policy outlook similar to neoconservatism, such as Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, also signed a variety of PNAC's public statements on the need for regime change in Iraq. It was the Project for a New American Century, more than any other

neoconservative organisation, that provided the most influential rationales and policy prescriptions for regime change in Iraq and an expansive policy of activist democratisation in the Arab world; transmitting the broad claims of the neoconservative paradigm of democratisation into specific policy guidelines for action on the ground.

The Project for a New American Century's Statement of Principles captured the outlook of the think tank and framed its advocacy of interventionist foreign policies in the Middle East. The Statement of Principles document emphasised, among other things, the need for an American foreign policy “that boldly and purposefully promotes American principles abroad; and national leadership that accepts the United States' global responsibilities.”¹⁹ The Statement of Principles maintained that the United States needed to “strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values.”²⁰ Further, PNAC argued that the United States must assertively “promote the cause of political and economic freedom abroad” through a “neo-Reaganite foreign policy of military strength and moral clarity” that would “accept responsibility for America's unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.”²¹ Prior to establishing PNAC, William Kristol and Robert Kagan had already emphasised the importance of a “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy in a 1996 article that was, among other things, sharply critical of the Clinton administration's reactive and ad hoc foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East.²² The “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy platform outlined by Kristol and Kagan became the guiding framework for the Project for a New American Century's thinking as articulated in its Statement of Principles, as it did for much of the democratic globalist outlook more generally.

PNAC applied a number of aspects of its Statement of Principles to its key argument that the United States must overthrow Saddam Hussein and democratise

¹⁹ Project for a New American Century, 'Statement of Principles'. Project for a New American Century, 3 July 1997. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>, accessed 20 March 2008. As of late 2008, the PNAC website is no longer a registered domain and the think tank has ceased all publication. It is still possible to access PNAC documents through internet search engines however, and the documents cited here remain available on several other websites.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Kristol and Kagan, 'Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy', *passim*. Kristol and Kagan expressed frustration as the Clinton administration's apparent inability to take decisive action against Saddam Hussein and its general unwillingness to challenge the status quo of the Middle East through American intervention to promote friendly democratic regimes.

Iraq. In January 1998, the project sent a letter to President Clinton calling for the adoption of policies of regime change.²³ The letter argued that “current American policy toward Iraq is not succeeding, and... we may soon face a threat in the Middle East more serious than any we have known since the end of the Cold War.”²⁴ PNAC's letter stated that the only lasting solution to the threat Iraq posed was armed intervention and the promotion of democracy. The Project for a New American Century contended that conducting regime change in Iraq needed to “become the aim of American foreign policy,” and held that replacing the Ba'athist dictatorship with a pro-American democratic regime would ensure that Iraq no longer threatened its neighbours or the values and interests of the United States.²⁵

Leading members of PNAC frequently reiterated this argument during the second term of the Clinton administration. One prominent example of this was a January 1998 article in the *New York Times* by William Kristol and Robert Kagan which argued starkly that “Saddam Hussein must go.”²⁶ Kristol and Kagan wrote that the only way to overthrow Saddam Hussein was through “using air power and ground forces, and finishing the task left undone in 1991.”²⁷ This goal was easily within the United States' capabilities, and combating tyrants was, moreover, a responsibility that came with global hegemony.²⁸ Kristol and Kagan warned that “unless we act, Saddam Hussein will prevail, the Middle East will be destabilized, other aggressors around the world will follow his example, and American soldiers will have to pay a far heavier price when the international peace sustained by American leadership begins to collapse.”²⁹ It was thus imperative that the United States act immediately to bring down Saddam Hussein's regime and replace it with a democracy.³⁰ Similar arguments were also made by other project members such as Ruel Marc Gerecht,³¹ and through their advocacy, PNAC helped to play a role in pressuring the Clinton administration to adopt the Iraq Liberation Act, which made

²³ Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Clinton on Iraq'. Project for a New American Century, 26 January 1998. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraqlintonletter.htm>, accessed 4 April 2008; For critical discussion of the project's letter, see Bamford, pp. 286-9.

²⁴ Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Clinton on Iraq'.

²⁵ Ibid. Compare this logic to the way in which the Bush administration articulated the benefits of regime change in Iraq, as detailed in chapter three of this thesis.

²⁶ William Kristol, Robert Kagan, 'Bombing Iraq isn't Enough'. *The New York Times*, (30 Jan., 1998), p. 17.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Reuel Marc Gerecht, 'Liberate Iraq'. *The Weekly Standard*, (14 May., 2001).

regime change in Iraq an official goal of American foreign policy.³²

An underlying assumption made in the Project for a New American Century's advocacy for regime change and democratisation in Iraq was that the Iraqi government was inherently prone to aggression because it was totalitarian.³³ Reflecting on the nature of the Iraqi regime, Kristol and Kagan contended that “as is so often the case in international affairs, there was no separating the nature of Saddam's rule at home from the kinds of policies he conducted abroad. Saddam's regime terrorized his own people, but it also posed a threat to the region, and to us.”³⁴ Kristol and Kagan argued that Saddam Hussein “achieved through brute force total dominance at home, and it was through force and the threat of force that he sought dominance in his region as well.”³⁵ Saddam Hussein went to war against Iran for eight years, invaded Kuwait in 1990 and spent the 1990's periodically launching attacks against coalition forces in the no-fly zones, all the while continuing to repress the Iraqi people.³⁶ Kristol and Kagan held that because Saddam Hussein was a brutal tyrant within Iraq, he was inherently more predisposed to engage in wars of aggression abroad. This logic also contained echoes of the activist variant of democratic peace theory, as PNAC saw that by replacing Saddam Hussein's regime with a democracy, peace and security could be more assuredly advanced.³⁷ In this way, the broad claims of neoconservative foreign policy thought were applied to a specific case and were used as the basis on which recommendations were made for policy and strategy. This advocacy acted as a bridge between the broader neoconservative paradigm of democratisation and the ideas about regime change articulated by President Bush and others after September 11 2001.

Kristol, Kagan and other PNAC members were optimistic that regime change and democratisation was the best way to remove Saddam Hussein and fundamentally reshape the Middle East. Buoyed by the spectacular spread of democracy in the post-Cold War world and the unchallengeable military supremacy of the United States,

³² 'H.R.4655: Iraq Liberation Act of 1998'. Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress, 31 October 1998. <http://www.iraqwatch.org/government/US/Legislation/ILA.htm>, accessed 9 June 2008; For favourable analysis of the Project for a New American Century and the Iraq Liberation Act, see Douglas J. Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*. New York, Harper Collins, 2008, pp. 195-7.

³³ For critical discussion of the links made by neoconservatives between totalitarian theory and Iraq's aggressive foreign policies, see Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 40-2.

³⁴ Kagan, Kristol, 'The Right War for the Right Reasons'.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

neoconservatives held that it was entirely within American power to overthrow a decaying totalitarian regime in the heart of the Arab world and thus trigger a much-delayed democratic revolution in this crucial region.³⁸ This would enhance American security, remove a belligerent and destabilising force in the region and allow the Iraqi people to claim their freedom and establish a democracy, forever changing the dynamics of Arab politics for the better. Such conclusions were shared by a range of neoconservative intellectuals and policy makers, and, as chapter three documents, played an integral part in providing an immediate intellectual basis to the Bush Doctrine's rationalisation of armed democracy promotion in Iraq.

Proxy War, Regime Change and the Iraqi National Congress

At approximately the same time that the Project for a New American Century was formed, a variation of the argument for regime change as a route to democracy in Iraq also developed. Neoconservative intellectuals Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad began arguing in the late 1990's that the best way to liberate Iraq and establish a democratic regime was for the United States to help Iraqi opposition groups launch an insurgency against the Ba'athist dictatorship, liberate territory inside Iraq and eventually cause the regime to collapse.³⁹ This would be cheaper and less risky than direct intervention, and would allow the Iraqis to free themselves and construct a democratic government with American assistance. To some extent, elements of this argument emerged as a part of the Bush administration's pre-war assumptions about the development of democracy in Iraq. As chapter five of this thesis shows, the links between neoconservative policy makers of the Bush administration and leading Iraqi opposition groups fostered a number of optimistic assumptions about the ease at which regime change could be conducted and which democracy could be built in Iraq after March 2003.

The neoconservative proponents of proxy war against Iraq argued that a number of steps should be taken by the United States government to initiate and sustain an insurgency to rollback the regime in Baghdad. In a statement to the Committee on Armed Services in September 2000, Richard Perle articulated the

³⁸ For critical analysis of the assumptions behind this thinking, see Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 52-3.

³⁹ Richard Perle, 'Iraq Policy'. Statement of Richard Perle, Fellow, American Enterprise Institute, Before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate, 28 September 2000.

general contours of a proxy war policy when he contended that

The United States, alone if necessary, with our friends if possible, should aggressively support the nascent opposition to Saddam's regime. We should organize, finance, equip, train and protect an Iraqi opposition broadly representative of all the people of Iraq. Such a program would be neither quick nor certain. It would certainly not be easy. But it has a better chance, and is a more worthy contender, than a new round of inconclusive air strikes or yet another abortive effort to organize an anti-Saddam conspiracy among retired Iraqi generals.⁴⁰

Perle believed that three steps should to be taken in order to ensure that the Iraqi opposition would be effective at bringing about regime change. First, the United States needed to release frozen Iraqi funds to finance the activities and training of the opposition forces; secondly, it needed to commit to the Iraq Liberation Act that the Clinton administration offered only lukewarm support; and thirdly it needed to support the proxy war activities of the opposition through co-ordinated air strikes against Iraq.⁴¹ This strategy would bring about regime change and ensure that the opposition could establish a democratic government.

In a similar vein to Perle, Zalmay Khalilzad also advocated a strategy of proxy war to roll back the Iraqi regime and ensure the development of a democratic government. Khalilzad explicitly tied his advocacy of rollback to the example of the Reagan Doctrine⁴² and discussed in some detail what would be required in order to ensure success in Iraq. In a February 1998 *Wall Street Journal* article, Khalilzad wrote that “now is the time to revive the Iraqi opposition, strengthening it as part of a comprehensive political and military strategy to end Saddam's tyranny [and] liberate the Iraqi people.”⁴³ Khalilzad contended that this policy was considerably more prudent and effective than the Clinton administration's ad hoc approach of occasional air strikes against Iraq and a piecemeal commitment to the Iraq Liberation Act. Linking his argument to the example of the Reagan Doctrine, Khalilzad held that

The U.S. should back the Iraqi people, just as it backed the Afghan

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² See Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, Gideon Rose, 'The Rollback Fantasy'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 1, (Jan/Feb 1999), pp. 34-5. In this critical study of neoconservative advocacy for proxy war in Iraq, Byman, Pollack and Rose note that Wolfowitz, Perle and Khalilzad had each been involved in the Reagan administration and supported its policies of proxy war against third world communist regimes; now in the late 1990's, they were attempting to apply the lessons and strategies of these covert wars to Iraq.

⁴³ Zalmay Khalilzad, 'It's Not Too Late to Topple Saddam'. *The Wall Street Journal*, (25 Feb., 1998), A22.

people against the Soviet occupation of the 1980's. Then, too, many critics argued that the Afghans were too divided and the Soviets too strong for the strategy to work. They were wrong, just as critics of "rollback" are wrong today.⁴⁴

In his advocacy of regime change, Khalilzad appeared to have put aside his knowledge of the consequences of covert war in Afghanistan;⁴⁵ especially the Islamist militancy it engendered in Afghanistan, and international Jihadist movements it inadvertently helped to embolden.⁴⁶ Khalilzad seemingly ignored these implications in proposing to launch a proxy war in Iraq, insisting instead that regime change on a similar premise would bring about a range of positive results.

The proponents of regime change by proxy war spoke frequently of the importance of supporting Iraqi opposition groups as the key to their strategy. Yet who were these opposition groups? Why did some neoconservatives place such faith in these organisations to carry out their aim of regime change? Among the exile Iraqi opposition groups, some neoconservatives came to embrace the London-based Iraqi National Congress and its leader, Ahmed Chalabi, as key to regime change and the democratic future of Iraq.⁴⁷ During the 1990's, a strong connection developed between Chalabi and some neoconservatives on the issue of Iraq. Both parties aimed for regime change and Chalabi offered the compelling option of using the Iraqi National Congress to lead the charge. Chalabi had been close to Perle and Wolfowitz since the 1980's, and in the 1990's he cultivated links with other neoconservatives like James Woolsey and Douglas Feith, as well as non-neoconservative figures such as Dick Cheney.⁴⁸ James Bamford, of the University of California, notes that while the CIA and the State Department originally supported Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress, these organisations became wary of what they viewed as Chalabi's

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Khalilzad is himself of Afghani decent and was involved with the policy of supporting the Mujaheddin in the 1980's, as with the international diplomacy surrounding the attempts at resolving Afghanistan's civil war in the early 1990's. Unlike many neoconservatives, Khalilzad has extensive knowledge of recent Afghani history and politics, and is therefore well aware of the potential for unsavoury outcomes resulting from proxy war.

⁴⁶ For an excellent analysis of the consequences of the Reagan administration's proxy war in Afghanistan, see Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars*. New York, Routledge, 2004, part II.

⁴⁷ Packer, pp. 77-8, *passim*; For further discussion of Chalabi and the neoconservatives, see Dorrien, *Imperial Designs*, pp. 68-9; Bamford, pp. 291-4. Neoconservatives were practically alone in the American foreign policy community in advocating proxy war as the best strategy of democracy promotion in Iraq. Mainstream views were closer to those expressed by Byman, Pollack and Rose. While some writers external to neoconservatism agreed that some form of military pressure for democratic change should be applied to Iraq, almost no one outside of neoconservative circles advocated a large-scale proxy war to drive Saddam Hussein from power.

⁴⁸ Dorrien, *Imperial Designs*, pp. 68-9; Bamford, pp. 291-4.

exaggerated claims about the benefits of regime change and his popular support inside Iraq, not to mention the issue of corruption in his organisation, and dropped their support for him in the mid-1990's.⁴⁹ Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress nonetheless remained key to some neoconservative's conceptions of regime change in Iraq. As chapter five documents, Chalabi's claims about the ease at which Iraq could be democratised, transmitted through neoconservative policy makers to top officials of the Bush administration, coloured a number of pre-war assumptions about regime change in Iraq.

Those in favour of proxy war argued that the United States must support the Iraqi National Congress as the most effective strategy for democratising Iraq.⁵⁰ In a chapter published in Kristol and Kagan's 2000 volume, *Present Dangers*, Perle contended that while the Clinton administration had failed to support the Iraqi National Congress, there was hope that the administration chosen after the 2000 election would adopt a new course. Perle wrote that "if the next administration is to protect America's interests in the Gulf and help bring about the conditions for long-term stability in the region, it must formulate a comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam and his regime. This can only be done by supporting the external opposition."⁵¹ Perle believed that the United States should help to create "safe zones" or "enclaves" in Iraq, establishing a provisional government in these areas as a route to undermining Saddam Hussein's rule over Iraq.⁵² The Iraqi National Congress-led provisional government would lift sanctions in the liberated enclaves, would use oil revenue to begin reconstruction, would establish a provisional democratic regime and provide a rallying point from which Baghdad could be taken.⁵³ Less than a year after making this argument, Perle became the head of the Pentagon's Defence Policy Board; an informal but nonetheless influential position from which he and like-minded neoconservative advisers could influence the creation and implementation of the Bush administration's Middle East policies.

A similar argument to Perle's was also put forward by Paul Wolfowitz in the

⁴⁹ Bamford, p. 291; For a defence of Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress that places the blame for negative reporting about the INC on the CIA and State Department, see Feith, pp. 240-2.

⁵⁰ For critical discussion of this strategy, see Byman, Pollack, Rose, p. 29.

⁵¹ Richard N. Perle, 'Iraq: Saddam Unbound' in Kagan, Kristol (Eds.), pp. 107-9.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

years before he joined the Bush administration. Wolfowitz argued in a congressional testimony in 1998 that supporting the Iraqi National Congress represented the best policy option for the United States.⁵⁴ Wolfowitz held that the Clinton administration could use Iraqi assets frozen by the United Nations sanction regime to aid the opposition, as well as stepping up its bombing of Iraq so as to weaken Saddam Hussein's armed forces and thereby improve the likelihood of success for the Iraqi National Congress.⁵⁵ Wolfowitz was particularly taken by the democratic credentials of the Iraqi National Congress, explaining to the congressional hearing that the United States

Should... indicate our willingness to recognize a provisional government of free Iraq, and the best place to start is with the principles of the Iraqi National Congress, the only organization that has to date set forth a set of principles on which a post-Saddam representative government could be built.⁵⁶

In a Senate hearing later in 1998, Wolfowitz expanded on the importance of the Iraqi National Congress as the core of the future government of Iraq by arguing that through the enclave strategy, a provisional government could be established in the north and the south of Iraq, over time acquiring sufficient influence and support to the point that it could march on Baghdad.⁵⁷ Thus, regime change would require little direct American involvement, and in the tradition of the Reagan Doctrine, it would be possible to pressure a dangerous regime out of power through proxy and to bring about democracy where there was once only totalitarianism.⁵⁸

Post-September 11: Regime Change, Democratisation and the War on Terrorism

The range of arguments made by neoconservatives in the late 1990's about the need

⁵⁴ Paul Wolfowitz, 'Statement of Paul Wolfowitz, Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the John Hopkins University, for the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on US Options in the Persian Gulf'. United States Capitol, 28 March 1998; For further discussion of the strategy Wolfowitz proposed for regime change in Iraq, see Zalmay M. Khalilzad, Paul Wolfowitz, 'Overthrow Him'. *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 3, No. 12, (1 Dec., 1997).

⁵⁵ Wolfowitz, 'Statement of Paul Wolfowitz'.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Paul Wolfowitz, 'Statement Before the House National Security Committee'. 18 September 1998.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

for regime change and democratisation in Iraq and the wider Arab world acquired considerably greater urgency after the September 11 terrorist attacks. Many prominent neoconservatives redoubled their advocacy of interventionist policies in the Middle East following the attacks, arguing that decisive American action was necessary to take the fight to Jihadists, and that regime change and democratisation in Iraq was integral to the war on terrorism. Intervention in Iraq was again cast as a first step towards bringing about the transformation of the political systems and culture in the Arab world which bred Jihadist violence against the United States. Many of the policies advocated by neoconservatives paralleled and reinforced thinking within the Bush administration, owing to its sense of vulnerability following the attacks and to the strong neoconservative presence within the administration.⁵⁹ Moreover, many of the interventionist ideas expressed by neoconservatives outside of the administration played important roles in helping to influence the Bush administration's march towards the invasion of Iraq.⁶⁰

The War on Terrorism and the Project for a New American Century

On 20 September 2001, the Project for a New American Century published a letter signed by a number of prominent neoconservatives that offered full support to President Bush and provided guidelines for the scope of the war on terrorism. The signatories to the letter agreed that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan must be the first target of the war on terrorism. However, they nonetheless strongly advocated regime change in Iraq as integral to winning the new global struggle.⁶¹ Addressing the terrorist attacks of less than two weeks earlier, the project's letter asserted that

Even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism.⁶²

⁵⁹ For detailed discussion of the ways in which the Bush Doctrine's rationalisation of armed democracy promotion was decisively shaped by many elements of the neoconservative thinking examined here, see chapter three of this thesis.

⁶⁰ Halper, Clarke, pp. 32-3.

⁶¹ Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Bush on War on Terrorism'. Project for a New American Century, 20 September 2001. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter.htm>, accessed 4 April 2008.

⁶² Ibid.

In what read like an ultimatum to President Bush, the Project for a New American Century effectively demanded that the Bush administration invade Iraq. PNAC maintained, as it had since 1997, that replacing the regime in Baghdad would bring about major political changes in the Arab Middle East and thus strike a blow against Jihadist terrorism. Project members believed that in the new conflict the United States entered on September 11 2001, the only path to victory was regime change in Iraq to remove a tyrant and to bring about democratic revolution in the Arab world.⁶³ This was not a break from the arguments put forward by PNAC before September 11, but the application of an existing strategy as a framework for justifying intervention in Iraq as the crux of the war on terrorism in the Arab world.

Subsequent letters and statements from the Project for a New American Century further reinforced the idea that regime change and democratisation in Iraq was the cornerstone of an effective anti-terrorism grand strategy. In an April 2002 letter to President Bush, PNAC again insisted that activist democratisation was the best solution to the heightened dangers Iraq posed.⁶⁴ The project's letter argued that "it is now common knowledge that Saddam... is a funder and supporter of terrorism against Israel. Iraq has harboured terrorists such as Abu Nidal in the past, and it maintains links to the Al Qaeda network."⁶⁵ The project's letter again reiterated the centrality of regime change in Iraq to victory in the war on terrorism, contending that "the surest path to peace in the Middle East lies not through the appeasement of Saddam and other local tyrants, but through a renewed commitment on our part... to the birth of freedom and democratic government in the Islamic world."⁶⁶

The idea of fighting the war on terrorism by promoting democracy in Iraq was particularly championed by the chair of the Project for a New American Century, William Kristol. In Kristol's view, regime change and democratisation in Iraq needed to become an explicit part of the Bush administration's foreign policies, and intervention in Iraq would bring about a range of positive results for the Middle East and for American security. In a February 2002 congressional hearing on foreign

⁶³ For further discussion of these aims by two neoconservatives closely associated with the Project for a New American Century, see Gary Schmitt, Thomas Donnelly, 'A War With Purpose'. *The Weekly Standard*, (24 Sept., 2001).

⁶⁴ Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Bush on Israel, Arafat and the War on Terror'. Project for a New American Century, 3 April 2002. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/Bushletter-040302.htm>, accessed 4 April 2008.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

policy, Kristol asserted that “Iraq is next” in the war on terrorism.⁶⁷ Kristol commented that “the president has chosen to build a new world, not to rebuild the old one that existed before September 11, 2001. And after uprooting al Qaeda from Afghanistan, removing Saddam Hussein from power is the key step to building a freer, safer, more peaceful future.”⁶⁸ According to Kristol, the United States could no longer tolerate the status quo and needed to pursue policies of democracy promotion, beginning in Iraq, thus fundamentally changing the domestic political systems of the regimes that bred Jihadist ideology. Kristol spoke with great optimism about the transformative potential of Iraq after democratisation, arguing that

A friendly, free, and oil-producing Iraq would leave Iran isolated and Syria cowed; the Palestinians more willing to negotiate seriously with Israel; and Saudi Arabia with less leverage over policymakers here and in Europe. Removing Saddam Hussein and his henchmen from power presents a genuine opportunity... to transform the political landscape of the Middle East.⁶⁹

Many elements of Kristol's argument emerged again in statements published by the Project for a New American Century as the invasion of Iraq began in March 2003. PNAC's first statement on post-war Iraq held that “the removal of the present Iraqi regime from power will lay the foundation for... establishing a peaceful, stable democratic government in Iraq.”⁷⁰ This in turn was key to fostering “the democratic development of the wider Middle East.”⁷¹ The signatories of the statement agreed that “regime change is not an end in itself but a means to an end – the establishment of a peaceful, stable, united, prosperous and democratic Iraq.” Indeed, the statement went on to advise the Bush administration that the United States

Must help build an Iraq that is governed by a pluralistic system representative of all Iraqis and that is fully committed to upholding the rule of law, the rights of all its citizens, and the betterment of all its people. The Iraqi people committed to a democratic future must be

⁶⁷ William Kristol, 'Next Phase of the War on Terrorism'. Congressional Testimony of William Kristol, Chairman of the Project for a New American Century, 7 February 2002.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid. Neoconservatives assumed that democratic Arab states would enhance American influence over oil and gas resources in the Gulf, as democratic regimes were apparently more predisposed towards upholding American hegemony. For discussion of the Bush administration's claim that democratisation would enhance American interests, see chapter three of this thesis.

⁷⁰ Project for a New American Century, 'Statement on Post-War Iraq'. Project for a New American Century, 19 March 2003. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20030319.htm>, accessed 28 April 2008.

⁷¹ Ibid.

integrally involved in this process in order for it to succeed. Such an Iraq will be a force for regional stability rather than conflict and participate in the democratic development of the region.⁷²

The project's second statement on Iraq reaffirmed these aims and insisted that the transfer of power from an occupying force to an interim democratic regime be swift, allowing Iraqis themselves to determine the nature of the liberal democratic regime they would invariably construct.⁷³ The signatories to the letter maintained, in line with their strong belief in the universal desires for freedom and the global appeal of liberalism, that the people of Iraq were inherently capable of constructing liberal state institutions and a progressive political and social order after their liberation by American military forces.⁷⁴ The Project for a New American Century's statement concluded that "the successful disarming, rebuilding and democratic reform of Iraq can contribute decisively to the democratisation of the wider Middle East."⁷⁵ Echoing elements of the logic of democratic peace theory and the core neoconservative belief that America's values and interests were one in foreign policy, the project's statement held that democratisation in Iraq was "an objective of overriding strategic importance to the United States, as it is to the rest of the international community – and its achievement will require an investment and commitment commensurate with that."⁷⁶ The actions of PNAC to 2003 show the way in which neoconservative prescription for activist democratisation served as the bridge between neoconservative theory and the key assumptions of the Bush Doctrine. The continued advocacy of specific interventionist policy after September 11 made the broader claims of neoconservative democratisation theory tangible as a guide to action, rendering it usable by policy makers as a framework for conceiving of armed democratisation as the cornerstone of the war on terrorism in the Middle East.

The Prospects for Proxy War After September 11

In contrast to the increasing influence of the Project for a New American Century's

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Project for a New American Century, 'Second Statement on Post-War Iraq'. Project for a New American Century, 28 March 2003. <http://www.newamericancentury.org/iraq-20030328.htm>, accessed 28 April 2008.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Project for a New American Century, 'Statement on Post-War Iraq'.

calls for direct intervention in Iraq, the arguments for proxy war against Iraq generally lost ground after the September 11 attacks. Wolfowitz, Khalilzad and Perle maintained close contact with Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress,⁷⁷ and some serious pre-war planning was undertaken by Pentagon civilians such as Douglas Feith for utilising Iraqi National Congress members as proxy fighters in Iraq.⁷⁸ However, the views of those in favour of proxy war hardened as a result of the September 11 attacks, as they too came to advocate direct intervention as the most effective solution to the danger Iraq posed; relegating the idea of supporting proxy forces to a secondary strategy more exclusively tied to democratisation subsequent to forcible regime change.

Paul Wolfowitz's views were most indicative of this changing outlook among the proponents of proxy intervention. Until the September 11 attacks and the declaration of the war on terrorism, Wolfowitz generally held that proxy war was the most effective way to deal with Saddam Hussein.⁷⁹ Wolfowitz's advocacy for a proxy war against Saddam Hussein developed during the 1990's as a response to what he viewed as the Clinton administration's seemingly inept handling of the containment of Iraq, and owing to his close connection with Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress.⁸⁰ In addition, Wolfowitz's existing views about the universality of freedom and the importance of democracy as a moral and strategic concern in Iraq were further emboldened by Chalabi's assurances that his organisation would bring liberal democracy to the state.

As a result of the September 11 attacks, Wolfowitz began to view military intervention as the best solution to the dangers posed by Iraq. According to Wolfowitz, a break in his thinking occurred because the September 11 attacks increased his perception of the potential threats posed by Saddam Hussein.⁸¹ In a 2005 interview, Wolfowitz asserted that

Contrary to the myth that I have been waiting all along for an excuse to invade Iraq, before [September 11] I really didn't want to even think about sending in U.S. ground forces. I had always thought the idea of occupying Baghdad was both unnecessary and a mistake. What was

⁷⁷ Richard Perle, 'Next Stop, Iraq'. *National Post*, (7 Dec., 2001), A16.

⁷⁸ Feith, pp. 255-8, 279-81.

⁷⁹ Mann, pp. 235-7.

⁸⁰ Ibid; See also Dorrien, *Imperial Designs*, pp. 66-8; Bill Keller, 'The Sunshine Warrior'. *The New York Times*, (22 Sept., 2002).

⁸¹ Keller, 'The Sunshine Warrior'.

needed was to arm and train the Iraqis to do the job themselves – the way, in effect, the Afghans did [in 2001] by taking advantage of the fact that a third of the country was already liberated. I advocated supporting them with air power if necessary.⁸²

Wolfowitz was content to support regime change through the Iraqi National Congress during the 1990's; but he now interpreted the threat of Saddam Hussein through the prism of the war on terrorism, and believed that the need to reform the political systems of the Arab Middle East had become so pressing as to require direct American military intervention.⁸³ Thus, Wolfowitz's advocacy for proxy war against Iraq became a secondary issue after 2001. Iraqi opposition forces still managed to retain a somewhat important place in the conceptions of activist democratisation proposed by the proponents of proxy intervention; especially in the assumptions made about the formation of a new Iraqi government after regime change. Nonetheless, the role of proxy forces in leading regime change in Iraq became a lesser concern shortly after the start of the war on terrorism.

The Calls for Democratic Revolution

The September 11 attacks and declaration of the war on terrorism encouraged some neoconservatives to advocate wide-ranging policies of regime change and democratisation that encompassed not only Iraq, but most states of the Arab world. Extrapolating from the logic expressed by their peers about the importance of regime change and democratisation in Iraq, some neoconservative writers argued that while intervention there was important to winning the war on terrorism, this alone was not enough. Making a number of connections between hostile states, terrorist groups and a political malaise which they view as responsible for fostering Jihadist ideology, select neoconservatives held that in order to prevent another terrorist attack against the United States, it was essential to transform the entire Arab world through an expansive strategy of armed democracy promotion.

One of the leading arguments for a wide-ranging regional policy of regime change and democratisation was made by the American Enterprise Institute scholar, Michael Ledeen. Beginning in the weeks after the September 11 attacks, Ledeen

⁸² Bowden, 'Wolfowitz: The Exit Interviews'.

⁸³ Ibid.

consistently put forward arguments calling for intervention against what he labelled the “terror masters.”⁸⁴ In a September 2001 *National Review* article, Ledeen contended that the United States should engage in “creative destruction” in the Middle East, using military force to annihilate the terrorists and bring about democratic revolution.⁸⁵ Ledeen argued that Jihadist terrorism was not a stateless phenomenon, but was backed by regimes like Iraq, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This meant that in its war on terrorism the United States had “a dual task: kill the terrorists, and destroy the regimes that provide them with the critical infrastructure – training, safe havens, travel documents, technology, and all the rest – they need to operate.”⁸⁶ In the most controversial and frequently-cited passage of his article, Ledeen admonished the United States that

We should have no misgivings about our ability to destroy tyrannies. It is what we do best. It comes naturally to us, for we are the one truly revolutionary country in the world, as we have been for more than 200 years. Creative destruction is our middle name. We do it automatically, and that is precisely why the tyrants hate us, and are driven to attack us.⁸⁷

Ledeen effectively held that the United States should act as the 'vanguard' of democracy, promoting this 'universal right' in the Arab world through successive military interventions and occupations. This was an argument that Claes Ryn, of the Catholic University of America, has identified as a form of “neo-Jacobinism” in its belief in the revolutionary power of the United States and its ability to spread freedom through acts of violence.⁸⁸ Ledeen's interventionist prescriptions were more expansive than those of the Clean Break report or much of the material produced by PNAC. While shared by only a minority of neoconservatives, these were ideas not without some influence over the actions of the Bush administration in the Middle East.⁸⁹

Alongside Ledeen, first-generation neoconservative intellectual Norman

⁸⁴ For Ledeen's most detailed exposition of his argument, see Michael Ledeen, *The War Against the Terror Masters: Why It Happened, Where We Are Now, How We'll Win*. New York, St Martin's Press, 2002.

⁸⁵ Michael Ledeen, 'Creative Destruction: How to Wage a Revolutionary War'. *The National Review*, 20 September 2001. <http://www.nationalreview.com/contributors/ledeen092001.shtml>, accessed 7 February 2007.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ryn, p. 28.

⁸⁹ For a fuller examination of this idea of “neo-Jacobinism,” see discussion in chapter four of this thesis.

