Assessing the Conditions for Multilateral Interventions or Non-Interventions: Intervention and Non-Intervention in the Asia Pacific Region

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By

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<td>Armed Forces of the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFRC</td>
<td>The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASG</td>
<td>Abu Sayyaf Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMIAF</td>
<td>The Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMP</td>
<td>Besi Merah Putih (a militia group in East Timor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>Any Clear Exit Points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCAP</td>
<td>Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific</td>
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<tr>
<td>DEATHMAG</td>
<td>Genocide or Politicide</td>
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<td>DISP</td>
<td>Dispute Issues</td>
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<td>DSWD</td>
<td>The Philippine’s Department of Social Welfare and Development</td>
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<td>ECIMPORT</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FALANTIL</td>
<td>FRETILIN’s military arm – The Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor</td>
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<td>FATAL</td>
<td>Fatalities</td>
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<td>FRETILIN</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>ICISS</td>
<td>International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>IDENORG</td>
<td>Identifiability and Organization of Disputants</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFM</td>
<td>Isatabu Freedom Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>INITIATE</td>
<td>Resistance to a Multilateral Intervention Option</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>The International Force for East Timor</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEVOUT</td>
<td>Level of Outrage expressed by Regional and International Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>LIKESUCCESS</td>
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<td>The Malaita Eagle Force</td>
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<td>MILCAP</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>The Moro Islamic Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MNLF</td>
<td>The Moro National Liberation Front</td>
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<td>MNLF-RG</td>
<td>Philippines Reformist Group</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<td>OPM</td>
<td>The Free Papua Movement (Indonesian: Organisasi Papua Merdeka, abbreviated OPM)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; now the OSCE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td>Phase of Conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIF</td>
<td>Pacific Island Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNP</td>
<td>Philippines National Police</td>
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<td>RAMSI</td>
<td>The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands</td>
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<td>REFCRISIS</td>
<td>Refugee or Internally Displaced Persons Humanitarian Crisis</td>
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<td>REPUT</td>
<td>Reputational Interests</td>
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<tr>
<td>RUF</td>
<td>the Sudanese Revolutionary United Front</td>
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<td>SPILL</td>
<td>Spill-Over Effects in Terms of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUPEROS</td>
<td>Superpower Opposition to, or Support of, Multilateral Intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACSTRA</td>
<td>Tactics and Strategies Adopted by Disputants</td>
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<td>TNI</td>
<td>Indonesian Military Forces</td>
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TPN: The Liberation Army of the Free Papua Movement
UN: United Nations
UNTAET: The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UPMs: Unregulated Population Movement
US: United States
YRBEGIN: Year that the Internal Conflict Started
YREND: Year that the Internal Conflict Ended or to Date
Abstract

The focus of this thesis has been on the identification of the primary conditions that attract or deter multilateral interventions into internal conflicts in the Asia Pacific region. This thesis develops a framework which is applied to four cases of internal conflict to see what roles twenty-two structural and perceptual conditions have played in determining why multilateral intervention was initiated in two of the cases, and why multilateral intervention failed to be initiated in the other two cases. The research found that multilateral organizations will accept risks and costs associated with intervention if certain structural and perceptual conditions make intervention an attractive option. These conditions are, a favourable or significant international environment or international event(s), the consent of a sovereign state (even if it is induced), sustained and critical regional and international media coverage, a complete collapse of the state in conflict tainting it with the term ‘failed state’, a high probability of success, potential economic benefits, a humanitarian crisis (in respect of UPMs and genocide/politicide), the possibility of a clear exit strategy, and a self-interested Member State who can greatly subsidize an intervention. Multilateral non-interventions, on the contrary, are driven by a combination of a lack of sustained and critically analyzed media coverage on conflict issues and consequences, generally positive tactics and strategies adopted by disputants, conflicts of a long duration, the international environment, economic factors unfavourable to intervention, resistance levels to intervention or a failure to call for intervention, lack of any clear exit points, and an escalation phase. The importance of these conditions suggest that multilateral organizations are reluctant to take risks and costs when political will, for the collective and self, are not provoked. Consequently, particular structural and perceptual conditions trigger or influence political will. The analysis of four case studies concludes that multilateral interventions will be the exception to the rule in the foreseeable future given the obvious selection bias evident in these policies, and the project questions the ad hoc determinants of current multilateral intervention policies.
Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 The Problem: Internal Conflict and Multilateral Intervention

‘Never again’ the international community said after the Holocaust, and after the Cambodian genocide in 1970, then again after the Rwanda genocide in 1994, then, just a year later, after the Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia. Yet the international community is still a long way away from reaching a consensus about when multilateral intervention should occur. In particular, there continues to be enormous disagreement as to whether any multilateral intervention should be undertaken. While the disagreement continues, internal conflicts continue to be waged.

Many of today’s conflicts are fought within states, they are often conducted by groups of irregular forces, they are most likely waged with small arms, and they have devastating impacts on civilian populations. In the First World War, civilians accounted for 5 per cent of casualties; in Mozambique (1977-1992), they accounted for 95 per cent; in Sudan (1983-2005) they accounted for 97 per cent. In the 6-day period between October 8 and October 13, 2003 the Wall Street Journal reported a disturbing set of events. Tribal fighters in the Congo shot and hacked to death 65 civilians; a car bomb in Bogota, Colombia, killed at least 6 people including 2 police officers; gunmen in Indonesia killed 9 people targeted for being members of the Christian faith; and Bolivia was forced to declare martial law in a city just outside its

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capital because of violent demonstrations. Although such events may not independently warrant intervention, disturbing instances of violence present the members of multilateral organizations with difficult decisions regarding intervention. Given the severity and continuousness of such violence, there can be no doubt some action is warranted, but the question this study attempts to illuminate is what structural and perceptual conditions are seen by multilateral organizations as warranting the use of intervention or in many cases non-intervention. The following paragraphs illustrate the extent of the devastation created by internal conflicts.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported in mid-1998 on the continuing atrocities being committed in Sierra Leone during its 10 year civil war for the control of the lucrative diamond-producing regions of the country. This war has been waged on an unarmed and helpless civilian population. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) soldiers typically captured civilians suspected of President Kabbah or pro-government militia, Kamajor, sympathies and committed atrocities against them in an effort to instil terror. The atrocities listed and investigated by HRW included: amputations by machete of one or both hands, arms, feet, legs, ears and buttocks; lacerations to the head, neck, arms, legs, feet and torso; the gouging out of one or both eyes; rape; gunshot wounds to the head, torso and limbs; burns from explosives and other devices; injections with battery acid; beatings; and sexual mutilation such as the cutting off of breast and genitalia. Victims of amputation were frequently told that they should take their amputated limb(s) and a verbal or written message to the Kabbah government. Eyewitness reports of massacres and other atrocities have emanated from this tiny state for decades. There is little, if any, accountability for these abuses and perpetrators often act with complete impunity.

3 All references are from the Wall Street Journal front page news notes between October 8th, 2003 and October 13th, 2003.
6 Janzekovic, 2005, 22.
Yet the conflict in Sierra Leone is not particularly unusual for some of the more dangerous conflicts in other states around the world.\(^7\) Between April and July 1994, averages of 8,000 people were slaughtered each day in Rwanda, and the regional African and international organizations took little if any forceful action to prevent further loss of life.\(^8\) The scale of atrocities in Rwanda represents not only the most tragic failure of multilateral organizations to date, but also the very best evidence that the issues surrounding the choice to multilaterally \textit{not} intervene must be examined closely.

The internal conflict in Zimbabwe, or the ‘drive out trash’ campaign, fronted some media headlines in June and July 2005.\(^9\) The list of atrocities commented on in the media include: the destruction of homes and lives, full control by the police, appalling conditions in camps, evictions from office blocks for ‘sanction reasons’, removals from jobs, food shortages, no free press, extreme cases of torture, corruption entrenched in the government and police forces, and forced relocation into rural Zimbabwe. These orders to flatten homes, to raise whole settlements to the ground, and extinguish lives were coming directly from President Mughabe. Yet there has been a wall of silence from African leaders who are unwilling to criticize; the European Union (EU) has only declared its disappointment with the African nation’s lack of reaction; and the head of the United Nations (UN) Habitat has only declared that she will look at what is happening. Is this a campaign of terror? This question still dominates the international community’s inaction. The atrocities depicted in the media raises the question: what will it take to \textit{shock or shame} the international and regional communities into intervention? This question will not be directly answered but it is related to the area of study this project examines – what conditions determine a particular multilateral response. Consequently, it could be examined by researchers upon review of the project’s results.

\section*{1.2 How to Deal with Internal Conflict}

\(^7\) See Ibid for further examples of the consequences of internal conflict, in particular in Afghanistan.
Once a conflict breaks out it can be managed in several ways: by violence, bilateral negotiation, by the involvement of a third party acting as an arbitrator or as a mediator between disputants, or by doing nothing.\(^{10}\) Third parties can be particularly useful in the process of conflict abatement. They can make positive and direct contributions by focusing disputants on a termination agreement, providing an agenda, and/or manipulating the timing of the negotiation process. They can help to overcome constraints faced by disputants, such as providing rationalizations for the disavowal of previous bargaining positions (face-saving), certifying the benefits of an agreement (guaranteeing), or providing insurance against the risks of the failure of an agreement (leverage).\(^{11}\) Third parties can also manage a conflict by enforcement through militarized intervention, a situation clearly envisaged and occasionally practiced under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.\(^{12}\)

### 1.3 Weapon of Choice: To Intervene or Not To Intervene

The decision by multilateral actors to intervene, or not, is the result of a *policy decision* or choice, and represent two different types of phenomena. This project aims to explain the point where this decision is taken. Each decision has strategic, political, economic, military, diplomatic, ethical, and human implications. Figure 1 depicts this “fork in the road” decision.

**Figure 1: To Intervene or to Not Intervene: Policy Decisions or Choices**

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Intervention as a way of dealing with conflict grows in popularity each year, as does its applicability to different situations. For example, there are currently United Nations interventions in Sudan (UNMIS), Burundi (ONUB), Cote d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), Western Sahara (MINURSO), Haiti (MINUSTAH), India/Pakistan (UNMOGIP), Cyprus (UNFICYP), Georgia (UNOMIG), Kosovo (UNMIK), Golan Heights (UNDOF), Lebanon (UNFIL), and the Middle East (UNTSO). Yet notwithstanding its popularity, longevity, ubiquity and importance, there is far less known about what conditions push forward the decision to intervene.

Or, more interestingly, what conditions deter international or regional communities from intervening in some conflicts? There are currently numerous protracted, unresolved and often violent internal conflicts where intervention has not taken place. For example, such conflicts in Thailand (Patani), Sri Lanka (Eelam), Nepal, Chechnya, Colombia, Darfur (Sudan), Jammu and Kashmir, Korean Peninsula, and Northern Ireland. There are also internal conflicts springing up every year. In 2006 internal conflicts have begun in the Basque country, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Iraq.

There appear to be discrepancies involved in these decisions. When the Kurds in Turkey raged a guerrilla war against the Turkish state in 1984, the conflict was

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soon visible to the whole world; nevertheless, as the number of casualties on both sides peaked, multilateral organizations remained silent. Yet on the other side of the border, when the Kurds in Northern Iraq were massacred by the Iraqi state after the Gulf War, the UN took immediate action to stop a possible genocide. This thesis attempts to identify these contradictions within the four cases studied.

1.4 The Question

Third party intervention can be unilateral or multilateral and it can be into both inter-state and internal conflicts. This thesis examines intervention or non-intervention in a multilateral context. Furthermore, the data for this analysis is culled only from internal conflicts in the Asia Pacific region. This is a departure in many ways from the broader body of research into the causes of third-party interventions in that it excludes cases of interstate conflict and unilateral interventions.

While there are so many internal conflicts underway currently, there is a lack of coherent explanations that can account for the primary or essential conditions that are conducive to multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. Consequently, this thesis explores the structural (environment) and perceptual conditions that can make multilateral interventions an attractive or unattractive option. While the case of Rwanda has deeply affected, perhaps even marred, the question of what it takes for a multilateral intervention in an internal conflict to occur, the question will be attempted in order to understand not only why certain responses are taken but why some responses are not taken.

1.5 Methodology: How this Problem will be Tackled

This thesis presents a framework in which to measure particular structural and perceptual conditions that may attract or deter multilateral intervention. Conditions include, but are not limited to, the media, conflict characteristics, intervener

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characteristics, phases of the conflict, humanitarian concerns, and the level of outrage felt by the international, regional, and domestic public. It applies the framework to four internal conflicts in the Asia Pacific region in the post-Cold War period: the Solomon Islands conflict, the East Timor conflict, the West Papua conflict, and the Philippines (Moro) conflict. Two cases have been intervened in whilst two have been left to fester.

The Asia-Pacific region is not a homogeneous entity; there are geographic, cultural, religious and economic divisions within and between Asia and Oceania. It is also replete with security contradictions and paradoxes and has had its share of different types of internal conflicts and interventions or non-interventions. Consequently, this region is an invaluable source of case studies. In the Asia Pacific region, the intervener(s) (and non-intervener in some cases of conflict) referred to in this project are the UN, the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Identifying the conditions that lead to such responses has a range of potential benefits. First and foremost, identifying the conditions for multilateral intervention or non-intervention serves as a useful yardstick from which to evaluate and create multilateral policies. Secondly, understanding the conditions under which multilateral actors will intervene in internal conflicts is central to the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of past multilateral interventions or non-interventions. Furthermore, contributing to the international debate concerning whether there could be certain guidelines that ‘should’ determine multilateral intervention, the framework will present the conditions that ‘do’ currently determine multilateral intervention policies.

While the introduction chapter has leaned towards the ethical implications of today’s internal conflicts, this thesis takes the ethical debate as a completely separate line of enquiry and proceeds with the premise that once the ethical concerns have been addressed, practical considerations about when multilateral decide to intervene or to not intervene take place come to the fore. These two considerations are, of course, related. Furthermore, this thesis will not look at the personal decision-making process or the motivations of potential intervening organizations. Motivations of the individuals and organizations involved would make this issue extremely complex.
Rather, multilateral intervention or non-intervention decisions are approached not as a single choice but as a series of small steps and as the result of an interaction of various conditions.\footnote{16}{Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson, and Larry Berman, eds., \textit{Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict}, Columbia University Press, New York, 1992, 17.}

\subsection*{1.6 Defining ‘Internal Conflict’ and ‘Multilateral Intervention’}

The term ‘\textit{internal conflict}’ is defined here as the clashing of overlapping interests (positional differences) around national values and issues (independence, self-determination, borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international power); the conflict has to be between at least two disputants (generally the government and non-state actors) within a state’s borders that are determined to pursue their interests and win their case. Possible instruments used in the course of a conflict are negotiations, authoritative decisions, threats, pressure, passive or active withdrawals, or the use of physical violence and war. The Small and Singer data\footnote{17}{Melvin Small and J. David Singer, \textit{Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980}, Beverly Hills, CA, Sage, 1982.} adopt the convention of 1,000 fatalities for inclusion as an internal conflict; this casualty rate was relaxed by Regan for the data used in his analysis and shall be relaxed in this thesis. This thesis adopts the convention of at least 200 fatalities for inclusion as an internal conflict. Two hundred fatalities convey a sense that the demands of the disputants are such that the potential for further escalation is reasonably high and works in accordance with the case studies examined – all of which are small states.\footnote{18}{Patrick M. Regan, \textit{Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict}, The University of Michigan Press, Michigan, 2000, 21.}

To understand the divergence in multilateral non-intervention and multilateral intervention policies the latter must be clearly defined. The term multilateral intervention is often used in a rather vague way. Part of the problem is the difficulty of defining the concept’s ambivalent nature which, for some, “[i]s practically the same as that of international politics in general.”\footnote{19}{S. Hoffmann, ‘The Problem of Intervention’, in H. Bull, ed., \textit{Intervention in World Politics}, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, 7; Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, 1992; S. Neil MacFarlane, \textit{Intervention in Contemporary World Politics}, Adelphi Paper 350, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2002, 14.} Indeed, the literature on multilateral intervention is so ambiguous that James Rosenau observed that “[t]he
spirit of scientific explanation appears to have had no impact on it whatsoever,” or – worse still – that writing about intervention seems to be taken by some as “a license for undisciplined thought.” It is one of the ironies of international studies that, while multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene are frequently recurring phenomena and possibly even integral parts of the international system, international theorists have not succeeded in solving this “international puzzle”. However, for the benefit of clarity, non-intervention can be defined here as ‘non-action’.

The issue of third parties and conflict management spans many disciplines and epistemological/methodological approaches, and there is a certain level of confusion regarding the concepts and definitions to be analyzed. James Rosenau exposed the confusion saying that it was difficult to develop variables and models, and thus make scientific progress, when the existing literature:

…is pervaded with discussions of military interventions, propaganda interventions, economic interventions, diplomatic interventions, and ideological interventions, not to mention customs interventions and other highly specific actions through which one state experiences the impact of another.

In other words, if any act can be qualified as an intervention, any explanatory model or framework developed loses its meaning as the concept itself is somewhat meaningless.

Rosenau’s critique remains valid: scholars and practitioners still have many differing conceptions of intervention. Some commentators define interventions by the

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intervener’s motives, their strategies, or the international environment. In terms of motives, intervention has been defined as any interference in the internal affairs of another state.\footnote{27} In particular, Carment and Rowlands write about “biased interventions” in internal conflicts.\footnote{28} Others narrow the definition of intervention to UN-sanctioned humanitarian interventions.\footnote{29} In respect of the strategies of intervention, coercive and non-coercive aspects are examined by both scholars and practitioners. Focusing on the non-coercive side of intervention, Burton is concerned with interveners in the mediation and facilitation process of conflict management,\footnote{30} while Diehl is eminent for his research on UN peacekeeping missions.\footnote{31}

The coercive side of intervention is studied extensively. Jack Donnelly defines intervention in the strictest sense, as involving unauthorized coercive interference in the internal affairs of another state; that is, the threat or use of force, short of aggression or war, in ways that infringe on state sovereignty.\footnote{32} Similarly, Neil MacFarlane defines intervention as the coercive attempt to change the internal political balance of another state;\footnote{33} while an article by Butler concentrates on cases of militarized interventions.\footnote{34} Furthermore, some commentators understand intervention


\footnote{28 Carment and Rowlands, 1998.}


\footnote{32 Donnelly, 1993, 608.}

\footnote{33 MacFarlane, 2002, 7.}

\footnote{34 Butler M.J., ‘Just War Theory and United States Military Intervention in Crisis’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 47(2), 2003, 226-248, especially pages 228-230. See also Pearson and Bauman, 1993, who define military intervention as consisting of “the movement of regular troops or forces [airborne, seaborne, selling, etc.] of one country [or many as in an organization] into the territory or territorial waters of another country, or forcible military action by troops already stationed in one country inside another, in the context of some political issue or dispute” in Kapral, 2004, 5. See also Rioux, 2004, 4.}
in terms of the context it takes place in, for example Smith understands intervention as a third-party action in the context of alliance.\(^{35}\)

These definitions do not answer the fundamental question: what is a universal definition of multilateral intervention for the purpose of empirical examination. A broad definition proposed by Oran Young serves as a good starting point. He defines intervention as “any action taken by an actor that is not a direct party to the conflict, that is designed to reduce or remove one or more problems of the bargaining relationship and, therefore, to facilitate the termination of the conflict itself.”\(^{36}\) This broad definition indicates that multilateral involvement can be of varying levels and takes different non-coercive and coercive forms.\(^{37}\)

Without a precise definition, analyzing intervention as a distinctive category of policy is of questionable value.\(^{38}\) Most international relations involve attempts to influence the behaviour of states (and other relevant actors). But to count even diplomatic expressions of concern as ‘multilateral intervention,’ as, for example, numerous governments have done in response to international human rights criticism, trivializes the concept.\(^{39}\) Multilateral intervention in the domestic affairs of states should not be confused with the concepts of ‘constructive intervention,’ ‘constructive involvement,’ ‘flexible engagement’ or ‘enhanced interaction’ which have been recently proposed by some Member States of ASEAN.\(^{40}\)

For the purposes of this thesis, \textit{a useful definition of multilateral intervention} is a \textit{concrete action, be it political or military, undertaken by a coalition of states supported by a regional and/or international organization}. Its purpose is principally to affect the direction, duration or outcome of an internal conflict, whether the target

\(^{39}\) Donnelly, 1993, 609-10.
state consents to the intervention or not. A multilateral intervention has a convention-breaking character, that is, it is an extraordinary and unusual measure. A multilateral intervention is an attempt to maximize the expected utility of the disputants by making a mutually beneficial peace rather than extending the conflict until only one disputant wins. Regardless of the factors that motivate the interventions, the major goal of multilateral intervention is the cessation of hostilities on terms favourable to the multilateral intervener and consequently, to bring stability to the region. It is undeniable that there are multiple goals behind any intervention but very often the first step in achieving these other goals is the cessation of hostilities. This conception of multilateral intervention is distinctly political in nature.

This proposed operationalization is inclusive because it recognizes that there are many reasons for multilateral actors to intervene in internal conflicts. Moreover, it is useful because it is concerned only with concrete steps undertaken by multilateral actors – actual political or military decisions – which should simplify the data-gathering process for empirical evaluations. Multilateral intervention is not limited to militarized intervention, meaning that it can be either coercive or non-coercive, neither does it include insignificant forms of intervention such as ‘calls for action’. 41

Three aspects of multilateral intervention that are addressed in this thesis are peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Focusing on these types of interventions allows for a maximum impact in terms of any analysis of cases studies, as they will illustrate the complexity of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. Committing to these three aspects is extremely complicated as they pose high levels of political, ethical, legal, economic and military risks, costs, and benefits and often attempt to alter the status quo. 42

Multilateral peacemaking and peacekeeping strategies are those which are applicable to resolve a conflict after it has crossed the threshold of armed hostilities. Peacemaking is best understood as involving the range of methods described in Article 33 of the UN Charter, but will be limited in this case to mediation. Initial

42 Regan, 2000, 6.
peacemaking efforts are usually aimed at stabilization of the situation on the ground; subsequent efforts, which might continue in parallel with the deployment of a peacekeeping mission, might be aimed rather at securing a durable political settlement.\footnote{Gareth Evans, Cooperating for Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond, Allen and Unwin, Australia, NSW, 1993, 10.}

Peacekeeping involves the voluntary deployment of military or police, and frequently civilians to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between disputants. These operations can involve monitoring, supervision and verification of cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and setting up of buffer zones and agreements.\footnote{Examples include UNFICYP in Cyprus and UNMOGIP in Kashmir.} ‘Expanded’ peacekeeping involves the supplementation of traditional peacekeeping with activities such as election monitoring or organization, human rights protection, and assisting or exercising civil administration functions during transition to independence or democracy.\footnote{UNITAG in Namibia and the much more ambitious UNTAC in Cambodia are some examples. See Evans, 1993, 12.}

Multilateral peace enforcement interventions are responses to conflicts where the agreement of all disputants is lacking. The strategies for this type of situation are essentially those described in Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and fall into two broad categories: non-military enforcement measures, or ‘sanctions’; and military enforcement measures. As economic sanctions are extremely difficult to track for empirical examination, sanctions will not be included when analyzing the four case studies examined.

Peace enforcement is the threat or use of military force in response to an internal conflict. Such actions may include demonstrations, blockages, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces.\footnote{Hilaire McCoubrey, and Nigel D. White, International Organizations and Civil Wars, Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd, England, 1995, 245.} This form of multilateral intervention may be to ensure compliance with part of a Security Council resolution, or to enforce agreements reached by the disputants. Difficult and delicate applications of peace enforcement activity is in support of peacekeeping operations; for example, in situations where one or more of the disputants to an agreement have subsequently
withdrawn from it, and action is required to enforce a cease-fire or re-establish a buffer zone. It is also used in internal conflicts in support of specifically humanitarian objectives. The next paragraphs provide brief political and legal backgrounds of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene.

1.7 Political and Legal Backgrounds of Multilateral Decisions to Intervene or to Not Intervene

1.7a Political Considerations

The international system currently rests on the assumption that the world is constituted of independent, sovereign states, equal in their rights and prerogatives though greatly differing in their size, degree of development, and military strength. All countries are assumed to possess the capacity to control and administer a territory clearly defined by fixed borders. Consequently, it is important to keep in mind that a multilateral intervention – just like non-intervention – is fundamentally a political decision with “inescapable political consequences”. Questions of power, interests, and bureaucratic, international and domestic politics undoubtedly affect whether multilateral members chose to intervene or not.

The basis of the principle of non-intervention was summarized by Adam Roberts,

It provides clear guidelines for limiting the uses of armed force and reducing the risk of war between armies of different states. It involves respect for different societies with varying religions, cultures, economic systems and political arrangements. It acts as a brake on the crusading, territorial and imperial ambitions of states.

The UN Charter, Article 2(7) states:

Nothing in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to

50 Adam Roberts cited in MacFarlane, 2002, 8.
settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.\textsuperscript{51}

As Roberts acknowledges, and the Article emphasises, the sovereign state has a right to control its internal domestic affairs.\textsuperscript{52} Yet under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council is given the power to use coercion and armed force ‘if necessary’ to maintain or restore international peace and security.\textsuperscript{53} At the same time, the sovereignty of the most powerful nations is constrained. Ernst B. Haas argues that no multilateral act can be considered an infringement of sovereignty because each state has in effect “waived its sovereign rights by virtue of becoming a member of a multilateral organization.”\textsuperscript{54}

In 1992, Former UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali affirmed that the conditions of the post Cold War era provided an opportunity to realize the fundamental goals of the UN – justice, human rights, social progress and a larger liberty for all.\textsuperscript{55} His relativist conception of sovereignty reflects an increasingly held view that a state’s enjoyment of sovereign rights in international society should be linked to its fulfilment of its responsibilities to its citizens.\textsuperscript{56} Furthermore, Boutros-Ghali’s successor, Kofi Annan, declared, “the [UN] Charter protects the sovereignty of peoples [sic]. It was never meant as a license to trample on human rights and human dignity. Sovereignty means responsibility, not just power.”\textsuperscript{57} Consequently, the systematic violation of human rights could degrade a state’s sovereignty and diminish its force of legal protections against multilateral intervention.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., MacFarlane, 2002, 77. Furthermore, Resolutions that reaffirm the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in what amounts to an unqualified general principle of non-intervention, include the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty (GA Resolution 2131 [XX], 1965) and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN (GA Resolution 2625 [XXV], 1970. See Semb, 2000, 471.
\textsuperscript{53} Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999, 35.
\textsuperscript{54} Ernst B. Haas, ‘Beware the Slippery Slope: Notes toward the Definition of Justifiable Intervention’ in (Policy Papers in International Affairs no.42), in Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, eds., Emerging Norms of Justified Intervention, Cambridge, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1993, 65-66.
\textsuperscript{56} MacFarlane, 2002, 52.
\textsuperscript{57} Kofi Annan, 1998 in Ibid., 52.
\textsuperscript{58} The UN under Chapter VII of the Charter in Ibid. This scrutiny of the concept of unfettered state sovereignty was heightened by the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia using military force for
position is that there may be some exceptional cases of internal conflict that are not necessarily the sole preserve of a strict definition of absolute state sovereignty. What those exceptional cases are has yet to be determined.

1.7b Legal Considerations

In terms of legal considerations, the issue is whether and to what extent elements of international law might permit violations of the codified and customary rights of sovereign states. The major difficulty in evaluating the legal status of multilateral intervention is that a large number of writers put the question outside the realm of international law entirely. Historical (Sir William Harcourt) indicates:

Intervention is a question rather of policy than of law. It is above and beyond the domain of law, and when wisely and equitably handled by those who have the power to give effect to it, may be the highest policy of justice and humanity.

Other writers echo this view. With an increasingly view of sovereignty as conditional, MacFarlane argues that the legal proscription of multilateral intervention has become weaker. Yet the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the International Human Rights Covenants (1966) provide an authoritative list of internationally recognized human rights. Important and widely ratified treaties deal with genocide (1949), refugees (1954), racial discrimination (1964), women’s rights (1979), and children’s rights (1990). Such documents have created a strong and comprehensive set of international human rights norms. Unfortunately none of the

60 MacFarlane, 2002, 9.
63 MacFarlane, 2002, 78.
65 See Ibid., 622-23.
obligations found in multilateral human rights treaties may be coercively enforced by a multilateral actor.\textsuperscript{66}

In particular, states have obligations under international humanitarian law with respect to populations victimized in conflict or vulnerable to \textit{genocide} independently of the Charter. Most states in the International Community have accepted, through their ratification of the 1948 Genocide Convention, an obligation ‘to prevent and to punish’ such acts. This suggests that genocide has been placed beyond the protection of the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN Charter – Article 2(7) – and must be viewed as an \textit{international} crime.

But two caveats must be noted. Firstly, the authors of the Genocide Convention explicitly chose \textit{not} to establish universal jurisdiction. Secondly, while legal analysis affirms that multilateral intervention in respect of genocide may include military action, at present under international law and UN practice opposition to a genocidal state is strictly optional. The Genocide Convention and the International Criminal Court could be used as a basis for criminal trials \textit{after} the fact. Although contemporary state practice is evolving on this question, particularly in the wake of the establishment of War Crimes Tribunals, it still suggests that prosecution by national courts is the preferred course in international law.\textsuperscript{67} The only protection against genocide is the one organization most likely to have orchestrated it, the victims’ own state. One of the current international norms, then, which is understandably not stated explicitly, appears to be that while no state ought to commit genocide within its territory, no other state and no international organization – most notably, not the Security Council – is legally bound to do anything about it.\textsuperscript{68}

\textbf{1.8 Conclusion}

This project focuses on specific structural (environmental) and perceptual conditions and their subsequent effects on the decision to intervene or not, this

\textsuperscript{66} There is not a comparable body of law with respect to humanitarian crises. ‘Humanitarian law’ deals primarily with situations of war. Only in so far as humanitarian crises generate refugees have they been seriously addressed in international law. Ibid., 623.


\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., 20.
expands current theoretical insights as it is a departure from the research that examines the impact of interventions mostly during or after their occurrence. Little empirical research exists on the structural environment and perceptions of multilateral actors that influence the decision to intervene or to not intervene in internal conflicts. It shows how the existence of conditions such as failed state status and the economic importance of the state in conflict can trigger a particular multilateral response of intervention or non-intervention. By developing a framework that defines and measures certain conditions, this project attempts to develop a useful tool for developing theories concerning decisions to intervene or not.

In the following chapters this thesis highlights the conditions that have been subject to scrutiny by both scholars and practitioners – all of which may play a role in the attractiveness or unattractiveness of multilateral intervention policies. It then develops a framework that provides conceptual definitions and operational measurements of certain structural and perceptual conditions. This framework is applied to four cases of conflict in the Asia Pacific region in an attempt to analyze the primary conditions that influence a particular multilateral response. Finally, the analysis and conclusion chapters compare the results to portray the descriptive, predictive and prescriptive value of the framework. Some guidelines that may explain multilateral intervention or non-intervention policies are suggested and the project concludes with implications for future research.
Chapter Two

Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Why multilateral organizations decide to intervene or to not intervene in internal conflicts remains an elusive question, and this tends to be reflected in a review of the literature. It is important to fill this gap in the literature in order to understand these two phenomena and to assist in predicting when these different responses may occur. The literature is generally dedicated to singling out successful strategies of intervention. Little attention has been given to the question of why various multilateral peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement interventions were initiated or even why they have not been initiated. More than 20 years ago, James N. Rosenau observed, “Scholarly writings on the problem of intervention are singularly devoid of efforts to develop systematic knowledge on the conditions under which intervention behaviour is initiated, sustained and abandoned.”\(^1\) 8 years ago Patrick Regan argued that “[we] [still] do not have a set of logically consistent and empirically verified conditions that increase the likelihood that outside actors will intervene in internal conflicts.”\(^2\) Both authors were writing in respect of unilateral intervention. In fact most literature on intervention analyzes conditions in terms of unilateral or, arbitrarily, third party intervention. While this literature is still important to consider, the emphasis in this thesis will be on multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene.

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\(^1\) Rosenau, 1969, 149; Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, 1992, 15.

\(^2\) Patrick M. Regan, ‘Choosing to Intervene: Outside Interventions into Internal Conflicts as a Policy Choice’, *Journal of Politics* 60(3), 1998, 756.
Although many scholars go some way towards analysis of why interventions should be, or were, initiated, there remain many gaps. Stephan Solarz indicates when an intervention policy should be chosen, but he does not articulate the criteria by which such decisions are made; James M. Scott informs us that the process of deciding involves many factors but not how the specific outcome of the decision is derived. Through his analysis of four British responses, Richard Little supports the construction of a model of the processes by which governments decide to intervene in, or remain aloof from, internal conflicts. He offers a useful argument that there is both a prescriptive and a behavioural norm prescribing intervention in internal conflicts. 

Recently a few researchers have attempted to find some conditions that increase the likelihood that outside actors will intervene in internal conflicts. Regan, in particular, offers some useful approaches by using certain conditions as a basis to explain a particular response of intervention. However, none of these scholars have analyzed intervention in a multilateral context and they have not approached the issue of non-intervention.

Furthermore, in the period since NATO’s bombing of Kosovo, a number of scholars, practitioners and international bodies have even presented certain conditions as guidelines for when to intervene in an internal conflict. It is hoped that these guidelines might be used by multilateral organizations, such as the Security Council, to assist in decision-making, especially in respect of humanitarian crises. In an attempt to uncover criteria for multilateral intervention, the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ concept was introduced in a report produced by the Canadian-sponsored Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). ICISS was charged with confronting a dilemma that the norm of non-intervention, codified in the UN charter and based on the right of state sovereignty, is used to justify inaction in the face of gross violations of human rights. The ICISS report found a way forward by shifting the question away from the issue of state sovereignty, and putting the

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3 Regan, 2000, 2.
5 James M. Scott, Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy, Durham, NC, Duke University, 1996.
emphasis on the point of view of those seeking or needing support. That is, is the state fulfilling its responsibility to protect its citizens, and, if not, is the international community prepared to react?  

