A religion of relatedness: transformation through the appreciation of difference

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There is a huge and heroic sanity of which moderns can only collect the fragments. There is a giant of whom we see only the lopped arms and legs walking about. They have torn the soul of Christ into silly strips, labelled egoism and altruism, and they are equally puzzled by His insane magnificence and His insane meekness. They have parted His garments among them, and for His vesture they have cast lots; though the coat was without seam woven from the top throughout.

(Chesterton, 1909, p. 78)

Now there are varieties of gifts, but the same Spirit; . . . For just as the body is one and has many members, and all the members of the body, though many, are one body, so it is with Christ.

(1 Corinthians 12: 4, 12-13)

There is neither Jew not Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.

(Galatians 3: 28)
ABSTRACT

In spite of many indications to the contrary, not least the tenor of the times which includes both the remnant left after the “death of God” as well as the rise of New Age religiosity, this thesis proposes, using feminist and feminine archetypal thinking, that the theory of culture that Christianity, and specifically Catholicism, formulates, is more relevant than ever for the culture it had a part in creating.

Within the frame of Christian value reality, a “religion of relatedness” is centred on the Great Commandment which orders loving relatedness to God, then to oneself, and finally to others. What this has to mean in practice is that our relatedness to others depends on our relatedness with ourselves which depends on our relatedness to a beneficent God.

Our relatedness to ourselves and to God can be appreciated and evaluated through the lens of Jungian thought—in particular Jung's theory of individuation. Our relatedness to others and the success of that as expressed in the health of our cultural milieu can be appreciated and evaluated through the lens of Lacanian discourse theory. Both individual and cultural growth are part of a developmental and maturation process leading to the “paradox, depth and intergenerational responsibility” that Fowler (1981) describes as characteristic of a Stage 5 level of faith in his Stages of Faith model. That complexity in Stage 5 understanding is seen as essential for growing out of the social and environmental problems that beset human life at this point in its history.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An important bottom line of this thesis is that relatedness and relationships can be valued to the extent that they allow one to “be” oneself. The trick to that of course is knowing what that “being” really is. In a religious and Christian sense, that “being” is the very antithesis of a narcissistic and childish preoccupation with “getting one’s way”. In other words, a religion of relatedness is anything that leads to the spiritual maturation of all the people involved with each other—both proximal and distal.

In that sense, and with regard to this thesis, I have had the freedom to answer my own questions, and to answer them in a way universal enough I hope to be of some assistance to others. In contrast to those parts of the Catholic community who understand “loyalty” and “authority” in an overly simplistic way compared to the more complex understandings of those concepts that I have tried to describe in these pages, I have been given the standing at the University of Canterbury—both academically and financially (through a University scholarship)—to pursue and develop my thoughts based on a lifetime of learning and experiences. For that very precious opportunity, I would like to thank the University and especially its two representatives, my main supervisor Associate Professor Michael Grimshaw in the College of Arts, and my other supervisor from the College of Science, Professor Brian Haig, both of whose academic expertise and professional rigour have been gratefully and appreciatively received. These relationships have been carried out in spite of the fact that we each hold divergent views about this thesis’s main religious focus. The views in this thesis are ultimately my own but the thinking behind them has been immeasurably improved through the discussions with my supervisors. From Mike, I have had the benefit of his Protestant upbringing, his positions and experiences in the Philosophy and then Sociology departments, and his role as a self-confessed secular theologian. His unique attitudes—about learning and the purpose of the University for example—gave me the freedom to write the thesis I believe it was necessary for me to write. He is also responsible for the term “post-Protestant Catholicism” as well as the description of religion (ubiquitous in these pages) as a “claim of an alternative”. From Brian, I learned about the philosophy of science and psychology as I studied for my Masters in Applied Psychology under his direction. That project laid the groundwork for this more detailed and wordy account. From both my supervisors, I learned the critical importance that religion and philosophy must continue to have in any endeavour that we as human beings undertake. In fact, without that sort of contextual thinking, and the theory of various religious and philosophical identities that Mike and Brian provided, this thesis would probably never have seen the light of day.

Other academic staff at the University have also given valuable advice or have willingly allowed me to sit in on their classes. I’d like to single out Andy Martens for helping me in both of those ways. Terror management theory is an exciting development in social psychology for religion and culture in general, and I thank him for giving my work in that area a quick look-through. As regards all content however, because I range so widely, any errors are ultimately mine.

There were other people who played a part in the development of my thesis. I’d like to thank Phyllis Burland and Clive Anstey in particular who gave personal and intellectual encouragement at critical times. I have also been helped by the many Jungian seminars and retreats run by Allan and Joy Ryan-Bloore over the years. These helped to drive my thinking along, and in fact some of my content is derived from their lectures and retreats over the past few years. There are also many other points in the thesis where the content has been based on something somebody said or did at some particular time which led me on to fresh ways of thinking about matters. These people and events were not just the friendly acquaintances and engagements, but also the hostile ones. Resistance training is very necessary in the development of one’s ideas just as it is for one’s muscles. I thank them all; I couldn’t have achieved what I have done without these formative influences.

Finally, I thank my family for their support along the way. My parents of course were the source of my Catholic heritage, and that legacy was vastly improved by the discovery of Chesterton in my early twenties on the recommendation of my mother. Christianity’s strength is in many ways allied with its counter-intuitive nature which is why it, and Chesterton, appeal to me and my personality. I daresay a lot of what I am on about is still at times somewhat baffling, but my family have provided a sounding board beyond the university gates — the so what? if you like, that ordinary life needs to ask of any research endeavour.
FOREWORD

Like the fictional Dr Frankenstein, this thesis takes as its basis of belief and assumption, the notion that the prime project of the human family is the creation of a body. However, my vision, in accord with the Christian one, is not the mega-maniacal affair that Mary Shelley presciently described. Victor Frankenstein’s efforts were a desperate reflection of a diminished society based on patriarchal control (Fig 0.1 (a)) rather than the reflection of a society conceived as the mystical body of Christ (Fig 0.1 (b)).

To place this thesis in as clear a context as is necessary for the reader, I also need to make certain other assumptions explicit. The content that is based on these assumptions can be found in the main text of the thesis; nevertheless, the following explanations will provide an advanced warning of any aspects that may deviate from expectations or from the sum total of ideas that may be associated with well-known secular and other more religiously oriented theorists.

The accepted notion of the academic thesis

Academia runs on Protestant lines because it is largely made up of what Chesterton terms as a series of “monomanias” (see the entry for G. K. Chesterton below). Nevertheless, there is a trend emerging toward a greater emphasis on inter-disciplinary thinking in intellectual circles: siloed thinking is increasingly unable to fix the world’s problems.

This thesis models itself on a broad design process (I will refer specifically to the analogous design of landscape or gardens to make my points because I have been professionally trained in both of those areas). In this respect, my thesis deviates from the model of the conventional, narrowly-focused academic thesis. It deviates in this way because it sees both processes—those inherent in understanding both the proverbial forest and the trees—as part of the higher cerebral processes that contribute to the successful functioning of individuals and societies (see Chapter 8 for coverage of the neurological duality that characterises cerebral processing).

In this design model moreover, the process and the product of this thesis involves reference to value realities rather than the physical realities that need to be surveyed and appraised in the design of a landscape or garden. Those physical realities can be conveniently subdivided and summarised as earth (what sort of soil do I have to work with?), air (where is the wind coming from?), fire (where are the sunny places?), and water (how much moisture do I have to play with in terms of what I plant?). In this thesis, in parallel to those four archetypal physical elements, I am looking at the social and psychological elements which are formulated within the human psyche and which can, and will be described as the existential, systemic, vocational, and interpersonal realities that we believe either naturally exist within our psyches and collective imaginations, or that we “create” and manipulate. These realities of course, especially the existential, are far more contestable realities than the type of soil that I have on my garden site, because value realities are intangible in a way that the properties of a garden soil are not. In postulating the basis of the alternative Christian cultural design (what will be termed post-Protestant Catholicism, my “religion of relatedness”), I have made a choice as to which theorists, and which of their ideas I choose to valorise in the creation of a western culture that works to promote the well-being of all its citizens as well as those citizens in cultures that western culture influences. The following glossary is a brief summary of the better-known theorists (as opposed to the empiricists—that work can speak for itself) I have used, the ways I am using their theory, and some specific reasons for doing so.

A glossary of theorists

The structure and process of the design of the mystical body of Christ that I propose based on mostly secular scholarship can be broadly understood under the terms individuation and emergence (that is, the gradual emergence of the mystical body of Christ as we each, through individuation, discover our authentic self formed in the image of God (our imago dei)). I use Carl Jung’s theory of archetypes within
the collective unconscious to outline our common human heritage, as well as his more focused ideas (focused in the sense that they draw on Christian mysticism and the Roman Catholic Mass) concerning individuation at mid-life to describe the necessary psychic maturation of individuals at this post-Enlightenment stage of human history. I then propose Jacques Lacan’s discourse theory as a means of understanding how that individual process can morph, as more and more individuals individuate, into a culture-wide process of maturation that can then gradually emerge. Ernest Becker’s theory provides an overview of the entire process of human cultural emergence, taking in as it does the earliest forms of individual and cultural consciousness through to the positive and a-patriarchal possibilities that he identified the Christian turn 2000 years ago as potentially having. A range of feminist theorists are then valuable in pointing to ways in which a “claim of an alternative” (Grimshaw, 2013, p. 77) may then take shape, interestingly backed up by the findings of recent neurological research. What that means is that Catholicism’s claim of an alternative is compatible with, indeed is parallel to, Lacan’s so-called “hysteric discourse” (and those aspects of the “analyst discourse” that draw the “hysteric discourse” out) and Iain McGilchrist’s right-brain way of “being in the world”.

Baron-Cohen, Simon:

Baron-Cohen’s (2003) identification of the twin dimensions by which each of us live as an “essential” difference, is problematic because of that word “essential”. Essentialising discourses are anathema to the feminist mind and I certainly won’t be using Baron-Cohen’s systemising and empathising dimensions to ascribe “systemising” tasks to men and “empathising” tasks to women. Neither does Baron-Cohen; the “essentialising” draws its meaning from the two “essential” tasks of human life as far as I am concerned (similar in that sense to Freud’s Work and Love). In like manner, in the big picture, it is not so much who does what, than that they both get done, and, much more importantly, that they both get done in the right relationship to each other. Empathising lies more in the religious domain and systemising in the scientific domain. My standpoint in these pages is that the empathising dimension is the more important where that empathising is oriented chiefly, in line with Christian thought, to the least of our brethren. Therein, of course, lies the problem. As Chesterton (1909) states, ‘The rules of a club are occasionally in favour of the poor member. The drift of a club is always in favour of the rich one,’ (p. 260) and systemising is the more useful dimension if “winning” and “making money” are your goals. The fact that Baron-Cohen’s essential tasks aren’t gender neutral is of concern and I will argue it is the reason that religion gets such a bad rap in western culture when systemising gets strong enough to throw religion overboard.

1 Therein lies the fundamental danger for secular society and its jettisoning of the concept of imago dei. The “self-made” man in a secularist environment takes all the credit for himself, whereas a Christian one realises that all (nature x nurture) is gift: there is a higher proportion of eldest children at Harvard University for instance than would statistically be expected.

However, it could be argued that if we are all imago dei, does it then matter if we are secular or Catholic? Won’t secular society end up in the same place as an overtly Christian one, given that our identities as imago dei are fixed? This is where the problematic of the patriarchal society needs to be addressed. Such societies (which can to all intents and purposes be classed as ubiquitous despite the sometime manifestations of matriarchies within them), as a general rule, operate at a lower level of both intellectual and emotional intelligence than any one individual within them is capable of reaching, and thereby encourage the human doing rather than drawing on the nature of the human being at whose heart dwells the still, small voice of the Self. Unless an individual cultivates that still small voice, a society of human doings will drown it out. This was perfectly illustrated in a letter to the Editor of the local newspaper the morning that I wrote this footnote using the reputed words of the most influential Protestant scholar in New Zealand, Lloyd Geering (Smith, 2013): “The Age of God is coming to an end and the problem of genuine religious experience is that it can happen imago dei’s right way or the analyst discourse’s right way, but not both. Religion is thus considered by many as a ‘gift’ at whose heart dwells the still, small voice of the Self.

2 The religion I am referring to is that type that can be characterised as the “Help, help” variety (as defined in William James’ The varieties of religious experience (1902, p. 137) as quoted by Batson and Stocks (2004)).

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Playing to the crowd which is what the human doing does, lies at the heart of what I call “other-atedness”. When Chesterton’s character asks, “How many men have sold their souls to be admired by fools?” (1937, p. 92) he is referring to the foolish crowd. Something “higher” than the crowd is needed as one’s locus of control where values are concerned. (Crowds can be wise (Surowiecki, 2004), but the individuals within them need to be solely and existentially driven for that wisdom to emerge).
Becker, Ernest:

I have few if any reservations about the work of Ernest Becker. His work has since been picked up and given empirical support through the investigations of experimental existential psychology. This latter work has its roots in the secular beliefs underlying the scientific method and psychology in general, as well as in the secular beliefs of the formulators of terror management theory (TMT)—Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski. I, unlike them, place their theory in a different cosmic context with regard to that value reality, because I believe Christianity, in the way that Ernest Becker (1975) outlines, addresses the problematic fallout of cultural beliefs that are designed to mitigate the fears associated with what the TMT theorists call “mortality salience” (see Chapter 9). Christianity does more than that of course, but TMT is an important “support” for Christian beliefs.

Chesterton, Gilbert K.:

As a representative of Stage 5 Fowlerian thinking, defined in Chesterton’s case as the simultaneous defence of reason while also constituting a moving beyond it, I know of no better example than the Catholicism presented in Chesterton’s Orthodoxy which takes as the basis of its belief the Apostle’s Creed. This landmark work, which Schall (2008) dubbed the book of the twentieth century, happened to turn 100 in the same year (2008) as I started this thesis and is still in print.

In outlining why he was a Catholic in another work (1926), after he had become one in 1922, Chesterton stated that “no other corporate mind in the world … really pretends to be looking out in all directions at once”. As a consequence, and with relevance to this thesis where “looking out in all directions at once” is the basis of its structure (see Jung below and the “rule of four”), he ended that thought with this one: “In all probability, all that is best in Protestantism will only survive in Catholicism”….

[I]n the conditions of modern mental anarchy, neither [democracy] nor any other ideal is safe. Just as Protestants appealed from priests to the Bible, and did not realize that the Bible also could be questioned, so republicans appealed from kings to the people, and did not realize that the people also could be defied. There is no end to the dissolution of ideas, the destruction of all tests of truth, that has become possible since men abandoned the attempt to keep a central and civilized Truth, to contain all truths and trace out and refute all errors. Since then, each group has taken one truth at a time and spent the time in turning it into a falsehood. We have had nothing but movements; or in other words, monomanias. But the Church is not a movement but a meeting-place; the trysting-place of all the truths in the world.

In a similar way, my Catholic mind sees this thesis as some sort of “trysting-place”, if not of all the truths in the world, then at least as a potential framework in which they and many more could be tapped in a post-Protestant Catholicism. In his concluding paragraph of the same work, Chesterton repeats an image that he had described almost twenty years before in Orthodoxy: Christianity was like “a huge and ragged and romantic rock, which, though it sways on its pedestal at a touch, yet, because its exaggerated excrescences exactly balance each other, is enthroned there for a thousand years” (Chesterton, 1909, p. 180). That embrace of the whole as well as the inherent adventure and romance of Catholicism (as encapsulated in two chapter headings in Orthodoxy – Authority and the Adventurer, and The Romance of Orthodoxy) are its major attractions for me too. And he treats science—another truth in the world—as it ought to be treated:

[Catholicism] knows there are many other evolutionary theories besides the Darwinian theory; and that the latter is quite likely to be eliminated by later science. It does not, in the conventional phrase, accept the conclusions of science, for the simple reason that science has not concluded. To conclude is to shut up; and the man of science is not at all likely to shut up.

In other words, the Church is disinterested in these particular sets of truths; the physical milieu in which we live is as it is, and we are gradually finding out about it because we have faith in the reason that allows us to do that. Science is a master narrative that seeks objective truths to the limits that we can know them, and, with regard to evolution, Chesterton’s response in Orthodoxy is that a personal God outside time might just as well do things slowly as quickly. But science and the reliance that many place on it, is, as
one of my lecturers at Teacher's College (John Gourley) described Fowler’s Stage 4, “a total commitment to a partial truth”. Secular science is a complement to Catholic value reality and, in my text and diagrams, Catholicism and Science are two master narratives that together form a cross.

For Wood (2008), *Orthodoxy* was Chesterton’s response to modernity\(^3\) (“objectivist reason gone mad” (p. 42)) and (presciently) post-modernity (“the subjectivist denial of reason” (p. 42)). For both, the cure was Christianity:

> [T]he imagination is ... a cure for hyper-rationalism: ... Only when we immerse ourselves imaginatively in the life's complex alloy of “the familiar and the unfamiliar” can we learn to engage the world analogically and paradoxically... [and] ... the “Doctrine of Conditional Joy,” is Chesterton's proposed cure for our insane emotivism. ... In gladly embraced limits, not in the will to power, lies the only liberty ... The artist loves his limitations: They constitute the thing he is doing ... (pp. 42, 43)

In this thesis I postulate that we are all ultimately artists because we are all, whether we are aware of it or not, co-creating with God. The fact that many of us can barely draw at a level comparable to our levels of literacy and numeracy, is indicative of the imbalance that pervades our modern education systems.

There are two (and no doubt more) potential problems in Chesterton’s writings and those are his views on Jews and feminism. I have not made a study of Chesterton’s reputed anti-Semitic comments but a recently completed book by Simon Mayer in August 2013 is the most recent investigation of the question: *Chesterton’s Jews: Stereotypes and caricatures in the literature and journalism of G. K. Chesterton*. Mayer’s book is based on his PhD undertaken at the Centre for Jewish Studies at the University of Manchester in 2012 which examined English Catholic discourses from 1896 to 1929. This matter has become more newsworthy lately because of recent proposals within the Catholic Church to canonise Chesterton\(^4\).

I have read one account outlining Chesterton’s positions on feminism and women’s attempts to get the vote, and it is true, he was against both. I disagree with him of course, but his reasons for his stance are interesting because he is endeavoring to make a larger point, and I can understand that point if I interpret his remarks based on the distinction between Baron-Cohen’s (2003) masculine-systemizing and feminine-empathizing dimensions:

> I said to a Feminist once: “The question is not whether women are good enough for votes: it is whether votes are good enough for women.” He only answered: “Ah, you go and say that to the women chain-makers on Cradley Heath.”

> Now this is the attitude which I attack. It is the huge heresy of Precedent. It is the view that because we have got into a mess we must grow messier to suit it; ... Most of the Feminists would probably agree with me that womanhood is under shameful tyranny in the shops and mills. But I want to destroy the tyranny. They want to destroy womanhood. That is the only difference ... [D]o not talk to me about the poor chain-makers on Cradley Heath. I know all about them and what they are doing. They are engaged in a very wide-spread and flourishing industry of the present age. They are making chains.

> (Chesterton, 1913, pp. 179, 180)

Broadly speaking, **systemising** is characterised by self-interested and maximising competition; **empathising** is defined as other-centred and optimising co-operation. In high stakes competition, because the rewards are so keenly sought, the tendency is to use any means at one’s disposal\(^5\) to get one over on

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\(^3\) It must be remembered however that Chesterton was a complex enough critic to be in full support of that revolution (i.e. the French) that which resulted in democracy.

\(^4\) Every institution must have its Oscars I daresay, and that is my attitude towards canonisation processes. But, if we take the process seriously, it must be remembered that a lot of saints were sinners in their earlier lives. The perfection versus wholeness debate is based on the latter’s being the more healthy aim in the sense that it represents the victory of substance over style. In other words, wholeness involves the recognition of the Shadow (in Jungian terms) and the integration of one’s faults into the conscious psyche. What this means in practice is that, as sinners, what actually counts is where we end up rather than what mistakes we made along the way when we didn’t know any better, (and perhaps even when we did).

\(^5\) And this includes dishonesty and a lack of empathy (for the ubiquity of human dishonesty, see Ariely, 2012). It is not for nothing that cheating-detection is an important human cognitive module.
the competition. This tendency in the systemising dimension toward the focused winner-take-all, and the subsequent domination of and by the cleverest human beings rather than by the wisest, was what Chesterton wanted to protect “womanhood” from. What Chesterton did not seem to countenance however is what modern research is telling us. It is simplistic to separate men and women along these systemising and empathising lines; we all have to deal with the tensions created by the existence of these two incompatible dimensions within our respective psyches. Moreover, given that there are some sex-linked differences, the presence of women in public life may be the force needed to bring about the systemic change Chesterton wanted back in 1910—and the sort of change which will be argued for in this thesis. However, Anne Wilson Schaef, a feminist I am extensively using, would not agree with the reforming power that women could have in “white male”-created systems (short-hand for who the current top dog is). She believes any system of dominance is one to be steered clear of, which is why she calls herself a “recovering psychotherapist” in terms of that particular milieu—one of many that fundamentally disrespect their clients. I am inclined to agree with her, at least within the short term, with additional support for that view coming from C. S. Lewis’s observation that with age one does not so much make one’s home in the world; the world rather makes its home in you.

And therein lies the double bind that many women (and no doubt many men too) find themselves in (and that men should equally find themselves in, given my commentary above)—in systems that are dominated by the sort of masculine systemising that does not have an equally strong empathising ethic to put the systemising into its proper context. Some have recognised this problem, most notably and recently a former Jesuit seminarian who recognises that leadership must possess strong existential heft—that is, a strong relatedness to oneself and to one’s strengths and weaknesses.

In the book, [Pope Francis: Why he leads the way he leads] Lowney distils Pope Francis’ leadership principles like this: “Commit to yourself deeply, including your frailties, and come to some peaceful acceptance of yourself and your calling to lead. Then commit to ‘get over yourself’ to serve a purpose greater than self.” (Huppke, 2013, p. D1)

Chesterton’s analysis of feminism is faulty to the extent that it divides the two dimensions along gender lines. Otherwise, his analysis of the modern problem is sound enough in terms of the fundamental incompatibility of the two systemising and empathising dimensions with the result that Chesterton and a modern feminist can—somewhat—agree! In other words, Chesterton is a complex enough thinker to demand a measured response, if not total agreement even though the anti-Semitic charges may not be so easy to “overlook”.

In addition to Chesterton’s identification of “looking out in all directions at once” as the fruitful Catholic aim, I would add that the reversal of prominent and faulty societal aims is also integral to Chesterton’s espousal of Catholicism. In this sense, he was and is an example of Kotsko’s (2010) radical sociopath when he proffers such aphorisms as “the rich are the scum of the earth in every country”. By turning things upside down, he throws western society’s received wisdom back in its face, because as Chesterton clearly saw, money is sacred in our society (see for example Chapter 9), the rich are indeed “careless” as F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Gatsby discovered to his cost, and the Bible contains far more cautions about the dangers of wealth than it does for the so-called “sins of the flesh”.

Fowler, James (and Keating, Thomas):

Like many, I have concerns that Fowler’s Stages of Faith theory is overly intellectual in its underpinnings. Nevertheless, I have always found it structurally handy in the sense that it exemplifies and adds heft to other theory such as Jung’s individuation process and, latterly, Thomas Keating’s explanation of original sin for a modern world. For Keating, the three temptations of Christ exemplify the

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6 Nevertheless, if individual women wish to throw their hat whole-heartedly into the milieu that is contemporary systemising (with the violence of social injustice it currently manifests) that remains of course a matter of personal choice.

7 Radical sociopathy as a concept in the sense I interpret it needs to be understood in the context of Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith theory. Radical sociopathy in this sense is a Stage 5 phenomenon characterised by righteousness but not self-righteousness.
problematics of the human condition and what it is that we specifically need to overcome – our needs for security/comfort which I believe line up with a Stage 3 Fowlerian sensibility, and our needs for power/control and affection/prestige which, again, I believe crudely line up with a Stage 4 Fowlerian sensibility. A Stage 5 Fowlerian sensibility for me signals that we have overcome our emotional attachment to these common secular markers of human achievement. This can only completely happen in the case of very rare individuals such as the Francis of Assisis of this world. The rest of us can only work our way towards such an ideal assuming, that is, that we may want to in the first place.

I also use Fowler with the proviso that we are each operating out of a range of stages in our day-to-day lives. I may indeed momentarily achieve a Stage 5 understanding, but also, given the promptings of the society in which I live, consistently operate out of Stage 3—in the way I “consume” perhaps. Again, Keating’s work is a valuable aid; if I note and dig down into the affective emotions and motivations that I feel at any particular moment, I can work out where indeed I am coming from. Even a common taken-for-granted and positively perceived social activity such as putting one’s money on term deposit can be seen as a violation of the ethic behind “give us this day our daily bread”. The basic point I am making here is that Fowlerian stages can be easily perverted into crushing judgements on those who are seen as “less”—perhaps less knowledgeable—than oneself. Ferreting out one’s own emotional predilections for power, prestige, and possessions is the better work of a life-time.

The idea of “judgement” also requires some elucidation. Intellectual judgements are necessary for living one’s live in accord with thought-out values. It is the self-serving emotionally evaluative aspect of judgement – thinking ourselves “better” than others—that I take as the specific focus of the command: “Judge not, lest ye be judged”.

Freud, Sigmund:

Freud’s brief appearances in my work are related firstly to the broad significance of his theoretical work based on his identification of the importance of the unconscious in the understanding of human behaviour. Maxwell (1984) and Gilligan (2002) are two contemporary theorists used in these pages who have in this sense dipped into Freudian theory to make their own specific points. Secondly, and leading on from Freud’s work, various theoretical branches have built on Freud’s work. The three theorists that I have chosen to concentrate on are Carl Jung and Jacques Lacan, and finally Ernest Becker, an American, who was once removed from Freud in the sense that his work developed out of the work of Otto Rank who, like Jung, was at one stage, one of Freud’s inner circle. Jacques Lacan’s work was another development again, this time in France.

The notion of the unconscious is pivotal in my argument because, in a patriarchal world (as explained by sexual selection in our evolutionary past), that is why the “drift of a club is always in favour of the rich one”. The ideas of Jung, Lacan, Maxwell, Gilligan, and McGilchrist, to the extent that the unconscious figures in their theories, are likewise pivotal in my argument. Until sociology better recognises the importance of the unconscious, its critiques of society and of ourselves won’t have the depth they should have.

Jung, Carl:

Jung’s work provides an important basis for this thesis because I believe he best outlines, firstly, the structure and content of human consciousness as it developed out of our archaic collective history, and secondly as it develops within contemporary individual histories. The work of Erich Neumann (1959), a student of Jung’s, outlines the development of consciousness from a primordial archetype which gradually differentiated itself into various symbols, images, and characters that were used by early

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8 I would personally divide his affection/prestige factor into two and place the need for affection within a Stage 3 sensibility and the need for prestige into Stage 4.
humans to make sense of life. They are the psyche’s parallels if you like of the differentiation of the unitary physical cell into the array of affordances that make up the complex human body.

Besides the obvious dual archetypes of masculine and feminine, and Mother and Father, an important archetype in this thesis is also the number four which orders human reality in a number of ways: the four directions of the compass, the four rivers of Eden, the four humours, the four elements (earth, air fire and water), the four seasons, the four basic operations of arithmetic, the four cardinal virtues, the four phases of the moon, the four Hebrew letters of the Lord’s sacred name, and so on (Nichols (1980) as quoted in Mitroff (1987)). I have used this basic structure to illustrate the convergent validity that operates over a range of theory, including theory that comes from empirical investigation (e.g. Ackerman & Heggested, 1997). The significance of this point for my thesis has been the problematic conversion of these both-and dualities and the four-fold models of that original primordial unity, into either-or dualisms and into bits of what should be conceived of as wholes (as illustrated by the difference between Figures 0.1 (a) and (b)).

Jung postulated that our common human psychical inheritance (that is, the collective unconscious referred to above) was the latent and common factor lying behind the similar mythological manifestations of various widely-spread human cultures. So, as Jung’s intellectual descendents like Joseph Campbell have implied in studies of comparative mythology, Christ’s virgin birth and resurrection is comparable with the Egyptian myths of Isis and Osiris and their like. For this thesis, the Incarnation and all that followed on from that is quite separate and distinct, and rather, represents a specific eruption of the divine into the mundane in the manner described by Chesterton’s Father Brown (Chesterton, 1929, 1974, pp. 367-368 emphases added) when he wrote.

“IT’s part of something I’ve noticed more and more in the modern world, appearing in all sorts of newspaper rumours and conversational catchwords; something that’s arbitrary without being authoritative. People readily swallow the untested claims of this, that, or the other. It’s drowning all your old rationalism and scepticism, it’s coming in like a sea; and the name of it is superstition.” He stood up abruptly, his face heavy with a sort of frown, and went on talking almost as if he were alone. “IT’s the first effect of not believing in God that you lose your common sense, and can’t see things as they are. Anything that anybody talks about, and says there’s a good deal in it, extends itself indefinitely like a vista in a nightmare. And a dog is an omen and a cat is a mystery and a pig is a mascot and a beetle is a scarab, calling up all the menagerie of polytheism from Egypt and old India; Dog Anubis and great green-eyed Pasht and all the holy howling Bulls of Bashan; reeling back to the bestial gods of the beginning, escaping into elephants and snakes and crocodiles; and all because you are frightened of four words: ‘He was made Man.’”

The important theoretical work of Chesterton’s fellow Roman Catholic believer, Rene Girard, also identifies the unique place the Incarnation has in history although for reasons of space I have had to omit all but passing references to his ideas. To overcome what I see as this “muddying” problem in Jungian thinking, I tend to see the Self as quite distinct from the other archetypes that are the artefacts of the human growth to consciousness within time and space. In this sense, the Self for me is even greater than the ‘archetype of archetypes’ as Stevens (1994) describes the Self. I understand it as the umbilical cord within the unconscious that connects us with the Transcendent. As such, I understand the Self as the channel and mechanism by which revelation – both collective and individual - occurs.

Allied with this point is the claim made by those such as Tacey (2013) that there is a need to de-concretise traditional Catholic reliance on the scriptures as literal historical fact. Rather, although Tacey identifies the problematic Protestant turn exemplified by the likes of Don Cupitt’s work, the Incarnation represents a powerful metaphor that relies on the Christian faithful giving birth to Jesus Christ in their own lives as well as imitating Christ in their taking up of their own Crosses whatever those might turn out to be and mean in the context of their individual lives. This understanding is a much more potent and virile version of the Catholic and Christian ideal than the weak and passive devotional message that

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9 This thesis predominantly focuses on the use of secular theory for understanding the nature and value of what I call post-Protestant Catholicism. Girard’s important analysis of the vital differences between the Oedipus and Christ mythologies are beyond the task I have set myself in these pages.

10 In understanding scripture as just symbol, i.e. as a mere intellectual exercise, the Don Cupitts leave out all the emotional resonance and power that metaphor conveys.
Catholicism has latterly become for many “laity” – a term whose problematic nature will also be explained as the thesis progresses.

Lacan, Jacques:

Lacan’s discourse theory is of great importance for my thesis although Lacan himself was an atheist. According to this secular stance, the master discourses by which we live are somewhat relative affairs, although to give this stance its due, some master narratives must be better than others according to some measure of value. In Christianity, we live according to what Chesterton referred to above as that “central and civilized Truth, to contain all truths and trace out and refute all errors”.

The Analyst and Hysteric (that which “desires” and “protests”) discourses are particularly important for the transformation of society. Without our internal Analyst excavating what our “Being” wants, we end up just desiring what everyone else wants. What we in Catholicism desire is collective and individual at the same time based on the identity of our Being as the daughters and sons of God within the mystical Body of Christ.

Maxwell, Nicholas

Nicholas Maxwell is no religious believer but he identifies the one-sidedness in academia (see also McGilchrist below) and the necessity for some modern version of what religion once achieved to correct it. Integral to this approach is the need for “inquiry”, or, as Chesterton (1909, 1920) describes “all real democracy”—the “attempt to bring the shy people out” (p. 213). In many ways I interpret this “inquiry” as parallel to the interaction between the Analyst and Hysteric Lacanian discourses described above.

McGilchrist, Iain:

McGilchrist’s 2007 book which identified the “Master” and his “Emissary” helped in the writing of at least one religious book—Jonathan Sacks’ (2011) The great partnership: God, science and the search for meaning. If my thesis reads simplistically to some, I counter with the fact that patriarchy (and its reliance on left-brained thinking) is “simply” dominant in every culture. I also draw on that New Testament simplicity that states we cannot serve two masters (Matthew 6: 24); life is as simple as that choice. Iain McGilchrist’s identification of the two ways of being in the world is likewise simple, but it is not simplistic. It is simply the way that the brain appears to function based on the range of research that McGilchrist canvasses. Some of us who can draw beyond a childish level know what “being” in “right brain” consciousness explicitly feels like, and it is captured well by Rabbi Heschels’ (1965) statement that the world will not perish from a lack of facts but it may from a lack of appreciation.

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11 In addressing the importance of difference within unity, Palmer (2000, p. 11) quotes Martin Buber’s Tales of the Hasidim: The Early Masters:

There is a Hasidic tale that reveals, with amazing brevity, both the universal tendency to want to be someone else and the ultimate importance of becoming one’s self: Rabbi Zusya, when he was an old man, said, “In the coming world, they will not ask me: ‘Why were you not Moses?’ They will ask me: ‘Why were you not Zusya?’”

12 Sacks (2011) wrote, “When, in 2009, Iain McGilchrist published his magisterial The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World, I knew I was on the right lines. I benefited enormously from a conversation I had with him.” (p. ix)

13 If there is a secular justification for the Catholic Church’s identification of a “culture of death”, it can be found in this reliance. Left-brained thinking relies for its strength on its ability to drain the life out of its research object in order to understand it. This is acceptable where the intention for the results of such research is to help people and reverence nature, but as a means in itself, it is highly problematic.

14 This is not an arcane skill; Betty Edward’s (1982) book has an introductory exercise that accomplishes this shift as quickly as one can draw a line!

15 ‘A premise of significant being is full and grateful acceptance of one’s own being. Perceptions, moments of insight, the privilege of being present at the unfolding of time- who has the right to ask for more?”
statements involve a simple choice but they do not constitute a simplistic either-or decision. Rather, McGilchrist identifies the right-brain—left-brain—right-brain progression which places the two sides into a fruitful and creative partnership.

**Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre:**

Teilhard’s name only appears once in my text, and his thought is the background for a diagram, but his ideas on evolutionary progress and the cosmic Christ underlie it even so. I too assume some sort of omega point – the mystical body of Christ - toward which creation is gradually progressing with the emphasis on “gradually”. My point is that this progression must now lie in a second order “feminine” empathising dimension rather than in the “masculine” systemising dimension that has been the main focus of human civilisations up to now. Given that change of overall focus, differences can be seen as vital to the organic unity of a body rather than as nuisances to the mechanical viability of a machine (exemplified in Weber’s conceptual identification of the “iron cage” of modernity to take one example). Along with unity then, comes difference – what Ursula King (1996) names as Teilhard’s pairing of unification with differentiation:

> Coming together in closer union always means that differences are enhanced and heightened through being combined in a new synthesis. This is where the creative moment lies, a moment he perceived in all realities, in personal relationships, in everything that is in process, everything that is truly alive. (p. 64)

‘Acceptance is appreciation, and the high value of appreciation is such that to appreciate appreciation seems to be the fundamental prerequisite for survival. Mankind will not die for lack of information; it may perish for lack of appreciation’ (Heschel, 1965, pp. 82-83).
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<td>14.5. The disposition of the four psychological functions in the Analyst Discourse</td>
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Post-Protestant Catholicism
The subject of this thesis is “post-Protestant Catholicism”. Post-Protestant Catholicism is, I will argue, a religion of relatedness—and, as such, it is what every religion should be, if it is to escape the naturalistic fallacy—a religion of transformation. Religion is a theory of culture, and culture is a very big part of what makes us human. Nevertheless, I argue that post-Protestant Catholicism is a challenge to culture inasmuch as culture is man-made and, in terms of Terror Management Theory, an immortality ideology. Post-Protestant Catholicism is an immortality ideology too, albeit a literal rather than a symbolic one, but with the important difference I will argue, that it is not a patriarchal one.

Catholicism as Unity-across-difference and complementarity
A post-Protestant Catholicism, as a form of Christianity, requires both a Catholicism and a Protestantism and an amalgamation of the two, and Charles Taylor, the Roman Catholic philosopher, can enlighten us about all three of those ingredients. Taylor (1999) looks at “the original word katholou in two related senses, comprising both universality and wholeness; one might say universality through wholeness” (p. 14). It is that phrase—universality through wholeness—that pares down post-Protestant Catholicism to its essentials, incorporating relatedness as it does so because none of us can claim to be whole on our own. That is how Taylor says real Catholicity is different from pre-Protestant Catholicism; our complementarity is essential. As he goes on to explain:

Our great historical temptation has been to forget the complementarity, to go straight for the sameness, making as many people as possible into “good Catholics”—and in the process failing of catholicity: failing of catholicity, because failing wholeness; unity bought at the price of suppressing something of the diversity in the humanity that God created; unity of the part masquerading as the whole. It is universality without wholeness, and so not true Catholicism. (p. 14)

Catholicism, he goes on, is unity-across-difference (corresponding to my post-Protestant Catholicism) rather than unity-through-identity (my pre-Protestant Catholicism).

The necessity of Protestantism
As for Protestantism, Taylor (1999) affirms the necessity of the Protestant Reformation, the “breakout from Christendom”, because “modern culture . . . carried certain facets of Christian life further than they ever were taken or could have been taken within Christendom” (p. 16). This it did through the institution of “modern liberal political culture” as “characterised by an affirmation of universal human rights—to life, freedom, citizenship, self-realization” beyond any type of categorization such as gender or ethnicity or sexual orientation:

As long as we were living within the terms of Christendom—that is, of a civilization where the structures, institutions, and culture were all supposed to reflect the Christian nature of the society . . . we could never have attained this radical unconditionality. It is difficult for a “Christian” society, in this sense, to accept full equality of rights for atheists, for people of a quite alien religion, or for those who violate what seems to be the Christian moral code (e.g., homosexuals). (pp. 16-17)

The naturalistic fallacy is the belief that what naturally “is” is also what “ought to be”. As co-creators with God, human culture is our response to the human condition. With the knowledge gained from and through modernity, culture can now be a more considered response to that human condition as long as, I argue, we see that response as a partnership between the fact and value realities provided by both science and religion.

I use the word “man” here purposefully given that cultures are patriarchies; that is, men are mostly in charge. This is not to say a woman-made culture would have been any better. There are indications according to some authors, Joseph Campbell (1998) for example, that a Matriarchy did once exist, and that by taking its cue from Mother Nature and seeing how vegetative death promoted new life, also took human life so that through human death, human life would persist. There will be no hankering to return to such a Goddess in these pages. As Tacey (1997) states, we need to learn from, and then leave our parent archetypes. Leaving Father but then going back to Mother is a regression.

Pre-Protestant Catholicism is of course patriarchal, as well as Protestantism albeit that Protestantism has within it the seeds of its own reform, but I will argue that it requires post-Protestant Catholicism to complete the process in the radical manner required.
Post-Protestant Catholicism as Stage 5 in Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith model

The account above supplies the background for the basic structure of the three-step process outlined in Figure 1.1(b). Figure 1.1(b)’s more explicit foundation is Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith theory (see Figure 1.1(a), or, more accurately, that part of his model—from Stage 4 to Stage 5—where he charts a 90° change of trajectory in the development of faith which had, until that point, followed a straight line from Stage 0 to 4). Given the presence of that word “transformation” in my thesis title, I am interested in the dynamics underlying that change in trajectory, and I will document the likely substance of those dynamics by drawing on a range of social, psychological, and other theory. One of these theories is Bakan’s (1966) early conception of the basic tension that all human beings, social beings that we are, need to live with, and I have divided the three-step process into two columns headed up by either Agency or Communion. We are each agentic persons and we are also social creatures, and while Protestantism, with its valuing of the individual, swung onto the agentic side of the ledger, Catholicism has always been the more communal. As will be seen, I don’t intend to gainsay that division, but to more firmly unite it within the individual human psyche which means that, given Jung’s insight that when you treat the patient you treat the culture, with the maturation of the individual will come the advance of culture no matter how small that change might be.

Models of Wholeness across Difference

Bakan’s (1966) model is one example of universality and wholeness, and unity-across-difference. It is mirrored by Baron-Cohen’s (2003) more empirical model of two dimensions of human life as systemising and empathising. Although Baron-Cohen characterises the systemising brain as “male” and the empathising brain as “female”, there is only a small difference overall in their manifestations in the two sexes in the sense that any man could have a stronger empathising “brain” than a systemising one, and any woman could have a stronger systemising “brain” than an empathising one. The important point is that Baron-Cohen’s construct in Figure 1.2 includes every-one, somewhere on its grid. Some of us are—in an overall sense—above-average systemisers and empathisers, some of us are above the average in systemising but not in empathising and vice versa, and some of us are below-average systemisers and empathisers. Given that the scale is one of standard deviations on a normal distribution, most of us are clustered reasonably closely around the centre where the two axes meet. The other point to note is that the two axes are working at cross-purposes especially for those of us who find ourselves equal on both dimensions. In terms of limited resources such as one’s time, there often needs to be an “either/or” choice made as to how to spend that time.

Another way of mapping Wholeness-across-Difference and a map which goes somewhat further in dividing humanity up is Jung’s personality typology (Figure 1.3 (a)) which I will be relying on substantially in this thesis. The full model (conventionally known as the Myers-Briggs system (Myers, 1995)) comprises 16 subtypes but I will for the most part be confining it to the four subtypes that Mitroff (1983, 1998) has used for their utility in, in his case, explaining the value of Difference in business contexts. Figure 1.3 (b) shows this model bisected with two fault lines: the diagram on the left charting Baron-Cohen’s (“male”) systemising / (“female”) empathising division line, and the other on the right charting the line between the Individual and the Group.

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19 Durkheim’s well-known study of suicide, for example, found that Protestants committed suicide more than Catholics did because they lacked the greater social supports that Catholics enjoyed.

20 How this might happen is unclear but I am not rejecting the notion that by the advance of the one comes the advance of the many. Why should the collective unconscious be a static entity? We can ask how it was that the women’s movement changed society so quickly. Therein lies the answer as to how Jacques Lacan’s desiring, complaining, and protesting Hysteric discourse can affect the controlling Master Discourse.

There are also more pedestrian ways of explaining cultural change. For example, Suroweicki’s (2004) “wisdom of crowds” postulates that under certain circumstances crowds can be wise.

21 The Good Samaritan (Luke 10: 25-37) for example faced such a dilemma, and chose, in the short term, the Empathising option over the immediate Systemising one of going about his business.
Mitroff (1998) uses the model in Figure 1.3 (a) to chart four general solutions to the problems we face and these, I submit, are gendered as well: there are systemic, scientific/technical (or technological), as well as interpersonal and existential solutions to problems (see Figure 1.4). While the nexus of system and technology (what I will refer to as “male”22 Eco-consciousness) has conventionally been favoured for solving individual and cultural problems—solutions that have favoured the resource-rich and powerful and devalued the interpersonal and the existential well-being of many—the existence of a large and increasing human population, as well as mass migrations of diverse cultural groups, and a finite planet, mean that it is becoming more urgent to see our problems broadly classed as issues of relatedness. These problems therefore need solutions arising from the nexus of the interpersonal and the existential (what I will refer to as “female”23 Eco-consciousness). In formulating post-Protestant Catholicism—a religion of relatedness and Eco-consciousness (and this relatedness I will argue is automatically inclusive of Ego-consciousness as a way of giving concrete expression to relatedness24)—I am proposing a Catholicism that is a claim of an alternative to both traditional Catholicism and the Protestant secularism that resulted from the Reformation, both of which I will characterise as on the whole favouring solutions arising out of Ego-consciousness alone—the technological solution and the systemic organization that lies behind it.

