Consequences of Ethnic Conflict: Explaining Refugee Movements in the Southeast Asia/Pacific Region

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree of Master of Arts in Political Science, in the University of Canterbury, by Julia Johnstone.

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Julia Johnstone

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“They are living monuments to war, disorder, long-term social collapse, governmental failure, prejudice and sheer malice. They pay directly for the militaristic swaggering of their leaders, for the intolerance of political and religious orthodoxy and for the short-term successes of mindless power-seekers.”

(Gordenker, 1987, p. 6).
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Abstract

Ethnic conflict is the most common type of internal armed conflict in the world. It often involves systematic attacks on civilian populations and is therefore also the major source of most of the world’s 9.2 million external refugees and 25 million internal refugees. In 2003, Asia-Pacific was the region second most affected by conflict-induced displacement and in 2004 it had the second largest global number of internal refugees following Africa. Given the likelihood that this trend will continue, it is perhaps surprising that a relative lack of research has been conducted concerning the relationship between ethnic conflict and refugee movements within this region compared to other areas. It is therefore imperative that a comprehensive study be undertaken to fill this void of knowledge. The fundamental question posed by my thesis is “why do some ethnic conflicts produce external refugees and others do not in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region? To answer this question, this thesis develops a theoretical model from which to analyse variations in both external and internal refugee numbers as a result of ethnic conflict in the region. It applies the model to specific ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands during the period 1995 – 2005 and identifies a common set of factors conducive to creating internal and external refugees. The findings emphasise the interlinked nature of the variables and demonstrate that no single-factor explanation exists that can explain how refugees are created.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The majority of conflicts in the world are no longer between states, they are within them. Since the post-Cold War period (1990 – 2003), 55 of the 59 different major armed conflicts in 48 different locations registered were internal (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2004, p. 132). Many of these internal conflicts also possess an ethnic dimension. From the early 1950s only a few countries had experienced ethnic conflict, but by the early 1990s, 31 countries had been affected by them (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p.1). The rate of new ethnic conflicts peaked at the end of the Cold War when the Soviet Union was collapsing (figure 1). In 1991 alone, eight new conflicts broke out; more than double the number from any other year since 1955. Furthermore, 20 ethnic conflicts erupted within seven years (1988 – 1994), composing nearly one-third of the total number of conflicts that had arisen since 1955. Although the rate of new ethnic conflicts declined in the late 1990s, ethnic conflict remains the most common type of internal armed conflict in the world (Goldstone et al, 2000, pp. 33 - 34).

Figure 1: Global Incidence of Ethnic War, 1955 - 98

These ethnic conflicts mostly originate in the newly independent states of Africa and Asia and the post-Communist states, and can largely be attributed to the geographical distribution of politically active ethnic groups (Gurr and Harff, 2004, pp. 13-15). As the figure below shows, in 2001, Africa had the largest number of politically active ethnic groups in the world, followed by the post-Communist states and states in the Asia-Pacific region (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 4). These findings seem to support Ganguly’s (2002, p. 3) argument that ethnic conflicts in Central/West Africa and South/South East Asia are increasing, whereas elsewhere they have been declining.

**Figure 2: Politically Active Groups by Region, 2001**

![Figure 2: Politically Active Groups by Region, 2001](image)

Source: Gurr and Harff, c2004, p. 4.

Ethnic conflicts are also the source of most of the world’s refugees because they usually involve systematic attacks on civilian populations (Brown, 1993, p. 17; Weiner, 1996, p. 21). In 2002, about two-thirds of the world’s 15 million refugees were fleeing from ethnopolitical conflict and repression (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 1). Furthermore, almost 38 million people have been displaced and seven million killed during ethnic conflicts, making them the greatest cause of human suffering (Brown, 1996, pp.4-7, Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 339).
Despite these facts, the salience of both ethnic conflict and refugee movements in international relations has previously been overlooked; both being relegated to peripheral areas in international relations theory and either marginalised, or disregarded altogether. However, contemporary developments have meant that ethnicity has assumed a greater degree of importance, as most of the almost two hundred member states of the United Nations are ethnically heterogenous, with groups increasingly asserting their ethnic distinctiveness and making it known that their ethnic bonds are stronger than their national allegiances. Kuran (1998, p. 35) acknowledges that: “Subnational groups that had appeared to be assimilating into geographically defined populations are now demanding ethnically based economic rights, political power, and social respect. Moreover, elections, development strategies, coups, and international treaties increasingly involve ethnic dimensions.”

This, combined with the comparative lack of research conducted on ethnic conflict and refugee trends within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region, compared to other areas, such as Africa and Eastern Europe, have limited our understanding of the relationship between these phenomena and the processes by which they become diffused. It is therefore important that a comprehensive study be undertaken to fill this void of knowledge, to explain what factors have made the Southeast Asia/Pacific region the second most affected by conflict-induced displacement in the world (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 5).

**Definition of an “Ethnic Conflict”**

Although many authors mention or allude to the concept of an “ethnic conflict” in their work, most do not define the term and seem to assume that its meaning is generally understood. To understand the term “ethnic conflict,” one must first define “ethnicity.” The word “ethnicity” derives from the Greek “ethnikos,” (the adjective of “ethnos”), which refers to a people or nation (Cashmore, 2004, p. 142). In his influential work on ethnic conflict, Horowitz (1985, pp. 17-18) explained that: “Ethnic groups are defined by ascriptive differences, whether the indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof….This is an inclusive concept of ethnicity [that facilitates] comparison,” and, “Ethnicity is close to Max
Weber’s conception of a ‘subjective belief’ in ‘common descent’…ethnicity embraces groups differentiated by color, language, and religion; it covers ‘tribes,’ ‘races,’ ‘nationalities,’ and ‘castes.’” (p. 53).

In contemporary usage, the word “ethnic” also retains this basic meaning because it describes a group of people who share some level of solidarity and coherence and who are aware of having a common plight and historical experience. These shared experiences are often founded on feelings of relative deprivation. Once these similarities are realised, the group can then construct boundaries, inside which their own beliefs, customs and cultures are developed (Cashmore, 2004, p. 142). Ethnicity therefore becomes a cultural phenomenon in response to material conditions (Ibid, p. 145). An “ethnic conflict” may arise when one or more of these defined boundaries are threatened by another ethnic community (Brown, 1993, p. 5) and involves: “Episodes of violent conflict between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities (ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status” (State Failure Project, 1997).

Drawing on these preceding ideas, an “ethnic conflict” is defined as “war among communities (ethnicities) that are in conflict over the power relationship that exists between those communities and the state” (Sambanis, 2001, p. 261; Kaufman, 1996, p. 138). However, it is important to realise that not all conflicts involving different ethnicities are necessarily “ethnic conflicts.” The issues at the centre of the conflict must be integral to the concept of ethnicity as described above (Sambanis, 2001, p. 261).

**Characteristics of Ethnic Conflict**

In order to better recognise ethnic conflicts and to understand their nature, it is helpful to determine the similar characteristics they possess. Ethnic conflicts often involve violence and bloodshed due to their seemingly intractable and highly intense nature (Cooper and Berdal, 1993, p. 203; Stack, 1997, p.17). This recourse to violence may be related to evidence which shows that ethnic conflicts are more likely to: “have violent triggers; induce a resort to violence and to higher levels of violence; and involve the use of violence as the primary means” (Moore and Davis, 1998, p. 91).
Brown (1993, p. 24) argues that this intensity occurs because groups involved in ethnic conflicts are highly motivated, often believing that their very existence is at risk and involving higher perceived threats to basic values. This means that such conflicts are likely to have a higher incidence of stalemate or compromise outcomes and to be terminated by less formal agreements (Moore and Davis, 1998, p. 91). Carment and James (1997, p. 259) liken this situation to a “zero-sum” outcome, in that ethnic conflicts begin from within an environment of fear, which “will be resolved through the destruction or assimilation of a group.” They argue that this is especially probable if the political system is organised along ethnic lines and one group becomes dominant.

Ethnic conflicts are often based on non-negotiable traits and values and therefore tend to be of a longer duration than other conflicts, as the tension between parties is likely to be deeply entrenched creating the conditions for protracted conflicts (Cooper and Berdal, 1993, p. 196). Due to this, “many ethnic conflicts have proven largely resistant to lasting, peaceful resolutions because the groups involved believe they are fighting for their nation’s survival; powerful ethnocentric emotions tend to overwhelm calls by outside mediators for power sharing and rational dialogue” (Wood, 1994, p. 613). These non-negotiable traits or values may involve questions of identity, effective participation, security and other basic needs or social goals (Carment and James, 1997, p. 260). Gurr and Harff (2004, p. 35) agree, arguing that a common underlying trait in all ethnic conflicts is that people become more acutely aware of their common identity. This awareness can be heightened by attacks from other groups, by appeals from their leaders, or by dramatic examples of political action undertaken by similar groups elsewhere. The divergence of this fundamental identity manifests itself into an “us-them” syndrome and is at the basis of all ethnic conflicts.

A recent history of ethnic conflict, ethnic diversity and ethnic discrimination are other indicators that are most strongly associated with the outbreak of ethnic conflict. The State Failure Task Force Report (2000) found that countries which had previously experienced a major ethnic conflict were three times more likely to suffer from a new ethnic conflict.
Furthermore, the probability of an ethnic conflict occurring was four times as high for those countries with very diverse populations. The most significant factor the Task Force discovered was that in countries where certain ethnic minorities are subjected to substantial political or economic discrimination, the odds of a new ethnic war starting were more than ten times as high (Goldstone et al, 2000, p. 33). This is because when an ethnic group’s identity is coupled with feelings of resentment and discrimination or it feels aggrieved in response to an unequal status in comparison with other groups, and it is perceived as impossible to redress these grievances through legal or political channels, violent ethnic conflict can ensue (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 35; de Nevers, 1993, p. 62).

These feelings of resentment are therefore often directed at the state, and so as well as ethnic conflicts involving a mixed ethnic community within a single state (de Nevers, 1993, p. 62), they are generally also between governments and ethnic movements; that is, between a legally recognised authority and a rather ill defined and possibly illegal movements (Cooper and Berdal, 1993, p. 196).

Like other conflicts, lower levels of economic development and integration in the global political system may also be associated with greater risks of ethnic conflict (Sambanis, 2001, p. 266). Goldstone et al (2000, p. 33) found that countries with worse-than-average infant mortality rates were twice as likely to experience ethnic conflict and that countries with relatively few memberships in regional organizations were three times more likely to face ethnic conflict than countries with many regional memberships.

**Costs of Ethnic Conflict**

Ethnic conflicts often involve serious costs and consequences. Many analysts fear that ethnic conflict is contagious under certain circumstances; meaning that a “bandwagon” can produce ethnic dissimilation within one country by drawing in neighbours and outside opportunists, which in turn can create a “super bandwagon” that heightens the role of ethnicity in successive others, inevitably destabilising whole regions (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, pp. 3, 36-37, 341). Indeed, almost half of the 61 ethnic conflicts that began between 1955 and 1998 either preceded or coincided with some other state-failure episode. Some ethnic conflicts instigate a surge of additional ethnic conflicts, others
because governments to collapse; and still others prompt governments to initiate large-
scale, indiscriminate killings (genocides or politicides) (Goldstone et al, 2000, p. 34).

However, ethnic conflict only seems to be contagious under certain circumstances. Unless local conditions are ripe for its transmission (for example where states are weak and have not developed effective solutions to their strategic dilemmas, the balance of ethnic power is precarious or the demands made by each side are large and the costs of conflict are small), the spread of ethnic conflict is unlikely (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, pp. 24, 28). These conditions seem to apply to much of Africa and in the newly independent states of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 341). Additionally, they also apply to the Asia/Pacific region, which has suffered from the largest number of “major armed conflicts” of any region in every year between 1989 and 1997 (Reilly and Graham, 2004, p. 10). Such conflicts can have devastating consequences (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 26).

Reasons for attempting to prevent the diffusion and escalation of ethnic conflicts include humanitarian objectives, (such as the value of preventing slaughter), economic objectives (including the value of trade with prosperous states in the region), and to some extent ideological objectives (in the sense that the success of exclusivist ethnic programmes in Eastern Europe “might contribute to the undermining the legitimacy of liberal democratic ‘civic’ notions of citizenship in the West” (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p.108). It is not necessary to simply observe ethnic conflict spreading to conclude that it is a potential problem. Even the forestalling of the diffusion of ethnic conflict is important, as any alteration in the current actors involved may lead to greater escalation or diffusion in the future (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 25). Moreover, once internal conflicts involve neighbouring states, violence becomes far more difficult to control and resolve (Brown, 1996, p. 26). The effects of ethnic conflicts on neighbouring states are also important because these problems often activate minor conflicts and bloodshed (Brown, 1996, p. 594).
The table below shows conflict trends in ten Southeast Asian/Pacific countries from 1946 – 2004. The conflicts are assessed based on the International Peace Research Institute’s (PRIO) “Armed Conflict” database. This database measures the intensity level of a conflict according to the number of deaths it created. Gleditsch et al (2002, p. 10) define a “minor” conflict as “at least 25 battle-related deaths per year for every year in the period.” An “intermediate” conflict has “more than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1,000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1,000 per year,” and a “war” has “at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year” (Gleditsch et al, 2002, p. 10). Unfortunately, the dataset does not include all the conflicts that have occurred in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region and notably omits those ethnic conflicts which occurred in Fiji and the Solomon Islands because they have less than the minimum threshold of deaths required to be termed as a “minor” conflict.

It also does not provide an overall total of refugees created from the conflicts from 1946 – 2004, as a reliable individual breakdown of refugee numbers is unavailable for each of the conflicts. However, the UNHCR’s “2004 Global Refugee Trends” provides an estimate of the total population of concern to the UNHCR within each country as at the end of 2004. This is perhaps the best reliable indicator for refugee numbers available, although it unfortunately includes all types of refugees and not just those induced by conflict. Despite this, it provides an idea of the number of refugees emerging from each country.
Table 1: Conflict and Refugee Trends in the Southeast Asia/Pacific Region, 1946 – 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Conflict Duration</th>
<th>Intensity Level</th>
<th>Total People of Concern end-2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&lt;10 yrs</td>
<td>10-24 yrs</td>
<td>25-39 yrs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma/Myanmar</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Papua New Guinea</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Table 1 demonstrates that the majority of conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region from 1946 – 2004 have lasted 40 or more years and have all created at least 25 battle-related deaths. Some conflicts have suffered from minor wars, intermediate wars, and wars during the period 1946 – 2004, which indicates that they are highly intractable. Thailand had the largest total population of concern to the UNHCR at the end of 2004,
whereas Laos had no population of concern to the UNHCR, perhaps because of its more authoritarian government.

The Diffusion of Ethnic Conflict

The process by which ethnic conflicts spread is a subject of considerable debate. The concepts of “contagion,” “escalation,” “diffusion,” and “internationalisation,” are used interchangeably in the literature to describe this process, but are not usually clearly defined. Although the term “diffusion” has varying definitions in the literature (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 221; Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 4), for the purposes of this thesis it is defined as “the spillover processes by which conflicts in one country directly affect neighboring countries” (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 3). This definition best encapsulates the means through which ethnic conflicts become diffused by refugee movements, as it is through these “spillover processes” that a conflict in one country can directly affect political organisation and action in adjacent states (Gurr, 1993, p.133).

Lake and Rothchild (1998, pp. 25-27) argue that ethnic conflict can be diffused through one of four closely interrelated processes:

1. Events abroad may directly alter the domestic ethnic balance of power, which in turn disrupts the existing ethnic contract and precipitates violence. This can occur, for example, through refugee flows from neighbouring states that might substantially alter the ethnic composition of the receiving state, or through armed insurgents from one state seeking refuge in another, provoking local conflicts.

2. Ethnic conflict in one state may encourage groups in another to make more extreme demands. If groups in one state witness ethnic mobilisation or political success by ethnic groups in another, they may increase their own political agitation to obtain a larger proportion of the country’s resources, increasing the likelihood of conflict. Likewise, ethnic conflict overseas may lead groups to revise their beliefs about the possible demands of other groups in their own country, even if no action has actually

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1 Exceptions to this include: Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 3; Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 4; and, Gurr, 1993, p.134.
occurred, and may encourage them to strike pre-emptively to secure their own interests.

3. Ethnic conflict abroad may cause groups to update their beliefs about the efficacy of the political safeguards contained in their existing ethnic contracts. For instance, if events overseas suggest that the economic leverage wielded by wealthy minority groups is less effective than originally thought, the poorer majority may become emboldened and the minority threatened, again creating conflict without any obvious changes in the domestic conditions.

4. Ethnic conflict abroad may also encourage groups to revise their beliefs about the costs of protest or, eventually, violence and their probability of success. If protest and violence is effective overseas this may lead groups at home to believe that they too can obtain their goals through coercion. Furthermore, if groups predict that the international community will punish violent acts, but it becomes likely this will not occur; groups will lower their estimated costs of using violence and are increasingly likely to use force.

Although the above explanations are detailed, they do not consider other common important means of diffusion, including international terrorism or partisan intervention. Both Brown (1993, p. 16) and Ganguly (2002, pp. 70-71) provide a broader analysis of the process by which ethnic conflict can be diffused. Brown (1993, p. 16) suggests diffusion can occur through: civilian slaughter; weapons of mass destruction; chain reaction effects; neighbouring powers; distant interests; international organisations; and, refugee flows. Whereas, Ganguly (2002, pp. 70-71) argues that diffusion can occur through one of four processes:

- international diplomatic activity of ethnonationalists and states confronted with ethnic conflict; or,
- partisan intervention by outside states in a domestic ethnic conflict; or
- international terrorism used by ethnonationalists or secessionists; or
- refugee flows from domestic ethnic conflicts.
The diffusion of ethnic conflict through refugee movements is a commonality that exists within Lake and Rothchild, Brown, and Gangulys’ methods of diffusion. While it is important to acknowledge that not all ethnic conflicts produce refugees (Suhrke, 1993, p. 230; Newland, 1993, p. 143), this commonality demonstrates that refugee movements are a salient means by which ethnic conflict is diffused and is therefore the subject of this thesis.

**Definition of a “Refugee”**

The term “refugee” was apparently first used by the French Huguenots who sought sanctuary in England after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. It is derived from the French réfugié (which in turn derived from the word réfugier), which means to flee (Stein, 2004, p. 363). In a colloquial sense, a “refugee” is commonly distinguished from an “economic migrant,” as someone who is forced to migrate, rather than someone who has moved more or less voluntarily (Black, 2001, p. 63). It is therefore important to mention that this study separates and excludes patterns of migration which are solely or largely generated by voluntary and self-determined decisions. Refugees can broadly be divided into two major categories – external and internal refugees. Although both types flee for similar reasons, they are not classified as the same under international law and therefore do not qualify for the same international protection.

**The concept of an “external refugee”**

Unlike the colloquial definition, international law defines an “external refugee” more specifically. The most internationally accepted definition of an “external refugee” is the United Nations concept, which was formulated in the immediate post-World War Two period, mainly in response to European refugee movements. This definition was codified in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Convention), which defines an external refugee as a person who: “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (1951).
As the Convention expressly addressed external refugees in Europe who claimed asylum before 1951, the UNHCR had no legal authority to help such refugees outside Europe or involved in World War Two and its aftermath. This was because despite its appearance, the regime was designed to be of regional and provisional use, rather than as a model of universal application (Coles, 1989, p. 374). In order to broaden its application, the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Protocol) was adopted. This widened the definition of an “external refugee” to include all others who were outside their country of nationality as a consequence of a well-founded fear of persecution, irrespective of whether their flight was caused by events in Europe prior to 1951 (Gordenker, 1987, p. 38). Furthermore, the UN has passed numerous covenants on human rights again extending these protections, including “liberty of movement,” “freedom to choose his residence,” and the right “to leave any country, including his own” (Wood, 1994, p. 622).

Additionally, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) implemented the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (1969), due to the irrelevance of the Convention and Protocol in many external refugee situations in developing countries due to decolonisation. While the 1969 Convention generally follows the 1951 Convention of an “external refugee,” it widened the definition by including those persons who: “…owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality” (OAU, 1969).

This broader concept emphasises that victims of foreign domination and “events seriously disturbing public order” are equally worthy of special consideration to those who are escaping persecution. It therefore captures the problems of instability, natural and man-

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2 The 1967 Protocol’s definition of an “external refugee” is: “any person who is outside the country of his nationality…because he has or had [a] well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and is unable or, because of such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the government of the country of his nationality” (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 4).
made disasters which primarily cause external refugees within Africa (Zolberg, 1989, p. 29).

As a further response to the mass outflows of external refugees in developing countries, the Central American governments approved the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees (1984). Like the 1969 Convention, it again widened the definition of an “external refugee,” to render it more applicable to the actual causes of external refugees in developing countries to include: “persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order” (1984).

Incorporating the above definitions, this thesis defines an “external refugee” as someone who has fled their country by crossing an internationally recognized state border, because their lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression or occupation, internal conflicts, massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.

This broad definition reflects the changing nature of international relations since the Cold War and emphasises that generalised violence rather than individualised threats are most significant in creating external refugees. It also encapsulates the idea that people flee from many different types of danger and that the state is often not the only or main terrorizing agent. However, it is important to stress that the above definition does not include:

a) economic migrants (who are not fleeing from any danger);

b) internal refugees (who have not crossed an international border);

c) environmental refugees (who are fleeing for environmental reasons); or,

d) forced ecomigration (which is propelled by economic decline and environmental degradation).
The concept of an “internal refugee”

As previously mentioned, “internal refugees” (often known as “internally displaced persons” or “IDPs”) flee from similar dangers as “external refugees,” but are distinguishable from the latter because they have not crossed an international border to seek refuge in another country. Internal refugees therefore remain, for whatever reason, in their own states. This means that they do not qualify for refugee status under the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol definitions. Furthermore, unlike external refugees, no Convention exists which is specifically designated to address internal refugees. However, the UN has formulated the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement which allows it to take responsibility for internal refugees under certain general circumstances (UNHCR, 1997, p. 117). While these Principles provide greater protection to internal refugees, they do not allow the UNHCR to universally aid all internal refugees, with each involvement being decided on a case-by-case basis (Schmeidl, 1998, p. 25). Occasionally the UN has designated the UNHCR or its other agencies to organise assistance for internal refugees, and on rare occasions, the international community has intervened militarily or politically in civil wars on their behalf (Newman, 2003, p. 6; UNHCR, 1997, pp. 117-118).

Although the UNHCR defines internal refugees as “people [who] are forced to flee…but they either cannot or do not wish to cross an international border,” the most widely used working definition is contained in a 1992 report of the secretary-general of the United Nations, which identifies internal refugees as: “persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of human rights or natural or man-made disasters, and who are within the territory of their own country” (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p. 16).

However, in practice, the above definition excludes many cases of internal displacement as it overlooks three important factors: time, the numbers involved, and the instigator for flight. Internal refugees do not necessarily flee “suddenly or unexpectedly,” nor do they always flee “in large numbers.” Furthermore, internal refugees are not always “forced to flee.” Sometimes they are expelled from their homes or forcibly moved by their
governments for political or ethnic reasons (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p. 17). Therefore, the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons and a group of international lawyers have widened the above definition to rectify these discrepancies and define an “internal refugee” as persons or groups of persons: “who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular, as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border” (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p. 18).

An “internal refugee” is defined in this thesis using the above definition, with the omission of the words “natural disasters.” This is because this thesis does not address environmental factors as a cause of refugee flight.

**Refugee Movements as a Consequence of Ethnic Conflict**

Refugee movements are not a new phenomenon; the concept of people fleeing to seek sanctuary is as old as the development of international borders and the nation-state system itself (Helton, 2002, p. 8). Throughout history refugees have been caused by political and ethnic violence, persecution and pogroms, war, famine, environmental degradation and impoverishment (Loescher, 1992, p. 9). Most refugee movements occur in the developing world where war, famine and political repression primarily contribute to their growth, causing an additional burden upon the poorer and less secure states (Loescher, 1992, p. 10). Furthermore, since the Cold War, the number of countries with major ethnic conflicts and refugee movements has steadily increased (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 1).

The magnitude of refugee flows has caused increasing global concern, because in 1951, when the UNHCR was first established, there were approximately 1.5 million external refugees; by 1980 there were 8.4 million; and in 1992 there were 17.8 million (table two) (Loescher, 1992, p. 9; UNHCR, 2005, p. 2). Although the global number of external refugees decreased to 9.2 million in 2004, the total external refugee population of Asia and the Pacific has increased by 1.6 percent during 2004 to 836,700. This is the highest
rate of annual change of all the geographical regions listed under the “UNHCR Bureau,” and demonstrates the severity of the refugee problem in the Asia-Pacific region (UNHCR, 20 June 2005).

Table 2: Number of External Refugees and Total Persons of Concern to UNHCR *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Global number of external refugees</th>
<th>Total population of concern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>8,446,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>9,706,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>10,310,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>10,610,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>10,717,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>11,851,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>12,620,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>13,114,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>14,331,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>14,716,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>17,378,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>16,837,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>17,818,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16,306,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>15,754,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>14,896,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>13,357,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12,015,000</td>
<td>19,795,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>11,481,000</td>
<td>19,895,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>11,687,000</td>
<td>20,628,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12,130,000</td>
<td>21,871,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>12,117,000</td>
<td>19,922,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>10,594,000</td>
<td>20,779,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>9,680,000</td>
<td>17,009,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>9,237,000</td>
<td>19,197,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes revised year-end figures.  
Despite a general trend indicating that the global number of external refugees is decreasing, internal refugee figures have grown dramatically in recent years. The global number of internal refugees has reached an unprecedented level of 25 million, and continues to be caused by the growing saliency of ethnicity (table 3) (UNHCR, 20 June 2005, p. 2; Ludlam-Taylor, 1998, p. 34; Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 4). In 2003, Asia-Pacific was the region second most affected by conflict-induced displacement in the world, and had the second largest global number of internal refugees (3.6 million), following Africa (12.7 million) (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 5).

Table 3: Number of internal refugees (estimates; as of end-2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Internal refugees (in millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


What is most alarming about this, is that international public attention continues to focus on external refugees, despite internal refugee numbers being at least twice as high, consequently internal refugees receive less international protection and assistance, and that their plight is often far worse than that of external refugees (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 4; UNHCR, 2004, pp. 4-5). What is particularly significant about this is that internal displacement may be an instigator in the diffusion of ethnic conflict through external refugee flows (Cohen and Deng, 1998, p. 11; Hein, 1993, p. 49). However, Schmeidl (1998, p. 28) argues the opposite, and contends that external refugee movements typically precede internal refugee movements, with the latter lagging behind for a minimum of one, but usually several years. Schmeidl discovered that external refugee flows preceded internal refugee flows in 45 of the 55 countries with concurrent internal and external refugees in her study from 1964 – 1996. In each of the exceptions, there were either real or perceived obstacles to exit; fighting in neighbouring countries; or
targeted violence that initially deterred external refugee flight (Schmeidl, 1998, p. 28). Furthermore, internal refugee populations seem to be increasing in size and in duration. For example, Schmeidl notes that prior to 1990, 25 percent of internal displacement lasted only one or two years and only eight populations were displaced for ten or more years. This trend changed markedly during the 1990s; with about 61 percent of internal displacement lasting five years or less and 21 percent of these existing for ten or more years. The comparative figures for external displacement are 53 percent and 27 percent respectively (1998, p. 29). Possible reasons for the extended duration of internal refugee movements may include “lack of assistance and self-reliance opportunities, land and property disputes, continued hostility from local populations, and continued fighting,” meaning that many internal refugees prefer to wait before returning or instead choose to resettle elsewhere (Global IDP Project, 2005).

**Main Aim of the Research**

The principal aim of this thesis is to answer the fundamental question:

- Why do some ethnic conflicts produce external refugees and others do not in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region?

To answer this question, this thesis analyses variations in both external and internal refugee numbers as a result of ethnic conflict in the region. To supplement the findings of this question, the following additional questions are also answered:

- What factors within ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region are most conducive to creating external and/or internal refugees?
- Which ethnic conflicts produce more refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region and why?
- Are external or internal refugee movements more likely to occur first in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region and does one encourage the other?
Thesis Outline

This chapter provided a contextual overview of the costs and consequences of ethnic conflict, specifically addressing refugee flows as a means through which ethnic conflict may be diffused. It also defined the terms used in this thesis and the complexities involved at reaching these definitions. Chapter Two summarises the nature of the literature concerning refugees and previous models which have attempted to explain the factors conducive to creating refugees. It concludes that these explanations have serious shortcomings and that a more comprehensive theoretical model is required. Based on the existing common trends in the literature, Chapter Three develops an original theoretical model from which to analyse the factors conducive to creating refugees. It highlights four major independent variables and some possible intervening variables that may explain why some ethnic conflicts create refugees and others do not. These variables are then applied to the countries of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands in Chapters Four and Five to determine which factors are most significant in the creation of external and internal refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. Chapter Six assesses which factors are the most important in creating external and internal refugees in the region and evaluates the usefulness of the model in determining these. The thesis concludes by providing recommendations for governments and regional organisations for reducing refugee numbers within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Overview of the Literature Regarding Ethnic Conflict and Refugees
Little effort has been made to specify the theoretical connections between ethnic conflict and how it may become diffused through refugee movements. Instead Davis, Jaggers and Moore (1997, pp. 148-149) argue that studies have either concentrated on: the impact of ethnic conflicts on the behaviour of other states (Suhrke and Noble, 1977; Shiels, 1984; Boucher et al, 1987; Chazan, 1991); how ethnic conflicts become diffused through third party intervention or mediation (Halpern, 1964; Modelski, 1964; Luard, 1972; Suhrke and Noble, 1977; Touval and Zartman, 1989; Stedman, 1992; Licklider, 1993; McGarry and O’Leary, 1993; Haglund and Pentland, 1996; James, 1996; Kaufman, 1996; Ryan, 1990); the relationship between ethnic conflict and foreign policy behaviour (Heraclides, 1990; Midlarsky, 1992; Carment, 1993; Carment et al, 1993; Carment and James, 1994; Moore and Davis, 1994); and, ethnic groups and their conflicts with nation-states (Young, 1982; Horowitz, 1985; Gurr, 1993; Posen, 1993). However, only a few studies address the impact of the international system on ethnic conflict within states (Nagel and Whorton, 1992; Rasler, 1992). This is alarming because some of the most dangerous ethnic conflicts are those which spill over into the international arena as crises and become part of the existing rivalries among international actors (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1997, p. 166).

