David Lange and the ANZUS Crisis: An Analysis of Leadership Personality and Foreign Policy

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Summary of proposed relationships between personal characteristics of political leaders and their government’s foreign policy behaviour.
ABSTRACT

The New Zealand Labour Party’s election victory on 14 July 1984 resulted in an official rejection of the global strategy of nuclear deterrence. This action was the most fundamental challenge to the defence relationship between New Zealand and the United States since the signing of the ANZUS Treaty on 1 September 1951. This thesis is concerned with the effect of Prime Minister David Lange’s personality on the resulting dispute between the two nations. This qualitative study utilises a theoretical framework articulated by Margaret G. Hermann which seeks to demonstrate the relationship between the idiosyncratic characteristics of leaders and the foreign policy behaviour of their respective nations.

In order to effectively conduct this study, a number of key individuals involved in various aspects of the ANZUS dispute were interviewed by this author. It should be noted that David Lange was seriously ill throughout the course of this study and was unable to be interviewed by the author. Sir Geoffrey Palmer declined to be interviewed for this study.

Following the introductory chapter of this study, a review of the literature concerned with the analysis of leadership and personality is undertaken. The powers of the Prime Minister in the New Zealand political system are examined as are the events surrounding the execution of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS dispute. This thesis then assesses the effect of Lange’s personality on the dispute through an examination of situational factors, and a variety of aspects of his personality.

This thesis finds that Lange’s personality was instrumental in determining the course of events in the ANZUS crisis. Furthermore, this study concludes that Hermann’s theoretical framework is a useful tool in determining the effect of a leader’s personality on a particular foreign policy outcome.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

One may ask whether personality is truly an important determinant of decisions when a political leader is acting in their official capacity. Indeed, what difference does a leader make? This question has long fascinated scholars, not just in political science proper, but also in history and literature. It has been argued that “the analysis of personality does shed light on the actions of key politicians and in this way contrasts with so much of the political science discipline, which seems to have little practical relevance to the “real world” of politics”.

Political leadership is recognised as being an integral element of the political process.

Political theorist, Jean Blondel, observed:

If one reduces politics to its bare bones, to what is most visible to most citizens, it is the national political leaders, both at home and abroad that remain once everything else has been erased, they are the most universal, the most recognized, the most talked about elements of political life.

Moreover, foreign policy is arguably the policy field most likely to be influenced by the personalities of leaders. A nation’s foreign policy is often viewed in terms of the personalities of its leaders. Indeed, one is immediately able to recall examples of political events that were critically dependent upon the personalities of key individuals.

Political theorist, Fred Greenstein, stated:

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Harry Truman, not some abstract commander in chief, authorized the use of the atom bomb; Lyndon Johnson, not the impersonal forces of the Cold War, authorized the transformation of the advisory mission in South Vietnam into a full-scale military intervention.

Investigations into the effect of the personalities of American presidents on United States foreign policy abound. However, the study of New Zealand political leadership is lacking. Accordingly, this thesis will seek to assess the impact of a New Zealand prime minister’s personality on a particular foreign policy executed by his respective Government. To effectively conduct this case study, the political leadership theory formulated by Margaret G. Hermann3 will be utilised.

David Lange, as Prime Minister of the Fourth Labour Government, is remembered for his role in securing a nuclear-free future for New Zealand. This thesis will assess the effect of David Lange’s personality on the ANZUS crisis that unfolded following the election of the Fourth Labour Government in July 1984 and the implementation of its anti-nuclear policy. Lange’s term as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1984-1987, constitutes the timeframe for this study.

The rationale for Lange’s selection for this thesis is twofold. First, he led the New Zealand Government at the point in time where New Zealand, without precedent, defied the wishes of the United States – the world’s hegemonic power. Second, the policy executed by Lange’s government was in direct opposition to that of her closest ally – Australia. New Zealand and Australia share almost identical views on a wide range of foreign policy questions – the ANZUS crisis is perhaps the largest aberration. Indeed, the

anti-nuclear policy is arguably the most radical foreign policy in New Zealand’s political history; it still stands today. Therefore, those leadership factors that affected its implementation deserve investigation.

A review of the literature pertinent to a study of this nature is undertaken in Chapter 2. Furthermore, the contribution this thesis will make to the field of personality and political leadership is identified. Subsequent to this discussion, Chapter 3 analyses the theoretical framework that forms the foundation of this thesis. The three distinct sections of Margaret G. Hermann’s model and those variables which comprise each section are examined in detail. Chapter 4 will discuss the powers of the Prime Minister and how these impact on the foreign policy process. This will define further the political context within which Lange was operating. The foreign policy behaviour that constitutes the basis for this study is identified in Chapter 5: the anti-nuclear policy of Lange’s Government and the subsequent ANZUS crisis are examined. Chapter 6 marks the first chapter to apply Hermann’s framework to the Lange case study. It applies the first category of the model, which is concerned with situational factors, to Lange. The second section of Hermann’s framework is applied to Lange in Chapter 7, discussing aspects of his personality in detail. Chapter 8 pertains to the last category of Hermann’s framework, analysing particular personal characteristics of Lange, which Hermann considers to be critical to the assessment of personality and political leadership. The concluding chapter of this thesis, Chapter 9, summarises the findings of the case study and comments on the utility of Hermann’s theoretical framework for conducting a study of this nature.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

The personality of key, official decision makers is argued to be a key determinant of their decisions and, hence, of their nation’s foreign policy. Politics is a matter of human behaviour. Behaviour is defined by both the environmental situations in which actors find themselves and the psychological predispositions they bring to those situations.\(^4\)

Therefore, no analysis of political behaviour can be complete without an examination of the political actor who is the agent of that behaviour.

It should in no way be assumed, however, that personality is the sole determinant of political leaders’ decision-making. One foreign policy analyst, James N. Rosenau, constructed a pre-theory of foreign policy in which five sets of variables underlying the external behaviour of societies are ranked according to their relative potencies in eight different types of societies.\(^5\) The five sets of variables which form the core of this theory are:

- **Systemic:** any non-human aspects of a society’s external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials. For example, geographic “realities” and ideological challenges from potential aggressors.

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- **Societal**: those non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its external behaviour. For example, public opinion.

- **Governmental**: those aspects of a government’s structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers.

- **Role**: the external behaviour of officials that is generated by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the individual characteristics of the role occupants.

- **Individual**: the characteristics unique to the decision-makers who determine and implement the foreign policies of a nation.

Rosenau contends that a society’s characteristics will determine which of these variables is the most important influence on that society’s external behaviour. For example, Rosenau asserts that the foreign policy behaviour of a small, developed state, with an open economy (such as New Zealand) will be most affected by the role of the decision maker in question. Following this line of reasoning, New Zealand’s foreign policy behaviour would follow the same path regardless of the particular individual decision-maker, as long as they occupied the same official position, for example, the prime ministership. Rosenau does take into account the idiosyncrasies of the individual political leader but, in the view of this author, does not accord it sufficient importance. The personalities of political leaders have long fascinated scholars not just of political science proper, but also of history and literature. There is a certain fascination in analysing political leaders. Whether or not a political leader’s personality affects political behaviour has been debated through the ages, for example in Plato’s *Statesman* and in
Machiavelli’s *Prince*. The debate rests on a number of issues, not the least of which is the centuries old “great man” versus “zeitgeist” dilemma: Will a man be a great leader regardless of the times, or must the times be right for the man?

The brief interpretation of an 1863 dream of Bismarck by the psychoanalyst Hans Sachs in 1913 was perhaps the first attempt to relate a leader’s foreign policy to personality factors. However, the first sustained analyses of personality and foreign policy concerned former United States President Woodrow Wilson. Three studies were undertaken - the earliest is by Freud and Bullit (published in 1967, though substantially completed by 1932), followed by later works of George and George in 1956 and Weinstein in 1981.

A number of theorists have explored this salient issue as to whether an individual’s personality can have a critical impact on political behaviour. Indeed, some intellectuals assert that a leader’s personal characteristics are subsidiary to the formation of foreign policy. Theoretical frameworks have been developed in order to analyse the extent to which political actors personalities affect the foreign policies of their respective states. The most widely used framework has been operational code analysis. Nathan Leites

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6 According to Sachs’s interpretation, beneath the political plans of Bismarck to provoke a victorious war with Austria in the pursuit of German unification were unconscious fantasies of infantile masturbation, erotic victories, and identification with the biblical Moses – D. G. Winter, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview”, in *Political Psychology and Foreign Policy*, eds. E. Singer and V. Hudson (Boulder, 1992), p.80


8 A. George and J. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House, A Personality Study*, (New York, 1956. The Georges’ key assertion is that Woodrow Wilson’s life was affected by an unconscious effort to solve his repressed problem with his father. Accordingly, Wilson kept having to prove himself (and his father) that he was worthy of love. He kept striving for greater achievement and power. Wilson was also exceedingly dependent on the approval and love of friends.

introduced the operational code construct into the domain of political psychology in his classic work, The Operational Code of the Politburo. Alexander George reformulated the framework in 1969 in a way that has provided the framework for all subsequent research. Operational code analysis proceeds from a simple set of ten questions which seek to ascertain an actor’s ‘beliefs’. Moreover, it is composed of two types of beliefs - philosophical and instrumental beliefs. Philosophical beliefs refer to a political leader’s “fundamental assumptions” about the nature of politics (e.g. their belief about the role of chance in political events); instrumental beliefs characterise the leader’s beliefs about strategies and styles appropriate to acting in a political world defined by their philosophical beliefs (e.g. risk-taking preferences). George describes the operational code of a leader as: “A political leader’s beliefs about the nature of politics and political conflict, his views regarding the extent to which historical developments can be shaped, and his notions of correct strategy and tactics.” The operational code model has been further refined by Holsti and Walker.

James David Barber also regards the study of the personal characteristics of leaders as being crucial in accounting, at least in part, for the impact of leaders and for the nature of this impact. Barber’s work The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the

11 A. George “The “operational code”: A neglected approach to the study of political leaders and decision-making”, International Studies Quarterly 13 (1969)
12 ibid, p. 197
13 O. Holsti, “The “operational code” as an approach to the analysis of belief systems”, Final Report to the National Science Foundation, Grant SOC 75-15368 (Durham, 1977)
White House\textsuperscript{15} provided another significant contribution to the field of political psychology and has provided the framework for a number of case studies of United States Presidents.\textsuperscript{16} In describing the behaviour of presidents in detail, Barber demonstrated that actions follow character and therefore character matters.

Furthermore, Barber sought to elaborate a psychological classification which would enable scholars to predict the performance of United States Presidents. The model is based on two simple questions relating to a leader’s participation: how much energy or activity they devote to politics and how they regard their political life. The answers to these questions on activity and affect allow a leader to be categorised into one of four character types: active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive and passive-negative. Barber contends that with each of the four types of personality goes a certain pattern of behaviour which enables one to predict the performance of a political actor. He seeks to demonstrate that it is in childhood that a leader’s presidential character is established, in adolescence their worldview, and in their early political successes their political style. Furthermore, it is contended that an individual’s participation in politics and their feelings about their political life are the central features of anyone’s “orientation to life”, and is accordingly central to understanding the personality of politicians.\textsuperscript{17}

Similarly Margaret G. Hermann asserts that a political leader's view of the world and their personal political style can influence their government's strategies and styles of

\textsuperscript{15} J. D. Barber, \textit{The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House} (3\textsuperscript{rd} ed.), (New Jersey, 1985)
\textsuperscript{17} Barber, p.7
foreign policy behaviour.\textsuperscript{18} She seeks to demonstrate that a leader's interest in foreign affairs, their training in foreign affairs and their sensitivity to their environment affect the magnitude of the relationships between these personal characteristics and foreign policy behaviour. Hermann has applied this model in an intensive study of twelve leaders from sub-Saharan Africa\textsuperscript{19} as well as in three individual case studies of United States Presidents Reagan\textsuperscript{20} and Bush\textsuperscript{21} and Soviet President Gorbachev\textsuperscript{22}.

The theory that a political leader’s personality can have a significant effect on their nation’s foreign policy behaviour is not without critics. Hermann has noted three main arguments propounded against the case for the importance of personality to political behaviour.\textsuperscript{23} First, individual actors are limited by social forces in the impact they can have on events. The international system so shapes and constrains policy that individual decision makers can have minimal impact. Second, critics state that in the foreign policy arena leaders who have different personal characteristics behave similarly in common situations. Whilst names may change policies do not. Third, it is argued that organisational constraints limit the effect of individual characteristics as foreign policy choices are made in complex bureaucracies.

\textsuperscript{20} M. G. Hermann, “Assessing personality at a distance: A profile of Ronald Reagan”, \textit{Mershon Center Quarterly Report (Ohio State University)} 7 (1983)
\textsuperscript{21} M. G. Hermann, “Defining the Bush presidential style”, \textit{Mershon Memo (Ohio State University)} (Spring 1989)
\textsuperscript{22} M. G. Hermann, “Personality profile data on Gorbachev”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association held in London, March 1989
\textsuperscript{23} Hermann (1978), p.50
One proponent of the view that personality does affect on political behaviour, Richard Lazarus, has asserted:

The sources of man’s behaviour (his observable action) and his subjective experience (such as thoughts, feelings, and wishes) are twofold: the external stimuli that impinge on him and the internal dispositions that result from the interaction between inherited physiological characteristics and experience with the world…It is evident that a man’s behaviour varies greatly, from circumstance to circumstance, changing with the changing conditions to which he is exposed.

Still, even as we recognize the dependency of behaviour on outside stimuli, we are also aware that it cannot be accounted for on the basis of the external stimuli alone, but that in fact it must arise partly from personal characteristics.24

Political theorist Fred Greenstein has made some observations about the United States’ political system that may be well applied to other political systems, indeed to this thesis’ case study. He has stated that it is a common misperception to regard the United States’ political system as one of laws and institutions rather than individuals:

For better or worse, the personalities of presidents are as integral a part of the American political system as the constitutionally mandated instruments of government and are equally in need of close and continuing attention.25

Another school of thought maintains that different types of leaders are required for different kinds of situations.26 An individual’s personal characteristics may only allow them to cope with certain types of situations. Hermann notes that a leader in one situation is not necessarily a successful leader in another.27 Indeed, Churchill and de

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27 Hermann (1978), p. 51
Gaulle had to wait for situations in which saviours were required before they could truly be recognised and make a major impact on their societies.28

Similarly, Greenstein suggests that a leader’s personality may be particularly important under four conditions: when the actor occupies a strategic location; when the situation is ambiguous or unstable, when there are no clear precedents or routine role requirements; and when spontaneous or particularly effortful behaviour is required.29 It can be well argued that these conditions are most often met in the arena of foreign policy.

What personal characteristics are most likely to affect political behaviour is another point on which scholarly opinion differs. A facet of this debate is concerned with the distinction between a leader’s “personality” and a leader’s “personal characteristics”. Indeed, there is disagreement as to what constitutes “personality”. As Greenstein notes, “[t]here are differences within psychology over what is meant by “personality” and, furthermore, the term tends to have different connotations to political scientists than it has to psychologists.”30 Indeed, Allport in his Personality: A Psychological Interpretation31 noted some fifty different definitions of personality.

However, the uncertainty of this term has not discouraged some scholars from venturing a definition. A number of psychologists have described individual personalities in terms of functions that are common to all people. George Kelly has suggested that each individual should be understood in terms of the dimensions of the world they create about

28 Blondel, p. 134
29 Greenstein (1969)
30 ibid, p. 129
31 G. Allport, Personality: A Psychological Interpretation (New York, 1937)
them. Gordon DiRenzo asserts “[p]ersonality may be defined fundamentally as follows: one’s acquired, relatively enduring, yet dynamic, unique system of predispositions to psychological and social behaviour.”

Other scholars are not prepared to use a somewhat ambiguous term and thus refer to a leader’s “personal characteristics” in order to avoid misunderstandings. Hermann is one such scholar. She defines personal characteristics as being all aspects of an individual qua individual – their biographical statistics, training, work experiences, personality traits, beliefs, attitudes, and values. In her chapter in *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies*, Hermann categorises these personal characteristics into four distinct groups: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style. The relationships between these four characteristics are influenced by a leader’s interest in foreign affairs, their training or expertise in foreign affairs and their sensitivity to their environment. Hermann, however, has been criticised for failing to include intelligence and emotionality in her model.

Joseph de Rivera also considers the many facets that comprise a decision-maker’s personality. For example, a decision-maker’s various preferences (such as low risk taking), abilities, problems (such as an anger management), and his general style are considered. Indeed, de Rivera notes “[t]here are so many preferences, abilities, rules,

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34 Hermann (1978), p.64
35 Blondel, p.133
36 J. de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, 1968), p. 166
and styles that it is difficult to know how to describe the behaviour of a decision maker with some economy.”

De Rivera also notes a number of different approaches to measuring personality developed by psychologists. These are divided into three major categories: the nomethetic approach, the ideographic approach and the phenomenal approach. The “nomethetic” approach may be divided into the “operational”, the “conceptual” and the “complex description” approaches. Both the operational and conceptual approaches involve the investigator working with one personality variable that interests them, such as the need to achieve or the need for approval. In contrast the complex description approach works to describe individuals in terms of many variables. De Rivera notes that using these methods, psychologists have created a barrage of tests that describe various aspects of personality and may be used to predict decision-making behaviour. However, this author contends that a skilful biography rather than a bombardment of personality tests may prove to be a more accurate portrayal of an individual’s personality.

Secondly, the “ideographic” approach begins with the individual, describes his life as a series of responses, investigates the pattern and then categorises it. Like the nomethetic approach, the ideographic approach examines the person “externally” and uses descriptive labels to type rather than understand their behaviour.

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37 ibid, p.167
38 ibid, p.168
39 ibid, p.181
Lastly, the “phenomenal” approach describes the situation the individual is in and the decisions they make from a subjective stand-point in an attempt to assess the individual’s personality.

**Theoretical studies of the personalities of New Zealand prime ministers**

Much of the literature linking personality to foreign policy decision making has focused on American presidents. Little scholarly attention has been given to the effect of the personalities of leaders of parliamentary systems on the foreign policies of their governments. Moreover, the effect of the personalities of New Zealand political leaders on New Zealand foreign policy is much neglected in the field of political science. Only a handful of studies have been undertaken which utilised theoretical frameworks to assess the impact of leaders’ personalities on the New Zealand political process.\(^{40}\) John Henderson, former Director of the Advisory Group and then the Prime Minister’s Office under David Lange, utilised Barber’s framework in order to assess the impact of Lange’s personality on the political process.\(^{41}\) After applying Barber’s typology, Henderson characterised Lange as a “passive-positive”. Lange is shown to have been motivated by the drama of politics and the lure of the political stage on which he could win the affection and approval of others.\(^{42}\)

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\(^{41}\) Henderson (1992), (2001)

\(^{42}\) Henderson( 2001), p.209
New Zealand political scientist, Jon Johansson, has also analysed Lange’s political leadership style. Johansson utilised Erwin Hargrove’s model of presidential leadership to assess the prime-ministerial leaderships of both Robert Muldoon and David Lange. Johansson asserts that Lange, whilst being a master of rhetorical leadership, was ultimately let down by his lack of bargaining skill and his problematic interpersonal relations. With regards to the ANZUS crisis, Johansson notes that Lange “defended and developed the [anti-nuclear] issue in a way that none of his colleagues, or any of his many opponents, could have matched.”

**Conclusion**

As has been demonstrated, there are a number of different theories regarding the effect political leaders’ personalities can have on the formulation and execution of foreign policy, all of which stem from a plethora of contrasting opinions. Different theorists emphasise different factors. However, there does appear to be a prima facie valid argument that the personality of political leaders is an important component of the foreign policy process. This thesis will utilise Margaret Hermann’s model to analyse a case study and thus determine the extent to which a leader’s personality affects the formulation and execution of foreign policy. This will also allow Hermann’s framework to be tested and the utility of the model revealed.

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43 J. Johansson, *Two Titans: Muldoon, Lange and Leadership*, (Wellington, 2005)
44 Erwin’s model has three major components: a leader applying their strategy and skill in context; cultural leadership; and teaching reality.
45 ibid, p.214
46 ibid, p.150
47 Hermann (1978)
The need for further, in-depth studies of New Zealand political leadership has also been demonstrated. Whilst a handful of analyses of New Zealand prime ministers have been undertaken, to this author’s knowledge no theoretical studies have been undertaken linking a New Zealand prime minister’s personality to a particular foreign policy outcome. Given the abundance of scholarly material that has been produced on American presidential leadership, the need for such a study is all the more acute. Accordingly, this thesis will assess the effect of David Lange’s personality on the ANZUS crisis during his term as New Zealand Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs – 1984-1987.

In the following chapter, Margaret Hermann’s theoretical framework will be examined in detail. The three components of her model will be analysed: the nature of the situation in which the leader finds themselves, the first set of personal characteristics of the leader (beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style) and the second set of personal characteristics, which Hermann labels “filters”, (interest in foreign affairs, training in foreign affairs and sensitivity to environment). The rationale for the use of Hermann’s model for this thesis will also be discussed.
CHAPTER THREE

HERMANN’S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Margaret G. Hermann is a leading scholar in the study of the effect of personality and leadership style on national foreign policy behaviour through the decision-making process. Hermann has articulated a theory and produced a number of empirical studies which explore the ways in which leadership styles differ within similar political settings. The personal characteristics of political actors, which give rise to their personal political styles, are regarded as having a fundamental effect on the foreign policy implemented by their respective countries.