The final example of a “wholeness-across-difference” model (and there will be more of these presented in the thesis), is Lacan’s Discourse Theory Model (see Figure 1.5). I have highlighted two of the sectors in this model: the Master Discourse corresponds to the higher (than average) systemisers and the lower empathisers of Baron-Cohen’s (2003) model. The Hysteric Discourse corresponds to the higher empathisers and the lower systemisers of the Baron-Cohen model. If, as Jung states, by treating the patient you treat the culture, the arrow that is shown in Figure 1.4 (b) is how it might happen. This pathway has already seen the Women’s and many other movements change the Master discourses of culture.

**Complementarity**

Taylor’s (1999) theme of unity-across-difference underlies Bakan’s (1966), Baron-Cohen’s (2003) and the Jungian, Mitroff (1998), and Lacanian systems—and the same theme also applies to the Christian God as Trinity which conceptualises a oneness of this kind25. There is however one proviso I would make with reference to the following point Taylor makes:

> This unity-across-difference, as against unity-through-identity, seems the only possibility for us … because of the diversity among humans, starting with the difference between men and women and ramifying outward. (p. 14, emphases added)

There is a need to take considerable care in the way we define “complementarity”, and Samuels (1993) is a valuable guide in this regard. As he states, “Any expression of complementarity usually requires two lists . . . The list-making method rests on our seemingly ineradicable tendency to think in terms of binary pairs” (p. 144); Bakan’s (1966) and Baron-Cohen’s (2003) divisions above show how dependent we are on them. Another of these dual lists has “Either-Or” at the top of one column and “Both-And” at the top of the other. Yet another has “Men” at the top of one column and “Women” at the top of the other. The context for Samuels’ (1993) comment was parenting and the dual list he was commenting on had the qualities associated with mothering in the left hand column and those associated with fathering on the right. It was one of those rare instances where the “female” side occupied the prime position because, as Samuels observes, “the left-hand column is important for, given that we read from left to right, this makes [the left hand occupant the one] on whom the complementary comparison is based” (p. 144).

Samuels (1993) importantly concludes,

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22 This corresponds to Baron-Cohen’s “male” systemising.
23 This corresponds to Baron-Cohen’s “female” empathising.
24 Again, the Good Samaritan used the technology of his day—oil, bandages, domesticated animals, money, and inns—to proffer the appropriate help.
25 Human diversity, he states, is part of the way in which we are made in the image of God (Taylor, 1999, pp. 14-15).
Difference in this thesis is that kind of tricky concept. At base, I am looking at difference as (1) between men and women (recall that Baron-Cohen (2003) calls the systemising brain the “male brain”, and the empathising brain is the “female” brain) and (2) between different ways of Being in the world (as “a shaper” or “as shaped” by collective social realities). Nevertheless, just as Samuels (1993) indicates I should in the quotation above, I am then metaphorically tearing up the list as a definitive statement. The tensions of both these differences ((1) and (2) above) exist in all of us. Even if we are a woman and happen to have a far stronger empathising brain than a systemising one, there is a responsibility to develop the systemising “brain” to its fullest capacity. It’s called education and an education model is one of the Wholeness-across-Difference models I will be using because it makes the specific point that we should at least improve those skills we may not have the native talents for. At the very least, we should develop them enough in ourselves to be able to appreciate them in others. Difference needs to be examined firstly because it is used to justify the different roles that men and women are supposed to slot into according to current Catholic thinking (and Pope Francis I reaffirmed the party line\textsuperscript{26} as I was writing this). This claim needs the challenge that comes from the analyses within various scientific fields such as evolutionary and gender psychology, and Baron-Cohen’s psychology above. Nevertheless, there also needs to be enough of a difference for women’s entry into public life to actually have the potential to make a difference. My position ends up being both, Yes, men and women are different in the sense that overall women have the slight advantage in empathising and overall men have the slight advantage in systemising, and No, men and women are not different because there are many women who are better at systemising than many men and there are many men who are better at empathising than many women. Or maybe we could put it this way: women and men are more similar than they are different and what differences there are come from their sexuation and socialisation than from anything truly inherent or essential. Or at least we could say that that is how we should approach it because the differences are so small that they can be reasonably thought of as possibly/probably unlikely to apply in any particular situation\textsuperscript{27}.

Difference will also come to mean much more as the thesis progresses. I will be for example focussing specifically on the West because Judeo-Christianity on which it is based is a very different religion from all the others—as Girard (2001) describes. It must also be realised that that difference becomes more clearly expressed as people’s stage of faith within Christianity progresses and their position vis-a-vis their personal psychology and cultural milieu also change. Therefore, in line with the discussion in my preceding paragraph, I can make a final statement that states, women and men are different enough for that fact to be highly significant as a culture matures, in the sense that instead of seeing empathising in the context of Systemising, we instead start to see systemising in the context of Empathising\textsuperscript{28}.

\textsuperscript{26} The party line is John Paul II’s statement which I will be examining in Chapter 2.

\textsuperscript{27} There yet again is another dual list of the idiographic and the nomothetic!

\textsuperscript{28} The capital letters are intentional and relate to the pervasiveness of the two principles involved. So, Systemising in the form of capitalism for example is a pervasive global influence for which no alternative is seen. \textit{God Is Love} however is also a pervasive Value Reality for those who hold to that belief, and moreover, in the terms of that belief, it is also seen as the Value Reality for those who don’t. In this sense, I see \textit{God Is Love} as the cosmic Attractor that will always draw Life back into its force field no matter what human life does to resist it. That is, there are boundaries beyond which we cannot stray in the same sense that Chaos Theory states that it can never snow at sea level on the equator. I see this for example as the central message of Margaret Atwood’s (1986) \textit{The Handmaid’s Tale}, and, as a real-life equivalent of Atwood’s scenario, it is also the lesson we can learn from the inherent and silly (albeit highly toxic while it lasted) vanity encapsulated in the naming of Hitler’s “1000-year” Reich.
“Paradox, depth and intergenerational responsibility”
Paradox is an essential part of post-Protestant spirituality. In fact, as an inspection of Figure 1.1(b) shows, Fowler (1981, p. 290) defines Stage 5 as the stage of “paradox, depth and intergenerational responsibility for the world”. So what exactly is paradox? I will be using Chesterton’s (1909) notion of “two colours co-existent but pure . . . not a mixture like russet or purple [but] . . . rather like a shot silk, for a shot silk is always at right angles, and is in the pattern of the cross” (p. 177). And like the cross Chesterton is obliquely referring to, it has a greater depth below the crossbars than it has above, and it is a symbol that stretches down the generations and, I believe, into the future.

The importance about the pattern of the cross is that, like Baron-Cohen’s model above, the two elements are to some extent working at cross-purposes and those purposes may or may not be achieved, or may be very difficult to achieve, at the same time. It is also no accident that all the models of Wholeness-across-Difference I will be introducing in this thesis are in the pattern of the cross, and why we need to turn to Samuel’s (1993) depth psychology to get a grip on the fundamental nature of that Cross so that future generations can be more emotionally mature than we have been, and thereby employ better Master discourses than we have done. To do that, we must leave Matriarchy and Patriarchy behind, grow up, and be our own Men and Women.

Two categories of relatedness (among individuals and among cultures) x 4 types
The problematic division of whole humanity into male and female is one focus in this thesis. The problematic division of humanity into individuals and groups and the social conventions of those groups is another. As individuals we both shape and are shaped by the various groups we belong to. This is problematic because as individuals we depend on our groupings to survive. However, as Jung stated, the group works at a lower level of intelligent consciousness than the individual is capable of reaching.

A point that I am leading to here is that relatedness in this thesis is of four broad types: within the first category of relatedness, the relatedness of individuals, there is firstly the relatedness of the Individual to other individuals, but secondly, there is the relatedness that the individual needs to have with him or herself. With regard to those, and most importantly because it is contextual and conditions the first two forms of relatedness, we need to form a relatedness with what we consciously formulate is our value reality (Maxwell, 1984)—that is, the nature of the context of our existence that we each assume to be true. That is, faith, in itself, is about “relatedness”. We need faith in something. Finally, in the light of that faith, we need to develop a reverence for life, for the environment of which we are a part; we need to see and appreciate its beauty and its other intrinsic attributes, in other words.

As regards all of these, but especially the third, the Catholic author Rolhesier (2004, p. 125) quotes theologian Jan Walgrave who has observed that, “our present age constitutes a virtual conspiracy against the interior life.” As an extreme introvert myself, I know of what he speaks, and as a part of wholeness (as Jung indeed included in his full personality typology with his Introversion/Extraversion scale) the introverted—or inner—“voice” needs to be heard, which necessitates in turn, a contemplative atmosphere free from distraction. We all need silence to carefully consider who we are, what we stand for, and what we stand against. Within the context of our value reality, positive relatedness to others of necessity involves positive relatedness with ourselves; and positive relatedness with others also necessitates listening to the alternative views (especially those of the less powerful) espoused within the models of wholeness above. It also necessitates holding our own against those who would seek to dominate us—those who are more powerful than we are. That involves, however, holding our own without the use of violence, however subtly that violence can potentially be practised. This imperative is based on the value reality of Christianity.

For this thesis, in spite of many indications to the contrary, not least the tenor of the times, this thesis proposes that the theory of value reality that Christianity, and more specifically Catholicism, formulates is more relevant than ever for Western civilisation particularly if and when it is expressed at a Stage 5 level. Fowler (1981) indeed makes the bold statement that Stage 5 is about belief and trust in a benevolent and
ineffable God. I am not disputing that (although secularists no doubt would) but in helping me to explain this, I can draw on the Maori proverb which states that if one is going to bow down, then let it be to a mighty mountain. I will argue that Christianity is that mighty mountain—the mightiest of them in fact—and that it represents a valuable legacy to be conserved and used for individual and cultural emotional maturation. This maturation, this becoming whole, while valuable in itself for those who achieve it at whatever level, is also needed to resolve—at best grow out of—the problems that confront not just the West but humanity in general—problems such as war, environmental despoliation, and social injustice, which are at base problems of violence and exploitation. Violence and exploitation is relatedness of the negative sort, and, of course, constitute the antithesis of what the “relatedness” in my title is referring to.

The second category of relatedness concerns the relatedness of groups, or cultures, as manifested in their different kinds of social conventions. A culture needs to understand itself just as an individual does, and it also needs to relate to other cultures. To do this, as for the individual, it needs to understand what it is, what it stands for, what it stands against, so that it can relate to those cultures less and more powerful than itself in the appropriate manner. Again, all those relationships will depend on what a culture’s conception of the ultimate value reality is.

Because I am talking about post-Protestant Catholicism, it is the relationships x 4 of each individual that have the priority in my schema because that is what a “democracy of the different” is defined by. No matter how badly we might be “doing it” at this present time, democracy is our Enlightenment inheritance and we need to continually, as individuals, keep working to improve our response-ability so that it works well for all people. Democracy, in this sense, is arguably the most important of Mitroff’s (1998) systemic solutions in Figure 1.4.

Stage 5 Relatedness before Stage 4 Systemising
What I am proposing is in many ways the opposite of the situation we are in now. What we have now is governed by the Master discourse—the value reality—of Stage 4 spirituality, which, in the terms of Mitroff’s (1998) model, was previously described as the nexus of the systemic and technological methods of solving problems—the Ego-Systemising—“Male” consciousness. Eco-Empathising—“Female” consciousness plays second fiddle to this discourse.

What I am proposing is that an Ego-Systemising—“Male” consciousness serves both a first- and second-order Eco-Empathising—“Female” consciousness. The predominant aim of a first order Eco-consciousness is to ensure that every pre-rational child grows up in an emotionally safe environment. It is domestic Empathising in other words which fits the first stage of human life. The aim of second order Eco-consciousness is that all people everywhere enjoy the conditions that ensure good health. That second aim will be a product of individual and cultural maturity and will be internationally and globally manifested. Both of these aims therefore rely on the development of a religion of relatedness where the nexus of the interpersonal and the existential becomes the basic driver of our solutions to problems. This nexus importantly includes the System-Technological nexus, but as the servant rather than the Master. This aim resonates with a Christian value reality wherein its eponymous founder was able to state that He came to serve, not to lord it over, others.

Jesus Christ also importantly eschewed violence. It is violence that keeps Stage 4’s spirituality in charge, and the engine that keeps it going is our evolutionary inheritance. We are the daughters and sons of those who physically survived to breed grandchildren and beyond. Women chose mates who had the motivation and the wherewithal to protect their offspring, and men chose mates that had the motivation and the physical health to produce those offspring. While warm-heartedness is the primary requirement on average in a mate (Fletcher, 2002), the second, gendered, requirements stimulate a competitive arms race that values a man’s ability to accumulate resources as well as a woman’s physical attractiveness as a sign
of health. In other words, historically, a man’s systemising quotient, bearing some similarities as it does to a zero-sum game, determines who “wins”  

If one believes in the naturalistic fallacy, then this must be the status quo. But in this thesis, Stage 5 spirituality turns this around; it valorises metanoia or repentance — a turning away from such evolutionary dictates. This is what separates a post-Protestant Catholicism from a pre-Protestant Catholicism.

Stage 4 spirituality however did accomplish the thing that was necessary before Stage 5 spirituality could occur. If we take Iris Murdoch’s (1959) dictum that the enemies of Love are social convention and neurosis, then Stage 4 challenged and continues to challenge that first enemy. Western modernity removed the traditional ways of structuring society and thereby set up those advantages of the Enlightenment that Taylor (1999) enumerated above. Stage 5 challenges the second enemy by way of the Jungian process of individuation which involves the integration of the contra-sexual Other and/or the Shadow into one’s individual psyche, just as Samuels (1993) and other Jungians say it should.

**Male neurosis and unfreedom**

Neurotic behaviour occurs when unconscious factors affect one’s motivations and thereby what one does, or how one behaves. Thomas Keating’s (2001) theory of original sin is a valuable summary of how our motivations are determined by what he calls “emotional programmes for happiness” that were programmed biologically and culturally in our evolutionary past, and biologically and individually in our personal pre-rational past. In addition, Gilligan (2002), using Freudian theory, also documents that men have a neurosis all their own because of their need to separate from the contra-sexual parent which happens before the age of reason. In this way, the patriarchal legacy is continued without a sufficiently conscious evaluation of its health for the men concerned. However, this conscious evaluation has begun to happen with the advent of the women’s movement of which Gilligan’s work is a part. Women have the, admittedly mixed, advantage in this sense because they only start to properly internalise the patriarchal systemising milieu they find themselves in, well after the age of reason. Nevertheless, that acclimatization to a masculine hegemony still causes substantial problems for many of them.

This “advantage” and the potential for greater liberty that women have because of the absence of this neurosis, was recognised by, for example, the American social reformer Henry Brown Blackwell (and husband of a feminist), who said in 1853, “The interests of the sexes are inseparably connected and in the elevation of the one lies the salvation of the other” (quoted in Kimmel, 2010, p. 223); Samuels (1993), a Jungian, so familiar with the concept of the existence of an internal anima, or feminine archetype, writes that, as a man, feminism is his mentor. Feminism is also the reason why Germaine Greer could write in 1999, “...visionary feminists of the late sixties and early seventies knew that women could never find freedom by agreeing to live the lives of unfree men” (p. 2). For Greer, women have unfortunately settled for equality instead of liberation, and by doing so have settled for assimilation rather than the assertion of difference and the dignity that that difference carries. If we take the second part of the Great Commandment seriously (loving our neighbour as ourselves), then Greer’s insistence for that difference to be a condition of self-definition and self-determination, will be to the advantage of everybody, including, as it would, the salvation of her “unfree men”.

**Maxwell’s philosophy of wisdom**

Not only are many men neurotic in the specific way that Gilligan describes, but so also is our culture, according to Maxwell’s philosophy of wisdom. My conception of post-Protestant Catholicism includes the secular view that Maxwell represents. While he eschews the religious, Maxwell’s (1984) exemplars of

29 While women complain of being treated as sex objects, it is somewhat (but not totally) surprising that men do not complain quite so much about being treated as pay packet objects, because in view of the research, that — perhaps to the same extent that women are sex objects—is what they “are”.

30 Schaeff (1981) believes it causes a problem for all of us women, which is why she calls it “the original sin of being born female”.

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his philosophy of wisdom include “Jesus of Nazareth”. The philosophy of wisdom includes the philosophy of knowledge which underlies current academic inquiry, but, in addition, it also stresses that inquiry has as its basic aim the realization of value in life (p. 182). The philosophy of wisdom, and the important legacy it actively incorporates, has sizable implications not only for the aims and methods of intellectual inquiry but also for the whole institutional structure of the academic enterprise. One of these implications is that social science, rather than physics, should be the Queen of the Sciences. In the philosophy of wisdom this is because there is no decisive gulf maintained between personal feelings and values on the one hand, and public, objective facts and knowledge on the other. In other words, the reason we want to find out the objective facts and knowledge should be to explicitly and overtly inform the actions related to personal and collective feelings and values—an area which is surely the province of social science, and the psychology and sociology that are the specific foci of this thesis, but which, unfortunately, isn’t. We still, overwhelmingly, study people as if they were the equivalent of rats in a maze. Moreover, for Nicholas Maxwell (1984), an important purpose of academia is to act as a public service for and to the general public. This thesis is written in the spirit of the philosophy of wisdom: How exactly should we live our lives? What exactly is a life of value? And how can we use our systems to lead that life of value that we have consciously worked out given all the knowledge of psychology and sociology we now have at our disposal? While many forms of New Age religiosity may be egregious in their beliefs and practices, their existence provides a clue, if not an answer, as to what it is that people are looking for, and what modernity is lacking (Tacey, 2001).

Splitting and Projection

What Maxwell describes as the philosophy of knowledge, is, like the predominance given to “male” systemising, an example of splitting and projection. Wholeness—like Maxwell’s philosophy of wisdom above—is not being achieved in both Catholic and secular spheres. The splitting of ourselves into private Individuals and public Groupings as we saw above, is one of the fault lines that prevents wisdom. Gender is the very important other fault line. Gender as we have seen is one of our binary lists and Samuels (1993) investigates the problems inherent in this type of thinking by asking from where, in human ideation, do such lists come. One answer, as we shall further see, comes from the nature of reality itself as paradox:

If one single person encompasses such formidable tensions, then a high level of anxiety is likely to follow. Humans deal with anxiety in a number of ways; two of these are splitting and projection. What happens is that the anxiety spawned by these contradictions is handled by projecting the split within each of us onto the most convenient receptors for the projection: women and men. At the same time, historical economic and social forces constitute the material base for some kind of division. Putting the intrapsychic and the socioeconomic factors together, an irresistible pressure for a clear, indeed overclear, line of demarcation based on complementarity builds up. (p. 145)

Both of these fault lines—between men and women and between the individual and society—can be extracted from the Christian mythology of original sin and its institution in the Garden of Eden. And we can start to heal the divisions by stating with regard to the first that Jesus Christ is not only the new Adam. Following on from the order of Creation (in the second Creation story in Genesis 2: 21-25), I will argue that Jesus Christ must also now be appreciated as the new Eve if human wholeness is to be achieved. To repeat, the incorporation of the contra-sexual Other is one of the main maturation tasks entailed in the process of Jungian individuation.

For many who hold to an essentialist outlook on matters of gender, Jesus Christ as the new Eve will be a scandalous suggestion31. In anticipating such a reaction, I am reminded of Chesterton’s (1909) assessment of Herbert Spencer32 implied in the following quote in Orthodoxy: “Herbert Spencer would have been greatly annoyed if any one had called him an imperialist, and therefore it is highly regrettable that nobody did” (p. 108). Anything that actually or potentially receives an indignant or angry response is often a neurosis that needs healing or, in Thomas Keating’s (2001) parlance, an “emotional programme for

31 Yet it is strongly stated in the sense of the inclusive statement in Galatians 3: 28, that all are included in Christ.
32 Arguably, Spencer’s main claim to fame was to coin the term “survival of the fittest”, but his theory was also significant in early sociology.
happiness” that needs dismantling. Moreover, when afflictive emotions such as anxiety produce physical effects, then we are in the territory of Freudian hysteria.

“Male” and “female” hysteria
Freud’s clients were often well-to-do women whose physical symptoms manifested the mental difficulties they were having living their lives in a man’s world. However, in terms of Lacan’s discourse theory, I am interpreting hysteria as any problematic motivation. For the post-Protestant Catholic I will be taking Keating’s (2001) theories as inordinately valuable in the healing of the human condition that underlies neurosis, both general neuroses and the specifically male neurosis identified above. Keating’s definition of spirituality is a valuable one for centering on that ultimate desire that post-Protestant Catholicism believes we all hold. Keating (2001) defines spirituality thus:

... a life of faith in interior submission to God and pervading all one's motivation and behavior; a life of prayer and action prompted by the inspirations of the Holy Spirit; a disposition not limited to devotional practices, rituals, liturgy, or other particular acts of piety or service to others, but rather the catalyst that integrates, unifies, and directs all one’s activity. (p. 147)

Afflictive emotions impede the action of the Spirit and grace and he defines these emotions as “the spontaneous feeling reactions to the failure to acquire things perceived to be good and difficult to attain, or to the failure to avoid things perceived to be evil and difficult to avoid. Afflictive emotions include the capital sins enumerated by Evagrius, The Desert Father of the fourth century, which are a combination of several emotions: pride, vanity, envy, gluttony, greed, lust, anger, and apathy” (Keating, 2001, p. 144).

I will define “afflictive” emotions in an alternative and simpler way by drawing on Turner’s (2011) sociology of emotion. He identifies four primary emotions and I have gendered them in the way shown in Figure 1.6. As Turner observes, three of the four primary emotions are negatively valenced, and in view of Keating’s observations above about what Stage 5 spirituality believes happiness consists of (and I also draw in the title of Belliotti’s (2004) book Happiness is overrated here too), satisfaction-happiness is not necessarily a good thing either, if it stems from neurosis and leads to rabid over-consumption which in turn builds on itself in a vicious cycle. What the diagram illustrates, as far as the problem of splitting and projection is concerned, is that if the personal is the political, (and of course it is), every time a man gets angry and self-satisfied, and every time a woman gets depressed and fearful, then both are capitulating to patriarchal culture (and to our socialisation within it). However, given that men are “in charge” (via the patriarchal nature of the Master discourse), it is more important that men control their anger and their self-satisfaction than it is for women to control their sadness and their fear. The problem is of course that without pressure from women, it is not likely that men will do this because, by withdrawing from their anger and self-satisfaction, they will come into contact with the sadness and the fear that will often lie beneath the self-satisfaction and the anger, what William S. Pollack is referring to when he describes boy school shooters as “weeping bullets”33. What Keating and I are however really recommending is that we work to challenge and dismantle these afflictive emotions and moreover, the emotional programmes for happiness that generate them in the first place.

Jesus is not only the new Adam but also the new Eve because he is the pre-eminent symbol of wholeness—neither splitting or projecting. Jesus came as a man, and it was as a man that he showed in the post-Edenic Garden of Gethsemane his own great fear (sweating drops of blood), and then, on the Cross, his own great sadness (Why have you forsaken me?) and, by doing so, he became the new Eve and the model for all men and women.

God is not ungendered but full of gender, as I illustrate in Figure 1.7. Christ is, as Irigaray (1985, p. 144) describes him, that “most female of men”. The Holy Spirit has been portrayed in both male and female terms—as tongues of fire and as Sophia to take just two metaphors. Moreover, God the Father is, as the

33 Girls don't yet shoot up schools, but of course they still might if these emotions become more contained in the single psyche without an over-arching philosophy to control them.
story of the prodigal Son describes him, that most gentle of fathers relying not on just the empathising he created in our earthly milieu, but the Empathising which alone is dominant in the milieu He inhabits.

The end-point of this thesis

Figure 1.8 shows Rolheiser’s (1998) four non-negotiable elements of Christian spirituality distributed around the Jung/Mitroff or wisdom model. As regards the two Ego-conscious solutions of social justice and personal prayer and morality, my contention is, in line with Christianity’s claim of an (radical) alternative, that the world as it is cannot achieve those aims to the extent that they need to be achieved. We have seen, for example, that the lure—the very real attractor—of toxic egocentricity re asserted itself with the rise of neoliberal capitalist economics and the consequent rise in inequality around the world within nations, not to mention the problems associated with runaway capitalism such as environmental change and degradation.

Figure 1.9 shows the effective end point of this thesis which shows that unlike material power in the world (the upper left quadrant of the Jung/Mitroff model), the cross encapsulates the Christian claim of an alternative. Its centre of gravity—what I will call, after Chesterton (1909), the “wildness that lies in wait”—lies in the Eco half of the Jung/Mitroff model and is connected to the “invisible means of support” that the Christian faith, as interpreted by Jungian theory, claims exists. Its centre of gravity lies within the nexus of the interpersonal and the existential means of solving problems according to the Mitroff (1998) model and on the right side of the brain where wholeness is again achieved. In the Genesis account it was Eve who sought first of all to know the nature of good and evil, and, with the consciousness that that has lead us to, we have some answers. We either choose the material power of the upper left quadrant and the security in the lower right quadrant that obeisance to that ideology offers, (as well as the prestige that goes along with both of those) or we use the knowledge of good and evil (the circle in the diagram that connects all quadrants) to dismantle those emotional programmes for happiness and live our lives centred on the cross. What that life will be, will be different in each individual case because we are unique and we each have our unique crosses to bear. The process of Jungian individuation is one theory that postulates how we discern what our particular cross is, and, if we see our emotional life as pivotal for the discernment of our vocation, I believe the somewhat arcane process of Jungian individuation becomes more accessible to everyone.

It is ultimately through that existential dimension that cultures will be changed and as such, it will be a long and arduous process reliant on the extent to which human beings feel free enough to choose their own fates rather than having systems more or less decide those for them. To that extent, it will be important for “just enough” to do “just that”, for change to happen.

Figure 1.9 is also an illustration of two biblical passages that have always intrigued me for the fact that they describe a deeply etched fault line between the world that, for example, sociology describes and interprets, and the world that Christianity represents. This is firstly well represented in Christ’s rebuke to Peter:

Get thee behind me Satan: thou art an offence to me: for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but those that be of men. (Matthew 16: 23)

Peter believes in the powers and principalities of this world to solve problems (in this particular case Jesus’s upcoming crucifixion) that are better grown out of34 by, for example, the personal process of Jungian individuation and the consequent benefit that that confers on the community of which that person is a part. As Jung states (CW 11: 414), the Catholic Mass, which is the remembrance of Christ’s death and resurrection, is the individuation process in a nutshell.

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34 Joseph Campbell (1998) made an interesting counter-cultural statement in this sense about Abraham Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” model: those [needs] are the things we live for when we have nothing to live for. While this could be a recipe for a deluded and narcissistic fanaticism, I am interpreting Campbell’s statement as the activity, like Jesus Christ’s, that results from the psyche’s intimate connection to the archetype of the Self (see Chapter 13).
The other passage comes from Luke 10: 21:

I thank thee O father, lord of heaven and earth, that thou hast hid these things from the wise and the prudent, and hast revealed them to babes.

In other words, there is nothing wrong with being wise and prudent as long as it doesn’t make one arrogant. The meaning of the circle that connects all quadrants is the very real necessity for informing one’s conscience, but humility—our groundedness—is finally the queen of the virtues. If one lingers or stays in that split-off upper left quadrant then one does not have the humility to see the truth of the cross. That is what the lower right quadrant fundamentally represents, with the proviso that if life in that quadrant is lived in obeisance to the arrogance of the upper left quadrant, then that connection with something bigger by which all matters must be judged, will be missed.

Figure 1.10 shows the process by which we can achieve the end state of affairs that Figure 1.9 illustrates. It repeats Figure 1.1 (b) but with the theory I have used in this thesis added. I will therefore describe Figure 1.10 by going through the sequence of chapters and how it is that the theory in them leads us to Figure 1.9.

**Summary of chapters**

Chapter 2 will range across recent feminist, Jungian, and Catholic thought in an attempt to outline what I argue is the main problem in an organization (the Church) that fails to see the broader perspective that some feminist thinking potentially provides. In essence, what I will be ultimately arguing is that the Church’s patriarchal limitations are responding to the evolutionary dictates inculcated in us as a result of our human evolution (specifically those controlling women and their sexuality) rather than responding to the claim of the alternative that the Incarnation brought. While personal morality is part of that claim, it is one of Rolheiser’s (1998) four non-negotiable elements of a Christian spirituality and needs recognition within that bigger context. The importance of the existential dimension in particular will be an important focus in this chapter because Jungian psychology will provide a basis for that aforementioned recognition in the ways it will encourage us to grow up and away from stultifying patriarchal and fragmented symbolism.

Chapter 3 will then identify the potent value that Christianity embodies in its challenge to the fear of, and indifference to, “the Other” that underlie all human natures and cultures as a result of our developmental histories. It will do this firstly by drawing on the experience of one who has trodden the journey through the Fowlerian Stage 4 of atheism to an appreciation of the fundamental romance of Catholicism at Stage 5. While his writing illustrates some of the problematic attitudes of his day such as anti-Semitism and anti-feminism35, G. K. Chesterton and his appreciation of the limited nature of modernity will be a valuable context for the modern theory that is the Enlightenment’s best legacy as far as this thesis is concerned. Social psychology and psychological sociology are means by which some aspects of the Christian genius can be explained for a scientific age.

The terms that form the title of this thesis—relatedness, appreciation, difference, transformation—are then defined more fully in Chapter 4 in relation to the models that will provide the underlying structure for my argument—the first two of which structure Figure 1.9. These models include Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith model, the conceptual wisdom or Mitroff/Jung model, the “personal” and the “social” Model, and the cultural design model in which I illustrate the potential and actual dynamics of what I describe as a developing Fowlerian Stage 5 “Democracy of the Different”.

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35 It is never a question of whether or not we are prejudiced, but the extent to which we are. Just how anti-Semitic and anti-feminist was Chesterton? While in Chapter 13, I go through what I see as the most pertinent discussions of how anti-Semitic Jung was, I haven’t had the benefit of a Samuel (1993) nor have I studied it sufficiently myself to come to firm conclusions about the extent of Chesterton’s prejudices. That is another thesis and a very necessary and interesting one. The romance that post-Protestant Catholicism brings is an unfinished and continuing project carried out by flawed human actors.
Where Chapter 4 developed the structure of the wisdom model, Chapter 5 will look at its content and dynamics in terms of Stage 4 secularity and Stage 5 post-Protestant Catholicism using feminist, moral psychological, and progressive Catholic thinking to show how the Stage 5 claim of an alternative differs. Haidt’s (2006, 2012) discussions about moral psychology from a secular point of view will be particularly significant in this regard. However, my interpretation of his views relies heavily on the evaluation of what Schaeff (1987) calls the myths of the “addictive society”36 which fundamentally boil down to a reluctance to own the embodied vulnerability inherent in the human condition, the vulnerability that Jesus Christ accepted as part of the paradox of His “insane meekness” and His “insane magnificence” (Chesterton, 1909, p. 78).

The end-point of Part 1 and the starting-point of Part 2 is the statement that a post-Protestant Catholicism is an antithesis to the thesis of secular modernity. The ultimate aim of my conception of post-Protestant Catholicism is to seek a new synthesis in political and economic systems that achieves social justice for all. The advent of neo-liberal capitalism in the 1970s set that Christian project back considerably as witnessed by the rise in levels of structural inequality between the rich and the poor. This is the natural endpoint of a culture based on Ego-consciousness and the splitting off and projection of its unacknowledged existential fear. The result is that other people and the environment end up paying the price.

In assessing the resulting situation in his 1998 book, Mitroff diagnoses a human addiction to certainty against which Stage 4 posits what Schaeff (1987) calls its “Illusion of Control”. In that sense our need to Control embodies the human existential fear of surprise37. Chesterton (1909, p. 146), by postulating a “wildness that lies in wait”, illustrates the potential for surprise that the Annunciation and Incarnation exemplifies in Christian and Catholic existential thinking. The scholarship that additionally supports those and my claims in this thesis and the existence of a “wildness that lies in wait”, and which explains various facets of the Part 1 models more fully, is presented in Part 2.

After the Introduction in Chapter 6, which points to the individual (individuation) and cultural (emergence) processes under investigation, Maxwell’s (1984) “philosophy of wisdom” as a more rational alternative to the existing “philosophy of knowledge” that currently dominates western thinking, is the focus of Chapter 7.

Building on Maxwell’s call for a fresh look at the “rationality” that modernity is defined by, Haidt’s (2012) “rationalist delusion” and McGilchrist’s (2009) account of the narrowly-focussed left-brained Emissary’s problematic usurpation of the role of the right-brained Master, are described in Chapter 8.

Chapter 9 outlines Becker’s (1975) anthropological account of humankind’s fundamental problem which is consciousness of death and his (and I use that pronoun deliberately to refer to patriarchal culture) attempts through the creation of culture to escape that “evil”. Becker identifies Christianity as the one system that promised escape from the patriarchy that had gradually evolved from the “hopeful mystification” of our early origins into the powerful military-industrial and corporate capitalist complexes that attempt to control the globe today. He also claims that Christianity hasn’t “taken”. Many agree with this claim and my description of a Stage 5 Christianity is intended to illustrate a Christianity that could “take”, albeit in a limited way. At worst, this thesis is a critique of modernity and a call, like Tacey’s

36 She previously identified this as the ‘white male society’ (Schaeff, 1981) given that systemically it is “white male society” that has set up and arguably still rules the current global political and economic hegemony.

37 Chervin and Neill (1982, p. 13) characterise the Annunciation as “living with surprise”. Chervin specifically states that we can view surprise with dread rather than delight (p. 16): “Surprise! your father is gone” or “Surprise! he chose another woman.” Opposite to that, Chervin identifies the Annunciation as teaching us how to respond to change and to see it as a moving beyond the rigid and the sterile. She recommends seeing the Holy Spirit as a bridegroom coming with fresh visions: “Perhaps it is a different approach to the same old tasks. Even terrible surprises are important in one’s life tale. Even that which is so destructive to our smoothly established routines and plans shows us that there is a living God who initiates the dance, and that we are not spinning on a carousel alone” (p. 17).
(2001), for cutting the New Age some slack in terms at least of its search for something that modernity isn’t supplying (if not for most of its current content).

Chapter 10 examines patriarchy from some feminist perspectives and looks into the derivation of the Ego/Eco fault line by way of Smith’s (1987) Standpoint Theory. Gilligan (2002) provides a valuable theoretical overview which draws on Freudian theory to show why patriarchy retains its hold on culture and why its underlying neurosis must be confronted and healed. Schaefer’s (1981, 1987, 1992) provision of the subjective woman’s viewpoint that Smith states sociology lacks is the final focus around which some observations from other scholars can be gathered to show how important feminism has been and will continue to be in terms of providing an alternative.

While Big Business and the money it generates may be seen as the generator of Mammon, business literature has also produced valuable material on ethical and intelligent behaviour in everyday settings. This practical material which I use to exemplify how “that which is Caesar’s” also ultimately falls under the dominion of moral considerations is the subject of Chapter 11. Argyris’s (1999, 2006) organizational insights identify the problematic aspects inherent in the administration of the Catholic Church, specifically in the way the Church’s “theory-in-use” is different from its “espoused theory”.

Chapter 12 looks into the causes of the emotional dis-ease in culture that warps human motivation in accord with Keating’s (2001) theory of original sin. This involves examination of both the psychological and sociological aspects of emotion. The link between the systems of love and attachment in both childhood and adult phases of the individual human journey can provide both a problem and then an opportunity for healing. Addressing afflicutive emotion as it occurs, rather than what I call “matronising” it, is a potent potential means of human growth because of its value for the discernment of Desire. The sociology of emotion, I will argue, is gendered, and its splits and projections require the healing gained from the recognition of the necessity for dismantling our “emotional programmes for happiness” which are inculcated through our socialisation as well as from our personal developmental experiences.

Jung’s theories are the subject of Chapter 13 because of the importance, for the emotional health of both individuals and cultures, to acknowledge the unconscious Shadow and other repressed archetypes. The process of individuation that is possible from middle age onwards is, I argue, the important individual process that needs to be accomplished because it will provide the necessary engine by which cultural renewal will be attained. If that does not happen, then the processes set in motion by post-modernity will continue to undermine culture by processes that Lacan has illustrated by way of his four discourses theory.

Lacan’s discourse theory is the focus of Chapter 14. While a problematic and superficial therapeutic culture (the Analyst discourse) can only mine trivial and immature materialistic desires from its clients (the Hysteric discourses), it poses no threat to the Master discourse and its servants in the Bureaucratic discourse that carry out the Master’s orders. The healing and development of the Hysteric through channels that the Analyst (as catalyst) opens up, can provide the potential for a culture that is mature enough to fathom its true nature and thereby live with limits that human communities and the natural environment require. Together, Jung’s and Lacan’s theoreies contribute to the overall subject of my thesis which is that it is through the processes of individuation and the counter-cultural contributions of these individuals to the emergence of an inclusive and democratic culture, that the Christian aim of social justice may be attained.

The concluding chapter, Chapter 15, using the framework of the wisdom model, begins to formulate some suggestions for solutions to the existential, interpersonal, systemic, and technological problems which a post-Protestant Catholic value system can address. The focus will be on the existential as the fundamental source for solutions to the other problems, given the underlying assumption of this thesis that change will come from individuals rather than from more dictatorial social sources. While the latter are important in the sustaining of Fowlerian Stage 3 and Stage 4 faith systems, these two stages reflect immature
ecocentric and egocentric drives that are ultimately inimical to an existentially powerful Christian milieu. The continuing neglect of the existential dimension within the disciplines of Psychology and Sociology is also problematic as some of the scholarship in Part 2 illustrates. In summary, the post-Protestant Catholic solutions to the fundamental problems that beset western culture are those identified by Rolheiser (1998) which are existential astonishment and mellowness, community, personal morality, and last, but certainly not least, as intimated above, social justice. Of those, the first two are those identified by Chesterton (1909, p. 14) as the source of Catholicism’s romance—wonder and welcome. It is the sacred responsibility encapsulated within these two that requires us as individuals and cultures to do our best to ensure that the wonder and welcome of a religion of relatedness are a reality for all, everywhere.
Part 1:
THE CLAIM OF AN ALTERNATIVE

Chapter 2
FEMINISM, SOCIOLOGY AND CATHOLICISM: AN OVERVIEW

Rome
May 14, 1904

My dear Mr. Kappus,

Much time has passed since I received your last letter. . . . It was a pleasure for me to read [your] sonnet and your letter, often; I thank you for both.

And you should not let yourself be confused in your solitude by the fact that there is some thing in you that wants to move out of it. This very wish, if you use it calmly and prudently and like a tool, will help you spread out your solitude over a great distance. Most people have (with the help of conventions) turned their solutions toward what is easy and toward the easiest side of the easy; but it is clear that we must trust in what is difficult; everything alive trusts in it, everything, in Nature grows and defends itself any way it can and is spontaneously itself, tries to be itself at all costs and against all opposition. We know little, but that we must trust in what is difficult is a certainty that will never abandon us; it is good to be solitary, for solitude is difficult; that something is difficult must be one more reason for us to do it.

It is also good to love: because love is difficult. For one human being to love another human being: that is perhaps the most difficult task that has been entrusted to us, the ultimate task, the final test and proof, the work for which all other work is merely preparation. That is why young people, who are beginners in everything, are not yet capable of love: it is something they must learn. With their whole being, with all their forces, gathered around their solitary, anxious, upward-beating heart, they must learn to love. But learning-time is always a long, secluded time, and therefore loving, for a long time ahead and far on into life, is: solitude, a heightened and deepened kind of aloneness for the person who loves. Loving does not at first mean merging, surrendering, and uniting with another person (for what would a union be of two people who are unclarified, unfinished, and still incoherent?), it is a high inducement for the individual to ripen, to become something in himself, to become world, to become world in himself for the sake of another person; it is a great, demanding claim on him, something that chooses him and calls him to vast distances. Only in this sense, as the task of working on themselves ("to hearken and to hammer day and night"), may young people use the love that is given to them. Merging and surrendering and every kind of communion is not for them (who must still, for a long, long time, save and gather themselves); it is the ultimate, is perhaps that for which human lives are as yet barely large enough.

. . . The claims that the difficult work of love makes upon our development are greater than life, and we, as beginners, are not equal to them. But if we nevertheless endure and take this love upon us as burden and apprenticeship, instead of losing ourselves in the whole easy and frivolous game behind which people have hidden from the most solemn solemnity of their being, then a small advance and a lightening will perhaps be perceptible to those who come long after us. That would be much.

We are only just now beginning to consider the relation of one individual to a second individual objectively and without prejudice, and our attempts to live such relationships have no model before them. And yet in the changes that time has brought about there are already many things that can help our timid novitiate.

The girl and the woman, in their new, individual unfolding, will only in passing be imitators of male behavior and misbehavior and repeaters of male professions. After the uncertainty of such transitions, it will become obvious that women were going through the abundance and variation of those (often ridiculous) disguises just so that they could purify their own essential nature and wash out the deforming influences of the other sex. Women, in whom life lingers and dwells more immediately, more fruitfully, and more confidently, must surely have become riper and more human in their depths than light, easygoing man, who is not pulled down beneath the surface of life by the weight of any bodily fruit and who, arrogant and hasty, undervalues what he thinks he loves. This humanity of woman, carried in her womb through all her suffering and humiliation, will come to light when she has stripped off the conventions of mere femaleness in the transformations of her outward status, and those men who do not yet feel it approaching will be astonished by it. Someday (and even now, especially in the countries of northern Europe, trustworthy signs are already speaking and shining), someday there will be girls and women whose name will no longer mean the mere opposite of the male, but something in itself, something that makes one think not of any complement and limit, but only of life and reality: the female human being.

This advance (at first very much against the will of the outdistanced men) will transform the love experience, which is now filled with error, will change it from the ground up, and reshape it into a relationship that is meant to be between one human being and another, no longer one that flows from man to woman. And this more human love (which will fulfill itself with infinite consideration and gentleness, and kindness and clarity in binding and releasing) will resemble what we are now
preparing painfully and with great struggle: the love that consists in this: that two solitudes protect and border and greet each other.

And one more thing: Don’t think that the great love which was once granted to you, when you were a boy, has been lost; how can you know whether vast and generous wishes didn’t ripen in you at that time, and purposes by which you are still living today? I believe that that love remains so strong and intense in your memory because it was your first deep aloneness and the first inner work that you did on your life.—All good wishes to you, dear Mr. Kapps!

