Pacific Islands Forum: Facilitating Regional Security Cooperation

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Abstract

Oceania is an example of a region where traditional security theory based on historical enmity and competition does not fit. A history of amity and cooperation has evolved through regionalism and the region’s pre-eminent organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum (the Forum). In 2004, the Forum was tasked to develop the ‘Pacific Plan’ (the Plan) to facilitate closer cooperation and deeper integration. Security is one of the four pillars of the Plan.

The objective of this thesis is to analyse the institutions of the Forum as facilitators of regional security cooperation. The Forum is reviewed and the idea of a logic of action is introduced. To help explain security in an environment with a history of cooperation, traditional security theory is re-defined. A security environment equation is created as a framework to help analyse the Forum’s structures and security mechanisms. The Forum Regional Security Committee is examined closely resulting in suggestions to strengthen the region’s security environment.
Acknowledgements

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

...Security is a precondition for economic growth and sustainable development.

Forum Secretary General, Greg Urwin

Security – being and feeling safe from harm or danger – is a basic need and the means of survival.\(^1\) A dichotomy however exists in the pursuit of security. The end, ‘a peaceful and secure world,’ is threatened by the means, as frequently the ‘how to…’ becomes a source of tension and in itself causes conflict. The process or way is often determined by the nature of relationship between those seeking to secure a particular space. Cooperation and pooling resources is a way to maintain security especially when vulnerability is high and threats are imminent.

This thesis includes a real-time narrative analysis of events unfolding as they occurred within the region during 2004-2005. The objective of this thesis is to analyse the institutions\(^3\) of the Pacific Islands Forum (the Forum) as facilitators of regional security cooperation.\(^4\) It concentrates on the transition of structures, mechanisms and systems within the region. Presenting what exists and investigating how institutions work will expose the flaws in the security environment resulting in recommendations for improvement.

\(^3\) The term ‘institutions’ is used here in a wider meaning to include systems and processes such as norms, conventions and standards as well as actual organisations.
\(^4\) The definition of region will be discussed later in this chapter. In this context it refers to Pacific Island countries, including Australia and New Zealand but excludes Pacific Rim countries such as China, the United States of America, Japan and South East Asia states.
A single theory with the capacity to explain security in a historically cooperative environment facilitated by a regional organisation does not appear to exist. The foundation of this thesis therefore is built from a variety of theories and these are discussed throughout the chapters. Combining them in one chapter was considered to be unwieldy and risked losing their explanatory value.

‘Regionness theory’ therefore is discussed in this chapter. An update and description of the Forum is in chapter two where the idea of a ‘logic of action’ is introduced to test the effectiveness of the Forum’s security structures. The history of Pacific cooperation is examined in the literature review in chapter three. Security theory is described and redefined in chapter four with the purpose of providing a more relevant explanation of the Pacific security environment. The creation of a universally applicable security equation is used to create a full picture of the region’s security environment. The region’s main mechanism for closer security cooperation – the Forum Regional Security Committee – is analysed in chapter six along with recommendations made to strengthen the security environment. The conclusion asserts that a regional organisation through its various institutions is the most appropriate vehicle to facilitate closer security cooperation but that its members must increase political responsibility to ensure cooperation is effective.

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5 Logic of Action is a term introduced in this thesis to explain the how and why of regionalism and regional institutions. Chapter two will explain the concept further.

6 Political responsibility is used here as a term to describe a standard of responsible behaviour expected from governments. This includes for example, obligation, accountability, dependability and the commitment to implement a certain set of actions as agreed collectively.
This chapter makes a number of propositions and uses the theory of regionness to define Oceania. An introduction to Oceania’s security environment follows below and by borrowing Greg Fry’s claim that “regions matter in world politics in a way they did not before …” it is asserted here that regionalism is a given. 

The sources of research, opportunities for fieldwork, the limitations faced in the study and the rationale for this thesis are then described.

1.2 Propositions

The main proposition of this thesis is that: regional security can be strengthened by an organisation facilitating the means for closer cooperation. Other propositions that may support this include:

- If a regional organisation is to facilitate closer cooperation, then its logic of action must be explicit;\(^8\)
- If closer cooperation is to be effective, then a sense of good regional governance is required which includes transforming ‘political will’ into ‘political responsibility’;
- If cooperation is to achieve its objectives then the means for debate must reflect the established method of relating, for example the ‘Pacific Way’ – a honest, consensual, inclusive and authoritative mechanism to make legitimate regional decisions.\(^9\)

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\(^8\) The concept of a logic of action is described in chapter two – 2.5

\(^9\) The ‘Pacific Way’ is described in chapter three – 3.6
• If the concept of security is to remain relevant, then it needs to be re-defined to cover the characteristics of the environment;\textsuperscript{10}

In chapter six, the above propositions are re-constructed into an argument which asserts that in order for the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) to be effective it needs to be:

• A mechanism that has the authority to define the region’s security environment, with good regional governance structures that mirror a matured ‘Pacific Way’ of consensus decision-making, which includes the transformation of political will into political responsibility.

Chapter seven will conclude the status quo is likely to increase the region’s vulnerability as insecurities will only continue to weaken the security environment. Conversely, a strengthened and invigorated FRSC will assist towards more effective security cooperation that will fortify the region’s security environment against the impact of insecurity.

1.3 Defining the Region

“Mostly when we speak of regions we actually mean regions in the making. There are no “natural” or “given” regions, but these are created and recreated in the process of global transformation.”\textsuperscript{11}

Bjorn Hettne & Fredrik Soderbaum

This study focuses on security within the regional level of analysis and it is therefore, important to clearly define what is meant by the ‘Pacific region’.

\textsuperscript{10} In chapter four, ‘Security Redefined’ discusses this assertion.
Defining a region is problematic. Geography is a common tool but implies that a judgement can be made as to where boundaries begin and end. It assumes that territory, proximity or some other distinction can be made to separate off an area and call it a ‘region’. This raises many questions.

Is the Pacific region defined by ocean boundaries, and if so where do they begin and end? Should the introduction of another ‘sea’ such as the Bering Sea, Tasman Sea or Coral Sea become a natural boundary? Should countries on the periphery of the oceans be included? Should countries with

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12 For a discussion on the problems of what boundaries define a region see Ron Crocombe, 2001, *The South Pacific*, University of the South Pacific, Suva, p 592

similar physical features categorise a region? Defining a region using only geographic criteria alone can be unhelpful and therefore other variables must be taken into account, for example: history, identity, commonalities or the degree of mutual relationship by the members within the region.

1.4 Regionness Theory

Bjorn Hettne’s notion of “regionness” is a useful theory when considering how to define a group of states as a region. His levels of ‘regionness’ are simple descriptions based on the degree of relationship between the groups or members within a space. The five levels of ‘regionness’ comprise:

- Regional Space
- Regional Complex
- Regional Society
- Regional Community
- Regional State.

A Regional Space is a geographical unit, inhabited by human beings maintaining some kind of relationship. This is known as a pre-regional zone.

A Regional Complex where there is increased social interaction but national states are predominant. Regional identity is low and suspicion is more common than cooperation. Economic cooperation is based on self-interest.

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15 Ibid 1996, p 3
16 Hettne & Soderbaum, 2002, p 39
17 Ibid, p 40
and tends to be exploitative rather than cooperative and mutually reinforcing. Relations may include a security complex where security is dependent on each other as well as the overall stability of the region. This system is considered a rather primitive security mechanism.

**Regional Society**\(^\text{18}\) embraces a form of cultural, economic, political or military organised cooperation. The “increasing and widening” of “mutually reinforcing” relationships fosters greater levels of institutionalism with a “gradual deepening of mutual trust and responsiveness.”\(^\text{19}\) This is a formal organised region.

A **Regional Community**\(^\text{20}\) is associated with the development of a distinct identity, informal actor capability, legitimacy and structure of decision-making. Violent conflict between members is inconceivable. Regional civil society emerges but is dependent upon the institutions and regimes that facilitate social welfare, social communication and convergence of compatible culture and values throughout the region. There is a multi-dimensional and voluntary quality of regional cooperation.

Finally, a **Regional State**\(^\text{21}\) is a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign national political units into a supranational security community, where sovereignty is pooled for the good of all. States retain compatible but not identical policies as authority and decision-making is decentralised.

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\(^{18}\) Ibid, p 41  
\(^{19}\) Ibid  
\(^{20}\) Ibid, p 43  
\(^{21}\) Ibid, p 44
1.5 Pacific Regionness

What then defines the Pacific as a region and at what level of ‘regionness’ should it be categorised? Oceania is immense. The North Pacific Ocean and the South Pacific Ocean touch numerous rim countries and they contain a wide variety of islands within. Frequently the Pacific area is described as only a group of islands but this is inadequate in a region with great geographical and demographical diversity as shown in table one.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Land Area sq km</th>
<th>Population (2004-5 est)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia Continent</td>
<td>7,617,930</td>
<td>19,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook Islands 7 Atolls, 8 Islands</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>21,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Polynesia 118 Islands and Atolls</td>
<td>4167</td>
<td>270,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji 332 Islands</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>880,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiribati 33 Islands</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>100,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall Is 30 Atolls, 1152 Islands</td>
<td>181.3</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federated States of Micronesia</td>
<td>607 Islands</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nauru 1 Island</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Caledonia 1 main Island, 5 islands and atolls plus archipelagos</td>
<td>18,575</td>
<td>216,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand 2 large, 7 smaller Islands</td>
<td>268,000</td>
<td>4,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niue 1 Island</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palau 300 Islands</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoa 6 Islands</td>
<td>2,944</td>
<td>177,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea Eastern half of Papua, 600 Islands</td>
<td>462,000</td>
<td>5,420,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Is 6 Major Islands, 992 Smaller Islands</td>
<td>28,450</td>
<td>523,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokelau 3 Atolls</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonga 169 Islands</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>110,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuvalu 9 Atolls</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vanuatu 84 Islands</td>
<td>12,200</td>
<td>202,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nauru, Tokelau and Tuvalu have less than 30 sq kms of land, whereas Australia is a very large island/continent of 7.6 million sq kms, whose coastline touches the Indian, Southern and Pacific Oceans.

The divided island of West Papua and Papua New Guinea is slightly larger than New Zealand, which comprises two distinct large islands. Australia, New Zealand and Papua New Guinea have populations in the millions, while Tokelau and Niue have less than 1500. Environmental characteristics also vary around the region. Some states are abundant in natural resources while atolls have no arable land. Others have abundant marine resources with large Economic Exclusion Zones.

Australia and New Zealand are highly developed countries, whereas some island states still struggle for basic amenities such as fresh water and a consistent power supply. Government structures are also diverse and include: a constitutional monarchy and/or federal state systems; parliamentary democracies; republics and states in free association.23

Defining a region by identity is also difficult. Is West Papua part of the Pacific region? Predominantly of Melanesian descent, West Papuans struggle to assert their identify separate from their Indonesian rulers. New Zealand is situated in the South Pacific Ocean, therefore do New Zealanders identify

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themselves as Pacific Islanders?\textsuperscript{24} How do Australians’ view themselves? Timor Leste is also an example of definitional difficulty as some identify it as being part of the Pacific region but geographically it is closer to Indonesia and South East Asia. Also islands within Micronesia in the north have only recently been considered to be part of the Pacific region. Its inclusion was reflected in the Forum’s name change from the South Pacific Forum to the Pacific Islands Forum in 2000.

While many Pacific countries share a colonial history, their experience of decolonisation is diverse. Some states moved into self-government easily while others fought long and hard for their independence. Some territories are still ruled by colonial powers. However, the legacy of colonialism and a desire for cooperation has created a sense of regionness for its members. Regionalism grew when the South Pacific Commission (SPC) was established in 1947.\textsuperscript{25} The creation of other regional organisations, particularly the Pacific Islands Forum, has furthered a distinctive regional identity.

Geography, identity and history clearly play their roles in defining a region. It is argued here that it is the ‘degree of relationship’ that defines an actual region through the voluntary membership of states to be in and part of institutions that promote regionalism. This membership may expand or decrease over time as relationships change. The Pacific group of independent and self-governing states coalesce through the Forum and the criterion for

\textsuperscript{24} Witi Ihimera said, ‘While Pakeha New Zealanders now accept, sometimes reluctantly, that ours is a Pacific Country – how long must we wait for you to claim as freely as we do that you are Pacific Islanders.’ quoted in John Henderson, 1991, ‘New Zealand and Other Pacific Islands’ in Richard Kennaway and John Henderson, Beyond New Zealand, Longman Paul, Auckland, p 18 – 19

\textsuperscript{25} Tom Smith, 1977, ‘South Pacific Regional Cooperation’, New Zealand International Review, No 4, July/August, p 29
membership was amended at the 2005 Forum summit to provide for associate membership status for Pacific territories.\textsuperscript{26} Oceania or the Pacific region, in this thesis, is therefore defined by the membership of the Forum. The Pacific Rim states, which have come together under APEC are not – with the exception of Australia and New Zealand – included.

Using Hettne’s notion of regionness, the Pacific region can be described as a “Regional Community” where cooperation is expected method of interaction. It is a place where violent conflict between states is considered inconceivable and a sense of family has crept into the region. Smith described how at SPC meetings, “the delegates from islands hundreds of miles apart quickly became friendly and by the time they met for the third [South Pacific] conference in 1956 they often used the expression “our Pacific brothers.”\textsuperscript{27} Fifty years later, the idea of ‘family’ was further entrenched into regional language with the 2000 Biketawa Declaration, which stated:

“Forum Leaders recognised the need in time of crisis or in response to members” request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family. (emphasis mine)\textsuperscript{28}

This document enables the Forum members to seek assistance or intervention in a time of a crisis and signals a significant degree of mutual trust. This does not mean, however, that relationships are always harmonious. As in any family, squabbles break out from time to time.

\textsuperscript{26} Forum Communiqué, 2005
\textsuperscript{27} Smith, 1977, p 29
\textsuperscript{28} Forum Communiqué, 2000
1.6 Oceania’s Security Environment Described

National security is traditionally seen as the maintenance of territorial integrity and defence of political autonomy and this is achieved principally through the use of military power.\(^29\) In attempting to explain the nature of inter-state relationships, realist international relations (IR) theory asserts that the international system is anarchic. International security has therefore been traditionally viewed through a realist lens as described by Barry Buzan: a build up of military force that leads to a security dilemma.\(^30\) Suspicion and competition characterise the nature of inter-state relations so conflict (war) is considered inevitable. Regional security has been compared with traditional perspectives of international security with the focus on a particular region.

Unlike other regions, the genesis of security cooperation in Oceania is not based on these traditional theories. Historically, cooperation and amity as opposed to competition and enmity have been the main characteristic of inter-state relationships in the Pacific.\(^31\) Other powers have used the region as a theatre for war, but Pacific militaries have not been deployed against each other.\(^32\) Therefore these traditional or conventional interpretations and theories are unhelpful as they confine security to the complexities of negative interstate relations based on militarist conflict. They do not explain other forms of insecurity in an environment where amity and cooperation is the norm.

\(^{29}\) Richard Shultz, Roy Godson, Ted Greenwood, 1993, Security Studies for the 1990’s, Brassey’s, Washington, p 2

\(^{30}\) Barry Buzan, 1987, An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations, Macmillan Press, London. Buzan explains that, ‘it is a dilemma because states cannot easily take measures to strengthen their own security without making others feel less secure,’ p 78

\(^{31}\) The term amity is used throughout this thesis to describe the state of friendship between countries. It infers that countries view each other as friends not enemies but it does not mean that tension or disagreement are absent.

\(^{32}\) During the Bougainville conflict, PNG soldiers did enter Solomon Islands in pursuit of rebel militia however; the governments of the Solomon Islands and PNG did not declare war against each other.
Insecurity in the region comes from diverse sources. The global terrorism agenda impacts on Pacific security indirectly. For example, the imposition of complex international legal standards to counter terrorism is beyond the capacity of some small Pacific legislatures and low enforcement levels weaken the legal environment. Also, the need to implement strict and expensive border controls threatens to further marginalise small Pacific economies. The consequences of these weaknesses are becoming more significant as trans-national criminals exploit lax border controls and use weak institutions to further their activities. One instance is the revelation that Chinese triad-mafia intimidate senior officials of the Papua New Guinea Police forces.  

Internal insecurities have the most impact on Pacific states. The transfer from colonialism to independence for some has not been smooth. Constitutional structures considered incompatible with local culture have undermined indigenous methods of social control. Inept governance and under-development has weakened Pacific countries. In some island countries, disciplined forces are politicised, corrupt and unprofessional. Instead of upholding law and order they become the source of violence and social instability. Political violence, coups, secessions, riots and intractable tribal or clan warfare have taken lives and further damaged fragile economies.

Natural disasters destroy already meagre infrastructures. The slower impact of climate change resulting in rising sea levels spoils the quality of water and soil, which affects subsistence farming, making some small atolls reliant on expensive food imports. Under-development has caused a poverty of opportunity across many sectors, such as education and health. United Nations Secretary General, Kofi Annan said, “... sub-Saharan Africa and Oceania are lagging in almost all areas ...”\textsuperscript{34}

More developed countries, such as Australia and New Zealand feel obligated to provide assistance and/or intervention to alleviate the stresses to maintain regional stability in order to preserve their own security interests. This has caused resentment and tension in some Pacific island states because of the perception that this interference threatens their sovereignty. Donors also debate whether assistance should be premised by security needs. While this contention is likely to persist, it is suggested that for those who believe security should not be linked with development assistance, their view of security requires redefining (this is discussed further in chapter four). The Pacific Strategy of the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) states, “Without security, defined in its broadest sense, development cannot occur in a sustainable way.”\textsuperscript{35}

Emeritus Professor and regional specialist, Ron Crocombe and his team completed a series of national and regional security studies in 2000 – 2004 for


\textsuperscript{35} New Zealand Aid and Development Agency’s (NZAID), 2002, ‘Towards a Strategy for the Pacific Islands Region, A Consultation Draft, p 15
the Forum.⁴⁶ A distinction was made between security and conflict. Security is threatened by crime, smuggling, false documentation, international terrorism and international financial crime.⁴⁷ He identified the principal causes of conflict in the over the past 20 years as,

... ethnic differences, land disputes; economic disparities; a lack of confidence in the government’s ability to resolve differences fairly or satisfactorily, and usually a belief that those with the power to act are either biased, corrupt or inefficient.⁴⁸

These problems he said were at the “core” and that the failure to address them was the “basic causes of deteriorating national security.” ⁴⁹

In this environment, can a regional organisation facilitate closer security cooperation? What has been the experience in Oceania over the past three and a half decades? Leaders from the newly independent Pacific island countries initiated the first South Pacific Forum (the Forum) in 1971. ⁵⁰ They discussed a “wide range of issues of common concern,” including the security issue of the day – French nuclear testing.⁵¹ New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk hosted the meeting and Australian officials attended. It was agreed that the meeting “significantly advanced the spirit of regional

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⁴⁷ Crocombe, 2000, p 7-8
⁴⁸ Ibid, p 6
⁴⁹ Ibid, p 8
⁵⁰ Name changed to Pacific Islands Forum in 2000
⁵¹ Forum Communiqué, 1971 – see annex one.
cooperation and mutual confidence.”\textsuperscript{42} Pacific leaders have met annually ever since. The Forum and its institutions have become the Pacific region’s pre-eminent political association.\textsuperscript{43}

1.7 Sources and Fieldwork

Material for this thesis was gathered from a wide range of sources including: personal interviews, media, government policies, speeches and academic articles. Forum documents such as communiqués, declarations and annual reports are easily accessible. Information on the Forum, however has not been collected in one publication. Analyses are sparse and confined to works covering wider topics.

Attending the 2004 Forum Annual Heads of Government meeting in Apia, as part of the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) delegation, provided invaluable insight into the workings of the Forum. Access to all meetings, ceremonies and receptions provided the opportunity to observe the interaction between the region’s leaders, ministers and officials. This experience will be discussed further in chapter two.

Visiting the Forum’s impressive and up-to-date library in Suva, Fiji, afforded the chance to research archival documents. This provided an overview of the Forum’s structure and helped to clarify the complex Forum network. Attending the Pacific Plan national consultation meetings in Auckland, March 2005 and

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid
\textsuperscript{43} The Pacific Islands Forum membership includes: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Republic Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu
in Christchurch, October 2005 also provided the opportunity to hear and experience the concerns people felt towards the region and its transition towards closer regionalism.

During 2004-2005, I managed and coordinated the Securing a Peaceful Pacific project. It consisted of an international conference with over 230 attendees, the publication of the multi-authored (60) book derived from the conference and its launch coincided with a series of roundtable discussions held in Christchurch, Wellington and Auckland. This provided special opportunities to meet many Pacific specialists. The conference brought together from the region a diverse group of people including politicians, policy makers, practitioners, NGOs, academics and other post-graduate students. Attending and presenting papers at two other major conferences in Brisbane and Hawaii also afforded the chance to exchange views and debate the many issues of Pacific security as well as to receive comments and criticisms that have helped immensely in the development of this thesis.

1.8 Limitations and Rationale

The main issue that arose from these sources and fieldwork was that a full analytical approach to understanding Pacific security was a serious gap in the current literature. A ‘big-picture’ view was missing. Works on Pacific regionalism and the Forum are sparse in comparison with the volumes of

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work devoted to other regions and their institutions. Also theories and frameworks from other regions were not appropriate because they simply did not fit the Pacific environment.

Globally since 1945, regionalism, which included the creation of security mechanisms, was premised on a history of interstate conflict. Conversely, the Pacific has had a history of interstate cooperation.46 While there is general agreement about the threats facing the region, many works on Pacific security still only describe them and recommend certain actions to be taken. There is no model for actual analysis based on cooperation.

This was exemplified at the Brisbane conference, mentioned above, where one stream of presentations was to focus on Pacific regional institutions, namely the Forum. I had hoped to learn from other academics but found my paper was the only one that directly addressed the Forum. The presentations on European models of regionalism were interesting but did not provide insight into Pacific regionalism and security.

The main rationale for this thesis is to develop a model that has the ability to complete a comprehensive explanation, breakdown and analysis of Pacific security cooperation. Such a model must have the ability to systematically examine the security environment and regional mechanisms. Its purpose is to expose any institutional weakness and recommend strengthening existing security mechanisms through the Pacific Islands Forum.

46 See Chapter three for a history of Pacific cooperation.
Chapter 2: Pacific Islands Forum

2.1 Introduction

This chapter profiles the Forum as it is now and describes the nature of its annual summit meetings. The idea of a logic of action for an organisation is established. While this term is borrowed, its substance is derived from a variety of theories and ideas to create a framework that considers the logic of purpose and structural logic and practical logic. An effectiveness test is applied by comparing this objective logic of action with the provisions for the various Forum institutions under the new Agreement. The purpose is to assess whether the Forum has the capacity to facilitate the next step of Pacific regionalism – closer cooperation and deeper integration.

2.2 Forum Profile

The South Pacific Forum was founded in 1971 and to reflect its expanding membership changed its name to Pacific Islands Forum in 2000. Its membership currently comprises 16 independent or self-governing states with three observers, one special observer and 13 dialogue partners – see table two. Territories in the region may apply to be admitted as associate members. Heads of government meet annually but special meetings may be convened. Leaders meet privately in retreat where it is claimed honest and robust discussion takes place.

48 These membership categories are explained in greater detail below.
49 This is new status was agreed to at the 2005 Forum summit and is provided for in Article I(3) of the new Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum. This Agreement can be found at http://www.forumsec.org and also annex three.
Table 2 Pacific Islands Forum Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Members</strong></th>
<th>Australia; Cook Islands; Federated States of Micronesia; Fiji; Kiribati; Marshall Islands; Nauru; New Zealand; Niue; Palau; Papua New Guinea; Samoa; Solomon Islands; Tonga; Tuvalu; Vanuatu</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Associate Membership</strong> (this new status was created in October 2005)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observers</strong></td>
<td>French Polynesia (2004); New Caledonia (1999); Tokelau (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Special Observer</strong></td>
<td>Timor Leste (2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dialogue Partners</strong></td>
<td>Canada; PRC; EU; France; Indonesia; India; Malaysia; Japan; Philippines; Korea; Thailand; UK; USA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no formal rules of procedure, however a number of traditions or conventions exist. Decisions are usually made by consensus. At all meetings countries sit in alphabetical order and this also normally guides the choice of next host country and therefore the Forum Chair until the following meeting.\(^{50}\)

The summit agenda is set by the Forum Secretariat with input from members and regional organisations. A communiqué announces the decisions made during the meetings and regional policies are also set through Forum Declarations.

Australia and New Zealand pay one third each of the annual core budget and Pacific Island members collectively make up the other third. Contributions are

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\(^{50}\) The alphabet procedure is flexible to allow for countries to bid as Forum host especially if the prospective host country is celebrating a significant event. For example, to celebrate 30 years independence, Papua New Guinea bid for 2005 summit when the next in line was Tonga - now host of the 2006 summit.
also received from other donors, for example the European Union, France and Japan. China and Taiwan also contribute generously.

The Secretariat’s main functions are to serve its members’ by providing policy advice and implementing initiatives as tasked by the leaders. It also acts as a coordinating body for various regional agencies and promotes the Forum’s interests internationally. It operates offices in Auckland, Beijing, Sydney and Tokyo.51

The Secretary General acts as secretary to the various Forum meetings including the leaders’ special retreat. Greg Urwin, a former Australian diplomat, is the current Secretary General. He manages the Secretariat and is permanent Chair of the Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP).52 The Forum Officials Committee (the Committee), comprises senior officials from member governments and acts as Executive to the Secretariat.53 There are numerous Forum Ministers’ and officials meetings held throughout the year and in 2004 Ministers’ were given greater authority to make decisions.

52 CROP agencies are: Fiji School of Medicine (FSchM); South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA); Pacific Islands Development Programme (PIDP); Secretariat for the Pacific Community (SPC); South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC); South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment (SPBEA); Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS); South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP); South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO); University of the South Pacific (USP)
53 Also known as the FOC meetings, however this thesis follows the format of the new Agreement to describe Forum institutions.
2.3 Forum Update

A number of events led to the convening of an Eminent Person’s Group (EPG) to review the Forum in 2003-04.


2. The deterioration of security in Solomon Islands and subsequent intervention in 2003 of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI).

3. More significantly however, was the role of the New Zealand Prime Minister as 2003 Forum Chair.  

New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and seniors officials sought to maximise this opportunity and at the 2003 annual summit received a “wholesale sign-up to reforms,” for the New Zealand-led EPG review to, “put far more grunt into the Forum … [by] reconditioning its motor and adding more horsepower.”

The controversial appointment of former Australian diplomat Greg Urwin in 2003 as Secretary General, was considered by some as another means by which Australia could dominate the Forum and further the “unabashed trend where the Pacific is being created in Australia’s image.” Others, given the diplomatic credentials of Urwin, did not “bridle, baulk and speak of neo-
colonialist attitudes,” but, “reached for the positives in Australia’s renewed interest in the region … [and] came to recognise that Mr Urwin was, quite simply, the ideal man to lead the Forum’s Suva based Secretariat.”57 In late 2005, Robbie Robertson, Professor of Development Studies at the University of the South Pacific, argued that, “The EPG was certainly no mouthpiece for Australia and New Zealand, and its goals were very different from the security concerns of the Australian Government.”58

At a special leader’s summit in Auckland early 2004 the EPG submitted a report: Pacific Cooperation: Voices of the Region, where it recommended the adoption of a ‘Pacific Vision.’

Leaders believe the Pacific region can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives. We treasure the diversity of the Pacific and seek a future in which its cultures, traditions and religious beliefs are valued, honoured and developed. We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of democratic values, and for its defence and promotion of human rights. We seek partnerships with our neighbours and beyond to develop our knowledge, to improve our communications and to ensure a sustainable economic existence for all. 59

57 New Zealand Herald, 2003, ‘Pacific group showing new maturity’
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/index.cfm?ObjectID=3518862
58 Robbie Robertson, The Pacific Plan as a Development Strategy, Speech 29 September 2005,
http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-view_forum_thread.php?
comments_parentId=49&top...
59 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation: Voices in the Region, p 8,
http://www.mft.govt.nz/foreign/regions/pacific/pif03/pifreviewdocs/reviewindex.html,
At this summit, leaders also agreed to the development of a ‘Pacific Plan’ (the Plan) to create stronger and deeper links between the sovereign countries of the region.”

The 2004 Auckland Declaration also stated that security was one of four “key goals” for the Forum’s focus. In March 2005, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark warned that “a regional approach” was needed to prevent “the region from becoming a permanent backwater.” She said, “the biggest challenge was to get traction” on the development of the ‘Pacific Plan’, “as development internationally was proceeding at a fast pace”. This call for forward traction is premised on what, Fred Bergsten called the, “bicycle theory”, which says, “you either move forward or you fall over.” The Secretariat was tasked with the responsibility to develop and implement the Plan and it has been described as:

… the most widespread and intensive consultation process ever undertaken to prioritise Pacific solutions by Pacific people and is more extensive than any previously undertaken by the Governments of the region. It is not complete and is a process which must be further developed as the Pacific Plan itself develops. As a living document, the Pacific Plan will continue to draw inspiration from Leaders and from the people whom they serve.

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60 Ibid, p 21
61 Auckland Declaration, Forum Communiqué, 2004
63 Ibid
Nevertheless, the process has not been smooth. The composition of the EPG was criticised for giving a “false impression that only men of the older generation are capable of becoming members,” and found, “it ironic that in this new millennium, gender equity is not an obligation in the Pacific when forming any local, national, regional and international working committees, institution or in this case the EPG.”66 It should be noted however that the EPG review process was chaired by New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Helen Clark and the Reflection Group set up to offer expertise and advice to the EPG consisted of many outstanding female participants (see annex two for the membership of the Pacific review project). The Pacific Plan Taskforce has also ensured women were well represented.67

The major contention in the development of the Plan has been the depth of consultation. Journalist Michael Field said Urwin had “consulted the region to death,” and that leaders instead “want a plan of action.”68 As a result, during the national consultations held in New Zealand March 2005, Field alleged Urwin was given, “the deep dark hurry up and the message from Pacific leaders that they are deeply disappointed with his lack of performance.”69

Conversely, civil society groups and NGO’s called for leaders at the 2005 leader’s summit in Papua New Guinea to reject the Plan demanding, “more

69Ibid
time, at least two more years for further consultation….” Crocombe countered these criticisms by claiming, “these groups are spreading their own opinions, which are not representative of the wider Pacific community.” At the summit, the Plan was accepted by leaders in its entirety. In December 2005 however Urwin reminded the region that the Plan “is not a blueprint for the Pacific Islands,” and while it was endorsed by the leaders, “it would be further developed.”

Another criticism, which also affected this research as it has been completed in real time, was the intermittent and infrequent flow of information about the Forum, the Plan and its development. The monthly Forum news e-bulletins were released inconsistently as the Forum’s webpage was not updated regularly. Late 2005 however saw a new comprehensive Pacific Plan and Forum website appear. They contain a significant quantity of high quality work and analysis. This proved that behind the scenes in various organisations as well as the Forum, much research, analysis and reporting had been taking place. It could be argued that a more consistent flow of this information may have increased confidence in the Plan’s development.

Radio Australia, Pacific Beat, 2005, ‘Calls for leaders to reject Pacific Plan,’ Presenter: Jemima Garret, Speaker: Rex Horoi, Executive Director, Foundation of the Peoples of the South Pacific International (FSPI)


http://www.pacificplan.org; http://www.forumsec.org (note: the old website at time of writing is still running and is found at http://www.forumsec.org.fj; the subtle difference in the URL, in my opinion could produce confusion and misunderstanding.)

For further details of the work completed by the Secretariat in 2005 see: Greg Urwin’s opening address at the Forum Officials Committee pre-Forum and Budget and Work Programme session, http://www.forumsec.org.fj, (note: old Forum website), under Forum Speeches.
A more aggressive marketing of the Forum and its programmes would dispel many negative assumptions and myths and this was also noted in the EPG report. They said, “we were disappointed to find that many aspects of the work of the Forum were poorly understood outside central government and core ministries ...”\(^75\) It is acknowledged however, the Forum, its library and staff are extremely professional and have patiently assisted and encouraged this study. The new websites are very user-friendly which once word gets out, is likely to encourage more study and research.