The absence of literature regarding the relationship between the diffusion of ethnic conflict through refugee flows may be explained by the fact that both areas of research have largely existed on the periphery rather than in the mainstream of academic research. Since the demise of the Cold War and the increase in refugee movements and ethnic conflicts, this trend is changing. For example, the Social Science Index listed an annual average of fifteen journal articles on refugees from 1970-1974, forty from 1975-1979, and over 80 during the 1980s (Hein, 1993, p. 43). During the same period, the numbers of publications on ethnic conflicts also markedly increased; from two books and 38 articles published from 1970-1990 to a total of 35 articles and books published in 2002 alone (figure 3).
Despite this, the majority of scholarly literature regarding refugee studies remains in broad disciplinary or policy studies journals, rather than in more specialist journals. For example, Black (2001, p. 61) acknowledges that over the last decade, articles concerning refugee studies have appeared in various social science disciplines, including geography (Black, 1991; Wood, 1994), sociology (Hein, 1993), and anthropology (Malkii, 1995), and that these have not always been cross-referenced to provide an overview of the field. While the diversity of sites for publication makes it difficult to provide a fully comprehensive literature review of this area of studies, it also demonstrates the interdisciplinary nature of refugee studies and its relevance to a wide range of fields. This enables it to draw on a much wider base of theories and methods from the mainstream of academic disciplines (Zetter, 1988, p. 4; Black, 2001, p. 62).

Black (2001, p. 71) emphasises that the area of refugee studies is unique from other more traditionally inward-looking academic disciplines, in that it has developed “in relation to a crucial area of policy that directly affects the lives of millions of people.” While this high level of policy relevance does not obviate the need for critical theoretical reflection,
it does mean that the existence of pioneering theoretical work in this field is less common than in other social science disciplines.

The growth of interest in ethnic conflict and in refugee movements since the end of the Cold War may be because both became major factors in national and international instability. In many countries refugees have also been instrumental in continuing such conflict and instability (Newman, 2003, p. 5). The permeable nature of refugees challenges the traditional realist perception that the state is the fundamental unit of analysis in international relations and fails to acknowledge that while states may be secure according to the orthodox philosophy, they may be insecure regarding human security (Troeller, 2003, p. 51; Newman, 2003, p. 11). Indeed, major new security threats are emerging from political and social instability in the developing world due to religious, inter-community or ethnic tensions or because of economic upheaval. A consequence of this instability is a growth in the number of refugee and migration movements (Loescher, 1992, p. 57). Due to this, Newman (2003, pp. 5, 8) argues that the management of refugee movements and the protection of displaced people should be an integral, rather than a peripheral, issue of regional security, conflict settlement and peace-building initiatives and that the whole concept of “security” needs to be reviewed.

Previous Models Used to Explain the Factors Conducive to Creating Refugees

Refugee movements have predominantly been considered a political phenomenon and have accordingly been omitted from most migration literature and theory, which tends to focus exclusively on the nature of voluntary migration (Lee, 1966), thus providing little guidance for the analysis of refugee movements (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 285). In most instances, economic factors are assumed to be predominant, in both determining the outflow and in interpreting the experience following migration. It is also often assumed that some regularity exists in detecting the flows of economic migrants but that refugee movements are, by contrast, spontaneous and thus unpredictable (Richmond, 1988, p. 9). It is therefore generally believed that while immigrants constitute an economic form of migration, refugees are considered a political form (Hein, 1993, p. 44). For example, Bascom (1998) takes this argument so far as to argue that a “theory of refugees” does not
exist and never will. He therefore implies that the search for theoretical grounding of refugee studies, “might be better achieved by situating studies of particular refugee (and other forced migrant) groups in the theories of cognate areas (and major disciplines),” thus participating in the development of social science, “rather than leading refugee studies into an intellectual cul-de-sac” (Black, 2001, p. 66). Other, more distinguished scholars have argued against such beliefs, contending that refugee movements “do not constitute a collection of random events” but form distinct patterns which are related to political transformations (Zolberg, 1986).

The literature concerning forced migration largely consists of descriptive case studies and some comparative case studies (Zolberg et al, 1989; Weiner, 1996; Cohen and Deng, 1998), rather than theoretically informed quantitative work (Davenport et al, 2003, p. 47; Melander and Öberg, 2004, p. 3). For example, much has been written on the policies of receiving and sending countries, the economic and social adaptation in receiving countries, or global trends in population movement (Richmond, 1988, p. 7). This means that the majority of refugee theory does not specifically address the factors that are conducive to creating refugees; although exceptions exist (Clark, 1989; Zolberg et al, 1989; Edmonston, 1992; Schmeidl, 1995, 1997, 2003; Gibney et al, 1996; Weiner, 1996; Wallensteen and Öberg, 1998; Davenport et al, 2003). Other studies only examine countries which have produced external refugees and therefore have problems with selection bias (Hakovirta, 1986; Edmonston, 1992; Gibney et al, 1996; Zolberg et al, 1989; Apodaca, 1997, 1998), or only focus on bivariate relationships (Hakovirta 1986; Edmonston, 1992; Gibney et al, 1996; Wallensteen and Öberg, 1998; Apodaca, 1998; Melander and Öberg, 2004, p. 3), which limits their capacity to rank the importance of causes and examine their effects on refugee movements (Schmeidl, 1997, pp. 285-286). Although studies concerning the relationship between violence and refugee flows have been undertaken, only five published studies examine the relationship between violent political conflict and refugee flows using a global database (Hakovirta, 1986; Schmeidl, 1995, 1997; Gibney et al, 1996; Davenport et al, 2003, p. 29; Moore and Shellman, 2004). This chapter evaluates eight influential theoretical models that analyse the factors
conducive to creating refugees, but only Zolberg et al (1989) analyse this specifically within the context of an ethnic conflict.

**Richmond’s 1988 and 1993 Models**

Richmond (1988, 1993) emphasises that a multivariate approach is needed to explain the complex relationship that exists between the various interlinked factors that cause refugee flows. He suggests that there is a continuum between the rational choice behaviour of “proactive” migrants trying to maximise net advantage (economic migrants) and the “reactive” migrant whose degree of freedom is severely constrained (political migrants) (Richmond, 1993, p. 10). The majority of international migrants (including refugees) fall between these two extremes. “Figure 4” illustrates this idea and “Figure 5” applies it to a variety of international population movements.

**Figure 4: Structuration of Migration**

![Figure 4: Structuration of Migration](source: Richmond, 1993, p. 11.)
Figure 5: Paradigm of International Population Movements

Source: Richmond, 1988, p. 21.

The vertical axis in each model depicts decision-making on a continuum from maximum to minimum autonomy, while the horizontal axis illustrates the interaction between economic and socio-political factors. The nearer the category falls to the vertical axis the more important the economic factors are, while those closer to the horizontal axis are more political in nature (Richmond, 1988, p. 20). Therefore, the structural constraints are greater for “reactive” migrants whose scope for rational choice behaviour is more limited than the “proactive” migrants.

Richmond (1993, pp. 12-3) analyses the factors conducive to “reactive” migration more comprehensively in his later models. These models depict the importance of economic, political, social, environmental and bio-psychological variables in generating refugees.
Figure 6: Reactive Migration: Multivariate Factor Analysis


Figure 7: Reactive Migration: Typology

“Figure 6” is more complex than “Figure 7” because it includes a series of additional factors which also facilitates refugee movements: predisposing factors, structural constraints, precipitating events, enabling circumstances and feedback effects. However “Figure 7” is more quantitatively oriented because it enables the primary and secondary determinants of reactive migration to be characterised into a possible 25 options. Under this model, the political determinants (categories one - nine) are usually more identifiable with refugee movements than the others (Richmond, 1993, pp. 18-19).

While Richmond (1988, pp. 22-23) acknowledges that a comprehensive theory which accounts for all aspects of international migration does not exist, it can be stated that: $M = P + R$. Where $M$ is the total number of international migrants, $P$ indicates the number of “proactive” migrants and $R$, the number of “reactive migrants.” This equation can be further summarised as: $P_{ab}t$ or $R_{ab}t$, where $P$ and $R$ are the number of “proactive” or “reactive” migrants respectively from place $a$ seeking entry into place $b$ in time period $t$. These equations are, as Richmond admits, a “gross over-simplification,” which fails to explain the factors leading to the different forms of migration, which are fundamental in understanding their unique nature.

Clark’s 1989 Model

Clark’s 1989 model expands on research undertaken in 1981 by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights, and distinguishes between underlying causes (root causes) and proximate conditions, intervening factors and triggering events. This provides a model for early warning research and the classification of indicators (Schmeidl, 1993, p.133).
Unlike Richmond’s models, Clark importantly describes the characteristics of the intervening factors, which contribute to either accelerating or decelerating refugee movements. Clark identifies five groups of intervening factors:

1. Alternatives (coping strategies) to international flight (e.g. the possibility of resistance or internal displacement;
2. Obstacles to international flight (e.g. knowledge of flight route, geographic obstacles, proper transportation, health and food factors, security problems and controlled borders, the controlling of borders, denial of entry, and the restrictions on immigration laws). Obstacles, however, are not necessarily actual difficulties encountered, but could merely be perceived as such;
3. Expected reception in the asylum country (e.g. its economic situation, asylum policies, the existence of cross-border ethnic groups). For example, it could be argued that camps providing international assistance are a potential “pull factor” for refugees;
4. Patterns in decision-making (e.g. tribal leadership, the “bandwagon effect," the demography of the refugees);
5. Seasonal factors (e.g. weather patterns, agricultural cycles). This can be linked to either labour migration or the fact that in conflict situations warring parties tend
to fight less during the cold winter months, potentially briefly halting mass migration (Schmeidl, 2003, p. 139).

No distinction is made between those intervening variables which may be more likely to cause external as opposed to internal refugees within the above categories. The detailed nature of the above intervening factors also means that several other possibly important intervening factors are overlooked, such as whether governmental or non-governmental assistance is provided within the refugee-producing state and whether this acts as a facilitator or deterrent to refugee flows. Furthermore, Clark incorrectly classifies a number of independent variables as intervening variables. For example, it is argued that “geographic obstacles” are actually structural variables, as they do not interpose themselves spontaneously within a situation. Furthermore, “proper transportation” could also be viewed as independent variable, as again transportation systems do not suddenly appear as a facilitator of refugee flows.

**Zolberg, Suhrke and Aquayos’ 1989 Model**

Zolberg et al (1989, p. 236) construct a typology by identifying four major types of ethnic conflict, each associated with distinct refugee problems. These include:

1. the explosion of ethnic hierarchies;
2. target minorities;
3. communal conflict; and,
4. separatism.

**1. The explosion of ethnic hierarchies**

This occurs when a social ruling class and an ethnic affiliation coincide either as a ruling minority or a trading minority. Such conflicts are often revolutionary and violent in nature and involve the elimination of the dominant minority group through massacre, forced expulsion or coerced flight. A ruling minority could use its privilege to exploit the majority; and a trading minority acts as either an exploitative bourgeoisie or as an unpopular intermediary between rulers and peasants (Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 236-7).
2. Target Minorities

This category gives rise to the classic type of refugee who is persecuted by the state for reasons of religion or nationality. It involves the targeting of certain minorities who are perceived as an obstacle to nation building and who therefore are unable to be part of the new unitary national identity. However, despite the ethnic heterogeneity of many of the new states in Africa and Asia and aside from the trading groups previously mentioned, Zolberg et al (1989, p. 238) acknowledge that this type of refugee is now relatively rare. They contend that the scarcity of refugees generated by such conflict may partly be attributed to the majority of the new states accepting the existence of a multinational or multiethnic political community from the beginning. However, this thesis disagrees and argues that many states within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region do not have a sense of unitary national identity. Therefore, in this region many refugees have been generated due to state persecution.

3. Communal conflict

Zolberg et al (1989, p. 239) emphasise that communal conflict is not always hierarchical and that groups which are not hierarchically related are often regionally concentrated and spatially interspersed within a state. Each group is associated with a distinct pattern of conflict. Where groups are regionally concentrated, they have their own area, and competition occurs through the centre. When this escalates into conflict it usually becomes separatism, which can generate large numbers of external refugees (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 245). Conversely, groups which are spatially interspersed surround each other and are therefore more likely to engage in periodic confrontations amongst themselves. Those spatially interspersed groups with clashes involving some or all of the local community cause much violence and high death tolls, but are “inherently circumscribed and generate few refugees,” as outsiders are reluctant to interfere in the state’s domestic politics. This non-action by external states renders it more likely that unavailability of asylum will be a deterrent to flight (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 239).
4. Separatism

As previously mentioned, secessionist movements occur when large ethnic groups are regionally concentrated and central power is perceived to be working against their interests. Those protracted or recurring conflicts tend to generate large and cumulative numbers of external refugees (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 245). Secessionist movements are especially prevalent in regions that have become “backward” due to the uneven impact of social change during the colonial period. Comparatively advanced groups in advanced regions are less likely to instigate secessionist movements, as they usually control the centre (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 243). However, despite the numerous secessionist movements within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region, only those in Bangladesh and East Timor were successful.

Zolberg et al (1989, p. 245) argue that successful separatist movements might be associated with a distinctive pattern of short-lived refugee flows, temporarily involving flight from violence and a subsequent unmixing with settlement in the host state. However, the more common unsuccessful separatist challenges tend to create more problematic refugees. Initially only a few activist exiles who possess little difficulty in finding sanctuary may emerge, but if the ethnic conflict moves into the military phase, then actions by the antagonists are likely to generate much larger refugee flows. It is also likely that refugees fleeing the violence of secessionist wars or the aftermath of a failed secessionist movement may become “target minorities.”

Wood’s 1994 Model

Wood (1994) attempts to encapsulate some of the complexity and variety of the interrelated factors that previous theorists tried to demonstrate in their models to explain how refugee flows are generated.
He correctly recognises several “push” factors that drive forced migration within three overlapping domains:
1. Political instability, war, and persecution – the conditions usually blamed for creating refugees;
2. Life-threatening economic decline and ecological crisis – the conditions usually attributed to causing international economic migrants; and,
3. Ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts – the conditions that create intense territorial and nationalistic emotions, intolerance of “foreigners” and “ethnic cleansing” (Wood, 1994, p. 615).

The overlapping domains emphasise that neat analytical distinctions between “push” factors are obscured during a forced migration, as dilemmas in one area often spill over into another. Wood’s model therefore suggests that such distinctions among causal factors are less important than the cumulative effects of two or more causal factors.

It is important to acknowledge that unlike most models, Wood makes a visible distinction between the “subnational” (internal refugees) and “international” (external refugees) components of forced migration and treats each differently. Wood claims that internal refugees are at a greater risk than external refugees, despite sharing similar fears and needs. This is because internal refugees are at risk from further oppression and lack the institutional support provided to external refugees. He argues that the survival of internal refugees often depends on their capacity to cope with “political instability, ethnic discrimination, and economic and ecological degradation,” whereas for external refugees, survival often depends on host governments and international relief agencies (Wood, 1994, p. 615). While it is commendable that Wood differentiates between internal and external refugees, his distinction between them is often obscured and therefore his argument difficult to follow. Wood (1994, p. 615) himself acknowledges that his model may convey “too static an image of these adaptations,” but believes that it is a starting point provided one realises that forced migration movements are highly dynamic.
Schmeidl’s 1997 and 2003 Models

In her 1997 study, Schmeidl found that political violence is the most important cause of refugee movements, but that ethnic conflict only significantly predicted refugee migration once six large refugee populations were excluded. This suggests that ethnic conflict is important in creating small and medium-sized refugee movements, but not necessarily large refugee flows, which are more likely to be caused by higher forms of political violence, such as genocide/politicide/civil war (Schmeidl, 1997, pp. 302-303).

Schmeidl’s (1997, p. 286) theory distinguishes between three general types of factors that cause refugees: root causes, proximate conditions and intervening factors. She argues that there is a clear distinction in the literature between “root causes,” which are generally viewed as economically-related and “proximate causes,” which are generally seen as politically-related (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 287). Schmeidl (2003, p. 136) argues that “root” causes are underlying events which by themselves do not lead to refugee flows. They are therefore a necessary, but not sufficient cause of refugee movements and interact with other more proximate factors to create refugees. Proximate conditions are often associated with inter- and intra-state wars or are connected to a government’s inability or unwillingness to cope with root causes or unfavourable political, economic, or social conditions. Inter-state wars are more likely to generate internal refugees, because exits may be blocked due to fighting on border areas, whereas intra-state wars (especially if combined with external military intervention), are extremely likely to create external refugees (Schmeidl, 2003, p. 138).

Like Clark (1989), Schmeidl (1997, 2003) emphasises the importance of intervening factors, which may either prevent or facilitate the occurrence of a refugee movement. Intervening factors will also influence the timing, size and duration of the displacement and perhaps whether internal or external refugees are created (2003, p. 138). Like Clark (1989), Schmeidl (1997, pp. 295 – 296; 2003, p. 139) acknowledges the significance of improved transportation facilities, geographical proximity and migration networks as intervening factors, although these are actually independent variables because they do not occur spontaneously. She also adds to Clark’s five categories of intervening factors, by
suggesting that the best predictor of large migration streams are small trickles in the years before and that the stakeholders in refugee-producing conflicts may also act as an intervening factor in deciding whether forced expulsion may be used as a political strategy (Schmeidl, 2003, p. 140).
Figure 20: Examples of Indicators for the Early Warning of Forced Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ROOT (SYSTEMIC) CAUSES</th>
<th>PROXIMATE CAUSES</th>
<th>DECREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF EXODUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historic</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political Governance</strong></td>
<td>• Efforts by civil society to stop conflict and war (war weariness of non-state actors)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Past history of conflicts and wars</td>
<td>• Level of democracy</td>
<td>• External conflict resolution or peace-building efforts (and support of local efforts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Important historical event that influenced country’s perception (e.g. partition of India/Pakistan)</td>
<td>• Legitimacy of government</td>
<td>• Incentives (economic, political) from the outside to put down arms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political / Institutional</strong></td>
<td>• Institutional mechanisms able to deal with diversity</td>
<td>• Obstacles to flight (difficult territory, security in border areas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Level of democratic experience</td>
<td>• Level of human rights violations</td>
<td>• Alternatives to fight/cop ing strategies (joining of opposition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amount of experience in non-violent conflict resolution</td>
<td>• Strength of social infrastructure</td>
<td>• Cost of flight (not wanting to leave land behind, not being able to afford to leave)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Equality</strong></td>
<td>• Level of corruption</td>
<td>• Expected reception in neighbouring countries (difficult asylum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Scarce resources or existing resource competition</td>
<td><strong>Societal/Socio-Demographic</strong></td>
<td><strong>INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF EXODUS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Abundance of natural resources that could be looted or exploited for war</td>
<td>• Strength of civil society as “counter-weight” to bad governance</td>
<td>• Clear government strategy of ethnic cleansing and forced expulsion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Level of economic development</td>
<td>• Level of unemployment, especially among youth (youth bulge)</td>
<td>• Scapegoating and isolation from the outside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Important regional difference in access to resources</td>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td>• Existing migration routes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Societal/Socio-Demographic</strong></td>
<td>• Strength of economy (e.g. dependency on one export crop)</td>
<td>• Existing migration networks abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnic diversity in country</td>
<td>• Financial dependency on drug or arms trade (war economy)</td>
<td>• Expected reception in neighbouring countries (favourable political environment, existing refugee camp, ability to seek refuge with ethnic kin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ethnic grievances</td>
<td>• Balance between public and military expenditures</td>
<td>• Past tradition of seasonal or labour migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Population distribution in country (which could encourage competition)</td>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td>• Patterns of decision-making (“leaders” decision to leave or stay)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regional diversity</td>
<td>• Abundance of arms trade into country</td>
<td><strong>FORECED EXODUS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td>• Intervention (political, military) from outsiders</td>
<td><strong>FORECED EXODUS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Historical meddling of neighbouring (or other) states</td>
<td>• Border disputes</td>
<td><strong>FORECED EXODUS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>FORECED EXODUS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Geographic location, such as potential trade route (Afghanistan) important to outsiders</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>FORECED EXODUS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Arbitrarily drawn borders of disputes over territory</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>FORECED EXODUS</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schmeidl, 2003, p. 137.
Shortcomings of these explanations
Some previous theoretical models have attempted to explain the relationship between the various factors that cause refugee movements. However, as the variations between the models suggest, a comprehensive theory is difficult to formulate because involuntary migrations are based on complex decision-making processes and diverse causal factors (Wood, 1994, p. 608). The literature is particularly strong in identifying the underlying domestic factors within specific case studies that give rise to refugee movements. However, it pays less attention in identifying the specific catalytic causes of such movements, and the importance that governmental policies can play in instigating violence and in encouraging refugee flows.

Both Richmond’s and Wood’s models do not specifically identify the factors that give rise to refugees. Instead, they simply mention vaguely defined factors as possible causes of refugees (Richmond, 1988, p. 2; 1993, pp. 11, 13, 18; Wood, p. 614). The broad nature of these factors is largely unhelpful in determining the specific characteristics within each situation that may create refugees, as few (if any) clear examples of each are provided in the explanation of their models. This makes them more difficult to apply in practice.

A number of important factors and distinctions are also omitted from their models. Wood does not include any structural factors within his analysis and neither Wood nor Richmond recognises the importance that cultural/perceptual and intervening factors can play in influencing refugee movements. They also make little (if any) distinction between how internal and external refugees are created or between the various stages involved in this process, and instead group the factors together as if they all occur concurrently. Although Richmond’s later model (1993, pp. 12-13) analyses the factors conducive to creating refugees in more detail, he again oversimplifies these by stating that they must “fit” into one of a possible 25 categories based on a combination of political, economic, environmental, social, and bio-psychological characteristics. These categories exclude the importance of ethnicity and intervening factors as possible instigators of refugee flows.
Although the models by Clark (1989), Zolberg et al (1989, p. 236), and Schmeidl (1997; 2003, p.137) are an improvement on Richmond and Woods’ models, they also have their limitations. Zolberg et al’s model (1989) is different from the others in that it only applies to refugees created from four specific types of ethnic conflict. While this provides a useful theoretical insight for the purposes of this thesis, it is not so easy to apply in practice. This is because it assumes that refugees are only created from one cause, ethnic conflict, and does not acknowledge the variety of other possible structural, political, economic, and social factors that may be involved in producing refugees. The typology is also not formulated into a model, making the process through which refugees are created less clear to visualise.

Clark (1989) and Schmeidl’s (2003, p. 137) models recognise that a host of factors may influence the creation of refugees and clearly outline the process through which refugees are created by distinguishing between root causes, proximate causes, intervening factors, and triggers. Although Schmeidl improves on Clark’s model by making hers more comprehensive and differentiating between those intervening variables which are more predisposed to creating external and internal refugees, she still incorrectly classifies some independent variables as intervening factors (improved transportation facilities, geographical proximity and migration networks). Schmeidl also omits some important variables, including exclusionary national ideologies and the role that external parties can play in facilitating refugee flows. There is also the danger that Schmeidl’s model is too detailed, with too many variables, making it difficult for the reader to identify the ones that are most important. This has the potential to make any application of the model unnecessarily time-consuming.

Given the above shortcomings within the existing refugee literature, this thesis develops a theoretical model that more concisely and specifically explains the causes conducive to generating refugee flows within the context of an ethnic conflict. The model has three different sets of variables: independent variables, intervening variables, and dependent variables. These variables provide a combination of interrelated factors which may
generate refugee movements during ethnic conflicts. A simplified version of the model is outlined below and is explained in further detail in the following chapter.

**Figure 11: Factors Conducive to Creating Refugees**

![Diagram of factors conducive to creating refugees]

- **Ethnic Conflict**
- **Independent Variables**
  - structural
  - political
  - economic/social
  - cultural/perceptual
- **Intervening Variables**
  - facilitators
- **Dependent Variables**
  - external refugees
  - internal refugees
Chapter 3: Factors Conducive to Creating Refugees

Much interest has been expressed concerning the prevention of refugee flows, but it is often argued that in order to understand how to better prevent refugee flows, one must understand the causes which generate them. Therefore, an objective study of the causes and dynamics of modern refugee movements would provide a pragmatic basis from which to determine modern approaches to address the refugee problem (Coles, 1989, p. 393).

As stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, it has been established that ethnic conflict is the greatest cause of most of the world’s refugees, but that not all ethnic conflicts produce refugees (Gurr and Harff, 2004, p. 1; UNHCR, 20 June 2005, p. 7; Suhrke, 1993, p. 230; Newland, 1993, p. 143). Newland (1993, p. 145) argues that ethnicity should be seen as a political and economic resource and as a major factor in the distribution of wealth and power, when examining the relationship between ethnic conflict and refugee flows. This is because ethnicity can be an important determinant of entitlement and privilege. Loescher (1992, pp. 30-1) also acknowledges the importance of ethnicity and argues that the catalyst for many conflicts in the developing world involve multiethnic groups fighting for political power.

Given this knowledge, it is now important that substantial research is undertaken to address what factors, aside from ethnic conflict, make some states more likely to produce refugees than others. Many of the previous pioneering studies (outlined in Chapter 2), which attempt to explain the factors conducive to creating refugees are out-dated and require supplementing to reflect the contemporary situation in which the majority of refugees are generated by ethnic conflict. This chapter seeks to enhance these earlier models by developing a theoretical model from which to answer the fundamental question: why do some ethnic conflicts produce refugees?

In identifying the mechanisms that may create refugee flows, this thesis draws on the structure of Brown’s (1996) typology, which cites conditions within internal conflicts that may make some places more predisposed to violence than others. Many of the factors that
Brown mentions regarding conflict also seem relevant in discussing how refugee flows emerge, as the relationship between the two is so interrelated. Brown categorises these conditions into four main groups: structural factors; political factors; economic/social factors; and cultural/perceptual factors.

**Structural Variables**

Brown (1996, p. 13) has identified three main structural factors which he argues make some situations more predisposed to violence than others. These are: weak states; intra-state security concerns; and ethnic geography. Using Brown’s categorisation of structural factors in the context of ethnic conflict, three major factors are influential in producing refugees: weak states, ethnic heterogeneity and composition, and land access. Each of these factors is examined below:

**Weak States**

A “state” is defined as “the authoritative political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory” (Zartman, 1995, p. 5). If a state is not fulfilling its functions in the three capability areas below, it is deemed a “failed state.” However, if a state is deficient in only one or two of the capability areas it is defined as a “weak state” (Weinstein et al, 2005, pp. 13-14).

*Capability Areas:*

1. “protecting people from internal and external threats (the security gap);”
2. delivering basic health services and education (the capacity gap); and,
3. providing institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and needs of the population (the legitimacy gap)” (Weinstein et al, 2005, pp. 1, 13-16).

It is important to realise that states which are “weak” in one area may be perceived by some as “strong” in another area. Therefore, a dynamic view of state strength and weakness is essential in recognising that state capability fluctuates across time and sectors (Dauvergne, 1998, p. 8). When a state is “weak,” property may be seized, personal and political rebuffs repaid, families disrupted and secessionist movements may
develop particularly where visible ethnic or national differences exist within society. Furthermore, the instability that weak states cause also invites dissidents, exiled political movements, incursions from irredentist movements and advantage-seeking neighbouring states, making it more probable that refugees are created (Gordenker, 1987, pp. 76-7).

- The Security Gap
When a state cannot fulfill its most basic function in ensuring security through protecting people from internal and external threats, maintaining a monopoly over the use of force, and preserving effective sovereignty and order within its territory, a “security gap” emerges. This gap may entice other states, non-state actors, and criminals to fill it through violent, hostile, or illicit acts (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 14). The “security gap” is measured by dividing states into three categories: major war, intermediate war, and minor war (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 47), according to the following definitions:

- A “major war” is defined as any conflict with at least 1000 battle-related deaths in any given year over 1995-2005.
- An “intermediate war” is defined as any conflict with at least 25, but fewer than 1000 battle-related deaths in any given year and an accumulated total of at least 1000 deaths over 1995-2005.
- A “minor war” is defined as any conflict with less than 25 battle-related deaths in any given year and fewer than 1000 battle-related deaths over 1995-2005.

In states where a security gap exists, ethnic security dilemmas may also arise, whereby individual groups feel obliged to provide for their own defence and become concerned over whether other groups pose security threats to their existence. The weaker the state, the stronger the defensive measures undertaken and the possibility that refugees will be generated (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 8; Posen, 1993; Brown, 1996, p. 576). This lack, or weakening of state structure, often encourages violent conflict to ensue, as groups fight to gain control and power over the central authorities. Minority ethnic groups, which were once protected under the state apparatus, now become more vulnerable to human rights violations and can be more easily victimised in racially motivated attacks. Such
attacks can encourage large refugee flows, as when the state’s structure weakens, borders are controlled less effectively, and become more permeable, generating cross border movements of arms, drugs, militia, smuggled goods, migrants and refugees (Brown, 1996, p. 14).