“The basic argument is that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe,” says Gareth Evans, ICISS co-chair and former Australian Foreign Minister. “However, when they are unable, or unwilling to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of nations.” The report warns the UN that its failure to rise up and protect “in conscience-shocking situations” could lead the concerned states to explore other means to meet the urgency of the situation. In such a case, “the UN’s stature will seriously suffer,” Evans says. The ICISS report goes on to propose principles for military intervention. But it stresses that military intervention should always be a last resort, with the least intrusive and coercive means used as possible. The development of such principles should, according to the report, be useful in limiting the number of otherwise illegal military interventions that could be justified. The conditions highlighted by the ICISS report and other scholars, practitioners and international bodies are illustrated in the next section.

2.2 Expectations from some Scholars, Practitioners, and International Bodies of the Conditions that Should Make Multilateral Intervention an Attractive Option

1. Clear and objective evidence of the threat or occurrence of gross, grave, blatant, persistent and large-scale violations of human rights, including substantial deprivation of basic needs.

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2. *The Just Cause Threshold or Seriousness of Threat.* In the case of internal threats, does it involve genocide or other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violation of international humanitarian law, actual or imminently apprehended?

**Large scale loss of life,** actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or

**Large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’,** actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape.12

3. *Right Intention.* The Primary Purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.

4. *Proportional Means.* The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.

5. *Reasonable prospects.* There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.

6. *The government of the state in conflict is unwilling or unable to take remedial action.*

7. *There is a clear urgency.*13

8. *Last resort.* Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.14

9. *The purpose is clearly explained to the public* involved in the conflict and the international community.15

10. *Proper Purpose.* Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed intervention is to halt or avert the threat in question, for example, the cessation of hostilities between the disputants, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved?

11. *There is support or involvement of regional states* in the peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement policies.16

12. *There should be a high probability that the intervention itself would not create a rapidly deteriorating situation* when the policy is either ill-conceived or could be potentially poorly implemented.

13. *When the projected time horizon for achieving the main objective is short*

14. *When domestic and international opposition to intervention is minimal*

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15. *The use of force should be proportional* to achieving the goals.
16. *International law* on the conduct of war should be followed during the action.
17. *Non-intervention option* - How serious will the consequences be for the people in the state in conflict or for the peace of the region if the multilateral organization does not intervene?
18. *The Movement of IDPs and Refugees* in numbers significant enough to affect the security of neighbouring states.
19. *Extent of Abuse.* Severe and large-scale abuses present a stronger case for intervention than mid or small-scale ones.
20. *Capacity to Respond.* Can the situation be improved?\(^{17}\)
21. *Costs of Intervention* both in dollars and in lives. In some cases the costs may outweigh the benefits.
22. *Legitimacy and Legality.* Interveners should hold themselves accountable to the international community for their intervention, since it is from the international community that they derive the authority to intervene.\(^{18}\)
23. There should be a high probability of success.

These attempts to establish criteria for multilateral intervention are more likely *justifications* for multilateral intervention rather than actual conditions that lead to a particular response. What conditions are significant remains a matter of debate.

In particular, there is no agreed-upon framework which is useful for analysing conditions which result in multilateral intervention or non-intervention. There is also a need to identify conditions that are evident in decisions by organizations that consider an intervention option, but reject it.\(^{19}\) The criteria set out by ICISS and other scholars suggest that a pressing need exists for a systematic analysis of the real conditions that are currently attracting multilateral intervention and non-intervention policies.\(^{20}\) The next section illustrates the conditions raised in the literature that may attract or deter multilateral intervention. For a full view of the conditions addressed in the literature refer to figure 2. It is important to note that the literature does not provide for conditions that may determine non-action or non-intervention.

### 2.3 The Nature and Scope of Past and Current Research

\(^{17}\) Unless sufficient resources can be mobilized, there is a great risk that an intervention may fail, drawing criticism upon the organization and the Member States that engage in such an operation. The Mr Hans Corell, ‘To Intervene or Not: The Dilemma That Will Not Go Away,’ Keynote Address to the conference on the future of humanitarian intervention, Duke University, 19 April 2001, [http://www.un.org/law/counsel/english/duke01.pdf](http://www.un.org/law/counsel/english/duke01.pdf), accessed 20 March 2006.


\(^{19}\) Regan, 2000, 145.

Figure 2: Conditions that May Attract or Deter Multilateral Intervention into Internal Conflicts as Discussed in the Literature.

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<tr>
<th>Key Categories</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<td>Intensity – Fatalities</td>
<td>Regan, 2000, 139.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Humanitarian Considerations – ‘Massive and Systematic Violation of Human Rights’</td>
<td>Pence, 8</td>
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<td><strong>Characteristics of Disputants and State in which Conflict is Occurring</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cultural Characteristics of Disputants</td>
<td>Regan, 2000, 23.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identification and Orientation of Disputants</td>
<td>Regan, 2000, 23.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Economic Importance or Wealth of the Target State</td>
<td>Cooper and Berdal, 1993, 118-42; Clement and James, chapter 2 in Lobell</td>
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<td>Dominance by a State in an Organization</td>
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<td>Information From Previous Intervention Efforts and Outcomes</td>
<td>Information From Previous Intervention Efforts and Outcomes</td>
<td>Fomerand in Krasno, 2004, 216.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Coverage</td>
<td>The CNN effect</td>
<td>Viggo Jakobsen, 1996, 205-215; Gowing, 1994b;</td>
</tr>
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</table>
2.3a Dispute Issues

Numerous studies have accessed the linkage between intervention effectiveness and dispute issues. Yet there are limited studies that question the linkage between multilateral intervention policies and dispute issues or dispute complexity. To what extent have the parties’ goals and interests been determining factors in multilateral decisions to intervene or to not in internal conflicts? Does the fact that a disputants’ goal is status quo or expansionist-orientated establish the direction of a multilateral response? Bercovitch and Langely have acknowledged that dispute issues influence the decision to intervene or not by “the substantive nature of the issues at stake, their number and complexity.” Six of these substantive issues have been established as significant in the literature. These are issues of territory, ideology, security, independence, resources, and ethnicity.

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22 Bercovitch and Langely, 1993, 676.

The tangibility of these issues may determine the extent to which an internal conflict can be resolved. Intangible issues which derive from the parties’ psychological needs – reflecting matters of principle such as moral rules, beliefs about one’s rights, and normative standards – may serve as a serious disincentive to multilateral intervention. However this has not been established in the literature. Tangible issues, such as those over territory, sovereignty, resources, security and independence may be perceived as easier to manage and, while perhaps not incentives to multilateral intervention, may not be disincentives to multilateral intervention.24

Moreover, an internal conflict may become extremely complex when multiple issues are involved, when disputants do not agree on which issues are being disputed, or which issues are important. As a consequence, issue complexity may deter multilateral intervention.25 However Jackson suggests that a high degree of issue complexity may create “greater opportunities for trade-offs, sequencing, and packaging, thus enhancing the chances of successful multilateral intervention.”26 Could issue complexity create incentives as well as disincentives for multilateral intervention?

2.3b Characteristics of the Conflict

Each internal conflict has its own baggage which needs to be assessed before multilateral intervention can take place. For example, the existence of a humanitarian crisis associated with the conflict may be necessary for multilateral intervention to occur. Regan has suggested other influential conditions including the number of shared borders, the intensity of the conflict, and the number of fatalities.27

The nature of the international environment may be a significant determinant for whether multilateral intervention takes place or not. Wendt argues

27 Regan, 2000, 23.
that the international environment is the generator of “conditions of possibility for organization action”\textsuperscript{28} that shape opportunities, provide incentives, or act as constraints on the use of this particular form of response. More specifically, the international setting affects the payoff structure, duration, targets, location, frequency, and format of multilateral intervention. Vertzberger argues that at any point in time, particular multilateral actors have fewer or greater opportunities and incentives to intervene, depending on the prevailing external conditions.\textsuperscript{29} It is relatively rare, however, Vertzberger continues, that international factors deter intervention. At most, they modify decisions about the scope and style of intervention. Only with time, as the multilateral intervention becomes protracted, he declares, do international factors come to be considered important constraints.\textsuperscript{30}

There can be little disputing that the \textit{intensity} of an internal conflict can affect the attractiveness of multilateral intervention or non-intervention policies. Yet there is disagreement over what \textit{extent} intensity has an impact. Conflict intensity has been measured on several levels including negative perceptions, anger levels, the degree of previous hostilities, the type of issues at stake, and even the type of warfare used. However, some of these indicators are too problematic to define, operationalize or quantify because they involve subjective perceptions of disputant feelings and behaviour.\textsuperscript{31} The literature has generally measured intensity using two contextual characteristics: the number of fatalities and the duration of the conflict. These characteristics reflect the seriousness of the internal conflict and the extent to which it is visible to the global community.

According to Regan, \textit{fatalities} exceeding a certain threshold of 200 are more likely to attract unilateral intervention. Yet Regan’s analysis confirms that the more intense the conflict, the less likely outside interventions will be. He argues that this is because potential interveners hold very low expectations about the likely success of


\textsuperscript{29} Vertzberger, 1996, 143.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 404.

\textsuperscript{31} Bercovitch and Langley, 1993, 675.
their efforts in these types of conflicts. As the fatality numbers rise it becomes less likely that an outside actor will estimate that their intervention will be sufficient to stop the fighting.\(^{32}\) Whether this applies to multilateral intervention as well as to unilateral interventions has yet to be recognized in the literature.

The *duration* of an internal conflict is an indication of conflict entrenchment. Bercovitch and Houston argue that the longer a conflict lasts, the more entrenched disputant positions become, decreasing the likelihood of intervention success.\(^{33}\) This may increase the disincentives for multilateral interventions. With higher fatalities and prolonged hostilities, disputants can become polarized, more likely to reject intervention, and more willing to win at all costs. Yet Bercovitch asserts that the longer a conflict continues, the more amenable it may become to outside intervention,\(^{34}\) while Edmead argues that disputants must reach a certain “threshold of violence” before becoming willing participants of multilateral intervention.\(^{35}\)

*Unregulated population movements (UPMs)* are increasingly seen as a condition that can generate multilateral interventions. UPMs may be defined as the forced or unsanctioned (by governments) movement of people across borders and within states for economic reasons, or as a consequence of war, persecution or environmental factors. Migration is, of course, hardly new; however, current instabilities in the global security environment have triggered new waves of international mass migration, unprecedented in their numbers and scale.\(^{36}\) Between 1975 and 1995, UPMs globally increased over 1,000 per cent, from 2.4 million to between 14.5 and 27.4 million. This figure includes some 14.5 million refugees, 5.4 internally displaced people and another 3.5 million who did not meet the refugee criteria but were nevertheless considered to be in refugee-like situations.\(^{37}\) High

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\(^{32}\) Regan, 2000, 139.

\(^{33}\) Bercovitch and Houston, 1996, 23.

\(^{34}\) Bercovitch, 1986a.


numbers of refugees pose serious problems, according to Kris Pence, and are hard for international and regional communities to ignore.\textsuperscript{38}

According to MacFarlane, this rapid rise in numbers of persons displaced within and between countries has dramatically altered the interests of organizations vis-à-vis internal conflicts. It has raised the prospect of overpowering existing border control and asylum procedures, creating substantial domestic political and economic costs, overcoming the infrastructure of neighbouring states, and destabilizing internal politics by altering ethnic balances.\textsuperscript{39} Uncontrolled migration, especially involving sudden and large influxes of people who are ethnically or religiously different from indigenous inhabitants, can create a perception of threat. There is a fear that military forces retreating from one state could use their refuge in a neighbouring state’s territory to recover their strength and resume their armed conflict. This in turn could provoke military attack on the territory of the host state. Whether this leads to multilateral intervention has not been examined. Immigration issues are still provoking intense debate in the US and Europe, with demands for various control policies to stem the tide of new arrivals.\textsuperscript{40} This illustrates how UPMs are an undesirable consequence of conflict – it is not hard to accept that UPMs may be a determining factor in multilateral intervention.\textsuperscript{41}

Humanitarian issues appear to matter in whether to respond multilaterally to internal conflicts. Kris Pence argues that \textit{humanitarian considerations} increase the likelihood of intervention into an internal conflict.\textsuperscript{42} This is accepted by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who states that the trigger for multilateral intervention


\textsuperscript{39} MacFarlane, 2002, 51-53.

\textsuperscript{40} Rupesinghe, 1998, 50.

\textsuperscript{41} MacFarlane, 2002, 53. Refugees and IDPs affected the decision of Resolution 688 (1991) which defined the movement of Kurds towards Iraq’s frontiers and cross-border military incursions as threats before demanding an end to Iraq’s repression. Furthermore, in Northern Iraq, the trilateral UK-French-US intervention was strongly influenced by the fact that the country of destination for a considerable number of the displaced was Turkey, a NATO member and close ally. Turkey was unwilling to accept several hundred thousand more Kurds flowing into a region that it was already having difficulty in controlling.\textsuperscript{11} The invasion of Haiti was also in part a response to the flood of Haitian migrants seeking refuge in Florida and the importance of that state in the American electoral process. For more examples see \textit{Ibid.}, 54-65.

\textsuperscript{42} Pence, 8.
is “massive and systematic violations of human rights”.\textsuperscript{43} Furthermore, an examination of the types of conflicts for which the Security Council has authorized field operations shows the decisive element as being ‘humanitarian considerations’.\textsuperscript{44} Despite his assertion that very intense conflicts are considerably less likely to attract an outside intervention, Regan has demonstrated that humanitarian crises increase the probability of an outside actor intervening. He argues that this is a result of the political forces coming to bear on decision makers, compelling them to take some action to alleviate the resulting carnage.\textsuperscript{45} Whether this applies to multilateral decision makers has not been examined.

Another hypothesis offered is that internal conflicts create harmful \textit{regional and global side-effects} that can create security dilemmas.\textsuperscript{46} These result from the spread of weaponry, world-wide media coverage, economic dislocation, links with terrorism, floods of refugees, destabilization of surrounding regions or when one ethnic group straddles several states.\textsuperscript{47} The regional effects are both outwards – ‘spill-over’, ‘contagion’, ‘diffusion’ – and inwards – ‘influence’, ‘interference’, ‘intervention’.\textsuperscript{48} According to Gian Luca Burci, when the Security Council has used its enforcement powers in connection with a field deployment it has established the existence of a threat to the peace on the basis of finding that a systematic and organized use of military force within a state has grave humanitarian consequences that could spill over into a surrounding region. The existence of such an armed conflict within a state provides a solid foundation, he argues, for the involvement of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{49}

\textbf{2.3c Characteristics of the Disputants and of the State in which the Conflict is Occurring}

\textsuperscript{45} Regan, 2000.
\textsuperscript{46} See Miall, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, 1999, 95.
\textsuperscript{47} Carment and James, Chapter two, in Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, 14. See also Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 1999, 81.
\textsuperscript{49} Burci, chapter 9, in Sellers, 1996, 242.
Another category offered in the literature focuses on the characteristics of the disputants and of the state in which the conflict is occurring. The conditions offered include the strategic and economic value of the state,\textsuperscript{50} regime type,\textsuperscript{51} the number of disputants, homogeneity, power, previous disputant relationship, and the strategic interactions between the non-state disputants and government.

A continuing problem for multilateral decision-makers is the question of who the disputants are in an internal conflict. According to Gian Luca Burci, operations undertaken by the Security Council tend to make the ‘threshold’ for intervention the existence of an armed conflict between \textit{identifiable and organized groups}.\textsuperscript{52} Disputants to inter-state conflicts are at least identifiable and are often willing to abide by certain minimum standards of international humanitarian law. Disputants to internal conflicts, on the other hand, can be hard to identify, have no central authority, often are not in uniforms, have no allegiance to a particular flag, do not respect certain commitments, and have little or no regard for international humanitarian law. They do have access, however, to an endless and easily available supply of generally small arms.\textsuperscript{53} Without clear identification, multilateral interveners face the prospect that there is ‘no one to settle with.’ To make an intervention even more unattractive would be if the disputants themselves do not even have a clear understanding of their own and other disputants’ identities.\textsuperscript{54}

This unattractiveness can be compounded by the difficulty of not only identifying but also \textit{gaining access to non-state disputants} in internal conflicts. Guerrilla disputants operate over a wide terrain and often have no means of communicating with the outside world. They are able to use local populations, blend in with their environment, regularly change location, and often deliberately maintain a

\textsuperscript{50} Pearson F., ‘Foreign Military Intervention and Domestic Disputes’ International Studies Quarterly 18, 1974, 259-290.
\textsuperscript{52} Burci, chapter 9, in Sellers, 1996, 242.
\textsuperscript{54} Fretter, 2001, 131.
low profile. So even establishing the first point of contact is difficult. Working in isolation, disputants have less chance of establishing links and building relations with multilateral organizations and their representatives. Often they are distrustful of official representatives who, by virtue of working under an explicit mandate that states any communication with ‘insurgent groups’ must be with the knowledge and approval of the host government, do not appear to be impartial. This is, according to Rupesinghe, a significant obstacle to the development of any relationships between multilateral representatives and non-state disputants. Furthermore, Regan asserts that aspects of the organizational decision calculus will involve the cultural characteristics of the disputants and the identification or orientation of the disputants in conflict because these conditions have implications for the political costs of intervening.

Multilateral actors, Western politicians and policymakers in particular, have in recent years expressed increasing concern about the consequences of state failure. The term ‘failed state’ re-emerged to describe the major human rights and humanitarian disasters of the 1990s in places like Somalia, Haiti, Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor. These situations attracted the attention of scholars and policymakers because of the enormous suffering involved, as well as the massive international interventions they sometimes provoked. Perhaps most importantly, these crises raised the “specter of the imminent breakdown of the state-centered global order that had been relatively stable in the Cold War era”. This doomsday idea was popularized by journalist Robert Kaplan in an article called ‘The Coming Anarchy’ where he predicted the withering away of the modern nation-state in favor of tribal domains “city-states, shanty-states, and nebulous and anarchic regionalisms”. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, questions of ‘failed states’ and what to do about them have become firmly linked to concerns about terrorism and the deployment of weapons of mass destruction. The problem is not

56 Regan, 2000, 23, 69.
only that the decline or collapse of states such as Afghanistan, Angola, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Burundi or Liberia threatens the welfare of the citizens involved. It is also that failing and failed states are assumed to be vulnerable to the overtures of a variety of non-state actors, including transnational criminals. These elements could, the argument goes, threaten the economic, security, or political interests of other states. According to Francis Fukuyama, “For a while, the United States and other countries could pretend these problems were just local, but September 11 [2001] proved that state weakness constituted a huge strategic challenge as well….state weakness is both a national and an international issue of the first order”. Strengthening weak nation-states in the developing world has consequently assumed new urgency.

Usually considered important for attracting unilateral interventions, the economic importance or wealth of the target state may also be considered potentially important for multilateral interventions. Internal conflict may weaken state structures, which in turn, according to Cooper and Berdal, encourages intervention by multilateral actors who hope to maintain an economic members’ stability, obtain resources, or influence the outcome of the strife to their advantage economically. Oil or diamonds in particular are popular and scarce resources that may be seen as good incentives for multilateral intervention.

In the literature, the resistance levels to multilateral intervention and whether the disputants consent to multilateral intervention or not are considered important conditions for or against intervention policies. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DPKO argues that most peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN have been formally based on the principle that the mission should be deployed only at the request, or with the acceptance of, the

61 Rotberg, 2002, [link].
63 Clement and James, Chapter two, in Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, 12.
Adherence to the principle of consent has opened a whole range of political, ethical and legal problems for multilateral operations. The UN has occasionally pressed the limits of positive non-intervention, for example, in the provision of humanitarian assistance in Sudan. But Donnelly insists that the only operations that can plausibly be called multilateral interventions have occurred where an international agency has been invited by, or able to act in the absence of, an internationally recognized government. Accordingly, multilateral actors need evidence of a ‘willingness to settle’ before joining an effort to implement a settlement. Disputants are likely to resist multilateral intervention and to defend their sovereign jurisdiction against external intrusion if there is no consent beforehand.

To what extent do the strategies and tactics employed by the disputants, or the modes of conflict management, create an international push for multilateral intervention or non-intervention? Have there been ‘measured’ attempts on either side to manage the conflict? This could either produce multilateral intervention in support of the efforts or lead to the perception of not wanting to create any difficulties to the process. Yasushi Akashi argues that for a conflict to end there must be at least a grudging acceptance of peace amongst the contending parties, both from their populations and from their leaders. Perhaps this acceptance of peace may be perceived by multilateral actors through the disputants’ behaviour.

It might be argued that the levels of civil liberty and political freedom (for example, free elections and participation, political competition, or repressive systems – dictatorships, military juntas, autocracies) could attract or deter policies of multilateral intervention. Fretter suggests that high levels of civil liberty and political freedom in a state would not necessitate multilateral intervention, whilst low or no

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64 Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Humanitarian Affairs, DPKO cited in Burci, chapter 9 in Sellers, 1996, 250.
68 Akashi in Burci, chapter 9, in Sellers, 1996, 250.
levels of civil liberty and political freedom may increase the willingness of multilateral organizations to intervene.\textsuperscript{69}

*Homogeneity* considers the degree to which the disputants’ internal characteristics are alike. The degree of commonality or disparity between the disputants’ characteristics relates to the disputants’ willingness to actively participate and cooperate in the intervention process, and may provide incentives for multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. Gouchman argues that sharing a similar economic, cultural, social and political background increases the level of cooperation and understanding between disputants.\textsuperscript{70} This may be advantageous, allowing for disputants to readily identify with one another.\textsuperscript{71} A great degree of homogeneity may reduce anxieties of potential multilateral interveners, while disputants who share very little commonality could be seen as an obstacle to a successful multilateral intervention.

*The previous relationship between disputants* or the level of amicability or animosity in the disputants’ relationship may be important in increasing the willingness to intervene multilaterally. Kleiboer argues that:

\begin{quote}
\ldots both the history and the nature of the relationship are important in this respect. Disputants in an ongoing relationship are far more interested and willing to invest to preserve this relationship than parties that have only a short-term relationship or relationship that has been built on animosities.\textsuperscript{72}
\end{quote}

Disputants with a history of friendship or cooperation create the potential for a successful intervention, something that a multilateral intervener may look for when deciding whether to intervene.

Closely linked to the nature of the disputants’ previous relationship is whether the disputants have a history of recurring disputes. More definitively, *enduring rivalry* is understood as

\textsuperscript{69} Fretter, 2001, 138.
\textsuperscript{71} Bercovitch and Houston, 2000, 178-179.
\textsuperscript{72} Kleiboer, 1996, 367.
…a long history of conflict and hostility between disputants…[or]
a prolonged competitive relationship…that is characterized by mutually
reinforcing conflictual interactions that are very resistant to many outside
efforts aimed at their termination. 73

Several studies have sought to understand the nature of protracted conflicts
and their impact on the attractiveness of multilateral intervention policies but it is
generally agreed in the literature that enduring rivalries are extremely difficult to
manage, 74 and this may be a disincentive to the decision to intervene multilaterally.

2.3 d Intervener Characteristics

The impact of intervener characteristics on the attractiveness of multilateral
intervention policies is still a matter of debate. Conditions that may be influential
include institutional constraints, 75 the level of international and domestic outrage,
regime type, 76 and domestic pressures and politics. 77

The levels of outrage felt regarding an internal conflict, Janzekovic argues,
often equate to the severity of the response. The greater the outrage, the more likely
actor(s) will intervene. Small atrocities, he continues, do not have the same impact as
large atrocities. The moral impetus to act is dependent on the degree of outrage felt
and the immediacy of the act itself. 78 Responses vary between’…it’s terrible, we
should do something about it’, to ‘…it’s not our problem’, depending, according to
Janzekovic, on their moral views, or on how long people are able to maintain their
focus on a particular incident. This is not an objective appraisal of the seriousness of
the situation. Constant priming by the mass media is required to maintain levels of

73 Bercovitch et al., 1997, 768.
74 See Bercovitch and Diehl, 1997; Bercovitch et al., 1997; Bercovitch and Regan, 1997; Diehl P.
Reifsneider J. and Hensel P.R., ‘United Nations Intervention and Recurring Conflicts’ International
Organization 50(4), 1996, 683-700; Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, The Empirical Importance of
75 J.H. Leurdijk, Intervention in International Politics, Leeuwarden, The Netherlands, Eisna B.V.
76 Lemke and Regan 2003.
77 M.E. Brown, The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, Massachusetts, the MIT Press,
1996c; Carment and James, Peace in the Midst of Wars, Columbia, SC, University of South Carolina
concern, even levels of interest. Claiming a common human empathy between people on different parts of the globe does not mean, Janzekovic argues, that perceived moral values are boundless. He sees them as very selectively applied depending on convenience or circumstance. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Burma (or Myanmar), Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe could not be described as anything but severe, yet international interest has not reflected the urgency of humanitarian need in these regions.

Morgenthau asserts that multilateral actors are “guided in their decisions...by what they regard as their respective national interests.” The importance of political will or self-or collective-interest in determining multilateral intervention cannot be underestimated. It would be naïve to assume that multilateral organizations actually want to intervene in internal conflicts. Kumar Rupesinghe argues that “too often they are not sure of the action that could or should be taken...This is further compounded by a lack of strategy and of relevant and effective ‘instruments’ for intervention.” In the case of Rwanda, it was neither a lack of coordination between the multilateral actors, nor a lack of concrete evidence about the scale of genocide, which stalled intervention. The UN even had its own forces stationed there. The fact was that Rwanda was not a priority for multilateral organizations. Rwanda was deemed of such little consequence that not even the ‘Genocide Convention’ was agreed upon.

The instrumentalist school of thought asserts that multilateral members intervene in internal conflicts to obtain access to valued resources or to create a diversion. Multilateral organizations are expected to respond like rational actors to external opportunities to maximize their security, wealth, and power. Accordingly, the organizational decision to intervene or to not intervene in the affairs of a nation is usually based on a pressing economic or geopolitical interest. However, this argument cannot explain why multilateral members refrain from opportunistic

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79 Ibid., 36.
80 Ibid., 24-25.
81 Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘To Intervene Or Not to Intervene’, Foreign Affairs, 45, April 1967, 420. See also Levite, Jentleson, and Berman, 1992, 17.
82 Rupesinghe, 1998, 82.
83 Ibid.
84 Clement and James, Chapter two, in Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, 12.
85 The truth of this was demonstrated by the events in Somalia. See Ibid., 20.
Consequently, the extent to which the interveners see themselves as collective *stakeholders* in the conflict or country that is in conflict may determine multilateral intervention or non-intervention.

**Major power opposition or support** could prove a determinant for whether multilateral intervention occurs or not. Superpowers are able to apply leverage, commanding more resources than medium or small powers and, consequently, their support of, or opposition to, multilateral intervention efforts may be decisive in the decision to intervene. Charles Hauss argues that multilateral intervention is all but completely ruled out when one of the world’s major powers opposes such intervention, as is the case with the Russians in Chechnya’s case.

The organizational capability of multilateral organizations should be considered an important condition in respect of whether multilateral organizations decide to intervene or to not intervene. These decisions necessitate considerations of the size and composition of the *military force capability*. Unlike interstate wars, which are usually carried out in well-defined military zones, these multilateral operations are executed in a mostly civilian environment. The lines between civil and combat zones, where different rules of conduct apply, are often fuzzy or nonexistent. This imposes significant restrictions on how military power can be deployed and on the rules of engagement. Specifically, multilateral actors may need to determine whether they have a sufficient number of regular troops to sustain intervention as well as the organizations and individual states other commitments or whether the organization will have to call up reservists. Another component, suggests Vertzberger, is the availability of hardware. Multilateral actors must determine whether the intervening military force has the quantities and types of hardware required by the task and geographic features of the target country (terrain and climate).

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89 Ibid., 121.
A fundamental dilemma confronting multilateral organizations is that they face many more security problems than there are apparent resources available to respond to them. Gareth Evans argues that economic capability continues to determine the multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene. In Rwanda, UN action was increasingly constrained by its financial crisis, due in part to the refusal of the US to pay its contributions to the peacekeeping budgets. The deployment and maintenance of a sizable multilateral military force can turn out to be a significant economic burden, generating both direct and indirect costs. In cases of protracted intervention, the costs of hardware, spare parts, and ammunition can, according to Neuman, become a decisive factor in determining the intervener’s capacity to maintain the level of military activity required for success.

The economic costs of multilateral intervention may be offset when intervention provides direct economic gains. Atsu Amegashie and Kutsoati find that multilateral intervention will occur if the interveners care sufficiently about the net resources that will be left after the conflict. Alternatively, multilateral intervention is, according to Vertzberger, sometimes used to prevent economic loss, such as the disruption of production or loss of access to vital natural resources (for example, oil).

Donnelly suggests that dominance by a state in a regional or international organization could manipulate multilateral intervention or non-intervention policies. Regional actions may be unusually subject to the interests of a single state, as in Nigeria’s domination of the intervention of Liberia by the Economic Community of West African States. Reputational interests may be another significant condition for why some multilateral interventions take place. Vertzberger suggests that

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91 Evans, 1993, 8.  
95 Vertzberger, 1996, 125.  
96 Donnelly, 1993, 630
interveners may be concerned that by not taking action they might risk adverse effects on their reputation and the viability of the organization.97

Another line of argument emphasizes domestic, regional and international audience costs as inducing or discouraging multilateral intervention decisions. Nil Seda Satana argues that domestic politics impinges on the decision-making of multilateral organizations.98 An organization is unlikely to initiate an intervention without regional and international support.99 Belief by the public that their multilateral organization’s policy is constructive and that the policy will succeed tends to make costs and sacrifices acceptable even when they are high. But when the public doubt the efficiency and morality of the policy, even low costs may be considered a burden not worth bearing. Regional and international opposition to a multilateral policy undermines the probability of success and the freedom to escalate or de-escalate intervention. Vertzberger agrees, arguing that the combination of possible public dissatisfaction and failure of a high-stake policy is often perceived as threatening decision-makers’ personal interests, including survival in the organization or being judged positively by history.100 The public’s conscience can be aroused, but multilateral leaders generally remain fearful that it will turn against them if there is a serious risk of casualties. It is hard to stipulate how much suffering a population must undergo before multilateral actors may justifiably override public opposition.101

Ideology affects assessments of the risks worth taking to shape developments in a state’s internal conflict. According to Vertzberger, an ideology that justifies or advocates multilateral intervention as a legitimate and necessary instrument of the organization’s mandate or as a way to achieve collective interests – for example, spreading the faith, freeing oppressed people – encourages multilateral intervention, notwithstanding the risks. The resulting confidence, generated by ideology, that intervention is going to work and that it is justified at virtually any cost makes

100 Vertzberger, 1996, 131.
ideology a powerful instrument for building cognitive and normative legitimacy and incentives for multilateral intervention.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{2.3e The Nature of the Relationship Between the Potential Intervener(s) and the Disputants}

Multilateral organizations do not behave in a vacuum; rather prior interactions and relationships often shape future expectations and current behaviour. Therefore, another category identifies those conditions that indicate the nature of the relationship between the potential intervener(s) and the disputants, including conditions such as shared borders, ethnic affinities, and regime types.

One of the most significant linkages cited in the literature is \textit{ethnic affinities} – such as cross-border affiliations or the existence of diasporas which provide support for these responses.\textsuperscript{103} Carment et al., in agreement with the affective school of thought,\textsuperscript{104} argue that a strong ethnic affinity between the people in the warring country and those in the intervening organization is a necessary condition for multilateral intervention.\textsuperscript{105} Saideman agrees that ethnic allegiances are an important factor in motivating interventions, particularly in secessionist conflicts.\textsuperscript{106} Yet while such tendencies exist, the empirical record, set out by such scholars as Gurr, demonstrates that cross-border ethnic ties do not always “bind” – these ties inspire intervention in some cases but not in others.\textsuperscript{107}

The role of \textit{geographic contiguity}, or the number of shared borders, receives substantial attention as a linkage condition for unilateral intervention and non-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{102} Vertzberger, 1996, 133-34.
\item\textsuperscript{105} Ibid.. For agreement in the literature on intervention see Amegashie and Kutsoati, 2005, 1
\item\textsuperscript{106} Saideman, 1997.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
intervention. Regan suggests that the greater number of shared borders, the less likely an intervention. Regan accounts for this by asserting that, since an intervention would deplete resources, as the number of potential adversaries increase (that is, a greater number of shared borders) the intervening actor(s) would increase their vulnerability through the process of intervening. In a hostile strategic environment this depletion of resources in a neighbour’s conflict might have grave consequences for security. These results look quite compelling in the context of multilateral non-interventions. During the Rwandan upheaval of 1994 African regional organizations were clearly reluctant to take decisive action. The killing was so intense that smaller neighbouring states were probably incapable of bringing the slaughter to an end; the capable states were unwilling to try. While this condition may not be relevant in attracting multilateral intervention it is still an important condition discussed in the literature.

2.3f Information from Previous Intervention Efforts or Outcomes

Information from previous intervention efforts or outcomes may present numerous conditions that may determine whether a multilateral organization decides to intervene or to not intervene. Trepidation from previous multilateral intervention experience with or without the current disputants may lead the potential intervener to forestall on intervention or dismiss it altogether. The disastrous outcome of the Somalia operation has, according to Fomerand, led to “a new disinclination of the international community to intervene in non-strategic civil wars.”

2.3g Media Coverage

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109 Regan, 2000, 64-65.
While Boutros Boutros-Ghali, the former UN Secretary General declared "[Television] has changed the way the world reacts to crises," the international debate over the relationship between media coverage and multilateral intervention remains inconclusive. While most accept that the impact of the media on the international public has increased, there is little agreement on what this impact amounts to. As Livingston points out, "despite numerous...books, articles, and research fellowships devoted to unravelling the ‘CNN effect’, success at clarifying it...has been minimal." This lack of progress can be seen in the discussion of the so-called ‘CNN-effect’ which has dominated the debate. The causal mechanism of the ‘CNN effect’ is usually conceived in the following ways: Media coverage (printed and televised) → journalists and opinion leaders demand that multilateral organizations ‘do something’ → the (public) pressure becomes unbearable → multilateral organizations ‘do something’.

A factor perceived to have enhanced the impact of the media is the increased importance of ‘real time television’. Using mobile satellite dishes, journalists are now able to bring atrocities to the attention of international audiences either instantaneously or hours after they have occurred. The CNN-lead explosion of global news coverage has increased public awareness of the human dimension of internal conflicts and has contributed to pressures on policymakers to take ‘constructive’ action. But has this actually made intervention more or less

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115 For example, In July 2000 H. E. Mr. Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of ASEAN stated, “People’s humanitarian impulse with respect to armed conflict has been intensified by the entry into the world’s living room of images, in living colour, of rotting corpses, starving babies, stumps of limbs hacked off or blasted away, streams of desperate refugees, the physical and human devastation. Graphic descriptions and passionate advocacy on the internet have had the same effect. H.E. Mr. Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of ASEAN, at the ASEAN scholars’ Roundtable, Singapore, 3 July 2000, Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN Way, http://www.aseansec.org/3221.htm, accessed
attractive? Can limited or no media coverage be a factor in the decision to not intervene?