Yours,
Rainer Maria Rilke

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In line with Freud’s appraisal of the two most important things we do in life as Work and Love, the second wave of feminism advanced the rights of women in the West to develop and use skills in contexts beyond those involved in domestic relationships. This was an important and valuable development. However, women entered the workforce on the existing terms of engagement which had been and continue to be largely determined by men. One of the first people I read as a young woman with concerns in this area was practising psychologist Anne Wilson Schaef who in the 1980s wrote a seminal book called *Women’s Reality* in which, using the observations she had built up from women in her work as a psychologist, identified what she called the White Male System. In succeeding decades she has built on this work and, while merely recording the existence and attributes of the White Male System (as well as what she called a Reactive Female System needed for the former to exist) in that first work, went on in subsequent works to evaluate it as extremely harmful to all that it touches, which, given the globalisation of the White Male System that has occurred since, is, to all intents and purposes, everyone. Given my own experience of work environments, I can only concur with a woman—a little older than myself but basically in the same demographic of New Zealand post-menopausal who was interviewed along with her co-author on a New Zealand national radio programme in 2010. When asked about her recent retirement she talked of the relief she felt on leaving employment with what seemed a largish organization after one silly but entirely typical email too many. Her relieved comment mirrored the fundamental contention of Schaef with regard to our addictive culture and work places: “I feel more honest [now] . . . it just feels more real” (emphasis added). The narrow focus and sheer perversity of many work places that the White Male System has produced are, as Taylor (2010, p. 151) observes in his treatment of perversion, in the manner of Kraus’s (1977) observation:

38 By the West, I mean the Western European, and particularly the British culture, that developed as a result of the intersection of a number of favourable natural factors described by Diamond (2005) and which, through the development of technology and the power that that afforded, ultimately enabled the invasion and exploitation of the resources of countries outside Western Europe. US hegemony ultimately displaced the western European dominance but continues its legacy inasmuch as White Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture can be said to typify the dominant ideology of the United States of America. In these pages I will be drawing on the idea of WEIRD culture which is Western as well as Educated, Industrial, Rich, and Democratic (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) and its manifestation in ways that make “White Anglo-Saxon Protestant” culture distinct from traditional societies.

39 Schaef has revised the names of the systems she identified in her 1981 work. Now she refers to the White Male System as the Addictive System, and her antithesis of that system as Living Process.

40 For example, When society becomes an addict, The addictive organization, Escape from intimacy, Meditations for women who do too much, Beyond therapy, beyond science.

41 Age will continue to be significant in this thesis because, as will become evident, it is my intention to be counter-cultural in my treatment of it in line with Jungian thinking. The second half of life can be a time of new and considerable freedoms, especially for women, as long as one develops the ego-strength to ignore the societal messages that equate value with youthfulness.

42 Urbanite Janice Marriott wrote in a letter to her farming friend Virginia Pawsey: “… Just before the mince pies and Secret Santa morning tea today, I got an email that so uninspired me that it inspired me, if you see what I mean. It said, in part: Project managers will be working to critique and analyse their communications in order to strengthen their effectiveness around improving practice. Also looking at the first cut of the data from the sustainability focus group on cohorts who have exited the project. … It was a sign. I reached for a piece of A4 paper and, in that earth-shattering moment, wrote my resignation letter” (Marriott & Pawsey, 2010, pp. 212-213).

43 Marx’s concept of alienation is apposite here, and indeed, the typical factory production line is the example par excellence of the perverse workplace. The differences and range of workplaces—from the perverse to the ideal—that I have in mind here are
There is no more unfortunate being under the sun than a fetishist, who yearns for a woman’s shoe and has to make do with a whole woman. (p. 225)44

The whole (and necessarily, I would contend—drawing on Jungian theory—older) woman and what she can potentially bring to society now that she has been somewhat freed to participate in public space has, one hopes, had its beginnings in our time. And, as the Rilke letter shows, men can “get it”—in fact foresee it—especially, one assumes, the imaginative artistic ones45.

Nevertheless, the task is formidable. In line with Schaeff’s characterisation above, pro-feminist academic Michael Kimmel characterises our entire society as “gendered”. What that means is that while we as individuals have to become gendered by “cutting our own deal” with definitions of masculinity and femininity, we also have to realise that we don’t do this in a gender-neutral environment. “The social institutions of our world—workplace, family, school, politics—. . . have evolved in ways that reproduce both the differences between women and men and the domination of men over women” (Kimmel, 2008, p. 15).

This is not to undervalue the advances for which the Western White Male System has been responsible. Although not wealthy by any means, I, as a student on a below average income, live in greater comfort than royalty have in the past46. In fact without the extensive medical help I have on at least two occasions needed, I would possibly not be alive to write this at all47. Segal, in Hill (2000), identifies a myriad of feminist viewpoints and among them she identifies the stance of Camille Paglia who thinks men are encapsulated in the well-known tale of the three stone cutters and what they said when asked what they were doing: the first stated he was cutting stone, the second stated that he was cutting a stone to fit in its assigned place, and the third stated that he was building a Cathedral. I am reminded of a young worker I recently observed as I was stalled in one of the many traffic jams that have plagued Christchurch streets since the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes. His demeanour was one of complete alienation from the task he was doing; there was little investment in his task other than that which was being squeezed out of him by authority. It was a tragic sight.

44 The phenomenology of this fetishistic obsession with bits and parts instead of wholes can be appreciated directly in many song videos for instance with their focus on women as a series of breasts and bottoms (see Jhally (2007)).

45 One of the overwhelming values of Schaeff’s early study was its insights into one side of a relationship (the relationship within heterosexual marriage) that is fundamental to our and all cultures and which can serve as a template for any relationship wherein power is unequally shared. In a relationship, if the weaker party in that relationship (however that is defined—economically, politically, culturally, emotionally etc) states honestly that there is a problem, then there is a problem. Healthy relatedness in this thesis importantly assumes mutuality.

46 It is for this reason that evolutionary biologist Pagel (2012) states we have in the past, and continue to tolerate “domination systems” because we all gain from them:

If humans evolved a tribal nature that revolves around life in relatively small and exclusive cooperative societies, how do we explain the enormous social groupings of the modern world in which so many can be so willingly led by so few? The growth of human populations happened far too quickly for biological changes to our nature to have kept up. . . . The forces propelling this growth were many, but mainly of three sorts—protection, economic well-being, and reproductive output. People were, in a word, better off, even if it is by now well established that we were often less healthy in these large groupings. But being better off does not alone tell us why it worked. . . . What have we acquired throughout our brief evolution is a taste for the benefits of cooperation and some rules that can make it work in the right circumstances. (pp. 346-347)

It is true then that there are “domination systems” and “domination systems”. Given the choice, I would have no hesitation in opting to live in the West. Nevertheless, there is plenty of scope for improvement and this thesis gets its rationale from that need to make “thy will be done on earth” as a continuation of the West’s cultural heritage but, in a way that follows more closely the model set down by the person who first uttered those words 2000 years ago. That is a preliminary assumption then: God, in post-Protestant Catholicism, is not seen within these pages as a domination system; quite the opposite.

47 Kimmel (2010) begins an essay with a James Brown song which documents “a litany of men’s accomplishments: men made the cars, the trains, the electric lights, and the boats that carried the loads and took us out of the dark . . .” (p. 15). But as Kimmel then documents, Brown changes course at the end of the song: “But it would be nothing . . . without a woman or a girl.” Without women, Brown ends, men are ‘lost in the wilderness . . . lost in the bitterness . . . lost, ’ his voice trailing off in both confusion and despair” (p. 15). Man indeed does not live on bread alone. This situation is problematic in the sense that women are having to live men’s emotional lives for them. As women have entered the work force and taken up their share of the systemising function (Baron-Cohen, 2003), so also men will need to enter women’s traditional empathising domain and take more responsibility for their own emotions. When women no longer have to bear the disproportionate burden of this “matronising” role (the emotional equivalent of intellectual “patronising”), then we will have probably reached equality.
wonderful for the real benefits that accrue from living in the West. If culture had been left to women Paglia postulates, we’d still be stirring the stew with sticks. Whatever the truth of that (and I believe it utterly simplistic), “man” does not live on bread alone—in fact many struggle in our globalised markets simply to find that—and the defects that Schaef and others have identified need rectification.

There must now be, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the realisation that we are all in this together and it would be a mistake if the “difference” in the thesis’s title were to be confined to gender alone.48 Segal (in Hill, 2000) brings us up to date with the difficulties inherent in the transitions that Rilke’s letter hinted at:

Segal looks on in frustration at a culture now obsessed with comforting notions of fixed sexual essences, with trying to identify crude oppositions between all women on the one hand, all men on the other. From one direction comes evolutionary psychology, feeding the media mania for genetic explanations, urging us once again that biology will always be destiny in the end. . . . [Segal counters] “As human beings, we are never in any way at the mercy of biology. We are always able to do with our biology what the cultural and social and personal resources available to us allow.

From another direction, bearing the same conservative message, come those who positively live on gender clichés: Greer to shout that girls are much better than boys, Andrea Dworkin to demonise men, Camille Paglia to worship them. By absolute contrast, Segal poses a much better class of question: why begin with difference in the first place? Why be so preoccupied with mapping and defining things that barely exist? “The truth is, there's not that much difference between men and women. The point about being human is we're so adaptable and adjustable. Trying to tell us that there's some fixed way of being anything is always going to be more foolish than helpful.”

Segal paid her socialist feminist dues working for the dispossessed in Islington, London and stated in Hill (2000) that she wished to remake “the case for a dynamic feminism that rejects pessimism and becomes once again a ‘movement of transformation’”, able to liberate both sexes from the tyrannies of labour, of fear and, of course, gender”. The paradoxical fact remains however that we will not be liberated from gender under a patriarchal rule. Jungian David Tacey (1997) states that the two big obstacles to a liberated consciousness can be categorised as domination by paternal and maternal archetypes. Patriarchy does not tolerate difference he says; it despises creative individuality49, and as long as the feminine remains “mother”, the male ego remains “son” and “infant” and therefore in need of what I call “matronising”50. While Segal’s point in the quotation above is well and truly taken, even a little difference can go an awfully long way. And in the history of the West, it has.

Tacey’s (1997) points illustrate a major problem in the practise of a sociology that ignores the unconscious dimension of the human mind. We do act out social scripts but we also act out archetypal ones. One woman ahead of her time who, like Lynne Segal espoused the rights of women to whatever sort of sexual pleasure a woman could find” (Hill, 2000), and who put that maxim into considerable practise, was Iris Murdoch. While obviously rejecting conventional sexual notions of morality51, she also rejected the philosophies of existentialism and structuralism as too limited in scope and spoke instead of the necessity of a moral life as the fundamental way of being. The roots of the malaise at the heart of

48 It is the intention in this thesis that individual “difference” can come to mean that expressed in 1 Corinthians 12:4 as in “varieties of gifts” which depend on our humanity rather than our gender.
49 This view is supported by other critics of modernity, such as Hughes (2002) who, using Zygmunt Bauman, speaks from the disabled’s point of view: “Modern culture—in Bauman's view—is both heterophobic and morally indifferent, and as such will be well disposed to any means that proposes the extirpation of difference” (p. 576). Sennett’s (2012) observation of modern life wherein “tribalism couples solidarity with others like yourself to aggression against those who differ” (p. 3) shows that we haven’t progressed as much as we should have from the systems bred in us by our evolutionary heritage. As he points out, the complexity of our cultures demands that we now must.
50 “Matronizing” is a neologism that parallels “patronizing”, except that it represents behaviour that is intended to mollify and thereby avoid the expression of the strong feelings caused by neuroses. Rather than mollifying (or numbing through addiction) such feelings, one should persist in getting to the bottom of them so as to make their source conscious and thereby capable of being addressed.
51 There was a problem with Murdoch’s sexual behaviour in the sense that it apparently caused her husband considerable pain. There is also more to be said about sexual morality in light of Hamilton (2008) and the morality espoused by the Catholic Church. These issues will be addressed at the appropriate time. In the meantime it should be pointed out that Iris Murdoch’s behaviour was not in essence different from that of many men who have traditionally enjoyed more licence in such matters.
society and of each person who makes up a society is encapsulated within, and can be seen as a series of footnotes to, the following quotation: “The enemies of art and of morals, the enemies that is of love, are the same: social convention and neurosis” (Murdoch, 1959, p. 52). While her concept of the Good is wholly objective and lacking any of the personal nature of a Christian God, she is aligned with religion in the sense of its having a moral perspective on every instance of life³².

Religion in the final analysis is a relational venture and can thus be seen as conventionally “feminine”. That the feminine can be seen in both comforting and terrifying forms is borne out in Chesterton’s (1909) view that “Christianity even when watered down is hot enough to boil all modern society to rags” (p. 217). When he wrote that, he hadn’t perhaps reckoned on the warped ethic of the prosperity gospels, although he did admit of one propensity of Catholicism (admittedly in defence of accusations that all it did was preach fire and brimstone) to present the more kindly aspect of Christ (meek and mild) to the faithful. Christianity, and specifically Catholicism, under the rule of men has in our day reached an ignominious pass with sexual scandals that have inflicted great existential harm on those who, because of their great vulnerability, should have been seen as the most precious citizens in the eyes of the Church. Feminine forces within an institution that is conventionally described as feminine (that is, the Church) are justifiably clamouring for the right to be heard within it. While from all accounts Jesus himself seemed to rarely acknowledge it (and only then in relation to adultery and presumably therefore with reference to its implications in terms of the betrayal of another), sex and gender issues preoccupy our individual and social lives, and, as Tacey (1997) points out, for strong psychic reasons:

In persisting with the language of masculinity and femininity, we stay in touch with passion and desire. Whoever heard of brain hemispheres having sexual intercourse, or Yin and Yang making love? The psyche loves sexuality and Eros, and we would deprive it of its central passion if we were to jettison sex-linked categories in favour of more intellectual ones. Jung correctly saw in the sexual couplings of our dreams an alchemical exchange and interaction, a coming together of disparate and contradictory parts of the soul, a union of like with unlike. Masculine and feminine remain crucial because they force us into the realm of sexuality, they keep ideation and instinct linked, and so, for all the baggage they necessarily carry, we cannot and must not desert them. (pp. 35-36)

This thesis does not desert them. “Ideation and instinct”, “masculine and feminine” lie at the centre of it. However, in passing, while accepting that sexuality mirrors something fundamental in the human psyche, this thesis will put forward the idea that it may just be in brain hemispheric difference—and one of its manifestations in the extent to which one does or does not participate in the power-making “systemisation” processes of one’s culture—that these psychic forces are most profoundly expressed. It is in this consideration of paired dualities, like the left and right brains, that McGilchrist’s (2009) use of recent neuropsychological findings becomes most valuable in confirming intuitions that some (who are by choice and circumstance rather peripheral to the system) have had for years. That work also finds resonances within the moral psychology of Haidt (2006, 2012) in his analyses of a range of dualities and differences that need to be considered together.

It is instructive to place Tacey’s (1997) views alongside a 2004 pastoral Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women in the Church and in the World. The Letter is problematic for many of the views it expresses as well as for the assumptions that underlie it. Like sociology (in accord with Tacey’s views above), the Letter has problems with “the obscuring of the

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³² Murdoch was an ardent Platonist as Widdows (2005) explains:

Murdoch’s understanding of the moral life as a way to be lived is in many ways the most singular, and for many the most inspiring, aspect of her moral vision which, like her conception of the good, owes much to her commitment to Plato. For Murdoch, the moral life is a totality and moral striving is the primary and unending task of the agent as he or she moves through life. The moral life is essentially a pilgrimage from illusion to reality, going on in the moment-to-moment judgements of daily life. Moreover, and perhaps surprisingly in the philosophical context, it is, in part, spiritual (although not supernatural) in nature. (p. 89)

At the end of her book, in summing up Murdoch’s moral vision, Widdows notes the criticisms that spring from the foundation of her ideas in the reality of human experience. The philosopher Simon Blackburn for instance does not recognize her vision in his own experience. Of course he doesn’t, and this thesis will endeavour to show why.
difference or duality of the sexes” through the highlighting of the cultural element of *gender* at the expense of the physical difference of *sex*.

Tacey (1997) has valuable points to make that put sociology in general, and the Church’s *Letter* in particular, (albeit that both of these are arguing from opposing points of view) into a larger Jungian context in which the issues of sex and gender can be more accurately perceived. What sociology fails to see is the extent to which the archetypes of the collective unconscious influence our lived experience as men and women. As a result, gender theory is “hopelessly inadequate” because it doesn’t recognise the fundamental energies it is dealing with. As Tacey states, “Unless a depth dimension [that is, from Freud or Jung] is taken into account, political and social science will remain frustrated and frustrating, a testimony only to the machinations of the hubristic intellect” (pp. 9-10).

On the other side, far from wanting to deny difference, the *Letter* emphasises and essentializes it. The *Letter*’s first point with regard to “women’s” issues is the “tendency . . . to emphasize strongly conditions of subordination in order to give rise to antagonism: women, in order to be themselves, must make themselves the adversaries of men. Faced with the abuse of power, the answer for women is to seek power” (emphasis added). The underlying assumption of course is that *woman* is the “other” to the normative *man*. Moreover, the *Letter* confuses men and women with their archetypal identities.

Like Tacey, the viewpoint in this thesis will be a Jungian one: yes, male and female archetypes do count very much in a more rounded sociology, and yes, one suspects that there are some cultural as well as biological differences between men and women (see for example Baron-Cohen, 2003, and Fletcher, 2002), but that the sizes of these are considerably less than the similarities. This question is important not only for the consequences it has in women’s lives but also for those whose sexuality departs from the heterosexual norm. The *Letter* illustrates a heavy investment in the concept of sexual difference:

> The theory of the human person, intended to promote prospects for equality of women through liberation from biological determinism, has in reality inspired ideologies which, for example, call into question the family, in its natural two-parent structure of mother and father, and make homosexuality and heterosexuality virtually equivalent, in a new model of polymorphous sexuality.

While this thesis will concentrate on the place of women in the West, the notion of Difference also has implications for broader questions related to human sexuality53.

The Catholic Church has missed its chance with many women in the West. I suspect many are like me. I attend a parish for spiritual sustenance—it remains one of the few places one will hear in a group setting some sort of morally uplifting message—but it is not an entirely satisfactory experience unless the clergy and others in the pews display personal characteristics that illustrate a gendered maturity. O’Regan (1995) for instance talks of the letter that Pope John Paul II wrote to women in 1995 which, while “quite remarkable . . . [for the fact] it was written at all”, caused “scarcely a ripple” (p.127) among women she knew:

> . . . maybe a cartoon in Time magazine at the time was saying something significant. It showed the Pope with his red cloak and long white cassock flying as he hurries up the path clutching a large bouquet of flowers. The caption read, “I’m sorry, ladies, to be so late!” (p. 127)

He was thirty years too late according to O’Regan. He wouldn’t have found many of us still living at the same address.

The problem is of course, where do we go? As Tacey (2004) observes, the educated Catholic has a problem. We live in the secular world created by Protestantism but for us a “Protestant-style faith . . . is

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53 Where I *would* have sympathy with the sentiments expressed in the *Letter* is that, with women’s greater role in *Work*, the other aspect of Freud’s concern, the field of *Love*, is being left somewhat orphaned and devalued. Where I differ from the *Letter* however is in saying that while both of these archetypal concerns are vital, it is both men and women that must seek to keep them both healthy.
too rational, cerebral, wordy and not sacramental enough” (pp. 166-167). We somehow have to grapple with modernity and post-modernity, a context that holds our faith as some sort of hangover of “medieval superstition” (p. 167).

One beacon of hope for me in resolving this question has been an ex- and multiple award-winning teacher in the New York education system—John Gatto—who saw the need to change the system and felt the need to get out of it to do so. While not a Protestant himself, he saw how American Protestantism gave a clue as to how to do so. He saw that the “particular genius of American spirituality” primarily came from the Protestant reformation in Britain which was “a protest against system itself”.

This independent and dissenting religious tradition shifted responsibility for salvation from the political system to the individual... The American genius was to locate wisdom in ordinary people, whereas every other government on earth located it in an aristocracy, theocracy, military class, or counterfeit meritocracy. (Gatto, 2001, pp. 172, 175)

Catholicism is another one of those systems. It will become evident in these pages that, rather than wait for the attentions of a so-called “catholic” organization that cannot appreciate the generic experience of half of its citizens, this thesis will outline an option for Catholicism that takes as normative that half of the population that can appreciate both its own and the experience of the normative culture to which it has had to adapt over the centuries and indeed millennia.\(^{54}\)

\(^{54}\) Schaeff (1981) recounts an incident in her early career that makes this point very clearly:

The White Male System sees its mythology as all-knowing and all-revealing. In truth, however, it is just the opposite. I realized this most clearly many years ago when I was doing a workshop on racial issues in a Southern state. (This was during the heyday of the civil rights movement, when school districts were required to sponsor workshops on this topic in order to keep their public funding.) The group I was working with was about half Blacks and half whites. Neither side wanted to disturb the tenuous equilibrium they had established thus far, and they invited me in because I was perceived as essentially harmless.

I had designed a relatively simple exercise I wanted to try out on the group in order to generate some data. I asked the participants to draw three columns on a sheet of paper. In the first, they were to list those characteristics which they perceived as uniquely Black. In the second, they were to list those they perceived as uniquely white. In the third, they were to list characteristics they saw as common to both groups.

After explaining what I wanted the group to do, I sat down to wait. After a while, the anxiety in the room became almost palpable. I decided to find out what was happening.

I found that the Blacks had done precisely what I had asked them to do. Because they knew the Black system, they had been able to list characteristics they perceived as uniquely Black. Because they also knew the White Male System—they had to in order to survive—they had been able to list characteristics they saw as uniquely white. They were ready to move on to the third column.

The whites were having great difficulty completing the exercise, however. Because they knew nothing about the Black system, they could not do column one. Because they could not see the White Male System for what it is (one has to experience non-pollution before being able to recognize pollution), they could not do column two either. Increasingly frustrated, most of them had gone directly to column three. They had decided to ignore the differences between the two systems (“Let's not look at differences. Differences separate us!”) and focus instead on common characteristics (“Let's look at ways in which we're alike and ignore the experience of being Black in the White Male System!”).

In addition, as often happens in educational groups, the whole group had started cheating. People were looking at one another's papers. When the whites saw that the Blacks had been able to come up with answers for the first two columns, they became agitated (“What do they know that we don't know—and how can this be?”). When the Blacks saw that the whites had not been able to come up with answers for those two columns, they felt exposed. (“We cannot let them know that we know that they don't know more. We'll lose our jobs if they find that we know they aren't superior.”)

What the group had just experienced was a full-fledged myth-breaker. The whites were not superior and did not know more than the Blacks. In fact, the Blacks knew more. They had to. They had learned all about the White Male System because they needed to in order to survive in it. Because the whites did not have to know the Black system to survive, the whites had learned little or nothing about the Black system. The only way for them to find out about it would have been for Blacks to teach it to them, and that had not happened. Nor was it likely to happen.

Both sides were exhausted by this exercise. The whites were supposed to be innately superior and all-knowing—but they could not come up with answers! The Blacks were trying to support the myth that whites were innately superior and all-knowing—in order to keep their jobs—but they had completed the exercise. Sometimes it is difficult to remember what one is not supposed to know! The myth was that the whites knew more. The reality was that the Blacks did. (pp. 13-15, latter emphasis added)
The system itself is the problem, when access to material power is seen as a zero-sum game—the survival of the fittest—the world according to Dawkins’ (1989) selfish gene and individual evolutionary selection. Moreover, it is a system of privilege in which, in feminist Michael Kimmel’s (2008) view, “Privilege is invisible to those who have it”. Connell (2009) calls it “the patriarchal dividend” which takes the form of money income but also “authority, respect, service, safety, housing, access to institutional power, emotional support, and control over one’s life” (p. 142). However, Camille Paglia’s admirable men fare none too well in the world they have created in the terrifying existential state of affairs we find ourselves in, pitted against an unfeeling and monstrous Nature: “…to be beyond is to be exiled from the center of life. They wander the earth seeking satisfaction, craving and despising, never content. There is nothing in that anguished motion for women to envy” (Paglia, 1990, p. 19).

The “craving and despising” and “anguished motion” are centre stage in another anecdote that Schaef (1981) recounts:

When one clings to the myth of innate superiority, one must constantly overlook the virtues and abilities of others.

Nevertheless, the mere thought that these myths might not be truisms terrifies White Male System persons. I have seen proof of this over and over again. Once, when I was lecturing on this subject to a group of professional men and women, I noticed one of the men becoming increasingly agitated. When he could sit still no longer (he started pacing back and forth at the far end of the room), I finally stopped and asked him to tell us what he was experiencing.

“If what you are saying is true,” he said, “then I am nothing but a piece of shit.”

“I don't think I was implying that,” I answered. “Can you tell us more?”

“Well,” he went on—and these were his exact words—“if I'm not innately superior and I don't know and understand everything, then I'm nothing but a piece of shit, just like the rest of you!” (pp. 11-12, emphasis in the original)

This is the dark side of a system—a system where one is fundamentally defined by what one does (a human doing) than by what one is (a human being). Relationship of course still exists (for example, Smith and Mackie’s (2000, p. 17) social goal of “Seeking connectedness”) but as the poor cousin of what I postulate, by way of the existence of the patriarchal dividend, is the stronger masculine motivation towards “striving for mastery” (Smith and Mackie, 2000, p. 17), a masculine preoccupation that ultimately resulted in the disintegration of the medieval world view (and the latter’s world view centering that “mastery” elsewhere, in “God”).

Chesterton (1909), a strong albeit complex critic of modernity, and a fellow exponent of Catholicism (after a period of atheism which leads me to theorise he was a Fowlerian Stage 5 thinker), talked of modernity as a time full of wild and wasted virtues55, for the reason that (as we saw above with the shoe fetishist) it split up the whole and failed to see the vital and specific interrelationships of the parts. Modesty for example moved from the organ of ambition to “the organ of conviction; where it was never

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55 Chesterton’s (1909) prose is always worth quoting in full:

The modern world is not evil; in some ways the modern world is far too good. . . . When a religious scheme is shattered (as Christianity was shattered at the Reformation), it is not merely the vices that are let loose. The vices are, indeed, let loose, and they wander and do damage. But the virtues are let loose also; and the virtues wander more wildly, and the virtues do more terrible damage. The modern world is full of the old Christian virtues gone mad. The virtues have gone mad because they have been isolated from each other and are wandering alone. Thus some scientists care for truth; and their truth is pitiless. Thus some humanitarians only care for pity; and their pity (I am sorry to say) is often untruthful. . . . But a much stronger case than these two of truth and pity can be found in the remarkable case of the dislocation of humility. . . . what we suffer from to-day is humility in the wrong place. Modesty has moved from the organ of ambition. Modesty has settled upon the organ of conviction; where it was never meant to be. A man was meant to be doubtful about himself, but undoubting about the truth; this has been exactly reversed. Nowadays the part of a man that a man does assert is exactly the part he ought not to assert—himself. The part he doubts is exactly the part he ought not to doubt—the Divine Reason. . . . Every day one comes across somebody who says that of course his view may not be the right one. Of course his view must be the right one, or it is not his view . . . . (pp. 50 - 54)
meant to be” (p. 53). His prophecy accords with the phenomenon of the so-called “wishy washy liberal” who knows more of what s/he is “against” rather than what s/he is “for”.

It is that active discernment whereby an individual reaches “his view”, that is the best potential legacy of the Enlightenment. But the Enlightenment was fundamentally flawed according to Maxwell (1984) because it wasn’t rational enough. That is the basis he says of the problems identified by such commentators as Appleyard (1992) and I would add Schaef (1981) to their number, the latter identifying Science as the religion of the White Male System. Haidt (2012), a modern, secular, liberal experimental psychologist, identifies what he calls “the rationalist delusion” (p. 28) whereby the “strategic” reasoning employed by left brain processes (what the neuroscientist Gazzaniga calls “the interpreter module”) (Haidt, 2012, p. 329)) comes after intuition and merely makes up a good reason to rationalise behaviour. “Striving for Mastery” is at the centre of the rationalist delusion as Haidt (2012) describes it while not putting it in those exact terms: as well as being a claim about the essential nature of human nature, it’s “also a claim that the rational caste (philosophers or scientists) should have more power” (p. 88). Therein lies the problem with humility no longer controlling “the organ of ambition”.

As for the stereotypical feminine values, the seeking of connectedness, to return to the Letter, our “individual active discernment” invites a look at those exemplified in Mary of listening, welcoming, and humility, implying one guesses—it’s never quite made explicit—that women had better get back to them. This thesis prefers the reinterpretation of Jung that Tacey (1997) describes: that the masculine and feminine archetypes are present in both men and women. Both men and women need to get back to those values (and to be fair the Letter does perhaps make this point too). Those virtues represent (because such virtues are repressed in men) an Hegelian antithesis whereby all can become fully human . . . as will be discussed in what follows. However, and this is to bring in another view from Luce Irigaray, who, perhaps like many women, doesn’t want to be a mere copy of a man. (The fact that they have to be is probably inflicting a degree of psychic cultural harm.) Irigaray positively valorises sexual difference: “quite literally, the fate of the world lies in this difference: either a totalitarian neutralisation or a culture in which the drama of sexual alterity will bring about unprecedented and unimagined creativity” (Kerr, 1997, pp.100-101). While superficially this appears similar to the Letter, while Irigaray was brought up a Roman Catholic, it is certainly not Irigaray’s intention to subscribe to phallocentric propaganda as this thesis believes the Letter fundamentally is.

In that light, and in reading the Letter, sexual difference can also include radical differences in interpretation. Its identification of the traits of Mary—the listening, the welcoming, and the humility—can be interpreted in ways that take them further from those the Church fathers might have been intending. We can take Irigaray’s advice and perform an embodied feminine theological exercise. Women can take the half-seed that men are offering—that which is necessary but not sufficient. They can combine that seed with their own and move things forward through a nine month gestation. So listening—yes, as a preliminary to judgement and decision: a judgement of So what? for the stillborn, or one of What if? for the authentic possibility. Welcoming—yes, as a preliminary to vigorous conversation between equals: one can ask, Who suffers and who benefits from your world view? Humility—yes, as a preliminary to the searing cosmological perceptions of the Magnificat. Those who are marginalised are important to me and to the cosmos. Yes—we can say—there is most definitely a difference, and it’s time it got a public voice. At least we had better hope there is a “difference” somewhere; we are in deep trouble if there isn’t. More of the same will mean more of the problems that currently beset us.

It is that perception of the offerings of men within the context of something much larger (which includes both them and the unique “genius” of women as Pope John Paul II put it, although not in the “post” sense that I am using it) that is important. Tarnas (1991) postulates “a threefold mutually enforced prison of modern alienation” (p. 419): “the cosmological estrangement of modern consciousness initiated by Copernicus and the ontological estrangement initiated by Descartes were completed by the

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56 Chapter 7 will give a fuller outline of Maxwell’s views on rationality.
epistemological estrangement initiated by Kant” (p. 419). This is where we at present stand. That is the offering that the masculine systemic progress has produced. Tarnas also quotes Freud’s three blows to “man’s naive pride and self-love” (p. 422): Copernicus’s heliocentric theory, Darwin’s theory of evolution, and Freudian psychoanalysis. However, in Jung’s development of the latter, especially when he had thrown off the “Cartesian-Kantian philosophical assumptions” (p. 425) of his earlier years and gone forward into theology and metaphysics, he began to reverse the alienation in a search which was also remarkable for the number of women who supported it.

We can place these developments within a larger metaphor—an organic one similar to the one used above in relation to the conception and development of the human child—and one that McGilchrist (2009) refuses to illustrate recent scientific advances in the understanding of the human brain. It is Hegel’s metaphor of the developing plant until it blooms—the “German aufhebung . . . [which] . . . positively includes the idea of being preserved, as well as transformed” (p. 204).\(^57\)

Is Tacey’s depth psychology an answer? It has certainly played a major part in my understanding of my own life as it has developed within a system that seems to have been largely inimical to a process that seems in the order of things to require some sort of death for anything to bloom. Gilligan (2002) identifies the problem of the human condition as a masculine Freudian neurosis which occurs in early unconscious life and which both sexes must then necessarily live with. This is where the more forward-looking and broader-based psychology of Jung can come into play. Tacey (2004) uses it to explore with his students the experiences of their individual lives, an exploration which he says is now essential with the experiential turn that religion—or more accurately spirituality—has taken, even while implicitly acknowledging the Western Christian metanarrative upon which individual experiences can be understood. However, analysis of one’s unconscious depths forces one to embark on a journey into images and not into words. The answers therefore are not easily deciphered. They need time and introspection for their insights to be revealed which in turn do not remain constant or fixed. They require a different set of capabilities and a much longer gestation. Again we find ourselves in the realm of difference. Where will all this lead us? That is something Time will determine.

However, some of us can make attempts at guessing what our culture might become. So far this chapter has covered some cultural facets that I theorise can and will move modernity and post-modernity on, and these are differences that, in their clash with opposites, can lead to the creation of something . . . not so much new, but hidden within the capabilities of our Western culture if we do but see and appreciate them. So I, or more specifically the scholars canvassed above, starting with Rilke, have described some of these differences and latent capabilities: the need to embrace Solitude; the importance of Love and one’s Agency within it; the significance of Age as a Ripening; the difference represented in and the potential derived from the Agency and Maturation of Women as a way of making us all more Human; as part of that, the possibilities of accepting, but also overcoming, our Evolutionary Inheritance and its relatively narrow sexual-selective legacy; the manifestations of that evolutionary legacy in Murdoch’s Social Convention and Neurosis; Catholicism’s backwardness in relation to both of those (i.e. social convention and neurosis); the necessity of developing an appreciation of the Whole rather than the one neurotic Part that Protestantism and its legacy have disproportionately valorised as the result of the flawed Enlightenment; but also Luce Irigaray’s naming of the important opportunity lying within western culture

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57 He extends it as follows:

What is offered by the right hemisphere to the left hemisphere is offered back again and taken up into a synthesis involving both hemispheres. This must be true of the processes of creativity, of the understanding of works of art, of the development of the religious sense. In each there is a progress from an intuitive apprehension of whatever it may be, via a more formal process of enrichment through conscious, detailed analytic understanding, to a new, enhanced intuitive understanding of this whole, now transformed by the process that it has undergone.

This idea, though difficult, is critically important . . . (p.206)

Chapter 8 will look into these ideas more closely.
whereby the Enlightenment can eventually lead to *Alterity’s Blooming and Ripening* as a corrective process in *Time* and *Space*. 
Chapter 3

THE PROBLEMS OF FEAR AND INDIFFERENCE

The spirits of indignation and of charity took terrible and attractive forms, ranging from that monkish fierceness that scourged like a dog the first and greatest of the Plantagenets, to the sublime pity of St. Catherine, who, in the official shambles, kissed the bloody head of the criminal. Poetry could be acted as well as composed. This heroic and monumental manner in ethics has entirely vanished with supernatural religion. They, being humble, could parade themselves: but we are too proud to be prominent. Our ethical teachers write reasonably for prison reform; but we are not likely to see Mr. Cadbury, or any eminent philanthropist, go into Reading Gaol and embrace the strangled corpse before it is cast into the quicklime. Our ethical teachers write mildly against the power of millionaires; but we are not likely to see Mr. Rockefeller, or any modern tyrant, publicly whipped in Westminster Abbey. (Chesterton, 1909, p. 176)

Our human senses rebel at the thought of embracing the bloody and—it is implied—the broken dead body of a reviled stranger, but there are people in our society who similarly deal with the unwelcome sights and smells of the bodily fluids of strangers on a daily basis. They are usually among our lowest paid citizens if they are paid at all, and they are represented by those who clean—say in hospitals, those who look after the elderly in rest homes, or those who tend to the basic, albeit familial bodily needs of those at either end of the lifespan in domestic settings.

The two characters in the quotation above are related by both love and courage and the absence of their opposites—indifference and fear. If the masculine principle was exerted more in the manner of Thomas à Beckett (a medieval version of “speaking truth to power”), or by a woman like him, there’s a good chance that there might be fewer criminals. If the feminine principle was exerted more in the manner of Catherine, or by a man like her, there is a good chance there might be less need for some to neurotically amass wealth and power. It is no accident that in a culture built on indifference and fear, the occupants in jails are disproportionately from the ranks of the disadvantaged.

At the centre of western Christian religion, there is a depiction of a criminal body, which at its death (we are informed in scriptural accounts) had drained itself of most of its bodily fluids during the rigours of a brutal and excruciating death. And it is this radical and assaulting image that Beck (2008) describes, through the lens of terror management theory, as inviting a “queasy ambivalence” manifested for example through the psychology of Gnosticism and the heresy of Docetism. This death is also presented as being a fundamentally “for-othered” event (Bernier, 1981), thereby also entering the field of an ethic that is as virile and compassionate as the two itemised in the quotation above. In fact it provides the model on which Catherine’s and Thomas’s ethics were based.

Today, “passion” is a word much evoked to explain one’s attitude to a chosen career, that is, to that aspect of life through which we achieve a great proportion of our social meaning and status. That is, our work (and its monetary and social rewards) allows us to hold our atomised heads higher or lower depending on the social milieu we move in. The passion with which Catherine and Thomas approached their respective tasks was however a “for-othered” passion, with, as Chesterton surmises, a complete disregard for their respective milieux, a point understood, as Chesterton did for his time, if one imagines the public reactions if both scenarios were acted out today. Similarly, much new and old age religion (that which is psychologically characterised as “extrinsic religiousness” (Allport, 1950)), can be characterised as dwelling more on the self-centred “ego” dimension of life than the “eco” dimension in its better “other-centred” meaning.

That “eco” dimension, or relatedness, is a concept that is central to sociology, just as a concentration on the individual—the “ego” dimension—is the focus of psychology. Buechler (2008) provides a compelling image of the importance—in fact the pre-eminence—of relatedness in critical sociology (that type of neo-Marxist sociology based on critical theory and “dedicated to progressive social change” (p. x)) in this account of the sociograph:
This however is not to deny the importance of the circles. For those they represent, the self is an allimportant responsibility—in fact, Leary (2004) refers to it as a “curse”—which is not to deny the potential for a profound existential joy that an individual life can also come to represent and experience.

For this thesis, both areas of study—the “eco”/sociology and the “ego”/psychology—are important; like the personifications of compassion and indignation in Catherine and Thomas, they are, as Chesterton (1909) puts it, “two colours co-existent but pure . . . rather like a shot silk for a shot silk is always at right angles, and is in the pattern of the cross” (p. 177). It is this image that Maxwell (1984) also conjures up for his amalgamation of fact and value—two more “co-existent but pure” realities that he believed were mistakenly—and neurotically—cut asunder in the Enlightenment. It is his concept of “value reality” which will be used as a stand-in for the terms “faith” and “religion” when necessary, given that a “value reality” is what religion describes and faith trusts in, however those values might have been corrupted in day-to-day life. It is reasonably obvious that Maxwell believes this value reality must be “man-made”, but, ultimately, we cannot know what sort of “value reality” it is that we live in—benevolent, malevolent, neutral and/or indifferent.

While we may stand enclosed by what Fowler (1981) calls this “mystery of the abyss” (that is when we actually think in those sorts of terms), Christianity postulates its own version of what that mystery might consist of. As Rolheiser (2004, p. 142) states, ultimately “there is no neutral middle ground on which to experience it without ultimate graciousness or ultimate void invading it”. We all make something up for ourselves because, unlike Camus’s L’Etranger, we can’t live without “a teleology that holds . . . [our] lives together”—that motivates those lives, and gives them a sense of purpose and destiny, inciting us as a result “to love and hate with some zest”.

Rolheiser (2004) employs Langdon Gilkey to show that atheism is not natural to us, but that idolatry is. We all attribute value and power to something; we genuflect before some sort of absolute . . .

... be that Yahweh, Allah, Krishna, Brahmin, Mother Earth, an ideology, an astrological sign, the harmony of the planets, universal love, an aesthetic ideal, the beauty of the human body, the power of romance or sex, or a political, social, moral, or ecological cause. Everyone invests something with the attributes of God and then lives obediently to that lord and sacrifices and worships accordingly. As many a poet has put it, we find salvation in surrender. (p. 153)

Even those—especially those—who leave their fortunes to their pets, testify to their choice of idolatry. For this thesis however, the “centre of value and power” (Fowler, 1981) will be “post-Protestant Catholicism” as a specific example of Christianity. Thomas and Catherine may have gotten there before us even though they lived in a medieval world, and they may have each represented in their way a gendered response that was typical for their times, but they represent an ego and eco response that in our time can be expressed, through the paradox that Chesterton describes above, as a totality, a whole; as different aspects of a response that must now be welded together and thereby overcome the split that has always been present, but which has reached its zenith within modernity.

I will be arguing therefore for a re-working and a sociological re-imagining of western religion in a postor para-secular age as it looks to find the rejected cornerstone that lies among the detritus of a 2000-yearold building site. Inasmuch as science and religion are both—usually triumphalist—postulations about the nature of the fact and value of the world and cosmos we live in, Catherine and Thomas represent radical challenges to what that fact and value is currently taken to be. What needs to be established is how our capabilities, and our ideas and values, and our means of social control, within modernity and now post-
modernity, can lead us to a world in which the ethics of Catherine and Thomas, while never being a total social reality, can come to gradually solidify the existential ideals of Christianity. It is postulated that it will be only then, that the value reality espoused by the social, gains an enchantment which, when it becomes emergent, earns its own capital E. However, it is suggested that only by confronting our existential “queasy ambivalence” about embodiment, through a turn to what the psychology of religion calls “intrinsic religiousness”, that this can be brought about.
Chapter 4
TRANSFORMATION, RELATEDNESS, APPRECIATION AND DIFFERENCE

The Christian religion has always been thoroughly political. . . . Briefly, Christians find God in their neighbour rather than in their consciousness or in the cosmos. (Davis, 1993/4, p. 58 quoted in Kirwan, 2008, p. 3)

Christianity asserts as the highest act . . . the gesture of separation . . . The pagan criticism that the Christian insight is not “deep enough”, that it fails to grasp the primordial One-All, therefore misses the point: Christianity is the miraculous Event that disturbs the balance of the One-all; it is the violent intrusion of Difference that precisely throws the balanced circuit of the universe off the rails. (Zizek, p. 121, quoted in Kirwan, 2008, p. 49)

. . . science suffers from a damaging but rarely noticed methodological disease, which I call rationalistic neurosis. It is not just the natural sciences which suffer from this condition. The contagion has spread to the social sciences, to philosophy, to the humanities more generally, and to education. The whole academic enterprise, indeed, suffers from versions of the disease. (Maxwell, 2004, p. ix)

The three quotations above offer a glimpse of what is meant by key words in the thesis heading. That is, what does “transformation” mean with regard to (1) “relatedness”, (2) “appreciation”, and (3) “difference”, in the Western context?

Firstly, Davis’s quotation settles “relatedness” ultimately onto the Other58, and, in the Christian tradition, this Other is defined (in the parable of the Good Samaritan) as the foreign neighbour, making it therefore an inherently political issue. To put this into its religious context, Davis’s comments can be placed into the context of the Great Commandment which states the order in which we love, as God, our self, then our neighbour. However, the paradox in a Christian cosmos in which human hierarchies are inverted, transforms this into the pre-eminent position being given to the neighbour.