In her chapter “Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on Foreign Policy” in *Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies* Hermann constructs a theoretical framework in which to answer the question: How do the idiosyncratic characteristics of political leaders affect their governments’ foreign policy behaviour? She argues strongly that personal characteristics of leaders can affect what actions governments take in the international arena. Hermann divides her theory into three distinct sections. First, the nature of the situation in which a political leader finds themself is analysed. Hermann asserts that the likelihood of finding a relationship

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49 Hermann (1978)

50 ibid, p.49
between a leader’s personal characteristics and their government’s foreign policy behaviour are enhanced if the situation facing the government is taken into account.51 Second, the personal characteristics of a leader are examined. Hermann argues that personal characteristics of political leaders will have a larger influence on national foreign policy if they hold high-level positions.52 Hermann gives the example of heads of state meeting this criterion.

Third, the theory analyses a second set of personal characteristics, which Hermann labels “filters”. The “filters” are features which affect the degree to which a leader’s personal characteristics can have an impact on national foreign policy. These three characteristics are: a leader’s interest in foreign affairs, their training in foreign affairs, and their general sensitivity to the political environment.53 This chapter will analyse Hermann’s framework and comment on the utility of its application for the case study in question.

**Nature of the Situation**

The situation in which a leader finds themself is widely acknowledged to be of great importance when examining the effect of a leader’s personality on the policy-making process. Indeed, Joseph de Rivera has argued that “the very importance of the individual’s personality depends on the situation he finds himself in.” 54 Following Hermann’s analysis, this variable is comprised simply of three types of conditions which give rise to circumstances which enable a leader’s personal characteristics to have more

51 ibid
52 ibid
53 ibid
54 J. de Rivera, *The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy* (Columbus, 1968), p.198
impact on foreign policy. First, situations in which the political leader has wide-decision latitude give more scope for influence. Hermann gives the example of the “honeymoon” period following a landslide election.\textsuperscript{55} It can be well argued that new leaders are afforded a certain ‘capital’, based on possibly popularity or fear, which places them in a better position to achieve policy changes or impose their will. Secondly, leaders’ personal characteristics have more impact in situations that compel the political leader to define or interpret them. An ambiguous situation is one example that meets this condition. Lastly, personal characteristics will have more impact on foreign policy in situations in which the political leader is likely to participate in the decision-making process. Times of crises are an example of this.

Other theorists have outlined the situational factors believed to have a bearing upon the effect of a leader’s personality. Fred Greenstein has suggested that a leader’s personality may be particularly important under four conditions: (a) when the political actor occupies a strategic location, such as Prime Minister, (b) when the situation is ambiguous or unstable, (c) when there are no clear precedent or routine requirements and, (d) when spontaneous or particularly effortful behaviour is required.\textsuperscript{56} Foreign policy is arguably the field in which these conditions are most often met.

Blondel has also articulated the importance of situational factors when analysing the influence of a leader’s personality. He argues that different leaders are appropriate to

\textsuperscript{55} Hermann, p.52
different kinds of situations.57 “However endowed an individual may be with ‘leadership qualities’ he may be able to cope with only some types of situations and not with all.”58 Therefore, it is well argued that the effect of a leader’s personality is, to a significant extent, dependent upon the situation in which they find themself.

**Personal Characteristics: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style**

Hermann asserts that the four types of personal characteristics that appear most relevant to foreign policy making are a political leader’s beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style.59 By ‘relevant’ Hermann means “that variables from these clusters of traits have often been described as important, idiosyncratic determinants of political behaviour.”60 A leader’s beliefs and motives form their view of the world and their decision-style and interpersonal style comprise their personal political style.

Beliefs under Hermann’s model are regarded as mirroring the philosophical beliefs of the operational code. As noted in chapter 1, these beliefs entail a leader’s fundamental assumptions about the world. Hermann notes that such beliefs can range from being very general, such as a political leader’s notions about their ability to control events in their life, to quite specific, such as a leader’s notions about their ability to shape political events for their nation.61
A political leader’s motives refer to the reasons for their actions: “the desires that activate them.”62 This feature is similar to Barber’s model which categorises a leader into one of four character types based on their underlying motivation for engaging in the political machine.63 Power, achievement, duty and affection are the four fundamental motivations found in Barber’s leadership framework. The desire for power has often been discussed as a driving force behind a political actor. Hermann also notes that other motives that may be relevant to the policy-making process are: the need to be independent and the need for structure.64

Decision style is defined as a leader’s preferred methods of making decisions. Hermann posits the following question as a means of assessing a leader’s decision style: Can we discern certain ways of approaching a decision-making task that characterise the political leader? Synder and Robinson suggest that decision style is comprised of the following five factors: “(a) confidence, (b) openness to new information, (c) preference for certain levels of risk and sizes of stake, (d) capacity for postponing decision without anxiety, and (e) rules for adjusting to uncertainty.”65 Decision style is viewed as similar to the instrumental beliefs found in the operational code as articulated by George, which represent a leader’s beliefs about strategies and styles appropriate to acting in a political world defined by their philosophical beliefs.66 Moreover, Barber’s four presidential character types are each accompanied by a distinctive decision style: flexibility,

62 ibid
63 J. D. Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (3rd ed.), (New Jersey, 1985)
64 Hermann, p. 60
65 R. C. Snyder and J. A. Robinson, National and International decision-making: toward a general research strategy related to the problem of war and peace (New York, 1961), p.164
compulsivity, compliance, or withdrawal. Hermann suggests that other possible components of decision style include preference for compromise and preference for planning instead of activity.\textsuperscript{67}

Lastly, interpersonal style refers to the “characteristic ways in which a policy maker deals with other policy makers.”\textsuperscript{68} Examples include suspiciousness, paranoia or manipulation as means of dealing with others. Hermann proposes that a leader’s sensitivity to others, political timing, and means of persuading are alternative facets of interpersonal style.\textsuperscript{69}

Political theorist, David Winter, is also of the opinion that beliefs, motives and interpersonal style are salient to the research of foreign policy behaviour and personality.\textsuperscript{70} In assessing past research into this field, he used three broad headings to group three basic elements of personality: 1) motives; 2) cognitions and beliefs; 3) temperament and interpersonal traits. Winter defines motives as being “the different classes of goals toward which people direct their behaviour” and notes that power and affiliation are the most frequently studied.\textsuperscript{71} Cognition and beliefs “include specific beliefs, attitudes, and values as well as more general cognitive decision-making, and interpersonal styles.”\textsuperscript{72} Third, Winter states that temperament and interpersonal traits

\textsuperscript{67} Hermann, p.60
\textsuperscript{68} ibid
\textsuperscript{69} ibid
\textsuperscript{70} D. G. Winter, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview of Research”, in Political Psychology and Foreign Policy eds. E. Singer and V. Hudson (Boulder, 1992), p.86
\textsuperscript{71} ibid
\textsuperscript{72} ibid
reflect individual differences in energy levels, sociability, impulse control, and emotional stability.”

Having articulated the personal characteristics at issue, Hermann seeks to examine the nexus between them and foreign policy behaviour. She asserts that two aspects of foreign policy appear to be affected by a leader’s personal characteristics: (1) the strategies that the government employs in its foreign policy, and (2) the styles in which the foreign policy is made and executed. Foreign policy strategies are defined as “a government’s basic plans for action.” Adopting a generally cooperative or competitive stance toward other nations is an example of such a strategy. Styles of foreign policy are the methods a government uses in formulating and executing its foreign policy, such as the use of personal diplomacy and the relative involvement of the bureaucracy in the foreign policy process. In effect, strategies are concerned with the substance of foreign policy, and styles focus on the means of its formulation and execution. These strategies and styles are affected by a leader’s personal characteristics because as a leader’s beliefs and motives refer to their interpretation of the environment, they are likely to co-erce their government to act in ways consistent with these notions.

73 ibid
74 Hermann, p.60
75 ibid
76 ibid
“Filters” – personal characteristics: interest in foreign affairs, training in foreign affairs and sensitivity to environment

The final section of Hermann’s framework is labelled “filters”. This term refers to three further personal characteristics which affect the influence of a political leader’s personality on foreign policy. First, Hermann argues that without at least a general interest in foreign affairs, a political leader’s personal characteristics will have little effect.77 The higher the degree of interest, the higher the degree of attention the leader will pay to foreign policy. An interested leader will ensure they are consulted on decisions and kept abreast of developments in foreign affairs. Indeed, a political leader’s rationale for their interest in foreign affairs may predetermine the course of action they will follow. Should a leader have minimal interest in foreign affairs, they will be more likely to delegate authority thus negating any influence of their personality on the subsequent policy.

Once an interest is established, the leader’s training or expertise in foreign affairs is examined. Hermann views training as entailing experience as a foreign minister, ambassador, or foreign affairs official prior to assuming their current office. The leader with no previous experience has no personal expertise to draw upon, ensuring little knowledge of what will succeed and fail in the international arena. With training and/or experience comes a wider repertoire of possible foreign policy behaviours to consider. Blondel also recognises the importance of a leader’s experience in the foreign policy

77 ibid, p.56
process. He notes that leaders change over time and their ability to act effectively is likely to improve at first as a result of better training.\textsuperscript{78}

The third personal characteristic is general sensitivity to one’s environment. This affects “the consistency of the relationship between other characteristics and foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{79} Hermann defines sensitivity to one’s environment as indicating “the extent to which an individual is responsive to incoming stimuli from objects in the milieu in which he operates.”\textsuperscript{80} The less sensitive political leader will adjust incoming stimuli to conform to their viewpoint, whilst the more sensitive political leader will adjust their views if incoming stimuli warrant such an adjustment.

Further qualitative research into personality, leadership styles and foreign policy behaviour undertaken by Hermann

Since publishing this theoretical model, Hermann has continued to analyse the effect of personality and leadership style on foreign policy behaviour. As mentioned in Chapter 2, Hermann has applied this framework in an intensive study of twelve leaders from sub-Saharan Africa\textsuperscript{81} as well as in three individual case studies of United States Presidents Reagan\textsuperscript{82} and Bush\textsuperscript{83} and Soviet President Gorbachev\textsuperscript{84}. Moreover, Hermann has

\textsuperscript{78} Blondel, p.142
\textsuperscript{79} Hermann, p.57
\textsuperscript{80} ibid
\textsuperscript{82} M. G. Hermann, “Assessing personality at a distance: A profile of Ronald Reagan”, \textit{Mershon Center Quarterly Report} (Ohio State University) 7 (1983)
\textsuperscript{83} M. G. Hermann, “Defining the Bush presidential style”, \textit{Mershon Memo} (Ohio State University) (Spring 1989)
\textsuperscript{84} M. G. Hermann, “Personality profile data on Gorbachev”, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association held in London, March 1989
conducted further examinations of the variables pertinent to the study of personality and foreign policy behaviour.

In 1994, Hermann and J. T. Preston produced an analysis of advisory systems which included a review of the various studies of presidential leadership style. From these studies they derived five common leadership style variables: involvement in the policy-making process, willingness to tolerate conflict, motivation for leading, preferred strategies for managing information and preferred strategies for resolving conflict. Involvement in the policy-making process is “…suggestive of a focus on personal engagement in the process and a desire to be a part of what is happening, to be on top of problem solving …” Associated with this variable is a leader’s interest and experience in policy-making in general and certain issue-areas in particular. A leader’s attitude to conflict is reflected in a leader’s willingness to tolerate disharmony among advisors. A leader’s motivation for leading may be rooted in a general ideology, by popular approval, or by personal gain. The fourth and fifth variables, the preferred strategies for managing information and resolving conflict refer to how leaders endeavour to structure the environment around them.

These five leadership variables, as identified by Hermann and Preston, common to leadership and foreign policy behaviour studies, are all present in Hermann’s original model. Involvement in the policy-making process is reflected in the first and third categories of Hermann’s original model: nature of the situation and the personal

86 ibid, pp.81-82
characteristic “filters” of interest and training in foreign policy. The second and third variables, willingness to tolerate conflict and motivation for leading are located in the second category of Hermann’s model: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style. A leader’s strategies for managing information and for resolving conflict are also covered by Hermann’s “sensitivity to environment” found in the “filters” section.

Hermann, in conjunction with political scientist, Juliet Kaarbo, has also produced an analysis of the effect of leadership styles of prime ministers on the foreign policy-making process.87 Similarly to the Hermann and Preston study, the variables that are posited as influencing prime ministers’ political leadership styles are included in Hermann’s model: 1) a leader’s degree of involvement, which includes their interest and experience in foreign policy; 2) a leader’s focus of involvement, which refers to a leader’s motivation in the political process; 3) managing information; 4) managing conflict; 5) inclusion of other policy makers in the decision making process. Unlike Hermann’s original model, the variables which the authors consider pertinent are not easily discernable, making its application somewhat problematic.

**Why Hermann’s model?**

Biographies and autobiographies have proven to be the preferred means of analysis of political leadership. Through detailed descriptions it has been shown that the personalities of leaders have a large effect on foreign policy behaviour. However, it has

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been argued that the link between personal characteristics and impact on foreign policy remains vague and obscure.  

A handful of commentators have proposed frameworks which examine the relationship between leadership personality and foreign policy behaviour. However, it has been asserted that the role played by individual characteristics in the foreign policy process is yet to be demonstrated. Blondel suggests that this field of study requires a model, as general as possible, which elaborates the different dimensions of the relationship between personal characteristics and leadership impact. There is scholarly speculation that Hermann’s framework does indeed meet this standard. David Winter has contended that:

Hermann’s model, combining as it does the interactive effects of eight objectively defined, major personality variables with these filters of interests, learning, and situation, reflects some of the most sophisticated and advanced trends of modern personality theory and research applied to the interpretation and understanding of foreign policy behaviour.

Hermann’s framework is easily comprehended and covers a broad range of factors one would consider pertinent to include in such an analysis.

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88 Blondel, p.115
89 Blondel, p.115
90 ibid, p.138
91 W. G. Winter, “Personality and Foreign Policy: Historical Overview of Research”, in Political Psychology and Foreign Policy, eds. E. Singer and V. Hudson (Boulder, 1992), p.95
MARGARET G. HERMANN’S THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Nature of situation
- Has wide decision latitude
- Is forced to define situation
- Is likely to participate in decision making

Personal characteristics
- Beliefs
- Motives
- Decision style
- Inter-personal style
  - Views of the world
  - Personal political style

Filters
- Interest in foreign affairs
- Training or expertise in foreign affairs
- Sensitivity to environment
- Degree of attention to foreign policy
- Extent of repertoire of foreign policy behaviours
- Openness to change
- Government’s foreign policy behaviour

* Summary of proposed relationships between personal characteristics of political leaders and their government’s foreign policy behaviour.
Conclusion

Hermann’s theoretical framework is comprised of three sections: nature of the situation; personal characteristics; and filters. Included in these sections are a number of variables which are pertinent to the study of personality and foreign policy behaviour. The model is also easily understood and jargon-free. Examination of Hermann’s subsequent qualitative research has demonstrated that the variables she considers salient to this field of research have not altered. Accordingly, this author will utilise this model to analyse the case study of David Lange and the ANZUS dispute.

As Prime Minister, Lange was afforded a number of political powers. In order to effectively examine the effect of Lange’s personality on the ANZUS dispute, the powers he had at his disposal, by virtue of his position, require investigation. Therefore, in the subsequent chapter the powers of the New Zealand Prime Minister in the foreign policy process will be investigated.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE POWERS OF THE NEW ZEALAND PRIME MINISTER IN THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

In democratic parliamentary governments prime ministers are located at the apex of power and as such they are the most powerful individuals in their respective political systems. They are the Head of Government, chief Government spokesperson, leader of the governing party, and chairperson of Cabinet and the Government Caucus.

It has been noted that “[p]owerful as the Prime Minister is, he remains the leader of a team rather than conductor of an orchestra.”\(^{92}\) Accordingly, the Prime Minister is referred to as ‘primus inter pares’ (first among equals). They are ‘among equals’ because in the governmental decision-making process, they are but one member of the decision-making body. They are referred to as ‘first’ because they are not only the leader of the decision-making body but also are able to decide the composition of the body\(^{93}\) and the roles which each member will fulfil. When discussing the powers of the Prime Minister it is crucial that one notes that as the leader of the country, the prime minister has more scope to influence affairs of state than any other individual. The area of foreign affairs is subject to such influence.

\(^{93}\) Whilst the leader of the National Party selects members of Cabinet and allocates portfolios, the leader of the Labour Party allocates portfolios to those members the Caucus has elected to Cabinet.
The role of the Prime Minister

In accordance with New Zealand’s sparse, unwritten constitutional arrangements there does not exist an evident statement of the formal powers of the Prime Minister. Political scientist, Roderic Alley has noted:

“[i]n every other respect, New Zealand has followed the British tradition that the Prime Minister is not known to the law as an officer of the state to which specific legal powers are attached…Nevertheless, the key conventions prescribing the Prime Minister’s core constitutional role are clear and unambiguous: as head of the party in Parliament maintaining the confidence of the House, the Prime Minister leads the Ministry which, in formal terms at least, tenders advice to the Crown through the Executive Council.”94

As has been noted above, depending on their respective parties’s rules, the Prime Minister may determine the composition95 of Cabinet and the allocation of portfolios. This enables them to determine where influence will lie. Ministers are all too aware that it is the Prime Minster who can control their political advancement and future political careers. With regard to the execution of foreign policy, these powers provide the Prime Minister with significant influence. She or he is able to allocate the Foreign Affairs portfolio to either themselves or a like-minded colleague, thus ensuring their agenda is satisfied.

The Prime Minister can also advise the Governor-General to dissolve the House of Representatives at any time and hold a general election. Such a step was taken before the customary election time in 1951 and 1984. However, given that elections much be held

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95 This can be either through selection or dismissal.
every three years in New Zealand, the possibility of holding an early election is not of fundamental importance to prime ministerial power.

As Chairperson of Cabinet and caucus, the Prime Minister’s opinion will carry weight on all issues. Hence, this role is of critical importance. The Prime Minister is afforded considerable power through their ability to determine the agenda and to sum up the decisions of Cabinet and caucus.

“Cabinet is the central decision-making body of Executive Government.”96 Palmer and Palmer have observed that “[a]n incredible amount of decision-making power is concentrated in the New Zealand Cabinet.”97 Ultimately, Cabinet has final determination of New Zealand’s foreign relations. Included in this are: the conclusion of treaties, acts of peace to acts of war, and the formalising of trade agreements. G.A. Wood has stated: “It is through domination of Cabinet, with all its powers and functions, that strong Prime Ministers can assert their will. It is through Cabinet’s close liaison with the governing party in Parliament that the Prime Minister heads the supreme law-making authority.”98 Therefore, Wood concludes: “Political control over the organs of Government, the prestige of Cabinet and the power of Parliament are the bases of prime ministerial power, and consequently they implicitly uphold them.”99 Following this logic, one may conclude that the Prime Minister will impose their preferences, with respect to foreign affairs, on Cabinet and Parliament.

96 Cabinet Office, Cabinet Office Manual (Wellington, 1996)
99 ibid
A further important function of the Prime Minister is to be the Government’s chief spokesperson. This entails presenting the Government’s position on key matters to Parliament and the public by way of the media. Patrick Weller has noted: “Since the media concentrate on the figure at the top, prime ministers can use that attention for their own purposes.” Furthermore, Former Director of the Advisory Group and then Head of the Prime Minister’s Office under David Lange, John Henderson, has commented: “The prime minister’s statements are taken by the media to be the authoritative view of government, which gives the prime minister considerable potential power to commit the government to a course of action even without Cabinet approval.” Therefore, it can be argued that, in matters of foreign affairs, the Prime Minister may unilaterally alter the direction of the country’s international relations.

As Head of Government, the Prime Minister is reliant upon the stability of their government in order to maintain their position. As such, the Prime Minister is concerned with all matters and events that affect the general health of the government. Former New Zealand Prime Minister, Sir Keith Holyoake, observed that “the Prime Minister must maintain a fatherly oversight over the progress of his Cabinet colleagues, particularly in their work of implementing policy.”

The Prime Minister is also able to play a direct role in the making of diplomatic appointments, such as ambassadorial posts. Alley has observed there is a general

100 P. Weller, *First Among Equals* (Sydney, 1985), p.5
presumption that if the Prime Minister seeks to influence an appointment then this will happen.\textsuperscript{103} The ability to influence which individuals represent New Zealand’s opinion on international matters in cities such as London, Washington D.C. and Canberra is a significant power; one which allows him or her to affect the foreign policy process.

As Minister in charge of the Security Intelligence Service, the New Zealand Prime Minister has an important function to perform in furtherance of New Zealand’s security. The SIS is empowered to investigate terrorism, subversion and espionage; all vital aspects of New Zealand’s foreign policy. Accordingly, as Minister of this particular portfolio, the Prime Minister is privy to examination of matters of national security.

