Green Politics and the Reformation of Liberal Democratic Institutions.

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Contents.

Abstract ................................................................................................................................. VI

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... VII

Methodology ................................................................................................................. XIX

Part 1.

Chapter 1
Critical Theory:
  Conflict and change, marxism, Horkheimer, Adorno, critique of positivism, instrumental reason, technocracy and the Enlightenment .......................................................... 1

  1.1 Mannheim’s rehabilitation of ideology and politics. Gramsci and social and political change, hegemony and counter-hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe and radical plural democracy. Talshir and modular ideology ................................................................. 11

Part 2.

Chapter 2
Liberal Democracy:
  Dryzek’s tripartite conditions for democracy. The struggle for franchise in Britain and New Zealand. Extra-Parliamentary and Parliamentary dynamics ................................................. 29

  2.1 Technocracy, New Zealand and technocracy, globalisation, legitimation crisis. ................................................................................................................................. 46

Chapter 3
Liberal Democracy-historical origins. Liberalism .............................................................. 61

  3.1 Liberal democracy/ representation ............................................................................. 73

  3.2 Liberal hegemony in New Zealand ......................................................................... 76

Chapter 4
End of ideology, anti-politics ............................................................................................ 84

Part 3.

Chapter 5
Revival: Localisation, revival of politics ......................................................................... 95

  5.1 Participation ............................................................................................................. 101

Chapter 6
The emergence of green ideology .................................................................................... 114

  6.1 Green ideology ......................................................................................................... 121
Part 4.
Chapter 7

The New Zealand Values Party...............................................................149


7.2 Decentralisation, participation, Parliamentary reform........................185

7.3 Electoral umbrella.............................................................................195

Chapter 8

Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand.....................................................207

8.1 Values to Green, ideological challenge. Sustainability, regional development. .........................................................................................................................211

8.2 Displacement of political decentralisation. Appropriate decision-making versus grassroots. Representation and consultation gain ascendancy. Study circles. The Wild Greens, coalition and the end of the new political culture. Green politics in action, GE and GATS. .........................................................................................................................233

8.3 Modular ideology: potential and limitations.....................................289

Conclusion..............................................................................................296

References:
The New Zealand Values Party...............................................................305
Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand..........................................................307

Bibliography............................................................................................311
Abstract.

Various writers, for example Rudolf Bahro and Arne Naess, have for a long time associated Green politics with an impulse toward deepening democracy. Robert Goodin has further suggested that decentralisation of political authority is an inherent characteristic of Green politics. More recently in New Zealand, speculation has been raised by Stephen Rainbow as to the consequences of the direct democratic impulse for existing representative institutions. This research addresses that question.

Examination of the early phase of Green political parties in New Zealand has found that the Values Party advocated institutional restructuring oriented toward decentralisation of political authority in order to enable a degree of local autonomy, and participatory democracy. As time has gone on the Values Party disappeared and with it went the decentralist impulse, this aspect of Green politics being conspicuously absent in the policy of Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand, the successor to the Values Party. Since this feature was regarded as synonymous with Green politics, a certain re-definition of Green politics as practised by Green political parties is evident.

This point does not exhaust the contribution Green politics makes to democracy however, and the methodology used in this research, critical discourse analysis (CDA), allows an insight into what Douglas Torgerson regards as the benefits in resisting the anti-political tendency of modernity, of politics for its own sake. This focusses attention on stimulating public debate on fundamental issues, in terms of an ideology sufficiently at variance with that prevalent such that it threatens to disrupt the hegemonic dominance of the latter, thereby contributing to what Ralf Dahrendorf describes as a robust democracy. In this regard Green ideology has much to contribute, but this aspect is threatened by the ambition within the Green Party in New Zealand toward involvement in coalition government. The final conclusion is that the Green Party in New Zealand has followed the trend of those overseas and since 1990 has moved ever closer to a commitment to the institutions of centralised, representative, liberal democracy and this, if taken too far, threatens their ideological integrity.
Dedication.

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## Contents

Abstract.................................................................................................................................VI

Introduction............................................................................................................................VII

Methodology.............................................................................................................................XIX

Part 1.
Chapter 1
Critical Theory:
   Conflict and change, marxism, Horkheimer, Adorno, critique of positivism, instrumental reason, technocracy and the Enlightenment........................................1

1.1 Mannheim’s rehabilitation of ideology and politics. Gramsci and social and political change, hegemony and counter-hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe and radical plural democracy. Talshir and modular ideology.................................................................11

Part 2.
Chapter 2
Liberal Democracy:
   Dryzek’s tripartite conditions for democracy. The struggle for franchise in Britain and New Zealand. Extra-Parliamentary and Parliamentary dynamics. .........................29

2.1 Technocracy, New Zealand and technocracy, globalisation, legitimation crisis. .................................................................................................................................46

Chapter 3
Liberal Democracy-historical origins. Liberalism...............................................................61

3.1 Liberal democracy/ representation ..................................................................................73

3.2 Liberal hegemony in New Zealand....................................................................................76

Chapter 4
End of ideology, anti-politics................................................................................................84

Part 3.
Chapter 5
Revival: Localisation, revival of politics...............................................................................95

5.1 Participation......................................................................................................................101

Chapter 6
The emergence of green ideology.........................................................................................114

6.1 Green ideology................................................................................................................121
Part 4.
Chapter 7
The New Zealand Values Party.....................................................149


7.2 Decentralisation, participation, Parliamentary reform.................................185

7.3 Electoral umbrella.......................................................................................195

Chapter 8
Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand.........................................................207

8.1 Values to Green, ideological challenge. Sustainability, regional development. .........................................................................................................................211

8.2 Displacement of political decentralisation. Appropriate decision-making versus grassroots. Representation and consultation gain ascendancy. Study circles. The Wild Greens, coalition and the end of the new political culture. Green politics in action, GE and GATS. .........................................................................................................................233

8.3 Modular ideology: potential and limitations.............................................289

Conclusion.....................................................................................................296

References:
The New Zealand Values Party.................................................................305
Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand..........................................................307

Bibliography.................................................................................................311
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Introduction.

This research focuses on the juxtaposition of two views. The first is that liberal democracies have been described as ‘thin’ and ‘pseudo-democracies’ (Barber, 1984; Green, 2000). The second is that Green politics has been characterised as asserting a strong impulse toward deepening democratic participation (Bookchin, 1982; Porritt, 1984; Bahro, 1986; Naess, 1989; Carter, 1993). This is a view also held by theorists who have studied Green politics in New Zealand, (Rainbow, 1991, 1993; Davidson, 1992; Dann, 1999). The question for this research is what evidence is there to support the assertion that Green politics in New Zealand is oriented toward deepening democracy. In particular the research addresses itself to an examination of the consequences of the direct democratic impulse for existing representative institutions (Rainbow, 1991:255).

In this endeavour there are three aspects related to democracy on which Green politics in New Zealand will be examined. The first is to examine to what degree Green politics in New Zealand provides an ideological framework which sufficiently and fundamentally challenges the prevalent ideology. This is framed by the view of Dahrendorf (1990) and Torgerson (2000) that political debate ensures a robust democracy, and resists the anti-political tendency of modernity. Put in a wider historical perspective, such an ideology, by challenging the current social/political order, can play a part in resisting *The End of Ideology* (Bell, 1962).

The second aspect is directed to assessing the consequences of the direct democratic impulse on existing representative institutions, as mentioned above (Rainbow, 1991). In this regard, Green politics in New Zealand will be examined in terms of policy initiatives which are aimed at substantively re-structuring the existing political institutions.

The third aspect looks at the re-configuration of ideology within Green politics from totalizing to modular (Talshir, 1998, 2002). In this regard, Green politics in New Zealand will be examined in terms of its ability to act as a conduit for the democratic demands of
various groups in society, for example, women, youth, and Maori (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992).

The research approach is based on a social constructionist view that language is essentially constitutive of institutional reality (Searle, 1995; Gergen, 1999). Therefore, the institutions of democracy have no prior status beyond the thought of people. This perspective is one which favours the efficacy of agency over structure, directing attention to the determinative effect of agents acting back upon and altering structural features of their social conditions. In this way, liberal democracy, and democracy more generally, will be regarded in terms of competing ideas and various ideological frameworks, particularly the interaction between Green ideology and the prevalent liberal ideology.

This interaction will be analysed using critical discourse analysis (CDA) from the work of Norman Fairclough (1992, 2001, 2003). With a focus on politics, Fairclough’s work provides a method by which the dialectical relationship between context and discursive event is seen in terms of political struggle aimed at the change or maintenance of a social order. For Fairclough (1992), a critical approach is one which reveals how discourse is ‘shaped by relations of power and ideologies’, as well as the constructive effects discourse has upon ‘social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge...’ (Fairclough, 1992:12).

In this way, the potential for the re-structuring of the current social/political order is revealed through the conflict between ideologies, and this will be applied to the first two aspects described above, that is Green ideological confrontation with liberalism, and the effects of this on existing representative institutions.

Fairclough’s method will be applied to case studies of what may be referred to as two phases of Green politics in New Zealand, the Values Party era and the current Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand. This will be preceded by a substantial examination of relevant theory which lays out the already constituted social/political world into which Green politics emerges and acts, as well as examining Green theoretical views in order to establish Green thinking as an ideology capable of impacting substantively on politics in New Zealand.

The research will assess Green politics in New Zealand according to the theory of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci. According to this, hegemonic dominance in civil society must precede the contest for state power otherwise the revolution will fail (Boggs,
For the purposes of this research the preferred meaning of revolution will be that indicated by Williams (1983). This meaning refers to a renewal of war\(^1\). This is a particularly appropriate meaning here since it implies that the current social/political order is now thrown into question, and that principles previously agreed upon are subject to an ideological challenge which threatens the stability of those principles. Combined with Fairclough’s theory, the emphasis of this research is on ideological conflict and the constructive effects discourse has upon ‘social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge...’ (Fairclough, 1992:12).

The research is divided into 4 parts. Part 1 establishes the philosophical basis for both the research and Green politics as the inheritors of the critique of the Enlightenment and modernity. Part 2 examines liberal democracy, liberalism and liberal hegemony. Part 3 looks at the possibility for emancipation through the revival of politics as public debate based on reason, and considers both the potential of Green ideology to fundamentally challenge liberal hegemony, as well as the likely shape of reformed political institutions based on this ideology. Part 4 consists of the case studies of Green political parties in New Zealand.

Part 1, Chapter 1 begins the theoretical examination by looking at the marxist tradition. Young (1992) has argued that ‘philosophy provides a basis for the way society is organised and about the search for knowledge and for a set of beliefs that guide and govern existence’. In this way, this chapter not only provides the philosophical basis from which the research proceeds, it also provides the philosophical basis for Green politics. In the former case, the work of Mannheim provides a theoretical process by which humans are able to construct their social world with the emphasis on a dynamic conception of truth among many ideological positions. This is chosen to directly oppose what this research argues is the current hegemony of liberal and neo-liberal ideology and, thereby, argues for the possibility of social change.

The latter is evident in a number of common themes between critical theory and the approach of Green politics to Western liberal capitalist societies, and this process locates

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\(^1\)The use of the word ‘war’ and its association with violence, is used in connection with Green politics only insofar as the terms are modified to mean ‘struggle’ at the level of ideological contestation.
Green politics within the tradition of conflict and social change as well as the inheritors of the critique of the Enlightenment/modernity. The emphasis will be on the motifs of conflict and change, and it is argued that this approach on the part of Green politics toward the current order in New Zealand is a significant contribution in terms of engendering a resilient democracy.

The relevance of the critical theorists to Green politics may be illustrated when the earlier work of, particularly, Horkheimer and Adorno, is considered in terms their rejection of Enlightenment foundational truth. Enlightenment foundational truth involves the reduction of truth to the methods of science, and is consequently instrumental, unreflective, and capable only of reproducing the dominant bourgeois social order. These insights, it is argued, form the philosophical basis of the subsequent attack by Green politics against technocratic forms of governance with its associated restricted consideration of social factors. Therefore technocracy contains no emancipatory moment- reproducing the current social order, and this argument is evident among the critical theorists. Also Green politics challenges the dominant ideology in that by rejecting technocracy, Green politics simultaneously uncovers its ideological underpinnings, stripping away the façade of neutrality and exposing this ideology to critical analysis. Other examples provide reason to refer to the critical theorists in relation to Green politics. These include the rejection of the dominance of ‘economic ethics’ and its associated individualism, by the critical theorists. This attack on individualism is found in Green politics as the grounds for the argument by the latter for the assertion of community and individual responsibility toward society.

The work of Karl Mannheim, as has been mentioned, provides a process by which social change may be conceived. This is dealt with in section 1.1 and begins with Mannheim’s reconstruction of ideology away from the false consciousness associated with orthodox marxism, and toward the recognition that social contexts produce existential bondedness resulting in many ideological positions. The process of social change depends on Mannheim’s insistence that conflict is a cultural phenomenon, and the conflict among ideological positions results in a dynamic conception of truth which rejects Enlightenment foundational truth in favour of a linguistically structured life-world. The prevailing conditions produced in this way are constantly under pressure from other ideological positions and change occurs when the limits of the current order are breached.
While this process provides a useful framework to examine conflict and social change, the mechanism Mannheim relies on to mobilize practical politics, that of the intelligentsia, is flawed. For this reason the work of Antonio Gramsci is referred to.

Parallels may be drawn between Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and Mannheim’s process of social change as a non-coercive synthesis, where the former defines counter-hegemony in terms of an ideological struggle aimed at attaining moral and intellectual reform of existing society (Fontana, 1993). This is still at a reasonably abstract level and to observe the mechanism ‘in action’ the theoretical insights around the term ‘conceptual capture’ by Blaug (2002) are utilized in this research. Although Blaug has used the concept to describe the colonization of the life-world associated with the work of Jürgen Habermas, it is possible to utilize the same concept to describe an emancipatory potential. This potential argues that change may be effected through ‘conceptual capture’ in which an ideology is able to saturate a discursive field, displacing key concepts and thereby change the outcome in accordance to its ideology, in effect, as Mannheim has argued, breaching the limits of the current order. Blaug (2002) does not displace Fairclough’s (2003) CDA whose mechanism of the dynamics of articulation and re-articulation serves a similar function. However, Blaug’s use of the word ‘concept’ sharpens the focus of Fairclough’s theory to the point where salient terms such as ‘sustainable’ play a part in the ideological struggle.

Finally in this section, in the way that Mannheim argued for a social ontology of multiple ideological positions some of which an individual may participate in simultaneously with others, Talshir (1998, 2002) has a further theoretical elaboration to account for Green ideology. This recognises the diversity of ideological positions and argues that Green ideology is characterised as ‘modular’, allowing for the diversity of new political issues while co-operating to transform the political system. The first point is utilized as a framework by which to examine Green ideology in the function as a ‘nodal point’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992). This examination focusses on the extent to which Green parties are able to advance the democratic struggles of various groups each with their own distinctive existential bondedness reflected in a particular ideological position. The latter point refers back to Rainbow (1991) and the implications of the direct democratic impulse in Green politics for the existing representative institutions.

The approach to this begins with an examination of the existing representative
institutions and this is the purpose of Part 2, Chapter 2, in which a critique of liberal democracy is launched with the purpose of emphasising the arbitrary nature of this variety of democracy as well as establishing an argument for its reform toward greater emphasis of the democratic aspect in place of the liberal aspect.

Chapter 2 begins the process of examining liberal democracy by first looking at it in terms of the historical process of enfranchisement. It is not intended to be exhaustive and takes in the period from 1832 till 1918. This begins with Britain since it is from here that New Zealand has inherited its political institutions. Within this examination the emphasis will be on the struggle and protests which have attended demands for enfranchisement. It will be argued that the resistance to these demands betrays a central characteristic of liberal democracy, that of the barrier between the political institutions and civil society. This is regarded as the critical factor when participation versus representation is considered. Also emphasised from this chronology is the inefficacy of pressure for enfranchisement from civil society.

This point is regarded later when it is argued that extra-Parliamentary politics in the form of protests are almost entirely without effect. This is significant when the development of Green parties in New Zealand is considered. The extent of the detail in this section is intended to add weight (since no single event can achieve the definitive proof, a number of examples registering a pattern provide reasonable grounds for the case) in regarding events such as the dissociation of the Wild Greens as a maturing of Green politics in New Zealand.

Section 2.1 focuses on two problematic developments in Western liberal democracy. The first, raised by the critical theorists, is technocracy, the second is the global expansion of markets (globalisation). Technocracy is taken from its philosophical consideration in Chapter 1 and discussed in a way which draws out features salient to later Green critique. Both technocracy and globalisation are mentioned here to clearly link them with democracy and this is illustrated by reference to events in New Zealand. These linkages are later taken up by Green politics in New Zealand and form the basis of a Green critique of technocratic forms of governance and liberal democracy which is acquiescent to its development.
Technocracy results in decision-making which leaves the fundamental issue of ideology uncontested. Green opposition to developments like technocracy oppose not only this narrow form of decision-making, but also draws attention to the issue of ideology and the possibility of a more dynamic decision-making process.

As with technocracy, globalisation is raised here, linking it with liberal democracy and setting it up for subsequent criticism by Green politics on the basis of the constraints agreements such as the GATS, place on nation-states. Both issues are regarded with reference to the legitimation crisis raised by Habermas (1976) in order to regard each issue as an example of a more general process in Western capitalist societies. This discussion also raises the issue of localisation of production and consumption, part of core Green ideology, versus global expansion of the market place, thereby again emphasising the issue of ideological contestation on these matters. This Green critique is raised in terms of Green theory set out in section 6.1, and in terms of Green parties in New Zealand when the case studies are considered in Part 4.

Interest then turns to liberal democracy and its historical origins in Chapter 3 with the emphasis on the liberal aspect. This is intended to unpack particular features of liberal democracy with the emphasis on representation, citizenship, and participation by reference to classical and more modern theorists. This then sets up liberal democracy for a detailed critique by oppositional theories, especially that of the communitarians. This then enables linkages to be made between the latter and Green politics which has the purpose of clarifying Green opposition to aspects of liberal democracy.

Having looked at liberalism and the democratising process and identified some problematic features, section 3.1 examines the hegemonic status of liberalism, liberal democracy and its associated institutions, especially that of representation. This examination reveals that the current political institutions are open to ideological challenge and rearticulation according to other ideologies, thus initiating the transformation of the practice of democracy in accordance with the constructive potential of discourse [Searle, 1995; Fairclough, 1992 (refer to Methodology section p.XIX)].

This discussion is continued in section 3.2 where it is argued that liberalism has hegemonic dominance in New Zealand. The section further argues that this situation is
compounded in New Zealand in that the latter is characterised by a lack of strong ideological traditions capable of challenging liberalism, and those that had this potential have been thoroughly marginalised. This argument relies on historical events to establish the case, as well as the view of theorists. This argument is aimed at revealing the existing conditions confronted by Green ideology, and also raises the prospect that the latter may provide an oppositional discourse capable of fundamentally challenging liberalism.

Chapter 4 continues the discussion on liberal hegemony by reference to *The End of Ideology* (Bell, 1962) as a work which structures the remainder of the Chapter. The Chapter reflects the concern of the critical theorists over the domination of techno-scientific rationality, and the end of the great ideologies since the end of the Cold War. This, it is argued, supports the conclusion that politics has been reduced to the function of sorting through priorities for short-term economic fixes, and itself functions as a market rather than a forum for public debate (Elster, 1986). It is also argued that a diminished socialism has enabled liberalism to develop in an unfettered manner to produce neo-liberalism and the associated drive toward the unending expansion of markets.

This discussion is more general than those in 3.1 and 3.2 in order to locate the New Zealand situation into the broader historical process, and to make available concepts and factors of anti-politics which will be essential in framing the Green ideological relationship to what is argued to be the current anti-political situation. This discussion is vital to providing the grounds on which the potential of Green ideological opposition to revive politics is evaluated.

Part 3, Chapter 5 takes up the anti-political effects of liberalism and globalisation as discussed in the previous Chapter but furthers the discussion by offering the possibility of both the revival of politics, and alternatives to centralised forms of governance. Globalisation is mentioned here with the emphasis on questions over the continued relevance of the nation-state rather than the detail of the agreements themselves (GATS, for example) as discussed in section 2.1.

This leads to a discussion on the possibilities of the re-configuration of the polity and on what basis and to what extent political involvement can exist. This discussion adds weight to the Green ideological impulse toward decentralisation since the latter is discussed...
in terms of its being an equal but opposite reaction to an already existing process of
globalisation. This development adds momentum to the possibility of decentralisation
without the requirement of a prior commitment to Green ideology.

However, if this momentum continues to grow in civil society, Green politics might
find itself expressing these wishes views and this may further the impact of Green ideology
on politics more generally thereby aiding the counter-hegemonic challenge of Green
ideology. The Chapter concludes with the view of a number of theorists that Green politics
has the capacity to revive politics.

Central to the issue of alternative forms of governance is the issue of participation as
opposed to representation, which, as has been discussed in section 3.1, is intimately linked
with liberal democracy. Section 5.1 examines participation at a theoretical level in order to
provide depth to the previous discussion on alternative forms of governance, as well as
raising the relevant terms and concepts by which the Green impulse toward direct democracy
may be examined.

The examination of Green politics at a theoretical level begins in Chapter 6. This
Chapter traces the politicisation of nature to the point where it is possible to talk about
something called ‘Green ideology’ in a meaningful way. The Chapter traces earlier
references to, and utilizations of, ‘nature’ by both the left and right ideologies and suggests
that an important point in the emergence of Green ideology for itself is the rejection of both
the left and the right.

This rejection has developed into a characteristic associated with Green ideology as
it emerged in the 1970s, and is encapsulated in the slogan ‘neither left nor right’. This slogan
is credited to Hebert Gruhl and it is to he and other theorists, some of whom have been or
still are members of Green parties, in particular in Germany and New Zealand, that section
6.1 refers to in order to build on the previous Chapter.

Section 6.1 sets out salient features of Green ideology emphasising its approach to
liberal democracy in Western capitalist societies. It is argued that the range of Green
ideological concerns goes beyond that for the ecology and can be associated with furthering
the cause of ‘new politics’ as opposed to ‘old politics’ (Offe, 1984). This process is intended
to further the argument that Green ideology has the potential to disrupt liberal hegemony as
well as setting out its considerations on political decentralisation. The chapter concludes,
in this respect, that Green ideology regards the only democracy worthy of the name is
decentralised and direct, with the phrase ‘grassroots’ capturing this essence.

Also in section 6.1, attention is drawn to the work of Talshir (1998, 2002) who
provides a framework within which the ideological approach of Green parties in New
Zealand may be examined. This framework identifies three tasks that a political actor must
deal with in order to present a coherent challenge to the current order, these are: a critique
of the current order; a clear vision of an alternative future; and a process by which the
alternative may be attained.

The first of these tasks provides the grounds for the second and this critique of the
current order will be the first consideration when examination of Green political parties in
New Zealand begins in Part 4 of this research. This aspect has relevance in that a critique
of the current order at sufficiently a fundamental level, goes some way to reviving politics
generally, as discussed in Chapter 5, as well as offering the particular challenge of Green
ideology against liberal hegemony.

The second consideration, following Talshir’s scheme above, will focus on
alternatives to the current political institutions. The policy proposals offered by Green
parties in New Zealand will be compared with the claims of Green theorists set out in this
section and discussed in relation to the fore-going theory on liberal democracy discussed in
Chapters 2 and 3. This consideration addresses in particular the impact of the direct
democratic impulse on existing representative institutions (Rainbow, 1991).

The third consideration is framed according to Talshir’s reconceptualization of Green
ideology as ‘modular’ as opposed to totalizing. This is useful in framing the co-existence
of sub-ideologies within the structure of core Green principles, and is utilized in this research
to examine the function of Green parties in New Zealand as a ‘compound collective actor’
(Talshir, 1998) or ‘nodal point’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992), advancing the democratic
struggles of various social groups, for example, Maori, women and youth.
These considerations may be summarised as:

I. Ideology and the ideological challenge to the current order.

II. Alternatives to the current liberal representative political institutions.

III. The function of Green parties as compound collective actors.

It is argued that these three considerations will provide a varied examination of Green politics in New Zealand addressing democratic issues including, the revival of politics, reform of political institutions, and support in the democratic struggles of groups in society.

The analysis of Green parties in New Zealand is framed in accordance with the three areas of consideration set out in Chapter 6.1. Chapter 7 begins the process with an examination of the New Zealand Values Party, and Chapter 8 deals with the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand. The Parties are examined in terms of their external relations. In this way, the focus is on the socio/political context within which each Party has emerged and functioned rather than the decision-making process within the Parties themselves.

Following Gramsci, the material gathered from the parties is regarded in terms of a counter-hegemonic challenge to the current order. The material is analysed in accordance to Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (CDA) which is described fully in the methodology section. While the analysis treats both cases of Green parties in New Zealand as discrete studies, there is some comparison between cases in order to emphasise the main areas of consideration set out in Chapter 6.1. Also in the process of comparison, the development of Green party politics in New Zealand may be traced. This has important implications for the prospects of the reform of current representative institutions as well as for Green theory in general which has previously emphasised decentralisation of governance as a defining characteristic of Green politics.

The emphasis on Green ideology continues throughout the research and it is concluded that this is the strength of Green politics in New Zealand currently where the impulse for institutional reform is virtually nil, and the function as a compound collective actor is variable with this latter area needing more research.

However, the strength of Green ideology in reviving politics relies on its ability to fundamentally oppose liberal principles. This capacity, it is concluded, is severely compromised by the ambition on the part of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand for a
role in coalition government. This view is based on the attendant power asymmetry with the larger partner in coalition arrangements. A role in coalition can be seen as a challenge for state power. This challenge for state power is therefore regarded as premature since, following Gramsci, support for the Greens is far from hegemonic therefore, the revolution will fail.  

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{2}Less than hegemonic support may be gauged from the general election result for the Greens of 5.3\% in 2005. Since we have used revolution to mean an effective ideological challenge, compromise and consensus will dull the Greens capacity to act as critic against the current order.
\end{flushright}
Methodology.

The methodological approach adopted in this research is that of critical discourse analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 1992, 2001, 2003). Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis emphasises the struggle between ideologies for general acceptance to the point where one is regarded as common-sense, and where the ideology has ‘“colonized” many institutional orders of discourse’ (Fairclough, 2001:30).

Diverging from the approach of Noam Chomsky, for example, where language is considered a mental phenomenon (Schiffrin, 1994), and following the work of Michael Halliday, Fairclough focusses attention on the relationship between language and other elements of social life, and the ‘social character of texts’ (Fairclough, 2003:5). Within this, discourse, regarded by Fairclough as a form of social practice and a mode of action, does not simply reflect social entities and relations but constructs or constitutes them (Fairclough, 1992).

This social practice is characterised by power and it is the role of language in power relations, and the transformation of the latter, that is central to CDA. This focus constitutes the critical approach of CDA, and in contrast with the methodological individualism of other approaches to discourse, for example that of Potter and Wetherell (Fairclough, 1992:12,24), a critical approach is one which reveals how discourse is ‘shaped by relations of power and ideologies’. Fairclough achieves this by combining discourse analysis with a theory of ‘power relations and how they shape social structures and practices’, as well as emphasising the constructive effects discourse has upon ‘social identities, social relations and systems of knowledge...’ (Fairclough, 1992:12,103).

In this regard, although the relativism among truth claims evident in the work of Michael Foucault is rejected since it rules out the possibility of the critique and challenge of truth claims, Foucault’s work is, however, drawn on where it emphasises the political nature of discourse where power struggles occur both in and over discourse, and where Foucault emphasises the discursive nature of social change where changes in discursive practices are an important element in social change (Fairclough, 1992:55,56).
Where Foucault steers away from ideology, Fairclough sees it as an important element in the common-sense assumptions constitutive of language, and since discourse is the social practice of language, CDA aims at uncovering these ideological assumptions through the critical examination of discourse (Fairclough, 2001:2). This then, for Fairclough, reveals the ideological basis of truth claims and enables the critique of the latter, thereby countering the relativism of Foucault.

For Fairclough, the important work of ideology is securing the universal acceptance of a particular world-view so that it resembles ‘common-sense’ (Fairclough, 2001:27). The achievement of ‘common-sense’ on the part of an ideology amounts to achieving hegemony where a particular world-view shapes the ‘nature and content of the common-ground’ (Fairclough, 2003:55). This common-ground is instantiated in assumptions ‘embedded in particular conventions’ and the ‘nature of those conventions themselves are dependent upon the power relations which underlie the conventions’ (Fairclough, 2001:71).

Hegemony is therefore the goal of competing ideologies and this is the essence of the struggle among the latter. The potential for this struggle exists in that, according to Fairclough (1992), orders of discourse are ‘unstable equilibria consisting of elements which are internally heterogeneous- or inter-textual in their constitution- the boundaries between which are constantly open to being redrawn’. The basis of this is that a diversity of ideologies will always be present, resulting in conflict and struggle over orders of discourse (Fairclough, 2001:71).

As well as providing the potential for change, the inter-textual constitution of discourse illustrates that change is dialectical in that ‘existing language practices reflect the victories and defeats of past struggles’ and constitutes the current order of discourse (Fairclough, 1992:93,103,124; 2001:73). This dialectic functions in that the elements of discourse, as both the site and stake in social change or the maintenance of the existing order, as well as the relationship between any discursive production and the already existing order of discourse, means that change is a dialectical process in that the emerging text ‘absorbs and is built out of texts from the past’ (Fairclough, 1992:102).

Laclau and Mouffe (1985) describe the process of hegemonic struggle in terms of the disarticulation and rearticulation of orders of discourse (Fairclough, 1992:124; 2001:73). Within this process agents are able to use ‘their own “causal powers” which are not reducible
to the causal powers of social structures’ (Fairclough, 2003:22). Fairclough (2001) recalls Pierre Bourdieu who observed that the recognition of legitimacy could be thought of as the misrecognition of its arbitrariness. Revealing the ideological underpinnings of a system of legitimacy has the effect of removing its façade of naturalness, and that de-structuring of an order of discourse with a critique of its ideological base disrupts the order such that it may then be rearticulated according to some other ideological base.

In this regard, the discourse analysis of Green politics in New Zealand will be concerned mainly with the process of articulation and disarticulation especially the establishment of equivalences and differences. This process is aimed at producing differing meanings for the purposes of displacing competing meanings as the ideologies underlying those meanings struggle for hegemonic dominance. In this way, Fairclough’s CDA is especially suited to the purpose of revealing political conflict and change with the emphasis on the actions of agents constructing their social world within the constraints a shared language and tradition.

Rearticulation can be observed as changing the meaning of existing concepts or replacing those concepts with alternatives, so as to reconfigure the discourse. Efforts directed toward changing the conceptual apparatus employed in state practices can be referred to as conceptual capture (Blaug, 2002) in which the interests of the Green movement can be linked to a state imperative such as revenue collection (Dryzek et al., 2003), and this can be viewed as part of the counter-hegemonic challenge offered by the Green Party in terms of intellectual and moral reform, ideological transformation and rearticulation of existing ideological elements. For example, the definition of sustainability becomes a site of ideological contestation which the Greens must first dominate before successfully dominating the policy field in a hegemonic way, and, for Rainbow (1993:32), this represents nothing less than an epochal change comparable to the agricultural and industrial revolutions.

The scale of the changes that Green parties seek are revolutionary in that as Eckersley (1992) has pointed out, ‘bio-region’ as a neologism serves as an example that an entirely new conceptual apparatus is required if Green political aspirations are to be expressed and it is the important work of ideology to link this framework with practical solutions to the problems society confronts. In this regard, the meaning of the word revolution preferred here is that in which the emphasis is on struggle or, more specifically, ideological
contestation (Williams, 1983:270).

This definition aptly captures the process of an ideological conflict in play in which the previous meanings and organising concepts guiding society are again thrown into question and against which they must adequately defend themselves or give ground to, in this case, a Green conceptual apparatus.

In this regard, a text must come across as plausible to multiple intended audiences rather than as an esoteric code with limited comprehensibility, that is, it must have the quality Fairclough has called hybridization (in Jaworski and Coupland, 2000). It has been argued that, ‘the objective of the ideological struggle is not to reject the system and all its elements but to re-articulate it, a process of disarticulation and rearticulation’ (war of position). That is ‘to break down the system to its basic elements and then to sift through past conceptions to see which ones, with some changes of content, can serve to express the new situation’, a new ideological system which will serve to cement the hegemonic bloc within which they will play the role of the leading force (Mouffe, 1979; Talshir, 1998, 2002). ‘...Gramsci declares that a hegemonic principle does not prevail by virtue of its intrinsic logical character but rather when it manages to become a “popular religion”’. To this end it is vital that the group seeking hegemony do not isolate themselves in any form of purism but must be orientated toward representing the interests of increasingly numerous social groups (Mouffe, 1979:194). Because of this it is vital to the hegemonic aspirations of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand that eco-centric elements are left in the background and this includes the spiritual aspect of Green politics.

On these basic principles, CDA will be utilised to critically assess Green political material in New Zealand revealing both its ideological basis and the practical issues on which it conflicts with the prevalent ideology. In this way, the struggle to dominate the common ground may be viewed as a political struggle with determinative consequences for socio/political organisation and relations, and, to this end, Green politics in New Zealand will be examined in terms of material from the two main political parties, that is the New Zealand Values Party and the Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand.

In addition to CDA, the qualitative methodology set out in Tolich and Davidson (1999) was used to both analyse conferences of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand, and to deal with the interviews with the Green Party MPs.
Although the information gathered from the conferences does not directly feature in the research focus, attendance at conferences enabled the research to be contextualised. This means that the main subject of the research became a ‘living’ entity and not simply abstracted pieces of text. Through the degree of correspondence between textual elements, on one hand, and events, encounters and informal discussion with members during the conferences, a perception of the authenticity of the former is able to be established. Attendance at conferences also served a practical function in that it facilitated interview access to the MPs.

The analysis has its emphasis on the external relationship between each of the parties and their social/political context, but also considers how the two may be compared. Through this latter process the development of Green politics in New Zealand over 30 years may be mapped and allows a brief look at how this compares with the trends in Green politics in other countries. Finally, while the emphasis of the research is on the Green Party, examination of the Values Party provides some essential insights into the development of fundamental principles of Green politics generally as well as in New Zealand.

The texts are selected on the basis of their relevance to the research question and their potential to ‘answer it fairly’ (Krippendorff, 2004:113). This formed the population of texts which were then drawn on to answer the research question. This population included Values Party manifestos and other publications, for example, the various magazines produced by the Party over the period of its existence (1972-1989) including, Vibes, Turning Point and Linkletter. The examination of the manifestos produced by the Values Party relied heavily on the first three (1972, 1975 and 1978) since they provide the richest source of information relevant to the research. Their selection is based primarily on the length and depth of discussion found in these manifestos compared with the ‘leaflet’ style manifesto of the 1984 manifesto, for example.

The web site of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand offered the main source of information on this Party in terms of speeches, press releases and policy statements. In addition, earlier material such as Greens 2000: Framework for an Eco-nation, and material produced by the Wild Greens are also scanned for their relevance to the research question. In the case of both the Values party and the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand additional material was sought through newspaper and journal articles.

Similarly the information gathered from interviews with Green Party MPs was
scanned for relevance to the research question. The research has also looked at a number of case studies, such as the genetic engineering debate, in order to draw out the position of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand beyond statements made on their web site, for example.

This examination focussed especially on words which have become salient due to their meaning being politically contentious. CDA analysis of words such as ‘sustainable’ provide a valuable insight into the ideological struggle ‘in action’ as various meanings established through equivalence and difference are offered as contestants for the common-ground. In this way, the research rejects the view that ‘sustainable’ and other contested terms have become ‘rather meaningless’, (de Geus, 2001:20). The approach of this research is to view these terms as sites which are the very essence of political struggle and CDA as the tool which may demonstrate this struggle. Therefore the current research rejects the search for an ultimate foundation on which to establish an eternal definition of sustainability, but focusses on the dynamic process of meaning-making and the construction of the social and political conditions in which a society lives. These terms represent the ideological building blocks from which policy designed to address what Green politics in New Zealand regards as what is wrong with the current order is developed. In this regard, Green party policy will be examined and compared with that of other political parties, in particular the New Zealand Labour Party which has formed the core of government since 1999.

A range of speeches made by, in particular, the co-leaders of the Green Party will be analysed, once again to reveal their ideological basis and to emphasise where this conflicts with that prevalent. In a similar way, press releases from a range of Green Party MPs will be examined. The two may be compared in that while speeches provide a more measured and contrived articulation of the Green position in more general terms, the press releases respond more rapidly to specific situations as they occur in order to capture media attention. In this way press releases can provide an insight into the party’s approach along side the party’s stated position. Relatedly, specific issues such as the GATS agreements are looked at in order to gauge the approach of Green politics to democracy as a cross check to other party statements and policy.

Also, the speeches, especially those delivered at Green party conferences, can be regarded as equivalent to information that used to be presented in manifestos when the practice was for parties to produce printed material for public information. This now occurs
largely in electronic form on the internet through web-sites developed by the political parties, and it is from this source that much of the material on the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand analysed here was obtained. However, additional information was obtained from interviews with six of the current nine Green MPs, as well as personal correspondence with both the MPs and others who became relevant from time to time depending on the issue being discussed. In addition four Green Party conferences were attended, including AGMs and summer policy conferences. As previously stated, the focus when attending these conferences was on the party’s external relations rather than its internal processes.
Part 1

Chapter 1

Critical Theory: Conflict and change, marxism, Horkheimer, Adorno, critique of positivism, instrumental reason, technocracy and the Enlightenment.

Part 1 is generally concerned with establishing the philosophical approach of both the research and Green politics. Chapter 1 draws on the marxist tradition, in particular the work of the Frankfurt School, and this establishes the central motifs of conflict and change relevant to the research approach and Green politics.

Frankfurt School opposition to aspects of the Enlightenment, especially the unity of the sciences and the notion of value-free forms of knowledge which together contribute to a third aspect rejected by the School, that of foundational truth, is similarly rejected by the research in favour of an approach guided by the sociology of knowledge and a social constructionism approach.

Aspects of the rejection of the Enlightenment by the Frankfurt School evident in Green politics include opposition to the domination of instrumental reason and technocratic forms of governance. The latter functions to hide attendant ideologies, and to produce élite and private decision-making as opposed to the public debate favoured by Green politics. The parallels between the critical theorists and Green politics are drawn with the intention of establishing a view of Green politics as the inheritors of the critique of Enlightenment and the bearers of emancipatory politics. In addition, the parallels are drawn to engender a view of Green politics as being concerned with issues beyond ecologism.

The social constructionist approach taken by the research puts to the forefront the capacity of humans to construct their social world through discourse as a mode of action. At the heart of discourse is ideology and it is in this regard that we turn to the work of Karl Mannheim in Section 1.1 which follows.
Critical Theory is the theoretical approach associated with the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research. The Institute of Social Research was opened at Frankfurt University in 1924, Max Horkheimer became its director in 1930. From this position Horkheimer set the trajectory for the Institute and wrote in the 1930s and 1940s a series of essays that define the critical theoretical approach. For this reason it is the work of Horkheimer that will be mainly considered here. Horkheimer also collaborated with Theodor Adorno on a number of important publications, and initially Horkheimer saw himself as the defender of marxist theory.

Critical theory developed out of the failure of marxism to correctly predict the historical course of Western societies. Three historical events contribute to this view. The first was the rise to power of the Nazi fascist regime in Germany and fascism elsewhere, the second was the failure of the development of the proletariat revolution as Marx had predicted would occur, and the third was the development of the Stalinist managed economy after the revolution of 1917 which decoupled the link between theory and revolutionary practice centred in the proletariat (Rasmussen, 1996:16).

These events seriously undermined the predictive power of the marxist doctrine in which history would unfold according to the theory of historical materialism wherein the system of capitalist production would be surpassed and in its place socialism would rise on the back of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This motivated attempts to reconfigure marxist theory while retaining its critical attitude to the capitalist mode of production and consequent social order. These reconfigured theories were able to avoid the pitfalls of orthodox marxism, in particular the base-superstructure model of society where all else is determined by the mode of production. Kellner (1989) observes that it was believed by the critical theorists that marxism, as a historical and dialectical theory, required development, revision and modification, precisely because it was, they believed, a theory of contemporary socio-historical reality which itself was constantly developing and changing. It was the mishandling of marxism as dogmatic prophecy which meant it was bound to fail since, under such treatment, the theory was unable to respond to changing socio-historical circumstances. It would be by emphasising responsiveness and the dialectical intentions of the theory which critical theorists felt should be the basis of the reconstruction of marxism, retaining the aim for both the investigation and transformation of social reality. Wiggershaus (1994) tells us
that while the term ‘critical theory’ was a camouflage label for marxist theory, there is great difference among critical theorists in how they each approached the problems of orthodox marxism, and while, for example, Horkheimer eventually abandoned marxism altogether, his earlier work with Adorno in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1973) provides useful insights for the continued development of critical theory and the attitudes of both theorists to social change.

In *Critical Theory* (1972) Horkheimer carries the central themes of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1973) in a criticism of the rise of the methods of positivism and the impact of this on philosophy and the social sciences:

‘The task of describing facts without regard for non-scientific considerations and of establishing the patterns of relations between them was originally formulated as a partial goal of bourgeois emancipation in its struggle against Scholastic restrictions upon research’ (Horkheimer, 1972:5).

The resultant limitation of scientific activity, where research is reduced to description, classification and generalization, prompted Horkheimer’s view that science had ‘evaded its responsibility when faced with the problem of the social process as a whole’ (1972:5). In this way, science had become detached from its social base and had developed a self-justifying mechanism which Jürgen Habermas was later to describe as scientistic self-understanding. The corrective to this for Habermas is the comprehension of science in purely epistemological terms in which science is regarded as one category of possible knowledge (Habermas, 1978:4). Scientific method was established as a set of unvarying procedures, tests, and reductionism resulting in a conception of society as an unvarying process geared to the reproduction of certain understandings and knowledge about the world. In this way, the methods of science had mastered the social world by disregarding the interests served by either the dominance of particular fields of knowledge, or the interests served by the resultant social structure, which were thereby reproduced as the only rational outcome.

This opposition to positivism became a distinctive feature of critical theory. As Bottomore (1984) points out the empiricist methods of positivism mean that it sanctions the present social order by attending only to what is observable. In this way, it systematically
obstructs any possibility of radical change and leads to political quietism. Furthermore, the dominance of positivism gives rise to its social/political variant, that is, technocracy.

Although the central thrust of Horkheimer’s conception of the problem facing social knowledge and the current social order in western capitalist societies with regard to the dominance of positivism and its consequences for society in terms of its undifferentiated view of society, he was not convinced that there was any solution to this. As he writes in *Critical Theory* (1972):

‘Insofar as we can rightly speak of a crisis in science, that crisis is inseparable from the general crisis. The historical process has imposed limitations on science as a productive force, and these show in the various sectors of science, in their content and their form, in their subject matter and method. But the situation cannot be changed by purely theoretical insight any more than the ideological function of science can be. Only a change in the real conditions for science within the historical process can win such a victory’ (Horkheimer, 1972:8-9).

From this it can be seen that the crisis to which Horkheimer refers is general but he refers to two distinct facets. The first is a crisis in science, and the second is a crisis in society and the two are inexorably bound. It is also clear Horkheimer believed that the situation was in the hands of a socio-historical process. Both the dialectical theoretical approach along with the influence of materialist marxism indicate that Horkheimer saw the material conditions of western capitalist society as the fundamental cause of the crisis in general, therefore, the solution to the crisis of science is dependent upon a solution to the crisis in society. This is apparent where Horkheimer observed that ‘The root of this deficiency, however, is not in science itself but in the social conditions which hinder its development and are at loggerheads with the rational elements immanent in science’ (1972:6).

The crisis is located in the material conditions of society and, it is a critique of capitalism and bourgeois ideology that would distinguish critical theory throughout its trajectory (Kellner, 1989:15). Critical of the individualist ethos engendered by capitalism as opposed to a social philosophy oriented toward a conception of ‘humans beings insofar as they are parts of a community and not mere individuals’ (Kellner, 1989:16), Horkheimer would guide the institute with the ‘unchanging will to truth’ rather than the
promotion of social change or revolution. Though it can be argued that the ‘will to truth’ implies a contest of some sort given his previous remarks on the state of knowledge and the current socio-historical context. This then indicates an orientation toward transcending current societal norms and rules in order to change society. This is conditioned by the fact that the Institute was primarily concerned with research and was not in itself a political organisation. As we shall see though, the approach of the institute is able to have a profound influence on political organisations the goals of which are to bring about social change. As well as this the so called second generation critical theorists, notably Jürgen Habermas and Herbert Marcuse, did involve themselves more directly in political issues, especially during the student movements of the 1960s. Finally, Kellner observes that ‘...Critical Theory... constituted itself as a critique of existing conditions that produce suffering and an instrument of social transformation which would serve the interests of increasing human freedom, happiness and well-being’ (1989:32).

Insofar as Horkheimer, at this stage, still believed in the marxian idea that the economy has a determinative effect on the social superstructure, resulting in an unequal distribution of wealth, goods, opportunity and power, Horkheimer’s approach was to combine philosophy, social theory and politics in an effort to merge ethics with politics. The ruling economic ethics, for Horkheimer, suffered from decisionism since such an ethics was grounded in arbitrary values and decisions informed, as they were, by a system characterised by the critical theorists as contradictory and irrational. This ethics became embedded mainly due to the uncontested and ‘fetishistic’ nature of instrumental reason which itself was, of course, ineffectual in criticising that which it had produced. In Horkheimer’s estimation this was an impoverished form of reason and likely to have profound effects on individuals and society.

In addition to the asymmetry of resource distribution, the capitalist system generated an ethos of individualism but not of individual freedom. Under these conditions people see themselves not as members of a community but as individuals whose main purpose in life is to rationally calculate toward material well-being rather than to develop any philosophical thinking. This resulted in ‘...the integration of all modes of thought and behaviour into the prevailing mode of production’ (Kellner, 1989:64). This impoverishment of thinking has implications for the possibility of social change, as Wiggershaus (1994:49) tells us,
Horkheimer believed that:

‘The socialist order of society...is historically possible. But it will not be realized through any logic immanent in history. It will be realized either by human beings trained in theory and determined to achieve better conditions, or not at all’.

Faith in the possibility of a marxist inspired society remained. However, the mode of its achievement has moved from historical materialism, to the possible transcendence of the current dominance of instrumental rationality by people able to effectively criticise the current social order with a particular telos in mind.

Horkheimer characterises the form that this social order would take in terms of a system of worker’s councils or Soviets, ‘where the workers themselves democratically control the workplace, community and other forms of socio-political life’ (Kellner, 1989:76). In this way, Horkheimer still holds out hope that the current system will itself be the cause of its own undoing. But ascending to predominance in Horkheimer’s thinking is the activity of people armed with theory and knowledge rather than the playing out of history that will bring about social change.

The change away from historical materialism was driven by the development in the capitalist mode of production away from the earlier liberal/market type, to a later variant referred to as monopoly/state capitalism. The effect of this for capitalist societies was the emergence of the capitalist state. State planning worked to overcome the contradictions inherent in capitalism that Marx observed and to stabilize the capitalist mode of production in a way that Marx had not anticipated. As a result of

‘The absence of both a revolutionary proletariat and an emancipatory socialist alternative to state capitalism and fascism, the Institute found it increasingly difficult to advocate the marxian politics of its 1930s essays’ (Kellner, 1989:65).

As a result, both Horkheimer and Adorno abandoned their marxist perspectives and while formerly the historical process was the focus of the crisis of reason, along with the transition to socialism, social relations and class struggle, this later phase of critical theory turned its attention to a more philosophical analysis of the administered society, instrumental reason, science and technology (Kellner, 1989:86).
The thrust of the argument developed by Horkheimer and Adorno is set out in the first line of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1973) where it is written ‘In the most general sense of progressive thought, the Enlightenment has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty. Yet the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant’ (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1973:3). Further, in the *Eclipse of Reason* (1947) Horkheimer argues that the irony of reason exists in that it failed to transcend religion since it retained exactly those features of religion that were the grounds for the latter’s displacement. In Horkheimer’s view, reason had become instrumentalised and as such had become a ‘fetish, a magic entity that is accepted rather than intellectually experienced’ and therefore had lost its relevance to truth (1947:23).

Reason and language had been reduced to functionaries in the service of the dominant rationality, emasculated and open to ideological manipulation, not questioning but accepting its assertion of neutrality, progress, expansion, growth and wealth. Horkheimer is lamenting the loss of philosophical thinking which had been replaced by modern scientific thought and this domination has repercussions in society since scientific rationality has its place in ‘the expansion of industry; but if it becomes a characteristic feature of minds, if reason itself is instrumentalised, it takes on a kind of materiality and blindness’ (Horkheimer, 1947:27).

For Horkheimer (1947) this dehumanisation of thinking affects the very foundations of civilized society and in terms of the principle of the majority ‘which is inseparable from the principle of democracy’, reason beyond ‘economic ethics’ and politics had become less than a public activity, and ‘deprived of its rational foundation, the democratic principle becomes exclusively dependent upon the so-called interests of the people, and these are functions of blind or all to conscious economic forces’ (Horkheimer, 1947:27,28).

As the instrumentalisation of reason had dominated nature, so had it dominated humans and this domination extended to the very institutions of democracy that were established, it could be argued, just so such domination could be avoided. Instrumental reason produces rational calculation and while in the service of economics it functions well; its dominance in the minds of people and politics lead to technocracy where rational calculation on the grounds of economic principles produces political quietism. In this way the individual is alienated from society, and liberal thought obscures this alienation giving the appearance of political participation that suggests the avoidance of dominance by
sectional interests through the structures and function of democracy.

Thorstein Veblen became a target for Horkheimer and Adorno. Veblen, a champion of the rational technocratic organisation of society, maintained an image of the good life centred around work rather than human happiness as Adorno insisted it should, the latter also objected to Veblen’s denouncement of the modern as barbaric and inhumane (Adorno, 1967). Since Adorno ‘unswervingly affirmed the values of Enlightenment, he believed that modernity suffered from a deficit, rather than a surplus, of reason and rationality’ (Bernstein, 2001). But it is the application of reason that Adorno questions. For him, scientific and bureaucratic rationalism are, in their claim to totality, irrational in themselves and their totalizing effect leads to disenchantment of the world and this, in turn, also represents a rational deficiency (Bernstein, 2001). Offe (1985:302) points out that ‘...the rationality of bureaucratic action does not guarantee, but rather perhaps conflicts with, the functional rationality of the political system’. But it is just this totalizing application of scientific/bureaucratic rationality that, for Veblen, held the key to human survival.

In this way Veblen can be seen as representing the side of capital. This is because for Veblen the narrative of emancipation from poverty is through technical and industrial development, whereas the socialization of labour was the required path if emancipation was to be achieved within the marxist narrative(Benjamin, 1989:318). This then represents another point on which the critical theorists and Veblen would clash. Although at this stage the critical theorists had all but cut their ties with marxism, their continued interest in concepts such as alienation and emancipation as principles rather than parts of a specific theoretical or ideological construct, still had relevance in their work. For Bernstein (2001), Adorno’s critique of modernity can be stated in terms of ethical atrophy in the political domain which had diminished hopes for emancipation, and that Adorno

‘understands the predicament of ethical life to be a consequence of the overlap and convergence of the domination of scientific rationality in intellectual life and, ... the bureaucratic rationalisation of practical life in the context of indefinite economic (capital) expansion. These converge in assuming similar if not identical conceptions of reason and rationality, and in securing as never before the means for human existence. The result of this convergence is a disenchantment of the world which drains
from it the sources of meaning and significance that traditionally anchored ethical practices’ (Bernstein, 2001:3).

It is relevant for this study to acknowledge Adorno’s insight that the convergence of the domination of scientific rationality and bureaucratic rationalisation has resulted in disenchantment, and that these two processes feed back and reinforce each other. The first concerns the critical view on the undecidability of reason in its present state on matters of truth. This was observed by the critical theorists where, for example, Horkheimer had said that reason had failed to transcend religion and had become a system of scientific dogmatic belief.

The prevalent epistemology was positivism and the means of acquiring knowledge was empiricism based on the principles of science and technology. The same methodology was applied to other areas of human scientific endeavour, and the efforts of Auguste Comte to effect a unity of the sciences resulted in the application of the methods of the natural sciences to societies. From here it was a short step to theorists such as Veblen who advocated the organisation of society along lines informed by technological consciousness aimed at efficiency and industry, and while that represents one approach to problem solving, it by no means exhausts all possibilities.

However the rise to dominance of technological consciousness backed by positivism has secured the reproduction of a particular social order where the problems faced by a society are cast in a narrow range of terms and concepts. The solution to these problems are increasingly seen as being beyond the abilities of the mass of the population on whom these solutions impact. Rather, the rise of the specialist has come to dominate decision-making, and the concentration of responsibility in a decreasing number of, especially manager, specialists has created a societal élite who are beyond the debates of the life-world and politics, and work in the systems, effectively reinforcing certain principles (economic) into a social forming hegemony (Mills, 1959).

As regards the first point made above, Bernstein (2001:5) has remarked that Adorno, on the domination of scientific rationality, has effectively created a situation of nihilism where the highest values devaluate themselves, and remarks

‘by seeking to produce a wholly secular form of life we have espoused, above all, the values of scientific rationality and truth; in pursuing these
values, in ordering our intellectual and practical lives in accordance with their dictates, all other values and ideals tendentially lose their rational appeal until, eventually, even the worth of scientific rationality and truth become problematic for us. Modern secular reason is self-undermining’.  

Examining the term nihilism a little closer reveals Nietzsche’s optimism that in order to transcend the present conditions, a crisis of authority arises (nihilism) and this sparks the search for new idols to provide a new set of morals. In this, the prevalent norms and values are transcended. This is, for Nietzsche, the problem of a new ethical life, and his solution is the age of ‘great politics’ where an élite class of philosopher-legislators will create new values (Ansell-Pearson, 1994:85).

From this Section we bring forward the issues of the domination of instrumental rationality, economic ethics, technocracy and the constraining effects this domination has on human and social emancipation. In the following, Section 1.1, we examine the possibility of emancipation from this ‘iron cage’ through practical politics in the work of Karl Mannheim. In this process we consider the theoretical framing of ideology Mannheim develops insofar as it facilitates the possibility of social change.
1.1

Mannheim’s rehabilitation of ideology and politics. Gramsci, social and political change, hegemony and counter-hegemony. Laclau and Mouffe and radical plural democracy. Talshir and modular ideology.

Section 1.1 mobilizes the potential for humans to construct their social conditions through ideological discourse. Whilst preserving the marxist emphasis on conflict and change, Mannheim’s social ontology broadens this potential by conceiving of society as made up of many ideological positions linked to the existential bondedness of individuals with a common social experience. Within this schema, impetus for change may emerge from a number of areas including those associated with ‘new politics’, for example feminism (Offe, 1984). In this way, Mannheim’s thinking takes account of the rise of new social movements in the 1960s and 1970s, and this provides a measure of the accuracy of his theory and is directly connected to Green politics since, as will be later demonstrated, the Values Party in New Zealand emerged from just these social movements. Mannheim also emphasises the linguistic construction of the social world by rejecting eternal, unperspectivistic truth claims, and conceives of change as dialectical. This latter point is significant when the mechanism for social change argued for in this research is considered in terms of Fairclough’s (2003) articulation and rearticulation as a contest of meaning construction between ideological positions. This works in with Mannheim’s conception in that change is not regarded as a cataclysmic or sudden event, but rather as the gradual displacement of concepts as the ideological basis of prevalent meanings is altered.

While Mannheim’s process of change through practical politics between various ideological positions is a valuable insight, it is argued that his mechanism for achieving change, regarding the intelligentsia, is flawed and this will be explained later in this Section. In place of Mannheim’s intelligentsia, the overarching framework by which change is achieved is provided by Antonio Gramsci and his term hegemony. Gramsci’s ‘organic phase’ is of particular interest for this research in that it focuses attention on the counter-
hegemonic challenge to the current order. This can be seen in terms of an ideological contest where the fundamental basis of the current order is questioned (Williams, 1983). Analysis of Green politics is seen according to the view that politics for its own sake guards against the anti-political tendencies of modernity and therefore bolsters the democratic aspect of liberal democracy (Torgerson, 2000). This, in effect, deepens democracy and so this aspect warrants examination when considering the assertions made by various theorists regarding Green politics and democracy (Bookchin, 1982; Porritt, 1984; Bahro, 1986; Naess, 1989; Rainbow, 1991, 1993; Davidson, 1992; Carter, 1993; Dann, 1999). Deepening democracy in this way is achieved in the process of ideological struggle and does not require an already accomplished counter-hegemony. Also, since ideology is the basis of party policy, it is relevant where the reconfiguration of current liberal political institutions is considered. Liberal institutions, as will be argued more fully later, are considered by Laclau and Mouffe (1992) as arbitrary, and this opens the possibility for change initiated at the ideological level.

The final aspect dealt with in Section 1.1 refers to what Laclau and Mouffe (1992) regard as ‘radical plural democracy’. In this regard, Green parties in New Zealand will be examined in terms of what Laclau and Mouffe (1992) refer to as a ‘nodal point’ (this term is explained in Section 1.1), or, as Gayil Talshir has argued, as a ‘compound collective actor’ (Talshir, 1998, 2002). Talshir then argues for a conception of Green ideology as ‘modular’ allowing for a diversity of sub-ideologies to exist within the framework of core Green principles.

Talshir’s elaboration is especially relevant since it forms the theoretical basis for the later examination of the function of Green political parties in New Zealand as a ‘nodal point’. Of particular relevance here is the degree to which such a conceptualisation of Green ideology facilitates the advance of the democratic struggles of various social groups in a way that can be regarded as authentic rather than symbolic (Dryzek, 1996).

Whereas in the previous Section Nietzsche argues in favour of the work of an élite class of philosopher-legislators to bring about a new social order, for Karl Mannheim the élite class were not a class but a stratum whose position, independent of the system of ‘social production’, was necessary if they were to perform the vital task of the dynamic
synthesis of social interests. In this, the focus for Mannheim was on the development of sectional interests derived via historically available conceptual schemas. Mannheim utilises Alfred Weber’s term ‘socially unattached intelligentsia’ who form a relatively classless stratum. This is achieved in that they do not directly participate in the social process of production, though the intelligentsia is able to attach itself to class interests and transform various world-views into a conflict of ideas. In this process intellectuals strip away the ‘glorification of naked interests’ and with the infusion of intellectual demands, transform interests into practical politics (Mannheim, 1960:142).

The aim of this in Mannheim’s political sociology, is the ‘fullest possible synthesis of the tendencies of an epoch’ (Mannheim, 1960:146). The tendencies are expressed in the development of various Weltanschauungen or world-views of social groupings. This worldview is the product of ‘existential bondedness’ where individuals share a world understanding based on their historical/social circumstances. The dynamic synthesis performed by the intellectual strata pushes society, in the light of this revelation, to the next stage of development.

Mannheim’s solution was a rejection of the Enlightenment conception of foundational truth, and in its place Mannheim advocated the potential of a linguistically structured life-world, where members of an ethical community are held together by shared ideas. The structure of the life-world depended on a tradition of inherited concepts with which to access social and physical reality. On the basis of this tradition, various world-views could be synthesised via the work of the intelligentsia and a social truth, constructed from the partial truths revealed by various social positions, would result. Synthesis was effected by the action of practical politics, and this amounted to a process of argumentation between members of the intelligentsia who, while socially detached, were able to take up partial truths only insofar as their identification with such truths was directed toward synthesis between truths and, once fused, this constituted the new social order.

Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge, set out in his book *Ideology and Utopia*, (1929, 1936), draws attention to the social conditions of the scientist that necessarily impact upon any resultant view of the social world. Specifically with regard to socialism, Mannheim maintained that while it had unmasked all its adversaries’ utopias as ideologies, it never raised the problem of determinateness about its own position (Mannheim, 1960:225).
In epistemological terms, Mannheim’s thesis resists the unity of the sciences, particularly the influence of the methods of positivism to determine social truths. Positivism, which had risen to some dominance as mentioned, had not only failed to emancipate human beings, but its dominance had ensnared human existence, preventing historical and social development. Mannheim’s dynamic conception of truth is derived from an ontological commitment to the existence of multiple social conditions. These conditions produce ideological points of view from which develop various Weltanschauung and it is the constant competition between the latter that will produce the dynamic aspect of Mannheim’s truth. It is this conception of truth that he pits against ‘the older static ideal of eternal, unperspectivistic truths independent of the subjective experience of the observer...’ (Mannheim, 1960:270).

In finding a practical solution to the impasse on which the earlier critical theorists founded, Mannheim emphasises the life-world. Mannheim demonstrates how language is both constraining and enabling, and that the reason for this is that language used by present day speakers is inherited from a tradition that is itself conditioned by historical and social circumstances. Therefore, language is constraining in that the conceptual apparatus of any linguistic community is limited by the inherited tradition, and this ensures that the nihilism implied by the postmodern theorists is avoided. This is because tradition provides a normative basis on which communication between various world-views is able to proceed. Tradition is enabling in that it provides the conceptual apparatus with which the linguistic community may access, interpret and understand the world around them.

Mannheim also emphasises a differentiated society and his adherence to competition as a cultural phenomenon ensures a critical moment to his theoretical conception. Mannheim also constructs a process allowing for social change where the next order is born via utopias that breach the limits of the existing order. From this it can be seen that Mannheim’s theory has political implications and this is confirmed when we consider his later works that address the issue of social order.

These considerations will follow an examination of Mannheim’s reworking of the term ideology. This has a central place in Mannheim’s scheme in that the recognition of the ideological component of a truth assertion helps to identify the sectional interests involved. This recognition allows the self-reflexive process that simultaneously denies claims of value
neutrality, and aids the process of the fusion of world-views to an extent that coercion is absent from any resulting social order. However, Horkheimer was highly critical of Mannheim’s approach, and, although the meaning of ideology has changed over time, Horkheimer was reluctant to accept any change that differed from the way Marx employed the term.

Woldring (1986) tells us that during the nineteenth century, ideology had acquired an increasingly pejorative meaning. This is best exemplified by the marxist use of the term that drew attention to how the reality of social relations was obscured by bourgeois ideology in order to maintain their position of dominance within the capitalist system. In this way ideology is regarded as a distortion of social facts for the purposes of securing social domination, and that, for Marx, had its basis in the productive relations of capitalist societies. To this conception of ideology, which Mannheim terms ‘particular’, is added a ‘total’ conception of ideology that applies specifically to the sociology of knowledge and which ‘has no moral or denunciatory intent’ (Mannheim, 1960:238-9).

Stressing the determinative effects of the historical and social setting of the subject, Mannheim rehabilitates ideology (though preferring to use the word perspective) to a study of all ideas emanating from various social positions, which were the result, for Mannheim, of the ‘existential bondedness’ of individuals to those particular historical-social conditions. From here Mannheim reasoned that all thought can be termed ideological in the sense of it being conditioned by the situation within which it arises. ‘It is not the consciousness of men that determine their existence but, on the contrary, their social existence which determines their consciousness’ (Mannheim, 1960).

However, this explanation did not satisfy Horkheimer who condemned it as an ‘idealistc reinterpretation of actually existing contradictions as a mere opposition between ideas, “style of thought”, and “systems of world-view”‘ (Horkheimer, in Meja and Stehr, 1990:156). Here Horkheimer condemns Mannheim for undoing the work of Marx who, after Feuerbach, turned society on its head and turned our attention away from the tradition of German idealism and toward the material aspects of capitalist society as determinative of social relations. Mannheim seems to be suggesting that in fact ‘styles of thought’ are determinative, but for Mannheim these thoughts were the result of material conditions and an interpretation of particular social conditions on the part of a community. This has an
empowering effect of being able to articulate a social position, as opposed to marxist thinking where proletariat consciousness is abstracted from the class and must be recovered.

While Horkheimer shared Mannheim’s recognition of the socially conditioned character of human thought, he maintained that if it was ever going to be possible to know the truth about society, a strong commitment to the distinction between true and false consciousness was imperative. Such a strong distinction was threatened by Mannheim’s use of ideology, and this, for Horkheimer, ran the risk of relativism where every view was equally valid, jeopardizing the possibility of locating the truth (McCarthy in Benhabib, Bonss and McCole, 1993:125). Horkheimer concluded that ‘once all thinking is characterised as ideology, it becomes evident that ideology as well as “particularism” refer to nothing but to a discrepancy vis a vis eternal truth’ (Horkheimer, in Meja and Stehr, 1990:153).

Mannheim’s best defence against relativism was his use of the term ‘relationism’. For Mannheim, relationism means that certain (qualitative) truths cannot be grasped except in the framework of an existential correlation between subject and object (Mannheim in Meja and Stehr, 1990). To this can be added his view that ‘...there are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to conceive of absolute truth existing independently of the values and position of the subject and unrelated to the social context’ (Mannheim, 1960:71), and that such a conception only becomes relativism when it is linked with the older static ideal of eternal unperspectivistic truths (Mannheim, 1960:270). It is evident here that, to some degree, Mannheim and Horkheimer are ‘talking past each other’, and Mannheim draws a distinction between eternal philosophical truth on one hand, and a dynamic conception of truth on the other that he hopes will be more responsive to historical/social conditions, as opposed to the historicism of marxism.

The insight of Mannheim’s dynamic conception of truth comes from the recognition of the various Weltanschauungen in society, and the true interpretation of the world obtained through the dynamic synthesis of these partial perspectives (Longhurst, 1989:84). It therefore opens the possibility that societies can develop in a number of directions responding to a number of interests that might come from social groups as diverse as those based on gender, ethnicity, and unemployed workers. This is coupled with a dynamic view of history where conceptual frameworks of the past inform social groupings in the present, brought into practical politics via intellectuals, and challenge the current social order.
Mannheim’s work recognises the social construction of truth developing forms of life that assert themselves politically. Thus dynamic relationalism resists the demands of philosophical truth that Horkheimer uses to criticise Mannheim, since it is not aimed at establishing one eternal truth (Longhurst, 1989:80).

As mentioned, Mannheim resists the charge of relativism by reference to his term ‘relationism’ within which various social positions are related through the tradition of an existing conceptual framework. Also, in this regard, Mannheim argues for the work of the intelligentsia who, through the process of synthesis, effect the fusion of various social positions. Tradition provides a normative framework ensuring the potential for communication across particular social positions, and the intelligentsia settle disputes across social positions ensuring the new social order effectively combines elements of all emerging world-views.

In addition to that already mentioned, Mannheim also relies on the role of the intelligentsia in the task of dynamic synthesis to avoid the slide into relativism. As part of the Enlightenment tradition, this role is nothing new for the critical theorists and Horkheimer himself believed that the achievement of better social conditions would only be brought about by human beings trained in theory.

Dynamic synthesis would ensure social co-ordination, and for Mannheim this began with the ability of the intelligentsia to see through the ideological façade of various Weltanschauung, and formulate the truth about society from these partial truths. But immediately that conception reveals a contradiction. This is evident in that although he has a strong commitment to ‘existential bondedness’ and the effects of historical and social conditions generating specific world-views, the production of a science capable of truth assertions necessitates the wresting of world-views from those life-world conditions ‘at the last moment’ by free floating intellectuals. So at once a great weight of importance is attached to the world-view producing effects of social conditions but this cannot produce a truth assertion without the aid of socially detached intellectuals. As will be demonstrated later, Mannheim reviews the role of the intelligentsia when it becomes evident that in fact this strata can be located within specific class interests, and the condition of detachment is no longer justifiable.

However, before we get to that, Mannheim’s conception of the intelligentsia as
socially unattached moved Horkheimer to accuse Mannheim of interpreting ‘all intellectual positions sub specie aeternitatis’ (an immortal being) on the way to achieving eternal truth (Horkheimer in Meja and Stehr, 1990:149). Horkheimer suggests Mannheim is therefore clinging to a form of metaphysics and it is just this intellectual tradition that Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge set out to oppose. The importance of that criticism is that, if carried, it meant that Mannheim had not altogether succeeded in leaving behind Enlightenment conceptions of truth, and therefore, that he was offering no solution at all. Other commentators have pointed out that the ‘free-floating’ status of the intelligentsia is an unlikely situation and that the theorised function of the intellectuals in Mannheim’s scheme was unlikely to come to pass (Woldring, 1986).

Although Mannheim received much criticism for his view on the function of the intelligentsia, it has been suggested that he considered the role of intellectuals only as a potential (Longhurst, 1989:81). The role of the intelligentsia effecting synthesis is not so questionable as their position as socially detached. In fact, the role as social synthesizers bears a resemblance to the ideal function of Members of Parliament in a representative democracy.

It is this detached state that is reminiscent of the positive sciences in that Mannheim’s intelligentsia are essentially value-free and this claim is an important part in the production of neutral, immutable truths free from bias, in the natural sciences. It is also inconsistent with his commitment to hermeneutics, and further, casts the intelligentsia as educator and promoter of reform. This is firmly based in the Enlightenment tradition and one that Habermas was critical of in the work of Kant (Williams, 1987:198). These two points indicate that Mannheim’s commitment to the restructuring of social science was at best partial, but does not alter the fact that he made some important contributions to social science and politics, and, as mentioned, he was prepared to face up to the controversy and review the role of the intelligentsia in view of developments in society.

In his *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction* (1940), Mannheim introduces the notion of the ‘proletarianization of the intelligentsia’ with which he points to certain negative developments as society modernises. The first is the ‘widening of apparatus for social advancement through education’, the effects of which are that the ‘culture of intellectual activity itself is belittled by public opinion’. This results in a push in social development in
the direction of the interests of the proletariat, that is, a sympathy for technical rationality, industrialization, and rationalization of certain social relations (Mannheim, 41:104).

The other effect, as Mannheim saw it, was that the close connection between intellectuals and ‘high society’ meant that ‘intellectual culture to a very considerable extent acquired a class character’ (Mannheim, 41:101). These developments meant that the intelligentsia were increasingly unable to function as socially unattached, and so more closely resembled other social groupings with their own interest commitments. This then is a consistent treatment of the intelligentsia who develop their own ideology and, along with other social groupings, a Weltanschauung derived from their existential bondedness within particular historical and social conditions. So while this removes the aspect of Mannheim’s theory that indicated his lingering adherence to the possibility of objective knowledge, it also removes the mechanism by which competing social interests are resolved in order to effect social co-ordination. So having moved away from the potential role of the intelligentsia to bring about synthesis, the idea of synthesis stands unsupported, and the persistence of social inequality indicates that it is unlikely that any synthesis has ever taken place, in the way that Mannheim theorised. If we accept the dynamic process of social change as Mannheim theorises, then we have to look at its apparent failure in terms of a rupture in the communication process that would otherwise function.

A great insight on Mannheim’s part is to draw our attention to looking at society as differentiated but with the potential to act in a co-ordinated way. This is expressed in the work of Laclau and Mouffé (1992) to which we will be referring to later on. What is missing from Mannheim are the exact details of the institutions within which the competition between world-views would be conducted, especially since the role of the intelligentsia had been reviewed. However, the value of Mannheim’s work still exists in three main areas. These are, the potential for self-formation; social co-ordination; and social change. However, while these features are insightful, as an overall theory Mannheim’s contribution has to be regarded as fragmentary.

To begin with, Mannheim’s focus on the self-formation of individuals within communities of interest preserves the commitment to emancipation that characterised the work of the critical theorists and is ultimately aimed at social change. In Mannheim’s conception ‘the speaking subject becomes a link in the process whereby symbolically
structured forms of life and thought are maintained and renewed’ (Habermas, 2001:14), whereas the historicism of marxism sets the goal that must be reflected in the consciousness of the proletariat if history is to proceed. It is clear here that Mannheim is working in the tradition of interpretive sociology and has pitched his sociology of knowledge toward the philosophy of language emphasising the formation of linguistic communities and the liberating power of symbols whereby, ‘whatever the members of a linguistic community may encounter in the world, is accessible via the linguistic forms of a possible shared understanding concerning such experiences’ (Habermas, 2001:14).

The shared understandings, with which individuals access and interpret the world, produce a unitary Weltanschauung that, in competition with others, attempts to gain dominance over the ‘structure of historical reality’. Although this was Mannheim’s intention, Habermas has cast doubt on whether tradition can be relied on as a basis for self-formation since it is possible that tradition itself is a site of social domination (Delanty, 1997:83). However wrong-headed the self-formative efforts of individuals might be, what can be salvaged is a recognition that linguistic formation of any social position was oriented toward emancipation, and Mannheim, it can be argued, has preserved the emancipatory impulse of the critical theorists. The process of social groupings attaining emancipation was, for Mannheim, characterised by competition as ‘the motor impulse behind diverse interpretations of the world that, when their social background is uncovered, reveal themselves as the intellectual expressions of conflicting groups struggling for power’ (Mannheim, 1960:241).

For Mannheim ‘actually existing contradictions’ in society, which may act as a catalyst in the process of social change, might arise in social relations at any number of locations including the relations of production. This was because in Mannheim’s view competition is a ‘cultural phenomenon’, and the Western capitalist economic system is competitive because of this. This then opens up the possibility of social conflict in other areas of society including the economic sphere, and represents a turn away from economic determinism while at the same time raising the status of other social groups above that of epiphenomenon.

Further, Mannheim asserted that ‘individual members of the working class do not experience all of the elements of an outlook that could be called the proletarian
Weltanschauung, since every individual participates only in certain fragments of this thought-system (Mannheim, 1960:52). This implies that the same is true of all Weltanschauungen, and that an individual might well participate in a number of world-views that from time to time might conflict or complement each other. For example a person might participate in world-views of feminism and proletarian, as well as a world-view in which the environment is paramount. This goes, perhaps, some way to explaining why a single, monistic proletarian consciousness has failed to develop. The world-views of individuals and the number of social groupings being more complex than might have previously been imagined, a proletarian consciousness consequent of the relations of production forming an important part of a total world-view but by no means dominating. In orthodox marxism the material base of society is the principle structuring factor in societal competition and as such it enables a clear view of how social groupings are formed, but at the same time, limits the possibility of insight into any other areas of social life from which conflict may emanate.

Mannheim’s conception of society as a matrix of competing social positions resists the charge of relativism since the idea of competition presupposes that there at least exists a set of normative rules and values that uphold the possibility that various world-views are able to communicate across language games in a meaningful way that has the potential for social co-ordination. In this way, Mannheim avoids an interpretation that might take the form of social positions as incommensurable language games in the way that the postmodern theorist Jean-François Lyotard would later become noted for (Williams, 1998:27).

The relationship between the existing order and a rising utopia is, for Mannheim, a dialectical one,

‘...every age allows to arise (in differently located social groups) those ideas and values in which are contained in condensed form the unrealised and unfulfilled tendencies which represent the needs of each age. These intellectual elements then become the explosive material for bursting the limits of the existing order. The existing order gives birth to utopias which in turn break the bonds of the existing order, leaving it free to develop in the direction of the next order of existence’ (Mannheim, 1960:179). ‘...every historical event is an ever-renewed deliverance from a topia (existing order) by a utopia, which arises out of it. Only in
utopia and revolution is there true life, the institutional order is always only the evil residue which remains from ebbing utopias and revolutions’ (Mannheim, 1960:178).

As a contribution to social science Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge alerts us to the interests inherent in the production of knowledge and successfully challenges the notion of the possibility of value-free science. This notion, a premise of positivism, was rejected by Mannheim and, in so doing, Mannheim resists the unity of the sciences in that his commitment to truth production in society led him to believe that ideological positions attached to sectional interests had to be revealed in order to uncover their confounding effects in the search for truth, and that this applied equally to marxism.