In the second quotation, “difference” can be defined in the present day West as the difference between New Age mysticism (which harks back to the monism of paganism), and a Christian reconceptualization of an alternative reality, which, as Barr (2003) maintains (using the reconceptualisation of physics at the turn of the last century) has become “credible” again. And by exposing the value of Christianity as the assertion of “separation” rather than the One-All of paganism, relatedness becomes an individual choice rather than a structural compulsion built into the “One-All”. Chesterton (1909) puts it this way: “If souls are separate love is possible” (p. 242).59

“Difference” can also be assessed in relation to many other sorts of difference which I intend to examine: there is the difference between cultures (real and hypothetical) founded predominantly either on the “masculine” systemising or on the “feminine” empathising principle60, and, as a consequence of that, and the dominance of “masculine” systemising cultures overall, the difference between two of those “feminine” cultures, one that exists and another that is in the throes of coming to birth (see the description of Figure 4.3 below) the latter of which will be a central focus of the thesis. 61

58 I have some issues with Davis’ seeming exclusion of “consciousness” and “cosmos” as I think relatedness extends to them as well, but I agree with Davis to the extent that relatedness to the neighbour is the end to which these forms of relatedness, as means, are directed.
59 Love however is not inevitable. Therein lies the possibility of choice, a choice I would interpret as consequent on the knowledge of good and evil as it is referred to within the mythology of the Genesis creation stories.
60 These differences will be defined in relation to two theories: that of Fowler (1981) which looks at the stages of faith that an individual passes through over the life span (the theory itself being based on other human development theories) and that of Baron-Cohen (2003) who postulates two fundamental forms of functioning in human culture which are systemising and empathising, and that there is a gender difference in the predominance of one over the other. This is echoed in Jung’s personality typology where he contrasts “Thinking” (T) and “Feeling/Valuing” (F) ways of making decisions in life. As Mitroff (1998) notes, F-dominant personality types value difference more than T-dominant personality types.
61 The distinction between the two types of feminine—or “eco”—culture that I will be describing, cannot be over-estimated, and it can possibly be understood in relation to this quotation from Chesterton (1909) which builds on the fundamental idea of separation at the heart of Western religion and thereby the necessary respect there must be for difference:
While this difference between Baron-Cohen’s systemising and empathising dimensions (mirroring those of Freud’s Work and Love it should be noted) is the preliminary focus of Difference in this thesis, there are other meanings that come into play after the resolutions/dissolutions/solutions (Mitroff, 1998) of that dominant Difference within an appreciation of the Whole. There is the Difference at the level of the personal whereby, each of us, as a unique being, brings Difference to our societies. In addition, by the end of this thesis, Difference will come to have its most profound meaning—as a function of that Difference—as necessary for Relatedness. The meaning here is Difference as complementarity. This summons up the conception of the Whole within which all Difference comes to have its meaning. This switches Catholicism from an “ego” concern about getting converts, a process that historically sat uncomfortably alongside the brute forces of colonialism, to a more “eco” inquiry into what Difference those conversions bring into the fold. This notion of complementarity can lead us to another appreciation of Difference; the difference that the Christian religion represents within the panoply of those that humanity has either divined (—or “dreamt up” depending on one’s notion of religion). Quite simply, Christianity and its central figure are odd. While Catholicism “makes up for it” by instituting celebrations of Christ’s “mastery” like the Feast of Christ the King, its central imagery remains one of a body of this so-called “master” in agony on an instrument of torture at the behest of both an imperial power and native religious authorities. This imagery has not always been so dominant in the course of the Church’s history, but it is the dominant one today. It is true that this image has been used as a rationale for hating one of the causes of this agony (i.e. anti-Semitism), yet the final words and the core message that emerged from the figure on this cross were not about revenge, and blame, but forgiveness. This Difference, encapsulated in Jesus, requires an explanation and a defence in a milieu that often times despises Him and his religion.

This Difference in Christianity is also not a figment of my Catholic imagination. Moral psychology, for example, has started to make a similar secular point. The West really is different. Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) identify what they call WEIRD societies whereby people who grow up in Western, Educated, Industrial, Rich and Democratic societies are frequent statistical outliers in many domains such as fairness, cooperation, self-concepts and related motivations, and moral reasoning.62

There is a lot more to be said on this subject, but just to summarise it at this early point, it is my contention that the Protestant Reformation played a very necessary part in the institution of the West’s core genius63 and that the stress on the importance of individuality is a big part of that. Something more—something different—is now needed for the fulfilment of that genius, but, taken as a whole, Judeo-Christianity is a very necessary difference that underlies the west. Something now needs to rescue that genius from its moribund excrescences and contemptuous critics at this particular time in history. T. S. Eliot is an important guide in this quest for relatedness. His famous quotation from Little Gidding both appreciates a return to the place from whence we came and the fact that it is only then that we can know it for the first time.64 Eliot’s Murder in the Cathedral provides a clue to the meaning of this ambiguity by...

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All those vague theosophical minds for whom the universe is an immense melting-pot are exactly the minds which shrink instinctively from that earthquake saying of our Gospels, which declare that the Son of God came not with peace but with a sundering sword. The saying rings entirely true even considered as what it obviously is; the statement that any man who preaches real love is bound to beget hate. It is as true of democratic fraternity as of divine love; sham love ends in compromise and common philosophy; but real love has always ended in bloodshed. Yet there is another and yet more awful truth behind the obvious meaning of this utterance of our Lord. According to Himself the Son was a sword separating brother and brother that they should for an aeon hate each other. But the Father also was a sword, which in the black beginning separated brother and brother, so that they should love each other at last. (pp. 244-245)

It must also be pointed out here that I am making the case for empathising to be the dominant rationale for the life of humankind. In a “man’s world” this is not the case, but at its best, that man’s world promises to lead us to a second-order empathising which is not solely domestic in its focus. Christianity is, importantly, not a domestic religion. For those individuals who are singled out for action on a wider stage, there is a need for domesticity to give way to broader considerations where necessary and appropriate.

62 Others less related to the moral domains that I am chiefly concerned with are visual perception, spatial reasoning, categorization and inferential induction, reasoning styles, and the heritability of IQ.

63 Although I do not agree with his politics, Niall Ferguson in his work on western civilisation (2011) charts the reasons for the West’s progress and the ways Protestantism was responsible for a significant part of it.

64 The full quotation from Little Gidding is as follows: “We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time.”
clearly stipulating the crucial importance of doing the right thing and doing it for the right reason. Rather than trumpeting a simplistic call back to fundamentals, I will be making the case that the patriarchy of contemporary Catholicism is the biggest part of its problem in the sense that it formulates moral problems from a predominantly masculine point of view, and that that (its “wrong reason”) corrupts what it seeks to achieve. A church that seeks to do right would not do things for the wrong motives, and, as long as it remains a masculine organization, there can be no denouement of its task. Acting badly for reasons of which one is unconscious is a marker of neurosis, a neurosis which now needs healing.

To return now to the last quotation with which this chapter began, it is based on 30 years of writing in which Nicholas Maxwell has developed his thesis about the need in science for a philosophy of wisdom to include but supersede the pervasive and ubiquitous philosophy of knowledge. The quote points to the wider problem of neurosis that can be generally said to underpin individual lives as well as collective life in the West. In fact it could be said to collectively define humankind—a religare of global human life, but a religare that few wish to acknowledge. In fact the human tendency is to project one’s neuroses on to the different Other who thereby functions like the scapegoat of biblical repute. As Maxwell (2004) goes on to say with reference to the collective type, “…one of the most damaging features of rationalistic neurosis is that it has built-in methodological and institutional mechanisms which effectively conceal that anything is wrong” (p ix). This self-sealing is by definition egocentric, and therefore, an open, energetic and honest dialogue with the Other is needed to potentially expose the truths hidden within, and by, that process of self-sealing.

As Davis intimates above, Christianity is, or should be, in the final analysis, ecocentric. Finally, in the context of Maxwell’s thinking, “appreciation” of the Other must be both a cognitive and a valuing exercise. As referred to above, if we are “to love our neighbours as ourselves”, there must be an active participation of the thinking and feeling self in the interchange.

The mixing of cultural populations as a result of globalisation provides an opportunity for dialogue with very different others, although many would define that process as something altogether less positive than this. What Maxwell defines as the New Enlightenment is also integral to the process, because it provides a hand-hold of reason whereby critics of western modernity, who are nevertheless defenders of reason, may be able to find some sort of grip for their concerns.

Reason is absolutely integral to Maxwell’s (2004) vision. He acknowledges the critics of science but also points out their genesis as echoes of the Romantic opposition named by Isaiah Berlin as the “Counter-Enlightenment”. Maxwell’s list, rightly or wrongly, includes the Frankfurt School, post-modernists and writers such as Lawrence and Lessing in fiction, and Appleby in non-fiction, as well as sociologists and historians of various stripes. He acknowledges their criticisms but defies their content by claiming his criticisms as diametrically opposed “in so far as the above criticisms oppose scientific rationality, seek to diminish or restrict its influence, or hold that it is unattainable” (p. xi):

65 A neurotic condition occurs when unconscious contents of the psyche are manifested in disturbed thinking and behaviour. The splitting of consciousness into archetypal masculine and feminine elements, and then the projection of the feminine content of the masculine mind onto women is the dominant neurosis I have in mind. This neurosis will be examined in Part 2 of this thesis.
66 Maxwell’s philosophy of knowledge is manifest in the norm of academic scholarship which consists of the acquisition of knowledge. Maxwell believes the acquisition of knowledge should be embedded within a system of overt presuppositions and overt cultural meanings and values. His philosophy of wisdom recommends cooperative, aim-oriented rationality as a model of inquiry into an integration of fact and value. This requires a societal revision from the question, How do we acquire knowledge? to questions like What do we want? and, How should we live?
67 Reference can also be made here to the writings of Chris Argyris who has done extensive research on the phenomenon of self-sealing in business contexts. His work will be the focus of Chapter 11 in Part Two.
68 It can be argued—and will be—that globalisation is the challenge that Christianity is best designed to receive. In fact it could be said to need to receive that challenge if it is not to become moribund.
69 The process of globalisation is of course not designed as a cultural or a specifically Christian exercise. As Buechler (2008) notes, it has been set in motion by economic elites wishing to garner more power and influence. Nevertheless, Christianity has latched onto the coat-tails of the “global” movements of egregious empires before (i.e. the Roman Empire).
70 And even those who are not, who, nevertheless, may prod hitherto unconscious values into revealing themselves.
My central point is that we suffer not from too much scientific rationality, but from not enough. What is generally taken to constitute scientific rationality is actually nothing of the kind. It is rationalistic neurosis, a characteristic, influential and damaging kind of irrationality masquerading as rationality . . . (p. xi)

The throwing out of both water that may be occasioned by a searing look at ourselves as the Other sees us, as well as by the many problems (war, hunger, environmental despoliation) that Maxwell enumerates as evidence of Western relational dysfunction with regard to the Different, should not however extend to the baby that represents what is valuable and non-neurotic in culture. Capability in culture includes the worthy and the unworthy, and the wisdom will, as the saying goes, lie in knowing the difference.

Intimations of an alternative culture have already been introduced by way of the figures of Thomas and Catherine above. Those two figures now need contextualising. Catherine and Thomas embodied choices that each of us must make and live out in the mundane flatlands of our lives. They chose instead of Indifference and Fear, Love—or Compassion—and Courage. More notably however, they chose a countercultural way to express that Love and Courage: an embodied Love for the despised and possibly “infected” “outsider”, and an embodied Courage by flouting an authority figure who could, and ultimately did, kill his accuser. Figure 4.1 shows these choices graphically.

What however determines who is an “outsider” and who is in “authority”? Flatland is not really flat. We live as well in the context of a man-made vertical system71, one made by Ego and supported by Eco (see Figure 4.2). Catherine and Thomas had a vertical system too for their versions of Ego and Eco and their model radically deviated from the man-made cultural norm. Nevertheless, to appreciate the two versions of reality more clearly, we need to place “normal” Ego and Eco within their evolutionary and personal histories and thereby understand why Catherine and Thomas’s actions were so revolutionary. That concept of a patriarchal ecosystem will be developed in the next chapter. It was however built on human capability within our “cultural survival vehicles” (Pagel, 2012); the “vehicles” that appropriated the most power were the ones that “won”, as represented by the succession of Empires that have waxed and waned across the globe.

Capability is dependent on development and growth. Theories of human development over the lifespan are many and varied and focus on different facets of development. Theories of humanity’s development are also varied ranging from evolutionary psychological theory to historical interpretations of human progress. Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith theory can be used to amalgamate both these fields of human progress.

Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith theory
A “stages of faith” theory is important because religion, to which faith is related, as a theory of culture, is central to this process, even if, as in the West, there is the belief among many that we have grown beyond it. However, these discussions have their basis in a Western secularity that not only must be defined in association with religion, but which also has its roots in Protestant Christianity.

71 Pagel (2012) provides a helpful summary of these vertical systems over recorded history.

Until perhaps 10,000 years ago, all humans lived in small hunter-gatherer bands. The invention of agriculture changed all that as having the capacity to produce rather than simply gather food meant larger numbers of people could reside in the same place. Small bands of maybe ten to three hundred people gradually came to be replaced by tribes that were effectively bands of bands. Tribes gave way to chiefdoms, in which for the first time in our history societies became centralized. There was stratification by class and the chief sat at the top of a formal hierarchy of authority. Chiefdoms eventually gave way in turn to large city-states such as Jericho (in modern-day Israel) and Çatal Hüyük in Turkey, or the Mesopotamian cities of Ur and Babylon. These were later succeeded by fledgling nation-states. (p. 346)

The latest phenomenon is the appearance of transnational corporations which, in the case of the most powerful of these, possess more economic and political power than many nation states.
Fowler’s thesis postulates an evolution of faith in seven steps from Stage 0 to Stage 6. Stage 6 in fact, the last stage, postulates the individual as the embodiment of Difference (a “relevant irrelevancy”) to the culture that s/he exists in.

Figure 1.1(a) in Chapter 1 gave the pictorial representation of Fowler’s (1981) theory showing stages along the journey of a human life in a certain direction (Stages 3 to 6 normally being adult) until the last two stages—Stages 5 and 6—where a marked change in trajectory takes place. At its most “rational”, Western society reaches Stage 4, but most adults could be classed at Stage 3 with many more at Stage 2. If this model and its proposed trajectory is valid and, if it can be applied to the development of humanity as a whole, it holds out hope for the progress of humanity at a time when that hope is sorely tested by the ongoing and serious nature of the global problems referred to above. That is, Fowler’s model may predict a future for human society that is not necessarily characterised by the replication of the destructive patterns that feature in humanity’s past and which Maxwell (2004) refers to as the products of rationalistic neurosis.

This thesis will further develop Fowler’s model within that broad trajectory outlined in Figure 1.1(a). This will be done in accordance with Maxwell’s (2004) explanation of the roots of the problem of rationalistic neurosis:

...the basic idea of the philosophes of the Enlightenment—Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet et al. [was] to learn from scientific progress how to achieve social progress towards world enlightenment. ... Unfortunately, in developing the Enlightenment idea intellectually, the philosophes blundered. ... If the basic Enlightenment idea had been properly implemented by the philosophes, the outcome would have been a kind of synthesis of Rationalism and Romanticism. (pp. 71-73)

Why did the philosophes make this fatal error? While Maxwell (2004) uses the Freudian Oedipal conflict of the young male child to explain the rationalistic neurosis itself (see Appendix 7.1), the Oedipal conflict in general can be used to structure an understanding of male-dominated Western culture and how it could be transformed. In fact the original Oedipus myth itself is central to a Christian and a feminist take on the Western predicament, as well as on the fundamental and unique value that underlies Western culture. With regard to the former (the Christian take), Girard (2001) uses the myth of Oedipus to illustrate the important difference between Oedipus’ story and the gospel story of Jesus Christ: Oedipus’ deserved downfall is told from the viewpoint of the collective culture, whereas Jesus Christ’s story privileges the viewpoint of an innocent individual victimised by a collective neurotic culture. In so doing the Jesus narrative exposes the neurosis, which, Girard maintains, myth has been at pains to conceal. This is what makes Christianity unique and the potential means by which culture can break out of its neurotic bind. As such, the establishment of Christianity can be said to form a hinge point in history—or to use another metaphor—a corrective booster rocket, that, if or when it finally does “go off” in the human psyche, will shift the trajectory of human civilisation from its current destructive orientation.

Gilligan (2002) uses Freud’s Oedipus conflict to postulate the differences between men’s and women’s development in early childhood which she uses to explain the psychoanalytic embeddedness of patriarchal culture in the male, if not in the female, mind. She also presents her interpretation of the Cupid and Psyche post-Christian myth, that this thesis will also refer to, to chart a way out of that aspect of patriarchal culture that exhibits an individual and collective “will to power” (Adler’s take on Freudian theory) into an alternative of an individual “will to meaning” (Jung’s take on and progression of Freudian theory).

72 Faith is defined variously as that on which one sets one’s heart; the centre of one’s value and power; or that which gives one’s life meaning, direction and purpose. Most potently, it is what one wagers one’s life on, what one fundamentally puts one’s trust in.

73 Being an “embodiment of difference” requires a strong ego I argue. Ego-centric egos are, on the contrary, weak egos. Strong egos—with their invisible means of support—can stand alone. Weak egos need the adulation of others.

74 This encapsulation of Stage 6 identity was one I heard in a series of lectures by John Gourley that I attended when completing my Diploma of Teaching at the Christchurch Teachers’ College in 1989.
To return to Fowler’s model with all that in mind, it is this thesis’s contention that there is a dialectic (as opposed to a dualism) built into Fowler’s model that mirrors the partnership between masculine (Egoic) and feminine (Ecoic) archetypes, Rationalism and Romanticism (Maxwell, 2004), secularity and religion, reason and emotion (Damasio, 1994), and between Jung’s Thinking and Feeling functions. While the former in each partnership is privileged in scientific and Western discourse, Damasio’s (1994) research, which Maxwell (2004) quotes, supports the close relationship that Thinking and Feeling functions, for example, must have for true rationality to occur.75

This thesis, at its simplest, will look at four possible routes for Western spirituality based on Fowler’s (1981) model and on Maxwell’s (2004) theory, as well as on the insights provided by Girard’s (2001) and Gilligan’s (2002) claims. These can be appreciated from a study of Figure 4.3.

The first thing to notice is that Figure 4.3 separates Stages 2 to 5 into either an Agency (Bakan, 1966) or Communion (Bakan, 1966) emphasis. There is also an extreme version of Agency as shown by the circle representing the Nietzschean “Overman” or “Superman” on the left. In line with Maxwell’s criticisms of Science above, there is also a distinction drawn between a management focus on “doing things right” rather than the broader and more primary visionary aim of finding “the right thing” for humanity to do within which the aim of “doing the thing right” becomes more rational.

Firstly there is the Business as usual option: at best this is a striving for original Enlightenment values within existing secular nation states where, nevertheless, a diminished type of democracy dominated by elite power structures, is practised (Buechler, 2008). In Fowler’s model, this option can be understood as a partnership between Stage 4 Agency and Stage 3 Communion.

There is the second, and the most optimistic, option prefigured by this thesis’s title: it is the option of Transformation whereby a rationally conceived life is used to serve others (an interpretation of Maxwell’s aim-oriented rationality), and, in Rohr’s (2001) extreme Christian terms, the paying of the price for others’ growth, even if one assumes, in extreme circumstances, that may mean the loss of one’s life or livelihood. In terms of Fowler’s model this takes place when a life can be characterised as at Stage 5 in faith development76. While Stage 5 is sufficient unto itself when a life can indeed be characterised as Stage 5 (Stage 4 is taken to be subsumed within the Stage 5 character), the societal value of that life nevertheless is dependent on its partnership with the means available through a Stage 4 system of governance based on Enlightenment values to effect wider societal change. So, in societal terms, this second option should perhaps be more accurately described as a Stage 5/Stage 4 partnership which replaces the Stage 4/Stage 3 partnership of Business as Usual. It is also important to note that Stage 5 represents an advance on Stage 3 Communion culture. In Figure 4.3 this is described as a Re-enchantment, and it represents the Valuing process that the philosophes omitted. While Fowler (1981) represents (quoting Sharon Parks) Stage 3 as a “tyranny of the they”, I have named Stage 5 as a “democracy of the different”. An intimation of what this change might involve is briefly sketched below, but in the meantime Tacey (2004, p. 2) describes it as a “spirituality revolution” which . . .

. . . thrusts us into a new social situation. We have not only outgrown the values and assumptions of mechanistic science and humanism, but we can no longer situate ourselves comfortably in the containment of the traditional religions. We need spiritual guidance, but for a variety of historical and social reasons we cannot return to organised religion or dogmatic theology in their old, premodern forms . . . This makes some people shudder with horror, while others rejoice at the new feeling of liberation and freedom from the strictures of the past. But Western society cannot be expected to return to antiquated systems of meaning that have not themselves been part of the long line of historical changes and revolutions that society has experienced over the recent period.

75 This also mirrors the partnership that the secular and the religious must have in the western secular state.
76 Fowler indeed makes the bold and controversial claim that attainment of Stage 5 is specifically a Christian phenomenon. As already mentioned, that postulation is supported by Girard’s (2001) claims.
Nevertheless, Tacey goes on to write, being “caught in a difficult moment in history, stuck between a secular system we have outgrown and a religious system we cannot fully embrace . . . regression to fundamentalism is always a real but counter-revolutionary possibility” (p. 2). This third option—a Retreat into a fundamentalism—this thesis will view as a refusal to come to terms with unconscious realities which is the very definition of neurosis. When using the term “retreat”, the group represented by this category (Stage 2) are not actually in a place where “retreat” is necessary because they are already there. “Retreat” as used here means a conceptual societal retreat from the category of Business as Usual into Fowler’s Stage 2 (the reverse of the progress towards Enlightenment).

Finally there is the flight into Nihilism characterised in this thesis as predominantly a Stage 3 mentality using the sophisticated technology (e.g. drugs, video games, shopping etc) that the Western Stage 4 culture is able to provide. It represents a logical extension of the trajectory up to Stage 4 into the territory occupied by Nietzsche’s Superman (what I have identified as Stage 3a on Figure 4.3); that is, it is the logical extension of the Ego function of Stage 4 at the expense of, or in individual defiance of, the more Écoci mentalities of Stages 3 and 5. As Hamilton (2008, p. 4) observes, the personal and political movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and then the liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s focused on sexuality, gender and racism, while they may have been fought ostensibly for freedom, have actually left us, as consumers, “free to be miserable in new, more insidious ways”. While he notes that “some have found promising paths [towards finding individual authenticity] in spiritual traditions or psychological ‘work’, . . . most have ended up seeking a proxy identity in the form of commodity consumption” (pp. 4-5).

Given the partiality for fundamentalist systems towards modern technology even as they reject modernity, I have classed both nihilistic excess and fundamentalist disapproval together in Figure 4.3 in the sense that both are problematic for the progress that I still postulate is possible for a Stage 4 society—a belief which is of course inherent in Fowler’s (1981) model.

These are broad brush categories and, like all categories, they reduce what is the actual complexity in any social milieu. Even in a single life there is considerable movement up and down Fowler’s stages depending on such factors as the issues being confronted and one’s self-confidence at the time. To maintain oneself at Stage 5 for example, especially if one has newly arrived there, requires considerable cognitive and emotional resources which stress and laziness may well undermine. The same applies to the wider societal adaptation of the model. Even Stage 4 requires cognitive resources which take considerable energy to maintain, although the enlightened self-interest which can be maximised at Stage 4 for those with a sufficient power base to implement it, can make the exercise of those cognitive resources less onerous albeit exercised within a narrow ambit. This latter point emphasises the importance of a strong enough Stage 5 conceptualisation of value to steer Stage 4 means in the right direction.

**Bauman’s “artists of life” metaphor**

Maxwell’s thesis can be further illustrated through recourse to an analogy in which Jung’s Thinking and Feeling functions are indeed closely related. Bauman (2008) states that, in our individualised society, we are all “artists of life” constructing and narrating our life trajectories. The agency of artistry is indeed a potent metaphor for change given that many (and the reference here is intended to privilege the most lowly) feel buffeted by forces they feel powerless to resist, and who thereby need a discourse that emphasizes the importance of Agency within what seems the all-powerful Structure of modern life.

Western society could also avail itself of this metaphor for change, because, whether or not our “individualised” society likes the results, the past and current states of the world have been and are the result of an ongoing design project carried out by the collective (and the individual within that milieu) schemes of the most conscious species of life on earth. The questions to ask of the collective schemes however are Who suffers

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77 *Agency* is used here in its sociological sense (that is, as partnered with *Structure*).
and Who benefits from the current arrangement, the arrangement we are in the best position to improve if not to fix?

Design is a systematic, disciplined, and rational process for solving a problem or problems in an elegant fashion. Given that the design process is going to provide a dominant metaphor for this thesis, it is apposite therefore to give a preliminary outline of the steps in such a process. The example to be outlined is an ecological planning and design process because, being ecological, it emphasizes the important relationships among entities within a coherent system that must be respected if the final product is to function optimally.

Figure 4.4 outlines the steps of the process. In the beginning is the collection of data or knowledge about the things that matter. In this particular case, where land use is the product being designed, the entities to be surveyed and appraised are natural and cultural. Who are the groups who have an input to the process either by their living there (individual interests) or their having an interest or legal standing in the area (social interests)? What are the natural entities that need to be surveyed? In the example to be outlined, they are the geology, relief and physiography of the area, climate and microclimate as measured by the ranges of precipitation, temperature, insolation et cetera, the surface and ground waters as manifested in streams, floodplains, lakes, water tables, aquifers and aquifer recharge areas, the soils, and the vegetation and its associated wildlife. There are also natural/cultural intersects that need to be inventoried such as historic sites, transport routes, scenic amenities, and of course existing land use patterns. Finally, there are the social constituencies that need to be catalogued and interviewed or otherwise assessed. What are their interests and desires? How do they organise themselves? How are they represented—or not represented—in the existing social structure?

However, this is just data. The next step is to ask, So what? Looking just at the natural factors, why would we want to know about the geology, climatology, hydrology, and biology? Take soils for example. Soils have different nutrient absorption capacities which mean some are better than others for the septic tank effluent disposal needed in low density developments that are too expensive to service communally. Why should we care about that? Because aquifers that underlie land uses and the quality of water within them, need to be protected if they are to be used by other land users downstream. The quantity of water recharging the aquifers also needs to be maintained. However, some land uses can prevent that recharge by paving over the land. Again, controls need to be put in place to avoid social costs. It is these social and individual values that need to be systematically analysed and synthesised into a coherent plan for the future that is sufficiently flexible however to respond to changing social (and “natural” given such processes as global warming) circumstances.

Figure 4.5 shows one aspect of a much larger and comprehensive plan (Juneja, 1974) which clearly sets out all the values associated with the use of soils in a particular region. In this can be seen a reflection of Maxwell’s fundamental concern which is for society to answer the fundamental question: How should we live? In the ecological process, this question is answered with: “By living with respect to the limits Nature sets us in any particular location and by privileging the local interests against those of big business or whatever external interests threaten to engulf those of locals to their detriment and to the detriment of the natural environment”.

Such a philosophy is in accord with that strain of sociology called Critical Sociology (Buechler, 2008) which concerns itself with domination and subjugation in culture; the ecological planning and design model can therefore be adapted for a project where the ultimate design is not for land use, but for culture (see Figure 4.6). Transformation of Western society is thereby dependent on the three avenues of Control, Ideas and Capability. However, if the project is led by Control, the project becomes totalitarian, so that avenue as a first option is omitted. The thesis will therefore firstly concentrate on the avenues of Ideas
and Capability and their interactions. For example, the full capabilities of the human psyche may have been intuited by some before the nineteenth century, but those capabilities became more firmly specified through the ideas, techniques, and writings of Freud and Jung. A more obvious example is Capability as technology which was an outgrowth from the ideas of the Enlightenment. That Capability in turn leads to new Ideas and to more effective means of Control such as the use of weaponry to subdue native populations in the past in the West's colonies. More recently, the technology of capitalism has proved to be more effective as a domination system.

The thesis will discuss what the Transformation path referred to above (that is, the Fowler Stage 4 and 5 and partnership) might consist of with regard to the interaction of these two avenues of Ideas and Capability, and from there, how they are expressed through Control. At this stage in my deliberations, it is looking like the postulation of another wave of feminism conceived of as (with apologies to Oliver Wendall Holmes' original quotation) the simplicity on the other side of the second wave's complexity. Many of the themes that this thesis will cover, are qualities of this next wave: the need for Strong Being, the significance of age and the wisdom that can come with that, the need for an evolved Feeling function to provide the hierarchy of values for the advanced Thinking function of the Enlightenment to address and make manifest, the need for a "spirituality of imperfection" to eclipse the pernicious spiritualities of modernist and New Age perfectionisms, and the recognition of and limits needed on "matronizing".79

**Clayton's (2008) conceptual wisdom model**

The means of achieving cultural transformation is by way of a model that came out of my Master's thesis which can provide the framework for a summary of Catholic culture and thereby show the Ideas/Values, Capacities and Control that are needed for an adequate account of culture to be attained—adequate in the sense that it would allow us to grow out of the problems that currently beset us.80 In Catholic terms that culture would represent a manifestation of the mystical Body of Christ on earth—an account that would necessarily value ideas and capacities that are left out of Protestant Christian culture. Their inclusion would create a post-Protestant Catholicism.

This wisdom model deconstructs the cultural endpoint of Figure 4.6 and thereby points to what a Democracy of the Different would specifically consist of. What is the particular nature of the Different that a Democracy needs? In Figure 4.7, Ideas/Values, Capability and Control have been compared to the parts of an equation derived from Industrial/Organizational (I/O) Psychology (P = A*M – SC), which is that Work Performance (in cultural terms, that equals the definition of culture as "the way we do things around here") equals the product of Ability and Motivation minus the Situational Constraints that one has to work within.

The wisdom model details what varieties of these abilities, motivations and situational constraints might encompass or create, and therefore I need to give a quick rundown on the three main ways it was derived in Clayton (2008).

Firstly, I took Maxwell's (1984) work on the relationship between fact and value reality (those "distinct, intellectually equally legitimate, interdependent but opposingly directed modes of explaining and understanding" characterised as "the duo-directional theory of understanding" (p. 267)) and compared

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78 There is of course considerable evidence that Control is far and away the dominant factor in the trio. Nevertheless I will continue on with my admittedly idealistic line (because that, after all, is what Idealists like me, are for). For example, capitalism is a world system because powerful people in history put it there, and powerful people today continue to maintain it. But it is an imperfect system and the gap between capitalism’s performance and what we actually want a system to achieve in terms of human well-being, needs to be in the forefront of our minds at all times.

79 The end of "matronizing" (recall that this is the neologism that parallels “patronizing”, except that it refers to feelings) would however have ramifications on the maximising (of systemising) culture of Fowler’s Stage 4 in the sense that it would undermine its hegemony.

80 That growth, importantly, will always remain a long-term process rather than a utopian reality. Underlying this thought is the idea of Jung’s that we do not solve problems; we grow out of them. I believe that in that prognosis we have the meaning of a life that is lived out in Time. Time allows that growth; that possibility for change constitutes the meaning of a life.
that model with the model in mathematics that looks at the complexity of reality through the intersection of real and imaginary numbers: that is, complex numbers in mathematics are the intersection of real and imaginary numbers (Figure 4.8).\textsuperscript{81} Asimov (1963) explains how imaginary numbers are used in physics and engineering to plot the pushes and pulls of forces. As he concludes, in “this way, the number $i$, which to many non-mathematicians seems completely mysterious and useless, is really down to earth” (pp. 139-140).

This metaphor from mathematics is a way of integrating Maxwell’s scientific and value realism. Value realism does not negate scientific realism, but contextualises it. Using this duo-directional model (depicted in Figure 4.9) means that the experiential world of human life can be accommodated within the physical universe without reductionism.\textsuperscript{82}

The problem is to find the value realism that Maxwell postulates exists “out there”. Assuming that there is such a thing as value realism (and many do not in the sense that such a reality is extra to meaning created by humanity itself), we need to ask, are the values we live by (that is the “imaginary numbers” in the metaphor above) in the spirit (and soul) of that reality or not—or do they miss the mark?

Maxwell is not the only one to question the conventional separation of fact and value. One of the pillars of Iris Murdoch’s (1959, 2001) philosophy is the necessary acknowledgement of value in everything we do. A recent work by atheist Sam Harris (2011) makes the same point. The simple model encapsulated in the x and y axis is a valid metaphorical means for depicting this idea and it provides the underlying format of the conceptual wisdom model. The flesh for its bones was derived from three epistemological sources: empirical, rational, and mythological/intuitive (Clayton, 2008).

Ackerman and Heggestad’s (1997) study correlating human abilities, interests, and personality traits and identifying four trait complexes (Social, Clerical/Conventional, Science/Math and Intellectual/Cultural—see Figure 4.10) provides empirical evidence for a model that charts the entire human spectrum underlying ability and motivation. The two quadrants that will feature strongly as my argument progresses will be “Science/Math” in which Reasoning and Math are dominant abilities in contrast to the “Social” quadrant which is comprised of more relational motivations of Extroversion, Social Potency and Well-being.

A conceptual derivation of a similar pattern was taken from Mitroff (1998) in which he used Jung’s ideas about ability and motivation—the same schema that underlies the Myers-Briggs model of personality determination. For Ian Mitroff, as we move from a Machine Age to a Systems Age, we need to make decisions and find solutions from a range of viewpoints, not just one. He takes as his basis four broad viewpoints that can be characterised from the way we see and take in data from the world and how we then make decisions based on that selective seeing.\textsuperscript{83}

So, Mitroff starts off with the continuum which ranges between the polarities of “T” (Thinking) and “F” (Feeling) types of decision-making (see Figure 4.11). Those with minds at the Thinking end of the spectrum tend to make impersonal decisions, whereas Feeling types make decisions based on personal feelings and values. In broad terms I believe that this is an important aspect of a broad distinction between the Protestant and the Catholic mind. (Appendix 4.1 gives some detail about the differences between the T and F types of decision-making.)

\textsuperscript{81} This metaphor was a somewhat naughty attempt to add value to Maxwell’s and my model by giving both a certain degree of credibility in light of what I have read described as the “physics envy” that the social sciences display when comparing themselves with the natural sciences. What is different in the social sciences—the richness of human perceptions and experience—is devalued as a consequence of “physics envy”, just as female experience is ignored, devalued, and diminished by the construct of “penis envy” in Freudian psychology.

\textsuperscript{82} E. O. Wilson’s Consilience for example is an attempt to explain everything within the “nothing but” framework of one conception of materialistic science.

\textsuperscript{83} It must be appreciated that we are each changing individual expressions of and within this framework.
The difference in these two viewpoints is important when appreciating brain hemispheric difference which will be expanded on below when the findings of Iain McGilchrist (in 2009’s *The Master and his Emissary*) are canvassed in Chapter 8. In short, the “T” way of making decisions is in danger of being “full of itself” (the *Emissary* in McGilchrist’s metaphor) unless it sees its thinking process in a wider context (of the *Master*). That is, it is a viewpoint that cannot see beyond itself to its original source in the *Master*.

The cruciform character that the model then takes on is created by the crossing of the T–F axis of “decision-making” by a S (Sensing)–N (Intuitive) axis representing individual differences in “data input” (see Figure 4.12). In brief, Sensing types notice concrete facts in the present. Intuitive types notice patterns and look to the future.

From the combination of these two axes, Mitroff (1998) has derived his model of problem evaluation and solution. In the Systems Age in which we are now living, he believes a reliance on *scientific/technical* (ST–Sensing/Thinking) thinking alone is no longer enough. He advocates the additional presence of NF–Intuition/Feeling, SF–Sensing/Feeling, and NT–Intuition/Thinking styles that proffer alternative *social/interpersonal, existential, and systemic* means of perceiving and then solving, resolving, dissolving, and absolving problems (see Figure 4.13)\(^\text{84}\).

Figure 4.13 represents the *Whole* but, like the proverbial blind men and the elephant, we each tend to see different aspects of that whole as the constituents of the model indicate. “Difference”, however, in terms of what I want this thesis to explore, is on the basis of two sets of “Both/And” categories: between the *Individual* and the *Group* and between the “masculine” *Ego* stance and the “feminine” *Eco*. In Clayton (2008), I described the two sets of constituencies as containing a stronger and a weaker viewpoint in terms of the power that was able to be exercised. So, the Group has greater power than the Individual, and the *Ego* has greater power over the *Eco* in our current societal systems. Instead of a “Both/And” where the viewpoint might be chosen on the specific basis of the problem being faced, an “Either/Or” construct is used whereby the stronger consistently prevails over the weaker\(^\text{85}\).

\(^{84}\) To illustrate the validity of this system, Mitroff (1998) uses these groupings in the seminars he conducts for business people to show how different people’s perceptions of the world can be:

> In our teaching and consulting work, in order to demonstrate how differently these personality types approach problem solving, we begin with a short test that assesses a person’s Jungian type. We then put all those of a similar type into a common group. That is, all the STs are put in one group, all the NTs in another, and so on. We then ask each group to analyze a complex situation, define what they perceive the problems to be, and suggest possible solutions based on their perspectives. If the groups are open and venturesome, we even give each of them a Tinkertoy set and ask them to build something that best represents their view of the problem and to list as many characteristics of both the problem and the solution as possible.

> Only after each group has presented its views do we explain the Jungian system and how the groups were put together. We explain that putting like types together in a common group accentuates what they have in common—they all speak the same psychological language and hence tend to see the world similarly—and it accentuates the differences between the various types. Also, asking people to build something and to list characteristics allows people to see what is one of the most difficult of all things to observe: human personality.

> The fact that there are no experts in Tinkertoys, a *Whole* as the constituents of the model indicate. “Difference”, however, in terms of what I want this thesis to explore, is on the basis of two sets of “Both/And” categories: between the *Individual* and the *Group* and between the “masculine” *Ego* stance and the “feminine” *Eco*. In Clayton (2008), I described the two sets of constituencies as containing a stronger and a weaker viewpoint in terms of the power that was able to be exercised. So, the Group has greater power than the Individual, and the *Ego* has greater power over the *Eco* in our current societal systems. Instead of a “Both/And” where the viewpoint might be chosen on the specific basis of the problem being faced, an “Either/Or” construct is used whereby the stronger consistently prevails over the weaker.\(^{85}\)

> Mystification turns to outright shock when a cover is removed from a flip chart containing previously written predictions regarding what each of the four types would select as a problem, its list of detailed characteristics of the problems, and the general nature and shape of its construction. (pp. 122-123)

When Mitroff states that this exercise “allows people to see what is one of the most difficult of all things to observe: human personality” he is, as he says, illustrating *phenomenology*—“making visible how humans construe phenomena” (Mitroff, 1983, p. 50).

\(^{85}\) There are a variety of explanations for why we do this and when I bring in the work of Gilligan, Schaef, Becker, and Samuels, I will cover some of their explanations. In Clayton (2008) I used Gould’s (2003) explanation which is pragmatic in
Two diagonal lines separate the Group from the Individual viewpoint and the Ego from the Eco. The latter uses the guidance of the Baron-Cohen (2003) model (Figure 4.16) which identifies and divides the systemising and empathising brains (Figure 4.15); the former, the constituents of “task performance” and “organizational citizenship behaviour” in Coleman and Borman (2000). While that latter model is derived from I/O Psychology, it can also function, I believe, as a construct whereby the whole of society acts as one big organization in which we each have our tasks but which also requires us to act as citizens in ways that go beyond our specific talents (see Figure 4.14). They require from us (1) a certain basic loyalty to our cultural milieu in the sense of working for its “well-being” (the systemic), (2) our support of our fellow men and women (the social/interpersonal), and to do all that effectively, our society also expects us (3) to make sure we, as individuals, have existential integrity, (the existential solution) in the sense that we are continually growing into maturity.

To return to the Ego/Eco differentiation is to return to what is the most crucial difference in terms of its dysfunctional workings in our current gendered society. Ego and Eco are archetypal descriptions of the “masculine” and “feminine” but there is of course a very real sense in which flesh and blood men and women are socialised to relate to and manifest these archetypes. The Ego is on the upper side, and it also has the upper hand. It is archetypically masculine, agentic, it is know-how, and represents “public, objective facts and knowledge” (Maxwell, 1984, p. 6). It is also the side which exhibits an inherent narcissism as described by social psychologist Greenwald’s (1980) “totalitarian ego”, which “operates much like a totalitarian office of misinformation, fabricating and revising our personal histories to cast us in unrealistically positive light” (cited in Leary, 2004, p. 56).

The archetypically feminine Eco is communicative, it is know-why, and represents “personal feelings and values” (Maxwell, 1984, p. 6), and it too can also function in a dysfunctional way by, for example, “getting along” as a way of “getting ahead”. Schae (1981) refers to this as “reactive femininity”.

In addition to Greenwald’s (1980) totalitarian ego, the Ego can also be characterised as narcissistic and thereby aggressive in response to what it perceives as insults (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Haidt (2006) also documents our hypocritical tendencies whereby we each see the faults in others but let ourselves off the judgemental hook. As indicated above, in Part 2, we will also see the Ego side of the model classed as an upstart Emissary which sees itself instead as the Master, and, in Lacanian theory, it literally occupies the position of what is termed the Master discourse, but a Master discourse that seals itself off from its context. “Self-sealing” is the adjective Argyris (2006) uses to characterise leadership in business organizations. Finally, Becker (1975) charts the underlying anthropological rationale for narcissism and ethnocentrism as stemming from the human knowledge of death and the terror it produces in the conscious mind. So, as well as being responsible for the focused striving that is responsible for civilisation’s advance, it must not be forgotten that the Ego dimension of the model can also be classed as authoritarian, self-centred, self-serving, fundamentally fearful, and hypocritical.

In terms of the Eco dimension, what Schae (1981) calls a Reactive Female System is of little use in reining in the narcissistic Ego; in fact the Reactive Female System can be characterised as an alternative Ego system that goes underground to stay safe within and to get what it wants from the dominant patriarchal Ego system. This interpretation is supported by I/O psychology research (Bolino (1999) and Hui, Lam and Law (2000)) who have characterised organizational citizenship or prosocial behaviour as a “getting along” to “get ahead”. By being “good actors” for the purposes of emulating “good soldiers”, we are primarily being self-serving.

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The sense that we can only do one thing at a time (fight or flight, sleep or wake, mate or wait). The other explanations will be more psychological.

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86 By way of illustration, Haidt (2006) quotes Robert Wright from The Moral Animal: “Human beings are a species splendid in their array of moral equipment, tragic in their propensity to misuse it, and pathetic in their constitutional ignorance of the misuse” (Wright, 1994, p. 13). When one thinks of the executive function of the Freudian ego, then it is therefore of “constitutional” significance to recognise this “tragic propensity” and work on correcting it.
By talking about the Ego as “self-serving”, I am not necessarily implying that that is always a bad thing and thereby also implying that somehow Ego is “Bad” and Eco is “Good”. If in the Great Commandment we should love our neighbour as ourselves, then being “self-serving” is part of the Eco dimension in that sense. I believe the Great Commandment actively supports the development of our talents as the parable of that name describes. What I am trying to point to here is the importance of honesty in liberating the true nature and value of the human person. I believe that that is what Stages 4, 5, and 6 in Fowler’s (1981) model are describing—the integrity of a stage 4 Ego when it is redeemed by a Stage 5 sensibility. Haidt (2006) describes the problematic nature of a society which actually encourages the Machiavellian tit-for-tat performance—which more accurately describes a Stage 3 Eco sensibility—that we as social actors seem to have to buy into if we are to play an active public role in our societies. Haidt (2006) also points out the importance of both Ego and Eco for happiness.

Happiness comes from within, and happiness comes from without. We need the guidance of both ancient wisdom and modern science to get the balance right. (p. xii)

Relatedness, “the bonds we form, and need to form, with others” are one of the “external conditions of life that can make you lastingly happier” (p. xii). Haidt also acknowledges Buddhist and Stoic attitudes which “counseled people to break their emotional attachments to people and events, which are always unpredictable and uncontrollable, and to cultivate instead an attitude of acceptance” (p. xii), although he rejected it as a total philosophy. The totality of the conceptual wisdom model is also an acknowledgement of the necessary over-determination of happiness which takes in both the Ego and the Eco, and the Individual and the Group.