**Has the office of Prime Minister become “presidentialised”?**

The question of how powerful prime ministers are is of fundamental importance. When examining the powers of the Prime Minister, one should have regard to the often cited argument that the political system has changed from one of cabinet government to prime ministerial government.\textsuperscript{104} In other words, the office of Prime Minister has been “presidentialised”. Illustrative of this point, Alley notes a piece of paper Sir Robert Muldoon referred to at a news conference in March 1984 on the occasion of his retiring Deputy, Duncan McIntyre’s, departure. On this were inscribed two rules: ‘(1) The Boss is always right; (2) If the Boss is wrong, then refer to Rule (1).’\textsuperscript{105} Similarly, Sir Keith Holyoake was never anxious to dispel a widely held belief that locked away in a private

\textsuperscript{103} Alley, p.86
\textsuperscript{104} Weller, p.1
\textsuperscript{105} Alley, p.84
safe he held the signed, undated letters of resignation from all of his serving Cabinet Ministers.

Former New Zealand Prime Minister, Sir Geoffrey Palmer has stated “Cabinet Government is based on teamwork – it is not and should never become presidential government.” Similarly, Weller notes that whilst prime ministers may be the individuals at the top of the political pile, essentially they are the leaders of teams. This author submits that whilst the consensus approach is more in line with the Westminster system that New Zealand has developed, the degree to which prime ministerial power is exercised in a “presidential” manner is dependent upon the individual in office. Indeed, the particular personality and style of a given prime minister will affect the extent to which they are simply “team leaders”. Palmer has remarked that much of the Prime Minister’s power is dependent upon personality and temperament. Political commentator, Rodney Brazier, has commented that “[t]he office of Prime Minister amounts to what each individual is able and willing to make of it.” Different leaders exercise influence in different ways: where foreign policy is concerned the same rule applies.

The effect of MMP on the powers of the Prime Minister

The advent of mixed member proportional (MMP) representation has impacted upon numerous New Zealand political institutions: the office of Prime Minister is no exception.

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106 Palmer, p.67
107 Weller, p.1
108 Palmer and Palmer, p.53
Palmer and Palmer have observed that “[u]nder MMP the role is changing and evolving in new directions.”¹¹⁰ However, contrary to many predictions, to date, MMP has not resulted in Prime Ministers adopting more consensual leadership styles. Current Prime Minister Helen Clark’s firm control over her government illustrates this point. Indeed, the argument that the New Zealand political system is becoming “presidentialised” is gaining more credence. Henderson has asserted that “New Zealand has continued along the path to a more presidential style of government.”¹¹¹

The constitutional powers of a Prime Minister have not been removed by the establishment of MMP. Helen Clark’s decision to call an election, approximately three months early, in 2002 demonstrated that a Prime Minister under MMP still retains the right to call an early election. Moreover, the dismissal of New Zealand First Deputy Prime Minister, Winston Peters, by former National Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, confirmed that a Prime Minister’s power to dismiss Cabinet Ministers is unaffected under MMP.

However, MMP has increased the likelihood of a change in government and, hence, Prime Minister between elections. The potentially precarious nature of MMP Governments and Prime Ministers was illustrated by the collapse of the National-New Zealand First coalition Government, formed after the 1996 election. Under MMP, Prime Ministers must not only manage their own caucus and Cabinet colleagues but also the Cabinet Ministers from other political parties with whom they are in coalition. There will

¹¹⁰ Palmer and Palmer, pp.52-53
be a wider range of opinions on issues of the day, including those relating to foreign policy. Therefore, a reduction in Prime Ministers’ domination of Cabinet may result. However, the example of Clark may indicate otherwise.

**Conclusion**

The Prime Minister is at the pinnacle of political power in New Zealand’s Westminster system of government. The position is neither established nor defined by statute. A Prime Minister is able to dominate foreign policy through their chairpersonship of Cabinet and the Government caucus, their role as Government Spokesperson, the management of diplomatic appointments and the SIS portfolio. The importance of the role of Prime Minister has not diminished under MMP; to date, neither have the powers. Prime Minister Helen Clark has demonstrated this point.

In the following chapter the events that comprise the ANZUS dispute will be discussed. Of critical importance to the dispute is the *Buchanan* affair which will be examined in detail. The extent of David Lange’s involvement in and significance to the ANZUS crisis will be revealed through close examination of the events that took place.

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112 *Cabinet Office Manual*
CHAPTER 5

NEW ZEALAND’S ANTI-NUCLEAR POLICY AND THE ANZUS DISPUTE

The ANZUS Treaty, the tripartite arrangement that binds together Australia, New Zealand and the United States, was signed at San Francisco on 1 September 1951. Following World War II, Australia and New Zealand sought out an alliance with the United States in order to “bolt the back door” against a potential revival of Japanese militarism. The ANZUS Treaty linked the United States, Australia and New Zealand in a military alliance. Its terms set out the conditions and procedures under which the parties would act to meets threats to any one of them in the Pacific area. For more than thirty years ANZUS was characterised by many as a model alliance.113

The New Zealand Labour Party’s election victory on 4 July 1984 resulted in an official rejection of the nuclear deterrent doctrines and strategies of nuclear allies. The party was elected to office in 1984 with the promise of keeping out nuclear ships but preserving the ANZUS alliance. The Labour Government’s position was that naval visits by ships of the United States, or any other ally, were welcome, provided the ships were not nuclear-propelled or nuclear-armed. Indeed, this action was the most fundamental challenge to the defence relationship with the United States since the establishment of the ANZUS alliance.114

114 The ANZUS Treaty provides for each signatory recognising that an armed attack upon the any of the parties will result in the other parties acting to “meet the common danger in accordance with [their] constitutional processes.” (Article IV). At the time of signing, New Zealand and Australia were concerned
The Government, however, sought to maintain New Zealand’s independent membership of the ANZUS alliance, wanting to fulfil its military obligations in conventional terms only. Prime Minister David Lange was adamant that New Zealand did not have to choose between ANZUS and its anti-nuclear policy. He argued that unlike NATO, the ANZUS alliance had in the past been regarded by the treaty partners as a conventional alliance, not a nuclear alliance. Lange stated, “[t]here was no intention of leaving the alliance or becoming a sleeping partner in it…At that time it was my view that New Zealand could exclude nuclear weapons and remain in active alliance with a nuclear power.” The United States Administration was of a different opinion.

**The Buchanan Affair**

Following the ANZUS Council meeting in Wellington in July 1984, United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, met with Lange, then Prime Minister-elect, making it clear that United States naval vessels visiting New Zealand ports were regarded as one of the important ways in which New Zealand made its contribution to the alliance. Shultz stated: “If the incoming government’s policies proved to be incompatible with the articles of the ANZUS Treaty Alliance, the United States is not prepared to renegotiate the treaty.”

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117 *New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review*, 34:3 (July-September 1984), p.19
This meeting between Lange and Shultz remains one of the most contentious aspects of the ANZUS dispute. There are two schools of thought on what undertakings Lange gave to Shultz when talking about his government’s anti-nuclear policy and its implications for U.S. naval visits. Shultz left the meeting believing that Lange had indicated that he required 6 months in which to get on top of party opposition to nuclear ship visits. A request for a naval ship visit after this time would be met with a positive response.\textsuperscript{118} However, Lange is adamant that he gave no such undertaking to Shultz: “I gave him no reason to think that I would concede him the nuclear-free policy for the sake of keeping ANZUS alive.”\textsuperscript{119} In support of Lange’s claims, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish, stated at a parliamentary conference in 2004:

The Secretary of State convinced himself that Mr Lange had intimated that over the following six months he would bring about some change in his party’s policy on nuclear ship visits. I was the only other person there and I did not interpret Lange’s comments that way. He did indeed say that he would be talking to party members about the issue at Labour branch conferences over the next six months ahead. Perhaps there was a touch of ambiguity there. But he did not say either then or at a later meeting in New York, that he would bring about a changed outcome.\textsuperscript{120}

This misunderstanding proved to be a significant factor in the dispute. It subsequently coloured Shultz’s attitude to Lange, who would later be regarded as having gone back on his word.

Following the Labour Party’s election, senior members of the bureaucracy endeavoured to find a means of reconciling New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy with the United States’ unshakeable policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons

\textsuperscript{118} Interview by the author via email with former Secretary of Defence, Mr. Denis McLean

\textsuperscript{119} D. Lange, \textit{My Life} (Auckland, 2005), p.194

\textsuperscript{120} Transcript provided by Mr Norrish; in the possession of the author.
on their vessels. Lange’s advisors felt that if New Zealand had a ship visit from a vessel which was, to all reasonable senses, not nuclear-armed or nuclear-propelled that this would buy the government time in which the United States would not press New Zealand for any further naval visits; thus enabling the issue to be worked through more calmly over a greater time period. 121 Accordingly, Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson; Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish; and Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Gerald Hensley, suggested to Lange that Jamieson meet with United States Navy officials in Hawaii.122 Jamieson would seek to find a suitable ship that would be acceptable to the U.S and not contravene New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy. Lange acquiesced. Jamieson believed he had found an appropriate vessel in the Buchanan. Indeed, Norrish has stated that the Buchanan certainly would not have had nuclear weapons on board.123

Lange later wrote that he confided only in his deputy, Geoffrey Palmer and third-ranked minister, Mike Moore, about these secret diplomatic negotiations.124 Lange was also quoted at a post-Cabinet press conference in December 1984 as saying the United States will not seek permission for a nuclear warship to visit New Zealand. He said further that, “the American people and Government are, in my view, intelligent and aware and they are not going to engage in some sort of needless, pointless, provocative incident.”125 These comments may suggest that Lange did believe a solution was in the making.

121 Interview by author with former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Mr. Gerald Hensley, 9 December 2004
122 Interview by author with former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mervyn Norrish, 10 December 2004
123 ibid
124 D. Lange, Nuclear Free – The New Zealand Way (Auckland, 1990), p.82
125 “‘Will not seek visit’”, Otago Daily Times, 18 December 1984, p.1
In mid-January 1985, the United States issued a formal request for a visit by the *USS Buchanan*. At this time, Lange was visiting the Tokelaus. Lange’s visit to the Tokelaus has been widely criticised. He was seen by some to have simply “walked off the job”. Former Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean, has stated that Lange went on holiday in order to avoid facing down the radicals on the issue.\footnote{126 Interview by the author via email with former Secretary of Defence, Mr Denis McLean} He was made aware of the American request by his officials back in New Zealand. Upon his return, Lange was met with two recommendations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was of the opinion that the proposed ship visit should proceed. The *Buchanan*, “an aged, small, conventionally powered ship not normally deployed to areas of high tension”\footnote{127 S. Hoadley, *New Zealand-United States Relations: friends no longer allies* (Wellington, 2000), p.45} had an extremely low probability of being nuclear-armed. The alternative recommendation was authored by Geoffrey Palmer, who had been Acting-Prime Minister in Lange’s absence. He recommended that the request be declined as New Zealand officials were unable to categorically state that the *Buchanan* was not going to be either nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed.

It should be noted that Palmer’s recommendation was strongly supported by the Labour Party Executive who were adamant that New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy was non-negotiable. Labour Party President, Margaret Wilson, had earlier met with Palmer to discuss the American request. She and the Labour Party Executive were resolved that as the *Buchanan* was capable of carrying nuclear weapons, the request should be declined.\footnote{128 M. Wilson, *Labour in Government 1984-1987* (Wellington, 1989), pp.64-65} This change in policy from nuclear-armed to nuclear-capable ensured that the issue came to an end. Hensley has noted: “Certainly from a civil service point or
view there was not much more that could be done once that political decision had been taken that nuclear-capability rather than actual assessment of nuclear-probabilities was the issue.”

Lange accepted Palmer’s recommendation and, with caucus and Cabinet approval, declined the American request. Kevin Clements, a peace activist, has claimed that at the particular meetings which discussed the request for the Buchanan to visit, Lange “found himself outmanoeuvred in Cabinet and caucus.” This is not a view shared by David Caygill, a senior Cabinet Minister at the time: He has stated that Lange was not at the critical Cabinet meeting as he was still making his way back to New Zealand from the Tokelaus.

In an effort to salvage the situation, Lange suggested to United States Ambassador, H. Munroe Browne, that the United States might like to request a visit of a ship from the Oliver Hazard Perry Class, a type universally understood to be solely conventionally armed. This proposal was subsequently leaked to the media, putting an end to a possible compromise. Despite Lange following up the conversation with a formal invitation to the United States to send a vessel of a non-nuclear-capable class, Browne

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129 Interview with Hensley
131 Interview by the author with former senior Cabinet Minister, Hon. David Caygill, 13 December 2004
132 Lange (1990), p.88
133 Lange is adamant that New Zealand officials played no role whatsoever in the leak and later had his office swept for bugs.
replied on behalf of the U.S. Administration that “it was the Buchanan or nothing.”

Lange has noted:

The American ambassador wrote to me with the stark advice that it was the Buchanan or nothing. This letter I took to cabinet. The cabinet had not changed its mind: the Buchanan was not coming. I wrote back to the ambassador telling him that New Zealand was unable from its own resources to determine if the Buchanan conformed with our policy, and for that reason we must decline its visit.

The Logic of Lange’s Decision

The rationale behind Lange’s decision to accept Palmer’s recommendation and to decline the American request for the Buchanan to visit has been the subject of much speculation. In his memoirs when writing of this decision, Lange simply states: “I supported Palmer’s assessment and the cabinet agreed.” Cabinet agreement on the decision to reject the Buchanan is a point which former Labour Cabinet Minister, Dr. Michael Bassett, takes issue with. In his Fulbright lecture, delivered in December 2002, Bassett asserts that the Buchanan was rejected following a unilateral decision by Lange and not collective Cabinet agreement. Bassett argues further that in early 1985 Lange was leading the Labour Party in name only. He capitulated to the “Left” of the Labour Party in rejecting the naval visit in an effort to win over his party. The Cabinet and caucus were not

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134 Lange (1990), p.90
135 ibid
136 Lange (2005), p.204
137 M. Bassett, *The Collapse of New Zealand’s Military Ties with the United States* (Fulbright Lecture delivered at Georgetown University on 2 December 2004); reprinted from: www.michaelbassett.co.nz/article_fulbright.htm
138 Included in the “Left” of the Party are Helen Clark, Jim Anderton and Margaret Wilson. Bassett observes that these individuals were among Lange’s harshest critics at this time. Bassett notes a diary entry of his penned on 23 November 1984 (during the time he was a minister in the Fourth Labour Government): “They have decided to kill this government rather than have it run by people they dislike.”
fully informed, and simply “went along with him because they, too, hoped to heal the rift inside the Labour Party.”  

Jamieson, shares a similar opinion. He has commented that Lange “was targeted by and became increasingly under the influence of those within the parliamentary arm of the Labour Party of much greater ideological resolve and stronger anti-American passion than his own.” Jamieson also asserts that in leaving for the Tokelaus, Lange was deliberately withdrawing from the scene. Upon his return he simply went through a “short charade of negotiations with the U.S. before making the pre-ordained decision and, so, delivering the coup de grace to our participation in ANZUS.”

Support for this school of thought is found in the memoirs of former Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, which recall a conversation between Hawke and Lange about New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy:

[Lange] indicated that the nuclear-free policy had been fashioned by the Left and accepted by the party, and there was virtually nothing he could do about it. I told Lange I was angered by this and couldn’t understand how he could possibly conduct foreign policy in the best interests of New Zealand on the basis of such a compact. He shrugged resignedly and said that unfortunately that was the way it was.

In response to these claims Lange stated:

As I have often said, have written, been quoted on, understood and accepted, the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand was not a loony-tunes movement of the Left or the unions or even the Labour Party. It became a mainstream political issue after (former Prime Minister Norman) Kirk

139 ibid
140 Interview by the author via email with former Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal, Sir Ewan Jamieson
141 ibid
did the New Zealand Government demonstration at Mururoa back in the seventies. It became an Anglican Mothers’ Union issue.143

However, former Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean, also shares Hawke’s view of the reasoning behind Lange’s decision to reject the Buchanan. He asserts that Lange “simply accepted a fait accompli”.144 He chose not to challenge the Left of the party on the anti-nuclear issue. Furthermore, McLean points to the fact that Lange did not take the prudent course of gathering a coalition around him of those members of the Labour caucus and Cabinet who did not want to fall into a dispute with the United States.145 However, this point may illustrate that Lange himself was committed to the anti-nuclear policy regardless of the consequences of its implementation.

Bassett’s fellow Cabinet Minister, David Caygill, offers a different opinion as to Cabinet’s participation in the decision regarding the Buchanan. In an interview undertaken by this author, Caygill noted that Lange was not involved directly in the decision to reject the Buchanan at all: “Geoffrey [Acting-Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer] talked about it at Cabinet and Cabinet debated it and rejected the visit…The fundamental decision to reject the visit was made at Cabinet.”146 Furthermore, he suggested that Lange was not captured by the “Left” of the Labour Party and points to the fact that Lange was involved in the plans which subsequently led to the proposal from the Americans to send the Buchanan.

143 “Lange criticises Hawke memoirs as self-centred”, 18 August 1994, unnamed article held at Archives NZ, Wellington; archives reference: AAWW 7112 W4640/1
144 Interview with McLean
145 ibid
146 Interview with Caygill
Furthermore, in an interview conducted by Vernon Wright in 1987, the then Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, stated he believed Lange “arrived at the same conclusion [regarding the Buchanan] I arrived at on the evidence I sent him, and then when we had a cabinet discussion about it there didn’t seem to be any dissent at all.”\textsuperscript{147}

Indeed, Palmer and Caygill’s accounts of events appear to differ somewhat to Bassett’s recollection of how things unfolded during that period.

**Public Opinion on the Anti-Nuclear Policy and ANZUS**

Public opinion was an arguably significant element of the ANZUS debate. Lange has noted that the Labour Government’s intention to prohibit nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand was “the reflection of a substantial movement of public opinion in New Zealand.”\textsuperscript{148} Public opposition to French nuclear testing in the Pacific provided the impetus for the anti-nuclear policy that would come to define New Zealand’s foreign policy in the 1980s. The results of the New Zealand general election of July 1984 provide a crude indication of public attitudes about the nuclear ships issue. The percentage of votes cast for Labour was 42.5 per cent, the New Zealand Party gained 12.9 per cent, and the Social Credit Party attracted 8 per cent.\textsuperscript{149} The National Party obtained 36 per cent of the New Zealand vote.\textsuperscript{150} Therefore, the total votes cast for parties with a declared policy to exclude nuclear ships amounted to 63.4 per cent. However, as Stuart McMillan points out, those who voted against the Government may have been swayed

\textsuperscript{147} Interview by Vernon Wright with Geoffrey Palmer, 8 February 1987, p.8, transcript held at Archives New Zealand, Wellington; archives reference: AAWW 7112 W4640/1

\textsuperscript{148} D. Lange, “ANZUS: the New Zealand view”, *Listener*, 13 April 1985, p.14

\textsuperscript{149} S. McMillan, *Neither Confirm Nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute between New Zealand and the United States* (Wellington, 1987), p.31

\textsuperscript{150} ibid
more by voting out the National Party and its dominating Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, than they were by the prospect of a nuclear ships ban.  

A useful indicator of the strength of public opinion in New Zealand prior to the election of the Labour Party lies in the results of the national campaign of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Committee. On 14 July 1983, 872,000 people (28 per cent of the New Zealand population) lived in officially declared nuclear free regions. By November 1984, the number of people living in a nuclear free zone had risen to 2,075,747, amounting to 65 per cent of the population. This campaign serves to highlight the potency of the anti-nuclear sentiment shared by the New Zealand public.

In 1986 the New Zealand Government sponsored an extensive debate on security policy. The Prime Minister established a Defence Committee of Enquiry led by Frank Corner which, in turn, commissioned a comprehensive public opinion poll and public hearings in 1986. The poll found that 92 per cent of New Zealanders opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons in New Zealand. Overall 66 per cent of respondents wanted nuclear armed ships banned from visiting New Zealand ports. Of significance is the finding that 52 per cent of New Zealanders were found to prefer staying in the ANZUS alliance should a nuclear free policy prove to be incompatible with membership of ANZUS; only

\[\text{\textsuperscript{151}} \text{ibid}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{152}} \text{ibid}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{153}} \text{ibid}\]
\[\text{\textsuperscript{155}} \text{ibid}\]
44 per cent of New Zealanders wanted to ban nuclear ship visits even if that entailed removing New Zealand from ANZUS.\textsuperscript{156}

This public opinion poll indicates that support for ANZUS remained relatively high in New Zealand in the 1980s. However, it is also evident that the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand was \textit{mainstream}. Unlike in many other countries, anti-nuclear sentiment was not reflected simply by a minority of the population: as noted above, over 90 per cent of the population opposed the stationing of nuclear weapons in New Zealand, and over 60 per cent wanted to ban all nuclear armed ships from New Zealand ports.

The rationale behind the New Zealand public’s opposition to nuclear ship visits is examined by Keith Jackson and Jim Lamare. They note the results of a 1983 poll which found that opponents of nuclear ship visits based their position upon a fear of nuclear accidents while United States’ ships were berthed in New Zealand harbours; a general worry about the prospect of nuclear war; a rejection of the overall viability of a nuclear defence strategy; or a concern that the mere presence of nuclear weapons in the country would make New Zealand a target of nuclear attack.\textsuperscript{157} Similarly, Paul Landais-Stamp and Paul Rogers note that since the 1960s, the New Zealand peace movement has maintained that New Zealand’s involvement in ANZUS and its willingness to provide port facilities to United States’ warships serve to make New Zealand a potential target in

\textsuperscript{156} ibid, p.44
a nuclear war.\textsuperscript{158} Also of concern to New Zealanders was the mounting threat posed to
world security by the continuing arms build up of the preceding decades.\textsuperscript{159} Accordingly,
the New Zealand public appears to have opposed the nuclear ship visits for security
reasons. In contrast, opposition to French nuclear testing was based on environmental
and health concerns.