- **The Capacity Gap**

If a government is unwilling or unable to play a fundamental role in meeting the basic needs of all of its citizens through providing physical infrastructure, such as roads and schools, and by investing in skills and structures that empower citizens and make progress possible, a gap in capacity results. This “capacity gap” may create the conditions for suffering, humanitarian crisis, epidemics, loss of public confidence, potential political upheaval, and refugees. Such a situation will impel people to leave in order to escape the predictable decline in the quality of life, and in poor countries, famine (Gordenker, 1987, p. 76). The “capacity gap” is often closely associated with gaps in security, as it is difficult to provide basic services when security can also not be guaranteed (Weinstein et al, 2005, pp. 14-15). “Basic needs” are measured by the UNDP’s measles immunisation rate in the Human Development Index (2005). Using this rate, states are placed into quintiles. The immunisation rate is not only a good indicator of broader health policies and strategies, but also has a strong relationship with lower infant mortality rates and increased literacy rates and a reasonably positive association with economic growth (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 48).

- **The Legitimacy Gap**

When a state can not foster legitimacy, maintain institutions that protect fundamental rights and freedoms, enforce laws and contracts equally, hold individuals accountable for their actions, and enable broad-based citizen participation in the political process, a legitimacy gap exists. Such a gap provides an opportunity for political upheaval and crisis, including widespread corruption (Weinstein et al, 2005, pp. 15-16). Some states have inherent legitimacy gaps, due to the historical process in which they were created. For example, many states in Africa and Asia were artificially created from the remnants of colonialism, and lacked the political institutions, political legitimacy, and politically
sensible borders required to exert meaningful control over their territory (Brown, 1996, p. 13). The degree of legitimacy that a state has is measured according to its government’s commitment to a transparent and democratic government. The Index of Political Freedom measure of “voice and accountability,” which combines data from Freedom House, the Economist Intelligence Unit and Political Risk Services, is used to place states into quintiles based on their performance, from best (top 20 percent) to worst (bottom 20 percent) (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 49).

**Ethnic Composition and Heterogeneity**

It is popularly assumed that minority groups within a state are more likely than dominant groups to be targeted for persecution for reasons of race or nationality (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 238). Therefore, states with higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity should suffer from more refugee flows than more homogenous states (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 235). However, given that less than twenty of the 189 states in the world remain ethnically homogeneous, in which ethnic minorities account for less than five percent of the population (Brown, 1996, p. 15); it is surprising that more ethnic conflicts and refugees have not been produced. Instead, it may be that the mere existence of high levels of ethnic heterogeneity within a state is not by itself a sufficient precondition for the creation of conflict and refugees. Rather, the size of the ethnic group, how various ethnic groups within a state are distributed across its territory, and the political balancing by the state between ethnic groups, may better determine whether ethnic conflict and refugee movements occur (Brown, 1996, p. 15; Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, pp. 256-7). Given the lack of availability of data, this thesis compares only the size of the groups engaged in ethnic conflict in relation to the rest of the country’s population. The existence of a dominant ethnic group, comprising between 45 to 90 percent of the total population, within an ethnically heterogenous country indicates that at least one other minority ethnic group also exists (Sørli, Gleditsch and Strand, 2005, p. 150).

Brown contends that ethnic groups can either be distributed along regional lines or they may be intermingled amongst other ethnic groups. States with highly intermingled populations are less likely to face secessionist demands, than those with groups
distributed along regional lines, which lend themselves more readily to partition. However, although groups distributed along regional lines may be more conducive to secessionist demands; if warfare develops it is more likely to be conventional in nature. This contrasts with trends in highly intermingled populations which suggest that if secessionist demands do develop, it is more probable that groups will attempt to assert their control over a specific territory, rendering it more likely that direct attacks on civilians ensue (Brown, 1996, p. 16). Provided this argument is correct, one could deduce that higher numbers of refugees are more likely to originate under these latter circumstances, compared to those situations where more conventional warfare prevails.

**Land Access**

The physical characteristics of a state, including its proximity to neighbouring states, are another important structural factor in considering why some ethnic conflicts create refugees. The geographical variables – the number of borders a state has and the degree of land access relative to the total kilometres of boundaries – are most important in the creation of external refugees.

With regard to the first variable, Schmeidl (1997, p. 296) argues “that a country with more borders provides more opportunities for refugee flight, because there are more neighboring countries in which to seek asylum.” In terms of the second variable, the percentage of land access relative to the total kilometres of boundaries (a given country’s coastline and land boundaries), land is defined by how much of the state’s land boundaries are solid land, as opposed to water:

\[
\% \text{ land access} = \frac{\text{KM land boundaries}}{\text{(KM land boundaries + KM coastline)}} \times 100
\]

In the above equation, a landlocked country would score 100 percent land access and an island zero percent. As refugees usually travel across land, and normally resort to sea travel as a last option, Schmeidl contends that higher land access should facilitate the creation of external refugees (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 296).
Political Variables

Brown’s (1996) categorisation of political factors is used as a basis from which to determine those political sub-factors most conducive to creating refugees in the context of ethnic conflict. This thesis argues that five major political sub-factors are most important to creating refugees in the context of ethnic conflict: state-building (including political transitions, political and social revolutions, genocide/politicide, and coups d’état); political regime; discriminatory political systems; exclusionary national ideologies; lack of human rights; and the role of external parties.

State-Building

Some scholars contend that refugees in the developing world are mostly a by-product of two major historical processes: the formation or state-building of new states and confrontations over the social order (Zolberg, 1981, p. 416; Zolberg et al, 1986, p. 153). These processes are analytically distinguishable but are often combined in reality to produce violent and complex conflicts. For example, from World War Two until the end of the Cold War, decolonisation and superpower conflict generated the largest number of refugees (Hein, 1993, p. 47; Gordenker, 1987; Zolberg et al, 1989). If a country experienced “colonialism” it is likely that the indigenous population was also marginalised. For example, colonisers often used divide-and-rule strategies to delineate colonial boundaries, partitioning existing culturally homogeneous nations into two or more states (Gordenker, 1987, p. 72). This practice often stimulated irredentism, whereby a minority ethnic group in one state seeks to be reunited with its majority ethnic group in another, encouraging tension and violence, and the possibility of refugees (Hein, 1993, p. 48; Gordenker, 1987, p. 72).

Refugees may also be generated from the conflict caused by the political dynamics of state-building, which enables aspiring nationalists to create their own exclusively defined nation-states, often leaving minority groups exposed. Therefore, the way in which the new state addresses questions of nationality, citizenship and minority rights will largely determine whether ethnic conflicts develop and whether refugees are produced (Newland,
If groups have “ambitious incompatible objectives, strong senses of identity and confrontational strategies,” conflict may be more likely, as will the production of refugees (Brown, 1996, p. 18). For example, Schmeidl (2001, p. 81; 1996, p.21) acknowledges that many African and Asian states have perceived minorities as obstacles to state-building and used them as scapegoats during critical phases of state formation, rendering it more easy to victimise, persecute, and push them out.

- Regime Transitions

A “regime transition” indicates a process when the country’s ruling regime alters, during which “new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put into effect.” The Polity IV Project’s “transitional government” indicator (coded as -88) is used to operationally define a “regime transition.” Transition periods are only coded if the new regime is formally established in a different year than that of the previous regime's demise (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).

If internal unrest causes the form of a state to alter and a political transition to occur, regardless of whether this change originated in rightist, leftist or other ideological factions, there is a potential for the creation of refugees (Keely, 1996, p. 1054). Political transitions brought about by the collapse of authoritarian rule, democratisation, political reforms, or social or political revolutions often provide a catalyst for such refugee movements (Brown, 1996, p. 576; Keely, 1996, p. 1055).

- Political and Social Revolutions

As well as governments enacting discriminatory ethnic policies, political and social revolutions can also generate refugees (Weiner, 1996, p. 23; Gordenker, 1987, p. 68; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 420). Both political and social revolutions are similar in that they can be conceptually defined as incidents of often violent conflict between governments and challengers that aim to overthrow the central government, replace its leaders, or seize power in one region. However, a “political revolution” is distinguishable from a “social revolution” in that the former aims to radically transform the political system of the state through revolutionary processes, whereas the latter seeks to drastically alter the nature of society through revolutionary means (State Failure Task Force, 2002).
Other common characteristics within such revolutions that are specifically conducive to creating refugees include intolerance of dissent and the drive for total consensus by the challengers (Dowty and Loescher, 1996, p. 52; Loescher, 1992, p. 29). This maybe achieved through re-education programmes, encouraging political dissidents and potential challengers to authority to flee (Koehn, 1991, p. 9; Loescher, 1992, p. 29; Gordenker, 1987, p. 78).

Interestingly, states which have acquired power through violent means, such as revolutions or coups d’état, often continue to rule through violence as they lack other measures, like majority representation or established political institutions, for successful governance. Therefore, heterogeneous and highly stratified states tend to be ruled by force, particularly if the group in power is itself a minority, which is perceived as easier than accommodating various ethnic demands (Gurr, 1986).

- Genocides/Politicides

Despite their revolutionary nature, “politicides” and “genocides” can be differentiated from “political” and “social” revolutions as both involve the mass murder of unarmed civilians who may or may not be supporting a revolutionary movement. The fundamental distinction between “politicide” and “genocide” is that the former defines the victimised groups primarily according to their political opposition to the regime and dominant groups, whereas the latter defines them in terms of their communal (ethnolinguistic, religious) characteristics (State Failure Task Force, 2002). However, genocides and politicides are categorised together in this thesis and exist when the following criteria are met: “… the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents or in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non communal group” (State Failure Task Force, 2002).

Schmeidl (2001, p. 81) finds that genocide/politicide is the strongest and most consistent predictor of refugee migration among all variables conducive to creating refugees that she
studied, as “on average, fifty-six thousand more refugees seek a safe haven elsewhere when genocide/politicide is present than when it is absent” (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 301). Interestingly, she also finds that genocide/politicide and civil war cause refugee flows regardless of a country’s level of development or population density. For example, from 1969-1990 there were 12 cases of genocide and 22 politicides in 26 of 29 countries with ongoing refugee flows and all were associated with forced displacement (Schmeidl, 1997; 2001).

- **Coups d’état**

Coups d’état are similar to political and social revolutions in that they seek the replacement of one ruling faction by another, but differ in that they seek replacement by members of the same ruling elite and do not advocate a complete reconstruction of society (Gordenker, 1987, p. 69). Due to only a relatively small sector of society being involved in a coup, any refugees that are created are therefore likely to include senior political figures and military officers who formed part of the replaced regime. However, Gordenker (1987, p. 70) acknowledges that to generalise that coups can not create large flows of refugees is misleading, as the aims of the new regime and its immediate repression or violence determine the initial flow of refugees following a coup.

**Political Regime Type**

The political regime type or “the institutions and structures of a state that allow its citizens to make, implement and change public policies” (Shafritz et al, 1993, p. 541), may have a profound effect on whether refugee flows occur within the context of an ethnic conflict.

Political regimes are classified according to the Polity IV Project’s “annual polity score.” This is determined by firstly measuring the levels of autocratic and democratic characteristics separately within a country’s political system on an additive 11-point scale (0-10). Secondly, the overall polity score is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score; giving a unified polity scale which ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). However, many political regimes can possess
mixed authority traits and therefore produce middling scores on both the autocracy and democracy scales. As a group, these regimes proved to be less durable than coherent democracies and autocracies (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).

Polity IV defines a “democracy” as having three essential, interdependent elements:

1. The presence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and leaders;
2. The existence of institutionalised constraints on the exercise of power by the executive; and,
3. The guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political participation.

Comparatively, an “autocracy” is conceptually defined as including political systems which possess the commonalities of “a lack of regularised political competition and concern for political freedoms” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). Both the operational indicators of “autocracy” and “democracy” are taken from a number of Polity IV’s codings. These include: the competitiveness and/or regulation of political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.

Gordenker (1987, pp. 176-8) contends that forced migrations usually result from governmental actions or inactions. The actions of governments undertaken of their own accord or in response to other governments’ policies will therefore be most influential in encouraging or dissuading refugee flows. However, even if governments manage to exert enough control to prevent an external refugee movement, it should not be assumed that the causes that might have otherwise induced the flight have been resolved. This only indicates that external refugees have not yet originated (Gordenker, 1987, pp. 180).

Gurr (1993, p. 93) argues that democratic states are better at accommodating and deflecting protests of ethnic groups, thereby averting serious rebellions. By contrast, if the system is authoritarian and closed, or a repressive dictatorship, resentment will
accumulate over time, especially if only some ethnic groups’ interests are adequately represented within the state, calling into question the legitimacy of the system (Brown, 1996, p. 16). Moreover, such closed political systems are more likely to use violence or oppression towards their citizens; a practice conducive to creating refugees (Loescher, 1992; Weiner, 1996).

**Discriminatory Political Systems**

Loescher (1992, p. 28) and Schmeidl (2001, p.79) also highlight the importance that officially instigated or organised state actions can have in generating refugees. The existence of such discriminatory political institutions that make a distinction in favour or against a particular group within society can be operationally defined according to the “Minorities at Risk: Political Discrimination Index,” below (2004, p. 36) This uses three characteristics to determine whether political discrimination exists within a country:

1. Historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions imposed on the ethnic group;
2. Under-representation in political office and participation; and,
3. The nature of the state’s political public policies towards the ethnic group.

The extent to which the ethnic group suffers according to the above criteria is summarised into five categories of political discrimination in the table below:
### Table 4: Political Discrimination Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Discrimination Index</th>
<th>Characteristics of Political Discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Discrimination</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect/Remedial Policies</td>
<td>Substantial under representation in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve the group’s political status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect/No Remedial Policies</td>
<td>Substantial under representation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial public policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Exclusion/Neutral Policy</td>
<td>Substantial under representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion/Repressive Policy</td>
<td>Public policies substantially restrict the group’s political participation by comparison with other groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Basis for Judgment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Davenport et al, 2004, p. 36.

State repression is defined by Stohl and Lopez (1986) as “the governments’ or its allies’ use of threat of coercion against political opponents in order to weaken resistance or opposition to government objectives,” and can range from an overt use of force or implementation of governmental sanctions, such as declarations of state emergency and restrictions on press freedom and civil actions. Or, it can include more covert measures of persecution, intimidation, discrimination and inducement of an unwanted group to leave, generating refugee flows (Dowty and Loescher, 1996, p. 52; Gordenker, 1987, p. 72). Both overt and covert forms of persecution are therefore interrelated, and one can actually encourage the other (Gordenker, 1987, p. 73). Mass expulsions of this kind have been used throughout history and usually occur when multinational governments seek cultural and political homogeneity in the form of a new national identity. Such governments therefore take measures to remove or reduce selected social classes and
ethnic groups from their territories in order to transform society and consolidate their political control (Loescher, 1992, p. 28).

Schmeidl (2001, p. 79) argues that strong and weak states use different types of government repression. Strong states often rely on a “general aura of terror,” whereas weak states often resort to force to remain in control, because they often lack sufficient power and the general level of institutionalisation found in strong states necessary to instil a general fear in their population (Duvall and Stohl, 1988; Gurr, 1986). This may lead them to use varying degrees of human rights violations to stay in power, which combined with the general inability of weak states to fully control their borders can lead to large refugee flows. Schmeidl’s findings support this argument, and show that refugees are less likely to flee from states which infringe on their political and civil rights than from states that threaten their lives (Schmeidl, 2001, pp. 79-80). Refugee exodus can therefore be viewed as an alternative to political protest and rebellion, and as “voting with one’s feet,” implying that states experiencing refugee flows are also likely to experience some form of rebellion against an existing government (Hirschman, 1970).

**Exclusionary National Ideologies**

The relationship between a state and its ethnic groups is central in determining whether refugees will be created from ethnic conflicts, as refugees are defined by their relationship to the state they are citizens of. If the state possesses an “exclusionary national ideology,” (ethnic/religious nationalism), whereby the prevailing ideas and beliefs of the state are defined to exclude those belief systems that do not conform to its ideology, it is possible that refugees may be generated. Such a governmental practice maybe more common in multinational states to unite diverse peoples for the purpose of state-building (Keely, 1991).

The prevailing national ideology of a state can be classified as either based on predominantly “civic” or “ethnic/religious” nationalism.
Table 5: Types of Nationalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Nationalism</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Nationalism</td>
<td>This stresses the importance of “civic institutions, public offices, public agencies and officials, churches in their secular activities, and common and authoritative rules with a territorial scope. These define a country and the nation that inhibits it” (MacCormick, 1999, p. 125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/Religious Nationalism (Exclusionary National Ideology)</td>
<td>This stresses the importance of a “common ethnicity and culture, a shared language perhaps, a shared history and common ancestral struggles. The nation is the community of fate, the community of ethnic bonds” (MacCormick, 1999, p. 126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the state’s prevailing national ideology and its concept of nationalism and citizenship are based on ethnic distinctions or religious fundamentalism, rather than civic nationalism, then states will often deny protection to their minority groups. Even though the government may not be directly persecuting its minorities, the tense atmosphere may still encourage refugee flows (Gordenker, 1987, p. 83). Exclusionary national ideologies inspire secessionism among minority groups, to ensure they have rights in their own nation states, and can provoke ethnic conflict. The basis of state sovereignty, whereby the state is the protector of its citizens’ rights and that only citizens’ possess full rights within it, combined with its prevailing national ideology, is therefore important in determining the political stability of a country, and ultimately whether refugees are produced (Newland, 1993, pp.146-7). While civic nationalism does not always ensure stability, (like in Indonesia), Brown (1996, p. 17) argues that conflict is more likely when ethnic types of nationalism dominate. He asserts, as Snyder (1993) does, that such ethnic nationalism is a default option and therefore more probable when states are weak; their institutions are collapsing, or when existing institutions are not fulfilling society’s fundamental needs. Given the artificial creation and weak nature of many of the developing states, it is not surprising then to discover that ethnic nationalism widely exists there.
Lack of Human Rights

Lack of respect for fundamental human rights, particularly when connected with oppressive governments, is continually recognised as a contributing factor in the creation of refugees (Gordenker, 1987, p. 170; Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 259, 264; Newland, 1993, p. 156; Loescher, 1992, pp. 57-59; Keely, 1996, p. 1060). While the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 has attempted to define the concept of “human rights,” it remains an ambivalent term. Burnell’s concept of “human rights” is perhaps one of the more clear definitions: “Human rights are a special sort of inalienable moral entitlement. They attach to all persons equally, by virtue of their humanity, irrespective of race, nationality, or membership of any particular social group. They specify the minimum conditions for human dignity and a tolerable life” (Burnell, 2003).

Zolberg et al employ a more specific definition of “human rights” to specifically apply to refugees, whereby the principal basic human right includes: “Freedom from the most immediate forms of life-threatening violence: mass killings, torture, ‘disappearances’ at the hand of the state apparatus or ‘encounters’ with so-called security forces, exposure to mob attacks, and the danger of being caught in the cross fire” (1989, p. 264).

A lack of human rights therefore is the antithesis of the above definitions, and can be conceptually defined as any act that threatens to override any of the fundamental rights that humanity possesses, including the right to food, shelter, health, and protection.

The Political Terror Scale (PTS), originally developed by Michael Stohl and David Carlton which seeks to determine whether high levels of repression are connected to refugee outflows escaping from violence, is used to operationally define a “lack of human rights.” Under the PTS, countries are coded annually on a scale of one-five (listed below) according to their level of political violence that year based on information gathered from Amnesty International and US State Department Country Reports. Gibney and Dalton (1996, p. 60) define “gross levels of human rights abuses” or a “lack of human rights” if they meet the characteristics under level four or five of the PTS. Unsurprisingly, the
authors find that most of the refugees tend to be generated from countries classified as being on levels four or five.

Table 6: Political Terror Scale (PTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Political Violence</th>
<th>Characteristics of Political Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5</td>
<td>The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gibney and Dalton, 1996, pp. 73 -4.

There is wide support for the argument that human rights violations and refugee flows are interconnected (Gibney et al, 1996; Harkovirta, 1986), and that “refugees are human rights violations made visible” (Loescher, 1992, p. 42). However, it is important to acknowledge that human rights violations can be either institutionalised in the discriminatory nature of the political, economic, and social institutions of the state, or they can result from measures of overt generalised state violence (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 284). Schmeidl finds that refugees are more likely to be created from some form of
generalised violence as opposed to being subjected to institutional human rights violations (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 78).

Debate also centers over why governments resort to denying their citizens such basic human rights. Gordenker (1987, p. 74) rightly argues that governments may deny human rights to all as a means of consolidating their political control and keeping an elite group in power, or because they believe that gentler handling of the situation would encourage national disorder or chaos.

Role of external parties

Zolberg et al (1989, pp. 264-5, 275) reject the simplistic notion that refugees appear because they are merely persecuted or victimised by governments or brutalising rulers. Instead they maintain that such governments and states operate within a necessary structure of international support exacerbated by the highly interdependent nature of the world. They contend that refugees usually originate from regimes that have external parties supporting them. These external parties may include “…other states, non-state actors, or outside ethnic groups…” (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 3). Three particular roles that external parties can play in creating refugees during ethnic conflicts are examined:

- providing external support to the ethnic group during the ethnic conflict (diaspora/migration networks);
- providing external support to the governing regime during the ethnic conflict; and,
- external party intervention in the ethnic conflict.

Such processes of diffusion occur through the more “traditional” means of other interstate conflicts, such as: “alliances between transnational kin groups as well as by intentional or unintentional spillovers, irredentist demands, attempts to divert attention from domestic problems, or by predatory states that seek to take advantage of the internal weaknesses of others” (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 4).
- **External support received by the ethnic group (diaspora/migration networks) during the ethnic conflict**

Often the external party involved in an ethnic conflict involves a diaspora, which Cohen (1997, p. 180) says usually demonstrates several of the following features:

a) dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically;
b) alternatively, the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambitions;
c) a collective memory and myth about the homeland;
d) an idealization of the supposed ancestral home;
e) a return movement;
f) a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long time;
g) a troubled relationship with host societies;
h) a sense of solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries; and
i) the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in tolerant host countries.

Unlike previous studies which have included diaspora or migration networks as an intervening factor conducive to creating external refugees (Massey, 1988; Schmeidl, 2003, p. 137), this thesis incorporates diaspora as an independent variable. This is because a diaspora should be viewed as a timeless underlying political factor, rather than as a spontaneous catalyst in generating external refugee flows. The role of diaspora in diffusing an ethnic conflict through encouraging external refugee flows should not be underestimated. Ethnic bonds and antagonisms often motivate external parties to become involved in ethnic conflicts as many ethnic identities rarely coincide completely with the territorial boundaries of modern nation states (Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 29; Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, p. 154; Brown, 1996, p. 595; Vasquez, 1992; Zartman, 1992; Hein, 1993; Carment and James, 1997; Gurr, 1993, p. 133). For example, while most ethnic groups are concentrated in one of several adjacent regions, over one-third of these groups have kindred distributions across three or more countries (Gurr and Marshall, 1990).
- **External support received by the governing regime during the ethnic conflict**

Likewise, strong affective motivations between states with similar ethnic ties or between states with a specific cultural affinity to a disadvantaged communal group in another are likely to develop into deep partisan alignments which could provide support for those escaping the regime (Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, p. 154; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 6). Following Siverson and Starr’s (1991) argument that states with similar geopolitical goals and interests form alliances, Moore and Davis (1998, pp. 29, 92-3) apply this to ethnic alliances. They reason that ethnic alliances, situations where a majority group in one state is a minority group in another or diaspora, should have similar consequences because minority groups will assume their ethnic kin share similar policy and geopolitical preferences. This is particularly so, if instrumental motivations, such as political, material, and ideological support are provided by the external party to the targeted ethnic group, which would enhance the group’s ability to wage war (Suhrke and Noble, 1977; Shiels, 1984; Brown, 1996, p. 592; Massey, 1988). Indeed, Davis, Jaggers and Moore prove that the existence of such ethnic ties has a positive impact upon warlike behaviour in bordering dyads (1997, p. 160). Such affective and instrumental involvement across borders therefore increases partisan violence, can lead compatriots to become more radicalised generating further political instability, and encourages the possible occurrence of external refugee flows.

Conversely, refugees themselves can be used by diaspora in neighbouring states as a vehicle for providing material support to domestic opposition groups of a similar ethnic group or political faction in their country of origin (Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, p. 154). Elites therefore may perceive such ethnic affinities as an opportunity to be exploited and view refugees as international linkages with potential uses for their own welfare (Carment and James, 1997, p. 257), or they could play a pivotal role in mobilising political support by using ethnic appeals to rebuke a rival state for its treatment of its ethnic kin (Horowitz, 1985, p. 291).
Indeed, Lobell and Mauceri (2004, p. 8) contend that external parties become empowered when conflict occurs in a neighbouring country, where state sovereignty is reduced and borders are weakened, and such external parties can threaten or destabilise the ruling ethnic regime in nearby states. They can do so, by supporting organised opposition or dissident groups of the current regime by localised popular support, questioning the legitimacy of the ruling regime, redrawing state boundaries, or overthrowing the ruling regime that opposes them (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 5). For example, such external support of opposition groups was common during the process of decolonisation, and was intended to promote political change, either of the regime or its policies. It was therefore likely to encourage internal chaos which could result in persecution or heavy pressure on those who favoured the foreign-supported movement. The subsequent stress caused could then motivate people to flee (Gordenker, 1987, p. 85).

- External party intervention in the ethnic conflict
Refugees can also emerge from conditions produced by external strategic and economic interests (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 275). Those refugees from geo-politically important regions experiencing ethnic conflict may encourage interventions by foreign powers, especially those involving the extensive use of military force (by proxy or directly). An “intervention” is defined as “…coercive action against a state, without its consent…” (Roberts, 1997, p. 118). For example, Gurr (1993, p. 91) argues that external parties have repeatedly intervened on behalf of communal rebels or the states they challenge and finds that approximately one-third of the overt military interventions in the Third World since 1970 have occurred in conflicts with ethnopolitical cleavages.

As well as complicating and prolonging ethnic conflicts, which might have otherwise ended for lack of resources, external interventions often generate complex refugee situations (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 284; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 251). For example, a study conducted by the UNHCR in the 1980s found a positive relationship between interventionist policies and large refugee flows in the then five most conflict-prone world areas (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 265; Loescher, 1992, p. 28). While Schmeidl (1997, p. 289) acknowledges that not all external intervention in domestic conflicts may directly
produce refugees, she argues that it should be viewed as an accelerating factor that “interacts with the conflicts, intensifies them, and consequently contributes to refugee exodus.”

**Economic/Social Variables**

A complex relationship exists between the characteristic imbalances of economic underdevelopment and violent political conflicts, which have historically generated large refugee flows (Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 262, 258-59; Brown, 1996, p. 18; Loescher, 1992, p. 28). The economic/social factors conducive to creating refugees are broken down into three major areas, based on Brown’s (1996, p. 18) categorisation of: economic problems; discriminatory economic systems; and the trials and tribulations of economic development and modernisation. However, these categories are modified and expanded to include: poverty and economic underdevelopment, discriminatory economic systems, and social change. The expansion of these categories reflects the importance that economic/social factors can play within an ethnic conflict in creating conditions conducive to generating refugees.

**Poverty**

Some argue that economic imbalances and overall poverty in the developing world make it more conducive to political instability and recession - conditions which often lead to refugee movements (Edmonston, 1992; Wood, 1994). For example, during the 1980s “root cause” debate, the UN argued that economic factors lead to the underlying political causes of flight, and therefore could be considered the primary cause of refugees (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 82).

“Poverty” is conceptually defined as occurring when a state lacks material or cultural resources (Marshall, 1998). An operational definition of “poverty” is more complex. Firstly, a distinction must be made between “absolute” as opposed to “relative” poverty. “Absolute poverty” occurs “where a population or section of a population is, at most, able to meet only its bare subsistence essentials of food, clothing, and shelter to maintain minimum levels of living” (Todaro and Smith, 2003, p. 787). By contrast, “relative
poverty” refers to the group’s lack of resources when compared to other groups in society (relative standard of living). This latter definition of “relative poverty” is used in this thesis, because it is the economic imbalances within a state that have been posited as generating refugees. High discrepancies in standards of living are indicators of poverty and when combined with political instability may instigate an environment under which refugee flows are more likely (Brown, 1996, p. 19; Richmond, 1993, p. 12).

“Relative poverty” is measured using the United Nations Development Programme’s “Human Poverty Index for Developing Countries” (HPI-1), which measures deprivations in three fundamental areas:

a) a long and healthy life - vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40;
b) knowledge - exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as measured by the adult illiteracy rate; and,
c) a decent standard of living - lack of access to overall economic provisioning, as measured by the unweighted average of two indicators, the percentage of the population without sustainable access to an improved water source and the percentage of children under weight for age (UNDP, 2004).

Unlike other measures of poverty, the HPI-1 is formulated specifically for developing states and recognises that a large proportion of households in such countries derive most of their income from semi-subsistence production rather than from cash. Semi-subsistence production is notoriously difficult to give a specific financial value, because it operates both in and out of the cash economy (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, March 2004). Due to these difficulties, the Index provides a useful measure of determining relative poverty levels in states which do not strictly adhere to Western forms of production. This is because they incorporate health, education, access to services, and wealth indicators within their definitions of “poverty.”
Economic Underdevelopment

The report of the Group of Experts appointed by the UN General Assembly in 1986 cites economic underdevelopment; “inherited from colonialism,” within the developing world and exacerbated by the erosion of traditional social support mechanisms by the modernisation of economic production as a major root cause of refugees. “Economic underdevelopment” is defined according to the factors that several leading refugee theorists identify as conducive to creating refugees. These are: “balance-of-payments problems, deteriorating terms of trade, indebtedness, and inflation” (Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 258-260), as well as unemployment and resource competition, especially concerning land (Newman, 2003, p. 4; Brown, 1996, p. 19; Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2004). These six factors, aggravated by economic stringencies and the environmentally related problems of deforestation and desertification, may contribute to societal tensions and provide the environment for conflict. Violent conflict can disrupt food production and distribution in subsistence economies, rendering disease, famine, and refugee movements more likely (Newland, 1993, pp. 151-2). Such conditions foster insecurity and threaten survival, encouraging people to flee (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 260).