Podhoretz also penned a strong argument for an expansive anti-terrorism strategy of regime change and activist democracy promotion throughout the Arab world. Having been among the most hardline of the neoconservative 'Cold Warriors' during the Cold War, Podhoretz re-emerged after the September 11 attacks with an argument claiming that “the great struggle into which the United States was plunged by 9/11 can only be understood if we think of it as WWIV.”⁹⁰ Podhoretz believed that the Cold War was actually WWIII, and therefore the war on terrorism was WWIV; another titanic global war that could last more than forty years.⁹¹ As with WWII and WWIII, Podhoretz argued that in WWIV the United States again faced a determined totalitarian enemy, this time in the form of what he labelled “Islamofascism.” This ideology fused together religious and secular totalitarianism, held global messianic ambitions and was heir to the totalitarians of the twentieth century.⁹² Podhoretz even contended that “it can plausibly be argued that [the Islamofascists] are even more dangerous and difficult to beat than their totalitarian predecessors of WWII and WWIII,” as Islamofascism was an ideology with deep cultural roots and found support from over 200 million people, which was more than either Fascism or Communism ever attained.⁹³

Podhoretz believed that the most effective strategy for defeating “Islamofascism” was a policy of systematic regime change and democratisation across the Middle East. Podhoretz saw that the regime of Saddam Hussein represented one of the most malign forms of Islamofascism, but that regime change in Iraq alone would not defeat this menace. Only through the co-ordinated rollback of all of its enemies in the Middle East could the United States win this great struggle against the new totalitarian enemy. Writing in early 2002, shortly after President Bush's 'axis of evil' speech, Podhoretz outlined an expansive agenda for an anti-terrorism policy of regime change in the Arab Middle East, as he contended that

The regimes that richly deserve to be overthrown and replaced are not confined to the three singled-out members of the axis of evil. At a minimum, the axis should extend to Syria and Lebanon and Libya, as

⁹⁰ Norman Podhoretz, *WWIV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism*. New York, Doubleday, 2007, pp. 2-4; See also Joseph Rago, 'The Weekend Interview with Norman Podhoretz: Unrepentant Neocon'. *Wall Street Journal*, (12 Aug., 2006), A8; Critiques of Podhoretz's views are numerous; See for instance Lieven, Hulsman, pp. 67-9; For a good summary, see Dorrien, *Imperial Designs*, chapter one, passim.

⁹¹ Podhoretz, *WWIV*, pp. 5-6; Norman Podhoretz, 'World War IV: How it Started, What it Means, and Why we Have to Win'. *Commentary*, Vol. 118, No. 2, (Sept., 2004), p. 27.

⁹² Podhoretz, *WWIV*, pp. 12-14.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

well as "friends" of America like the Saudi royal family and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, along with the Palestinian Authority, whether headed by Arafat or one of his henchmen.⁹⁴

Podhoretz held that despite the opposition of realist naysayers, democratic regimes would triumph in the Arab world, as they had in much of the rest of the world.⁹⁵ While Podhoretz's views did not have wide appeal in official policy making circles, they were again indicative of the way in which broader historical 'lessons' and theoretical concepts of the neoconservative paradigm of democratisation influenced specific interventionist prescriptions for Middle East democratisation.

Conclusion

From the mid 1990's to the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq, neoconservatives put forward a comprehensive set of arguments for Middle East democratisation, focusing above all on regime change and democracy promotion in Iraq as integral to a strategy of regional political transformation. Neoconservative policy advocacy about the need for armed democratisation in the Middle East served as the link between the broader neoconservative paradigm of armed democratisation and the specific interventionist propositions of the Bush Doctrine itself. After the September 11 attacks, neoconservative policy frameworks quickly became the prism through which the Bush administration understood the causes of terrorism and formulated its grand strategy for dealing with this threat through the political transformation of the Arab world.⁹⁶ Examining the development of neoconservative prescriptions for rollback, regime change and democratisation makes it possible to comprehend how it was that neoconservative foreign policy thinking transferred from a largely theoretical level to one where it could be utilised as a framework for a grand strategy of activist democratisation.

⁹⁴ Norman Podhoretz, 'In Praise of the Bush Doctrine'. *Commentary*, Vol. 114, No. 2, (Sept., 2002), p. 28.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁹⁶ Halper, Clarke, pp. 32-4.

Chapter Three

The Bush Doctrine's Middle East Democratisation Policies: A Neoconservative Paradigm

The Bush administration's Middle East democratisation policies centred around six interrelating propositions that laid out an internally logical and sophisticated argument for promoting democracy through armed intervention against authoritarian regimes. Each of these propositions drew extensively from neoconservative policy advocacy during the 1990's, as from many of the assumptions of the broader neoconservative democratisation paradigm. The six key propositions of the Bush Doctrine's Middle East democratisation policies were that:

- Freedom is the universal right of all people
- Free people will always choose to live in a liberal political and economic order
- Authoritarianism fosters terrorism, while democracy will undermine terrorism
- Democracy in Iraq will engender a democratic domino effect in the Middle East
- A democratic Middle East will be peaceful
- Middle East democratisation will enhance American security and national interests

Together these six propositions formed a foreign policy doctrine that justified regime change and democratisation in Iraq as the centrepiece of a post-September 11 grand strategy to transform the Middle East for its own benefit and to enhance American interests and security. These propositions serve as the basis on which the Bush Doctrine, and by its close association, neoconservative assumptions and claims, are critically assessed later in this thesis.

As with neoconservative arguments, the propositions about democratisation expressed in terms of the Bush Doctrine need to be taken seriously and studied on their own terms, rather than to speculate on potential hidden agendas behind such assertions. The most comprehensive articulation of the Bush Doctrine's Middle East

democratisation policies are contained in the Bush administration's National Security Strategy documents of September 2002 and March 2006. The Bush Doctrine was also outlined in a number of speeches, especially President Bush's West Point speech, re-inauguration speech and State of the Union addresses, as well as in numerous policy documents, fact sheets, articles and testimonies produced by senior advisers over the eight years of the administration. This provides a rich primary document record through which the assumptions of armed democratisation can be examined. Assessing the Bush Doctrine's propositions about democratisation lays out the key claims and justifications put forward for intervention in the Middle East, and also shows the large extent to which these propositions were closely related to the neoconservative paradigm of democratisation.

The Universality of Freedom

At the core of the Bush Doctrine was a fundamental claim that all people had a natural right to freedom. Senior members of the Bush cabinet held as an article of faith that all people wished to live in freedom, able to decide for themselves their own form of government and society.¹ According to President Bush, people liberated from repression and authoritarian rule would chose freedom, liberal institutions and ultimately democracy as their form of government.² Such ideas about the universality of freedom were consistently applied by the Bush administration to Middle East democratisation from 2001.

As with many aspects of the Bush Doctrine, the case for the universality of freedom was stated most succinctly in the September 2002 National Security Strategy. In the introduction to the National Security Strategy, President Bush asserted that “freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person – in every civilisation.”³ The President's introduction contended that

Liberty and justice... are right and true for all people everywhere. No nation owns these aspirations, and no nation is exempt from them.

¹ The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002'. Washington, 17 September 2002, p. iii. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, accessed 1 May 2007.

² Ibid; For critical analysis of these claims, see Ryn, pp. 7-9.

³ NSS 2002, p. iii.

Fathers and mothers in all societies want their children to be educated and to live free of poverty and violence. No people on earth yearn to be oppressed, aspire to servitude, or eagerly await the midnight knock of the secret police.⁴

This notion of the universality of freedom played an integral part in the Bush administration's foreign policy outlook from the time it assumed office. In his inaugural address of January 2001, President Bush championed the universality of freedom, expressing a strong belief that within every person there existed an innate desire for freedom.⁵ President Bush claimed that it was the aim of United States foreign policy to help people throughout the world realise this desire, utilising the many instruments of its national power to advance freedom; including its military power where it deemed necessary.⁶ As the benevolent hegemon, it was the responsibility of the United States to champion universal rights applicable to all people. Further, the United States government determined that freedom, as it conceived of the concept, was always in the best interests of people in other nations.

The conception of universal freedom expressed by a number of Bush administration officials was most strongly associated with the need to promote democracy in the Middle East.⁷ In his June 2002 West Point graduation address, which stood as the first systematic public articulation of the Bush Doctrine as a whole, President Bush argued that

When it comes to the common rights and needs of men and women, there is no clash of civilizations. The requirements of freedom apply fully to Africa and Latin America and the entire Islamic world. The peoples of the Islamic nations want and deserve the same freedoms and opportunities as people in every nation. And their governments should listen to their hopes.⁸

Such thinking was also regularly articulated by second-term Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. In a December 2005 article, Rice wrote that the desire for freedom was universal, and that “our power gains its greatest legitimacy when we support the natural right of all people, even those who disagree with us, to govern

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ 'Inaugural Address of George W. Bush'. United States Capitol, 20 January 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/inaugural-address.html>, accessed 21 April 2008.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ 'President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East'. Remarks by the President in Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina, 9 May 2003.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030509-11.html>, accessed 20 February 2007.

⁸ 'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'.

themselves in liberty.”⁹ Elsewhere, Rice was more categorical, contending in a speech in mid-2005 that “liberty is the universal longing of every soul, and democracy is the ideal path for every nation,” and this included all people of the Middle East.¹⁰ Thus Rice, like Bush and most other officials in the top echelons of the State and Defence Departments, claimed that freedom was the natural condition of the Arab world, and that the primary obstacle to its realisation there was the existence of tyranny bent on preventing those it repressed from gaining and expressing their freedom.

In their support for spreading freedom to the Middle East, President Bush and others attempted to confront what they characterised as the argument of some critics that Arabs did not want to live in freedom and that it was ill-conceived to promote freedom in a region with a history of authoritarian rule and strong religious traditions. President Bush claimed that those who did not share in the 'freedom agenda' for the Arab world were, at best, cultural relativists who wrongly believed that Arabs were incapable of living in freedom.¹¹ In perhaps the most frequently-cited articulation of this argument, President Bush claimed in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute in February 2003 that

It is presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a whole region of the world – or the one-fifth of humanity that is Muslim – is somehow untouched by the most basic aspirations of life. Human cultures can be vastly different. Yet the human heart desires the same good things, everywhere on Earth. In our desire to be safe from brutal and bullying oppression, human beings are the same. In our desire to care for our children and give them a better life, we are the same.¹²

The president expanded on this theme again in a speech in May 2003, pointing out that during WWII and the Cold War, some critics questioned the appeal of freedom in countries like Fascist Japan or in the Soviet Union and its satellites, but history time and again proved these naysayers wrong as freedom took root in such formerly

⁹ Condoleezza Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace'. Opinion Editorial. *The Washington Post*, (11 Dec., 2005).

¹⁰ 'Remarks at the American University in Cairo'. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Cairo, Egypt 20 June 2005. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/48328.htm>, accessed 5 May 2008.

¹¹ 'President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East'. Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, Washington, D.C., 6 November 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031106-2.html>, accessed 21 April 2008.

¹² 'President Discusses the Future of Iraq'. Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C., 26 February 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html>, accessed 2 February 2007.

totalitarian states. Applying this argument to the Middle East, Bush declared that “the history of the modern world offers a lesson for the skeptics: do not bet against the success of freedom.”¹³ Just as it had transformed the Axis powers and the USSR, the United States would spearhead the emergence of freedom in Arab Middle East, helping its people to realise their long-held aspirations for freedom that had been stifled by decades of authoritarian rule.¹⁴

Liberalism and Democratisation

The propositions put forward in the Bush Doctrine about spreading freedom and democracy were overtly liberal in nature. Liberal ideas profoundly shaped the Bush administration's interventionist arguments and its conceptions of the democratic regimes it sought to encourage in the Middle East. The Bush Doctrine's underlying liberal outlook was influenced by the activist liberal international relations theories interpreted and expressed by democratic globalists, as examined in chapter one, as well as by the heightened optimism about the global appeal of liberalism engendered by the collapse of communism and spread of democracy in the 1990's. This fostered a rationale for intervention centred on the claims that the United States alone held the sole remaining prescription for successful liberal societies, and that one of the most effective ways to promote liberal democracy in non-liberal states was through armed action.¹⁵

Liberalism as The End of History

The Bush Doctrine claimed that a liberal political, economic and social order was the sole remaining way in which people throughout the world could organise their lives

¹³ 'President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East'. See the discussion in chapter four of this thesis on the way in which the Bush administration linked democratisation in Iraq to the examples of post-war Germany and Japan.

¹⁴ This idea closely reflected the claims of Paul Wolfowitz, Paula Dobriansky and others, examined in chapter one of this thesis, where each claimed that freedom had universal appeal and it was imperative to encourage freedom in authoritarian societies. Wolfowitz and Dobriansky assumed important positions in the Bush administration and it is quite likely that their ideas about the universality of freedom helped to influence the claims expressed in the Bush Doctrine itself.

¹⁵ Jedediah Purdy, 'Liberal Empire: Assessing the Arguments'. *Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs*, (Apr., 2003), pp. 2-3.

and governments. In his West Point speech, President Bush asserted that “the 20th century ended with a single surviving model of human progress, based on non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on the power of the state, respect for women and private property and free speech and equal justice and religious tolerance.”¹⁶ In the subsequent National Security Strategy of September 2002, the Bush administration argued that with the defeat of communist totalitarianism, and in the absence of any other challengers, liberal ideology was now the single means by which humanity could achieve lasting freedom and peace.¹⁷ The National Security Strategy claimed that the United States sought “to create a balance of power that favours human freedom,” aiming to foster “conditions in which all nations and societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and economic liberty.”¹⁸ President Bush argued that the United States did not seek to impose liberal values on other people, but rather that it would give all people the option to choose liberalism – confident that when given this freedom of choice, individuals and groups throughout the world would embrace liberal values as these were intuitively the “single sustainable model” of government, economic development and social order in the twenty-first century.¹⁹

This conception of the teleological direction and universalism of liberalism derived in large part from the neoconservative reading of Francis Fukuyama's 'End of History' argument. Distilled and simplified by neoconservative intellectuals, the End of History teleology expressed in the National Security Strategy, and in other documents, lacked probabilistic qualification and was a reified version of the theory. Many senior foreign policy making officials of the Bush administration conceived of the End of History as a simple linear process that often required speeding up through the agency of American military power.²⁰ Some in the Bush administration sought to operationalise Fukuyama's theory as part of the United States' post-September 11 grand strategy in the Middle East, expanding the boundaries of the liberal world through force “with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world,”²¹ in order to

¹⁶ 'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'.

¹⁷ NSS 2002, p. i.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 1.

¹⁹ Ibid; For detailed criticism of this key assumption, see chapter four of this thesis.

²⁰ For critical analysis of this key aspect of the Bush Doctrine's outlook and its implications, see Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 54-5.

²¹ For President Bush's first and most sweeping articulation of this goal, see 'President Bush Sworn into Second Term'. Washington, 20 January 2005.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural/index.html>, accessed 2 August 2007.

help make the 'end of history' a reality. The essence of the democratic globalist interpretation of Fukuyama's argument about the teleological direction of liberal development became a guiding framework for the Bush Doctrine's conceptions for understanding and promoting a liberal democratic order in foreign states after September 11 2001.

Examining the National Security Strategy's claims, Carnegie Endowment democratisation scholar Jedediah Purdy aptly captures the Bush Doctrine's faith in this teleological direction of liberalism. Purdy writes that to the policy makers that influenced the formulation of the doctrine, “the fall of Marxist-Leninist governments across Eastern Europe and then the Soviet Union seemed mightily to confirm that people everywhere really do want the same things: personal liberty and security, a measure of comfort and opportunity, and the privilege of feeling at home in a “normal country.””²² Purdy contends that the spread of liberal democracy during the 1990's reinforced for neoconservatives “the idea that, given the choice, all cultures would converge on a roughly American set of tastes and aspirations.”²³ This heightened sense of optimism, combined with the activist variations of liberal international relations theory and practice that developed in the 1990's, engendered a sense that liberalism was truly the only way forward – the ideology that would soon govern the world and bring about the end of history.²⁴ These ideas coalesced in the Bush Doctrine into an almost unassailable faith in the future of liberalism as the sole remaining model of progress, and encouraged the idea that accelerating liberal development through intervention was an eminently realistic foreign policy with a range of beneficial results.

Democracy For All

The two National Security Strategies and related documents not only articulated a faith in liberalism in broad theoretical terms, but also laid out in some detail what the United States government believed a liberal state and society should constitute. According to President Bush and most other cabinet officials around him, the United States held a set of universally applicable prescriptions for liberal democracy,

²² Purdy, p. 10.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

economic development and social order, and it therefore best understood the requirements for liberal democracy in other countries. The introduction of the 2002 National Security Strategy contended that the United States would “actively work to bring the hope of democracy and development to every corner of the world.”²⁵ Indeed, the document declared, “only nations that share a commitment to protecting basic human rights and guaranteeing political and economic freedom will be able to unleash the potential of their people and ensure their future prosperity.”²⁶ Hence, only through a commitment to liberal democracy could countries progress, and the United States offered the best, and indeed, the only, prescription for a democratic order and a successful liberal society more generally.²⁷

Expanding on many of these ideas, the Bush administration's March 2006 National Security Strategy outlined in some detail what the United States government considered the key elements of liberal democracy. The 2006 National Security Strategy emphasised the need for the United States to “promote effective democracies” abroad.²⁸ According to the strategy document, “effective democracies:”

- Honour and uphold basic human rights, including freedom of religion, consciousness, speech, assembly, association and press.
- Are responsive to their citizens, submitting to the will of the people, especially when people vote to change their government.
- Exercise effective sovereignty and maintain order within their borders, protect independent and impartial systems of justice, punish crime, embrace the rule of law and resist corruption and;
- Limit the reach of government, protect the institutions of civil society, including the family, religious communities, voluntary associations, private property, independent business and a market economy.²⁹

²⁵ NSS 2002, p. i; For the Bush administration's first articulation of this key claim of its doctrine, see 'President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'.

²⁶ NSS 2002, p. i.

²⁷ For critical discussion of this logic, see Paul T. McCartney, 'American Nationalism and US Foreign Policy From September 11 to the Iraq War'. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119, No. 3, (Fall 2004), p. 407; See also Jonathan Monten, 'The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in U.S. Strategy'. *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (2005), p. 143.

²⁸ 'The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006'. (Hereafter NSS 2006) Washington, The White House, 16 March 2006, pp. 4-5.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006>, accessed 2 August 2007.

²⁹ Ibid.

The National Security Strategy noted that “elections are the most visible sign of a free society and can play a critical role in advancing effective democracy. But elections alone are not enough – they must be reinforced by other values, rights, and institutions to bring about lasting freedom. Our goal is human liberty protected by democratic institutions.”³⁰ Thus, checks and balances between the branches of government were essential to establishing and upholding effective liberal democracy, as was the rule of law, equality of all citizens, independent media and civil society organisations that could lobby the government.³¹ In addition, free market economies were integral to maintaining a liberal democratic order and ensuring prosperity. The neoliberal model apparently proved to be the most effective way to overcome poverty, create wealth and foster healthy competition in both a domestic and international economy.³² The Bush Doctrine articulated a prescription for liberal democracy and society that was effectively identical to the existing structures and norms of liberal society in the United States, Western Europe and other liberal states, and it held that every state and people had the capacity to realise what it deemed to be the last remaining viable system of government and society.

The prescriptions for liberal democracy outlined by the Bush Doctrine were strongly supported by neoconservatives. Leading neoconservatives in the Bush administration, such as Wolfowitz and Perle, and influential figures outside of the administration such as Kristol and Kagan, consistently backed the Bush Doctrine's claims about liberal democracy. However, the lesser-known neoconservative, Paula Dobriansky, stood out within the Bush administration as one of the most

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid; See also 'President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East'. The Bush administration also launched a variety of aid programs to assist the development of civil society, women's groups, education and enterprise in Arab states. Especially important were the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA). While this is what Thomas Carothers has labelled a “soft” approach to democratisation which does in its own right have some importance, it is not considered here as a part of activist democratisation for three reasons: it is not a justification for interventionist democratisation; it is in many ways a continuation of civil society aid programs pursued by the Clinton administration and organisations such as the United Nations; and it is not a policy generally favoured by neoconservatives as it is too gradualist and can reinforce the political status quo. For the text of MEPI, see 'The U.S.-Middle East Partnership Initiative: Expanding Political Opportunity'. Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs Washington, DC, 18 June 2003. <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/22251.htm>, accessed 6 May 2008; For critical discussion of MEPI, BMENA and the merits and pitfalls of a “soft” approach to democratisation, see Thomas Carothers 'Choosing a Strategy' in Thomas Carothers, Marina Ottaway (Eds), *Uncharted Journey: Promoting Democracy in the Middle East*. Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, pp. 193-4; See also Sami E. Baroudi, 'Arab Intellectuals and the Bush Administration's Campaign for Democracy: The Case of the Greater Middle East Initiative'. *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 61, No. 3, (Summer 2007), pp. 390-418.

³² NSS 2006, pp. 25-7.

sophisticated proponents of the claims put forward by the Bush Doctrine. Dobriansky served as the Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs and Democracy, acting in this position to reinforce calls for the spread of liberal democracy. In an article in *The National Interest* in 2004, Dobriansky emphasised the need for liberal institutions and civil society to encourage the development of successful democracy.³³ Dobriansky wrote that

Democracy-building is a protracted process, and one or two free elections do not make a democracy. A mature democracy requires far more than periodic holding of even free and fair elections. It calls for limited government, with many of the economic, social and cultural issues being handled within a private sphere. The rule of law is another must, with a particular emphasis on ensuring governmental accountability.³⁴

Dobriansky recognised that while elections were integral to the process of democracy building, it was essential that liberal institutions be constructed first, that checks and balances on the power of the government be enshrined in law, and that the rights of all minorities within the state were guaranteed.³⁵

Dobriansky emphasised that while the United States was “happy to share our experience, promoting democracy does not mean imposing the American political and constitutional model on other countries.”³⁶ Dobriansky insisted that the United States government believed that “citizens in emerging democracies must be free to develop institutions compatible with their own cultures and experiences,” and that while “the desire for freedom, the rule of law and a vibrant civil society, and for a voice in one's government, is universal,” this did not mean that all liberal democratic systems would necessarily resemble the American system.³⁷ Liberal development would thus not necessarily be even, but it will occur, as no other model of government could offer a viable alternative to the values, institutions and order

³³ Dobriansky, 'Advancing Democracy', p. 72.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ While this more complete package of liberal institution building, rule of law and constitutionalism was emphasised in theory by Dobriansky and the Bush administration more generally, discussion in chapter four of this thesis shows that in practice, the administration appeared to go against its own advice as it pushed for rapid elections in the Middle East after 2003, helping to engender a number of problems in the process.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid; For further discussion by Dobriansky on the key requirements of effective liberal democratic governments and the ways in which this can vary between nations, see Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Strategies on Democracy Promotion'. Remarks to the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, 20 June 2005. <http://www.state.gov/rls/rm/2005/48394.htm>, accessed 29 April 2008.

offered by liberal democracy.³⁸

The Bush Doctrine's faith in the future of liberalism and its strong support for the promotion of democracy was intimately related to its justifications for armed intervention in the Middle East. While President Bush proclaimed a general commitment to promoting and sustaining a liberal world order by force, such ideas were applied most frequently to the Arab Middle East. Purdy writes that in the Middle East especially, "the Bush Doctrine stakes its case" for intervention "on the idea that [liberal] values can be effectively achieved by imperial intervention. The basis of this idea... is the belief that top-down American competence and bottom-up local spontaneous order will meet to produce a market economy, stable democratic institutions, and a civil society that protects basic liberty and security."³⁹ The Bush Doctrine aimed, through promoting liberal democracy by acts of military intervention in the Middle East, to defeat threats to the United States, secure freedom and peace in the region, and enhance American security and material interests. Each of the remaining propositions made by the Bush Doctrine for armed democratisation in the Middle East reflected key elements of its liberal interventionist thinking. The defining feature of this logic was the need for regime change and democracy in Iraq as the first step towards bringing about a liberal democratic order across the Arab world, transforming it from a 'historic' to a 'post-historic' region that would be terrorist-free, pro-American, secure, and at peace.

Authoritarianism and Jihadist Terrorism: Democracy as the Cure

One of the Bush Doctrine's strongest and most frequently invoked justifications for activist democracy promotion in the Middle East was that establishing democracy in the region was integral to defeating Jihadist terrorism. Senior foreign policy figures of the administration contended that the presence of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East bred Jihadist terrorism against the United States, and the cure to this

³⁸ Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Promoting Democracy in the 21st Century: An Essential Tool Against Terrorism'. Remarks to the Baltimore Council on Foreign Affairs, Baltimore, Maryland, 9 February 2004. <http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2004/29184.htm>, accessed 29 April 2008. For critical discussion of the problems of assuming that all Arab states will invariably become liberal democracies, see discussion in chapter four of this thesis.

³⁹ Purdy, p. 12.

violent ideology was to 'drain the swamp' in which it grew by transforming authoritarian Arab states into democracies by force where necessary. The Bush Doctrine's claim that armed democratisation was essential to defeating terrorism and authoritarianism was drawn from some important elements of neoconservative thinking, especially the neoconservative emphasis on the links between totalitarianism and conflict, and their confidence that, as American power helped to shatter the status quo of the Cold War, so too could it fundamentally change the violent status quo of the Middle East.

The Problem of Authoritarianism

A number of senior figures of the Bush administration argued that it was the authoritarian status quo of the Arab Middle East that bore large responsibility for the attacks of September 11 and the fostering of Jihadist ideology.⁴⁰ President Bush argued frequently that authoritarian Arab regimes created breeding grounds in which Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism grew, as people denied their freedom turned to violent extremism.⁴¹ In a speech in March 2005, President Bush laid out this logic in perhaps its most succinct form when he argued that

Our strategy to keep the peace in the longer term is to help change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror, especially in the broader Middle East. Parts of that region have been caught for generations in a cycle of tyranny and despair and radicalism. When a dictatorship controls the political life of a country, responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme. And to draw attention away from their social and economic failures, dictators place blame on other countries and other races, and stir the hatred that leads to violence. This status quo of despotism and anger cannot be ignored or appeased, kept in a box or bought off, because we have witnessed how the violence in that region can reach easily across borders and oceans. The entire world has an urgent interest in the progress, and hope, of freedom in the broader

⁴⁰ For a good discussion of the way in which the Bush administration, taking its cue from neoconservatives, conceived of the political status quo of the Arab world as the primary cause of Jihadist terrorism, see Amy Hawethorn, 'The New Reform Ferment' in Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), pp. 60-2.

⁴¹ 'Fact Sheet: Winning the Struggle Between Freedom and Terror in the Middle East'. The White House, 31 August 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060831.html>, accessed 2 February 2007; For discussion of the key elements of the propositions made in this document and others, see Packer, pp. 50-2.

Middle East.⁴²

President Bush and other officials, such as Condoleezza Rice and Dick Cheney, consistently reiterated their belief that the terrorist-breeding status quo of the Middle East was no longer acceptable. Rather than ignoring this problem or refusing to attack its root cause out of a desire to maintain 'stability', the United States now faced the necessary task of removing the regimes responsible for generating this radicalism.⁴³

President Bush claimed that his administration explicitly broke with the policies of its predecessors by opting for democratic transformation in the Middle East. In a speech to the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003, Bush contended that “sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe – because in the long run, stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty. As long as the Middle East remains a place where freedom does not flourish, it will remain a place of stagnation, resentment, and violence ready for export.”⁴⁴ Bush reiterated this theme in greater detail later in the same month in a speech at Whitehall Palace in London, contending that

We must shake off decades of failed policy in the Middle East. [We have] in the past... been willing to make a bargain, to tolerate oppression for the sake of stability. Longstanding ties often led us to overlook the faults of local elites. Yet this bargain did not bring stability or make us safe. It merely bought time, while problems festered and ideologies of violence took hold. As recent history has shown, we cannot turn a blind eye to oppression just because the oppression is not in our own backyard.⁴⁵

The 2006 National Security Strategy codified this thinking further, arguing that “political alienation,” combined with domestic repression, a culture of violence and

⁴² 'President Discusses War on Terror'. National Defence University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 8 March 2005. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050308-3.html>, accessed 20 February 2007.

⁴³ 'Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union'. Washington, 20 January 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006>, accessed 12 February 2007; See also 'Vice President's Remarks to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee 2006 Policy Conference'. The Washington D.C. Convention Center, Washington, D.C., 7 March 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060307-1.html>, accessed 3 February 2007.

⁴⁴ 'President Bush Discusses Freedom in Iraq and Middle East'.

⁴⁵ 'President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London'. Remarks by the President at Whitehall Palace, Royal Banqueting House-Whitehall Palace, London, England, 19 November 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/11/20031119-1.html>, accessed 2 February 2007.

severe restrictions on freedom, drove some disenchanted individuals in the Arab world towards terrorism and political extremism.⁴⁶ Echoing a key claim of neoconservatism, the Bush Doctrine argued that advancing democracy in the Middle East also advanced American security, while to continue with the realist pursuit of 'stability' at the expense of freedom would only generate further anger and resentment.⁴⁷

In making its claims about the links between authoritarianism and terrorism, the Bush administration was in some ways echoing elements of the neoconservative interpretation of totalitarian theory. Columbia University international relations professor Robert Jervis notes that President Bush and many of his top advisers subscribed to the idea that regime type played a highly significant role in international relations.⁴⁸ The Bush Doctrine expressed the idea that an authoritarian regime would foster an ideology of violence by virtue of being a repressive state, and that the straightforward solution to this problem was to transform such a state into a democracy.⁴⁹ Leading neoconservative writers and policy makers often articulated these ideas and implicitly linked them to the tradition of totalitarian theory in neoconservative thought. Joshua Muravchik contended in a December 2007 interview that in the neoconservative analysis of the roots of Jihadist terrorism

The problem lay in the political culture of the Middle East. The question was how to change it. One of the defining features of that political culture was tyrannical government. We argued that if we can spread democracy as a form of government in that region, then the process of socialisation that occurs in democracies will lead people away from thinking murder and suicide are the way to carry on an argument, and foster more political and peaceful ways.⁵⁰

Muravchik held that explanations for terrorism that focused on poverty or the grievances Jihadists claimed to hold against the United States and its allies were spurious; what mattered most was the political climate of fear and repression caused by Arab authoritarianism which drove frustrated individuals into the arms of

⁴⁶ NSS 2006, p. 4.

⁴⁷ Compare this claim, regularly made from 2002 to 2006 with those made in 2008, as examined in the conclusion of this thesis, where President Bush and others now regularly emphasise the importance of regional stability over democratic change.

⁴⁸ Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine', p. 371; For further discussion of this crucial assumption in the Bush Doctrine, see Robert Jervis, 'Why the Bush Doctrine Cannot be Sustained'. *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 120, No. 3, (Fall 2005), pp. 365-6.

⁴⁹ Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine', p. 371.

⁵⁰ Muravchik, Johnson, 'The Neoconservative Persuasion and Foreign Policy'.

extremists.⁵¹ Similarly, Paula Dobriansky argued that Middle East authoritarianism bore prime responsibility for generating Jihadist ideology and violence. Dobriansky held that in the Middle East “the danger to America comes not exclusively from dictators who make war directly upon us, our allies, and our interests – it also emanates from dictators who create an atmosphere so poisonous and so brutal that evil sprouts and motivates a small but radicalized cadre to terrorism.”⁵² Only by sweeping away this status quo in the Middle East through the process of democratisation could the United States fundamentally undermine terrorism and ensure its security into the future.⁵³

Democracy as the Panacea

Leading foreign policy officials of the Bush administration placed such emphasis on democratisation as the best strategy for overcoming terrorism that this idea became what Katerina Dalacoura, of the London School of Economic and Political Science, labels “something that would put right all troubles – a panacea.”⁵⁴ Encouraging democracy was conceived as among the most important weapon in the war on terrorism, as democratic values were seen as the very antithesis of Jihadism.⁵⁵ In his January 2005 re-inauguration speech, widely seen as the most sweeping affirmation of the Bush Doctrine's “freedom agenda,” President Bush asserted that

As long as whole regions of the world simmer in resentment and tyranny – prone to ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder – violence will gather, and multiply in destructive power, and cross the most defended borders, and raise a mortal threat. There is only one force of history that can break the reign of hatred and resentment, and expose the pretensions of tyrants, and reward the hopes of the decent and tolerant, and that is the force of human freedom.⁵⁶

Further, Bush stated that “it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”⁵⁷ In the President's view, this task

⁵¹ Ibid. For critical analysis of this claim, see chapter five of this thesis.