Supporters of the ‘CNN effect’ argue that the media drives multilateral conflict management by forcing organizations to intervene in humanitarian crises against their will.\textsuperscript{116} Many decision-makers have lent credence to this view. For example, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, US General John M. Shalikashvili argues

Surely the ‘CNN effect’ exists, and surely we went to Somalia and Rwanda partly because of its magnetic pull. Surely the world’s actions – or inaction – and political leaders’ pronouncements are greatly influenced by this effect.\textsuperscript{117}

Yet sceptics such as Gowing argue that the influence of the ‘CNN effect’ is negligible, that a decision to launch a multilateral intervention is ultimately decided by other factors, and that the ‘CNN effect’ may actually prevent multilateral intervention because organizations fear that televised images of dead soldiers may cause public support behind an intervention to collapse.\textsuperscript{118}

In cases such as the intervention in northern Iraq to save the Kurds (April 1991), the intervention in Somalia (December 1992) to create a secure environment for the distribution of humanitarian relief, and the intervention in Rwanda (June 1994) which set up a security zone for refugees, there is clear evidence that the ‘CNN effect’ did matter. However Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues that interventions were ultimately decided by other factors, notably low risks of casualties and clear exit points. Consequently, the ‘CNN effect’ is only likely to pave the way for multilateral

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interventions in exceptional circumstances when multilateral actors believe that they can be undertaken quickly with few losses.\textsuperscript{119}

Moreover, Piers Robinson posits that media influence on organizational policy occurs only when policy uncertainty exists and there is critically framed media coverage that emphasizes the consequences of conflict on citizens. In this situation, multilateral actors, uncertain of what to do and without a clearly defined policy line with which to counter critical media coverage, can be forced to intervene during a humanitarian crisis due to media-driven public pressure or the fear of potential negative public reaction to organization inaction. However, with multilateral actors set on a particular course of action, critical media coverage is unlikely to influence policy. Instead, multilateral actors are more likely to work harder to promote their chosen course of action through press briefing and public announcements.\textsuperscript{120}

2.3h Time or Duration

The role of time may be important when considering whether to intervene due to the costs of intervening. Efforts to rebuild a country’s infrastructure or provide the types of humanitarian relief that can prevent famine cannot operate with a short-term horizon. Yet there are gaps in the literature in terms of the linkages between multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene and the time or duration of effort. Cost and intractability increases with time and under the best of conditions these costs increase. The longer it takes to make a decision concerning intervention, or the longer the duration of the conflict, the less appealing a multilateral intervention policy may become.\textsuperscript{121} How the duration of the conflict attracts or deters multilateral intervention attempts has not been extensively examined in the literature.

2.3i Phase of Conflict

Are there some phases of conflicts that are more predisposed to multilateral interventions than others? Regan asserts that multilateral interventions will be

\textsuperscript{119} Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 136.
\textsuperscript{120} Robinson, 2000, 613.
\textsuperscript{121} Regan, 2000, 105.
considered once the most violent phase of conflict has passed, a cease-fire has been
negotiated, and the contending groups are trying to find ways to reconcile their
differences. Then it may be likely that a multilateral community can achieve
consensus on an intervention policy.\textsuperscript{122}

\section*{2.3j Other Disincentives}

There are particular disincentives which may convince potential multilateral
interveners to dismiss or accept a policy of intervention. One disincentive is the \textit{level
of complexity that can be felt upon intervention}. This can include such demands as
needing to build on the positive results of earlier or simultaneous efforts, gaining
access to disputants on all sides, and convincing them that ending the fighting is in
their best interests.\textsuperscript{123}

Many of the interventions of the 1990s led to the establishment of some form
of \textit{international administration} in the territory concerned. Administrative assistance
requires a high degree of competence in a range of administrative matters with which
multilateral organizations do not ordinarily deal – hence the accusations of ‘gap-year colonialism’.\textsuperscript{124} Their involvement in the administration of territories puts
intervention representatives in a peculiar position in which they have both to uphold
the interests of the territory they administer, and the \textit{impartiality} of the organization
they represent vis-à-vis its Member States. An intervening organization can be
viewed, sometimes unfairly, as partisan to a disputant, not least because
representatives need to engage with various protagonists in order to carry out their
organization’s mandates. In Tajikistan, for example, the UN and The Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were portrayed as puppets of the regime,
and at other times of the opposition.\textsuperscript{125} Furthermore, the international community was
criticized, for example, for conferring legitimacy on the ethno-nationalist parties in
Bosnia by including them in international negotiations, while excluding the
moderates.\textsuperscript{126}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{122}] Ibid., 110.
\item[\textsuperscript{123}] Ibid., 74-75.
\item[\textsuperscript{124}] Sir Adam Roberts, ‘The UN and Humanitarian Intervention,’ chapter 5 in Welsh, 2004, 95.
\item[\textsuperscript{125}] Sriram and Wermester, 2003, 358
\item[\textsuperscript{126}] Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse, 1999, 140.
\end{itemize}
Another disincentive from multilateral intervention could be the fear of being criticized for an intervention failure or actions taken during interventions. By almost any normative standard, interventions that exacerbate an existing conflict are difficult for the intervenee, the intervener(s), and the international community. Even a multilateral intervention with the most humane of intentions can create a rapidly deteriorating situation when the policy is either ill-conceived or poorly implemented. Bethany Lacina argues that, the humiliation of the missions in Yugoslavia and Somalia have spelled an end to the boldest attempts to have UN blue helmets engage in coercive peace enforcement.\footnote{Lacina, 2003, 77.} Beginning in 1992, UN troops proved powerless to prevent siege, bombardment, and, in some cases, military takeover of the protection areas in Bosnia and Croatia. Nor did UN troops help to bolster a political process to end the violence. As in Yugoslavia, no UN Member State proved willing to commit its troops to the prolonged urban combat required to forcibly disarm the factions.\footnote{For more information on the conflict in Yugoslavia and Somalia see Ibid., 79.}

Finally, there is the possibility of the re-ignition of violence or remaining instability post-intervention. This perception may prove a disincentive to multilateral intervention. In Angola, both disputants maintained their military capacity while theoretically implementing a peace agreement, only to return to open conflict immediately after the elections in 1992. Furthermore, while Haiti and Tajikistan have remained weak states despite efforts to enhance the government’s security control and capacity to enforce law and order, the Central African Republic continues to be plagued by coups, and the hold of the government in Sierra Leone is tenuous in the face of insurgent rebel activity.\footnote{Ibid., 83-4.}

### 2.4 Key Themes that have dominated the Literature

The literature presented in this chapter suggests that there are identifiable conditions that influence the attractiveness of a multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene. Five key themes that dominate the literature are presently listed. These
are **connectivity, selectivity, costs-risks and benefits, likelihood of success, and clear exit points.**

**Connectivity** (as a consequence of globalization) equates to the sharing of human aspirations and endeavour through worldwide telecommunications, economic trading, defence arrangements or cultural exchange. Provided one is able to accept the idea of the existence of some sort of connectivity between human endeavour, human aspiration and human value, then it is not unreasonable to suggest that whenever and wherever humans deliberately inflict extensive pain and suffering on each other all of humanity is affected in some way. When a state engages in conflict then there is the likelihood that such conflict will spread the circle of death, suffering and destruction.

This also applies to a realist view of the world. If a state causes hardship and suffering to its own citizens then eventually the ramifications will permeate among all states. Economics and trade will suffer, relationships will be strained, and meaningful discourse will be diminished. Regional trading partners and economic arrangements set up to benefit all parties may be jeopardized, neighbouring states will suffer from a ‘spill-over’ of side effects; no State or organization could be said to benefit from internal conflict in the short or long term.\(^{130}\) Furthermore, there is the recognition in all multilateral organizations that today’s threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be addressed at the global and regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s perceived threats which may currently include terrorist threats. As such, the theme of connectivity must not be lost amongst the other determinants of the multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene.

Multilateral organizations contemplating an intervention into an internal conflict face a range of options, one of which is to do nothing with the military and political tools at their disposal. The ability of multilateral organizations to substitute policy alternatives under varying conditions suggests a need for greater attention to issues of **selection bias.**\(^{131}\) This selectivity has been explained by Sir Adam Roberts as

\(^{130}\) Janzekovic, 2005, 25.

“the interweaving of the normative agenda with considerations of collective or state interest”.

The contrast between the international reaction to the crisis in Kosovo and the absence of reaction to the war in Chechnya provide powerful examples of the problem of selectivity in multilateral policies. The humanitarian consequences of the latter were considerably greater than those of the Serbs’ actions in Kosovo prior to the NATO campaign. This selectivity has drawn into question the legitimacy of the ‘new interventionism.’

Any type of intervention or non-intervention comes with **risks, costs and potential benefits** to Member States and the organization. The cost of either policy is comprised of material, human, and audience costs. Multilateral intervention involving troops and/or equipment incurs, at minimum, the cost of the supply and transport of the hardware, while at the extreme a military or extensive economic intervention can result in loss of life. Regan argues that factors that raise domestic and international consistency costs will lead to a policy of non-intervention, while the factors that raise the political benefits to multilateral leaders will result in an interventionist policy.

For its part, the UN is currently running 16 peace operations involving approximately 62,300 personnel. In addition, at the time of writing plans were well advanced for a 17th operation to deploy to southern Sudan. If this goes ahead, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has estimated these 17 operations will cost an unprecedented $5.18 billion during 2004/5.

Other examples of the financial costs of response include the relief and reconciliation in Bosnia in 1992-98 which cost

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132 For instance there have been accusations that there has been selectivity due to the preoccupations of the Permanent Five. Roberts, chapter 5 in Welsh, 2004, 91. MacFarlane, 2002, 80.
133 The effectiveness of some interventions has influenced the scholarly debate in leading Western nations to the point that such operations are now viewed as a model for solving innumerable international crises. The old definition of intervention is no longer relevant due to the qualitative changes in the nature of the definition of sovereignty itself. The state can no longer be considered the sole master within its borders if it cannot carry out the basic functions of such a "master". In essence this notion forms the basis of a "new interventionism" doctrine. However, several recent cases of international interventions have failed to bring the desired results, indicating that "humanitarian intervention" may not in fact be such a versatile tool. MacFarlane, 2002, 64.
135 A UN advance mission has already been deployed to Khartoum, and if the parties involved in the Machakos-Naivasha peace process conclude a political settlement a larger peace operation is set to follow. For details see UN doc. S/2000/763, 28 Sept 2004.
$7,500,000,000 (per annum) and the NATO bombing and reconstruction effort in Kosovo that cost $670,000,000 (per day of bombing). An example of the direct human cost of intervening would be when the Sudanese Revolutionary United Front (RUF) held 500 UN peacekeepers hostage for weeks and murdered several in 2000 until a negotiated release was arranged between the UN and the RUF’s chief sponsor, Liberian President Charles Taylor. Indirect costs can also be considerable, such as the AIDS epidemic that Cuba suffered when infected soldiers returned home from Angola. These costs often expand as interventionist forces may find themselves reacting to political and strategic imperatives that have little to do with why they intervened in the first place. All too often political and strategic imperatives supersede humanitarian intent.

Yet there are benefits to be gained by intervening multilaterally. Benefits can include the combat hardening of military, the development of potentially long-term relationships with local, regional or international allies, not to mention regional and global stability. There are also costs from not intervening in respect of human lives in the target state, the destabilization of local, national, regional, and international economies and political systems, alliances and regions, and the undoing and undermining of any development processes. Moreover, a missed opportunity for a role in conflict management, for winning an international reputation, for establishing solid credibility, and for the chance to restructure a state’s political system could cost heavily in terms of audience, material and political costs.

The decision to intervene or to not intervene is also a function of the multilateral actors’ subjective estimate of the likely outcome of the conflict and the effect of multilateral intervention on that outcome. Regan argues that the probability

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of a conflict abating with or without an intervention is one of the crucial factors in determining the likelihood that a third-party will intervene. Uncertainty over likely outcomes shows up as a declining probability of interventions. Organizations pursue intervention when they believe there is some beneficial utility in acting. That organizations are unlikely to intervene unless the chance of success is perceived as good is a common assumption in the literature. However there is little evidence of how it can be measured qualitatively. The difficulty, of course, is that the definition of ‘success’ is hard to define. When considering the likelihood of a successful intervention – what is the minimum requirements of ‘success’? Multilateral actors seeking regional or global security would generally prefer that an internal conflict end without them having to expend resources to achieve the outcome. However they would also prefer to expend some resources if they thought that their efforts could ensure stability. If it is assumed that multilateral actors get no utility from the act of intervening, then they would not intervene if they had a low expectation about the role of an intervention in ensuring stability. One of the key problems is that multilateral actors generally do not have sufficient information to know with confidence when success or failure is likely.

Finally, multilateral ‘non-interventions’ from the 1990s onwards suggest that clear exit points are decisive. Organizations have repeatedly withstood strong media generated pressures to intervene militarily in humanitarian emergencies when the exit points could not be identified. Concern about quagmires and casualties played a major role in decisions to withstand media generated pressures for multilateral intervention in Bosnia between 1992 and May 1995, in Chechnya in November to December 1994 where it would have triggered a confrontation with Russia, in Burundi in July 1996, in the Great Lakes region in November 1996, and in Kosovo in June 1998.

143 Regan, 2000, 23, 110.
144 Ibid., 56.
145 Little 1975; Regan 2000, 5.
146 Regan, 2000, 43, 135-136.
147 Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 131-143.
2.5 Conclusion

What decision-makers face is an *ad hoc choice* among different uncertainties and risks. A coherent understanding in the literature in terms of what *primary* conditions attract multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene is lacking. Scholars and practitioners do, however, offer plenty of suggestions on what conditions ‘should’ contribute to an intervention policy. Most studies have focused on unilateral interventions, with conditions that ethically justify such interventions. Consequently, further research on this extremely interesting and significant topic is a necessity.

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Chapter Three

Theoretical framework

3.1 Introduction

A review of the available literature on the conditions that attract or deter multilateral intervention into internal conflicts reveals significant shortcomings. There are no agreed-upon conditions that determine multilateral intervention or non-intervention policies and there are some conditions whose importance has not been fully explored and explained. There are no useful frameworks measuring certain conditions which may describe, predict, or prescribe multilateral decisions to intervene or not. There is a further need to identify conditions that are evident in decisions by organizations that consider an intervention option, or are asked to intervene, but reject it without responding.

This chapter describes a framework that, upon application of four case studies in the Asia Pacific region, attempts to understand which structural (environment) and perceptual conditions make multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene attractive. The framework developed serves as a tool for conceptually defining and operationally measuring certain conditions. It is hoped that the effects of these conditions on decisions to intervene or to not intervene can be systematically tested upon application of numerous cases of internal conflict. The conflicts examined are the Philippine (Moro) conflict, the East Timor conflict, the Solomon Island Conflict, and the West Papua conflict. This research provides reasons behind multilateral organizations taking concrete action to help cease hostilities between disputants and reasons behind these same actors choosing to take no action whatsoever. The findings may be of particular descriptive, predictive and even prescriptive value after their further application on other cases of internal conflict. In particular the results may aid
in establishing further theories in respect of the organizational decision-calculus, selection bias in multilateral organizations, and the unattractiveness of an intervention policy.

### 3.2 Three Key Components Underlying the Framework

Some key scholars, including Patrick Regan and John Janzekovic, have developed ideas about the causes of unilateral interventions. Costs, risk and benefits; the issue of connectivity; and the level of outrage felt by the domestic and international communities are essential ideas when developing an accurate framework that considers the determinants of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. These three ideas are adopted as the key headings of the framework and are used in respect of a multilateral context. Unfortunately it must be noted that these concepts do have some limitations. It is difficult to measure or even define all of the conditions that may represent them, especially perceptual conditions such as levels of outrage and perceived connectivity. However, their importance in the literature validates their inclusion.

As noted in the previous chapter, multilateral actors have to weigh the costs, risks and benefits of alternative actions and estimate the probability that any action will achieve a desired outcome. While the costs and benefits of multilateral interventions are distributed across all sanctioned parties, they still act as a powerful influence on the attractiveness of a particular policy, and, as such, are incorporated as an essential element of the framework. Andrew Kapral argues that the basic premise of cost, risk and benefit analysis is that some factors of a certain decision will yield negative outcomes to the decision maker (costs), or certain risks will have to be taken, and some conditions will yield positive outcomes (benefits).\(^1\) The goal, therefore, is to choose the path that leads to the highest level of benefits in exchange for the lowest levels of costs and risks. If multilateral actors are militarily superior to the disputants, direct multilateral intervention will have relatively low costs. Conversely, if the disputants have a powerful military relative to the multilateral intervener(s), the

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\(^1\) Kapral, 2004, 3.
likelihood that intervention will yield benefits is low, and the danger that multilateral intervention will be costly is increased.

In a similar vein, Regan asserts that when the expectations are such that the rewards are slight and the costs prohibitive, “we should not expect to see many interventions.” He argues that political leaders choose to intervene only when they have considered an intervention to be necessary and they expect that intervention will have a high chance of success or that the benefits of success are accessible and greatly worthwhile. This could work in the context of multilateral intervention. The multilateral intervener(s) estimates that the conflict will continue without an intervention or that the costs of non-intervention outweigh the costs of multilateral intervention.

The specific goals of multilateral intervention may determine the extent to which an intervening organization will accept the material and political costs of intervention. If such goals are included in an organization’s rationale, the perceived benefits of intervention increase. In addition to the material interests of multilateral organization, such as the protection of economic, strategic, and territorial interests, intervention for humanitarian goals may also benefit the multilateral intervener(s). Multilateral intervention to protect humanitarian interests may generate support from the interveners’ regional and international public. It is likely that the regional and international audiences will accept greater material losses for more profitable goals that they have agreed on.

Consequently, the main theme of multilateral intervention proponents is always that the cost-benefit ratio is favourable, and the risk involved is acceptable. If this cannot be argued forcefully and with a convincing emphasis on the controllability

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2 Regan, 2000, 4 As Regan argues, “The decision to intervene is laden with political costs that go far beyond the resources expended.”
3 Regan asserts that there are undoubtedly more factors that influence the decision to intervene, though he argues that the relative purchase that additional explanations give is marginal when compared with those identified here. Ibid., 139.
4 For example, some studies have posited that the goal of intervention is not only to eliminate violence and create stability, but also to do so in a manner that favours the longer-term economic and territorial goals of the intervener. Pearson 1974.
6 Ibid.
of risk, Vertzberger argues, a decision to intervene is unlikely to be made; even supporters will find it difficult to accept and defend an open-ended commitment. Thus, the question of control is crucial. Control, by definition entails the reduction of risk, uncertainty, and complexity to an acceptable minimum – not an easy task in most multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene, which by their nature require a degree of policy-relevant knowledge that is not readily, if at all, available.  

The *degree of connectivity* or global and regional spill-over effects created by the internal conflict may attract or deter multilateral intervention. With the acceleration of globalization and the growth of supranational organizations, so-called internal conflicts have become more ‘internationalized’ than ever before. Internal conflicts can weaken state structures, create instability in the world market place, generate refugee problems, and instigate conflicts beyond the borders of the original conflict. All these may pose a security threat against outside citizens which may encourage intervention decisions by multilateral organizations. In particular, humanitarian crises affect the entire global community to some extent, and there is a need to act in pursuit of alleviating their consequences. The Member States that are for intervention may indicate the importance of proximity, historical factors, and spill-over effects, especially if these are refugees.

Finally, depending on its nature, the *level of outrage* generated by regional and/or international communities created by certain conditions could attract multilateral intervention or non-intervention. Regional and international constituencies may press strongly for either policies particularly when the conflicts and the resulting carnage are covered by the media. It is possible that human empathy may be able to transcend state boundaries and that the greater the public

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9 Regan, 2000, 47.
10 Ibid.
outrage over an internal conflict, the higher the likelihood of multilateral intervention. Whether the moral impetus to act is dependent on the degree of outrage or shock felt, the extent of the atrocities,¹¹ and the immediacy of the act itself will be explored. It must be acknowledged that such outrage is not boundless; indeed these vocal feelings are frequently very selectively applied. Janzekovic argues that constant priming by the mass media is required to maintain levels of concern and even levels of interest.¹²

3.3 Research Design

The framework in this thesis concentrates on the point where multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene were taken, and it limits the conditions to key structural and perceptual conditions that may attract or deter multilateral intervention. This section argues that both the structural environment and the perceptions of the structural environment are required for a full description and explanation of intervention or non-intervention decisions. These concern the relationships between multilateral actors and their surrounding environments; how the environment limits or encourages the activities of these actors, and how multilateral actors perceive their environment. The unit of analysis in this project is naturally intervention decisions and non-intervention decisions.

At its foundation this project is interested in following Most and Starr’s thinking:

…partitioning the world in at least two crude ways: the presence or absence of dependent variables (Y and –Y or intervention decisions and non-intervention decisions), and the presence or absence of predictor variables (X and –X or the presence or absence of certain structural and perceptual conditions). In doing so, there is the realization that the most general questions or propositions might not hold because these crude partitioning factors might limit their general applicability. Furthermore, by organizing our thinking in these terms, they may help us in bringing disparate phenomena together in an orderly manner. At the least the results of this project might indicate some factors and/or relationships which are

¹¹The grim reality, Janzekovic continues, is that small atrocities do not have the same impact as large atrocities (except, of course, to those doing the suffering and dying). Janzekovic, 2005, 20.
¹²Ibid., 24-25, 36.
essential, others significant, and others marginal or insignificant to a particular multilateral decision.\textsuperscript{13}

In order to clearly define and measure the conditions in this framework, various conceptual definitions and operational measurements have been adopted. Conceptual definitions of the conditions are sourced from such references as Regan’s \textit{Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict},\textsuperscript{14} the Correlates of War Project,\textsuperscript{15} and from Marshall, Gurr et al.’s PITF Set Codebook.\textsuperscript{16} The operational measurements include yes/no/limited answers, statistical information, analytical descriptions and multi-choice definitions. Particular operational measurements were picked for their abilities to provide the clearest results and information in respect of each condition. Operational measurements are generally sourced from such references as Marshall, Gurr et al’s database or are original measurements.\textsuperscript{17}

In particular, some of the measurements have been modified in accordance with the particular case studies examined, especially in respect of the numbers of fatalities and refugees. While the yes/no/limited and multi-choice nature of some of the questions has, in past research,\textsuperscript{18} required an analytical tool, a logit procedure; this thesis will provide a numerical value to the answer, for example, yes=1, no=2, limited=3, and no basis for judgement = 9. Such a rudimentary form of investigation can at best serve as a prelude to a more systematic treatment to follow in succeeding chapters and, in respect of future research, will require further case studies for a more thorough analysis. Figures 3 and 4 provide broad illustrations of how this framework can work and what conditions it includes.

\textsuperscript{13} For more information on this method of analysis see Most and Starr, 1989, 17.
\textsuperscript{14} Regan, 2000.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
In respect of the cases where intervention was considered but it was dropped as a valid policy, there should be visible traces left behind from the multilateral process. Two ways to identify this trace is to look for an indication of threats to intervene that were ultimately not carried out or an attempt by the state in conflict to call for an intervention, a call which was ultimately ignored. The problem with the first condition would be that clear threats are not always evident. The second condition works much more efficiently. In the case of the Solomon Islands conflict, the authorities sought intervention three times before gaining multilateral intervention. What was it that deterred multilateral intervention from taking place earlier? Since the question of whether multilateral actors considered intervening, but chose not to, is difficult to disentangle, it will be included as much as possible when applying the Solomon Islands case to the framework.

While it may be critiqued as limited in scope, the framework in this thesis offers valuable conditions for further analysis, extending the current international debate. Conditions that have not been mentioned in the literature, such as the impact of tactics and strategies adopted by the disputants, and the impact of identifiable and organized disputants will be included in the framework, challenging their invisibility. This framework allows an understanding not only about what the primary conditions are that make multilateral decisions to intervene or not intervene attractive, but it will be of descriptive worth in constructing data on current internal conflicts. Once the conditions are perceived as valuable in case study analysis, then a set of predictive criteria can be produced to ascertain when a multilateral intervention may or may not take place. It should be noted at the outset that an organization can intervene as a result of many conditions at once.

Figure 3: Model of Structural and Perceptual Conditions that Attract and Deter Multilateral Intervention

19 For example, it fails to consider personal attributes of the potential intervener or the decision-making process.
Figure 4: Summary of Key Structural and Perceptual Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Conditions</th>
<th>Perceptual Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs and Risks</strong></td>
<td><strong>Costs, risks and benefits</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISPS – Dispute Issues</td>
<td>LIKESUCCESS – Likelihood of Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATAL – Fatalities</td>
<td>CLEAR – Clear Exits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRBEGIN – Duration</td>
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<tr>
<td>YREND – Duration</td>
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<tr>
<td>PHASE – Phase</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILCAP – Military</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
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<td>ECOCAP – Economic</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGFIGHT – Number of</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Disputants</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>TACSTRA – Tactics and</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategies adopted by</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### 3.4 Operationalization of the Structural Conditions

#### Structural Costs and Risks

##### 3.4a Dispute Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disputants</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
<th>Connectivity</th>
<th>Connectivity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUPEROS – Superpower Support or Opposition</td>
<td>ECWEALTH – Economic Wealth of the State in Conflict</td>
<td>ECIMPORT – Economic Importance of the State in Conflict</td>
<td>UPMCRISIS – IDP and Refugee Crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENORG – Identifiable and Organized Disputants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DEATHMAG – Genocide/Politicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIATE – Resistance Levels</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFAIL – Status of Government</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- **Disposition:**
  - SUPEROS – Superpower Support or Opposition
  - IDENORG – Identifiable and Organized Disputants
  - INITIATE – Resistance Levels
  - MAGFAIL – Status of Government

- **Benefits:**
  - ECWEALTH – Economic Wealth of the State in Conflict

- **Connectivity:**
  - ECIMPORT – Economic Importance of the State in Conflict
  - UPMCRISIS – IDP and Refugee Crisis
  - DEATHMAG – Genocide/Politicide

- **Level of Outrage:**
  - MEDIA – Media Coverage
  - INTENVIRO – Nature of the International Environment
  - LEVOUT – Level of Outrage
The types of dispute issues have implications for the political, economic, and audience costs and risks of intervening. The more intractable the dispute issues are, the higher the likelihood of costs and risks to resolve it. Tractable disputes such as territorial or resource issues, especially those which are limited in number, may be more attractive to multilateral interventions than those intractable disputes that involve such issues as ethnic divisions.\textsuperscript{20} The following code is sourced from Marshall, Gurr et al., but it is slightly modified in its order.\textsuperscript{21}

**DISPS:** This paper categorizes dispute issues into eight categories, although internal conflicts may involve one or many of the following:

1. Territory, borders, sea borders
2. Resources
3. Others dispute issues
4. Decolonization, national independence
5. Internal power
6. International power
7. Ethnic, religious or regional autonomy
8. Ideology, system
9. No basis for judgement

These eight categories can be aggregated into three groups that characterize the conflict by the main objectives in dispute:

1. 1, 2, 3. material or territorial issues
2. 4, 5, 6. international power
3. 7, 8. national power
9. No basis for judgement

### 3.4b Intensity

Although the ‘intensity of a conflict’ (the degree of threat or tension? the magnitude of violence? the number of fatalities?) remains ambiguous in meaning, it is


presumed to affect the attractiveness of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. Conflict intensity is operationalized in this framework in terms of the number of casualties and the tactics and strategies adopted by the disputants. The tactics and strategies adopted by disputants are, however, addressed as a separate condition to illustrate its importance. On the one hand, to a liberal perspective, highly intense conflicts tend to be associated with humanitarian concerns\textsuperscript{22} making a multilateral intervention policy compelling. Yet highly intense conflicts may also pose severe threats to regional and international stability, of paramount importance to the realist.

The role of intensity reflects to a large extent the certainty or uncertainty with the decision to intervene or to not intervene multilaterally. It is quite likely that in intense internal conflicts both the expectation that the conflict will be resolved without multilateral intervention and the expectation about the efficiency of a multilateral intervention will be low. According to Regan, one result of this should be a decreased likelihood of observing multilateral interventions, even though Member States may see an intervention as necessary to stop the fighting.\textsuperscript{23} Yet a reflection of a high intensity conflict may be a high level of outrage and shock expressed by the media. This outrage which can generate audience costs may override the costs and risks associated with intense conflicts. An important question for this work is whether there is a \textit{threshold} in the number of fatalities which influence multilateral intervention or non-intervention decisions. Fatalities not only denote an operational point for inclusion of cases but also reflect the seriousness of the conflict and the extent to which it is entrenched in the society and is visible to the global community.

\textbf{FATAL}

The intensity of the conflict is measured in terms of the number of fatalities over the course of the conflict prior to the multilateral intervention or the estimated fatalities to date if the conflict has not attracted multilateral intervention. The numbers of victims in internal conflicts given in governmental and academic records vary

\textsuperscript{22} There are, of course, benefits to intervening in intense conflicts that result from humanitarian aspects of the mission, but with a low probability of success the intervener is too likely to end up with the least preferred outcome – a failed intervention.

\textsuperscript{23} Regan, 2000, 48.
considerably. In many protracted internal conflicts, for example with the 1994 massacre in Rwanda or the decades of war in Angola, it is technically impossible to estimate any exact number of victims. It also becomes more and more difficult to draw the lines between civilian and military victims. This paper has listed the *lowest and highest estimates of victims* available at the point of intervention, at the point of consideration or to date. Sources for the number of casualties in each Asia Pacific case of conflict include the Correlates of War data, the Pearson and Baumann data on military interventions, Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr et al.’s²⁴ PITF (Political Instability Task Force) Problem Set Codebook, UN databases, and Monty G. Marshall’s *Measuring the Societal Impact of War* data.²⁵

The following code, sourced from Marshall, Gurr et al., provides a definition of what number of fatalities converts to a crisis or war. The code is based on source estimates of fatalities directly attributed to fighting, armed attacks, and revolutionary protest including rebel fighters and leaders, demonstrators, regime forces and officials, civilians massacred in war zones or caught in cross-fire, victims of government campaigns of genocide and politicide, and victims of terrorist attacks. It excludes, insofar as possible, victims of disease and starvation that result indirectly from open conflict.²⁶

0. Less than 200 fatalities: this converts to latent conflict heading towards a crisis
1. 200 to 1000 fatalities: this converts to a crisis
2. 1000 to 5000 fatalities: this converts to a severe crisis
3. 5,000 to 10,000 fatalities: this converts to war
4. More than 10,000 fatalities: this converts to war
9. No basis for judgement

### 3.4c Duration

A conflict is not a static situation but dynamic. An understanding of the conflict cycle is essential for an understanding of when a multilateral intervention may appear an attractive option or not. Numerous models of conflict patterns have been put forward by scholars. Typically, conflicts tend to be described as cyclical in regard to their intensity levels, escalating from (relative) stability and peace into crisis and war, and therefore, de-escalating into relative peace. Most scholars also agree that these cycles are recurring. For an illustration of the conflict cycle see figure 5.\footnote{Niklas L.P. Swanstrom and Mikael S. Weissman, “Conflict, Conflict Prevention, Conflict Management and Beyond: A Conceptual Exploration,” Concept Paper, Summer 2005, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Silk Road Studies Program, Washington, D.C., \url{http://www.silkroad.org/new/docs/ConceptPapers/2005/concept_paper_ConfPrev.pdf}, accessed January 2006.}

**Figure 5: The Conflict Life Cycle**

Conflict Intensity

![Conflict Life Cycle Diagram](image-url)
According to Bercovitch the duration of a dispute and the timing of multilateral intervention determine to a significant extent the likelihood of intervention success.\textsuperscript{28} To be effective, intervention must take place at a propitious moment. There is, however, no agreement about exactly when potential interveners are attracted to multilateral intervention. Is there a particular phase of conflict that attracts multilateral intervention? History might argue that a multilateral intervener only intervenes when the conflict has not managed to settle itself – when duration is lengthy, yet it would also seem that the longer a conflict’s duration, the more intractable it appears and, as such, the less attractive it is to multilateral actors. The operational measurement for duration and phase of conflict, modifying Marshall, Gurr et al.’s PITF Set Codebook,\textsuperscript{29} dates the beginning and end of armed conflict, and what the phase was when intervention was taken, was considered, or has not taken place.

**YRBEGIN** (4-number numeric year denoting event beginning (9999=no basis for judgement)). This code records the year in which the conflict began. Marshall, Gurr et al. define ‘open armed conflict’ as beginning when more than 100 conflict-related fatalities are recorded in a single year, or defined by an overt, symbolic or decisive action.\textsuperscript{30} However this is not appropriate for Asia-Pacific conflicts in the Philippines (Moro), East Timor, West Papua, and the Solomon Islands. Consequently, UN sources or specific case histories are used to determine the year that the conflict began.

**YREND** (4-number numeric year denoting event ending (9999=ongoing)). It records the last year of open armed conflict. If there is a decisive conclusion, such as a multilateral intervention that ends almost all fighting, it records the year of the concluding event and indicates the nature of that event.

**PHASE** At what phase of the conflict was intervention initiated, considered, or to date?
1. Dispute (non-military) phase
2. Conflict (pre-hostilities) phase

\textsuperscript{28}Bercovitch, 1986, 161.
\textsuperscript{29}Marshall et al., 2001.
\textsuperscript{30}Ordinarily, open conflict results from a conscious, strategic policy on the part of one or both conflict groups; in this case, date armed conflict from the year in which the first attacks or clashes occur.
3. Hostilities phase
4. Escalation
5. De-escalation
6. Termination (post-hostilities) phase
7. Settlement
8. No basis for judgement

3.4d Capabilities of the Intervener and Disputants

Motivation, opportunity and a strong willpower to intervene need to be supplemented by appropriate skills or capabilities. Power and material capabilities are not identical; but given their association it is essential that there is an attempt made to define the latter in operational terms so as to understand the former. Military personnel and military expenditure reflect the breadth and depth of the resources that an organization could bring or has brought to bear in instances of multilateral interventions. Furthermore, the ability of an organization, including the capabilities of the interested Member State(s), to create and sustain a long-term commitment to resolution and reconstruction will limit the costs or risks incurred by multilateral intervention. The higher the capabilities may mean the higher the likelihood of intervention. While on the other hand, the less the capabilities or the weaker the capabilities, the less likelihood of multilateral intervention. In terms of non-intervention cases, the capabilities of the disputants need to be considered as a factor that has motivated inaction. Consequently, while the capabilities of the intervener(s) are noted in the cases of intervention, the capabilities of the disputants are considered as deterrents in the cases when multilateral organizations have not been forthcoming with intervention. The following codes come from the Correlates of War Project codebook.