Mannheim’s work is to be valued as a theory of social change through the agency of individuals acting in social groupings. Each grouping’s world-view is ideological and it is the conflict between ideologies that challenges the existing order and leads to social change. The emerging utopia rises to prominence offering solutions that lie beyond the discursive scope of the old order. Paul Ricoeur (1986) has said that ‘Mannheim fights against those who claim, and herald, that we are now living in the time of the death of ideology and utopia.’ This is very important since politics relies on the revival of ideology and the continual pressure of doubt on the truth claims of the current order (Habermas, 1971).

But Mannheim’s work does not rely solely on discursive construction, or idealistically projecting the possibility of what the future may look like. Each world-view has its roots in the material existence of specific social locations. In this way, Mannheim emphasises that there can be no objective claims to knowledge about the social world in particular, and that each truth assertion betrays allegiance to a particular tradition from which the concepts used to access the world are drawn. Further, since language is essentially constitutive of institutional reality, social institutions are essentially the outcome of discursive constructions based on knowledge about the world (Searle, 1995). This is a crucial attitude if domination and authoritarian regimes are to be avoided. The recognition and actuation of various world-views into practical politics is the life-blood of democracy and the trap of the subjectivist illusion, that is, the insistence on the possibility of objective knowledge, is the life-blood of domination.

Therefore Mannheim’s work is valuable in this challenge to the ‘subjectivist illusion’
that, according to Jürgen Habermas, affected all epistemological standpoints in the past; the basis of these standpoints was the ontological assumption that the external world, both natural and social, is self-sufficient as an object of scientific inquiry, and, in a theme subsequently taken up by Habermas, Mannheim emphasises the social interests inherent in all knowledge claims. Against the ‘modern’ view of the neutral, disassociated scientist, Mannheim points out that all views on society are imbued with interests derived from particular social positions, and recognition of this fact means that no knowledge can claim privileged access to the object. The objectivist illusion in marxism meant that it was trapped within the problem of the dialectic of Enlightenment. There is, therefore, no set of institutions that can claim to be eternal and natural or neutral and value-free. In this way, for example, we can see that a liberal state is based on the values of liberalism and a Green state would be based of values important to Green ideology. Neither version can claim to be more correct in an objective sense but each struggles for ascendancy as the dominant truth claim.

Ideologies represent the world-views of social groups, and although Mannheim writes in the marxist tradition, he shares with pluralism an emphasis on social groups against both the individualism of liberalism, and the limited notion of economic class found in marxism. Mannheim’s social ontology structures society as a plurality of groups and this very much differs from the reductionism of marxism in which social change is the historically prescribed outcome of a struggle, the roots of which are located in the relations of production, between two central social groupings, the proletariat and the bourgeois. Mannheim thus corrects the ontological weakness and reductionism evident in orthodox marxism. Along with interests of ‘old politics’, for example, economic growth, consensus and security alliances; the force of ‘new politics’, for example, values of ecology, human rights, pacifism, and alternative forms of production and distribution have a place in Mannheim’s social ontology (Offe, 1985).

Mannheim’s thought can be regarded as a return to Hegelian marxism where the emphasis is on the power of ideas and the significance of the intelligentsia in turning world-views into practical politics, and in so doing constituting the political subject, and thus initiating social change as a dialectical process. This is evident in the early Marx where he observed that the real world cannot be directly grasped via sense data or empirical
observation, but human consciousness was capable of understanding external reality (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987).

Within Mannheim’s work there are strong parallels to be found with that of Antonio Gramsci. In both theorists work, the idea of human self-formation is central, as well as a dialectical process of social change that emphasises the work of intellectuals. However, while Mannheim’s is an élitist intellectual, floating freely above the social milieu, for Gramsci the process of self-formation involves a dialectical process between the intellectual and the population, where the intellectual and the people mutually define each other. This is the ‘democratic philosopher’ ‘who is central to the emergence and development of a people as a collective and moral force that fulfills itself in history and that creates its own reality and its own “truth”...’ (Fontana, 1993:99-115). Mannheim’s schema remains trapped in the dualism central to liberal thought in which practical politics remains a domain separate from the mass of the population. The intellectual for Mannheim is very like the cleric mediating between the assembled congregation and, like this aspect of liberal theory, is itself trapped in the dominance of pre-Enlightenment structures.

For Gramsci, ethics was made discontinuous with politics due to the dominance of liberal bourgeois ideology. Central to the latter was the separation between the thought of intellectuals and the popular culture of the people, and since ethics is the relationship between philosophy and culture, the separation of these two results in the separation between ethics and politics. Politics, under these circumstances, becomes a mere appendage of economics. Gramsci’s solution was the democratic philosopher, or, after Machiavelli, a modern prince who would wage an ideological and cultural struggle to attain the moral and intellectual reform of existing society (Fontana, 1993). For Gramsci the political party becomes the modern prince and attempts to transform the existing social order. The process of transformation must follow a specific formula where a social group must first be leading (that is hegemonic) before it can be dominant, revolution that first seizes state power then attempts justification through legitimating institutions will fail (Boggs, 1984).

Gramsci’s model of change revolved around a dual perspective, organic and conjunctural. The organic phase (war of position) involved a gradual struggle within civil society for hegemony resulting in a decisive shift in the balance of social forces. This is followed by the conjunctural phase (war of manoeuver), a passing period of crisis where
contesting political forces struggle for state power (Boggs, 1984). This conception provides a basic mechanism for social change that focusses on the struggle between various ideological positions.

This mechanism is elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe (1992) who propose radical, plural democracy that allows for change emerging from ideological contestation. What they propose is a change of political system that is more responsive to changing values in society. The change in system requires first that liberalism be revealed as an ideology that is open to critique, and therefore an arbitrary choice. The arbitrary nature of liberal institutions has been demonstrated by the rise of new social movements that, simultaneously, intimated that radical change was still possible. To effect such a counter-hegemonic project, argue Laclau and Mouffe (1992), what is required is the reassertion of the democratic moment in liberal democracy resulting in ‘radical plural democracy’. Essential to the development of the latter is the rearticulation of the fundamental principle of liberal democracy, that is the separation between the political sphere and civil society insisted on under liberalism.

The liberal conception of democracy depends upon a commonsense understanding that renders subordination in a non-antagonistic manner, aided by the belief that democracy constitutes citizens as equals together with an understanding that radical struggles are things of the past. However, in spite of a discourse based on fair and free competition in both economic and political spheres, the ‘democratic revolution’ ‘frequently laid bare the arbitrary character of a whole set of relations of subordination’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992:138,155-189). The transition from an extensive to an intensive regime of accumulation resulted in the transformation of society into a vast market with the consequent commodification of, first, more and more products of human labour, and then of human relations, resulting in the penetration of the ‘logic of capital accumulation into increasingly numerous spheres’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992:161).

Resistance to this rose in the 1960s and 1970s in what Laclau and Mouffe (1992) refer to as a ‘democratic revolution’. New social movements directed demands for reform against the state. The response by neo-conservatives has been to ‘restrict political participation to an even narrower field’, remove public decisions from politics and place more political power in the hands of ‘experts’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992:185). This results in a political system increasingly separate from civil society. Such a conception is a return
to core liberal theory that Laclau and Mouffe (1992) reveal as arbitrary and therefore open to rearticulation in terms of radical plural democracy.

For Laclau and Mouffe (1992) expanding the ‘democratic moment’ is based on a critique of the liberal aspect of liberal democracies on the basis that liberal democrats are liberals first and democrats second (Levine, 1981). On this basis Laclau and Mouffe (1992) argue for ‘radical and plural democracy’ that may be effected by linking the plurality of democratic struggles around a nodal point. The nodal point does not simply establish an alliance between interests but modifies the identity of forces so that, for example, the defence of the worker’s interests does not come at the expense of ecological considerations. This process, however, still requires hegemonic articulation since there is no necessary connection between the different political spaces between, for example, the women’s movement and the ecology movement (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992:178).

The necessity for hegemonic articulation is emphasised where Laclau and Mouffe (1992) struggle with a conflict around, on one hand, the issue of social unity, and on the other, the unfixity and fluid nature of society that they argue is essential to avoiding totalitarianism, intellectual and political domination or an ultimate foundation of the social. While Laclau and Mouffe (1992:188) argue that any attempt to establish a definitive suture leads to totalitarianism, radical plural democracy brings with it the ‘symmetrically opposite danger of a lack of all references’ to unity, which will lead to the ‘implosion of the social’ in the ‘absence of a common point of reference.’ In this regard, Laclau and Mouffe (1992:189) declare that no hegemonic project can be based solely on a democratic logic but must also ‘consist of a set of proposals for the positive organization of the social.’ That is, an order characterised by an unstable balance and tension, where an element of social positivity predominates rather than condemnation and marginalisation.

Focussing on the notion of the ‘nodal point’, Talshir (1998, 2002) has elaborated a specific understanding to address this aspect of Green ideology. In the way that Laclau and Mouffe (1992) challenge the liberal barrier between civil society and the political sphere as an essential element in the composition of a radical plural democracy, Talshir sees Green ideology in terms of ‘modular’ as opposed to ‘totalizing’. Important in this conceptualisation is that Green parties act as conduits for the politicisation of the interests of groups in civil society. For Talshir (1998, 2002) Green ideology may be distinguished in the way that it is
composed of a core ideology and a number of coexisting sub-ideologies, encouraging ideological activity among the various independent currents. While sub-ideologies accept the integrity of core Green ideology, Talshir insists that the former retain their own comprehensive world-view (2002:107). In this way, modular ideology represents the possibility for the coexistence of different political clusters within one ideological framework, and this approach is more closely examined as Green ideology is reviewed, firstly in an abstract manner and then during the examination of Green ideology in New Zealand.

Summary.

This Chapter has focussed on social change and conflict, within the tradition of the critical theorists, aimed against the hegemonic dominance of liberal democracy and other de-politicizing aspects of modernity. To this end, ideology has been rehabilitated from the narrow marxist understanding as false consciousness to a conception, with reference to the work of Mannheim, that emphasises ideology as discursive constructs that are reflexive of the existential bondedness of a social groupings. The general mechanism by which social change may be effected is provided by Gramsci, in particular his conception of counter-hegemony driven by ideological conflict, and this is the essence of politics. This is elaborated by Laclau and Mouffe (1992) who emphasise the potential for the challenge to current prevalent ideology and its associated institutions. This argument is applied to Green politics in that, in Gramsci’s terms, Green political parties represent Machiavelli’s modern prince, and through a process of ideological struggle, attempt to transform society.

Green parties in New Zealand enter the political field in an already constituted social/political state dominated by liberalism and the effect of this domination determines a particular type of democratic arrangement. Chapter 2 critically examines this particular form of democracy with the emphasis on the de-politicising effects inherent in the system. This examination provides the grounds for the reformation of liberal democracy before the particular view of Green politics is considered. The work in this Chapter connects Green politics with critical traditions of Western thought by discussing themes raised by the critical
theorists that are subsequently relevant to Green politics. This Chapter oversees what follows and becomes particularly relevant in Part 3 when the possibility of change and, in particular, a solution to the problems associated with liberal democracy are raised by means of the challenge to liberal hegemony by Green ideology.
Part 2

Part 2 is concerned with a critique of liberal democracy. This is approached by revealing its ideological basis and emphasising the inconsistencies between liberal ideology and the principles of democracy through examination of the process of enfranchisement. It will be argued that the desire for electoral reform indicates that enfranchisement by itself has failed to satisfy all expectations of representation and that these reforms themselves are flawed according to some views. Although these measures (enfranchisement and electoral reform) may be regarded as advances for democracy, the limited gains they represent are conditioned by élitist forms of governance evident in instances of technocracy and global trade deals which are also discussed here.

The focus then shifts to the liberal component of liberal democracy and a critique of liberalism in Chapter 3. Within this, section 3.1 critically assesses representation as a necessary aspect of liberal democracy and the Chapter ends with section 3.2 with the assertion that liberalism is hegemonic in New Zealand. Part 2 therefore aims at focusing the issue of social/political change at an ideological level in terms of a struggle on the part of liberalism to remain hegemonic and on the part of Green parties to disrupt that hegemony (Green ideology is set out in section 5.1). Chapter 4 concludes Part 2 by broadening the scope of the debate within the history of Western capitalist societies framed by the end of ideology thesis (Bell, 1962).
Chapter 2


In this Chapter the intention is to trace the development of democracy with the focus on the process of enfranchisement. This examination highlights two main features. The first is the reluctance on the part of the holders of power to agree with any alacrity to reforms that would make decision-making a public practice. This draws attention to an enduring characteristic of liberal democracy that is the barrier between civil society and the political sphere. This, it is demonstrated as the discussion proceeds, is due to the influence of liberal ideology on which this version of democracy is based. The Chapter then argues that since this barrier is a product of a particular ideology and since any ideology is susceptible to challenge, the widely considered ‘naturalness’ of the barrier may be exposed as arbitrary. This then creates the potential for the reform of the current political institutions on, for example, principles that emphasise democracy rather than liberalism.

The second aspect revealed in the examination of the process of enfranchisement is the inefficacy of political pressure from civil society to substantively influence the process of enfranchisement. This becomes significant for this research where Green political parties are considered with reference to the ‘new political culture’ where Green parties act as both a Parliamentary party and a social movement in civil society (Kelly, 1991:194).

Within this Chapter British history will be referred to covering the period 1832-1918 since it offers many incidents in the struggle for enfranchisement and is directly connected to the development of liberal democracy which is central to this research. It is also from the British tradition that New Zealand has inherited most of its institutions, traditions and political processes. However, examples from New Zealand’s history are also included in the examination with particular reference to women’s enfranchisement. This then situates New Zealand’s democratic history within the broader context of the development of liberal democracy.
Consideration is also given to developments in Western societies that aggravate the depoliticising effect characteristic of liberal democracy, which is argued here to be its crucial failing. This discussion follows on from the case studies of Britain and New Zealand in which the process of enfranchisement is examined, and looks at the development of a technocracy and the emergence of global agreements, especially those concerned with trade in services (GATS). These issues are dealt within section 2.1 and take the form of a general theoretical discussion followed by case studies illustrating the workings of technocracy and global trade agreements in New Zealand. The section concludes that a critical perspective would be that these developments have contributed to a legitimation crisis where both technocratic forms of governance and global trade deals impinge upon the ability of governments to meet their normative commitments to society (Habermas, 1976). The issues are regarded from a critical perspective because it is argued that any concern for democracy will follow this line of argument. However, the solutions offered by the Green parties in New Zealand are discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

The purpose of this critique is to emphasise the variable nature of democracy throughout its history and, as we regard this variability, we are better positioned to see the potential for the transformation of democracy today. Put simply, there is no fixed, immutable conception of democracy, no natural form of democracy that resists the possibility of reformation, and reconstruction. Also, there is no linear development toward an ultimate perfection in democracy. We can find examples where the development of democracy is riven with faults and fractures scattered throughout its history, where appeals to the principles of ‘rule by the people’ seem to be bypassed, or blatantly ignored; so while it may be assumed that a particular kind of democracy exists, breaches of the understanding about how democracy should work may vary within a society and this is dependent upon other social and political factors, as well as ideological perspective. Examples of these perceived breaches will be included as the historical process of democratic development is cast as uncertain both between and within each developmental stage. In this way, there is good reason for investigating the aspirations of Green politics especially since an association between Green thinking and an impulse toward deepening democracy has long been argued (Bookchin, 1982; Naess, 1989; Rainbow, 1993; Dann, 1999). The focus for this research is on this potential of the Green political tradition within New Zealand, and this potential is
made clear where Green politics is critical of the current functioning of liberal democracy.

The history of democracy is one of continuing development. For Markoff (1996) this development is characterised as ‘waves’, for Dahl (1989), in ‘phases’. Machin (2001) has argued that the early developments in democracy in Britain can only be regarded as such retrospectively, and that what we consider democracy today is the outcome of piecemeal and stuttering changes. These changes in the way that society is governed (or coordinated as Offe, 1985 has it) have resulted from the interaction between demands from the population; the work inside parliamentary institutions; manoeuvring between political parties; hereditary rights and the influence of the monarchy, industrialisation, and changing conceptions of ‘citizenship’. Machin gives the eventual attainment of female franchise a significant role as an index of democratic development in Britain; the exclusion of half the population from participation in Parliamentary politics is therefore regarded as a major impediment to the development of democracy. In this way, participation in politics by the greatest number of a population is implicated as essential to democracy.

It can be argued that this is a commonsense understanding. Any discussion on democracy usually begins with a definition in which democracy consists of a demos, the people or more specifically the citizens, and kratein, direct governance or power. This, as Saward (2003a) points out, is simply the lexical meaning of the word democracy, but what is more interesting is how this meaning accords with the practices of democracy from its recognised place of birth, that is Athens in the fifth and fourth century BC. The historical variability around the development of democracy then centres around shifting conceptions of who the citizens can be and how much of what sort of power they have (Lively, 1975).

It is argued that in most Western capitalist countries including New Zealand, that the first condition Dryzek (1996a) identifies in his tripartite conditions for democracy, that is enfranchisement, has been attained to the degree that the demands of earlier centuries on this issue have now ceased, and that attention is directed toward the next two conditions in Dryzek’s configuration. These are ‘scope’ and ‘authenticity’. Scope refers to the domains of life under democratic control; and authenticity, is the degree to which democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic. The importance of these issues will become apparent
when liberal democracy is examined critically as a specific variety of democracy. The liberal capitalist mode of production, as another dominating feature of life in Western democracies, is also critically looked at especially with regards to ideological oppositions that have resulted from this system of production. It is, therefore, with regard to scope and authenticity that the Green political aspirations for deepening democracy will be considered. As well as focussing on representative democracy, it will also consider various forms of participatory democracy, including Dryzek’s (1990) discursive democracy.

What Machin (2001) calls the fairly advanced stage of democracy in Britain by 1918 was due to two general tendencies; these were public demand and party political interest. We can substitute the terms extra-parliamentary and parliamentary activity respectively as broad characterisations that become all the more significant when the liberal aspect of Western democracy is considered. Although demands from civil society for enfranchisement are prominent features of this stage of democratic development, it will be demonstrated that this type of political activity often appears completely without effect. Extra-Parliamentary action, in the form of demands for gaining citizenship and voting rights, seem to have succeeded only when those demands coincided in some way with goals of parties in Parliament. For example, according to Machin (2001:12) the Whigs’ Reform Acts of 1832 gave, the ‘…country a substantial start in the direction of democracy’ though, as he goes on to explain, the intention was to secure their (the Whigs) place as Government against the Tories; the benefits to democracy were largely unintentional and this is verified to some degree when it is considered that the Act contained the formal exclusion of women’s right to vote (Machin, 2001:21).

By contrast, the political demands of the Chartists, the most sustained democratic upsurge before campaigning for the women’s vote got underway early in the twentieth century, were aimed at increasing the number of those represented in Parliament and ensuring that that representation was not distorted by matters of social status, economics or religious belief (Machin, 2001). These demands failed to influence Parliament even though some members of the London Working Men’s Association, which published and circulated the six points of The People’s Charter in 1838, were radical MPs. Three efforts were made to have the six points considered in the Commons. The last one failed in 1848, but for ten years after this the Chartists continued to be at the centre of radical democratic demand; the
mantle of radical reform then being taken up at the time by the Reform League in 1865. The failure of the Chartists furthers the view that democratic development relied more on a convergence of goals between radical democrats, working mainly outside Parliament, and the political manoeuvring of parties within. Popular agitation through societies, meetings, demonstrations, and radical newspapers expressed various political intentions that sometimes found resonance with the interests of political parties.

Outside Parliament, organisations were formed to both demand franchise and to oppose demands for it. Demanding franchise for males led to a convergence between middle and working class radicals within the London Working Men’s Association. The convergence and divergence between classes occurred from time to time and were instances where the common element of gender united the classes in the demand for manhood suffrage (Machin, 2001).

Class convergence occurred in 1830-2 where there was considerable coincidence of interests, and again during the 1860s when Parliamentary Reform was again to the fore. Under these circumstances, middle and working class radicals were again closely allied as they were in the next period of agitation for popular participation. Again in 1906-1914 the classes worked together since the most important question of the time was female suffrage, an issue that affected both classes, although support was variable and certainly not unanimous in the fight for female suffrage.

Further evidence of the inefficacy of public pressure influencing decisions made in Parliament is the failure of the Hyde Park riots in July 1866. Frustrated at the lack of legislative initiatives, the Reform League organized the national demonstration but even this riot, and the subsequent mass meetings in major towns in Scotland and the north and Midlands of England, failed to spur the Government to introduce a Reform Bill (Machin, 2001).

In May 1867 another meeting in Hyde Park took place in spite of an official ban. This time, however, the Government seemed to take note, Liberal Radicals turned to support the Conservative push for reform and an increase in enfranchisement. This resulted in the intentions for reform being approved at the opening session of Parliament on 5th February 1867. Machin (2001) concludes that while it is highly doubtful that such important Reform Bills as those of 1832 and 1867 could have been carried without considerable public
pressure, it is also doubtful whether the changes proposed would have been made had they not been in keeping with the party interests of the Governments that introduced them. The way in which the acts ‘whet the appetites of reformers for further change’ was the main benefit to democracy, but the acts themselves did little in a practical way to broaden political involvement beyond the élites (Machin, 2001:66).

International events played their part in sending Britain in the direction of democratic reform. Prevalent among these were the French and American revolutions in the eighteenth-century, and later, at the end of the First World War, the consequent collapse of autocratic empires greatly heightened the opportunities for pressing democratic demands.

The American Revolution and subsequent declaration of independence from the Crown in 1776, followed by the French Revolution of 1789, provided dramatic evidence of the capacity of the mass of the population to bring pressure to bear in the desire for social reform generally and democratic reform specifically. The threat popular revolution represented to aristocratic power is said to have acted as a catalyst sending Britain on the road toward greater involvement of the mass of the population in politics. However, motivation due to a perceived threat leaves room for speculation that subsequent measures toward popular involvement in politics would more likely be oriented toward control of the masses rather than their emancipation. In addition to these international events, the Industrial Revolution at home led to enlarged and more cohesive middle and working classes and gave form to the common purpose and interests of the masses. This, and the spectre of revolutionary overthrow, served as a powerful incentive for the aristocrats to moderate their position of political privilege. Though, as we have seen, the involvement was symbolic rather than substantive, and the slow progress on the issue of enfranchisement displays a reluctance to have the population exercising any real political power.

The main shift in power seems to have been from the aristocracy to the bourgeoisie, while at the same time retaining aristocratic privilege in the form of the House of Lords. An aspect of that privilege was the House of Lords right of veto, and on this matter there was debate whether a hereditary and unelected Chamber should have the power to veto policies of the people’s elected representatives (Machin, 2001). An attempt to limit the powers of the House of Lords was made with the Parliament Bill that became law in 1911, although to the year 2000, the intention of the 1911 Act remains unfulfilled (Machin, 2001:134).
Philosophical influences in the form of Enlightenment thinkers, for example Jean-Jacques Rousseau, led to initiatives aimed at reforming the political system. Cartwright and Wyvill’s pamphlet entitled *Take Your Choice* appeared in 1776 and began the Parliamentary Reform movement that continues today. The main points of the pamphlet were manhood suffrage, and annual Parliaments. These points were to reappear with four additional points in the *Six Points of the People’s Charter* in 1836, including abolition of the property qualification for MPs and State payment of same. Though, once again, when we recall the fate of the People’s Charter, philosophical deliberations seem to have had little immediate effect.

John Stuart Mill, writing in Britain at this time, was at the forefront of extra-Parliamentary demands for proportional representation that coincided with the 1850 motions and bills for Parliamentary Reform. Together with Thomas Hare, Mill published a pamphlet *The Machinery of Representation* in which a scheme of proportional representation is set out; including a threshold of votes calculated by dividing the total number of registered electors by the number of seats in the Commons. Mill followed this up with *Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform* (1859) and *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861). However, ‘The British Parliament still remains, in 2000, without an element of proportional representation; though the latter was partly operated in the Northern Ireland Parliament from 1921 to 1929, in the Northern Ireland Assembly from 1973, and in the new Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly from 1999’ (Machin, 2001:146).

Mill’s attempts to argue for the inclusion of women’s suffrage in the 1867 Reform Bill, and in *The Subjection of Women* (1869), met no immediate success. Any attempts at increasing franchise were up against the view of Lord Palmerston that ‘Power in the hands of the masses throws the Scum of the Community to the surface, and … Truth and Justice are soon banished from the land’ (Machin, 2001:56).

There followed a period of quiet on the democratic reform front that lasted from 1867 until the suffragette campaign began in 1903. This Machin (2001) attributes to the absence of a popular movement to sustain the pressure ‘from below’. The result of this was ‘meagre electoral changes in Gladstone’s first ministry and the almost complete lack of them in Disraeli’s Government of 1874-80’ (Machin, 2001:71). Given the pattern of earlier attempts ‘from below’, it seems more likely that Parliamentary élites saw no opportunity to exploit
moves toward popular representation for their own ends. As we have seen the attitude of key politicians at the time displayed a strong impulse in the opposite direction to increasing popular representation. In any case, there seems little evidence of leadership on the part of those in Parliament toward increasing franchise except for those described by Machin (2001) as ‘radical’.

An important point to note in this regard is that during this time the political parties reformed their organization in response to the expanded franchise. This involved the establishment of a party caucus. The issue as to whether these new party organizations and the social clubs contributed to the spread of democracy is a matter of debate. Machin (2001) observes that the Russian, Ostrogorski, saw the ‘caucus’ as a new oligarchy, comprising a rising business élite that was gradually replacing a declining aristocracy.

In view of the writings of C. Wright Mills in The Power Elite (1955); Michels, (1949) ‘iron law of oligarchy’ and Lindblom in Markets and Politics (1978), the insight of Ostrogorski has to be appreciated in terms of future criticisms of democracies in Western capitalist nations. As Ostrogorski observes, the displacement of one élite with its sectional interest, that is, the aristocracy, by another élite, the bourgeoisie, has to be viewed as, if not a backward step for democracy, then certainly one that functions to obstruct the principle of popular decision-making. It can be argued that the caucus tends toward élitist decision-making, compounding the barrier between decision-makers and the mass of the population that already exists in liberal democracies. This may be contrasted with developments in civil society that demonstrated a desire for greater public involvement in decision-making. In this case it can be concluded that the institutions of liberal democracy evolved to protect the hold on power by an élite from the influence of the mass of the population.

Although a growing national press and declining illiteracy from 1870 played their part in increasing awareness of political issues for the population, they did not necessarily lead to greater success in increasing representation. Of greater significance was the development of independent debating societies. The first of these was established in Liverpool in 1860, and served as an important educational aid in dealing with political issues. Run on the same lines as Parliament in the form of a local ‘Parliament’ or ‘House of Commons’, they numbered over one hundred by 1883, and, occasionally started a politician on the road to national politics. Also, the success of these societies proved that the practice
of politics at the local level is possible. Whether this hinted at decentralization of governance or not is speculation, but the exercise of practical politics plus the dissatisfaction of the population with the attitude of politicians toward increasing franchise, would certainly have bolstered the desire for increased participation in central politics if not kindled a desire for decentralisation.

Whether the success of the Franchise Bill (or ‘Representation of the People Bill’) can be attributed to these events is debatable, but under Gladstone it was passed in December 1884 adding two million men to the United Kingdom electorate. Again the activity of élites is implicated by Machin where ‘…crucial electoral transformations behind the closed doors of statesmen’s houses…brought to its highest pitch the tendency for Parliamentary reform to be initiated and decided by politicians rather than by the multitude’ (Machin, 2001:98). Therefore, the speedy passage of the bill was not altogether a victory for democracy. Although the outcome was an increase in franchise for men, the manner of its achievement was a bad omen for the workings of a democratic system. The fact that the reforms were far short of expectations indicates that the primary aim was not to extend franchise for the sake of improving democracy but rather that the strategic manoeuvring between parties in Parliament took precedence. As Machin (2001:101) observes ‘the newly extended franchise had given the vote to about two-thirds of the adult males. But this was very far from being a democratic suffrage. Many males, and all females, were still excluded…’.

The campaign for women’s suffrage lasted over 50 years. Beginning with J. S. Mill’s attempt to have female suffrage included in the Reform Bill of 1867; between 1885 and 1897 women’s suffrage bills were introduced in the Commons nine times and twice in the Lords; all of them failing. Machin (2001) notes that some Whigs were reluctant to support the Bill because of the effect such an increase in suffrage would have especially in Ireland where it was likely to have a detrimental effect on the power of English absentee landowners. Prevalent also was the view that women simply did not have ‘adequate powers of judgement for giving a vote’.

Within this context, the campaign for women’s suffrage was fought mainly through the activities of extra-Parliamentary organisations both for and against female suffrage. Tensions were not confined to these opposing factions since within pro-suffrage organisations there was disagreement as to what methods to employ to achieve the aim.
Although, in the attempt, much energy was expended, both violent and nonviolent, none of it seems to have made much progress, and where radical activity for political emancipation failed, in the end women were ‘rewarded’ with limited suffrage for war work supporting the social order that had denied them for so long.

Chief among the organisations set up to politicize women’s suffrage was the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Societies (1897), and the Women’s Franchise League formed in 1899. The latter argued against status and property conditions and demanded that all women, single and married, should be enfranchised. Adopting female suffrage as one of its policies in the mid-1890s was The Women’s Liberal Federation, formed in 1887, with the Women’s Social and Political Union joining forces in 1903. Many campaigners for women’s suffrage became attached to one of the new socialist political organizations, including the Independent Labour Party formed in 1893. However, the militant group known as The Suffragettes could never shake off the appearance of a relatively privileged and wealthy group of trouble makers and this denied them working-class support.

In addition to the denial of working class support, pro-suffrage organisations were confronted by groups formed with the purpose of opposing women’s suffrage. These included The Women’s National Anti-Suffrage League which had the support of the Men’s Committee for Opposing Female Suffrage, and these two combined in 1910 to form the National League for Opposing Woman Suffrage. Also, in 1910, a separate Scottish National Anti-Suffrage league made its appearance.

While the National Union of Women’s Suffrage Society (suffragists) pursued a moderate, constitutional course, a militant wing of the movement was founded by the Pankhurst family at Manchester in 1903. This was the Women’s Social and Political Union (suffragettes) who would later turn to more aggressive methods to force women’s suffrage to the forefront of democratic issues.

At this early stage both the Suffragists and Suffragettes utilized conventional ways of politicizing their cause. In 1908, the Suffragists followed the example of the Reform League demonstrations of 1866 and 1867 in Hyde Park. Also, drawing on the experience of past movements, the Suffragettes organized a ‘Women’s Parliament’ in the same year, that resembled the Chartist Conventions. However, the lack of a positive response to their demands, both in and outside Parliament, led the suffragettes to turn to violent means in
As Emmeline Pankhurst declared in 1913, ‘the argument of the broken pane is the most valuable argument in modern politics’, she referred to a speech which pointed out that women suffragists had failed to arouse the popular fervour shown in the original Hyde Park riots of 1866 (Machin, 2001). Pankhurst regarded this as a call to arms and justification for an intensification of the destructive tactic; for example blowing up an empty house that was being built for Lloyd George. Involved in this incident was Emily Davison who is most remembered for her death as a result of her attempt to seize the reigns of the King’s horse as it ran at the Derby.

The response in Parliament was to clamp down and not be moved by the demonstrations of violence. Ministerial intervention to resolve the issue of women’s suffrage was limited to the passage of the Public Meetings Bill aimed at curbing political militancy and a government authorisation to force-feed Suffragette hunger strikers in prison. Also, early in 1910, attempts had been made to gain inter-party agreement on the issue of women’s suffrage. This resulted in the Conciliation Bill to extend Parliamentary franchise to women occupiers. The bill failed. A third Conciliation Bill failed to pass its second reading in 1912. ‘So far all the legislative activity concerning the women’s vote had ended in nothing. Manhood suffrage had also been lost on account of its possible conjunction with women’s suffrage in the same measure’ (Machin, 2000:139).

The outbreak of the First World War provided an unexpected boost to the cause of women’s suffrage. In times of armed conflict, patriotic fervour usually has the effect of setting aside domestic politics as the nation unites against a common foe. It was just such patriotism, rather than continued militancy, that led to an extension of male suffrage and a limited female suffrage, and Emmeline Pankhurst and her daughter, Christabel became patriotic champions of the war effort. Important in this regard was the readiness of women to work in munitions factories and other war work. This is supposed as the reason that female suffrage, limited to women over 30, came about in 1918. The extension of male franchise also came about in recognition of service to their country. ‘The question of manhood suffrage provided the catalyst for the adoption of partial women’s suffrage. Manhood suffrage was bound up with the emotive question of giving the vote to soldiers, sailors, and airmen who were so nobly serving their country’ (Machin, 2000:140). This,
together with limited women’s suffrage, was introduced and carried as part of the domestic reconstruction beginning in 1918.

The Representation of the People Act of 1918 was passed with Asquith declaring ‘No one can now contend that we are yielding to violence what we refused to concede to argument’ (Machin, 2001:143). But, in order to prevent a female majority in the electorate, it was recommended that the Parliamentary vote should go only to women who were voters in local council elections or the wives of such voters; also, that an age limit of 30 or 35 should be adopted. This resulted in eight and a half million women being registered for the 1918 election.

‘The attainment, maintenance, and decay of democracy depend largely on changeable economic, social, and political circumstances; and it can by no means be assumed that the world, by the end of the twentieth century, has been made safe for democracy’ (Machin, 2000:153).

As these examples show the struggle for democratic participation has centred around enfranchisement, or political involvement in the form of voting rights. We have seen how uneven was the progress toward, particularly women’s enfranchisement, and how many were the barriers from both inside Parliament as well as outside. We have also seen how privilege is institutionalised, and therefore officially sanctioned, in the British system when the position of the House of Lords is considered. Privilege is also evident in the New Zealand party structure where the caucus, inherited from Britain, forms an élite assembly of the executive.

New Zealand's political institutions were borrowed from the British liberal model. Except, for example, that New Zealand has only one house in Parliament\(^1\), the influence of the Magna Carta (1297) is found in the way acts are made and in the statutory basis of the constitution. The Imperial Laws Application Act (1988) adopted, where appropriate, the English and U.K. statutes (Miller, 2001). The power of British acts on New Zealand’s

\(^1\)New Zealand’s ‘Upper House’, The Legislative Council, was formed as part of the Constitution Act (1846). The Council was initially made up of twelve members appointed by the Governor of New Zealand but its membership reached fifty three in 1885. It had the power to initiate, review, amend or reject legislation. The Legislative Council Abolition Act was passed in 1950 and the Council dissolved on Jan. 1\(^{st}\), 1951.
legislature remained until the Constitution Act (1986) was passed replacing the Constitution Act of 1852. As far as female franchise is concerned, women were active in their demands long before attaining the right to vote in 1893 and this is consistent with the Suffragists and Suffragettes in Britain, as mentioned. Mary Ann Muller, publishing under the name ‘femina’ asked, ‘..what can be said for a government that deliberately inflicts injury upon a great mass of its intelligent and respectable subjects..’, and ‘...how long are women to remain a wholly unrepresented body of the people..’(Wilson, 2001:377).

Phillips (1996) observes that finally granting women voting rights in New Zealand, the first of any national legislature to do so, might be interpreted as a shining example of our free and liberal traditions. However, as Phillips points out, the focus was on controlling men. Although all males had been granted the right to vote in 1887, female suffrage in effect gave married men two votes and so encouraged marriage; this acted as a counter to the tradition of the itinerant male. This served the purpose of settling down a male workforce that could then be organized to complete the tasks of constructing the national infrastructure.

Kate Sheppard managed the suffrage campaign for women within the framework of the Women’s Christian Temperance Movement (WCTM), and between 1891 and 1892 organized a petition that attracted 30,000 in support of women’s franchise. Within Parliament, Premier Vogel introduced the Women’s Suffrage Bill into the House in 1887. However, after losing the election that year the bill was replaced by the Electoral Bill, 1888 and this did not include women’s franchise. Again in 1891 another Electoral Bill also failed to include provision for women. The Electoral Bill of 1892, which this time included women’s suffrage, foundered on the machinations of party politics (Wright, 2004).

The view of Phillips (1996) that the main motivation for women’s suffrage was to control the males of the colony, was originally that of Scobie Mackenzie expressed at the time the bill was passed (Reeves, [1902]1969:108). The view that granting women franchise had an ulterior motive may have great weight since neither the association of women with the temperance movement, nor the fears, expressed by Premier Richard Seddon, that too much political power given to women will ‘unsex’ them (Burdon, 1955:109), were sufficient to prevent the bills passing into law by 2 votes in September, 1893. In fact Oliver (1960) points out that a faction of the Liberal Party were keen to grant women the vote in the expectation that this would add pressure toward the institutionalization of prohibition, and
therefore represents another ulterior motive for the measure. Finally, the view of Mackenzie (in Reeves, 1969) and Phillips (1996) that female franchise would give plural votes to a number of men in the colony, means that the measure does not seriously disrupt the existing system of patriarchy. Also, the measure can be seen as the appropriation of the demands of women in civil society to serve the purposes of the political élite, while at the same time giving the appearance of responsive political institutions acting on the democratic demands of women.

Therefore, it cannot be seen as a move primarily concerned with ensuring an authentic political voice for women which, if this was the case, would carry the potential for the dismantling of the current social structure. Following the view of Mackenzie and Phillips above, it can be argued that granting women the right to vote relied on the continuance of the patriarchal dominance of women in social institutions, in order that the incentive of a plural vote for men would achieve the goal of settling down the male population into a controllable workforce. Therefore, paradoxically, a move which may appear to grant women a measure of self determination is, on examination, a means to preserving their subordination.

Reeves (1969) also points out that female suffrage was not the product of political agitation on the part of women. ‘No New Zealand female orator or leader of women could by the most polite exaggeration be said to have stood in the forefront and borne a leading part in converting public opinion...’ (Reeves, 1969:113). He further notes that outside the Temperance lodges women speakers were rare; and he describes the speeches that were made by women at the behest of party managers in 1893 as ‘fluttering, half-audible little speeches’ (Reeves, 1969:113). He also observes that women had left elections alone, were not politicians, and, generally speaking, had displayed not the faintest desire to become voters (Reeves, 1969:113). A conclusion that can be drawn from these observations is that the granting of universal franchise to 140,000 women in a population of 700,000, an event reckoned to ‘revolutionise modern politics all over the planet’ (Reeves, 1969:114), was not the result of pressure from women’s groups in civil society; but rather the result of decisions and debates within the institutions of politics, an institution monopolised by males.

As with the progress of democratic enfranchisement in Britain, so too in New Zealand the extension of the latter was incidental to other political goals; since if it were a general desire in democracies, enfranchisement would have occurred at a far greater pace.
than history indicates. Further, since confounding incidents accompanied the granting of enfranchisement, it is difficult to conclude that its progress was not a distortion of the ideals associated with democracy and public involvement in decision-making. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that New Zealand did not grant full citizenship rights to women until 1919, when the Women’s Parliamentary Rights Act enabled women to stand for Parliament (Miller, 2001:377).

The more recent example of electoral reform in New Zealand also illustrates the difficulty of taking at face value events that seem to advance the democratic principle of securing authentic representation for the mass of the population. As with female enfranchisement in New Zealand, and the examples discussed from British history, it can be seen that the aspirations of the political élite play a greater role, and this can be gauged in that the advance fails to live up to populist expectations.

Recent moves to improve representation revolved around reform of the electoral system. New Zealand has had minority governments since 1951 and the Labour Party raised concerns over the functioning of the electoral system as a result of the 1978 and 1981 general elections where they won more of the popular vote than did the National Party though on both occasions National became government (Boston et al; 1999). This was followed by a commitment by Labour, in their 1984 election manifesto, to review the electoral system. A Royal Commission recommended mixed member proportional (MMP), although the majority of members of Parliament were not happy with this recommendation and consequently a select committee was set up to review the decision. This resulted in two nationwide referenda, the first in 1992. A binding referendum in 1993 resulted in a decision to change to MMP by a margin of 7.8%, with the first MMP election being held in 1996.

Boston et al. (1999) attribute the desire to change the electoral system to the public’s rejection of ‘single-minded application of market liberalism’ by both Labour and National since 1984; resulting in a choice between ‘Rogernomics and Ruthanesia’ (Rosenberg, 1993:157). If this was the case, then the change to MMP was a desire for choice between ideological positions, since, according to Boston et al.(1999), Labour and National seemed to share a particular ideology, MMP raised the possibility that other ideological positions would be brought to bear. The political situation seemed to have ossified and ideological differentiation had died, taking politics with it; politics itself was reduced to deciding
between the application of various techniques all of which bore the neo-liberal stamp, rather than substantive debate between ideological positions.

The problem here is that the margin deciding on MMP was very small indicating that if the reason Boston et al. (1999) give for the change is correct then it is possibly more accurate to say that the New Zealand population was roughly equally divided over the issue of market liberalism and the desire for alternative ideological positions. Also, since the initiation for change came from within Parliament in 1978, it could not be directly related to conditions that dominated New Zealand in the 1980s /1990s. This last point once again provides evidence that measures regarded as advancing democratic ideals may be seen as incidental to political contrivance as the two main parties contest governance. This view has further support in that if democratic ideals were behind the move to MMP, why then did the issue not receive consideration in 1972 when it was politicised by the Values Party? Finally, even though it can be argued that MMP led to improvements in representation, (for example, that votes cast are more accurately reflected in resultant seats in Parliament; and the increases in the number of Maori and women MPs), the reaction of the major parties suggests that some aspects produced by MMP are to be tolerated rather than wholeheartedly embraced. An example of this is where Kelsey (1999) identifies the tendency for the major parties to control coalition partners with a subsequent restraint on any alternative agenda the minor party might bring to the coalition (Kelsey, 1999:381-382). This more recent example provides further evidence that the reform of liberal democratic processes has failed to improve the democratic aspect. The example also emphasises that the attitude of political élites in response to these reforms contributes to this failure. It has also been suggested that neo-liberal policies initiated after 1984 were not universally rejected by the mass of the population and this is an issue returned to in section 3.2 of Chapter 3.

Two further developments which erode the advances made by the achievement of franchise and electoral reform relevant for this research are those of technocracy, as an élite form of governance; and globalization. Both are relevant since they restrict popular involvement in decision-making and must be addressed by Green politics which emphasizes deepening democracy as a political aim (Rainbow, 1991, 1993; Davidson, 1992; Dann, 1999).
2.1

Technocracy, New Zealand and technocracy, globalisation, legitimisation crisis.

The discussion on technocracy and globalisation makes available terms and concepts relevant to the approach Green parties take on these matters, both of which are regarded at the conclusion of the Chapter in terms of the legitimisation crisis characteristic of late capitalism (Habermas, 1976).

Galbraith, in Lindblom (1977:201), suggests that a corporate ‘technostructure’ is the dominant group in economic affairs. Lindblom (1977:211) refers to this specific group dominance in policy making as the ‘… duality of leadership in polyarchal systems, …to the consequent privileged position of business, and to the disproportionate influence of business in polyarchy’. In this way, the values of business become the values of society. Where Lindblom talks of the competition of ideas in the market and in politics, he draws a distinction between the significance of each option in the market and how in politics a process occurs that selects out some opinions over others (1977:218). This is what Lindblom, (1977:205) calls the ‘short-circuiting’ or the ‘circularity’ of popular control resulting in indoctrination; and this can be regarded as a factor contributing to the hegemonic hold of liberalism.

The notion of knowledge (or managerial) élites can be found in the work of C. Wright Mills(1951), and the professionalisation associated with Taylorism. Knowledge élites operate within an ethos characteristic of Enlightenment scientific neutrality aimed at adjustment and efficiency with instrumental rationality as their main tool. Also, managerial élites have systematically undermined participatory democracy, social criticism, and democratic culture in favour of thin democracy (Barber, 1984), social engineering (Hollinger, 1996), and an attitude of authoritarian expertise (Offe, 1984).

The word technocracy had been used as early as 1882, but here information from the U.S.A in the 20th century will be drawn on. For clarity, a distinction may be made between technologists and technocrats (Martins, 1972). This differentiates between the two on the
basis of political power, in that a technologist plus political power may be referred to as a technocrat. The technologists came to public attention in 1932 when the depression was at its worst. This was a crisis in need of a radical solution. The solution offered by Howard Scott was the ‘Energy Survey’ which focussed on the relationship between technical growth and economic change. This involved reducing the terms of the latter to those of the former. The change in terminology is crucial to understanding the acquisition of power by the technologists as they move closer to becoming technocrats. Addressing the problem of the depression, Scott’s team measured industrial development in the United States over the preceding one hundred years using physical rather than monetary factors, for example worker-hours per unit of production. This amounted to a redefinition of the problem of the depression in the conceptual framework of the engineer, and resulted in statements by the technologists that appeared both profound and obscure with the use of terms like, ‘energy transversion’, and ‘order of magnitude’.

This language was foreign to political or sociological discourse and served to mystify the issue of the crisis allowing for its redefinition to the effect that solutions were limited to the conceptual framework of the expert. This reductionism consequently simplified the process of dealing with the crisis since fewer factors were now considered relevant. This over simplification and consequent acceleration of the decision-making process is the second main characteristic of a technocracy. Under these circumstances instrumental or goal directed rationality is more likely to achieve the desired outcome than is communicative rationality involving a process of argumentation by concerned members of the population (Habermas, 1984).

Howard Scott's technologists were a variation on a theme developed by Thorstein Veblen and the Technical Alliance (TA). The ideal for Veblen was that his technologists were rational, impersonal, dispassionate and politically neutral. These technicians would pull together the various sectors of production and co-ordinate efforts to solve problems so as to maintain economic, political and social stability. In this way, the technicians would become the high priests of society, as Veblen said, ‘the question of revolutionary overturn in America resolves itself in practical fact into a question of what the guild of technicians do’ (Elsner, 1967:21).

What Veblen proposed was the intervention in society by a group of ostensibly
politically neutral, dispassionate, impersonal, and therefore, decontextualized experts. In the way that the ideal of the socially abstracted individual has been denounced as a fiction, the same argument can be used with reference to attempts to cast experts in the same way. Also, in the case of the expert advisors to governments, this claim of social abstraction contains a depoliticising potential. Veblen believed that ‘the problem of a society in accord with modern technology is a strictly technical one in which politics based on opinions, democratic or autocratic, could make no contribution to resolving questions of fact’ (Elsner, 1967:21). However, it has been argued that all individuals are subject to a particular social location and this to some degree impacts on their particular world-view. The façade of neutrality Veblen attempts to place between the solutions offered by the technologists and the population repudiates the ideological basis of the existing social/political order which it was the goal of the T.A. to stabilize. This has the effect of reducing moral/political questions to choices between various technical solutions leaving the wider questions of ideology and alternative world-views unexamined.

In summary, the four significant characteristics of technocracy are: the rise to saliency of a specialist language; the reduction of other discursive forms to this; with the result that, with fewer factors now considered relevant, an acceleration of the decision-making process characterised by instrumental reason is achieved. Finally, the reduction of political questions to a narrow range of technical choices places questions over the fundamental organising principle beyond political consideration.

The exercise of power by technologists in New Zealand has been observed in the social and political reforms pursued by both Labour and National Governments since 1984. Rosenberg (1993) has characterised this process as the liberalisation of the economy. This liberalisation is based on the belief that a single instrument, that is the market, can be used to achieve all prominent economic equilibrium aims. With deregulation at the centre of its politics, the Government disenfranchised itself by handing over economic decision-making to private businesses, and since all decisions have a social impact, the effects of this process were not limited to systems of exchange. This then disenfranchises the population in that ‘under the conditions of liberalisation of the economy the term democracy becomes a mockery’ (Rosenberg, 1993:103). As the public becomes increasingly depoliticized, technocrats simultaneously gain political power as the holders of the answers to a crisis
situation where decisions become matters of reference to the expertise of particular forms of knowledge. This is contrasted with the moral justification of laws in the terms of Habermas (1984), that has its basis in discursive forms of governance involving reasoned justification of validity claims.

An example of the rise of technocrats under ‘crisis’ conditions has been observed by Kelsey (1997). The Government was alerted to the crisis on receipt of the Treasury 1990 briefing papers to the incoming government. These papers indicated a trebling of the projected budget deficit, and this ‘alarming fiscal situation’ resulted in the National government enacting benefit spending cuts. Kelsey also observed the inefficacy of rounds of public consultation. Giving the outward appearance of involving the public in decisions, the outcomes, ‘which bore no relation to the views harvested from the community’, suggested that the consultation had been a sham (Kelsey, 1997:33).

In a similar way, Robin Gwynn (1998:13) sees that, since 1984, the pursuit of Hayekian ideology in the form of neo-classical economic theory, has failed to produce an ‘economic miracle’, but the damage done to society has been ‘profound’. Gwynn also points out that no opposing ideology was available since it was the Labour Party, traditionally associated with the political left, that introduced neo-classical policies in 1984 and these had been carried on by National. The central emphasis Gwynn gives to his book is the use of language designed to bewilder rather than provide the public with clear information (Gwynn, 1998:44). Its use was clearly to keep the public out of political decisions and to ensure there would be neither a process of argumentation or the possibility that validity claims could be assessed by the population (Habermas, 1984).

Another aspect of depoliticization Robin Gwynn mentions is the speed with which legislation was passed, leaving little time for public involvement in the select committee stage. In addition to the lack of opportunity for public input due to time constraints, this reliance on the institutional forms of public input into decision-making has been further criticised in that the select committee stage can be avoided. This occurs where a clause can be attached to bills rather than introducing a separate bill (Gwynn, 1998).

Shaw and Eichbaum (2005) point out that power and money are also confounding variables that encroach upon the process of public involvement in decision-making. In the first case, money is a factor since most select committee processes are held in Wellington
necessitating travel for those living elsewhere. In the second case, power is a factor in that the power differentials existing between submitters and members of the committee function to create an intimidating environment. Both these examples represent constraints upon the process and are the delinguified media to which Habermas (1984) objects if the moral justification for law is to be achieved. Another point raised by Shaw and Eichbaum (2005) is that although amendments are almost invariably adopted, the House is not bound by recommendations of select committees. From this it may be concluded that as long as the general thrust of the bill is not opposed, the House will listen to public input, and this has to be regarded as a weak influence on the decision-making process where clear alternatives put forward by the public find little traction. Finally, if the House decides that urgency should attend a bill, the select committee stage is foregone and the opportunity for public input goes with it.

These problems with the workings of the select committee process (the only institutionalised opportunity for the public to influence the detail of legislation), compound the elitist tendencies evident in liberal democracies. Also the liberal barrier between the political sphere and civil society asserts itself to the point where it represents a barrier to ‘authentic’ political involvement (Dryzek, 1996a). The result of these factors is that since 1984, the legitimacy of governments in New Zealand has been eroded to the point where politicians are seen as unconcerned with the public good (McLoughlin, 1992).

So far it has been argued that governments in New Zealand are facing a legitimacy crisis due to the internal functioning of liberal democratic systems. The incoherent aims of liberalism and democracy (discussed in Chapter 3 and section 3.1) when combined, have corrupted the latter. This legitimacy crisis is exacerbated on a second front and its cause is external. In the following section this second front, the influence of international trade deals, will be examined with the emphasis on the corrosive effects of these deals on national sovereignty (that is, of a nation’s ability to manage its internal affairs without undue influence from other sovereign states), and the disruption that these effects on national sovereignty have on the relationship between citizens and governments within a liberal democracy.

The influence of these trade deals is commonly referred to as globalization. The fear of globalization is not so much about an international network of trade, but rather the specific
type of capitalism under which the trade takes place. Of the fifty-seven types of capitalism identified by Plender (2003) the fear is that one version, the American version, will be supreme. The critical characteristic of this type of capitalism for this discussion is its emphasis on shareholder’s rights above others, for example, employees and the wider community. This type of capitalism has its roots in nineteenth century liberalism at a time when capital flowed freely around the world under the axioms of individualism, limited government and free markets. They (‘American’ type capitalists) saw the shareholder as the ultimate risk-taker and that ‘business people had discharged their wider obligations to society simply by pursuing the narrow objective of profit in the interests of the owners of the corporation, the shareholders’ (Plender, 2003:9). For modern economic liberals the aim is stabilization of trade through global diversification of risk, a key part of which is the process of lifting national controls on the flow of capital.

This process began with the Bretton Woods agreement from which emerged the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In the 1980s these two organisations used debt renegotiation as leverage to force developing nations into implementing Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) which could require sweeping economic and social changes designed to channel the country’s resources and productivity into debt repayment and to enhance transnational competition (Clarke, 2001). In the opinion of Clarke, SAPs are an instrument of recolonisation particularly affecting countries in the South. As well as this, the general agreement on trade and tariffs (GATT) argued for the removal of trade barriers that protected local industries from outside competition. This orientation to open markets all over the world has been driven by huge Transnational Corporations (TNCs) that have the resources to mount massive lobbying and advertising campaigns aimed at enabling TNCs to act unhindered by national laws and constitutions (Clarke, 2001).

The work of the GATT agreement has since been extended, and the drive to bypass national laws intensified with the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that followed the Uruguay round of GATT in 1995. Through the WTO, an unelected and unaccountable global élite has effectively seized important instruments of governance in the three dominant regions of the world: the Japanese, North American and European (Clarke, 2001). Clarke also points out that, increasingly, workers are lumped into the same global labour pool, and exploitation in Malaysia or China is felt as wage competition by workers
in London or New York.

A development from the establishment of the WTO has been the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), also passed during the Uruguay round of GATT. The aim of the GATS is to open up to competition (or liberalize) among TNCs all those services that were formerly the prerogative of national governments, including health care, education and environmental services. The fulfilment of these obligations by national governments provided much of the basis on which the legitimacy of the government depended as far as the mass of the population is concerned (Bertrand and Kalafatides, 2001).

This development follows from a belief after the second world war that health, for example, is a fundamental human right and this view was enshrined in the World Health Organisation (WHO). However, Bertrand and Kalafatides (2001) note that during the 1990s a fundamental shift occurred that meant health was now viewed as a commodity suitable for market oriented delivery and competition. Also, under the ‘Millennium Round’ of the GATS it was determined that the scope of services be opened to liberalization should extend to an additional 160 separate sectors. Bertrand and Kalafatides report that the range is as vast as it is undefined and national Parliaments that rushed through the ratification of the ‘Millennium Round’ had little idea as to the extent of services that would be affected since they were simply not made aware of these.

Bertrand and Kalafatides (2001) see the development of two tier (underfunded public/well funded private), health systems in nations signed to the GATS agreement. They also predict the onset of a number of tendencies in national health systems as the weight of competition from the huge medico-pharmaceutical industry takes hold. Among these tendencies is the medicalization of conditions as diseases requiring medication, as well as an emphasis on treatment of symptoms rather than measures aimed at prevention. Compounding the problem is the noted outlawing of alternatives to orthodox medicine, for example homeopathy.

This then pushes health care toward an increasing reliance on pharmaceuticals, thus tying health care and the medico-pharmaceutical industry ever closer together. Also, in the field of medical research, Bertrand and Kalafatides (2001) argue that genetic engineering is a top priority for research into future high-tech therapies, and that scientific research is a service included in the GATS ‘Services 2000’ revision. It can be concluded that industries
with interests in genetic engineering will push for medical research in this area; but the main motivation might not be the service of health providers or patients, but rather patents on particular interventions.

Bertrand and Kalafatides also note that secrecy and confusion are ploys used by the WTO in its literature. For example clause 1.3.C provides for exemption of services from liberalization. However, conditions attached to that exemption mean that the services have only a stay and that in the future they too will be opened to international competition. One reason Bertrand and Kalafatides give for this subterfuge is that experience has taught the WTO that public opposition can counter their attack on national services as occurred with the multilateral agreement on investment (MAI). Bertrand and Kalafatides (2001) conclude that it is for this reason that corporations regard it as important that neither national Parliaments nor the public should know what exactly is being negotiated (Bertrand and Kalafatides, 2001).

The GATS agreements, overseen by the WTO, secure rights for service companies from one country to operate in another, requiring that domestic regulations are not barriers to the commercial interests of foreign companies (Kelsey, 2003). New Zealand’s deepening involvement in these agreements has been noted by Rosenberg (1993) and he points out that the mini-panic caused by the withdrawal of foreign investment in 1984, although not in itself reason to involve the IMF, was all the incentive Roger Douglas (Minister of Finance in 4th Labour Government) needed to voluntarily ask that the IMF intervene. This demonstrates, as Clark (2003) argues, that it is not always the case that organisations like the IMF impose policy on national governments, but that national governments occasionally seek assistance from these IGOs (intergovernmental organisations) to achieve particular outcomes. Although, once assistance is sought, the influence of the IMF can be far reaching. Rosenberg (1993) adds that, through its conditionality policies, the IMF gained the leverage to influence government policies on taxation and expenditure. Also, this influence can have long-term consequences for the relationship between elected representatives and the people they represent in that popular support for IGO influence may change over time but continued IGO influence is not responsive to the changing opinions of the population.

Rosenberg (1993) points to the function of the GATT system (FOGS) as particularly damaging to New Zealand’s sovereignty. Initiated after the Uruguay round of GATT, FOGS
brings in the multilateral trade organisation (MTO) which then has the right to supervise policies of member countries to see that they do not stray from the path of trade liberalisation, irrespective of popular mandates to the contrary.

For Kelsey (2003) the very notion of trade in services, brought in by the WTO under the GATS agreement, requires a shift in the way that we normally think about both trade and services. At first glance it seems inconceivable that services, including health, education, electricity or postal services, can be traded between countries. Kelsey (2003:7) states that ‘since the 1970s those who wanted countries to open up their services to private and foreign companies have seen free trade rules as the best way to achieve this’. What is important in this trade is that it is the ownership and control of service providing companies, (for example, Telecom, Tranzrail, the BNZ and Post Bank) that is international, thus affecting national autonomy in these areas. Also, the rules that will apply under the GATS agreement have damaging and far-reaching effects on national autonomy.

Once a country has signed the GATS agreement there is a commitment to progressive liberalization under article XIX with successive rounds of negotiations beginning no later than five years from date of entry and periodically thereafter. Kelsey (2003:27) sees that this could be a process with little in the way of limits on the services committed under the agreement. Article XXI is effectively a ‘lock-in’ clause where countries are free to withdraw from commitments but conditions attached to this article make the option highly unattractive. Kelsey (2003:28) observes here that the ability for future governments to reconsider commitments under GATS, and reassert effective control is severely constrained. Kelsey also points out that the New Zealand Parliament has no involvement in formulating the negotiating mandate nor any effective oversight of regulations or their outcome, and once again this binds future governments and restricts law making and policy pursuit. Significantly, it also entrenches neo-liberalism as an organising principle in signatory nation-states (Kelsey, 2003:29-30).

Parliament is also restricted in its scope to influence the outcome of negotiations since the agreements are tabled only after they have been signed. Therefore successive services committed are not debated in Parliament since the negotiations are already completed, and this provision is upheld by the Official Information Act in New Zealand that provides an exemption for negotiations on international treaties. This means that the
opportunities for the public to have any democratic input into these particular negotiations, whether through their representatives or in the form of extra-Parliamentary action, are virtually nil. This is especially the case since, as Kelsey (2003: pp 11,31) points out, the government’s consultation document from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) on the ‘offers’ required by the Government to be tabled in Geneva by end of March 2003, had been delayed from an original release date of early January 2003 and still had not been released by the time Kelsey’s book had gone to print later that year. Kelsey adds that even had the process of consultation gone ahead on time, there would be no guarantee that the submissions would have any bearing on services offered under the GATS agreement, and this seems to have support when we consider some of the articles set out above especially XIX and XXI.

The combination of the two trends outlined above (the rise of technocracy and trade liberalisation agreements) have contributed to the legitimation crisis characteristic of late capitalist societies (Habermas, 1976). This crisis has been viewed in terms of independent state theory in which the bureaucracy is seen as a mediator between various societal interests and capital accumulation. It is also acknowledged that in addition to the legitimation imperative the state is bound to pursue other imperatives to ensure longevity and stability, for example; domestic order, national security, and revenue gathering, and pursuit of these imperatives will always be in the interests of public officials independent of competing preferences other political actors may have (Dryzek et al., 2003). The legitimation crisis arises from the tension between state interests and those of the electors. An example from Vincent (1987) is that the pressure on the state to regulate the market must be balanced with demands to free markets from intervention in order to allow the flow of investment and accumulation.

The welfare state simultaneously props up capital accumulation while ameliorating the worst effects of market fluctuation on the rest of society especially workers, and the unemployed. However, since it is based on core liberal ideology the welfare state will always tend to encourage individual independence as opposed to collective dependence. In this way, a complicity exists between the welfare state and the process of capital
accumulation over unemployment assistance. This may lead the wage dependent majority to wonder why its interests are not being heard in a democracy based on the majority principle, since the owners of the means of production will always be outnumbered by those who must sell their labour. As Vincent (1987:177) says, the state ‘faces contradictory imperatives, economic restrictions demanded by one large sector of the electorate to moderate capitalism, conflict with demands by capitalist groups to minimize state regulation’.

The workings of the welfare state represent a focus for these tensions and for the legitimation crisis itself. The crisis involves the withdrawal of loyalty and support when the normative commitment to society has been undermined, and, in this way, the state is deprived of part of its normal sovereignty (Habermas, 1976). This can be seen in the case outlined concerning the GATS agreements where the restrictions on national policy making over-commit the state to decisions favouring capital accumulation over other social policy areas and imperatives. Secondly, in the case of the rise of élites, technocratic decision-making has depoliticized the mass of the population by restricting problem solving to narrow areas of specialized knowledge and this has resulted in a short-circuiting of the decision-making process. Offe (1984) has thought of this in terms of a neo-conservative reaction to the overburdened state where attempts to reduce the demands on the state take the form of reducing problem solving in societal media (these are political power relations, societal relations, market relations, and medium of truth or knowledge) to one outside that area. For example, redirecting claims on societal relations, welfare state security as well as political and economic power of trade unions towards monetary exchange and market relations.

This has implications for the claim that liberal democracy effects the legitimate political representation of the diversity of social groups. Also, the capture of the state by powerful groups, for example technocrats, acts as an impediment against the realisation of the pluralist, polyarchal ideal. A reaction to this has been the emergence of the new social movements. The pluralist theories regarding their rise approach the issue in terms of either too much democracy or too little. Those emphasising too much democracy opposed the democratic demands represented by the rise of new social movements. The latter were regarded as a threat to the stability of civil society itself, as a result of the erosion of existing values, and the destabilising effect of the emergence of new values. Also threatened by the
rise of social movements was governmental authority. This is because increasing demands on the state strain its capacity to deliver, thereby weakening the normative commitment between civil society and the state. Proponents of this view conclude that the boundary between public and private spheres must be reasserted and more carefully monitored (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987:66-68).

Those who regarded the rise of social movements in terms of too little democracy supported demands for increased democratic control for those in civil society. The grounds for this support were, for example, the perception of the systematic exclusion of some groups in policy making with the consequent entrenchment of existing inequalities. Also, the control of policy areas by unelected groups was seen as equally undemocratic (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987:68). This characterised the shift from conventional pluralism to neo-pluralism which provided a view that took into account ‘…the operations of large corporations and the modern extended state’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987:272).

Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) see the legitimation crisis best evidenced in the United States in the 1960s, where the rise of new social movements on the basis of ethnicity, ecology and peace, rose to dispel the myth that liberal democracy could guarantee equality among various groups in terms of political contestation. This ‘participatory explosion’, or participatory-democracy movement, was observed in 1963 and was thought to be a reaction against the depoliticization of civil society, and aimed at raising issues systematically left off the political agenda (Cook and Morgan, 1971). Offe (1985) has characterised these issues as ‘new politics’ or a new paradigm, which confronts ‘old politics’, where the latter focussed on national security and comprehensive growth, and agreement over the institutional means of conflict resolution. The challenge to the last of these factors within the participatory-democracy movement was described as an attempt to broaden the concept of citizenship in order to reverse the trend toward the concentration of political authority (Cook and Morgan, 1971). It can be seen that both technocratic governance and globalization tend toward the concentration of political authority and this tendency has continued beyond 1971 and the observations of Cook and Morgan with the consequent narrowing of the concept of citizenship and a deepening of the legitimation crisis.
Summary.

This Chapter has argued that liberal democracy is flawed in a number of ways with the result that involvement in decision-making for the mass of the population is constrained. This constraint has persisted throughout its history and the examination in this Chapter of advances in the democratic aspect, for example, enfranchisement and electoral reform, reveal that they had been taken on a particular trajectory due to the overbearing influence of political élites working within the political institutions.

The effect of this, as has been argued, is that democracy understood as ‘people power’ (demos kratein) has not been advanced on that principle, but hindered under liberal ideology. Compounding the constraints already mentioned, has been the depoliticising influence of technocracy, for example, which institutionalises political élitism and functions to eliminate the very aspect essential to democracy, that is, politics as a public forum. Relatedly, global trade deals, as discussed, are structured to depoliticize civil society though the effects of the deals have profound implications for the lives of those in civil society in terms of both politics and economics. Therefore it can be seen that although enfranchisement may be considered a democratic advance, the effect of this is eroded by the other two developments discussed here and the net gain to democracy of the former must be balanced against the latter.

Beyond enfranchisement, electoral reform and institutional access to policy decisions (for example the select committee process), there is extra-Parliamentary or movement politics. This Chapter has concluded that this type of politics usually takes the form of appeals to existing institutions and that it has been easily ignored by those institutions. Consequently extra-Parliamentary activity has been unable to influence Parliamentary activity to any degree where a causal connection can be established. This is particularly relevant for this research in that Green Parties have been characterised as forging the ‘new political culture’ where they act as half local action group and half as a Parliamentary party. In New Zealand this focusses attention on the Wild Greens discussed in Chapter 6.1 (Kelly, 1991:194). It can be tentatively concluded on the basis of historical events both in New Zealand and Britain that the movement aspect of Green politics would not be as effective as Parliamentary power within existing liberal institutions.
It is argued that on the basis of the discussion in this Chapter that central to the depoliticization of civil society is the insistence on the separation between civil society and the political sphere at the core of liberal ideology, and this must be confronted in its entirety, or by degree, in any attempt to substantively increase the democratic principle or to deepen democracy as is the aim of Green politics (Rainbow, 1991, 1993; Davidson, 1992; Dann, 1999). This steers the research into a direction that emphasises politics as a contest between varying ideologies or thought systems, in particular those of liberalism and Green ideology. Where it will be argued that liberalism serves to depoliticize civil society, Green principles emphasise the opposite, a deepening of democracy. Therefore, the research will focus on an examination of the claims of Green politics in this regard. The conjecture that liberal ideology is the cause of the depoliticising aspects so far discussed, which may be considered symptoms, requires investigation into the exact nature of this aspect of liberal democracy.

For this reason the following, Chapter 3, focusses on tracing liberal democracy in terms of the development of liberal ideology in its close association with democracy and in this way builds on the previous Chapter in which the functioning of the system as a whole was looked at. The following Chapter represents a dissection of liberal democracy now examining the liberal aspect. This begins with a historical overview dealing with the work of classic theorists and this discussion is followed by the views of more modern writers. These discussions are limited to the liberal separation between the political sphere and civil society. This separation implies representation as the means of effecting liberal democracy in practice and this aspect is critically analysed. In opposition to representation, various participatory systems have been devised over time and the ‘participatory-democracy movement’ was mentioned in the previous Chapter. In terms of deepening democracy, participation is thought to right the wrongs of liberal democracy by emphasising the democratic aspect, and for this reason becomes a consideration for Green politics. Participatory systems are discussed in section 5.1 and the particular Green version in section 6.1. These practical solutions have their origins in various ideological positions and these ideological positions justify alternative configurations of democracy. Against the success of these alternative ideological positions stands the hegemonic dominance of liberalism which is in part a product of an atrophied state of ideological thinking with the consequent non-recognition of the arbitrary nature of liberalism (Bourdieu in Fairclough, 2001).
final aspect discussed in section 3.2 is that the latter exists in New Zealand and it is this dominance that the Green parties in New Zealand must confront to bring to fruition ideals of deepening democracy. Green ideology is set out in section 6.1 prior to the case studies on two New Zealand Green parties, The New Zealand Values Party and the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand.
Chapter 3
Liberal Democracy: Historical origins. Liberalism.

This Chapter turns attention from the development of tendencies within liberal democracy producing a crisis of legitimacy to closer scrutiny of its underlying liberal ideology in order to uncover the latter as the cause of the corruption of democracy. To this end, the writings of both classic and more recent theorists are referred to in order to raise terms considered relevant to this research. These include representation, citizenship, participation and the separation of the state and civil society central to liberal thinking. These are considered relevant in that before we can consider the possible effects of Green ideology on existing institutions, we must first consider the nature of those institutions.

In this regard, this Chapter builds on the previous by narrowing the focus in order to highlight the fundamental ideological aspect of current institutions. To this end, the views of various writers on liberal democracy are followed by the views of various critiques aimed at the ideological basis of liberal democracy. Critique from a communitarian perspective is offered which, among other factors, raises the individualist focus of liberalism and sets this principle against their own focus on community. In this way, the communitarian critique is essentially ideological and the importance of this approach is that central to assessing the impact of Green ideology on current liberal democratic institutions is exposing the ideological basis of the latter. This is relevant to this research in that ideological critique has the dual effect of disrupting the hegemonic hold of liberalism (which exists in New Zealand, as will be argued in section 3.2 ) thereby stimulating political debate which is of benefit to democracy resisting the anti-political tendencies of modernity (Torgerson, 2000). Secondly, an ideological critique exposes the ideological basis of the depoliticising effects of liberal democracy (some of which have been discussed in the previous Chapter). The current order is then made accessible to critical examination which then may serve as justification for its reformation or restructuring on the basis of, for this research, Green ideology.
It can be concluded from the previous Chapter that democracy is historically variable. Alain Touraine has said that ‘no one would now describe as democratic a regime that restricted universal suffrage; we can no longer accept a restrictive definition of the electorate that excludes women’ (1997:60).

Although these observations might well suggest that throughout history democracy has been on a linear course of improvement and that the perfection of democracy is only a matter of time, we have to consider that enfranchisement, although a very important aspect, is the bare minimum requirement for liberal democracy. Therefore, there is room for critical examination of democracy, and history has indicated that the best we can hope for is that future developments will expose the failings of our current democratic arrangements.

The particular type of democracy prevalent in Western capitalist countries will be examined closer in an attempt to explain why the achievement of enfranchisement, as has been demonstrated, took the course that it did. The examination will focus on the liberal aspect of current institutions in New Zealand as an approach to explain the developments of technocracy and globalisation as already discussed. While demands for enfranchisement have reached an equilibrium in Western capitalist societies, technocracy and globalisation are sites where Green politics continues to confront the erosion of the democratic principle. In common with the historical process of enfranchisement, both technocracy and globalisation resist the attainment of authentic political involvement based on notions of democracy as public involvement in decision-making.

The explanation for these developments, it will be argued, will be found when the particular type of democracy that developed at this time is regarded, that is, liberal democracy. Liberal democracies have been variously regarded as ‘thin democracies’ (Barber, 1984); and by Philip Green as pseudo-democracies, (in Garrard, Tolz and White, 2000:18). A fundamental consequence of combining liberalism and democracy is that it necessitates a representative system. Reasons for this will become apparent when classical liberal theory is considered, with the focus on the resultant barrier between civil society and the political sphere. Voting for representatives is characteristic of liberal democracies and, according to Levine (1981), representative government is the sole practical ‘solution’ to the problem of joining liberalism and democracy. The result of this process is that the intention of each is compromised where ‘...the method of majority rule cannot undo the state’s role as
the principle source of unfreedom—where the majority determines the minority, those in the minority are forced to do what they do not want to do and are therefore unfree’ (Levine, 1981:32).

This then contravenes the liberal commitment to individual freedom asserted by Thomas Hobbes in *Leviathan* (1651). Hobbes took the view that in the state of nature, if individuals were left to their own devices, a war of all against all would dominate social life. Laws were therefore required to protect individuals from each other; and, in order that individuals should be free to pursue their interests without state interference, a strict division must exist between state and civil society. For Hobbes the political realm is dominated by instrumental value, and civil society is where most individuals find (divinely inspired) fulfilment. This indicates that the proper place for the mass of the population is civil society where their right to pursue their individual interests would be protected. At the same time that their rights in civil society were protected, the mass of the population were guaranteed no rights of involvement in the political sphere. Vincent (1987) points out that the triumph of absolute sovereignty in the seventeenth century followed the failure of the conciliar movement and this was to influence the work of Hobbes resulting in his theory involving the separation of civil society and the state. It is in this sense that liberal theory is not democratic (Oldfield in Garrard, Tolz and White eds.2000:8).

Following from Hobbes, John Locke in *Two Treatises of Government* (1690) expressed the view that the proper function of government was to protect the property (lives, liberties and estates) of individuals to ensure that individuals were free to pursue their own interests; the cumulative effect of which was the greatest good for all in society. The relationship was to be in the nature of a contract within which the government was to ensure order, thus securing freedom for individuals, and failure in this task meant that individuals had the right to resist the government’s authority and to change it. This is contrary to Hobbes for whom the sovereign was not accountable to those from whom he received the power to act. Jean-Jacques Rousseau added to the contract tradition by asserting that the contract should be constantly renewable since people are born into political arrangements that are not of their choosing, and so the legitimacy of any political arrangement was dependent on repeatedly given consent. Now there emerge elements of popular involvement in politics which encroach on the strict division between state and civil society advocated by both
Hobbes and Locke. Rousseau considered the concept ‘private citizen’ an oxymoron since citizen implies a public status in that a citizen can only be so in the context of other citizens in, for example, a nation state. The individual is pulled in contrary directions. Under the influence of core liberal theory the individual is private and free, but now required to act in a collectivity and consider periodically the legitimacy ceded to the sovereign. This thinking widens the gap between Rousseau and core liberal theory and illustrates the tension between core liberal theory and conceptions of democratic participation.

John Stuart Mill too was an advocate of political involvement and, contrary to Hobbes, saw, in the role of the citizen, the means to fulfilment rather than the political void of civil society. In On Liberty (1859), Mill expressed concern with the intolerance of mid-Victorian Britain and the threat to individual and lifestyle difference that this implied. For Mill, such an intolerance threatened to retard social progress in Britain.

An advocate of political participation, Mill was, however, concerned that the working class were, as yet, incapable of understanding politics and needed education in this regard. In the mean time, Mill advocated an intellectual and moral élite to challenge the prevalent order. Even so, the main thrust of Mill’s thinking was that, as Oldfield, tells us, Mill recognised the inevitability of democracy, and in Considerations on Representative Government (1861) contended that the working class needed some role in public affairs by which to exercise political power and use it for the common good (Oldfield, 2000). This runs counter to the Hobbesian conception of the individual. However, Mill’s use of the term ‘common good’ may be explained in that a heightened nationalism at the time that Mill was writing brought with it a perception of society where unity among individuals through national identity was prevalent. Also, the ‘common good’, as Mill used the term, may have had more to do with the good of the nation-state rather than a new conception of the common good emerging from within the nation. In this way, Mill did not stray far from core liberal principles concerning the individual. Mill’s utilitarian leanings are evident where he states ‘The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs...’ (in Sandel, 1984:2).

Also in contradistinction with the Hobbesian idea of a powerful leviathan ensuring order in civil society, is the work of James Madison writing in the late 1700s. Madison extends the call for popular involvement, and advocated both a pluralist system where, rather
than political power residing solely with the sovereign, it should be fragmented throughout society; and the institutionalization of political structures based on negotiation and compromise. This was intended to defuse the damaging effects of competition that in the past had led to revolution, and rather than suppress sectional interests, he sought to channel their energies into official political arenas.