The next step in regionalism is the implementation of the Plan especially those programmes identified as “low hanging fruits” or “early practical benefits.”\(^76\) The ‘Kalibobo Roadmap,’ named after the village in Papua New Guinea where the leaders’ retreat was held, guides the implementation of the Plan by the Secretariat with political oversight provided by the newly established Pacific Plan Action Committee (PPAC).

2.4 Pacific Islands Forum Annual Meetings

The next part of this chapter will describe the annual Forum summits. Much of this will be derived from attending the 2004 meetings in Apia Samoa. \(^77\) Due to the subjective nature of this type of research, events will be re-told as


\(^{76}\) Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2005, ‘The Pacific Plan For Strengthening Regional Cooperation And Integration,’ p 5


\(^{77}\) A major limitation of this type of narrative is that I have only attended one Forum summit, which prevents comparison. It is likely that the Auckland summit had its own atmosphere compared with the Papua New Guinea meeting. It was suggested however that despite this limitation, the experience was too valuable not to record.
experienced therefore the descriptions are personal views. In the same setting, it is acknowledged that others may view situations differently.  

2.4.1 Leaders’ Summit and Forum Officials Committee (the Committee)

The annual series of meetings comprise the Forum Officials Committee (the Committee), the Official Leaders’ Welcome, the Leaders’ Special Retreat, the Leaders’ Formal session and the post-Forum Dialogue. Taking advantage of the opportunity, bi-lateral meetings between leaders’ are also frantically arranged as officials are lobbied for the best time slots. Officials also take time to confer with their counterparts and informal get-togethers, especially those involving rugby, are arranged.

As with most Forum summits, the Apia meetings were characterised by their informality. It is suggested that this comes from the expectation that relations will be conducted in an amicable atmosphere and sometimes humorous fashion. Laughing and joking is common. All the meetings in Apia, except the leaders’ special retreat, were held in an open fale where the hotel’s cats wandered between tables and on rafters.

During the leaders’ so-called formal session, jokes were made about the mode of transport that had been generously provided (a number of large black Buicks by the Chinese government) and how some leaders had been mistaken for film stars, creating hoots of laughter for quite some time. Most surprising was the atmosphere during the evening receptions, most of the

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78 For ease of discussion, here the first person tense will be used – sparingly.
leaders moved among the guests, danced and sung to island music and appeared to enjoy each others’ company. The absence of the Australian Prime Minister was noticed at these open events.

After the Official welcome ceremony, leaders and the Secretary General participate in a special retreat. They use this time to thrash out issues in privacy. Officials do not usually attend. I was informed however they sit outside with arm-loads of information waiting just in case they are required. Normally there is no set agenda, but the agreed record of the Committee meeting is forwarded to leaders including a summary of the discussion that took place.

Some major issues may go straight to leaders’ without ‘pre-cooking’ by officials. The Pacific Plan update at the 2004 Apia meeting is an example. However, the numerous issues facing the leaders’ are complex and frequently require technical advice. To ease the burden during the retreat meetings, the Auckland Leaders’ Decisions recommended a series of reforms including procedural suggestions such as the Secretary General developing a short Retreat agenda and greater authority for Forum Ministers to make decisions at their respective meetings.79

In spite of the informality, professionalism during meetings is maintained. Procedures and agendas are followed and their content is taken very seriously. The Committee meetings take place over several days and are

79 Forum Communiqué 2004, Forum Special Leaders’ Retreat, Auckland Leaders Decisions, paragraph 15, 22
attended by senior government officials and they proceed through an agenda supplied by the Forum. Officials discuss their respective government’s position on various issues and identify key decisions and recommendations for the leaders to consider. The Forum budget and work programme is presented by the Secretary General. Decisions concerning the Secretariat are made and operational and administrative issues handled. These meetings were held just prior to the leaders’ meetings however the Secretariat hosted the 2005 Committee meeting in Suva, three weeks before the leaders’ meeting in Papua New Guinea.\(^\text{80}\)

**Flexibility** during these meetings is possible because the processes are not bound by legalism. One example of this in Apia was when the Ulu-o-Tokelau, Pio Tuia, addressed the leaders’ session at the suggestion of the New Zealand Prime Minister. It was thought that this was the first time a leader from a non-member state had spoken at the Formal session.\(^\text{81}\) Another example was when the President of New Caledonia, an observer country, without prior warning gave her welcoming speech in French.

One particular event that showed an aspect of political relations, which other regions could learn from, was the ability of leaders to move past or forgive a particular event. As an aside to the major meetings, island leaders met to choose the Forum’s representative for the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific group (ACP) negotiations. The final two contenders were from Papua New Guinea

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\(^{80}\) The EPG recommended the Committee meet a few weeks before the summit, while there was not enough time to implement the suggestion at the 2004 Apia meeting, in 2005, the Committee met in Suva the first week of October and the summit was held 25-27 October 2005.

\(^{81}\) Tokelau became an observer at the 2005 Forum.
and Samoa and this turned into a political tussle. It was rumoured that it could become a very difficult and tense issue.

I was observing from the distance the leaders huddled in a circle with heads bent inwards. Waiting for some expression of tension to erupt, surprisingly nothing occurred and I was left wondering about the result, imagining they were at an impasse. Keeping in mind, it is expected that consensus is the usual mode for Pacific decision-making, again I was surprised to learn, they actually voted and that the Papua New Guinea candidate won. Given that Samoa was the Forum chair and host, I expected the Samoan Prime Minister to be aggrieved. That night at a reception, however the Prime Ministers’ of Samoa and Papua New Guinea were laughing together, patting each other on the back and even stood together while I took a very jovial photo of them.

### 2.4.2 Post-Forum Dialogue

Post-Forum dialogue meetings with Forum partners began in Kiribati in 1989. The purpose was to provide an opportunity for parties interested in the region to participate in discussions with Forum members. The criteria for admission as a dialogue partner are:

- Long-established historical links with the region including security links;
- Significant trade and investment links;
- Long term commitment to the region through participation in regional organisations and diplomatic missions;
- Cultural and social identification with communities in the region;
• Development assistance to the region...  

Following several requests from potential new Dialogue Partners, a moratorium on new additions was placed by leaders at the 2005 summit and the Secretariat tasked to review the criteria.  

In Apia, the Dialogue meetings ranged from extremely formal such as the meeting with the Chinese delegates to a very informal meeting with the Canadian delegates. There are two panels made up of normally three or four Forum Foreign Ministers who meet with the respective partners to discuss issues of concern from both parties. It appeared to be an exhausting process for the Forum panels that sat through two hour long sessions, which were comparable to an interview process with one delegation following the next. Some country briefs were long and the Forum panels listened to tedious renditions of the well-known foreign policies of the respective partners. Conversely, the Forum panel repetitively stated their collective view on certain positions to each delegation. While it is a valuable opportunity, the procedure requires reform. A review of this process was also agreed to at the 2005 Forum and a report is due for the 2006 Forum.  

It is suggested that as part of the post-dialogue review, mention of the ‘Pacific Way’ and lessons in cultural sensitivity could be introduced. I noticed a clash of cultures between the Forum panel and some partner delegations. Demanding tones and aggressive hand gestures by some partner delegates

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84 Ibid
are unlikely to be received well in the friendly atmosphere of the Forum meetings. Berating Forum countries is also unlikely to achieve any objectives whereas understanding and consideration for cultural sensitivities is more appropriate and may encourage better relations.

When summing up the characteristics of the Forum annual meetings, the EPG’s suggestion that the “Pacific Way’ must evolve and be reasserted if it is remain relevant,” must be kept in mind. 85 It is the combination of informality, professionalism, flexibility and the ability to forgive a difficult political situation, which has matured the original idea of the ‘Pacific Way’. It is suggested that this is the reason cooperation has become normative and that there is a consistent expectation that future relations will remain friendly. It is this that creates a firm foundation for more intensive regionalism to progress.

2.5 Logic of Action

Regional integration described by Walter Mattli is,

...motivated by the belief that there is a general logic to regional integration ... That there is a way of looking at or interpreting or organizing the evidence that will reveal superficially disconnected and diverse phenomena to be manifestations of a more fundamental and relatively simple structure ... 86 (sic)

Pacific regionalism evolved ad hoc until the advent of the 2003-4 EPG report and the development of the Plan. Since the beginning of this study in early 2004, the Forum has undergone immense change and is in a period of

85 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 20
transformation. The 2003-4 EPG report and the development of the Plan has revealed the Forum’s strengths and flaws. It is argued that outcomes have not always satisfied regional expectations. Has the Forum failed to meet its objectives or have regional expectations been unrealistic? One answer is that until recently, the logic of integration and action has been implicit and obscured by myths, incorrect assumptions and ignorance.

During this time of regional transition, clarification is important. In all relationships, even friendly and cooperative ones, there comes a time when the expectations of all parties’ needs to be made explicit and roles clearly defined. If a party feels threatened or misunderstands motives and intentions, the desire to cooperate will lessen as tension or resentment builds. This scenario would undermine the basic objective of the Pacific Plan. On the other hand, for the Forum institutions to remain effective, its logic of action must be relevant and useful if it is to help fulfil the goals of the ‘Pacific Vision,’ through the implementation of the Plan.

As discussed above, one purpose of this chapter is to challenge the myths concerning the Forum’s responsibilities and the region’s expectations. This examination will assess whether the Forum has the authority and ability required to fulfil its obligations because the main problem is; now the Secretariat is tasked with the responsibility of the Plan, to whom the blame will be attributed, should the Plan’s programmes fade into obscurity. Is it valid to assume that the responsibility for the success of the Plan lies only with the institutions of the Forum?
Secretary General Greg Urwin cautions, “The Forum will not be able to do this on its own, and shouldn’t try to, for it is not a Forum Plan, but one that should belong to the nations and peoples of the Pacific.”\(^{87}\) It must be remembered that the Secretariat is not the sum of the Forum as it is the region’s governments that comprise its membership. Samoan Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Hon Misa Telefoni Retzlaff spoke to the Asian Development Bank in Manila early 2005 and stated, “Any Pacific Plan can only work with total commitment, good will participation and resolute compliance ….”\(^{88}\) Robertson also reminded that,

> The Pacific Plan needs popular support. Undoubtedly this will grow as the package of confidence-building initiatives, labour mobility and development assistance delivers benefits at the grassroots. But in the long term, deeper regionalism requires accountable and transparent institutions.

The consensus surrounding the Plan has created a moral imperative for its execution and this degree of political-will needs to transform into political responsibility. So while overall responsibility for the success of the Plan is region-wide, it is up to the leaders to clearly define the Forum’s ‘logic of action’ and then by accepting their degree of political responsibility, cooperate with the Secretariat by supporting its programmes and implementing its

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initiatives. The Plan may be the first tangible mechanism to ensure the region's governments cooperate with the Forum Secretariat.

2.5.1 What is the Logic of Action for a Regional Organisation?

The idea that a ‘logic of action’ exists is often taken for granted. During the process of organisational transformation, revealing the logic of action helps to prevent misunderstanding as the “means-ends relationships” can be clearly defined. It can be argued therefore that for a useful logic to emerge, it must consider the purpose of action and the structure for that action, which can then be tested by the effectiveness of the practical mechanisms to implement the action. Combined this logic of action will create an objective but common sense concept to help understand the ‘why and how’ processes of regionalism.

2.5.2 Logic of purpose

Classic authors of regionalism believed the purpose of organisation is to achieve an agreed goal or end by some form of cooperative endeavour. Amitai Etzioni, for example said organisations are, “… social units which are predominantly orientated to the attainment of specific goals.” Michael Smith described an organisation’s purpose as,

A mechanism through which states and other groupings attempt to manage their involvement in the international arena … a means by which authority is transferred away from states and other groupings to

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89 Bacharach, 1996
regional bodies better able to manage the problems that confront them.\textsuperscript{91}

Importantly, he asserted that, “the test for effectiveness is the extent to which security and prosperity can be achieved through collective action at the regional level.”\textsuperscript{92}

Greg Fry has contended that “the region and its institutions are increasingly a place where business gets done.” \textsuperscript{93} He extracted the “political roles” of regionalism and regional institutions,

- The region often has the capacity to confer legitimacy on practices (such as intervention) and on important concepts (such as security or development);
- It distributes resources, legitimates procedural norms and adjudicates on the legitimacy of states and governments by policing the right to membership;
- It is also the site of the generation of international law.
- It is used to protect local cultural mores;
- Is seen as an anti-hegemonic strategy to control great power and particularly American or Western dominance.\textsuperscript{94}

Fry’s last feature is explained as a “counter-hegemonic strategy.”\textsuperscript{95} This process provides the ability for “enhancing state power and maintaining state

\textsuperscript{91}\textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{92}\textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{93}Fry, 2000, p 123, 124, 130
\textsuperscript{94}\textit{Ibid}
\textsuperscript{95}\textit{Ibid, p 126}; A comparison of this strategy with Bernard K Gordon’s view of the ANZAC pact would make interesting research.
sovereignty and the non-intervention principle in the face of global encroachment.\textsuperscript{96} The affect of this, he concluded was that “even in the most marginalized case of the South Pacific, a region of micro-states, it can be shown that island state opinion has prevailed in the face of an attempt to impose a hegemonic order throughout the Cold War.”\textsuperscript{97} From here, the logic of purpose for a regional organisation can be described as the management of the region’s political roles through cooperative mechanisms with the purpose of attaining specific goals.

2.5.3 Structural logic

The structural composition of an organisation is an important feature to ensure the purposes of regional organisation are achieved. Philip Selnick reviewed the structure of an organisation by quoting John M Gaus, he said,

Organisation, we are told, is the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed purpose through the allocation of functions and responsibilities. Cooperative systems are constituted of individuals interacting as wholes in relation to a formal system of coordination ... Furthermore this structure is itself a totality, an adaptive organism reacting to influences upon it from an external environment.”\textsuperscript{98}

He added that the “maintenance of the system” and its structure required the need for:

- Security of the organisation as a whole;

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid, p 131
• The stability of the lines of authority and communication;
• The stability of informal relations within the organisation;
• The continuity of policy and of the sources of its determination;
• Homogeneity of outlook with respect to the meaning and role of the organisation.99

Structural logic therefore consists of the arrangement of personnel in an institutional environment that is adaptive and maintains stability and consistency with agreement of its roles and functions.

2.5.4 Practical logic

Institutions that promote cooperative endeavours are the practical mechanisms that have been called the “motors of integration” or “the driver of regionalism.”100 The “Monnet Method” also known as “neo-functionalist incrementalism” is described by Myrto Tsakatika; “Concerted action was to be a ‘concrete achievement’, insofar as there was continuity and institutionalisation of a variety of partial projects of cooperation on economic and social issues [and] the common projects that would result from it.”101 He argued that,

These projects would habituate European states and their citizens in cooperation. Gradually cooperation would be needed on other projects and whole sectors of common activity, due to the inter-dependence that would emerge from initial cooperation. Given time, Europe would become

99 Ibid, p 26
united without realising it, as common projects would lead European states
to pool their sovereignties.\textsuperscript{102}

This method relied on a “body of experts and administrators” not politicians.\textsuperscript{103}
These “technocratic elite” would be independent and loyal to the idea of
regionalism and would provide “advice upon which governments and men of
politics would act.”\textsuperscript{104}

Tsakatika argued that Monnet’s slow and concealed process of regionalism
has produced “deeply rooted structural reasons for the lack of openness
accountability, efficiency, coherence and participation,” so that “democratic
legitimacy” is threatened and the development of good regional governance
undermined.\textsuperscript{105} On the other hand, he acclaimed “there are many practical
considerations to be taken into account,” as from this method the EU has
become the, “motor of integration … is the centre of information and
goitre; [a] policy entrepreneur; point of reference; [and a] reliable mediator
between the contrasting interests of the Member states.”\textsuperscript{106}

It is argued that the habit of cooperation has been the foundation for Pacific
regionalism due to a lack of interstate enmity, but that ‘concerted action’
producing consistent ‘concrete achievement’ has limped along in ad hoc
fashion comparable to Monnet’s method. As the ‘motor for integration’ or
‘driver of Pacific regionalism’, the incremental development of the Forum has
obscured some of its structures and institutions. Myths of inefficiency are

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
\item[102] Tsakatika, 2002, p 4, 5
\item[103] Ibid
\item[104] Ibid, p 5
\item[105] Ibid, p 5
\item[106] Ibid, p 9
\end{footnotes}
\end{footnotesize}
perceived because its implementation of initiatives or ‘concrete action’ has lacked momentum. While this maybe a time-sensitive flaw in the sense that Pacific regionalism is still evolving. The time to increase impetus is evidenced by the development of the Plan, which has been a firm and positive step towards a greater depth of regionalism.

Ad hoc incremental regionalism has therefore been be superseded by deliberate political decision-making. The Forum, therefore as the driver of the Plan must take a more direct approach towards regionalism. Its logic of action is summarised as:

… having the authority to manage the region’s political roles with the purpose of attaining specific goals through mechanisms with stable but adaptive structures that can implement good governance processes.

2.6 Pacific Islands Forum Agreement

This part of the chapter will compare the logic of action described above with the structural reform provided by the new ‘Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum’ (the Agreement) adopted by the Leaders at the 2005 leader’s summit – see annex three. The purpose is to test the effectiveness of these adjustments and make suggestions towards increasing the Forum’s potential.

The political decision to legally establish the Forum through this Agreement, once in force, will change the constitutional and legal status of the region forever. At the 2005 summit, this regionally historical moment nevertheless occurred and passed without much media or academic fanfare. Previously the
Forum institutions were not confined to one formal document or treaty. It was believed this allowed for greater institutional flexibility however the communiqués, agreements and declarations have created an institutional complexity that was problematic when trying to clarify rules, roles and boundaries. The EPG review said, “The existing Agreement establishing the Forum Secretariat … is out of date and does not recognise the current nature of Secretariat work.”

The Agreement re-affirms the goals of the Pacific Vision. Its purpose is, “formally to establish the Pacific Islands Forum as an international organisation in its own right and better to provide for its purpose and operation…” (sic). Nevertheless, relative to other international agreements this explanation is sparse. It does not explain how the Forum will achieve its goals and purposes. Despite this, the implication is that, once in force, the Forum will have official actor status to enter and sign contractual agreements. It can participate as an entity, independent in law and of its constituents, with a legal platform to establish further binding agreements.

Ron Crocombe strongly agreed with the view of Dr Kurleigh King, Secretary General of CARICOM to, “Keep the lawyers out.” In 1980 Crocombe spent time “looking at regionalism in the Caribbean,” and said that, “CARICOM is bogged down by a detailed constitution and agreements that makes creative
action difficult.” Is it likely therefore that the Forum’s new Agreement will hinder creative action? The Agreement now formally and legally sets out a structure that defines the roles, functions and boundaries of the Forum. It has outlined a logic of action for the Forum but the next question is how effective it is?

Boister, an international lawyer, described this Agreement as ‘an empty – cut down version of a constitutional treaty.’ He noted it lacked a formal dispute resolution process and required all Forum members to sign and ratify before it enters into force. This, he said makes it a ‘difficult’ treaty as it does not have a timetable for action. Therefore, until ratification, it has no official legal standing.

The spirit of the Agreement, however clearly enunciates the structure and purposes, authority and functions of the Forum and its various institutions. Despite being deliberately vague with open-ended provisions, its main contribution is to clarify the status quo and provide for further development. With the Forum in a period of transition and the development of the Pacific Plan, this is a timely and sensible definition of the Forum’s logic of action and as another move towards a greater depth of regionalism – it is a small but appropriate step.

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112 Ibid
113 Boister, 2005, Interview,
114 New Zealand, Tonga and Tuvalu did not sign the Agreement in Papua New Guinea at the 2005 Annual Leaders Summit.
115 Ibid
2.6.1 Article I: The Pacific Islands Forum (the Forum)

The Forum is established as an international organisation. It comprises Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Samoa, Tonga as the founding members; and the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Island, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Associate membership of the territories must be approved by the Forum leaders. The criteria for associated membership and the nature and extent of the rights and obligations are to be determined by the Leaders from time to time. Leaders may also invite other territories and inter-governmental organisations to be Forum observers.

This defines the Forum, not as the group of leaders’ or their annual meeting (which is outlined in Article III), but as the membership of 16 governments. One interesting omission is a description of the nature and extent of the rights and obligations of members towards each other and the Forum. So, what action is available to the Forum institutions to ensure members cooperate with its strategies and initiatives? Cooperation implies a reciprocal interaction where all parties take responsibility to achieve a collective goal.

The Forum can only move with or alongside national governments, who ultimately must accept the consequences if they hinder the cooperation process. As former Forum Secretary General Noel Levi said when,

…trying to achieve the Secretariat's vision of, a sustainable prosperous and secure Pacific..., the pursuit of these goals has been much like a canoe race. Unless the team paddles on both sides, with a degree of
coordination and harmony, the canoe cannot move forward very well.\textsuperscript{116}

2.6.2 Article II: Purpose

The purpose of the Forum is to strengthen regional cooperation and integration including through the pooling of regional resources of governance and the alignment of policies, in order to further Forum members’ shared goals of economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security.

Admirable and reflective of the Pacific Vision, this description of the Forum’s purpose implies a degree of responsibility for the Forum to achieve its goals. Yet as discussed above, cooperation is a two way process and here no mention is made of the consequences should a member hinder the cooperative process. Ideas of sanctions and the use of sticks to coerce compliance are unlikely to be effective. As a result members must exert greater political responsibility to ensure the purposes of the Agreement are achieved. This would be evidence of mature regionalism.

Reliance on historical relationships of amity and cooperation based on the ‘Pacific Way’ will therefore become a more significant mechanism that will require careful maintenance. Most Pacific leaders and officials will not find this difficult, but some who are used to formal structures and strict deadlines, will need to lower their expectations. While this is not easy, it is achievable. It will ensure legitimacy is achieved as collectively-made decisions are more likely

to achieve their objectives. This will be a significant role model for other developing regions to emulate.

2.6.3 Article III: The Forum Leaders’ Meeting

The Leaders’ annual meeting is the pre-eminent decision-making body of the Forum. The meeting procedures are not described but left to their determination. They appoint the Forum Chair who will hold the position until the next annual meeting. In the 2004 Auckland Decisions, and traditionally, this was the leader of the host country however this Agreement leaves the provision open.

The 2004 ‘Auckland Decisions,’ gave the Forum Chair greater power and authority to provide leadership. The Decisions state that the Forum Chair is to ‘play a proactive role in taking a strong regional leadership role … including on the international stage.’ This raises the profile of the position. It can act as an incentive to encourage a greater level of good and skilful regional leadership to emerge.

The 2004 Forum Chair, Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi was described as ‘a great pragmatist' and chaired the region through the development of the Pacific Plan with courage and realism. He commented that,

…our commitment to regionalism has been patchy. There are complex reasons for this, among them the pursuit of inward-looking policies, as

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117 2004 Communiqué, Note, the Auckland Decisions are separate to that of the ‘Auckland Declaration.’
118 2004 Communiqué, para 18
well as the fact, put frankly, that our members can still benefit from regionalism without making a serious commitment to it.\textsuperscript{119}

The Hon Sir Michael Somare, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea (PNG), the 2005 Forum Chair said, ‘we have decided that the Pacific Plan is an appropriate vehicle … [and] let me state that it would be a mistake – an opportunity lost – if we do not approve the draft Pacific Plan.’\textsuperscript{120} As regional representatives, both these men are long term experienced politicians, from two very different Pacific island countries.

Malielegaoi is from a homogenous society with stable government that enabled him the freedom to fulfil the duties of Chair. Somare is from a fractured state with a list of complex security issues all of which have the ability to seriously threaten its stability. As Forum Chair with the mandate to represent and promote the region on the global stage, Somare may be compromised by his domestic problems. Tonga has agreed to host the 2006 Forum annual summit and will then become Forum Chair. It too may become preoccupied by domestic concerns as its citizens assert their desire for a more democratic form of governance.

How these domestic issues impact the role of the Forum Chair is unknown at this point. It is stressed however, that these are problems common in varying degrees in most countries and should not inhibit regional leadership. The

\textsuperscript{119} Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi, Samoan Prime Minister, 2005, ‘The Future of Pacific Regionalism ,’ Speech delivered Wellington & Auckland, March, p 4-5
\textsuperscript{120} Matangi Tonga Online, 2005, ‘Forum’s new Chairman Somare urges support for Pacific Plan,’ 26 October, http://www.matangitonga.to/article/spnews/pacificislands/somare261005.shtml
stress here is put on the Agreement which does not contain explicit provisions for dealing with difficult political situations.

Another major issue of promoting the position and authority of the Forum Chair is found in the Biketawa Declaration, which asserts,

Forum Leaders recognised the need in time of crisis or in response to members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family. The Forum must constructively address difficult and sensitive issues including underlying causes of tensions and conflict (ethnic tension, socio-economic disparities, and lack of good governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values). To this end, the Secretary General in the future after consulting the Forum Chairman should urgently initiate the following process … (emphasis mine)¹²¹

This problem here is if the Forum Chair is unable or unsuitable to function in this role, there is no formal solution. How can the list of ‘difficult and sensitive issues’ in the Declaration be ‘constructively addressed’ if the Forum Chair is the leader of the country suffering from these problems? Should a crisis arise in the country of the Forum Chair, how can the Secretary General consult when the position of Forum Chair is comprised by a conflict of interest?¹²²

This then also draws into question the position of Secretary General and especially in light of the call by leaders for his role to become more pro-active.

¹²¹ Pacific Islands Forum, Communiqué 2000
¹²² As a note of interest, as hosts of the previous 17th Forum in 1986, Fiji was officially Forum Chair at the time of the 1987 Fiji Coup.
Helen Clark, New Zealand Prime Minister, in 2003 explicitly asserted the Forum Secretary General was “to act in trouble spots” as like that of Commonwealth Secretary-General Don McKinnon.\textsuperscript{123} She said, “…let’s make it absolutely clear that the Secretary General is expected to be proactive. If we mandate a new direction, we expect proactive management of that…” and “as Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr McKinnon not only has the ability to send in special missions and call for special attention to a trouble spot, but he is expected to do so.”\textsuperscript{124}

As an alternative, one Forum institution not mentioned in the Agreement is the troika comprising the outgoing, current and incoming Forum Chairs – sometimes known as the Core Group of Leaders. The diversity of the group is transformed each time the Forum Chair circulates through the membership. If the Biketawa Declaration was updated to provide for the Secretary General to consult with this group – its diversity would reduce the possibility of conflict of interest and add towards greater regional legitimacy. In the course of their normal international leadership duties, all three could also promote and advance the interests of the region as they are able.

2.6.4 Article IV: Establishment of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat & Article VIII: Functions of the Secretariat

Article IV establishes the Secretariat based in Suva and article VIII clearly describes its functions. Article VIII (2) states:

\textsuperscript{123} New Zealand Herald, 2003, ‘Clark Backs Faster Entry to Hot Spots,’ 18 August 2003
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid
The primary roles of the Secretariat are to provide policy advice, coordination and assistance in implementing the decisions of the Forum Leaders.

Paragraph 3(a) states the Secretariat, “subject to the direction of Forum leaders and the Committee,” shall also:

Build upon the important basis for regional cooperation established by the Forum by working to further strengthen and deepen links between the countries of the region in accordance with the purpose of the Forum, including through the ongoing development and implementation of the Pacific Plan.

While these provisions clearly outline the functions of the Secretariat, the rights and obligations of the members to the Secretariat are still implicit. This could become contentious should a problem concerning resources or overloading arise. The EPG report acknowledged this problem, “There have been criticisms that it [the Secretariat] is struggling to produce concise, high-quality policy papers on time.”125 They recommended the Secretary General re-develop a corporate plan, it is suggested this include the provision that Pacific leaders and their respective governments prioritise their governance policies towards a more cooperative relationship. While the Secretariat and Secretary General serves the Forum members, the members must also reciprocate with national policies that provide the information and resources required for the Secretariat to develop effective policies.

125 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 51
2.6.5 Article V: Pacific Islands Forum Officials’ Committee (the Committee)

Comprising one representative of each of the members, this is the Secretariat’s Executive body and its powers and functions are, “to give general policy directions to the Secretariat and to make reports and recommendations to the Forum leaders.” It also approves the work-plan and budget of the Secretariat and comments on the Secretariat’s Annual Report.

The Committee also determines the remuneration and regulations of the Secretariat staff. It has been suggested that the turnover of staff is not frequent, thus political and technical expertise is not evolving throughout the region. The EPG report discouraged the “cult of regional career official,” and recommended, “executive/professional staff be hired for no more than two three year terms of employment.”\textsuperscript{126} Increased secondments from Forum member governments may augment the region’s talent pool of officials.

The position of Secretary General is limited by the two three year terms in Article VI but it makes no mention of other senior staff positions. This does not prevent the Committee from drafting the rule as this Article re-states the Committee is to determine the ‘establishment’ of staff and the remuneration policy.

Article V (7) states,

\begin{quote}
All decisions of the Committee shall be taken by consensus, wherever possible, or if necessary by a majority of the representatives present
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid, p 52, 53
and voting, except as provided for in Article IX(2) of this Agreement (this provides for the sharing of the Forum’s operating costs).

Consensus is considered an important feature in all relationships. The EPG report acknowledged its importance, “The ‘Pacific Way’ is one of the region’s greatest assets, but the concept must evolve and be reasserted if it is to remain relevant.”127 Taking the time to talk through a problem is a common cultural theme in many countries and it has an important moral strength that compels implementation.

However, a consistent debate over the legitimacy of consensus versus vote, does not in the meantime, solve the problems facing the region. The strength of the ‘Pacific Way’ is not undermined by accepting that in some situations, voting is appropriate. Article V retains the commitment to consensus decision-making but provides room for a vote if needed. Legitimacy can be achieved either by consensus or a vote but mainly by ensuring that regional decisions are made by a style of ‘good regional governance’ that is inclusive, effective and free from corruption.128

This step in the evolution of the ‘Pacific Way’ extends the idea of ‘political will’ or ‘buy-in’ towards a sense of greater ‘political responsibility’. The practice of agreeing formally to a decision without the intention of implementing has been described as ‘in but cheating’.129 In this context, regionalism is prevented from achieving its goals such as those set out in the Plan. One outcome from the

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127 Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 20
128 Ibid
129 Term is borrowed from Neil Boister, School of Law, University of Canterbury
members accepting the need for a greater degree of responsibility is a mature regionalism that sees adherence to the decisions made.

2.6.6. Article VII: Functions of the Secretary General

The Secretary General shall act as secretary to the Forum leaders’ meeting. The Secretary General shall also act as secretary to Ministerial meetings, the Committee and such other councils, committees or working groups as may be established by the Forum.\textsuperscript{130}

Before the new Agreement was made available, it was suggested that the Secretary General’s authority was obscure.\textsuperscript{131} In April 2004, New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark repeated her view that his “role is expected to allow for greater intervention in regional crises …” but that “the Forum Secretary General, for whatever reason, has not felt empowered to act in the way, say, Don McKinnon would if he saw a crisis in the Commonwealth.”\textsuperscript{132} ABC reporter Sean Dorney also said, “The leaders agreed in August [2003] that it was time to have another look at the Forum and give the Secretary General and the Secretariat greater powers to be proactive.”\textsuperscript{133} It was argued conversely, that the Biketawa Declaration, being at that stage the only document outlining the authority of the position, actually confined initiative by the requirement for consultation with the Forum Chair.\textsuperscript{134} It was stated therefore that if “the authority to act is derived … from the document, then the

\textsuperscript{130} The Agreement, Article VII(1)
\textsuperscript{134} Boxall, 2004
logic of action must be defined cautiously, if from the rhetoric, then there is more room to move.”\textsuperscript{135}

Looking at the wider context, a consistent degree of uncertainty concerning leadership in intergovernmental organisations was discovered. The current United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Kofi Annan said, “There are times when I have to be a secretary and times when I have to be a general and show leadership. Knowing when to be one and when to be the other is what makes this job so challenging.”\textsuperscript{136} Despite the objectives in the Terms of Reference for the 2003 EPG Review to “assess the mandate of the Secretary General including option for broadening and making more explicit the role”\textsuperscript{137} The new Agreement states explicitly the Forum Secretary General is the region’s ‘secretary’.