MILCAP This code contains numerical data on the size of the organization’s military (including the number of troops offered by interested parties) at the time of intervention. In the matter of non-intervention the numerical data on the disputants’

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31 Regan, 2000, 50.
32 Correlates of War Project, 2005.
33 Or at least under the command of the multilateral organization.
military capabilities is noted in an effort to understand policies of non-intervention. Due to the difficulty in gaining precise numbers of military personnel, the accurate numbers of active forces remains uncertain on a conceptual basis. A lot of the results are broad estimates from the most recent data reported.\textsuperscript{34}

ECOCAP Military expenditure is defined as the total military budget for an organization for a given intervention. How much was spent in the actual interventions?\textsuperscript{35} Just as with the condition on military capabilities, this condition will look at disputant economic capabilities when it comes to policies of non-intervention.

3.4e Number of Disputants

This only includes those disputants who have been actively involved in the negotiations or who have been recognized as disputants by the government. The higher the number of disputants may mean the higher the complexity of the conflict and thus the higher the chance of a policy of non-intervention. This code, based on Marshall, Gurr et al.’s PITF codebook,\textsuperscript{36} scales the number of disputants, ranging from 1-5; with 9=missing. The scale is based on source estimates of the number of groups of "armed supporters," "guerrillas," of rebel and revolutionary movements and the state.

\textbf{MAGFIGHT:}
1. The government only
2. 2 groups of disputants only
3. 3-4 groups of disputants
4. 5-6 groups of disputants
5. 7 or more groups of disputants
9. No basis for judgement

3.4f Tactics and Strategies Adopted by Disputants

\textsuperscript{34} Correlates of War Project, 2005.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
The attractiveness of multilateral intervention as a policy depends to a large extent on the behaviour of the disputants.\footnote{Regan, 2000, 50.} If the strategies and tactics adopted by disputants are destructive and conflictual, would this lead to a lesser probability of multilateral intervention taking place? Could evidence of an agreement and reconciliatory acts by at least one disputant influence the multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene? If there is an end to the conflict in sight, without the need for multilateral intervention, then there may be less likelihood of multilateral intervention occurring. The following is an original code.\footnote{For more information on conflict Management Strategies and Conflicts see Marshall and Gurr, 2005.} The strategies and tactics of the disputants over the course of the conflict up to intervention, at the point of considering intervention, or to date, will be used as the duration threshold for studying the disputants’ modes of conflict resolution. Figure 6 illustrates positive and negative modes of conflict resolution that the disputants may adopt during the duration of the internal conflict.

**Figure 6: Positive and Negative Modes of Conflict Resolution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>instruments</th>
<th>positive use (+)</th>
<th>negative use (-)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1. Bilateral diplomacy</strong></td>
<td>establishing diplomatic relations</td>
<td>recalling diplomats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dispatching envoys</td>
<td>suspending of relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>visits by government officials</td>
<td>cutting diplomatic relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>negotiations</td>
<td>notes of protest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>entrance of a mediator</td>
<td>leaving the negotiation table</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>use of diplomatic channels</td>
<td>ignoring signs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>breaking treaties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>expelling foreigners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Multilateral diplomacy</strong></td>
<td>organizing a conference</td>
<td>boycotting a conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mediation by an</td>
<td>resolution against a party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>international organization</strong></td>
<td><strong>resolution in favour of a party</strong></td>
<td><strong>ignoring multilateral initiatives</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>arbitration, facilitation by third parties</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### 3. Information, Propaganda

- Information policy to find solutions
- Misinformation
- Information policy to heat the conflict

### 4. Economic Instruments

- Granting of most favoured nation status
- Credits
- Economic support
- Trade agreements
- Tariffs, contingents
- Embargo
- Taxation of imports
- Subsidizing exports
- Nationalization
- Hidden trade barriers
- Demands for reparation
- Black mailing
- Cancellation of trade agreements
- Closure of borders

### 5. Military Instruments

- Dispatching military observers
- Delivery of arms
- Peacekeeping forces
- Withdrawal of troops
- Dispatching troops or vessels
- Concentrating troops at borders
- Mobilization
- Alerts
- Manoeuvres
- Sporadic military incidents
- Intervention or invasion
- Blockade
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Endings of military support</strong></td>
<td><strong>Full fledged war</strong></td>
<td><strong>Terrorist attacks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>6. Secret agencies and services</strong></td>
<td><strong>Gathering of information</strong></td>
<td><strong>Using information against the other party</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>7. Informal, subversive instruments</strong></td>
<td><strong>Support of non-governmental groups</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>8. Alliances</strong></td>
<td><strong>Admission to alliances</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leaving an alliance</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>9. Regional or universal integration or isolation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Founding international organizations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leaving an international organization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Organizing an international conference</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cancelling participation in a conference</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Supporting international organizations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Cancelling support of a conference</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10. Internal instruments</strong></td>
<td><strong>Government talks with opposition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Demonstration pro/contra the government</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Ending of state of emergency</strong></td>
<td><strong>Street blockades, terrorist assaults</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Amnesty</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bribery, corruption</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Recognition of opposition</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ideological mobilization, populism, charismatic leadership</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td><strong>Change of government</strong></td>
<td><strong>Censorship</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Fulfilling demands</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unorganized resistance, street battles</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Agreement on settlement policy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arrestments, police action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Opposition is willing to compromise</strong></td>
<td><strong>State of emergency, martial law</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Expulsion of citizen, exiliation</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Coup d'état</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Liquidations</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Military force</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Organized resistance,</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TACSTRA
1. There have been only systematic positive uses of conflict resolution instruments by both parties. Governments and oppositions are bound to non-violent actions in their dispute over conflicting interests.
2. There have been some attempts at positive uses of conflict resolution by both parties but the Governments and opposition resort occasionally to force or threat of force.
3. There have been systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by just the disputants, but the government has adopted some or systematic positive uses of conflict resolution instruments
4. There have been systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by just the government
5. There have been systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by the government and disputants.
9. No basis for judgement

3.4g Superpower Opposition or Support

The extent to which a superpower or other major states support, or are opposed to, multilateral intervention could make an option of intervention or non-intervention attractive. While superpower support is not essential to interventions by regional organizations, superpower opposition may be highly detrimental to intervention by an international organization. Opposition by a superpower to multilateral intervention may increase the political, economic and military costs of the potential multilateral intervener. For the time period between 1990 and 2006 this paper considers the US a superpower. The code, from Marshall, Gurr et al., suggests that a superpower can respond to internal conflicts in a variety of ways. 39

SUPEROS

1. A superpower takes a direct interest in the resolution of the internal conflict of another state and supports multilateral intervention.

2. A superpower remains neutral and inactive to the conflict resolution process and multilateral intervention decision.

3. A superpower remains in complete opposition to intervention.

9. No basis for judgement

**3.4h Identifiable and Organized Disputants**

If the disputants are not clearly identifiable or organized in their aims, there may be less likelihood of multilateral intervention. This is due to the fact that the more clearly identifiable and united the disputants are, the higher the perception of high chances of a successful multilateral intervention. The following code scales whether the disputants are easily identifiable and organized, ranging from 1-3 or 9 for no basis for judgement.

**IDENORG**

1. Yes – the disputants are easily identifiable and organized

2. Limited – the disputants are generally identifiable and are marginally organized

3. No – the disputants are not easily identifiable, nor are they organized

9. No basis for judgement

**3.4i Resistance levels to intervention by disputants**

What were the circumstances under which multilateral intervention was initiated or not initiated? The following code, modified from ‘Third Party Military Interventions 1900-2002’ Codebook, refers to whether there was a request for intervention, consent to intervention, or resistance to an intervention option. Were there any calls for intervention by one or more of the disputants? As long as one of the disputants is interested in intervention, induced consent by other disputants may

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still lead to multilateral intervention; while high resistance levels by the disputants, especially state actors, may lead to a policy of non-intervention.

INITIATE
1. Multilateral intervention was requested or consented to by the central government of the state (even if it was induced).
2. Multilateral intervention was requested or consented to by an opposition group.
3. While there was resistance by disputants to multilateral intervention, it was requested/welcomed by the civil society/grassroots community.
4. High resistance levels to multilateral intervention, but intervention was still initiated multilaterally.
5. High resistance levels to multilateral intervention and as such there was no intervention.
9. No basis for judgement

3.4j Status of the government

A failing or failed state may be perceived as a reasonable condition for multilateral intervention. Characteristics of state failure include economic deterioration, dramatically falling living standards, declining governance, misrule and corruption, failing institutions, and an incapacity to deliver services for citizens. If a government cannot control their territory, and are no longer able to pay their employees, law and order may break down, control of armed forces may be lost, and others may be looked to in order to provide security. Loyalty may be given to a tribe, clan, group or warlords. In some extreme cases, there are no alternative elites or authority structures to replace failed governance systems and an extended period of chaos results. If there is no recognized sovereign or governing body, there is more likelihood of multilateral intervention due to the low risk of intimidating or insulting such a state, and more risks of spill-over effects if left un-intervened. The status of

43 When no real government is in place, the idea that intervention constitutes a violation of sovereignty unless requested by the government appears outright absurd.
the government or any adverse regime changes at the time of intervention, at the point of consideration, or to date is noted in this code, taken from Marshall, Gurr et al.\textsuperscript{44}

**MAGFAIL** This scale refers to situations in which the institutions of the central state at some point in the conflict are so weakened that they can no longer maintain political order in significant parts of the country. Evidence includes shutdowns of routine government services, failure of security forces and administrators to carry out any government directives, and anarchic conditions in large parts of the country, with rival militias, warlords, or local or regional authorities attempting to establish autonomous zones of government.\textsuperscript{45}

1. No adverse regime changes
2. Adverse regime change (defined above) with no significant weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public order.
3. Failure of state authority in a limited part of the country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country or its capital
4. Failure of state authority in a substantial part of the country, or in the capital and its environs
5. Complete collapse or near-total failure of state authority
9. No basis for judgement.

**Structural Benefits**

3.4k Economic Wealth of the State

This section asks whether the state in conflict has valuable resources that the multilateral actors may wish to consume or take advantage of. The code is an original piece of dataset.

\textsuperscript{44} Marshall et al., 2001
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
**ECWEALTH**

1. No important resources evident
2. Some important resources – has the potential to be of economic benefit in terms of land or labour.
3. Exceptionally scarce and valuable resources – such as oil or diamonds
9. No basis for judgement.

**Structural Connectivity**

**3.4L The Economic Importance of the State in Conflict**

This code addresses whether an internal conflict will be more susceptible to multilateral intervention or non-intervention if the economic value of the state in conflict directly affects the economic value of organizations. This includes the state’s ability as a trading partner with Member States. The higher the economic importance of the state in which the internal conflict is taking place may translate into a higher likelihood of multilateral intervention.

**ECIMPORT** Is the state in conflict highly integrated in the international market, a strong and important trading partner, with membership in important trading agreements?
1. No.
2. Limited
3. Yes
9. No basis for judgment

**Structural Level of Outrage**

**3.4m Media Coverage**

**MEDIA** Media coverage of internal conflicts may contribute to the levels of outrage felt by regional and international audiences. Public constituencies may press strongly for multilateral intervention when media coverage is particularly intense. Media coverage may only be measurable with more time and effort, something that is
restricted by the thesis time constraints. Consequently, no precise measurements will be made but active examination of the evidence, such as practitioner statements of the importance of the media or important pieces of media evidence will be induced in the analysis of the four case studies.

3.4n Nature of International Environment

INTENVIRO At what stage in the international environment did the multilateral intervention occur or was considered before dismissal? Is there a link between particular events on the international stage and the attractiveness of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene into an internal conflict? Like media coverage, the international environment is difficult to measure. The operational measurement for nature of the international environment will be purely descriptive, using strong evidence to examine the importance of the nature of the international environment.

3.5 Operationalization of the Perceptual Variables

Perceptual conditions are at this point in time largely immeasurable, and will not be identified or measured in the same manner as the structural conditions. Rather, there will be an attempt made to analyze them only to the extent that they are evident and will create a greater understanding of the importance of the structural conditions and the current arguments in the literature.

Perceptual Costs, Risks and Benefits

3.5a Likelihood of Success

The perception of high success is continuously referred to in the literature\(^{46}\) as being of high importance when considering an intervention option. Successful multilateral interventions will generally maximize political benefits while minimizing political costs; failure would tend to do the opposite. It is unlikely, both practically

\(^{46}\) Regan, 2000, 107.
and conceptually, that a multilateral actor confronted with a choice over whether to intervene in an internal conflict will choose to intervene when they have no reasonable expectation of a successful outcome. Multilateral actors currently rely more on ad hoc criteria than on systematic evaluation. This thesis suggests that if at least three elements are evident, if the conflict has a strong society/grassroots element willing and working for peace, if there is a stalemate evident, and if there is an agreement from which to work from, then there may be a perception of medium to high likelihood of success.

**LIKESUCCESS**

1. If the conflict has a strong civil society/grassroots element willing for peace; if there is a type of stalemate evident; and if there is an agreement present to work from.
2. If none of these are present then there will be a low perception of the likelihood of success.
9. No basis for judgment

**3.5b Any Clear exit points**

**CLEAR** Clear exit points were a recognized feature of importance in the literature review for ascertaining whether an option of intervention or non-intervention is an attractive action. The ability to perceive points in the internal conflict in which the potential intervener(s) could exit the process may be extremely difficult to attain. But due to its prevalence in the literature, it will still be considered in each of the examination of four case studies.

**Perceptual Connectivity**

**3.5c Humanitarian Concerns**

Serious human rights violations may be a necessary or permissible condition for multilateral intervention or non-intervention. The universality of the principles of

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47 Ibid., 41, 34.
48 Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 131-143.
human rights means that state borders provide no immunity from international action when the violations are severe. However the extent of severity has not been determined. This thesis considers refugee and IDP numbers higher than 50,000, and genocide and politicide, as the leading humanitarian concerns that impact on the attractiveness of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene.

UPM Crisis

It must be noted, however, that the humanitarian crisis could be the cause of the conflict rather than a consequence of it. The following code, modified from Regan’s dataset and Marshall, Gurr et al.’s code book, suggests that a conflict associated with the flow of at least 50,000 refugees and IDPs are considered to be a humanitarian concern, which may determine a higher likelihood of multilateral intervention. This number may not be appropriate for the cases of conflict in the Asia-Pacific region, but it will still be used as it illustrates the seriousness and visibility when considering the population scale of these states. Data has been derived from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and specific case histories where necessary.

**UPMCRISIS**
1. Not a crisis – less than 50,000 refugees and IDPs
2. A Humanitarian Crisis – 50,000 refugees and IDPs +
3. No basis of judgement

Genocide/Politicide

Genocide and politicide involve the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites, their agents, or either of the contending authorities, resulting in the physical extermination of enough (not necessarily all) members of a target communal group or politicized non-communal group so that it can no longer pose any conceivable threat to their rule or interests. In

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49 Regan uses 50,000 as the cut-off between a crisis and a non-crisis, but the cases examined have limited population numbers and this must be taken into consideration. Regan, 2000, 56; Marshall et al., 2001.
genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal (ethno-linguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups. The following criteria and code are based on the codes developed by Barbara Harff and T.R. Gurr. Cumulative estimates of civilian deaths over the course of the conflict are identified from multiple sources. More research could be done on this issue with some improvement in the reliability of the following codings.

Three operational criteria for Genocide or Politicide should be noted. Firstly, authorities' complicity in mass murder must be established. In situations of internal conflict either of the disputants may be deemed responsible for carrying out, or allowing, such actions. Secondly, the victims to be counted are unarmed civilians, not combatants. It rarely is possible to distinguish precisely between the two categories in the source materials. Certain kinds of tactics nonetheless are indicative of authorities' systematic targeting of non-combatants: massacres, unrestrained bombing and shelling of civilian inhabited areas, declaration of free fire zones, starvation by prolonged interdiction of food supplies, or forced expulsion ('ethnic cleansing') accompanied by extreme privation and killings. Lastly, in principle, numbers provided in 'body counts' do not enter the definition of what constitutes an episode of genocide or politicide. A ‘few hundred’ killed constitutes as much a genocide or politicide as the deaths of thousands if the victim group is small in number to begin with.

**DEATHMAG**

1. Less than 300
2. 300 – 1000
3. 1000 – 2000
4. 2000 – 4000
5. 4000 – 8000
6. 8000 - 16,000

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51 Note: Definitions and operational guidelines are adapted from Ibid.
7. 16,000 - 32,000
8. 32,000 - 64,000
9. 64,000 - 128,000
10. 128,000 - 256,000
11. 256,000 +
99. No basis for judgement

Perceptual Level of Outrage

3.5d Level of Outrage

LEVOUT To what extent is there an international and/or regional level of outrage produced by the internal conflict? To what degree has this led to potential or real audience costs, and has this influenced the attractiveness of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene? From a liberal perspective, it could be expected that domestic, regional and international politics would play a central role in the making of organizational policy. Humanitarian crises which result in large numbers of casualties or lead to large social dislocations could lead to a sense of moral outrage on the part of the public, who may then exert pressure on multilateral organizations to constructively respond.\(^{52}\) Audience costs are generated by the level of outrage that can emerge as a consequence of extensive and analytical media coverage. When contemplating multilateral intervention, multilateral actors have to weigh the competing demands of various groups and states that will often be at odds over policy. In this environment the organization incurs audience costs for being too timid, too indecisive, or too aggressive. Some of these costs are incurred even when the decision is made not to intervene, though they could generally be considered to be minimal relative to the cost of multilateral intervention.\(^{53}\) The level of outrage will be measured by the evidence of Member States pushing for intervention or the extent of protests or forums held in the states that are most interested in multilateral intervention.

\(^{53}\) Regan, 2000, 43-44.
5.6 Conclusion

Understandings of the multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene into internal conflicts can be advanced by closely examining the structural and perceptual conditions which together contribute to the attractiveness of these policies. The framework attempts to analyze those conditions that appear to make such policies attractive or unattractive. Strong evidence relating structural and perceptual conditions to certain types of policies can allow political researchers to draw inferences about how those conditions affect the organizational decision calculus and what conditions could be used in establishing particular criteria that could determine or predict intervention or non-intervention within regional and/or international organizations. The next chapter applies this framework to four cases of internal conflict in the Asia Pacific region to determine its descriptive, predictive and prescriptive value.
Chapter Four

Application of the Framework

4.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to determine if the framework developed in the previous chapter is useful. Does it provide conditions for why some internal conflicts attract multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene? Does it describe internal conflicts competently? Is it of predictive and policy (or prescriptive) value? The framework is applied to four case studies of internal conflict in the Asia Pacific region: *East Timor, the Solomon Islands, the Philippines (Moro) and West Papua*. These cases were chosen because they represent the differences and similarities of internal conflicts within one region and recent multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. Evenly split, the cases depict internal conflicts that attracted multilateral intervention and internal conflicts that have failed to attract multilateral intervention. These cases will be compared in the chapter on analysis in order to generalize the inferences that may be drawn from the study of the four cases.

This chapter is organized as follows. Each section will present an overview of the case, an application of only the most relevant structural and perceptual conditions that affected a particular multilateral response, and a table presenting all of the individual findings in a concise format. A wide range of sources were researched, including the International Crisis Group, CIA Fact sheets, Uppsala University conflict databases, and various credible sources to enable a generous account of each case for application of the conditions.
4.2 East Timor - Intervention

4.2a Introduction and Overview

East Timor was declared independent from Portugal on 28 November 1975 but was invaded and occupied by Indonesian forces nine days later. It was incorporated into Indonesia in July 1976 as the province of East Timor. The majority of the international community refused to acknowledge the legality of Indonesia’s claim to East Timor. An unsuccessful campaign of pacification followed over the next two decades, during which an estimated 100,000 to 250,000 individuals lost their lives. On 30 August 1999, in a referendum supervised by the UN, an overwhelming majority of the people of East Timor voted for independence from Indonesia. Following this referendum, anti-independence Timorese militias - organized and supported by the Indonesian military - commenced a violent campaign of retribution. Wary of alienating Indonesia and of being drawn into the East Timor imbroglio, the UN and ASEAN members nevertheless intervened.¹ On 20 September 1999 the Australian-led peacekeeping troops of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), authorized by the UN Security Council, were deployed to the country and managed to control most of the violence. On 20 May 2002, East Timor was internationally recognized as an independent state.² The framework attempts to understand why this internal conflict managed to attract the interest of multilateral organizations and led to a policy of multilateral intervention.

Structural Costs and Risks

4.2b Fatalities

DEATHMAG = 4 = more than 10,000 fatalities: this converts to war or genocide. The suffering of the civilian population of East Timor was extreme. Estimates of the


number who died as a result of the invasion, resistance, repression, dislocation, famine and unavoidable disease, range from the tens of thousands acknowledged by Indonesia itself, to as many as 250,000 victims.  

4.2c Economic Capabilities

ECOCAP = The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) cost from 1 July 2001-30 June 2002 a total of $476.8 million (gross). Australia, and to a lesser extent Japan, carried the majority of this financial burden. The UN Security Council resolution established a trust fund which enabled Member States that supported but did not participate in the operation to contribute to the costs of those that did.  

4.2d Number of Disputants

FATAL= 2 = 2 main groups of disputants, but there were also pro-Indonesia militia groups operating that would have been taken into consideration when the option of intervention was contemplated.

Party A: FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor), with its military arm the FALANTIL (Armed Forces of National Liberation of East Timor).  

Party B: Indonesian government and the Indonesian military (TNI)  

Militia Gangs in East Timor: numbered in their twenties, with members ranging from double digits to over a thousand. The Militia Gangs, operating throughout East Timor’s many districts, had extensive arsenals that included M-16s, World War II-  

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5 Interviews with UN officials, November 1999 by Dupont, July 2000, 166.  

vintage G-3 rifles, AK-47s, and hand grenades obtained from TNI. Often working with TNI in intimidating and arresting pro-independence youth, their methods were to force people to become members through intimidation.\(^7\)

![Eurico Guterres (centre) with his Aitarak terror squad.](image)

4.2e Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants

TACSTRA = 4 = There were systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by *just* the Indonesian government.

The tactics and strategies adopted by the Indonesian government and military to manage the conflict were rife with contradictions, varying between attempting to kill off the disputants to agreeing to *consider* autonomy for East Timor.\(^8\) Despite negotiation and mediation efforts, killings, torture, burning of homes continued – causing people to flee. Despite these attacks, Independence leader Xanana Gusmao told militia gang Muladi he was still willing to talk with pro-Indonesian leaders.\(^9\)

The following are examples of Indonesia’s use of ‘sticks rather than carrots’ methodology. On 28 January 1999 Clementino Amaral, East Timorese head of the Dili delegation of Indonesia’s National Human Rights Commission, said "the [Indonesian] military are giving weapons to the civilians who support Indonesian rule, which means they can shoot supporters of independence who do not have guns".\(^10\) On 5 February 1999 Cancio Lopes, commander of militia gang Mahidi told the BBC that


\(^8\) Marsden Country Brief, East Timor (Timor-Leste).


\(^10\) Ibid.
he led an attack near Suai using automatic weapons supplied less than four weeks previously by the Indonesian army. Furthermore, when the violence erupted after the UN supervised referendum, Indonesian soldiers, despite clear commitments made under the 5 May agreements, refused to intervene. They even supposedly helped the militia gangs. When the violence became visible to the international community several countries called for a UN armed peacekeeping intervention.

![Indonesian officer coordinating with militia.](image)

4.2f Superpower Opposition or Support

SUPEROS = 1 = The US took a direct interest in the resolution of the internal conflict and supported multilateral intervention. On 8 September 1999 the US promised some non-combat military participation. The public message to Indonesia became clear when Clinton gave a press conference on 9 September 1999, it must invite – “it must invite,” he repeated emphatically – the international community to assist in restoring security. US pressure was crucial in persuading Indonesia to accept a UN force.

4.2g Resistance Levels to Multilateral Intervention

INITIATE = 1 = Multilateral intervention was requested or consented to by the central government of the state in conflict, even though it was induced. Indonesia’s agreement to a multinational force was the critical precondition for effective action.

11 Ibid.
It was our judgement that, without an invitation from the Indonesian government for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force, it was unlikely that the approval of all members of the Security Council would have been obtained for the proposed arrangements.\textsuperscript{13}

Even in a case where national sovereignty did not apply, as the UN did not recognize Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over East Timor, the Security Council was solicitous of the need for Indonesia’s consent to intervention. Tactics were, however, employed by international actors such as the Secretary-General and President Clinton to induce Indonesia’s consent.\textsuperscript{14} Furthermore, without Indonesia’s consent the humanitarian tragedy may have been compounded many times over.

**Structural Benefits**

**4.2h Economic Wealth of the State**

ECWEALTH = 3 = East Timor has exceptionally scarce and valuable resources, including oil, gold, petroleum, natural gas, manganese, and marble.\textsuperscript{15} The Timor Sea is believed to contain the world’s 23\textsuperscript{rd} largest oil field with estimated reserves of five billion barrels of oil and 50 trillion feet of liquid natural gas.\textsuperscript{16}

**Structural Connectivity**

**4.2i Economic Importance of the State in Conflict**

ECIMPORT = 1 = East Timor has no economic importance as yet on the international stage, but it has potential.

The World Bank referred to the situation in East Timor as “of paramount concern to our shareholders,”\textsuperscript{17} while in the months following the intervention, critics

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} United States CIA, \url{http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/feedback/print/tt.html}.
\textsuperscript{17} World Bank Statement on East Timor, Washington, 7 September 1999 cited in Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 155.
were to argue that the reconstruction of East Timor was providing an opportunity for massive foreign direct investment in the areas of telecommunication, banking, tourism, construction and legal services. George Aditjondro sees East Timor under UN and World Bank management as becoming “a paradise for market-driven foreign investors…a new outpost of global capitalism in the Asia Pacific region, due to the absence of a democratically elected government.”

Structural Level of Outrage

4.2j Media Coverage

MEDIA = evidence = yes

Tamrat Samuel argues that the role of the media in 1999 cannot be underestimated. After two and a half decades of almost complete neglect, the world media focused on East Timor, especially during the fateful months of August and September 1999, at a time when there happened to be no other major world event competing for attention. Some incidents, such as the Santa Cruz massacre of 1991, the jailing of Gusmao in 1992, and the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize being awarded to the East Timorese independence leaders Jose Ramos Horta and Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo, created a lot of attention from the international media. In particular, after the Santa Cruz massacre, when Western journalists caught on camera Indonesian forces firing on unarmed pro-democracy supporters, media coverage was extraordinarily intense, with East Timor in the headlines and leading news bulletins for days, with images of Dili burning on television screens, and news articles of women and children seeking protection from likely slaughter.

One explanation of the lack of multilateral intervention prior to this period was the lack of critical media analysis of the root causes or consequences of the crisis in

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18 George Aditjondro, ‘From Colony to Global Prize’ Arena Magazine, 47, 2000, 22-32.
East Timor. Coverage of the conflict in East Timor was one sided. For example, a journalist writing in the *New York Times* states:

> Though the anti-independence militias have clearly had the upper hand in terror, the pro-independence forces, with 24 years of experience in both war and propaganda, have seized the role of well-intentioned victims.

John Pilger, writing in the *Guardian*, 7 September, 1999:

> For almost 20 years, the BBC and the major western news agencies preferred to "cover" East Timor from Jakarta, which was like reporting on a Nazi-occupied country from Berlin. The coverage was minute; not offending the invader…became all-important.

### 4.2k Nature of International Environment

INTENVIRO = evidence = The timing of the international response to the conflict in East Timor was influenced by the international context. Multilateral actors had been repeatedly reminded of the shame heaped upon the UN for inaction at the occurrence of massacres in Rwanda and at Srebrenica. This has influenced the UN to be more willing to advocate intervention in East Timor. Previously, non-intervention in the affairs of Indonesia had been attractive in the Cold War climate. Recently released documentation reveals that the government of Indonesia had received support from the US and Australia for its East Timor policy in the 1970s and 1980s, as FRETILIN was perceived as a communist threat.

### Perceptual Costs, Risks, and Benefits

### 4.2L Reputational Interests

REPUT = evidence = In respect of ASEAN, its critics argue that it had little choice in their willingness to support the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in East Timor. Its reputation was on the line given its inability to respond effectively to the Southeast

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Asian economic crisis, or to ameliorate the anti-democratic behaviour in Burma. The strength of international reaction to the bloodshed in East Timor was so overwhelmingly negative towards Indonesia that failure to respond to Jakarta’s request for ASEAN assistance would have been a setback for ASEAN that might well have proved fatal for the organization. As already explained the UN was also in danger – after the massacres in Rwanda and Bosnia, many Member States had became critical of the UN’s ability to stand by its mandate of maintaining international peace and security.

4.2m Likelihood of Success

LIKESUCCESS = 2 = It is difficult to determine whether there was a perception that a successful intervention in the East Timor conflict was likely among multilateral actors. There was no stalemate evident. Furthermore, an agreement between the two main disputants, the Indonesian government and the East Timorese pro-independence groups, was lacking. However, the civilians in East Timor were desperate for peace due to the fact that they were the main casualties of the conflict. The Tripartite agreement between the Indonesian Government, Portugal and the UN on the future of East Timor also constituted a base for any multilateral intervention policy.

4.2n Any Clear Exit Points or Strategies

CLEAR = yes = A key element that contributed in making a multilateral intervention policy attractive was the clear statement of an exit strategy for the multinational force. In considering participating in the proposed force, the Australian Government was determined that the action should have a clearly defined end-point when a certain amount of social and political stability was in place.

Perceptual Connectivity

28 Dupont, 2000, 168.
4.2o Humanitarian Concerns in terms of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

UPMCRISIS = Refugees = over 1,300-1,500 to Northern Australia,\textsuperscript{30} with between 100,000 to over 300,000 refugees in West Papua.\textsuperscript{31}

= Internally Displaced Persons = since November 1998 to March 31 1999, there have been a total of 18,091 internally displaced persons (IDP's).\textsuperscript{32} Some 500,000 individuals were internally displaced between May 6 and October 20, 1999.\textsuperscript{33}

= 1 = Total estimates of the displaced range from over 600,000 to 700,000 = a Humanitarian Crisis.\textsuperscript{34}

Groups of IDPs became a target for militia groups, as clearly demonstrated in the attacks of the Liquiça Church on April 6, and at the home of Manuel Carrascalao on April 17. Before the Security Council met on 11 September 1999, members had been in East Timor, viewing the destruction of Dili and IDP camps. Nothing could conceal the extent of destruction, or the misery of people waiting at the port before being taken to West Timor.\textsuperscript{35}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{31} Shah, 2000.
\textsuperscript{33} TPI-Intrastate Disputes Data Sets, (51) Indonesia.
\textsuperscript{34} Shah.
\textsuperscript{35} Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 157.
\end{flushright}
The scene of the massacre in the church and home of Father Rafael, in the town of Liquisa.  

4.2p Genocide/Politicide

DEATHMAG = 10 = as many as 250,000 East Timorese people died. There was no one significant event – rather there were many events that could portray genocide or politicide.

Leaked military documents reveal that Indonesian military numbers in East Timor were in the region of 20,000. This means that there was 1 soldier per 40 inhabitants in East Timor, a ratio that is 7 to 9 times higher than the ratio in Indonesia. Moreover, militia gangs were used as a backup force for military operations to combat any resistance to Indonesian military control. The Foundation for Legal and Human Rights in Dili said the issue of ’internal conflict’ was nothing more than an artificial design to support actions of violence, terror and intimidation. On 10 September 1999, the UN Secretary-General declared that Indonesia “cannot escape responsibility for what could amount, according to reports reaching us, to crimes against humanity.”

39 Ibid. For more examples of the Indonesian government’s control of militias groups see Samuel, chapter 8 in Lekha Sriram and Wermester, 2003, 214.
41 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Statement on East Timor, New York, 10 September 1999 cited in Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 156.
The following accounts detail the genocidal actions taken by the Indonesian military and the militia gangs. On 6 April 1998 Besi Merah Putih (BMP) militia, Indonesian armed forces and police surrounded the Liquiça church where 2000 people were seeking refuge. The police shot tear gas into the church and gunshots into the air. The people, sprayed by the tear gas, ran outside of the church. BMP massacred the people with arrows and spears. An eyewitness said "they shot and hacked at people as though they were killing animals. Even when people were raising their arms to surrender, they were still shot and hacked". 62 people were slaughtered. An Indonesian army spokesman gave his version of the Liquiça massacre: "five separatists were killed after opening fire at soldiers".42

On 17 April 1998 a pro-autonomy rally in Dili was attended by a number of militia groups, the military and military commander, police representatives, the Governor and pro-autonomy civilians. Militia leader Eurico Guterres urged his followers to "conduct a cleansing of all those who have betrayed integration. Capture and kill them, if you need to".43 Following the rally and fearing attacks by the militia, Manuel Carrascalao, a pro-independence leader who was housing 143 refugees, asked an Indonesian military commander for help to guard his home. The Indonesian military commander, Colonel Suratman, flatly refused. "The military must remain neutral," he said. Around 2pm a 100 militia stormed Manuel Carrascalao’s home. Up to 12 unarmed people were killed including Manuel’s 18 year old son.44

A particular episode of genocide happened on 30 August 1999 after the UN-sponsored referendum. After 78.5 percent of the registered electorate voted for a transition to independence, the Indonesian military and their pro-integration militia carried out a ‘scorched earth’ policy. Countless civilians were victims of murder, rape, and torture. The military forced people to flee, burning and looting civilian property. About 260,000 people, or 75 percent of the population, were abducted to West Timor, only a fraction of them militia or pro-autonomy supporters.45 During the following two weeks, Indonesian forces and militias destroyed 75 per cent of the

43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 See the HAK Foundation, and other UN reports in Da Costa, chapter 9.4, in Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 350.
buildings and almost the entire infrastructure in East Timor. The level of organization and efficiency of the violence was proof that the militias were not acting alone. Much effort was made during the post-referendum violence to draw FALINTIL into conflict with the militia and the TNI in order to portray the situation as a fulfilment of the repeated predictions that there would be a civil war if East Timor were to separate from Indonesia. Independence leader Xanana informed the UN that he had given strict orders to avoid contact with the other side, despite pressures on the ground to respond to the violence.\textsuperscript{46}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{image.jpg}
\caption{Fernando Cardoso (27) killed and mutilated by Mahidi death squad at Manutasi.\textsuperscript{47}}
\end{figure}

\textbf{Perceptual Level of Outrage}

\textbf{4.2q Level of Outrage}

LEVOUT = evidence = yes

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{47} University of the West England, 1999, \url{http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/Yimor/death_squads1.htm}. 