Others contend that economic underdevelopment by itself is not a major factor conducive to generating refugees (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 260; Keely, 1996; Schmeidl, 1997; 2001). They argue that there is an inconsistency between the simplified idea that poverty causes refugees and the reality that situations of extreme economic deprivation have not usually generated external refugees and neither have all poor states. This finding therefore disqualifies the argument that poverty is a direct and necessary “push” factor of refugee migration. Schmeidl (1997, p. 299) also discovers that economic variables have little impact on predicting refugee flows which contradicts the argument that economic problems are a primary cause of refugee flows. In both her studies, Schmeidl (1997, p. 299; 2001, p. 82) finds that political violence leads to less refugee migration in countries with higher levels of economic development and a higher population density. She argues that this implies that in areas with higher levels of economic development refugee exodus is less likely than in areas with lower levels of economic development. For example, on average Schmeidl finds that the number of refugees fleeing from genocide/politicide is
reduced by 20,000 in areas with higher levels of economic development. Therefore it is possible that the level of economic development or poverty may be an accelerator to refugee flight and that in conjunction with political conflict leads to forced migration (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 299; 2001, pp. 82-5).

Economic development frequently creates rapid but uneven development, which often surpasses political development, failing to integrate large sectors of society in the process. This can lead to feelings of relative deprivation, particularly amongst traditional ethnic groups, which are less likely to benefit from modernisation and economic development and become apprehensive about their survival. They are therefore more likely to engage in ethnonationalism to undermine advanced groups and to strengthen their own sense of identity (Schmeidl, 1996, pp. 25-6). Such ethnic tensions can further be increased, if modernisation and economic change alters the division of labour, allowing formerly marginalised groups to compete in the same labour markets as more privileged ethnic groups. This can exacerbate ethnic tensions and the potential for refugees of ethnic conflict (Schmeidl, 1996, p. 26).

It is not only important that large sectors of the population are politically integrated into the modernised society, but that they are also economically, socially, and culturally integrated within the regional or global system. Lack of integration may increase the likelihood that ethnic conflict becomes diffused, and that refugee flows occur (Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, pp. 7-8; Richmond, 1993, p. 14). Due to the modernisation of transportation and communication, such refugee movements maybe more easily facilitated, and encourage potential refugees from the developing world to seek asylum in the industrialised world. Given the wide discrepancies that exist about the importance of poverty and economic underdevelopment in creating refugees, this issue must be further addressed (Melander and Öberg, 2004, p. 20).

**Discriminatory Economic Systems**

Discriminatory economic systems generating inequality between groups can foster feelings of resentment, which may lead to conflict and refugee movements. A
“discriminatory economic system,” is one that makes a distinction in favour or against a particular group within society and is operationally defined according to the “Minorities at Risk: Economic Discrimination Index” (2004, p. 39). This uses three characteristics to determine whether economic discrimination exists within a country:

1. Historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions imposed on the ethnic group;
2. Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations; and,
3. The nature of the state’s economical public policies towards the ethnic group.

The extent to which the ethnic group suffers according to the above criteria is summarised into five categories of economic discrimination in the table below:

**Table 7: Economic Discrimination Index**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Discrimination Index</th>
<th>Characteristics of Economic Discrimination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Discrimination</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Neglect/Remedial Policies</td>
<td>Significant poverty and under representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group’s material well-being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Neglect/No Remedial Policies</td>
<td>Significant poverty and under representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group’s material well-being.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Exclusion/Neutral Policies</td>
<td>Significant poverty and under representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive Policies</td>
<td>Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Basis for Judgment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Davis, Jaggers and Moore (1997, p. 155) agree with Gurr (1993) and find that the level of grievances experienced by the group helps to determine their potential for collective action against the state. They find to a limited degree that “the higher the level of discrimination or magnitude of grievances experienced by a minority group, the higher the level of international conflict, including war, between any two states.” The level of grievances experienced by the group therefore helps determine their potential for collective action against the state and for refugees to occur.

**Social change**

“Social change” is conceptually defined as “the impact of social and cultural factors on demographic features of society,” and encompasses the process through which these features alter over time (Marshall, 1998). The three main variables underlying social change are fertility, mortality, and migration (Marshall, 1998). Of these, three standard social factors are operationally defined as relevant to the creation of refugees:

1. Annual population change (population growth rate);
2. Population density; and
3. Total fertility rate.

The first of these factors, “annual population change/population growth rate” is defined as the “number of people added to (or subtracted from) a population in a year due to natural increase and net migration expressed as a percentage of the population at the beginning of the year” (ADB, 2005). The second factor, “population density” is the number of inhabitants per square kilometre of land, and finally the “total fertility rate” (births per woman) is defined as “the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her life-time, if she were to bear children at each age in accord with prevailing age-specific fertility rates” (UNDP, 2005).

While policy makers have long argued that population growth contributes to refugee flows, some (Edmonston, 1992; Weiner, 1996) suggest that when this is combined with very high population density, it is more likely that refugees will be generated. This explanation argues that increasing population density creates more people at risk of
becoming refugees, as competition for land grows (Weiner, 1996; Schmeidl, 1997, p. 287). Therefore, high population density and growth rates in the developing world may threaten to override any progress achieved in economic development and human rights, meaning that more people will be inevitably displaced as a result of conflict than in previous times (Loescher, 1992, pp. 31, 68; Brown, 1996, p. 576). Zolberg et al (1989, p. 231) support this, by finding that the world’s poorest countries today have a total fertility rate approximately three times higher than that of rich industrial market economies, meaning that as the world population grows, an increasing proportion of it is poor.

Conversely, Schmeidl (2001, p. 83; 1997, p. 299) finds that political violence leads to less refugee movements in countries with a higher population density, therefore discrediting arguments that imminent population pressure is a direct cause of refugees. She explains this trend by acknowledging that in areas with a high population density, it is possible that people may value their land so much that they are reluctant to leave it even when confronted with overt violence. Another explanation is the argument that “population density measures social complexity, which can be associated with democracy and thus with lower levels of political violence” (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 83).

**Cultural/Perceptual Variables**

According to Brown (1996, p. 20), two major cultural/perceptual factors make some places more predisposed to violence than others: cultural discrimination against minorities; and group histories and perceptions of themselves and others. This thesis concentrates only on the former of these factors, which is regarded as particularly influential in the production of refugees and is also easier to measure (MAR, 2004, pp. 40-1).

**Cultural Discrimination against Ethnic Groups**

Cultural discrimination against ethnic groups involves a state differentiation of the ethnic group based on cultural grounds and is assessed according to a modified version of the “Minorities at Risk” (2004, pp. 40-1) criteria. This involves four indicators:

1. Restrictions on religion;
2. Restrictions on the use of language;
3. Restrictions on appearance; and,
4. Restrictions on behaviour.

As well as the above cultural restrictions that may be placed on ethnic groups by the state, in extreme cases, more drastic measures attempting to assimilate ethnic minorities maybe implemented. For example, such cultural restrictions may be combined with programmes designed to bring large numbers of ethnic groups into minority areas, constituting a form of cultural genocide, often inducing refugee flows. If discrimination against minorities intensifies or if politicians blame ethnic groups for society’s larger problems and have control over the national media, these campaigns are particularly effective in generating refugees, as ethnic propaganda can quickly distort views and radicalise ethnic groups along ethnic fault lines (Brown, 1996, p. 586).

**Intervening Variables**

An “intervening variable” is a variable stemming from the independent variables that interposes itself spontaneously within a situation, and acts as either a catalyst in facilitating or deterring some event (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 290). Lee (1966, p. 53) was among the first to recognise the importance of intervening variables in his study of migration, arguing that the number of migrants is relative to the difficulty of overcoming the intervening obstacles. Clark (1989) then applied this idea specifically to refugee migration, which Schmeidl (1997) subsequently simplified into categories outlining the facilitators and obstacles to refugee flight. However, these scholars fail to accurately determine what an intervening variable is, and incorrectly include the independent variables of structural, political and economic/social factors in their analyses. For example, Schmeidl (1997) mistakenly includes the structural factor of geographical location and the economic/social factor of modernisation through increased transportation and communication as intervening variables.
Facilitators of External Refugees

Often the facilitators of external refugees are inhibitors to the creation of internal refugees, and vice versa. This demonstrates the interchangeable nature of such intervening variables – often the situation the intervening variable originates in determines whether it will be regarded as a facilitator or as an inhibitor to creating certain types of refugee flows. It should also be acknowledged that the above facilitators are not necessary pre-conditions for a certain type of refugee movement to occur, and that it is ultimately a person’s choice whether they decide to cross an international border and become an external refugee. The mere existence of the above facilitators does not necessarily mean that an external refugee will be produced. Furthermore, the existence of one type of refugee movement does not indicate that another different type of refugee movement will not occur. Often external and internal refugee movements occur concurrently within states, or one precipitates the other. For example, Schmeidl found that during the time period 1964-1996, only five countries out of 57 countries with internal refugees did not also produce external refugees (1998, p. 26).

In this thesis, only those intervening variables that act as facilitators in creating external refugee movements are analysed. This is because although the four countries (Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands) examined in chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis each produced internal refugees, not all created external refugees during their ethnic conflicts. According to refugee theorists (Loescher, 1992, pp. 39 - 41; Gordenker, 1987, p. 183; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 275; Wood, 1993, p. 17), five major facilitators are identified as conducive to the creation of external refugees and are explained in further detail in chapter 5. These are:

1. less fighting in border areas;
2. relaxed land border controls;
3. governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict;
4. non-governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict; and,
5. sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state,
Summary
This chapter explained the complex nature of the structural, political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual factors, as well as the intervening facilitators, most conducive to the creation of refugees within ethnic conflicts. The above causes of refugee movements are summarised in the model below, which provides a means from which to analyse variations in both external and internal refugee numbers, resulting from ethnic conflict in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region.
Figure 12: Factors Conducive to Creating Refugees within an Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic Conflict

Independent Variables

Major Factors

1. Structural Factors
   - A) Weak States
   - B) Ethnic Composition and Heterogeneity
   - C) Land Access

2. Political Factors
   - A) State-Building
   - B) Political Regime
   - C) Discriminatory Political Systems
   - D) Exclusionary National Ideologies
   - E) Lack of Human Rights
   - F) Role of External Parties

3. Economic/Social Factors
   - A) Poverty
   - B) Economic Underdevelopment
   - C) Discriminatory Economic Systems
   - D) Social Change

4. Cultural/Perceptual Factors
   - A) Cultural Discrimination against Ethnic Groups

Intervening Variables

Facilitators:

- i) Less Fighting in Border Areas
- ii) Relaxed Land Border Controls
- iii) Governmental Assistance to Refugees
- iv) Non-governmental Assistance to Refugees
- v) Sudden Outbreak of Disease in Refugee-Producing State

Facilitators:

- Fighting in Border Areas
- Strict Land Border Controls
- Governmental Assistance to Refugees
- Non-governmental Assistance to Refugees
- No Sudden Outbreak of Disease in Refugee-Producing State

Dependent Variable

External Refugees

Internal Refugees
The model above uses three main categories of variables: independent, intervening, and dependent. Of these, the four major independent variables conducive to creating refugees are identified as comprising structural, political, economic/social, and cultural/perceptual factors. These factors consist of more specific sub-factors, which are listed on the far right of the model and it will be shown that a combination of these sub-factors is necessary before refugees are created. However, it is the intervening variables that determine whether the dependent variable (refugee flows) will be either internal or external in nature. The intervening variables consist of ten facilitators specific to the creation of both internal and external refugee movements. This model is applied to four countries which have experienced ethnic conflict in the region (Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands), in the following chapters in order to answer the fundamental question posed by this thesis: why do some ethnic conflicts produce external refugees and others do not in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region? In addition, these chapters also answer the following supplementary questions:

- What factors within ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region are most conducive to creating external and/or internal refugees?
- Which ethnic conflicts produce more refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region and why?
- Are external or internal refugee movements more likely to occur first in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region and does one encourage the other?
Chapter 4: Structural and Political Variables

Overview of the Southeast Asia/Pacific Region

The Southeast Asia/Pacific region is complex, diverse and dynamic. Southeast Asia includes the 10 member states of the main regional organisation the “Association of Southeast Asian Nations” (ASEAN). This region alone has a population of about 500 million, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometres and a combined gross domestic product of US$737 billion (ASEAN, 2005b). Comparatively, the Pacific region includes the 22 Pacific Island countries and territories of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC), which has a population of approximately 8.6 million over a total land area of 551,483 square kilometres (SPC, 2005). The five largest island countries and territories in Melanesia account for the majority of the region’s population (86.4 percent), followed by Polynesia (7.4 percent) and Micronesia (6.2 percent) (SPC, 2005).

Ethnic conflict is widespread within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. From 1995-2005, 17 ethnic conflicts occurred within the 32 countries that comprise the region. At least twelve of these ethnic conflicts occurred in Southeast Asia, (five in Myanmar, four in the Philippines, two in Indonesia and one in Cambodia), and five in the Pacific (one each in Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, New Caledonia, Fiji and the Solomon Islands) (Bercovitch et al, 2005; Henderson, 2005, pp. 6-7). At the same time, the UNHCR recorded the total external refugee population of Asia and the Pacific as increasing by 1.6 percent during

---

3 The 10 member states of ASEAN are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (ASEAN, 2005).
4 The 22 Pacific Island countries and territories of the Secretariat of the Pacific Community include: American Samoa, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI), Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Wallis and Futuna. The SPC also has four remaining founding countries: Australia, France, New Zealand and the United States of America, however they are not included in this analysis.
5 These include: Fiji, New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.
6 The UNHCR defines “Asia and the Pacific” as including: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Macao Special Administrative Region of China, Malaysia, Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Mongolia, Nauru, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Niue, Norfolk Island, Northern Mariana Islands, Papua New Guinea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, American Samoa, Palau, Philippines, Pitcairn, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Viet Nam, and Wallis and Futuna Islands (UNHCR, 2005).
2004 to 836,700. This is the highest rate of annual change of all the geographical regions listed under the “UNHCR Bureau,” and demonstrates the comparative severity of the refugee problem in the Asia-Pacific region. Furthermore, Asia and the Pacific hosted nine percent of the global refugee population at the end of 2004 (UNHCR, 20 June 2005).

Table 8: Refugee Population by UNHCR Bureau, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNHCR Bureau</th>
<th>Begin 2004</th>
<th>End 2004</th>
<th>Annual Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa and Great Lakes</td>
<td>1,257,900</td>
<td>1,267,700</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East and Horn of Africa</td>
<td>768,100</td>
<td>770,500</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>306,200</td>
<td>245,100</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>531,200</td>
<td>465,100</td>
<td>-12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Africa*</td>
<td>2,863,400</td>
<td>2,748,400</td>
<td>-4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASWANAME**</td>
<td>2,827,300</td>
<td>2,735,200</td>
<td>-3.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>623,900</td>
<td>598,400</td>
<td>-4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>823,600</td>
<td>836,700</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>2,454,800</td>
<td>2,317,800</td>
<td>-5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,593,000</td>
<td>9,236,500</td>
<td>-3.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluding North Africa.
** Central Asia, South West Asia, North Africa and Middle East.

Recent figures from the UNHCR for 2005 indicate there are 82,400 “persons of concern”7 in Oceania and 6,899,600 “persons of concern” in Asia. A breakdown of the numbers of external and internal refugees within the region is still unavailable, as are specific figures for the Southeast Asia/Pacific region (UNHCR, September 2005, p. 5).

Table 9: Persons of Concern to UNHCR – By Region, 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1st Jan 2004*</th>
<th>1st Jan 2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>6,112,500</td>
<td>6,899,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>4,285,100</td>
<td>4,861,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4,242,800</td>
<td>4,429,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern America</td>
<td>978,100</td>
<td>853,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; Caribbean</td>
<td>1,316,400</td>
<td>2,070,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td><strong>74,400</strong></td>
<td><strong>82,400</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17,009,300</td>
<td>19,197,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Revised year-end figures
Source: UNHCR, September 2005, p. 5.

7 “Persons of Concern” include: external refugees, internal refugees, asylum-seekers, returnees, resettlement refugees, stateless persons and others “of concern” (UNHCR, September 2005).
However, the Global IDP Project (2005) provides these figures, although it differs from the UNHCR (2005) in its method of calculation. The Global IDP Project reports that by the end of 2004, about 3.3 million people were internally displaced in the Asia-Pacific region solely due to conflicts and not due to natural disasters or large-scale infrastructure projects. The number of conflict-induced internal refugees in Asia-Pacific\(^8\) roughly equals that of external refugees from the region. This is particularly significant because internal displacement is often an instigator of large external refugee flows. Despite the number of internal refugees decreasing in the Asia-Pacific by nearly thirty percent over the past two years, the region remains the third largest refugee-producing area in the world.

Table 10: Origin of Internal and External Refugees by Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Internal refugees (millions)</th>
<th>External refugees (millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Global IDP Project, March 2005, p. 11.

The model developed in Chapter 3 is applied to the Southeast Asia / Pacific region in an attempt to test whether it can explain the production of refugees within this region. Four states from the region that have experienced, or continue to experience, ethnic conflict are examined – two from Southeast Asia (Indonesia and the Philippines) and two from the Pacific (Fiji and the Solomon Islands). This thesis specifically concentrates on the ethnic conflicts between:

1. the Dayak and the Madurese in the Indonesian province of Kalimantan;

\(^8\) The Global IDP Project defines “Asia and the Pacific” as including: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (The Global IDP Project, March 2005).
2. the Moro and the Republic of the Philippines’ government (Roman Catholics) in the Filipino province of Mindanao;
3. the Indo-Fijians and indigenous Fijians in Fiji; and,
4. the Guali and Malaitans on the island of Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands.

These four ethnic conflicts are chosen because although each has created internal refugees, not all have produced external refugees, despite the countries’ similar structural characteristics. The ethnic conflicts analysed occurred in developing island states without land borders with neighbouring countries (except Kalimantan), which have at least two or more ethnic groups and possess similar colonial histories. This provides a good basis for comparative analysis. Furthermore, because external refugees were only created in some instances, the four conflicts serve to identify some general arguments about the relationship between ethnic conflict and refugee production in the region.

This chapter firstly provides a brief overview of the country’s history and refugee movements associated with ethnic conflict, concentrating on a 10-year post-Cold War period from 1995 - 2005. The rationale for choosing this time period is because the post-Cold War era saw an increase in the global number of internal ethnic conflicts, warranting that it be more closely examined (Eriksson and Wallensteen, 2004, p. 132). Furthermore, this time period was chosen as each of the ethnic conflicts studied in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands reached its peak during 1995 - 2005. The second part of this chapter applies the structural and political variables of the model to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands from 1995 - 2005. The remaining two independent variables of the model - social/economic and cultural/perceptual factors - and the intervening variables are applied to the countries in the following chapter.
Overview of Ethnic Conflicts and Refugee Movements in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands

Fiji
The foundations for a potential ethnic conflict were laid when the British colonised Fiji in 1874 and brought 50,000 Indian labourers to work on the sugar plantations until 1916 (Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 545). By the time Fiji became independent within the Commonwealth on 10 October 1970, Indo-Fijians comprised nearly half of the total population (Freedom House, 2005, p. 228). Although the Indian-led opposition party won the 1977 elections, it failed to form a government for fear of the reaction of indigenous Fijians to an Indian leader (MAR, 2004). Therefore, it was not until 1987, that the ruling Alliance Party (AP) was defeated by a coalition government containing a majority of Indo-Fijian Ministers. The new government was overthrown on 14 May 1987 and again on 25 September 1987 by military coups led by Sitiveni Rabuka (Europa, 2004, p. 1624). While no deaths occurred as a result of the ensuing conflict, large-scale emigration of skilled and professional workers occurred (Henderson, 2005, p. 6; Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 543). Rabuka portrayed his coups as necessary for indigenous Fijians to regain...
control of their country and enacted a new Constitution in 1990 to formally safeguard their rights (Henderson, 2000, p. 17). However, he replaced this in 1997 with a more equitable Constitution, which ironically enabled Mahendra Chaudhry to become Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian Prime Minister in 1999. On 19 May 2000, a third coup was staged, led by indigenous Fijian businessman George Speight, who like Rabuka, justified his actions in terms of protecting indigenous Fijian interests. Eight deaths occurred during the coup and about 375 - 750 internal refugees were created (Henderson, 2005, p. 7; USCRI, 2004; Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 544). An interim administration of 19 indigenous Fijians led by Laisenia Qarase was sworn in as the national government by the military on 4 July 2000, which was later declared illegitimate. Qarase eventually became Prime Minister in 2001 through a legitimate election (Europa, 2004, pp. 1626-7). Ethnic tensions between Indo-Fijian and indigenous Fijians still remain high. Over 120,000 Indo-Fijians have left Fiji in the aftermath of the 2000 coup, as anti-Indo-Fijian sentiment grows and crimes targeting Indo-Fijian homes and businesses have increased (Freedom House, 2005, pp. 230-31).

**Indonesia**

Indonesia was ruled by the Dutch from the early seventeenth century until 1949. Although Indonesia declared its independence in 1945, it took four years of intermittent negotiations, recurring hostilities, and United Nations mediation before the Netherlands
formally transferred sovereignty in 1949, with Sukarno continuing as President (Europa, 2004, p. 2116). The Kalimantan province was formed by the fledgling Indonesian government in 1957 after a Dayak\(^9\) revolt demanded more autonomy (Friel, 2001). However, ethnic tensions on Kalimantan first began in 1904, when Malay, Bugis and Arab merchants brought Madurese unskilled labourers from the island of Madura, off the north-eastern coast of Java, to the province. This practice continued under the Dutch resettlement programme (Kolonisasi) and in 1971, under the government-initiated “transmigration” programme, to relieve overcrowding within Indonesia. Over 100,000 transmigrants were moved into West and Central Kalimantan from 1980 - 85. In addition, voluntary migrants, including many from the island of Madura, also settled in Kalimantan. This influx threatened to turn the indigenous Dayak population of Kalimantan into a minority (Djalal, 2001; Bamba, 2004, pp. 400-1). Dayak resentment grew as the Madurese transmigrants began to economically and politically dominate Kalimantan by taking over their traditional lands (Chandrasekaran, 2001; Pereira, 2001). Since then, approximately eight conflicts have broken out between Dayak and Madurese and one between Madurese and ethnic Chinese. These ethnic tensions transformed into open conflict in December 1996 in Sanggau Ledo, West Kalimantan, following a Dayak massacre of Madurese transmigrants, with 3,054 houses destroyed by April 1997 and an estimated 20,000 Madurese internal refugees by the end of 1997. Despite a peace agreement in 1997, fighting resumed in Sambas, West Kalimantan in 1999 (killing 200 and displacing 35,000 Madurese) and in 2001 in Sampit, Central Kalimantan (Europa, 2004, p. 2118; Global IDP Database, 2004; Global IDP Database, 2005; Djalal, 2001; Bamba, 2004, p. 399). During the major 2001 conflict, a 10-day violent rampage ensued in which Dayak took control over a large area of Central Kalimantan and killed about 500 Madurese, generating at least 130,000 Madurese internal refugees. These people composed 26 percent of Indonesia’s total internal refugee population of 500,000 at this time (International Crisis Group, 2001; USCRI, 2005). Although comparative stability has returned to the province in recent years, allowing the return of nearly 45,000 internal refugees to Central Kalimantan in 2004, since 1997 the conflict has caused 1,388

\(^9\) It should be recognised that the term “Dayak” is actually an umbrella term covering over 200 indigenous groups in the Kalimantan province of Indonesia (Friel, 2001).

**Philippines**

The origin of ethnic conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims (Moro) began under Spanish colonial rule during the 16th century. The conflict was exacerbated when the Philippines was ceded to the United States (US) in 1898 following its victory in the Spanish-American War. The signing of the Bates Treaty between the US and the Sultan of Sulu the following year was designed to allow the US further control over the territory. It stipulated that the Sultan relinquish his and his heirs’ rights to sovereignty over Sulu, but was abrogated to enable the creation of the southern Moro Province of the Philippines in 1906. In 1940, the US government abolished the Sultanate completely and the Moro territories were brought under one administrative system of the Philippines. The American colonialism therefore laid the impetus for the contemporary Muslim separatist movement in the Mindanao-Sulu region (Islam, 2003, pp. 198-200; Europa, 2004, p. 3408).
After the Philippines gained independence in 1946, the Jabaidah massacre occurred in 1968, and involved the execution of Moro at the government’s request. This provided the catalyst for the creation of the Muslim (Mindanao) Independence Movement (MIM), which later became the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). The MNLF’s main goal was the complete independence of the Moros’ homeland. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement provided for the creation of an autonomous region in Mindanao, on the condition that the MNLF accept autonomy in favour of complete independence. However, the MNLF’s rejection of this facilitated the establishment of two breakaway groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the more extremist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) (Islam, 2003, pp. 201-4). The ensuing violence caused at least 100,000 deaths and created approximately 189,000 internal refugees (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 484; Medina-Salgado, 1998, p. 135). Despite government concessions under the 1987 Constitution and 1996 Peace Agreement, the MNLF and the MILF continue to demand separatism for the 23 provinces in Mindanao (Europa, 2004, p. 3415). Although the Arroyo government resumed peace talks with the MILF and held a referendum within Mindanao in 2001, the resumption of fighting in 2003 caused the deaths of at least 160 MILF rebels and eight Philippine soldiers, created over 420,000 internal refugees and approximately 57,000 external refugees, most of which were Moro (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 488; Global IDP Project, 2004; USCRI, 2004). Currently 60,000 internal refugees remain from the 2000 and 2003 conflicts and another 158,375 were generated from January - September 2005 alone. However, most of these latter refugees only experienced short-term displacement, often returning after a few days or weeks (Global IDP Project, 2005).
Solomon Islands

Britain gained full control over the Solomon Islands through Germany’s cessation of most of its territory there from 1898-99. The whole territory, known as the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, was later placed under the jurisdiction of the Western Pacific High Commission, which continued to rule the country until independence in 1978 when Peter Kenilorea became Prime Minister (Europa, 2004, p. 3810).

Ethnic tensions have existed in the Solomon Islands since World War Two, when the United States brought labourers from the island of Malaita to work on the island of Guadalcanal. Guali resentment grew as the Malaitan transmigrants began to economically and politically dominate Guadalcanal and erupted into open conflict in 1998, when a small group of Guali youth initiated a series of attacks on Malaitan transmigrants. Two of the leaders formed a militant group in 1999 called the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA) and began widening their attacks on migrant communities throughout Guadalcanal. During the year approximately 20,000 – 30,000 people were displaced from rural Guadalcanal into Honiara, often continuing on to Malaita. By 2000, almost all migrants within rural Guadalcanal had moved and many had lost everything. In response, a Malaitan militant group, the Malaita Eagle Force (MEF), began a campaign against the
Guali insurgency in late 1999. The MEF was largely supported by the police force, 75 percent of whom were Malaitans.

In June 2000, the MEF and the paramilitary police staged a coup, taking former Prime Minister Bartholomew Ulufa’alu, himself a Malaitan, hostage and seizing control of Honiara. This enabled the MEF to effectively gain control of Honiara as well as the bulk of military weaponry in the country. An internal split also occurred within the Guadalcanal militancy, leading to the creation of a new militia, the Isatabu Freedom Movement (IFM), separate from the GRA. The IFM claimed to represent the interests of indigenous Guali and initiated a campaign of threats and intimidation against Malaitans on Guadalcanal, demanding autonomy within the Solomon Islands and an end to new migration (Pollard and Wale, 2004, pp. 584-6). An estimated 100 - 1,000 people died during the conflict, which created an estimated 3,000 more internal refugees following the coup (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 582; US Department of State, 2005, p. 8; USCR, 2002; Henderson, 2005, p. 7). In addition, a few families of mixed parentage fled to Australia as external refugees, but their numbers are too small to warrant any close examination that an external refugee movement occurred (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 582).

Following Ulufa’alu’s forced resignation; a new government was formed with Manasseh Sogavare as Prime Minister (USCR, 2002). The Townsville Peace Agreement signed in October 2000 between the warring factions was rejected by a group of Malaitan militants led by Harold Keke, which killed 50 people and created thousands of internal refugees on Guadalcanal’s Weather Coast region (US Department of State, 2005, p. 5). Armed gangs terrorised other parts of the country, eventually forcing the government to leave Honiara. In the December 2001 parliamentary elections Sir Allan Kemakeza became Prime Minister and requested external assistance in 2003 to resolve the ethnic conflict (Europa, 2004, p. 3814). The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) increased stability, allowing the 1,500 internal refugees from Guadalcanal’s Weather Coast to return in 2004 (Global IDP Project, November 2004).
Structural Variables

If a country experiencing ethnic conflict is also identified under one or more of the operational definitions in Chapter 3 as a “weak state,” an ethnically diverse country with a dominant ethnic group, or as a country with a high percentage of land access relative to its total length of land boundaries, it should be more likely to create refugees (Gordenker, 1987, pp. 76-7; Sørli et al, 2005, p. 150; Schmeidl, 1997, p. 296).

Weak States

If a state is not fulfilling its functions in either one or two of the capability areas outlined in Chapter 3, (the security gap, the capacity gap, and the legitimacy gap), it is defined as a “weak state” according to Weinstein et al (2005, pp. 13-14). These three capability areas are applied to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands in the table below in order to assess whether they constitute “weak states.”

