

Conceptualising EU Development in the African Union: Will Brexit Matter?

by

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
EU	European Union
EEAS	European External Action Service
UN	United Nations
EUGS	European Union Global Strategy
EC	European Commission
IO	International Organisation
ACP	African Caribbean and Pacific Countries
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
JAES	Joint Africa European Strategy
DG	Directorate General
GNI	Gross National Income
ODA	Official Development Aid
EDF	European Development Fund
CAP	Common Agriculture policy
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreements
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
LDC	Least Developed Countries
NPE	Normative Power Europe
NCRE	National Centre for Research on Europe
GPARD	Global Program on Agriculture Research for Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisations

DCI	Development cooperation instrument
EIDH	European Instrument for Democracy and Human rights
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ISHA	Instrument for stability and humanitarian aid
PanAf	Pan African Programme
OPHI	Oxford Poverty Humanitarian Index

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Chapter 1

1.1 Introduction: What type of an actor is the EU?

Scholars have asked whether the European Union (EU) should be referred to as a *civilian power* (Duchêne, 1973) rather than a *military power* (Bull, 1982). Others have argued that the EU is neither a civilian nor a military power but a normative power (Manners, 2002). Manners (2002) argues that the EU is a normative power because the EU promotes its norms and values without the use of military force. In the endeavour to support developing countries through a set of diffusional methods, the EU has managed to transfer its norms (Börzel & Risse, 2009).

Unlike other big powers, who intervene in global politics with the use of force, the EU uses ethical means when interacting with its external partners to maintain world peace. The use of carrots and sticks has been identified as a reasonable method to coerce other countries to adopt EU values and norms. These values, which are considered non-violent, are: human rights, democracy, good governance, and the rule of law. The EU rewards its external partners for adopting these norms in the way of social, political, economic, and development assistance. The carrot for taking and placing these democratic values in the partners' legislative framework can be in the form of development aid, and the stick may be in the form of the use of sanctions. The EU uses both positive and negative reinforcement to shape the external political landscape and interact with the rest of the world. For Africa and the African Union, in particular, economic assistance has been vital, since future EU membership is not an option.

The European Union's development strategy in Africa has been instrumental in reducing poverty in many parts of the continent. The EU's development success is recorded in areas of economic, political, social, security, peace, justice, and human development. The ability of the EU to disseminate its norms (Manners, 2002) through Africa can be credited to the continent's historical linkages. Since the formation of the EU (previously called the European Economic Community (EEC)), relationships with African countries have been vital for the EU member states, who had previously occupied most parts of Africa. France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom were the three major colonial powers. When many of the African states gained

independence, it became mandatory for these European countries to help with development and better the lives of Africans, open more trading markets for the EEC but ultimately to consolidate European influence over Africa. For some time, the EU has been regarded as an influential player in both politics and economics in Africa. Its political influence is credited to the formation of the African Union (AU), which many claim is inspired by the EU framework (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; Fioramonti & Mattheis, 2016; Haastrup, 2013). As a supranational organisation, the AU considered the EU as a good model for regional integration and a perfect partner for region-to-region dialogue (Ayed, 2009), making it easy for the EU and AU to negotiate trade deals collectively.

From the onset of the relationship, the EU has taken upon itself a leadership role in eradicating poverty in Africa. The 1957 Treaty of Rome set out that financial and technical support should be made available to African counterparts and other developing countries to help them develop their economies. This led to the formation of the European Development Fund, which is aimed to finance development initiatives in developing countries (Rein, 2017). Through a series of agreements, the EU has continuously highlighted the importance of equal opportunities by helping the under-privileged communities with emphasis at completely poverty reduction throughout Africa. The reduction of poverty remains one of the core principles in the European Union Global Strategy. Such an undertaking by the EU has inspired the main scope of this thesis. The research seeks to investigate if there will be any implications on EU's poverty reduction agenda in Africa post-Brexit? since the UK is one of the most influential and biggest members states in the EU both economically and by populations. Working with other multilateral organisations like the UN and the World Bank has enabled the EU to gain legitimacy in the continent and is part of NPE. By consistently addressing poverty as the primary target, the EU received recognition as a champion for development. In 2016, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) replaced the MDGs. At the centre of the SDGs, is the desire to eradicate poverty, promote equality, provide education for all, better living conditions for all, and more.

1.2. Why study EU development in African Union?

The choice to study development in Africa is vital, since the EU spends more than half of its development budget in Africa pursuing efforts to eradicate poverty in all of its forms as the aim of the European Union Global Strategy of 2016 and SDGs. The SDGs, as outlined by the UN, are the foundation for a better future for all. The goals are designed to address world challenges and provide solutions to issues such as poverty, inequality, climate, environmental, peace, justice, and prosperity with a projected deadline of 2030. As a multilateral organisation, the EU played a vital role at the UN meetings to ensure that a plan was adopted to improve social equality, economic development, and environmental protection remains a top priority on the agenda. The SDGs were therefore agreed upon as a collective idea.

Helly (2013) as cited by Gumbo (2019) in a literature review has argued that, the relationship between the EU and the AU has captured much attention since early 2005 as African leaders began to complain about relationship inequalities. (Helly, 2013; Gumbo, 2019). Helly (2013) identified four areas of contention that have ignited the debates as: “economic, development, governance and politics and multilateralism.” In the author’s previous research, when reviewing literature, Gumbo argued the relationship started as a donor-recipient partnership and grew to be one of the most admired projects of the European integration project (Lister, 2002; Gumbo, 2019), at least to the EU. However, for the past decade, the relationship has faced many challenges. For instance, irregular migration to Europe, the European financial crises, increased terrorist activity, nationalist movements, the rise of other global actors (especially China), and the USA’s interest in the region (Hackenesch, 2015; Helly, 2013; Rein, 2017).

Apart from competition from other actors, some have argued that internal EU factors have exacerbated the continental drift which has been witnessed between the EU-AU cooperation from the early 2000 (Helly, 2013). Helly (2013) and Lister (2002) contend that continental drift has cost the EU its leadership position in development to China, though it still managed to maintain its position as a financial giant. The author’s earlier research reviewing literature, has also supported argument by Eurosceptics who have identified Brexit as a result of these

unresolved problems in the European Union camp, for example: internal conflicts, member states' interests, and home country politics (Gumbo, 2019). Development has several facets, thus EU development is broad and covers many areas, including, trade, immigration, climate change, security, human development and diplomacy (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). Any disruption of the EU development policy agenda has detrimental effects on a variety of these areas.

In the context of Brexit, the role played by the UK at EU negotiations on subjects regarding African development is vital. The UK's withdrawal from the EU will result in Africa losing an advocate within the EU. Due to the UK's colonial linkages with most African countries, the UK has been able to maintain a respectable stance on African development issues. The UK was vital to the formation of the Joint African European Strategy (JAES) and took a leading position in backing the incorporation of the MDGs and other programmes like the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) into the JAES agreement (Cumming & Chafer 2011). Though the MDGs are now outdated, the new revisions to the JAES have continued to adopt the SDGs. The loss of a voice within the EU could have a detrimental effect on African development, particularly in light of poverty reduction efforts.

This thesis will examine the relationship between the AU and EU through the lens of the JAES in order to identify whether the departure of the UK from the EU will have any impact on the EU's development policy. The research is led by the following research question: **What are the possible implications of Brexit on the EU's poverty reduction agenda in Africa?**

As Brexit has not yet happened, the impacts are still uncertain, therefore much of the thesis will feed on the current relationship landscape as outlined in partnership agreements, and the context of development between the EU and AU. Specific attention will be placed on analysing the documents and events post the signing of the JAES. The JAES is a 2007 agreement between the EU and the AU to help cement the relationship between the African continent and the EU. The document aimed to improve the EU-AU relationship by setting out a strategic set of goals: reinforcing political dialogue between Africa and the EU (peace and security, institutional cooperation, climate change); expanding Africa-EU cooperation (democracy, human rights, trade, energy, migration, education, employment, ICT); and

finally, promoting a people-centered partnership (equality, economics and human development) (Eurostat, 2014). The JAES was inspired by ideas of equality between the EU and AU. The main goals were to be achieved through a set of action plans (Helly, 2013). The thesis will review JAES as the driver of the current EU-AU relationship, in particular, the incorporation of SDGs and the use of different EU development instruments to reduce poverty in Africa. As stated in section 72 of the JAES, agriculture remains one of the most important areas to deliver results in the area of poverty. With this in mind, the reform of CAP, as demanded by the UK, as a way forward to create sustainable economic growth and curb poverty in Africa becomes an area of concern. Agriculture has the potential to provide income for farmers, and contribute to human capital, human well-being, food security and poverty alleviation.

Traditionally, poverty has been measured by consumption expenditure indicators, which rates poverty by the \$1.90 per day expenditure, while in real life people encounter different types and levels of needs. Poverty can take various forms, and people define poverty in accordance with their circumstances (Alkire, Kanagaratnam & Suppa, 2018). In Africa, over 40 percent of the population live on under \$1.25 a day, unemployment is high, and the population is rising; leading to over 750 million people living in poverty (Foresight, 2011). Against this backdrop, various approaches should be in place to counter poverty in all its forms. Reform in agriculture is vital, since the industry provides most of the employment for people living in rural areas and provides food for most households. The SDGs progress reports will provide neutral empirical evidence as to whether the EU has managed to assist Africa in achieving the goal to reduce poverty. The past and current inconsistencies within the EU will provide the basis for this thesis speculative projections, scenarios and the possible implications of Britain's departure from the EU and the AU's development plans.

Through the historical lens, the thesis will demonstrate that the UK has played an essential role in African development, and that the EU's desire to reduce poverty in Africa may face future challenges. We hypothesise that the UK's planned departure from the EU will leave a gap in the EU budget, as the UK will stop contributing towards the EU development budget and, in turn, the EU will reduce its spending in Africa.

The organisation of the thesis will follow the following structure: The second chapter will review some of the literature to set the scene and provide the foundation of the study, followed by a discussion of the historical evolution of the EU-AU relationship, with a particular focus on development assistance. The chapter will unpack the historical origins of the EU development agenda and explain why the AU is a strategic beneficiary for EU development assistance. Past conventions and current agreements will also be discussed. Lomé, Cotonou will be discussed briefly, while a more detailed analysis is offered to the JAES, as it is the only and current agreement tailored to African countries and the JAES framework's main agenda is focused on poverty eradication and thus greatly informs the analysis.

Chapter Three will address the methodology and theoretical framework of the thesis. Normative Power Europe was chosen as the theoretical paradigm to demonstrate how the EU gained its leadership status in Africa. The NPE theoretical framework plays a role when analysing EU global success, as the EU's development agenda is driven by its desire to assert itself as a global normative power. The EU's continuous use of economic and development assistance as a reward for adopting EU norms and values demonstrate that the EU has gained a normative power status in Africa through this mechanism.

Chapter 4 will introduce Brexit as a critical variable to the future of EU development. The departure of the UK is essential to the study due to the UK's historical ties with AU countries and its financial contributions towards the EU budget. The concluding chapter will offer recommendations to the EU-27 on how to counter the problems that may follow post-Brexit.

Chapter 2

Historical overview and Literature review

The EU has been described in so many ways, with Mark Eyskens calling it, “an economic giant, military worm and political dwarf” (Whitney 1991). Studies on the nature of the EU and how the EU conducts itself outside of Europe has resulted in significant literature from many scholars of international relations. This Chapter will review the literature from these studies in order to offer an overview of the EU and how the EU act in Africa to reduce poverty. In order to understand why and how the EU continues to work closely with the AU, this chapter will start with a historical background to the relationship. The historical background will set the stage in understanding and answer the How, the Why questions and introduce the rational for the chosen theory to this thesis.

2.1. Historical Background on EU- AU relationship

The relationship between the EU and African countries predates the formation of the EU itself, making it one of the oldest EU regional diplomatic projects (Farrell, 2005; Men & Barton, 2011). This long-standing relationship institutionalised through a series of agreements has enabled strong regional cooperation. The African regional integration project was established in 1963 (formerly known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and changing its name to the African Union in 2002) and has always admired the EU’s regional integration model (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). The connection of the EU to Africa can also be linked to when most African countries existed under European colonial powers. It was only in the mid-20th century, when colonisation was abrogated, that African countries started gaining independence from their colonial masters (Rein, 2017) and they came together in unity. In 1957 the relationship between the EU and AU was formalised in the Treaty of Rome.

As Hansen notes, the idea of maintaining and strengthening Europe’s relationship with its former empires was first recorded in the 1950 Schuman Declaration as the only way colonial powers could keep their influence on its former colonies and outside territories (Hansen et al., 2012). In 1958, under the direction of France, the European Development Fund (EDF) was

officialised, starting with a budget just shy of \$58 million (Flint, 2009) to be used towards development in Europe's overseas territories. When the UK finally joined the EU in 1973, former British colonies became part of the beneficiaries, since the UK had overseas interests different from Belgium and France (Galtung, 1973). This fund was a way to help Europe's ex-colonial territories (Flint, 2008, 2009). This point indicates that the EU's first iteration had a colonial viewpoint (Hansen et al., 2012) and, as will be explained in detail in the theoretical segment, the EU endeavoured to export its norms and values in areas of its market and political interest.

2.2 Lomé Convention

The 1975 Lomé Convention marked a historic new beginning for the EU and AU, as it signalled an unprecedented change to the relationship formerly driven by colonial ideas to one based on equality and cooperation (Farrell, 2007; Hill & Smith, 2011). The signing of the Lomé convention changed the tone to the EU-AU relationship (Helly 2013). The Lomé Convention, the predecessor of the 1964-75 Yaoundé Convention, became the pinnacle that represents an ethical relationship between the EU and AU, a step towards equality, partnership, cooperation, and sovereignty. These became the core principles to guide the future relationship between the EU and AU. Because the principles of Treaty of Rome guided Lomé, the EU wanted the Lomé agreement to complement the UN Charter, hence placing a strong focus on cooperation, trade, poverty eradication, and many other goals outlined in the MDGs.