\textbf{The Repercussions of Refusal}

The United States did not take kindly to New Zealand’s decision to reject the \textit{Buchanan}.
Ambassador Browne asserted that ANZUS was responsible for keeping the South Pacific
region free of hostility and unwelcome influence.\textsuperscript{160} Furthermore, he argued that “[i]n
effect [the New Zealand] government has said that the very ships which would defend
New Zealand in time of war may not enter New Zealand ports in time of peace.”\textsuperscript{161}

United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, remarked:

\begin{quote}
When New Zealand decided to reject the Buchanan it also decided, in effect, that the basic
operational elements of the ANZUS treaty would not apply to it. In a sense New Zealand walked
off the job – the job of working with each other to defend our common security.\textsuperscript{162}
\end{quote}

The swift and extensive response of the United States Administration demonstrated to
Lange that indeed an anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS alliance (as far as the United
States was concerned) were fundamentally incompatible. All scheduled military

\textsuperscript{158} P. Landais-Stamp and P. Rogers, \textit{Rocking the Boat: New Zealand, the United States and the Nuclear-
\textsuperscript{159} McMillan, p.73
\textsuperscript{160} H. Munroe Browne, “ANZUS – The American View”, \textit{NZ Listener} (March 30, 1985), p.21
\textsuperscript{161} ibid, p.22
\textsuperscript{162} US Secretary of State, George Shultz, \textit{On Alliance Responsibility}, US Department of State Current
Policy document No. 724, p.1, quoted in A. Robson, \textit{New Zealand’s Anti-Nuclear Cold War} (Suva, 1986),
p.5
exercises, including the upcoming Exercise Sea Eagle were cancelled. Intelligence cooperation with New Zealand was immediately discontinued. High-level United States officials would not meet their New Zealand counterparts. Indeed, “political contact was severely curtailed.”

Of particular concern to New Zealand was the threatened trade backlash. In September 1984, Shultz had stated that ANZUS was not an economic agreement in any sense. Despite this, prior to the decision to bar the Buchanan, New Zealand Minister of Trade, Mike Moore, warned that possible American reprisals would extend beyond the military area. Indeed, in 1985, United States Congressman Dick Cheney introduced a Bill that would bar imports from New Zealand and Australia. According to Cheney, he introduced the Bill because he was “[angered] by their uncooperative attitude towards US international defence policy…If these countries are not willing to share the burden and responsibility of defending freedom, why should we facilitate their enjoyment of freedom’s benefits such as unrestrained access to our markets…”

In response to these threats, Lange argued that it should be remembered that “the last time the United States mounted sanctions was in response to the Soviet Union’s invasion

164 D. Lange “ANZUS Not An Economic Agreement”, Press Release, 20 September 1984
165 Landais-Stamp and Rogers, p.92
166 Australia was included in the Bill because at this time Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke had reneged on an earlier commitment to provide support facilities in Australia for long-range tests of America’s MX missile.
167 D. Hayward, ‘New Zealand Takes the Threat of US Trade Retaliation Seriously’, Financial Times (London, 7 February 1985), quoted in Landais-Stamp and Rogers, p.93
of Afghanistan. That may put the matter of trade sanctions in perspective.\textsuperscript{168}

Fortunately for New Zealand trade sanctions were never imposed. In fact, in the year ending June 1985 the value of exports to America increased by 49.1 per cent to nearly $NZ1.6 billion.\textsuperscript{169}

The severity of the United States’ response to New Zealand’s anti-nuclear stance has been attributed to the concern of the Reagan Administration about the possible ripple effect of New Zealand’s example on other allied countries.\textsuperscript{170} The “kiwi disease”, as it became known, was what some American officials believed could weaken the Western nuclear deterrence strategy, which had ensured peace in the world for approximately forty years.\textsuperscript{171} “Through its response, the United States Government hoped to signal to other countries the seriousness with which it is prepared to view any efforts to diminish defence cooperation among allies.”\textsuperscript{172}

Also of concern to New Zealand’s policy makers was the strain upon Trans-Tasman relations following the Buchanan fiasco. There was considerable divergence between the views of the Australian and New Zealand Labour parties on nuclear issues. The official Australian position on ship visits was stated thus:

\textsuperscript{168} Lange, address to ‘The New Zealand Connection’ (1985) p.7
\textsuperscript{170} A. Robson, \textit{New Zealand’s Anti-Nuclear Cold War} (Suva, 1986), p.16
\textsuperscript{171} “The Reagan Administration worried that if New Zealand goes non-nuclear, there would be political fallout in a dozen or more nations that are friends or allies of the United States. It could even effect a strong – and so far tightly knit – security alliance as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” J. Wallace, ‘Why another U.S. treaty is going down the drain’, \textit{U.S. News and World Report}, 99 (23 December 1985), p.28
The dispute between New Zealand and the United States over visits by ships and aircraft has seriously damaged the defense relationship between our two allies. Australia is not a party to the dispute. It accepts, however, that access within reasonable environmental constraints for ships and aircraft is a normal part of an alliance relationship. Australia regrets that New Zealand policy detracts from that relationship.\footnote{Australian Government, (1987), pp.5-6 quoted in K. P. Clements, ‘New Zealand’s Role in Promoting a Nuclear-free Pacific’, \textit{Journal of Peace Research}, 25:4 (1988), p.403}

This difference of opinion is further illustrated in a letter written by Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke to David Lange on 2 February 1985, which was subsequently leaked to the media. In it Hawke states: “We cannot accept as a permanent arrangement that the ANZUS Alliance has a different meaning and entails different obligations for different members.”\footnote{S. McMillan, \textit{Neither Confirm Nor Deny: The Nuclear Ships Dispute between New Zealand and the United States} (Wellington, 1987), p.120}

It is evident that the Australian Government and the New Zealand Government did not agree upon all things nuclear, and New Zealand increasingly gained the reputation of a “free rider” in matters of defence.\footnote{Lange, address to ‘The New Zealand Connection’, (1985)p.5; M. McKinley, \textit{ANZUS, New Zealand and the Meaning of Life: An assessment of the Labour Government’s non-nuclear policy and its implications} (Wellington, 1986), p.49}

\textbf{Lange’s Presentation of New Zealand’s Anti-Nuclear Policy on the World Stage}

Despite incurring the wrath of its traditional allies, Lange continued to present New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy on the international stage. Arguably the most important international event at which New Zealand’s rationale for its anti-nuclear policy was articulated was the Oxford Union Debate, held in March 1985. Lange took part in the internationally televised debate with Reverend Jerry Falwell as his opposition. The topic
of debate was: *Nuclear weapons are morally indefensible*. Lange attended against the wishes of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Government. Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish, has commented that “with the Oxford Union Debate, he was taking a considerable risk, so far as relationships with the British and Americans were concerned.” This risk did not appear to faze Lange. He has commented that “Margaret Thatcher sent a note through her High Commissioner, which he delivered to me, asking me not to do it. And that sealed it…I decided definitely to go.”¹⁷⁶

Lange’s performance has been widely acknowledged to be “the stuff of legend”. His superior oratorical skills and quick wit were on show for a worldwide audience to appreciate. Lange has noted: “I was pleased that the debate would let me make the case for what I always saw as the essential part of New Zealand’s nuclear-free policy, which was our refusal to allow ourselves to be defended by nuclear weapons.”¹⁷⁷ He goes on to note that the Oxford Union debate was the highest point of his career in politics.¹⁷⁸

Indeed, commentators alike share this view. Political scientist, Jon Johansson, has asserted that “Lange’s actual performance at the Oxford Union was arguably his crowning achievement as Prime Minister.”¹⁷⁹ Moreover, “it was a rare display of public

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¹⁷⁷ Lange (2005), p.198
¹⁷⁸ ibid, p.208
leadership and one that saw Lange translate his and his government’s moral convictions into forceful and penetrating rhetoric.”

The international media were just as enamoured with Lange’s appearance at Oxford. Following the debate, The Economist described Lange as “a new star of the anti-nuclear movement.” The Washington Post commented: “Lange, looking tanned and confident, gave every impression of enjoying the battle immensely.” In addition, The Miami Herald described Lange as a “jolly, lowly speaker who appeared to delight in the crowded chambers and the bright television lights.” The Observer said that Lange exceeded his debating opponent in physical girth and “greater intellectual stature”.

The United States Administration was not as taken with Lange’s performance. Lange’s most famous one-liner “I can smell the uranium on [your breath]” delivered to an American interjector was regarded by the United States as the final insult. Indeed, Time magazine commented that “predictably the Prime Minister’s comments did not go down well in Washington.” Lange himself has noted:

The one thing the Americans never forgave me for was that interjection. That was deemed by them to have been a terrible slight in the relationship and it says something for my inability to understand what American sensitivities are about.

180 Ibid, p.150
181 “A Yank (and a Kiwi) at Oxford”, The Economist, 9 March 1985
182 “Sparring Over the Nuclear Issue”, The Washington Post, 2 March 1985
185 “Turning Up the Temperature”, Time, 11 March 1985, p.33
186 Quoted in Russell (1996), p.97
The slight the United States felt Lange had dealt arguably contributed to their response, or lack thereof, to the 1985 bombing of the Greenpeace protest ship the *Rainbow Warrior*.\(^{187}\) This act of terrorism perpetrated by a French Government agency was met with no official response from any New Zealand ally. Lange noted: “the leaders of the West expressed not a moments outrage about terrorism directed by a government against opponents of nuclear deterrence.”\(^{188}\) Landais-Stamp and Rogers note that “the bombing reinforced and hardened anti-nuclear attitudes and instilled a nationalistic pride and determination to maintain the nuclear-free policies.”\(^{189}\) New Zealand had experienced first hand the reality of lying outside the nuclear fold.

The bombing of the *Rainbow Warrior* will not be analysed further in the course of this thesis as it does not constitute part of the ANZUS dispute per se.

**Diplomatic Efforts to Breach the Impasse**

During 1985 and 1986 various meetings took place between officials; all with the objective of reaching a mutually acceptable outcome for New Zealand and the United States. In 1985 Palmer visited officials in Washington; the main purpose of his visit being to take the draft legislation to American officials and negotiate it in detail in a manner that they may find capable of accommodation.\(^{190}\) Among others, Palmer met with Secretary of State, George Shultz and Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger. No

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\(^{187}\) The *Rainbow Warrior*, the flagship of the environmental organisation - Greenpeace, had docked at Auckland harbour on 7 July in preparation for sailing to the French nuclear testing site at Mururoa Atoll. It was sunk by two limpet mines on 10 July, killing one crew member.

\(^{188}\) Lange (1990), p.122

\(^{189}\) Landais-Stamp and Rogers, p.112

\(^{190}\) Interview by Vernon Wright with Geoffrey Palmer, 1987, p.16, held at Archives NZ, Wellington; archives reference: AAWW 7112 W4640/1
understanding was able to be reached during the course of Palmer’s visit. Furthermore, United States officials were reported to have been quite unhappy with how negotiations with Palmer unfolded. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs telex dated 16 October 1985 noted an article in the Dominion newspaper which stated that the American officials had said the negotiations with Palmer “had little point” and that there had been “no good faith or movement on the fundamentals”.191

Caygill, also undertook a private and confidential meeting with senior State Department officials in 1985.192 The meeting focused on the impact of the proposed nuclear-free legislation and how that might be reconciled with a resumption of port access by United States vessels and the preservation of “neither confirm nor deny”.

Caygill also discussed New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS rupture at a meeting with eleven members of the United States House of Representatives Armed Service Committee at Christchurch in January 1986.193 The meeting proved to be somewhat hostile in tone. The delegation was concerned that New Zealand was after a “free ride” from the United States and why exactly it was necessary to legislate the anti-nuclear policy.194 Similarly to Palmer, Caygill’s negotiations did not provide a solution to the dispute.

191 Ministry of Foreign Affairs telex to Washington, 16 October 1985, held at Archives NZ, Wellington; archives reference: AAWW 7112 W4640/1
192 Interview with Caygill
193 Ibid
194 Ministry of Foreign Affairs telex to Washington, 13 January 1986, held at Archives NZ, Wellington; archives reference: AAWW 7112 W4640/1
The Enactment of Anti-Nuclear Legislation and the Creation of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone

By 1986 Lange and his Government were resigned to accept that ANZUS was indeed a nuclear alliance and as such New Zealand could no longer remain an active member. In 1987 Lange remarked: “The ANZUS alliance has been unequivocally revealed in the last three years to be a nuclear alliance, a defence arrangement underpinned by a global strategy of nuclear deterrence. As long as it retains that character it is no use to New Zealand.”  Neither New Zealand nor the United States formally withdrew from the alliance. However, at the ANZUS Council meeting in August 1986 at San Francisco, United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, issued a statement in which he expressed regret that New Zealand’s actions had disrupted the alliance relationship, and that the United States could no longer be expected to carry out its security obligations towards New Zealand. New Zealand was now deemed to be a “friend”, no longer an ally. It was apparent that a watershed had been reached, a point where both nations recognised that their different perceptions and policies made it impossible for an effective alliance relationship to continue.

Following these negative reactions, New Zealand was not deterred from its anti-nuclear resolve. Lange repeatedly stated that New Zealand does not ask, nor does it expect to be defended by nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Government went ahead with its plans

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195 Lange, ‘Facing a New Reality’, p.18
196 Lange, (1989), p.41
to entrench its anti-nuclear policies in law.198 On 10th December 1985, the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill was introduced into the House of Representatives. When introducing the Bill, Lange stated that “in practical terms, the Bill means that New Zealand has completely disengaged itself from any nuclear strategy for the defence of New Zealand.”199

To the chagrin of United States officials, the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act was officially passed into law on 4 July 1987.200 The Act formally established New Zealand territory and coastal waters as a Nuclear-Free Zone. Furthermore, the Act prohibits visits to New Zealand by all nuclear powered ships, and by all foreign warships unless “the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.”201 Some commentators have argued that this clause in the legislation directly challenges the United States’ “neither confirm nor deny” policy, for it provides for the New Zealand Government independently deciding whether or not ships or aircraft from nuclear states are likely to be carrying nuclear weapons.

The United States regarded this unprecedented move to impose a legislative ban on nuclear ship visits as quite unacceptable. It was evident that the United States made a distinction between policy and legislation. There was the impression among some United

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199 Introduction of the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Bill, 10 December 1985, reported in Hansard, vol.468, p.8914
201 section 9, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 1987
States officials that the passing of legislation would tie the hands of future New Zealand Governments.\textsuperscript{202} However, when the legislation finally passed, there was little overt reaction from the United States Administration.\textsuperscript{203} Similarly, the passage of the Broomfield Act in August 1987 by the US Congress, which confirmed New Zealand’s status had been officially down-graded from that of an ally to that of a friend, was accepted with remarkable composure in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{204}

The legislation also enacted into law those provisions of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty which required legislative sanction. The Treaty, promoted in the South Pacific Forum since 1975, had come into effect on 11 December 1986.\textsuperscript{205} The signatory countries agreed to place strict limits on the presence of nuclear weapons in their territory. Under the terms of the Treaty, the testing and stationing of nuclear weapons in their territory is prohibited. Furthermore, each party to the Treaty has agreed to not possess, build or take control of nuclear weapons anywhere in the world.\textsuperscript{206} In order to circumvent Australia’s commitments to the United States under the ANZUS Treaty, each signatory is allowed to accept visits by nuclear-armed ships and aircraft.\textsuperscript{207} The Treaty was not greeted with enthusiasm by the United States Administration. This was illustrated by its refusal to sign the protocols to the Treaty under which nuclear weapon states were invited to undertake commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear

\textsuperscript{202} McMillan, p.159
\textsuperscript{203} R. Kennaway, ‘The ANZUS Dispute’, in Beyond New Zealand II: Foreign Policy into the 1990s, eds. R. Kennaway and J. Henderson (Auckland, 1991), p.70
\textsuperscript{204} ibid, p.70-71
\textsuperscript{205} ibid, p.70
\textsuperscript{206} ibid
\textsuperscript{207} New Zealand Government, Nuclear Free New Zealand (Wellington, 1986), p.10
explosive devices against member states in the Zone, and not to test nuclear weapons in the Zone.

It should be noted that as the creation of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone was not a fundamental element of the ANZUS dispute, it will not be examined further in the course of this thesis.

Conclusion

The execution of the New Zealand Government’s anti-nuclear policy in 1985 brought to an end the more than thirty year old military alliance it had enjoyed with the United States. In rejecting the American request for the Buchanan to visit, New Zealand was deemed by the United States to have ended its role in the ANZUS alliance. Despite efforts to breach the subsequent impasse, the alliance relationship between the two nations could not be salvaged. Much to the consternation of Washington, the New Zealand Government succeeded in enacting the anti-nuclear policy into law.

As Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange played a crucial role during this period. Despite being committed to the anti-nuclear policy of his Government, much controversy surrounds the course of action he took. His management of the dispute with the United States has been much criticised, by both his political colleagues and public service advisors. However, Lange’s rhetorical leadership of the anti-nuclear issue has received widespread praise. Through his superior oratorical skills, Lange superbly presented New Zealand’s argument for rejecting the nuclear-arms race on the international stage.
The following chapter will address the first section of Hermann’s theoretical framework and apply it directly to the case study of David Lange and the ANZUS dispute. The nature of the situation with which Lange was faced when addressing this foreign policy issue will be examined. As articulated in Hermann’s work, the decision latitude afforded to Lange, his ability to define the situation at hand and his participation in the decision-making process related to the ANZUS crisis will be analysed.
CHAPTER 6

NATURE OF THE SITUATION: DECISION LATITUDE, DEFINITION OF SITUATION, AND PARTICIPATION

Theorists widely acknowledge the significance of situational factors when analysing the effect of a leader’s personality on the foreign policy-making process. The various courses of action available to a leader will depend upon the circumstances in which they are required to operate. Indeed, a restrictive situation will ensure a leader has limited, accessible options when addressing a foreign policy issue.

Hermann’s model addresses the nature of the situation with which a political leader is faced. Decision latitude, definition of the situation and participation by a leader comprise this section of her model.

Decision Latitude

First, wide decision latitude provides more scope for influence by a leader’s personal characteristics. As noted in Chapter 2, Hermann gives the example of the “honeymoon” period following a landslide election. Newly appointed leaders are afforded a certain ‘capital’, based on possibly popularity or fear, which places them in a better position to achieve policy changes.

209 ibid, p.52
An analysis of the political context which gave rise to Lange assuming power and the environment he was working in at the time of the ANZUS dispute will assist in determining the extent of decision latitude Lange was afforded. Lange came to power following the snap-election held on 14th July 1984. The snap-election had been called by the then National Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon, who had claimed himself unable to command a majority in the House following National MP, Marilyn Waring, crossing the floor to support a Labour bill which purported to make New Zealand nuclear free. The bill was subsequently defeated by renegade Labour Parliamentarians voting against it.

The Labour Party’s victory heralded an end to Muldoon’s reign over New Zealand’s political landscape. He had held the office of Prime Minister for nine years. As Prime Minister, Muldoon also held the finance portfolio providing for an extreme concentration of power. Muldoon wielded power in an autocratic manner. He instilled fear and intimidation in opponents and supporters alike. Indeed, Lange wrote in 1990: “when I entered [Parliament], it was dominated by the scourge of unpopular minorities and inviter of nuclear vessels to New Zealand, Robert Muldoon.” Lange’s victory brought this oppression to an end. He “embodied a liberation of both our politics and our language.” Bruce Jesson has asserted that “Labour came to power in 1984 amid a mood of euphoria and goodwill, earned by its election theme of bringing the country together again.” Indeed, Lange appeared to many to be the right man at this point in time to lead New Zealand.

Furthermore, Lange’s appointment as Prime Minister announced a generational shift in New Zealand’s political leadership. Upon assuming the office of Prime Minister, Lange was forty-one years old. Lange and the majority of his Labour colleagues were of the “Vietnam” generation. Those individuals whom they were replacing in government were of the “World-War II” generation. In a 1986 speech, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish, contended that one of the most important factors leading to New Zealand’s new-found independence and confidence in its dealings with the outside world was “the transition of power to the post-war generation. You see it in the make-up of the present Cabinet, with an average age in the forties.”\textsuperscript{213}

Inevitably accompanying this shift were new political ideas and agendas, one of which was the Labour Party’s firm anti-nuclear policy. This policy was a significant component of the Labour Party’s election campaigning: it was a manifesto promise.\textsuperscript{214} Moreover, anti-nuclear sentiment had increasingly gained public support and, it can be argued, had become a mainstream issue at the time Lange came to power. This widespread public support for an anti-nuclear policy would have affected the range of options available to Lange and his Government when seeking to resolve the dispute with the United States regarding the Buchanan.

