

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
HORACE'S *SERMONES* AND *EPISTULAE* BOOK 1:
"ARE THE LETTERS OF HORACE SATIRES?"**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of Canterbury
by
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2006**

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	i
ABSTRACT	ii
INTRODUCTION	
Satire — the problem of definition	1
The concept of genre	17
Approaches to Horatian criticism	21
Horace's hexameter corpus as political poetry	32
Summary of method	36
CHAPTER 1	
Do Horace's <i>Sermones</i> and <i>Epist.</i> 1 all belong to the genre of <i>satura</i>?	
Opinions from modern scholarship	38
Evidence from titles and the use of terms	44
Evidence from Persius and Juvenal for <i>Epist.</i> 1 as <i>satura</i>	52
<i>Sermones</i> or <i>satura</i> ?	57
Epistolary features and form	61
CHAPTER 2	
What is Horatian <i>satura</i>?	
The etymology of <i>satura</i>	66
The <i>satura</i> of Ennius and Lucilius	67
Horace on Horatian <i>satura</i>	74
<i>Serm.</i> 1.1 as a programmatic poem	75
Epicureanism in <i>Serm.</i> 1.1	81
Horace's redefined <i>satura</i>	86
Horace and Lucilius	92
The moral seriousness of the Horatian satirist	95
<i>Epist.</i> 1 as <i>satura</i>	98
Conclusion	101

CHAPTER 3

Place and status in *Serm. 1*

Introduction	102
The setting of Horatian <i>satura</i>	102
Sequential reading of <i>Serm. 1</i>	103
Conclusion	133

CHAPTER 4

Place and status in *Serm. 2*

Introduction	136
Sequential reading of <i>Serm. 2</i>	137
Conclusion	169

CHAPTER 5

Place and status in *Epist. 1*

Introduction	173
Sequential reading of <i>Epist. 1</i>	179
Conclusion	212

CONCLUSION	217
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ABBREVIATIONS	226
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REFERENCES

Editions, commentaries, and translations	227
Other works	231

APPENDIX 1

<i>Epist. 1</i> : epistolary features and place	249
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APPENDIX 2

General conclusions

Areas for further study	256
Conclusions re Horace's <i>satura</i>	257

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of a University of Canterbury Doctoral Scholarship for the first three years of this thesis. My thanks also to the Department of Classics for consistently providing excellent facilities.

Thanks to my fellow PhD students, the staff of the Classics Department, and the wider university community for invaluable friendship and support when my husband died suddenly and unexpectedly in 2001.

Special thanks to my supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Robin Bond, whose guidance has always been *verum, decens* and, above all, *ridens*.

Finally, very special thanks to my children, David and Christine, who in their very different ways have provided essential support.

This thesis is dedicated to
the memory of
Ken Whybrew
(1945-2001)
carpe diem

ABSTRACT

“Are the Letters of Horace Satires?” (Hendrickson 1897: 313). In response to this question, this thesis investigates whether Horace’s *Sermones and Epistulae* 1 all belong to the genre of *satura*. Ancient and modern evidence from the use of the terms *Sermones*, *Epistulae*, and *satura*, is surveyed, and is found to be inconclusive, but not to preclude *Epist.* 1 as *satura*. The nature of specifically Horatian *satura* is ascertained from the text of *Serm.* 1, especially *Serm.* 1.1 and the explicitly literary *Serm.* 1.4 and 1.10. The redefinition of Lucilian *satura*, and its political implications are also considered.

To confirm *Epist.* 1 as *satura* a sequential reading of the three *libelli* is undertaken, tracing the evolution of the theme of *locus*: place, both as geographical location, and as status, place in the social hierarchy, in the context of the socio-political environment of the time of composition. *Serm.* 1.1 as a programmatic poem is shown to establish Epicurean moderation as a prerequisite for a *vita beata*. In *Serm.* 1 Horace’s status as client-poet of Maecenas and Octavian initially permits this ideal lifestyle in the *Urbs*. The misperceptions of outsiders lead to a preference for a life of Epicurean quietude in the *rus* in *Serm.* 2, although Horace’s *aequanimitas* is disturbed by urban *officia*, and abuse of *libertas dicendi* associated particularly with Stoicism. The ideal of rural withdrawal is reinforced in *Epist.* 1 through an exploration of appropriate behaviour in relationships with *potentes amici*. Horace’s addressees cover the entire range of the social hierarchy, and in his letters he utilizes the arguments of moral philosophy, thus reconciling poetry and philosophy. He achieves a pragmatic compromise whereby he can enjoy *libertas* in his role as a poet, while acknowledging that personal *libertas* and true *aequanimitas* are still to be attained.

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will explore the question: “Are the Letters of Horace Satires?” (Hendrickson 1897: 313). Another way of phrasing this question is: Do Horace’s *Sermones and Epist.* 1 all belong to the genre of *satura*? Four areas relevant to this topic will be surveyed in this introduction:

- Satire — the problem of definition
- The concept of genre
- Approaches to Horatian criticism
- Horace’s hexameter corpus as political poetry

This chapter covers several topics which might conceivably justify a thesis in themselves. It is, however, intended as an introductory survey, and topics are explored only to the extent that they are relevant to the overall thesis.

Satire — the problem of definition

In order to answer the question: “Are the Letters of Horace Satires?” (ibid.), it is necessary to know exactly what satire is. Because it was already obvious that what is now generally termed ‘satire’ bears very little resemblance to Horace’s *Sermones*, it seemed appropriate to briefly explore the nature of satire in general, before embarking on an investigation of the characteristics of specifically Horatian *satura*. Consequently the most readily available and most commonly cited books and articles on general satire, mostly published since 1940, were surveyed in an attempt to discover a concise and comprehensive definition or description of satire.¹

The entries for ‘satire’ in literary reference books, intended for the non-specialist reader, generally start with a definition of satire. The following is typical: “Literature which exhibits or examines vice and folly and makes them appear ridiculous or contemptible” (Gray 1992: 255). The entries then usually continue with amplification and explanation of what satire actually is. In the example cited this occupies at least half a page, indicating that the definition of satire given is not considered adequate.

¹ This section is intended as a survey of metaliterary theorizing about satire, not of the history of literary satire per se. Literary manifestations of satire not appropriate for theorizing, for example, Chaucer’s *Canterbury Tales*, and the Elizabethan satire of Joseph Hall and John Marston, are omitted.

It was relatively easy for Quintilian in the first century CE to describe satire: “*Satura quidem tota nostra est*” (*Inst.* 10.1.93). In this, often misunderstood, comment he was referring to “*satura*” as the distinct genre of Roman hexameter verse satire written by Lucilius,² Horace and Persius (Hendrickson 1971: 45-8; Van Rooy 1965: 117-23), with Juvenal subsequently included. He also made brief mention of the Menippean³ satires of Marcus Terentius Varro as a separate type: “*Alterum illud etiam prius saturae genus*” (*Inst.* 10.1.95) (Van Rooy *ibid.*: 118). Quintilian’s remark need not be interpreted as denying the existence of satirical writing in Greek before Roman *satura*. Greek Old Comedy and the iambics of Archilochus and Hipponax are manifestations of “satire as a mode” (Muecke 2005: 34).

It seems likely that the first literary *saturae*, written by Ennius, were medleys, both in terms of content and metre. They may have contained a critical element, but *satura* at this time denoted predominantly the idea of a mixture (Van Rooy *ibid.*: 30-49). The element of harsh negative criticism was established by Lucilius, with the result that the denotation of *satura* shifted “from ‘a collection of miscellaneous poems’ to ‘a collection of satirical poems’” (*ibid.*: 55). Given the above development, it is perhaps appropriate to consider the concept of *uarietas* as equally as important in *satura* as criticism.

The term ‘*satura*’ eventually denoted a specific genre of poems which contained a critical element, but its English derivative ‘satire’ has been applied to satirical works in many different genres. Since Quintilian’s time satire has branched out in numerous directions and has infiltrated most literary genres and many non-literary forms of artistic expression and popular entertainment: journalism, theatre (plays and revues), film, television, visual arts, music, and dance.⁴ A great deal has

² In his earlier satires, Lucilius experimented with various metres. All his later satires (Books 30, 1-21) were composed in hexameters. Horace used this metre exclusively and it thus became the conventional metre for Roman verse satire.

³ Strictly speaking the term ‘Menippean’ should not be applied to classical examples of the form, because “*Menippean satire* is not used as a generic term until 1581” (Relihan 1993: 12). “Varronian” would be a more accurate term (Relihan: *ibid.*).

⁴ Satire also existed in Roman society as a social practice. This phenomenon is discussed by Habinek (2005), Graf (2005), Barchiesi and Cucchiarelli (2005), and Gunderson (2005). Habinek observes, citing Paul Connerton, that there is a “scholarly tendency to focus on texts as a path of lesser

been written about the question of whether there is a modern genre of satire, but given this diversity, it seems rather illogical to consider modern satire as a genre in itself. Many critics have preferred to regard it as a mode⁵ or procedure:

Satire is indeed not a genre ... but a literary procedure, not a kind of writing but a way of writing. (Spacks 1968: 15)

Satire is best seen as a mode which can adopt various conventions and forms. (Bestul 1974: 47)

Satire may more easily be explained and understood as a bent possessed by many human beings but more highly developed in some individuals and expressing itself in an almost endless variety of ways. (Test 1991: 12)

Perhaps the most sensible solution to this problem appears in an article by Mary Claire Randolph (1971: 171). By analogy with biological terminology, "Satire" can be regarded as a "genus", with the various forms in which the "Satiric Spirit" is expressed regarded as "species" (*ibid.*). Although the application of this terminology to literature is not entirely appropriate, the use of "genus" as a superordinate term does have merit; it has been similarly used by other critics, for example, Hendrickson (1897: 322).

Quintilian himself did not offer an actual definition of satire, but many subsequent writers have done so, with varying degrees of success and succinctness. The 1960s was a period of great academic interest in satire and its definition. One critic, Robert Elliott, came to the reluctant conclusion "that real definitions of terms like *satire*, *tragedy*, the *novel* are impossible" because "these ... are what philosophers call open concepts; that is, concepts in which a set of necessary and sufficient properties by which one could define the concept, and thus close it, are lacking" (1962: 22; italics original). In spite of Elliott's rather defeatist conclusion, it seemed worthwhile to undertake a brief exploration of attempts at definition.

resistance" (*ibid.*: 191). Connerton's criticism is acknowledged but, as this thesis is concerned solely with textual *satira*, the question of non-literary satire will not be considered.

⁵ Alistair Fowler makes the interesting observation that the terms for kinds of literature (equivalent to genres) are used nominally, whereas terms for modes are used adjectivally (1982: 106). This is consistent with Roman verse satire being a genre called '*satira*', whereas modern 'satire' is more correctly now the 'satirical mode'.

One of the earliest, that of Daniël Heinsius from his 1628-9 edition of Horace, was translated by John Dryden (1631-1700) and quoted in his *Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire* (1693):

Satire is a kind of Poetry, without a Series of Action, invented for the purging of our Minds; in which Humane Vices, Ignorance, and Errors, and all things besides, which are produc'd from them, in every Man, are severely Reprehended; partly Dramatically, partly Simply, and sometimes in both kinds of speaking; but for the most part Figuratively and Occultly; consisting in a low familiar way, chiefly in a sharp and pungent manner of Speech; but partly, also, in a Facetious and Civil way of Jestings; by which, either Hatred, or Laughter, or Indignation is mov'd. (Chambers et al. 1974: 77)

Dryden described this definition as “obscure and perplex'd” (ibid.), and preferred to call it a “Description of Satire” (ibid.). He also acknowledged that this definition was meant to apply to Horace, and it does seem reasonably adequate for that purpose, although “severely Reprehended” is rather out of character for Horace. However, if interpreted as a description of Roman verse satire in its entirety it is appropriate. An interesting feature of Heinsius' definition is the Aristotelian “purging of our Minds”, and the inclusion, in the final clause, of the emotional effects of satire, presumably in imitation of Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy in the *Poetics* (4.1449b).⁶

Another definition from about the same time as Dryden is that of Jonathan Swift, from the Preface to the *Battle of the Books* (c.1704): “Satire is a sort of glass wherein beholders do generally discover everybody's face but their own; which is the chief reason for that kind of reception it meets in the world, and that so very few are offended with it” (Guthkelch 1908 (ed.): lxxv). This was presumably not intended as a serious definition, and has been described as an “ironic contribution”, and “a definition that does not define” (Peter 1956: 3). It does, however, highlight the very important point that satire makes great demands on its audience in terms of interpretation, with the result that a great deal of satire is either misunderstood or missed entirely. Swift's observation could also be seen as an admission that satire does not have reformatory powers (Griffin 1994: 39).

Samuel Johnson's definition: “A poem in which wickedness or folly is censured”,⁷ is appropriately concise for a dictionary definition, but woefully

⁶ Heinsius had already published an edition of Aristotle's *Poetics*, in Leiden in 1611.

⁷ *A Dictionary of the English Language* (London: 1773): s.v. ‘Satire’.

inadequate as a definition of satire. By Johnson's time, satire was no longer confined to verse, and he made no mention of, for example, the humour essential to satire. Northrop Frye, among others, has seen "wit or humour" as "essential to satire" (1944: 76). His other essential is "an object of attack" (ibid.). Basically, a continuum is envisaged with pure invective and pure comedy as the extremes: in order to be designated as satire a work should not be too close to either extreme. Niall Rudd's "triangle of which the apices are (a) attack, (b) entertainment, and (c) preaching" (1986: 1) is an expansion of this. The element of humour in satire is also relevant when considering the emotional effects on the audience.

After Dryden, neoclassical formal verse satire continued to be written, notably by Alexander Pope (1688-1744) and Lord Byron (1788-1824), but there do not appear to have been any metaliterary discussions about satire on the scale of Dryden's *Discourse concerning the Original and Progress of Satire*. There may have been a feeling that there had already been sufficient theorizing about satire. The satirist William Gifford (1756-1826), admittedly writing after Pope, begins his *An Essay on the Roman Satirists*⁸ with the following statement: "It will now be expected from me, perhaps, to say something on the nature and design of Satire; but in truth this has so frequently been done, that it seems, at present, to have as little of novelty as of utility to recommend it" (Evans 1908: xii). Gifford justifies his position with reference to Dryden and earlier "French critics" (ibid.).

The sporadic reflections found in the satirical writings of Pope and Byron do not offer definitions or discuss "the nature and design of Satire", but rather they concentrate on its societal effects. Pope in his *Imitations of Horace* (1733-8) is an apologist for satire (Nisbet and Rawson 1997: 106). He is concerned with the moral function of satire as a corrective for undesirable behaviour and attitudes. In *Epistle II i* (1737) he decries a situation where poets are afraid to criticize a corrupt society and resort to flattery:

At length, by wholsom dread of statutes bound,
The Poets learn'd to please, and not to wound (257-8)

⁸ The date of this essay is not known. Gifford's translations of Juvenal and Persius were published in 1802 and 1821 respectively. The content of the essay mainly focuses on a "comparison of Horace with Juvenal and Persius" (Evans 1908: xii).

In such a society, the weapon of satire is needed. Satire may wound its targets, but ultimately it is curative:

Hence Satire rose, that just the medium hit,
And heals with Morals what it hurts with Wit. (261-2)

Again, in the *Epilogue to the Satires: Dialogue II* (1738) in a vehement, Juvenalian tone, Pope describes satire as a uniquely powerful weapon against corrupt morals:

Yes, I am proud; I must be proud to see
Men not afraid of God, afraid of me:
Safe from the Bar, the Pulpit, and the Throne,
Yet touch'd and sham'd by *Ridicule* alone.
O sacred Weapon! left for Truth's defence,
Sole Dread of Folly, Vice, and Insolence!
To all but Heav'n-directed hands deny'd,
The Muse may give thee, but the Gods must guide. (208-15)

Samuel Johnson (1709-84) included a definition of 'satire' in his *A Dictionary of the English Language* (see p.4), but does not appear to have discussed satire in any of his writings. Although he imitated Juvenal *Sat.* 3 as *London* (1738) and *Sat.* 10 as *The Vanity of Human Wishes* (1749), he wrote no original formal verse satire. Among his *Lives of the Poets* (1779-81), he included Dryden, Swift, and Pope, but he did not refer to satire in these pieces.

Byron was an admirer of Pope (Beaty 1985: 33), and like Pope he was concerned with the societal function and effects of satire. Although neoclassical formal verse satire was no longer in vogue (Beaty *ibid.*: 23), Byron was provoked by a hostile review of *Hours of Idleness* (1806) to write a satire in the tradition of Pope. In two passages in the resulting poem, *English Bards and Scotch Reviewers* (1809), he defends satire on the grounds that society, especially with respect to "literary offenders" (Beaty *ibid.*: 32), is in dire need of it. The first of these passages is reminiscent of Pope's *Epilogue to the Satires* (*ibid.*: 31-2):

When Vice triumphant holds her sov'reign sway,
Obey'd by all who nought beside obey;
When Folly, frequent harbinger of crime,
Bedecks her cap with bells of every Clime;
When knaves and fools combined o'er all prevail,
And weigh their Justice in a Golden Scale;
E'en then the boldest start from public sneers,
Afraid of Shame, unknown to other fears,
More darkly sin, by Satire kept in awe,

And shrink from Ridicule, though not from Law. (*EBSR*: 27-36)

The second reference to the reforming function of satire is in a passage addressed to the satirist William Gifford:

Arouse thee, GIFFORD! be thy promise claimed,
Make bad men better, or at least ashamed. (829-30)

Byron's *EBSR* is distinctly Juvenalian in tone. His *Hints from Horace* (1811) on the other hand, is "An act of homage to Horace and the Horatian tradition of satire (McGann 1980: 427), and is closely based on Horace's *Ars Poetica*.⁹ Consistent with this change of tone, Byron reflects on different aspects of satire: the nature of the satirist, and the effect of satire on its writer's reputation:

Satiric rhyme first sprang from selfish spleen.
You doubt — see Dryden, Pope, St. Patrick's Dean. (115-16)

MacFlecknoe, and the *Dunciad*, and all Swift's lampooning ballads. Whatever their other works may be, these originated in personal feelings, and angry retort on unworthy rivals; and though the ability of these satires elevates the poetical, their poignancy detracts from the personal character of the writers. (116n.)¹⁰

Beatty notes that "neoclassical critics ... regard[ed] [Hor. *Ars*] as satiric in spirit, tone, and rhetorical intention" (ibid.: 43).

Byron maintains the Horatian stance in a passage from *Childe Harold* (Canto 4, 1818), which acknowledges that satire can be written without harsh invective:

Then farewell Horace; whom I hated so,
Not for thy faults, but mine; it is a curse
To understand, not feel thy lyric flow,
To comprehend, but never love thy verse;
Although no deeper Moralists rehearse
Our little life, nor Bard prescribe his art,
Nor livelier Satirist the conscience pierce,
Awakening without wounding the touch'd heart,
Yet fare thee well — upon Soracte's ridge we part. (*CH* 4.77)

⁹ "Being an Allusion in English Verse to the Epistle 'Ad Pisones de Arte Poetica' and intended as a Sequel to 'English Bards and Scotch Reviewers'" (McGann 1980: 288).

¹⁰ These lines and note do not appear in all editions of Byron's works. For example, they are omitted from the edition of McGann (1980; see esp. 425-6). The lines quoted relate to Horace *Ars* 73f. especially v.79-80, in which Horace refers to the iambs of Archilochus.

In this passage the poet adopts an Horatian *persona*, with humility and acknowledgement of personal faults. This is consistent with a quotation from one of Byron's conversations (1823): "I maintain that persons who have *erred* are most competent to point out errors" (Wallis 1973: 176-7 (10); italics original). In his later satirical works, for example *Don Juan* (1819), Byron persisted with the Horatian *persona* of the gentler, more urbane satirist, even if "the equanimity born of Horatian detachment was never completely congenial with the Byronic temperament" (Beatty *ibid.*: 13).

In his adherence to neoclassical formal verse satire, Byron was a reactionary (*ibid.*: 41). From the advent of the Romantic Movement in the late eighteenth century, and throughout the nineteenth century, "the satiric spirit" assumed "a subordinate role" (*ibid.*: 23), as a mode rather than a distinct genre. This development intensified a trend which had begun earlier in the eighteenth century in, for example, Henry Fielding's novel *A History of Tom Jones* (1749), and the engravings and paintings of William Hogarth (1697-1764). Later manifestations of "the satiric spirit" are seen, for example, in the novels of Jane Austen (1775-1817), William Makepeace Thackeray (1811-63), and Charles Dickens (1812-70); in the poetry of William Blake (1757-1827), Percy Bysshe Shelley (1792-1822), and John Keats (1795-1821); as well as social and political satire in media as diverse as *Punch* magazine (first published 1841), and the Savoy operas of Gilbert and Sullivan (1875-96). These manifestations of "the satiric spirit" were not appropriate vehicles for metaliterary discussion on the nature of satire.

In the literary criticism of the early twentieth century there are scattered observations on satire. One instance of this is from the writer and critic John Middleton Murry. He did not define satire, but briefly discussed its nature (1922: 64-7). For Murry, satire should be written in prose not verse. This is related to his view that "invective and true satire are often indiscriminately lumped together under the single name [satire]; but they ought to be distinguished" (*ibid.*: 64-5). Invective should be restricted to personal attack, whereas "true satire" is appropriate for criticism "of a society by reference to an ideal" (65). Consequently in Murry's opinion: "Satire is not a matter of personal resentment, but of impersonal condemnation" (64). In the actual practice of the satirists, Murry's distinction is not observed because an individual may be attacked as the representative of a wider

problem. Furthermore, he does not appear to have taken into account the possibility that invective, as Juvenal's *saeva indignatio*, can be used against society as a whole.

Later in the twentieth century satire became the subject of academic debate: early examples being the work of David Worcester and Northrop Frye in the early 1940s. Frye proposed a definition which was more a statement of objectives: "I should define satire, then, as poetry assuming a special function of analysis, that is, of breaking up the lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things that impede the free movement of society" (1944: 79).

It is rather strange, and diametrically opposed to the opinion of Murry cited above, that Frye restricts the form to poetry, especially as he refers to works of prose satire in the article.¹¹ However, this definition is significant in that it mentions "society" and other extraliterary concepts, aspects of literary criticism which were anathema to New Criticism. Satire was generally ignored, and indeed suffered from "malign neglect ... by the New Critics in the middle of the twentieth century" (Connery and Combe 1995: 4). Brian Connery and Kirk Combe expand on this neglect, and discuss five factors which made satire unacceptable to the New Critics, namely satire's need to be situated in a historical context; its essential object of attack, often extratextual; the lack of closure; lack of specific form and genre, and finally the lack of unity, especially with respect to the common utilization of antithetical motifs (1995: 4-6).

Gilbert Highet, a scholar who published widely on satire, offered the following rather lengthy definition, which he intended as:

A definition of Roman satire, largely applicable to modern satire in so far as that is still a form in itself, ... : Satire is a continuous piece of verse, or of prose mingled with verse, of considerable size, with great variety of style and subject, but generally characterized by the free use of conversational language, the frequent intrusion of its author's personality, its predilection for wit, humour, and irony, great vividness and concreteness of description, shocking obscenity in theme and language, an improvisatory tone, topical subjects, and the general intention of improving society by exposing its vices and follies. Its

¹¹ Much of the content of Frye's 1944 article was reworked as the section on satire in his *Anatomy of criticism* (1957: 223-39), where it forms part of his framework of archetypal literary criticism.

However, the earlier article is more accessible and, being devoted entirely to satire, contains useful illustrative examples.

essence is summed up in the word σπουδογελοιοιν = *ridentem dicere uerum* = ‘joking in earnest’. (1949: 305)

The length of Highet’s definition illustrates just how many features need to be included to produce anything approaching a comprehensive definition. “Shocking obscenity” is a subjective judgement which overstates somewhat the content of much satire. On the positive side, however, this definition does emphasize probably the most important element of all satire, and one that many critics do not draw attention to, namely *spoudogeloion* (or *spoudaiogeloion*).¹² Significantly, in a later publication Highet did not repeat the above definition, but instead produced a list of eight characteristic features by which a particular piece of writing can be recognized as satire (1962: 14-23) (see p.11).

At the opposite extreme to Highet, is the concise definition suggested by Leonard Feinberg: “The technique of the satirist consists of a *playfully critical distortion of the familiar*” (1963: 7; italics original). This definition has been criticized on the grounds that it is too inclusive and does not make any distinction between satire and other forms of humorous writing (Anonymous 1963: 26-7). This assessment appears to ignore the presence of the essential term “critical”, an element which could be said to distinguish satire from other kinds of humorous writing. In a later article this definition was apparently abandoned by Feinberg himself: “I share Robert Elliott’s reluctant conclusion that no satisfactory definition of satire is possible” (1968: 31). Nevertheless, it is recommended “as a useful working definition” by Susan Braund (1992: 4). She continues: “The value of this four-term definition is that it allows the flexibility necessary to encompass the entire genre.” Despite its deficiencies, it makes no mention of *spoudaiogeloion*, for example, this definition does seem to be at least as comprehensive as some of the lists of features suggested by critics such as George Test (see p.12) and Dustin Griffin (see p.12), and it has the valuable advantage of being easy to remember.

This selection of attempts to define satire, although admittedly arbitrary, has illustrated the impossibility of a definition which is both concise and comprehensive.

¹² The humorous treatment of serious material can lead to confusion and misinterpretation. There is also the question of whether certain topics by their nature should ever be satirized; an example frequently cited in this context is the Holocaust.

Critics have described satire in ways which, at least implicitly, indicate that it is indefinable. The following are typical:

The Proteus¹³ of Literature. (Worcester 1960: title of ch.I)

The elusive nature of satire has called forth a great deal of criticism rather rhapsodical than rational, rather oracular than empirical. (Clark 1946: 35)

The protean nature of satire has interfered with any precise definition of its conventions. (Kernan 1959: 7)

Satire is notoriously a slippery term, designating, ... a form of art and a spirit, a purpose and a tone. (Elliott 1960: viii)

Satire is a complex mode of expression which has resisted attempts at definition throughout history. (Bestul 1974: 46)

Satire is merely the aesthetic manifestation of a universal urge so varied as to elude definition. (Test 1991: ix)

There being no agreed definition of satire, critics have investigated other methods for identifying satirical works: the most common is collections of characteristic features. Hight was probably one of the first to adopt this approach. More recently, Test (1991) and Griffin (1994) have suggested features which are more widely applicable.

Hight's characteristics of satire (1962: 14-23) are rather difficult to elucidate, and have been more conveniently summarized in a review of the book:

Certain characteristics help to identify an object as satirical: the author may say his work is satire, quote a satiric pedigree, choose a traditionally satiric subject, quote earlier satirists, use typical satiric devices, use a vocabulary that is forcible and varied in texture, and adopt a theme that is concrete, personal and topical; the reader may perceive that the satiric emotion is present. (Jackson 1964: 83)

¹³ Proteus is a very common metaphor in descriptions of satire, presumably referring to the shape-shifting characteristics of the mythological Proteus. He is a particularly apt symbol for satire in another way: Vergil's Proteus (*G.* 4.387-414) would only reveal the truth when forcibly restrained in his human form. A skilfully executed satirical work needs to be disentangled by a reader to a form in which it reveals its meaning for that particular reader. The Protean nature of satire is one reason why it places demands on its audience. This aspect of the symbolism of Proteus for satire has also been observed by Duncan Kennedy (2005: 299).

Hight appears to have adopted a rather jaundiced view of satire: “forcible” satiric vocabulary is described in truly hyperbolic fashion as: “Brutally direct phrases, taboo expressions, nauseating imagery, callous and crude slang — these are parts of the vocabulary of almost every satirist” (1962: 20). The qualification “almost every satirist” is telling: those particular features are certainly not characteristic of the bulk of Horace’s *satura*, and indeed perhaps not as much a feature of Juvenal’s as the *Satires* of Books 1 and 2 might suggest.

Test, who does not restrict his field to literary satire (1991: ix), adopts a “quadripartite approach” (ibid.: 34) to satire, designating the four elements of aggression, play, laughter, and judgement (15-30). These elements will not necessarily be present in equal proportions, but all “will be present to some degree” (15). A comparison with Feinberg’s four-term definition indicates that one important feature is missing: that of “*the familiar*”. Satire “must be grounded in recognizable reality” so that its audience can “recognize what is being satirized” (Nilsen 1988: 1). The connection with reality is implicit in Test’s narrative: “the special nature of satire and its relationship to the world outside, ... satire usually has a vital connection with a specific cultural context” (32). Nevertheless, the concept is not captured in his four elements.

Griffin confines himself to literary satire, especially that of the eighteenth century, and excludes satirical novels and “satiric forms from popular culture” (1994: 1). Instead of a list of features, he discusses satire according to four categories: “inquiry and provocation, play and display” (ibid.: 4). “Inquiry” is the most innovative category, because it considers satire to be exploratory: raising questions rather than necessarily providing answers, an approach which is particularly relevant for Horace. Essentially, and importantly, Griffin questions the assumption that the satirist always writes from an unambiguous moral viewpoint. Inquiry and provocation are relevant to satire as philosophical or ethical writing, while display and play locate satire as artistic and humorous writing. Therefore, Griffin’s approach is consistent with the traditional concept of *spoudaiogeloion*.

While it is undoubtedly the case that Griffin provides an innovative and stimulating approach to satire, it is perhaps unfortunate that he restricted his field to only twelve canonical literary satirists, including Horace (ibid.: 1). This results in a

new exploration of works universally acknowledged to be satirical, rather than an investigation of the nature of satire per se.¹⁴

Another slightly different approach has been adopted by Don Nilsen; he proposes seven “necessary and sufficient conditions”:

Satire is always grounded in reality, but it is also distorted in some way. In addition, it is always provocative — an attack of some sort. In addition, the humor of the satire usually makes the members of an audience feel closer to each other, and more separated from whatever group is the target of the satire. Satire is typically ironic; it is typically negative in tone; and it is usually humorous but not humorous to everybody, especially not to the targets of the satire. (1988: 1)

These conditions do seem to capture most of the “important features of satire” (ibid.: 1). Emphasis on the social aspects of satire raises the important question of whether the satirist actually rouses his audience’s feelings against the target, or reinforces their already existing prejudices.

Another approach to investigating the nature of satire, which was a feature of Heinsius’ definition (see p.4), is to consider the emotional effects produced in the audience. This approach is highly speculative, and several critics have drawn attention to this fact, for example, Patricia Meyer Spacks: “It is dangerous to try to specify what a reader’s reaction will be to any work of art” (1968: 22). Test deliberately excludes “the reaction and influence on the audience” (1991: 31) from his treatment because of the complexity and variability of audience response.

Hight includes this effect as one of his characteristic features of satire (1962: 21-3). He proposes that “the typical emotion which the author feels, and wishes to evoke in his readers ... is a blend of amusement and contempt” (21). These two emotions will not always be produced to the same extent, but both must exist for a work to be classed as satire. Another way of interpreting this is to see it as locating satire between the poles of comedy (amusement) and invective (contempt). Other critics have adopted this approach, for example Frye, who locates satire between “attack without humor, or pure denunciation” (1957: 224) and “the humor of pure fantasy” (225).

¹⁴ “Griffin’s ‘great satirists’ are those of a very limited cross section of satirists since the world began. To generalize from such a sample carries no empirical validity” (Canfield 1996: 332).

In a thought-provoking article, Spacks also considers the emotional effects of satire. She objects to Hightet's analysis, principally on the grounds that the suggested emotions are not ones that would "create any impulse toward action" (1968: 16). Even if no action is ultimately taken, satire should provoke a critical attitude. By analogy with Brechtian theatre, Spacks proposes that the satiric response is "an uneasiness which leads immediately to social criticism" (17). Although initially appealing, especially when reinforced by Spacks's example of Swift's *Modest proposal*, there are problems with this response. Uneasiness alone is not specific to satire. An amalgam of Hightet's and Spacks's proposals might be more satisfactory: some combination of amusement and contempt leading to uneasiness. To some extent Spacks' uneasiness anticipates Griffin's feature of inquiry (see p.12).

Gustav Seeck discusses the game that the satirist plays with readers, drawing them in by means of wit and skill until they realise that they themselves, or somebody they respect, could be the butt (1991: 18).¹⁵ Michael Frayn recounts a personal experience which illustrates Seeck's point. He was in the audience for a performance of *Beyond the fringe*, sitting behind "a perfectly sound pair of young Tories" who were thoroughly enjoying "Peter Cook's lampoon on [Harold] Macmillan". But suddenly daylight dawned, and "the man turned to the girl and said in an appalled whisper, 'I say! This is supposed to be the Prime Minister,' after which they sat in silence for the rest of the evening" (1987: 7).

This incident actually highlights probably the greatest barrier to a satisfactory definition of satire: that of perception. What produces amused uneasiness in one person, and will therefore be perceived as satirical, may be interpreted as offensive and in no way funny by another. Allied to this is the fact that satire makes intellectual demands on its audience, and "some members of an audience do not 'get' what the satirist is doing" (Test 1991: 11). Test continues with several examples of satirical works which have been taken seriously. One example not cited by Test is that of the BBC television series *Till death us do part*.¹⁶ Johnny Speight, the writer of the series, conceived the character of Alf Garnett as a satire on red-necked bigotry. Speight was horrified when Alf "came to be taken by some sections of the population as a

¹⁵ Cf. "quid rides? mutato nomine de te | fabula narratur" (Hor. *Serm.* 1.1.69-70). All quotes from Horace's text are from the edition of Shackleton Bailey (1985).

¹⁶ BBC-1: 1966-8; 1972; 1974-5.

spokesman” (Wilmot 1980: 121). Other viewers misinterpreted the satire slightly differently: morals campaigner Mary Whitehouse upbraided the Garnett family for setting a bad example (Briggs 1995: 210).

It is reasonable to conclude from the foregoing that a comprehensive definition, or even description, of something as complex and multifarious as satire is probably impossible. The situation has been summarized by Nilsen: “Satire is not easy to write, and when it is read it is frequently misunderstood. Satire is like pornography; we know it when we see it. And like pornography, some people see it everywhere, and other people don’t see it anywhere at all” (1988: 1). Nilsen’s statement may at first appear rather flippant, but on reflection is probably an accurate summation.

One should always bear in mind Dr. Johnson’s dictum: “Definition is, indeed, not the province of man; every thing is set above or below our faculties” (*The Rambler* No. 125, 28 May 1751, cited from Bate and Strauss (1969) (eds.): 300). The passage which immediately precedes this statement is very relevant to satire, and other products of the human intellect: “Things modified by human understandings, subject to varieties of complication, and changeable as experience advances knowledge, or accident influences caprice, are scarcely to be included in any standing form of expression, because they are always suffering some alteration of their state” (ibid.). More recently, Rosenheim has made the observation that what is recognized as satiric writing changes with time (1963: 2-3, 9). Consequently it would be unrealistic to expect a single definition to cover the whole range of satire from Roman *satira* to the present day. It will be necessary to determine what constitutes specifically Horatian *satira* from a close reading of *Serm.* 1, and this will be the topic of chapter 2.

Roman *satira*, as described by Quintilian (see p.2), is a distinct genre written in hexameter verse by Lucilius, Horace, Persius and Juvenal, over a period of about 250 years. Modern satire is more accurately regarded as the satirical mode with manifestations in many genres. Roman *satira*, especially before Juvenal, often seems to have very little in common with modern satire. One reason for this is that “in practice, Roman satire was not always or necessarily ‘satiric’ in tone” (Muecke 2005: 34). A useful perspective is provided by an observation of G.L. Hendrickson (1971: 38). He believes that in the history of satire disproportionate importance is attached to Roman satire, mainly because it supplied the name, for Western cultures at least.

Therefore, as Hendrickson argues, it is probably more accurate to regard the genre of Roman hexameter satire as just one literary manifestation of the satiric spirit among many: “not the source but only a tributary” (ibid.). Consequently, there is no reason to expect continuity from Roman *satura* to satire of the present day.

Humour in *satura*

It is commonly observed that poems in the genre of *satura* are serio-comic.¹⁷ It is also common for critics to concentrate on the serious element at the expense of the comic in the analysis of such poems. This is not really surprising because the subtle nature of the humour in *satura* is often very easy to overlook: the laughter provoked by *satura*, tends to be “not the *forte* of invective but the *piano* of irony” (Frye 1944: 82). In Horatian *satura*, the humour can often reside in the incongruity of serious subject matter being treated in a relatively light-hearted way.

Humour is fundamental to the Horatian satirist’s method: “ridentem dicere verum” (*Serm.* 1.1.24), and “ridiculum acri | fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res” (*Serm.* 1.10.14-15). Horace’s gentler humour is the principal way in which he differentiates himself from his predecessor, Lucilius. It is also seen in the way the perceptive Persius characterizes Horace’s method:

omne vafer vitium ridenti Flaccus amico
tangit et admissus circum praecordia ludit,
callidus excusso populum suspendere naso. (*Sat.* 1.116-18)

The “verum”, however, is just as important as the “ridentem”. Humour is the means by which the serious message is made more palatable (Hor. *Serm.* 1.1.25-6). Another problem with humour is that it is subjective and culture specific (Freudenburg 2005: 18-19). Judging whether something would have been perceived as humorous by Horace’s original audience can be very difficult. Conversely, humour that is dependent on native speaker knowledge of the language can now be missed.

Unless humour is the primary focus of a study, the serious element can predominate in interpretation. In this thesis, it will be assumed that *satura* is serio-comic, but not much attention will be paid to the humorous aspects.

¹⁷ Maria Plaza’s *The function of humour in Roman verse satire: laughing and lying* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006) was not available in time for inclusion in this thesis.

The concept of genre

The somewhat vexed question of genre is an aspect of literary criticism which is relevant to this thesis. What follows is not intended to be an exhaustive survey of the debates surrounding the whole notion of genre and its applicability, or otherwise, to Roman poetry. It is a brief survey only, and only to the extent that it is necessary to clarify two issues: the way in which the concept of genre is understood, and whether the use of the term is valid in a diachronic study of Horace's hexameter poems.

Beginning with the Romantic period, but more concretely with the work of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce in the early twentieth century, the tradition of classifying literary works by genre came under increasing suspicion (Dubrow 1982: 83). Croce objected to genre on the grounds that it distorts the reader's thinking from the intuitive to the logical level: for him creating and responding to art should be intuitive (Dubrow: *ibid.*). New Criticism, in the mid-twentieth century, with its focus on studying literary works in isolation from both context and other works, had little use for genres. The concept of genre became so unfashionable that in the mid-1970s a leading structuralist critic, sympathetic to the concept, could write: "To persist in discussing genres today might seem like an idle if not obviously anachronistic pastime" (Todorov 1976: 159). Todorov was reacting to the notion that the only valid literary genre is literature itself. In a similar vein, Alistair Fowler finds that genres have a role in modern literary criticism "not as permanent classes but as families subject to change" (1982: v).

The use of genres in criticism has been rejuvenated, but in a form very different from the prescriptive rules, notions of fixed kinds and 'purity', and hierarchy of the Renaissance and eighteenth century. Genre is now a tool of criticism, rather than a means of classification, and is seen as operating "much like a code of behavior established between the author and his reader" (Dubrow *ibid.*: 2). The work of Gian Biagio Conte provides a similar conception for classical literature. Conte's view has been summarized by Charles Segal:

We should view genre, he [Conte] suggests, not as something external to the work or as a category that modern critics impose for their convenience, but rather as the ancient poet's instrument for reaching the reader, organizing content and projecting thought in forms intelligible to the audience. Genre is a medium of literary communication ... in cultures like the Greco-Roman that have strongly defined literary traditions and therefore literary competences to connect author and audience in a common frame of reference. (Segal 1994: xiii)

The conventions appropriate to a particular genre assist the reader in interpreting and eliciting the meaning of a work. This point has relevance for *Epist.* 1 in that critics have commented on the difficulties caused in interpretation when a particular work is not perceived as fitting neatly into an accepted genre (Morris 1931: 81). Genre as an interpretative tool seems to be a valid concept for literary criticism, and one which is possibly used subconsciously even by critics who deny its existence.

One approach to genre, utilizing Wittgenstein's concept of family resemblances, is particularly relevant for a diachronic study. The basic of this approach is "that, in the loosely grouped family of works that make up a genre, there are no essential defining features, but only a set of family resemblances; each member shares some of these resemblances with some, but not all, of the other members of the genre" (Abrams⁷ 1999: 110). Obviously this concept has to be applied judiciously if it is to produce meaningful conclusions. The features selected must be more than superficial and formal, otherwise Horace's *Sermones* and Vergil's *Eclogues*, for example, could both be assigned to the same genre on the basis of metre and length. However, if features such as subject matter, tone, and place are taken into consideration very real differences start to emerge. Susanna Morton Braund provides a concise discussion of the features required by the "laws" of Roman verse satire, using the categories of "metre and form, material, presentation and language" (1996: 1-3).

There is evidence in Horace's text that he recognized something similar to the modern concept of genre. In *Serm.* 1.10 he justifies writing *satira* on the basis that other types of poetry are already being written, and being written well, by his contemporaries:

arguta meretrice potes Davoque Chremata
 eludente senem comis garrere libellos
 unus vivorum, Fundani; Pollio regum
 facta canit pede ter percusso; forte epos acer
 ut nemo Varius ducit; molle atque facetum
 Vergilio annuerunt gaudentes rure Camenae:
 hoc erat experto frustra Varrone Atacino
 atque quibusdam aliis melius quod scribere possem,
 inventore minor; neque ego illi detrahere ausim
 haerentem capiti cum multa laude coronam. (40-9)

This passage is written with the *varietas* characteristic of *satura*, and does not specify every genre by name; only “epos” (43) is denoted in this way. It is clear, however, that Horace distinguished between New Comedy (40-2), tragedy (42-3), heroic epic (43-4), pastoral (44-5), and *satura* (46-9) (here designated as “hoc” (46)), as distinct kinds of poetry, each with their own traits.¹⁸ In *Serm.* 1.4, the other literary *sermo* of Book 1, Horace twice uses the word “genus”, referring to *satura*, in the sense of genre: “quod sunt quos genus hoc minime iuvat” (24), and “genus hoc scribendi” (65).¹⁹

In the literary *Epistles* of Book 2 Horace again demonstrates his awareness of such distinctions. In *Epist.* 2.2.59-60 he distinguishes between the three ‘genres’ of his own corpus: “carmine tu gaudes, hic delectatur iambis, | ille Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro.”. Whatever the referent of “sermonibus” (60),²⁰ it is clear that he perceived differences between his lyric, iambic and hexameter poetry. If on no other grounds, there is an obvious distinction in terms of metre.

Finally, in a section of the *Ars* Horace discusses “*Diction as affected ..., by genre (73-98)*” (Rudd 1989: 60; also Muecke 2005: 33). This passage is of especial interest because it incorporates, with typical Horatian playfulness, the notion of restrictions placed on a poet by the ‘rules’ of the genre: “descriptas servare vices operumque colores | cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor?” (86-7). Charles Brink interprets “descriptas vices” as “genres” and “operum colores” as “styles” (1971: 171, *ad* 86-8; similarly Rudd 1989: *ad* 86). Here Horace appears to be stressing the importance of observing (“servare” (86)) generic conventions. This is reinforced by: “singula quaeque locum teneant sortita decentem.”(92). However, the thought is immediately undercut by: “interdum tamen et vocem comoedia tollit” (93), alluding to a crucial element in genre theory. Poets are aware of the *lex operis* and have no qualms about subverting the ‘rules’ of the genre. Indeed this has become an indispensable feature of literature. As Todorov points out, this practice can be used as

¹⁸ That this is not just an aberration and restricted to Horace is shown by Quintilian’s list of Roman authors, arranged by the type of writing (*Inst.* 10.1.85-124). In order, he treats epic (85-92), elegy (93), *satura* (93-4), Varronian *satura* (95), iambics (96), lyric (96), tragedy (97-8), New Comedy (99-100), history (101-4), oratory (105-22), and philosophy (123-4).

¹⁹ *Genus* has as one of its meanings: “a kind, class, form (of non-material or abstract object)” (*OLD*, s.v. ‘genus^{6c}’).

²⁰ Just what Horace included under “sermonibus” here will be discussed in ch.1.

evidence that genre is a meaningful concept: for something to be subverted it must first exist (1976: 160). It is inherently impossible to determine whether Horace's conception of genre corresponded to modern notions. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence to show that he was aware of distinctions between different kinds of poetry, and the importance of these distinctions for poets.

T.G. Rosenmeyer (1985) arguing against the existence of the concept of genres in antiquity maintains that Greek and Roman poets followed models, not the conventions of genres. “[The] allegiances and affiliations [of ancient poets] connect, not with a mode or a kind, but with a father, a personal guide” (81-2). The poet engages with this paternal figure through *aemulatio*, in the manner of a family quarrel. This does certainly seem to correspond with Horace's practice in *Serm.* 1.4.9-13, for example, where he criticizes his predecessor Lucilius for the prolix nature of his poetry. In the context of different types of poetry (*Serm.* 1.10.40-9, quoted p.18), Horace acknowledges Lucilius as “inventor” (48). If Lucilius is an “inventor”, he must be the “inventor” of something, and this can only be the type of poetry that Horace is writing, that is *satira* (“hoc” (46)). Rosenmeyer's notion of “model criticism” (ibid.: 81) therefore does not appear to preclude the concept of genre: the father figure as model can also be the originator of a genre. Conte, commenting on Rosenmeyer, supports this reasoning: “All in all Rosenmeyer is right; but it must not be forgotten that the imitation, if it succeeds, necessarily implies a degree of generalization: the imitative act requires that for the imitating poet the model functions as a ‘generic’ matrix capable of generating new texts.” (1994a: 174 n.1).

For the purposes of this thesis, genre is understood as a concept that is a consequence of the fact that although texts are written by individuals, they are written for an audience within a society (Most 2000: 15). Genre is a pragmatic mechanism for facilitating and simplifying access to the totality of texts produced. As Depew and Obbink observe: “A literary genre is significant only in relation to other genres” (2000: 8). Certain aspects of texts serve to relate them to, or differentiate them from, others: “To interpret a work, the critic needs to be able to relate it to similar texts” (Depew and Obbink *ibid.*: 9).

Genres should not be regarded as extrinsic to texts, or as prescriptive frameworks for classifying texts. They should also not be viewed as rigid categories, because genres are dynamic and change over time: “Genre is reborn and renewed at every new stage in the development of literature and in every individual work of a

given genre (Bakhtin 1984: 106). Although features evolve over time, certain similarities remain which permit texts to be grouped together. For example, the texts of the four major Roman satirists, spanning a period of about 250 years, can all be assigned to the genre *satura*, even though there are significant differences between them.

Care must be taken in utilizing the concept of family resemblances for genre in a diachronic study. If the features selected are too general, or too long a timespan is used, then supposed similarities between texts can be rendered meaningless (Kennedy 2005: 300). As has been stated above (see p.15), there is no continuity between Roman *satura* and modern satire. Further, it is considered that Roman *satura* is a distinct genre whereas modern satire is a mode.²¹ As this study will focus on *Serm.* 1, *Serm.* 2, and *Epist.* 1, three *libelli* which were written over a period of only about fifteen years, grouping them together by means of a sufficient number of appropriate family resemblances should be a valid procedure.

Classical genres such as *satura* can be characterized by certain features: “Poetic genres in antiquity were defined by a characteristic subject matter and the type of verse meter they used. Each genre had its place in a relative hierarchy from high to low, and implied by the hierarchy were certain distinctions of tone (e.g. serious vs. comic) and stylistic register (grand vs. everyday)” (Muecke 2005: 33). Braund (1996: 1-2) includes two further features which can be added to Muecke’s list: length of the composition (e.g. epic vs. *satura*), and “the type of presentation” (ibid.: 1). This relates to the method of narration (e.g. first person vs. third person), and form (e.g. dialogue vs. continuous narrative).

The features enumerated above will be used in determining genre for the three *libelli* to be studied.

Approaches to Horatian criticism

Approaches to Horatian scholarship in the twentieth century reflected the changing fashions in classical literary criticism. Stephen Harrison (1995b: 1-16) provides a comprehensive survey of Horatian criticism during this period, and the details will not be reiterated here.

²¹ Catherine Keane’s *Figuring genre in Roman satire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) was not available in time for inclusion in this thesis.

The New Criticism arose largely as a reaction to the biographical method which concentrated on the dating of individual poems, and the relation of content to events in the poet's life.²² Although it is obviously essential to avoid the extremes of this approach, New Historicism has revalidated the practice of studying literary texts as a component of their cultural background:

Literature is a cultural phenomenon, not a world unto itself. (Hume 1992: 89)

Without abandoning earlier study of language, form, and literary tradition, scholars have begun to consider as well the means through which literature was produced and circulated, the relationship between artist and patron, and ideological aspects of the production, consumption, and interpretation of classical literary texts. (Habinek 1998: 3)

Although not referring specifically to Horace, Segal appeals for moderation in criticism of classical texts: "In reacting against the biographical approach, then, we run the risk of heading for the opposite extreme and assuming that poetry has no contact at all with the life of the poet" (1968: 4). Segal later expressed this counsel with a different emphasis, now incorporating an essential caveat: "While literature is not independent of lived experience or historical events, it is not primarily the vehicle for making transparent, factual statements about truth and reality" (1994: ix). It is therefore necessary to maintain a balance between extremes of critical methods, something which is made more difficult in the case of Horace because he gives the impression of divulging autobiographical details. He also locates himself in his historical context by naming known contemporaries, often people in positions of power. Ellen Oliensis has drawn attention to the implications of this practice for the historical poet and his poetry:

To be sure, the speaker of Horace's poems is not identical with the poet who wrote them. But when he addresses living contemporaries such as Maecenas and Augustus, that speaker performs, in or under Horace's name, acts that may

²² The New Critics preferred to regard literature as autonomous. Wimsatt and Beardsley proposed that "Judging a poem is like judging a pudding or a machine. One demands that it work. It is only because an artifact works that we infer the intention of an artificer" (1954: 4). In a radio interview (*Kim Hill Radio New Zealand National Radio*, 05 Feb 2005), the historicist critic Stephen Greenblatt explained this analogy in terms of the biographical fallacy: the New Critics believed that it is not necessary to know the life history of the cook in order to judge the pudding. To this I would add that if it were a particularly innovative pudding, a knowledge of the cook's background might well enhance the experience by explaining the choice of ingredients and/or method of preparation.

have consequences for Horace himself, both for his material circumstances and for his present and future reputation. ... Horace's poetry is not just 'about' his life, it is an important part of his life. (1999: 86)

With respect to the important issue raised in Oliensis' quote, in this thesis it is assumed that the voice of Horace the satirist in the poems is a fictional *persona*²³ and is not identical with the actual poet. The name Q. Horatius Flaccus will be used to designate the historical poet.

The work of Eduard Fraenkel (1957a) illustrates another practice, related to biographical criticism, which is no longer considered desirable by many critics: that of selection and omission. Fraenkel omitted poems which either did not conform to his view of Horace, or where dating was too uncertain to fit neatly into his chronology of Horace's life (Harrison 1995b: 5). Ideally, and where appropriate, books of poems are now studied in their entirety as integrated collections, with due regard given to *dispositio*:

The only significant chronology in a *liber* of this sort [*Serm.* 1] is that of unrolling the book: that we are to read the first poem before the second, the second before the third. The order of reading creates its own dramatic time, and neither the Eclogues nor the Satires ever violate it. (Zetzel 1980: 63)

It seems beyond doubt, at any rate, that the ten poems [*Serm.* 1] belong together in something like the way the pieces in one of Bach's or Handel's suites belong together. ... we are supposed to listen to the component pieces in order. (Armstrong 1989: 27)

Lowell Edmunds has drawn attention to the fact that ancient audiences would not have read poems in isolation: "Ancient response to poetry did not take the form of interpretations of individual poems, nor, for that matter, has modern response done so until the beginning of the present [twentieth] century" (1992: 41-2).

The application of theoretical approaches to the study of classical texts is a relatively recent phenomenon. Gian Biagio Conte has employed his own combination of reception theory and traditional philology to analyse a selection of works from a variety of classical authors. For example, in *Genres and readers* (1994a) he applies

²³ The application of the concept of *persona* to satire in general was pioneered in the 1950s by Maynard Mack (1971 [1951]: 190-201), and became firmly established in the field of Roman verse satire, especially through the work of W.S. Anderson. See Freudenburg (2005: 28-9, esp. n.58) for brief discussion and further references. See also Braund (1996: 2 n.1) for further references.

this technique to Lucretius, Ovid (*Remedia amoris*), and the *Naturalis historia* of Pliny the Elder. Conte has adopted “the idea not of a *reader-interpreter* (which seems to have become prevalent in contemporary hermeneutics), but of a *reader addressee*. ... [which] is the figure of the recipient as anticipated by the text” (1994a: xx; italics original). He subscribes to “a model of directed reception” whereby “the text’s form and intentionality determine the reader’s form” (ibid.); “the text itself has been constructed in a certain way, and not in another, precisely so that the reader can receive and decode it” (xviii). Although texts may be polysemic, there cannot be an infinite plurality of meanings. The same point is made by Woodman and Powell: “the cultural context in which a work was composed, the conventions of linguistic usage current at the time of writing, and the type of audience which we may legitimately suppose the author to have had in mind, must impose limits on the range of reasonable interpretations, which cannot be overstepped without falling into irrelevance or absurdity” (1992: 210). This refinement is surely essential when working with classical texts. We cannot read these texts with native-speaker intuitions about possible meanings of words.²⁴ Moreover, the meanings we assign need to be validated by prior scholarship in dictionaries and commentaries.

With respect to Horace, there has been a tendency to apply theoretical techniques to isolated poems, whether lyric or hexameter, rather than to a whole book. Edmunds (1992) has utilized a Jaussian model to produce multiple readings of the Soracte ode (*Carm.* 1.9). John Henderson has applied his unique style of deconstruction and other post-structuralist techniques to selected *Sermones*, namely 1.2 and 1.8 (1989: 102-12, 139-44); 1.7 (1998: 73-107), and 1.9 (1999: 202-27). It may be significant that *Serm.* 2, in which Horace made more complex use of dialogue, does not appear to have attracted very much theoretical attention, or indeed sequential readings as have been published by, for example, James Zetzel (1980) and Braund (1992: 17-22) for *Serm.* 1, and Michael McGann (1969: 33-87) for *Epist.* 1.

Whatever approach is taken to any literary text it is imperative that the methodology is inductive, and that “above all, it is the text itself which should direct

²⁴ “Ancient texts are not accessible without knowledge of ancient languages, which can never be as perfect as the knowledge of a modern, spoken language” (Edmunds 1992: ix). “We can never read classical texts with the background knowledge, or with quite the level of linguistic competence, that an ancient reader would have had” (Woodman and Powell 1992: 207).

us to the method rather than the other way around” (Segal 1992: 170). Given this caveat, and the observation that for Horatian texts the majority of theoretical applications have been used with selected poems, not with whole books or with comparisons of texts, a more traditional, empirical method will be employed for this study.

The method to be adopted is a close reading of the two books of *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1. The three *libelli* will be read sequentially, focusing on selected themes as outlined below. Conclusions reached will be based on evidence derived from an individual reading of the texts, with due regard for appropriate prior scholarship.

A thematic approach has been employed in the diachronic criticism of Roman satire, from Lucilius to Juvenal, for example, by Rudd in his *Themes in Roman satire* (1986). The use of themes in the criticism of Roman satire has not met with universal approval. In particular John Henderson vehemently criticized Rudd (1986) in an “extended nasty note” (1989: 140 n.7). Henderson objected to a thematic approach on the grounds “that ‘themes’ are the things you choose as your organisational units *if* you want to slice up your material into artificially separate chunks” (ibid.: 140-1; italics original). However, it is not the intention here to use themes in this way. On the contrary, themes will be traced through the three books, in order to demonstrate that they are unified. In a comparative study of texts the selection necessitated by a thematic approach is unavoidable.

This method is essentially that of Braund (1992: 17-22). Following Zetzel (1980), in a sequential reading of *Serm.* 1 she traces the “story” (ibid.: 17) of Horace moving from outsider to insider with respect to the circle of Maecenas. In this context, Braund’s “story” is equivalent to a ‘theme’. In an earlier publication, Braund refers to the “development of his [Horace’s] satiric *persona* over his four books of *satura* [from *Serm.* 1 through to *Epist.* 2]” (1988: 197).

The theme chosen is that of *locus*: ‘place’, both in the sense of geographical location, and status²⁵. Both these meanings are attested for *locus*.²⁶ This choice has

²⁵ “Position or standing in society; rank, profession; relative importance” (*Shorter Oxford Dictionary* (1993), s.v. ‘status³’).

²⁶ “A place (regarded as having extent), locality, neighbourhood, etc. (*OLD*, s.v. ‘locus¹’); “Position in society, rank, station. (ibid.: ‘locus¹⁷’). Horace himself uses “locus” in the sense of status in *Serm.* 1.9: “est locus uni | cuique suus” (51-2).

been prompted by suggestions from various sources. First and foremost, it seems to be a common assumption of satire criticism that satire is an urban genre, and this assumption is often extended back to Roman satire. Braund is representative of this opinion: “Why does Roman satire use the city as a setting? Roman satire is in this respect no different from most satire, which is set in the big city: Hodgart rightly describes satire as ‘an urban art’” (1989b: 23). Braund (23-4) continues with a quote from Alvin Kernan (1959: 7-8) which is a list of the evils of the bustling, depraved city, and concludes: “It is no accident that most satire is set in the city, particularly in the metropolis with a polyglot people.”²⁷ While this description of urban satire may well fit the *Saturae* of Juvenal, especially 1 to 6, the first impression is that it may not be as appropriate for Horace’s *Sermones*.

Matthew Hodgart (1969), cited by Braund, focuses on eighteenth-century English satire, and Kernan (1959) on Elizabethan satire of the period 1590-1615. Both periods were more heavily influenced by Juvenal than by Horace. Significantly, the classical examples cited by Kernan, in the passage quoted by Braund, are “Trimalchio’s banquet room, the streets of Juvenal’s Rome” (ibid.: 8). In addition, Kernan later acknowledges that the satiric *persona* he has been describing was modified by several satirists, including Horace (ibid.: 28-9).

Place, as location, is an important feature in Horace’s hexameter poems, but does not seem to have received much critical attention in Horatian scholarship.²⁸ It will be demonstrated, in chapter 3, that the majority of the poems of *Serm.* 1 have an urban setting, often established by incidental details. There are two, well-marked exceptions: 1.5 and 1.7. In *Serm.* 2, one poem in particular, 2.6, has been widely studied with respect to the *Urbs/rus* dichotomy.²⁹ It has been observed that “the poems of book 2 all have distinctly Roman locales” (White 1993:86). This does not mean that all are set in the *Urbs*, but that all contain details which locate them in contemporary Roman society. This even applies to 2.5, a poem in which the explicit time and place are supposedly remote from Horace’s Rome.

²⁷ The *Urbs* in Roman literature has been discussed by Edwards (1996); Gold (1998), and Welch (2005).

²⁸ Salmon (1952); Anderson (1984); Leach (1993); Bond (2001).

²⁹ On *Serm.* 2.6: Brink (1965); West (1974); Rudd² (1982a, 243-57); Bond (1985); Braund (1989b, 39-42).

The ‘diatribe’ of “Ofellus rusticus” (*Serm.* 2.2), and the fable of the “mus urbanus” and “mus rusticus” (2.6.79-117) illustrate Horace’s symbolic use of location, especially the nexus between location and philosophy. In these two poems, the *rus* is associated with the *victus tenuis*, which facilitates *libertas* in Epicurean terms. The *Urbs* is associated with food and extravagance in 2.2, and with wrong thinking in connection with food in 2.4 and 2.8. The *Urbs* is associated with negative connotations of Stoic philosophy in 2.3 and 2.7.

In *Epist.* 1, the epistolary form implies that the writer and addressee are in separate locations. In several poems (1.7, 1.10, 1.14, 1.17, 1.18), the *Urbs/rus* dichotomy is relevant. In others (for example, 1.3, 1.11, 1.12), Horace’s addressees are in more remote locations, while in some poems, place is used simply as a marker of epistolarity (Williams 1968: 13). As in *Serm.* 2, the *rus* is symbolic of Epicurean *libertas*.

As Horace himself emphasized his non-aristocratic background, and his being “libertino patre natus” (*Serm.* 1.6.6, 45, 46; *Epist.* 1.20.20), it is not surprising that his social status has attracted critical attention, both in absolute³⁰ and relative terms. The latter obviously involves literary patronage, and especially Horace’s relationship with Maecenas.³¹ As both topics have been widely discussed in the literature, only those aspects of patronage which are immediately relevant to this study will be covered here.

Patronage, in the context of ancient societies, entails three basic conditions: “(i) an exchange of goods and/or services that is reciprocal; (ii) the relationship must be a personal one, and of some duration; (iii) the relationship must be asymmetrical, inasmuch as the two parties are of unequal status, offering each other different sorts of goods and services” (Millett 1989: 16, following Saller 1982: 1). To Saller’s three

³⁰ Taylor (1925, 1968); E.L. Harrison (1965); Treggiari (1973); Armstrong (1986); Anderson (1995); Mayer (1995); Williams (1995); Oliensis (1998).

³¹ **Patronage in general:** Brunt (1965); Blok (1969); Saller (1982, 1989); Garnsey and Saller (1987: 148-59); Wallace-Hadrill (1989b); Gruen (1993: 303-6); Konstan (1995, 1997, 2005); Damon (1997).

Literary patronage: Treggiari (1977); White (1978, 1993, 2005); Gold (1982) (ed.); Quinn (1982); Williams (1982, 1990); Wiseman (1982); Zetzel (1982); Badian (1985); Griffin (1984); Gold (1987); Mayer (1989); Konstan (1995, 1997, 2005); Bowditch (2001).

Horace and Maecenas: Hewitt (1940/41); Dalzell (1956); Reckford (1959); McGann (1973); Bradshaw (1989); Horsfall (1981a, 1983); DuQuesnay (1984); Gold (1987, 1992); McNeill (2001).

conditions, Paul Millett has “tentatively add[ed] a fourth: namely, that the relationship was conducted along lines largely determined by the party of superior status. It is this that opens up the way for the exploitation that is so common in patron-client relations” (ibid., cited by Konstan 1995: 328).³²

It is a common observation that determining the exact nature of a relationship between people of unequal social status is complicated by the terms used in Latin texts. The words *patronus* and *cliens* were not generally used, because of connotations of “social inferiority and degradation” (Saller ibid.: 9) for the lower status partner. *Amicus* was the preferred term, with the cognate *amicitia* used to denote the relationship. As critics have noted, this usage creates problems for interpretation: “The term *amicitia* is indeed ambiguous within a wide range. To determine its exact nuance in any particular context requires tact and discrimination, and it is often found where we have not sufficient knowledge of the circumstances to discriminate” (Brunt 1965: 11). Horace’s use of terms illustrates the wide variety of relationships designated by *amicitia/amicus*, and the relative avoidance of *patronus* and *cliens*. A few examples will be cited here.

Friendship is thematic in *Serm.* 1.3, and consequently words signifying this concept are well represented. “Amici” is used to indicate friends in general (1, 26, 33, 43, 50, 54, 73), and unspecified friends of Horace (69, 84, 93, 140). The last occurrence in this list is qualified by “dulces” (139). As both Octavian (“Caesar” (4) and Maecenas (64) are mentioned in this poem, there is the implication they are included in this reference. Finally, “amicitia” is used to denote the relationship between Octavian and Julius Caesar, and Tigellius Sardus (5), as well as friendship in general, contrasted with love (41).

As “amicitia” (*Serm.* 1.3.5, above) is used for a relationship between people of unequal status, so Horace uses “amicus” in similar contexts. For example, in *Serm.* 1.6 Horace uses “amicus” (50, 53, 62) of himself with respect to Maecenas, having emphasized their inequality at the beginning of the poem (1-6). At *Serm.* 2.8.60 “amicus” is used of Nasidienus, the host of the *cena*, as ‘friend’ of Nomentanus, described as one of “Nasidienus’s parasites” (Muecke 1993: *ad* 2.8.23). At *Serm.* 2.7.2-3, Horace’s slave Davus introduces himself, paradoxically, as “amicum |

³² These conditions may not necessarily be applicable to the relationship between a patron and a literary client: potential differences for this specialized patronage will be discussed below.

mancipium domino”. It is only the setting of this poem at the Saturnalia that grants Davus temporary equality as an “amicus” of his master (Muecke *ibid.*: ad 2.7.3).

Epist. 1 as a *libellus* has been dubbed “The poetry of friendship” (Kilpatrick 1986), so it is not surprising that the poems exhibit the vocabulary of friendship. More significantly, they contain examples of Horace’s rare usage of *cliens* and *patronus*. At *Epist.* 1.5.31 “cliens” is probably used neutrally to denote a client “coming for legal advice” (Dilke² 1961: ad loc.), appropriate for Torquatus, Horace’s addressee. In *Epist.* 1.7 Horace explores problems associated with patronage. In the context of his own relationship, he addresses Maecenas as “dulcis amice” (12). But in the long anecdote (46-95) of Philippus and the unfortunate Vulteius Mena, “amicus” is not used. “Patronus” (54) is used by Philippus to denote a possible patron for Mena, and Mena later addresses Philippus as “patrone” (92). Mena himself is referred to as “cliens” (75). The relationship is depicted as one displaying exploitation, emphasized by Millett (see p.28).

Epist. 1.18 also deals with patronage and contains some revealing uses of “amicus”. Horace addresses Lollius as “amice” (106), and refers to him as “amicus” (2, 4), in both instances contrasted with “scurra”, presumably in the context of a relationship with a person of higher status. In this poem qualifying adjectives are used to disambiguate “amicus” when it is used to denote a patron: “dives amicus” (24), “potentis amici” (44, 86), and “venerandi ... amici” (73). This clarification emphasizes the higher status of the patron. Finally, “amicus” (101) is used, in a section where Horace is advocating the study of philosophy for Lollius, in the sense of being a friend to oneself.

The examples cited above are representative of Horace’s usage of *amicus/amicitia* in the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1, and demonstrate the wide range of denotation for these words. As a consequence of this, it will be necessary to consider the context and tone of poems in order to interpret the nature of relationships designated in this way.

The fact that “the word *amicus* ... is a nicely ambiguous word which applies equally well to political allies or personal intimates, to the patron or the client” (Gold 1987: 134) raises the question as to whether *amicitia* when used of a patron/client relationship can signify true friendship. David Konstan, in opposition to Nicholas Horsfall (1981a: 5), argues that “friendship is ... distinct from clientship”, and that “Horace ... regarded himself as Maecenas’ friend” (1995: 329). Konstan does

concede that the relationship between Horace and Maecenas may have entailed some obligations as a client (*ibid.*), which suggests that where there are obvious status differences between the parties it may not in fact be possible to distinguish between friendship and clientship. More recently, Konstan has acknowledged that this is still an open question: “How patronage and friendship interacted remains a disputed question. ... could patron and client be true friends? ... work remains to be done” (2005: 359).

A further related aspect of patronage is whether or not literary patronage differed from other forms. Again, critical opinion is not unanimous on this matter. Several critics, for example, White (1978: 76, 1993: 29); Horsfall (1981a: 9), consider the situation for literary clients to be no different: “From a Roman perspective, ... the relationships between poets and their prominent friends looked no different from a mass of other relationships in upper-class society which presented subtly compounded elements of parity and inequality. All alike go by the name of friendship” (White 1993: 29).

On the other hand, James Zetzel (1982: 101) and Jasper Griffin regard the relationship with poets as “special” (Griffin 1984: 217 n.43), at least as far as Augustus is concerned, on the grounds that: “An ordinary client could not offer you immortal glory, nor would posterity have its eye on the nature of your relationship with him” (Griffin: *ibid.*). This is undoubtedly true with respect to the *beneficia* that a client-poet could offer to his patron. However, in their poems dependent poets do complain about the irksome nature of the duties of “an ordinary client” that they are required to perform, such as “the morning *salutatio*” (Gold 1987: 40). Horace certainly gives the impression that he was expected to perform non-literary duties for Maecenas (*Serm.* 2.6.23-58) (Muecke 1993: *ad* 2.6.40-58). These urban duties per se are not portrayed as being congenial for Horace, even if the prospect of Maecenas’ company is a source of pleasure (31-2).