The signing of the Lomé trading agreement offered African states exclusive rights and access to EU markets, creating a bond between the two institutions (Flint, 2008). The agreement enabled the creation of structures necessary to facilitate a better negotiating platform (Flint, 2009). As the relationship evolved and some goals of Lomé were achieved, it became necessary to re-evaluate, which meant a need to set out a more strategic partnership. These Lomé revisions were criticised, in particular, by the UK House of Commons International Development Committee which identified nuances of unfairness, bullying and blackmail towards African countries. Liz Clements of the UK Presidency was recorded as stating:

The current proposals would transform Lomé into a battering ram for free trade, forcing the infant industries of the developing countries in the ACP into unfair competition with the industrialised economies of Europe. Lomé should focus on poverty-focused trade development and the building of supply-trade capacity so that trade and investment can become a vehicle for human and social development. (Clements, 1998)

Liz Clements' comment clearly laments the UK's interests and the divisions among the EU when it comes to issues of development in Africa. When the Africans analyse these comments, they create a bias towards the UK. The UK then becomes a preferred partner, as it is perceived to understand and have a higher level of care for Africa. The perceived leadership position held by Britain in Africa (at least by the Africans) is fundamental for the EU and AU's continuous relationship. This kind of position held by the British leads to the question: "Will the EU still be a relevant partner for the African Union post-Brexit?" In the last few years, it became evident that the partnership needed to be revised if the EU wanted cooperation from their African counterparts. Lomé was deemed to be out-dated and not in keeping with the World Trade Organisation standards (Men & Barton, 2011).

2.3 The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA)

The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) between the EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries came into force in the year 2000 as an attempt to improve on the Lomé agreement (Helly, 2013). The Cotonou Agreement could be considered a level-up partnership to be entered into between the EU and AU, as it is the most comprehensive agreement to have been signed between the two (Holland, 2002). The CPA partnership therefore wanted to achieve three goals: reduce poverty, contribute towards sustainable development, and trade cooperation and the integration of ACP countries (Article 1, 2000) while enriching their economies and encouraging political engagement (Keijzer & Negre, 2014).

Critics of the CPA agreement have summarised it as "a diktat rather than a genuine partnership agreement" (Flint, 2008). These sentiments are common among African member states who are not ready to adopt the EU norms in full. Cotonou was meant to act as a connecting link between the EU and less-developed countries (LDCs), but poor coordination created flaws in the partnership. For Holland (2002), Cotonou was historic as it represented

a disconnection from the past. However, empirical findings suggest the opposite. Sentiments by Carlos Lopes, the African Union High Representative, suggest that the AU has had enough of the EU and is no longer going to be soft when it comes to negotiating trade deals (Euroactiv, 2018). By the 2000s, aid going to Africa reduced by over 50% compared to a decade earlier. Therefore, the mandate of poverty eradication through sustainable development has failed or been overpowered by political interests (Rodt & Okeke, 2013).

It is also important to note that the Cotonou agreement, while still up for revision in 2020, has not been able to match the rhetoric or mend the gap which is continuously growing between the two continents. Critics of the ongoing Cotonou agreement have argued that both Lomé and Cotonou have failed to address their goals in five policy areas: partnership, political development, poverty eradication, regional integration, and economic and trade development. The African states are complaining of extreme poverty and the impact of political conditionality as one of the many contributors to their predicament. This has made Africans look for help elsewhere, and China became a better alternative. Even with the Cotonou, the EU has failed to fulfil Article 131 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome. The article stipulates the importance of promoting the economic, social, and cultural interests as desired by developing countries, of which all of these targeted areas are important for poverty reduction.

2.4 The British referendum in context of EU development

Following the June 2016 UK referendum, the UK decided to leave the EU. The decision by the UK electorate to leave the EU surprised many and posed many more questions than answers as to how the EU would manage to further its commitments on development. Many who imagined the EU as a model representing unity and as a like-minded group of people who share the same values, who would always stick together for better or worse, found themselves wondering. As such, the EU-UK divorce inspired this research. Mainly, because the EU is an important donor for African states that has used aid to alleviate poverty in the region for years. Additionally, the UK is the leading donor at a bilateral level and the most prominent financial contributor towards the EU budget. In the EU, the UK is one the so called

big three together with France and Germany due to its role in the EU policy making and economic strengths (Whitman & Wolff, 2012,p.10)

The financial support dedicated to developing countries by the EU through its development instruments is significant when compared to other superpowers. Since the Lisbon Treaty and the introduction of the European External Action Service and Directorate General for Development and Cooperation dedicated to pursuing development in the EU neighbourhood, the EU has been able to establish a development leadership status (Gavas et al., 2013). The ever-growing global population is increasingly demanding serious strategic commitment and innovative ways to counter the possibility of poverty, famine, and malnutrition crises. Of all the countries expected to be vulnerable to poverty, African countries are at the top of the list. Henökl (2018) has argued that Brexit's implications are both from short- and long-term. Due to existing EU obligations, any budget shortfalls create problems for the EU's development policy. Policy realignment will be difficult without one of the EU's major financial contributors (Gavas et al., 2013; Henökl, 2018). While Henökl's conclusions are speculative in nature, the recommendations to make sure that the EU acts appropriately in order to ensure that the Brexit phenomenon will not affect development commitments currently underway in developing countries and future development policies should be considered vital.

Ansorg and Haastrup (2016) have analysed the Brexit phenomenon and argue that Brexit does not only affect the UK-EU 27 economies, but has detrimental economic and geopolitical effects on Africa. Most of the African countries who consider the UK a strategic partner have their economies dependant on the UK, therefore, are likely to suffer in case of a UK recession. The UK is one of the few countries that have kept their promise to contribute funds at a consistent percentage towards the European Development Fund (EDF). To show its commitment towards aid, the UK has included aid contribution in its laws. The impact of recession also affects the UK contribution towards ODA. The UK is one of the few countries who contribute 0.7% GNI towards ODA and is seen as an influential player in international development (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). This significant contribution will be affected if the British Sterling loses its value.

Ansorg and Haastrup also argued that the exit of Britain would mean a loss for Africans, as the UK has been a well-known advocate for African affairs within the EU, in particular in the Common Agriculture Policy debates (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; Haas & Rubio, 2017). The UK's understanding and history of relations with African countries were vital for the promotion of African interest in the EU. However, Ansorg and Haastrup did not address the issue of poverty reduction, a role assumed by the EU as part of its commitment to help Africa achieve the MDGs. Due to the growing population in Africa, with an estimation that by 2050 Africa will have the biggest population in the world, Africa becomes a critical region to watch as it is susceptible to severe poverty (Cohen, 2003).

Haas and Rubio (2017) have presented a qualitative argument showing that, without the UK, the EU will suffer a significant budget-gap. The budget deficit is estimated at around 10 billion euros per year. Contrary to Nunez-Ferrer and Rinaldi's arguments, a 10 billion deficit is a significant amount of money compared to how much the EU spends on its development budget. Haas and Rubio (2017)'s simulation predicts the possibilities that could happen in trying to counter the budget shortfall. Important to note, is the recognition of the looming possibility that the EU might cut spending on CAP and the development budget. These cuts would hurt aid recipients (Haas & Rubio, 2017). Their research also agrees with Ansorg & Haastrup (2016) that Brexit will disrupt the EU's development budget.

Haas and Rubio concluded by providing two solutions that could help if the EU wants to cover any budget deficit after Brexit. The recommendation is that the EU should go through a complete revenue sources reshuffle, be flexible, and focus on clearly defined goals (Haas & Rubio, 2017). The research did not address the impact of the budget deficit on poverty reduction programmes. If the EU is to aim at clearly defined goals, these goals should include focusing on areas of poverty reduction in countries experiencing severe famine and hunger.

Lightfoot et al. (2017), who also agreed that Brexit has implications for the EU's development goals, have argued that both the UK and EU will feel the implications. The UK and the EU will both experience challenges on its development policy implementation. In the past, both the UK and the EU have redefined development aid but, as an individual member state, the UK

has played a significant role (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). The UK helped to drive EU development priorities by influencing EU operations and providing finance. The UK's commitment towards the EDF contributions aiming at development in Africa shows how much the UK values the region. Sophia Price (2016) stated that the completion of Brexit could affect the UK's position in global development and its historical trade relations with African ACP countries.

The lengthy negotiations that followed after the UK triggered article 50 left scholars and experts debating whether the European model of integration is actually good for Africa. Some have gone so far as to call for the EU to leave African problems to African people. Peter Draper (2012) argued that the "economic integration is not appropriate as in most cases, it produces more harm than good". Draper concluded that there was a big gap between the ideological character of states in Europe and Africa. This conclusion could help explain why the two institutions, despite a good motive and the right intentions, have continuously missed the point – which is aligning their policies to areas that matter for the ordinary people

Amid all the problems within the EU and the inconsistencies in policy implementation, China has utilised the opportunity and assert itself as an alternative model for development in Africa (Men & Barton, 2011). China has capitalised from the EU's credibility loss and controversial foreign policies in Africa by offering unconditional development aid. These EU troubles have helped Mr. Xi Jinping's government to acquire significant goodwill in Africa (Wang & Elliot, 2014). This goodwill is evident in Chinese investments, aid provisions, security, and trading relations between the AU and China. In 2013 alone, China became Africa's largest trading partner, with a total of US\$199 billion investment, a growth of 114% from 5 years before. Since Africa seeks to benefit its economies, China is becoming a new source of economic opportunities.

China has been accused of providing African countries with unconditional development aid and loans considered to undermine EU development strategies (Hackenesch, 2015). In line with this, this thesis considers this opportunity to cherry-pick problematic, as the unconditional aid by China to Africa has the potential to undermine fundamental human rights, which helps in poverty reduction. The conditions attached to EU aid were helpful to

deter non-democratic leaders from undermining fundamental human rights, otherwise risk development assistance. Without the “stick”, it is tempting for authoritarian leaders to undermine human rights, leading to a decline in development and increase in poverty.

Even though people are panicking over the budget shortfalls, others are speculating a minimal effect on the EU budget (Nunez-Ferrer & Rinaldi, 2016). This conclusion is based on the amount of the UK rebates compared to its EU contribution in order to keep access to the internal markets. This analysis by Nunez-Ferrer and Rinaldi does not take into consideration the impact Brexit has on external relations. Their research only focuses on UK-EU future economic challenges. This perspective creates an opportunity for this thesis to examine how these gaps could lead to severe food shortages and dire conditions for African countries. As this research seeks to identify all possible channels that could undermine existing EU efforts to reduce poverty, any financial reduction towards the EDF is considered detrimental.

2.5 European Union as a Normative Power: Is it normative?

Literature explaining the role of the EU in the world is plenty, but the most popular angle when studying EU external relations is Manners’ (2002) normative power paradigm. This thesis considers this Normative Power Europe (hereafter NPE) to study EU-Africa relations based on the three epistemological groupings suggested by Manners (2002): 1) Ontological – meaning the ability to change norms; 2) Positivist – regarding how the EU changes norms; and 3) Normative – how the EU acts while extending its norms and values. The idea of normative power by Manners (2002) suggests that the EU’s relationship with the rest of the world has evolved over time, making it a special player with extraordinary power which is neither civilian nor military but normative. Manners suggested that there are ways other than military force which the EU uses to extend its influence in the world. Manners summarised the EU’s power claim as follows:

The concept of normative power is an attempt to suggest that not only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, and usually overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is. (Manners 2002)

Ian Manners' notion of NPE suggests that the EU's external relations and its actorness is found in the framework of what it is and is to some extent "normatively cultured" (Elgström & Smith, 2006). He suggests that the EU's core values and norms are what defines its actorness in external relations. This idea emanates from Duchene's complementing concept of the Civilian Power paradigm. Duchene (1973) coined the term Civilian Power after analysing the EU's power as based primarily on its economic muscle, not its military capabilities (Kohnstamm, 1973). Francois Duchene understood or believed that economic power was a better tool to be used in international relations than traditional military force. In response to this, Manners wanted to cite that: "Europe's role in the world is not determined by what it does or what it says but is embedded in what it is" (Manners 2002, p. 252).

Manners' study of the EU and its position on the death penalty was used to demonstrate that the EU intentionally shapes what is now considered to be normal internationally. What Manners was saying, was that the EU, through a set of methods, is able to transfer its ideas or norms to the others. Using a set of "diffusional methods" (Manners 2002, p. 244), Manners argues that when these ideas are received by the "Other" because they are universal, they will become the new normal (Manners 2002). These EU norms are the rule of law, democracy, and human rights (Manners 2002). According to Manners, these norms are diffused in the international system and when they reach the intended community they will transform and shape what would be considered normal in international relations. He argues that, for an idea to be received, it has to be justifiable, coherent, and consistent. In EU-AU relations, NPE is located in the EU's foreign policy and contribute to knowledge production. In Africa, NPE is visible in declarations, policy documents, and diplomatic speeches issued by top EU officials.

Other studies on the EU's position in global politics have gone as far as claiming that the EU is unique (Elgström & Smith, 2006; Whitman, 2011) and possesses an extraordinary power, "normative power" due to the way it consistently conducts itself around the world (Manners, 2002; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008). The EU's consistency has sparked enormous debate, with scholars suggesting that the EU foreign policies contain a range of inconsistencies (Powel, 2009; Risse, 2012; Youngs, 2004, 2010). The rationale for choosing NPE as a theoretical paradigm is because the EU's norms and values are repeated in most of the EU strategic

documents and partnership agreements with its external partners, for example in the Lomé and Cotonou as previously discussed. These fundamental principles still exist among African countries and, even though the relationship is continuously evolving, these norms remain relatively stable and, hence, consistent in every partnership agreement.

The attempt by the EU to export its norms and values dates back to the formation of the relationship between the EU-AU and the way the EU tried to interact with the AU (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008). Even though the EU, or at least some of the member states, had previously been involved in Africa by military force (in the colonial era), the second time around the relationship was built on its core principles and mainly democratic values. The idea of reshaping global norms by changing pre-existing concepts and replacing them with EU norms and values forms a cornerstone of the normative power concept.