Ross Vintiner, Lange’s Press Secretary, was involved heavily in the Buchanan affair and is of the opinion that Lange had no other option but to accept Palmer’s recommendation

\textsuperscript{214} Interview by the author with former senior Cabinet Minister, Hon. David Caygill, 13 December 2004
and decline the American request.\textsuperscript{215} He has argued that “to [allow the Buchanan to visit] would have been political suicide. You would have put doubt in the public mind, introduced doubt about the policy, and introduced an enormous amount of lobbying around the issue.”\textsuperscript{216} John Henderson, the Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, has noted that had Lange allowed the Buchanan to visit the ensuing public outcry may have prevented the Fourth Labour Government winning a second term.\textsuperscript{217}

The dispute with the United States regarding port visits quickly followed the Labour Party’s election. As was outlined in the preceding chapter, political and diplomatic negotiations took place immediately following the election result. The request for the Buchanan visit was made and declined less than a year after Labour came to power.

Constraints upon the decision latitude afforded to Lange did however exist: the emphatic opinion of the Labour Party Executive providing the strongest restriction. For the Party Executive the anti-nuclear policy was “non-negotiable”.\textsuperscript{218} Labour Party President, Margaret Wilson, met with Lange and in his absence, Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, to discuss the anti-nuclear policy. She was resolved that the Executive would in no way support acceptance of the American request for the Buchanan to visit. As the vessel was capable of carrying nuclear arms the request could in no way be accommodated. The opinion of Labour Party Executive carried substantial weight within

\textsuperscript{215} Interview by author with Mr. Ross Vintiner, 8 December 2004
\textsuperscript{216} ibid
\textsuperscript{217} Interview by the author with former Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, Dr John Henderson, 7 September 2004
\textsuperscript{218} M. Wilson, Speech delivered at a parliamentary conference: “The First Term of the Fourth Labour Government”, (Wellington, 30 April 2004); notes are the author’s own.
the party as a whole and as such Lange was not at liberty to simply ignore it. Support of
the Executive was crucial to the stability of the Government as a whole. Thus, to some
extent, it limited the decision latitude afforded to Lange when attempting to work through
the crisis. However, it is unclear just how much this came to bear upon Lange’s final
decision to reject the Buchanan.

Lange was required to navigate the ANZUS dispute during what would be termed his
“honeymoon” period in office. He had come to power following a snap-election,
deposing the oppressive incumbent. His party’s victory heralded a generational shift
bringing with it a publicly supported anti-nuclear policy. Therefore, it can be argued that
Lange indeed had the political ‘capital’ afforded to newly appointed, popular leaders
when he tackled the issue of port access and ANZUS. Despite the limitations imposed by
the Labour Party Executive and public opinion, it is evident that Lange had wide decision
latitude within which to work.

**Definition of the Situation**

Secondly, situations that require a political leader to define or interpret them allow for
their personal characteristics to have more impact. An ambiguous situation is one such
example. It can be argued that attempting to reconcile New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy
with the United States’ policy of NCND was such a situation that required definition.

First, prior to the Fourth Labour Government coming to power, the alliance between New
Zealand and the United States had never been questioned. The dispute with the United
States was indeed unprecedented. Previous New Zealand governments had taken issue with nuclear warships prior to this but disputes had never eventuated. The Third Labour Government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Norman Kirk, was strongly opposed to the testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific by France. That Government had also inherited the ‘ban’ established under the preceding National Government which suspended visits of nuclear warships in light of questions of insurance liabilities.\textsuperscript{219} Hence, after the \textit{USS Enterprise} visited Wellington in 1964 no nuclear powered vessels visited New Zealand until 1976. The anti-nuclear policy of the Lange Government proved to be the only policy that would jeopardise New Zealand’s membership in the ANZUS alliance. Given that the Government had no forerunner with which to compare its strategy, ambiguity arguably surrounded the situation. The Government was faced with a foreign affairs crisis and required Lange to forge ahead with defining the issues at hand.

Lange often spoke at length publicly about New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the dispute with the United States in an effort to clarify the situation. He went to great pains to explain the purpose of the anti-nuclear policy, the rationale behind it, and its implications from the New Zealand perspective. Lange also attempted to demonstrate how New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy would not necessarily spell the end of New Zealand’s participation in the ANZUS alliance.

\textsuperscript{219} The New Zealand Government, led by Keith Holyoake, chose to suspend visits as insurance companies were reluctant to accept the risk of an accident involving U.S nuclear warships whilst stationed in New Zealand ports. This ban was lifted in 1976 by the Muldoon-led Government following the passing of legislation in the U.S. which accepted absolute liability for accident involving U.S. warships abroad.
In an effort to elucidate the logic underpinning the anti-nuclear policy, Lange stated during the Oxford Union debate in 1985:

It makes no sense for a country which faces no threat to seek to surround itself with nuclear weapons. It makes no sense for that country to ask its allies to deter enemies which do not yet exist with the threat of nuclear weapons. It makes no sense for a region which is the most stable in the world to allow itself to become a strategic arena for the nuclear powers. Having considered all this, the people of New Zealand reached a straightforward conclusion; the nuclear weapons which defended them caused them more alarm than any which threatened them, and it was accordingly pointless to be defended by them.220

In attempting to further define the implications for the policy, Lange repeatedly stated adamantly that New Zealand did not regard itself as setting an example which other nations should follow.221 The New Zealand policy was not for “export”. Furthermore, Lange strongly argued that ANZUS was indeed not a nuclear alliance and therefore New Zealand’s participation in it should not come into question. In a press statement on 1 February 1985, Lange stated: “New Zealand is, and intends to remain, a committed member of ANZUS ...I continue to believe that it is possible for New Zealand and the United States to find a practical solution which meets the interests of both countries.”222

In a speech delivered in Los Angeles in February 1985 Lange asserted that “[u]nlike NATO, the ANZUS alliance has in the past been regarded by the treaty partners as a conventional alliance, not a nuclear alliance. The treaty does not oblige New Zealand to

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222 D. Lange, Press Statement, 1 February 1985, p.1; held at Archives NZ, Wellington; archives reference: AAWW 7112 W4640/1
accept nuclear weapons.” Lange was adamant that “[t]he ANZUS alliance remains at the heart of New Zealand’s security preoccupations.”

However, Lange was forced to redefine the situation once it became apparent that agreement with the United States on this particular issue was not possible. In 1987 he noted:

> [t]he ANZUS alliance has been unequivocally revealed in the last three years to be a nuclear alliance, a defence arrangement underpinned by a global strategy of nuclear deterrence. As long as it retains that character it is no use to New Zealand and New Zealand had better make arrangements which are better suited to our own circumstances.

**Participation**

Lastly, personal characteristics will have more impact on foreign policy in situations in which a political leader is likely to participate in the decision-making process. One such example of this is a time of crisis.

Following the implementation of the Government’s anti-nuclear policy, a dispute ensued between New Zealand and its most powerful ally: the military alliance which New Zealand had been a member of for more than thirty years was on the verge of collapse. This foreign policy crisis warranted significant involvement by the individual who held both the office of Prime Minister and the foreign affairs portfolio. Accordingly, Lange was the political actor who participated most heavily in the critical dealings.

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First, as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange was responsible for articulating the merits of the policy to the New Zealand public and to the international community. Press conferences, media releases, interviews with individual members of the media, debating in the House of Representatives, and speeches both abroad and in New Zealand enabled Lange to clarify the Government’s position on nuclear ship visits and its anti-nuclear policy. Taking part in the Oxford Union debate and addressing the United Nations General Assembly are examples of Lange’s critical involvement in the crisis.

Second, Lange met with high level officials from other countries. Meetings took place with the Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke; the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher; the United States Ambassador to New Zealand, H. Munroe Browne; Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Bill Hayden; the British Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Lady Young; and Chief of Defence Staff (designate) of the United Kingdom, Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Fieldhouse. However, the most important individual whom Lange met with was United States Secretary of State, George Shultz. The two men met on a few occasions: Meetings took place in Wellington and New York in 1984 and in Manila in 1986.226

Lange was by no means the only New Zealand political actor involved in the ANZUS dispute. As can be expected of any Prime Minister, Lange was compelled to delegate a number of duties regarding the negotiations with the United States. In 1985 Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, and senior Cabinet Minister, David Caygill, met with

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226 It was after their discussions in Manila on 27 June 1986 that Shultz famously told the press that New Zealand and the United States “part company as friends, but we part company”.

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United States officials in the United States and New Zealand attempting to negotiate a way around the impasse. Moreover, as noted in the preceding chapter, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials also played a crucial role in negotiations with the United States. The important role played by some of Lange’s primary advisors should also not be overlooked.

Third, as Prime Minister, Lange was responsible for leading the debate on the ANZUS issue within Cabinet. As was noted in the preceding chapter, the extent to which Lange carried out this function at the critical time of the Buchanan request is in dispute. However, given that issues pertaining to foreign affairs were Lange’s area of responsibility, his was the leading voice on the issue of nuclear ship visits and ANZUS.

Lastly, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange introduced the anti-nuclear legislation into the House on 10th December 1985. Lange outlined the provisions of the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill, articulating its purpose, function and form. Lange answered questions regarding the legislation from Opposition Members of Parliament in the House and from the media.

**Conclusion**

As has been established, Lange was significantly involved in the ANZUS dispute and in efforts to reconcile New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy with the United States’ policy of NCND. The dispute can be categorised as one of crisis. It was an unprecedented state of affairs, requiring high level participation by Lange as Prime Minister and Minister of
Foreign Affairs. Moreover, Lange worked within wide decision parameters and was compelled to define the situation at hand. As a consequence, his personality undoubtedly played a decisive role in the proceedings.

The following chapter explores the personal characteristics found in the second section of Hermann’s framework. Thus, Lange’s beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style will be examined and the manner in which they affected the ANZUS dispute investigated.
CHAPTER 7

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: BELIEFS, MOTIVES, DECISION STYLE AND INTERPERSONAL STYLE

According to Hermann’s model, the personal characteristics that are most relevant to a political leader’s role in the foreign policy making process include: beliefs; motives; decision style and interpersonal style. A leader’s view of the world is shaped by their beliefs and motives and their personal political style is formed by their decision-style and interpersonal style. As noted in Chapter 2, beliefs entail a leader’s fundamental assumptions of the world. A leader’s motives refer to the desires that activate them, such as the need for power or approval. A leader’s beliefs and motives will shape their view of the political process and, thus, help determine their agenda for their term in office.

Decision style is comprised of a leader’s preferred methods of making decisions. The styles and strategies a leader employs when making a political decision constitute an individual’s decision style. As an example: a leader may prefer to make decisions in a collegial environment rather than in a dictatorial manner. Lastly, interpersonal style refers to the characteristic ways in which a leader interacts with other policy makers. A leader’s preference to be open and frank with colleagues is one example of an interpersonal style. David Lange’s beliefs, motives, decision style an interpersonal style will now be examined.

Beliefs

In determining the composition of Lange’s beliefs due regard must be paid to the circumstances which gave rise to the formation of his fundamental assumptions about the world. In order to analyse his political and philosophical beliefs, Lange’s childhood and education will be examined, as will his world experience prior to entering politics. It should be noted that Lange’s childhood and education also inherently influenced the development of his motives. The beliefs he accumulated over these years which he subsequently took with him into government will be uncovered. An examination of the circumstances that gave rise to his political career and the beliefs that he demonstrated once in office will assist in painting a comprehensive picture of who Prime Minister David Lange was.228

David Lange’s childhood and education

David Lange was born on 4th August 1942 in Otahuhu, the first child of Dr Roy Lange, a traditional family doctor, and his wife, Phoebe. Otahuhu was a small industrial town where the majority of town men were employed at the brewery or the railway workshops or the abattoir or one of the three freezing works and, with few exceptions, every woman stayed at home unless she was a nurse or a school teacher.229 As his biographer, Vernon Wright wrote: “Lange … grew up in a liberal Christian household where the twin injunctions of charity and duty kept the parents busy in the service of others. You were

228 Blondel has noted: “Thus there is little doubt that demographic variables, from background to career, constitute a significant element in the extent to which leaders can exercise certain skills …” J. Blondel, Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis (London; Beverly Hills, 1987), p.145
229 D. Lange, My Life, (Auckland, 2005), p.21
in a sense defined by what you did for others.”230  The Lange children were encouraged to be talkative, funny, and play competitive word games: at this, the oldest of the Lange children excelled.

Roy Lange was known as “a bit of a left” and took his elder son to a number of political meetings to hear the great issues of the early 1950s, including the waterfront lockout and the Korean War, strongly debated.231  Lange’s passion for public speaking grew as did his enthusiasm for world affairs, travel and politics. From an early age, he listened to parliamentary broadcasts. In his autobiography, Lange wrote:

I listened every night it was on, all the way through secondary school, and was always on the Labour side. It was not because Pop voted Labour or because many of the families I knew supported Labour; it was because Labour was for the underdog and I hated the National Party for its smugness and arrogance.232

Lange’s formal education included Otahuhu Kindergarten, Fairburn Road School, Otara Intermediate School, Otahuhu College, and Auckland University. Throughout his schooling, Lange consistently performed below capacity. It was not until completing his Master of Laws with First Class Honours at Auckland University in 1970 that the potential of his high IQ was realised.

A defining characteristic of Lange’s schooling years which would have a lasting effect on his personality and, later, his political experience was his physical size. From an early age, Lange was grossly overweight. In his school years, Lange learnt to use humour to

230 V. Wright, David Lange: Prime Minister (Wellington, 1984), p.122
232 Lange’s grandfather also was a member of the Labour Party, joining its Thames branch in 1917.
232 Lange (2005), p.47-48
deflect the cutting remarks made by children about his weight. “‘Different’ is a word a lot of people use to describe David Lange at school, and in later life. It is clear that his size is central to this, and he was to acknowledge years later that his size was a major reason for his rapid rise in politics.”

Lange’s size was not his only conspicuous personal characteristic. At Otahuhu College, he came to be known for his quick wit and his ability as a public speaker. It was during a class talk that Lange first announced his political ambitions. He informed his intermediate class that he was either going to be Prime Minister of New Zealand or an engine driver.

**Lange’s beliefs and his working life prior to entering politics**

Lange supported himself financially at university by working at a freezing works over the summer holidays. Lange described the working conditions as “appalling” and said he could not help but identify with his fellow workers. He also worked on a part-time basis whilst studying law part-time as a clerk in a law firm, which was unconventionally committed to acting for the less privileged and protesters against apartheid, Vietnam and the nuclear arms race.

As a graduate, Lange commenced employment as a law clerk; initially working for Haigh, Charters and Carthy. It was around this time that Lange also started travelling;

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233 Wright, p.21  
234 ibid, p.22  
235 Lange (2005), p.63  
236 Grant, p.160
visiting the United Kingdom and Asia. Whilst in London, he met and married his first wife, Naomi.

Lange and his new wife settled in Auckland and, after completing his Masters degree, he commenced employment as a lawyer. He took over a retiring lawyer’s practice. Lange’s law office predominately handled criminal cases and he increasingly became regarded as a “poor man’s lawyer”, representing the poorest and least-likely-to-pay clients.\textsuperscript{237} The great bulk of Lange’s work was done on legal aid and he noted that he “ended up with the people who found the system too big a challenge.”\textsuperscript{238} His practice “brought [him] into contact with the run-of-the-mill human failings which arose from drunkenness, disorder and domestic disharmony.”\textsuperscript{239} Indeed, the Christian ideals of working in the service of others, instilled in him by his parents, appear to have played an important role in this aspect of his life, as did his affiliation with the underdog.

\textit{Lange’s beliefs and early political activities}

Lange became a father for the first time in May 1971 after the birth of his son, Roy.\textsuperscript{240} Byron followed in March 1974 as did Emily in May 1976. Whilst becoming a family man, Lange was also increasingly participating in political activities. He had earlier joined the Labour Party in 1963 and later became the chairman of the Council for Civil Liberties. He remained on the political periphery until he contested the seat vacated by Michael Bassett, his distant cousin, on the Auckland City Council in 1974. He was

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\textsuperscript{237} Wright, p.87  \\
\textsuperscript{238} Lange (2005), p.93  \\
\textsuperscript{239} ibid, p.95  \\
\textsuperscript{240} Lange and his wife also had a stillborn daughter in 1969.
\end{flushright}
unsuccessful but not discouraged. At the 1975 election, Lange unsuccessfully contested the safe National seat of Hobson. Lange was finally victorious after seeking selection for the safe Labour seat of Mangere in the 1977 by-election.\(^{241}\) Lange’s booming voice, confidence and quick wit ensured he romped home with an impressive majority.

Lange’s decision to enter politics stems from his frustration with his predominately reactive role as a lawyer.\(^{242}\) Indeed, Lange believed the ‘system’ was failing his clients. Lange’s biographer has noted:

> If, like David Lange, you have for years picked people up at the bottom of the cliff, the exercise will probably after a time begin to seem futile, and you may feel that your best efforts should be directed towards building a fence at the top – that is to say, towards political activity.\(^{243}\)

A belief in needing to come to the aid of the vulnerable certainly appears to be a driving force behind Lange’s desire to enter politics. It has been noted that Lange simply wanted people to be given “a fair go”.\(^{244}\) His brother, Peter Lange, wrote shortly before Lange’s death in 2005 that he regarded his brother’s main characteristics as being “a sense of compassion, a sense of adventure and a sense of humour.”\(^{245}\) Even Lange’s critics acknowledged that he was “a genuinely good-hearted man with strong feelings of social concern.”\(^{246}\)

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\(^{241}\) The Hobson seat had been vacated by Labour MP, Colin Moyle, after being accused by Prime Minister Muldoon of being picked up by police for homosexual activity. He gave three different explanations for his presence on the street in question thus opening himself up to the charge that he had misled parliament. He resigned his seat and did not seek re-election in the by-election.

\(^{242}\) Wright, p.94

\(^{243}\) ibid, p.99


\(^{245}\) P. Lange, Letter to the Editor, *Listener*, 13 November 2004, p.10

Examination of Lange’s maiden speech to the House will also assist in explaining the beliefs that led to his entering the political scene. In it he described his politics as “democratic socialism”. Lange’s speech also highlighted his sense of compassion for the under-privileged. When speaking of his electorate, Mangere, and the challenges it faces he notes:

The concern that I have is that in my electorate there are some people under desperate stress. That stress arises from their present inability to provide sufficient [sic] for themselves and their families to live adequately.247

Lange addressed the role of Parliament and its duty to New Zealand society as a whole:

I believe that our challenge is to create a society where people feel committed to each other, where they have an interdependence which no adversity can force apart, where they realise they have a duty to their brothers, and where the fruits of such society are seen in the love, the charity, and the compassion of people, because, unless we elect to take that course, we must take the course of doing it by legislation.248

Lange also stated:

I invite members to reflect …to see whether this House has led the country to a new plateau of security and achievement or whether, somewhere on that slippery slope, we might be putting the millstones around the necks of the children in our society.249

Celebrating life and the inherent worth of oneself are also beliefs Lange has been noted to have had.250 Shortly before the 1984 election, Lange was quoted as saying:

I don’t surrender any of the optimism that I think should mark our vitality as people. I think there is no inevitability of disaster, of pessimism, that people have for too long simply talked about life after death.

247 D. Lange, Maiden Speech to the House of Representative, delivered 26 May 1977; reprinted in Wright, p.108
248 ibid, p.113
249 ibid, p.114
I think it comes back much closer to home. I’m prepared to leave the metaphysical aspects of it beyond, but I think that you have to seize that sense of worth of life, of one’s uniqueness.251

Lange’s belief in the role of Government to provide the means of achieving a successful and just society is apparent, as is his concern for the disadvantaged. The Christian socialist ideals he was brought up with helped form a sense of community service and comprise the basis of his political belief system.

*Lange’s beliefs demonstrated in the course of the ANZUS dispute*

Lange’s maiden speech propelled him into national prominence. Two years later, in November 1979, he won the deputy leadership over incumbent Bob Tizard. Through the efforts of others in the Labour Party, mainly by Auckland colleagues, Lange became party leader in February 1983. Just over a year later, in July 1984, Lange became Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Upon assuming the office of Prime Minister, Lange was personally against nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence. However, the extent of Lange’s belief regarding nuclear matters is in dispute. In interviews with this author, former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mervyn Norrish; former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Mr. Gerald Hensley; former Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, Dr. John Henderson; former Press Secretary to Lange, Mr. Ross Vintner; and former senior Cabinet Ministers, Rt. Hon. Mike Moore and Hon. David Caygill all stated that Lange was *personally* committed to the Labour Party’s anti-nuclear policy.

251 ibid
It should be noted that former Secretary of Defence, Mr. Denis McLean and former Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson, believed otherwise. McLean asserts that evidence such as the authorisation of Jamieson visiting Hawaii to discuss a possible ship to be sent, suggests Lange was indeed not personally committed to the policy. Furthermore, Jamieson contends that Lange’s commitment fluctuated. Whilst he believed Lange’s inclination was always to shun nuclear weapons and question the merits of nuclear power, he was not committed to the extent that he was prepared to risk his political prospects.