The idea of a plural society is also evident in the work of Alexis de Tocqueville’s *Democracy in America* (1835). Tocqueville saw in democracy the great danger of the tyranny of the majority and the subsequent obliteration of groups, associations and institutions that stood as intermediaries between individuals and the state. As with Mill, Tocqueville considered democracy an inevitable development, and he feared that its success would reduce individuals to a stultifying conformity in the absence of other groups offering alternative points of view. His solution was federalism, in which political power would be split between states and national government. This, he hoped, would give rise to voluntary associations forming around matters of common interest.

Holden (1988) points out that the concept and practice of representation emerged during the middle ages but only became integral to democratic theory late in the 18th century. Representation was a response to increasing franchise, and within the contractarian tradition going back to Locke, representation evolved where individuals enter into a hypothetical contract where peace and order in civil society are exchanged for the absolute power of the sovereign.

Since then representation has the form that individuals in society vote for representatives to act on their behalf. Representation is the vital link between state and civil society, where representatives are, supposedly, conduits for the interests of those who are able to vote in civil society. Although an improvement on Hobbes, for whom civil society was conceived of as apolitical, representation confers on civil society a degree of political involvement; and the first advances in democracy concerned the achievement of universal suffrage, as has been discussed.

The following discussion draws on the work of more recent theorists. This discussion builds on the thought of classical theorists and pursues the issue of representation. This covers a range of views around the level of political involvement thought necessary for a democratic system. For example, some writers have argued that political involvement at the
minimum level of periodic voting is all that is required for a democracy. Joseph Schumpeter, for example, writing in 1943, was impressed with the irrationality of people caught up in mass movements, and concluded that it was dangerous for both individual liberty and national politics to have the people too closely involved in politics (Oldfield, 2000:15). Schumpeter argued that if government office is allocated on the basis of competitive popular elections, we have, unproblematically, a democracy (Hyland, 1995).

Also, for Hannah Arendt, the assumption that democracy is an assurance against totalitarianism is illusory. However, rather than restrict political involvement, as Schumpeter advocated, Arendt’s solution was to increase political participation, but in a decentralised system of government. She argued that given the right conditions, the mass of the population is drawn to totalitarian regimes, and under such conditions difference is crushed. Also, that the ground for this had been prepared from within liberalism from Hobbes to Rousseau (law giver), and other thinkers such as Heidegger, Plato and Nietzsche (philosopher king), who had advocated ‘one-man rule’. The latter three thinkers had ‘looked at politics from the standpoint the solitary thinker engaged in his single-minded pursuit of truth’(Canovan, 1998:43). In contrast to this, Arendt was an advocate of what she called the ‘council system’. This was a form of participatory republicanism based on a federation of face-to-face groupings. She comments that this developed before the Russian revolution of 1905, where Soviet councils had developed, only to be crushed by the Bolshevik uprising of 1917 in the interests of centralised state control (Canovan, 1998:48).

John Burnheim also rejects centralisation in favour of democratic self-government by autonomous bodies working in distinct issue areas. Representation is of the utmost importance with representatives being selected by random lot with rapid rotation and a short term of service to counter the development of career politicians (Hyland, 1995; Levine, 1981).

C.B. Macpherson diverges even further from Schumpeter by emphasising core democratic theory over the liberal division between civil society and the realm of politics. To this end, Macpherson argues for the reform of liberal democracy within the existing framework by retaining an emphasis on individual development toward emancipation, while rejecting possessive individualism that works against development of community (Holden, 1988). Macpherson argues that democracy can only be achieved when all the members of
a community have achieved self-realisation in an egalitarian manner, and in this way, separate out the developmental from the possessive elements of liberal individualism. Also, Macpherson aimed to alter what Arendt regards as the gigantic process of bribery that elections represent; where voters decide according to which party offers them more as individuals (Canovan, 1998). In this way, the common good cannot be realised, but only the egoistic endeavours of utility striving individuals.

Following the point Macpherson makes, a number of examples will be discussed in order to emphasise the often contradictory trajectories of liberalism and democracy; in order to construct the term ‘liberal democracy’ as an oxymoron. To this end the autonomous individual, as opposed to collective goals, will be looked at in terms of communitarian theory. The conception of the autonomous individual derived from liberalism has been criticised by communitarian theorists who argue that such an individual is fictitious. Central to this view is the role of language and tradition as well as existential bondedness of the sort encountered in the work of Karl Mannheim.

The term communitarian was coined in 1841. Among early communitarian thinkers are Ferdinand Tönnies and Emile Durkheim, who were critical of both the individualist assumptions held by liberals as well as their opposition to collectivist conceptions of the common good. Communitarians are more concerned to emphasise the importance of linkages between individuals to traditions and communities that share a conceptual apparatus leading to coherence around a particular world-view. This unity in the perception of the world leads to common understandings and a shared ethic about how we should act in the world toward a common good. An aspect of this is evidenced in the Green political commitment to holism, a view of the world as a ‘closely interwoven system of patterns’; it therefore makes no more sense to regard humans as separate from other humans than it is to regard humans as separate from nature (Smuts, 1994:98).

In this regard, the term de-ontology is central to the communitarian critique of liberalism. This term encompasses a view of the individual unencumbered by any overarching thought system. This constructs the individual as free to find out for themselves in what their ‘good’ consists, and this is among core liberal principles.

This principle has its historical origins in the attempt to emancipate human political nature from the ever eroding influence of the church, which took place in 1300 in Italy.
Machiavelli, however, was to focus on the pathologies, establishing that evil was more significant in politics than good. A void appeared in terms of deciding upon the nature of good in human politics and existence in the absence of the certainties of the good offered by the church. Also, as politics was wrested from control by the church, and secular forms of politics asserted themselves, it was Machiavelli’s view that the latter seemed to offer nothing but the evil struggle of all against all (Manent, 1994). This accords with the view of the communitarian theorists, and centres on a critique of the priority liberalism ascribes to the right over the good. The decay of churchly authority represented a great freedom for those beholden to liberalism. As religious orthodoxy abated, the opportunity to construct that which is no longer self evident presented itself (Sandel, 1984). According to liberalism, individuals are no longer bound by an authority that sought control over every aspect of their existence. Within this de-ontological universe, independent individuals are sovereign and, ‘cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are, and as inhabitants of a world without telos, are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given’ (Sandel, 1984:170).

Insistence on de-ontological conditions opens a void where individuals are ‘unencumbered and essentially dispossessed’; under these circumstances ‘justice finds its occasion because we cannot know each other, or our ends, well enough to govern by the common good alone’ (Sandel, 1984:175). Therefore in the absence of a conception of the good founded upon church authority, and under the influence of a dominant liberal ideology, reconstruction of the common good languishes under the insistence of individual sovereignty. The danger here is that under these conditions of relativism, ethics is free to take whatever form the individual desires. This necessitates law after law to constrain the willful endeavours of utility seeking individuals. Therefore the conditions hoped by liberal thinkers to secure freedom for individuals, have condemned the latter to a politics of evil with no end (Sandel, 1984).

Alasdair MacIntyre has characterised this as Sartrian and Goffmanesque conceptions of selfhood, and typical of the modes of thought and practice of modernity where the self is liquidated into a set of demarcated areas of roleplaying in the pursuit of maximum utility.
MacIntyre insists, in opposition to the sovereign, atomistic individual, that ‘we cannot...characterise behaviour independently of intentions, and we cannot characterise intentions independently of settings which make those intentions intelligible...’ (1984:128). Linking traditions, the present and the future, MacIntyre is adamant that the social space into which we are born does in fact constitute the individual. ‘We cannot, each of us, form at our birth a set of understandings about the world independent of that into which we are born, and independent to those with whom we live’. Also for MacIntyre, ‘There is no present which is not informed by some image of some future and an image of the future which always presents itself in the form of a telos– or of some variety of ends or goals--towards which we are either moving or failing to move in the present’ (MacIntyre, 1984:137).

MacIntyre recognises that different social circumstances will produce differing world-views and therefore differing conceptions of what the good life should be. ‘We all approach our own circumstances as bearers of a particular social identity (one of the bearers of a tradition), therefore what is good for me has to be good for one who inhabits all the roles I do; and this gives my life its own moral particularity’ (MacIntyre, 1984:143).

The only hope for locating a moral code to guide those of a community toward the good life is first to recognise the traditions that give us our conceptual apparatus with which we view the world. Those around us will have much the same view and an idea of where we should be going to achieve the good life.

Liberalism, as mentioned, regards freedom more highly than the good, and, under such a conception of utility seeking individuals, there is an affinity between liberal democracies and ‘free-markets’. Under such a system, the worker becomes a commodity and is treated as such while the capitalist becomes homo oeconomicus, and is subordinated to the requirements of capitalist calculation where persons are means only and humanity disappears (Levine, 1981:131). Once again laws are required, in the form of human rights, to save human beings from themselves. In this way, instrumental reason comes to dominate in the relations between people and the environment, and where market relations dominate in society it follows, according to Levine (1981), that political control is absent and representative government encourages this absence. Given the deeply entrenched view in liberal democracies on the relationship between politics and society, it is hardly surprising
that liberal democrats resolve the tension on the side of liberalism and society rather than
democracy or the state (Levine, 1981:150).

There are obvious connections between MacIntyre’s argument and that of Mannheim
inasmuch as individuals inherit a linguistic tradition through their common connection to
particular existential circumstances. With this conceptual apparatus members of that
community build a world-view and this contains a shared telos, or to use Mannheim’s term,
a utopia. Mannheim went on to construct a process by which social change would occur.
Within this process the existing order allows to arise (in differently located social groups)
those ideas and values of each age that then breach the limits of the existing order thus
establishing a new order (Mannheim, 1960).

As mentioned, the communitarian theorists have argued that the liberal conception
of the possessive, or atomic individual, fails to take account of humans as social beings.
Possessive individualism is compounded by the influence of capitalism and the relationship
between people it encourages. Levine (1981) has also suggested that if atomic individualism
is to be avoided and if community is to exist, then persons cannot continue to be instrumental
for each other in the way that the workings of the capitalist market economy engender.

For these reasons Macpherson proposes to do away with extractive methods of
production and, at the same time, extractive social relations; establishing in their place
developmental liberty or individual self-direction. That is, an emancipation free from
capitalism and its asymmetrical distribution of benefits and burdens that translate into
differential means for individuals (Levine, 1981). The focus on the individual has liberal
tones but the rejection of the capitalist market economy indicates Macpherson’s collectivist
leanings, aimed at achieving social cohesion once possessive individualism is replaced by
developmental individualism. The implication is then that removing the capitalist system
is the first and crucial step in the process of social change in the way that Macpherson has
suggested. This is nothing short of the ideological overturn of the current order where only
under circumstances where the working class in particular are ‘free from exploitation’ can
‘genuine democracy prevail’ (McLennan, 1989:8).

However, from within liberalism, critics have focussed on the failure of the ideal of
pluralism, an approach which claims that ‘the essential foundation for a successful
democracy is the existence of a range of citizen groups within wider society’ (McLennan,
1989:10). For example, Robert Dahl has argued that pluralism has been reduced to a politics of élites engaged in open competition by means of periodic elections. This élitism is the result of two main tendencies. The first is a lack of interest in politics on the part of many in civil society. The second is differential access to wealth and political resources which have a bearing on people’s capacity for political involvement. Even so, he warns that the wealthy do not form a united, cohesive group, since loyalties are divided between other social categories such as gender and ethnicity (Dahl in Hirst, 1990).

Dahl argues, however, that although this élitist conception is a defective form of democracy, the disjuncture between the democratic ideal and its practice is nothing unusual. Furthermore, Dahl contends that the maximum conditions for democracy are virtually unrealisable and that most systems operate at much lower levels of inclusiveness and openness (Dahl in Hirst, 1990:40-41).

In this regard, Dahl’s view is close to that of Hannah Arendt, as mentioned, in that most people will not want to involve themselves in public affairs, and this will exclude them from a share of democratic power. Therefore, while Schumpeter’s élitist theory asserts that the mass of the population should not be involved in politics and Arendt sees that this will almost naturally be the choice of many outside participatory republicanism, Dahl, on the other hand, hopes that the imperfections of liberal democracy can be overcome. In this regard, Dahl looks to technological innovations to herald in phase three of the development of democracy resulting in increased participation for all citizens along with access to the political agenda (Dahl, 1989). But for now, Dahl’s conception of democracy reveals its liberal emphasis in that, as Levine (1981) tells us, Dahl’s acceptance of the intention of the public solely on the basis of those who participate, amounts to a conception of the public not as everyone but rather anyone.
Summary.

This section has argued that the combination of liberalism and democracy is incoherent and that the combination of the two compromises the principles of each. This critique was conducted from the perspective of communitarian theorists in order to raise key points to illustrate this incoherency in ways relevant to this research. The communitarian critique also clarifies Green politics in that, since there are many points common to both, it can be concluded that Green political opposition is directed against liberalism although liberal ideology may not be clearly identified in Green material.

In particular, the communitarian critique emphasises the de-ontology associated with liberalism on the grounds that the latter stresses atomic individualism, and simultaneously rejects the principle of the collective, common good. This conceives of a collection of individuals with little in the way of common reference points, and this undermines the possibility of securing the ethical justification of political decisions.

It has been further argued that de-ontology produces a ‘thin’ version of democracy in that possessive individualism, combined with the influence of capitalist market relations, produces a democracy that more closely resembles a market rather than a public forum (Elster, 1986). Also, that representation, as the solution to the combination of liberalism and democracy, only serves to encourage political inactivity among those in civil society resulting in a level of politics advocated by Schumpeter, and this encourages politics as appeals to voter self-interest, rather than fundamental debate on the system itself.

The view of Schumpeter may be contrasted with that of Arendt where participatory republicanism aims at the reassertion of social connections between individuals. This, it is argued, is a matter of disrupting the prevalence of liberal truth claims about social ontology and political institutions, including representation. The latter has been argued to be incompatible with the ethical basis of decision-making and is the institutionalization of the barrier between civil society and the political sphere of core liberal theory.
3.1

Liberal democracy, representation criticised.

This section critically assesses representation, and clearly links this form of governance with liberalism. In so doing it raises the possibility that the ‘naturalness’ of representation may be challenged through a critique of its ideological basis. It is argued that such a critique may simultaneously disrupt the hegemonic hold of both liberalism and representation.

For Levine (1981), the persistence of the dominant liberal tradition is due to its having become commonsense; a consequence of which is the assumption that the liberal state acts as a neutral arbiter, and as such, seldom has to justify itself while liberalism remains the dominant ideology. The assumption of neutrality underpins the liberal claim to uphold the rights of individuals to choose their ‘good’ according a particular set of values.

As the foregoing has demonstrated, democratic involvement covers wide variations and, very generally, democracy can emphasize either representation where, to some degree, voters give up their sovereignty, or, on the other hand, the emphasis can be on some degree of participation which can include direct participation in decision-making, for example, in the style of Athenian democracy of the 5th and 4th century BC. Saward (2003 a) has identified 29 types of democracy ranging from associative to deliberative, to competitive élite, people’s democracy, polyarchal and finally virtual democracy. We can conclude that there is no essential ‘democracy’ by which to judge all others and that the possibilities for democratic arrangement and institutions are almost endless.

Wood (1995:237), for example, has argued that the longevity of liberal democracy cannot be attributed to it’s having ‘surpassed all conceivable alternatives’, but that a hegemony sustains it. While it at once gives the appearance of having achieved the end of history, it is sustained by succeeding only in obscuring the possibilities of alternatives.
Therefore the reconfiguration of democracy, that takes it beyond its present liberal variation, is at least a theoretical possibility, and it is into this theoretical space that we approach the subject of Green politics and the implications it has for representative democracy in New Zealand.

Exposing liberalism as an ideology among others leaves room for debate about the institutional consequences of liberal democracy, namely representation. As mentioned, Levine (1981:31) sees that representative government is the sole practical solution to the problem of joining liberalism and democracy. However, he is not convinced that it is a satisfactory solution, neither is he convinced that it is a lasting solution. Representation becomes necessary because liberal theory insists on the separation of civil society and the state, and democracy requires a mandate from the mass of the population. This results, for Levine (1981); Holden (1988) and Hirst (1990) in the depoliticization of civil society.

The tension between liberalism and democracy can be briefly stated. Initially liberals were enemies of royal tyranny and in struggling for freedom from such tyranny, liberalism became synonymous with emancipation. However, the progressive extension of democratic franchise meant that the tyranny of the majority came to represent a greater threat; liberalism then developed in opposition to democracy as the rising middle-class sought to defend access to resources recently won from previously dominant groups (Levine, 1981:93-94).

Essentially the problem for liberal democracy is that it is caught on the horns of a dilemma. It attempts at once to articulate both liberal and democratic judgements on political institutions. The insistence from the liberal tradition on the right to individual privacy is combined with the democratic judgment which holds that the only legitimacy for the state comes from a collective mandate from the masses, and that individual choices should somehow be aggregated across society (Levine, 1981).

Hirst (1990) argues that when we problematize the notion of ‘representation’, then modern democracy ceases to be a form of delegated rule by the people and instead becomes rule by professional politicians and government officials over people, in which some of those rulers are periodically changed by the mechanism of elections. He further points out that the hegemony of liberal-democratic politics obscures the fact that it was already obsolete in the nineteenth century. He attributes this hegemony to the influence of the work of conservative liberal, Frederick Hayek (Hirst, 1990:28,105).
For Hirst, the delegation process breaks down for two main reasons. These are the immense size and complexity of governments, which mean that they are only ever able to ‘superintend a tiny percentage of decisions’, thus making the functioning of democracy difficult; and secondly, the emergence of managerial élites, or technocrats as mentioned earlier, are characterised as the ‘rule of the unelected official’ (Hirst, 1990:105).

In addition to voting every three years (in New Zealand) there is the select committee process which has already been discussed with the emphasis on its shortcomings. The alternative to institutional forms of politics is the range of extra-Parliamentary political activity. Included here are protest marches, demonstrations and petitions. However, unless this activity is aimed at the overthrow of the existing political institutions, they have, at some stage, to deal with those institutions, and extra-Parliamentary action can be seen as making an appeal to existing institutions. Therefore it can be argued that political involvement at the moment in New Zealand generally relies on representation, electoral system and the functioning of Parliament.

Summary.

This section has argued that liberal dominance is hegemonic, in that it has become regarded as commonsense. The section has also argued that substantive social/political change is possible, and that an impediment to this is liberal hegemony. Finally, that the way around this impediment, and so the key to effect change, is to expose liberalism as an ideological perspective among others. This, it is argued, would have the effect of disrupting the commonsense with which liberalism is currently regarded. This task is complicated in the case of New Zealand, in which, it is argued, there is a dearth of competing ideological traditions that might be mobilised to effect the disruption of liberal hegemony.
3.2

Liberal hegemony in New Zealand.

It has been so far argued that a challenge to liberalism can revive politics as well as disrupt the way in which representation is regarded as commonsense, since it has been established that the latter is strongly associated with liberalism. It has also been argued that disrupting liberalism in this way is essential if the barrier between civil society and the political sphere is to be influenced in a way that facilitates the deepening of democracy. However, what any challenge to liberalism confronts is liberal hegemony in which liberalism is no longer seen as one ideological position among many, but rather dominates the common ground. This section argues that this is the case in New Zealand. It is also argues that a factor in the hegemonic dominance of liberalism in New Zealand is a lack of oppositional ideologies capable of challenging the liberal position.

It has been argued that the institutionalization of MMP has not achieved the improvements in representation that might have been expected, and that the tendency has been the reassertion of liberal barriers, and further, that this has support from the population. Boston (1998) has noted that voter support for MMP has declined. This he attributes to the political turbulence, inter-party conflict, and a reduction in government stability associated with MMP. If these reasons are accurate, then it points not to a will for politics and change, but to the opposite, the status quo, stability and political ossification. It can be concluded that New Zealanders are in no way inclined to reject core liberal theory, or to mount a substantive challenge to it on ideological grounds. Therefore it can be argued that in New Zealand liberal ideology has attained the status of commonsense, and currently resists any ideological challenge that could disrupt this hegemony. Under these conditions, politics in the form of ideological challenge and debate, is regarded as disruptive of the current social/political order rather than ensuring a robust democracy (Dahrendorf, 1990).

Evidence for this may be found in New Zealand’s past. For example, Pearson (1951)
has observed that New Zealanders are only too willing to cede their sovereignty and their responsibility as citizens. In other words, to opt for representation over any other form of democracy. This has resonance with the argument of Dahl (1989) for example, and results in a corruption of the ideal of democracy (Hirst, 1990: 40-41). In this way, New Zealand can be argued to have an elitist democracy similar to that advocated by Schumpeter, in which the liberal aspect dominates the prevailing conception of democracy. According to this theory, it can be argued that many believe that voting every three years unproblematically constitutes a democracy and that, between elections, civil society and the political realm should have little to do with each other.

But as Levine (1981) points out, the system survives mainly due to the fact that liberal values have hegemonic domination. Kekes (1997) furthers our understanding here where he points out that the claim to neutrality held by the liberal state is simply untenable in that it asserts, at the same time, that a plurality of conceptions of what is good can be expressed within the liberal framework, while also asserting that the liberal version is the best and that non-liberal ones are misguided. Therefore, the claim to tolerate a plurality of conceptions of the good is a sham. This has been conceptualised as ‘repressive tolerance’ by Herbert Marcuse where he refers to liberal domination as ‘abstract’ inasmuch as it refrains from taking sides, but in doing so, it actually protects the already established machinery of discrimination (Marcuse, 1969:85). This has implications for the generally well regarded political practice of consensus since under the conditions of liberal dominance only liberal outcomes will result, since disagreements about options within a system deflect critical attention away from the system itself (McLennan, 1989).

This has been noted in New Zealand by Jesson, Ryan and Spoonley (1988), where the hegemony of the libertarian right, aided by the expression of its interests as synonymous with national interests along with a climate of individualism, failed to result in a dispersal of power but produced a concentration of power. Robyn Gwynn (1998) has concluded that the hegemonic dominance of new right ideology conflicts with democracy thus guarding against substantive change through the current democratic system. But for Gwynn a deeper problem is that of the quiescence of New Zealanders. To support this comment, he points to the lack of public protest at the time that neo-classical ideology took form in policy initiatives after 1984. Gwynn does not speculate on the actual cause of this quiescence,
although he refers to *Fretful Sleepers* by Pearson (1951), suggesting a long-term national trait rather than a state specific to the events around 1984.

An outstanding example of the ‘quiescence’ of New Zealanders occurred during the 1951 waterfront lockout. Emergency regulations enacted by the National Government under Sid Holland, made it an offence to publish any view of the watersiders’ thereby ensuring censorship of the mass media (Bassett, 1972; Barnes, 1998). Barnes (1998) notes that the regulation was perhaps superfluous since it was not met with cries about the freedom of the press, thus indicating general agreement with the attitude of the Government. It was also an offence to offer assistance of food or money to watersiders while the lockout was declared, and Barnes comments that this was a callous attempt to starve the workers and their families into compliance with the Government’s wishes. Bassett (1972) notes that it was only the unionised workers, the watersiders themselves, and a few intellectuals who were concerned at Holland’s regulations in spite of the breaches of basic human rights enacted by the latter.

Common to events of 1951 and 1984 (refer to pages 48-49) was the perception of a crisis that seemed to threaten the current order, and, on these grounds, breaches of democracy were justified in both cases. Just as the acceptance of the Government’s dictatorship in 1951 was aided by reports accusing the watersiders of preparing the way for Soviet world domination (Bassett, 1972); a crisis was again the justification for the ‘denial of democracy’ in 1984 (Gwynn, 1998). Each time the crisis involved a core state imperative (national security and economic stability in 1951; economic stability in 1984), together with the lack of opposition, it can be concluded that the mass of the population saw the reason in ensuring that those imperatives were met; and crisis times require crisis measures. Also, the period between 1951 and 1984 saw the upsurge of ‘new politics’, and given the support for comprehensive growth associated with ‘old politics’ in 1984, it can be concluded that in New Zealand the new political surge has subsided and liberal and neo-liberal values again dominate. This example serves as an index of the hegemonic hold of liberal ideology that was sufficiently strong to override opposition to the emergency regulations of 1951, on the grounds of human rights breaches, for example. Therefore quiescence (as used by Gwynn, 1998), is not the best word insofar as it implies an unconscious way of acting. It is possible to explain this situation in a way that opens the possibility for future change involving the
displacement of liberal hegemony.

This explanation begins by asserting that liberal hegemony is not a product of unconsciousness, but rather that of the non-recognition of its arbitrariness, as mentioned. This non-recognition is aided by two developments. The first is the absence of an ideology capable of fundamentally challenging liberal principles in order to disrupt its dominance. The second is that where the potential for the latter existed, for example in socialism, historical factors weakened its potential as a serious contender. These historical factors were a world-wide phenomenon and will be discussed in more detail later, and involve the perceived threat of post-war international communism. This influenced a conformist society conditioned by years of rationing (during and post World War Two), and so on, and a society intolerant of deviations from Western, Anglo-Saxon values. These war time measures, and consequently, the conformity it engendered, were seen to be linked to survival, as was the rejection of communism in all its guises, including its associated thought systems. The result was, in the 1980s, a period that may be characterised as the end of ideology (Bell, 1962).

The participatory-democracy movement of the 1960s and 1970s notwithstanding, other theorists have argued that Western societies have returned to a period of the exhaustion of political ideas (Jacoby, 1999). Under these conditions, ideology, far from being the grounds on which to support a view, is now considered the very reason it should be rejected. It is often the case that a point of view is attacked on the grounds that it is derived from ideology. This is evidence of the hegemony of liberalism and the non-recognition of the arbitrariness of the latter; that it is itself ideological. Further, this is testament to the commonsense with which liberalism has been regarded in New Zealand for some time. Under these circumstances, any other ideology is seen exclusively in terms of its disruptive effects to the current order. A world-view is regarded as ideological if it fails to conform to liberal ideology, and liberalism is no longer regarded as a world-view among others, but as the world-view, in other words ‘the type of discourse which (society) accepts and makes function as true’ (Foucault, 1980 cited in Rengger, 1995:85).

It is suggested here that the ‘dominance of bourgeois consciousness’ (Bedggood, 1977:113) is due to the atrophied state of ideologies generally in New Zealand and in particular of socialism. Bassett (1998:10) has written that observers of New Zealand’s early state intervention had found no consistent socialist ideology, and that ‘socialism without
doctrines’ characterised New Zealand political practice. From Richard Seddon, who emphasised a democratically based society without class division; through to Labour Government leaders, Michael Savage, and Norman Kirk and onto Bill Rowling, whose party in 1977 debated the meaning of the term ‘democratic socialism’ without resolution; the Labour Party has pursued policy based on ‘vague egalitarianism’ (Bassett, 1998:13).

While Bassett (1998) refers mainly to the governments and the state in New Zealand, there is evidence of socialist ideology appearing elsewhere outside the political institutions. For example, the Red Federation were followers of a socialist doctrine as the name implies. The Red Feds were reported to have opposed sending troops to fight in the first world war with the comment that unionists of the world had flocked to murder one another (Roth and Hammond, 1981). Also Harry Holland, leader of the Labour Party when he entered Parliament after the 1919 general election, included in his maiden speech, that the party recognised ‘...that the antagonisms which divide society into classes are economically foundationed’, and went on to promise to change those foundations and to ‘end the causes of class warfare’ (Roth and Hammond, 1981:102). These declarations were considerably revised when Labour came to power as Government in 1935, and the new Labour Government only went so far as to take comprehensive measures to make conditions of exploitation more bearable with the introduction of the Social Security Act, 1936 (Roth and Hammond, 1981). Also, the Labour government, eight of whom had been Red Federation activists, supported the fight against the ‘Nazi dictatorship’ as war broke out in 1939, as did the Federation of Labour, thereby reversing the previous opposition to workers of the world killing each other in the name of the capitalist state.

Bedggood (1977) points to nationalism as part of state hegemony, and as a powerful discourse providing the ‘final solution’ to the problem of proletarian consciousness. Nationalist discourse had succeeded in turning radical sections of the working-class into a minority subordinated to a majority conservative working-class. Bedggood favours this explanation over both the marxist thesis on objective conditions, and the liberal idea of the embourgeoisment of the working-class. In this way, Bedggood (1977) argues that proletarian consciousness exists, but is constrained under the weight of bourgeois hegemony, which is aided by socio-cultural institutions that mediate and divide proletarian consciousness. This is also the view of Pivan and Cloward (1972), who have analysed the latent function of
institutions as agencies of social control via the ‘hegemony of institutionalised medium’. They claim their term, ‘systems of deference’, explains how individuals are prepared for social conformity. Bedggood (1977) concludes that unless the dominant bourgeois culture is weakened, the prospect for the working-class to realise a proletarian consciousness is remote. The same could be argued for any alternative ideology, but it is the dearth of competing ideologies that is the problem for social change, proletarian or Green. In the next section the argument for the potential of Green ideology to successfully challenge liberal hegemony and the benefits to the revival of politics this presents will be discussed.

Liberalism survives not because it is neutral but because it has hegemonic domination, and as such, is seen as commonsense, and that most individuals have enough of a liberal consciousness so that in-coherences in value orderings are avoided (Levine, 1981:100). Green politics must engage liberalism in a hegemonic struggle toward ‘freeing language from the tyranny of Orwellian syntax and logic...’ (Marcuse, 1969:126). Not toward the comprehension of reality as an objective fact, but toward a specifically ‘Green’ world-view, which, once having gained the dominance formerly occupied by liberalism, can set about creating a society in which Green values dominate and determine the form of life. After the period of crisis and conflict, or conjunctural phase in Gramsci’s terms, there can be a return to consensus.

Dryzek (2003) has theorised a practical approach to completing the ‘organic’ phase toward gaining hegemony which can be described borrowing the term ‘conceptual capture’ (Blaug, 2002:113). Blaug uses this term to describe colonization of the life-world (Habermas, 1987), but it can be useful to describe the process Dryzek proposes where state imperatives undergo a transformation of meaning due to subtle changes in the concepts used to access those imperatives. Within this counter-hegemonic project the aim would be that the imperatives begin to take on ‘Green’ values while former liberal values wither away.

This has resonance with MacIntyre in that he believed that reasoned discourse can extend across traditions in the event of a crisis, where members look beyond their own traditions for solutions (Dryzek, 1990:10). It may be an argument of Green politics that the legitimation crisis for governments in late capitalism represents such a crisis, (Habermas, 1972) and an indication that new demands may threaten the existing order. For the purposes of this research, evidence of this will be looked for in the Green ideological tradition, in
particular its aspirations toward deepening democracy. The process of change looked for here is not that of a commonsense style revolutionary overthrow of the existing order, but rather a dialectical process in which the existing order represents the victories and defeats of the past (Fairclough, 1992:124). Discursively, the mechanism of conceptual capture (Blaug, 2002:113) is regarded as a salient process here, where the struggle over meaning may serve to disrupt the ideological dominance of liberalism, and, by increments, displace that dominance with Green ideology.

Summary.

In this section, the review of classical theorists has revealed that the liberal approach to the social order places an emphasis on the demarcation between civil society and the political sphere. Emphasising the individual’s right to pursue their own good, as opposed to any notion of the collective good, liberal theory demonstrates its inconsistency with democracy, which has, by contrast, collectivist principles such as politics as a public activity essential to the moral justification of decisions made. Over time, the rigid separation between civil society and the political sphere has been amended by contractarian theorists in whose hands a sovereigns’ legitimacy is subject to periodic review. This introduces the notion of representation based on elections, and more recent theorists, both inside and outside the liberal tradition, have argued over the degree of political power held by those in civil society. As discussed, Schumpeter’s view represents a minimal involvement by those in civil society to voting in elections, whereas Arendt’s participatory republicanism emphasises political activity in decentralised polities. The latter emphasises the distribution of political power that goes back to the thought of Madison and this is the principle behind the pluralist approach within liberalism, the foundation of which is the existence of groups in civil society able to influence decision-making. The views of theorists discussed range from the projection of possible ‘oughts’ for democracy (Maepherson in Levine, 1981) to confessions that liberal democracy is imperfect, but that its improvement should not come at the expense of its central tenets (Dahl, 1989).

It is argued that while major reformation along the lines of Arendt and Macpherson
remain possible projections, the forgoing discussion has revealed that the depoliticising aspects of liberal democracy may be attributed to its liberal ideological basis. This is evident in that projected reformations in favour of democracy imply the removal of the core liberal principle of keeping a distance between the rulers and the ruled. This discussion emphasises that substantive reformation of liberal democracy necessitates a challenge at an ideological level in order to free democracy from the exclusive association with liberalism, and to justify an alternative. This would facilitate structural reformation of current institutions, and this aim may be included in aspects concerned with deepening democracy as Green politics may consider it. Another aspect remains at the level of an ideological challenge that, as argued, must precede attempts a institutional restructuring, but which is of benefit to democracy in that such a challenge revives politics beyond various considerations on the achievement of ‘commonsense’ goals (Torgerson, 2000:12). Against these possibilities, this Chapter has argued that liberal hegemony in New Zealand is a major impediment to social and political change. It has been argued that this dominance has justified the erosion of the democratic rights of New Zealanders on the grounds of liberal principles.

Following Gramscian hegemony, dominance is achieved by non-coercive means where the general acceptance of the principles of an ideology is accomplished. While this rules out coercion as a critique against the dominance of liberalism, it does not rule out the non-recognition of the arbitrary nature of any ideology, including liberalism, as a contributing factor to its dominance. This is exacerbated in New Zealand due to the atrophied state of ideological traditions capable of challenging liberalism, and this supports the hegemonic dominance of the latter. Hegemony also raises the possibility for change, since a conscious acceptance of liberalism leaves open the possibility for its rejection in favour of another ideology through rational argumentation, the revival of democracy as public debate on fundamental issues, as well as justification for the structural reform of liberal democratic institutions.

This aspect is considered more closely in Chapter 4, where the current situation is described in terms of liberal hegemony and the ‘end of ideology’. Chapters 5 and 6 argue that there is some way out of here and this centres attention on Green ideology.
Chapter 4
End of Ideology, anti-politics.

In this section, liberal hegemony is given a broader historical consideration with the focus on the effect of liberal hegemony on politics, rather than its effects on political institutions as previously discussed. The overarching theme for this Chapter is *The End of Ideology* (Bell, 1962), but traces historical developments such as the revival of politics in the 1960s and 1970s, the reassertion of liberal dominance in the 1980s and the emergence of neo-liberalism at the end of the Cold War.

It has so far been argued that politics in New Zealand has settled on a consensus on political issues around neo-liberal ideology and that, therefore, solutions to social problems have been reduced to decisions between alternative applications of techniques. These techniques have as their base techno-scientific rationality and this, combined with the neo-liberal belief in the logic of the market, in particular its drive to expand capitalist economic activity, leaves other questions undebated. The current situation reduces the scope of the political agenda to those factors mentioned above. Also, this situation is a result of a more general demise of political debate around core issues at the centre of ideological orientations.

These factors, neo-liberal hegemony, the dominance of techno-scientific rationality and the core liberal boundary between the political sphere and civil society, have resulted in the death of politics, and, it will be further argued, that the potential for its revival can be found in the challenge of Green politics.

The first aspect to be considered is the hegemonic dominance of liberalism and neo-liberalism and the effect of this dominance on the erosion of competing ideologies. Laïdi (1998) notes that ideologies that traditionally competed with liberalism have crumbled since the end of the Cold War, leaving an ideological void, and at the same time, there has been an acceleration of technical change and ever increasing globalization driven by neo-liberal ideology. The ‘end of the great ideologies’ and the increasing influence of the market, have combined to reduce politics to appeals to ‘pragmatism’, ‘realism’, and ‘empiricism’, which are ‘devoid of content and threadbare in philosophical essence, and therefore incapable of
tackling the crisis of meaning’ (Laïdi, 1998:7, 8, 67, 75). This threatens the political space with extinction since, as Capra and Spretnak (1984) suggest, politicians now ‘argue about priorities and the relative merits of various short-term economic “fixes” with the result that the fundamental issue from which the problems arise is left undebated.’; resulting in the dominance of a ‘growth at any cost’ organising principle (Capra and Spretnak, 1984:19). The absence of an ideological challenge to liberalism means that there is no meaningful way to critically assess the basis of decisions, and that, as a consequence, neo-liberal market rationality has become dominant (Guéhenno, 1995; Laïdi, 1998; Talshir, 2002:264). For Scholte (2000:26) and others, while the dominance of technoscientific rationality has brought great understanding to humanity in certain dimensions of life, it has tended to subordinate other aspects, for example, ‘spirituality’, diversity and debate as well as critical thought (Capra and Spretnak, 1984). This situation has left economic efficiency, devoid of a telos and incapable of providing the world with meaning, as the essential criterion for evaluating Western political systems (Laïdi, 1998:36). Arising out of this disenchantment has been the dominance of ‘market democracy’ in which ‘a combination of democratic sanctions (elections) and market (competition) are seen as a way of correcting errors or deviations at regular intervals (democracy) or even instantaneously (market)’ that is, where politics resembles a market rather than a forum (Elster, 1986; Rainbow, 1993; Laïdi, 1998:34).

For Laïdi (1998:7), it is the formation of community identity that is important if ‘meaning is to be revived beyond an ordinary present’. However, the possibility of community, dependent upon concern for collective interests, is frustrated by the pursuit of particular interests (Anderson, 1983 cited in Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett 1994:236). The dominance of the pursuit of particular interests is therefore secured in a self perpetuating cycle resisting collective interests, resisting community identity and therefore meaning beyond an ‘ordinary present’ (Laïdi, 1998:7). Here, ‘the natural tendency is for everyone to pursue his [sic] interests to the furthest extent possible’ (Guéhenno, 1995:23-24). What Green politics offers, according to Capra and Spretnak (1984) is a new paradigm, or vision, of reality, which is essentially a reorientation for society away from economic growth and toward human development. Situating Green politics in the history of human affairs requires a look back to see how this situation arose and, later, what the Green response is.
For Bell (1962), the 1950s in the United States represented a period of the exhaustion of political ideas, that is, the ‘end of ideology’. Bell was responding to historical and social conditions prevalent at a time of solid political consensus, where the Cold War united the nation against communism, and the Government used its military budget to prop-up economically depressed areas in an attempt to demonstrate the superiority of both liberal democracy and liberal capitalism (Jacoby, 1999). Laïdi (1998:21) observes that the great internal cohesion of American society at this time conferred prerogatives on the federal Government it otherwise would not have acquired. An example of this was the security regulations instituted to guard against communist infiltration, leading to the episode known as ‘McCarthyism’, in which were employed ‘reckless methods disproportionate to the problem’ exacting ‘extensive damage to the democratic fabric’ (Bell, 1962:110). However, Jacoby (1999) concludes that Bell’s conclusions may not be applied to the coming decade.

The 1960s, characterised by civil rights movements, feminist activism, the rise of the ecology movement and peace movement opposition to the Vietnam War, raised a serious challenge to the end of ideology thesis (Jacoby, 1999). Writers, for example, E.F. Schumacher (1973:277) noted that the fundamental questioning of conventional values was a symptom of the widespread unease with which industrial civilization was increasingly regarded. The period of ‘counter-culture’ emerged but soon became fragmented and depoliticized, and consequently joined with elements of the New Left forming more professionalized and specialized groupings in the form of new social movements.

The extent of the ideological criticism can be gauged by the feminist slogan ‘the personal is political’ (Kelly, cited in Capra and Spretnak 1984:55), which indicated that the liberal boundary between the political sphere and private sphere was under threat at many points, and that ‘private life once considered outside politics was now the subject of manifestos’ (Jacoby, 1999:6). This revival of politics was reflected, and sometimes reluctantly led, by intellectuals such as the critical theorist Herbert Marcuse. Marcuse, who sought a ‘revolutionary subject’ in the ranks of students and the movements with which they were associated, also advocated building linkages between the left and new social movements in an anticapitalist movement. However, Kellner (1984) points out that Marcuse should have exorcised the problem of the revolutionary subject, and focussed instead on developing new concepts to deal with the problem of emancipatory social change.
The 1980s however, heralded a revival of Bell’s original thesis, especially since 1989; marked particularly by the collapse of the Soviet Union (Jacoby, 1999). The fall of the Soviet Union left socialism in disarray, and Eric Hobsbawm concluded that the promise offered by the October Revolution, as the gate to the future of world history, had failed to be realised (in Jacoby, 1999). The vitality of liberalism relied on the left as its ‘goad and critic’ and in its absence, liberalism had lost its ‘bearings’, and further, that this was true of all political currents that set out to challenge the capitalist order (Laïdi, 1998:19; Jacoby, 1999).

Liberalism may have lost its bearings and become dominant in the absence of the socialist position as a viable alternative to social organization, however, as noted by Giddens (1994), welfare liberalism became neo-liberalism characterised by revolutionary change driven by the relentless pursuit of market growth, while at the same time the left has become conservative in the sense that it has been reduced to protecting remnant welfare institutions. The ‘crisis’ of the market system, presaged in the ‘oil shocks’ of the 1970s and the recession in the major economies of Britain and the U.S.A in the 1990s, resulted in American attempts to impose free trade in services deals on European countries (Lipietz, 1995). Liberalism was no longer under pressure to present the benevolent side of its character and solutions could err on the side of ‘more of the same’.

Lechner has observed that political action is now reduced to economic management where ‘political society finds itself more and more constrained by the economy through ‘technical imperatives” (1996:181), and further, that the ‘structure of the political world’ is being eroded along with our ‘ideological and cognitive maps’, that used to provide political cleavages. In this it can be seen that Lechner is appealing for political action beyond economic parameters and for the reassertion of an ideological discourse that would restore ‘our ideological maps’ (Lechner, 1996:181). This could restore clear ideological cleavages in Western politics that existed when, for example, worker’s interests were aligned with some form of socialism. Now however, as Giddens (1994:143) points out, class is less a ‘collective fate’ and problems that have their ‘origin in class factors are not experienced as coming from the past but as the result of circumstances impinging on an individual or group’. This is attributed to what Giddens refers to as ‘de-traditionalization’. In the past, class used to be a communal experience consisting of shared occupational experience in a local area, however, this has been disrupted by the forces of ‘global stratification’, where the resultant
regionalisation (that is, collectivities of nation-states) rarely produces the same class solidarity (Giddens, 1994:143). Also the ‘hopes for transnational social movements based upon class or other group’s interests appear utopian, especially inasmuch as advocates do not relate those interests to power and institutions’ (Lentner, 2000:57).

It can be argued that the erosion of class identity and ideology would have been especially easy to develop in New Zealand. In addition to the points made in the preceding Chapter, Jesson, Ryan and Spoonley (1988) suggest that it was not obvious to New Zealanders that since 1984 they had been ruled by a government of the libertarian right, and that this state of affairs can be traced to the fact that since the 1930s, political awareness in New Zealand has been on the decline. This trend can be found in earlier developments in New Zealand’s history, for example, where the articulation of class interests had been institutionalised and controlled under the yoke of the capitalist relations of production within prevailing institutions through legislative measures. An example of this can be found in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894, particularly after the Act was amended in 1905 making strikes and lockouts illegal. Although removing the fear of lockouts for workers, it also removed their most powerful weapon in class warfare, the right of workers to withdraw their labour (Olsson, 1988). In this way, workers’ interests were installed as part of the state machinery and operated according to the dominant logic of capitalism.

Class ideology could not develop whilst constrained under the dominant ideologies of liberalism and capitalism, but its absence does not imply an absence of social antagonism and structural inequality. Classlessness might then be better regarded as the mass identification of similar interests across the social strata rather than an absence of social inequality. Also, as Laïdi (1998) points out, the ideological hegemony of liberalism is, paradoxically, based on its rejection of total hegemony over society. Liberalism presents itself as a natural state rather than an ideology and this makes a step-by-step questioning of its principles difficult, (Laïdi, 1998:146), the absence of a competing ideology makes this questioning impossible and the hegemony of liberalism complete.

As Fukuyama (1992:137) has said, ‘...if people living in liberal democracies express no radical discontent with their lives, we can say that the dialogue has reached a final and definitive conclusion’. Liberal democracy seems self-sustaining since ‘distinction between better or worse seems to violate the democratic principle of tolerance’. Under these
conditions, it could be argued, it might be that the apparent lack of contradictions is due to a consensus around liberal ideology to the point where it has become hegemonic. All that it would take to reveal contradictions is the popular acceptance of an ideological position critical of the current social order.

Lechner (1996:168) speaks of a variety of antipolitics, which, while not questioning democracy, is concerned with profoundly altering its exercise. This is where political action is increasingly reduced to the technical imperative of economic management. Democracy was affected when the system of bureaucratic paternalism (1950s-1970s) gave way to new-right ideology, with the emphasis on competition (1980s). Ideologically, this gave individuals the power of ‘exit’, and critique was reduced to economic rationality where individuals ‘voted’ by changing where they lived or swapped between suppliers. Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett (1994) emphasise the disempowering effect of this system and advocate, instead, the development of ‘voice’, as conceived by Hirschman (1970, quoted in Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994), where dissatisfied citizens obtain a response by taking political action. Taking political action by itself is, however, not enough. It is possible to take political action, as opposed to economic action, but still not substantively challenge the current hegemony. A critique that responds within the framework currently dominant, is limited to those options that can be articulated within that particular discursive framework and so rather than offering a substantive critique, actually serves to reinforce that dominance.

The legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1976), raises the possibility that the liberal democratic relationship between the polity and the state is under some strain in this late period of capitalism especially with regard to the neo-liberal global expansion of markets. Hindess (1996:23) argues that our understanding of politics is acquired from idealizations of ‘public life in the cities of antiquity’ and relies upon ‘metaphorical elaborations’ where politics is seen to be attending to the affairs of the polis. On this understanding politics is a ‘collective activity of a community consisting of autonomous political actors’. Hindess draws a distinction between this idealization and the ‘antipolitics’ he sees prevalent today, where a ‘materialist conception of politics as an inescapably corrupt sphere of public activity’ dominates. The contrast between the idealization and reality, where the ‘political sphere is thought to be in danger of corruption by the invasion of concerns that properly belong
elsewhere, while the nonpolitical domain is thought to be in danger from the tyrannical reach of government’, bears the unmistakable stamp of liberal democracy, the key feature of which is the insistence that the political sphere and civil society be kept separate in the interests of preserving the integrity of both (Hindess, 1996:23).

The failure of the idealization of politics from antiquity lies in the classical assumption that the community is culturally, ethnically, and in other regards, homogeneous and therefore able to govern itself. Only under these conditions could it be justifiable to insist on a strict separation between the rulers and the ruled, in which a monism of interests ensures the unproblematic attention to the affairs of the polis within the political sphere. Hindess notes that there will ‘always be different views as to where precisely the boundary between the political and the nonpolitical should lie, but there will always be those who regard it as presently lying in the wrong place’. Liberal ideology insists that in order to protect the autonomy of individuals, the work of government must be protected from the corrupting effects of political activity, and this makes liberalism ‘..by far the most influential anti-political doctrine of modern times’ (Hindess, 1996:31).

Taking up this view, Talshir (1998:187) condemns the liberal distinction between public and private since it limits politics to economic interests and reproduces patterns of subordination. Issues are constrained by a dominant construction as to what should be regarded as matters for political consideration, and systematically excludes other issues as ‘nonpublic’. Following these criticisms, it is argued that such a separation has a depoliticizing effect, limiting the range of issues that can properly be regarded as matters of politics. This alters exactly where the barrier between public and private lies and amounts to altering the range of issues that count as matters of politics. It is argued that to increase the range of issues emerging from civil society and subsequently dealt within the public sphere to the extent that they impact upon existing state imperatives, amounts to an extension of the democratic consideration of those issues and deepens the democratic participation of those for whom the issues are raised.

The metaphorical elaboration made by Hindess, where politics is understood to attend to the affairs of the polis, is disrupted by the effects of recent free trade agreements as they impinge upon the ability of national governments to serve the polis, and, as a consequence of this disruption, the notions of citizenship and nation-state become vague (1996:23).
Insistence on nation-state becomes a rhetorical device aimed at the construction of an image of a monistic peoplehood by reference to tradition and myth in the form of familiar and largely uncontested pre-understandings. For example, in New Zealand’s case, the egalitarian myth, that denies the existence of systematic inequality and implies systematic equality, works together with the weak form of tolerance associated with liberal-democracy, and serves to discourage critical assessment of the social order (Bohman, 2003). An expression of the power of this myth can be found in this extract from the New Zealand Values Party. In the magazine *Turning Point* (1975) the statement is made ‘...the conventional wisdom of egalitarianism in New Zealand is, I think, too firmly rooted to allow the gross inequalities that exacerbate class conflict’.

Another example of an enduring mythological symbol of New Zealand’s nationhood is that of a ‘clean and green’ country, again pre-empting any assertion of the contrary view (Bührs and Bartlett, 1993).

The threat globalization represents to the nation-state has only occurred in the last 25 years, and in that time the implications for domestic economies has been serious (Lentner, 2000). For example, Guéhenno (1995) points out that in all modern democracies taxation has a territorial basis and this has been a fundamental factor in establishing a sense of common goal and collective responsibility forming a nation-state. However, under the conditions of commitments to supranational bodies, this relationship has been threatened, since these supranational bodies are able to dictate levels of social spending a nation-state may commit to (Taylor-Gooby, 1999). Consequently, the nation-state may opt for reducing their collective, ‘free’ services, replacing them with paying benefits or individualized systems of insurance (Guéhenno 1995:11). This, contends Guéhenno (1995), calls into question the territorial basis of taxation, and signifies the impoverishment of the nation-state that seems uncontrollable and irresponsible; as Taylor-Gooby (1999:3) puts it ‘...governments can no longer claim to remain sovereign in their own houses’. This is because the relationship between the citizens and the body politic is now in competition with the many connections established outside the latter, which, incidentally, do not include any supranational authorities able to discipline transnational markets (Ferge, 1999:230). The

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1However, Mackwell (1977:125) discovered that 70.9% of Values Party members polled disagreed that New Zealand was egalitarian, and this view was a motivation for fundamental change.
implications of this have been expressed by Guéhenno (1995:5), for whom the territorial bondedness of the nation has been the ‘foundation of our liberty and the condition for an open community’, if solidarity can no longer be locked into geography, if there can no longer be a city or nation, then the consequence is that the disappearance of the nation carries with it the death of politics (Guéhenno 1995:17,19).

Similarly, for Scholte (2000:16-20), the most significant effect of globalization has been its threat to a previous understanding of the ‘territorial world order’; where economies and societies are organized on the basis of territorial units, and the world ecology is an aggregation of territorial eco-spheres. The sense of territorial units carries with it notions of community and citizenship, and, if we refer briefly to Karl Mannheim (1960), collective meanings are produced under the conditions of existential belonging, the basis of this being threatened by a globalizing tendency that renders ‘supra-territorial’ those important aspects of productive governance, identity and ecology. This, as Laïdi (1998) has already suggested, impacts negatively on politics, in that as Scholte (2000:20) states, globalization has ‘perpetuated and often compounded difficulties connected with the realization of democracy, distributive justice, social solidarity and ecological sustainability’ and so cannot provide any guidance in terms of the ‘good-life’.

Part of the problem has been what Pauly (1996:150) refers to as ‘...the anti-political language of global market enthusiasts’; which he says ‘obfuscates, but cannot solve, the problems of legitimacy’. The legitimacy problem arises in much the same way for Pauly as it does for Guéhenno (1995), in that national governments are under strain from both commitments to global financial integration as well as citizen’s continued expectations of national economic performance. The resulting tension must be managed by governments, and Pauly suggests that closing down political debate on options by saturating announcements with a particular discourse, limits objections to that particular logic and discursive framework. The result of this is that objections are not sufficiently critical to challenge the ideological basis of decisions, and, rather, function to support the continued hegemony of the prevalent course of action (Pauly, 1996:158).

The concepts used limit the scope of options, and, as soon as debate is entered into, this limitation comes into effect, leaving a narrow field of options. The obfuscation has been politically useful in leaving aside questions over possible alternative solutions, and this is a
device in the anti-political stance of some national governments (Pauly, 1996:150), and this is regarded as a neo-conservative response to increased demands for involvement in political decisions (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987). An aspect of the obfuscation lies in a contrived sense of the urgency; that solutions to problems are required immediately, leaving no time for reflection or debate. The result is a ‘total absence of perspective’, and these anti-political discourses and devices form important elements in securing ideological hegemony (Schedler, 1996:1; Laïdi, 1998).

States are now oriented towards, and dependent on, both global and territorial actors and this raises questions as to how the principle of rule by the people can be successfully executed with the additional pressure on the state from global commitments. Also, how can market ‘self-regulation’, especially in the area of global finance, meet the criteria of popular participation, representation and consultation? (Burns, Hambleton and Hoggett, 1994).

These points lead to a reconsideration of both the concept and institutional mechanisms of democracy. Scholte (2000:22) notes how during the 1980s and 1990s many governments have reduced their redistributive commitments ‘in order to attract favour from global capital, while no supra-state governance has established redistributive mechanisms’. In this way, there is no comparative global commitment to the welfare of citizens as, perhaps, compensation for nation-state retrenchment, associated with global trade commitments.

Taylor-Gooby (1999:5) has argued that retrenchment and the retreat of the state from welfare measures is not the only possible response to globalization. Gough (1996, quoted in Svallfors and Taylor-Gooby, 1999) has observed that the relationship between welfare spending and competitiveness is contingent on how social programmes mesh with the needs and opportunities of particular welfare regimes; pointing to Scandinavian social democratic countries which face high taxation but are able to provide skilled labour and social solidarity.
Summary.

This section has set out historical factors in support of an argument for the growing hegemonic hold of liberalism and neo-liberalism. It has also emphasised the growing dominance of techno-scientific rationality which, as argued, serves to support the current liberal dominance and suppress public political debate and critical thought. Globalisation, has been discussed as a factor which de-politicises civil society by diverting state commitment from civil society to global trade agreements. Overall these factors have contributed to the end of ideology, the end of politics and the end of human ability to construct their social/political world.

These factors have also cast doubt on the continued relevance of the nation-state and this point begins the discussion in which the potential for emancipatory politics is revived in Part 3.
Part 3
Chapter 5
Revival of politics, Localisation.

The last section of Part 2 completed a critical exposition of liberal democracy and liberal hegemony in Western capitalist societies with evidence drawn from historical events in New Zealand to establish the current social/political context that Green ideology confronts. Part 2 has argued that liberalism and liberal institutions are dominant and that liberalism in New Zealand can be accurately described as hegemonic to the extent that it is not considered an ideology. In this way, Part 2 has identified major hurdles to any attempt at destabilising liberalism. However, Part 3 Chapter 5 discusses the possibilities for change which, paradoxically, are, in one regard, an equal but opposite reaction to neo-liberalism and its associated global expansion of markets. It is argued that the reassertion of the local raises the possibility of the reconfiguration of the polis and political institutions, and implicates Green ideology in that this process might find resonance with the Green decentralist impulse. It is argued that this is at least a way around what may seem the impossible task of challenging the hegemony of liberalism and its associated political institutions. In this way, the discussion turns from the de-politicizing effects of liberal hegemony dealt with in Part 2, and turns the focus to the emancipatory potential of Green politics.

The withdrawal of the normative commitment to civil society on the part of the state as a result of global commitments has produced disenchantment with the existing liberal representative institutions (Habermas, 1976). However, emerging out of this sense of the loss of politics, participation, identity, community, and purpose resulting from, first, the hegemonic hold of liberalism, and secondly, the process of globalization of trade and its underlying neo-liberal ideology, is segmentation within nation-states; the equal but opposite reaction to globalization. Global commitments have raised questions around the notion of citizenship since the latter is defined by national boundaries as well as political participation. However, globalisation, while at least partially responsible for that loss of citizenship, at the
same time presents an emancipatory potential which may, for Scholte, transcend the difficulties presented by globalization and its philosophical underpinning, which ‘might loosely be called modernity’ (2000:26).

While globalism itself has raised its opposite, it none-the-less shares with intra nation-state segmentation or decentralisation, a threat to the continued relevance of the nation-state, the latter, in the view of Guéhenno (1993), becoming increasingly abstract, where socioeconomic inequality increases between regions and where the legitimacy of the nation-state is strained, producing an increase in political distance between the state and the polis (Lechner, 1996). This then brings about initiatives for decentralization, where ‘community is likely to appear the natural framework within which everyone may rediscover (their) identity’ (Guéhenno, 1993:45). Community presupposes shared interests and common purpose which work against the dominance of particular interests, and this stimulates, according to Laïdi (1998), opportunities for a revival of political participation. Globalization has broken the monopoly of the nation-state creating the opportunity for experiments in alternative forms of democracy (Scholte, 2000).

Referring again to Hindess (1996) who draws our attention to the relationship between the political community and the nation-state, we can theoretically regard the possibilities of redefining the political community in response to the effects of globalization with the focus on its counter-effect, localisation or sub-national regions. In this way, the nation-state is threatened both from without, with the effects of globalization as discussed, and from within.

Näsström (2003) has noted that theorists who argue that globalization threatens the sovereignty of the nation-state reveal a theoretical inconsistency in that whilst claiming this, their remedies are to decouple the strict conception of the political community in terms of the nation-state and seek a cosmopolitan, global remedy. In so doing, Näsström claims, these theorists switch from a historical-descriptive approach in which the relationship between the political community/democracy and the nation-state is symbiotic, to a normative approach in which the relationship is contingent. Näsström claims that David Held, for example, advocates a ‘cosmopolitan community’ and is thereby distinguishing between the political community and the nation-state. If this is a valid step, then it is possible, under a normative approach, to advocate any configuration of the political community, distinct from
that implied by its association with the nation-state. Also, although Guéhenno (1993) is right to claim that the weakening of the nation-state means the weakening of politics, this only holds if the definition of the political community is tied to the historical-descriptive model. This problem can be resolved, and politics rescued, with a reconfiguration of the political community within the normative model, where the relationship between the polity and the institutions is contingent, and may be based upon a mandate other than the nation-state.

In a similar way Sáinz and Andrade-Eekhoff (2000:172), argue that globalization has succeeded in raising questions as to the relevance of the nation-state as a ‘regulatory space’ producing, at the same time, the possibility of alternative ‘regulatory formations’ based on the ‘revitalization of the local’. Scholte, from the same text, takes up the notion of alternative regulatory formations and talks about experiments in alternative forms of democracy, alternative kinds of economic restructuring, alternative modes of identity politics, alternative approaches to the ecology, and alternative constructions of knowledge that have emerged from social movement responses to globalization. In this way, Scholte (2000:14) sees that globalization has not only had a negative effect, contributing to ‘social violences’, but that it simultaneously presents an opportunity for a ‘potentially emancipatory reaction’ to those ills. This opportunity rests, for Scholte, on the resilience of diversity to the ‘onward’ progress of globalization, and represents a counter-effect that may ameliorate some of the worst consequences of economic globalization. Scholte (2000:27) points to the proliferation of community based organisations (CBOs) in many countries which have had the effect of reorientating substantial parts of politics from the state to the local non-governmental arena. When compared to statist government, CBOs tend to offer increased opportunities for popular participation and direct consultation.

Global communication has the potential to aid co-ordination of popular participation and debate around issues such as the protection of the environment; offering new modes of representation, transparency and accountability for example, ‘sub-state’ and ‘trans-border ethno-nations’, and supra-state region-nations. In terms of supporting the development of community, globalization is useful in forging local-global linkages and ‘identity politics of inter-culturality’. Global communication enables the development of ‘cyber-communities’ that work against the development of defensive localism. The term ‘inter-culturality’ refers to social cohesion forged through reciprocity, diversity and difference (Scholte, 2000:14-20).
In terms of knowledge production and truth assertions, Scholte (2000:29) has observed that the secularist, objectivist and instrumentalist thought is coming increasingly under critical scrutiny as an assertion of ‘folk wisdom’ gains ground on the ‘respectability’ of higher learning. ‘In this way, global communication and a diversification of identities beyond the nation-state has helped to create space for women’s histories, alternative healing, deep ecology and other formerly hidden truths’. This has led to a concession on the part of proponents of the Enlightenment Project, that no one ‘meta-narrative can provide the standard against which all forms of knowledge are evaluated’ (in Aulakh and Schechter 2000:29).

Ecological integrity potentially benefits from global treaties (for example, the Kyoto Protocol, and the international conference in Rio de Janeiro), aimed at environmental protection together with the many environmental groups that have emerged since the 1960s. However, Scholte (2000:28) concludes that although some ground has been made toward ecological regeneration, there has been little to suggest that a ‘radical asceticism is displacing global consumerism’.

Another impediment to the revival of local communities has been raised by Laïdi (1998:172) who argues that these identities refer back to realities that are ‘outdated, worn out or frozen’ and therefore any attempt to assert the values inherent in them are futile. Also, Jacoby (1999) argues that the ‘politics of difference’ has been reduced to competition for a bigger piece of the same action, and as such, has fallen prey to the dominance of economic rationality. Under these circumstances, ethnic politics is largely ineffectual as a basis for the critique of social life, and can be described, following Schmitt (1986) as a form of political romanticism. So while contemporary social forces have thrown up the unintended consequence of the desire to return to modes of living which provided identity and meaning, these may be conceptually ill-equipped to effectively launch emancipation since they remain locked in the conceptual apparatus of the dominant discourse.

What is missing, laments Jacoby (1999), are the critics who can indulge in ‘the democratic critique of the democratic culture’ and what has developed is a general consensus that the current social order is the only possible one. A logic of equality pervades and, together with an insistence on relativism, where every view has the same weight as every other, meaning is lost and criticism is impossible. Jamison (2001) also finds problematic the
lack of strategic reflection as universities are increasingly dependent on funding from corporate interests. In conclusion Jacoby (1999) claims that along with the demise of the critic so too has gone a ‘vision of emancipation’ and ‘utopian spirit’.

If what is required to revive politics and meaning is an ideology that takes a critical standpoint and sets society on the path to emancipation then Fukuyama (1992) thinks the answer might lie with the ecology movement. This view is shared by Lipietz (1995) who regards political ecology as the new paradigm; a framework of thinking to unite the hopes of feminism, ecology, workers and all those fighting against oppression, and to achieve this, and other Green goals, Lipietz recommends the most direct confrontation between the competing discourses of ‘environment’ and ‘development’. Also, under Green ‘modular’ ideology (Talshir, 1998, 2002), politics based on identity, including feminism and ethnicity, could be revitalized beyond romanticism in their democratic struggles.

Fukuyama (1992:83) has said that ‘at the moment the most coherent and articulate source of opposition to technological civilization comes from the environmental movement’. He also says that the environmental movement attacks the entire modern project of mastering nature through science. Although it will be demonstrated that Green politics does not limit its attack on modernity to its negative effects on nature, neither does it advocate the complete abandonment of the project of modernity in that, as will be argued, Green politics has human emancipation as a central maxim. Fukuyama (1992:296) goes on to say that ‘a future left-wing threat to liberal democracy is much more likely to wear the clothing of liberalism while changing its meaning from within...’, and this accords well with a basic description of Green political parties according to Dobson (2000:20). Also, the potential for Green parties to fulfil the projection expressed by Fukuyama (1992:83) exists in that Green parties contest elections in liberal democracies and contain an impulse, so it is contested, toward changing representation, the fundamental feature of liberal democracy, for some form of participation.

Parkin (1989) points out that Green politics represents a social and political movement that transcends socialism, though has acquired the dynamism of socialism (cited in Carter, 1999). Giddens (1994) also advocates a ‘Green’ political approach. In spite of his criticism of ‘deep’ or eco-centric approaches, Giddens sets out a six point framework for reconstituted radical politics including confronting the role of violence in human affairs; rethinking the welfare state beyond class compromise and toward connecting autonomy with personal and
collective responsibility; an emphasis on life-politics connected with emancipation, to repair damaged solidarities; and the development of ‘generative politics’, linking the state to reflexive mobilization of society at large. The last three points Giddens makes have resonance with Green party politics. This is evident where Green parties act as a conduit for interests generated in civil society, giving autonomy to these groups to act beyond traditional constraints, and this amounts to emancipation through the exercise of life-world politics. Also, the concern for social justice in Green politics finds its parallel in Giddens’ thinking on the welfare state, and, finally, the rejection of violence in human affairs is explicit among Green political principles. In this way, close parallels may be drawn between Giddens’ reconstruction of radical politics and Green political ideology which we will now consider with regard to the points raised so far.

Summary.

Chapter 5 has emphasised the potential for the redefinition of the political community in terms of localisation and this potential has been demonstrated by reference to some practical examples. This argument has sought to raise the possibility that there are alternatives to liberal representative institutions and the discussion in section 5.1 examines participation as an alternative. The institution of alternatives relies on the ability to critically disrupt the dominant ideology. In this regard, it was argued that the politics of difference defined, for example, along ethnic lines, has lost its critical moment and remains colonised by the dominant ideology. While this consideration does not exhaust all possible sources of resistance to liberalism, the Chapter concluded that Green politics has the potential to raise this criticism. Prior to the examination of Green political parties in New Zealand, an examination of Green ideology, which as argued, critically confronts liberalism, will be completed in Chapter 6 and 6.1.
5.1
Democratic participation.

Since it has been argued that representation is inextricably linked with liberalism, then displacing the hegemony of liberalism disrupts the naturalness of representation, and this form of governance is subsequently exposed to critique. The foregoing has emphasised a contrast between the de-politicizing effect associated with liberal institutions, and reforms toward participatory democracy (Talshir, 1998:187). A consideration of issues around participation will provide relevant terms and concepts by which to judge Green political initiatives with regards to its challenge to liberal representation in New Zealand.

With reference to Guild Socialism Restated (1920), Pateman (1970) explains that G D H Cole believed, as John Stuart Mill, that only through participation at the local level could an individual learn to participate in democracy at the national level. For Cole, industry provided the perfect location where workers could receive social training; organized around the concept ‘Guild Socialism’. Structured vertically and horizontally from the grassroots upward, Guild Socialism was to be participatory at all levels, and the grassroots unit of each workshop council was to be small enough to allow maximum participation by everyone. The latter was also to be ensured by the horizontal structure, and this was aimed at generating an aspect of community. In this way, Cole has associated participation with the idea of community, and since community implies a commonly shared social position and interests, it can be argued that this in turn implies a common conceptual apparatus and ideological identity. From this it can be concluded that participation is greatly enhanced under the conditions that a community has a clear idea of its interests, social position and ideology. Without clear lines drawn in this way, judgment between ideological positions becomes incomprehensible and therefore politics, and involvement in it, becomes similarly incomprehensible.

However, participation based on ideological positions and identities linked to capitalist relations of production has been questioned by Pateman (1970). In this regard, she points out that there is something paradoxical in the thought that socialization for participation in
democracy can be achieved in organisations that are oligarchical and hierarchical, as most industries tend to be. In this way, it can be argued that capitalism is able to stabilize itself, due to its organisational form, against alternative solutions, for example, those proposed by Cole. Therefore, while the organisation of production might facilitate class differentiation, aspects of the organisation, for example its hierarchical structure, mitigate against participation.

Cole’s socialist aspirations are symptomatic of the times in which socialism stood as the strongest contender to capitalism. Consistent with this, the working class was the focus of any potential for emancipation. However, the workings of the capitalist system produced and reproduced the conditions that thwarted this potential. Cole himself recognised this, and was critical of the capitalist organisation of industry in which labour was commodified and therefore dehumanised. In addition to the commodification of labour, this subordination was a product of the workers’ low socioeconomic status, correlated with powerlessness; and these factors are in turn enforced and sustained by the hierarchical structure of industry. Technical processes further reduce the workers’ sense of control as mechanisation increasingly removes the worker from the status of the crafts person. Under these conditions, which Schumacher (1973:33) describes as ‘meaningless, mechanical, monotonous, moronic work that is an insult to human nature’, and consequently conditions workers to do what they are told (Pateman, 1970).

Since Cole’s theory of Guild Socialism, Pateman (1970) observes that in the last years of the 1960s, calls for greater political participation had again gained momentum, but rather than the working class as the focus, other areas of social identity emerged, especially from the student movements. Pateman points to the selective process of theorists, for example Joseph Schumpeter, for ‘obscurring the fact that there is more than one type of classical theorising’ within liberalism. Pateman then goes on to consider the ‘classical’ participatory theorists in an endeavour to raise the possibility that there is an alternative to political participation beyond choosing between decision makers (Pateman, 1970:14). Many of the objections to greater participation of the sort that G D H Cole anticipated, have been based on a ‘realist’ conception of participation which argues that greater participation is not practical since the size and complexity of modern societies rules out deliberations of the sort advocated by some versions of participatory democracy.

In this regard, Warren (2002) notes that the realist approach to democratic participation that, in addition to the above points, reduces democratic involvement to voting representatives
into office, is outdated. He concludes that new concepts are required if the theory of democracy is to catch up with developments that he sees as responses to the realist ‘demand overload thesis’ developed in the mid 1970s. He observes that ideals of democracy were pushed to the margins as mainstream liberal democratic theory and ideology became defensive following the rise of fascism and Stalinism. Consequently, what is observed as political apathy evident today in phenomena such as low voter turn out in elections, has to be rethought of as ‘disaffection’ with the political institutions.

Rather than a lack of interest in politics, disaffection indicates a demand for participation by what have become ‘critical citizens’. While apathy is the product of an identification of the state as the centre of politics, participatory alternatives are built upon the perception that the state has ceased to be the most significant site of collective action. As a result of this change in perception, Warren notes that there is increasing interest in other ways of getting collective things done, and new forms of political activity have emerged at the local level. Insofar as the significance of the state as ‘a unitary collective actor’ is incrementally diminished by forces such as globalization, this ‘reduces the scope of what might be achieved through democratizing the state’ (Warren, 2002:684).

Similarly, Dryzek (1992) argues that capitalism, liberal democracy, and the administrative state are the current dominant arrangements of Western society, and that these arrangements fail the ‘acid test’ of responding to ecological problems; and the extent of this failure can be measured by the seriousness and pervasiveness of these problems. However, a way around this is, paradoxically, a product of the confusion and confounding effect produced by the interaction of these three arrangements themselves, that conspire to provide ‘a space for discursive and democratic alternatives’ (Dryzek, 1992:18).

An example of the confounding effect is pointed out by Dryzek (1992), where the ‘capitalist market “imprisons” both liberal democracy and the administrative state by ruling out any significant actions that would hinder business profitability’ (Dryzek, 1992:26). The main problem within the administrative state is the dominance of scientific rationality with its overriding tendency to disaggregate problems, artificially separating them. This usually results in simply displacing the problem elsewhere, therefore, in cases where the administration responds to ecological problems, the response is ineffective (Dryzek, 1992:25). This confounding and confusing situation renders dominant structures, and their imperatives,
vulnerable to significant opposition and ‘to action on behalf of some alternative institutional order’ (Dryzek, 1992:29). The arena where this is most likely to occur, Dryzek argues, is the public sphere, by which he means civil society, ‘where individuals enter into discourse which involves mutual respect, openness, scrutiny of their relationships with one another, the creation of truly public opinion, and, crucially, confrontation with state power’ (Dryzek, 1992:30).

Dryzek (1996 a) points out that the history of democratization indicates that pressure for greater democracy emerges from oppositional civil society and almost never from the state. However, Machin (1996) has indicated, (see Chapter 2), that the state was able to resist this pressure and that advances in democracy were only achieved if they, inter alia, satisfied political machinations around party alliances and the balance of power in Parliament; the gains to democracy being almost incidental. This defines two areas for political action, that of civil society and that of the state. Classical liberalism has ruled out civil society as a cite for political power as has been discussed in Chapter 2, and Dryzek (1996 a) draws attention to this sphere as being increasingly involved in politics and how this would work within existing liberal institutions.

A group emerging from civil society may choose, according to Dryzek (1996 a), to remain in civil society as an oppositional group or to enter the state. For Dryzek (1996 a), where a group leaves this oppositional sphere to enter the state, caution must be used, and only under the conditions that the group’s interests are able to connect with an existing or emerging state imperative, should entry into the state proceed.

The risk involves the fact that if the group’s interests cannot be assimilated, the groups will only achieve symbolic gains in a process referred to by Selznick (1966, cited in Dryzek, 2000:88) as ‘co-option’, whereby new elements are absorbed into the policy determining structure thus averting threats to the stability of the latter, without any real power sharing. This also has the negative effect of weakening the significance of politics in civil society (Dryzek, 1996 a: 476, 485). Dryzek (1992) points to Green, feminist, direct action and peace groups, that strive for discursive and consensual decision-making, in contrast to the hierarchical political style of institutions they oppose (Dryzek, 1992:30).

At the theoretical base of discursive and consensual decision-making is communicative rationality embodied within communicative reason (Habermas, 1984). This, Dryzek describes, as ‘a procedural standard for political interaction that does not dictate a substantive way of life’
(Dryzek, 1992:31). The need is for the development of diversified ‘autonomous public spheres’ which, armed with communicative rationality, unremittingly confront the state (Dryzek, 1992:35). Dryzek (1992) makes the point that it is unlikely that uncompromising opposition groups such as Earth First!, will be able to contribute much to this process since they too closely resemble the Carl Schmitt approach to politics as a confrontation between enemies who have nothing to say to each other; and so the ‘realos’ rather than the ‘fundis’ in the German Greens, for example, are more likely participants in the process of discursive and consensual decision-making (Dryzek, 1992:35-36). The fear sounded by the fundamentalists, that principles will be compromised where the liberal democratic state may ‘subvert and co-opt discursive forms’ notwithstanding, the move is justified in that the risk is necessary for discursive democracy to ‘erode the strategic, private interest-driven character of liberal democracy’ (Dryzek, 1992:37).

However, will this lead to ecological politics? It is possible that autonomous public spheres such as the Business Round Table, may have as their aim the relaxation of conditions designed to protect the environment in order to enhance business opportunities, thus entrenching the relationship between the business sector and the state as indicated earlier by Dryzek (1992:26). As he points out ‘ecological rationality and political congeniality of discursive democracy apply only insofar as discourse can scrutinize and penetrate ideological and cultural schemes’ (Dryzek, 1992:41).

It can be argued that this means that adherence to the purely procedural communicative ethics offered by Habermas (1984) leads to the problem of not being able to guarantee outcomes, and such an adherence might work to bring about ecological goals, but only under the conditions where such concerns enjoy a hegemonic status. A hegemonic status would mean that political discussions become saturated with ecological discourse such that consensual outcomes favour ecological protection and ‘Green’ sustainability.

This point is taken up by Gutmann and Thompson (2002) who argue that ‘pure proceduralists’ make two kinds of argument; one from moral authority, that the moral judgement of democratic citizens should determine the content of laws; the other from political authority, where substantive principles, it is argued, pre-empt the political sovereignty of citizens that should only be exercised through democratic decision-making. Gutmann and Thompson (2002:154) dispute these arguments and ‘defend the inclusion of substantive principles in a theory of deliberative democracy’ on the grounds that ‘procedures such as majority rule cannot
justify outcomes that are unjust according to substantive principles’. In this way, two issues are raised. The first concerns the place of consensus within deliberative democracy, and the second the place of substantive principles against pure proceduralism. Gutmann and Thompson advocate that both procedural and substantive principles be ‘systematically open to revision’, and this, they argue, constitutes the strength of deliberative democratic theory (Gutmann and Thompson, 2002:154).

The essence of participatory, discursive and deliberative forms of democracy, according to Gaus (2003), is the requirement that a ‘real’ process of argumentation or discourse has occurred. As opposed to voters merely choosing representatives to argue on their behalf, participatory forms demand that an actual process of argumentation be aimed at agreement to confirm the validity of a truth claim to stand as the common will. Vital to this process is the ideal of reason which, for Postema, as Gaus (2003) reports, must be public reason in a radical sense, that is, common reason.