Manners' NPE ideas have provoked debates among scholars and faced much criticism in EU foreign policy scholarship. Questions on the EU's actorness, legitimacy, norms over interest, and its ability to attract others are but a few (Sjursen 2006). This chapter is not going to address these questions and neither will it entertain a debate on the relevance of NPE, but suggests that the core principles of NPE exist in the Treaty of Rome which is the foundation to the formation of the EU-AU partnership agreements as recorded in Lomé, Cotonou, and JAES.

2.6 The EU as a development aid provider

One of the most important issues for the EU is its desire to assist developing countries to achieve sustainable economic and social development. Its foreign policy is persistent on equality, prosperity, and poverty reduction. In pursuit of these moral goals, it has dedicated its financial and technical resources towards development aid. By the early 2000s, the EU accounted for more than half of the world's foreign aid, making it the biggest aid provider to the African continent (Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2009; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008). With most of the budget dedicated to Africa, the rate of poverty reduced significantly.

This ethical move has, however, faced much criticism from international relations scholars. Some have even argued that, while the EU tries to help, it has damaged its international image. In terms of how the EU uses its development policy in international relations, Maurizio Carbone has argued that the EU's approach of using development policy as a way of asserting itself as a global power might have damaged its relationship with African countries (Carbone, 2011, 2013). Mostly the argument regarding Africa is linked to the EU's use of political conditionality when offering aid. In order to get cooperation from AU member states, the EU has included conditionality within its development policy. These political and economic conditions are designed to coerce its partners into the adoption of the EU's core principles, as mentioned by Manners (2002, p. 241), namely: "Respect for human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance." The EU considers these principles to be a sustainable vehicle to poverty reduction.

Carbone (2011) noticed that the EU was providing development aid but in return asking aid receivers to adhere to a set of norms as a condition for more development support in the future. This framework sparked debate on the future of development due to a conflict of interest between the donor and recipient (Scholl, 2009). Because the recipient needed more help at a later stage, they would be left with no choice but to adopt these norms and values. Over time, these norms have become the new normal. Carbone's conclusion illustrates how the EU deals with the AU. The emphasis on conditionality when negotiating deals has been noticed in most EU negotiations with African countries (Fioramonti, 2010; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008). These conditions are not always palatable to Africans, leading them to look for alternative support. Men and Balducci have argued against EU conditionality, citing that the EU's strong emphasis on political conditionality has made them become ineffective in implementation of development (2010, p. 1). China has realised this gap and created a model different from that of the EU, a move received well by Africans but heavily criticised by the West (Men & Balducci, 2010; Men & Barton, 2011).

The view of the EU as a normative power is always highly contested, with consensus on its role as a privileged partner in fighting poverty becoming more prominent (Hill & Smith, 2011; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008). According to Zielonka (1998), the EU's development approach is questionable due to inconsistencies within its foreign policy (Schmalz, 2000; Smith, 2002,

2003). These inconsistencies have contributed to the rise of African scepticism, losing faith in the European integration project. Since cooperation is one of the keys to a successful partnership, the inability to mend the gap is affecting the EU's ability to assert itself as a global power. Trying to bridge the gap of distrust in the model of the EU, development has become one of the main tools at the EU's disposal to maintain its position in the region. Because aid for trade is increasingly becoming the preferred foreign policy approach, the EU uses its economic muscle to build relations with third countries. This is supported by Lucarelli and Fioramonti (2009)'s conclusion that, by becoming a consolidated global player, the EU must seriously consider how it performs the duties expected, especially its involvement in aid initiatives.

This conclusion is bolstered by the findings of the National Centre for Research on Europe (NCRE) on perceptions that the EU has been increasingly recognised as an aid provider in most parts of the world but not as a normative power (Björkdahl et al., 2015; Chaban, Elgström & Holland, 2006; Sheahan et al., 2010). Aid for trade is one of the main tools used by the EU to stay connected with its former colonies (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). This study by the NCRE on perceptions contributed an essential component to the studying of EU relations with others, as it shows that what the EU tries to achieve is not what the other sees. The EU was not regarded as a normative power in Africa, but through its development capacity was considered an economic giant and an aid provider (Chaban & Elgström, 2014; Chaban, Elgström & Holland, 2006). Based on aid, the relationship between the EU and AU progressed significantly, considering it just started as a simple interaction between a donor and aid receiver (Farrell, 2007; Hill & Smith, 2011; Rodt & Okeke, 2013). Against this backdrop, the EU has adopted and plays the vital role of helping developing countries in the AU to reduce poverty. EU development aid has helped to provide basic needs for many, reducing the number of people who live in extreme poverty.

Stefania Panebianco has studied the EU's relationship with AU countries, trying to understand the extent to which the EU can act as a norm promoter, especially in areas of human rights and democracy (Panebianco 2006). The research paid attention to sub-Saharan countries that were targeted by the EU enlargement. It was evident that there were problems when it comes to EU norms being accepted in the region. This is supported by Smith & Elgström (2006), who

concluded that the EU's impact in the area of political systems has been unimpressive, but there is evidence of recognition in areas of economic development. Even though Panebianco analysed only a few countries, the empirical evidence has been similar to the results obtained by the NCRE, proving that the EU is perceived as an economic player rather than the normative power it tries to portray (Chaban, Elgström & Holland, 2006). The EU's influence is somehow declining (Fioramonti, 2007), making it a weaker partner due to inconsistencies on rhetoric versus action.

Even though the EU is recognised as influential in development, as shown by the studies by NCRE and other scholars, this does not mean that there are no problems involved. Fioramonti (2007) has identified some problems that existed between the EU and Africa. The rise of other powers like the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) countries is known to be rewarding for other AU countries, as they come with better opportunities which contribute to further drift from the EU (Fioramonti, 2017). Using media images to analyse the relationship between South Africa (Alden & Schoeman, 2013) and the EU (South Africa is a significant economic power in Africa), Fioramonti's concluding remarks were that the EU's image in the region was declining (Fioramonti, 2007). In other terms, if one's image is not attractive, it decreases the chances of having an influence and acceptance. This lack of influence further complicates the issue of aid coordination and as a result, affects the effectiveness of the EU's effort to reduce poverty.

Since the EU prides itself as a bearer of valuable norms, self-proclaiming cannot be sufficient to provide an accurate picture as to what the EU is. In order to verify whether what the EU claims is valid, a study on images can help to verify such claims. Ole Elgström's work on the images of the EU as portrayed by the "other" suggests mixed responses, indicating the existence of a conception-performance and capability-expectation gap, and a failure or resistance to adopt the EU norms (Hill, 1993). Some look up to the Union as a saviour, an angel, while others see it as a partner with a hidden agenda driven by self-interest (Elgström, 2008).

The persona of the EU as an inconsistent actor with double standards and friend with ulterior motive has increasingly been seen outside of the EU28 (Fioramonti & Poletti, 2008). The EU

is regarded as a partner that is increasingly becoming aggressive and using its economic muscle, one which constructs Africans as a problem (Połowska-Kimunguyi & Kimunguyi, 2017). While trade is regarded as key within the EU foreign policy and a way of maintaining relations with developing countries, it has been used by EU policy strategists as a tool depicting developing countries as inferior (Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008, p. 608).

The suggestion that trade will contribute to the reduction of poverty has also been criticised. Critics have suggested that “trade accentuates and deepens poverty instead of rectifying and diminishing poverty in poor countries” (Bhagwati & Srinivasan, 2002). Claar & Nolke’s conclusion on the study of the relationship between the North and South have highlighted that relationships based on trade agreements could result in compatibility conflicts (Claar & Nölke, 2013, p. 285). Development based on EPAs has resulted in policies unable to work universally for many countries at different levels of development.

2.7 A call to strengthening African-EU partnership

By 2005, the relationship between the EU and AU started becoming rocky, which signalled a need to introduce a new approach to the troubled affair (Helly, 2013). The problems spanned social imbalance; unfair trading attitude towards developing countries; and economic, and political bullying (Lilley, 2016). The leaders of the AU complained of the unrealistic reforms required when negotiating with the EU and the inequalities which existed in previous agreements (Helly, 2013). Aid attached with political conditionality is referenced by Fioramonti and Kimunguyi (2011), Fioramonti and Kotsopoulos (2015), Fioramonti and Mattheis (2016), Fioramonti and Poletti (2008) and Men and Barton (2011) as a common cause of making Africans uncomfortable and continue to drift away from the partnership (Helly, 2013).

Though aid is tied with conditions as a way to curb corruption in Africa, it is also noted that aid was also distributed for political reasons (Rimmer, 2000). This did not only create problems for Africans, but also created a rift among the EU member states who had an interest in the region. With trouble in both camps, the two institutions decided to renegotiate better partnership terms. The two come up with a plan to bolster this partnership through

the EU-Africa Strategy to help Africa reach the UN MDGs. While aiming to make the world a better place, internal problems have crippled the EU and hindered its intention to play its role (Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2009).

2.8 A new beginning: Entering the Joint Africa Europe Strategy (JAES)

In 2007, after negotiations to balance the playing field, the JAES was adopted at the Lisbon summit. With more substantial changes in peacebuilding, economic development, and sustainable development, the partnership became the cornerstone for a new era enabling more cooperation (Helly, 2013). The JAES was instrumental in revitalising African economies through EDFs and ODAs and the funding of development projects. Unlike Lomé and Cotonou, the JAES is only focused on African countries who collectively form the African Union.

The EU provided loans and funds through the EDF. While intentions were good, the JAES project faced criticism as it lacked the spine to withstand bureaucratic pressure, and thereby succumbed without yielding further development. The sentiments by the former Senegalese president in January 2008, President Abdoulaye Wade, indicated that African leaders were considering partners other than the EU. He is on record stating: “China is doing a much better job than western capitalists in Africa. The Chinese model for economic development is much better for Africa” (Financial Times, 2008). Hackenesch (2015), who assessed the EU-AU relations disagrees with those who blame the USA and China as the source of tensions between the EU and AU. The hope that the JAES would help remedy the areas which Lomé and Cotonou could not address was shuttered.

2.9 Gaps in the Literature

This Chapter has demonstrated that there are several problems which exist in the EU-AU relationship, which Lomé, Cotonou, and JAES are failing to address. Development aid is not enough to solve these problems. Due to the historical relations discussed earlier, Britain has strong ties with Africa, and its interest is evident in its contributions towards EDF and separate bilateral agreements with Africa outside of the EU. It is against this backdrop that this thesis decided to investigate the possible impact of Brexit on the EU in terms of development. The

available literature has identified the uncertainties ahead after the expiry of the Cotonou agreement. Since there have not been any member states to have ever withdrawn from the EU since its inception, there is not enough research to support the prediction that any exit of a member state will influence the EU and its foreign relations.

Therefore, the exit of Britain (a significant aid donor) creates an opportunity to study the EU in terms of future development and relations. This thesis predicts that the withdrawal of Britain from the Union could have severe implications for EU foreign policy and further increase the problems affecting the already fractured relationship with the AU. The research pays particular attention to the need to reduce poverty as outlined by the EU Global Strategy and JAES and argue that these ambitions may not come to fruition.

2.9.1 Summary

The UK referendum of 2016 which led to the UK leaving the EU has been a blow to the two institutions. As for the EU, this means that the EU is losing one of its biggest contributors towards the development fund of which much is used in Africa. The UK has been a critical player in the area of bringing neighbouring African countries together due to its colonial legacies. Without the UK, Africa might not have an incentive to stick by the conditionalities that come with EU aid when there are other countries in the region seeking to bond their relationship with the institutions.

In the past decade, the EU has been challenged by China and the USA, therefore adding another player seeking bilateral relations will increase competition for the EU. In the African camp, this might create problems, as African member states are faced with the choice of whether to work closely with the UK as a single state or to fight to maintain their relationship with the EU. Due to the technical complexities of multi-level and supranational organisations, the time required for restructuring and renegotiating existing partnerships can be long. Some existing deals would need to be disbanded, which might lead to the conditions of those beneficiaries dependent on EU assistance to worsen.

Chapter 3

Introduction

This chapter will delve into the theory and methodology section of this research. First, the chapter will introduce the theoretical dimension linking it to the research question. The second part will then introduce the methodology of the thesis, outlining how the issue of validity concerns, delimitation, terminology, and working definitions for the argument will be addressed.

3.1 Theory: Normative Power Europe (NPE)

This paper employs NPE as the theoretical framework to help answer the question: “What are the possible implications of Brexit on the EU development agenda in particular on eradicating poverty in Africa?” NPE is a theory developed by Ian Manners (2002). This theory has been used by many scholars to study the impact of the EU in international relations (Elgström & Smith, 2006; Langan, 2014; Nicolaïdis & Whitman, 2013; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008; Whitman, 2011). NPE best fits this study, since the EU has considered Africa a strategic external partner from the onset of the European Community and has always used many development instruments to promote its norms and values in exchange for development assistance.

Manners (2002) argues that the EU has a unique power, one which is neither military nor civilian. It is from this ethical approach to foreign policy that he argues that the EU possesses a Normative Power. This kind of ideational power has the ability to change and influence what is considered normal in international relations. Manners accepts that economic and military actions have the ability to influence international politics, but recommends that the EU should prioritise this ethical approach in order to shape what is normal in international relations (Manners, 2002).

Manners highlights nine norms which the EU successfully promotes in its external relations. He groups these norms in two categories, with the first category qualifying as the core norms. The core norms include democracy, human rights, the rule of law, peace, and liberty. The four minor norms are: good governance, sustainable development, social solidarity, and anti-discrimination (Manners, 2002). These fundamental values also form the backbone of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on EU, Article 2). The desire to uphold these values and spread them around the globe is also emphasised in TEU Article 3:

The Union shall uphold and promote its values and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. (TEU, Article 3, para 5).

The EU's role is not limited within its member states but is extended to achieve a global mandate. All these norms are at the centre of EU development policy and present in the most of the partnership agreements between the EU and AU. The JAES predominantly highlights the importance of prioritising these principles. The JAES is a partnership between the EU-AU which was entered into mainly to deal with African countries outside of the Cotonou Caribbean and Pacific countries.