105
As the scale of post-referendum violence and the role of the Indonesian army became clear, those who had argued for an international peacekeeping presence in East Timor, particularly the citizens and government representatives in Portugal and Australia, redoubled their appeals. In the early days of September 1999, hundreds of thousands of Australians took to the streets, marching under banners proclaiming “Indonesia out, peacekeepers in,” calling for the introduction of an international peacekeeping force into East Timor. In Portugal, there were vigils and demonstrations throughout the country demanding action. The Prime Minister himself participated in a human chain that snaked around the Lisbon embassies of the 5 Permanent M of the Security Council. In the US, the NGO lobby on East Timor worked with its friends in Congress to press the Administration towards multilateral intervention. In fact, in an open session of the Security Council in New York in 1999, no less than 50 delegations took the floor – a highly unusual total, including some who rarely spoke as non-members. Overall, the session was a powerful demonstration of international outrage and Indonesia’s growing isolation. The following graph summarizes the affects of the individual conditions identified in the framework on the attractiveness of multilateral intervention in the case of conflict in East Timor.

48 Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 152.
50 Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 154.
51 Ibid., 155-6.
52 Ibid., 157.
**Figure 7: Summary of Conflict and Multilateral Intervention in East Timor - Measurements and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural and Perceptual Conditions</th>
<th>Measurement/Evidence of Conditions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISPS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The type of incompatibility between the disputants was over the territory of East Timor and independence from Indonesian annexation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Ranging from tens of thousands acknowledged by Indonesia itself, to as many as 250,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRBEGIN</td>
<td></td>
<td>30 November, 1975 when Indonesia invaded East Timor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YREND</td>
<td>Total duration: 24 years</td>
<td>October 1999 when the UN takes over administration and defence of East Timor as a non-self-governing territory - UNTAET.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Intervention was initiated and undertaken during an escalation phase, when the violence in East Timor was extremely intense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILCAP</td>
<td>About 20,000 personnel</td>
<td>INTERFET: 10,000 peacekeeping troops from 16 countries. UNTAET: 8,000 peacekeeping troops and 1,640 civilian police personnel from 48 countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOCAP</td>
<td>AUSS$476.8 million</td>
<td>UNTAET: 1 July 2001-30 July 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFIGHT</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>FRETILIN and Indonesia (and 20 odd Militia Gangs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACSTRA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>There were systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by just the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPEROS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>US took an interest in the prospect of intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENORG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The key disputants in this conflict were identifiable and well organized, but the many militia gangs and the Indonesian military have often been confused.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIATE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intervention was requested after inducement by the sovereign authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFAIL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Failure of state authority in a limited area of the country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country of its capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECWEALTH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oil, gold, petroleum, natural gases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPILL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Over 500,000 IDPs and Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECIMPORT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No economic importance of the state in conflict (East Timor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Media coverage was extremely intense after the televised Santa Cruz massacre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTENVIRO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Post Rwanda and Srebrenica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUT</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>In respect of ASEAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIKESUCCESS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>There was no stalemate evident and there was no agreement between the two main parties, the Indonesian government and the East Timorese pro-independence groups. But, the grassroots in East</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Timor were desperate for peace because they were the main casualties in the conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLEAR</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>There was the existence of a clear exit strategy for the multinational force.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REFCRISIS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>A humanitarian crisis: over 600,000-700,000 IDPs and Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEATHMAG</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>As many as 250,000 dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVOUT</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Medium to high level of outrage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3 Solomon Islands - Intervention

4.3a Introduction

In 1998 conflict in the Solomon Islands escalated very quickly due to existing ethnic tensions in this small state. It moved swiftly from the initial stages of violence to result in organized military activity and ultimately complete failure of the state. In July 2003, an international multilateral police and military force, led by Australia, was deployed to the Solomon Islands under Operation Helpem Fren. The deployment was the first stage of the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), a longer-term ‘cooperative intervention’ to address the crisis of development and governance. Since the 2003 intervention, many rebels have surrendered their arms and participated in efforts to uphold a cease-fire. In this section the framework is used to determine whether it has predictive value when it comes to the likelihood of intervention in an internal conflict.

4.3b Overview

The Solomon Islands comprise over 900 islands spread over 1.6 million square kilometres of ocean territory. The islands include numerous indigenous cultural groups, each with distinct languages and territories. The 500 Islands became the Solomon Islands under British colonial rule during the early 1900s, achieving full independence in 1978.

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56 There are currently sixty-eight living indigenous groups in the country, some with additional dialects. The consequence of this diversity is that languages are spoken by very small groups of people, often inhabiting very limited areas.
58 Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 582.
A rapid urbanization process followed, which focused on the capital Honiara. This was due to a lack of services and very limited opportunities in the villages.\textsuperscript{59} Honiara, based on Guadalcanal, became a magnet for migrants especially from the neighbouring island Malaita.\textsuperscript{60} Over two generations Malaitans came to dominate both Guadalcanal's agricultural economy and a large proportion of the jobs in Honiara, including the public service.\textsuperscript{61} The Indigenous people of Guadalcanal, especially the members of the younger generation, resented the acquisition of land by migrant Malaitans and their prominence in business.\textsuperscript{62} Anger at the consequent land loss was directed at the migrants who had brought, rented or were squatting on land they had hoped to own as theirs. In 1998 a group of Guadalcanal men, who later became known as the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), embarked on a campaign of violence against Malaitian settlers. By mid 1999 around 20,000 people, most of whom were Malaitans, were evicted from their homes on Guadalcanal.\textsuperscript{63} The violence escalated with confrontations between the IFM and the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force. In June 1999 the government declared a state of emergency.\textsuperscript{64}

In 2000 the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) emerged demanding compensation for the destruction caused by the IFM. Denied compensation by the government, the MEF, with the support of elements of the police, took over the police armory and staged a political coup in June 2000.\textsuperscript{65} They ousted Prime Minister Ulufa’alu and threatened a state of war unless a new national leader was installed.\textsuperscript{66} Manasseh Sogavare consequently became Prime Minister, but the IFM refused to recognize him as a legitimate authority. Subsequently, public services were disrupted, corruption in

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\textsuperscript{59} Much of this migration has been from central and northern Malaita to Honiara and its environs. This has resulted over the years in the growth of considerable peri-urban settlements, largely on customary land of the northern coast of Guadalcanal. Pollard and Wale, chapter 10.4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 582.

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{61} ASPI, \url{http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html}.


\textsuperscript{64} Dinnen, 2002, 285-298.

\textsuperscript{65} Kabutaulaka, March 2004.

government became the norm, the economy faltered, and systems of law and order collapsed. Despite repeated calls for multilateral intervention by the government, multilateral organizations refused to intervene. However, as Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka has argued, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, multilateral actors considered the possibility that the Solomon Islands could become a haven for international terrorist organizations, and multilateral intervention was considered a necessity. In 2003, under the authorization of the UN, RAMSI was deployed to the Solomon Islands.

**Structural Costs and Risks**

4.3c Dispute Issues

DISPS = 1, 2, 3 = Material and territorial issues, international power, and national power

An issue underpinning the Solomon Islands conflict included the issue of migration which lead to population pressures and uneven development. In particular, the influx of Malaitans fuelled land disputes and resentment at their comparative success. The values of the different islanders often clashed, and the people of Guadalcanal felt they were being culturally marginalized in their own land.

Another issue was the exhaustion of a large proportion of the country’s valuable natural resources, such as the large palm oil plantation of north-eastern Guadalcanal, without contributing to sustainable development. In particular, logging companies committed several forms of malpractice through which they deprived

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70 Patrick Smellie, ‘The Semiautomatic Solution: In the Solomon Islands, an intercultural conflict explodes as rebels place the Prime Minister under house arrest (South Pacific),’ *Time International* 155.24, June 19, 2000, 58.
71 Land in Guadalcanal is matrilineally inherited, while in Malaita it is inherited through the male (patrilineal). Intermarriage between Malaitan men and Guadalcanal women sometimes resulted in frictions due to the extent of the man’s dominance in his wife’s land affairs. See Pollard and Wale, chapter 10.4, Helijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 583.
72 See Ibid.
landowners and governments of the revenues that ought to have accrued to them.\textsuperscript{73} This resulted in relative deprivation in terms of the many investments on the island, most notably jobs and the provision of services.

Moreover, ethnic tensions in the Solomon Islands resulted from different interpretations placed on the National Constitution and on Section 14, which granted freedom of movement. From the viewpoint of the people of Guadalcanal, their real grievance was the imposition on them of another island’s traditions, customs and laws by migrants.\textsuperscript{74} Since becoming one country Solomon Islanders failed to accept each other as one people, and there was no acknowledgement of citizenship. The widely expressed wish for the provinces to be given state governments illustrated the depth of separatist feelings.\textsuperscript{75}

The central problem became the issue of government control as it hardly had an income to exist, or manage the conflict.\textsuperscript{76} Fundamentally, the crisis which evolved was attributable to the failure of successive governments to provide effective mechanisms through which people were able to express their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and sort out their differences.\textsuperscript{77}

4.3d Fatalities

FATAL = 1 = Solomon Islanders use the term ‘the tensions,’ as an understatement for three years of neighbours killing neighbours, and hidden graves that could number in the tens, hundreds or thousands.\textsuperscript{78} No one seems to know for sure just how many people were killed during the Solomon Islands conflict but estimates vary between 100 and 1,000,\textsuperscript{79} this converts to a crisis.

\textsuperscript{73} Liloqula and Aruhe’eta Polland, 2000.  
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{76} Michael Fields, ‘Solomons: an invitation to disaster,’ The Press, Christchurch, Saturday, June 28, 2003, World, B5.  
\textsuperscript{77} Liloqula and Aruhe’eta Polland, 2000.  
4.3e Phase

PHASE = between 5 and 6 = between de-escalation and the termination phase.

Multilateral intervention took place in the post-crisis phase. After signing the Townsville Peace Agreement, the Solomon Islands remained in a state of ‘latent peace’ – a situation where the potential for violence remained. According to Nick Warner, Special Coordinator of RAMSI, the timing for multilateral intervention was right due to the overwhelming political and, crucially, public support in the Solomon Islands. Had a multilateral intervention force been mobilised in 2000 at the time of the coup, and in the middle of ethnic tensions, he did not believe that it would have enjoyed public support. RAMSI would have risked being accused of taking sides and the deployment of forces would not have solved the land dispute. Multilateral intervention risked becoming open-ended, and diplomatic pressure was thought at that time to be more effective.

4.3f Economic Capabilities

ECOCAP = Phase 1 = short-term one-year program of stabilisation = $97m

= Phase 2 = long-term program of capability development = $78m per annum for first two years

= $75m per annum thereafter

The multilateral intervention effort will cost a total of $853 million over a decade. Australia will end up paying half the costs as the Australian government

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announced a long term commitment of military and economic capabilities for ten years.  

4.3g Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants

TACSTRA = 2 = There were some attempts at positive uses of conflict resolution by both disputants but the government and other disputants also resorted to the use or threat of force or other negative modes of conflict resolution.

The underlying feelings of injustice that fuelled the internal conflict in the Solomon Islands were not successfully addressed by the disputants. The existing avenues such as political forums for resolving the conflict were ineffective and the economic circumstances continued to perpetrate feelings of injustice. The evolving political culture was one of different factions consumed by their desires to gain and/or retain power or any other personal benefits, creating an unstable climate that made it impossible to develop or implement any long term positive conflict management policies. Proactive leadership was also lacking.

The 2000 coup led by MEF intensified conflict and effectively cut off access to more diplomatic channels of dispute resolution. General lawlessness and thuggery throughout Guadalcanal and parts of Malaita paralyzed the government, the economy, and even traditional relations in central regions. Alternatives for addressing injustices within traditional society were not effectively used. Rather, under Prime Minister’s Sogavare’s peacemaking efforts, $10 million (Solomon Islands dollars) were paid out as compensation to militant representatives from MEF and IFM for a range of grievances and for their participation in peacemaking efforts. Not surprisingly Sogovare’s “cheque book approach to peace negotiations” contributed to the disorder, providing a source of blackmail for the disputants.

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85 Ibid., 586.
The various peace talks, declarations of cease-fires, and reconciliation ceremonies undertaken by the disputants failed to alleviate ethnic tensions, resulting in demands for further compensation instead. There were attempts by Fiji (1999) and the Commonwealth Special Envoy (2000) to mediate a resolution to the conflict. In fact several peace agreements were signed. In October 1999 a peace-monitoring group by Fiji and Vanuatu was established, while in October 2000, the Townsville Agreement led to the creation of an international peace monitoring team and establishment of a Peace and Reconciliation Commission. However, both disputants resorted to increased militancy throughout 2000. Although a weapons disposal process began after June 9, 2000, international peace-monitoring teams withdrew due to the deterioration of security.

The disputants’ modes of conflict resolution appear to have provided reason behind non-intervention during the earlier phases of conflict. While Eagles front-man Andrew Nori (7 June 2000) and the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands (early 2000) called for an international peacekeeping force, New Zealand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Phil Goff said New Zealand would send in troops only if it was convinced that both groups of disputants were willing to negotiate and stop the violence. “We cannot impose a solution. If it is imposed, it won't be a solution. Until there is a willingness to make peace, there is no point sending in people who are the meat in the sandwich.”

4.3h Resistance Levels to Intervention

INITIATE = 1 = This was intervention by invitation. The Australian Associated Press said the vote “was unanimous in the Solomon Islands parliament, despite some criticism that the plan was an attempt to re-colonize the former British protectorate.”

There was no doubt that it was widely supported by its people, who viewed it as an

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effective action for reducing the influence of the militias.\textsuperscript{91} Those with arms realized that it was inevitable and extorted as much money from the government as they could before the multilateral intervention forces arrived.\textsuperscript{92}

### 4.3i Status of Government

MAGFAIL = 5 = complete collapse of state control or near failure of state authority.

The Solomon Islands had virtually ceased to function as an effective national entity. The crisis had paralyzed the country's capital, Honiara, stifled its economy (the government's revenue base disintegrated as the economy stagnated—falling by 35\% in 2001),\textsuperscript{93} disrupted government, discouraged aid donors, inflicted suffering and hardship on its people and hindered the peace process. The State was unable to ensure societal compliance with official laws, preserve stability, encourage societal participation in state institutions, or even provide basic services.\textsuperscript{94} It was widely, and largely correctly, seen as being subordinate to the interests of the Malaitan gangs.\textsuperscript{95} Key members of the government even depended on former militants for their political and economic survival, while large sums were disbursed to political leaders, former militant leaders and their associates. It was this situation that led John Roughan, a prominent Solomon Islands citizen, to say that the “Solomon Islands is the Pacific’s first failed state.”\textsuperscript{96} The current Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, told the Federal Parliament:

> If we do nothing now and the Solomon Islands becomes a failed state…potential exploitation of that situation by international drug dealers, money launderers, international terrorism…will make the inevitable dealing with the problem in the future more costly, more difficult.\textsuperscript{97}

\textsuperscript{91} Oxfam Community Aid Abroad, 2003. See also Pollard and Wale, chapter 10.4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 587.
\textsuperscript{92} Tara Kabutaulaka, 2004, 393-401, \url{http://www.pidp.eastwestcenter.org/pireport/2004/November/tcp-si.htm}.
\textsuperscript{93} ASPI, \url{http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html}.
\textsuperscript{94} Tara Kabutaulaka, March 2004.
\textsuperscript{95} ASPI, \url{http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html}.
This draws attention to failed states not just as a humanitarian problem, but also as a major security concern.

**Structural Level of Outrage**

**4.3j Nature of International Environment**

INTENVIRO = The nature of the international environment greatly affected the decision to intervene multilaterally in the Solomon Islands. This is especially relevant in terms of the Member State that substantially subsidized multilateral intervention, Australia.

The June 2003 decision reflects a fundamental change in global security policies following the 11 September 2001 attacks on US territory. It illustrates the perception that trans-national terrorism has made it less possible to separate external and internal security. Global security issues and the ‘coalition of the willing’ ‘war on terror’ influenced the approach employed by RAMSI, especially its focus on strengthening a ‘failed’ state to prevent terrorists from manipulating it and threatening neighbouring states.98 It would have been tidier and cheaper to have intervened earlier.99 Consequently, it was not only on the basis of the invitation of the Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands that the multilateral intervention was undertaken. In 2003 multilateral actors perceived their collective security interests to be directly under threat by a failed Solomon Islands state post Bali-bombing (12 October 2002) and post 11 September 2001. The cost of multilateral intervention in the Solomon Islands was perceived to be significantly less than the costs of potential terrorist attacks on Pacific neighbours. A failed Solomon Islands was a threat to other Melanesian and Pacific States as these were perceived as easy targets for terrorist cells.100 The appointment of Mr. Nick Warner, the newly appointed ambassador for

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counter-terrorism, as leader of RAMSI, reflects the way this deployment has been framed within the so-called ‘war on terror.’

Perceptual Costs, Risks, and Benefits

4.3k Likelihood of Success

LIKESUCCESS = 1 = There was a perception that there was a high probability of success in respect of the multilateral intervention. The civil society in the Solomon Islands had resolved to ‘take on’ government and militia on issues of justice and accountability, the fighting officially ended with the Townsville Peace Agreement of October 2000, and by mid 2003 the conflict had reached an intolerable ‘mutually hurting stalemate’, with citizens on all sides having come to the view that their country was on the verge of collapse. The conflict was "ripe" for an intervention supported by the general population.

4.3L Any Clear Exit Points

CLEAR = evidence = Clear exit points were considered in the decision to intervene in the Solomon Islands. Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, interviewed on National Radio (16 July 2003), said there was an exit strategy. Mr Downer declared that military forces to be deployed in the Solomon Islands could be quickly reduced after the operation got underway. Mr Downer continued, "The police will be there for quite some time but once the Solomons police are up and running more effectively, and are able to do the job, then we can be downsizing the police presence".

Perceptual Connectivity

4.3m IDP/Refugee Crisis

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IDPs = 12,806 within Guadalcanal, 12,676 to Malaita, 6,339 to Honiara.  

= Refugees = A few refugee families of mixed parentage did go to Australia.  

= 4 = Total = According to the Norwegian Refugee Council/ Global IDP Project in May 2002, an estimated 35,000 persons (9 per cent of the national population) were forced from their homes during the 1998-1999 conflict.

By 2000, rural Guadalcanal had been essentially cleared of all migrants. The cost was the closure of all industries, the closure of almost every school, and deprivation of access to medical facilities for most Guadalcanal people. Thousands of Malaitans were forced to return to a ‘home’ they had never known. This in turn led to many internal problems and tensions in Malaita.

4.3n Genocide/Politicide

DEATHMAG = 1-2 = less than 300 annually or between 300-1000 at the most annually. There were no specific events of genocide or politicide. Yet according to Graham Fortune, New Zealand’s Secretary of Defence, “At the height of the crisis in the Solomon Islands, the rate of ethnic cleansing through dislocations on the island of Guadalcanal was proportionally higher to that seen in the Balkans”. Whether this case was state terror or ethnic cleansing is difficult to determine.

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106 Fortune, 2005.
108 Pollard and Wale, chapter 10,4, Heijmans, Simmonds, and van de Veen, 2004, 584.
Figure 8: Summary of Conflict and Multilateral Intervention in the Solomons - Measurements and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural and Perceptual Conditions</th>
<th>Measurement/ Evidence of Conditions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISPS</td>
<td>1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>Material and territorial issues, international power, and national power.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATAL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100-1,000 dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YREND</td>
<td>2003 (July 2003: intervention)</td>
<td>Total duration = 5yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>Intervention took place between de-escalation and termination phases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILCAP</td>
<td>2,000 military and police personnel</td>
<td>The intervention mission involved over 2,000 military and police personnel from Australia, New Zealand and five Pacific Island nations. Regional contributions included more than 470 police and troops from New Zealand, PNG, Tonga and Fiji. Both IFM and MEF had access to weapons, and recruitment was not a problem that contributed to their ability to pursue a strategy of conflict.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOCAP</td>
<td>AUSS$853 million</td>
<td>Over a decade.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFIGHT</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7 or more disputants. Yet two disputants remained dominant to every process, the IFM and MEF. IFM had strong links to the police force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACSTRA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Various peace talks, coup, general lawlessness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPEROS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>A Superpower remained neutral and inactive to the conflict resolution process and intervention decision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENORG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Limited organization and identifiability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIATE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intervention was by invitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFAIL</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Complete collapse of state control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECWEALTH</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Solomon Islands are rich in underdeveloped mineral resources such as lead, zinc, nickel, and gold, all which could be of potential benefit to the interveners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPILL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35,000 (9 percent of population)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECIMPORT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The state in conflict was not highly integrated in the international market, did not have a strong and important trading partner, or membership in important trading agreements. The economy had collapsed with the internal conflict. GDP fell by 14% in 2000 and 10% in 2001. Exports had fallen 60% between 1996 and 2001. GDP per capita halved in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
real terms since independence in 1978. By mid 2003 the country’s debt was registered at A$352 million, more than three times the country’s annual budget.

| MEDIA | Limited | Coverage of the conflict in the regional and international media was sporadic and did not generate any of the domestic political resonance that coverage of the violence in East Timor did in 1999. Three incidents raised the profile of the conflict, including: the August 2002 killing of a Government Minister allegedly by militant Harold Keke; the February 2003 murder of Sir Fred Soaki, formerly the first locally appointed Police Commissioner; and the May 2003 beheading of Australian Seventh Day Adventist missionary Lance Gersbach. |
| INTENVIRO | Yes | Post September 11th attacks and post-Bali = reaction |
| REPUT | Limited | The possibility of gaining negative reputations did not hinder intervention. Both the Australian Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer rejected any accusations that the policy towards the Solomon Islands crisis represents a form of neo-colonialism |
| LIKESUCCESS | 1 | The conflict was ‘ripe’ for an intervention |
| CLEAR | Yes | Possibility of quick reduction of substantial military and police numbers |
| REFCRISIS | 1 | Less than 50,000 refugees and IDPs. Consequently it is not termed a humanitarian crisis. |
| DEATHMAG | 1-2 | Less than 300 deaths annually – between 300-1000 over the course of the conflict |
| LEVOUT | Limited | There is not wide evidence of a large level of regional and international outrage in terms of the Solomon Islands conflict. But a survey published by *The Australian* newspaper in early August 2003 found that 87 percent of Australians supported the intervention in the Solomon Islands. This suggests that audience cost may have been considered when intervention was made an option |
4.4 The Philippines – Non-Intervention

4.4a Introduction

In this section the framework is used to determine whether it effectively captures the conditions that make multilateral non-action (non-intervention) an attractive policy. In the Philippines, a predominantly Christian country, conflict is concentrated in the southern Mindanao-Sulu region where a predominantly Muslim population has campaigned for a separate Muslim homeland for four decades.\(^{112}\) The disputants have demonstrated that they view settlement as more costly than violence. Consequently, this conflict can be described as an active intractable conflict, with violence being a sporadic but permanent feature of conflict since late 1969. This conflict meets the criteria of an internal conflict that has yet to be intervened in by a multilateral organization.

4.4b Overview

In the provinces of the Sulu archipelago and Mindanao, Spanish control (1565–1898) came late. Muslim state formation resisted alien rule, Muslim sultanates only becoming fully incorporated into the Philippines under the aegis of American colonialism (1898–1946). The Moros had hoped for an autonomous region when the Philippines were granted independence from the US at the end of World War Two. Instead, their incorporation with the Philippines, together with the government’s policies of repression and integration fuelled insurrection in the Mindanao-Sulu region. Mass migration, accelerating through the 1950s and 1960s, from the Christian North to the Mindanao frontier fundamentally altered the demographic balance in the South, leaving Muslim majorities in only five of the region’s twenty-five provinces. Tensions between the Christian settlers and the Muslim farmers coincided with a revival of Islamic consciousness beginning in the 1950s.\(^{113}\) These events gave rise to a transcendent, multi-tribal ‘Moro’ identity.

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\(^{112}\) Heijmans, Simmond and van de Veen, 2004, 13-14.

The event that catalysed the establishment of the Moro nationalist movement was the Jabida massacre in 1968 when a number of Muslims were shot for refusing to undertake a military mission.\textsuperscript{114} No one was charged for the deaths, resulting in widespread resentment from the Moro community. This resentment led to organized demonstrations and militia skirmishes. Catholic elites responded by launching an anti-Moro movement which culminated in the June 19, 1971 massacre of some 70 Muslims in a mosque. This led to the formation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) under the leadership of Nur Misuari,\textsuperscript{115} with the goal of the ‘liberation of the Moro homeland’. President Ferdinand Marcos cited this disorder in imposing martial law on the country in September 1972. By early 1973, the armed forces were locked in full-scale civil war with the secessionist MNLF.\textsuperscript{116}

Realising the necessity to manage this rebellion, Marcos initiated a peace process which culminated in the signing of the Tripoli Agreement in December 1976. This agreement provided for “the establishment of autonomy in the Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.”\textsuperscript{117} However, Marcos failed to fulfil his end of the agreement and fighting resumed in 1977. Soon after this, second in command, Hashim Salamat broke away from MNLF forming the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).\textsuperscript{118} Another

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\textsuperscript{115} Islam in Ganguly and Macduff, 2003.


split occurred when an extremist party – the Abu Sayyaf group – led by Abdul Razzak Jan Jalani emerged.\footnote{Islam in Ganguly and Macduff, 2003.}


**Structural Costs and Risks**

**4.4c Dispute Issues**

DISPS = 1, 2, 3 = There are numerous dispute issues. The primary issue concerns the right to religious and territorial self-determination.

The roots of the conflict have been the clash of interests in land and other natural resources; inequalities and unmet needs based on Moro identity; and the identity issues emerging from the de facto second-class status of much of the Moro population.\footnote{Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global IDP Database, 2005. See also Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, 1999.} Territory, or a separate Islamic state, for the Moros in the southern Filipino region of Mindanao - consisting of the Mindanao, Sulu, Basilan, and Palewan

\footnote{Islam in Ganguly and Macduff, 2003.}
islands, appears to be the single most important issue in the peace negotiations. Of particular concern has been the high level of migration into Mindanao by Filipino Catholics that has resulted in a significant reduction in the number of localities in which Muslims once comprised a majority. During the first decade of the last century, settlers in Mindanao were very successful in growing crops like rice, corn, and coconuts, on productive agricultural lands. Today due to land scarcity and the monopoly of prime land in the hands of big agribusiness, not only the Moro but Christian and Lumad (non-Christian indigenous groups) farmers have become impoverished.

Furthermore, a number of writers cite deep religious animosities and ethnic prejudices between Christian-dominated central government and the minoritized Muslim groups as one of the triggers of the internal conflict. Members of the Muslim population have sought to end what they perceive as systematic government discrimination or “crimes against Muslims”, particularly in claims of Christian confiscation of Muslim land in southern Mindanao, and the disparity of wealth, services, schooling, and representation between Christians and Muslims. The Moro communities have also faced cultural insecurity due to multiple attempts at forced integration. Government policies have repeatedly denied recognition of their values, belief and traditions based on their identity.

4.4d Fatalities

127 See, for example, the works of B.R. Rodil, Samuel K. Tan, and Macapado A. Muslim cited in the Resources section of B.R Rodil, The Minoritization of the Indigenous Communities of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago, Davao City, Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, 1994, 51.
FATAL = 4 = more than 10,000 fatalities, this converts to war. Conflict in the Mindanao-Sulu region of Southern Philippines has reportedly claimed between 65,000 to 120,000 lives since the violence began in the early 1970s. The Philippine Government alone has estimated 100,000 casualties.

4.4e Military Capabilities

MILCAP = Philippines = 9 = undetermined
   = MNLF = 30,000 armed members
   = MILF = 15,000 members, 12,000 of them armed
   = Abu Sayyaf = more than a thousand guerrillas with 2-5,000 members

There has been no shortage of weapons supply for the Filipino armed forces or the armed Moro disputants. MNLF has sourced weapons from Libya and through a Malaysian political leader from Sabah, and has a substantial army of around 30,000 fighters. MILF now numbers around 15,000 members, consisting of more than 12,000 armed fighters, trained in Afghanistan from the Al-Qaeda network, in 13 major camps and 33 satellite enclaves. The Philippine military has estimated Abu Sayyaf partisans at more than a thousand guerrillas with 2-5,000 members. The supply of guns, military training and ready recruits has enabled the disputants to sustain their military campaign and has provided confidence for each disputant in their ability to achieve their aims through conflict.

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130 Rodil, 1994, 51.
4.4f Number of Disputants

MAGFIGHT = 3 = 4 main disputants

Names of the parties:

**Party A:** Government of the Philippines; Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); Philippine National Police (PNP), civilian militia units;

**Party B:** Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF);

**Party C:** The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF);

**Party D:** Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG);

Other participating disputants:

**Party E:** The MNLF-RG (Reformist Group);

**Party F:** ‘Christian defenders groups’ which are sponsored by Manila, the most notorious being the Illaga Movement.\(^{135}\)

Founded in 1969 MNLF has remained the largest group, and is recognized as such by the Philippine government.\(^{136}\) It has accepted talks on autonomy within the Philippine state. MILF, founded in 1984, emphasises Islam to a greater degree than MNLF. MILF is supported by many Muslim religious leaders as well as containing its own powerful military wing, the Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BMIAF).\(^{137}\)

Founded in the mid 1980s, ASG aims to propagate Islam through jihad, purposefully attacking the Christian population.\(^{138}\) ASG has splintered into different factions, and its activities are driven more by banditry and kidnapping than political struggle. For example, it has issued no definitive policy statements. Successive governments have refused to negotiate with this group, asserting that it is a terrorist organization.\(^{139}\)

4.4g Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants

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\(^{136}\) Ibid., 13-14.


\(^{139}\) CIDCM, Minorities at Risk Data.
TACSTRA = 2 = There have been some attempts at positive uses of conflict resolution by both disputants but the government and opposition occasionally return to the use or threat of force to pursue their aims.

Since 1972 secessionist disputants have confronted the government forces with a strong and organized armed resistance resulting in full-scale-war in Mindanao, while the government’s approach to the conflict has been one of ‘carrot and stick’, in which the stick — instruments of violence — has received more emphasis. The Philippine government has generally mobilized troops or withdrawn from the peace process to counter, or in retaliation of, disputant’s attacks or bombings. State repression of the Moros to ‘neutralize their resistance’ has included the destruction of property, arrests, saturation police/military presence, intimidation, terror tactics, and the destruction of suspected rebel areas. This use of military might has only sustained and intensified the armed struggle.  

The carrot, designed to entice Moro mujahideen (fighters) and their sympathizers to return to the fold, has included amnesty, offers of government posts to their leaders, grandiose development programmes for Mindanao, and funds for livelihood projects. Santos notes that from 1996 to 2000, the government and MILF entered into a total of 39 agreements, joint communiqués, acknowledgments, and resolutions, 16 agreements on the implementation of the cease-fire pact (organization of committees, repositioning of government and MILF troops, return of evacuees, and safety and security guarantees), 13 on the framework of the talks, 6 on procedural matters, and 4 on recognition and verification of MILF camps. Yet throughout this period no resolution on the substantive issues was reached.

Immediately after assuming office, President Arroyo sent emissaries to MILF to resume talks, named Mindanawons to her newly formed cabinet, and appointed an all-Mindanawon peace panel to negotiate with MILF. From November 2000 to February 2003, negotiations resulted in the forging of numerous agreements and

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140 For examples see Cagoco-Guiam, chapter 9.6.2 in Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 491.
141 Ibid., 488.
142 United States Institute for Peace, 2005.
143 Cagoco-Guiam, chapter 9.6.2 in Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 489-90.
guidelines, including the 2001 Tripoli Peace Agreement. The ceasefire agreed in July 2003 between the government and MILF has been holding relatively well in the past two years and the absence of any major clashes has allowed for the return of the vast majority of the estimated 400,000 people displaced in 2003. In October 2005, the Government agreed in principle to allow a Bangsamoro government to draft its own charter, impose its own tax system, form and maintain legal and financial institutions necessary for the development of an expanded, progressive Muslim Mindanao region. Time will tell whether this goes ahead or not.

4.4h Status of Government

MAGFAIL = 2 and 3 = Manila = Adverse regime change with no substantial weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public order.

= Mindanao-Sulu = Failure of state authority in a limited part of the country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country or its capital.

Since independence in 1946, the Philippine state has been relatively weak, plagued by insurgencies, economic mismanagement, and widespread corruption. The Philippines have experienced incidences of adverse regime change during the end of the Marcos era and in 2003 with a coup d’état. It has also struggled to deal with a secessionist conflict in the case of the Moros and a revolutionary war in the case of the communist movement. Furthermore, a few dozen powerful families continue to play an overarching role in politics and hold an outsized share of land and corporate wealth. The Philippines was ranked 102 out of 146 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2004 Corruption Perceptions Index. Fiscal difficulties

144 United States Institute for Peace, 2005.
have persisted and the country’s balance of payments has eroded. The Filipino state has demonstrated weakness, inadequate legal institutions and inability to maintain law and order at critical points in the conflict, undermining the credibility of the government.

**Structural Benefits**

4.4i Economic Wealth of the State

ECWEALTH = 3 = Mindanao represents 48 per cent of gold production, 63 per cent nickel and 18 per cent charcoal in the country’s total reserves. The Philippines has the capacity to produce 8 barrels of oil and natural gas every day and as much as 500 to 600 barrels of crude oil every day. More than 60 per cent of these resources can be found in Mindanao. Mindanao is characterized by fertile soil suitable to cultivate a variety of crops and has a timberland of nearly 39 per cent of nation’s forest cover. These areas, especially those within the MILF camps have potentials for super profits.