Barbara Gold represents an intermediate position on this issue, namely that literary clients “often performed some of the same functions as the lesser *clientes*” (1987: 40), while also being distinguished by the special nature of their literary services. She traces this development to the arrival of Greek poets in Rome earlier in the first century BCE. These poets, for example Archias patronized by Cicero, had enjoyed high social status in their own communities but needed patronage in order to

obtain Roman citizenship. Their previous higher status brought about a change in attitude on the part of Roman patrons towards these literary clients (*ibid.*: 71).

Peter White's insights on Roman friendship expand Gold's perspective. He argues that "friendship as Roman writers present it is based on ... ethical congruence" (1993: 14). Although a poet like Horace may not be the equal of Maecenas with respect to social status, if the two men share certain attitudes, such as moral values and literary standards, then as far as those attitudes are concerned they can become more equal. These shared attitudes "unite the partners rather than ... [the] status differences which divide them" (*ibid.*: 276 n.20). Horace exemplifies this with the list of his desired audience (*Serm.* 1.10.81-6) in which, in a literary context, the names of *potentes amici* are not presented in any order of precedence.

The evidence surveyed above suggests that literary clients were to a certain extent in a similar relationship to ordinary clients, while at the same time regarded as special because of their literary services. Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller offer a classification of patronage relationships which accommodates this situation. Their categories, which should not be interpreted as rigid, are "patrons and clients, superior and inferior friends (or patrons and protégés), and equal friends" (1987:149). The intermediate category would seem to be appropriate for the relationship between Horace and Maecenas as it is portrayed in the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1.³³ There is still a status differential between the participants, but there is also allowance for closer friendship than that between a patron and an ordinary client.

In conclusion, it must be stressed that what is most important is the relationship as portrayed in the poet's texts. In actuality, Q. Horatius Flaccus may have enjoyed a close friendship with Maecenas and Octavian/Augustus, but the truth or otherwise of that assertion is ultimately unknowable. Another difficulty is that notions of friendship are culture-specific. Konstan has argued that "ancient friendship in general, ... [is] a bond based on mutual affection rather than obligation" (2005:358), and in his 1995 article seems reluctant to accept a utilitarian basis. In this respect, especially in Horace's poetry, the influence of Epicurean philosophy must be considered. For the Epicureans friendship was of prime importance: "Of all the things which wisdom acquires to produce the blessedness of the complete life, far the

³³ "The Poet as Companion and Protégé" (White 1993: title of ch.1) implies a similar conception of relationships with literary clients.

greatest is the possession of friendship” (*RS* 27, tr. Bailey 1970: 101), and has utilitarian foundations: “All friendship is desirable in itself, though it starts from the need of help” (*Sent. Vat.* 23, tr. Bailey 1970: 109). In three poems in *Epist.* 1 (1.7, 1.17 and 1.18) Horace explores the nature and problems of relationships with men of higher social status. As will be demonstrated in chapter 5, these poems confirm Konstan’s observation that: “There was ... a tense dialectic between *amicitia* and clientship” (1995: 341).

The stance that will be adopted in this thesis is that Horace portrays himself as a client-poet of Maecenas. Although the attitudes of the two men are in many respects “ethically congruent”, Horace makes it clear, especially in *Serm.* 1.6, that his social status is lower than that of Maecenas. It will be argued that, in the hexameter corpus, Horace often depicts himself at a distance from his patron, and that in the later poems he exhibits a degree of ambivalence towards patronage relationships.

Horace’s hexameter corpus as political poetry

It has never been denied that some of Horace’s corpus was ‘political’ poetry, especially poems such as the ‘Roman Odes’ (*Carm.* 3.1-6). But before about the mid-1980s there was a “remarkable consensus” (Kennedy 1992: 29) view that the *Sermones* were apolitical: “in Horace’s *Satires* and *Epistles* ... there is ... the least reflection on political issues” (Williams 1982: 14-15³⁴). DuQuesnay’s (1984) essay has aroused interest in the possibility of a political reading of the *Sermones*, and has been accepted by a broad spectrum of critics. There is, however, still some resistance to a political interpretation (Rudd 1986: 54 n.4; Griffin 1993: 1-22; Lyne 1995: 21-30, 186-92). The essential element in these objections is adherence to the traditional distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ poetry: “The Horace of the *Satires* is typically concerned with *private* ‘morality’, in particular with how a man should secure his own private *contentment*” (Lyne 1995: 23; italics original).

³⁴ Also: Commager 1995 [1962]: 160; McGann 1973: 64; Rudd 1982a: 37, 1982b: 370.

Williams connects the distinction between political and apolitical poetry in Horace’s corpus with differing *personae*. He states that “in Horace’s *Satires* and *Epistles* ... there is the least distinction between the real personality and the poetic persona” (1982: 14-15). While it is true that in “the *Odes*, ... the poet adopted the highly specialized persona of the *vates*” (ibid.: 15), it is not clear how we can know that the *persona* in the hexameter poems approximates to the poet’s “real personality”.

It is instructive to briefly compare Rudd's opinions concerning *Carm.* 3 as a whole with those of David West, a critic who supports a political reading of *Serm.* 1 (1997: xii). In the introduction to the most recent commentary on *Carm.* 3 (Nisbet-Rudd 2004), reference is made to "some of the non-political poems [of *Carm.* 3]" (xx); and more specifically: "In 24 BC Horace celebrates the great man's return to Rome in an ode that combines his roles as a public and a private poet (3.14)" (ibid.: xxii). By contrast, West "find[s] Augustan elements throughout [*Carm.* 3]" (2002: xiv). The ostensibly 'private' love poems, based on Greek models, are compatible "with Augustus' desire to foster a culture which could rival the Greek achievements" (ibid.).

In this context it is essential to clarify what is understood by the terms 'public' and 'private'. As Oliensis points out, all Horace's poetry is 'public' in the sense that it would have been read by his patrons and a wider immediate audience (1999: 86). Self-evidently any strictly 'private', that is, non-published, poetry that Horace wrote would not have survived. Lyne uses 'public' in the restricted sense of "when Horace dealt with political themes or addressed great public figures" (1995: vii). Even this causes problems because in the *Sermones*, which Lyne considers apolitical, Horace addresses Maecenas. It is in fact desirable to dispense with the traditional public/private antithesis. As DuQuesnay's reading has shown, what superficially may appear to be personal and private can actually be functioning politically:

Divisions between the 'public' and the 'private' are ideological in that they mobilise power in society in specific directions and thus serve some interests at the expense of others. The so-called 'personal' is 'political' in that the constitution and exercise of power involves compliance. It can be precisely those things that present themselves, or are presented as, apolitical that are the most actively political in allowing power to be accumulated and exercised in ways that extend beyond the notice of those involved. (Kennedy 1992: 34)

Lyne's concept of sapping (1995: index, s.v. 'sapping', esp. 207 n.1) implies that he would accept a political dimension which is covert and oppositional. Several critics, for example, Kennedy (1992: 30) and Santirocco (1995: 226-7), have commented on a preoccupation with detecting oppositional ideology in the work of the Augustan poets. Santirocco sees this as reflective of a desire to liberate the poets from the status of "paid agents of the regime" (ibid.: 227). Duncan Kennedy observes that terms like "political" have come to be accepted in the context of "issues of conflict, overt differences and instances of disruption" (ibid.). He continues:

“However, reconciliation and integration are no less political processes in that they affect the distribution of power in specific social contexts” (ibid.). Like Santirocco, Kennedy attributes the need to find oppositional ideology to the critics’ desire to locate literature in a place remote from “the diurnal sordidness of politics” (ibid.).

DuQuesnay’s (1984)³⁵ examines “The propaganda value of *Sermones* 1”, in the historical context of the time of writing, the extremely dangerous situation of 38-36 BCE, when Octavian was involved in a struggle with Sextus Pompeius (ibid.: 21-3). He argues that Horace in *Serm.* 1, in an indirect way, supports Octavian in the ongoing conflict by presenting himself and his *amici* as the champions of true *libertas*. Horace redefines “Lucilian *libertas* as something morally responsible [and] invites the inference that the Triumvirs are opposed not to true *libertas*, which is traditional and responsible, but rather to licence, the irresponsible, malicious and divisive exercise of freedom with which true *libertas* is wrongly confused by those who oppose them.” (30). Lucilius, the “inventor” of the genre (*Serm.* 1.10.48), had become a symbol of Republican *libertas* (Cic. *Fam.* 12.16.3) (DuQuesnay: 29), and Horace’s stylistic criticisms of Lucilius in *Serm.* 1.4 and 1.10 have an underlying political dimension (27-32). “Horace’s choice of Lucilius as a model was not politically naive” (Galinsky 1996: 57).³⁶

DuQuesnay himself is obviously uncomfortable about the use of the term “propaganda” with its “ugly connotations” of “the crude, the obvious and the strident” (57). In his review Kennedy (1984: 158-60) articulates DuQuesnay’s argument in terms of the work of Jacques Ellul (1973) on propaganda, which DuQuesnay himself does not acknowledge. It is certainly true that *Serm.* 1 can be read as Ellul’s “rational, horizontal, sociological propaganda of integration” (Kennedy ibid.: 158), but the application of Ellul’s concepts to Horace’s poetry is anachronistic and distortive. Ellul emphasizes that he considers propaganda to be “a *modern technique*” (1973: 3; italics original), and that “integration propaganda” is inextricably connected with “mass

³⁵ All subsequent references to DuQuesnay, in this and later chapters, will be to this work unless indicated otherwise.

³⁶ Horace’s relationship with Lucilius and its political ramifications will be explored in more detail in ch.2.

media” (ibid.: vi). Moreover he distinguishes between modern propaganda and “the primitive stages ... that existed in the time of Pericles or Augustus” (4).³⁷

White objects to a “political interpretation of Augustan poetry” (1993: 96) on the grounds that it implies that “Augustus has a program” and that the poets were in some way directed to “communicate [this program] to the public” (ibid.: 95). In essence White is objecting to the influential view of Syme (1939), especially chapter XXX: “The organization of opinion”.³⁸ In the conclusion to the book White suggests an approach which avoids the concept of propaganda with its connotations of the totalitarian regimes of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin, as well as more recent conflicts. White’s suggestion is that “the poets elaborated an Augustan thematic by themselves, independently both of Augustus and of one another” (ibid.: 206).³⁹ This approach has been espoused by many critics,⁴⁰ and continues to find favour: “These poets wrote for an elite public, and their aim was not so much to doctor history as to articulate a vision of the principate in which they and their peers might believe” (Konstan 2005: 355).

At least for the Triumviral period, rather than Octavian giving orders via Maecenas, or the poets engaging in subversion, now all involved are considered to be sharing a common goal (Galinsky 1996: 57). The poets are actively engaged in shaping Augustan ideology, rather than passively promulgating pre-existing ideology

³⁷ These reservations notwithstanding, Ellul’s concept of propaganda may be applicable to some genres of Roman poetry. Lindsay Watson’s (1987) essay demonstrates how Hor. *Epod.* 9 can be interpreted in the light of Ellul’s ideas on propaganda. Especially interesting is Watson’s observation of the similarities between the aims of traditional Greek and Roman rhetoric, and of what is now known as propaganda (ibid.: 122).

³⁸ White does not mention Syme by name, but Denis Feeney in his review (*BMCR* 94.06.16) clarifies the target of White’s criticisms.

³⁹ More recently, White has modified his opinion on this issue. He now states that “Maecenas might have encouraged verse in praise of Augustus” (2005: 331) and that “Augustus may have manipulated literary interactions which for other aristocrats would have belonged to the realm of the apolitical” (ibid.: 335). This change of direction for White is reminiscent of Williams’s relatively recent proposal that “the main generative force in the production of political poems in the thirties and twenties” was “imperative suggestion” from Maecenas (1990: 269). It can be concluded that the question of whether the Augustan poets were subject to direction is still an open one.

⁴⁰ For example: Zanker tr. Shapiro 1988: 3, 107, 283, 338; Conte 1994b: 251; Galinsky 1996: 5, 39-41, 57, 2005: 8; West 1997: xii.

(Santirocco 1995: 227). The basis for this self-motivated support is not just “that Augustus was a poetically exciting idea” (White 1993: 207). There must have been genuine relief after so many years of civil strife, and optimism that Octavian/Augustus could bring stability and peace. As Syme himself acknowledges: “The class to which these men of letters [Virgil, Horace and Livy] belonged had everything to gain from the new order” (1939: 464).

The stance to be adopted in this thesis is that Horace, in the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1, did not write under any sort of prescriptive direction from his patrons. With respect to the political dimension in the *libelli* it is assumed that “it is more accurate to speak of Horace’s political movement than of his political position” (Commager 1995: 160).⁴¹ In *Serm.* 1, essentially following, but also supplementing, DuQuesnay, it will be argued that Horace indirectly expresses support for Maecenas and Octavian. This support is articulated in terms of Horace’s lifestyle, and relationship with Maecenas and other *amici*. David West has succinctly described the image portrayed by Horace: “The effect of the first book of the *Satires* was to present Maecenas and his friends as humane, humorous, cultured, morally serious, and above all flattery and corruption” (1997: xii). It will be argued, in chapter 4, that in *Serm.* 2 Horace’s attitude evolves to one of greater detachment, representing a degree of ambivalence towards political developments. In *Epist.* 1 (chapter 5), there is a gradual shift towards acceptance of the political situation, and a resolution, through compromise, of the conflict between patronage and personal *libertas*.

Summary of method

With respect to the overall approach to the thesis, a comprehensive sequential reading of *Serm.* 1 and 2 and *Epist.* 1 will be undertaken. This will involve close reading of the texts in published order, focussing on content and context. Content is predominantly the theme of *locus*, place, as location and social status. These two interconnected aspects of place, together with Horace’s concomitant use of philosophy, especially Epicureanism and Stoicism, will be traced through the three *libelli*. A further unavoidable theme is Horace’s concern with poetry itself. The poems will be read in the literary context of self-referentiality within Horace’s three books,

⁴¹ This view is endorsed by David Armstrong in his foreword to this second edition (1995: vi). It should be noted, however, that Commager regards the *Sermones* as apolitical (1995: 160).

and intertextuality with other poets, for example, Lucretius. In addition, the relationship of the poems to their socio-political context will be considered. One consequence of a comprehensive sequential reading is that not all poems are equally relevant to the main themes. Nevertheless all poems will be included for completeness, and because some details may acquire relevance in hindsight through repetition or variation.

CHAPTER 1

Do Horace's *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1 all belong to the genre of *satura*?

In this chapter it will be demonstrated that it is not possible to decide this question on the basis of evidence from secondary literature, or superficial evidence from the primary texts. As a consequence of this, much of the evidence presented is inconclusive. The question being explored is of a type for which doubt must remain.

Opinions from modern scholarship

A survey of opinions, mostly from twentieth-century scholarship, has revealed that for the majority of critics there are considerable similarities between the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1. The three *libelli* are all written in dactylic hexameters, and are relatively informal both stylistically and linguistically. There is also continuity in the basic concerns of the subject matter. On a superficial level at least, the three *libelli* share the features of ancient genres discussed elsewhere (see p.21).

The titles *Sermones* and *Epistulae* may have been given by Horace to his different books of satires, as indicating in a general way the different forms of the *musa pedestris* which he had chosen. (Hendrickson 1897: 322-3)

The epistles, indeed, are simply a subdivision of the satiric form. (Fiske 1920: 426)

Fiske reinforced this assessment by including passages from *Epist.* 1 (and 2) in his catalogue of parallel passages from Lucilius and Horace (*ibid.*: 520-4).

Horace's epistles belong to the same literary genre as the satires. Porphyrio attests to this [On Horace, *Satires* 1.1.1 and *Epistles* 1.1.1] and Horace himself suggests it [*Epistles* 2.1.250-9; cf. 2.1.4]. Moreover, considerations of meter, language, and style show that the basic rationale is the same in both. It is just that with the epistles Horace has perfected his mastery of the art still further. (Knoche 1975: 89)

The generic differences between the *Satires* and *Epistles*, except for those dictated by the time, experience, and an altered perspective on life, are minor. (Kilpatrick 1986: xv)

Both types use the same meter (dactylic hexameter) to present similar personal, social, and philosophical concerns. They both portray men's foolish strivings, in defence of Horace's style of living and writing. There is as great a

difference between *Satires* I and II as between *Satires* II and the *Epistles*. (ibid.: xiv)

All the above quotes express or imply that all three *libelli* belong to the genre of *satura*. This is also the opinion of Braund (1992: 25). To a certain extent, differences can be attributed to the greater maturity of the satirist's *persona*. The epistolary form necessitates the inclusion of features which mark the poems as letters, and this is the basis of Dilke's assertion that the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1 "differ in certain important respects" (1981: 1837). The extent to which the poems of *Epist.* 1 exhibit epistolary features will be discussed in the last section of this chapter (see p.61).

Fraenkel's opinion on the genre of *Epist.* 1 is somewhat difficult to discern. Although he described them as "an organic continuation of his [Horace's] *Satires*. ... show[ing] many characteristic features of those *sermones*, both in form and in matter" (1957a: 310), he had previously stated that Horace's ideas had become "too serious" for *satura* (ibid.: 309). Fraenkel's views are complicated by two factors: he followed Edmond Courbaud in believing that the *Epistles* were "genuine letters" (310),¹ and in subscribing to an "evolutionary approach to the *Satires*" (Rudd² 1982a: 152).² The latter raises particular problems in Fraenkel's case because of his very low opinion of *Serm.* 2 (1957a: 144-5).³ With reference to *Serm.* 2, he remarks: "when he realized that the natural stream of his *sermones* had ceased to flow, he abandoned the writing of such poems" (145). Elsewhere, in the context of *Epist.* 1, he writes: "But though the potentialities of the Horatian *satira* were exhausted, the potentialities of the

¹ The fictional nature of Horace's *Epistles* has been conclusively established by Gordon Williams (1968: 1-30), anticipated by Morris (1931: 82). "The battle between Fraenkel (1957), 308-63, and Williams (1968), 1-30, on this question is now a distant Titanomachy" (Harrison 1995c: 47 n.1).

² Rudd (1982a: 152-9) convincingly argues against this "evolutionary approach ... which regards Horatian satire as a kind of living organism passing through the phases of growth, maturity and decay" (152). The most extreme manifestation of this approach was that of Courbaud (cited by Rudd ibid.: 154) who thought that the *Epistles* were the only true medium for the expression of Horace's poetic genius. As Rudd dryly remarks: "One can only feel thankful that the poet discovered his proper *métier* before it was too late" (295 n.50).

³ "Perhaps it is unfair to judge the rest of the second book by the standard of the uncommonly happy sixth satire, but if we apply this standard we shall find that the seven other satires, with the exception of the quite different introductory one, fall short of it" (ibid.: 144).

Horatian *sermo* were not” (1957a: 309). This suggests that for Fraenkel the poems of *Epist.* 1 are written in the same style as the *Sermones* but are not *satura*.⁴

Michael Coffey makes explicit an objection which possibly lies behind the resistance of Fraenkel and other critics to including the *Epistles* in the genre *satura*: “But though there is some continuity of topic, the lack of the *Lucilianus character* in the epistles, its invective and miscellany of contents, makes a distinction between satires and epistles valid” (1989: 96). The crucial element here is the phrase “*Lucilianus character*”. The consensus view on the meaning of this phrase was given by DuQuesnay: “For the contemporaries of Horace the name of Lucilius was synonymous with personal abuse and invective. That was the meaning of *Lucilianus character*” (29).⁵ This phrase was first used by Varro (*R.* 3.2.17) of one L. Abuccius: “cuius Luciliano caractere sunt libelli”. John Svarlien, in opposition to Coffey among others (1994: 253 n.3) contends that “character” should be taken as referring not to invective but to Lucilius’ style which elsewhere, and preserved by Gellius, Varro had identified as exemplifying “*gracilitas*” (*Gel.* 6.14.6).⁶ As Svarlien has to concede, Lucilius was most certainly known in antiquity “for his *libertas* and *acerbitas*” (*ibid.*: 257).⁷ As the text of L. Abuccius is not extant, and there are no other classical usages of “character” in this sense,⁸ there can be no certainty as to what Varro really meant.

As the evidence for Svarlien’s argument is not very convincing, it seems that the consensus view of the meaning of “*Lucilianus character*”, cited above, can be accepted. It must always be borne in mind that Horace’s construction of Lucilian *satura* is partial, and that he probably exaggerated the element of “personal abuse and

⁴ The use of the terms ‘*satura*’, ‘*sermo*’, etc. will be examined in the next section (see p.44).

⁵ For the same view see: Svarlien (1994: 253 n.3 and references there); Classen (1988: 96).

⁶ In this passage, Gellius when referring to the traditional three literary styles mentions Varro by name: “Vera autem et propria huiusmodi formarum exempla in Latina lingua M. Varro esse dicit ubertatis Pacuvium, gracilitatis Lucilium, mediocritatis Terentium” (6.14.6). However, in the earlier section where the Greek “characteres” is equated with “genera dicendi” (6.14.1), no reference is made to any authority. Svarlien, with reference to “an unnamed Varronian work” (1994: 254) cites Holford-Strevens who states that Gellius’ chapter 6.14 “is entirely derived from Varro” (1988: 162), but cites no supporting evidence.

⁷ *Cic. Att.* 16.11.1 cited by Svarlien; also *Cic. Fam.* 12.16.3; *Quint. Inst.* 10.1.94.

⁸ *TLL*, s.v. ‘*character*’ II Bb: “*forma et genus dicendi uel stilus*”.

invective”: “The fragments bear out this outspokenness in named personal attack, while showing that this is by no means the only side of Lucilius” (Brown 1993: 7).

There is little doubt that Coffey (ibid.: 63-4) was thinking of the consensus meaning of the phrase. It should also be noted that the evidence that Coffey presents to substantiate the statement concerning “*Lucilianus character*”, quoted above, relates solely to the *Epistles* of the second book, including the *Ars*. These three poems are all, at least ostensibly, literary, are much longer than the poems of the first book, and were probably not published together as a unified book. Detailed discussion of these three poems is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The assumptions underlying Coffey’s statement would appear to be that *satura* must possess *Lucilianus character* (in the meaning of the consensus view), and consequently that the nature of *satura* had been fixed for all time by Lucilius as its “inventor” (*Serm.* 1.10.48). The first assumption raises the question of how much *Lucilianus character* there actually is in Horace’s *Sermones*. As Hendrickson has observed, there was a discrepancy between Horace’s stated theory in the *Sermones* and his actual practice: “[Horace’s] allusions to his own satirical muse seem to give it a character of violence and acerbity which in fact it does not reveal” (1897: 313). The nature of Horatian *satura*, as exemplified by the poems of *Serm.* 1, will be examined in the next chapter. It is self-evident that each satirist adapted the genre to suit his own personality and circumstances. The most extreme expression of this flexibility is that of Wilamowitz, cited by Ulrich Knoche, “that there really is no Latin satire, but only Lucilius, Horace, Persius, and Juvenal” (1975: 5).

Roland Mayer wants to see *Epist.* 1 as something totally innovative: “At the height of his creative powers he himself became the ‘discoverer’ of a new verse form, the epistle” (1994: 1). This insistence on “a new verse form” is related to the fact that Mayer believes that *Epist.* 1 cannot be satire because “satire *must* criticize” (ibid.: 7; italics original). Further, he claims that “Horace’s subject matter in the *Epistles*, ... is substantially different from what we find in the *Sermones*.” (39). However, this difference appears to “lie[s] in the change of tone from criticism to analysis and exhortation” (ibid.). This is presumably based on the assumption that criticism has to consist of harsh invective, in other words *Lucilianus character*. This ignores Horace’s redefinition of Lucilian *satura* in *Serm.* 1, and overlooks the fact that “analysis and exhortation” can function as implicit, and sensitive, criticism: why would Horace be giving advice if he had not perceived a fault that needed to be corrected?

What does appear to be a real innovation is that the twenty verse letters of *Epist.* 1 are collected into a *libellus*. Rudd suggests that Lucilius interspersed epistles among his *Saturae*, citing the evidence of the fragments 404-6W and 186-93W. By contrast, Horace “distinguished the two sub-forms” (1989: 11). After mentioning poets before Horace who had written letters in verse, Mayer draws attention to “a whole collection of verse letters” (1994: 2) as being innovative. Similarly Kilpatrick: “a planned sequence of twenty separate epistles to friends, all in hexameter verse, was an entirely original stroke” (1986: xiii). This reference to “a planned sequence” suggests the importance of reading and interpreting these twenty poems in the order of Horace’s book, something which Kilpatrick himself does not in fact do in *The poetry of friendship*.

Elizabeth Haight believes that the inclusion of *Epist.* 1 “in antiquity” in the “definite poetic genus of *satura*” (1948: 525) has been detrimental to their reputation. Her aim is to separate them generically from the tradition of Lucilian *satura*, thereby appearing to place more emphasis on perceived genre than the evidence of the texts themselves. Haight attempts to establish a tradition of poetic epistles to which *Epist.* 1 could be assigned, but unfortunately for her argument, the evidence presented is not very convincing. The poems selected are all either fragmentary: Sappho and Theognis (ibid.: 528-9), or isolated poems in collections: Theocritus 12 and 29 (530), Catullus 65 and 68 (531-2). These poems may all have epistolary characteristics, but they are not integrated *libelli* like *Epist.* 1. More seriously, as Haight’s conclusion (540) reveals, with one possible exception, the moods of these epistolary poems are very different from that of Horace’s *Epistles*. The majority are “threnodic” or “passionate” (ibid.). She classified Theognis’ poems as “philosophical” and exhibiting “the *de amicitia* motif” (ibid.). However, in her discussion she alludes to “the corrupt state of the manuscripts” (528), and that the poems are elegiac. In summary, it appears that there is no compelling evidence for a tradition of epistles in hexameter verse published as an integrated *libellus* before Horace.

Several critics have regarded *Epist.* 1 as a turning point in Horace’s poetic career. Kilpatrick describes *Epist.* 1.1 as “introduc[ing] a new stage in Horace’s poetic life” (1986: 2). Similarly, Mayer sees the epistolary form as “signaliz[ing] a change of direction both in his life and in his art.” (1994: 3). This change is related to what Mayer feels was Horace’s desire to use his own experience and social position in a more positive way of instructing, and entertaining, than in the *Sermones*. These

opinions are perhaps not so surprising when one considers what Horace himself wrote in *Epist.* 1.1.1-19. Taken at face value, these lines would seem to indicate a radical change, but as always caution is needed in their interpretation. In a more detailed examination in a later chapter, it will be argued that in terms of Horace's essential themes the *Epistles* are not in fact such a departure from his previous practice as the beginning of *Epist.* 1.1 might suggest. This is borne out by the fact that several critics have detected a development through Horace's corpus rather than an abrupt change.

This was discussed by Hendrickson in the context of the discrepancy between Horace's theory of *satura*, as expressed in the *Sermones*, and his actual practice. Although this theory never really had any great influence on Horace's writing, the *Epistles* are the culmination of the move away from any adherence to "the tradition of the censorious nature of satire" (1897: 314). The most detailed exposition of the development view is that of Braund (1988: 197-8). As the conclusion to a section tracing the development of Juvenal's satiric *personae* through Books 1 to 5 (*ibid.*: 183-96), she outlines a parallel progression for Horace's *persona*. The street corner preacher of *Serm.* 1.1 to 1.3 gradually becomes a more confident member of Maecenas' circle and defends its values in *Serm.* 1.7 to 1.10. The dialogues of *Serm.* 2 utilize a "Socratic-type *persona* ... inviting fools to hang themselves with their own rope" (197). In *Epist.* 1 a more mature *persona* offers advice to his addressees. The overt epistolary form provides for Horace's audience a more challenging form, being in essence dialogue with one participant missing. A version of the development through the three *libelli* will emerge from chapters 3 to 5.

One factor that several critics, for example, Conte (1994b: 313) and Mayer (1994: 1), cite as justification for asserting that Horace introduced a new genre with his verse epistles is that, unlike his practice in the other genres in his corpus, he does not refer to an *inventor*. As evidence this is problematical because it is an argument from silence. One could just as easily say that Horace did not invoke an *inventor* for the *Epistulae* because he considered that he was writing in the same genre as the *Sermones*. He did not introduce *Carm.* 4 with an explicitly programmatic poem, but there are no claims that these poems represent a totally new genre. This suggests that titles can have great influence on perception and interpretation.

Evidence from titles and the use of terms

In 1979 in the *Liverpool Classical Monthly* there was a lively debate about the titlature of Horace's hexameter poems. Nicholas Horsfall argues that although Horace's third book of hexameter poems is "called *Epistulae* in the MSS" (1979a: 117), this is not necessarily good evidence for their original title because the manuscripts also use other "erroneous" titles, such as "*Epodon liber*" (ibid.). He argues that the poems themselves do not exhibit more than "a small number of formal epistolary elements ... which the *Satires* do not" (118), and that the study of *Epist.* 1 with respect to their epistolary nature "is not a sharp-edged and useful critical tool" (118). Acknowledging their close affinity with the *Satires*, he suggests instead that the *Epistles* should be investigated for the characteristics of Greek diatribe (118), having stated earlier that the word *sermo* has links with diatribe (117). Therefore it would appear that Horsfall's preference for *Sermones* as a title for all three books is motivated by his inclination to regard these poems as having significant affinities with Greek diatribe. He concludes by suggesting that Horace's original title for the *Epistles* may have been "*Sermones*" (119).

H.D. Jocelyn (1979) and Rudd (1979) both swiftly responded to Horsfall. Jocelyn (145) accepts the evidence of Porphyrio (*ad Serm.* 1.1.1, and *ad Epist.* 1.1.1.) for the title *Epistulae*, and contends that only two poems, *Epist.* 1.13 and 1.20, are not significantly epistolary. He also argues strongly against the association of *sermo* with "diatribe" (145-6). Rudd, as well as accepting the evidence of the scholia (147), cites further evidence for the use of *Epistulae*, from Statius (*Silu.* 1.3.102-4) and Sidonius Apollinaris (*Carm.* 9.221-2).

The most relevant conclusion from the *LCM* discussion is that there are obviously both perceived similarities and differences between the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1. On the one hand, Horsfall sees all the poems as being so similar that the title *Epistulae* is not justified, preferring instead *Sermones* for all three books. On the other hand, his opponents feel that there is a need to be able to distinguish these poems, and that the poems of *Epist.* 1 do indeed exhibit significant epistolary characteristics, and there is no good reason to reject the title *Epistulae*.

The evidence from the actual titles used on the manuscripts is relatively straightforward. Horsfall (1979a: 117) does not dispute that they were *Sermones* and *Epistulae*. His objection is the accuracy, or otherwise, of the latter in relation to the

poems themselves. With reference to the manuscript title *Epistulae*, Dilke has stated: “there seems no reason to dispute the title” (1981: 1837). No modern editor appears to have used any title other than *Epistulae* for the third book of Horace’s hexameter poems (Hendrickson 1897: 314-15).

Disagreements exist, however, over the title for the first two books. Keller and Holder find no evidence in the manuscripts for *Satirae*: “ex omnibus quos contulimus libris nullus exhibet titulum saturarum” (1925: *ad Serm.* 1.1.1.). Jocelyn suggests that “the title ‘Satires’” is unwarranted (1979: 146), and Braund states that “it is likely that we should refer to these poems as *Sermones* rather than *Satires* and that the term *satura* designates the genre” (1992, 29 n.5). As Palmer (1905: 1) points out, although all the best evidence from the manuscripts, “the ancient grammarians and the scholiasts” is for *Sermones*, many modern editors⁹ prefer *Satirae*.

It is interesting to note that Palmer and other editors¹⁰ have in effect used both terms. Palmer’s (1905) edition is titled: “*Q. Horati Flacci Sermones: The Satires of Horace*”. This use of “*Satires*” may indicate a difficulty in translating *Sermones*: neither ‘conversations’ nor ‘dialogues’ carries the appropriate connotations. In this context, no other title but *Satires* appears to have been used for modern translations into English. All this is perfectly understandable, but one wonders to what extent reception of the *Sermones* has been influenced by the inevitable association with modern satire, coupled with Horace’s practice of exaggerating the aggressive nature of his *satura*.

Horace’s use of *sermo* and *satura*

Horace himself used the terms ‘*sermo*’ and ‘*satura*’, but unfortunately not in a way that might resolve the difficulties. His first use of “*sermo*” in the literary sense,¹¹ is at *Epist.* 1.4.1: “Albi, nostrorum sermonum candide iudex”. The consensus among critics is that the reference here excludes the epistles.¹² This is the logical conclusion,

⁹ For example: Orelli-Baiter (1852); Lejay (1911); K-H⁷ (1959); Wickham (1891); but Wickham-Garrod (1912) has *Sermones*.

¹⁰ For example: Müller (1893); Morris (c.1968); Villeneuve (1951).

¹¹ “*sermo* at *Sat.* 2,2,2 and *Epp.* 2,1,4 refers to the contents of the discourse and is not a title” (Coffey² 1989: 228 n.37).

¹² **Re *Epist.* 1.4.1:** Döring (1826: ad loc.); Orelli-Baiter (1852: ad loc.); Wickham (1891: ad loc.); Müller (1893: ad loc.); Dilke² (1961: ad loc.); Wilkins (1958: ad loc.); Rudd² (1982a: 154); Préaux

given that the poem concerned was placed near the beginning of *Epist.* 1, especially if the poems are read sequentially, without considering the putative chronology of writing.

By contrast the next occurrence: “nec sermones ego malle | repentis per humum quam res componere gestas” (*Epist.* 2.1.250-51), is taken as referring to both *Sermones* and *Epistulae*.¹³ Here the tone of the passage, in a self-depreciatory context, makes interpretation difficult. “Sermones ... repentis per humum” suggests reference to the ‘low’ style of Horace’s hexameter poems as compared to epic or lyric, and therefore could be a reference to *sermo* as a style rather than to any particular poems (Coffey² 1989: 228 n.37; Brink 1982: 254, *ad Epist.* 2.1.250). According to Hendrickson, if Horace chose “sermones” to cover *Epist.* 1 as well as the first two books of hexameter verse it was “to characterize their style, approximating to that of prose” (1897: 315).

The final occurrence: “carmine tu gaudes, hic delectatur iambis, | ille Bioneis sermonibus et sale nigro” (*Epist.* 2.2.59-60) is generally taken as referring to *Serm.* 1 and 2 only.¹⁴ It is commonly observed that these lines represent a tripartite division of Horace’s corpus.¹⁵ If this is interpreted as a division of Horace’s entire corpus on metrical grounds, then *carmina* (*Carm.* 1-3)¹⁶ and *iambi* (*Epodes*) present no problems. “Bionei sermones” would then allude to all the hexameter poems on stylistic grounds, as argued by Hendrickson (1897: 323) and Coffey (1989: 228 n.37).

(1968: ad loc.); Coffey² (1989: 228 n.37). *Contra*: Brink (1982: 254, *ad Epist.* 2.1.250); Mayer (1994: ad loc. (foll. Brink)).

¹³ **Re *Epist.* 2.1.250-51**: Döring (1826: ad loc.); Orelli-Baiter (1852: ad loc.); Wickham (1891: ad loc.); Müller (1893: ad loc.); Van Rooy (1965: 86 n.76); Wilkins (1958: ad loc.); Dilke² (1961: *ad Epist.* 1.4.1); Préaux (1968: *ad Epist.* 1.1.4); Rudd² (1982a: 154); Brink (1982: 254, ad loc.); Coffey² (1989: 228 n.37).

¹⁴ **Re *Epist.* 2.2.59-60**: Döring (1826: ad loc.); Wickham (1891: ad loc.); Fraenkel (1957a: 6); Wilkins (1958: ad loc.); Brink (1982: 299-300, ad loc.); Horsfall (1979a: 117); Rudd (1989: ad loc). *Contra*: Hendrickson (1897: 323); Fiske (1920: 426); Coffey² (1989: 228 n.37).

Elsewhere Rudd had been equivocal on this point: while conceding that the consensus view was for *Serm.* 1 and 2 only, he maintained that there could be no certainty (1982a: 154-5).

¹⁵ For example: Wickham (1891: 6-7); Hendrickson (1897: 323); Fiske (1920: 426); Rudd (1989: ad loc.); Brink (1982: 299-301, ad loc.).

¹⁶ If *Epist.* 2.2 was published in 19 BCE (Rudd 1989: 37), this would pre-date the *Saec.* and *Carm.* 4.

Hendrickson's argument focuses on the correspondence of Horace's tripartite classification with that of Quintilian.¹⁷ "Sermones" is used because of "the contrast with *carmine* which the antithetical structure of the passage demands" (ibid.: 323). Objections have been raised to the characterization "saepe nigro" for the *Epistulae*, for example, by Rudd (1989: *ad Epist.* 2.2.60). Elsewhere, he refers to the fact that "the great majority of modern commentators" object to "saepe nigro" applied to the *Epistles* (1982a: 154). Both Hendrickson and Coffey, however, are sensitive to Horace's use of "self-depreciating irony" (Coffey² 1989: 69). The latter points out that even "applied to his satires, as distinct from the epodes, [it] is a deliberately misleading description" (ibid.). For Hendrickson it is another example of the inconsistency between Horace's stated theory and actual practice (1897: 323-4). Given all this uncertainty it is conceivable that these lines should not in fact be interpreted as referring to Horace's corpus as commonly assumed. There is no unequivocal evidence that "Bioneis sermonibus" includes *Epist.* 1.

On the basis of the evidence presented above, only one of Horace's uses of "sermones" is accepted by the majority of modern critics as applying to both the *Sermones* and *Epistulae*, namely *Epist.* 2.1.250. Further, it should be noted that here *sermo* probably refers to the style of the hexameter poems (Hendrickson ibid.: 315). All that really can be concluded is that none of these passages provide evidence for Horace having used the term *sermo* to refer to *Epist.* 1 generically.

Horace twice used the term *satura*, on both occasions in *Serm.* 2. He began the programmatic 2.1. with: "Sunt quibus in satira uidear nimis acer et ultra | legem tendere opus" (1-2).¹⁸ "Satira" is interpreted as a generic term, and indeed as its first extant occurrence as a literary term.¹⁹ In *Serm.* 2.6.17: "quid prius illustrem satiris musaque pedestri?", it is taken as referring to individual poems.²⁰ One implication of Horace's usage is that by about 30 BCE *satura* was being used both as a generic term,

¹⁷ Horace as writer of *satura* (*Inst.* 10.1.94); Horace as writer of *iambi* and as *lyricus* (ibid.: 10.1.96).

¹⁸ The variant spelling 'satira' is printed in Shackleton Bailey's (1985) text. Of the twenty six readily available editions of Horace's texts surveyed, fifteen printed 'satira' at *Serm.* 2.1.1, with the rest printing 'satura'. 'Satira' is designated as a post-classical form (*L&S*, s.v. 'satur^{lib}'). The development of the orthography 'satura', 'satira', 'satyra' is discussed by Van Rooy (1965: 155-72 *passim*).

¹⁹ Van Rooy (1965: 60); Rudd (1982a: 154); Knoche (1975: 11).

²⁰ Van Rooy (1965: 60); Knoche (1975: 11).

and as the term for a single satirical poem (Van Rooy 1965: 50-71). Horace never used the term *satura* after *Serm.* 2, and therefore he never actually referred to *Epist.* 1 as *satura*. Nor did he refer to the poems as *Epistulae*. It has been observed that “*Epistula* is an unhandy word for use in the hexameter, since it can occur only in the nominative singular” (Allen et al. 1972/73: 119 n.4).

Horace’s use of “*satura*” in *Serm.* 2 suggests that he regarded the first two books of his hexameter corpus as belonging to the genre *satura*. There is no conclusive evidence that he referred to *Epist.* 1 as *sermones*, except in the context of style. There is also no evidence from his use of terminology that he himself included *Epist.* 1 in the genre of *satura*.

Use of *sermo* and *satura* by Ennius and Lucilius

The use of *sermo* and *satura* as literary terms before Horace might possibly offer some clarification of his usage, but unfortunately is even more inconclusive. Q. Ennius was known to have written epic (*Annales*), tragedies on Greek themes, comedies, *fabulae praetextae*, occasional poems, and four (or six) books of *saturae*:²¹ “item Ennius, qui quattuor libros saturarum reliquit” (Porph.: *ad Hor. Serm.* 1.10.46). His satires were written in various metres, with only eighteen fragments comprising about thirty-one lines extant (Muecke 2005: 35). Consequently, very little can be deduced with any certainty about the nature of Ennius’ *Saturae*, or the term(s) used to describe them.

Hendrickson argued that the word *satura* had not been used as a generic term before its first extant occurrence at Horace *Serm.* 2.1.1, although many critics have assumed that it had been: “Apart from the general assumption that Lucilius used the word either as a title or as a generic designation for his caustic poems, it has been the accepted opinion that it was similarly used by Ennius” (1911: 129).²² This assumption with respect to Ennius’ title has persisted:

²¹ The uncertainty arises from differences in the scholiasts. Porphyrio (*ad Hor. Serm.* 1.10.46) refers to four books. On the other hand, Donatus (*ad Ter. Ph.* 339) appears to refer to six books: “haec non ab Apollodoro sed e sexto satirarum Ennii translata sunt omnia” (Courtney 1993: 12).

²² At this time there was considerable interest in the use of *satura* and related terms. Other scholars responded to Hendrickson’s article, e.g. Wheeler (1912), who disagreed with Hendrickson’s thesis, but could not produce evidence that *satura* had been used pre-Horace. Instead he suggested reasons why the word was not used in contexts where it might have been expected. It should be noted that,

Ennius wrote four books of miscellaneous poems to which he no doubt assigned the title *Saturae*, in the plural. (Van Rooy 1965: 32)²³

For this miscellaneous collection he [Ennius] chose the name *Saturae*. (Coffey² 1989: 24)

It is undoubtedly true that Porphyrio (*ad Hor. Serm.* 1.10.46; quoted above) referred to Ennius' "quattuor libros saturarum". Several critics have taken their evidence from this, for example, A.S. Gratwick: "While it is likely that the title *Saturae* does derive from Ennius, it does not follow that the book arrangement or even the contents of the edition known to Porphyrio were due to Ennius himself" (1982: 158). This quote illustrates the pervasive nature of the assumption criticized by Hendrickson. The evidence for the title is no greater than for anything else about Ennius' *Saturae*. All it actually shows is that *Satura(e)* was the accepted term in Porphyrio's time.

As indicated in the quote from Hendrickson above, he considered the evidence for any title used by Lucilius to be no better. The word *satura*, in the literary sense,²⁴ does not appear in the extant fragments of Lucilius. Nevertheless, the assumption has prevailed:

Lucilius published his work under the title *Saturae*, as we have good reason to believe, but styled it 'sermones' in the extant fragments. (Van Rooy 1965: 60)

Calling his work *schedium* and *ludus*, and perhaps even *libri saturarum*. (Fiske 1920: 127)

The title *saturae* must have been given by Lucilius himself. It is hardly likely that he left it to later editors and grammarians to find a title for the one literary form to which he devoted all his creative activities, especially in an age that made careful generic distinctions. (Coffey² 1989: 39)

consistent with the scholarly practices of the time, the focus was philological, and on the etymology and usage of *satura*. Little or no account was taken of the content of the poems of Ennius and Lucilius. The scholarly debate about *satura* is summarized by Van Rooy (1965: 46 n.8).

²³ Van Rooy justifies this assertion (46 n.8) by reference to the methods of citation of the later scholiasts and grammarians.

²⁴ In 47W: "per saturam aedilem factum qui legibus solvat", the word is generally interpreted as being used in the legal sense. The actual meaning of this line has been much disputed. Ullman (1913: 179-82) discusses it in detail, and suggests a possible context.

Coffey's certainty is not universal. Representative of the contrary view is John R.C. Martyn: "even if the literary term *satura(e)* was current by the time of Ennius, which remains doubtful, to argue that Lucilius adopted the same title for his satires is less justified" (1972: 157). In addition to his doubts regarding Lucilius' use of *satura*, he is sceptical about all the terms that have been suggested as titles for his poems. In turn, he argues against *schedium* (ibid.: 157-60), *ludus* (160-62), *sermo* (162-4) and *satura* (164-6), in all cases on the grounds that there is no compelling evidence to accept any of these terms.

As far as both Ennius and Lucilius are concerned the fragmentary nature of their work and the late date of external evidence leads to the conclusion that we cannot know with any confidence what title, if any, either of them originally gave to their poems which are now referred to as 'Satires'. None of the responses to Hendrickson's 1911 paper has produced any evidence to show conclusively that *satura* had been used as a title or generic term before Horace.

Use of *sermo* and *satura* by Persius and Juvenal

For Horace's successors the problems with titles become almost non-existent. In the case of Persius, there has been virtually no argument about *Satura(e)* as a title. The only dissent has been over whether it was singular or plural, with the majority opting for plural.²⁵ Similarly for Juvenal, there is general agreement on *Saturae* as a title, with *satura* denoting both the genre and a single satirical poem (Ullman 1913: 192; Van Rooy 1965: 76).

In contrast to Horace, neither Persius nor Juvenal include any extended passages of literary discussion in their *Saturae*. Consequently, there is virtually no internal evidence from their use of the terms: *sermo*, *satura*, *epistula*. In fact neither poet uses *sermo* as a literary term.²⁶ Persius does not use the noun *satura* at all.²⁷

²⁵ For example: Van Rooy (1965: 72); Horsfall (1979b: 169), *contra*: Ullman (1913: 191, 1920: 383). Ullman argued that "saturis" (Hor. *Serm.* 2.6.17) refers not to individual poems but to books of poems: "he refers vaguely by use of the plural to the two books of satires ... — as if he had said *libris*" (1913: 190); similarly in Persius' time "*satura* ... still meant a collection of poems in one book" (ibid.: 191).

²⁶ Persius' only use of *sermo* is at 1.63. Juvenal uses *sermo* (in various cases) nine times, none of them in a technical sense: 2.14; 3.73, 87; 6.189, 193, 449; 8.39; 10.88; 14.152.

²⁷ He uses *satur* four times, in every instance as an adjective in a non-literary sense: 1.31, 71; 5.56; 6.71.

Juvenal does use *satura* as a generic term: the most obvious instance is: “difficile est saturam non scribere” (1.30). Other occurrences are at: 3.321; 4.106, and 6.634. All but one of these are in the singular and denote genre (Van Rooy 1965: 76). The exception (3.321) probably refers to individual poems (*ibid.*).²⁸ Persius nowhere uses *epistula* in any sense. Juvenal uses it three times, always in the nominative singular (4.149; 10.71; 16.5), to refer to real, not literary, letters.

This rather perfunctory internal evidence does confirm that by Juvenal’s time there was more certainty about the use of the literary term *satura*. It was used by the poet himself to refer to the genre (1.30; 4.106; 6.634) and to individual poems within his collection (3.321). Modern preconceptions about the nature of *satura* could also perhaps be influenced by Juvenal’s characteristic, at least in Books 1 and 2, *persona* fuelled by *indignatio*. Indeed, some critics have had difficulty accepting Persius’ corpus as *satura*. Van Rooy, although accepting *Saturae* as Persius’ title (1965: 72), nevertheless only admits these poems to the genre of *satura* on the basis that each satirist modified the genre in accordance with his own personality and circumstances. In the case of Persius, this involved emphasizing the philosophical element (*ibid.*: 75). Barr (in Lee and Barr 1987: 4) expresses this difficulty in terms of what we think of as satirical today. He finds that only *Sat.* 1 fits this category, because the rest do not attack the ills of contemporary society. Although he does not mention Juvenal, it is hard to escape the conclusion that Barr’s view of *satura* is shaped by his practice.

This brief survey of the use of *satura* and related literary terms, has revealed that Horace’s employment of terminology is unusually complex, especially when compared with his successors. It is obvious that titles, whether original to the poet or imposed at a later date, are not a reliable guide to the nature and content of the poems themselves. It is also clear, and regrettable, that titles can influence the perception of literature, although they are in practice just one element. The style and subject matter are far more important in determining the genre to which all these poems belong.

²⁸ There are two other, non-literary uses of *satur* as an adjective at 7.62 and 15.3. In the former, “satur ... Horatius”, it is tempting to see a play on *satur/satura*, because although the actual line alludes to *Carm.* 2.19.5 (Courtney 1980: *ad* 7.62), *Sat.* 7 is programmatic to some extent (Braund 1988: 24), being the first poem of Book 3, and its subject is literary patronage. Braund (*ibid.*: 24-25) suggests that with the explicit allusion to the *Odes*, Juvenal is implying that patronage is essential for writing lyric poetry but not for satire, hence he writes “satire and nothing else” (*ibid.*: 25).

Evidence from Persius and Juvenal for *Epist. 1* as *satura*

It is obviously not possible to know whether Horace himself considered all his hexameter poems to be *satura*. The evidence from Horace's own use of *sermo* and *satura* investigated above is inconclusive in this respect. However, there is evidence that his successors in *satura* were influenced by the *Epistulae* as well as the *Sermones*.

Persius places himself in the tradition of his predecessors, Lucilius and Horace, in his programmatic *Sat. 1*, in order to justify his own criticisms of contemporary literary and, by extension, moral, standards:

secuit Lucilius Urbem,
te Lupe, te Muce, et genuinum fregit in illis.
omne vafer vitium ridenti Flaccus amico
tangit et admissus circum praecordia ludit,
callidus excusso populum suspendere naso. (1.114-18)

Opinions differ as to whether Persius in his reference to Horace (116-18) alludes only to the *Sermones*, or to the *Epistulae* as well. R.A. Harvey (1981: ad loc.) favours reference to both: "116-17, with its mention of Horace's friends, clearly relates to the *Epistles*, and 118, in which the populace is said to be derided, to the *Satires*."²⁹ The two references are conflated". Harvey disagrees with Rudd's argument (1982a: 155) that all three lines allude only to the *Sermones*. In turn, Rudd was disagreeing with earlier critics, Conington and Némethy, who had preferred reference to the *Epistulae* only. Nevertheless, Rudd concedes that his preference is not decisive: "one cannot prove that the *Epistles* are excluded. It should be noted, however, that in general Persius draws quite freely on Horace's *Epistles* and actually includes an epistle among his own *Satires* (viz. no. 6)" (ibid.).

The uncertainty over the referent of this passage could reflect the fact that Persius perceived Horace's satiric technique to be basically the same in the *Sermones* and *Epistulae*. Rudd (ibid.) in arguing for reference solely to the *Sermones* cites: "mutato nomine de te | fabula narratur" (*Serm. 1.1.69-70*) as evidence for Horace's satirical method in the *Sermones*. In these poems, Rudd maintains, Horace's gently mocking criticism of others was later accepted by his friends as applying to them.

²⁹ This seems to suggest one distinction between the *Sermones* and *Epistulae* is that in the former society as a whole is criticized, whereas in the latter the criticism/advice is directed towards individuals. The epistolary form obviously invites this interpretation but the question of a wider audience and wider applicability needs to be considered.

However, this can work in reverse, certainly from the perspective of a wider readership. In letters addressed to specific individuals, and certain of the *Sermones* where named individuals, either real or fictitious, are criticized, the faults that are rebuked and the advice given to these specific individuals can be accepted as having wider applicability. Harvey's concept of "conflation" is useful in this respect, although it seems unnecessary to delineate the references as Harvey has done. Rudd is unhappy with the idea that Persius had combined the *Sermones* and *Epistulae*, describing the result as "clumsy to say the least" (ibid.). But if Horace's hexameter poems are all considered as belonging to the same genre, there is no reason why joint reference should create problems.³⁰ The fact that Persius *Sat.* 6 is in the form of an epistle is also significant, and this will be examined below.

Persius' acknowledged debt to Horace's hexameter poems has been thoroughly documented in commentaries, articles, and books covering the whole of Persius' corpus.³¹ In particular, Harvey (1981: 18-19) has an extensive list illustrating Persius' dependence on Horace. Persius' use of short phrases from Horace indicates that he was extremely well acquainted with his predecessor's entire corpus, but in general does not constitute evidence for the issue of genre.³²

Of the longer passages, Pers. 2.8-14, modelled on *Epist.* 1.16.59-62 (Harvey: ad loc.) is especially interesting.³³ The theme of this passage, the wrong, hypocritical use of prayer, is one that is not treated in quite this way in the *Sermones*. The foolish prayer at *Serm.* 2.6.8-13 (ibid.: ad 2.9-14) has some similarities, but the tone and context are different, and the element of hypocrisy is absent. The theme of what men

³⁰ Anderson's observations on this passage are worth noting. He cautions against taking Persius' assessment of Horace at face value: satirists always select and emphasize their predecessors' characteristics for their own purposes (1963a: 3).

³¹ Commentaries: e.g. Jenkinson (1980); Harvey (1981); Lee and Barr (1987). Articles: e.g. Reckford (1962); Hooley (1984). Books: e.g. Dessen (1968a); Rudd (1976: 54-83); Morford (1984); Hooley (1997).

³² One well-documented example of this type of borrowing is Pers. 5.111: *inque luto fixum possis transcendere nummum*, derived from Hor. *Epist.* 1.16.64: *in triuiis fixum cum se demittit ob assem*. (Rudd 1976: 54-55). The process here is "making implications explicit" (ibid.: 54), and has no bearing on the genre argument.

³³ Persius' re-modelling in *Sat.* 2 of four passages from Horace (*Epist.* 1.16.58-61; *Serm.* 2.6.10-13; *Serm.* 2.5.45-6, and *Serm.* 2.3.69) is discussed by Rudd (1986: 101-3).

should pray for was treated at much greater length by Juvenal (10.56-366). It has to be admitted that Juvenal in 10 was not concerned so much with the hypocritical use of prayer as with the foolishness of men in praying for things which will harm them. However, all these passages involve the wrong or foolish use of prayer in some way. This is one example of a topic treated by Horace in both the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1, and then picked up by his successors in the genre of *satura*. It must always be borne in mind, however, that *satura* was an extremely fluid genre. Each poet utilized the work of his predecessor(s), and shaped the genre to suit his own circumstances and purpose.

Probably the best evidence that Persius and Juvenal regarded both the *Sermones* and *Epistulae* as *satura* is the fact that the later poems of both poets have some epistolary characteristics, analogous to Horace's *Epist.* 1 coming after *Serm.* 1 and 2. Persius *Sat.* 6, last in the collection, is in the form of a letter, made clear by reference to geographical place.³⁴ Persius is writing from Liguria ("Ligus ora" (6.6)) to the lyric poet Caesius Bassus, presumably at his Sabine winter retreat ("foco ... Sabino" (6.1)). Like the other five hexameter poems in Persius' corpus, *Sat.* 6 is a complex and skilful blending of allusions to earlier poets, principally Horace.³⁵ In this poem Persius has taken themes and motifs from Horace's entire hexameter corpus: for example, the opening address to the poet Bassus (1-2) recalls Horace *Epist.* 1.4.1-2 to Tibullus. The main theme of the satire (25-74) is the proper use and enjoyment of money, especially with respect to concern for one's heir, a topic utilized by Horace several times in his hexameter poems.³⁶

³⁴ Apart from "Roma" (1.5), "Romae" (1.8), and "Tiberino in gurgite" (2.15), *Sat.* 6 is the only poem where there is any indication of place. In *Sat.* 1 Rome is the setting for Persius' attack on contemporary literary tastes and standards; "Tiberino" in *Sat.* 2 is an incidental detail. In *Sat.* 1 to 5 Persius maintained philosophical detachment from society (Ramage, Sigsbee and Fredericks 1974: 2), but in 6 actual physical locations are mentioned. It surely cannot be coincidence that Bassus, a lyric poet, is in Sabine territory (1). The relevance of this, and the possibility that Persius, in his most Horatian of satires, is implicitly criticizing, or maybe correcting, Horace is something I would like to investigate at a later date.

³⁵ Persius' borrowings are documented in detail in commentaries, e.g. Harvey (1981: 181-204); Barr (in Lee and Barr 1987: 157-69), and in articles and books, e.g. Reckford (1962: 497-8); Dessen (1968a: 78-92); Morford (1984: 64-72); Hooley (1993: 137-54; 1997: 154-74).

³⁶ Concern for heir, for example, in *Serm.* 2.3.122-3; *Epist.* 1.5.13-14, and *Epist.* 2.2.190-4.

One further point needs to be acknowledged with respect to Persius *Sat.* 6. Critics, for example, Dessen (1968a: 78-9) and Morford (1984: 64-5), have observed that it is very different from the previous five poems. Morford goes so far as to assert that Persius completed his satiric programme with *Sat.* 5, and 6 was more like an epilogue (ibid.). The most significant differences discussed are those of tone and *persona*, with Persius adopting a more Horatian stance. These observations indicate that when a satirist turns from ‘conversation’ to an overtly epistolary mode, even if style and topics remain essentially the same, there are still perceived differences.

Juvenal’s dependence on Horace is much less than that of Persius and, as has often been observed, his style and *persona(e)* are different, especially in the *Satires* of Books 1 and 2. Nevertheless, according to the conventions established for the genre, Juvenal, in his programmatic *Sat.* 1, acknowledged his predecessors, both Horace: “Venusina ... lucerna” (1.51), and Lucilius: “magnus ... Auruncae ... alumnus” (1.20) and “Lucilius ardens” (1.165).³⁷ No explicit mention is made of Persius, but Braund considers the “Death in the bath” scene (1.142-6) indicates Juvenal’s debt to Persius (3.98-106) as a predecessor (1996: *ad Juv.* 1.142-6). Harvey (1981: *ad Pers.* 3.98-9) links Persius’ use of the motif with both Juvenal and Horace (*Epist.* 1.6.61). This can be seen as a motif from *Epist.* 1 incorporated by both later satirists in their *Saturae*.

Although *indignatio* has traditionally been regarded as the defining characteristic of Juvenal’s *persona*, this strictly applies only to the poems of Books 1 and 2 (Anderson 1982: 277). A change in tone and *persona* has been detected in the later books. Braund, following Anderson (1982: 277-92), provides a summary of this progression of *personae*: from “indignant” in Books 1 and 2 to “ironic” in 3, “more overtly Horatian” in 4, and cynically detached in 5 (1988: 197). The significant point about this shift in *personae* is that, at least in some of the later *Satires*, it brings Juvenal’s satiric method closer to Horace’s.³⁸ Other factors also produce a more Horatian satirist: a gradual change in satiric technique from a concentration on solely condemning vice and crime to the inclusion of both apotreptic and protreptic

³⁷ 1.153-4 is also an allusion to Lucilius. It is impossible to know whether or not it is a direct quotation (Courtney 1980: *ad loc.*).

³⁸ Courtney (1980: 12); Singleton (1983: 198); Braund (1988: 184).

elements,³⁹ and in Book 3 “the appearance of a more limited audience” (Braund 1988: 180). The latter marks a change from addressing society as a whole to concern with individuals (Courtney 1980: 16). The most obvious manifestation of this is the *Satires* which have addressees, namely all the poems in Books 3 to 5, except 7 and 10.

More significantly, some of these poems have been described as possessing epistolary characteristics, especially 8, 11, 12 and 14.⁴⁰ One critic has asserted that in his later books Juvenal “finally adopt[ed] themes and treatment very similar to those of the Horatian epistle” (Lindo 1974: 18).⁴¹ Another critic, responding to Ribbeck’s proposition that most of the later satires are imitations, prefers to see these poems as epistles (Singleton 1983: 198). In his article Locksley Lindo argues that Juvenal’s satiric form gradually evolves through his corpus to the poems of Book 5 which resemble Horatian epistles (1974: 26). To support his argument Lindo identifies four areas of correspondence between Juvenal’s later *Satires* and Horace’s *Epistles* (ibid.: 26-7). As well as addressees, he notes “the opening format” (26) which is either “a rhetorical question (8, 13, 15, and 16) or a proposition advanced for the sake of argument” (ibid.),⁴² references in the body of the poem to the addressee (for example: 8.74-6 and 11.183-5), and finally correspondences of language and attitude. This last feature is perhaps the most convincing as it potentially establishes a close link between Horace’s *Epistulae* and Juvenal’s *Saturae*. Of especial interest is the cited similarity between Hor. *Epist.* 1.2.59-63 and Juvenal 8.88-9. These passages both deal with *ira*, which has an obvious connection with Juvenal’s earlier *persona*. The verbal

³⁹ Hight (1954: 104-5); Courtney (1980: 14); Singleton (1983: 198); Coffey (1989: 131).

⁴⁰ Courtney (1980: 12); Singleton (1983: 198); Rudd (1986: 79); Braund (1988: 184).

With respect to Juv. 8, Anderson notes that this “poem uses for the first time the more sedate manner of the Epistle” (1982: 287). In addition this is the first time Juvenal introduces a positive element, specifically “he advocates the true meaning of *nobilitas*” (ibid.).

⁴¹ It is noteworthy that Lindo attributes this to a failure of Juvenal’s “initial indignation and inspiration” (1974, 18), thus implying that *satura* which lacks *indignatio* is inferior in some way.

⁴² These openings may be characteristic of an epistolary style, but they are also a feature of conversation or ‘diatribe’ and occur in Horace’s *Sermones*, for example *Serm.* 1.1.1-3, and are a conventional way of attracting attention.

reference in “*irae frena*” (8.88) to Horace’s “*hunc frenis* (*Epist.* 1.2.63) is also noted by Courtney (1980: ad loc.).⁴³

In conclusion, both Persius and Juvenal acknowledged Horace as their predecessor in *satura*, and both were influenced not only by the *Sermones* but also by both books of the *Epistulae*. It has been observed for both poets that poems placed later in their collections are characterized by a more mellow ‘Horatian’ *persona*, with more moderate and targeted criticism/advice. In addition, several of these poems exhibit epistolary features. With respect to Persius and Juvenal, the title *Saturae* is used almost without question for what Horace had differentiated as *Sermones* and *Epistulae* (Jocelyn 1979, 146).

***Sermones* or *satura*?**

There appears to be a consensus view that the affinity between all Horace’s hexameter poems justifies classing them together in some way. However, there is not similar agreement as to whether *satura* or *Sermones* is the appropriate superordinate term. The generic term *satura* is favoured by Hendrickson (1897: 322-3), Fiske (1920: 426), Knoche (1975: 89), Jocelyn (1979: 146) and Braund (1992: 25, 31 n.61).

Hendrickson (*ibid.*) argues that the manuscript titles for Horace’s hexameter poems were *Sermones* and *Epistulae*, and that all should be considered as belonging to the genre *satura* (also Knoche *ibid.*: 78; Braund *ibid.*: 29 n.5). As evidence for the *Epistulae* as *satura*, Hendrickson (315-21) cites five authors from the first to the fifth centuries CE: Suetonius, Quintilian, Porphyrio, Sidonius Apollinaris and Statius. Any conclusions drawn from the evidence of the last two authors have to be extremely tentative.

The passage from Statius (*Silu.* 1.3.102-4) does not implicitly refer to Horace, but other critics have acknowledged Horatian associations (Horsfall 1979b: 169; Rudd² 1982a: 156). Hendrickson, citing the passage from v.99-104, argues at some length (318-21) for this as evidence that Statius regarded Horace’s *Epistulae* as *satura*, but only succeeds in perhaps proving that Statius was drawing a comparison

⁴³ Braund notes one other intriguing, and somewhat bizarre, connection between the *Epistles* and Juvenal, namely references to elephants. They are mentioned in all three of the poems of Book 4: 10.150, 158; 11.126; 12.102-14, and nowhere else in Juvenal’s corpus. Similarly the only reference to

between Vopiscus and Horace. Horsfall notes that “St. *Silv.* i.3.103 shows only that Horace wrote satire” (1981b: 113 n.92).

The passage from Sidonius “non quod post saturas epistularum | sermonumque sales nouumque epodon” (*Carm.* 9.221-2), does refer directly to Horace, but it “is not such as to inspire confidence” (Horsfall 1979b: 170). Both the text and punctuation are disputed. Rudd concludes that Sidonius was referring to the *Epistulae* as *saturae*, but using the term “in the early sense of medley” (ibid.: 157).

Quintilian cited Horace as a writer of *satura* (*Inst.* 10.1.94) and *iambus* (ibid.: 10.1.96), and as a *lyricus* (ibid.; also 1.8.6). He made no mention of the *Epistulae*. Referring to this, Hendrickson offers two possibilities: either Quintilian included the *Epistulae* as *satura* or he omitted them completely (315). He concedes (316) that Quintilian may have regarded the *Epistulae* as irrelevant for his purpose, which was to provide exemplars of style for budding orators. However, he maintains that if this was the case, Quintilian would have made it clear, in the same way as he rejected Theocritus’ “musa rustica et pastoralis” (*Inst.* 10.1.55), and hence made no mention of Vergil’s *Eclogues* and *Georgics* in his catalogue of recommended works (Hendrickson: ibid.). He concludes that it is “highly probable that Quintilian included the Letters of Horace in his treatment of Roman satire” (ibid.). Jocelyn thinks it probable that Quintilian could have designated all four books of hexameter poems as *saturae* to distinguish them “from poems of more exalted content” (1979: 146). Rudd, on the other hand, concludes that “certainty is impossible” (1982a: 156), and this is probably the most sensible conclusion.

With the evidence from Suetonius there seems to be more certainty. In his *Vita Horati* (*De poetis* 24) he described Horace’s physical appearance in the following way: “Habitū corporis fuit brevis atque obesus, qualis et a semetipso in saturis describitur” (Rostagni 1956: 118.53-4). As all the commentators and critics point out, the relevant details are disclosed by Horace not only at *Serm.* 2.3.308-9,⁴⁴ but also at *Epist.* 1.4.15⁴⁵ and 1.20.24.⁴⁶ This leads to the conclusion that Suetonius included the

elephants in the whole of Horace’s corpus is at *Epist.* 2.1.196, in a strongly Democritean context (1988: 188-9).

⁴⁴ “longos imitaris ab imo | ad summum totus moduli bipedalis”.

⁴⁵ “me pinguem et nitidum bene curata cute vises”.

⁴⁶ “corporis exigui”.

Epistulae with the *Sermones* “in saturis” (Hendrickson *ibid.*: 315, 317). This view is shared by Jocelyn (1979: 146), Rudd (*ibid.*: 156-7) and Braund (1992: 31 n.61).

Porphyrio (Pomponius Porphyrio) thought that the *Epistulae* were closely related to the *Sermones*:

Flacci epistularum libri titulo tantum dissimiles a sermonum sunt. Nam et metrum et materia uerborum et communis adsumptio eadem est. (*ad Epist.* 1.1.1)

Quamuis saturam esse opus hoc suum Horatius ipse confiteatur, cum ait:
 Sunt quibus in satura uidear nimis acer, et ultra
 Legem tendere opus,
 tamen proprios titulos uoluit ei accommodare. Nam hos priores duos libros Sermonum, posteriores Epistularum inscribens in sermonum *nomine* uult intellegi quasi apud praesentem se loqui, epistulas uero quasi ad absentes missas. (*ad Serm.* 1.1.1)

Hendrickson cites the above passages in support of his view that all the hexameter poems belong to the genre *satura* (316-18; also Jocelyn 1979: 145). Braund concurs with Hendrickson’s opinion, and draws attention to the crucial distinction made by Porphyrio in the second passage: “the one [*Sermones*] addressed to someone present and other [*Epistulae*] to someone absent” (1992: 31 n.61).