To further show the significance of these norms and values, through its Consensus on Development, and the Global Strategy, the EU aims to remain the champion of promoting these norms outside of Europe. The EU continues to emphasise the importance of the promotion of these core and minor principles by committing itself to help developing countries achieve SDGs, as will be explained in detail in the next chapter. It is through the implementation of various development activities that the EU acts in a normative character (Manners, 2002; Nicolaïdis & Whitman, 2013; Whitman, 2011). The EU believes that its involvement in the developing world has helped shape what is now considered normal. Though controversial for many as to whether what the EU perceives as normal is good or bad, it is undeniable that the EU norms has had an impact. This act by the EU supports Manners' ideas of normative power. The EU continues to want to be seen as an influential actor or as a

force for good through its initiatives and activities as defined in the Treaty of the European Union (TEU).

Manners listed six mechanisms through which these norms and values can be diffused external to the EU. These mechanisms are contagion, informational, procedural, transference, overt diffusion, and cultural filters (Manners, 2002). These mechanisms justify how these norms have been able to reach Africa and how they were adopted to create the norm. These filters also help answer the questions raised by many scholars as to whether these norms are Eurocentric or Universal (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010).

Considering that the first encounter between Europeans and Africans was during colonisation, the diffusion mechanisms should offer an explanation as to how the EU managed to interact with Africans. These diffusional methods indicate that without the use of physical force, cultural filters became a new method of coercion by the EU (Manners, 2006). The ability to coerce and achieve intended goals, which would have been resisted, indicates that the values diffused by the EU were adopted as new norms by external parties.

3.2 Rationale for choosing “Normative Power Europe”

This research uses the NPE theory paradigm as used by other scholars interested in the study of EU foreign policy. The results generated from past research indicate that the theory still remains relevant in answering questions regarding the EU’s external actorness. The EU’s foreign policy is inspired by the promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and the objective to see successful sustainable development (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014; Manners, 2002). The EU’s promotion of NPE values has shaped the EU-AU relationship from the early 1950s. An emphasis on these values is active in most of the interactions between the EU and AU. Through trade deals and development negotiations, these values always take centre stage and through them the EU has been able to maintain a strong position in Africa.

Langan has also found that the EU’s normative principles are embedded within the AU-EU relationship (Langan, 2012b). Even though Manners’ arguments do not expressly mention poverty reduction as one of the norms, this paper interprets the norms and values mentioned

as a key to development and as an underlying factor to reduce poverty. The EU also desires the reduction of poverty around the world. The rationale behind aligning this theory with development also emanates from the premise that unless there is good governance, respect for the rule of law and human rights, poverty becomes inevitable.

The EU considers poverty and malnutrition as problems associated with development and as a violation of human rights (Khan, 2009). Irene Khan (2009) opines that in order to end poverty, human rights should be at the forefront. This means that poverty reduction is closely aligned with human rights, therefore all efforts to advance human rights will have an impact on poverty.

In the past, there have been improvements in areas of development and the EU has been able to influence Africa in many areas and in cases where military action could have been detrimental. In pursuit of norms promotion, the EU has been involved in areas of development in Africa. Manners' NPE theory provides the foundation to help explain whether the EU will be able to continue its development policy in Africa post-Brexit in particular in the area of eradicating poverty, which is one of its priorities as stated in the Treaty, EU Consensus on Development and the SDGs and overall in the JAES.

For the purpose of studying EU-AU relations, NPE is appropriate, but for future in-depth EU external relations studies, the use of only one theory may not provide conclusive results. Manners' NPE theory offers an explanation of the basis of the EU, but other theories may be able to offer something different; however, for the purpose of answering the research question, NPE is enough. As mentioned in the first paragraph, NPE has drawn a lot of criticism.

3.3 Criticism of Normative Power Europe

The theory has helped to answer many questions pertaining to the EU's external action. Yet, the theory has also been heavily criticised by many (Diez, 2004, 2005, 2013; Forsberg, 2011; Hyde-Price, 2006; Langan, 2012a; Merlingen, 2007; Staeger, 2016) for different reasons, some of the reasons being beyond the scope of this thesis. Of note, is the criticisms regarding legitimacy, the universal appeal of norms, and the issue of values over interests.

Critics of NPE have argued that the EU norms cannot be universal as they promote Eurocentric ideas (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010). The notion of legitimacy of the EU's actions is debated widely as some researchers have argued that these EU norms are adopted in certain geographic areas but are not seen to exist in other parts of the world (Chaban et al., 2015). The argument is that the EU is viewed as a normative power by its closest neighbours, while it is only viewed as an economic power in other parts of the world without any trace of norms (Björkdahl et al., 2015). In Africa, the EU has been dominant in areas of economic power with less recognition as a normative power. Another criticism is that theorising the EU as a normative power undermines the EU's foreign policy interests. Critics argue that there is a conflict of interest and values (Diez, 2005).

For others, the "Other," the norm recipient's role and desires are missing in Manners' theory. While the norms and values are diffused through the six diffusional methods, the theory undermines the importance of other partners who are supposed to adopt those values. The recipient is equally important in the debate, but Manners' NPE did not discuss this phenomenon. As found by the NCRE research on perceptions, the recipients who were expected to see the EU as a norm provider actually considered the EU as a mere aid provider (Chaban, Elgström & Holland, 2006).

Thomas Diez disagrees with Manners and thinks that NPE is self-constructed. Diez sees the concept of depicting the EU as a normative power as problematic because the other actor is completely neglected. He sees this idea as self-centred and thinks NPE as a self-righteous project which create a gap between the European and the Others. Diez raises a powerful argument that NPE only pays attention to regarding the EU's actorness, undermining the effect this might have on the other. This position will be explored further in this research in trying to examine and understand whether the EU's pursuing of norms promotion might have impacted the AU negatively and whether that could affect its ambitions in African post-Brexit.

The ideas of NPE cannot be judged effective unless it can be proven that the EU has the power to do the things it says its capable of doing outside its borders. When analysing the relationship between the EU and AU, Michelle Pace has argued that the EU should admit that

its foreign policy is two-faced. The EU seeks to be viewed as a normative power but it also endeavours to further its economic interests and wishes to influence the political spheres in the region (Cavatorta & Pace, 2010).

If ever NPE is going to be put to the test, Africa is the best case study to investigate this claim. As discussed earlier, AU-EU relations started early in the 1950s and the relationship has evolved with time, forcing regular changes to adapt to the changing geopolitics. What has not changed, is the EU's interest in the continent and the EU's claims that it purely continues to promote its norms and values. Though the EU intentions in Africa are highly contested, the AU has been a privileged partner benefiting most from the EU funding compared to any other EU partner in the world.

3.4 Methodology

This section introduces the research methodology used to answer the main research question: *What are the possible implications of Brexit on the EU's poverty reduction agenda in Africa?* It aims to introduce the reasons for selecting a specific method – qualitative analysis through the study of official EU documents -- and outlines the research strategy introduced in order to answer the main research question and sub questions.

In order to address the main research question, a set of sub-questions will help to untangle the historical, contextual, and other factors that can contribute to challenging the EU development agenda post-Brexit. These sub-questions are:

1. Historically, was the relationship between the EU and AU guided by the EU's normative power framework?
2. What are the EU's goals for the AU regarding poverty eradication?
3. What role does Britain play in the EU's development policy towards the AU?
4. Could Brexit interfere with the EU's desire to eradicating poverty in Africa?

Because this research aims to examine how successful has been the EU's poverty reduction in Africa? and what are the possible implications of Brexit in this agenda?, a qualitative approach was chosen as the appropriate method.

Qualitative research methods are mostly used in political science studies and are reliable for small samples. The qualitative approach helps to analyse relationship structures and themes which are sometimes not detectable in international relations. It allows the researcher to explore and understand individuals or groups who hold a certain belief (Creswell & Creswell, 2018). In most cases, conclusions of qualitative research are the result of the researcher's own interpretations and judgements. This research has focused on analysing primary sources, the JAES partnership agreement, AU reports, press releases and evaluation reports, all of which determine whether the EU's poverty reduction desire is possible without the UK, since the UK is one of the major actors in EU development. The JAES was designed to provide African solutions to African problems. The signing of the JAES was meant to be a partnership which placed focus only on African partners, unlike the Cotonou Agreement which included countries from the Pacific and the Caribbean.

The JAES was regarded as a hallmark by both the AU and EU as it outlined principles of partnership. One of its main principles is human development which fights for equality, reduction of poverty, better education for all, economic growth, and, zero tolerance to hunger and discrimination. JAES documents are essential to this study since it is the current partnership agreement which offers the AU exclusive attention. The period of study is limited to the inception of the JAES in 2007 until 2018. This longitudinal approach sets a clear timeframe to look at the progress of the partnership. Even though the EU-AU relations were formalised in 1957 through the Rome treaty, they were revised many times by the signing of other treaties, namely Yaoundé, Lomé, and Cotonou. This thesis will not seek to evaluate these previous partnerships in detail, but will only focus on the JAES partnership, which came into effect in 2007. This is because the desire to eradicate poverty in Africa is at the centre of the JAES, and an analysis of the Action Plans will help to summarise the effectiveness of this partnership and whether it has managed to address the need to eradicate poverty in Africa.

While the JAES was still in force, the African Union agreed on their own fifty-year plan. In the bid to succeed in areas of development, the AU at continental level produced its own Agenda 2063, which is reinforced by and aligned with the SDGs. Because the SDGs are aligned with the EU agenda and now with the Africa's Agenda 2063, SDG reports are analysed in this research in order to gauge if there has been any progress in the effort to reduce poverty. To get a report with a balanced view, UNDP's SDG reports are a good source as they arguably offer a neutral viewpoint.

To increase the validity of this research, secondary sources were utilised in the form of journal articles, books, scholarly work from other researchers, news articles, and NGOs reports. Since the EU operates in partnership with NGOs to implement projects, NGO reports, such as those from Oxfam and Save the Children have been reviewed, offering up to date information on the current levels of poverty. To compliment the information obtained from these secondary sources, publicly available online information from the EU websites has made information verification easy. These online documents from the EU are useful for giving an indication of how much Britain has been contributing toward Africa through the EDF and ODAs. The involvement and individual contribution of the UK towards the EU development, both financially and technically, is important in this research.

Finally, secondary sources from authoritative researchers, such as those canvassed in the literature review, who have spent a lot of time researching EU development at a broad level other than poverty contribute significantly to this thesis. These experts have been able to complete research and offer recommendations to the EU that led to foreign policy reforms in the past, making their literature a reliable source of information. This thesis takes that useful information, together with our own analysis to provide important and useful insights into how Brexit may impact EU-AU relations going forward.

3.5 Definitions of terms.

European Union (EU)

- The EU institutions, particularly the main institutional actors involved in the EU's development policy, namely the European Commission and the EU member states. (Orbie et al., 2017)

African Union (AU)

- The AU institutions, particularly the main institutional actors, the Commission of the African Union and the AU member states.

Brexit

- The withdrawal of the UK from the European Union as a result of a referendum outcome on 23 June 2016, which resulted in 51.9% of the British voting to leave the EU.

Poverty

Poverty has traditionally been defined and measured in monetary terms. If one lives below the \$1.90 per day threshold, he or she is deemed to be living in poverty. Research by Alkire, Kanagaratnam and Suppa (2018) has shown that poverty can take different forms and should be broadly defined to cover areas such as education, health, housing, human empowerment, employment, and personal security. They state: "No one indicator, such as income, is uniquely able to capture the multiple aspects that contribute to poverty" (Alkire, Kanagaratnam & Suppa, 2018). All the aspects of poverty which are taken into consideration for this thesis are listed in the table below.




Figure 1: Global Multidimensional Poverty Index: Poverty Dimension and Indicators

Source: Alkire et al., 2018, p. 9.

3.6. Limitations

While this research seeks to provide a clear picture of the implications of Brexit on the EU's poverty reduction efforts in Africa, there are some limitations. Firstly, Brexit negotiations are still underway, so the conclusion of the research is drawn from explicit assumptions. Brexit has not yet happened and is expected to complete in October 2019. The thesis only pays attention to only one particular area of development, namely poverty reduction, though the EU is involved in many different aspects of development in the region (for example, issues of peace and security, trade and political development). The research also critically analyses the JAES and to a lesser extent the Cotonou partnership agreement, though there are other partnerships currently in place at bilateral level managed by each respective member state.

This thesis is limited to the area of development, in particular the areas outlined in the SDGs. Goal number one of the SDGs has inspired this research, but the EU is involved in trying to achieve all seventeen goals. This thesis acknowledges the impact of the individual EU member states who are actively involved at a bilateral level in Africa, as their involvement might have a positive effect on development, but those achievements are beyond the scope of this paper. Other actors like the UN, China and the US are also active in the region, but their impact is also beyond the scope of this research. Finally, since Brexit is a new phenomenon, there is not enough academic literature to support the conclusion, but the build-up is supported by others who have made assumptions since the beginning of the negotiations.

Chapter 4

In order to understand EU development policy in Africa and its potential impact on poverty reduction, Chapter 4 begins by providing a working definition of poverty and outlines the parameters by which one could be identified as living in poverty. In this way, it will become clear what is meant by “poverty reduction” and this is followed by some poverty related figures gathered by the UN. These figures show the number of people currently living in poverty in Africa is high, although there has been some inroads. These figures illustrate that poverty is an issue that needs to be addressed and the number of the most affected are in Africa. Using data from the UN reports allows this research to work with reliable and up to date information. The EU relies on the figures published by the UN in most of its planning. Most of the EU’s reports always reference other multilateral organisations like the World Bank and the UN as a partner in fighting poverty. This Chapter will also the mechanism which was decided to be fit to fight and reduce such high level of poverty.

4.1 Determining if one is considered to be in poverty: Poverty Indicators

The UN outlines poverty in terms of three key areas: health, education, and living standards. This definition is used in this research as it streamlines and identifies critical areas of poverty. As illustrated in the below table, these areas are then grouped into different specific target areas and conditions necessary for one to be labelled as living in poverty. Efforts to reduce poverty should be given top priority as projections indicate that by 2020 over 500 million in Africa will be food insecure (USDA, 2010). Against this context, Africa is continuously at risk and should be prioritised before the situation becomes dire.