Article VII (2) clearly outlines the Secretary General’s responsibilities and tasks,

The Secretary General shall be responsible, in close consultation with the Forum Chair and within the limits set by the Forum leaders from time to time, for setting Forum Leaders’ meeting agendas and coordinating responses by members to regional events, particularly crises. The Secretary General shall also perform other functions and duties as directed by Forum leaders.

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid
\textsuperscript{136} Smith Courtney, 2003, ‘More Secretary or General? Effective Leadership at the United Nations,’\textit{International Politics}, 40 (137-147)
\textsuperscript{137} Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 59
While this has dispelled any myths concerning the Secretary General’s authority and it provides little room for initiative or for a more pro-active role. During the 2003 review, the EPG “encountered a general belief that the role of the Secretary General should be less constrained” and in their report they asserted that the “role of the Forum Secretary General is substantial and the incumbent is a key determinant to the success or failure of both the Secretariat and the wider Forum process.”

Keeping in mind the idea of *structural logic* as described above, “…is the arrangement of personnel for facilitating the accomplishment of some agreed purpose…” Regional governance under this Article is to bear all the negative bureaucratic burdens of constraint. When lamenting the demise of “individual genius and initiative,” former Under-Secretary of the UN Giandomenico Picco said, “We need to encourage the role of commandos … in the civil realm … [and that] a new theory of institutions, which combines the strength of their structure with the genius of individuals …” Despite the region’s call for ingenious and directive leadership from the Secretary General, under this new Agreement, the position is to remain constrained without risk.

**2.7 What the Agreement missed**

The Agreement does not provide for all the Forum bodies, namely the numerous Forum Ministers’ meetings. The annual Forum Communiqués list

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138 Ibid, p 54
139 See chapter two – 2.5.3
the annual reports from the ministerial meetings for the year past. These have included the meetings of Foreign, Fisheries, Education, Trade, Economic, Aviation, Communication ministers and the Pacific ACP and the Forum Ministerial Committee on New Caledonia. Some ministerial groups meet annually and others as required. The 2004 Auckland Decisions has mandated “Forum Ministerial meetings with decision-making power,” and Secretary General Greg Urwin has also acknowledged this “effort to devolve more decision-making to Ministers …“\textsuperscript{141}

It is noted that defence or security ministers have not met in an official capacity. Security officials meet annually through various meetings such as the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC), Pacific Chiefs of Police, Oceania Customs Organisation, Pacific Immigration Directors Conference, and the Pacific Law Officers Meeting. In March 2005, police, defence and security officials from 15 countries and Pacific regional organisations, including the Forum Secretariat, attended a South Pacific Defence and Security Seminar at the Military Studies Institute, Trentham Military Camp, hosted by the New Zealand Defence Force.\textsuperscript{142} The status, function and potential of the FRSC will be detailed in chapter six but it is argued here that as security is one of the four pillars of the Plan and with Forum leaders devolving more authority to Ministers, it would be appropriate for defence or security ministers’ to meet with the purpose to make collective decisions concerning the Pacific security environment.


2.8. Forum Appraised

The test for effectiveness of the Forum is whether it, as described above, ‘has the authority to manage the region’s political roles with the purpose of attaining specific goals through mechanisms with stable but adaptive structures that can implement good governance processes.’ Being tasked with the implementation of the Plan, the Forum has been clearly been accepted as the driver or motor for greater regionalism. The new Agreement provides a simple logic of action that gives the Forum the formal and legal authority to manage the region’s political roles. Its structures are stable and have been clarified under the new Agreement. The adaptability of them to adjust towards their respective goals, despite the new legal structures, is likely to occur due to the informality and flexibility of regional relations.

The success of the Plan and ultimately the Pacific Vision however may suffer due to the lack of good regional governance processes in the security sector. This will be discussed in chapter six when one regional institution, the Forum Regional Security committee is detailed and its processes analysed.
Chapter 3: Pacific Cooperation Review

3.1 Introduction

This review considers the literature on regional cooperation in the Pacific region. The emphasis on cooperation is important because it challenges the applicability of traditional security theory that relies on realism, when studying security in the Pacific. The characteristics of Pacific cooperation will be described with a focus on the evolution of the ‘Pacific Way’ – the region’s established means for consensual, inclusive and authoritative decision-making process. Pacific cooperation depends on this principle especially when the members have disproportionate resources and power.

3.2 Historical Cooperation

The desire for closer relations and greater regional cooperation has been a historically consistent feature of Pacific relations. In 1930, Caroline Mabel West-Watson from the Canterbury University College presented her MA thesis on International Rivalries and Cooperation in the Pacific Area. While her definition of the Pacific region is different to this study by focusing on the rim countries, she included Pacific island countries as the territories of colonial powers. Her work is considered relevant as two principles of cooperation she espoused characterise the beginning of cooperative relationships in the Forum countries. One feature she argued was that:

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143 This is discussed further in chapter four
144 West-Watson, Caroline Mabel, 1930, International Rivalries and Cooperation in the Pacific Area, MA Thesis, Canterbury University College, Christchurch, p 2. It is acknowledged that some of West-Watson’s political views reflect those of her colonial-era and are not quite appropriate in an age of post-de-colonisation.
... the growth of a spirit of cooperation ... [evolves from] a system of cooperation [where] the various nations will be neither in subjection to the will of the strongest nor in competition with each other ...”

In a region, like the Pacific, where there is a large diversity in resources and power, successful cooperation depends on a system that can prevent domination as well as providing the means for more vulnerable members to participate and contribute appropriately.

Secondly, West-Watson asserted that cooperation was, “developed among them primarily to enable them to pursue their own aims more effectively.”

This idea that self-interest can be satisfied through cooperative action is obvious, but reminding the parties that it is a natural reward and inherent motivation for parties to work together, encourages effective regionalism. There exists however in Pacific literature that will be discussed below, a tautological argument that if parties seek to satisfy national interests at the expense of cooperation then regionalism is ineffective. The flaw here is that the means has become the goal. If cooperation is the goal instead of a specific outcome, then any disagreement about the method of cooperation will threaten the relationship. If however the goal is specific, such as the prevention of trans-national criminals violating border regulations, then debate over the means acceptable.

145 West-Watson, 1930, p 2
146 West-Watson, 1930, p 35
A Chatham House Study Group (the Group) in 1946 on *The Pattern of Pacific Security* presented a similar theme of cooperation.\(^{147}\) Their view of the region also differs from this study but their main argument is still useful. They said that, “… a genuine working order of collective security is the best condition of peace and progress.”\(^{148}\) They also identified a geographical characteristic of the region that gives insight into the cooperative nature of Pacific relations.

The Group examined the character of the whole region, which included the four main powers: the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR and China. They identified the lack of a “land-mass which provides the political centre of gravity” and that, “the Pacific Ocean presented one strong contrast with all the other regions of the world” because the major powers had substantial security interests elsewhere.\(^{149}\) They illustrated this lack of ‘centre’ by asserting that the two countries, New Zealand and Australia, while “more manifestly Pacific in geographical situation … look beyond the Pacific to the Mother Country.” \(^{150}\)

One outcome of this lack of a dominating centre power was that the Pacific Island countries were not drawn deeply into the security complexities of Cold War dilemmas during their respective periods of decolonisation. In comparison with other developing regions and with the exception of Vanuatu, they did not experience the manipulations of the east/west power struggle for influence. While this assertion needs further investigation, for the purposes

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\(^{147}\) Chatham House Study Group, 1946, *The Pattern of Pacific Security*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Oxford University Press, London & New York, p 7, The purpose of the report was to make a submission to the Ninth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations in January 1945.

\(^{148}\) Chatham House Study Group, 1946, p 69

\(^{149}\) Chatham House Study Group, 1946, p 11

\(^{150}\) Chatham House Study Group, 1946, p 12
here, this is a useful explanation of why traditional theories of security based on realism are not applicable to the region.

The Group believed that, “the most fundamental threat to Pacific security is the possibility of the system itself breaking down through the principal parties failing to cooperate on a basis of mutual trust and of agreement on basic principles.”¹⁵¹ They recommended that “…the good that is in sovereignty can be combined with the good that is in partnership…”¹⁵² Concluding with a bold and comprehensive proposal to establish a “New Pacific Order,” they recommended: ¹⁵³

- A political organ for conference and decision, with appropriate machinery for conciliation;
- A Pacific Court of International Justice, related to the Permanent Court and a quasi-judicial organ for arbitration;
- An economic organ for the conception, supervision and coordination of development and welfare programmes;
- A defence organ capable of instant action to hold in check any threat to the general security and an organ of intellectual cooperation as a cultural clearing house.¹⁵⁴

Asserting that, “the Pacific needs, not the illusory promise of an ideally complete blue print, but a firm foundation of united action…”, while beyond the

¹⁵¹ Chatham House Study Group, 1946, p 16-18
¹⁵² Chatham House Study Group, 1946, p 64
¹⁵³ Chatham House Study Group, 1946, p 30
¹⁵⁴ Chatham House Study Group, 1946, p 30-31
scope of this thesis, a comparison of this Oxford study with the 2004 EPG Report, conducted 58 years later, would make interesting research."  

3.3 Decolonisation – The Beginnings of Regionalism

Narrowing the focus to the Pacific region as defined in chapter one, Davidson writing in 1971, described *The Decolonisation of Oceania*:\(^{156}\) He stated that,

> In the Pacific Islands, decolonisation and its immediate aftermath have also been unusually peaceful and orderly. The islands have experienced no revolutions (like those, before and after independence in Indonesia) \[and\] no civil wars (like those in the Congo and Nigeria).\(^{157}\)

At that time, this was the major feature that distinguished the Pacific area from other regions.\(^{158}\) As the confidence and political authority of Pacific Island leaders grew during the 1970s, as explained by Davidson, “cooperation on a regional basis” become one of their political objectives.\(^{159}\)

The early 1970s, with 1971 being the ‘South Pacific Year,” were a busy time for New Zealand’s foreign affairs officials and academics.\(^{160}\) Seminars and conferences were organised and many books and pamphlets tracing Pacific regionalism were published. In Bruce Brown’s, *New Zealand in the Pacific*, TR

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155 Chatham House Study Group, 1946, p 16-18
157 Ibid
158 The rebellion on Santos, Vanuatu in 1980, the Bougainville civil war and the ongoing struggle in West Papua does taint this assertion.
159 Davidson, 1971, p 22
Smith (former Secretary-General of the South Pacific Commission) stated that challenges to security came from outside the region.\textsuperscript{161} He said:

The spread of Europe’s lethal quarrels to the Pacific in 1942 made it clear to Australians and New Zealanders at least, that association with the outer world involved Pacific islanders in perils against which they had no real defence. [There] was a firm determination to build a better world in the future for the Pacific peoples … It was in this spirit that the Australian and New Zealand Agreement was signed at Canberra on 21 January 1944. \textsuperscript{162}

This Agreement, referred to as the ANZAC\textsuperscript{163} pact, clearly outlined the depth of responsibility taken by Australia and New Zealand for the Pacific region. The two governments agreed to establish a “zone of defence” in the region and declared their intention to the “community of Nations” to “assume full responsibility for policing or sharing in policing such areas in the South West and South Pacific.”\textsuperscript{164} Bernard K. Gordon asserted the intention of Australian and New Zealand was to ensure their influence in post-war “Allied discussions” was noted by Britain and America.\textsuperscript{165} The Agreement stated the purpose of this, was for the “the welfare of the native peoples and their social, economic and political development.”\textsuperscript{166} The pact also agreed to “promote the establishment” of a South Sea Regional Commission that could

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\textsuperscript{161} Smith TR, 1970, ‘International Cooperation for Aid to Underdeveloped Pacific Territories’ in BM Brown, \textit{New Zealand in The Pacific}, New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, Trentham,
\textsuperscript{162} Ibid, p 69
\textsuperscript{163} Australian and New Zealand Army Corp - ANZAC
\textsuperscript{164} Canberra Pact 1944, para 13-15 – see annex four.
\textsuperscript{166} Canberra Pact 1944, para 28
\end{flushright}
secure a common policy on social, economic and political development directed towards the advancement and well-being of the native peoples themselves ... with a view to promoting the ultimate attainment of self-government in the form most suited to the circumstances of the native peoples concerned.”  

Smith, however, was quick to point out that, 

the original inhabitants of the islands of the South Pacific had, before the arrival of Europeans, lived in their islands for centuries, and even millennia, in full political independence ... [but] the new factor in the situation which had made them unable to stand alone in the modern world was the presence of Europeans.  

Smith described how the proposal for the Commission was taken to a Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ meeting in London in 1946 and later to the governments of France, the Netherlands and the United States. In 1947, representatives of these countries came together in Canberra and drew up the agreement to set up the South Pacific Commission (SPC). He explained, however, that the “political development” component of the original objectives of the Commission in 1944 was not included in the 1947 agreement.  

Smith can be seen to imply a reason for this omission when he described how the French outlook contrasted with that of the other members. While the principle concern of the agreement was the welfare and development of ...
colonial peoples, strengthening “international cooperation” became an imperative and caused this objective to be “redefine[d].”\textsuperscript{170}

Smith highlighted the contrasting opinion held by Mr Robert Butler from the American delegation that,

\begin{quote}
    The island peoples must be brought into the programme and made to feel part of it. They must find in it a means of expressing their wishes and aspirations. They must have confidence that it is operating in their best interests.\textsuperscript{171}
\end{quote}

However, reflecting the approach by other members, Smith goes on to say,

\begin{quote}
    the South Pacific Commission (SPC) was planned for the peoples of the South Pacific but not by those peoples … Any development of common political aims among Pacific islanders would have been unwelcome to at least some of the administering powers in 1947. The provision for consultation between islanders was, therefore, limited and cautious.\textsuperscript{172}
\end{quote}

At the sixth South Pacific Conference at Lae in 1965, Smith described how “the increasing dissatisfaction of island leaders with an organisation in which important decisions affecting them were made by a body on which they had no vote came to head.”\textsuperscript{173} Ratu Kamisese Mara (later Sir) asserted the view “that Fiji would have little use for the Commission in the future if it did not

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid, P 73; Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Commission, para 6 – see annex five for the omission of the ‘political development’ component.
\textsuperscript{171} Smith, 1970, p 76
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid, 1970, 79
regard the territories as equal partners,” and this opinion, said Smith, was held by most Pacific Island leaders at this time.\textsuperscript{174}

Norman Kirk, in 1971, as Leader of the Opposition in New Zealand (Labour Party), commented on “the need for independent thinking of a new and vigorous nature” concerning the South Pacific. \textsuperscript{175} He said, “for the present there is no satisfactory regional organisation where the Island States and the Australian and New Zealand Parliaments can meet to discuss political issues.\textsuperscript{176} He felt a government to government forum was not enough and recommended the establishment of a “Pacific Council representative of the parliaments of the region.”\textsuperscript{177} He called for a venue, “drawing people from every party represented in those [Pacific] parliaments … [where] further cooperation and coordination on development can be discussed.”\textsuperscript{178}

In Bruce Brown’s \textit{Asia and the Pacific in the 1970’s}, Mary Boyd provided a broad overview of many issues in the ‘Southwest Pacific’ on the eve of decolonization. \textsuperscript{179} Her aim was to “make some general observations about the main problems and trends discernible.”\textsuperscript{180} In an overview of larger Pacific island countries, she included their experiences of independence, evolution of political authority and identified potential security problems. For example, in the case of Fiji she asserted, “A multi-racial rather than a Fijian military force

\textsuperscript{174} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{175} Norman Kirk, MP, 1971, \textit{New Zealand and its Neighbours}, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington \\
\textsuperscript{176} Ibid, p 13 \\
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid \\
\textsuperscript{179} Mary Boyd, 1971, ‘Southwest Pacific’ chapter in Bruce Brown (ed) \textit{Asia and the Pacific in the 1970’s}, AH & AW Reed, Wellington \\
\textsuperscript{180} Ibid
would be a better insurance for internal security.”\textsuperscript{181} In Papua New Guinea, she contended that the aim of the Pacific Islands Regiment is to become a national army, but that “in the event of civil politics becoming ineffective, unstable or corrupt, the possibility of a military takeover clearly exists.”\textsuperscript{182}

Boyd acknowledged the, “south Pacific [was] entering a period of political change.”\textsuperscript{183} She asserted, “for small emergent, economically non-viable territories who cannot afford to become United Nations members and have many problems and interests in common, regional associations are particularly valuable.”\textsuperscript{184} Boyd did not explicitly promote recommendations for closer cooperation, but encouraged, “building on machinery already in existence.”\textsuperscript{185} She asserted that “the growing aspirations of islanders to determine their own course in economic and social development,” was evident by Pacific leaders initiating the development of the Pacific Islanders Producers’ Association (PIPA) to facilitate inter-territorial trade cooperation. She cautioned that “it is hard to believe that a revitalized South Pacific Commission can remain non-political.”\textsuperscript{186}

In agreement with Boyd, LV Castle, argued that the Pacific Island leaders “desire for regional cooperation is probably more clearly apparent in the formation of the Pacific Islands Producers Association (PIPA) which embraces

\textsuperscript{181} Boyd, 1971, p 66
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid, p 71
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid, p 85
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid, p 82
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid
Fiji, Western Samoa, Cook Is, Niue and Tonga.” He said the aim of PIPA was to “achieve closer regional economic cooperation,” and that it was not “concerned with problems of a political nature, nor is it likely to develop in that way.” He described it as “an organisation of indigenous origin,” but that, “what is now needed also is some means whereby the indigenous peoples can meet for the discussion of common political problems.” The focus of his paper was the role and responsibility of New Zealand in the Pacific and keeping in mind the practical ideas of cooperation espoused by West-Watson, Castle concluded,

Whatever we do let us do it with grace and understanding; let us conceive our self interest as being served by the greater welfare of our Pacific neighbours. As Adam Smith, that gentle spirit, was at pains to establish, the pursuit of true self-interest is the key to a natural harmony in the affairs of men.

The New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, held its annual conference in August/September 1971, where Pacific regionalism and its implications were robustly discussed. Mary Boyd edited the conference papers into a book entitled Pacific Horizons. Boyd’s introduction outlined the evolution of SPC and described how the “growing political aspirations of island leaders” were frustrated by the prohibition of political debates, but how it “… encouraged

187 LV Castle 1970 ‘NZ’s role and responsibility in the South Pacific’ in New Zealand and Australia Foreign Policy in the 1970’s, Price Milburn, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Trentham
188 Castle, 1970, p 81
189 Ibid, p 82
190 Ibid, p 85
191 Mary Boyd, (ed) 1972, Pacific Horizons: A regional role for New Zealand, Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Christchurch
them to spawn new sub-regional organisations.”¹⁹² She contended that Kirk’s idea of a Pacific Council had “an air of unreality about” it.¹⁹³ She asserted that, “flexible, home-grown regional arrangements were more likely to satisfy felt needs. The South Pacific Commission, the Pacific Islands Producers’ Association and the South Pacific Forum were useful tools well worth sharpening.”¹⁹⁴

RQ Quentin-Baxter in his chapter, A New Zealand view, noted the significance of the meeting where a group of Pacific leaders met in Wellington for private and informal talks “about various matters of common concern.”¹⁹⁵ He wrote, “We should try to realise what a landmark this meeting represents.”¹⁹⁶ He took a brief look into the evolution of regional cooperation but quickly moved on to the nature of the first Pacific forum.¹⁹⁷ Of the meeting, he described how, the Pacific leaders were, “free to confer without restriction as to subject matter. They invite Australian and New Zealand participation, but they have no duty to tailor their attitudes to fit in with our expectations.”¹⁹⁸ However, he countered this freedom with responsibility when he stated,

The new countries, coming to the Forum on a basis of equality, do not feel entitled to judge only the behaviour of the metropolitan countries. Theirs is no longer the irresponsible relationship of the child to the adult, making endless demands but not stopping to reflect on its own conduct. At this meeting it was, I think, notable that each participant

¹⁹² Ibid, p 8-9
¹⁹³ Ibid, p 10
¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p 14
¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p 8
¹⁹⁶ RQ Quentin-Baxter, 1972, ‘A New Zealand View’ in Mary Boyd, Pacific Horizons: A regional role for New Zealand, Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Christchurch, p 21
¹⁹⁷ Ibid, p 22
¹⁹⁸ Ibid
was conscious of the need for self-scrutiny. More often than not, the mirror of self-examination leads to the discovery of common interests and deepened sympathies.¹⁹⁹

This mature, but partly patronising, assessment led into further debate on the practicalities of closer relations. Quentin-Baxter highlighted the merits and problems of a more open migration policy and how greater cooperation in the development of education services could impact on the cultural inheritance and social cohesion of Pacific communities.

Keith Jackson argued the merits of Kirk’s idea of a Pacific Council modelled on the Nordic Council.²⁰⁰ He described its structure and functions comparably with the Pacific region and became concerned about the potential problems of arousing, “premature and exaggerated expectations of the possibilities of cooperation,” arguing that this would, “ultimately lead to greater frustration for some Island leaders.”²⁰¹ Nevertheless, he soundly criticised the then New Zealand Prime Minister’s view of Kirk’s proposal when Holyoake said, “for my part, I am confident that we in New Zealand should keep in step with our island friends rather than get out ahead of them.”²⁰² Jackson asserted that, “Not getting out ahead of the islanders’ sounds too much like a euphemism for not doing more than we have to.”²⁰³ He advocated the continuing of “essentially informal forums” which “do not raise hopes too high, yet they

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, p 25
²⁰⁰ Keith Jackson, 1972, ‘South Pacific Council’ in Mary Boyd, Pacific Horizons: A regional role for New Zealand, Price Milburn for the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Christchurch, p 46-48
²⁰¹ Ibid, p 46
²⁰² New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review: Statement of the Month, June, 1971, p 6
²⁰³ Jackson, 1972, p 50
provide a valuable safety valve for the islanders as well as a place where ideas can be tossed around.”

3.4 The Monnet Philosophy

What therefore is the logic of cooperation implied at this point in the evolution of Pacific regionalism? Jean Monnet, the architect of the European Commission/Union described, “when men are put in a certain situation they see that they have common interests and they are led towards agreement.”

He articulated a universal principle of cooperation that, “it is essential that they should be talking about the same problem, with the desire and even the duty to reach a solution acceptable to all.”

Monnet continued to expand his logic of cooperation. He said,

Cooperation between nations will grow from their getting to know each other better and from interpenetration between their constituent elements and those of their neighbours. It is therefore important to make both Governments and peoples know each other better, so that they come to see the problems that face them …

3.5 Monnet’s Philosophy Pacific Style

In the Pacific context, Monnet’s philosophy on cooperation is comparable to the belief of Pacific leaders that it is in the interests of all to solve problems of

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204 Ibid, p 51
206 Ibid
207 Monnet, 1978, p 83
common concern. In August 1971, these issues were ‘tossed around’ by leaders at the first Forum of the South Pacific held in Wellington New Zealand. They discussed the practical problems they faced governing their newly independent countries. The communiqué stated that the talks, “concentrated on matters directly affecting the daily lives of the people of the Islands of the South Pacific, devoting particular attention to trade, shipping, tourism, and education.”

Pacific Leaders agreed cooperation through collective action and pooling resources was a means to solve their own problems and satisfy their interests.

At this particular point in Pacific history, however, where are the resources for collective action coming from? Paula Kunabuli argued,

The small states of the Pacific need to develop specialized agencies to act as pressure groups for their needs and demands in the international community because a united front is more effective than an individual effort in international trade and diplomacy … thus regionalism is essential to their well-being.”

While, the Forum provided the venue for Pacific Leaders to discuss ways to find greater resources to reduce their vulnerabilities, Jackson asserted, “the only really common factor throughout the whole area [the Pacific Islands] is dependence.”

208 South Pacific Islands Forum, 1971, Communiqué – see annex one.
209 Paula Kunabuli, 1975, ‘Regionalism and Inter-Island Relations within the South Pacific’, Journal of Pacific Studies, The University of the South Pacific, Suva, Volume 1, p 5-19
210 Jackson, 1972, p 41
Ron Crocombe edited the 1975 compilation, *The ‘Pacific Way’*, in which a group of authors discussed the impact of “The Tyranny of Freedom: Political Independence and Economic Dependence.” Political scientist, Sione Tupouniua called for more research into development and trade theories relevant to the region. Journalist, Isakala Paeniu warned, Independence regained from our colonial masters will be eroded slowly but surely. Islanders will live the kind of life dictated to them by foreigners, definitely not one of their choice. Beggars don’t choose.

Pacific Island leaders needed significant economic assistance to run their newly independent governments so they could provide services and function within the international community. Without a functioning economy, insecurity grows. Conversely, political sovereignty does not always translate to economic autonomy. Had the responsibility that came with political freedom, been fully accepted by the newly independent Island countries? Tupouniua stated, “Pacific Islanders are searching for a new way of life: a life in which we fully accept the responsibility for creating the social, political, economic and cultural institutions,” and he also recognized that, “political independence is robbed of much of its true meaning if excessive dependence of other kinds still overwhelms the new nation.”

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214 Tupouniua, 1975, p 239
It can be argued that political responsibility had been eroded by paternalism. In a robust lecture given in 1962, New Zealand geographer, Kenneth Cumberland tackled the failures of New Zealand’s administrative responsibilities to many Pacific territories. He described how the previously “strong, socially tight-knitted and politically sophisticated Polynesian community” clashed with “almost twenty years of costly ill-advised paternalistic welfare projects,” which had a “costly policy of misguided humanitarianism and an official attitude of passive indifference to economic development.” He berated the “the largely flabby and ineffectual South Pacific Commission,” which he described as,

… pottering along collecting film strips, devising improved techniques for repairing fish nets, organising South Pacific games or formulating safe and innocuous agenda topics for discussion by islanders at South Pacific Conferences – and studiously avoiding the basic political and economic questions of the region.

More strongly, however, he urged that, “Polynesia must be prepared to stand on its own feet and accept responsibility for its own political, economic and social future knowing it can turn elsewhere and to New Zealand more especially, for technical assistance, administrative know-how, expert personnel and financial aid.” In response to the “changing political situation,” he called for an urgent “overhaul of the form and functions of the South Pacific Commission.”

216 Ibid, p 393
217 Ibid, p 392
218 Ibid, p 393
Sitting in the audience of this winter lecture was Fijian, 42 year-old Ratu Kamisese Mara. Five years later, Mara became Fiji’s Chief Minister. It can be argued that the influence from this lecture was pronounced, as Mara in 1974, recited lengthy excerpts from it to an audience in the newly independent Papua New Guinea.219

Mara was convinced that “there must be another organisation to fill the gaps left in the Commission’s framework” and said,

We who were not satisfied with the exclusion of politics from the conference, especially the leaders of newly independent countries or those moving to independence, took advantage of the South Pacific Conference to hold political discussions outside the conference meetings.220

He described putting “out feelers to the Prime Minister of New Zealand suggesting that New Zealand might like to take the initiative in inviting Pacific Island Leaders to a meeting to discuss matters of general interest.”221 He explained that it was “the flowering of a spirit of cooperation … [and] a yearning for dialogue between the peoples of the South Pacific,” that developed the concept of the South Pacific Forum.222

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220 Ibid, p 25
221 Ibid
222 Ibid, p 26
Mara outlined in this speech the reasons for inviting Australia and New Zealand to become members of the Forum.\textsuperscript{223} He said, “the aspirations of the small nations have much in common with the way of life in Australia and New Zealand and there are trade relations between all these countries.”\textsuperscript{224} More importantly he asserted, “that without the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand, the forum might tend to develop along the lines of the Organisation of the African States … where racial friction between Africans and Europeans developed with such tragic results,”\textsuperscript{225}

3.6 Diversity and the ‘Pacific Way’

During this address, Mara also addressed the great diversity between the members of the Forum. He stated that, “there is no doubt in my mind that the forum will lead the way to infinitely better understand[ing] and much more effective cooperation between the nations of this area, large and small.”\textsuperscript{226} He described the “‘Pacific Way’,,” as, “a lively, vocal, frank but friendly,” method of discussing the “opinions and ideas on subjects of vital importance to all our people,” and that regional organisations, “open the way to full dialogue between us and provide permanent channels of peaceful communication through which we can foster good-will and understanding to the lasting benefit of all our people.”\textsuperscript{227} He then concluded in an ideological tenor,

Cooperation in the region will only be attained by tolerance, harmony and goodwill. Yes and by hard work too, for nothing in this life is worth having if we did not have to work for it. When we use the phrase, the

\textsuperscript{223} Ibid
\textsuperscript{224} Ibid
\textsuperscript{225} Ibid
\textsuperscript{226} Ibid, p 27
\textsuperscript{227} Ibid, p 28
‘Pacific Way’ we are not thinking of the way of the loafer or the idler. It is the way that energetic and vibrant nations find to resolve their differences and harmonise their efforts. It is this very energy which produces the need for the ‘Pacific Way’.  

Mara laid the foundation of regionalism and cemented a Way for the newly independent states to interact. In 1977, TR Smith re-asserted the purpose of cooperation. He said, “there is much scope yet for inhabitants of the South Pacific to cooperate in protecting and promoting their interest in the best use of economic resources.”  

The Forum was to facilitate dialogue and to provide the opportunity for leaders to find a collective solution to common problems. Mara acknowledged the difficulties of cooperation but in his biography The Pacific Way, he said, “I have found regionalism one of the most rewarding experiences of my political life in the Pacific.”

3.7 Pacific Cooperation Actualised

The next step towards greater Pacific regionalism was decided by leaders in Canberra at the second Forum meeting in February 1972. They stated,  

This second meeting advanced the process of mutual consultation and represented a further stage in the sympathetic understanding of each other’s problems and in willing collaboration in practical measures directed to their solution. The advantages of co-operation and the opportunity of easy and informal exchanges were found to reinforce a

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228 Ibid, p 29  
229 Tom Smith (TR), 1977, ‘South Pacific Regional Cooperation’, in New Zealand International Review, July/August, p 30  
sense of regional identity and common purpose, directed to the advancement of all the peoples of the region.\textsuperscript{231}

The Leaders agreed to establish the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). Article III of the formal and legal Agreement establishing SPEC stated the “purpose of the Bureau is to facilitate continuing co-operation and consultation between members on trade, economic development, transport, tourism and other related matters.”\textsuperscript{232} A long list of functions outlined the services SPEC was expected to provide and the objectives it was to meet.

Ken Piddington, newly appointed Deputy Director of SPEC, in November 1972 described the establishment, functions and structure of the Bureau.\textsuperscript{233} He said, “the new Bureau has been launched with high hopes and I will speak with the enthusiasm of one who believes that its role could be unique.”\textsuperscript{234} He covered many topics worthy of mention and analysis, the focus here however, is to assess his ideas on cooperation. He stated,

“the South Pacific is in transition … [t]he Islands must now adapt to a far more complicated matrix of economic activity and it is in this situation of rapid change that it is essential to develop effective cooperation. SPEC’s message is a simple one; we recognise the need for accelerated economic development in the region; we are convinced that the key to this lies in a collective effort; but it must be pursued in

\textsuperscript{231} Forum Communiqué, 1972
\textsuperscript{232} See annex six.
\textsuperscript{233} Ken Piddington, 1973, \textit{The South Pacific Bureau: A new venture in Economic Cooperation}, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington
\textsuperscript{234} Ibid, p 3
harmony with local values and local attitudes – in brief, economic progress through regional cooperation “in the ‘Pacific Way’.”

Piddington was commenting on something he was a part of and acknowledged the difficulties of describing a newly established organization. However, comparable with West-Watson’s earlier comments, he realistically noted the need for cooperation to “start from a hard-headed assessment of long-term national interests.” Satisfying the interests of the parties collaborating was inherent for cooperation to be successful. However, the logic of cooperation must be questioned when the national interests of the parties are not consistent and the potential for free riding is more than likely, yet the parties still desire collaboration because they take a long-term view of the costs of not cooperating.