The evidence cited by Hendrickson is far from conclusive, and not all critics interpret it in the same way. Rudd examines the same evidence (1982a: 154-8), and in particular rejects the scholiasts’ classification of the *Epistles* as *satura* because “their reason for doing so is unsound. For they have taken the word *satura* from *Sat.* 2.1.1. and extended it to the *Epistles*” (1982a: 157; also Van Rooy 1965: 182-3 n.100). There is no way of knowing exactly how the scholiasts formed their opinions with respect to the genre of Horace’s hexameter poems. They may not have based them based solely on whether or not the poet explicitly designated his works in a certain way. Rudd states that he himself uses “the separate titles of *Satires* and *Epistles*, reserving the term *sermones* for the hexameter poems in general” (1982a: 158),⁴⁷ justifying this usage by reference to Fraenkel.⁴⁸ Somewhat curiously, Rudd then

⁴⁷ This has been moderated slightly from an earlier article where “the only term which we may safely use to embrace both *Satires* and *Epistles* is *Sermones*” (Rudd 1960a: 176).

⁴⁸ Cited by Rudd: “he returned to the writing of *sermones*, ... but not as *satires*” (Fraenkel 1957a: 153); “the potentialities of the Horatian *satira* were exhausted, the potentialities of the Horatian *sermo* were

concedes that based on the evidence he examined “to call the *Epistles* satires too ... may well be correct” (ibid.: 158). However, he qualifies this by insisting on “the distinction between the Lucilian, or quasi-Lucilian, satire of the first two books and the non-Lucilian satire of the rest” (ibid.). This is really just another way of acknowledging that *satura* was a fluid genre, and all the poets innovated and made it their own.

One of the difficulties in this area of terminology resides in the polysemy of *sermo*.⁴⁹ When *Sermones* is used as the title for the first two books of hexameter poems it is in the sense of ‘conversation’ or ‘dialogue’ (*OLD*, s.v. ‘sermo³’). It can also connote a style (ibid.: ‘sermo⁶’), and this is probably the way Horace used it at *Epist.* 2.1.250 (see p.46). There is also the association of *sermo* with Greek ‘diatribe’, and the influence that some critics perceive on Horace’s *Sermones*. The notion of ‘diatribe’ was strongly rejected by Jocelyn (see p.44), and discussed in a more circumspect way by Muecke (1993: 6-7, and references there). There is evidence that the Romans acknowledged the existence of a genre called *satura* (Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.93), whereas ‘diatribe’ as “a particular genre of Greek popular philosophy” (Muecke ibid.: 6) is not universally accepted.

As Hendrickson points out, the title that is given to a collection of poems need not necessarily specify its genre. Reacting to recent editors who had defended using the title “*satirae*” instead of “*sermones*”, he argues that Horace’s use of *satira* in *Serm.* 2.1.1 referred to “a definite poetical genus” (ibid.: 322), and did not necessarily entail the use of this term as the title of the two books. Hendrickson justifies this by analogy with another genre: elegy. Ovid’s *Pont.* 4.5.1 reads “ite, leues elegi, doctas ad consulis aures”. These elegiac poems have been given the title “(*Epistulae*) *ex Ponto*” because of their form, but on the evidence of the cited line might just as well have been titled “*elegorum libri*”. Similarly, Horace could have given the titles “*Sermones*” and “*Epistulae*” to his books of hexameter poems on the basis of their different forms, and this does not preclude both collections from belonging to the same genre: *satura* (ibid.: 322-23).

not” (ibid.: 309). Brink (1963, 173 and n.5), following Rudd (1960a), also appears to favour the use of *Sermones* for all Horace’s hexameter poems.

⁴⁹ *OLD* lists eight separate categories of meaning for “sermo”.

To conclude: although some of the evidence on which Hendrickson based his argument is not conclusive, there seems to be no compelling reason to reject his preference for the separate titles of *Sermones* and *Epistulae*, with *satura* as the superordinate, generic term. However, none of the evidence surveyed takes into account the content of the poems. This aspect will be addressed in chapters 3 to 5.

Epistolary features and form

Even if *Epist.* 1 can be assigned to the genre *satura* and regarded as a continuation of the *Sermones* in a different form, it has to be acknowledged that this change in form entails important differences. The title *Epistulae* implies poems that are in some way marked for epistolarity. The epistolary features for each of the twenty poems of *Epist.* 1 are set out in tabular form in the Appendix. This has proved to be a very productive analytical method. Provided the poems are read sequentially, it reveals that Horace included sufficient indication of epistolarity without any of the poems being over-determined. For example, *Epist.* 1.1 has little overt epistolarity, but is followed by four poems (1.2 to 1.5) which are very clearly epistolary, 1.6 has little epistolary character,⁵⁰ but by now the form has been established, and it can be read as a letter regardless of explicit features.

Tabulation also provides a striking contrast with *Serm.* 1 and 2. When these *libelli* were treated in a similar way, that is tabulating indications of place, and people other than the addressee, it immediately became apparent that this was impractical. Place, although a relevant feature, was often indicated by incidental details; very few of the poems had addressees, and there was a large number of people mentioned. This is consistent with the differences between face-to-face communication and a letter. In the former the recipient, at least in theory, has the opportunity to ask about unfamiliar people. This is obviously not immediately possible with a letter. For a letter to be credible as meaningful communication all the entities referred to must be mutually intelligible.

Horace indicated epistolarity in several ways:

⁵⁰ “Least like a letter in form” (Mayer 1994: 157); “at once the least epistolary and most philosophical of the collection” (Kilpatrick 1986: 65). *Epist.* 1.6 ends with “vive, vale” (67); “vive valeque” is similarly used at *Serm.* 2.5.110.

- by using epistolary formulae, albeit considerably modified;⁵¹
- by using words signifying the act of writing;⁵²
- by reference to place, indicating that the writer and addressee are geographically separated,⁵³ or
- by writing poems which more or less conform to conventional epistolary types, as exemplified by Cicero's correspondence, such as letters of invitation and recommendation.⁵⁴

Communicating face-to-face in a *sermo* (conversation or dialogue) obviously entails different conventions and expectations from communication by a letter, which has to be both written and sent to the recipient, who is separated from the writer both in place and time.

Stylistic differences between the *Sermones* and *Epistulae* have been elucidated at length and in detail by Mayer (1994: 11-39),⁵⁵ with respect to prosody, vocabulary, syntax, and *compositio*. This discussion will be briefly summarized here in so far as it relates to a comparison between the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1. In general the differences reflect the change in form: "The overall effect, compared to the *Sermones*, is one of measured pace. The lively changes of direction in the conversations give way to a more deliberate ordering of the sentences. Horace is chastening his style to approximate it to the more formal tone of a written document" (Mayer *ibid.*: 25).

In the *Sermones* Horace, following the practice of Lucilius, frequently employed enjambment, and varied the position of the caesura, thus producing

⁵¹ For example: *Epist.* 1.10.1-2: "Urbis amatorem Fuscum salvere iubemus | ruris amatores." This opening is an adaptation of the conventional epistolary formula used, for example, by Cicero: "*Cicero Attico suo salutem dat*" (Williams 1968: 11).

⁵² For example: "debes ... rescribere" (*Epist.* 1.3.30); this also suggests a continuing correspondence.

⁵³ For example: in *Epist.* 1.2 Horace is in Praeneste (2), while Lollius is in Rome (2); the juxtaposition of the place names "Romae, Praeneste" expresses a contrast between the two places, and also "establish[es] the need for a letter" (Mayer 1994: ad loc.). Horace used place "unobtrusively" as a marker of epistolarity (Williams 1968: 13).

⁵⁴ For example: *Epist.* 1.5 is an invitation to dinner, addressed to the lawyer Torquatus, and *Epist.* 1.9 is a *commendatio* to Tiberius on behalf of one Septimius. Other poems contain elements of these epistolary conventions, e.g. invitations in *Epist.* 1.3 and 1.4, and a *commendatio* in 1.12.

⁵⁵ In a long, and vehemently critical, review, John Moles isolated this section as being "enormously strong" and one "which [he] personally found very illuminating" (1995).

hexameters more informal than those appropriate for epic and didactic verse (13-15).⁵⁶ In *Epist.* 1 the hexameters follow patterns closer to those of the higher genres, but are still relatively informal. In particular, elision is less frequent and more controlled in comparison with the *Sermones* (15).

Referring to the style of his own prose letters, Cicero declared: “epistolas vero quotidianis verbis texere solemus” (*Fam.* 9.21.1; cited by Mayer: 16 n.56). The Greek critic Demetrius also prescribed a plain style for letters (*On style* 223). Moreover he distinguished between the styles appropriate for a letter compared to a dialogue: “The letter should be a little more formal than the dialogue, since the latter imitates improvised conversation, while the former is written and sent as a kind of gift” (*ibid.*: 224, tr. Innes 1995: 481). As observed by Rudd (1989: 12), there is remarkable accord between Demetrius’ precepts, for prose letters, and Horace’s practice. The identity and date of Demetrius are still in dispute, but one of the most recent editors agrees with the “growing consensus that the contents [of *On style*] at least do not preclude and may best reflect the second century B.C.” (Innes *ibid.*: 313).

With diction and word-order (Mayer: 16-21), there is also a tendency towards more literary usages, but still in a predominantly colloquial idiom. Comparison with the *Sermones* is more problematical in this area because word-choice is often influenced by need as much as by style. As Mayer observes, referring to colloquial language: “some words and phrases found in the *Sermones* are absent, perhaps by design” (16). However, it does appear that Horace avoided some words whose “archaic or colloquial tone may have rendered them less fit to Horace’s ear for inclusion in a documentary style” (17). Counter to this tendency, the more literary “-ere” ending of the third person plural of the perfect indicative active is used more in *Epist.* 1 (*ibid.*).

As far as *compositio* is concerned, the *Epistles* exhibit less freedom with respect to the introduction of new ideas in the final foot of a line, a practice that was common in the *Sermones* (24-5). In terms of larger structural units, Horace tended to avoid convoluted sentence structure in the *Epistles*, consistent with a letter being more

⁵⁶ The use of the dactylic hexameter in *satira* is intriguing. It does seem remarkable that the metre associated with epic, the highest of genres, should have been used for *satira*, one of the lowest. Citing Michael Silk (2000: 110), Frances Muecke has suggested that the use of the hexameter facilitated “stylistic ‘mobility’, the comic or ironic switch from one stylistic register to another” (2005: 41).

carefully constructed and “the product of reflection” (31), as opposed to the less disciplined, extemporaneous nature of conversation.

By way of example, Mayer provides a comparative analysis of the opening sentences of *Serm.* 1.1 and *Epist.* 1.1, both being three line questions addressed to Maecenas (31-2).⁵⁷ In *Serm.* 1.1, Maecenas is named in the first line, followed immediately by the statement of the opening topic.⁵⁸ This is appropriate for a conversation, with the early mention of a name to attract the addressee’s attention, and then getting straight to the point. The first topic is extrinsic to both Horace and Maecenas.

Consistent with a letter being more considered, *Epist.* 1.1⁵⁹ opens with “ a balanced eulogistic formula” (31), closer in tone to *Carm.* 1.1.1-2. than the opening of *Serm.* 1.1. The first three lines are introspective, densely packed with allusions to both Horace, his poetry, and his relationship with Maecenas. All of these are thematic in *Epist.* 1. Consequently, Mayer believes that *Epist.* 1.1. is programmatic, whereas *Serm.* 1.1. is not. Contrary to Mayer, in the next chapter it will be argued that not just *Serm.* 1.1, but to some extent the whole of *Serm.* 1, is programmatic.

Rudd who is not convinced that the *Epistles* are *satura* (see p.59), nevertheless finds that the hexameter poems “are broadly similar in metre, in stylistic level, and in subject-matter”, however they differ “in form and manner” (1982a, 157-8). He sees the change in method from *Sermones* to *Epistulae* as a transition from ridiculing moral faults “to reform[ing] them by exhortation and advice” (158). He also notes that

⁵⁷ Mayer observes that some editors print *Epist.* 1.1.1-3 as a statement rather than a question (31 n.103). A survey of readily available editions reveals the following:

STATEMENT: Orelli (1850); Maclean (1881); Wickham (1891); Wilkins (1892); Page (1895); Keller and Holder (1899); Morris (c.1968); Wickham-Garrod (1912); Fairclough (1929); Dilke² (1961).

QUESTION: Plaistowe and Watts (n.d.); Döring (1826); Müller (1893); K-H⁵ (1957); Bo (1959); Klingner (1959); Préaux (1968); Borzsák (1984); Shackleton Bailey (1985); Mayer (1994); Rudd (tr. 1997: 129).

Therefore it appears that more recent editors favour a question which, as Mayer comments, makes the lines “more urgent and bewildered” (ibid.).

⁵⁸ *Serm.* 1.1.1-3: “Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem | seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa | contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentis?”

⁵⁹ *Epist.* 1.1.1-3: “Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena, | spectatum satis et donatum iam rude quaeris, | Maecenas, iterum antiquo me includere ludo?”

Horace no longer indulges in the practice of *onomasti komoedein*. This again raises the question of just how much *Lucilianus character* there actually is in *Serm.* 1 and 2 (see p.40), and how much the adoption of the title *Satires* 1 and 2 for these poems influences their perception vis-à-vis *Epist.* 1. Rudd concludes: “In short, Lucilius has been left behind” (ibid.). This statement gets to the crux of the matter: in *Serm.* 1 and through *Serm.* 2 and *Epist.* 1 Horace redefines *satura*, consistent with his own times and circumstances.

In conclusion, Horace used various methods to give the poems of *Epist.* 1 epistolary character. The possible reasons for this change from *sermo* to *epistula* will be explored in more detail in a later chapter. One very obvious cause is the passage of time. Horace’s *persona* in *Epist.* 1 is that of a more mature man than in the *Sermones*, now in a position to appropriately offer advice to younger men. Concomitant with this is his status as a poet and his relationship with Maecenas, both of which are thematically important in *Epist.* 1.

The evidence presented earlier in this chapter does not preclude assigning *Epist.* 1 to the genre *satura*. Whether or not *Epist.* 1 can properly be considered as *satura* is something that can only be determined conclusively by a close examination of the content of the poems. This will be addressed in chapters 3 to 5. The exact nature of Horatian *satura*, as exemplified by the poems of *Serm.* 1, will be investigated in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 2

What is Horatian *satura*?

The etymology of *satura*

The etymology of the word ‘*satura*’ has received much attention in discussions of the nature of Roman verse satire. This topic will not be treated in detail here: it has been covered thoroughly elsewhere,¹ and is of marginal relevance. Of the four etymologies offered by Diomedes (*GLK* 1.485.30-486.16) the first, the derivation from Satyrs has been universally rejected on linguistic grounds.² The remaining three: the *lanx satura*, the *genus farciminis*, and the *lex satura*,³ all encapsulate the concepts “of abundance and variety” (Braund 1996: 4). Options two and three are the most favoured, although all connote a medley or miscellany (Van Rooy 1965: 19; Coffey² 1989: 14-15). Coffey prefers the derivation from *farcimen*, because the humble nature of this food is appropriate for “a rich and variegated but unpretentious literary form” (ibid.: 17). Juvenal’s use of “farrago” (1.86) to designate his *Saturae* could support this derivation, and is perhaps his way of ridiculing learned theorizing (Coffey ibid.: 15-16; Braund 1996: 5).

Investigating the etymology of the word ‘*satura*’ may be a fascinating, and possibly inevitable, academic exercise, but it is of questionable validity for describing the actual genre: “Perhaps more than other genres, satire invites readers to scrutinize its name as a key to its nature. But this approach notoriously raises more questions

¹ See for example: Van Rooy (1965: 1-29); Knoche (1975: 3-16); Coffey² (1989: 3-23); Gowers (1993: 109-26); Keane (2002: 11-14).

With respect to Livy’s account (7.2) of dramatic *satura* in the development of Roman drama, the majority of critics have rejected this as not having any validity for the development of literary *satura*, for example: Van Rooy (1965: 33-4); Knoche (1975: 7-11); Coffey² (1989: 18-22); Conte (1994b: 113); *OCD*³: 1358.

² The rejection does not preclude the possibility that the title of Petronius’ *Satyrica* is a punning allusion to this derivation (*OCD*³: 1358; Braund 1996: 3-4).

³ The existence of a law of this type is doubted (Hendrickson 1911: 139-40; Van Rooy 1965: 14-15; Knoche 1975: 14; Coffey² 1989: 17). These doubts notwithstanding, the concepts of abundance and variety are still present. Braund has suggested that the legal connotations could reflect the satirist as “a moral legislator on a variety of topics” (1996: 5).

than it answers” (Keane 2002: 11). Catherine Keane’s article offers a more productive approach to Diomedes’ etymologies: the four etymologies are interpreted as metaphors reflecting characteristic features perceived in *satura*, namely “playfulness, abundance, and variety” (ibid.: 12). She argues that both Diomedes and Varro (widely accepted as his ultimate source) would have been aware of the linguistic difficulties with the first and fourth etymologies, and yet they still included them (ibid.). Regarding the derivations as *ex post facto* eliminates the necessity to select the most appropriate option(s). Keane also plausibly suggests that the multifaceted nature of Diomedes’ passage matches the playful and mixed nature of *satura* itself: “Satire, like Diomedes’ definition of it, proposes sets of alternatives at different or even inconsistent levels, thereby creating multiple possibilities for uncomfortable awareness and allowing imaginative truth to emerge from real uncertainty” (Knight 1990: 149, cited by Keane: 13-14).

The approach of Keane and Knight is intellectually satisfying, encompassing all four options without the need to accept dubious ancient etymologies. However, the name of a genre alone, even combined with the etymology or other origin of that name, only reveals a limited amount of information about actual texts produced in that particular genre. The characteristics of the genre can only be elucidated by examination of extant texts. For Horatian *satura* this could involve not only Horace’s texts but also those of his predecessors, Ennius and Lucilius.

The *satura* of Ennius and Lucilius

Ennius

It is accepted that Ennius wrote *satura* of some kind.⁴ It is also acknowledged that the thirty-one lines⁵ of indirectly transmitted fragments provide little in the way

⁴ Discussions of the life and works of Ennius and Lucilius can be found in the following general books on Roman satire, and literary history:

Ennius: Ramage, Sigsbee and Fredericks (1974: 8-26); Knoche (1975: 17-30); Coffey² (1989: 24-32, 214-17); Conte (1994b: 75-84); von Albrecht (1997: 129-46); Muecke (2005: 35-40).

Lucilius: Ramage, Sigsbee and Fredericks (1974: 27-52); Knoche (1975: 31-52); Coffey² (1989: 35-62, 217-26); Conte (1994b: 112-17); von Albrecht (1997: 250-66); Braund (1992: 10-15); Muecke (2005: 40-7).

of reliable evidence: “The remains of his [Ennius’] 4 books of satires are so slight that very little of real use can be adduced from them” (Freudenburg 2001: 1 n.1). The allocation of fragments from his minor occasional poems present particular difficulties, because some critics do not see any qualitative differences between these and the fragments assigned to his *Saturae* (Gratwick (1982: 159).⁶ This caveat notwithstanding, Gratwick has identified features of later *satura* in Ennius’ fragments: it is personal poetry, and exhibits moral criticism of types, rather than attacks on named individuals. It also displays *varietas* in forms of presentation with examples of both monologue and dialogue. Elements from comedy and animal fables are employed (ibid.: 158).⁷ One major difference from Horatian *satura* is that Ennius wrote in a variety of metres: “iambic senarii, dactylic hexameters, trochaic septenarii, and sotadeans, trochaic tetrameters” (Muecke 2005: 37).

Of more importance is whether later Roman satirists were influenced to any extent by Ennius’ *satura*: “the Ennian stage of *satura* was in some ways a false start, and it seems likely that it had a very limited influence on later satirists” (Coffey² 1989: 32). Horace, in his hexameter poems, refers to Ennius by name five times, but never as a satirist.⁸ Of these, only one: “Ennius ipse pater numquam nisi potus ad arma | prosiluit dicenda” (*Epist.* 1.19.7-8) has any connection with Ennius’ satires. Although there is a clear allusion to *Sat.* 21W: “Numquam poetor nisi si podager”, the words “ad arma | ... dicenda” (7-8), and the mention of “Homerus” (6) suggest that the *Annales* is also relevant. At *Serm.* 1.4.60-1 Horace quotes directly from the *Annales* (258-9W) (Brown 1993: ad loc.), and at *Serm.* 1.2.37-8 he parodies *Ann.* 471-2W (Brown ibid.: ad loc.). For Horace, Ennius would appear to be important as an iconic poet-figure from Roman literary history rather than as a predecessor in *satura*.

⁵ Warmington’s edition of the *Saturae* (1935: 382-94) contains 31 verses. He refers to (ibid.: 388-9) but does not include the prose paraphrase of Ennius’ version of Aesop’s fable of the crested lark preserved in Gellius (2.29.3-20 = 21-58V³).

⁶ There is also potential confusion with fragments from the *Annales* as Ennius included personal passages in the proems to Books one and seven (Jocelyn 1972: 1010; Conte 1994b: 77, 80-81; von Albrecht 1997: 136).

⁷ For all of these features, Gratwick (ibid.: 158) includes reference to fragments, both in Warmington and Vahlen.

⁸ *Serm.* 1.10.54; *Epist.* 1.19.7-8; *Epist.* 2.1.50; *Ars* 56, 259.

Ennius has been implicated in the vexed question of who is referred to as “inventor” (*Serm.* 1.10.48) and “auctor” (*ibid.*: 66). With respect to “inventor”, the majority view is for Lucilius.⁹ The situation with “auctor” is far more complicated. Van Rooy, while adopting the majority view of Lucilius as “inventor”, designated the “auctor” as Ennius (1965: 45 n.6). Palmer (1905: *ad* 1.10.48, 66) associates both passages with Lucilius, in the case of “auctor” (66) on the assumption that “Graecis intacti carminis” (66) refers to *satira*. He glosses the whole line as: “than an inventor of a new branch of poetry unattempted by the Greeks’ (might be expected to be)” (*ibid.*: *ad* 66).

The whole question of these disputed references has been thoroughly explored in an article by Rudd (1960b: 40-4). He argues convincingly for the referent of “auctor” being an unspecified early Latin poet writing in native Italian metres, and proposed a translation: “Suppose too that he was more polished than an author of a rough *carmen* unhandled by the Greeks” (*ibid.*: 43). *Carmen* here refers to “verse”, denoting poetry written in native Italian metres (*ibid.*). More recently, Brown (1993: *ad Serm.* 1.10.65-7) accepts Rudd’s argument, and discusses and refutes other opinions. Essentially, there is little evidence for Horace alluding to Ennius as a predecessor in *satira*.

Similarities have been detected between what has become known as the “Good Companion” (Gruen 1990: 111) passage (*Ann.* 210-27W = 268-85Sk) and Horace’s portrayal of his relationship with Maecenas (Skutsch 1985: 14-15, 459 *ad Ann.* 280; Badian 1985: 346). The Good Companion passage is preserved in Gellius (12.4.1-4), and Gellius’ description of the client figure, “an exemplary depiction of the virtues desired in a man who serves as refuge and solace for one higher in status and fortune” (Gruen *ibid.*), is more redolent of the way Horace portrays himself vis-à-vis Maecenas in the *Odes*, for example, 3.29, than in the hexameter poems.

Quintilian did not include Ennius in his main reference to the genre *satira* (*Inst.* 10.1.93-95). He did, however, mention him in connection with an otherwise unknown *satira*, in a section on personification: “Sed formas quoque fingimus saepe, ... ut Mortem ac Vitam, quas contendentes in satira tradit, Ennius” (*ibid.*: 9.2.36). Diomedes, in the *locus classicus* for the etymology of *satira*, included Ennius with

⁹ A minority opinion was that of Lejay who favoured Ennius as both “inventor” and “auctor” (1911: *ad* 1.10.48, 66).

Pacuvius in a tradition of *satura* which pre-dated Lucilius, Horace and Persius: “Satira dicitur carmen apud Romanos nunc quidem maledicum et ad carpenda hominum vitia archaeae comoediae caractere conpositum, quale scripserunt Lucilius et Horatius et Persius. et olim carmen quod ex variis poematibus constabat satira vocabatur, quale scripserunt Pacuvius et Ennius” (*GLK* 1.485.30-4; emphasis added). The principal distinction is between *satura* which is “carmen ... maledicum” and that which is “a verse form made up of a variety of smaller pieces of poetry” (tr. Coffey² 1989: 9). If Diomedes’ ultimate source was Varro, who originally cited only Lucilius,¹⁰ then this contrast would be more explicable. Whatever was meant by Diomedes’ statement, it is clear that *varietas* both in metres and content was a feature of Ennian *satura*.

The difficulty of assigning fragments to the *Saturae*, the fact that the ancient evidence suggests that he was not considered part of the mainstream tradition of *satura*, and his lack of influence on later writers of *satura* qua satirist,¹¹ all lead to the conclusion that very little can be deduced with any confidence about Ennius’ *Saturae*. Edward Courtney’s summary is apposite: “The genre provided Ennius with a vehicle for self-expression in a non-lyrical way and for the moralizing so dear to the Romans” (1993: 8).

Lucilius

Although Lucilius was explicitly acknowledged as a predecessor in *satura* by the three major satirists,¹² and therefore can be assumed to have influenced their practice, the evidential value of the fragments is not much better. On the positive side, there is no suggestion that he wrote in any other genre, and no doubt about the attribution of fragments. The extant fragments comprise fewer than 1300 lines from thirty books and, as with those of Ennius, they are all indirectly transmitted, mainly by grammarians especially Nonius Marcellus (fourth century CE), in his *De compendiosa doctrina*. The passages so preserved may not be representative of the bulk of Lucilius’ texts and, as always with fragments, there is no context, no way of assessing tone, and

¹⁰ Van Rooy suggests that “et Horatius et Persius” was added by Suetonius (1965: 2).

¹¹ Horace’s successors made even less reference to Ennius. Juvenal made no explicit mention at all, and Persius has one, typically enigmatic, allusion at 6.9-11. Harvey (1981: ad loc.) has a long note on these problematic lines.

¹² **Horace:** *Serm.* 1.4.6-13, 56-7; *Serm.* 1.10.1-2, 56; *Serm.* 2.1.29, 62-5; **Persius:** 1.114-15; **Juvenal:** 1.20, 165.

no knowledge of the identity of narrators/speakers (Gruen 1993: 274 n.9; Svarlien 1994: 265).

The features of Lucilius' *satura* which have influenced later exponents of the genre are metre, forms of presentation, and subject matter. These features are adopted, without comment, by Horace, Persius and Juvenal. Any influence with respect to language is more difficult to assess because of the fragmentary nature of Lucilius' *Saturae*; the fact that language use always changes diachronically, and also because of an aspect of the *varietas* of *satura* itself: "The language was permitted to range from the extravagances of mock-epic grandeur, through the everyday discourse of polite gentlemen, to explicit crudity" (Braund 1996: 2). In general it can be assumed that Lucilius employed vocabulary that was more informal and closer to that of everyday speech than that found in the higher genres of epic and tragedy (Brown 1993: 8).

Lucilius' three major successors all wrote exclusively in dactylic hexameters, apart from Persius' enigmatic fourteen verse prologue in choliambics. Although in his earliest books Lucilius had used a variety of metres, the later books (30, 1 to 21), are exclusively in hexameters (Warmington 1938: xii-xiii). Forms of presentation are monologue, dialogue (713-14W), and epistle form (102-5W, 186-93W), all used by his successors (Braund 1992: 11).

The subject matter discernible in the Lucilian fragments is discussed in the general works on Roman satire,¹³ and will be summarized here. What is most noteworthy is the continuity in the topics treated by Lucilius and his successors: "In terms of content, ... Lucilius established the repertoire of the genre" (Braund: *ibid.*). His *satura* consisted of social criticism mixed with literary and linguistic criticism, narrated in a personal style with 'autobiographical' elements (for example, 650-1W). His eclectic use of philosophy, although described as "commonplace" (Coffey² 1989: 52), demonstrates an awareness of all the major schools, and perhaps a deeper acquaintance than superficial appearances might suggest (Gratwick 1982: 166-7; Gruen 1993: 308). Significantly with respect to Horatian *satura*, Lucilius also appears to have parodied Stoic philosophy (1189-90W). His social criticism covered such topics as the mindless pursuit of personal gain in public life (1145-51W); food and

¹³ Ramage, Sigsbee and Fredericks (1974: 32-49); Knoche (1975: 39-51); Gratwick (1982: 162-71); Coffey² (1989: 40-54); Conte (1994b: 115-16); von Albrecht (1997: 260-2); Braund (1992: 11-15).

drink (1019-37W), especially extravagance (601-3W);¹⁴ sexual morality (275-6W; 291W; 359-60W; 1048W, etc.), and superstition (524-9W). In short, Lucilius utilized the “general moral lessons of the sort which had figured earlier in the Greek street-sermon or diatribe” (Brown 1993: 8). The connection here with diatribe implies serio-comic moral criticism. The humour of *satura* tends to reside in its playfulness and irony, and the detection of this kind of humour in a fragmentary text is highly problematical. There is evidence of the more obvious humour of parody (the *Concilium deorum* (5-46W)), and of extracts which exhibit “the comic inventiveness of Plautus” (Rudd 1986: 84).

Many of the fragments assigned by Warmington to Books 9 and 10 focus on literature, oratory and orthography, and Lucilius established a place in *satura* for various aspects of literary criticism. Pliny designated him as “qui primus condidit stili nasum” (*Nat., praef.* 7), glossed by Coffey as “the first Roman to have a critical faculty” (1989: 223 n.102). Pliny quotes the fragment preserved as 632-4W, which has been attributed to a programmatic poem in Book 26, the first book that Lucilius wrote (Warmington 1938: 200-1). Lucilius is ostensibly stating that his *satura* is intended for a moderately well-educated audience, certainly this is how it is interpreted by Cicero: “neque se ab indoctissimis neque a doctissimis legi velle” (*de Orat.* 2.25). There is no way of accurately assessing Lucilius’ tone, but it seems possible that he was being somewhat disingenuous. Gratwick (1982: 167) enumerates the wide knowledge of Greek and Roman literature and philosophy needed by Lucilius’ audience.

Horace alludes to Lucilius’ critiques of Ennius and Accius (*Serm.* 1.10.53-5). Criticism of Ennius (413W) would appear to be on stylistic grounds. On the other hand, criticism of Accius, a contemporary, may have been more wide-ranging. Warmington suggests that all of the fragments assigned to Book 9 *Sat.* 2 (366-410W) are “in opposition to the views of Accius” (p.107). Coffey goes further and proposes that there may have been a political dimension to Lucilius’ literary feud: “Accius’ celebration of the Spanish triumph of his patron Iunius Brutus Calliacus at a time when Scipio aspired to *gloria* in Spain may have been displeasing to the Scipionic faction” (1989: 53; von Albrecht 1997: 251). This utilization of superficially literary

¹⁴ Lucilius’ thematic use of food and drink is discussed by Gruen (1993: 303-6).

criticism with an underlying political motive has resonance for Horace's own criticisms of Lucilius.

Finally in the context of literary criticism, in Book 30 *Sat.* 4 (1061-92W) Lucilius has been interpreted as engaging in a debate with his critics. The fragments do not reveal who his opponents are, but Warmington assumes that there was "at least one other literary man" (ibid.: 344), and possibly others "including Accius" (ibid.; also Griffith 1970: 66). Whoever Lucilius was arguing with, it appears that he was defending himself for his *nominatim* attacks on socially prominent contemporaries (Coffey² 1989: 41; Fredricksmeier 1990: 792 n.3). This aspect of Lucilius' practice is the one where he differs most from his successors, all of whom draw attention to it in programmatic contexts.¹⁵ Persius (1.114-15) appeals to Lucilian precedent to justify his own practice, which did not in fact involve personal attacks.¹⁶ Juvenal seems to feel obligated to excuse himself for not adopting the same satiric method as Lucilius. He does this on the grounds that it is now too dangerous (1.165-71). Horace's rather different, and more extensive, response will be examined in detail later in this chapter (see p.92). In their programmatic poems Lucilius' successors demonstrate the tension between tradition and innovation, and present their individual responses to the problem caused by the convention of acknowledging an *inventor* whose method in this particular genre was no longer appropriate (Kenney 1962: 32-40; Courtney 1980: 83).

In summary, several features of *satura* were established by Lucilius: the dactylic hexameter; the personal nature of the poetry with ostensibly autobiographical details; *varietas* in forms of presentation (monologue, dialogue or epistle); and the subject matter, principally social and moral criticism with some elements of literary criticism. The genre is not an elevated one in terms of language register, although assessment of language use in the fragments of Lucilius presents problems (see p.71). While it may be true that "Lucilius ... taught the poets of Roman satire how to present themselves, and he gave them their range of topoi" (von Albrecht 1997: 263), it is not possible to determine from the fragments the tone of his treatment of those topoi or the *persona(e)* that he created.

¹⁵ Hor. *Serm.* 1.4.1-6; 1.10.3-4; Pers. 1.114-15; Juv. 1.165-7; also Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.94.

¹⁶ "Neither Horace nor Persius nor Juvenal ever attacked an eminent contemporary, either by name or by unmistakable innuendo" (Kenney 1962: 37).

Satura as a genre which involves social criticism inevitably changes diachronically, both in terms of the specific details of the ‘vices and follies’ which are exposed, and the manner in which each poet chooses to do this. Braund has described Lucilius as a poet who “is very much a product of his time and place” (1992: 14). This is equally true of all satirists. However much the Roman satirists may create external reality and control their reception (Keane 2002: 8-11), their subject matter and satirical method must to some extent reflect their particular socio-historical circumstances. The exact nature of *satura* for each satirist can only be determined from the texts themselves.

Horace on Horatian *satura*

Horace wrote three programmatic poems: *Serm.* 1.4, 1.10 and 2.1, all of which have attracted much scholarly attention. One critic has remarked that devoting three out of eighteen satires to “the writing of satires” is “extraordinary” (Classen 1988: 96). As Lucilius had already established literary criticism as an appropriate topic for *satura*, this may not in fact be the case. There is, as always, the problem of not knowing how much of his corpus Lucilius devoted to this topic, and clearly literary criticism remained thematically prominent for Horace throughout his poetic career.

Comparative discussions of the programmatic poems of Horace, Persius and Juvenal tend to focus on *Serm.* 2.1 as the most suitable for this purpose (Shero 1922: 148; Kenney 1962: 34-5; Griffith 1970: 56-7; Fredricksmeyer 1990: 792 n.2).¹⁷ While this may be perfectly logical, albeit in a somewhat circular way, on the grounds that 2.1 “by nature of its position ... performs an introductory and apologetic function and thus parallels the programmatic satires of Persius and Juvenal” (Fredricksmeyer: *ibid.*), it does raise the question of why Horace should have delayed writing a *sermo* recognized by his successors as programmatic until the beginning of his second Book.¹⁸ What has not received so much attention is the possibility that *Serm.* 1.1, and the whole of the first Book to some extent, is programmatic.¹⁹ If Horace was

¹⁷ An exception to this is Anderson (1963a: 2) who focussed on *Serm.* 1.4. His perspective, however, was how the Roman satirists located themselves in the tradition of Lucilian *satura*, rather than the “pattern of apology” in programmatic poems, demonstrated by Kenney (1962: 36).

¹⁸ *Serm.* 2.1 will be discussed in ch.4 in the context of status.

¹⁹ The programmatic nature of *Serm.* 1.1 has been discussed by Zetzel (1980: 69-70); Hubbard (1981), Muecke (1990), Gold (1992); Dufallo (2000).

establishing his own version of *satura* throughout *Serm.* 1, this could explain why he delayed using the word “*satura*” itself until *Serm.* 2.1.1, and why this poem exhibited features which his successors perceived to be essential for their practice in the genre.

Kenney has observed with respect to Lucilius that: “Of the four great exponents of *satura* only he did not live and write under a despotism, and moreover he enjoyed the protection of a powerful coterie” (ibid.: 36-7). Viewed from this perspective it is rather remarkable that a genre pioneered by Lucilius, and one that so exemplified the *libertas* of the Republic, should have continued to flourish under the Principate. Kenney also remarked that all the satirists after Lucilius adhered to the dictum: “*parcere personis, dicere de vitiis*” (Mart. 10.33.10) (ibid.: 37). Horace may have chosen to write *satura* because the personal and flexible nature of the genre enabled him to adapt it to express support for Maecenas in *Serm.* 1. In the context of *satura* as personal poetry, Conte has remarked: “none of the standard poetic genres—epic, tragedy, comedy—provides a space for direct expression, in which the poet can reflect his relation to himself and to contemporary reality” (1994b: 114).²⁰

Given the enormous difference in Horace’s “contemporary reality” compared to Lucilius’, Horace’s redefinition of *satura* could not be achieved in one programmatic poem, and the whole of *Serm.* 1 can be seen as experimental and programmatic. It is therefore appropriate to establish the characteristics of Horatian *satura* from a reading of *Serm.* 1, focusing particularly on 1.1.

***Serm.* 1.1 as a programmatic poem**

Serm. 1.1 to 1.3 have become known as ‘diatribe satires’, (for example, Rudd² 1982a: title of ch.1 “The Diatribes of Book 1: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3”). Although the use of the term ‘diatribe’ has been questioned (see p.61), it is certainly the case that many of the features that have been associated with Bionean diatribe are also found in Roman *satura*.²¹ One aspect of diatribe in particular, the informal presentation of philosophy, suggests similarities with much of Horace’s hexameter corpus. Whatever the actual

²⁰ Similarly, in the context of Lucilius and the emergence of *satura*, Sander Goldberg has observed: “Neither comedy as it developed among the Romans nor epic offered its practitioners much opportunity to cultivate so personal a tone” (2005: 155).

²¹ A comprehensive list of these features can be found in Randolph (1971: 172-3). There are also discussions of diatribe in Kenney (1971: 17-20); Coffey (1989: 92-93); Brown (1993: 4-5); Muecke (1993: 6-8).

nature of the Hellenistic prose diatribe and its influence on Roman verse satire, ‘diatribe’ is a useful term for features which appear in *satura* and have traditionally been designated in this way.

Horace includes diatribe features in 1.1, several in the first three lines:

Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem
 seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa
 contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentis?

The rhetorical question indicates that the form is quasi-dramatic, with direct address to a second person, Maecenas, the addressee at the beginning. The poem is a monologue with a structure which resembles the informal logic of a conversation.²² The mention of Maecenas’ name also serves the overtly programmatic purpose of dedicating the book to a patron (Brown 1993: *ad* 1.1.1). The hyperbole of “nemo” contributes to the “arresting opening” (Brown: *ibid.*), characteristic of both diatribe and *satura*. In the context of *Juv.* 1, Kenney refers to “the old Lucilio-Horatian technique of the flippant and arresting introduction” (1962: 32).

The first word “qui”, used in the sense of *quomodo*, adverts to the informal nature of *satura*, as opposed to higher genres in hexameters. ‘Qui’ in this sense is classified by Bo as “*sermo priscus*” (1960: 359), and is used by Horace only in his hexameter poems, predominantly in the *Sermones*:²³ “*qui fit* and *nemo* are not poetic words” (Zetzel 1980: 69, 76 n.51 and references there).

Horace also signals in these verses that popular philosophy will form part of his subject matter. The opposed phrases “ratio dederit” and “fors obiecerit” (2) are suggestive of Stoic and Epicurean philosophy respectively. This was first noted by a scholiast: “Breuiter duas sectas tetigit; nam cum dicit ratio, Stoicos tangit, cum fors, Epicureos. Stoici enim dicunt omnia certa ratione fieri, Epicurei fortuitu” (Ps.-Acro: *ad loc.*), and has been widely accepted by more recent critics (Bond 1977: 5-7; Zetzel 1980: 69; Freudenburg 1993: 11). Lejay, on the other hand, was of the opinion that

²² A perceived lack of unity between the themes of *mempsimoiria* and *avaritia* in this poem has troubled some critics, but Rudd’s succinct outline of the poem’s argument, without any of Horace’s digressions or elaborations, reveals its unity (1982a: 12).

²³ Eleven out of sixteen occurrences are in the *Sermones*, four in the *Epistulae*, and one in the *Ars* (Bo 1960: 359). Lejay (1911: *ad Serm.* 1.1.1) has a detailed note which includes reference to the use of *qui* and *qui fit* in other writers. *Qui* in this sense is used by Vergil only at *A.* 11.822, where there is imitation of Ennius (Lejay: *ibid.*).

this is everyday usage rather than the technical vocabulary of philosophy (1911: *ad Serm.* 1.1.2).²⁴ This may well have been a common expression: Lejay cites an instance of the juxtaposition of *ratio* and *fors* by Cicero in a letter of April 44 (*Att.* 14.13.3) in an overtly non-philosophical context. It is perhaps legitimate to suppose that Horace's immediate audience would have been aware that these words had both general and technical connotations. If this is accepted, then in 1.1.1-3 Horace programmatically foreshadows his use of the major philosophical schools for popular moralizing. The philosophical element in 1.1 will be discussed in more detail below (see p.81).

The lively and varied exposition of discontented types (4-12) with its pointed contrasts, quoted speech, and reference to everyday occupations is characteristic of diatribe. So too is the metaphor contained in Horace's allusion to Lucretius (1.935-50) in v.25-6: the "sweetening of the pill" (Kenney 1971: 17). A further element of diatribe is debate with an anonymous interlocutor, characterized by Horace as an *avarus* (41-107).

It is possible to identify diatribe features used by Lucilius which also appear in 1.1. There are fragments of Lucilius which clearly retail the fable of the fox and the sick lion (1111-20W), while Horace employs the sensible ("sapiens" (38)) ant as an *exemplum* for the *avarus* of the proper use of resources. Both poets use *exempla* from myth: Horace (1.1.68) and Lucilius (136-7W). It is not possible to draw any conclusions from the fact that both allusions are to Tantalus. The Lucilian fragment has no context, and was preserved by Nonius on the basis of unusual vocabulary. Anecdotes about named individuals, possibly contemporaries, are found in Lucilius Book 11 (424-54W), and Horace includes the anecdotes about the unnamed "dives" (64-7), and Ummidius (95-100), a type figure, in his argument with the *avarus*.

By the use of diatribe features Horace implicitly locates his *Sermones* in the genre pioneered by Lucilius. However, he also implicitly foreshadows the tension between tradition and innovation which will become apparent in later poems of the *libellus*. There are accumulated oblique references to the desirability of *brevitas* through the disparagement of its opposite: "cetera de genere hoc adeo sunt multa, loquacem | delassare valent Fabium" (13-14); "non longa est fabula" (95); "Iam satis est. ne me Crispini scrinia lippi | compilasse putes, verbum non amplius addam" (120-1). Crispinus was a Stoic writer (Freudenburg 1993: 110-13). Further gibes at his

²⁴ "Ici, Horace parle comme tout le monde, sans recherche de profondeur philosophique".

prolixity recur at *Serm.* 1.3.139 and 1.4.14. In a somewhat different guise he is the ultimate source of Davus' Stoic 'lecture' in *Serm.* 2.7. Throughout the *libellus*, *brevitas* as a stylistic requirement is gradually reinforced, both implicitly by Horace's practice and obliquely, especially by negative criticism of Lucilius himself in 1.4.9-13, until it becomes fully explicit in 1.10: "est brevitate opus, ut currat sententia, neu se | impediatur verbis lassas onerantibus auris" (9-10). For Horace *brevitas* is not an end in itself as it was for the neoterics, but has a practical purpose: that the listener receives and understands the meaning of the poem.

In connection with *brevitas*, Freudenburg (1993: 111) has detected an allusion to the "*deductum carmen*" in Horace's use of "deducam" (1.1.15): "Ne te morer, audi | quo rem deducam" (14-15). Other critics posit Horace's first reference to this concept at *Serm.* 1.10.43-4 (Brink 1982: 242, *ad Epist.* 2.1.224-5; Muecke 1993: *ad Serm.* 2.1.4). Although certainty is impossible, it seems highly likely that there is an Alexandrian allusion here. Vergil uses the phrase "deductum dicere carmen" (*Ecl.* 6.5), in a context where "the adjective [*deductum*] connotes the polish and refinement of neoteric personal poetry" (Coleman 1977: *ad loc.*).²⁵ As with "ratio" and "fors" (2), Horace's sentence can be interpreted on more than one level, so that it is possible to accept a translation such as that of Brown: "let me tell you what I'm leading up to" (1993: 19), at the same time acknowledging that the metaphor of spinning highly wrought poetry is also present.²⁶ The likelihood of Freudenburg's assertion being correct is perhaps reinforced by the use of the image of the muddy river: "at qui tantuli eget quanto est opus, is neque limo | turbatam haurit aquam neque vitam amittit in undis" (59-60). This Callimachean image recurs at *Serm.* 1.4.11 in a more predictable literary context, but in 1.1 the context is moral criticism. For Zetzel, this is an illustration of how in *Serm.* 1 Horace is concerned with "the relationship between manner of life and literary style, endorsing *mediocritas* in both spheres" (1980: 68). By employing these elusive metaphors, Horace is signalling that his *satura* will be highly crafted poetry for a learned audience, with meanings on more than one level,

²⁵ The *Eclogues* are generally thought to have been published in 39-38 BCE, slightly earlier than *Serm.* 1. Both poets are reflecting contemporary ideas about the writing of poetry.

²⁶ Freudenburg's suggested translation: "hear how I *reduce* the matter at hand" (1993: 111; italics original) captures the idea of finely crafted poetry, but not the ambiguity, which would be impossible in a concise translation.

consistent with Knight's observation that satire functions on multiple levels (cited on p.67 above).

In *Serm.* 1.1 Horace also foreshadows the importance of food imagery in his *satura*. This topic is found in the Lucilian fragments: a burlesque of a vulgar dinner party in 1019-37W (Ramage, Sigsbee and Fredericks 1974: 39) and, with more relevance to the present context, criticism of excessive spending on food at 1234-5W (Coffey² 1989: 52). Horace's use of food imagery in this poem emphasizes basic, natural requirements. Glazewski has suggested that in both books of *Sermones* Horace "repeatedly used food imagery to convey a true picture of Epicureanism" (1971: 88; also Muecke 1993: 9). The retirement savings of the "agricola", "caupo", "miles", and "nautae" (28-30) are represented by "cibaria" (32). This connotes very basic simple food: "Such as is supplied to slaves, etc." (*OLD*, s.v. 'cibarius²'), and would apply more accurately to the "acervus" of the "formica" (Brown 1993: *ad* 32). Other images of moderate food follow: modest amounts of grain (45-6); bread carried by a slave (47-8); the contrast between large granaries ("tua granaria") and small grain baskets ("cumeris nostris") (53). This section culminates in the river imagery (54-60) referred to above, thus bringing together the desirability of moderate consumption of the natural and necessary grain and water. In a passage which proposes a more attractive diet than bread and water, Horace links food imagery with the correct use of money:

nescis quo valeat nummus, quem praebeat usum?
panis ematur, holus, vini sextarius; adde
quis humana sibi doleat natura negatis. (73-5)

This imagery of the *victus tenuis* may also have a literary dimension, denoting the lowly nature of *satura*, much like Juvenal's "farrago" (1.86).

In *Serm.* 1.1.23-7 Horace establishes both the tone of his *satura* and his satirical method. The tone is serio-comic, the traditional *spoudaiogeloion* of diatribe, expressed as: "quamquam ridentem dicere verum | quid vetat?" (24-5). In other words, he will treat serious topics in a humorous way. This is reinforced by the word order of the misleading: "sed tamen amoto quaeramus seria ludo" (27). The humour of Horatian *satura* is of the type which provokes amused and knowing smiles rather than side-splitting raucous laughter. Much of the humour resides in the elusiveness of the argument, and the satisfaction of deconstructing the learned playfulness of the poet.

In indicating his satirical method he is anticipating what he will explicitly expand upon and validate in *Serm.* 1.4. and 1.10 (Brown 1993: *ad* 23-7). As he

demonstrates at 1.1.4-12 and 95-100, his method is to use people, usually unnamed or types, as *exempla* of vices or faults in an apotroptic way, rather than *nominatim* attacks on named individuals. Horace is also concerned to offer constructive proptreptic advice, for example, the fable of the ant (1.1.32-40). Classen's phrase "benevolent criticism" (1988: 96) is a succinct and accurate description of Horace's method, especially as a contrast to Lucilius' destructive invective.²⁷

In 1.4 and 1.10 Horace will overtly criticize his predecessor, but Anderson (1982: 34-5) has detected a critical allusion to Lucilius in 1.1.23-8. In "praeterea, ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens | percurram" (23-4), "percurram" is "pejorative, suggesting a superficial treatment of the subject" (Brown: *ibid.*).²⁸ This anticipates the explicit criticism of Lucilius' prolixity and lack of discipline in writing at *Serm.* 1.4.9-13. The juxtaposition of "iocularia" and "ridens" emphasizes the undesirable concentration on humour alone, which the Horatian satirist rejects, while "ridentem dicere verum" (24) combines humour with the morally serious in his preferred method. Anderson asserts that this passage expresses "the principal distinction between the Lucilian and the Horatian manner, while the former is essentially *lusor*, the Horatian satirist is *doctor*" (*ibid.*: 35). This judgement is too polarized, and possibly unfair to Lucilius. Consistent with his stated technique, Horace is both *lusor* and *doctor*, and if more of Lucilius' text were extant, the same judgement might be made about his *persona*.

Another key aspect of Horace's method is indirection: "quid rides? mutato nomine de te | fabula narratur" (69-70). By reflecting on the faults exposed in another person, the reader may come to realize that he possesses the same fault. Persius perceptively selected this very aspect of Horace's *satura* in a programmatic context (1.116-18).²⁹ Humour is crucial to this method of raising awareness in the audience. With reference to "amoto quaeramus seria ludo" (1.1.27), Classen observes: "The purpose is serious, the *ludus* is meant to guarantee effect, as the preceding lines [24-7] show" (1988: 98).

²⁷ It should be emphasized that Horace's portrayal of Lucilian *satura* was partial and may not accurately reflect its true nature.

²⁸ Horace also uses "percurro" in the context of stylistic criticism of Plautus: "quantus sit Dossennus edacibus in parasitis, | quam non astricto percurrat pulpita socco" (*Epist.* 2.1.173-4).

²⁹ "Omne vafer vitium ridenti Flaccus amico | tangit et admissus circum praecordia ludit, | callidus excusso populum suspendere naso."

Wickham (1891: 16) uses these lines as the epigraph to his commentary on Horace's *Sermones*.

Horace's address to Maecenas (1), as well as being a conventional dedication to a patron, establishes Horace's relationship with Maecenas and by extension Octavian. Barbara Gold has raised the further possibility that as poems in antiquity "were often known by their first line or partial first line, the name of Maecenas" as third word in the first line signifies that "he is immediately invested with a formal importance for the work itself as well as for Horace's life and career" (1992: 163). In the circumstances of composition there could have been risks for the historical poet in declaring his allegiance to Octavian's 'side'.

Although appearing to offer advice on moral matters, Horace is in fact "urg[ing] his addressee to do or believe that which he already intends to do or does believe" (DuQuesnay: 33). This paraenesis is an indirect form of encomium which functions as praise without incurring accusations of autocracy or flattery. More than this, it creates the impression of relaxed *amicitia* between men who share the same views on contemporary moral issues. Although these men were not all necessarily equal in social status, they were equal in terms of shared attitudes and opinions (see p.31). By presenting this image, *Serm.* 1 supports the new regime by emphasizing the reasonable attitudes of the circle of Maecenas.

Epicureanism in *Serm.* 1.1

Although Horace never mentions Lucretius or Epicurus by name, intertextuality with Epicurean texts has been recognized. Brown has identified a number of allusions to Lucretius and/or Epicurus in his commentary on *Serm.* 1.1 (1993: 90-100).³⁰ In arguing for recognition of Lucretius' influence on Horace's *satura*, Glazewski has made the following observations: "Writing between Lucilius and Horace, he used the hexameter ... he had a didactic purpose as did Horace; he treated as closely akin to his subject ... many of the contemporary themes of Roman satire on private life" (1971: 88 n.2).

Horace's first allusion (24-6) to Lucretius (1.936-50) does not refer to any specific tenet of Epicurean philosophy, but it is an important allusion in terms of Horace's programmatic statements about his use of moral philosophy. Lucretius uses the "comparison of his poetry with the honey smeared round the edge of the cup of his bitter philosophical medicine (i.936ff)" (Brown 1993: *ad* 23-7) in a programmatic

³⁰ Brown has published editions of *Lucretius* 1 (1984), and 3 (1997).

context.³¹ This is a traditional image in moral philosophy, going back to Plato (*Laws* 2.659e). By the use of this simile, Horace is not only putting his *satura* in the tradition of Lucilius and Hellenistic diatribe, but he is also alluding to earlier Greek philosophy, and Lucretius' more recent, and highly innovative, exposition of Epicurean philosophy in Latin hexameter verse. In this way, he can be seen to be identifying the serious purpose of his *satura* ("dicere verum" (24), "seria" (27)), which will nevertheless be treated in a humorous way ("ridentem" 24).³²

It is revealing to investigate the ways in which Horace has modified the simile vis-à-vis Lucretius. He has changed Lucretius' honey to small cakes ("crustula" (25)). This change may signify more than the expected *aemulatio*. Lucretius explicitly links the honey which disguises his bitter medicine with the honey of the Muses:

sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes
cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum
contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore (1.936-8)

cf.

volui tibi suaviloquenti
carmine Pierio rationem exponere nostram
et quasi musaeo dulci contingere melle (1.945-7)

By substituting "crustula" for Lucretius' "mel" Horace is using a rather less poetic image³³, perhaps anticipating the, disingenuous, assertion: "primum ego me illorum dederim quibus esse poetis | excerptam numero" (*Serm.* 1.4.39-40). Before Horace "crustulum" was used by Plautus (*St.* 691) in the context of a very humble 'banquet' given by two slaves,³⁴ the sort of meal in fact that would have been appropriate for Horace's "rusticus mus" (*Serm.* 2.6.79-117). It also appears in a Lucilian fragment, with unfortunately no context: "Gustavi crustula solus" (1232W). As a word indicating unpretentious food, "crustula" may also belong with the other food images in 1.1 (see p.79).

In addition, Horace has transferred Lucretius' image from the sphere of medicine to that of education; "sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes | cum dare

³¹ "Lucretius' mission. 921-50" (Bailey 1947 vol.2: 756).

³² The seriousness of the Horatian satirist with respect to moral philosophy will be discussed later in this section (see p.95).

³³ "Mais *crustulum* existait sans doute dans la langue populaire" (Lejay 1911: *ad Serm.* 1.1.25).

³⁴ "Hoc conviviumst | pro opibus nostris satis commodule nucibus, fabulis, ficulis, | olea in tryblio, lupillo, comminuto crustulo" (*St.* 689-91).

conantur” has become: “ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi | doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima” (1.1.25-6).³⁵ Lucretius’ medical analogy is consistent with Epicurus’ teaching, and his view of philosophy as therapy for the soul.³⁶ By his modification Horace has demonstrated that in his *satura* he will not be a slavish imitator of earlier poets, but he will incorporate material in a learned and innovative way. Furthermore, this is not a gratuitous change: education is thematic in later poems, from the informal education by his father (*Serm.* 1.4.105-29), to his formal schooling (*Serm.* 1.6.71-88), and later his advice to younger friends in *Epist.* 1, which can be seen as a form of education.

The philosophical concepts in 1.1 are all in some way related to limits. Coffey identifies the theme of this poem as: “sit finis quaerendi” (92) (1989: 70).³⁷ Limits are first mentioned explicitly with “naturae finis” (50). The passage (41-60) is consistent with Epicurus’ classification of the desires (*Ep. Men.* 127), and his view that there is “a limit ... to pleasure, which is constituted by the satisfaction of desire; beyond that limit pleasure cannot be increased, but only ‘varied’” (Bailey 1947 vol. 1: 62). Also relevant is *Sent. Vat.* 59, which specifically relates to excessive desire for food: “It is not the stomach that is insatiable, as is generally said, but the false opinion that the stomach needs an unlimited amount to fill it” (tr. Bailey 1970: 115). Horace’s *avarus* would seem to have been the sort of person Epicurus had in mind at *Sent. Vat.* 68:

³⁵ Horace’s “elementa ... prima” (26) may also be an allusion to Lucretius. “Elementa” is used by Lucretius with a range of meanings: “atoms”, “letters” and “principles” (Bailey 1947 vol.3: 1770, Index II: s.v. ‘elementa’). Commentators on Horace’s passage generally interpret “elementa” as referring to the letters of the alphabet, which is appropriate for the context. A minority favour the sense of ‘rudiments’ (e.g. Brown 1993: 19), while Kiessling-Heinze detects simultaneously the alphabet and the secondary meaning of “*principia*” (1959: ad loc.). None of the commentaries consulted mentions Lucretius. Horace also uses “elementa” at *Epist.* 1.1.27 in the sense of ‘rudiments’ (Mayer 1994: ad loc.), and 1.20.17 in a similar context to *Serm.* 1.1.26 of elementary education.

³⁶ “[Quoting Epicurus] ‘Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul’” (Porphyry, *To Marcella* 31 (Usener 221), tr. Long and Sedley 1987: 155, 25C).

³⁷ Wickham (1891: ad 1.1.92) detects an allusion to Lucilius: “virtus quaerendae finem re scire modumque” (1201W). Lucilius here connects “finis” and “modus”, as Horace goes on to do in v.106 (Wickham *ibid.*: ad loc.). As always, the lack of context, and hence assessment of tone for the Lucilian fragment inhibits any valid conclusions.

“Nothing is sufficient for him to whom what is sufficient seems little” (tr. *ibid.*: 117).³⁸

At v.106-7 Horace explicitly links, perhaps equates, “fines” with “modus” (‘measure’, ‘moderation’): “est modus in rebus, sunt certi denique fines | quos ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum.” This is another philosophical commonplace, finding its best-known expression in Aristotle *NE* 2.1106AB, but also found in Epicurus *Sent. Vat.* 63: “Frugality too has a limit, and the man who disregards it is in like case with him who errs through excess” (tr. *ibid.*: 117). This is relevant to the extremes expressed by Horace in v.101-4.

Lucretius’ proem to Book 2 (16-61), embodies his fullest description of the moral theory of Epicurus, and has several similarities with *Serm.* 1.1. Lucretius’ lines 16-22:

nonne videre
nil aliud sibi naturam latrare, nisi utqui
corpore seiunctus dolor absit, mente fruatur
iucundo sensu cura semota metuque?
ergo corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus
esse opus omnino, quae demant cumque dolorem,
delicias quoque uti multas substernere possint

express in more abstract terms Horace’s prescription for the *victus tenuis* (73-5),³⁹ already quoted above (p.79). Further, Horace’s next question to the *avarus* introduces the hedonistic calculus of Lucretius’ v.19:

an vigilare metu examinem, noctesque diesque
formidare malos fures, incendia, servos,
ne te compilent fugientes, hoc iuvat? (76-8).

In v. 81-4 Horace’s *avarus* demonstrates that he has not assimilated Lucretius’ message (2.34-36)⁴⁰ with respect to the benefits of wealth during ill health.

³⁸ The subtitle of a recent book on the problems caused by consumerism is, probably unconsciously, a paraphrase of *Sent. Vat.* 68: *Affluenza: when too much is never enough*. (Clive Hamilton and Richard Denniss, Crows Nest NSW: Allen & Unwin, 2005). Much of the material discussed in this book is very familiar to readers of Horace’s *Sermones*.

³⁹ Lucretius expressed the desirability of the *victus tenuis* more concisely elsewhere: “divitiae grandes homini sunt vivere parce | aequo animo; neque enim est umquam penuria parvi” (5.1118-19).

⁴⁰ “Nec calidae citius decedunt corpore febres, | textilibus si in picturis ostroque rubenti | iacteris, quam si in plebeia veste cubandum est.”

At the end of the poem, where Horace brings together the various philosophical strands, he includes yet another commonplace, the life as a banquet motif:⁴¹

inde fit ut raro qui se vixisse beatum
dicat et exacto contentus tempore vita
cedat, uti conviva satur, reperire queamus. (117-19)

Although this is a commonplace motif, there are obvious similarities with Lucretius: “cur non ut plenus vitae conviva recedis?” (3.938); “ante | quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum” (3.959-60).⁴² As Brown observes (1993: *ad* 1.1.117-19), there is also a link between the same passage in Lucretius and the theme of *mempsimoiria*: “sed quia semper aves quod abest, praesentia temnis” (3.957). Further, in Horace the lines immediately preceding (110-16) contain images of competitive greed, the fundamental folly that Horace attacks in this poem. Epicurus had decried competition at *RS* 21: “He who has learned the limits of life knows that that which removes pain due to want and makes the whole of life complete is easy to obtain; so that there is no need of actions which involve competition” (tr. Bailey 1970: 99). With possibly more relevance to the political dimension of Horace’s *Sermones*, Lucretius also inveighed against the folly of competition:

sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere
edita doctrina sapientium templa serena,
despicere unde queas alios passimque videre
errare atque viam palantis quaerere vitae,
certare ingenio, contendere nobilitate,
noctes atque dies niti praestante labore
ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri. (2.7-13)

With the two animal images (110-16) of the last section Horace has confirmed that the real reason for dissatisfaction with one’s lot is competitive greed, expressed earlier in the poem as: “nil obstet tibi, dum ne sit te ditior alter” (40). The reason for mindless accumulation of resources has been shown to be the inability to be satisfied with a modest amount, exemplified in concrete terms with the recommendations for the *victus tenuis* (73-5). Acquisitive fervour is compounded by the fear that someone else may have accumulated more, hence the emphasis on competition in these images.

⁴¹ Kindstrand has a comprehensive discussion of the various manifestations of this motif (1976: 281-2).

⁴² Bailey (1947 vol.2: 1152, *ad* Lucr. 3.938) comments that Horace also imitates this passage, but “less closely” at *Epist.* 2.2.214-15: “edisti satis atque bibisti. | tempus abire tibi est”.

What is far more important, however, is that the accumulation of wealth does not make people happy: money cannot buy the love and loyalty of friends or even family (84-94). *Amicitia*, a topic of great importance in Epicurean philosophy, is only briefly mentioned in 1.1, but assumes much greater prominence from 1.3 onwards.

Horace has signalled some negativity towards certain aspects of Stoicism by two pejorative, ostensibly stylistic, references to verbose Stoic writers: “cetera de genere hoc adeo sunt multa, loquacem | delassare valent Fabium” (13-14), and “Iam satis est. ne me Crispini scrinia lippi | compilasse putes, verbum non amplius addam” (120-1). Both of these passages have already been cited in relation to Horace’s indirect stipulation of *brevitas* (see p.77). These negative Stoic allusions both occur in contexts with Lucretian elements: “cetera de genere hoc” is used eleven times by Lucretius (Brown 1993: *ad* 1.1.13), and at v.120-1 there is perhaps irony in the suggestion of ‘borrowing’ from a Stoic poet when Horace has just alluded to Lucretius (117-19) (Brown *ibid.*: *ad* 120-1). With these ‘attacks’ on writers of Stoic persuasion he is anticipating his criticism of the rigidity and extremes of Stoicism in later poems, such as ridicule of Stoic paradoxes in *Serm.* 1.3, 2.3 and 2.7. DuQuesnay has tentatively identified both Fabius and Crispinus with “the proscribed and the active adherents of the Republican and Pompeian forces” (53-4). Stoicism in general had become associated with the Republican cause, exemplified by the opposition of Cato Uticensis to Julius Caesar, and there may be a political dimension to Horace’s negativity towards Stoic writers.

In *Serm.* 1.1 Horace has utilized philosophical commonplaces in his exploration of the folly of competitive greed as a cause of unhappiness. It would be contrary to the evidence of his poetry to categorize him as a dogmatic adherent of Epicureanism, or indeed of any other school, but whatever the ultimate source of these commonplaces, none are incompatible with the teachings of Epicureanism, as found in the extant texts of Epicurus and/or Lucretius.

Horace’s redefined *satura*

Horace’s first poem in the genre of *satura* is not programmatic in the same way as his three literary *Sermones*, but it does foreshadow many of the features of the rest of his hexameter corpus. *Serm.* 1.1 demonstrates the tension between tradition and innovation, characteristic of much Roman poetry, not just *satura*. Horace positively acknowledges the tradition of *satura* established by Lucilius by writing a relatively

short poem employing the dactylic hexameter and relatively informal vocabulary. He utilizes features of the Hellenistic prose diatribe also found in the extant fragments of Lucilius. On the other hand, he obliquely anticipates overt criticism of his predecessor with respect to the desirability of *brevitas*. In this poem these gibes are aimed at prolix Stoic writers, and also foreshadow the political dimension of Horace's *satura* in *Serm.* 1.

Horace announces and demonstrates his satirical technique, which is broadly in the tradition of the *spoudaiogeloion* of diatribe, but opposed to the *nominatim* invective of Lucilius, which he will criticize explicitly in later poems. The "seria" (27) is shown to be the *praecepta vitae beatae*, drawing on the common ground of popular philosophy. These *praecepta* are based on various manifestations of "fines" ('limits', 'self-control', 'self-discipline'), sometimes expressed in terms of the *victus tenuis*. *Brevitas*, although not explicitly prescribed in this poem, is a literary exemplification of "fines". There is intertextuality with Lucretius, and none of the philosophical elements in the poem are incompatible with Epicureanism. Negative philosophical comment is directed against the extremes of Stoicism, consistent with Horace's concern with limits. The *ludus* component is not easy to define but involves devices such as irony and playfulness, and a generally light-hearted tone.

Varietas is a fundamental aspect of *satura* which cannot adequately be demonstrated in just one poem. Within 1.1 it is represented by the variety of diatribe features, such as animal fable and anecdote. Horace's treatment of the theme of *avaritia*, which has caused so much consternation to critics, also displays *varietas* by exposing different facets of *avaritia*. The broader canvas of the whole *libellus* provides evidence of further examples of *varietas*. The most obvious is the variety of presentation: with the partial exception of 1.9, the poems are monologues which exhibit considerable variation in theme and treatment.⁴³

Serm. 1.1 to 1.3 are all grounded in the diatribe tradition, with the theme of *avaritia* in 1.1 giving way to sexual *mores*, especially the dangers of adultery with *matronae*, in 1.2, and tolerance towards friends in 1.3. Literary criticism is treated in 1.4, in particular Horace's hostility towards the abuse of *libertas dicendi*. 1.5 is

⁴³ *Serm.* 1.9 is a monologue containing reported sustained dialogue with two delineated characters, anticipating the predominant form of *Serm.* 2. Several of the monologues in *Serm.* 1 contain short passages of embedded dialogue, furnishing another example of *varietas*.

possibly an epistolary monologue, describing the journey to Brundisium. *Amicitia* with both equals and the *magni* is a prominent motif. 1.6 returns to the diatribe monologue, and attacks political ambition. The three short poems, 1.7 to 1.9, often referred to somewhat disparagingly as ‘entertainments’, all treat manifestations of conflict in relationships. 1.7 is an impersonal narrative, 1.8 is a monologue related by a wooden Priapus, and 1.9 is the reported dialogue between Horace and the social-climbing pest. Finally, in 1.10 Horace returns to literary criticism.

The *persona* of the Horatian satirist is gradually developed through *Serm.* 1, and is characterized mainly by means of ‘autobiographical’ details. In 1.1 the *persona* is already a character who is acquainted well enough with Maecenas to engage with him in an informal conversation on moral matters. The first person plural “quaeramus” (27) functions to unite Maecenas with Horace and differentiate them both from the malcontents in the following lines. If it can be accepted that Maecenas is the referent of “te” (14) and “putes” (121), then Horace shows some deferential awareness of Maecenas’ busy schedule, with perhaps an early indication of difference of status. In v.23-7 the impression is conveyed of a gently mocking satirist whose technique is like that of a “blandus doctor” (25-6), an impression which is confirmed by the nature of the criticism in the rest of the poem. The development of the Horatian *persona* in *Serm.* 1.1 will be examined in the context of status in the next chapter.