Under such a condition where common reason is available to the mass of the population, it is possible to imagine what Dryzek (1997) refers to as ‘democratic pragmatism’ where public consultation, alternative dispute resolution, policy dialogue, and public inquiries can provide the space for argumentation, provided that the public have access to the relevant information under ‘right to know legislation’. For Habermas, where conflict arising from the ‘disruption of a normative consensus’ occurs, the disrupted consensus must be repaired by ‘restoring the intersubjective recognition of a validity claim after it has become controversial’, or ‘assuring the intersubjective recognition for a new validity claim that is a substitute for the old one’ (quoted in Gaus 2003:121). This process is necessary to ensure moral justification for a validity claim. Moral justification on any other grounds is untenable and can only be claimed as a result of the procedure of intersubjective argumentation.

Liberalism, which emphasises the rights held by individuals as equals within the legal institutions, is criticised by Habermas for making these rights to liberty morally prior to democratic decision-making, so ‘circumscribing the area in which democratic decisions are legitimate’, and in his opinion ‘discourse theory invests the democratic process with normative connotations stronger than those found in the liberal model’ (quoted in Gaus 2003:121,126). In this case, the relationship between morality and norms is disrupted by the priority of a legal framework which delimits the possibility of intersubjective agreement on moral life.
positivism regards laws as social facts and ‘even highly immoral law is law’; by contrast ‘natural law theory’ holds that law must be morally justified (Gaus, 2003:120). Therefore, Gaus concludes that the only basis for the moral justification of law structuring human life, according to natural law theory, is an actual process of argumentation aimed at consensus and involving the use of reason by as many of the public affected by decisions as possible, for as long as the procedure of argument is fruitful (Gaus, 2003).

This standard of moral justification emphasises contestation and argumentation which, while it aims at consensus, this aim is not regarded as the ultimate arbiter in judging between truth claims. In this way, the emphasis in the work of Habermas should fall on intersubjective argumentation where ‘no force except that of the better argument’ should be the standard of moral justification (Habermas, 1975:108). While for Habermas, moral discourse aims not at truth but validity through argument, claims to validity are analogous to truth claims. Therefore, we cannot separate our epistemic standards from argument and reasoning, and, because of this, consensus is inadequate by itself as a guarantee of ethics, rather argument and reason are more stable grounds for moral justification (in Gaus, 2003).

In this way, the defining feature of deliberative democracy, that is, that public justification is tied to discourse, is preserved without there being the necessity to amalgamate positions that are in opposition and where the procedural goal of consensus leads only to compromise where neither position retains its full force or, alternatively, results in co-option where one position is subordinated to the other, potentially leaving the status quo intact.

An illustration of this is offered by an examination of ‘ecological modernization’ (Dryzek, 1997). Here it is pointed out that although the environmental policy developed in Germany, Japan, Norway and the Netherlands is achieved through a high degree of consensus, the political systems that operate are corporatist, or, if not definitively corporatist, are characterised by a ‘political-economic system where consensual relationships among key actors prevail’, and decisions are made by an élite behind closed doors (Dryzek, 1997:141). This, because of its restricted scope of opinions, transgresses the fundamental principle of discursive and deliberative democracy, that of including as many affected by the decision in decision-making, as is possible.

Further, Dryzek (1997) points out that as a discourse, ecological modernization aims at the restructuring of the capitalist system such that it more closely coheres with ecological
principles and, in this way, seems to be a synthesis of what would be regarded from an eco-
centrist or deep Green position as incommensurable opposites; that is, a partnership between an
ever expanding capitalist economy and environmental preservation such that each could proceed
and reinforce the other; as Dryzek (1997) points out, ecological modernization is beholden to an
anthropocentric world-view the fundamental basis of which is that nature is there to serve human
needs, and as such pushes the idea of ‘limits to growth’ into the background.

Gaus (2003) points out that Habermas recognises that the ‘deliberations of citizens are
not apt to yield a consensus’ and so the discussion may have to be cut off and recourse made to
voting on the issue. However, it is stressed that closure in terms of a vote cannot be final and
that public discussion should remain open (Postema, in Gaus, 2003). In this way, argumentation
is given priority over reaching agreement, and, even where agreement is reached, such agreement
should be considered tentative and open to renegotiation. Gaus (2003:140) argues that the aim
of consensus is unrealistic, and bases this opinion on the observation that not only are
understandings of the good life plural, but also that society is characterised by ‘diverse and
conflicting ideologies that insist their competitors are deeply misguided’.

However, Gaus is not claiming that this makes political life in an ideologically fractured
society impossible, and it has been argued that ideological fractures are the very essence of
politics. Gaus concludes that this condition ‘strains beyond plausibility the claim that politics
ought--even ideally--to aim at actual consensus’ (Gaus, 2003:140). The point here is that
‘reasoners find themselves in principled disagreement which cannot be negotiated or
compromised’ (Gaus, 2003:140). Therefore, Gaus advocates an ‘adjudicative conception of
democracy’ which, while retaining the ideals of reason and public justification, rejects the pursuit
of political consensus, in favour of the practical resolution of disputes (Gaus, 1999:207). While
acknowledging that the constraints of time may force a temporary suspension of discussion,
concluding with a vote, Elster, also points out that with regard to social psychological
phenomena such as ‘group think’ (Irving Janis, 1972), discussion oriented toward consensus may
fall victim to such phenomena, and, far from yielding the common good, may only reveal a
‘mutually reinforcing bias’ (Elster, 1999:16).

In contrast to pursuing consensus, Gaus (2003) agrees with the view of Joshua Cohen,
who, while he supports deliberative democracy, also advocates ‘epistemic populism’, which ‘at
its core, rejects that idea that there is an aggregation of preferences that yields the will of the
people’ (Gaus, 2003:157). Gaus (2003) indicates that epistemic populism holds that in Rousseau’s theory, the general will is to be identified with the common good; according to this view, the general will is not constructed via some aggregative procedure but is identified with a substantive end: the common good (Gaus, 2003:158). In this way, the outcome of an election is regarded as evidence as to what the people think will promote the common-good, but cannot be taken as an adequate system since ‘democracies seldom have votes on well defined issues...even in referendums voters are asked only whether they support’ a proposition, ‘not their specific judgement on the issue’ (Gaus, 2003:160). This then places the weight on deliberation, an actual process of argumentation, to ensure moral justification.

It can be argued that Habermas’ pure proceduralism is the result of a desire to theoretically preserve the clarity of the bifurcation of reason into communicative and instrumental types. However, following Elster, whose view is ‘that politics is concerned with substantive decision-making, and is to that extent instrumental’ (Elster, 1999:19), we find that rather than relying solely on communicative reason, another approach suggests that in the process of argument (communicative reason), substantive principles aimed at particular ends (instrumental reason) form the basis of conceptions of the common good. In this way, the common good is regarded as substantive principles argued for, rather than stumbled upon. In the absence of an abstracted conception of the common good that a social group or political party may one day hit upon, (Elster, 1999:19), we have to regard the common good as something argued for with its final ascendancy into common acceptance as its ultimate aim. This understanding presents the possibility that there is little to distinguish the common good from substantive principles that have achieved hegemonic status. This argues that in order to change the common good, preference is given to ‘public debate and confrontation’ rather than aggregation and filtering preferences, aimed at consensus. Politics is defined, therefore, as ‘public in nature and instrumental in purpose (Elster, 1999:12, 26).

It has been argued that the ‘test for democratic legitimacy will be, in part, substantive--dependent upon the content of outcomes, not simply on the process through which they are reached’ (Cohen, 1999:407). As mentioned, Dryzek (1992) similarly asserts that the combination of capitalism, liberal democracy and the administrative state have failed the ‘acid test’ of responding to ecological problems. The dominance of concerns around business profitability rules out significant action aimed at ecological protection (Dryzek, 1992:18, 26). To get around
this Dryzek (1992:35) argues for the development of diversified ‘autonomous public spheres’ and both he and Cohen argue against a procedural conception of democracy, and in favour of deliberative democracy organized around alternative conceptions of the common-good (Cohen, 1999). Alternative conceptions of the common-good cannot be traded or aggregated, therefore consensus is ill-disposed to achieve a coherent rendering of the common good except by means of the better argument, accepted in its essential elements, rather than finally representing a sutured body consisting of various parts representing the interests of those contributing to that consensus.

However, it is over the issue that deliberation should be aimed at achieving consensus where Dryzek (1992) and Cohen, (1999) differ. Although Dryzek (1992) insists on substantive values beyond pure proceduralism, he concludes that consensus should be the goal of deliberation while Cohen, and others, for example, Gaus (1999, 2003) and Gutmann and Thompson (2002) disagree. For Gutmann and Thompson (2002:153-154), the attempt to ‘keep democratic theory procedurally pure fails’, and that any ‘adequate theory’ must include, in addition to procedural principles, substantive principles which, in their opinion, represent an ‘essential value of democracy itself’. Gutmann and Thompson (2002:169) further argue that pure proceduralism reliant, for example, on majority rule (consensus), can produce unjust outcomes, and the inclusion of substantive principles can act as a standard against which outcomes can be judged. It is possible, argue Gutmann and Thompson, that ‘...a law citizens make is unjust, however correct the procedures by which they make it.’

To overcome this difficulty, Saward (2003a :161) suggests ‘reflexive proceduralism’ which while focussed on the ‘shaping of binding collective decision-making procedures’, is reflexive in that it ‘regards political principles, mechanisms and institutions as open to constant change and adjustment...’. For Gutmann and Thompson (2002) this does not go far enough, and in addition to reflexive procedures, they argue that the substantive values themselves ought to be subject to contestation. This then overcomes the problem of the ‘authority of prior norms’, and in this regard, Cohen argues for deliberation free from constraints (Cohen, 1999). Prior norms exist to the extent that the state is beset with the necessity to fulfil ‘systematic imperatives’ that democracy now works to overcome (Habermas, 1999:41).

Gutmann and Thompson (2002:155-156) attach their views to the principle of reciprocity which they recognise as a core principle of democracy. ‘Reciprocity holds that citizens owe one
another justifications for the mutually binding laws and public policies they collectively enact’. This principle is also evident in the work of Cohen (1999) who insists that the requirement to provide reasons for a particular conception of the common-good, acts as a check on any sectional interests parading as having plausible appeal as the common-good. In this way, ‘mutual justification, either between citizens or their representatives in public forums, requires reference to substantive values’ thereby emphasising the importance of substantive values as the basis of reason in deliberation beyond pure proceduralism (Gutmann and Thompson, 2002:156).

Actual deliberation in public forums is an essential test for reasoning ‘if it is to ground laws that actually bind all citizens’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2002:157). In this way, reciprocity is essential to establish validity of reasoning and Gutmann and Thompson (2002:158) declare that it ‘is to justice in political ethics what replication is to truth in scientific ethics’; and that this is essential if decisions are to achieve moral justification where decision makers are required to ‘offer justifications for policies to other people, including those who are both well informed, and representative of the citizens who will be most affected by decisions’. This requirement applies equally to experts for whom ‘while (they) may be the best judges of scientific evidence, they have no special claim to finding the right answer about priorities when degrees of risk and tradeoffs of costs and benefits are involved’ (Gutmann and Thompson, 2002:158).

Gutmann and Thompson (2002:163) argue that while some proceduralists wish to keep substantive principles out of the deliberative process, procedural principles such as majority rule, are no less contestable; and that both substantive and procedural principles should be open to contest. Also, that a democratic theory that tries to insulate itself from conflict by ‘limiting the range of principles it includes, is likely to be less relevant for recognizing and resolving the disagreements that democracies typically confront’. The argument that including substantive principles ‘usurps the political authority of democratic citizens’, is responded to by Gutmann and Thompson (2002:169) who argue that deliberative democracy relies on ‘political provisionality’. This means that ‘deliberative principles, and the laws they justify, must not only be subject to actual deliberation..but also that they be open to actual reconsideration and revision at a future time’.

Gaus argues that for Rousseau the ‘breakdown of consensus into contradictory views and debates indicates the corruption of the body politic and the nearer the opinion approached unanimity’ the closer is the domination of the general will (Gaus, 1999). Rousseau’s view has
to be understood contextually as a product of a period in history when society was regarded as more homogeneous than is the case today where claims for the politics of identity and difference have gained salience, for example in the work of Iris Marion Young (2000). Under the conditions of a differentiated society where political contestation arises along lines of gender and ethnicity, for example, the simple equation of unanimity with the general will has to be reviewed, for as noted before with reference to the work of Gaus, ‘the problem is that we do not simply live in a society with plural understandings of the good life, but with diverse and conflicting ideologies that insist their competitors are deeply misguided’... these conditions ‘strain beyond plausibility the claim that politics ought...to aim at actual consensus’ (Gaus, 2003:140).

Summary.

Considering the foregoing, it is argued that pure proceduralism fails to satisfy the conditions of moral law-making and that a deliberative process in which substantive principles are included is regarded as more effective in solving problems with some prospect of displacing dominating ideologies. The inclusion of substantive principles insures against the risk of losing all references to unity and provides ‘proposals for the positive organisation of the social’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992). Also, the requirement that reasonable justification must attend validity claims in deliberative forms, ensures the moral basis for resultant decisions since this requirement presents an impediment to solutions based on largely unexamined principles, achieving acceptance and shortening the deliberative process. Finally, the primacy of argumentation and reason over the goal of consensus is regarded as vital for politics to resist the continued common sense status of prevalent ideologies, and this opens the potential for substantive social and political change to become actualised.

In the following, Chapter 6 and section 6.1, we will be dealing with Green theory as it relates to Green parties. Since Green parties form part of the Green movement, the ideology has a common basis in ‘ecologism’ (Vincent, 1992), but within the Green movement there are groups that have no political ambition at all, while others, such as Greenpeace, are political in the sense that they seek to influence government policy, but do not seek political office. Therefore, we
are referring here to parties that contest national elections for the purpose of gaining political power in order to influence policy and state imperatives through the machinery of the state. The discussion begins with a brief look at the history of the politicisation of nature.
Chapter 6
The emergence of Green ideology. Nature and politics.

Where Green ideology has been implicated in the process of the revival of politics and the reconfiguration of liberal political institutions, this Chapter will begin its examination. This traces the emergence of Green ideology from a concern for a return to a more natural state in response to industrialisation, to the rejection of both left and right ideologies that were eventually deemed equally guilty of pursuing industrial expansion at the expense of the natural environment. The discussion in this Chapter, and section 6.1 that follows, does not claim to be either a historiography of Green thought, nor does it delve to any extent into the debates from within Green thinking on the issues and concepts mentioned here. The purpose is to outline concepts and issues salient to Green thought and to leave it to the Green parties discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 fill out the concepts with their particular meaning as the concepts are mobilized politically. For an in-depth discussion on insider debates and the development of Green thought over time, see Hay, P. (2002) Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought, and Wall, D. (1994) Green History: A Reader in Environmental Literature, Philosophy, and politics.

The concept of wilderness, or nature free from human intervention, emerges simultaneously with agriculture. Although a pivotal moment in human history, the concepts used then in regard to nature would have differed markedly from the way nature was regarded at the time of industrialisation of the late 18th and 19th century, and these again may be distinguished from the Green movement’s conceptualization of nature and the environment in the 20th century where a politicised version of environmental ethics developed (Weber in Meja and Stehr, 1990:60).

Dobson (2000:33) has argued that Green politics proper emerged during the 1970s, and points to ‘The Limits to Growth’ report of 1972 as ‘hard to beat as a symbol for the birth of ecologism’. The qualifications Dobson offers for this view are that earlier concerns raised with regard to the environment were locally orientated and lacked the global perspective characteristic of modern ecologism, also, that political ecologists believe that a single issue approach to environmental problems fails to address their seriousness at a sufficiently fundamental level, in
that these problems stem from political, social and economic relations that encourage unsustainable practices. The most significant observation is that although similar ideas to those held by modern Greens can be found in the late 19th century, what was missing was an ideology (Gould, 1988; Dobson, 2000). This meant that the earlier movement was vulnerable to appropriation by both the left and the right in the name of the interests held by each, including industrialism.

For Gould (1988:ix) ‘back to nature’ in Britain in the late 19th century was a reaction against ‘urban/industrial society and sympathy for things rural and natural.’ This places the ‘back to nature’ movement in opposition to liberal-capitalist industrialism, and this opposition has led to the Greens being placed ideologically on the left, but as Gould goes on to observe, the association was uneasy and it was some time before the Greens could be seen ‘outside the market-dominated right and the socialist dominated left’ (Gould, 1988:x).

Gould points to thinkers such as William Morris who, critical of bourgeois oppression, was influential in the emergence of societies, for example the Selborne League, 1885; Pleasant Places, 1886; and Society for Protection of Birds, 1889 set up to ‘defend nature against those plagues and pests which sought to worry her out of existence’ (Gould, 1988:22). This represents one approach to industrial society with the emphasis on the protection and preservation of nature. Other societies emerged, for example the Commons Preservation Society, 1865, and the Edinburgh Environment Society, 1884, and since these groups represented an alternative to capitalist/urban society, they were seen as an attractive political vehicle for other groups fundamentally critical of capitalism. As this process advanced, the emphasis on the simple life and the mystical quality of nature gave way to the ideologies of the Fabians and the Marxists (Gould, 1988).

Under this influence nature was seen as the source of all production and work with the emphasis on co-operation and the commune, and was regarded as the cure for anomic individualism. The synthesis between the simple life and forwarding the socialist cause can be found in the Clarion movement. Influential to this movement was Robert Blatchford who advocated a ‘future in which socialism and nature are established institutions...[and where workers] had to rise against the capitalists in an effort to regain natural rights to beauty and health’ (Gould, 1988:39). In this way, the Clarion movement worked to establish a socialist society based on human co-operation and contact with nature. However, attempts to establish
communities in towns in the late 1890s signalled a weakening in the influence of the intrinsic value and benefits of ‘back to nature’. The complete appropriation of the back to nature movement by the socialists can be gauged when the overriding concern turned to a commitment to the maintenance and progress of a predominately industrial society with public control of the land providing food to fuel an industrial and urban population (Gould, 1988:75).

A consequence of rapid industrialisation was the development of a large class of casual labourers, and this raised the spectre of socialist inspired revolution, leading to appeals to wild, natural beauty in order to defuse the menace to industrial society that this section of the working class represented. To this end, the Commons Preservation Society aimed its promotion of open spaces ‘to lessen the sullen discontent amongst labouring people which made for social conflict’ (Gould, 1988:90). In a similar way, the Kyrle Society set up a sub-committee on smoke abatement to raise public awareness of the value of smokeless fuels; to ‘make existence more pleasant for both plants and human beings’ (Gould, 1988).

In both cases, the presence of the very poor and the lumpenproletariat, was thought to constitute a threat to the current social order, and, that this threat might be alleviated by the provision of open spaces, thus reducing class antagonism (Gould, 1988:94). In this way, the ‘back to nature’ movement was utilized as a means to defuse political tensions and as an implement of the bourgeoisie to maintain the current social order, that is, the movement was pressed into the service of bourgeois industrialist society. Although an element of sustainability is evident in the work of the Kyrle Society (advocating smoke-less fuels, for example), this at best resembles an environmentalist approach where increasing industrial activity itself remains unquestioned. This may be contrasted with an ecologist approach where both the productive and political processes are scrutinised. It can be concluded that the movement had not only lost its critical force, but now supported the very system it rose in opposition to.

At this stage, that is the early 20th century, the prevalent view was that the hope of a future society based on a natural life, was simply a vain longing. This was supported by the view that humans had never lived in harmony with the world, and that hopes for a return to the state of nature risked the destruction of modern society (Gould, 1988:146). However, the revival of a positive attitude towards human association with nature was offered up by the Boer War (1899-1902), which ‘alerted public opinion to the physical weakness of the urban population, and its correlation to rural decline’(Gould, 1988:147). Once again, nature was regarded politically
insofar as it was of benefit to the aspirations of a system of imperialism, acquisition of overseas colonies and their subsequent exploitation; all of which supported industrial capitalism and the prevailing social and political order. On the other side of the political spectrum, unemployed workers in Manchester and Bradford, in an attempt to free themselves of the necessity to sell their labour in order to survive, seized land to cultivate on co-operative principles. In both cases, the politics of nature is tied to the entrenched ideologies of the right and the left and regarded in terms of either bolstering the current order or emancipation from exploitation inherent in the same.

The failure of the ‘back to the land’ movement has in part been attributed to the ‘immoveable corporate class-consciousness of the British working class...’(Gould, 1988:158). What emerged later in the 20th century was a growing environmental interest that formed the basis of an ecology movement. Popular open-air movements, youth movements and rambling, extended from the Wandervogel in Germany to similar movements in America.

It can be concluded from the foregoing that the ‘back to nature movement’ had been colonized by existing ideologies and had yet to become politicised in its own right, to become an ideology for itself. Dobson (2000) concedes that although some ideas, for example, opposition to industrialism in favour of a return to nature, clean air and open spaces, evident in the late 19th century are now associated with ecologism; this is not the same thing as ecologism. Ecologism can be distinguished as a ‘critical challenge’ aimed at the ‘unsustainability of present political and economic practices...’(Dobson, 2000:11). Although Dobson (2000) points to the early 1970s as the era in which ecologism emerged, a politicised version of environmental ethics appeared in the work of Aldo Leopold’s Land Ethic, (1949) (Bullock and Trombley, 1999). In this way ecologism represents the ideology of a ‘radical Green challenge to the political, economic and social consensus that dominates contemporary life’(Dobson, 2000:2).

A distinction is drawn between ecologism and environmentalism in that care for the environment evident in both is an essential part of Green ideology, but

‘ecologism argues that care for the environment presupposes radical changes in our relationship with the natural world and in our mode of social and political life. Environmentalism, on the other hand, takes a management approach to environmental problems, secure in the belief that these can be solved without fundamental changes in present values or
patterns of production and consumption’ (Porritt, in Dobson, 1990:13).

Following this, Dobson (2000) says that the Green politics of, for example, carbon dioxide scrubbers on industrial chimneys, cannot be considered part of radical Green politics since it does not challenge the dominant paradigm. This indicates a characteristic in Green politics in which differing approaches are plotted along a spectrum from deep Green, representing the radical adherents to ecologism, to light Green environmentalism, which is reformist in its approach to environmental problems.

Essential to ecologism is the relationship between human and nonhuman nature. Under this approach nature is regarded as having intrinsic value independent of any use value it might have for humans. Andrew McLaughlin (1993) writes from the position of deep ecology and concludes that the recognition of some duality between humans and the rest of nature makes sense in that biological processes can occur without the application of human thought or intervention, but the way that this relationship is regarded and how far we take it, is the significant factor where ecologism is concerned. For example, one attitude is that ‘we are not outside nor exempt from the natural processes...’ (McLaughlin 1993:2), and that nature should be allowed to take its course. This could be interpreted as providing grounds for the justification of any human activity with regards the rest of nature, including preservation and exploitation, since humans are part of nature, everything humans do must be, to some extent, ‘natural’. Another is that there is a distinction between humanity and nature where ‘Nature is distinguished from ‘humanity’ as an ‘other” (McLaughlin, 1993:2).

This dualism has engendered two distinct attitudes toward nature. One that McLaughlin describes as ‘nature knows best’ and is an eco-centric position suggesting that any human intervention with nature is likely to be destructive. The other can be described as anthropocentric and, when linked with the view of Francis Bacon, regards scientific knowledge as power over nature, and this power should be used to extend the boundaries of nature’s limits in the service of humans (Pepper, 1993:11). The contrast between the views can be simply stated as ‘nature knows best’ in the first instance, and ‘humans know best’, in the second.

Recognition of this dualism also focuses attention on the view that humans are not constantly nor fatally bound by the laws of nature, and this imparts a sense of responsibility on humans, since it is people who construct meanings around objects like nature. Further, since it is possible to construct an exploitative relationship, it is also possible to construct the
relationship otherwise. Since humans ‘live within a cognitive world and act on the basis of our ideas’, our representations and constructions of nature shape the relationship, and as this relationship is the result of a commonly shared conceptual apparatus, it is only through ‘cultural forces that the rest of nature appears to us’ (McLaughlin, 1993:6).

This means that in the case of an exploitative attitude towards nature, exploitative attitudes are a cultural phenomenon and as an unfreedom, this attitude has a general application toward other humans as well. Therefore, the eradication of exploitation increases the freedom of individuals in society toward self-formation. So the goal of emancipation cannot be reduced to sectarian struggles but rather must be generalised across the social strata, and this reintroduces the idea of the world as interconnected and interrelated and that humans are subject to certain biological ‘laws’ of nature. Therefore, while it is true that humans are able to modify their environment and escape, to some degree, the caprices of nature; modification (or other action) of nature (the environment) is likely to have repercussions for humans. This recognition emphasises the change in terminology that accompanies the emergence of an ideology. Formerly ‘nature’ with its connotations of an outside, that is, away from the industrial/urban centres, dominated the discourse. Later terms such as the ‘environment’ and ‘ecology’ with connotations of interconnectedness become prevalent. Therefore, change for McLaughlin (1993) results from cognitive dissonance in which the rationale for current social practices no longer withstands scrutiny, and the limits of the current order is threatened, and this is indicated by the change in terminology. This occurred in the 1960s and 1970s with the rise of counter-movements of which Green politics is one, and this marks the politicization of the environment.

Summary.

Chapter 6 has dealt with the politicisation of nature toward an environmental ethic by way of introducing Green ideology which, as has been argued, will critically confront liberal hegemony. The history of this politicization has been traced from the ‘back to nature’ response to increasing industrialisation to the emergence of modern ecologism in the early 1970s. The defining characteristic of the latter has been its social and political critique which expresses opposition to unsustainable practices and argues for an alternative. A broad distinction within Green ideology has been indicated on a range that extends from ecologism to environmentalism, with the former critical of current political institutions, while the latter is reformist, working within existing institutions. This distinction will be relevant when Green parties in New Zealand
are examined, and finer distinctions between Green ideological positions are possible. The development of a taxonomy of Green ideological approaches by Wissenburg (1997) indicates that, in common with other ideologies, varying shades of Green ideology are identifiable. This means that a single approach might consist of one or more elements ranging from deep Green (ecologism) to light Green (environmentalism). The following section provides a detailed examination of Green ideology since its recognised beginnings in the early 1970s (Dobson, 2000).
6.1
Green Ideology.

Having sketched out the beginnings of Green ideology we now take a detailed look at the framework of that ideology. In this regard, theorists, and others who write from what has become regarded as a Green ideological position, will be discussed to draw out the salient features of Green ideology relevant for this research. It will be from this discussion that Green politics in New Zealand will be examined in Part 4, and this examination will be framed according to three main considerations discussed in this section derived mainly from the work of Gayil Talshir (1998, 2002).

Before looking at the Green ideological mobilization of nature, a definition of ideology will be regarded. According to Stavrakakis, ideology is a meaningful construction, a belief structure and set of discursive practices through which social reality is produced, and which then gives direction to our (political) action (Stavrakakis in Jaworski and Coupland, 2000). The work of van Dijk (1998) reveals that core ideologies, which in turn will influence social discourses, historically have their basis in the writings of small élite groups of philosophers, writers, academics and others, who at least have access to books and the mass media, and also that although ideologies are expressed and reproduced by social and semiotic practices other than talk and text, discourse is more explicit and articulate than other semiotic codes. Talshir (2002: xxii/xxiii) adds that forming a political identity is a discursive exercise aimed at providing a characterisation of the ‘other’, and from this position to engage with the dominant discourse in order to transform the latter. The features of ideology emphasised here is that ideology is a discourse that constructs reality and, through conflict with the dominant ideology, is aimed at social change. This definition indicates how an ideology works but does not itself characterise Green ideology.

The above definition of an ideology will form a framework within which Green ideology will be established from the work of Green theorists. This framework will receive greater clarity as the case studies of New Zealand Green parties are considered. Porritt (1984 cited in Dobson, 2000:13) has said that although he had written the last two election manifestos for the UK
Greens, he could not say, with any clarity, exactly what their ideology was. Ironically the desire to define themselves clearly as a radical break from institutional politics, led the German Greens to confuse the issue of their ideological position. Herbert Gruhl is credited with the well known Green slogan ‘neither left nor right; we are in front’, and the variations on this, and this attempts to capture the idea that the Greens are breaking away from the old traditions, offering new solutions towards a new vision for society (Capra and Spretnak, 1984). For Gruhl the problem is the dominance of the organising principle of economic growth ‘which both Left and Right, East and West, take for granted’ (Talshir, 2002:46).

However, the slogan is problematic in that, as Lipietz (1995) points out, it leads to an indeterminacy about the political orientation of the Greens, resulting in the perception of an ‘absence of a clear political stance’. He goes on to say that this has been irritating for political commentators, but it may be that it threatens the political efficacy of the entire Green project. The slogan itself is an ideological statement without being a statement of ideology, and runs the risk of having the Greens regarded by commentators and electors as ecologists in the fundamentalist sense (Giddens, 1994). The problem for the Greens is that ideological indeterminacy leaves open the question of Green ideology and this will be filled most vociferously by opponents who will engage in seeing the Greens in terms of environmental reductionism, and level negative connotations along the lines of ‘Luddite’ and ‘tree-huggers’, thereby denying Green parties the full impact of their critical programme. Lipietz (1995) observes this effect in that ‘Right’ and ‘Left’ try to stifle Green politics by reducing it to the environment, whereas if the Greens are to offer a social critique, then what has to be emphasised is that the Greens are the heirs of the emancipation aspirations of humanity (Lipietz, 1995:139).

In this way, for Green parties the ecology is the ‘paradigm case’ of a more general critique of aspects of modernity, but ecology does not exhaust the Green political project. For Talshir (2002:7),

‘environmental issues provide the banner under which the struggle to define the “political” itself was fought’. ‘Ecological problems emphasised the interconnectedness of the economic, social and environmental processes, hitherto outside the scope of the political realm, and this exposed the need to extend political discourse to new issues, and thus ordained the politicization of the personal, communal and global’.
As distinct from the withdrawal that characterised the counter-culture days, the environment provided the ‘battlefield in an attempt to shift the political grounds of the debate’ toward ‘new politics’ away from concerns of ‘security and economics in the international terrain’ (Talshir, 1998:174-175). Many analysts and Greens have argued that the very notion of economic growth must be abandoned and replaced with a contrasting core concept, namely, a regard for Nature, and this defines the ‘battle cry’ of the groups, but does not exhaust their critique of the current order.

An examination of Green ideology provides evidence that it resists the charge of ecological reductionism, and therefore represents an ideological discourse that may restore our ideological maps, revive politics, and spur democratic participation (Lechner, 1996; Jacoby, 1999; Goodin, 1992:131). This evidence can be found in the core Green party principles set out in the ‘near canonical’ programme of the German Green Party, 1983, (Goodin, 1992; Saward, 1993). These four principles are, ecological wisdom which relates human existence in a ‘web of dynamic systems that are simultaneously interrelated’; social justice or social responsibility, these mean different things in different parts of the party as is characteristic in the Greens; grassroots democracy, which was inspired by West German citizen movements throughout the 1970s. The principle being to locate a greater amount of power, either direct or participatory, with the local group or those most effected by the decisions; and the principle of non-violence (Capra and Spretnak, 1984).

Talshir (2002) observes that the German Greens endorsed a plurality of actors, encouraging ideological activity among the various independent currents. However, Capra and Spretnak (1984:37,47) point out that many felt that the principle of decentralisation should have been a fifth pillar since, quoting from the Green Party Federal Program, they observe that ‘Grassroots democratic politics means an increased realization of decentralised direct democracy’, and this indicates that grassroots necessarily implies decentralisation within the principles. Examination of the principles indicates that Green ideology touches on aspects of Western societies beyond eco-centrism, including challenging the separation of civil society and the political sphere at the centre of prevalent liberal democracy, and the following discussion will argue this point further. In this way, an overview of the approach of Green parties in New Zealand will be achieved before the detail of the polices of these parties is examined.

The tendency has been to attempt to ‘fit’ Green ideology into an ideological conceptual
framework that only recognises totalizing ideologies of the old variety, for example, socialism; but these attempts fail to fully comprehend Green ideology. As Talshir (1998:186) states,

‘Crucially though, whereas an ecological perspective may provide an elegant theoretical anchoring for an alternative ideology, the ideology of the Greens is not an ecological ideology *per se*, the ecological dimension is but one in an array of realms from which the critique of economic growth is conducted’.

This protest is directed against both material culture and ‘one-dimensional politics which entrenches personal and social modes of behaviour in the material sphere’. Talshir (2002) adds that ‘the thrust of Green ideology is to generate a world-view in which social and ecological processes interact within a framework which transcends purely environmental concerns, necessitating major political reconstruction’, Green ideology also undermines the dominant Weltanschauung (Talshir, 2002: xxii, 42).

Throughout its history various influences have exerted themselves to varying degrees, for example, the Greens have been regarded as a ‘radical’ left party, a principle opposition party, and a political liberal party (Talshir, 2002). In spite of these variations, some constant themes have developed. From post 19th century romanticism (as discussed in Chapter 6), ecological thinking of the 1970s emphatically transcended the protection of nature, and was concerned with conceptually changing the humanity/environment relationship. This period was characterised by a critique of the project of modernity based on the limits to growth thesis (Talshir, 2002: 26,108). According to this view, the relentless exploitation of nature and people is anchored in patterns of domination serving class sectional interests. While the relevance of the mechanisms of domination and struggle are recognised within Green ideology, the Greens extend the analysis beyond class struggle. Consequently a new language is needed to mould a new world-view in order to free individuals from the dominant ideology of technical progress. This involves the essentially anti-modernist approach, allowing the politicisation of issues including lifestyle, food and gender. This has been termed an ‘organicist discourse’ and is opposed to the mechanicist-materialist discourse currently predominant (Talshir, 2002:100,102).

Markovits and Gorski (1993:115) argue that ‘Green ideology in all its variants has been defined by the attempt to develop a theoretically grounded synthesis of ecological and socialist politics’. Although the reconstruction of marxian socialism is rejected by Green activists who
insist a new society beyond left and right is being prepared, Eckersley (1992) argues that efforts to define a position beyond the growth consensus of capitalism and communism has served to generate debate concerning the proper political characterisation of Green politics. Eckersley (1992) favours a theoretical bridge between eco-socialism and eco-centrism since, while many Green theorists accept the eco-socialist critique of capitalism, they do not accept the conclusion requiring the dismantling of the market economy to the degree advanced by eco-socialists (Eckersley, 1992:120). The limitations of such a theoretical bridge can be seen in that the appeal to conventional conceptualisations are evident with socialism and ecologism being the most prevalent. This has the effect of entrenching just those ideological categories that Green politics defines itself as being beyond.

With the fall of USSR in 1989, the spectre of socialism has given way to a conception of Green politics as narrowly concerned with the environment. While Eckersley (1992) attempts to grasp the range of issues politicised by Green politics, conventional theories of ideology are unable to fully comprehend Green politics leading to uncertainty and, consequently, to revert to past ideological certainties, for example, ecological reductionism or socialism, by those hoping to complete the task. For Talshir (2001: xx) this would amount to an attempt to deduce political views from ecological principles on the assumption that Green ideology is environmental, the result is a perception of Green ideology as ‘thin...having little or nothing to say about politics and society’.

The variations over the years may trigger a desire to pin down once and for all exactly what Green ideology is, however, it is argued by Talshir (1998, 2002) that, by its very nature, Green ideology resists these attempts, and Talshir proposes a reconceptualisation of ideology. In so doing she shifts the problem from one of locating Green ideology on the traditional ideological spectrum, to one which raises fundamental questions about ideological taxonomy (Talshir, 1998, 2002). The prevailing understanding of ideology, for Talshir, is too narrow to accommodate the Greens’ political world-view.

In order to grasp the Greens’ claim to a unique ideological position, including an association with socialist strains, a rethinking of the concept of ideology is required. To this end Talshir argues for a ‘modular’ ideological conception which comprises two levels; the framework of core concepts, and coexisting sub-ideologies (Talshir, 1998, 2002). This latter category consists of groups, who, while they may subscribe to different notions of the ‘good society’,
‘accept the dominance of the Green conceptual framework, but the configuration of those ideas, and adjacent concepts which compose their own comprehensive world-view, remain distinct’ (Talshir, 2002:107). The acceptance of the legitimacy of the sub-ideologies is a unique characteristic of modular ideology and represents the possibility for the coexistence of different, and sometimes competing, sub-ideologies within one ideological framework. It is on these grounds that Green ideology may be distinguished from totalizing or conventional ideologies (Talshir, 2002).

This conceptualisation is particularly useful when the democratic struggles of various groups in society are considered. Modular ideology can be seen as a microcosm of how political society should function under a Green state, where a new ideology dominates providing a positive political theory based on a new conception of society and of what is the *political* within advanced industrial democracies (Talshir, 1998:171). Talshir further argues that any account of the Greens must reflect an internal duality which characterises them as a compound collective political actor, which maintains the diversity of the new political issues, but co-operates in the struggle to transform the political system (Talshir, 1998:176). This has resonance with the theory of Laclau and Mouffe (1992). Although the latter use the term ‘nodal point’, it expresses essentially the same idea, and this will be used to examine green politics in New Zealand and its relationship with the democratic struggles of various social groupings.

Also important in the examination of green politics in New Zealand are the three tasks confronted by the new political actor identified by Talshir (2002: xviii). The first of these tasks involves an analysis of what is wrong with the existing order. This includes a critique that justifies its entry into the political arena, emphasising the discrepancy between the dominant ideology and socio-political reality. That is, setting up a position of contention between its own ideology and that which currently dominates. This involves demonstrating that not only does the prevailing political ideology constitute and maintain specific modes of socio-economic practices which are contingent upon an adherence to this ideology, but also that they are now out of date, and the prevailing ideology has become detached from socio-political reality and therefore must be replaced. In place of the existing order, the second requirement is that a clear vision, or projection of a possible future, must be offered. Thirdly, a new political actor must set out a way to attain this alternative vision which has to be identified in relation to what the new political actor defines as politically salient issues, and this necessarily involves changing the way people
think about the political agenda.

In the following, the terms thought salient in accomplishing the three tasks outlined above will be discussed in order to provide some insight into Green ideology with the overall emphasis being on demonstrating the breadth of Green ideology beyond ecologism. This emphasis is aimed at arguing that Green ideology is capable of the fundamental critique of current liberal institutions. This process is selective and restricted to those terms and principles relevant to the question this research seeks to answer. In this respect, the terms discussed will also include those relevant to the reformation of liberal political institutions that derive from Green ideology.

Initially, the source of some Green ideas is looked at before considering the term sustainability. Since this is a central structuring term for Green politics it recurs throughout the discussion. This is followed by a discussion on decentralisation and participation as alternatives to representative democracy. The grassroots aspect associated with Green politics is considered and follows on from the previous discussion on ‘modular ideology’. In this regard, Green politics as a ‘new political culture’ is implicated here, where the party acts as both a social movement involving grassroots participation, as well as a political party (Kelly, 1991:194). The involvement of Green politics in contesting general elections and considering coalition with other parties necessitates a look at the ‘realos/fundis’ debate. Since the fundamentalists insist that Green politics remain ‘pure’, a look at the deep Green aspect of spiritualism is useful in covering the deep Green/light Green spectrum within Green politics. Finally, the importance of a telos in Green political aims is looked at and this is contrasted with the liberal preference for the right over the collective good as its guiding principle.

Following van Dijk (1998), it is possible to trace important elements of Green ideology to various writers and thinkers. As mentioned, an early influence for Green politics was E.F. Schumacher, who, in his book Small is Beautiful (1973) embarked on critical social analysis where he argues against the trend toward accelerating material production on the grounds of the availability of resources and the capacity of the environment to cope. This has resonance with the ‘limits to growth’ thesis which rose to prominence in the 1970s, however Schumacher’s criticism included not only the rate of production but also the methods of production, particularly Fordism and Taylorism. Schumacher was critical of the effect these productive methods were having on the workers where the

‘soul destroying, meaningless, mechanical, monotonous, moronic work is an
insult to human nature which must necessarily and inevitably produce either escapism or aggression, and that no amount of “bread and circuses” can compensate for the damage done.’ (1973:33).

Schumacher was also critical of how technology and science are pressed into the service of material production driven by

‘...a callous attitude to the land and to the animals thereon (which) is connected with, and symptomatic of, a great many other attitudes, such as those producing a fanaticism of rapid change and a fascination with novelties-technical, organizational, chemical, biological, and so forth, -- which insist on their application long before their long-term consequences are even remotely understood’ (1973:107).

Schumacher (1973:31) also advocated small cities of no more than half a million inhabitants on the principle that even numerous small-scale operations are less harmful ‘because their individual force is small in relation to the recuperative forces of nature’. This view is echoed by Lipietz (1995) where a form of ecologist economics emphasises production by small groups in urban or rural areas in communities or co-operatives, and both theorists agree that smaller scale productive units are therefore less devastating in their effects on both humans and the environment.

In accordance with the tasks identified by Talshir (2002), the influence of Schumacher is evident where several theorists have pointed out various aspects of the Green programme which aim at disrupting the integrity of liberal ideology, and economic/market supported by techno-scientific rationality inherited from the modern tradition. For example, Rainbow (1993: xiv) argues that Green politics aims at institutional reform including the displacement of the current dominance of economic values by a holistic approach to decision-making. Another critique is aimed against continued profit driven economic development, and concludes that human activity must become sustainable, and this involves the integration of environmental concerns into all aspects of social and economic life (Jamison, 2001).

This attack against Western capitalist society provides evidence supporting the argument offered by Talshir (2002) that Green ideology cannot be reduced to ecologism, in that Green ideology has much in common with the emancipatory aspects of modernity. In this way, it has been argued that the new paradigm for Green politics entails cultural hegemony, that is, the
ability to refocus public debate around its arguments. An example of this is where Green politics seeks to displace progressivism by rearticulating the dominant organising principle in terms of ‘sustainable’ development. This can be regarded as a direct conflict since the neo-liberal model of capitalist development opposes the emergence of Green sustainable development (Lipietz, 1995; Rainbow, 1993).

Sustainable.

The Green opposition is encapsulated in the concept ‘sustainable development’\(^2\). This concept has been central to the Green political programme following the *Brundtland Report* (1987). For Rainbow (1993:32) sustainability represents a fundamental challenge to existing cultural, political, and economic arrangements. Also, because it is aimed at transforming industrialisation and halting the ecological crisis, it is instrumental in changing our conception of the human good and the attainment of a just society (McLaughlin, 1993). These influences provide Green politics with alternative solutions to those currently practised ‘on behalf of values which this modernity ignores’ (Lipietz, 1995; Rainbow, 1993).

The deep Green meaning of sustainability is premised on the belief that our finite Earth places limits on industrial growth (Dobson, 2000:62). It is the ‘limits to growth thesis’ (1972) that Dobson contends separates the deep from the light Green approaches, and the principle asserts three fundamental points. First, that technological solutions, that is, those formulated within the current economic, social and political practices, will not in themselves bring about a ‘sustainable’ society in the way deep Green politics conceives it. Secondly, that continued rapid growth of industrialism is hurling the world toward a catastrophic event as the cumulative effects of this process reach an uncontrollable point; and thirdly, that a piecemeal approach to environmental problems is insufficient, and only a concerted and co-ordinated effort on all fronts will ensure sustainability.

The concept ‘sustainable development’ and the neo-liberal model of capitalist development are therefore seen as competing conceptions of how society should be ordered. Although previously discussed as ideologically bewildering, Dobson (2000) argues that the

\(^2\)This does not imply that the term ‘sustainable’, and other terms in this section, are unproblematic within Green discourse. The approach here is to outline the terms and allow the Green parties in New Zealand, subject to case studies in Chapters 7 and 8, to attach their particular meaning as the terms are mobilised against political rivals.
‘neither left nor right’ slogan can be seen as a critique of modernity in terms of the limits to growth thesis, and sustainability can be seen as the articulation of an alternative future derived from that critique. In this way, Green ideology declares a loss of faith in what were the dominant ideologies in the West, in that both the left and the right have demonstrated a commitment to accelerating industrial production with little regard for the capacity of the earth to absorb the resultant pollution or recuperate the resource loss.

Following Talshir (2002), as important as the critique is, the projection of the possibility of a new society, which for the Greens, revolves around the term ‘sustainable development’, is equally important. Saward (1993) argues that ‘sustainable development’ has come to occupy a central place in environmental thinking and policy proposals, and that a ‘sustainable’ society describes the goal of Green political initiatives. This process involves a critique of current liberal representative democracy which, following Levine (1981), is similarly regarded as unsustainable. It is for this reason that the Greens advocate more participatory forms of governance in order to oppose the ‘unsustainability of present political and economic practices’ inherent within liberal democratic structures (Dobson, 2000:11).

It has been demonstrated, therefore, that although ecologism is the fundamental ideological position for Green politics, consideration of the four principles brings to light the scope of its political concern. Also that behind the Left/Right spectrum of opposites, lies a fundamental agreement resulting in a ‘super-ideology’ referred to as ‘industrialism’ (Porritt and Winner, 1988 quoted in McLaughlin, 1993: 180). In this way, the Green claim to be neither ‘left nor right’ is an ideological counter-position to expanding industrialism and in favour of ‘sustainable development’. Dobson (2000) also points out that ecologism recognises that the fundamental issues of basic political, social and economic relations that encourage unsustainable practices, need to be addressed and that campaigns against, for example, deforestation, are not by themselves going to have the desired effect.

In some cases, solutions are guided by the view that the nation-state is too small to be effective, and call for a ‘new global order’. This approach advocates global co-ordination in response to the international nature of the problems of ‘resource’ and ‘sink’ (Baxter, 1999). While in other cases, solutions focussing on the nation-state have included centralized authoritarianism where nation-states introduce legislative controls on consumption through the mechanism of rationing, for example. Social groupings within national borders in the form of
However, Goodin (1992:168) sees a tension between procedures (democracy) and substantive outcomes (environmentalism), and concludes that in Green theory the former cannot guarantee the latter.

Authoritarian communes represent a variation on this measure.

Replacing authoritarianism with participation in decision-making within an anarchist egalitarian framework has been yet another, and this approach is derived from the view that the nation-state is too big to be effective in solving ecological problems. This solution introduces the notion of the decentralisation of political authority away from central structures. An eco-centric approach is offered by Robin Eckersley whose view is that if the ecology is given primary consideration then the rest will follow. This is based on the belief that ecologism is fundamentally emancipatory and will ensure the self-determination of all entities, including humans (Eckersley, 1992 in Dobson, 2000). This emphasises the contrast between anthropocentric solutions and eco-centric, and it is eco-centrism which drives the idea of bioregionalism in which an embeddedness in the natural world is believed to produce social arrangements that would ensure sustainability and self-determination.

Decentralisation.

Grassroots democracy and decentralisation have been considered synonymous and formed the basic programme of die Grünen in 1980 (Talshir, 2002:85). Support for this idea can be found in both early and later writers such as Schumacher (1973), and Carter (1999), who argue that small-scale participatory democracy not only requires geographical decentralisation but also implies political decentralisation. In this way, participation implies decentralisation and the relationship can be regarded as symbiotic in that while decentralisation means that regions are small enough to manage participatory forms of governance, participation enhances a sense of community and local identity thus strengthening commitment to decentralisation.

It has been emphasised that the truly distinctive thing about Green politics is the desire for decentralised political power (Pilat, 1980; Goodin, 1992³). Its significance in Green politics is as a solution to the criticism of the ‘over-bureaucratization’ and hierarchical structure of government, which thwarts the initiative of citizens (Capra and Spretnak, 1984:47). In response to the denial of the latter, decentralization aims at realizing these initiatives and devolving participation in political decisions to the smallest group affected. Participatory democracy is a

³ However Goodin (1992:168) sees a tension between procedures (democracy) and substantive outcomes (environmentalism), and concludes that in Green theory the former cannot guarantee the latter.
process whereby a party sets its basic policy according to the voting at large assemblies, and is also the model of democracy desired for society at both local and national levels (Capra and Spretnak, 1984; Goodin, 1992).

A ‘dark-Green’ or eco-centric version of decentralisation is that drawn on the basis of bio-regions as a cultural alternative (that is, a central structuring concept for societies in both ecological and political considerations) to the ‘industrial Goliath’ (Bahro, 1986 cited in Dobson 2000:201). Eckersley (1992) tells us that bio-regionalism can be traced to the work of Berg and Dasmann (1978) who refer to both a geographical terrain and a terrain of consciousness, and combine these as knowledge about how to live in a particular place. Bio-regionalism emphasises decentralisation on both economic and political levels, human scale communities, cultural and biological diversity, co-operation and community responsibility, with the long-term goal of creating a patchwork of anarchist politics linked through networking and exchanges, rather than formal state apparatus (Capra and Spretnak, 1984:49). McLaughlin (1993:205) sees this form of decentralisation achieving a symbiosis between society and the rest of nature. As such, it represents an alternative vision for human society and the only way meaningful democracy will be achieved beyond élitist politics on the scale of the nation-state (Goodin, 1992).

As the above suggests, bio-regions are an attempt to accord human activity with a regions’ biota, and to live within its dictates, limits and potential, minimising resource use, conserving and recycling, while avoiding polluting and waste (Dobson, 2000). With the natural world as an example, systems of centralised control would be avoided, and so it is more accurate to speak of bio-regional societies (Dobson, 2000). This forms the basis of Green aspirations toward decentralisation where sustainability is thought to depend on institutional changes in liberal democratic societies.

Goodin (1992:131) argues that Green theory in this regard is only half as unrealistic as it sounds, and bio-regionalism at least presents a potential alternative for the reconfiguration of communities. This was discussed in Chapter 5, where the unintended consequence of increasing globalisation has been an impulse toward the return to local identities, and bio-regions represent a possible focus for identity formation (Capra and Spretnak, 1984). The assertion of control by supranational bodies such as the WTO on nation-states have the tendency to produce regional atrophy, as control of national budgets encourages retrenchment, and where the state increasingly sheds its former social responsibilities in areas such as education and health. A return to the
provincialism characteristic of New Zealand’s earlier history is a plausible result where regions take up the state’s former responsibilities by providing and funding their particular regional hospitals and schools, for example. So while the nation-state loses autonomy to supranational organisations, regions gain autonomy as well as the possibility of participatory/deliberative forms of governance to replace representative forms.

However, there are Green theorists who regard bio-regions as utopian. Rainbow (1993:83) for example, objects to arguments in favour of bio-regions, evident in Green literature (for example,Steps to a Green Land, 1992), where in spite of the ‘nebulous promise of community’ there is no model by which this can be brought about. However, Lipietz (1995) states that, although he agrees that solutions derived from ecologism as a blueprint for society will lead to the advocation of bio-regions and other ‘dark-Green’ solutions, and while he holds to the view that Green politics is regionalist in that it sees value in shared territory as the roots of true democracy and the basis of socialisation, he argues that the basis upon which regions are formed is open to question and not necessarily dependent upon either ecologism or bio-regions (Lipietz, 1995). This view has the agreement of Talshir (2002) who emphasises that it is mistaken to reduce Green ideology to ecologism. It follows, therefore, that to limit Green participatory solutions to a necessary connection with bio-regions is equally mistaken. It is possible, as Burns, Hambleton, and Hoggett (1994) suggest, that democratic units be formed along ethnic lines, for example, or a reversion to provincial political authority as previously mentioned.

The development of bio-regionalism depends on the success of the ecologist aspect of Green ideology in guiding the subsequent development of regions, including Green ideals on decentralisation and participatory politics. As Sale (1984:233) suggests, autonomous bio-regions will likely go their own separate ways and end up with quite disparate political systems...’, risking the loss of ‘a common point of reference’ presenting problems for the possibility of achieving co-ordinated solutions to ecological problems (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992).

While Capra and Spretnak (1984) speak of ‘over-bureaucratization’ and ‘hierarchical structure’ these criticisms are directed against the machinery of government, or the means, rather than the ends, that is, the outcome of applying this machinery, to a particular ideological orientation. So while it might be valid to be critical of an inefficient legislative process, even an efficient process will fail to bring about desired Green outcomes if the dominant ideology
remains something other than Green ideology. In this way, participatory democracy might bring about more economic expansion and desire for industrial growth, and resist the Green counter-hegemonic project.

Therefore, this project must be fought and won at the level of ideology before concrete measures can have the desired effect of bringing about a Green society. Goodin (1992) states this where he says that much more needs to be done to ensure that advocating democracy will not cut across core Green Party goals. Some degree of regional decentralisation, though, does not rule out ties with the state to ensure co-ordinated solutions, but does rule out complete regional autonomy and retains the concentration of power within the institutions of central governance.

What might be regarded as a ‘happy medium’ is provided by an examination of the term ‘appropriate decision making’. Schumacher (1973) uses the term to mean that nothing should be done centrally if it can be done locally, but there is a level of decision-making which more appropriately should be taken by central government. This potentially provides a means of ensuring a co-ordinated approach to environmental problems, however, it comes at the expense of regional autonomy. This term is examined in Chapter 8 with regard to its usage within the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand.

It can be concluded that a commitment to decentralisation and the reconfiguration of the current liberal institutions is evident throughout the deep Green/light Green spectrum. From the new Benedictine order, advocated by Rudolf Bahro on the grounds that ‘The existing technobureaucratic structure can in no way be reformed in such a way that the rest of humanity could live with it’ (1986, cited in Dobson, 2000:200); to the observation by Pepper that more recent Green theorists, while still retaining the idea of decentralisation in some degree, have shifted their focus toward the acquisition of political power within existing institutions (Pepper, in Dobson, 2000). However, Green decentralisation is dependent upon the success of Green ideology, and the potential for the reformation of liberal political institutions is stated by Näström (2003:812) where she points out that since ‘...democracy is an ideal...it can be reformulated according to its contextual circumstances’.

Practical examples are provided by Fung and Wright (2001), and include local urban experiments in democratic participation, such as neighbourhood governance; industrial partnerships; and the devolution of administrative and fiscal power. To emphasise the family
resemblance between Green ideology and these examples, Fung and Wright (2001) also discuss the development of ecosystem governance, designed to satisfy the double imperative of both human development and the protection of endangered species. This is very like bio-regionalism and the coherence between the two conceptions serves to decouple the exclusive connection between Green ideology and this form of governance.

This process of decoupling can also be applied to decentralisation generally and the discussion that follows, suggests that decentralisation may be detached from a prior commitment to Green ideology and the latter regarded as not necessarily opposed to existing liberal institutions. This discussion rests on the variation of meanings that may be applied to decentralisation and, therefore, the variable function that decentralisation may fulfill depending on the meaning applied. For example, arguments for decentralisation in the past have not necessarily implied regional autonomy, but rather, preparation for political practice within existing liberal institutions. This can be demonstrated if we take up the observation by Pepper (above) that there is a shift toward the acquisition of political power within existing institutions, and recall the view by Pateman (1970) that local exercise in political participation was the best education for citizens in preparation for participation on a national scale. Pateman (1970) argues that this thinking is evident in the work of ‘classical’ theorists especially John Stuart Mill and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and the fact that these influences are not more prevalent in subsequent theories on democracy is due to an arbitrary selective process on the part of later prominent theorists, especially Joseph Schumpeter.

In this regard, Mill was critical of central government and argued that exclusively centralised political power could not bring about political freedom (in Pateman, 1970). Also, Mill drew attention to the negative effects of the dominance of capitalist rationality and private wealth seeking in individuals which works against the conception of collective interests. For Mill, there was no point in having achieved universal suffrage and participation in national government, if the individual had not prepared for this participation at the local level (Pateman, 1970). As discussed in Chapter 2, an attempt to gain the required preparation led to the emergence of independent debating societies in Britain in the mid 1800s. Functioning as a local ‘Parliament’ they gave those in civil society the opportunity to debate political issues. In this way, a development which gave the impression of a desire for decentralisation, was in fact directed toward involvement in the existing political institutions.
It can be argued that there is nothing exclusively Green or radically new about these aspirations. It has been demonstrated that ideas around decentralisation and participation prevalent in the work of Green theorists, have their origin in the writings of contractarian liberal theorists from the 19th century, and activated in the 1960s and 1970s counter-culture characterised as the participatory-democratic movement, to which Green politics responded (Cook and Morgan, 1971). It can be concluded that, at a philosophical level, these points weaken the relationship between decentralisation and participation as an exclusive aspect of Green politics; nor are the terms limited in their possible meanings within Green ideology to bio-regions or any permanent decentralisation. Also, it can be argued that the rise of the participatory-democratic discourse of the 1960s and 1970s was more an expression of discontent, and symbolic of the desire for increased political involvement, rather than ideas directed toward the practical reconfiguration of existing political structures. This leaves room for speculation that the democratic aims of Green politics can be regarded as preparation for, rather than the rejection of, liberal institutional forms of politics.

Evidence of this can be found in the emergence of Green parties (at the light end of the Green spectrum), in that while Green parties responded with a distinct approach, it was an approach that appealed to existing liberal institutions and aimed at achieving changes to liberal democracy. In this sense, Green politics, from a theoretical point of view, can be seen to limit its critique of current liberal institutions to the extent of their reform, rather than completely detaching the latter from its ideological anchoring.

To remain pure and radical or to contest Parliamentary elections is central to the ‘realos/fundis’ debate discussed later in this section. Carter (1999:214) raises the fear held by the fundamentalists where he links the impulse toward direct democracy with radical variants of Green politics and, consistent with this view, he doubts that a ‘sustainable’ society can be brought about within institutional forms of democracy, since they are already ‘tainted by just those strategies and practices’ that the Green movement rose to oppose. In this way, decentralised direct democracy is seen as the counter to the institutionalised, centralised form currently operating, and that only through decentralisation will it be possible to avoid ‘tainting’ by the dominant unsustainable discourse, and displace this with Green ‘sustainable’ discourse.

A concrete example of what Carter refers to as ‘tainting’ can be seen where he refers to the work of Marilyn Waring (1989 in Carter, 1999:216). Waring points out that the conceptual
apparatus employed in what may seem neutral measures, such as that for the GDP of nations, emphasises government tax revenue and accepts, uncritically, factors that are regarded within Green politics as negative and unsustainable. Under the prevalent UN system of national accounts, ecological disasters such as an oil spill, are regarded positively since the cost of the clean up adds to the government tax income. While it is not argued that the state encourages ecological disasters, the example serves to highlight that concepts structure thought and action in that the dominance of a particular conceptual apparatus necessarily promotes particular outcomes and, in the process, suppresses the possibility of alternatives. Challenge to the dominant conception of how well a country is doing depends upon alternative concepts that would emphasise, in the case of an alternative to GDP argued for by the Greens, issues central to Green politics, for example, that more will be done to avoid things like oil spills and unsustainable practices, and in this way represents a paradigm shift.

Another example is presented by Goodin (1992:62) concerning a conceptual clash between the term ‘sustainable development’ and the ‘discount rate’ (‘discount rate’ being prevalent in economic theories). The latter equates the present value of a resource with its value at a future date. For example, milling an entire beech forest might be calculated as economically sound if in ten years time an estate of houses is built with the timber yielding an income. The discount rate is premised upon there being substitutes or replacements; since using a resource now only makes sense if in the future substitutes are available, and this clearly cannot apply if a resource has been exhausted. In this regard, Goodin (1992:72) states that ‘it is only the irreplaceable whose future is potentially immune to the solvent of compound interest calculations (discount rate)’. Goodin (1992:72) adds that what is needed is a theory of irreplaceability, ‘to resist the economists’ strongest arguments for discounting the future’, and further, that this ‘is precisely what the Green theory of value...has provided’. The crux of the matter is that since no resource, including biological populations, continues growing at exponential rates indefinitely into the future, neither can our discounting of such resources, since it is impossible to discount on extinction. Goodin then alights upon the economic term ‘maximum sustainable yield’ as being closest to the Green theory of value as applied to the Green meaning of sustainability.

Maximum ‘sustainable’ yield, according to Goodin (1992:73) amounts to harvesting a resource within its replaceable limits. The problem is that it ‘applies only to particular sorts of environmental assets’. While it might work with fish stocks, for example, it will not apply to a
beech forest, which once gone, is gone forever⁴. Therefore the strategy Goodin uses in meeting the economists on their own ground, will not satisfy the Green theory of value, but the example serves to highlight the conceptual conflict that must be fought out with prevailing frameworks regarding, in this case, resource use, in order to properly represent the interests of those who may favour preserving the irreplaceable. In this way, Green protests against beech forest milling and oil spills, cannot be viewed simply in terms of eco-centrism.

Beyond the particular examples discussed above can be found an ideological confrontation against short-term economic growth characteristic of Western societies at the centre of which is that the impact on resources and the environment are regarded only insofar as they are accessible to economic calculation. In this way, the Green theory of value referred to, challenges unhindered production and consumption with an approach that values the environment for its own sake, as an alternative vision of the ‘good life’ (McLaughlin, 1993:73). In a similar way, Baxter (1999) refers to the principle ‘moral considerability’ aimed at the protection of bio-diversity specifically to avoid the world’s sixth mass extinction, and also to leave the environment for the next generation of humans in at least the state it was for the present generation. Both these considerations are central to the Green ideological position.

Grassroots.

Rainbow (1993) states that Green politics has long been associated with representing the interests of groups in civil society, and that this involvement is aimed at increased participation in political decision-making. Explaining how to bring grassroots ideals into electoral politics, Capra and Spretnak (1984) first mention that development of a policy program involves extensive consultation with grassroots membership, rather than a few professional politicians. It is the observation of Capra and Spretnak (1984:144) that in invigorating and transforming the political culture in Germany, the Greens have changed not only what should be discussed, but also who should discuss it: women as well as men, ordinary citizens as well as entrenched party politicians. Illustrating the links between social movements and the Green Party and the positive effect noted above, Capra and Spretnak mention that while not all citizens in the heterogeneous

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⁴This refers not only to the genus of beech tree themselves (where Nothofagus solandri occur only in the Southern Hemisphere, for example) but also that the destruction of the habitat the forest creates for other animals threatens other species and risks their extinction, for example, the Great Spotted Kiwi, Falcon, Weka, and Kaka.
peace movement endorse the entire Green Party peace program, it is because of the Greens that the role of West Germany in NATO became politicized and placed on the agenda for discussion. This illustrates the function of the Green Party as a nodal point around which various peace groups centered their political aspirations.

However, since Capra and Spretnak were writing, Carter (1999) observes that die Grünen abandoned their decentralist and egalitarian principles once they were elected into the Bundestag in 1983, and measures to ensure grassroots control were dropped one-by-one. This, and other tendencies, have been noted by Burchell (2002) who speaks of the possibility that these developments within Green Parties in Sweden, Britain, Germany and France, marks the final institutionalization of ‘new’ politics into the party establishment. This tendency is particularly relevant in cases where Green parties enter into coalition agreements. The consequent power asymmetry may mean that Green ideology becomes assimilated by other parties, and the integrity of Green principles is at risk. Should this occur, it would mean that Green parties will have lost the ability to challenge the prevalent conceptual framework, and will remain trapped within the dominant ideology unable to mount a counter-hegemonic challenge. Burchell (2002) questions whether Green parties still represent an alternative ‘new politics’, encapsulating the anti-party sentiments of new social movements, or does Green Party development represent the incorporation of the Green challenge within the established party system of Western Europe?

The problem with working within the current structures is that, as Dobson (2000) has pointed out, there is the danger that the ‘state legislative machinery’ might well be destructive in that Green policy might be appropriated and ‘watered-down’. This issue is at the centre of the ‘realos / fundis’ debate that, while it originated in the German Greens it can be applied to all Green parties (Kelly, 1991; Eckersley, 1992; Markovits and Gorski, 1993). The issue concerns not only whether or not to contest national elections and enter Parliament, but also, once in Parliament, whether coalitions should be considered. If coalition partners accept some but not all Green demands, the result is a reduction in the efficacy of Green parties to introduce ‘new politics’ issues at all. The ‘fundis’, or fundamentalists, insist that the Greens should remain ‘pure’ and in perpetual opposition. The ‘realos’, or realists, insist that the possibility of making a genuine difference makes the risk of joining a coalition, and making the inevitable compromises, acceptable (Goodin, 1992).

The only other option is to remain outside the institutional structures, but even radical
outsiders are not free from the political processes. Unless a movement is intent upon the overthrow of the current institutions, any movement in civil society must relate, at some point, to the current institutions. In order to politicize issues not normally considered matters of politics, it is advantageous to groups in civil society to have a Green party acting on their behalf within the political institutions. This is reflected in party organisation around the term ‘rainbow-coalitions’, within which a wide range of movements are embraced (Müller-Rommel, 1989; Rüdig, 1985). In this way, these groups have a direct link into the system with which they must deal. Also, influencing policy with subtle but significant changes in the concepts used, may at times have a far greater impact than years of campaigning outside the institutions. Jamison (2001) also would go along with this since he can see no point in the piety of various forms of ‘radical outsider action’.

Burchell (2002:171) concludes that in spite of the fears generated by the Fundis, there is no evidence to suggest that the ‘Greens are losing their identity and falling into the mainstream’. Talshir (1998:176) observes that the development of Green political parties was controversial in that since they (political parties) were the building block of the existing order, the foundation of Green parties legitimised the very system (liberal democracy) the Green movement had set out to criticize. But the move was justified on the grounds that it seemed the only way to bring the protest movement to bear on the political system, and the parties did not exhaust the Green movement, but represented one weapon in the arsenal of the Green movement.

The attempts of Green politics to reconceptualise democracy involve attacking liberal grounds for the degree of separation between the rulers and the ruled. This challenge may be expressed in ideological terms as a conflict of competing conceptual frameworks along the borders between ‘the state’ and ‘society’ (Schedler, 1996:15). Challenging where the barrier between public and private lies amounts to altering the range of issues that count as matters of politics, and, it is argued, that to increase the range of issues emerging from civil society dealt with in the public sphere and impacting upon established state imperatives, amounts to extending the democratic consideration of these issues.

There is a range of possible options to be considered in this regard. Dobson (2000:124) observes that Green movements in most countries are attracted to Green parties and see the role of Green parties as influencing the legislative process. Therefore, Green parties are well placed
to act as a conduit for the demands of ‘new politics’ or a new political paradigm, as distinct from ‘old’ politics (Offe, 1985; Lipietz, 1995). As well as a central function to act as the voice of citizen’s movements, Green parties, according to Capra and Spretnak (1984), also relay privileged information from institutional legislative bodies to the grassroots movements. Financial support is also channelled through the Green Party in Germany to activists’ projects. As a consequence, the Green Party is said to operate with a foot in each camp of the legislative bodies and citizen’s movements.

Representing the politics of social movements around issues such as peace, feminism and ecology, from which the Green movement emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, is best devised, as McLaughlin (1993) has argued, as a two pronged strategy of political action. This arises from a combination of government regulation and community activism, where a Green party in Parliament is prepared to act on the political wishes of those in the community. This is very similar to Dryzek (1996a) who advocates a ‘duel strategy’ that combines institutional engagement, with activist strategies outside the state. This arrangement has been advocated by Petra Kelly (1991:194) where the ‘new political culture’ is one in which Green parties act as ‘...half party and half local action group...’. Closely allied to this is Jamison (2001) who advocates a program currently working in Denmark where civil servants, working with people in non-governmental organizations (NGOs), combine their efforts to bring both professionalism and ‘official’ connections to a wide range of projects (Jamison, 2001:172).

In this regard, we can see plainly the theoretical impact of regarding the Green Party in terms of the notion of ‘nodal point’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992), that is, as a ‘compound collective actor’ (Talshir, 1998) or the political voice of the various citizens’ movements in their democratic struggles (Kelly, 1991; Capra and Spretnak, 1984). This increases the political participation of these groups, and gives coherency to various social movements that in the past, according to some critics, has been lacking with a consequent diminution in the efficacy of social movements (Dobson, 2000).

**Green Spirit.**

The spiritual (or spiritualism, in the sense of a doctrine that holds that spirit has a real existence distinct from matter) aspect associated with Green politics plays a central role in the epistemological challenge Green politics offers current world-views. According to Rainbow
(1993:25), it is the spiritual aspect which distinguishes Green politics from other political approaches, but it is this association between spirit and politics that will be argued against in this section.

For the new age travellers of the ecological movement, the spiritual view is often linked to ecological sensibility. This includes a reverence for all living things on the planet and a desire that humans learn to live harmoniously and holistically with all living things. To this end, spirituality seeks to change the way people think about the natural world, and spirit is to act as a buffer against encroaching instrumentalist values (Skolimowski, 1976 in Radcliffe, 2000; Petra Kelly cited in Capra and Spretnak, 1984; Talshir, 2002:232,233). In this way, spirituality is intended to effect the re-enchantment of the world, displacing the dominant modern tendencies of growth mania, fragmentation, compartmentalisation and instrumental reason (Rainbow, 1993; Davidson, 1994). Against this scientistic epistemology, Green politics associates itself, through spirituality, with a belief system based on the non-measurable that transcends understanding. This epistemology is clearly one that rejects the empiricism of the modern world, and seeks to avoid classification within existing frameworks. This is similar to the Green claim to have an ideology that transcends the existing left/right spectrum discussed earlier, and the desire to claim a distinct political position pervades the Green approach.

However, as with claims regarding its ideology, Green political claims to an aspect of their epistemology based on an unmeasurable quantity is at once both confounding and powerful. It is powerful in its rejection of modern instrumental reason, which simultaneously raises the possibility that an alternative point of view is possible. It is confounding in the sense that a great weight of importance is attached to the term in Green politics, but the factors that make it a powerful critique of empiricism also weaken its political usefulness. This is because for some writers spirituality goes beyond living harmoniously with other living things and represents a remedy for all that is wrong with the world. For example Spretnak (1988 cited in Rainbow, 1993:25) has claimed that it is not possible to solve our political problems without first addressing our spiritual ones. This view requires that before political issues may be dealt with, there must first be a commitment to a nonrational belief system and, as is argued later, this requires the prior task of convincing the mass of the population of the existence of a spiritual realm.

However, the principle of holism, associated with spiritual concerns, has implications
for politics. Consistent with this principle, politics can be seen as part of life rather than separate from it, and this raises two issues (Rainbow, 1993:26). The first is that the claim has resonance with the ‘personal is political’ slogan raised by feminists in their attempt to assert new political issues onto the agenda. This is of benefit to democracy in that it pushes against the liberal demarcation between civil society and the political sphere. Another interpretation dismantles this demarcation altogether, and replaces representation, associated with core liberal theory, with participation. On this understanding, holism implies that there is no difference between the individual in society and their function in public decision-making. However, holism is often linked to spiritualism (while it can be argued that spiritualism implies holism, the obverse cannot be justified). Where it is linked beliefs based on holism encounter the problem of a prior commitment to ‘spirit’ as that part of an epistemological foundation based on faith and belief. This acts as a precondition before the political aspects are actionable. In principle, as a foundation for what can be known of the world, spirit has its historical precedents. However, since the Enlightenment in Western societies, knowledge systems rely on reason, instrumental and communicative; and Green politics based on spirit confronts this dominance, which it must overcome before spirit is capable of convincing the mass of the population of the veracity of the Green world-view.

Another difficulty with the spiritual aspect has been identified by McLaughlin (1993). In this regard, McLaughlin sees any talk of spirituality as dangerous because of its divisive potential within the Green movement, since it is likely to lead to sectarianism in that ‘true believers’ have a strong sense of the spiritual aspect, and anything less is to be regarded as ‘light’ and incapable of serving Green interests. Also, McLaughlin sees difficulties with the capability of the term in supporting the goal of social change.

As mentioned, it is argued that at the centre of the problem of spiritual reductionism is the requirement that there be a prior commitment to spirit before social and/or political change can be argued for. Talshir (2002:264) observes that the loss of meaning is the result of the dominance of capitalist ideology that produces instrumental relationships between individuals and competitive aggression, and that this results in alienation and a spiritual vacuum. In this statement we can see a ‘relation of equivalence’ (Fairclough, 2003) between spirit and meaning, where Talshir says the loss of one accompanies the loss of the other. Because of the criticism around the use of the word ‘spirit’ by various theorists, (for example, Goodin, 1992;
McLaughlin, 1993), it is argued here that it is possible to raise the issues dealt with under the concept ‘spirit’ without reference to the term itself, but at the same time retaining the critical attitude to the current order as justification for a Green alternative.

The inference above is that meaning and spirit are equivalent. While there are difficulties with the term spirit, reference to meaning enables the former to be sidestepped. This is plausible, since in Green literature the two, meaning and spirit, are often used interchangeably (Porritt and Winner, 1988, cited in Davidson, 1994; Talshir, 2002). In this way, the issues usually referred to under the term spiritual become part of the discursive field, and can be dealt with in argument and discussion, that is, they become accessible to reason. For Talshir (2002) spirit stands in opposition to instrumental relationships caused by the dominance of capitalist ideology. However, it is argued here that Green ideology challenges this dominance, and in particular that part which leads to the development of instrumental relationships, and therefore, would be a more efficacious political tool since spiritualism attacks the symptom rather than the cause. If the cause of the spiritual (meaning) vacuum is capitalist ideology, then it is this cause that must be challenged.

An insistence on the use of spirituality might at worst be regarded as an attempt to mystify and bewilder by reference to a transcendental realm of meanings which persist because they are inaccessible to reason and therefore immune to critique. Also, for this reason, it is argued that unless people are beholden to such a belief, the grounds of its argument disappear. At best the appeals to spiritualism might be seen as a conservative and nostalgic attempt at the re-appropriation of God associated with the pre-Enlightenment period when belief systems and faith dominated. Since Porritt (1989 cited in Davidson, 1994) asserts that spirituality is beyond political persuasion or ideology, it is difficult, then, to see how it might persuade in politics. It can be argued that since the goal of politics is to persuade the mass of the population of the plausibility of, in this case, a particular Green world-view, then a spiritual aspect runs the risk of lacking the necessary ‘hybridisation’ (Fairclough, 2000). It will therefore fail to appeal as a plausible political approach to social problems across ‘multiple audiences’.

Therefore it can be concluded that spiritualism is too esoteric with limited comprehensibility. For the spiritualist perspective to serve any political purpose, first the mass of the population must accept the ontological assumption that ‘spirit’ exists, then they must be convinced that the Green spiritual view has the answers to problem solving in practical politics,
and this represents twice the task. Also, the reversion to spiritualism is an anachronism in that history has demonstrated that since the Enlightenment the authority of religious orthodoxy in the justification of truth claims has been replaced with human reason, and as Green politics reflects the emancipation of modernity, it should, it is argued here, retain the modern means of its achievement.

The Good Life.

Beyond eco-centrism, Green ideology challenges the fundamental principle associated with liberalism, that the right should be valued over any conception of the good, in that Green ideology contains a telos or vision of the ‘good life’. Referring to Talshir (2002) a telos can be understood as the alternative to which Green ideology is oriented. For Laïdi (1998:7) liberal hegemony has created a world of uncertain identities that confound the possibility of any representation of a ‘future that has a final goal’, and that an overwhelming concern with ‘managing an ordinary present’ ensures the end of telos, and of ‘grand narratives’.

Into this ideological void and absence of meaning, purpose and final goal, emerges, for Talshir (2002:115), the co-existence of a visionary, uncompromising grand-ideology, and concrete policies that have characterised Green programmes since 1979. Talshir (2002:164) notes that the German Greens’ consolidation of their position within the party system marks a maturing of the party as it emerged from the ‘adolescent crisis’. Relevant here is the withdrawal from movement politics, anti-institutionalism and principle opposition positions, and that since 1999 the Greens have moulded a coherent social vision and political world-view embodied in the conceptual framework of modular ideology.