⁵² Dobriansky, 'Promoting Democracy in the 21st Century'.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Katerina Dalacoura, 'US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East Since 11 September 2001: A Critique'. *International Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 5, (2005), p. 974.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ 'President Bush Sworn into Second Term'.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

had special salience in the Middle East, as it was there that the forces of terrorism and tyranny were most malignant and where the need for democracy was most pressing.⁵⁸

Key foreign policy documents released by the Bush administration consistently maintained that democracy provided freedom, representation and prospects for the future to those who would otherwise become alienated and susceptible to extremism. The 2006 National Security Strategy claimed that democracy was integral to undermining the resentment that fed Jihadist ideology. According to the strategy document “in the place of alienation, democracy offers an ownership stake in society, a chance to shape one's own future,” and that “in the place of festering grievances, democracy offers the rule of law, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and the habits of advancing interests through compromises.”⁵⁹ Elsewhere, President Bush argued that democratic regimes were inimical to Jihadist ideology and that encouraging democratic development and elections in the Arab Middle East struck a blow against the enemy. In his November 2003 speech at Whitehall, President Bush claimed that

In democratic and successful societies, men and women do not swear allegiance to malcontents and murderers; they turn their hearts and labor to building better lives. And democratic governments do not shelter terrorist camps or attack their peaceful neighbors; they honor the aspirations and dignity of their own people. In our conflict with terror and tyranny, we have an unmatched advantage, a power that cannot be resisted, and that is the appeal of freedom to all mankind.⁶⁰

Invoking both the universal desire for freedom and the apparently inherent pacifying effects of elections and representative government on political extremism, the Bush administration consistently held as an article of faith that democracy represented the single best solution to the problem of authoritarianism and Jihadist terrorism, as it alone could resolve all of the problems that encouraged the growth of Jihadist ideology.⁶¹

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ NSS 2006, pp. 10-11.

⁶⁰ 'President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London'.

⁶¹ 'President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy'. Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C., 6 October 2005.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html>, accessed 15 February 2007.

The Case of Iraq

The proposition contained within the Bush Doctrine that authoritarian regimes fostered Jihadist terrorism and that democracy was the panacea to this problem was most consistently linked to regime change in Iraq.⁶² A large number of scholars critical of regime change in Iraq have pointed out that many influential foreign policy makers linked Saddam Hussein's regime to Jihadist terrorism from the time they assumed office. Influential non-neoconservative figures, such as Rumsfeld and Cheney, and senior neoconservative policymakers and advisors such as Wolfowitz, Feith and Perle, had been pushing for regime change in Iraq since the Bush administration's first National Security Council meeting in January 2001.⁶³ A number of these individuals brought into government many aspects of the policy advocacy they had pursued at the Project for a New American Century and in neoconservative journals in the 1990's.⁶⁴ In the nine months before the September 11 attacks, neoconservatives within and outside of government were frustrated at the administration's lack of decisive action on Iraq, and again repeated their long-standing warnings from the late 1990's about the dangers Saddam Hussein posed and the opportunities for regional political transformation the demise of his regime would bring.

After the September 11 attacks, many neoconservatives and their allies in the administration pushed hard for the adoption of policies of regime change and democratisation in Iraq as the top priority of the war on terrorism.⁶⁵ James Bamford points out that notes of Donald Rumsfeld's conversations with his staff late in the day of September 11 2001 read that he wanted the “best info fast: judge whether good enough to hit S.H [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only U.B.L [Osama Bin Laden].” “Go massive... sweep it all up. Things related, and not.”⁶⁶ Shortly after the attacks, Paul Wolfowitz similarly began pressing the apparent linkages between Iraq,

⁶² For the Bush administration's conceptualisation of the dangers of Iraq, see National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, 'Principals Committee Review of Iraq Policy Paper'. The Situation Room, The White House, 29 October 2002, pp. 2-3, published in Feith, appendix five, pp. 541-3.

⁶³ Bamford, pp. 284-5; Packer, pp. 39-41.

⁶⁴ Packer, pp. 39-41.

⁶⁵ For a good example of pre-September 11 planning on options for dealing with the threat of Iraq, see Donald Rumsfeld, 'Memo on Iraq: Working Paper. Close Hold, Secret/Noform'. Department of Defence, 27 July 2001, published in Feith, appendix 3, pp. 535-8. For critical discussion of neoconservative planning for regime change in Iraq before September 11, and the way in which this intensified following the attacks, see Glenn Greenwald, *A Tragic Legacy: How a Good Vs. Evil Mentality Destroyed the Bush Presidency*. New York, Crown Publishers, 2007, pp. 97-100; Packer, pp. 41-5.

⁶⁶ Bamford, pp. 285-6.

Al Qaeda and, implicitly, the events of September 11, especially at a keynote National Security Council meeting on the war on terrorism held at Camp David a week after the attacks.⁶⁷ Former Bush administration Counter-Terrorism chief, Richard Clarke, claims in *Against All Enemies* that Wolfowitz was especially eager to target Iraq first as a response to the terrorist attacks, believing that this, and not Afghanistan, was where the war on terrorism should begin.⁶⁸ Furthermore, according to Bob Woodward's account in *Plan of Attack*, Rumsfeld and Feith agreed in principle with the idea of regime change in Iraq as the first response to the attacks, but this was opposed by Colin Powell, Condoleezza Rice and George Tenet, who convinced President Bush to put such an option aside for the time being.⁶⁹ Recent publications have revealed that despite regime change then being officially off the table, planning for military action against Iraq nonetheless began in late September 2001, with Rumsfeld directing his military chiefs to begin drawing up new war plans for Iraq and to reconsider their assumptions about the overall threat of Saddam Hussein in light of the terrorist attacks.⁷⁰ This showed that among neoconservatives and their allies there was a significant sense of urgency immediately after September 11 that striking Saddam Hussein was key to the regional political transformation they believed was required to defeat terrorism in the Middle East.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Ibid; For a sympathetic assessment of Wolfowitz's argument at Camp David, see Feith, pp. 48-52, passim; For brief critical appraisals, see Thomas E. Ricks, *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq*. London, Penguin Books, 2007, pp. 30-1; See also Lawrence Freedman, *A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East*. London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2008, p. 7.

⁶⁸ Richard A. Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror*. New York, Free Press, 2004, pp. 231-2, 237-8; For additional discussion of some of the issues Clarke raises, see Keller, 'The Sunshine Warrior'.

⁶⁹ Bob Woodward, *Plan of Attack*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2004, pp. 22, 25-6; Douglas Feith also offers a similar account of the meeting at Camp David, and although his apparent aim is to paint his civilian peers of the Defence Department as wise pragmatists aware of the risks of action and inaction regarding Iraq, his narrative reinforces that produced by Woodward, Clarke and others critics, as it shows that neoconservatives at the Pentagon were in fact pressing for regime change in Iraq only a week after the attacks. See Feith, pp. 48-52.

⁷⁰ Feith, pp. 14-16.

⁷¹ Although Douglas Feith repeatedly claims in his memoir, *War and Decision*, that detailed planning on regime change in Iraq had not commenced until some time after the September 11 attacks, and that no decisions had been made on this action, he provides a narrative where Rumsfeld asks for military options for an invasion of Iraq on September 29 2001 – mere weeks after the September 11 attacks. Furthermore, Feith actually reinforces the claims of critics like Woodward and Clarke when he recounts how the potential for military action against Iraq came up repeatedly in one of the first National Security Council meetings after September 11, not because any planners believed Iraq was directly linked to the attacks, but because it was believed only days removed from the attacks that regime change in Iraq would be key to victory in the war on terrorism. These examples contradict Feith's own assertions later in his memoir where he claims that Iraq was only later conceived as a threat and that war was only decided upon in late 2002. This reinforces again the fact that neoconservatives with prescriptions for regime change in Iraq that were formulated in the late 1990's were indeed intent on implementing these aims shortly after the terrorist attacks. See

As 'phase one' of the war on terrorism commenced in Afghanistan in late 2001, neoconservatives within the Bush administration turned their focus onto conceptually linking Iraq to the war on terrorism and the need to promote democracy through regime change. In November 2001, Paul Wolfowitz convened a meeting of a group of neoconservative and conservative foreign policy intellectuals involved with think tanks such as the Project for a New American Century and the American Enterprise Institute, in order to assess the scope of the war on terror in the Arab Middle East.⁷² Calling themselves “Bletchley II,” after the name “Bletchley” used by the program which broke the German secret codes of WWII, this group, which included Fareed Zakaria, Bernard Lewis, Fouad Ajami, Mark Palmer, Ruel Marc Gerecht and James Q Wilson, produced a paper entitled “The Delta of Terrorism.”⁷³ The Bletchley II group argued that Jihadist terrorism was an existential threat comparable to Soviet communism during the Cold War, and that the nexus of this threat lay in belligerent authoritarian regimes such as Saddam Hussein's Iraq.⁷⁴ Most participants in Bletchley II agreed that overthrowing Saddam Hussein was key to winning the war on terrorism, and that replacing his regime with a liberal democracy would fatally undermine Jihadist ideology.⁷⁵ The “Delta of Terrorism” paper was presented to President Bush and his national security team in December 2001, impressing Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Rice alike. This paper helped to influence the formulation of the Bush Doctrine's interventionist rationales towards Iraq, providing additional concepts that emerged as policy over the following year.⁷⁶

To some extent, the linkages made between the war on terrorism and regime change and democratisation in Iraq were also influenced by the interventionist thinking of neoconservatives outside of the government. Senior policy makers and the President himself appeared to have embraced many elements of the policies advocated after September 11 by the Project for a New American Century and *The Weekly Standard*. President Bush stated as he declared the war on terrorism in September 2001 that “any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will

Feith, pp. 14-16, 48-9, 51-2, 218-21.

⁷² For the most detailed discussion to date of the Bletchley II meeting, see Bob Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War Part III*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2006, pp. 83-4, 498-9. Fukuyama also makes implicit mention of the Bletchley II meeting in *After the Neocons*, although he was not involved in this meeting, and Feith too makes brief mention of this meeting in *War and Decision*, but neither go into the detail Woodward offers in his account.

⁷³ Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp. 83-4.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”⁷⁷ Through this and similar statements, the Bush administration expanded the scope of the war on terrorism to include states deemed responsible for this menace; just as the Project for a New American Century had demanded in its letter published on 20 September, and as a number of writers at the *Weekly Standard* then advocated as well.⁷⁸ As they developed their case for regime change in Iraq, President Bush and his foreign policy advisers also increased their repetition of the argument that it was Saddam Hussein's despotism that was primarily responsible for fostering terrorism in the region. Such statements again ran parallel to the arguments repeatedly made by the Project for a New American Century.⁷⁹ Neoconservatives outside of the Bush administration did not have wide-ranging influence on thinking about Iraq. Nonetheless, these groups did provide a number of additional policy prescriptions for intervention that were often carried into official policy making and reinforced by the arguments of their neoconservative peers within the government.

Following its invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the Bush administration consistently reiterated the centrality of democratisation in the state to winning the war on terrorism. The theme of Iraq as the front line of the battle of ideas for the future of the world gained increased prominence in the explanations offered by President Bush for the growing violence in Iraq. In a speech in March 2006, the President asserted that “the terrorists and Saddamists have been brutal in the pursuit of [their] strategy. They target innocent civilians; they blow up police officers; they attack mosques; and they commit other acts of horrific violence for the cameras. Their objective is to stop Iraq's democratic progress.”⁸⁰ The President regularly linked the war in Iraq to what he conceived as the wider battle between the forces of freedom and tyranny in the Middle East. Thus, Bush claimed in a June 2007 speech that the on-going Jihadist violence in Iraq was a part of a wider conflict against the

⁷⁷ 'Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People'. United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 20 September 2001. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.

⁷⁸ Project for a New American Century, 'Letter to President Bush on War on Terrorism'. Many signatories of this letter also regularly wrote in the *Weekly Standard* in the months after the September 11 attacks.

⁷⁹ Kristol, 'Next Phase of the War on Terrorism'; For good analysis of neoconservative thinking on Iraq within the Bush administration, and some of the ways that this was reinforced by thinking external to the administration, see Mann, chapter 21, *passim*.

⁸⁰ 'President Discusses Democracy in Iraq with Freedom House'. Hyatt Regency Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C., 29 March 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/03/20060329-6.html>, accessed 2 February 2007.

evil forces of the region.⁸¹ President Bush argued that the victory of democracy in Iraq was closely linked to stemming violence elsewhere, especially that emanating from Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as to pressuring Syria to cease supporting terrorism and to challenging Iran's machinations in the region.⁸² Each of these issues was repackaged as part of the same monolithic threat of authoritarian regimes linked to terrorism, and the Bush administration often continued to insist in its last year in power that by promoting democracy, Jihadist terrorism in the Middle East could be undermined.

The 'Democratic Domino Effect'

Present in a number of the documents that make up the Bush Doctrine, such as the two National Security Strategy documents and President Bush's re-inauguration speech, was the claim that as a result of regime change and the establishment of democracy in Iraq, a 'democratic domino effect' would occur in the Arab Middle East. President Bush and his foreign policy advisers confidently claimed that the example of successful liberal democracy in Iraq would help to bring about popular pressure for change and reform in authoritarian Arab states, including 'rogue' regimes like Syria, as well as American allies like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt. This would lead to a wave of change reminiscent to that which swept Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, with the peaceful dismantling of authoritarian governments again giving repressed people the freedom they desired, allowing for the construction of liberal democracies and enhancing security and peace.⁸³

⁸¹ 'President Bush Visits Naval War College, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror'. Spruance Auditorium, Newport, Rhode Island, 28 June 2007.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070628-14.html>, accessed 3 November 2007.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ For useful discussion of the way that some key policy makers of the Bush administration conceived of the spread of democracy in the Arab world as analogous to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, see Thomas Carothers, Marina Ottaway, 'Conclusion: Getting to the Core' in Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), p. 266.

The Bush Administration's Argument

Key figures in the Bush administration, such as President Bush, Paul Wolfowitz and Condoleezza Rice, regularly argued that the establishment of democracy in Iraq was the key to unleashing a wave of democratic transformation in the Middle East and to resolving long-standing conflicts in the region. From this perspective, the emergence of liberal democracy in Iraq would have a large and beneficial demonstration effect on the region, as it would pressure other regimes to dismantle their authoritarian systems. This would do much to undermine the root cause of terrorism and conflict and help to bring freedom to millions of Arab people.⁸⁴ In his 2004 State of the Union Address, President Bush claimed that democracy in Iraq would “light the way for others, and help transform a troubled part of the world.”⁸⁵ Indeed, “the victory of freedom in Iraq” would “bring more hope and progress to a troubled region,” as it would cause a wave of democratic change to sweep the Middle East.⁸⁶ Similarly, in an April 2006 speech, President Bush declared that “a free Iraq will inspire democratic reformers from Damascus to Tehran, and send a signal across the broader Middle East that the future belongs not to terrorism but to freedom.”⁸⁷

Some other influential members of the Bush administration similarly held that promoting democracy in Iraq would foster a regional democratic domino effect. Condoleezza Rice consistently argued that promoting democracy in Iraq was integral to fundamentally changing the political order of the Middle East. In her confirmation hearing as Secretary of State in January 2005, Rice contended that

The success of freedom in... Iraq will give strength and hope to reformers throughout the region, and accelerate the pace of reforms already underway. From Morocco to Jordan to Bahrain, we are seeing elections and new protections for women and minorities, and the beginnings of political pluralism. Political, civil, and business leaders have issued stirring calls for political, economic and social change. Increasingly, the people are speaking, and their message is clear: the future of the region is to live in liberty.⁸⁸

⁸⁴ For good discussion of this aspect of the Bush Doctrine's thinking, see Packer, pp. 57-8.

⁸⁵ 'State of the Union Address'.

⁸⁶ 'State of the Union Address'. Chamber of the U.S. House of Representatives, The United States Capitol Washington, D.C., 2 February 2005.

⁸⁷ 'President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror'.

⁸⁸ 'Opening Remarks by Secretary of State-Designate Dr. Condoleezza Rice'. Secretary Condoleezza Rice, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, DC., 18 January 2005. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/40991.htm>, accessed 29 April 2008.

Relating democratic change in the Middle East to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, Rice held that people should not doubt that similar monumental political changes could also be brought about in a short period in the Arab world.⁸⁹ In a similar vein to Rice, Paul Wolfowitz argued that “success in Iraq would demoralize those who preach doctrines of hatred and oppression and subjugation. It would encourage those who dream the ancient dream, the ageless desire for freedom.”⁹⁰ Wolfowitz claimed that the United States could bring democracy to the Middle East by establishing a model regime in Iraq, as this would bring about significant clamouring for democracy in authoritarian states and thereby spark rapid political changes across the region.⁹¹

Initiating a regional democratic domino effect through armed democratisation in Iraq was viewed by President Bush and others as the key to resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict. The establishment of democracy in the Palestinian territories would apparently undermine the appeal of extremism, provide a firm basis for the “Roadmap for Peace” and ensure a two-state solution to the conflict.⁹² In his February 2003 speech to the American Enterprise Institute, President Bush linked regime change and democratisation in Iraq to the resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict, arguing that

Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state. The passing of Saddam Hussein's regime will deprive terrorist networks of a wealthy patron that pays for terrorist training, and offers rewards to families of suicide bombers. And other regimes will be given a clear warning that support for terror will not be tolerated.⁹³

President Bush claimed that the first step towards resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict was not to confront issues such as the status of Jerusalem, the positioning of borders, the nature of right of return and the problem of Israeli settlements on occupied land, but rather “the serious work of economic development, and political

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ 'On Iraq'. Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Washington, D.C., Wednesday, 16 October 2002. <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=295>, accessed 13 May 2008.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² 'President Discusses Roadmap for Peace in the Middle East'. Remarks by the President on the Middle East, The Rose Garden, 14 March 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030314-4.html>, accessed 21 April 2008. For critical assessment of these claims, see chapter four and the conclusion of this thesis.

⁹³ 'President Discusses the Future of Iraq'.

reform, and reconciliation” in the Palestinian territories.⁹⁴ According to Bush, the “end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an opportunity” to change the dynamics of the conflict, as it would press the Palestinians to democratise.⁹⁵ The clamouring for democratic change in the region engendered by regime change in Iraq would have a rapid, positive effect on the climate of authoritarianism and despair that drove Palestinians to political extremism and undermined previous hopes for peace.⁹⁶ This thinking reflected what Jonathan Monten of Harvard University labels a “bandwagoning” logic, where through American leadership and the example of Iraqi democracy, Palestinians would realise that peace and self-determination were best achieved through democracy.⁹⁷ Accordingly, they would dismantle their existing authoritarian government and rally behind democratic change.⁹⁸

The Bush administration also claimed in more general terms that the example of successful liberal democracy in Iraq would radiate across the Middle East. Democratisation in Iraq would place the Syrian Ba'ath Party under pressure to reform or eventually be overthrown, and would compel Iran to cease its support for terrorism and to reform its highly illiberal domestic political system.⁹⁹ Democratic change would also sweep America's Arab allies, as the example of Iraqi democracy would bring about clamouring for liberalisation and elections in Egypt, Jordan, the Gulf States and even Saudi Arabia. This process was to be analogous to the wave of democratisation many neoconservatives believe was engendered by the Reagan administration's support for democracy in the late 1980's, where authoritarian American allies such as South Korea, Chile, the Philippines and South Africa liberalised their governments under American pressure.¹⁰⁰ A repeat of such dramatic changes in the context of the Middle East would strike at the roots of terrorism, give the people of the Arab world their freedom and allow for the normalisation of relations between Israel and Arab states.¹⁰¹ Thus, regime change and democratisation

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Monten, p. 150.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ 'President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror'. Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 28 June 2005. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/20050628-7.html>, accessed 3 February 2007; See also Richard N. Haass, 'Towards Greater Democracy in the Muslim World: Remarks to the Council on Foreign Relations'. Washington, D.C., 4 December, 2002. <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/15686.htm>, accessed 16 May 2007.

¹⁰⁰ For discussion of this view, see chapter one of this thesis.

¹⁰¹ For a critical appraisal of this thinking, see Rachele Marshall, 'Bush Promises Democracy But Iraqis and Palestinians Aren't Cheering'. *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 3, (Apr., 2004), pp. 7-8.

in Iraq could fundamentally alter Arab domestic political landscapes and the present condition of the region for the better.

The 'Arab Spring' of 2005

President Bush and senior cabinet officials confidently asserted by 2005 that their propositions about an Arab democratic domino effect had been vindicated. Events in the Middle East during 2005 seemed to strongly suggest that democratisation in Iraq had indeed initiated a wave of democratic change in the region, fostering a heightened sense of optimism among senior Bush administration figures that the Bush Doctrine's freedom agenda had come to fruition and that an "Arab Spring" had arrived.

In a March 2005 speech devoted to discussing democracy in the Middle East, President Bush outlined how influential calls for reform and liberalisation were spreading throughout the region. President Bush commented that

Progress in the broader Middle East has seemed frozen in place for decades. Yet at last, clearly and suddenly, the thaw has begun. The people of Afghanistan have embraced free government, after suffering under one of the most backward tyrannies on earth. The voters in Iraq defied threats of murder, and have set their country on a path to full democracy. The people of the Palestinian Territories cast their ballots against violence and corruption of the past. And any who doubt the appeal of freedom in the Middle East can look to Lebanon, where the Lebanese people are demanding a free and independent nation. In the words of one Lebanese observer, "Democracy is knocking at the door of this country and, if it's successful in Lebanon, it is going to ring the doors of every Arab regime."¹⁰²

The President especially emphasised the political progress he saw occurring in the Palestinian territories and in Lebanon in early 2005. Following the death of Yassir Arafat in November 2004, Palestinian presidential elections took place in January 2005 and the "moderate" Fatah leader Mahmoud Abbas came to power, initiating reforms in the Palestinian Authority while also expressly rejecting terrorism as a tactic.¹⁰³ Meanwhile, following the assassination of their popular former Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri in February 2005, the people of Lebanon threw out almost

¹⁰² 'President Discusses War on Terror'.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

thirty years of Syrian occupation in April 2005 through the “Cedar revolution,” a largely peaceful uprising that some compared to the beginning of the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.¹⁰⁴ President Bush strongly supported such changes in Lebanon, stating in soaring language common at the time that

All the world is witnessing your great movement of conscience. Lebanon's future belongs in your hands, and by your courage, Lebanon's future will be in your hands. The American people are on your side. Millions across the earth are on your side. The momentum of freedom is on your side, and freedom will prevail in Lebanon.¹⁰⁵

President Bush and other senior officials also asserted that the democratic domino effect was bringing about beneficial political changes among America's long-time Arab allies. Bush claimed in his March 2005 speech, as with many subsequent speeches during the year, that the example of Iraq was influencing changes in states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States.¹⁰⁶ Egypt was set to hold its first competitive presidential election during 2005, Saudi Arabia was to hold staggered municipal elections with male suffrage, and electoral reforms and enfranchisement was increasingly occurring in the Gulf monarchies and Jordan.¹⁰⁷ Condoleezza Rice emphasised these apparent movements towards democratic change and pressed for further reform in a speech at the American University of Cairo in June 2005. Rice outlined the changes that had occurred in the region to date, especially elections in Iraq and Palestine, and political developments in Lebanon, before publicly pressuring the regime of Hosni Mubarak to hold free and fair elections.¹⁰⁸ Rice argued that

President Mubarak's decision to amend the country's constitution and hold multiparty elections is encouraging. President Mubarak has unlocked the door for change. Now, the Egyptian Government must put its faith in its own people. We are all concerned for the future of Egypt's reforms when peaceful supporters of democracy – men and women – are not free from violence. The day must come when the rule of law replaces emergency decrees – and when the independent judiciary replaces arbitrary justice.¹⁰⁹

Rice emphasised that Mubarak needed to “meet objective standards that define every

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ 'Remarks at the American University in Cairo'.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

free election,” and to accept the outcome of the vote, even if this cost him power.¹¹⁰ This was an unusual position, as previous American administrations refrained from publicly pressuring their Arab allies into democratic reform in such a way.¹¹¹ This reflected two key concepts of the Bush Doctrine: that the authoritarian status quo of the Middle East needed to be fundamentally reformed, and that contrary to realist claims, promoting democratic values, even among close authoritarian allies, would inherently enhance American security and national interests.¹¹²

The “Promise of Democratic Peace” in the Middle East

Present in the terms of many of the documents that constitute the Bush Doctrine was the claim that the unfolding of a democratic domino effect outwards from Iraq would lead to the spread of democratic peace in the Middle East. Leading foreign policy authorities in the Bush administration asserted as an article of faith that democratic regimes did not fight with one another and did not breed ideologies of violence.¹¹³ According to these figures, the growth of democracy would have a wide-ranging pacifying effect on conflict and extremism in the Middle East. Embracing the simplified neoconservative version of democratic peace, the Bush administration asserted that democracies were inherently pacific in nature and that for this very reason it was imperative to encourage the spread of democracy in the Middle East.

The democratic peace theory was consistently invoked by President Bush and his advisers as the cornerstone of a strategy to pacify the Middle East and ensure its security into the future.¹¹⁴ The 2006 National Security Strategy captured succinctly this belief in the importance of democratic peace when it argued that

Governments that honour their citizens' dignity and desire for freedom tend to uphold responsible conduct towards other nations, while governments that brutalise their people also threaten the security and

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ For good discussion of Rice's positions on spreading democracy to America's authoritarian Arab allies, see Marcus Mabry, *Condoleezza Rice: Naked Ambition*. London, Gibson Square, 2007, pp. 264-5.

¹¹² These claims are critically assessed in some detail in chapter five and the conclusion of this thesis.

¹¹³ For critical analysis of the Bush administration's faith in democratic peace, see Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace'; See also Shalom, 'The Civilisation of Clashes', p. 549; Desch, 'America's Liberal Illiberalism', p. 22; Moses, pp. 49-50.

¹¹⁴ For an examination of this logic, see Montan, p. 112.

peace of other nations. Because democracies are the most responsible members of the international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity.¹¹⁵

The National Security Strategy document asserted that “peace and international stability are most reliably built on a foundation of freedom.”¹¹⁶ As regime type determined a state's foreign policy, an Arab world comprising of a community of democratic states would be peaceful, as it had been empirically proven beyond question that democracies did not engage in aggression with one another.

Echoing neoconservative intellectuals and the activist liberal thinkers from which they derived the theory, many in the Bush administration simplified democratic peace theory into an equation whereby the creation of successful democracies in the Arab world would inevitably bring about peace.¹¹⁷ President Bush contended in his 2005 State of the Union address that the growth of democratic regimes would be advantageous for the advancement of peace “because democracies respect their own people and their neighbours” and thus “the advance of freedom will lead to peace.”¹¹⁸ Indeed, Bush held that dictatorship inexorably led to foreign policies of aggression and brinksmanship, while democracy ensured benign relations and the defusing of regional tensions. As President Bush made clear in a speech in May 2003, “the expansion of liberty throughout the world is the best guarantee of security throughout the world. Freedom is the way to peace.”¹¹⁹

Arguments in favour of bringing about a democratic peace in the Middle East were regularly articulated by leading neoconservative and non-neoconservative figures of the Bush administration alike. In a Senate committee testimony in May 2005, Paula Dobriansky argued that “we know now more than ever that the way a government treats its own people bears directly on how it acts in the international arena. We know that the best defense of our own borders comes from the growth of freedom abroad,” and this was particularly true in relation to the Middle East.¹²⁰

¹¹⁵ NSS 2006, p. 3.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, p. iii.

¹¹⁷ For discussion of the version of democratic peace theory expressed by the Bush administration, see Shalom, 'For a Democratic Peace of Mind'.

¹¹⁸ 'State of the Union Address'.

¹¹⁹ 'President Bush Presses for Peace in the Middle East'.

¹²⁰ Paula J. Dobriansky, 'Promoting Democracy Through Diplomacy'. Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC., 5 May 2005.
<http://www.state.gov/g/rls/rm/2005/46358.htm>, accessed 29 April 2008.

Dobriansky held that from the outset of the war on terrorism, President Bush had been committed to a policy of activist democracy promotion in the Middle East, and always conceived the spread of democratic peace to be integral to the security and future of the region.¹²¹ Dobriansky contended that the conclusions of democratic peace theory made it imperative that the United States encourage the development of democracy in the Middle East, as this by definition would ensure the advancement of peace.

The aim of bringing about a democratic peace in the Middle East was also a common theme expressed by Condoleezza Rice. As an academic, Rice had been a foreign policy realist and had often discounted the influence of regime type on a state's foreign policy. Following the September 11 attacks, however, Rice came to embrace the idea that regime type did matter in international relations. According to her biographer, Marcus Mabry, after September 11 Rice underwent a "metamorphosis" from being a "George Herbert Walker Bush Republican to being a George W. Bush Republican," casting aside much of her realist thinking in favour of a new and more 'transformational' outlook.¹²² Rice now believed that encouraging democratic peace was key to American security and the resolution of long-standing conflicts.¹²³ In a December 2005 *Washington Post* article, Rice expressed her new-found support for democratic peace when she argued that the threats and opportunities of the post-September 11 world

Lead us to conclude that the fundamental character of regimes matters more today than the international distribution of power. Insisting otherwise is imprudent and impractical. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. Attempting to draw neat, clean lines between our security interests and our democratic ideals does not reflect the reality of today's world. Supporting the growth of democratic institutions in all nations is not some moralistic flight of fancy; it is the only realistic response to our present challenges.¹²⁴

¹²¹ Ibid. Dobriansky's claim that the Bush administration was consistent in its beliefs about the need to promote democracy in the Middle East contradicts Feith's claims that these ideas did not significantly motivate the Bush administration, or that they existed as interventionist justifications well before the war in 2003. This reinforces the post-facto nature of Feith's claims and shows the way in which omissions in his memoir paint an inaccurate picture of the Bush administration's thinking.

¹²² Mabry, pp. 182-3.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace'; For discussion of this thinking, see Mabry, pp. 182-3.

Rice argued that securing a democratic peace in the Middle East would help the United States to win the war on terrorism, ensure American security, and improve the present condition of the Arab world.¹²⁵ Rice wrote “our statecraft must now be guided by the undeniable truth that democracy is the only assurance of lasting peace and security between states, because it is the only guarantee of freedom and justice within states.”¹²⁶ According to Rice, regime type primarily defined a state's foreign policy, not its relative power or other materialist factors. Thus, a Middle East dominated by democracies would be considerably more peaceful and secure than the authoritarian order so long tolerated in the past by the United States.¹²⁷

Middle East Democratisation and American Strategic Interests

In their numerous speeches and policy papers on democratisation in the Middle East, the leading foreign policy figures of the Bush administration argued that, as a cumulative result of the success of each of their previous propositions about regime change and democracy promotion, the United States' material strategic interests in the Middle East and overall national security would be enhanced. This thinking reflected the core tenet of neoconservatism that promoting moral causes abroad advanced American national interests, as there was no separating realism and idealism in American foreign policy since the United States was a uniquely benevolent and self-interested power at once.