Horace’s clearest statement of his desiderata for *satura* is at *Serm.* 1.10.9-15 and 20-30. With respect to v.9-15, on one level the desired qualities can be quite simply interpreted as “brevity and variety” (Morris c.1968: *ad* 9ff.). The first is relatively straightforward: as already indicated (see p.77), *brevitas* is an essential requirement for Horace, and with practical justification not merely an aesthetic whim (1.10.9-10). *Varietas* is specified in a more complex manner. It is discussed in terms of contrasting styles: “et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso” (11), with the implication that the latter should predominate (Brown 1993: *ad* 11-15). The interpretation of several words in this passage (9-15) is problematical, and can significantly alter the meaning of the text. “Tristi” (11) is variously translated as, for example, ‘stern’ (Brown *ibid.*: 83); ‘severe’ (Rudd 1997: 79); Fr. ‘âpre’ (‘harsh’; ‘bitter’; ‘scathing’) (Lejay 1911: *ad* 11). Lejay quotes a passage from Cicero where *tristis* is used to describe the oratorical style of one P. Rutilius Rufus, a contemporary of Lucilius: “Rutilius... in quodam tristi et severo genere dicendi uersatus est; erat... natura uehemens et acer” (*Brut.* 113). As Lejay observes, the idea of “tristis” (11) is

repeated by “acer” (14). This component of the contrast signifies the perception of pre-Horatian *satura*.

The following lines:

defendente vicem modo rhetoris atque poetae,
interdum urbani parentis viribus atque
extenuatis eas consulto. ridiculum acri
fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res. (12-15)

elaborate on the contrast of styles, thereby introducing the *persona* and critical method of the satirist. Both concepts are inseparable from style in a genre of personal poetry like *satura*. The opposition of “rhetoris atque poetae” (12) with “urbani” (13) corresponds respectively to “tristi” and “iocoso” (11), and “acri” and “ridiculum” (14). Playing the part of a “rhetor atque poeta” represents the occasional use in Horace’s *satura* of a more impassioned style (Fraenkel 1957a: 129), exemplified by his response to the interlocutor’s accusation of vindictiveness (*Serm.* 1.4.79-85).

Following the example of his father, Horace’s *satura* aims to be constructive not destructive. Horace’s father based his son’s moral education on the provision of both positive and negative “exempla” (1.4.105-26). He endeavoured to deter his son from behaviour which would lead to dissatisfaction and unhappiness by pointing out people as “exempla vitiorum”:

insuevit pater optimus hoc me,
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.
cum me hortaretur parce, frugaliter atque
viverem uti contentus eo quod mi ipse parasset (1.4.105-8)

People are named in a situation depicted as private, between father and son. They are not subjected to the public *ad hominem* attacks that Horace’s detractor objects to (1.4.34-9), and which Horace disavows. At 1.4.69-78 he stresses that he is not seeking a large audience. The poetic fiction is that his *satura* is for a small group of *amici*. Horace refers to a “liber amicus” (1.4.132) as the kind of friend who, along with his own increasing maturity (“longa aetas” (ibid.)), will help to free him from his residual, minor faults (“mediocribus et quis | ignoscas vitiis teneor” (130-1)). In fact, the *persona* of the Horatian satirist resembles a “liber amicus”, a true friend who employs frank criticism for the purpose of correcting faults: “*liber amicus*, where the key idea of *libertas* reappears once more, is an apposite description of Horace’s own moral persona in the satires” (Brown 1993: ad 1.4.132-3).

The sense of *libertas* that is relevant here is the *libertas dicendi* of the satirist that is redefined for Horatian *satira*. At 1.4.21-33 Horace asserts indirectly that the social criticism of *satira* is still needed: “Horace did not want to eliminate the function of social criticism from the definition of satire” (Muecke 1979: 57). In the context “utpote pluris | culpari dignos” (24-5) is the reason why *satira* is an unpopular genre, and ostensibly why Horace does not recite in public, but it can also be understood as justification for the continuation of the genre, albeit with appropriate modification. Therefore, Horace’s *satira* will retain the essential element of criticism, but his method will derive from his father, not from Old Comedy and Lucilius (Schlegel 2000: 106).

Lucilius and the poets of Greek Old Comedy attacked their targets “multa cum libertate” (1.4.5), by contrast Horace concedes that he himself may have spoken “liberius” (1.4.103). Although the comparative may imply “a degree of excess” (Leach 1971: 630), it does nevertheless represent moderation relative to the “multa libertas” of the earlier poets. Furthermore, the open condition with indicative verbs: “liberius si | dixero quid, si forte iocosius, hoc mihi iuris | cum venia dabis” (103-4), suggests that Horace expects the justification that his method is based on the practical teaching of his father will be accepted, and forgiveness will be forthcoming.

Closely associated with the expression of “libertas” in both places cited above is the verb “notare” (1.4.5, 106), translated in both instances by Brown as “branding” (1993: 45, 51). This verb is used with reference to the earlier poets (5) and Horace’s father (106). There is, however, a difference in the target of the “branding”. In the practice of the comic poets and, by association Lucilius (1.4.1-7), people are attacked directly by being identified with their vices (Muecke 1979: 57-8). On the other hand, Horace’s father branded the vices that his son should avoid: “ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando” (1.4.106). The *libertas dicendi* of the Horatian satirist is restricted to criticizing people as “exempla vitiorum” to an essentially private audience of *amici*, an extension of the father-son situation, for the purpose of correcting errors in behaviour. With reference to his own faults, and by extrapolation those of his audience, Horace obviously believes that correction is possible (1.4.129-37). The Horatian satirist in *Serm.* 1 is basically optimistic in his outlook.

Connected with the now restricted *libertas dicendi* is Horace’s redefinition of what it means to be “urbanus” (1.10.13-14). Fraenkel singled out *urbanitas* as the most important element of 1.10.9-15: “but above all you must preserve *urbanitas*,

which is as much as to say you must not behave like a boor or a doctrinaire” (1957a: 129). Cicero had described Lucilius as “homo doctus et perurbanus” (*de Orat.* 2.25; cited by Fraenkel *ibid.*: 128 n.5). Horace twice uses the phrase “comis et urbanus” in *Serm.* 1. The first occurrence is addressed to his hostile interlocutor in connection with the behaviour of a *scurra* of whom Horace obviously disapproves, and also invokes *libertas*: “hic tibi comis et urbanus liberque videtur” (1.4.90). The second involves Lucilius himself: “fuerit Lucilius, inquam, | comis et urbanus” (1.10.64-5). Although Fraenkel interprets this positively (*ibid.*), other critics have recognized the force of the subjunctive, and interpret it as a concession for the sake of argument (Morris c.1968: *ad* 64, 65; Rudd² 1982a: 115; Brown 1993: *ad loc.*). The latter (*ad* 4.90-1) makes the conjecture that Horace was attributing *scurrilitas* to Lucilius. Whether or not this has validity, it is clear that Horace’s description of Lucilius as “urbanus” may not be wholly positive. For a satirist to be “urbanus” as envisaged at 1.10.13-14 he must display restraint and self-discipline. These lines apply not only to poetic style, but also to Horace’s desired approach to social criticism.

A passage from Quintilian illustrates Horace’s redefined *urbanitas*: “Catonis,⁴⁴ ut ait, opinionem secutus: ‘Urbanus homo erit cuius multa bene dicta responsaque erunt, et qui in sermonibus circulis conviviiis, item in contionibus, omni denique loco ridicule commodeque dicet’” (*Inst.* 6.3.105). The most important element in this definition is that of speaking “amusingly and with appropriateness ... on every occasion” (tr. Russell 2001: 119). This encapsulates the essential quality of Horace’s revised *libertas dicendi*. “Appropriateness” would include sensitivity to the feelings or status of the recipient of criticism as, for example, in a relationship between people of unequal status. Horace illustrates his concept of *urbanitas*, in a somewhat circuitous way, at *Serm.* 1.4.76-8: “inanis | hoc iuvat, haud illud quaerentis, num sine sensu, | tempore num faciant alieno.” This is in the general context of purveyors of the wrong sort of social criticism seeking a wide audience, which is an abuse of *libertas dicendi*, and appeals to the “inanis”. An “urbanus” satirist, like Horace, does perform with tact and endeavours not to be intrusive (Brown 1993: *ad* 1.4.77-8; 3.66-7).

⁴⁴ It is not known which Cato Quintilian was referring to (Russell 2001 (ed.): 118 n.114). This quote is in the context of a longer passage discussing a scholarly work on *urbanitas* written by Domitius Marsus, a poet who was a contemporary of Horace (*ibid.*: n.112).

The remaining desideratum for *satura*, that of *Latinitas* (1.10.20-30) is relatively straightforward. Horace's use of Greek words in the *Sermones* is discussed by Rudd (1982a: 111-14), and listed for his entire corpus by Bo (1960 vol. 3: 350-5). Rudd considers the 180 non-naturalized Greek words found by Marx in the Lucilian fragments to be a large number (ibid.: 111). By contrast Horace did not use such words gratuitously. Their use functioned in the satire in some way, for example, "hybrida" to describe the part-Greek Persius (*Serm.* 1.7.2), and "pharmacopolae" as a grand-sounding word to attract attention in a less than elevated context (*Serm.* 1.2.1). As often, Horace's correction of Lucilius is implicitly anticipated, in this instance by the translation of an adapted Homeric tag: "sic me servavit Apollo" (*Serm.* 1.9.78). Lucilius had also alluded to *Il.* 20.443, but had quoted verbatim and in Greek (267-8W) (Brown 1993: *ad* 1.9.78).

In summary: Horace's redefinition of *satura* demands *brevitas* for clarity, not just for its aesthetic desirability, although this is still important for Horace. *Varietas* is essential, as is *Latinitas*. The latter was possible for Horace, but might not have been for Lucilius, because since his time both Cicero and Lucretius had greatly expanded the Latin vocabulary for moral discourse. Horace concedes that if Lucilius had been his contemporary his standards of poetic composition would have been higher (1.10.67-71), in effect correcting all the stylistic faults criticized in 1.4.9-13. Horatian *satura* treats serious topics in a humorous way, stressing the "ridiculum" over the "acer". This refined *libertas dicendi* of the satirist is the most innovative element in Horatian *satura*. Horace's *persona* does not vilify his targets with *ad hominem* attacks in public spaces, but he criticizes types of undesirable behaviour to a small group of close *amici*, in a way consistent with the standards of an "urbanus" as redefined for Horace's time and circumstances. This redefinition of *satura* in *Serm.* 1 calls into question Rudd's opinion that the *Sermones* are "Lucilian, or quasi-Lucilian" (1982a: 158) and *Epist.* 1 "non-Lucilian" (ibid.). Although Horace locates his *satura* in the tradition established by Lucilius, none of it is strictly "Lucilian", in the sense of harsh invective and *ad hominem* attacks.

Horace and Lucilius

The treatment of Horace's relationship with Lucilius in the three overtly programmatic *Sermones* (1.4, 1.10 and 2.1) represents an aspect of the political dimension of these *libelli*. Anderson (1963b: esp. 62-87) argued that Lucilius had

been adopted as a symbol of *libertas* by Republicans and Pompeians. Anderson's argument has subsequently been cited, with some equivocation, by Coffey: "Lucilian satire was a weapon in the hands of the enemies of Caesar and was perhaps associated with the republican cause" (1989: 64, 227 n.9), and more unreservedly by both DuQuesnay (27-31) and Brown (1993: 183). Both acknowledge that Anderson's arguments are overstated, but this can be excused "in view of the novelty of his idea, of its importance and of the frustrating nature of the evidence" (DuQuesnay: 203-4 n.52). Elizabeth Rawson (1985: 104-5) is sceptical about the notion of a 'literary circle' which championed the writings of Lucilius, and was centred on Pompey in the fifties BCE.

Even if the Pompeian link is uncertain, there is a letter from Gaius Trebonius, one of Caesar's assassins, to Cicero, dated to May 44, which explicitly links Lucilius and *libertas* (Cic. *Fam.* 12.16.3 = 328SB). Trebonius refers to some verses which he has appended to the letter, in which he frankly attacks his target, probably Antony (Galinsky 1996: 57; Shackleton Bailey 2001b: 106). Trebonius justifies his invective as follows: "deinde qui magis hoc Lucilio licuerit adsumere libertatis quam nobis?" This suggests that the liberators hoped that the *libertas* traditionally associated with the Republic and Lucilius was being restored (Galinsky: *ibid.*).

DuQuesnay argues that the real target of Horace's literary criticism is not Lucilius himself. Rather it is Lucilius' admirers in the thirties BCE: "Horace reserves his real contempt and scorn for the poetic standards of the latter-day defenders and imitators of Lucilius" (28). Further, Horace is also critical of their abuse of *libertas dicendi*: "He [Horace] is critical of personal abuse which serves no moral purpose and his criticism is here aimed as much at the latter-day supporters of Lucilius as at Lucilius himself" (29). In both 1.4 and 1.10, Horace places criticism of Lucilius near the beginning of the poem (1.4.9-13; 1.10.1-5). However, in both poems he swiftly transfers the argument to other, contemporary, figures: Crispinus and Fannius (1.4.13-22), and a "Lucili fautor" (1.10.2). In the latter case 'poets' are implicated in the following section as fitting that designation: Laberius (6), Hermogenes and "simius iste" (18). It may well be true that "Lucilius is also to be detected behind Crispinus and Fannius" (Rudd 1956: 53),⁴⁵ nevertheless Horace's criticism cannot be said to be

⁴⁵ In an earlier article, responding to Fiske and Hendrickson, Rudd's emphasis was somewhat different: "It does not follow that the whole of Horace's answer should be concerned with Lucilius. On the

exclusively directed at Lucilius, and in 1.4 there is no explicit mention of Lucilius after v.6.

In 1.10, the unnamed “Lucili fautor” (2) becomes the *adversarius* of v.20 and 23-4, and the addressee of v.51-2. In this section (50-71) Horace in fact associates himself with Lucilius against the “Lucili fautor” by appealing to Lucilian precedent in criticizing earlier poets to justify his own criticism of Lucilius (53-6). In the concluding lines of this passage (67-71), Horace claims that if Lucilius were writing in his own time he would be as good a poet as himself. The implication from this is that the latter-day “Lucili fautores” have not changed with the times, and still adhere to outdated poetic standards and *libertas dicendi*.

This last point can be inferred from the names of poets criticized, either directly or indirectly, in 1.10.6-19. There is evidence that Laberius (6), Calvus and Catullus (19) all wrote invective against Julius Caesar. When Decimus Laberius had been forced by Caesar to perform in one of his own mimes “he responded with taunts of despotism” (Brown 1993: *ad* 1.10.6). He was also described by Macrobius (*Sat.* 2.7.2) as “a sharply outspoken man (*asperae libertatis*)” (Rudd 1986: 15). The consistently coupled Calvus and Catullus here represent the invective strand of ‘the neoteric school’ (Wiseman 1974: 52.) Suetonius in a passage illustrating Caesar’s *clementia* (*Jul.* 73) mentions scurrilous attacks by both writers. In the case of Catullus these are poems 29 and 57 (Rolfe 1951: 94 *n.a*). Admittedly, in 1.10.17-19 the primary targets of the criticism are the imitators of Calvus and Catullus, but the latter “are brought in ... as masters of lampoon and invective” (DuQuesnay: 28). In *Serm.* 1.4 and 1.10, through his literary criticism of both Lucilius and the “Lucili fautores”, Horace has established himself as a successor to Lucilius in the genre of *satura*, and in the process has redefined the satirist’s “*libertas* as something morally responsible” (DuQuesnay: 30). This counters the opinions of the opponents of the Triumvirs who viewed them as the enemies of *libertas*. Horace demonstrated that “he was the true successor to Lucilius, his friends the true champions of *libertas*” (*ibid.*: 31).

In *Serm.* 2.1 Horace identifies with Lucilius in a different way, but one which still projects a favourable image of Octavian, namely the association with the ‘Scipionic Circle’ (DuQuesnay: *ibid.*). Horace explicitly associates himself with

contrary we should expect a great deal of it to be directed against his own detractors” (1955: 150, and *n.2* and references there).

Lucilius: “sequor hunc” (2.1.34), for the first time in his *satira*. Earlier in the poem both Horace’s connection with Octavian (“Caesaris” (11, 19)) and Lucilius’ with Scipio (17) are clearly stated. Astin (1967: 294-6) believes that the notion of the ‘Scipionic Circle’ as a close-knit group of “philhellene *litterati*” (ibid.: 294) is a recent one, stemming from nineteenth-century scholarship. Nevertheless, Lucilius’ association with Scipio is not doubted, and the period when he was writing his *satira* witnessed great advances in culture. P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus Aemilianus was “one of the greatest heroes of the Republic” (DuQuesnay: 31), and the inference that the circle of Octavian/Maecenas could somehow be equated with Scipio’s group would support Octavian in his claim to be restoring the Republic.

The moral seriousness of the Horatian satirist

There has been a trend in Horatian scholarship of questioning the seriousness of the Horatian satirist as moralist. This first appeared in an article by Zetzel (1980), and was subsequently expanded upon by Freudenburg (1993: esp. ch.1); Lyne (1995), and Turpin (1998). Zetzel considers that the Horatian satirist is an inept philosopher, principally because the discontented types (*Serm.* 1.1.4-12) are depicted as desiring occupations which entail the same disadvantages as their current ones (ibid.: 69-70). However, this is precisely Horace’s point: if given the chance to change (1.1.15-19) the discontented would refuse (“nolint” (19)), revealing that dissatisfaction with their occupations is not the real cause of their discontent. Brown suggests that Horace is depicting them as hypocrites (1993: 89). This may be too harsh, rather he may be portraying them as not thinking clearly because they are focused on acquisition.

Zetzel’s argument also involves the much-debated problem of the shift in referent in *Serm.* 1.1 of the second person address from Maecenas in the vocative (1) and “te” (14), to the generic *avarus* (38, 40, etc.). He asserts that with the opening lines: “we are forced to imagine our philosopher buttonholing the great man in the street, attempting to gain his attention — and perhaps his patronage” (ibid.: 69). The absence of any guide to the setting of the poem is problematical,⁴⁶ but Zetzel’s solution is somewhat bizarre, and appears to be motivated by the need to justify the further claim that Horace’s *persona* lacks “tact and logic” (ibid.: 70) in confronting

⁴⁶ It may not be coincidence that probably the most popular poems of Horace’s *Sermones* are those which have clearly defined settings, namely 1.5, 1.9 and 2.6.

Maecenas in this way.⁴⁷ Furthermore, this notion, which could be said to equate Horace's *persona vis-à-vis* Maecenas with the *pest* of 1.9, is contradicted by the facts of the text. At *Serm.* 1.6.52-64 Horace recalls the beginnings of his relationship with Maecenas. Here he projects an impression of humility and *decorum*, a far cry from the gauche individual envisaged by Zetzel.

It has to be acknowledged that the shift in referent can appear to be extremely awkward, but the difficulties can be resolved to a certain extent by an examination of the various levels of audience. This aspect of the poem has been investigated by Muecke (1990) and Gold (1992). McNeill (2001) deals more broadly with the topic of Horace and his audience(s). The fundamental problem in 1.1 seems to be a change in the implied audience of the text from Maecenas (1, 14) to the dialogue with the imaginary *avarus* as the referent of "te", "tibi", "te" (38-40). But the shift in implied audience may in fact be much greater if in the dramatic situation the imaginary interlocutor is presupposed to be a component of a monologue simulating a diatribe delivered by a street-corner preacher, with a potentially much larger audience.

With reference to 1.1.69-70, Muecke has plausibly suggested that this confusion with the implied audience is a deliberate strategy to "remind[s] the reader of the universal applicability of the message" (1990: 42). Horatian *satira* is poetry which never allows its audience to become complacent, or comfortable. There are always unexpected twists and turns in the discourse: "the identity of *tu* is constantly changing, an unsettling and thought-provoking tactic" (Richlin 1992: 182; cited by Muecke: *ibid.*⁴⁸). This tactic is an aspect of the exploratory nature of Horatian *satira*, raising awareness rather than providing answers. It is also an illustration of Spacks's proposal (1968: 17) that satire in general functions by provoking unease in its audience (see p.14). One important factor that must be borne in mind is that what is problematical for twenty-first-century readers may have presented no difficulties for Horace's immediate audience. The performance conditions of a *recitatio* could have resolved the ambiguities now apparent in the written text (Muecke *ibid.*: 47 n.36).

⁴⁷ Gold considers that Zetzel was wrong on this point, and that Horace deliberately varies addressees "to express many different levels of meaning to different types of audience" (1992: 164-5 n.11).

⁴⁸ Muecke cited the 1983 edition of Richlin's book. The quote and page number are the same for both editions.

Critics do not appear to have detected difficulties with referents in any other poems in *Serm.* 1, and it may be significant that the ‘diatribes’ of *Serm.* 2 are dialogues with carefully delineated characters: Damasippus in 2.3 and Davus in 2.7, with Horace as the implied audience.⁴⁹ This can be seen as a further refinement of *satura*, away from the tradition associated with Lucilius and Hellenistic diatribe, towards a form directed at a more select audience. This is consistent with Horace’s repeated insistence in *Serm.* 1 that he does not seek a large audience,⁵⁰ and also with Epicurean philosophy in the context of seeking a large following: “He [the wise man] will set up a school, but not one which results in courting the mob” (Diog. Laert. 10.120, tr. Long & Sedley 1987: 133 22Q(6)).⁵¹ The adoption of the epistle form is a further development in this trend, producing a form of *satura* directly targeted to a single recipient as the implied audience.

Categorizing Horace’s *persona* in 1.1 as a parody, and therefore not a serious moralist seems to be an unnecessarily drastic strategy. It also raises the question of just what Horace meant by “*seria*” (27). If his *satura* is all “*ludus*”, then the redefinition is indeed radical. When the historical context, and the situation of the real Q. Horatius Flaccus within it, is considered it would seem to be highly unlikely that Horace would have written poetry as envisaged by those who wish to see the moralist as a parody. In order to view Horace’s use of philosophy in this way, it is necessary to judge it as inept (Zetzel 1980: 69), and yet, as has been shown above (see p.81), even though the philosophy may be commonplace, it is not inconsistent with Epicurean teaching, and is far from inept.

The exposition of clichéd topics in a light-hearted tone does not necessarily mean that there is not a serious element. Horace was writing in the tradition of Lucilius who was renowned for his vitriolic attacks on named contemporaries, and presumably those were not written without some element of seriousness. Horace modified the genre in ways appropriate to his circumstances, but it seems unlikely that he would have departed so far from the *spoudaiogeloion*. It is always necessary to

⁴⁹ This type of dialogue with definite characters is also present in *Serm.* 1.9.

⁵⁰ *Serm.* 1.4.69-78; 1.10.37-39, 81-90.

⁵¹ It is true that Epicurus did not encourage the writing of poetry, but obviously by Horace’s time this element of the master’s teaching had been modified, as evidenced by the poetry of both Lucretius and Philodemus.

maintain a sense of perspective when analyzing Horace's poetry: to balance the "seria" and the "ludus". "Horace's moral purpose in the book [*Serm.* 1] should be neither ignored nor exaggerated" (Brown 1993: 11). Horace was utilizing the arguments of popular philosophy in the tradition of 'diatribe', he was not writing philosophical treatises.

One further factor is relevant here: the place of moral philosophy in the lives of Horace and his contemporaries. For them it was not an abstract, academic subject, but an integral part of everyday life. It performed a function that is now more the province of religions: "They [the Hellenistic philosophical schools in Greece and Rome] practiced philosophy not as a detached intellectual technique dedicated to the display of cleverness but as an immersed and worldly art of grappling with human misery" (Nussbaum 1994: 3). This is reflected in the teachings of Epicurus: "We must laugh and philosophize at the same time and do our household duties and employ our other faculties, and never cease proclaiming the sayings of the true philosophy" (*Sent. Vat.* 41, tr. Bailey 1970: 113). The various schools of Hellenistic philosophy had developed at a time when all the traditional supports of the Greek *poleis* had broken down, and people were in need of help. The Triumviral period in Rome was similarly a time of great upheavals, and Horace in his *Sermones* was utilizing philosophy to raise awareness of serious matters, and to promote reflection among his contemporaries in a humorous and entertaining way.

Epist. 1 as satira

As previously discussed (see p.61), in terms of the formal features of Horatian *satira*, the poems of *Epist.* 1 do not reveal any significant differences other than those consistent with the change to epistolary form.

Epist. 1.1 as a programmatic poem (Mayer 1994: 110) can be taken as representative of the *libellus* with respect to features of *satira*. Kilpatrick has commented on the structural similarity between *Epist.* 1.1 and *Serm.* 1.1: "The beginning and close of the epistle are both intimately addressed to Maecenas, framing (as in *Satire* 1.1) a long central sermon on *mempsimoiria*" (1986: 3).⁵² This "sermon" is a "diatribe" (*ibid.*), a feature of Horatian *satira*. The vices enumerated in v.33-8,

⁵² In his discussion of *Epist.* 1.1 Kilpatrick finds other points of similarity with the *Sermones* (*ibid.*: 1-7).

namely “*avaritia* (33), *amor laudis* (36), *invidia*, *inertia*, *iracundia*, *inebrietas*, *amor* (38)” (ibid.), have all featured in *Serm.* 1 and 2. This suggests that despite all the socio-political changes in the intervening period, Horace’s contemporaries are still prey to the same problems. The Horatian satirist nevertheless still implies that improvement is possible, through education (39-40).

The central diatribe section (28-91a) contains other characteristic features of *satura* seen in *Serm.* 1.1. Horace uses the fable of the fox and the sick lion (73-5), in an example of extreme concision which does not sacrifice clarity. The same fable appears in a fragment of Lucilius (1111-2W), so there could conceivably be a passing allusion to the *inventor* of *satura* here. There is a large number of second person singular verbs in the diatribe section, which Mayer interprets as “address[ing] the world at large” (1994, *ad* 1.1.28). Although this is unexceptional in a Hellenistic diatribe, it is perhaps unexpected in what purports to be a letter addressed to Maecenas. As in *Serm.* 1.1, this ambiguity could be a deliberate strategy (see p.96). As before, it would function to unsettle the reader and provoke reflection on the faults under attack, suggesting that Horace’s satirical method remains basically the same in *Epist.* 1.

Consistent with the passage of time since the publication of the *Sermones*, there is a degree of evolution evident in the major themes of *amicitia* and *libertas*. The opening three lines:

Prima dicte mihi, summa dicende Camena,
spectatum satis et donatum iam rude quaeris,
Maecenas, iterum antiquo me includere ludo?

can be shown to reveal significant developments in Horace’s attitude to his relationship with Maecenas, and his concern with *libertas*. Compared to *Serm.* 1.1.1-3, the immediate impression given by these lines is of Horace distancing himself from Maecenas (*pace* Kilpatrick cited above). The latter is not named until v.3, as against the third word in *Serm.* 1.1.1. Furthermore, the vast majority of Horace’s addressees in *Epist.* 1 are named in the first line, a notable exception being Maecenas again at 1.7.5. The first line of *Epist.* 1.1 does in fact refer to Maecenas, but explicitly concerns Horace and his poetry, and although, following Kilpatrick, it could be interpreted as an “intimate address”, it can also be read as rather formal and an expression of obligation. There is none of the relaxed informality of the colloquial “Qui fit, Maecenas ...” of *Serm.* 1.1.1.

The second line focuses on Horace, only including Maecenas with the final word, the second-person verb “quaeris”. Maecenas is named at the beginning of the third line, while the rest of the line is devoted to Horace’s concerns. Mayer asserts that this opening “identifies the as yet unnamed addressee intimately with Horace’s poetic production” (1994: 31). This can be taken further: Horace is a client-poet dependent on Maecenas, and the nature, and disadvantages, of the patron-client relationship are explored in several of the poems in the *libellus*. The gladiator imagery in the opening lines alludes to *libertas*: “the metaphor suggests re-enslavement and the loss of independence” (Mayer *ibid.*: *ad* 1.1-19).

The opening section of *Epist.* 1.1 is traditionally interpreted as a *recusatio*,⁵³ with the assumption being that Maecenas had requested more lyric poetry from Horace (Dilke² 1961: 71; West 1967: 25; Préaux 1968: *ad* 1.1.1; Mayer 1994: *ad* 1.1.1-19; etc.). A *recusatio* by definition is a statement of independence (cf. *Serm.* 2.1.12-15). There is a further embedded expression of independence at v.7. A conventional element in a *recusatio* was the appearance of a god, Apollo (*Verg. Ecl.* 6.2-5), or an appropriate poet, Homer (*Enn. Ann.* 5W). Horace himself had Romanized this trope to Quirinus at *Serm.* 1.10.31-5. At *Epist.* 1.1.7 there is no god, just “a sort of deterrent voice” (Mayer 1994: *ad loc.*). Mayer takes this to be an allusion to Socrates. This may well be the case, but it may in addition be an expression of self-sufficiency and self-knowledge. Philosophy has enabled Horace to be aware of his limitations without the help of any god, perhaps another allusion to Epicureanism.

A further philosophical image, that of Aristippus at v.18-19, also relates to *libertas*. Although the Cyreniacs were associated with hedonism, it is not this aspect of their philosophy that Horace utilizes in *Epist.* 1.17. Rather it is the “attitude to circumstances (*res*)” (Mayer 1994: *ad* 1.1.18-19). In connection with this passage, West (1967: 25) cites a fragment of Aristippus preserved by Stobaeus (3.17.17 Wachsmuth and Hense): “The man who masters pleasure is not the one who abstains from it, but the one who enjoys it but is not led astray by it. So, the man who controls a *ship* or a *horse* is not the one who doesn’t use them, but the man who makes them

⁵³ The *locus classicus* for discussion of *recusationes* is Wimmel, W. (1960) *Kallimachos in Rom: die Nachfolge seines apologetischen Dichtens in der Augusteerzeit*, Hermes, Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie, Einzelschriften, Heft 16, Wiesbaden: F. Steiner.

go where he wants” (italics original). This precept represents a further refinement of Horace’s redefined *libertas* from the *Sermones*. As well as exercising self-discipline, it is necessary to try to control circumstances so that one is not controlled by them, and can therefore be independent of them.

Conclusion

Epist. 1.1 as representative of the *libellus* exhibits ‘family resemblances’ with the *Sermones* in terms of formal features and some aspects of content. There are differences consistent with the change from *Sermo* to *Epistula*, and with the evolution of Horace’s relationship with Maecenas. *Satura* is a personal genre which the satirist adapted by innovating within the tradition established by Lucilius. Consequently, the only satisfactory way to confirm that the poems of *Epist.* 1 do belong to the same genre as the *Sermones* is to trace the ‘story’ of the *persona* through all three *libelli*. This will be the focus of the next three chapters.

CHAPTER 3

Place and status in *Serm.* 1

Introduction

As already discussed (see p.26), satire in general is commonly assumed to have an urban setting, an assumption which has frequently been applied retrospectively to Roman *satura*, including Horace. It will be shown that this assumption is substantially valid for *Serm.* 1. Through a sequential reading of the *libellus*, the evolving prominence of place will be investigated. Concomitantly, the development of the *persona* of the Horatian satirist will be examined in the context of status. In connection with status, the actual rank of the historical Q. Horatius Flaccus is not relevant.¹ What is of concern is what the text reveals about the status of the *persona* of the satirist relative to Maecenas, other *amici*, and other people in the text. In addition, from 1.7² the passage of time intersecting with place and/or status becomes a significant feature.

The setting of Horatian *satura*

Passing reference has been made by a few critics to the problem of the setting of the actual conversations implied in the title ‘*Sermones*’. In the context of Horace’s choice of the epistolary mode as a different form for *satura*, Williams suggests that in the *Sermones* “it was difficult for the poet to make plausible the setting in which the conversation took place” (1972: 36). In a discussion of the relationship of Horace’s *Sermones* to their audience, Muecke has also drawn attention to the relative difficulty of “identify[ing] the implied (fictional) occasion of the satires as mimetic communication.” (1990: 35). Even with poems like, for example 1.9, where the dramatic setting is clearly stated, this only supplies a location for the content of the *sermo* not the setting of the conversation itself (ibid.: 36). “If *Satires* 1.1 imitates a conversation with Maecenas, it omits to depict an occasion or context for this

¹ The rank of the historical Q. Horatius Flaccus is discussed by Taylor (1925, 1968); Badian (1985); Armstrong (1986). The related topic of Horace’s father as *libertinus* is discussed by E.L. Harrison (1965); Williams (1995); Anderson (1995).

² In this chapter references to poems by numbers only will be to *Serm.* 1.

conversation.” (ibid.). There can obviously be no solution to this problem of setting: one can only speculate that perhaps the eventual adoption of the epistolary mode provided a resolution for Horace, if in fact it was a problem for the poet.

Sequential reading of *Serm. 1*

Serm. 1.1 and 1.2

The dramatic setting for the majority of the poems of *Serm.1* is by default the city of Rome. As will be shown, this is signalled by incidental details in *Serm. 1.1* to 1.4, until it is confirmed somewhat paradoxically in 1.5, the first poem in the *libellus* which has an explicitly non-urban setting: “Egressum magna me accepit Aricia Roma” (1). There is an antithesis of sorts between *Urbs* and *rus* at 1.1.11-12: “ille, datis vadibus qui rure extractus in urbem est, | solos felicis viventis clamat in urbe.” This does not express the traditional moral contrast, but locates the two discontented types: “ille” (11) is the “agricola” (9), whose lot is envied by the “iuris legumque peritus” (9). The “agricola” and the *irrisconsultus* here are not functioning in the same way as, for example, the city mouse and country mouse (*Serm. 2.6.79-117*). The other locations in 1.1 are similarly incidental, providing natural contexts. The “Aufidus” (58), a river remote from the city, is an appropriate choice for a raging river, and the “Campus” ([Martius] (91)) is associated with the training of horses (Brown 1993:³ ad 88-91).

In 1.1 place is not used in the traditional sense of *rus* as an idyllic location contrasted with the corrupt *Urbs*. Competitive greed, the predominant moral concern of the poem, is illustrated by balanced urban and rural images in the concluding section. The pastoral image of envying the neighbour’s more productive goat (110-11) is reinforced by, not contrasted with, the urban chariot-racing image (113-16). This should not be taken to imply that the poet deliberately balanced these images. If the use of these urban and rural images signifies anything, it is perhaps that competitive greed is a universal problem.

The setting of 1.2 as more unequivocally urban can be deduced from small details. The opening parade of low-status types who constitute the funeral cortège of Tigellius Sardus is an urban image evoking the bustle of city life, seen as typical of

³ All future references to Brown in this chapter are to this work, unless indicated otherwise.

the milieu of later satire. This is one of the few instances in Horatian *satira* of a passage which evokes “the metropolis with a polyglot people” (Kernan 1959: 8).⁴ The striking three-word first line contains two exotic words, an Horatian breach of *Latinitas* which is integral to the humour of the satire. As Brown observes, the “mock-heroic opening ... is undermined by the sleazy nature of its constituents” (*ad* 1.2.1-2). “Ambubaia” derives from Aramaic, and denotes “A Syrian singing-girl and courtesan” (*OLD*), while “pharmacopola” is a Greek loan-word designating “A seller of drugs and medicines (usu. in a derogatory sense)” (*ibid.*). “Mendici” (2) also has exotic connotations, referring to “the begging priests of Isis, Cybele, and other Eastern deities” (Palmer 1905: *ad loc.*). The only native Latin word in v.1: “collegia”, has class connotations, and will be discussed below in the context of status. The “fornix” (30) also suggests an urban setting for the poem, and this is confirmed by “nec vereor ne dum futuo vir rure recurrat” (127).

In this *sermo* Horace represents sexual relationships as equivalent to financial transactions by using the language of commerce and the market-place (Dessen 1968b: esp. 205-6). Adultery with a “matrona” is not condemned because it is immoral, but because of the potential dangers to finances and reputation (133). The use of commercial vocabulary suggests the city, and implies that the follies attacked, adultery, and infatuation with any sexual partner, are urban problems. The country as the location for the faithful marriages of the idealized Republican past is not contrasted with the corrupt practices of the present-day city.

At the beginning of a discussion of *Serm.* 1, Braund has stated that “*Satires* 1 tells a story” in which Horace “presents a character whose personality and circumstances change throughout the course of the book” (1992: 17). The approach taken in this present chapter with regard to status is indebted to Braund’s “story”. The status of the satirist is not relevant in the first two poems of the *libellus* as both these poems are relatively impersonal. The mention of Maecenas’ name at 1.1.1. dedicates the book to him, but the text reveals nothing about Horace’s relationship to Maecenas until 1.3.63-6, and Horace’s position as client-poet is not fully explained until 1.6.

It is possible that “sors” (1.1.1) could connote ‘status’, this being one of the attested meanings: “social position, degree, station” (*OLD*, s.v. ‘sors’^{9b}). Horace is acknowledged to have used the word in that sense at *Carm.* 4.11.22. Commenting on

⁴ *Serm.* 1.5.3b-4 and 11-13 briefly evoke a bustling hive of activity, although not strictly metropolitan.

this line, Putnam suggests that “the speaker tells us forthrightly that Telephus is ‘non tuae sortis’. This could mean that her [Phyllis] social position or financial circumstances, or even some vaguer ‘destiny,’ keeps them apart” (1986: 192). Similarly with *Serm.* 1.1.1 it would be foolhardy to restrict “sors” to one definitive meaning, but “social position” may be one component. Status in 1.1 is eventually shown to be a matter of comparative wealth: “quia tanti quantum habeas sis” (1.1.62). Commentators note that this proverbial idea was used by Lucilius (Brown: ad loc.): “Aurum atque ambitio specimen virtutis virique est. | Tantum habeas tantum ipse sies tantique habearis” (1194-5W).⁵ In this fragment Lucilius explicitly linked wealth and political ambition as markers of status. Horace in 1.1 deals only with wealth, leaving political ambition until 1.6.

The connotations of “sors” notwithstanding, there is further evidence in 1.1 of awareness of the different strata of society. The discontented types of 1.1.4-12 all have occupations to be discontented about: they are not the senatorial elite engaged in politics or enjoying cultural *otium* at a *villa suburbana*. The “miles” is not a heroic image of an eminent general, but “gravis annis | ... multo iam fractus membra labore”⁶ (4-5). The lawyer is a *iurisconsultus*, not an orator addressing the senate. Whatever the setting of the implied conversations is imagined to be, the content of the *Sermones* is a world away from the rarefied atmosphere of Cicero’s dialogues set in aristocratic villas or town houses. As will be shown, throughout the *libellus* Horace displays awareness of a hierarchical society, and the importance of both knowing one’s place within it and being satisfied with that place, as expressed in a later poem: “est locus uni | cuique suus” (1.9.51-2). To a certain extent this is a consequence of the genre of *satura* and its connection with some sort of everyday reality, but there may also be a political dimension, more specifically an indirect attack on Sextus Pompeius. This will be discussed below.

Two other status images in 1.1 both function in contrasts. Brown observes that “the slave carrying the bread bag, who receives (and needs) no more on that account,

⁵ Another Lucilian fragment also appears to treat the same topic: “Aurum vis hominemne? Habeas. | Hominem? quid ad aurum? | quare, ut dicimus, non video hic quid magno opere optem” (588-9W) (Fiske 1920: 237).

⁶ *Labor*, or cognates, is repeated throughout *Serm.* 1.1 (5, 30, 33, 88, 93, 112). Observing this, Brown comments that this repetition functions to link the two related themes of *mempsimoiria* and competitive greed (*ad* 1.1.5).

serves as the exact counterpart of the grain baron.” (*ad* 46-9). The grain baron, whose “threshing floor has produced a hundred thousand bushels of grain” (45, tr. Brown: 21) is Horace’s interlocutor, a representative *avarus*. In fact, Horace’s image depicts the *avarus* as the one carrying the bread bag in a party of slaves: “si | reticulum panis venalis inter onusto | forte vehas umero” (46-8). The status of the *avarus* has been demoted to that of a slave to highlight his servitude to excessive greed, and the accumulation of far more than is needed to live within nature’s limits (49-51).

The anecdote of the miserly Ummidius (94-100) similarly employs slave imagery to contrast the extremes of his behaviour: “dives | ut metiretur nummos, ita sordidus ut se | non umquam servo melius vestiret” (95-7). He is a very rich man who lowered himself to the level of a slave. Further, his death was brought about by a “liberta” with an axe (99-100), incongruously described as “fortissima Tyndaridarum” (100). A further image of the dangers posed by lower status people in a household occurs at v.77-8, where fleeing slaves stealing his fortune are one of the sources of pain for the *avarus* who seeks pleasure from the unnecessary accumulation of wealth: “an vigilare metu exanimem noctesque diesque | formidare malos fures, incendia, servos, | ne te compilent fugientes, hoc iuvat?” (76-8).

These repeated allusions to the dangers posed by slaves and freed persons could be indirectly attacking Sextus Pompeius. It was a common element in sources favouring Octavian that Sextus depended on slaves, especially *fugitivi*, and freedmen. This is reflected in the pro-Caesarian Velleius Paterculus’ assessment of him as: “libertorum suorum libertus servorumque servus” (2.73.1). Horace elsewhere referred to Sextus’ forces as “latrones atque servilem manum” (*Epod.* 4.19), and described his actions as “minatus urbi vincla quae detraxerat | servis amicus perfidis” (*Epod.* 9.9-10). Many years later, Augustus himself portrayed Sextus in the same terms: “Mare pacavi a praedonibus. Eo bello servorum qui fugerant a dominis suis et arma contra rem publicam ceperant triginta fere millia capta dominis ad supplicium sumendum tradidi” (*RG* 25.1). Accusing an enemy of brigandage and of recruiting slaves were both elements of political invective in the first century BCE (Watson 2002: 215-16). Throughout *Serm.* 1 Horace portrays Maecenas and his *amici* as an exclusive group who do not court popularity, and repeatedly he displays a sensitivity to maintaining the traditional social hierarchy.

In his essay on “The propaganda value of *Sermones* 1” DuQuesnay identified the time of writing as that of the *Bellum Siculum*, 38-36 BCE (21). Scholarship on this

period since DuQuesnay⁷ has recognized that Sextus posed a much greater threat to Octavian than earlier twentieth-century opinions had allowed. Syme's influential view of Sextus downplayed his importance and abilities, vis-à-vis Octavian: "it was only a name that the son had inherited, ... Pompeius might sweep the seas, ... the Roman plebs might riot in his honour—it was only from hatred of Caesar's heir. In reality an adventurer, Pompeius could easily be represented as a pirate" (1939: 228).

The basic problem for Octavian was that Sextus was able to portray a more traditional Roman image, and as a consequence enjoyed greater popularity. Appian, in the context of the events of early September 42 BCE, just before Philippi, described Sextus as "greatly beloved by all at that time" (4.85.356) (Gowing 1992: 183).⁸ Appian and Cassius Dio "furnish conflicting images of Sextus: Appian, of a popular hero; Dio, of a brigand" (Gowing *ibid.*: 184). As evidenced by Syme (quoted above), scholarship has tended to follow Dio's assessment, with the notable exception of Moses Hadas' iconoclastic *Sextus Pompey* (1930) (Powell 2002: ix).⁹ Dio's narrative of the Triumviral period is biased towards the importance of Octavian, and compared to Appian underrates "the profound significance of the war against Sextus Pompey" (Gowing 1992: 203). Suetonius revealed awareness of the significance of the *Bellum Siculum*: "Nec temere plura ac maiora pericula ullo alio bello adiit" (*Aug.* 16.3). Even Syme seems to have acknowledged the magnitude of the potential threat: "For Octavianus there subsisted the danger of a revived Republican coalition under Antonius, Lepidus and Pompeius, banded to check or subvert him. Hence the need to destroy Pompeius without delay" (1939: 230).

By comparison with Octavian, Sextus was able to portray an "image of virtue" (Powell *ibid.*: viii) being the true, rather than adopted, son of his famous father. Not

⁷ Publications focusing on Sextus Pompeius since DuQuesnay (1984) include: Watson (1987, 2002, 2003 Index s.v. 'Sextus Pompey'); Gowing (1992: esp. ch.11); Powell (1992b: esp. 151-7); Powell and Welch (2002) (eds.).

⁸ The following provide further evidence of Sextus' popularity: Powell (1992b: 155); Watson (2002: 220-1 and ns 41-8).

⁹ "Hadas' willingness, as a young scholar, to suggest that Sextus should be taken seriously as a competitor of Octavian in both the moral and military spheres, may even have involved a certain courage, given the dismissive attitude predominant at the period" (Powell 2002: ix). An anecdotal sidelight on this issue is that of the four New Zealand universities with Classics departments only one, Victoria University of Wellington, has a copy of Hadas' book in its library holdings.

surprisingly, the ancient sources differ as to whether or not Sextus was a worthy son of Pompeius Magnus: Appian (4.36) and Cicero (*Phil.* 13.13) make a positive assessment, while Velleius, Florus and Lucan are negative (Powell *ibid.*: 120 and n.31). Visual evidence from Sextus' coinage: "the only surviving contemporary utterance from the man himself, uncontaminated by enemies or sceptics" (*ibid.*: viii) has facilitated a different perspective. Evidence from coins issued in Spain and Sicily reveals that he promoted the ideal of *pietas* towards his father, and also his dead brother Gnaeus Pompeius (118-20), and his cognomen *Pius* appears on coins dating from his period in Spain onwards (120).¹⁰ Uniquely among those competing for power at this time, Sextus' coinage is not dominated by his own portrait, that of his father being more common (120-1; Gowing 1992: 201 n.59). This less autocratic image "invoked rather the self-subordinating quality of *pietas*" (Powell *ibid.*: 121).

In addition to images of familial *pietas*, Sextus exemplified this quality in his behaviour towards fellow citizens by providing sanctuary in Sicily, both for the survivors of Philippi and for those proscribed by the Triumvirs, and also perhaps by not invading Italy (*ibid.*: 127). This aspect of his *pietas* was also advertized on coins depicting "a portrait head of Sextus himself, alongside an oak-wreath, symbolic reward for saving fellow citizens by bravery in war" (119; coin: Crawford no. 511/1). Among the honours which Augustus (*RG* 34.2) described as being conferred on him by the senate was the *corona civica*, "a wreath of oak leaves" (Brunt and Moore 1967: 78, *ad* 34.2). In the same passage of the *Res Gestae*, the "clupeus aureus in curia Iulia positus" commemorated Augustus' virtues which included *pietas* (Brunt and Moore: *ibid.*). In his later self-promotion, as well as obliterating the memory of Sextus, Augustus appropriated images which Sextus had used in the earlier conflict.

Those who fled to Sextus were portrayed by the distortions of hostile sources, reflected in Horace *Epod.* 4 and 9, as runaway slaves and criminals. It is true that there would have been a large number of slaves, but not all were *fugitivi*, and more importantly, many proscribed nobles fled to Sicily. Notable among these were Antony's mother, Julia, after Perusia, and Ti. Claudius Nero together with his wife, Livia Drusilla, and their young son, the future emperor Tiberius. (Watson 2002: 219). People such as these were classed as a "servilis manus" by Horace (*Epod.* 4.19).

¹⁰ Powell (*ibid.*: 118-27) discusses in detail the evidence that Sextus' coinage provides for his importance compared to Octavian in the period 43-36 BCE.

A consequence of Sextus' more traditional Roman image and background was that it made it far more difficult for Octavian to depict the *Bellum Siculum* as anything but civil war. Although Sextus' naval commanders were freedmen with Greek names, his "Roman virtues obstructed the picture" (Powell 2002: xi). Antony and Cleopatra, on the other hand, were far more appropriate for portrayal as foreign enemies, hence the emphasis on Actium over Naulochus in sources sympathetic to the Caesarian cause (Powell: *ibid.*).

As far as Horace and *Serm.* 1 are concerned, this reassessment of Sextus Pompeius as a serious threat to Octavian adds a further element to the extremely uncertain and dangerous period of the *Bellum Siculum*. With hindsight we know that Naulochus and its aftermath saw the elimination of both Sextus and Lepidus, but until 36 BCE there could be no certainty as to who would eventually prevail. This situation would have necessitated great caution on the historical poet's part in supporting Octavian's cause. Sextus' military abilities were far superior to Octavian's, and prior to Naulochus the latter had been defeated in naval battles on several occasions (Watson 2002: 214). As Powell observes: "until Naulochus the Roman populace, because of Sextus, saw Octavian as a loser ... Philippi, notoriously, had been Antony's victory" (2002: 115). Without Agrippa, the Battle of Naulochus might well have resulted in Octavian's defeat.

Opposition to Sextus in *Serm.* 1 could not be as explicit as that of *Epod.* 4 and 9, published after Actium. Explicit invective would also not be appropriate for Horace's redefined *satura*. In *Serm.* 1.1 slaves are represented in two distinct ways, in the first instance as a source of danger (77-8, 99-100). In the other examples slaves per se are not implicated, rather it is free men, the *avarus* interlocutor (46-8), and Ummidius (95-7), who are ridiculed for demeaning themselves by behaving like slaves: Velleius' "servorum servus".

To turn to *Serm.* 1.2: as with so many aspects of this poem, the role of status is problematical. Although the status of the Horatian satirist himself is not relevant, status in general, especially of lower-class people, is a prominent feature. Words with connotations of status are scattered throughout the poem.¹¹ This reflects the interest of the satirist in all levels of a highly stratified and status conscious society.

¹¹ At v.1-2, 16-17, 28-30, 47-8, 54, 56-8, 62-3, 70-1, 78, 82, 86, 94, 98, 117 and 130.

An intriguing element is interwoven with status in *Serm.* 1.2: there are several allusions to clothing, and in some instances the status of a person is defined by his or her clothing (16, 29, 63, 70-1, 82, 95, 99, 101). In v.16: “nomina sectatur modo sumpta veste virili”, “nomina” denotes upper class young men who have just replaced the childhood *toga praetexta* with the *toga virilis* of the adult male citizen (Stone 1994: 13). Elsewhere in the poem references to togate women have different status connotations. At v. 63 the “ancilla ... togata”, who is contrasted with a “matrona”, is probably a *meretrix* (Brown, ad loc.), wearing the *toga muliebris*. This would also be the garment worn by the “togatae” (82). The *toga muliebris* was worn by prostitutes and women who had been divorced for adultery. In both cases this signified that they were adult women who were not *matronae*, and therefore did not have the right to wear the *stola* (Sebesta 1994: 50).¹²

The status of a *matrona* is symbolized by her clothing at v.29,¹³ 70-1, 95, and 99. In the passage from v.94-103, the “matrona” (94), further characterized by “demissa veste” (95), is contrasted with a presumably lower status woman, also designated by her clothing: “altera ... Cois” (101). Traditionally in Roman society: “The costume of the matron signified her modesty and chastity, her *pudicitia*” (Sebesta *ibid.*: 48). This is acknowledged by Horace in that her “ad talos stola demissa et circum addita palla” (99) are among the things which shield the “matrona” from view (96-100). In this respect she is contrasted with the “altera” (101) in her diaphanous Coan silk (101-3). Horace, however, goes one stage further and suggests, in the language of commerce common in this poem, that the respectable married woman’s clothing may in fact facilitate deceit and a purchase which is not good value for money: “An tibi mavis | insidias fieri pretiumque avellier ante | quam mercem ostendi?” (103-5).

¹² The costume appropriate for an unmarried adult woman is unknown (Sebesta 1994: 50). In fact very little is known about such woman: “How common the situation of the never-married adult daughter in a patrician family was is hard to say, but doubtless there were some” (Sebesta: *ibid.*).

¹³ Judith Lynn Sebesta cites Bieber’s translation of “subsuta ... instita veste” (29) “as meaning ‘a dress suspended from the sewed-on straps’” (1994: 49). On this interpretation, “institae” are shoulder straps, not the more commonly used translation as “flounce” (Brown: 27; Rudd 1997: 45; etc.). As Sebesta points out: “Bieber correctly described the stola in 1920” (*ibid.*), supported by visual evidence (*ibid.*: fig. 2.1), but the mistranslation is still prevalent.

Clothing as an external indicator of status reflects the fact that Roman society was highly status conscious.¹⁴ In *Serm.* 1.2, Horace also uses clothing imagery (25-6, 132) as a marker of behaviour and morality.¹⁵ In this respect clothing can be seen as an appropriate topic for *satura*. Clothing imagery is, however, nowhere near as well developed a motif as, for example, food. Possibly this is because the limited availability of fabrics and dyes did not offer so many opportunities for variation and extravagance.

Status-related images occur at the beginning of 1.2. “Collegia” (1) were similar to trade-guilds: urban “mutual aid societies” (Garnsey and Saller 1987: 156) for the lower classes, and are a rare example of such relationships for which there is evidence, “from numerous inscriptions and some largely hostile references in the literary sources” (ibid.).¹⁶ The hostility arose in the late Republic because “collegia” were seen as potential sites for subversive activity (ibid.: 157). It is possible that Horace’s incongruous collocation here: “ambubaiarum collegia”, is ridiculing these institutions.

The list of Tigellius’ mourners is made up of people who, like the discontented types of 1.1.4-12, all have to work for a living. They are not the elite of Maecenas’ circle. Lists like this are found in Roman comedy. The list of people (98) who are a component of the obstructions (94-100) to the “matrona” (94) is reminiscent, in a drastically abbreviated form, of the list of tradesmen whose goods and services are essential for the “matrona” at Plautus *Aul.* 508-19. Horace’s list contains two lexically

¹⁴ The *clavi* on *tunicae* as a marker of senatorial or equestrian status do not feature in 1.2. They do appear, however, in 1.5 and 1.6, to be discussed later in this chapter.

¹⁵ Clothing imagery is used in this way by other Roman writers. Cicero’s usage is discussed by Heskell (1994). In particular, Cicero used clothing metaphorically in his criticism of Antony’s behaviour (*Phil.* 2.44) (Heskell ibid.: 140-1).

Clothing imagery in Propertius Book 4 has been examined by DeBrohun (2003: 156-200). Consistent with the change from love elegy to aetiological elegy, characters, such as Hercules, the unsuccessful cross-dresser in 4.9 (DeBrohun ibid.: 157-65), and Vertumnus in 4.2 (ibid.: 169-75), attempt to redefine their gender identity using the vocabulary of clothing. In the case of Vertumnus, god of change, his identity is entirely dependent on clothing (173): “indue me Cois, fiam non dura puella: | meque virum sumpta quis neget esse toga?” (Prop. 4.2.23-4). Propertius’ use of clothing, as discussed by DeBrohun, is not really analogous to Horace’s in *Serm.* 1.2 as there are no status connotations.

¹⁶ As the majority of evidence for *collegia* is epigraphical, it follows that the best attested of these institutions are burial clubs. There is a possible allusion to a burial club at *Serm.* 1.8.8-11.

interesting items: “ciniflones” and “parasitae” (98), both used uniquely here (K-H⁷ 1959: *ad* 96).¹⁷ The former is usually translated as “hairdressers” (for example, Damon 1997: 116), or Rudd’s more upmarket “coiffeuses” (1997: 47), but a “ciniflo” may in fact have been more specialized, and Bovie’s cumbersome “beauticians, with curlers” (1959: 43) may be more accurate. The scholia explain that the duty of a “ciniflo” involved warming curling tongs in embers prior to curling the hair of the “matrona”.¹⁸ This would be an example of the “differentiation of labour” in large households referred to by Garnsey and Saller (1987: 122). There may also be status connotations here as “the costume of the head—hairstyles, veils, and mantle coverings” were “an indicator of the status and social function of women” (Sebesta 1994: 46).

With respect to “parasitae”, one of the few earlier commentators who went beyond v.24 interprets this literally as denoting the female equivalent of the *scurrae* and *convictores* belonging to the husband of the “matrona” (K-H⁷ 1959: *ad* 1.2.96). More recently, Damon has suggested that the term is used to denigrate the female friends of the “matrona” because of their obstructive behaviour, rather than as an objective term for their status (1997: 117).

There is another aspect of status which has wider relevance for the interpretation of the poem. Dessen observes that: “Horace never specifies the social status of his ideal woman (119ff.)” (1968b: 201 n.3). She cites this as evidence for her argument that adultery is not condemned in moral terms. It is true that Horace’s emphasis is more on the basically Epicurean notion that the pleasure of an adulterous relationship with a “matrona” would be outweighed by the pain of damage to “fama” and “res”, and also the risk of physical assault or even loss of life (37-46). If this is considered from a different perspective status becomes relevant. The one category of sexual partner advised against under any circumstances is the “matrona”. Whatever the status of the ideal sexual partner (119-34), she is definitely not a “matrona”. This is consistent with the morality of the *mos maiorum*, as indicated by the, albeit

¹⁷ *TLL* and *OLD* both have only one other usage for ‘*parasita*’, referring to a bird (Pliny *Nat.* 10.68).

¹⁸ “Et ciniflones et cinerarii in eadem significatione apud veteres dicebantur ab officio calamistrorum, in cinere calefaciendorum, quibus matronae capillos crispabant” (Porph.: *ad Serm.* 1.2.98).

“Cinerarius” was used by Lucilius (282W), unfortunately in an isolated sentence.

distorted, allusion to Cato Maior (31-5). Above all, the Roman “matrona” was traditionally chaste, one only has to think of the example of Lucretia. In this respect 1.2, with its emphasis on male sexual behaviour, promotes the image of the circle of Maecenas as men who respect traditional sexual morality. “There was, as one element among many in the pressures of Roman politics, a strong demand by the ruled for virtue in their rulers, or at least for restraint of vice” (Powell 2002: 118). The qualification here is crucial: Octavian could not easily compete directly with Sextus’ positive image of *pietas*, but he could compete indirectly by displaying “restraint of vice”. Although 1.2 proved too shocking and amoral for many critics in the English-speaking world, “it is incredible that *Satire* 1.2 should have shocked either Maecenas or Octavian, hard to believe that they gave anything less than wholehearted approval to this first onslaught on adultery” (DuQuesnay: 20).

Serm. 1.1 and 1.2 have been treated together because with respect to place and status they share common features: the urban setting is indicated by incidental details, and the status of Horace’s *persona* is not significant. The latter is a consequence of the relatively impersonal nature of both poems. However, the personal element emerges at the end of 1.2 (119), and then becomes more prominent, with a concomitant rise in the significance of the status of the *persona*.¹⁹ A common feature of the scholarship of *Serm.* 1 is the grouping together of the first three poems as diatribe satires, as, for example, by Rudd (1982a: 1-35), and Brown (9). While it is true that features of diatribe are common to all three poems, when viewed from the perspective of status, in particular the development of the *persona*, 1.3 is markedly more personal. Braund follows the conventional grouping of the poems, but acknowledges that 1.3 “also lays the foundations for a shift into a new phase of the ‘story’” (1992: 18). Earlier, and from a different perspective, Fiske had also detected a qualitative difference in 1.3 compared to the previous two poems. Consistent with his overall argument, he attributed this to the fact that it had been written “without the direct consciousness of a Lucilian model” (1920: 274). In other words, Horace is gradually and implicitly redefining *satira* before 1.4, the first overtly programmatic statement.

¹⁹ The personal element in 1.3 occurs at: 19-20; 53-4; 63-6 (Horace and Maecenas); 69-71; 90-5, and 137-42.

Serm. 1.3 and 1.4

Place in these two poems is again not an obvious feature, and an urban setting is indicated by incidental details. In 1.3 the only real indication of an urban setting is the indirect reference to the public baths: “dum tu quadrante lavatum | rex ibis” (137-8). Although in 1.4 place superficially appears to be no more significant, on closer analysis it is found to have literary connections: three out of four urban images have negative literary associations. In particular, they are locations where the wrong sort of satirist can access a wide and indiscriminating audience.

At 1.4.37-8 the locations are the “furnus” (public bakehouse) and “lacus” (water tank), and the low-status audience consists of slave-boys and old women. The wording of the text: “et quodcumque semel chartis illeverit, omnis | gestiet a furno redeuntis scire lacuque” (36-7), implies that the satirist recites his malicious verses at these public gathering places, and that the slaves returning home then spread the gossip to others, thus increasing the size of the audience. This image may be *satura*’s more down-to-earth version of Vergil’s “rumor” (*A.* 4.173-95).

The section from v.71-8 contains two sets of urban images associated again, in the first instance, with a wide audience of the wrong people: “nulla taberna meos habeat neque pila libellos, | quis manus insudet vulgi Hermogenisque Tigelli” (71-2). Both “taberna” and “pila” connote public dissemination of books in an urban environment. As an element of his redefinition of *satura* in 1.4, Horace emphasizes, disingenuously, that his *libellus* is not intended for publication, both in the passage quoted and previously at v.22-3 (Brown: *ad* 22-3, 71). The unpleasantly graphic image of “insudet” (72) implies a derogatory connotation for “manus vulgi”²⁰, while Tigellius Hermogenes has already been encountered in a hostile context at 1.3.129 (Brown: *ad* 1.3.129; 1.4.72). The negative criticism at v.74-8 is directed at poets who recite in the middle of the forum and at the baths: “in medio qui | scripta Foro recitent sunt multi quique lavantes” (74-5). These are also sites with potentially large audiences, but the criticism (76-8) seems to be that the poets are concerned more with the sound of their own voices than whether their performances are appropriate or wanted.

²⁰ *OLD*, s.v. ‘uulgus²’: “A (particular) multitude of ordinary or undifferentiated people, crowd (usu. w. some derogatory implication).”

By contrast, the urban image of the “porticus” (134) has positive connotations, both philosophical and literary. The public, exterior “porticus” is equated with the very private, interior “lectulus” (133) as a suitable site for “consilium proprium” (133). In both of these places Horace depicts himself as able to be alone, even though one is a public place. Furthermore, he demonstrates that he is content to engage in his private pursuits in a public place, and he does not crave an audience like his literary rivals criticized at v.74-8. Some fifteen or so years later, “porticus” will also acquire negative connotations:

Quod si me populus Romanus forte roget cur
non ut porticibus sic iudiciis fruar isdem,
nec sequar aut fugiam quae diligit ipse vel odit. (*Epist.* 1.1.70-2)

Status begins to assume more importance in 1.3. The scattered words associated with status cover the whole spectrum of the social hierarchy. “Caesar” (4) refers to Octavian and is the only direct mention of him in *Serm.* 1, “patris” (5) denotes Julius Caesar, and Maecenas is named (64). At the other end of the spectrum slaves appear (12, 80), in the context of contrasts or relativity. In the first occurrence: “saepe decem servos; modo reges atque tetrarchas” (12), the real contrast is between “decem” and “ducentos” (11), but there is an explicit status contrast in v.12. It also indicates that a “cantor” like Tigellius Sardus, who was probably a freedman (Treggiari 1969: 141), had slaves of his own. “Servum” (80) occurs in the overall discussion of appropriate punishments for crimes (76-124), and implicitly denotes an unequal power relationship, with “quis” (80) implying *dominus*.

“Rex” occurs several times (125, 136, 138, 142) in the final section (124-42) which ridicules the Stoic paradox: *Aequalia esse peccata et recte facta*. The ridiculing of the *sapiens* consists of attributing to him the skills of the lower status occupations of “sutor” (125), “tonsor”²¹ (132) and “cantor” (129) or “modulator” (130). To add to the mockery, the “vitium” attributed to “omnibus ... cantoribus” (1) turns out to be inconsistency, a serious fault for a Stoic *sapiens*.

²¹ This is the reading of Shackleton Bailey (1985). Other editors, e.g. Brown, repeat “sutor” here. Shackleton Bailey’s preferred reading adds another low status artisan to the list, and “give[s] greater variety to the adversary’s argument” (Brown: *ad* 1.3.132).

Amicitia is thematic in 1.3,²² and becomes inextricably linked with status from this poem onwards. The friendship between Tigellius Sardus and Octavian (4-6) is clearly not an equal relationship as the latter is referred to as “Caesar, qui cogere posset” (4). Although the syntax of the contrary-to-fact condition (5-6) implies that Octavian did not compel Tigellius to sing against his wishes, the fact remains that he was in a position to do so. That he did not conveys an impression of restraint and tolerance towards a man of inferior status.

The most significant image of *amicitia* is that of Horace and Maecenas:

simplicior quis et est qualem me saepe libenter
 obtulerim tibi, Maecenas, ut forte legentem
 aut tacitum impellat quovis sermone molestus:
 ‘communi sensu plane caret’ inquit. (63-6)

These lines occur in the context of a passage (38-75) which is a plea for enlightened self-interest with regard to tolerating the “vitia” of friends (esp. 67-75), and they have presented problems of interpretation. Following Woodcock (1938) and Shackleton Bailey (1982: 24-5), it seems preferable to take “obtulerim” as a potential subjunctive with future reference (Woodcock: *ibid.*).²³ Rudd’s translation of “qualem ... obtulerim” implies a similar reading: “(the sort of fellow I would often | wish you to think *me*, Maecenas)” (1997: 51; italics original), as well as emphasizing the parenthetical nature of Horace’s self-reference. This is the first appearance of the *persona* of the satirist directly connected with Maecenas, and the reticence of the self-reference serves to indicate some degree of inequality.

Horace’s argument in 1.3 is complex and what these lines (63-6) actually convey is not straightforward. They function as the climax to a cluster of three examples (56b-66) of how, through their intolerance of “vitia”, people “even give disagreeable names to their [friends’] virtues” (Shackleton Bailey *ibid.*: 24) (1.3.55-6). This behaviour is contrasted with the tolerance exemplified in v.49-53, where friends, as they should, downplay each other’s faults, just as fathers do for the physical defects of their sons (41-8). The fundamental importance of tolerantly

²² *Amicus* or cognates occur at 1, 5, 26, 33, 41, 43, 50, 54, 69, 71, 73, 84, 93, 140.

²³ The alternative that Woodcock argues against “is to take *obtulerim* as optative subjunctive. and so make it refer to the past (‘in which character I hope I *may have* exhibited myself to you.’ ...)” (*ibid.*: italics original).

minimizing the faults of “amici” is expressed by: “opinor, | haec res et iungit iunctos et servat amicos” (53-4).

To return to v.63-6: Shackleton Bailey’s argument (ibid.: 24-5) is that Horace is saying that he would willingly appear as “simplicior” to Maecenas: “simplex”, closely linked with “fortis” (52), is presented as a positive quality, or at least a less negative alternative to “truculentior atque | plus aequo liber” (51-2). However, he knows that he might be judged harshly if he behaved in this way, and in fact has “too much ‘social sense’ to make a nuisance of himself” (ibid.: 25). With regard to status, these lines so interpreted demonstrate that Horace is tentatively exploring his relationship with Maecenas, a *potens amicus*. This is the first place in the *libellus* where Maecenas and Horace are mentioned together. Horace’s position “in amicorum numero” is not made explicit until 1.6. At this stage it is clearly not one of equals. Although Shackleton Bailey sees it as a “close, if deferential, association” (ibid.), closeness is not really apparent, and Braund’s assessment, that “Horace portrays himself as on the periphery of Maecenas’ circle” (1992: 19), is more accurate for this early stage of the *libellus*, and of Horace’s “fictionalized version of his upwards mobility” (Braund: ibid.).

1.4 is more notable for what Horace does not say about the status of his father, and hence indirectly his own social position. His father’s status as “libertinus” is not disclosed until 1.6, with the emphatic and repeated “libertino patre natum” (45, 46, “natos” (6); cf. *Epist.* 1.20.20).²⁴ Consistent with the programmatic nature of 1.4, the construct of Horace’s father functions as the model both for the satirical method of redefined *satura* and for Horace’s own self-awareness (105-37). Horace’s father is portrayed as a traditional Roman father in his practical concern for his son’s moral education consistent with the *mos maiorum*, combined with suspicion of abstract philosophy (115-17). In this respect he exhibits similarities with Cicero’s portrayal of Scipio when he outlines his credentials for presenting his ideas about the Republic: “sed ut unum e togatis patris diligentia non inliberaliter institutum studioque discendi a pueritia incensum, usu tamen et domesticis praeceptis multo magis eruditum quam litteris” (*Rep.* 1.36). Horace’s father resembles Scipio’s father in his concern for his son’s education, and Scipio himself in his preference for practical experience over

²⁴ The actual nature of the enslavement of the father of the historical Q. Horatius Flaccus is not relevant here. For references to discussion of this topic see n.1 above.

abstract learning. In 1.4 the *persona* of the Horatian satirist, modelled on his father, is established as valuing traditional Roman morality, even if this is combined with, or more accurately overshadowed by, elements of Hellenistic philosophy, especially Epicureanism. The irony of this impression is exposed when Horace senior is revealed to be a freedman in 1.6.