Clayton (2008) explores the height and width dimensions of the model, with the conclusion that while we can document what Wilber (2006) and Haidt (2012) describe as the “flatland” philosophy of our age—that milieu in which we live corresponding to the horizontal arm of the wisdom model—the systemic heights and existential depths of our existence are fundamentally unknown to us. What sort of system do we live in? What for example lies outside the Time/Space continuum that started at the Big Bang? And what lies in the unconscious? How deep does that go? Is that even a question that it makes sense to ask? What sort of value/meaning does the universe have for humanity, if any, in terms of its heights and its depths? The model needs to reflect the possibility of some sort of answers to these questions which, while open to some sorts of inquiry, ultimately require a faith in something. Figure 4.17 illustrates Maxwell’s (1984) metaphysical presuppositions about the comprehensibility of the universe (the realm of fact) as well as presuppositions about the meaning of the universe (the realm of value). Experimental existential psychology is one area of research investigating the unconscious at the existential end of the vertical dimension, with Terror Management Theory as one outcome of that work. McCauley (2001) characterises terror management theory as promising “a kind of master key for understanding social behavior” (p. 355).

Terror management theory, and its basis in Becker’s (1975) ideas, will be briefly investigated in Chapter 9 because it is a very important and relevant development in social psychology for assessing the role of religion in particular. Other aspects of Freudian theory as well as its outgrowths in both Jungian and Lacanian theory, will also be discussed in Part 2. Maxwell’s (1984) four prescriptions—for a “saner”, “more just”, “humane”, and “happy” world—are added to the model at those places where they fit best. An addition to Maxwell’s version of value reality is Rolheiser’s (1998) Catholic conception of what he

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87 The sentiment behind the title of Belliotti’s (2004) book, Happiness is overrated, is well taken. Nevertheless recent research that Haidt (2006) reports shows that while the pursuit of happiness may be a fruitless quest (because of the so-called “hedonic treadmill”), activities that involve helping others can indeed lead to greater levels of happiness as a product perhaps of acting with reference to what Christians would interpret as the promptings of the soul. In other words, happiness as a description is different, and a separate concept from happiness as a prescription.
refers to as the four non-negotiable pillars of a Christian spirituality: *private prayer and private morality, social justice, community as constitutive of worship and mehollowness of heart and spirit*. They too have been placed in the model where they fit best, as well as the following secular version of value reality. This comes from positive psychology and its attempts to define a meaning within life rather than a meaning of life. Haidt (2006) derives it from McAdam’s (2006) three levels of personality, with the first level made up of the conventional Big Five of personality traits (*openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism*). At the second level, Haidt employs Emmon’s (2003, 1999) life goal categories to describe McAdam’s “characteristic adaptations” that one’s basic personality makes to the social milieu in which it finds itself. Emmon’s categories are *Work and Achievement, Religion and Spirituality, Relationships and Intimacy, and Generativity*, and they are also included in Figure 4.17 as a secular alternative to Rolheiser’s conception of value reality.

Finally, at the centre of the model lies the executive ego which must be understood differently from its sense in the Ego-Eco differentiation. The executive ego is a reference to Freudian psychology in the sense that the executive ego is, as Freud understood it (Haidt, 2006, p. 3), the executive function (the conscious, rational self) which, by way of its strength, controls the id (and its desires for pleasure) and achieves independence from the superego (the consciousness of the rules of society). It is that ego that ultimately determines how we each live; it must determine what mix and what characteristics of the Ego and the Eco principles are suitable in any particular situation; and to do this adequately, the executive ego must have knowledge of what those characteristics might potentially be.

Before moving on, it is a valuable digression to consider Haidt’s (2006) model (see Figure 4.18) of three dimensions of social space in which he identifies a two-dimensional flatland in which “hierarchy” and “closeness” (the x and y dimensions) are in tension. In many ways these two dimensions are parallel to systemising and empathising and the idea of putting the third dimension of divinity (the z dimension) as both above and below that flatland is an inspired one. However, Haidt’s perspective is that of a secular Jewish man, and as a consequence of all three of those adjectives, his view differs from mine. My perspective is that of a religious Christian/Catholic woman. What that means firstly is that I come to his divinity axis with a Catholic sensibility which in turn is founded on a body that was literally disgusting (see Chapter 3 and Beck (2008)). Haidt’s survey of traditional religious belief posits a logic of disgust underlying a purity/degradation morality of the z dimension. As an evolutionary psychologist, he regards these taboos (associated with food, menstruating women, and so forth) as adaptive, especially at the point in evolutionary time when the human species became meat-eaters. While remaining a liberal himself, he sees the benefit of such moralities and taboos, and found himself adopting some of them in his own life—such as taking his shoes off at his front door—while also preaching tolerance for the ethics of such religious beliefs and conservatives in general. There are problems from my perspective however in what I suspect is his definition of tolerance. One of them is that, as intimated above, the logic of disgust has become something much more complex in the Christian faith; and, as a consequence of the Western focus on autonomy and individuality after the Reformation, the dualism (either one is pure and above the line, or degraded and below it) inherent in Haidt’s model is unacceptable. That could be rectified by making the z dimension a continuous loop whereby the dualism becomes a paradox. However, as if a z axis didn’t make the model complicated already, that added complication makes it untenable both in the drawing and in the understanding of the conceptual wisdom model. The other point that must be made—and this comes from my identification as a woman—is that while the purity/degradation taboos make some hygienic and spiritual sense, they also carry considerable patriarchal freight. Unless that freight is exposed for what it is, the conservative values that Haidt identifies will continue to be problematic. The

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88 These are archetypal and therefore unconscious.

89 However, as Haidt (2006) very wisely notes, the more mechanical metaphors employed in the social sciences (the exclusively “rational actor” of Economics for instance) have tended to neglect the very real connection that the executive ego needs to keep with the unconscious. Older organic metaphors like Plato’s of the driver driving a chariot drawn by two horses recognise this connection with our animality far better (see Haidt, 2006: “Modern theories about rational choice and information processing don’t adequately explain weakness of the will” (p. 3)).
problem is that Haidt does not mention this freight explicitly enough even though it has been extensively researched in his same field of social psychology under the aegis of terror management theory.

Figure 4.19 is a clarification of the vertical dimension of my model using Haidt’s (2006) conception in Figure 4.18. Within the milieu in which we as human beings operate, the systemising dimension is dominant. However, outside of that milieu, in what Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1960) described as “the divine milieu”, there is a change of structure: as the next chapter will explain, the claim of an alternative is that the empathising dimension is predominant. God is Love, and the Word made Flesh is Jesus Christ, and, at the Incarnation and then at the Crucifixion and Resurrection, Love and Word are a Unity. Unless that is made manifest in the world however, there is a discontinuity between noumenon and phenomenon. System was made to serve Love. While it is too difficult to make my diagrams illustrate Haidt’s (2012) valuable construct, the diagrams in this thesis should be read with my points in this paragraph in mind.

The two ways of deriving the wisdom model—the empirical and the conceptual—are compatible as shown in Figure 4.20. The final way of deriving the wisdom model—from an understanding of myth—uses the myth of Cupid and Psyche which describes the archetypal development of the feminine. That parity is shown in Figure 4.21 (taken from Clayton (2008) and its analysis of Labouvie-Vief’s (2004) interpretation91) by comparing the four tasks that the older Aphrodite sets her younger rival Psyche.

For now however, the nest of models that underlie the understanding of this thesis are almost complete (see Figure 4.22 for a preview). Of those covered to this point, Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith model is the most general. Within that model, to return to Figure 4.3, I have postulated that the varying societies/cultures reflect, at the very least, the sum of the stages of faith of its individual constituents. A society therefore at a cumulative stage of faith different from another will reflect that difference92. Figure 4.3 brings in more theory to fill out Fowler’s conceptualisations of Stages 3, 4, and 5; important theory comes from the investigation of the nature of three levels of meaning.

Three levels of Meaning
Eagleton (2009) is organised on the basis of Lacan’s three stages of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real, and he notes the parity—with some reservations—of Lacan’s categories with Kierkegaard’s three levels of the Aesthetic, the Ethical, and the Religious (p. 161). Eagleton casts “the three Lacanian registers in the form of an historical narrative” starting with “the imaginary” marking “an emergent moment of optimism and self-assurance”; followed by the heyday of the symbolic and its representation in Kant and Hegel; followed then by the descent into “the tragic, sceptical or revolutionary reflections of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Marx and Nietzsche”. These are now “the motifs of blockage, impasse and contradiction which come gradually to the fore, to culminate, in a fin-de-siecle of capitalist crisis and savage imperialist conflict, in the profoundly pessimistic meditations of Sigmund Freud [and] . . . the reign of the Real” (p. 154).

. . . And at the heart of this barbarous experiment [of fascism], in the death camps of central Europe and the fascistic cult of Thanatos, lies the horror of a Real which eludes representation. (p. 155)

While somewhat implicated in that barbaric turn of events93, I believe that Jung and his ilk rescue something worthwhile from that wreckage—something that puts a better interpretation on the “Real which eludes representation”. Eagleton reports that Kierkegaard too sees how, at the Real, there is some sort of battle between the forces of Good and Evil which is absent at the previous stages.

90 Again see Part 2 and especially Chapter 9. Before that however, there will be a more sustained analysis of Haidt’s moral psychology and the points made in this paragraph in Chapter 5 following.
91 There is of course more than one interpretation of this myth but space precludes my looking at them here in sufficient detail.
92 They will be different in how they manifest the elements of culture identified in Figure 4.6: the social, the political, the fiscal, the legal, the moral, and the environmental.
93 This involvement will be investigated in Chapter 13.
There is . . . a positive and a negative version of the Real in Kierkegaard, as there is, one might claim, for Lacan. The Real to be affirmed is God, the infinite abyss at the core of the self; . . . Like the Lacanian Real, Kierkegaardian faith introduces permanent crisis and disruption into the *insipid assurances of the ethical*. (pp. 165-6, emphasis added).

The idea that “Faith has nothing to do with human well-being or sensuous fulfilment; the true Christian ‘calls one away from the physical man’s pleasure, life and gladness’” (Eagleton, 2009, p. 166) is brought up into recent times and into science by Seligman’s (2002) three conceptualisations of happiness, the *pleasant* life, the *good* life, and the *meaningful* life. It is of course the latter that corresponds to Fowler’s Stage 5 just as Kierkegaard’s *Religious* and Lacan’s *Real* do.

Seligman likewise characterises the meaningful life as one wherein happiness is over-rated. Its purpose is outward-looking in relatedness to something bigger than oneself, away from Eagleton’s “insipid assurances of the ethical”.

This thesis seeks to come to some sort of determination with regard to what the Stage 5 of a Catholic faith might look like. While most of us remain at a Stage 3 level in our Eco understanding of faith, something more is needed to build on and go beyond “the insipid assurances of the ethical” at Stage 4. This is not to devalue Stage 4 faith, but the problem remains that a Stage 3-Stage 4 partnership is not existentially robust enough to overcome the forces that, while seemingly distant from the settled world in which I live, are common for those not so fortunate. That the extent of their difficulties are not divorced from the extent of my comfort, is an added reason to search for a socially just world that shares its resources more fairly. A socially just world is only possible through an ethic of relatedness that sees that relatedness going beyond the naturally inscribed and calculated loyalty that each of us has to our own gene pool of blood relatives, and to the “survival vehicle” instituted by our particular cultural group.

*The Personal and the Social* (Figure 4.23)

Finally, there is an aspect of this thesis that concerns itself with the disciplines of sociology and psychology themselves, and academia in general. A Stage 5 Catholicism regards Comtean sociology with a critical eye—as an outgrowth of Stage 4 faith in other words. Stage 5 regards Stage 4’s ambit as too narrow. Certainly my conception of Stage 5 believes Stage 4 should make its own assumptions clear about value reality rather than merely assuming that they are the common default position, (even though of course they predominantly are the default position in the academic fraternity). This lack of fundamental reasoning in its epistemology is an outgrowth of its genesis in the unbalanced Enlightenment thought that Maxwell (1984) identifies and criticises. So, as a corrective, Hamilton (2008) identifies the noumenon as the backdrop and context of our social phenomena—a Platonic* notion that balances sociology’s more Aristotelian focus. It is suggested that the noumenon (whatever it is)* and the natural

94 Stage 3 thinking is what Haidt (2006) characterises as the vengeance/gratitude/gossipy basis of human ultrasociality—the reciprocity in other words that binds a society beyond the intimate bonds of love—and, in his description of our ultrasociality, he is describing very well the Ecoic basis of the Fowlerian Stage 3 society. As he states, while studies have shown that people disapprove of gossiping, if we didn’t have those systems of vengeance, gratitude, and gossip, we’d get away with “a trail of rude, selfish, and antisocial acts, often oblivious to . . . [our] own violations” (Haidt, 2006, p. 55). Morality does indeed rely on those foundations and Stage 5 Eco consciousness needs that system to be maintained. As Haidt (2006) observes, “Gossip is a policeman and a teacher. Without it, there would be chaos and ignorance” (p. 55). The point here is to recognise it for what it is; the prevention of that chaos rather than the institution of real value.

95 Rolloheiser (1998) uses Plato to describe the fundamental dis-ease of desire that each of us experiences as a result of living within the fetters of Time and Space. “We are fired into life with a madness” he writes paraphrasing Plato, “... an unquenchable fire that renders us incapable, in this life, of ever coming to full peace. Spirituality is, ultimately, what we do with that desire” (p. 3-4). That dis-ease should contextualise everything sober and academic that the diagram otherwise seeks to document.

96 There are problems for me both as a Catholic and as a Catholic writing about post-Protestant Catholicism in some of Hamilton’s (2008) conceptions of the noumenon: while Hamilton does use Christian and Catholic examples in attempting to get to grips with the noumenon, the following passage is particularly problematic for someone who believes in *God Is Love* and who sees more complexity in Christ’s anguished cry from the cross than he does:

The destruction of phenomenal forms has no effect on the noumenon. The continual arising and passing away of living things means nothing to the inner core of existence. It is only by superimposing a personal god on the universal energy, a penchant of Westerners, that the grieving family can cry out “Why?” Only people who have been taught to believe in such a superimposed god can lose faith when a
environment—need to be factored into sociological theory.\(^97\) The phenomenon of Desire then is placed as a lightning rod that passes through everything, especially human beings and the societies we create, although I have distinguished between a robust one that passes (I believe, based on evidence to be presented in Part 2) through the right side of the conceptual wisdom model, and a slimmer version that the Enlightenment encompasses and which again (I believe) passes through the left side of the conceptual wisdom model. For example, Rolheiser (1998) observes the naivety with which modernity treats the spiritual, creative, and erotic energy that our desire reflects while being dismissive of what it sees as the quaint taboos, prohibitions, and strict laws of ancient cultures that saw the need to genuflect before these energies and surround them with “very high symbols” (p. 22). There is, he writes, a need for us to genuflect before the divine energy too and approach it with the sort of caution we now reserve for high voltage electricity lines:

There is a madness in us that comes from the god and unless we respect and relate it precisely to its divine source we will forever be either too restless or depressed ever to fully enjoy life or we will be some mini-version of David Koresh, convinced that we are God. (p. 29)

Not only David Koresh, but the dark side of sexuality as well displays the fact that we are dealing with energy that is not all sweetness and light. Rolheiser (1998) quotes Jung who also described this energy as unfriendly and imperialistic unless it is accessed and contained properly, and, moreover, of a type which “can beat us up like the playground bully” (p. 21) should we not take it seriously enough. As Rolheiser intimates in the quotation above, we do pay the price: for example in the brittleness of our culture—its “shallow optimism, forced joy, and [the] artificial energy of the guru on positive thinking” (p. 24). We do not take delight in life but struggle with depression—or with its opposite problem of being over-inflated.

Rolheiser’s (1998) final criticism of modernity (although he has more and these will be canvassed in the next chapter) is its lack of balance and the bevy of “divorces” this creates. Some of these are reflected in the fault lines of the conceptual wisdom model (see Figure 5.2 in the next Chapter for a fuller version of the model): “the divorce between private morality and social justice” (p. 34) is the most obvious one because it reflects the chasm between conservatives and liberals, and “the divorce between spirituality and ecclesiology” (p. 32) reflects the other major Ego/Eco fault line as well. There is the gap between the system of religion and the earthiness that lies below in the sensate half of the model (“the divorce between religion and eros” (p. 31)). Rolhesier’s final divorce (“the divorce of the gifted child and the giving adult” (p. 34)) is I believe the one between Stage 3 and Stage 5 eco thinking which describes the difference between being a doormat and a victim, and its alternative which is a willed self-donation.

As for the rest of the model that the noumenon and the natural environment enclose and support, we can begin with Clayton’s (2008) conclusion that if society is going to change for the better without revolution or coercion, then it will need to do so one individual at a time. As Rilke observed in his letter that began Chapter 2, the true individual can only exist, it is postulated, at a time in life when one has had the chance to think about one’s society and one’s place in it. That happens at Stage 4 and beyond. Moreover, the advantage to society of an individual, whose life as an actively thought-through process goes beyond enlightened self-interest, comes at a Stage 5 level of faith whereby one’s egoic strengths are utilized primarily for the good of others. That is the Christ-nature for the purposes of this thesis.

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\(^97\) Clive Hamilton (2008), an Australian intellectual, can see the problem in a way unfettered by religious loyalties:

In an age of over-consumption, intemperance and moral confusion, the structures that prevent us from flourishing have lodged themselves in our psyches. The source for the kind of transformation that is now needed lies beyond the cultural, political and social philosophies that have formed the bedrock of progressive thought. We need to look to metaphysics—ideas about knowing and being that are beyond the psychological and social structures that condition everyday experience—to discover what unites us all in our humanity. (p. xiv)
Therefore, Figure 4.23 takes the wisdom model and applies it to the individual psyche as well as to culture, and inserts it into a schema that is constituted by the main pillars of sociology: the Time98 and Space99 within which humanity lives; societal individuals as physical bodies and the minds within them that can be debilitated by illness and enhanced by technology; and finally, the differences which exist among peoples and individuals and the divisions these create in terms of power relationships. Social psychology (Smith & Mackie, 2000) supplies an additional construct of Motivational and Processing Principles to insert in that sociological model and this gives further detail to the sociological themes of the Personal and the Social (what C Wright Mills called the sociological imagination—”personal troubles” and “social issues”) and the Strange and the Familiar. It is in this latter sense that the theme of Difference becomes particularly cogent because a tenet of social psychology is that we each “Value Me and Mine”. It is to this fundamental human tendency that Christianity provides a challenge; it challenges it from its inception through its narratives of Christ’s birth and the visit of the foreign magi, and onwards to Jesus’ encounters with gentiles and the travels of the apostles following his death and resurrection. In that sense, the local and the global were, and are, truly co-constitutive, and the fundamental message is the need for fundamental and radical personal and social change. In Christianity, that is called repentance—a radical re-visioning of one’s life and its aims—whereby we live in the context of the Great Commandment which states the order in which we love, as God, our self, then our neighbour, lived out, through Christian paradox, by giving the pre- eminent position to the neighbour. In that sense, it is a religion of cosmic relatedness100. However, while my primary focus here is on Catholicism, I am also mindful that that categorisation makes Catholicism exclusive in a way it was never meant to be. As “children of God”, what I describe as Catholic must be, by definition, universal in its description if not in prescription. Allied then within Figure 4.23 is a nod to secular thinking in conjunction with the Catholic. Given the predominance of American thinking in the field of positive psychology—that area where psychology comes closest to religious thinking—the concept of e pluribus unum (from many, one) is also important to include. Likewise, Hamilton’s (2008) postulation of a system of post-secular ethics includes much that is of value for a post-secular Catholic ethic and it is expressed in terms that make more sense to the non-Catholic mind.

Given the central focus of Figure 4.23 on the Personal and the Social, the focus on difference then comes down to each individual. The inquiry into the richness of human experience that Maxwell suggests needs to take place is dependent on the hermeneutics that each individual brings to life as encapsulated in the Construction of Reality that each individual makes even while we are each subject to the Pervastiveness of Social Influence from the society in which we grow up.

That then, to return to the theme introduced at the beginning of this chapter, is the final meaning of Difference. I am different to the extent that I have and perform my gender, ethnicity, class, age, ability, religion and so forth. In some of those aspects of my social and personal identity (my gender, my age, my religious identity, my ability and disability, certain aspects of my personality) I am subject to discrimination from mainstream ideologies that I will attempt to describe in this thesis. In other aspects of my identity I am privileged (my ethnicity, my class, my ability and disability, and certain aspects of my personality (the appearance of dis/ability and personality in both lists will become understandable in

98 Our occupation of Space in Time means that change is inevitable. This appreciation underlies the sociological theme, Social change is an ongoing process (McLennan et. al, 2010). Chesterton (1909, p. 253) gives us a somewhat oblique Christian version of this when he writes that if a man “is to be saved from forging, he must not be a patient but an impatient. He must be personally impatient with forgery. All moral reform must start in the active not the passive will”.

99 In the current age, our occupation of Space has become global; however, whatever the scale of the “global”, the sociological theme The local and the global are co-constitutive (McLennan et. al, 2010) holds true. How we each make sense of our value reality in our local necks of the woods counts.

100 Hamilton’s (2008) Moral Self is related to this. He believes the Moral Self is the presence of the noumenal—the Universal Self—in the phenomenal world of Time, Space and Causality that we construct. Hamilton’s thesis is very impressive and in the sense that it creates a “post-secular ethics” a valuable development. He too uses Seligman’s Meaningful Life as one that reflects the noumenal to the highest degree in its commitment to something greater than the self, and which importantly challenges Stage 3a in Figure 4.3—the search for the Pleasant Life which has become so potent a force in Western—and other cultures to which it has spread—by way of the greater instrumental opportunities provided by modern technology.
time)) because I represent a mainstream view. I have various means of processing those differences and similarities, and various motivations to do so—or not—that are a direct result of my humanity and its evolution within a milieu of both a hostile and beneficent natural environment. I too as an individual have had a developmental history which is responsible for the health or otherwise of my mind and body. The ability of a society to handle the vicissitudes of and the opportunities present in all that individuality is also important in the sense that group adaptation was as important in our evolutionary history as the so-called “survival of the fittest” within those groups. Therein, one assumes, lies the basis of Baron-Cohen’s (2003) dual schema of systemising and empathising. Systemising gives an individual and a society power to resist the depredations of a hostile environment and other human groups as well as to overcome and master them both, and science has been the West’s powerful systemising force. Empathising too must be considered and the reluctance of many to accept the group adaptation thesis that David Sloan Wilson (2002) has put forward is consistent with Empathising’s—and the feminine and religious roles that embody it—second class status (see Figure 4.24). In both systemising and empathising then, lie the three motivations of the personal and the social in Figure 4.23: “striving for mastery” (systemising), “seeking connectedness” (empathising), and “valuing me and mine” (as a focus for both). We do that with minds that process in various ways as a result of our evolutionary history; the nature of those processes and how we need to consciously challenge them in certain circumstances, will become clearer as the thesis looks at various theoretical stances in Part 2.
Chapter 5

THE CLAIM OF AN ALTERNATIVE

In his book *Theorising Myth*, Bruce Lincoln (1999) describes myth as “ideology in narrative form” (p.207). This immediately raises the question: what exactly is “ideology”? Roberts (2009) defines it both generally and specifically. The general meaning is descriptive of the sets of ideas behind anything from events to institutions. The specific meaning brings in power relations as the reasons why ideologies are so useful in and for the subordination of others. Lincoln (1999) employs both meanings but it is the latter one that gives his book and his definition its primary punch. However, in his epilogue, he widens out his discussion to include a reflexive account of his own scholarly endeavours and the academic context in which they are carried out:

Over the past several years, as I have presented one or another paper that contributed to the evolution of this book, a question has regularly arisen, usually in response to my characterization of myth as “ideology in narrative form.” Most often it is a student who poses the challenge, an undergraduate whose seat toward the rear of the room signals her alienation, not just from the lecture but also from the institutions that, with equal pomposity and pathos, gamely try to make lectures seem interesting and important. “But isn’t that true of scholarship as well,” she observes. “Isn’t scholarship just another instance of ideology in narrative form? Don’t scholars tell stories to recalibrate a pecking order, putting themselves, their favourite theories, and their favorite peoples on top?” Touché.

Once, a particularly puckish student put it somewhat differently. “Isn’t logos just a repackaged mythos?” she asked, . . . By equating the two, she effectively said: “You and I speak the same language, with a single exception. Your language is more pretentious than mine.” Touché again. . . . (p. 207)

After discussing these points, he goes on,

I now respond: “If myth is ideology in narrative form, then scholarship is myth with footnotes.” (p. 209)

In identifying *logos* as *mythos* with footnotes, he, unwittingly perhaps, puts his finger on the greatest strength as well as the greatest weakness of academic scholarship, which is its fundamental self-referentiality; strength because of the “academic values of hard work, integrity, and collegial accountability in scholarship” (p. 209), and weakness, not only for the qualities that are the reverse of the aforementioned strengths (“misrepresentation, mystification, sycophancy, character assassination, skilful bluff, and downright fraud” (p. 209)) but also for the fact that such scholarship can be self-sealing and confined to one, or at best two, conceptual quadrants of the human brain’s overall capability (see for example McGilchrist, 2009).

In these pages I want to do right by disenfranchised young women like those in the account, and I also want to do right by Bruce Lincoln and what he represents101 which is a way of thinking that at its best also appreciates the limits of what it does, and who and which perhaps sees beyond control, or more accurately, and this is an extremely important point, sees control in the context of care. That is what this thesis contends a University should be about—seeing its expertise in terms of the benefit it accrues, especially for the vulnerable, an aim which is in line with the Christian foundations of the West. This thesis in its own small way seeks to critique the system that produced it by stating that all academic work produced should be interrogated by two questions: *So what?* and *Who suffers and who benefits from its production and use?*

In seeking to critique the system that has produced this work, I will be reverting to sociological text books to gain an appreciation of the assumptions by which the discipline of sociology works. In other words, how do the myths of sociology and its footnotes work, as well as the myths of religious studies and psychology and their respective footnotes? By doing this, I am putting the value reality that I espouse in this thesis as a claim of an alternative, on an equal footing with the value reality or realities that the disciplined inheritors of the Enlightenment have, which is that there is no value reality whatever other

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101 This is especially important in environments where anti-intellectualism can pervade social attitudes. New Zealand is no exception in this regard.
than the one we make for ourselves. (Haidt (2006) contrasts positive psychology’s value for example as a search for meaning within life rather than a search for a meaning of life. This is entirely in line with Enlightenment thinking)\textsuperscript{102}.

A sociology text (Cohen & Kennedy, 2007) defines two key concepts that help in establishing and explaining the spirit of the West, in the following manner:

\textbf{Modernity} The year 1492, when Columbus reached the Americas, can be taken as a convenient symbolic marker opening the modern era. However the orientations towards modernity only began to crystallise from the seventeenth century onwards. They involved the growth of a questing spirit, a powerful leaning towards rationality—the search for valid, verifiable knowledge—and a belief in the possibility of transforming the material world in the pursuit of social “progress”. The project of modernity eventually boosted science and culminated in industrialization and urbanization (p. 60, emphasis added) . . .

\textbf{Reflexivity} All humans reflect on the consequences of their own and others’ actions and perhaps alter their behaviour in response to new information. This quality of self-awareness, self-knowledge and contemplation is of great interest to sociologists because it speaks to the motives, understandings and intentions of social actors. In contemporary societies, reflexivity is said to intensify as every aspect of social life becomes subject to endless revision in the face of constantly accumulating knowledge . . . (p. 60, emphasis added)

The emphases in both quotations above point to two aspects of modernity that are examined and developed in this thesis. The “growth of a questing spirit” is regarded as a mythology—in the best sense of that word—but one perhaps that, while not redundant by any means, can be questioned in light of the content of the second emphasis—“the motives, understandings and intentions of social actors”\textsuperscript{103}.

In this thesis those motives, understandings, and intentions explicitly include unconscious and under-used conscious motives and intentions as well as their conscious and over-used variants.

Grimshaw (pers. comm.) identifies religious belief as the aforementioned claim of an alternative and if one defines “religious belief” widely enough, history is full of claims of alternatives. Barzun (2000) names the Reformation (that can be conveniently dated to 1517 when Luther nailed his 95 theses to the door of the church in Wittenberg) as the beginning of an era, the first of four revolutions\textsuperscript{104} that gave “culture a new face” (p. 3) in the 500 years from 1500 to the present. For Barzun this first revolution “posed the issue of diversity as well as of faith” (p. 4) and it is also therefore the best starting point for a thesis concerning itself with “difference”.

To many commentators the world’s peoples face social and natural challenges that we may find hard to overcome. While it may appear hubristic to claim that another but profoundly different “revolution” (in the sense that it will happen one person at a time) is needed, that is what this work does propose in line

\textsuperscript{102} Chesterton (1909) makes a nice argument for the freedom that a belief in the supernatural can supply:

For we must remember that the materialist philosophy (whether true or not) is certainly much more limiting than any religion. In one sense, of course, all intelligent ideas are narrow. They cannot be broader than themselves. A Christian is only restricted in the same sense that an atheist is restricted. He cannot think Christianity false and continue to be a Christian; and the atheist cannot think atheism false and continue to be an atheist. But as it happens, there is a very special sense in which materialism has more restrictions than spiritualism. Mr. McCabe thinks me a slave because I am not allowed to believe in determinism. I think Mr. McCabe a slave because he is not allowed to believe in fairies. But if we examine the two vetoes we shall see that his is really much more of a pure veto than mine. The Christian is quite free to believe that there is a considerable amount of settled order and inevitable development in the universe. But the materialist is not allowed to admit into his spotless machine the slightest speck of spiritualism or miracle. (pp. 39-40, emphasis added)

Therefore, just to clarify, I am more than ready to see the value in theoretical Sociology, Psychology and Religious Studies (in fact the existence of this thesis attests to it), in addition to adhering to the value reality that Christianity describes. Why the latter reality should be greeted by mainstreamers in these disciplines with perplexity, and at worst, with prejudice, is a bit of a mystery to me which is why I mention it.

\textsuperscript{103} Note the importance here ascribed to Motivation which links up with the equation introduced in the last chapter: \( P = A^*M-SC \).

\textsuperscript{104} The four were the 16C religious revolution; the 17C monarchical revolution; the liberal, individualist “French” revolution that straddles the 18\textsuperscript{th} and 19\textsuperscript{th}; and the 20C “Russian,” social and collectivist revolution.
with a raft of ideas from a number of works in a range of disciplines. These works firstly postulate the
need for an alternative, and secondly they outline the contours of how that revolution might come about,
in terms of a number of claims of alternatives.

Figure 5.1 (a) and (b) (and indeed Figure 5.2 which enlarges the conceptual wisdom model) jumps the
gun and shows one end point of this thesis’s deliberations and my claim of an alternative—a summary
state of affairs for the (a) fourth and (b) fifth stages of Fowler’s (1981) Stages of Faith model. Both (a)
and (b) are a cultural result of the West’s Christian heritage. Figure 5.1(a) illustrates the secular state
derived from Protestantism and the Enlightenment. Figure 5.1(b) illustrates a situation that transcends
the secular state in the manner of Fowler’s description. This, also according to Fowler (1981), can only be
the result of a Christian tradition. This thesis takes the part of Figure 5.1(b) while also acknowledging the
debt that this model owes to Figure 5.1(a). The crucial difference is however that for Figure 5.1(b), Figure
5.1(a) is merely a way-station. That is, Stage 4 Control must ultimately be seen in the context of—must in
fact be redeemed by—Stage 5 Care in the sense of Stage 5 being Other-centred. Stage 5 Care likewise
needs the prompts, challenges, and arguments of a worthy type of Stage 4 Control to save it from slipping
into sentimentality, self-indulgence, and cultural chauvinism.

To return to the point about “ideology” above, what does one do with a descriptive ideology in Roberts’
(2009) first sense that is characterised by—that is, importantly, if one reflects on its founding documents
and not on the history and traditions of its institutions since—the giving away of power, rather than its
accumulation and use for the domination of others? If an ideology expresses itself in paradoxical terms
such as in the statement that the first will be last and the last shall be first, then we are dealing with a
topsy-turvy ideology in terms of Roberts’ second sense of the term. It is in this strongly counter-cultural
and counter-intuitive sense of ideology, that this thesis feels justified in “flouting” Lincoln’s rules about
neutrality as set out in Lincoln (2005). It is this thesis’s contention that in Christianity, in the sense in
which Chesterton (1913, p. 39) imagines it (“The Christian ideal has not been tried and found wanting. It
has been found difficult; and left untried”), Christianity is a valuable theory of culture which needs
rediscovery at a time when the West is meeting alternative cultures where there is not the same evident
crisis of belief. It is one thing to have a strong culture of critique; there also needs to be a strong culture of
belief in what one stands for. Without that, the West stands exposed to cultural systems that threaten the
welfare and wellbeing of the more powerless in our society (I am thinking specifically here of the
liberation of women and girls from fiercely controlled cultural restraints). It is the contention of this thesis
that it is the Christian inversion of those ideas and practices—those that valorise the power, wealth, and
security that controls others—that are its best legacy.

Returning to Bruce Lincoln and the disgruntled female student in his class, in the light of the Christian
inversion of values, we can also draw on the claim of an alternative in Carol Gilligan’s 1982 work on the
129) expresses the difference between Gilligan’s views and Kohlberg’s as one where women have a
morality of responsibility that emphasizes their connection to others, while men have a morality of rights
that emphasizes their separation from others.

Women are concerned with their responsibilities to others, other’s feelings, and the effect their behaviour has on
relationships, whereas men are concerned with rights, rules, and standards of justice. Gilligan stated, “While she places
herself in relation to the world . . . he places the world in relation to himself.” (p. 35)

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105 Stage 5 individuals are never perfect. There is the widely known example of Ghandi who tested his chastity by sleeping
with young women one of which was his niece. A Stage 4 feminist could have readily appraised and informed Ghandi of the
self-indulgence motivating and exhibited in that behaviour. One struggles to see how it could have been remotely “other-
centred” in its intentions. In such examples lie the evidence for the corrosive effects of uneven power relationships of all
kinds—not just those between men and women. As Adams (2010) states, “Like many great men, Gandhi made up the rules as
he went along” presumably because he could. As I stated above, the existence of Stage 5 is no guarantee that the other, less-
evolved, stages are not present also.
However, based on further findings which still found a small sex difference in moral reasoning along the lines that Gilligan described, Helgeson (2012) questions whether the difference arises not so much from sex differences as from the situations that men and women typically face:

Women face [moral dilemmas] that require a care orientation, and men face those that require a justice orientation. (p. 129).

While this observation is an important one in terms of moving away from an essentialising discourse, the even more important reason for referring to Gilligan’s original study is that it offers a valuable way of differentiating two alternative views of the world, one of which resonates more strongly with the idea of “relatedness” or the “eco” viewpoint. These two differing viewpoints can be characterised as the “egoic” stance” (placing the world in relation to oneself) and the “ecoic” stance (placing oneself in relation to the world). Moreover, Helgeson, in moving on to discuss sex comparisons in social development, describes Erikson’s (1950) stages of social development as mirroring men’s social development better than women’s. This is because in his schema, identity achievement precedes intimacy achievement (or in my terms above, the “ego” develops before the “eco”) whereas for women, their “ego”-identity has conventionally been tied in with “eco”-intimacy (as evidenced in the now thankfully dropped egregious habit of referring to married women as “Mrs Paul Jones” and the nuns at the convent schools I attended as Sisters Matthew and John the Baptist).

The second wave of feminism was the time when these differences began to blur. Today, based on research, what were once often seen as two essentially different genders are now seen in terms of what amount to some differences that are often characterised, in statistical terms, by small effect sizes. Nevertheless, it is still instructive to look at some aspects of feminist theory and research to see what can be learnt about “alternatives” that are based on a different viewpoint—specifically the “eco” viewpoint.

Baron-Cohen’s (2003) model, (which I have combined with Jung’s four basic groups—see Figure 5.3)106, describing systemising107 and empathising108 dimensions of human behaviour, mirrors the model that Helgeson (2012) also provides as a generalised summary of the differences in some characteristics between men and women (Figure 5.4). There is indeed some evidence to support Baron-Cohen’s distinction that women are more empathic than men although men help more in situations of danger (Helgeson, 2012, pp. 127-128). Moreover, the male-dominated history of the West has seen its success

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106 Both Baron-Cohen and Jung’s schemas are depicted within Vahanian’s (2005) concept of the saeculum as the world of shared experience. Ultimately my thesis includes the point that Catholicism, as I describe it in these pages, is open to anybody. That concept of the saeculum is one way of making that point. Using Hamilton’s (2008) ideas is another.

107 As Baron-Cohen explains it, “Systemizing is the drive to understand a system and to build one” whereby a system is “anything which is governed by rules specifying input-operation-output relationships” (p. 61). Systemising therefore “involves first the analysis of the features in a system that can vary, followed by close, detailed observation of the effects that occur when each feature is varied (“systematically”). Repeating such observations leads one to discover the input-operation-output rules governing the behavior of the system. . . . The key thing about systemizing is that the system your brain is trying to understand is finite, deterministic, and lawful” (pp. 61-62). The ultimate payoff with systemising is that “discovering causes gives you control over the world” (p. 67). Hence systemising and its use in systems of various kinds underlines Mitroff’s (1998) technological and systemic solutions to the problems we face. Empathising, on the other hand, identifies the interpersonal and existential solutions to our problems.

108 “Empathizing is about spontaneously and naturally tuning into the other person’s thoughts and feelings, whatever these might be” (p. 21). “A good empathizer can immediately sense when an emotional change has occurred in someone, what the causes of this might be, and what might make this particular person feel better or worse. A good empathizer responds intuitively to a change in another person’s mood with concern, appreciation, understanding, comforting, or whatever the appropriate emotion might be. . . . [E]mpathizing drives you to do this because you start from the position that your view of the world may not be the only one [and] . . . that you see a person as a person, with feelings, rather than as a thing to be used to satisfy your own needs and desires” (pp. 22-24). Empathy has both cognitive and affective components. The cognitive element is about responding non-egocentrically and using a theory of mind to do so: “The cognitive component also allows you to predict the other person’s behavior or mental state” (p. 26). The affective component is illustrated in the correct response to another person’s emotional state. Sympathy is one of these although there are others: “Perhaps you feel anger (at the system) in response to the homeless person’s sadness, or fear (for his safety), or guilt (over your inability to help him): these feelings are based on empathy. Feeling pleasure, or smugness, or hate toward him would not be empathic reactions, since none of these emotions is appropriate to his emotion” (pp. 26-27).
determined by its proven powers of systemising (even though the western development of these powers owed much to certain advantages in the Eurasian natural environment (Diamond, 2005)).

Schaef’s psychotherapy work with women in the 1970s highlighted a number of alternatives to certain concepts as a result of the “eco” framework by which they had to define their “ego” or identity. In her words, “I began to realise that what I had been taught was useful in working with men but at best useless and at worst harmful in working with women” (Schaef, 1981, p.xv). She decided to listen instead and wrote her first book Women’s Reality based on a synthesis of what she had heard in a number of different settings.

In her Chapters 5 to 7, she listed a range of alternative understandings of common concepts that her clients had described (see Table 5.1). Like the conclusion that can be drawn from the differences that Gilligan found in the area of moral development, these too can be seen as functions of experiences faced.

In addition, Schaef outlined the theology of the White Male System as describing a God that is omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent, and, here is the payoff, a schema wherein the hierarchy becomes God (at the top), men, women, children, animals, and finally the earth at the bottom. What Schaef and her female informants were describing has entered the sociological mainstream as Kimmel’s (2008) “gendered society”; the left side of the table describes patriarchy. What Schaef also essentially describes in the left column are all the characteristics of what Borg and Crossan (2009) identify as a “domination system” with men and women involved in its perpetuation. I contend, for both evolutionary and psychoanalytic reasons. These will be explored later. At this stage it is important just to recognise their existence in historic and current western settings.\textsuperscript{109}

The crucifixion of Jesus Christ by the domination systems of his day is important for three main reasons (which also can and will be explicitly related to the wisdom model). Borg and Crossan (2009), in their exposition of the “real” and radical Paul, contend: “the cross reveals the character of empire, the path of personal transformation, and the character of God” (p. 131)\textsuperscript{110}. It is the first of those three that refer to “domination systems”\textsuperscript{111}.

Christ crucified . . . signal[ed] . . . that Jesus was an anti-imperial figure, and that Paul's gospel was an anti-imperial gospel. . . . The issue was not simply Roman imperial authority, as if Rome were worse than most empires, and that a Jewish or Christian empire would be better. Paul did not simply indict Rome, but what he saw in it: Rome embodied the wisdom of this world—the normalcy of this world, the way life most commonly is, the way things are. (pp. 131, 135)

This “normalcy” of the world specifically refers then to . . .

. . . the most common form of human society since the development of large-scale agriculture and the concentrations of populations it made possible, beginning in the fourth millennium BCE. What emerged is what we and others call in shorthand “domination systems,” societies ruled by a few who used their power, wealth, and “wisdom” to shape the social system in their own self-interest. . . . What they shared in common was domination through power, including violence and the threat of violence. . . . This, along with the ideology that legitimates it, is the wisdom of this world. (p. 135)

That then is what Schaef (1981) describes as the White Male System; it is essentially the domination system—“systemising” in other words—at the top of its game; and the Female Reactive System is the system that allows the White Male System to go on operating because it is primarily a system that has

\textsuperscript{109} This thesis is focused on Christian aspects of western societies.

\textsuperscript{110} There is a wealth of significance for my thesis in that quotation not least in the identification of the cross as illustrating the character of God. This idea is developed in Gorman (2009) who also equates the cruciform world with theosis. This is essentially the radical claim of Christianity that we are made to ultimately share in the nature of the Godhead itself.

\textsuperscript{111} Rome reserved crucifixion for two categories of people: those who challenged imperial rule (violently or nonviolently) and chronically defiant slaves (not simply occasionally disobedient or difficult slaves). . . . The two groups who were crucified had something in common: both rejected Roman imperial domination. Crucifixion was a very public, prolonged, and painful form of execution that carried the message, “Don’t you dare defy imperial authority or this will happen to you.” It was state torture and terrorism. . . . (Borg & Crossan, 2009, p. 131)
been developed to “cope with and stay safe within the White Male System” (p. 20). It is fundamentally described as “the original sin of being born female”:

In general, women feel relatively safe attacking other women. We are not dependent on each other for our identity, so what does it matter? This ongoing antipathy has severely hindered the growth and maturation of the Female System. The White Male System has used its observation of women inflicting pain on one another to discount the Female System. When women say, “I do not like or trust other women,” what we are really saying is, “I don't like myself.” And this in turn can be expanded to “I don't like femaleness” . . . In other words, what women were saying when we felt safe was that to be born female means to be born innately inferior, damaged, that there is something innately “wrong” with us. (pp. 23-24)

Schaef (1981) has enumerated the strategies for coping with this assigned inferiority such as the capacity to remember details of events, goodness (as a way of earning absolution), scrupulous fairness, and scrupulous rule-following, and an endless capacity to be understanding. And have those worked? she asks:

Have our excellent memories, or goodness, or fairness, or conformity to the rules, or understanding ever really accomplished anything? Not really. As in the theological concept of original sin there is no justification by works. However, we are told that we can turn to an outside intermediary for help. We can look to someone else to intercede for us. We are taught that once we attach ourselves to a male, we can get validation and approval. In this way, we will feel better and be absolved of our Original Sin of Being Born Female. Unfortunately, this usually does not work either, and we continue to struggle with intense feelings of worthlessness. (pp. 32-33)

The main point however is that when one reads Schaef’s work, what comes through from the women who are healing is the greater validity that “their” system has in terms of New Testament thinking, corroborating the superior values on the right hand side of the table above. Responding to Freud’s and Erikson’s ideas on where women’s identity lay, this following example is an interesting alternative to the Marian norm:

Women do experience an inner space. We never describe it as being in the lower abdomen, however. It is almost always in the solar plexus. Women use various words and phrases to name it—hole, pit, nothingness, void, “black” space, cavern. We are fearful of it and vulnerable to it. In strange, unfamiliar, or threatening situations, we will often stand with our arms folded over our solar plexus—our cavern. Women have also developed body postures that “sink in” and protect this area. We often cover it with fat.