The Bush administration claimed that the United States could advance its national interests and democratic values in the Middle East simultaneously. Democratisation in Iraq and the region was conceived as integral to expanding and maintaining American hegemonic power. With reference to the Middle East, the 2006 National Security Strategy claimed that “the United States has long championed freedom because doing so reflects our values and advances our interests.”¹²⁸ Indeed, pushing for democracy in the Middle East “advances our interests because the survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty abroad.”¹²⁹

¹²⁵ Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace'.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ NSS 2006, p. 2.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

Condoleezza Rice similarly contended that only the fusion of values and interests, which she labelled “practical idealism,” could serve as an effective basis for American foreign policy.¹³⁰ Rice was adamant that in the Middle East this meant promoting liberal democracy was the most effective way of advancing American interests, security and power.¹³¹

According to the two National Security Strategies and other documents, democratic Arab regimes would be inherently pro-American and would therefore act in accordance with American interests. A democratic Iraqi government would ensure the security of its oil and the territorial integrity of the Iraqi state, would allow basing rights for the United States in order for it to fight the war on terrorism and project its power into the Middle East, and would generally support the consolidation of a regional Pax Americana.¹³² Moreover, once regional democratisation took hold, other Arab states, both enemies like Syria, and troubled allies like Saudi Arabia, would also fall in line behind American regional dominance and would work closely with the United States to uphold its power and its material interests in the region.¹³³ The logic of “bandwagoning” was apparent here once again, as it was assumed that democratic Arab states would rally behind American leadership because they held the same democratic values as the hegemon and understood that maintaining stability advanced the common interests they shared with the United States.¹³⁴

Some members of the Bush administration claimed that alongside upholding American regional hegemony and joining in the 'war of ideas' against Jihadist ideology, Arab democracies would also become close allies in the military fight against terrorism. In a December 2005 *Foreign Affairs* article, Paula Dobriansky and Henry Crumpton, then the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism at the State Department, contended that in the Middle East

New and emerging democracies not only provide viable, legitimate recourse for their own citizens' grievances, but also offer greater opportunities for counterterrorism partnerships with other

¹³⁰ Rice, 'The Promise of Democratic Peace'.

¹³¹ In a July 2008 *Foreign Affairs* article, Rice reiterated many of her key ideas about the importance of promoting democracy as the best way to enhance American strategic interests and national security. Rice maintained, as she had since before the invasion of Iraq, that American interests in the Middle East were best advanced by the active promotion of liberal democracy in Iraq and the wider region by the United States. See Condoleezza Rice, 'Rethinking the National Interest', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4, (Jul/Aug 2008), pp. 2-26.

¹³² NSS 2006, pp. 15-17, *passim*.

¹³³ 'President Bush Sworn into Second Term'.

¹³⁴ For discussion of the way the Bush administration believed that a democratic Arab world would follow its lead, see Monten, *passim*.

democracies. Interdependent, networked liberal institutions throughout the globe, reinforced by the structure of democratic governments, provide the best means to defeat the interdependent, networked terrorist cells of radical extremists who seek to destroy democracy and, in fact, the nation-state system itself.¹³⁵

In a region as crucial to American national security as the Middle East, Dobriansky and Crumpton claimed that winning the war on terror required democratic allies. Such partners allowed for the most effective anti-terrorism strategy, owing to higher levels of trust and co-operation prevalent in relations between democracies, and because of their shared sense of the threat posed by Jihadists and tyrants.¹³⁶ President Bush consistently framed his support of democracy in Iraq in this manner, arguing that by standing by Iraqi democracy, the United States could help turn Iraq into a leading ally against terrorism.¹³⁷ Democracy in the Arab world was thus viewed as integral to enhancing American security and national interests, as democratic Arab states would share the same outlook as the United States on important issues, and would be willing to uphold a regional Pax Americana that was beneficial to both their interests and those of the United States.

Conclusion

The Bush Doctrine's armed democratisation policies were the cornerstone of a post-September 11 grand strategy aimed at transforming the political malaise of the Arab Middle East from which the Bush administration determined that Jihadist terrorism had emerged. The interventionist policies championed by the Bush Doctrine were intimately related to the justifications for regime change and democracy promotion in Iraq. Installing a new regime in Baghdad was seen as integral to confronting the authoritarian roots of terrorism, to fostering a democratic domino effect in the region, to encouraging a democratic peace and to advancing American interests and security. Framing these policy assumptions were a set of broader theoretical claims about the

¹³⁵ Paula J. Dobriansky, Henry A. Crumpton, F. Gregory Gause III, 'Tyranny and Terror'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 1, (Jan/Feb 2006), p. 135.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ See 'President Addresses Nation, Discusses War on Terror'; 'President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror'.

universal appeal of freedom and liberalism, the notion that in some instances where recalcitrant regimes resisted history's arrow, a liberal order needed to be brought about through the agency of American military power, and optimism that the large-scale transformation of the Middle East was within the United States' power and would bring about a range of positive results.

The Bush Doctrine's interventionist democratisation strategy represented the ascendancy of neoconservatism to the heart of American foreign policy. The confluence of neoconservative influence within the Bush administration and the September 11 attacks created unique conditions that allowed for the formulation of a highly ambitious foreign policy of interventionist democracy promotion in the Middle East. Neoconservative influence was by no means been absolute of course, and elements of the Bush Doctrine were shaped by the ideas of key figures such as Rice, as by Rumsfeld and Cheney, who shared much of the neoconservative outlook while in office but who were not, strictly speaking, neoconservatives themselves. Nonetheless, neoconservatives within and outside the administration offered the most compelling interventionist framework for understanding and dealing with the dangers the United States faced after September 11, providing the most influential prescriptions for overcoming the terrorist threat through the democratic transformation of the Arab world by American power.

Chapter Four

Theoretical Critiques of the Bush Doctrine

As the previous chapter helps to demonstrate, the Bush administration based a number of its propositions about interventionist democratisation in the Middle East on the 'activist' version of liberal international relations theory expressed by neoconservatives. These theories shaped democratisation policies which claimed that freedom, as understood in a western sense, was a universal aspiration, that liberal political, economic and social order represented the 'end of history,' and that democracy always equalled peace. Liberal theory provided the backbone on which the Bush Doctrine's policies were built, informing the Bush administration's underlying propositions about how democracy would emerge in the Middle East.

Since the announcement of the Bush Doctrine, a number of scholars have offered critical assessments of the theoretical propositions made in the speeches and policy documents that comprise this grand strategy. Why is it that scholars often find the Bush Doctrine's theoretical claims problematic? In examining the critical literature, three broad avenues of argument are apparent. The first of these is that some scholars believe the claims made in the Bush Doctrine are often based on dubious assumptions about the universal appeal of liberal values and democratic government. Secondly, some view the claims made by President Bush and his foreign policy advisers as contradictory, especially concerning the idea of fostering democracy through a top-down process of regime change and occupation in select states. Finally, there is a view that the claims made in the Bush Doctrine about democracy and peace lack caution and nuance when applied to Iraq and the wider Arab world. While there is not necessarily consensus among scholars over these three avenues of argument, some important elements the literature produced on Middle East democratisation and the Bush Doctrine during the past five years have nonetheless often given prominence to these aspects of theoretical criticism.

The Questions of Universal Freedom and the Global Appeal of Liberal Democracy

The Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy captured the Bush Doctrine's essential claims about freedom when it argued that “freedom is the non-negotiable demand of human dignity; the birthright of every person – in every civilisation.”¹ On this basis, President Bush and senior officials around him consistently maintained that 'freedom,' as the idea was conceived of in the United States, was universal and could be best secured and upheld through liberal democratic government.² Yet since 2002, scholars who are critical of the Bush Doctrine have brought into question the idea that there exists a shared global understanding of freedom which inexorably lends itself to the adoption of liberal values and democratic government.

Universal Freedom?

In his critical analysis of the Bush Doctrine, published in 2004, University of Richmond professor of political science Paul T. McCartney argues that “any abstract term such as freedom can only have a substantive meaning that is determined by its cultural context.”³ McCartney notes that “in the United States, the meaning of the term “freedom” has evolved as American notions of justice have changed over time.”⁴ Thus, McCartney argues, the idea of freedom expressed by President Bush and others does not have a fixed or immutable state, since freedom as understood within the United States is itself shaped by the political and social contexts in which it emerged.⁵ If the meaning and value of 'freedom' is primarily determined in such a way, why would other societies conceive of freedom in inherently the same fashion as the American government – especially owing to their widely diverse histories,

¹ The White House, 'The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002'. Washington, 17 September 2002, p. iii. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>, accessed 1 May 2007.

² See discussion of the Bush Doctrine's claims about freedom in the first section of chapter three of this thesis.

³ McCartney, p. 422.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

traditions and norms? From differing conceptions of freedom, different varieties of political and social order can develop, each designed to uphold and advance the form of 'freedom' people chose to adopt.⁶ In this sense, 'freedom' and the political systems that are formulated to protect and advance it, emerge out of an agreed collective understanding of the values ascribed to this term in a given social and cultural context, not from a universally-shared or innate conception of the idea.⁷

The fact that the Bush Doctrine's definition of freedom is not universal brings into question a guiding assumption of the Bush administration's democratisation policies. President Bush and his foreign policy advisors conflate freedom and democracy, ignoring that simply because a country embraces some form of democratic practice does not mean that its people now automatically understand freedom in the same sense as the leaders of the United States. Moreover, while it is quite likely that people in authoritarian states often desire 'freedom' of some form, this does not mean they inherently have in mind the types of freedom deemed universal by the Bush administration, or, crucially, that they will protect their understanding of freedom through political institutions familiar to the United States government.

The Problems of Liberal Universalism

One of the most problematic claims made in the documents that constitute the Bush Doctrine was the idea that having gained freedom, all people would inherently choose political liberalism and its values system.⁸ In an article published in early 2003, Edward Rhodes, the director of the Centre for Global Security and Democracy at Rutgers University, makes a strong and convincing case against this key claim. Rhodes argues that in President Bush's West Point speech and the subsequent September 2002 National Security Strategy, "the Bush administration fails to acknowledge the possibility that individuals who are free to choose may not choose what we believe is best for them – or indeed what, by some objective manner (if such a thing is conceivable) – is in fact best for them."⁹ President Bush and other senior

⁶ Shalom, 'Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism', p. 568.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ For examples of this claim, see NSS 2002, pp. i-iii; NSS 2006, introduction; 'President Bush Sworn into Second Term'.

⁹ Rhodes, pp. 144-5.

officials argued that the United States sought to encourage conditions through which all people would be given the opportunity to embrace liberal values and institutions, confident that there would be unanimous acceptance of this choice as the only viable option.¹⁰ Yet this effectively means that the people of the world are, in Rhodes words, “free to choose, but only to choose liberalism.”¹¹ This is in truth “no choice... whatsoever,” as the Bush Doctrine was seemingly unwilling or unable to acknowledge that people might rationally opt for a differing values system when given the opportunity to do so.¹² Rhodes writes that “by denying the possibility that tastes (or even nutritional needs) may vary across societies, or seasons, or ages of life, crusading liberals blind themselves to the possibility that a menu that offers global diners a single choice is a dictation, not a liberation.”¹³

In order for people in other countries to embrace liberal ideology and accept it as a legitimate world view, Rhodes contends that they themselves have to come to accept its “rightness.”¹⁴ According to Rhodes, “liberalism is not simply the absence of illiberal, or anti-liberal institutions, like tyranny and terrorism. Nor even is liberalism simply the existence of particular democratic and free-market institutions. Liberalism is a philosophy, a set of beliefs.”¹⁵ Accepting the philosophy of liberalism and the norms and institutions that come with this is “in the final analysis an internal matter within each individual and society.”¹⁶ This means that liberalism has to be chosen by people themselves, and this “happens – or fails to happen – not because a hegemon wills it, but because of organic developments within human consciousness and societal operations, developments that render liberalism's assumptions plausible and give evidence that its norms will yield the benefits claimed.”¹⁷ In this sense, a foreign societies' embrace of liberal ideology cannot easily be made to occur at a given time and place through the application of American military power, but is rather an organic process within the society itself; one of trial, error and perhaps the eventual acceptance of liberal ideas over time.¹⁸

Conceiving of the development of liberalism as an organic process allows for

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 141-2.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid, p. 141.

¹⁸ Ibid.

the possibility, not considered in the Bush Doctrine, that free people can rationally make illiberal political choices. While free people might be motivated by any number of good reasons to embrace liberal ideas and norms over time, it is not inevitable that they do so. There always exists the possibility that illiberal or authoritarian tendencies can emerge among individuals and leaders in a society undergoing political transformation.¹⁹ In a chapter published in the collected work *The Right War?: The Conservative Debate on Iraq*, Charles Kesler, a senior fellow at the Claremont Institute, argues that it does not follow that people who chose to be 'free' will necessarily see it as being in their interests to embrace liberal norms.²⁰ The Bush Doctrine assumed that free people would be liberal people, content to see their former enemies or those outside of their communal group gain and express the same freedoms they have attained.²¹ Yet as Rhodes points out, the Bush Doctrine's optimistic outlook on the universal appeal and adoption of liberal values "does not entertain the possibility that the human heart is divided, that human eyes suffer from myopia, and that the human mind is capable of passion and irrationality."²² Further, the Bush administration's view of liberalism "does not admit the possibility that humans can be moved by anger, vengeance or pique, and that they are susceptible to demagoguery. In other words, it fails to recognise that the threat to liberal values and liberal institutions lays within as well as outside of us."²³ Thus, the adoption of liberal ideas and norms is not usually a straightforward process, as when given the choice, liberal ideas will not necessarily be embraced by all.

Democracy for All?

The Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters claimed that in the early twenty-first century, liberal democracy represented the only form of government left for states to embrace.²⁴ While there are more democracies in the world at present than

¹⁹ For a brief discussion of this issue in the context of democratisation in Iraq, see Larry Diamond, *Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq*. New York, Owl Books, 2005, p. 315.

²⁰ Charles R. Kesler, 'Democracy and The Bush Doctrine' in Gary Rosen (Ed), *The Right War? The Conservative Debate on Iraq*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 228.

²¹ The Bush administration appeared to assume that the inherent appeal of liberal values would help to reconcile groups previously in conflict and would have a pacifying effect on society more generally.

²² Rhodes, p. 145.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ See discussion on the Bush administration's claims about the globalisation of democracy in chapter

at any previous time, scholars of democratisation have pointed out that this does not mean all other models of government and social organisation are now discredited or defunct, nor that the predominance of liberal democracy is a permanent condition that cannot be challenged by competing illiberal or authoritarian forms of rule.²⁵

One of the leading scholars of democratisation, Thomas Carothers, offers an impressive analysis of the rise of challengers to liberal democracy in a report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in late 2007.²⁶ Carothers examines the state of democracy globally since 2001, and finds that the norm of liberal democracy has been increasingly challenged by the rise of illiberal regimes and the so-called “stronghand” model of semi-authoritarian political rule.²⁷ Carothers contends that the models of China and Russia are gaining adherents in areas such as the Middle East, as they offer a way for incumbent regimes to give the appearance of reform while retaining the essence of the authoritarian state structure that keeps them in power.²⁸ The rise of illiberal systems of rule has also been reinforced by the high energy prices of the 2000's, as this has allowed semi-authoritarian regimes with oil or gas reserves sufficient funds to satisfy many of the economic demands of their people, to expand their military forces and to help reinforce their power domestically.²⁹ Perhaps most important, however, is the mounting evidence that the Third Wave of democratisation has ceased, as many states that democratised in the late 1980's and early 1990's have returned to some form of illiberal or heavy-handed rule. This shows that states with only a limited experience in democracy are often prone to slipping back into non-democratic practices, and that leading liberal states placed too great a faith in the inevitability of the consolidation of democracy after the Cold War.³⁰ These factors bring into

three of this thesis.

²⁵ For discussion of these critiques and their implications for the Bush Doctrine's claims, see Steven Heydemann, 'In the Shadow of Democracy'. *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 1, (Winter 2006), p. 150.

²⁶ Thomas Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush'. Washington, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2007).

²⁷ Ibid, pp. 27-8.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 28. For a “reformed” neoconservative view on this development and its implications for liberal foreign policy assumptions, see Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*. New York, Knopf, 2008, pp. 67-71; For further discussion of Kagan, see the conclusion of this thesis.

²⁹ Carothers, p. 28. A good example of this phenomenon in the Middle East is Iran, where the government has become increasingly hardline as it has utilised its growing oil revenue to increase its influence in the Arab world. Examples from elsewhere include Venezuela and Russia, which have likewise become increasingly illiberal and belligerent from 2001-8.

³⁰ Ibid.

question the assumption that democracy will inherently continue to spread, and point to the idea that despite the Bush administration's claims, alternatives to its liberal democratic model do retain credibility and influence in some important parts of the world.

The prevalence of ideas about government and social order at variance to the liberal democratic model prescribed by the Bush administration is apparent in the Arab Middle East. The people of the Arab world are most certainly capable of liberal democracy; it is simply the case that the most influential, popular and organised political movements outside of the ruling regime are usually illiberal Islamist parties at present.³¹ Models of Islamic government with indigenous credibility are offered by Sunni political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots, Hamas and the Jordanian Islamic Action Front. Each of these groups stresses the importance of *Sharia* and the Koran as the sources of law, legislation and social order, rather than secular and liberal ideas.³² While these groups have been willing to participate in elections and the formation of governments based on popular rule, attempts are often made to link these to Islamic concepts of *Shura* and the idea of a *Majlis*, (a consultative council), rather than to liberal conceptions of separation of power and checks and balances between sources of governmental authority.³³ Other Islamic parties offer a variety of additional competing models of government and social order as well, ranging from the theocratic model of Iran, to the more apolitical vision advocated by Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani in Iraq, to the populist models of Hezbollah

³¹ For good discussion of Islamic movements and their attitudes towards democracy, see Graham Fuller 'Islamists and Democracy' in Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), pp. 37-55; See also Adam Garfinkle, 'The Impossible Imperative? Conjuring Arab Democracy'. *The National Interest*, No. 69, (Fall 2002), pp. 164-5. For additional discussion of the growing influence of Islamists in the context of negative reactions against regime change in Iraq, see chapter five of this thesis.

³² For discussion of Hamas's attitude towards democracy and liberal values, see Graham Usher, 'The New Hamas: Between Resistance and Participation'. *Middle East Report Online*, (21 Aug., 2005). <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero082105.html>, accessed 27 April 2006; Sara Roy, 'Hamas and the Transformation(s) of Political Islam in Palestine'. *Current History*, Vol. 102, No. 660, (Jan., 2003), pp. 13-21; For good discussion of the wider Muslim Brotherhood's notions of democracy, see John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* New York, Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 184-90.

³³ Esposito, pp. 184-90; For further discussion of Islamic conceptions of government, see Suha Tah Farouki, 'Islamic State Theories and Contemporary Realities' in Abdel Salam Sidahmed, Anoushiravan Ehteshami (Eds), *Islamic Fundamentalism*. Boulder, Westview Press, 1996, pp. 35-50; Charles Tripp, 'Islam and the Secular Logic of the State' in Sidahmed, Ehteshami (Eds), pp. 51-69. For a more recent discussion of many of these themes of Islamic government, see Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Fundamentalism Since 1945*. London, Routledge, 2004. That these groups embrace elections as a route to power does not show that democracy is the only legitimate form of regime type which even seemingly non-democratic forces must invoke to justify their rule. Rather, these groups often utilise elections as a tactic for attaining power, and they otherwise hold ideas about government and politics that are at large variance to any liberal democratic models of government.

and the Mehdi Army, up to the highly authoritarian model of a restored Caliphate advocated by Jihadists.³⁴

The fact that there exists such a variety of conceptions of government based on interpretations of Islam, rather than on secular liberal values, shows that in the Arab world alone there are a range of alternatives to the supposedly universal democratic model of government. Examining this development, Brookings Institute Middle East scholar Kenneth Pollack argues that in Arab societies which remain highly religious and wed to many of their traditional cultural practices, Islamic ideas of government and social order often appear more authentic than 'western' liberal forms of government.³⁵ Eric Davis, of Rutgers University, adds that Islamic models of government have also been given a boost by the fact that many people in the Arab world have since 2003 frequently come to associate liberal democracy with American intervention and violence and destabilisation in Iraq.³⁶ Not all forms of Islamic government are inimical to democracy or liberal values in some form; it is simply that their current appeal and following suggests that liberal democracy, as conceived by the Bush Doctrine and its neoconservative supporters, is not the "single sustainable model" of government and development that will be inherently embraced by all.³⁷

'Democratic Vanguardism' and the Bush Doctrine

On the basis of its claims about liberalism and democracy, as examined in chapter three and above, the Bush administration suggested that it was possible to expand the boundaries of the liberal world to the Arab Middle East through the agency of American military power. In making this claim, the Bush Doctrine and many

³⁴ Esposito, chapter six, passim; For an articulation of the Khomeini model of rule by Islamic jurists, see Imam Ruhullah Khomeini, 'The Pillars of an Islamic State' in Ruhullah Khomeini, *Khomeini Speaks Revolution*. Karachi, International Islamic Publications, 1981, pp. 14-19; For discussion of the Quietist model of rule advocated by Ayatollah Al Sistani in Iraq, see Ahmed H. al-Rahim, 'The Sistani Factor'. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 16, No. 3, (Jul., 2005), pp. 50-4; For discussion of the Caliphate model advocated by Jihadists, see Benjamin E. Schwartz, 'America's Struggle Against the Wahhabi/Neo-Salafi Movement'. *Orbis*, Vol. 51, No. 1, (Winter 2007), pp. 107-128.

³⁵ Kenneth Pollack et al, 'Imperial Ambitions: Can The Middle East be Transformed?' *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 4, (Winter 2003), p. 9.

³⁶ Eric Davis, 'History Matters: Past as Prologue in Building Democracy in Iraq'. *Orbis*, Vol. 49, No. 2, (Spring 2005), p. 240. For further discussion of this issue, see chapter five of this thesis.

³⁷ NSS 2002, p. i.

democratic globalists expressed what critics such as Francis Fukuyama, journalist George Packer and Claes Ryn view as a form of 'democratic vanguardism'.³⁸ This is a modernised version of a notion that first emerged among the Jacobins during the French Revolution; to bring about a new and more enlightened political order, the agency, organisation and leadership of an armed vanguard is required. Critics of the Bush administration often bring into doubt the idea that through armed intervention, the United States can unleash a democratic revolution and thereby 'push' history forward in the Middle East.

'Vanguardism' and the End of History

The Bush Doctrine's 'democratic vanguardist' claims have been most prominently criticised by Francis Fukuyama. In his book, *After the Neocons*, Fukuyama argues that democratic globalists and the Bush administration took his End of History teleology, which is premised on a gradual process of modernisation, and wrongly concluded that through American military agency, the development of liberal democracy could be fast-tracked.³⁹ Fukuyama favourably cites the view of Hoover Institute Professor, Ken Jowitt, who in Fukuyama's view correctly identifies this key problem of the Bush Doctrine's outlook when he argues in an April 2003 *Policy Studies* article that

The Bush administration has concluded that Fukuyama's historical timetable is too laissez-faire and not nearly attentive enough to the levers of historical change. History, the Bush administration has concluded, needs deliberate organization, leadership, and direction. In this irony of ironies, the Bush administration's identification of regime change as critical to its anti-terrorist policy and integral to its desire for a democratic capitalist world has led to an active "Leninist" foreign policy in place of Fukuyama's passive "Marxist" social teleology.⁴⁰

Fukuyama writes that, in effect, the Bush Doctrine attempted to place the United States in the role of the vanguard of liberalism, as it claimed to act as the guide through whom all people will come to realise and ultimately accept liberal values.⁴¹

³⁸ For critical discussion of 'democratic vanguardism', see Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 50-60; Packer, pp. 390-1; Ryn, pp. 25-8.

³⁹ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 54-5.

⁴⁰ Ken Jowitt, 'Rage, Hubris and Regime Change'. *Policy Review*, No. 118, (Apr/May 2003), p. 37.

⁴¹ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 54-5.

Fukuyama sees this belief in the need for the United States to act as a vanguard of liberal democracy as a major divergence from the process of modernisation towards democracy expressed in the *End of History*.⁴² Fukuyama writes that “I did not like the original version of Leninism and was skeptical when the Bush administration turned Leninist.”⁴³ Fukuyama maintains his belief, first detailed in the *End of History*, that “democracy in my view is likely to expand in the long run.”⁴⁴ However, Fukuyama notes that “whether the rapid and relatively peaceful transitions to democracy and free markets made by the Poles, Hungarians, or even the Romanians can be quickly replicated in other parts of the world, or promoted through the application of power by outsiders at any given point in history, is open to doubt.”⁴⁵ Thus, in Fukuyama's view

One can argue that there is a universal human desire to be free of tyranny and a universalism to the appeal of life in a prosperous liberal society. The problem is with the timeframe involved. It is one thing to say that there is a broad, centuries long trend towards the spread of democracy – something I myself have argued in the past – and another to say that either democracy or prosperity can emerge in a given society at a given time.⁴⁶

Fukuyama essentially argues that the Bush administration misunderstood the length of the modernisation process described in the *End of History*, as it casts aside the key observation that liberal political development can rarely be made to occur at a forced-pace through military intervention.⁴⁷

Fukuyama believes that the democratic globalist interpretation of the collapse of communism best explains how the *End of History* has been reconceived as a guide for interventionist democracy promotion.⁴⁸ Fukuyama writes that to the group of democratic globalists that came to dominate the neoconservative persuasion after the end of the Cold War, “the rapid, unexpected and largely peaceful collapse of communism validated the concept of regime change as an approach to international relations.”⁴⁹ Yet “this extraordinary validation laid the groundwork for the wrong turn taken by many neoconservatives in the decade following that has had direct

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 116.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 52-3.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

consequences for their management of post-September 11 foreign policy.”⁵⁰ Fukuyama contends that because the authors of the Bush Doctrine conceived of the collapse of the Eastern Bloc as a vindication of the role of American agency in bringing about monumental changes in the world, the Bush administration's “belief in the possibility of linking power and morality was transformed into a tremendous overemphasis on the role of power, specifically military power, as a means of achieving American national purposes.”⁵¹ Hence the Bush administration questionably claimed that the active use of American military power was integral to the task of democratising the Middle East, as the United States apparently had the ability and vision required to act as the 'vanguard' of this transformational process.

The Utopianism of 'Democratic Vanguardism'

In an article published in the autumn 2005 edition of the *National Interest*, David Hendrickson of Colorado College and Robert Tucker of John Hopkins University describe the claims made in the Bush Doctrine about the need for United States' military agency in spreading democracy to the Middle East as an example of “utopia” in American foreign policy.⁵² In a subsequent symposium on the Bush Doctrine published in the following edition of the *National Interest*, Robert Merry, the president of *Congressional Quarterly*, commends Hendrickson and Tucker's characterisation of the Bush Doctrine's 'vanguardist' claims as symptomatic of “utopia.”⁵³ Merry argues that this description aptly captures the grandiosity and lofty idealism of the Bush administration's ambitions for transforming the Middle East, and provides a new avenue for critical analysis of the Bush Doctrine.⁵⁴

Many of the documents that make up the Bush Doctrine implied that the United States was by definition a benevolent power, and as a result, its use of military force to spread democracy was a beneficial form of violence necessary to sweep away authoritarianism and bring about freedom and peace in the Middle East.⁵⁵ Claes Ryn aptly captures the nature of this aspect Bush Doctrine's outlook

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 63.

⁵² David C. Hendrickson, Robert W. Tucker, 'The Freedom Crusade'. *The National Interest*, No. 81, (Fall 2005), p. 19.

⁵³ Robert W. Merry in Leslie H. Gelb et al, 'The Freedom Crusade, Revisited: A Symposium'. *The National Interest*, No. 82, (Winter 2005/06), pp. 12-13.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ See especially the two National Security Strategies, NSS 2002, NSS 2006; See also 'President

when he labels it a form of “neo-Jacobinism.”⁵⁶ Examining the Bush Doctrine's claims about interventionist democratisation, Ryn writes that “the new Jacobin is convinced that he knows what is best for all mankind, and if much of mankind shows reluctance to follow his lead, it is to him a sign that injustice, superstition, and general backwardness or a misconceived modernistic radicalism is standing in the way of progress.”⁵⁷ According to Ryn, “perhaps the most fundamental idea of the new Jacobinism is that the United States is an exceptional nation that was founded on universal principles and that all of mankind, heeding the American example, should adopt a single model of social and political life.”⁵⁸ In Ryn's reading of the Bush Doctrine, the Bush administration claimed to have determined that the interests of humanity were essentially in harmony with its interests. Through its leadership, all people would come to realise enlightenment under the liberal democratic order the United States determined is the future of the world.⁵⁹

It is questionable that armed intervention in pursuit of democratic revolution would be regarded as enlightened or benign by those at the receiving end of such violence; however well-intended such actions might be. Ryn makes an important observation about the implications of the Bush Doctrine's 'vanguardist' democratisation posture when he notes that in considering the violence unleashed in Iraq in pursuit of a wide-ranging democratic transformation in the Middle East

A philosophically and historically inclined observer is reminded of the terrible and large-scale suffering that has been inflicted on mankind by power-seeking sanctioned or inspired by one or another kind of Jacobin model and intellectual conceit. Communism, one of the most radical and pernicious manifestations of the Jacobin spirit, has disintegrated, at least as a major political force. But another panacea for the world is taking its place. The neo-Jacobin vision for how to redeem humanity may be less obviously utopian than that of Communism. It may strike some as admirably idealistic, as did Communism. But the spirit of the two movements is similar, and utopian thinking is utopian thinking, fairly innocuous perhaps if restricted to isolated dreamers and theoreticians, but dangerous to the extent that it inspires action in the real world.⁶⁰

Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point'.

⁵⁶ Ryn, pp. 20-1.

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 25-6.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Claes G. Ryn, 'The Ideology of American Empire'. *Orbis*, Vol. 47, No. 3, (Summer 2003), p. 396.

The aims of the Bush Doctrine in the Middle East were of course not totalitarian in aspiration, as were those of communism in the parts of the world in which it held significant influence. Further, the Bush administration sought a future of freedom and democracy in the Arab world, rather than a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' or some other authoritarian order. Where the "Jacobin spirit" was strongest in the Bush Doctrine was in its claims that the United States alone understood the direction of history and that the use of violence to spread democracy in the Middle East was in the greater good of peace, progress and security for all.⁶¹ Yet as analysis later in this thesis makes clear, these lofty aims have repeatedly come into conflict with countervailing political conditions in the Middle East in such a way that even many of their proponents have come to acknowledge the problems of these theoretical notions in practice.⁶²

"Imperial Democratisation"

The Bush Doctrine's claims about liberal values and the spread of democratic government – particularly those relating to the possible need for an armed vanguard to promote democracy and that intervention in an authoritarian state will unleash longings for democratic rule – lent themselves to the concept that, where necessary, democracy could be brought about through a process of political transformation under the aegis of American military occupation. Critics of the Bush Doctrine often argue that a strategy in which the United States forcibly overthrows another sovereign government, occupies the state and attempts to construct a democratic regime from the top down, represents a policy of "imperial democratisation."⁶³

A number of democratisation scholars hold that "imperial democratisation" is usually an ineffective way in which to bring about democracy. The essential problem of "imperial democratisation" is, as Bard College associate professor of politics Omar G. Encarnación writes, that attempting to encourage democracy by military intervention "entails creating democracy through undemocratic means."⁶⁴

⁶¹ Smith, chapter seven, *passim*.

⁶² See especially the conclusion of this thesis.

⁶³ For detailed discussion of "imperial democratisation" and its many critics, see Perry, *passim*.

⁶⁴ Omar G. Encarnación, 'The Follies of Democratic Imperialism'. *World Policy Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 1, (Spring 2005), p. 49.