Serm. 1.4 is predominantly a literary poem, concerned with Horace's redefinition of *satura* (see p.86), and the status of *satura* as a genre is relevant (39-62). This passage is particularly problematical, and no interpretation can be wholly satisfactory. As far as status is concerned, there does seem to be a distinction "between grand poetry, like epic ... , and less elevated poetry, like comedy and satire" (Brown: *ad* 1.4.39-62).²⁵ Significantly, although in this poem Horace is moving *satura* away from the Lucilian model, he aligns himself with Lucilius with respect to this status issue (56-62). As in 1.3, Horace has shown that he was aware of his lower social status relative to Maecenas, so here in 1.4 he demonstrates an awareness of the lower status of his chosen genre. On a more general level, this reveals that the Horatian satirist is concerned with knowing one's place in a hierarchy, of whatever sort and, just as importantly, is aware of the importance of being content with that place.

A notable feature of *Serm.* 1.4 is that it is the first truly personal poem in the *libellus*. This is appropriate for the satirist's programmatic statements about his desiderata for the personal genre of *satura*. It also facilitates the disclosure of 'autobiographical' details about Horace's father, and the presentation of a *persona* consistent with the aims of the proto-Augustan regime. The following two poems reinforce this important aspect of the *persona*, and its potential for indirect support.

Serm. 1.5

From the first line place is a very obvious feature, and as has already been indicated (see p.103): "Egressum magna me accepit Aricia Roma"²⁶ (1) confirms retrospectively that "Roma" is the setting of *Serm.* 1.1 to 1.4. The juxtaposition

²⁵ "They [Horace's *Sermones*] go on foot, on the ground, in contrast to the poetic flight of the higher genres" (Muecke 1993: 3).

²⁶ This is the first use of "Roma" in *Serm.* 1; the only other occurrence is at 1.6.76 in the context of Horace's education.

“Aricia Roma” establishes the contrast of the *Urbs* with *municipia* throughout the poem, a contrast between Rome and Italian towns of lower status.²⁷ Although the overall impression of 1.5 is of the discomforts of travel, several of the locations function positively through their association with *amici*, both equals and *potentes*.

As in 1.3, the whole social spectrum is represented. Appropriately, Maecenas is the first person of high status to be mentioned: “Maecenas optimus atque | Cocceius, missi magnis de rebus uterque | legati, aversos soliti componere amicos” (27-29). L. Cocceius Nerva (*cos. suff.* 39 BCE) had been a negotiator at Brundisium in 40 BCE (Syme 1939: 225). These lines tantalizingly give the only indication of the vitally important mission, and also establish the thematic role of *amicitia*. The third “legatus” is C. Fonteius Capito (v.32) (*cos. suff.* 33 BCE), from “a highly reputable praetorian family” (Syme *ibid.*: 242 n.2), and “Antoni non ut magis alter amicus” (33).

M. Plotius Tucca, L. Varius Rufus and Vergil are introduced at v.40. The effusiveness of v.39-44 suggests that these men are Horace’s close friends (Braund 1992: 19), while the description of them as “candidi” (“candidiores” (41)) “has specific overtones of sincerity and, ... , frankness” (Brown: *ad* 41-2), and also carries the suggestion of Epicurean *amicitia* and *parrhesia*. The relationship between Maecenas and the poets is not fully explained until *Serm.* 1.6.54-62.²⁸ “Lusum it Maecenas, dormitum ego Vergiliusque; | namque pila lippis inimicum et ludere crudis” (1.5.48-9), is the only passage in the poem explicitly linking Maecenas with Horace. Compared to v.39-44, the relationship depicted is somewhat remote. DuQuesnay (43) sees the line as indicating that Maecenas did not insist on constant attendance from his clients. It could also indicate that Horace and Vergil recognize their proper place in the hierarchy, and maintain a respectful distance, the sore eyes and indigestion being convenient excuses. Braund supports this view, observing that

²⁷ The following locations are named: “magna ... Aricia Roma” (1); “Forum Appi” (3); “[via] Appia” (6); “Anxur” (26); “Fundos” (34); “in Mamurrarum ... urbe” [= Formiae] (37); “Sinuessae” (40); “Proxima Campano ponti quae villula” (45); “Capuae” (47); “Coccei ... plenissima villa, | quae super est Caudi cauponas” (50-1); “Beneventum” (71); “Apulia” (77); “vicina Trivici | villa” (79-80); “oppidulo quod versu dicere non est” (87); “Canusi[um]” (91); “Rubos” (94); “Bari ... Gnatia” (97); “Brundisium” (104).

²⁸ M. Plotius Tucca is now best known as one of Vergil’s literary executors, along with Varius. Lejay comments that a mention by Jerome is the only evidence that Plotius was a poet (1911: *ad* 1.5.40).

in 1.5 Horace “does not yet appear to be close to the great man [Maecenas] himself” (ibid.).

DuQuesnay (ibid.) cites a passage from Cicero *de Amicitia* to illustrate his conception of the friendship between Horace and Maecenas in 1.5: “comitas adsit, assentatio vitiorum adiutrix procul amoveatur, quae non modo amico, sed ne libero quidem digna est; aliter enim cum tyranno, aliter cum amico vivitur” (*Amic.* 89). It is true that Horace displays “no show of flattery or adulation” (DuQuesnay: ibid.), and he would be well aware of the need to avoid such behaviour. But “cum tyranno ... cum amico” provides too stark a contrast for the situation Horace describes, and subtler distinctions need to be recognized. Maecenas is in no way a tyrant, nevertheless Horace’s relationship with him, as exemplified in this poem, is not the same as that with his friends of equal status. DuQuesnay’s contention that “Maecenas, of course, is included in the *amici* of Horace” (ibid.) is not supported by the passage cited (39-44), nor by v.48 (quoted above).

There are low status types in the bustling scene at “Forum Appi, | differtum nautis cauponibus atque malignis” (4-5), with the “nautae” trading insults with slaves (“pueri” 11). One boatman in particular, the “multa prolutus vappa nauta” (16), makes a significant contribution to the discomforts of the barge trip on the Pomptine marshes (14-23). The tone of the passage from v.51-70 suggests that the status of Sarmentus and Messius Cicirrus is below that of Horace. Sarmentus is described as a “scurra” (52), while Messius is described ironically as from “clarum genus Osci” (54), and was possibly on the household staff of Cocceius (Corbett 1986: 66). In reality Sarmentus may have been a freedman of Maecenas (Treggiari 1969: 271-72), but in the context of the poem the emphasis is on slavery: “Sarmenti domina exstat” (55); “scriba quod esset, | nilo deterius dominae ius esse” (66-7), and “rogabat denique cur umquam fugisset” (67-8). Slaves also feature at v.75-6: “convivas avidos cenam servosque timentis | tum rapere”. The unfortunate events at the abortive “cena” cause the guests and slaves to resort to the same level of behaviour, but for different reasons: the former “because of hunger”, the latter through “fear of punishment” (Brown: *ad* 75-6).

Octavian is not mentioned by name, but is implied at v.27-9 (quoted p.119). Further, there may be allusions to him in the first three lines. He had family connections with Aricia (Suet. *Aug.* 4), and “rhetor comes Heliodorus, | Graecorum longe doctissimus” (2-3) may refer to Apollodorus, Octavian’s tutor (Frank 1920:

393). If this identification is correct, it would give point to the unusually enthusiastic praise of him in v.3 (Brown: *ad* 1-2). “Hospitio modico” (2) need not be read as pejorative and indicative of “inconveniences and discomforts” (Brown: *ibid.*). Moderation is not generally a negative concept for Horace. DuQuesnay (41-2) argues that the repeated references in 1.5 to the modest demands of Maecenas’ entourage are complimentary, and contrast with earlier travellers like Cicero and Julius Caesar. Cicero complained about events on the Saturnalia in 45 BCE when Caesar arrived at his villa at Puteoli with a retinue of two thousand soldiers, and the *cena* necessitated the use of four dining rooms (*Att.* 13.52). Small, seemingly incidental details like “Proxima Campano ponti quae villula, tectum | praebuit et parochi, quae debent, ligna salemque” (45-6) demonstrate the moderation of Horace’s *potentes amici* (DuQuesnay: *ibid.*).

Aricia is a place with positive connotations through its underlying associations with Octavian. Associations with *amici* and pleasant hospitality function to produce favourable images for other places: Anxur (26) because of the arrival of Maecenas and the other *potentes amici*, and Sinuessa (40) where Horace met up with his fellow poets. Hospitality was provided by Capito at Murena’s villa at Formiae (37-8), and by Cocceius at his “plenissima villa” at Caudium (50-1). The latter villa was the venue for entertainment featuring the “scurrae” (51-70). Critics are not in agreement about the reception of this entertainment by the group. Brown (*ad loc.*) reads “prorsus iucunde cenam producimus illam” (70), as ironic because the personal abuse of the “scurrae” resembles that disapproved of by Horace at 1.4.86-91. On the other hand, Braund refers to “the superior attitude exhibited by the urban, urbane group of friends towards the bumpkins” (1992: 19), citing this passage as an example of how Horace is demonstrating a growing awareness of “the ‘rules’ of the group” (*ibid.*). The adverb “iucunde” (70) may refer back to “nil ego contulerim iucundo sanus amico.”(44), and signify the enjoyment of sharing an activity with friends, both equals and *potentes*. With regard to the criticized behaviour in 1.4, the situation is somewhat different. There the man was insulting his fellow-guests, and even the host. In 1.5 the “scurrae” are providing entertainment for guests, and the *amici* are remote from the conflict inherent in the exchanges. Rudd concludes that the mood is one of amusement because the “boisterous humour appealed to something very deep in the Roman character” (1982a: 64). This may be an aspect of culture and tradition that cannot now

be accurately judged. On balance it seems likely that the *amici* appreciated the entertainment.

A recurring source of discomfort, the quality or quantity of the water supply, occurs first early in the poem at Forum Appi (7-9) where, close to the marshes, the problem is the quality. Later in the poem, further south at the unnameable town (87-9); Canusium (91), and Gnatia (97-8), water is scarce. This recurrent motif could be functioning as an unfavourable contrast between the Italian *oppida* and the *Urbs*, the latter enjoying a plentiful water supply thanks to the “*lacus*” (1.4.37). Canusium has a particularly negative image as it provides gritty bread, and moreover is the place where Varius left the party of *amici* (91-3). The problems with water occur both before and after the arrival of the *potentes amici* indicating that their presence made no difference to the hardships endured, contributing to the impression of Maecenas as a powerful man who did not expect “pomp and ceremony” (DuQuesnay: 41).

Inappropriate behaviour by ‘provincials’ accounts for the negative images of Fundi (34-6) and Beneventum (71-6). In the case of Fundi, the magistrate Aufidius Luscus has pretensions above his station, wearing the toga “*praetexta*” (36) to which he may have been entitled, with a senatorial “*latum clavum*” to which he almost certainly was not (Brown: *ad* 34-6). Fundi was probably governed by aediles (Brown: *ibid.*), and Horace’s playful description of Aufidius as “*praetor*” (34) emphasizes the fact that he is a man who does not recognize his true place in the political hierarchy. The behaviour of the “*sedulus hospes*” (71) at Beneventum is inappropriate in that he was “anxious-to-please” (Braund 1992: 19), and attempted to provide hospitality which was beyond his abilities, and was not appropriate for Maecenas’ entourage.

Serm. 1.5 is an account of a journey which may have actually taken place. It is, however, an idealized account, a “poetic fiction” (Anderson 1982: 20), in which elements are shaped to provide positive perceptions of the circle of Maecenas (DuQuesnay: 39-43). It is widely acknowledged that this poem is based on a Lucilian model (94-148W), and is a practical demonstration of the literary standards of redefined *satura* espoused in 1.4, most notably *brevitas* (Brown: 139). The final line: “*Brundisium longae finis chartaeque viaeque est*” (104) is disingenuous. The journey was certainly long, roughly 550km in about fifteen days, but “the poem has been a masterpiece of compression” (Brown: *ad* 104). *Aemulatio* of Lucilius represents significant support for Octavian, especially in the ongoing conflict with Sextus

Pompeius, as Lucilius may have been important to the Pompeians, being the great-uncle of Pompeius Magnus (Brown: 183) (see p.92).

This is a very personal poem, and the development of the satirist's *persona* contributes constructively to the image of Maecenas' entourage, and also reinforces attributes from earlier poems in the *libellus*. Horace demonstrates that he, as representative of the circle of Maecenas, has high personal standards. He is the soul of discretion and only alludes obliquely to the mission's real purpose (27-9). He is not one "commissa tacere | qui nequit" (1.4.84-5). Both he, and Vergil, know when not to intrude on Maecenas' leisure activities (48-9). They could not be accused of lacking in "communis sensus" (cf. 1.3.63-6). Allied to this is Horace's awareness of his place in the social hierarchy, and the maintenance of correct distance from those both above and below. Above all, Maecenas' entourage is portrayed as a group for whom *amicitia* is of paramount importance, especially in terms of reconciling estranged friends (29), thus dispelling any fears of a rift between Octavian and Antony (DuQuesnay: 42). This impression may have been far from the truth, but for all periods of the Augustan regime the image was more important than the reality.

Serm. 1.6

As DuQuesnay observes, this "is a complex and difficult poem" (43). In 1.5 place was immediately apparent whereas 1.6 opens with status, and a contrast between the high birth of Maecenas ("nemo generosior est te" (2)) and Horace's lowly origins ("ut me, libertino patre natos" (6)). Place, specifically the *Urbs*, becomes significant at the end of the poem (111-31). In this respect, 1.5 and 1.6 can be seen as a related pair: at the beginning of 1.5 Horace left Rome, and by the end of 1.6 he is happily back there. *Amicitia* is also an important element, but here principally in the more restricted sense of patronage, in a passage (45-62) where the relationship between Maecenas and Horace, and other poets, is made fully explicit.

1.6 is the most overtly political poem in the *libellus*, and consequently has the greatest potential for support of Maecenas and Octavian. DuQuesnay (43-52) discusses this aspect of 1.6 in detail, and his argument is summarized briefly here. He argues that Horace's emphasis on the military prowess of Maecenas' ancestors (3-4) seeks to legitimate his position as a *privatus* holding supreme power. The first long section of the poem (7-44) supports the view that only those properly qualified for office, both technically and personally, should hold political power. The immediate

impulse for this is the political chaos of 38-36 BCE, when many unqualified candidates were elected, a situation often attributed to the practices of Sextus Pompeius. To be worthy of office, noble birth is not enough, a man should have *virtus* as well as *maiores*. Octavian needed the support of the *nobiles*, consequently Horace's careful argument is not opposed to them in general, but is targeted towards those men who sought office for the wrong reasons: for personal *gloria* rather than to advance the interests of the state.

DuQuesnay's discussion is based largely on the assumption that in 1.6 "the views expressed are at least as much those of Maecenas as of Horace" (44). As a result of this perspective, he does not take into account the very personal way in which Horace presents his complex argument, nor does he consider some of the philosophical implications. The emphasis in what follows will be on how the status of the *persona* revealed in the poem, intersecting with place (111-31), nuances the argument. As DuQuesnay reads 1.6 in isolation his reading also misses the relationship of certain aspects to earlier poems, and to the overall theme: how to live a "vita beata".

Horace observes that although Maecenas comes from distinguished ancestors he does not despise people of humble origins like himself (1-8), adding the significant and ambiguous proviso: "dum ingenuus" (8). The "populus" are often dazzled by the superficial trappings of noble ancestry and elect to office men who are unworthy (15-17). Consequently, it is difficult for a *novus homo* to gain office (19-20). The argument then takes a surprise turn, with Horace now using himself as *exemplum*: "censorque moveret | Appius, ingenuo si non essem patre natus - | vel merito, quoniam in propria non pelle quiessem" (20-22). This makes it clear that he has no political ambitions because, as in earlier poems, he recognizes his correct place in the social hierarchy. Despite Horace's alleged reason for expulsion, it seems likely that according to the strict letter of the law being the son of a freedman would not have debarred him from office (Syme 1939: 78; Treggiari 1969: 62). But if *mos* was more important than *ius* a zealous censor might expel such men from the Senate, as Appius Claudius Pulcher did in 50 BCE. There are also philosophical reasons for refraining from seeking public office: "quiessem" (22) connotes Epicurean quietude (Brown: *ad* 19-22).

By taking this stance, Horace is advocating adherence to traditional Republican political procedures as opposed to the irregular practices that were causing

chaos and instability. Octavian needed support from “new men of ability and ambition paired with aristocrats of the most ancient families” (Syme *ibid.*: 236). The “new men”, however, had to be worthy of office. Sextus was not the only leader guilty of promoting men beyond their station. Earlier, Julius Caesar had also done this, with his “adherents” colourfully described by Syme as “a ghastly and disgusting rabble” (*ibid.*: 78). Whatever the reality, Horace is here distancing himself and his *potentes amici* from irregular practices in recruitment to the Senate.

The next section (23-44) deals with the adverse criticism (29-44) which results from having political aspirations without the appropriate background or character. The pretensions of the named *exemplum*, Tillius (24), are described in terms of dress (cf. Aufidius Luscus (1.5.34-6)): the “clavum” (25), presumably the “latum clavum”, of the “quisque insanus” (28). Here the senator’s black leather straps (“nigris ... | pellibus” 27-8) are added, an adornment of status which Aufidius apparently did not aspire to. When Tillius resumed senatorial status he encountered hostility (“invidia accrevit” (26)), and this is specifically related to his political involvement (“privato quae minor esset” (*ibid.*)). “Invidia” also connoted the undesirability of political ambition at 1.3.61. The context at 1.6.26 reinforces this by explicitly confirming that “invidia” would be decreased for Tillius as a “privatus”, and as a consequence he would be able to lead a more contented life. A similar sentiment is expressed in the final line of 1.3: “privatusque magis vivam te rege beatus” (142).

The central section of the poem deals first (45-70) with Horace’s acceptance into the circle of Maecenas (“in amicorum numero.” (62)), in spite of his low status (“libertino patre natum” (45, 46)). It is stressed that acceptance was dependent on his being worthy (“dignos” (51)), and without political ambition (“prava | ambitione procul” (51-52)), with further emphasis on his good character at v.64-70. This, coupled with the fact that Maecenas did not rush his decision (“revocas nono post mense” (61)), functions as a contrast to Sextus Pompeius’ practice of recruiting large numbers of men of any status and character. The circle of Maecenas is shown to be unashamedly elitist: Horace did not make the first advances himself, he was introduced by Vergil and Varius (55). Here he demonstrates that he has sufficient “communis sensus” to appreciate the exacting and lengthy procedure by which Maecenas selects his *amici*.

Horace attributes the good character that earned him acceptance by Maecenas to his father (71-88) now, unlike 1.4.105-37, having been explicitly identified as

“libertinus”. This status and the assertion that he was not a rich man (“macro pauper agello” (71)) notwithstanding, he provided his son with a traditional education in Rome, which would have prepared Horace for a political career (76-8). But he once again rejects politics, and more importantly, asserts his satisfaction with his humble ancestry and private status (“meis contentus honestos [parentis] | fascibus et sellis nollem mihi sumere” (96-7), and “nollem onus haud umquam solitus portare molestum” (99)).

Contentment with his place in the social hierarchy is illustrated in the final section of the poem, where status and place coincide. The hapless Tillius is reintroduced to provide a contrast between the *libertas* enjoyed by Horace as “privatus” and Tillius as “praeclare senator” (110), with respect to travelling outside Rome. Horace maintains that he could travel, presumably alone, “if the mood takes me ... all the way to Tarentum on a gelded mule” (104-5, tr. Brown: 69). On the other hand, Tillius is ridiculed for needing a retinue of slaves “lasanum portantes oenophorumque”²⁹ (109), while merely journeying to Tivoli (Brown: *ad* 107-9). As in 1.5, Horace’s image of his personal travelling in Italy during the Triumviral period is very idealized. It gives the impression of complete safety without bodyguards, when in reality Italy was infested with brigands. In the context of 1.5, DuQuesnay suggests that “the intention is to encourage the reader to reflect that the military successes of Octavian and his generals in 36 had made travel in Italy safe once again” (40).

Horace concludes the poem with a description of the carefree *otium*: “Quacumque libido est, | incedo solus” (111-12), he enjoys in the *Urbs* thanks to his private status, and implicitly because of Maecenas’ patronage. The location is made clear by the inclusion of city landmarks: “Circum” (113); “Forum” (114); “Marsya”³⁰ (120); “Campum” (126). In a literary context Horace’s *otium* is anticipated by 1.4.134 where the “porticus”, although a public space, provides a suitable location for “consilium proprium” (133). The lifestyle described in 1.6.114-18 is consistent with the *victus tenuis* advocated as a prerequisite for the “vita beata” in *Serm.* 1.1. Horace’s “vita solutorum misera ambitione gravique” (129) is consistent with Epicurean

²⁹ This is an example of a Graecism which, although potentially breaching Horace’s insistence on *Latinitas*, contributes to the satire, in this instance by increasing the pomposity of Tillius’ image.

³⁰ This refers to the Statua Marsyae in the Forum, and alludes to business activities. As the statue was located near the praetor’s tribunal the reference is probably to legal proceedings (Brown: *ad* 119-20).

principles except for one puzzling detail: there is no mention of *amici*, indeed his freedom is expressed by “solus” (112). At the beginning of the passage the emphasis admittedly is on the contrast with Tillius and his retinue, but even Horace’s simple meal is solitary, except for his three slaves in attendance (116). Whatever this detail signifies, the passage certainly does convey a mood of Epicurean “freedom from mental disturbance” (Brown: *ad* 119-20).

By the end of 1.6 the *persona* of the Horatian satirist “has developed into the poet who enters the exclusive circle of Maecenas” (Braund 1992: 20). This statement needs one qualification: he has entered the circle as a client-poet. In the course of the poem it has been made clear that, despite his humble origins, Horace was accepted by the discriminating Maecenas “in amicorum numero” because he was worthy and not politically ambitious. He has demonstrated that he does not lack “*communis sensus*” (cf. 1.3.63-6). Horace’s “*vita beata*” of *otium* in the *Urbs* (111-31) is possible because he is aware of, and contented with, his place in the social hierarchy. This is the highpoint for both place and status in *Serm.* 1. In later poems negative aspects of being Maecenas’ client-poet in the city start to emerge.

Serm. 1.7 to 1.9

Serm. 1.7 was described by Dryden as “garbage” (cited by Rudd² 1982a: 65), by Rudd himself as “a failure” (*ibid.*: 66) and, slightly more charitably, as “perhaps ... a make-weight” (Brown: 165). More positively and taking a broader perspective, Braund considers *Serm.* 1.7 to 1.9 are poems “in which Horace explores different modes of conflict and the resolution of conflict” (1992: 20). Reading these three poems as a triad can be more productive than treating them in isolation.

There is certainly a difficulty with the change of tone from Horace’s urban *otium* at the end of 1.6 to the third person narrative³¹ and invective of 1.7. With the earlier poems in the *libellus* there has been a thread of some sort linking one poem to the next, for example, the extremes of folly with money linking 1.1 to the opening section of 1.2; Tigellius appearing at 1.2.3 and 1.3.4.-5, and so on. By contrast, the opening and content of 1.7 seem to be totally unrelated to 1.6, and not satisfactorily motivated. However, if place and the passage of time are taken into account a

³¹ A consequence of the different narrative device is that the status of the satirist is irrelevant. There are no other allusions to status in *Serm.* 1.7.

connection can be found. The dramatic setting of 1.7 is Clazomenae (5) in Asia, during the time of Brutus' "praetorship" (18-19). This takes the events described back to the place and time recalled by Horace at 1.6.47-8: "nunc quia sim tibi, Maecenas, convictor, at olim | quod mihi pareret legio Romana tribuno". Here Horace explicitly contrasts the present with the past, in the immediate context referring to the reason for widespread resentment because of his humble status as "libertino patre natus", in the present because of his association with Maecenas, and in the past as military tribune in Asia with Brutus.

In the final section of 1.6 being a "convictor" of Maecenas acquires positive connotations in the *Urbs* in the present. Horace's life of *otium* (111-31) contains no elements of conflict, the one instance of potential conflict, signified by the Statua Marsyae, is something that Horace does not have to experience (1.6.119-21). The content of 1.7 involves the bitter verbal conflict of a law suit, possibly the type of business denoted by Marsya (1.6.120). This verbal battle, described in mock epic terms (1.7.9-18), was located in the past, before Philippi, and remote from Rome. Critics have drawn attention to the similarities between 1.7 and the verbal dual at 1.5.51-70 (Rudd² 1982a: 64; Braund 1992: 20). In terms of time and place the latter is set in Italy, but outside Rome, and fairly close to present time, with the crucial qualification that it is presented by Horace as an event "which so entertained Maecenas' coterie" (Braund: *ibid.*). The combination of remote place and time in 1.7 could create the impression that this type of conflict does not happen now in Rome, illustrated by Horace's conflict-free *otium* (1.6.111-31). Further, when conflict does occur it is in the form of entertainment (1.5.51-70). As before, this impression may have been a long way from reality.

The setting of 1.8 is Horace's contemporary Rome. To be more accurate, it is the Campus Esquilinus: "a large area just outside the Porta Esquilina" (Richardson 1992: 64). Details of the actual location are teasingly 'drip-fed', with the first indication being "novis ... in hortis" (7), confirmed by "Esquiliis ... salubribus" (14). The first-person narrator is not the satirist himself but the statue of Priapus (2), guardian of the new gardens. Consequently status with respect to Horace's *persona* is not relevant, except in an oblique way to be discussed below.

Status does feature in the poem in two novel ways, both involving intersection with time. In the opening section there are two contrasts between past and present time: "olim" (1) correlating with "inde" (3), and similarly "prius" (8) with "nunc"

(14) (Brown: *ad* 8-9;). Not mentioned by Brown is a further contrast between “prius” (8) and “modo” (15). The first antithesis concerns the status of the material used to make the statue. The “truncus ... ficulnus” (1) is transformed from “inutile lignum” (1) to a statue of the god Priapus (2-3). Admittedly, the status of Priapus would probably not be very high in the hierarchy of gods, but the wood now performs a useful and appropriate function as “furum aviumque | maxima formido” (3-4), and Priapus was ultimately successful in scaring away the witches, even if by unintentional means (46-7).

The second instance concerns the improved appearance of the place itself, which can be thought as an elevation of the area’s ‘status’. It has been transformed from the former “commune sepulcrum” (10) for slaves (8-9) and “miseræ plebi” (10) to a healthy place for people to live, and to enjoy a stroll on the “agger” (14-15). The contrast of ‘then’ and ‘now’ is further illustrated by the detail of the previously unpleasant view of the cemetery (15-16). The reading of v.15 is disputed: Brown favours “e quo modo tristes”, while Shackleton Bailey (1985) reads “qui modo tristes”. Brown objects to this reading on the grounds that it “unconvincingly restricts the opportunities of 14-15 to those previously familiar with the site” (*ad* 15). This restriction, however, functions to heighten the contrast between past and present: the people are the same, the location is the same except that its appearance and function have been improved.

In connection with the former cemetery on the Campus Esquilinus, Horace appears to have exaggerated the humble nature of the burials (8-11). It was a cemetery “where burial of public heroes could be made in plots assigned by decree of the senate (Cicero, *Phil.* 9.17)” (Richardson: *ibid.*). The “public hero” in question was Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, a man whose high status would not be covered by Horace’s description. This aspect of the cemetery is in fact hinted at by “magna ... sepulcra” (36). This distortion of the facts functions as a subtle compliment to Maecenas. He was the person responsible for the conversion of the land to “novi horti” (Brown: 170), and the gentrification of the Campus Esquilinus was an important early stage in the Augustan development of the city (Anderson 1982: 74). This oblique praise for a patron is a reminder of the poet’s status as client, and contrasts with the overt, “Eastern-style flattery” (Brown: *ad* 1.7.24-5; DuQuesnay: 37-8) showered on Brutus at 1.7.23-5.

There is another contrast of time which renders praise of the “*novi horti*” somewhat equivocal, that is the contrast between day (“*in aprico*” (15)) and night (“*vaga Luna*” (21)). Although the site is now improved in daylight, the nocturnal activities of Canidia and Sagana remain a serious problem for Priapus (17-22). The Campus Esquilinus is apparently a place that is still in transition, and its transformation to “*Esquiliae salubres*” is not yet complete. As part of their activities the witches are collecting bones (22) representing the former use of the site. The witches’ rituals can thus be seen as a “threat to present values from past evils” (Anderson *ibid.*: 78). There is a further dimension to this, implied at the end of the poem: when Canidia and Sagana have been scared off by Priapus’ fart, “*illae currere in urbem*” (47). These women symbolic of the danger and destruction of the past run away from a liminal area into the city.

DuQuesnay’s interpretation (38-9) of *Serm.* 1.8 is probably the weakest component in his argument (Griffin 1993: 7). He includes the “*prius*”/“*nunc*” contrast (8/14), but overlooks the day/night contrast (15/21), which leads him to the conclusion that Maecenas had already succeeded in getting rid of “such nuisances” (DuQuesnay: 38). Consequently for him, Horace’s implicit compliment is unequivocal, and the ridicule of the magic rites attacks Sextus Pompeius and Pompeians in general, widely associated with such superstitious practices. Anderson’s (1982) essay concentrates on the literary aspects of 1.8 without recourse to “external data” (77), but it is not incompatible with a political reading, as Horace’s literary concerns are always part of the wider context. The Pompeians represent the “destructive past” (Anderson *ibid.*: 81) on both a literary and a political level. On this reading, 1.8 introduces a negative dimension to Horace’s depiction of the *Urbs*, very different from the conclusion to 1.6.

Up to the end of 1.8, Horace himself has not been personally affected in an adverse way by any of the images of conflict (1.5.51-70; 1.7; 1.8). But in 1.9, in the centre of the *Urbs* in broad daylight, the confrontation with the *molestus* produces a negative experience for Horace as Maecenas’ client-poet.

The setting of 1.9 is immediately and obviously the city with “*via Sacra*” (1). Later landmarks, “*trans Tiberim ... prope Caesaris hortos*” (18), and “*ad Vestae*” (35), function as reminders of the location. The situation for Horace is rather different from that of 1.6.111-31. Although, as he says, he was behaving in his usual way: “*sicut meus est mos*” (1), he was not able to continue this urban activity as normal. In

addition, he was not “solus” (1.6.112), as indicated by the presence of a slave (“puero” 10). As Brown suggests, this may be “a *pedisequus*, perhaps accompanying Horace in a secretarial capacity” (*ad* 8-11). The crucial difference from 1.6 is that Horace is interrupted by the *molestus*, who right from the start exhibits inappropriate behaviour, and shows himself to be an *exemplum* of the *vitia* that Horace has been criticizing throughout the *libellus* (DuQuesnay: 53).

The *molestus* reveals himself as the sort of person who is unaware of his place in the social hierarchy, or at least if he is aware, he is not content with that place. He is overly ambitious to improve his status by being admitted as a poet to the *numerus amicorum Maecenatis*, a privilege which he demonstrates he is not worthy of. His address to Horace as “dulcissime rerum” (4) is extravagant and, his pestering intrusion (6-19) is presumptuous from one known “nomine tantum” (3). The self-important “docti sumus” (7) suggests his literary aspirations (Brown: *ad* 7), and this is confirmed by v.21-25. As a poet he reveals that his aesthetic standards are the opposite of Horace’s desiderata (cf. 1.4.14-21), specifically with respect to *brevitas* and careful composition.

The *molestus*’s behaviour resembles that of the populist poets criticized for their public recitations at 1.4.74-8 “in medio ... | ... Foro” (74-5), and at the baths (75). The *molestus*, identified as a poet, is behaving in the same way in a similar location, but in a social encounter. Horace’s assessment from 1.4 applies equally to the *molestus*: “inanis | hoc iuvat, haud illud quarentis, num sine sensu, | tempore num faciant alieno” (76-8). Brown (*ad* 1.4.77-8) comments that “*sensu* = *communi sensu*; cf. 3.66 ... *alieno* = *non suo*, i.e. unfavourable, suggesting intrusion”. In other words, the *molestus* lacks “*communis sensus*”.³² What is more, he plans to adopt the same intrusive strategy with Maecenas: “occurram in triviis” (9.59).

Most importantly, he assumes that the members of Maecenas’ circle are as competitive for status as he is (45-8). Horace’s rejoinder to this (48-52) includes his expression of the essential quality of the satirist’s *persona* in *Serm.* 1, the recognition that “est locus uni | cuique suus” (51-2). In his response the *molestus* reinforces the impression of a man whose ambition would drive him to corrupt and obsessive behaviour (52-60), a man who lacks moderation. Significantly he is also a man who

³² OLD, s.v. ‘*communis*’^{5(c)} “*sensus* ~*is*, feeling for others in the same community (as a guide to conduct, etc.)”.

lacks a sense of humour and irony (54-5). Horace, on the other hand, repeatedly displays restraint and humour in the encounter, and is not provoked to respond in an aggressive manner, even though he, humorously, wishes he could (11-12).

Overall, the *molestus* reveals himself to be lacking in sensitivity and self-awareness. This is in stark contrast to Horace's *persona*, as developed through the *libellus*. In the first 'personal' poem he acknowledges that "vitiis nemo sine nascitur" (1.3.68), explicitly including himself in this generalization (69-71). This is expanded upon in the next poem, where Horace not only admits to possessing minor faults but also the need to eradicate them (1.4.129-37). In 1.9, Horace reiterates the qualities that make him worthy of the status of *amicus Maecenatis* by exposing the *vitia* of a social climber unworthy of that privileged status.

There is, however, a serious underlying negative aspect to Horace's situation: his normal routine is no longer the uninterrupted *otium* of 1.6, which was possible because of his relationship with Maecenas. Now, in 1.9, that relationship creates conflict because ambitious people like the *molestus* want to be in his position. As a rival poet, the *molestus* represents the outdated literary standards denigrated in 1.4, he may represent the *Lucili fautores*. In a literary way, he is a "threat to present values from past evils", as the witches' activities were in 1.8. It is true that Horace was eventually rescued from the *molestus*, but only by divine intervention, by Apollo, the god of poetry (78) (Brown: *ad* 77-8). This motif leads naturally to the content of 1.10, which revisits with notable differences the poetic concerns of 1.4.

Serm. 1.10

Like 1.4, there is no overt location for the discourse of 1.10. It is in fact the first poem since 1.4 to lack a setting. The possible significance of this will be discussed below. Neither place nor status have a prominent role in 1.10. The city is confirmed as the location for Lucilian *satura*: "quod sale multo | urbem defricuit, charta laudatur eadem" (3-4). The opinion here is positive for Lucilius, but negative for the city which needed to be scoured by Lucilius because it was the site of undesirable behaviour. On the evidence of *Serm.* 1.8 and 1.9 it still is. The poetaster of 1.9 has revealed that literary standards still require improvement, hence the literary content of 1.10.

Time contrasts are still relevant with the concession that if Lucilius had been a contemporary his poetry would have conformed to Horace's more exacting standards

(67-71). Horace's attitude in 1.10 towards Lucilius is "a blend of praise and criticism" (Braund 1992: 21). He is praised as "inventor" of the genre, and Horace does not wish to detract from that achievement (46-9). The concessions to Lucilius, especially v.67-71, reinforce the suggestion that the real target of Horace's previous criticism in 1.4 was not the "inventor" of the genre himself, but contemporary poets who insist on adhering to standards from the past.

In v.40-5 the status of the various genres is not relevant (cf. 1.4.39-62). The emphasis is on the fact that Horace does not want to compete with any of his fellow poets: he writes *satura* because that was a genre in which he could improve on recent efforts. This is the expression in the literary sphere of "est locus uni | cuique suus" (1.9.51-2). In a later passage (81-6), Horace specifies "his (ideal) audience, a small, select audience of like-minded friends" (Braund *ibid.*: 22). Unlike the occurrences of Maecenas in 1.5. and 1.6, there is no differentiation in terms of status: "Plotius et Varius, Maecenas Vergiliusque" (81). Here, with the repetition of the names of the poet *amici* of 1.5.40, Maecenas as *potens amicus*, although in a prominent position, does not come first. Although their actual social status may be very different, what matters in this passage is the equality of all the *amici* with respect to literary standards. Braund observes that, with respect to the *numerus amicorum Maecenatis*, this marks Horace's "development from outsider to insider" (*ibid.*). This is certainly true in the context of poetry, and the end of 1.10 suggests that Horace is content with his status as a client-poet among his *amici*. But the world is wider than this "small, select" group and, as Horace demonstrated in 1.9, outside in the *Urbs* there are still people who disturb his *otium*. People like the *molestus* misunderstand the nature of Maecenas' circle, resent Horace's position within it, and suspect him of political ambition (cf. 1.6.45-8). The lack of an overt setting for 1.10 could be interpreted as a retreat from these attitudes into the ideal world of poetry with "like-minded friends".

Conclusion

The final lines of 1.10 show that in *Serm.* 1 the satirist, despite being revealed as "libertino patre natus" (1.6.6), is an *amicus* of Maecenas. He has in the course of the *libellus* demonstrated that he upholds the values, both social and literary, of the new order, against values that persist from the destructive past. Place, as overt location for each poem, does not feature prominently until 1.5, where the first line confirms retrospectively that 1.1 to 1.4 are located in Rome, and that Horace's *satura*

is an urban genre. In 1.4 he redefines *satura* with explicit reference to Lucilius as a predecessor in the genre. The journey in 1.5, through the *municipia* of Southern Italy, is acknowledged to be a reworking of a Lucilian theme. A precedent for taking *satura* outside the city had therefore already been established. 1.6 represents a climax for the positive perception of both place and status, with Horace able to enjoy a life of unrestricted and undisturbed *otium* in the city. This is enabled by his relationship with Maecenas, which in turn is possible because he embraces the values of Maecenas' circle.

1.7 takes the narrative to a location remote in place and time, and introduces an element of conflict which was absent, at least as far as Horace was concerned personally, from the concluding lines of 1.6. 1.8 brings images of conflict from the past closer to Horace, while in 1.9 he is directly confronted by the *molestus*. The latter can be seen as the antithesis of Horace himself with respect to both literary and social values. He represents “the threat to present values from former evils”, which still persists in the *Urbs*. It is not just conflict as entertainment provided by “*scurrae*” outside Rome (1.5.51-70), or something that happened in Asia before Philippi (1.7), or the nocturnal activities of witches on the periphery of the *Urbs* (1.8).

Horace's relationship with Maecenas as client-poet facilitated the *otium* of 1.6.111-31, but it was also responsible for the encounter with the *molestus* in 1.9. A small detail, in a light-hearted context, illustrates the significance of this encounter for Horace: “*ut iniquae mentis asellus*” (1.9.20). Brown notes that “*iniquae mentis*, ... denotes the opposite of equanimity” (*ad* 20-1). A variation on this phrase: “*haud aequo animo*” (1.5.8) indicated the poet's mental state, disturbed by the effect of poor quality water outside Rome. In 1.9 he is in Rome and disturbed by an encounter with a fellow citizen. Moreover the “*asellus*” is troubled by a “*gravius ... onus*” (21). Horace may have foresworn the “*onus*” of the *cursus honorum* (1.6.99), but he is still burdened by the *officia* of patronage. In 1.10 he retreats from the streets of the *Urbs* to the private world of poetry and the *numerum amicorum Maecenatis* as fellow poets (40-5) and his desired audience (81-6). Poetry represents a less burdensome *officium* of patronage, especially when shared with like-minded friends.

Even this aspect of patronage, however, may have a negative side. If two occurrences of the same verb are linked, there is a slight hint of compulsion with respect to performance earlier in the *libellus*. In the context of the inconsistency of the singer Tigellius Sardus (1.3.4), there is the observation: “*Caesar, qui cogere posset*”,

while at 1.4.73 Horace remarks “nec recito cuiquam nisi amicis, idque coactus”. In the latter instance, the more obvious point is the contrast between Horace and populist poets, and “coactus” could simply indicate modesty, sincere or otherwise. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight, there may be a veiled allusion to the more onerous aspects of being a client-poet.

Rudd has observed that *Serm.* 2.1 “is designed as a bridge leading from the cultivated but open ground of Book 1 to the walled garden of Book 2” (1982a: 131). When *Serm.* 1 is examined from the perspective of place it may be more appropriate to place one end of the “bridge” further back, at 1.10. The *persona* of the satirist has developed from the outward-looking ‘popular preacher’ of 1.1, concerned with the follies of society in general, to the introspective poet, *amicus* of Maecenas, more concerned with how those follies of his fellow citizens affect him personally. 1.10 ends on a positive note, with Horace dismissing his critics (78-80, 90-1), while anticipating the approval of his desired audience of *amici* (81-90). Nevertheless, “the threat ... from former evils”, as exemplified in both the literary and social spheres by the *molestus* of 1.9, still lurks out in the *Urbs*.

None of this should be taken to imply that Horace no longer supports the regime. Rather, he is more preoccupied with the dilemma posed by patronage. *Serm.* 1 as a *libellus* supports Octavian and Maecenas in the manner discussed by DuQuesnay. If as generally agreed, *Serm.* 1 was published in 35 BCE, then the Triumviral Period was far from over. The *Bellum Siculum* may have delayed the final conflict between Octavian and Antony, but that inevitable battle was imminent, and a favourable outcome for Octavian was not assured. It could be that for the historical Q. Horatius Flaccus the period between the defeats of Sextus and Lepidus in 36 BCE and Actium was even more difficult, and a retreat into “the walled garden” of more personal concerns might have been more appropriate — and safer.

An exploration of place and status in *Serm.* 2, together with the philosophical and any political associations, will be the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

Place and status in *Serm. 2*

Introduction

As for *Serm. 1*, the exploration of the connected themes of place and status, together with other themes where relevant, will be conducted via a comprehensive sequential reading of the *libellus*. Even though the desirability of reading a *libellus* in this way is now widely accepted, it is still common practice in the case of *Serm. 2* to regard the poems as being structured in a non-linear fashion (for example, Braund 1992: 22-4; Muecke 1993:¹ 8-9). A typical schema is that outlined by Muecke, in which the poems are grouped in four sets of two: 2.1 and 2.5 as “consultations”; 2.2 and 2.6 as “rural simplicity”; 2.3. and 2.7 as “Stoic sermons”, and 2.4 and 2.8 as the “follies of gastronomy” (8). Although Braund, with reference to Zetzel (1980), expresses a preference for a sequential reading of *Serm. 1* (Braund *ibid.*: 17) she nevertheless reverts, without comment, to “the patterning and balance between poems” (23) for her summary of *Serm. 2* (23-5). This precedent notwithstanding, it seems preferable to adopt a consistent method, and read all three books of Horace’s hexameter corpus in the published order.

Philosophy and *amicitia* are important elements allied to place in *Serm. 2*. Philosophy in particular becomes more prominent compared to *Serm. 1*. With respect to *amicitia*, Horace explores the limits of relationships, for example, his own patron-client relationship in 2.1² and 2.6; the abuse of *amicitia* as manifested in *captatio* (2.5), and the behaviour of Maecenas’ entourage in 2.8.

Continuity with *Serm. 1* is an essential factor in a study of this kind. The last line of 1.10: “I, puer, atque meo citus haec subscribe libello”, even if it does have “the appearance of an after-thought” (Muecke: 8), establishes *Serm. 1* as a self-contained and separate book. Nevertheless, there are overt, self-conscious allusions to the earlier *libellus*, for example 2.1.22 is quoted from 1.8.11. Other, more implicit references will be noted as appropriate.

¹ All references in this chapter to Muecke will be to this work, unless otherwise indicated.

² In this chapter references to poems by numbers only will be to *Serm. 2*.

Sequential reading of *Serm. 2*

Serm. 2.1

2.1 is a programmatic *sermo*, but it differs from 1.4 and 1.10 in that Horace's deliberations about his *satura* are in the context of social status. Place as location is not a significant element in this poem. The setting can be assumed to be urban (Muecke: 130). A *iusconsultus* like Trebatius would more naturally be consulted in the city (cf. *Serm.* 1.1.9-10), and the reference to swimming across the Tiber (2.1.7-8) would make little sense in a rural setting.

The focus in the following discussion will be on the literary aspects of 2.1. The legal dimension has attracted critical attention, summarized by Muecke (1995: 204-7, and references there). Horace's consultation with Trebatius can be regarded as a stratagem "for a further exploration of the poetics of Horace's satire and his relationship with Lucilius" (ibid.: 204). If the evidence from Cicero's letters to or concerning Trebatius (*Fam.* 7.5-22) is admissible, then several similarities with Horace emerge which have a direct bearing on Horace's social status and situation, and make Trebatius an appropriate figure as interlocutor. The publication date of the *Epistulae ad Familiares* is unknown, except that it was "after Cicero's death" (*OCD*³: 1562), "during the Augustan period" (Shackleton Bailey 1978: 7). In the case of an 'identity' like Trebatius it is likely that the details and anecdotes concerning him could be known to the comparatively small world of Horace's elite audience, even if the actual letters were not available (Treggiari 1973: 246 n.4). Trebatius is one of the few minor historical figures named in the *Sermones* about whom there is extant evidence from other sources.

Like Horace, Trebatius originally came from outside Rome, from Velia in Lucania (*Fam.* 7.20.1), alluded to at 2.1.34 (Muecke: ad loc.). He appears not to have come from a noble family, and on Cicero's recommendation (*Fam.* 7.5) he became a client of Julius Caesar and was with him in Gaul. Trebatius seems to have found his client status irksome and to have resented being away from the city, as evidenced by an unusually stern letter (*Fam.* 7.17.1) in which "Cicero has taken it on himself to lecture Trebatius" (Fraenkel 1957b: 70), because of his perceived impatience with Caesar, desire for reward, and ingratitude to Cicero himself. He eventually became "Caesaris familiaris" (*Fam.* 7.14.2) and, although this is never mentioned by Cicero, acquired the rank of *eques* (Porph.: *ad Serm.* 2.1.1) (Bauman 1985: 127).

The inclusion of quotes from Latin poets, such as Terence (*Fam.* 7.10.4) and Ennius (*Fam.* 7.13.2), and allusions to philosophy in Cicero's letters to Trebatius suggest two areas of common interest with both Cicero and Horace (Muecke 1995: 208). One of the references to philosophy indicates that Trebatius became an Epicurean: "Indicavit mihi Pansa meus, Epicureum te esse factum" (*Fam.* 7.12.1). There may be a connection between this and "the most striking feature" of these letters, namely "the absence of political material" (Bauman *ibid.*: 132). Further implications of this will be discussed below. From the tone of the majority of Cicero's letters it is obvious that Trebatius possessed a well developed sense of humour, certainly the ability to tolerate Cicero's jokes (*ibid.*: 135). Evidence from the letters also illuminates his advice to Horace at 2.1.7-9: Trebatius enjoyed swimming (*Fam.* 7.10.2), and was not averse to drinking wine (*Fam.* 7.22) (Muecke: *ad* 7).

The evidence presented above shows that Trebatius has the ideal credentials for a discussion with a client-poet about the difficulties of writing Lucilian *satura* in the 30s BCE. Viewed from this perspective, it becomes obvious that Horace could not have consulted Maecenas on this topic in the same way. As well as the relevance of Trebatius' profession as a lawyer there is also the fact that, unlike his mentor Cicero, he was a survivor. However much he may have resented being a client of Julius Caesar in the beginning, he was obviously adept at negotiating the potential pitfalls in relationships with those in power, and had been on friendly terms with both Caesar and Cicero, and was able to be portrayed in 2.1 as an intermediary between Horace and Octavian (Fraenkel 1957a: 149). Trebatius with his flexibility has similarities with the figure of Aristippus (*Epist.* 1.1.18-19; 1.17.13-32).

The negative criticisms of his *satura* cited by Horace *in propria persona* (2.1.1-4) and by Trebatius (21-3) are patently unfounded, and have been prospectively refuted implicitly by Horace's practice throughout *Serm.* 1, and explicitly in 1.4. and 1.10. They are also answered by the word play on "bona" and "mala carmina" at the end of the poem (see p.140). The new aspects of literary criticism have a direct bearing on Horace's status as a client-poet, and are introduced by Trebatius (10-12, 16-17, 60-2). In the process of suggesting encomiastic epic as an alternative to *satura* (10-12), Trebatius alludes to Horace's dependent status, and focuses on the potential rewards: "multa laborum | praemia" (11-12). If these "praemia" are financial, then the implication could be that a client-poet, is not much better than a *scurra*. This could be an indication of Horace's anxiety about the perception of his status with respect to his

patron.³ There may also be an ironic allusion here to Trebatius' earlier impatient desire for wealth and advancement through patronage (see p.137). Horace's reply, in the form of a *recusatio* (12-15), tactfully asserts his poetic independence, while at the same time praising Octavian for his military qualities. This support for Octavian is motivated by Trebatius (10-12), who is also utilized to praise Octavian's "virtues of peace" (Muecke: *ad* 16).

Trebatius' second unsuccessful attempt to dissuade Horace from writing *satura* (21-3) prompts a long justification from Horace (24-60), which reinforces his *libertas* as a poet to write in his chosen genre. In this reply Horace first declares that writing *satura* is a "studium" (27) which brings him pleasure: "me pedibus delectat claudere verba | Lucili ritu" (28-9). Further, although he desires peace (43-4), if provoked he will defend himself with *satura*, his natural defensive weapon (44-6). He demonstrates an Epicurean awareness that indulging in his pleasure may lead to pain (57-9), but "quisquis erit vitae, scribam [saturam], color" (60).

This in turn motivates a stronger warning from Trebatius, with the suggestion that he could damage his relationship with his powerful friends: "O puer, ut sis | vitalis metuo et maiorum ne quis amicus | frigore te feriat" (60-2). The basic idea expressed here, 'of being given the cold shoulder', bears a striking similarity to a passage addressed to Trebatius at Cicero *Fam.* 7.10.2 (= 33SB): "valde metuo ne frigeas in hibernis", which Shackleton Bailey interprets as "with innuendo. *Frigere*, to be cold, often means have nothing to do or be coldly received ('a frost')" (2001a: 202 n.1).⁴ If this intertextuality is valid, it would reinforce the suitability of Trebatius' role in this poem, passing on the lessons of his experience as a client, and as an older man (cf. "O puer" (60)), functioning in a way somewhat analogous to Horace's father in 1.4, and foreshadowing the role of Horace himself in the poems of *Epist.* 1 (1.2, 1.3, 1.8, 1.17, 1.18) addressed to younger friends.

The example of Lucilius' relationship with Scipio and Laelius is used by Horace to refute Trebatius' concerns (62-70). There is, however, a crucial difference: Horace's relationship with Octavian and Maecenas is public and remote, unlike the

³ "Especially in the poetry of Lucilius and Horace, the satirist frequently refers to the figure of the *scurra*, at least in part to differentiate himself from a character whose resemblance to the satirist is too close for comfort" (Habinek 2005: 182).

⁴ Further examples of this metaphorical use of *frigere* are cited by Muecke (*ad* 2.1.62).

close, private friendship of Lucilius with Scipio and Laelius depicted in v.71-4 (Hardie 1990: 180). Horace refers explicitly to his more humble status vis-à-vis Lucilius: “quamvis | infra Lucili census ingeniumque” (74-5). The meaning of “census” is relatively straightforward, referring to Lucilius’ wealth and the senatorial rank of his family (Muecke: *ad* 75). The significance of “ingenium” is more problematical. It may have a similar connotation to an earlier reference to Lucilius: “nostrum melioris utroque” (29), and refer to him simply “as inventor of the genre” (Muecke: *ad* 29). On the other hand, “ingenium” is used a few lines earlier in the context of the nature of the *satura* which Lucilius used his talent to write:

num Laelius aut qui
duxit ab oppressa meritum Carthagine nomen
ingenio offensi aut laeso doluere Metello
famosisve Lupo cooperto versibus? (65-8)

If these two occurrences are linked, Horace could be stating that as a satirist he is both inferior to his predecessor in status, and in talent as a specifically aggressive satirist. There is the further implication that these two attributes are connected, in that his lower status precludes the writing of the type of *satura* Lucilius was permitted to write in the Republic. Horace’s assertion “me | cum magnis vixisse” (75-6) only partially compensates for the differential in status and talent.

Furthermore, the punning word-play of the final section (79-86) privileges the legal dimension and obfuscates the significance of “iudice ... Caesare” (84). Critics have tended to concentrate on the identification of the law cited by Trebatius (80-3), but if the literary dimension is considered “mala ... carmina” (82) could refer back to the negative criticisms of Horace’s “satira” (1-4) (Muecke 1995: 217-18). “Mala” is ambiguous, and covers both the ethical sense of verses which are *maledica* (cf. 1-2) and the aesthetic sense of badly written poetry (cf. 3-4). But if Horace’s “carmina” are “bona” (83), the adjective is again ambiguous and negates both grounds for criticism (Muecke *ibid.*: 218). There is, however, an element not contained in the opening verses: Horace’s poetry will be deemed “bona ... | iudice ... laudatus Caesare” (83-4). This is the third of three explicit references to Octavian in this poem (cf. 11, 19). The *libellus* as a whole contains five such references.⁵ The concentration of references in 2.1 suggest Horace’s awareness of “his [Octavian’s] desire and ability to oversee what

⁵ The other references are “Caesar” at 2.6.56, and the indirect “iuvenis Parthis horrendus” (2.5.62).

the poets say” (Muecke *ibid.*: 205 n.2). Commenting on the limits to freedom of speech permitted in Augustus’ principate, Feeney makes the following observation: “In the end, as with everything else in the principate, it was up to the *princeps*, in each particular case, to draw the line in the sand” (1992: 7-8). Regardless of whether Feeney is referring to a period strictly contemporaneous with *Serm.* 2.1, Horace does seem to be exhibiting an awareness of the need to exercise caution. The choice of Trebatius, a lawyer, as his interlocutor facilitates the inclusion of the legal material, which may have less relevance to Horace’s real concerns than the political dimension.

Speculating on the reasons for fewer names and the change to dialogue form in *Serm.* 2, Rudd considers that Horace “now enjoyed a position of esteem and security such as he had never known before” (1982a: 151). The above interpretation of 2.1 suggests that this is not quite the case, and that Horace demonstrates a certain degree of ambivalence with respect to his status as a client-poet. This resumes the negative aspect of his life in the *Urbs* as Maecenas’ client, first raised by the encounter with the *molestus* in 1.9 (see p.130). If, as is generally agreed, *Serm.* 2 was published in 30 BCE, then the poems are set in the period immediately post-Actium. Although Octavian had finally defeated Antony and Cleopatra with their deaths in 30, this does not mean that Horace and his contemporaries experienced the kind of idyllic peace implied by Rudd’s opinion cited above. As events in Iraq since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003 have shown, ‘regime change’, however desirable, is not necessarily instantaneous. There was no guarantee that other opposition to Octavian would not arise.

Evidence exists to support the view that the situation at the time of publication was far from one of certain peace and tranquillity. Marcus Lepidus, son of the former Triumvir, was involved in a plot to assassinate Octavian on his return to Rome in 29 BCE. This plot was discovered in advance by Maecenas, and Lepidus was put to death (Vell. 2.88; Syme 1939: 298; Pelling 1996: 62). Octavian was forced to return briefly to Italy at the end of 31 or early 30 to sort out problems with large numbers of veterans demanding land (cf. *Serm.* 2.6.55-6). This affair was successfully and peacefully resolved, but the spectre of Perugia still loomed large (Cass. Dio 51.4.6; Suet. *Aug.* 17.3; Syme *ibid.*: 304; Pelling *ibid.*: 61-2; Muecke: *ad* 2.6.55f.). Although Egypt and the East had been subdued, other dangers remained for Octavian from the provinces: “his own equals and rivals, the pro-consuls of the military provinces” (Syme *ibid.*: 302).

Octavian did not finally return to Rome until the summer of 29, adding to the uncertainty. Vergil's *Georgics* is thought to have been completed in 29 (Thomas 1998: 1), and therefore was written during a period when "it was more easy to witness and affirm the passing of the old order than to discern the manner and fashion of the new" (Syme *ibid.*: 255; cited by Thomas *ibid.*: n.2). The writing of *Serm.* 2 would be roughly contemporaneous. The conclusion to *G.* 1 (498-514) articulates the feelings of uncertainty and longing for peace and security (Thomas *ibid.*), in a more overtly political poem than Horace's *Sermones*. As Syme observes (*ibid.*: 304), enduring peace after Actium was dependent on Octavian alone. This finds expression in *G.* 1.500-2:

hunc saltem euerso iuuenem succurrere saeclo
ne prohibete! satis iam pridem sanguine nostro
Laomedontae luimus periuria Troiae.

The *pax Augusta* was "parta victoriis pax" (*RG* 13), and Vergil acknowledges the cost of victory in loss of life (*G.* 501-2). The simile with which Vergil concludes *G.* 1:

ut cum carceribus sese effudere quadrigae,
addunt in spatia, et frustra retinacula tendens
fertur equis auriga neque audit currus habenas. (512-14)

is very similar to that used by Horace at *Serm.* 1.1.114-16. Despite verbal similarities (Thomas *ibid.*: *ad* 512, 514), the connotations of the simile are different. For Horace it represents relentless competitive greed, whereas for Vergil it is the loss of control in a world consumed by war. The significance, if any, of this intertextuality remains obscure: Thomas makes no comment beyond noting Vergil's indebtedness to Horace.

At first sight Trebatius may seem to be a strange choice as interlocutor, but on closer examination he is seen to be eminently suitable, and able to perform a role which Maecenas could not. Above all, he was a survivor at a time when so many men, both senators and *equites*, had perished in battles and proscriptions. As an adviser to Horace, the client-poet, his advice carries the authority of experience. As intermediary between Horace and Octavian, Trebatius facilitates support for the latter, first of all by prompting the *recusatio* (10-15). He is also responsible for the first mention of Lucilius (17), in a context which associates Lucilius with Scipio, suggesting that if Horace and Lucilius are equated, then so are Octavian and Scipio, providing another indirect compliment to Octavian (Muecke: *ad* 17).

Trebatius' first word of advice to Horace, the ambiguous "Quiescas" (5) (Muecke: ad loc.), may have wider significance for the *libellus* as a whole. Trebatius was known to be an Epicurean, and the political connotations⁶ reinforce Horace's disavowal of political ambition in 1.6. The wider meaning of 'live unnoticed' can be seen as applicable to *Serm. 2*: throughout the *libellus* Horace endeavours to live his life unnoticed, although he is often thwarted by other demands.

A prerequisite for a satisfactory sequential reading of a *libellus* like *Serm. 2* is to identify connecting strands between the poems. These connections are not as obvious as those in *Serm. 1*, which helps to explain the preference for analyses which depend on patterned structures (see p.136). There is a feature of *Serm. 2* which functions to interrelate the first three poems: in most of the poems Horace is involved in a dialogue of sorts with a named character who is known to him. This device was initiated in 1.9, where the unnamed *molestus* was described as "quidam notus mihi nomine tantum" (3). Where it is not explicit in *Serm. 2*, familiarity is implied by informality of tone. Trebatius (2.1), Ofellus, the 'author' of the diatribe of 2.2, and Damasippus the interlocutor of 2.3, are all men older than Horace who have survived difficulties in their lives by various means, and with varying success with respect to independence. Trebatius can be assumed to have survived by maintaining a non-aligned stance to the political upheavals of the late Republic. His conversion to Epicureanism was no doubt instrumental in this. The survival strategies of Ofellus and Damasippus will be explored below.

Serm. 2.2

Like Trebatius, Ofellus is from the previous generation: "puer hunc ego parvus Ofellum | ... novi" (112-13). In the context of place, the actual setting of the poem has been the subject of debate. Both Palmer (1905: ad 7) and Lejay (1911: ad 7) favour a rural setting, specifically Ofellus' farm. Palmer (ibid.) cites and disagrees with Orelli who had preferred Rome, which more recently has again become the favoured location (Rudd² 1982a: 171; Muecke: 114). This division of opinion is prompted by details in the text: the designation of Ofellus as "rusticus" (3), and the explanation of

⁶ OLD, s.v. 'quiesco'^{4c}: "to abstain from politics, lead a quiet life." 'quiesco'^{4d}: "to take no part in a conflict, remain neutral."

how Horace came to know him (112-13). Probably the most satisfactory approach to the question of location is that of Kiessling-Heinze, for whom “hic” (7) refers to “in dieser einfachen Umgebung, und mit nüchternem Magen” (1959: ad loc.). In other words, the conditions of reception are more important than the actual physical location, although these particular conditions would be more easily attained in the country than in the city as depicted in this poem. It is reasonable to assume that the setting for 2.2 is the *Urbs*, as the city is the place from which most satire emanates. In *Serm.* 1, Horace clearly establishes the setting where it is not the *Urbs*, as in 1.5 and 1.7. The *Urbs* is perhaps the most likely location for extravagance, although *luxuria* was also a feature of *villae suburbanae* and *maritimae* (Dyson 2003: 13-35).

Philosophy also becomes important in 2.2, and this is directly related to place. Ofellus’ “sermo” (2) espouses traditional Italian “country values” (Muecke: 115), especially with respect to frugality (ibid.: 114). This touches on another area of debate: the question of whether or not Horace purports to quote Ofellus verbatim. Once again the commentators of the early twentieth century differ from the more recent. The former (for example, Palmer: ibid.) favour a verbatim transcript, consistent with their view of the setting (Rudd²: ibid.). This older interpretation entails considerable difficulty with the disjunction between the characterization of Ofellus and the nature of his “sermo”. A more satisfactory approach is to assume that Horace reproduces “quae praecepit Ofellus | rusticus” (2-3), but in his own words (K-H⁷ 1959: ad 1; Rudd²: ibid.; Muecke: 114).

This approach makes more plausible the fact that “Ofellus’s country values are transmitted in the terms of Hellenistic ethics” (Muecke: ad 3), but does not help to explain Horace’s distancing device: “nec meus hic sermo est” (2). The Greek antecedents of this formula are outlined by Muecke (ad 2). This lineage highlights the disjunction between Horace’s *auctor* and the presentation of his *praecepta*. It is this incongruity which provides the humour of the poem (Bond 1980: 121), and also contributes to its Protean nature, characteristic of the poems of *Serm.* 2. Most significantly, the expression of traditional Italian values in the language of Hellenistic ethics emphasizes the compatibility of these systems, at least as far as the selected elements are concerned.

There is nothing in the poem which is inconsistent with what Horace would have written *in propria persona*. It is possible that in the distancing of v.2 there is a connection with the end of 2.1, and the awareness of “iudex Caesar” (84). Even

though there is nothing in 2.2 which could give offence, Horace as client-poet is taking heed of Trebatius' warning (2.1.60-2) and protecting himself. 2.2 is the first poem of the *libellus* in which the bulk of the discourse is purported to be the words of another man. There are, however, passages in 2.1 where Horace utilizes the figure of Trebatius to raise topics that would be inappropriate in his own voice, for example, praise of Octavian (10-12, 16), and the warning of giving offence to the powerful cited above. Horace's apparent detachment from the content of the poems in *Serm.* 2 is possibly a more significant change from the poems of *Serm.* 1 than the transition to dialogue which is usually highlighted.

Ofellus' "sermo" satirizes the values of contemporary Rome with respect to food, and its protreptic aspect advocates the simple life from the perspective of traditional country values expressed in terms of Hellenistic ethics, mainly Epicurean (Muecke: 115). This marks the first appearance in *Serm.* 2 of food, a recurrent topic throughout the *libellus*. The theme: "vivere parco" (1) is reinforced by repetition (53, 70, 110). The "victus tenuis" (70) as a prerequisite for a *vita beata* has already been advocated in *Serm.* 1.1, and exemplified by Horace's own urban *otium* (1.6.111-31). It also formed part of his father's *praecepta*: "cum me hortaretur parce, frugaliter, atque | viverem uti contentus eo quod mi ipse parasset" (1.4.107-8). In view of the latter example it seems unlikely that Horace is satirizing Ofellus, as he does with Damasippus in 2.3 and Davus in 2.7 (*contra* Bond 1980: 113; Anderson 1982: 44). This point will be explored in more detail below.

The summary of the theoretical philosophical content of Ofellus' 'diatribe' presented below is heavily indebted to Muecke's commentary (116-29), which refers to the underlying philosophical concepts with relevant citation of primary sources. Ofellus advocates a simple diet in accordance with Epicurean natural and necessary desires (8-22). The perverse preference for luxurious, and unnecessary, foods is attributed in Epicurean terms to "empty opinion" (*ibid.*: ad 23-52). In this section the contrast between Ofellus as "rusticus" and the city as the site of the problem is exploited as "the glutton, ... is located in contemporary Rome" (*ibid.*). The section concludes with a slighting reference to "Romana iuventus" (52), an example perhaps of the perennial 'generation gap', but also denigrating the generation to which Horace himself presumably belonged. Muecke refers to 2.2 as being presented "from the perspective of the alienated city-dweller" (130), and the *Urbs/rus* contrast in this

section illustrates that alienation, a process which began in 1.9 and receives explicit treatment in 2.6.

The “*victus tenuis*” next becomes the mean between *sordes* and *luxuria* (53-69), a concept most commonly associated with the Peripatetics, but also compatible with Panaetius’ Stoicism. The final theoretical section (70-93) deals with the advantages of the simple life from an Epicurean perspective, with the erudite inclusion of Stoicism “influenced by Platonic-Pythagorean doctrine” (ibid.: *ad* 79). Flexibility is part of Ofellus’ philosophy, with the occasional enjoyment of more indulgent food (82-88).

The section from v.94-105, in particular v.102-5, is more difficult to reconcile with the philosophical argument up to this point. Muecke comments that “the social and civic consequences of ... prodigality” are “most un-Epicurean” (*ad* 94-111). The political dimension of this passage will be discussed below. The theoretical content of the diatribe then reverts to a concept directly relevant to Ofellus’ life: the ability to withstand a change in fortune (106-11). This leads into the final section (112-36) which provides a practical demonstration of the benefits of living the simple life advocated by Ofellus.

In this concluding section, Ofellus’ exemplary lifestyle intersects with his status. The introductory lines (112-15) succinctly locate Ofellus in time and place, as well as indicating his diminution in status: “*puer hunc ego parvus Ofellum | integris opibus novi non latius usum | quam nunc accisis*” (112-14). In 2.1 Horace established his birthplace as Venusia (34-35), presumably also the home of “Ofellus rusticus”. The actual details of how, when and where Ofellus suffered loss of his land are not as important as the fact that his adherence to a “modest and self-sufficient life ... has enabled him to take philosophically the reduction in his circumstances” (Muecke: 115). Ofellus’ *aequanimitas*⁷ in adverse circumstances exemplifies the fundamental concept expressed in v.107-11:

uterne
ad casus dubios fidet sibi certius? hic qui
pluribus assuerit mentem corpusque superbum,
an qui contentus parvo metuensque futuri

⁷ This word is being used as the Latin equivalent for Gk. *ataraxia* (*OLD*, s.v. ‘*aequanimitas*²’: “Calmness of mind, tranquillity, equanimity.”). It is used in this sense by Mayer (1994: 46). It seems preferable to *tranquillitas* (*animi*), being closer in form to Horace’s “*aequus animus*”.

in pace ut sapiens aptarit idonea bello?