Table 1: Poverty Indicators

Area of Poverty	Indicator	Conditions
Health	Nutrition	If an adult under age 70 years or child is undernourished.
	Child mortality	If any child died in a family in the five-year period preceding the survey.
Education	Years of Schooling	If no family member aged 10 or older has completed six years of schooling.
	School attendance	If any school-aged child is not attending schooling up to the age at which the child completes class 8.
Standard of Living	Cooking Fuel	If a household cooks with dung, wood, charcoal or coal.
	Sanitation	If a household uses alternative sanitation facilities not improved to international standards as stated by SDG guidelines or if shared with two or more households.
	Drinking Water	If a household does not have access to clean and safe drinking water.
	Electricity	If a household has no electricity.
	Housing	If the housing materials for at least one of roof, walls and floor are inadequate or are from rudimentary materials.
	Assets	If a household does not own a radio, TV, telephone, computer, animal cart, bicycle, motorbike or refrigerator, and does not own a car or truck.

Source: Human Development Report 2018

Where do most of the people in poverty live?

According to the UN *Human Development Report*, the number of people living in poverty is increasing, and most of them are from Africa. The 2018 report, as illustrated in Figure 6 below, indicates that at least 1.3 billion people in the world live in poverty. Of these people living in acute poverty, the highest percentage (42%) is from sub-Saharan Africa. Over half a million African people are living in multidimensional poverty.




Figure 2: Human Development Poverty Report 2018

Source: Human Development Report, 2018.

The UN identified deprivation as a lack of education, unemployment, poor health, and poor living standards such as not having clean water, sanitation, and adequate nutritious food.

In sub-Saharan Africa, children are the most vulnerable to poverty. Figure 3 shows the intensity of child poverty by region. In the graph, Africa hosts the highest number of children living without education or proper health services and in poor living conditions (GMPI, 2018)




Figure 3: Intensity of Multidimensional Poverty Index: Child Poverty by Region

Source: Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2018.

Figure 4 provides broken down data by country. While most of the poor children live in Africa, some countries are more vulnerable than others (Alkire, Kanagaratnam & Suppa, 2018). To alleviate poverty, most countries rely on agriculture for GDP growth, employment and agriculture supplies for people's livelihoods. A report by the world bank in 2008 reported that agriculture was twice as effective at alleviating poverty in Africa as trade (World Bank, 2008). The EU has been on the forefront advocating for better practices in agriculture, governance, human development in order to reduce the causalities of poverty.




Figure 4: Where do the 559 million poor people in sub-Sahara Africa live?

Source: Global Multidimensional Poverty Index 2018.

African countries remain top of the ladder of countries with extreme poverty. It is in this region where the EU is striving to reduce poverty in order to leave no one behind. This is part of the EU's consensus on development and one of the main principles outlined in the JAES partnership and the reason for incorporating CAADP in the agreement. The AU countries which has the highest percentages of people in poverty are also the ones that rely mostly on

the EU and UK for exports. Agricultural produce from countries like Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya and Mozambique and natural resources from Ethiopia and Niger are also mostly sold in the EU yet these countries are the most affected by poverty.

In a press statement released on January 22, 2018, the data produced by the Oxford Poverty and Human Development initiative found that 48% of Angola's population still lives in extreme poverty (OPHI, 2018). Angola has a population of over 29,7 million people and of that number almost half are deprived of education, health, and better living conditions. Angola is one of the countries who relies on export to the EU countries for GDP growth and has been receiving more aid to alleviate poverty but has remained unmanageable.

As emphasised in a European report on development 2012 stated, "the rate at which the world population is growing, by 2030 demand for food, water and energy is expected to rise by 30-40 %" (EU Commission, 2012). This growth in population not only affects developing countries in Africa but will also put pressure on Europe, hence an added need to collaborate with developing nations to help reduce its possible effects. In the remaining part of this chapter, the following sub-question is addressed: "What framework drives the current EU-AU development relationship?" Answering this question will help to unpack the nuances tied in the current relationship and outlines some essential details associated with the EU's poverty reductions strategy. This is answered by analysing the NPE framework and complimented by the analysis of the JAES.

4.2 Joint Africa -European Strategy to fight poverty

In December 2007, the EU entered into a new strategic partnership with the AU to addresses concerns regarding lack of ownership in areas of common interest (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). This political framework, on top of the Cotonou agreement, drives the EU-AU relationship differently than in the past. The JAES partnership is based on shared objectives and mutual benefits and risks. This new strategy was the first to represent long-term goals between the two organisations while creating open and co-ownership projects exclusively focused on the African continent. The JAES aims to address four objectives:

- To enhance EU-AU political dialogue
- Promotion of peace and security and help to achieve MDGs
- Effective Multilateralism
- Creating a people-centred partnership

As is traditional with all EU agreements, the so-called “norms and values”(Manners, 2002) take centre stage in the partnership agreements, and the JAES starts with just that. The JAES partnership agreement state that:

Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the constitutive texts of our respective Unions. (Council of European Union 2007)

The extract above suggests that the EU_AU relationship has its roots in ethical motives as Manners’ NPE claimed. The partnership acknowledges historical experiences as the key (Fioramonti & Mattheis, 2016), but the current challenges presented by ever-evolving global politics call for both parties to acknowledge these changes, as they have the potential to undermine addressing the root causes of poverty. The EU can no longer rely on this historical colonial linkage, as the AU member states now seem to be driven by pan-Africanism rhetoric, regional relations, and generational self-interest. The two continents participating in the agreement emphasise designing mechanisms that can mitigate poverty. The documents on the partnership also outline that the two institutions share a vision and common purpose to achieve the SDGs.

The JAES partnership was built on principles of equal partnership, emphasising the aim to achieve SDGs, cooperation, and human development. Unlike in the past, the AU has teamed up to become assertive when negotiating trade deals, which makes them an unbreakable union. Implementation of the JAES Action Plans was jointly conducted by moving away from the traditional aid-based projects, bringing together a wider sphere of stakeholders, including civil society and international organisations. The call for equal partnership that brings the two continents together is perfectly summarised in a statement by the EU.

This partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity. (Council of European Union, 2007)

Implementation of the JAES Action Plans or Roadmaps focused on different aspects of human development, trade, and economic and political dialogue. The action plans outline the importance of aligning the partnership with the SDGs, as the EU aims to help developing countries achieve these goals. In a perfect world, the JAES was intended to bridge the inequality gap by addressing common concerns. In order to have a system of checks and balances, the partnership incorporated civil society actors, moving towards an effective multilateralism. As shown in table 2, the partnership objectives are implemented through action plans targeting a few specific areas of development at a given time. The EU manages its foreign policy through the European External Service Action (EEAS) to help developing countries achieve sustainable development. The first action plan was implemented in 2008-2010, the second plan in 2011-2013 and the other in 2014-2017.

4.3 The Implementation of the JAES

The following chapters will explain the JAES, its main pillars and the EU foreign policy strategy and how the EU interacts with the rest of the World (Flint, 2008; Helly, 2013; Rimmer, 2000). It also highlighted that the EU holds a prestigious position as the biggest aid provider (Elgström, 2007; Elgström & Smith, 2006; Lucarelli & Fioramonti, 2009; Scheipers & Sicurelli, 2008), therefore the EU's goal to reduce poverty in Africa is possible if the implementation process is refined. On the flip side, this position can potentially be compromised by the departure of Britain from the EU – as the UK is the biggest contributor towards the EU EDF budget.

4.4 The EU's other policy Implementation Instruments

The EU uses many of its financial instruments in dealings with the AU. The implementation of EU services is done through various instruments in trying to address broader issues, but the

complications of using different types of instruments to address poverty have not spared the EU. Beneficial to this thesis, these instruments contribute by providing an insight on the progress and outcomes of the action plans. The JAES projects were carried out through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Development Fund (EDF), the Partnership Instruments, the European Instruments for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDH), the Instrument for Stability and Humanitarian Aid (ISHA), and Development Assistance Committee (DAC) supported by the European Investment Bank (EIB). Besides working at the EU level, individual member states also contribute further assistance towards development using different tools. These various instruments by the EU and the member states, instead of being helpful to the implementation of action plans, have contributed to inconsistencies and incoherence, leading to shortcomings in policy output.

In order to demonstrate clearly with data, the thesis relies on information in the EU external development reports, from these different instruments, Civil Society Organisations, International Organisations, EU financial institutions and development instruments directed to non-EU countries but Africa in particular. Figure 5, compiled with data from the OECD website, provides detailed information on the world's top contributors towards the ODA. As demonstrated, the EU holds over half of the world's ODA contributions, of which most of it is used to help countries in African, Caribbean and Pacific to fight poverty and hunger. To fight poverty, the EU applies different projects, which are managed by the Commission and funded through the EDF. However, as the EU does not carry these projects themselves, they rely on CSOs, IOs and NGOs to help manage the projects at a regional or country level.




Figure 5: Share Total ODA to Africa 2015

Source: OECD

4.5 Pillar 1: The Importance of Political dialogue in policy implementation

Despite these financial contributions by the EU, the EU has a big task ahead to fulfil its commitments as promised to the AU through the JAES. As described in the theoretical framework, the EU takes pride in advocating for peace and security (Manners, 2002). The first pillar of the JAES, as shown in Table 2, demonstrates that same desire to strengthen the EU-AU political relationship. Due to historical ties, the EU has always been interested in helping African countries in areas of good governance. The JAES collaboration did help to address areas of common concern (relationship based on equal ownership) for both the EU and AU outside the Cotonou Agreement. A continent-to-continent dialogue is the first step to create stronger ties which could lead to future cooperation in other areas and especially in human development. Through several summits (namely-Lisbon 2007, Tripoli 2010, Brussels 2014 and Abidjan 2017), the heads of state from both sides met to discuss the Action Plans. In addition to these summits, political dialogues took place at ministerial level on specific political subjects, like sharing ideas on tackling migrations crises and identifying areas in urgent need

of action. Since the heads of state summits happened at three year intervals, the ministerial level meetings were designed to address grassroots problems, implementation and provide the road map for future goals. As indicated by the results in Table 2, the 2014-2017 action plans have suffered from lack of a political cooperation, which led to poor outcome when progress on pillar 1 was assessed and in turn negatively impacts in areas of poverty reduction. The assessment shows that there is a communication deficit between the EU and the AU which leads to failure in political dialogue. Our analysis of these findings is that without a proper dialogue and engagement, it is difficult to achieve and maintain a partnership. The head of states and ministerial meetings had been criticised as dominated by EU agenda rather than focusing on the issue that matters to both. The inconsistencies and disconnect in these dialogues have contributed to poor success. In order to achieve the poverty reduction agenda, there is needed to self-reflect otherwise the intended poverty reduction agenda will fail.

4.6 Pillar 2: The accomplishment of SDGs

As highlighted in Chapter 2, the EU's desire to help reduce poverty in all its forms and dimensions in Africa is also enshrined in the consensus for development. In 2005, the EU, at the Union and bilateral level, committed itself to see through in favour of poverty reduction (Consensus on Development, 2005). On 20 December 2005, the EU further signed the MDGs (now SDGs) to affirm its commitment to development. According to the EU, poverty is "an act when people of any gender are deprived and perceived as incapacitated in society" (European Commission, 2005). The inconsistencies experienced through the MDGs led to the creation of a more refined and effective framework: SDGs. The SDGs offered a comprehensive and covered a broader area of issues. The SDGs consists of 17 areas focused on ending poverty, reduce inequalities and tackling climate change. They are more comprehensive, as they call for action from all countries to contributing towards ending poverty and address climate change concerns, unlike the MDGs which were only focused on developing countries. The SDGs also seek to further the scope of the MDGs to address the root causes of poverty by addressing the issues of economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. Throughout the JAES document, SDGs are repeated many times to emphasis the importance of working towards to achieve them all. As poverty is described as an act of deprivation, these

acts of deprivations can take the form of human, political, economic, socio-cultural, and protective capabilities. As noted in the Consensus Document:

This Declaration states loud and clear that the European Union is united in the fight against world poverty and that it has not given up on achieving the Millennium Development Goals, on the contrary! (Consensus on Development, 2005)

This introduction by the European Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid clearly outlines the EU's fight towards a better world. A world where everybody is equal and a world free of poverty, a "normative" vantage point. NPE is actively in the centre of the Consensus and shaping the EU's dealings with the AU is the desire to see a successful eradication of poverty.

Combating poverty is stressed in the first sentence of the consensus. The EU took upon itself the mandate to help develop third world countries. For the EU, poverty reduction is a moral obligation that needs to be initiated at the EU level.

Never before have poverty eradication and sustainable development been more important... Combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world. (Consensus on Development, 2005)

The rhetoric from the excerpt above, as documented in the European Consensus for Development, suggests that the EU's commitment to saving the starving children in developing countries goes beyond just a moral obligation to the EU norms and values. The EU considers its development policy as a tool that can remedy the growing numbers of poverty, reduce HIV/AIDS, reduce conflicts and help create sustainable jobs. This idea of positioning the EU as a global champion pursuing liberal norms rather than military action international relations formulates the NPE paradigm narrative. Most people in developing countries survive under a dollar per day, and over a billion people die every year from communicable diseases. In response to these challenges, the introduction of the SDGs and aligning them with the European Consensus show the commitment by the EU become a global actor.

The SDGs goals aim to:

Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality and empower women; reduce the mortality rate of children; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; ensure environmental sustainability and develop a global partnership for development. (UNDP,2015)

All these goals listed by the UN in the SDGs are what inspired the JAES. The aim of the EU is to see success to these goals which is why they are included in many of the EU agreements and the in particular the JAES.

Amidst these developments, the EU emphasises the importance of cooperation by the member states in achieving these ambitious results. This comprehensive EU Consensus document encompasses diverse areas of development. The common factor of the JAES is based on mechanisms that can lead to fully achieving the SDGs and reducing poverty. In the JAES documents, the EU norms and values take centre stage and are considered and agreed upon by the AU. These SDGs forms the backbone when discussing poverty. As most of the SDGs are considered universal or norms of the EU, in particular, human rights, democracy, good governance and rule of law, many AU leaders have been reluctant to fully commit. This lagging behind has contributed to a weak success in this area.