Our cavern is central to our identity and wholeness, but it has nothing to do with penises and babies [a reference to Freudian theory]. Instead, it is related to the fact that we go from being our fathers' daughters to being our husbands' wives and finally our sons' mothers. It is related to our Original Sin of Being Born Female and our need to look outside ourselves for validation and approval. When we begin to determine who we are from inside, our cavern begins to get smaller. . . . Let something major go wrong in their lives, though, and they are immediately aware of it again. (pp. 34-35)

It is in this sense that women can have a head start of understanding the paradoxical complexity of a cruciform world where what was seen as deficiency or lack—the stone rejected—becomes the corner stone; and where Jesus as “Saviour” is a less pertinent symbol than Jesus as “a model to be participated in”. It is in this sense that I propose another claim of an alternative—and this is a radical alternative to existing Catholic practice, whereby Jesus did not only become Man; there is a very real sense that in his Crucifixion he then also became Woman. Figure 5.6 (to be explained in more detail later in this chapter) sets out a model for appreciating the cruciform world whereby both male and female elements are part of the Godhead.

As regards the Female Reactive System which, in the final analysis, does not do the world much good beyond our evolutionary legacy, I propose Saiving’s (1979) recognition of what she refers to as feminine sin, as representative of this system:

. . . the specifically feminine forms of sin—“feminine” not because they are confined to women or because women are incapable of sinning in other ways but because they are outgrowths of the basic feminine character structure—have a quality which can never be encompassed by such terms as “pride” and “will-to-power” . . . [They] are better suggested by such items as triviality, distractibility, and diffuseness; lack of an organizing center or focus; dependence on others
for one’s own self-definition; tolerance at the expense of standards of excellence; inability to respect boundaries of privacy; sentimentality, gossipy sociability, and mistrust of reason—in short, underdevelopment or negation of the self. (p. 37)

In these two systems—one aggrandising itself, the other diminishing itself—we can perhaps appreciate why the so-called “enlightenment” must remain “an unfinished project” (Peukert, 2005)\(^{112}\). We need an alternative that addresses the problems inherent in these two systems. To return to the point made earlier—all the work produced should be interrogated by two questions: \textit{So what?} and \textit{Who suffers and who benefits from its production and use?} The “diminished” self, described by Saiving above, needs to step into its growth process so as to step forward and keep the “aggrandised” self honest in terms of the ends it is working for.

The result of that change is two principles—the Ego and the Eco—both at the top of their game, working together albeit at cross-purposes\(^{113}\). In support of this idea, McGilchrist (2009) states: “Creativity depends on the union of things that are also maintained separately” (p. 42), like the professor and his challenging student, Baron-Cohen’s systemising and empathising, as well as Ego and Eco. For Maxwell (1984), the integration of scientific and value realism is a manifestation of an idea of an underlying holistic reality and in this reality, “opposites” can be integrated—“opposites”, that is, in the sense of complementary pairs of concepts that could be conceived as being “either/or”, but can and should be conceived as “both/and” in a scientifically and meaningfully “real” universe.

So, to return to Figures 5.1 and 5.2, the claim of an alternative in 5.1(b) and 5.2, depicts a situation where that balance has been achieved, unlike Figure 5.1(a) where the power emanates from the top left-hand quadrant, which, because of the potent combination of system and technological advance that it is defined by, holds the power. Rather, Jesus emerges from the bottom right quadrant and then, after his death and resurrection, works through the Pentecostal fire of the Acts of the Apostles which ultimately emerges in the Enlightenment enthronement of reason without it, however, in effect being “reasonable” enough (Maxwell, 1984) to finish the process. To become “reasonable” enough, it now needs to advance into feminine territory once more over the Ego-Eco, Systemising/Empathising fault line of the conceptual wisdom model. It is to that transition that I now turn by examining more closely what the claim of an alternative is measuring itself against.

Systemising at the top of its game and at its rapacious marauding “best”, can be seen in the autistic efforts of some evolutionary biologists such as Richard Dawkins to reduce humanity and its disparate cultures to mere vehicles of the genes they embody. Pagel (2012) for instance, reiterates Dawkins’ views on genes and memes (a human being is the way a gene makes more genes and a scholar is a way for a library to make another library) and outlines the way our “cultural survival vehicles” are responsible for humanity’s ability to overcome the “rule of two”\(^{114}\) and to occupy almost every habitat on earth (no matter how briefly in the case of the Everest of this world). This is all entirely reflective of Stage 4 thinking however

\(^{112}\) One might wonder of course, as Hamilton (2008) does, that it might have failed altogether:

\begin{quote}
If affluence—the object of so much determined effort—has failed to improve our wellbeing, why have we tried so hard to become rich? Has our pursuit of riches led us to sacrifice some things that contribute to more satisfying lives, including the strength of our relationships, a surer sense of self, and the quality of the natural environment? In short, has the whole growth project failed? (p. 4)
\end{quote}

I do not believe that it necessarily has, but there must be reform. To repeat, Stage 5 spirituality will assume Stage 4 rather than thoroughly repudiate it. In other words, Stage 4 thinking now needs to enter a creative design process, whereby the whole Stage 5 product of that process exceeds the sum of its Stage 4 parts.

\(^{113}\) This latter fact means that one must be ultimately pre-dominant and I contend, in line with the fundamental Christian principle that ‘God is Love’, this must be ‘Eco’. Nevertheless, this Eco must be robustly understood as going beyond the domestic, and thereby, one’s genetic legacy, and, in light of Pagel’s (2012) thesis, cultural legacy, where it enables one individual to dominate another.

\(^{114}\) This refers to the inability of all other animals to overcome, by way of instinct alone, the limits to growth that the environment prescribes. Human beings, with their advantages of social learning, have been easily able to overcome these natural limitations to the extent that we are now the most successful biological species on earth.
and the level of meaning that Figure 4.3 shows Stage 4 as reaching—”enlightened self-interest”\textsuperscript{115}. As a theory, it is a compelling enough one, but, as McGrath (2005) and McGrath and McGrath (2007) and others have pointed out, the “new Atheism” of which Dawkins is a part, is another system of religious belief\textsuperscript{116}. It can be compared therefore to a Christian belief which points to a superior\textsuperscript{117} level of meaning which is “enlightened other-interest”. In other words, a Stage 5 faith sees the biological reality of our lives in systemic Time and Space within an alternate and larger reality wherein God can be understood as essentially Empathy writ large. In that alternative reality—reflected in a cruciform world—the “enlightened other-interest” of the Cross makes complete sense.

Faith is needed to subscribe to this larger meaning based on the evidence supplied by the New Testament, and, while this faith was “strong” in the Middle Ages and before in terms of those controlling society and nominally adhering to its creed, this was shown to be less than adequate to counter the claims of the alternative espoused by the Enlightenment. This inherent weakness was thoroughly exposed by Nietzsche’s powerful account of the death of God announced by the madman in the village square, to the extent that Rolheiser (2004) can now write of the “unbelief of believers” (p. 17) and the “agnosticism of our ordinary consciousness” (p. 17).

When Nietzsche’s madman smashes his lantern and shouts: “God is dead and we are his murderers!” the process that he refers to has taken place over many centuries. A generation that feels that God is dead is at the end of a long historical process that killed God unknowingly, gradually, and imperceptibly, often with the very means it was employing to keep him alive.[\textsuperscript{118}] The present crisis has roots that reach back hundreds of years . . . (p. 25)

In this sense we can see the descriptive merits of Pagel’s (2012) theory that religion is a mere “cultural enhancer” (p. 132)—a way, for example, of showing you are a “trustworthy” member of your cultural group\textsuperscript{119}; for many of us, that is indeed most of what it is\textsuperscript{120}.

Rolheiser’s (2004) work is worthy of more extensive coverage because he highlights the predicament that Catholicism finds itself in, in these secular times. How can a Stage 5 Empathising trump a Stage 4 Systemising which is what this thesis states the world now needs to do if it is to fulfil the progressive promise of modernity? How could this happen given the Stage 5 unbelief of Stage 3 believers?

To find a solution one must first tease apart the problem and Rolheiser (2004) states first of all that “God is always partially obscure and we are always partially blind” (p. 21). He divides this up into a Liberal and a Conservative issue respectively and chooses to look at it exclusively from the Conservative side because we cannot in the end “do anything about God’s freedom” (p. 21). So, “God is present to us but

\textsuperscript{115} Even group selection, Pagel (2012) writes, is fundamentally a mechanism whereby the individual’s genetic material gains advantages.

\textsuperscript{116} Using Dawkins’ way of thinking, I could counter that Dawkins and his theories are a way that the Systemising meme ensures the survival and continuing dominance of the Systemising meme. Likewise, I could say that I am Empathising’s means of ensuring that my favourite meme produces more Empathising memes. We are back into a battle of the memes whereby the “fittest” meme will survive. We all know how that works out. As far as this world is concerned, Systemising will keep winning the wars for a long time to come. Again, the God of Christianity is a God who empathetically woos; he doesn’t ravish—or punish. As Rolheiser states, the gates of hell are wide open with a four lane motorway heading out of them if we care to avail ourselves of it. The “Good News” is meant to be understood as a map by which to locate it.

\textsuperscript{117} Admittedly, I am using a different measure of value to Pagel (2012). He would say that Good Samaritans tend to be limited in numbers in cultural groups because others will inevitably take advantage of them with the result that their genes, while helpful to the group, will never be overrepresented.

\textsuperscript{118} Rolheiser’s footnote states: “We often kill God by bad religion. Atheism, though, is most often generated by bad theism. Michael Buckley discusses this in his monumental At the Origins of Modern Atheism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).”

\textsuperscript{119} If, as Schaef (1981) contends, Science is the religion of White Male Society, I face the same problem in getting my thesis taken seriously. Being a fully paid-up member of the Catholic Church after the Enlightenment does not for example make me particularly “trustworthy” in terms of establishment values. I am more likely to be regarded as a “religious nutter” or someone who is as likely as not to “force my beliefs down other people’s throats”.

\textsuperscript{120} We will see in Chapter 9 that in fact the difference between seeing one’s faith as a mere cultural enhancer and actually trusting in one’s faith are distinguished by Allport (1950) as showing the difference between what he terms “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” religion.
we are not present to God” (p. 22); we need to look at the ways we are living, and the problem there, is that we lack contemplation: “The eclipse of God in ordinary awareness is a fault in contemplation” (p. 22).

At this stage, to put matters back in a secular context, we can understand these points in terms of Figure 4.23 where one of our minds’ processing principles is “accessibility”. In these terms, Rolheiser’s (2004) thesis is that God is no longer very “accessible” in our Catholic (and more generally Christian) consciousnesses.

Rolheiser (2004, p. 27) then goes on to specifically document “the factors militating against contemplation” as “narcissism, pragmatism, [and] unbridled restlessness” (see Table 5.2 for a more detailed explanation of these three problems). There is nothing surprising about the first of these, as narcissism is how we come into the world after all, and our own personal problems have always been of paramount concern to most people in all ages. Pragmatism is Mitroff’s (1998) technological systemizing solution in a nutshell. Finally, it is hard to grow out of the unbridled restlessness that results from our kind of society which offers so much choice at all times and which thereby distracts us from what is really important.

Rolheiser (2004) concludes:

“Blessed are the pure of heart, for they shall see God.” What makes our hearts less than pure? It is not always simply sin, moral laxity, or bad will. Narcissism, pragmatism, and excessive restlessness can effectively block us from seeing God in ordinary life. (p. 50)

In this sense, it is the Beatitudes that are the greatest challenge to modern life and they represent a description for its reform. They are the most effective remedy that Christianity can provide: “when we operate out of restlessness rather than out of our true center, then, in the famous phrase of Augustine, God is within us, but we are outside of ourselves (p. 50).”122 This is a complex and somewhat counter-intuitive conclusion to come to, which is possibly the reason why Stage 5 Christianity will always remain the province of the very few. It entails a march across the desert between the eastern gate of Eden that we were thrown out of and the western one which will welcome us. Contemplation has succeeded, states Rolheiser, when it has brought on Ricoeur’s (1967) “second naiveté” expressed in T.S. Eliot’s words from Little Gidding, whereby we actually “know” Eden for the first time when we reach it for the second. It does this by restoring our early instincts for astonishment.

Our modern problems however are expressed as Stage 3a in Figure 4.3. Stage 4 society has enabled us to entertain ourselves into a mental oblivion whereby we dance to a tune played by the rich and powerful—the movers and shakers of our technological solutions—although they too are “outside themselves” in the mental oblivion that modernity has created according to Rolheiser’s (2004) Christian theory above.

The moving and shaking that the “Science” and “Math” quadrant of Ackerman and Heggestad’s (1997) model accomplish in our modern society is illustrated by another model which is now needed for a full understanding of Figure 5.1(a). Before leaving the field of secondary school teaching, I was fortunate enough to attend a seminar given by Julia Atkins, an Australian educator, whose system of teaching follows a model that is remarkably similar to the conceptual wisdom model. It is reproduced in Figure 5.5. The admirable aspect of it that I wish to emphasise first in this context is the need to teach to all four

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122 Augustine, The Confessions of St. Augustine, 10.27.
quadrants of her model in spite of the fact that we all have various strengths in one or more of the quadrants as well as weaknesses in the remainder. Despite these weaknesses, we need to develop some sort of competence in them as well as working to our strengths.

Atkins’ model divides competencies on the basis of the structure of the human brain—namely its two hemispheres as well as its vertical division whereby our specifically intellectual resources in the cerebral cortex are laid over our mammalian inheritance represented by the limbic brain\textsuperscript{123}. The quadrants so created are clearly delineated in Figure 5.5—the Rational, Theoretical Self, the Imaginative, Experimental Self, the Ordered, Safe-keeping Self, and the Feeling, Interpersonal Self.

There is indeed an obvious bias in the model whereby the Rational Theoretical Self quadrant is seen as dominant—which mirrors the way the education system is organized to the extent that one critic once wrote that the education system is seemingly set up to produce university professors as its main goal. Now, as I have written above, I do not wish to be guilty of intellectual-bashing or to be derogating of the so-called “ivory tower”, but I do wish to point out that there is a problem with the way the actual teaching process is set out with all arrows emanating from the powerful upper left quadrant. It would seem to me (and Maxwell (1984) too I would suggest) that the more logical starting point for the process would be in the bottom right hand quadrant, the Feeling, Interpersonal Self and its key question What has this got to do with me? and, more importantly (to avoid the malaise that education has actually fallen into), the more fundamental questions that lie behind it, which are How should I live? What should I do with this existence that I find myself in? As it happens (and in line with Lacan’s discourse theory that will be outlined in Chapter 14), it is indeed apposite that some of the arrows in the right hemisphere of Atkins’ model do rise up from the Feeling, Interpersonal Self through the Imaginative, Experimental Self and into the quadrant of the Rational, Theoretical Self. Nevertheless, I contend that the overall direction of the arrows is a relic of the way human society has been built up over its history (representative of what Maxwell (1984) calls “rationalistic neurosis” (see Chapter 7), what Haidt (2012) refers to as “the rationalist delusion” (see Chapter 8), and what I and many others would call patriarchy (Chapter 10), rather than a more logical and rational way of doing things.

So, the arrows in Atkins’ Model depict the dynamics of education in a secular state which accords its greatest importance to the systemising dimension—Figure 5.1 (a). The nature of this sort of society, and indeed I will use his work as an exemplar of the Protestant secular state, is well described by Carroll (2008). In describing two important sources of meaning in the modern world as Work and Sport, he pinpoints the primary importance of symbolic intellectual analysis supported by the procedural strengths of the quadrant below it. His description of the Calvinist world view that underlies his observations is a direct result of the Reformation and the events subsequent to it.

What Carroll (2008) describes is the current form of what the theorists of Terror Management Theory call an “immortality ideology”. This theory, and the ideas of Ernest Becker that underlie it, will be canvassed in Chapter 9, but in essence, this theory states that, as a consequence of our unique place in Nature, we are the only animal that consciously knows it is going to die. This knowledge is a source of terror to us so we have developed means of dealing with what is called “mortality salience” when it arises. Another term for those “means” is culture which provides us with narratives or immortality ideologies that either explicitly promise immortality (in the case say of Catholicism) or a symbolic substitute for it (excelling in some area that our culture recognises as valuable—Carroll’s Work and/or Sport for example). The superior importance of the Rational and the Theoretical over Feeling and the Interpersonal in the modern world is underscored at one point in Shen and Bennick (2003) in which psycho-historian Robert Jay Lifton makes the following comments:

\textsuperscript{123} While the Atkins model is schematic, it perhaps downplays the importance of the lower two sectors by placing them exclusively in the limbic brain. As Haidt (2006) observes, “The orbitofrontal cortex . . . appears to be a better candidate for the id”, (p. 12) and the orbitofrontal cortex is in the more recently evolved primate brain.
I had an interesting conversation some years ago with Paul Tillich, the great Protestant theologian, and Tillich told me that almost from the beginning the more brilliant theologians always had a sense of the symbolic, of the idea of the eternal rather than the literal sense of eternal life; that literal sense of eternal life if you like was given to the masses by the Church as part of its way of controlling them whereas the brilliant thinkers and outstanding theologians had a different sense closer to what I call the symbolic.\textsuperscript{124}

For this thesis I too make my assumptions and point to my own proposed “immortality ideology”. If one is human, one lives in culture and one thereby has an immortality ideology. It is unavoidable. This thesis supports the “immortality ideology” of Catholicism as expressed predominantly in the Gospels. Its model, in accord with the topsy-turvy system of values it espouses, is Jesus Christ—a figure that Luce Irigaray described as, that “most female of men” (Irigaray, 1985, p. 199).

So, the arrows and the starting point in Figures 5.1 (a) must change. My claim of an alternative for this thesis is that in line with the female development myth of \textit{Cupid and Psyche}, one that has “Eco” or relatedness at its very heart, the need for development starts in the bottom right quadrant, and then progresses counter-clockwise till it arrives back “where it started and knows it for the first time”. That journey arrives at different conclusions and at a different place than those of Protestantism (and Robert Jay Lifton) in spite of my acknowledgement of Catholicism’s debt to it.

In addition to the myth of \textit{Cupid and Psyche} and the progression that that myth charts around the conceptual wisdom model, I want to add observations from other sources that build on this sort of progression. Moreover, they come from sources that are embedded in the Enlightenment thinking and the left side of Figure 5.1 (a).

For example, Haidt’s (2006) work as a moral psychologist first isolated five universal bases of morality (recently enlarged to six in Haidt, 2012) and he notes the differences between Liberals and Conservatives in their evaluation of them. Liberals are different from Conservatives in their greater and more exclusive espousal of the \textit{Care} moral foundation. Conservatives value those foundations too but the more conservative one is, the greater the strength of the values of Authority, Loyalty, and Sanctity. Haidt’s expressed intent is for tolerance from those of his liberal persuasion towards those who come from pre-modern traditions. To repeat the point made in Chapter 4, from my female point of view that is concerning because, while Haidt certainly doesn’t “accept” the subjugation of women and girls by way of this tolerance, he seems to have no way of dealing with it in a manner that is acceptable to me.

I don’t want to tolerate this subordination of women and girls in pre-modern cultures because it represents a hangover from our evolutionary heritage (Fletcher, 2002) whereby women’s sexuality was controlled by men\textsuperscript{125}. The situations he describes from his time in India doing his research where the women in a

\textsuperscript{124} As an antidote to these comments, I will employ Chesterton (1909) to express my view of Mr Lifton’s comments, which is similar to Chesterton’s view of Yeats after quoting the words in one of his poems:

\begin{quote}
It is a dreadful thing to say that Mr. W.B. Yeats does not understand fairyland. But I do say it. He is an ironical Irishman, full of intellectual reactions. He is not stupid enough to understand fairyland. Fairies prefer people of the yokel type like myself; people who gape and grin and do as they are told. (pp. 97-98)
\end{quote}

I have never forgotten as a child pondering on how utterly strange life was. Nothing can be stranger than that; certainly nothing in Catholic Orthodoxy as expressed in the \textit{Apostle’s Creed}, the basis on which Chesterton writes his \textit{Orthodoxy}, strikes me as stranger than the fact of life itself.

\textsuperscript{125} Fletcher (2002, p. 262) includes among his four well-documented gender differences in intimate relationships the following generalization: “Men adopt a more proprietorial attitude toward women’s sexuality and reproductive behavior, than vice versa” with the result being that men are more likely than women to “become sexually jealous at possible or actual sexual infidelities and react violently” such as “kill or seriously injure their partners”. The other three general gender differences (general in the sense that these are average trends and that there are men and women who exhibit the contra-sexual traits to a greater extent than the other sex) are also important to note, given the importance of sexual selection in our evolutionary past. They are: women are more motivated and expert lay psychologists than men in intimate relationships; men possess a stronger and less malleable sex drive, and a stronger orientation towards short-term sexual liaisons, than do women; and women are more focussed on the level of investment in intimate relationships than are men.
household served but did not share the men’s meals, are literally intolerable. Haidt’s (2012) lack of religiosity is no match for the expression of pre-modern and conservative religion in that sense. In other words, this stance can be characterised as that “wishy-washiness” that Liberals are often accused of, whereby all such conflicts of values can be reduced to an agreement to disagree. Now, I do have a religiosity and it is seen those Conservative values in a new light whereby, in reference to T S Eliot’s quotation from Little Gidding, it sees them for the first time. As a result, the lens through which I see them is not clouded by a patriarchal point of view that seeks (according to the explanation proffered by evolutionary psychology to explain the near universality of patriarchal systems and their control of the women within them) to ensure that all children in the tribe have secure (as in known and verified) paternity. My evaluation of conservative values (and I must value them if I am going to hold to the holistic view of my conceptual wisdom model) is seen through a second-order, born-again lens whereby each eocio Soul (as opposed to eocio Spirit) knows, like St Augustine—whose words I quote—that it will not rest “until it rests in Thee”—that is, in that entity “in which we live and move and have our being”.

The best way of depicting this is by way of the arrows within the conceptual wisdom model that make dynamic the relatedness of its parts (see Figures 5.2, 5.7, and 5.8). So the Conservative values (like the bumper sticker: More individual choice and Less government) on the left side of the Left/Right fault line are those concerned with personal “sin”; those (degradation, betrayal and insubordination) that offend against the moral foundations of Sanctity; Loyalty; and Authority. That emphasis on personal sin is present-day Conservative Catholicism in a nutshell, by which the men in it (and the women who support their ideas) who, in terms of my espousal of evolutionary theory, are acting on the basis of values instilled by way of our evolutionary history, rather than those alternative values that should be inculcated in them as a result of their imitation of the life of Jesus Christ. Catholic men in power showed this most keenly in their traditional attitudes towards women; it is in women’s sanctity, loyalty and subordination that women received their greatest accolades—the woman as virgin and martyr for the cause.

The Reformation and the subsequent Enlightenment followed the big left-hand arrow in Figures 5.2 and 5.7 up to the cerebral, intellectual and rational capabilities of the top left quadrant. This is secular modernity in all its glory and power and it also includes the theologians who also may or may not be Conservative or Liberal, or perhaps Conservative in some things and Liberal in others. The fault line dividing these two political groups runs right through the middle of the NT quadrant. Now, this quadrant is important; it is important to vote and participate in the secular state, but, if you are a not a native of this camp, it is hard to be ardent about politics because of the varying nature of problems which can respond to solutions from either political camp. The wisdom lies in knowing which ideology is better in any particular case. I certainly have a distinct tendency to opt for the collective Left (or in American terms the Liberal) camp because I am predominantly concerned with the existence of “social sin”—and the political system of a secular state is the best practical way of rectifying that (albeit that something more existential—more charitable) is required in the long run. It is not that I do not recognise the existence of “personal sin”, but, being personal sin, the locus of control for rectifying it would seem to me to rest more with the “person” concerned, albeit the existence of social mores in each of our brains that either encourage or discourage us towards that rectification. Certainly, the social context should exist whereby personal “wholeness” is encouraged, but a conservative system based on patriarchal values does not seem to me to be the most fertile context in which that might happen. In other words, while individual and societal moral values are ultimately the best way to fix human problems, in secular modernity, politics remains the main way that our society fixes them, and the more politics aims at social equality, the better the health of a society (according to Wilkinson and Pickett, 2011, and a lot of sociological thinking).

It is in the last difference that we can see one engine that drives greater and greater systemizing in human populations so as to garner more and more power, wealth, and prestige. If a man is rich he becomes more attractive as a mate to a lot of women. Both genders however, on average, select for warm-heartedness as their primary requirement in a mate. Empathizing is an important consideration in all human communities, but again, we must remember, in the “valuing me and mine” motivational sense that Smith and Mackie (2000) identify in Figure 4.23.

Finally, Fletcher (2002, p. 263) observes that while culture does play a role in “in either minimizing or accentuating these basic gender differences”, the gender differences above are “remarkably resistant to being extinguished”. We should not underestimate the difficulties associated with bucking the instinctual end of the Ideation-Instinct continuum!
A new basis for evaluating “personal sin” comes with the closing of the circuit by the big arrow on the right of Figures 5.2, and 5.7; it returns to “the place from whence it started”, to again quote T S Eliot. Here is where the moral basis of Authority, Loyalty and Sanctity are seen to be in partnership with Hamilton’s (2008) noumenal basis for post-secular ethics and my Catholic basis of God is Love. Although their ethics are not quite identical as a reading of Hamilton (2008) will show, there are enough similarities in the two systems to consider them together. Hamilton, for example, is positing the pressing need for an inner personal freedom if we are to emerge from our immersion in shallow consumerism and the nihilism it both illustrates and produces.

So, yes, Authority, not to any shallow ideology, but to a God of Love who, when tasted, is Good\textsuperscript{126}. That sweetness, and the realisation of one’s inherent and integral place within it, is a reason for subordination to something greater than oneself.

And, yes, Loyalty over betrayal, but not to any man-made ideology or those ideologies dressed in religiosity and clerical robes that seek to subjugate women rather than to liberate them. Loyalty to a God of Love satisfies one’s deepest cravings to the extent that betrayal becomes unthinkable.

Finally yes, Sanctity over degradation in the sense that Chesterton described “white” as a colour, and where chastity means the full appreciation of one’s inherent value as a Being made in the image of God. This is in contrast to much social convention where one’s body is valued merely as the carrier of a strategy or a derogation designed to protect men’s interests in the maintenance of the claims of paternity or the sexual use of women’s bodies. To take the viewpoint of men who also find themselves at or near the bottom of the patriarchal food chain, it can also mean resistance to the use of one’s body as cannon fodder in a system designed to protect rich men’s interests. If one is truly the Temple of the Holy Spirit, then respect is due one’s own and other people’s bodies\textsuperscript{127}.

To the extent that these are feminist stances, they are roundly rejected by many in Catholic circles. Nevertheless, they, and the journey they must come to represent, form the basis for my loyalty to the Catholic faith.

That difference in motivation is critical for appreciating what I in this thesis see as “good behaviour” in a Catholic context. A rough and ready indication for why motivation is important can be seen from another analysis of the equation which has already been encountered in Figure 4.7 and which also appears near the top of Figure 5.2: Cultural Performance or Behaviour equals the product of Ability and Motivation minus Situational Constraints. Situational Constraints can be valuable where the product of Ability and Motivation leads to an anti-social result. Fowlerian Stage 3 Situational Constraints in particular are very important for Stage 3-Stage 4 social cohesion. However, these Situational Constraints can also work against the Good, as Christ’s crucifixion—and the reason for it—showed. In this sense, post-modernity was and is a valuable social project for its exposure of the vested interests that underlie social conformity. At the same time, post-modernity has a lot to answer for in the dumbing-down of higher order Abilities and Motivations that it left in its wake and which Hamilton (2008) for example documents. In other words, and in reference to Figure 4.3, instead of society progressing upward towards Stage 5, it went sideways into Stage 3a and narcissism.

Before drawing this chapter to a close, there is another way in which Jungian theory about personality types is important in understanding why we have the problems that Rolheiser (2004) and Hamilton (2008) have itemised above. The two dimensions that have been presented as underlying the derivation of the conceptual wisdom model in Chapter 4—the T-F and the I-N dimensions—are, in the Myers-Briggs

\textsuperscript{126} I do not ultimately agree with Iris Murdoch that Good has sovereignty over God although I thoroughly understand why she might have thought that way. I see God differently, so I can assess it differently.

\textsuperscript{127} Hamilton (2008) makes a very valuable point with regard to sanctity. We are “moral advisors” in such matters rather than moral judges. That should be the difference when assessing matters of sanctity from an a-patriarchal viewpoint.
system and the sixteen personality types that it identifies (Myers, 1995), supplemented by two other dimensions. These are the Extraversion-Introversion and the Perceptive-Judgemental dimensions. An understanding of these is also important for the full understanding of why Rolheiser’s (2004) Pragmatism and Unbridled Restlessness especially, are problems of the modern age. These other two dimensions are also important for understanding how a better education system might work in terms of my postulation above that it start more logically in the bottom right hand quadrant, with the Feeling, Interpersonal Self and its key question What has this got to do with me? in terms, that is, of How should I live? What should I do with this existence that I find myself in? The two dimensions (E-I and P-J) have a specific relevance in terms of the speed of modern life.

As I write this, it is two days after Anzac Day which is the day that both Australia and New Zealand remember those who have died in (predominantly, but not only) the two world wars. One topical magazine article I was reading spoke of the critical factor in the failure of one small foray into enemy territory during the Gallipoli campaign as being the lack of speedy action by others to follow up the gains made. Obviously Rolheiser’s (2004) contemplation and Hamilton’s (2008) advocacy of moral advice cannot work in the heat of war. Those latter both need a time of quiet reflection and the necessary solitude in which to do such concentrated reflection. It is those two aspects that the J-P (the speed with which we tend to make decisions, with J-types coming to decisions quickly, and P-types being deliberative and open-ended) and E-I (our orientation towards the world with the “E” dimension being outwards toward the world and the “I” inward, toward solitude and away from the world) dimensions address. By charting these two (Figure 5.9) we can see that again, with regard to power, there is an imbalance with regard to power between the top left quadrant and the bottom right. The monastery is in the end no match for the war machine as the movie Of Gods and Men demonstrated. The action, or lack of it, of the monks as they waited for death, witnessed to the longer time frame and the greater patience involved in their belief system. To go from the sublime to the ridiculous, the differences in the two new Jungian dimensions is also reflected in the difference between fast and slow food.

The Catholic belief system has been summarised by Rolheiser (1998). His four non-negotiable pillars of Christianity have already been included in the wisdom model but it is necessary to give them more consideration here given that they lie at the core of the claim of the alternative in both the wisdom model’s terms and in terms of its adjunct depicted in Figure 5.9. The special focus of this thesis in terms both of (1) its intrinsic value and that (2) it feeds into the others, is mellowness of heart and spirit. This brings in the cultural performance equation (Performance = Ability* Motivation - Situational Constraints)—specifically the motivational aspects of our behaviour. If the motivation for our actions does not reflect a warm and healthy soul, then we do not have mellowness of heart and spirit, and a warm and healthy soul is a sign of sanctity and sanctity is associated with gratitude.

We can will and do the right thing for the wrong reason. . . . Only one kind of person transforms the world spiritually, someone with a grateful heart. . . . an empathy that can only issue forth from a very grateful heart . . . The wrong God is the God of both the contemporary Right and the contemporary Left, that is, the God who is as wired, bitter, anxious, workaholic, neurotic, and unhappy as we are. (p. 64)

Moving around the wisdom model, the next is personal prayer and personal morality. Rolheiser defines this as the personal relationship we have with Jesus, and through him, to God, as reflected in our moral life. This is similar to the conservative piety that Liberals might scorn, but which Rolheiser defends as the interiority and intimacy with God that distinguishes Christianity from mere ideology:

. . . we will make progress in the spiritual life only if we, daily, do an extended period of private prayer, and only if we practise a scrupulous vigilance in regard to all the moral areas within our private lives. (p. 61)

128 This is not to say that religion is all contemplation and waiting. For example there is the ardent and impatient longing underlying Jesus’s words in Luke 12: 49: “I came to cast fire upon the earth; and would that it were already kindled!” I am also not saying that there isn’t patience and contemplation in Ackerman and Heggestad’s (1997) Maths and Science quadrant. Many of the great discoveries in Science—and in Business as another example—have been thought of in the shower rather than in the lab or the office. The Narcissism, Pragmatism and Unbridled Restlessness that Stage 3a uses however are not born of the contemplation that drives both Science and Religion—and even War—at their intellectual best.
In terms of Figure 4.23 this is all about maintaining mental accessibility to the claim of an alternative.

*Social justice*, defined as the preferential option for the poorest and most vulnerable in our society—the biblical widows, orphans and strangers—is another integral part of living one’s faith and another sign of the strength of our personal relationship with God.

God cannot be related to without continually digesting the uneasiness and pain that are experienced by looking, squarely and honestly, at how the weakest members in our society are faring and how our own lifestyle is contributing to that. . . . It is something that lies at the very heart of the gospel and which Jesus, himself, makes the ultimate criterion for our final judgment. (p. 63)

**Community as a constitutive element of true worship** is the fourth and final pillar:

. . . how we relate to each other is part of how we relate to God . . . [but] . . . our age tends to divorce spirituality from ecclesiology . . . Without church, we have more private fantasy than real faith. . . . Real conversion demands that eventually its recipient be involved in both the muck and the grace of actual church life. (pp. 65-66)

Figure 4.23 noted the Incarnation as part of Time, and for the Christian, because of what it led to, it is the most significant event in human history, and something that all Christians carry forward in their own Time. Rolheiser (1998) names a spirituality of the paschal mystery that can guide the changes in one’s own life—“five clear distinct moments”: Good Friday (real death); Easter Sunday (the reception of new life); the forty days leading up to the Ascension (a time of readjustment to the new and grieving for the old); the Ascension (letting go of the old); and Pentecost (the reception of new spirit for the new life that one is already living). Figure 5.6 outlines a necessary “sexuality” of God given the eruption of God into Time and our continuing representing of Fire and Water in the flatland we occupy, forever mindful however of the vertical dimension in which we live and move and have our Being.

This chapter has outlined the beginnings and the bases of a claim of an alternative. In the post-Protestant Catholicism of Figures 5.1 (b), 5.2, 5.7, and 5.8, the starting point is in the social Empathising potency of SF (albeit that it is weak systemically) and the direction is clockwise, recruiting systemising along the way, back to where it started where it knows for the first time. Part 2 will now look at the work of a range of scholars in a number of disciplines to see how this claim fits in with modern scholarship. Ultimately, the claim of an alternative—just like the claims of those systems that it makes alternatives to—is a claim of faith about “the abyss of mystery” we live in. But faith is never blind. It seeks evidence. Part 2 will present some of this, using Stage 4 scholarship and its findings and conclusions.
Part 2

THE WILDNESS LYING IN WAIT

Chapter 6

INDIVIDUATION AND CULTURAL EMERGENCE

The real trouble with this world of ours is not that it is an unreasonable world, nor even that it is a reasonable one. The commonest kind of trouble is that it is nearly reasonable, but not quite. Life is not an illogicality; yet it is a trap for logicians. It looks just a little more mathematical and regular than it is; its exactitude is obvious, but its inexactitude is hidden; its wildness lies in wait. I give one coarse instance of what I mean. Suppose some mathematical creature from the moon were to reckon up the human body; he would at once see that the essential thing about it was that it was duplicate. A man is two men, he on the right exactly resembling him on the left. Having noted that there was an arm on the right and one on the left, a leg on the right and one on the left, he might go further and still find on each side the same number of fingers, the same number of toes, twin eyes, twin ears, twin nostrils, and even twin lobes of the brain. At last he would take it as a law; and then, where he found a heart on one side, would deduce that there was another heart on the other. And just then, where he most felt he was right, he would be wrong. (Chesterton, 1909, pp. 146-147, emphasis added)

Simple extrapolation of the progression of Fowler’s (1981) earlier stages of faith (see Figure 1.1) would predict more of the same after Stage 4; but, on the contrary, there is a 90° change of trajectory, which indicates that some form of “wildness lies in wait”. It is my contention that that wildness, that “something unexpected” that comes when we are most sure that we are right, is the realisation of our neurosis. In line with Iris Murdoch’s two enemies of Love, while Science theoretically freed us from Stage 3 Social Convention, we now need theoretical liberation from Stage 4 Neurosis. While this is a more existentially difficult task in the sense that its remedy will be somewhat counter-intuitive, we do have the necessary knowledge at our disposal to effect change if we develop the motivation to do so.

Geuss (1981) states that a critical theory “... is a reflective theory which gives agents a kind of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation” (p. 2). With that in mind, and with reference to the notion stated in Chapter 5 that there are unconscious and under-used conscious examples of the “motives, understandings and intentions of social actors” (Cohen & Kennedy, 2007, p. 60), it is time to investigate what some of these could be. While the Enlightenment valorised reason, reason might be a plumper and better rounded concept once the theories that follow have been investigated. We can also return to Germaine Greer’s point that it is in liberation—or in the aforementioned emancipation—rather than in equality, that the feminist movement will be of greatest value to all women and all men. In view of the fact that this thesis is also seeking to re-energise a Catholic faith that appears more and more moribund in modern times and climes, there is a need to progress beyond a narrowly-based reason to a place where Chesterton above indicates that full “enlightenment and emancipation” might be found. We need to use human will to try and amend the current ills that are dependent on human desires and abilities. Even with regard to those natural forces that would seem to be beyond our ken, there is still much that the human race can do to mitigate their disastrous effects should we all desire to do so, and, given that will, we can do a lot better using the knowledge that the Enlightenment continues to give us.

Part 2 of this thesis takes the models introduced and augmented in Part 1 and endeavours to put some systematic flesh on their bones. Specifically, Part 2 looks at the (1) unconscious and (2) under-used conscious “motives, understandings, and intentions of social actors” with reference to the problems that those two groups of deficiencies manifest and continue to manifest in culture. My argument is countercultural (e.g. in its use of feminist and some Christian beliefs) to the extent that it points to the “wildness lying in wait” that is yet unrecognised, or not recognised fully enough. Given that the wisdom model (Figure 5.2) stands for a potential culture of wholeness and/or the model of the saeculum (the “world of shared experience” in its fullest sense) as derived both rationally and empirically, Part 2 will be focusing on the upper left quadrant and the lower right quadrants of that model. It will also focus on the unconscious aspects of the human psyche, which, even if only superficially understood from the experimental findings of cognitive psychology, is still important for the ways that unconscious processes fundamentally affect the workings of our culture. The investigation of the theorists in Part 2 will lead to
some concluding comments in Chapter 15 where the findings of these theorists will be used to make some
general points with regard to advancing Catholic culture in a way that is cognisant of those aspects of our
evolutionary heritage that are resistant to the reforms that Jesus brought, and to the teachings of Galatians
3: 28\textsuperscript{129}. Those aspects of our evolutionary heritage are for example those noted by Fletcher (2002) which
supply the basis for men’s attempts to control women’s sexuality\textsuperscript{130}. As produced by spiritual and soulful
beings, Culture should challenge Nature, and Christianity can be, as depicted in the life of Jesus, a very
advanced form of Culture. This is not to say that Nature can or should be supplanted; in many ways it is the
stronger impulse in the first half of life by virtue of our evolutionary psychology\textsuperscript{131}. However, that it
should continue as the stronger impulse into older age—through plastic surgery and Viagra to take just
two examples of modern methodologies designed to ease the anxieties of each sex respectively—is part of
the neuroticism of the modern age in which eternal youth becomes a central meaning within life for the
aging who no longer feel as valued as they might once have been\textsuperscript{132}. The importance and value of the
wisdom that only age can bring—for instance in the Jungian theory that I will review in Chapter 13—is
one aspect of the “wildness lying in wait” within human development, should we choose to accept and go
with it.

It should also be noted that, given the postmodern milieu in which the west now partly lives, it is intended
that, even though we may now choose to reject “grand-narratives” of the intellectual variety, the emotions
are a different matter. If, for the sake of argument, we are thrown back on our own resources in terms of
what we intellectually believe, then the self-reflexivity of emotional distress may be the more potent
indicator of truths that we do not wish to register, let alone clasp to our bosoms. The emotions create and
respond to their own grand narratives as the recently resuscitated area of motivation studies in psychology
attests. The heart has its reasons whereof Reason knows nothing, said Blaise Pascal, and the heart can
register those truths that perturb and anger as much as those that enlighten. Given Damasio’s (1994)
findings about the close relationship between reason and emotion, in fact the necessity for the passions to
supply our motivation (M) to act or not (P = A*\textsuperscript{133}M – SC), the emotions have been responsible for
creating the grand narratives of Western and other cultures. In this sense, Part 2 seeks to break free from
what Richard Rorty has called a truth that is defined as “what our peers will let us get away with saying”
(Rorty (1979) quoted in Tarnas, 1991, p. 399), a sentiment and a goal which should sound warning bells
for a post-Protestant Catholic, given the priorities specifically laid out in the Great Judeo-Christian
Commandment. We need to defy our peers as a primary source of truth in the sense that Rorty defines it,
if not as the receivers of our loving concern. We certainly need to defy our peers in their egregious New
Age reactions to modernity, most importantly where those New Age forms seek to block out the
“affictive emotions” which, as we will see, are very much part of our human inheritance and a fact of our
existence that needs to be confronted if these emotions are not to be acted out in self-indulgent and
dangerous ways.

So, it is the intention of the ideas that are covered in Part 2 to disturb, and it is my intention in discussing
these ideas to disturb the men (given the dominant “masculine symbolic and social economy” (Irigaray
(1993) quoted by Deal & Beal, 2004, p. 106)) and women, reactive and otherwise, who act as if there is

\textsuperscript{129} There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ
Jesus.

\textsuperscript{130} Refer to footnote 125 in Chapter 5 where I identified Fletcher’s (2002) general principle that “Men adopt a more
proprietorial attitude toward women's sexuality and reproductive behavior, than vice versa” (p. 262). There are understandable
reasons for this: while women can be sure of their maternity regarding a particular child (excepting Maternity Hospital mix-
ups), men cannot to nearly the same extent.

\textsuperscript{131} It is perhaps best to treat this either/or type question as modern genetic theory and the Nature/Nurture debate does—as an
interactive phenomenon in the way of Nature X Culture.

\textsuperscript{132} Appleyard (1992) credits the never-ceasing innovation of science as one reason why youth is over-valued in modern
culture. For my thesis this is yet one more reason for Christian wisdom as a claim of an alternative. Its fundamental point is
that such desperate attempts to hold onto what is seen as a youthful self are examples of Campbell’s point earlier in footnote 34
—and I paraphrase: That is one of those things one lives for, when one has nothing to live for.