Ofellus' status has been reduced from that of a "peasant proprietor" (Garnsey 1998: 137) to that of a tenant-farmer ("mercede colonus" (115)). A person who enjoys an extravagant lifestyle worries about how a reduction in circumstances may damage that lifestyle, but Ofellus by being "contentus parvo" (110) is free from that worry. "The greatest fruit of self-sufficiency is freedom" (Epicurus *Sent. Vat.* 77, tr. Bailey 1970: 119). When Ofellus occasionally indulges in more luxurious food (118-22) the enjoyment, because not habitual, is that much greater:

To grow accustomed therefore to simple and not luxurious diet gives us health to the full, and makes a man alert for the needful employments of life, and when after long intervals we approach luxuries disposes us better towards them, and fits us to be fearless of fortune. (Epicurus *Ep. Men.* 131, tr. Bailey 1970: 89)

The demonstration (112-36) that Ofellus lives the life advocated in his "sermo" functions to clarify the earlier ambiguous description: "rusticus, abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva" (3). Both "rusticus" and "crassa" can be interpreted as either positive/neutral or pejorative. Following Muecke, the preference here is for the former in both cases, with "rusticus" translated neutrally as "countryman", and "crassa Minerva" as "homespun wisdom" (*ad* 3). This is diametrically opposed to the interpretation in Robin Bond's (1980) article, in which the assessment of Ofellus is derived from v.1-6 (*ibid.*: 114-23), and both words have negative connotations, from a Stoic perspective (118-20). If the effectiveness of Ofellus' philosophy, as demonstrated at the end, is taken into consideration, he can be seen as a "magnum documentum" (1.4.110) (Muecke: 114), an *exemplum* of desirable behaviour of the type that Horace's father employed. Ofellus' self-sufficient life enabled him to survive extreme hardship with *aequanimitas*, and this entitles him to be designated "sapiens" (3, 111), albeit of an "abnormis" (3) kind. Although arguing from a totally different perspective, Bond's conclusion with respect to Ofellus as a survivor is essentially the same: "Ofellus' *mores* have enabled him to survive in an extremely dignified manner a considerable blow of fortune, namely the loss of his land" (*ibid.*: 126).

To return to the problem posed by v.102-5 (see p.146): the sentiments expressed in this passage cannot easily be accommodated to the overall philosophical content of Ofellus' diatribe. Morris (c.1968: *ad* 103-5) compares *Carm.* 2.15.18ff. and

3.6.2ff. The more overtly political context of the latter poem in particular suggests the possibility that these lines in *Serm.* 2.2 may be expressing support for the new regime. Kiessling-Heinze⁷ (1959: *ad* 103) refers to Agrippa's aedileship in 33 BCE as being during the time of writing. This appointment was an important component in the war of words between Octavian and Antony in the years leading up to Actium (Pelling 1996: 47). Triumphators from both sides restored buildings, especially temples, *ex manubiis* in the period 35-33, and Agrippa had begun work on improving the drainage system and water supply before his aedileship (Pelling: *ibid.*). This aedileship was extraordinary, both constitutionally and in its lavish generosity to the *populus*. There were "spectacular games, free distributions of salt and olive oil, free admission to the baths, and a scattering of vouchers in the theatre for clothing, money and other things" (*ibid.*: 47-8, summarizing Cass. Dio 49.42-3). Although the publication date for *Serm.* 2 of 30 BCE is later, this "astonishing aedileship" (Crook 1996: 82) could presumably be evoked by Horace's exhortation to euergetism. In the next poem Agrippa is named in the context of his generosity (Muecke: *ad* 2.3.185). As aedile he "undertook to act as intermediary between Octavian and the masses" (Reinhold 1965: 46). Magistrates in the Republic had traditionally provided games and other benefits for the *populus*: "Tradition consecrated the expenditure of war-booty for the benefit of the populace and the adornment of the city" (Syme 1939: 241), but Agrippa's unprecedented largesse, connected with neither a triumph nor a festival, could be employed as an indication of what could be expected from the new regime of Octavian: "It was, in effect, the beginning of the new régime" (Reinhold *ibid.*: 47). The munificence advocated in v.102-5 may not be strictly in accordance with Epicureanism, but it would not be incompatible with the *mos maiorum*. The presentation of philosophy in Ofellus' "sermo" has a political dimension by demonstrating that elements from the past will be preserved, together with innovations that are necessary for the future.

This passage is unique in being the only one in the *Sermones* where Horace overtly refers to public *officia* (Muecke: *ad* 101ff.). The euergetism that he advocates is in effect patronage writ large, and here he is showing an awareness of the needs of the *plebs urbana*, people below the level of the traditional patron-client relationship. These were people who potentially would benefit from the new regime: "The monarch was, inevitably, monarch of everybody" (Momigliano 1940: 80).

Like Trebatius in 2.1, Ofellus is a survivor from the previous generation. Trebatius, known from extratextual evidence to be an Epicurean, was an eminent

iurisconsultus who refrained from political involvement. Ofellus is a character invented by the poet to demonstrate the compatibility of traditional country values with Hellenistic, mainly Epicurean, ethics. By living a simple life consistent with his philosophy he was able to survive a reduction in status with his equanimity and freedom preserved.

The first two poems of *Serm.* 2 explore various aspects of *libertas*. In 2.1, it is *libertas* in the sense of the freedom of speech permitted to a writer of *satura* in the late thirties BCE. Horace is not directly involved in the discourse of 2.2, but he shows that he has heeded Trebatius' advice with respect to his *libertas dicendi* as a client-poet. By distancing himself from the content of the "sermo" (2), he is careful not to give offence to his *potentes amici*, responding to 2.1.60-62. Further, he includes some praise, albeit indirect, for Octavian and his close associates (102-5), in accordance with Trebatius' suggestion at 2.1.10-12. In 2.2 the "victus tenuis" exemplified by the life of Ofellus is shown to be the way to withstand adverse circumstances and preserve personal *libertas*, principally as expressed in terms of Epicurean ethics. The "sermo" of "Ofellus rusticus" associates the *rus* with a philosophy which facilitates *libertas* and the *vita beata*.

Serm. 2.3

There are both similarities and some considerable differences between this poem and its predecessors. Like Trebatius (2.1) and Ofellus (2.2), Damasippus (16) is known to Horace. That this can be assumed, and would have been obvious to Horace's contemporary audience, is indicated by the fact that as with Trebatius the dialogue begins *in medias res*. There is also no explanation of how Horace came to know him, as was necessary for the fictional Ofellus (2.2.112-13). As with Trebatius, there is extant extratextual evidence concerning Damasippus, although the text (18-26) supplies essential facts about his background.⁸ Like Ofellus, he has recently suffered a reversal of fortune, with the collapse of his business (18-19). Unlike Ofellus whose philosophy rendered him "fearless of fortune" (Epicurus *Ep. Men.* 131,

⁸ The evidence about Damasippus' occupation is contained in a few of Cicero's letters: as a dealer in antique statues (*Fam.* 7.23.2-3; cf. *Serm.* 2.3.20-3), and as a real estate agent (*Att.* 12.29.2, 12.33.1; cf. *Serm.* 2.3.24-6), all letters dated to 46-45 BCE. From other evidence it has been deduced that he was from a senatorial background (Treggiari 1973: 260).

tr. Bailey 1970: 89), Damasippus had no personal philosophy to enable him to withstand misfortune. This resulted in his near-suicide (36-8). Another major difference is that his rescue by Stertinius (33) led to his zealous conversion to Stoicism. Once more Horace distances himself from the content of the *sermo*. In this poem he adds an extra layer, with his interlocutor Damasippus quoting the Stoic preacher Stertinius.

The setting of 2.3 is Horace's country villa (10). This is the only poem in the *libellus* unequivocally set in the *rus*. At the time of the Saturnalia (5), Damasippus intrudes on Horace's *otium litteratum* "bringing with him the city's discontents" (Muecke: 130). The negative connotations of the *Urbs* are established by reference to the site of Damasippus' business collapse as "Ianum | ad Medium" (18-19), and jumping from the "Pons Fabricius" (36) as his chosen method of suicide. In addition, Damasippus' occupation (20-6) identifies him as an urban type. Consequently, the basic situation in 2.3 is the reverse of that in 2.2, with philosophy from the city presented in a rural setting.

The relevance of the timing of this *sermo* at the Saturnalia has not been discussed to the same extent as for 2.7. In the case of the latter, the character of the slave Davus obviously highlights the concept of *libertas* associated with the festival. It is possible to invoke the same concept for Damasippus. He can be seen to abuse the *libertas* of the Saturnalia, first of all by intruding on Horace's *otium litteratum*. There is considerable irony in the fact that he slavishly imitates, and at great length (82-295), the diatribe of Stertinius on the Stoic paradox: *Omnem stultum insanire*, even including the preamble verbatim (41-81). Like the dinner guest criticized at *Serm.* 1.4.86-91, he abuses his *libertas dicendi* by insulting Horace, his host (307-23). Ofellus' philosophy facilitated the preservation of his *libertas*, Damasippus' uncritical adoption of Stoicism has resulted in the abuse of *libertas*, and a lack of *communis sensus*. In this respect he resembles the *molestus* of 1.9. There is one important difference, however, in the way Horace reacts to the situation. In 1.9 he envied the quick temper of one Bolanus (1.9.11-12), here in 2.3 he does get angry with Damasippus (323-6), indicating that the invasion of his rural *otium litteratum* is more difficult to tolerate with equanimity than being pestered in the city.

The philosophical content of Stertinius' diatribe as narrated by Damasippus has been discussed in detail by Bond (1998), with the conclusion that "the Stoic detail of the sermon is convincing" (ibid.: 107). The follies of mankind attacked: *avaritia*

(82-157), ambition (158-223), *luxuria* (224-46), love (247-80), and superstition (281-95), have all except the last topic been treated by Horace in earlier poems, but not from a Stoic perspective. Although Horace is not satirizing Stoic philosophy per se, he is critical of “the extremism of the doctrine, ... and the extremism of expression” (Bond 1987: 16) of Stertinius’ lecture.

The section on *luxuria* (224-46) is of particular interest in the context of place: it contains allusions to locations in Rome and to urban types. It also contributes to the continuity of the *libellus* by complementing Ofellus’ *praecepta* from 2.2. The *exempla* of Nomentanus (224-38)⁹ and the “Quinti progenies Arri” (243-6) both focus on *luxuria* with respect to extravagant food, an obvious connection with 2.2. The “turba impia” (228) of v.227-8 are all purveyors of items, mostly food, which the self-sufficient “Ofellus rusticus” would not need or want. The “Vicus Tuscus” (228) contained a variety of shops, perhaps specializing in expensive clothing (Richardson 1992: 429), while the “Velabrum” (229) was the location of a busy food market (ibid.: 406). With these references, the Stoic Stertinius identifies the city as the source of extravagant food, just as Ofellus did from the perspective of traditional country values and Epicureanism (see p.145).¹⁰ Further, Ofellus singles out for special criticism attitudes towards fish (2.2.31-40, 120) and bore (2.2.41-43, 89-93), and it is the suppliers of these items who are the first two recipients of Nomentanus’ largesse (234-7).

Stertinius’ Stoic attack on *luxuria* demonstrates the area of overlap between Stoicism and Epicureanism with respect to the consumption of extravagant food. In addition, it supplements as well as reinforcing Ofellus’ *praecepta*. Muecke observes

⁹ For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that “hic” (226) refers to Nomentanus (Muecke: *ad* 2.3.225).

¹⁰ The question of convergence of the teachings of the various philosophical schools by the end of the first century BCE is a topic relevant to the ethical content of Horace’s hexameter corpus. In connection with the section on sexual passion (247-80), Bond (1998: 100) comments on the compatibility between Stoicism and the *mos maiorum* on this topic, while Muecke (*ad* 247-80) cites, among others, Lucr. 4.1068-72. The section on superstition (281-95) is even more striking in its similarity to Epicureanism (Bond *ibid.*: 103-4). It is not relevant to this thesis, but it would be interesting to investigate at a later date all the philosophical content of 2.3 to determine the extent of the overlap. When Horace is speaking *in propria persona*, it is expected that the philosophical content will not be restricted to one school. But in 2.3 the philosophy is supposed to be Stertinius’ Stoicism, regurgitated by Damasippus.

that Nomentanus “seems to be someone who seeks to gain popularity from misplaced generosity” (*ad* 225). It has also been noted that some of the language used in this passage conveys the impression of a public meeting (Muecke: *ad* 227, 230, 231; Bond 1998: 96-8). Taken together these observations would suggest that Nomentanus is using his excess wealth to buy political support. This comments, cynically, on Ofellus’ exhortation to use money to aid ‘the deserving poor’ or the State (2.2.102-5). Neither the “*impia turba*” (228) nor the “*scurrae*” (229) would qualify as ‘the deserving poor’, but the reality is that in the *Urbs* surplus wealth is used for this corrupt purpose rather than Ofellus’ more worthy, but perhaps overly idealistic, recommendations.

The remaining named city location in the poem, the “Circus [Maximus]” (183) also occurs in the context of political ambition, specifically the cost of gaining office (182-6; cf. *Serm.* 1.6.100-4). Largesse to the *populus*, here in the form of the legumes (182), the staple diet of the *plebs urbana*, is cited as waste of patrimony (184) in order to acquire the honours and acclaim that accompany political office. Agrippa is named (185), and alluded to with the mention of a bronze statue (183) (Muecke: *ad loc.*). The references to Agrippa would invoke memories of his aedileship in 33 BCE (see p.148), and are presumably complimentary. It must be borne in mind in assessing the political dimension that the speaker is Stertinius via Damasippus, and not Horace *in propria persona*.

Status is not a prominent feature in 2.3, but does appear in incidental ways that are nevertheless revealing. According to his own testimony (20-6), Damasippus before his bankruptcy was held in high regard as a successful dealer, especially in “*hortos egregiasque domos*” (24). Given that his business failed, this has to be seen as rather dubious. But that proviso notwithstanding, he presumably would have enjoyed higher status than the market traders of v.227-8. There may be an element of irony in Stertinius’ diatribe here, in that the “*turba impia*” seem to have fared much better than Damasippus. Be that as it may, it is ironic that Damasippus with his reduced status is taking care of “*aliena negotia*” (19). Instead of employing his newly acquired philosophy to improve his own life, he uses it as an excuse to intrude on Horace’s *otium* and impede the *aequanimitas* which he exhorts (16). Furthermore, through his insensitivity and incompetence he is shown to be a failure at this enterprise too (Bond 1998: 106-7).

The mention of Maecenas (312) by Damasippus raises the question of Horace's client status. In the concluding dialogue Damasippus, as an incompetent novice Stoic, falsely accuses Horace of just about all the faults attacked in the Stertinian lecture (Bond: *ibid.*). The principal accusation is that he is ambitiously competing with Maecenas, especially in building (307-13). If this were true, it would indeed be a breach of the Stoic principle of *decorum* (Muecke: *ad* 307-20), but elsewhere (for example in *Serm.* 1.3, 1.5, and 1.6) Horace has shown himself to be very sensitive to the importance of appropriate behaviour towards his patron. This accusation does, however, also function as another example of how Horace's relationship with Maecenas is misunderstood (Muecke: *ibid.*). The urban *molestus* of *Serm.* 1.9 displayed a similar attitude. In 2.3 Damasippus has invaded Horace's rural *otium litteratum* bringing with him those perverse urban opinions.

Serm. 2.4

This poem is set "back in Rome" (Muecke: 166). Status is not relevant for either Horace or Catius, the protagonist. The identity of Catius has been much debated (for example, Wickham 1891: 160-1; Treggiari 1973: 259-60; Classen 1978: 344-7; Muecke: 167-8). The most likely candidate is probably T. Catius, referred to in a letter from Cicero to C. Cassius (*Fam.* 15.16.1) as an Epicurean, specifically in connection with sense-perception, with no mention of food. Classen argues strongly for this identification, and refutes all the objections raised against T. Catius (*ibid.*: 346). As convincing as his argument may seem, it remains difficult to accept because Horace's text does not supply enough evidence to substantiate it. The framing dialogues (1-11, 88-95) give no real clues to Horace's attitude to or relationship with his interlocutor, as in the corresponding sections of 2.1 and 2.3. That both Trebatius and Damasippus also featured in Cicero's correspondence would make the identification of T. Catius satisfying, but all that can be said with any certainty is that "it can hardly be a name which carried no associations [for Horace's contemporary audience], for the drama would lack point" (Wickham *ibid.*: 160). The lack of secure information about Catius, both in and outside the text does problematize interpretation to a degree that is exceptional in Horace's corpus: "To assess the tone and intention of this work is unusually difficult" (Coffey² 1989: 85).

The development of a philosophical ambience (1-11) (Muecke: 168-9 *passim*) leads to expectations about the "nova praecepta" (2) of Catius' teacher, which are

humorously deflated with the mention of “ova” (12). The target of Horace’s attack in 2.4 is not Epicurean philosophy itself, but “misunderstandings and misrepresentations of Epicurus’ teaching” (Muecke: 167). As in 2.3, the *Urbs* is shown to be the source of the misuse of philosophy, and of extreme modes of thinking. Catus’ teacher has applied the techniques of genuine philosophy to the relatively trivial matter of gastronomy. The types of food referred to in the *praecepta* are not as extravagant or expensive as those criticized by Ofellus (2.2.8-52), or by Damasippus/Stertinus (2.3.227-35, 244-6). Moreover, with a few exceptions, all the foods specified are of Italian origin, not expensive imports.¹¹ Nevertheless they are not the basic foodstuffs of a subsistence diet, or even the slightly more elevated ingredients of Ofellus’ ‘special’ meals (2.2.120-2) (Classen 1978: 343; Rudd² 1982a: 212). The criticism is directed at the obsession with the purchasing, preparation and presentation of food, and the misapprehension that this is the way to happiness (Classen: *ibid.*), as indicated by Horace’s allusion, *in propria persona*, to Lucretius (1.927-8) and the “*vita beata*” (94-5).

Neither Catus nor presumably his teacher can be seen as self-sufficient as exemplified by Ofellus (2.2.116-36). Therefore, in Epicurean terms they cannot enjoy true freedom: *aequanimitas*. Catus has been shown to be enslaved by his enthusiasm for the “*nova praecepta*”, and to lack independent thought by regurgitating from memory a verbatim account, even including an inappropriate first-person pronoun (46): “The acolyte has surrendered his identity” (Rudd² 1982a: 212).

In 2.4 Horace has used Catus, whatever his identity, to present a parroted version of perverted Epicurean ethics in an urban setting. In 2.3 Damasippus from the city invaded the poet’s rural *otium litteratum* with an unsolicited, also parroted, diatribe on the Stoic paradox *Omnem stultum insanire*, displaying extremism and insensitivity both in doctrine and expression. Both protagonists revealed themselves to be lacking in self-sufficiency, and hence freedom, when compared to “Ofellus rusticus” in 2.2. His philosophy, an original blend of traditional country values and genuine Epicureanism, enabled him to live a life independent of Fortune.

The lack of ‘local knowledge’ about Catus frustratingly impedes interpretation of this poem. The implication that he has mistakenly believed that

¹¹ The non-indigenous foods are “*Afra* | ... *coclea*” (58-9); “*Byzantia* ... *orca*” (66), and “*Corycius crocus*” (68).

gastronomy is the way to the *vita beata* has no resolution in Horace's text: there are no indications as to his state of mind apart from his zealous enthusiasm for the "nova praecepta". The unstructured nature of his 'lecture', which "seems to jump from precept to precept in a rather random fashion" (Muecke: 168), may be a comment on the 'real Catus', or his equally unknown teacher. While it is generally undesirable to rely on extra-textual knowledge for interpretation, in this case the lack of textual evidence highlights how useful it can be, and perhaps how it is used, unconsciously, in many instances. 2.4 is a rare example of a poem which to some extent runs counter to Rudd's observation "that with Horace, as opposed to many of the eighteenth-century [English] satirists, our ignorance concerning a name rarely if ever makes a passage unintelligible" (1982a: 150).

Serm. 2.5

Like *Serm. 1.7*, 2.5 is the only poem in the *libellus* with a setting distant in place and time from Horace's contemporary Rome, being set in the Homeric Underworld of *Od. 11*. The theme, however, is depicted as a current problem in Roman society: *captatio* ("capes | ... testamenta senum" (23-4), "captator" (57)). The protagonists and the contemporary relevance are concisely identified in the opening lines. The explicit "Teresia" (1), and "doloso | ... Ithacam revehi" (3-4) indicating Ulysses, identify the context as the Homeric *Nekuia*. At the same time, Roman details are introduced with the metonymic "patriosque Penates" (4) (Muecke: ad loc.). By contrast with 2.4, the tone of 2.5 is easier to gauge: "acid and cynical throughout" (Fraenkel 1957a: 145). The poem is a scathing attack on "the perversion of values in the contemporary Roman world" (Muecke: ad 1-22). The accumulation of Romanizing details,¹² reinforced by the disjunction between the setting and content of the poem, locates *captatio* as an undesirable practice in the city: "The poem is firmly rooted in the social life of Rome" (Rudd² 1982a: 232).

As Horace is totally absent from 2.5 his personal status is not relevant, but status in general is an essential element in Teiresias' *ars captatoria*, linked to the

¹² Other Roman details are: "vate" (6); "Larem ... Lare" (14); "augur" (22); "Foro ... res certabitur" (27); "Quinte ... Publi" (32); the technical legal term "cognitor" (38); the allusion to a Roman poet "Furius" (41); the allusion to Octavian (62-4), "tam fortem tamque fidelem" (102): "epitomising the highest Roman ideals" (Muecke: ad 101f.).

central theme: the betrayal of traditional Roman values. ‘Betrayal’ is a concept more easily associated with the *satira* of Juvenal than Horace, and there has been ongoing debate about the Juvenalian nature of 2.5, focusing mainly on “the spirit of this Satire” (Sellar 1892: 70). Sellar’s opinion that 2.5 is Juvenalian was endorsed by Fraenkel (*ibid.*: 144-5), but rebutted by Rudd (1982a: 240-2) and Coffey (1989: 87). An argument which seeks middle ground on this issue is provided by Roberts (1984).

To return to status: Ulysses asks for advice from Teiresias on how to restore his lost wealth (1-3) because “et genus et virtus nisi cum re vilior alga est” (8). This is a restatement of “quia tanti quantum habeas sis” (*Serm.* 1.1.62), which in turn was derived from Lucilius (1194-5W) (see p.105). “Pauperies” (9), to be interpreted as synonymous with living a “victus tenuis” (cf. Ofellus 2.2.116-36) rather than with “indigence or destitution” (Muecke: *ad loc.*), was traditionally an honourable state, but now it is to be feared and avoided. One of the recommended remedies is for Ulysses to behave in a servile way to one Dama, presumably a rich freedman (18-19). The military hero possessing “et genus et virtus” (8) is prepared to exhibit behaviour which “amounts to a public display of inferior status” (Muecke: *ad* 17) with a former slave for the sake of obtaining money (20-1).

This inversion of values is reinforced at the end of the poem where Ulysses is being advised on appropriate, servile, behaviour in the presence of the *captandus*: “Davus sis comicus” (91), “obsequio grassare” (93). Finally, *captatio* is revealed explicitly for what it really is: “servitium longum” (99), reminiscent of Cicero’s “conditionem ... durissimae servitutis” of *captatio* (*Parad.* 39) (Muecke: *ad* 99). As with the slavish, uncritical adoption of Stoic philosophy in 2.3 and the *praecepta* of gastronomy in 2.4, the aberrant behaviour perversely recommended to Ulysses in 2.5 leads to a loss of *libertas*.

Captatio is also a betrayal of traditional values as an abuse of *amicitia*: “*Captatio* is merely *amicitia* viewed in a negative light; indeed it springs from the very wide Roman notion of friendship, with its particular emphasis on the exchange of *beneficia*” (Champlin 1989: 212, cited by Muecke, 178; Roberts 1984: 432-3). Words and concepts associated with friendship are scattered through the poem: “amicum” (33); “amicis” (43); “sodalis” (101), and the traditional “social mechanism ... of the ‘recommendation’” (Muecke: *ad* 72), all in contexts of cynical manipulation.

Teiresias advises Ulysses to ingratiate himself with a man “locuples sine gnatis”, however reprehensible his character (28-9), by representing him in a lawsuit (27-44). Traditionally, receiving legacies in return for legal services rendered was entirely honourable. Cicero is openly proud of the amount he received in this way: “ego enim amplius sestertium ducentiens acceptum hereditatibus rettuli”, but with a crucial proviso: “me nemo nisi amicus fecit heredem” (*Phil.* 2.40).¹³ Underlying this is another problem arising from the Roman concept of reciprocal *beneficia*. By its very nature a legacy had to be in return for services already rendered (Champlin *ibid.*: 200). Consequently, attentive behaviour towards a “locuples sine gnatis” could be that of a *captator* or a true *amicus*. Misapprehensions could easily arise, just as with a patron-client relationship the client’s behaviour could be misunderstood as that of a *scurra*, a problem which Horace himself faces with Davus (2.7.29-42). Superficially, 2.5 is a condemnation of the abuse of *amicitia* in the specific context of *captatio*, but at a deeper level Horace is exposing fundamental difficulties with accepted traditional forms of behaviour which are prone to misunderstandings leading to conflict.

In this poem the level of distancing by Horace from the content is unparalleled. In the other poems where the satirist’s *persona* is absent, *Serm.* 1.7 and 1.8, there are easily discernible connections with Horace. In both poems the time and place provide at least indirect associations. In presenting amoral advice to Ulysses Teiresias is “condemned by his own words” (Roberts 1984: 433), consistent with the protagonists of 2.3, 2.4, and 2.7. As there would be little likelihood of Horace’s audience disagreeing with this condemnation (*ibid.*: 432), the extreme distancing does seem unmotivated. It could be a manifestation of *varietas*, or it could have political connotations.

Teiresias, in appropriate oracular style, makes an unmistakable reference to Octavian, victorious after Actium (62-4). Once again overt praise of Octavian is not expressed by Horace *in propria persona*. Teiresias’ prophecy is the mechanism for

¹³ Cicero continues with an accusation of *captatio* against Antony with respect to L. Rubrius Casinas, who made Antony his heir despite never having met him, thereby disinheriting a nephew and close friend who Rubrius had publicly declared to be his heirs (*Phil.* 2.40-1). This type of behaviour ran totally counter to traditional expectations concerning wills on the part of the testator as well as the *captator* (Champlin 1989: 210). Champlin’s article provides valuable insights into Roman attitudes to wills, attitudes which were markedly different to our own in their fundamental importance to Roman society.

locating the time, in contemporary Rome, with the anecdote of Nasica and Coranus (64-9), an example of behaviour which subverts the expected norms for testators. Allusion to Octavian in the context of this betrayal of traditional values might well evoke memories of a recent incident: “the seizing and [public] reading [by Octavian] of Antony’s will in 31 B.C.” (Champlin 1989: 202), as a component of the pre-Actium war of words. Although this was a flagrant breach of protocol, Octavian was exonerated because the content of Antony’s will proved that his wishes were even more unRoman (ibid., and references there). Allusion by Horace to Octavian’s action could be construed as implied criticism and could cause offence. By distancing himself from this potential connection, Horace can be seen to be heeding the warning of Trebatius (2.1.60-2), having just complied with his other prescription: “aude | Caesaris invicti res dicere” (2.1.10-11). Horace’s strategy here is ambiguous. He could be playfully suggesting that his allusion might be thought to be dangerous, but Octavian is broad-minded enough to allow it, and by this device he is in fact praising him for that quality. Alternatively he could be indicating that caution is needed and any possible offence must be shielded by Protean ambiguity, thereby commenting obliquely on the restricted *libertas dicendi* of the satirist.

The behaviour exemplified in the anecdote of Nasica and Coranus (64-9) demonstrates that the *captandus* should not necessarily be viewed as a victim (Champlin ibid.: 212). Both *captator* and *captandus* are equally deceitful and manipulative, and both are equally guilty of betraying the traditional Roman values of *amicitia*, in particular “the security derived from the mutual exchange of benefits by friends” (ibid.). Viewed from this perspective, it is possible that any indirect criticism is aimed at both Octavian and Antony, both had betrayed traditional Roman standards of behaviour. On a more general level, the breakdown of the time-honoured conventions of mutual trust and exchange of *beneficia* between *amici* represents a social manifestation of civil war. Teiresias’ *ars captatoria* with its cynical and amoral *praecepta* leads to an overwhelming and atypical sense of pessimism.

Serm. 2.6

A sequential reading reveals a striking contrast in tone moving from the cynical pessimism of the Homeric Underworld in 2.5 to the warmth of Horace’s

opening prayer of gratitude to Maecenas¹⁴ (2.6.1-15) for his “modus agri” (1) in the Italian countryside. Horace’s Sabine farm has become a very familiar concept, but at this stage in the *libellus* it has not yet been identified as such: it was a welcoming “tepidus villula tecto” (2.3.10), and is eventually specified as “ager Sabinus” (2.7.118). The presence of Horace *in propria persona* for the majority of the poem is another major difference between 2.6 and its predecessor, and most of the poems of *Serm.* 2.¹⁵ This could be one reason why 2.6, unlike the rest of the *libellus* except 2.1, has received positive critical attention.¹⁶ Previous discussions have concentrated mainly on 2.6 in isolation, consequently the emphasis here will be on the major themes of place and status, and on the ways in which the poem relates to others in the *libellus*, and how it functions to clarify the ambivalence of some earlier poems.

It is a commonplace that 2.6 focuses on the *Urbs/rus* antithesis. Paradoxically for a poem in which place is such an important feature the setting is not straightforward. The content of the discourse alternates between the *rus* and the *Urbs*, but “there is no fixed location” (Muecke: 196).¹⁷ In connection with this there is a bewildering tendency for the majority of translators surveyed to read “now”, presumably for “ubi” (16).¹⁸ This results in translations such as Rudd’s: “Well then, now that I’ve left town [*sic*] for my castle in the hills” (1997: 114), strongly suggesting that the setting is the country. Indeed, elsewhere Rudd explicitly states with reference to v.59f. that “Horace, who is writing in the country, is thinking of himself in Rome thinking of the country” (1982a: 245). Although it is very tempting to situate Horace in the country, the evidence of the text does not support this interpretation.

¹⁴ The question of why Maecenas is addressed as “Maia nate” (5) is discussed in detail by Bond (1985: 69-74).

¹⁵ “Horace interrompt la série des satires dialoguées et s’adresse directement aux lecteurs” (Lejay 1911: 512).

¹⁶ Fraenkel (1957a: 138-44); Brink (1965); West (1974); Rudd² (1982a: 243-57); Anderson (1984: 112-14); Bond (1985); Braund (1989b: 39-44); Muecke (1993: 193-6).

¹⁷ Following Muecke (196-212), 2.6 can be divided into sections as follows: 1-15 *rus*; 16-39 *Urbs* (Horace going to Maecenas); 40-58 *Urbs* (about his relationship with Maecenas); 59-79 *rus*; 79-117 fable of the mice, *rus* and *Urbs*.

¹⁸ Fairclough (1929: 211); Fuchs (1977: 40); Rudd (1997: 114); Braund (1989b: 40); Alexander (1999: 293). The exceptions, reading “when” are Muecke (1993: 75), and Beaumont ([1629], In Carne-Ross, D.S. and Haynes, K. (1996) (eds.): 322).

The lack of a specified location represents the dilemma faced by Horace, a dilemma that is closely connected with his status as client of Maecenas. Ideally Horace would like to enjoy *otium* at his Sabine farm (16-17, 60-76), and the expression of this in the poem is a way of showing gratitude to his patron (Muecke: 194). However, the reality is that as Maecenas' client he is obliged to undertake "officia" (24) in Rome, which are uncongenial (20-39). Although his duties in Rome do involve meetings with Maecenas which are a source of pleasure (30-2), misunderstandings with respect to their relationship are a further cause of anxiety (40-58). The *Urbs/rus* antithesis is mirrored by that of reality/ideal: without the reality of urban "officia" there would be no ideal rural *otium* (Muecke: 195). Times have changed since the urban *vita beata* (1.6.111-31).

In 2.6. the *rus*, more specifically the Sabine farm, is associated with values that recur in Horace's later poetry (Muecke: *ibid.*; Williams 1972: 16). In this respect, the insights of Champlin's discussion (1982) of the phenomenon of the *suburbium* have some relevance. In reality, *suburbium* refers to the geographical area "of the modern Roman Campagna" (Champlin *ibid.*: 98), but it functions in literature more as "an idea, more a matter of shared attitudes than of location" (*ibid.*: 99). The word "rus" will continue to be used here, both for the sake of convenience and because Horace himself uses it (2.6.60). Nevertheless the concept of the *suburbium* more accurately conveys the idealized nature of the Sabine farm.

Champlin associates the *suburbium* with three attributes: *salubritas*, *otium*, and *amoenitas* (*ibid.*: 100). Of these, *amoenitas* is not immediately relevant,¹⁹ while others need to be added to comprehensively capture the rural values Horace reveals in 2.6. One that can be added is *perfugium* in the sense of "A place of refuge, shelter, sanctuary" (*OLD*, s.v. 'perfugium¹'). This is suggested by advice from Cicero to Trebatius in a letter of July 44 when Cicero was visiting Trebatius' home-town of Velia in Lucania. He advises Trebatius not to sell his villa there on the grounds that "in primis opportunum videtur, his praesertim temporibus, habere perfugium, ... , eaque remoto, salubri, amoeno loco" (*Fam.* 7.20.2). *Perfugium* is represented in 2.6 by Horace's description of the Sabine farm as "my mountain citadel" (16; tr. Muecke: 75), and by association the "tutus ab insidiis" (117) of the country mouse's burrow.

¹⁹ The *Sabinum* is described in terms of a *locus amoenus* at *Epist.* 1.10.6-7; 1.14.20, and 1.16.15.

Another essential concept associated with the Sabine farm is suggested by “modus agri non ita magnus” (1), namely moderation (4, 6, 8-13), and the *victus tenuis* (63-4, 82-9). This moderation of desires is the Epicurean restriction of desires to what is natural and necessary (Epicurus *Ep. Men.* 127-8), which enables self-sufficiency and hence true freedom. The positive connotations of the *victus tenuis* in 2.6 function as a corrective to the greed in Teiresias’ *ars captatoria* in 2.5, and also clarify the assessment of the lifestyle of “Ofellus rusticus” (2.2). Both Ofellus and the “rusticus mus” (80) lead true Epicurean self-sufficient lives which protect them against hardships, as the “rusticus mus” expresses it: “me silva cavusque | tutus ab insidiis tenui solabitur ervo” (116-17), bringing together the concepts of *perfugium* and the *victus tenuis*. This is not the lifestyle of the “urbanus mus” (101-11), who is depicted as a *scurra* dependent on the leavings of others for which he competes with other *scurrae*, the dangerous Molossian hounds (113-15). As with Catus and his mentor in 2.4, the pseudo-Epicureanism of the “urbanus mus” does not facilitate the *vita beata* enjoyed by Ofellus and the “rusticus mus”, and desired by Horace.

Champlin’s *salubritas* is expressed by contrast with the unhealthy *Urbs*: “nec plumbeus Auster | autumnusque gravis, Libitinae quaestus acerbae” (18-19). This aspect of the Sabine farm acquires greater prominence in *Epist.* 1. The other relevant concept from Champlin, *otium*, appears as *otium litteratum*, already associated with the *rus* in 2.3, where it was disrupted by the intrusion of the urban Damasippus (see p.150). In 2.6. it is represented by Horace’s writing of poetry, specifically *satura* (17), reading (61), and meaningful philosophical conversation after a simple meal (71-6). One of the topics of this conversation is “amicitia” (75), another essential element for Horace’s *suburbium*.

The dinner party (65-76) functions to associate the *rus* with another positive value: equality, especially with respect to “amicitia”. Unlike the Greek *symposion*, the Roman *cena* reflected the hierarchical nature of society and “the principle of equality among participants was not always observed.” (D’Arms 1990: 312). However, if in a description of a *cena* the food and surroundings are subordinate to the enjoyment of social interaction, then “we are intended to imagine a socially egalitarian setting” (D’Arms *ibid.*: 318). D’Arms cites the passage under discussion as an example (*ibid.*: 319 n.74). Although Horace does not refer explicitly to the equality of the diners, it can at least be said that status differences, if any, are not important. Equality, or its opposite, as a topic is prominent in 2.7 and the urban “Nasidieni cena” of 2.8.

Horace's Sabine farm therefore symbolizes moderation and the *victus tenuis*, safety from danger (*per fugium*), *salubritas*, *otium* especially *litteratum*, and *amicitia* between equals. In combination these concepts facilitate a lifestyle that provides true Epicurean freedom from care: *aequanimitas*, represented in *Serm.* 2 by Ofellus (2.2) and the "rusticus mus" of 2.6. Horace himself had been able to lead a similar life in Rome (1.6.111-31) (Muecke: 194), but now the *Urbs* represents more disadvantages and prevents Horace from 'living unnoticed'. The pressures of urban *officia* (20-39) outweigh the only advantage, the pleasure of Maecenas' company (31-2). Moreover, the misconception that Horace is privy to state business involves him in questions of current political concerns (40-58). All this amounts to a "sollicita vita" (62). The disadvantages of urban life for Horace can be encapsulated by one concept: *sollicitudo*: "Disquiet of mind, anxiety, uneasiness" (*OLD*, s.v. 'sollicitudo'¹), the antithesis of Epicurean *aequanimitas*. A scholion on "cenaque deum" (65) explains the phrase thus: "Cenas dixit deorum [securiores], quae sine sollicitudine sunt" (Ps.-Acro: ad loc.). The Sabine farm is a refuge from the *sollicitudo* of the *Urbs*.²⁰

It has to be acknowledged that without the disadvantages of Horace's urban obligations he would not have anything to complain about — or satirize. With respect to place, this poem exhibits a dilemma for Horace: the *Urbs* does offer the chance for him to enjoy Maecenas' company, and furthermore without Maecenas there would be no Sabine farm. This is obviously a problem for which there can be no easy resolution.²¹

Serm. 2.7

In 2.7 Horace moves from the ideal of rural *aequanimitas* to the reality of urban *sollicitudo*. The setting is not confirmed until the very last line with the threat to send Davus to the Sabine farm (118). However, it is clear from Horace's first response to Davus' 'lecture' (21-2) that, whatever the setting, the mood of the poem is not rural tranquillity. This is another poem set at the time of the Saturnalia ("libertas Decembri" (4)), and Davus, a "servus" (1) and Stoic neophyte, is taking advantage of the temporary equality afforded by the festival to act, ironically, as a "*liber amicus*"

²⁰ Expressing a somewhat different interpretation, Armstrong in a brief discussion of 2.6 refers to "Horace's exhausting but pleasurable business life in Rome" (1989: 49).

²¹ Horace returns to this dilemma in several of the poems in *Epist.* 1, to be discussed in ch.5.

(Muecke: 212) to Horace and deliver some advice on the theme of the Stoic paradox: *Solum sapientem esse liberum et omnem stultum servum*. The conventions of the Saturnalia may have granted Davus equality with respect to *libertas dicendi*, but he is shown not to be Horace's intellectual equal. His *sermo* abounds in misunderstandings of Stoic doctrine, and of Horace's morals. An early indication of his incompetence (18-20) undercuts his credibility (Bond 1978: 86), and identifies him as an unreliable authority (ibid.: 91).²² This is hardly surprising as Davus reveals that his source was "Crispini ... ianitor" (45), also a slave (Muecke: ad loc.).

Status, with respect to Davus as a slave, and Horace's status relative to those both above and below him in the social hierarchy, is a prominent element in 2.7. "Servus" (1) immediately identifies Davus' status, even before the first mention of his comic slave name (2), the first of several reminders of his status. The name itself is repeated (46, 100), and the abusive "furcifer" and "pessime" (22) from comedy are further reminders. There are allusions to the fact that Davus is a bought slave: "mancipium domino" (3) and "me ... ipso | quingentis empto drachmis" (42-3). In this he differs from the "vernae procaces" (2.6.66), who were included in the affectionate description of the rural "cena". Horace's closing threat to banish Davus to the "ager Sabinus" (117-18) establishes his status as master, and abruptly terminates the slave's brief equality.

Horace's relationship with Maecenas is depicted as a kind of slavery (29-35) (Bond 1985: 72). This is to some extent another example of how the relationship is misunderstood, but more than that it reveals that Horace is exploring the question of his own *libertas* as a client-poet. Although Horace enjoys the pleasure of Maecenas' company, it is nevertheless his duty as a client to respond to an invitation to dinner, however inconvenient it may be. This section also demonstrates that as well as Davus Horace has others dependent on him: "Mulvius et scurrae" (36). From their description (36-42), it would seem that these "scurrae" are no more conducive to Horace's *aequanimitas* than Davus is.

There is another "scurra" in 2.7 unconnected to Horace. This is the impoverished and gout-ridden Volanerius, the subject of one of Davus' anecdotes (15-18). Unable to "afford the upkeep of a slave" (Muecke: ad 17), he employs a

²² Bond's article discusses in detail the Stoic doctrine in Davus' lecture with respect to inaccuracies and inappropriateness as criticism of Horace.

“mercede diurna | conductum” (17-18) to assist him with his gambling. “Scurrae” occur sporadically throughout Horace’s hexameter poems, but in a cluster at the end of *Serm.* 2. The “scurrae” in 2.8 will be discussed below.²³ Horace’s attitude to the “scurrae” here is markedly different from that which he displayed at *Serm.* 1.5.51-70. There his attitude was one of superior detachment, as a member of an audience of *amici* (see p.121). In 2.7, although the “scurrae” are not mentioned by Horace *in propria persona*, he is nevertheless more closely associated with them, especially by Mulvius’ reported accusations of hypocrisy (37-42). Assuming that this is not just another of Davus’ misapprehensions, it could indicate an awareness on Horace’s part of the fine distinction in perception between a client and a *scurra*. In terms of status both are technically free, but in reality are dependent on others for their livelihood. In *Serm.* 1, Horace endeavoured to portray his relationship with Maecenas as one of friendship, but in *Serm.* 2 the latter has become a remoter figure (Coffey² 1989: 88), and their difference in status has become more problematical.

There are two examples of status depicted in terms of clothing and accessories. The inconstancy of Priscus (8-14) represented as ‘changing his stripe’ (10) probably signifies no more than frequent changes of clothing (Muecke: *ad* 10). Nevertheless, the fact that Horace used an image with status connotations is interesting in itself, and indicates how ingrained conventions of dress were to the Romans.²⁴ The other clothing image, which involves the insignia of a Roman *eques* (53-4), has received a disproportionate amount of critical attention because of the assumption that the referent of the second-person pronoun must be Horace, and concomitant disagreements over the status of the historical Q. Horatius Flaccus (Muecke: *ad* 53ff.).

In this matter it is preferable to follow the older commentators. In the context of the passage from v.46-71, Lejay interprets “tu” (53) as the generic second person characteristic of diatribe (1911: 550). Wickham (1891) has a note on v.45 which is worth quoting in full, because it contains valuable observations on the whole of Davus’ lecture:

²³ They appear again in *Epist.* 1.15.26-41 and 1.18.1-20, also the cognate verb “scurror” at *Epist.* 1.17.19. The exploration of relationships between people of unequal social status is a continuing concern in Horace’s hexameter corpus.

²⁴ As Muecke notes, “a change of stripe could indicate a change of aim in life” (*ad* 2.7.10). She cites the example of Ovid (*Tr.* 4.10.29-30, 35-6), who changed from the broad senatorial stripe to the narrower equestrian one as an indication of giving up a public career for poetry.

Crispini ... ianitor. The doorkeeper has picked up fragments of the master's lectures and retails them to men of his own class. It is not the actual teaching of Crispinus nor of his 'ianitor,' but a lecture by Davus to Horace à la Crispinus, as reported by his 'ianitor.' We need not imagine it to be too appropriate at every turn to Horace. There ought to be some Stoic commonplace in it. Some should be evidently inappropriate, and under cover of this there should be some sly hits at his actual or reputed character.

When interpreted in this way it becomes obvious that it is extremely difficult to ascertain just what is supposed to apply to Horace himself. Also there will be some elements quoted from Crispinus, including perhaps the description of 'a house of ill-repute' as "unde | mundior exiret vix libertinus honeste" (11-12), which is humorously incongruous coming from a slave.

Like Damasippus in 2.3, Davus as a Stoic neophyte fails in his endeavour to help his master correct his behaviour, as shown by Horace's angry reaction (116-18). On this level the garbled Stoicism of a slave has disturbed Horace's *aequanimitas*. There is, however, a potentially more serious dimension underlying Horace's ridicule of extreme Stoic doctrine, because "an 'educated' slave can learn of concepts and theories which are capable of seriously undermining the stability of the established social and economic system, however laudable those concepts may be from a purely philosophical or humanitarian point of view" (Bond 1978: 87). Ostensibly the subject of 2.7 is *libertas*, and in particular who is truly free, but the setting at the time of the Saturnalia and the slave as protagonist inevitably highlights the related concept of equality. In the poem Davus' equality is strictly limited to the area of *libertas dicendi*, and in time by Horace's opening sanction (4-5) and concluding reminder of reality (117-18).

In retrospect, it can be seen that Horace's use of the Stoic paradoxes in 2.3 and 2.7 suggests the potentially "dangerous consequences from their practical application" (Arnold 1911: 389). The description of Horace's rural *otium* in 2.6 revealed the extent of the disruption caused by the proselytizing Damasippus in 2.3. As a Stoic, Damasippus would have been motivated by the common bond with his fellow men: "Eademque natura vi rationis hominem conciliat homini et ad orationis et ad vitae societatem" (Cic. *Off.* 1.12; cited by Arnold *ibid.*: 284-5). Damasippus expresses this as "aliena negotia curo" (2.3.19). In the context of the poem, the concluding altercation (2.3.323-6) demonstrates that Damasippus had disturbed Horace's personal *aequanimitas*. By extension, it could be argued that Stoicism, by encouraging such

interference in the lives of others is incompatible with the independent, self-sufficient *vita beata* shown to be Horace's ideal in 2.2 and 2.6. Similarly, teachings on freedom and equality, especially when not properly understood, are irritating to Horace personally in 2.7, but could have extremely serious consequences at the level of the State.

Serm. 2.8

The setting of 2.8 is not specified, but can be assumed to be the *Urbs*, as this would be the most suitable setting for an extravagant dinner party. Throughout the *Sermones* it is Horace's established practice to indicate the setting for the poems (1.5, 1.7, 2.3, 2.5) unequivocally set outside the city. The social interactions of the urban "Nasidieni ... cena" (1) related in this poem are a far cry from the rural ideal of 2.2.116-25 and 2.6.63-76. In particular, the equality of the "cenae deum" (2.6.65) is absent.

Status is prominent in 2.8, with the seating plan (20-4) reflecting the social hierarchy (Muecke: 227), with Maecenas (22) appropriately "in the place of honour" (ibid.: *ad* 20-3). The details of the narrative reveal an even more highly differentiated situation. Speculation as to the identity of Nasidienus has not produced a conclusive solution (ibid.: 227-8), but presumably his status would be lower than that of Maecenas, but higher than that of the three poets in the latter's retinue: Fundanius (19), Viscus Thurinus (20) and Varius (21). Horace's status is not strictly relevant as he was not present at the "cena", although it can be assumed that he would be equivalent in status to the other poets as a member of Maecenas' circle. Apart from one brief reference to Varius' perhaps less than exemplary behaviour (63-4), the poets do not play any part in the proceedings.

In terms of the focus of the narrative, the four *scurrae*, immediately below the poets in status, are the most interesting characters. Maecenas has brought with him his "umbrae" (22), Servilius Balatro (21) and Vibidius (22), while Nomentanus (23) and "Porcius ... | ridiculus" (23-4) perform an equivalent function for Nasidienus. Although these four men are of equal status, there is a marked difference in their behaviour. The host's *scurrae* both have designated duties: Nomentanus is seated adjacent to Maecenas so that he can explain the intricacies of Nasidienus' elaborate food to him and the other guests (25-33). In this respect, it seems permissible not to

distinguish this Nomentanus from the one mentioned elsewhere in the *Sermones*²⁵ as “a self-indulgent gourmand” (Damon 1997: 113). Damon’s suggestion that Nomentanus’ extravagant life-style has reduced him to using his “culinary expertise” (ibid.) as *scurra* to the unfortunate Nasidienus is very attractive. It would certainly provide an apt conclusion to his repeated appearances in the *Sermones*, and his downfall is consistent with that of a later Horatian *scurra*, Maenius (*Epist.* 1.15.26-32) (ibid.: 113-14). The premature ending of the “cena” prevents Nasidienus’ other *scurra*, Porcius, from displaying his special talent (24).

Wiseman distinguishes two types of *scurrae*, both of which appear in Horace.²⁶ The earlier Plautine type was “witty in a libelous sort of way and the very soul, at least in his own estimation, of *urbanitas*” (1982: 41), while the later variety resembles the “slave-born buffoon Sarmenus” (ibid.) of *Serm.* 1.5. Nomentanus and Porcius in 2.8 represent the later type being more considerate of, and dependent on, their patron. By contrast, Maecenas’ *scurrae* are of the earlier type, and both display the kind of behaviour criticized by Horace as an abuse of *libertas* by a dinner-party guest at *Serm.* 1.4.86-91. Nasidienus has followed the correct protocol with the traditional maximum number of nine guests (Gel. 13.11.2), thus providing conditions which, in theory at least, should be conducive to civilized behaviour (ibid.: 13.11.3). One short passage in 2.8 summarizes the difference in behaviour of the two types of *scurrae*, and also demonstrates how the rest of the guests were conducting themselves:

invertunt Allifanis vinaria tota
Vibidius Balatroque; secutis omnibus imi
convivae lecti nihilum nocuere lagoenis. (39-41)

Nasidienus’ slaves are also clearly differentiated according to their specific tasks. After the *gustatio*, an unnamed “puer alte cinctus” (10) clears and cleans the tables (10-13). The slaves performing the more important task of serving the wine are named: “fuscus Hydaspes” (14) and Alcon (15), the latter having a Greek name

²⁵ *Serm.* 1.1.102; 1.8.11; 2.1.22; 2.3.175, 224.

On the other hand Shackleton Bailey, for example, differentiates between Nomentanus as “*Nasidieni parasitus*” (2.8.23, 25, 60) and “*prodigus et luxuriosus*” elsewhere (1985: 359).

²⁶ *Scurrae* of these two types recur in *Epist.* 1.18.3-20, where they are differentiated as the “infidus scurra” (4) corresponding to Wiseman’s later type (e.g. Nomentanus), and the *asper scurra* (e.g. Balatro) corresponding to the Plautine type.

matching the origin of the wine (Muecke: *ad* 15). With all the attention to detail with respect to status, both of guests and waiting staff, the “Nasidieni cena” is depicted as a highly regulated occasion. In addition, Nasidienus insists on explanations of the food, by Nomentanus (25-33) and by himself (42-53), thereby preventing the meaningful conversation between equals which Horace enjoyed at his rural “cena” (2.6.65-76).

Status differences notwithstanding, all the guests, including Maecenas, are implicated in the excessive, not moderate, consumption of wine (39-41). “Secutis omnibus” (40) refers to everyone present except those on the “*imus lectus*” (40-1). Not surprisingly, scholars have debated whether or not Horace was critical of Maecenas and his entourage for their behaviour, particularly in the way they hurriedly left without eating the spectacular main course (85-95).²⁷ The literature on this topic has been summarized by Baker (1988). In opposition to Palmer, Wickham and Lejay, Baker adopts a sympathetic attitude to Nasidienus, and considers that his only fault was in trying too hard (*ibid.*: 222). When one considers how Horace in *Serm.* 1.3 pleaded for tolerance and punishments that fitted the crime this is a reasonable argument.

It is, however, notoriously difficult to reach a firm conclusion on this matter. In the first place, Horace’s text ends abruptly with no closing remarks from which to gauge his attitude. Secondly, we just do not know enough about “the nuances of Roman manners and social conventions” (Muecke: 227). An alternative approach is to consider the implications of Horace’s absence from the “cena”. It seems clear from almost his last words in the poem, and the *libellus*, that had he been present he would have wanted to be there as a spectator, not necessarily as a participant: “Nullos his mallet ludos spectasse” (79). The “cena” is no longer a private gathering of like-minded friends but some sort of performance, a ‘spectator-sport’.

As Baker observes, Horace in 2.8 has placed himself outside Maecenas’ circle (*ibid.*: 227). His perspective, as for most of the *libellus*, is that of a “detached observer” (Muecke: 1). There is the possibility that if he had been a guest at the

²⁷ Not all critics interpret this section as indicating that Maecenas’ party left before the meal had ended (Muecke: *ad* 93-5, and references there). Even if there is doubt over this particular issue, the fact still remains that the behaviour of Maecenas’ retinue throughout the “cena” was far from exemplary: “Clearing Maecenas and his friends of the hasty departure’s rudeness only removes some of our discomfit with the satire” (Muecke: 228).

“Nasidieni cena”, he might well have been obliged to behave in exactly the same way. In other words, Horace is showing that at urban dinner-parties all the guests, regardless of status, are reduced to behaving in the same way as *scurrae* like Balatro and Vibidius. Interpreted in this way, *Serm.* 2.8 leaves the reader with a strong sense of disillusionment and pessimism on Horace’s part.

One possible reason for this pessimistic ending to *Serm.* 2 lies in a phenomenon highlighted by the narrative of 2.8 which is interwoven through the *libellus*, namely misunderstandings and/or a failure to communicate effectively. Discussion here will be limited to relevance to 2.8; the rest of the *libellus* will be covered in the conclusion to this chapter. Reference has already been made to the fact there was no real conversation between the participants, as there should be at a “cena”: “The intimacy and mutual respect of genuine friendship is lacking from Nasidienus’ party” (Gosling 1986: 101). The diners never become a cohesive group; the impression created is of two groups on parallel lines. Baker’s anachronistic designation: “The home team, so to speak, on the *imus lectus*” (ibid.: 221) accurately conveys the mood of competition, and even warfare. Vibidius’ strangely unmotivated “nos nisi damnose bibimus, moriemur inulti” (34) is a mock-epic “declaration of war” (Muecke: *ad* 34)²⁸, and is answered by Fundanius’ “quem nos sic fugimusulti” (93). But exactly what the feud was about, if indeed there was one, is never made clear. The life of urban dependents was depicted in terms of competition in 2.6, specifically in relation to food with the “urbanus mus” competing with the Molossian hounds (113-15). In a different context, Horace’s struggle to reach Maecenas’ house through the urban crowds is depicted as a kind of battle (16-39). The allusion to competition in 2.8, the last poem of Horace’s *Sermones*, harks back to *Serm.* 1.1, especially the urban, chariot-racing simile of competitive greed (113-16).

Conclusion

Serm. 2.6 may be “the origin of the ideal of country life which permeates his later work” (Williams 1972: 16), but a sequential reading of the entire *libellus* reveals that *Serm.* 2 is still overwhelmingly urban, a fact obscured by the critical concentration on 2.6. The country, as depicted in the lifestyle of “Ofellus rusticus” in 2.2 and endorsed in 2.6, is the location which facilitates the *vita beata*. The

²⁸ Other epic allusions are noted by Muecke (229-39, *passim*).

philosophy which underpins Ofellus' life of self-sufficiency and true *libertas* consists of traditional country values compatible with Hellenistic ethics, predominantly Epicurean. Horace's ideal *rus* is presented as contemporary with the late thirties BCE, not a nostalgic vision of a remote Golden Age.

2.6 is pivotal and reveals Horace's dilemma with respect to place and status. In Epicurean terms his status as *amicus inferior* of Maecenas gives him pleasure in two distinct ways: in the *Urbs* he enjoys his patron's company, and the gift of the "ager Sabinus" enables him to experience rural *otium litteratum*. On the other hand, the obligations of urban *officia* are a source of pain in themselves and, by detaining him in Rome, hinder the attainment of *aequanimitas* in the *rus*.

Throughout the *libellus* the *Urbs* is shown to be the location of many discomforts. On the personal level there are frequent misunderstandings about the nature of his relationship with Maecenas (2.3.306-13; 2.6.40-58; 2.7.29-35). From the evidence of 2.6 to 2.8 it is clear that Horace is no longer able to enjoy the *rus in Urbe* of *Serm.* 1.6.111-31. Misunderstandings with respect to philosophy and the way to achieve happiness are also a feature of urban life. Cadius (2.4), the "urbanus mus" (2.6), and Nasidienus (2.8) are all under the mistaken impression that their pseudo-Epicureanism and obsession with food will lead to the *vita beata*. Similarly with extreme Stoicism, Damasippus' (2.3) account of the philosophy is accurate but it is misapplied, while Davus (2.7) has also misunderstood and misapplied the teachings of Crispinus. In 2.5 the *Urbs* is associated with *captatio*, an abuse of *amicitia* and betrayal of traditional Roman values, which entails the sacrifice of *libertas* for financial gain.

In *Serm.* 2, Horace associates the *rus* with true Epicureanism, compatible with traditional country values, in terms of the *victus tenuis* which facilitates self-sufficiency and true *libertas*. In the rural "cena" (2.6.65-76) differences in status between *amici* are not mentioned, implying that the *rus* is the location for equality in *amicitia*. This contrasts sharply with the urban status-conscious "Nasidieni cena" (2.8). The *Urbs* is also associated with extreme Stoicism (2.3 and 2.7), presented in such a way that Horace as recipient rejects the advice, however beneficial it may actually have been (see below). At this stage in his hexameter corpus Horace has rejected Stoicism as a component in his personal philosophy.

With respect to potential support for Octavian in *Serm.* 2, on this reading it is only possible to reach the tentative conclusion that there is nothing comparable to that

postulated by DuQuesnay (1984) for *Serm.* 1. The political climate of the peri-Actium period was very different from that of the *Bellum Siculum*, when both sides were participating in verbal attacks. It could be that the situation at that time was unique in providing a suitable opportunity for indirect support for Octavian, as exemplified by DuQuesnay's reading of *Serm.* 1. When *Serm.* 2 was published in 30 BCE Octavian had no obvious and immediate opposition (Crook 1996: 73). Political content in the *libellus* is muted both by being infrequent and put into the mouths of other characters. This distancing negates accusations of obsequious flattery which would be detrimental to both Horace and Octavian.

Horace's stance as a "detached observer" in *Serm.* 2 can be seen as a reaction to Trebatius' warning about not offending his *potentes amici* (2.1.60-2), and as symptomatic of the satirist's concern with restrictions on his *libertas dicendi*. Whether this represents covert criticism of Octavian is a moot point. There is always the possibility that by playfully suggesting that he has problems with Octavian Horace is actually acknowledging how little interference and restriction he experiences. Although the *persona* of the satirist should not be conflated with the historical Q. Horatius Flaccus, when he mentions *potentes amici* such as Maecenas and Octavian "that speaker performs, in or under Horace's name, acts that may have consequences for Horace himself, both for his material circumstances and for his present and future reputation" (Oliensis 1999: 86).

On another level, distancing enables Horace, especially in 2.3 and 2.7, to express his reactions as recipient of the diatribes. From his angry reaction in both instances (2.3.323-6; 2.7.116-18), it is obvious that he has not been receptive to the advice proffered and that miscommunication has occurred. Neither diatribe was appropriate for the needs and feelings of the recipient. In this way Horace demonstrates that however beneficial the teachings of a philosophical school may be, they will be useless unless they are presented in a sensitive way. In other words, society needs poets like Horace as well as philosophers. This becomes an important theme in *Epist.* 1.

Although Horace's consultation with Trebatius (2.1) is amicable, it too contains misunderstandings and a certain amount of miscommunication. The poet and the *iurisconsultus* use different registers of the same language (Muecke 1995: 203-4). Conversely, and ironically, there is effective communication between the two protagonists of 2.5, because both are equally amoral and speak the same language, as

it were. Compatibility of positive values is demonstrated by the effective communication by Horace of Ofellus' "sermo" in 2.2 and Cervius' fable in 2.6 (79-117). Although Horace dissociates himself from the content of all or part of these two poems, they are in effect monologues *in propria persona*, and a return to the predominant form of *Serm.* 1.

In *Serm.* 2 Horace experiments with different kinds of dialogue: the consultations of 2.1 and 2.5; in 2.4 and 2.8 "conversations [which] arise from chance encounters in the street" (Muecke: 9), and the dialogues framing the Stoic diatribes of 2.3 and 2.7. The latter in particular expose the miscommunication produced by presenting potentially useful advice in a form that is not tailored to the needs of the recipient. An appropriate method of communicating in a way that can be precisely directed to a recipient is by letter. The written form necessitates careful composition if misunderstandings are to be avoided, and its permanence implies more opportunity for reflective reception. Hence Horace adopted the epistolary form for his third book of poems in the genre of *satira*.

CHAPTER 5

Place and status in *Epist.* 1

Introduction

Between *Serm.* 2 and *Epist.* 1, Horace had published the three books of *Odes* in 23 BCE. As the generic conventions for lyric poetry differ from those for *satura*, very little reference will be made to the *Odes*. The political situation in the intervening decade had become more stable with the gradual establishment of the Principate.¹ There appears to have been no powerful opposition to Augustus at this time (Crook 1996: 81), and without serious rivals there would have been little need for the indirect support of *Serm.* 1.

The political content in *Epist.* 1 consists mainly of overt expressions of modest praise and support for Augustus (1.3.2, 7;² 1.5.9; 1.12.28; 1.13.2, 18; 1.16.29), Agrippa (1.6.26; 1.12.1, 26), and Tiberius (1.3.2; 1.8.2; 1.9.1, 4; 1.12.26). The emphasis is on foreign policy, especially campaigns in the East (1.3.1-5; 1.12.25-9; 1.18.56), as it had been in *Serm.* 2 (*Serm.* 2.1.13-15; 2.5.62-4). Octavian's triple triumph in 29 BCE celebrated the defeat of foreign enemies (Syme 1939: 303), and during the twenties Augustus spent lengthy periods away from Rome: 27-24 in Gaul and Spain, and 22-19 in Greece and Asia. The Roman people had put civil war behind them, and were once again fighting wars of conquest and expanding the Empire. Horace's move to the epistle form for his hexameter poetry may reflect this more outward-looking ethos: as the Empire expanded written communication was to become very important as is evidenced by, for example, the large number of personal letters on the Vindolanda tablets (Trapp 2003: 9).

Although Augustus appears to have successfully managed the potential threat from the various competing interests in society: the army, the *plebs urbana*, and the *nobiles* (Crook *ibid.*: 73), one factor that threatened to destabilize the nascent Principate was his poor health, especially in 23 (*ibid.*: 81). Some uncertainty still remained, hence the individual's need for self-sufficiency, achieved through the application of appropriate philosophy in everyday life.

¹ For a detailed discussion of this period see, for example, Syme (1939: 303-30); Crook (1996: 70-94).

² In this chapter reference to poems by numbers alone will be to *Epist.* 1.

Although the exploration of *Epist.* 1 will be focused on the major themes of place and status, it is impossible to discuss these poems without considering philosophy. Critics have disagreed about the philosophical content: which school(s) Horace favours (despite his pronouncement in 1.1.14-19), and whether or not the poems should be considered philosophical at all. The majority opinion is that the philosophical content is serious. In some cases it is taken rather too seriously, with reference to, for instance, “a kind of conversion to philosophy” (Macleod 1979: 16; cf. Kilpatrick 1986:³ xvi) on Horace’s part.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, scholarly conclusions with respect to Horace’s philosophical stance in *Epist.* 1 have included the following: Stoicism (Courbaud 1914; Campbell 1924); the doctrine of the mean (Oates 1936); Epicureanism (De Witt 1935, 1937, 1939; Porter Packer 1941); the modified Stoicism of Panaetius (McGann 1969),⁴ and Panaetianism plus Cynicism (Moles 1985).⁵ For Kilpatrick Horace exemplifies Cicero’s Academic philosophy in the *de Amicitia* and *de Officiis* (xx-xxi). The stance of both McGann and Kilpatrick has been seen as “too dogmatic” (Harrison 1995c: 47 n.2). More recently, Armstrong (2004) has raised the possibility of the influence of the modified Epicureanism of Philodemus, based on evidence from the Herculaneum papyri. By analogy with the early twentieth-century fashion for discerning Posidonian influence on practically every Roman author, Armstrong cautions against attempts to restrict Horace to any one school (ibid.: 267-8). Maguinness (1938), reacting to De Witt’s (1935 and 1937) preference for Horace as a doctrinaire Epicurean, proposed the designation of his philosophy as eclectic. Macleod (1979) did not identify any one school as dominant.

In opposition to all the above, both Rudd (1993b) and Mayer (1985, 1986, 1994)⁶ categorize Horace as a “moralist” but deny, somewhat strangely, that *Epist.* 1

³ All references to Kilpatrick in this chapter will be to this work.

⁴ All references to McGann in this chapter will be to this work.

⁵ These references were gleaned from McGann (9 n.2); Rudd (1993b: 64-71); Moles (2002: 141, 235 n.1); Armstrong (2004: 268-9).

⁶ It is to be regretted that in his commentary on *Epist.* 1 (1994) Mayer is so resistant to the philosophical content. An up-to-date commentary in English on this complex *libellus* is sorely needed, to complement the valuable commentaries of Brown (1993) and Muecke (1993) on *Serm.* 1 and 2 respectively. As Moles observed in his *BMCR* (1995) review of Mayer (1994), it “is a major missed opportunity.”

is in any way philosophical (Moles 2002: 141). A comment by Rudd may shed some light on this paradoxical position: “the ideas themselves matter more than their philosophical provenance” (ibid.: 88 n.42). The fact remains, however, that those “ideas” did have a “philosophical provenance”, and for those members of Horace’s contemporary audience who were alert to the key words and concepts signifying the various schools, the “provenance” must surely have “mattered”. The way the poet synthesized the doctrines would have contributed to the intellectual challenge and enjoyment of the *libellus*.

With reference to 1.1.14-19, both Rudd (ibid.: 67) and Mayer (1986: 64) object to the designation of Horace’s stance as “eclectic”. This objection is based on the fact that in the late first century BCE there was an ‘Eclectic school’ of philosophy founded by Potamon of Alexandria, and Horace’s ethics do not conform to the sort of philosophical system that a school implies (Mayer: ibid.). To deal with the first issue: the existence of such a school is contentious: “Diogenes Laertius (*Proem.* 21) describes him [Potamon] as founding a school, but whether he had followers is doubtful” (*OCD*³: 1235).⁷

Mayer objected on the grounds that Horace’s philosophy is unsystematic: “A system can be taught; Horace’s instruction works only for particular friends in particular situations and for himself (and then not always reliably)” (ibid.). But this is to misunderstand the nature of Horace’s letters to his friends, and one reason why he may have chosen to use the epistolary form. The advice given is tailored for each recipient: a personal philosophy is not a ‘one size fits all’ entity. As Mayer himself points out elsewhere, living life correctly involves making choices (1994: 42). In *Epist.* 1, Horace is providing the tools to enable those choices to be made informed by the appropriate philosophy.

It is certainly true that eclecticism was more commonly associated with the incorporation of precepts from a rival school by followers of one particular school to produce a system more suited to their needs, as was the practice of Cicero and Seneca, for example (*OCD*³: 502). Nevertheless, in explicit disagreement with Mayer, Miriam Griffin has commented that “eclecticism itself, ... need not mean a lack of

⁷ Rudd insists that “we should not call him [Horace] an eclectic, or at least not an Eclectic” (1993b: 67). At the time of writing I have not discovered any reference to Horace as “an Eclectic”, and certainly Maguinness did not use this designation in his 1938 article.

commitment to live by the precepts chosen” (1989: 15 n.25). Educated Romans were not interested “in the disputes between the schools” (Griffin *ibid.*: 15), rather for them philosophy fulfilled a practical function in everyday life: “Philosophy is a part of a mature and civilized life, not a system or a doctrine, but the act of asking the important questions” (Brower 1959: 173).

Griffin cites two examples where Cicero in his correspondence with Atticus uses philosophical arguments to help in making vital decisions in his political life (*ibid.*: 34). More informally, in *Epist.* 1 Horace is urging his addressees to behave in a similar way. Macleod (1979: 17-18) illustrates the integral role of philosophy in everyday life with an example from Cicero’s letters that has more direct relevance to Horace’s situation. *Fam.* 3.7.5 shows Cicero using a Stoic argument to negotiate with a superior, Appius Claudius Pulcher, whom he had offended: “By appeal to philosophic teachings he can both soothe and scold his addressee with detachment and as an equal” (*ibid.*: 18). In this way the subjective becomes more objective, and status differences can be neutralized, or at least attenuated.

Particularly in the letters to younger men Horace is following the practice of his own father (*Serm.* 1.4.105-20), but with a significant difference. Horace’s father preferred the practical morality of the Republican *mos maiorum* (*ibid.*:115-17), displaying similarities with the attitudes towards Greek philosophy of Cicero’s Scipio at *Rep.* 1.36 (see p.117). In *Epist.* 1 Horace employs the teachings of the Hellenistic schools, a sign that times have changed and new strategies are needed, recalling the *exemplum* of Ofellus (*Serm.* 2.2) (see p.143f.), with his blend of the *mos maiorum* and Epicureanism.