Rainbow (1993) also reports that change in the way we manage environmental problems is necessary since the technologies required for this task already exist, and all that is needed is legislation to make environmental-friendly technologies viable, in other words, a commitment to the Green vision for the future. This requires an appropriate legislative environment, that is, a reform of institutions at both the local and global level since no amount of popular mobilization can deliver the long-term fiscal and legislative framework within which sustainability might be achieved. For this reason Rainbow (1993) argues that sustainability is the goal to which all other ambitions must be subordinated.

What is the hope that these goals can be achieved? Jacoby (1999) points out that we
cannot know what the future holds and just as prediction of the student uprisings and other radical political events of 1968 eluded scholars (Markovits and Gorski, 1993), along with the fall of Soviet Russia in 1991, great epochal change may be just around the corner. Contrary to this in terms of Green fortunes, Talshir (2002:167) tells us that even an ecological disaster that mobilized the majority of the population against nuclear power stations, did not translate into a Parliamentary majority for the SPD/Green coalition, let alone a Green alternative, and they remain identified with anti-nuclear, peace and ecological policies.

While Green politics is opposed to aspects of modernity, this opposition does not amount to a complete rejection of the project of modernity, and, following Jürgen Habermas, it has the potential, as argued here, to effect human emancipation through the application of reason and deliberative forms of decision-making.

Summary.

This section has drawn, from the work of Talshir (1998,2002), a framework within which to examine Green politics in New Zealand with regard to prevailing liberal institutions and the hegemony of liberal and neo-liberal ideology. Where Talshir has described the three tasks that a new political actor must confront (critique of the existing the order, an alternative order, and a means for its achievement), three areas related to democracy may be examined. These areas are the fundamental ideological challenge that Green politics presents to the current order. Secondly, the alternatives to existing liberal institutions, and finally the function of Green parties as a ‘compound collective actor’ (Talshir, 2002).

It has been argued that the first issue considered (ideological challenge) is of value to democracy since it stimulates political debate, revives politics at an ideological level and, thereby, resists the anti-political tendencies of modernity and ensures a robust democracy (Bell, 1962; Dahrendorf, 1990; Torgerson, 2000).

Following Talshir, the second issue considered follows from the first in that arguments for alternative institutions are justified on the grounds of an ideological critique of current institutions. This issue is focussed on alternatives offered by Green parties in New Zealand to existing liberal institutions, and therefore, addresses itself to the implications of Green
participatory and decentralist tendencies for current representative institutions (Rainbow, 1991).

Finally, the third aspect of democracy considered focusses on the function of Green parties in New Zealand as a ‘compound collective actor’ (Talshir, 2002). This function is focussed on a particular aspect of liberal democracy, that is, the barrier between the political sphere and civil society. It has been argued that this aspect of liberal democracy is at the centre of its de-politicising character. The examination of Green parties in New Zealand will focus on the extent to which their activity as a compound collective actor is able to authentically represent the interests of various social groupings in New Zealand and, in this way, permeate the liberal barrier for issues usually regarded as outside political consideration (Dryzek, 1996 a; Hindess, 1996). This issue is related to the importance attached to grassroots politics for Green parties. The section has discussed the relationship between Green parties and political movements in civil society and how this relationship informs the Green construction of alternative institutions.

In this regard, this section has argued for the importance of ideology in articulating a critique which forms the grounds for an alternative order, and the reform, or restructuring, of current liberal institutions. For this reason, the spiritualist aspect has been rejected as ineffective grounds on which to achieve mass appeal of the Green world-view since it requires a prior commitment to the existence of something called ‘spirit’.

This section has argued that central to Green politics is the term ‘sustainability’, to which a particular meaning is attached, and that this meaning is derived from Green ideology. This example is of fundamental importance in reviving politics since competing meanings attached to the same term struggle for dominance, and this provides a site where the Green counter-hegemonic challenge to the prevalent organising principle can be observed.

The discussion on decentralisation and participation has pointed out that for some theorists decentralisation should have been enshrined as the fifth Green principle, while other theorists claim that a trend is evident where Green parties have suspended the decentralist aspect in favour of gaining political power within existing political structures. It has been argued in this section that, for Green political parties, decentralisation can be regarded as a metaphor aimed against the concentration of power and in favour of the distribution of political power across the ideological spectrum, rather than the pursuit of policy aimed at achieving an anarchist federation of autonomous bio-regions. The result of this discussion has been to describe a range of possible Green responses to current liberal institutions from complete restructuring to degrees of reform.
This section has argued that while it is possible for a Green party to represent fundamental Green views, challenging liberal and neo-liberal ideology, these Green parties do not aim at the complete dismantling of liberal institutions. However, since the literature has described decentralisation of political authority and Green politics as synonymous, the issue is regarded from this assumption when the case studies of Green parties in New Zealand are considered. This will provide an answer to Rainbow (1991) where he asks: what consequences will the direct democratic impulse in Green politics have for existing representative institutions?
Part 4  
Chapter 7  
The New Zealand Values Party.

In this chapter, the New Zealand Values Party will be examined in terms of the three issues set out in Chapter 6.1. Values Party material will be examined using critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992, 2001, 2003). The application of this method will aim at revealing the process of dis-articulation and articulation, and, in this way, the struggle over meaning can be examined. The significance of this struggle is argued for by Fairclough where, in his view, discourse as a form of ‘social practice and a mode of action’ does not simply reflect social entities, relations and systems of knowledge, but constructs them (Fairclough, 1992:12).

Within this process, relations of power and ideology are revealed in discourse which, for Fairclough (1992), is shaped by the former. There are two main reasons for this which are relevant to the present study. The first is that it is the recognition of various ideological positions which raises the possibility of the critique of truth claims (Fairclough, 2003:55), and secondly, that the achievement of hegemony relies on the general acceptance of particular truth claims as common-sense. This is achieved where the ideological grounds for these claims are no longer identifiable as ideological and consequently, a particular world-view shapes the ‘nature and content of the common-ground’ (Fairclough, 2001:27).

In this way, discourse is both the site and stake in social change or the maintenance of the existing order. The contest over the meaning construction of particular terms or words indicates the site of political struggles, the stake is an attempt to change the dominant discourse, or to resist those attempts and re-stabilize the current order. Any challenge is aimed against an already existing order of discourse and change is, according to Fairclough, a dialectical process in that the emerging text ‘absorbs and is built out of texts from the past’(Fairclough, 1992:102). Overall the process is one of undecidability where the point at which all alternatives are exhausted is never reached, therefore ‘existing language practices reflect the victories and defeats of past struggles’,
and constitutes the current order of discourse (Fairclough, 1992:124; 2001:73). Orders of discourse are always unstable and open to attack from competing ideological positions in a perpetual process where a text responds to, re-accentuates and reworks past texts, contributing to history and the wider process of change, as well as anticipating and contributing to subsequent texts (Fairclough, 1992:102-103). For these reasons, the focus will be on ideology and struggle. This Chapter, which deals with the Values Party and the following, Chapter 8 which deals with the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand, will be divided into three sections each dealing with a particular aspect related to democracy. Following the theoretical framework suggested by Talshir (2002), Values material will be examined with regard to the critique it brings to the ‘existing order and dominant ethos’, as well as the way in which it articulates both critique and vision conforming to the ideology of The New Zealand Values Party.

The first of the three issues involves a more general examination of how the Green parties in New Zealand under consideration, are positioned in an already existing socio/political order. This involves a critique of the current order, as well as the articulation of an alternative, and a means by which the latter may be achieved. This relates to the view that such a critique stimulates political debate at a fundamental ideological level, and this process in itself defends against the anti-politics associated with modernity and ensures a robust democracy (Dahrendorf, 1990; Torgerson, 2000).

The second consideration will focus on alternatives to the current political institutions. The policy proposals offered by Green parties in New Zealand will be compared with the claims of Green theorists set out in section 6.1, and discussed in relation to the foregoing theory on liberal democracy in Chapter 2. This consideration addresses, in particular, the impact of the direct democratic impulse associated with Green politics on existing representative institutions (Rainbow, 1991).

The third section is an examination of the extent to which the Green parties in New Zealand function as a nodal point around which various groups in society coalesce in their democratic struggles (Laclau and Mouffe 1992:182). Talshir (1998, 2002) has used the term ‘compound collective actor’ to describe this function of Green political parties, where a plurality of actors are endorsed, encouraging ideological activity among the various independent currents. Green parties in New Zealand will be examined to the extent that this function provides authentic representation for the groups involved (Dryzek, 1996 a). This, as has been discussed, leads Talshir to a conception of Green
ideology as ‘modular’ as opposed to ‘totalizing’.

These issues may be summarised as:
I. Ideology and the ideological challenge to the current order.
II. Alternative to the current liberal representative political institutions.
III. The function of Green parties as compound collective actors.
7.1

Ideological debates, 1979, new political culture, ideological challenge, crisis in New Zealand, sustainability and consultation.

Jacoby (1999) has argued for the revival of politics as a corrective for the current absence of the democratic critique of the democratic culture. By democratic culture, Jacoby points to societies in which the ideological claim of equality by liberal democracy has a pervasive hold. This system of governance has been criticised throughout this research as being fraught with inequality, and that liberal democracy can be seen as offering the façade of public participation in politics, while ignoring structural inequalities which result in differential influence in policy decisions. Wood (1995) succinctly phrases this as the equalising of the unequal. In addition, the ostensible liberal commitment to relativism and tolerance suppresses critique of its own ideological position. This relativism is derived from the core liberal principle which emphasises the rights of individuals, and holds that every position is of equal weight. On these grounds, there is little justification for judgement between positions or goals pursued by individuals. The consequence of this is that liberalism, which dominates the common ground, effectively suppresses criticism of the existing order, where criticism might otherwise provide the grounds for an alternative.

Under these circumstances, an ideology capable of exposing liberalism as an ideological position among others, is the key to an alternative social order. It will be argued here that Green politics, as Lipietz (1995) argues, represents the most direct confrontation between the competing discourses of ‘environment’ and ‘development’, and in this way, provides an ideology capable of reigniting fundamental questions about Western capitalist societies.

This feature of Values politics has been observed by Stephen Rainbow, where he asserts that the Values Party raised new issues and extended the ‘boundaries of political debate’(1989:185). Similarly, Oliver (1978:6) claims that the value of Values is as a ‘forcing house for ideas’, and that it ‘alone of the present New Zealand parties... has begun to look at real problems’. Finally, Tony Kunowski, critical of Values after he lost the leadership in 1979, has conceded ‘that Values ideas seeped into the minds of New Zealanders in the Lang period, and began to challenge the accepted orthodoxy of the day’ (1989:12).
Zealanders in the last decade and gave the country progressive Green policies...’ (Reported in the NZ Herald, 29/07/89).

A plurality of ideological currents is evident in Values literature, but paradoxically, what developed in the period before 1978 was a tendency toward totalizing ideologies. For example, a strong element in the party argued for a monist socialism, and there also emerged a debate around what exactly the Values Party was; movement, political party or both. It has been argued that the former led to the controversy which finally broke the Values Party. Certainly Stephen Rainbow (1989:179) and Hope and Jesson (1993:11) regard the tension between red and Green ideological factions as the source of the Values Party undoing.

In spite of this, and the lack of electoral success, the Values Party was able to mount ideological opposition to the current order and politicize issues usually regarded as outside the horizon of politics. In this way, the challenge presented by Values Party ideology is regarded as bolstering democracy in that, as Douglas Torgerson argues with reference to the work of Hannah Arendt ‘...political action for its own sake at least defends against modernity’s anti-political tendencies. Doing so enhances prospects for active democratic life while weighing against authoritarian or totalitarian prospects’ (Torgerson, 2000:12).

It is argued that the development of a sharp critique of the existing liberal order by the Values Party, necessary to effectively mobilize the revival of politics, was dependent on two factors. The first was the nature of the Values Party’s relationship with movement politics and groups in civil society. The second was the failure of the Values Party to enter Parliament. While the latter may be regarded as a failure for a political party, it is argued that this fact aided the development of a clear ideological position.

The New Zealand Values Party emerged from social movements and groups in civil society, and these were identified as the only legitimate source of change in society. This connection has been observed by various theorists, for example, Rainbow (1989:170) talks of networks of diverse groups ‘cemented together by the prospect of political influence’ being ‘pertinent to Values. Davidson (1992:64) observes that ‘Green parties trace their histories from many broad social movements’, and Hope and Jesson (1993:7) comment on a survey of 1976 which indicated that ‘Values Party members were typically involved with environmentalist organisations...anti-nuclear groups (and)...feminist organisations...’. With 25% of respondents having ‘participated in anti-
Vietnam war demonstrations’.

The social movement origin of the Values Party was clearly stated in 1977 by Dave Woodhams, Values Party national chairer, who commented that the Values Party first manifesto, *Blueprint for New Zealand*, (1972), formed the basis of the coalition of interests which is the Values Party today (*Vibes*, Dec. 1977, no. 16). Also, co-leader Alan Wilkinson explained that

‘In 1972 the Values flame was lit by spontaneous combustion. The Vietnam war protestors revolted against the New Zealand political debate still centred on the depression era conflicts of thirty years before. Peaceniks, feminists, environmentalists, and radical socialists coalesced into a critical mass...A new era of activist politics began, and the New Zealand political scene was permanently changed’ (*Linkletter*, Nov. 1981, no. 14).

The revival of politics depends on the development of a critical attitude to the current social order and this is characteristic of movement politics. Pivan and Cloward have argued that social movements thrive on conflict, while electoral politics is based on consensus and coalition. In this way, social movements widen cleavages among voter groups producing dissensus rather than consensus politics, and that ‘social movements are often the mobilizers of disaffection’ (1995:237). In this way, the post-war consensus, questioned in the late 1960s as well as the time of the Values Party emergence in 1972, was disrupted by a challenge to the fundamental values upon which the existing order rested.

It can be argued that antagonism is necessary if a counter-hegemonic challenge is to be mounted since ‘if hegemony involves antagonism and is a form of politics, it follows that politics is inextricably linked to social antagonism...’ (Torfing, 1999:121). This legacy (movement origins) manifests as a sharp critique of the current order on the part of the Values Party, and the politics of social conflict and change. This critique was all the sharper since it developed unfettered by the demands of Parliamentary machinations and pressure for consensus and coalition. Recalling the Gramscian conception that hegemony first requires a ‘war of position’, it can be argued that the Values Party, by advocating a revolution to effect social and political change, was advocating a counter-hegemonic challenge to the current order, and this implies the fundamental critique of the latter.
Generally, Values focussed on social and political change, and frequent use was made of the word ‘revolution’. In one sense of ‘revolution’ McDavitt, writing in 1975, defined it as ‘wide-ranging change in conventional mythologies’ (Turning Point, May/June, 1975:14, vol. 1; no.6). In this way, McDavitt is using mythology in a negative sense to mean, from the Greek mythos, ‘a fable or tale contrasted with logos and historia to give the sense of what could really not exist’ (Williams, 1983:210-211). The implication being that the conventional way of thinking was not plausible and had to be changed. The meaning of the word revolution can be removed from its association with the already accomplished and violent overthrow of an existing order, to a meaning which captures the sense of a dialectical process in play, and in this sense, linked to a counter-hegemonic process.

This meaning of revolution is brought to our attention by Williams (1983) and is used for the purposes of this research to mean struggle or ideological contestation (Williams, 1983:270). This brings revolution and democratic politics closer together in equating politics and dissensus as necessary for a robust democracy (Dahrendorf, 1990; Torgerson, 2000). It is in this way that both the Values Party and the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand may be described as revolutionary. In addition, the Values Party, as will be demonstrated, became increasingly aware that rather than reflecting an impulse for change from civil society, it had to ‘initiate’ change, and this involved convincing the mass of the population of the veracity of Values ideology.

The circumstances into which the Values Party emerged were characterised by demands for political participation, demonstrated by the rise of social movements in the late ‘60s and early ‘70s, and this brought to a halt the view that the end of ideology had been reached (Jacoby, 1999). The 1980s, which were characterised by the reassertion of liberal and neo-liberal ideology, heralded a revival of Bell’s (1962) ‘end of ideology’ thesis and the return of broad a consensus (Jacoby, 1999). This change is evidence that the earlier democratic impulse had run out of momentum. However, throughout the 1970s and 1980s the democratic impulse was carried on by the Values Party. Over this period the Party realised that increasingly the burden of carrying on the struggle for the democratic reforms they stood for fell to the Party; rather than the Party acting as institutional advocates for movements in civil society, as had earlier been the belief. It is argued that in addition to playing a part in the revival of politics and disrupting post-war consensus, the Values Party also developed key terms, slogans, and principles which
have had a lasting influence on the future of Green politics both in New Zealand and overseas.

The Values Party was formed in May, 1972 primarily around the manifesto *Blueprint for New Zealand* written by Tony Brunt, the party founder. Values contested the general election in 1972 achieving 2.7% of the national vote. The manifesto *Beyond Tomorrow* spearheaded the Values campaign for the 1975 general election in which they gained their best ever result of 5.2% of the national vote. In its argument for electoral reform, the 1978 manifesto points out that had proportional representation been the voting system in 1975, Values would have won 4-5 seats in Parliament. Things changed dramatically for the party in the 1978 general election and the result of 2.8% of the national vote has been described by Stephen Rainbow (1989) as a ‘shattering blow’ for the party, and significant for changes within the party as will be shortly outlined. Hope and Jesson, (1993), regard 1981 as effectively the end for the Values Party and subsequent electoral results seem to confirm this. The 1981 general election gained Values a mere 0.2% of the national vote with a similar result in the 1984 snap election. In the last general election contested by Values in 1987 less than 1% was gained.

Putting aside the dismal reading the electoral results make, the focus of this study is on how, in spite of never setting foot inside Parliament, the Values Party was to affect political debate in New Zealand in a number of areas shortly to be described. A brief example is drawn from the work of Rainbow (1989:184) where he comments that the establishment of the Commission for the Environment by the Labour government in 1972 was intended to create the appearance that the ‘political establishment’ was capable of addressing environmental concerns which the Values Party represented. In this way, the Values Party were articulating concerns which had the potential to attract support, and the Labour Party sought to neutralise the appeal of Values on those grounds. This led to both the establishment of the Commission for the Environment, and environmental concerns gaining official recognition on the political agenda. Although this ‘worked against the Values Party’ (Rainbow, 1989:184) it worked to further Values political demands by drawing attention to environmental issues. There is room to suspect, as Rainbow suggests above, that Labour appropriated the issue merely out of concern that Values was threatening its electoral support, rather than out of a genuine desire to respond to growing concerns around environmental issues. However, the environment
appeared on the political agenda, adding to earlier attempts, for example, the Save the Manapouri Campaign of 1969 (Rainbow, 1989).

Ideology and Green politics have an uneasy existence. Many commentators doubt the existence of a coherent Green ideology. For this reason a Green ideology cannot be assumed and must be argued for. Examination of Green literature from the political parties will reveal both an ideology and indicate how that ideology confronts an already constituted world. More recently, Guy Salmon, the director of the Maruia Society, commented in the Listener of Sept, 10th 1990 with reference to the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand that he was ‘bothered by the lack of a Green blueprint’, and that, ‘They don’t give me the impression of holding an intellectually coherent philosophy...’ Comments of this sort were applied earlier to the Values Party where Davidson, citing Rainbow (1989), agrees that the ‘lack of an all embracing policy’ meant that Values candidates ‘came up with answers which reflected more the application of self-evident truths than the application of doctrine’ (Davidson, 1992:62).

This may be in part due to what Hope and Jesson (1993) describe as the uncritical assimilation of the ‘limits to growth’ thesis. This informed the publication Blueprint for Survival (1972), and was borrowed heavily from by Tony Brunt for inclusion in Blueprint for New Zealand, the 1972 Values Party manifesto. The uncritical assimilation of the thesis is one thing, and this was revisited by Values Party members later. However, rather than betraying the lack of a doctrine, it could be argued that assertions as if they were ‘self-evident truths’ indicates the presence of one, where the latter serve a rhetorical function aimed at ideological closure and this aim is the essence of a counter-hegemonic project (Torfing, 1999:109).

On the basis of the material drawn from Blueprint for Survival (1972), an essential part of Values Party ideology can be described as ecology (Vincent, 1993:6). If by doctrine Rainbow (1989) and Davidson (1992) mean ‘a principle of belief’, then this applies to ecology, in that Values principles of belief are presented ideologically in that the ‘predicates presuppose values’ (van Dijk, 1998:102-107). The Values Party proclaimed itself as a ‘post-industrial’ political party which rejected, in accordance with the ‘limits to growth’ thesis, the emphasis on continuing industrial growth, evident in regimes of both the left and the right (Vibes, Oct., 1977). Though the range of ‘ecologies’ means that within Values Party literature, ecology ranges from a deep-Green, holistic/Arcadian view to shallow, imperialism, where the possibility of planning change
dominates\(^1\). Evidence for this appears in the Values manifesto of 1978 where forests are referred to, on the one hand, in terms of having a spiritual value that should be prevalent over economic concerns. On the same page however, the Values Party advocate the logging of native forests in the economic interests of Westland until their industry became suitably diversified. This thereby gives expression to the imperialism/management approach to the environment (1978:27). The coincidence of these variations of approach to the environment are regarded as a common occurrence by Wissenburg (1997).

A doctrine is certainly present in Values literature from the very outset, but as Talshir (2002) argues, a common error is made in trying to deduce political views from ecological principles on the assumption that Green ideology is environmental ideology. The problem of this reductive approach is that, as Talshir (2002) has argued, ecologism does not exhaust the Green political project and can better be regarded as the paradigm case for a more general critique of modernity; in which the Values Party offers a critical analysis of contemporary society. The various sites of this critique present points of conflict over the meaning of salient concepts, for example, individualism, the ecology, sustainability, production and consumption.

It can be argued, following the modular conception of ideology offered by Talshir (2002), that from the outset in 1972, there is evidence of an ideological position in the Values Party, and that retrospectively, this can be regarded as Green ideology. However, rather than overlay Talshir’s theory of Green ideology over events and developments in the Values Party, an examination of the struggle for identity within the Values Party will indicate that although Talshir’s theory seems to hold, the perception from within the Values Party was one of uncertainty.

When Values opposition to the term ‘ideology’ arises, it can be inferred from Values Party material to be based on the connection between ideology, derived from narrow sectional interests, and political power. It is argued that ideology defined as ‘abstract systems, and sets of logically consistent ideals, governing our conduct, and pronouncing truth about society’ (Ash, 1987 cited in Vincent, 1993 a:215), would not attract opposition from Values Party members. But it can be observed from Values Party material there is less inclination to deal in ideology conceived in close relation to political

\(^1\)Based on Worster’s distinction between, at one extreme, the eco-centric/arcadian approach to ecology, and at the other extreme, the anthropocentric/imperialist ‘control of nature’ approach (Wall, 1994:104).
power and narrow sectional interests, where ideology is seen as ‘more lethal than any physical danger the world holds, because [its] logic would enslave us’ (Ash, 1987 cited in Vincent, 1993 a :215). An approach to ideology that could be argued to be closer to Values is expressed by Laclau and Mouffe (1992) that is, the refusal to dominate intellectually or politically, or to present an ultimate foundation of the social. This is evident in *Linkletter* (Dec. 1983, no.34) where Ken Cairns differentiated the Values Party from other political parties on the basis of the desire for political power which, while prevalent in other parties, was not the case in the Values Party. He did this by suggesting that in other parties politicians tended to camouflagge and rationalise their pursuit of power.

Therefore, the relationship ideology has to sectional interests, and the potential for this to be converted into political power, led Values commentators to turn away from both ideology and political power. This represents a paradoxical approach for a political party, but can be explained in that Values was more likely to associate itself with political power if that power was perceived as coming from civil society. This was made explicit by Janet Roborgh in *Linkletter* (1983, no.32) where she says ‘...an awakening to the effects of community power is occurring, and we must be there to foster it’. This expresses the ideal that the Values Party responded to, and articulated the interests of the wider community, rather than a narrow class interest, for example, and that this was central to Values political identity. Therefore, the task was to go beyond ideology understood as a totalizing system of thought, thus ‘avoiding a transcendent order which binds power, law and knowledge together’, and this, for Laclau and Mouffe (1992), is the radical plural society.

While Laclau and Mouffe (1992:188-189) argue that any attempt to establish a definitive suture leads to totalitarianism, radical plural democracy brings with it the ‘symmetrically opposite danger of a lack of all references to unity’, which will lead to the ‘implosion of the social’ in the ‘absence of a common point of reference.’ This is relevant for the Values Party whose cautious approach to ideology runs the risk of representing too loose a confederation of interests. The risk exists in that the democratic projects of the Values Party might easily be usurped by oppositional ideologies. In this regard, Laclau and Mouffe (1992:188-189) declare that no hegemonic project can be based solely on a democratic logic but must also ‘consist of a set of proposals for the positive organization of the social.’ This is especially relevant in a democratic society.
dominated by liberal de-ontology. The view of Laclau and Mouffe (1992) implies the
dominance of an ideological position, but one broad enough to be characterised with a
strategy for the construction of a new order. In this way, democratization for its own sake
would be insufficient to bring about the type of society envisaged by the Values Party.
Therefore, pure proceduralism based on communicative action (Habermas, 1984) would
work internally in the formation of a nodal point of various interests, but externally in
competition with other ideologies, instrumental reasoning would be necessary to ensure
the construction of a new order (Gutmann and Thompson, 2002).

The problem is that it seems from the confusion within the ranks of the fledgling
green party evident in Values Party material, that the principle of core and sub-ideologies
(central to modular ideology, Talshir, 2002) rather than being a defining characteristic,
was a source of tension and indecision and this is best indicated when a selection of
quotations is briefly considered. This begins where the Values Party claimed to be ‘...a
fresh look precisely because it’s not yet ideological’; then struggled to respond to a
perception regarding the party as socialist, ‘because we have so far refused to face them
we are now in the stupid position of being called “socialist” by everybody except
ourselves’ (Turning Point, Nov/Dec.1975:16,17, vol.1, no. 9), and finally in 1978
Heather Watkins described Values economic policy as ‘undeniably socialist’ (Vibes, Dec.
1978:11, no. 26). Terry McDavitt, in 1975 argued for a ‘coherent political philosophy
that could be related to Values and respond to the socialist/capitalist continuum in some
meaningful way’. The article, entitled ‘Beyond Socialism’, claimed that Values Party
philosophy transcended socialism since ‘it aims not at the socialist society but at a better
society, [by accepting the] humanizing aspects of the socialist legacy, Values is placed
on the left of the socialist/capitalist continuum; rejecting the de-humanizing aspects of
mechanism, Values is placed on the radical side of the radical-mechanist continuum’.
Concluding that ‘Values is, if you like, idealistic (I prefer the word radical); it isn’t

Also clear that Values was not socialist was John Perkins, a member from
Alexandra, who argued for a rethinking of political ideologies and ultimately the
replacement by Values of the ‘old right and the old left’. In his opinion, there was ‘no
real fundamental difference’ between National and Labour, which he described as
‘essentially conservative political parties’. This argument grappled with issues such as
individualism by upholding the tension between ‘human impulses’ and ‘the good of all’,
that is, ‘with policy suited to today’s new and critical situation’. Referring to the Values Party in this context, Perkins claimed that ‘no other political party anywhere on earth has attempted to re-frame the inter-linked political and economic structures which are showing increasing signs of failure.’ This argument declared the irrelevancies of a left and right political distinction in New Zealand and aimed at reassessing what issues should occupy the political agenda (Turning Point 1976, vol. 2, no. 2).

A similar argument was made two years later in Vibes (July, 1978, no.21) where John Stewart, the Values National Fieldworker, commented that ‘...in an era of resource depletion and environmental spoilation, it is our view that unless there is radical change in values, in the structure of ownership and control of our social and economic institutions, and in the way in which we manage our social and economic resources, there is no way in which we can survive as a just, democratic, liberal and sustaining society’. However, distinct from Perkins in 1976, a change in values for Stewart implied a radical change in ownership of the means of production, and this, in turn for Stewart, implies socialism.

Later in 1978 an explicit claim for socialism was evident in an argument from Heather Watkins. Commenting in Vibes (Dec, 1978, no.26) in the wake of the address, ‘Drifting Leftward’, to a Values conference by Bruce Jesson and David Bedggood, Watkins declared that the title should be ‘shifting leftward’. This arose from her view that ‘despite this consistent strain of anti-capitalism throughout its policies, Values does not appear to accept that it is a socialist party. Members tend in fact to shy away from the word socialist and to deprecate ideological labels, and terms like left and right’.

The general Values view is summed up in the 1978:12 Manifesto calling for a way that is ‘neither capitalism nor communism: the way of the co-operative community economy. The Values Party way’. Heather Watkins claimed that the term was ‘just about meaningless’. But focussing on the term ‘co-operative community economy’ she asserted ‘one might just as well say “socialism”’. Watkins further argued that there is no point in turning back, ‘given the clear stand against capitalism. Even the most conservative members of the party accept the slogans that people must come before profit and co-operation before exploitation. These are purely socialist ideals’. Watkins anticipated objections to her assertion that Values was socialist on the grounds that some will say that Values is an ‘original movement, ecological, experimental, exciting, untainted by ideology’ (Vibes, Dec. 1978:11, no. 26).
Arguments of this sort led to an out-right claim that the Values Party was in fact socialist. In *Vibes* (April, 1979:4, no. 28) John Stewart proclaimed that the primary aim of Values was to ‘work towards the formation of a broad-based socialist political party’. This was a significant point in the history of the Values Party and culminated in a change of leadership in 1979 where Margaret Crozier defeated Tony Kunowski by 11 votes, and so became the first woman to lead a political party in New Zealand (Rainbow, 1989:182). Some commented that it represented a victory of the life-stylers of the north over the socialists of the south.

Such tensions in Green parties are usually referred to in the literature as the red/green debate, or socialists versus ecologists factions, and indeed Crozier’s political origins were from the ‘environmental and women’s movements’. Following her ascendancy to the leadership of the Values Party, Crozier called for unity, recalling her initial impression of the Values Party ‘as an organisation that drew together people working in a number of different fields and gave them a viewpoint that could relate all these issues together’. She also considered that ‘Values was ahead of the various “Green” movements in Europe, in that it was stressing not only the need for survival, but asking the questions, how and in whose interests. This was...a position of the Left’ (*Vibes*, July, 1979, no. 30).

Crozier’s victory may have settled the red/green issue, Kunowski and Stewart, the central socialist thinkers in Values, having left the party after the leadership vote of 1979, but questions of identity persisted- not excluding mention of socialism. In this way, contrary to the view of Rainbow (1989) and Hope and Jesson (1993), it can be concluded that the red/green tension cannot be regarded as the factor which broke the Values Party. Rather, it is possible that the Party’s failure at the polls (exemplified by the ‘shattering blow’ of the 1978 result) had more to do with its demise. The red/green debate survived along with the Party beyond the changes of 1979, and vestiges of the ‘community co-operative’ remained until 2002 as policy in Green politics in New Zealand within the successor to the Values Party.

The debate over ideology continued after 1979 when John Horrocks reported that Ron Mitchinson (chairing a meeting at which Bruce Jesson, editor of *The Republican* and David Bedggood, a lecturer in sociology at Auckland University spoke) ‘found it interesting that people from the floor were actually asking outside speakers to define where Values stood. This seemed, he remarked, to be one of the problems of Values, to
define where it stands in terms of left, right or whatever’. Jesson and Bedggood, however, were advocating a ‘United Front in which the Left may work with other groups but retains its own independent platform’, with Bedggood concluding that ‘things can’t just be reduced to class’ (Vibes, May 1980:9, no. 34). The general configuration of the Values Party as a nodal point for the democratic struggles of other groups became the prevalent theme. However, it cannot be regarded as equivalent to the ‘realo /fundis’ debate of classic Green theory (Kelly, 1991; Eckersley, 1992; Markovits and Gorski, 1993). This is because, when the relationship between the party and social movements was contended, the idea that the Values Party should cease to function as a political party was only briefly considered in May 1979, otherwise Values as a political party was integral to the configuration.

The function of the Values Party as a point of focus for a number of groups, including socialists, had been considered as an option two years earlier when, in a 1978 issue of Vibes (no. 26) the Co-ordinating Committee of the Values Party initiated a ‘party directions and priorities discussion’. Readers of the magazine were invited to reply to some guidelines for discussion including the question,

‘What is Values? It’s tried to be all of these: (1) a social movement-seeking to bring about individual and social change through action and example in the community (setting up co-operatives, alternative lifestyles, support groups, networks etc.; (2) a political action movement-operating as an extended pressure group, promoting policies, taking a stand on political issues, lobbying local and national government, organising people on community issues; (3) a political party--standing candidates and aiming to win seats in national elections with the aim of becoming the majority party in Parliament, and using election platforms as a means of gaining publicity for our policies’.

An answer to this problem was argued for a year earlier by Dave Woodhams in Vibes (October, 1977, no. 14). Where the Values Party was to take on the duel role of political party, dedicated to persuading people to support Values policy, while at the same time acting as a pressure group, applying pressure to governments, forcing the changes Values desired. However, Woodhams stressed that ‘it is not...the Values Party itself which will cause change...changes are brought about by pressure from within society,...’(Vibes, 1977:8, no. 14). Here an apparent contradiction arises where, on the
one hand, Values would not cause change but, on the other, should work towards persuasion. The tasks seem incompatible. However, Woodhams stressed that the consensus within Values that changes should originate through ‘pressures within society’, as in 1972 when ‘Blueprint for New Zealand’ was a political focus for the wide-ranging concerns of a generation that gained its political awareness during the turbulent years of the 1960s ...’. Woodhams concluded that Values should continue to articulate pressure for change from society and thus avoid narrow sectional interests in favour of a broader range of interests.

This was a consistent theme, and D. Welch in Vibes (Nov., 1977, no.15) observed that a perceived political apathy is ‘symptomatic of a profounder feeling that the real changes in our society are taking place somewhere other than the House of Representatives,’ and he observed that this will always be true. The logical implication here, if we hold to the state /civil dichotomy, is that civil society is the site of ‘real changes’. But in fact Welch was saying that while civil society has the answers to political questions, Parliament should be embraced since this, he argued, is one way to seek ‘change by democratic means’. Janet Roborgh made a similar argument six years later, in 1983, where she said that Values ‘must be there to back up the mood of change that is beginning to sweep the country, a mood for change.’ and that the ‘role of the politician is to inform, to involve and thus empower, those whom he/she represents’ (Linkletter, 1983, no.32). This then reiterated the role of Values proclaimed by Tony Brunt in Blueprint for New Zealand (1972:2) where the Values Party was regarded as ‘one product’ of a more generalised ‘set of values emerging in society’ to which ‘it seeks to give political expression’.

Exactly how Values was to ‘back up the mood of change’ was made clear where Deputy leader, Richard Thomson, at a conference reported in Vibes (May 1980, no.34), argued that ‘the most crucial political objective of the 1980s is to convince that myriad of single-issue pressure groups that their issues are also those of others. There is no such thing as a single issue. Until there is unity among ‘single-issue’ pressure groups there will be no credible alternative to the present system’. Thomson continued that:

‘...the efforts of those who believe in a democratic, ecologically sound and socially just society must go firmly and definitely into moulding those various elements into an unholy alliance which just might create the groundswell of public knowledge which leads to the groundswell of
public support which just might one day create a political movement that will return economic and political power to people, ...towards genuine participatory people’s government’ (*Vibes*, May, 1980:1, no. 34).

There are two important developments to be drawn from Thomson’s comments. The first is that, whereas in the early 1970s, it was thought that the impulse for change was emerging from civil society, it now seemed that this impulse by itself was insufficient to trigger substantive change. In order to achieve this it was increasingly realised that the Values Party would have to provide a focal point for disparate interests in society. In this regard, it was reasoned that this might create a political movement for change, rather than the party responding to, and giving voice to, one already in existence (as had earlier been the assumption). The second is a commitment to working closely with groups in society thus re-affirming a defining aspect of the Values Party since 1972.

Janet Roborgh in *Linkletter* (Nov., 1982, no. 23) agreed that the ‘challenge for Values in the eighties...is...to become the electoral “umbrella” for the pressure groups’. In this way, Roborgh considers it a false dichotomy to draw a distinction between political parties seeking electoral success and pressure groups. ‘It never has been an EITHER/ OR situation and true political change will occur only if this “umbrella” is achieved’. On the relationship between Values and pressure groups, Roborgh declared that ‘we do not need to be persuaded to support the pressure groups, we gave birth to them and our members sustain them to a large part’. Also in 1983, the peace spokesperson argued in *Linkletter* (no. 29) that the Values Party should act as the ‘political wing of the peace movement’, ‘...possibly a strong Values Party supported by the members of the peace organisations and the environmental groups may just be able to do something before it is too late’.

In 1984, although another leadership change had occurred, a consistent theme was developing concerning the relationship between the Values Party and groups in civil society. This is apparent in *Linkletter* (April, 1984, no. 37) where Graeme Channells advocated that Values act as part of a social movement by simultaneously standing candidates in both national and local body elections to provide a ‘wider opportunity to make contact with the public which also has the side-effect of opening up access to official information’. This was in addition to functioning as a ‘social pressure group through a variety of community action groups demanding of the system that it take into account the wishes and
aspirations of the people affected by whatever proposal is under discussion’ (Linkletter, 1984, no. 37).

This has been elaborated as the ‘new political culture’ in subsequent Green theory, in which Green parties act as half party and half local action group, active in both Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary action (Kelly, 1991:194).

This represents another turn in the development of the Values Party. While it functioned as an ‘umbrella’ for an ‘unholy alliance’ of interests emerging from society, the realisation that things had changed since the early 1970s became prevalent and this led to the conclusion, from within the Values Party, that it had to bear the burden of convincing the population of the plausibility of the Values vision, since the general consensus around these values of the early days could no longer be assumed.

The perception that there had been a shift in the situation regarding the social movement for change (of which Values was a part) is evident in this selection from Values Party material from 1980 through to 1982. Bruce Jesson and David Bedggood, speaking at a Values conference, held the opinion that the ‘morally-outraged protest movements of the late ‘60s and early ‘70s had evaporated’ (Vibes of May, 1980:9, no.34). ‘Unjustified optimism’, was the view of co-leader Alan Wilkinson in Vibes (1981, no. 14), of expectations that the protest movements of the ‘60s and ‘70s would sustain the radical changes Values advocated. Finally, Janet Roborgh in Linkletter (November, 1982, no.23) took up the view of Felix Donnelly where he wrote ‘I cannot help but look back to the late sixties and early seventies to all the promise that seemed to exist in the world...and compare it with the reality of today.’

This was not only a perception that the impulse for change from within civil society had fallen away, but also that the position of the Values Party as a contender of general elections was under threat. In this regard, Denis Welch (Vibes, November, 1977, no. 15) comments that the general public regarded Values as ‘very much a minority party’ and that in an unwillingness to support the three main parties, National, Labour and Social Credit, voters might prefer not to vote at all.

It can be concluded that either the earlier ‘new current’ in New Zealand had ceased or that the Values Party had misread the situation at the outset. This is expressed in an issue of Vibes (December, 1977, no.16), where Dave Woodhams commented on the pointlessness of policy formulation ‘based on the erroneous assumption that all we need to do is to put our ideals into policy statements and an overjoyed electorate will flock to
the cause’. Also pointless, in his opinion, was ‘providing detailed solutions to problems which 90 percent of the electorate do not even perceive as problems’. This view, of course, is very different from the belief that Values was reflecting a ‘new set of values emerging in society’ (Blueprint for New Zealand, 1972:2).

One year later the inevitable questions over detailed solutions in the form of policy were raised. Even ‘cornerstone’ policy that had been part of Values core ideology since its inception, was not immune to reassessment as to its continued relevance. One such policy was the co-operative community enterprise, and Keith Langton in Vibes (Dec.1978, no.26) suggested that for Values ‘to push for compulsory co-operative ownership of the means of production in this country which has such a high proportion of owner-producers and at the same time expect to become government is to invite political oblivion to engulf the Values Party’. It could be argued that the Values Party had entered a period of fundamental reassessment based on the perception of a changed social and political situation.

Far from the jubilation of a liberated population, the Values Party found itself confronted by a prevalent ideology, the principles of which were fundamentally opposed to its own in some respects. Terry McDavitt in Turning Point (May/June 1975:13, vol. 1, no. 6) argued that Values now confronts considerable resistance since ‘Values principles opt for choices absolutely opposed to established social and economic mythology’. The Values Party approach to politics was now characterised by arguing and convincing, rather than reflecting and giving ‘political expression to the new values’. This shift occurred even though it remained of fundamental importance to the Party to reject narrow, sectional ideology in favour of a coalition of societal interests.

Confirmation of the belief that the mass of the population had to be convinced of Values ideology was found in the results of a survey brought to the attention of the Values Party by Bevin Fitzsimons. This survey indicated that support for moderate economic growth was prevalent among those interviewed (Linkletter, December, 1980, vol.1, no.6). Since Values had been arguing since 1972 for zero economic growth, the support for moderate growth reveals the distance that had developed between Values policy and what they regarded as the general consensus. Further evidence that the Values Party perceived it was alone in its views on economic growth can be found in the manifesto Beyond Tomorrow (1975:15), where it is stated that, common to the major parties in New Zealand was that while they might ‘...disagree about what is the more
efficient means of producing goods and providing services...they all agree that material wealth is the object of the exercise’. Worse was to come with the ‘Think Big’ schemes introduced in the mid 1970s, predominately under a Muldoon National government. If ever there was an antithesis to Values ideology, then ‘Think Big’ was it. It moved in exactly the opposite direction to the Small is Beautiful (E.F. Schumacher, 1973) thinking that lay behind many Values policies. ‘Think Big’, however, sharpened the ideological distinction between the Values Party and the other major parties in New Zealand, thereby providing an ideological reference for those in the population opposed to ‘think big’; and simultaneously shaping Values Party ideology.

The Think Big projects came out of the energy surplus of the mid 1970s. Combined with oil price rises in 1974 and 1979, the local energy surplus became potentially valuable, and a number of options were considered to reap this value. Projects included the aluminium smelter at Aramoana, extension of the steel mill at Glenbrook, gas reticulation through the North Island and the Taranaki synthetic petrol plant. But Values opposition extended beyond considerations around production and consumption to those fundamental to democracy. For example, Dennis Small commented that the Think Big projects, when considered in the light of current world economic conditions, presented for the government a ‘problem of its own legitimation’. That is, that the National Party could not justify its right to power when failing to deliver on economic promises or when these promises just lacked credibility (Comment, Aug. 1982:8-9, no. 16).

Values literature expressed the view that the projects proceeded without due democratic process, and that they lacked the backing needed to make them successful. For example, in Linkletter (October, 1981, no.13) it was revealed that Cabinet had decided to go ahead with the Mobil synthetic fuel plant without hearing from its fast track tribunal. The Aramoana smelter deal was shortly to be signed, but in the first two days of October Alusuisse (the Swiss aluminium corporation) pulled out of the project. Also, Mobil refused to sign up to the synthetic petrol plant until after the election due to Labour’s threat to review the synpet project. The result of this crisis was the necessity to look toward the Values Party, and Keith Lockett states that ‘after the failure of Think Big...New Zealand will have to start again and follow the path the Values Party is now advocating...we will be thrown back on our own resources, forced to the small scale, local, co-operatively owned enterprises...’ (Linkletter, July 1982:2, no. 19).
The Values Party view was that it was up against the dominance of the ‘values of the capitalist system’, and that the ‘radical changes’ proposed by Values required the adoption of the ‘new values that [Values] claim should shape our lives’ (Neil Williams, Values Party Industrial Spokesperson in Vibes, March, 1978, no.17). The way to achieve the wide ranging change in conventional beliefs was, for McDavitt, through focussed political action, making media statements, setting up research groups, starting petitions, filing objections and submissions on proposals, and public demonstrations, marches, and pickets (*Turning Point* May/June 1975:16, vol. 1, no. 6). This plainly suggests that the Values Party were prepared to engage in an ideological struggle, thereby making a contribution to resisting the reassertion of the end of ideology. Therefore, the ‘war of position’ had yet to be won, and it was increasingly realised that the party would ‘not enact Values policies without fundamental and wide ranging change in conventional mythologies-i.e. without a revolution’, (*Turning Point* May/June 1975:14, vol. 1, no. 6).

It is here that revolution as a disruption of the existing consensus is explicit in Values material and it is clear that this revolution was aimed at convincing the mass of the population of the plausibility of Values ideology to displace that prevailing.

It was hoped that the original goals of the Values Party could be attained if the Party took up the task of ‘changing attitudes’, ‘raising the level of people’s awareness’ and ‘dramatising the problems that face us as a society’, in order to create the climate for ‘radical change’*(Dave Woodhams, Vibes October, 1977:8, no. 14)*. These tasks, it will be recalled, are those required of a new political actor orientated toward social change according to Talshir (2002).

Changing attitudes seemed less a straight forward task than had been envisaged in 1972 when far greater support from the mass of the population had been assumed. Bevin Fitzsimons lamented that ‘the speed of sound ...is about 1000 k/m an hour--yet it seems that the speed of new ideas into the majority mind of New Zealand people may be about eight years!’(*Linkletter*, December, 1980:3, vol.1, no.6). Similarly, in a 1983 issue of *Linkletter* (no. 32) Janet Roborgh was reported from her address to a conference that, there is a view that ‘New Zealand’s greatest problem is our inflexible attitude to change’. Focussing on the ability of the public to bring about change, she initially suggested that the withdrawal of the US from the war in Vietnam was the result of a ‘change of public thinking’, and that by informing, involving and appealing to the reason of the public, the ‘kind of society in which most people would like to live’ could be achieved. This
concludes the discussion on the realization on the part of the Values Party that it now had to actively engage the prevalent ideology and convince the mass of the population of the veracity of Values Party ideology in order to bring about social and political change.

This section has traced the development of the Values Party ideology to the extent that it may be described, retrospectively, as Green with characteristics which Talshir (1998, 2002) regards as modular. It is evident that in the period 1979-1982, through debate within the Party over issues of ideology and organisation, that the Values Party arrived at some degree of settlement on these issues. Central to this was the adoption of a Party organisation described as an ‘electoral umbrella for the pressure groups’ incorporating core Green ideology (including ecology) and sub-ideologies (including socialism). The realisation in the mid 1970s that the momentum of demands for change from within civil society of the 1960s and early 1970s, which had previously sustained Values Party politics, had fallen away, contributed to a maturing of the Party. In the 1980s it became evident that, from that point on, the Values Party alone had the responsibility for arguing the veracity of its views and, in this process, engage in an on-going political struggle with competing ideologies, including that prevalent.

It is now possible to examine this political struggle in terms of the critique of the current order and the Values Party vision for an alternative future. This relates primarily to the revival of politics in terms of creating a dissensus at the ideological level which is of benefit to democracy in itself as Torgerson (2000) has argued. Also of interest is the contribution the Values Party makes to core Green ideology and how this fits into the tradition of Green politics in New Zealand.

The ‘kind of society’ envisaged by the New Zealand Values Party will be examined through its literature in the form of party manifestos as well as Values Party magazines Turning Point, Linkletter, and Vibes. From this material it will be demonstrated that in the process of satisfying these three requirements (a critique of the prevalent order, a new vision, and a means for its attainment) sites of fundamental ideological struggle against the current social/political order will be revealed.

Broadly, the political manifestos of The New Zealand Values Party differ in that while Blueprint for New Zealand (1972) contains much in the way of what is referred to by Fairclough (2002) as manifest intertextuality, that is citations from other works, writers and thinkers, this is less a feature of subsequent manifestos. In this way, the 1972
manifesto has more the appearance of an academic work where support for the policy decisions takes the form of arguments. In this process, reference was made to writers as diverse as academics from university departments, former British cabinet ministers, Tim Shadbolt (an activist in the Progressive Youth Movement), and Alvin Toffler writer of *Future Shock* (1970). It can be concluded that the other manifestos serve as better examples of interdiscursivity. For Fairclough (2003:96) interdiscursivity is a mixing of genres, in these cases it is a mix of policy information and advertising, which are ‘descriptions with covert prescriptive intent aimed at getting people to act in certain ways on the basis of representations’. This reflects the change in role for the Values Party from the ‘passive’ exponent of existing societal values, to the appreciation of ideology as the means to re-articulate meaning and disrupt hegemonic dominance. Some of the representations took the form of photographs and illustrations, which, as van Dijk (1998) argues, serve a discursive function. The 1972 manifesto is notable for their absence. There is an increasing tendency in subsequent manifestos for the use of photographs and illustrations intended to convey aspects of New Zealand life in a way supporting Values policy proposals and ideological position. The 1975 manifesto has only 7 pages of a total of 91 without illustrations of some kind, the 1978 manifesto with only 1 page exclusively of text out of a total of 48, while the 1984 manifesto, *Beyond ‘84*, is notable for covering only 10 pages in total.

What was wrong with the existing order is introduced with the word ‘crisis’. Comparing the first three consecutive manifestos produced by Values, including *Blueprint for New Zealand*, 1972; *Beyond Tomorrow*, 1975, the 1978 Manifesto, as well as the 1984 version, *Beyond ‘84*, there is consistency with the utilization of a crisis/resolution theme. This served an ideological function in that it suggests that we were all subject to this crisis and the only possible salvation was the immediate general acceptance of the particular view of the Values Party.

In the introduction to the 1972 manifesto, a legitimization crisis was the focus. This is based on the propositional assumption that an over-burdened and unresponsive state ‘will not survive its present form’ (1972:28). The very urgent need was an alternative in the form of decentralisation of political authority in order to satisfy demands for participation from movements within society.

There is, however, an apparent shift in the centre of the crisis in the 1975 manifesto *Beyond Tomorrow*. While participation continued to be emphasised, it is
displaced somewhat by the limits to growth thesis. This particular crisis is also prevalent in the 1978 manifesto where it is stated that ‘the world cannot go on using up resources like ore and oil that cannot be renewed’ (1978:13). This crisis was attributed, in the 1975 manifesto, to the twin problems of population growth and industrial growth. A medical metaphor was employed in 1975, and referred to growth in these areas in terms of ‘a pathological growth which, like a cancer, renders unhealthy the living organism it feeds on’ and that ‘today the world has two cancer-like problems–population growth and industrial growth’, thereby revealing the ideological attachments that both population growth and industrial growth undermined the ‘...health of our democracy’(1975:13). On page 84 of the 1975 manifesto it was asserted that decentralisation is the cure, and the logical implication was that ‘alienation, apathy, sectional greed and competitive individualism’ are among the ills society is plagued with.

The 1978 manifesto introduced a propositional assumption that ‘New Zealand has lost direction’. It continued with the metaphor of a ship lost at sea, battling ‘squalls of the last quarter of the 20th century’ which had left New Zealand drifting. The reasons given for this repeated the limits to growth thesis which states that within ten years demand for fossil fuels will have outstripped supply. This is followed by the claim that ‘there is no real commitment to finding alternatives’. The word ‘alternative’ stood as the theme in the introduction and was repeated in statements which focussed attention on the negative aspects of, for example, markets for primary products, the present economic system since it delivers inflation and unemployment, and a ‘centralised political system that produces ever more repressive laws’, and finally, ‘our once famous social services have broken down so much that some scarcely operate any more. Yet there is no real commitment to finding alternatives’ (1978:2). The culmination of this theme was the declaration that the Values Party is the alternative, and by implication, stood in opposition to the aforementioned negative effects.

The 1984 manifesto, Beyond ’84, used the word crisis only in relation to the ‘oil and mineral crisis’ which, among other things, it claimed Values correctly predicted. This statement and others are part of a more defensive approach where, rather than asserting claims, the manifesto defends itself against suggestions that the Values Party was too idealistic. However, the Values Party remained committed to a coherent doctrine and this was indicated by the inter-textual connections evident between the manifestos examined here, and the book Blueprint for Survival (1972).
This can be seen where the Values Party expressed opposition to the current order by establishing a contrastive relation between the ‘new social ills’ and a ‘quality of life’ (1975:3). The former was made equivalent to an over-emphasis on economic growth, technology, bureaucracy, and individualism, and these ‘social ills’ are exacerbated by the then current ‘national leadership’. While ‘quality of life’ was made equivalent to those things being sacrificed to the former, and included, the environment, job satisfaction, human spirit, public participation in government, and community.

Further, that the perpetuation of the failings of government cannot be attributed solely to the current national leaders, but rather, was common to the major parties in New Zealand where ‘the other three parties in New Zealand...disagree about what is the more efficient means of producing goods and providing services...but they all agree that material wealth is the object of the exercise’ (1975:15).

In this way, the Values Party advanced questions over that which, at least, the other parties agreed upon, that is, whether increasing material wealth was desirable or even possible. The apparent agreement among other parties can be seen in terms of the pursuit of state imperatives (Dryzek et al.,2003). Critical of how the state imperative of production was pursued, the Values Party opposed the prevalence of liberal capitalism under which the profit motive dominates production decisions. This fundamental understanding comes under attack from the Values Party where the meaning of production was contested in terms of a contrastive relation between the ‘profit motive’ and ‘community benefit’ (1975:21).

While other parties saw revenue gathering tied to wealth generated through continued growth in productive activity, the Values Party sought to disrupt this linkage. In this way, as Dryzek et al. (2003) argue, changing the conceptual apparatus used to refer to the activity does not necessarily disrupt the state imperative of, in this case, revenue gathering, but can significantly alter the means by which the wealth is produced. This, for the Values Party, amounted to ‘unnecessary industrial activity’ (1975:14). Where the Values Party rearticulated production to conform to its ideas around terms such as ‘co-operative community enterprise’ and ‘sustainable’, these can be understood as instances of ‘relexicalization’. Relexicalization refers to new words generated in opposition to existing ones, (conceptual capture) and are intended to dominate discourse around, for example, production; these words are linked to the counter-hegemonic challenge against the current order (Fairclough, 1992; Blaug, 2002:113).
The 1978 manifesto focussed on the word ‘growth’ and its derivatives, often positively associated with the expansion of material wealth. The manifesto then attacked the latter by associating the word ‘growth’ in ways which derive a negative emphasis. In this way, growth is disarticulated from a positive meaning, through its association with material wealth, for example, in relation to the economy, and is re-articulated with negative effects, for example, ‘state power’, ‘the wealth of the few’, and ‘the ranks of the poor’. This ideological opposition forms the grounds for the assertion by the Values Party that the ‘growth economy’, characterised by continued and unlimited growth, was not possible (1978:13).

The contrasting terms offered by the Values Party in the 1975 manifesto represent, as well as a set of value assumptions, an attempt to articulate the goals society should be pursuing through a process of establishing equivalences and difference during the struggle over meaning. In this regard, the Values Party differentiated itself from core liberal theory by advocating that ‘New Zealand badly needs a set of clearly defined national goals with which the whole community can identify’ (1975:8). This demonstrates how the Values Party engaged in debate on fundamental political issues. This contrasts with core liberal theory where the right of each individual to pursue their own goals is protected by the state, rather than the state determining what goals are to be pursued.

This point was raised again where the Values Party were critical that politics had become reduced to minor adjustments on an already determined course. Insisting that politics should be more concerned with fundamental issues at the core of political philosophies, the Values Party emphasised the issue that fundamental debate is essential to politics. For example, an article in Turning Point (May/June, 1975:8) argued that the meaning of politics has become that of ‘the local odd job man, instead of one of the people who are supposed to decide where our country is going’. This is contrasted with the Values Party commitment to disclose where the country is heading, and take control of development and direction with regard for ‘the needs of future generations as well as those of the present’ (Beyond Tomorrow, 1975:15). This again opposed core liberal ideology by advocating the achievement of particular goals on a collective basis and steered by the government.

Also, evidence in the manifesto of 1975 pointed to a direct challenge to neo-liberalism. Although this term is not mentioned in the manifesto, it can be inferred from
Values Party text that this was the prevalent ideology they confronted. The Values Party declared their position on this issue where they state ‘we don’t want a society based on the values of the market place. We don’t measure progress in terms of material and monetary profit’ (1975:15). ‘Material and monetary profit’ are contrasted with the Values goal, in the ‘new age in which community is more important than materialism and man [sic] learns to live in harmony with the rest of nature rather than against it’ (1975:15), and this completed the contrastive relation in an attempt to displace industrial expansion with harmony with nature as the dominant principle around which society should be organised.

In this respect, holism is evident in Values Party writings. Rather than existing outside nature, manipulating it for materialist and profit driven ends, people are regarded as inextricably part of nature. At another level of abstraction this can be seen as opposition to aspects of Enlightenment/modernity. The Enlightenment celebrated the triumph of human cognition over nature through application of the techniques of science. This led to narrow instrumental reason becoming the guiding basis for human action aimed at the emancipation of humans from the constraints and caprices of the natural world, but also gave rise to technocratic forms of governance. Reference to increasingly specialised areas of thought had the effect of removing public consideration and deliberation, and this reveals technocracy as a political anaesthesia (Radaelli, 1999). In the example above, decisions on production, for example, increasingly relied on the principles of economics. The scientisation of political decisions, in that these decisions have public outcomes, ‘deprives any democratic decision-making of its object’ (Habermas, 1971 b:68). Therefore, the Values argument for holism can be seen in this context as directly opposed to the process of atomisation characteristic of modernity.

This atomisation has led to the specialisation of all aspects of human life into areas of expertise, alongside a pious faith in science and technology to achieve human freedom. Along with the classic marxist theorists Horkheimer and Adorno, the Values Party contended that this belief has resulted in the opposite, in that restrictions on democratic process limit control over the course of problem solving for the mass of the population. Further, the scientisation of decisions carries with it an assumption of neutrality which disguises the prevailing ideological conditions within which science operates. This then makes critique of the ideological foundation of decisions difficult, and hinders the consideration of alternatives and the possibility of change. In this way,
it can be demonstrated how Values Party holism was connected with practical politics and ideological opposition, as well as deeper theoretical issues relevant to traditions of thought in Western culture.

As a matter of practical politics, neo-liberalism was attacked since it informs the drive toward materialism and monetary profit which were intrinsic to consumerism and ‘unnecessary industrial activity’. This linkage followed the form that the capitalist market economy provides the incentive of profit for sellers to sell, and advertising creates material acquisitiveness which in turn encourages production. By attacking the profit motive as the basis for industrial growth and production, the Values Party targeted consumerism and advertising. Consistent with the belief that market rationality dominates society, the Values Party argued that consumerism pervades society. By reducing consumerism, the Values Party reasoned they could wrest the hold of market rationality from its position of dominance. Treating the symptoms in this way is consistent with the belief that grassroots action would be most effective. This approach was premised on the propositional assumption put forward by the Values Party that a conspiracy between the State and big business served to convince people to act as mindless consumers (1975:19). Critical to this assumption was that between the conspirators and their victims, the consumers, was advertising. The Values approach to this will be dealt with later.

Values had before them the task of convincing the mass of the population of the folly of consumerism and this, for Values, meant convincing individuals. This, it was thought, would be difficult since, as the 1975 manifesto argues, ‘the man [sic] in the street’ would not find the limitation and control of affluence appealing (1975:15). However, Values believed that this grassroots approach to the problem had some chance since consumerism on the part of many in the population was based on ‘short-term bribes and distractions’ offered by the three main parties in New Zealand (1975:15). In this way, the Values Party was differentiated from the other main political parties in New Zealand by offering an alternative to the pursuit of material wealth. This alternative was encapsulated in the term ‘community sharing’ and was placed in a contrastive relation with consumerism, which was made equivalent to ‘individual acquisition and selfishness’ (1975:33). Fundamental to community sharing was the value assumption that community is preferable to an emphasis on the individual. On this basis, the Values Party attacked this aspect of neo-liberal ideology which denies the existence of something called
society.

By disarticulating advertising from its usual positive images, and rearticulating it to negative effects, the Values Party intended to persuade the public away from consumerism and towards regarding the Values Party world-view as the most preferable. This entailed the reconceptualization of production in a way consistent with the limits to growth axiom.

**Summary.**

The points on which the Values Party were critical of the prevalent ideology, as an argument for the Values alternative, can be summarised as relating to either of two crises: the legitimation crisis of government, or the crisis of population and industrial growth. The above examples have been selected to demonstrate the degree to which the Values Party challenged some fundamental understandings of the current order. In terms of democracy, the Values Party raised questions over representation and participation, and their response to these issues, in terms of proposed institutional change, will be looked at shortly. As well as raising a critique over centralisation and the tendency toward authoritarianism in the current democratic system, the Values Party also questioned core liberal ideology. It did this by suggesting that society should be steered toward a national goal, and this emphasis on collectivity opposes the core liberal ontology, at the centre of which is an emphasis on individuals seeking their own conception of the good.

The Values Party determined that the dominance of neo-liberalism undermined both democracy and ecology. It did this by arguing that the dominance of market rationality reduced questions of what and how to produce to the profit motive. In this regard, the Values Party rejected the scientific and elitist approach to political decision-making in favour of greater participation for the mass of the population in democratic decision-making. This can be generally regarded as opposition to technocratic forms of governance, and since, in the view of the Values Party, market rationality led to increases in industrial activity, opposition to neo-liberalism had, as a goal, the survival of the environment as well as an improved democratic system.

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2This has more recently been expressed by Margaret Thatcher (Riddell, 1991:239).
In this next section the focus will shift closer to particular words or terms which can be regarded as ‘culturally salient keywords’ (Williams, 1983; Fairclough, 1992:186). These indicate sites of political contest over meaning, and the key areas of concern for the Values Party. They are an important part of the revival of politics since the Values Party sought to displace the ideological base of the current order, by asserting alternative words and terms to displace existing concepts. In some cases these can be referred to as re-wording or relalexicalization, ‘that is, generating new wordings which are set up as alternatives to, and in opposition to, existing ones’ (Halliday, 1978 cited in Fairclough, 1992:194). Once again, we are concerned with the ideological struggle over meaning and the attempt to disrupt the consensus around meaning and, in the process, effect social change. Since these words construct the way in which the social and political world is regarded, dominance of their accepted meaning results in the power to direct how society is organised. The words looked at there are: depression, stable-state, ‘sustainable’, the individual, and open society. Other concepts and slogans looked at refer to the contribution the Values Party has made to Green ideology, and these include the Green principles, and the slogan ‘neither left nor right’.

The word ‘depression’ can be regarded as culturally salient, and the Values manifesto *Blueprint for New Zealand* (1972) begins with the existential assumption that ‘New Zealand is in the grip of a new Depression’. A change of meaning occurs from an economic depression to a medical metaphor which asserted that it is the ‘national spirit’, not the ‘national economy’, suffering depression (1972:1). In this instance, ‘depression’ is culturally salient since it immediately recalls the ‘Great Depression’ of the 1930s. In this way, the Values Party simultaneously evoked the spectre of the far reaching institutional changes of the order which occurred in response to the Great Depression in New Zealand. These changes included a landslide change in government, and the institution of the welfare state. The implication was that the ‘new depression’ will, likewise, be followed by the major changes outlined in the manifesto.

With the emphasis of the 1975 manifesto on industrial and population growth, the solution to this crisis was encapsulated in the term ‘Stable-State Society’. This term prescribed that both industrial and population growth are limited to their present rates of growth so that eventually they are brought into balance with the finite resources of the world, and so that pollution levels can be contained.
Stable-state\(^3\), as an organising principle, makes its appearance in the Values 1972 manifesto, *Blueprint for New Zealand* (the term is found in *Blueprint for Survival*, 1972 from which Tony Brunt borrowed in writing the Values Party first manifesto as suggested by the title of the latter). In the Values Party manifesto of 1975, *Beyond Tomorrow*, the term was fully articulated with zero population growth (ZPG), which was ‘central to all Values Party policies’ (1975:16). Also central to Values policy was the stabilisation of production and consumption as opposed to ever increasing production and consumption. This was justified on the grounds that it was necessary since ‘the attempts to continually expand our economy’ produce a less than human society, widen the gap between rich and poor, and damage the environment (1975:19). This point was repeated in the statement that ‘society must decide which levels are best (for people and the environment) and stick to this until there is a change in the information...’. This level represented a threshold which should not be crossed if there was to be a ‘social order that we can expect to be ‘sustainable’’ (1975:13). It is here, in the 1975 manifesto, that the term ‘sustainable’ made its first appearance and both stable-state and sustainability are based on the ‘limits to growth’ thesis.

In the 1978 manifesto, however, the term ‘stable-state’ had disappeared and was replaced with ‘sustainable’. Although the essential definition of the stable-state remains ‘sustainable’ was now the dominant term. Also, the change in terminology does not disrupt the inter-textual connection with *Blueprint for Survival* (1972:3), in which the term ‘sustainable’ also appeared, although as a subordinate term. In this way, by emphasising ‘sustainable’, the Values Party 1978 manifesto had reversed the relative emphasis given to the terms in their earlier manifesto. In the manifesto of 1978, the term ‘sustainable’ appeared in policy sections on economics, agriculture, fisheries, and energy and this provides an index on its rise to dominance as the Values Party articulated policy and its particular world-view.

A ‘sustainable’ economy was defined as one based on renewable resources, where non-renewable resources are used slowly. Further, the population is stabilized, and ‘we do not jeopardize the ecological processes on which our quality of life depends’ (1975:13/14). The 1978 manifesto illustrates the struggle over meaning. For example, [The]‘Minister of Energy talks a lot about “renewable energy sources” - but... includes

\(^3\)Associated with John Stuart Mill’s 1848 idea of ‘steady-state economy’ (de Geus, 2001:19).
only traditional hydro and geothermal electricity, and ignores sun, wind and wood’, and ‘The Planning Council calls for “stable expansion” without seeing the contradiction in those two words’ (1978:13). These statements contrast with the Values Party insistence that sustainability means for them, that ‘the world cannot go on using up resources like ore and oil that cannot be renewed’(1978:13). Also, in opposition to continuing economic expansion, ‘sustainable’ was made equivalent to the Economics of Enough; ‘producing and consuming only as much as the Earth can stand’ (1978:13).

Relatedly, the 1975 manifesto introduces the term ‘social consequences tax’ (1975:22). Although referring specifically to achieving regional balance in industry placement, it was fundamentally concerned with making industries directly responsible for their decisions. This has some resonance with the ‘carbon tax’ legislation which, in more recent times, has gained increasing political salience.

For the Values Party, freedom in society cannot be achieved without freeing the individual. In this regard, the Values Party sought to free the individual from traditions, authoritarianism and ‘hierarchy of the secondary school, the factory, ...and the state bureaucracy’ (Vibes, July, 1978, no.21). But this did not mean the same freedom implied by, especially, neo-liberalism, in which society is theorised out of existence. Rather, the Values Party had the task of rescuing the individual from authoritarianism but, in the process, instilling social responsibilities as a defining aspect of successful individualism. In this regard, there are parallels to be drawn between the Values Party’s view of the individual, and that of C.B. Macpherson. Macpherson similarly rejects possessive individualism which works against development of community. As a corrective Macpherson argues for the reform of liberal democracy, within the existing framework, by retaining an emphasis on individual development toward emancipation (Macpherson in Holden, 1988). In this way, the Values Party view was that the

‘dignity of the individual is preserved only when a high value is placed on personal enlightenment, self-determination and achievement. We, therefore, consider that the role of government is to protect and enhance the ability of all people to choose and attain a fulfilling and socially responsible life-style’ (Linkletter, April, 1984, no.37, Graeme Channells).

For the Values Party, the movements of the 1960s and 1970s represented a
significant rejection of tradition and authoritarianism. However, the Values Party saw more insidious forms of control acting upon individuals. At the centre of this influence was the distorting effects of advertising and it was this, the Values Party argued, that stood in the way of change.

In the 1975 and 1978 manifestos, the individual was regarded as the oblivious victim of advertising which was instrumental in subverting the minds of individuals and creating dissatisfaction, and this was the basis of the culture of consumerism (1975:33). In this argument, the Values Party suggested that a type of false consciousness is at work whereby the individual would think otherwise were it not for the pervasive and distorting effect of advertising. This may be traced to a variety of reasoning termed veracitas naturae associated with Francis Bacon, whereby only those whose minds are prejudiced are incapable of grasping the truth (Popper, 1969). In this way advertising was thought to produce a prejudice in the minds of individuals who, as a result, were no longer able to judge between actions. Although political statements which take this form can be seen as rhetorical devices, for the Values Party it may also have been linked to the earlier belief that a consensus for change had already existed in civil society, and the Values Party was seeking political office on the basis of that assumption. However, along with that assumption, the Values Party later reviewed this attitude toward individuals.

In an issue of Linkletter entitled ‘Values and Ethics’ Graeme Channells of the Values Council discussed ‘Values Philosophy’. The second of his ‘fundamental insights’ argued for a rejection of ‘theories and political philosophies which depict the individual as a helpless or passive element in the development of society’. In contrast to ‘helpless’ and ‘passive’, the individual was now cast as capable of ‘a dynamic power of choice’ and that it was ‘possible for individuals and groups to adopt and pursue ideals and objectives which radically alter and improve their circumstances’ (Linkletter, 1984, no. 37, ‘fundamental insight’ no. 1). This reasserted the realisation that the Values Party now regarded its task in terms of arguing for the change they advocated, and that this should be aimed at changing the way people think, in other words, at the ideological level. The Values Party had conceived the subject who, in their masses, could bring about the society Values advocated.

To aid this process the Values Party called for the ‘open society’, convinced that in an effort to restrain the Values desired program of change, the state was involved in withholding politically relevant information. It was observed by the Values Party that,
in opposition to its own aims, the major problem was that people in power, both inside and outside Government, were still planning for a future based on the assumption that economic growth must continue (Keith Langton, *Vibes*, 1978, no.26). This aim was kept from public scrutiny by the absence of relevant information, and the mass of the population were only ever involved in a ‘politics of half truths’ (Ken Cairns, *Linkletter*, Dec. 1983, no.34). In this way, the individual was no longer viewed as unwittingly prejudiced and therefore unable to grasp the truth, but as a rational being who, but for the lack of vital information, was perfectly capable of seeing things in accordance with the Values Party.

‘Open society’ was designed to open up ‘access to central government information...dramatise the secrecy of local body and company decision-making, in order to change the present situation in which people find out the truth’ only after decisions have been made (*Vibes*, March, 1979, no. 27). The slogan ‘open society’ was intended as a focal point for a ‘very broadly-based movement’, the target of this movement was legislation such as the Official Secrets Act, and the SIS legislation. The then Party leader, Tony Kunowski, raised the issue of how the SIS Amendment Bill would impact on the freedom of individuals to follow their conscience, and that the Bill would ‘force people against their own free will to comply with the orders of the SIS’ (*Vibes*, Oct., 1977, no.14).

The term is significant in that it is generally aimed against a power élite. This tendency in Western capitalist countries has been observed by C. Wright Mills, (1959). The logical inference is that the mass of the population was being led by this élite, and this stood in the way of the changes Values wanted to institutionalise. Open society was essentially a call for a forum, as argued for by Elster (1986), where groups in society are armed with the relevant information and therefore able to effectively engage in reasoned discussions.

In terms of Green ideology, the Values Party 1975 manifesto brought forward three principles which bear a close resemblance to those adopted by the German Green Party, Die Grünen (n.d.). They included ‘Survival: of our species, of the environment it depends on, of our planet; Justice: a fair share of resources, wealth, and decision-making power, both between and within nations; Community: a face-to-face society where people
are precious’ (1975:13). These accord closely to the ‘four basic principles of ecology, social concern, grass-roots democracy, and non-violence’ (Die Grünen manifesto, n.d., page 4). Where ‘ecology’ encompasses the first Values principle, social concern and grassroots democracy come in under the Values heading ‘Justice’, and the Die Grünen principle of non-violence is expressed in the Values term ‘Community’, where ‘people are precious’.

Further, the slogan ‘neither left nor right but out in front’, credited to Herbert Gruhl of Die Grünen (Capra and Spretnak, 1984), has what might be called a fore-runner in the 1978 manifesto of the Values Party where it is stated that ‘...we can choose a way that is neither capitalism nor communism: the way of the co-operative community economy. The Values Party way’ (1978:12). This was an important ideological contribution because as van Dijk points out, slogans are ideological representations where ‘a few basic principles that organise the attitude of group members may be enough to define a core ideology which in turn will influence social practices and discourses, what is crucial though is access to public discourses. For some social movements, such discourses may begin with shouted slogans in the streets (1998:173).

The slogan serves to distinguish Green ideology from narrow sectional interests, opposition to which is evident in Values Party material. These points demonstrate the contribution made by the New Zealand Values Party in relation to some defining aspects of Green political ideology, in terms of both slogans as well as detailed systems and principles. In addition to the ‘family resemblance’ of the Values slogans and principles, there is evidence that Values Party material was exported to other countries. For example, Rainbow (1989) notes that requests for copies of the Values Party 1975 manifesto, Beyond Tomorrow, were received from overseas, particularly from California. Also, overseas trips by Values personnel, as well as the visit to New Zealand by influential Germans such as Petra Kelly in 1984, helped to spread the Party’s message (Linkletter, April, 1984, no.37). In this way, the Values Party had set in motion a revival of politics which challenged some core tenets of liberal democracy and beliefs around production and consumption.
Summary.

It can be argued that prevalent among the terms raised by the Values Party in opposition to the dominant ideology is ‘sustainable’. Not only has it continued as an organising principle in Green politics in New Zealand, but the term has gained salience in a wide range of fields, not least of all as a politically contested site.

While the meaning of ‘sustainable’ changed over time for the Values Party, it retained a particular meaning embedded within their ideological framework. The term represents an ideological challenge, since its Values Party meaning fundamentally contradicts the dominant liberal capitalist and neo-liberal ideology. Under neo-liberalism, ever expanding economic growth with regard primarily for share-holders interests, is the organising principle currently prevalent in the productive sphere and therefore has implications for the rest of society. Where the Values Party challenged this, they also challenged the domination of the focus on material wealth as the goal to which society should be oriented.

‘Sustainable’ appeared in Blueprint for Survival (1972), and was adopted by the Values Party the same year and has since developed into a significant term in many spheres of life in Western Capitalist societies. The political significance of the term exists in that the meaning of the term changes with the ideological perspective, and therefore provides a site of political contestation, the outcome of which has practical implications. The ideological contest also stimulates fundamental political debate and resists the reduction of politics to technical discussions on essentially agreed-upon goals.

The term ‘social consequence tax’ has similarities with sustainability, not least since it too has gained particular salience in recent times with the advent of carbon tax, for example, and other measures aimed at reducing the polluting effects of production.

In the way that it was intended that Values sustainability would displace other meanings and bring about social change, the term ‘open society’ addressed the issue of obstacles to change. In this regard the term was aimed at freeing information which would then stimulate political forum discussions on a wider range of issues by many more citizens. The Values Party argued that the lack of information was an impediment to social/political change, and that the Government was compliant in the control of information in an effort to resist change and to stabilize the current order. The availability of information has, for the Values Party, an impact on consultation, and the latter emerges in the future as a central concern for Green politics in New Zealand.
7.2
Decentralisation, participation, Parliamentary reform.

In this section the institutional changes advocated by Values will be looked at. Three main areas of policy directly relating to democracy were developed in the manifestos 1972-1984. These were; decentralisation, participation, and Parliamentary reform. There is a high degree of consistency between the manifestos over this period, and for this reason the 1975 manifesto *Beyond Tomorrow* will be the main reference unless otherwise stated.

Generally, the Values Party advocated participation over representation. In terms of representation, since 1972 Values had argued for MMP (mixed member proportional) generated representation over FPP (first-past-the-post). As followers of the *Small is Beautiful* doctrine of E.F. Schumacher (1973) Values advocated decentralisation of both economic and political institutions. In political terms participation and decentralisation have a symbiotic relationship. Decentralisation facilitates participation which in turn generates local identity. Local identity is aided by grassroots participation; where those most affected by decisions have the responsibility to make them. This then deepens the commitment to decentralisation.