Lange has stated that he simply took it for granted that Labour would ban nuclear weapons from entering New Zealand as soon as it was elected.252 “It seemed wrong for a country like New Zealand to play host to nuclear missiles, even if they came on ships full of recreationally minded sailors.”253 His aversion to nuclear weapons and the nuclear arms race took centre stage in many of his speeches. He often commented on the irrationality and immorality of the concept of nuclear deterrence. At the Oxford Union debate, Lange argued: “Nuclear weapons make us insecure, and to compensate for our insecurity we build and deploy more nuclear weapons …we know that we are seized by irrationality and yet we persist.”254 Moreover, he contended: “Rejecting nuclear weapons is to assert what is human over the evil nature of the weapon; it is to restore to humanity the power of decision; it is to allow true moral force to reign supreme.”255

252 D. Lange, Nuclear Free – The New Zealand Way (Auckland, 1990), p.31
253 ibid
255 ibid, p.11
However, Lange held a different belief about nuclear propulsion. Indeed, only a few weeks after gaining the leadership of the Labour Party, Lange unsuccessfully attempted to alter its anti-nuclear policy so as to allow for visits of nuclear-propelled ships. He believed that “a stand against the arms race was the legitimate concern of foreign policy.”²⁵⁶ Lange could not see how the arguments for banning nuclear weapons could be properly applied to nuclear propulsion: “If we continued to lock propulsion and weapons together and did not distinguish them, I was not sure how I could persuade the United States of the essential rationality of our policy.”²⁵⁷ Subsequently, in his speeches, Lange focused on the global threat of nuclear weapons and their proliferation as opposed to nuclear-powered and armed vessels.

Commentators on the ANZUS dispute have asserted that there was some anti-American sentiment within the Labour Party, which helped consolidate the break with the United States. Former Cabinet Minister, Michael Bassett, has contended that “[m]ore than a touch of anti-Americanism can be discerned within Labour’s growing nuclear stance.”²⁵⁸ However, it has been argued that Lange did not share this belief. Henderson has commented that not only did Lange not harbour anti-American sentiment, rather, he held America in high regard.²⁵⁹ Moreover, given the Cold War mentality that existed at the time of the ANZUS dispute, Lange was well aware of the need for American global strength. In light of this, in his Oxford Union speech, Lange acknowledged the role

²⁵⁶ Lange (1990), p.33
²⁵⁷ ibid
²⁵⁹ Interview by the author with former Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, Dr John Henderson, 7 September 2004
America, as a nuclear super-power, played in ensuring peace in Western Europe: “I freely acknowledge that the nuclear deterrent is maintained in good conscience with the honourable intention of preserving the life and freedom of the people of Western Europe.”

Another political belief Lange demonstrated whilst handling the foreign affairs portfolio, is the notion that a small state has the same sovereign right as a large state to implement policy. Despite how infuriated the United States Administration became with New Zealand, Lange firmly believed that the Government had every right to continue implementing its anti-nuclear policy. He argued at Oxford: “[t]o compel an ally to accept nuclear weapons against the wishes of that ally is to take the moral position of totalitarianism, which allows for no self-determination.” Lange’s affinity for the underdog had been taken to a higher level.

**Motives**

A complete analysis of Lange’s leadership style and its effect on the ANZUS dispute requires examination, not only of his fundamental beliefs, but also, of the desires that activated him. The underlying motives that led Lange into a political career will now be examined.

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260 Lange (1985), p.8
261 ibid, p.11
Uncovering the primary motivational factors in Lange’s political career has been the focus of a number of studies produced by Henderson. As the Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, Henderson was able to view Lange at close proximity as Prime Minister on a day-to-day basis. During his career as a political scientist, Henderson has applied James Barber’s framework in categorising Lange’s political motivation. As noted in Chapter 1, Barber’s typology consists of two variables: a leader’s participation in politics (how much energy they devote to politics), and how they feel about their political life. These variables allow the leader to be placed into one of four character types: active-positive, active-negative, passive-positive and passive-negative. A motivational force accompanies each character type. Henderson has identified Lange as a passive-positive leader and therefore, concludes that the search for approval and affection characterise his political motivations. Utilising Barber’s variables and determining Lange’s political activity levels and his attitude towards his political role will greatly assist in determining Lange’s motivational make-up and thus fulfil this section of Hermann’s model.

Lange’s political activity level

Lange did not devote all his energy to politics as some “active” leaders do. He has even been criticised as being lazy: a contention strongly disputed by Henderson. Lange is also remembered by his other advisors as not being a lazy man. In terms of foreign policy, Hensley has stated that Lange devoted however much time was necessary to tasks.

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264 Henderson, p.205
at hand. Norrish shares a similar opinion: he has stated that as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange gave the portfolio its due.

However, Lange’s ability to quickly get bored of a subject is well documented. Harvey McQueen asserts that because of Lange’s “quickness of intellect, he switched off if he was getting bored, hence he had a reputation for inattention and rudeness.” It has also been contended that “Lange was cursed by a mind so restless it needed continual protean stimulus to ward off boredom.” Henderson also notes that Lange was ill at ease in formal occasions and often felt trapped by the protocol of the seating arrangements.

Lange’s energy levels are best described as wide ranging. Indeed, Lange has acknowledged his inclination to work in fits and starts:

There were days of crisis when I would have worked more than twenty hours. There were other days, I would have worked, formally about four hours. And there were some days when I would deal with questions, lie down on the couch, and go to sleep in the office.”

Not surprisingly, Lange’s working style was best suited to times of crisis. His ability to rise to the occasion has been noted as one of his strengths.

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265 Interview by the author with former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Mr. Gerald Hensley, 9 December 2004
266 Interview by the author with former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mervyn Norrish, 10 December 2004
267 H. McQueen, *The Ninth Floor: inside the Prime Minister’s Office – a political experience*, (Auckland, 1999), p.196
269 Henderson, p.206
271 Wright, p.141
Of significance to the assessment of Lange’s level of activity is the fact that it was through the efforts of others that he was elevated to the leadership of the Labour Party. Lange was promoted by a group of mainly Auckland colleagues, led by Roger Douglas. Henderson notes that Lange took pride knowing that he never engaged in aggressive self-promotion.\textsuperscript{272} His attitude towards political manoeuvring is telling about his political motivations. This aspect of Lange’s leadership will now be analysed.

\textit{Lange’s attitude towards politics}

Barber’s second variable consists of asking the question: does the leader enjoy his political life? Henderson concludes that Lange enjoyed the political stage and regarded politics in a positive light. Therefore, Lange is characterised as a “passive-positive”.\textsuperscript{273} According to Barber, passive-positives are drawn to politics through their need to attract the approval of others and their search for affection. They revel in performing for people and the drama of politics. This characterisation aptly applies to Lange. His love of press conferences, television interviews and televised debates is widely acknowledged.\textsuperscript{274} Lange used these as a means of demonstrating his quick wit and superior oratorical skills. The Oxford Union debate arguably provided Lange with his greatest opportunity to gain widespread approval and affection. Jon Johansson has noted: “Oxford was also high theatre and in that type of forum Lange was superlative.”\textsuperscript{275} Former senior Cabinet Minister, David Caygill, regards Lange’s greatest strength as being “the combination of

\textsuperscript{272} Henderson, p.207
\textsuperscript{273} Henderson, p.208
\textsuperscript{274} In an interview with the author, Henderson, commented that “Lange loved the press conferences in Wellington. He would reply pretty colourfully to questions about ANZUS.”
\textsuperscript{275} J. Johansson, “The Falstaffian Wit of David R. Lange”, speech delivered at the parliamentary conference on the first term of the Fourth Labour Government, 30 April 2004. Transcript provided by Dr. Johansson; in the possession of the author.
his intelligence and his quickness of wit and his intuitive feel for people in situations and
his expressive language.”276  Furthermore, Vintiner has commented: “Lange was one of
those people who events came to him. Lange was like a hive and all the bees came to
him. And, like Queen Bee he was able to perform.”277

Whilst many enjoyed Lange’s dramatic abilities, some criticised his famous one-liners as
being personal and cruel.278  Political columnist, Colin James, at a parliamentary
conference last year, commented that whilst Lange could be warm and friendly, he could
also be quite cutting and vengeful.279  Moreover, in a 1987 article in the Far Eastern
Economic Review, Lange was described as “the lip with the quip”. It goes on to argue
that many of his comments work against him as they are often too esoteric and
unintelligible to the ordinary person and at times are cruel.280  Lange’s labelling of the
group of New Zealand former military chiefs who expressed their concerns about the
government’s anti-nuclear policy as “geriatric generals” illustrates this point.281  As does
Lange’s parting remark to retiring American Ambassador H. Munroe Brown that he must
be the only Ambassador who owned a horse named after his country’s foreign policy:

*Lacka Reason.*282

Lange’s penchant for performing for an audience also had policy implications and
affected the stand-off with the United States. Norrish, noted in an interview with this

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276 Interview by the author with former senior Cabinet Minister, Hon. David Caygill, 13 December 2004
277 Interview by author with former press secretary to Lange, Mr. Ross Vintiner, 8 December 2004
278 Grant, p.165
279 C. James, speech to the parliamentary conference on the first term of the Fourth Labour Government, 30
April 2004, notes are author’s own.
280 “Lange ‘the lip’ leads the personality polls”, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16 July 1987, p.32
281 “Breakdown risk say military men”, *Otago Daily Times*, 9 October 1985, p.3
282 Johansson
author, that when asked a particular question during a press conference, Lange often had a quick answer which didn’t always square with the policy his colleagues or advisors wanted to follow. 283 Many of the impassioned speeches Lange gave regarding his Government’s anti-nuclear policy, infuriated United States officials and served to diminish the likelihood of reaching a solution to the dispute. Indeed, the detrimental affect of a speech given by Lange in Christchurch in 1985 was the subject of conversation during a meeting between Deputy Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, and Australian Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Gareth Evans in October 1985. Having been briefed by Foreign Minister, Bill Hayden, on his meeting with United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, Evans informed Palmer of the strong response in Washington to Lange’s speech and the subsequent hardening of the American attitude toward New Zealand. 284

John Henderson, the Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, has remarked on how the United States viewed Lange as often making jokes about nuclear deterrence, which in their eyes was a most serious and sombre concept. 285 The Oxford Union debate and the comment made by Lange to an American interjector to “please hold your breath. I can smell the uranium on it”, was arguably the greatest affront to the American sensibilities. Lange has acknowledged the slight felt by the United States after making that remark:

The one thing the Americans never forgave me for was that interjection. That was deemed by them to have been a terrible slight in the relationship and it says something for my inability to understand what American sensitivities are about. 286

283 Interview with Norrish
284 Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo, 17 October 1985, held at Archives NZ, Wellington; archives reference: AAWW 7112 W4640/1
285 Interview with Henderson
286 Russell, p. 97
As has been demonstrated, the language employed by Lange impacted negatively on the ANZUS dispute. When asked during an interview with this author if a different Labour Prime Minister would have meant a different outcome on the ANZUS issue, Caygill responded by saying it quite possibly could have: “If the personalities had been different the language might have been slightly different, the impression might have been different and the relationship might have been different.”

Whilst rhetoric enabled Lange to gain affection from international audiences it also proved to be costly in terms of the relationship between New Zealand and the United States.

Whilst passive-positives, such as Lange, gain pleasure from their political careers, they loathe situations involving conflict and disharmony which are an inevitable part of the political process. It is widely acknowledged that Lange was extremely adverse to conflict on a personal level. As has already been noted, he was not prepared to aggressively pursue his own political promotion. Former advisor to Lange, Chris Laidlaw, has asserted:

Lange would go to almost any length to avoid confrontation and was forever ducking out through the rear entrance of his office to escape the clutches of angry ministers. He treated cabinet and caucus in the same perennially elusive. He seemed especially evasive when any of Labour’s stroppier women were trying to run him to ground.

Bassett, noted Lange’s aversion of confrontation in a speech delivered at Georgetown University in December 2002. He also commented that Helen Clark observed to him the

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287 Interview with Caygill
288 C. Laidlaw, Rights of Passage: beyond the New Zealand identity crisis (Auckland, 1999), p.112
“Lange always took the line of least resistance.”\textsuperscript{289} Similarly, Hensley has also noted that Lange strongly disliked confronting people.\textsuperscript{290}

It has been suggested that Lange’s distaste for conflict and disharmony led him to withdraw to the Tokelaus thus avoiding the situation surrounding the American request for a naval visit. Jamieson has asserted that Lange wished to avoid being at the centre of a cabinet row over the \textit{Buchanan} and having to deal with the more fervent anti-nuclear supporters: MP Helen Clark, Party President, Margaret Wilson and Lange’s speech writer (a later second wife), Margaret Pope. Therefore, “he deliberately withdrew from the scene, incommunicado in the Tokelaus.”\textsuperscript{291} This opinion is shared by former Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean, who has stated that “rather than face the radicals on the issue down he went off on a holiday.”\textsuperscript{292}

Lange’s Press Secretary, Ross Vintiner, briefed the Prime Minister on the developments in the \textit{Buchanan} fiasco on his way home from the Tokelaus and has a different interpretation of the situation with which Lange was confronted. He has contended that Lange’s trip to the Tokelaus was pre-planned the previous year and he was honour bound to go. Lange was unaware of the exact date that a request from the United States would come, but when it did he “quite wisely went away to get some space around the issue.”\textsuperscript{293}

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\textsuperscript{289} Bassett \\
\textsuperscript{290} Interview with Hensley \\
\textsuperscript{291} Interview via email by the author with the former Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson \\
\textsuperscript{292} Interview via email by the author with the former Secretary of Defence, Mr. Denis McLean \\
\textsuperscript{293} Interview with Vintiner
\end{flushright}
Whilst Lange loathed confrontation on a personal level, his execution of the anti-nuclear policy brought him into deep conflict with the United States. In response to Bassett’s argument, Lange has asserted that “it’s illogical to suggest that someone who didn’t like confrontation would deliberately take on a fight with the United States.”294 Henderson has contended that the policy Lange was pursuing inevitably involved confrontation with the world’s superpower. Had Lange solely sought to avoid conflict, he would have found a compromise formula.295 Indeed, in articulating New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy to its allies, Lange had to endure a number of confrontational, even hostile, meetings. In his memoirs, Lange recalled his first official meeting with British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher: “We had talks, but we did not have a conversation. She expressed forthright opposition to the nuclear-free policy and had no interest in anything short of our capitulation.”296

Evidently, Lange was a political leader who revelled in the performance aspect of politics. Gaining the approval and affection of others were his primary motivations during his first term as Prime Minister. However, as power is a fundamental aspect of politics, the extent to which Lange was motivated by power needs to be addressed.

As has been noted, Lange was not attracted to a career in the legal profession by the material gains it could provide. The same is true of the desires that compelled him to enter politics. Various commentators have contended that Lange was not materialistic. Former senior Cabinet Minister, Mike Moore, has said: “David has a sort of Gandhi-like

295 Interview with Henderson
296 Lange (2005), p.194
attitude which I admire and love. He’s the least materialistic person I know.”\textsuperscript{297} Lange has been praised for taking on no airs and graces and remaining “utterly unaffected by the trappings and flatteries of office.”\textsuperscript{298}

Whilst Lange must have harboured some personal ambitions upon entering politics, the desire for power was not his primary motivation. Lange has acknowledged “that the possibility of becoming a leader raises questions about personal ambition and personal power, but [said] categorically that these are not central for him.”\textsuperscript{299} Lange’s brother, Peter, has asserted that while Lange probably likes power he is not greedy for it.\textsuperscript{300}

\section*{Decision Style}

Over the course of Lange’s first term as Prime Minister, he had to make a number of difficult decisions regarding New Zealand’s foreign policy; arguably the decision to reject the \textit{Buchanan} was the most demanding. However, it should be remembered that he was operating within a system of cabinet government which did affect, to some extent, the strategies open to Lange when making a decision. Lange’s leadership of Cabinet has been described by his deputy, Geoffrey Palmer, as a “chairman of the board” approach.\textsuperscript{301} Palmer remembered Cabinet meetings in the first term of office as being very collegial and cooperative.\textsuperscript{302} Cabinet under the Fourth Labour Government did not operate on a
system of vote-taking. Policy decisions were never made through taking a vote at Cabinet. Under Lange’s leadership, Cabinet decisions were reached through a deliberative process. Lange’s Press Secretary, Ross Vintiner, asserts that this approach to running Cabinet was very much a deliberate decision on Lange’s part. However, former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Gerald Hensley, has suggested that Lange’s preference for chairing Cabinet may in fact be a result of his dislike of confrontational situations.

Lange’s decision style with regards to Cabinet stands in stark contrast to that of his predecessor, Robert Muldoon. Muldoon’s leadership of Cabinet can only be described as autocratic. Deliberation in a cooperative environment certainly did not characterise the preceding National Cabinet. Labour Cabinet Minister, Michael Bassett, has commented that the majority of ministers liked Lange’s style in Cabinet and “most ministers felt they had time adequately to discuss strategy in Cabinet.” Moreover, Palmer has noted that Lange gave ministers a lot of leeway in running their portfolios. Caygill shares this view and has stated that Lange “gave people jobs and left them to get on with them.”

However, Lange has been criticised for not fully disclosing crucial issues of foreign policy to Cabinet, such as the diplomatic negotiations with the United States regarding port access. Bassett asserts that Cabinet was never fully informed about the request for

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303 Interview with Vintiner
304 ibid
305 Interview with Hensley
306 M. Bassett, speech to a parliamentary conference on the first term of the Fourth Labour Government, 1 May 2004; notes are the author’s own.
307 Palmer
308 Interview with Caygill
the *Buchanan* to visit so was not able to make an informed decision. 309 This argument is supported by Hensley, who, whilst being interviewed by this author, commented that he later discovered that Lange “really had not discussed with any of his colleagues …anything about the *Buchanan* affair.” 310 Indeed, Lange has admitted that he confided only in his deputy, Geoffrey Palmer and third-ranked minister, Mike Moore, about the secret diplomatic negotiations with the United States. 311 Not even Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank O’Flynn, was privy to the developments regarding the *Buchanan*. Given these circumstances, it can be argued that deciding to visit the Tokelaus immediately after receiving the request for the *Buchanan* was a questionable decision to make. Cabinet was expected to discuss and make a decision about circumstances they had little, if any, knowledge of.

Consequently, Lange has been criticised for avoiding making difficult decisions. His visit of the Tokelaus has been used by his critics to illustrate this point. Former Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean, has argued that in trying to resolve the ANZUS crisis, Lange allowed problems to accumulate and was therefore unable to manage the decision-making process. He points to Lange “taking off on holiday” to the Tokelaus as evidence of this. 312 Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish, also notes that when Lange came up against a difficult issue, one which required him to make a firm decision one-way-or-another, Lange tended to sidestep it. 313 Moreover, former Chief of Defence

309 M. Bassett, “The Collapse of New Zealand’s Military Ties with the United States”, Fulbright Lecture delivered at Georgetown University, 2 December 2002; [www.michaebassett.co.nz/article_fulbright.htm](http://www.michaebassett.co.nz/article_fulbright.htm)
310 Interview with Hensley
311 Lange (1990), p.82
312 Interview with McLean
313 Interview with Norrish,
Staff, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson, regards Lange as having lacked the “resolution or firmness of command to handle the kind of international and national security crisis as represented by [the ANZUS dispute] that confronted New Zealand in the mid-1980s.”^314 This argument is affirmed by Norrish who has commented that in his opinion Lange’s biggest weakness was his “indecisiveness and lack of settled convictions.”^315

However, Lange was by no means uninformed when making decisions regarding ANZUS and the anti-nuclear policy. Advisors to Lange acknowledge that he ensured he was knowledgeable of the issues pertinent to the ANZUS dispute. McLean has commented that when deciding on a course of action, Lange certainly sought advice from officials.^316 Both Hensley and Norrish have noted that Lange was receptive to advice proffered by his advisors, read the briefs prepared for him and was able to quickly understand the material presented.^317

**Interpersonal Style**

As has been demonstrated, Lange’s decision style influenced the course the ANZUS dispute took. The way in which Lange interacted with his staff, advisors, colleagues and foreign officials will now be examined.

Lange’s personal staff and advisors regard their time working for Lange in a favourable light. Both Vintiner and Henderson have remarked that working for Lange was very

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^314 Interview with Jamieson  
^315 Interview with Norrish  
^316 Interview with McLean  
^317 Interviews with Hensley and Norrish
enjoyable. Indeed, Lange was a leader who instilled a sense of loyalty in his staff. Henderson notes that Lange never reprimanded his staff but also refused to interact with those members of his staff whom he considered to be difficult. Lange’s aversion of confrontation was illustrative of his poor interpersonal skills. Henderson also commented that rather than risk getting into an argument with a particular person, Lange would simply not talk to them.

Avoidance of conflict also permeated Lange’s relations with his public service advisors. In describing how he and Lange interacted, Jamieson, has commented: “Lange recognised my right to present my views frankly, listened with intelligent interest, occasionally commented on the apparent logic of what I said but rarely committed himself to an explicit position or enter into a discussion of pros and cons.” Moreover, Hensley has recalled that Lange preferred the personal to the professional approach when handling people. Indeed, this interpersonal method of retaining a collegial atmosphere during discussions and not entering into one-on-one debates would have significantly reduced the likelihood of a conflict.

One facet of Lange’s interpersonal relations that caused much controversy and resentment was his relationship with his speech writer, Margaret Pope. Lange and Pope embarked on an extramarital affair not long after Lange became Prime Minister, in early

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318 Interviews with Vintiner and Henderson
319 Interview with Henderson
320 ibid
321 Interview with Jamieson
322 G. Hensley, speech to the parliamentary conference on the first term of the Fourth Labour Government, 30 April 2004; notes are the author’s own.
The extent of her influence over Lange as it translated into government policy has been widely debated. Commentator, Simon Sheppard, has stated that “[n]otes from somewhere within the foreign affairs establishment taken in mid-1985 confirm that there was a great deal of concern felt within official circles about the role of Margaret Pope.”