Piddington acknowledged that the Forum was, “an exercise in partnership among nations of wide disparity.” That Australia was, “after all the superpower of our region.” Yet, he believed that,

Australia and New Zealand sit at the table as equals and are not dominant partners (in a non-political sense, they bring obvious advantages through their wealth of administrative and other skilled resources) … [but] that the total wisdom of the Forum on any given issue will rest on the contribution of some of its smaller members. And that it is tacitly understood that Australia and New Zealand will defer

235 Ibid, p 16
236 Ibid, p 16
237 Ibid, p 5
238 Ibid, p 16
when it comes to deciding the direction which the Forum as a whole should take in asserting its role in the region.\textsuperscript{239}

Despite this, the logic does become obscure when the parties are unequal and a history of colonialism exists with all its complexities. For a more developed country to defer to a group of lesser-developed countries may compromise its interests, particularly so when the needs of the lesser-developed countries are obviously greater and a higher level of vulnerability exists. Is cooperation, therefore still able to satisfy the interests of all the parties involved when relationships are complex?

3.8 Inequalities and Cooperation

At this point in Pacific history, a question, expressed in the form of a proposition is that, cooperation can still be effective when the parties involved are unequal in power and resources, as institutional structures can play a key role in helping to overcome the problems created by such disparities. Piddington asserted that for New Zealand it is a,

\ldots wholesome and constructive relationship with the Islands of the South Pacific\textsuperscript{\footnote{Ibid, p 5}} that must be its long-term interest and, \textquote{what SPEC must consciously seek} are techniques whereby New Zealand and Australia can contribute to this sort of relationship. Unless these techniques take account of the Pacific Way, we will be guilty of another chapter of economic imperialism.\textsuperscript{240}
Australia’s account of the Forum’s inception was published in 2004 and it has a very different emphasis.241 Instead of relating an understanding of the ‘Pacific Way’ or describing the positives of Pacific regionalism to address the needs of the region, it exposed Australia’s numerous suspicions about New Zealand’s motives, intentions and level of influence. In reference to the first Wellington meeting, Doran wrote, “There continued to be suspicion over prior New Zealand involvement in the Island initiative.”242

Reporting after the second Forum held at Canberra, Doran described a competitive atmosphere between the Australian and New Zealand meetings,

…the officials were confident that Australia had performed markedly better than New Zealand …. Consequently it was thought that while the Australian delegation advanced its standing in the Forum, New Zealand stocks slipped.243

In future relations it was asserted that,

Australia should seek to work in close relationship with the New Zealanders and to accept philosophically that they will, from time to time, try to do a certain amount of ‘grandstanding’ with the Islanders.244

So instead of championing the benefits of cooperation, it defensively concluded,

…the independent and self-governing nations of the region sought greater political interaction during 1970. This impulse resulted in both a rapid growth of cooperative activity and the emergence of low-level

242 Ibid, p 11
243 Ibid, p 22
244 Ibid
tensions – a two-pronged dynamic rooted in the pursuit of national interests. For Australia, these diverging forces bore a desire to collaborate and to influence.\textsuperscript{245}

3.9 \textit{Stresses of Regionalism}

In the 1980’s the honeymoon of Pacific regionalism has begun to wane. The competition and assertion of national interest versus common interest had begun. Cooperation became the goal and superseded specific outcomes. Richard Herr briefly outlined his view of the evolution of Pacific regionalism in \textit{Institutional Sources of Stress in Pacific Regionalism}.\textsuperscript{246}

Herr introduced this paper with, “the belief that regional cooperation is imperative for the survival of the South Pacific, it has become so widely accepted as to virtually enjoy the status of a political axiom.”\textsuperscript{247} He argued, however that, “the implementation of a regional approach has involved numerous difficult decisions particularly in recent years,” and “at the heart of many of these problems has been the felt need to reconcile the national aspirations of the constituent states and a general but less concrete desire for regional cooperation.”\textsuperscript{248}

Obviously deviating from West-Watson and Piddington’s logic of cooperation, Herr further stated, “as with any regional organisation, national interests

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{245} Ibid, p 26
\item \textsuperscript{246} Richard Herr, 1980, \textit{Institutional Sources of Stress in Pacific Regionalism}, Department of Political Science, University of Tasmania, Hobart. Herr explained neo-functionalism as ‘non-political organisations (those institutions which exist to serve limited functional needs such as trade, common social services and development) are comparatively non-controversial and by preceding political association help to give rise to a climate in which political institutions will emerge successfully.’ p 3
\item \textsuperscript{247} Ibid, p 1
\item \textsuperscript{248} Ibid
\end{itemize}
prevent a complete harmony of purpose within the Forum.” It appeared in his argument that purpose has been superseded by process. Herr’s argument has distorted the nature of Pacific cooperation as it was based on realist views of cooperation, which were used as a political norm to prevent conflict. The goal therefore is the act of cooperation. The logic of cooperation as described in chapter two is to achieve a specific goal and cooperation is the means of attaining the goal.

In a broader context to help explain Herr’s opinions, international theorist Robert Keohane summarised the prevailing views of cooperation from both a realist and institutionalist perspective. He re-asserted neo-realist Kenneth Waltz’s argument, that world politics is in a “state of war” and self-reliance is the means by which states must relate, resulting in conflict and war. Keohane then outlined the institutionalist view of Mitrany, et al, who, “see cooperation as essential in a world of economic interdependence and who argue that shared economic interests create a demand for international institutions and rules.” Robert Axelrod in *The Evolution of Cooperation* examined the mechanisms of cooperation. Similar to Herr’s argument, Axelrod analyses the problems of cooperation when the pursuit of self-interest frustrates the process. The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is used to represent, “the vast array of specific situations,” but it must be kept in mind that these

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249 Ibid, p 13  
250 See Chapter two – 2.5.1  
games are premised on suspicion and competition were the “pursuit of self-interest … leads to a poor outcome for all.”

3.10 Costs and Benefits of Regionalism – where is the equity?

In 1986, Ueantabo Neemia-Mackenzie also questioned the merits of cooperation in his work titled, *Cooperation and Conflict, Costs, Benefits and National Interests in Pacific Regional Cooperation.* In this cost-benefit analysis of regionalism, he said,

Cooperative efforts may frustrate or fail, if costs and benefits are allocated and distributed inequitably or if one or several countries selfishly and inconsiderately pursues its own interests without due consideration for the others’ concerns.

He concluded that, “the key to the success of regional cooperation is equity.”

Unfortunately, equity is in limited supply in the Pacific region. In his 2001 book, *The South Pacific*, Ron Crocombe acknowledged a long list of “costs, benefits, alternatives and limits in regional integration.” One generalisation he made in agreement with Neemia-Mackenzie was that “equitable distribution of benefits among members is crucial. To the extent equity is not achieved, effectiveness is reduced.” It is argued here that while the distribution of benefits is not spread equitably between all members of the

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255 Ibid, p 7 Axelrod provides a good explanation of the game that has developed into a complex field of study of its own.
256 Ueantabo Neemia Mackenzie, 1986, *Cooperation and Conflict, Costs, Benefits and National Interests in Pacific Regional Cooperation*, University of the South Pacific, Suva
257 Ibid
258 Ibid
259 Crocombe, 2001, p 624
260 Ibid
Forum, the enormous cost to facilitate cooperation is also not shared between the members of the region. In 2005, Crocombe calculated that “Pacific Island governments contribute generally below 1% of their budgets to regional activity.” Therefore taking a realistic view of the disparities in the region, equilibrium is unlikely to occur for quite some time, so can cooperation proceed effectively when the interests of all parties involved are diverse and unlikely to be equally satisfied?

3.11 The ‘Pacific Way’

Hawaiian Professor Michael Haas’ observations of regional cooperation based on a means of relating are described in his work entitled *The ‘Pacific Way’*. He said,

> The ‘Pacific Way’ is a new form of international interaction – a refreshing contribution to theories of regional integration. The power of the ‘Pacific Way’ is decidedly spiritual. The world would indeed be a better place if all countries were to adopt the ‘Pacific Way’ as a basis for international diplomacy.

He identified six features of the ‘Pacific Way’:

- Pacific solutions to Pacific problems;
- Equality of cultures;
- Unanimous compromise;
- Primacy of political goals;
- Pan Pacific spirit;

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263 Ibid, p xxii
• Optimistic incrementalism.  

As a “style of negotiation,” Haas said that it was, “the most promising form of discussion between countries seeking to improve relations that begins with areas of agreement and moves to areas of ambiguity, but scrupulously avoids unfruitful areas for cooperation.” He described the ‘Pacific Way’ as a “politically motivated … norm of diplomacy.” Pacific diplomacy, Ratu Mara said depended on “tolerance, harmony and goodwill.”

Herr, however worried that the ‘Pacific Way’ and future of regionalism depended on the “vision, statesmanship and personality of Ratu Mara,” because he believed “the Forum owe[d] its existence to his energies.” Greg Fry, a prominent regionalist specialist however argued, that while Ratu Mara “was an impressive paramount chief who had already established his regional leadership credentials …,” other Pacific leaders from newly independent countries were equally talented and advocated regionalism. He cited, Tupua Tamasese Lealofi IV, Prime Minister of Western Samoa; Albert Henry, Premier of the Cook Islands and Prince Tu’ipelehake of the Kingdom of Tonga. Together with Mara, this group were the drivers of regionalism during the period of decolonisation. More recently, however, other actors such as Sir Michael Somare, Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea; New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark and Samoan Prime Minister, Hon Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele...
Malielegaoi have also been promoting the virtues and future of Pacific regionalism.\textsuperscript{270}

3.12 The Forum and a Mature ‘Pacific Way’

Forum members are well acquainted with the inequalities of the region and the processes of cooperation may not always be harmonious because ‘energetic, vocal,’ and ‘frank’ debate is likely to produce disagreement. The regional consensus however to develop and implement the Pacific Plan and the maturing of the ‘Pacific Way’ through the Forum institutions is evidence of the member’s ongoing commitment to regionalism.

The works of Fry have been a significant contribution towards advancing the literature on regionalism.\textsuperscript{271} He said that,

\begin{quote}
The Forum network is the site of what we might call the main game of regional cooperation. It is through the Forum network that the principal integrative schemes have been attempted, that joint political stances have been worked out, and that a number of regional legal regimes have been negotiated … It is the only South Pacific organisation which represents the collective opinion of the independent states of the region.\textsuperscript{272}
\end{quote}

In contrast to Herr’s argument, but comparable with West-Watson and others, Fry in addressing the sovereignty issues, said,

\begin{flushright}\textsuperscript{270} See Hon Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi, 2005, ‘The Future of Regionalism in the Pacific,’ an address given March 2005 at the Pacific Cooperation Foundation Annual Pacific Lecture
\textsuperscript{271} Fry and O’Hagan (eds), 2000
\textsuperscript{272} Fry, 1994, p 138\end{flushright}
…there gradually grew a commitment to regional schemes that did not involve a sacrifice of sovereignty, that would in fact promote national interests rather than subsume them in a regional interest … 273

He continued by acknowledging that Pacific regionalism,

Far from subsuming state sovereignty, the regional process, embodied in the Forum became for many communities a significant potential or actual source of their claim to sovereignty. It was Forum membership which accorded recognition of state sovereignty to the otherwise questionable status of the associated states … 274

During the early years of Pacific regionalism, Fry said that,

The South Pacific states were fortunate that they did not venture far on the path of comprehensive integration common in other areas of the Third World and were encouraged by the prevailing development theories of the time. Had they done so, the experience would have likely poisoned any chance of moving to a more workable form of cooperation. 275

Fry emphasised the realities of cooperation when stating that there were,

…two specific interests in promoting cooperation. One was to assist in the economic development of the newly independent states; the other was to maximize the diplomatic influence of the small countries on political issues such as nuclear testing. 276

He concluded that,

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273 Ibid, p 146 (emphasis mine)
274 Ibid, p 171
275 Ibid, p 169
276 Ibid, p 141
The quest for regional sovereignty, a foundation idea of the Forum, permeated all subsequent cooperation efforts by the Islands states. As they have sought to strengthen their hand and expand their diplomatic resources to control or at least influence their relationship with the outside world, they have had to rely on the outside world to finance such efforts. But the history of South Pacific regionalism has shown that although important, this financial dependency has not been determinative.\textsuperscript{277}

Therefore, resource inequality does not have to determine the failure or success of cooperation. Other factors are important and Axlerod asserted that, “for cooperation to thrive … [it must] be based on reciprocity.”\textsuperscript{278} He also stated that, “friendship is not necessary for cooperation to evolve … The requirement for the relationship is not friendship but durability …”\textsuperscript{279} History of Pacific cooperation is, however based on \textit{friendship} and \textit{durability}.

This durability has been maintained by the Forum but also because, as argued by John Henderson, “the concept of regionalism would appear to have a compelling logic in a part of the world where a number of the island countries lack the resources to contemplate a future of their own.”\textsuperscript{280} After the 1990 New Zealand-led review, he too acknowledged the practical logic of

\textsuperscript{277} Ibid, p 173
\textsuperscript{278} Axelrod, 1984, p 173, 188
\textsuperscript{279} Ibid
cooperation, “if regionalism is to grow it must demonstrate tangible benefits to those taking part.”\textsuperscript{281}

More recently in another surging wave of Pacific regionalism, the idea of “pooled regional governance,” has been promoted.\textsuperscript{282} Fry asks more, than answers the problems of this concept. He questions the, “depth, breadth, form and purpose of future regional governance and the shape of institutional arrangements.”\textsuperscript{283} When reviewing past lessons of Pacific regionalism, he divided it into five episodes:

- Comprehensive economic integration (1971 – 1974);
- Sectoral integration (1971 – 1978);
- Collective diplomacy (1979 – 1990);
- Regional security community (1984 – 1989)

The main lesson he focused on again was the inequality of influence, the Australian and New Zealand dominance in setting regional security and their economic agendas. He asserted that, in the past, this has resulted in the failure, “to gain legitimacy among Pacific Islanders because they [Australia and New Zealand] fail to take account of their [Pacific} security concerns, forms of governance or ethics.”\textsuperscript{284} He warned that this “form of regional governance may also have the problems of legitimacy it experienced in the

\textsuperscript{281} Ibid, p 24
\textsuperscript{282} Greg Fry, 2005, ‘Pooled Regional Governance in the Island-Pacific: Lessons from History,’ paper for an International Workshop ‘Pacific Integration and Regional Governance,’ at the Asia Pacific School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid, p 2
\textsuperscript{284} Ibid, p 14
1990’s unless Australia and New Zealand engage more fundamentally with Pacific perspectives on the governance and security issues they seek to influence.”

Good regional governance in the Pacific, it is argued is founded on the qualities of the ‘Pacific Way’ as described above. The necessity of this type of governance for effective security cooperation will be discussed further in chapter six when the Forum Regional Security Committee is analysed.

Steve Hoadley reminds his readers that the original purpose of the Forum was to establish a means for leaders’ “to discuss political issues that could not be aired in the South Pacific Commission.”

It is a fact that the leaders of Pacific countries, including Australia, despite the disparities of wealth and influence and inequality of benefits and contributions, have volunteered membership to the Pacific Islands Forum. Simplistically, Pacific cooperation is premised on the most basic reality; that the Pacific neighbourhood is where we all live and leaders’ have agreed to achieve the goals of Pacific Vision by implementing the Pacific Plan.

In summarising the above, the ‘Pacific Way’ has evolved and matured. The desire and need for a new level of regionalism has been identified by Pacific leaders’ therefore, Pacific ad hoc regionalism has been superseded by deliberate decision-making that has been based on serious and detailed regional analyses. One background paper describes the “Basic Concepts,” of the Plan and sets out a number of tests, “The Market Test, The Subsidiarity

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285 Ibid, p 15
286 Hoadley, 1992, p 60
Test, The Sovereignty Test,” to determine the costs and benefits of regionalism within the various sectors.  

There are numerous works of detailed data and creative ideas on the Pacific Plan website. It is argued that it is this new depth of knowledge that has the potential to enable effective implementation of the Plan. Tension however is bound to ebb and flow, nevertheless this only furthers the argument for robust institutional structures to ensure these problems are moderated. This cooperation can move Pacific regionalism towards to the goals of the Pacific Vision – a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, [where] all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives.

This literature review has shown that cooperation has been the historically consistent form of interaction between Pacific countries and is likely to continue. Realist concepts of security cooperation based on enmity, if applied to the Pacific, would not sit easily with the history and nature of Pacific cooperation. Consequently any analysis of the region’s security environment must be premised on this cooperative type of regional interaction.

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Chapter 4: Security Theory Re-defined

4.1 Introduction
The realist view of international relationships is based on power and competition, whereas the nature of regional relationships in the Pacific has traditionally been one of friendship and cooperation as described in the previous chapter. Insecurities come from diverse sources and not from conflict between Pacific militaries. What then, is the base for security studies in the Pacific region?

This chapter considers that if the concept of security is to be relevant, then it must consider the historical relationships and current characteristics of the security environment. An overview of three prevailing International Relations (IR) theories is used to explain the concepts of security. Buzan's regional security complex theory and ideas of new security are described and the realism/security debate analysed. It concludes that despite the usefulness of these theories, a re-definition of security to help understand an appropriate theory of Pacific security relations is required.

4.2 Theories of International Relations and Security
International relations theories explain state behaviour. The three major variants include realism, liberalism and more recently constructivism. Ideas of security stem from these assumptions.

4.2.1 Realism

“Realism is based on the view of the individual as primarily selfish and power seeking. Individuals are organised in states, each of
which acts in a unitary way in pursuit of its own national interest, defined in terms of power.”

Realism asserts the state is sovereign. No global mechanism exists above the state. To ensure survival, the amassing of power (whether military, political or economic) is the state’s main objective. The growth in power of one state however threatens other states, who in turn amass power to counter each other. This competition to balance power is meant to protect autonomy. States are wary of cooperation or collective action and alliances are viewed with suspicion.

4.2.2 Liberalism

“Many Liberals also believe that the rule of law and transparency of democratic processes make it easier to sustain international cooperation, especially when these practices are enshrined in multilateral institutions.”

Liberalism asserts the human is essentially good and that conflict is not innate but is a consequence of poor social institutions. Cooperation and collective action can eliminate war and conflict. The individual is supreme and government must protect the rights and freedoms of the individual. Democracy is an important concept as it is contended that democracies do not go to war against each other. While this may be accepted as true so far, some assert that democracies may “launch messianic struggles against warlike authoritarian regimes,” in a crusader-like mission.

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290 Ibid
that democracies still display aggressive tendencies, despite not engaging in conflict with one another.

Other elements are also important. Reason – the belief that the world is rational, that debate and dialogue can solve problems; equality – all are equal; consent – social interaction is consensual, and that for government to be legitimate it should be based on popular representation; constitutionalism – government ensures that society remains stable but that checks and balances keep tyranny at bay. These principles are the foundation of most western democracies and the model for organisations.

4.2.3 Constructivism or Idealism
Constructivism asserts that ideas, values, identities and social interactions shape and change the world structure. It challenges the realist view that anarchy is a given and that states are unable to change their suspicious and competitive behaviour. Constructivists believe that ideas and norms have the power to change behaviour. States can change their worldview by adapting socially constructed standards of behaviour. An example of the power of ideas is the acceptance of the concept of human rights. Over time, states have accepted the obligation to establish mechanisms to ensure these rights are protected. Constructivism provides an explanation of this type of process, where other theories have been unable to account for such intangible phenomena.

Actors in the world structure are not confined to states, but include many players such as international institutions, non-government organisations, multi-national corporations, individuals and social movements. Frequent social interaction by these actors creates norms and institutions that have power to influence state behaviour. A group of individuals, for example heads of governments, will agree to accept an idea and thereby establishing a set of standards or rules to which their states are expected to cooperate with and adhere to. Regional cooperation or collective security administered by an institution is an example of constructivist behaviour.

4.3 The Realism and Security Debate

Traditional security theorist Stephen Walt asserted that, “the main focus of security studies is easy to identify … it is the phenomenon of war.” He contended that security studies are defined as “the study of the threat, use and control of military force.” New security theorists Barry Buzan et al, however questioned “the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security.” They attempted to widen the security agenda by “claiming security status for issues and referent objects” in the environmental, societal, economic, as well as the political and military sectors.

This broad view of new security is more relevant to the challenges facing the Pacific region because war between Pacific states and the deployment of

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293 Ibid
295 Ibid
Pacific disciplined forces\textsuperscript{296} in combat against each other is inconceivable.\textsuperscript{297} Nevertheless, the academic debates between the “wideners” and the “traditionalists” are ongoing. Terry Terriff, et al, acknowledges however that “the central problem in the study of security in the post-Cold War era is simply that there is no agreement on what constitutes security.”\textsuperscript{298}

Traditional security analysis was viewed through a state-centric lens and protection of the state was considered to be of the utmost value. However, the role of the state has evolved and the concept of security must take account of these changes. The degree of security a state or government wants, or is able to provide, will determine the safety of its citizens. If the state lowers its maintenance of security to the point where it is unable to protect its citizens, and permits – or becomes the source of – instability, then the concept of security must be re-assessed. Richard Ullman warned of the dangers on limiting security to the traditional view; “defining national security … in military terms conveys a profoundly false image of reality … it causes states to concentrate on military threats and to ignore other and perhaps more harmful dangers.”\textsuperscript{299}

Re-stating an original concept of security, the maintenance of a condition where peace and freedom, safety and survival are guaranteed, is more relevant to the Pacific security environment. Insecurity arises when the guarantee or maintenance of protection is weakened or under threat. With this

\textsuperscript{296} Disciplined forces include police, military and paramilitary.
\textsuperscript{297} As discussed previously, the border violation of PNG soldiers into the Solomon Islands is not considered a formal act or declaration of war.
wider definition of security, a more comprehensive analysis is needed, since the range of threats has expanded and taken on new dimensions.

When considering the object of security – that which is valued – all levels of analysis within all sectors must be considered. For example, if an individual – a human being – is the valued object, security can mean feeling safe, as well as free from danger. In the social sector, the welfare of the individual – social security – can be described as the expectation that a certain standard of living will be maintained.

Communities or ethnic groups value the core principles that hold them together. For them, the preservation of their collective identity is what they most value. For many groups, protection of the natural environment is paramount, as the land or sea is invested with spiritual value.

At the state level, security means the protection and maintenance of territorial boundaries – sovereignty. In the political sector, ideas such as democracy or the rule of law are highly valued and therefore require protection. The concept of Pacific regional security implies a sense of neighbourhood, where cooperation, stability and equality are valued to the point where institutions are established to protect these relationships.

It is the composition of vulnerabilities compared with the threats that determine the degree of insecurity. Buzan discusses this balance, “as threats
rise, vulnerabilities must be reduced if security is to be maintained.”

Obviously weak states are more vulnerable than strong states but this does not necessarily correspond to degrees of insecurity. Strong states may have a high degree of threat, whereas a weak state may experience a low degree of threat.

Vulnerabilities however, can only be identified and then reduced after a comprehensive analysis of the whole security environment. This not only includes looking at the sources and the effect of insecurity, but a deep investigation into the linkages and interaction of wider security phenomena such as security policies, actors, institutions and systems for response.

This broader analysis of security must include a “big picture” view of the regional environment. An open-minded and inclusive analytical approach will consider each element of a security environment, to make sure no potential risk is missed. One example, concerning the threat of terrorism, is the attention now given at airports to items such as backpacks and shoes and other mundane items that have been used to harm civilian targets.

An analytical model or map that has the capacity to consider all the characteristics of Pacific security will provide a thorough account to help explain and understand the environment. Existing analytical tools available for a comprehensive examination of security are based on theories of realism –

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power and competition, whereas the nature of Pacific relations is premised on friendship and cooperation.

4.4 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

Before discussing an appropriate theory of Pacific security relations, the applicability of Barry Buzan’s RSCT, which analyses security interactions of states within a region, will be examined. A regional security complex (RSC) is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.\(^{301}\) It is based on the “pattern of amity and enmity among states.”\(^{302}\) Amity can range from “genuine friendship to expectations of protection and supports,” whereas enmity is a “relationship set by suspicion and fear.”\(^{303}\) The middle of these poles “is a broad band of indifference and/or neutrality,” where a lack of interaction results in either a weak or unstructured complex.\(^{304}\)

A judgement of the degree and intensity of security interaction and interdependence is required to identify the existence of a security complex.\(^{305}\) High or low intensity and positive or negative interaction determines whether the complex is weak or strong, high or low-level.\(^{306}\) The existence or not, of inter-state war is also an indicator of a complex. A major feature of identifying the existence of a complex is the degree of “mutually” felt perception, threat/fear or friendship/trust, between states. At this point, it is evident that

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\(^{301}\) Ibid, p 190  
\(^{302}\) Ibid, p 189  
\(^{303}\) Ibid  
\(^{304}\) Ibid, p 190  
\(^{305}\) Ibid, p 192  
\(^{306}\) Ibid, p 192-195
RSCT is state-centric but Buzan has since revised this to include the widened security agenda, by opening the framework “to catch security in its increasing variation.”

In 1991, Buzan said the ‘small Pacific Ocean states, where very weak powers are separated by vast insulating distances of water,” would have little impact on the structure of a regional security complex but that the “Pacific Islands Forum binds Australia, New Zealand and many of the small island states into a loose security community.” Later, in 2003 he said the Pacific region is “probably the closest model” of a “pristine unstructured region containing largely inward-looking units [where], the units are too weak as powers to generate security interdependence.”

4.5. What is the Theory of Pacific Security Relations?

As previously discussed, Pacific relationships are based on a desire to cooperate and solve common problems by pooling resources. The involvement of military personnel from Papua New Guinea and Australian logistical support in quelling the Santos rebellion in Vanuatu is an example. The 2000 Biketawa Declaration formally established the expectation that in a time of trouble other members will assist as required. The intervention in Solomon Islands in 2003 under RAMSI, was considered by some to be mobilised rather too late, given that requests from the Solomon Islands’ Prime Minister for the assistance of Australia and New Zealand, were declined in 2000.

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307 Buzan, 2003, p 71
308 Buzan, 1991, p 195-205
309 Buzan, 2003, p 64
In the post 9/11 security environment, the features of transnational threats bind countries into a global security complex as the reliance on security cooperation has become more salient. The Pacific region is not exempt from this expectation and security cooperation, relative to the insecurities faced, thereby increases security interdependence. Internal threats also expand regionally as what affects one Forum member will ultimately involve the others.

A regional response to insecurity must reflect the breadth and depth of these threats and in a cooperative environment, dialogue and decisions need to be made through good regional governance structures so that the parties involved will accept their responsibility to act as required. Part of the decision-making process includes a need for thorough analyses of the security environment. A framework to analyse insecurity in a cooperative environment must take into account the full security environment.

4.6. New Security Agenda (NSA) Framework

The “New Security Agenda” re-analyses the framework of security studies. It was developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and others from the English and Copenhagen Schools to question the status of the military and state in traditional strategic studies.\textsuperscript{310} It distinguishes itself from strategic studies, which focuses on military strategy and the use of force within or between states.\textsuperscript{311} The NSA theory seeks to widen the security agenda by including issues from the economic, environmental, and societal sectors, as the military

\textsuperscript{310} Buzan et al, 1998, 2003
and political sectors are no longer considered privileged but become part of a larger area of enquiry.

Dividing security issues into sectors is an analytical means to understanding the nature of real-world challenges. The types of interaction or relationships identify the sector. For example, Buzan asserts the military sector is about forceful coercion; the political sector about authority and governance; the economic sector about trade, production and finance; the societal sector about collective identity and the environmental sector is about human activity and the planetary biosphere.\textsuperscript{312} Other sub-sectors could also include health and legal environment.

\textbf{4.6.1 Military Sector}

In the military sector, the state is the unit of analysis.\textsuperscript{313} The machinery of government includes the defence forces, whose main function is to have the ability to take action to secure the state against external threats and protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It also protects the government and its right to govern.\textsuperscript{314} In democratic states, the defence forces are meant to be under the control of civilian authorities.

\textsuperscript{312} Buzan, 1998, p 7
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid, p 49
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid
The military security sector is concerned with the “two level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states perceptions of each other’s intentions.” The military security agenda revolves around states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions – amity or enmity. Buzan said it is based on,

the ability of governments to maintain themselves against internal and external military threats, but it can also involve the use of military power to defend states or governments against non-military threats to their existence, such as migrants or rival ideologies.

One function of government therefore is to maintain law and order. Buzan stated, “military security is primarily about the ability of the ruling elite to maintain civil peace.” If the machinery of government, however, fails to provide security for its citizens, the authority of the military can become obscured. In some instances, Pacific military forces have themselves been the cause of insecurity as they have become increasingly politicised. For example in Fiji, during the 2000 Coup, the Military Commander took it upon himself to intervene to restore order. While this act of necessity brought stability, the Commander’s intervention into political affairs has continued a legacy where he maintains his right to comment on the actions of the

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315 Buzan, 1991, p 19
316 Buzan, 1998, p 50
317 Ibid, p 50
government and has defiantly said he “will not be gagged if there is a need to speak out on issues of national importance.”

4.6.2. Political Sector

The political security sector is concerned with “the organizational stability of states, systems of governments and the ideologies that give them legitimacy.” Challenges to these ideas can de-stabilise the reigning political order. These challenges include questioning the governmental structure, its right to autonomy and its ideological underpinnings. Challenges to legitimacy or the denial of recognition also impact the governing order. If these ideologies are violated causing the state to feel threatened, responses typically come from the military sector. The violations frequently derive from a disaffected social group.

4.6.3. Economic Sector

The economic security sector is concerned with threats to the “resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power.” The effects from problems arising from the economic sector spill over into other sectors making it difficult to identify pure economic security issues. The global market and national economies are the obvious sites of insecurity, as the collapse of the global market would threaten the survival of national economies.

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321 Buzan, 1991, p 19
322 Buzan, 1998, p 116
The effects of globalisation may be considered as threats to developing states. Economic marginalisation affects all states in the region in varying degrees. Poverty has been recognised as one of the leading causes of violent conflict and many aid programmes consider the elimination of poverty as an important base for development and conflict prevention. The Pacific Plan seeks to reduce the vulnerability of the region by developing initiatives to increase regional prosperity and development.

4.6.4. Societal Sector

Challenges to security in the societal sector are concerned with identity. While this may include the identity of a nation-state, it also includes units from other levels such as the family, clan, village or region. The community vigorously protects the “ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group.” When the survival of group identity and the development of community are threatened, the potential to incite violent reaction is increased. Inter-group conflict has been noted as “the world’s most costly and intractable social issue” and that “deep-seated cleavages between racial, religious, cultural or ethnic groups” can become entrenched and “resistant to resolution.”

When “we/they” loyalties are tested, they can produce insecurity. Migration of one group into a region of another frequently tests these loyalties. Perceptions of competition, undue influence and dilution or ignorance of

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323 Ibid, p 123
324 Ibid, p 119
326 Buzan, 1998, p 123
cultural norms can fester, and if left, can eventually trigger violent conflict.\textsuperscript{327} Fiji’s social insecurity is an example where continued inter-group tension has spilled over into the political and economic sectors.

Morton Deutsch said, “the most profound and enduring positive changes in inter-group relations occur when successful cooperation in the achievement of a joint or super-ordinate goal is promoted.”\textsuperscript{328} As a conflict prevention mechanism, the Plan implemented through the Forum Secretariat can promote effective and closer cooperation at a community level through development projects.

4.6.5. Environmental Sector

The environmental security sector is concerned with the “maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.”\textsuperscript{329} It is assumed that the “carrying capacity” of the earth’s population is threatened by misuse of its natural resources.\textsuperscript{330} The maintenance of the environment is the responsibility of humanity. As consumers, participants and caretakers of the biosphere, it is argued, there exists an obligation to protect it for future users.

The environment security sector has two competing agendas: the scientific agenda and the political agenda.\textsuperscript{331} At times, the two overlapping agendas complement or compete against each other. The scientific agenda deals with

\textsuperscript{327} Ibid, 121
\textsuperscript{329} Buzan, 1991, p 19-20
\textsuperscript{330} Buzan, 1998, p 81
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid, p 71-93
the investigations of the environment by mainly scientists and research institutes. It presents potential environment threats based on scientific findings, as the demand and contest for scientific proof is an important part of securitising environmental threats. The political agenda involves the politicising and securitising of environmental threats by the media, non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) and at times, governments. They may employ the scientific community to validate their claims and their main task is to alert the relevant audience to the “presumed urgency” of the threat.\footnote{Ibid, p 73}

Environmental security is survival of the planet. A closer inspection shows that the ‘ultimate’ threat is the “risk of losing achieved levels of civilisation – a return to forms of societal barbarism – while still apparently being able to prevent doing so.”\footnote{Ibid, p 75} Human structures and systems must respond and cope with environmental threats. Buzan divided these issues into three categories:\footnote{Ibid, p 79-80}

1. Threats to civilisation from the natural environment that are not caused by human activity; for example, natural disasters

2. Threats from human activity to the natural systems or structures of the planet, when the changes seem to pose existential threats to civilisation; for example bioterrorism, disease transmission, disruption of ecosystems, food scarcity

3. Threats from human activity to the natural system or structures of the planet when the changes do not pose an existential threat; energy and mineral depletion, loss of animal species
The division of the security agenda into sectors is a useful tool to track issues through the sectors and identify how they spill over. The cause and effect flows can be clarified, and effective mechanisms for response implemented and targeted directly to achieve the greatest impact in order to minimise or prevent insecurity. A next step to consider is how an issue become a security threat.