Decentralisation has been argued by Goodin (1992) to distinguish the Green political approach. Further, many argued it should have been the fifth pillar of the Green principles; such was its importance to Green politics (Capra and Spretnak, 1984). The central belief in the Values programme was that too much power was concentrated in too few hands requiring ‘major changes to our present system of government’ (1975:84). The solution to the problems associated with centralisation, so argued the Values Party, was its opposite, decentralisation. In the 1972-1984 manifestos, decentralisation entailed the expansion of the functions and autonomy of local and regional government with a consequent reduction in the functions of central government, and that issues, including housing, education, and welfare, would be locally administered.

The present centralised system was described in terms of ‘...too much power and too many functions, requiring a large and faceless bureaucracy’ (1975:84). The Values Party rearticulated the understanding of governance in terms of decentralization which,
in this process, was made equivalent with ‘community levels of government’, ‘true communities’, ‘kinship’, ‘co-operation’, ‘responsibility’, and ‘more autonomy’, and the redefinition of the role of central government, which while retaining some functions, is reduced in size and function.

Evident here is a convergence between Values Party ideology and core liberal theory in that both regard the state as best serving minimal functions, for example, ‘safeguarding civil rights’ (1975:85). However, the Values Party meaning has to be seen within the context of a commitment to ‘decentralised participatory democracy’ which was orientated towards reducing the ‘massness and alienation of Western society’ to which, it was argued, centralised governance contributes (1975:84). It can be argued that a legacy of the 1938 Social Security Act was the rise of the paternal state and this was interpreted as authoritarian control under the Muldoon era, which predominated during the existence of the Values Party. While Values supported a welfare system, they rejected its centralised administration in favour of local control. This is contrasted with core liberal theory in which a minimal state might have reason to create efficiencies of governance, and to keep state intervention in the lives of individuals at a level consistent with preserving the individuals rights to pursue their own goals. The point of contrast is that Values belief in political participation is inconsistent with liberal differentiation between the political sphere and civil society. Barry Hindess has commented that where the barrier between the rulers and the ruled should lie is a contested issue. What is at stake is the politicization of issues which, under core liberal theory, may be regarded as more properly belonging elsewhere (1996:31). In this way, the Values Party argued that extending the political consideration of issues was best achieved through small scale self-governing communities as opposed to a large state apparatus, and this configuration threatens the core liberal barrier between state and civil society.

The size and complexity of the polity are usual objections to the possibility of more direct forms of participation. Such objections refer to the difference in scale of the modern nation-state when compared to the city-state of, for example, the Athens of antiquity. Values built much of its policy on the possibility of change and change necessitates challenging the current order.

Centralist nation-state government has been demonstrated as an arbitrary choice of governance given New Zealand’s history of provincialism. Although the Abolition of the Provinces Act was passed in 1876, more recent developments raise again the prospect
that decentralisation may have some practical application. This prospect is derived from the process of globalisation and its counter-effect, localisation, as discussed in Part 3, Chapter 5.

Even though the act of 1876 had been passed, debate over provincial autonomy continued into the late 19th century between the centralists and provincialists, indicating that complete agreement on the issue had not been achieved. This raises the point that New Zealand has a historical precedent for political decentralisation, and, although things have changed considerably since 1876, the equal but opposite reaction to globalisation means that political decentralisation may again become a reality. This may eventuate to some degree in that a consequence of the international development of a ‘global economy’ has been the resurgence in provincialist aspirations. The Values Party had in place the two aspects associated with decentralisation on this basis. These were a critique of the de-politicising features of global agreements around the power of NGOs, and a policy for the decentralisation of political power. However, the Values Party did not connect the two in this way, but focussed on the critique of global arrangements.

It has been argued that globalisation produces a tendency for national governments to centralise their economies, and this has the effect of pulling resources away from the regions. Under these circumstances, local areas may seize the initiative and undertake their own development. This move was encouraged by the Values Party commitment to ‘decisive regional development’ (1972:26), and may bring with it democratic decentralisation, local participation and autonomy.

Globalisation, as previously discussed with reference to Rosenberg (1993) and Kelsey (2003), can be regarded as a process where nation-states enter into increasingly close agreements with governments of other nation-states via rules drawn up by international governing bodies, such as, the IMF or World Trade Organisation. Such agreements require obligations and concessions on the basis of, most importantly for this study, neo-liberal ideology as it relates to trade. Making a nation attractive to overseas investors, in order to increase trade with other nations, requires a substantial surplus in the consolidated fund and this necessitates tight social spending budgets. This then strains the perception that the government has the primary task of reconciling support for the nation-state with satisfaction of demands from the polis on the basis of taxation and principles of democracy (Hindess, 1996; Habermas, 1972).

This results in a process where socioeconomic inequality increases between
regions and where the legitimacy of the nation-state is strained, producing an increase in political distance between the state and the polis (Lechner, 1996). At the same time, the pressure to develop alternative ‘regulatory formations’ based on the ‘revitalization of the local’ gains momentum (Sáinz and Andrade-Eekhoff, 2000:172). These regulatory formations might take the shape of community based organisations (CBOs) which, in many countries, offer increased opportunities for popular participation and direct consultation (Scholte, 2000). However, there is quite some distance between the Values Party policy of the 1970s, and the more recent experience of globalisation of the world economy, with its consequent effects on the legitimacy of the nation-state.

In order to fully appreciate the view of the Values Party, it should be pointed out that Values policy was influenced, to some extent, by the effects of globalisation as it existed in the 1970s. For example in Vibes (May, 1980, no.34) an explanation of perceived political powerlessness is offered, and this is attributed to causes beyond national boundaries in that

‘New Zealand is intricately locked into the capitalist scene. More and more the conglomerates and multi-national companies of the world are directing Governments as to what they want, when they want it, and how they are going to get it’.

It was also reported in Vibes (1980, no.34) that the BP oil corporation had attempted to direct the Government in New Zealand on how to write the National Development Bill. How this information was obtained is not explained. However, this suspicion indicates that the Values Party were aware of the sorts of influence multi-national corporations might be able to have on national governments. In this way, it at least represents an awareness of this influence, which may have been difficult for many to believe given the assumption of a normative commitment to the polis by democratic governments. In this respect the Values Party were among the first to articulate this threat to national sovereignty, and this has gained increasing importance within Green politics in recent times, especially since the advent of the GATS agreements.

Access to information was the crux of the matter for the Values Party. This was discussed in the previous section, and it will be recalled that Values regarded the present system as characterised by decisions made behind closed doors in cabinet and caucus, and presented as faits accompli; and also, intrinsic to this process, is the denial of public access to vital information. To counter this situation, the Values Party insisted on politics
as a public practice conducted in a way consistent with a forum emphasising a process of argumentation (Habermas, 1975:108; Elster, 1999; Gaus, 2003). To this end, the Party advocated the use of societal-wide conferences whenever major policy was being considered. They also insisted on a process of consultation with those affected by decisions in which the participation of citizens is actively sought alongside public access to government records, and greater use of referenda.

Allied to the issue of access to information was the Values Party concern with the role of ‘experts’. In this regard, in the manifesto Beyond Tomorrow (1975) the meaning of ‘experts’ is shifted away from association with the ‘narrow fields’ of expertise held by science, technology, and the specialized professions; and re-articulated in terms of those affected by a decision, as the ‘most reliable experts’ (1975:86). In this way, they preserved the ‘status’ accorded the term ‘expert’, but contested those who should be regarded as falling under the category. For the Values Party, consulting with the mass of the population was a corrective to decisions made by a small number of those typically referred to as ‘experts’.

The Values Party argued that increasingly political decisions had to be made on issues that were both highly technical as well as far-reaching in their social consequences. A contrastive relation was established where, on the one hand, science and technological experts deal in ‘narrow fields’, and, on the other, they are involved in decisions that will have ‘far-reaching’ effects. This, argued the Values Party, ‘poses major problems for participatory democracy and social justice’ (1975:86). The 1975 manifesto also argued that the ‘narrow fields’ of scientific and technological endeavour are more properly ‘confined to providing reliable information on the technical details of various alternatives’, and answering the questions of elected politicians, community groups and individuals, if democracy is to prevail (1975:86). The implication was that scientific and technical experts have immense political influence beyond the narrow confines of their fields of expertise, and that they particularly lacked competence about ‘conflicting values and overall goals’ (1975:86).

A relation of equivalence was established between ‘values and overall goals’ and a concern with ‘long-term social and environmental costs’. This was then built into a contrastive relation with ‘short-term economic benefits’ which, by implication, are linked to the role of science and technology (1975:86). It was stated that decisions on values and overall goals should be left to the ‘general public’, and in order to get a balance
between scientific and technological knowledge, on one hand, and values and overall goals, on the other, that ‘all expert bodies should include...non-experts who represent important groups in the community (for example, women, youth, and consumers)’ (1975:86).

Also, that departments such as the DSIR (Dept. of Scientific and Industrial Research) should answer questions on political issues raised by community groups and individuals, as well as those raised by politicians; and access to information should be made public. The general orientation was toward the principle that social control over technology and science should be formalized. The ideological position stated by the Values Party was one based on principles of justice, participatory democracy, decentralisation, and community control, and these principles challenge the development of technocracy which, the text argues, is geared towards short-term economic gain at the expense of an orientation toward long-term social and economic concerns. In this way, a technocracy was construed in the text as distinct from justice, participatory democracy, decentralization and community control, and as an unsatisfactory method to secure an ethical basis for policy decisions (Habermas, 1984).

Participatory democracy for the Values Party was a matter of displacing the present ‘fundamentally undemocratic and unjust political system’ with a ‘truly democratic society’ in which ‘any citizen...can influence government’ (Beyond Tomorrow, 1975:84). It is clear that decentralisation was aimed at increasing the opportunities for participation in politics by citizens and that, in this regard, small scale communities were an essential aspect. Community was defined as the people most affected by decisions since the ‘responsibility and authority for social services...rests with...them’ (1975:84), and community is the basis for participatory democracy. In 1972 the manifesto recommended that all citizens should have the opportunity to participate in decisions affecting local welfare. To this end, the Values Party recommended neighbourhood councils and this recommendation remained in manifestos until 1978.

This form of governance has recently been discussed by Fung and Wright (2003), with regard to mini-publics. The example used is that of community policing in Chicago, USA, although their function could be directed at many areas. The councils use deliberation to clarify ‘preferences and values of participants and to communicate those preferences to policy makers’ (Fung and Wright, 2003:359). Fung and Wright also report that these neighbourhood councils emphasize ‘direct citizen participation’, have shown
substantial levels of participation, and that much of their success is due to the establishment of common agendas and strategies.

Recalling the earlier discussion on communitarianism, the Values position favoured the establishment of classical ‘Gemeinschaft’ associated with the work of Ferdinand Tönnies. This term contains the sense of social relationships based on membership of a community. This sense of community can be contrasted with what Alasdair MacIntyre has characterised as conceptions of selfhood typical of the modes of thought and practice of modernity where the self is liquidated into a set of demarcated areas of role-playing in the pursuit of maximum utility. Against this fragmented society of autonomous individuals, the Values Party directed their attentions toward decentralised community, the basis of which was a shared world-view, articulated through a conceptual apparatus which forms the basis of a moral code to guide the community toward the common good. MacIntyre contrasts this with liberalism which regards freedom more highly than the common good resulting in a conception of utility seeking individuals. In this conception there is an affinity between liberal democracies and ‘free-markets’, where democratic decisions are based on individual utility rather than the common good (MacIntyre in Sandel, 1984).

This interpretation of Values policy demonstrates where it clashes with liberalism and contests the fundamental basis upon which people should live. This then raises fundamental questions of not only how society should be organised, but also to what end; a question that liberalism leaves open to the individual. In this way, the Values Party regarded community as essential to the development of increased participation and that the development of community was debilitated by economic activity based on what MacIntyre, above, has described as ‘utility seeking individuals’. In this regard, the profit motive was again the focus of Values Party critique.

The profit motive was made equivalent to ‘large corporations’, ‘private self-interest’, and ‘enormous power’, both within New Zealand and the world economy. Community benefit was equivalent to ‘human need’, and the ‘spirit of the community’. In this way, the Values Party attempted to displace ‘private profit’ as the ‘principle motivation for economic activity’, with ‘community benefit’. Also, Values Party material reveals a recognition of the observations made by Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995). This is where Wood describes the perception by ‘classical economics’ of the economy in an abstract sense, emptied of its social and political content. It thus effects the
depoliticization of economic activity, thereby maintaining the perception of liberal capitalism as common sense (1995:19). This is because decisions reduced to a ‘pure’ form in this way are simultaneously ‘purged of every element that could be made accessible to cogent analysis’ (Habermas, 1971 b:65). On this understanding, it can be argued that the Values Party rearticulation of economic production seeks to reveal the ideological self-validation of capitalism. This would thereby expose production to an examination of the underlying sectional interests served under the façade of ‘neutral’ economic activity. Also, in this process, the Values Party then put forward the possibility that things could be otherwise based on an alternative set of ideological values.

To this end, the Values Party advocated community control of small-scale production aimed at community need, through their system of ‘co-operative community enterprise’. The co-operative community enterprise was based on the premise that all parties to production, that is, staff, customers, suppliers, and the community, would have an investment in the enterprise, and all four groups would have equal rights in the decisions taken by the enterprise. The Values Party was careful to steer a midway between the ideological positions of both ‘private profit associated with the traditional capitalist system’ and ‘State power associated with the traditional socialist system’ (Beyond Tomorrow, 1975:21).

When the political and economic aspects of Values policy on decentralisation are taken together, the result has some resonance with what Hannah Arendt called the ‘council system’. This was a form of participatory republicanism based on a federation of face-to-face groupings. She had seen this develop before the Russian revolution of 1905, where Soviet councils had developed, only to be crushed by the Bolshevik uprising of 1917 in the interests of centralised state control (Canovan, 1998:48).

The third proposition argued for by the Values Party regarding institutional change, was Parliamentary reform. From 1972 onwards the manifestos argued for Parliamentary reform, and this involved a number of issues. Amongst them was an increase in the number of MPs to provide better representation and allow greater numbers to enter Parliament. Most notable among the proposed Parliamentary reforms was electoral reform. In this regard, the Values Party favoured changing from the then current first past the post system to proportional representation.

This measure was aimed at the fact that in 1972, 52% of voters did not vote for
the winning Labour Party which went on to form a minority government. It was also noted by the Values Party that New Zealand has a history of minority governments, and that this has a negative effect in terms of representation. Further, that since ‘most MPs are male, over 40 years old, and from the professions, business, and farming...’ they are hardly representative of the population (1975:84). Proportional representation was regarded by the Values Party as a means to ensure a government representative of the electorate.

In *Blueprint for New Zealand* (1972) the Values Party adopted an idea from Norman Kirk and argued for a Parliamentary forum. This argument was repeated in the 1975 manifesto *Beyond Tomorrow*. This forum would consist of a council of 10 under the leadership of the opposition, and to which any citizen could make representations which would then be reported to Parliament. In this way, the forum was intended to give greater participation in central government. Although this issue was dropped from the 1978 manifesto, it provided for more direct input into the Parliamentary process than was then, or is now, possible through the select committee process. Also omitted from the 1978 manifesto and thereafter, but present in two earlier documents (1972 and 1975), was the argument for greater use of referenda.

### Summary.

Decentralisation stands out as the most significant policy initiative offered by the Values Party in terms of the reformation of the political institutions. The measure was developed from a perception that too much power was concentrated in too few hands, and that the major changes that this necessitated involved the diffusion of power away from central institutions and toward the regions. To effect this, it was determined that central governance would be reduced in function, and that regional governance would become increasingly autonomous. It was stressed that only through decentralisation could increased participation by individuals become a reality, and only decentralisation could guarantee that those most affected by decisions would be able to take part in decision-making. Participation also involved a view of the individual as a member of a community, as opposed to the liberal view of individuals as atomistic and utility seeking. What can be stressed from Values Party material is the symbiotic relationship between
decentralisation, participation and individuals as members of a community and society. Therefore, for this phase of Green politics in New Zealand, participation cannot be considered without decentralisation of political power. This was linked to community identification.

The Values Party also raised objections to technocracy, as well as cabinet and caucus decision-making, all of which intensified the concentration of power and therefore had, according to the Values Party, a corrosive influence on participation. A further response in opposition to these developments by the Values Party was the policy of societal-wide conferences whenever major policy was being considered. These were to provide a public forum for deliberation and argumentation. It can be noted that while decentralisation requires institutional restructuring, societal-wide conferences could be integrated into the existing liberal framework.
7.3
Electoral Umbrella.

Participation based on a ‘strong and active movement of people at the grassroots level’ represented a fundamental aim of the Values Party in the pursuit of a ‘truly democratic society’ (1975:85). To connect with and articulate the aims of grassroots groups, the Values Party saw its function as ‘...the electoral “umbrella” for the pressure groups’ (Linkletter, Nov. 1982, no. 23). This function was aimed at improving the representation of social groups within the existing liberal democratic system. In this way, the Values Party sought to achieve two democratic aims. The first was to effectively challenge the liberal boundary between the state and civil society. The second was the challenge of ‘new politics’ would find expression within institutional political structures against the dominance of ‘old’ political concerns (Offe, 1984).

By identifying with the democratic struggles of various social groupings, the Values Party would act as a conduit for these interests. This function has been observed by Laclau and Mouffe (1992, 1994), where, with reference to the left, the term ‘nodal point’ is used to describe how movements within civil society coalesce around a political party. In this regard, Laclau and Mouffe (1992) say that the left must locate itself within the field of the democratic revolution between the different struggles against oppression. The plurality of democratic struggles can be linked by a chain of equivalence around a nodal point which structures the social formation. Nodal points do not simply establish a simple alliance between interests, but modify the identity of forces so that, for example, the defence of worker’s interests does not come at the expense of the ecology movement. This aims at expanding the ‘democratic moment’ of liberal democracy toward a ‘radical and plural democracy’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992:155-189).

Talshir (1998, 2002) has a theoretical conception similar to that of Laclau and Mouffe’s (1992) ‘nodal point’ and applies it to Green politics. Talshir argues that a more accurate way to understand Green ideology is by utilizing the term ‘modular’. Modular ideology represents the possibility for the simultaneous expression of different political groupings within one ideological framework. It represents a distinctive ideological language encompassing a plurality of sometimes competing sub-ideologies, and may, on these grounds, be distinguished from totalizing or conventional ideologies. Admitting
the coexistence of a plurality of sub-ideologies is conceived of as a defining characteristic of Green politics.

The emphasis here is on discovering to what extent evidence of this function can be found in Values Party literature. This investigation will centre on evidence of the ‘voice’ of the group concerned. In terms of discourse analysis, this is referred to as intertextuality which refers to the ‘presence of elements of other texts (and therefore potentially other voices than the author’s own)’ (Fairclough, 2003:218). In this way, it is possible to gauge to what degree a group has ‘authentic’ democratic control (Dryzek, 1996). For Dryzek (1996), authentic democratic control is where democratic control is substantive rather than symbolic, and, in a group’s democratic struggle under the Values Party, this will be indicated by the input the group has in resulting Values policy. The investigation will focus on Youth, Maori and Women as social groups engaged in democratic struggles.

In the case of youth, in Blueprint for New Zealand (1972), under the heading ‘Fostering Community’, the manifesto discussed the National Youth Congress (NYC) held at Otaki in 1972. In opposition to the increasing economic growth aims of the National Development Conference, the manifesto sought to politicize issues arising from the National Youth Congress. Among the points adopted by the congress was the ‘call for genuine individual participation in crucial life issues; a re-definition of politics which is integrated with, not separate from, our lives’ (1972:25). On the grounds that the middle-aged and elderly are currently over represented in Parliament, the manifesto argued for some form of youth representation ‘in order to make their needs known’ since the fast pace of life meant that the ‘generation gap’ was a critical aspect in the failure of middle-aged people to act as a guide for younger people (1972:25). Although the policy is vague, it demonstrated that the Values Party was responding to demands and issues emerging from civil society in that it is politicizing youth as a social group with particular interests, specifically those raised at the NYC of 1972, which were not at that time otherwise recognised.

This may be contrasted with the policy on ‘Race Relations’ in Blueprint for New Zealand (1972:49) which contains a single quote of eight words from Labour Party MP Koro Wetere. On the basis of this quote and some statistical information on Maori pass rates in School Certificate, the manifesto advocated self-determination for Maori. The combination of very little Maori voice in this section alongside statements, for example,
‘the task ahead is not to assimilate Maori but to foster his [sic] racial and cultural identity’, betray an attitude that could be described as paternal (1972:49). This is because the material in this section of the manifesto is strongly weighted in favour of the pronouncements from the Values Party rather than an explicit expression of the wishes of Maori.

This is continued in the 1975 manifesto Beyond Tomorrow, along with a suggested programme aimed at the retention of cultural identity. Overall, an intention of integration, differentiated from assimilation, pervaded Values policy. Again, however, the ‘voice’ of the group is limited, in this instance to a quote from Witi Ihimaera, a Maori writer. In the 1978 manifesto, James K Baxter (New Zealand poet, 1926-1972) is quoted three times with no manifest ‘Maori’ or other Polynesian ‘voice’ evident. However, policies of self-determination for Maori through their own institutions, and work toward a ‘just settlement of past injustices’, were put forward (1978:34).

This poor showing of the ‘voice’ of Maori in the manifestos was improved upon when the Values Party magazines are examined. For example in Vibes (August, 1978, no.22) an article was printed under the title ‘The Maori Struggle Enters a New Phase’. The writer, Barney Pikari of Te Matakite O Aotearoa, is reported recalling Parihaka in reference to Bastion Point4. Te Matakite O Aotearoa is an organisation which set itself the task of taking the issue of land ‘off the Marae where they used to reside to be contemplated’, and publicizing the issue where it might be considered a legitimate matter for political consideration. He states ‘I know I do not speak for all Maori and I know I can’t go around saying “Because I’m Maori I can speak strongly on Maori issues”. However, I can say I know what I am, where my “grass-roots” are’. In saying this he claimed a distinctive identity against assimilation, but appealed to a united response to a ‘just struggle’ from ‘Ngati Whatua, Tainui Awhiro, the Maori people, the people of New Zealand’. Considering the points made about politicizing the land issue for Maori, and preservation of cultural identity, we can conclude that the Values Party were responding to Maori aspirations with policy on self-determination within the framework of their own (Maori) institutions (Values Party manifestos; 1972, 1975, 1978); and ‘action to ensure the retention of Maori lands’ (Values Party manifestos; 1972, 1978).

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4Parihaka was the site of Maori resistance to Government land survey in 1881. Bastion Point was the site of protest occupation by Ngati Whatua and along with, for example, the 1975 land march, formed part of ‘a new tone of resolve’ against loss of Maori land (Ward, 1999; Orange, 1987).
Also, directly relating to the preservation of cultural identity, it was reported in Linkletter (Sept., 1983, no. 32) that among the remits for the 1983 Conference was no. 56.30 which was about ‘including institutions using the Kohanga Reo programme to teach Maori language in a way which preserves the cultural context’. In this way policy aimed at the practical implementation of the idea of preserving cultural identity was proposed by the Values Party.

The final example here comes from Linkletter (August, 1983, no.30) where it was reported that members of the Values Party attending the conference in 1983 were hosted on the Nga Hau E Wha Christchurch National Marae on the coast of Otautahi (Maori name for Christchurch). It could be argued here that being present on a marae signifies a political commitment to Maori interests in that as Pikari has said above, that politicizing these issues beyond exclusive consideration on the Marae is an important step toward their resolution. This is the aim of Te Matakite O Aotearoa and, therefore, any politicization of these issues on behalf of Maori by the Values Party demonstrates a coincidence of method in their resolution. In this way, the Values Party can claim to be acting as a political conduit for Maori interests. An indication that there was a degree of authenticity in the expressed interests is evident in that the Values Party attend Marae to hear ‘first hand’ what the issues were and how best the Values Party might act.

The potential for the Values Party to act in this way was expressed in Turning Point (July/August 1975:5,6). The writer, Paki Cherrington, expresses the view that the Values Party should be able to represent Maori interests in the same way that it was able to represent the interests of any other group in society. The condition that Cherrington puts on this is that the Values Party must know and understand the particular situation of those it represents. This would achieve a political relationship where the interests of the group are authentically represented.

The Values Party could claim to have achieved this where the Party members were kept informed of Maori land issues. An example of this appeared in Vibes (Oct., 1977, no.15) where developments in an on-going process deciding on the management of Te Hapua land, was being fought out with Northern Pulp Ltd. Further, Christine Mariner-Grubb, the race relations spokesperson for the Values Party, reported back to members that the support (letters, telegrams and donations) they had contributed to those on Bastion Point was appreciated by the Tangata Whenua. Also, that a kindred spirit existed between the Maori struggle for recognition of their land rights and the Values
Party struggle for political recognition (*Vibes*, Sept., 1977, no.13). In addition to sending support, members of the Values Party also visited sites of Maori land claims. In *Linkletter* (March, 1981, vol.1, no.7) it was reported that Values Party national office holders and the three Party leaders, Jon Mayson, Janet Roborgh and Alan Wilkinson, guided by Tim Shadbolt, visited the Te Awhitu block, the subject of a historic land claim. The group was welcomed by Angelina Greensill who explained the background of the dispute and invited the Values Party to take an interest in Bastion Point which had gained a lot more media attention than the Te Awhitu block, and also had yet to be settled. These instances indicate that the Values Party was capable of authentically representing the issues raised by Maori and that, as evidenced by the appreciation of Values Party support, Maori saw that representation would further their claims.

It was also of concern to the Values Party that they reported in *Linkletter* (July, 1983, no. 30) that the Treaty of Waitangi Tribunal sat at Owae Marae, the first time it had been held on a marae. A claim brought by Te Atiawa was that the fisheries guaranteed them under the terms of the Treaty were no longer useable due to the pollution at the mouth of the Waitara river. This is interesting especially since it demonstrates the convergence of issues politicized by the Values Party, that of Maori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi, and ecological despoliation on the part of industry. This then indicates the working of modular ideology and how it is possible for sub-ideologies to pursue their democratic struggles under the umbrella of Values Party politics, though explicit mention of the Treaty was omitted from the Values Party manifestos.

In terms of Maori land use, the Values Party organised a seminar, in conjunction with the Ngati Wai Federation, which was held on the Whananaki marae to address the issue of ‘uneconomic blocks of land’. At the centre of this issue was the broader concern that Pakeha still had some way to go before really understanding Maori ‘land problems’. The seminar brought together representatives from the Regional Planning Authority, Federated Farmers, Trade Unions and the Regional Development Council. Maori landowners could make use of this pool of resources to develop their land without exploiting it in the ‘traditional European way’ (*Vibes*, August, 1978:6, no. 22).

Women’s rights were the subject of policy in the Values Party manifesto *Blueprint for New Zealand* (1972:57). However, the coverage was limited to 5 lines toward the back of the manifesto and contained no reference to, or quotations from, groups in society advocating women’s rights who might have been a reference point for
policy formation. Under the heading of ‘women’s rights’ areas of concern mentioned were, for example, ‘sexual stereotyping’ of women especially in education, child-care issues, and restructuring work so that both parents are able to share ‘work’ and ‘home’.

Abortion law reform covered little over a page in the 1972 manifesto, and again contains no obvious reference to women thinkers or writers on this issue. Intertextuality consists of reference to the British Abortion Act of 1967 in order to refute its efficacy in reducing ‘back-street’ abortions. Two Oxford University researchers are referred to, as is the Swedish doctor, Hans Forman. *Beyond Tomorrow* (1975) considerably lengthens the space dedicated to the ‘status of women’ to seven pages. Dr Margaret Mead, the anthropologist, is quoted directly, as is a section from the NZ Select Committee on Women’s Rights, June 1975.

Among the issues discussed is that of equal pay for women. The manifesto makes the point that ‘women are for the most part absent from union meetings, trade councils and the annual conference of the Federation of Labour’ (1975:61). This points to the lack of influence from women on the issue of worker’s rights and status. Also, that women’s pay is roughly half that of males. However, the manifesto was confident that this situation would improve after the full implementation of the Equal Pay Act, in 1977. This confidence, the 1978 manifesto admitted, was misplaced since in spite of the Act, women still struggle for pay parity with males (*Manifesto*, 1978:30).

Abortion was discussed in a separate chapter under the title ‘Individual Freedom’. Abortion was supported by the Values Party in terms of the UN Declaration of Human Rights, article 18- ‘everyone has the right to freedom of thought’, but otherwise the manifesto states it does not advocate abortion ‘just as it does not advocate the use of alcohol or other drugs’ (1975:51). In this way, the manifesto places abortion in the same category as alcohol and drugs use which may reveal an absence of direct input by women on this issue or the prevalence of a more general attitude toward abortion. The two cases are distinct in that while alcohol and drug use, are matters of individual choice, this is not the case with unplanned pregnancies. Also, the reflection people might typically apply before taking alcohol or drugs might be very slight when compared to the issue of life and death confronted by women who may be considering abortion.

The following article from the Values Party magazine *Turning Point* (July/August, 1975, vol. 1, no.7.) indicates that there was potential for a woman’s perspective on abortion and other issues from outside the Values Party, also that this influenced the
Party’s policy; but also that greater effort was required to ensure this continued. This view came from Dr Margaret Mead in an address, ‘Restoring Women’s Voices in Planning’ delivered at the United Women’s Convention, 1975 attended by 2,200. Mead touched on the subject of participation versus representation, and insisted that women must be wherever the decisions are being made. This sentiment set the tone for subsequent activities.

Workshops at the convention followed on topics such as ‘women in continuing education’ with the emphasis on women with dependents and those returning to work. Recommendations were then made. Those receiving immediate endorsement concerned abortion law reform. This recommendation emphasised Dr Wall’s recent amendments to the Hospital Act that abortion be carried out only in public and private hospitals, (which the 1975 Values manifesto pointed out, was passed by 43 male members of Parliament). Other recommendations included women having a say in ecological control of the environment, joining the Women’s Electoral Lobby movement, and the issue of the use of sexism by news media including the exploitation of women in advertisements.

The writer of this article, Margaret Stewart, commented that ‘sometimes during the plenary session one could easily have been listening to remits at a Values Party Conference...and indeed there were at least two familiar faces on the rostrum’ (Turning Point July/August, 1975, vol. 1, no.7). Stewart’s concluding remarks were that, although the Values Party has had from the very outset a high number of women, they could not afford to get too complacent since, in spite of the number of women, the greater burden of voicing issues for women was carried by a very small number. She concluded that increased participation by women would only result from greater effort by women themselves (Turning Point 1975:3, vol. 1, no.7).

Later in 1975, a group of women from the Auckland region met to discuss the remits arising from the 1975 Values Party National Conference. The group was surprised by the way women were ‘lumped together’ with ethnic minority groups, and unanimous in their rejection of Home Worker’s Wage, remit no.237, ‘which can only operate in such a way as to freeze women into a role society still sees as exclusively theirs, that is, housekeeping and mothering’. The women advocated that they wanted to see ‘women having the confidence in their own capabilities to tackle what have in the past always been regarded as especially male professions’ (Turning Point Nov/Dec, 1975:12, vol.1, no.9).
A formal linkage between women’s interests and the Values Party can be demonstrated when the Feminist Network is considered. This network arose from a Values Party conference workshop as did others on, for example, forestry and socialism. These workshops were described generally as a ‘relatively new approach, using the Values organisation to link people throughout the country who share concern for a particular issue’ (Vibes, July, 1979:9 no. 30). The article continues that ‘the theme of the feminist network workshop was to point out that Values women could increase their own skills and awareness, and at the same time reach out to other women in the community, respond to some of their needs, and promote awareness of Values through a range of feminist activities’ (Vibes, July, 1979:9 no. 30).

Part of the preferred framework included working through existing institutions to raise awareness of discrimination and women’s issues, and building alternative feminist institutions.

Examples of working through existing institutions included calling on Values women to support the Working Women’s Charter by Regional Trades Councils which had been rejected by the Federation of Labour (FOL) on the issue of abortion. The question of feminism within Values was touched on only briefly in Vibes (July, 1979:9, no. 30), but it was agreed that it was up to women in Values to ‘watch that the egalitarian policies of the Party are borne out in practice’. A formal network newsletter was thought unnecessary and that contact between women could be effected through the ‘web of contacts already existing in Values... .’

‘We stressed that it is very worthwhile to get involved in any area- to tap the resources Values offers in the form of people and experience for the good of others in the community, and at the same time demonstrate Values principles in action and win recognition and support’.

This quote ends significantly in that it points out that ‘as feminists say, “the personal is political”, and this expresses the challenge to the liberal demarcation between politics and society represented by organisations like the feminist network within the structure of the Values Party (Vibes, July, 1979:9, no. 30).

A critical examination of the ‘egalitarian policies’ of the Values Party was conducted by Deirdre Kent in an article published in the feminist magazine Broadsheet
(December, 1979:20-23, no.75). Under the title ‘Values-practising what it preaches?’ Kent goes so far as to claim the party as feminist, declaring that the Values Party bases itself on principles that Kent identifies as ‘traditional feminine values’ and that the ‘... Party has grown into its role as a feminist party’. Kent looks at the party’s history and events of particular importance to feminists. For example, in 1976, it put in place the condition that at least one woman be placed on the committee to select a full-time field-worker. Also, in 1977 Jeanette Fitzsimons gained an ‘overwhelming vote over two men for the position as spokesperson on energy’, and finally, the success of Margaret Crozier in challenging for the party leadership in 1979 (Broadsheet, December, 1979:20, no.75). This, Kent argued, is why a high number of women were attracted to the party, but Kent warned that there still existed a tendency among women to subordinate themselves to male party members when it came to party positions.

In this regard, she recalled how when she joined Values in 1975 she saw the need of a feminist ‘ginger group’ to act as watch-dog. She also pointed out that ‘other minorities have not yet been heard within the organisation, and that, for example, there was no obvious gay or lesbian ginger group. Kent also observed that formal women’s networks are scant with only two in the country, and efforts in 1977 to introduce an element of positive discrimination in favour of women failed because ‘the party was not genuinely convinced of its rightness’(1979:22). Kent concluded that ‘women are active in the Values Party and, of the women members, large numbers are committed feminists. They will not give up their watch to see that the party remains feminist in behaviour as well as in policies’ (Broadsheet, December, 1979:23, no.75). This view is supported by the fact that in the 1984 manifesto, Beyond ‘84, only the women’s section is retained, sections on Maori and youth, for example, had disappeared.

Although expressing the positive aspects of working through Values existing framework, Kent finished with recognition of the limitations of doing so in terms of the political expression of women’s interests. Kent pointed out a dilemma which is common in the dichotomy between institutional and movement politics. Moving into institutional forms, such as political parties, necessarily implies a more moderate approach, and pressure to reach consensus. This comes at the expense of a sharp and uncompromising critique of the current order which characterises movement politics (Pivan and Cloward, 1995:237). Kent says that feminists ‘outside the system yell “co-opted” to those inside the system’, and claim that those inside have put themselves in a ‘position where they...
might sell out to the worst of male values’ (Broadsheet, December, 1979:22, no.75).

The view of Deirdre Kent, that movement feminists claimed that institutional feminists had been co-opted, is an important insight as it indicates there will be feminists who do not see their interests best served by a relationship with the Values Party, or any party. Therefore Values policy, while it might authentically reflect the interests of those who see institutional politics as preferred, will always be silent on issues important to the feminists, and other groups, committed to ‘movement’ politics.

Of course there may be some coincidence on issues between groups opting for ‘movement’ politics and those willing to enter into some form of ‘institutional’ politics. Also, unless it is the intention of the feminist movement, and of movement politics generally, to over-throw the current political institutions in order to effect social change, the movements at some point must deal with those institutions. This brings movement politics and institutional forms closer together, or at least casts the relationship as less differentiated where movement politics becomes an adjunct to institutional. It can be concluded that the objection to institutional expression made by those committed to movement politics is fallacious. There is more that is politically useful in the Values Party claim that it is a false dichotomy to distinguish between the Party and pressure groups in order to achieve social/political change; that it is not a question of either/or (Linkletter, 1982 no.23).

This was later referred to as the ‘new political culture’ in Green theory, and regarded as a defining aspect of Green politics (Kelly, 1991:194). More recently this has been reasserted by theorists, for example, Dryzek (1996 a) in whose view the Green movement ought to follow a duel strategy. This resistance on the part of those beholden to movement politics will mean that, at best, the Values Party could claim to represent a section of existing women’s interests, that is, those seeking institutional forms of political expression within the Values Party. This limitation was also evident in terms of Maori interests where Barney Pikari conditions his comments, limiting the extent to which he can claim to speak for all Maori; equating women’s interests expressed within the Values Party with feminism generally is similarly conditional.

As well as these limitations the difficulties of locating the essence of, for example, women’s interests can only be solved by reference to women writers and thinkers expressing some interests rather than others. And it is solely on the basis of interest articulation by women that the Values Party has the potential to reflect some of
those interests. On this basis alone it can be assessed whether or not the Values Party effectively politicizes these issues, thereby challenging the core liberal barrier between civil society and the state.

Values Party material reveals that there is justification for the belief that effective linkages existed which enabled authentic influence on Values policy for women’s groups in society. One example is where Dr Mead, who spoke at the United Women’s Convention in 1975, was quoted in the 1975 manifesto. This forms a conceptual linkage between Values policy formation and the Convention through the words and thinking of Mead. Also, concerns over the issue of women and education expressed at the United Women’s Convention of 1975 were answered in the 1975 Values manifesto with 15 points directed toward this topic. A third example is where the Auckland group met and decided against the ‘Home Worker’s Wage’. Since this was subsequently omitted from the 1975 manifesto, it can be concluded that there was an ‘authentic’ connection between Values policy on this issue and the interests expressed by that particular group of women (Dryzek, 1996a).

**Summary.**

There is much to the comment by Deirdre Kent where she claimed that the Values Party is a feminist party, if only in terms of the issues Kent raises in connection with that view, and insofar as these issues can be regarded as ‘feminist’ in any way. Among the groups examined here it is clear that women’s issues were dominant and closely attended to. This is born out by the fact that only women had a ‘ginger group’ within the Party to act as a ‘watch-dog’, and that, in the 1984 manifesto, only women of the groups examined here retained a section dedicated to their interests. Women also filled key roles in that Margaret Crozier and Janet Roborgh were leaders or co-leaders at different times, and Jeanette Fitzsimons held the position as spokesperson for energy. Therefore Deirdre Kent has every reason to be satisfied that the Values Party was politicizing women’s democratic struggle. This was essential in terms of pay equity where women earned only half the wages of men at that time, and although that situation has only changed in terms of degree, the continued politicization of the issue is the only way to effect change.

In the case of Maori interests, the manifestos gave little evidence of the ‘voice’ of Maori, but the magazines produced by the Values Party contained material which
established a linkage between issues articulated by Maori and politicized by the Values Party. Notably absent from the manifestos was mention of the Treaty of Waitangi. Although it is mentioned in the magazines, its absence from policy statements in the manifestos perhaps indicate less than a complete commitment to the Treaty. If this is the case then the Values Party cannot claim to have politicized Maori interests as Maori have articulated them, that is, with the Treaty at the forefront. Often referred to as the foundation document of New Zealand’s nationhood, it is also the foundation for Maori land claims. An explanation for the Values Party treatment of the Treaty might be that, as Mackwell (1977:77) observes, a mere 1.6% of Values Party respondents to her survey identified as Maori, while even fewer, 0.4%, as ‘Islanders’. A conclusion can be reached that in spite of the attempts on the part of the Values Party to address what they saw as the subordination of these two groups in New Zealand, as Mackwell (1977:77) comments, these groups ‘obviously do not see the Values Party as a means of articulating the grievances’.

Recognition of the Treaty’s status as New Zealand’s foundation document and the basis of Maori land claims, would have mediated against a perception that New Zealand was multicultural in favour of a bicultural society as designated by the signatories to the Treaty. A less than full appreciation of the Treaty might also be the reason the manifestos advocated the retention, rather than return, of Maori land. These issues aside, there is reason to suspect that although on many issues the Values Party responded in politicizing the issues thought salient to Maori, perhaps they failed in articulating Maori interests in a completely satisfactory way.

There is evidence of a high degree of convergence between Values policy and youth interests, especially those expressed at the National Youth Congress, 1972. Although subsequent manifestos (1975, 1984) do not have a section dedicated to youth issues, and the concerns of youth participation raised at the 1972 Congress are subsumed under generalised policies around participation.

It is difficult to be entirely satisfied with the Values Party performance in politicising the interests of, in particular Maori, and also those of women, in spite of the positive comments in this regard by Deirdre Kent. According to Talshir’s theory of modular ideology, it can be concluded that the core ideology has an over-riding effect on policy outcomes.
Chapter 8
Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand

Values to Green, ideological challenge, sustainability, regional development.

Two versions of the end of the Values Party and the emergence of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand can be found. In the first instance the Greens emerge as the Values Party in all but name; that is, a rebranding exercise to retake the political field as the Green Party. The second version is one in which the Values Party is quite separate from the eventual emergence of the Green Party. In this version the latter had its beginnings as Green groups present in the 1980s, these uniting, easing the Values Party to the wayside, albeit with the agreement of those who chose to remain in the Values Party until the very end. These differing versions result in differing conclusions about the relationship between the two main Green parties in New Zealand.

In the first instance, Hope and Jesson (1993) report that a decision by the Values Party ruling council resulted in the termination of the Party in 1989. This followed a series of decisions, most significant of which was the change in name in 1986 from the New Zealand Values Party to ‘Values, the Green Party of Aotearoa’. The switch was completed in the 1988 Party Conference that gave itself the name, the Green ‘gathering’. Emerging from the gathering was ‘The Green Party of Aotearoa- New Zealand’. Stephen Rainbow had surmised the remaining elements of the Values Party acted as the nucleus for a new Green movement in New Zealand (1989:182).

In the second instance, Mike Ward (former Values co-leader and Green Party MP) has said that at a meeting of senior members of the Values Party on the Kapiti Coast in 1988, a decision was made to make way for something else in the face of falling membership of the Values Party with most joining the Greens. A remnant pocket of the Values Party kept going until 1989 until negotiations with the Greens were completed and the days of the Values Party were at an end (personal correspondence, 1st Feb, 2005).

The first version put forward by Hope and Jesson (1993) and Rainbow (1989), raises
questions over the reasoning for folding one Green political Party only to rejoin the political fray under a different name when other factors, for example the electoral system, had remained unchanged. For this reason, the information provided by Mike Ward, where the Values Party and the emerging Green Party are differentiated, provides some understanding of the fall of the former and the rise of the latter based on falling membership of the Values Party and that rising in the Green groups. Although the Values Party and the Green Party may be differentiated on the basis of the information provided by Mike Ward, the transfer of personnel is one factor that indicates that many similarities will be evident between the two. Prominent among those of the Values Party and rising again in the Green Party were Jeanette Fitzsimons, Rod Donald (both co-leaders in the Green Party), and Mike Ward, as mentioned, all MPs in the 2002-2005 Parliamentary term. It will be demonstrated that the similarities between the two are grounds for the view that Green party politics in New Zealand had been initiated by the Values Party and carried on by the Green Party of Aotearoa/New Zealand. However, one immediate improvement in the fortunes of Green politics in New Zealand is indicated where the Green Party, contesting its first general election in 1990, achieved 9% of the popular vote, thereby eclipsing Values’ best result of 5.2%.

*The Greens Policy Directions* (1990) continues the trend of short, eight page ‘leaflet’ style manifestos as was the 1984 Values manifesto. For this reason, it lacks the detail of earlier Values manifestos that ran to 91 pages in the case of *Beyond Tomorrow* (1975). New technology has meant that manifestos now exist in electronic form on web-sites developed by political parties, and it is from this source of information, in the form of policy, press releases and speeches, that the Green Party Aotearoa/ New Zealand will be analysed with regard to democracy in New Zealand.

Following the 1990 general election result which, under the old first past the post (FPP) electoral system meant no seats in Parliament were allocated to the Greens, the Party joined with four others to form the Alliance late in 1991. The other parties included, the Liberals, the Democrats, Mana Motuhake, and NewLabour. It was considered by Hope and Jesson (1993) that a ‘polyglot five Party coalition’ would not last, and although three Green Party members, Jeanette Fitzsimons, Rod Donald and Phillida Bunkle, became MPs for the Alliance in 1996 indicating some level of success within that Party, the Greens decided to
split from Alliance and contest the 1999 general election under their own banner. This, it has been suggested, was the intention at the outset when the Alliance formed; that once mixed member proportional (MMP) had replaced FPP, Alliance would disband with each of the constituent parties then contesting future elections separately (Rainbow, 1995:476).

The background to this was the view that minor Party electoral co-operation was seen as a way to combat the barrier to these parties gaining representation under the first past the post electoral system (Rainbow, 1995:475), and this had certainly been the experience of the Values Party as previously mentioned. MMP was voted in by a slim margin in 1993, and the first signs of the split between the Greens and Alliance came in October, 1997. This occurred when the Green Party, though still officially a member of the Alliance, began a campaign of personalised advertisements featuring their three MPs, and appealing for Green Party support. The separation was formally recognised in September, 1999 just before the general election, when the Speaker of the House, Doug Kidd, recognised Green Party co-leaders Jeanette Fitzsimons and Rod Donald as Green MPs for Parliamentary purposes. From here on in the Greens would seek their political fortune alone.

Although there was considerable common ground among the parties within Alliance, for example their opposition to free-market economic policies that had dominated New Zealand since the fourth Labour government came to office in 1984, only material produced by the Greens after their departure from Alliance will be considered here. This is in order to be as certain as possible that we are dealing with Green politics rather than that produced in alliance with other parties and ideological influences.

Generally the analysis is concerned with the orientation of the Green Party into the political field according to the tasks identified by Talshir (2002). These include a critique of the existing order, magnifying the discrepancy between the ruling ideology and socio-political reality which justifies a new vision, and necessitates a route to actualise this vision. As with the analysis of the Values Party, this orientation is divided into three main areas that will be looked at with the focus on democracy.

The first concerns the revival of politics and resistance to the end of ideology thesis evident in Green Party material (Bell, 1962). In this way, Green Party material will be examined to the extent to which the Party’s ideology resists the anti-political tendency of
modernity (Torgerson, 2000). This will focus on the points raised by the Green Party that fundamentally question assumptions about the goals society should pursue and how these goals should be achieved.

The second examines Green policy initiatives directed toward the institutional reformation of liberal democracy, and addresses the question asked by Rainbow (1991:255) on the consequences for the latter of the direct democratic impulse of Green politics. Although there is only one year between these phases of Green politics in New Zealand (from Values to the Greens) some significant distinctions can be drawn between them on the matter of institutional reform, and a more detailed analysis will be conducted in this section as Green Party material is examined.

The third aspect concerns the Party’s representation of various groups in society. The theoretical framework referred to in this regard is that provided by Talshir (1998, 2002) whose conception of ‘modular ideology’ focusses on the accommodation of the sub-ideologies of a plurality of actors under core Green ideology. From a methodological point of view this aspect may be accessed by utilising what Fairclough (2001) calls intertextuality, or the voice of the other, to provide evidence of sub-ideologies. This, it is intended, will reveal the degree to which representation within the Green party is authentic (Dryzek, 1996 a).

In order to clarify the process of meaning construction as a political process, interest will focus on the external relationships the Greens have with other significant political parties, in particular the Labour Party which, since 1999, has formed the core of Government in New Zealand. Also of interest is evidence of the emanation of Green ideology throughout civil society. This is of interest insofar as it relates to the process of counter-hegemony following Gramsci, in particular, the success of an ideology among the mass of the population prior to the contestation for state power (Boggs, 1984). The importance of this emanation has been recognised by co-leader Rod Donald where he commented ‘...its always the power of persuasion that we have to rely on to convince people that we have the right ideas and offering the best way forward’ (interview, 16th July, 2003).
This section on Green Party ideology begins with a brief overview highlighting the prominent aspects that receive greater attention later on. To examine the evolution of Green politics in New Zealand since the formation of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand, it is necessary to return to 1990, one year on since the demise of the Values Party. The general election of 1990 was contested on the basis of a manifesto *The Greens: Policy Directions* (1990). This will be referred to as *The Greens* (1990), and it reveals that although Green politics in New Zealand now identified itself with the Greens as an ‘international movement’, not much had changed from the Values era in terms of the issues focussed on. However, the particular treatment of some issues reveal significant changes.

The similarities can be gauged from the high degree of correspondence in terms of policy direction and principles evident between the Green Party and its predecessor. For example, in proclaiming its alignment with the international movement, *The Greens* (1990) states the familiar Values belief that the survival of the earth depends upon urgent attention to the ‘threat from pollution and environmental abuse’, and that the fate of humans is closely intertwined with the survival of the biosphere (1990:1). Also familiar from Values is the observation by the Greens (1990:1) that the earth is finite and ‘all living things are dependent on each other and on the world in which they live’, as well as being mindful of the well-being of future generations. This was evident in Values material with the title of the 1975 manifesto *Beyond Tomorrow*, alluding to this aspect.

The Greens Economic policy *Thinking Beyond Tomorrow* (revised 2001) revives this aspect, the term ‘beyond tomorrow’ expressing the inter-generational approach in Green ideology that is often counterposed to what the Greens see as the prevalent approach to resource use with little regard for the future. This is expressed, in the above Green policy, where the vision is of a future ‘where each generation...passes on soil, air and water in a healthier state than we inherit them’. Also, the holistic/Arcadian view in combination with imperialism evident in Values ideology, reappears in the Greens material in the two...
statements of vision ‘of a country where human needs are met without damage to the other species that share the earth with us’, and ‘a future where technology is harnessed to extract more value from each unit of resource...’ (The Greens, 1990; Wissenburg, 1997).

The ideological confrontation with neo-liberalism evident in Values material, again surfaces in Green Party material. This is where the Green Party seek to displace an overriding focus on economic growth as the dominant organising principle of society, and subordinate it to the pursuit of ‘sustainable environment’. The term ‘sustainable’ continues its rise in saliency in Green politics and politics generally, as was discovered within Values Party polices. This important term will be examined in detail later. Consistent with the Values usage of the term, The Greens (1990) refers to energy use in favour of the more efficient use of all energy types and a move toward renewable sources, solar, and wave action, for example. These measures were set out in the Values manifestos of 1975 and 1978.

Electoral reform appears in The Greens (1990) manifesto as it had in Values manifestos since 1972, and again the argument is for a mixed member proportional (MMP) system on the grounds that it would avoid the formation of minority governments which had become a feature of the New Zealand voting system prevalent at the time.

A section attends to the Treaty of Waitangi in The Greens (1990), and although this had not occurred in Values manifestos, a separate section for Maori issues is consistent between the Greens and its predecessor. Also consistent between the two is a separate section for Women’s Policy focussing on the elimination of oppression and gender stereotyping. Also a focus on women’s educational and career opportunities is consistent between Values and The Greens, as well as a concern to achieve gender balance in decision-making.

The crisis/resolution theme that predominated in Values Party material, is again prevalent in that of the Greens. For example, the Greens rely on a propositional assumption that New Zealand had lost its way and is drifting without direction and is ‘rudderless’ (Fitzsimons, 13th Feb, 2005). The analogy of a tsunami is used to describe the magnitude of the crisis produced by the combined effects of ‘oil depletion, climate change, and ecological collapse’ (Fitzsimons, 16th Jan, 2005). As with the Values Party, this assumption provides the grounds for the justification of the alternative, that is the Green Party and its
This alternative finds expression in Green material variously as the ‘new paradigm’, or the ‘radical alternative’ (Donald, 11th August, 2000), and a vision which may be distinguished from that to which the world is dedicated (Fitzsimons, summer conference, 26th Jan. 2003). The Green approach is contrasted with that of the ‘old grey parties’ (Donald speech to Green AGM, 2002), ‘establishment parties’ (Donald, 10th June 2003), and ‘Conventional parties and Governments’ (Donald, speech to Green AGM 2004). These descriptions of other parties and governments suggest they represent a staid approach from an era past, behind the times, unsuitable and insufficient to deal effectively with the crisis that faces New Zealand and the world; this sense that the current institutions of government are inadequate in their present form to deal with the emerging demands in society was also evident in Values Party material from the outset in 1972.

For the Green Party, this suggestion of inertia is coupled with a sense that not only are current approaches unlikely to avert the crisis, but that they serve only to further our progress toward an inexorable end. The inevitability of all this is expressed within the analogy of a ‘Greek tragedy’, referred to by Jeanette Fitzsimons. Speaking on genetic engineering she comments, when the Government does act ‘...we watch like the chorus in a Greek tragedy, as the doomed players, blinded by the dollar signs in their eyes continue to gamble, knowing it is only a matter of time till one of those unpredictable products causes an environmental and economic disaster’ (Fitzsimons, address to Green AGM, 2003). This analogy is used again in reference to the foreshore and seabed issue where Fitzsimons comments, ‘The resulting knee-jerk promise to confiscate couldn’t be withdrawn, and from then on it all unfolded like a pre-ordained Greek tragedy’ (Fitzsimons, AGM, 2004). This analogy gives the sense of a process in play which, like an out of control juggernaut, seems unable to change its direction and impossible to halt. In this way, it expresses both an opposition to the ill-considered and uncritical following of a predetermined course, as well as an expression of the powerlessness of those who oppose it in order to stop it. As with the Values Party, the Green Party struggle to comes to terms with the barriers to effecting social/political change.

In the way that the analogy points out the unexamined, unfolding of events, it also unveils the course of action as arbitrarily resting on an ideology that had succeeded to the
point where it is no longer viewed as an ideology but rather as commonsense. In this regard the implication that the course of action is followed in an unexamined and uncritical way, immediately suggests that examination and criticism should be engaged in and, in the process, raise the prospect that things could be otherwise. In terms of Green ideology, this means that things could be organised according to the ‘sustainable’ principle with consequently different outcomes for the environment and economy. This then stimulates political debate where generally the ‘new right’ is, firstly, revealed as one ideology among others; destabilizing its commonsense status, and secondly, confronted by that of the Greens and their framework of sustainability (Donald, Green Party conference, 1998). The sense of powerlessness perhaps fuels the Greens’ desire to become part of a government, but first, following Gramsci, it is necessary to win the support of the majority of the population for their ideological principles before they can expect support for the measures built on those principles (Boggs, 1984).

An examination of the ideological framework of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand (hereafter the Greens) can continue as other documents are examined. This examination reveals the central concept ‘eco-nation’. In *Green 2000: Framework for an Eco-Nation* (1998) an eco-nation is made synonymous with a ‘sustainable’ nation and ‘sustainable’ is offered as the central organising principle for New Zealand. *Framework for an Eco-Nation* raises a number of issues central to the Party’s world-view. Behind this world-view is a holistic approach where ‘human needs are met without damage to the other species which share the earth with us’(1998:2).

More importantly, in terms of the revival of politics, ‘sustainable’ has become a salient keyword (Williams, 1983). Its rise to saliency is possibly because, like democracy, the term is almost unquestionably regarded positively, and implies acceptability of what ever it is associated with. Political parties and other groups contest the meaning of the term and since these meanings are ideologically imbued, the struggle over meaning is a political struggle aimed at securing the hegemonic dominance of one meaning over others (Fairclough, 2003).

The significance given to the term can be gauged by the number of times it appeared in Green Party (2002) policy as well as that of other parties. For this reason it is central to
the following discussion. For the Green Party the term appears in 25 out of 32 of their 2002 policies, ranging from urban policy, and arts, through to health, conservation and environment. For the Labour Party, it appears in policy on tourism, energy, defence, and transport as well as the environment. Other parties follow this trend. For example, the Progressive Party employs the term in policy and views on economic development, and the National Party advocates a ‘sustainable’ environment.

Briefly it can be illustrated that use of the term among various parties does not always result in similar policy outcomes, and this is indicative of the differing ideological underpinnings applied to the term. For example, the National Party includes in its ‘Vision for New Zealand’, ‘sustainable development of our environment’, and this, it can be argued, has similarities with Labour’s statement that sustainability is the cornerstone of environment policy, and the Greens recognition of the need for ‘ecological wisdom to underpin everything we do’ (response to Prime Minister’s statement 13th Feb. 2001; Environment Policy Statement, 2002). However, while for the Greens and Labour these statements lead to policy such as the introduction of a carbon tax and commitment to the Kyoto Protocol on control of carbon emissions, for the National Party it means the opposite, that is, opposition to the carbon tax and withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol (National’s Climate Change Policy, 2004).

Even among those who agree on a commitment to Kyoto, there are differing shades of meaning that reveal greater ideological divergence than is initially apparent. For example, on the matter of urgency and implementation of policy, although the Labour Party has stated in its Sustainable Development Strategy (2001) that it will implement our ‘national commitments’ under the Kyoto Protocol by 2002, the Greens note that the government commitment to the Kyoto Protocol is ‘all talk, no action’ since the Government had ruled out a carbon tax before 2007 (Fitzsimons press release, 30th April, 2002).

The struggle over meaning can be gauged by the words used around the term, indicating a definition of the term and the way in which various users of the term attempt to subvert other usages in favour of their preferred use. In this way, dominance of the discursive field may be achieved with the victorious meaning being that which forms the commonsense use (Fairclough, 2001). Since the Labour Party has formed the core of government since 1999, it must be concluded that it is their meaning of sustainability that is
currently prevalent and it is this meaning which the Green Party attempts to displace.

The similarities of the meaning of ‘sustainable’ between the Green Party and Labour Party can be illustrated when considering the Labour Party’s *New Zealand Sustainable Development Strategy* (2001), which advocates, as mentioned, a reduction in global Greenhouse gas emissions and associated ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 2002. Also and that the market price of resources should reflect the environmental and social costs and benefits of economic activity in line with the OECD strategy. These views place the ecology at the centre of sustainability, and this is certainly the position of the Greens. However, the Green Party contend that the Labour Party does not apply this strategy completely and that it favours economic growth over other considerations. Co-leader of the Greens, Jeanette Fitzsimons has commented in a press release on 31st January, 2003 that the ‘Government’s fixation with higher growth...did not bode well for a ‘sustainable future’, concluding that ‘sustainable development is not about ‘how to grow the economy’...’.

This disjuncture of meaning between the two is further evident in the *Labour Party Economic Policy* (2002) in which it is stated that in order to achieve the goal of moving New Zealand back into the top half of the OECD, New Zealand will be required ‘to lift the sustainable growth rate of the economy’. As previously mentioned, Jeanette Fitzsimons has drawn a distinction that rules out conflating economic growth with ‘sustainable’ development, and in so doing, subverts the equivalence between the two terms that the Labour Party attempts to establish.

This struggle over the meaning of sustainability continues in a response by Rod Donald to the second reading of the Industry NZ and Trade NZ Integration Bill on the 10th June 2003. He states that

“During the committee's consideration of the bill we sought to replace the words “sustainable economic growth” in the functions clause with the words “sustainable development”, in order to give the Government the chance to live up to its own rhetoric. The committee did change “sustainable economic growth” to “sustainable economic development”, but these words do not mean the same as sustainable development. They clearly imply that economic interests take precedence over social and environmental considerations” (Donald, 10th June, 2003).
In this case, Donald continues the efforts of Fitzsimons to subvert the association of ‘sustainability’ with economic growth. He does this by insisting on a particular meaning of ‘sustainable’ and implies that the Government distorts this meaning by emphasising economic growth.

This contest over meaning is directed toward a practical outcome which can be seen by applying the theory of conceptual capture within a state imperative (Blaug, 2002:113; Dryzek, et al., 2003). Had the Greens successfully displaced the Governments meaning of ‘sustainable’ with their own, they would have directed the policy in a way consistent with that meaning. Exactly how Green sustainability would work in policy depends on its operationalisation. In this regard, Green sustainability is applied as the ‘triple bottom line’ approach where economic, social and ecological considerations are taken into account. Labour have adopted this term in their Sustainable Development Strategy, 2001, as previously mentioned. However, Labour evade this meaning, according to the Greens, in the Industry NZ and Trade NZ Integration Bill by again insisting on emphasising the economic aspect. The Greens claim some success at conceptual capture where Jeanette Fitzsimons has commented that the Government has adopted this term in some policy. For example, changes the Greens achieved to the Local Government Bill in 2002 include incorporating ‘sustainable development’ in terms of the ‘triple bottom-line’ programmes into the bill (press release, 10th Dec, 2002).

Donald’s suggestion that the Labour use of ‘sustainable’ is rhetoric, merely recognises that the term has a different meaning for Labour from that which the Greens argue for. This is revealed where Donald insists that, in line with OECD recommendations, the Government should ‘buy Green when spending public money’, hinting that to do otherwise would be a contradiction of the Government’s intention to be ‘a world-leader in sustainability’ (press release, 5th Feb, 2002). In this way, Donald is seeking to add the weight of an international organisation to the Green Party meaning of sustainability over that of the Labour Government; thereby seeking to displace the latter with a meaning that has the support of the OECD.

The contest over meaning is continued where Jeanette Fitzsimons replies to the PM's Statement to Parliament, 11th February 2003. ‘The Minister says sustainable development is about growth. It is not. Nowhere in the world is that accepted. It is about meeting human
needs while living within the limits of the planet’. In this process, where there is a claim over the ‘correct’ meaning of ‘sustainable’, the Greens insist on the meaning presented here, while at the same time claiming that this is already the commonsense usage and any other meaning is a corruption of this. This claim can be regarded as an attempt to pre-empt the struggle over meaning, and is a tactic frequently used in politics where, for example, a political leader will presume to be speaking for all New Zealanders. An example of this is where Donald declares, with reference to ‘the foreign buy-up of Aotearoa’, that ‘New Zealanders are rightly upset that the world’s wealthy are buying up ... trophy properties’ (Just Trade # 57). The rhetorical aspect exists in that Donald could not know how all New Zealanders regard these sales, and since someone has sold these properties, it can be certain that not all New Zealanders object to this activity. Also, the use of ‘New Zealanders’ implies all the inhabitants of the nation New Zealand. Its use is ambiguous in that while it can be true that those who object are New Zealanders, the implication that all New Zealanders object cannot be true. However, reference to New Zealanders suggests that the Green Party is upholding the majority view, while the Party sidesteps the issue of exactly how many New Zealanders object which could be done by quoting from a survey, for example.

This clarifies a central difference between the two ideological positions which can be stated as, while the Greens insist that sustainability should emphasise ecological and social aspects, the Labour Party, for example, gives greater emphasis to the economy. Another area in which this ideological divergence is evident concerns how the ‘state of the nation’ is measured.

An examination of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) illustrates the workings of ideology behind a particular world-view that is perpetuated according to the way information is gathered about the world. GDP for the Greens, paints a ‘distorted picture of the “state of the nation”’(press release, Donald, 24th Sept, 1999). The analysis of Marilyn Waring concludes that the conceptual apparatus employed, in what may seem neutral measures, is aimed at raising government tax revenue, and, as a consequence, nations using this measure (which is the prevalent UN system of national accounts), accept uncritically factors that are regarded within Green politics as negative and unsustainable (cited in Carter, 1999:216).

The measurement of the ‘state of the nation’ then becomes a site of political contestation, since what can be known of this abstract term depends on how it is
operationalised and what categories are used in the process of making ‘state of the nation’ accessible and measurable. The political debate, therefore, revolves around the choice of categories measured, and it will be illustrated here that the Greens, in a process referred to by Fairclough (1992) as relexicalization, seek to displace the terms and categories associated with the current measure of the ‘state of the nation’ with concepts drawn from their conceptual apparatus in order to distinguish ‘good’ growth from ‘bad’, in their terms.

For the Greens, GDP is of ‘limited use because they count only those economic activities where money changes hands’ (Donald, 1999-address to Grey Power, 14th sept. 1999), and it says nothing about ‘whether that growth relies on a headlong rush to consume our natural resources or whether it is environmentally sustainable and socially beneficial’ (Donald-press release, 27th March, 2000). In this way, an oil spill, which for the Greens represents an ecological disaster, generates economic activity in the subsequent clean up and therefore is added as a positive factor in the GDP calculation, and for the ‘state of the nation’.

The Greens attempt to rearticulate what the ‘state of the nation’ should mean, and how its condition should be measured by insisting on a ‘modified set of national accounts’ that distinguish good from bad economic activity, guided as usual by Green sustainability. In addition, asserting the two additional aspects usually associated with the triple bottom-line principle, the Greens advocate a parallel set of natural resource accounts and social indicators, and this, for the Greens, would ‘measure national achievement and well-being more effectively than GDP’ and secure a sustainable future (Donald, press realese, 27th March, 2000).

Jeanette Fitzsimons makes the point that the term ‘state of the nation’ itself reveals an ideological bias to which the Greens object. Preferring instead, ideological holism that stresses the interconnections between humanity and nature, the Greens attempt to displace ‘state of the nation’ with ‘state of the planet’ and, in this way, reject the arbitrary drawing of national barriers, since pollution, for example, does not respect nation-state boundaries (Fitzsimons, speech Waiheke Island, 16th Jan. 2005). This point, along with the proposed ‘modified set of national accounts’ and ‘natural resource accounts and social indicators’, produces an altogether different emphasis when measuring growth, and, in some cases, leads to the an outright rejection of some activity formerly judged positively for the nation.

Furthermore, the Greens claim popular support for their views, where Fitzsimons...
states that ‘measuring our success solely in terms of Gross Domestic Product clearly doesn’t reflect the values that New Zealanders hold’. This claim is made on the basis of a survey from the Government’s Growth and Innovation Advisory Board, and Fitzsimons concludes that ‘New Zealanders want true prosperity—a real quality of life rather than a higher place on a meaningless economic league table’ (Fitzsimons, press release, 19th April, 2004).

The example once again serves to highlight, firstly, that Fitzsimons attempts to preempt the struggle over meaning by generalizing from a sample and claiming that New Zealanders want that which the Green Party is offering, and therefore claim that their concepts had already achieved hegemonic success. Secondly, the example illustrates the general aspect that concepts structure thought and action in that the dominance of a particular conceptual apparatus promotes particular outcomes and, in the process, suppresses the practice of alternatives. Challenge to the dominant conception of how well a country is doing depends upon alternative concepts which would emphasise, in the case of an alternative to GDP argued for by the Green Party, issues central to Green politics, for example, that more will be done to avoid things like oil spills and unsustainable practices.

Although it is clear that the Greens seek to displace the way in which growth is currently measured with a conceptualisation of growth that conforms to Green sustainability, no more detail than this general intention can be known. This is because the alternative measures in terms of ‘a modified set of national accounts’, and ‘natural resource accounts and social indicators’, do not currently exist. This means that, on one hand, where pre-emption of the struggle over meaning insists that generalised acceptance of the Green view already exists, on the other hand, the application of alternative indicators would provide a practical and observable countermeasure with which to contend the dominance of GDP. In this way, claims that general acceptance already exists is a rhetorical strategy designed solely to convince rather than a belief that every New Zealander thinks in a particular way. It is argued that the development and use of alternative measures would indicate, on the part of the Greens, an acceptance that the struggle is not yet over, and would also be a useful vehicle to effect the penetration of Green ideology throughout civil society. The importance of this would be to greatly enhance the Greens’ electoral prospects and support for their policies.

This was the experience of the German Greens where electoral success followed a period where the Green perspective became central in German politics, its ideas penetrating deep
into the mainstream (Pulzer, 1995:139-140).

Fitzsimons reports that although the Greens were granted $700,000 from the budget to develop alternatives while working with the Department of Statistics and the Minister of the Environment, this ‘did not produce an outcome that was meaningful in itself’ (Fitzsimons, interview, 2005). The ideological challenge usefully raises questions over what may be regarded as generally unproblematic (for example, the use of GDP) and in so doing raises the possibility that other measures (alternatives to GDP), would justify alternatives to achieving the production imperative. However, the failure of the Greens to practically apply their ideology mishandles an opportunity to give substance to Green ideas.

Important within the Green ideological framework is the proclivity for local development that the Party brings forward for consideration. This orientation is linked to the Green ‘sustainable’ principle and the eco-nation framework. This is submitted as a challenge to the ‘Growth and Innovation Framework’ of the Labour Party, within which the term ‘sustainable’ is oriented toward strengthening the ‘economies capacity to grow’ (Growth and Innovation Framework, 2002: 9).

Green sustainability then, confronts other organising principles, for example ‘free market corporate globalisation’ (Donald addresses to Green AGM, 2002). The latter is rejected on the basis that it is both ecologically unsustainable, and that it works against the development of human scale communities. Jeanette Fitzsimons reasserts the attack on large scale, think big, and globalisation in a speech to the Forest and Bird AGM in June, 2004. Here she draws a contrastive relationship between localisation and the needs of the people as ‘sustainable’, on one hand, and sets these factors against globalisation and the world as a market place, along with profit making, which, by implication, are regarded as unsustainable.

Commenting on the impact of large scale developments, Fitzsimons argues against a proposed amendment to the Resource Management Act on the basis that the amendment would give the Minister for the Environment power to bypass public concerns on the grounds that this would be in ‘the national interest’. This, for Fitzsimons, is a return to the ‘Think Big’ era opposed by the Values Party in the 1970s and 1980s, and represents a threat to democracy since local councils will have no recourse to the Environment Court (press release, December, 2004). In this case, ‘public concern’ is at a regional level and
Fitzsimons’ objection is consistent with the Green Party principle that decisions ought to be made by those most affected. However, applying the Green Party principle ‘appropriate decision-making’ the implication is that the level at which decisions are made is open to a determination (this is discussed in section 8.2) and it can be seen that the essence of Fitzsimons’ statement above is an argument for the involvement of people in the regions in the institutional arrangements of centralised liberal democracy, in this case, the Environment Court. This may be contrasted with advocating the autonomy of those living locally to be able to seek solution through entirely regional/local means which, it will be recalled, was an integral aspect of Values Party policy to deal with the concentration of power in centralised institutions.

In terms of production and consumption, however, the Greens argue that regionalisation is the way to avert the crisis of energy use and ecological destruction. It has been argued that the ‘limits to growth’ thesis of the 1970s is evident in the Green slogan ‘neither left nor right’. This evident in that the dominant ideologies of the West are both associated with a commitment to accelerating industrial production with little regard for the capacity of the earth to absorb the resultant pollution or recuperate the resource loss (Dobson, 2000). Green Party opposition to ever expanding economic development can be traced to the 1970s where the Values Party, anticipating the Green slogan ‘neither left nor right’ advocated community control of small-scale production aimed at community need, and this was encapsulated in the term ‘co-operative community enterprise’. This view, from a Green ideological perspective, may be contrasted with that of the Labour Party which reveals a commitment to an instrumental attitude toward the environment characteristic of modernity. This is stated in its Environment Policy (2002) that ‘our country has a wonderful endowment of natural resources and a mild climate that is the production engine of its economy’.

The propositional assumption that the development of a global economy is somehow inevitable is implicit where Helen Clark states that a ‘sustainable’ framework depends on ‘an economy capable of adapting quickly to the changing international environment’ (Helen Clark, press release, 2003). This position from the Labour Government is challenged by the Greens where the latter argue that the perceived ‘inevitability’ is rather, the non-recognition of the arbitrariness of neo-liberal ideology on which global trade liberalisation is based.
This is evident in Green Party statements that will be examined in terms of their ideological opposition to neo-liberalism, and in terms of the alternatives offered by the Greens.

The critique is launched from an ideological position and is applied to a practical situation, that of global trade. In this way, Green ideology has the potential to raise the arbitrary aspect of neo-liberal ideology as one ideology among others, and thereby disrupt its dominance. Also, from a practical perspective, revealing the arbitrary nature of the acceptance of neo-liberal ideology, raises the prospect that other ideologies, which bring their own organising principles aimed at differing practical outcomes, may be applied to issues such as global trade. In doing so the Greens raise a fundamental question around whether global trade under neo-liberalism is the best form of trade. This is apparent where the Greens insist ‘Localisation, rather than globalisation is the watchword of truly sustainable development’ (Donald, Green Vision and Action 13th Feb. 2001).

This theme is emphasised by Green MP Mike Ward in an address to the WasteMINZ conference 10th Nov. 2004 where he quotes from an overseas source that in order to meet the responsibility of ‘looking after the planet and people---localisation rather than globalisation is the key...’ In the same address Ward makes ‘excesses of consumption’ equivalent to ‘unsustainable’, ‘deeply destructive’ and ‘unsatisfying’, and by contrast, ‘sustainable’ equivalent to ‘community’, ‘co-operation and generosity’. Construction in favour of the latter is encapsulated within the term ‘eco-community’. Eco-community has links to the bio-regions idea of core deep Green ideology, and these links are especially evident in that both advocate human scale communities, cultural and biological diversity, co-operation and community responsibility.

In a section entitled ‘An Eco-nation Builds Strong Local Economies’ (Green 2000, 1998), the Greens’ challenge to a global economy begins with the suggestion that global economies will always make New Zealand vulnerable to economic collapse happening elsewhere. On these grounds the Greens assert the value assumption that local economies are therefore better than global economies. This, to some degree, repeats the Values Party argument for decentralisation as the solution to the problems they perceived with central government, aimed at achieving autonomy for people in rural and urban areas. The significant difference is, as will be discussed in the next section, that while pre-1978 Values focussed on governmental decentralisation, the Greens have economic decentralisation in
mind within a framework of eco-centrism that determines the type and extent of economic development.

There are two main aspects to Green localisation. The first, considered here, is the ideological challenge the Greens offer to capitalist relations of production in terms of its effects on human relations with the result that the Greens privilege communitarianism over individualism. The second, considered in section 8.2, relates to the Green argument for participatory democracy via a reconstruction of the relations of production on the basis of community ownership. Since both these approaches occur in the Green policies, *Community Economic Development* (2002) and *Work and Employment* (2002), there will be some repetition of material.

For the Greens, local economies inspire an emphasis on ‘local people’ in ‘local jobs’ using ‘local resources’ and ‘local knowledge’. But the main emphasis is the value assumption that community is preferable to an emphasis on the individual. Also that a symbiotic relationship is suggested between ‘strong local economies’ and ‘strong communities’, which may be contrasted with centralised economies based on individualism. The Greens’ attack on individualism, like that of the Values Party, can be seen as a propensity for communitarianism against the neo-liberal existential assumption that society does not exist, and against the neo-liberal value assumption that individualism is preferable. The Green view can be regarded as similar to that of C.B. Macpherson’s rejection of possessive individualism which, for Macpherson, works against the development of community (Macpherson in Holden, 1988). In this way, Green Party objections to neo-liberalism are clarified through the parallels that may be drawn with the communitarian theorists.

Communitarians such as Ferdinand Tönnies and Alasdair MacIntyre attach importance to traditions and a shared conceptual apparatus, forming the basis of community identity. These factors justify the claim for an ethical basis for decisions oriented toward a common goal. This is contrasted with core liberal ideology, under which reconstruction of the common-good languishes under the insistence of individual sovereignty. Alasdair MacIntyre has characterised this as typical of the modes of thought and practice of modernity where the self is liquidated into a set of demarcated areas of roleplaying in the pursuit of maximum utility (in Sandel, 1984:128). Under such a conception of utility seeking
individuals, there is an affinity between liberal democracies and ‘free-markets’, where the worker becomes a commodity and is treated as such while the capitalist becomes homoeconomicus and is subordinated to the requirements of capitalist calculation for whom persons are means only and humanity disappears thereby eroding the possibility of strong community bonds (Levine, 1981:131).

Against the liberal emphasis on individualism, the Greens advocate small scale production and this is evident in Green policy on *Community Economic Development* (2002), and *Work and Employment* (2002). *Community Economic Development* advocates ‘enterprises which are community owned, not for personal profit…’. Communities are defined in opposition to the private sector and any Government or local Government influence. In this way, community economic development aims at the decentralisation of production, including finance and consumption (buy local). The Green Party undertakes to ‘support local economic development that is ecologically and socially sustainable’, and to this end the Green Party supports the development of local currency schemes such as bartering, ‘time’ and ‘Green’ dollars, and this is aimed at maximising the circulation of profits within local communities.