**Table 11: “The Security Gap”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Major War</th>
<th>Intermediate War</th>
<th>Minor War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table above classifies countries into three categories according to the level of security within the state. Security is measured in terms of the government’s ability to protect people from internal and external threats, maintain a monopoly over the use of force, and to preserve effective sovereignty and order within its territory (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 14). The ethnic conflicts in Indonesia and the Philippines resulted in more battle-related deaths than those in Fiji and the Solomon Islands and fall under the category of “intermediate” rather than “minor” wars. This means that a greater “security gap” or weakness in security exists in Indonesia and the Philippines, which suggests that more refugees should be generated from these countries than from Fiji and the Solomon Islands.
Table 12: “The Capacity Gap”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 20 percent</th>
<th>60 to 80 percent</th>
<th>40 to 60 percent</th>
<th>20 to 40 percent</th>
<th>Bottom 20 percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>91 percent rate in 2003 of one-year-olds fully immunised against measles.</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This table ranks countries by the percentage to which their governments play a fundamental role in meeting the basic needs of its citizens, which is assessed according to the UNDP’s measles immunisation rate as measured by the Human Development Index, 2005. A higher percentage to the left indicates that the government is more capable of meeting its citizens’ basic needs (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 48). Under these criteria, the Fijian government was best able to deliver basic health services and education to its citizens in 2003, followed by the Filipino, Solomon Islands, and the Indonesian governments. This indicates that Indonesia had a higher “capacity gap” and was therefore more likely than the other countries to produce refugees under this criteria.

Table 13: “The Legitimacy Gap”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top 20 percent</th>
<th>60 to 80 percent</th>
<th>40 to 60 percent</th>
<th>20 to 40 percent</th>
<th>Bottom 20 percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


“Table 13” shows the comparative level of legitimacy within a state, which is measured according to a government’s commitment to a transparent and democratic government. Again, a higher percentage to the left indicates a greater governmental commitment to democracy. Unfortunately, Weinstein et al (2005) do not provide data for the Philippines and Fiji in this area. Therefore, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the table is
that the Solomon Islands’ government has a higher percentage of legitimacy than the Indonesian government.

Overall, Indonesia is the weakest of the four states analysed under the three capability areas, because it consistently has the largest gaps in security, capacity, and legitimacy compared to the other countries. Due to this, one would expect that during an ethnic conflict a higher number of refugees would emerge from Indonesia than from Fiji, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands.

Ethnic Composition and Heterogeneity
Although geographically isolated, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Indonesia and the Philippines are heterogeneous states with a diverse range of ethnicities and cultures. The table below shows the ethnic composition of each country according to its last population census:
### Table 14: Ethnic Composition of the Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Major ethnic groups</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiji</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous Fijians</td>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indo-Fijians</td>
<td></td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeans, other Pacific Islanders, overseas Chinese and Rotuman Islanders</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Javanese</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudanese</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madurese</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal Malays</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kalimantan</strong>&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Dayak</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madurese</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philippines</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Malays</td>
<td></td>
<td>91.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Malays (Moro)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)</strong></td>
<td>Muslims (Moro)</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Episocal Church</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Evangelicals</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Solomon Islands</strong>&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>Melanesian</td>
<td>94.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polynesian</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Micronesian</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unspecified</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This table demonstrates that a dominant ethnic group, which comprises 45 to 90 percent of the total population, as defined by Sørli et al (2005, p. 150), exists in each country. The

<sup>10</sup> Although Friel argues that no specific ethnic breakdown of Kalimantan’s population is available, Djalal (2001) states that of the four million people in the Kalimantan province of Indonesia, more than two million are ethnically Dayak, making them the dominant ethnic group. Pereira also cites that only eight percent in Kalimantan are ethnic Madurese (Friel, 2001; Pereira, 2001).

<sup>11</sup> The precise ethnic composition of the Solomon Islands is more difficult to ascertain, with no breakdown available for the percentage of Malaitans and Gualis within the total population. However, it is acknowledged that the Malaitans are the majority ethnic group in the country (Henderson, 2005). According to the 1999 census, Malaita had a total population of and Guadalcanal had a total population of 60 275 (Population and Housing Census, 1999).
existence of these dominant ethnic groups, combined by their size, how they are
distributed across a state’s territory, and the political balancing by the state between
ethnic groups, could influence the creation of the classic type of “target minority” refugee
238). This occurred during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji and in Kalimantan (Indonesia),
when the minority, rather than the dominant ethnic group, produced refugees. However,
refugees were produced by the dominant ethnic groups during the conflicts in Mindanao
(Philippines) and in the Solomon Islands, which contradicts this theory.

**Land Access**

Fiji, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands have no land borders. Therefore, the degree
of land access relative to total kilometres of boundaries is zero percent, which should
mean that fewer opportunities existed for the creation of external refugees during their
ethnic conflicts (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 296). According to this argument, comparatively
more opportunities therefore existed for external refugees to be created from Indonesia’s
Kalimantan province because it has a 1,782 kilometre land border with Malaysia (CIA,
2005). This gives potential external refugees 18.1 percent land access to Malaysia using
Schmeidl’s formula below:

\[
\text{Percent land access} = \frac{1,782 \text{ km land boundaries}}{(1,782 \text{ km land boundaries} + 8,054 \text{ km coastline}) \times 100}
\]

\[
= 18.1\% 
\]

Despite the existence of a land border in Kalimantan, no external refugees were created.
Instead, external refugees were created from countries with no land access, Fiji and the
Philippines. Therefore, Schmeidl’s (1997, p. 296) assumption that a higher percentage of
land access should facilitate the creation of external refugees is incorrect. However, as
18.1 percent is still a fairly low percentage of land access, this may have prevented
external refugees being created from Kalimantan.

12 The coastline of Kalimantan extends 8,054 kilometres from the Sambas Peninsular in the west to the
island of Nunakan on the Sabah border, much of which is covered by a dense belt of mangrove forest
Table 15: Summary of Structural Factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Evidence of Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak States</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic composition and Heterogeneity</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land access</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above shows that not many structural differences exist between Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. This is because all four countries are: “weak” under one or more of the capability areas, ethnically heterogeneous with a dominant ethnic group, and island states without land borders with neighbouring countries (except Kalimantan).

**Political Variables**

Six major political factors are commonly associated with creating conditions conducive to generating refugees within developing countries. These are: the processes of state-building, the type of political regime, discriminatory political systems, exclusionary

**State-Building**

Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands share a number of commonalities in their state-building processes. Each has a history of colonialism, the acquisition of independence, ethnic conflict, and at least one attempted coup. These variables are all conducive to the production of refugees (Hein, 1993, p. 48; Gordenker, 1987, pp. 70-2; Brown, 1996, p. 576; Keely, 1996, p. 1055; Schmeidl, 1997, p. 301). Although Indonesia and the Philippines experienced a politicide/genocide from 1971 – 1993 and in 1973 respectively, none of the countries have encountered a politicide/genocide from 1995 – 2005 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). In addition, all the countries, except Fiji, were occupied by Japan at some stage during World War Two. The Polity IV Project’s “transitional government” indicator is applied to the countries to determine whether a regime change occurred during 1995 – 2005 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). Regime changes resulting from internal unrest increase the likelihood that refugees will be produced (Keely, 1996, p. 1054).

**Fiji:** The Polity IV Project reports that Fiji encountered an adverse regime transition in 1987, following two military coups staged by Sitiveni Rabuka. Rabuka revoked the Constitution and declared himself Head of State, thus deposing the Queen and severing Fiji’s ties with the Commonwealth (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005; Europa, 2004, p. 1624). A second period of transitional government occurred from 2000 – 2002 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). This instability occurred as a result of a coup in May 2000 by indigenous businessman George Speight over the election of the first Indo-Fijian, Mahendra Chaudhry, as Prime Minister. Like Rabuka, Speight declared that he had dissolved the Constitution and reclaimed Fiji for indigenous Fijians (Europa, 2004, p. 1626). Eventually the Commander of the Armed Forces, Frank Bainimarama, announced the imposition of martial law and a curfew to try and restore order to Fiji (Europa, 2004, p.
1626). The interim administration of indigenous Fijians later sworn in as the national government by the military was declared “illegitimate” (Europa, 2004, p. 1627).

As previously stated, coups often generate smaller numbers of refugees, because they usually involve a small sector of society. Those refugees that are created from a coup are therefore likely to include senior political figures and military officers who formed part of the replaced regime (Gordenker, 1987, p. 70). Following the 2000 coup, refugees were created from all sectors of society within Fiji, as the aims of the new regime and its immediate repression and violence determined these refugee flows. This indicates that coups were an important variable in Fiji in the creation of refugees during the ethnic conflict.

Figure 13: Authority Trends, 1970 – 2003: Fiji
Indonesia: From 1995 – 2005, Indonesia experienced both ethnic and revolutionary warfare, both of which are conducive to the creation of refugees (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005; Weiner, 1996, p. 23; Gordenker, 1987, p. 68; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 420). Despite two attempted coups in Indonesia in 1965 and 1995, the Polity IV Project (2005) reports that Indonesia has not experienced any transitional governments in its history. However, the abortive military coup in 1965 against former Indonesian President Sukarno’s authoritarian regime signalled a succession of political transitions. These began in 1966, when Sukarno was forced to transfer emergency executive powers to military commanders. In 1967 Sukarno transferred full power to Suharto who became President in 1968 (Freedom House, 2005, p. 293).

Suharto ruled Indonesia under authoritarian rule for thirty-two years until an attempted coup in 1995, by members of an extreme conservative group, the Islamic State of Indonesia, destabilised the regime. In 1998 he was forced to resign, following what could be loosely termed as a “political revolution” and was succeeded by his Vice-President Habibie. Since Suharto’s demise from power, substantial democratic reforms have occurred in Indonesia’s political system, including an overhaul of the 1945 Constitution, the formal separation of the police and armed forces, and a return to the armed forces original pre-Suharto name, Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) (Europa, 2004, p. 2119). 1999 marked a substantial turning-point in Indonesian politics, when Indonesia held its first free parliamentary elections since 1955. Further amendments to the Constitution included provisions for greater regional autonomy, direct presidential and vice-
presidential elections and for the abolition of all seats held by non-elected representatives, effectively terminating military involvement in the legislature. A bicameral legislature was also introduced through the creation of the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD – House of Representatives of the Regions), which paved the way for Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s election as President in the 2004 elections (Freedom House, 2005, pp. 293-4; Europa, 2004, p. 2121).

The preceding political transitions resulting from internal unrest facilitated Indonesia’s substantial regime change from autocracy to democracy. Such regime changes caused by domestic instability increase the probability that refugees will be created (Keely, 1996, p. 1054). Moreover, as this regime change was brought about by the collapse of authoritarian rule, it is even more likely to facilitate the creation of refugees (Brown, 1996, p. 576; Keely, 1996, p. 1055). Indeed many internal refugees were created in Kalimantan following Indonesia’s regime change in 1998, during the midst of the ethnic conflict there. The ethnic conflict in West Kalimantan intensified in 1999, killing 200 and displacing 35,000 Madurese (Global IDP Database, 2004). However, it is difficult to determine whether Indonesia’s regime change was a factor in the conflict’s escalation and subsequent increased production of internal refugees. This is because the motivation for each individual refugee’s flight is unknown.
Philippines: From 1995 – 2005, the Philippines suffered from ethnic conflict and also revolutionary warfare until 1997 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). Again both conflicts are conducive to the creation of refugees (Weiner, 1996, p. 23; Gordenker, 1987, p. 68; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 420). Furthermore, the Polity IV Project reports that a transitional

At least eight attempted coups have also occurred in the Philippines, the majority during the period 1995 – 2005 when the Philippines was making its transition from an autocracy to a democracy. Former President Aquino faced seven coup attempts during her Presidency. President Arroyo also encountered a military coup in 2003, declaring a nationwide state of rebellion which was later lifted (Freedom House, 2005, p. 502; BBC News; Europa, 2004, pp. 3411-13). Despite occasional rumours of coup plotting, none have yet occurred since Arroyo narrowly won the 2004 presidential election (US Department of State, 2005, p. 1). It is highly unlikely that refugee movements were generated solely as a result of past unsuccessful coup attempts.
Figure 15: Authority Trends, 1946 – 2003: Philippines

**Solomon Islands:** The Polity IV (2005) project does not provide data for the Solomon Islands regarding its state-building processes. Instead, it is rated as negative 77, which indicates cases of “interregnum,” or anarchy which reflect the instability caused by the Solomon Islands’ ethnic conflict from 1998 until 2003. The existence of an ethnic conflict makes it more likely that refugees will be created (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005; Weiner, 1996, p. 23; Gordenker, 1987, p. 68; Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 420).

During the period 1995 – 2005, evidence exists that the country was undergoing state-building processes. An attempted coup in 2000 led members of the rebel group the MEF to place former Prime Minister Ulufa’alu under house arrest, forcing his early resignation. The MEF claimed that Ulufa’alu had failed to compensate displaced Malaitans within an established deadline (Europa, 2004, p. 3812). Despite external assistance to facilitate peace negotiations between the warring MEF and IFM, through the Honiara Peace Accord, Panatina Agreement and Townsville Peace Agreement, the conflict continued (Europa, 2004, p. 3812). Eventually in 2003, Kemakeza visited Australia and requested direct foreign intervention into the Solomon Islands. The government passed the Facilitation of International Assistance Act to facilitate the deployment of foreign troops (Kabutaulaka, 2004, p. 398), and on 10 July 2003, unanimously agreed to allow the Australian-led intervention force (RAMSI) into the country (Europa, 2004, p. 3814). RAMSI substantially reconstructed the political, economic and social framework of the Solomon Islands, through providing assistance and aid to the country (Europa, 2004, p. 3814; Kabutaulaka, 2004, p. 398; US Department of State, 2005, p. 1).

The majority of internal refugees (20,000 – 30,000) were created two years before the 2000 coup and only another 3,000 more were created after the coup (US Department of State, 2005, p. 8; USCR, 2002). This indicates that the coup was not a major factor in the creation of internal refugees in the Solomon Islands. The demise of the ethnic conflict since the RAMSI intervention means that refugees are also less likely to be generated from 2003 than if the conflict was still continuing. Indeed, no new refugees have been
created since 2003 and many internal refugees have returned to Guadalcanal (Freedom House, 2005, p. 573).

Political Regime

The Polity IV Project’s annual polity score is applied to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands from 1995 - 2005, to determine the nature of the political regime during the ethnic conflict and whether it was inherently democratic or autocratic (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). The annual polity score of Fiji, Indonesia, and the Philippines is shown above in Figures 13, 14, and 15.

Fiji: Following the 1987 coups, Fiji’s annual polity score dropped dramatically from nine (nearly a full democracy) to negative three (nearly a full autocracy). From 1990 onwards, its annual polity score has steadily increased and levelled off so that it consistently scored five on the index until 1999. In 1999, Fiji’s annual polity score sharply increased to six but has reduced to five in 2003 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). This means that during the peak of the ethnic conflict from 1995 – 2005, Fiji could still be considered as relatively democratic. Fiji’s democratic status means that refugees are less likely to be created during an ethnic conflict.

Indonesia: From 1968 – 1998, Indonesia’s annual polity score consistently remained at negative seven, indicating that its political regime was almost a full autocracy under former authoritarian leader Suharto. Having only comparatively recently resorted to democracy, Indonesia still retains a mixture of autocratic and democratic features. Indonesia’s annual polity score increased sharply from a score of negative seven in 1998 to a score of seven in 2000, reflecting Suharto’s forced resignation in 1998 and Indonesia’s transition to democratic governance. From 2000 onwards, Indonesia’s annual polity score has remained constant at seven, indicating that it has remained more democratic than authoritarian (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).

During Indonesia’s transitional period from autocracy to democracy, the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan intensified from 1996 – 2001. As earlier stated, autocracies are more likely to
generate refugees than democracies. This is because autocracies are more likely to use violence or oppression towards their citizens; a practice conducive to creating refugees (Loescher, 1992; Weiner, 1996). However, although many internal refugees were created in Kalimantan during Suharto’s authoritarian rule, many others also originated in 2003 after Indonesia’s democratic reforms. This indicates that in Indonesia the nature of the political regime may not be overly important in determining whether refugees are produced or not.

**Philippines:** The Philippines’ annual polity score has remained at a score of eight since 1988, giving the country a high democratic score. Prior to this, the Philippines experienced a transitional government and so an annual polity score was unavailable. However, during the height of Marcos’s reign (1973 – 1981), the Philippines’ annual polity score was negative nine - almost a complete autocracy. Although its score sharply increased to a negative six in 1984, it was not until the change of political regime in 1988 that the Philippines became more democratic (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).

During the period of ethnic conflict in Mindanao from 1995 – 2005, the Philippines had a consistently high democratic annual polity score. As the Philippines was technically a “democratic” state during this period, it should have been better at accommodating and deflecting protests of ethnic groups, thereby averting serious rebellions than if it was still an authoritarian state (Gurr, 1993, p. 93). However, evidence supporting this is limited. Although a new ceasefire agreement was implemented and renewed in 1999 and formal peace negotiations between the warring factions resumed in 2000, they failed to achieve substantial progress, due to the escalating violence in Mindanao (Europa, 2004, p. 3416).

Therefore, the ethnic conflict in Mindanao still occurred during this “democratic” period and actually intensified as former President Estrada continued to vacillate between supporting the economic development of Mindanao, organising peace talks to eradicate insurrection and threatening to eliminate the rebels through military action. For example, in 1999 former President Estrada conducted successive offensives against the MILF, causing the collapse of the 1997 cease-fire agreement, following MILF’s statement
advocating Mindanao’s independence. Nearly 60 people were killed in the ensuing fighting and 90,000 refugees were created (Europa, 2004, p. 3416).

Although a political change in 2001 brought about the resumption of peace negotiations and the governmental military campaign against the MILF ceased, the arrival of US troops threatened to undermine the peace process (Europa, 2004, p. 3415). Peace negotiations broke down again in 2003 and the government renewed its military offensive against MILF, despite reconciliation efforts by external parties (Europa, 2004, p. 3417). This led to the creation of 420,000 internal refugees and approximately 57,000 external refugees, most of whom were Moro (Global IDP Project, 2004; USCRI, 2004). Therefore it seems that the Philippines’ transition to democracy has not reduced the number of refugees created within Mindanao.

**Solomon Islands:** The Polity IV project does not provide a graph of regime trends for the Solomon Islands, so only the years 2002 and 2003 can be analysed. During these years, the Solomon Islands’ is rated as negative 77, which indicates cases of “interregnum,” or anarchy. Therefore, the Polity IV’s revised combined polity score is used to determine the country’s polity score. Under this measure negative 77 is converted to a “neutral” or polity score of “zero” (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). This means that the Solomon Islands was neither autocratic nor democratic during 2002 – 2003. Countries experiencing anarchy could be viewed as middling on both the autocracy and democracy scales and are therefore less durable than coherent democracies and autocracies (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005). There is therefore probably a higher chance that refugees could result from the internal instability.

**Discriminatory Political Systems**

The “Political Discrimination Index” (below) provides six succinct levels from which to classify the level of political discrimination within a country. The Index ranges from “no political discrimination” to the highest level of political discrimination: “exclusion/repressive policy.” It assesses a government’s political discrimination of a group according to three major characteristics: historical marginality, under-
representation in political office and participation, and the nature of the state’s political public policies towards the ethnic group. These characteristics are applied to the ethnic groups which produced refugees during the conflicts examined in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. The higher the level of political discrimination the groups experienced during the conflict, the higher the number of refugees likely to be produced.

Table 16: Political Discrimination Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Discrimination Index</th>
<th>Characteristics of Political Discrimination</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Discrimination</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Malaitans in the Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect/Remedial Policies</td>
<td>Substantial under representation in political office and/or participation due to historical neglect or restrictions. Explicit public policies are designed to protect or improve the group’s political status.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neglect/No Remedial Policies</td>
<td>Substantial under representation due to historical neglect or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. No formal exclusion. No evidence of protective or remedial public policies.</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Exclusion/Neutral Policy</td>
<td>Substantial under representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset discriminatory policies.</td>
<td>Madurese in Indonesia Moro in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion/Repressive Policy</td>
<td>Public policies substantially restrict the group’s political participation by comparison with other groups.</td>
<td>Indo-Fijians in Fiji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Basis for Judgment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Davenport et al, 2004, p. 36.

Fiji (Historical marginality): The British ruled Fiji using divide and rule policies which favoured the indigenous Fijians to the disadvantage of Indo-Fijians. By cooperating with the British, traditional Fijian chiefs were able to maintain their political and economic advantages (MAR, 2004). Indo-Fijians have experienced further historical restrictions
due to colonial initiated land policies. The British gave preferential treatment to the indigenous Fijians and protected them from exploitation and their land from occupation. This means Indo-Fijians now lack access to land, of which 83 percent is owned by indigenous Fijians, eight percent is owned by the government, and the remainder is freehold. The 18,000 Indo-Fijian sugar cane growers are forced to lease their land from indigenous Fijians landowners through the Native Land Trust Board. The estimated expiration of 10,000 of these land leases from 1997-2024 and the non-renewal of many by landowners was a contributing factor behind the 2000 coup (MAR, 2004). Such actions have created refugee problems and insecurity, with several alleged illegal evictions of Indo-Fijians and reoccupations of land by native Fijian landowners. Furthermore, some Fijian landowners have extorted higher rents from their Indo-Fijian tenants and almost none of these violations were prosecuted (US Department of State, 2005, p. 7). However, communal indigenous Fijian landowners argue that the rental formulas included in the Agricultural Land Tenure Agreement (ALTA) are not favourable to them (US Department of State, 2005, p. 7; USCRI, 2004).

**Fiji (Representation in political office):** From 1990 – 1997, Fiji had a racially-biased Constitution which favoured indigenous Fijians. Throughout this period, Indo-Fijians were discriminated against and became isolated, with ethnonationalists declaring them as “visitors” rather than citizens (Prasad and Snell, 2004, pp. 546-7).

Although the Constitution was amended in 1997, it still remains oppressive for Indo-Fijians, which is reflected in their substantial under-representation in political office and participation (CIA, 2005). Fiji’s 1997 Constitution still reserves the presidency, prime ministership and several key positions for indigenous Fijians. It also empowers the Great Council of Chiefs, consisting of the highest-ranking members of the traditional chief system, to appoint 14 of Parliament’s 32 Senators. Therefore, only the support of an additional two Senators is required to give indigenous Fijians effective control in the Senate (Anere et al, 2001, p. 45; US Department of State, 2005, p. 5). Successive governments have employed this provision to appoint indigenous Fijians and Rotumans

Before being forced to resign, former Prime Minister Chaudhry made major concessions to appease indigenous Fijians and gave them a majority of seats in his cabinet (11 of 18 full positions and two of five junior positions) (MAR, 2004). Current Prime Minister Qarase has continued this trend, forming a government which includes only one Indo-Fijian and some nationalists who had supported Speight’s coup (Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 549). Qarase has also refused to include any FLP members in his cabinet – a party which is predominantly composed of Indo-Fijians. A Supreme Court ruling in July 2004, found that the Constitution required a multi-party (effectively multi-ethnic) cabinet, which Fiji had not had since the 2000 coup. The dispute ended in November 2004, when Mr Chaudhry declared that the FLP no longer wished to join the coalition government (Amnesty International, 2005; Freedom House, 2005, p. 228; The Economist Intelligence Unit, December 2004, p. 5). Indo-Fijians’ political participation and representation is therefore substantially restricted at all levels of government (Freedom House, 2005, p. 229).

**Fiji (Public policies):** The Constitution continues to cite “the ‘paramountcy’ of Fijian interests as a guiding principle for the protection of the rights of indigenous citizens.” It also provides for “affirmative action” and “social justice” programmes to ensure that indigenous Fijians, Rotumans and other disadvantaged citizens have equal access to opportunities, amenities and services (US Department of State, 2005, p. 5; Amnesty International, 2005). Some of these programmes include preference in recruitment into the police, military and the senior public service, among other benefits (Chand, 1997, pp. 1-2; MAR, 2004, p. 2). Therefore, the majority of Indo-Fijians are seeking equal civil rights and status, as well as an increased role in political decision-making at all levels that is representative of their population within the country (MAR, 2004). Such public policies combined with substantial Indo-Fijian under representation in political office and participation means Indo-Fijians suffer from “exclusion/repressive policy” on the Political Discrimination Index. Such overt and covert measures of political discrimination
can generate refugee flows and are interrelated in that one can encourage the other (Dowty and Loescher, 1996, p. 52; Gordenker, 1987, pp. 72-3). Both internal and external refugees were created from Fiji, as the government sought political homogeneity in the form of a new national identity (Loescher, 1992, p. 28).

**Indonesia (Historical marginality):** The Dutch colonial administration of Indonesia was completely centralised in Jakarta and refused to take into account the ethnic diversity of the country. A distinction continued to be made under the Japanese occupation between Java, where administrative posts were given to local people, and the outer islands where this had not occurred. The committee which prepared for independence had 64 members – only four of whom came from outside Java. Although a more ethnically representative committee was later established, its work was disrupted by World War Two (Kooistra, 2001, p. 9). The colonial government’s preference of people of Javanese ethnicity to represent Indonesia politically is inherent in all these policies. Even though Madurese comprise Indonesia’s third largest ethnic group, following Javanese and Sundanese, their views were not represented (Taylor, 2003, p. 173). Unfortunately, no census measured Indonesia’s ethnic composition from 1930 – 2000, so it is difficult to provide accurate statistics regarding the level of comparative marginality the Madurese experienced during this time. President Suharto’s “New Order” government had few explicit policies on ethnic groups, although it was keen to develop a modern, non-ethnic Indonesia (Van Klinken, 2003, p. 64). Part of this process of modernisation included government-initiated transmigration programmes, which received funding from the World Bank. Under these programmes, the majority of the 335,000 people resettled in Sumatra and Kalimantan were Madurese, with many hired to build roads through Kalimantan in order to provide access to large areas of untapped rainforests to logging operations (Chandrasekaran, 2001).

**Indonesia (Representation in political office):** Perhaps as a result of previous government policies, Madurese are not equally represented in political office and in political participation. Despite an amendment to the 1945 Constitution in 2002, which gave Indonesia a bicameral, all-elected legislature, this continues to be dominated by
Javanese. The highest authority of the state, the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat - MPR), has 678 (previously 700) both elected and appointed members serving for five years. This includes the 550 members of the House of People’s Representatives (Dewan Perkawilan Rakyat - DPR) and the 128 representatives of the newly formed House of Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah – DPD). This latter body explicitly provides for the inclusion of four members from each of Indonesia’s 32 provinces (US Department of State, May 2005, p. 4; Europa, 2004, p. 2128). Like former President Megawati’s 33-member cabinet, which included 12 minority members, President Yudhoyono’s cabinet mainly consists of Javanese (US Department of State, 2005, p. 17).

**Indonesia (Public policies):** There are not any explicit government policies that substantially restrict Madurese political participation in comparison with other ethnic groups. However, the timing of the 2001 ethnic conflict in Kalimantan coincided with the implementation of new government laws designed to guarantee greater regional autonomy. The laws, which were introduced in 1999, affected the prosperity of district and provincial level business and political power brokers and were intended to cause significant changes to the regional administration (Van Klinken, 2003, pp. 78, 83). Reflecting these changes, local councils in Central Kalimantan have enacted discriminatory legislation since 2001 that prohibits the return of Madurese refugees, unless they can prove they have previously lived in the area and do not have a criminal record (US Department of State, 2005, p. 15). These overtly discriminatory policies indicate that the Madurese in Kalimantan currently suffer from an “exclusion/repressive policy,” whereas during the ethnic conflict they suffered from a “social exclusion/neutral policy,” under the Political Discrimination Index. Madurese were substantially politically under-represented due to the prevailing social practice of the dominant Dayak groups in Kalimantan, which seems to be a factor in their creation of refugees.

**Philippines (Historical marginality):** Historical neglect and restrictions account for the Moros’ disadvantaged political and economic status in the Philippines (MAR, 2004; Islam, 2003, p. 219). The Moro have experienced historical restrictions due to the
Spanish and American colonisers undermining the sultanate’s economic base through trade blockades and weakening Moro power through a policy of “Filipinisation” in the 1920s (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 484; Islam, 2003, pp. 199-200). Under this policy, government sponsored migration programmes enabled northern Catholic administrators to settle in Mindanao to administer the Muslim areas in order to transfer control from the Americans to the Filipinos. However, in reality, most of the Muslim provinces had non-Muslim Governors, so the Muslims were subjugated once again (Islam, 2003, pp. 199-200). The “Filipinisation” policy also enabled Catholic Filipinos to acquire Moro land through colonially imposed land laws that did not recognise Moro customary law on land stewardship (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 485). This created deep-seated grievances within the Moro population, which were exacerbated by the government’s post-independence policy of inviting multinational corporations to establish industries in the region, mainly to develop an export market, rather than to provide for the locals (Islam, 2003, p. 219). This modernised production effectively limited the capacity of Moro to compete on an equal footing with other citizens, as they relied predominantly on subsistence farming.

**Philippines (Representation in political office):** Moro are under-represented in the Filipino government and in senior civilian and military positions due to historical marginality and the prevailing social practices of the dominant Catholic group (Freedom House, 2005, p. 504; US Department of State, 2005, p. 8). There are no Moro senators or cabinet members and only 10 Moro members within the 236-seat House of Representatives. Such low political representation may partly be attributed to the nature of the selection process. The method of electing senators from a nationwide list tends to favour established political figures from the Manila region, to the disadvantage of Moro. To rectify this, many Moro favour a Constitutional amendment to provide for election of senators by region (US Department of State, 2005, p. 10).