4.7 Securitisation

The process of securitisation, is when ‘security actors” successfully convince an audience that a particular issue has become a real and imminent threat to security.\(^{335}\) This will result in agreement to mobilise an extra-ordinary response to prevent or minimise the threat. It permits using “emergency measures and justif[ies] action outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”\(^{336}\) It may include legitimately breaking rules, such as human rights, which under normal circumstances would not be permitted. The use of military force or other coercive means is also accepted as a necessary response. This act of selling insecurity will be discussed further in chapter six in the discussion of the Forum Regional Security Committee.

4.8 Pacific Security – Theory Re-defined

Since cooperation has been the historical nature of the relationship between Forum members, traditional security theory premised on a realist framework does not explain the insecurities suffered by Pacific countries. As discussed

\(^{335}\) Buzan et al, 1998, p 24
\(^{336}\) Ibid
previously, the creation of a theory for Pacific security is beyond this study but such a theory could start with Buzan’s theories to widen the security environment.

In an environment where security is defined broadly, the maintenance of security requires re-consideration. As sources of insecurity come from a variety of sectors, security has become more than military defence. If this premise is extended further, the agencies that address security issues must also mirror this extension, whether regionally or nationally.

This leads us to question the structure of security maintenance within Forum member countries. The division of labour of many government ministerial portfolios still reflects a realist cold-war framework. External defence, border control, environmental and internal security for example, are spread among a variety of separate agencies. The security infrastructure of national security service providers may then require some adjustment.

As a consequence of widening the security agenda, a ‘whole of government’ approach to security maintenance has already begun. The New Zealand’s Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (ODESC) co-ordinates New Zealand’s external and internal security needs.\textsuperscript{337} This includes intelligence, counterterrorism preparedness, and internal emergency/crisis management and defence operations. It comprises Chief Executives from Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Defence Force, the Ministry of

\textsuperscript{337} Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Co-ordination (ODESC), http://www.dpmc.govt.nz/dess/
Defence and the NZSIS, the GCSB, the NZ Police, the Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management, Treasury and other groups if necessary. It is chaired by the Chief Executive of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Domestic & External Security Group acts as a support secretariat. It is suggested that this type of holistic structure needs to be mirrored regionally. This will be considered in the analysis of the FRSC in chapter six.

An ability to explain a region’s full security environment is however still lacking. A framework to analyse the ‘whole of government’ or more fitting, ‘whole of region’ approach to security has not yet been considered. Security actors, policies and security services must be compared with the issues they are faced with. In addition, the securitisation process requires greater understanding to ensure that all security issues are addressed and the means of response is effective. Therefore to fully understand regional security needs, a model or framework must have the ability to account for all the characteristics of the region’s security environment.
Chapter 5: Security Environment Equation

5.1 Introduction

This chapter will create a framework to analyse a cooperative security environment. The ‘security environment equation’ includes all the variants present during the securitisation process. It is an objective model with universal applicability and when applied to a security environment it completes a full picture of what exists. The security equation comprises three factors or divisions: security agenda, security architecture and security infrastructure. The equation can be used to complete a number of investigations as described below. In this chapter however it is applied to the Pacific region and a full picture of the Pacific security environment is revealed.

A secure environment is enjoyed by all. As discussed previously, the means, however frequently becomes a problem. Debate over issues, threats, responses and agendas is likely. It is important to measure the expense of obtaining a secure environment, but a cost/benefit analysis where tangible and intangible variables are a significant feature, is difficult. Notwithstanding this, the response must be comparable to the threat, as democratic accountability demands tax-payer dollars and human resources are spent wisely.

A framework, appropriate to the situation, which has the ability to reveal and assess the security environment, is necessary. At the 2005 Forum Regional Security Committee meeting, Greg Urwin, Forum Secretary General acknowledged the importance of a full assessment;
Regional and national security initiatives need, then, to be grounded in an appreciation of the comprehensive nature of the things which threaten us and by extension, of the need for comprehensive responses. How we achieve that comprehensiveness is one of the major tasks confronting us in the region ...  

Buzan’s theories, as discussed in the previous chapter, while a useful beginning to re-defining security, do not go far enough for a comprehensive explanation of the Pacific security environment. Application of his sectoral division to the issues does provide insight into their characteristics, especially as to how they evolve and spill through other sectors. The theory of securitisation also provides a good account of how an issue becomes a security threat and why action is or is not mobilised. A full account of the security environment is, however, still lacking a theoretical model.

Only after a full assessment is made of the security environment, can evidence be produced to justify appropriate responses to the insecurities facing the region. Moreover, if the assessment is made collectively by the region’s stakeholders and this is made available to the relevant audience, these responses are more likely to be considered legitimate. Obtaining legitimacy encourages greater responsibility and participation to help secure the environment.

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5.2 Security Environment Equation

It is argued here that a security environment is the sum of three dynamic factors:

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\text{Agenda} + \text{Architecture} + \text{Infrastructure} = \text{Security Environment}
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Table 1: Security Environment Equation

The security *agenda* identifies issues and sells them as security threats through the process of securitisation.\(^{339}\) Security actors try to convince the relevant audience that a particular threat is real and imminent. If successful, there will be an agreement to mobilise and use whatever means are necessary to prevent or minimise the threat.

The security *architecture* is the plan or design for dealing with the security agenda. The architecture is made up of security actors and security policies. Official actors design security policies that set the agenda. They also attempt to securitise issues as threats. Conversely some actors may be perceived as a threat by one group, but by another, the liberators or freedom fighters.

\(^{339}\) Buzan et al, 1998, p.23
Consequently, both security and insecurity actors plan strategies for response to perceived threats. Insecurity actors may act as militia and attempt to disrupt the plans of the official security actors. Security service providers comprise the security *infrastructure* – the operational side of security. They administer programmes and initiatives, and in some cases monitor the security environment.

Analysing the interaction between the bodies or agencies that comprise the *agenda, infrastructure and architecture* provides a full explanation of the *environment*. For example: when a security service provider behaves as an actor and tries to set the agenda by attempting to securitise an issue, their status and purpose becomes confused. The politicisation of the Fiji military is a good example of this. As a security service provider it can “promote either security or insecurity.” The Commander Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama considers it well within his professional position to comment on political affairs. However, taking a wider approach and after asking why this is, underlying issues within other sectors can be identified. These threats (in Fiji’s case the need to uphold the rule of law), can then be addressed by more appropriate security actors or governmental systems. The military should then return to its appropriate constitutional functions.

Analysing the interaction between the factors or divisions may also provide ideas for response. At the 2000 Forum Regional Security Committee, it was

agreed that “ethnicity, land disputes and other social issues were matters that required deeper understanding and action.” If the issues are tracked through the equation: agenda, architecture and infrastructure, it may be revealed that a group have become frustrated from a lack of justice in some form. As a response a government as an actor may create more functional policies, which strengthens the architecture. They may also construct an efficient institution to provide structured mediation and negotiation processes, building a stable infrastructure; thereby fortifying the security environment.

This equation accounts for all the unique features of a security environment. It is universally applicable to other security environments: national, regional, even global. The unique characteristics of each environment are not sacrificed to the generalities of theory. The loose framework allows for specific security information or data to be complied or in other words, it requires ‘filling in the blanks’ – see table three.

Table 3: Universal Security Environment Equation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Issues</em></td>
<td><em>Actors</em></td>
<td><em>Security Service Providers</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>Disciplined Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Nations/States</td>
<td>Border Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Non-Governmental</td>
<td>Intelligence Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental</td>
<td>Organisations</td>
<td>Aid Donors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Militia/rebel groups</td>
<td>Judicial Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal/External</td>
<td>Policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Securitisation Process</em></td>
<td>Laws</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Treaties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conventions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= Security Environment

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5.3 The Pacific Security Environment – A full picture

When introducing an original model for the first time, the critique needed to fine tune is lacking. One criticism or problem acknowledged is the need for first hand investigation of all the factors within the region. The short-comings of an open-sourced desk analysis become clear when information on the groups, their functions and their interactions is limited. In a region where relationships are informal and friendships cross professional and official boundaries, extensive field work would provide depth and a greater understanding of the cultural features of Pacific security relations. Nevertheless, table four below is an attempt to “fill in the blanks” with the information available to create a picture of the Pacific security environment.

Despite the earlier judgement by Buzan discussed in chapter four, the Pacific security environment is a structured complex with networks comprising a matrix of security interaction and interdependence. In the Pacific security agenda, insecurity arises from a broad array of issues in a diverse range of sectors. The process of securitisation is contentious and some states within the region are suspicious of the motives of the security actors. The actors in the Pacific security architecture are diverse and the growing body of security policy and its legal complexities require more analysis. The security service providers in the Pacific security infrastructure are well organised and cooperate within their various groups but greater interaction between the groups would make more effective use of meagre resources.
### Table 4: The Pacific Security Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security Issues and Securitisation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Security Actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Security Policies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internal Issues</strong></td>
<td><strong>State Governments</strong></td>
<td><strong>National Policies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Political</em></td>
<td>Internal/Internal to the region</td>
<td><strong>Regional Policies</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional crisis, Inept and corrupt governance, Deterioration of law and order, Crime</td>
<td>National/Ethnic Groups</td>
<td>Forum Declarations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military</strong></td>
<td>Greenpeace, Amnesty, Transparency International, Pacific Islands Association of Non-Government Organisations (PIANGO)</td>
<td>1992 Honiara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorly resourced, Lack professionalism &amp; training, Politicised or compromised</td>
<td><strong>Inter-governmental Organisations</strong></td>
<td>1997 Aitutaki</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>Pacific Islands Forum, Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>2000 Biketawa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation, Trade disputes, Poverty, Under-development</td>
<td><strong>International Organisations</strong></td>
<td>2002 Nasonini</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil instability, Land disputes, Population disparities, Health problems, Crime</td>
<td><strong>International Actors</strong></td>
<td>1985 Rarotonga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Rebel groups, Militia, warlords, Undisciplined forces, Criminal gangs, Transnational criminals, External pressure groups, Terrorists, Conflict entrepreneurs, Mercenaries</td>
<td>1995 Waigani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disasters, Climate changes, Unsustainable resource exploitation, Disease transmission</td>
<td><strong>National Policies</strong></td>
<td>International Policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor implementation of legal obligations, Low adherence to regional agreements Under-resourced and under-skilled judiciaries</td>
<td><strong>Insecurity Actors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Security Service Providers</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Issues</strong></td>
<td><strong>Security Environment</strong></td>
<td>Regional Security Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism, Drug and people smuggling, International financial crime, Dangerous goods transportation, Piracy, Illegal fishing, Border crime, Disease transmission</td>
<td>Security Environment</td>
<td>CLAGS Combined Law Agency Groups; FIU Financial Intelligent Units; FFA Forum Fisheries Agency; OCO Oceania Customs Organisation; PASO Pacific Aviation Security Office; PICP Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police; PIDC Pacific Immigration Directors Conference; PILOM Pacific Islands Law Officers Meeting; PCC Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre; SOPAC South Pacific Applied Geo-science Commission; SPC Secretariat of the Pacific Community; SPICIN South Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence Network; SPREP South Pacific Regional Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Disciplined Forces</strong></td>
<td>Military, paramilitary, police</td>
<td>National Development Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Development Agencies</strong></td>
<td>NZAID</td>
<td>AusAid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Development Agencies</strong></td>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>United Nations World Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.3.1 Pacific Security Agenda = Issues + Securitisation

Issues

The Forum Secretariat commissioned Ron Crocombe, et al, to complete a series of national and regional security studies in 2000 – 2004.\(^{343}\) The issues identified in these reviews comprise the security agenda and are listed in table four. Crocombe said many of these issues were at the “core of the actual conflicts in the region” and implied that the failure to address them were the “basic causes of deteriorating national security.”\(^{344}\) He said “sensitivity” was a reason for the “lack of acknowledgment” of the issues because one approach was “to hide, deny or avoid them until they deteriorate to the point of conflict.”\(^{345}\) “Habit,” he said was another reason issues were ignored.\(^{346}\) Enhancing public awareness and encouraging open and constructive research and discussion of the issues combined with facilitating “widespread involvement in actions to overcome them,” was his recommendation to address, or in ‘new’ security terms, securitise the issues.\(^{347}\)

Threats to security impacts globally. A United Nations report of the Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change identified that “a threat to one is a threat to all.”\(^ {348}\) Security interdependence is pronounced and collective responses are expected. The origins of threat may come from one source yet the impact may be felt by another – global warming leading to rising sea levels is an example in the Pacific region. While in

\(^{343}\) Crocombe, 2000; Ray Anere et al; Crocombe & Siliga Kofe, 2003

\(^{344}\) Ibid, p 8

\(^{345}\) Ibid

\(^{346}\) Ibid

\(^{347}\) Ibid

debate over the Kyoto Protocol and the consequences of climate change, former New Zealand Minister, Hon Taito Philip Field described how in February 2004 the small atoll island of Tuvalu, “… went underwater for over an hour …” and that if nothing is done to reduce fossil fuel emissions in industrial countries, “we could see low-lying islands in the Pacific totally disappear as a result of the effect of greenhouse gases.”

The debate over the origins and the cause/effect of risks and threats is likely to increase within an interdependent global system. Crocombe et al, for example, acknowledged that while there is “considerable agreement on security matters,” within the Pacific region, ‘security interests and perceptions of security differ widely.”

For instance, tropical hurricanes are a real threat to the people of Niue, whereas New Zealand, sitting directly on the Alpine Fault line, is over-due for a massive earthquake. Trans-national crime, especially drug trafficking and airport security, is a major concern for Australia. HIV/AIDS threaten the health security of the people of Papua New Guinea. In Tonga, democratic reform may cause civil instability if the management of this process of political change is poor.

This diversity within the region also causes debate. How, for example, do land disputes produce insecurity in Fiji when compared with New Zealand? The responses necessary for an appropriate solution must fit the situation, a one-size-fits-all approach does not address all the nuances, including cultural.

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350 Ibid, p 3, 6
351 Recent reports (July 2005) of the first nationwide strike of the public servants in Tonga have shown the growing discontent of its citizens. During the final editing of this thesis, the Tongan Government appointed Fred Sevele, a commoner (non-royal), for the first time as the acting Prime Minister.
Similarly, the economic insecurity suffered from illegal fishing is much greater between Micronesia and Polynesia; again solutions must mirror the relative security environment.

Any assessment of the complexity of the issues within the security agenda needs to be logical, systematic and thorough. Using security analysis and reviews to hype up or contest threats against other risks is self-defeating. It is essential that all parties in the security environment are involved in the process of securitisation.

**Securitisation**

Securitisation, as discussed in the previous chapter, describes the process whereby a particular threat is accepted as real and imminent, and a response is formulated. Emergency measures may be justified, including legitimately breaking rules and the use of military force or other coercive means judged necessary. The dispute of whether an issue is a threat and requires action is often a battle itself and consensus on securitisation in the Pacific region is inconsistent.

How do issues – such as climate change, HIV-aids or transnational threat – become securitised? Commissioning and the acceptance of security reports is only an attempt to securitise as they do not always mobilise a response. In most instances, a “performative,” the act of saying, makes it so. For example, a declaration of war means the existence of war. The securitising act can be

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compared with a marketing campaign. It is the actor’s ability to sell the issue as a threat and persuade their audience that a response is required. If action occurs, securitisation can be considered successful.

A relevant example in the Pacific region is the assertion that poverty or under-development is a security risk. As a consequence, governments of wealthier states justify spending taxpayer dollars on the development of poorer states. Domestic constituencies from the wealthier countries are the relevant audiences and if they accept this as a necessity, poverty has become securitised. For example, the 2003 Australian Senate inquiry, *A Pacific Engaged*, strongly asserted that “there will be serious implications for Australia if economies in the region collapse”.353 The Australian Government, (in this case part of the audience), accepted this assertion. As a result, the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) stated that “Australia’s national interest [is] advanced by assistance to developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development.”354 Further that, “Australia is at the forefront of donors engaging with countries that face particularly stark poverty and development challenges and are vulnerable to further decline.”355 Consequently, Australian aid in response to the crisis in the Solomon Islands was increased by A$55.2 million in 2004-5 to A$92.6 million.356

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355 Ibid, p 27
Another reason for the increase in aid to Solomon Islands stems from the securitisation of the global terrorism agenda. The Australian Government asserted that,

“establishment of terrorist bases, the laundering of money, the procurement of false documents and the trafficking of weapons are easier in a state whose legal, political and governance systems are weak or have failed to operate. What happens in the Pacific affects our strategic and security interests. Australia is playing a leading role in efforts to avert the prospects of state failure and institutional weakness in the Pacific islands.”

An outcome of this act of securitisation was the invention of RAMSI – led by Australia in 2003 to “help deter international terrorist groups from exploiting the islands countries.”

While imagining the prospect of Osama Bin Laden residing in the Pacific is considered unlikely by most; Dell Higgie, New Zealand’s Ambassador for Counter Terrorism said, “the region is not exempt from threat – even though the threat is low…” Despite this low rating, the guard must be keep up as it was alleged by Solomon Islands Finance Minister, Peter Boyce, in July 2005 that radical militant groups from Indonesia attempted to recruit teenage Solomon Islanders.

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358 Ibid, p 110
Resources are required to market or sell the threat, and when these are in limited supply, as is the case for many Pacific island countries, securitisation may be very difficult. This may lead to threats such as climate change failing to become securitised, while wealthier actors succeed in having lesser security priorities attended to. Security actors may also mobilise a response without seeking agreement to securitise. This causes problems with legitimacy because in a regional setting, unilateral and frequently bilateral action often causes resentment. Other members of the regional neighbourhood may wish to be consulted in order to feel they have a degree of control and influence over their regional security environment.

Disparities in power and resources, combined with cultural and ideological differences, will influence the security debate and disagreements are likely when the perception of what is valued differs. Methods of response also cause debate. Nevertheless, a regional institution is a suitable setting to facilitate equality, offer explanation and understanding, as well as provide technical assistance during securitisation.

Members of the Forum meet as equals and can exercise this equality to accept or reject an attempt to securitise. ‘Buy in’ is thereby communal and the political will and responsibility to ensure compliance through pooling resources is more likely. This leads to closer security cooperation to ensure regional security is maintained and therefore, national security interests are also satisfied.
5.3.2 Pacific security architecture = Actors + Policies

Security Actors

The current architecture comprises a diverse group of security and insecurity actors and a comprehensive set of regional security policies. The status of security actors, internal and external, requires clarification and strengthening. These actors include individuals, governments, ethnic and communal groups as well as non-governmental, inter-governmental and international organisations. While official security actors establish security policies, all actors identify problems and attempt to securitise. For example, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Greenpeace alert the region to environmental threats, while individual activists such as Philip Alpers, promote the dangers of a lack of gun control in Papua New Guinea. The role of the media as an actor and facilitator is also an important feature in the age of rapid telecasting.

Actors may also cause insecurity because it is the perception of the audience, which determines the status of a freedom fighter, rebel group, an interfering NGO or politicised military. These actors also attempt to securitise their cause. As part of the any security analysis, it is necessary to take a deeper look before applying enemy-terminology to a particular actor.

The focus of this thesis is the security institutions of the Pacific Islands Forum. Chapter six will assess the status and logic of action for the Forum Regional Security Committee as a security actor. Its ability to securitise will be

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examined resulting in suggestions to strengthen the Pacific security environment.

Policies

Pacific security policy consists of a number of treaties, conventions and declarations as listed in table five. Declarations are not binding unless this is explicitly stipulated. They are considered statements of intent, adopted by states or organisations, incorporating a moral imperative for parties to uphold certain principles or courses of action.

Treaties, conventions and international obligations are legally binding contractual agreements that make up the body of international law, and violations can be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). However, the cost of bringing cases to the ICJ restricts many small states from using this system, making access to international justice beyond their capacity. Therefore, Forum members rely on the principle of "pacta sunt servanda": the commitment by the parties to act in good faith, to maintain treaty compliance and co-operation.363

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Declaration</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Treaty of Rarotonga</td>
<td>South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Honiara Declaration</td>
<td>Law Enforcement Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Waigani Convention</td>
<td>Convention to Ban the Importation in to Forum Island Countries of Hazardous and Radioactive Wastes and to Control the Trans-boundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within the South Pacific Region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Aitutaki Declaration</td>
<td>Regional Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Biketawa Declaration</td>
<td>Principles of Good Governance &amp; Collective Crisis Response</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite this principle, adherence to international and regional agreements by Forum members is considered “poor”.365 “High implementation costs, “poor co-ordination”, and “low law enforcement capacity” are cited as difficulties facing Forum members.366 From a legal point of view, it has been suggested that “relying on soft law . . . runs counter to orthodox modes of regional law making” and that a “hard law” or more formal approach through a “range of regional treaties” may be advantageous.367

**Declarations**

The 1992 Honiara Declaration was a response by the region’s leaders to the potential impact of trans-national crime.368 The Forum Secretariat developed model legislation for Pacific states to adopt, involving mutual assistance in

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364 The Declarations can be found in the Forum Communiqué of the respective year.
366 Ibid
367 Ibid
368 For a detailed analysis of the declaration see Neil Boister 2005
The main goal of the 1992 Honiara Declaration is the “need for a more comprehensive, integrated and collaborative approach to counter” the threats and impact of trans-national crime. This has become more significant in today’s security climate, yet establishing the means to achieve it requires more work.

The 1997 Aitutaki Declaration built on the Honiara Declaration by widening the region’s security agenda to include threats from a range of sectors. It also noted the vulnerabilities of Forum members in the face of external threats. It outlined a comprehensive set of “guiding principles governing security co-operation”, including various mechanisms for “preventive diplomacy”, including a regional response to “emergency situations”.

In July 2000, just weeks after the coups in Fiji and Solomon Islands, at the annual FRSC meeting in Vanuatu, former Forum Secretary General Noel Levi said, “[T]he security of the region is under severe pressure and the expectations from around the region of the Committee producing a substantive recommendation to fully implement the principles of the Aitutaki

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369 Forum Communiqué 1992, Honiara Declaration paragraph 3
370 Forum Communiqué 1997
Declaration is never higher.” The options recommended by the FRSC were tabled later that year at the 31st Pacific Islands Forum in Biketawa, Kiribati.

The 2000 Biketawa Declaration included the Forum Economic Action Plan Eight Principles of Good Governance, and the regional response mechanisms of the Aitutaki Declaration. It acknowledged “the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another member state”, but asserted that in “the time of crisis or in response to members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family”. This declaration justified the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and the financial rescue plan for Nauru (PRAN) when it was threatened with bankruptcy.

It can be argued that the provision for a regional response to a crisis has been available since 1997, with the response mechanisms of the Aitutaki Declaration. Furthermore, the informal and flexible nature of the Forum has always allowed for creative responses when needed, as was the case in the 1987 Fiji coups. It would seem, then, that response to a crisis or security threat may be determined by other factors, such as the ability of the ‘security actors’ to convince the regional audience that a threat is real and requires action.

Why is the Biketawa Declaration used to securitise some circumstances and not others? It is held to embody a “proactive” approach, so that response to a

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372 Forum Communiqué 2000, Attachment 1 or annex seven
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crisis is not impeded by ‘slow and considerable diplomatic effort’.

However, a regional response needs to be legitimate, and this can only be achieved in an environment free from politically dominating agendas, so decisions can be made by consensus. This improves the chances that, when implemented, the response will be effective. One way to achieve this is to ensure that decision-makers – or security actors – are regionally representative and have the appropriate authority.

The 2002 Nasonini Declaration built on the previous declarations and committed Forum members to the counter-terrorism measures agreed by the international community after 9/11. This included legislation to meet the standards of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Financial Action Task Force Special recommendations. The Nasonini Declaration also noted that implementation of the Honiara Declaration legislation had not been completed and urged Pacific states to recommit to “full implementation by the end of 2003”. An Expert Working Group met in 2003 to develop a regional framework for model legislation. They also noted that in-country drafting assistance was available to Forum members.

Treaties and conventions

All Forum members have signed (and most have ratified) the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty and the 1995 Waigani Convention. Treaty protocols “commit nuclear powers not to use or test explosive nuclear devices

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374 Forum Communiqué, 2002

in the region”. At the 2004 Forum, leaders again “called upon the United States to ratify the Protocols to the Treaty as a means of enhancing global and regional peace and security”. However, the Pacilii treaty database contains comments that assert the US is unlikely to do so, as this would impede the passage of US nuclear-powered or -armed naval vessels through the region. These comments are comparable with the 2005 United States Defense policy which declares one of its objectives is to ensure free access around the world’s oceans.

The 1995 Waigani Convention, which came into force in October 2001, bans the importation of hazardous and radioactive waste into Forum countries and controls the trans-boundary movement and management of hazardous wastes in the Pacific. The South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) acts as the Secretariat of this Convention.

There appear to be a few problems concerning the enforcement and application of Waigani obligations. Notification by the exporter of trans-boundary waste shipments was made mandatory by Article 6 of the convention. However, this does not occur as it was reported that some Pacific island countries were not officially informed of the route of the April 2005

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shipment of nuclear material by the *Pacific Sandpiper*. This was the tenth shipment made since 1995. Pacific island countries have repeatedly voiced their objections to the shipments to the three shipping states, Britain, Japan and France. Also, Forum Secretary General Greg Urwin is concerned that the “international arrangements for liability and compensation do not adequately address the risks posed by shipments through the region”.

Should an incident occur, how would the region respond? What contingency plans exist? As mentioned previously, this is another area of Pacific security that needs further examination.

The vulnerability of these ships to terrorism (including hijacking) was considered “a real threat” by the Regional Maritime Legal Adviser to the Secretariat of the Pacific Community. A recent Oxford Research Group study reported that terrorists could obtain enough radioactive waste products from one shipment to manufacture a “dirty bomb”. Greenpeace estimated the nuclear waste aboard one ship enough to build 60 nuclear devices.

While the risk of an accident to a shipment in severe weather is worrisome, the idea that terrorists could use the shipments to hold the international community to ransom is a significant concern. This could come in the form of a threat to attack, or an actual attempt at boarding or hijacking. If such an

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incident occurred, the damage and destruction would be incalculable. In 2002 the US Nuclear Control Institute (NCI) considered it “irresponsible” to ship nuclear waste in the post-9/11 security climate.\textsuperscript{385}

\textit{International standards and laws}

The cost of compliance, the consequences of non-implementation, and the lack of capacity to enforce the host of complex international legal requirements constitute a dilemma, particularly for small and economically poor Pacific states.

Pacific Island countries rely on tourism and trade and cannot risk the prospect that international shipping companies and airlines will refuse to land. This is an ever-present threat. International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) officials can arrive unannounced to inspect an airport – both Solomon Islands and Fiji airports are reportedly below ICAO standards. In mid-2005 Nadi airport was issued a three-month licence instead of the usual 12 months, and has since announced a $19 million upgrade to meet the required standards.\textsuperscript{386} The Solomon Islands airport “restoration project” is reliant on external funding from the Japanese government.\textsuperscript{387} The United States Coast Guard and Homeland Security included Nauru on their Port Security Advisory list because it had not reported its compliance with the Maritime Transportation Security Act and the International Ship and Port Facility

\textsuperscript{385} BBC News Online, 2002, A Floating Target for al-Qaeda? http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2038097.stm
\textsuperscript{386} Pacific Islands Reports, 2 May 2005, ‘Fiji Nadi Airport Faces Compliance Deadline’, http://pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireports/2005/May/05-03-09.htm
Security Code of the International Maritime Organisation. Consequently, ships that have recently docked at Nauru could be refused access to US ports.

Terrorism has been described by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as a “global scourge with global effects”. One consequence of the global terrorism agenda is the threat of further marginalisation, should Pacific countries fail to adequately implement and enforce international security policies. Higgie asserted that,

“the legal counter-terrorism framework drawn up by the international community is universal in its application. It applies to Pacific Island countries as to other members of the global community.”

The integrity of the region would be tested if it were perceived internationally to be falling behind international legal standards. In this case, when Pacific leaders voice their concerns on other issues, the international community is less likely to respond favourably.

Conversely, if the international community is intent on imposing strict and expensive security standards on Pacific Island states, they must also accept responsibility for assisting these vulnerable states to achieve compliance. The Pacific Islands Regional Security Technical Cooperation Strategy is one mechanism that will help Forum members and “donor countries and organisations work co-operatively in meeting regional and international

390 Higbie, 2005, p 103
expectations for these countries”. The question must be, is this enough to ensure compliance before the implementation deadlines? If not, what would be the consequences, legal and otherwise, of a failure to comply?

One way to mitigate the circumstances is for Pacific countries to pool judicial services. This would relieve the legislative burden from Pacific countries by providing regional jurisdiction for certain criminal or terrorist situations. This would strengthen the Pacific legal security environment and provide assurance to the international community that the region is serious about adhering to international legal standards.

The 2002 Nasonini Declaration noted that implementation of the 1992 Honiara Declaration legislation has not been completed, and urged Pacific states to recommit to “full implementation by the end of 2003”, exemplifying the region’s problems with adherence to regional agreements. Furthermore, the 2004 EPG Review identified the lack of an “efficient mechanism” as hindering regional co-operation on security and law enforcement issues.

While the technical assistance offered by the PIRSTCS will help Pacific countries meet their international legal obligations, pooling judicial resources would provide greater regional legal protection. The idea of a regional court has been advocated for some time. Samoa, at the 1974 Pacific Islands Forum in Rarotonga, proposed a regional court of appeal. Forum Secretary General Greg Urwin proposed the idea of a regional “privy council” in late 2004. In

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This strategy is listed to be implemented as an ‘Early Practical Benefit’ in the draft Pacific Plan.
early 2005, Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Aiono Sailele Malielegaoi also suggested that greater co-operation could be achieved by pooling judicial resources.

Boister describes a regional judicial system that could,

Articulate national criminal processes and perhaps even remove the burden of suppressing serious trans-national and international crime from the member states by delegating jurisdiction to a regional court that deals with such offences, staffed by regional judges and procuracy processing offences investigated by a regional investigation bureau.\(^{392}\)

Model legislation developed by the Forum Secretariat could provide the basis for a body of regional laws administered by a Forum regional court attended to by a group of legal officials from member states. A set of regional laws could interface between national and international laws and standards. The idea of shared jurisdiction could also be a step towards resolving some of the complexities facing the pooling of police forces in the region. Questions of sovereignty can be examined by introducing the idea of a shared “regional sovereignty”. This may appear to be an oxymoron if the concept of state sovereignty is strictly interpreted. Nonetheless, the idea should not be discarded, as solutions to problems often involve stretching concepts so they remain relevant. In the recent reviews of the region, sovereignty has been tested and re-evaluated in a Pacific context. Chapter seven compares the latest regional reviews and the sovereignty issues discussed.

\(^{392}\) Boister, 2005, p. 11.
5.3.3 Pacific Security Infrastructure = Security Services Providers

Until the flurry of activity in the development of the Pacific Plan, analysis of the Pacific security infrastructure has been limited. In the Terms of Reference for the Pacific Plan Taskforce, the Leaders tasked the Forum Secretariat to complete *An Assessment of Regional Mechanisms and Processes in the Pacific*. The resulting report in August 2005 by AV Hughes, *Strengthening Regional Management: A Review of the Architecture for Regional Cooperation in the Pacific*, proposed some bold reforms of five of the CROP agencies: Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP).

Examples of the CROP agencies that provide some form of security service are FFA – the Vessel Monitoring System (VSMi), SPC – the Regional Maritime Programme (RMP), SPREP – protection and management of natural resources including monitoring climate change, and pollution.