This emphasis on community production aimed at providing the conditions of economic independence, challenges capitalism and, in particular, the commodification of labour. An essential aspect of the capitalist process of industrialisation consisted of removing the conditions of economic independence. Community production advocated by the Greens, reestablishes these conditions and frees labour of the necessity to ‘sell’ itself even in the absence of more favourable opportunities (Offe, 1985 a:17).

Offe (1985 a) also points out the ‘fictive character of the commodity’ of labour in that, unlike other commodities, it cannot be separated from its owner. Where it is assumed that the worker can be separated from their labour, it is also assumed that the economic sphere is separate from other spheres of social life. This, argues Wood (1995:19), has aided the capitalist mode of production in establishing itself as commonsense, since as a separate sphere it has become an abstract entity emptied of its social and political content.

The Green policy that advocates support of community production initiatives based on co-operatives and need as opposed to profit, reverses the capitalist abstraction of production and reestablishes this activity within the wider considerations of human society.
and ecology. Under these conditions, where worker and citizen know no barrier between these functions, economic activity becomes politicised, opening capitalism to critique. Therefore, in order to disrupt the hegemonic dominance of the capitalist mode of production, there must first develop a commitment to eco-communities. This would establish a common world-view around the particularities of where the community lived, enabling the development of a telos, or a commonly held societal goal, part of which may include reforming the productive sphere along co-operative lines. Since eco-communities rely on regional development, the first step must be to ensure this.

The Green Party *Community Economic Development Policy (2002)* would positively contribute to restructuring the relations of production and breaching the abstraction behind which the capitalist mode of production survives as a de-politicised sphere. The problem is that the current abstracted condition means that worker and citizen are separate entities, and the arbitrary nature of this must first be revealed by an ideological confrontation with liberal capitalism. Similarly, it is only a remote possibility that people would spontaneously embrace changing the relations and mode of production in accordance with Green thinking on bio-regions, within which local communities produce in harmony with their particular surroundings. What is absent is the initial ideological struggle which, if successful, provides the grounds on which structural change can be built. Since Green policy is only to *support* local economic development that conforms to Green ideology, the success of Green policy is weakened in that it depends on the mass of the population experiencing a spontaneous awakening that just so happens to coincide with Green ideology.

This may be compared with the Values Party that had a similar decentralised, community production/consumption policy, encapsulated in the term ‘co-operative community enterprise’ (*Manifesto*, 1978). The Values Party and the Greens are closer in terms of decentralisation when considering community economic development which each differentiate from both private profit and State power. However, when decentralisation and politics are considered, the Values Party solution approaches what Hannah Arendt called the ‘council system’, a form of participatory republicanism based on a federation of face-to-face groupings (Canovan, 1998:48). While the Greens also advocate such participation, they have no policy equivalent to that of the Values Party. The Greens’ policy is one of support for the spontaneous emergence of community production; and this is a condition for the future
development of participatory democracy within the productive sphere.

In this respect the Green Party and communitarian theory do not completely converge with regard to the importance attached to the development of community and rejection of liberal individualism. Levine (1981) argues that political alienation is the product of two main developments. The first is the dominance of instrumental reason in the relations between people and the environment, and where market relations dominate in society. In this regard, the Greens can argue they have an effective answer against this particular cause of political alienation within the detail of the eco-communities ideal. However, as will become increasingly apparent as the present argument proceeds, the Greens offer only a partial solution. This is due to the Greens growing commitment to representative and centralised institutions of governance and it is just these representative institutions that Levine (1981) identifies as the second development, compounding rather than ameliorating the problems raised by the first, both of which negatively impact on democratic participation by the population.

Two practical examples will be discussed that illustrate both the Green Party’s ostensive commitment to regional development, which is the first step toward eco-community as mentioned, and also uncover Green Party commitment to centralised governance which, as argued, negatively impacts upon regional autonomy and participation. On balance it can be concluded that the Green Party shows a stronger orientation toward centralised governance.

The first example concerns the Labour Governments’ move in late 2003 to close an estimated 300 schools over the next ten years. The schools were predominately in rural areas, and objections from the Greens centred on the negative effect on local communities, and especially, how this move, along with the establishment of unemployed ‘no-go zones’, spelled the beginning of the end for small communities. These measures would have the effect of reducing the possibility of the development of localised bio-regions and a holistic way of life, and further the tendency toward centralisation in the main urban centres.

The planned school closures were criticised by the Green Party spokesperson on Education, Metiria Turei as ‘structural violence against rural and provincial communities’, and an act of theft since rural schools are usually the result of years of local fundraising (Turei, press release, Nov. 2003; Reply to Prime Minister, 10th Feb. 2004). Also, Turei had
said earlier that the message was that the days of rural communities were numbered and that this policy by the Government contradicted its own regional development strategy (Turei, press release, Oct, 2003 and Jan. 2004). It was the Greens view that ‘a region cannot develop with any degree of certainty and sustainability when public services, like schools are taken from them’, and at the heart of this was the failure of governments to see well-being holistically (Turei, speech in Parliament, Feb. 2004).

However, when criticising the school closures, Rod Donald appeals to central government to be responsible for regional development, rather than, for example, advocating that local communities take on the responsibility themselves (press release, 20th Jan. 2004). To advocate the latter would be consistent with encouraging the development of decentralisation and local autonomy, however, since the appeal was to central government, the implication is that central government is the proper place for decisions to be made on regional development. This decision by the Greens negatively impacts upon the development of participatory democracy.

A specific example indicating the Green Parties’ centralising tendencies concerns the resistance to the closure of the rural school Orauta in Northland. It was made clear by the Green Party in early 2004 that it would support any school that resisted closure by the Ministry of Education. This is expressed by the Green Party where Metiria Turei says ‘I urge communities facing school closures to not give up. Fight for your children, your communities and the future of provincial New Zealand, the Greens will do everything we can to support you’ (press release, 10th Feb. 2004). This is consistent with Green Party advocation of regional development, since the closure of schools deprives regions of infrastructure and forestalls development of ‘distinctive rural communities’ (press release, 10th Feb. 2004). Rod Donald added to this argument stating that schools are ‘the hearts of their communities’, have an ‘important part to play in our future’, and are essential infrastructure for regional development (urgent debate, 24th Feb, 2004). The central importance of schools as the heart of a community was applied specifically to Maori communities by Sue Bradford with reference to Orauta School, the closure of which ‘contradicts the Government’s...intention to nurture...education appropriate to the needs of tangata whenua’ (quoted in press release by Turei, 10th Feb, 2004).

However, subsequent events indicate that the Green Party commitment to do
‘everything they could to support schools’ threatened with closure, has a specific meaning that was not immediately obvious. Orauta School remained open in spite of Ministry of Education orders to close. The school was deregistered, and threats of legal action made against parents and management of the school. For its part, the school claimed the right to remain open under tino rangatiratanga within the 1835 Declaration of Independence, and argued for the return of school land to Maori (Northern Advocate, 22 March, 2005).

A review of Green Party press releases, speeches and campaigns indicate that the Green Party intention by the term doing ‘everything we can’ amounted to working through the institutions of centralised governance. This was indicated by Rod Donald’s response (mentioned earlier), and is evident where Metiria Turei congratulated the Ministry of Education on its offering the Orauta school land back to Maori. Another move was to urge the Ministry to consult on how to ‘provide Maori immersion education in the area’ (press release, 16th Feb, 2005).

The perception of these developments in terms of support for the school is expressed by Ken Brown, chairman of the board of trustees at Orauta school, in that, as of the 24th May, 2005 they had not been contacted by any member of the Green Party in support of their stand (personal correspondence, 24th May, 2005). The trustees of Orauta school were clear they had received no support from the Greens, and since Ken Brown declared that trustees have ‘lost confidence with this government system’, and did not trust the Ministry of Education, it is unlikely that the solutions so far offered by the Green Party would be regarded as effective support for the school’s autonomy since they are mediated through just the institutions the board of trustees felt alienated from (personal correspondence, 24th May, 2005).

In spite of the importance to local communities the Green Party attached to schools, the unfolding of events has indicated that in terms of regional development, the principle that those most effected should decide what outcomes are most suitable, gives way to the ‘appropriate level’ principle. In this case, the Green Party decided that the appropriate level was the centralised institutions of Government, as opposed to regional autonomy. It should be noted that this decision is inconsistent with appropriate decision-making where this is understood to mean that those most effected should predominate in decision-making. It is also inconsistent with the principle of regional development, especially where Maori are
concerned since the area is of predominately Maori population.

The second issue concerns the workforce specifically, where the Labour Government planned to designate 259 rural communities as ‘no-go’ zones for the unemployed. This runs counter to the Greens’ desire to build ‘strong local communities and economies’ and so, on these grounds, the Greens were opposed to this development fearing that the communities that make rural New Zealand will be killed off and everyone herded into Auckland, Wellington or Christchurch (Bradford, press release, Jan. 2004). Bradford also made the point that, as with school closures, the move contradicted the Labour Governments’ regional development statements that it would ‘encourage greater partnership with industry and local communities’ (Labour Party, *Science and Innovation Policy*, 2002). Also, the Greens saw regional development as essential to relieving the infrastructural pressure on urban centres and did not want to see rural populations as a source of labour for urban areas.

In the course of these two issues the Greens were critical of how democracy, within Parliament and within the community, worked, and their focus centred on consultation. Specifically consultation between Ministers, cabinet and the Prime Minister, and consultation with the local communities involved in the decisions. In the first instance, *The Press* reported on 28th Feb. 2004 that the Prime Minister, Helen Clark, had said that the review leading to school closures had never been a Cabinet decision, but that ‘it was not extraordinary for an Education Minister to look at school closures without Cabinet approval’. However, the *Sunday Star Times* on the 29th Feb 2004 reported that while Clark made her comments, Education Minister, Trevor Mallard, said that he had kept Cabinet colleagues informed of the situation. In the view of Rod Donald, the public might lose confidence in a Government that produced such contradictory statements.

Further, the press had received ministry papers that stressed media management and details on how to ‘sell the closures to affected communities’ (*Sunday Star Times*, 29th Feb, 2004). The idea of ‘selling a decision’ runs counter to the Green principle of community involvement in decisions affecting that community. It was on this basis that the Greens were critical of the Government, expressed by Metiria Turei with reference to the question of consultation by the Ministry in the communities affected, that the consultation process was ‘farcical’ (press release, 9th Nov. 2003). This clarifies the Green position with regard to regional development in that while regional autonomy is ruled out, the Greens insist on
consultation between the political institutions and citizens. However, this raises the issue of consultation that dominates the Green Party’s approach to democracy and this will be examined in the following section.

**Summary.**

This section has highlighted some areas in which the Green Party in New Zealand fundamentally challenges the predominant liberal ideology and neo-liberal approaches to the states’ productive imperative. Consistent with the Values Party and the ‘limits to growth’ thesis, the Green Party oppose the dominance of economic growth as an organising principle. Central to this challenge has been Green sustainability that insists that ecological and social factors be taken into account. It was also argued that Green Party opposition extends to the global expansion of markets, and that at the basis of this opposition was the rejection of neo-liberal ideology. Localisation directly opposes this development and is linked to core Green thinking that may be traced to writers such as E. F. Schumacher (1973). The Green Party also contest current world-views by opposing how information about the world is gathered. In the case of GDP the Green Party argued that its sole focus on economic activity results in policy outcomes skewed in this direction. Transposition of key concepts currently used in the measure for those linked to Green ideology, would shift the emphasis away from economic activity and take into account ecological and social factors. These again relate to the term central to Green Party politics, that is ‘sustainable’. The term has become a site of political contestation and therefore is a good illustration of the clash between ideological positions, stimulating politics at a fundamental level beyond adjustments to an already determined course.

However, it has also been discovered in this section that the Green Party fails to convert ideological opposition into practical outcomes and therefore, in those instances, fails to exploit its oppositional stance on those issues discussed. This has the consequence of losing both the opportunity of demonstrating, in a practical way, that Green ideology has solutions to problems, and of having Green ideology penetrate into civil society. In the examples of alternative measures to GDP and local development by opposing school closures, it was found that the Green Party lacked the commitment to convert ideological opposition into practical outcomes. This may be regarded as a serious flaw for Green politics
since the development of alternative measures to GDP, together with sufficient publicity of the same, would greatly aid the incursion of Green ideology into civil society, enhance the party’s electoral prospects and their counter-hegemonic challenge.
8.2

Green initiatives in terms of the reform of the democratic institutions centre on the process of consultation between central government and citizens. It is evident from The Greens (1990) that the treatment of ‘democracy’ has undergone some change when compared with Values manifestos.

The institutional reform advocated by the Values Party has been discussed in section 7.2, and it will be recalled that this included decentralisation of political authority, involving a reduction in the functions and size of central government; in order to satisfy demands for participation and regional autonomy (Blueprint for New Zealand, 1972; Beyond Tomorrow, 1975). This is consistent with the view of Goodin (1992) for whom the distinguishing characteristic of Green politics is the emphasis it places on decentralisation. Instead of a section dedicated to democracy, The Greens (1990), for example, deals with issues related to the current system of democracy, for example electoral reform. Also, in a section entitled ‘regional development’, the Greens use the term ‘independent regional government’ which, on the surface, may be regarded as to some degree equivalent to Values’ 1972 reference to ‘decentralisation’. However, it is argued that the change in terminology marks a significant change for Green politics in New Zealand on the issue of democratic reform.

While regional independence suggests resistance to centralised government, in that local autonomy would require a shift in power from the centre to the regions in the way advocated by the Values Party, it is evident that the Greens, while focussing on the regions, do not regard ‘independent regional government’ as implying a simultaneous reduction in central government power. Therefore, for the Greens, regional independence is not based on a critique of the liberal institutions of central government, and this has implications for any measure advocated by the Greens in terms of participation since the balance of power

For the Values Party, decentralisation was a critical response to the centralised nature of government which was cast as ‘too big and too clumsy’ with ‘all the power... concentrated in relatively few hands’. This critique was then the grounds for sharing power, along with a reduction in the ‘functions and size of central government’ (Blueprint for New Zealand, 1972; Manifesto, 1978). For the Green Party, however, independent regional government focusses on the ‘...richness and diversity in all aspects of life...’, and that the habitats of other creatures must be considered when regional development is considered. As such, this approach mobilizes Green ideology as a critique of centralisation with the focus on promoting ecological holism, rather than both political decentralisation, and a political critique of the institutions of centralised, representative, liberal democracy (The Greens, 1990). In this regard, independent regional government has its emphasis on the ecological region, rather than regional government, since it is incoherent to speak of independence for the regions while leaving the power of central structures intact.

Regionalism, in this regard, becomes a matter of the recognition of bio-regions and this is evident where The Greens (1990:8) states ‘the region is that part of the earth which we can get to know intimately and are primarily responsible for’. This is consistent with the ‘deep-Green’, or eco-centric, version of decentralisation traceable to the work of Berg and Dasmann (1978), though it is evident in The Greens (1990) manifesto that the political aspect of the bio-region conception has been modified. While the Greens emphasise the human scale communities, cultural and biological diversity, co-operation and community responsibility aspects of bio-regionalism, they exclude the long-term goal of creating a patchwork of anarchist politics linked together through networking and exchanges rather than formal state apparatus (Berg and Dasmann cited in Eckersley, 1992; The Greens, 1990). It can be concluded that the Greens are not prepared to restructure the institutions of centralised liberal representative government, and now look toward that apparatus as a means to achieving their goals. Although The Greens (1990) subscribes to a deep-Green view in the advocation of bio-regions, politically, the institutions of centralised liberal democracy are thought adequate to deal with ecological problems. On this basis the Green Party can be regarded as environmentalist rather than ecological since the latter insist that existing political structures are inadequate to deal with these problems (Pilate, 1980).
A conclusion can be reached that for the Greens since 1990 ‘regional independence’ is associated with the bio-region, and that independent government would enable people living locally to consider regional development in terms of their bio-regions’ specific ecology. This can be contrasted with the political critique of centralisation, and by implication, representative government, offered by the Values Party.

It can be argued that for the Green Party the attainment of MMP sufficiently improved representation (in that the number of seats a Party wins in Parliament is proportional to the number of votes gained) to the extent that decentralisation is no longer justified. However, the Green Party ceased arguing for decentralisation before MMP was instituted. Also, MMP by itself does not solve the problems that decentralisation was intended to address by the Values Party, specifically the concentration of political power in few hands. Finally, MMP does not alter the liberal barrier between issues regarded as matters of politics and those that are thought to properly belong elsewhere (Hindess, 1996:31). The issue then becomes one of access to the decision-making apparatus and who has the power to make decisions. Central to this question is the Green Party term ‘appropriate decision-making’.

Among the four Green Party principles, the most explicit reference to democracy is made in the third point of the ‘Green Charter’ which refers to *Appropriate decision-making*. This advocates that decisions be made directly at the appropriate level by those affected (*The Greens*, 1990). The term caused some concern among Green Party members, as to exactly what it meant. For example, Jill Whitmore, writing in a Green Party magazine, comments that ‘This must surely be the least-understood principle if not by us, then by the public at large’ (*Greenweb*, Aug, 1995:4).

It can be seen that ‘by those affected’ has some resonance with the Values Party view on decentralisation where Values advocated a ‘real opportunity for participation in all decisions which affect peoples’ lives’ based on ‘a fair share of resources, wealth, and decision-making power’ (*Values manifestos* 1975:13; 1984). However, with the use of the

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1Linked to the theorist E.F. Schumacher where he contends that scale should depend upon what is trying to be achieved and is therefore variable. This applies to the duality between autonomy and co-ordination where different purposes require different structures (*Small is Beautiful*, 1973). Therefore, a commitment to local autonomy would require appropriate structures to facilitate this, that is decentralisation.
term ‘appropriate level’ by the Green Party, a condition is added to the participation by those
affected, and consequently this participation is subject to a decision as to which level is
appropriate. This removes local autonomy since the power to decide on the appropriate level
must override all other levels, that is, it must be centralised, and it is exactly this
centralisation of power that the Values Party were critical of. The appropriate level principle
could only imply local autonomy if the Green Party had policy by which this autonomy could
be instituted and they do not.

In the same way, ‘directly’, though it implies some form of participatory democracy,
is also conditioned by the ‘appropriate level’ clause, and such a condition opens the
possibility that the decision process moves in the opposite direction to participation, that of
representation. Since, if it is decided that the decision should be taken at the national level,
then the decision is made on behalf of those affected rather than directly by them. In these
cases those in the regions may view themselves as politically alienated.

This point may be elaborated when it is considered that although the Greens identify
with the international Green movement, ‘appropriate decision-making’ is notable since it has
replaced the term ‘grassroots democracy’ found in the charter of other parties of the same
movement. For example, a Die Grünen programme includes grassroots democracy among
its principles and defines this term as the ‘increased realisation of decentralised and direct
democracy’ (n.d. page 8). Within this statement, ‘decentralised’ and ‘direct democracy’ form
a coherent meaning. However, the Greens’ combination of ‘directly’ with ‘appropriate level’
is at best an ambivalent combination of opposites.

This rearticulation seems contradictory since while direct democracy is feasible on
a small scale through decentralisation, direct democracy finds its opposite in representation
for which elections are a necessary feature. Wood (1995:217), for example, has observed
that an election can itself be regarded as an oligarchic practice that did not belong to the
essence of the democratic constitution. This essence refers to the direct participatory
democracy practised by the ancient Athenians, and therefore may be contrasted with
representative institutions, which, on this understanding, contribute to the alienation of
political power. It can therefore be concluded that the Green Party had begun to move in the
opposite direction to the Values Party in terms of the distribution of political power and
therefore emphasise the liberal aspect over the democratic in their approach to liberal
democracy.

Rod Donald has confirmed this where he comments that the Green Party aims to enhance

‘democracy within the context of appropriate decision-making so that at various levels there are more appropriate decision-making mechanisms than at other levels. So we’re not a Party that is into direct democracy where people vote in referenda on everything from prostitution law reform to whether there should be a bottle deposit scheme, for example. We do subscribe to the benefits of representative democracy where you have law makers who are deeply involved in looking at the issues in front of them and who represent the people in deciding the outcomes’ (interview, 16th July, 2003).

This may be contrasted with an earlier statement in which Rod Donald says that representative democracy ‘...is definitely not the ‘Green extension’ of democracy he had hoped to facilitate by becoming a Green politician (Dann, 1999:409). Therefore, while the Green Party’s use of the term appropriate decision-making is not in itself fraudulent, it is sufficiently ill-defined as to leave room for an interpretation that the term implies a ‘commitment to local politics and some form of participatory democracy’ (Dobson, 2000:106). However, Rod Donald’s comment above rules this view out and it can be concluded that the Green Party in New Zealand has become increasingly committed to representative institutions.

The change in the Green Party position over time is evident, where the partial rejection of representation is displaced by its wholehearted acceptance. Significantly, it can be noted that this change has occurred in the period that the Green Party has held seats in Parliament. Also the influence on Green politics in New Zealand by similar arrangements, in particular coalition in government, will be explained later.

Whereas the overwhelming evidence indicates that the Greens are committed to representation, participatory democracy is mentioned in the Greens Community Economic Development policy (2002). This policy argues that strong local economies ensure participatory democracy, though exactly how is not clearly set out. The intention of the Greens policy may be clarified by looking at marxism, from which it borrows to some extent
especially on the issue of the separation of citizen functions as producers and the polity. For Marx the separation of the political and civil spheres distinguished modern politics, and since the primary activity in civil society is production, the solution to the problem had to focus on production and the workplace. The idea led to syndicalist, Council Communists and Guild Socialists ‘setting up democratic decision-making institutions in the workplace’ with the intention of abolishing the rift between the citizen and worker at one stroke (Schecter, 1994:7). Also the commune and co-operative production had, for Marx, the potential to ‘abolish the political realm as a separate, alienated sphere of unaccountable political power’ (Schecter, 1994:8).

This idea received elaboration in the work of G.D.H. Cole where his guild socialism based on the organisation of local areas into communes or wards, would allow for maximum political participation, and it can be seen that this intention is preserved in the Greens policy (Pateman, 1970). The Greens’ policy advocates community production bringing with it, as the Greens stated goal, participatory democracy. More generally, Green support of community production, against capitalist relations of production, links production and political emancipation in the way argued for by Laclau and Mouffe (1992) where every project of radical democracy implies a socialist dimension as it is necessary to put an end to capitalist relations of production which are the source of numerous relations of subordination.

It can be argued that although the Green policy on community economic development addresses the economic emancipation of labour, it cannot be regarded as radical democracy. This is because the Green conception does not go as far as the marxist notion of the commune, and therefore, misses the target of political emancipation. Democratic participation in the productive sphere still retains the separation of the productive and political spheres, and does not achieve self-government of citizens. This is evident in the Greens Community Economic Development policy (2002) where there is no explicit connection between participation in the productive sphere and that in local or national politics. What is missing from the Greens policy is political decentralisation and the coextensive weakening of State power that would provide the necessary conditions for the development of participatory democracy. Also, in the way that the development of participatory democracy is tied to the spontaneous development of community production,
the Green policy is primarily one of support for the latter and a weak policy for achieving the former.

It can be argued from this that it is only after the development of community production that capitalism would become open to critique, and this seems to reverse the order in which change would occur. Also, following Gramsci, it can be further argued that only after a successful ideological challenge would people be willing to change the way in which the productive process is organised. This points up, once again, the importance of public access to the Green ideological position on these issues. Also, since the development of participatory democracy is dependent upon the development of community production, the absence of a concerted ideological attack on the capitalist mode of production, means that development of the former seems all the more remote.

Therefore, any ‘Green extension of democracy’ amounts to consultation within the institutions of representative democracy at the nation-state level, and which reasserts the liberal division between the rulers and the ruled and moves in the opposite direction of participation. The next part of this section focusses on a Green proposal to improve the process of consultation. In particular, the Green Party criticism of existing institutional access points by which citizens may influence policy decisions will be examined with reference to the ‘study circles’ concept.

It is evident since the Values Party days that Green politics in New Zealand has advocated a change in the electoral system from first past the post (FPP) to mixed member proportional (MMP), and this had been continued by the Green Party since 1990. This change to the electoral system came into effect in 1996, and is especially significant since Jeanette Fitzsimons has commented that the main difference between the Values phase and the present is that now the Green Party is in Parliament (interview, 28th Feb, 2005). The effect of MMP on the fortunes of Green politics in New Zealand can be gauged by the fact that the 5.2% of the national vote won by the Values Party in 1975 would have been sufficient to gain seats in Parliament had MMP been the electoral system. It can therefore be concluded that Green politics in New Zealand has had sufficient support within the population for Parliamentary representation for some time.

However, examination of the Green Party in New Zealand reveals that the emphasis on decentralisation is absent, and has been replaced with an emphasis on government
consultation with the public. It is in this context that new meaning is articulated around key Green political terms. For example, the association articulated between ‘grassroots’, direct democracy and decentralisation (Die Grünen, Capra and Spretnak, 1984) creates a tension that must be dealt with by the Green Party in New Zealand. These latter terms do not feature as political aims, although reference to ‘grassroots’ is retained. In order to deal with the tension, the Green Party rearticulate the term ‘grassroots’ in a way that reaffirms the liberal separation between civil society (grassroots) and the locus of political power (the Parliamentary team) (press releases, 26th Jan, 2001; 4th Dec., 2003). This disrupts the association between grassroots, decentralisation and direct democracy. It can be concluded from this that the grassroots are no longer to be regarded as the holders of political power and practitioners of direct democracy, but rather to be consulted with on matters to be dealt with by central Parliamentary institutions.

Consistently, when the Green Party is critical over government policy initiatives it is on the grounds that ineffective and insufficient consultation was undertaken to justify authentic, that is, substantive rather than symbolic, representation of the will of the people (Dryzek, 1996 a). The previous section discussed how Green Party criticisms over the lack of consultation were applied to the issue of school closures. These criticisms were also evident on the foreshore and seabed issue (dealt with in section 8.3) where it was claimed that the ‘Government scheduled a ridiculously short time-frame for its ‘consultation’” (Turei, press release, 16th Sept., 2003). Also, over the issue of no-go zones for the unemployed, Bradford asked ‘who exactly did they [Labour Government] consult with’ (press release, 4th March, 2004).

In response to the perceived lack of consultation, a significant initiative was raised by the Green Party which can be regarded as a practical form of discursive democracy (Dryzek, 1992). Encapsulated in the term ‘study circles’, the idea first emerged as ‘societal-wide conferences’ put forward by the Values Party as policy to be utilized whenever major policy was being considered. It was under these circumstances that the idea reemerged in Green politics in New Zealand 30 years later. The issue under consideration was the debate over the role of the Treaty of Waitangi, and future constitutional change, which arose in early 2004, although potentially the model has broader applications if implemented in the form intended by the Values Party. Vernon Small, in the Dominion Post of March 12th 2004,
comments that the Greens were calling for ‘registered “study groups” to be set up as part of a grassroots debate’ on this issue.

Fitzsimons favoured community-based groups over the Governments’ preferred Royal Commission or commission of inquiry, since the latter reduces submitters to ‘supplicants’ confronting ‘a group of experts’, rather than as participants in a process of dialogue (Dominion Post, 12th March, 2004; Fitzsimons, Tanczos, Turei, press release, 11th March 2004 b). Fitzsimons argued that people were jaundiced about royal commissions after the genetic engineering inquiry(dealt with later this section), and that the proposal the Greens were putting forward ‘put people in charge of an inquiry’. Also that this last point was a condition that would override developing proposals she would agree with. An outline of how the process would work included that self-organised groups would ‘register to take part in the national dialogue’, and each would receive resource materials. At least six months would be allowed for discussion and the media would be expected to report on the process thus encouraging others to join in the discussion (Fitzsimons, Tanczos, Turei, 11th March, 2004 a).

This proposal raises a number of theoretical issues. The first is that the Greens argue that there exists a legitimacy crisis where the liberal democratic relationship between the polity and the state is under some strain (Habermas, 1976). This is evident in Green material where they argue that people have lost faith in institutional democratic arrangements such as Royal Commissions and commissions of inquiry. Warren (2002) has described this as disaffection with political institutions which produces a perception of an apathetic population. For Warren, however, the fault lies with the institutions, and what is needed is a space for the ‘critical citizen’ (Warren, 2002).

Providing for critical citizens has been referred to as the democratisation of the state, and has a historical precedent in the marxist tradition. For example, the Green initiative can be seen in terms of Eduard Bernstein’s marxist reformism. Bernstein was critical of the marxian commitment to the inevitable collapse of capitalism and advocated instead, reforms aimed at public ownership of the means of production and the democratisation of the State (Schecter, 1994:22). Both these elements are in evidence in Green material and are defining aspects of Green politics. Moving from marxism to Green politics, this idea is later expressed by Petra Kelly of the German Greens where she says that ‘Parliaments have proved
themselves incapable of responding to the demands of local action groups. We aim to democratize Parliament...’ ‘We must set ourselves uncompromising programmatic objectives in order to stimulate debate and discussion inside and outside Parliament’ (1991:194).

In this regard, the Green proposal can be seen as a practical application of what Habermas has referred to as ‘communicative action’ in that it alludes to an ideal speech situation free from the delinguified media of power and money (Habermas, 1984). Also, the proposal seems to satisfy the need for the development of diversified ‘autonomous public spheres’ which, armed with communicative rationality, unremittingly confront the state (Dryzek, 1992:35). Furthermore, it satisfies the essence of discursive and deliberative forms of democracy according to Gaus (2003). This is because the Green proposal aims at a ‘real’ process of argumentation or discourse by as many of the population as are affected by a decision. Also that within this process of argumentation, the principle of no force except that of the better argument, as has been contended, should be the only standard to ensure the moral justification of laws, as opposed to consensus (Habermas, 1975:108). This is the strength of the Green proposal.

As a form of discursive democracy, the Green proposal challenges core liberal theory on a number of counts. For example, in terms of representation, the initial stages of the Green proposal move in the opposite direction to the notion of democracy involving representatives arguing over issues on behalf of electors. In this regard, the Green proposal encourages greater political involvement of the population beyond, for example, the minimal conception of democracy favoured by Schumpeter, for whom, citizens voting for political élites satisfied democratic requirements (Hyland, 1995). The democratic impulse of the Green proposal also contains a rejection of technocracy where in the press release of 11th March 2004 (b), Fitzsimons, Tanczos and Turei contrast ‘dialogue in community groups’ with, making ‘submissions to a group of experts’.

The position of experts in the political process has long been criticised by Green politics in New Zealand. This represents a challenge to the motive force behind modernity, that techno/scientific rationality will provide the solutions to social problems, and that the decision-making process should be as brief as possible (Radaelli, 1999:16). This has been criticised on the grounds that it transforms moral/political questions, requiring deliberation, into technical ones decided on a narrow range of considerations. As has been demonstrated,
the moral grounds favoured by the Greens for decisions rests with the principle that sufficient consultation had been entered into. Also, ‘purely’ technical decisions have their ‘purity’ questioned in that the façade of neutrality can serve to hide sectional interests that might dominate should one group's influence in society rise above others in the absence of discussion (Elsner 1967; Habermas, 1976; Wood, 1995). Generally, the Green proposal challenges the degree of separation between the rulers and the ruled, the maintenance of which is central to core liberal democratic theory. In this way, it is an ideological challenge over the meaning of democracy along the borders between ‘the state’ and ‘society’ (Schedler, 1996:15).

As mentioned earlier, Fitzsimons, Tanczos and Turei (press release, 2004 a, b) state that the proposal the Greens were putting forward put people in charge of the inquiry, and that this was a condition that would override developing proposals Fitzsimons would agree with. This can be described as ‘a procedural standard for political interaction that does not dictate a substantive way of life’ (Dryzek, 1992:31). The provision that participants in the discussion set the agenda, opens the possibility for the politicisation of issues previously regarded as matters properly belonging elsewhere, thus extending the democratic consideration of these issues. This then resists the anti-political tendency of modernity and is a return to the conception of politics attending to the affairs of the polis (Torgerson, 2000; Hindess, 1996). However, at the same time this approach risks what Laclau and Mouffe (1992) refer to as the implosion of the social in the absence of a ‘common point of reference’. Laclau and Mouffe insist that, where pure proceduralism is dominated by democratic logic, that alone is insufficient for a hegemonic project. The solution to this is that the democratic logic be accompanied by a ‘set of proposals for the positive organisation of the social’ (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992).

The strong aspect of proceduralism evident in the Green Party proposal, raises the problem of not being able to guarantee outcomes. Since, as Fitzsimons has stated, the study circles were not expected to limit themselves to proposals she would agree with, there is the possibility that the circles might bring about a view of society consistent with that of the Green Party. Equally, however, groups taking part might settle on outcomes regarded as unsustainable by the Greens, the former could only be guaranteed under the conditions where the Green world-view enjoyed hegemonic status.
This commitment to proceduralism is criticised by Gutmann and Thompson (2002:154) who ‘defend the inclusion of substantive principles in a theory of deliberative democracy’ on the grounds that ‘procedures such as majority rule cannot justify outcomes that are unjust according to substantive principles’. In this way, while the study circle discussions have the virtue of being decided on the grounds of no force except that of the better argument, the second aspect, referred to as the ‘Report to the Nation’(Fitzsimons, Tanczos and Turei, press release, March, 2004, a), discussed below, reverts to majority rule and consensus where a balance of views is sought. This has been criticised by Gaus (2003) where the conflict between ideologies ‘strains beyond plausibility’ that politics ought to aim at consensus, and this view is justification for the rejection of that method of decision-making.

The ‘report to the nation’, occurs where the views generated by the circles are directed back to the central institutions. In this way, the study circles form another access point for public submission in the way that select committees do at the moment. Also, it is a form of grassroots consultation rather than decision-making, since the information is solicited from the groups and forwarded to central institutions where a decision is made. It has been argued that by definition this means that the groups will have not participated in ‘any significant sense’, based on the fact that the power differential will favour central institutions over localized, self-formed groups with no formal status (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992:182; Oxford Dictionary of Politics 2nd ed., 2003).

Assessing the ‘study circles’ reveals that the challenge to the liberal separation between the rulers and the ruled is one of degrees rather than an absolute rejection of representative institutions. As Hindess (1996:31) has said, shifting the barrier rather than arguing for its removal. In this way the Greens display a commitment to centralised representative democracy. Therefore, the Green ‘study circle’ proposal is at once a critique of liberal institutions, and a solution that does not substantively or permanently reconstruct those institutions. The proposal effects a means of shifting the institutions closer to the people at the local level, but this is not the same thing as local autonomy.

This indicates the approach to institutional reform taken by the Green Party. This and may be contrasted with that of the Values Party insofar as there is no recommendation from the Greens that central government should be reduced in scope or activity. In this way,
the delinguified media of power is not entirely absent but only deferred. The power
differential between representatives and citizens is reasserted at the point where the decision
is made, and the power differential will always favour central institutions. Also, the example
strengthens the view that the Green Party in New Zealand regard the grassroots in terms of
consultation, subordinated to, rather than autonomous from, central forms of governance.

Finally, while the Green proposed use of study circles was a response to a particular
issue it could be applied more broadly, although it is not currently put forward as policy to
reform the political institutions as Values intended with their ‘societal-wide conferences’.
However, when compared with the Green Party approach to achieving participatory
democracy through community production, the study circles proposal is more rigorously set
out and therefore more likely to become an aspect of New Zealand’s democratic system.
This view is supported where Jeanette Fitzsimons has intimated that the Prime Minister at
the time, Helen Clark, had given unofficial approval to the idea (interview, 28th Feb, 2005).
In this regard, the study circle proposal is an example of the institutionalization of extra-
Parliamentary politics in that, while it seeks closer association with those in civil society, it
preserves and strengthens the current liberal institutions. This is because study circles would
have the effect of diffusing demands for direct influence in policy formation, while at the
same time upholding the current institutions as the final arbiter. The proposal is, therefore,
an index of the commitment to centralisation on the part of the Green Party.

It is argued that increasingly the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand has committed
itself to the centralised institutions of representative democracy. This assertion is based on
a number of considerations already discussed. Other considerations include the Party’s
organisation, and this relates to a conceptualisation that the Greens act as half Party and half
local action group, active in both Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary action, (Kelly,
1991:194). It is evident, however, that the Green Party is becoming more ‘Party’ and less
part of a ‘new political culture’. This is manifest in the Green Party in New Zealand with
the dissolution of the Wild Greens (the first issue to be discussed), which simultaneously
dissociates the Green Party from direct connection with political action outside Parliament
(Touraine, 1985; Offè, 1985 b), and of a politics that breaches the limits of the existing
system (Melucci, 1996).

The second consideration is that simultaneously, as the Green Party moves away from
direct association with movement politics and the devolution of political power to the regions, it moves ever closer to the centre of institutional politics with an ambition for coalition in government. This is evidenced in a change in the way coalition is talked about in the Green Party. The process begins with the rejection of association with any other Party, then, over time, the Greens settle on the belief that Parliamentary representation is better within a coalition government than without. This is the second issue discussed here.

The synthesis of extra-Parliamentary politics with institutional politics has been regarded as characteristic of Green politics. This has been described by Petra Kelly as the ‘new political culture’, as previously mentioned, where the Greens act as half Party and half local action group, active in both Parliamentary and extra-Parliamentary action, ‘...to take public, nonviolent action and to engage in civil disobedience outside and inside Parliament...’, (Kelly, 1991:194).

For the Green Party in New Zealand, this issue centres attention on the ‘Wild Greens’ group, described as the semi-autonomous ‘direct action wing of the Green Party of Aotearoa’ and, as this description suggests, links the Wild Greens within the Green Party organisation (Wild Greens, 1997/98). In March, 1999 the Green Party supported Wild Green extra-Parliamentary activity on the grounds that they could understand the ‘frustration’ behind the action of the Wild Greens, thereby indicating support for public, nonviolent action (Fitzsimons, press release, 11th March, 1999). However, a withdrawal of support emerged in November 1999, shortly before the general election of that year, where a press release from the Green Party states that ‘Nor are Wild Greens’ policies necessarily endorsed by the Green Party’ (Fitzsimons, 16th November, 1999). This confirms the observation by Claus Offe that the attempted synthesis of extra-institutional and institutional politics is fragile (cited in Dalton and Kuechler, 1990).

The days of the Wild Greens were numbered when former Wild Greens spokesperson, Nandor Tanczos became an MP in 1999, and the Wild Greens were transformed into the youth wing of the Green Party, more closely resembling that of other political parties. The Young Greens newsletter, Grass-roots, advocates involvement in protest marches and for young people to take an interest in institutional forms of politics. For example, the newsletter points out that the Tertiary Education Commission considering the Tertiary Reform Bill will now have a student present so that the voice of students will
be heard. The Green Party emphasis on youth involvement in institutional forms of politics continues with Rod Donald, declaring that ‘democracy is not a spectator sport’, and goes on to encourage young people to ‘actively participate’, and by participate he means voting in general and local body elections (press release, 15th Aug. 2004). It can be argued that articulating active participation in terms of voting in elections, as Rod Donald does, is very passive political activity and is better described as encouragement for involvement in the representative system, rather than participation. Donald’s view is encouragement for political activity at the very minimal level in liberal democracy and has resonance with the view of Schumpeter where citizen participation in elections settles the requirements for a democracy (Hyland, 1995). This may be contrasted with the Wild Greens, for whom participation involved direct action. In this way, the treatment of the Wild Greens may be seen as symptomatic of a shifting tendency toward institutional forms of politics on the part of the Green Party in New Zealand.

This indicates a restructuring of the Green Party in New Zealand. As a commitment to the ‘new political culture’ fades it is replaced with a commitment to the institutions of Parliamentary politics alone. More significantly it is a reconceptualization of Green politics generally. In this regard, the shift away from the Wild Greens is symptomatic of a rejection of extra-Parliamentary politics and conflict, by which it is characterised, in favour of consensus and coalition (Pivan and Cloward, 1995:237). This is evident where the rejection of the Wild Greens is also a rejection of their guiding ethos ‘...faith in action not votes’, and this clearly demarcates between direct action and representative politics, signalling a commitment to votes and representation on the part of the Green Party (Wild Greens, 1997/98).

The Parliamentary/ extra-Parliamentary dichotomy is referred to by Blaug (2002:112-113) as the competing discourses of democracy. Using the terms ‘incumbent’ and ‘critical’ to describe distinctive conceptions of democracy, incumbent is characterised with a failure to increase democratic participation and it can be argued that critical democracy, aimed at increasing democratic participation, has more in common with direct action. Blaug (2002) also points out that the democratic intentions of each approach may be antagonistic and strategically opposed, and this corresponds to the view of Claus Offe (1990), that the synthesis of the two is fragile. It is argued that an increasing commitment to incumbent
democracy comes at the expense of the critical, and by rejecting a connection with the Wild Greens, the Green Party finds itself having to deal with incumbent democracy, consensus and coalition thereby weakening its capacity to criticise and justify the Green alternative.

Events preceding the transformation of the Wild Greens outlined above provide an example of public, nonviolent action. This was where a crop of genetically engineered potatoes was destroyed at Lincoln University by 12 Wild Green activists. Nandor Tanczos was quoted as saying that the action was directed toward bringing about a moratorium on growing genetically engineered crops until their safety could be assured. The action was justified on the principle that ‘people not only have the right and power to take direct action, they also have the responsibility’ (Tanczos, press release, 12th March, 1999). This is based on the grounds that Governments have disempowered the people, and that he and his group were taking back that power. This represents a critique of the legitimation of governments, and by implication the institutions of liberal democracy, where the Wild Greens felt that governments were failing to recognise the wishes of the people, and that, therefore, the system of representation was negligent. Therefore, by turning away from support of the Wild Greens, the Green Party also turns away from this particular critique of the institutions of representative liberal democracy.

Following these events, the Green Party strategy changes to focus on consultation, rather than direct action, as a response to a perceived failure of the liberal democratic institutions to reflect the wishes of the people. In the view of Petra Kelly, groups in society would have greater opportunity to implement demands if they were put forward in Parliament and that movements ‘have no option but to relate to the political system as it is, given the nature of power in our society’ (1991:193). Therefore the shift for the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand, has been that instead of acting as a ‘local action group’, the Green Party acts for such groups in society by focussing on the system of consultation between the Government and the population. Therefore, although this signals the end of the new political culture for the Green Party, its commitment to existing institutions is regarded by Petra Kelly as a reasonable course of action. However, evidence suggests that the Green Party commitment to liberal institutions is variable, and it is argued that this does damage to the Party’s counter-hegemonic ambition.

It has so far been argued that for the Green Party in New Zealand the ‘new political
culture’ had come to an end as an organisational form, and been replaced by a commitment to the institutions of liberal representative democracy. Paradoxically, this assertion is further supported where the Green Party extols the involvement of it’s MPs in the ‘venerable tradition’ of protest and ‘honourable dissent’ (Tanczos, press release, 12th March, 1999; Bradford, keynote speech, Globalisation or Localisation Conference, 2001). Street protests represent an example of extra-Parliamentary politics of the sort that characterised the Wild Greens. It is contradictory to, on the one hand, praise the extra-Parliamentary action of MPs, while at the same time cutting organisational ties with the Wild Greens. This has resulted in the suggestion that Green politics displays a ‘veneer of radicalism’ and that the Party’s attempts to cultivate ‘an image of radicalism’ are readily observable (Roper, 2002; Edwards, 2003:213), and this refutes the claim that Green politics is the ‘radical alternative’, differentiated from ‘establishment parties’ (Donald, 11th August, 2000; Donald, 10th June 2003). The differentiation becoming increasingly difficult to justify.

The above paradox can be explained in terms of Offe’s ‘institutional self-transformation of movement politics’, and may be observed in the Green Party starting with its formation from Green groups in New Zealand; embracing the ‘new political culture’ incorporating the Wild Greens, finally the dissolution of the latter with the Green Party focussing on the institutions of Parliament as the proper site of political activity (Offe, 1990:232). While the involvement of MP’s in extra-Parliamentary politics is not uncommon among other political parties, the way it is celebrated as a ‘venerable tradition’ within the Green Party can be explained as the remnants of the new political culture, as the Green Party evolves toward a complete commitment to Parliamentary institutions (Tanczos, press release, 12th March, 1999). This can be seen as an evolution still in progress since the capricious commitment to extra-Parliamentary politics (MPs protesting), has its counterpart in a commitment to Parliamentary politics that can appear mutable.

For example, where Green MPs Nandor Tanczos and Sue Bradford attended a protest against the World Economic Forum in Melbourne in 2000, Tanczos was reported in the New Zealand Herald claiming the protests to be an ‘important demonstration of people power’, and that the protest showed that there is not agreement on the spread of ‘corporate globalism’ (NZ Herald, 12/09/00). Another method of demonstrating disagreement to the spread of corporate globalism is to present an alternative system that opposes the underlying
assumptions of ‘corporate globalism’ at an ideological level as well as practical considerations informed by the Green ‘sustainable’ framework. From this a distinction may be drawn between extra-Parliamentary politics indicated by demonstrations of ‘people power’, and institutional politics, indicated by policy formation on the basis of alternatives to global corporatism. This will then illustrate that the purpose of the street protest can be achieved in ways more relevant to a political Party seeking to convince the population of the veracity of its ideology.

The opportunity to begin the process of alternative formation arose where, at the same time that the World Economic Forum was meeting, it was reported that there was, simultaneously, a forum on an alternative to free trade and globalization, and that this was attended by Bradford and Tanczos (press release, 7th Sept. 2000). Alternatives to global corporatism could form part of Green policy on trade, and would be consistent with its preference for localisation. This policy could form part of a discursive challenge aimed at changing the way trade is thought about and how it is conducted. This process depends upon the success of alternative concepts colonizing those central to World Economic Forum, and this is, initially, dependent upon the development of alternative concepts and their dissemination through Green Party ideology in the form of policy. Altering the way these issues are conceptually framed and thought about would not only demonstrate opposition to corporate globalism, but, simultaneously, stimulate political debate on grounds other than differing approaches to essentially the same ends.

This could be achieved by ensuring sufficient publicity of alternatives and making available concepts on which to base the debate on alternatives. This would have the potential effect of politically activating civil society, which, according to Dahrendorf (1990) ensures that democracy is robust and resists the end of ideology (Bell, 1962). The importance of this can be gauged where Pulzer (1995) points out that German Green electoral success followed a period where the Green perspective became central in German politics, its ideas penetrating deep into the mainstream raising again questions for which there had seemed to be certainties (Williams, 1983:270; Pulzer, 1995). When this is considered, along with the commitment

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2 The World Social Forum was formed in 2001 as a counter to meetings of the World Economic Forum (Starr, 2005:47).
to gaining votes on the part of the Green Party in New Zealand, it is reasonable to expect the emphasis to be on the diffusion of Green ideas into civil society, stimulating political debate and increasing Green Party chances of electoral success.

However, Green Party commitment to Parliamentary politics is set back a little when the opportunity to have Green ideas emanate into civil society is squandered on an instance of extra-Parliamentary action, thus illustrating how incomplete is the commitment to the former. This is because the alternative framework intended to challenge corporate globalisation did not find its way to New Zealand, though it was intended that it should. A Green Party press release, emphasises the point that the trip to Melbourne amounted to research for policy purposes where it is stated that ‘the two MPs have been invited by the Australian Green Party to take part in a number of meetings and forums to look at alternatives to free-trade and globalisation’ (Green Party press release, 7th Sept, 2000).

However, this did not occur, the Green MPs being more inclined toward ‘three days of street action’ (Bradford, personal correspondence, 2005). This incident is one of a litany where Green ideology remains unarticulated, not applied in practical politics and therefore remains inaccessible to civil society. Another example already mentioned is the alternative measures to GDP. While it challenges what is usually unquestioned, that is, what goals society should seek to achieve, the alternative to GDP, along with its ideological framework, remain unarticulated, and this sets back the Green counter-hegemonic challenge to neo-liberalism which, according to Gramsci, must be successful before the struggle for state power proceeds (Boggs, 1984).

On this basis, civil society cannot be convinced of Green ideology unless it is publicised in relation to practical problems, confronting solutions such as those put forward by the World Economic Forum. As well as convincing the public of the alternative, argument inside Parliament against the neo-liberal approach to world trade liberalisation may then infiltrate policy and reconfigure international trade so that eventually it no longer conforms to neo-liberal principles, but rather, Green ideology, by way of ‘conceptual capture’ Blaug (2002:113) and Dryzek et al. (2003). It can be concluded that the involvement by Green MPs in ‘street action’, while it may have added to the ‘radical’ image of the Green politician, contributed to the failure of MPs, and Green politics in New Zealand, to benefit from the alternative forum and the advancement of Green ideology as a viable alternative.
Finally, the presence of MPs at demonstration protests can be regarded as a symbolic gesture since protests are appeals to the political institutions of which MPs are an integral part. Also, unless the intention is to overturn existing political institutions, protests have nothing better to appeal to than the institutions that, in their view, have failed them. Those who believe in protests for democratic recognition of an issue are beguiled by the enduring myth that if democracy will not come to the people, then the people must seize it³. Where it is believed that the institutions have failed to reach the will of the people, then MPs must develop policy to reform those institutions. It is incoherent that Green MPs will join the disaffected demonstrators but fail to develop policy on institutional reform aimed at improving the mechanisms of democracy. This is especially incoherent given moves by the Green Party toward a deepening commitment to these institutions and this is apparent where the Green Party ambition for coalition with the Labour Party is considered.

In the *Dominion* (27th April 2001) Jeanette Fitzsimons responded to an earlier suggestion that the Greens were ‘hungry to put themselves inside the Cabinet’. Fitzsimons replied that while the Greens were ‘discussing the options’ a decision to enter into a coalition would depend on the ‘nature of the agreement that can be negotiated’. However, she conceded that coalition ‘has dangers for a small Party, including compromises on key issues and a potential loss of identity’ (Fitzsimons, *Dominion*, 27/4/01).

Prior to the Greens electoral success in 1999, the issue of closer association with other parties had already risen and resulted in the Green Party seeking ‘greater visibility for the Green Party and the Green message’ (Fitzsimons, NZPA, 20th Oct; 1997). The prospect of closer association with other parties brought with it anxiety that the Green Party would disappear within a coalition or alliance and that its policy initiatives would either find no expression in legislation or be appropriated by the larger partner. This anxiety was apparent during the years that the Greens spent within the Alliance Party where various people expressed the dangers to the Greens of closer relations. For example, Green Party member Diana Mellor had said that ‘I could not see how we could espouse (or even keep) our Green

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³ A causal mechanism between extra-Parliamentary action and policy outcomes cannot be readily established. For example, Clements (1988) claims that New Zealand’s nuclear free legislation of 1985 was brought about through public pressure, but this must be conditioned by the fact that objection to nuclear technology began in 1956 and went through a phase where the demands from civil society were directly opposed by the National Government under Muldoon.
Principles if we allowed ourselves to join others with a more conventional “old school” style of politics’ (Greenweb, Nov/Dec, 1995:4).

These fears might very well have been founded on the experience of Jeanette Fitzsimons who found difficulties getting Green ideas into policy while working in the Alliance. On the question of Green levies and resource charges, Fitzsimons feared that ‘...will participation in the Alliance lead to our dropping these ideas because they are not well enough worked out to be part of a government in 1993? (Greenweb, Volume 3; Issue 1, 1992:11). Mellor however argued that, after three years in the Alliance, the risk to Green Principles was justified on the grounds that such relationships were the most effective way of getting ‘Greens into Parliament’ (Greenweb, Nov/Dec, 1995:4).

This illustrates the tension that has been described as the ‘realos’ / ‘fundis’ debate that originated in the German Greens but can be applied to all Green parties (Kelly, 1991; Eckersley, 1992; Markovits and Gorski, 1993). The ‘fundis’ or fundamentalists, insist that the Greens should remain ‘pure’ and in perpetual opposition. The ‘realos’ or realists, insist that the inevitable compromises that must be made are justified on the grounds that joining a coalition government means there is the possibility of making a genuine difference, and this makes the risk acceptable (Goodin, 1992). The decision now rests on a balance between preserving Green principles and gaining political power. It is considered that the strategic risk is acceptable not only for the purposes of getting into Parliament, but once there, the risk is justified on the grounds that more political power might be acquired. However, it is argued that such a view contravenes Gramsci’s assertion that ideological hegemony must precede the contest for state power. Therefore compromise on principles, with a consequent weakening of both ideological identity and challenge to the current order, should not be risked for the sake of a coalition agreement.

The Party arrived at this conclusion after consideration of the tension between coalition on the one hand, and being an ‘independent force in Parliament’ on the other, and this was raised by Green Party co-leaders before the 1999 general election. Jeanette Fitzsimons observes that although MMP ‘continues to evolve...the old two Party way of thinking dies hard and there is still an expectation that a Party must be totally for or against the Government’. Fitzsimons’ hope was that the ‘co-operation agreement’ under which the Green Party operated ‘as though in coalition’; ‘co-operating where possible, confronting
where necessary’, will be the way coalition governments evolve (*Politics for Beyond Tomorrow* 25th October 1999, Green Party Campaign Launch).

In spite of this ideal, Fitzsimons was only too aware of the tension between the desire to influence government policy and the reality of coalition agreements she had observed. Two years later, in 2001, with seven MPs in Parliament, the Green Party are in a position to support a government, and the issue of coalition rises again where Fitzsimons states,

‘We have got agreement to a lot of processes (enquiries, reviews, working parties, Royal Commission, consultation) but not many outcomes. As you might expect, there are very severe limitations on trying to govern outside Government!’  ‘While it is tempting to seek the hands-on decision-making power of ministerial positions, there are obviously limitations on the inside too. The junior partner in the present coalition, with more seats than us, has achieved few of their key policies and been torn apart by the conflicts between the demands of Cabinet solidarity and Party demands to uphold policy’ (Fitzsimons, 30th November 2001, Christchurch - Eco-politics Conference XIII).

As Fitzsimons has stated, the potential conflict between Cabinet and Party demands is at the centre of the matter, and she points out that the ability for the Green Party to criticise and represent the supporters of Green politics is potentially compromised should they enter Cabinet.

However, with the focus on political power, the following year, 2002, saw talk focus on the ‘limitations on trying to govern outside Government’, with Rod Donald declaring ‘We have learnt in the last three years that it is very difficult to govern when you are not in Government’, also that, ‘I believe we are ready for the responsibility of government. It’s time to stop offering advice from the sidelines and start playing the game’. ‘I hope we can negotiate a workable coalition with Labour’ (Donald, AGM conference, 1st June 2002).

The idea of a coalition agreement with Labour was setting in, with Rod Donald telling the Green AGM in 2004 (one year out from a general election) that ‘Green members recognised that we already have a formal co-operation agreement with Labour- including a
‘coalition-style’ relationship on transport-and that Labour already depends on us to pass key pieces of legislation’. Also that, ‘A vote for the Greens is a vote for a Labour-led Government’. Adding assurances for Party members that this will not be ‘...any old Labour Government but one with Green involvement and influence’ (Donald, 5th June, 2004, AGM).

In this way, Donald attempts to pre-empt objection to coalition by suggesting that, in effect, the Green Party is already operating as a coalition partner. This attempt to dragoon Green Party members into acceptance of a coalition may have been prompted by earlier events when it was apparent that Green Party members have not always been as keen as Rod Donald for the Party to enter into coalition. Jeremy Hall sent an e-mail on the Green News web list and explained how in 1999 Donald had suggested on radio that the Greens supported going into coalition when the Party, according to Hall, had not decided this at all. Also in 2002 Donald stated that the Green Party was ready for coalition, and again Hall counters that this had not been decided by the Party.

Also, it can be argued that the hope expressed by the co-leaders of the Green Party that a coalition agreement would guarantee a continuance of the Party’s critical attitude is misplaced. Further, that it erodes the ability of the Party to represent the followers of Green politics, and to affect the democratisation of Parliament. Coalition agreements are, in effect, a purchase of political scope, that is a demarcation of an area of political activity allowable under conditions of coalition. Such political activity can be seen through the metaphor of the market as opposed to politics as a public forum (Elster, 1986). These agreements, therefore, limit the issues on which the Green Party may pronounce, effectively depoliticising the issues, even though they might represent demands for politicisation from civil society. In this way, coalition agreements distort the process of representation, limiting the politicisation of issues to those that will be tolerated by the major coalition partner. This, of course, does nothing to further the democratization of Parliament since it adds another obstacle, in addition to the separation of civil society from the political sphere, already instituted in liberal democracy. Further, it tends toward an elitist political process in which

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4This is exemplified during the Green Party negotiations with the Labour Party on the possibilities of coalition and other Parliamentary agreements following the 2005 general election. A special general meeting (SGM) was initially to allow members to vote on any proposed agreements before acceptance. However this was later retracted on the grounds that the negotiations were too sensitive, and this is symptomatic of the Green Party shift on the meaning of grassroots.
MPs do not act on behalf of the public sphere, but rather, determine the issues which will be regarded as matters for political consideration.

This has implications for MMP. Paradoxically the system that is supposed by many, including Green Party co-leaders, to improve representation, can produce the opposite effect. Since MMP has meant that many more smaller parties now play a part in the formation of governments, there exists the potential that interests formerly regarded as outside matters of politics will find representation in Parliament. However, the power differential instantiated within coalition governments means that the potential for the politicisation of issues, which the smaller Party might represent, is lost in the power dynamics. Power, in this sense, has been described as delinguified media that prejudicially effects the function of coalitions. In this way, coalitions can be seen to fall short of the ideal as a forum for representation (Habermas, 1984; Kelsey, 1999).

An example of the effects of this power differential had been played out before the general election of 2005. The Prime Minister, Helen Clark, objected to critical remarks by Jeanette Fitzsimons on the grounds that such criticism was an ‘odd’ way to treat a prospective coalition partner. Fitzsimons suggested that Labour had begun developing policy based on poll ratings rather than, for example, a social conscience (Otago Daily Times, 15th Feb; 2005). This illustrates that before an election had been run, and before coalition becomes a remote possibility, the Labour Party is applying fetters to the Green Party’s ability to be critical, and therefore applying constraints upon the articulation of Green ideology. This is because where Labour deny the Greens the opportunity to criticise, they also deny the grounds for the justification of an alternative built on the Green vision.

The cautionary statements on the risk that the Greens would be subsumed by the larger coalition partner offered by Fitzsimons in 2001, for example, eventually gave way to acceptance of the idea of coalition in 2005. The focus then shifted to the nature of any possible relationship. In this regard, the Greens were clear that they would not be subordinate to the larger partner in the coalition but in fact would take a steering role for the ‘rudderless government’ (Fitzsimons, 13th Feb, 2005). Donald stated, ‘We are ready to work with Labour, on all these challenges, to steer them in the right direction, apply the brake whenever they look like they are slipping backwards and to take bold steps to protect our environment and become a fairer society’ (Donald, 2nd Feb, 2005 speech). The nature of this
relationship was proposed in parental terms where Fitzsimons says of working with Labour, ‘We have to encourage them in their infant steps to sustainability, convince them of the urgency of the issue, oppose them strongly when they panic and slip back into authoritarian and unsustainable ways (Fitzsimons, 16th Jan; 2005 *State of the Planet*).

Generally the tendency within the Green Party has been one of leaving behind any commitment to acting both inside and outside Parliament and to concentrate on coalition agreements with a Labour government, in spite of the dangers to the integrity of Green principles that might lurk within a coalition. From this it can be concluded that any impulse toward decentralisation, as was evident in the Values Party phase of Green politics in New Zealand, has evaporated and been replaced with a firm commitment to centralised, representative democracy. This commitment comes with assurances that it will in fact be the Green Party guiding the Labour government, effectively reversing the earlier observation by Fitzsimons in 2001 on the balance of power between the larger and smaller coalition partners, an assurance that struggles for credibility given the fetters already applied by the Labour Party on Green Party statements in the press.

The risks inherent in alliances and coalitions, which had effectively been de-emphasised by 2004/2005, include that Green policy initiatives may be appropriated or watered-down (Selznick, 1966 cited in Dryzek, 1996 a). Fitzsimons had observed this in 1992 while the Greens were part of the Alliance Party, and where the coalition partners may accept some but not all Green ideas. This has the effect of reworking policy initiatives to the extent that they are wrested from their connections with Green ideology. This potentially weakens the possibility of bringing Green ideology to bear against prevalent or competing ideologies, and risks the public disappearance of Green ideology. Further, that the reworking of initiatives becomes advanced to the stage where such initiatives work to bolster opposition ideologies.

This, in itself, indicates that potentially the conceptual apparatus derived from Green ideology can be lost. Also lost is the opportunity to launch alternatives against government policy. Fitzsimons (Eco-politics conference, 2001) mentioned that the demands of Cabinet solidarity often conflict with Party demands to uphold policy. Whereas upholding policy has the potential to present a practical solutions based on Green ideology, the demands of cabinet solidarity would crush this potential, reducing the Green Party’s ability to act as goad and
critic. This will also reduce the democratising effect of Green politics to resist the end of ideology (Bell, 1962; Fukuyama 1992; Torgerson, 2000).

Further evidence of the effects of constraints on political action imposed by the larger coalition partner on the smaller, can be found when New Zealand’s first coalition government is considered. In this instance, when the smaller partner to the coalition, the New Zealand First Party, attempted to assert its will against the larger National Party, the result was not more democracy, in that views beyond those tolerated by the National Party were instituted within policy, but rather the failure of the coalition. The then (1998) leader of the National Party claimed that the smaller partner had breached the convention of collective cabinet responsibility. Not only did this result in the failure of the coalition government but also seriously damaged the New Zealand First Party, support for which fell from an election night total of 13.4% of the national vote, to 2% following the coalition failure. Therefore, on this occasion, friction within coalition threatens the stability of government, and raises the distinct possibility of political oblivion for the smaller party. Also, a party associated with a coalition failure is unlikely to be among the first choices as a coalition partner in the future, and so it seems that the smaller party must either ‘tow the line’ (observe collective cabinet responsibility) or stay out of coalition (Boston, Church and Pearce, 2004).

The last example to illustrate this point deals with the Green Party and, once again, uses the, admittedly, blunt measure of election results as an indicator. Prior to the 2002 election, publicity around the Green Party electoral campaign centred on its refusal to support legislation aimed at the release of genetically engineered organisms. This principled stand (that is, one on which the Party would not negotiate for the sake of political expediency) won the Green Party 7% of the national vote. This may be contrasted with the result following the 2005 general election. On this occasion, publicity around the Green Party campaign centred on its clear intention to seek a coalition deal with the then ruling Labour Party, and the Greens gained only 5.3% of the national vote. It can be concluded on the basis of this evidence that voters are drawn to parties which, at least appear, to be making a principled stand, rather than, apparently, being prepared to make concessions for the sake of a coalition deal.

More generally, the power asymmetry within coalitions enforces political quietism,
suppresses political debate on ideological grounds and sustains the dominant ideology as commonsense since it will not be revealed as an ideology. This may be illustrated by reference to the previous discussion on the divergence between the Green Party and the current Labour Government on the meaning of sustainability, for example. Further, the threat Clark delivers to the Greens casts doubt on the previously mentioned assurances that both Rod Donald and Jeanette Fitzsimons give, that in coalition with the Labour Party, the Green Party will take a parental and guiding role.

It can be concluded that the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand now identifies with the ‘realos’ among Green parties, in spite of having already experienced the compromises that must be made when in alliance with other parties, and found them unacceptable. In this regard the Green Party in New Zealand is following the pattern of overseas Green parties. For example, Carter (1999) tells us that Die Grünen abandoned its decentralist and egalitarian principles once they were elected into the Bundestag in 1983, and measures to ensure grassroots control were dropped one-by-one. This, and other tendencies, has been noted by Burchell (2002) who speaks of the possibility that these developments within Green Parties in Sweden, Britain, Germany and France, mark the final institutionalization of ‘new’ politics into the Party establishment. This development is particularly prevalent in cases where Green parties enter into coalition agreements.

It has been argued that the Green Party in New Zealand is committed to central liberal representative democracy. For the Values Party a fundamental critique of liberal democracy was the tendency of the latter to concentrate political power in the hands of a few, thereby contravening the understanding of democracy as a public forum. In response to this the Values Party developed policy initiatives around the decentralisation of political power. The Green Party, however, restricts itself to focussing on consultation between civil society and central institutions. In this regard the Green Party offers no innovations or policy initiatives designed to improve access to the policy formation process by members of the public, but focuses on the Party gaining access to the concentrated power of Cabinet in government.

This section deals with the criticism by the Green Party over what they perceive as a rupture of the democratic process revealed during the rise to political prominence of the genetic engineering issue and GATS agreements in New Zealand. The examination illustrates that Green Party opposition to aspects of these issues, reveals the ideological
underpinnings of both. By politicising the issues in terms of Green Party ideology the Green Party revives political debate (Torgerson, 2000).

Green Party ideology is also revealed in its approach to political institutions, since any corrective offered by the Green Party on how democracies ought to function is drawn from their ideological framework. Central to this is an understanding of democracy evident in Green Party material, that the government is there to attend to the demands of the polity (Hindess, 1996). This means that if a majority of the population desire a particular policy outcome then the principle of demos (people) and kratia (power) should determine that that policy outcome eventuates. Further, that democratic participation should be authentic rather than symbolic (Dryzek, 1996a) and, in contrast to Joseph Schumpeter, involve a civil society that is politically active beyond simply casting a vote at general election time (Hyland, 1995). However, it will be seen that although moves to politically motivate civil society are evident, in contrast with the Values Party, no significant institutional reforms are argued for in this second phase of Green politics in New Zealand. What is reasserted are the institutions of centralised liberal, representative governance.

A central criticism of the Green Party was the inefficacy of institutional means to influence policy outcomes. Among these institutional means were proposed amendments to bills within Parliament, petitions to Parliament, submissions to the Royal Commission and select committees. Similarly ineffectual were instances of extra-Parliamentary action in civil society. These included the formation of GE free zones, demonstration marches, and majority opinion on various polls. In spite of activity on both these fronts by the Green Party, no change in Government policy could be effected with particular regard to lifting the genetic engineering moratorium, and this is the first issue dealt with here.

At the centre of this democratic rupture, so far as the Greens were concerned, was that the sovereignty of the New Zealand Government was compromised primarily due to the influence of pro genetic engineering (GE) corporations, and that this influence had significant implications for the functioning of the democratic process. As will be shortly explained, it was determined that the economic imperative faced by the Government, in combination with pressure from GE commercial interests, eroded the capacity of the population to have its view authentically represented in policy decisions. Generally, the Greens were critical of a complete breakdown of democratic influence on Government policy
affecting the citizen rights of the population within the territorial boundary of the nation-state.

Genetic engineering has long been of concern to Green politics in New Zealand. Dave Stratton, writing in the 1970s, stated that ‘...Genetic Engineering is the most important ecological issue of the century. It pales nuclear physics into insignificance’ (Values Party internal memo, n.d.). Consequently, a proposal put to a Values Party conference suggested that opposition to the new science take the form of banning all travel from the US ‘until they have proper statutory controls on their GE research’. The issue appeared in the Values manifesto of 1978, where, under the ‘Environment’ section, ‘a full inquiry into the implications of genetic engineering’, was recommended (1978:27).

The extent to which the issue was to become significant for Green politics in New Zealand would not have been realised at the time of these early encounters with GE, in which it is regarded primarily as an ecological issue. However, the political and democratic issues around genetic engineering were made plain by Nicky Hager in his book Seeds of Distrust (2002).5

On April 17th 2000 a Royal Commission of Inquiry, initiated by the Green Party, was set up to investigate and receive representations on the strategic options available to New Zealand with regard to genetic modification, and to consider any changes to the current institutional arrangements that might be desirable. At the same time a moratorium on genetic engineering was imposed. The Royal Commission started hearing submissions in mid October, 2000. During this process, in November, 2000, Hager alleges that the Government learned of a consignment of GE contaminated corn seed, that had come from the US and had already been planted in various locations in New Zealand. The ‘corngate’ scandal began when the Government changed the way it would react to the suspected GE contaminated corn seed. Initially the government intended removing the corn from the field and issuing public announcements about the crops and their disposal. However, they then reversed this decision, allowing the seeds already planted to remain in the field, and also for the remaining seed to be sown, while keeping the issue from the public. Importantly, alleges Hager, this

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5 At the time of its printing, Hager proclaimed no association with the current Green Party in New Zealand. However, Hager had a connection with Green politics in that he stood as a candidate for the Values Party in Pahiatua in 1978. This fact is only of significance given the politicisation of an issue close to Green politics leading up to the general election in 2002.
change came about as a result of ‘business lobbying’ on the part of a PR company, Communications Trumps, that represented the multinational seed company Novartis. Nicky Hager points out that ‘corngate’ raises the issue of the influence of transnational corporations on the decisions of democratically elected governments, this then becomes one of the grounds on which the Green Party mounted its opposition to genetic engineering.

The result of the Royal Commission of Inquiry was the ‘proceed with caution’ statement, and on that basis the Government decided that the moratorium on GE release would be lifted on 29th October, 2003, allowing for applications to be made for field testing of GE crops, subject to examination by Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA). As it opposed the release of GE organisms into the environment, the central concern for the Green Party was to prevent the moratorium being lifted.

The Green Party claimed that by intending to lift the moratorium, the Government was not following the Royal Commission recommendation to ‘proceed with caution’. They contested that the phrase should be interpreted as ‘continue to study the use of gene technology within a contained laboratory but don’t let it out in the field’ and this can be seen as an ideological confrontation with that of the Labour Government (Fitzsimons, 22nd May, 2002). The ideological difference can be illustrated in terms of that contested site ‘sustainable’. For the Greens, ‘sustainable’ will dictate caution in the use of new technologies, the long-term effects of which are not yet known. While for the Labour Government ‘sustainable’ is oriented toward strengthening the ‘economy’s capacity to grow’ (Helen Clark, press release, 2003). If growing the economy is seen in terms of GE release, then, for the Labour Government, it will be a ‘sustainable’ move. In addition to this opposition, the Greens find problematic the influence of transnational corporations (TNCs) over Government policy decisions. This was expressed by the Green Party in contrastive terms where the will of the majority of New Zealanders, and a principle of moral authority, on one side, is set against the aims of the TNCs.

In the general debate in Parliament on 17th Sept, 2003, Sue Kedgley expressed exasperation at the Governments’ ‘pigheadedly ignoring public opinion’, and ‘dismissing the risks...in...a cavalier fashion’. Kedgley argued that the only motive to explain this was pressure from the ‘American Government and various multinational corporations’ the interests of which were put ‘ahead of the interests of New Zealanders’. To add weight to the
objection, the Green Party appealed to past events and iconic aspects associated with a popularised view of New Zealand. Examples of these are an appeal to the past made in a speech where Kedgley argued that at one time the Labour Party brought in nuclear free legislation helping to ‘forge our independent identity in the world’. The implication being that now that independence was being threatened by the present Labour Government’s bowing to the interests of TNCs, and also that these interests carry with them a threat to the ‘clean, green’ image of New Zealand that would be lost forever were GE to be released. In this way, both New Zealand’s independence, which will be referred to later in terms of sovereignty, as well as our international image as clean and green, were at risk. The word ‘risk’ itself rose to some salience as a site of political contestation among pro and anti GE factions where it was cast in differing ways revealing the ideological position of the users.

Generally, what was contested was whether the risk of GE technology was worth the potential gains to the economy. In this regard, pro and anti GE factions spoke past one another, the grounds for accepting the risk were predominately economic as opposed to the democratic and ecological grounds offered by the Greens for its rejection. While the Environment Minister, Marion Hobbs, articulated the term by subverting the division between risk and ‘growth and innovation’, ‘opportunity’ and ‘moving forward’ (*The Press*, 15th October, 2003), in a way identifiable with neo-liberal discourse (Fairclough, 2003); the anti-GE faction countered this meaning-making process by emphasising the uncertainties around the short and long term effects of GE. This was achieved through use of the terms ‘Frankenscience’ and ‘Frankenfood’, invoking an image of out-of-control and destructive ‘science’ characterised as fraught with unforeseeable and dire consequences (*Green Party Agriculture Policy*, 1999).

For Fitzsimons the unforeseeable consequences of GE were a result of the fact that the technology was both ‘ill-understood and poorly researched’, and that its ‘effects on humans and the environment are not only unstable but untested and unknown’ (Fitzsimons, press release, 26th August, 2003). Specifically, Fitzsimons pointed to uncertainties around the issue of horizontal gene transfer. She argued that the potential threat of contamination that this issue represented, amounted to subjecting non-GE farmers to Russian roulette (Fitzsimons, HSNO amendment speech-third reading, 22nd May, 2002). The possibility of horizontal gene transfer was also suggested by the Greens as a reason why the moratorium
should not have been lifted in October, 2003 (Ewen-Street, press release, 6th May, 2004). For both Fitzsimons and Ewen-Street, the risk of contamination was not only an ecological risk but also an economic one. Horizontal gene transfer represented a risk to ‘our burgeoning organic and GE-Free agriculture industry’, ‘destroying our GE-Free marketing advantage’ (Ewen-Street, press release, 6th May, 2004; Fitzsimons, HSNO amendment speech-third reading, 22nd May, 2002). The Green Party argued that while markets for GE food were becoming increasingly difficult to find, people around the world were looking for the safest food and were prepared to pay premiums for that guarantee (Fitzsimons, press release, 16th March, 2001). In this way, while GE was often publicized as a revolution in food production, the Greens sought to counter with a revolution of their own based on organic food production. The Greens argued that the state imperative of a food exporting industry should be reconfigured to be based on organics. This means that the concepts associated with organics should eventually dominate in the industry. The Greens also argued that this approach to food production was consistent with the already existing emphasis on our clean green image on which New Zealand trades (Fitzsimons, press release, 16th March, 2001).

The extent of the Green agriculture revolution (in that the Greens sought to throw into question both proposed GE, and existing solutions to food production), went beyond opposition to GE and included a critique of conventional farming methods as similarly hazardous to the environment and falling short of the clean green ideal.

This meant that New Zealand should not continue with conventional farming methods and these methods were criticised, in particular with regards to the ‘enormous amounts of agricultural chemicals’ that are used, and that, consequently, both GE and conventional farming methods should give way to ‘an entirely different food production ethos’, that is organics as mentioned and, according to the Greens, a national commitment to organic farming required a ‘paradigm shift’ driven by a change in ‘our ideological direction’ (Ewen-Street, in Soil and Health Magazine, 1st June, 1999). This paradigm shift is consistent with the Green Party’s ecological wisdom principle, according to which, ecological sustainability is paramount. This ideological argument broadens the terms of the political debate around GE food production in that it goes the further step by questioning the conventional use of chemicals in farming practice. This means that for the Greens the
political debate goes beyond a choice between GE farming and current practice and includes the reconfiguration of farming practice, and, rather than adding more technology to improve production, the Greens advocate a reduction in the use of innovations such as gene technology and chemicals that have suspected or proven contaminating potential.

With particular reference to GE, the Greens argued that it was in fact a question of GE or organics since the two cannot co-exist, and this also applied, although to a lesser extent, to conventional farming. This was the case, the Greens argued, since the Government’s insistence that the two could co-exist was on the basis that organic and conventional farmers, as well as consumers, accept 1% contamination (Fitzsimons, press release, 26th August, 2003). This represents a manifestation of a direct ideological challenge that sees no possibility of compromise, and as such, clearly defines the Green Party position and stimulates politics beyond arguments over degrees of contamination, for example.