**Philippines (Public policies):** The Filipino government has initiated several policies to improve Moro political status, but these have been inadequate to offset social discriminatory policies. Efforts to improve Moro political status began in 1976, when the government and the MNLF signed the Tripoli Agreement which provided for the creation
of an autonomous region in Mindanao, on the condition that the MNLF accept autonomy in favour of complete independence. However, the MNLF rejected this proposal and was also dissatisfied with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, which established the Autonomous Regions in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). This granted autonomy to only four provinces, as opposed to the 13 provinces and nine cities, as indicated under the Tripoli Agreement (Islam, 2003, pp. 203-4). In 1996, a Peace Agreement provided for the implementation of the Tripoli Agreement in two phases; the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPC), and the creation of a new Regional Autonomous Government (Islam, 2003, p. 219). After a period of three years a referendum was to be conducted in each of the 14 provinces and 10 cities in Mindanao, to determine whether they would join the existing ARMM. Although these policies were intended to benefit the Moro by giving them more political autonomy, in reality they largely failed. In 2001, only two provinces elected to join the ARMM in the referendum and in the 2005 ARMM elections, the first non-MNLF Governor of the region was elected (Europa, 2004, p. 3415; Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 4). Given this, Moro fit under the category of “social exclusion” on the Political Discrimination Index, which indicates this may have been a contributing factor in the creation of Moro refugees.

**Solomon Islands (Historical marginality):** Malaitans have experienced discrimination since they began immigrating to Guadalcanal in large numbers after World War Two as the Moro movement had long advocated the expulsion of non-Guali and a return to custom (Anere et al, 2001, p. 31). The Malaitans successful exploitation of the economic opportunities, made available from the many significant investments on Guadalcanal after 1945, meant that they composed almost three-quarters of plantation labour on the island by the mid-twentieth century. While the Malaitan settlers originally obtained leases for land and resource use from the government or landowners, they often contravened agreed boundaries or extended beyond the original agreed basis for settlement, transforming the land into poor squatters (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 583). The government did not ensure that those transactions through them were protected or that other acquisition was strictly prohibited. Therefore, some Malaitans were accused of using land beyond which they had
bought and of depleting local supplies. This fostered further resentment among Guali towards Malaitans (Anere et al, 2001, p. 32).

**Solomon Islands (Representation in political office and public policies):** Despite this historical neglect of Malaitans on Guadalcanal, Malaitans are not under-represented in political office or in political participation. As the largest and dominant ethnic group in the Solomon Islands they are adequately represented in Prime Minister Kemakeza’s cabinet and hold the majority of the nineteen cabinet posts (Gegeo, 18 November 2005). Due to this, no public policies exist to improve the Malaitans’ political status. Therefore, the Malaitans do not currently suffer from political discrimination under the Political Discrimination Index, which indicates that this was not a factor in the creation of Malaitan refugees during the ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands.

**Exclusionary National Ideologies**

The prevailing type of national ideology in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands is classified, according to the criteria in the table below, as either of a predominantly “civic” or “ethnic/religious” nature. An “exclusionary national ideology” exists when ethnic/religious nationalism dominates because not everyone can adhere to its strict criteria. This type of nationalism is conducive to the creation of refugees, as under it states will often deny protection to their minority groups (Gordenker, 1987, p. 83).

**Table 17: Types of Nationalism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Nationalism</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Nationalism</td>
<td>This stresses the importance of “civic institutions, public offices, public agencies and officials, churches in their secular activities, and common and authoritative rules with a territorial scope. These define a country and the nation that inhibits it” (MacCormick, 1999, p. 125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic/Religious Nationalism</td>
<td>This stresses the importance of a “common ethnicity and culture, a shared language perhaps, a shared history and common ancestral struggles. The nation is the community of fate, the community of ethnic bonds” (MacCormick, 1999, p. 126)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although the Constitutions of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands embody the characteristics of civic nationalism, in reality this ideology has not infiltrated throughout all sectors of society. In practice, most citizens of these countries more readily identify with their regions, religion, or ethnicity than with the state’s officially promulgated “civic nationalism.” This may be because these states were not created through the development of a cohesive nationalist movement, but rather through the actions of their former colonisers. Their claim to statehood is therefore predominantly based on anti-colonial sentiment rather than on “natural” bonds, cemented through a common historical experience, consanguinity and identification with a common language or religion. In order to create such bonds and create national cohesion, the governments of these multinational states have often attempted to assimilate ethnic and religious differences through promoting a state-endorsed ethnicity, religion, or ideology.

As demonstrated under the sections entitled “discriminatory political systems” (pp. 101-109) and “economic underdevelopment,” (pp. 130-134) in practice, the Fijian and Solomon Islands’ governments tend to promote the indigenous Fijian and Guali ethnicities respectively as a form of exclusionary ethnic nationalism. Although the Indonesian government also engages in ethnic nationalism, by tending to favour the Javanese ethnic group, a more exclusionary ideology was constructed under the Suharto regime and embodied in the 1945 Constitution (US Department of State, 2005).

“Pancasila” is a five-point state philosophy, including: belief in a supreme being; humanitarianism; national unity; democracy by consensus; and, social justice. The prevailing ideas and beliefs of “Pancasila” were defined to exclude those belief systems, such as Islam, that did not conform to its ideology in an attempt to unify the state. Although all political, social and religious organisations were required to adopt “Pancasila” in 1984, its ideology continues to be employed by the House of People’s Representatives today (Crouch, 1998, p. 102).

Similarly, the Filipino government tends to encourage religious nationalism, preferring Roman Catholicism over Islam as the dominant state ideology (US Department of State,
2005, pp. 8-10; May, 1998, p. 71). Such an exclusionary approach can inspire secessionism among minority groups to ensure they have rights in their own nation states and can provoke ethnic conflict, increasing the possibility of refugee flows (Newland, 1993, pp.146-7). Conflict is more likely when ethnic nationalism dominates and so the possibility of refugees emerging is increased (Brown, 1996, p. 17). Indeed, given the weak nature of these developing states, ethnic nationalism seems to have become a default option (Snyder, 1993) and has contributed to the creation of refugees in these three countries.

**Lack of Human Rights**

The Political Terror Scale (PTS) below is used to assess whether a government’s lack of respect for human rights during an ethnic conflict is conducive to creating refugees. The PTS categorises the degree of political violence within a country into five levels. Level one indicates that human rights are respected, whereas levels four and five indicate a severe lack of human rights (Gibney and Dalton, 1996, p. 60).
### Table 18: Political Terror Scale (PTS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Political Violence</th>
<th>Characteristics of Political Violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1</td>
<td>Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2</td>
<td>There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3</td>
<td>There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4</td>
<td>The practices of level 3 are expanded to larger numbers. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5</td>
<td>The terrors of level 4 have been expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gibney and Dalton, 1996, pp. 73-4.

Gibney and Dalton (1996) apply the PTS to a range of countries, including to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands from 1995 - 2005, based upon information from the US State Department and Amnesty International. Their results are illustrated the table below. The shaded areas indicate the peak of each ethnic conflict and the darker areas indicate when the majority of the refugees were produced in each country.
Table 19: Political Terror Scale: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>3 2</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>2 2</td>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>4 3</td>
<td>3 4</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>5 4</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>4 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3 4</td>
<td>3 3</td>
<td>3 3</td>
<td>3 3</td>
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<td>4 4</td>
<td>3 4</td>
<td>3 3</td>
<td>4 4</td>
<td>4 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>9 1</td>
<td>3 2</td>
<td>4 3</td>
<td>3 3</td>
<td>3 3</td>
<td>3 3</td>
<td>2 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Gibney and Dalton, 1996.
“A” indicates the rating that Gibney et al gave the country based on information from Amnesty International in the given year.
“S” indicates the rating that Gibney et al gave the country based on information from the US State Department in the given year.
“9” indicates that no data was available.

**Fiji:** During the peak of its ethnic conflict in 2000, Fiji was a level four on the PTS, which indicates a lack of human rights (Gibney and Dalton, 1996, p. 60). Extensive political imprisonment occurred during 2000 and murders, disappearances, and torture were widespread. Furthermore, numerous human rights abuses were committed by both the police and by rebel groups against Indo-Fijians, including the looting and burning of their houses and businesses (Amnesty International, 2005; US Department of State, 2005, p. 1). Terror during this period mostly affected people interested in politics or ideas.

However, in 2001, Fiji moved to levels three and two on the PTS, reflecting its return to law and order and the government’s increased respect for human rights. As of 2004, Fiji remains at level two on the PTS which suggests that while a limited amount of
imprisonment for non-violent political activity still occurs, few people are affected and torture and beatings are exceptional. Indeed, the Fijian authorities intensified their investigations in 2004 into those who participated in the coup or who were involved in subsequent human rights abuses. Despite this, the most valid complaints to the Human Rights Commission continue to concern racial and ethnic equality problems (US Department of State, 2005, p. 7). Gibney et al (1996, p. 60) speculate that most of the refugees created in Fiji tended to be generated in 2000, when human rights abuses were highest and Fiji was ranked as a level four on the PTS (USCRI, 2004). This suggests that a lack of human rights was associated with the creation of refugees in Fiji.

**Indonesia:** Indonesia had a consistently high level of human rights abuses during 1995 – 2005. Since 1997, when the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan intensified, Indonesia has remained fairly constant on level four of the PTS. However, in 2003, it reached level five when terrors expanded to include the whole population and leaders placed no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursued their personal or ideological goals. Indonesia has since dropped to a level four on the PTS, although the military and police routinely violate human rights and employ excessive use of force (Amnesty International, 2005). As corruption is common, the overall professionalism of the forces remains low, as does its effectiveness at investigating human rights abuses (US Department of State, 2005, p. 8). The weakness of the judiciary, combined with inadequate enforcement mechanisms, enables authorities to routinely violate human rights (US Department of State, 2005, p. 9; Freedom House, 2005, pp. 297-8).

This indicates that extensive political imprisonment, execution and brutality and murders, disappearances and torture were common, but only affected those interested in politics or ideas. It also supports the argument that most refugees are generated from countries classified at levels four or five on the PTS and suggests that a lack of human rights was associated with the creation of refugees in Indonesia (Gibney et al, 1996, p. 60). Furthermore, this information adds weight to Schmeidl’s (2001, p. 78) finding that refugees are more likely to be created from some form of generalised violence rather than from institutionalised human rights violations.
Philippines: The Philippines has vacillated between levels three and four of the PTS during the last decade and has remained at level four since 2003, when the ethnic conflict intensified in Mindanao. Large internal and external refugee movements also occurred in Mindanao in 2003, when peace negotiations collapsed and the government renewed its military offensive against the MILF (Europa, 2004, p. 3417). In Mindanao, there were reports of breaches of international humanitarian law by both the government and the MILF, including apparently indiscriminate use of force by Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) units and the use of ‘human shields’ by MILF forces. Furthermore, under the name of militarisation or “development” projects, arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial executions and “disappearances” still regularly occur (Amnesty International, 2005). Therefore overt generalised state violence exists in the Philippines which is more conducive to the creation of refugees than institutional human rights violations (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 78).

However, human rights violations are also institutionalised within the Philippines. This lack of respect for fundamental human rights, particularly when connected with the often oppressive nature of the Filipino government towards the Moro, is a contributing factor in the creation of refugees in Mindanao (Gordenker, 1987, p. 170; Zolberg et al, 1989, pp. 259, 264; Newland, 1993, p. 156; Loescher, 1992, pp. 57-59; Keely, 1996, p. 1060). Despite the Philippines’ Commission on Human Rights (CHR) providing the police with mandatory human rights training, the police are often described by this organisation as the country’s worst human rights abusers (Freedom House, 2005, p. 504; US Department of State, 2005, p. 1). This is due to a low level of professionalism among police, high levels of corruption, inadequate enforcement mechanisms and the weakness of the judiciary (US Department of State, 2005, pp. 8-9; Freedom House, 2005, pp. 297-8).

Solomon Islands: Since 1999, the Solomon Islands’ rating on the PTS has varied from levels two to four. Its rating reached level four in 2000, indicating that the country suffered from a lack of human rights due to the MEF’s campaign against the Guali
insurgency and the chaos generated from the coup that year (Gibney et al, 1996, p. 60; US Department of State, 2005, p. 8; USCR, 2002). During this time, numerous human rights abuses were committed by both the police and by rebel groups against Malaitans (Amnesty International, 2005; US Department of State, 2005, p. 1). These included the looting and burning of Malaitan property, the abductions of over 100 people and widespread torture, mistreatment, assassinations, beheadings and hostage takings (US Department of State, 2005, p. 2). Evidence also suggests that the Solomon Islands’ police force employed former militants within their forces as “special constables,” who further perpetuated human rights abuses by killing and torturing people in the operation against warlord Harold Keke in March 2003 (Europa, pp. 3812, 3814). Such generalised violence increases the likelihood of refugee movements and indeed approximately 15,000 internal refugees were created in 2000 (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 78; USCR, 2002; US Department of State, 2005, p. 5). However, the majority of the Solomon Islands’ refugees were generated in 1998, when either no data was available or the US State Department rated the country at a level one on the PTS (USCR, 2002; Gibney and Dalton, 1996). Due to these discrepancies, the PTS for this year can not be analysed with any certainty. Notwithstanding, a lack of human rights in the Solomon Islands during the ethnic conflict appears to have facilitated the creation of refugees.

Since 2003, the Solomon Islands’ has reduced from a level three to a level two on the PTS, reflecting the RAMSI intervention’s restoration of law and order in the country. In 2003, more than 240 people, including approximately 40 police officers, Keke and other militants, were arrested in the Solomon Islands for offences committed during the ethnic conflict and over 600 charges were lodged against them (US Department of State, 2005, p. 2). The special constables were also demobilised and the police reorganised (US Department of State, 2005, p. 1; Europa, p. 3814).

**Role of External Parties**
The role that external parties played during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands is analysed according to the three criteria in the table
below. This includes: the external support received by the ethnic group during the conflict, the external support received by the governing regime during the conflict, and whether any external intervention in the conflict occurred.

**Table 20: Role of External Parties in Creating Refugees**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>External support received by ethnic group during the ethnic conflict</th>
<th>External support received by the governing regime during the ethnic conflict</th>
<th>External intervention in the ethnic conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20 shows that of the four countries, only the Indo-Fijian and Moro ethnic groups received some form of external support. The governing regime during the ethnic conflicts in the Philippines and the Solomon Islands also received external support, most noticeably in the form of an external intervention force in the conflict.

**Fiji:** The Indo-Fijian diaspora harnessed considerable external support from their ethnic brethren overseas (Cohen, 1997, p. 180; Gurr, 2000, p. 7). The Indian government mainly gave political support to Indo-Fijians during the ethnic conflict, including closing its diplomatic mission in Fiji and imposing an eight-year trade embargo which lasted until 1995 following the 1987 coups (Gurr, 2000, p. 7). India’s specific ethnic affinity to the disadvantaged Indo-Fijians therefore developed into a deep partisan alignment and provided political support for those escaping the regime (Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, p. 154; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 6).
The government during the ethnic conflict received extremely limited political support from some highly nationalistic indigenous communities overseas. This included political support from Māori activists representing the Tino Rangatiratanga movement, which advocates indigenous rights for Māori. Some members of the group travelled to Fiji to express sympathy with indigenous Fijians in taking action to secure their rights (Alley, 3 June 2000). However this support was insufficient to be a factor in encouraging refugee flows.

**Indonesia:** The Madurese diaspora in Kalimantan did not receive any external support during the ethnic conflict despite their adherence to Islam and that Indonesia is a member of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC). This is surprising, as the OIC has provided much support to other Islamic groups (Cohen, 1997, p. 180; US Department of State, 2005). Apart from non-governmental assistance (outlined in Chapter 5) the governing regime of Indonesia during the ethnic conflict also did not receive external support (Bamba, 2004, pp. 405-7). External support was therefore not a factor in the creation of refugees in Kalimantan.

**Philippines:** The Moro in Mindanao received much external political and financial support, which was provided to the MNLF by the OIC (Islam, 2003, pp. 203-4). The specific religious affinity between the OIC and the Moro created a strong partisan alignment and provided support for those escaping the conflict (Davis, Jaggers and Moore, 1997, p. 154; Lobell and Mauceri, 2004, p. 6).

During the ethnic conflict the Filipino government also received external support. In 2002, the US signed a five-year military agreement with the Philippines and recently resumed joint military exercises in Mindanao (Europa, 2004, p. 3418). The US government also provides financial support to Mindanao, through large aid packages (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 7). Malaysia and Brunei additionally provide political support to the Filipino government in overseeing ceasefire arrangements and in facilitating peace negotiations (Amnesty International, 2005; Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 4). Malaysia, Brunei, and the US share similar geopolitical goals and interests with the

With the Arroyo government’s consent, the US intervened in the ethnic conflict in Mindanao in 2002 and hundreds of US troops were dispatched to Mindanao through the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This occurred despite popular resistance, with some perceiving it as a foreign intervention (Islam, 2003, pp. 216-8). However, it can not be termed an “intervention” in the common sense of the word as it had the consent of the governing regime (Roberts, 1997, p. 118; Europa, 2004, pp. 3814, 3418). Despite this, the Philippines is a geo-politically important region for the US and its intervention in the country increases the chance that a complex refugee situation will arise (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 284; Zolberg et al, 1989). Although this intervention may not directly produce refugees, it should be viewed as an accelerating factor in their creation (Schmeidl, 1997, p. 289).

**Solomon Islands:** Although the Malaitan diaspora on Guadalcanal did not receive any external support during the ethnic conflict, the Solomon Islands’ government did, despite the fact that numerous members of Parliament were involved or implicated in the conflict. Sitiveni Rabuka, former Prime Minister of Fiji and instigator of the 1987 coups in Fiji, was appointed a Commonwealth Special Envoy and facilitated peace agreements in neutral locations between the warring factions. A UN delegation and a multinational peace-monitoring group from Fiji and Vanuatu also implemented numerous peace agreements in the Solomon Islands from 1998 – 2000 (Cohen, 1997, p. 180; Europa, 2004, p. 3811). However as these actions were designed to rebuild peace rather than to create further instability, it is unlikely that they facilitated the creation of refugees.

The Solomon Island government’s requests for further external assistance were denied in 2000 and 2002. The government finally received external support in 2003 when Prime Minister Kemakeza requested direct foreign intervention to address the ongoing
lawlessness in the country\footnote{The support provided by the RAMSI intervention force is not included in this section, because it did not aid the Ulufa’alu or Sogavare governments which had effective control of the state during the peak of the ethnic conflict from 1998 – 2001 (Europa, 2004, p. 3812).} (Europa, 2004, pp. 3814). Although some studies have found a positive relationship between interventionist policies and large refugee flows (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 265; Loescher, 1992, p. 28), this intervention was not an “intervention” in the common sense of the word, because it had the consent of the governing regime and the popular consent of Solomon Islanders (Roberts, 1997, p. 118; Europa, 2004, pp. 3814, 3418). It therefore can not be seen as conducive to the creation of refugees.
Table 21: Summary of Political Variables within the Ethnic Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Evidence of Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-building</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Regime</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminatory Political Systems</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary National Ideologies</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Human Rights</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of External Parties</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 21 (above) summarises those political variables analysed in this chapter and shows that relatively few differences exist between the political variables conducive to creating refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Exclusionary national ideologies and a lack of human rights were present during all of the ethnic conflicts and discriminatory political systems existed in three of the four conflicts. Higher discrepancies exist between the role of external parties and the processes of state-building within the countries as a factor in creating refugees. The type of political regime seems to have little impact on facilitating refugee flows.
Chapter 5: Economic/Social, Cultural/Perceptual and Intervening Variables

Here other aspects of the framework outlined in Chapter 3 are applied to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Ten different economic/social and cultural/perceptual characteristics are examined in an attempt to determine why some countries have created refugees during their ethnic conflicts, while others have not. The impact that five common intervening factors may have had in facilitating refugee flows during these conflicts are also discussed.

Economic Variables

Poverty, economic underdevelopment, and discriminatory economic systems are three major economic factors which are commonly associated with creating conditions conducive to generating refugees within developing countries. The existence of these factors within a developing state is believed to increase the likelihood of political instability and recession, which often lead to refugee flows (Edmonston, 1992; Wood, 1994).

Poverty

The level of poverty that existed during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands is measured using the “Human Poverty Index for Developing Countries” (HPI-1), produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This Index can best determine levels of relative poverty between ethnic groups within states, through comparing their lack of resources with those of other groups in society. Such a measure should be useful in determining whether relative poverty has any impact on refugee production. The HPI-1 measures deprivations in three fundamental areas:

1. long and healthy life - vulnerability to death at a relatively early age, as measured by the probability at birth of not surviving to age 40;
2. knowledge - exclusion from the world of reading and communications, as measured by the adult illiteracy rate; and,

3. a decent standard of living - lack of access to overall economic provisioning, as measured by the unweighted average of two indicators, the percentage of the population without sustainable access to an improved water source and the percentage of children under weight for age (UNDP, 2004).

Table 22: Human and Income Poverty: Developing Countries (2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Fiji</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) Rank</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) Value (%)</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probability at birth of not surviving to age 40 (% of cohort), 2000-05</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult illiteracy rate (% ages 15 and above), 2003</td>
<td>7.1(^{14})</td>
<td>12.1b</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population without sustainable access to an improved water source (%)</td>
<td>53(^{15})</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children underweight for age (% under age 5) (HPI-1), 1995-2003</td>
<td>8(^{16})</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>21c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population living below $1 a day (%), 1990-2003</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population living below $2 a day (%), 1990-2003</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population living below the national poverty line (%), 1990-2002</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPI-1 rank minus income poverty rank</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\(^{14}\) Data refers to a year between 1995 and 1999.


\(^{16}\) UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). 2004. The State of the World's Children 2005. New York: Oxford University Press. Data refers to a year or period other than that specified, differ from the standard definition or refer to only part of a country.
The table above shows that Fiji, Indonesia, and the Philippines ranked above the halfway mark of the 117 developing countries analysed in the HPI-1. This indicates that their levels of poverty are not as serious compared to those of other developing countries. Fiji and the Solomon Islands have some missing data which indicates that either the statistical data is unavailable, out-dated, or of an unreliable quality. This makes it difficult to accurately quantify specify specific income poverty trends in these countries. This may indicate that the levels of poverty within Fiji and the Solomon Islands are so bad that data has not been collected, which, if true, suggests that these countries should produce more refugees than their Southeast Asian neighbours.

**Fiji:** Fiji’s poverty levels grew substantially within all ethnic groups and rural and urban populations during the period 1995 – 2005. A 1997 UNDP study shows that although Fiji’s economy grew by 25 percent from 1977-91, the proportion of households living in poverty was estimated to have increased from about 25 percent in 1997 to about 40 percent in 2000, with the most poor generally being indigenous-Fijian (Anere et al, 2001, pp. 44-5; Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 543). The Task Force concluded that while the greatest amount of poverty is found in villages, the most intense poverty is found in urban squatter settlements (The World Bank Group, 2004).

The most recent survey (the 2002/2003 Household Income and Expenditure Survey) states that 29 percent of the indigenous Fijian population and 28 percent of the Indo-Fijian population live below the poverty line. While slightly more indigenous Fijians than Indo-Fijians live under the poverty line in urban areas (27:24 percent), the situation is reversed in rural areas. 41 percent of Indo-Fijians compared to 30 percent of indigenous Fijians live below the poverty line in rural areas, which may be due to a lack of accessibility to resources (Fijilive, 24 November 2005). The Poverty Task Force supports this idea, stating that the majority of poverty experienced by Indo-Fijian landless cane-cutters is caused by a lack of access to land or to regular employment, as they can only secure work during the cane-cutting season (The World Bank Group, 2004). According to the most recent 2002/2003 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, the variation in
poverty levels between indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians is not overly significant. Poverty therefore may not have played a significant role in the creation of Indo-Fijian refugees.

**Indonesia:** Indonesia also suffers from high economic imbalances and poverty levels (Freedom House, 2005, p. 293). Although the proportion of people living below the poverty line declined from 60 percent in 1970 to an estimated 17.5 percent in 2002, the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 sharply altered this trend (The World Bank Group, 2004; US Department of State, 2005). During that crisis, the real poverty incidence increased by about 15 million people. The recovery of the economy and the better political situation of 1999 enabled a gradual deduction of the number of poor people – a trend which has continued until 2003 (the latest figures available). In 2003, about half of Indonesia’s approximately 37.3 million (17.4 percent) poor were situated in Java and Bali, with the remainder spread across Sumatera, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and other islands. Approximately 2.2 - 8.6 million people or 20-22 percent of the total population lived below the poverty line (Sub Directorate of Analysis Statistical Consistency, 1999, p. 596; Sub Directorate of Analysis Statistical Consistency, 2003, pp. 575-79).
### Table 23: Population below the Poverty Line in Areas by Province, 2002/03 (Indonesia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Number of Population Below the Poverty Line (thousand)</th>
<th>Percentage of Population Below the Poverty Line</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam</td>
<td>1,199.9</td>
<td>1,254.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Utara</td>
<td>1,883.9</td>
<td>1,883.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Barat</td>
<td>496.4</td>
<td>501.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riau</td>
<td>722.4</td>
<td>751.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambi</td>
<td>326.9</td>
<td>327.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumatera Selatan</td>
<td>1,600.6</td>
<td>1,397.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengkulu</td>
<td>372.4</td>
<td>344.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lampung</td>
<td>1,650.7</td>
<td>1,568.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kepulauan Bangka Belitung</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKI Jakarta</td>
<td>286.9</td>
<td>294.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawa Barat</td>
<td>4,938.2</td>
<td>4,899.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawa Tengah</td>
<td>7,308.3</td>
<td>6,980.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta</td>
<td>635.7</td>
<td>636.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jawa Timur</td>
<td>7,701.2</td>
<td>7,578.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banten</td>
<td>786.7</td>
<td>855.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bali</td>
<td>221.8</td>
<td>246.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Barat</td>
<td>1,145.8</td>
<td>1,054.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nusa Tenggara Timur</td>
<td>1,206.5</td>
<td>1,166.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Barat (West)</td>
<td>644.2</td>
<td>583.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Tengah (Central)</td>
<td>231.4</td>
<td>207.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Selatan (South)</td>
<td>259.8</td>
<td>259.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Timur (East)</td>
<td>313.0</td>
<td>328.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Utara</td>
<td>229.3</td>
<td>191.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Tengah</td>
<td>564.6</td>
<td>509.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Selatan</td>
<td>1,309.2</td>
<td>1,301.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulawesi Tenggara</td>
<td>463.8</td>
<td>428.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorontalo</td>
<td>274.7</td>
<td>257.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku</td>
<td>418.8</td>
<td>399.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maluku Utara</td>
<td>110.1</td>
<td>118.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Papua</td>
<td>984.7</td>
<td>917.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indonesia</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,394.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>37,339.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The table above breaks down the population of Indonesia that was below the poverty line in rural and urban areas in 2002 and 2003 by province. It shows that Kalimantan Tengah (Central), where ethnic conflict and refugee flows occurred in 2001, has a lower
percentage of people below the poverty line (11.88 percent in 2002) compared to the national average (18.20 percent in 2002). Observers have also agreed that little difference existed in relative poverty levels between Dayak and Madurese during the Kalimantan conflict, as both were similarly poor (Bertrand, 2004, p. 48). This suggests that poverty was not an overly significant factor in the creation of refugees during the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan.

**Philippines:** Wide disparities in wealth exist both between regions and ethnic groups in the Philippines. A recent Household Income and Expenditure survey states that the richest 30 percent of families in the Philippines earned 66.3 percent of national income, whereas the poorest 30 percent received approximately eight percent (US Department of State, 2005, p. 1). Many of these poor are situated in the rural areas of Mindanao, where refugees fleeing the ethnic conflict are created. It is currently estimated that 49 percent of the rural population in Mindanao are unable to meet their basic needs (US Department of State, 2005, pp. 1, 12). This is because much of the wealth in Mindanao is disproportionately placed with most belonging to Catholics or to foreign investors (US Department of State, 2005, p. 16). It seems that a few dozen powerful families from the Suharto regime continue to exercise an overarching role in politics and hold an outsized share of land and corporate wealth (Freedom House, 2005, p. 503).

The table below breaks the Philippines’ gross domestic product (GDP) for 2003 into regions, which is useful for analysing comparative poverty trends. It shows that in 2003 the ARMM was the poorest region within the Philippines, earning just 0.9 percent of the country’s total GDP, compared to the richest region, the National Capital Region (NCR), which earned 35.7 percent of the country’s total GDP.
Table 24: Philippines: GDP by Region, 2003  
(At current prices unless otherwise indicated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total (P bn)</th>
<th>% of national total</th>
<th>% of real change 2003/1998</th>
<th>GDP per head (P)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Luzon</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Capital</td>
<td>1,536.6</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>144,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Region</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>68, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cordillera</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Region</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>68, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ilocos</td>
<td>124.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>28,065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>68, 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visayas</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Visayas</td>
<td>283.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>43,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Visayas</td>
<td>298.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>48,882</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Visayas</td>
<td>100.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>26,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mindanao</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zamboanga Peninsular</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>31,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Mindanao</td>
<td>196.5</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>51,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao Region</td>
<td>188.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
<td>47,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soccsksargen</td>
<td>142.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>63.6</td>
<td>40,784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caraga</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>25,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)</strong></td>
<td><strong>37.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,291</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The statistics in the above table constitute part of a long history of poverty within the ARMM and wider Mindanao. From 1991-2000, the average percentage of families in poverty rose by 15 percent in the ARMM to reach 66 percent, whereas elsewhere in the Philippines it decreased from 40 to 34 percent (International Alert, December 2003, p. 58). Given these appalling figures, poverty seems to be a major factor in the creation of refugees in the ARMM.