What exactly Horace meant by: “nunc itaque et versus et cetera ludicra pono: | quid verum atque decens curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum” (1.1.10-11) has been widely discussed, with no totally satisfactory resolution. The accepted interpretation of v.10 is that it is a *recusatio*, with the assumption that Horace is declining Maecenas’ request for more lyric poetry (see p.100), although there is no textual evidence for the exact nature of any request that Maecenas may have made. However, “versus” can be taken to imply all verse, hexameter as well as lyric (Moles 1995: *ad Epistle I*). If this is the case, then v.10 is a drastic *recusatio*, rejecting all poetry, not just one genre as in a conventional *recusatio* (cf. *Serm.* 2.1.10-20). When a poet of Horace’s expertise and experience declares that he is laying aside all poetry, and furthermore when he says that in hexameter verse in the context of a poem which

functions as the prologue to about a thousand lines of carefully crafted poetry, then caution is needed. In addition, he follows his *'recusatio'* with a line that contains a “monstrous and unpoetic accumulation of elision” (Thomas 1982: 27 n.2). This recalls Horace’s strategy at *Serm.* 1.4.39, where he begins a section in which he claims not to be a poet with a highly unpoetic line. When he is making questionable claims about his own poetic practice Horace produces a verse which emphasizes by contrast the skilfully crafted poetry of the rest of the *libellus*.

The foregoing does not explain the poetic status of *Epist.* 1. Moles considers that v.10-11 “creat[e] multiple ambiguities whereby the *Epistles* are simultaneously not-poetry and poetry, not-philosophy and philosophy” (ibid.). This paradox can be resolved by considering that in the course of the *libellus* Horace reconciles poetry and philosophy.⁸ In the beginning of 1.1 he exhibits a “conflict of wishes between Maecenas and himself” (McGann: 33). His patron wants him to return to the writing of poetry of some kind (1.1.3), while Horace supposedly wants to devote himself to writing philosophy (1.1.11). Having stated the extremes of the wide range of his philosophical options, from orthodox Stoicism to the hedonism of Aristippus (1.1.14-19), at the beginning of 1.2 Horace asserts that in fact the epic poetry of Homer is a better guide for Lollius than the works of the Stoic Chrysippus or the Academic Crantor (1.2.1-5). McGann believes that both 1.1 and 1.2 are programmatic with respect to “the ethical preoccupation of the book” (ibid.). This wider perspective provides a corrective to interpretations which place too much emphasis on 1.1.11. The implications of the nature and source of the ethical advice addressed to Lollius will be discussed further below.

The position to be adopted in this chapter with regard to Horace’s philosophical stance in *Epist.* 1 is basically that of Armstrong (2004): that much of the content consists of “the accepted ethical common-places of ancient literary and philosophical culture” (ibid.: 269), with the essential proviso that “nothing in the poems contradicts any fundamental doctrine of Epicureanism” (ibid.: 293). Armstrong also proposes (274-5) that the alternatives for Horace’s philosophical stance at 1.1.16-19, orthodox Stoicism and Aristippean Hedonism, are extremes. Consistent with his customary preference for a middle course, in reality Horace’s preference is for an

⁸ If his argument has been understood correctly, Macleod (1979: 22) has a similar view of this difficult paradox.

intermediate doctrine: Epicureanism. This Epicurean bias is really no different from Horace's philosophical stance detected in *Serm.* 1.1 (see p.81-6), except that in *Epist.* 1.1 philosophy has become more explicit. This explicitness is to some extent the only real difference in Horace's use of philosophy from the rest of his hexameter corpus. The *Sermones* are just as 'philosophical' as the poems of *Epist.* 1, and the latter are no more "a philosophical text" (*pace* Moles 2002: 149) than are *Serm.* 1 and 2. They are fictional verse letters addressed to friends, giving ethical advice appropriate for the recipient utilizing the language and arguments of moral philosophy.

Mayer, arguing for *Epist.* 1 as "a new literary form" (7), claims that satire was not a suitable vehicle for Horace in this *libellus* because "satire *must* criticize" (*ibid.*: italics original). But the proffering of advice can be regarded as an indirect, and more sensitive, form of criticism in that the advice is a response to a perceived fault in the recipient. In this respect, *Epist.* 1 can be regarded as a continuation of Horace's poetry in the genre of *satura*. The more moderate and targeted criticism is a corrective to the extreme insensitivity exhibited in some of the poems of *Serm.* 2, especially 2.3 and 2.7. The diatribes in both of these poems are totally apotreptic with no balancing protreptic element. In his use of the epistolary form Horace has collapsed the apotreptic into the protreptic, relegating criticism to the subtext.

When Horace claims to be devoting himself to philosophy he uses the crucial term "decens" (1.1.11). The concept of *decorum* is Panaetian, and very important in Cicero's *de Officiis*, thematic in *Epist.* 1⁹ (McGann: 10-12), and fundamental to Horace's use of the epistolary form. Mayer's objection to the unsystematic nature of his philosophy (see p.175) provides an excellent expression of this. The notion of appropriateness in interpersonal conduct is intrinsic in any society, like that of Rome, that has gradations of social status, and *decorum* was so ingrained in Roman thought that it can be said to transcend allegiance to any philosophical school.

The concept of *decorum* as applied to Horace's manner of criticism in *Epist.* 1 adds a further element to his satirical method "ridentem dicere verum" (*Serm.* 1.1.24), restated as "quid verum atque decens" (1.1.11). The "ridens" is still important, these letters are not totally serious. To ensure that communication is effective, the advice must be "decens", adapted to the needs and feelings of the recipient. The poems of

⁹ "Decens", or cognates, occurs at 1.1.11; 1.6.62; 1.7.44; 1.14.32; 1.17.2, 23, 26; 1.18.30.

Epist. 1 to some extent reflect on and provide a corrective to the ineffective communication evident in some poems in *Serm.* 2.

Sequential reading of *Epist.* 1

Epist. 1.1

Place in this programmatic poem intersects with philosophical concepts which will recur throughout the *libellus*, and images which allude to the *Sermones*. The opening lines (1-6) contain images which establish place as an important theme. “*Latet abditus*” (5) is a gloss of the Epicurean “live unnoticed” (Moles 2002: 142; cf. 1.17.10, 1.18.103), and the specific “*agro*” (5) makes it more than this: ‘live unnoticed in the country’. Although it may be misguided to place too much emphasis on individual word-choices, “*ager*” was the word used by Horace in the first explicit mention of the Sabine farm (“*ager Sabinus*” (*Serm.* 2.7.118)). In *Serm.* 2, the *rus* was identified as the location for the ideal life of Epicurean *aequanimitas*, a lifestyle no longer possible for Horace in the *Urbs*. In 1.1 the allusion to the *rus* is surrounded by negative urban images of dependency, symbolized by the retired gladiator potentially once more subject to the whim of popular opinion (4-6).

Horace’s assertion of philosophical independence (14-19) has associations with place. The image of orthodox Stoicism “*nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis*” (16): “I actively drown in the surge of public life” (tr. Macleod 1986: 4) recalls Horace’s struggle to reach Maecenas through the crowded streets of Rome (*Serm.* 2.6.20-39). In complete contrast, the opposite extreme of free will exemplified by the Aristippean concept of being in control of circumstances has no location, consistent with adaptability. The significance of the verb “*conor*” (19) should not be overlooked: Horace does not claim to have achieved his philosophical goals, he is still a *proficiens* (20-32).

The philosophical concept of *profectus* is important in *Epist.* 1, and was not an obvious feature of the philosophy of the *Sermones*. It is particularly associated with the less extreme Stoicism formulated by Panaetius (McGann: 10-11). The idea of making progress rather than striving after the virtually unattainable goal of the Stoic *sapiens* had great appeal for the practical Romans. Even if there is no equivalent concept in orthodox Epicurean doctrine, it is possible that Philodemus was more explicit about it in his *On frank speaking*. In a discussion of this text Michels

comments: “Philodemus ... assumes throughout that no member of his sect was perfect, although some were more advanced in wisdom than others, and therefore all were open to admonition and correction” (1944: 174).

The familiar image of the “mercator” (45) (cf. *Serm.* 1.4.29-32) as an *exemplum* of *avaritia* is modified to include an explicit destination: “extremos ... ad Indos” (45), reflecting a more outward-looking society, with a greater awareness of distant countries. The purpose of the voyage is now expressed as “pauperium fugiens” (46), linked to “exiguum censum” (43). “Censum” could simply mean ‘wealth’, but in the context of the following section may also have the more technical connotations of the property qualification for equestrian status (58-9). In this passage (51-69) place and status intersect, with “Ianus” (54) an urban location signifying financial business (cf. *Serm.* 2.3.18-19), the overall argument being “tanti quantum habeas sis” (*Serm.* 1.1.62). The specific allusions to equestrian status (58-9, 62, 67), like the destination at v.45, function to make an image from the *Sermones* more concrete.

Another urban image from the *Sermones*, namely “porticibus” (71) (cf. *Serm.* 1.4.133-4), acquires negative connotations. In its earlier manifestation “porticus” was equated with “lectulus”, and was an appropriate location for solitary reflection, an aspect of the *rus in Urbe* of *Serm.* 1. This may be a place where “a man could be alone with his thoughts” (Mayer: *ad* 71), but it symbolizes Horace’s feelings of alienation rather than the solitary contentment of *Serm.* 1.4.134. Now Horace shares the “porticus” with the “populus Romanus” (70), whose judgements he does not share (70-3), considering popular opinion to be fickle and untrustworthy (cf. *Serm.* 1.6.15-17).

The philosophical concept of inconsistency dominates the final section of the poem (80-105). Place is used to illustrate the restlessness of the rich man who forsakes the unsurpassable resort of Baiae (84) for the even better Teanum (86). The topic of inconsistency appeared in the *Sermones* (1.1.15-19; 1.3.1-19; 2.7.6-20), and Horace himself was accused of it by Davus (*Serm.* 2.7.28). Throughout *Epist.* 1 he playfully exploits the concept, beginning with a philosophical manifesto that guarantees inconsistency (1.1.14-19). The example at v.94-105 will be discussed in the context of status below.

Horace’s status as a client-poet of Maecenas is a prominent feature at the beginning of 1.1. The dedication to his patron (1-3) with respect to distancing and personal *libertas* has been discussed in an earlier chapter (see p.98). The issues raised

in these opening lines indicate that *Epist.* 1 will continue the exploration of the potential problems of *clientela* raised in *Serm.* 2, but now from Horace's personal perspective rather than from the misperceptions of others.

Horace uses philosophy as a strategy for negotiating with a superior in a manner similar to the example from Cicero cited in the introduction (see p.176). The diatribe of the central section (28-91a) is an extension of the *recusatio*. Like *Serm.* 1.1 to 1.3, it is modelled on the topics of popular philosophy, and Horace employs this as justification for supposedly devoting himself to “quid verum atque decens” (1.1.11) rather than complying with Maecenas' request: people still have faults and need the benefits of philosophy to make their lives happier and more satisfying.

The tone of the concluding section (94-105), which focuses on Horace and Maecenas, is difficult to gauge. On a superficial level, it is a humorous exposure of the inconsistencies of both men. In Horace's case with respect to his dress and grooming (94-6, 104), and Maecenas because he is concerned about his client's external *déshabillé*, but not his lack of *aequanimitas* (97-103). The passage could, however, also be exposing tension resulting from a deeper, more serious inconsistency. When Horace described his acceptance by Maecenas “in amicorum numero” (*Serm.* 1.6.61-4) he was grateful that his patron selected clients on the basis of their good character: “vita et pectore puro” (*Serm.* 1.6.64) (McGann: 36 n.8). But now Maecenas “has the interests only of a literary patron and a dandy” (McGann: 36).

It would be wrong to read too much into this passage (94-105), but the relationship between poet and patron is not the same as the one portrayed in *Serm.* 1, and the framing sections of *Epist.* 1.1 reinforce the remoteness of Maecenas detected in *Serm.* 2. McGann concludes that in this passage and the opening section “the situation is not harmonious” (ibid.). In the context of *Epist.* 1 as a whole, and friendship, Mayer has observed: “the issue is the tension between friendship with the great and personal independence (... *autarkeia*) (1989: 13). What is revealed about Horace at the end of *Epist.* 1.1 is that he is still in need of a “liber amicus” (cf. *Serm.* 1.4.132): as a *proficiens* he is not yet mentally self-sufficient.

Horace's awareness of his increasing age is connected with status in two rather different ways. At the beginning of 1.1 it is a component of the *recusatio* (4, 8-9), Maecenas' request being inappropriate for the no-longer-young poet (cf. 1.7.25-8; 1.14.32-5.; 1.15.21). In the poems where he gives advice to younger *amici* (1.2, 1.3, 1.8, 1.17, 1.18), Horace assumes a superior status by virtue of his age and experience,

even though most of these young men come from higher status backgrounds. Here again philosophy is being used to alleviate status differences, as well to facilitate the delivery of personal advice in an objective and sensitive way. This did not happen with the inappropriate use of extreme Stoicism in *Serm.* 2.3 and 2.7.

Epist. 1.2

Place in 1.2 is simply an epistolary feature (Mayer 1994:¹⁰ *ad* 2), and not part of the poem's argument. Lollius is in Rome pursuing his education, while Horace is in Praeneste (1-2). The fact that Horace has been rereading Homer at Praeneste, however, does indicate that the *Sabinum* is not the only place outside Rome where he can enjoy *otium litteratum*.

There is no certain identification of Lollius, but what is clear is that he is preparing for a political career ("declamas" (2)) (Mayer: 132). If he comes from a noble family (Kilpatrick 126: n.1), then his status is above Horace's, but he is younger ("puer" (68)). Horace by virtue of his age becomes a kind of cultural patron, where 'cultural' should be understood as embracing both poetry and philosophy. Lollius may eventually be in a position of power, or at least close to it, and Horace is proffering *exempla* of the behaviour of bad and good rulers (6-26), to be avoided or followed respectively.

Status is also relevant with respect to the status of poetry, and poets in society especially with respect to philosophy. Although Horace claims that he has been rereading Homer (1-2), Armstrong argues that in fact all the *exempla* are based on Philodemus' *On the good king according to Homer* (2004: 276-7).¹¹ Horace is presenting Homeric epic poetry as mediated by an Epicurean philosopher: "The poet is not morally useful *as a poet* and not useful at all until the philosopher points out how he should be read" (ibid.: 277; italics original). This can be taken one step further: Horace, a Roman poet, is remediating Philodemus' Greek philosophical text in Latin verse.

The second half of the poem (44-59) takes this reconciliation in a different direction. It is practically a reversal of v.6-31 in that Horace is presenting "poetic

¹⁰ For the rest of this chapter all references to Mayer will be to his commentary (1994), unless otherwise stated.

¹¹ Armstrong (ibid.: 277-9) provides all the sources in Philodemus's text for 1.2.1-31.

paraphrases of distinctively Epicurean doctrines” (ibid.: 279).¹² A philosopher like Philodemus can extract ethical *exempla* from Homeric epic, whereas a poet like Horace can give poetic expression to philosophical doctrines. In both cases the resulting material can be employed to administer criticism in a manner that is both objective and sensitive, above all appropriate for the recipient. The emphasis falls on “ira”, which is initially mentioned in a Homeric context (11-13), and later at v.59-63, where it is based on Philodemus’ *On anger* (Armstrong ibid.: 280-1). This suggests that “ira” is the fault that Lollius most needs to correct. The essential point in both Philodemus’ and Horace’s texts is that anger must be limited: “qui non moderabitur irae” (1.2.59). It does not need to be eliminated: without anger “one could not effectively repel danger and insult” (ibid.: 281). However, excessive anger is counter-productive. Consequently in: “ira furor brevis est” (62), the emphasis is on “brevis”.

In using his status as a cultural patron, Horace demonstrates that society, represented in 1.2 by Lollius as a young man preparing for a public career, needs both philosophers and poets, and presumably in his ideal State they would be reconciled as in his text.

Epist. 1.3

Place is again part of the epistolary machinery (1-5), and also enables the first mention in the *libellus* of Augustus (2), and allusion to his foreign policy in the East (3-5). Mayer states that the description of Tiberius as “Claudius Augusti privignus” (2) “flatters both men” (*ad* 2). On one level this may be true, but it can also be read as rather forced and intrusive. Similarly, the reference to “res gestas Augusti” (7) seems self-conscious. Given that Trebatius was urging Horace to write patriotic epic some ten years earlier (*Serm.* 2.1.10-17), there is possibly a playful gibe at Augustus for continued pressure on the poets.

As in 1.2, Horace assumes the status of cultural patron in a letter addressed to a younger man, or more accurately younger men, as there is admonition for not only the addressee Iulius Florus (1), but also Titius (9) and Celsus (15). All three are members of “the *cohors amicorum* of Tiberius” (Mayer: 8), and as aspiring poets they reflect Tiberius’ literary interests (Suet. *Tib.* 70). Only Florus receives Horace’s approval (21-5): Titius is overreaching himself in attempting to adapt the choral lyrics

¹² Armstrong (ibid.: 279-81) provides all the sources from Epicurus and Lucretius for 1.2.44-59.

of Pindar to Latin verse (9-11) (McGann: 40; Moles 1995: *ad* Epistle III), while Celsus is guilty of plagiarism (15-20).

Although Florus has undoubted talent as a poet and lawyer (21-5), he still needs the benefits of “*caelestis sapientia*” (27), glossed by Moles as “moral wisdom” (1995: *ibid.*). Philosophy is available for all, regardless of status, “*parvi ... et ampli*” (28; cf. 1.1.25-6), and can bring about “a state of affairs where all, small and great, can be dear both to themselves and to the *patria* [29]” (Moles: *ibid.*). Young men like Florus and the rest of the *cohors* are the “budding élite” (Mayer: 8), the sort of men Augustus needs to replenish the ranks of the aristocracy. If the State is to avoid the upheavals of the late Republic, it needs men with Florus’ existing skills supplemented by appropriate philosophy. From the aesthetic perspective it is vital that poets should be excellent poets and write “*bona [carmina] ... | iudice ... Caesare*” (*Serm.* 2.1.83-4; cf. Suet. *Aug.* 89.3).

Horace demonstrates that as a *proficiens* he is capable of learning from his own *exempla*. Like the elderly Nestor (1.2.11-13), he promotes the reconciliation of two people, here Florus and Munatius (30-5), estranged by *ira* (“*calidus sanguis*” (33)). There is, however, a significant difference between the two examples of estranged men: in 1.2 Achilles and Agamemnon were on opposite sides in a war between two different States, but “*indigni fraternum rumpere foedus*” (1.3.35) evokes civil war. The “budding élite” must learn to control their anger (cf. 1.2.59-63), and preserve *amicitia*.

Horace ends 1.3 with an invitation to the, hopefully, reconciled Florus and Munatius to a “celebratory *cena aduenticia*” (Mayer: *ad* 36). The invitation theme is continued in the next two poems.

Epist. 1.4

Horace addresses this poem to the poet Albius (1) Tibullus.¹³ He was a client-poet of M. Valerius Messalla Corvinus, and was a slightly older friend of equal status (*OCD*³: 1524). The theme of *amicitia* is picked up from 1.3.30-5, except that here Horace demonstrates how *amici* should behave. Albius had been “*sermonum candidus iudex*” (1), as Horace was “*candidus iudex*” of the poetry of Florus et al. in

¹³ “Agnosticism about the identification of Albius with Tibullus is frivolous” (Moles 1995: *ad* Epistle IV).

1.3. Horace is now reciprocating, and performing the duty of a *liber amicus* with respect to Albius' lifestyle.

The only reference to place locates Albius "in regione Pedana" (2), "between Tibur and Praeneste . . . , two favorite places of Horace" (Kilpatrick: 137 n.6). He is in a desirable location, he has both poetry (3) and philosophy (4-5) in his life, he has many advantages (6-11), but Horace still feels the need to write as a *liber amicus*. McGann observes that v.4-5 "make[s] the first clear reference in the book to the living of a philosophic life in the country" (43). Whatever philosophy Albius subscribes to, Horace clearly believes that it is not appropriate for him (Macleod 1979: 21). Consequently he exhorts him to enjoy the good things in his life while he still has the chance (12-14), essentially the *carpe diem* motif. There is an obvious, even if subverted, Epicurean reference in the invitation (15-16), and v.13-14 translates "a famous dictum of Epicurus (fr. 490 Usener¹⁴)" (Moles 1995: *ad* Epistle IV).

Epist. 1.1 to 1.4 all deal in some way with poetry and philosophy as elements in the lives of individuals and in society as a whole. As the culmination of that sequence, 1.4 focuses on a man who has incorporated both elements in his life and moreover lives in the *rus*, but has not selected the appropriate philosophy. Supplementing McGann's comment cited above, Horace is advocating Epicureanism as the appropriate philosophy for "the living of a philosophic life in the country", at least as far as his addressee Albius is concerned.

Epist. 1.5

In 1.5 there are no allusions to poetry and no explicit philosophy. It is clearly a letter of invitation to a simple *cena*, and the concept of *decorum* is implied, as is the Epicurean moderation of desires. Although "domi" (3) is equivocal, the setting is generally agreed to be the *Urbs* (Dilke² 1961:¹⁵ 89; Kilpatrick: 61, 139 n.34; Mayer: *ad* 3). The significance of this setting will be discussed below. The name Torquatus (3) suggests an aristocratic family, the Manlii Torquati (Dilke²: *ad* 3; Mayer: 8: *ad* 1-11), therefore his status is higher than Horace's. He is characterized as being a lawyer, busily involved in public life (8-9).

¹⁴ "He who least needs to-morrow, will most gladly go to meet to-morrow" (fr.78, tr. Bailey 1970: 139).

¹⁵ All references to Dilke in this chapter will be to this work.

Despite Torquatus' elevated status, Horace stresses the simplicity of the menu and his dining room (1-2, 29). He will, nevertheless, pay appropriate attention to cleanliness (7, 21-4) and protocol (24-9). He also shows consideration for Torquatus' hectic life by arranging the *cena* for the evening ("supremo ... sole" (3)) (Mayer: *ad* 3) before the public holiday for Augustus' birthday (9-10), allowing ample opportunity for friendly conversation (10-11). Above all, the provenance of the wine Horace intends to serve is appropriate for Torquatus' family (Mayer: *ad* 5).

The exhortation to drunkenness (12-20) has caused consternation to critics, who see it as inappropriate (for example, Macleod 1986: 15). The customary explanation is to refer to "dulce est desipere in loco" (*Carm.* 4.12.28), with the emphasis falling on "in loco" : "on the right occasion" (Mayer: *ad* 16-20). Closer precedents, however, can be found in *Serm.* 2. In *Serm.* 2.2 Ofellus stated that on working days ("luce profesta" (116); cf. "festus | ... dies" (1.5.9-10)) he adhered to the "victus tenuis", but on special occasions he allowed himself slightly more lavish food (118-20), followed by unrestricted drinking (123). The beneficial effect of "Ebrietas" (1.5.16): "sollicitis animis onus eximit" (18) is strikingly similar to Ofellus' "Ceres ... | explicuit vino contractae seria frontis" (*Serm.* 2.2.124-5). Horace's own "cena" in *Serm.* 2.6 likewise involved drinking "solutus | legibus insanis" (68-9). The significant difference between the examples from *Serm.* 2 and *Epist.* 1.5 is the setting. Horace's urban dinner party resembles his rural one in all the essential details: food (1.5.2; cf. *Serm.* 2.6.63-4); pleasant conversation (1.5.11; cf. *Serm.* 2.6.70-6), and the indulgence in wine cited above.

In the "Nasidieni cena" (*Serm.* 2.8) the host had also invited a guest of honour (Maecenas) with higher status, but unlike that disastrous, and inappropriate, "cena" Horace's dinner party in the *Urbs* will resemble a rural "cena deum" (*Serm.* 2.6.65) in its moderation and *decorum*. 1.5 can be read as referring back to *Serm.* 2.8, and providing a demonstration of how to appropriately organize an urban *cena* for an important and busy guest.¹⁶

¹⁶ It would be a digression to further develop this self-reference here. However, the question of the extent to which the poems of *Epist.* 1 comment on, and in some instances clarify, passages in *Serm.* 2 is something that I would like to investigate at a later date.

Epist. 1.6

In 1.6 place does not function thematically or as an epistolary feature; places are named (6, 18, 33, 62) as incidental details. The recipient, Numicius (1), is unknown (Mayer: *ad* 1-27), and nothing can be inferred about him from the letter (McGann: 46). Consequently, his status relative to that of Horace is not relevant. One thing that can perhaps be deduced is that Numicius was in need of a *liber amicus*.

The subject matter of 1.6 is entirely philosophical: “at once the least epistolary and most philosophical of the collection” (Kilpatrick: 65), being an exhortation to philosophical detachment (McGann: *ibid.*). The argument is a philosophical justification for behaving in a way that is appropriate to one’s own nature, a topic which becomes linked with status in 1.7. As the first sustained explication of “decens”, 1.6 signals an important development of “verum atque decens”.

“Nil admirari” (1): “Marvel at nothing” (tr. Fairclough 1929: 287) is the basis of the first half of the poem (1-27)¹⁷, and is a precept common to many philosophical schools. While not disagreeing with this, Armstrong believes that Horace presents “an Epicurean version of what this maxim should mean” (2004: 284), similar to the practice of Philodemus. The final line of this section (27, adapted from Lucr. 3.1025) confirms the Epicurean perspective (*ibid.*: 285). The argument is also compatible with the doctrine of the mean, and can be read as the familiar Horatian advocacy of moderation. Excessive zeal in pursuing even the *summum bonum* is criticized (15-16).

Recognizing that “nil admirari” may not be possible for everyone, in the second half of the poem (28-66) Horace provides *exempla* of things that people do “marvel at”. Ostensibly he is suggesting other ways to the *vita beata*, but as all the options: Stoic *virtus* (30-2a, cf. 15-16); wealth (32b-48); political ambition (49-55); gluttony (56-64), and love and jests (65-6) have been rejected by Horace himself elsewhere in the *Sermones* it is clear that none of these are appropriate for him. However, as the last two lines (67-8) indicate, he is not preaching dogmatically, and Numicius should choose whatever course is appropriate for him. “Istis” (67) refers to v.28-66 which Horace rejects for himself, whereas “his” (68) refers back to v.1-27, Horace’s preferred choice. Further, as a *proficiens* he suggests he is prepared to learn from Numicius, if he has better suggestions (67). “Candidus” (68), glossed as “frankly” by Macleod (1986: 19) has overtones of Epicurean *parrhesia*, and the

¹⁷ This analysis of 1.6 is indebted to McGann (46-8), except where otherwise indicated.

possibility of Numicius reciprocating as a *liber amicus* (cf. Horace and Albius in 1.4 above).

Epist. 1.7

In the first half of this poem place and Horace's status as Maecenas' client-poet are interconnected. In this section (1-45), in an exploration of appropriate behaviour in a patron-client relationship from his own personal perspective, Horace justifies having been away from Rome longer than expected (1-2), his intention to stay away for a considerably longer time, but with a specified time for his return (3-13), and finally his desire not to be obliged to be in Rome most of the time (14-45).

His justification for having been in the "rus" (1), not explicitly identified but presumably the *Sabinum*, for a whole month rather than the promised five days (1-2), and his intention to spend the winter by the sea (10-12), is that these places are more appropriate for his physical health than the *Urbs* (6-9). As Dilke (ad loc.) notes, "contractus" in "contractus leget" (12) is ambiguous, but in Macleod's translation: "will ... retire with his books" (1986: 21), it depicts Horace's chosen winter retreat as a suitable location for *otium litteratum*. In 1.2 Horace was writing from Praeneste, in 1.7 he prefers to be in the "rus" (1), or by the sea (11), the crucial point being that these places are all outside the *Urbs*.

To justify not being in Rome as much as Maecenas might consider appropriate (25) necessitates a diplomatic and complex argument (14-45). Unlike the Calabrian in the negative *exemplum* (14-19), Maecenas has not bestowed inappropriate gifts on Horace. On the contrary, he has behaved according to the "compressed statement of how favours should be given and taken [20-24]" (Macleod 1979: 20). As Maecenas has been the ideal patron, so Horace will be the ideal client: "I shall prove worthy as the giver has deserved" (24, tr. Macleod 1986: 21).

This tactful expression of gratitude for *beneficia* received in the past prepares the ground for the most sensitive and difficult aspect of Horace's argument: his desire to be allowed to stay outside Rome in the future, consistent with what he now believes to be "decens" for a man of his age (25-9; cf. 1.1.4). The fable of the fox¹⁸ trapped in the corn-bin (29-33) culminates in: "hac ego si compellar imagine, cuncta resigno"

¹⁸ Reading "vulpecula" (29) for Shackleton Bailey's "cornicula". The other animal suggested here, Bentley's "nitedula", is refuted by Dilke and Mayer (both: ad loc.).

(34), “a critical moment in the argument” (Macleod 1979: 20). Horace declares that if he has behaved like the fox he will hand back everything. But in the following verses (35-6) he shows that in fact he has not been guilty of such behaviour. Unlike the fox, he has not been ‘trapped’ by Maecenas’ patronage, because he has self-knowledge and is aware that a life of urban luxury is not appropriate for him. He would not sacrifice his independence for the urban luxuries and extravagance implied in v.35-6 (Dilke²: ad loc.). These are things which he would be prepared to relinquish (Macleod: *ibid.*).

The *exemplum* from Homer (40-3) reinforces this interpretation: Telemachus declines Menelaus’ gift of horses because Ithaca, his home, is not appropriate for them (“non ... aptus” (41), “magis apta tibi tua dona” (43)). The horses correspond to the benefits that Horace would receive in return for living in the *Urbs*, and which he would decline. The concluding lines of this section: “parvum parca decent. mihi iam non regia Roma, | sed vacuum Tibur placet aut imbellis Tarentum” (44-5) make it clear, in terms of both place and status, that Horace would not give back the *Sabinum*. This gift from Maecenas to Horace has facilitated for the poet the independent, modest lifestyle in the country he now (“iam” (44)) feels is appropriate for his age and status, “and Horace’s staying out of town (*sic*) is therefore the right response on the part of the receiver” (Macleod: *ibid.*).

The remainder of the poem (46-95) concerns the long anecdote of the patron-client relationship between Philippus and Vulteius Mena. This is a cautionary tale in which the patron’s inappropriate gift led to considerable distress for the client. It functions as a compliment to Maecenas by presenting the story of a very different patron told in an entertaining way that demonstrates Horace’s skill as a poet. There is no more appropriate way of expressing gratitude for the *Sabinum*, and justifying the opportunity to spend more time there, than to write for Maecenas the poetry which rural *otium litteratum* enables.

Although there are similarities between Mena and Horace (56-9) (McGann: 54), there are important differences between Philippus and Maecenas. In particular, Philippus is shown to be impetuous and insistent in persuading Mena to be his client (60-71). This contrasts sharply with Horace’s description of the slow and careful way Maecenas selected clients (*Serm.* 1.6.52-62). The fundamental difference in the story, however, is that Mena lacks “self-knowledge” (Macleod *ibid.*: 20), and the awareness that his life in the city was perfectly appropriate for him and brought him contentment

(58). By contrast, Horace through experience and the benefits of philosophy has this self-knowledge and furthermore, as he demonstrates earlier in the poem, he has the determination to defend his right to pursue the life that he knows is appropriate, outside Rome. He does not want to risk losing this precious benefit (96-7).

The concluding *sententia*: “metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est” (98) emphasizes the concept of *decorum*. Horace’s preferred rural life would obviously not be right for the urban Mena, and to achieve *aequanimitas* each individual must recognize what is personally appropriate, and have the courage and confidence to pursue it. The thought expressed in v.98 first occurred at *Serm.* 1.3.77-9 and 117-19.¹⁹ There it was in the context of *amicitia*, and especially tolerating a friend’s faults. In that poem Horace also described the first tentative steps in his relationship with Maecenas (*Serm.* 1.3.63-66). *Epist.* 1.7 is the last detailed exploration of that relationship. 1.19 is also addressed to Maecenas, but it deals with a literary topic.

Epist. 1.8

Place is not thematic in this poem, the two place names mentioned (“Roma” and “Tibur” (12)) will be discussed below. Status is relevant as 1.8 continues the exploration of relationships between men of unequal status from 1.7, and in particular how it affects inferiors. The recipient, Albinovanus Celsus (1), is addressed indirectly via the Muse (1-2). Given that in an earlier poem Celsus was rebuked for the unoriginal nature of his poetry (1.3.15-20), there is irony as well as tact in this form of address (Macleod 1979: 21 n.28). In terms of poetic status Horace is using the Muse, with the highest poetic status, to address a young man whose status as a poet would not be high by Horace’s standards.

In 1.8, it is Celsus’ attitude towards his social advancement (“comiti scribaeque Neronis” (2)) that is the reason for indirect criticism. The emphatic placing of his *cognomen* (“Celso” (1)) suggests that Horace is playing with the ‘lofty’ connotations of the name “Celsus” (Macleod *ibid.*: 21): he may be getting ‘too tall for his height’. As he lacked self-knowledge with regard to his poetry in 1.3, so here he has the same problem with his social relationships. Using himself as *exemplum* to soften the rebuke, Horace reveals (3-12) that his own mental state is far from “recte”

¹⁹ It is also implicit at *Epist.* 1.2.70-1.

(4), and shows that he is aware of just how faulty his behaviour is (7-12), especially in his attitude towards his friends (9-10). By contrast, Celsus does not have this self-knowledge (13-17) (Macleod: *ibid.*). When asked by the Muse about relations with his superior Tiberius (“*iuveni*” (14)) and his friends (“*cohorti*” (14)), some uncertainty would have been more appropriate than his answer “*recte*” (15) (Mayer: *ad* 15)

Horace’s self-knowledge about his condition also reveals that he is still a *proficiens*. His vacillating between Tibur and Rome (11-12; cf. 1.1.81-7), in particular, shows that he is guilty of inconsistency. There is possibly an Epicurean allusion here, as Lucretius used a similar image of indecision between city and country, but without any specific place names (3.1057-67) (Dilke²: *ad* 12). As commentators note, Davus made a similarly worded accusation against Horace at *Serm.* 2.7.28-9 (Dilke²: *ibid.*; Mayer: *ad* 12). In retrospect, the Lucretian association would add to Davus’ lack of credibility as a Stoic convert.

Epist. 1.9

Status is again an important aspect of this poem, a *commendatio* for Septimius (1), addressed to Tiberius (“*Claudi*” (1)). Septimius is now unknown, but it is assumed “that he aimed to improve his status” (Mayer: *ad* 1-9). The collection of Cicero’s letters of recommendation (*Epistulae ad Familiares* Book 13) contains seventy nine such letters, evidence that this type was very common in the late Republic. Horace’s status was very different from Cicero’s, and he was not as confident about his appropriateness for this task (1-6) (Mayer: 181). True to his poetic standards, Horace has reworked the conventions of the *commendatio* by placing the emphasis on the referee rather than the person recommended.

“*Fortem crede bonumque*” (13) shows that Horace considers Septimius eminently suitable to join Tiberius’ *cohors amicorum*. Horace’s actual recommendation is limited to the last line, and the bulk of the letter is a reflection on his own status. To some extent, Septimius’ confidence in Horace’s influence with Tiberius (1-6) recalls the misperceptions of Horace’s relationship with Maecenas in the encounter with the urban crowd at *Serm.* 2.6.20-39 (esp. 38-9). His careful self-examination here reveals that his decision was made on the basis of enlightened self-interest (1.9.8-11).

This poem explores a wider ethical issue relevant to status: the character of the referee is just as important as that of the person recommended. This logically touches

on the much broader question of how good character is determined (cf. *Serm.* 1.6.52-64). Further, young men like Septimius should choose their referees carefully and appropriately (Mayer: *ibid.*).

Epist. 1.10

Place as the *Urbs/rus* antithesis is emphatically announced in the opening lines (1-2) (Mayer: *ad* 1-2). Horace depicts the addressee, Fuscus (1), as a close friend and equal (2-5). He is similarly portrayed elsewhere in Horace's corpus: at *Serm.* 1.9.61-74 he was "mihi carus" (61), although humorously unhelpful in the encounter with the *molestus*, and "optimus ... | Fuscus" (*Serm.* 1.10.82-3) was one of Horace's select audience (Dilke²⁰: *ad* 1). The only difference between the two friends in *Epist.* 1.10 is where they choose to live (1-3, 6-7). Horace, "ruris amator" (2), associates the "rus" with *libertas* ("vivo et regno" (8); Mayer: *ad loc.*), and the *victus tenuis* (10-11). The image of the country as *locus amoenus* (6-7) occurs here first in Horace's hexameter corpus, and recalls *Lucret.* 5.951²⁰ (Mayer: *ad* 7).

The thought: "vivere naturae ... convenienter" (12) is the key to Horace's argument. As Harrison observes, this is indebted to "Cicero's translation of the ... ultimate aim of Stoic moral theory ... [at] *Off.* 3.13" (1992: 545). But v.13-14 reveal that Horace adapts this precept to make it compatible with his preferred rural *otium* ("novistine locum potiore rure beato?" (14)), and Epicurean doctrine (Macleod 1979: 25). "Natura" (12) now refers to "man's natural needs and satisfactions which Epicurus took as the guide to right living" (*ibid.*), the appropriate location for the ideal Epicurean life being the "rus".²¹

The moderate climate of the "rus" (15-17) suggests an association with moderation of desires (Epicurus *Ep. Men.* 127). One needs to be able to distinguish true from false (29) in order to choose wisely between urban luxuries and their natural, rural alternatives (19-23). In a passage (30-3) reminiscent of Ofellus' statement of the ability of his personal philosophy to help him withstand a change in fortune (*Serm.* 2.2.107-11), Horace again returns to, and advocates, the *victus tenuis*, but with no clearly indicated location. The fable of the horse and the stag (34-8) can also be interpreted in Epicurean terms. For the sake of the short-term pleasure of

²⁰ "Umida saxa, super viridi stillantia musco",

²¹ Macleod (*ibid.*: n.46) provides the relevant sources from Epicurus and Lucretius.

winning the contest (34-7), the horse suffered the long-term pain of having sacrificed his freedom (38). Pursuit of wealth is equated with this loss of freedom (39-41a), with a further recommendation of the *victus tenuis* (41b; cf. *Serm.* 2.2.1). Desires need to be moderated to be appropriate to resources (42-3).

The repeated address to Fuscus (“Aristi (44)”) emphasizes his close involvement in this passage (44-8). These lines can be read in various ways. For McGann, it is evidence that Horace is “asking Fuscus to be a *liber amicus*” (60), a substitute for Maecenas who has been shown to be neglecting that duty (1.1.94-105) (*ibid.*). Certainly it could be that Horace as a *proficiens* is saying that he still needs a *liber amicus*. Alternatively, this passage could be ironic, with Fuscus being the one who is striving to accumulate more wealth than is really necessary (46), and is in danger of losing his *libertas* (47). Horace as “*ruris amator*” (2) is more likely to be able to live “*laetus sorte ... sapienter*” (44) than Fuscus would be in the city. This would give point to the repeated allusions to the *victus tenuis* and negative images of excess wealth. These occur frequently in Horace’s hexameter corpus, but here they are used specifically to admonish Fuscus, the recipient of the letter.

The fable would also have relevance here in that a more appropriate course of action for the horse might have been to withdraw from the contested “*communes herbae*” (34), as Horace has chosen to withdraw from the city (8-9). More specifically the text reads: “*ista reliqui*” (8). If “*ista*” is interpreted as “urban pleasures” (Mayer: *ad* 10), and these are things that Fuscus marvels at (“*mirabere*” (31); cf. 1.6), then Horace’s implicit advice to Fuscus via the fable is to abandon the urban rat race, paradoxically represented by the “*communes herbae*” (34), for a life of rural *otium*. This is the unarticulated message of the final two lines, where Horace says that his Epicurean life is “*laetus*” (50; cf. 44) except for one thing: the absence of his friend Fuscus (Macleod *ibid.*: 27).

Macleod’s interpretation differs in that he does not believe that Horace is promoting the country as being more appropriate for Fuscus’ happiness than the city: “what he recommends is as possible for Fuscus in the town as for himself in the country” (1986: 27). The problem with this proposal is that the city is not depicted in the text in a neutral way, especially at v.15-23, certainly not with images that suggest a place conducive to the *vita beata*. What Armstrong has observed for 1.6 may also apply *mutatis mutandis* to 1.10. Horace “is offer[ing] a Hobson’s choice under the guise of a series of choices, none of which on closer reading is attractive but the first

[i.e. Epicurean]” (2004: 284).²² The poem is a major statement and confirmation of the “rus” as the ideal place for Horace, the place where he can enjoy a life of Epicurean *otium* and *libertas*. As both McGann (60) and Mayer (190) note, 1.10 is the last poem in the first half of the *libellus*. If this is a significant placement, then it is unlikely that Horace would be as non-committal with respect to Fuscus’ choice of place as Macleod’s interpretation suggests.

Epist. 1.11

This difficult poem “focus[es] upon the theme of place as bearing on contentment” (Mayer: 195). The identity of the addressee, Bullatius (1), is unknown. The only information that can be deduced from the text is that he is familiar with Rome (4), and has been travelling in the Greek islands and Asia Minor (1-6).

The question in v.4 compares exotic destinations with Rome, and is an early hint that Bullatius’ travels might be for the wrong reasons. In the section about Lebedus (6-10) Horace empathizes with him (Kilpatrick: 77), but not for the biographical reasons that Kilpatrick suggests. Rather it is to identify why Bullatius has left Rome. He is endeavouring to solve his problems by running away to a place where he is not known (9), illustrated by a line (10) symbolic of Epicurean detachment (cf. *Lucr.* 2.1-2). As Horace emphasizes with the following *exempla*, living in Lebedus would be equivalent to resorting to places of temporary refuge (11-16), and would not be a permanent solution.

For a person who is “incolumis” (17) travel is unnecessary for happiness: “It cannot make good deficiency or enhance sufficiency” (Mayer: *ad* 18-19). The latter point is tantamount to the Epicurean teaching that pleasure cannot be increased (Epicurus *RS* 18). Provided the circumstances of life are right, Bullatius would not need to leave Rome (20-1). This entails having the right attitude of mind, *aequanimitas* (30). The final section (22-30) contains a mixture of Epicurean (22-25a, 26) and Stoic (25) arguments, leading to a tentative conclusion that Bullatius should choose whichever philosophy he finds most appropriate.²³ A change of place does not

²² Armstrong does not discuss *Epist.* 1.10 in this article.

²³ This poem justifies a more thorough analysis, particularly with respect to the philosophical allusions, than time and an impending deadline permit at present. The potential conflict between opposing Stoic and Epicurean arguments (22-7; cf. 8-10) could cast doubt on the conventional conclusion that “*Epistle* 11 reinforces the point that places are in the end indifferent to our happiness” (Macleod 1979: 25).

bring about a change of mental state (27). Restless searching is pointless (28-9), provided one possesses the right attitude of mind it is possible to live happily even in Ulubrae (30), “the last word in unpleasantness” (Macleod 1986: 31).

If restless travelling from place to place (28-9) is a metaphor for attempting to find happiness by inappropriate methods, then the moral for Bullatius is that he must find a permanent solution for his problems, whatever they are. There does seem to be an exhortation to Epicurean philosophy (22-25a; cf. 1.4.13-14), but this is problematized by the apparent rejection of the earlier Epicurean allusion (26; cf. 10).

As far as Horace is concerned, the ‘mirror image’ of the thought in v.30 seems more applicable: it is not possible to find happiness in any place, even the *rus*, if one lacks *aequanimitas*. This would retrospectively explain earlier examples of his inconsistency with respect to place (1.8.12 and *Serm.* 2.7.28) as indicating a disturbed state of mind.

Epist. 1.12

McGann notes that this poem and the two immediately following are “addressed to men who are, in different ways, subject to others” (62). In addition to this linkage, there is a retrospective connection with 1.11 in that Bullatius and Iccius are both discontented. Unlike Bullatius, however, Iccius is not a complete unknown, being the addressee of *Carm.* 1.29, and the cause of his *mempsimoiria* can be deduced from the text of 1.12. Pompeius Grosphus (22) was addressed in *Carm.* 2.16, and 1.12 is a poem where evidence from the *Odes* can assist interpretation (Kilpatrick: 84).

As with Bullatius, Iccius is associated with place distant from Rome. He is resident in just one place, Sicily, where he has administrative responsibility of some sort for Agrippa’s estates (1). The general assumption is that he was Agrippa’s

Similarly: “Happiness is an inner state and does not depend on the place where a man happens to be” (McGann: 60). Rather, Horace could be arguing that being in the right place is a component of *aequanimitas*. This would require a reassessment of the well-loved maxim (27); it could be that an appropriate change of place can bring about a change of mental state. Living a *vita beata* at Ulubrae may be an impossibility, not “an argument *a fortiori* for indifference to place” (Mayer: *ad* 30). Horace could also be investigating whether it is possible to live happily in a place which does not offer all the benefits of the *rus*, such as Lebedus, depicted as an extreme of total isolation without *amici* (7-10).

*procurator*²⁴ (Mayer: *ad* 1-11; Dilke²: *ad* 1), a position which would involve oversight of all the estates with *vilici* (cf. 1.14) working under his control (Dilke²: *ibid.*). He would not enjoy the status of a landowner, although he could make money from the land he administered (1-2) (Mayer: *ad* 1).

Kilpatrick has described this poem as “in some ways one of the most complex of the whole collection” (84). One of the difficulties in its interpretation is that it is composed of several discrete episodes. In the first episode (1-11) Iccius has clearly been complaining (“*tolle querelas*” (3)), presumably about his financial status (1-6) (see below). Employing common precepts from moral philosophy, Horace points out that sufficient wealth (4), good health (5) and a moderate lifestyle (7-9) are the prerequisites for happiness (Kilpatrick: 85). The clear implication is that the last element is at the root of Iccius’ dissatisfaction. Neither of the alternatives: a natural inclination to moderation (10) or the study of moral philosophy (11), now apply to him.

The allusion to philosophy leads to the next episode (12-20), which reveals Iccius’ preference for natural philosophy: “*sublimia*” (15), illustrated by v.16-20. This contrasts with his earlier interests, the moral philosophy of Panaetius and Socrates (*Carm.* 1.29.13-14). Even if Iccius, unlike Democritus, were able to successfully combine farming with natural philosophy, and the implication is that he could not, it is not appropriate for his current needs. What he needs is the friendship of Pompeius Grosphus (21-4), a good man (“*bonis*” (24)). He was possibly portrayed as an Epicurean in *Carm.* 2.16 (Nisbet-Hubbard 1978: 253). Certainly Horace depicts *amicitia* here in 1.12 as a utilitarian relationship of benefit to both parties (Epicurus *Sent. Vat.* 23)²⁵: Iccius needs a friend rather than natural philosophy, while Grosphus has unexplained needs, and Iccius should be willing and able to help him (22-4).

In the final episode (25-9), Horace names the three most important men in contemporary political and military affairs: Agrippa and Tiberius (26), and Augustus (“*Caesaris*” (28)). This is the first mention of the latter since the passing allusion at 1.5.9. These lines can be read as no more than a client-poet drawing attention to

²⁴ Kilpatrick (145-7 n.128) has queried this assumption, and draws attention to the fact that we really do not know what Iccius’ legal status was. However, there seems to be no firm evidence on which to base a different designation.

²⁵ “All friendship is desirable in itself, though it starts from the need of help” (tr. Bailey 1970: 109).

victories (27-8) and prosperity (28-9). It could also be further admonition to Iccius to stop complaining, there is peace and prosperity throughout the Empire so he really has nothing to complain about.

Iccius' *mempsimoiria* seems to be motivated by concerns over his status. Although he can enjoy the benefits of the land and make more than enough money for a comfortable life, he does not own the land (Macleod 1986: 32), and consequently does not have the status of a landowner. The word order at the beginning of v.1 emphasizes this: "Fructibus Agrippae Siculis". The Sicilian "fructus" belong to Agrippa,²⁶ and Iccius himself appears at the end of the line. The implied accusation is that he wants more than is appropriate for his needs (4), and does not have the self-knowledge to recognize the advantages that he has (2-3, 5-6). This is consistent with his characterization as avaricious at *Carm.* 1.29.1-5. Iccius in 1.12 suffers from the misconception that status depends on wealth ("tanti quantum habeas sis" (*Serm.* 1.1.62)). Whatever the cause, he clearly lacks *aequanimitas*, and consequently would not be happy wherever he lived.

Epist. 1.13

Neither Horace's location nor that of Augustus (2, 18) is specified. All that can be assumed is that they are in different places. Vinnius has already set out on his mission to deliver poems, whatever they were, to Augustus (1-2), and Horace is anxious to reinforce the instructions that he had already given to Vinnius (Kilpatrick: 15). Nothing can be deduced about how far Vinnius had to travel: v.10 is almost certainly ironic exaggeration (Dilke²: 117; *pace* Kilpatrick: *ibid.*).

Although the addressee is ostensibly Vinnius (2), this letter is really addressed to Augustus (2), who is named first. The two references to Augustus in the letter, "Augusto" (2) and "Caesaris" (18), "centre[s] the poem on H[orace]'s relationship with Augustus" (Moles 1995: *ad* Epistle XIII). More specifically, because the poem is concerned with Horace's poetry as finished product to be presented to his patron, his status as client-poet is highly relevant and will be discussed below. The identity, and hence status, of Vinnius, has been the subject of debate. If a real person is intended, then it seems most likely that he was one Vinnius Valens, a centurion of Augustus'

²⁶ Reading "Agrippae" as genitive, not dative with "colligis" (K-H⁵ 1957: *ad* 1; Dilke²: *ad* 1; Kilpatrick: 83).

praetorian guard (Dilke²: 116; Kilpatrick: 17; Mayer: *ad* 1-9). He was mentioned by Pliny (*Nat.* 7.82) in connection with “his prodigious strength” (Kilpatrick: *ibid.*), which gives humorous point to v.6, 10 and 16. His position as a centurion would make access to Augustus not unlikely, but he would not appreciate comparison with the types in v.13-15 (Kilpatrick: 16).

The central issue is Horace’s relationship with Augustus. The dramatic situation indicates that Horace was directly responsible for dispatching his poems, Maecenas does not function as an intermediary here.²⁷ There is considerable humour in Horace’s paradoxical choice of a man as seemingly inappropriate for the job as Vinnius, and then becoming so anxious to ensure that he carries out his duties appropriately. This device does, however, give him the opportunity to show how solicitous a client he is. The conditions: “*si validus, si laetus erit, si denique poscet*” (3; cf. *Serm.* 2.1.17-20) epitomize a client’s awareness of *decorum*, and express essentially the same thought as Ennius’ “*secunda loquens in tempore*” from the “Good Companion” passage (*Ann.* 222W) (see p.69).

By nature a patron-client relationship is reciprocal, and the reception of *beneficia* by the patron affects the reputation of the poet and his poems. If Vinnius, Horace’s agent, were to behave inappropriately (4-5), it could potentially damage Horace’s status as a poet (Mayer: *ad* 5). The image of abandoning a heavy load (6-7) recalls the orders of Aristippus to his slaves (*Serm.* 2.3.99-102) (Mayer: *ad* 7). This also refers back to 1.1.18-19, and the notion of being in control of external circumstances. One thing that a poet cannot control is the fate of his “*libelli*” (4) once they have left his own hands. Horace in 1.13 attempts to retain control for as long as

²⁷ This should not be taken to imply that Maecenas ‘fell from favour’ in 23 BCE. The idea that Maecenas lost favour because of his involvement in the conspiracy of Varro Murena and Fannius Caepio derives from Syme (1939: 333-43). More recently scholars have questioned this, and the debate about Maecenas’ ‘retirement’ is summarized by White (1991). Following Badian (1982), he believes that there was no loss of influence in 23, and that the “nonpoetic sources ... furnish no corroboration for the belief that Maecenas’ position in Roman literary society deteriorated during the last fifteen years of his life” (White *ibid.*: 130). Williams (1990) has revised his earlier acceptance of Syme’s view, and on the basis of literary evidence argues that it had been intended that Augustus would take over literary patronage when the time was right (267). Also following Badian (1982: 37), Williams pinpoints the date of crucial changes in patronage as 18 BCE (*ibid.*), a date which heralds the beginning of a period of greater stability at Rome, and therefore a time when it would be more appropriate for Horace to address Augustus directly in his poetry, regardless of patronage arrangements.

possible by thoroughly instructing Vinnius in all aspects of his duty, including not making public (“vulgo” (16)) what he has been delivering: “carmina quae possint oculos aurisque morari | Caesaris” (17-18). This motif of the poet’s anxiety about the reception and fate of his poems anticipates 1.19 and 1.20.

Epist. 1.14

In 1.13 Horace extended the range of social status of his addressees by utilizing a man of lower status as the pretext to address the man with the highest status in Rome (McGann: 66). In 1.14 he increases the range still further, by directly addressing a man of much lower status than himself: the slave who is the “vilicus” (1) of his Sabine farm. Place and status function here in ways which allude to several of the preceding poems. The most obvious comparison is with 1.7, where the situation with respect to the status and location of the protagonists is reversed. In 1.10 Horace writes from the “rus” to Fuscus, a recipient of equal status, in the “urbs”.

In both 1.7 and 1.10, Horace wanted to be in the “rus”, or at least not in the “urbs”. Fuscus was happy to be in Rome “without hostility to the country” (McGann: 66), and Maecenas’ opinion on his location is not stated. The difference in 1.14 is that both Horace and the “vilicus” would rather be in the opposite place (1-10): “rure ego viventem, tu dicis in urbe beatum” (10). Horace is detained in Rome by his duty for Lamia, a bereaved friend (6-8). This will be discussed below. Discontent is expressed in terms (10-11) which recall *Serm.* 1.1.1-3 (Dilke²: *ad* 11; also *Serm.* 1.1.9-12), while the thought that it is the state of mind (“animus” (13)) that is at fault not the “locus” (12) is reminiscent of 1.11.27 (Mayer: *ad* 13).

In 1.12 Iccius was also discontented, but not specifically with place. Indeed it was shown that his situation was extremely favourable, provided that he used it wisely, and he lacked self-knowledge in this respect (McGann: 66). The “vilicus” similarly does not know where he is well off (41-4). He displays inconsistency with regard to place (14-15) and like Mena in 1.7, who lacked the awareness that his life in the “urbs” was perfectly satisfactory, would not realize his error until it is too late, provided that he had the opportunity to change his place. One needs self-knowledge about the things which are needed for a contented life, and where these are to be found.

Horace creates the expectation that the letter will involve a theoretical debate (4-5) (McGann: 67), and further that it will be an exhortation to cultivate a correct

state of mind (11-13). None of this eventuates (McGann: *ibid.*), and would hardly be appropriate for the “vilicus” anyway. What Horace does is to depict both locations in the more concrete terms of what they represent, both for himself and for the “vilicus”.

For Horace, the “urbs” symbolizes restriction on freedom (8-9) and “invisa negotia” (17). It is a location where the pleasures are no longer appropriate for a man of advancing age (32-4). It is also the site of *invidia* (“obliquo oculo” (37; cf. 1.10.18)) and “the bite of secret hatred” (Mayer: *ad* “odio ... morsu” (38)), because of his relationship with the *magni* (Mayer: *ad* 37). By contrast, the “rus” represents *amoenitas* (20; cf. 1.10.6-7), and the familiar enjoyment of a moderate meal in natural surroundings (35; cf. 1.10.18-21). As well as these positive attributes, there is also the absence of the disadvantages of the “urbs”.

For the “vilicus”, according to Horace, the “urbs” represents “ludos et balnea” (15) and “fornix ... et uncta popina” (21), all aspects of *otium* not *negotium*. The negative factors associated with the “rus” (23-30) are all connected with his working life. There is no evidence for his attitude towards his urban work except that he had been discontented with it (14). He shares one pleasure with Mena: “ludos” (15; cf. 1.7.59). This, like the other amusements the “vilicus” misses, is a feature of urban life. Mena’s life before his misguided move to the country is described in terms (56-9) which suggest that it was ideally appropriate for him as a free man of low status and “*tenui censu*” (56): he “fulfils an Horatian ideal of well-balanced activities” (Mayer: *ad* 1.7.57). His occupation is urban (“*praeco*” (56)), as are his leisure activities (59). As the story revealed, a change of place involved a change of lifestyle and proved disastrous for Mena. His fault was a lack of self-knowledge about how happy his urban life actually had been (cf. *Iccius* in 1.12). In choosing his original place and lifestyle he had not made inappropriate choices. This would suggest that place is not indifferent to happiness.²⁸ In the country Mena would not be able to live the same life, and the “vilicus” would not be able to enjoy his urban pleasures. If these things are appropriate for their happiness, then they could not be happy outside the city.

²⁸ See n.23 above. Mayer has also detected a difficulty in reconciling the assumption about place as an indifferent with certain aspects of the text. Discussing 1.14, he notes that “there is a fundamental inconsistency, which he tries here to justify up to a point” (212). Mayer believes that Horace insists on the country as his most appropriate place “but remains convinced in principle that place should be a matter of indifference to the well-regulated spirit (10-11, cf. 11.27)” (*ibid.*).

Horace established in *Serm.* 2.6 that the *Sabinum* embodied the values that are conducive to *aequanimitas* for him, and that the “urbs” was associated with *negotium*, and inappropriate for his nature. This view has not changed so far in *Epist.* 1: his position in 1.14 is essentially the same as that of *Serm.* 2.6. The urban *negotium* in the earlier poem was the general duties of a client (*Serm.* 2.6.20-39), and writing poetry was associated with the *otium litteratum* of the *Sabinum* (*ibid.*: 16-17). In 1.14 he refers to “invisa negotia” (17), suggesting that irksome duties still impede his ‘real work’, and this was also an element in the subtext of 1.7.1-45.

Dramatically, Horace had to account for his absence from the *Sabinum*, and the reason given is his obligation to his grieving friend Lamia (6-8). The precise identification of the Lamia here is problematical (Mayer: *ad* 6), but this is not as important as his family connections. The Aelii Lamiae from Formiae were a family “of the Italian upper-class” (Treggiari 1973: 252), making Lamia of a higher status than Horace (*ibid.*). They were among the families promoted to patrician status by Augustus in 30-29 BCE (*RG* 8.1) to redress the losses of the late Republic: “the new nobility of the Revolution” (Syme 1939: 382). As with Lollius (1.2) and “the *cohors amicorum* of Tiberius [1.3]” (Mayer: 8), Horace is demonstrating his concern for “the new nobility”, the supporters of Augustus. He does this by offering advice in letters, or by helping them in person when needed. The success of the Aelii Lamiae illustrates another status issue, that of upward mobility. This is also relevant for Horace himself, and the cause of the *invidia* that he suffers in the “urbs” (37-8).

One real difference between the “vilicus” on the one hand, and Horace, Mena (1.7), Fuscus (1.10), and Iccius (1.12) on the other, is that the “vilicus” is not free to choose where he lives. Without this freedom, it is impossible to discover where one’s appropriate place is. But even for a free man like Horace there are still “obstantia” (9) to keep him from his desired location, whether they are the *officia* of *clientela* (1.7) or *amicitia* (1.14). Nobody has total freedom, there must be compromise, and it is not always possible to “res ... subiungere” (1.1.19).

In connection with Horace’s status as master vis-à-vis his “vilicus”, it is misguided to anachronistically attribute to him such traits as “present[ing] himself as a humane master” (Mayer: 213), or showing “sympathy and understanding for the hard-worked bailiff at 26ff.” (McGann: 69). However much we may now condemn slavery, it was an essential feature in Roman society, and Horace is objectively detailing jobs that have to be done by slaves if the farm, its master and his dependants

are to prosper. Mayer is also of the opinion that “certemus” (4) gives the impression of some sort of equality (*ad* 4). It is, however, a false impression, because there is no *certamen* between them. This is a humorous device to introduce a further exploration of how place contributes to happiness, and the limitations on the freedom to be in that place, ironically through the medium of a letter to a slave.

Epist. 1.15

The essential basis for an interpretation of 1.15 is not to take the poem too seriously. This aspect predominates in Kilpatrick’s reading (93-6), with repeated references to “humour” (94, 95, 96). The addressee, Vala (1), is unknown. From the text it is clear that he is connected with Velia and Salernum (1), towns in southern Italy. It can perhaps be assumed from v.45-6 that he owned a villa somewhere in the region of those two towns (Kilpatrick: 95; Macleod 1986: 40). Place therefore appears as an area outside the *Urbs* that is not the *Sabinum*. Horace’s status is relevant in one detail: the naming of his physician as Antonius Musa (3) is another reference that positions him as ‘being closer to the gods’.²⁹

The allusion to Musa’s cold-water treatment justifies Horace’s intention to travel, and to visit places other than his usual haunts of Cumae and Baiae (1-13). He has a legitimate purpose for travelling, unlike Bullatius (1.11). He is seeking a cure for whatever ails him, not restlessly wandering from place to place. His questions to Vala about Velia and Salernum initially focus on essentials like the climate in winter (1), the people and state of the roads (2), and the quality of bread and water (14-16; cf. *Serm.* 1.5). It becomes apparent, however, that he intends to indulge in good wine (16-20), women (21), and extravagant food (22-3) of the kind that he has condemned elsewhere in the *Sermones*.³⁰ The significant point at the end of this section is that Horace will return home (“domum ... reverti” (24)), albeit as a “pinguis ... Phaeax” (*ibid.*; cf. 1.4.15-16). Horace’s departure from the *victus tenuis* is only temporary, the Epicurean motif of permissible occasional indulgence. There is irony in his intention to desert the fashionable Cumae and Baiae (11-12) for towns, unknown to him, where the ‘high life’ might not be as ‘high’.

²⁹ This is the fourth consecutive poem in which there is reference to either the *magni* or those close to them: Agrippa (1.12); Augustus (1.13), and Lamia (1.14).

³⁰ McGann (72 ns. 1-5) provides details of the cross-references to *Serm.* 1 and 2.

Most of the second half of the poem (26-41) is taken up with the story of Maenius (26), a character from Lucilius (1136-7W), who featured at *Serm.* 1.3.21-3 as an *exemplum* of inconsistency, as he does here (33-41) (Kilpatrick: 95). Maenius is characterized as a “scurra” (28) with the conventional parasitic traits (29-32), but more than this he is a “scurra vagus, non qui certum praesepe teneret” (28). Mayer comments that this lack of “a steady patron” (*ad* 28) indicates a degree of independence. This is true, but what is also relevant is that Maenius functions here as a contrast for Horace, who by virtue of having “a steady patron” has a home to return to (24).

Both Horace and Maenius display inconsistency, but also adaptability: “making the best of present circumstances” (McGann: 72). Adaptability recalls the “opportunistic hedonism” (*ibid.*: 73) of Aristippus (1.1.18-19). Horace is seizing the opportunity afforded by Musa’s prescribed treatment for a temporary indulgence. There is more irony here if he is supposed to be travelling for the good of his health. When Horace supposedly confesses that he is like Maenius in his inconsistency (42-6), this is only partially true. He certainly exhibits inconsistent behaviour in this poem with his plans for hedonistic indulgence (16-23; cf. *Serm.* 2.7.29-35), but it is limited by his return home (24). Maenius, without the security of a patron, may have more independence, but this entails a life of inconsistency, certainly as far as food is concerned (32-5).

Epist. 1.16

Attempts to identify Horace’s addressee are probably misguided: even the precise form of his name is disputed. The majority of editors read ‘Quinctius’, while a minority read ‘Quintius’.³¹ The majority reading is adopted here. From the text it can be deduced that he was well-known in public life in Rome (17-18) (Mayer: *ad* 1-4). Place functions in the familiar *Urbs/rus* antithesis (cf. 1.7, 1.10), but with the further contrast of Stoic/Epicurean philosophy respectively (Moles 2002: 153). Apart from allusions to orthodox Stoicism at 1.1.16-17 and 68-9, this is the only poem in the *libellus* with obvious Stoic content (McGann: 75; Moles 2002: 150).

For Horace the value of his Sabine farm is not financial, an aspect that he anticipates will be of more concern to Quinctius (1-4), but its natural assets and the

³¹ Wickham (1891: 288); Müller (1893: 123); Shackleton Bailey (1985: 278).

moral values of the *rus* that it represents (5-16). The former are warmth from the sun (6-7), but also shade when needed (9-10), and cool, clear water (12-14). “*Temperiem*” (8) indicates a moderate climate (cf. 1.10.15-21). But more than this, the *Sabinum* symbolizes moderation in general and the *victus tenuis* (Mayer: *ad* 8; cf. 1.10.10-11, 15-17, 41). In view of Quinctius’ presumed interest in the monetary aspects of the *Sabinum*, “*temperiem laudes*” (8) is probably ironic. As elsewhere in *Epist.* 1, the farm also stands for *amoenitas* (15; cf. 1.10.6-7, 1.14.20), and *salubritas* (13-16; cf. 1.7.6-9 implied).

The most important concept associated with the *rus* in the context of this poem is *perflugium* (cf. *Serm.* 2.6.16; see p.160) which overlaps with *salubritas* (13-16). “*Hae latebrae dulces*” (15; cf. 1.1.5) is indicative of Epicurean ‘living unnoticed’, and this renders Horace “*incolumen*” (16) (Moles 2002: 153) in his rural retreat. This connotes not only physical health, but also “that ‘security’ (*asphaleia*) obtained by Epicurean ‘withdrawal’ (Epic. *KD* 14)” (Moles: *ibid.*).³² In terms of philosophy, the remainder of the poem (17-79) is concerned with Stoic precepts, appropriate for Quinctius’ involvement in public life in Rome (18).

Horace is concerned that his friend is not “*incolumis*”, although he might think that he is. In order to be “*beatus*” (20; cf. 18) in public life he needs to be both “*bonus*” and “*sapiens*” (20; cf. 73). He lacks self-knowledge, and believes unreliable public opinion when it tells him that he is “*beatus*” (18-20, 21-4). He is prey to many dangers: deceptive flattery (25-9), the whims of a fickle public (30-5), and false accusations (36-9).

Horace then proceeds to demonstrate (40-62) to Quinctius that even if one is a “*vir bonus*” (40) as traditionally understood in Rome, that is not sufficient to be “*beatus*” in public life. The “*vir*” who is considered to be “*bonus*” may be only superficially good (41-5). He may behave correctly through fear of punishment or pain (46-53), rather than “because he loves virtue” (52) (Kilpatrick: 97). He may be a moral relativist and not realize that theft however petty is a crime (55-6), and despite outward appearances he may not show true respect to the gods and may be praying for the wrong things (57-62). The section on *avaritia* (63-72; cf. 1-4, 8) may be more specific for Quinctius himself, and perhaps suggests that he is pursuing a public career

³² “The most unalloyed source of protection from men, ... is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life and the retirement from the world” (Epicurus *RS* 14, tr. Bailey 1970: 97-9).

as the way to wealth and security. This motivation was specifically deprecated by Epicurus in the context of *incolumitas*: “Some men wished to become famous and conspicuous, thinking that they would thus win for themselves safety from other men” (*RS* 7, tr. Bailey 1970: 97; cf. *Lucr.* 5.1120-30).

The final section (73-9), adapted from Euripides’ *Bacchae* (492-8), illustrates the true *libertas* (cf. 63-6) of the Stoic “vir bonus et sapiens” who is “beatus” regardless of circumstances (Moles 2002: 153). He is not enslaved to possessions (75-6), and even deprived of physical liberty (76-7) he is still free. The implication is that only men like this can be “beatus” while pursuing a public career in Rome. In conjunction with v. 25-35, Moles (*ibid.*: 153-5) detects subversive elements in the defiance of the “vir bonus et sapiens” to tyranny. The subtext that political life in the *Urbs* is dangerous for Quinctius could suggest some degree of ‘anti-Augustan’ sentiment. But while it cannot be entirely discounted, Moles’ interpretation seems unlikely for this early stage of the Principate.