Encarnacion contends that “imposing democracy requires one country to intrude itself in the political affairs of another country, thereby robbing democracy of its indigenous legitimacy.”⁶⁵ This in turn can often adversely affect the consolidation of stable liberal democracy in future.⁶⁶ In his detailed study of “imperial democratisation,” University of Indiana political science professor, Glenn Perry, expands upon Encarnacion's critique when he argues that “what almost everyone overlooks but which points to the most remarkable inconsistency of those who make “democracy” a universal demand on others, is the blatantly authoritarian nature of such calls.”⁶⁷ According to Perry, the Bush Doctrine's assertion that the United States should encourage democracy by force of arms where necessary, and its claim that the best way to establish democracy in Iraq was through coercive regime change, “violates the whole spirit of democracy.”⁶⁸ In a similar vein, Edward Rhodes holds that bringing about democracy by force actually undermines “efforts to turn illiberal societies into liberal ones.”⁶⁹ Rhodes believes that proclaiming the importance of liberal ideas of popular rule, self-determination and freedom from compulsion by violence, while simultaneously determining the nature and structure of democracy through foreign military occupation, is in most cases harmful to the values of liberal democracy itself.⁷⁰

In contrast to these critiques, Francis Fukuyama characterises democracy promotion through military occupation as a form of social engineering.⁷¹ Fukuyama contends that first-generation neoconservative concerns about the unanticipated effects of government social engineering in the United States “should have induced caution” among supporters of the Bush Doctrine regarding their “expectations for the kind of political transformation that would be possible in the Middle East, by, for example, promoting democracy.”⁷² Despite this, many contemporary democratic globalists seemingly failed to recognise that armed democratisation could represent an ambitious form of social engineering with an especially high chance of negative results.⁷³ In a symposium on the Bush Doctrine published in *Commentary* in late

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Perry, p. 82.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Rhodes, pp. 147-8.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 5-7.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

2005, Fukuyama writes that

Even if one accepted the view that the Middle East needed to be "fixed," it was hard to understand what made us think that we were capable of fixing it. So much of what neoconservatives have written over the past decades has concerned the unanticipated consequences of overly ambitious social engineering, and how the effort to get at root causes of social problems is a feckless task. If this has been true of efforts to combat crime or poverty in U.S. cities, why should anyone have believed we could get at the root causes of alienation and terrorism in a part of the world that we didn't understand particularly well, and where our policy instruments were very limited?⁷⁴

While Fukuyama believes that the United States can and should encourage democracy in the Middle East, he holds that a strategy of "imperial democratisation" is a risky and ineffective way in which to bring about democratic regimes. Fukuyama argues that democracy imposed from the outside usually lacks domestic legitimacy, and that without a nuanced appreciation of local politics, culture and traditions, establishing effective democracy through intervention is a task usually fraught with difficulty.⁷⁵

How did the Bush administration respond to such criticisms of its activist democratisation stances? Most often, President Bush and leading foreign policy figures of his administration attempted to bolster the legitimacy of interventionist democratisation by invoking select examples of this strategy in past American foreign policy. The Bush administration usually referred to the examples of the occupation of Germany and Japan following WWII as cases of successful democratisation that offered important lessons for the present. In a December 2005 speech on the development of democracy in Iraq, President Bush articulated this often-repeated argument when he contended that

As we advance the cause of freedom in Iraq, our nation can proceed with confidence because we have done this kind of work before. After World War II, President Harry Truman believed that the way to help bring peace and prosperity to Asia was to plant the seeds of freedom and democracy in Japan. Like today, there were many skeptics and pessimists who said that the Japanese were not ready for democracy. Fortunately, President Harry Truman stuck to his guns. He believed,

⁷⁴ See Francis Fukuyama in 'Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium'. *Commentary*, Vol. 120, No. 4, (Nov., 2005), p. 27.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

as I do, in freedom's power to transform an adversary into an ally. And because he stayed true to his convictions, today Japan is one of the world's freest and most prosperous nations, and one of America's closest allies in keeping the peace. The spread of freedom to Iraq and the Middle East requires the same confidence and persistence, and it will lead to the same results.⁷⁶

President Bush claimed that the task of democratising Iraq was in many ways analogous to that of democratising Japan after WWII; that occupying a defeated adversary and in the process establishing the institutions and norms of democratic government was again integral to liberty and progress in the occupied state, as it was to the security of the United States itself. The occupation of Germany was similarly invoked as an example of successful democratisation that offers 'lessons' for United States foreign policy today.⁷⁷ As President Bush argued in a May 2006 address, "just as an earlier generation of Americans helped change Germany and Japan from conquered adversaries into democratic allies, today a new generation of Americans is helping Iraq... recover from the ruins of tyranny."⁷⁸

Critics of the Bush administration have brought this often-invoked analogy into question. In a 2005 article on the prospects for democracy in the Middle East, University of Swathmore professor James Kurth emphasises three key differences between the examples of post-war Germany and Japan, and contemporary Iraq. Kurth notes that Germany and Japan had some prior experience with democracy before the rise of Fascism in the 1930's, that both states were in large part ethnically homogeneous and therefore more domestically pacific as they democratised, and that both states faced the existential threat of Soviet communism, which helped encourage them to establish secure democratic governments.⁷⁹ Iraq, by contrast, has virtually no prior experience in democracy and liberal ideas, is a state divided between three ethno-sectarian groups with often-divergent political outlooks that make democratisation more difficult, and is faced with external threats from Jihadists

⁷⁶ 'President Discusses Iraqi Elections, Victory in the War on Terror'. The Woodrow Wilson Center Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center, Washington, D.C, 14 December 2005. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214-1.html>, accessed 2 February 2007.

⁷⁷ 'President Delivers Commencement Address at the United States Military Academy at West Point'. Mitchie Stadium, United States Military Academy at West Point, West Point, New York, 27 May 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/text/20060527-1.html>, accessed 3 March 2008.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ James Kurth, 'Ignoring History: U.S. Democratization in the Muslim World'. *Orbis*, Vol. 49, No. 2, (Spring 2005), pp. 307-9.

and Iran that do not necessarily encourage the construction of a stable liberal democratic regime.⁸⁰ Kurth concludes that the examples of Germany and Japan are misleading when invoked in relation to democratisation in Iraq, and he argues that by drawing from a wider variety of examples in American history, a more accurate account of the past successes and failures of interventionist democratisation can be assembled.⁸¹

A variety of alternative historical analogies to those of Germany and Japan have been offered in the critical literature published on “imperial democratisation” since 2003. In his 2005 study of Middle East democratisation, Omar Encarnacion relates the examples of intervention and democratisation in Latin America during the presidencies of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson to that of contemporary Iraq.⁸² Encarnacion suggests that the experiences of countries such as Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Cuba and Haiti in the early twentieth century can point to some of the potential unintended consequences of interventionist democratisation that remain relevant today.⁸³ Encarnacion emphasises that most of the democratic system then installed in Central America by the United States later decayed and became increasingly authoritarian, as democratic institutions and norms imposed from the outside did not often develop deep roots in these societies.⁸⁴ In contrast to Encarnacion, neoconservative writer Max Boot contends that the example of democratisation in the Philippines at the turn of the twentieth century offers a good historical comparison to the Bush administration's policies in the Middle East.⁸⁵ Boot argues that while the United States lost 4000 soldiers in the Philippines and fought a prolonged insurgency, it eventually constructed a democratic regime that lasted until the early 1970's and was revived again in the mid-1980's.⁸⁶ Boot admits that the example of the Philippines is far from ideal, but he holds that it is a more realistic historical comparison for democratisation in Iraq than the exceptional cases of Germany and Japan.⁸⁷

Finally, John Schmidt, a former Senior Analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, contends that the examples of humanitarian

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid, p. 309-10.

⁸² Encarnacion, pp. 49-50.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ See Max Boot in 'Defending and Advancing Freedom: A Symposium', p. 2.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

intervention in the Balkans during the 1990's are of use when considering precedents for democratisation in Iraq. Schmidt believes that had the Bush administration considered the cases of intervention and nation-building in Kosovo and Bosnia, it might have better appreciated the difficulties of fostering democracy in a society riven with ethnic divisions and shattered by years of authoritarian rule.⁸⁸ Schmidt notes that there remains many figures in government and academia who were involved with intervention in the Balkans that can offer useful advice and ideas on how best to proceed with democratisation and nation building in the Arab world today.⁸⁹ Historical analogies must be treated cautiously, as it can be risky to seek broad 'lessons' for current policy from past precedents that themselves remain open to debate. Nonetheless, critically assessing the historical examples in which the Bush administration often grounds its claims about democratic transformation in the Middle East can offer a useful route for critiquing the concept of "imperial democratisation" expressed in the terms of the Bush Doctrine.

The Reality of Democratic Peace in the Middle East

One of the Bush Doctrine's key theoretical assumptions, related to its broader claims about liberalism and interventionist democratisation examined in this chapter, was the idea that a democratic Middle East would be peaceful. Many senior figures of the Bush administration claimed that by spreading democracy through intervention in the Middle East, the United States would advance peace, as democratic states were by definition peaceful in their relations with one another.⁹⁰ This core assumption, and some important elements of the theory on which it is based, have been challenged and brought into significant doubt by critics of the Bush Doctrine and by events in Iraq and the Palestinian Territories since 2003. Critics have also demonstrated the ways that neoconservatives and some liberal internationalists simplified what are in reality a contestable theoretical propositions that do not imply the need for a foreign

⁸⁸ John R. Schmidt, 'Can Outsiders Bring Democracy to Post-Conflict States?' *Orbis*, Vol. 52, No. 1, (Winter 2008), pp. 18-19.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ For discussion of these claims, see the section of chapter three of this thesis that examines democratic peace theory and the Bush Doctrine.

policy of activist democracy promotion as a path to peace.⁹¹

Weak Democratic Institutions and the Danger of War

The Bush Doctrine put forward prescriptions for democratisation that in theory stressed the importance of building strong institutions and checks and balances as the core of an effective democracy. Yet critics have noted that many of the documents which make up the Bush Doctrine also appeared to indicate that elections should come early in the democratisation process, and that the construction of liberal institutions and the rule of law could be completed after enfranchisement.⁹² Critics argue that such “out of sequence”⁹³ democratisation heightens the risk of conflict, as transitioning states with weak democratic institutions are often prone to aggression abroad.

The link between weak democratic institutions and inter-state conflict has been best elucidated by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, both professors of political science at Columbia University. In a number of studies published from the mid-1990's to 2007, including the books *From Voting to Violence* by Jack Snyder in 2000, and *Electing to Fight* by Mansfield and Snyder in 2005, the authors regularly found that states in the early stages of democratisation were more likely to launch external wars of aggression and act in a belligerent fashion towards their neighbours.⁹⁴ In their original 1995 *Foreign Affairs* article that first laid out this argument, Mansfield and Snyder write that although it appears mature democratic states are indeed less prone to external aggression,

Countries do not become mature democracies overnight. They usually go through a rocky transition, where mass politics mixes with authoritarian elite politics in a volatile way. Statistical evidence covering the past two centuries shows that in this transitional phase of democratization, countries become more aggressive and war-prone,

⁹¹ Shalom, 'Theory as a Hermeneutical Mechanism', p. 580.

⁹² Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, 'The Sequencing Fallacy'. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 18, No. 3, (2007), pp. 5-10.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and War'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 3, (May., 1995), pp. 79-98; Jack Snyder, *From Voting to Violence: Democratisation and Nationalist Conflict*. New York, Norton, 2000; Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. Boston, MIT Press, 2005; Edward D. Mansfield, Jack Snyder, 'Prone to Violence: The Paradox of the Democratic Peace'. *The National Interest*, No. 82, (Winter 2005/2006), pp. 39-46; Mansfield, Snyder, 'The Sequencing Fallacy', pp. 5-10; For further discussion of the Mansfield-Snyder argument, see Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace', *passim*.

not less, and they do fight wars with democratic states. In fact, formerly authoritarian states where democratic participation is on the rise are more likely to fight wars than are stable democracies or autocracies.⁹⁵

Mansfield and Snyder note that their research indicates that “states that make the biggest leap from total autocracy to extensive mass democracy... are about twice as likely to fight wars in the decade after democratization as are states that remain autocracies.”⁹⁶ In subsequent works published since 1995, Mansfield and Snyder have maintained that there exists a significant danger zone where formerly authoritarian states that have begun to establish the institutions of democracy are at an especially high risk of engaging in wars against their neighbours and regional powers.⁹⁷

According to Mansfield and Snyder, a number of democratising states have enhanced the risks of becoming engaged in an inter-state war as they have constructed their democratic systems out of order. Many democratising states opt for early elections when the liberal institutions, rule of law and checks and balances required for effective democracy have not matured, or are not in place at all.⁹⁸ In a 2007 article in the *Journal of Democracy* that reiterates their main argument about democratisation and war made over the past decade, Mansfield and Snyder write that

Countries taking the initial steps from dictatorship toward electoral politics are especially prone to civil and international war. Yet states endowed with coherent institutions – such as a functioning bureaucracy and the elements needed to construct a sound legal system – have often been able to democratize peacefully and successfully. Consequently, whenever possible, efforts to promote democracy should try to follow a sequence of building institutions before encouraging mass competitive elections. Democratizing in the wrong sequence not only risks bloodshed in the short term, but also the mobilization of durable illiberal forces with the capacity to block democratic consolidation over the long term.⁹⁹

Mansfield and Snyder contend that the danger of weak institutions is two-fold. Firstly, weak institutions and a lack of effective constraints on government power can

⁹⁵ Mansfield, Snyder, 'Democratisation and War', p. 79.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid; See also Mansfield, Snyder, *Electing to Fight*; Mansfield, Snyder, 'Prone to Violence'.

⁹⁸ Mansfield, Snyder, 'The Sequencing Fallacy', p. 5.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

undermine longer-term prospects for stable democracy, locking states into an illiberal system of government that remains prone to external violence for a number of years.¹⁰⁰ Secondly, weak institutions and an immature democratic order can make it easier for illiberal leaders to rally mass support behind their agendas to the extent that they can carry their state into popular wars of aggression against neighbouring regimes.¹⁰¹

Other influential scholars of democratisation often agree with many aspects of Mansfield and Snyder's argument. Thomas Carothers emphasises that weak liberal political institutions pose a significant risk to regional stability, and that holding early elections before the rule of law develops often encourages increased belligerence abroad.¹⁰² Unlike Mansfield and Snyder, Carothers stresses the need for "democratic gradualism" rather than "sequencing" as the key to establishing a peaceful liberal democratic government, but he generally agrees that the presence of weak and incomplete institutions in democratising states increases the likelihood of violence abroad.¹⁰³ Meanwhile, *Newsweek International* editor and democratisation specialist, Fareed Zakaria, contends that illiberal political outcomes are more likely in democratising states that do not develop a sufficiently liberal constitutional order, and that elected illiberal leaders with few constraints on their power are much more likely to take hardline stances that increase the chances of inter-state war.¹⁰⁴

The problem of weak liberal institutions that heightened the risk of war during the transition towards democracy is evident in the case of democratisation in Iraq. According to some scholars, a democratising Iraq is a likely candidate to initiate wars against its neighbours and act in a belligerent fashion towards powerful states, including the United States.¹⁰⁵ John Owen, an associate professor of politics at the University of Virginia, writes that "the Middle East could... become a much more dangerous place if Washington and the rest of the world settle for a merely

¹⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 6.

¹⁰¹ Ibid; For further discussion of this issue, see Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace', pp. 123-4.

¹⁰² Thomas Carothers, 'The "Sequencing" Fallacy'. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 18, No. 1, (2007), p. 12.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Fareed Zakaria, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 6, (Nov/Dec 1997), pp. 22-3. Zakaria was involved with the Bletchley II meeting on the war on terrorism in November 2001, as examined in chapter three of this thesis. Despite this, Zakaria has usually taken a less ideological approach to democratisation than have other intellectuals associated with Bletchley II, such as Paul Wolfowitz. Since the invasion of Iraq, Zakaria has become a prominent conservative critic of the Bush administration's assumptions about Middle East democratisation, critiquing senior members of the administration for being seemingly unaware for some time of the likelihood of illiberal political outcomes in the Arab world.

¹⁰⁵ Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace', p. 123.

semidemocratic regime in Baghdad. Such an Iraq... would be uncommonly likely to start wars – a bull in the Middle Eastern china shop. Unfortunately, such an Iraq may also be just what we are likely to end up with.”¹⁰⁶ Owen lays out a hypothesis in which Iraq develops only “anaemic” liberal state institutions that can do little to check and constrain the ability of elected leaders to initiate an external war of aggression.¹⁰⁷ Owen holds that weak state institutions and ineffective checks on power would likely be unable to prevent leaders from rallying their sectarian group around the perceived need for military action against a supposed external threat. This could realistically lead to external aggression supported by a significant segment of the population.¹⁰⁸ With this prospect in mind, Owen concludes that “an aggressive Iraq, prone to attack Kuwait, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, or Israel, is in no one's interest,” and would be an outcome highly detrimental to the United States.¹⁰⁹

Owen's hypothesis helps to illustrate some of the potential problems of what Mansfield and Snyder call a “premature, out-of-sequence attempt to democratise.”¹¹⁰ Assessing the elections held in Iraq during 2005, Mansfield and Snyder comment that “when elections are held in an institutional wasteland like Iraq... political competition typically coalesces around and reinforces the ethnic and sectarian divisions in traditional society. To forge liberal, secular coalitions that cut across cultural divisions, it is necessary to have impartial state institutions that provide a framework for civic action and a focal point for civic loyalty.”¹¹¹ Without effective institutions to control, constrain and mediate the various interests and demands of competing communal groups, there remains a reasonably high risk that elected leaders could embrace belligerent foreign policy stances towards their neighbours. Thus, despite there being an elected government in Baghdad, Iraqi foreign policies could still potentially remain aggressive in character.¹¹²

Democratisation, Nationalism and the Risks of War

A second major criticism levelled at the version of democratic peace theory

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Mansfield, Snyder, 'The Sequencing Fallacy', pp. 6-7.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

expressed in the Bush Doctrine is that it does not account for the important role resurgent nationalism can play in fostering hostile foreign policies in newly democratising states. According to Mansfield and Snyder, there is a clear link between democratisation in formerly authoritarian states and the increase of hardline nationalism. In concert with weak states institutions, resurgent nationalism further increases the chances that a democratising state experiencing a difficult transition will be prone to external violence. Examining the centrality of nationalism to the process of democratisation, Mansfield and Snyder write that

From the French Revolution to contemporary Iraq, the beginning phase of democratization in unsettled circumstances has often spurred a rise in militant nationalism. Democracy means rule by the people, but when territorial control and popular loyalties are in flux, a prior question has to be settled: Which people will form the nation? Nationalist politicians vie for popular support to answer that question in a way that suits their purposes. When groups are at loggerheads and the rules guiding domestic politics are unclear, the answer is more often based on a test of force and political manipulation than on democratic procedures.¹¹³

In states transitioning away from authoritarian rule, various groups compete with one another for political influence. Old elites can attempt to gain support from the population by fostering nationalist sentiments, while newly-enfranchised groups often pursue their communal or ethnic interests within the emerging system of democracy, frequently framing their aims in ethno-nationalist discourse and advocating the use of violence to advance their ambitions.¹¹⁴

Variations of resurgent nationalism have emerged in Middle Eastern states where attempts have been made to promote democracy since 2003, significantly challenging the Bush administration's assumption that democracy always equals peace. One of the most prominent examples of this phenomenon is the election of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian elections. According to Middle East specialist Jean Francois Legrain, Hamas is the “heir of Palestinian nationalism” and represents the ascendancy of a hybrid form of Islamist nationalism to the heart of Palestinian politics.¹¹⁵ Critics argue that it is simplistic to believe that a truly democratic

¹¹³ Mansfield, Snyder, 'Prone to Violence', p. 39.

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Jean Francois Legrain, 'Hamas: Legitimate Heir of Palestinian Nationalism' in John Esposito (Ed), *Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform?* Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, pp. 159-177.

Palestinian government would be peaceful towards Israel and the United States. Glenn Perry notes that in order to retain its popular support, a democratically-elected Hamas government must reflect the opinions and outlooks of those who elected it.¹¹⁶ Hamas represents a sizeable segment of Palestinian society which expresses an Islamised form of nationalism and believes that 'Islamic resistance', including acts of violence, are one of the key ways to overcome occupation and achieve Palestinian statehood.¹¹⁷ Hamas channels the opposition towards Israel expressed by a number of Palestinians into hardline foreign policies against the state and its allies.¹¹⁸ This helps to show that where populist nationalist aspirations and ideology are strong, and where democracy is young, outcomes other than a democratic peace are often more likely.

The election of Hamas also serves as a cautionary example of the unanticipated outcomes that can result from the promotion of democracy in a territory dominated by resurgent nationalism. The Hamas government opted to engage in a brief civil war with the secular Fatah Party in June 2007, seizing the Gaza Strip by force and bringing about the sacking of its government. Following this, Hamas became isolated in the Gaza Strip and returned to launching rocket attacks on southern Israel, kidnapping Israeli soldiers and strengthening its ties with Hezbollah and Iran.¹¹⁹ In late December 2008, such actions resulted in the launching of a three-week long Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip that sought to halt Hamas rocket attacks and significantly weaken the power and capabilities of the organisation.¹²⁰ These events help to make clearer some of the problems of the Bush administration's assumptions about democratic peace in the Palestinian Territories. The Bush administration appeared not to have considered the possibility that illiberal forces committed to violence could be legitimately elected, and was for some time reluctant to acknowledge the challenge the election of Hamas posed to its underlying beliefs about the development of peace between Israel and the Palestinians.¹²¹

¹¹⁶ Perry, p. 82

¹¹⁷ Ibid; See also Roy, *passim*; For discussion of the development of Islamised Palestinian nationalism and the important role of Hamas in this process, see Meir Litvak, 'The Islamization of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: The Case of Hamas'. *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 1, (Jan., 1998), pp. 148-164.

¹¹⁸ Perry, pp. 61-2.

¹¹⁹ Taghreed el-Khodary, 'A Year Reshapes Hamas and Gaza'. *The New York Times*, (15 Jun., 2008).

¹²⁰ This war killed over 1300 Palestinians and 13 Israelis, and ended with a tenuous ceasefire on 17 January 2009.

¹²¹ For more on how the Bush administration dealt with the election of Hamas – particularly how this influenced the scaling back of most of the administration's talk about democratisation in the Palestinian territories by 2008 – see the conclusion of this thesis.

The challenge of hybrid forms of nationalism to the Bush Doctrine's propositions about democratic peace is also evident in the case of Iraq. The Iraqi government has been dominated since the December 2005 elections by Shia leaders associated with the United Iraqi Alliance Party (UIA).¹²² Some groups within this party, particularly the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),¹²³ have sought closer ties with Iran and share its often-hostile attitude towards Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, accusing these states of supporting the Sunni insurgency inside Iraq.¹²⁴ The influence of sectarian identities and ethno-nationalism in Iraqi foreign policy is also apparent with regards to the Kurdish leaders in the government. In October-November 2007, Turkey launched a series of incursions into northern Iraq against the Kurdish PKK terrorist group.¹²⁵ Turkey had been conducting such raids since 2003; however only after the end of 2005 were Kurdish parties fully represented as a major bloc in Iraq's elected government and cabinet, and thus able to influence Iraqi foreign policy in a substantive manner. Kurdish leaders in the government harshly rebuked Turkish incursions into Iraq, stating that if Turkey interfered further in Kurdistan, the Iraqi government would respond with violence.¹²⁶ While this crisis was only short-lived and did not result in inter-state conflict, it points to one of the ways in which the concerns of influential ethno-nationalist groups in a newly democratising state can be conflated with foreign policy to the extent that it heightens the risks of external war.

¹²² Larry Diamond et al., 'What To Do In Iraq: A Roundtable'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4, (Jul/Aug 2006), p. 157.

¹²³ This group was subsequently renamed the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) in 2007, but for accuracy will be referred to by its older name of SCIRI when discussing the years before it adopted a new title.

¹²⁴ For discussion of this, see Owen, 'Iraq and the Democratic Peace', p. 123.

¹²⁵ Sebnem Arsu, Sabrina Tavernise, 'Turkey Authorises Troops to Enter Iraq to Fight Rebels'. *The New York Times*, (10 Oct., 2007), p. 10; Selcan Hacaoglu, David Rising, 'Turkish Troops Poised on Iraq Border'. *Associated Press*, (7 Nov., 2007); Norman Stone, 'Clouds Over Northern Iraq'. *The Wall Street Journal Europe*, (6 Nov., 2007), p. 14; Diana Elias, 'Iraqi President says Crisis with Turkey has Passed and Iraq Situation Better'. *Associated Press*, (14 Nov., 2007).

¹²⁶ Stone, 'Clouds Over Northern Iraq'. This crisis raised briefly the prospect of war between Turkey and Iraq over the northern border of Kurdistan. The Iraqi government began to mobilise its army, the Kurds their Pesh Meaga militias, and Turkey over 10,000 troops on the frontier. While Turkey had been conducting limited raids against the PKK for a number of years prior to this crisis, it had not previously mobilised such a large number of troops, and the Iraqi government had not previously reacted so strongly against incursions aimed at the PKK. This crisis was eventually resolved in November 2007 through American mediation, but it demonstrated the real prospect of war between an immature and increasingly nationalist democracy and one of its powerful neighbours over the conflation of ethno-sectarian issues with foreign policy.

Conclusion

Since the unveiling of the Bush Doctrine in 2002, a number of scholars have offered critical assessments of the theoretical claims offered in this grand strategy about promoting liberal democracy in the Middle East. There exists significant debate in the critical literature about the Bush administration's conception of the universality of liberal values, alongside its assumptions about the development of democracy and peace in the Middle East. Among critics of the Bush Doctrine examined in this chapter, Edward Rhodes offers perhaps the most effective assessment of the problematic assumptions made by the Bush administration about the universal appeal of liberal values and the ability of the United States to foster these through the use of its military power. Approaching questions about regime change and democratisation from a similarly critical stance, scholars such as Omar Encarnacion and Glenn Perry make important points about the problems of “imperial democratisation” as the preferred strategy for enacting the political transformation of states such as Iraq. More broadly, questions have been raised about the Bush Doctrine's propositions that the United States should assume what some critics view as a 'vanguardist' stance on democracy promotion, and that by spreading democracy, peace is inherently more assured. The range of criticisms made of the theoretical claims contained in the Bush Doctrine brings into doubt many of its guiding assumptions about liberalism and democracy. This in turn raises the question as to whether the practical application of these ideas since 2003 has been similarly problematic.

Chapter Five

From Theory to Practice: Democratisation in Iraq and the Broader Middle East

Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 a number of important critiques have been made of the implementation and outcomes to date of the Bush administration's democratisation strategy in the Arab world. As chapter three of this thesis details, President Bush and other senior cabinet officials and advisers repeatedly argued that through intervention in Iraq, a stable liberal democratic government could be established. This in turn would help to foster the democratic transformation of the wider Arab world through a 'domino effect,' and would thereby undermine the status quo of authoritarianism deemed primarily responsible for the growth of Jihadist terrorism. Such claims were made in the two National Security Strategy documents and in numerous speeches given by President Bush and others in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq and in the years shortly after this.

Examining such claims, a number of critics argue that these practical assumptions about democratisation and the policies that stem from them have often proven to be problematic. Many scholars have focused their criticisms on the example of regime change and democratisation in Iraq, critically assessing the claims made in the Bush Doctrine against political developments in this state since 2003. Drawing upon these analyses, other critics have examined the effects of intervention in Iraq on the prospects of regional democratic transformation, while some have also assessed how this intervention has affected the threat posed by Jihadist terrorism. While the outcomes of activist democratisation in the Arab world cannot be assessed in a final manner as yet, a significant body of critical literature has nonetheless emerged over the past five years which suggests that the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies have been frequently problematic in practice and faced significant unanticipated challenges to their assumptions and aims.

Democratisation in Iraq: The Early Years

Democracy promotion in Iraq in the years 2003 to 2005 serves as a useful case study of many of the Bush Doctrine's theoretical claims about democratisation, as examined in chapter four, in practice. Critics of intervention in Iraq often note that developments in the state during the first two years of occupation suggest that there are considerable limitations in practice over the ability of the United States to foster liberal political values and institutions through a top-down process of democratisation. Further, the Bush administration's strategy of democracy promotion in Iraq faced considerable indigenous political obstacles that many observers argue played a key role in the formation of an elected government in 2005 unlike that which policy makers anticipated would be established in the months after regime change in 2003.

Pre-war Assumptions About Regime Change and Democratisation in Iraq

On the basis of its theoretical propositions about the appeal of liberal values and the development of democracy, as discussed in chapter four, the Bush administration made three practical assumptions about the process of democratic transformation in Iraq. The first of these was the idea that regime change would be a straightforward task. In a press conference held shortly before the invasion of Iraq commenced, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Marc Grossman, pointed out that while regime change would involve doing away with some arms of the Ba'athist regime, it was nonetheless possible to retain many Iraqi state institutions and utilise these during democratisation.¹ In a press conference on the Bush administration's plans for post-war Iraq, Grossman told reporters that “you may go to the Ministry of Health, for example, and find there that if you took out the top one or two or three or four people, who are Saddam Hussein cronies or otherwise unacceptable to the coalition, you might find a whole rest of the ministry that could transit quite quickly back to Iraqi sovereignty.”² Grossman believed that some ministries would remain intact to

¹ Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, 'Assisting Iraqis With Their Future: Planning For Democracy'. Washington Foreign Press Center Briefing, Washington, DC., 19 March 2003. <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/18847.htm>, accessed 4 March 2007.

² Ibid.

the extent that they could help facilitate democratisation, maintaining essential services and aiding American forces in establishing a provisional government.³ Similarly, Douglas Feith argues in his 2008 memoir, *War and Decision*, that while he and his Office of Special Plans in the Pentagon understood that a power vacuum would emerge in post-Saddam Iraq, it appeared likely that many of the Iraqi ministries could be easily purged of their Ba'athist leaders and thus quickly become part of an interim regime.⁴ Paul Wolfowitz, meanwhile, believed that Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki's estimation in February 2003 that the United States would require up to "several hundred thousand troops" to secure Iraq after regime change was "wildly off the mark," as 130,000 would be sufficient.⁵ According to *Washington Post* journalist, Thomas Ricks, Wolfowitz held that Iraq would present a relatively benign security environment following regime change, as United States military personnel would be widely viewed as liberators, and that as an emerging democracy, Iraq would remain generally pacific during occupation.⁶

A second assumption made prior to regime change in Iraq was that the process of democratisation would be led by exiled Iraqi political leaders. Neoconservatives in the Pentagon were particularly adamant that democratisation should be led by secular pro-Western politicians primarily associated with Ahmed Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress.⁷ Investigative journalist David Reiff points out that in a number of ways, the idea that Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress should spearhead democratisation in Iraq was a scaled-down version of the proxy war strategy proposed by neoconservative intellectuals such as Wolfowitz, Perle and Khalilzad during the 1990's.⁸ Since this policy had become less viable after the September 11 attacks, its proponents now argued that while regime change in Iraq would be carried out by direct American military force, the Iraqi National Congress

³ Ibid.

⁴ Feith, p. 361. Feith also believed that the Iraqi military would remain intact in such a way that it would be a valuable asset for security and reconstruction purposes.

⁵ For discussion of Wolfowitz's optimistic predictions about post-war Iraq, see Ricks, pp. 97-100.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ For examples of this claim, see 'Deputy Defense Secretary Addresses Iraqi-Americans in Michigan'; Perle, 'Iraq Policy'; 'Under Secretary Feith Interview with Washington Post'. 21 February 2003. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1940>, accessed 13 May 2008; 'Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations'. 13 November 2003.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2932>, accessed 13 May 2008; For critical discussion of these views, see Bamford, pp. 291-94.

⁸ David Reiff, 'Blueprint for a Mess: How the Bush Administration's Prewar Planners Bungled Post-War Iraq'. *New York Times Magazine*, (2 Nov., 2003), p. 31; For an examination of neoconservative advocacy for proxy war prior to 2001, see chapter two of this thesis.

should lead the democratic regime to be established in Baghdad.⁹ High-level Pentagon planners believed that Iraqis would readily embrace the Iraqi National Congress, as this group was apparently viewed by a majority of the population as the most viable and popular option for establishing a provisional democratic government.¹⁰

In contrast to many of the 'conventional' narratives about intervention in Iraq, Douglas Feith attempts to refute the claim that he and leading Pentagon planners assumed that Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress would play a leading role in democratisation. In *War and Decision* Feith writes that “some critics have charged that we were seduced by Ahmed Chalabi's predictions that Iraqis would rejoice when liberated from Saddam's tyranny,” and that democracy would be rapidly established by the Iraqi National Congress.¹¹ According to Feith, “on each of these points, the critics are mistaken.”¹² Feith's criticism has at least some merit, as some accounts of regime change and democratisation in Iraq do exaggerate the influence of the Office of Special Plans and make accusations about the influence of Chalabi that are at times too strong for the available evidence. However, as James Bamford points out, despite the hyperbole surrounding the question of Chalabi, it would be mistaken to believe that the Office of Special Plans and some other key elements of the Bush administration did not make a number of important assumptions about the central roles Chalabi and many of the exiles would play in democratisation.¹³ According to Bamford, Chalabi's claims about his popular following, about the way in which Iraqis would rapidly embrace liberal democratic ideas, and about the overall ease of regime change, encouraged the belief among some members of the Bush administration that through installing Iraqi National Congress members in positions of power, democratisation would proceed quickly and smoothly with little cost to the United States.¹⁴

The third pre-war assumption made by the Bush administration, stemming directly from the previous two, was the idea that a program of rapid democratisation

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Feith, pp. 263-5.