17 The region of Southern Tagalog has been split into Calabarzon and Mimaropa.

18 Previously known as Central Mindanao, Soccsksargen is an acronym for South Cotabato, Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sarangani and General Santos City.
**Solomon Islands:** Anere et al (2001, p. 31) report that declining standards of living and increased poverty in both rural and urban areas contributed to the ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands. In 1999, the Solomon Islands fell from its ranking of 123rd under the Human Development Index to 148th. Furthermore, in 2002 the capital of the Solomon Islands, Honiara, had the lowest ranking on the Human Poverty Index (Solomon Islands Government, 2002). During this period, 93 percent of families were classified by the government as in the “low-income” bracket, and over 50 percent of income in Honiara was owned by less than one percent of households, many of them non-Guali (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, March 2004, p. 33). These statistics indicate that although poverty was significant within all sectors of society during the ethnic conflict, Malaitans were generally less poor than Guali in Guadalcanal. Therefore poverty was not a significant factor in the generation of Malaitan refugees during in the Solomon Islands.

**Economic Underdevelopment**

Economic underdevelopment is closely associated with poverty in the developing world and is assessed according to six key indicators derived from the ideas of some important refugee theorists (Zolberg et al, 1989, p. 259; Newman, 2003, p. 4; Brown, 1996, p. 19). These include: balance-of-payment problems, deteriorating terms of trade, indebtedness, inflation, high unemployment levels and resource competition (especially concerning land). Of these variables, the first five are able to be measured quantitatively but the last; resource competition is more difficult to measure quantitatively, so a qualitative analysis is provided instead. The numbers in bold indicate the year that the majority of refugees were created from each ethnic conflict in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Due to the lack of data available for the Pacific states, the national figures for these countries should be treated with some caution (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, p. 71).
Table 25: Economic Underdevelopment: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Balance of Payments</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( % of GDP)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>-0.7</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>-4.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>-0.06(2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(annual change %)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>-40.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>-11.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>-12.1</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>-20.6</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>-165.3</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>-66.6</td>
<td>-35.6</td>
<td>-31.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>467.6</td>
<td>-343.1</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>207.9</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>79.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External indebtedness</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>251.2</td>
<td>209.2</td>
<td>188.5</td>
<td>209.6</td>
<td>263.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>224.42 (1995-2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(US dollars, as of end of year)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>124398</td>
<td>144407</td>
<td>134045</td>
<td>131755</td>
<td>134389</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>133,798.8 (1995-2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in millions – total debt</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>39391</td>
<td>60850</td>
<td>58499</td>
<td>60090</td>
<td>62663</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>56,298.6 (1995-2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outstanding and disbursed</td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>158.7</td>
<td>155.4</td>
<td>162.7</td>
<td>180.4</td>
<td>185.7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>168.58 (1995-2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.04 (1998-2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(consumer price; average %)</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8 (1998-2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8.36 (1998-2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Rate</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The variables measuring the overall balance of payments, external trade balance, external indebtedness and unemployment rates are taken from the Asian Development Bank statistics. The inflation rate is taken from The Economist Intelligence Unit’s statistics.
The table above shows that Fiji, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands have experienced more overall balance of payments deficits than surpluses within the last decade. Furthermore, despite the severe fluctuation of the external trade balance within all four countries from 1995 – 2004, their external indebtedness still remained high. This is because the financing requirements of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands have traditionally been met through aid and by borrowing money from official and private sources.

The Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 particularly affected the Indonesian economy and to a lesser extent the Filipino economy, which was aided by the large inflow of remittances from Filipinos overseas, totalling US$8.5 billion in 2004 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005, pp. 23, 28). During the crisis, the Indonesian currency was devalued by over 5000 percent over six months. In the following year, the Indonesian economy shrank by 13.8 percent, which was the largest single-year contraction for any country since the Great Depression, and unemployment rose to 15-20 percent (Freedom House, 2005, p. 293; US Department of State, 2005a). The IMF’s continued refusal to release funds in support of the government’s economic reforms, led to a rapid decline in Indonesian currency and markets. However, Indonesia’s levels of economic development improved following Megawati’s accession to presidency in 2001 and the release of an IMF US$395 million loan to the country (which expired in 2003) combined with the CGI’s financial assistance and economic reforms (Europa, 2004, p. 2129; Freedom House, 2005, pp. 293-4).

Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess comparative trends regarding the inflation and unemployment rates between the four countries, due to a lack of data. Given this difficulty, it can not be deduced that the level of economic underdevelopment, as assessed by each country’s overall balance of payments, external trade balance, and external indebtedness was markedly and consistently greater during the years that it produced the majority of its refugees. This finding runs contrary to the UN “root cause” debate, but supports Zolberg et al’s conclusions (1989, p. 260).
However, the sixth economic underdevelopment indicator, resource competition concerning land (which could not be measured quantitatively), is perhaps a better indicator of refugee production in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. This is because subsistence farming is widespread within these developing countries and not all sectors of society are benefiting equally from the process of modernisation. The variable, resource competition concerning land, is applied qualitatively to Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands below, in order to assess whether it was a factor in creating refugees during their ethnic conflicts.

**Fiji:** Resource competition concerning land increased from 1995 – 2005, as many indigenous Fijians failed to become fully integrated in the modernisation of economic production in Fiji through cash crop farming. The sugarcane industry subsequently suffered from economic underdevelopment, as many indigenous Fijian landowners who leased land to Indo-Fijian cash crop farmers took back their land on the expiry of land leases, despite their lack of experience in sugarcane production (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, pp. 22-4; US Department of State, 2005, p. 7). This meant that many Indo-Fijian farmers were left landless, which exacerbated ethnic tensions and feelings of relative deprivation between indigenous and Indo-Fijians, providing an impetus for refugee movements.

**Indonesia:** During the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan, resource competition over land between ethnic groups was significant as multinational corporations’ modernised economic production by replacing subsistence production with export-oriented production. The New Order regime therefore created an environment of impunity for land-grabbing by plantations and timber concessions, with disputes often arising after Madurese farmers took possession of land previously owned by other ethnic groups (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005, p. 30; Islam, 2003, p. 219; Bertrand, 2004, p. 57). This created an environment of ethnic conflict and the potential for refugee flows.

**Philippines:** Resource competition concerning land between Moro and non-Moro was high during the ethnic conflict as multinational corporations, invited by the Filipino
Government, set up industries in Mindanao and modernised economic production in the area. This pattern of economic development worked against the Moro, because it replaced subsistence production with export-oriented production, increasing levels of poverty among the Moro community, providing a greater incentive to flee (Islam, 2003, p. 219).

**Solomon Islands:** Resource competition concerning land was high during the ethnic conflict, as about 90 percent of the population relied on subsistence agriculture (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, p. 70). As violent conflict can disrupt food production and distribution in subsistence economies, this provides a strong influence in facilitating refugee movements, which seems to have occurred in Guadalcanal (Newland, 1993, pp. 151-2).

**Discriminatory Economic Systems**
The level of economic discrimination experienced by the ethnic groups which produced refugees during the conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands is measured using the index below. The Index ranges from “no economic discrimination” to the highest level of economic discrimination: “restrictive policies.” It assesses economic discrimination according to three major characteristics: historical marginality, significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations, and the nature of the state’s public policies. As historical marginality was discussed in Chapter 4 (pp. 102 - 109) and poverty was examined earlier in this chapter (pp. 123-130), the following section simply analyses whether the ethnic groups which created refugees were under-represented in desirable occupations and the nature of the state’s public policies regarding them. The higher the level of economic discrimination the groups experienced during the conflict, the higher the number of refugees likely to be produced.
### Table 26: Economic Discrimination Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Discrimination Index</th>
<th>Characteristics of Economic Discrimination</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Discrimination</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Malaitans in the Solomon Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Neglect/Remedial Policies</td>
<td>Significant poverty and under representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to improve the group’s material well-being.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Neglect/No Remedial Policies</td>
<td>Significant poverty and under representation in desirable occupations due to historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at improving the group’s material well-being.</td>
<td>Madurese in Kalimantan, Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Exclusion/Neutral Policies</td>
<td>Significant poverty and under representation due to prevailing social practice by dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination.</td>
<td>Moro in the Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive Policies</td>
<td>Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups.</td>
<td>Indo-Fijians in Fiji</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Basis for Judgment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Fiji (Economic representation and public policies):** As previously discussed, Indo-Fijians are under-represented in desirable occupations due to historical marginality; but do not suffer from significant poverty compared to indigenous Fijians. In fact, Indo-Fijians are economically advantaged compared to most urban indigenous Fijians but are subject to more formal economic restrictions which have existed since Fiji’s colonisation. “Affirmative action” programmes implemented by the Fijian government since its independence are designed to foster greater levels of economic equality between the races, but in practice economically favour a select minority of indigenous Fijians. It is the educated urban elite indigenous Fijians who are most able to take advantage of these programmes; who on equity considerations least deserve these entitlements. Furthermore, such programmes are aimed at increasing the number of indigenous Fijians in business
rather than reducing the number of unemployed and impoverished youth who are susceptible to political manipulation during upheavals. These programmes can therefore actually exacerbate the income disparities within each group and heighten interethnic group tensions (Chand, 1997, p. 2; Prasad and Snell, 2004, p. 550). Such public policies employ formal exclusion which may substantially restrict Indo-Fijians’ economic opportunities. Therefore, Indo-Fijians suffer from “restrictive policies” under the Economic Discrimination Index. Such policies can generate inequality, foster feelings of resentment and lead to conflict and refugee flows, which occurred in Fiji during 2000.

**Indonesia (Economic representation and public policies):** The majority of Madurese in Kalimantan during the ethnic conflict were underrepresented in desirable occupations. However, this situation was not unique to just the Madurese, as many other ethnic groups, including the Dayak, held similarly less desirable occupations. Only the Chinese were relatively wealthier than other ethnic groups. Most Madurese were involved in transportation, labouring, trading, or farming (Bertrand, 2004, p. 48). Madurese have also not been subject to any less unfavourable state public policies than other ethnic groups in Kalimantan. Under the New Order regime, Madurese visibly progressed economically which increased Dayak resentment (Bertrand, 2004, pp. 51, 55). Madurese therefore suffered from “Historical Neglect/No Remedial Policies” under the Economic Discrimination Index.

**Philippines (Economic representation and public policies):** During the period 1995 – 2005, the Filipino government implemented several public policies aimed at improving the Moros’ material well-being. The 1996 Peace Agreement between the government and the MNLF granted the latter group the status of overseer of economic development projects in all provinces of Mindanao for three years. The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established and the leader of the MNLF (Nur Misuari) was made the region’s Governor. In 1997, former President Ramos publicly announced that “all legislative measures aiming to promote economic and social conditions of the Muslims and indigenous cultural groups in the country will be given priority.” Consequently, the government enacted various developmental projects,
including road and irrigation construction, with Muslim contractors in Mindanao (Islam, 2003, pp. 206-7). However, despite such rhetoric, limited progress was made in greatly improving the Moros’ economic situation and the ARMM still remains the poorest province in the Philippines. This is partly because foreign investors have been detracted due to the continuing violence (MAR, 2004). Therefore despite the well-meaning policies the government initiated to improve the Moros’ economic status, these have been inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination caused by their historical marginality. This information indicates that the Moro fit under the category of “social exclusion” in the Economic Discrimination Index. The feelings of resentment Moro experience over their inequality, has led to conflict and refugee flows in Mindanao.

**Solomon Islands (Economic representation and public policies):** During the period 1995 – 2005, some argue that the government’s public policies have favoured the Malaitans, at the expense of other ethnic groups. In 2001, the Government paid SIS17.4 million compensation to former members of the MEF for alleged property damage. Furthermore, in 2002 it paid a SIS26 million “allowance” to police officers – the majority of whom were Malaitans (Kabutaulaka, 2004, pp. 395). The creation of jobs in various sections of the police is also believed to have grossly favoured Malaitans, as the government paid unscheduled allowances to Special Constables (former militants from the ethnic conflict who were allowed to join the police force as part of the peace agreement) (Anere et al, 2001, p. 33; Europa, 2004, p. 3813). Malaitans therefore do not suffer from economic discrimination under the Index and this was not a factor in the creation of Malaitan refugees during the ethnic conflict in the Solomon Islands.

**Social Variables**

Three standard social factors are commonly associated with the production of refugees: population growth rate, population density, and the total fertility rate. The argument is that a higher population level, population density, and total fertility rate lead to more refugee flows (Marshall, 1998; Edmonston, 1992; Weiner, 1996). These three factors are analysed in the context of the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the
Solomon Islands, to see whether they had any influence on the creation of refugees within those countries.

**Population Growth Rate and Population Density**

The table below shows the total population, annual population change, and the population density of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands from 1995 – 2004. The numbers in bold indicate the year (or the year closest) to when the majority of refugees were created from each ethnic conflict in these countries. If the above argument is true, then more refugees should be produced during the years with higher levels of population, population change, or population density.

**Table 27: Population Variables: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population Total (million as of 1 July)</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>0.815</td>
<td>0.826</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>0.840</td>
<td>0.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>194.8</td>
<td>205.8</td>
<td>208.4</td>
<td>211.1</td>
<td>213.7</td>
<td>216.4</td>
<td>208.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>76.9</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>80.2</td>
<td><strong>81.8</strong></td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>0.382</td>
<td>0.459</td>
<td>0.476</td>
<td>0.490</td>
<td>0.508</td>
<td>0.521</td>
<td>0.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual Population Change (%)</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3 (2001-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td><strong>2.1</strong></td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (persons per square kilometre)</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>44.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>108</td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td>111</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>109.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>265</td>
<td><strong>270</strong></td>
<td>276</td>
<td>258.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Solomon Is</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27 shows that a significant difference does not exist between the national population total, annual population change, or population density between the years of ethnic conflict that each country created the majority of its refugees. Furthermore, the years that each country experienced the highest period of growth in these three areas does not reflect the years when the majority of refugees were produced. This indicates that population total, annual population change, and population density were not important factors in the production of refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Therefore, imminent population pressure is not a direct cause of refugees, which supports Schmeidl’s argument (2001, p. 83; 1997, p. 299).

A further breakdown of regional population statistics was available for Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Tables 28 – 30 (below) therefore provide a more accurate indicator of whether the population variables (population total, annual population change, and population density) within the regions that experienced ethnic conflict in Indonesia (Central Kalimantan), the Philippines (ARMM), and the Solomon Islands (Guadalcanal) had any influence on the creation of refugees.

**Indonesia:** The table below shows the comparative levels of population density and the distribution of Indonesia’s population within Kalimantan by percentage in 2000 and 2003. The ethnic conflict in Central Kalimantan in 2001 produced the majority of the province’s refugees, but unfortunately no data was available for this year. Therefore, the numbers in bold indicate those population figures closest to 2001, when the majority of refugees were created during the ethnic conflict.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Barat (West Kalimantan)</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Tengah (Central Kalimantan)</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Selatah (South Kalimantan)</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalimantan Timur (East Kalimantan)</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The data above indicates that only 0.90 percent of Indonesia’s total population was situated in Central Kalimantan in 2000, which then had a population of 1,857,000. Of this, 50-75 percent was Dayak and 6-7 percent was Madurese (Bamba, 2004, p. 400). As the population density of Central Kalimantan in 2000 was only 12 people per square kilometre, this was not important in the creation of refugees in Central Kalimantan.

**Philippines:** Table 29 shows the distribution of the Philippines’ total population, the annual growth rate, and the population density by region in 2000, according to the latest census. The ethnic conflict in the ARMM in 2003 produced the majority of the province’s refugees, but unfortunately no data was available for this year. However, the population data for 2000 should provide an indicator as to whether population growth and population density in the ARMM may have been conducive to creating greater numbers of refugees in 2003 (Marshall, 1998; Edmonston, 1992; Weiner, 1996). The comparative figures for the ARMM are marked in bold.
Table 29: Philippines’ Population Distribution by Region, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>76,504,077</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Capital Region (NCR)</td>
<td>9,932,560</td>
<td>12.98</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>15,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)</td>
<td>1,365,412</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I) Ilocos</td>
<td>4,200,478</td>
<td>5.49</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II) Cagayan Valley</td>
<td>2,813,159</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III) Central Luzon</td>
<td>8,030,945</td>
<td>10.50</td>
<td>3.20</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV) Southern Tagalog</td>
<td>11,793,655</td>
<td>15.42</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V) Bicol</td>
<td>4,686,669</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI) Western Visayas</td>
<td>6,211,038</td>
<td>8.12</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII) Central Visayas</td>
<td>5,706,953</td>
<td>7.46</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII) Eastern Visayas</td>
<td>3,610,355</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX) Western Mindanao</td>
<td>3,091,208</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X) Northern Mindanao</td>
<td>2,747,585</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI) Southern Mindanao</td>
<td>5,189,335</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII) Central Mindanao</td>
<td>2,598,210</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII) Caraga</td>
<td>2,095,367</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARMM</td>
<td>2,412,159</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: NSO, Various Censuses of Population and Housing National Statistics Office, Databank and Information Services Division, 01 May 2000.

The above table indicates that the ARMM had the third lowest population of the sixteen provinces within the Philippines in 2000. It also had the fourth lowest annual population growth rate from 1995 – 2000 and third lowest population density of the Filipino provinces in 2000. This shows that neither high population, population growth or population density were important in the creation of refugees in the ARMM, which discredits Edmonston’s (1992) and Weiner’s (1996) arguments, and adds weight to Schmeidl’s findings (2001, p. 83; 1997, p. 299).

**Solomon Islands**: Table 30 provides a summary of population statistics for each of the Solomon Islands’ 10 provinces in 1999, the year when the majority of the country’s refugees were created during the ethnic conflict. The numbers in bold indicate the
population figures of Guadalcanal, where the ethnic conflict occurred, compared to the average population figures for all the provinces.

Table 30: Solomon Islands’ Population Statistics by Region, 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Inter-censal annual growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Total fertility rate</th>
<th>Population displaced due to ethnic tension (1999)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choiseul</td>
<td>20,008</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>62,739</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1,140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isabel</td>
<td>20,421</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>21,577</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rennell-Bellona</td>
<td>2,377</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guadalcanal</td>
<td><strong>60,275</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,806</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaita</td>
<td>122,620</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>12,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makira-Ulawa</td>
<td>31,006</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Temotu</td>
<td>18,912</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honiara</td>
<td>49,107</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6,339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All provinces</td>
<td><strong>409,042</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>35,309</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


According to the table above, Guadalcanal had the third highest population of the 10 provinces in the Solomon Islands in 1999 (60,275) but had the lowest annual growth rate of the provinces (1.5 percent), which was also well below the national average. Turner (2005, p. 1464) states that the population density of Guadalcanal in 1999 was 14.4 people per square kilometre, which was also lower than the average population density in the Solomon Islands of 16.3 people per square kilometre. This indicates that high population density and growth rates were not important in the creation of refugees in Guadalcanal, which again supports Schmeidl’s arguments (2001, p. 83; 1997, p. 299).

Total Fertility Rate

The total fertility rate of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands is compared in the table below between two periods, 1970 – 1975 and 2000 – 2005. A higher total fertility rate should provide an environment that is more conducive to the
creation of refugees, as competition for land grows (Weiner, 1996; Schmeidl, 1997, p. 287).

Table 31: Total Fertility Rate: Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Fertility Rate % (births per woman) 1970-1975</th>
<th>Total Fertility Rate % (births per woman) 2000-2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia and the Pacific</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 28 shows that the total fertility rate of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands has decreased since 1975. The total fertility rates were therefore comparatively lower within these countries during the years they produced the majority of their refugees (1999 – 2003). However, while these rates were comparatively lower within the countries, they were still higher than the average total fertility rate in East Asia and the Pacific from 2000 – 2005, which was 1.9 percent. In particular, the Philippines and Guadalcanal province in the Solomon Islands had the highest total fertility rates of the four countries within the last decade (3.2 percent and 5 percent respectively). However, these high total fertility rates were not matched by a high annual growth rate within these countries, which indicates that this was not a significant factor in the creation of refugees. For example, Guadalcanal had the lowest annual growth rate of the Solomon Islands’ provinces (1.5 percent) and the ARMM also had a comparatively low annual growth rate compared to the other Filipino provinces (1.63 percent) (tables 30 and 29).
Table 32: Summary of Social/Economic Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Evidence of Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Underdevelopment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminatory Economic Systems</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Change</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32 shows that resource competition concerning land was the most significant economic underdevelopment variable in providing an environment conducive to the creation of refugees within the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. Economic discrimination was important in producing refugees in three out of the four ethnic conflicts, but was not a significant factor within the Solomon Islands’ conflict. This is because the Solomon Islands’ government made a conscious effort to provide economic support to Malaitans (Anere et al, 2001, p. 33; Europa, 2004, p. 3813). Significant levels of relative poverty only existed between Moro and non-Moro...
in the Philippines, largely as a result of the legacy of the Suharto regime (Freedom House, 2005, p. 503). The population size, population density, and the total fertility rate of Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands during their ethnic conflicts was not significant in providing an environment conducive to the creation of refugees.

**Cultural/Perceptual Variables**

Governments sometimes differentiate between ethnic groups based on cultural grounds (MAR, 2004, pp. 40-1). In this section, four major cultural discrimination indicators are applied to the ethnic groups which produced refugees during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. These include: restrictions on religion, restrictions on the use of language, restrictions on appearance, and restrictions on behaviour.

**Cultural Discrimination against Ethnic Groups**

**Fiji:** The only cultural restriction Indo-Fijians faced during the ethnic conflict related to religion. Religious affiliation runs largely along ethnic lines, with indigenous Fijians being Christian (52 percent) and Indo-Fijians being mostly Hindu (38 percent). There is also a small Muslim population (eight percent). Although the Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the government generally respects this right in practice, some Indo-Fijians were concerned during the ethnic conflict about their ability to freely express their cultural and religious beliefs and to seek protection against attacks by the majority indigenous Fijian population (MAR, 2004; Freedom House, 2005, p. 230; CIA, 2005; US Department of State, 2005, pp. 4-5). During the 2000 conflict, Indo-Fijians faced considerable cultural discrimination as their places of worship were desecrated. Efforts to declare Fiji a Christian state only deepened Indo-Fijians’ feelings of discrimination (Prasad and Snell, 2004, pp. 545-7).

**Indonesia:** The Madurese did not experience any overt cultural restrictions during the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan. This may be because Madurese are part of the 88 percent of Indonesia’s total population which are Muslim (Europa, 2004, p. 2141). The government also recognises Islam as one of the country’s five official faiths, which also
include: Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism and Buddhism. Adherents to these faiths have little difficulty in obtaining the compulsory National Identity Card (KTP), which identifies their religion and is required to register births, marriages, and divorces (Freedom House, 2005, p. 296).

**Philippines:** During the ethnic conflict in the ARMM, Moro encountered some cultural restrictions, mainly relating to religion. While the majority of Filipinos are Roman Catholic, comprising 80.9 percent of the total population, Moro are Muslim, and comprise five percent of the total population (2000 census) (CIA, 2005; US Department of State, 2005, p. 8). Although the Filipino Constitution provides for freedom of religion and the government generally respects this right in practice, some Moro reported difficulty renting rooms in boarding houses or being hired for rental work if they used their real names or wore distinctive Muslim dress. As a result, some Muslims used Christian pseudonyms and did not wear distinctive dress when applying for housing or jobs (US Department of State, 2005, p. 8).

**Solomon Islands:** Malaitans did not experience any cultural restrictions during the ethnic conflict, as the Solomon Islands is relatively culturally homogenous compared to Fiji, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The religious composition of the Solomon Islands is also not defined according to ethnic group. Instead, over 90 percent of the population belong to one of the five established Christian dominations. These churches form the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA) (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 591).
Table 33: Summary of Cultural/Perceptual Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Fiji</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Religion</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>The Indo-Fijians and Moro experienced some restrictions on religion during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji and the Philippines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Use of Language</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Appearance</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Behaviour</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other types of cultural restrictions</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table shows that not many cultural restrictions were imposed on the ethnic groups which produced refugees during the conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. The only cultural restrictions imposed related to restrictions on religion and these were only evident in Fiji and the Philippines, perhaps because their belief systems did not conform to the state’s predominant religion.

**Intervening Variables**

Five major intervening variables, which act as facilitators, have been identified as most conducive to generating external refugee movements. These include:

i) less fighting in border areas;

ii) relaxed land border controls;

iii) governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict;

iv) non-governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict; and,

v) sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state.
Less fighting in border areas
This variable is only applicable to the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan, Indonesia, because Fiji, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands have no land borders. Kalimantan has a land border with two Malaysian provinces, Sarawak and Sabah. During the intermittent ethnic conflict in Kalimantan from 1996-2001, fighting was limited to the main centres of Sanggau Ledo and Sambas (West Kalimantan in 1996 and 1999) and Sampit (Central Kalimantan in 2001) (Bamba, 2004, p. 399). There is no evidence to suggest that fighting occurred along the border areas during the ethnic conflict, which may act as a facilitator in encouraging potential external refugees to cross the border into Malaysia order to reach safety (Schmeidl, 1998, p. 26).

Relaxed land border controls
Relaxed border controls and more generous immigration policies of refugee-receiving states may act as facilitators in encouraging potential external refugee movements to occur (Loescher, 1992, p. 41; Gordenker, 1987, p. 183). However, such policies are likely to depend on whether the refugees are perceived as being beneficial in contributing to the receiving state’s power base. Again this intervening variable is only applicable to Indonesia because it is the only country examined with a land border. Information was unavailable regarding Indonesia’s border controls during the ethnic conflict. However, Malaysia employed strict border controls in preparation for a possible influx of Indonesian external refugees. For example, Malaysia’s Sarawak state increased the number of guards on its border with Kalimantan and more police and marine patrols were stationed in the waters around Sarawak and Sabah and in the Malacca Straits. Malaysian troops stationed along Sarawak’s border were reportedly ordered to ask any would-be illegal immigrants to return home or to detain them for future deportation. Perhaps as a result, no external refugees were generated from the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan.

Governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict
Fiji: Fiji’s deposed coalition government provided limited assistance to Indo-Fijian refugees created by the ethnic conflict. Instead, it sought international help to grant refugee status to the thousands of Indo-Fijian refugees caused by violence after the 2000 coup (BBC, 26 July 2001).

Indonesia: The Indonesian government recognised internal refugees created by the ethnic conflict as citizens and provided some assistance. Although the Indonesian Security Force’s response to the conflict was initially slow, the government implemented several effective refugee policies. It arranged evacuations of Madurese by boat to Java, set up temporary and relocation housing for most internal refugees in 12 relocation sites, and allocated 11,000 families of agricultural background with two hectares of agricultural land per family. In total, 1,259 households chose the alternative option of a government local settlement “empowerment” package of IDR five million (US$600) per family to arrange their own accommodation and living (Global IDP Database, 2004). Additionally, the Indonesian government developed a national coordinating body, Bakornas PBP to formulate national policies on the accelerated handling of internal refugees in Indonesia. It was mandated to completely resolve all internal refugee problems by the end of 2002 and indeed all of the internal refugee camps in Pontianak have since been cleared (Bambas, 2004, p. 405).

The government also established the National Coordinating Board for Tackling Disasters and Refugees Management which formulated the “National Policies on Refugee Management in Indonesia,” which were agreed on by cabinet in September 2001 (Bambas, 2004, p. 414). It has since applied a strategy consisting of three options: return, empowerment, and resettlement. Under its return policy, the government aims to peacefully return internal refugees to their normal livelihoods and prior living places. Under the empowerment policy, the government aims to provide facilities and job opportunities to the refugees to establish new lives in the communities to which they have fled. With its resettlement policy, the government hopes to resettle refugees in new locations through transmigration programmes (Bambas, 2004, p. 404). However, in January 2004 the government reclassified its internal refugees as “vulnerable people,”
shifting the responsibility for basic welfare and local integration from the central
government to provincial authorities and causing regional discrepancies in assistance.

**Philippines:** The government generally acknowledged its responsibilities concerning
internal refugees created from the ethnic conflict in the ARMM and has assisted them
through the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the Office of Civil
Defence, the National Red Cross, and local authorities (Global IDP Project, 2005, pp. 7-8). In 2001, both MILF and the Filipino government formally agreed to ensure the safe
return of internal refugees to their villages of origin. In May 2002, additional
implementing guidelines were agreed upon (“Implementing Guidelines on the
Rehabilitation aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001”), to provide for the safe
return of refugees. The Agreement also provides technical and financial assistance to
refugees to rebuild their houses and reparations were awarded by the government for the
properties lost and/or destroyed by the fighting (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 6).

Since October 2004, an 18-month government – United Nations programme has been
conducting a rehabilitation and resettlement programme addressing the needs of the
estimated 60,000 internal refugees unable to return home (Global IDP Project, 2005). A
Joint Needs Assessment (JNA), involving all key stakeholders including the MILF, was
also conducted during 2004 in conflict-affected areas of Mindanao and is due to be
completed by the end of September 2005 (Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 8). Under the
programme, over 50 percent of the targeted 5,800 core shelter units were completed by
However, reported shortcomings exist between the positive intentions and statements
made by the government and their practical implementation. For example, according to
Mandanews, 94 people died in evacuation centres in North Cotabo province in Mindanao
due to food shortages (Global IDP Project, 2005; USCRI, 2005). Such shortcomings may
result from a lack of capacity of national and local institutions to effectively address the
scale of displacement and from a lack of funding. As a result, governmental assistance is
often short-term and inadequate to meet the needs of internal refugees (Global IDP
Project, 2005, pp. 7-8).
**Solomon Islands:** The government was indecisive during the ethnic conflict and provided very little assistance to internal refugees, who generally relied on their extended families and subsistence farming for support (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 587; US Department of State, 2005, p. 5). Returnees were only provided with a three-month supply of supplementary food rations and it was assumed that other local community members would assist the returnees in obtaining their food requirements. Many requested additional food assistance but did not receive it (Global IDP Project, November 2004).