Alternatively, 1.16 can be read as an admonition to Quinctius to avoid politics because the state is already in the safe hands of Augustus and Jupiter (27-9), and his involvement is not needed. Horace’s letters to other political aspirants, Lollius (1.2) and Florus et al (1.3), have not counselled against ambition in this way, but they presumably came from the ‘right’ families. Further, if Horace is recommending that only a man with the attributes of a Stoic *sapiens* should consider political involvement, then based on this criterion there would not be many candidates, for the *sapiens* was a *rara avis*.

Critics have commented on the serious tone of this poem, especially when compared with the almost frivolous nature of 1.15 (Morris 1931: 91; Kilpatrick: 97, 102; Macleod 1986: 43). It is extremely difficult to detect anything even vaguely humorous. It is not unusual for humour in Horace’s *satira* to be elusive, but the sustained “*gravitas*” (Kilpatrick: 97) is atypical, although perhaps not inappropriate for the topic, and Quinctius’ situation.

Epist. 1.17

Both 1.17 and 1.18 deal with the same basic theme: “quo ... pacto deceat maioribus uti” (1.17.2): ‘the way in which to associate appropriately with people of superior status’. There are nevertheless considerable differences between the two poems, consistent with the needs of the recipients, and consequently they will be

discussed separately. Status is of fundamental importance to both poems. Place functions in its now-familiar connection with Horace's preferred lifestyle (1.17.6-10; 1.18.104-12), but there is no indication of the locations of either Horace or his addressees. There is no overt indication of epistolarity in either poem.

Scaeva (1) is unidentifiable. Evidence from the text confirms that he is younger (16), and suggests that he may be of relatively low status (11, 43). Horace acknowledges that his own preference for a life of Epicurean withdrawal (6-10, esp. 10) may not be appropriate for Scaeva (Macleod 1979: 19), and recommends finding an *amicus maior* (11-12). In a long and lively passage, he then presents alternative strategies for the life of a dependent from the perspective of two philosophies: the "opportunistic hedonism" (McGann: 73) of Aristippus versus the austerity of the Cynics (13-32). There is an implicit acceptance that *amicitia maiorum* involves the loss of some degree of *libertas* (cf. 1.16.63-79), and Horace is exploring the most appropriate way for Scaeva to live the life of a dependent (Macleod 1986: 47).

The Aristippean alternative is clearly recommended (17). In associating with "reges" (13), Aristippus openly recognized that he was not independent, and in a reciprocal relationship ("officium facio" (21)) he received substantial rewards (20). On the other hand, the hypocritical Cynic demeaned himself by begging (19), with very poor rewards (21-22), all the while insisting on his independence (22). In addition, and perhaps more importantly, is the question of adaptability (23-32; cf. Maenius 1.15.26-41). For Aristippus "omnis ... decuit color et status et res" (23), while the Cynic would not be able to adapt to a changed way of life (26). Underlying this whole passage (13-32) is the further implication that Aristippus in his association with "reges" was participating in the life of his society, whereas the Cynic was marginalized and not performing any useful role in society (Mayer 1995: 287).

Horace then proceeds to a defence of the life of the *amicus maiorum* as worthy and onerous (33-42). The triumphal displays of the "principes viri" (35) are the pinnacle of Roman "virtus" (33-4), but to have pleased these men is no mean achievement (35), and in its own way requires "virtus" (41). While it is not possible for every man to be a successful dependent of the *magni* (36), it is still important to try (37). The vital thing is to set about the task "viriliter" (38). If the prospective *amicus maiorum* has "virtus" (41), he will rightly seek appropriate honour and rewards (41-2) (Mayer: *ad* 42).

The difficulty of being a successful *amicus maiorum* is stressed in the final section of the poem (43-62), where Horace instructs Scaeva in some of the skills necessary for maximizing financial rewards. While some of this advice may seem manipulative and grasping it is essential to take into account the exaggeration and tone of sardonic humour. The client must be disciplined enough not to demand money (43-5) (Macleod 1979: 18); he should not expect to receive something for nothing (46-9), and sometimes he may have to endure hardships (51-7). Above all, he must be honest and not try to gain rewards by trickery and deceit (58-62). Basically Horace is advocating enlightened self-interest in the pursuit of financial support.

This poem was not favoured by earlier critics,³³ but it is important to realize that Horace is dealing in a relatively light-hearted way with the reality of life for many men in his society. Patronage was a traditional element of Roman society, and was to continue under the Principate. Moreover, it was a more realistic option than the political ambitions of a man like Quinctius as depicted in 1.16. In 1.17, from the perspective of personal experience, Horace is defending the position of an *amicus maiorum* as an honourable status which requires self-discipline and integrity (Macleod 1979: 18).

With the emphasis on the personal qualities (36-42) and skills (43-62) required for negotiating the pitfalls of *amicitia maiorum* Horace, as someone who has succeeded as a client, is of course demonstrating that he possesses the prerequisite character and social skills (cf. *Serm.* 1.6.62-70). More than this, there may be the suggestion that, in Horace's opinion, Scaeva does not have the ability to succeed. The opening five lines can be read as a "*captatio benevolentiae*" (Kilpatrick: 44), but the excessive self-depreciation and almost obsequious tone suggest irony (Williams 1968: 17). The exhortation to *profectus* (37-42) could indicate that Scaeva is the sort of young man who would give up rather than face the challenge, and he may be prone to the undesirable behaviours in the last section (43-62), and that he does in fact need advice (1-5). If Horace is "*docendus adhuc*" (3), Scaeva has a lot more to learn. The feasibility of this interpretation becomes more apparent by contrast with 1.18, where Horace not only stresses the onerous nature of *amicitia maiorum*, but also Lollius' good character and relevant experience.

³³ Kilpatrick in a long note (131, n.76) surveys the critical reception of 1.17 from the scholiasts to McGann (1969).

Epist. 1.18

Lollius (1), also the recipient of 1.2, has a name that points to a noble provenance, and consequently a smaller status differential with the *maiores* (Williams *ibid.*: 17-18; Kilpatrick: 50) than implied for Scaeva. In the course of the poem, several details are revealed about Lollius and his impeccable credentials. He has the fitness and skills (50-3) for the “Romanis sollemne viris opus” (49) of hunting, even if he would rather indulge a preference for writing poetry (40); he had been a successful competitor at the games on the Campus Martius (53-4), and he has seen military service in Spain with Augustus (54-7). He has not always devoted his *otium* to poetry, having been known to stage re-enactments of the battle of Actium on the lake of his ancestral estate (60-6).

The description “liberrime Lolli” (1) suggests that in spite of all these advantages he still needs advice on how to behave appropriately as an *amicus maiorum*. This becomes the opportunity for an exploration of the limits of *libertas* in *amicitia maiorum* (3-20). The extremes are defined by the characteristics of the “infidus scurra” (4, 10-14) and the *asper scurra* (6, 15-20). The former, “in obsequium plus aequo pronus” (10), displays no independence and merely imitates his patron (11-14; cf. Nomentanus in *Serm.* 2.8). The opposite extreme, the *asper scurra* (cf. Balatro in *Serm.* 2.8), is too independent, being prone to pilpulistic arguments (15-20), and it is this type that Lollius risks resembling (1-2). As an *amicus maiorum* he should be aiming for the Horatian middle course between the two extremes (9).

For his own protection, a client needs to know his place and live accordingly. He must avoid the ruinous temptations of the flesh and gambling (21); an ostentatious lifestyle (22), or *avaritia* (23-4). This behaviour would not impress his patron: a good one may help him (26-31), but a bad patron like Eutrapelus (31-6) will reduce him to the status of a gladiator or the hired driver of the vegetable grower’s horse.

1.18 complements 1.17, and provides further recommendations for appropriate ways in which a client should behave in the company of his patron (37-40, 67-95). These stress restraint in *libertas dicendi* (67-71), and a general need to be adaptable and aware of how one’s behaviour can affect a patron (89-95). Two aspects are of particular interest: “*commissum teges*” (37) and “*percontatorem fugito*” (69), which may comment retrospectively on *Serm.* 2.8. In that poem Fundanius, a member of Maecenas’ retinue, recounted to Horace the events of the disastrous “Nasidieni cena”,

some of which could be said to reflect badly on Maecenas. If Fundanius was an exemplary *amicus maiorum*, he would not have disclosed this information. Further, he was encouraged in this by Horace (*Serm.* 2.8.1, 18-19) in his role as a “percontator”, who was certainly “garrulus” (69). Fundanius should not have responded to Horace’s requests. But he did, and the “emissum ... verbum” (71) has most definitely flown beyond recall.³⁴

What a man needs to be an *amicus maiorum* is above all self-knowledge, in order to avoid the many hazards of the relationship. To this end Lollius is exhorted to study philosophy (96-103), something that he was also encouraged to do at 1.2.67-8. Whether this is reinforcement or a gentle reprimand is unclear. The suggested topics are the commonplaces of moral philosophy familiar from the rest of Horace’s corpus, culminating in a restatement of the Epicurean ‘live unnoticed’ (103; cf. 1.17.10).

1.18 is the last poem in the *libellus* which discusses aspects of “how to live in society” (Macleod 1979: 18). Appropriately, Horace concludes with a statement of what the *rus* means for him in terms of his ideal life (104-12). Significantly, the most important things are expressed in the form of a prayer (107-10), an acknowledgement that there is a limit to his control over his life. To always live like Aristippus (1.1.18-19) “and try to ride, not be ridden by my fortunes” (1.1.19, tr. Macleod 1986: 4) is as unrealistic an extreme as the orthodox Stoic “virtutis verae custos rigidusque satelles” (1.1.17; cf. 1.16.73-7). Horatian moderation involves compromise, and he is aware that his Epicurean *otium* is not a permanent option: “Me quotiens reficit gelidus Digentia rivus” (104) (McGann: 82). Similarly, he will not be able to live the rest of his life just for himself (107-8).³⁵ He also has the self-knowledge to know that he has not yet attained the state of *aequanimitas*, that is something he is personally responsible for — but it is still in the future (“parabo” (112) (Mayer: ad loc.)). His personal *libertas* as an *amicus* of Maecenas and Augustus is also a compromise, consistent with his recommendation to Lollius, the mean between the extremes (9; cf.

³⁴ This is the second instance in *Epist.* 1 of a poem which seems to comment retrospectively on *Serm.* 2.8 (see n. 16 above).

³⁵ The majority of commentators and translators read “vivam” (107) as present subjunctive, which is logical as it is one of the elements of the prayer. Mayer (ad loc.) reads it as future indicative, commenting that it “sounds the independence theme” (ibid.). But *libertas* is not something Horace has control over.

1.15). The focus on *libertas* in 1.18 continues this theme which became explicit in 1.14, and continues to the end of the book.

Epist. 1.19

The penultimate poem of *Epist.* 1, the only literary epistle in the *libellus*, contains several allusions to the literary poems of *Serm.* 1, one in the first line: “Cratino” (cf. *Serm.* 1.4.1). The address to “Maecenas docte” (1) also has literary connotations, recalling his inclusion in Horace’s audience of selected *docti amici* (*Serm.* 1.10.81; also *Carm.* 3.8.5 (Mayer: *ad* 1)). The mention of his patron also has connotations of status and, following 1.17 and 1.18, the inevitable restriction of *libertas* associated with *amicitia maiorum*. Place only functions in a minor way: “Forum Putealque Libonis” (8), symbolizing “money-lenders and ... orators” (Mayer: *ad loc.*), men who would be debarred from writing poetry (9). There is no indication of the location of either Horace or Maecenas, but the subject matter is that of the urban literary poems of *Serm.* 1.

1.19 is addressed to Maecenas as a recipient who understands the literary content of the letter, but this content is not directed to him. In this respect, the poem more closely resembles a *sermo*. The opening section (1-11), which focuses on the dispute between water-drinking and wine-drinking poets, utilizes a technique from the earlier *Sermones* (for example, 1.2, 1.3), that of beginning a poem with a subsidiary topic. Two non-literary *exempla* (12-18), introduce the theme of literary *imitatio* (19-34). An exclamation of exasperation (19-20), reminiscent of *Serm.* 1.10.21-3 (McGann: 82), reduces Horace’s imitators to servile status “servum pecus” (19). In complete contrast, Horace extols his own poetic *libertas* (21-34) (Macleod 1983: 262). His *Epodes* (23-31) were based on the model of Archilochus (25), but his *imitatio* was selective and creative (24-5), as had been the practice of his intermediate models Sappho (28) and Alcaeus (29).

The proud but restrained allusion to the originality of the *Odes* (33-4a) facilitates the transition to the reception of his poetry (35-49). The positive reference to his audience: “ingenuis oculisque legi manibusque teneri” (33-4), recalls Horace’s ideal, *doctus* audience (*Serm.* 1.10.81-7; *Serm.* 1.4.71-4). “The *ingenui* (34) exclude the *volgus* and second-rate professional critics (*servom pecus*), for they show independent spirit and taste” (Kilpatrick: 20). The “*ingratus ... lector*” (35) embraces all those excluded from the “*ingenui*” (*ibid.*: 21). As Kilpatrick observes (20), the

problems Horace experiences with the “grammatici” (39-40) are nothing new (cf. *Serm.* 1.10.90-1). His reluctance to recite in public (41-2; cf. *Serm.* 1.4.73-6; 1.10.36-9) is also a familiar trait, which provokes the familiar response (43-5) of *invidia*.

It could be said “that his situation has not changed much in fifteen years” (ibid.: 20), but there is one difference. Horace’s literary opponents in *Serm.* 1 were “Lucili fautores” (see p.92). In 1.19 he has problems with “imitatores” of his own poetry, although no specific genre is cited. Horace’s earlier insistence on his naturally belligerent nature as a writer of *satura* (*Serm.* 2.1.34-60 (McGann: 82)) is attenuated by the enlightened self-interest of his response to conflict (47-9).

In giving advice to Scaeva (1.17) and Lollius (1.18) Horace was exploring the restrictions on personal freedom entailed by patronage. In 1.19, he retreats into the *perflugium* of his literary milieu (cf. *Serm.* 1.10), and analyses his *libertas* as a poet (19-34). This *libertas* is limited only by the conventions of the chosen genre. His poetry and the patronage of Augustus (“Iovis” (43)) (Mayer: ad loc.) bring him into potential conflict with the “grammatici” (40), and accusations of elitism (41-5). However, as elsewhere (*Serm.* 1.10.78-80), he does not value the opinions of people like these: the only critics that matter are the “ingenui” (34; cf. *Serm.* 1.10.81-8). Horace does not court the popularity of a wide audience (35-45), because he does not need to. He has succeeded as an *amicus maiorum* through his talents as a poet, and with the patronage of Augustus (43) he can be independent of inferior critics.

Epist. 1.20

It has become a commonplace of the criticism of this poem to equate the book (“liber” (1)) with a “*puer delicatus*” (McGann: 85). This interpretation depends on the ambiguity of “prostes” (2) (Dilke²: ad loc.). While there is no denying the *double entendre*, the subtextual homoeroticism has been pushed to inappropriate extremes.³⁶ The interpretation here will expand on an observation by Macleod: “Horace is criticizing a part of himself, the vain author, anxious for publicity and admiration” (1979: 24). 1.20 is a final example of the self-criticism and self-knowledge that is so much a part of his hexameter corpus (ibid.).

³⁶ A particularly distasteful illustration of this is Mayer’s comment: “like a modern-day rent-boy” (*ad* 2).

Horace qua poet has written with independence restrained only by the convention of acknowledging his predecessors in the chosen genre (1.19.21-33; cf. *Serm.* 1.10.46-9; 2.1.28-34). The book represents his poems as finished product, an extension of Horace qua poet, the “part of himself” that will be displayed to the outside world, and the “part of himself” that he has no control over. He has control over the polish of the poetry within the book, but for the outward appearance he is dependent on the “Sosiorum pumex” (2). This lack of control, an aspect of slavery, means that the poet lacks *libertas* with respect to the face that he projects to the world, a world that extends beyond Rome (10) to distant parts of the Empire such as Utica and Ilerda (13).

Horace qua poet has consistently maintained his desire for a small, elite audience and his aversion to wide public exposure (*Serm.* 1.4.71-6; 1.10.36-9, 81-8; *Epist.* 1.19.33-4). In 1.1, as a reason for ‘giving up poetry’, he claimed that he had been “spectatum satis” (2), but now qua book he wants to be widely known and admired (1-5) (Macleod: *ibid.*), even if a book with so much ethical content really should know better: “non ita nutritus” (5).

Horace qua poet and “augur” (9) is only too aware of the fate that will befall his *alter ego* (9-18). The rueful observation: “carus eris Romae donec te deserat aetas” (10) adds a different dimension to the poet’s preferred life of Epicurean withdrawal in the *rus*. Among other indignities (11-14), it will lose its external polish with frequent handling (11; cf. *Serm.* 1.4.71-2 (Dilke²: *ad* 11)), assuming that it meets with wide popular approval. The ultimate fate of the poet qua book, as an elementary teaching text (17-18), was earlier scorned and dreaded by the poet qua poet (*Serm.* 1.10.74-5).

As the book projects the poet into the outside world, he is naturally concerned that it conveys a favourable impression of his life and character in the *sphragis* (19-28). The repetition of “me libertino natum patre” (20; cf. *Serm.* 1.6.6, 45, 46) and the allusion to *amicitia maiorum* (23; cf. 1.17.35) references Horace’s upward mobility, and is an oblique compliment and gratitude to his patrons Maecenas and Augustus.

Conclusion

In *Epist.* 1, the principal themes of place and status manifest themselves in complex, often interconnected, ways. With respect to place, one implication of the oft-quoted line: “caelum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt” (1.11.27), could be, the basically Stoic notion, that place is indifferent for happiness (see n.28).

The evidence from other poems in the *libellus*, however, suggests that, although not completely erroneous, this interpretation is overly idealistic, and in practical terms an impossibility.

If the wider context of this quote is considered, it becomes obvious that the individual's philosophical orientation is crucial:

nam si ratio et prudentia curas,
non locus effusi late maris arbiter, aufert,
caelum, non animum, mutant qui trans mare currunt. (1.11.25-7)

This is reinforced by the thought at 1.14.12-13:

stultus uterque locum immeritum causatur inique:
in culpa est animus, qui se effugit umquam.

Only a person who has achieved Epicurean *aequanimitas* can be totally happy wherever he or she happens to be. For lesser mortals, place is not irrelevant to happiness, but it is not the only factor. The individual's state of mind is of particular importance and could, presumably, be affected by the place where the individual happens to be. This potentially 'catch-22' situation suggests that a degree of compromise is required.

Horace's own evolving attitude to place in *Epist.* 1 illustrates his own compromise. In 1.7, he justifies not being in the *Urbs*, where he has obligations to Maecenas, on the grounds that the city is not the appropriate place for a man of his advancing age and state of health. The anecdote of Philippus and Vulteius Mena confirms that one needs self-knowledge with regard to the place which is most appropriate in order to live a *vita beata*. In the letter to his "vilicus" (1.14), Horace confirms that for him the *Urbs* is associated with "invisa negotia", and that the *rus* is his desired location. It is clear from the text that the "vilicus" would be happier in the *Urbs*. As a slave he does not have control over where he lives, but even for a free man like Horace there are always "obstantia" which prevent him from being where he really wants to be.

A passage at the end of 1.18 confirms that Horace has accepted a compromise with respect to place. "Me quotiens reficit gelidus Digentia rivus" (1.18.104) suggests that the *Sabinum* is not Horace's permanent location. Furthermore, in the prayer which follows, the place where Horace wants to spend the rest of his life is not specified. If place contributes to *aequanimitas*, this is something that he will take responsibility for, and Horace has accepted that flexibility is needed.

It is also true that no location can be perfect for an individual all the time. In 1.10, Horace extols the advantages of living in the *rus* contrasted with urban life. At the very end of the poem, however, he expresses one serious disadvantage of country life: his friend Fuscus is not there with him. Horace also demonstrates that he is able to enjoy rural simplicity in the *Urbs*. The invitation to Torquatus in 1.5 anticipates a *cena* which encompasses all the elements of Epicurean moderation and the *victus tenuis* advocated in the *Sermones*. For Horace, the opportunity to spend time with his friend is more important than the food, and this is something which the *rus* may not offer. Furthermore, this indicates that one aspect, at least, of Horace's preferred Epicurean lifestyle is now possible in the *Urbs*.

In *Epist.* 1 the *rus* is emblematic of the values of the *suburbium*, first established in *Serm.* 2.6. These are *amoenitas*, *salubritas*, *perflugium*, *otium*, and moderation, and are most clearly seen at the beginning of 1.16. The *rus* is no longer the location for *otium litteratum*, as it was in *Serm.* 2. Incidental details locate both 1.19 and 1.20, the only exclusively literary poems in the *libellus*, in the *Urbs*. This may denote another example of a previously rural element of Horace's life now achievable in the city.

The development of the theme of status also indicates flexibility and compromise. The status of the addressees in *Epist.* 1 ranges widely from Augustus (implicit in 1.13) to Horace's "vilicus" (1.14). This reflects the highly stratified nature of Roman society, and creates the impression of Horace as a man who has cultivated a wide circle of *amici*. Letters to his *potentes amici* (1.1, 1.7, 1.13, 1.19) constitute a symbolic backbone for his *libellus*, and his life. These letters frame others to younger men, mostly of higher status (1.2, 1.3, 1.8, 1.9, 1.17, 1.18), and contemporaries of varying status (1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12, 1.14, 1.15, 1.16).³⁷

1.1 reveals a degree of ambivalence towards patronage on Horace's part. The *recusatio* to Maecenas at the beginning of 1.1 articulates, in literary terms, a need for autonomy. At the end of the poem (94-105), Horace is explicitly aware of his lack of *aequanimitas*, and regrets that his patron does not seem to be concerned about this aspect of his client's needs. Although this passage is undoubtedly humorous, there is an underlying element of seriousness, which acquires more significance when combined with the evidence from later poems.

³⁷ 1.20, addressed to Horace's *liber*, functions as an epilogue.

1.7 is the last poem dealing with patronage that Horace addressed to Maecenas. Appropriately, it is fundamentally an expression of Horace's gratitude, although the complex argument tends to obscure this. The anecdote of Philippus and Mena compliments Maecenas by contrast, while at the same time exposing the negative, exploitative side of patronage.

As part of his continuing concern with status, Horace explores other possibilities in 1.15 and 1.16. In 1.15, in his brief excursion away from the *victus tenuis*, Horace compares himself with Maenius, a *scurra vagus*. Superficially, Maenius, without a patron, enjoys more independence. But having a permanent home to return to brings Horace more happiness, even if it entails the obligations of patronage. Basically, 1.16 reinforces Horace's rejection of political ambition, first encountered in *Serm.* 1.6. Quinctius is advised that to be "beatus" in public life he would need to be a Stoic *sapiens*. This is tantamount to saying that it is impossible to be both politically active and happy.

Having rejected these options, Horace explores the more general aspects of *clientela* in the letters to Scaeva (1.17) and Lollius (1.18). In these poems Horace, as an experienced and successful client, gives advice to younger men, as Trebatius had advised him in *Serm.* 2.1. Indulging in what is basically self-congratulation, Horace emphasizes that to be an *amicus maiorum* is an honourable status (1.17.34-6), and that it requires the right qualities and perseverance (*ibid.* 37-42). In this endeavour, the study of philosophy is of great benefit (1.18.96-103). In his poems to younger men, with the possible exception of 1.17, Horace is almost certainly addressing men of higher status. Being a successful poet enabled him to adopt the role of a cultural patron: "Success in poetry meant success in capital society, and that enabled a poet to wield influence over others even in spite of status handicaps" (White 1993: 47).

The literary content of 1.19 returns to an area of concern from the earlier literary *Sermones*: the *invidia* of literary rivals. At the end of the poem (45-9), however, Horace reveals that he has now developed strategies to cope with this disadvantage of *clientela*. His reluctance to engage in conflict (47-9) shows that, with maturity and the benefits of philosophy, he has learnt to moderate his own anger, consistent with Philodemus' Epicureanism. Unlike Aristippus (1.1.18-19), he may not be able to control circumstances all the time, but he can control his reactions to unfavourable situations, specifically in 1.19 *invidia* provoked by his status as a client-poet of Augustus. This impression is reinforced by the final section of 1.20, with a

further reference to *ira* (25). Just two lines earlier, Horace expresses the pleasure he derives from having succeeded as an *amicus maiorum*: “me primis urbis belli placuisse domique” (23). He admits to anger, but this is anger that is under his control, and which he can be use for protection. Horace has reached a state of acceptance of his status as a client-poet. He can control his reaction to the disadvantages, when they arise, and enjoy the advantages.

With reference to place and status, by the end of *Epist.* 1 Horace has accepted the realities of his life as client and poet. The *rus* is still a very special place for him, but cannot be his permanent location. This compromise is reflected in the fact that some pleasurable activities previously associated with the *Sabinum* are now possible for Horace in the *Urbs*. As a poet, he can deal with his literary opponents, confident in his proven talent and creative *libertas*. As a client, he can enjoy the advantages of patronage, but the “obstantia” will remain. This is something that he must continue to accept, while still striving as a *proficiens* for *aequanimitas*.

CONCLUSION

To return to Hendrickson's question (1897): "Are the Letters of Horace Satires?", on the basis of this sequential reading of all three *libelli* it can be concluded that the poems of *Epist.* 1 do belong to the genre of *satura*.

All three *libelli* share formal features, such as metre, linguistic register, tone, and length. If the superficial epistolary machinery is disregarded, the letters read very much like the *Sermones*. Most of the differences are consistent with the epistolary form, and the greater maturity of the *persona*. However, the inconclusive nature of the evidence discussed in Chapter 1 suggests that external features are not sufficient. The poems of *Epist.* 1 also satisfy Horace's desiderata for his redefined *satura*, as discussed in Chapter 2. These include *brevitas*, *Latinitas* and, above all, the restricted *libertas dicendi* of the satirist. Compared to *Serm.* 2, one major difference is that in all the letters Horace writes *in propria persona*. This, combined with more straightforward syntax, facilitates greater clarity of meaning and tone. The epistolary guise entails that the advice should be targeted in an appropriate manner for each recipient. This is unlike, for example, the 'Stoic lectures' inflicted on Horace in *Serm.* 2.3 and 2.7. But, like the *Sermones* in general, the criticism and advice is expected to have applicability beyond the purported recipient: "mutato nomine de te | fabula narratur" (*Serm.* 1.1.69-70).

For a more satisfactory demonstration that all three *libelli* belong to the genre of *satura*, content needs to be considered. As will be summarized below, the poems of *Epist.* 1 continue the ethical, personal and literary topics from *Serm.* 1 and 2, including the primary themes of place and status.

Exploration of the theme of place reveals a progression in Horace's attitude to location. In *Serm.* 1, the *Urbs* is shown to be the default setting, indicated by incidental details, for all the poems except 1.5 and 1.7. In retrospect, based on the evidence of a sequential reading, this is not surprising, because these poems were written before Maecenas' gift of the *Sabinum*. It is also the case that for all satire the city is a major source of inspiration. At the end of 1.6, Horace portrays his life in the *Urbs* as one that can, again in retrospect, be described as *rus in Urbe*. He is able to pursue the ideals of the *victus tenuis*, with a considerable degree of personal *libertas*, producing something approximating to a *vita beata*. This pleasurable state is short-

lived, however. In 1.4 there were muted hints of disadvantages of city life, with negative literary images associated with urban locations. This potential problem becomes explicit in 1.9. In this poem, Horace has his confrontation with the *molestus*, who reveals himself to be a budding poet keen to enter Maecenas' circle. Here, Horace's status as a client-poet of Maecenas begins to be connected with the *Urbs* in a negative way.

In *Serm.* 2, place becomes associated with philosophy. In 2.2, through the *exemplum* of Ofellus, the *rus* is established as the location for the *victus tenuis*, a lifestyle that provides protection against changes of fortune, and can enable the individual to live a *vita beata* with true Epicurean *libertas*. This is confirmed as Horace's desired location in 2.6. The *rus* is linked with *otium litteratum* in 2.3 and 2.6. *Serm.* 2.6 reveals the essential dilemma Horace faces with respect to status and place. The *Sabinum* is the appropriate location for his modest Epicurean lifestyle and *otium litteratum*. But it is only made possible by patronage from Maecenas, and that entails urban *officia*, which are uncongenial in themselves, and keep him away from the *rus* and *aequanimitas*. "Comparison of *Satires* 2.6, in praise of the Sabine farm, with the earlier city-idyll of 1.6 shows that in time life in Rome became more complicated for the friend of Maecenas" (Reckford 1959: 201). The fable of the *mures* at the end of 2.6 rehearses Horace's dilemma. Resolution is not possible for Horace. However, the final words of the poem, assigned to the "rusticus mus": "me silva cavusque | tutus ab insidiis tenui solabitur ervo" (116-17), may suggest that the advantages of the *Sabinum* are more important to Horace at this stage of his life and career.

Images of genuine Epicurean philosophy have positive, and rural, connotations in *Serm.* 2. On the other hand, pseudo-Epicureanism and Stoicism have negative, and urban, associations. In 2.4, the pseudo-Epicureanism of Catus and his teacher is ridiculed. In 2.8 the "Nasidieni cena", which is the complete antithesis of the "cena deum" of 2.6, is shown not to be the way to a *vita beata*. In 2.3, the urban Stoic convert, Damasippus, intrudes at great length on Horace's rural *otium litteratum*, while in 2.7, in an urban setting, another Stoic neophyte, the slave Davus, ironically lectures his master on *libertas*.

By the end of *Serm.* 2, Horace has established the *rus* as his preferred location. The *Sabinum* embodies concepts which are productive of happiness and security: *salubritas*, *otium*, *perflugium*, *temperies*, and *amicitia*. In the socio-political context,

the *rus* is more than just a metaphor for the ‘good life’. It is literally the place for withdrawal, Epicurean or otherwise, from politics and *negotium*. There is, nevertheless, some equivocation because of the dilemma revealed in 2.6. Without the *Urbs* there would be no patronage from Maecenas, and without that there would be no *Sabinum*.

The beginning section of *Epist.* 1.1 resumes this tension. There are negative urban images associated with loss of personal *libertas*, while the *rus* is linked with the Epicurean ‘live unnoticed’. Horace’s preference for a location outside the *Urbs* is confirmed by 1.7. This poem introduces a new element: that self-knowledge is essential so that an individual can choose the most appropriate place. In subsequent poems, a more pragmatic and nuanced attitude gradually evolves. The letter to Fuscus (1.10) suggests that the choice of place must be based not only on self-knowledge, but also on knowledge of true and false, with a sound philosophical basis.

1.11 introduces the Stoic notion of place as indifferent to happiness. This is shown in subsequent poems to be overly idealistic and impractical. Other factors have to be taken into account, and the individual must compromise. A person may not always have the freedom to choose their place, as is demonstrated in 1.14. Horace would rather be at the *Sabinum* but he is detained in the *Urbs*, at this particular time by the *officia* of friendship, and at other times by the “obstantia” of “invisa negotia”. The preference of Horace’s “vilicus” is for the *Urbs*, but for him the “obstantia” are those of slavery, and he is advised to make the most of the advantages of his current location. In the beginning section of 1.16, Horace expresses, in lyrical vein, what the *Sabinum* symbolizes for him. These are the concepts established in *Serm.* 2, with the addition now of *amoenitas*.

This confirms that for Horace the *rus* is ideally where he would like to spend his life. However, in the closing passage of 1.18 it is clear that he has reached a compromise position. He has come to an understanding that living at the *Sabinum* permanently is not possible, but it is still available for rest and recreation. Incidental urban details in 1.19 and 1.20 suggest that for Horace the *Urbs* is now the site for literary activity.

The theme of status is manifested in two different ways. The details disclosed by a sequential reading of the *Sermones* demonstrate Horace’s awareness of the wide range of social strata in his contemporary Rome. This is to some extent a consequence of the nature of *satura*. It is a comparatively low genre, dealing with everyday life, not

the gods and heroes of epic. In *Epist.* 1, social stratification is represented by Horace's addressees, who range from Augustus to Horace's bailiff.

The most important aspect of status, however, is that of Horace himself. This is most appropriately seen as the "story" (Braund 1992: 17) of Horace's *persona* as it develops through the three *libelli*, especially in the context of his patronage relationship. In the course of *Serm.* 1, Horace progresses from outsider to insider in the circle of Maecenas. The earliest mention of the relationship of Horace and Maecenas is in *Serm.* 1.3, followed in 1.6 by the history of Horace's recruitment "in amicorum numero" (62). The highpoint for Horace, in terms of both status and place, is his undisturbed *rus in Urbe* at the end of 1.6. Disadvantages of his status as a client-poet are first revealed in 1.9, where the *invidia* of literary rivals emerges in the encounter with the *molestus*. This poetaster shows himself to be the antithesis of Horace, and someone who does not accept that "est locus uni | cuique suus" (51-2).

The dialogue form and distancing in *Serm.* 2 restrict to some extent the evolution of Horace's *persona*. Nevertheless, there are some significant developments. In 2.1, "the easy intimacy of Lucilius and Scipio Aemilianus" (Muecke 2005: 40) provides a contrast with "Horace's less comfortable position as Maecenas' companion (*Sermones* 1.3.63-6, 2.6.40-6)" (Muecke: *ibid.*). Horace's relative discomfort is due to the greater status differential between himself and his patron(s). He explicitly acknowledges this fact:

quidquid sum ego, quamvis
infra Lucili censum ingeniumque, tamen me
cum magnis vixisse invita fatebitur usque
Invidia (2.1.74-7)

Elsewhere in *Serm.* 2, the major status issue in terms of Horace's "story" is the recurring misperception regarding his position as Maecenas' client. This first occurs in the dialogue at the end of 2.3, where Damasippus accuses Horace of competing with Maecenas. In 2.6, in addition to Horace's dilemma already mentioned, it is apparent that people mistakenly believe his position makes him privy to state secrets, and pester him for information. Finally, in 2.7, Davus portrays Horace relationship with Maecenas as a form of slavery in that Horace is compelled to attend a dinner party with his patron. The effect of these misperceptions is to make Horace more aware of his lower status, and the constant reminders increase his discomfort.

In *Epist.* 1, the ambivalence with respect to patronage continues. In 1.1, Horace reveals tension between his status as a client-poet and his need for personal *libertas*. In later poems, he further explores patron-client relationships, both from his own perspective, and in more general terms. In the complex argument of 1.7 he expresses gratitude to Maecenas, while at the same time exposing the exploitative potential of patronage. In 1.17, from the perspective of one who has succeeded as a client, he explains to Scaeva that being a client of the great is an honourable position, but not an easy option. In his advice to Lollius in 1.18, Horace suggests that to succeed as a client, one must be adaptable and prepared to compromise. 1.19 shows that Horace has indeed achieved a compromise as a client-poet. As a client, he has accepted that the *officia* of *clientela* inevitably involve some loss of personal *libertas*. As a poet, he can deal with the *invidia* of his literary rivals. He has confidence in his talent, and he is proud of his creative *libertas*, restricted only by the conventions of his chosen genres.

It is certainly the case that in all three *libelli* in the genre of *satira* Horace draws attention to his relatively low status. In his entire corpus, he refers to himself as “libertino natus patre” only in *Serm.* 1.6 and *Epist.* 1.20.¹ As already mentioned, in *Serm.* 2.1 he refers to his status as being below that of Lucilius. On the other hand, Horace displays awareness of factors which serve to alleviate the status differential in negotiating with his patrons, and other people of higher status.

As discussed in the Introduction to Chapter 5, his use of the language and arguments of philosophy is one such device. In the poems of *Epist.* 1 addressed to younger men of higher status, he adopts the role of cultural patron by virtue of his achievements as a poet. Similar ethical and aesthetic standards, White’s “ethical congruence” (1993: 14) can also produce a form of equality. “When Augustus’ cultural proclivities come into play, Vergil and Horace stand on the same footing with him as Atticus or Maecenas: they are intimates whom he teases, cajoles, consults, and strives to envelop” (White *ibid.*: 113).

As so often in Horace’s poetry, the topic of his status as a client-poet is far from straightforward. In his poems in the genre of *satira*, he is explicitly, and appropriately, aware of his lower status relative to his predecessor in the genre, and

¹ “Horace, ... was a freedman’s son and makes much of his lowly origins in his works [*Sat.* 1.6.1-6, 45-46, 89-92 and *passim*; *Epist.* 1.20.20] (Gold 1987: 113 and 220 n.5).

his patrons. At the same time, he employs devices which to some degree neutralize this status differential.

Amicitia is a complex concept in Horace's hexameter corpus, partly because of status differences. In *Serm.* 1, the circle of Maecenas is portrayed as a close group of *amici* who nevertheless observe the traditional distinctions of status. The *locus classicus* for this is *Serm.* 1.5, where the intimate friendship between the poets of equal status contrasts with the distance between them and Maecenas. A more egalitarian friendship is implied, in a literary context, at the end of *Serm.* 1.10, with Horace's preferred audience of men of varying status, although all are equally *docti amici*.

In *Serm.* 2, apart from the brief allusion to the "cenae deum" in 2.6, there is no really close or equal friendship. Horace's relationship with Maecenas (2.6), although it is a source of pleasure, is depicted as rather distant, and a component of urban *negotium*, not rural *otium*, with trivial rather than philosophical conversation. Throughout the *libellus*, the men who are engaged in dialogue with Horace are all perhaps more accurately described as acquaintances than close friends. None of his literary *docti amici* appear in *Serm.* 2. Fundanius (2.8) appeared in the list of contemporary poets in other genres in *Serm.* 1.10, but he was not one of the select few at the end of the poem. The only member of this group who appears in *Epist.* 1 is Fuscus (1.10).

The epistolary form facilitates, and indeed necessitates, a degree of remoteness. Although there are invitations in 1.3 to 1.5, and implied in 1.10, there is no evidence within the letters of Horace actually being in the company of any of these friends. Epicurean notions of friendship are represented by his function as a *liber amicus*, giving advice to help the recipient correct a perceived fault. This is also indicated by the brokering of friendship between Iccius and Pompeius Grosphus (1.12), two men who may be able to help each other. But Horace remains a solitary figure, as he was in his illusory urban *vita beata* in *Serm.* 1.6.

Horace's explicit programmatic statement about philosophy in *Epist.* 1.1 is misleading: throughout his hexameter corpus philosophy has been an essential component. Right from the start, his *satura* is "The poetry of ethics" (Macleod 1979), using moral philosophy to offer advice on how to attain, or at least approach, *aequanimitas* and the *vita beata*. His philosophical stance established implicitly in *Serm.* 1.1 remains the same at the end of *Epist.* 1: the commonplaces of ancient

ethical thought with no doctrine incompatible with Epicureanism. The extremes of orthodox Stoicism and Aristippean Hedonism are shown to be unattainable ideals. Horace is not interested in the minute details of arguments between the schools. He offers practical advice utilizing philosophical concepts. This advice, which often amounts to not much more than enlightened self-interest, is mediated through the palatable and effective medium of poetry, thus reconciling poetry and philosophy and performing a useful function for society.

One advantage of a comprehensive, sequential reading is that small, seemingly irrelevant details can acquire greater significance from the cumulative effect of repetition. In the three *libelli* studied, the topic of *ira*, as a minor thread often occurring in the context of status, falls into this category.

It first appears in *Serm.* 1.9, a poem in which Horace's status as a client-poet in the *Urbs* first acquires negative connotations. In a joking aside (11-12), Horace wishes that he could defend himself by means of anger. He apostrophizes one Bolanus whose quick temper he obviously envies. Horace himself, however, in this instance displays impeccable tolerance towards the appalling attitudes and behaviour of the *molestus*.

Horace's own behaviour has undergone a transformation by the time *ira* appears in *Serm.* 2. At the end of *Serm.* 2.3 (323-6), he demonstrates that by means of anger he can dispose of Damasippus' urban intrusion on his rural *otium litteratum*. *Ira* is an ironic weapon to use against a Stoic neophyte. The ultimate provocation for Horace's angry outburst is Damasippus' assertion that Horace is competing with Maecenas in building projects. In this passage (307-13), height is used as a metaphor for status. Horace also employs *ira* to rescue himself from the irritations of another would-be Stoic, the slave Davus, at the end of *Serm.* 2.7 (116-19). Status differentials are explicit or latent throughout this poem, and Horace's anger re-establishes his position as *dominus*, and terminates Davus' temporary equality.

Ira appears in *Epist.* 1 in the context of advice from Horace to younger men, and also in passages about Horace himself. It is thematic in 1.2, addressed to Lollius. In the first instance (11-16, esp. 13), in a Homeric context, the anger is that of Achilles and Agamemnon. It is cited here as a negative emotion in rulers, and one which damages their subjects. Towards the end of 1.2 (59-63), the implication is that Lollius, a young man preparing for a public career, should learn to curb his own anger. 1.3 is addressed to Iulius Florus, who is serving in the *cohors amicorum* of

Tiberius, in the East. At the end of the poem, Horace expresses his hope that Florus can be reconciled with his estranged friend Munatius. Anger (“calidus sanguis” (33)) is cited as one of the reasons for their estrangement. It is interesting to observe that Horace addresses other letters to both of these recipients: 1.18 to Lollius, and 2.2 to Florus.

In both of the last two letters in the *libellus*, Horace refers to anger in relation to his own behaviour. In the conclusion to 1.19, he shows that he can control his anger and avoid confrontation, specifically here in disputes with literary rivals. This is reinforced in the *sphragis* of 1.20 (19-28, esp. 25). The first item in this passage refers to Horace’s status: “libertino natus patre” (20), and in the penultimate item he describes himself as “irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem” (25). The qualification here is crucial, and is a component of Philodemus’ Epicurean re-assessment of *ira*, as discussed in the section on *Epist.* 1.2 in Chapter 5. Competitive aggression and unrestrained anger are not desirable, but a self-sufficient person needs a degree of controlled anger for protection.

The appearance of *ira* as a minor thread in the *Sermones* and *Epist.* 1 would require further study in order to determine its significance. *Ira* became a prominent topic in Roman literature after Horace. In the Neronian period, it features in the works of Seneca. Later, and with more immediate relevance, it is associated in Juvenal’s earlier *Saturae* with his angry *persona* and *saeva indignatio*.

Tracing the evolution of the political dimension can only be speculative, but it seems logical to assume that it would correlate with the evolution of Horace’s attitude towards his status as a client-poet. Until almost the end of *Serm.* 1 Horace depicts his relationship with Maecenas as overwhelmingly positive. As argued by DuQuesnay, throughout the *libellus* Horace provides indirect support for the new regime by portraying the circle of Maecenas as a group of *amici* with high ethical and literary standards: “The effect of the first book of the *Satires* was to present Maecenas and his friends as humane, humorous, cultured, morally serious, and above all flattery and corruption” (West 1997: xii).

The situation with respect to the political dimension in the other two *libelli* is very different. In *Serm.* 2, the Horatian *persona* is more remote, and is not depicted as a member of a group of close friends. The political content is overt and infrequent, and consists of, superficially at least, complimentary allusions to Octavian. These references concentrate on foreign policy, and are always put into the mouths of other

speakers. Horace's political attitude in this book is perhaps best described as ambivalent.

In *Epist.* 1, the political content is similar, except that the epistolary form necessitates its expression by Horace *in propria persona*. By the end of this *libellus* Horace has achieved a compromise in his relationship with his patrons. Consistent with this, it could be that he has similarly accepted the political arrangements of the Augustan regime. This can only be speculation, but a certain degree of resigned acceptance would be consistent with some of Horace's later writing. The only literary works for which there is evidence of commission by Augustus are all poems written by Horace after *Epist.* 1. These are the *Carmen Saeculare*, *Epist.* 2.1, addressed to Augustus, and *Carm.* 4.4 and 4.14 (White 1993: 123).

Finally, there is a feature which first appears in *Epist.* 1 and is continued in Horace's later works. This is the provision of advice, both ethical and literary, to younger men. This manifests itself in both *Epist.* 2.2, and the *Ars Poetica*. The *Carmen Saeculare* was written for the youth of Rome to perform, and *Carm.* 4 begins not with a poem for Horace's patron, but for the young aristocrat, Paullus Fabius Maximus. As a poet approaching the end of his career, Horace utilizes his talents for the next generation — the future of Rome.

ABBREVIATIONS

- GLK:* *Grammatici Latini, vol. 1*, ed. Keil, H. (repr. Hildesheim: Olms, 1961 [1857]).
- L&S:* Lewis, C.T., and Short, C. *A Latin dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945).
- OCD*³: *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 3rd edn., ed. Hornblower, S., and Spawforth, A. (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
- OLD:* *Oxford Latin Dictionary*, ed. Glare, P.G.W. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
- Porph.:* *Pomponi Porphyronis: commentum in Horatium Flaccum*, ed. Holder, A. (Innsbruck: Universitäts-Verlag Wagner, 1894).
- Ps.-Acro:* *Pseudoacronis scholia in Horatium vetustiora*, ed. Keller, O. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1902-1904).
- TLL:* *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1900-).
- K-H:* Kiessling-Heinze
- SB:* Shackleton Bailey
- Sk:* Skutsch
- W:* Warmington
- V:* Vahlen

References to Latin authors and texts follow the abbreviations set out in *OLD* except:

Horace:

Epist.: *Epistulae*

Serm.: *Sermones*

RG: *Res gestae divi Augusti*.

References to Greek authors and texts follow the abbreviations set out in *OCD*³.

Titles of periodicals when abbreviated follow the system of *L'Année philologique*.

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APPENDIX 1

EPIST. 1: EPISTOLARY FEATURES AND PLACE

	ADDRESSEE	EPISTOLARY FEATURES	PLACE	PEOPLE OTHER THAN ADDRESSEE ¹
1	<i>Maecenas</i> (3) ² higher status	NONE programmatic	gladiator imagery (2-6) = urban; <i>latet abditus agro</i> (5); <i>extremos ... ad Indos</i> (45); <i>Ianus</i> (54); <i>populus Romanus</i> (70); <i>porticibus</i> (71); <i>Bais ... amoenis</i> (83), <i>Teanum</i> (86)	<i>Veianius</i> (4); Aristippus (18); Glyco (30); <i>Curius ... Camillis</i> (64) {M ^r . Curius Dentatus, M. Furius Camillus: “types of the old Roman virtue” (Dilke ² 1961: ad loc.)}; Pupius (67) {tragedian}
2	Lollius Maximus (1) {also <i>Epist.</i> 1.18.1, possibly related to Lollius <i>cos.</i> 21 BCE (Mayer 1994: 8-9)} younger but probably higher status	place is epistolary	H. in <i>Praeneste</i> (2), L. in Rome (2)	Homer (<i>Troiani belli scriptorem</i> (1)); Chrysippus {Stoic}, Crantor {Academic} (4)

¹ Names from religion and mythology are omitted because they can be assumed to be easily recognized by the recipient. What is of interest is whether or not all other names are clearly known to both parties.

² Also *Epist.* 1.7.5; 1.19.1; *Serm.* 1.1.1; 1.3.64; 1.5.27, 31, 48; 1.6.1, 47; 1.9.43; 1.10.81; 2.3.312; 2.6.31, 38, 41; 2.7.33; 2.8.16, 22; *Epod.* 1.4; 3.20; 9.4; 14.5; *Carm.* 1.1.1; 1.20.5; 2.12.11; 2.17.3; 2.20.7; 3.8.13; 3.16.20; 3.29.3; 4.11.19.

3	Iulius Florus (1) {also <i>Epist.</i> 2.2.1} younger	<i>Debes ... rescribere</i> (30) F. in <i>cohors amicorum</i> of Tib. in the East	<i>Thraeca, Hebrus</i> (3); <i>pingues Asiae campi collesque</i> (5)	<i>Claudius Augusti privignus</i> [Tiberius] (2); <i>quis sibi res gestas Augusti scribere sumit ...?</i> (7-8); <i>Titius</i> (9); Pindar (10); <i>Celsus</i> (15); <i>Munatius</i> (31) ³
4	Albius [Tibullus] (1) {also <i>Carm.</i> 1.33.1} contemporary, equal status	“letter of consolation” (Kilpatrick 1986: 61) “invitation” (Mayer 1994: 136)	A. in <i>regione Pedana</i> (2), {“Pedum ... between Tibur and Praeneste” (Kilpatrick <i>ibid.</i> : 137 n.6)}	Cassius Parmensis (3) {conspirator}
5	[Manlius] Torquatus (3) contemporary, higher status	<i>rescribe</i> (30) invitation to dinner (1-3)	H. & T. both in Rome: <i>domi</i> (3) {“H.’s town house” (Mayer 1994: ad loc.; Kilpatrick 1986: 61, 139 n.34)}; <i>palustris inter Minturnas Sinuessanumque Petrinum</i> (4-5) ⁴	Archias (1) {furniture maker? (Mayer 1994, ad loc.)}; [T. Statilius] Taurus [<i>cos.</i> 26BCE] (4) {marker of vintage}; Moschus (9) {T.’s client}; cras nato <u>Caesare</u> [Augustus] (9); Butra ... Septicius (26), Sabinus (27) {other guests}

³ Titius and Celsus are budding poets in the East with Florus; Munatius is an estranged friend of Florus. Celsus also in *Epist.* 1.8.

⁴ These place names are associated with the wine, and are also a compliment to Torquatus’ family (Mayer 1994: ad loc.; Kilpatrick 1986: 63).

6 ⁵	Numicius (1) otherwise unknown	<i>Vive, vale</i> (67)	<i>maris extremos Arabas ditantis et Indos</i> (6); <i>Tyrios ... colores</i> (18); <i>Forum</i> (20); <i>porticus Agrippae, via ... Appi</i> (26); <i>Cibyratice ... Bithyna negotia</i> (33); <i>Forum Campumque</i> (59); <i>Caerite cera</i> (62)	<i>plausus et amici dona Quiritis</i> (7); <i>Mutus</i> (22); <i>Cappadocum rex</i> (39); [L. Licinius] <i>Lucullus</i> [cos. 74 BCE] (40); <i>in Fabia ... Velina</i> (52); <i>Gargilius</i> (58); <i>Mimnermus</i> (65)
7	<i>Maecenas</i> (5) higher status	<i>si me vivere vis sanum recteque valentem</i> (3) {may be “an echo of the traditional opening formula, ‘si vales, bene est; ego quoque valeo’.” (Dilke 1973: 110 n.17)}	H. [in] <i>rure</i> (1); <i>Albanis agris</i> (10); <i>Arabum</i> (36); <i>regia Roma ... vacuum Tibur ... imbelle Tarentum</i> (44-5); <i>Foro ... Carinas</i> (48); <i>Campo</i> (59); <i>arvum caelumque Sabinum</i> (77); <i>ex nitido fit rusticus</i> (83)	<i>Cinara</i> (28); <i>Philippus</i> (46); <i>Vulteius Mena</i> (55)
8	<i>Albinovanus Celsus</i> (dat. (1), voc. (17)) via <i>Musa</i> (2) younger (cf. <i>Epist.</i> 1.3)	<i>Celso gaudere et bene rem gerere Albinouano Musa rogata refer</i> (1-2)	<i>Romae ... Tibur ... Tibure Romam</i> (12) ⁶	[Tiberius Claudius] <i>Nero</i> (2)

⁵ *Epist.* 1. 6 reads very much like a *Sermo* with respect to the use of names, and anecdotes with dialogue.

⁶ These place names are used with reference to Horace, not Celsus.

9	[Tiberius] Claudius [Nero] (voc. (1), gen. (4)) younger but higher status	letter of recommendation for <i>Septimius</i> (1)	NONE Tiberius already known to be in East (cf. <i>Epist.</i> 1.3)	<i>Septimius</i> (1)
10	[M. Aristius] Fuscus (acc. (1), <i>Aristi</i> (voc. (44)) {also <i>Serm.</i> 1.9.61, 1.10.83; <i>Carm.</i> 1.22.4} contemporary, equal status	<i>Fuscum salvere iubemus</i> (1) {“epistolary plural” (Dilke ² 1961: ad loc.), <i>dictabam</i> (49) {epistolary imperfect (Dilke ibid.: ad loc.) ⁷ }	F. in Rome, H. in the country (Mayer 1994, <i>ad</i> 1-11); <i>urbis ... ruris</i> (1- 2); <i>ruris amoeni rivos</i> (6-7); <i>rure beato</i> (14); <i>Libycis ... lapillis</i> (19); <i>Sidonio ... ostro ... Aquinatem ... fucum</i> (26-7); ⁸ <i>post fanum putre Vacunae</i> (49)	NONE
11	<i>Bullatius</i> (1) otherwise unknown	“ <i>Bullatius ... is or has been travelling in the East</i> ” (Mayer 1994: <i>ad</i> 1-10)	<i>Chios ... Lesbos</i> (1); <i>Samos ... Croesi regia Sardis</i> (2); <i>Zmyrna ... Colophon</i> (3); <i>prae Campo et Tiberine flumine</i> (4); <i>Attalicis ex urbibus</i> (5); <i>Lebedus</i> (6, 7); <i>Gabiis desertior atque Fidenis vicus</i> (7-8); <i>qui Capua Romam petit</i> (11); <i>Aegaeum mare</i> (16); <i>Rhodos et Mytilene</i> (17); <i>Tiberis</i> (19); <i>Romae laudetur Samos et Chios et Rhodos absens</i> (21); <i>caelum, non animus, mutant qui trans mare currunt</i> (27); <i>Ulubris</i> (30)	NONE

⁷ This epistle exhibits “the most explicit of epistolary conventions.” (Williams 1968: 11). The opening is an adaptation of the conventional epistolary formula used, for example, by Cicero: “*Cicero Attico suo salutem dat.*” (ibid.).

⁸ “Aquinas fucus” is a purple dye inferior to that from Tyre and Sidon (Mayer 1994: *ad Epist.* 1.6. 18).

12	<p>Iceius (1)</p> <p>{also <i>Carm.</i> 1.29.1}</p> <p>contemporary, equal status?</p>	<p>partly letter of recommendation: Iceius to Pompeius Grosphus (22-24)</p> <p>{Grosphus also <i>Carm.</i> 2.16.7}</p>	<p>Iceius in Sicily (1); <i>Cantaber</i> [= Spain] (26); <i>Phraates</i> [= Parthia] (27);</p> <p><i>aurea fruges</i> <i>Italiae pleno defudit Copia cornu</i> (28-9)</p>	<p>Agrippa (1); Democritus (12); Empedocles ... Stertinius (20); Pompeius Grosphus (22, 23); <i>Cantaber Agrippae, Claudii virtute Neronis</i> [Tiberius] <i>Armenius cecidit</i> (26-7); <i>ius imperiumque Phraates</i> <i>Caesaris</i> [Augustus] <i>accepit</i> (27-8)</p>
13	<p>Vinnius (2) indirectly to Augustus (Kilpatrick 1986: 1; Mayer 1994: 205)</p> <p>higher status</p>	<p><i>Vade, vale</i> (19); V. has already set out (“<i>proficiscentem</i>” (1))</p>	<p>NONE EXPLICIT</p>	<p><i>Augusto reddes signata volumina</i> (2); <i>carmina quae possint oculos aurisque morari</i> <i>Caesaris</i> [= Augustus] (17-18)</p>
14	<p><i>vilicus</i> (1)</p> <p>contemporary, lower status</p>	<p>place is epistolary</p> <p>{status difference re <i>libertas</i>: <i>vilicus</i> has no personal freedom as slave, H. is his master}</p>	<p>H. in Rome (6-9), <i>vilicus</i> at Sabine farm; <i>Variam</i>⁹ (3); <i>rure ego viventem, tu dicis in urbe beatum</i> (10); <i>tacita prece rura petebas</i>; <i>nunc urbem ... optas</i> (14-15); <i>invisa negotia Romam</i> (17); <i>urbis desiderium</i> (22); <i>urbana diaria</i> (40)</p>	<p>[Aelius] Lamia (6)</p> <p>{also <i>Carm.</i> 1.26.8; 1.36.7; 3.17.1};</p> <p>Cinara (33)</p>

⁹ “*Varia vicus in Sabinis*” (Shackleton Bailey 1985: 370), mod. Vicovaro (Mayer 1994: ad loc.).

15	[Numonius] <i>Vala</i> (1) otherwise unknown	<i>scribere te nobis, tibi nos accredere par est</i> (25) {H. maximizing <i>libertas</i> as dependent; Aristippean adaptability but limited}	H. planning to travel for his health. <i>Veliae ... Salerni</i> (1), <i>Baias</i> (2); <i>Clusinis Gabiosque ... frigida rura</i> (9); <i>Cumas ... Baias</i> (11-12)	<i>Musa ... Antonius</i> (3); <i>Lucana amica</i> (21); <i>Maenius</i> (26); <i>Bestius</i> (37)
16	Quinctius/Quintius (<i>optime Quinti</i> ¹⁰) (1) otherwise unknown	<i>scribetur tibi</i> (4) {subject is public life in <i>Urbs</i> ; <i>libertas</i> in Stoic terms}	H. writing about his farm, no indication if he is actually there. <i>Tarentum</i> (11); <i>Thracam ... Hebrus</i> (13); <i>Roma</i> (18); <i>urbi</i> (28)	<i>Augusti laudes agnoscere possis</i> (29); <i>Sabellus</i> ¹¹ (49)
17	<i>Scaeva</i> (1) younger otherwise unknown	NONE {status: relative loss of <i>libertas</i> in patron/client relationship}	<i>Ferentinum</i> (8); <i>Corinthum</i> (36); <i>Brundisium comes</i> [cf. <i>Serm.</i> 1.5] <i>aut Surrentum ductus amoenum</i> (52)	<i>Aristippus</i> (14)
18	Lollius (<i>liberrime Lolli</i>) (1) {also <i>Epist.</i> 1.2} younger but probably higher status	NONE {status: relative loss of <i>libertas</i> in patron/client relationship}	<i>Brundisium Minuci melius via ducat an Appi</i> (20); <i>Cantabrica bella</i> (55); <i>Parthorum signa</i> (56); <i>Italorum ... arvis</i> ¹² (57); <i>Actia pugna</i> (61); <i>lacus Hadria</i> (63); <i>gelidus Digentia rivus</i> (104); <i>Mandela</i> (105)	<i>Castor ... Docilis</i> (19); <i>Eutrapelus</i> (31); <i>Thrax</i> (36)

¹⁰ “Quintius *Hirpinus* C. 2, 11, 2; *Epi.* 1, 16, 1” (Shackleton Bailey 1985: 364). Majority reading is Quinctius.

¹¹ “*incertum qua significatione*” (Shackleton Bailey 1985: 365).

¹² “*Italorum ... arvis*” (Shackleton Bailey 1985); “*Italis ... armis*” (Mayer 1994).

19	<i>Maecenas</i> (<i>Maecenas docte</i> (1)) higher status	NONE {literary: Horace's independence as poet}	<i>Forum Putealque</i> <i>Libonis</i> (8); <i>Parios ... iambos</i> (23); <i>Latio</i> (24)	Cratinus (1); <i>Homerus</i> (6); <i>Ennius</i> (7); Cato (13, 14); <i>rupit Iarbitam</i> <i>Timagenis</i> <i>aemula lingua</i> (15); Archilochus, Lycambes (25); Archilochus, <i>Sappho</i> (28); <i>Alcaeus</i> (29)
20	<i>liber</i> (1) <i>liber as servus</i>	NONE {literary: poet has no control over book once published}	<i>Vertumnum</i> <i>Ianumque</i> (1); <i>carus eris Romae</i> <i>donec te deserat</i> <i>aetas</i> (10); Utica ... Ilerdam (13); <i>urbis</i> (23)	Sosii (2); <i>me primis urbis</i> <i>belli placuisse</i> <i>domique</i> (23); Lepidus ... <i>Lollius (coss.</i> 21BCE) (28) {Lollius also <i>Carm.</i> 4.9.33}

APPENDIX 2

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Areas for further study

Several areas have already been identified as warranting further investigation. There are other topics in this category. The first of these is *amicitia*, and in particular the closeness or otherwise of the relationship between Horace and Maecenas, as it is portrayed in the texts. When reading the poems in the context of status I was surprised at how distant their friendship seemed to be, compared to the impression that I had previously gained from the secondary literature. Caution is needed because what appears to be criticism of Maecenas on one level can be interpreted as praising him for his tolerance on another. Nevertheless, the tension apparent in *Epist.* 1.1 is not wholly resolved by Horace's compromise in 1.19 and 1.20. It could be that the relationship depicted reveals a distinction between *clientela* and *amicitia*.

It is possible that generic differences may be operating. For this reason, a comparative study of the *Epodes* and *Carm.* 1 to 3, especially the poems addressed to Maecenas, would be useful. There is also the issue of Horace's solitariness: again it would be interesting to explore the extent to which he portrays himself actually in the company of others rather than, for example, issuing invitations or reminiscing about past pleasures.

It is true that a great deal of work has already been done on patronage and friendship. However, David Konstan, a scholar who has made valuable contributions in this area, recently expressed the opinion that the subject is far from closed: "How patronage and friendship interacted remains a disputed question. ... could patron and client be true friends? ... work remains to be done" (2005: 359).

It would also be of interest to investigate the literary *Epist.* 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 to determine to what extent they can be read as *satura*. More specifically, to investigate if these poems continue the exploration of Horace's personal concerns. In this regard 2.2 is especially relevant, being addressed to Iulius Florus, the recipient of *Epist.* 1.3. This study could raise the question that if these hexameter poems do not belong with the other three *libelli*, then what sort of poetry are they?

The humour of Horace's hexameter corpus is one aspect that it is difficult to do justice to. Humour tends to be culture-specific and elusive, and even if one is fully aware that these poems are not totally serious, it is all too easy to neglect humour in interpretation. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to investigate this element in more detail. There is no doubt that humour is indispensable for the type of criticism practiced by the Horatian satirist: "people are often ready for a new thought after they laugh, just as they are ready for a fresh breath after they sneeze."¹

The political dimension of *Serm.* 2 and *Epist.* 1 is an area which warrants further study. It appears that an interpretation similar to DuQuesnay's for *Serm.* 1 is not appropriate. For *Epist.* 1, it may be that the political content of the *Odes*, for example, *Carm.* 3.1 to 3.6, needs to be considered. Horace's concentration on the issue of the return of the standards from the Parthians is of especial interest (Seager 1980).

Reading all three *libelli* diachronically as *satura* has confirmed the very strange nature of *Serm.* 2. This book definitely justifies a lot more attention. The remoteness of the satirist's *persona* is a major obstacle, and it is very difficult to find coherent threads between poems. It is totally understandable that critics have tended to favour patterned arrangements. It would be worthwhile to persevere with a further sequential reading, paying close attention to such things as repeated motifs and vocabulary.

The tracing of threads through the poems of *Epist.* 1 would also be worthwhile. Several threads have already been identified, for example: invitations in 1.3 through 1.5; mention of people who are connected with the *magni* in 1.12 through 1.15. Close sequential reading might reveal an intricate network of links between poems.

Conclusions re Horace's *satura*

There are two aspects of Horace's *satura* that are somewhat surprising. The first is the urban location that predominates in *Serm.* 1 and 2. Because there is nothing comparable to Juvenal *Sat.* 3 in his corpus, there is a tendency to assume that place is not an issue, but for Horace the *Urbs* is established just as certainly as the location for society's ills. There are even, admittedly very short, passages which evoke the urban

¹ James, Clive (2005) *The meaning of recognition: new essays 2001-2005*, London: Picador: 366.

bustle of later satire. This urban location reflects the life of a client-poet, who would be expected to spend a large amount of time in the city, especially when his patrons are Augustus and Maecenas; and when that poet is a satirist he needs urban experience as ‘grist for the mill’.

The other unexpected aspect is also a feature of later, and indeed much modern, satire. This is the technique of allowing a protagonist to condemn himself with his own words. The *molestus* in *Serm.* 1.9 is the first character to demonstrate this, as do Damasippus (2.3), Catius (2.4), and Davus (2.7). It is, however, most skilfully developed in 2.5, where both Teiresias and Ulysses reveal their negative characteristics, in much the same way as Alf Garnett in *Till death us do part* and David Brent in *The office*.

What is not surprising is the continuing relevance of the ethical issues explored through the three *libelli*. The first of these, the desirability of limits on *libertas dicendi*, is very topical at the time of writing (March 2006). Just recently the media have been preoccupied with the publication of newspaper cartoons satirizing the prophet Muhammad, and the subsequent angry and even violent reactions of outraged Muslims. Newspaper editors, in particular, cited their right to freedom of speech, and the spectre of censorship as a threat to liberal democracy. There appears to be no awareness that other people in society have the right to have their feelings and beliefs respected. Enlightened self-interest might suggest that it is not always appropriate to exercise the right that one may possess as an individual in a society: freedom should be socially responsible, not licentious individualism. Equally, of course, there is also the need for aggrieved parties to control their reactions to events, and ensure that their *ira* is *brevis* (cf. *Epist.* 1.2.59-63).

Another problem for which contemporary society requires Horatian advice is the misconception that money can buy happiness and/or status: “*tanti quantum habebas sis*” (*Serm.* 1.1.62). The social propaganda of advertising fuels the illusion that rampant consumerism is the way to true happiness. This is an area where Epicurean philosophy has a lot to offer: the moderation of desires can alleviate anxiety and stress now just as effectively as in the first century BCE.² The hedonistic calculus also has a

² The popular philosopher Alain de Botton discusses this aspect of the contemporary relevance of Epicureanism in the episode on Epicurus in his television series *Philosophy: a guide to happiness*

role to play in raising awareness that the transient pleasure of ‘retail therapy’ is greatly outweighed by the pain of the credit card bills.

In retrospect, it is possible to read Horace’s hexameter corpus up to the end of *Epist.* 1 as an ‘autobiography’ of sorts. It is the story of a poet who as a young man in the turbulent and dangerous period of the Second Triumvirate succeeded in gaining the patronage of Octavian, mediated at this time by Maecenas. He is a poet who has also been educated in philosophy, but for him this is not an abstract intellectual pursuit. Rather, philosophy can offer guidance on how to achieve contentment and satisfaction in everyday life. In the course of the ‘novel’ he uses philosophical doctrines as a matrix to explore the difficulties he encounters in his life as a client-poet. Although the topics are serious and he is often highly critical of the vices and follies of his fellow-citizens, this is a ‘novel’ written in a humorous manner, thus making the criticism more acceptable and effective.

As one benefit of patronage he acquires a country retreat, the Sabine farm. This affords him the ideal location for writing poetry and spending time with friends in an environment of Epicurean withdrawal and freedom. It also presents him with a dilemma, however, because the duties of patronage require him to spend time in the city performing uncongenial tasks, and encountering the envy of people who resent his upward mobility. Eventually he resolves his dilemma to the extent that he is satisfied with his independence as an innovative poet, and with enlightened self-interest is able to compromise on other aspects of his life.

The institution of patronage may not seem to have much relevance to the twenty-first century, but in one respect it does resemble the reality of life for contemporary artists who are dependent on securing financial assistance from funding bodies. One great hurdle that any artist faces is justifying their existence in terms of benefit to society. Horace demonstrates that in the medium of his poetry he can raise awareness of issues that are important for the continued well-being of society, a function that art of all kinds can still perform.

One final quote, from an article on happiness in a recent issue of the *New Zealand Listener*:

(DVD: Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2004): Episode 2: “Epicurus on happiness”). The television series is based on his book *The consolations of philosophy* (London: Penguin, 2001).

“... Another stream of thought is that having more goods and services to consume has an important effect on happiness, but only up to a certain level.” The income level above which happiness doesn’t grow very fast is quite low, about \$US15,000 ([NZ]\$22,500). This is the “Easterlin Paradox” — after basic economic needs are met, people’s happiness depends less on how much they have in any objective sense and more on how much they have in relation to their neighbours.³

The problem is still the same as that identified in *Serm.* 1.1, and Horace’s Epicurean moderation and the *victus tenuis* may still be the prescription for a *vita beata*.

³ Bone, Alistair. The science of happiness, *New Zealand Listener*, vol. 202 no. 3436, March 18-24 2006: 14-17, quote from p.16.