**Structural Connectivity**

4.4j Economic Importance of the State in Conflict

ECIMPORT = 3 = The Philippines is an important regional and international economic player. Despite the country's recent political and economic difficulties, there remain opportunities for international businesses in a number of sectors, particularly in the development of infrastructure projects including power, transport, water, construction, oil and gas and environmental technology. It is a member of many international organizations including the UN, ASEAN, Asia Pacific Economic

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148 IDCM, Background to the Moro struggle in Mindanao,
http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wViewCountries/45EB949167E42875C125706F0054A23F.
149 United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Country Profile: Philippines,
Co-operation (APEC), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), International Monetary Fund (IMF), Non Aligned Movement (NAM), Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (Observer), World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), World Health Organisation (WHO), World Trade Organisation (WTO), and World Bank.¹⁵⁰

**Structural Level of Outrage**

#### 4.4k Nature of International Environment

INTENVIRO = Limited = It is extremely difficult to determine whether the international environment has, in the past five years, influenced multilateral policies of non-intervention in the case of conflict in the Philippines. What can be determined is that the government has, after the 11 September 2001 attacks on US territory, been incredibly willing to support any venture made by the ‘war against terror’. This has presented President Arroyo with an internationally legitimate reason to harden her policy towards Abu Sayyaf rebels and against MILF, who her administration suspects of harbouring Abu Sayyaf members. The ‘war on terror’ has extended to the Philippines with ASG’s high profile attacks on civilian targets. Consequently, the Muslim struggle for autonomy has been recast as part of the ‘war on terror’, politicizing international interest and overshadowing humanitarian concerns.¹⁵¹

**Perceptual Costs, Risks, and Benefits**

#### 4.4L Likelihood of Success

LIKESUCCESS = 1 = There is a possibility of multilateral actors perceiving any multilateral intervention policy in this case of conflict to have a medium to high probability for success.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.
There are existing peace agreements from which to work from if multilateral intervention should ever take place. The Tripoli Peace Agreement (July 2001) for instance sets a broad framework and guidelines on security and the conduct of negotiations on the substantive aspects of the conflict. Other agreements have established local cease-fire monitoring teams, affirmed the disputants observance of international humanitarian law, provided guidelines for the rehabilitation and development of areas affected by conflict, and stipulated guidelines for isolating criminal activity within MILF areas.

Civic groups, including religious leaders, the media, women and indigenous communities, among others, in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict, with their different agendas and styles, continue to act both individually and collectively in the struggle for peace. Their tactics include working to enlarge spaces for peace in communities, working quietly to establish ‘backdoor’ linkages with both the government and MILF, or holding conferences to craft a common peace agenda.

While the conflict has been labeled ‘intractable’, the conflict has matured to the point where the disputants see more advantages to ending it than to continuing the armed conflict. The major wars of 2000 and 2003 did not bring the disputants any tactical advantage and were costly in terms of human casualties and civilian dislocations. The stalemate between the Philippine government and insurgent disputants has created an environment conducive to a resolution. Yet Alexander Martin Remollino argues that, despite the climate of optimism surrounding the talks between the government and the MILF, there is no guarantee that third party talks will be successful. There are some formidable obstacles along the path to a settlement.

156 United States Institute for Peace, 2005.
157 Ibid.
In particular, since 1997, the peace process has been constantly derailed because of charges and countercharges of cease-fire violations.

**Perceptual Connectivity**

**4.4m Humanitarian Concern in terms of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons**

$\text{UPMCRISIS} = 2 = \text{more than 50,000 IDPs or refugees}$

Based on figures provided by the Philippines Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), a total of 1,824,435 people have been displaced by the armed conflict in the five last years (2000-June 2005).\textsuperscript{159} Other figures of IDPs vary from 200,000 to 500,000.\textsuperscript{160} Cycles of displacement and return, however, are constant, and the actual number of Filipinos displaced at any one time is estimated to be much higher. Almost all of the IDPs and refugees are Muslim.\textsuperscript{161} 85 percent of the victims stated that the perpetrators of the violence that led to displacement were either the army, the Philippine Constabulary or the Police.\textsuperscript{162} The government generally acknowledges its responsibility vis-à-vis IDPs, assisting them through the DSWD, the Office of Civil Defence, the National Red Cross and local authorities. However, the UN Secretary-General's Representative on Internal Displacement has noted that there are often gaps between positive intentions and statements made by the government on behalf of the evacuees and their practical implementation.\textsuperscript{163}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{159} IDMC, \url{http://www.internal-displacement.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf/(httpEnvelopes)/AFB5F697D6EA4A8D802570B8005AAF8A?OpenDocument}.
  \item \textsuperscript{161} Refugees International, \url{http://www.refintl.org/content/article/detail/914/}.
  \item \textsuperscript{162} Jems, chapter 6 in Clements, 1993, 168.
  \item \textsuperscript{163} CHR, 3 February 2003, 12 in IDMC, Global IDP Database, 23 September 2005. \url{http://www.internal-}.
\end{itemize}
Conditions in evacuation centers are generally described as inadequate, with insufficient food, poor medical facilities and sanitation, resulting in health risks for the most vulnerable.\textsuperscript{164}

4.4\textsuperscript{a} Genocide/Politicide

DEATHMAG = 9 = between 65,000 and 120,000 deaths. While there are plenty of theories about the actions of the Philippines Government and its repression tactics, there have been no serious allegations of genocide or politicide in this conflict. At least there have been no single incidents of concentrated mass murder. Rather, there have been attacks by both sides of disputants using varying violent tactics and strategies, leading to massive human rights abuses. The Philippines is a functioning democracy, with a flourishing civil society and lively media. It has acceded to all the core UN human rights treaties, and many of these rights are incorporated into domestic law. But the rule of law is not necessarily respected in the Philippines. Reports of arbitrary and unlawful arrest or detention in harsh prison conditions, disappearances, kidnappings, extrajudicial killings, and abuse of suspects and detainees continue. Members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) are regularly described by the official Commission on Human Rights as the country’s worst rights abusers.\textsuperscript{165} At the height of the ‘Moro insurgency’ in the mid 1970s, about 80 percent of the entire Philippine military force was deployed in Muslim-dominated areas in Mindanao.\textsuperscript{166}

\textsuperscript{164} Mindanews, 19 February/2 September 2005 and Notre Dame University & Commission on Population, January 2004, 34 in Ibid.

\textsuperscript{165} Freedom House, \url{http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2001/gdp.htm}.

\textsuperscript{166} Muslim and Cagoco-Guilam, ‘Mindanao,’ 16 in Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 488.
**Figure 9: Summary of Conflict and Multilateral Non-Intervention in the Philippines – Measurement and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural and Perceptual Conditions</th>
<th>Measurement/ Evidence of Conditions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISPS</td>
<td>1, 2 and 3</td>
<td>Primary issue: the right to religious and territorial self-determination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Between 65,000 and 120,000 since 1970s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YREND</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>Ongoing conflict. Four decades of conflict: deep rooted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>Between hostilities and termination or post-hostilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILCAP</td>
<td>Disputants: 47,000 members</td>
<td>The Military capabilities of the Philippines Government is largely undetermined, MNLF: 30,000 armed members; MILF: 15,000 members, 12,000 of them armed; Abu Sayyaf: more than a thousand guerrillas with 2-5,000 members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOCAP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>No basis for judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFIGHT</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3-4 main disputants with a number of unrecognized groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACSTRA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Some attempts at positive uses of conflict resolution by both parties but the government and opposition occasionally return to the use or threat of force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPEROS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>High likelihood that the Superpower would be opposed to any intervention decisions due to the Philippines' so-called 'special relations' with the US dating from colonial times. The US and Philippine militaries cooperated in 2002 and 2003 to engage in combat operations against Abu Sayyaf. US-Philippine 'special relations' were calibrated after Arroyo became the first Asian leader to openly support the American government policies on terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENORG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Some of the disputants are well organized and easily identifiable such as the Government, MNLF and MILF, yet ASG remains limited in its organization and identifiability. MNLF and MILF have established where their aims differ and where they agree.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIATE</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>There have been no concerted efforts by any of the disputants or civil society/grassroots communities to call for intervention or resist intervention by actors such as the Organization of Islamic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Countries (OIC).

| MAGFAIL | 2-3 | Manila: Adverse regime change with no substantial weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public order. Mindanao-Sulu: Failure of state authority in a limited part of the country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country or its capital. |
| ECWEALTH | 3 | Potential to be profitable |
| SPILL | 5 | 200,000-500,000 IDPs and Refugees |
| ECIMPORT | 3 | Highly integrated and important economically |
| MEDIA | Limited | In the early 1990s, increased international attention was directed towards Mindanao, as there were several incidents of high-profile kidnappings. However, there has yet to be any sustained regional and international attention on the conflict itself. |
| INTENVIRO | Limited | War on Terror has extended to the Philippines and ASG |
| REPUT | No | No evidence of reputational interest in decision to not intervene. |
| LIKESUCCESS | 1 | Strong civil society, stalemate and agreement |
| CLEAR | No | No evidence of any clear exit points. |
| REFCRISIS | 2 | 200,000 to 500,000: A Humanitarian Crisis |
| DEATHMAG | 9 | Between 65,000 and 120,000 |
| LEVOUT | Limited | Muslim Diaspora substantial |
4.5 West Papua – Non-Intervention

4.5a Introduction

While the conflict in East Timor succeeded in gaining multilateral intervention, the situation in West Papua has been largely ignored by multilateral actors since Indonesia occupied it in 1963 and annexed it in 1969. The absence of peace today stems from the denial of Papuan aspirations for self-governance. Conflict in West Papua has lasted for forty-years, resulting in estimated deaths between 30,000 and 10,000. To some extent, it is a conflict in the conventional sense in that there are clashes between armed separatists and government forces. But conflict in West Papua also exists in the structures of injustice that affect every aspect and every section of society. West Papuans have been under systematic political abuses and economic repression since occupation by Indonesia.

4.5b Overview

In the 1950s the Dutch government began the process to relinquish control of West Papua, promising independence. On 19 December 1961, with the aim of establishing its sovereign claim to all Dutch East Indies territories, first President of Indonesia, Sukarno, announced a military plan for the “return” of West Papua. The US stepped in to broker a settlement, seeking to keep Jakarta out of the Soviet axis during the Cold War period. Under this deal – the New York Agreement – West Papua was placed under interim UN administration in October 1962. The territory was transferred to Indonesian administration in May 1963 with the agreement that a UN-supervised referendum would allow the people of Papua to determine whether they would become part of Indonesia or form their own independent nation in 1969. This referendum was called the Act of Free Choice. To carry out the Act of Free

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172 Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 438.
173 Ibid.
174 known as the UN Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea (UNTEA).
175 Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 438-9.
Choice, Jakarta appointed a consultative council that could represent the West Papuan nation. Faced with intimidation by gunpoint and coercion, the handpicked council returned a unanimous result in favour of integration with Indonesia. Brutality and terror silenced those protesting the way Papuans were cheated of their right to self-determination.\textsuperscript{176} The majority of Papuans oppose Indonesian rule and view Indonesia’s annexation of Papua as illegitimate. In response, the Indonesian government has resorted to violence.

The situation in West Papua today is characterised by political intolerance for aspirations of independence. While state violence has been somewhat curbed by greater media freedom, vocal civil society organizations, and reforms for special autonomy, structural violence of indigenous communities is largely intact. Murder of the independence leader Theys Hiyo Eluay by the Indonesian Military illustrates that the brutality of the armed forces remains unchanged. Several factors suggest the likelihood of the continuation of this state of perpetual conflict. These include the ongoing repression of West Papuans by the Indonesian Military, West Papuans’ territorial concentration, their high degree of group cohesion and organization, the unstable regime of Indonesia over the past 5 years, and the continual exploitation of West Papua’s natural resources, while the area’s development is neglected.\textsuperscript{177}

Structural Costs and Risks

4.5c Fatalities

FATAL = 4 = more than 10,000 fatalities, this converts to war. Estimates of fatalities tend to be between 30,000 to at least 100,000 as a result of Indonesian occupation.\textsuperscript{178}

4.5d Military Capabilities

\textsuperscript{176} Ibid., 439.

\textsuperscript{177} MAR Project, Risk Assessment, \url{http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=85005}.

\textsuperscript{178} John Wing with Peter King, \textit{Genocide in West Papua? The Role of the Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment of the Papuan people}, a report for the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, and ELSHAM Jayapura, Papua. August 2005, 19. See also Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 439.
MILCAP = There are currently 15,000-20,000 Indonesian military and police personnel in West Papua.\(^{179}\)

= The Free Papua Movement (TPN/OPM) personnel, which openly promotes restoring independence from Indonesia, are estimated at 1,600,\(^{180}\) including a number of units pursuing non-violent means.\(^{181}\)

4.5e Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants

TACSTRA = 4 = There have generally been more systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by just the government than positive uses of conflict resolution instruments.

Previously insurgents staged relatively small-scale hit and run attacks on Indonesian military posts and, on a few occasions, took hostages to draw attention to their cause. However guerrilla fighters now pose a serious challenge for Indonesia.\(^{182}\) The government’s strategies have diversified, but in often taking a hard-line approach, none have succeeded in moderating the demands for independence or addressing the grievances of Papuan people.\(^{183}\) There are four dimensions of violence in this conflict: open armed conflict between armed disputants and the Indonesian military; state violence against ordinary citizens as a consequence of military operations and violent responses by the state to civilian resistance; structural violence through the systems of economic, political, social, and cultural injustice that marginalize ethnic Papuan communities and secure the dominance of Indonesian authority; and communal conflict between different religions, ethnic, and sub-ethnic groups.\(^{184}\)


\(^{181}\) Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 440.


\(^{183}\) Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 446.

\(^{184}\) Ibid., 440.
Since June 2000, the government has banned peaceful expressions of support for Papuan independence, security forces have moved aggressively against independence demonstrators, and key Papuan leaders and prominent civil society groups have been arrested or have been subjected to increased surveillance and harassment.\textsuperscript{185} While peaceful dialogue is frequently called for by Papuan groups, the TNI has shown no willingness to forgo security operations in order to achieve peace in the province. The government has even blocked attempts from Papuans to undertake a negotiated settlement or dialogue mediated by a third party.\textsuperscript{186}

At the same time, the government sought to tackle the problem with a massive welfare program and policies of ‘special autonomy’ (October 2001) intended to convince Papuans of the benefits of being part of the Indonesian state.\textsuperscript{187} According to the Chairman of the Dewan Adat Papua, Tom Beanal, ‘special autonomy’ has given nothing, and symbols of Papuan nationalism, such as the Morning Star flag and anthem (Hai Tanakuh Papua), which were promised in the Special Autonomy law of 2001, have been removed.\textsuperscript{188} Eighteen months after the implementation of ‘special autonomy’, only 10 percent of reforms have been implemented.\textsuperscript{189} The government’s proposal for an all-Papuan upper house of the local parliament has greatly diluted the powers envisaged for it in 2001.\textsuperscript{190} Additionally, new troop deployments of up to 15,000 are being planned for 2005-2009, mainly for the PNG border area, the highlands and large towns.\textsuperscript{191}

4.5f Resistance Levels to Intervention

INITIATE = 2, 3 = Multilateral intervention has been requested or consented to by the opposition group and the civil society/grassroots community, while there has been resistance by at least one of the disputants (in this case the Government).

\textsuperscript{186} Wing with King, 2005.
\textsuperscript{187} Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 447.
\textsuperscript{188} Interview, 5 February 2005 in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{189} See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 447.
\textsuperscript{190} Wing with King, 2005, 13.
\textsuperscript{191} Tiarma Siboro, ‘Army to station extra division in Papua,’ \textit{Jakarta Post}, 19 March 2005.
Several prominent actors in West Papua have repeatedly called for multilateral intervention. In late 2003 Resistance leader Yustunus Murib pleaded for international intervention in what he believed to be policies of ethnic cleansing. His appeal was broadcast on Australian television and sent to the UN. He was brutally executed in a Kopassus raid on 4 November 2003 that left eleven others dead.\(^{192}\) The next day, his corpse was displayed by Indonesian troops and a raid was launched against his followers, which left another ten dead.\(^{193}\) Petrus Tabuni, another OPM leader, also pleaded for international dialogue in 2003 in a televised address. His calls remain unanswered and the whereabouts of his clan of several hundred men, women and children are unknown.\(^{194}\)

Pleas for multilateral intervention had come as early as 1969. In May 1969 two members of the West Irianese Provincial Assembly, Clemens Runaweri and William Zongganau, crossed the border into Manus Island, the Australian administered territory of Papua and New Guinea, asking the authorities to help them get to the UN. The men carried documents proving Indonesian repression, important evidence which may have had a significant bearing on the Papuan case. Not only were they refused help to travel, they were prevented from leaving Manus Island. On a request from Adam Malik, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, the Australian, Dutch and US government conspired to deny travel documentation for their international movement between the period June-August 1969.\(^{195}\)

**Structural Benefits**

4.5g **Economic Wealth of the State**

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\(^{194}\) Ibid., 19.

ECWEALTH = 3 = West Papua is home to one of the world's biggest gold mines, and under its jungles lie oil, gas and minerals. In particular, West Papua is home to kwila timber.\textsuperscript{196}

**Perceptual Costs, Risks, and Benefits**

**4.5h Likelihood of Success**

LIKESUCCESS = 2 = There is no stalemate evident or substantial agreement from which to base a multilateral intervention policy on. Yet there is a strong civil society/grassroots element willing for peace in West Papua. At least 140 NGOs and numerous community-based organizations are operating in Papua, with 72 involved in peace-building. Today, a healthy variety of civil society strategies can be identified, including initiatives responding to state violence; patterns of engagement and confrontation with the government and security apparatus; and initiatives from the heights of international diplomacy to the grassroots of Papuan communities.\textsuperscript{197}

**Perceptual Connectivity**

**4.5i Humanitarian Concern in terms of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons**

UPMCRISIS = 1 = not a humanitarian crisis = there are varying estimates of IDPs and refugees but the minimum number recorded stands at 20,000 up.\textsuperscript{198}

- IDPs: 15,000 (est. January 2000) numbers fluctuate and are difficult to confirm.\textsuperscript{199}
- Refugees: Bonay and McGrory state that there are some 6,000 refugees in PNG (est. 2000); and an estimated 150 political exiles in other countries.\textsuperscript{200} Whilst, King and King

\textsuperscript{197}See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 448-449.
\textsuperscript{198}See Wing with King, 2005.
\textsuperscript{199}Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDPs Report, August 2002, pp. 117.
\textsuperscript{200}See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 439.
state that TNI operations have created over 11,000 refugees during 2003-5. It was also noted that some 12,000 West Papuans fled as refugees to Papua New Guinea between 1984 and 1987.

Male eyewitness testimony in Mulia refugee situation, 10 January 2005:

…volunteers are coming here and giving us aid, but the government hasn’t given us anything…This is proof the government doesn’t care about us…Why is the government not concerned about the suffering? They say there is all this money available but we haven’t seen any of it! Who is getting the money?…We hear the rice aid from through the governor…is one thousand tonnes. We hear about that but we did not receive it…No-one from parliament has been here…And at the moment there’s no food, no aid. So from the 21st until now, the people haven’t eaten.

4.5j Genocide/Politicide

DEATHMAG = between 8-9 = between 30,000 to at least 100,000. There are no specific dates of confirmed genocide or politicide. If there is genocide or politicide occurring it is being done ‘silently’.

When West Papuan resistance leader Tom Beanal was interviewed on 4 February 2005, he was asked, Why do you think the international community does not care about what is happening here, if genocide is taking place? Genocide is a strong term to use isn’t it?” He replied,

I already told the UN, and Yale University had its own report charging genocide. If people kill with guns, and others kill with injections [with HIV], and in the highlands there are no teachers, no hospitals, no clinics…children have no skills, no knowledge, that’s Genocide!

201 Wing with King, 2005, 12.
205 Wing with King, 2005, 47.
206 Ibid.
Researchers at Yale University’s Law School concluded in a report released in November 2003 that the issue of genocide has become serious in Papua, with xenophobia and racism contributing to a lack of inclusion of Papuans within the Indonesian Republic. The current situation is often referred to as a ‘silent genocide.’ The state security apparatus has sought to eliminate and silence opponents of Indonesian rule through restrictions on freedom of expression and political organization, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest, detention, torture, execution, domestic spying, rape, insufficient food supply, saturation of military presence, and unstrained forces used against protesters, burning down of their livestock, houses, and churches. The systems of structural violence create conditions of economic, political, social, and cultural disadvantage for Papuan communities.

From 1963 onwards Indonesia worked assiduously to remove any sense of Papuan identity from the community, implementing a process of ‘Indonesianization,’ using ‘anti-subversion’ measures legislated in Presidential Decrees No. 8 and 11 of 1963. The government banned the singing of the Papuan national anthem, traditional Papuan apparel, the raising of the Morning Star flag and all political assembly or activity, declaring expressions of cultural identity as being punishable by torture or even death. The Indonesian government and security apparatus have sought to “civilize” Papuans, whom they stigmatise as “primitive people”, using terms of denigration, for example, that Papuans are animals, in particular, monkeys. Furthermore, of the issue HIV/AIDS has never been seriously handled, even though the Province of Papua records the highest number of victims in Indonesia. The military is even involved as pimps bringing in HIV/AIDS affected prostitutes from Indonesia.

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207 Ibid.
212 Wing with King, 2005, 1-11.
Despite being one of the richest provinces in terms of natural resources, West Papua has one of Indonesia’s highest rates of poverty. Major businesses are generally owned by investors from outside Papua and migrants dominate the local commercial sector. Papuan’s socio-economic system has been further undermined by the seizure of traditional lands and the degradation of indigenous cultures. Pauans have lower access to education, health services, and the media than their counterparts in Indonesia. In addition, there has been very low representation of Pauans in executive and legislative arms of government, as well as in the military and police force.\textsuperscript{213}

Freedom of movement is being severely restricted in Papua. This restriction has been compared to the system of apartheid in South Africa during the year before democratic elections and self-rule. People have to have a travel permit when travelling to their home villages; people are detained with no clear reason for unspecified periods and tried with no clear charges; Pauans who are members of the military apparatus will sometimes not be given any arms to equip themselves to handle crowds, whereas those coming from Indonesia will always be fully equipped with rifles, and/or pistols; the Indonesian newcomers to Papua looking for jobs can easily get one, often within a week, while Pauans have to wait for years.\textsuperscript{214}

Furthermore, there are reports of Indonesia undertaking militia training and recruitment and moving illegal arms to West Papua by local informants:

\[\text{[The TNI] have opened two bases in Manokwari... At...one [base] in SB7, in the year 2000, there were weapons delivered by ship which were brought ashore at Pasi Putih beach...I am convinced that the TNI is preparing militias in these two places and that at some stage these militias will become a force used to attack the community as happened in East Timor... someone caught an Ambonese in the act of bringing in weapons for these people...someone reported this to the district police. [The police] caught the person involved and asked him to be processed by the police, but what they found when they got there was the security forces [who] said}\]

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid.
the matter should be left up to them and they would follow it up. But to date there has been no further news concerning this case.\textsuperscript{215}

4.5k Level of Outrage

LEVOUT = yes

Thirty-five years after the event, the international community has finally come to question the validity of Jakarta's takeover of West Papua and the ongoing human rights abuses. In March 2004, 88 members of the Irish Parliament urged UN Secretary General Annan to review the UNs' role in the 1969 Act of Free Choice. On 28 June 2004, nineteen U.S. Senators sent a letter to Annan urging the appointment of a Special Representative to Indonesia to monitor the human rights situation in West Papua. A news poll out on 19 April 2006 revealed that more than 75 per cent of Australians support self-determination or independence for West Papuans. This is not reflected in the Australian Government’s current hard-line asylum policy for West Papuans. The Government asylum policy is seen as a direct response to Indonesian anger over Australia’s granting asylum to some Papuans.\textsuperscript{216} The PIF has been a sympathetic voice for the plight of Papuans on the international stage.\textsuperscript{217} Member States Nauru and Vanuatu have been significant driving forces behind regional attention for the struggle,\textsuperscript{218} lobbying for West Papua to be put back on the UN’s decolonization list and a review of the legality of the Act of Free Choice by the International Court of Justice. The government in Port Vila has also allowed the PPC and OPM to set up representative offices in Vanuatu.\textsuperscript{219}

\textsuperscript{215} Wing with King, August 2005, 1-8.
\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., 35. See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 446.
\textsuperscript{218} See Bonay with McGrory, chapter 9.5.5 Heijmans, Simmond, and van de Veen, 2004, 446.
\textsuperscript{219} Port Villa Presse, ‘Vanuatu Wants West Papua Back on Decolonization List,’ September 25, 2002. See Ibid.
**Figure 10: Summary of Conflict and Multilateral Non-Intervention in West Papua – Measurements and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural and Perceptual Conditions</th>
<th>Measurement/Evidence of Conditions</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISPS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The greatest grievance is regarding West Papua’s independence and the end of illegitimate Indonesian occupation of Papua.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATAL</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Between 30,000 and 100,000 deaths as a result of Indonesian occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRBEGIN</td>
<td>May 1965</td>
<td>President Sukarno decides that there will be no self-determination for Papuans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YREND</td>
<td>9999</td>
<td>Conflict Ongoing: 41 years in total duration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Currently, the conflict is still in the conflict or escalation phase, something that has not changed since January 1, 1976.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILCAP</td>
<td>15,000-20,000 Indonesian forces; TPN/OPM forces estimate at 1,600</td>
<td>This was the number of forces in West Papua on April 2002. The figure for TPN/OPM includes a number of units pursuing non-violent means</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOCAP</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>No basis for judgement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFIGHT</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3 main groups of disputants: Indonesia, OPM, and TPN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACSTRA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>There have generally been more systematic negative uses of conflict resolution instruments by just the government than positive uses of conflict resolution instruments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPEROS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Superpower remains neutral and inactive to the conflict resolution process and any multilateral intervention decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENORG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Limited organization and identifiability of West Papuan disputants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIATE</td>
<td>2 and 3</td>
<td>Multilateral intervention has been requested or consented to by the opposition group; while there has been resistance by at least one of the disputants (in this case the Government), it has been requested/welcomed by the civil society/grassroots community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFAIL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Failure of state authority in a limited area of the country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country of its capital.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECWEALTH</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>There are some exceptionally scarce and valuable resources such as oil, rare timber, gas and minerals – has the potential to be of economic benefit. Home to one of the World’s biggest gold mines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPILL</td>
<td></td>
<td>IDPs: 15,000 (est. January 2000) numbers fluctuate and are difficult to confirm. Refugees: Bonay and McGrory</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
state that there are some 6,000 refugees in PNG (est. 2000); and an estimated 150 political exiles in other countries. Whilst, King and King state that TNI operations have created over 11,000 refugees during 2003-5. It was also noted that some 12,000 West Papuans fled as refugees to Papua New Guinea between 1984 and 1987.

| ECIMPORT | 1 | West Papua is not highly integrated in the regional and international market, is not a strong and important trading partner, with membership in important trading agreements. Papua remains ranked the second lowest in the Indonesian Human Development Index of 2004. This is despite its Gross Regional Domestic Product (GRDP) being ranked the third largest in Indonesia based upon income from the trading of their rich natural resources. |
| MEDIA | No | No evidence of concentrated media attention on the West Papua conflict. |
| INTENVIRO | No | There is no evidence on how this might impact on the attractiveness of non-intervention. |
| REPUT | No | There is no concrete evidence to suggest that reputational interests have effected the decision not to intervene in West Papua. |
| LIKESUCCESS | 2 | There is no stalemate evident or substantial agreement from which to base an intervention on. Yet there is a strong civil society/grassroots element willing for peace. |
| CLEAR | No | No evidence of any clear exit points. |
| REFCRISIS | 1 | Not a humanitarian crisis. There are varying estimates of IDPs and refugees but the minimum number recorded stands at 20,000 up. |
| DEATHMAG | 8-9 | Between 30,000 to 100,000 dead. A “silent genocide” |
| LEVOUT | yes | International NGOs – Amnesty International, TAPOL, Human Rights Watch, the World Council of Churches, the International Crisis Group, and the International Catholic Migration Commission – are prominent campaigners on issues of peace and justice in Papuan on the international level. Additionally, international solidarity movements, in particular in Australia, the UK, and the Netherlands, are active in raising the international profile of the Papuan struggle. The Papuan Diaspora in Australia and the Netherlands also work to raise the awareness of human rights abuses and issues of self-determination. |
Chapter Five

A Comparative Analysis of the Primary Conditions that Attract Multilateral Intervention or Non-Intervention

5.1 Introduction

In this chapter the descriptive, the predictive and the prescriptive value of the framework will be analyzed with regard to the cases of multilateral intervention in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, and with regard to the cases of multilateral non-intervention in the Philippines and West Papua. Chapter Four indicated that many of the structural and perceptual conditions identified under the framework were present in all four cases, and some conditions were found to correlate strongly with a particular multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene. Yet will these strong correlates be maintained as relevant when all of the cases are compared? This chapter defines the primary conditions found in each case, compares the results, and examines the primary conditions that are prevalent in both decisions to intervene and to not intervene.

5.2 Primary Conditions that Attract Multilateral Intervention

5.2a East Timor

In the case of East Timor, the role of the media, which focused on fatalities, the IDP and refugee crisis, and evidence of genocide of the East Timorese people, was critical in cultivating an environment conducive to high levels of outrage and the audience costs necessary to stir multilateral actors towards intervention. With its reputation undermined by humanitarian abuses, Indonesia had little leeway with the

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1 See Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 162.
international community when there was so much concrete and sustained media evidence of brutality that the Indonesian state and its military had undertaken.

Secondly, the nature of the international environment influenced the multilateral response to the East Timor conflict. The failure to intervene previously in high profile internal conflicts such as Rwanda and Srebrenica had almost crippled the usefulness and reputation of the UN and ASEAN. This suggests that the issues of timing or significant events on the world stage are important in attracting multilateral intervention. Gaining the consent of the Indonesian government (even if it was induced), the economic wealth of East Timor (the Timor Sea oil supply), and the existence of a clear exit strategy also proved valuable conditions that determined multilateral intervention. Consequently the media, the humanitarian crisis (in respect of UPMs and genocide), the international environment, the consent of the sovereign state, potential economic benefits, and a clear exit strategy were all determining factors leading to multilateral intervention in East Timor.

5.2b Solomon Islands

In the case of conflict in the Solomon Islands, the role of state failure and the nature of the international environment were also pivotal in attracting multilateral intervention. Undermined by corruption, the weakened Solomon Islands state demonstrated an inability to maintain law and order. After the terrorist attacks in New York (11 September 2001) and Bali (October 2002), this weakness was viewed as a threat to collective and individual security. Secondly, the short duration of conflict (5 years), the perception of a likelihood of success, the fact that the phase was post-conflict at the point of intervention, the invitation to intervene, and the possibility of a quick reduction of substantial military and police numbers, implied a high probability of a successful intervention with low risks and few costs. In addition, an interested Member State, and neighbour Australia, was willing to subsidize the intervention effort for over a decade. Therefore, state failure, the international environment, the high likelihood of success due to favourable conditions, and a self-interested investor contributed to multilateral intervention in the Solomon Islands. See figure 11 to gain an understanding of how two conditions were essential in making the other primary conditions significant in attracting multilateral intervention.
5.3 Primary Conditions that Deter Multilateral Intervention

5.3a Philippines

The results of the multilateral non-intervention cases are harder to determine and this, unfortunately, leads to less accurate conclusions. Many of the dynamics identified under the framework were present in the case of the Philippines (Mindanao-Sulu) conflict. The primary conditions that have made multilateral intervention
unattractive to this case of conflict have been the long duration of the conflict (40 years) which has made it highly entrenched; the attempts at positive uses of conflict resolution by both disputants, even though they have both generally resorted to force or the threat of force; the fact that there have been no concerted efforts calling for multilateral intervention; the lack of clear exit points or sustained media coverage; the Philippines’ important presence in the international market; and currently the ASG’s role in the ‘war on terror’. Each of these conditions either suggests a possible solution between the disputants in the near future, so that there would be no need for multilateral intervention, or illustrates the potential high risks and costs for any multilateral actor considering intervention.

5.3b West Papua

In the case of conflict in West Papua, many of the results from the framework look very like those found in the East Timor case, but whereas these conditions led to multilateral intervention in East Timor, it appears that the same conditions are affecting multilateral non-intervention in West Papua. This has made the examination of the West Papua conditions extremely difficult. How does one explain a multilateral action in one case when there is a similar case that produced a completely different multilateral response? There is particularly convincing evidence of the lack of media attention in failing to attract a high level of regional and international level of outrage. Yet recently there has been a medium level of concern; whether this will encourage higher media attention and, consequently a greater level of international opposition has yet to be seen. Other important conditions hat have influenced a policy of non-intervention in this case of conflict include the long duration of the conflict (41 years), that during the majority of the time the conflict has been escalating, and the resulting fact that there have been no clear exit points. See figure 12 to gain an understanding of which conditions have proved essential in deterring multilateral intervention.

Figure 12: Diagram of the Primary Conditions for Multilateral Non-Intervention
Given the presence of both primary structural and perceptual causes in all of the cases, it is concluded that the framework adequately demonstrates why intervention *has not* happened in the internal conflicts in West Papua and the Philippines and why it *has* occurred in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. Table 13 compares the measurement and evidential results of the four cases of conflict in an effort to determine and analyze the primary conditions that correlated with a particular response and to determine which primary conditions were prevalent in cases that led to a different response. For other graphs that attempt to compare the results in further detail see the Appendix.
Table 13: Summary Comparison of the Four Case Studies: Measurement and Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural and Perceptual Conditions</th>
<th>Measurement or Evidence of Conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Timor</strong></td>
<td><strong>Solomon Islands</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISP</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATAL</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YRBEGIN</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YREND</td>
<td>1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILCAP</td>
<td>20,000 UN and Member State personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOCAP</td>
<td>AUS$476.8 million over a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFIGHT</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACSTRA</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPEROS</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENORG</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIATE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFAIL</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECWEALTH</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPILL</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECIMPORT</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTENVIRO</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUT</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIKESUCCESS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFCRISIS</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEATHMAG</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNTBEGIN/MNTEND</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVOUT</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Results in Comparison
This comparison of the results implies that there are no exact correlates between the structural and perceptual conditions and the attractiveness of multilateral intervention. It must, consequently, be considered that multilateral intervention and non-intervention may amount to self or collective political interest and a group of particular primary conditions which affect political will. The selection bias is obvious. Yet it is still important to note and examine the primary conditions that did attract intervention and non-intervention in order to understand these multilateral policies and to predict future multilateral interventions and non-interventions of other internal conflicts. The next section examines the conditions that were found to be of primary importance to a particular multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene and which were not prevalent in the cases of a different multilateral response. The section that follows examines the primary conditions that were prevailing in cases of both multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene.