The government also did not provide adequate and comprehensive compensation for damage or lost property to those citizens affected by the ethnic conflict, although payments were made to MEF members. By contrast, the Taiwanese government made the equivalent of US$6 million available for compensation to the Solomon Islands’ refugees (USCR, 2002). RAMSI, the National Disaster Management Office and the Guadalcanal Province Disaster Committee have since assisted the repatriation of refugees employing community development programmes to support their reintegration and military escorts to ensure their protection on return (Global IDP Project, November 2004).

**Non-governmental assistance to refugees created from the conflict**

**Fiji:** During the ethnic conflict in Fiji, several coalition groupings of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were formed in order to put greater pressure on the Fijian government to reduce ethnic tension and to provide assistance to the refugees created from the conflict. Other local NGOs and civil society organisations used their international networks to lobby European governments, Australia and New Zealand, and the UN and its Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination for support (Prasad and Snell, 2004, pp. 555-7).

In 2004, there were several small, foreign-based organisations that concentrated on local human rights causes, including the Coalition for Democracy in Fiji and the International Fiji movement and the Movement for Democracy. The International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) also continued to operate an office in Fiji (US Department of State, 2005, p. 5).

**Indonesia:** The majority of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community groups’ efforts in Kalimantan during the ethnic conflict focused on providing emergency support to the internal refugees. They were principally involved in the distribution of basic necessities, such as food, medicine and clothes and included local student and youth groups and Christian and Muslim religious organisations. Numerous international NGOs were also active in the region, including CARE, World Vision International, Catholic Relief Services, International Medical Corps, Red Cross, Mercy Corps, Save the Children, the British Council and Search for Common Ground. Other international organisations, like the International Organisation of Migration, World Health Organisation (WHO), UN OCHA, UN Children’s Fund and the UNHCR also provided varying levels of assistance (Bamba, 2004, pp. 405-7).

**Philippines:** During 1995 – 2005, many NGOs and church groups participated in relief and rehabilitation efforts for the internal refugees created from the ethnic conflict in Mindanao (Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 8). These included the Mindanao Emergency Response Network (MERN), a coalition of national and international NGOs, Bantay Ceasefire, a network of grass roots organisations, and the Red Cross (US Department of State, 2005, p. 9; Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 8). Furthermore, at the end of 2004, the UNDP and the European Commission began implementing an 18-month rehabilitation project benefiting internal refugees within Mindanao, particularly in those areas most affected by violence and fighting. The project aims to address the rehabilitation and resettlement requirements of about 60,000 internal refugees in 35 selected conflict-affected communities in Mindanao. By June 2005, 32 out of 35 selected areas had already benefited from some sort of rehabilitation assistance and 120,000 internal refugees had received relief assistance (Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 8).
**Solomon Islands:** The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Solomon Islands Red Cross, funded by the European Union, provided assistance for internal refugees created from the conflict in Guadalcanal (US Department of State, 2005, p. 5). The ICRC also provided relief efforts to some of the more inaccessible parts of the Solomon Islands, including Sikaiana Island in Malaita province, which saw its population increase by 40 percent as Malaitans fled Guadalcanal (USCR, 2002). Aside from the structures of traditional society, churches and NGOs in the Solomon Islands have also assumed important roles in providing humanitarian assistance to internal refugees. In particular, the Solomon Islands Christian Association (SICA) which is identified with a number of churches, the Women for Peace NGO and the Honiara Civil Society Network (CSN) have been actively involved in such work (Pollard and Wale, 2004, p. 593). The Melanesian Brotherhood, an organisation of mainly young itinerant evangelists also played an important role in reducing ethnic tension in the Solomon Islands (Anere et al, May 2001, p. 35).

**Sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state**

No sudden outbreaks of disease were reported in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands during the ethnic conflicts from 1995 – 2005. Despite the announcement of warnings concerning the potential for a disease outbreak in Kalimantan, this did not eventuate. Instead, only five deaths occurred as a result of diarrhoea in internal refugee camps in Kalimantan, with others contracting typhoid and many starving. Starvation was also a concern in Mindanao in 1997, following the refusal of about 30 000 internal refugees to return to the Mindanao province of Cotabato despite a ceasefire signed between the government and the MILF (Robles, 8 August 1997).
Table 34: Summary of Intervening Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Evidence of Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less fighting in border areas</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relaxed land border controls</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental assistance to refugees created from the ethnic conflict</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental assistance to refugees created from the ethnic conflict</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>×</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 34 (above) shows that intervening variables have little influence in facilitating external refugee movements, as few differences exist between them when applied to the ethnic conflicts in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. The most significant intervening variable is “non-governmental assistance to refugees created from
the ethnic conflict.” However, this appears to have acted as a deterrent to external refugee flows because the NGOs were located within the borders of the refugee-producing countries. This may have encouraged the refugees to remain within their state of origin in order to gain access to the resources provided by the agencies. NGO assistance therefore seems to have outweighed the limited governmental assistance that was provided to the refugees, encouraging them to remain internally, rather than externally, displaced. The least important variable is “sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state,” which did not exist in any of the countries, and therefore did not act as a facilitator in creating external refugees.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

Successes and Shortcomings of the Model
Ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region possess similar characteristics which are conducive to creating external and/or internal refugees. The theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 therefore provided a valuable means from which to answer the questions posed in Chapter 1. It identified those factors most closely associated with producing external and internal refugees, and discovered that internal refugee movements are more likely to occur first in this region and that they do not necessarily encourage external refugee flows. Furthermore, the multivariate approach of the model was successful in illustrating the interlinked nature of many of the variables, demonstrating that no single-factor explanation exists that can determine which ethnic conflicts produce internal and/or external refugees.

The success of the model’s multivariate approach was also, however, to its detriment. Firstly, due to the interlinked nature of the variables, the information gathered was sometimes applicable to a range of variables, rather than just solely one. For example, as in the case of the Philippines, the government received external assistance from the United States during the ethnic conflict (political variable), which was intended to improve levels of economic development within Mindanao (economic variable). Likewise, information regarding the lack of human rights (political variable) within each country could also be included under other categories, such as “discriminatory political systems” and “discriminatory economic systems.” This demonstrates the close relationship between political and economic/social variables in creating refugees.

Secondly, the model does not sufficiently take into account the role that an individual leader or governing regime can play in the creation of refugees during an ethnic conflict. This may be particularly important in assessing whether a country possesses an exclusionary national ideology or not. By simplifying “nationalism” into just two types (ethnic/religious nationalism and civic nationalism), there is a risk that other forms of nationalism, equally capable of producing refugees, are omitted. For example, a country’s
exclusionary national ideology may derive from its leader’s imposed personal ideology, as demonstrated during former President Suharto’s regime which imposed the “Pancasila” ideology on Indonesia. Likewise, the actions of individuals as an intervening factor in the creation of refugees, is also not provided in the model. Indeed, there may be many more salient intervening factors than just the five major ones outlined in the model. Other intervening factors may include: lack of housing, food scarcity, poor water and sanitation conditions, lack of access to health and education facilities and lack of sources of livelihood (Global IDP Project, 2004, p. 5).

Thirdly, some specific issues which are particularly prevalent in the ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region are perhaps not given sufficient attention in the model. Land is of fundamental importance within the ethnic conflicts studied in this region, but its relevance in the creation of refugees is perhaps overlooked. Additionally, political and economic corruption is endemic in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines and the Solomon Islands. However, the model does not include “corruption” under either its political or economic variables as a factor conducive to the creation of refugees. This is an important oversight, as corruption within the elite often leads to poverty amongst the masses, which is a contributing factor in the production of internal refugees.

Summary of the Factors Conducive to External and Internal Refugee Movements

External and internal refugees are created through a separate, yet interrelated, set of independent and intervening variables. Four predominant political, economic, and cultural/perceptual factors are most conducive to the creation of external refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. These include: discriminatory political systems, external support for a specific ethnic group, discriminatory economic systems, and cultural discrimination against ethnic groups. Of these four factors, three involve discrimination of some type. Interestingly, discrimination is not a major factor in producing internal refugees. Instead, a combination of five structural, political, and economic factors accompanied by the intervening factors of governmental and non-governmental assistance to refugees are important in encouraging refugees to remain within their country of origin.
Factors Conducive to External Refugee Movements

Of the four major independent variables in the model, political factors are the strongest in creating external refugees. In particular, if political systems are discriminatory and external parties are involved in supporting a specific ethnic group during an ethnic conflict, there is a greater likelihood that external refugees will be produced. This is supported by evidence that the Indo-Fijian and Moro ethnic groups experienced especially high levels of political discrimination from 1995 – 2005, according to “The Minorities at Risk Political Discrimination Index,” and produced external refugees (MAR, 2004; Amnesty International, 2005; Freedom House, 2005). Comparatively, the Madurese and Malaitan ethnic groups did not experience similarly high levels of political discrimination during this time period and did not produce external refugees.

Both Indo-Fijians and Moro are substantially under-represented in political office and participation due to the prevailing social practice by dominant groups. This is exacerbated in Fiji by formal public policies which further restrict the ability of Indo-Fijians to participate in politics (Chand, 1997, pp. 1-2; MAR, 2004, p. 2). In addition, the formal public policies constructed to reduce such political discrimination in the Philippines are inadequate to offset social discriminatory policies by the dominant Catholic group (Global IDP Project, 2005, p. 4).

The role that partisan external parties can play by providing political, financial or military support to an ethnic group with whom they have a special affinity with is another important factor in the creation of external refugees. Unlike the Malaitans and Madurese, the Indo-Fijian and Moro ethnic groups received external political support for those escaping persecution during the conflicts. While the Indian government provided mainly political support to Indo-Fijians by closing its diplomatic mission in Fiji and imposing an eight-year trade embargo after the 1987 coups (Gurr, 2000, p. 7), the OIC gave both political and financial support to the MNLF in the Philippines (Islam, 2003, pp. 203-4). Both actions seem to have facilitated the creation of external refugees.
Discriminatory economic systems are another major factor in the creation of external refugees. Under “The Minorities at Risk Economic Discrimination Index” (Davenport et al, 2004, p. 39), the Indo-Fijian, Malaitan, Moro, and Madurese ethnic groups either suffer from historical marginality and neglect and/or varying degrees of poverty – but not all suffer from high levels of economic discrimination. Therefore, the nature of the public policies in force during the ethnic conflict is most indicative as to whether these groups produced external refugees. If public policies substantially restricted the group’s economic opportunities compared to other ethnic groups, (as with the Indo-Fijians in Fiji), or if public policies designed to improve the group’s economic situation remained inadequate to offset active and widespread social discrimination, (as with the Moro in the Philippines), feelings of inequality and resentment led to conflict and external refugee flows.

The final factor conducive to the creation of external refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region is cultural discrimination against ethnic groups, particularly involving restrictions on religion. Both the Indo-Fijian and Moro ethnic groups faced such religious restrictions during their countries’ ethnic conflicts, as neither conformed to the dominant national religion of Christianity. Correspondingly, some Hindu places of worship were desecrated in Fiji and some Muslims in the Philippines experienced discrimination if they dressed in distinctive Muslim dress (Prasad and Snell, 2004, pp. 545-7; US Department of State, 2005, p. 8). Such instances of cultural discrimination did not occur towards the Madurese or Malaitans, probably because they adhered to the dominant state religion.

**Factors Conducive to Internal Refugee Movements**

A set of preconditions is necessary in determining whether internal refugee movements result from ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. The state embroiled in an ethnic conflict must possess five specific independent variables if it is to produce internal refugees. These include: two structural factors (weak states and ethnic composition and heterogeneity), two political factors (exclusionary national ideologies and lack of human rights), and an economic factor (resource competition concerning land). In addition, two intervening variables, favourable governmental and non-
governmental policies to refugees, are important in encouraging refugees to remain within their country of origin.

A state needs to be sufficiently “weak” to generate internal refugees. It therefore must not be fulfilling its functions under either one or two of the following capability areas: the security gap, the capacity gap, and/or the legitimacy gap (Weinstein et al, 2005, pp.13-14). Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands all suffered from a decreased level of security from 1995 – 2005, in that they were unable to effectively protect people from internal and external threats, maintain a monopoly over the use of force, and preserve effective sovereignty and order within their territories (Weinstein et al, 2005, p. 14). During this time, the governments’ of these countries were also unable to meet the basic needs of their citizens, and Indonesia, in particular, struggled to maintain legitimacy over its populace. Due to their unfulfilment of the above capability areas, Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands can be considered as “weak” states.

The existence of a dominant ethnic group within an ethnically heterogeneous population is the second structural factor necessary for the creation of internal refugees within an ethnic conflict. In the majority of the countries (Fiji, Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands) the minority ethnic group within each conflict produced refugees. However, the opposite was true in the Philippines. In the ARMM, the dominant Moro ethnic group produced the majority of the province’s refugees. This variance can perhaps be explained by the greater level of inequality in power between the two groups in conflict in the ARMM (Cagoco-Guiam, 2004, p. 488; Global IDP Project, 2004; USCRI, 2004). The non-Muslims fighting the Moro in the ARMM included the Filipino government, which has far superior resources to draw upon than the Moro, perhaps making it inevitable that Moro refugees would be produced.

The political characteristic of an exclusionary national ideology, either of an ethnic or religious nature which exists in practice within a state, was important in facilitating the generation of internal refugees. Ethnic nationalism dominated in practice from 1995 – 2005 with the Fijian, Indonesian, and Solomon Island governments promoting the
indigenous Fijian, Javanese, and Guali ethnicities. Whereas religious nationalism dominated in practice in the Philippines during this same period, with the government tending to prefer Roman Catholicism over Islam as the dominant state ideology (US Department of State, 2005, pp. 8-10; May, 1998, p. 71; Gegeo, 18 November 2005). This meant that the Indo-Fijian, Madurese, Malaitan and Moro ethnic groups were often denied protection, encouraging them to flee within their states.

A lack of human rights brought about by generalised violence was a fundamental factor in the creation of internal refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. These countries scored relatively highly on the Political Terror Scale (PTS) during the peak of their ethnic conflicts, when the majority of their refugees were produced (Gibney and Dalton, 1996, pp. 73-4). In 2000, each country experienced a severe level of human rights violations, reflected in its rating of level four on the PTS. Fiji generated the majority of its refugees in 2000, when ethnic conflict and human rights violations were at their highest (USCRI, 2004; USCR, 2002; US Department of State, 2005, p. 5). Although the Philippines and the Solomon Islands also produced many refugees in 2000, the majority were created in the Philippines during the 2003 ethnic conflict, when it also had a rating of level four on the PTS (Europa, 2004, p. 3417). Likewise, the majority of refugees were created during the ethnic conflict in Kalimantan in 2001, when the country still ranked at level four on the PTS. Despite Indonesia reaching level five on the PTS in 2003, no refugees were generated from Kalimantan, as the ethnic conflict there had already stopped. This indicates that refugees are more likely to be created from some form of generalised violence rather than from institutionalised human rights violations (Schmeidl, 2001, p. 78). Comparatively, most of the Solomon Islands’ refugees were generated during 1999, but unfortunately no accurate data was available to establish the PTS for that year (USCR, 2002; Gibney and Dalton, 1996, pp. 73-4). Notwithstanding, a lack of human rights in the Solomon Islands during the ethnic conflict appears to have facilitated the creation of refugees.

Resource competition concerning land is the most significant economic underdevelopment indicator in each of the countries in facilitating the generation of
internal refugees from 1995 – 2005. Tensions over land in Fiji increased during this period, when many indigenous Fijian landowners refused to renew land leases to Indo-Fijian farmers, which compromised the Indo-Fijians’ economic well-being, encouraging many to move (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, pp. 22-4; US Department of State, 2005, p. 7). Similarly, the economic well-being of many Moro, who largely relied on subsistence agriculture for survival, was threatened by the Filipino government’s emphasis to modernise economic production in Mindanao. The government’s selling of traditionally-held Moro land to multinational corporations to facilitate this objective increased competition over land, jeopardised the Moros’ livelihood, and created a further impetus for some to move (Islam, 2003, p. 219). Resource competition over land also increased in Kalimantan from the late 1980s with the rapid growth of the Madurese population and with many Madurese acquiring land previously owned by Dayak under the New Order’s political institutions (Bertrand, 2004, pp. 55-7). Dayak resentment over this facilitated an internal refugee movement of Madurese in Indonesia. An internal refugee movement of Malaitan settlers to Guadalcanal was similarly created in the Solomon Islands, when their numbers increased enough to place undue stress on the availability of land, of which approximately 90 percent of the population rely on for subsistence agriculture (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, p. 70).

In addition to the previous independent variables mentioned, two intervening variables exist which are important in encouraging refugees to remain within their country of origin. Favourable governmental and non-governmental policies to refugees create a huge incentive for them not to cross an international border and become external refugees. The degree of emergency support and relief that governments and NGOs provide immediately following an ethnic conflict is therefore extremely influential in determining whether refugees remain internally displaced or not. The Fijian, Indonesian, Filipino, and Solomon Islands’ governments, as well as various local and international NGOs, each provided high levels of assistance to the refugees created from their ethnic conflicts. This perhaps helps to explain why higher numbers of internal refugees (rather than external refugees) were created from each conflict.
The Relationship between External and Internal Refugee Movements

Internal refugee movements are often of a larger size and occur before external refugee movements during ethnic conflicts in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. However, the mere existence of internal refugees does not necessarily mean that external refugees will also be created. For example, only half of the countries examined produced both internal and external refugee flows. The larger size of internal refugee movements, relative to external refugee movements, comprises part of an international trend, whereby internal refugee flows are increasing in size and duration. For example, Schmeidl notes that prior to 1990, 25 percent of internal displacement lasted only one or two years and only eight populations were displaced for ten or more years. This trend changed markedly during the 1990s; with about 61 percent of internal displacement lasting five years or less and 21 percent of these existing for ten or more years. The comparative figures for external displacement are 53 percent and 27 percent respectively (1998, p. 29). Possible reasons for the extended duration of internal refugee movements may include “lack of assistance and self-reliance opportunities, land and property disputes, continued hostility from local populations, and continued fighting,” meaning that many internal refugees prefer to wait before returning or instead choose to resettle elsewhere (Global IDP Project, 2005). This shift towards greater numbers of internally displaced people indicates that refugees now appear to have fewer opportunities of escaping across international borders. Such containment of refugees within countries can be attributed to a number of factors, including:

- The inhibitors (which the model does not discuss), may be of a greater magnitude than the facilitators in dissuading external refugee movements; and/or:
- Extreme forms of any of the independent variables conducive to generating refugees can also have the effect of constraining refugee flight

Possible inhibitors to external refugee movements can be of either a physical nature (such as inaccessible mountain ranges or water/sea), or of a human-made nature (such as strict border controls, unavailability of asylum in neighbouring countries, or fighting in
bordering areas that prevents mass overland exodus) (Schmeidl, 1997). It is interesting to note that land access was not a significant factor in facilitating the creation of external refugees in any of the ethnic conflicts examined. Instead, two island states produced external refugees (Fiji and the Philippines) and the only country with a land border (Indonesia) did not produce external refugees. However, other inhibitors to external refugee movements existed in Indonesia. A lack of geographical proximity to the border, combined with harsh terrain and especially strict border controls appear to have been significant in preventing external refugee flows from Kalimantan. Furthermore, many of the states in the region have not ratified the 1951 Convention or 1967 Protocol. This unavailability of asylum may also act as a deterrent to flight and thus the creation of external refugees.

Another reason why internal refugee movements are more prevalent than external refugee movements in this region may be associated with the nature of the independent variables involved. Extreme forms of any of the independent variables conducive to generating refugees can also have the effect of constraining refugee flight. For example, while the coercive policies of repressive authoritarian governments may encourage people to leave, those same repressive laws and totalitarian methods can act as a constraining force, by rendering actual flight more difficult (Richmond, 1993, p. 16). Likewise, refugee movements may favour young and healthy people as well as those with some material resources that can be traded or converted into foreign currency. It may also be gender discriminative, in that adult males may be more proactive in escaping than women and children, who often have fewer options and are therefore left behind (Richmond, 1993, p. 17).

Suggestions for Governments and Regional Organisations to Reduce Refugee Flows
Although ethnic conflict is ultimately responsible for producing many of the refugees in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region, other important independent and intervening variables may strongly influence the nature and extent of refugee movements. If these variables can be minimised, there is a greater likelihood that refugee numbers will also decrease in the region. Firstly, it is important to minimise the independent variables most conducive to
creating refugees, as they provide the basic cause of the problem. However, the extent to which this can occur largely depends on their fundamental character. For example, political and economic factors are easier to alter than structural and cultural/perceptual factors due to their more transient nature. Having already identified which of these factors are most important in creating internal and external refugees, some preventative measures that governments or regional organisations could take to reduce refugee numbers are now considered.

The major factors conducive to creating external refugees in the region - discriminatory political and economic systems, the involvement of external parties, and restrictions on religion - are of a political and economic nature, and therefore can be better manipulated, and thus prevented, than those factors likely to generate internal refugees. For example, public policies or social practices which substantially restrict an ethnic group’s political participation, representation, or economic opportunities in comparison to other ethnic groups, must be revised by governments to end political and economic discrimination. Such a revision can not merely occur on paper to be effective; it must also be implemented in practice, so that mechanisms are in place to offset any possible future discrimination. Regional organisations could support governments which have expressed interest in revising their public policies, by assisting them in the planning and implementation of such remedial programmes.

Likewise, regional organisations could emphasise to member-states that external refugee flows are likely to result if they provide political, financial, or military support to a specific ethnic group involved in an ethnic conflict. Dissuading external parties from providing partisan support, unless they are capable, willing, and prepared to accept any resulting refugees, is therefore salient in preventing external refugee flows. Regional organisations should also emphasise the importance of religious tolerance as a vital step in contributing towards a country’s economic prosperity and political stability. Promoting the need for compulsory religious education programmes at primary school level in ethnically heterogeneous countries should encourage religious tolerance by teaching children of the equal validity of minority religions.
It is more difficult to employ preventative measures for internal refugee movements as two significant structural factors involved in their production – weak states and ethnic composition and heterogeneity – are much harder, if not impossible, to alter. Aside from these factors, there is also not much that regional organisations can do to change a country’s national ideology, which is a by-product of its past and deeply engrained within society. Therefore, the only factors conducive to creating internal refugees which regional organisations might be able to notably influence is by encouraging governments to respect fundamental human rights, including land ownership, and to provide assistance to internal refugees created from ethnic conflicts.

Once the independent variables most conducive to creating refugees have been minimised, the monitoring of intervening variables by regional organisations and governments is important in preventing refugee flows (Schmeidl, 2003, p. 139). Given that many of the conflicts in this region are long-standing, it is important that a region-wide strategy is developed and implemented to address ways of minimising those factors most conducive to creating refugees and to monitor any intervening factors. Such a strategy needs to focus on an early-warning prevention plan. However, this can only be as effective as the information that is available to it. Therefore, greater emphasis needs to be spent on data collection and analysis within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. Governmental, non-governmental, and regional organisations need to work together to collate and share such information, if this is to be successful. In particular, regional organisations need to invest more of their resources in areas of less geo-political importance, including in the Southeast Asia/Pacific region. Some initiatives have been taken on this, including a report released by the Secretariat of the Pacific Community in August 2000, which details the major deficiencies in the collection of economic statistics in the Pacific region (SPC, 10 August 2000).
Suggestions for Further Research

Although refugees are created by a combination of structural, political, economic, cultural/perceptual and intervening variables, political factors rated twice as high compared to the other factors in generating both internal and external refugee movements. In particular, discriminatory political systems, external parties, exclusionary national ideologies, and a lack of human rights all contributed towards the production of refugees from the ethnic conflicts examined in Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands. While various literature exists which analyses the role that discriminatory political systems and a lack of human rights play in creating refugees, less research has been undertaken in analysing the effect of external parties and exclusionary national ideologies on refugee movements. The findings of this thesis suggest that these factors deserve greater attention in future research in this field. Unlike much of the previous research, this study also found that the style of political regime had little significance in contributing towards the production of refugees. Similar numbers of refugees were created under both democratic and authoritarian regimes.

Structural, economic, cultural/perceptual, and intervening variables were also prevalent in creating refugees within the Southeast Asia/Pacific region from 1995 – 2005. However, these factors (weak states, ethnic composition and heterogeneity, discriminatory economic systems, resource competition concerning land, restrictions on religion, and governmental and non-governmental assistance to refugees created from ethnic conflict), all played a less significant role than political factors in producing refugees. These findings contradict the argument that economic hardship is an important cause of refugee movements (the root cause debate), as not all the refugees that were created suffered from comparatively greater poverty levels than their indigenous counterparts. Indeed, the Indo-Fijian and Madurese ethnic groups in Fiji and Indonesia were generally less poor than the indigenous Fijian and Dayak ethnic groups in these countries. Therefore evidence of a direct causal link between refugee flows and poverty is unfounded. Furthermore, Edmonston’s (1992) argument that higher levels of social change (population growth rate, population density, and fertility rate); produce greater numbers of refugees also remained unfounded. Schmeidl’s (2003, p. 304) finding that neither facilitators nor
inhibitors were significant in predicting refugees was not founded in this study. However, she correctly assumes that non-geographical facilitators and inhibitors are more important in creating refugees.

If policymakers continue to view refugee movements as problems of “humanitarian relief,” they will only be able to react to the latest refugee crisis, rather than decipher the underlying factors that create them (Wood, 1994, p. 608). Until the root causes of refugee flows are addressed by governments, local ethnic hatred will continue to resurface and feelings of discrimination and marginalisation will continue to create refugees.
Table 35: Variations from Hypotheses: A Complete Summary of the Application of Variables to the Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Evidence of Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Weak States</strong></td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>Fiji, Indonesia, the Philippines, and the Solomon Islands were weak under at least one of the capability areas. A weak state is a precondition for the creation of internal refugees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Ethnic composition and Heterogeneity**| ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓              | The countries are ethnically heterogeneous and a dominant ethnic group exists within each of the ethnic conflicts.  
* Unlike the other countries, the dominant ethnic group in ARMM produced refugees in the Philippines. |
| **Land access**                         | × ✓ × ×              | Kalimantan (Indonesia) is the only country with land access, but it did not produce external refugees. Whereas, Fiji and the Philippines produced external refugees despite having no land access. |
| **State-Building**                      | ✓ ✓ ✓ ×              | Coups only seemed to have a significant impact in the creation of refugees in Fiji and a marginal impact on the creation of refugees in the Solomon Islands.  
* The regime change in Indonesia may have contributed towards the creation of refugees in Kalimantan, but evidence remains unsubstantiated. |
<p>| <strong>Political Regime</strong>                    | × × × ✓              | Except for the Solomon Islands, the political regimes of the other countries did not seem to influence the creation of refugees. Fiji and the Philippines were democratic from 1995 – 2005, yet refugees were still produced. Although Indonesia’s political regime transferred from autocracy to democracy during this period, similar numbers of refugees were produced under both types of political regime. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Evidence of Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discriminatory Political Systems</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✗</td>
<td>Disciminatory political systems exist in Fiji, Indonesia and the Philippines and are a factor in the creation of refugees in those countries. While the Filipino and Indonesian governments have not enacted formal public policies to disadvantage Moro and Madurese, the Fijian Constitution includes provisions designed to disadvantage Indo-Fijians. No political discrimination of Malaitans exists in the Solomon Islands, so is not a factor in the creation of refugees there.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary National Ideologies</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>Exclusionary national ideologies exist in practice in all four countries. Ethnic nationalism dominates in practice in Fiji, Indonesia and the Solomon Islands, whereas religious nationalism dominates in practice in the Philippines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Human Rights</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>During the ethnic conflicts, all countries were rated at a level four on the PTS in 2000. Therefore, a lack of human rights seems to have contributed to the creation of refugees in these countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of External Parties</td>
<td>✓ ✗ ✓ ✗</td>
<td>The Malaitan and Madurese ethnic groups did not receive any external support and did not create external refugees. However, the Indo-Fijians and Moro ethnic groups received external support from ethnic brethren which may have encouraged their external refugee flows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Poverty was evident in the creation of refugees in the ARMM. However, it was not significant in the creation of refugees in Fiji, Indonesia, and the Solomon Islands. This is because the Indo-Fijians, Madurese, and Malaitans are relatively less poor than their indigenous counterparts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Underdevelopment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Only one of the six variables could be attributed to providing an environment which facilitated refugee flows. The variable: “resource competition concerning land,” was significant in creating an environment conducive to refugees in the ethnic conflicts.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discriminatory Economic Systems</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Economic discrimination towards the ethnic groups that produced refugees was only evident in Fiji, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The Malaitans in the Solomon Islands did not suffer from economic discrimination.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Change</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Population size, population density, and the total fertility rate had no impact on the creation of refugees within any of the four countries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Evidence of Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Fiji</th>
<th>Indonesia</th>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>Solomon Islands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Religion</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Use of Language</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictions on Appearance and Behaviour</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other types of cultural restrictions</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less fighting in border areas</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relaxed land border controls</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental assistance to refugees created from the ethnic conflict</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental assistance to refugees created from the ethnic conflict</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Description

- **Restrictions on Religion**: The Indo-Fijians and Moro experienced some restrictions on religion during the ethnic conflicts in Fiji and the Philippines.
- **Relaxed land border controls**: Only applicable to Indonesia. Malaysia imposed strict border controls.
- **Governmental assistance to refugees created from the ethnic conflict**: The Fijian, Indonesian, Filipino, and the Solomon Islands’ governments provided limited assistance to refugees generated from their ethnic conflicts.
- **Non-governmental assistance to refugees created from the ethnic conflict**: All four countries received much support from both local and international NGOs as well as from community groups.
- **Sudden outbreak of disease in the refugee-producing state**: No sudden outbreaks of disease were reported in any of the four countries, although intermittent periods of starvation and treatable diseases increased in Indonesia and the Philippines.
List of References

**Books**


**Journals**


**Legislation**


Reports and Interviews


**Newspaper Articles**


Internet Sources


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