Moreover, former advisor to Lange, Chris Laidlaw, has contended:

> There was of course one woman in the Beehive who was never seen by the outside world but who pulled more Prime Ministerial strings than any cabinet ministers …[Pope] wrote, or re-wrote, almost every significant speech he delivered and was a major source of influence particularly on the issue of nuclear weapons.

Vintiner, however, has remarked that the influence of Pope was not particularly important in terms of policy in the first term of government. Fellow Lange advisor, Henderson, believes Pope did have an influence over Lange which had political implications, but believes she impacted on the style the anti-nuclear policy took rather than its substance. Pope made the relationship with the United States much more difficult because of the sometimes undiplomatic nature of some of her speeches. Whilst Pope has sometimes been referred to as Lange’s “left-wing conscience”, Henderson is adamant that Lange did not require Pope to ensure he remained steadfast to the anti-nuclear policy. Pope commented on this concern over her influence in an interview in November 2005:

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323 Lange (2005, p.202
324 S. Sheppard, *Broken Circle: The Decline and Fall of the Fourth Labour Government* (Wellington, 1999), p.18
325 C. Laidlaw, *Rights of Passage: Beyond the New Zealand Identity Crisis* (Auckland, 1999), p.112
326 Interview with Vintiner
327 Interview with Henderson
328 Interview with Norrish
David and I often talked about policy issues and I used to have quite firm views and I would have expressed them to him had I been simply his employee. David encouraged people to express their opinions. He never needed anyone to tell him what was right and what was wrong, ever.\textsuperscript{329}

However, the emotive anti-nuclear speeches penned by Pope and delivered by Lange, which infuriated the United States and made resolution of the ANZUS dispute all the more impossible, have also been noted as being an instrumental factor by Norrish.\textsuperscript{330}

Lange’s relationship with Pope is one of the most controversial aspects of his time as Prime Minister. The evidence suggests that the speeches she wrote exacerbated the situation with the United States. These speeches encouraged the performer in Lange and were cause for considerable irritation in Washington. Had Lange not enjoyed such a close personal relationship with Pope, a resolution to the quarrel may have been forthcoming.

Lange’s relationship with Pope concerned many of his political colleagues. Stan Rodgers, the Minister of Labour in the Fourth Labour Government, stated in a parliamentary conference in 2004 that Pope significantly influenced Lange.\textsuperscript{331}

Furthermore, Russell Marshall, the Minister of Education, has been quoted as saying: “The real decisions were being made by those other two [Lange and Pope] and none of us were ever privy to that.”\textsuperscript{332} However, in an interview with this author Caygill asserted

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\textsuperscript{330} Interview with Norrish
\textsuperscript{331} S. Rodger, speech to the parliamentary conference on the first term of the Fourth Labour Government, 1 May 2004; notes are the author’s own.
\textsuperscript{332} Interview by Simon Sheppard with Russell Marshall, 16 April 1999, quoted in Sheppard, p.18
\end{flushleft}
that “I am not impressed with the argument that Margaret had a significant influence over David in a policy sense at any stage.”\textsuperscript{333}

Regardless of the question of his relationship with Pope, some of Lange’s colleagues regarded his interpersonal skills as lacking. His strong disliking of interpersonal conflict lead Marshall to the conclusion that: “David was always better at dealing with people en masse than he was an individual …He couldn’t cope with the one-on-one discussion at all, especially if the other person was angry. Not at all!”\textsuperscript{334} Bassett is also critical of Lange’s poor interpersonal skills. He believes Lange’s inability to confront opponents contributed to his failure to effectively lead the Labour Party and secure an acceptable outcome to the ANZUS dispute.\textsuperscript{335}

Other of Lange’s colleagues remember with fondness their experiences of working with him. Palmer regarded Lange as being “very easy to get along with.”\textsuperscript{336} Moore remarked to this author that working with Lange was “great fun.”\textsuperscript{337} However, whilst working with Lange may have been enjoyable for some in the Government, Lange’s poor people management skills have been shown to be problematic for others.

Lange’s weak interpersonal relations were also apparent in his dealings with foreign officials during the course of the ANZUS dispute. Lange’s infamous 1984 meetings with

\textsuperscript{333} Interview with Caygill
\textsuperscript{334} Russell, pp.194-195
\textsuperscript{335} Bassett (2002)
\textsuperscript{336} G. Palmer, speech to the parliamentary conference on the first term of the Fourth Labour Government, 30 April 2004; notes are the author’s own.
\textsuperscript{337} Phone interview by the author with former senior Cabinet Minister, Rt. Hon. Mike Moore, 4 December 2004
United States Secretary of Defence, George Shultz, provide a striking example of Lange’s poor interpersonal skills. Whilst it has been confirmed Lange did not indicate to Shultz that he would be able to reverse the government’s anti-nuclear policy within six months, Lange’s aversion of confrontation arguably led to him suggesting that the Americans place a ship request in the usual manner. He would have been fully aware that the United States would not want to request a naval visit only to have it declined. In buying time, Lange was simply putting off the inevitable, thus demonstrating his non-committal and indecisive character. As was noted in Chapter 4, the two meetings that took place between Lange and Shultz in 1984 coloured Shultz’s view of Lange and hindered subsequent negotiations.

Lange also did not enjoy favourable relations with Australian Prime Minister, Bob Hawke. In his memoirs, Lange described their relationship as “strained”. Norrish, has recalled how Lange regarded Hawke as being patronising and, to some extent, a bully; to which Lange did not react well.

**Conclusion**

Lange was brought up with a sense of duty to the community and, in particular, the disadvantaged. Frustrated with his primarily reactive role as a lawyer, Lange decided to enter politics. Lange was also motivated by the performance aspect of politics. He

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338 Interview with Norrish
339 The United States Ambassador, H. Munroe Brown, was another American official whom Lange met with. Brown suffered from hearing problems and was often not accompanied by a senior U.S. Embassy official. Lange had very little confidence in Brown and there was concern about Brown’s ability to accurately convey to Washington developments in New Zealand.
340 Lange (2005), p.190
341 Interview with Norrish
revelled in the drama of the political process. Whilst he strove for approval and affection from others, he keenly avoided confrontational situations, often resorting to humour to alleviate hostile situations. Lange’s fondness for performing for an audience also had political implications and negatively affected the dispute with the United States. Indeed, many of the speeches Lange gave concerning the anti-nuclear policy infuriated Washington and diminished the possibility of reaching a solution to the dispute.

Lange’s personal political style is best described as poor. While ensuring Cabinet meetings were collegial and allowing ministers room to move with their portfolios, Lange’s inability to involve himself in potentially confrontational situations and to act decisively hindered the ANZUS dispute resolution process. His relationship with Pope affected the work of other advisors and the undiplomatic character of the speeches she authored goaded Washington. Lange ensured he was well informed of those issues pertinent to the Buchanan standoff and the ANZUS dispute, yet did not allow his Cabinet colleagues to do the same, whilst expecting them to make a decision regarding the American request.

In Chapter 8 of this thesis, the final section of Hermann’s framework will be applied to the case study of David Lange and his affect on the ANZUS dispute. This portion of the model is comprised of three “filters”: personal characteristics Hermann asserts affect the degree to which a leader’s personality can influence foreign policy behaviour. Accordingly, Lange’s interest and training in foreign affairs and his sensitivity to his environment will be assessed.
CHAPTER 8

“FILTERS” - PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS: INTEREST
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TRAINING IN FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND SENSITIVITY TO ENVIRONMENT

The final section of Herman’s model is comprised of three further personal characteristics which Hermann asserts affect the degree to which a leader’s personal characteristics can have an impact on national foreign policy.342 These three characteristics are a leader’s interest in foreign affairs, their training in foreign affairs, and their general sensitivity to the political environment. Hermann labels these three features “filters”. These three filters will now be applied to David Lange and the extent to which these personal characteristics affected the nuclear ships issue and the ANZUS dispute examined.

Interest in Foreign Affairs

Hermann asserts that without at least a general interest in foreign affairs, a political leader’s personal characteristics will have little effect.343 The higher the degree of interest, the higher the degree of attention the leader will pay to foreign policy. An

343 ibid, p.56
interested leader will ensure they are consulted on decisions and kept abreast of developments in foreign affairs. This variable will now be related to Lange.

In his memoirs, Lange stated that he took the foreign affairs portfolio “because it interested [him] and because [he] knew it would be critical to the new government.”

Lange also wrote that he was attracted to the role of Minister of Foreign Affairs by the international travel which accompanied the portfolio and the opportunity to meet the significant figures of the day. He was also concerned that he advance New Zealand’s interests in places where that had not traditionally been done. Lange was eager to build relationships with the emerging world. For this reason, Lange visited places such as Africa, India, China, Indonesia and the Philippines. Lange’s Press Secretary, Ross Vintiner, remarked to this author how Lange foresaw the enormous impact Asia was going to have on the global community. Vintiner also recalled the awareness Lange had of New Zealand needing to play a tangible role, as opposed to a merely a notional one, in the Pacific region. Furthermore, he described Lange as being “very cosmopolitan” and remembered him following world affairs very closely.

At the heart of the foreign affairs portfolio lay the Labour Government’s anti-nuclear policy. Anti-nuclearism had long been an interest of Lange’s. Whilst he did not join the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or any other group formed to protest against nuclear testing, Lange was drawn into the small active protest movement through his law

345 ibid, p.219
346 ibid, p.220
347 Interview by the author with former press secretary to Lange, Mr. Ross Vintiner, 8 December 2004
studies. During the course of his employment at Haigh, Charters and Carthy, barristers and solicitors of Auckland, Lange would often be called on by the senior partner, Frank Haigh, to help distribute leaflets which denounced nuclear testing in the Pacific and announced the times of rallies and marches. Lange wrote that although he did not enjoy that part of his job he “thought enough of the cause not to spurn support for it.” He summed up his participation in the movement thus: “I delivered the leaflets, I marched in the rallies and I went to the meetings.” Indeed, Lange regarded the majority of protestors with whom he came into contact as “reek[ing] of sincerity and goodness.” Lange’s regard for the anti-nuclear movement in New Zealand is also evidenced in his legal representation of protestors charged for acts carried out in the course of protests.

One aspect of foreign affairs that did not appeal to Lange was the formal aspect of representing New Zealand abroad. Former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Gerald Hensley, has commented that Lange found the formality and ceremonial nature of the foreign affairs role to be disagreeable. Similarly John Henderson, the Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, recalled Lange’s loathing of formal occasions when he was “trapped” by the protocol of seating arrangements. Henderson also noted that whilst

349 ibid, p.14
350 ibid
351 ibid, p.15
352 ibid
353 Interview by the author with former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Mr. Gerald Henley, 9 December 2004
on official overseas visits, Lange’s preference was to spend time at fun parks rather than attend formal VIP receptions.  

Despite his dislike of the formal aspect of foreign affairs, Lange continued to be keenly interested in the portfolio and the issue of nuclear ship visits and ANZUS. It can be argued that his interest in this area helped ensure he was kept well abreast of foreign affairs developments. He studiously read all the foreign affairs briefs prepared for him by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Lange was also kept well informed of developments in the negotiation process with the United States over the nuclear ships issue by the high-ranking public service officials. Henderson contends that any errors Lange made during the course of the ANZUS dispute were not the result of ignorance on his part. 

**Training in Foreign Affairs**

A leader’s training in foreign affairs prior to assuming their current office constitutes Hermann’s second “filter”. Experience as a foreign minister, ambassador, or foreign affairs official meets Hermann’s definition of “training” in foreign affairs. The leader with no previous experience has no personal expertise to draw upon ensuring little knowledge of what will succeed and fail in the international arena. With training and/or experience comes a wider repertoire of possible foreign policy behaviours to consider. Lange had no training in foreign affairs prior to his election as Prime Minister in 1984. Furthermore, similarly to many of his Cabinet colleagues, he had had no experience being

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355 ibid
356 Interview by the author with the Director of the Advisory Group to Lange, Dr. John Henderson, 27 September 2004
357 ibid
in Cabinet. Prior to becoming Prime Minister, Lange was a lawyer and an opposition Member of Parliament. Despite this, Henderson believes that Lange was quite well prepared for the foreign affairs role of Prime Minister upon assuming office.\textsuperscript{358} He notes that Lange was well read on international issues of the day and having travelled quite extensively in the past, had “an instinctive feel for foreign affairs.”\textsuperscript{359} Having worked at close quarters with Lange, Henderson also asserted that his expertise in foreign affairs developed rapidly. Lange studiously studied the briefs that were prepared for him by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and readily absorbed the material presented to him by his other advisors.

However, it can be well contended that foreign affairs is a policy area that requires skills that are primarily acquired through experience. Whilst Lange may have had an instinct for foreign affairs and was well read in world affairs prior to assuming the office of Prime Minister, many of his actions during the course of the ANZUS dispute highlighted his lack of prior practical experience. One such example includes Lange’s invitation to the United States to proceed with a ship request in the usual manner and authorising the secret diplomatic negotiations, whilst not informing his Cabinet colleagues of developments. This course of action ensured his Cabinet colleagues were ignorant of the vital issues surrounding the issue of American naval visits and contributed to the slight felt by Washington when their request was met with a negative response.\textsuperscript{360}

\textsuperscript{358} Interview with Henderson
\textsuperscript{359} ibid
\textsuperscript{360} Interestingly, whilst Lange’s handling of the \textit{Buchanan} affair may be construed as demonstrating inexperience, former Chief of Defence, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson, contends that Lange’s management of the crisis was “shrewd and politically masterly”. Jamieson asserts that by deliberately withdrawing from the scene, Lange provided “room for his more passionate anti-American colleagues to
Lange’s lack of foreign affairs training is evident in his decision to travel to the Tokelaus during the course of the Buchanan crisis. Lange chose to proceed with the scheduled visit in January despite receiving a diplomatic note from the American Embassy foreshadowing a request for a naval visit. The American request for the Buchanan to visit was the most crucial stage in the ANZUS dispute: for the first time, the New Zealand Government was applying its anti-nuclear policy; at stake was the more than thirty year old alliance with the world superpower. Leaving New Zealand merely ensured his uninformed colleagues had to manage the critical situation.

Indeed Lange’s lack of training or previous experience in foreign affairs and its adverse effect on the ANZUS dispute has also been noted by some of his public service advisors. Hensley suggests that the inexperience of Lange and other ministers may have led them to underestimate the seriousness of the quarrel with Washington. Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mervyn Norrish, points to Lange’s improvisation at press conferences when discussing the Government’s foreign policy as illustrative of his inexperience: his statements did not always square with the agreed policy line his advisors and colleagues wished to follow.

Indeed, Lange’s lack of experience in foreign affairs explains, to some extent, the undiplomatic character of some of his speeches, which were met with much outrage in Washington. Lange continually stated that the Government wished to retain both New

“push the button” to activate the wider anti-American movement operating under the emotion charged anti-nuclear banner.” Interview by the author via email with Jamieson

361 Interview with Hensley
362 Interview with Norrish
Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and its participation in the ANZUS alliance, but he also continued to make remarks with which Washington took offence. In particular, Lange was aware of the undiplomatic nature of the speeches he gave to Labour Party conferences. When questioned about them by officials he simply described them to his advisors as “party romps”, to which not much consideration should be given.\footnote{Interviews with Henderson, Norrish and Jamieson} However, these “party romps” were scrutinised by Washington and were a source of much frustration. As noted in a Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo, the response in Washington to one such speech was to “[make] the United States position even more rigid.”\footnote{Ministry of Foreign Affairs memo, 17 October 1985; held at Archives NZ, Wellington; archives reference AAWW 7112 W4640/1}

These examples demonstrate Lange’s limited repertoire of foreign policy responses; particularly at the time of the Buchanan crisis. It can be seen that Lange’s inexperience was instrumental in the failure to resolve the dispute with the United States. Had Lange had more practical experience in foreign affairs he may have implemented a different series of decisions. Consequently, the slight felt by the United States may have been avoided and a mutually acceptable solution to the impasse found.

However, it should be noted that upon assuming the office of Prime Minister, Lange was immediately thrust into the dispute with the United States over the nuclear issue. He was not afforded any time with which to come to terms with the position of Prime Minister nor the foreign affairs portfolio. Subsequent to his election on Saturday 14\textsuperscript{th} July 1984,
Lange met with George Shultz in Wellington the following Tuesday.\footnote{Shultz was in New Zealand for the annual meeting of foreign ministers of the three ANZUS signatories. New Zealand was represented by Warren Cooper, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the outgoing National Government, as the incoming government was not due to be sworn in for another ten days and could not be represented at the meeting.} Despite the brevity of the meeting, Lange and his new Government’s anti-nuclear policy was thrust into the spotlight. Had Lange been afforded time to adjust to his new role and therefore gain a better appreciation of the requirements of foreign affairs, the extent of his foreign policy repertoire may have increased and allowed him to navigate the ANZUS dispute more skilfully.

**Sensitivity to Environment**

The third personal characteristic is general sensitivity to one’s environment. This affects “the consistency of the relationship between other characteristics and foreign policy.”\footnote{Hermann, p.57} Hermann defines sensitivity to one’s environment as indicating “the extent to which an individual is responsive to incoming stimuli from objects in the milieu in which he operates.”\footnote{Ibid} The less sensitive political leader will adjust incoming stimuli to conform to their viewpoint, whilst the more sensitive political leader will adjust their views if incoming stimuli warrant such an adjustment. This characteristic will now be applied to Lange and his role in the ANZUS crisis.

The public service officials and personal staff who were involved most heavily in the nuclear ships issue and the ANZUS dispute regard Lange as having been an attentive listener.\footnote{Interviews with Henderson, Hensley and Norrish} Moreover, he encouraged his advisors to explore different options.
Henderson has observed that generally Lange was open to advice, but was himself very capable and very determined to weigh up advice against his own beliefs.\textsuperscript{369} Moreover, Vintiner has observed that the extent to which Lange would listen to advice depended upon the issue in question.\textsuperscript{370}

Indeed, much of the advice Lange received from public service officials went against the Government’s anti-nuclear policy. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence officials opposed the banning of nuclear-capable warships. Lange recalled:

\begin{quote}
My officials missed no chance to remind me of the harm they believed the nuclear-free policy was already doing…Now officials warned us that we ‘should also be aware that the maintenance by New Zealand of a total and unqualified ban on port visits by vessels that are either nuclear-powered or capable of carrying nuclear weapons may constitute a significant complication in the realisation of an effective regional zone. Whatever we might say in explanation of our policy, the United States and Australia …are likely to suspect that New Zealand’s long-term goal is to have that policy adopted region-wide and incorporated in a regional zone.’\textsuperscript{371}
\end{quote}

In particular, Lange took issue with the advice tendered by the defence establishment:

“The advice I got from defence headquarters had a lot in common with the messages that came to me, directly and indirectly, from the American embassy. The Americans, of course, put it a lot more bluntly.”\textsuperscript{372} Lange viewed the Ministry of Defence and the advice it proffered with much scepticism. Its vocal opposition to the Government’s anti-nuclear policy exasperated Lange and led to a strained relationship, particularly between Lange and the Secretary of Defence, Denis McLean.\textsuperscript{373}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{369} Interview with Henderson \textsuperscript{370} Interview with Vintiner \textsuperscript{371} Lange (1990), p.66 \textsuperscript{372} ibid, p.69 \textsuperscript{373} Ibid
\end{flushright}
It should be noted that the various articles of advice offered to Lange by his advisors were subject to political constraints. The Labour Party, including the Executive and the parliamentary wing, was firm in its stand against allowing nuclear-capable vessels into New Zealand ports. Henderson has observed that “Lange had to stay within the context of Labour thinking.” As evidence of this he points to Lange capitulating to the majority of the Labour Party on the issue of nuclear propulsion. Indeed, political considerations necessitated readjustment of Lange’s viewpoint.

Conclusion

Lange had an interest in foreign affairs which ensured that he not only keep abreast of developments but also played a key role in the execution of the Government’s key foreign policy: the anti-nuclear policy. Lange’s lack of training and previous experience when tackling a number of key issues in the ANZUS dispute, most importantly the Buchanan incident, contributed to some poor decision making on his part, making navigation of the crisis more difficult. Finally, it has been demonstrated that Lange was sensitive to the political environment within which he was operating. He was open to receiving advice, but ultimately political constraints, rather than advice he received from officials, proved to be key in his adjusting his viewpoint on the nuclear ships issue. Despite the adjustment of his viewpoint on nuclear-propulsion, Lange’s resolve did not waive on the issue of nuclear weaponry. Lange did not regard incoming advice as warranting modification of his stand on the nuclear ships issue.

374 Interview with Henderson
In the concluding chapter of this thesis the conclusions drawn from the application of Hermann’s framework to the case study of the affect of David Lange’s personality on the ANZUS dispute will be discussed. The utility of the model for the assessment of the impact of a leader’s personality on a particular foreign policy will also be addressed.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

David Lange’s personality and leadership style have been shown to have had a significant impact on the execution of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the subsequent ANZUS dispute during his term as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1984-1987. Whilst he did not construct the anti-nuclear policy that formed the basis of the ANZUS crisis, he was the key figure in its implementation and significantly influenced the course of events. Moreover, the way in which Lange managed the impasse with the United States has been the subject of much debate.