\textsuperscript{133} As already introduced, Performance equals the product of Motivation and Ability minus the Situational Constraints
involved.
no alternative worthy of consideration. If there is one academic theorist who acts as a sort of Patron Saint of this endeavour, it is Luce Irigaray. In particular, the following quotation illustrates the potency of Irigaray and her valorising of sexual difference in its application to a Christianity honoured more in the breach than in the heeding: whereas the “Word made Flesh” is a radical doctrine, it has been reversed by the Christian tradition into the flesh made word (Irigaray (1991) quoted by Deal & Beal, 2004, p. 107). She counters thus in terms of her own despised womanly identity:

What does it matter that all judge her mad if the “prince of the world” has noticed her and if henceforward he will be her companion in solitude . . . this means that she exists all the same, beyond what anyone may think of her. It means that love conquers everything that has already been said. And that one man, at least, has understood her so well that he died in the most awful suffering. That most female of men, the Son. (Irigaray, 1985, p. 199)

Looking at the diagram that represents my take on Fowler’s model (Figure 4.3), it is the arrow of transformation (that proceeds directly from the amalgam of Stage 3 and 4 (in which the agentic Stage 4 is the defining partner) to the amalgam of Stage 5 and 6 (where Stage 5 communion is the defining partner)) that represents the priority. It should also be noted again that Stage 5 and 6 culture does not reject but assumes Stage 4 (that is, Stage 4’s value is tied up in Stage 5 and 6 culture). Its representation as an amalgam ultimately of Stages 5 and 6 is to avoid what Irigaray (2002) calls a fetishism of word and language—an “idolatry of the means” (p. 30) which is Stage 4 faith. Means are however still necessary to the process of transformation. For this thesis, those “means” are personified by the Stage 4 theorists in the following eight chapters of Part 2.

What this part of the thesis endeavours to do is to describe what Bonhoeffer’s “religionless Christianity” may actually mean from a feminist point of view. Religion in its “binding together” sense automatically implies an exclusion of others. It is discrimination by definition and one, that in its worst excesses (as evidenced in master-race doctrines), sees the “other” as some form of pollution. In this sense I am drawing on a sociology of the “Other” and all that that involves. Doris Lessing’s (1988) The fifth child was a valuable fictional representation of what this meant in a domestic setting. It would seem that as a fifth child (one wonders if that number was deliberately chosen134), he would even be excluded from my four-quadrant model, except that it is my contention that everyone who has a body can find a space in the SF quadrant135. The “binding together” therefore of a “religionless Christianity” is descriptive of the physical realities we hold in common, rather than prescriptive of the diverse mental and physical realities that divide us. It is the physical state of the injured man that draws forth the action of the Good Samaritan who otherwise shares little cultural identification with his charge and, moreover, doesn’t seem to expect any.136

But what about the cultural? Seidman (2013) draws a valuable distinction between a sociology of differences, and a sociology of the “Other”, the latter being far more discriminatory. I made the point earlier about those aspects of my life wherein I am relatively advantaged (middle class, white) and those in which I am not (female, over 60). Seidman’s sociology of the “Other” is specifically concerned with

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134 Five has a special significance in Jungian theory I am informed, inasmuch as the central dot on a dice-throw of five is depicted in the midst of the dots at each of the four corners. It would seem to stand therefore for the unity that the four quadrants fundamentally represent when taken together. The fifth child in Lessing’s account stood for the Jungian Shadow which is the last archetype to be incorporated into our psyches because of its unpleasantness. Nevertheless, we cannot be whole without it. (Five as a number also figures in modern experimental psychology: there is the five-factor model of personality and five (plus or minus two) is the number of items that the mind can handle in short term memory. )

135 The necessity for inclusiveness brings up some very awkward questions. I immediately ask myself, does that include psychopaths and sociopaths—the Eichmans for example of the ST quadrant who “were just following orders”? Of course it does, even though they, by definition, have less than the average amount of the Empathising dimension in their makeup (the fundamental rationale for the ST quadrant if we look at the derivation of it in Part One). Nevertheless, serial killers are part of human reality, and a part we have to confront and deal with, thereby I would further argue, owning our own coldness and indifference, our shadows in other words. Hanging the Eichmans of this world is not part of that process although, in such cases, humane incarceration has to be the means of control to protect the vulnerable from their predations. Chesterton’s (1920) “Travellers in State”, in his collection Tremendous Trifles, provides a sensitive treatment of this topic.

136 One could fantasize, given the cultural difference between the Samaritan and his Jewish charge, that a good discussion on cultural differences might have ensued if the wounded man had been up to it on the Samaritan’s return!
the deeper, more existential aspects of difference whereby one becomes stigmatised (Erving Goffman’s theory), is classed mad and abnormal (Michel Foucault’s theory), is racially “Othered” (Edward Said’s theory), and/or polluted (Mary Douglas’s theory). I was reminded of my own propensity to “Other”, when watching the movie Children of Men (2006) some years ago, in which Clive Owen, in a world without children and hope, is going all out to shepherd his pregnant charge to the safety of a ship out at sea which he has arranged to meet. When he becomes embroiled with an old woman in the bleak port town where he must somehow secure a boat to go out to meet the ship, I felt all my “Othering” instincts bubble up to the surface. I wouldn’t have anything to do with her Clive if I were you my reptilian brain—probably even my neocortex with its indoctrinated attitude of valuing me and mine—was telling me. She failed the cut on so many of Seidman’s levels, being old, unattractive, slovenly dressed, Eastern European (and therefore perhaps Muslim) foreign, and probably mad—as well as bad, and sad; let’s just throw the book at her. The scriptwriter—and I assume P. D. James, the original writer—used her of course as a guide and the means of salvation by way of her procurement of a dinghy. This fictional woman very possibly died soon after when the jets of the authorities strafed the unruly town, by which time Clive (who thankfully had ignored all my warnings) and the young woman were safely out at sea and out of range.

Purity is a good thing with regard to natural resources such as water; the city in which I am writing this boasts one of the purest water supplies in the world. This has not been the result of an active policy of water protection so much as a consequence of geologically-recent glacial history. As the mountains eroded to Christchurch’s west and built up the gravel plains on which the city now sits, the sea level rose and fell depending on whether the earth was in an inter-glacial or a glacial period at the time. The fine sediments deposited in times of high sea level became in time a vertical series of near horizontal non-water-bearing lenses or aquicludes separating the coarser (and as one went east, better sorted) gravels deposited on the eastern plains. These well-sorted water-bearing gravels became the series of artesian aquifers supplying Christchurch city when European settlers arrived in the 19th century (and perhaps for the Maori settlers in the centuries before them). Each aquifer is distinct because it is separated from the others by the aquicludes. Moreover, they are each protected from pollution (at least from the city above if not from the west which is where their recharge comes from) by a pressure gradient that is directed out and away from the aquifers (the reason of course for their artesian properties). They act like the water hoses pulled out by the authorities to repel protestors. They, and the hoses, drive pollutants and protestors off the premises, just as the processes in my tribal mind endeavoured to drive off the old woman in Children of Men.

These aquifers are therefore “self-sealing”, an expression that is used by Argyris (2006) (whose theory will be covered in more depth in Chapter 11) to describe the (skilled and incompetent) behaviour of actors in business organizations—behaviour which becomes increasingly more harmful the more powerful an actor is in an organization. The more powerful one is in terms of the system, the more an actor’s egocentricity can resist the “pollution” of other people and considerations, as exemplified by the arrows in the Education Model (Figure 5.5), which represent the intent of the teacher but also, more critically, the desires of the system itself in which the teacher is functionally more and more the mere acolyte. It is the upper left quadrant of that model—and the wisdom model—which represents power at the top of its game because of its command of both system and technology. White males and their consorts and imitators fill that favoured position says Schaefer (1981) because it is they who are currently riding high in the systemising game unencumbered moreover by too much empathising. Their position, however, could be filled by anybody who has access to the most power in a society. The arrows come out from that quadrant because as Schaefer has generally identified, the occupants of that quadrant don’t really have to listen to anybody (except out of self-interest). That quadrant’s inhabitants—and most of us have some part in it depending on how many there are that are “lesser” than we are—can say “speak to the hand”; that is, they can repel all boarders, just because they can. Argyris’s solutions come down to the personal admissions of threat and/or embarrassment by those in charge, which is why his work has been described as politically unfeasible; after all, who really wants to swap what one has of powerful NT with more of vulnerable SF which, in terms of Baron-Cohen’s model, and at its extremes (and in overly crude terms), is all Empathy and no System, compared to NT’s all System and No Empathy.
Nevertheless, the very unfeasibility of Argyris’s theory goes straight to the heart of the problem—of why a “will to power” undergirding human action has always gained more traction than the “will to meaning” espoused by that survivor of the Nazi death camps, Victor Frankl. The “will to meaning” in other words is universally interpreted, in practice at least if not always in intention, as a “will to power”; that is, the attaining of power, prestige, and possessions is the meaning of life. In terms of the way Frankl would understand it however, the difference between meaning and power can be seen when comparing the valorised masculine myth of Parsifal (the pursuit of the Holy Grail) and the lesser known feminine myth of Cupid and Psyche; while Parsifal is all action movie, at least until the hideous damsel makes her appearance at half-time, Psyche, in the earlier part of her myth, spends a considerable amount of time praying at altars and, when she does act, she is guided by masculine symbols. However, that “passivity” is at the root of the use of the word “Passion” to describe the crucifixion that results from the exercise of “domination systems”. Jesus of Nazareth eschewed the violence of the two (Roman and Jewish) domination systems he was confronted with, and therefore had little choice but to submit to the role of the despised “Other” and thereby become the model for all who suffer. Here again, in the journey taken by New Femininity in the context of the Old Femininity that Aphrodite represents in the myth of Cupid and Psyche, and in the journey taken by New Masculinity in the second half of the Parsifal myth, we see again the wildness lying in wait in terms of the need for individual and cultural maturation.

So, the “wildness lying in wait” is the wildness that dwells potentially—and for Christianity definitely—in the bottom right quadrant of the wisdom model because that is where each of us starts and, more importantly one hopes, ends. Because, between one’s beginning and one’s end, lies the very real danger entailed in the journey through the upper left place—where the weaker “Other” can be seen as a threat to the egoic purity of the powerful. The weaker “Other” both reminds me of my own essential embodied vulnerability which I want to disown because it leads me to death—both literal and social—while also disrupting my systemising plans. This lies at the basis of the camel and needle metaphor which warns of the specific danger that the “rich” face in terms of “getting” the Christian message; and why Jesus reproimands Peter in such harsh terms for the words and sentiments he uses after learning of Jesus’s impending crisis (Matthew 16: 21-23). If there is anything in the Christian message that is meant to forewarn of that threat, it is captured by Chesterton (1909) when he defends the Christian Church’s warning that “the most dangerous environment of all is the commodious environment”:

I know that the most recent biologists have been chiefly anxious to discover a very small camel. But if we diminish the camel to his smallest, or open the eye of the needle to its largest—if, in short, we assume the words of Christ to have meant the very least that they could mean, His words must at the very least mean this—that rich men are not very likely to be morally trustworthy. Christianity even when watered down is hot enough to boil all modern society to rags. . . . You will hear everlastingly, in all discussions about newspapers, companies, aristocracies, or party politics, this argument that the rich man cannot be bribed. The fact is, of course, that the rich man is bribed; he has been bribed already. That is why he is a rich man. (pp. 216-217)

This thesis postulates that we each need to live (and let live) according to four natures at once, and that the greatest of these natures is the one in which we most clearly see Christ in the least of his and our brethren, and, more importantly, in terms of the order of the Great Commandment, in ourselves—in our own wretched state, in the “illness that we are” as Dourley (1984) puts it. It is therefore those dimensions of the Eco character that Part 2 concentrates on, in which, instead of the Ego character (which includes both itself and the engulfment of the subjectivity of the “other” within) claiming our allegiance, it is the identification with the Eco that gives both itself and the Ego its proper and mature meaning. As Paul

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137 It is the fundamental paradox of power, that the greatest power is evident when the power is not used.

138 As one otherwise rather dull sermon I listened to once, noted: Heaven is not a come-as-you-are party. In other words, there should be a knowing element in one’s journey back to that space. In the Cupid and Psyche myth, and in her second task, Psyche gathers the ram’s wool; she doesn’t reject its importance. She gathers it however by keeping the dangerous rams at arm’s length—by harvesting wool from the branches where the wool has been caught as the rams walked by.

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paradoxically states, “when I am weak then I am strong” (2 Corinthians 12: 10). In that statement is the “paradox, depth and intergenerational responsibility” of Fowler’s (1981) Stage 5.

Ultimately, the end point which draws together all the relationships that can be derived from the foregoing account and the chapters to come is the one outlined in Figure 6.1. The diagram’s fundamental message is that human and cultural development is stalled on account of Maxwell’s (1984) “rationalistic neurosis” (see Chapter 7); Haidt’s (2012) “rationalist delusion” (Chapter 8); McGilchrist’s (2009) usurpation by the Emissary of the role of the Master, (also Chapter 8); Becker’s (1975) “deliberate lie” by and within culture (Chapter 9); Smith’s (1987) gendered “fault line”, Schaeff’s (1987) “addictive society”, and Gilligan’s (2002) masculine development neurosis (Chapter 10); Argyris’s (2008) “skilled incompetence” (Chapter 11); as well as a lack of emotional (and motivational) intelligence (Chapter 12). Jung’s individuation and the valuing of the second stage of life (Chapter 13); and Lacan’s processing of, and acting on, the ultimate Desire underlying the Hysteric discourse (Chapter 14) are potential ways of excavating an alternative set of values from our lives. The development of a mature Christian and post-Protestant Catholic culture will be the product of—all the individuals (and their levels of emotional maturity as determined by their embrace of the “wildness that lies in wait”), who co-create it.

One last point lies in the sense in which Baruch Spinoza can be seen as Part 2’s other patron saint. While one must ultimately reject his doctrine given the terms in Part 1 that have already been used to define a Christian viewpoint, (a relatedness of separation rather than a unity or a oneness of all things) the same cannot be said of his principled praxis. Like Psyche gathering the rams’ wool at a distance from the rams, he sacrificed success for principle by keeping the system (whether that was the Catholic Church, Louis XIV, the Jewish synagogue, or his parents) at arm’s length in spite of the fact that he could have made a considerable success of himself within it. Ultimately, as the Culture Model (Figure 4.7) illustrates, it is “what we do around here”, and the culture we do it in, that matters. He did far more than could be socially expected and no doubt paid the price for that with his early death because of the dangerous craft (lens grinding) he had to pursue to make a living—by all accounts a kind, gentle, and considerate as well as a principled and talented man, to the end. One doesn’t have to be a “Christian” to live a Christ-like life. Jesus, as a physician, came for the sick, not the healthy. There are no doubt rare souls such as Spinoza who can figure a good bit of it out on their own.

139 Paul can say this because, as Jackson (2013) notes, “few people are likely to ponder their own worldview as it appears from the standpoint of another unless circumstances compel them to” (p. 11) and Paul, in the biblical account, experienced those circumstances. Jackson states that it is only in conditions of “contingency, difference and struggle” (p. 11, Jackson’s emphasis), and not in the “European salons and seminar Rooms”, that people will have the motivation to really know themselves:

Understanding others requires more than an intellectual movement from one’s own position to theirs; it involves physical upheaval, psychological turmoil, and moral confusion. This is why suffering is an inescapable concomitant of understanding—the loss of the illusion that one’s own particular worldview holds true for everyone, the pain of seeing in the face and gestures of a stranger the invalidation of oneself. (p. 11)

This necessity for the mentally incommodious environment is Chesterton’s point above.
Chapter 7
THE WILDNESS LYING IN WAIT AS MAXWELL’S “RATIONALISTIC NEUROSIS”

The wisdom model was conceived as a result of my Masters thesis (Clayton, 2008) which investigated the links between Maxwell’s (1984) philosophy of wisdom and psychology. In 2009, a former student of Maxwell’s, Leemon McHenry, edited and introduced a series of contributions discussing the work of Nicholas Maxwell, and in the Preface, McHenry recalled Maxwell’s lectures on Contemporary British Philosophy at the London School of Economics in 1978 as “standing out”, because he had “something to say on things that really mattered”:

Here was a whole new way of doing philosophy that did not treat the problems and issues as merely linguistic or conceptual analysis, but as powerful ideas to change the world. (p. v)

From a sociological point of view, Maxwell’s philosophy of wisdom is even more significant because of the primary importance he places on “social inquiry and the humanities” (Maxwell, 2009, p. 2)\footnote{In fact Maxwell (1984, pp. 129-130) equates the philosophy of science with the sociology of science. They have the same meaning within the philosophy of wisdom.}. Tackling problems of knowledge is secondary for Maxwell; that is, the philosophy of knowledge is subsumed within the larger ambit of his philosophy of wisdom, “wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom thus including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else besides. A basic task ought to be to help humanity learn how to create a better world” (p. 1).

Bueno De Mesquita and Smith (2012) point to the reason why social inquiry and the humanities are so important: “Math and science are great subjects for study in China;” they say. “[S]ociology and political science are the subjects of democracies” (p. 111). That difference provides the underlying theme for this chapter, drawing as it does on Fowler’s model described in Part 1. To quickly recap, the progression from Stage 3 to Stage 5 in that model is characterized by a progression from Sharon Park’s (1980) “tyranny of the ‘they’”, to what I conceive of as a “democracy of the different”, where “the different” has an existential meaning, rather than a meaning derived from ethnic difference for example, even though cultural differences may point to authentic existential differences. It is that progression from tyranny into democracy that is pivotal; and it is my contention that that democracy is only effectively realized in the substantive Communion characteristics of Stage 5. Totalitarianism is in fact inherent in the Stage 4 Agency phase I will submit, to the extent that it is supported by Stage 3 functioning despite the high-mindedness of the Stage 4 Enlightenment. There is something in the “they” that invites tyranny (social convention), and something in the “different” (personal neurosis) that is not as yet ready to overcome its neurotic tendencies\footnote{Sociology shouldn’t be too flattered by this however because Maxwell is highly critical of the slavish way that the social sciences imitate the natural sciences.}.

Why should this be so? A preliminary answer can be extracted from Baron-Cohen’s (2003) model of our systemising and empathising brains. It is interesting to note the subtitle of Maxwell’s first book What’s wrong with science? which is Toward a people’s rational science of delight and compassion—“delight” in our understanding of the way the natural world works (≡ Baron-Cohen’s systemising dimension), and “compassion” with those we share this natural world with (≡ Baron-Cohen’s empathising dimension). In a world devoid of personal and systemic fear, that is a realistic vision of how it could be. However, that is not how it does work because we came into full consciousness—both individually and collectively—

\footnote{A fuller understanding of the need for this cultural evolution into a “democracy of the different” can be gained from a re-reading of footnote 46 in Chapter 1 in which use was made of Pagel’s (2012) identification and explanation for the current enormous and systemic social groupings of the modern world “in which so many can be so willingly led by so few” (p. 346), and how human health suffered as a result of that development. I am in essence suggesting that now is the time that the advancement of human health becomes the focus of our modern systemic endeavours. The economic basis required for this distribution of wealth exists—and probably and problematically exceeds the Earth’s capacity to sustain it. Nevertheless, as Gandhi identified, there is surely still enough for need if not for greed, and the measuring stick required for assessing need is the optimization of global human health.}
under an evolutionary system that demanded survival and reproductive fitness. While (arguably) empathising was important in this fitness (I refer to the theoretical contestation over the “group selection” hypothesis versus the accepted “individual selection” thesis), systemising was pre-eminent for the value it held for survival (as in food gathering for instance). Our biological origin is uncomfortable for us because it reminds us of the fact of biological death—an important preoccupation within philosophy (Ferry, 2010), and the focus of empirical investigation in experimental existential psychology (Terror Management Theory).

There are a number of facets to Maxwell’s philosophy of wisdom and I will start by reviewing how Maxwell (1984) seeks to integrate the human experiential within the physical universe. To do this, and to repeat, he says “we need to recognise clearly the existence of two distinct, intellectually equally legitimate, interdependent but opposingly directed modes of explaining and understanding” characterised as “the duo-directional theory of understanding” (p. 267).

Figure 7.1 follows Maxwell’s (1984) description, and shows the vertical dimension of value reality and the horizontal dimension of fact reality. His “value realism” means that there is a valid way for us to live and experience life and we can find out through cooperation with each other what that is. As for fact or scientific realism he states that the “authoritarian objectivism” in the realm of science expressed in standard empiricism, doesn’t explicitly state its values, and it also doesn’t state its presuppositions. As a remedy to authoritarianism, he suggests the following:

I propose that . . . authoritarian objectivism for the realm of fact . . . be rejected, and that instead we adopt conjectural physicalism as far as the physical is concerned. (p. 258)

There are indications in fact that as we delve into the deepest mysteries of the physical system we inhabit, the indeterminate nature of our existence is becoming more apparent, thereby necessitating a more subdued approach to what it is indeed that we can know.

“Give me a place to stand and I will move the earth” is one translation of Archimedes’ famous remark (New York University, 1995). And while his remark points to the impossibility of ever being able to do so, it can be maintained that Archimedes’ principle is also metaphorically true for our human abilities to prescribe a universal way of living our lives in accord with some sort of underlying value reality. Even if we were theoretically able to find out exactly what that value reality is, it is arguable whether we would have the capacity to realise that that in fact is what it was—that it indeed could be a reality that could “move the earth”. Ultimately therefore, there is a necessity to live by faith in a series of assumptions that ideally we can each state with varying degrees of explicitness and comprehensiveness. The Apostle’s Creed is one such statement of assumptions and beliefs that can underlie life. The belief outlined by Dawkins (2006) is another. The scientific world view is a third. Those creeds all live by the faith of their adherents. Whether one of them, or two—or indeed none of them—reflect an encompassing reality is something we cannot finally know—at least not while we live trapped in time and space.

Rorres (2009) in a talk entitled Archimedes and the quest for a theory of everything, takes Archimedes’ axiomatic system of “proofs” and charts the progress of that system through to Gödel’s theorem which

143 This is a secular interpretation. Christianity also of course recognises the pivotal role of revelation standing behind cultural and social interaction.

144 Hamilton (2008, p. xii) disputes this however. He states:

The ancient Greek mathematician Archimedes wrote, “Give me one fixed point and I will move the Earth”. If we can find a fixed point, it will allow a moral philosophy to be nailed down, and moral relativism vanishes. I argue that there is such a locus, a metaphysical absolute that is the basis for all important moral judgments. After consideration of the alternatives, I adopted the term “noumenon” (usually pronounced “noomenon”) to describe its source. Kant uses this word for his concept of the “thing-in-itself” which can be thought of as the world as it is, in its pure existence, before we bring our forms of understanding to it. The noumenon is always discussed as a partner of the concept of the “phenomenon”, the world of everyday appearances. As this suggests, the distinction is really about how we experience and understand the world.
ultimately leads us to the point presciently identified by Augustine several centuries earlier that “we do not know what we do not know”. Schaef, (1992) a self-described “recovering psychotherapist” (Part I, The Rise and Demise of a Psychotherapist), used a similar formulation to the criticism of physics implicit in Gödel’s incompleteness theorem when she identified in 1981 what she derived from her work with women as the fourth, albeit unspoken, basic myth of the White Male System: “it is possible to be totally logical, rational, and objective” (p. 10, italics in the original).

In 2002, Stephen Hawking, after previously being bullish about the prospects of finding a theory of everything, caught up with her.

Some people will be very disappointed if there is not an ultimate theory that can be formulated as a finite number of principles.

I used to belong to that camp, but I have changed my mind. (Rorres, 2009)

There is no Archimedes point—some point outside of that which we study, by which we can understand what sort of reality—physical and value-wise—it is that we reside within. And like the conclusion that Stephen Hawking has eventually arrived at, Rorres also quotes Stanley L. Jaki, a Benedictine priest and physicist (and one of the first of that latter number to realise the import of Gödel’s theorem for physics and much else besides) who, in 2004, stated that

Gödel’s theorem remains a serious assurance to all physicists that their minds will forever be challenged by ever fresh problems.

We can say the same for Religious Studies. While we are “trapped” in time, space, and matter without the wherewithal to step outside that frame of reference, we are also, conclude the new so-called Mysterians, “trapped” in consciousness. It too is one of the “primitives” of the Universe. Rorres (2009) quotes one of them—Colin McGinn: “Consciousness is an extra feature of the universe, as basic as space and time and matter themselves.” (Figure 7.2 places those four “primitives” on Maxwell’s model in Figure 7.1.)

And that consciousness can now be expanded in ways that we will see are redolent of McGilchrist’s (2009) findings in the next chapter. Take this for example from Jaki (1966):

It is on the ultimate success of such a quest [for a TOE or a Theory of Everything] that Gödel's theorem casts the shadow of judicious doubt. It seems on the strength of Gödel's theorem that the ultimate foundations of the bold symbolic constructions of mathematical physics will remain embedded forever in that deeper level of thinking characterized both by the wisdom and by the haziness of analogies and intuitions. For the speculative physicist this implies that there are limits to the precision of certainty, that even in the pure thinking of theoretical physics there is a boundary present, as in all other fields of speculations. (p. 129, italics added)

There is no ultimate objectivity possible, because we do not have an Archimedes point for consciousness by which we can see exactly what consciousness is. We only have the consciousnesses of ourselves and others in this realm in which we dwell. But while we do not have an all-knowing Archimedes point, we all do stand somewhere (in the light of Jaki’s comments above, however “hazy” and “intuitive” that may be) whether we are each conscious of that or not. Assumptions therefore need to be stated, including those underlying the discipline of sociology itself. For much of sociology for example, an atheistic standpoint is assumed in line with the genesis of Sociology as a discipline in the Enlightenment. In this thesis I am making an alternative assumption that the Judeo-Christian faith is an accurate map of value reality.

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When Maxwell (2009) reduces his argument down to the fundamental question of How can life of value best flourish in the real world? (p. 1), we can answer that question in a perverse way by saying that the human race has already shown where its so-called “values” lie, and Maxwell helpfully provides a summary of the effects of that value system:
new knowledge and technological know-how increase our power to act which without wisdom, may cause human suffering and death as well as human benefit. All our modern global problems have arisen in this way: global warming, the lethal character of modern war and terrorism, threats posed by modern armaments (conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear), vast inequalities of wealth and power round the globe, rapid increase in population, destruction of tropical rain forests and other natural habitats, rapid extinction of species, even the AIDS epidemic (AIDS being spread by modern travel). (pp. 1-2)

The difference of course with what Maxwell is proposing—the life of value he refers to—includes the above effects in a rational process that is fully cognisant of those effects. As McGilchrist (2009) recommends in the following chapter, it sees the whole, not just the self-interested parts. That is the difference between a philosophy of wisdom and a philosophy of knowledge, and, for the former, it is the empathising/compassionate brain that must be pre-eminent, thereby undermining the inherent authoritarianism of the systemising dimension (“inherent authoritarianism” because systemising creates power, and power corrupts). Academia must “cure its current structural irrationality, so that reason—the authentic article—may be devoted to promoting human welfare” (p. 2). Social inquiry and the humanities are the most important academic pursuits in any university, forming the basis of a civil service for the public “doing openly for the public what actual civil services are supposed to do in secret for governments” (p. 85).

Academia would actively seek to educate the public by means of discussion and debate, and would not just study the public. (p. 2)

Of all the contributions in McHenry (2009), it is Stewart’s piece that is the most valuable in terms of my thesis: *Why is it so hard to move from knowledge to wisdom?* In looking at the brief notes for each contributor it is interesting to note that Stewart is not an entrenched part of the system. “[I]n existential doubt over the social utility of science, he took some “time out” from his career” (p. 323), fifteen years no less145. Stewart’s piece is important because he enlarges on Maxwell’s point about rationalistic neurosis. Recall that in Chapter 2 it was stated that “A neurotic condition occurs when unconscious contents of the psyche are manifested in disturbed thinking and behaviour.” One only has to look at the effects of our existing “value” system quoted above—and in the last century that included instances of mass murder, on the scale of millions, carried out in the Jewish Shoa with industrial (systematic) efficiency—to know that we are indeed dealing with “disturbed thinking and behaviour”.

In asking the question, *Is science neurotic?* Maxwell (2004) states the obvious puzzlement that meets such a statement: “how can a vast, impersonal intellectual endeavour like science be called neurotic? Is not this to attribute a mind to science, an ego, id and superego? What could be more nonsensical?” (p. 1). The problem is compounded when we reflect on how successful science has been. “If neurosis meets with such success should we not try to acquire it, rather than hope to be cured of it?” (p. 1). Again, in light of the previous chapter, the answer lies in a conception of the whole rather than remaining at the level of the parts. While we may say we pursue science for the benefit of mankind, there are repressed aims that are actually being pursued that need acknowledgement146. These aims, in line with a number of theories which will be advanced in future pages, are our self-interested and ego-centric desire for power/control, security/comfort, and esteem/affection (Keating, 2001). Or, as expressed in an alternative way by some, the three ps: *power, possessions, and prestige*. That we feel some sort of existential and/or socially-derived guilt about our “real” motives is illustrated by our habitual urge to conceal them (further clarification of this point will come in Chapter 8).

So, Stewart (2009) documents human history in answering his question, *Why is it so hard to move from knowledge to wisdom?* He sums up Maxwell’s (1984) argument as follows:

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145 According to his page on amazon.com, John Stewart is an Australian-based evolutionary theorist and core member of the *Evolution, Complexity and Cognition Research Group* affiliated with the *Free University of Brussels*. He argues for an evolutionary worldview to provide meaning, purpose and direction for human existence in the sense that humanity must now intentionally advance that evolution.

146 See Appendix 7.1 for a fuller outline of Maxwell’s substantiation for his thesis that indeed yes, science is neurotic.
The essential idea in *From Knowledge to Wisdom* . . . is both very simple, and manifestly correct. To formulate it in my own words, it rests on the logical principle that no argument can be more rational than the premise on which it is based; and no course of action more rational than the aims it seeks to achieve. (p. 93)

He uses Captain Ahab in *Moby Dick* to show how all Ahab’s actions can be considered “impeccably rational” as long as you limit yourself to the initial aim: “to find out the White Whale and to engage with it in a show-down life-or-death struggle”, a premise that was “stark raving mad” (p. 93).

It is therefore an elementary requisite for rationality to give overriding priority to correctly identifying the aims to be achieved and the problems to be solved; and then, since in the end it is action that counts, to propose and critically assess possible personal and social actions as solutions to these problems. In order to count as properly rational, efforts devoted to problems of knowledge must be rigorously connected and subordinated to problems of action . . . the route that Maxwell calls the “philosophy of wisdom”. (Stewart, 2009, p. 93)

It is at this point that I want to re-introduce the equation from I/O Psychology that captures Stewart’s point: Performance or Action = Ability * Motivation - Situational Constraints. The philosophy of knowledge is all about increasing Ability. But the philosophy of wisdom also needs to know what the *Motivation* and the *Situational Constraints* are. What are the “goals, values and beliefs of common social life” that warp the actual results of this equation so as to produce the litany of problems identified in Maxwell’s list above?

The fact that a great deal of rationality is deployed in implementing [the philosophy of knowledge’s] aim is to no avail, because the aim itself is mistaken; just as for Captain Ahab, this subsidiary rationality only aggravates the final disaster. The problem is not that the Philosophy of Knowledge lays too great an emphasis on reason, as Romantic critics have tended to maintain; quite the contrary, it is a lack of reason that is the problem. (Stewart, 2009, p. 94)

Stewart (2009) endeavours “to get a feel for the particular sort of difficulty that the social dimension poses for human action” (p. 96). He uses two social phenomena to advance his thesis: the voluntary servitude that supports tyranny, and capitalism as a runaway system that nobody now has any control over.

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147 That is why I remarked on the voluntary holiday that Stewart took from systemic life. Sociology and religion need the individual and independent intelligences of people like Stewart. We all have it, and I believe we all need enough freedom from systems, as well as enough personal investment in our own growth, to develop that individual genius.

148 As Stewart observes, “if servitude can only exist to the extent that it is voluntary, why on earth do the masses submit to their own enslavement?” (Stewart, 2009, p. 97). He uses the insights of Etienne de la Boëtie to provide two answers: firstly that the tyrant is not a single human being who can be easily disobeyed. There is a hierarchy of privilege that surrounds him, “from the large gainers from despotism, to the middling small gainers, and finally down to the mass of the people who falsely think they gain more than they lose from the receipt of petty favors. In this way the subjects are divided . . .” (p. 98).

“Bread and circuses” are the second social phenomena, to which Stewart adds “drug addiction” as a generic group that goes beyond substance and into process addiction. They share a common appeal which is that they are “diverting (in Pascal’s sense of ‘divertissement’); they distract attention from other worries”.

This leads to a vicious circle: having wasted already too much time on the drug, the resulting malaise, the disquiet, further fuels the attraction of a distraction until it becomes a compulsion, at that point, one is locked into the addiction. (Stewart, 2009, p. 98)

Underlying all this is the “sway of custom”. We were born into these social milieux so we continue their norms, structures, and practices until we individually learn to do better. That should be the province of a religion but religion all too often is just another source of the problem.

Political scientists Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011) provide support for Stewart’s conclusions about the problematic continuation of tyranny, and provide a rough and ready guide to tyranny of all types in dictatorships as well as in democracies. Just as Stewart does above, they identify three political dimensions in the political landscape: the nominal selectorate, the real selectorate, and the winning coalition, or in simpler terms—the *interchangeables*, the *influentials*, and the *essentials*.

By working out how these dimensions intersect—that is, each organization’s mix in the size of its interchangeable, influential, and essential groups—we can come to grips with the puzzles of politics . . . what leaders can do, what they can and can’t get away with, to whom they answer, and the relative qualities of life that everyone under them enjoys (or, too often, doesn’t enjoy). (p. 7)

A democracy in this regard is of course healthier in that governments are dependent on much broader coalitions; however Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2012) give examples in which distortion and corruption can occur in democracies if the system is set up in a particular way or if people do not exercise their voting rights. They also include multinational companies in their purview because, rather than democracies, these tend to be enacted along dictatorial lines with small coalitions of the *essentials*
over. Both represent the systemic dimension of the wisdom model at its worst in terms of the Catholic value of social justice identified by Rolheiser (1998)—social justice being what the system’s agenda should really be about from a Catholic point of view.

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The pervasiveness of the capitalist global system and Cohen and Kennedy’s (2007) generalisations about it are shown in Figure 7.5. The ideas of Paul Virilio (2012) expand on Cohen and Kennedy’s sixth generalisation (and the fourth as its means) to note specifically the global synchronization of fear and to show how the response created by our fears has become something to fear in itself. Instead of a democracy of difference, we end up with a democracy of the same emotion of fear.

What Virilio charts is important for this thesis because it describes well the religion that has replaced religion—the religion that is the very antithesis of the values of humility and eco-centricity espoused by Christianity. This religion that has replaced religion will be documented through the insights of a range of writers in the following chapters of Part 2. For now, I want to present it within the Mysterions’ structure of the cosmos introduced above. They posited four basic components of the universe and I can “gender” these terms by introducing them into the structure of the wisdom model. In Figure 7.3, the nexus of Consciousness and Time is divorced from the nexus of Space and Matter in the same manner that Ego and Eco are.

In relation to the first characteristic of global society in Figure 7.5, Virilio (2012) interprets it in the words of his Preface which is written by Bertrand Richard: “Shrinking time means killing space little by little” (p. 11). In terms of the wisdom model, this is in line with the restricted nature of the philosophy of knowledge as represented by the archetypal Egoic half. Matter, and the vulnerability that goes with it, can be discussed in relation to Terror Management Theory which postulates that women bear the brunt of this vulnerability through their greater identification with Matter by way of their ecoic child-bearing concerns. (See for example Goldenberg and Roberts (2004) who discuss their empirical evidence for making this claim). The Consciousness that is valorised as we saw from Chapter 4 is a specific type of egoic consciousness that is focused and left-brained.

supporting, or not supporting, the leader or CEO who disregards them at his or her peril even though they can ignore the small shareholders whose influence doesn’t amount to much.

150 Stewart charts the genesis of capitalism in Calvinism and its doctrine of predestination after Weber’s analysis. However, the real problem is that, once created, capitalism developed its own internal logic and became an autonomous law unto itself.

If the bizarre historical accident of Calvinism had never happened, it could well be that capitalism would never have occurred; but once it did, it became unstoppable, spreading like a deadly epidemic with no possible antidote. In terms of dynamic systems theory, it is a strong “attractor”. Let me insist that this logic is totally impersonal. Even the managing director of a multinational corporation or the chairman of the stockholders are not free; if they were to behave in a way that does not maximise the profits and stock market rating of the company, they would very quickly be fired and replaced. (Stewart, 2009, p. 102)

Not only this but the logic of capitalism also requires continual innovation to maintain profit margins, and this generates the social ills associated with the “creative destruction” that occurs when technology changes. Moreover, there is also the fact that this technologically-based exponential growth associated with capitalism occurs within a planetary context that is ultimately finite.

150 Virilio (2012) compares this to earlier patterns—before the instantaneous flows of information to all parts of the globe:

This [informational] bomb comes from instantaneous means of communication and in particular the transmission of information. It plays a prominent role in establishing fear as a global environment, because it allows the synchronization of emotion on a global scale. Because of the absolute speed of electromagnetic waves, the same feeling of terror can be felt in all corners of the world at the same time. It is not a localized bomb: it explodes each second, with the news of an attack, a natural disaster, a health scare, a malicious rumor. It creates a “community of emotions,” a communism of affects coming after the communism of the “community of interests” shared by different social classes. There is something in the synchronization of emotion that surpasses the power of standardization of opinion that was typical of the mass media in the second half of the 20th century. With the industrial revolution of the second half of the 19th century, the democracy of opinions flourished through the press, pamphlets and then the mass media—press, radio and television. This first regime consisted of the standardization of products and opinions. The second, current regime is comprised of the synchronization of emotions, ensuring the transition from a democracy of opinion to a democracy of emotion. For better or for worse. (p. 30)
Consciousness and Matter make up the vertical component of the wisdom model as the components of Maxwell’s (1984) value reality in its egoic and ecoic forms. The physical reality we live in is Time and Space. There is gendering here too as in Father Time; Irigaray (2004) writes of the “feminine . . . experienced as space . . . often with connotations of the abyss and night . . . while the masculine is experienced as time” (p. 9). It is only a short step from Time to Speed and the Futurist Manifesto\(^\text{151}\) and the totalitarianism of the new God of militarised Science: Shock and Awe, and the Blitzkrieg (speed as the essence of war)\(^\text{152}\).

The egoically focused system/technology nexus (or technocracy) of the wisdom model shrinks time which means killing space too as the first of Cohen and Kennedy’s (2007) characteristics indicates in Figure 7.5. As John Stewart (2009) notes above, there isn’t enough planet and therefore space to assuage what we think we desire.

Virilio (2012) charts the problematic of cultural speed which figure 7.4 illustrates in terms of the way speed diminishes space on a roadway:

… with increased speed, we lose the sense of lateralization, which is an infirmity in our being in the world, its richness, its relief, its depth of field. We have invented glasses to see in three dimensions while we are in the process of losing our lateralization, our natural stereo-reality. Augmented reality is a fool's game, a televisual glaucoma. Screens have become blind. Lateral vision is very important and it is not by chance that animals’ eyes are situated on the sides of their head. Their survival depends on anticipating surprise, and surprises never come head-on. Predators come from the back or the sides. There is a loss of the visual field and the anticipation of what really surrounds us. (pp. 36-37)

As ecologist Angeles Arrien once observed, there is nothing in nature that moves fast unless it is in danger. Speed may in fact work like the psychology experiment in which subjects holding a pencil in their teeth simulate a smile and thereby raise their inner positive affect. Likewise, speed simulates panic. As Virilio (2012) explains, using an analogy from his experiences as a child in German-occupied France in which there were a trinity of experiences—occupation, resistance and collaboration:  “When you are occupied, fear is a State in the sense of a public power imposing a false and terrifying reality” (p. 17)—a reality of terrorism, pandemics, stock market panics, economic crises. Maxwell (1984) may call it institutional inertia, but it actually acts like a runaway juggernaut.

Virilio (2012) draws on Hannah Arendt’s statement that terror is the realization of the law of movement and rephrases that “law of movement” as the “law of speed” and the “acceleration of reality”: “Terror cuts to the quick: it is connected to life and quickness through technology. You can see it in the image of a gazelle using its agility to escape a lion” (p. 21). It infects us existentially and overpowers the democracy

\(^{151}\) In The new religion - morality of speed—a discourse that followed on from his Futurist Manifesto, Marinetti (1916, in Rainey, Poggi & Wittman, 2009, p. 224), in his proposal to replace Christian morality, writes that, “Futurist morality will protect man against the inevitable decay produced by slowness, memory, analysis, rest, and habit. Human energy, multiplied a hundredfold by velocity, will dominate Space and Time”. In a quote that encapsulates his morality and the simultaneous denial of the feminine as anything but a second-rate form of masculinity as well as its valorization if it’s fast enough, we have the following:

If to pray means to communicate with divinity, then run with all speed to pray. Holiness of wheels and rails. We should kneel on the rails to pray to divine speed. We should kneel in adoration before the whirling speed of a gyroscope compass: 20,000 revolutions per minute, the highest mechanical velocity reached by man . . . Our male saints are the innumerable small bodies that are penetrating our atmosphere at an average velocity of 42,000 meters a second. Our female saints are light and electromagnetic waves at 3 \times 1010 meters a second. (pp. 225-226)

\(^{152}\) Bertrand Richard in Virilio (2012, p. 9) expands:

Once chimeric, fear has become a foundation. All of our confidence in reason and in the perfectibility of the human species has progressively given way to a “principle of fear” that replaces faith with fear as the cornerstone of our attitudes towards existence. The spread of fear thus appears to be the product of a nuclear era with pervasive totalitarianism where science, once the hope of Western Enlightenment, has now taken on a threatening appearance. . . . If there is fear, [Paul Virilio] tells us, it is because the Earth is shrinking and space is dwindling, compressed by instantaneous time. Carried along by the headlong rush of an increasingly accelerated world, all we can do is manage and administer this fear instead of deal with it fundamentally. The administration of fear is politics without a polis; the administration of people who are no longer at home anywhere, constantly squeezed and dreaming of a somewhere else that does not exist. The administration of fear is a world discovering that there are things to be afraid of but still convinced that more speed and ubiquity are the answer. . . .
of our community, which under the military-scientific regime instituted by the H-bomb, “can only survive in an illusory and very partial manner” (p. 23). In addition, with the discovery of “the instantaneity offered by the absolute speed of waves”, (see Figure 7.5’s No. 4), philosophy has been left behind. There is no room for the slower speed of thinking through human problems because, as Virilio notes,

Our societies have become arrhythmic. Or they only know one rhythm: constant acceleration. Until the crash and systemic failure. (p. 27)

So, the instantaneous transmission of information means the synchronization of emotions on a global scale, an effect and affect that Figure 7.5 does not explicitly record in its identification of its No. 6 strand, but perhaps should. This has the effect of dehumanizing us in the sense that we revert to the behavioural responses of our animal nature rather than the more reflective and thought-through responses that humanity with its advanced neocortex has the potential to achieve.

In that sense, the Consciousness that created the instantaneous, is emasculated by the system it started, and, moreover, it is also that emasculated system that Virilio states we now need to become consciously aware of that fact. The problem is, he states, that “speed is still not taken into account with wealth. . . . We lack a political economy of speed . . . [and] one thing is clear: we will need one, or we will fall into globalitarianism, the “totalitarianism of totalitarianism”, because . . .

. . . the mastery of power is linked to the mastery of speed. A world of immediacy and simultaneity would be absolutely uninhabitable . . . We must be able to dominate the domination of progress. (pp. 37-38)

Virilio is not a Luddite, but the worship of speed is our modern equivalent of the ancient worship of the sun: “How could you not be afraid of the power, ubiquity, and instantaneousness that, very significantly, were first the attributes of the gods?” (p. 43). The modern world and its progress occupy us permanently placing us . . .

. . . under surveillance, watching us, scanning us and evaluating us, revealing us and it is increasingly present, increasingly accepted as a fate, a destiny. Promoting progress means that we are always behind: on high-speed internet, on our Facebook profile, on our email inbox. There are always updates to be made; we are the objects of daily masochism and under constant tension. (p. 47)

Meanwhile, we have migrants of “happiness” (tourists) and migrants of misery (refugees) to illustrate the human flows of Strand 5 in Figure 7.5.