5.5 Assessing the Value of the Non-Overlapping Conditions: The Conditions of Primary Importance to the Multilateral Decision to Intervene or to Not Intervene

5.5a Duration

The duration of the conflict is significant for both multilateral decisions to intervene and to not intervene. Previous studies have argued that the duration of a conflict is an indication of conflict entrenchment.2 This study illustrates that the shorter the duration the less the perception of an entrenched internal conflict. To increase the expected utility of providing assistance, multilateral actors pursuing multilateral intervention will become involved earlier rather than later in internal conflicts. Whilst the longer an internal conflict continues, as the two non-intervention cases validate (40 years or more), the higher the disincentives and complexities for getting involved. Long duration of an internal conflict decreases the perception of a high likelihood of intervention success, thereby increasing the disincentives of such a multilateral policy.3 As the intensity of fighting escalates in a conflict of long duration, the level of multilateral assistance that must be offered to influence the

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2 Bercovitch and Langely, 1993, 676.
3 Ibid.
conflict rises.\textsuperscript{4} Duration would however, as diagrams 10 and 11 illustrate, only be a primary condition if it were accompanied by other primary conditions such as a lack of sustained media coverage or high resistance levels to a multilateral intervention policy.

\textbf{5.5b Consent or Resistance to Multilateral Intervention}

In the literature, whether the disputants consent to multilateral intervention or not are considered important conditions for or against intervention.\textsuperscript{5} The cases of conflict examined in this project illustrate that the level of resistance (high or low) by the State in conflict to the idea or suggestion of multilateral intervention is a significant condition for both multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. Sovereignty has been the rock of international relations for 350 years, and the guiding framework around which the UN is organized.\textsuperscript{6} It remains deeply important to most UN Member States. This means that any efforts to interfere in domestic affairs continue to face strong opposition. Yet the UN document, ‘In Larger Freedom’, gives the impression that Member States not only benefit from the privileges of sovereignty but also accept their responsibilities to protect their citizens.

Whatever perceptions may have prevailed when the Westphalian system first gave rise to the notion of State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own people and meet its obligations to the wider international community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community, acting in accordance with the Charter of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, to help build the necessary capacity or supply the necessary protection, as the case may be.\textsuperscript{7}

Sovereignty still matters. There have not been many cases, with the possible exception of South Africa, in which multilateral actors have been willing to intervene \textit{on humanitarian grounds} when an existing government has resisted multilateral

\textsuperscript{4} Pence, \url{http://www.indiana.edu/~iupolsci/bio_pence.html}, 9.
\textsuperscript{5} Akashi cited in Burci, chapter 9 in Sellers, 1996, 250-1.
\textsuperscript{7} UN, Larger Freedom, \url{http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/executivesummary.pdf}, 3-4.
intervention.\textsuperscript{8} Despite the human rights justifications for intrusion in the four case studies examined, multilateral intervention was undertaken \textit{only} with the consent of the sovereign state; with the cases that did not attract intervention, the sovereign states have not called for such a policy.

The case of East Timor presents an interesting relationship between sovereignty and multilateral intervention. Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over East Timor was not recognized by the UN and a majority of its Member States, yet the international community deemed Indonesia’s consent to be an essential condition for multilateral intervention even if such consent was induced. The International Community was not prepared to destroy its relationship with Indonesia by acting without its consent – let alone to have to fight its way into East Timor against the Indonesian army. The discomfort of multilateral actors in overriding claims of sovereignty continues to set limits on norms relating to multilateral intervention.\textsuperscript{9} In the case of Sudan, the government has, at the time of writing, succeeded in blocking the creation of a UN peacekeeping force in Darfur, despite US allegations of ‘genocide.’ The decision has come as a setback to many of the UN Member States who have seen the dispatch of UN forces as the best chance of saving thousands of lives.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{5.5c Nature of the International Environment}

Previous studies have argued that the nature of the international environment may be a significant determinant for whether a multilateral intervention takes place or not.\textsuperscript{11} Vertzberger argues that at any point in time particular multilateral actors have fewer or greater opportunities and incentives to intervene, depending on the prevailing external conditions.\textsuperscript{12} The case studies examined validate this argument for the attractiveness of both multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. All the responses to the case studies, with the exception of West Papua (only due to the lack of concrete evidence), have been influenced to a high degree by the nature of the international environment. The intervention into East Timor and the Solomon Islands,

\textsuperscript{8} For examples see Donnelly, 1993, 636.
\textsuperscript{9} Martin, chapter 8, in Welsh, 2004, 160.
\textsuperscript{10} \textit{The Press}, In Brief, World B3, Monday, March 13, 2005.
\textsuperscript{11} Heraclides 1990; Regan 2000.
\textsuperscript{12} Vertzberger, 1996, 143.
and non-intervention in the Philippines validate the idea that these responses are a consequence of the changing political, economic, or security collective interests in the international environment. Intervention in East Timor was the result of a period of “enormous euphoria” post-Cold War when international and regional organizations were finding their footing after so much focus on one major inter-state conflict, and as a result of the failures to act in the face of ethnic cleansing and genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia.\(^\text{13}\)

With the Philippines and the Solomon Islands it has been the threat of, or reaction to, terrorism that has led to such varied multilateral responses. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington, D.C., brought with them a glimpse of the potential for renewed collective security.\(^\text{14}\) For many, those events and their aftermath have suspended the international community’s concern about the plight of individuals in situations of humanitarian emergency, and placed more fundamental concerns about survival at the top of the policy agenda. As Canadian Ambassador to the UN Paul Heinbecker put it, while the interventions in East Timor and Kosovo were all about protecting the vulnerable ‘other, in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Solomon Islands, the motivation was protecting ‘self’.\(^\text{15}\) It can also be argued that the motivation was in protecting the ‘collective’. Furthermore, the experiences of 11 September and the requirements of the ‘war on terror’ may have dampened Member States’ enthusiasm for criticizing the treatment of civilians within other sovereign jurisdictions. Interestingly, States such as the Philippines that were previously subject to international criticism for internal repression have skillfully deflected attention by labelling their actions as ‘counter-terrorist’.\(^\text{16}\)

5.5d Status of Government

Recently, complete state failure has become a strong justification for multilateral intervention, especially with the intervention in the Solomon Islands. Where the State in question has failed or collapsed, with no government effectively

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\(^{13}\) Andrew Thompson, ‘Interview on Ideas’, \textit{National Radio Programme}, after the 11am news Sunday 19 March.


\(^{16}\) Welsh, 2004, 181.
able to exercise the sovereign responsibility of protecting its people, the principle of multilateral non-intervention has less force.\textsuperscript{17} Even while there remains very little literature on whether state failure attracts multilateral intervention or non-intervention, the importance of state failure as a condition that attracts intervention is validated by the Solomon Islands intervention. Invoking for the first time the (October 2000) Bitekawa Declaration governing intervention in the affairs of its Member States, the Pacific Island Forum said in 2003 that the consensus on intervention was a reflection of the severity of the Solomon Islands crisis.\textsuperscript{18} But considering that the crisis had limited fatalities, was in the early stages of conflict and was not technically a humanitarian crisis, the Forum \textit{must} have meant the severity of state collapse in the Solomon Islands. Without an effective government upholding the rule of law and controlling its borders, the Solomon Islands risked becoming “a petri dish in which trans-national and non-state security threats could develop and breed”.\textsuperscript{19} The fact that the Solomon Islands Government was bankrupt meant that it was vulnerable to external influence by both state and non-state actors. There was a perception among multilateral actors that this weakness could lead to such external schemes as the dumping toxic waste; money laundering; drug smuggling; gun-running; identity fraud; people smuggling; providing a transit point for trans-national crime and terrorism; the selling of sovereignty; or resorting to the use of mercenaries to restore control in some areas in exchange for extraction rights.\textsuperscript{20}

This mattered for two reasons. First, this kind of legal, political, economic and military vacuum could have made Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia and the rest of the Pacific in particular, significantly more vulnerable to trans-national criminal operations based in or operating out of Solomon Islands. This would be a result of the Solomon Islands' limited capacity to monitor the movement of people. Secondly, there may have been a high likelihood that such problems would prove contagious to other states in the region. Collapse in Solomon Islands may have made it all the harder for other weak states to maintain their political systems. If transnational criminals had become established in Solomon Islands, it would have

\textsuperscript{17} ICISS, \url{http://www.iciss-ca/menu-en.asp}, 19.
\textsuperscript{19} ASPI, \url{http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html}.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
been that much easier for them to penetrate and expand operations in regional neighbouring States. Yet it must be considered that there are many failing states that have not attracted multilateral intervention. Somalia has not had a government in 15 years. What does this say about the importance of a failed state in attracting multilateral intervention? Does it just mean that there is a necessity for other primary conditions to be prevalent in attracting this multilateral response? These questions need to be considered by future researchers in order to explain the full importance of the status of government as a determinant for intervention or no-intervention decisions.

5.5e Any Clear Exit Points or an Exit Strategy

The high or low perception of clear exit points or the evidence of an exit strategy is significant for both multilateral decisions to intervene and to not intervene. Multilateral intervention in the conflicts in the Solomon Islands and East Timor were made more attractive with the possibility of a quick reduction of forces, with no obvious quagmires to combat. In the Solomon Islands, there were clear exit points due to the low intensity levels, illustrated by the low number of fatalities and the generally positive tactics and strategies of the disputants. The lack of evidence of clear exit points appears to be a primary condition in the cases of multilateral non-intervention, portraying the possibility of high costs and high risks associated with multilateral intervention decisions. Member States always want to know what the strategy is for getting their troops out of a conflict situation and bringing them home alive.

Unfortunately the perception of clear exit points or evidence of an exit strategy at the time of multilateral intervention does not necessarily equate with reality. In any conflict a clear exit point may subsequently need revision. In 2006 riots broke out in both the Solomon Islands and East Timor and the level of deployment of multilateral intervention had to increase substantially in both countries.

5.5f Reputation interests

21 Ibid.
22 TV3 News, Television New Zealand, 2 April, 2006, 6pm.
23 Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 131-143.
The high or low perception of reputational interests at stake within a case of conflict is significant for the multilateral decision to intervene. Vertzberger suggests that interveners may be concerned that by not taking constructive action they may risk adverse effects to their reputation.\textsuperscript{25} The case of East Timor validates this in respect of ASEAN and the UN. After their failure to act in other internal conflicts, both organizations faced harsh criticism and lost credibility prior to the decision to intervene in East Timor. However, in the Solomon Islands conflict, the multilateral actors were aware of the likelihood that any successful policy approach would require much deeper engagement which risked being seen as a step towards ‘neocolonialism’. This situation caused much debate about the costs and risks between Member States.\textsuperscript{26} Yet this did not deter multilateral intervention. It was in the collective interests of both organizations to recover their reputation. Suffering a negative reputation is not detrimental to multilateral intervention when collective interests overrule any negative feedback an intervention may generate.

5.5g Economic Importance of the State in Conflict

The economic importance of the target state in conflict has been a condition ascertained as important in the literature. Usually considered important for unilateral interventions,\textsuperscript{27} in the case of the conflict in the Philippines economic importance was important in influencing multilateral non-intervention. Multilateral actors do not wish to upset an important economic state with intervention and consequently, the economic importance of the state in conflict will make an option of non-intervention an attractive policy. John Pilger points out that were it not for ‘western’ business interests in Indonesia, more decisive action could have been taken earlier and more lives could have been saved in East Timor.\textsuperscript{28} The Philippines case illustrates that being an important regional and international economic player, and a member of many important economic organizations, despite economic difficulties, \textit{will} shape the collective and self interests of an organization such as the UN and ASEAN and their individual Member States.

\textsuperscript{25} Vertzberger, 1996, 401-404.  
\textsuperscript{26} ASPI, \url{http://www.aspi.org.au/22484solomons/directors.html}.  
\textsuperscript{27} R. Cooper and M. Berdal, ‘Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts’ \textit{Survival} 35, 1993, 118-42.  
\textsuperscript{28} Shah, 2000.
5.5h Media Coverage

While media coverage did not prove decisive for multilateral intervention into the Solomon Islands, it proved an essential element in the case of intervention in East Timor with the focus on ‘real-time television’. The ‘CNN-lead’ explosion of global news coverage increased public awareness of the human dimension of internal conflict in East Timor, contributing to regional and international pressure on multilateral actors to take immediate and constructive action.\(^{29}\) Supporters of the ‘CNN effect’ argue that the media drives multilateral conflict management by forcing organizations to intervene in humanitarian crises against their will.\(^{30}\) However, in the case of the conflict in East Timor, other primary conditions were also necessary to make intervention attractive, such as the international environment, consent, and economic benefits. Organizations cannot be forced to intervene against their will.\(^{31}\) Consequently, the ‘CNN effect’ is only effective in exceptional circumstances when multilateral actors believe that they can be undertaken with the consent and legitimacy of the sovereign State, with some benefits and in an environment that necessitates such an intervention policy.\(^ {32}\) There was little collective or national interest in managing the East Timor case. When national interests are not perceived to be at stake the ‘CNN effect’ is necessary to mobilize pressure on multilateral organizations.\(^ {33}\)

5.5i Phase of Conflict

There are some phases of conflict that are more predisposed to multilateral interventions than others. Multilateral interventions will more often be considered once the most violent phase of conflict has passed, a cease-fire has been negotiated, and the disputants are trying to find ways to reconcile their differences. In the

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\(^{29}\) For example, In July 2000 H. E. Mr. Rodolfo C. Severino, Secretary-General of ASEAN stated, “People’s humanitarian impulse with respect to armed conflict has been intensified by the entry into the world’s living room of images, in living colour, of rotting corpses, starving babies, stumps of limbs hacked off or blasted away, streams of desperate refugees, the physical and human devastation. Graphic descriptions and passionate advocacy on the internet have had the same effect. Severino, 2000, [http://www.aseansec.org/3221.htm](http://www.aseansec.org/3221.htm). See also Harff and Gurr, 2004, 189.

\(^{30}\) Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 131-2.

\(^{31}\) For analysis arguing that the importance of the CNN effect is exaggerated see Gowing, 1994b; Natsios in Rotberg and Weiss, 1996; Strobel, 1997.

\(^{32}\) Viggo Jakobsen, 2000, 136.

Solomon Islands case the phase when intervention was taken, between de-escalation and termination or the post-conflict phase was a primary condition for multilateral intervention. Once the most violent phases of the conflict had passed it was perceived that Member State and public consensus on an intervention policy could be achieved.\textsuperscript{34} It was during this phase that the Solomon Islands public had had enough time to be weary of the conflict and welcome intervention. Table 14 provides a summary of the above primary conditions that are \textit{not} prevalent in a different multilateral response.

Table 14: Summary Comparison of Non-Overlapping Primary Conditions that Attract Multilateral Intervention \textit{or} Non-Intervention Decisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Conditions</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Non-Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evidence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>Within 5yrs for early intervention or up to 24 years maximum</td>
<td>40 years or more</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Sovereign consent or appeal for intervention** | \textit{East Timor:} Induced sovereign consent  
\textit{Solomon Islands:} intervention by sovereign invitation | No sovereign consent or appeal for intervention                                  |
| **Nature of International Environment** | \textit{East Timor:} Post-Rwanda and Srebenica  
\textit{Solomon Islands:} Post September 11 and Bali bombing | \textit{Philippines:} War on Terror has extended to the Philippines and ASG  
\textit{West Papua:} no evidence on how this might impact on the attractiveness of non-intervention |
| **State Failure**                | \textit{Solomon Islands:} Failed State                              | No complete state failure                                                       |
| **Clear Exit Points**            | \textit{Solomon Islands:} The possibility of a quick reduction of substantial military and police numbers. | No clear exit points in both conflicts                                           |

\textsuperscript{34} Regan, 2000, 110.
| Reputation | East Timor: ASEAN | No evidence of reputational interest in the decision not to intervene in either case |
| Economic Importance of the State in Conflict | Both places of conflict were not highly integrated in the regional and international market; not strong and important trading partners; and neither had membership in important trading agreements. | Philippines: is highly integrated in the regional and international market, a strong and important trading partner, with membership in important trading agreements. |
| Media Coverage | East Timor: Media coverage was extremely intense | No evidence of concerted media attention in either conflicts |
| Phase of conflict | Solomon Islands: de-escalation-termination phase | Philippines: hostilities phase – termination phase; West Papua: Escalation phase |

5.6 Assessing the Primary Conditions that were Prevailing in Both Multilateral Decisions to Intervene and to Not Intervene.

5.6a Introduction

Some conditions determining a multilateral response were of primary importance in some cases, but were prevalent in another case study that led to an opposing outcome. This raises the question, why was a multilateral action not taken when it was in other instances with the same conditions? Perhaps political will does control multilateral action but certainly there are still some conditions that make multilateral intervention or non-intervention attractive policies. What it does suggest is that there are some conditions which are very important in influencing decisions to intervene or to not intervene, and there are various conditions which are sufficient but not essential for these decisions to be influenced. For more information about necessary and sufficient conditions see Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, *Inquiry, Logic and International Politics* University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, South Carolina, 1989.
what conditions should be prevailing for multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. It appears that multilateral interventions are taken on an ad hoc basis – without much thought to other internal conflicts or past multilateral acts.

5.6b Escalation Phase

The escalation phase may be characterized by significant armed violence or its spread, generating not only direct casualties but also human rights abuses, humanitarian crises, refugees, and IDPs. There will also be a significant hardening of disputant positions as the violence increases. Multilateral actors must develop strategies that seek not only to defuse conflict, but also to limit its escalation, terminate it, and lessen the effects that may complicate peace negotiations and eventual peace-building. In the Solomon Islands conflict, while the post-conflict phase was found to attract multilateral intervention, the escalation phase was found to decrease the attractiveness of a multilateral policy of intervention in the conflict in West Papua. Yet it was during the escalation phase that multilateral intervention in East Timor occurred. Consequently, this condition is only a sufficient condition for multilateral non-intervention decisions it is not an essential condition. In the literature, it is the escalation phase that is perceived to cause high costs and high risks. Multilateral actors are unlikely to view escalation as an appealing phase to intervene. In East Timor, this condition with its costs and risks was overshadowed by the other primary conditions such as the potential for negative audience costs.

5.6c Tactics and Strategies of Disputants

The type of tactics and strategies employed by disputants in an internal conflict, as indicated by the East Timor case, is significant for the multilateral decision to intervene. However the evidence of this same condition in the case of conflict in the Philippines indicates that it is not an essential condition to the decision to intervene. Strategies and tactics, such as those of repression, conciliatory gestures, or terrorism, elevated the visibility of both of these conflicts.

While a lack of measured attempts by the government to settle the conflict was a condition for multilateral intervention in East Timor, the lack of positive action by
the Indonesian Government in the case of West Papua had no such effect. This discrepancy has been found in other cases. While Haiti was considered a suitable candidate for multilateral intervention because of its military regime’s lack of democratic respect, Burma, whose military regime is at least as repressive as was that of Haiti’s General Cedras, was not. Furthermore, the case of conflict in the Philippines illustrates that when positive uses of conflict resolution are undertaken by both government and disputants this appears to deter multilateral decisions to intervene. Multilateral actors may perceive that a policy of intervention would create further difficulties to the negotiating process. While this condition is of primary importance to the Philippines non-intervention, it was also present in the Solomon Islands case where multilateral intervention took place.

5.6d Economic Wealth of State in Conflict

An interesting finding is the importance of material interests in determining the response of Member States to internal conflict. Edward Mortimer argued on New Zealand’s National Radio, “countries do not intervene unless they have material interests”, Wednesday 18 January 2006, 5.30pm. The presence of economic interests in East Timor increased the potential gains for the intervener(s), and thus Member States were willing to invest greater resources toward multilateral intervention. This finding would tend to support the realist theory of international relations which stresses the importance of Member States as rational actors, seeking to maximize their share of limited resources. Yet both the Philippines and West Papua have exceptionally scarce and valuable resources, all of which would be perceived by multilateral actors as a potential benefit to any intervention policy. Consequently, the economic wealth of the state in conflict is a sufficient condition for multilateral decisions to intervene but is not an essential condition for this response.

5.6e No Concerted Media Coverage

The media is selective when it comes to the level of reporting and analysis of internal conflicts. Multilateral non-intervention in West Papua and the Philippines can be partly explained by the lack of concerted media coverage that has resulted in low to medium levels of international outrage. Yet a lack of media coverage in the Solomon Islands failed to deter multilateral intervention. With organizational policymakers set on a particular course of action, as they were in the Solomon Islands, critical media coverage is unlikely to influence multilateral policy. Multilateral actors are, instead, more likely to work harder to promote their chosen course of action through press briefing and public announcements. When national and collective interests are perceived to be at stake, as they were in the Solomon Islands case, multilateral actors will work hard to mobilize international and domestic support. In this scenario, the ‘CNN effect’ becomes diluted.

5.6f Likelihood of Success

The decision to intervene is also a function of the multilateral actors’ subjective estimate of the likely outcome of the internal conflict and the effect of multilateral intervention on that outcome. Political fortunes may also be tied to the outcome of a given multilateral policy. A failed multilateral intervention may come with high political costs while a multilateral organization may reap considerable political rewards from a successful intervention. The perception of a successful policy was a primary condition in the Solomon Islands multilateral intervention, yet the possibility of a successful policy is also evident in the Philippines. In the case of conflict in the Philippines, a strong civil society is willing and working for peace, there is an emotional, economic, and military stalemate between some of the disputants, and there are some agreements which to work from. Perhaps there remains uncertainty in how to confront the conflict in the Philippines especially when the tactics and strategies of the disputants are generally positive. Uncertainty over how to

40 Robinson, 2000, 613.  
42 Regan, 2000, 23.
deal with a particular internal conflict would show up as a declining probability of multilateral intervention.\textsuperscript{43}

\textbf{5.6g Refugee or IDP Humanitarian Crisis}

In the literature, UPMs are increasingly seen as a condition that generates multilateral interventions.\textsuperscript{44} According to MacFarlane, the rapid rise in numbers of persons displaced within and between countries has dramatically altered the interests of organizations vis-à-vis internal conflicts.\textsuperscript{45} In respect of East Timor, the IDP and refugee humanitarian crisis provoked a multilateral decision to intervene, but only after the media attention provided evidence of this crisis. In the conflicts in the Philippines and in West Papua, both have similar UPM numbers, yet this condition has failed to attract such a multilateral response.\textsuperscript{46}

\textbf{5.6h Genocide/Politicide}

In considering whether and where to intervene, the question that has assumed talismanic significance is: Is it genocide? In the words of the international tribunal for Rwanda, genocide is the “crime of crimes.”\textsuperscript{47} Such a finding has become a signal for the world to act. Under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), Member States have agreed that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international law which they will undertake to prevent and punish. Since then it has been understood that genocide anywhere is a threat to the security of all and should never be tolerated.\textsuperscript{48}

Consequently, it may be assumed that genocide or politicide might be important criteria for multilateral intervention, and in the case of East Timor it was a primary condition. Yet blatant genocide and/or politicide are prevalent in West Papua

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid., 56.
\textsuperscript{44} Loescher 1992, 3.
\textsuperscript{45} MacFarlane, 2002, 51-53.
\textsuperscript{46} ACFID, \texttt{http://www.acfid.asn.au/campaigns/solomons/Aus\_intervention.pdf}.
which has yet to attract intervention. Nicholas J. Wheeler argues that “the West’s conception of humanitarian intervention is so ideologically biased that the ‘silent genocide’ of death through poverty and malnutrition is rendered natural and inevitable.”\(^4^9\) What does this say about the priorities of multilateral organizations? Should genocide and politicide still be considered pivotal conditions for intervention? Multilateral intervention in East Timor can best be explained in terms of the human rights, or what has been considered a genocide/ politicide, disaster that unfolded. In West Papua, although similar human rights violations and situations continue to occur, the lack of current major commercial multilateral interests coupled with the presence of current major commercial interests in Indonesia has made the status quo the focus for Multilateral policy.\(^5^0\)

5.6i Level of Outrage

High levels of outrage were an important condition in respect of the decision to intervene in East Timor, but there is now a growing level of outrage regarding the situation in West Papua. The levels of international and regional outrage felt regarding an internal conflict, Janzekovic argues, often equate to the severity of multilateral response. The greater the outrage the more likely multilateral actors will intervene. Small atrocities, he continues, do not have the same impact as large atrocities. The moral impetus to act is dependent on the degree of outrage felt and the immediacy of the act itself.\(^5^1\) The case of East Timor illustrates that high levels of international concern contributed to the pressure on multilateral organizations to intervene. This level of outrage was fuelled by the mass media which maintained high levels of concern. This medium to high level of outrage is growing in respect of the situation in West Papua, but not to the same extent as with East Timor. Perhaps the lack of sustained coverage and critical analysis is why this condition has yet to prove important in attracting multilateral intervention in West Papua. Claiming a common human empathy between people on different parts of the globe does not mean, it appears, that such perceived values are boundless. They are very selectively applied


\(^5^0\) Ibid.

depending on what the other primary conditions are and whether they affect political will. Table 15 examines the tendency for primary conditions in one multilateral response to be also prevalent in another response entirely.

Table 15: Summary Comparison of the Four Case Studies – Measurement and Evidence of the Primary Conditions that determine whether Multilateral Organizations Decide to Intervene or to Not Intervene: The Conditions that are Prevalent in Both Cases of Multilateral Intervention and Non-Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Conditions</th>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Non-Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase:</strong> primary condition for Solomon Islands and the Philippines</td>
<td>Solomon Islands: de-escalation-termination</td>
<td>Philippines: hostilities phase-termination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactics and Strategies adopted by Disputants:</strong> primary condition for East Timor and the Philippines</td>
<td>East Timor: There have just been negative uses of conflict resolution by just the government</td>
<td>Philippines: There have been some attempts at positive uses of conflict resolution by both parties but the government and opposition occasionally resort to negative instruments of conflict management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Wealth of State:</strong> primary condition for East Timor</td>
<td>Exceptionally scarce and valuable resources – potential to be a profit</td>
<td>Both the Philippines and West Papua have exceptionally scarce resources that may be of potential profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Media Coverage:</strong> primary condition for East Timor, the Philippines, West Papua</td>
<td>East Timor: media coverage was extremely intense</td>
<td>The Philippines: coverage was directed towards high profile kidnappings only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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52 Ibid., 24-25.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Likelihood of Success:</strong> primary condition for the Solomon Islands</th>
<th><strong>Solomon Islands:</strong> the conflict was ‘ripe’ for intervention</th>
<th><strong>Philippines:</strong> Strong civil society, stalemate and agreement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Refugee or IDP humanitarian crisis:</strong> primary condition for East Timor</td>
<td><strong>East Timor:</strong> 600,000-700,000 IDPs</td>
<td><strong>Philippines:</strong> 200,000 to 500,000 IDPs and refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Genocide/Politicide:</strong> primary condition for East Timor</td>
<td><strong>East Timor:</strong> 250,000 dead</td>
<td><strong>West Papua:</strong> between 30,000 – 100,000 dead: a silent genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Outrage:</strong> primary condition for East Timor</td>
<td><strong>East Timor:</strong> medium to high level of regional and international outrage</td>
<td><strong>Philippines:</strong> substantial Muslim diaspora; <strong>West Papua:</strong> medium level of regional and international outrage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5.7 Costs, Risks, Benefits, Connectivity and Level of Outrage

As a first attempt at identifying what conditions attract multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene this thesis offers some tentative conclusions. The cases indicate that the main components underlying the framework – costs, risks, benefits, level of connectivity and level of outrage – do matter when multilateral actors choose their intervention or non-intervention policies. Since multilateral interventions are inherently political, there are costs, risks and benefits; a degree of connectivity; and certain amounts of international and regional outrage that derive from an internal conflict and a policy of intervention or non-intervention. These components are rooted in a combination of certain structural and perceptual conditions. None of the structural and perceptual conditions by themselves would have been credited with multilateral intervention or non-intervention policies. There must be a combination of conditions that trigger or deter political will that can influence these policies. These conditions justify such a response multilaterally – even if merely to the individual Member States and other multilateral actors. This is not to suggest that other combinations of conditions may not also amount to these responses.
5.7a Multilateral Intervention

Broadly speaking, as ascertained by the two cases that led to multilateral intervention, this response will only be undertaken if there are low to medium costs and few major risks, some benefits, especially in terms of international, regional and national security, and the perception or actuality of a high level of outrage that raises any costs of inaction.

Risks and costs

Even if there is a high complexity to the conflict, as was the case with East Timor, multilateral intervention will occur in an internal conflict if the risks of leaving a failing state outweigh the risks of multilateral intervention; if there is sovereign consent to intervene (even if it is induced); if there is an interested investor(s) who can sustain intervention until the goals are completed; if there is the perception of a high likelihood of a successful intervention; and if there is the perception of a clear exit strategy.

In particular, multilateral interventions will more often be considered once the most violent phase of the conflict has passed, a cease-fire has been negotiated, and the disputants are trying to find ways to reconcile their differences. Once the most violent phases of the conflict have passed it is increasingly likely that a multilateral organization can achieve consensus on an intervention policy. Yet the East Timor conflict illustrated that multilateral intervention may still occur, even during the escalation phase if there are sufficient audience costs for inaction that make intervention an attractive alternative to high levels of public outrage.

Benefits

Benefits that result from multilateral intervention can be found in numerous quarters, including both domestic and international factors. Multilateral intervention will occur if there are actual economic benefits for the intervener(s), for example the presence of oil, or if intervention is perceived to bring regional and global stability. In both cases of multilateral intervention, multilateral actors contemplating intervention had agendas that were considerably more complex than simply stopping
the fighting between the disputants. These complex goals covered a wide range of political outcomes. The overriding goal was to ensure regional stability.

*Connectivity*

Connectivity (or a stake in the conflict) to an internal conflict can influence multilateral intervention policies. The case of intervention in East Timor suggests that humanitarian crises which spill-over (for example in terms of UPMs and audience costs) make inaction an unattractive option. These consequences of conflict can make multilateral organizers perceive that they have a stake in the conflict. Yet the case of conflict in the Solomon Islands suggests that a humanitarian crisis is not a necessity for multilateral intervention to occur.

*Level of Outrage*

The evidence from the East Timor case has made it clear that the international public do see a legitimate role of multilateral organizations, the UN in particular, in relieving some of the social and regional stresses caused by internal conflicts. This confirmation indicates that multilateral organizations respond to pressures over humanitarian issues. It clearly suggests that multilateral intervention will occur if there is a high level of sustained media coverage that portrays a humanitarian crisis which may produce audience costs and if the international environment or a significant world event makes multilateral intervention an attractive option.

Interestingly there was no significant threshold in the number of fatalities from which multilateral parties decide to intervene. The Solomon Islands case had about 300 fatalities while the case of conflict in East Timor had as many as 250,000. It appears that it is not about intensity in terms of fatalities that attracts multilateral intervention but whether there are audience costs associated with a multilateral policy of non-intervention that determines an intervention decision, or a change in the nature of the international environment that makes intervention necessary for collective or self interests. Domestic and international constituencies do seem to matter in these types of policies.

**5.7b Multilateral Non-intervention**
Upon review of the two cases that have not attracted a multilateral policy of intervention, it appears that multilateral non-intervention is likely to occur if there are medium to high costs with quite a few risks involved, some benefits but not enough to outweigh the costs and risks involved, a degree of connectivity but only in respect of deterring multilateral intervention, and a perception by multilateral actors that there is a low level, or a controllable level, of outrage that will not provoke too many unmanageable audience costs.

*Risks and costs*

Multilateral actors will decide to not intervene if there are risks and costs signified by: the long duration of the conflict (35+ years), an escalation phase, a lack of any clear exit points, and no sovereign consent. Furthermore, generally positive tactics and strategies by some of the disputants, while lowering the costs and risks involved with any multilateral intervention efforts, appear to decrease the appeal or need for such intervention attempts. Each of these conditions has intensified the conflict situation, enhancing the Member States’ perception of a lack of ability to pursue any efforts to change the status quo on the ground.

*Benefits*

Even if there are potential benefits to a multilateral policy of intervention, in particular economic benefits, any benefits of this policy will prove to be unattractive if there are high costs of any such actions. It is unlikely that a multilateral actor confronted with a choice over whether to intervene in an internal conflict will choose to intervene when the costs for intervening far-outweigh any potential benefits from doing so. The Philippines and West Papua conflicts have offered benefits for multilateral intervention but they also offer high costs for any potential multilateral actor.

*Connectivity*

The case of conflict in the Philippines demonstrates that multilateral intervention will not occur if there is a certain amount of connectivity between the Member States’ economies and the economic importance of the state in conflict.
Member States are reluctant to damage their economic investments in a state in conflict, or intrude on an important economic player. Perhaps this can account for the years during which East Timor (and West Papua remains) was not intervened in multilaterally. Indonesia remains an important economic player and neighbour to key multilateral Member States such as Australia.

Level of Outrage

The political nature of multilateral intervention policies implies audience costs for multilateral actors. When contemplating intervention, multilateral actors have to weigh the competing demands of various groups, who will often be at odds over policy. The cases of non-intervention indicate that multilateral intervention will fail to occur if there are no potential audience costs for inaction. No potential audience costs can be perceived when there is a lack of media coverage or consequent lack of high levels of outrage.

5.7c ‘Multilateral Non-Intervention – though considered Intervention’

One major weakness of this thesis is that it does not look at a timeline of the cases to see if the primary conditions were evident during an earlier phase of each of the conflicts. This thesis does, however, monitor the reasons behind the failure to take up intervention earlier when the Government requested intervention. The Solomon Islands case illustrates that while sovereign consent or intervention by invitation is a condition that makes multilateral intervention an attractive option, it was not a decisive factor. Earlier attempts by the Solomon Islands Government to call for multilateral intervention were rejected by multilateral actors. Instead, the change in the international environment and the failed status of the Solomon Islands Government were the essential conditions that were needed to attract this multilateral response.