4.7 Pillar 3: Creating an Effective Multilateralism

As part of the Action Plans, the EU has committed financial support for JAES development projects. Financial support has remained the central feature of most of the EU partnership deals and the JAES. JAES relations were meant to be an equal partnership, but in reality, the EU utilised its financial support instruments to drive the Action Plans while keeping the donor-recipient framework which many have criticised, as it supports the AU to continue to be dependent on Europe (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). The EU remains the main contributor towards the JAES roadmaps. This has created AU dependency behaviour on the EU. The AU member states have an obligation to contribute towards the AU budget, but in most cases, the

member states' default in contributions means the AU cannot always meet the agreed funding budget on programs. In turn, the EU covers all the programs and provides aid. For a successful completion of these Action Plans in Table 1, the AU needs to step up, otherwise the poverty reduction project will not yield any fruitful results. The lack of well-structured financial commitment from the EU has also led to failure in accomplishing the action plans.

As the JAES aims to move away from this dependency framework, in order to address the issue of poverty by ensuring that all the SDGs are met, the AU has an obligation to provide funding towards the financing of the action plans. For the first time in the history of EU partnership agreements with Africa, non-state actors were also invited to participate in discussions based on shared interests, a consensus of values, and common concerns. These CSOs are vital for poverty reduction as they are the vehicle to coordinate programmes on the ground. The inclusion of civil society within the JAES to ensure implementation of the action plans created an open, clear, and transparent playing field. The CSOs were to play watchdog, advocate, monitor and evaluate roles and take a neutral position in political dialogue. The EU continues to use the EDF as the primary tool to support development in the region but funding provided to the AU for the programs required the AU to inject a contribution to avoid a total EU funding on projects, avoiding further dependency. The introduction of the African Union Support Programme 111, which started in 2016, had a budget of 51 million euro, of which 85% was contributions from the EU and 15% from the AU. This budget went towards the support of SDGs, an initiative received well by many as it tackled poverty at a time when the percentage rate of poverty was growing compared to the 2011 percentage. Still with this financial commitment, nuances of conditionality are blamed as the catalyst to failure.

At a bilateral level, the EU uses the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) when dealing with individual states, like the EU-South Africa, EU-Kenya, and EU-Ghana interaction. The objective of the DCI is to complement other EU programmes, ensuring sustainable development mainly in areas of peace and security, democracy, good governance, respect for human rights, sustainable development, human development, continental integration, and people-centred partnership, but its main purpose is poverty reduction. At a continent level, the DCI has led to the formation of the Pan African Programme (PanAF) in 2014, which covers the whole continent. For the period of 2014-2020, the PanAf project received over 800 million

euro directed at poverty reduction. The creation of the PanAf is a direct response to the complaints by the AU and EU that the success of the JAES should be based on cooperation and commitment from both sides. The DCI instrument therefore works to complement other EU external programmes to support Africa to reduce poverty. Having many instruments to compliment JAES helps to determine whether the JAES has had an influence on poverty at all.

4.9 Pillar 4: People-to-People based partnership

The response to repeated criticism from the AU has led to the formation of this JAES agreement to address the concern of inequalities and discrimination. Both parties agreed there should be a joint strategy co-owned by both the EU and AU. Successful political dialogue is the first step in ensuring people's needs become the centre of all partnerships.

People-to-people relationships are the cornerstone for the PanAf, and the two continents hope to promote this in almost all negotiations. The resolutions of the EU-AU Abidjan Summit in November 2017 emphasise the importance of prioritising SDGs to ensure economic, and social development on equal terms. This approach is also extensively covered in the European Consensus for Development, which is aligned to the SDGs. The adoption of the SDGs is a testament to this desire to invest in a people-focused strategy.

The JAES' emphasis on human rights as a top priority seeks to address the inequality gap. Through several programmes and collaborations focused on human rights, the JAES programmes were able to address poverty root causes. In collaboration with EU and AU member states, but driven mostly by the EU, respect for human rights is vital and contributes directly towards the completion of SDGs with desired results. In addition, Africa created the Agenda 2063, which is a blueprint plan that aims to help deliver the SDGs and a better future life for the African people. These SDGs remain the focus for the JAES, Agenda 2063 and the new EU Global Strategy.

Economic growth, social development and poverty reduction take centre stage of the three policies addressed above (JAES, Agenda 2063 and EUGS). Poverty is one of the main problems faced by Africa, and the EU has been involved in efforts to try and reduce hunger and

starvation and other areas identified as root causes for poverty through the JAES action plans. These actions plans, cited on Table 1, target different key areas and root causes for extreme poverty. Against this backdrop, the UK has been vocal in advocating for reform in agriculture policies. Agriculture is one of the areas which provides income and food to many people in Africa. In order to empower small agriculture practitioners, the EU partners in the area of agriculture with financial and technical support. A Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), as a branch of NEPAD, was established with the help of the UK to contribute to the efforts to provide food security, curb international marginalisation, and alleviate poverty in Africa. Addressing these root causes is in line with the JAES being en route to achieving all the SDGs.

4.9.1 Overall Analysis of the JAES

This section of the thesis now focuses on the analysis of the JAES documents discussed in the previous sections. The analysis will begin by analysing the main document, the JAES partnership agreement. To perfectly offer a good analysis, the Table 1 below provides an assessment of the JAES partnership agreement and the action plans agreed between the EU and AU for 2014 - 2017. These action plans are essential to the JAES as they are drivers towards poverty reduction. The table evaluates the action plans' progress.

In some areas, like peace and security, the EU has remained a crucial partner as a financial provider. Technically, there are still problems associated with the fragmentation and lack of focus on capacity building. The main contributing factor to most of the shortcomings, is the EU's inability to find a common ground to initiate productive political dialogue. The JAES agreement considers all of the partnership goals fundamental to poverty reduction therefore any failure to deliver in any of these areas is detrimental to the goal. Overall, the analysis indicates that there are many problems experienced in other target areas and these issues hamper the EU's delivery on poverty reduction. The EU continues to suffer from incoherence, inconsistency and ineffectiveness. The mechanisms designed to drive the JAES action plans are not enough for sufficient economic growth, poverty reduction and job creation. The results as indicated in the table 1 are concerning for future efforts to mitigate extreme poverty.

Table 2: JAES Partnership and Plans: 2014-2017 Assessment

Partnership	Action Plan	Assessment 2014-2017
Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance dialogue on challenges to peace and security; Full operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture; Predictable Funding for African-led Peace Support Operations. 	Full operationalisation hampered by still insufficient absorption capacity, accountability and mobilisation of own resources by African partners. Complexity and fragmentation of EU funding and insufficient focus on capacity-building
Africa-EU Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Enhance dialogue at global level and in international fora; Promote the African Peer Review Mechanism and support the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods. 	Securitisation of the migration agenda and divergences over human rights and international criminal justice have reinforced the African perception of a one-way dialogue. Efforts towards enhanced policy dialogue jeopardised by insufficient communication and coordination.
Africa-EU Partnership on Trade, Regional Integration and Infrastructure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the African integration agenda; Strengthen African capacities in the area of rules, standards, and quality control; Implement the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership. 	<p>Limited contribution to concrete achievements (i.e. in trade and market integration).</p> <p>Focus on technology, but no push for necessary effort in the regulatory domain</p>
Africa-EU Partnership on the Sustainable Developments Goals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure the finance and policy base for achieving the SDGs; Accelerate the achievement of the Food Security Targets of the SDGs; Accelerate the achievement of the Health Targets of the SDGs; Accelerate the achievement of the Education Targets of the SDGs. 	EU support to some specific institutional initiatives. Weak as a cross-cutting issue and conditionality.
Africa-EU Partnership on Energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement the Energy Partnership to intensify cooperation on energy security and energy access. 	Limited regional-based initiatives. Lack of an overall architecture.
Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation; Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the "Green Wall for the Sahara Initiative". 	Emphasis on the use of development funding for climate change, but action is so far too focused on mitigation and does not covers sufficiently adaption and environment protection.
Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement the Declaration of the Tripoli Conference on Migration and Development; Implement the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking of Human Beings; Implement and follow up the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa. 	Prioritised, but as a European short-run interest without close attention to local needs and to long-term challenges related to poverty eradication.
Africa-EU Partnership on Science, Information Society and Space	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa; Support S&T Capacity Building in Africa and Implement Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action; Enhance cooperation on space applications and technology. 	Limited regional-based initiatives. Lack of an overall architecture

4.9.2 Challenges towards the JAES success

The historical interaction between the EU and the AU can be described as unique in a sense because of the difficulties and successes they experienced together. As stated throughout this essay and supported by the introduction of the JAES, the relationship dates back to a time when Africa was heavily dependent on the EU. Using different development tools, the EU managed to inspire the formation of the AU. The AU has emulated the EU, leading to the formation of a similar style organisation in order to bring regional cooperation. Such an outcome ties with the NPE concept of transference of norms and values, which has offered the theoretical explanation to the study of EU-AU relations.

Past encounters between the EU and AU also experienced some challenges, and these challenges affect the current relationship. The AU is hesitant to fully trust the EU for a variety of reason, particularly when it comes to issues of state sovereignty. This is also evident in the JAES assessment (table 1), which show that the AU perceive the EU as a negotiating partner with protectionist tendencies. The AU member states are suspicious of EU motives and fear the EU's interference in state politics. While the JAES meant to break this concern, there are still elements of mistrust in the AU member states who feel this partnership is another attempt by the EU to interfere. It is from this angle that the UK has been vital in facilitating dialogue between the two institutions. The UK is regarded as a better partner, mainly due to its past references in development. Without the UK in the middle to facilitate dialogue, the EU-AU partnership objectives as outlined in the JAES face difficulties.

The EU is not only disadvantaging themselves by not addressing Africa immediately on the way forward post-Brexit, but they risk losing ground to competitors like China, India and possibly the UK. Even though the EU 28 (27 post-Brexit) remain Africa's significant political and economic partner, the EU would need to work hard to improve their competitive advantage to counter the growing influence of other actors (Fioramonti & Kotsopoulos, 2015). Chinese influence in areas of infrastructure development in Africa has already created tensions between the EU and AU. The development model offered by the Chinese does not require political reform, which is welcomed by the AU heads of state, as it is perceived not to

interfere with national sovereignty (Rodt & Okeke, 2013). This creates a scenario where the EU will not be able to coordinate development tools as efficiently as they did in the past. If that happens, that interrupts the existing channels that address poverty reduction.

While the AU appreciates this Chinese development strategy, it is perceived by the EU to challenge their influence in areas of political and economic development. On the other hand, Russia has been involved in development with the AU member states. In 2012, Russia spent at least 2 million US dollars on African development initiatives. Other countries like India and Brazil have joined forces as the BRICS countries to assist in areas of development in Africa. Though the EU remains a big donor, it has lost some of its traction, influence, and leadership role in the area of development (Helly, 2013). Helly argues that the only a donor-recipient relationship exists between the two institutions, but both have agreed to disagree on other matters, including development issues (Helly, 2013).

4.9.3 Summary

The results drawn from the roadmap's assessment are somewhat varied. Areas of political engagement remain unclear and cannot provide a clear picture of progress. A lack of trust from the AU and lack of commitment by some of the AU heads of state who claim that partnership with EU threatens their state sovereignty is slowing down progress. Political leaders keep on pursuing political agendas at the expense of vulnerable people living in poverty. Migration concerns in the EU camp have overshadowed proper dialogue with the AU. The EU has begun using a protectionist approach when dealing with Africa, closing borders to stop the poor people escaping poverty to enter Europe and closing doors for those who hope to trade their agriculture products with the EU. Following the La Valletta Summit 2015, African heads of state raised concerns over the EU as they felt the summit was dominated by the EU agenda on migration and failed to address the issue of development and in particular the issue of rising poverty.

Chapter 5

5.1 Could the departure of the UK have any implication on the EU's poverty reduction agenda?

The previous Chapters has been referring to the EU as a collective group of 28 European member states, but after four decades as a fully-fledged member, the UK has decided to exit the EU. In a referendum held on the 23 June 2016, the electorate had a choice between leaving or staying in the EU. The majority voted to leave. This decision to leave has come as a surprise for some, but to others, it was a long way coming.

Historically, the UK-EU relationship was more contested than that of any other members states. Christopher Lord has argued that Brexit should not surprise anybody, since the UK has never entirely accepted the European projects from the onset, and the relationship has always been so complicated (Lord, 2018). As hinted by the research question, Brexit has profound economic, political, and social implications on the EU's development agenda in Africa. For over fifty years, Africa has had a special relationship with the EU and strong bilateral relations with the UK. The EU's commitments to help Africa reduce poverty is now threatened by the UK's departure from the EU. The UK would potentially move away with both well-needed financial and technical expertise.

For years, the UK has been an important voice within the EU, regularly known as an advocate for development in African and other least developed countries. The UK and France have been instrumental in the informal and formal negotiations with the EU which led to the creation of the JAES in 2007 (Cumming & Chafer 2011). The UK was then involved in leading most of the priority areas for the JAES. The UK's exit will have detrimental consequences on the African economies (Fasan, 2016; Tan, 2016). This is alarming and calls for an immediate action plan if the EU wishes to remain a role model for the AU and succeed in its goal to reduce poverty. The UK's long-standing history of advocacy for the reform of the CAP, hoping to create better and equal opportunities between the two institutions, is crucial for the issue of poverty. For the UK, the CAP reform was necessary in order to help create a balanced economic

environment which will in turn help to alleviate poverty in Africa. Without the UK on the negotiating table pushing for reform of CAP, African food reserves continue to be threatened by EU food dumping, which has a direct impact on African food producers. CAP reform should aim to create agriculture-led development programmes that will help alleviate hunger and poverty in Africa.

Besides pushing for CAP reform, the UK has been instrumental in advocating for the UN agreement for first world countries to commit to a 0,7% Gross National Income (GNI) towards ODA to help developing countries (Henökl, 2018). The UK has stayed one of the few countries to stick to this commitment, and in 2013, the UK became the first G7 member to achieve the 0.7% goal. In 2015, the UK even passed this commitment to be enshrined in the UK legislation so that the 0,7% commitment becomes law.