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393 Pacific Plan Task Force, 2004, 'Terms of Reference,' para 3
http://www.pacificplan.org/tiki-page.php?pageName=Pacific+Plan+TERMSOFREFERENCE&PHPSESSID=ACA4C4D5EAF72B0C17B4...

394 Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific (CROP) membership includes: Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Fiji School of Medicine (FSchM), Pacific Islands Development Programme (PIDP), South Pacific Board for Education Assessment (SPBEA), Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC) and the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP), South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO), and University of the South Pacific (USP).


396 Uses satellite technologies to monitor fisheries vessels and a policy programme to streamline and strengthen their laws and operations in surveillance and enforcement.

397 The mission of RMP is safe and secure shipping, the Public Health Surveillance and Communicable Disease Control Section (PHS & CDC) and the Pacific Plant Protection Organisation (PPPO) Biosecurity.
protection, and acting as Secretariat for the 1995 Waigani Convention. SOPAC monitors disaster management practices.

CROP, however, does not include other security agencies such as Pacific Islands Law Officers Meeting (PILOM), Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO),\textsuperscript{398} Pacific Immigration Directors Conference (PIDC), Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP), South Pacific Islands Criminal Intelligence Network (SPICIN), Pacific Aviation Security Office (PASO), Pacific Financial Intelligence Unit (PFIU), and the Pacific Trans-national Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC).

Other service providers include national aid agencies, international donors and organisations and disciplined forces.\textsuperscript{399} Schemes such as the New Zealand Mutual Assistance Programme (MAP) and the Australian/New Zealand funded Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI) will strengthen inter-operability and increase professionalism. Non-government organisations also provide services in a crisis situation, of which, Red Cross and Oxfam are examples. Security providers in the Pacific are well organised and while there is co-operation within each sector, there is room for improvement in communication between sectors.

One possibility would be to structure a network to co-ordinate the security infrastructure as described in table four. Building on existing mechanisms, PICP could act as a coordinating unit of the security service providers with the

\textsuperscript{398} Formerly known as Customs Heads of Administration Regional Meetings (CHARM)

\textsuperscript{399} Disciplined forces include the military, paramilitary and police.
Forum Secretariat providing administrative and technical support while incorporating the decision making capacity of the Forum Regional Security Committee. A representative of this structure could also become part of the CROP group. This would compliment the recently revised CROP charter which asserted that a, “Joint CROP response to crisis situations in the region [is] another coordinated function.”

5.4 Security Equation Applied

This overview of the Pacific security environment briefly described the three factors or divisions in the security equation: security agenda, security architecture and security infrastructure. This equation can be applied for a variety reasons to produce a number of outcomes, which include:

- A complete security environmental analysis revealing a comprehensive overview of the region’s security needs;
- An issue-driven analysis of the security agenda through the various sectors, delving into the securitisation process which would trace the threat through the security architecture and infrastructure and give greater understanding of its nature and the type of response required;
- Collation of the security infrastructure revealing duplication and exposing areas that require modification;
- An investigation into the security architecture revealing the status of the security actors and their effectiveness.

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401 An overview of the region’s security environment see – 5.3
The next chapter will focus on this last outcome by concentrating on the Forum Regional Security Committee, one security mechanism of the Forum.
Chapter 6: The Forum Regional Security Committee

6.1 Introduction

The insecurities facing the region are complex and becoming more sensitive. Sharp-end threats such as transnational crime can be more amenable to regional solutions compared to internal issues such as corrupt governance or resource and land disputes. This is because the threat is, by nature, transnational and it is self-evident that solutions to these threats require regional security cooperation. The Biketawa Declaration however called for Forum members to start the process of “constructively” addressing the “difficult and sensitive issues including underlying causes of tensions and conflict (ethnic tension, socio-economic disparities, and lack of good governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values).”

One security mechanism available to the region is the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC). As a regionally representative institution, it has the legitimacy to securitise issues and set the region’s security agenda. It has the potential to explore ways to address these difficult and sensitive issues that are common to all Forum members in varying degrees. Solutions to internal crises may be hard to find and, while not advocating a one size fits all solution, certain responses to problems are universal and lessons can be learnt from various situations. Therefore, with security as one of the four pillars for the Forum’s focus in the Plan’s development and implementation, it is timely to examine the FRSC which is danger of becoming moribund.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the flaws and potential of the FRSC. It describes its inception, and by using the security equation created in chapter five, it will update its current structure and status within the security environment. Its logic of action is defined by modifying the objective logic of action described in chapter two with the assertion introduced in chapter one. A comparison of the characteristics and functions as set out in the region’s security policies will help to explain its inability to securitise the issues causing insecurity. It is concluded that, without strengthening its authority to set the region’s security agenda, the Pacific security environment will be weakened and the goals of the Pacific Vision and Plan threatened.

6.2 FRSC – Inception

At the opening of the Forum Officials Committee meeting Apia 2004, the Hon Han J. Keil, the Samoan Minister of Commerce, Labour and Tourism recalled the last Forum summit held in Apia 1987, seventeen years prior. He said,

It was a time of turbulence for our region then, with the first political crisis in Fiji occurring just a few weeks before the Apia Forum. The discussions at the 1987 Forum naturally were dominated by the events in Fiji and how the region should respond to the crisis. Fortunately for us then, there was and still is today the ‘Pacific Way’ of resolving difficult problems.403

The inception of the FRSC was at that 1987 Forum in Samoa. Forum leaders relayed their “deep concern and anguish” over the Fiji coup, and conveyed

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403 Hon Han J Keil, 2004, ‘Opening Address of the Forum Officials Committee meeting,’ Apia, Samoa, 5 August 2004
their “expression of willingness to provide whatever help they might be able to.” After “detailed informal discussion” with the Governor General of Fiji, leaders agreed to send a mission to Fiji. The purpose was to hold discussions with all parties and facilitate processes for resolution. The Prime Minister of Australia was to lead the mission, which included the Prime Minister of Solomon Islands and the director of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation (SPEC). While the Forum’s offer of help was not taken up by Fiji’s Governor General, the fact that a regional response to an internal crisis was discussed and organised is significant. An Air New Zealand aircraft had been hijacked five days after the coup, and the leaders also agreed to “establish a working group to examine the issue and develop ways to enhance the capacity of the Forum states to counter terrorism and hijacking.” It was in this context that the Committee on Regional Security Information Exchange was established.

The Committee held its inaugural meeting at the SPEC headquarters in Suva in February 1988. A wide-ranging list of security issues was submitted and, from the outset security was defined broadly. While a second meeting was held in June 1988, the committee did not meet again until November 1990, when it became known as the Forum Regional Security Committee.

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404 Forum Communiqué, 1987
405 South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation, currently known as the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat.
406 Forum Communiqué, 1987
6.3 FRSC in the Security Equation

Using the security equation created in chapter five, the FRSC’s current structure and status within the security environment is analysed. Table six places the FRSC as a security actor within the security architecture. As a security actor it has the objective ability to securitise and set the region’s security agenda. It also has the potential to create regional security policies and set the tasks and build or strengthen the security infrastructure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>Architecture</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>FRSC Actors</td>
<td>Security Service Providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securitisation</td>
<td>Policies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

= Security Environment

6.4 FRSC – Structure and Status

The FRSC meets annually at officials’ level. The meetings are divided into two sessions over two days. Session one receives reports from prior meetings of the Regional Law Enforcement agencies comprising the Forum Secretariat, the Oceania Customs Organisation, the Pacific Immigration Directors Committee and the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police. Other agencies, such as the Pacific Island Law Officers, also brief the FRSC on their strategies and programmes. Session two is a retreat meeting where representatives of each Forum member are expected to participate in frank discussions on sensitive issues. In 2005, papers from two Pacific academics were presented with the aim of encouraging provocative discussions.
The outcomes for session one are drafted by the Secretariat and adopted by members out of session. The recommendations are prepared for endorsement of the Forum Officials Committee, which then identifies the issues that are forwarded to leaders. To ensure the openness of the second session, no record is kept but major outcomes are summarised.

The attendance and participation at the FRSC by some Forum member delegations has been criticised as absent, poorly prepared and uninformed. Over-domination by the New Zealand and Australian delegations has been noted while Island delegations have been accused of apathy. The combination of assertiveness on one hand and passiveness on the other has produced confusion and resentment, resulting in a situation where the meeting process has become an expensive and time consuming activity.

Comments were made that competing and overlapping mandates between the various agencies, particularly in the field of transnational threat, criminal intelligence and money laundering, have meant that Forum members can become confused about agenda. There is also a lack of clarity in the relationships between the Forum and the regional law enforcement agencies, such as OCO and PICP as the latter have wider memberships than just the Forum. The security-related activities of the Secretariat have also been criticised as not driven by clear consensus, but by the priorities of individual

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407 Comments made at three confidential interviews with officials from two separate countries and one intergovernmental organisation.
408 Ibid
staff members or more significantly, directed by the objectives of external donor funding.\textsuperscript{409}

The failure of the FRSC to deliver the expectations, (arguably implicit and unrealistic), of the region has meant that opportunities to strengthen the security environment have been missed. It is asserted, therefore, that its main problems are a result of a confused and obscure logic of action and that a lack of authority, logic of purpose and structural logic has prevented practical and effective implementation of otherwise creative and useful initiatives.

Also hindering FRSC’s potential is the issue of political responsibility. Political will for consensus-style decision-making or securitisation in this sector, has been undermined by the dominance of the Forum’s larger members. Political responsibility amongst the majority of smaller Forum members for their own national and regional security is weakened. Conversely, because responsibility has been lacking, the well-resourced delegations have become even more dominant in order to fill the vacuum and take action to solve the pressing problems. This self-reinforcing system of pro-activeness and passivity breeds tension and resentment. This is especially significant when compared to one of the goals of the Pacific Vision:

\begin{quote}
We seek a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance …\textsuperscript{410}
\end{quote}

The quality of security governance in the region has therefore suffered and opportunities have been missed to encourage better security cooperation.

\textsuperscript{409} Ibid
\textsuperscript{410} Pacific Islands Forum, 2004, Pacific Cooperation, p 8
Solving the problems stemming from bureaucratic inertia are beyond this thesis, nevertheless after “strengthening” and “invigorating,” the FRSC has the potential to be a legitimate mechanism to effectively securitise the challenges facing the region.\textsuperscript{411} It liaises and coordinates well with the security service providers within the security infrastructure. Part of the solution therefore begins with identifying a logic of action, directed by an appropriate level of authority.

The status of the FRSC arguably comes from the seniority of its level of attendance. At officials’ level, it reports directly to leaders as it has been suggested they are responsible for security. This logic seems weak. Leaders are ultimately responsible for the gamut of issues in all sectors and with full meeting agenda they are unable to give concentrated attention to the assorted insecurities facing the region. The EPG report recognised this problem and the 2004 Auckland Decisions mandated ministers with more decision-making authority. Ministers from many other sectors meet either annually or as required. To include ministers from the various security-related portfolios is one way to direct a strong degree of authority to the FRSC.\textsuperscript{412}

6.5 FRSC – Logic of Action

By modifying the logic of action created in chapter two with the above assertion, the logic of action for the FRSC as a security actor is: ‘the authority

\begin{flushright}
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to manage the region’s security roles by good governance processes of securitisation that reflect the ‘Pacific Way’ with the aim of achieving specific security-related goals through mechanisms with stable but adaptive structures.¹⁴¹³

The FRSC, it is argued here, lacks the appropriate authority to manage the region’s security roles. Its bureaucratic structures are adaptable but weak due to this lack of authority. Security governance lacks legitimacy because the structures do not mirror principles of good governance. This inhibits its ability to sell insecurity thereby securitisation is difficult. The ‘Pacific Way’ is undermined as the security goals are not agreed too by consensus. Specific security goals do not cover the broad array of issues in the security agenda but have been overtaken by the global transnational threat agenda.

6.6 FRSC – Characteristics and Functions

The characteristics of the FRSC and its functions, as set out in the region’s security policies will now be compared. This comparison will help to explain why it lacks the appropriate authority and ability to securitise the region’s security issues.

6.6.1. Characteristics

As a regional institution it is represented by the region’s members. This gives it a legitimacy to discuss and decide upon the issues affecting the region. As a Forum creation, it is expected to adopt the established method of relating –
the ‘Pacific Way’. As a security institution it is clearly compelled to consider all issues that threaten the region’s security. Security, as discussed previously, has been defined broadly and reaches across a variety of sectors. The principles of the Biketawa Declaration assert that security issues are to be addressed. Its meetings are held annually which implies members agree that dialogue concerning security issues requires consistent attention.

6.6.2. Functions

The functions of the FRSC have grown ad hoc and are found in a collection of the Forum communiqués and the various regional leaders’ declarations – see table seven below. It is argued that these functions have been diverted and narrowed from the original purpose of the FRSC by the dominance of the global transnational threat agenda. This distraction has prevented the securitisation of other insecurities facing the region.

Its inception was derived from the internal crisis of Fiji and the 1987 Forum Communiqué, which established the ‘Exchange of Information on International Developments Affecting the Security of the Region’ later to become the FRSC. The Exchange was to consider “matters affecting national security and defence, … [and] the economic security of the region was to be monitored.”

The 1988 Communiqué re-iterated the Forum’s commitment to the Committee on Regional Security Information Exchange but “noted” the “unwelcome international phenomena of terrorism and the illegal trade in arms…”

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414 Forum Communiqué, 1987, paragraph 17
415 Forum Communiqué, 1988, paragraphs 18-19
### Table 7 Functions of FRSC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Declaration</th>
<th>Functions</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992 Honiara Declaration</td>
<td>• Co-ordinate and disseminate information;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To establish a framework for increasing contacts amongst specialist</td>
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<td></td>
<td>agencies;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• To provide advice to Forum Leaders on law enforcement issues;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• To meet annually before the Forum Officials Committee meeting;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To review and advise on programme priorities, institutional linkages,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and resource needs in the area of law enforcement co-operation and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>information exchange on regional and international security issues;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Focus on: legal issues, mutual assistance in criminal matters, forfeiture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of the proceeds of crime, extradition, financial action task force,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>customs, police, drugs and environmental issues; terrorism, maritime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>surveillance, taxation issues and training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 Communiqué</td>
<td>• Study ways to achieve the Honiara Objectives;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Study and report on a common approach to weapons control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 Communiqué</td>
<td>• Continued role in overseeing co-ordination of law enforcement amongst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>specialist agencies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Role to be broadened and strengthened.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 Aitutaki Declaration</td>
<td>• Further develop mechanisms for preventive diplomacy including use of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the Forum Regional Security Committee;</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Be strengthened through the addition of a second session for consultations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on broader security issues;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Give early consideration to the circumstances whereby the Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>would be convened in response to emergency situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 Communiqué</td>
<td>• Action Plan to assist member achieve Honiara objectives;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Continued regional law enforcement co-ordination of specialist agencies;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Development of recommendations on policy approaches to broader security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 Biketawa Declaration</td>
<td>• Convening of a special high level meeting in times of crisis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Nasonini Declaration</td>
<td>• Review regional implementation of UNSCR 1373, the FATF Special</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Recommendations and the Honiara Declaration and report back to the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 Melanesian Spearhead Group</td>
<td>• Look at the concept of a standing regional force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next mention of the Committee was in 1990 and the diversion to narrow its focus was complete as the Forum agreed it was to “be revived to consider the needs and priorities of member countries in the area of law enforcement cooperation.”\(^{416}\) The characteristics of FRSC were obviously not considered during this evolution and thereby its potential to function as a security actor was hindered. Details of the political agenda for this, implicit or explicit, are

\(^{416}\) Forum Communiqué, 1990, paragraph 24
beyond this discussion however its neglect has meant that opportunities to strengthen the security environment have been missed.

Ron Crocombe’s series of national security studies, mentioned above, detail the complexities of security issues that the Biketawa Declaration asserted needed to be addressed. The FRSC has the ‘characteristics’ to strengthen the security environment by securitising these issues. The processes of securitisation however require resources for the actors to sell a threat and then mobilise action to counter the threat. These resources include authority, legitimacy and political responsibility as well as financial commitment.

6.7 FRSC with Teeth – the appropriate level of authority

In an earlier paper presented at the conference held at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii, I suggested that the FRSC should be attended at ministerial level. This idea received a polarised response; a Pacific Island delegate gave the idea a good back-slap while an official from Australia was completely against the idea. New Zealand officials acknowledged it may be timely to consider the idea.

6.8 Ministers’ Meeting Agenda

The main contention from the Australian official was that their ministerial agenda was too full to attend more meetings. This rebuttal lacks sense. If security ministers’ are too busy to meet to discuss issues of regional security, re-prioritisation is the solution. To ignore or neglect security issues and the
securitisation process, the issues fester and the security environment becomes weaker and the eventual response can be more complex.

As a response to this criticism in a chapter in Securing a Peaceful Pacific it was argued that “the ministers’ council [could] meet when necessary.” New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade official, Susannah Gordon who organised the 2005 FRSC meetings also suggested security ministers’ could meet on the fringes of the United Nations General Assembly annual meeting as an alternative if required. After further research and keeping in line with the goals of the Pacific Plan for closer cooperation, it is contended here that regular meetings would add a greater depth of political commitment and responsibility towards solving the region’s security needs. This would make the FRSC a more authoritative security actor with the power needed to define the security environment through setting the security agenda and monitoring the security infrastructure.

In addition, I previously suggested that a Forum Security Council of Ministers be established. Again after further research, the idea of a Council seems excessive. The FRSC format, as described earlier, mirrors the annual Forum summit meetings. Security officials could meet beforehand and set an agenda for the ministers’ who then meet in retreat format. The officials meetings would still receive reports from the security infrastructure agencies and this could be extended to include civil society groups. The main contention

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417 Sheryl Boxall, 2005, p 180
418 Interview with Susannah Gordon, 11 February 2006.
419 Ibid
420 Chapter two
regardless of the meeting details: is for the FRSC to successfully securitise insecurities greater decision-making authority is needed.

6.9 Security Ministerial Portfolios Adjusted

It is acknowledged however, one problem of raising the authority of FRSC to ministerial level is that there are a number of ministers from various security-related portfolios who could attend. In chapter four the theory of security was re-defined and it was argued that where security is defined broadly, the maintenance of security by the agencies that address security issues must mirror this extension, whether regionally or nationally. Consequently some Forum governments may need to re-consider their national security structures. Ministerial portfolios often mirror cold-war frameworks where the maintenance of national security is spread among distinct agencies. While the full extent of this readjustment is far beyond the objectives of this thesis, it is suggested that the issue needs considering. Therefore, when deciding which minister should attend FRSC, practically at this stage, it needs to be left to the members’ discretion but keeping in mind the idea of the ‘whole of government’ approach to security maintenance should be mirrored regionally.

6.10 FRSC with Democracy

One benefit of strengthening FRSC to ministerial level would be that it makes securitisation more democratic. Ministers’ are elected whereas officials are appointed. The regional electorate then has more power by proxy to determine the security agenda.

\[421\] Chapter four
\[422\] Chapter four
The political responsibility of ministers is also greater than that of officials. The implementation of security decisions is likely to increase as ministers are responsible and accountable for the portfolios. This degree of political responsibility and accountability is also more likely to filter down to officials and security service providers.

6.11 FRSC with Political Respect

Another benefit of the attendance of Ministers at FRSC is the likely increase of political respect. The dynamic between ministers is different than officials. Ministers’ need to be made more responsible for security decision-making as they are used to an environment of debate and are more able to assert their government’s interests. They have the authority and status that comes with their portfolio and so meet with other ministers as equals. This level of respect also minimises the ‘political spin’ used by officials to protect themselves from difficult situations.

6.12 FRSC with Legitimacy

One ‘characteristic’ of the FRSC as a security actor, is that its membership is regionally representative therefore it has the legitimacy to set the region’s security agenda. This structural logic helps reduce the chances for resentment to build because this degree of representation should protect the less influential members from the dominance of those with greater power.
One of the political roles of regionalism espoused by Greg Fry is the ‘counter-hegemonic strategy’. This was explained in a global context in chapter two, but here it can be applied within the FRSC. Despite the disparities of the region discussed in the introduction, the Forum is a venue where domination by larger or wealthier Forum members over other Forum members’ is reduced. This is further reduced when ministers meet as equals because it is expected they will express their disagreements openly and maximise the opportunity to find ways to settle their differences.

6.13 FRSC – Reduced Sensitivities

As a Forum creation, the principles of the ‘Pacific Way’ are the expected method for regional decision-making. In this environment, sensitivities are reduced; therefore it is more likely that the problems facing the region, both external and internal will be addressed. One example of a set of circumstances that would benefit from a regional approach is the bi-lateral Enhanced Cooperation Programme (ECP) between Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia.

As an exercise in security cooperation, the ECP experience failed miserably. Commentators described it as muscular, hairy-chestedness, arrogant and that it smacked of Australian neo-colonialism. One point missed however, regardless of alleged heavy handedness of Australian diplomacy, is that PNG

\[\text{\footnotesize \cite{423} Chapter two}
\text{\footnotesize \cite{424} For further details of the package and its process see - Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – PNG, Enhanced Cooperation Programme, http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/png/ecp2004.html}
suffers a serious lack of professional law and order maintenance. A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report on the state of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary titled, ‘Making their own rules: Police beatings, rape and torture of Children in Papua New Guinea,’ outlined the grim and fatal realities of the lack of law and order. 426 Michael Field reported that the Police Minister Bire Kimisopa freely admitted the report was correct but “something, you know, we’re not proud of.”427 In January 2006, however Kimisopa warned, “Any person who tries to sabotage or criticise the Enhanced Co-operation Programme (ECP Mark II) will be severely dealt with.”428

It appears then after two years of negotiations the programme is again underway. The Australia and PNG colonial relationship is complex and to accept that PNG is victim of Australian browbeating is a fallacy.429 However using the FRSC as the mechanism for the ECP negotiations, the colonial complexities would be minimised because the securitisation process would involve the wider Forum membership. The Biketawa Declaration also makes provisions for security involvement from other Forum members resulting in regional policies to guide the intervention processes. This may save time and money in future security projects.

426 The Human Rights Watch Report states: Papua New Guinea is one of the more dangerous countries in the world not at war. There is no question that the country, and its police force, face a serious violent crime problem, including gang crime, armed highway robbery, tribal fighting in the Highlands, conflicts related to resource development such as mining, and election-related conflict. White collar crime, fraud, and corruption among politicians are also serious problems.
429 In 2003, during the Australia – Papua New Guinea Ministerial Forum, the PNG delegation was led by an impressive group of politicians that included, the Rt. Hon. Sir Rabbie Namaliu, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Immigration, and included the Hon. Sir Moi Avei, Minister for Petroleum and Energy, the Hon. Bart Philemon, Minister for Finance and Treasury, the Hon. Bire Kimisopa, Minister for Internal Security, the Hon. Sir Peter Barter, Minister for Inter Government Relations, the Hon. Kappa Yarka, Minister for Defence, the Hon. Sinai Brown, Minister for National Planning and Monitoring, the Hon. Peter O’Neill, Minister for Public Service and the Hon. Mark Maipakai, Minister for Justice.
6.14 FRSC - Strengthened

It is concluded that the FRSC as the region’s security actor needs ministerial authority to set the region’s security agenda. Its status quo however does not meet the security needs of the region so without attention, insecurity in the region is likely to increase resulting in a weak security environment. This scenario contradicts the goals of the Pacific Vision and intentions of the Pacific Plan.
Chapter 7: Conclusion

The concluding assertion of this thesis is that the status quo security arrangements in the region are likely to further weaken the pacific security environment. This would result in many of the objectives of the pacific plan being threatened and consequently the goals of the pacific vision frustrated. The security mechanism of the Pacific Islands Forum, the Forum Regional Security Committee (FRSC) has the potential to minimise this vulnerability by facilitating closer and more effective security cooperation. But a key requirement identified in this thesis is that greater authority should be mandated to the forum ministers’ by raising attendance at FRSC meetings from officials to ministerial level. Decisions would be more likely to be implemented effectively if political responsibility for the security environment is increased.

The rationale of this thesis is to introduce ideas which help explain the region’s security environment. Traditional views of security theory were not applicable in an environment where cooperation as opposed to competition or enmity, has been and remains the norm. A redefinition of security was therefore required, but before this could explain the security interaction taking place, a full picture of the security environment was needed. An equation that had the ability to complete such a picture was presented and proved to be universally applicable because it included all aspects and variables of the security environment. The ‘security environment equation’ was applied to the specific characteristics of the pacific region’s security environment. It
produced a comprehensive picture that provides a greater depth of knowledge to guide more accurate analysis.

The Pacific Islands Forum is identified by this study as the region’s driver of regionalism and the FRSC as the region’s main ‘security actor’ in the ‘security architecture’. The analysis of the FRSC revealed that it does have the potential to effectively address the security issues facing the region. It is hindered however because its ‘logic of action’ is implicit rather than explicit and lacks the appropriate level of authority to make strong decisions and ensure their effective implementation.

The thesis argues that the implementation of existing security programmes and initiatives at a national level has been poor and that political will needs to be transformed into a greater sense of political responsibility. It was discovered however, that during regional security meetings a self-reinforcing dynamic of dominance by more resourced forum members, contrasts with passivity of lesser capable members. It was argued that this frustrates the ‘buy in’ or acceptance of responsibility needed to ensure decisions are followed through.

Forum institutions have the capacity to overcome the dominant/passive problem as its members meet as political equals who all have the ability and right to have their opinions heard. Diversity is a major characteristic of the region. Socially, politically and economically the Forum members differ greatly. A recurring question of this thesis is whether cooperation can be
effective if the parties are unequally resourced. A consequence of this regional disparity is that the costs and distribution of benefits from regionalism is also diverse. This however does not have to translate into a set of negative assumptions. Difference is not the same as inequality. It is not a ‘power/resource’ or ‘cost/benefit’ equality that is facilitated by the Forum, but it is its ability to equalise the field for political decision making. As Forum membership is based on political autonomy, of mainly democratic countries (Tonga, the exception, is moving towards greater democracy), leaders have their national mandate to collectively make regional decisions. The status of leaders therefore is the same and participation in the decision-making process is expected.

Equilibrium is also relative in the region because what is important to one member may differ from the others. For instance the maintenance of transnational security is high on the security agendas of Australia and New Zealand. Upgrading border security in island countries can be viewed as a positive development rather than an intrusion into national sovereignty. It is argued in this thesis that the acceptance, or re-framing, of closer security cooperation depends on the process of negotiation and consultation. The ‘Pacific Way’ of consensus seeking is a valuable regional asset. It is the means by which inequality can be minimised when contributions by participants to the decision-making process are valued for the equality of their position as members of the Forum, and not the resources of their countries.
It is asserted in the introduction to this thesis that a mechanism is needed that has the authority to decide the nature of the region’s security environment. This should combine good regional governance structures and the maturity of the ‘Pacific Way’. As a regionally representative Forum institution, the FRSC has the essential characteristics to make effective security decisions. It is therefore the region’s most appropriate security mechanism. It has the potential to address sensitive security problems as envisaged in the Biketawa declaration. It is important to stress that regional consultation does not need to prevent action. Collective agreement on the characteristics of the region’s security environment is more likely to encourage effective implementation than an externally imposed set of security initiatives. One example cited was the global terrorism agenda and the imposition of its set of universal rules and standards.

Strengthening the FRSC by raising the attendance from officials to ministerial level is considered by this thesis to be imperative. Without this, it is likely to languish in the myriad of ineffectual regional meetings. While efforts to make the FRSC more effective are ongoing, a deliberate step-up in the region’s hierarchy to ministerial level will provide it with much needed authority and help establish good regional governance processes to achieve security-related goals through greater cooperation. The region, defined as the group of countries within the Pacific that desire to cooperate through membership in the Porum, therefore does have the ability to achieve the goals of the Pacific Vision:

    Leaders believe the Pacific region can,
should and will be a region of peace,
harmony, security and economic prosperity,
so that all its people can lead free and worthwhile lives.
Annex 1

SOUTH PACIFIC FORUM
WELLINGTON 5 - 7 AUGUST 1971

JOINT FINAL COMMUNIQUE

The President of Nauru, the Prime Ministers of Western Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, the Premier of the Cook Islands, the Australian Minister for External Territories, and the Prime Minister of New Zealand met in Wellington from 5 to 7 August for private and informal discussion of a wide range of issues of common concern. They concentrated on matters directly affecting the daily lives of the People of the Islands of the South Pacific, devoting particular attention to trade, shipping, tourism, and education.

The talks were essentially exploratory. Those present discussed, as neighbours and partners, a number of problems which concern them and possible ways of solving them.

Useful ideas and information were exchanged: helpful and practical comments were made; and new lines of enquiry were suggested. Quite apart from being of immediate value to individual participants the talks significantly advanced the spirit of regional cooperation and mutual confidence.

The Wellington meeting could be described as an ad hoc gathering of Island Leaders and Representatives of Australia and New Zealand. The initiative came from the Leaders of the Independent and Self-Governing Island States, all of which are associated with the Commonwealth.

During the course of the discussion attention was drawn to the forthcoming series of nuclear tests to be conducted by France in the South Pacific. Participants expressed deep regret that atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons continued to be held in the Islands of French Polynesia despite the partial Test Ban Treaty and the protests repeatedly made by a number of the countries attending as well as other Pacific countries. They expressed their concern at the potential hazards that atmospheric tests pose to health and safety and to marine life which is a vital element in the Islands' subsistence and economy and addressed an urgent appeal to the Government of France that the current test series should be the last in the Pacific area. The Forum requested the New Zealand Government to transmit this appeal to the French Government.

The following main items on the Agenda were discussed:

Trade

The Forum made a close examination of South Pacific trade, and particularly that between the Island States themselves and with Australia and New Zealand. A programme was instituted to identify trading problems requiring further study by the Forum members. It was recognised that changes in the world trading situation, as well as developments in the Island economies, created a need for regular consultations between the participants on trade matters. The Forum resolved accordingly that a meeting of senior officials of the five Island Governments be held within 3 months to survey production potential and marketing.
prospects for Island commodities in the region, and to study and report on statistical, economic and agricultural implications with a view to making recommendations about the possibility of establishing an economic union for the area. It was hoped that New Zealand and Australian officials would join in this task in order to promote trade and economic co-operation in the region. It was agreed that New Zealand should, in liaison with other members, coordinate the necessary preparations for the meeting.

The Forum decided in addition that the officials' meeting should investigate the situation with regard to existing regulations that may be regarded as unnecessary barriers to inter-island trade and the feasibility of establishing a regional bulk ordering scheme. The question of treatment for Islands products entering Australia and New Zealand would also be studied.

Quarantine, shipping, customs tariffs and the difficulties of marketing products were also discussed. The Forum recognised that there were a number of problems affecting inter-island trade and trade between the Islands and Australia and New Zealand and welcomed proposals made for increasing the frequency of trade missions between the Island groups and with Australia and New Zealand.

**Shipping**

The Forum agreed that a considerable amount of further study in this field was required. It was noted that a joint working party had already been formed of representatives from each PIPA member country to investigate fully the organisation and operation of a regional shipping line. An UNDP regional transport survey is also under way. The Forum decided that further discussions on shipping would be held in the light of the information provided by these two investigations and the results of the Senior Officials' Trade Meeting.

**Civil Aviation**

The Forum heard a survey of current developments in civil aviation in the region. After a general discussion it was agreed that the present system of liaison and close cooperation among all the countries represented at the Forum was most valuable and should be continued and strengthened.

**Foreign Investment including Tourism in the Pacific**

There was general agreement on the great importance for all members of welcoming and offering incentives for investment, and the desirability of ensuring a substantial local equity in all enterprises. Tourism, in particular, was regarded as most important to the economies of the member countries. The Forum recognised the advantages of joint tourist promotion, and noted that further consultation would be desirable, especially in the light of the results of the current UNDP survey now taking place.
Law of the Sea

The meeting discussed the question of territorial sea claims in the South Pacific. It was considered that the unique dependence of countries of the South Pacific on marine resources merited special consideration in the recognition of territorial claims. The meeting welcomed the offer of Australia and New Zealand, as members of the United Nations Seabed Committee to keep Island Governments informed of progress of the Committee’s deliberations and to draw the attention of the Seabed Committee to the special needs of the South Pacific Islands.