As mentioned, the uncertainty over horizontal gene transfer exists because research into this was still several years from completion (Ewen-Street, press release, 6th May, 2004). However, the Greens believed that leading scientists have evidence that proves the dangers of releasing GE into the environment (Fitzsimons, press release, 18th July, 2003). Unfortunately for the Greens, there was no unity among scientists on the dangers of GE.

Related to this issue is that the influence of TNCs extended to the scientific community and this played a part in the influence TNCs had over national governments. The issue became one of deciding on the risk involved, and relying on scientific information to assess the risk. However, for as many scientific studies there were that reported gaps in the knowledge of the long term effects of GE on the environment and concluded that the risk was too great, as claimed by the Green Party, there were reports from other scientists claiming that the risk was minimal. Weight was added to the Green Party claim, that the Government did not fully apprehend the risk, when doubt was cast on the scientific integrity of those claiming minimal risks (The Press, Oct 13th 2003).

In addition to claiming that the integrity of scientific method was compromised by the influence of TNCs and their commercial interests, the Green Party also asserted that the influence of transnational corporations was blinding the Government to ‘new DNA research showing that the basic assumptions on GE are flawed’; this information was not acted upon due to the ‘urging of the bio-technology multinationals’ (Kedgley, press release, April, 2003).
This influence, the Green Party alleged, was the reason the government was ‘insisting on lifting the moratorium’ (Kedgley general debate Parliament, 17th Sept, 2003). The Green Party claimed that not enough was yet known of gene technology to accurately predict what would happen once genetically modified organisms were released into the environment.

Accurate prediction is a matter of the methods of science and experimentation, and these methods, it had been argued, have been compromised by bias and, in particular, commercial interests. *The Times* reporter Anjana Ahuja stated that the ‘perceived cosiness...between scientists and industry has caused concern of late’. The cosiness of this relationship has been characterised as the ‘collision between commerce and academia’ by Hilary Rose, a sociologist at City University, London. Ahuja continues that ‘scientists are caricatured as making a Faustian pact with industrial employers, taking valuable grants in return for conducting research that bears the stamp of academic authority’ (*The Press*, Oct, 13th, 2003). Such authority can be persuasive and distorts the grounds on which the public and governments make decisions on this issue.

A government, keenly aware of the need for safety in using GE, might be convinced of this on the basis of scientific research, and, at the same time be tempted by the value a GE industry would have for the economy. However, acceptance of the risk involved in bolstering the state imperative of a strong economy and one growing with cutting edge technology, may be based on the compromise of scientific principles for those of the commercial interests of pro-GE industries.

The foregoing illustrates points related to the influence of TNCs, claimed by the Green Party, and the consequent negative effects on the democratic process. At the same time the Green Party claimed that in opposing GE release, they spoke for the majority of New Zealanders, and therefore mounted their opposition on the defence of the democratic principle of majority rule. Building its case in this regard, the Green Party first rejected claims that, as a minor Party in the New Zealand Parliament, it was exerting too much influence, on the grounds that ‘a small minority of pro-GE businesses are trying to dictate our future while the overwhelming majority of Kiwis want to keep New Zealand’s environment GE-Free’ (Donald, press release, May, 2002). For example, the Green Party presented a petition of 92,000 signatures to the Health Select Committee in support of a Royal Commission and moratorium on genetic engineering in October 1999, which led to
the Royal Commission being convened on this issue. In effect, the Green Party claimed that in spite of their minor Party status, not only were they representing the voice of the majority but that also this carries with it the weight of moral authority. Since the citizens of New Zealand have to live with the consequences of environmental release, then, on that basis alone, they should have the greater weight in the decision. Whereas pro-GE transnational corporations do not have to live with the consequences but seemed, in the view of the Green Party, to have a disproportionate influence in the decision.

Although the Green Party had put in place some Parliamentary initiatives, for example, the right to know to counter the provision in the Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (HSNO); five amendments to the NOOM (new organisms and other matters) bill, including that the lifting of the moratorium be delayed by five years; and moving the HSNO (Moratorium Reinstatement) Amendment Bill to reimpose the moratorium (subsequently voted down in Parliament 16th March, 2005). These measures were designed to modify legislation intended by the Government to support GE release. The Green Party, frustrated at the apparent inefficacy of this sphere of political activity, then turned to the population to demonstrate its will to retain New Zealand’s GE-free status. The frustration is reflected in Jeanette Fitzsimons’ use of the Greek tragedy analogy where the future is fated, Sue Kedgley adding to this sentiment with the assertion that the Government was ‘steamrolling ahead on GE’. Both express the idea that there seems to be no way of altering the Government’s preselected course of action, and basic democratic principles, such as the will of the majority, were being similarly ‘steamrolled’ (Fitzsimons, press release, 14th Oct. 2003; Kedgley, press release, 10th April, 2003). However, the Green Party encouraged people, en masse, to make submissions to the education and science select committee on the NOOM bill ‘in numbers that they can’t ignore’ (Fitzsimons, July 18th, 2003).

Where the Green Party stressed the will of the majority of New Zealanders as sufficient reason to expect a change in Government policy, the Government response was to reduce the significance of opposition on this basis. For example, Steve Abel of Greenpeace said ‘I don’t see how the Government can ignore such a huge, impassioned, public expression of the fact that people want New Zealand to keep its GE-free status’ (The Press, Oct. 13th, 2003). In contrast, the view of the Minister for the Environment, Marion Hobbs, in response to a question on why the Government was determined to end the moratorium,
was that, ‘we realised there were some in the community really anxious about this issue’ (*NZ Herald*, 23rd-24th, August, 2003). The contrast between ‘huge public expression’ and the anxiety of ‘some in the community’ illustrates the ongoing work of construction intended to achieve particular perceptions.

This was added to with the use and interpretation of statistics. For example, on July 14th 2003, Rod Donald stated in a press release that a Colmar Brunton poll indicated that ‘a clear majority 54% don’t want the moratorium lifted in October’, and that ‘This is a real wake-up call for Labour they should listen to what the overwhelming majority of the public want’. It can be argued that 54% is only a majority by 4%, and certainly not an overwhelming majority. Such exaggeration was not necessary on another poll, however, where the percentage of those polled who wanted the moratorium to remain in place had risen 14% since July, 2003 to 68% in September of that year.

In addition to the use of statistics, the Green Party matched the perceived unstoppable course toward lifting the moratorium with claims of a similarly unstoppable force, public opposition. Where Sue Kedgley said ‘New Zealanders will keep rising up to say no to the well-financed biotech tidal wave that threatens to engulf us all’ (10th April, 2003), Jeanette Fitzsimons declared, ‘The tide of support for extending the moratorium on the release of genetically engineered organisms has turned into a tidal wave that the Government can no longer ignore...’ (press release September 14th, 2003). Sue Kedgley went on to suggest that the opposition may be ‘...in small numbers or large- like the 10,000-plus who marched against GE in Auckland last November’ (10th April, 2003). This prefigures the hope of the Green Party that protest action, to demonstrate opposition to lifting the GE moratorium, might succeed where Parliamentary work had not. This represents a move toward extra-Parliamentary activity aimed at mobilizing civil society, in conjunction with the Parliamentary work as mentioned. Although the marches were organised by the group GE-Free New Zealand, the Green Party actively encouraged people to join in. In this way, although the Green Party saw the value of public demonstrations to oppose GE release, they were mindful of retaining a distance from direct connection with protest politics.

This further adds weight to the assertion that the presence of Green MPs on protest marches is more symbolic than expressive of a Green approach to political activity theorised by Petra Kelly, as the ‘new political culture’. As mentioned earlier, this describes Green
politics as ‘...public, nonviolent action and... civil disobedience outside and inside Parliament...’ Where the Party structure conforms to ‘... half Party and half local action group...’(1991:194).

In order to politically mobilize civil society against the influence of ‘big food manufacturers running government policy on genetic engineering’, one approach taken by the Green Party was launching a campaign to create ‘genetic engineering free zones’ in February 1999. This move, reminiscent of the nuclear free zone campaign of the 1980s, had been designed to give ordinary people the chance to make a ‘personal commitment to GE-free food and crops’ (Otago Daily Times, Feb. 12th, 1999). The local body elections in September 2004 gave the Greens an opportunity to politicise the issue at the local level and to put GE-Free zones onto councils’ agendas. Fitzsimons argued that ‘central Government has done everything to ensure that local bodies have no say on the use of GE’. Therefore, in order to give some autonomy to local bodies on the GE issue, Fitzsimons, citing the Local Government Act 2002, argued that local councils might even be obliged to exclude genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in order to protect economic, social, environmental and cultural well-being of their communities under the terms of the Act (Fitzsimons, September 16th, 2004). In this example, the focus for the Greens turns toward localisation against the dominance of central government, in a way consistent with core Green thinking on the importance of decentralisation (Goodin, 1992). However, this does not amount to autonomy for local areas since the authority appealed to by the Green Party, the Local Government Act, derives its force as an act of central Government, rather than principles derived from Green thinking on, for example, bio-regions as the basis of autonomous regions without formal state apparatus (Capra and Spretnak, 1984, Eckersley, 1992). Autonomy for local government, following the earlier phase of Green politics in New Zealand under the Values Party, would have to include the simultaneous diminution of central government authority, as local authority grew.

The second approach, following Parliamentary initiatives involved the mobilization of civil society in mass marches to protest against GE release. In 2002, the Greens declared that all they could do in Parliament had been done and now it was up to ‘the people’ to ‘take the battle to the streets’ (Fitzsimons, 22nd May, 2002). This appeal grew as the date for lifting the moratorium neared, the Green Party ‘encouraging all New Zealanders to join
protests’. These were planned for 21st September, (Lincoln); 4th October, (Dunedin); 11th October, and 19th October (Christchurch). Emphasis was placed on the simultaneous marches in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin on the 11th October where 40,000 were expected to march in Auckland (Fitzsimons, September 18th, 2003). As the 11th October approached, the Green Party warned the Government that it ‘ignores GE marches at its peril’, and implied that the GE marches are also the majority of voters. This was the basis for the democratic demand made by the Green Party, that the Government cease ignoring ‘their calls for the moratorium on GE releases into the environment to be extended, and for GE to remain in the lab’ (Fitzsimons, October 10th, 2003). In the event, the turn-out in Auckland was 25,000, significantly lower than the 40,000 expected, while 1500 turned out in Wellington and 2000 in Christchurch. In spite of the warnings to the Government from the Green Party, the marches were ignored and the moratorium lifted on October 29th, 2003 thus paving the way for field release of GE organisms.

Although Fitzsimons was resigned to the fact that the moratorium would be lifted, she vowed that the ‘fight against GE will not be over’ (Fitzsimons, October 14th, 2003). In this regard, Fitzsimons turned her attention toward the consultation process and the GE regulator ERMA.

The Government set up the Environmental Risk Management Authority (ERMA) for the ostensive purpose of managing the ‘proceed with caution’ recommendation by the Royal Commission, by assessing applications for GE release on a case by case basis. Within this process applicants put their case for release, and submitters put theirs forward, usually to prevent release. In this way, the system appeared to be one where consultation with all those interested was available. However the Green Party pointed out that there were some undemocratic tendencies built into the system.

The grounds for this claim, the significance of which will be discussed shortly, are that ERMA had gained a degree of political power and institutional autonomy from the Government, thereby distancing themselves from accountability to both the Government and the population; the decisions ERMA made were on the basis of very limited grounds, and essentially, according to the Green Party, those of commercial profitability; and finally, that the purpose of ERMA was efficiency in decision-making rather than an even-handed assessment of information from both applicants and submitters. Since ERMA did not seize
political power, and thereby threaten a democratically elected government, there is reason to suspect that ERMA is a symptom, or aspect, of technocratic governance exercised by the Government (Elsner, 1967:3).

The position occupied by ERMA can be described as ‘institutional autonomy’ and functions ‘as a form of political insulation’ between the Government and the mass of the population, and therefore absolves the Government of any accountability to the polity for decisions made by ERMA (Boylan, 2001:23). Political insulation was achieved in a number of ways that worked to effectively depoliticize the GE issue, placing it beyond the influence of public demands. In the first place, the Green Party point to a statement by the Environment Minister who insisted that any decisions made by ERMA were their responsibility, the Government thereby distancing itself from the unpopular decisions it set up ERMA to make (Fitzsimons, press release, November, 4th, 2003). In this respect, the Labour Government does not seek moral authority since the institutional autonomy invested with ERMA justifies a separation between the decisions ERMA makes and the Labour Government, and therefore their normative commitment to society (Sagoff, 2003:21; Habermas, 1976). The Greens further claimed that this separation was in effect an admission by the Government that it was acting in contradistinction to the ‘wishes of the vast majority of New Zealanders’ (Fitzsimons, press release, November, 4th, 2003).

Radaelli (1999) has observed that technocracy has more to do with efficiency and rational decision-making than with technical determinism. It is therefore not surprising to hear from the Greens that ERMA did not exhibit much in the way of expertise in any particular area. The Greens point out that a Government review of ERMA discovered that the members were insufficiently skilled in matters of gene technology, ecology, social science, and public policy development, and that the sole criterion on which ERMA based its decisions was that of commercial profitability (Fitzsimons, general debates Parliament, July 23rd, 2003). This has resonance with the view that ‘a technocratic society revolves around economic imperatives’ (Radaelli, 1999:13). The predominance of the economic imperative can be found in the Labour Party slogan ‘Growth and Innovation’. This can be interpreted as indicating a tendency toward technocracy when considered with the observations of Boylan (2001), Radaelli (1999) and the Green Party above. As argued previously, ‘growth’ for the Labour Party refers particularly to economic growth, and when
combined with the Labour Party’s avidity to adopt genetic engineering, according to Green Party observations, it can be seen that the latter is seen by the Labour Party as a means to securing the former. The overall effect of these factors was to produce a management procedure that functioned as a ‘political anaesthetic’, paralysing the mediation between the people and Parliament (Radaelli, 1999:16; Dahrendorf, 1990: 56,57).

Insofar as the Greens have sought to prove that ERMA’s decisions were based on little more than economic imperatives, and that ERMA suffered a dearth of skills that might otherwise be called upon to make those decisions, leaves ERMA open to speculation that its main purpose was to close as quickly as possible on decisions by limiting the breadth of considerations. Further indication of this function was the uncovering in the review, initiated and commissioned by the Government, that evidence from applicants was weighed more heavily than that from submitters opposing release. This would, of course, result in a consultation process prejudiced in favour of one side, namely, pro-GE commercial interests. (Fitzsimons, general debates Parliament, July 23rd, 2003). It can, therefore, be argued that there is sufficient coherence among Green Party claims and revelations from the Government inquiry into ERMA, with the theory of technocracy offered by Radaelli (1999), to conclude that ERMA was in fact set up merely to accelerate the decision-making process. The intended outcome was the furtherance of a profitable genetics industry, and the process was insufficient to assess the morality of such a step.

With field release and the application of GE technology to food being the main Green Party objection, much attention was given to the regulation of food labelling. In this regard, Sue Kedgley, the Green Party Safe Food spokesperson, argued that New Zealanders had lost the democratic right to influence decisions over the safety standards of food. This centres around the formation of Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ) that New Zealand joined in the mid 1990s. In addition to the threat to national sovereignty from TNCs as previously discussed, FSANZ provides an example of a formal, ‘supranational’ bureaucratic arrangement that impinged upon the sovereignty of the New Zealand Government, disrupting the latter’s normative commitment to the polity (Habermas, 1976).

When Sue Kedgley raised concerns that the Food Safety Authority was moving too slowly on implementing a GE labelling regime for fast food outlets, despite the Royal Commission recommendation of urgency on the matter (Kedgley, press release, Sept, 2003),
she may not have realised things were about to get much worse. On the 9th December, 2003 the Health Minister enraged Kedgley by refusing to revisit a decision to establish a trans-Tasman therapeutic products agency, an arrangement Kedgley described as ‘an insult to every New Zealander who cares that decisions about their health are made by them, in their own country and not by Australians in Australia’ (Kedgley, press release, 9th Dec, 2003). In March 2004, Jeanette Fitzsimons commented that the issue of FSANZ as a transnational body raises concerns for New Zealand’s sovereignty, since a decision over, in this case, a GE wheat application, ‘is being dictated from Australia’ (press release, 17th March, 2004). Once again, the issue becomes effectively depoliticized for the population of New Zealand, since as Kedgley reveals, FSANZ is an Australian organisation ‘...staffed by Australians, set up under Australian law, which reports to the Australian Minister of Health, New Zealand has the status of an Australian state-namely one vote out of ten’ (Kedgley, Food for Thought, October 9th, 2002). Under these conditions, there are clear implications for the sovereignty of the New Zealand Government to regulate on issues of food health, since FSANZ reports to the Australian minister, there is only a one in ten chance that the public of New Zealand can influence its decisions. Also the statement that New Zealand is effectively treated as a state of Australia illustrates the fracturing of New Zealand as a sovereign state, and intimates the practical realisation of the ‘global village’.

Kedgley further informs us that although under FSANZ the Australian Minister is required to consult, the fact that FSANZ is subject to the Official Information Act due to its supranational status, it is difficult to see how effective consultation can proceed in the absence of the relevant information. The sham of consultation this represents leads Kedgley to declare that ‘consultation has become a byword for governments making decisions and then telling those affected what has been decided’ (Kedgley, press release, November 18th, 2003). This statement indicates a degree of disenchantment with the current political institutions in New Zealand, and lays the emphasis on the importance of consultation, once

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6 The Act provides under Part 1 section 6 (e) that information may be withheld if release would damage the economy by premature disclosure relating to (vi) entering into o/sea trade agreements.

7 This contravenes the Green Party stated commitment to the principle that those most affected should play a part in decision-making. Though as argued, this principle is overruled by the Green Party understanding of the appropriate decision-making principle.
again defending the principle that the voice of the people should be heard. This is a consistent theme in the material of the Green Party in New Zealand and one that receives closer examination in the next section dealing with the GATS agreements.

The eagerness with which the Labour Party sought to embrace genetic engineering was criticised by the Green Party where, for example, Sue Kedgley referred to the Labour Government’s ‘steamrolling ahead on GE’ (10th April, 2003). The speed of implementation was referred to earlier as a factor contributing to the lack of consultation on the issue. An additional sense in which the Government was ‘steamrolling ahead’ on GE can be examined in regard to particular aspects of modernity. This approach, that is, the reliance on science and technology to solve problems, not only has implications for the democratic system as previously discussed, but also for the environment. It is the collision between scientific investigation and the impact of experimentation on the environment that the Greens objected to.

In doing so they reflect the caution offered by E. F. Schumacher (1973:107) critical of how technology and science are pressed into the service of material production driven by a ‘fascination with novelties- technical, organizational, chemical, biological, and so forth, - which insist on their application long before their long-term consequences are even remotely understood’. Mike Ward of the Green Party points out that ‘charging ahead with lifting the GE Moratorium’ falls into the same trap that claimed those of the scientific community who once considered safe, chemicals that now are the focus of expenditure to clean up sites subsequently contaminated. Also, Ward points out that the tactic of vilifying those who both register alarm and recommend caution in the use of new technologies and substances, is nothing new. Recalling how Rachael Carson (author of ‘Silent Spring, 1962’; considered by Dobson (2000) as the seminal work in the Green movement) ‘alerted the world to the dangers of DDT’ and was vilified by Monsanto, which now is the ‘leading GE proponent’ (Ward, press release, 11th Sept 2003). Ward’s comments display an intertextual relationship with early Green writers and apply these earlier insights to a current issue. This not only establishes a coherency across time in Green thinking, but also functions to bring together recent events with past drawing out the similarities. In so doing, Ward has projected possible future events, around which a degree of uncertainty exists, with reference to past events on which there are certainties.
It can be seen that the rapid employment of genetic engineering, and the silencing of objections was attempted through the position of ERMA, as mentioned, and the process of consultation set up therein, and that these attempts to depoliticize the issue are opposed by the Green Party, thereby, stimulating political discussion on these issues and resisting the anti-politics associated with technocracy; and instead insist on a politics of public consultation. Also, it attacks a fundamental belief of the modern era that science and technology are able to solve problems by themselves, recalling the views of the critical theorists. The caution that the Greens offer is, in this case, that consideration beyond commercial profit should be taken into account, and that this can only be achieved through authentic consultation (Dryzek, 1996a).

Similarly New Zealand’s involvement in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) agreements under the World Trade Organisation (WTO), (which came into force in 1995 aimed at the global scale liberalisation of trade in services), is seen by the Green Party to threaten New Zealand’s sovereignty. This threat is expressed in terms of control over vital services, for example, education, health and water services (Donald, press release, April 23rd, 2002). Jane Kelsey has observed that the GATS agreements secures rights for services companies from one country to operate in another, requiring that domestic regulations are not barriers to the commercial interests of foreign companies (Kelsey, 2003).

The Greens were also concerned that the GATS threatened New Zealand’s ability to offer ‘protection from overseas ownership of iconic sites of historical, cultural and environmental interest (Donald, press release, November 10th, 2003), as well as objecting to trade deals with countries that have an alleged record of human rights abuses, in particular, of political prisoners; and workers, with regard to ‘core labour standard violations’; as well as countries that ‘do not respect the environment’ (Donald, press release, December 1st, 2004).

As with the GE issue, the diminution of New Zealand’s ‘sovereign rights’ by supranational arrangements is at the centre of a democratic rupture identified by the Greens with regard to the GATS (Fitzsimons Reply to the PM's Statement to Parliament, 11th Feb. 2003; Donald, press release, 10th Nov. 2003; Locke, 30th April, 2002). Two issues of great concern for the Greens in this regard are the ‘lock-in’ nature of agreement commitments, and
the progressive liberalisation of services.

‘Lock-in’ simply refers to the nature of agreements under article XXI of the GATS where the Green Party claim that commitments are ‘extremely difficult to reverse’, and that this negatively impacts upon domestic politics. The Greens point out that under the GATS, the commitments a country makes on its national schedule for trade liberalisation of services are commitments not easily altered. The impact on domestic policy making may be gauged by restrictions on measures a government might want to introduce. For example, a mandate for local content quotas would be deemed GATS-illegal, and regarded as unfairly advantaging local suppliers over overseas suppliers (Green Party submission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28th Feb. 2003). This also has implications for the future since it limits the legislative scope of succeeding governments to introduce policy that might be aimed at stimulating regional development. This point was made by Mike Ward where he argues that ‘local procurement’ policies that support New Zealand-owned businesses, are threatened under the terms of the GATS (Ward, press release, 2nd April, 2003).

The Greens use the term ‘undemocratic ratcheting’ to describe progressive liberalisation. This is intended to indicate that the process moves in one direction, that of increasing liberalisation. This condition does not allow future governments to decrease commitments or to oppose neo-liberal ideology on which trade liberalisation rests. Another sense of ratcheting relates to the linear progression in the number of commitments. In this regard, Article XIX compounds the above problems in that it requires countries to progressively expand their commitments to trade liberalisation on their national schedules under the GATS agreements. This means that, increasingly, the ability for national governments to fulfil popular mandates, which might vary in directions (including ideological) counter to that required under WTO trade liberalisation, is effectively constrained (Kelsey, 2003). This point is taken up by the Green Party where they argue that the inability of countries to withdraw without penalty from commitments ‘constrains a democratically elected government from implementing its domestic election policy’ (Green Party submission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28th Feb. 2003). The continued practice of both ‘lock-in’ and ‘progressive liberalisation’, in particular, ensure the continued dominance of neo-liberal ideology since it is impossible to separate the practice from the ideology on which it is based. Therefore, where the Greens oppose ‘lock-in’ and
‘progressive liberalisation’, they also raise an ideological challenging neo-liberalism.

Since the commitments made in the pursuit of trade liberalisation are only those that the Government in New Zealand freely makes under the GATS agreements, the issue of consultation between the Government and the people of New Zealand was preeminent in Green Party material. Generally, the Greens were critical, as with GE release, that too much haste attended the negotiations with the WTO under the GATS agreements, and that there was too little consultation with the public over the extent and type of services committed for trade liberalisation. Consequently, too many services were offered by the Government under the national schedule of commitments to the GATS agreements. This, therefore, leads to the propositional assumption that with the application of a ‘proper democratic process’, as argued for by the Greens, that trade liberalisation would slow, if not cease (Donald, 28th Feb, 2003).

The issue of consultation was premised around the exclusive manner in which negotiations between governments and the WTO were conducted. This limited participation by Parliament and the represented population, thereby effectively depoliticising the issue of extent and type of services offered for liberalisation as mentioned. Also, as with FSANZ, the exclusive negotiation process is aided by the clause in the Official Information Act, part 1, section 6 (e, vi). Kelsey (2003) has commented that this clause ensures that Parliament is restricted in its scope to influence the outcome of negotiations since the agreements are tabled only after they have been signed. In this way, services committed on the national schedule are not debated in Parliament. This limits the availability of relevant information, and means that the opportunities for the public to have any democratic input into these particular negotiations, whether through their representatives or in the form of extra-Parliamentary action, are consequently limited.

This is justified by the WTO on the grounds that since governments are the elected representatives of their countries, they have the democratic legitimacy to enter into these agreements (GATS-Fact and Fiction, 2001). This rests on an assumption that the relationship between government and the population is one where the wishes of the population are unproblematically delivered by the government. The Greens however, argue that it is not quite so simple, and that although the Government, or specifically the executive, might agree with a particular extent of trade liberalisation, the mass of the population might
not agree (although they might). Under either circumstance it is difficult to know whether the majority of the population agree or not given the absence of any opportunity to have their views known before commitments are made. It is exactly this basis for the legitimacy of Government, as stated above, the WTO relies on to justify exclusive negotiation, that the Greens bring into question, and argue that a legitimation crisis exists between the Government and those it represents.

This is made clear where the Green Party claim that since the GATS negotiations process is undemocratic, it is clear that the Labour Government is ‘determined to maintain absolute power’ (Donald, press release, 28\textsuperscript{th} Feb 2003). Since absolute power is associated with totalitarian regimes, and therefore, the opposite of democratic regimes, casting the Labour Government as possessing absolute power is intended to imply that not only is the process undemocratic, but that the Government itself is undemocratic. While it can be argued that the GATS negotiation mechanism is technocratic, in that it is geared toward hastening the decision-making process, bypassing domestic democratic considerations; the Green Party focus is on the consequent legitimation crisis which they argue exists between the Government and the population (Radaelli, 1999). In this regard, Rod Donald argued that ‘the Green Party is demanding the Government extend the deadlines on its secretive GATS negotiations, which have the potential to erode fundamental protections for New Zealand services, businesses, land and resources’ (Donald, press release 28\textsuperscript{th} Feb, 2003). The claim is that the deadline for public submissions should be extended on the grounds that, since the negotiation process is secretive it is, therefore, undemocratic, and public access to the process would go some way to correcting this deficiency. The warrant for this is that the negotiations affect ‘areas New Zealanders have a fundamental stake in’ therefore, the Green Party claims, New Zealanders should have some input into the negotiations (Donald, 28\textsuperscript{th} Feb, 2003).

Although the Labour Government provided the public with 25 days to comment on the offers the Government has made to ‘foreign competition’ under the GATS, the Green Party insisted it is still undemocratic since New Zealand business have had a year of consultation with the Government, and that this is considerably more than that allowed to the New Zealand public. The claim is therefore reasserted by the Greens declaring that the Labour Government is prepared to ‘completely ignore what the people are saying’ (Donald,

On this basis, it is claimed by the Greens, that what is needed is that these international negotiations are opened to a ‘proper democratic process’ (Donald, 28th Feb, 2003). The variations on this term used by the Greens are, ‘full and proper public consultation’, ‘consulting widely in the community...in a transparent and democratic manner’, and a ‘proper consultation process with the community’ (Donald, 28th Feb, 2003; Green Party submission to trade negotiation division 28th Feb, 2003; Donald, press release, 1st April, 2003). The meaning constructed here is one in which consultation with the community is synonymous with a proper democratic process, that democracy proper can only exist while community consultation is practised. In order to remedy the perceived undemocratic process of, in this case, negotiation with the WTO, the Green Party argue for a process of Parliamentary scrutiny, select committee process with public submissions, and a debate and vote of the whole Parliament (Green Party submission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 28th Feb, 2003).

This is significant in that while much had been made of the importance of ‘the people whose lives will be permanently and profoundly affected by any changes’ (Donald, press release, 4th Feb, 2003) having input into the process, all that is offered to counter the Labour Government’s hold on ‘absolute power’ is an appeal to the very institutions that the Labour executive has been dealing with in order to establish this perceived hold on power in the first place. Nowhere is there mention of the type of community consultation in the form of, for example, the ‘study circles’, advocated by Jeanette Fitzsimons in relation to the Treaty debate (Fitzsimons, Tanczos and Turei, press release, 11th March, 2004).

This response may be contrasted with what constitutes a democratic society when the view of the Values Party is recalled. For the Values Party, a ‘strong and active movement of people at the grass-roots level’ ensures a ‘truly democratic society’ and this is contrasted with the institutions of liberal democracy, the very institutions that the Green Party now appeals to in order to bring about proper democracy (Beyond Tomorrow, 1975:85). Significantly, while the Values Party advocated participation, the Green Party advocate representation.

The recourse exclusively to the institutions of liberal democracy may be contrasted with the comments of Rod Donald where he says ‘we don’t trust this Government to
negotiate the...GATS on our behalf...their agenda runs contrary to New Zealand’s best interests’ (Donald, press release 23rd April, 2002). Since ‘negotiating on behalf’ is fundamental to representative democracy, Donald’s rejection of this is not consistent with the Green Party proposed solutions. This is because the fundamental premise of the Green Party solutions is representation since all their solutions are directed through Parliament. Also, rather than advocating participation in the form of consultation with the community, the Green Party relies upon the already existing institutions that have, in the opinion of the Green Party, proved themselves incapable of ensuring a more democratic outcome. This throws doubt on the Green Party claim that its chief concern is the defence of democracy based on community participation in consultation when what they advocate is soliciting information and opinion from the population through the mechanisms of central governance. This, by definition, is not political participation, but representation (Oxford Dictionary of Politics, 2003).

The final aspect considered here is the Greens’ opposition to the influence of the GATS on the basis of the threat the agreement presents to national identity. This aspect was raised to argue that, in addition to political impacts of the GATS, there were also negative social and cultural implications. In short, that trade liberalisation will lead to threats to New Zealand’s ‘unique character’ turning this country into a ‘globalized village’ (Donald, press release, 4th Feb, 2003). Where the WTO states that ‘all commitments apply on a nondiscriminatory basis to all other Members’ (GATS-Fact and Fiction, 2001), the Greens choose to discriminate in favour of local suppliers and against ‘foreign’ suppliers. Although the WTO uses the word ‘foreign’, it does so in a way that rearticulates the word from its dictionary definition of alien, irrelevant, dissimilar (Oxford Dictionary, 1958). The result of this rearticulation is a sense invoking unity among members to an agreement on the basis of nondiscrimination. This discursive exercise in meaning-making by the WTO is intended to attack the inflexibility of nation-state definitions so that it might matter little where the company providing services comes from. This meaning construction also attacks the notion of identity attached to the nation-state (Guéhenno, 1995). It is from this perspective that the Greens launch another attack against trade liberalisation and neo-liberalism, in the process revealing core Green ideological perspectives. This is especially so where the Green Party reject the dominance of free-trade rules as the basis for service provision by a corporation.
from another country (Kelsey, 2003). Core Green ideology favours local production and consumption, and therefore attacks a fundamental premise of trade liberalisation on which global capitalism rests.

The Green Party launched an attack on the fundamental basis of trade liberalisation by subverting the association articulated by the WTO above, where ‘foreign’ is made equivalent to ‘non-discriminatory’. The Greens response is to rehabilitate the dictionary definition by using foreign in association with other words in an attempt to cast it in a negative sense. Phrases like ‘foreign interference’ (Donald, press release, 1st April, 2003); ‘foreign firms’ (Donald, 4th Feb. 2003); ‘Foreign owners’, ‘foreign corporations’, and ‘the tip of the foreign ownership iceberg’ (Just Trade #57). This rearticulation of the part overseas suppliers might play in New Zealand service provision is intended to contrive a sense where these suppliers are seen as having imperialist intentions of conquest and the subjugation of New Zealanders to alien rule. The sense of conquest is evident in Rod Donald’s description of ‘foreign bankers’ as a ‘horde’ with its connotations of a Viking horde intent upon pillage, and it is the intention of the Greens, as the defenders of New Zealand, to keep ‘foreign hands off our silverware’ (Donald, press release 1st April, 2003; Donald, press release 10th Nov. 2003).

The status of Maori as Tangata whenua was also referred to as the Greens discriminated between foreign and local suppliers of services. Objecting to the ‘foreign buy-up of Aotearoa’, the Greens appeal to ideas of colonisation by outsiders to the disadvantage of the original inhabitants of Aotearoa/New Zealand (Just Trade #57). However, there is something paradoxical in the Greens reference to ‘Aotearoa’ as a defence against both colonisation and the nation-state. Since ‘Aotearoa’ evokes the idea of these islands prior to becoming New Zealand and a nation-state, this is a defence of the nation-state that only came into being following a period of colonisation that subsequently dominated the existing Maori way of life. The vague intimation that governance on other than nation-state basis is intended to achieve no more than a differentiation on the basis of the uniqueness of Maori and Aotearoa in the world, thereby drawing a boundary that is not open to negotiation, rather than a shift toward superseding the nation-state, which may imply decentralisation of political authority. In contrast to the latter, the evidence from Green Party material suggests that rather than superceding the nation-state, the Green Party see it as the legitimate focus of
political activity and this is also, by implication, a commitment to centralised forms of governance.

The discussion around the issues of GE and the GATS, has revealed the emphasis the Green Party attaches to consultation with the population as the essence of democracy. The factors identified by the Green Party have contributed to a legitimation crisis that revolves around the disruption of the states’ normative commitment to the polity (Habermas, 1976). The recognition of this can be found in Green Party material where Fitzsimons refers to the ‘Greek tragedy’ style of governance, and where Kedgley declares that consultation has become corrupted to mean its opposite. These views reveal a sense of powerlessness at the basis of which is the failure of the democratic mechanism. For the Green Party the latter should mean that the Government is guided by the majority of the demos (Hindess, 1996). The issues raised in this discussion have highlighted the points upon which the Green Party is critical of the current practice of democracy.

These have included the speed with which decisions are made, giving little time for input from the community, as well as criticism of the technocratic arrangements that have aided this process. Also, the Greens identify the influence of TNCs (especially those in the biotech industry), as well as the GATS agreements constraining the capacity of the state to grant the polity authentic input into policy decisions. The Greens also raise an ideological challenge in that by opposing the GATS agreements in particular, the Green Party, inter alia, opposes its ideological basis, neo-liberalism. In raising these issues the Green Party places developments like the global expansion of trade on the political agenda. This serves to encourage political debate at a fundamental level by arguing that neither globalisation nor genetic engineering are inevitable. This then opens the way for considering alternatives based on Green ideology.

While providing the potential for political debate on these fundamental issues is significant for a robust democracy generally (Dahrendorf, 1990), the Green Party’s proposed solutions to the problems around the democratic mechanism, revealed in the GATS discussion, do not challenge the existing structures and, rather, reassert the dominance of liberal, representative democracy. Significant restructuring by the Green Party might reasonably be expected since the criticism levelled against the Government handling of these issues is also a criticism of the process of representation. It can be concluded that for the
Green Party these institutions are not beyond redemption, and that it is possible to make them more democratic. However, it is ineffectual for the Greens to argue for Parliamentary scrutiny, select committee process with public submissions, and a debate and vote of the whole Parliament as a basis for ensuring authentic influence in policy decisions by the polity. This is because these institutional arrangements already exist but have failed to respond to demands from the polity. The Green Party response can be described as incoherent since it at once criticises existing institutional arrangements for this failure and then turns to these arrangements as a corrective. This response is likely to be ineffective since the grounds for the Green Party critique had been that these institutions have been ignored, ruled out, or mishandled, and the Green Party offer no guarantees that the same institutions won’t be similarly treated in the future, nor does it plan for their reformation.

Reasons for the failure of the existing institutions have included the development of technocratic governance which, as argued, depoliticizes issues placing them beyond the influence of the population. Dispossessing the polity of their political rights as citizens also removes the ‘foundation of our liberty and the condition for an open community’ (Guéhenno, 1995:5). This has certainly been the claim of the Green Party which accused the Government of exercising ‘absolute power’ (Donald, press release, 28th Feb 2003). In this regard, the association of the nation-state and citizenship are threatened, taking with it the assurances of normative political activity.

This is based on the understanding of politics acquired from idealizations of ‘public life in the cities of antiquity’ where politics is seen to be attending to the affairs of the polis (Hindess, 1996:23). The legitimation crisis can be seen as a disruption of this idealisation. The cause of this crisis identified here is linked to commitments by the nation-state to global trends in trade and investment. Scholte (2000) has observed the disruptive effect globalisation can have on democracies as well as a range of other factors, such as ecological sustainability and social solidarity. In contrast to the way in which communitarian thought is based on notions of citizenship (MacIntyre in Sandel, 1984), global commitments throw into question the notion of citizenship since the latter is defined by national boundaries as well as political participation, both of which are undermined by the workings of supranational bodies, as the foregoing has demonstrated.

This raises the issue of the reconfiguration of the political community in terms of a
territorial redefinition displacing the nation-state (Näsström 2003). While globalism itself has raised its opposite, that is, the internal fragmentation of the nation-state, or decentralisation, this counter effect none-the-less shares with globalisation a threat to the continued relevance of the nation-state. The nation-state becomes, for Guéhenno (1993), increasingly abstract where socioeconomic inequality increases between regions and where the legitimacy of the nation-state is strained, producing an increase in political distance between the state and the polis (Lechner, 1996).

Within this issue, Sáinz and Andrade-Eekhoff (2000:172) argue that alternative ‘regulatory formations’, based on the ‘revitalization of the local’, are a distinct possibility. Scholte (2000), takes up the notion of alternative regulatory formations, and talks about experiments in alternatives, in the form of democracy, economic restructuring, modes of identity politics, approaches to the ecology, and constructions of knowledge, which have emerged from social movement responses to globalisation. At the centre of these alternatives is the community based organisation (CBO), which, as Scholte (2000) argues, have had the effect in many countries of reorientating substantial parts of politics from the state to the local non-governmental arena. When compared to statist government, CBOs tend to offer increased opportunities for popular participation and direct consultation (Scholte, 2000:27).

Decentralisation has the distinction that, for some theorists, its increasing saliency is a product of the globalizing process, and capable of providing a cure for the democratic ills wrought by globalisation (Sáinz and Andrade-Eekhoff, 2000:14). In this way, globalisation potentially carries the seeds of its own undoing. The emancipatory potential of decentralisation, born of globalisation, depends on the extent to which nation-states are willing to see their sovereignty eroded from within as well as from without.

It can be argued that bio-regions, a central structuring concept regarding both ecological and political considerations from core Green thinking, would serve as a basis for decentralisation and reconfiguration of the polity. Bio-regions redraw the political territorial boundary primarily on ecological grounds, but, in so doing, offer the political community a reidentification beyond that provided by the nation-state. It does so with a conceptual apparatus of its own emphasising decentralisation, human scale communities, cultural and biological diversity, co-operation and community responsibility, and as such has resonance
with communitarian thought (MacIntyre in Sandel, 1984:137). For McLaughlin (1993:205), decentralisation is necessary if meaningful democracy is to be achieved since, in his view, politics on the scale of the nation-state has become a contest between professionals. Meaningful democracy is defined by Die Grünen, 1980, as grassroots democracy which, for them, is synonymous with decentralisation with the long-term goal of creating a patchwork of anarchist politics or ‘non-aligned regions’, linked through networking and exchanges, rather than formal state apparatus (Capra and Spretnak, 1984).

On the basis of these observations it can be argued that decentralisation of political authority would be a reasonable response to the legitimation crisis. Historically in New Zealand, the Values Party in 1972 advocated decentralisation in order to satisfy demands for participation. This involved a reduction in the size and function of central government, since it is only through a sacrifice of central authority that local autonomy could be secured. In addition to this, the not too distant history of provincialism in New Zealand provides a concrete example of how decentralisation has functioned in the past.

However, none of this is evident in the material of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand. The strongest evidence indicates that the Greens are oriented toward protecting and bolstering the sovereignty of the nation-state, and that this political unit, for the Greens, should be the focus of political activity; centralised and representative rather than decentralised and participatory democracy.

It can be argued that on a global scale the Green Party advocates a form of decentralisation in that criticism against the influence of supranational agreements is directed toward protecting the ability of nations to act autonomously within their sovereign boundaries. However, there is evidence to suggest that this concern for the sovereignty of the nation-state is a selective process for the Green Party. In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, for example, the Greens welcome its guidelines and insist on its having effect on the domestic policy making of New Zealand as a sovereign state. Consistent with its core ideology, the Green Party consider the influence of the Kyoto Protocol to be a worthy contribution to the nation as well as the rest of the world. Also, and similarly with the GATS (which the Greens reject, as discussed), there is no negotiation around its terms, as Fitzsimons states, ‘New Zealand is obliged under the Kyoto Protocol...’ (press release, 28th June, 2001). The difference is one of ideology; the rejection of neo-liberalism, on one hand,
and embracing global solutions to what is perceived as a global ecological problem on the other hand. This ideological contestation is of value in challenging the dominance of the principles of neo-liberalism. However, in both rejecting as imperialism the influence of some supranational agreements and embracing as liberating the effects of others, the nation-state is the strategic political unit for the Green Party in New Zealand.

Further more, when the issue of a consultation process around whether New Zealand should commit to the Kyoto Protocol was reopened, Fitzsimons argued that although she endorses a consultation process, this should not get in the way of ratifying Kyoto. This argument reverses the primacy of consultation in the determination of policy emphasised by the Green Party, and conditions the insistence on consultation as a principle generating ‘a proper democratic process’ (Donald, 28th Feb; 2003). The grounds for this is the propositional assumption that ‘...we know climate change is happening’ (Fitzsimons, press release, 18th Oct. 2001). This claim can be regarded as a rhetorical device and attempts to dragoon support by the veracitas naturae aspect of the claim. On this basis Fitzsimons claims that consultation should be on how emissions should be reduced and not whether they should be. In this case, where the Convenor of the Ministerial Group on Climate Change, Pete Hodgson states that the Government will be ‘listening closely to the views of New Zealanders before making a formal decision on ratification.’, Fitzsimons considers this a corruption of consultation and labels what the Convenor is suggesting as lobbying. This indicates that Green Party support of consultation is not unconditional, and where the Party regards the issue to be beyond debate, then consultation can be foregone. It can be argued on the basis of this that once the Green Party had achieved their ideological aims, consultation would shift from being regarded as the very essence of democracy to something to be avoided and denigrated to the status of lobbying that carries connotations of outside sectional interests squabbling for ascendancy. This, it can be argued, amounts to an abandonment of consultation in principle, at least in this instance.

Summary.

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8This doctrine insists on the truthfulness of nature and that only those whose minds are poisoned by prejudice can fall into error (Popper, 1963:7).
This section has argued that a major change in Green politics in New Zealand has occurred. Material examined from the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand has indicated that political decentralisation, thought a defining characteristic of Green politics, is no longer a goal the Party seeks to achieve. This may be differentiated from the earlier phase of Green politics in New Zealand when the Values Party argued for decentralisation as a remedy for what the Party regarded as the concentration of political power in few hands. Integral to Values policy was the reduction of the size and function of central Government in regional affairs. In this way, the Values Party policy was aimed at emphasising the democratic aspect of liberal democracy. For the Green Party, however, the liberal aspect is emphasised as the Party has moved closer to a commitment to existing centralised, representative institutions. Therefore, it can be concluded that where Rainbow (1991) asks what the implications the Green decentralist impulse has for existing representative institutions, the answer is that not only are there no Green Party plans to decentralise existing institutions, but also, that the decentralising impulse itself is under question.

Significant factors leading to this conclusion are the displacement of ‘grassroots’ democracy with the ‘fuzzier’ notion of ‘appropriate decision-making’ which, as argued, effectively rules out grassroots participation in favour of representation by political élites. It has been found that in this process, the meaning of grassroots has been rearticulated to conform to the liberal separation between the political sphere and civil society. Also, the internal structure of the Green Party has been significantly altered with the demise of the Wild Greens. In doing so the Green Party cut its ties with the ‘new political culture’ and direct action. This indicates a move away from dissensus politics associated with social movements and toward consensus associated with institutional politics. The Wild Greens were then reconfigured as the youth wing of the Party and encouraged to get active by voting in general elections. The youth wing is, therefore, transformed from the critics of current liberal institutions to its supporters.

Arising from the material analysed is the conclusion that the Green Party in New Zealand emphasises consultation, and this may be contrasted to the reconfiguration of existing institutions advocated by the Values Party. The Green Party emphasis on consultation itself betrays a commitment to the liberal separation between politics and civil society, and emphasises representation over participation. Examination of the Green Party
‘in action’ on the GATS agreements, as with its response to school closures, reveals that the Party sought solutions through existing institutions. The importance of these case studies (GATS, GE and school closures, for example) is that they are able to reveal the rhetorical use of terms such as ‘participatory democracy’ by the Green Party in its policy. The commitment to existing institutions was also evident in the study circles proposal. Potentially a significant development in instituting a participatory moment. However, at the final stage this potential is lost as the process relies on representatives reaching consensus in Parliament. Finally, the Green Party’s desire for coalition with Government not only reveals the Party’s allegiance solely to liberal institutions but also, as argued, the necessity of a coalition agreement restricts the political scope of the Party. This limits the issues on which the Green Party may pronounce and reduces its efficacy to define itself with a clear and distinctive ideology. The consequence of this is that the Green Party is less able to challenge current hegemony. In this way, while the Green Party have raised the issue of a legitimation crisis, its solutions to the problem have remained faithful to the institutions of liberal representative democracy and, given the example above concerning Kyoto, the Green Party is not beyond eroding democratic principles to secure their political aims.

Therefore it can be concluded that increasing the democratic moment of liberal democracy is not as prevalent among the aims of Green politics in New Zealand as once it was. Also, that since it is the preference of the Green Party to embrace liberal institutions, this should come at as small a cost in terms of its principles and ideological integrity as is possible. This can only be assured if the Green Party remains outside coalition until it wins a general election and becomes the major coalition partner. Since coalition agreements limit the range of issues the Party may politicise, such agreements limit the capacity of the Green Party to act as a compound collective actor and this function of the Green Party is examined in the final section of this Chapter (Talshir, 1998, 2002).
8.3

Modular Ideology: Potential and limitations.

It will be recalled that the Green proposal on ‘study circles’ emphasised discursive democracy on the basis of ‘self-forming’ groups. The next section focuses on social groups formed on less arbitrary grounds, and more enduring factors such as ethnic identity. Petra Kelly of the German Greens, has said a function of Green politics is to ‘genuinely espouse the cause of the weaker members of society...’(1991:193). It is in this regard that the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand will be examined.

The emphasis in this section will be on the extent to which the connections between the Green Party and groups in society can be regarded as ‘genuine’ as suggested by Petra Kelly. This is regarded as authentic representation by Dryzek (1996 a), that is, substantive rather than symbolic. While there can be no absolute guarantees that a Party’s policy will achieve in practice that which policy statements indicate, a reasonable gauge of authentic representation will be the amount of terminology specific to the group concerned that is integrated into policy, as well as commentary on the groups’ interests from those outside the Party. To this end, the concept ‘intertextuality’ will be relied on to deal with the textual aspects in this examination, while reference to outside sources will provide additional information. Intertextuality refers to the ‘presence of elements of other texts’, and therefore voices other than that of the author’s (Fairclough, 2003:218). The framework for this discussion will the notion of modular ideology (Talshir, 1998, 2002). Modular ideology represents the possibility for the simultaneous expression of different political groupings within one ideological framework, in this way, it represents a distinctive ideological language encompassing a plurality of, sometimes, competing sub-ideologies, and may on these grounds be distinguished from totalizing or conventional ideologies. In this way, admitting the coexistence of a plurality of sub-ideologies is conceived of as a defining characteristic of Green politics.

Specifically, with regard to the issue of intertextuality, the Green Party approach to
Maori serves as the best example. Green Party policy on the Treaty of Waitangi, 2002 is entitled ‘Tiriti o Waitangi’ and immediately signals an aspect of intertextuality where the Green Party ‘acknowledges the indigenous language version of Te Tiriti as the legitimate text...’, and founding document of Aotearoa/New Zealand when the Treaty was initially signed in 1840. In this way, the voice of Maori is placed at the forefront of the Treaty issue as opposed to the English language version. This may be contrasted with the current Labour Government reference to the Treaty. In both the 2002 Maori Development Policy and Social and Economic Development policy, the Labour Party refer to the English ‘Treaty of Waitangi’.

Also, in the Green Party’s Tiriti o Waitangi Policy (2002) Maori are recognised as tangata whenua or people of the land of Aotearoa/New Zealand, thereby establishing an equivalence between Maori and the land suggesting an existential boundedness between the two. The grounds for Maori democratic struggle, are set out in point 3 of the principles in the policy and revolve around breaches of the ‘Tiriti rights of Maori’ by delegated representatives of the Crown. The Treaty is regarded as the framework through which Maori interests should be expressed, and, regarded in this way, the Treaty is not only foundational for the nation but also for Maori interests. This suggests that the two are co-terminus, which challenges the Eurocentric social order. It is this order that for a long time Maori emancipation efforts have struggled and sought redress through the Treaty. In this way, Maori attempt to reassert their sovereignty against an overarching European influence, the language and culture of which have colonised previous Maori systems.

An index on the authenticity of representation offered by the Green Party, is the degree of coherence between Green policy and that of the Maori Party. For example, a commitment to Te Tiriti o Waitangi as the founding document of the nation on the part of the Green Party, as mentioned, is also to be found in the ‘Tikanga’ (policies and processes) of the Maori Party. Similarly, a commitment to tangata whenua and their struggle to achieve self-determination, are common to both Green and Maori Parties. Throughout other Green Party policy, reference to Maori can find its parallel in the Tikanga of the Maori Party. For example, the Green Party conservation policy supports the ‘role of tangata whenua as kaitiaki of natural areas’. Another example is found in the Green Party environmental policy where there is support for ‘an increased role for tangata whenua as kaitiaki of their rohe’, as well
as recognition of ‘waahi tapu’. The sense of these statements can only be extracted with a knowledge of Maori, and the meaning is not converted into the English equivalent during which process the specific Maori meaning might be altered.

Possibly the best example of intertextuality appears in the Green Party 2002 Health Policy where it is stated that

‘Health focuses not just on te taha tinana (physical) but also te taha wairua (spiritual), te taha hinengaro (mental and emotional) and te taha whanau (social - family and community) and the interconnectedness of these dimensions. Whare Tapu Wha - a model of a Maori understanding of health by Dr Mason Durie’.

In this example, it is the Maori view on health, as expressed by Mason Durie, that determines the Green Party policy, with English terms subordinated to Maori.

However, although the Greens support the claim that Maori are tangata whenua, it does not follow that the Greens will axiomatically support expressed Maori interests. For example, on the 16th November, 2000 the issue of ‘indigenous rights to carry out customary practices’ saw tension rise between the Greens and Maori rights (NZPA, Nov. 2000).

Within this there were two related issues; that of rights to beached whales, and that of commercial whaling. In the first case, the issue revolved around whether stranded whales should be saved, as the Greens argued, or should be left to die and then used by Maori for materials. Sir Tipene O’Regan of Ngai Tahu was reported arguing that Maori had every reason to be irritated that ‘natural strandings’ were being averted with the support of ‘central Green bureaucrats’, and depriving Maori interests. For the Green Party, Sue Kedgley argued that ‘While we fully support the rights of Maori to use the remains of dead whales for carving, ...we do not agree that humans should turn our backs on beached whales to ensure that they die’ (NZPA, Nov. 2000).

The second issue was that of commercial whaling. The World Council of Whalers, hosted by iwi from the top of the South Island and the Waitangi Fisheries Commission in Nelson, told the conference that they had come ‘to support iwi in their struggle to establish their indigenous rights to carry out customary practices’ (NZPA, Nov. 2000). Mike Ward of the Nelson Greens raised the point that appeal to Maori indigenous rights was a strategy on the part of commercial whaling interests to resist the establishment of a South Pacific whale sanctuary (supported by the government), by cultivating tensions within New Zealand
Maori were divided on the issue, and the Waitangi Fisheries Commission stated that it had not yet arrived at a ‘position which reflects the entirety of Maori view’ (on the establishment of a whale sanctuary) (NZPA, Nov 2000).

This raises the issue of the indeterminancy involved in knowing what Maori interests (or that of any group in society) are. While Green Party support of a South Pacific whale sanctuary would reflect the interests of some Maori, according to the experiences of the Waitangi Fisheries Commission, it is equally clear that this support would not reflect the interests of all Maori. However, Green Party support in their policy for Maori indigenous rights can be seen to conflict with arguments in favour of, in the first instance, letting whales die when beached, and, in the second instance, to the practice of whaling, both of which are argued for on the same indigenous rights principle. The theory of modular ideology offered by Gayil Talshir provides a framework within which to examine this situation.

According to Talshir (1998, 2002), modular ideology represents the possibility for the coexistence of different political clusters within one ideological framework, in this way, it represents a distinctive ideological language encompassing a plurality of sometimes competing sub-ideologies, and may on these grounds be distinguished from totalizing or conventional ideologies (Talshir, 2002).

Within this conceptualisation, Maori interests represent a coexisting sub-ideology, and, while such interests may subscribe to different notions of the ‘good society’, the overall coherence of the Green conceptual framework is accepted. Important, however, is that the configuration of, in this case, Maori ideas and the conceptual framework that compose their own world-view, remains distinct and preserved within their language (Talshir, 2002:107).

The acceptance of the legitimacy of the sub-ideologies is a unique characteristic of modular ideology. This acceptance and legitimacy can be seen where, as mentioned, the Green Party refer to the indigenous version of the Treaty as Te Tiriti O Waitangi and regard it as the ‘founding document of Aotearoa/New Zealand’, as well as other instances previously mentioned. Further, evidence indicates Green Party inclusion of Maori language in policy documents including that on the Treaty as mentioned, and this would indicate a commitment to Maori as tangata whenua and the foundational status of the Treaty. In this way, the particular Maori world-view is expressed with the use of Maori concepts, and therefore is an authentic representation of ‘Green Maori’ views (Te Awa, Magazine of the

292
Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand). The term ‘Green Maori’ indicates the limitation that the Green Party, through its Maori network, Te Roopu Pouamunu, places on its ability to speak for Maori, and this it limits to Maori who share the views of the Green Party.

It is sometimes the case that core Green ideology will converge with the Maori sub-ideology. Jeanette Fitzsimons has pointed this out in February, 2002 after the Waitangi Day observance that ‘some Maori elders commented on issues we have in common- the knowledge that the foundation of our existence is respect for the natural world- land, water and other living things’. These factors have an eco-centric appeal, but there are other factors on which Green and Maori world-views converge. Again Fitzsimons points out that ‘Maori are also not focussed solely on economics’ which, although important, the emphasis for the good of the nation should be on the ‘quality of the relationship under the Treaty’...[built on] ‘dialogue, tolerance and understanding’ (Fitzsimons, debate on Prime Minister’s statement, 1st Feb, 2005). Further convergence is evidenced by a member of the Maori Party who notes that the Maori Party offers an anti-neoliberal critique (Butler, 2004), and, as has been demonstrated, there are many points on which the Green Party also confronts neo-liberal ideology.

Perhaps the most obvious incident where the Green Party expresses Maori interests is in the debate around the Foreshore and Seabed Act, 2004. Butler (2004) reports that in 2003, a court decision upheld the right of eight Maori tribes of the upper South Island to pursue their claim of areas of seabed and foreshore as customary Maori land (Butler, 2004). The Labour government at the time decided that it would override the decision and legislate full title of the foreshore and seabed over to the Crown. Under the Treaty, Maori were granted tino Rangatiratanga, that is, chiefly authority, which may be contrasted with government authority under the term kawanatanga, or governance (Orange, 1992:35).

On this basis, the Green Party refused to support the legislation. The Green Party supported Maori opposition to the foreshore and seabed legislation on the grounds that it represented a confiscation of existing Maori rights, as well on the grounds that access was not an issue since the ‘general’ Maori view was that reasonable public access should be retained along with Kaitiakitanga or ‘collective customary title’. The Green Party also recognised the preservation by local hapu of kaitiaki, or guardianship, which had been in place for generations over the foreshore and seabed (Fitzsimons, address to Green Party
policy conference, January, 2004). Maori opposition to the legislation was emphasised by the resignation of Tariana Turia from the Labour Party.

However, this did not mean that Turia saw the Green Party as the obvious focus for Maori aspirations, and she went on to form the Maori Party for this purpose. This illustrates the limitation, suggested by the term ‘Green Maori’, on Green Party representation of Maori interests. Generally, further limitation has been indicated by Jeanette Fitzsimons in an interview on the 28th Feb., 2005, where she said that many groups in society turn away from association with the Green Party, preferring instead larger parties that hold more power. This is a pragmatic consideration rather than the ideological one dealt with by Talshir (1998, 2002). However, it curbs the ability of the Green Party to represent those in society who lack power as suggested by Petra Kelly (1991:193). Further, a guest speaker at the Green Party AGM at Karapiro in 2003, Angeline Greensill from the Tainui Hapu spoke on, ‘Local Green Action and Respecting Kaitiakitanga’. The point she emphasised was that of establishing boundaries, and, in answer to her own question, ‘what role do the Greens play in kaitiakitanga?’, her response was–none, and that kaitiakitanga is exercised only by tangata whenua. She also spoke of an independent Maori Party and asked Green MP Metiria Turei when she was going to lead the Maori Party. This suggests that according to some Maori, an incommensurable rift exists between the interests of Maori and the capacity for the Green Party to represent them.

Summary.

It is reasonable to conclude that since the Green Party express a number of their political aims in Maori, that the Party is genuinely focussed on tangata whenua. This is especially evident in policy on Tiriti O Waitangi and health. A degree of convergence in political aims is evident between the Green Party and the Maori Party and this fact indicates the accuracy of the Green Party in advancing issues relevant to the political struggle of Maori. A good illustration of this was the Green Party position on the foreshore and seabed issue. This also illustrates the accuracy of Talshir’s (1998,2002) conception of Green ideology as ‘modular’ in that Maori political aims can be explained as a sub-ideology with in the framework of core Green ideology.

However, while it is reasonable to argue that the Green Party authentically advance
the interests of Maori, problems arise when opposition to this come from Maori themselves. This opposition raises questions over the efficacy of Green Party representation of Maori interests and of the Green Party’s function as a nodal point for the democratic struggles of groups in society (Laclau and Mouffe, 1992). However, given the above limitations, it can be concluded that this relation is subject to conditions that cannot be negotiated or compromised. This raises the point that offering the opportunity for political expression as a sub-ideology that preserves the integrity of its origin, does not guarantee support from the group concerned and is, rather, conditioned by other factors mentioned.
Conclusion.

Generally the research has focussed on the process of democratic social change. That is, as a means to achieve change in a peaceful, incremental manner (Popper, 1963). For this reason political conflict has been regarded in terms of competition as a cultural phenomenon at an ideological level. This ideological conflict is essential if politics is not to be reduced to technical decisions between alternatives aimed at essentially the same ends (Mannheim, 1960; Bell, 1962). The theory of Antonio Gramsci has been utilised in order to frame the political conflict. It will be recalled that for Gramsci the challenge for state power must be preceded by the achievement of hegemony for the intellectual reform of existing society (Fontana, 1993). It has been demonstrated that there is evidence of this process on the part of Green politics in New Zealand.

Viewed from this perspective the research has found that Green ideology is critical of the current social and political order. This criticism provides the grounds for the argument for an ‘alternative’ Green vision. This provides the basis of an ideological conflict with the already constituted social/political order. The research has identified three areas in which to examine the influence of Green politics on liberal democracy in New Zealand. The first looked at the contention that ‘political action for its own sake...defends against modernity’s anti-political tendencies’ (Torgerson, 2000). The second has focussed on the proposed reforms of liberal democratic institutions offered by the Green parties, and examines the implications for current representative institutions of the direct democratic impulse associated with Green politics (Rainbow, 1991). Finally, the third has examined the function of Green Parties as compound collective actors (Talshir, 1998, 2002).

With regard to the first area, the research focussed on the ideological conflict manifest in the active process of meaning-making ‘an important element in the political process of seeking to achieve hegemony’ (Fairclough, 2003). Important examples in this process identified by the research centre on the Green rejection of core liberal principles. This is evident in their opposition to liberal atomic and anomic individualism in favour of ideals of community and interconnections between individuals and the environment. This
is summarised in the holism, which pervades Green politics, and which determines a different way of viewing both the social and environmental world. It therefore represents a fundamental rejection of this aspect of liberal ideology. The politicisation of this holistic approach is evident where ‘state of the nation’ is replaced with ‘state of the planet’, resulting in the rejection of GDP in favour of ‘natural resource accounts and social indicators’.

It can be concluded that Green politics in New Zealand has revived politics at the ideological level first and foremost, as well as paradoxically, through its rejection of conventional ideological labels. As mentioned, this is expressed in the phrase ‘neither left nor right...’ characteristically associated with Green politics. It has been argued that this slogan has a particular New Zealand connection since it was anticipated by the Values Party declaration that they choose a way that is ‘neither capitalism nor communism...The Values Party way’. In this way, the Values Party has contributed to core Green principles, which then form a coherent doctrine, opposed in many respects to existing liberal and neo-liberal principles. The Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand subsequently quoted the slogan in its revised form that is usually credited to Die Grünen. This has the effect of focussing on the issue of ideology, not only in relation to Green politics in New Zealand, but also that of the prevalent order, which having then be revealed, may be subject to scrutiny and criticism on this basis. This process disrupts the ‘naturalness’ of the prevalent ideology and so may be regarded as a counter-hegemonic challenge.

Further evidence of this is that both, firstly, the Values Party and, subsequently, the Green Party in New Zealand have regarded themselves in opposition to the values of the liberal capitalist system. Further, both rejected a society based on the values of the market place and the ‘new-right’. The ‘new-right’ was perceived as the prevalent organising principle and Green politics in New Zealand continues to attempt to displace neo-liberalism with their version of ‘sustainable’. ‘Sustainability’ has been identified as a site of considerable ideological debate between the Greens and other groups and political parties using the term with variations on meaning. Since this struggle is ongoing its contribution to the revival of politics is significant. Its rise to political salience began when the Values Party, drawing from the ‘limits to growth’ thesis, developed their policy around the term ‘stable-state’ economy. By 1978 this had evolved into the term ‘sustainable’ and since then has had a particular meaning for the Greens, the roots of which can be traced back to the
‘limits to growth’ principle. This is politically significant since it confronts the idea that ever increasing industrial and economic growth is possible and desirable, and this, for the Greens, has dominated in both the West and the East since the industrial revolution.

Instances of success in the ideological struggle are evident where conceptual capture had been achieved to some degree by the Green Party. This occurred where the Green Party successfully colonised Government policy with their ‘triple-bottom line’ meaning of sustainable. This thereby, oriented the direction of the policy concerned closer to that preferred by the Greens. This instance not only illustrates the political challenge Green ideology represents to the current order, but also that the Greens are able to alter policy outcomes that will go on to have a practical impact in policy implementation.

Green politics in New Zealand has rejected the neo-liberal expansion of global economic trade in favour of its opposite, localisation of production and consumption. In this regard, both the Values Party and the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand developed policy in favour of the latter. However, it has been observed that the Values Party displayed a stronger commitment to local development with its ‘co-operative community economy’ than the Green Party’s ‘community economic development’, in that the latter amounts to support for the spontaneous emergence of production initiatives from within a community. Also, since the Green Party rely on this development as a precondition for participatory democracy, they display, in this instance, less commitment to challenging liberal democratic institutions than that implied by the Values Party’s decentralisation policy (to be discussed shortly). However, in terms of economic decentralisation, both policies display an opposition to dominant trends and therefore fulfil the function of raising the possibility of an alternative ideological position from which to organise society.

These examples illustrate the disruption achieved by the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand on solutions that have become hegemonic since they are usually uncritically accepted. Generally, with regard to the ideological challenge offered by the Green Party, it can be concluded that the Party successfully stimulates political debate and contributes to ensuring a robust democracy. It is reasonable to conclude this since the ideological critique offered by the Green Party is at a sufficiently fundamental level as to undermine the principles of liberal and neo-liberal ideology.

However, this ideological challenge has not been capitalised on to the extent that it
might have. It was noted that in a number of instances the Green Party failed to develop practical solutions to some of the contested issues. That is, they failed to put their preferred alternatives into practice, and so failed to demonstrate how Green ideology has answers to practical problems. In this regard, we can refer back to the issue of GDP where, although the ideological critique was strong, it largely remained undeveloped in a practical sense and thereby lessened the impact of Green ideology on members of the public. Also, the alternative to the World Economic Forum was not put forward at the time and so lost the opportunity to display the capability of Green ideology to address current issues with plausible alternatives at the time the issue was foremost in the media and therefore at the attention of the public.

It has been argued that the Green ideological challenge to the current order is at its strongest when contributing to ensure a robust democracy. This is borne out when the absence of Green policy on the reform of liberal institutions is considered. The gains made by the Green Party, described in the research as conceptual capture, represent the step-by-step process by which they will achieve hegemony.

However, this process is under threat by the Green Party’s ambition for state power (coalition in government). The insight of Gramsci (where failure will likely result where state power is sought before hegemonic dominance is achieved), is evident where the demands of coalition and Cabinet positions in particular, put fetters on the critical scope of Green ideology. Since Green Party critique has always been the grounds for the alternatives they advocate, coalition weakens Green ideology and a weak ideology will not be sufficient to challenge the hegemony of that prevalent. It can be concluded that the ideological confinement of coalition restrains the ability of the Green Party to act within Parliament in accordance with the ‘new political culture’ as much as dropping the Wild Greens restrains this ability outside Parliament. This does not apply if the Green Party remain in Parliament but outside coalitions. Green Party seats in Parliament will increase the chances of Green ideological hegemony. This is because Parliamentary representation potentially provides access to the media for the dissemination of Green ideas into civil society and provides the Party with the opportunity to influence policy formation in the way described above.

In this way, coalition can be seen as a ‘bridge too far’ as the Greens move ever closer toward incumbent democracy. In this regard, as has been argued, coalition agreements can
be likened to the purchase of political scope from the larger coalition partner. This configures with a view of politics as a market, characterised by private purchase, rather than public debate (Elster, 1986). Not only does this limit the critical potential of Green ideology, but it is also symptomatic of the trend toward the existing institutions of centralised, liberal representative democracy, and élitist forms of governance. Further evidence of this can be found in the GE issue. Although the Greens were convinced that their opposition to environmental release of GE reflected a majority of voters wishes, they also regretted the negative effect this had on the relationship between themselves and the Labour Government with whom the Greens were intent on entering a coalition following the 2005 general election (Fitzsimons, election campaign launch, 14th August, 2005). The Greens were prepared, in 2005, to let the issue rest on the flimsy grounds that New Zealand was still GE free since no application for release had been made. This ignored the fact that the necessary legislation was in place and required only an application for release which would have resulted in the loss of New Zealand’s GE free status. On this basis, the Greens entered the 2005 election with a strategic emphasis on coalition with Labour, rather than a principled one of opposition to GE release. In this way, the Greens were prepared to sacrifice the fundamental democratic principle that the majority should influence policy outcomes. This move also comes at the expense of a clear Green ideological position, the Green position being reconfigured (by de-emphasising their opposition to GE release), to fit with the Labour Government. This has the effect of subsuming Green ideology and weakening its ability to mount a counter-hegemonic challenge and to continue to stimulate political debate.

In terms of the second aspect examined, that is, the reform of liberal democratic institutions, both the Values Party and the Green Party advocated the reform of the electoral system to MMP to achieve a closer correlation between the wishes of the polity and representatives in Parliament. Both Green parties also objected to technocratic forms of governance. In both cases it has been found that opposition to technocracy was on the grounds that it depoliticizes issues and functions as a political anaesthesia thereby exacerbating the barrier between civil society and the political sphere already inherent within liberal institutions (Radaelli, 1999). Once again, the similarity between the Values Party and the Greens is apparent in that both parties were concerned to reform political procedures so that the greatest number of the population were able to influence decisions, that is, to
increase the democratic moment of liberal democracy. However, where the Values Party and the Green Party can be clearly differentiated is on the issue of decentralisation of political authority, and this is related to the impact of the direct democratic impulse in Green politics on existing representative institutions.

As Goodin (1992) has observed, decentralisation has been considered a defining aspect of Green politics, and while the Values Party were critics of unresponsive, centralised decision-making, the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand has moved steadily toward a commitment to central, liberal, representative political institutions. In this way, the Green Party seeks to increase the democratic moment of liberal democracy without disrupting its ideological basis. This conclusion is based primarily on a trend observed throughout the research where decentralisation has given way to centralisation of political authority. This was indicated by developments such as the adoption of the term ‘appropriate decision-making’ in place of decentralisation advocated by the Values Party. It can be noted that this change coincided with the best election result for a Green party in New Zealand (9% in 1990) as well as later when, under MMP, Rod Donald, Jeanette Fitzsimons and Phillida Bunkle gained seats in Parliament, as Green members of the Alliance Party. This adds weight to the contention that decentralisation in Green party politics has more to do with a protest against a lack of Parliamentary power and once the latter had been achieved, desire for the former withers away. Also, the absence of policy on the decentralisation of political authority in material produced by the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand, where such a policy was evident in Values Party material, is a clear indication of the change in Green politics in New Zealand on this issue.

Although the proposed use of study circles, for example, had much to recommend it in terms of a practical application of deliberative democracy and democracy as a forum, the process was subordinated to the liberal separation of the rulers and the ruled at the ‘report to the nation’ stage. At this stage, views gathered from study circles were aggregated so that a consensus could be reached. This has two consequences. The first is that the centralisation of the process negates any instance of grassroots decision-making. The second is that the emphasis on consensus, as has been argued, reduces the possibility of substantive change ever occurring. Finally, although study circles represent a significant addition to existing liberal institutions, their impact on the democratic process in New Zealand is unlikely to be
significant since study circles are not, as yet, part of Green Party policy. Therefore, study circles can be regarded as populist, in its meaning as a political approach oriented toward ‘support for the preferences of ordinary people’, rather than participatory (Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics, 2003; Goodin, 1992:128). In this way, study circles may be regarded as either the advancing impulse to reform liberal institutions, or the dying vestiges of reform. This is because, as with other Green Parties around the world, the Green Party in New Zealand has begun to shed its decentralist/participatory principles once it had gained Parliamentary representation.

The research has revealed that the orientation toward existing liberal institutions as the focus of Green politics in New Zealand has shifted from political decentralisation and participation toward consultation with civil society. Although highly critical of the lack of consultation around policy initiatives, the Green Party solution was consistently no more than to resort to the already existing institutions of centralised, liberal democracy. This cannot be regarded as radical in any sense, nor even reformist. Since the process of consultation reaffirms the liberal treatment of the political sphere as separated from civil society and that the politicization of any issue is subject to the condition that it is not regarded as a matter that properly belongs elsewhere (Hindess, 1996:31).

However, it was found that for the Green Party there were limits to consultation and its use could be subject to condition. This, as will be recalled, occurred in regard to a proposed consultation on the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. In advocating that it was reasonable to forego consultation in favour of a particular outcome, the Green Party tends, simultaneously, further toward political élitism and further from grassroots democracy. This raises a paradox in terms of deepening democracy. As champions of consultation, the Green Party seek to achieve authentic input on policy decisions for the polity, however, this can be threatened where the Greens perceive their ideological aims threatened. The paradox is that although both the argument for increased consultation and Green ideology are of value to democracy, at times, they are incompatible, and the latter will not be subordinated to the former. This further weakens Green Party association as the champions of consultation in principle, and in the light of the ‘acid test’ over Kyoto, their commitment to consultation can at times be regarded as rhetorical.

With reference to the final aspect related to democracy, that is the capacity of the
Green Party to act as a compound collective actor for the democratic demands of various groups in society, the research has revealed that there are too many restrictions placed on the Green Party to claim this. The theory explaining the coexistence of core and sub-ideologies offered by Talshir (1998, 2002) is reasonably supported in the examination of Green Party material. However, it could not be claimed that the interests represented by the Green Party were unproblematically those articulated by the groups concerned. Neither is the Green Party unproblematically nor unanimously accepted, by the social groups concerned, as the organisation through which their interests ought to be articulated. The evidence gathered, which, while it indicated the willingness of the Green Party in New Zealand to authentically represent the interests of Maori for example, this must be conditioned by evidence that suggests not all Maori share the Green Party’s enthusiasm to have their interests represented by them. In addition to this it was discovered that there are problems associated with positively identifying a groups interests in order to determine whether or not the Green Party succeeded in its function as a compound collective actor. It can be concluded that this was only the case insofar as the Maori interests represented were referred to by the delimiting term ‘Green Maori’, a term used by the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand.

In summary, the strength of the Green Party, in terms of the three aspects of democracy discussed here, is in the ideological challenge offered to the hegemonic dominance of liberal and neo-liberal ideology. Following Gramsci, this capacity will be devastated should the Green Party enter into coalition with another party and the drive for significant change will fail. Also, when considering the difficulty in establishing a causal relationship between extra-Parliamentary activity and policy outcomes, it can be concluded that the best option for the Green Party in New Zealand is to fully commit to Parliamentary politics using this activity to confront the prevalent ideology with its alternatives, and to influence policy concept by concept. The Green Party should rule out coalition and seek government positions only when they are large enough to dominate the discursive field, this outcome would be compromised by premature entry into government.

The impulse toward decentralisation of political authority has been jettisoned from the Green Party programme in New Zealand. Therefore, in response to Rainbow (1991), the consequences of the Green direct democratic impulse for existing representative institutions is negligible at present, and, given the continuing commitment to liberal institutions on the
part of the Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand, substantive restructuring of liberal institutions appears to be remote. Also, since decentralisation has been described as a distinctive characteristic of Green politics, the meaning of Green politics, in this instance, has been reconfigured. This, however, should not be considered a betrayal of pious Green orthodoxy since, as has been argued, a degree of decentralisation (people’s Parliaments) had been proposed from within the contractarian tradition. Therefore, the distance that might otherwise be drawn between Green and liberal approaches to political institutions can be regarded as less extreme than some Green theorists argue. Evidence of this is the particular response of Green politics to demands for participation from within civil society: a Green Party was formed to contest elections. Also, contractarian decentralisation was intended to prepare civil society for effective involvement in central politics, and the Green Party in New Zealand may yet have a significant role in this regard depending on what happens to the study circles proposal.

The fate of the study circles is especially important since the commitment to consultation has proven to be conditional and, in the absence of something like study circles, the association between Green Party politics and the extension of democracy would be difficult to sustain. Therefore, serious consideration on the development of study circles should continue since this has the potential to emphasise the participation of the population in decision-making and the politicisation of civil society. The continued development of this process should be aimed at preserving the participatory aspect, and not allow it to be subsumed by the liberal barrier between political sphere and civil society.

The ‘preservative transcendence’ of liberalism is the best Green theorists can hope for, and this would mean that Green politics becomes ‘post-liberal’, as opposed to radical Green, and in preference to being sacrificed on a wholehearted commitment to liberalism (Eckersley, 1992 cited in Barry, 2001:59). The Green Party Aotearoa/New Zealand has devised a practical institutional reform of current liberal institutions with the development of study circles. But this must become policy. Further more, as policy it should emphasise argumentation and public reason, and exclude Green spiritual aspects. Only then can there remain any reasonable grounds for the claim that Green politics is linked to any democratising impulse.
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