The UK is the second most significant supporter of aid and funding towards the EU budget (Chang, 2018), suggesting that EU development aid towards the AU will decrease unless the EU27 step up to cover the gap. As for 2014, according to the Department for International Development (DFID), the UK's contribution towards aid through the EU amounted to 1.144 billion pounds (Chang 2018). If the contributions from the UK vanish, the EU would have to dedicate more resources towards Africa or risk another failure in foreign policy. Such a significant cut in contribution, if not replaced by other means, will have implications on future EU-AU relations.

5.2 The role of the UK in the EU

The UK has always been vocal and passionate about negotiations within the EU on development in developing countries, especially in Africa. This African connection can be traced back from the time when the UK joined the Common Market in 1975; the UK pushed that the EDF should include former British colonies. The UK has forged its bilateral relations with the region, moving Africans away from aid dependence. The relationship of the UK with the AU has made strides in the right direction, making the two institutions best partners (contested by others). Since then, other EU members have benefited from this close relationship helping them (EU member states) to open trade markets in African. The UK's soft

side on developing countries, in particular, the African countries will be missed in EU negotiations (Fasan, 2016).

It is arguably in the best interest of the EU to work closely with the AU to maintain the relationship and facilitate a smooth transition of EU development instruments in areas where the UK was influential. Future EU negotiations with African counterparts will not be the same without the UK mediating, as has been argued by others who assume that Brexit is not bad. They suggest that the exit of the UK might finally bring the opportunity to renegotiate and reform the EPAs. We argue that the EU should now come up with a trusted plan which is attractive and competitive with what China has been offering in areas of development in Africa. In addition, China is not going to be the EU's only competitor but the UK would also pursue its interests.

5.3 What would change if the UK is out?

The unexpected exit of the UK has sparked anxiety within the EU, the AU, and the world at large, at least due to uncertainties in the areas of development, economic security, and peace. As goes the saying, "when elephants fight, it is the grass that suffers". Since triggering Article 50 of the Treaty of Rome in March 2017, it seems like the UK opened a Pandora's box of complex problems. Article 50 was the official way to notify the EU that the UK will be leaving the Union. Since then, a lot of uncertainties and concerns arose, leaving people asking questions on the future of the European project and the impact of Brexit on the EU-UK economies. Even the United States president at the time, President Obama, commented that the future of European integration now hangs in question (Financial Times, 2016). From a distance, the AU has been wary of its future economic and trading policies with both the EU and UK (Holmes, Rollo & Winters 2016).

The UK's Department of International Development (DFID) manages projects around the region, which helps to achieve sustainable goals. Through the UK AID Direct, the UK works with small to medium civil society organisations to reach vulnerable and marginalised people in a bid to reduce poverty. The UK focuses on improving African countries in various sectors: agriculture, education, environment, health, income generation, capacity building, and

violence against women and girls. In 2015 alone, through the UK aid direct, the UK has managed to spend over 131 million euro in order to facilitate the completion of MDGs.

The withdrawal of a major actor like the UK threatens delivery of the European development policy, particularly in the area of poverty (Henökl, 2018). The UK played an important role in the area of advocacy and poverty reduction by pushing for the African agenda and providing financial contributions. The UK is regarded as a strategic partner by most of the AU member states due to historic ties. As discussed previously, the UK's historical ties help to facilitate closer political cooperation. The UK has been vocal for engaging the AU as an equal partner. The UK's mediating role enabled the implementation of the JAES. Future AU concerns forwarded to the EU for discussion might not get attention from the EU without the UK's backing.

In the event of Brexit, new EPAs would need to be renegotiated, and this creates uncertainties as the AU has already been complaining about the way the EU tries to leverage political interest when negotiating trade deals and addressing non-political issues(see table 1). There is a chance that decisions might take longer to be reached while in the short term, people will be getting worse. Brexit becomes a complicated scenario for anybody who has trade agreements with the EU. As Parsons concluded, "Brexit is a legal, economic and constitutional nightmare for all who have trade agreements with the EU" (Parsons, 2016). These problems within the EU also bring to question whether the concept of regional integration is sustainable and can lead to any greater good. As discussed in the previous chapter, the AU considers the EU as a model for regional integration and aims to abide by all the similar principles. These principles has been beneficial and a contributing factor to manage poverty in Africa.

5.4 The impact to Achieving SDGs

The UK played a pivotal role in ensuring that the EU adopted the SDGs and increased its budget contributions towards the EDF. In turn, most of the EDF budget was redirected towards Africa, enabling the EU to establish a close relationship with the AU. The active role by the UK enabled the EDF to be channeled towards crucial areas of development which are mainly SDGs targets. As the EU has been struggling and accused of inconsistency, the UK has

been able to lead and direct EDF toward areas of serious need. The experience with the EU working with most countries in Africa at bilateral level provided the UK with current information and enabled it to identify key areas that need immediate attention. When dealing with vulnerable communities, it is vital to align financial resources to critical areas. In evaluating the success of the MDGs and SDGs, the ERD report noticed something uniform with the two programmes was the disconnection between the financial support and policy areas (EU Commissioner, 2019). Policy coherence is crucial in the context of the 2030 SDGs agenda. The UK has a strong influence in Africa due to its geographic proximity and its colonial legacies. The UK's bilateral relations with most of the key players in Africa has been a significant pillar which bonded the EU-AU for years.

5.5 The UK impact on trade deals

Trade between the UK and African countries is higher than any other EU member state. However, soon after the referendum vote's results, the UK's sterling depreciated significantly against other currencies. An estimate of about GBP 200 billion was lost on the stock markets. A poor performance by the British sterling creates uncertainties, as the UK contributes a significant amount of money towards the EU and towards its current development projects in Africa and through remittances. The decline of the sterling is a concern as it reduces the amount of remittances from the UK to Africa. Remittances are one of the most important cross-border revenues for developing countries (Mold, 2018). The 0.7% of UK GNI commitment to the ODA decreases in turn. Any revenue losses have the potential to affect the AU in both the short term and long term.

While the relationship between Britain and African member states is far from perfect, former UK Prime Minister Theresa May has already started plans to gain favour among AU member states. In March 2018, Mrs. May toured Africa with a delegation of business people and promised \$ 5.2 billion of support towards the continent (The Economist, 2018). Already this is a problem for The EU 27, who might now need to dig deeper in their pockets to compete with Britain.

5.6 The UK's contribution towards poverty reduction projects in Africa

The EU 28 (including the UK) have been helpful in Africa by assisting in projects that can help these countries be sustainable and build food reserves. If successful, this would help Africa stop relying on aid from the West. Drought and famine are the root of migration, especially from Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, and Ethiopia. These dire conditions result in most African states experiencing dramatic food and water shortages. Records from Oxfam indicates that these shortages often lead to poor performance in the agriculture sector. Agriculture is crucial in Africa, as most families rely on agriculture as a source of income and to provide daily food. The EU 28 have played a significant role in helping Africa to tackle pressures which might reduce agricultural production. Climate change, disease, land degradation, and growing population calls for innovative agriculture methods.

In response to these potential challenges, the EU teamed up (led by UK) with Africa to provide agricultural expertise by funding research, which will provide solutions to improve food security. Over the years, the EU has run the Global Programme on Agriculture Research for Development (GPARD) projects. The results show the GRDP projects have succeeded in increasing agriculture diversification, educating smallholder farmers to become resilient to climate change, empowering farmers with agricultural innovation while maintaining traditional methods, creating access to markets and improving control of diseases threatening agriculture. The EU has dedicated over 41 million euro towards GRDP in order to address food security: A step towards achieving the first SDG. Almost all the countries in the AU have benefited from this initiative. The implementation of this initiative is through CSOs and international organisations and other EU partners.

As mentioned in the previous Chapters, the UK is known for negotiating strongly on behalf of the AU when it comes to agriculture development. The position taken by the UK when negotiating African issues within the EU is essential for the future of AU food security. The departure of the UK's voice in these areas threatens food security and the goal of eradicating poverty in all of its forms. The exit of Britain has a direct impact on the AU agriculture industry.

5.7 The impact of Brexit on the EU Budget

Because the UK's contribution towards the EU development fund budget is significant; if the UK stops contributing, the EU will suffer a substantial budget shortfall and long-term development realignment (Henökl, 2018). The effect of Brexit on EU finance is significant and has the potential to disrupt the day-to-day lives of those who have close economic ties with both the EU and the UK. Without the UK's contributions, the gap left would need to be addressed for the EU to retain its current position as a global economic giant. Within the EU, the UK has been one of the top three of the highest contributors on the EDF, together with France and Germany.

It is estimated that the UK's departure would reduce the EU budget by at least 10 billion euro per year. The EU budget is also one of the reasons fueling the UK's departure. The Leave campaign claimed that leaving the EU would enable the UK to use the money it contributes towards the EU budget on other areas which are currently not a priority for the EU. Unless the remaining EU 27 increases their contributions to cover this shortfall, the EU is left with no option but to reduce spending. Reducing spending has implications for prior commitments, which include development goals committed before Brexit. African development falls in this category. If the EU cuts its spending, it is unlikely that it will reduce its spending on its member states. The possibility is that money which was usually destined for the EDF might be diverted to areas of interest for the EU, and this might not involve African development.

Since the Brexit referendum, the British sterling lost its value against other currencies like the US dollar and the euro. By losing its value, the sterling created a shortfall in the 2016 EU budget. There is overwhelming evidence to support the notion that Brexit has implications for the EU budget (Haas & Rubio, 2017). The budget gap experienced by the EU due to the sterling depreciation against the euro has both long-term and short-term effects. In the immediate term, the commission should have a plan B to cover this deficit, while in the long-term, there is a need to reform the contribution structure of the EU budget.

Research conducted by the Jacques Gelors Institute suggests a loss of at least 10 billion euro per year (Haas & Rubio, 2017). The "Brexit gap" is calculated based on data provided by the

DG Budget. The calculation was based on the presumption that the EU budget without the UK's contributions would affect EU expenditure. The simulation results indicated that the Brexit gap would mean that the EU would lose at least 14 billion euro per year from the UK government (Haas & Rubio, 2017). Figure 3 below illustrates the 10 billion gap. While this simulation is only based on estimates and remains an assumption, it is most likely that the shortfall will be evident in the overall EU spending.




Figure 6: Total EU budget with the UK

Source: Jacques Delors Institute, 2017

Importance to note here is that the 10 billion euro cuts represent a considerable amount of money when compared to what the EU spends on its international projects. The figure below illustrates how much a Brexit gap would look like in terms of the EU budget. The 10 billion euro deficit exceeds the budget dedicated by the EU towards the Global Europe budget, Security and Citizenship, Administrations, and Special Instruments budget.




Figure 7: EU Budget 2019 vs Brexit gap

Source: EU Budget

Besides stepping up with financial contributions, the UK played a crucial role as a political mediator between the EU and the African countries. From a UK perspective, Africa is a strategic partner but not a major trading partner (Mold, 2018). A mere 2.6% of imports and exports are to and from the UK, but in economic terms, when international economies are unstable, Africans or other developing economies always underperform. The weakness of the British sterling and Brexit uncertainties are already creating panic within African economies.

In terms of EU development and Africa, the problem is that there is no assurance that the EU will continue to help African countries building their economies and providing aid from that smaller budget. Without the UK advocating for Africans, that is unlikely to happen. Without the UK on the negotiating table, the EU might choose to channel their money into other areas than development in Africa. The UK's involvement at negotiations advocating for more funding and development aid towards Africa will be missed at the EU negotiations. That alone is concerning for the AU's development programmes. The EU would likely cut its spending budget, particularly on CAP, which is an area where the UK most famously asked for reform. Apart from natural resources, agriculture is the most important industry sustaining Africans.

Some have argued Brexit could be beneficial for the AU and provide the AU with options and a chance to negotiate better EPAs (Hinkle & Schiff, 2004; Mold 2007; Stevens & Kennan,

2016). From an African point of view, the UK is strategically important but is still a small market for AU total exports. The argument is that Brexit would mean the EU has less leverage when negotiating than they used to have. It also means that the EU-AU relationship might change for the better. While this optimism might become a reality, this thesis still argues that new negotiations will take time and that AU citizens will suffer in the short term.

5.8 The impact of Brexit on aid destined for African Union projects

According to a report by the OECD, the EU, together with its member states, is the biggest aid provider of ODA contributions, responsible for over 50% (Mendez-Parra, Te Velde & Kennan, 2017). Within the EU, the UK is a larger contributor than other EU member states. Following the referendum, UK aid suffered as the pound plummeted down compared to other currencies (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). Because commitments towards funding EDF are already secured until 2020, the UK needs to keep its commitments as part of the divorce negotiations. This gives the EU time to prepare for the next steps on how to restructure the budget, making sure that any restructuring will not be detrimental to its member states and problematic to its relationship with the AU.

The UK funds most donors operating in Africa, with their head offices in the UK. Most of them have expressed concern over the future of their funding, considering the work that still needs to be done in Africa. The UK brings a lot of development expertise, which the EU has adopted into its development policy beyond financial contributions. The departure of the UK will have a significant financial impact, therefore, if the EU wants to continue to be regarded as the world's biggest donor and force for development in Africa, the EU 27 needs to regroup.

In response to such concerns, the EU 2019 budget, which aimed to increase the development budget by 10 percent compared to past years, has been criticised by NGOs. Oxfam, Save the children, Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung and International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network have argued that the 10 percent increase is far from reducing poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. The NGOs blamed the EU for focusing more on its internal policies than its external commitments (Mold, 2018).

The NGOs are arguing that the EU has increased the development budget but cut spending on areas that have the potential to reduce poverty. In a statement the NGOs have said:

The fight against poverty and inequality must not become an afterthought. The EU proposes to divert ever more development money to stop migration, ignoring the actual needs of people. Member states should instead increase funds for health, education, social protection, and gender equality, which are vital for human development. (Save the Children, 2018)

The NGOs claim that the EU priorities are already driven by its political interests rather than its mandate to achieve long-term human development goals. Looking back at the Consensus for Development, the EU's commitment to increase its development assistance to 20 percent has not been met, and the new EU budget does not show any desire to achieve the target.