¹² Ibid. Exactly who “the critics” constitute and the extent to which they “are mistaken” is not made at all clear by Feith. Such claims about critics are nonetheless repeated at various points in *War and Decision*, as Feith chastises the critical literature on regime change in Iraq without actually engaging with the evidence and debate it offers.

¹³ Bamford, pp. 291-4.

¹⁴ Ibid.

was a realistic option for Iraq. The Bush administration's senior leaders, Colin Powell and Richard Armitage aside, generally believed that since regime change in Iraq was going to be a straightforward task, and since there were exiled leaders ready to assume control when Baghdad fell, the transition to democracy could occur quickly. In his memoir, Feith frequently discusses the initial plan for democratisation in Iraq, which was known as the Iraqi Interim Authority Plan.¹⁵ According to Feith, the Bush administration envisioned a three-stage process whereby a transitional regime led by exiles would be constructed immediately after regime change, after which power and responsibility would be given to a new government within months and Iraq would emerge as a secure, democratic and sovereign state within a year.¹⁶ In his 2005 study of democratisation in Iraq, entitled *Squandered Victory*, Larry Diamond writes that it was this Iraqi Interim Authority Plan that influenced the democratisation process championed by Jay Garner, the retired general first charged with leading the occupation of Iraq.¹⁷ Garner aimed to appoint a government in May 2003, to appoint a constitution-writing assembly in June, and to move towards ratification of this constitution and then national elections by August 2003.¹⁸ Diamond views this as an extremely ambitious program of democratisation that exemplifies the Bush administration's high degree of confidence that political outcomes in Iraq would conform with each of its pre-war assumptions about democratic transformation in the state.¹⁹

The Coalition Provisional Authority and Democratisation in Iraq

Soon after the removal of Saddam Hussein's regime, the Bush administration established an occupation authority that would oversee the reconstruction and democratisation of Iraq. In late April 2003, the Department of Defence established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, and President Bush appointed retired diplomat, Paul Bremer, to lead this organisation.²⁰ In its fourteen months of existence from April 2003 to June 2004, the CPA attempted to control a top-down

¹⁵ Feith, pp. 368-9, *passim*.

¹⁶ *Ibid*; For further discussion of this plan, see Grossman, 'Assisting Iraqis With Their Future'.

¹⁷ Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, pp. 32-3.

¹⁸ *Ibid*.

¹⁹ *Ibid*.

²⁰ L. Paul Bremer III, *My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope*. New York, Threshold Editions, 2006, pp. 10-12.

process of political, economic and social reorganisation in Iraq. Paul Bremer and the CPA sought to enact policies and strategies that derived from the pre-war assumptions examined above; in the process revealing many of the problems of these ideas in practice.

The Coalition Provisional Authority quickly found that in practice, the pre-war assumptions made about security and the continuity of government during and after regime change had been misplaced. In his 2004 study of regime change in Iraq, journalist James Fallows notes that the Iraqi regime, its military forces and the state in general suffered a total collapse as a result of the American invasion in March-April 2003.²¹ This meant that there were no remaining state institutions or assets, such as local councils, police forces or government employees, which could aid the United States in securing Iraq and initiating a process of democratisation.²² A RAND Corporation study of intervention in Iraq, published in February 2005, notes that the Bush administration's assumptions about security, stability and the continuity of government in Iraq often stemmed from overly-optimistic and simplistic assumptions about regime change; particularly a belief that state failure, chronic insecurity and lawlessness would not be major problems.²³ The RAND study emphasises that in a post-war situation, power vacuums generally encourage disorder and violence, and in such cases, security should trump everything else. This means that sufficient troops should be deployed to secure the country, and that ambitious plans for building a new regime should be deferred until disorder has been contained.²⁴

Along with dire security issues, the CPA regularly faced the question of how to establish a stable democracy in Iraq. One of the most difficult tasks of this process was deciding when and how to hold elections. In his 2006 memoir, *My Year in Iraq*, Paul Bremer repeatedly emphasises his opposition to the ideas about rapid democratisation expressed in the Pentagon's Interim Iraqi Authority Plan. Bremer writes that talk in Washington about holding elections mere months after regime change was a “reckless fantasy” that showed some planner's “aversions to nation-building” and their misplaced assumptions that democratisation would not face any

²¹ James Fallows, 'Blind Into Baghdad'. *Atlantic Monthly*, (Jan/Feb 2004). <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200401/fallows>, accessed 12 May 2008.

²² Ibid.

²³ The RAND Corporation, 'Iraq: Translating Lessons into Future DoD Policies'. The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, February 2005, p. 6.

²⁴ Ibid.

significant obstacles in Iraq.²⁵ Bremer argues that without effective security, and with the total collapse of Iraqi state institutions and basic services, pushing for early elections was simply out of the question. Iraq would therefore have to be ruled through the CPA for an extended period.²⁶ Critically assessing neoconservative support for the Iraqi Interim Authority plan, Bremer writes in his memoir that

I came to realise that some folks in Washington underestimated the complexity of the challenge and thought we could solve all our problems by simply transferring authority immediately to the Iraqi Governing Council, as if this group could somehow overcome the interconnected security-economic-political problems we in the CPA could not. That kind of wishful thinking did not augur well.²⁷

Having cast aside the Iraqi Interim Authority Plan, Bremer and the CPA attempted to devise an alternative strategy for building democracy in Iraq. George Packer, a journalist who covered the first years of occupation in Iraq, writes in his 2006 book *The Assassin's Gate* that the CPA essentially sought to “fill all the blanks left empty back in Washington by the war's visionaries who had imagined that freedom and democracy would emerge spontaneously in Iraq.”²⁸ Packer argues that it was Bremer and the CPA which spearheaded plans for democratisation, as the realities of Iraq after regime change left many in the Bush administration temporarily unsure about how to establish democracy in any practical sense.²⁹ Symptomatic of the CPA's dominance of policy in the early occupation period was Bremer's unilateral announcement of a “seven-step plan” of democratisation in September 2003.³⁰ In his *Washington Post* article that outlined this plan, Bremer declares that “at the present elections are simply not possible.”³¹ Instead, the only way in which Iraq could become democratic was through writing a constitution that would enshrine essential democratic rights and establish the institutions and rule of law required for elections.³² Bremer argues that it would be necessary for constitution-writing to come before full elections, and he holds that despite this process resulting in the extension of the occupation of Iraq, this was essential in order to bring about effective

²⁵ Bremer, p. 12.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 205.

²⁷ Ibid, p. 117.

²⁸ Packer, p. 187.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ L. Paul Bremer III, 'Iraq's Path to Sovereignty'. Opinion Editorial, *Washington Post*, (8 Sept., 2003).

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

democracy.³³

Examining Bremer's "seven-step plan" and its consequences, Larry Diamond notes that the CPA faced considerable pressure from the Bush administration and Iraqi Governing Council members to adopt a modified plan of democratisation that would shorten the occupation and ensure the return of sovereignty during 2004.³⁴ After some months of negotiation, the CPA announced a revised democratisation strategy that became known as the "November 15 agreement."³⁵ This plan, signed on 15 November 2003, called for a "Transitional Administration Law" (effectively an interim constitution) by March 2004, an interim government for the period June 2004 to January 2005, an election in January 2005, the national ratification of a constitution by October 2005, and elections again in December 2005.³⁶ Diamond labels this process a "formidable timetable" which assumed there would be little resistance among Iraqi political groups to forced-pace democratisation, and that the institutions required for stable democracy could be established in such a short timeframe.³⁷ The CPA, and its successor from June 2004, the American embassy in Baghdad, pressed ahead with this plan, holding all of the elections scheduled for 2005. Nonetheless, this process faced significant challenges from indigenous Iraqi leaders and had unanticipated political outcomes in later years.³⁸

The Challenge of Ayatollah Al Sistani

The CPA and many members of President Bush's cabinet appeared to assume that Iraqi political leaders would be generally quiescent towards the timetable for democratisation established in 2003. Yet during 2003, the leader of the Shia in Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Al Sistani, increasingly confounded the CPA's plans for democratisation and the Bush administration's underlying assumptions about the development of secular liberal democracy in Iraq. Sistani repeatedly called for a political process that centred on direct national elections; a process that would result

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, pp. 153-5.

³⁵ 'Agreement on Political Process'. Coalition Provisional Authority, 15 November 2003. <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/1115nov15agreement.htm>, accessed 27 June 2008.

³⁶ Ibid; For discussion of the November 15 agreement, see Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, pp. 154-5.

³⁷ Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, pp. 154-5.

³⁸ For further analysis, see discussion in the next section of this chapter on democratisation and terrorism in Iraq.

in an elected government dominated by the majority religious Shia. Both the CPA and the Bush administration only belatedly realised the immense influence of Sistani, coming to understand over time that democratisation in Iraq could only succeed if they acceded to most of the Ayatollah's demands.

Ayatollah Al Sistani first stated his disagreement with the CPA's process of democratisation through a *fatwa* released in June 2003. In his *fatwa*, Sistani expressed concern at the way in which the CPA sought to control the democratisation process, and he called for progress towards direct national elections.³⁹ Larry Diamond notes that the CPA initially ignored Al Sistani, viewing him as merely another religious figure among many in Iraq. In Diamond's view, the CPA's dismissal of Sistani in the months after he issued his *fatwa* had "far reaching, ominous implications, for he was the most revered moral authority in Iraq."⁴⁰ As Rajiv Chandrasekaran, a journalist who covered Iraq during the first years of occupation points out, Sistani commanded the support of a majority of Shia in Iraq and could mobilise millions by issuing *fatwas* and making public announcements on his views about democratisation.⁴¹ After the November 15 agreement had been signed, Sistani made his influence again known, as he stated that he was dissatisfied with the CPA's plan to appoint an interim regime without first completing a constitution written by an elected body.⁴² In Paul Bremer's account in his memoir, Sistani warned that if he remained displeased with the CPA's plans, he would issue another *fatwa* stating his opposition to the whole democratisation process.⁴³ Bremer feared this would lead to widespread Shia rejection of the November 15 agreement, and would likely put the democratisation of Iraq in jeopardy.

It was at this point that the CPA began to realise the extent of Sistani's influence. Paul Bremer comments in his memoir that, facing the prospect of having the Shia majority come out in opposition to the November 15 agreement, the CPA

³⁹ For discussion of Sistani's *fatwa* and its implications for Iraqis and the CPA following its release, see 'Interview with Rajiv Chandrasekaran'. *PBS, Iraq's Lost Year*. (6 Aug., 2006). <http://www.c.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/yeariniraq/interviews/rajiv.html>, accessed 27 June 2008.

⁴⁰ Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, pp. 44-5.

⁴¹ Rajiv Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Baghdad's Green Zone*. London, Bloomsbury, 2006, pp. 88-9; See also 'Interview with Rajiv Chandrasekaran'.

⁴² 'Interview with Rajiv Chandrasekaran'.

⁴³ Bremer *My Year in Iraq*, pp. 211-12. Ayatollah Al Sistani refused to talk directly to the Coalition Provisional Authority, and instead communicated his ideas through either Shia members of the Governing Council close to the clerical establishment (such as those of the SCIRI Party), or through Muslim ambassadors sent to Sistani by Bremer.

accessed to a modified democratisation process.⁴⁴ Discussing the changes made to the CPA's plans for democratisation in late 2003, Bremer writes that he and his advisers

Decided to float the idea of an interim constitution, which we hoped would get past the Sistani fatwa and allow us to transfer sovereignty to an Iraqi government under a legal framework establishing Iraq's political institutions, structure and democracy while protecting minority and human rights. But we would also agree to the conditions set forth in Sistani's fatwa – that elections be held as soon as possible for a body to draft Iraq's permanent constitution.⁴⁵

Assessing Bremer's account, Glenn Perry comments that the fact the CPA's plans for top-down democratisation were modified to this extent, on the basis of demands made by one Shiite Ayatollah, showed the way in which the occupation authority was beginning to become “entrapped” in a process of democratisation considerably different to that which the Bush administration had envisioned prior to regime change.⁴⁶ Similarly, Chandrasekaran argues that by late 2003 the CPA had belatedly recognised that the democratisation process was coming to be dominated by religious Shia that were previously thought to be apolitical in outlook and less popular than the secular exiled leaders who had returned to Iraq after regime change.⁴⁷

In his 2006 study of Middle East democratisation, Glenn Perry argues that the CPA's attempts to appease Sistani by altering elements of the plan for democratisation did not prevent him from pressing for direct national elections.⁴⁸ In late 2003, the CPA proposed what it labelled a “caucus” system of indirect elections that it hoped would placate Sistani's demands for enfranchisement. This system would allow a CPA-controlled process of elections to occur at local and regional levels in order to select suitable delegates for a national assembly of 'notables'.⁴⁹ This assembly would then write the interim constitution demanded by Sistani.⁵⁰ Shortly after the announcement of the caucus plan however, Sistani stated his opposition to this election process and continued to insist on direct national elections. Sistani mobilised over one hundred thousand Shia to protest against the caucus plan in January 2004; an act Perry argues was decisive in forcing the CPA to abandon this

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid, pp. 213-14.

⁴⁶ Perry, p. 70.

⁴⁷ Chandrasekaran, *Imperial Life in the Emerald City*, pp. 88-9.

⁴⁸ Perry, pp. 70-1.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

proposed election system.⁵¹ Similarly, during the writing of the interim constitution in early 2004, Sistani again challenged the CPA's plan for democratisation and forced further concessions before agreeing to the American-led political process.⁵² Sistani pushed the CPA and the Governing Council to include his demands regarding Islam and democracy in the constitution, and he again rallied many tens of thousands of Shia behind his calls for enfranchisement on his terms.⁵³

The actions of Sistani from 2003 to early 2005 caused some influential figures in the Bush administration to begin reconsidering their initial assumptions about the unfolding of democracy in Iraq. According to Bob Woodward's account in his 2006 book, *State of Denial*, President Bush and some top officials around him gradually realised that it was Sistani, not secular pro-Western Iraqi exiles such as Chalabi, that were integral to the democratic future of Iraq.⁵⁴ Woodward writes that in a December 2003 National Security Council meeting, Paul Bremer asked “are we going to let a 75 year old cleric decide what our policy is going to be in Iraq?”⁵⁵ Vice President Dick Cheney responded by noting that he believed it was indeed necessary to “cultivate” Sistani, even if the CPA and Bush administration disliked Sistani or opposed some of his goals.⁵⁶ At another meeting in early 2004, President Bush contended that “Sistani is right” about the need for elections in Iraq. Bush commented that he had “the majority community wanting elections, and I'm supposed to say no?”⁵⁷

Woodward notes that once policy planners realised how reliant the United States had become on Sistani to carry out their aims of democratisation in Iraq, “Sistani was the certified go-to cleric for the Bush administration. Whether cranky, Iranian or beloved, one thing was for sure: He had the power over millions.”⁵⁸ The Bush administration's embrace of Sistani represented an important shift in practice from the ideas about democratisation in Iraq expressed in the terms of the Bush Doctrine. Entering Iraq in 2003 with a number of preconceived assumptions about

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid, pp. 71-2. During the process of drafting Iraq's interim constitution, Sistani voiced his views on the role of Islam in the state, on the need for proportional representation of Iraq's various ethnic and sectarian groups, and on his concerns about the veto powers included in the interim constitution by the Kurds.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp. 263-4.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 370-1; For further discussion of Bush's position on elections in Iraq, see Gewen, p. 17.

⁵⁸ Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp. 263-4.

the development of liberal democracy, the Bush administration was pressured in practice to carry out democratisation on Sistani's terms; even as it gradually realised that this would lead to the formation of a regime in 2005 quite unlike that which it had originally aimed to establish.⁵⁹

Democratisation and Terrorism

Many of the claims made in the Bush Doctrine about encouraging democracy as a route to overcoming terrorism have been brought into question by the case of regime change and democratisation in Iraq. Critics have argued that interventionist democratisation in Iraq played a large role in enabling the growth of terrorism in the state. While the presence of democracy in Iraq is not in itself a cause of terrorism, critics often agree that regime change and the process of democratisation adopted by the United States helped to embolden Jihadists and facilitate sectarian terrorism between Iraqi communities. Further, events in Iraq have also led a number of critics to question the Bush Doctrine's broader propositions about the links between democratisation and the reduction of terrorism across the broader Middle East, as many of the Bush administration's claims have been seemingly contradicted in practice.

Democratisation and Sectarian Terrorism in Iraq, 2003-6

Regime change and democratisation in Iraq played a major part in enabling sectarian terrorism between Iraq's Shia and Sunni communities. Overthrowing Saddam Hussein's regime unleashed political sectarianism, while democratic elections codified this into a form that helped to facilitate communal violence.⁶⁰ Adeed Dawisha argues that beginning in 2003 “ethnosectarian identities were reified into fixed political cleavages. Particularistic identities were fused into the concept of

⁵⁹ Perry, p. 69.

⁶⁰ The fact Iraq was held together under a dictatorship that stoked communalism for political ends fostered a strong sense of sectarian division among many Iraqi communities. In the chaos that followed regime change, people turned towards their communal and tribal groups for security, reifying these identities into fixed outlooks that many were willing to defend with violence.

parties, so that national issues were now viewed from an ethnosectarian perspective, and sub-national concerns would generally define national policy.”⁶¹ On the basis of the idea that proportional representation by demography would ensure that all groups in Iraq would have a voice, the CPA institutionalised a political system in which sectarian identities became the primary manner by which groups understood and expressed their political interests.⁶² This did much to facilitate sectarian violence, as it encouraged divisive identity politics and the belief that group interests could be advanced through force.⁶³

The three elections held in Iraq during 2005 played a decisive part in the consolidation of sectarianism in the state.⁶⁴ The January 2005 election for a transitional assembly was, according to Adeed Dawisha and Larry Diamond, “almost purely a national-identity referendum.”⁶⁵ The Shia United Iraqi Alliance Party gained the most votes in this first election, closely followed by the Kurdish Alliance and smaller religious parties generally associated with either of these two outlooks.⁶⁶ A majority of Sunnis, meanwhile, boycotted this election and took up arms against the interim regime.⁶⁷ Similarly, the outcome of the election to ratify Iraq's constitution in October 2005 was determined primarily by sectarian affiliations. A majority of Shia and Kurds voted in favour of a document that would give them significant power in Iraqi politics, while Sunnis came close to preventing the ratification of this document through their generally negative vote.⁶⁸ This reinforces the fact that politics in Iraq had become essentially sectarian in character by this point, as groups viewed their interests primarily through sectarian lenses, not generally in terms of Iraqi national interests. Finally, the December 2005 elections for a full-term national assembly completed the codification of sectarian politics in Iraq, as this election empowered the United Iraqi Alliance and its allies to form a Shia-dominated government.⁶⁹

The consolidation of political sectarianism through democratic elections played a major role in fomenting the sectarian terrorism that engulfed much of Iraq in

⁶¹ Adeed Dawisha, 'The Unravelling of Iraq: Ethnosectarian Preferences and State Performance in Historical Perspective'. *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 2, (Spring 2008), p. 223.

⁶² Ibid, p. 229.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Adeed Dawisha, Larry Diamond, 'Iraq's Year of Voting Dangerously'. *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 17, No. 2, (Apr., 2006), p. 89.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 93.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid, pp. 93-4.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 94.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 97.

2006.⁷⁰ Shia militia groups rode to power with the election of a Shia-dominated regime, assuming important positions in the Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence, from which they could infiltrate the police forces and parts of the army.⁷¹ Sectarian violence in Iraq became considerably worse during 2006 as a result of the bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara in February that year, as this triggered repeated rounds of sectarian killings by Shia against Sunni and reprisal killings by Sunni death squads.⁷² This violence became so endemic that many observers feared at the time that Iraq could disintegrate into “communal cantons” through a process of large-scale ethnic cleansing.⁷³ While Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki and the clerical establishment led by Sistani publicly denounced this explosion in sectarian violence, some major Shia parties in the government were in fact implicated in much of this violence. Many militia groups associated with the UIA, al Dawa and SCIRI parties achieved through the elections of 2005 a degree of influence that allowed them to use government resources to launch campaigns of terror against their enemies.⁷⁴ In this way, the democratic elections consistently championed by the Bush administration actually played an important part in enabling sectarian terrorism in Iraq, rather than undermining the appeal and use of this form of political violence.

Jihadist Terrorism in Iraq- 2003-6

A number of critics argue that contrary to the Bush administration's claims about undermining Jihadism through intervention in Iraq, regime change and events in the state from 2003 to 2006 actually played a key role in fostering Jihadist violence. It is not that democracy in Iraq itself encouraged Jihadism, but rather that through its actions, the Bush administration inadvertently established in Iraq an ideal breeding ground for this ideology. In the years prior to the change of American strategy in Iraq in early 2007,⁷⁵ Jihadist terrorism was on the rise in the state, facilitated in large part

⁷⁰ Diamond, *Squandered Victory*, pp. 324-6.

⁷¹ Diamond et al, 'What to do in Iraq', pp. 156-7.

⁷² Toby Dodge, 'The Causes of US Failure in Iraq'. *Survival*, Vol. 49, No. 1, (Mar., 2007), pp. 88-90; For further discussion of the rise of sectarian violence in Iraq in 2006, see Peter W. Galbraith, *The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2006, pp. 1-3.

⁷³ See for example, Diamond et al., 'What To Do In Iraq', pp. 157-8. This article was published in August 2006 – a time when communal violence in Iraq continued to escalate almost weekly and many observers believed that Iraq was close to collapsing into three sectarian mini-states.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ For discussion of this change in strategy and its effects, see the conclusion of this thesis.

by the insecurity and chaos resulting from regime change and its aftermath.

Some agencies of the United States government have acknowledged the important role intervention in Iraq played in fostering Jihadist violence. According to an April 2006 CIA report entitled 'Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,' regime change and democratisation in Iraq made the state “the “cause celebre” for Jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of US involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating support for the global Jihadist movement.”⁷⁶ Indeed, the CIA report contends that “the Iraq Jihad is shaping a new generation of terrorists and operatives” and that “perceived Jihadist successes [in Iraq] would inspire more fighters to continue the struggle elsewhere.”⁷⁷ Thus, a strong Al Qaeda presence developed in Iraq from 2003 owing in large part to regime change, whereas before the invasion, Jihadism was virtually non-existent in the state.⁷⁸ In a similar vein to the CIA's assessment, a classified Joint Chiefs of Staff report dated May 2006 argues that Jihadists in Iraq “retain the resources and capability to sustain and even increase current levels of violence” throughout 2006 and into 2007.⁷⁹ While Jihadist attacks were at a near all-time high in Iraq at the time the report was published, its conclusion that a primary cause of this violence is the chaotic security situation resulting from the invasion of 2003 remains accurate.⁸⁰

Critics have argued that through its invasion of Iraq and actions in the state to 2007, the United States helped to embolden a more hardline form of Jihadism. In 2004, Al Qaeda in Iraq was established under the leadership of the Jordanian Jihadist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.⁸¹ According to Council on Foreign Relations scholar Greg Bruno, Zarqawi developed in Iraq a more extreme version of Jihadist ideology than that of Osama Bin Laden, in which 'jihad' was not only carried out against the

⁷⁶ 'Declassified Key Judgements of National Intelligence Estimate “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States” dated April 2006'. Washington, April 2006, p. 2. <http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/trends.pdf>, accessed 12 July 2007.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Mary Anne Weaver, 'The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi'. *The Atlantic Monthly Online*, (Jul/Aug 2006). <http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/prem/200607/zarqawi>, accessed 4 September 2007.

⁷⁹ For discussion and further details of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's still-classified assessment, see Woodward, *State of Denial*, pp. 481-4. The report accurately predicted that levels of violence would increase: Jihadist attacks reached their all-time high in October and November 2006, and again reached extremely high levels in the first months of 2007, before being significantly undermined by the surge and the Sunni tribal rebellion against Al Qaeda in the second half of 2007. For further discussion of the surge strategy, see the conclusion of this thesis.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Greg Bruno, 'Profile: Al-Qaeda in Iraq (a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Mesopotamia)'. *Council on Foreign Relations Online*, (14 Dec., 2007). <http://www.cfr.org/publication/14811/profile.html>, accessed 12 May 2008.

occupiers and their clients, but also against the Shia and other Muslim groups Zarqawi deemed apostates.⁸² Al Qaeda in Iraq was likely responsible for a number of the most deadly bombings in Iraq carried out to 2007, including the bombing of the Jordanian embassy and the United Nations mission in Iraq in 2003, as well as the bombing of the Golden Mosque of Samara in February 2006, and the attack on a Yazidi village in northern Iraq in August 2007 that killed over 500 people.⁸³ Zarqawi was also likely behind the bombings of three western hotels in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, and there is evidence that Al Qaeda in Iraq also made links with other Jihadists in the Gulf, Lebanon and Egypt.⁸⁴ While Al Qaeda in Iraq lost some of its organisational capability after Zarqawi was killed by an American airstrike in June 2006, it has remained what Brookings Institute Middle East scholar Bruce Riedel describes as the “cutting edge” of Jihadist ideology.⁸⁵ Intervention in Iraq played a major role in fostering a new wave of Jihadism more extreme than that of the broader Al Qaeda network, and until the adoption of the “surge” strategy in 2007, the Bush administration's actions in Iraq contributed to a situation that was generally enabling, rather than undermining, this movement.⁸⁶

Reassessing the Roots of Terrorism

The practical application and consequences of activist democracy promotion in Iraq has led some scholars to question the broader assumptions made by the Bush administration about the roots of terrorism. While President Bush consistently claimed that the authoritarian status quo of the Arab world was the primary source of Jihadist ideology, and that spreading democracy was the key to undermining this threat,⁸⁷ critics argue that these claims have often been contradicted and brought into

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid; See also Bruce Riedel, 'Al Qaeda Strikes Back'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 86, No. 3, (May/Jun 2007), pp. 26-7.

⁸⁴ Thomas Hegghammer, 'Global Jihadism After the Iraq War'. *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 60, No. 1, (Winter 2006), p. 11; For further discussion of Zarqawi's regional strategy, see Brian Fishman, 'After Zarqawi: The Dilemmas and the Future of Al Qaeda in Iraq'. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (Autumn 2006), p. 23. The groups Zarqawi likely made connections with include Fatah al Islam in Lebanon, Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula in Saudi Arabia, and Jihadist groups in Egypt that splintered from the Muslim Brotherhood.

⁸⁵ Bruce Riedel, 'The Return of the Knights: Al-Qaeda and the Fruits of Middle East Disorder'. *Survival*, Vol. 49, No. 3, (Sept., 2007), p. 115

⁸⁶ Ibid; See also Riedel, 'Al Qaeda Strikes Back', p. 27. For discussion of the surge and the undermining of Al Qaeda in Iraq by 2008, see the conclusion of this thesis.

⁸⁷ See discussion of authoritarianism and terrorism in chapter three of this thesis.

significant doubt in practice.

A major criticism levelled at the Bush administration's propositions about the roots of terrorism in the Middle East is that there is almost no evidence that authoritarian regimes are the primary, or even an important, source of Jihadist violence. In a September 2005 *Foreign Affairs* article, University of Vermont political science professor, F. Gregory Gause, challenges the Bush Doctrine's claim that there is undeniable causation between authoritarianism and terrorism.⁸⁸ Examining a variety of scholarly and governmental sources on Jihadist terrorism in the Arab world, Gause writes that “although what is known about terrorism is admittedly incomplete, the data available [does] not show a strong relationship between democracy and an absence of or a reduction in terrorism. Terrorism appears to stem from factors much more specific than regime type.”⁸⁹ Indeed, Gause contends that “there is... no solid empirical evidence for a strong link between democracy, or any other regime type, and terrorism.”⁹⁰ Writing two years after the invasion of Iraq, Gause holds that there is still no “evidence that democracy in the Arab world will “drain the swamp,” eliminating soft support for terrorist organizations among the Arab public and reducing the number of potential recruits for them.”⁹¹ In Gause's view, the case of Iraq appears to show that intervention in the Middle East can help to embolden Jihadist terrorism, rather than eliminate the conditions in which it apparently breeds.⁹²

Critics of the Bush Doctrine have also argued since 2003 that the Bush administration's explanation for the origins of Jihadism marginalises compelling alternative explanations that can better account for the growth of this ideology.⁹³ Examining the views of Islamic politics scholar Olivier Roy and others, Fukuyama

⁸⁸ F. Gregory Gause III, 'Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?' *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 5, (Sept/Oct 2005), p. 62.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 65.

⁹² Ibid, p. 62.

⁹³ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 74-6; Richard Crockatt, *America Embattled: September 11, anti-Americanism and the Global Order*. London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 94-6. Fukuyama and Crockatt note that some critics argue that the Bush administration might have deliberately marginalised alternative explanations for Jihadism. Some critics hold that the Bush administration did not wish to acknowledge that past and current American policies might have played a role in fostering Jihadist ideology, as to admit this would not be consistent with the Bush administration's own virtuous self-image, and would contradict its rationales for activist democracy promotion. According to such critics, this meant that an alternative explanation for Jihadist terrorism had to be offered. Despite such claims, there is little evidence at present that the Bush administration merely offers its explanation for Jihadist terrorism to remain cognitively consistent.

argues that “there is considerable evidence that a large number of Muslims in the world, including many living in very traditional Muslim societies, do not hate the United States, modernisation or “freedom.”⁹⁴ Fukuyama contends that most people in the Middle East “don’t dislike the United States or the West as such but rather dislike American foreign policy. They believe that the United States supports Israel one-sidedly against the Palestinians, and supports Arab dictators like Egypt’s Mubarak or the Saudi royal family at the expense of democracy.”⁹⁵ Similarly, Richard Crockatt, of the University of East Anglia, points out that Islamic fundamentalists view conflict in Iraq and between Israel and the Palestinians as a cause for Jihad, and see the alliances between the United States and authoritarian regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia as affronts to Islam that require a violent response.⁹⁶ Believing that their religion remains under siege, Jihadist groups have continued since the invasion of Iraq with what they view as a global insurgency against American foreign policies in the Middle East.⁹⁷

In the view of a number of scholars, the example of Iraq can help to show that armed democracy promotion is an ineffective way to deal with the problem of terrorism.⁹⁸ Writing in the context of escalating violence in Iraq in 2006, Fukuyama argues that “the long-term problem is... not somehow “fixing” the Middle East” through democratisation, but rather seriously examining the resentment of American foreign policy that seems to have done so much to exacerbate Jihadist ideology.⁹⁹ Addressing the idea, often expressed by President Bush, that democratic elections in a state such as Iraq would undermine Jihadist ideology, Gregory Gause writes that in reality it is “logical to assume that terrorists, who rarely represent political agendas that could mobilize electoral majorities, would reject the very principles of majority rule and minority rights on which liberal democracy is based.”¹⁰⁰ Bruce Riedel and others suggest that this is what occurred in Iraq following its three elections in 2005, as Jihadists sought to disrupt and undermine democratisation by increasing the number and severity of attacks against civilians and the government in Baghdad.¹⁰¹ A number of critics have concluded from the example of Iraq that, despite the Bush

⁹⁴ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 74-6.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Crockatt, pp. 94-5.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ For discussion of this important argument, see Halper, Clarke, pp. 282-3.