Developments of Oceanic Resources

The meeting took note of the work being done by the Hawaii Oceanic Institute for Research and Economic Development of Fisheries in the Region, and learned with interest of initial trials in the Cook Islands. The Premier of the Cook Islands would report in six months how the scheme was progressing.

Education

The meeting considered the relevance of a Western academic-oriented education to meet the needs of the Island Territories in their development, and discussed ways in which the University of the South Pacific could be influenced to take account of traditional values and adapt curricula to the requirements of life in the Islands. The importance of technical training to develop the needs of the region was emphasised, and the advantages of doing this within the region were recognised. While it was necessary to find solutions to these problems, the meeting affirmed their strong and continuing support for the University of the South Pacific.

Telecommunications

The Forum discussed the possibility of improving telecommunications facilities in the South Pacific with a view to catering, in particular, for the needs of the smaller Islands. It was agreed that Australia and New Zealand would undertake a preliminary study of this matter for future consideration and that Australia should present the views put forward in the Forum at the forthcoming Telecommunications Meeting in Sydney.

National Parks

The Island leaders heard about conservation of national parks, for historical, recreational and tourist purposes and welcomed the offer of the New Zealand Government to assist with technical advice and training.

Regional Disaster Fund

It was agreed that the establishment of a Regional Disaster Fund would mean that some relief should be available immediately; it would show that the region was prepared to help itself and show an awareness of the close ties binding the Pacific countries. The establishment of such a fund was agreed in principle and detailed proposals would be brought forward at the next meeting by the President of Nauru.
Joint Diplomatic Representation

Considering the expense of foreign representation the Island leaders agreed that there would be advantages in joint representation where appropriate, and that those interested could pursue the matter with each other.

Regional Cooperation

The Forum noted with satisfaction the growing strength of regional cooperation in the area through the work of such bodies as PIPA. While reaffirming their support for the South Pacific Commission, representatives expressed the hope that its procedures and activities would be modified and improved to suit present day conditions. It was agreed that it would be useful to have a catalogue and analysis of the activities of all the organisations serving the region and Australia undertook to prepare a paper and circulate members on this subject. Meanwhile it was agreed that the Forum had significantly advanced regional awareness and cooperation, and had produced positive proposals for further joint action.

Future Meetings

Recognising the value of the frank and informal inter-change of views and the opportunity for planning for future regional development afforded by the South Pacific Forum, the meeting said they would like to see its continuation on an annual basis. It was considered premature to institute a formalised arrangement, although this could emerge in due course as and when the need for it became apparent. The matter would be reconsidered at the next meeting. It was agreed that Australia should be invited to host the next meeting of the Pacific Forum.

The Island leaders agreed that as countries of the Pacific attain nationhood it would be open to them to join the Forum.

Appreciation

The Island leaders expressed their warm appreciation of New Zealand’s kind offer to host the meeting, and for all the excellent arrangements and hospitality provided for delegations by the Government of New Zealand.

7 August 1971
Annex 2

Pacific Cooperation
Voices of the Region

The Eminent Persons’ Group Review of the Pacific Islands Forum, April 2004

Appendices

1. Review personnel

(a) Eminent Persons’ Group members

- **Chair: Sir Julius Chan** (Papua New Guinea). Sir Julius is a former Prime Minister of Papua New Guinea.
- **Bob Cotton** (Australia). Until mid-2003 Mr Cotton was Australia’s High Commissioner to New Zealand. He has recently acted as a special envoy to Papua New Guinea.
- **Dr Langi Kavaliku** (Tonga). Dr Kavaliku is pro-Chancellor of the University of the South Pacific and a former Deputy Prime Minister of Tonga.
- **Teburoro Tito** (Kiribati). Mr Tito is a former President of Kiribati and former Chair of the Pacific Islands Forum.
- **Maiava Iulai Toma** (Samoa). Mr Toma is Samoa’s current Ombudsman and was previously Samoa’s Secretary to Government and Ambassador to the United Nations. He led the Forum Observer Group to the last general election in Solomon Islands.

(b) Reflection Group members

- **Chair: Prime Minister Rt Hon Helen Clark.**
- **Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Hon Phil Goff.**
- **Facilitator: Michael Powles:** Former New Zealand diplomat.
- **Emele Duituturaga:** CEO, Ministry for Women, Social Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, Fiji.
- **Rae Julian:** Executive Director, New Zealand Council for International Development.
- **Luamanuvao Winnie Laban, MP:** Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Development Assistance and Trade), New Zealand Parliament.
- **Richard Mann:** Manager, Planning Unit, Secretariat of the Pacific Community.
- **Hon Fiame Naomi Mata’afa:** Minister of Education, Samoa.
- **Resio Moses:** Senator, Federated States of Micronesia.
- **Dr S K Rao:** Former Director of Strategic Planning, Commonwealth Secretariat.
c) Assistants to the EPG

- **H E John Goodman**: New Zealand High Commissioner, Kiribati. Assistant to Mr Cotton.
- **Jeremy Milne**: New Zealand Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Assistant to Maiava Toma.
- **John Mills**: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Assistant to Mr Tito.
- **Don Stewart**: New Zealand Department of Conservation. Assistant to Dr Kavaliku.

(d) Support for the EPG

- Project director: **Rene Wilson**, Director, Pacific Division, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Project coordinator: **Paul Willis**, Deputy Director, Pacific Division, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Policy and logistics: **Nicola Ngawati**, Policy Officer, Pacific Division, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Travel programmes: **Shirley Munro-Holmes**, Administrative Officer, Pacific Division, New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
- Writer: **Jonathan Schwass**.
- Other support provided by New Zealand diplomatic missions.
**KEY TASK FORCE MEMBERS**

| AUSTRALIA          | Mr Keith Scott  
|                   | Director Pacific Regional Section, DFAT  
|                   | Mr Chris Tinning  
|                   | Director  
|                   | Pacific Governance Section, AusAID, Canberra  
| COOK ISLANDS      | Mr Carl Hunter  
|                   | Director, Pacific Division  
|                   | Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Immigration  
| FSM               | HE Mr Kodaro Gallen  
|                   | Ambassador to Fiji  
| FIJI              | Mrs Litia Mawi  
|                   | Acting Deputy Secretary, International Economic Affairs  
|                   | Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
|                   | Ms Anju D Keethanth  
|                   | Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
| KIRIBATI          | Mrs Makurita Baaro  
|                   | (686)21 183  
|                   | Secretary to Cabinet  
|                   | Office of the Beretitenti  
| NAURU             | HE Dr Ludwig Keke  
|                   | High Commissioner  
| NEW ZEALAND       | Ms Heather Riddell  
|                   | Director  
|                   | Pacific Division – Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
|                   | Mr Niels Holm  
|                   | Deputy Director  
|                   | Pacific Division – Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
|                   | Niels.holm@mfat.govt.nz"  
|                   | Dr Richard Kay  
|                   | Second Secretary (Regional)  
|                   | NZ High Commission, Suva  
| NIUE              | To be advised  

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>PALAU</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNG</td>
<td>Mr Leonard Louma (Leader)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff &amp; Special Advisor on International Affairs to Prime Minister</td>
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<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr Peter Eafeare</td>
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<td>Director General International Relations</td>
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<td>Department of the Prime Minister &amp; National Executive Council</td>
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<td>RMI</td>
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<td>SAMOA</td>
<td>Mr Aiono Mose Sua</td>
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<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>Mr Terry Toomata</td>
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<td>Assistant Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<td>SOLOMON ISLANDS</td>
<td>Mr Barnabas Anga</td>
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<td>Permanent Secretary</td>
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<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Relations</td>
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<td>TONGA</td>
<td>Mr Va’inga Tone</td>
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<td>Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>TUVALU</td>
<td>HE Mr Taukelina Finikaso</td>
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<td>High Commissioner</td>
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<td>VANUATU</td>
<td>Mr Jean Sese</td>
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### CROP Agencies

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<tr>
<td>Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA)</td>
<td>Mr Feleti Teo</td>
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<td>Director Forum Fisheries Agency</td>
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<td>Mr Steve Dunn</td>
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<td>Deputy Director Forum Fisheries Agency</td>
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<td>Fiji School of Medicine (FSchM)</td>
<td>Dr Eddie McCaig</td>
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<td>Acting Dean Fiji School of Medicine</td>
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<td>Pacific Islands Development Program (PIDP)</td>
<td>Dr Sitiveni Halapua</td>
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<td>Director Pacific Islands Development Program</td>
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<td>East-West Center</td>
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<td>Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS)</td>
<td>Mr Greg Urwin</td>
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<td>Secretary General Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mr Iosefa Maeva</td>
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<td>Deputy Secretary General Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat</td>
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<td>Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC)</td>
<td>Ms Lourdes Pangelinan</td>
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<td>Director-General Secretariat of the Pacific Community</td>
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<td>Dr Jimmie Rodgers</td>
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<td>Deputy Director-General Secretariat of the Pacific Community</td>
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<td>South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC)</td>
<td>Ms Cristelle Pratt</td>
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<td>Director SOPAC Technical Secretariat</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr Russell Howorth,</td>
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<td>Deputy Director SOPAC Technical Secretariat</td>
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<td>South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment (SPBEA)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dr Visesio Pongi</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Director South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment</td>
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<td>South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP)</td>
<td>Mr Asterio Takesy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Director SPREP</td>
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| South Pacific Tourism Organisation (SPTO) | Mr Lisiate ‘Akolo  
Chief Executive  
South Pacific Tourism Organisation |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                       | Mr Ross Hopkins  
Technical Adviser |
| University of the South Pacific (USP)  | Prof Anthony Tarr  
Vice-Chancellor  
University of the South Pacific |
|                                       | Ms Esther Williams  
Pro Vice-Chancellor  
University of the South Pacific |
Annex 3

AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE
PACIFIC ISLANDS FORUM

The Governments of Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu;

Believing the Pacific region can, should and will be a region of peace, harmony, security and economic prosperity, whose people can all lead free and worthwhile lives;

Treasuring the diversity of the Pacific and seeking a future in which its cultures, traditions and religious beliefs are valued, honoured and developed;

Seeking a Pacific region that is respected for the quality of its governance, the sustainable management of its resources, the full observance of democratic values, and for its defence and promotion of human rights;

Determined to work in partnership with each other and with others beyond our region to achieve our shared goals of economic growth, sustainable development, good governance and security;

Desiring to further these goals through the strengthening and deepening of links between countries of the region including through the development and implementation of the Pacific Plan;

Wishing formally to establish the Pacific Islands Forum as an international organisation in its own right, and better to provide for its purpose and operation;
Affirming the principle of the equality of all its members;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I
The Pacific Islands Forum

1. The Pacific Islands Forum (hereinafter called “the Forum”) is hereby established as an international organisation.

2. The Forum comprises Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Samoa and Tonga, being founding members of the Forum, together with the Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Vanuatu; and such other states as may be admitted to Forum membership with the approval of the Forum Leaders and in accordance with Article XI.

3. Territories in the Pacific islands region may be admitted to associate membership of the Forum, if a request for associate membership is approved by the Forum Leaders. The criteria for associate membership, and the nature and extent of the rights and obligations of such members, shall be determined by the Forum Leaders from time to time.

4. The Forum Leaders may as they see fit invite other territories, and intergovernmental organisations whose membership includes a significant number of Forum members, to be Forum observers. The entitlements of observers shall be determined by the Forum Leaders from time to time.
ARTICLE II

Purpose

The purpose of the Forum is to strengthen regional cooperation and integration, including through the pooling of regional resources of governance and the alignment of policies, in order to further Forum members’ shared goals of economic growth, sustainable development, good governance, and security.

ARTICLE III

The Forum Leaders’ Meeting

1. The preeminent decision-making body of the Forum shall be the Forum Leaders’ Meeting.

2. The Forum Leaders’ Meeting shall be held annually. The Forum Leaders shall appoint one of their number to be Chair at each annual Meeting (hereinafter called “the Forum Chair”) who shall hold the position of Forum Chair until the next annual Meeting. The venue, agenda and procedures for the Forum Leaders’ Meeting shall be as determined by the Forum Leaders from time to time.

3. In addition to the annual Forum Leaders’ Meeting, the Forum Leaders may convene special meetings at any time as they see fit.
ARTICLE IV
Establishment of the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat

1. The Forum shall have a secretariat to be known as the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (hereinafter called "the Secretariat").

2. The headquarters of the Secretariat shall be located in Suva.

ARTICLE V
Pacific Islands Forum Officials' Committee

1. The Forum shall have an executive committee to be known as the Pacific Islands Forum Officials' Committee (hereinafter called "the Committee").

2. The Committee shall comprise one representative of each member of the Forum.

3. The powers and functions of the Committee shall be to give general policy directions to the Secretariat and to make reports and recommendations to the Forum Leaders. In particular the Committee shall:

   (a) approve, reject or amend the annual work programme and budget of the Secretariat and any interim budget submitted by the Secretariat;

   (b) receive, examine and comment on the Annual Report of the Secretary General on the operation of the Secretariat, and

   (c) determine the staff establishment and the remuneration policy of the Secretariat, and approve its Staff Regulations.
4. The Committee shall meet each year prior to the Forum Leaders’ Meeting, and at such other times as may be required.

5. The Committee Chair shall rotate annually in alphabetical order of members or as otherwise decided by the Committee.

6. The Secretary General, in consultation with and at the request of the Committee Chair, shall convene meetings of the Committee.

7. All decisions of the Committee shall be taken by consensus, wherever possible, or if necessary by a majority of the representatives present and voting, except as provided for in Article IX(2) of this Agreement.

8. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure.

ARTICLE VI
Appointment of Secretariat Staff

1. The Secretariat staff (hereinafter called “the Staff”) shall consist of a Secretary General and such other staff as may be appointed by the Secretary General in accordance with this Article.

2. The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Forum Leaders under such conditions as the Forum Leaders may determine. If for any reason the post of Secretary General is vacant, a Deputy Secretary General shall be directed by the Forum Chair to carry out the functions of the Secretary General on an interim basis until the position is filled.
3. The Secretary General shall appoint all other staff in accordance with the Staff Regulations, the staff establishment and the remuneration policy determined by the Committee.

4. The Secretary General shall be appointed for a term of three years and shall be eligible for reappointment. The Secretary General’s appointment shall not, however, exceed two consecutive terms.

ARTICLE VII
Functions of the Secretary General

1. The Secretary General shall act as secretary to the Forum Leaders’ Meeting. The Secretary General shall also act as secretary to Ministerial meetings, the Committee and such other councils, committees or working groups as may be established by the Forum.

2. The Secretary General shall be responsible, in close consultation with the Forum Chair and within the limits set by the Forum Leaders from time to time, for setting Forum Leaders’ Meeting agendas and coordinating responses by members to regional events, particularly crises. The Secretary General shall also perform other functions and duties as directed by the Forum Leaders. Where appropriate the Secretary General shall act on the advice of and in consultation with the Committee and other bodies referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. The Secretary General shall be responsible for the management of the Secretariat.
ARTICLE VIII
Functions of the Secretariat

1. The functions of the Secretariat shall be carried out by the Staff.

2. The primary roles of the Secretariat are to provide policy advice, coordination and assistance in implementing the decisions of the Forum Leaders.

3. Subject to the direction of the Forum Leaders and the Committee, the Secretariat shall also:

   (a) build upon the important basis for regional cooperation established by the Forum by working to further strengthen and deepen links between the countries of the region in accordance with the purpose of the Forum, including through the ongoing development and implementation of the Pacific Plan;

   (b) promote the identity and activities of the Forum;

   (c) work to advance partnerships between the Forum and its stakeholders within and beyond the Pacific region; and

   (d) undertake such other activities as are necessary for the attainment of the Forum’s purpose.

4. The Secretariat shall work in cooperation and coordination with other intergovernmental organisations in the Pacific region, with the aim of ensuring that the most effective use is made of regional resources.
5. In the performance of its functions the Secretariat shall have regard to the particular needs of the most vulnerable Forum members, communities and peoples, including the smaller island states, and shall embrace the cultural diversity of the region with tolerance and respect.

6. The Secretariat shall provide support services to Forum Leaders' Meetings, Ministerial meetings, and meetings of the Committee and such other councils, committees or working groups as may be established by the Forum.

7. The Secretariat shall communicate with members through their Ministries of Foreign Affairs, or such other contact points as may be nominated by the respective members.

**ARTICLE IX**

**Budget**

1. The annual budget of the Forum shall be prepared by the Secretary General for consideration and approval by the Committee.

2. The costs of operating the Forum shall be borne by the members in the shares determined by the Committee by consensus from time to time, subject to review by the Forum Leaders at their discretion.

3. In advance of the Committee's approval of the budget, the Secretary General shall be entitled to authorise expenditure up to a limit not exceeding one third of the previous year's actual expenditure.
ARTICLE X
Legal Status, Privileges and Immunities

1. The Forum shall enjoy the legal capacity of a body corporate within the jurisdictions of its members. The Secretary General shall be empowered to enter into legal undertakings on behalf of the Forum.

2. The Forum shall enjoy in the territory of each member such privileges and immunities as the member and the Forum Secretariat may agree are necessary to enable the Forum to fulfil its purpose and carry out its functions. Members shall take all necessary measures to confer such privileges and immunities upon the Forum in accordance with their domestic legislation. Where appropriate, such privileges and immunities may be defined in separate agreements between the Forum and its members.

3. When requested by the Forum Secretariat, members shall take measures in accordance with their domestic laws to afford all appropriate immunities to representatives attending Forum Leaders' Meetings, Ministerial meetings, and meetings of the Committee or of other Forum councils and committees, including immunity from suit and legal process and inviolability in respect of their official documents.
ARTICLE XI
Signature, Ratification, Accession, Entry into Force
and Denunciation

1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by the Governments of Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.

2. The signature of a member shall not be taken as extending the rights and obligations set forth in this Agreement to the territories for whose international relations the member is responsible.

3. The original of this Agreement shall be deposited with the Government of the Republic of the Fiji Islands which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all members and the Secretary General and shall register the Agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the day on which the instrument of ratification of the last to ratify of the Governments referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article has been received by the depositary.

5. The depositary shall inform members of the entry into force of this Agreement pursuant to this Article.

6. Other states may, with the approval of the Forum, accede to this Agreement. By acceding to this Agreement, a state becomes a member of the Forum.
7. For a state admitted to membership in the Forum in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Article, the Agreement shall enter into force on the date of receipt by the depositary of that state's instrument of accession, or the date of the entry into force of the Agreement generally in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, whichever is the later.

8. Any member may denounce this Agreement by notification addressed to the depositary. Such notification shall be accompanied by a written statement of the reasons for its denunciation, which shall be transmitted by the depositary to all other members. The denunciation shall take effect one year after the day upon which the depositary has received the notification, unless the notification is earlier withdrawn.

**ARTICLE XII**

**Amendments**

1. The text of any amendment proposed by a member shall be submitted to the depositary which shall transmit it to all other members.

2. If the proposal to amend the Agreement receives the support of at least two other members, the depositary shall notify the Secretary General who shall include the proposal on the agenda for the next meeting of the Committee. The Committee shall make a recommendation to the Forum Leaders.

3. If the proposal receives the unanimous approval of the Forum Leaders, the amendment so adopted shall enter into force three months after the date of such approval, or on the day on which the instrument of ratification of the last of those members requiring ratification has been received by the depositary, whichever is the later.
ARTICLE XIII
Termination of Prior Agreement and Savings

This Agreement, upon entry into force, shall terminate and replace the Agreement Establishing the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat done at Tarawa on 30 October 2000, provided that upon such termination and replacement, all rights and obligations validly acquired or incurred under the provisions of the abovenamed Agreement shall be deemed to have been so acquired or incurred under the provisions of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Opened for signature at Port Moresby this 27th day of October, 2005.

For the Government of Australia: .............................................................

this 27th day of October, 2005

For the Government of the Cook Islands: ......................................

this 27th day of October, 2005
For the Government of the Federated States of Micronesia:

[Signature]

this 27th day of October, 200__

For the Government of the Republic of the Fiji Islands:

[Signature]

this 27th day of October, 200__

For the Government of Kiribati:

[Signature]

this 27th day of October, 200__

For the Government of the Republic of Nauru:

[Signature]

this 27th day of October, 200__
For the Government of New Zealand:

..............................................................

this ........ day of ................., 200. .

For the Government of Niue:

..............................................................

this 27th. day of October, 200. 

For the Government of Palau:

..............................................................

this 27th day of October, 200.5

For the Government of Papua New Guinea:

..............................................................

this 27th. day of October, 200.5
For the Government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands:

this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_, 200\_\_

For the Government of Samoa:

this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_, 200\_\_

For the Government of Solomon Islands:

this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_, 200\_\_

For the Government of Tonga:

this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_\_, 200\_\_
For the Government of Tuvalu:

this ........ day of ...................., 200.

For the Government of Vanuatu:

this 24th day of November, 2005
AGREEMENT BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA and HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE DOMINION OF
NEW ZEALAND (herein after referred to as "the two Governments") represented as follows:-

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA by-

The Right Honourable John Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia and Minister for Defence,

The Honourable Francis Michael Forde, Minister for the Army,

The Honourable Joseph Benedict Chifley, Treasurer and Minister for Post-War Reconstruction,

The Right Honourable Herbert Vere Evatt, KC, LLD, Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs,

The Honourable John Albert Beasley, Minister for Supply and Shipping,

The Honourable Norman John Oswald Makin, Minister for the Navy and Minister for Munitions,

The Honourable Arthur Samuel Drakeford, Minister for Air and Minister for Civil Aviation,

The Honourable John Johnstone Dedman, Minister for War Organisation of Industry,

The Honourable Edward John Ward, Minister for Transport and Minister for External Territories, and
The Honourable Thomas George de Largie D'Alton, High Commissioner for Australia in New Zealand, and

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINION OF NEW ZEALAND by-

The Right Honourable Peter Fraser, Prime Minister of New Zealand, Minister of External Affairs and Minister of Island Territories,

The Honourable Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence and Minister in Charge of Civil Aviation,

The Honourable Patrick Charles Webb, Postmaster-General and Minister of Labour, and

Carl August Berendsen, Esq., CMG, High Commissioner for New Zealand in Australia:

HAVING MET in Conference at Canberra from 17 to 21 January 1944,

AND DESIRING to maintain and strengthen the close and cordial relations between the two Governments

DO HEREBY ENTER into this Agreement.

DEFINITION OF OBJECTIVES OF AUSTRALIAN-NEW ZEALAND COOPERATION

1. The two Governments agree that, as a preliminary, provision shall be made for fuller exchange of information regarding both the views of each Government and the facts in the possession of either bearing on matters of common interest.

2. The two Governments give mutual assurances that, on matters which appear to be of common concern, each Government will, so far as possible, be made acquainted with the mind of the other before views are expressed elsewhere by either.

3. In furtherance of the above provisions with respect to exchange of views and information, the two Governments agree that there shall be the maximum degree of unity in the presentation, elsewhere, of the views of the two countries.

4. The two Governments agree to adopt an expeditious and continuous means of consultation by which each party will obtain directly the opinions of the other.

5. The two Governments agree to act together in matters of common concern in the South West and South Pacific areas.

6. So far as compatible with the existence of separate military commands, the two Governments agree to co-ordinate their efforts for the purpose of prosecuting the war to a successful conclusion.

ARMISTICE AND SUBSEQUENT ARRANGEMENTS
7. The two Governments declare that they have vital interests in all preparations for any armistice ending the present hostilities or any part thereof and also in arrangements subsequent to any such armistice, and agree that their interests should be protected by representation at the highest level on all armistice planning and executive bodies.

8. The two Governments are in agreement that the final peace settlement should be made in respect of all our enemies after hostilities with all of them are concluded.

9. Subject to the last two preceding clauses, the two Governments will seek agreement with each other on the terms of any armistice to be concluded.

10. The two Governments declare that they should actively participate in any Armistice Commission to be set up.

11. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia shall set up in Australia, and His Majesty's Government in the Dominion of New Zealand shall set up in New Zealand, Armistice and Post Hostilities Planning Committees, and shall arrange for the work of those Committees to be co-ordinated in order to give effect to the views of the respective Governments.

12. The two Governments will collaborate generally with regard to the location of machinery set up under international organisations, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and, in particular, with regard to the location of the Far Eastern Committee of that administration.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE

13. The two Governments agree that, within the framework of a general system of world security, a regional zone of defence comprising the South West and South Pacific areas shall be established and that this zone should be based on Australia and New Zealand, stretching through the arc of islands North and North East of Australia, to Western Samoa and the Cook Islands.

14. The two Governments regard it as a matter of cardinal importance that they should both be associated, not only in the membership, but also in the planning and establishment, of the general international organisation referred to in the Moscow Declaration of October 1943, which organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States and open to membership by all such States, large or small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

15. Pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, the two Governments hereby declare their vital interest in the action on behalf of the community of Nations contemplated in Article V of the Moscow Declaration of October 1943. For that purpose it is agreed that it would be proper for Australia and New Zealand to assume full responsibility for policing or sharing in policing such areas in the South West and South Pacific as may from time to time be agreed upon.
16. The two Governments accept as a recognised principle of international practice that the construction and use, in time of war, by any Power, of naval, military or air installations, in any territory under the sovereignty or control of another Power, does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities.

CIVIL AVIATION

17. The two Governments agree that the regulation of all air transport services should be subject to the terms of a convention which will supersede the Convention relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation.

18. The two Governments declare that the air services using the international air trunk routes should be operated by an International Air Transport Authority.

19. The two Governments support the principles that-

(a) full control of the international air trunk routes and the ownership of all aircraft and ancillary equipment should be vested in the International Air Transport Authority; and

(b) the international air trunk routes should themselves be specified in the international agreement referred to in the next succeeding clause.

20. The two Governments agree that the creation of the International Air Transport Authority should be effected by an international agreement.

21. Within the framework of the system set up under any such international agreement the two Governments support-

(a) the right of each country to conduct all air transport services within its own national jurisdiction, including its own contiguous territories, subject only to agreed international requirements regarding safety, facilities, landing and transit rights for international services and exchange of mails;

(b) the right of Australia and New Zealand to utilise to the fullest extent their productive capacity in respect of aircraft and raw materials for the production of aircraft; and

(c) the right of Australia and New Zealand to use a fair proportion of their own personnel, agencies and materials in operating and maintaining international air trunk routes.

22. In the event of failure to obtain a satisfactory international agreement to establish and govern the use of international air trunk routes, the two Governments will support a system of air trunk routes controlled and operated by Governments of the British Commonwealth of Nations under government ownership.
23. The two Governments will act jointly in support of the above-mentioned principles with respect to civil aviation, and each will inform the other of its existing interests and commitments as a basis of advancing the policy herein agreed upon.

DEPENDENCIES AND TERRITORIES

24. Following the procedure adopted at the Conference which has just concluded, the two Governments will regularly exchange information and views in regard to all developments in or affecting the islands of the Pacific.

25. The two Governments take note of the intention of the Australian Government to resume administration at the earliest possible moment of those parts of its territories which have not yet been re-occupied.

26. The two Governments declare that the interim administration and ultimate disposal of enemy territories in the Pacific is of vital importance to Australia and New Zealand and that any such disposal should be effected only with their agreement and as part of a general Pacific settlement.

27. The two Governments declare that no change in the sovereignty or system of control of any of the islands of the Pacific should be effected except as a result of an agreement to which they are parties or in the terms of which they have both concurred.

WELFARE AND ADVANCEMENT OF NATIVE PEOPLES OF THE PACIFIC

28. The two Governments declare that, in applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter[1] to the Pacific, the doctrine of "trusteeship" (already applicable in the case of the mandated territories of which the two Governments are mandatory powers) is applicable in broad principle to all colonial territories in the Pacific and elsewhere, and that the main purpose of the trust is the welfare of the native peoples and their social, economic and political development.

29. The two Governments agree that the future of the various territories of the Pacific and the welfare of their inhabitants cannot be successfully promoted without a greater measure of collaboration between the numerous authorities concerned in their control, and that such collaboration is particularly desirable in regard to health services and communications, matters of native education, anthropological investigation, assistance in native production and material development generally.

30. The two Governments agree to promote the establishment, at the earliest possible date, of a regional organisation with advisory powers, which could be called the South Seas Regional Commission, and on which, in addition to representatives of Australia and New Zealand, there might be accredited representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, and of the French Committee of National Liberation.

31. The two Governments agree that it shall be the function of such South Seas Regional Commission as may be established to secure a common policy on social,
economic and political development directed towards the advancement and well-being of the native peoples themselves, and that in particular the Commission shall—

(a) recommend arrangements for the participation of natives in administration in increasing measure with a view to promoting the ultimate attainment of self-government in the form most suited to the circumstances of the native peoples concerned;

(b) recommend arrangements for material development including production, finance, communications and marketing;

(c) recommend arrangements for co-ordination of health and medical services and education;

(d) recommend arrangements for maintenance and improvement of standards of native welfare in regard to labour conditions and social services;

(e) recommend arrangements for collaboration in economic, social, medical and anthropological research; and

(f) make and publish periodical reviews of progress towards the development of self-governing institutions in the islands of the Pacific and in the improvement of standards of living, conditions of work, education, health and general welfare.

MIGRATION

32. In the peace settlement or other negotiations the two Governments will accord one another full support in maintaining the accepted principle that every government has the right to control immigration and emigration in regard to all territories within its jurisdiction.

33. The two Governments will collaborate, exchange full information and render full assistance to one another in all matters concerning migration to their respective territories.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE RELATING TO THE SOUTH WEST AND SOUTH PACIFIC

34. The two Governments agree that, as soon as practicable, there should be a frank exchange of views on the problems of security, post-war development and native welfare between properly accredited representatives of the governments with existing territorial interests in the South West Pacific area or in the South Pacific area, or in both, namely, in addition to the two Governments, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the Government of the United States of America, the Government of the Netherlands, the French Committee of National Liberation and the Government of Portugal, and His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia should take the necessary steps to call a conference of the governments concerned.

PERMANENT MACHINERY FOR COLLABORATION AND COOPERATION BETWEEN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
35. The two Governments agree that-

(a) their co-operation for defence should be developed by:

(i) continuous consultation in all defence matters of mutual interest;

(ii) the organization, equipment, training and exercising of the armed forces under a common doctrine;

(iii) joint planning;

(iv) interchange of staff; and

(v) the co-ordination of policy for the production of munitions, aircraft and supply items, and for shipping, to ensure the greatest possible degree of mutual aid consistent with the maintenance of the policy of self-sufficiency in local production;

(b) collaboration in external policy on all matters affecting the peace, welfare and good government of the Pacific should be secured through the exchange of information and frequent ministerial consultation;

(c) the development of commerce between Australia and New Zealand and their industrial development should be pursued by consultation and, in agreed cases, by joint planning;

(d) there should be co-operation in achieving full employment in Australia and New Zealand and the highest standards of social security both within their borders and throughout the islands of the Pacific and other territories for which they may jointly or severally be wholly or partly responsible; and

(e) there should be co-operation in encouraging missionary work and all other activities directed towards the improvement of the welfare of the native peoples in the islands and territories of the Pacific.

36. The two Governments declare their desire to have the adherence to the objectives set out in the last preceding clause of any other government having or controlling territories in the Pacific.

37. The two Governments agree that the methods to be used for carrying out the provisions of clause 35 of this Agreement and of other provisions of this Agreement shall be consultation, exchange of information, and, where applicable, joint planning. They further agree that such methods shall include-

(a) conferences of Ministers of State to be held alternately in Canberra and Wellington, it being the aim of the two Governments that these conferences be held at least twice a year;

(b) conferences of departmental officers and technical experts;
(c) meetings of standing inter-governmental committees on such subjects as are agreed to by the two Governments;

(d) the fullest use of the status and functions of the High Commissioner of the Commonwealth of Australia in New Zealand and of the High Commissioner of the Dominion of New Zealand in Australia;

(e) regular exchange of information;

(f) exchange of officers; and

(g) the development of institutions in either country serving the common purposes of both.

PERMANENT SECRETARIAT

38. In order to ensure continuous collaboration on the lines set out in this Agreement and to facilitate the carrying out of the duties and functions involved, the two Governments agree that a permanent Secretariat shall be established in Australia and in New Zealand.

39. The Secretariat shall be known as the Australian-New Zealand Affairs Secretariat and shall consist of a Secretariat of the like name to be set up in Australia and a Secretariat of the like name to be set up in New Zealand, each under the control of the Ministry of External Affairs in the country concerned.