Some of the repercussions of Brexit include the future coordination of UK charities currently doing work in Africa. These charities have benefited from the EDF due to influence by the UK, so without the UK to act as a voice for these donors, the EU might prioritise other projects in other regions than African countries. Anderson and Michell (2016) have also lamented the absence of political influence as detrimental to future EU commitments on development in former British colonies.

5.9 Can the EU remain a model for AU integration?

Since its inception in 2002, the African Union has been inspired by the European Union integration framework (Haastrup, 2013). The AU was formed as a response to the problems encountered during the existence of the OAU, which led to Morocco leaving. After this reform, the AU has tried to align itself to the EU institutional model. In integration terms, the EU has been regarded as a role model, but the role model is now wobbly (Mold, 2018).

Brexit has great potential to reduce the EU's political influence (Henökl, 2018). Democracy, the rule of law, human rights, good governance, conflict resolution, and sustainable development have become important principles advocated by the AU (Smith, 2003), which is similar to what the EU stands for. African counterparts believe that these EU norms and values

are universal; therefore, it should be enforced by all its member states. The EU is involved in funding the AU's regional integration project. From this perspective, the AU has taken the MDGs and SDGs seriously in order to achieve its aspirations and at the same time fulfill EU aid conditionalities. Brexit will leave the AU questioning the viability of the regional integration process.

Development is considered one of the keys to stability. A stable AU can contribute to peace and security. A weak and unstable AU will affect its potential to drive the economic development agenda. The formation of the AU is seen as a catalyst to facilitate this stability. Others have also argued that there is a correlation between poverty and conflicts. This could be the reason why the EU embarked and committed to JAES poverty eradication projects to reduce conflicts. The EU believes that if its neighbourhood is stable, its borders will be safe and reduce the number of refugees to Europe. Brexit has indirect and direct effects on people's wellbeing, and the results of instability are extreme poverty conditions and migration crises.

Another argument presented by other scholars who see Brexit as beneficial for the AU, is that Brexit should be taken as a lesson for the AU. The confusion and economic, political, and social complexities should be enough to deter them from disintegrating the Union. According to Haastrup (2013), because of the historical context of EU-AU relations, Brexit is a sentimental loss. The UK played a vital role in bringing its former colonies together when they joined the European Community. On that note alone, the AU holds a high regard to UK.

Chapter 6: Concluding remarks

In this final chapter, the research will focus on providing concluding remarks. At this point, attention is drawn towards the previously discussed areas associated with poverty (see Figure 1). This Chapter brings all the pieces of the puzzle together to answer the research question: “What are the possible implications of Brexit on EU development agenda, in particular, the agenda to eradicate poverty in Africa?” The conclusion addresses the financial, social, political and human development impact both in the short and long term as all these areas contribute towards poverty reduction.

6.1 The financial impact of Brexit on AU living standards, education, and health

Most of the literature has focused on the potential impact of Brexit on the EU-UK relations and neglected its severe reparations for the developing counties in the South (ODI, 2016, Mendez-Parra et al., 2016; Holmes and Winter, 2016). The AU is an important region to study, as the continent holds a longstanding economic relationship with the UK due to colonial ties, as well as with the EU, since the EU is a significant economic partner for the African continent. This thesis did not claim to give a comprehensive assessment of Brexit’s impact on all aspects of development, but rather present possible scenarios based on previous and present data. Particular attention has been given to the area of poverty reduction; a mandate taken by the EU in their relationships with the AU through the JAES.

The immediate depreciation of the British pound soon after the Brexit vote indicates undeniably that Brexit has a negative implication on the economy. Immediately after the sterling succumbing to the Leave vote, many reports via opinion polling of UK citizens suggested cutting the UK’s commitment of the 0.7% towards aid (Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). At the same, as noted by Tan (2016), the South African economy felt the pressure and lost its value. Therefore, Brexit did affect not only the local economy but also global economies. Others have also concluded that Brexit means a negative impact on regional trade and aid (Langan, 2016; Langan & Price, 2015).

Trade is a significant component binding the two continents together. Both the EU and AU benefit from trade relations. These trade flows are essential for economic growth and the provision of basic food to the African population. If these transactions are interrupted, they could impede economic growth, resulting in unemployment, inflation, hunger, and starvation.

In 2013, the European Commission resolved to dedicate at least 3.5 billion euro towards nutrition in developing countries, as outlined in the 2014 Commission action plan on nutrition (European Commission, 2014). According to Commissioner Neven Mimica, “hunger and malnutrition are detrimental to peace and prosperity; therefore, it should be fought in order to achieve a long-lasting peace” (Mimica, 2018). In 2017, through the European Union Consensus on Development, the commission adopted the 2030 SDGs as an important part of development. The Commission aimed to reduce the number of children and minors living in poverty. The goal for 2025 was set to reduce these numbers by 7 million (European Commission, 2014).

These initiatives to reduce the number of children who would sometimes live without nutritious food is a significant step towards reducing poverty. The timeframe set to achieve these ambitious goals fully will be affected by Brexit. The target to meet the 7 million children by 2025 was made with the UK’s involvement, committing financial and technical support.

Because Brexit will have both a short and long-term impact, it is recommended these concerns must be investigated.

6.2 The impact of Brexit on policy framework: The EU negotiations without the UK

The progress made by the European Commission’s negotiating of better partnership strategies with the AU are now in jeopardy due to uncertainties of the future of EU foreign policy. Some AU member states are concerned about their future trade relations and whether they should focus on negotiating with the UK alone. An example, is a refusal by the Tanzanian and Ugandan governments (both AU members states) to ratify EPAs due to uncertainties regarding the EU after Brexit.

6.3 The Cotonou renewal negotiations

The Cotonou agreement is about to expire in 2020 and negotiations are already underway. This is a crucial time for the UK to be available on debates on how to shape the future relationship and influence objectives of development. Without the EU's internal influence due to the UK's historical, moral obligation as a commonwealth member, the negotiations might be one-sided of just pushing for policies in favour of the EU; mostly in the area of CAP, where the EU has been cited to be taking a protectionist approach (Fasan, 2016). The UK and its representatives have been vocally in favour of fairer trade agreements and global market integration with AU members (Langan, 2016). While this powerful stance taken by the UK falls in the short term, it is also applicable as a long-term consequence.

6.4 The Common Agricultural Policy reform

Another vital area to be addressed when discussing strategies to reduce poverty is the area of agriculture. Even though the UK's efforts of advocating for CAP reform in order to benefit African developing countries have not been fruitful, the UK's pro-development voice representing the Africans will disappear entirely in future policy negotiations.(Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016). This is a significant disadvantage to the AU governments who aspire to reduce poverty in all its forms in their countries. Agriculture is the leading provider of income to most African families. Africans benefit from producing their food and selling in the region, but the EU has been criticised for dumping its commodities in the region, making it difficult for the people who survive on agriculture to earn any income. Many NGOs have blamed the EU for undercutting African farmers' livelihoods. As discussed in previous sections, without the UK and its representatives at the council advocating for ACP reforms there will be repercussions for Africans both in the short and long term. This interference in most African families' sources of income exacerbate the levels of poverty.

6.5 The Long-term impact of Brexit on poverty reduction in Africa

The longer-term impacts can be summed by looking at how the UK and the EU are already trying to restructure their budgets. In the EU, since the current 11th EDF already includes a

commitment by the UK, the UK should honour this legal obligation. Though it is not guaranteed that the EU will consider UK's interests in the future budget. The UK is supposed to contribute at least 4.5 billion euro, which is 14.7% of the EDF for the period 2014-2020. The only concern is that, even though the UK contributes its share, it will not have a say on how the money is going to be spent.

The UK has already indicated that it will need to review all development policies. The rhetoric suggests that the UK will be moving towards policies that are focused on economic growth as machinery for development rather than focusing on poverty eradication (Ansorg & Haastrup, 2016; Lightfoot, Mawdsley & Szent-Iványi, 2017). As the UK has been benefiting from trading with most countries through its EU links, without the EU, the UK would need to start seeking trade deals. As for now, UK spending conforms to the law, which stipulates that international development must aim at poverty reduction. The current Conservative Party has promised to review this policy soon. Most likely, the UK will be using aid to leverage for better trade deals rather than aiming for poverty reduction (Mawdsley, 2015). It is also likely that the UK might consider changing the law completely.

In the long run, the EU might also choose to redirect aid away from Africa. Since the UK was influential in negotiating aid for Africa and for Commonwealth countries of the ACP, without the UK, the EU might choose to pursue other areas of development on areas strategic for the EU. As experienced in the past during the enlargement, the EU reduced its spending in Africa and focused on former communist countries who were working towards accession. These historic flashbacks do not indicate that the EU without the UK will consider Africa as one of the top priority regions, since there are also calls for poverty alleviation in other parts of the World.

Another area of discussion is the coordination of aid donors. The UK has played a leadership role in coordinating donors in the past when other member states showed an unwillingness to coordinate. Without its expertise, this could impede aid effectiveness, and without the UK's voice on how EDF is used, poverty eradication in Africa might be overlooked. The only coordinating agent used by the EU is through its delegation offices. The problem with this, is

the fact that these offices are not found in many countries which the EU have been assisting with funding. In Africa, the EU has worked with CSO and IOs with the help of the UK.

Some parts of Africa are considered unstable (for example, Sudan, Somalia, the DRC) and others are facing migration challenges. The idea of regional integration has been considered instrumental in bringing the countries together. Following many civil wars that tore the continent apart, the formation of the AU helped to stop these fights. Some have even argued that the EU model is beneficial for the AU and the EU is considered a mentor. Brexit will bring the whole regional integration idea into question. If the African regional integrations fall apart, there is a higher chance that poor people will suffer and become worse than when their governments are stable.

6.6 Conclusion

The study of the EU and its role in Africa is essential when studying the future of the UK-EU relations post-Brexit. For most of the time, the EU internal discussions have been focused on the economic implications of Brexit within Europe, but some attention should be given to its external relations. Brexit implications are not only going to be devastating on the EU member states' economies but also in its neighbourhood. The implications of Brexit on Africa should be considered seriously in order to forge a way forward without disrupting its previous commitments. The absence of the EU in Africa at the moment is worrying, as it does not assure the AU whether the EU will remain a reliable partner post-Brexit. The EU needs to assure the AU that they will continue to take development seriously post-Brexit.

This research has demonstrated that Brexit is not only a concerning matter for the EU-UK alone but for the rest of the world. This thesis has highlighted the impact of Brexit on African countries in the short and long term. Due to the historical connection between the two continents and the UK's moral obligations towards most AU countries, Africa becomes more vulnerable to Brexit.

The relationship between the two continents has been revised several times, starting with the Lomé, Cotonou and, in particular, JAES covering African countries alone. The motive

behind these partnerships is the desire to eliminate poverty in all of its forms. The EU is perceived as a leader in areas of development, and the UK as a pro-development member state who always advocates for AU member states at EU negotiations, in particular for reform of CAP. Agriculture is vital for African countries and is a vehicle used to end poverty as it provides human capital, employment, food, and is an important contributor to economies and poverty reduction. The UK played a vital role in pushing the EU to reform the CAP to allow African farmers compete with their products on international markets.

Without the EU's financial contributions, the AU will have to figure out a plan to meet the development programmes which used to be funded through aid in order to feed vulnerable families. The thesis outlined in detail how much the UK's contribution to the EU has helped to push the EU position as a global aid provider. The budget deficit, estimated at over 10 percent, is a significant gap in the context with how much the EU dedicates towards Global Europe projects. This thesis has argued that if there is no immediate funding restructuring within the EU, the EU might divert the currently available funding, which used to be sent towards Africa, to other interest. On the budget issue, the EU 27 should aim to increase their contribution towards the EU budget rather than cutting its spending as that will have immediately detrimental effects on developing countries.

The EU is no longer regarded as the only strategic partner in Africa. This thesis has acknowledged the impact of China, the USA, Russia, Canada, and India, who are increasingly helping African countries to further their economies, though it still argued that Brexit will be detrimental to the area of human development. While these other players are suitable for African states, the close connection with the EU has helped many AU countries to export to EU countries, meaning more opportunities for trading. If the EU without the UK adjusts the EPAs, African countries will immediately lose on trade deals that were benefiting their economies.

The study offers recommendations to both the EU and the UK, but if the EU wants to retain its leadership position in Africa and continue the journey to eradicating poverty, dialogue needs to start soon. The EU should also consider the importance of agriculture in Africa and rather reform the CAP than continue with protectionist tendencies, as that leads to more

inequalities. Subsidising agriculture in the EU and dumping of EU commodities in Africa undercuts local markets leading to more families in extreme poverty.

The EU should take a leading role and start consultations with the AU as the dangers of extreme migration will impact EU member states. If citizens of AU countries are affected by more poverty, that will lead to people flocking to Europe to seek a better life, which will affect both the EU and UK. The impact of migration also affects other areas, such as security, especially with economic challenges currently experienced.

The last chapter also highlighted that the current negotiations on the renewal of the Cotonou agreement are vital for poverty reduction in Africa. These negotiations will soon suffer from the absence of the UK, who has always played an important role in looking after the interests of commonwealth countries.

As with any research, there have been limitations to this thesis. First, this being a Masters thesis, there are limitations on the word count, which means there is a restriction on what could be written. Secondly, studying two such large continents (institutions) like the AU and EU demands time and resources, both financial and technical. Africa is an interesting continent on this point, due to the interests of other bigger actors like China, Russia, and India mentioned in the previous chapters. It would have been interesting and beneficial to the research if interviews were conducted with AU leaders to understand their opinions on Brexit. The conclusion of the thesis is based on generalisation and speculative projections, since no AU head of state was contacted to get their view. China's presence is increasing in Africa, and the EU views that as a problem. Future research could be a comparative study of EU-China development policy in Africa with both attempting to reduce poverty.

Finally, since Brexit has not yet been completed, we can only wait to see what its impact will be. The thesis assumed that there could be a negative impact. Depending on the outcome of the negotiations and the route the UK decides to take, this thesis conclusion might be challenged. Future research might be done to evaluate the Brexit process and consequences on economic, social, political factors, referencing empirical evidence, which this thesis did not

benefit from. If the assumptions of this thesis are correct, it may serve as a base for reference for future scholars and policymakers.

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