⁹⁹ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. 74-5.

¹⁰⁰ Gause, p. 66.

¹⁰¹ Riedel, ‘Al Qaeda Strikes Back’, passim.

Doctrine's claims, the presence of a democratic regime does not necessarily mean that Jihadist ideology will be undermined, and that the link between authoritarianism and Jihadist ideology is most often tenuous at best.

The Dominoes that did not Fall

The Bush administration consistently linked the promotion of democracy in Iraq to its wider aim of regional democratic transformation in the Arab world. In practice, however, developments in the Middle East since 2003 have roundly challenged this notion. A number of critics have noted that when faced with the example of democratisation and its consequences in Iraq, the United States' authoritarian Arab allies have dug in their heels against change and have successfully deflected most pressure for reform. In addition, critics often note that where democratic elections have occurred in the Arab world, these have frequently resulted in the rise of Islamist political parties that challenge many key elements of the Bush administration's assumptions about liberal democratic development.¹⁰² While it is still too soon to assess the longer-term effects of democratisation in Iraq on the wider Middle East, it is apparent that the outcomes to date have been generally negative and a 'democratic domino effect' has not occurred.

The Entrenchment of Authoritarian Allies

Contrary to the assumptions made by senior policy makers of the Bush administration, democracy promotion in Iraq has not encouraged the democratic transformation of America's Arab allies.¹⁰³ Examining the regional effects of democratisation in Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations fellow Stephen Cook writes that

It is far from clear... that the war [in Iraq] has contributed anything to the drive for democracy in places such as Amman, Cairo, Damascus, or Riyadh. The arrival of U.S. troops in Iraq may alter the behaviour

¹⁰² Thomas Carothers, 'Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 1, (Jan/Feb 2003), p. 89.

¹⁰³ Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 6.

of some states on the country's borders, but this does not mean that the new Iraq will somehow act as a catalyst for political liberalization and democracy in the region.¹⁰⁴

Similarly, in a 2007 article on the potential for political change in the Gulf States, Anoushiraven Ehteshami and Steven Wright, both of Durham University, comment that “the heightened level of insecurity in Iraq is now serving as a barrier for future reform” in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia.¹⁰⁵ This is “the exact opposite of what was intended by Washington.”¹⁰⁶ Ehteshami and Wright hold that regular “coverage of the near-daily carnage within Iraq” by Arab press “is increasingly being cited by opponents to reform as an example of where reform will lead.”¹⁰⁷ Events in Iraq have often reinforced an already-strong reluctance among authoritarian leaders to engage in anything more than the most piecemeal reforms that do not fundamentally alter the status quo.¹⁰⁸

In the view of some critics, the entrenchment of authoritarianism among America's Arab allies demonstrates that such regimes continue to be adept at deflecting and marginalising external pressure for reform. Georgetown University political science professor Steven Heydemann notes that many of the authoritarian regimes the Bush administration seeks to transform are “more broadly consolidated than is often acknowledged.”¹⁰⁹ Arab leaders have been able to weather previous external pressure for change, such as that brought about by the collapse of communism and the Third Wave of democratisation, through initiating piecemeal reform programs and by manipulating state structures to give the appearance of liberalisation, but to control this process to the extent that no substantive changes take place.¹¹⁰ This is what Marina Ottaway, a leading Middle East specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, calls the development of a “semi-authoritarian” model of reform.¹¹¹ Under this model, a regime opens up to the extent that the slightest degree of liberalisation does occur; however this process is totally

¹⁰⁴ Steven A. Cook, 'The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 84, No. 2, (Mar/Apr 2005), p. 94.

¹⁰⁵ Anoushiraven Ehteshami, Steven Wright, 'Political Change in the Arab Oil Monarchies: From Liberalisation to Enfranchisement'. *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 5, (2007), pp. 916-17.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Heydemann, pp. 148-9.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Marina Ottaway, 'Evaluating Middle East Reform: How do we Know When it is Significant?' *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Middle East Series, No. 56, (Feb., 2005), pp. 6-7.

controlled from the top and often reversed after a short period of time out of a fear that reform could impede regime survival if any form of genuine democracy is allowed to develop.¹¹² In this way, authoritarian Arab states have been able to marginalise substantive reform to the extent that such regimes are more stable and entrenched than authoritarian governments in most other parts of the world today.

Reform among 'friendly' authoritarian regimes has also been significantly impeded by a widespread perception among such governments and their populations that the United States lacks the credibility to promote democratic change in the Middle East. Marina Ottaway comments that Arab populations are well aware that the United States has for decades stood behind their authoritarian leaders as it sought to maintain the status quo.¹¹³ There is therefore a great deal of cynicism and hostility towards the idea that the Bush administration has now decided to support real democratic change.¹¹⁴ In addition, Thomas Carothers writes that to many Arab elites and the wider population, the idea of democratisation has since 2003 been "contaminated" by its association with American intervention in Iraq.¹¹⁵ American-backed democratisation has consistently lacked credibility in Arab eyes when voiced by an administration which speaks in lofty terms about democratic change, but which nonetheless appears through its invasion of Iraq to remain most interested in upholding American regional power, ensuring Israel's security and protecting the United States' economic interests in the Arab world.¹¹⁶ Accordingly, many authoritarian regimes are reluctant to be seen undertaking substantive reform at the behest of an external power they and most of their populations believe has very little credibility or genuine will to push for wide-ranging democratic transformation.¹¹⁷

As the 'friendly' authoritarian states of the Middle East have entrenched their positions in the face of pressure for change, some critics have noted a gradual shift in the Bush administration's policies in practice. Thomas Carothers writes that despite its strong statements about the need for extensive political transformation in the Arab world, in practice the Bush administration has exhibited a "split personality" towards

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Marina Ottaway, 'Promoting Democracy in the Middle East: The Problem of US Credibility'. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Middle East Series, No. 35, (Mar., 2003), p. 9; For further discussion, see Carothers, Ottaway in Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), pp. 252-3.

¹¹⁴ Ottaway, 'Promoting Democracy in the Middle East', p. 9.

¹¹⁵ Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 6.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Husam A. Mohamad, 'Democracy Promotion in Arab Politics'. *Journal of International and Area Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, (Dec., 2007), p. 112.

its Arab allies since 2003.¹¹⁸ President Bush and other have pushed for democratic change, but have also started to become more aware that enacting such a policy is neither easy nor always beneficial in practice.¹¹⁹ Examining this tension in the Bush administration's policies, Carothers and Ottaway contend that

Although [the] desire for democracy may be heartfelt, the United States has a lengthy laundry list of other priorities in the region: access to oil, cooperation and assistance on counterterrorism, fostering peace between Israel and its neighbors, stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and preventing Islamist radicals from seizing power.¹²⁰

Some policy makers have belatedly realised that pushing the United States' authoritarian allies to democratise at a rapid pace is not the panacea to all of the problems of the Middle East, and could actually be detrimental to the pursuit of other American interests.¹²¹ As Carothers notes, breaking down the long-standing client-patron structure that serves as a pillar of American regional power is not in practice nearly as simple as establishing a model democracy in Iraq that will inspire wide-ranging democratic change among America's Arab allies.¹²² In reality there is usually tension, rather than harmony, between the United States' desire to democratise authoritarian client regimes and its reliance on the stability of such regimes to uphold its regional influence.¹²³

How might have the Bush administration resolved this apparent tension between its statements about overturning the authoritarian status quo of the Middle East and the difficulties these policies face in practice? Some scholars have suggested that the most effective policy of democratisation for the Middle East is a gradualist process of "liberal autocracy reform."¹²⁴ Ray Takeyh and Nikolas Gvosdev of the Nixon Centre contend that "rather than blindly prop up authoritarian rulers or gamble on democracy, the American empire has to opt for a middle course and aim to produce liberal autocracies capable of managing rather than suppressing pluralism."¹²⁵ Takeyh and Gvosdev hold that "ideally, the United States would hope

¹¹⁸ Carothers, 'Promoting Democracy and Fighting Terror', p. 89.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ Marina Ottaway, Thomas Carothers, 'Middle East Democracy'. *Foreign Policy*, No. 145, (Nov/Dec 2004), p. 23.

¹²¹ See discussion in the conclusion of this thesis.

¹²² Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 6.

¹²³ Ibid; For further discussion, see Perry, pp. 66-7.

¹²⁴ Ray Takeyh, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, 'Democratic Impulses versus Imperial Interests: America's New Mid-East Conundrum'. *Orbis*, Vol. 47, No. 3, (Summer 2003), p. 419.

¹²⁵ Ibid, p. 425.

to engender Arab versions of Vladimir Putin – a pragmatic realist capable of cooperating with the United States while effectively managing popular discontent with American policies.”¹²⁶ This is essentially a prescription for fostering illiberal democrats that are sufficiently co-operative as to allow for some degree of liberalisation that does not harm American interests or cause turmoil in Arab states.¹²⁷

While this notion of “liberal autocracy reform” appears a compelling option for the Arab world, it is not without problems. Georgetown University democratisation scholar, Daniel Brumberg, warns that despite its allure, “liberal autocracy reform” can be a “transition to nowhere.”¹²⁸ Too often, this process of reform does not fundamentally alter key authoritarian state structures of control and repression. An incumbent authoritarian leader can easily enough manipulate national law and place stringent limits on politics and civil society if they believe that reform is getting out of hand.¹²⁹ Similarly, Thomas Carothers questions whether “liberalising autocrats” can be trusted to implement fully the reforms they claim to champion.¹³⁰ Carothers writes that “for every Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore there have been dozens or even hundreds of rapacious, repressive autocrats posing as reformers, leaders for whom the rule of law represents a straitjacket to be avoided at all costs.”¹³¹ In these ways, while liberal autocracy reform is most certainly a more prudent and realistic policy than promoting Middle East democracy through a ‘domino effect,’ this policy could nonetheless lead to outcomes almost as mixed as those of the Bush Doctrine’s attempts to democratise its authoritarian allies from 2003 to 2008.

'Negative Contagion'

The claims made in the Bush Doctrine about the practical unfolding of regional democratic transformation in the Middle East have also been brought into significant doubt as when democratic elections have been held since 2003, they have generally resulted in strong victories for Islamist political parties. To some extent, this reflects

¹²⁶ Ibid. If the United States did manage to foster an Arab Putin, it would likely be dissatisfied with the outcome – an assertive illiberal nationalist leader intent on engaging in revisionist actions abroad to strengthen the power and security of his state.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Daniel Brumberg, 'Liberalization versus Democracy' in Carothers, Ottaway (Eds), p. 30.

¹²⁹ Ibid.

¹³⁰ Carothers, 'The "Sequencing" Fallacy', pp. 13-14.

¹³¹ Ibid.

what Robert Jervis labels “negative contagion” in the international system.¹³² This is when an event in one part of the system, such as regime change and democratisation in Iraq, has unforeseen “feedback” in other states, fostering political developments that were seemingly unanticipated by an external actor when it first intervened.¹³³

While it is difficult to assess presently what longer-term effects events in Iraq might have on the development of democracy in the Arab world, it is at least clear that developments to 2008 have run contrary to those anticipated in the Bush Doctrine. In March 2003, journalist Greg Miller, of the *Los Angeles Times*, reported that the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research had produced a report critical of the supposed regional benefits of promoting democracy in Iraq.¹³⁴ Entitled “Iraq, the Middle East and Change: No Dominoes,” the report argued that it was “not credible” that the Bush administration could bring about the democratic transformation of the Arab world through the invasion of Iraq.¹³⁵ The State Department report contended that “electoral democracy, were it to emerge” in Arab states “could well be subject to exploitation by anti-American elements.”¹³⁶ The invasion of Iraq and American actions in the state have indeed helped to energise a strong anti-American backlash. As Thomas Carothers notes, Islamist groups, being the most organised and influential political force outside of the ruling regime, have spearheaded this backlash and as a result have expanded their base of popular support to the extent that they have risen to positions of influence in many states.¹³⁷ This process has only been accelerated as a result of the election of a Shia-dominated regime in Iraq, as this has played an important role in encouraging Shia groups from Lebanon to the Gulf States to become more politically assertive.¹³⁸

This development of unanticipated “feedback” stemming from regime change in Iraq is most evident in Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. Critics have argued that while Islamist groups in this area have risen to power for a variety of reasons, there is nonetheless a connection between the election of Islamists in Iraq and increased Islamist political participation in this region. The 2006 election of Hamas

¹³² Jervis, 'Understanding the Bush Doctrine', p. 369.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Greg Miller, 'Democracy Domino Theory “Not Credible”', *Los Angeles Times*, (14 Mar., 2003), p. 1.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹³⁷ Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 14.

¹³⁸ Gilbert Achcar, 'Arab Spring: Late and Cold', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, (Jul., 2005).

<http://www.globalpolicy.org/empire/intervention/2005/07arapspring.htm>, accessed 8 May 2007.

confounded the Bush administration's consistent claims that democratisation in the Palestinian Territories would result in a pro-American and pro-Israeli liberal democratic government.¹³⁹ Dennis Ross, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, contends that “the Hamas victory should compel Washington to reconsider its approach to promoting democracy in the Middle East.”¹⁴⁰ According to Ross, the Bush administration needs to understand that despite its optimism about the universal appeal of liberal democracy, it is always possible that hostile illiberal political forces can come to power through legitimate democratic elections.¹⁴¹ While Hamas rose to power primarily owing to domestic political changes within the Palestinian territories, Ross observes that its decision to stand in elections was nonetheless influenced to some extent by the fact that Islamist groups have been empowered through elections in Iraq, and as Islamists in other Arab states were making important political gains by choosing participation over rejectionism.¹⁴²

A similar dynamic also encouraged Hezbollah of Lebanon to participate in democratic elections. Emboldened by growing Shia political power in Iraq and the general revival of Shia political activism since 2003, Hezbollah gained increased influence through elections in Lebanon in 2005. With popular support from its constituencies, Hezbollah launched an attack against Israel in mid-July 2006, resulting in a major Israeli counter-strike that escalated into the Israel-Hezbollah war. According to investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, the fact that a freely elected party of Lebanon's government launched an attack against Israel undercut entirely the Bush administration's previously strong support for the spread of the 'Arab spring' and the 'Cedar Revolution' in Lebanon.¹⁴³ Seeking now to encourage an Israeli 'rollback' of Hezbollah in a manner not dissimilar to the strategy advocated in the

¹³⁹ 'President Discusses the Future of Iraq'.

¹⁴⁰ Denis Ross, 'From Washington to Hamas: Change or Fail' in Robert Satloff (Ed), 'Hamas Triumphant: Implications for Security, Politics, Economics and Strategy'. *Washington Institute For Near East Policy*, Policy Focus No. 53, (Feb., 2006) p. 47.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. The classic example of the phenomenon was the democratic election of the Nazi Party in Germany in April 1933. Hitler was legitimately elected as Chancellor and the Nazi Party assumed a majority in the Reichstag, using this new-found position of power to dismantle German democracy and establish a one-party state.

¹⁴² Ibid. This again does not imply that such groups are embracing democracy as the “single sustainable model” of political order in the twenty-first century, but rather shows that such groups are pragmatic enough to utilise democratic institutions and elections as a route to power. Once in power, they often do not move in a liberal democratic direction. As the example of the rise and fall of Hamas shows, such parties can remain illiberal and violent to the extent that they undermine their own power through their actions.

¹⁴³ Seymour M. Hersh, 'Watching Lebanon: Washington's Interests in Israel's War'. *The New Yorker*, Vol. 82, No. 25, (21 Aug., 2006), p. 33.

Clean Break report published ten years earlier, some in the Bush administration appeared to have belatedly realised in July-August 2006 that early democratic elections in divided religious societies could embolden hostile political forces contrary to American aims.¹⁴⁴ Thus, rather than foster the emergence of benign liberal democratic groups in the Arab world, the invasion and democratisation of Iraq has to 2008 played an important part in doing just the opposite, helping to empower political forces often antithetical to the Bush Doctrine's assumption and detrimental to its goals.

Conclusion

Through studying the development of democracy in Iraq and its effects on the region to 2008, a number of scholars have concluded that the practical application of the propositions about democracy promotion made in the Bush Doctrine are often highly problematic. While the Bush administration entered Iraq with preconceived notions of how democracy was likely to unfold, these were quickly challenged in practice by state collapse and the chronic insecurity that followed regime change. Moreover, as Glenn Perry and others show, the Bush administration did not anticipate the key role influential indigenous actors, above all Ayatollah Al Sistani, would play in forcing considerable changes to democratisation which resulted in a regime different to that expected in 2003. Examining the broader unintended consequences that stem from regime change and democratisation in Iraq, Gregory Gause and others observe that intervention in the state helped to embolden Jihadist and sectarian terrorism in the period 2003-6, rather than diminish such forms of political violence. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, meanwhile, hold that the example of Iraq has been detrimental to liberal democratic transformation, as it has discouraged change among the United States' authoritarian allies and emboldened hostile political forces. Thus, in practice, the Bush Doctrine's Middle East democratisation policies have faced countervailing conditions that have challenged many of the assumptions, goals and overall outlook of this anti-terrorism grand strategy.

¹⁴⁴ Marina Ottaway et al, 'The New Middle East'. Washington, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (Mar., 2008). pp. 13-14.

Conclusion

The Return to Reality

In a recent report on American democracy promotion during President Bush's time in office, Thomas Carothers argues that the anti-terrorism grand strategy of Middle East democratisation that constitutes the heart of the Bush Doctrine has by 2008 “ended up as a semi-realist venture.”¹ Carothers notes that while the “United States is still fighting in Iraq” in Bush's last year in power, this is primarily for “the more basic goals of keeping the country from breaking apart and achieving at least basic order.”² With regards to democratisation in the wider Arab world, Carothers comments that the Bush administration has now “fallen back into the old pattern of accepting or embracing useful autocratic friends,” and is aiming to organise 'friendly' authoritarian states, such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States, into an alliance against what it perceives as a revisionist Iran.³ While some elements of the Bush administration's democratisation policies remain in effect, such as its aid programs,⁴ Carothers concludes that the heart of the Bush Doctrine's transformational strategy “is gone... broken on the shoals of Iraqi political realities and U.S security and economic interests throughout the region.”⁵

It is this context of realist resurgence in American foreign policy through which the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies, and commensurately, the neoconservative paradigm from which they are derived, have entered a state of decline. Since the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, realist scholars have offered among the strongest and most consistent critiques of interventionist democratisation in the Middle East. Realists have regularly emphasised the need for a foreign policy that rejects the strategy of forcible democratic transformation in the Arab world, and that is more aware of the benefits of prudence, humility and pragmatism in

¹ Thomas Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush'. Washington, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, (2007), p. 7.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid, p. 6.

⁴ See discussion of the aid programs Middle East Partner Initiative and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative in footnote number thirty one in chapter three of this thesis.

⁵ Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 7.

international relations.⁶ Until 2006, the Bush administration and its neoconservative supporters chose to marginalise or ignore such arguments, and attempted to press ahead with their goals of democratic transformation in Iraq and the wider Arab world. However, a confluence of events in 2006 – particularly the dire situation in Iraq, the democratic elections and actions of hostile political forces in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, and the decline of neoconservative personnel in the administration – compelled President Bush and his foreign policy advisers to significantly alter their strategy in Iraq, and to eventually abandon many of their ambitions for transforming the Middle East in favour of an increasingly realist posture in their last two years in office.⁷

The “Surge:” Acknowledging the Realities of Iraq

In a nationally-televised speech on 10 January 2007, President Bush told the American people that “it is clear that we need to change our strategy in Iraq.”⁸ In the context of the worst violence seen in Iraq, Bush stated that “there is no magic formula for success in Iraq,” and without a change in approach, the risks of failure would increase.⁹ Such an outcome, the President averred, would be “a disaster for the United States.”¹⁰ Bush noted that while the three elections held in Iraq in 2005 “were a stunning achievement,” the explosion of sectarian and Jihadist violence in Iraq in 2006 “overwhelmed the political gains the Iraqis had made” and brought the democratisation, if not the very continued existence, of Iraq into doubt.¹¹ In an attempt to improve this dire situation, President Bush announced a “surge” strategy focused on the deployment of an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq, a change in counter-insurgency tactics and a program of political reconciliation aimed at establishing peace between Iraq's warring sectarian parties.¹²

⁶ For brief discussion, see Campbell Craig, 'American Realism Versus American Imperialism'. *World Politics*, Vol. 57, No. 1, (2004), p. 144.

⁷ Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 7; For further discussion, see Ottaway et al, 'The New Middle East', conclusion.

⁸ 'President's Address to the Nation'. The Library, The White House, 10 January 2007. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html>, accessed 11 January 2007.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

Over the course of 2006, the situation in Iraq deteriorated sharply. As chapter five of this thesis details, Jihadist and sectarian violence consumed many parts of Iraq during that year, causing a number of observers to question the Bush administration's strategy of democratisation.¹³ Within the Bush administration itself, questions were also being raised about current strategy, and new approaches were proposed as violence in Iraq continued to escalate. In June 2006, President Bush's National Security Advisor, Stephen Hadley, initiated a review of Iraq policy which questioned the assumptions made about the development of democracy in Iraq and the route to victory.¹⁴ According to Peter Feaver, a National Security Council Iraq policy staffer from 2005-6, it became increasingly apparent to him and other policy planners that “over the course of 2006, the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq collapsed,” as chronic insecurity and growing political violence directly challenged the United States' democratisation strategy.¹⁵ Feaver writes that by the middle of 2006 “the results on the ground in Iraq made it clear that, without a dramatic change, the President would be leaving his successor with an untenable mess, if not the prospect of a catastrophic American rout.” As a result of this realisation, “a review of administration policy was therefore launched.”¹⁶

Integral to the movement towards a change in strategy in Iraq was the departure from the administration of leading neoconservative personnel and their allies. On 8 November 2006, Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld resigned following significant Republican losses in the mid-term congressional elections. Rumsfeld had come under increasing pressure for what many viewed as his mishandling of the deteriorating situation in Iraq and his refusal to reassess the policies of 'Iraqification' and democratisation which he championed.¹⁷ Rumsfeld was

¹³ See discussion in chapter five on the upsurge in Jihadist and sectarian violence in Iraq during 2006.

¹⁴ For a detailed narrative of the origins and development of the surge strategy, see Bob Woodward, *The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006-8*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 2008, introduction, chapter 7, passim. The Bush administration's change of strategy was also influenced by the extensive deliberations by military Chiefs of Staff, by dissenting generals and by military historians at the American Enterprise Institute.

¹⁵ Peter D. Feaver, 'Anatomy of the Surge'. *Commentary*, Vol. 125, No. 5, (Apr., 2008), p. 25.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ For discussion, see Jim Lobe, Michael Flynn, 'The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives'. *Rightweb*, International Relations Committee, (17 Nov., 2006). <http://rightweb.ironline.org/rw/371.html>, accessed 17 March 2008. 'Iraqification' was the name given to the policies that aimed to quickly develop Iraqi security forces and give them responsibility for maintaining order in the state. By 2006, this policy was in a dire condition, as Iraqi security forces were woefully small, under-trained and often infiltrated by sectarian fighters. As a part of the surge, the pace of Iraqification slowed and emphasis was placed on in-depth training over rapid deployment.

replaced on 18 December 2006 by Robert Gates, a realist-leaning foreign policy thinker who had served as CIA director in George H.W. Bush's administration and was regarded as a moderate.¹⁸ Gate's appointment was significant, as it signalled a substantial transition away from neoconservative ideology and towards pragmatism and moderation. The eclipse of neoconservative influence within the Bush administration began in 2005, with the resignation of prominent figures associated with intervention in Iraq. Both Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith left the Pentagon in 2005, while Lewis Libby and Richard Perle were removed from their positions in government amid scandals.¹⁹ From 2006 onwards, neoconservative influence in the Vice President's office and the National Security Council also started to wane. Many of the new advisers appointed to these organisations in President Bush's last two years in power shared much of the outlook of Robert Gates and his allies in the administration, rather than the views of Dick Cheney and the few remaining neoconservatives. With these changes in personnel came a shift in ideology and strategy that culminated with the announcement and implementation of the surge; a new policy focused not on an ambitious program of rapid democratisation, but on more pragmatic strategies aimed at establishing the requirements of basic security in Iraq.

The publication of the Iraq Study Group Report in December 2006, and the Bush administration's subsequent embrace of its recommendations for a surge, aptly exemplified this resurgence of realism. The Iraq Study Group was chaired by James Baker, a leading realist figure and former Secretary of State to President George H.W. Bush, and Lee Hamilton, a realist-leaning Democrat.²⁰ Robert Gates was also a member of the study group before his appointment as Secretary of Defence, and he carried a number of the ideas expressed by the group into government.²¹ According to the study group's report, "the situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating," and that to

¹⁸ Ibid; See also 'President Bush Nominates Dr. Robert M. Gates to be Secretary of Defense'. The Oval Office, 8 November 2006.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061108-4.html>, accessed 1 September 2007.
 Robert Gates has been retained as Secretary of Defence by President Barack Obama and will likely continue to serve until at least 2010.

¹⁹ Lobe, Flynn, 'The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives'. Lewis Libby was charged with lying under oath and perverting the course of justice in the case of the outing of undercover CIA agent Valerie Plame. Richard Perle was forced to resign from his position as the chair of the Defence Policy Board owing to a conflict of interest with a weapons company in which he was a high-ranking board member.

²⁰ James Baker, Lee Hamilton et al, *The Iraq Study Group Report*. New York, Vintage Books, 2006, pp. 124-7.

²¹ Lobe, Flynn, 'The Rise and Decline of the Neoconservatives'.

continue with current strategy would likely bring about defeat for the United States.²² Examining alternatives for dealing with the situation in Iraq, the study group suggests that the United States send an additional 20,000 or more troops to the state for an eighteen-month period. The study group holds that the United States should adopt new counter-insurgency tactics focused on stationing troops in local communities in order to fight Jihadists and stem sectarian conflict, rather than attempting to rely on the processes of democratisation and 'Iraqification' to quell this violence.²³ The report also contends that the United States needs to establish benchmark goals of political reconciliation and reform that must be met by the Iraqi government.²⁴ In his address announcing the surge, President Bush agreed that an additional 30,000 troops would be sent to Iraq by mid-2007, and that new programs aimed at stemming political violence and enhancing security in the state would be initiated.

By the second half of 2007, the military component of the Bush administration's surge strategy met with success. By increasing its troop numbers at the same time as it formed alliances with Sunni tribal groups that had begun to rebel against Jihadists, the Bush administration had by 2008 established a level of security in Iraq unseen under its previous strategy centred on democratisation. In late 2006, differences developed between Al Qaeda in Iraq and Sunni tribes in Anbar province over Al Qaeda's extreme tactics and ideology. This led tribal sheiks to approach the United States military offering to turn against the Jihadists they once aided.²⁵ As 30,000 more troops were deployed to Iraq in the first half of 2007, the American military began to make alliances with these Sunni "awakening groups," paying them monthly salaries and providing them with arms and training to fight Jihadists across central and western Iraq.²⁶ In his September 2007 congressional testimony on the effects of the surge, the-then commander of American forces in Iraq, General David Petraeus, argues that "the most significant development in the past six months... has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local citizens rejecting Al Qaeda and

²² Baker, Hamilton et al, pp. xv- xvi, 38-9.

²³ Ibid, pp. xv- xvi.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Greg Bruno, 'The Role of the 'Sons of Iraq' in Improving Security'. *Council on Foreign Relations Online*, (May., 2008), <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16088/>, accessed 12 May 2008.

²⁶ Ibid. See also Woodward, *The War Within*, pp. 380-2. Woodward notes that alongside supporting the awakening groups, the United States military and CIA operatives have been involved in top secret counterinsurgency operations to infiltrate and break up Jihadist cells. According to Woodward, these operation have met with significant success to late 2008, playing a decisive role in undermining Jihadist groups in Iraq.

other extremists.”²⁷ These groups have been integral in facilitating a 'bottom-up' process of restoring security in many regions of Iraq, striking a major blow against Jihadists in co-ordination with American forces and making possible a number of gains that seemed out of reach in 2006.²⁸

Alongside the development of awakening groups in 2007, sectarian violence in Iraq has been significantly reduced owing to ceasefires between some of the leading sectarian militias. As with the stemming of Jihadism in Iraq, this improvement owes much to the change in strategy initiated by the Bush administration in early 2007, particularly its new focus on encouraging 'bottom-up' initiatives, rather than imposing political solutions from above. According to Stephen Biddle, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Sunni insurgents came to understand during 2006 that they would likely lose in a full-scale civil war against the Shia.²⁹ Many Sunni realised they were better off joining awakening groups to fight foreign Jihadists rather than fellow Iraqis.³⁰ Further, Shia groups, such as Moqtada Al Sadr's Mehdi Army, began losing popular support in 2007 as security improved in Baghdad owing to the deployment of more American troops. Al Sadr therefore opted for a ceasefire with his enemies in August 2007.³¹ While these ceasefires can be tenuous, as shown by renewed violence between elements of the Mehdi Army and the Iraqi government in the first half of 2008, it is clear that a number of bottom-up actions that aim to reduce sectarian violence in Iraq have met with some important successes since 2007.³²

By late 2008, the Bush administration's surge strategy helped to facilitate

²⁷ General David H. Patraeus, 'Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq'. Washington, 10-11 September 2007, p. 5. Patraeus was named the commander of United States Central Command in early 2008.

²⁸ Jim Michaels, 'U.S. Gamble on Sheiks is Paying Off – So Far'. *USA Today*, (28 Dec., 2007). http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2007-12-26-tribal-sheiks_N.htm, accessed 28 December 2007; James Kurth, 'Winning a Civil War?' *The American Interest*, Vol. 3, No. 4, (Mar/Apr 2008). <http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=396&MI=18>, accessed 25 March 2008. Some scholars have expressed concern that a reliance on awakening groups will make it more difficult to ensure long-term stability in Iraq. As Steven Simon of the Council on Foreign Relations writes, the strategy of supporting awakening groups “is not linked to any sustainable plan for building a viable Iraqi state. If anything, it has made such an outcome less likely, by stoking the revanchist fantasies of Sunni Arab tribes and pitting them against the central government and against one another. In other words, the recent short-term gains have come at the expense of the long-term goal of a stable, unitary Iraq.” See Steven Simon, 'The Price of the Surge'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 3, (May/Jun 2008). <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87305/steven-simon/the-price-of-the-surge.html>, accessed 12 May 2008.

²⁹ Stephen Biddle, 'Patient Stabilized?' *The National Interest*, No. 94, (Mar/Apr., 2008), pp. 37-8.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid, p. 40.

³² Ibid, pp. 39-40.

agreement on a timetable for the American withdrawal from Iraq. Prior to the success of the surge, President Bush and his leading foreign policy advisers consistently refused to commit to a withdrawal timetable, contending that this was fundamentally at odds with their strategy of achieving victory by establishing a stable liberal democracy in Iraq.³³ As the Bush administration's November 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq declared, "no war has been won on a timetable, and neither will this one."³⁴ Yet the gains made in security since early 2007 began to make possible the consideration of a withdrawal timetable.³⁵ This was given added impetus by the pending expiration of the United Nations mandate for the American presence in Iraq at the end of 2008.³⁶ Accordingly, the Bush administration began negotiating a "Status of Forces" agreement with the Iraqi government in mid-2008. Owing to Iraqi pressure, this document included provisions for the withdrawal of all American combat troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.³⁷ After lengthy deliberation within the Iraqi government and between Iraq's leaders and the United States, agreement was reached in mid-November 2008 that "all... United States forces shall withdraw from Iraqi territory no later than 31 December 2011."³⁸ This marked change in the Bush administration's position over the past two years gives a good indication of the extent to which many of the initial ambitions and aims of the Bush Doctrine in Iraq have been significantly scaled back as the United States attempts to deal with the complex realities of the state.

³³ See for example, 'President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War on Terror'; 'President Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy'; 'President Discusses Iraqi Elections, Victory in the War on Terror'.

³⁴ 'National Strategy for Victory in Iraq'. The National Security Council, November 2005. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html, accessed 4 December 2008.