5.7d Political Will

Finally, intervening multilaterally in internal conflicts requires both opportunity and Member State willingness to do so. A direct route to opportunity
(structural environment) and willingness (perceptions) is through self and collective interest which, this thesis has determined, are affected by a number of conditions.

5.8 Conclusion

The use of a data-based framework has enabled the ability to understand the conditions that influence multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene in internal conflicts. The framework has been of descriptive value in describing each case of internal conflict and the conditions conducive to a particular multilateral policy. While there were many reasons for multilateral intervention into East Timor and the Solomon Islands, it remains difficult to decipher the ad hoc nature of non-intervention decisions. In particular, there is no doubt that there is an urgent need to understand why some internal conflicts have not attracted intervention when they have the same conditions that are prevalent in cases where multilateral actors have intervened. The framework has provided conditions that do appear to have determined multilateral decisions of non-intervention in West Papua and the Philippines. But what about the primary conditions that were apparent in decisions of both intervention and non-intervention? This raises many unanswered questions. In particular, how can genocide not determine multilateral intervention in West Papua? Until there is a greater understanding of past and current multilateral intervention or non-interventions decisions or a greater interest in ascertaining guidelines that – in principle at least – help determine when multilateral intervention should occur, these policies will remain ad hoc and erratic. Consequently, this will make it much harder to understand how to achieve a successful multilateral intervention policy.
Chapter Six

Conclusions

Imagine for one moment that, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, there had been a coalition of states ready and willing to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but the [Security] Council had refused or delayed giving the green light. Should such a coalition then have stood idly by while the horror unfolded?

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan1

6.1 Introduction

Internal conflicts have become increasingly widespread in the Asia-Pacific region, creating an “arc of instability” around the southern rim of the region, stretching from Indonesia in the west, through East Timor, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the other parts of the Pacific, to Fiji in the east. As these types of conflicts continue to threaten stability and peace, the study of internal conflicts and their peaceful resolution is more crucial than ever. Additionally, as the numbers of multilateral interventions into internal conflicts appear to be increasing, the study of this multilateral response has developed into a major field in international relations. There continues, however, a need to draw attention to, and understand, why these multilateral occurrences take place – or why they fail to take place when the consequences of internal conflicts encroach on both individual state practices and international relations.

Currently, some scholars, practitioners and international bodies are supporting the establishment of various combinations of guidelines that should be met, or should help multilateral actors decide whether to intervene or not. However, to date there have not been any attempts to accurately establish what essential structural and

perceptual conditions are currently determining multilateral responses to internal conflicts. In particular, the numerous conditions offered by scholars to understand the multilateral decision-making process lack a suitable framework from which to examine and evaluate their individual significance. The question: ‘Why do international and regional communities intervene in some internal conflicts, yet not in others?’ remains unanswered.

The focus of this thesis has been on the identification of the primary conditions that attract or deter multilateral intervention into internal conflicts in the Asia Pacific region. The framework developed conceptually defines and operationally measures particular structural and perceptual conditions under the guiding components of costs, risks, benefits, connectivity, and level of outrage. The framework was applied to four cases of internal conflict in an attempt to observe what roles twenty-two structural and perceptual conditions have played in determining why multilateral intervention was initiated in two of the cases, and why multilateral intervention failed to be initiated in the other two cases. It assisted in revealing the conditions which were of primary significance to a particular response of multilateral intervention or multilateral non-intervention.

This study differs from the numerous other attempts made by scholars in the field. It focuses on conditions that can lead to a particular multilateral response. This is a departure from a focus on the subjective motivations of unilateral decision-makers and the unilateral decision-making process. It also examines perceptual conditions that have been determined as significant in the literature but whose extent of influence has not been clearly established.

6.2 Summary of Findings

The application of the framework has demonstrated that multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene eventuate as a result of a combination of both structural and perceptual conditions. The results confirmed that not only are there certain structural and perceptual conditions that influence the multilateral decision to intervene or to not intervene, but that these policies are also a result of collective and

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self political interest. The results illustrate the extent of selection bias evident in, and the ad hoc basis, of current multilateral intervention policies. Figures 16 and 17 categorize the conditions found to be of particular influence in the decisions to intervene or to not intervene within four categories, the conditions which are essential, significant, marginal, and insignificant.

**Figure 16: Determinants for Decisions to Intervene: A Scale of Importance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Essential</th>
<th>Significant</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Not Significant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High level of international and regional level of outrage – often as a result of Media coverage</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective and Self Political Interest to intervene</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of International Environment that makes intervention an attractive policy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Interested Member State(s) who are willing to invest long-term in an intervention policy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Failure</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of medium to high likelihood of Success</td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian abuses – UPMs and/or genocide/politicide</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consent (even if induced)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economic Wealth of the State in Conflict as a potential benefit</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The existence of an exit strategy and clear exit points</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A post-hostilities phase</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A short duration (less than 24 years)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute issues</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatality numbers</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities of Intervener(s) and the disputants</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of disputants</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superpower support</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifiable and organized disputants</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies and Tactics employed by the disputants</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Importance of the State in Conflict</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 17: Determinants for Decisions to Not Intervene: A Scale of Importance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Essential</th>
<th>Significant</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Not Significant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A lack of an exit strategy and clear exit points</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective and Self Political Interest to not intervene</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of International Environment that makes intervention an unattractive</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No sustained media coverage leading to low levels of international and regional levels of outrage</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Economic Importance of the State in Conflict</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrenchment of the conflict as a result of conflict duration</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generally positive Strategies and Tactics employed by the disputants</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Concerted calls for Intervention and high resistance levels to this option by the State</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An escalation phase</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Self-Interested Member State(s) who are willing to invest long-term in an intervention policy</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A long duration (more than 25 years)</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispute issues</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatality numbers</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities of Intervener(s) and the disputants</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The number of disputants</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superpower opposition</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Identifiable and unorganized disputants</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The research found that multilateral organizations will accept some of the risks and costs associated with an intervention policy if there are certain structural and perceptual conditions evident which influence the political interests of the individual Member States and the collective interests of the organization. Consequently, particular conditions make the option of intervention an attractive and viable option. These conditions are: a favourable or significant international environment or international event(s); the consent of the sovereign state (even if it is induced); sustained and critical regional and international media coverage which leads to a strong international identification of perpetrators and victims; a complete collapse of the state in conflict tainting it with the term ‘failed state’ (which leads to high perceived regional stakes); a high probability of success; potential economic benefits; a humanitarian crisis (in respect of UPMs and genocide/politicide); the possibility of a clear exit strategy; and a self-interested and capable Member State who can greatly subsidize an intervention.

In both cases of multilateral intervention perhaps the most important condition was the willingness of a capable regional actor – the Government of Australia – to take the lead in intervening in both situations to end the hostilities. Australia’s willingness to do so was itself the result of a range of the above conditions. When multilateral interventions do occur, they will be based firstly on a strongly perceived national and collective interest and the calculations of a reasonable chance of success at acceptable costs. But decisions to intervene multilaterally may also eventuate if there is the perception that multilateral inaction could lead to unacceptable political economic, military, security, reputational, humanitarian and audience costs.
Individually these conditions would probably not attract a similar multilateral response without evidence of a number of essential and significant conditions. In particular, by itself a humanitarian imperative does not appear to be very influential. The humanitarian imperative has not attracted multilateral intervention into the gradually evolving genocide in Burundi or the current ‘silent genocide’ in West Papua. Even the possibility of a successful multilateral intervention may not be a deciding factor to influence political self and collective interest. The amalgamation of the above conditions and how they affected this political will is precisely why they proved significant.

While the framework provided a useful guide for conditions that influenced multilateral intervention decisions, deciphering why a multilateral action has not taken place in another conflict proved much more ambitious. Multilateral non-interventions, it appears, are driven by a lack of sustained and critically analyzed media coverage on conflict issues and consequences, generally positive tactics and strategies adopted by disputants, conflicts of a long duration, and an unfavourable international environment. In addition, economic factors unfavourable to intervention, resistance levels to intervention or a failure to call for multilateral intervention, a lack of any clear exit points, and an escalation phase were also influential. However, these conditions need to be examined in respect of other internal conflicts that have failed to attract multilateral interventions in order to assure their relevance.

The Solomon Islands conflict undeniably illustrates how some essential conditions can be evident – in particular, the consent of the sovereign state – but that if other essential conditions are lacking, the process can be seen as unattractive to the Member States and collective interests. An earlier intervention by multilateral actors may have proven far less costly, in terms of direct and indirect costs, but it was only when the Solomon Islands began to be seen as a ‘failed state’ that multilateral intervention proved a necessity. This ‘failed state’ status was also seen as a security threat in light of the changing perceptions of threat in the international environment.

While the costs, risks and benefits are distributed across all Member States, they still act as a powerful influence on the attractiveness of a particular multilateral
policy. What can be ascertained in both cases of conflict in East Timor and the Solomon Islands is that the specific goals of the regional and international organizations determine the extent to which they will accept direct and indirect costs of an intervention policy. If the goals are included in an organization’s rationale, the perceived benefits increase. In the case of the Solomon Islands, this goal meant stopping a potential threat to regional and international stability; with East Timor, this goal meant fulfilling the humanitarian objectives of the organizations involved.

The components of connectivity and level of outrage provided other useful headings for the framework. In particular, depending on its nature, the level of outrage generated by the media, the international environment and the levels of concern expressed by international and regional communities can influence multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene. It appears that the moral and political impetus to act is dependent on the degree of outrage or shock felt, the extent of the atrocities on regional and international stability, and the immediacy of the act itself after a significant world event(s). Both cases of non-intervention illustrate that such levels of outrage are not boundless. These vocal concerns are frequently very selectively applied. Constant priming by the mass media is required to maintain levels of concern and even levels of interest.

6.3 The Implications of the Findings

The framework developed in the thesis attempts to provide clarity to a highly multifaceted issue by systematically accessing the significance of individual conditions. It provides a means to draw numerous generalizations from a small number of case studies. The framework provides multiple possible combinations of conditions that may result in a particular multilateral response. Furthermore, it suggests an insight into why multilateral interventions have not occurred to date in other internal conflicts. It also indicates that the conditions once thought to be of significance in determining multilateral intervention have lost their appeal. One particularly interesting finding is that there is no threshold of fatalities that determines a multilateral response. Fatalities often reflect the seriousness of the conflict, the extent to which it is entrenched in the society, and the extent it is visible to the global community. But fatality numbers appear to matter only in respect of whether it is a
‘humanitarian crisis’ or whether low fatalities indicate the possibility of a successful intervention policy.

The framework is of particular descriptive worth in constructing data on current internal conflicts. Additionally, if it is accepted that structural and perceptual conditions contribute to the decisional calculus, then the framework developed can be useful in formulating hypotheses about whether one might expect multilateral interventions into internal conflicts, or even when such a response is necessary. Consequently, the framework is of predictive and prescriptive value. While it may be limited in its scope, especially in terms of the limited number of cases, the framework offers useful conditions for further analysis, extending the current international debate on such a multifaceted subject matter. It incorporates conditions not previously examined, including the impact of disputant strategies and tactics adopted and the impact of the level of identification and organization of the disputants, and accordingly challenges their previous invisibility. If the data collection was expanded to include a larger number of cases and to varying responses to situations of internal conflict, the value of the framework may be increased.

A further collection of data from the processes of multilateral decision-making is necessary for full analysis of the primary conditions. Future researchers could look into what conditions determine each modality of intervention or non-intervention decisions. For example, what determines or fails to determine a particular economic, military or diplomatic response? Similarly, there needs to be some way to distinguish the various multilateral responses of peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement – which conditions determine which response? Conditions including the likelihood of success and genocide/politicide need more expansion, and the reliability of their codings improved. Moreover, other conditions warrant consideration but are not given significant emphasis in the framework, for example the importance of ethnicity needs to be ascertained as a determining condition of multilateral intervention or non-intervention. There is also a need for some new measurements when it comes to some of the conditions, especially the perceptual conditions in order to gain accurate findings.
Certainly, identifying the conditions that influence multilateral intervention policies serves as a useful yardstick from which to create such policies. Furthermore, understanding the conditions under which multilateral actors will intervene or not intervene in internal conflicts is central to the ability to evaluate the effectiveness of past and current multilateral interventions or non-interventions. This debate has become more significant with discussions about the 2001 report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) entitled ‘The Responsibility to Protect,’ and in the current international climate as a result of the escalation of the ‘war on terror’.

6.4 Recommendations

There is a current academic idea that applying certain criteria to multilateral decisions of intervention might help to increase the chances of success and secure support for such an intervention policy. Yet much of this criterion is based on the moral responsibility of intervention or justifying intervention actions, and does not take into account the individual and collective interests of Member States. The findings of the case studies suggest that multilateral actors are reluctant to take risks and costs when political will, for the collective and the self, is not provoked. A primary reason for the failure to respond to the ‘silent genocide’ in West Papua has been the perception, by those most capable of stopping the atrocities, that West Papua has not represented a compelling collective and national security issue. How does this impact on the guidelines set out by some scholars, practitioners and international bodies?

One recommendation is that certain conditions need to be considered in respect of any guidelines established by international bodies. Other recommendations include the empowerment of a non-governmental organization such as the World Court with the task of deciding when an internal conflict required a particular type of multilateral intervention; the appointment of a mixed military-civilian committee to establish whether multilateral intervention is viable and necessary and how it should

be carried out; and the creation of a permanent rescue team of mediators, diplomats
and military personnel from a large number of countries to be deployed in real time,
whenever and wherever needed. This thesis will, however, focus only on the
development of guidelines. Although the recommendations are utopian, it will be
helpful to shift the intellectual agenda from conditions that should allow multilateral
interventions to the design of appropriate guidelines that reflect the conditions
influencing collective and self political will.

Political interest is determined by the changing perceptions of multilateral
leaders that multilateral intervention is a necessary and viable option. This sense of
necessity and viability is triggered by blatant evidence of significant structural and
perceptual conditions. Criteria established in the literature provide no accountability
of political interests of multilateral actors. Criteria or other guidelines established by
ICISS or any other international body will not be influential in guiding multilateral
intervention policies unless this component is considered significant.

This is not to declare that there is no common ground between established
guidelines and the conditions illustrated as significant in the cases studied. The
perception of a successful policy and the consent of the sovereign state have been
included in most criteria set out by international bodies. The following sections make
contributions to the search for common criteria, by which to decide whether to
intervene or whether to not intervene in an internal conflict. It attempts to compile
two sets of guidelines that reflect both important current guidelines and certain
conditions found in the case studies to be of influence. This is an attempt to reflect the
importance of self and collective political interests in any multilateral policy.

While this chapter moves this thesis from being an empirical paper looking at
determinants of intervention or non-intervention decisions to discussing normative
issues (when multilateral actors should intervene), these two areas are related.
Without a clear understanding of the reality behind the decisions of multilateral
organizations, there can be no effective implementation of conditions as determinants
of multilateral intervention or non-intervention decisions.
6.4a Institutionalizing the Duty to Protect: New Criteria for Multilateral Decisions to Intervene

1. When there is a significant *international environment* or world event that makes multilateral intervention appear an attractive option.

2. When there is *consent* by the sovereign state (even if it is induced) and/or consent by the general majority of the grassroots community (willing to work for peace) and the other disputant(s). Coercive external intervention may simply trigger a much larger conflict, multiplying the human fatalities involved.

3. When there are *perceived audience costs* for inaction. This can be reflected in an existing medium to high level of public outrage.

4. When it is a *failed State* that has the potential of, or is affecting, its region negatively, in respect of UPMs, arms, people and drug trafficking, economic distress, and as a potential ‘haven’ for terrorist groups.

   A state fails when it lacks the ability to maintain control in the face of some type of threat which could compromise its authority such as an internal conflict. In a climate void of state control, disputants are able to pursue conflict without hindrance from a strong state military force and are likely to remain unwilling to reach a settlement while the possibility for political power and economic gain remains. This scenario creates the potential for intractable conflict, rendering civilian populations to the mercy of militias, warlords, and criminal gangs, and the possibility of creating regional and international instability.\(^5\)

5. When there is a *medium to high probability of success*, something which can be perceived by multilateral actors when there is a stalemate evident, an agreement from which to work from, a grassroots community or strong civil society willing to work for peace, and possible clear exit points or strategies.

   The chance for success must be seriously weighed before a multilateral intervention can take place. This perception can be formulated in various ways depending on the definition of ‘success’. “Does the intervention preserve or revert to a status quo that is grossly abusive? Are perpetrators left in positions of authority? Will civilians remain at risk once international forces depart?” Multilateral actors have a

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\(^5\) This notion of a ‘failed state’ has, of course, been prominent before the 1990s. It just has not previously gained this much spoken importance as a condition for multilateral intervention as it is currently. The Canadian Committee for the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations, December 1995, [http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/States.pdf](http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/States.pdf), 2.
responsibility to determine in advance that there is a good chance the intervention will improve rather than worsen the situation.

6. When there is the possibility of a self-interested Member State/neighbour(s) who can provide substantial economic, military and political capabilities to the multilateral intervention effort.

7. When the sovereign in conflict is only adopting negative modes of conflict resolution (strategies and tactics) towards the other disputants.

8. When the conflict involves the actual or apprehended action of genocide, politicide, large scale loss of life, with genocidal intent or not, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ by either disputant.

The principle of non-intervention in internal affairs cannot be used to protect genocidal acts or other atrocities such as large-scale violations of international humanitarian law or large-scale ethnic cleansing. These can be considered a threat to international security and as such should provoke action by multilateral organizations, especially the Security Council. One of the major difficulties with the term ‘genocide’ is that it is defined as a crime of specific intent – it requires that the guilty disputants intended to destroy all or part of an ethnic, racial, national or religious community. Identifying that intent can be a difficult struggle and has in the past led to many debates about the evidence of such intent. Furthermore, identifying and classifying the victims is a further complication.

9. When there is a degree of connectivity between the organization and the state in conflict. The multilateral actors have a stake in the positive outcome of the conflict. This might be in terms of UPMs, a humanitarian crisis, or global and regional stability.

10. When there is a perception of controllable costs and manageable risks undertaking a multilateral intervention policy. Costs and risks of such an intervention policy can be both indirect and direct.

11. When such an intervention policy is the last resort. Has every non-intervention option, including negotiations, diplomatic attempts, internal mediation, for meeting

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the threat in question been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing that the other measures will not succeed?\(^7\)

12. *The purpose is clearly explained to the public* involved in the conflict and the international community.

13. *Proper Purpose.* Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed intervention is to halt or avert the threat in question, for example, the cessation of hostilities between the disputants, whatever other purposes or motives may be involved? The purpose is limited to stopping the human rights abuses and when administration is necessary, for instance if it is a ‘failed state’.

14. *There is support of, or involvement by, regional organizations* in the peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement policies.\(^8\)

15. *The use of force should be proportional* to achieving the multilateral goals

### 6.4b Institutionalizing the Barriers Against Intervention: New Criteria for Non-Intervention Decisions

1. When there is a significant *international environment* or world event that makes multilateral intervention appear an *unattractive* option.

2. *High resistance levels* by the State in conflict to a policy of multilateral intervention, or at least, no substantial calls for intervention by the civil society or grassroots within the state in conflict. There is also no political will within the multilateral organization to attempt to induce the State’s consent.

3. When there are *no perceived audience costs* for inaction.

4. When there is *a medium to high probability of failure*, something which can be perceived by multilateral actors when there is no stalemate evident, no agreement from which to work from, a civil society that is not willing to work for peace, and no clear exit points or strategies.

5. When there is *not the possibility of a self-interested Member State/neighbour(s)* who could provide substantial economic, military and political capabilities to the multilateral intervention effort.

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\(^7\) Tension exists between those who argue that military intervention can legitimately occur *only* when peaceful remedies have been exhausted. Some analysts have suggested that all peaceful alternatives should be “considered” rather than “exhausted” prior to the use of forceful intervention. Stanley Hoffman, *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, South Bend, Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press, 1997, 39.

6. When the sovereign in conflict is adopting generally positive modes of conflict resolution (strategies and tactics) towards the other disputants.

7. When the conflict does not involve the actual or apprehended action of genocide, politicide, large scale loss of life, with genocidal intent or not, and ‘ethnic cleansing’ by either disputant.

8. When a degree of connectivity between the organization and the state in conflict. The multilateral actors do not have a stake in the positive outcome of the conflict is lacking.

9. When there is a perception of uncontrollable costs and unmanageable risks undertaking a multilateral intervention policy.

10. When such an intervention policy is not the last resort.

11. When there is no support of, or involvement by, regional organizations in the peacemaking, peacekeeping or peace enforcement policies.

12. When Self and collective political interest makes a multilateral policy of intervention an unattractive policy.

6.4c The Question of Evidence

Even if consensus is reached on the types of conditions or situations which might warrant multilateral intervention, it will still be necessary in each case to determine whether events on the ground do in fact meet the criteria presented. Defining when abuses are ‘grave’ or when there is a ‘disaster’ is highly subjective and the nature of the decision, whether it is made by the UN Security Council or another multilateral organization, would still invariably be highly politicized.9 In many cases competing ‘facts’ and versions of events will be produced. These are often created for the specific purpose of misleading multilateral opinions. Obtaining fair and accurate information is difficult but essential. One significant actor has been regional and international media coverage, but this has also been selective in terms of its application. The ICISS has suggested the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) as a possible monitoring candidate. 10

6.4d Difficulty in Gaining a Consensus


The difficulty of reaching a new consensus on certain guidelines that might (in principle) determine multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene must never be under-estimated. Questions remain over how a consensus on guidelines would be reached, who would set out such criteria, and who would oversee their implementation. Presumably the UN would have a major role in this process, but not all its Member States share the same views.

From a legal point of view, it would be possible to attempt to codify situations where multilateral intervention would be and would not be allowed. However, perhaps it is more realistic to look at these multilateral decisions in the same way as “necessity” under national law. Normally necessity is not codified; rather its very nature is such that it can be identified when it occurs. The alternative could be to codify criteria outside the Charter, such as through regional organizations. But Article 103 provides that, “in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the UN under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.”\footnote{Daniele Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitan Guidelines for Humanitarian Intervention’, Italian National Research Council, Rome, 2 October 2002, available at \url{http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/seminar/03/Archibugi_HumanitarianIntervention.rtf}, accessed 5 May 2006.}

This means that even if attempts were made to codify situations where multilateral intervention could or should be undertaken, there remains the problem of a possible conflict with the Charter of the UN.

An obvious obstacle to creating guidelines comes from Member States who are unwilling to subscribe to multilaterally agreed codes of conduct. In such an application of guidelines, Member States would agree to limit their freedom and even to take on the obligation to participate in a type of humanitarian ‘International Fire Brigade’. But Member States may have direct interests in preventing what may be perceived as interference. Is there a danger that, by softening the principle of non-intervention, the UN and other regional organizations may get on a slippery slope of forcible interference?\footnote{Semb, 2000, 469.} As Jane Stromseth argues, the current system reduces this
probability because “states engaging in humanitarian intervention know that they have an extraordinarily [sic] high burden of justification.”

The major problem in creating criteria is that, by putting energy into establishing firm criteria, attention is diverted from the heart of the problem: how states and organizations operationalize conditions. Even supposedly clear guidelines such as ‘large scale’, or ‘extreme emergency’ are not foolproof; they are ultimately subject to political judgement as ascertained in the analysis of the four cases studied. The unruly process of argument and discussion within the Security Council and other multilateral organizations, and within the military councils of individual states, may remain the key factors determining the future incidences of interventions for humanitarian purposes. At an Asiaweek-PECC roundtable, Allen Hawke argues that “the reality is that you’re going to have to deal with situations on an ad hoc basis. I doubt very much if you’re going to be able to have a priori formulation of principle which is going to satisfy every situation.”

6.4e Mobilizing International Political Will

The analysis of the four cases suggests that the key to influencing multilateral intervention is to mobilize domestic, regional and international support or outrage for a situation of internal conflict, or at least to neutralize domestic, regional and international opposition. The Secretary-General’s routine activities and interaction with the Security Council, and his international profile with Member States and the media, give him a unique opportunity to mobilize international support for a particular multilateral decision. In respect of the media, there is no question about the effect that exceptional reporting, well-argued opinion pieces and in particular ‘real time’ transmission of images of suffering have in generating both domestic and international pressure to act. But this ‘CNN effect’ can be unbalanced in its impact, with similarly troubling crises not always receiving similar attention.

14 Ibid.
6.5 Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to develop policy-relevant generalizations from a useful framework which conceptually defines and operationally measures 22 structural and perceptual conditions. The framework and cases examined illustrate whether multilateral organizations decide to intervene in internal conflicts or leave the conflict to its own devices as a result of an amalgamation of structural and perceptual conditions, with humanitarian concerns being only one of these conditions. Furthermore, the analysis has established that multilateral policies, like other major decisions, are made with considerations of the structural (environment) and perceived risks and costs involved in such an undertaking, the possible benefits of action versus inaction, the perceived or actual degree of connectivity in the internal conflict, and the extent to which there is an actual or perceived high level of international outrage felt regarding the situation. Upon review there will always be some structural or perceptual conditions that attract a particular response, but how these conditions trigger a particular response is determined by the political self and collective interests of multilateral actors.

However, some of the primary conditions that influenced the multilateral policies of intervention in the Solomon Islands and East Timor are also prevalent in the cases of the Philippines and East Timor. This unequal distribution of multilateral responses suggests an ad hoc nature and selection bias within each decision to intervene or to not intervene. In light of the shift in attitude at the UN World Summit in September 2005 that the World Body has a “responsibility to protect”, this is of grave concern.

It should be recognized that there are limits to multilateral intervention. It is not advisable in every circumstance, and any guidelines need to reflect the political, financial, ethical, and operational constraints. Given some conditions such as the characteristics of the conflict and the orientation of the disputants, sometimes the best strategy is not to intervene. Intervening, it may turn out, simply increases the level of conflict without any reasonable prospect of achieving a desired outcome.
Forcing Member States to define in advance the parameters under which they would consider multilateral intervention might introduce a measure of predictability and accountability into this multilateral process. It could also have a deterrent effect on future violators of human rights. Such criteria could also provide a tangible focus for discussion on the issue of multilateral intervention by offering an analytical lens through which to examine and evaluate ongoing or past instances of multilateral intervention. Moreover, clear guidelines hedge against arguments about double standards and accusations that interventions are only for self-serving reasons. In particular, criteria could expose the rhetoric of some states who use human rights as a false justification for intervening in the affairs of their neighbours, or those that use sovereignty as a convenient shield to hide behind while massacring their own civilian populations. It would be easier to reach expeditious intervention decisions in multilateral organizations if there were agreed guidelines stating clear positions on the circumstances under which each organization’s peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement operations would be warranted or not.

It is apparent that the debate over when it is ‘right or wrong’ to use multilateral intervention to stem internal conflicts and their humanitarian consequences has now taken on a new urgency. Millions of human beings remain at the mercy of internal conflicts, insurgencies, state repression and state collapse. What is at stake here is the delivering of practical protection for ordinary people whose lives are at risk, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect them. The experience and aftermath of Somalia, Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, as well as multilateral interventions or non-interventions in the current cases of East Timor, the Solomon Islands, the Philippines, and West Papua provide a clear indication that the ad hoc basis and selectivity of multilateral decisions to intervene or to not intervene need now to be comprehensively reassessed.
## Appendix

### Figure 16: Summary Comparison of Case Studies: Evidence of Structural and Perceptual Conditions Extended

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>East Timor</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>West Papua</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural Costs and Risks</td>
<td>DISP</td>
<td>International power - decolonization</td>
<td>Material or Territorial, International power, and National Power</td>
<td>Material or Territorial, International power, and National Power</td>
<td>International power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATAL</td>
<td>DISP</td>
<td>10,000 to 250,000</td>
<td>100-1,000</td>
<td>65,000-120,000</td>
<td>30,000-100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Duration</td>
<td>24 years</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>40 years: ongoing</td>
<td>41 years: ongoing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
<td>Escalation</td>
<td>De-escalation-Termination</td>
<td>Hostilities phase-Termination</td>
<td>Escalation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILCAP</td>
<td>20,000 personnel</td>
<td>2,000 personnel</td>
<td>Disputants: 47,000 members</td>
<td>15,000-20,000 Indonesia forces; 1,600 Disputant forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOCAP</td>
<td>AUS$476.8 million for a year</td>
<td>AUS$853 million over a decade</td>
<td>No basis for judgement</td>
<td>No basis for judgement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFIGHT</td>
<td>2 Groups of Disputants but included 20 odd militia gangs</td>
<td>7 of more Disputants but IFM and MEF remained dominant</td>
<td>3-4 main disputants</td>
<td>3 main disputants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACSTRA</td>
<td>There have just been systematic negative uses of</td>
<td>There have been some attempts at positive uses of</td>
<td>There have been some attempts at positive uses of</td>
<td>There have just been systematic negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPEROS</td>
<td>Conflict resolution instruments by just the government</td>
<td>Conflict resolution by both disputants but the government and opposition occasionally resort to negative instruments of conflict management</td>
<td>Conflict resolution by both disputants but the government and opposition occasionally resort to negative instruments of conflict management</td>
<td>Uses of conflict resolution instruments by just the government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDENORG</td>
<td>Superpower takes a direct interest in the resolution of the internal conflict and supports intervention</td>
<td>Superpower remains neutral and inactive to the conflict resolution process and intervention decision</td>
<td>Superpower remains neutral and inactive to the conflict resolution process and non-intervention decision</td>
<td>Superpower remains neutral and inactive to the conflict resolution process and non-intervention decision</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIATE</td>
<td>The Disputants were well organized and identifiable</td>
<td>Limited Organization and Identifiability of disputants</td>
<td>Limited Organization and Identifiability of disputants</td>
<td>Limited Organization and Identifiability of disputants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intervention was requested or consented to by the central government (even if it was induced)</td>
<td>Intervention was by invitation</td>
<td>No concerted efforts to call for intervention</td>
<td>Intervention was requested by the opposition and grassroots community, but resisted by the central government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Failure of state authority in a Complete collapse of state control</td>
<td>Adverse regime changes</td>
<td>Failure of state authority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Benefits</td>
<td>ECWEALTH</td>
<td>Exceptionally scarce and valuable resources – potential to be a profit</td>
<td>Some important resources – potential to be a profit</td>
<td>Exceptionally scarce and valuable resources – potential to be a profit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFAIL</td>
<td>limited area of the country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country of its capital.</td>
<td>with no substantial weakening of state institutions or persistent collapse of public order in Manila; Mindanao-Sulu: failure of state authority in a limited part of the country, i.e. succession</td>
<td>in a limited area of the country, for example, secession or rebel control of, or anarchic conditions in, one or several regions that do not include the core area of the country of its capital.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Connectivity</td>
<td>SPILL</td>
<td>Over 500,000 IDPs/refugees</td>
<td>35,000 IDPs/refugees</td>
<td>200,000-500,000 IDPs/refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECIMPORT</td>
<td>Not highly integrated in the regional and international market, not a strong and important trading partner, without membership in important trading agreements</td>
<td>Not highly integrated in the regional and international market, not a strong and important trading partner, without membership in important trading agreements</td>
<td>Highly integrated in the regional and international market, a strong and important trading partner, with membership in important trading agreements</td>
<td>Not highly integrated in the regional and international market, not a strong and important trading partner, without membership in important trading agreements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Level of Outrage</td>
<td>MEDIA</td>
<td>Interviro</td>
<td>Perceptual Costs, Risks and Benefits</td>
<td>Likelihood Success</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trading Agreement</td>
<td>Media coverage was extremely intense after the televised Santa Cruz massacre</td>
<td>Coverage was sporadic and did not generate any domestic political resonance</td>
<td>Coverage was directed towards the conflict as there were incidents of high-profile kidnappings, but there has yet to be any sustained attention on the conflict itself</td>
<td>No evidence of concentrated media attention on this conflict</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Post-Rwanda and Srebrenica</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>War on Terror has extended to the Philippines and ASG</td>
<td>No evidence on how this might impact on the attractiveness of non-intervention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Post-September 11th and post-Bali</td>
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<tr>
<td>In respect of ASEAN</td>
<td>Limited evidence: the possibility of gaining negative reputations did not hinder intervention</td>
<td>No evidence of reputational interest in decision to not intervene</td>
<td>No evidence of reputational interest in decision to not intervene</td>
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<tr>
<td>No stalemate evident or substantial agreement, yet there was a strong grassroots community</td>
<td>The conflict was <em>ripe</em> for intervention</td>
<td>Strong civil society, stalemate and agreement</td>
<td>No stalemate evident or substantial agreement, yet there was a strong grassroots community</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlight</td>
<td>illustrates the secondary conditions that resulted in multilateral intervention and non-intervention</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highlight</td>
<td>illustrates the primary conditions that resulted in multilateral intervention and non-intervention</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 17: Summary Comparison of Case Studies: Evidence of Primary Conditions for Multilateral Intervention and Non-Intervention in Order of Importance:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Conditions for Intervention</th>
<th>Primary Conditions for Non-Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. REFCRISIS</td>
<td>1. MAGFAIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. INITIATE</td>
<td>2. INTENVIRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. INTENVIRO</td>
<td>3. LIKESUCCESS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. MEDIA</td>
<td>4. INITIATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. DEATHMAG</td>
<td>5. ECOCAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. LEVOUT</td>
<td>6. CLEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>West Papua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. TACSTRA</td>
<td>1. MEDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. DURATION</td>
<td>2. PHASE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. INITIATE</td>
<td>3. CLEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. INITIATE</td>
<td>4. DURATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. MEDIA</td>
<td>5. MEDIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. CLEAR</td>
<td>6. CLEAR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 18: Summary Comparison of Non-Overlapping Primary Conditions that Attracted Multilateral Intervention and Non-Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention</th>
<th>Non-Intervention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DURATION</td>
<td>DURATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIATE</td>
<td>INITIATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGFAIL</td>
<td>ECIMPORT</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTENVIRO</td>
<td>INTENVIRO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLEAR</td>
<td>NO CLEAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDIA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHASE</td>
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</table>
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