The application of Margaret Hermann’s theoretical framework⁴⁷⁵ has enabled a comprehensive analysis of the effect of Lange’s personality and correlating leadership style on the ANZUS crisis to be undertaken. The situational factors with which Lange was confronted constituted the first set of variables to be considered in Hermann’s model. Decision latitude, definition of the situation and participation comprise this section.

As has been demonstrated, Lange had wide decision-latitude within which to work. The period within which Lange was managing the foreign policy crisis immediately followed his election victory. He was a young, popular, newly elected Prime Minister and as such was afforded a certain amount of political ‘capital’. Accordingly, Lange was in a better position to achieve policy change.

Second, the nature of the ANZUS dispute was such that Lange was required, to some extent, to define it; thus allowing more scope for his personality to influence the course of events. The dispute with the United States was unprecedented and as such, required Lange to interpret the issues comprising the foreign affairs crisis. He did so primarily by way of numerous public speeches, in which clarified the New Zealand Government’s anti-nuclear policy and its views on ANZUS. These public addresses and his superior oratorical skills enabled Lange to bring New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy to the world’s attention in a manner no other of his contemporaries could match.

Third, as both Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange was the political actor who participated most heavily in the ANZUS crisis. Lange met with a number of high level officials from the United States, Australia and Britain to discuss the ANZUS dispute. As the Government’s spokesperson, he also articulated the merits of the anti-nuclear policy to the media and the international community. As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lange was also responsible for introducing the New Zealand Nuclear-Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Bill into Parliament.
The application of Hermann’s second set of variables enabled a detailed examination of Lange’s personal characteristics to be undertaken. It was demonstrated that Lange was brought up with Christian ideals and a corresponding sense of duty to the community. He identified with the disadvantaged and this contributed to his desire to enter politics. Once in politics, Lange relished the performance aspect of the political process. He endeavoured to gain the approval and affection of others and went to great lengths to avoid confrontational situations.

These aspects of Lange’s personality have been shown to have had a negative affect on the ANZUS dispute. Numerous speeches Lange gave regarding New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy infuriated Washington and diminished the possibility of resolving the dispute. Lange’s loathing of conflict manifested itself in his sometimes offensive humorous retorts.

Lange’s personal political style was also examined in this second set of variables. Lange’s decision style and interpersonal style, which comprise his personal political style, were analysed and were shown to be lacking. Lange was a likeable leader who ensured he was informed of all issues pertinent to the ANZUS dispute. However, his inability to cope with confrontation impeded Lange’s ability to act decisively and prevented him from informing colleagues of critical developments in the ANZUS crisis. Indeed, Lange’s management of the Buchanan affair highlighted these weaknesses. His poor judgement and inability to take a firm stand on an issue which would inevitably involve conflict were demonstrated by Lange’s decision to travel to the Tokelaus at a
time when an American request for a naval visit was imminent. Furthermore, Lange’s personal relationship with his speech writer, Margaret Pope, hindered the work of other advisors. The undiplomatic nature of a number of the speeches she authored caused New Zealand officials much concern and served to further incense the United States.
The final section of Hermann’s theoretical framework was concerned with three further personal characteristics which were asserted to affect the degree to which a leader’s personal characteristics can have an impact on foreign policy. Lange’s interest and training in foreign affairs and his sensitivity to his environment were analysed. It was demonstrated that Lange did have an interest in foreign affairs and, in particular, anti-nuclearism. His decision to assume the foreign affairs portfolio and the enjoyment he evidently received from his role as Minister of Foreign Affairs illustrated this point. Consequently, Lange’s personality came to have more influence on the course of the ANZUS dispute.

Lange’s lack of training and previous experience in foreign affairs did have a negative impact on the ANZUS issue. In particular, his poor navigation of the Buchanan incident highlighted this deficiency. Furthermore, Lange’s cavalier attitude to the dispute with the United States may be due, in part, to his lack of prior experience in foreign affairs.

Finally, Lange was sensitive to the political environment within which he was working. He was open to receiving advice from officials and was not overly rigid in his views. Political constraints, as opposed to advice from officials, were demonstrated to have also played a key role in shaping Lange’s view of the foreign policy process.
In conclusion, the application of Hermann’s model to Lange and the ANZUS dispute has demonstrated that Lange had a significant effect on the execution of New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy and the subsequent ANZUS dispute. His considerable oratorical skills enabled New Zealand’s opposition to nuclear weapons to be heard on the world stage. He proved to be a superior spokesperson on this issue. However, his general management of the foreign affairs crisis was lacking in some respects. In particular, Lange’s handling of the Buchanan affair illustrated his poor management skills. His keen aversion of conflict and his inability to act decisively at crucial times negatively impacted on the dispute resolution process with Washington.

**The Utility of Hermann’s Theoretical Framework**

The application of Hermann’s framework allowed for a wide range of variables to be considered when assessing the influence of a leader’s personality on a particular foreign policy executed by their respective government. The examination of situational factors enabled the political constraints a leader must navigate to be explored, thus enabling political leaders from various political systems to be examined under Hermann’s framework. Analysing Lange, who operated in a Westminster system of parliamentary government, was possible as Hermann did not limit her model to leaders from presidential systems of government. Key factors in the New Zealand political system, such as the role of cabinet government and public opinion, were able to be addressed.
The personal characteristics Hermann included in the model are also wide ranging. Beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style cover a broad collection of personal characteristics. However, this author submits that further characteristics require inclusion in this set. The general management skills a leader possesses are of significance as to how they operate in the foreign policy making-process. A leader with strong administrative and organisational skills will approach a foreign policy issue in a manner different to one who does not. Whilst decision style and interpersonal style are indeed pertinent to such an investigation, they are limited (by Hermann’s definition) to a leader’s interaction with other policy-makers and the strategies they employ when making a decision.

Second, a leader’s intelligence is not directly addressed by Hermann’s model. Whilst an individual’s intelligence will come to bear upon the formation of their beliefs and motives and the development of their decision style and interpersonal style, this author submits that it is of such importance to how a leader operates in their political environment that it should be independently addressed. Indeed, the course of action a leader takes is directly related to their intellect. Furthermore, shortcomings, such as lack of training in foreign affairs, are more pronounced in a leader of more limited intelligence.

Assessment of intellect applies aptly to the study of David Lange. His considerable intelligence is often noted by political commentators. The manner in which he processed information arguably impacted on the way he managed foreign affairs issues and, in particular, the ANZUS crisis. Lange’s ability to comprehend enormous amounts of
complex material may have produced a more streamlined foreign policy decision-making process.

The third set of personal characteristics which Hermann labels “filters” are also of significance when assessing the affect a leader’s personality has on a particular foreign policy. A leader’s interest in and training in foreign affairs and their sensitivity to their environment were demonstrated in the preceding case study to have had a significant bearing on the degree to which a leader’s personality can affect the foreign policy of their nation.

Therefore, it can be argued that Hermann’s theoretical framework effectively demonstrates how a leader’s personality can affect the foreign policy behaviour of their nation. Despite two omissions, the variables Hermann utilises are pertinent to a study of this nature. Hermann’s model has enabled David Lange’s personality to be shown to have been a significant element to the ANZUS dispute.
APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

SECURITY TREATY BETWEEN AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE PARTIES TO THIS TREATY,

REAFFIRMING their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific Area,

NOTING that the United States already has arrangements pursuant to which its armed forces are stationed in the Philippines, and has armed forces and administrative responsibilities in the Ryukyus, and upon the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty may also station armed forces in and about Japan to assist in the preservation of peace and security in the Japan Area,

RECOGNIZING that Australia and New Zealand as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations have military obligations outside as well as within the Pacific Area,

DESIRING to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area, and

DESIRING further to coordinate their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area,

THEREFORE DECLARE AND AGREE as follows:
Article I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article II

In order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Article III

The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific.

Article IV

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article V

For the purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on any of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of any of the Parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.

Article VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

**Article VII**

The Parties hereby establish a Council, consisting of their Foreign Ministers or their Deputies, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council should be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

**Article VIII**

Pending the development of a more comprehensive system of regional security in the Pacific Area and the development by the United Nations of more effective means to maintain international peace and security, the Council, established by Article VII, is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of that Area.

**Article IX**

This Treaty shall be ratified by the Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of Australia, which will notify each of the other signatories of such deposit. The Treaty shall enter into force as soon as the ratifications of the signatories have been deposited.

**Article X**

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Any Party may cease to be a member of the Council established by Article VII one year after notice has been given to the Government of Australia, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of such notice.

**Article XI**

This Treaty in the English language shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof will be transmitted by that Government to the Governments of each of the other signatories.

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF** the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

DONE at the city of San Francisco this first day of September, 1951.
APPENDIX II

NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR FREE ZONE, DISARMAMENT, AND ARMS CONTROL ACT 1987

An Act to establish in New Zealand a Nuclear Free Zone, to promote and encourage an active and effective contribution by New Zealand to the essential process of disarmament and international arms control, and to implement in New Zealand the following treaties:

(a) The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty of 6 August 1985 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 1 to this Act):

(b) The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 5 August 1963 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 2 to this Act):

(c) The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1 July 1968 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 3 to this Act):

(d) The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of 11 February 1971 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 4 to this Act):

(e) The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 1972 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 5 to this Act):

1. Short Title—
This Act may be cited as the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987

2. Interpretation—
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—
"Biological weapon" means any agent, toxin, weapon, equipment, or means of delivery referred to in Article 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 1972 (the text of which is set out in Schedule 5 to this Act):

"Foreign military aircraft" means any aircraft, as defined in section 2 of the Defence Act 1971, which is for the time being engaged in the service of or subject to the authority or direction of the military authorities of any state other than New Zealand:

"Foreign warship" means any ship, as defined in section 2 of the Defence Act 1971, which—

(a) Belongs to the armed forces of a state other than New Zealand; and

(b) Bears the external marks that distinguishes ships of that state's nationality; and

(c) Is under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the Government of that state; and

(d) Is manned by a crew under regular armed forces discipline:

"Immunities", in relation to any ship, aircraft, or crew member, means immunities enjoyed under international law by ships, aircraft, or crew members of a class to which that ship, aircraft, or crew member belongs:

"Internal waters of New Zealand" means the internal waters of New Zealand as defined by section 4 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977:

"Nuclear explosive device" means any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used, whether assembled, partly assembled, or unassembled; but does not include the means of transport or delivery of such a weapon or device if separable from and not an indivisible part of it:

"Passage" means continuous and expeditious navigation without stopping or anchoring except in as much as these are incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by distress or for the purpose of rendering assistance to persons, ships, or aircraft in distress:

"Territorial sea of New Zealand" means the territorial sea of New Zealand as defined by section 3 of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act 1977.

3. Act to bind the Crown—
This Act shall bind the Crown.

4. New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone—
There is hereby established the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, which shall comprise:

(a) All of the land, territory, and inland waters within the territorial limits of New Zealand; and

(b) The internal waters of New Zealand; and

(c) The territorial sea of New Zealand; and

(d) The airspace above the areas specified in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this section.

Prohibitions in relation to nuclear explosive devices and biological weapons

5. Prohibition on acquisition of nuclear explosive devices—

(1) No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, shall, within the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,—

(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; or

(b) Aid, abet, or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device.

(2) No person, who is a New Zealand citizen or a person ordinarily resident in New Zealand, and who is a servant or agent of the Crown, shall, beyond the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone,—

(a) Manufacture, acquire, or possess, or have control over, any nuclear explosive device; or

(b) Aid, abet, or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device.

6. Prohibition on stationing of nuclear explosive devices—

No person shall emplant, emplace, transport on land or inland waters or internal waters, stockpile, store, install, or deploy any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

7. Prohibition on testing of nuclear explosive devices—

No person shall test any nuclear explosive device in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

8. Prohibition of biological weapons—

No person shall manufacture, station, acquire, or possess, or have control over any biological weapon in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone.

9. Entry into internal waters of New Zealand—
(1) When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the entry of foreign warships into the internal waters of New Zealand, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.

(2) The Prime Minister may only grant approval for the entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by foreign warships if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the warships will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device upon their entry into the internal waters of New Zealand.

10. Landing in New Zealand—
(1) When the Prime Minister is considering whether to grant approval to the landing in New Zealand of foreign military aircraft, the Prime Minister shall have regard to all relevant information and advice that may be available to the Prime Minister including information and advice concerning the strategic and security interests of New Zealand.

(2) The Prime Minister may only grant approval to the landing in New Zealand by any foreign military aircraft if the Prime Minister is satisfied that the foreign military aircraft will not be carrying any nuclear explosive device when it lands in New Zealand.

(3) Any such approval may relate to a category or class of foreign military aircraft, including foreign military aircraft that are being used to provide logistic support for a research programme in Antarctica, and may be given for such period as is specified in the approval.

11. Visits by nuclear powered ships—
Entry into the internal waters of New Zealand by any ship whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power is prohibited.

Savings
12. Passage through territorial sea and straits—
Nothing in this Act shall apply to or be interpreted as limiting the freedom of—

(a) Any ship exercising the right of innocent passage (in accordance with international law) through the territorial sea of New Zealand; or

(b) Any ship or aircraft exercising the right of transit passage (in accordance with international law) through or over any strait used for international navigation; or

(c) Any ship or aircraft in distress.

13. Immunities—
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as limiting the immunities of—
(a) Any foreign warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes; or

(b) Any foreign military aircraft; or

(c) Members of the crew of any ship or aircraft to which paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of this section applies.

**Offences**

**14. Offences and penalties**—
(1) Every person commits an offence against this Act who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of sections 5 to 8 of this Act.
(2) Every person who commits an offence against this Act is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.

**15. Consent of Attorney-General to proceedings in relation to offences**—
(1) No information shall be laid against any person for—

(a) An offence against this Act; or

(b) The offence of conspiring to commit an offence against this Act; or

(c) The offence of attempting to commit an offence against this Act, — except with the consent of the Attorney-General:

Provided that a person alleged to have committed any offence mentioned in this subsection may be arrested, or a warrant for any such person's arrest may be issued and executed, and any such person may be remanded in custody or on bail, notwithstanding that the consent of the Attorney-General to the laying of an information for the offence has not been obtained, but no further or other proceedings shall be taken until that consent has been obtained.

(2) The Attorney-General may, before deciding whether or not to give consent under subsection (1) of this section, make such inquiries as the Attorney-General thinks fit.

**Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control**

**16. Establishment of Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control**—
There is hereby established a committee to be called the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control.

**17. Functions and powers of Committee**—
(1) The functions of the Committee shall be—

(a) To advise the [Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade] on such aspects of disarmament and arms control matters as it thinks fit:
(b) To advise the Prime Minister on the implementation of this Act:

(c) To publish from time to time public reports in relation to disarmament and arms control matters and on the implementation of this Act:

(d) To make such recommendations as it thinks fit for the granting of money from such fund or funds as may be established for the purpose of promoting greater public understanding of disarmament and arms control matters.

(2) The Committee shall have all such powers as are reasonably necessary or expedient to enable it to carry out its functions.

18. Membership of Committee—
(1) The Committee shall consist of 9 members, of whom—

(a) One shall be the Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control, who shall be the Chairman; and

(b) Eight shall be appointed by the [Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade].

(2) Each member of the Committee appointed under subsection (1)(b) of this section shall be appointed for such term not exceeding 3 years as may be specified in the instrument of appointment, but may from time to time be reappointed.

(3) Any such member may be removed from office for incapacity, neglect of duty, or misconduct proved to the satisfaction of the [Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade], or may resign by notice in writing to that Minister.

(4) The functions and powers of the Committee shall not be affected by any vacancy in its membership.

19. Procedure of Committee—
Subject to any directives given by the [Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade], the Committee may regulate its procedure in such manner as it thinks fit.

20. Remuneration and travelling expenses—
(1) The Committee is hereby declared to be a statutory Board within the meaning of the Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 1951.

(2) There shall be paid to the members of the Committee, out of money appropriated by Parliament for the purpose, remuneration by way of fees or allowances, and travelling allowances and expenses, in accordance with the Fees and Travelling Allowances Act 1951, and the provisions of that Act shall apply accordingly.

21. Money to be appropriated by Parliament for purposes of this Act—
All fees, salaries, allowances, and other expenditure payable or incurred under or in the administration of this Act shall be payable out of money to be appropriated by Parliament for the purpose.

Amendments to Marine Pollution Act 1974

22. Interpretation (Repealed)—

23. Application of Part 2 of Marine Pollution Act 1974 (Repealed)—

24. New sections inserted (Repealed)—

25. Permits (Repealed) —

Amendments to Other Acts

26. Amendment to Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968—

The Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Act 1968 is hereby amended by inserting, after section 10, the following section:

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10A. Facilitation of international inspectors under disarmament treaties—

The Governor-General may from time to time, by Order in Council,—

(a) Confer upon any persons who are appointed as inspectors pursuant to any international agreement on disarmament or arms control to which New Zealand is a party all or any of the privileges and immunities specified in the Third Schedule to this Act; and

(b) Make provision (subject to and consistent with any other international obligations and commitments binding upon New Zealand) for any such persons so appointed to have access to all such information and to all such places in New Zealand as may be relevant to enable those persons to carry out their official duties."
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27. Amendment to Official Information Act 1982—

The Official Information Act 1982 is hereby amended by inserting in Schedule 1, in its appropriate alphabetical order, the following item:

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"Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control"
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28. Amendment to Foreign Affairs and Overseas Service Act 1983 (Repealed)—
APPENDIX III

INTERVIEW QUESTIONS POSED TO INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED BY THE AUTHOR

Nature of the situation: decision latitude, definition of situation, participation

1. How much involvement did you have in the decision-making process with regards to the anti-nuclear policy and ANZUS dispute?
2. With regard to Lange’s unsuccessful attempt to change Labour’s anti-nuclear policy to allow nuclear propelled ships to enter NZ waters—how did you view this move with regards to his leadership skills?
3. As Prime Minister, did he ever contemplate changing the policy again?
4. Was he afforded much room to move with regards to the policy?
5. In your view, how important was Lange to the anti-nuclear policy of the Fourth Labour Government? What role did he play?
6. Lange was away in the Tokelaus when the request for the Buchanan was made and it appears that by the time he had returned the Labour Party had already decided to reject the visit—how important was Lange in the decision to reject the Buchanan?

Personal characteristics: beliefs, motives, decision style and interpersonal style

7. How personally committed was Lange to the anti-nuclear policy when he became Prime Minister?
8. During your time working with Lange how important was Lange’s personality in determining the nuclear ships issue?
9. How would you describe Lange’s leadership style during his first term as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs? i.e. interpersonal skills, management style, decision style.
10. How did his particular leadership style impact on your work?
11. What did you perceive as Lange’s greatest strength?
12. What did you perceive as his biggest weakness?
13. How did you perceive his relations were with his other staff and fellow Cabinet and caucus members in the first term?

14. Within Cabinet, to what extent was there a range of views on the anti-nuclear policy? Did Lange take notice of these?

15. Is Michael Bassett’s view of Lange as captive of the Left of the Labour Party accurate?

16. Former Lange advisor, Chris Laidlaw has stated that Margaret Pope’s relationship with Lange (and the influence that relationship wielded) was a significant factor in the anti-nuclear policy and the ANZUS issue. To what extent do you agree with this? In your view how important was Pope to the anti-nuclear policy?

17. How important were Lange’s oratorical and television skills in the execution of the anti-nuclear policy? For example, the Oxford Union debate.

18. To what extent did Lange listen to the advice offered by his staff and MFAT’s advisors with regards to the anti-nuclear policy? Who was most influential in this area?

19. How would you assess Lange’s handling of the anti-nuclear policy in the period 1984-1987, in particular his handling of the dispute with America?

Filters - personal characteristics: interest in foreign affairs, training in foreign affairs and sensitivity to environment

20. In your view, to what extent was Lange was sufficiently versed in the area of foreign policy upon assuming the office of Prime Minister?

21. How did these skills develop in office?

22. On reflection, did Lange’s holding the Foreign Affairs portfolio help or hinder the anti-nuclear policy?

23. How much time did Lange devote to foreign affairs whilst Prime Minister?

24. How widely did he delegate foreign affairs responsibilities? (e.g. What role did Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank O’Flynn)

25. To what extent was Lange’s personality suited to the area of foreign affairs?

26. To what extent was Lange sensitive to the American officials he came in contact with during the course of the ANZUS dispute? E.g. H. Munroe Brown, Secretary of State George Shultz

27. From your perspective did Lange enjoy his time as Minister of Foreign Affairs?

28. Would a different Labour Prime Minister  have meant a different outcome on the ANZUS issue? (e.g. Geoffrey Palmer, Mike Moore)

N.B. Due to time constraints and in light of the respondents’ particular areas of expertise not all questions were asked of every interviewee.
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Former Head of the Prime Minister’s Department, Mr. Gerald Hensley, 9 December 2004

Former Chief of Defence Staff, Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson; interview via email

Former Secretary of Defence, Mr. Denis McLean; interview via email

Senior Cabinet Minister in, and later Prime Minister of, the Fourth Labour Government, Rt. Hon. Mike Moore; phone interview, 4 December 2004

Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mervyn Norrish, 10 December 2004

Former Chief Press Secretary to Prime Minister David Lange, Mr. Ross Vintiner, 8 December 2004