40. The functions of the Secretariat shall be-

(a) to take the initiative in ensuring that effect is given to the provisions of this Agreement;

(b) to make arrangements as the occasion arises for the holding of conferences or meetings;

(c) to carry out the directions of those conferences in regard to further consultation, exchange of information or the examination of particular questions;

(d) to co-ordinate all forms of collaboration between the two Governments;

(e) to raise for joint discussion and action such other matters as may seem from day to day to require attention by the two Governments; and

(f) generally to provide for more frequent and regular exchanges of information and views, those exchanges between the two Governments to take place normally through the respective High Commissioners.

41. His Majesty's Government in the Commonwealth of Australia and His Majesty's Government in the Dominion of New Zealand each shall nominate an officer or officers from the staff of their respective High Commissioners to act in closest
collaboration with the Secretariat in which they shall be accorded full access to all relevant sources of information.

42. In each country the Minister of State for External Affairs and the resident High Commissioner shall have joint responsibility for the effective functioning of the Secretariat.

**RATIFICATION AND TITLE OF AGREEMENT**

43. This Agreement is subject to ratification by the respective Governments and shall come into force as soon as both Governments have ratified the Agreement and have notified each other accordingly.\[2\] It is intended that such notification will take place as soon as possible after the signing of this Agreement.

44. This Agreement shall be known as the Australian-\(\textit{New Zealand}\) Agreement 1944.

DATED this twenty-first day of January, One thousand nine hundred and forty-four.

SIGNED ON BEHALF OF HIS SIGNED ON BEHALF OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA: DOMINION OF \(\textit{NEW ZEALAND}\):

[Signed:] [Signed:]

JOHN CURTIN PETER FRASER
F M FORDE F JONES
J B CHIFLEY P C WEBB
H V EVATT C A BERENDSEN
JOHN A BEASLEY
NORMAN J C MAKIN
ARTHUR S DRAKEFORD
JOHN J DEDMAN
ED J WARD
TOM D'ALTON

\[1\] Current Notes 1945 p. 93 and 1947 p. 261; UKTS 1942 No. 5 (Cmd. 6388); Cmd. 6321; SP 144 p. 1070; EAS 236; LNTS 204 p. 381; CTS 1942 No. 1.
The Agreement entered into force 21 June 1944, upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification.
AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE SOUTH PACIFIC COMMISSION

THE GOVERNMENTS of Australia, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, (hereinafter referred to as "the participating Governments"),

DESIRING to encourage and strengthen international cooperation in promoting the economic and social welfare and advancement of the peoples of the non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific region administered by them,

HAVE, through their duly authorised representatives met together in Canberra, made an Agreement in the following terms:

Article I

Establishment of the Commission

1. There is hereby established the South Pacific Commission (hereinafter referred to as "the Commission").

Article II

Territorial scope
2. The territorial scope of the Commission shall comprise all those non-self-governing territories in the Pacific Ocean which are administered by the participating Governments and which lie wholly or in part south of the Equator and east from and including Netherlands New Guinea.

3. The territorial scope of the Commission may be altered by agreement of all the participating Governments.

Article III

Composition of the Commission

4. The Commission shall consist of not more than twelve Commissioners. Each participating Government may appoint two Commissioners and shall designate one of them as its senior Commissioner.

5. Each participating Government may appoint such alternates and advisers to its Commissioners as it considers desirable.

Article IV

Powers and functions

6. The Commission shall be a consultative and advisory body to the participating Governments in matters affecting the economic and social development of the non-self-governing territories within the scope of the Commission and the welfare and advancement of their peoples. To this end, the Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

(a) to study, formulate and recommend measures for the development of, and where necessary the coordination of services affecting, the economic and social rights and welfare of the inhabitants of the territories within the scope of the Commission, particularly in respect of agriculture (including animal husbandry), communications, transport, fisheries, forestry, industry, labour, marketing, production, trade and finance, public works, education, health, housing and social welfare;

(b) to provide for and facilitate research in technical, scientific, economic and social fields in the territories within the scope of the Commission and to ensure the maximum cooperation and coordination of the activities of research bodies;

(c) to make recommendations for the coordination of local projects in any of the fields mentioned in the previous subparagraphs which have regional significance and for the provision of technological assistance from a wider field not otherwise available to a territorial administration;

(d) to provide technical assistance, advice and information (including statistical and other material) for the participating Governments;
(e) to promote cooperation with non-participating Governments and with non-
governmental organisations of a public or quasi-public character having common
interests in the area, in matters within the competence of the Commission;

(f) to address inquiries to the participating Governments on matters within its
competence;

(g) to make recommendations with regard to the establishment and activities of
auxiliary and subsidiary bodies.

7. The Commission may discharge such other functions as may be agreed upon by the
participating Governments.

8. The Commission may make such administrative arrangements as may be necessary
for the exercise of its powers and the discharge of its functions.

9. With a view to facilitating the inauguration of the work of the Commission in
matters immediately affecting the economic and social welfare of the local inhabitants
of the territories within the scope of the Commission, the Commission shall give early
consideration to the projects set forth in the resolution (appended to this Agreement)
relating to important immediate projects adopted by the South Seas Conference at
Canberra, Australia, on 6 February 1947.

10. The participating Governments undertake to secure such legislative and
administrative provision as may be required to ensure that the Commission will be
recognised in their territories as possessing such legal capacity and as being entitled to
such privileges and immunities (including the inviolability of its premises and
archives) as are necessary for the independent exercise of its powers and discharge of
its functions.

Article V

Procedure of the Commission

11. Irrespective of the place of meeting, each senior Commissioner shall preside over
sessions of the Commission in rotation, according to the English alphabetical order of
the participating Governments.

12. The Commission may meet at such times and in such places as it may determine.
It shall hold two regular sessions in each year, and such further sessions as it may
decide.

13. At a meeting of the Commission two-thirds of all the senior Commissioners shall
constitute a quorum.

14. The decisions of the Commission shall be taken in accordance with the following
rules:

(a) senior Commissioners only shall be entitled to vote;
(b) procedural matters shall be decided by a majority of the senior Commissioners present and voting;

(c) decisions on budgetary or financial matters which may involve a financial contribution by the participating Governments (other than a decision to adopt the annual administrative budget of the Commission), shall require the concurring votes of all the senior Commissioners;

(d) decisions on all other matters (including a decision to adopt the annual administrative budget of the Commission) shall require the concurring votes of two-thirds of all the senior Commissioners.

15. In the absence of a senior Commissioner, his functions shall be discharged for all purposes of this Article by the other Commissioner appointed by his Government or, in the absence of both, by an alternate designated by his Government or the senior Commissioner.

16. The Commission may appoint Committees and, subject to the provisions of this Agreement, may promulgate rules of procedure and other regulations governing the operations of the Commission, of its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies and such Committees as it shall establish, and of the Secretariat and generally for the purpose of carrying into effect the terms of this Agreement.

17. The official languages of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies shall include English and French.

18. The Commission shall make to each of the participating Governments, and publish, an annual report on its activities, including those of its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies.

Article VI

Research Council

19. In view of the special importance of research for the carrying out of the purposes of the Commission, there shall be established a Research Council which shall serve as a standing advisory body auxiliary to the Commission.

Article VII

Composition of the Research Council

20. Members of the Research Council shall be appointed by the Commission on such terms and conditions as the Commission may decide.

21. (a) The Commission shall appoint, as members of the Research Council, such persons distinguished in the fields of research within the competence of the Commission as it considers necessary for the discharge of the Council's functions;
(b) Among the members of the Council so appointed there shall be a small number of persons highly qualified in the several fields of health, economic development and social development who shall devote their full time to the work of the Research Council.

22. The Research Council shall elect a Chairman from its members.

23. The Commission shall appoint a full-time official who shall direct research and be charged with the general responsibility for supervising the execution of the programme of the Research Council. He shall be, ex officio, a member and the Deputy Chairman of the Council and, subject to the directions of the Commission, shall be responsible for arranging and facilitating cooperative research, for arranging and carrying out research projects of a special nature, for collecting and disseminating information concerning research and for facilitating the exchange of experience among research workers of the area. He shall be responsible to the Secretary-General for all administrative matters connected with the work of the Research Council and of its Committees.

24. In all technical matters full-time members shall be under the direction of the Deputy Chairman of the Research Council. In all administrative matters they shall be responsible to the Secretary-General.

25. Recommendations of the Research Council in connection with research projects to be undertaken shall be first submitted to the Commission for approval.

Article VIII

Functions of the Research Council

26. The functions of the Research Council shall be:

(a) to maintain a continuous survey of research needs in the territories within the scope of the Commission and to make recommendations to the Commission on research to be undertaken;

(b) to arrange, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, for the carrying out of the research studies approved by the Commission, using existing institutions where appropriate and feasible;

(c) to coordinate the research activities of other bodies working within the field of the Commission's activities and, where possible, to avail itself of the assistance of such bodies;

(d) to appoint technical standing research committees to consider problems in particular fields of research;

(e) to appoint, with the approval of the Commission, ad hoc research committees to deal with special problems;

(f) to make to each session of the Commission a report of its activities.
Article IX

The South Pacific Conference

27. In order to associate with the work of the Commission representatives of the local inhabitants of, and of official and non-official institutions directly concerned with, the territories within the scope of the Commission, there shall be established a South Pacific Conference with advisory powers as a body auxiliary to the Commission.

Article X

Sessions of the Conference

28. A session of the South Pacific Conference shall be convoked within two years after this Agreement comes into force, and thereafter at intervals not exceeding three years.

29. Each session of the Conference shall be held in one of the territories within the scope of the Commission at a place designated by the Commission with due regard to the principle of rotation.

30. The Chairman of each session of the Conference shall be one of the Commissioners of the Government in whose territory the session is held.

31. The Secretary-General shall be responsible for the administrative arrangements of the Conference.

32. The Commission shall adopt rules of procedure for the Conferences and approve the agenda for each session of the Conference. The Secretary-General shall prepare the necessary documents for consideration by the Commission.

33. The Conference may make recommendations to the Commission on procedural questions affecting its sessions. It may also recommend to the Commission the inclusion of specific items on the agenda for the Conference.

Article XI

Composition of the Conference

34. Delegates to the Conference shall be appointed for each territory which is within the scope of the Commission and which is designated for this purpose by the Commission. The maximum number of delegates for each territory shall be determined by the Commission. In general, the representation shall be at least two delegates for each designated territory.

35. Delegates shall be selected in such a manner as to ensure the greatest possible measure of representation of the local inhabitants of the territory.

36. Delegates shall be appointed for each designated territory in accordance with its constitutional procedure.
37. The delegations for each designated territory may include alternate delegates and as many advisers as the appointing authority considers necessary.

Article XII

Functions of the Conference

38. The Conference may discuss such matters of common interest as fall within the competence of the Commission, and may make recommendations to the Commission on any such matters.

Article XIII

The Secretariat

39. The Commission shall establish a Secretariat to serve the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies.

40. The Commission shall, subject to such terms and conditions as it may prescribe, appoint a Secretary-General and a Deputy Secretary-General. They shall hold office for five years unless their appointments are earlier terminated by the Commission. They shall be eligible for re-appointment.

41. The Secretary-General shall be the chief administrative officer of the Commission and shall carry out all directions of the Commission. He shall be responsible for the functioning of the Secretariat, and shall be empowered, subject to such directions as he may receive from the Commission, to appoint and dismiss, as necessary, members of the staff of the Secretariat.

42. In the appointment of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General and the staff of the Secretariat, primary consideration shall be given to the technical qualifications and personal integrity of candidates. To the fullest extent consistent with this consideration, the staff of the Secretariat shall be appointed from the local inhabitants of the territories within the scope of the Commission and with a view to obtaining equitable national and local representation.

43. Each participating Government undertakes so far as possible under its constitutional procedure to accord to the Secretary-General, to the Deputy Secretary-General, to the full time members of the Research Council and to appropriate members of the staff of the Secretariat such privileges and immunities as may be required for the independent discharge of their functions. The Commission may make recommendations with a view to determining the details of the application of this paragraph or may propose conventions to the participating Governments for this purpose.

44. In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General, the full time members of the Research Council and the staff of the Secretariat shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Commission. They shall refrain from any action which
might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Commission.

45. Each participating Government undertakes to respect the exclusively international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General, the full time members of the Research Council, and the staff of the Secretariat, and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Article XIV

Finance

46. The Commission shall adopt an annual budget for the administrative expenses of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies, and such supplementary budgets as it may determine. The Secretary-General shall be responsible for preparing and submitting to the Commission for its consideration the annual administrative budget and such supplementary budgets as the Commission may require.

47. Except for the salaries, allowances and miscellaneous expenditures of the Commissioners and their immediate staffs, which shall be determined and paid by the respective Governments appointing them, the expenses of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies (including the expenses of delegates to the South Pacific Conference on a scale approved by the Commission) shall be a charge on the funds of the Commission.

48. There shall be established, to meet the expenses of the Commission, a fund to which each participating Government undertakes, subject to the requirements of its constitutional procedure, to contribute promptly its proportion of the estimated expenditure of the Commission, as determined in the annual administrative budget and in any supplementary budgets adopted by the Commission.

49. The expenses of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies shall be apportioned among the participating Governments in the following proportions:

Australia 30%
France 121/2%
The Netherlands 15%
New Zealand 15%
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 15%
United States of America 121/2%

Before the close of its second fiscal year, the Commission shall review the apportionment of expenses and recommend to the participating Governments such adjustments as it considers desirable. Adjustments may at any time be made by agreement of all the participating Governments.
50. The fiscal year of the Commission shall be the calendar year.

51. Subject to the directions of the Commission, the Secretary-General shall be responsible for the control of the funds of the Commission and of its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies and for all accounting and expenditure. Audited statements of accounts for each fiscal year shall be forwarded to each participating Government as soon as possible after the close of the fiscal year.

52. The Secretary-General, or an officer authorised by the Commission to act as Secretary-General pending the appointment of the Secretary-General, shall at the earliest practicable date after the coming into force of this Agreement submit to the Commission an administrative budget for the current fiscal year and any supplementary budgets which the Commission may require. The Commission shall thereupon adopt for the current fiscal year an administrative budget and such supplementary budget as it may determine.

53. Pending adoption of the first budget of the Commission, the administrative expenses of the Commission shall be met, on terms to be determined by the Commission, from an initial working fund of [sterling]40,000 sterling to which the participating Governments undertake to contribute in the proportions provided for in paragraph 49 of this Agreement.

54. The Commission may in its discretion accept for inclusion in its first budget any expenditure incurred by the Governments of Australia or New Zealand for the purpose of paragraph 64 of this Agreement. The Commission may credit any such expenditure against the contribution of the Government concerned. The aggregate of the amounts which may be so accepted and credited shall not exceed [sterling]5,000 sterling.

Article XV

Relationship with other international bodies

55. The Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies, while having no organic connection with the United Nations, shall cooperate as fully as possible with the United Nations and with appropriate specialised agencies on matters of mutual concern within the competence of the Commission.

56. The participating Governments undertake to consult with the United Nations and the appropriate specialised agencies at such times and in such manner as may be considered desirable, with a view to defining the relationship which may in future exist and to ensuring effective cooperation between the Commission, including its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies, and the appropriate organs of the United Nations and specialised agencies dealing with economic and social matters.

57. The Commission may make recommendations to the participating Governments as to the manner in which effect can best be given to the principles stated in this Article.

Article XVI
Headquarters

58. The permanent headquarters of the Commission and its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies shall be located within the territorial scope of the Commission at such place as the Commission may select. The Commission may establish branch offices and, except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, may make provision for the carrying on of any part of its work or the work of its auxiliary and subsidiary bodies at such place or places within or without the territorial scope of the Commission as it considers will most effectively achieve the objectives for which it is established. The Commission shall select the site of the permanent headquarters within six months after this Agreement comes into force. Pending the establishment of its permanent headquarters, it shall have temporary headquarters in or near Sydney, Australia.

Article XVII

Saving clause

59. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to conflict with the existing or future constitutional relations between any participating Government and its territories or in any way to affect the constitutional authority and responsibility of the territorial administrations.

Article XVIII

Alteration of agreement

60. The provisions of this Agreement may be amended by consent of all the participating Governments.

Article XIX

Withdrawal

61. After the expiration of five years from the coming into force of this Agreement a participating Government may withdraw from the Agreement on giving one year's notice to the Commission.

62. If any participating Government ceases to administer non-self-governing territories within the scope of the Commission, that Government shall so notify the Commission and shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the Agreement as from the close of the then current calendar year.

63. Notwithstanding the withdrawal of a participating Government this Agreement shall continue in force as between the other participating Governments.

Article XX

Interim provisions
64. Preliminary arrangements for the establishment of the Commission shall be undertaken jointly by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand.

Article XXI

Entry into force

65. The Governments of Australia, the French Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America shall become parties to this Agreement by:

(a) signature without reservation, or

(b) signature \textit{ad referendum} and subsequent acceptance.\footnote{1} Acceptance shall be effected by notification to the Government of Australia. The Agreement shall enter into force when all the abovementioned Governments have become parties to it.\footnote{2}

66. The Government of Australia shall notify the other abovementioned Governments of each acceptance of this Agreement, and also of the date on which the Agreement comes into force.

67. The Government of Australia shall on behalf of all the participating Governments register this Agreement with the Secretariat of the United Nations in pursuance of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

This Agreement, of which the English, French and Netherlands texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of Australia. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by the Government of Australia to the other participating Governments.

\textbf{IN WITNESS WHEREOF} the duly authorised representatives of the respective participating Governments have signed this Agreement.

\textbf{OPENED} in Canberra for signature on the sixth day of February One thousand nine hundred and forty-seven.

[Signatures not reproduced here.]

\textbf{RESOLUTION CONCERNING IMMEDIATE PROJECTS}

RESOLVED

THAT the South Seas Conference recommends that the \textbf{South Pacific Commission} on its establishment should give early consideration to the projects set forth below. The Conference does not consider that these projects are all-inclusive but considers them to be of great importance to the economic and social welfare of the local inhabitants of the non-self-governing territories in the South Pacific. The Conference also considers that these projects, which are not stated in any order of priority, should be undertaken at an early date.
Agriculture

(a) Biochemical investigations in connection with animal nutrition.

(b) Systematic botanical investigations.

(c) Research into plant pests and diseases research.

(d) A biological survey.

(e) A study of the relationship between plants and their environment including soils and climate.

Economics

(a) An economic survey to include native industries, native fisheries, native trading systems and native cooperative movements and organisations.

(b) A study of the mechanisation of production and of suitable schemes for the organisation of uniform grading, packing, pooling and marketing of primary products such as copra.

(c) The development of schemes for the introduction to and distribution in the territories of potentially useful species, varieties, breeds or strains of plants and animals.

(d) The taking of all possible steps, within the scope of the functions of the Commission, to ensure adequate shipping services within the area.

Education and social development

(a) A study of the most efficient methods of teaching illiterate people to read and write in their own languages.

(b) A review of the research work already carried out in the field of social anthropology and consideration of future lines of research which would be of value to the territories in connection with education and social development.

(c) A study of special educational and related activities for handicapped persons - the blind, the mentally backward, lepers and sufferers from other diseases.

(d) Research in the most efficient methods of training local inhabitants for health, education and technical services and a survey of existing facilities therefor.

(e) A study of the use of visual aids in education and in other developmental and welfare activities.

(f) A study of the education and social development of women and girls in relation to the status of women in the respective communities and with a view to widening the cultural life and improving the domestic conditions of women.
**Fisheries**

Fisheries research, including surveys and the testing of methods of catching and of processing fish and other marine products with the special aim of improving the nutrition of the local inhabitants.

**Forestry**

Surveys of or research in:

(a) forest resources in regard to areas, commercial timbers and other forest products;

(b) forest management including utilisation of forests and forest products;

(c) technology of wood and other forest products;

(d) the relationship between forests and water conservation and soil conservation.

**Health and medicine**

(a) A survey of improved methods of nutrition and an investigation of the relationship between nutrition and dental defects.

(b) An investigation to improve methods of village hygiene including housing.

(c) General surveys of disease and disease-carriers, with particular research into:

(i) the respiratory diseases (including pulmonary and surgical tuberculosis);

(ii) leprosy;

(iii) malaria prevention, and the dysenteries and other bowel infections;

(iv) yaws and its relationship to syphilis;

(v) filariasis;

(vi) hookworm and other intestinal parasites;

(vii) diseases of the skin;

(d) A study of infant and maternal welfare.

(e) A study of the human body's response to changes of climate and environment with a view to the improvement of diet and general living conditions.

(f) A study of quarantine procedures, including the existing international regulations, in order to meet the particular needs of the territories.

(g) The collection and dissemination of epidemiological information.
Labour

A study of labour conditions within the territories with a view to improvement in accordance with the Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation wherever applicable.

Library

The establishment of an up-to-date technical and scientific reference library. [1] Signed for Australia 6 February 1947. Accepted for Australia 16 April 1947.

AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE SOUTH PACIFIC BUREAU FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The Governments of Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa, together comprising the South Pacific Forum (hereinafter referred to as "the Forum"),

RECOGNISING the need for increased co-operation in matters relating to trade and economic development in the South Pacific region,

DESIRING to identify opportunities for the removal of barriers to trade between states within the region and also between those states and states outside the region and for the modification of current trade patterns,

DESIRING also that consideration should be given to the possibility of establishing a free trade area for the South Pacific region,

NOTING that the collection and dissemination of information and the preparation of reports and studies will be essential to facilitate these ends,

CONCERNED to ensure co-ordination of studies relating to transport services within the region,

CONCERNED also to obtain advice and assistance in the operation of regional trade and tourism promotion services,
CONVINCED of the need to work towards co-operation and co-ordination in the planning and siting of new industries and development projects within the region,

CONCERNED that all these activities should, wherever possible, be undertaken in co-ordination with the work of other international and regional organisations,

HAVE AGREED as follows:

Article I

Establishment of the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation

1. There is hereby established the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Co-operation (hereinafter called "the Bureau").

2. The Bureau shall be located in Suva and shall operate in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement.

Article II

Organisation

The Bureau shall have an executive board to be known as the South Pacific Committee for Economic Co-operation (hereinafter called "the Committee") and a Secretariat (hereinafter called "the Secretariat").

Article III

Purpose

The purpose of the Bureau is to facilitate continuing co-operation and consultation between members on trade, economic development, transport, tourism and other related matters.

Article IV

Membership

1. The Governments of Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa shall be entitled to membership of the Bureau and shall become members by signing this Agreement pursuant to Article XI.

2. Other governments may be admitted to membership of the Bureau in accordance with Article XI.

Article V

The Committee
1. The Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of the members of the Bureau.

2. The Committee shall have the following powers and functions:

   (a) to consult with the Director in the preparation of the annual budget for submission to the Forum;

   (b) to recommend to the Forum amendments to the Annex to this Agreement;

   (c) to approve the annual or interim report of the Director on the operation of the Bureau and transmit such report to the member governments;

   (d) to make recommendations to the member governments;

   (e) to lay down staff establishment and salary scales;

   (f) to give general directions to the Bureau.

3. The Committee shall appoint a Chairman at its first and subsequent annual meetings who shall remain in office until the next annual meeting.

4. The Chairmanship shall rotate annually as decided by the Committee.

5. The Committee shall hold a meeting at least once in each calendar year and shall meet prior to meetings of the Forum.

6. The Director, in consultation with and at the request of the Chairman, shall convene meetings of the Committee.

7. Each representative on the Committee shall have one vote. All matters shall be decided by a majority of the representatives present and voting.

8. The Committee shall establish its own rules of procedure.

   Article VI

   Secretariat

The Secretariat of the Bureau shall consist of a Director and Deputy Director and such further staff as may be appointed by the Director in accordance with the establishment and salary scales laid down by the Committee.

   Article VII

   Appointment of Director

1. The Director shall be appointed by the Forum for a term of three years under such conditions as the Committee may determine.
2. The Director shall be eligible for reappointment. His appointment shall not, however, exceed two consecutive terms.

3. The channel of communication of the Director with member governments shall be through their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

**Article VIII**

**Functions of the Secretariat**

1. Subject to the direction of the Committee, the Secretariat may:

(a) prepare studies in order to identify opportunities for a modification of present trade patterns in the South Pacific region, and between the region and other countries, having in mind the objectives of regional trade expansion;

(b) carry out necessary investigations in connection with development of free trade among the Island members of the Bureau;

(c) prepare studies of the development plans and policies of member governments in an effort to promote co-operation in the region; and investigate the scope for regional development planning aimed among other things at a rationalisation of manufacturing and processing industries and the achievement of economies of scale in certain regional enterprises;

(d) establish an advisory service on sources of technical assistance, aid and investment finance, both official and private, that are available to members;

(e) undertake studies of regional transport, as necessary, and help co-ordinate action, both government and private, in this sector;

(f) advise and assist member governments with the operation of a regional trade and tourist promotion service;

(g) provide a means of regular and rapid consultation among the Islands on the region's import requirements to enable the bulk ordering of essential imports by official agencies;

(h) act as a clearing house for information on trade, production, and economic development in the region and in areas outside the region which are of interest to members;

(i) carry out research and statistical studies on production and trade on a continuing basis as requested by the Committee;

(j) prepare reports, studies and working papers;

(k) establish means for the collection, dissemination and exchange of information and statistics;
(1) co-operate with member governments in research projects and the obtaining and collating of statistics and other information;

(m) co-operate and co-ordinate its work with that of other international and regional organisations;

(n) undertake such other activities as the Committee may from time to time consider necessary for the attainment of the Bureau's purpose.

2. In addition to the powers conferred expressly by this Article, the Secretariat shall exercise any powers delegated to it by the Committee.

**Article IX**

**Budget**

1. The annual budget of the Bureau shall be prepared by the Director and approved by the Forum on the recommendation of the Committee.

2. The costs of operating the Bureau shall be borne by the member governments in the shares set out in the Annex to this Agreement, subject to review from time to time.

**Article X**

**Legal status, privileges and immunities**

1. The Bureau shall enjoy the legal capacity of a body corporate in the territories of member governments.

2. The Bureau shall have immunity from suit and legal process and its premises, archives and property shall be inviolable.

3. The Bureau shall be exempt from taxes, other than such as represent charges for specific services rendered. It shall also be exempt from taxes, duties and other levies, other than charges for specific services rendered, on the importation of goods imported for its official use.

4. The Bureau shall be free of prohibition on importation or exportation of goods imported or exported for its official use.

5. The Director and staff of the Bureau shall be entitled to immunity from suit and legal process in respect of things done or omitted to be done in the course of the performance of their official duties.

6. The Director shall be accorded the same exemption from taxes, duties and other levies as is accorded to a diplomatic agent.

7. All officers of the Bureau who are not nationals of Fiji shall be accorded exemption from taxes in respect of salaries received from the Bureau. They shall also be
accorded exemption from taxes on the importation of furniture and effects at the time of first taking up post.

8. Representatives attending meetings of the Committee shall be accorded immunity from suit and legal process and their official documents shall be inviolable.

Article XI

Signature, accession, entry into force and withdrawal

1. This Agreement shall be open for signature by the Governments of Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, New Zealand, Tonga and Western Samoa.[1]

2. The signature of a member government shall not be taken as extending the rights and obligations set forth in this Agreement to the territories for whose international relations the member government is responsible.

3. This Agreement shall enter into force one month from the day on which it has been signed by the last to sign of the seven member governments referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.[2]

4. Other governments may, with the approval of the Forum, accede to this Agreement.

5. For governments admitted to membership in the Bureau in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Article, the Agreement shall enter into force on the date of deposit with the depositary Government of an instrument of accession.

6. The depositary Government shall inform member governments of the entry into force of this Agreement pursuant to this Article.

7. The original of this Agreement shall be deposited with the Government of Fiji which shall transmit certified copies thereof to all member governments and shall register the Agreement with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

8. Any member government may denounce this Agreement by notification addressed to the depositary Government and such denunciation shall take effect one year after the day upon which the depositary Government has received the notification.

Article XII

Amendments

1. This Agreement may be amended at any time by the unanimous agreement of all member governments. The text of any amendment proposed by a member government shall be submitted to the depositary Government which shall transmit it to member governments.

2. If three or more member governments request a meeting to discuss the proposed amendment, the depositary Government shall call such a meeting.
3. If all member governments agree to an amendment, it shall then be open for ratification.

4. An amendment shall enter into force when the depositary Government has received instruments of ratification from all member governments.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

OPENED for signature at Apia this 17th day of April, 1973

[Signatures not reproduced here.]

ANNEX

SCALE OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BUDGET

Australia 1/3
New Zealand 1/3
Cook Islands 1/15
Fiji 1/15
Nauru 1/15
Tonga 1/15
Western Samoa 1/15


Annex 7

Attachment 1

“BIKETAWA” DECLARATION

Forum Leaders recalled their 1995 Vision Statement, the Forum Economic Action Plan Eight Principles of Good Governance and the 1997 Aitutaki Declaration. With the aim of elaborating upon these earlier statements and in the interests of regional cooperation, Forum Leaders while respecting the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of another member state committed themselves and their countries to a number of guiding principles and courses of actions:

(i) Commitment to good governance which is the exercise of authority (leadership) and interactions in a manner that is open, transparent, accountable, participatory, consultative and decisive but fair and equitable.

(ii) Belief in the liberty of the individual under the law, in equal rights for all citizens regardless of gender, race, colour, creed or political belief and in the individual’s inalienable right to participate by means of free and democratic political process in framing the society in which he or she lives.

(iii) Upholding democratic processes and institutions which reflect national and local circumstances, including the peaceful transfer of power, the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, just and honest government.

(iv) Recognising the importance and urgency of equitable economic, social and cultural development to satisfy the basic needs and aspirations of the peoples of the Forum.

(v) Recognising the importance of respecting and protecting indigenous rights and cultural values, traditions and customs.

(vi) Recognising the vulnerability of member countries to threats to their security, broadly defined, and the importance of cooperation among members in dealing with such threats when they arise.

(vii) Recognising the importance of averting the causes of conflict and of reducing, containing and resolving all conflicts by peaceful means including by customary practices.

2. Forum Leaders recognised the need in time of crisis or in response to members’ request for assistance, for action to be taken on the basis of all members of the Forum being part of the Pacific Islands extended family. The Forum must constructively address difficult and sensitive issues including underlying causes of tensions and conflict (ethnic tension, socio-economic disparities, and lack of good governance, land disputes and erosion of cultural values).
To this end, the Secretary General in the future after consulting the Forum Chairman should urgently initiate the following process:

(i) Assess the situation, make a judgment as to the significance of the developments and consult the Forum Chair and such other Forum Leaders as may be feasible to secure approval to initiate further action;

(ii) Consult the national authorities concerned regarding assistance available from the Forum; and

(iii) Advise and consult with the Forum Foreign Ministers, and based on these consultations, undertake one or a combination of the following actions to assist in the resolution of the crisis:
   (a) A statement representing the view of members on the situation;
   (b) Creation of a Ministerial Action Group;
   (c) A fact finding or similar mission;
   (d) Convening an eminent persons group;
   (e) Third party mediation;
   (f) Support for appropriate institutions or mechanisms that would assist a resolution; and
   (g) The convening of a special high level meeting of the Forum Regional Security Committee or an ad hoc meeting of Forum Ministers.

(iv) If after actions taken under (iii) the crisis persists, convene a special meeting of Forum Leaders to consider other options including if necessary targeted measures.

3. Any regional response to a crisis should take account of the guidelines set out in Annex A.

Biketawa, Kiribati
28 October 2000

Annex A to Attachment 1
(i) Actions are discussed with the authorities in the country concerned;
(ii) The Forum and persons involved on behalf of the Forum should have credibility i.e. must be seen as honest and impartial brokers who are genuinely interested in bringing about a fair resolution;
(iii) There must be coherence and consistency in the strategy followed;
(iv) There must be continuity and conclusion of the process i.e. staying the course;
(v) There must be cooperation with other key international and regional organisations and national actors and coordination of all these efforts;
(vi) There must be a sufficient degree of consensus on the resolutions by those who have to implement them i.e. local players and supporters and those that support them (i.e. outside organisations and governments); and
(vii) The intervention must be cost-effective.
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