³⁵ For discussion, see Sally Buzbee, 'Iraq Insists on Withdrawal Timetable for US Troops'. *Associated Press*, (9 Jul., 2008). http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20080708/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iraq;_ylt=AnjkVWYXWaN5cG4hFi86tCOs0NUE, accessed 9 July 2008.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ For details of the Bush administration's withdrawal agreement, see 'Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organisation of their Activities During their Temporary Presence in Iraq'. United States Embassy, Baghdad, 17 November 2008, p. 24. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SOFA.pdf, accessed 4 December 2008; For further information, see also, 'Strategic Framework Agreement for Relationship of Friendship and Co-operation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq'. American Embassy, Baghdad, 17 November 2008. http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/SE_SFA.pdf, accessed 4 December 2008.

The Reality of Regional Democratic Transformation

The Bush administration's 'return to reality' has not just been confined to Iraq. In his last two years in office, President Bush has effectively abandoned many of his administration's ambitions for regional democratic transformation in the broader Middle East. As a result of the major setbacks the Bush administration's regional democratisation policies faced, in large part as a result of the unintended outcomes and negative regional effects of intervention in Iraq as examined in chapter five, its actions in practice have become increasingly 'realist' in character.³⁹ President Bush and other senior administration officials still occasionally talk in grand terms about the unfolding of Arab democracy and its beneficial longer-term effects.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, it is clear that many in the administration have come to realise the difficulty of putting these ideas into practice and have recognised the possibility of political outcomes in the Arab world detrimental to American aims.

Since 2006, the Bush administration has emphasised a more gradualist conception of Middle East democratisation. President Bush has started to claim that Middle East democratisation will be a “generational commitment” with the emergence of democracy taking decades, not merely a matter of years.⁴¹ In contrast to his earlier positions expressed about Arab democratic development as late as 2005, President Bush now argues that while “free elections are exhilarating events... history teaches us that the path to a free society is long, and not always smooth.”⁴² Bush contends that “no nation in history has made the transition to a free society without

³⁹ Carothers, 'US Democracy Promotion During and After Bush', p. 7.

⁴⁰ President Bush continued to talk in broad terms about democracy in the Middle East right up to his last days in office. See 'President Bush Makes Farewell Address to the Nation'. East Room, The White House, 15 January 2009. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2009/01/20090115-17.html>, accessed 16 January 2009.

⁴¹ 'President Bush Delivers State of the Union Address'. United States Capitol, Washington, D.C., 23 January 2007. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070123-2.html>, accessed 16 August 2007; 'Fact Sheet: Fostering Freedom and Justice in the Middle East'. During Middle East Trip, President Bush Says Desire For Liberty Is The Greatest Weapon In The Fight Against Violent Extremism, 13 January 2008. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/mideast/text>. Implicit in a number of statements made by the Bush administration, particularly in relation to Iraq in the early years of the occupation, was the idea that the whole enterprise of regional democratisation would take merely a year or two. During the height of the 'Arab Spring' in the first half of 2005, many senior figures of the Bush administration consistently invoked the rapid collapse of the Eastern Bloc as analogous to events in the Arab world, with the implication that within a few years the Middle East would too have cast off authoritarianism and largely democratised.

⁴² 'President Addresses American Legion, Discusses Global War on Terror'. Capital Hilton Hotel Washington, D.C., 24 February 2006. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/text/20060224.html>, accessed 3 March 2008.

setbacks and false starts,” and that “free societies do not take root overnight,” but rather require a lengthy period of development that eventually results in the consolidation of liberal democracy.⁴³ While Bush remains adamant that history's arrow points in the direction of liberal democracy, it is apparent that some of his earlier assumptions about rapid democratisation have been challenged by the difficulties of establishing democratic regimes in Iraq and neighbouring states since 2003.

One of the changes most indicative of an increasing shift towards realism in practice is the way in which the Bush administration has toned down its calls for democratic change among its authoritarian Arab allies.⁴⁴ University of Central Oklahoma Middle East specialist Husam A. Mohamad writes in a December 2007 article that “the worsening security situation in Iraq [in 2006], the increased popular appeal of Islamists across the region, and the rising criticism of the U.S approach to the Israel-Palestine issue, have eventually enticed Bush's advisers to abandon the democracy promotion agenda” among authoritarian allies, “in favour of shoring up the status of Arab autocratic regimes that continue to serve the goals of U.S interests in the region.”⁴⁵ Marina Ottaway adds that this new-found “realism” is in many ways “a return to pre-9/11 policies;” a return, after a few years of calling for democracy, to “business as usual.”⁴⁶ This development is a significant reversal of the Bush administration's earlier position, examined in chapter three of this thesis, where President Bush claimed that the United States would decisively break with sixty years of policy that advanced “stability at the expense of liberty” in the Middle East.⁴⁷ Such a change can help point to the extent to which previous assumptions about regional democratic transformation have in practice been challenged in such a way that even some of the practitioners of the Bush Doctrine have come to recognise the problems of their claims.

In toning down its calls for democratic transformation among its authoritarian allies, the Bush administration has come to embrace elements of strategies advocated by a variety of realist-leaning academics and policy makers. Ray Takeyh, now a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and former Clinton

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Marina Ottaway, 'Who Wins in Iraq?: Arab Dictators'. *Foreign Policy*, (Mar/Apr 2007). http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3710, accessed 12 September 2008.

⁴⁵ Mohamad, pp. 104-5.

⁴⁶ Ottaway, 'Who Wins in Iraq?'

⁴⁷ 'President Bush Discusses Iraq Policy at Whitehall Palace in London'.

administration Middle East peace negotiator, Martin Indyk, argue separately that the United States should adopt an “off-shore balancing posture” in the Middle East.⁴⁸ This strategy would aim to contain Iran and its allies through the establishment of defence alliances between Sunni Arab states in the Gulf and beyond.⁴⁹ Rejecting the neoconservative claim that democratic transformation is the solution to the ills of the Middle East, these scholars argue that engaging in balance of power politics offers a more pragmatic route for resolving conflicts and advancing American interests.⁵⁰ The Iraq Study Group, meanwhile, argues that the United States must engage in wide-ranging regional diplomacy in order to ensure American interests and security in the Middle East. The study group contends that “the United States should immediately launch a new diplomatic offensive to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region.”⁵¹ Such a strategy should “include every country that has an interest in avoiding a chaotic Iraq, including all of Iraq's neighbours.”⁵² In direct contravention of the neoconservative belief that enemy authoritarian regimes are irreconcilably aggressive and hostile, the study group holds that rather than push for regime change against states such as Syria and Iran, the United States should engage in serious diplomacy with these nations to help stabilise Iraq and address their legitimate security concerns.⁵³

Some important elements of these realist ideas have emerged in the Bush administration's regional policies over the past two years. By 2008, the Bush administration seemingly embraced a balance of power strategy in the Middle East, as it has, in Marina Ottaway's words, sought to “line up” what it labels “moderate” states in the Gulf, as well as Jordan and Egypt, against Iran and its allies.⁵⁴ The Bush administration cast aside much of its previous talk about rapid democratisation among its allies in favour of shoring up such states against a perceived common adversary.⁵⁵ Moreover, the Bush administration has in its final year initiated some

⁴⁸ Ray Takeyh, 'Iran's New Iraq'. *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 62, No. 1, (Winter 2008), pp. 13-31; Martin S. Indyk, Tamara Cofman Wittes, 'Back to Balancing'. *The American Interest*, Vol. 2, No. 3, (Nov/Dec 2007), pp. 42-52.

⁴⁹ Indyk, Wittes, pp. 50-1.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Baker, Hamilton et al, pp. xiv-xv.

⁵² Ibid, pp. xiv-xv.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ For discussion of this development, see Ottaway et al, 'The New Middle East', pp. 21-2.

⁵⁵ Ibid. This change in practice implies that the Bush administration is also stepping back from its earlier claims about the links between authoritarianism and terrorism, as it has ceased to pressure most authoritarian states of the region to democratise. While President Bush and others maintain that states such as Iran and Syria play a part in fostering terrorism owing to their regime type and ideology, this argument is often no longer applied in relation to regimes such as Saudi Arabia,

diplomatic contacts with Syria and Iran. Iranian diplomats briefly met with their American counterparts in Baghdad in April 2008, and Syrian officials were invited to attend regional talks on the Israel-Palestine conflict and issues relating to Lebanon. Such developments are indicative of an important shift away from the policies of rollback and regime change towards realist-orientated policies focused upon negotiation, compromise and pragmatism.

Finally, the Bush administration's increasing turn towards realism in practice is reflected in the way in which its stances towards democratisation in the Palestinian Territories have changed.⁵⁶ In the March 2006 National Security Strategy, the Bush administration acknowledges that the election of Hamas was free and fair, but states that if Hamas does not renounce terrorism, as well as its stated desire to destroy Israel, and refuses to act in a fashion considered 'democratic' by the United States, the Bush administration would withhold recognition of the regime and would not consider it "fully democratic, however it [took] office."⁵⁷ In light of Hamas's refusal to change its stances as it formed a government in April 2006, the Bush administration cancelled a number of aid programs aimed at Palestinian governance, economic development and social services.⁵⁸ Following the dissolution of the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority government in June 2007, President Bush and his foreign policy advisers openly embraced Mahmoud Abass and Fatah as the sole legitimate government of the Palestinian people; in the process toning down significantly their advocacy of further elections and reform in Palestinian politics.⁵⁹

Since 2006, the Bush administration has also started to pursue a diplomatic solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. This development represents the effective repudiation of the neoconservative belief that peace between Israel and the Palestinians can be best brought about through the promotion of Palestinian democracy. In November 2007, President Bush convened a peace conference on the

Egypt or the Gulf States.

⁵⁶ See for example, 'President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly'. United Nations, New York, New York, 19 September 2006.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/text/20060919-4.html>, accessed 3 March 2008.

⁵⁷ NSS 2006, p. 5.

⁵⁸ 'Statement on Palestinian Assistance'. Washington, DC, 7 April 2006.
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64237.htm>, accessed 15 April 2006; 'Palestinian Assistance: Humanitarian Assistance and Democracy Building Fact Sheet'. Office of the Spokesman, Washington, DC, 7 April 2006.
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2006/64234.htm>, accessed 15 April 2006; 'Fact Sheet: Fostering Freedom and Justice in the Middle East'.

⁵⁹ Ottaway et al, 'The New Middle East', pp. 15-17, *passim*.

Israel-Palestine conflict in Annapolis, Maryland.⁶⁰ This was the first and only American government-led conference held on this issue during Bush's time in power, with the President holding talks with Israeli leaders and a range of officials from Fatah.⁶¹ The President also announced an ultimately unfulfilled aim of reaching a formal peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians by the end of 2008.⁶² To some extent, this movement towards diplomacy reflects the argument of the Iraq Study Group that the United States must engage in a sustained program of diplomacy, not activist democratisation, in order to help resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict. According to the study group, "the United States will not be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless [it] deals directly with the Arab-Israeli conflict."⁶³ Indeed, "there must be a renewed and sustained commitment by the United States to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace on all fronts: Lebanon, Syria and... [the] two state-solution for Israel and Palestine."⁶⁴ In light of the election of Hamas in 2006 and developments in Palestinian politics over the subsequent two years, the Bush administration has effectively shelved its ambitions for political transformation in the Palestinian Territories, returning instead to a more traditional diplomatic approach to resolving this conflict.

The "End of the Neoconservative Moment"

The effective abandonment of much of the Bush Doctrine's democratisation policies in Iraq and the wider Arab world, coupled with the broader resurgence of realism among many foreign policy academics and practitioners, has by 2008 chastened a number of neoconservatives. Many leading neoconservatives, both democratic globalist and democratic realist, have now come to question a number of their own

⁶⁰ For information on the Bush administration's first and only attempt at an Israel-Palestine peace conference, see 'Joint Understanding Read by President Bush at Annapolis Conference'. Memorial Hall, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, 27 November 2007. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/11/20071127.html>, accessed 5 September 2008.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² 'Fact Sheet: Fostering Freedom and Justice in the Middle East'. By late 2008, a peace deal between Israel and the Palestinians appeared very distant, as Israel launched a three-week long war in the Gaza Strip on 27 December to prevent rocket fire from Hamas and undermine the capabilities of the organisation.

⁶³ Baker, Hamilton et al, p. 54.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

previous assumptions and claims about Middle East democratisation. Some have even come to adopt more overtly realist-leaning stances that downplay the importance of democratisation altogether. In some form, the neoconservative persuasion will continue to endure among its remaining proponents in the years beyond 2008. Yet the-now prevalent divisions among neoconservatives about their own interventionist ideology, the Bush Doctrine, and what the future holds for the persuasion – along with the change of administration in January 2009 – points convincingly to the “end of the neoconservative moment”⁶⁵ in American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Since 2003, a number of realist scholars have offered strong critiques of the interventionist strategies advocated by neoconservatives. Realists have expressed criticism of what they view as the excessive idealism of activist democratisation and the harmful consequences of this for American national interests.⁶⁶ One of the leading realist critiques of neoconservative thinking about Middle East democratisation has come from the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. Established in October 2003, the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy has the support of over seven hundred academics and former policy makers, the majority of whom are realists.⁶⁷ Prominent realist signatories of the Coalition's statements include Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt, Robert Keohane, Robert Jervis, Charles Kupchan, Andrew Bacevich, John Mearsheimer and Christopher Prebble, among many others.⁶⁸ In its Statement of Principles, the Coalition argues that its members are “united by our desire to turn American national security policy toward realistic and sustainable measures for protecting U.S. vital interests in a manner that is consistent with American values.”⁶⁹ The Statement of Principles contends that the neoconservative prescription for American policies towards the Middle East represents “an imperial strategy [that] threatens to entangle America in an assortment of unnecessary and unrewarding wars” detrimental to American national interests and the war on terrorism.⁷⁰ The Coalition holds that despite neoconservative claims, pursuing democratic

⁶⁵ Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neoconservative Moment', *passim*.

⁶⁶ For brief discussion, see Craig, pp. 144-5.

⁶⁷ Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'About Us'. *Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy*, (2003). <http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/static/000024.php>, accessed 11 September 2008.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹ Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'The Perils of Empire: Statement of Principles by the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy'. *Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy*, (Oct., 2003). <http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/static/000027.php>, accessed 11 September 2008.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

transformation in the Arab world is not generally beneficial to American interests, and is not a sustainable or pragmatic strategy for dealing with terrorism after September 11.⁷¹

Alongside criticising the strategy of activist democracy promotion developed by neoconservatives, some realists have also questioned the theoretical foundation on which such policies are based. In a 2005 study of neoconservative contributions to international relations theory, University of Wales political science professor, Michael Williams, contends that a strong theoretical critique of neoconservative ideas about the harmony of interests and values in foreign policy can be drawn from the work of classical realist, Hans Morgenthau.⁷² According to Williams, Morgenthau believed that the idea of a convergence of values and interests in foreign policy was potentially harmful to both a state targeted for intervention and the American republic itself.⁷³ Without an appreciation of the limits of their power and the subjectivity of their proclaimed virtue, the leaders of the United States could launch the country into a major foreign war that could cause significant damage to national interests and national security.⁷⁴ Moreover, Williams argues, Morgenthau held that linking intervention abroad to the regeneration of “republican virtue” at home could help to foster “bellicose nationalism” and militarism that might threaten the very liberal values on which the republic is built.⁷⁵ Thus, in William's words, Morgenthau considered that in foreign policy “too great a regard for one's own virtue was a constant temptation to be zealously guarded against, lest it yield an hubristic blindness or arrogance, deaf to the demands of prudence, and leading to disaster rather than glory.”⁷⁶

Elements of these realist critiques have influenced a turn away from activist

⁷¹ Ibid; See also Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, 'The Perils of Occupation'. *Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy*, (28 Oct., 2004). http://www.realisticforeignpolicy.org/archives/2004/10/in_this_electio.php, accessed 11 September 2008.

⁷² Williams, p. 311.

⁷³ Ibid

⁷⁴ Ibid; See also Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fifth Edition, Revised. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, p. 6.

⁷⁵ Williams, p. 311-12. This criticism goes to the heart of the long-standing neoconservative belief that an outward looking and moral foreign policy is the key to ensuring a healthy and patriotic democratic polity. While Morgenthau and other realists of his generation agreed with first-generation neoconservatives that an entirely amoral foreign policy and technocratic domestic politics is harmful to liberal democracy, such realists warn that attempts to regenerate “republican virtue” and overcome 'liberal decadence' through armed intervention abroad risks encouraging an over-zealous patriotism that can become anti-democratic, militaristic and increasingly intolerant in character.

⁷⁶ Ibid, pp. 326-7.

democratisation by some leading neoconservative figures. While most neoconservatives still hold that American values and interests can usually be advanced by spreading democracy, there has been recognition by some of the need for a renewed dose of realism in neoconservative thought. Following the invasion of Iraq, Francis Fukuyama broke with many of his neoconservative peers. In *After the Neocons*, Fukuyama writes that he has “concluded that neoconservatism, as both a political symbol and a body of thought, has evolved into something that I can no longer support.”⁷⁷ Recognising the importance of the resurgent realist critique of democratic globalism, Fukuyama believes that “one of the consequences of the perceived failure in Iraq will be the discrediting of the entire neoconservative agenda and a restoration of the authority of foreign policy realists.”⁷⁸ In light of this development, Fukuyama contends that in future, American foreign policy should be based on what he terms “realistic Wilsonianism.”⁷⁹ This is a hybrid outlook comprising elements of pre-1990's neoconservative foreign policy thinking melded with a strong dose of realism, which will apparently “better matches ends to means” and take a considerably more cautious view of the costs and benefits of activist democratisation.⁸⁰

In a similar vein to Fukuyama, neoconservative intellectual Robert Kagan has also turned to offering realist-leaning alternatives to democratic globalism. In his 2008 book *The Return of History and the End of Dream*, and in subsequent articles, Kagan has moved away from the democratic globalist ideas he once regularly advocated with William Kristol.⁸¹ In contrast to the arguments he made in the influential article 'Toward a neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy' or in the book *Present Dangers*, Kagan now expresses scepticism about the global spread of democracy and

⁷⁷ Fukuyama, *After the Neocons*, pp. xxv-xxvii.

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 5-7.

⁷⁹ Ibid, pp. xxvii-xxviii; Francis Fukuyama, 'After Neoconservatism'. *The New York Times*, (19 Feb., 2006). The concept of “realistic Wilsonianism” is oxymoronic in character, as realism and Wilsonianism are usually antithetical and define themselves in opposite to one another. Finding a balance between these two ideas is a long-standing goal of neoconservatism, but attempting to put this into practice, as does the Bush Doctrine, has proven to be harmful to the promotion of both American values and interests abroad. Further, Fukuyama's approach parallels in many ways the idea of “democratic realism” advocated by Charles Krauthammer, as it does the concept of “practical idealism” advocated by Condoleezza Rice. Both of these ideas have been extensively criticised by realists and brought into question as a practical framework for American foreign policy, and it thus seems unlikely that Fukuyama's similar concept would fare much better.

⁸⁰ Fukuyama, 'After Neoconservatism'.

⁸¹ Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*; For critical analysis of Kagan's new position, see Andrew J. Bacevich, 'Present at the Re-Creation: A Neoconservative Moves On'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 4, (Jul/Aug 2008), pp. 125-132.

warns that the enduring threat in the twenty-first century is not Jihadist terrorism, but renewed great power conflict.⁸² In an April 2008 article on the revival of great power rivalry and its implications for the democratic world, Kagan argues that

The spread of democracy was not merely the unfolding of certain ineluctable processes of economic and political development. The global shift towards liberal democracy coincided with the historical shift in the balance of power towards those nations who favoured it. But that shift was not inevitable, and it need not be lasting. Today, the re-emergence of the great autocratic powers, along with the reactionary forces of Islamic radicalism, has weakened that order and threatens to do so further in the years and decades to come.⁸³

Adopting a realist balance of power posture, Kagan argues that in order to check the rise of autocratic powers, the democratic world must form a “league of democracies” and return to policies of containment, rather than regime change, in order to deal with present threats.⁸⁴ Thus, in a remarkable transition, Kagan has effectively repudiated most of his democratic globalist beliefs and has now refashioned himself as a ‘realist’ who is more concerned with containing great power conflict than encouraging the democratic transformation of the Middle East.⁸⁵

As a result of the problems faced by the Bush Doctrine in the Middle East since 2006, a number of neoconservative commentators have, like Fukuyama and Kagan, rescinded much of their support for activist democratisation in favour of more cautious stances. While some neoconservatives, such as William Kristol, Michael Ledeen and Norman Podhoretz, remain unapologetic supporters of regime change and democratisation in the Arab world,⁸⁶ a number of their peers have become more

⁸² Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*, pp. 53-80; See also Robert Kagan, 'The September 12 Paradigm: America, the World, and George W. Bush'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 87, No. 5, (Sept/Oct 2008). <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080901faessay87502-p0/robert-kagan/the-september-12-paradigm.html>, accessed 11 September 2008.

⁸³ Robert Kagan, Robert Cooper, 'Is Democracy Winning?' *Prospect Magazine*, (24 Apr., 2008).

⁸⁴ Robert Kagan, 'The Stuff of Dreams'. *National Post*, (22 Jul., 2008), A15; Robert Kagan, 'End of Dreams, Return of History'. *Policy Review*, No. 114, (Aug/Sept 2007). <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html>, accessed 6 August 2007. During the brief war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia in August 2008, Kagan contended that Russia's invasion of parts of Georgia showed that great power rivalry and the revisionist aspirations of autocratic powers, not terrorism, will be more enduring threats of this century.

⁸⁵ For critical discussion of Kagan's changing position, see Bacevich, 'Present at the Re-Creation', pp. 127-9.

⁸⁶ William Kristol, 'The Long War': The Radical Islamists are on the Offensive. Will we Defeat Them? *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 11, No. 24, (6 Mar., 2006); William Kristol, 'It's Our War: Bush Should go to Jerusalem – and the U.S. Should Confront Iran'. *The Weekly Standard*, Vol. 11, No. 42, (24 Jul., 2006); Michael A. Ledeen, 'Faster, Please'. *Foundation for the Defence of Democracies*, (December 2008). <http://pajamasmedia.com/michaelledeen/>, accessed 12 December

critical towards the ideas they once advocated. This change in outlook among many neoconservatives is exemplified by Charles Krauthammer, who wrote in a 2007 article on Iraq that, compared with the outcomes to date there, neoconservatives “had hoped for much more.”⁸⁷ Krauthammer contends that “our original objective was a democratic and unified post-Hussein Iraq. But it has turned out to be a bridge too far,” as the sectarian violence unleashed by regime change brought Iraq to the brink of partition and fostered a predominantly illiberal democracy.⁸⁸ Such developments were “exacerbated by post-invasion U.S. strategic errors,” especially those relating to military strategy and the CPA's attempts at democratisation.⁸⁹ While Krauthammer believes that “a democratic, unified Iraq might someday emerge,” he holds that Iraq will for some time remain a fractured and occasionally violent state.⁹⁰ Similar views are now expressed by Reuel Marc Geretch, Joshua Muravchik, Max Boot and other neoconservative commentators who were once staunch advocates of interventionist democracy promotion in the Middle East.⁹¹

Many elements of these above sentiments are shared by neoconservatives that once held influential policy making roles in the Bush administration. While not all have become critical of the Bush Doctrine, there has been a noticeable shift in outlook over the past two years among many of the neoconservatives that served in the Bush administration. In a 2007 interview with journalist David Rose, former Defence Policy Board chair Richard Perle contends that “I think if I had been Delphic, and had seen where we are today, and people had said, 'Should we go into Iraq?,' I think now I probably would have said, 'No, let's consider other strategies for dealing with the thing that concerns us most.’”⁹² Similarly, former Undersecretary of Defence for Policy, Douglas Feith, admits that serious mistakes were made in the implementation of regime change and democratisation in Iraq.⁹³ Unlike Perle, however, Feith maintains that intervention in Iraq was the right policy, as it “paved

2008; Michael A. Ledeen, 'The Same War: Hezbollah, Natch'. *National Review Online*, (13 Jul., 2006). http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.24651/pub_detail.asp, accessed 13 April 2008. Podhoretz, *WWIV*, pp. 5-7; See also Rago, 'The Weekend Interview with Norman Podhoretz'.

⁸⁷ Charles Krauthammer, 'The Partitioning of Iraq'. *The Washington Post*, (7 Sept., 2007), A21.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Reuel Marc Gerech, 'On Democracy in Iraq'. *The Weekly Standard*, (30 Apr., 2007); Muravchik, 'The Past, Present, and Future of Neoconservatism', pp. 19-30; Max Boot, 'How Not to Get Out of Iraq'. *Commentary*, Vol. 124, No. 2, (Sept., 2007), pp. 19-27.

⁹² David Rose, 'Neo Culpa'. *Vanity Fair*, (Jan., 2007), p. 83.

⁹³ Feith, p. 515.

the way for elections that were competitive, fair and widely supported,” while also potentially encouraging “political reform in the Arab and Muslim worlds that could serve our interests in international peace, security and prosperity.”⁹⁴ This, Feith holds, means that despite its problems in practice, the principles behind intervention in Iraq remain sound.

Feith's sympathetic assessment of the Bush Doctrine is not shared by a number of his former associates in government. Former neoconservative policy makers David Frum, of the National Security Council, and Kenneth Adelman and James Woolsey, of the Defence Policy Board, now each now take a critical view of the Bush Doctrine and many elements of neoconservatism. According to David Rose, Kenneth Adelman now holds that “neoconservatism itself – what he defines as “the idea of a tough foreign policy on behalf of morality, the idea of using our power for moral good in the world” – is dead, at least for a generation. After Iraq, he says, “it's not going to sell.””⁹⁵ James Woolsey and other former policy makers of the Pentagon and Defence Policy Board, meanwhile, view Iraq as a “great strategic defeat” for the United States and fear that neoconservatism will not survive as a viable foreign policy ideology owing to its association with this war.⁹⁶ It is possible that elements of these critical views, and parts of Feith's views, are shared by other figures of Bush administration; however, pending the release of further memoirs, this can only be speculative at present.⁹⁷ While some former neoconservative policy makers have found reason to be less pessimistic by late 2008 as a result of the successes of the surge in Iraq, most have become much more realistic about the likely outcomes of intervention in Iraq and now advocate a limited role for the United States in encouraging democracy in the Middle East.

These above developments considered, it is still premature at present to claim that neoconservatism will leave no residual mark on American foreign policy. Important elements of the other pillars of the Bush Doctrine that are derived from neoconservative thought, such as the need to maintain American hegemony and the

⁹⁴ Ibid, pp. 234-6.

⁹⁵ Rose, p. 84.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ It is likely that a memoir will be published by Donald Rumsfeld on the war on terrorism and Iraq, and that memoir material will be published by Condoleezza Rice and President Bush in the coming years. While it is unlikely that any of these figures will admit major errors in principle, it is possible that they will argue, as Feith has, that mistakes were made in the implementation of regime change and democratisation in Iraq.

option of pre-emptive war, appear to have retained a degree of influence among some groups of foreign policy thinkers.⁹⁸ Further, many aspects of the overall neoconservative approach to the war on terrorism were present in debates about foreign policy during the 2008 Presidential election campaign, with Republican Presidential candidate John McCain and Vice Presidential nominee Sarah Palin reprising neoconservative themes about the war on terrorism as a Manichean struggle that should be considered WWIV.⁹⁹ Finally, elements of the democratic interventionism articulated in the Bush Doctrine continue to be supported by a small group of neoconservatives that remain in the Republican Party, as by a group of “liberal hawks” in the Democratic Party.¹⁰⁰

Despite these elements of continuity, the resurgence of foreign policy realism and the abandonment of many aspects of Middle East democratisation have made it much less likely that the neoconservative paradigm of activist democracy promotion will retain lasting influence. Ensuring a “responsible withdrawal” from Iraq, addressing the state of the United States' image and its national interests in the Middle East appear to be major aims of the new American president, Barack Obama, not the redoubling of the Bush Doctrine's policies of regime change in the cause of spreading democracy in the Arab world.¹⁰¹ Obama argues that he will continue the war on terrorism initiated by the Bush administration, but he has indicated already that he believes a grand strategy of armed democratisation in the Middle East is not a

⁹⁸ For discussion of the residual influence of the other elements of the Bush Doctrine aside from its democracy promotion ideology and strategy, see Anonymous, 'Can the Bush Doctrine Last?' *The Economist*, Vol. 386, No. 8573, (29 Mar., 2008), p. 6.

⁹⁹ Robert McMahon, 'McCain's Brain Trust'. *Newsweek*, (3 Jul., 2008). <http://www.newsweek.com/id/139898>, accessed 5 December 2008; See also Rightweb, 'Profile: John McCain'. *Rightweb*, Political Research Associates, (12 Nov., 2008). <http://www.rightweb-irc-online.org/profile/3890.html>, accessed 5 December 2008. Neoconservative intellectuals Robert Kagan, Max Boot and William Kristol were utilised as part-time foreign policy advisers for some portions of McCain's campaign.

¹⁰⁰ For examples of the “liberal hawk” view on activist democratisation in American foreign policy, see Will Marshall, 'Rejoin the Battle of Ideas'. *Progressive Policy Institute*, (10 Sept., 2007). http://www.ppionline.org/ppi_ci.cfm?knlgAreaID=450004&subsecID=900021&contentID=254435, accessed 6 December 2008; Will Marshall (Ed), *With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty*. New York, Rowman & Littlefield, 2006; Clifford May, 'What's at Stake?' *The Foundation for Defence of Democracies*, (2008). http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=516485&Itemid=365, accessed 6 December 2008; For good discussion of the “liberal hawk” view on democratisation and the war on terrorism, see Smith, chapters 3, 6.

¹⁰¹ For an overview of the Obama administration's approach to Iraq, see 'The Agenda: Iraq'. The White House, 21 January 2009. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/agenda/iraq/>, accessed 28 January 2009. For President Obama's articulation of his broader foreign policy goals in the Middle East, see 'President Barack Obama's Inaugural Address'. Washington, 20 January 2009. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/>, accessed 21 January 2009.

realistic policy for dealing with the threat of Jihadist terrorism.¹⁰² With the example of Iraq in mind, Obama and his foreign policy advisers appear to be developing a 'centrist' foreign policy that recognises many of the dangers of attempting to spread democracy through the use of American military power. This emerging change in policy may reflect more broadly the chastening of the 'activist' elements of liberal internationalist thinking. Many of the key theoretical assumptions and optimistic claims about interventionist democracy promotion made by 'activist' liberal scholars have now been brought into significant doubt by the effects and consequences of democracy promotion in Iraq and the wider Arab world.

With the Bush administration having now left office, its anti-terrorism grand strategy of democratisation in the Middle East is in eclipse. In its last years in power, the Bush administration effectively abandoned its ambitions of democratic revolution in the Middle East, and in practice exhibited greater interest in ensuring stability and the containment of American adversaries. The many neoconservatives who invested their intellectual stock in the Bush Doctrine are more divided than ever on the question of activist democratisation, with a majority assuming an increasingly 'realist' orientation on foreign policy and only a small minority remaining committed to the cause. Over the past five years, a number of critics have proclaimed the end of the "neoconservative moment" and the decline of the "Bush revolution" in Middle East democratisation, only to have their arguments confounded by the continuation of this interventionist paradigm.¹⁰³ While it may have previously been premature to make these declarations, it is apparent that today the "Bush revolution" and the "neoconservative moment" in American Middle East policy are both now effectively over.

¹⁰² See 'Obama Tells Al Arabyia Peace Talks Should Resume'. Interview of President Barack Obama by Hisham Melhem of Al Arabyia News, The Map Room, The White House, 27 January 2009. <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2009/01/27/65087.html>, accessed 28 January 2009; See also, Obama, 'Renewing American Leadership'.

¹⁰³ See for example, Ikenberry, 'The End of the Neoconservative Moment'; Fukuyama, 'The Neoconservative Moment'; Philip H. Gordon, 'The End of the Bush Revolution'. *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 4, (Jul/Aug 2006), pp. 75- 81.

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