As Virilio (2012) notes, in the absence of religion, there is no philosophy to take up the slack. He describes a meeting in which the philosopher and the scientist (Albert Einstein) talked past each other. There is no philosophy of speed. But yes there is, I would contend, and it is Marinetti’s.

My female answer, and my proposed philosophy of speed, is encapsulated in the wisdom model and its division into masculine Ego and feminine Eco which together make up any human subject, no matter how much the contents of either one may be repressed in any individual. Nevertheless Sanford’s (1980) interpretation of Jungian theory states that men tend to identify their egos with the masculine and women with the feminine. So Virilio’s response is a masculine one: we must dominate the domination. My

153 The sociology of emotion does now exist, although it is a relatively new part of sociology. The sociology of emotion will become a specific focus of this thesis in Chapter 12.

154 This can be appreciated in the context of Figure 4.23 in which Smith and Mackie’s (2000) processing principle of “Depth versus Superficiality” was introduced. That principle can be appreciated anew in terms of this quotation from Virilio (2012):

On the positive side, there are the examples of spontaneous generosity following disasters of all types; on the negative side, there is the instantaneous terror caused by an attack or a pandemic and the short-term political actions that are taken in response. This shift is a significant event that places the emphasis on real time, on the live feed, instead of real space. And because the philosophical revolution of relativity did not take place, we have been unable to conceive of every space as a space-time; the real space of geography is connected to the real time of human action. With the phenomena of instantaneous interaction that are now our lot, there has been a veritable reversal, destabilizing the relationship of human interactions, and the time reserved for reflection, in favor of the conditioned responses produced by emotion. Thus the theoretical possibility of generalized panic. (p. 31, second italics added)

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religious answer in this thesis is a reconnection with what was, and is, despised and rejected—the female. Maxwell’s (2004) metaphor of a little boy having to surrender to Dad to resolve his Oedipal crisis (see Appendix 7.1) shows that there is an answer in the excavation and archaeology of neurosis which we will return to in more depth when we consider Carole Gilligan’s Freudian and feminist work. While the feminine remains abject and disconnected as in Figure 7.3, there will be no real solution. In this sense, the stone rejected by the builders must really become the cornerstone of each individual’s “construction of reality” (see Figure 4.23). And, in line with that biblical observation, there is a sense in which the normal rules of identity and relationship are overturned.

As Schaeff (1981) documents, this brings into focus two ways of dealing with relationship which she gendered as follow:

In the White Male System, relationships are conceived of as being either one-up or one-down. In other words, when two people come together or encounter each other, the White Male System assumption is that one of them must be superior and the other must be inferior. There are no other possibilities for interaction.

In working with men, especially business executives, I have found that many men do not necessarily want to be one-up. They just do not want to be one-down. But since those are the only two options in their System, they do their best to go one-up and put others one-down.

In the Female System, relationships are philosophically conceived of as peer until proven otherwise. (This, of course, is only true for women who feel clear and strong and have come to know and trust their own system.) In other words, each new encounter holds the promise of equality. One does not have to be one-up or one-down, superior or inferior; one can be peer. (pp. 104-105)

My conception of Christianity also upends such simplistic determinations as to who is dominating who. In a universe of benevolence, Christianity’s ultimate answer is cooperation, freely given, rather than competition with another. Competition might be necessary in the smaller way that a philosophy of knowledge is necessary within the wider conception of a philosophy of wisdom, but that is the extent of it. It shouldn’t fill the entire frame. Living by faith in the bigger frame places into perspective—for the soul at least if not the body and mind—the insults and injuries that human beings inflict on one another. This of course does not obviate the need to seek justice. If one prays for a kingdom on earth, as it is in heaven, then that makes justice all the more necessary. One just shouldn’t take insults and injuries personally.155

Cooperation is not however the most fundamental characteristic of the Ego as psychology defines it. Here for example is the abstract of Greenwald’s (1980) paper which defines ego as fundamentally totalitarian along with an identification of a problem that extends from Ego to a larger domain than the individual psyche when it gets an opportunity.

. . . (a) ego, or self, is an organization of knowledge, (b) ego is characterized by cognitive biases strikingly analogous to totalitarian information-control strategies, and (c) these totalitarian-ego biases junction to preserve organization in cognitive structures. Ego's cognitive biases are egocentricity (self as the focus of knowledge), "benefectance" (perception of responsibility for desired, but not undesired, outcomes), and cognitive conservatism (resistance to cognitive change). In addition to being pervasively evident in recent studies of normal human cognition, these three biases are found in actively functioning, higher level organizations of knowledge, perhaps best exemplified by theoretical paradigms in science. . . . (Greenwald, 1980, p. 603)

No wonder Captain Ahab, as Stewart above describes it, sees everything in terms of himself. And that while democracy may have been the product of the Enlightenment, its continued existence is endangered—as Virilio observes—by the processes that that Enlightenment set in train, corrupted as Maxwell maintains by "rationalistic neurosis".

155 What I mean by this apparently absurd and counter-intuitive statement is that the “insults and injuries” are, within Christian thinking, evidence of the perpetrator’s alienation from his or her god-given nature.
At this point, I wish to enlist another author who sets out in detail how totalitarianism (natural to the developing psyche as Maxwell (2004) implicitly surmises by equating rationalistic neurosis to the Oedipus complex) is reified within the structure of modernity.

Ehrenfeld’s (2008) main concern within the pantheon of problems that Maxwell (1984) identifies, is the problem of sustainability and our inability to adapt to the Earth’s carrying capacity. He doesn’t lay the problem at the feet of capitalism as Stewart above does. He identifies three deeper problems of modernity that nevertheless are intimately associated with capitalism: our conceptions of reality, rationality and technology. The connections between his three ideas and Stewart’s (2009) of Captain Ahab are plain, especially his point about rationality. Reality is skewed for a start as Stewart (2009) and Greenwald (1980) suggest. Our “everyday, objective way of holding reality . . . leads to the potential of domination at all levels of social interaction, from family to workplaces to whole societies”:

Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana claims that, in the objective reality way of thinking, “a claim of knowledge is a demand for obedience” . . . [supporting] the idea of human mastery over nature, as we see ourselves as outside rather than as a part of the natural world. Objective reality disempowers the general public in favor of those in privileged professions, like scientists or economists who are consulted for solutions to life’s “big” problems . . . the way we hold reality has much to do with the possibility of flourishing and the fullness of what it is to be human. (Ehrenfeld, 2008, pp. 24-25)

Based on this premise, our rationality must be suspect as well, and it too is bound up with conceptions of Ego (at the expense of a relational Eco principle) in the notion of “economic man, Homo economicus” in which the self “. . . is little more than a bundle of preferences that ebb and flow as they become momentarily satisfied or are pushed aside by another desire that mysteriously pops to the top of the heap”:

Acts that apparently are done for the benefits of others, such as heroism or altruism, are seen as manifestations of self-interest in this model . . . (Ehrenfeld, 2008, p. 27)

As the wisdom model indicates, it is the technological and systemic Ego solutions that emerge as the commonly suggested solution to our problems, thereby subsuming—indeed, often obliterating to all intents and purposes—the Ecoic existential and community possibilities that Christianity and Maxwell’s philosophy of wisdom propose—not “instead of”, but “as well as” albeit within their ambit136.

The addiction that accompanies the technological solution is one problem of the system we operate within. Others are reductionism (the sort of solution that merely removes pollutants from one realm or country to another), and efficiency (as if increasing say, fuel economy, will solve the fundamental problem). Ehrenfeld (2008) also identifies the problems associated with Marinetti’s “divine speed” (see footnote 136 above):

In the hurly-burly modern world we do not give ourselves time to search for the “right” answer to our wants and needs. “Not enough time” and “too busy” are ubiquitous complaints. We tend to follow the advertising messages that are omnipresent and that have just the right answer for whatever it is we think we need. (p. 36)

Addiction is about “shifting the burden”, a systems archetype that he borrows from MIT systems thinkers and which has been popularized by Peter Senge in his book The Fifth Discipline. This archetypal system which represents addiction among other processes (see Figure 7.6) illustrates how we choose the addiction over more basic ecoic ways of solving problems. We feel stress? We have a cigarette. We feel

136 Ehrenfeld (2008) describes the current mindset like this:

Addressing our unease with the world around us largely as a set of problems to be mitigated through technology is itself a manifestation of modernity. Since the rise of the Enlightenment, with its optimistic ideas about knowledge and technology, change is normally thought to be fundamentally progressive—leading individuals and the societies they constitute to an always-rosier future that is bigger and better than its past. . . . [S]ustainable development—is not actually a vision of the future. It is merely a modification of the current process of economic development . . . Unsustainability springs from the cultural structure of modernity itself: the way we hold reality and ourselves as human beings, and the hegemony of technology as the solution to every problem facing individuals and the society at large . . . Unsustainability is an unintended consequence of the addictive patterns of modern life. Almost everything being done in the name of sustainable development addresses and attempts to reduce unsustainability. But reducing unsustainability, although critical, does not and will not create sustainability. (pp. 5, 7, emphasis in original)
blue? We go shopping—retail therapy. We feel the vulnerability of our human condition? We glorify the superior strength and speed of masculinity, and condemn women to “the original sin of being born female” (Schaef, 1981, p. 23).

From this analysis, it seems that the only thing an individual can do is not to participate and for that to happen, there must be some sort of an idealist ethic that conditions the human systems as they currently exist. The history of philosophy however is not helpful in this regard as Ferry (2010) documents. While Christianity and then Humanism provided aspirational ideals, post-modernity and the “case of Nietzsche” and his vehement rejection of God and the idols of Reason, brought them crashing down. While acknowledging Nietzsche’s obvious importance in the West’s philosophical pantheon, Ferry disposes of him as follows:

. . . we can read Nietzsche as accompanying the birth of a new world, in which notions of the real and the ideal were replaced by the overriding logic of the will to power. This was to be Heidegger’s conclusion . . . who saw Nietzsche as the “thinker of technology”, the first philosopher to destroy—entirely and without leaving the smallest trace—the notion of “purposes”: the idea that there was a meaning to be sought for in human existence, objectives to pursue, ends to achieve. With “the grand style”, the only remaining criterion by which to define “the good life” is indeed one of intensity, of force meeting force, to the detriment of all higher ideals. But—once the pleasure of destruction is over—would this not condemn the world to pure cynicism, to the blind laws of the market and unbridled competition? (Ferry, 2010, pp. 196-197)

We need to find new ways of salvation, Ferry states. We can make a start by understanding salvation—soteriology: how can we be saved?—as an adjunct to the more normal division of philosophy into ontology, epistemology, and ethics (see Figure 7.7). As regards ethics, in this thesis, despite Emmanuel Levinas’s view that ethics is the first philosophy, I will claim that it is ontology (and thereby the meaning of soteriology at the other end of the vertical axis). Ehrenfeld (2008) agrees in his identification of Being as central to his analysis. He uses Heidegger, and I will use Jesus Christ to make our points. For both of us, epistemology would seem to come third, which is not to decry its importance, but just its order and place (as servant) in the scheme of things.

Salvation as a fourth element to join the traditional trinity underlying philosophy as well as Maxwell’s point about all inquiry being directed towards “learning how to live” is almost exactly paraphrased in the title of the aforementioned book by Luc Ferry: Learning to live: A user’s manual. We need philosophical ideas because of the fundamental human problem of Death. “The question of salvation” must be preeminent from the start, because, as he points out, “the simplest way of starting to define philosophy is always by putting it in relation to religion” (p. 3) and religion has always had a lot to say about salvation. He defines death widely as well because life is made up of many deaths from which we need to be saved as well as the big Death at the end of Life. He uses Poe and his raven quoting “Nevermore”, as suggesting that death “means everything that is unrepeatable” (p. 5).157

We encounter an infinite number of its variations, in the midst of life, and these many faces of death trouble us, even if we are not always aware of them. To live well, therefore, to live freely, capable of joy, generosity and love, we must first and foremost conquer our fear—or, more accurately, our fears of the irreversible. (p. 5)

Ferry (2010) however has some contentious points to make about religion although they are indicative of a fundamental attitude that I wish to address in these pages. It is an either/or attitude that is highly problematic and which is encapsulated in the heading that immediately follows “The Question of Salvation” (p. 3) which is “Philosophy versus Religion” (p. 5). While Ferry may perceive matters in this exclusive way, it is not my intention to follow that perception. Rather, the conception of religion in these pages is of a type which, following on from the ideas expressed by Chesterton in the quotation that began Part 2, includes philosophy and understands it within a framework of religion.

157 In this sense, it is similar to Kubler-Ross’s five step “salvation” schema (Denial, Bargaining, Anger, Depression, and Acceptance) that charts the reaction to Death, and how that schema also has relevance to the little deaths we all experience in the midst of life.
As an example of the reasoning Ferry (2010) uses in this respect, the following is a good instance of it:

... philosophy also [as well as religion] claims to save us—if not from death itself, then from the anxiety it causes, and to do so by the exercise of our own resources and our innate faculty of reason. Which, from a religious perspective, sums up philosophical pride ... [T]he philosopher ... believes ... we shall succeed in overcoming fear, through clear-sightedness rather than blind faith. (p. 6)

The exercise of our own resources and our innate faculty of reason is not something that religion necessarily abhors, just as “faith” is not limited to religion as will be discussed further on in this chapter. Nor is faith necessarily “blind”. Such comments, while being indicative perhaps of an attitude of radical immanence, do not include the type of religious belief I intend to outline. The broader point that these comments indicate is an important one. It is that religion can include philosophy in a way that philosophy can’t include religion. I, as a practising Catholic, can include philosophy in my worldview, in a way that Luc Ferry can no longer include Catholicism (there are indications that he once did). My interpretation of Catholicism demands that I very much make use of my “own resources” and my “innate faculty of reason”. I am of the opinion that I am doing so right now. My belief in radical transcendence can certainly accept immanence, albeit not the radical version of it that excludes the radical transcendence.158

In fact Chesterton makes the point—and it becomes more obvious as one reads Ferry’s very helpful summary of Western thought—that it is Christianity that has been, and is, at pains to preserve Reason from those who would seek to undermine it159.

With regard to another epistemological category, Nicholas Maxwell was highly critical of its irrational buy-in to the Logos type of science; however Allan (2011) does chart what he refers to as “the political person hinted at in Giddens’ and Castells’ theories within social science. It is a politics of knowledge and identities” (p. 514). He provides Patricia Hill Collins’ definition of identity politics as follows:

Identity politics encompasses “a way of knowing that sees lived experiences as important to creating knowledge and crafting group-based political strategies. Also, [it is] a form of political resistance where an oppressed group rejects its devalued status”. (P. H. Collins, 2000, p. 299)

158 The radical point that I will eventually make is that, in terms of the wisdom model, it is Ego that must make sense of Eco, not Ego that makes sense of Eco.
159 As Chesterton (1909, pp. 55-58) explains:

... there is a great and possible peril to the human mind ... Against it religious authority was reared, rightly or wrongly, as a barrier. And against it something certainly must be reared as a barrier, if our race is to avoid ruin.

That peril is that the human intellect is free to destroy itself. Just as one generation could prevent the very existence of the next generation, by all entering a monastery or jumping into the sea, so one set of thinkers can in some degree prevent further thinking by teaching the next generation that there is no validity in any human thought. It is idle to talk always of the alternative of reason and faith. Reason is itself a matter of faith. It is an act of faith to assert that our thoughts have any relation to reality at all. If you are merely a sceptic, you must sooner or later ask yourself the question, “Why should anything go right; even observation and deduction? Why should not good logic be as misleading as bad logic? They are both movements in the brain of a bewildered ape?” The young sceptic says, “I have a right to think for myself.” But the old sceptic, the complete sceptic, says, “I have no right to think for myself. I have no right to think at all.”

There is a thought that stops thought. That is the only thought that ought to be stopped. That is the ultimate evil against which all religious authority was aimed. It only appears at the end of decadent ages like our own: and already Mr. H.G. Wells has raised its ruinous banner; he has written a delicate piece of scepticism called “Doubts of the Instrument.” In this he questions the brain itself, and endeavours to remove all reality from all his own assertions, past, present, and to come. But it was against this remote ruin that all the military systems in religion were originally ranked and ruled. The creeds and the crusades, the hierarchies and the horrible persecutions were not organized, as is ignorantly said, for the suppression of reason. They were organized for the difficult defence of reason. Man, by a blind instinct, knew that if once things were wildly questioned, reason could be questioned first. The authority of priests to absolve, the authority of popes to define the authority, even of inquisitors to terrify: these were all only dark defences erected round one central authority, more undemonstrable, more supernatural than all—the authority of a man to think. We know now that this is so; we have no excuse for not knowing it. For we can hear scepticism crashing through the old ring of authorities, and at the same moment we can see reason swaying upon her throne. In so far as religion is gone, reason is going. For they are both of the same primary and authoritative kind. They are both methods of proof which cannot themselves be proved. And in the act of destroying the idea of Divine authority we have largely destroyed the idea of that human authority by which we do a long-division sum. With a long and sustained tug we have attempted to pull the mitre off pontifical man; and his head has come off with it.
It is in this way that sociology approaches what is a fundamental Christian concept and one perhaps that Auguste Comte originally had in mind when he tried to emulate the traditional system of Christianity with his new secular science of sociology. Allan expands on the point above—on the wider ambit that epistemology must have—in this way:

*Who you are and how you express your existence in the world around you matters. It matters because in modernity it’s always mattered. As I’ve said, modernity was founded on a specific idea of the citizen. And the exciting, frightening thing is [given that there] aren’t the same kinds of guideposts that traditional and early modern societies provided [we] need to find our way together, which is, after all, the meaning behind democracy.* (Allan, 2011, p. 514, Italics added)

Maxwell (1984), as we saw earlier in the construction of the wisdom model, postulates the idea of value realism as a complementary system to scientific realism and in light of the above it is a way of organizing and characterising the rich diversity of human life and experience. It is in the subjective experiences of all gender and ethnic groups that value reality may be found, however covered-over and distorted it might be, as well as in the other two ways of knowing—ratiocination and empiricism.

Gatto (2001), a consistent critic of tyranny in the form of compulsory schooling, makes the same point. Despite the fact that the scientific model of the universe shows that the sun and not the earth is the centre of the solar system, that view of reality “doesn’t speak to the depths of human nature—our feelings of loneliness and incompleteness, our sense of sin, our need to love, and our longing for immortality” (p. 177). He advocates for the individual, and his and her forms of knowledge, as vitally important, in a way that I too will argue for in this thesis. He puts it this way:

You are the center of your universe, because if you don't show up, it doesn't exist. This may sound self-absorbed, but the minute you deny your own centrality, you betray the rest of us. You are then fleeing your responsibility—as the most important person in the universe—to make things better. When you deny your centrality, you lose trust in yourself. (And school is there to drill you in distrusting yourself.) As that trust wanes, you lose self-respect, without which you can't like yourself very much. How can you like someone you don't respect or trust? . . . And it gets worse, for when you don't like yourself very much you lose the ability to sustain loving relationships with others. Think of it this way: you must first be convinced of your own worth before you ask for someone else's love, or else the bargain will be unsound. You'll be passing off low-grade merchandise—yourself—as the real McCoy. (p. 178)

For Gatto, “[t]he primary goal of real education is not to deliver facts but to guide students to the truths that will allow them to take responsibility for their lives. In that quest, Galileo is no help at all” (p. 178).

I am essentially an idealist and I value meaning. Modernity in that sense is problematic—excepting that is, and they are large exceptions, in the education in foundational ideas that it has given me and in the opportunities for freer expression it has provided. In that sense, the pre-modernity expressed by the chauvinistic attitudes of Church leaders is problematic too.

People like me never stop learning. And of all the ideas, it is the big ones that attract me the most. The Christian amalgamation of Jerusalem and Athens is tailor-made for a consciousness like mine. As stated above, my consciousness is idealistic and anxious. The first part of that description is derived from the Myers-Briggs personality typology, the same system that underlies the development of the wisdom model. In one variant of that system I am classed as an Idealist as distinct from a Rationalist, a Guardian and an Artisan (Keirsey, 1998). In another, those four groups are classed as Catalysts, Theorists, Stabilizers and Improvisers (Berens, 2006—see Table 7.1). I have always done reasonably well in an educational system that valorises the aforementioned logic, rationality, and objectivity—a system, that is, that valorises the characteristics of the Rationalists/Theorists and their four manifestations in the Masterminds, Architects, Field Marshalls and Inventors (Keirsey, 1998). It is no accident that all four titles, as well as Beren’s Theorists, imply some sort of archetypal masculine power in strategy, war, economic progress, and technology. If one looks at the four manifestations of the Idealist they are Counselor (sic), Champion, Teacher and Healer (as well as Beren’s grouping category of Catalyst). There is masculine gendering in there for sure—the Prophet, the Holy Spirit, the old wise man in business—but they are far more “powerless” in their action in the sense that they coax (rather persistently
it must be admitted in terms of the Old Testament prophets) rather than force. Feminine gendering is best realised in that last type and Beren’s overall typing—the Catalyst—which describes that most female and ancient art of midwifery. The other two personality types—the Guardians/Stabilizers and the Artisans/Improvisers—keep existing systems going. They do not have their eye on the “Big Picture” as the Rationals/Theorists and the Idealists/Catalysts do (note that I am writing here of types rather than individuals who distribute themselves among these classes as they may, even though some of us represent our classes rather strongly), and those are the two classes I will concentrate on because if there is any transforming to do, it is those two types that will do it. Moreover, the barrier between those two groups is the reason why Maxwell believes the existing milieu is irrational. It is because the search for truth, as represented by Beren’s Theorists, has been separated from the search for value or meaning as represented by Beren’s Catalysts. Wisdom comes from an integration of scientific (in the realm of fact) and value (in the realm of meaning and value) realism of the Theorists and Catalysts respectively.

I am predominantly an INFP with some INFJ as well, both of which are included in the Catalyst category and the Healer and Counselor categories respectively. Certainly the emphasis in this thesis on embodiment (and therefore the sensate dimension) is far outside my comfort zone. It is at midlife however, a time that I have occupied for two decades now, that one must develop neglected aspects of one’s personality if one is to attain wholeness and therefore integrity at the end of one’s life. A theory that relies on embodiment and that sensate function is the one developed by Schaef in the 1970s and on up to the present day, and her work in the context of Smith’s standpoint “theory” will be examined in Chapter 10.

One of the important lessons I have learned is that the ideas that come from women like Schaef and the women she interviewed, attack the ring-fence of affective emotion that protects the tyrannical system that lies at the centre of modernity. The truth will set you free, but it will first make you very angry in the way that Kubler-Ross’s schema says it will. But that can ultimately lead to Acceptance. Grace under pressure is indeed the sign of a noble soul and threats to the three Ps show us all up by the valency and degree of our emotional reaction to those threats. The need for emotional intelligence—and the journey into the chaotic depths of one’s psyche—is the most valuable lesson I as an all-too-disembodied Idealist have learned from my own very necessary mid-life journey.

Gatto’s (2001) thoughts on the fundamental limits on our human lives are a good way to end this chapter on a realistic and down-to-earth note. In a defence of original sin and what he calls the neglected genius of American spirituality, Gatto (a Catholic) writes:

Although the American Christian tradition draws on European and Near Eastern roots, and has been fertilized by a variety of faiths throughout its course, the particular genius of American Christianity is primarily derived from the Protestant reformation in Britain—a movement not only opposed to the official, systematic state church, but also, in a fundamental sense, a protest against system itself. This independent and dissenting religious tradition shifted responsibility for salvation from the political system to the individual. (p. 171, italics added)

Therein lies the potential genius of post-Protestant Catholicism. Unfortunately, as Gatto (2001) documents, system eventually won out, specifically what he identifies as the “liberal and the corporate” agendas for whom the doctrine of original sin and its central idea that “the sins of the parents are visited upon the children” was anathema because for “the former group it was an intolerable obstacle to the pursuit of happiness, and the latter, to the pursuit of profit” (p.176).

160 The tradition of American spirituality is grounded in the doctrine of original sin Gatto states, and as such “it paradoxically identifies the core problems of living as the fundamental bases for inner peace and happiness”. Rather than suggesting strategies to combat or flee these problems, American Christianity demanded they be accepted willingly as conditions of human life in a fallen world. . . . [W]e are all stuck with the burdens that Christianity ascribes to original sin. Nobody can escape—regardless of wealth, intellect, charm, powerful connections, or scientific miracles. Whether we are good or bad cuts no mustard. Everyone is in for it. (pp. 178-179)
What we are all “in for” as a result of original sin, are the four fundamental penalties that accompanied our expulsion from Eden: work, pain, free will (and the moral wariness that has to come with it), and death. And Gatto (2001) documents two different responses to them:

Some folks cast in their lot with shrewdness, calculation, and science to find a way out, and that group has commanded our schools, our economy, our technology, and our public life for over a century. . . . Only stupid people work; the enlightened can make a living exploiting and regulating others, paying them to mine the rock and harvest the earth. . . . Science provides ways to avoid pain and enhance pleasure. . . . Feeling good is what life’s all about; there isn’t anything else. . . . There is no absolute good or evil. Every principle is negotiable, all ethics are situational, and right and wrong are relative. Don’t worry about God’s punishment. With enough knowledge, we can duplicate the power of the mythical God. So God destroyed Sodom and Gomorrah with fire; we turned the night sky over the desert to flame and incinerated a hundred thousand retreating Iraqis in a matter of seconds. We are God. . . . Science can stave off sickness and extend life. Aging must be concealed as long as possible through surgery, dress, personal-training regimens, and attitude makeovers. . . . Only the secular establishment would grant absolution. (pp. 179-181)

Gatto advises something different which is quite unacceptable to the modern secular mind. American spirituality he states is about embracing punishment rather than running from it:

It . . . taught the marvelous paradox that willing acceptance of our human burdens is the only way to a good, full life. If you bend your head in obedience, it will be raised up strong, brave, indomitable, and wise . . . (p. 181)\(^{161}\)

He then lists the differences step by step and concludes:

. . . the answers to our problems lie within us, that we are the center of the universe, and that wisdom cannot be learned in school, but only through accepting the burden of work, learning the lessons pain teaches, sorting out right and wrong for ourselves, and coming to terms with aging and death. If these are our spiritual compasses, we need no rulers or experts to tell us how to live. (p. 184)

Gatto’s (2001) account valorises certain aspects of the wisdom model and its conservative response to change can be problematic. “Family”, for example, is surely a big part of the problem of original sin. While there are excellent proponents of a family-controlled process such as home-schooling (e.g. David Guterson’s books on the subject are excellent), the term too often conjures up fundamentalist belief systems. One is also reminded of biblical exhortations to leave family behind for the sake of the kingdom. Nevertheless, Gatto’s is a valuable point of view and a real vision for the road ahead, in his rejection of System as tyranny. After all, Virilio (2012) above opted for the solution of community and family under the intolerable regime of Nazi occupation (see Figure 7.5), and we are free to interpret “family” in more diverse ways than traditional social convention would decree. We have not yet achieved the requisite state of Being that he describes, because of original sin, and Fowler shows us that we are part of a journey that seems to have necessitated the dogleg of the supposed Enlightenment and Nietzsche\(^{162}\).

\(^{161}\) This obesiance and lack of control—this feminine (and thereby complex I would suggest) passivity—is something that sticks in the throat of many of us moderns. However, in a culture that seeks certainty, the alternative remains that life is something we often do not have much choice about. Barney Miller put it well at the end of the final episode in the first series of Barney Miller (1974). Counselling one of his men (Chano) who had had to shoot two men in the line of duty so as to save the lives of others, and who was subsequently having trouble coming to terms with his necessary action, Barney asked him, “Did you know that the largest mammal in the world is the sperm whale? . . . Do you know how large its throat is?” By holding his thumb and index finger about 50mm apart, he showed that it was, “about this big”. “And do you know why that is”, he continued. “Because that’s the way it is, and there’s nothing you can do about it.”

Chesterton (1909) makes a similar point in Orthodoxy:

Such, it seemed, was the joy of man, either in elfland or on earth; the happiness depended on not doing something which you could at any moment do and which, very often, it was not obvious why you should not do. Now, the point here is that to me this did not seem unjust. If the miller’s third son said to the fairy, “Explain why I must not stand on my head in the fairy palace,” the other might fairly reply, “Well, if it comes to that, explain the fairy palace.” If Cinderella says, “How is it that I must leave the ball at twelve?” her godmother might answer, “How is it that you are going there till twelve?” If I leave a man in my will ten talking elephants and a hundred winged horses, he cannot complain if the conditions partake of the slight eccentricity of the gift. He must not look a winged horse in the mouth. And it seemed to me that existence was itself so very eccentric a legacy that I could not complain of not understanding the limitations of the vision when I did not understand the vision they limited. (pp. 99-100, emphasis in the original)

\(^{162}\) There is an assumption that I have built into the Fowler model discussed in Chapter 4, that the main progression is from Stage 3 to Stage 5. Stage 4 is seen primarily as the means by which that occurs; in that sense Beren’s (2008) “Theorist” exchanges places with her “Catalyst” in function if not in name. Within Maxwell’s philosophy of wisdom that change of nomenclature indeed makes more sense. The technocracy is the means to an end—Stage 5—not an end in itself.
The wisdom model at its centre holds the autonomous individual sovereign; the ego (in a use of the word that is different from its use vis-à-vis the archetypal Ego in the wisdom model) as the executive function of the human psyche. That autonomy of an adult life, in all senses of “adult” (spiritual, emotional, intellectual), is a sacred responsibility and should be the primary aim of all education. It is unfortunate therefore that so many of the influences that impinge on citizens in the west are infantilising and encouraging of self-censorship.  

Systems colonise and infantilise because they are subject to the all-too-human agendas of the more powerful. That was evident enough in colonial times but now the processes are more subtle. In his analysis of American popular culture (“the adult-as-spoiled child of Donald Duck, or the innocent-in-the–body-of-the-infinite-adult in Superman, or the reader-as-Adam-with-all-the-knowledge-of-Faust in the Digest” (pp. 174-175)) Dorfman (2010) states:

> Perhaps it is inevitable that the consumer should be treated as an infant, helpless and demanding, in societies such as ours. As a member of a democratic system, he has the right to vote and the even more important right and obligation to consume; but at the same time he is not really participating in the determination of his future or that of the world. People can be treated as children because they do not, in effect, control their own destiny. Even if they feel themselves to be utterly free, they are objectively vulnerable and dependent, passive in a world commandeered by others, a world where the messages they swallow have originated in other people's minds. (p. 174)

The subject of agendas and who sets them is the subject of Agassi’s (2009) contribution to Leemon McHenry’s compendium that began this chapter. We need to ask, *Who sets the agenda? Is there a philosophy of agenda setting?*

I asked friends to help me in my study of the question, how does the commonwealth of learning fix its agendas? Their comments baffled me: they asked me, what makes me choose to study the question that is not on the agenda? (p. 120)

Agassi’s suggestion, in line with Cohen and Kennedy’s (2007) third strand in Figure 7.5, is to create a global agenda: “First we must admit our ignorance and declare the agenda of philosophy to include global survival as its first and most urgent item” (p. 128). Unfortunately, I would suggest, “ignorance” and relationship with all peoples (rather than just “me and mine” (Smith & Mackie, 2000)) are anathema to the egoic consciousness of the technocracy. We need the bigger context of a necessarily broad and generous ecoic consciousness to accept Agassi’s proposed agenda. Virilio’s (2012) metaphor of occupation is a very apposite one requiring a resistance movement for a considerably more diffuse enemy than the one he faced during World War II. Or maybe an army that institutes its own values is the answer—one that replaces the occupying one by stealth and wit. To end with Maxwell (1984), we need a new “Enlightenment Programme”, a philosophy of wisdom that concerns itself with the scientifically  

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163 Some years ago when I was the Chair of the Liturgy Committee (or at least an active member of it) at a local parish Church, I became aware of the extent to which I was self-censoring in order to “protect” the feelings of one particular priest who was part of the old guard. It wasn’t of course “protection” of him at all; I just didn’t want to deal with the fallout if I expressed my irritation at what I saw as his sub-par performance: his sermons merely repeated the gospel and didn’t add appreciable value; he made a fuss if a woman entered the sacred portals of the Presbytery—that sort of thing. On one occasion, I decided to act on a liturgical matter: instead of one chalice on the altar at the Offering, he had a number, which diluted the symbolism. The division of the consecrated wine, as with the breaking of the bread, should have come later in the Mass—just before the Communion rite. When I pointed this out to him I got the response I was expecting: *How dare you lecture me on what is the right and the wrong thing to do?*

Ehrenfeld (2008) analyses why I should (although I don’t recommend it for political reasons) continue to be socially disruptive and forego good manners if the situation calls for it. He explains it thus:

Rationality and reasonableness have very strong normative force attached to them. One of the worst things that can be said about a person is that the individual is acting unreasonably or irrationally. To the objective realists, this means that the person is doing something wrong. To others, it means that the subject of the observer's remarks is bucking the normal ways of doing things. In any case, this claim has strong negative social sanctions, calling for, in the extreme, separation from normal society. I will argue that acting according to prevalent norms is a root cause of unsustainability, and it will take a strong dose of unreasonableness to break the logjam of conventional thinking. The more that everyone believes that rationality is some sort of fixed capability of the human brain or some other aspect of human nature, the harder it will be to run up against the social tide. (pp. 27-28)
discoverable and the humanly desirable which includes both delight and compassion—that is, relationships with nature and others as well as to the vulnerable bits of ourselves. To return to T S Eliot, we shall not cease from exploration because it will enable us finally to know what it is that we really seek. In that sense, and as Gatto (2001) realises, the doctrine of the Fall will paradoxically be seen for what it can ultimately be: a Rising . . . as long as we complete the process and, in Catholic thinking, seek a system that is not subject to corruption and inadequate agendas, as those created by human beings commonly are\textsuperscript{164}.

\textsuperscript{164} For the record, Maxwell (1984) criticises the philosophy of knowledge for the inherent triviality and the esoteric nature of a lot of science and scholarship; the scandal of the domination of military research and its products of mass destruction; the disproportionate service science pays to the interests of the wealthy and powerful; and finally, the deleterious side effects of scientific progress on the natural environment.
Chapter 8
THE WILDERNESS LYING IN WAIT AS HAIDT’S “RATIONALIST DELUSION”
AND MCGILCHRIST’S AUFHEBUNG

A man always has two reasons for doing anything: a good reason and the real reason.

J. P Morgan

In 1984 Maxwell identified what he called “rationalistic neurosis”, while Haidt (2012) more recently has identified what he calls “the rationalist delusion”, and, by so doing, also shows us a way forward which McGilchrist (2009) then documents, by way of neuroscience research, into a journey that illustrates Hegel’s concept of *aufhebung*. This concept, in terms of the theme of Part 2, is effectively the journey into “the wildness that lies in wait”, a journey that lies beyond rationality, but not reason.\(^\text{165}\)

But first, what does Haidt (2012) mean by “the rationalist delusion”? He defines it as the worship of reason; it is the view that “reasoning is our most noble attribute” (p. 88) and, as a reaction to this, he concentrates on the Aristotelian end of the Plato/Aristotelian tension.\(^\text{166}\) And speaking of that tension, this thesis is very much concerned with it from its use of the Platonist Iris Murdoch’s vision of the Good, through to, and this will become evident in the chapters yet to come, the other end of the continuum, in its use of empirical research as one example, and in its advocacy of virtue ethics as another. The necessary return of virtue ethics is one Aristotelian staging post we will visit in this chapter under the tutelage of Haidt (2006).

The European philosophical tradition may be, as Alfred North Whitehead characterised it, a series of footnotes to Plato, and I have played on that idea by characterising this thesis as a series of footnotes to Murdoch’s twin enemies of social convention and neurosis. Certainly that legacy is not gainsayed; but when it has done its job in calling into question both Stage 3 social convention and Stage 4 neurosis as a basis for human life, then it is time to move on and work out what it is that we as a species really do want out of life at a Stage 5/6 level. While the Ten Commandments give us a valuable list of should nots—which parallels my focus on social convention and neurosis—we also need to figure out what it is that we truly and fundamentally desire once we scrape away the dross or unhelpful hangovers of and from our evolutionary and personal histories. For Christians, our fundamental desire must be to use Jesus Christ and his desire to do God’s will—*Thy Will Be Done* rather than *My Will Be Done*\(^\text{167}\) as our model. Reason is certainly an important tool by which to discern what that might be in any particular situation. But to worship reason as if it was a God is problematic for Haidt, even despite the fact that he is an

\(^{165}\) McGilchrist (2009, pp. 64-65) identifies the difference between reason and rationality by way of the subtitle of his book *The Master and his Emissary*: “the divided brain and the making of the western world”. Reason is more descriptiv of the way the right hemisphere of the brain works in a problem-solving, insightful sort of way; the rationality of the more superficial structure of linear, sequential argument is a left hemisphere way of being in the world in which the reasoning is explicit. Design is a process that ultimately relies on both hemispheres but the “aha” moment where a number of strands come together into a coherent whole, is a right-brained moment. As a landscape architect, I experienced this often; it involved a number of false starts but if one took the time and kept scribbling and trying out new ideas, then ultimately problems resolved themselves. This thesis has in fact relied on a similar process where thoughts gathered together during the day resolved themselves in some way during sleep. Long walks seemed to achieve the same thing. As long as the information had

\(^{166}\) One parallel of this is to see it as an Ideation/Instinct continuum that I introduced in Chapter Two from the writings of David Tacey. I believe the continuum is ultimately a unity in God but given the fractured world we live in, we must tease the two apart and continually assess how we’re all doing along that continuum’s length. This chapter will be in part devoted to Haidt’s (2012) contention that as far as the Ideation end is concerned, we could do better, and the first step is to show how self-serving our ideation can be. He parallels that in Haidt (2006) with the recommendation that we train the instinctual end by returning to virtue ethics, a topic which will be covered in Chapter 8.

\(^{167}\) I am aware how this sort of talk comes across—as the result no doubt of the dreariness and conflated circumstances in which some of us received our religious training. It is not meant to be read as something unutterably boring and, worse, controlling, but as “a coming home” to our true and authentic nature no matter that now we only see that home through a glass half-darkly.
American secular Jew and, in terms of his professorship in empirical psychology, a child of the Enlightenment. As I have illustrated in Figure 5.1(b) with the clockwise progression around the conceptual wisdom model, the Enlightenment doesn’t exactly contain within it the seeds of its own destruction, but it does carry within it the seeds of its own reform and that I believe is what can be taken from Haidt’s valuable work in moral psychology.

In recounting the journey from philosophy and through to the psychology that replaced it after the Enlightenment, Haidt (2012) begins with Plato’s self-serving beliefs in the primacy of Reason and therefore in its high priests—the philosopher kings. In keeping with the feminist slant of this work, Plato’s belief that a “man who is mastered by his passions, however, will be reincarnated as a woman” (Haidt, 2012, p. 28) is telling, apposite, and quite in accord with the ontological philosophical context that I grew up within, which, to again quote Schaef (1981), was “the original sin of being born female”. Plato’s “sin” is described by Haidt in this way:

> Western philosophy has been worshipping reason and distrusting the passions for thousands of years. . . . There's a direct line running from Plato through Immanuel Kant to Lawrence Kohlberg. I'll refer to this worshipful attitude throughout this book as the rationalist delusion. I call it a delusion because when a group of people make something sacred, the members of the cult lose the ability to think clearly about it. Morality binds and blinds. The true believers produce pious fantasies that don't match reality, and at some point somebody comes along to knock the idol off its pedestal. That was Hume's project, with his philosophically sacrilegious claim that reason was nothing but the servant of the passions. (Haidt, 2012, pp. 28-29)

Haidt’s (2012) approach to moral psychology is a “social intuitionist” model which combines nature (nativist theories such as Darwin’s in which morality comes “pre-loaded” as it were) and nurture (empiricist theories of childhood learning) into the identification of three cultural strands that are illustrated in Figure 8.1: the moral matrices of American liberals, American libertarians, and American social conservatives. He defines the rationalist theories168 of Kohlberg (which along with sidelining Kohlberg likewise sidelines Carol Gilligan’s responses to Kohlberg’s theory169) as part of the rationalist delusion, and therefore rather unhelpful when dealing with morality as it is actually lived. For example, research by philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel that Haidt (2012, p.89) quotes, has shown that moral philosophers behave no better than the rest of us; in fact Haidt entertains the possibility that it might make ethicists even worse than the rest of us (“by making the rider more skilled at post hoc justification” (p. 89)).

While I am writing this thesis with a Western audience in mind, Haidt’s “social intuitionist” model unifies all humanity in a way that Kohlberg’s theory never could (Haidt after all did a lot of his research in India). While Figure 8.1 presents Haidt’s findings for a western audience, the moral domains he identifies appear to be universal. The problem with Kohlberg’s rationalist theory (and Gilligan’s amendment of it) was that it was ensconced within Western secular values of Fairness, Care and Liberty only, and the Enlightenment valorising of the developmental progression towards abstract thought.

There’s nothing wrong with the progression towards abstract thought of course; the main problem for Haidt is that that abstract thought is, as Hume believed, the servant of the Passions rather than its master. “[M]oral thinking is more like a politician searching for votes than a scientist searching for truth” (Haidt, 2012, p. 91). To relate that to a model presented earlier, the reason for this again lies in Smith and Mackie’s (2000) “processing principles” outlined in Figure 4.23. The “in-depth processing” referred to in that diagram is used to justify the moral thinking that the automatic systems of our brains have already intuited (the “superficial processing” in other words), and Haidt characterises these two processes as the rider and the elephant, and the rider exists to serve the elephant170. Table 8.1 recounts an example from

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168 “[M]orality is self-constructed by children on the basis of their experiences with harm” (Haidt, 2012, p. 26).

169 There is nothing problematic in this because the two concerns that Kohlberg and Gilligan presented as the basis of moral development are included in Haidt’s liberal matrix as far as I can gauge.

170 That conclusion—that the rider was created to serve the elephant—is in line with Haidt’s evolutionary beliefs and our place within nature. My conception of the rider, as a Catholic, is seen through the lens of the Great Commandment. We were created as children of God and to serve each other as a result of that love. In that sense, I put more weight on the need to discipline
Haidt’s personal life that shows exactly how the system serving the rationalist delusion works in situ. There needs to be deeper cognitive processing of such events rather than the superficial processing that Haidt caught himself doing.

Haidt’s (2012) conclusion is surprising in the sense that it is so anti-Platonic. While I have no problem accepting one of his conclusions that we all, as elephants, carry around on our backs “a full-time public relations firm” (p. 46) in the form of the rider (after all, this, and Table 8.1, is one of Schaeff’s accusations about the White Male Society in a nutshell) it is not until you see his social intuitionist model (see Figure 8.2) that you see that there is room for “private reflection” and “reasoned judgement”, albeit that they are shown as dotted lines, because, as Haidt writes, “this process doesn’t seem to happen very often” (p. 47). What he does allow for—as depicted with solid lines—are the more frequent challenges and argumentation that can occur in a social context. Certainly that can be effective, but I want to place more emphasis on those dotted lines because I see them as being more significant in bolstering one of my contentions in this thesis which is that we need to grow beyond our evolutionary inheritance. As we shall see in Chapter 13, the process of Jungian individuation can be a solitary journey whereby we embark on a trail that no-one has travelled before. Trailblazers only have their own wits to guide them—in the form of Tacey’s (1997) ideation and instinct—the two ends of the systemic-existential axis that runs through each of us. Nevertheless, Haidt’s point is taken; the fact that so few do individuate in a Jungian manner, backs up his conclusion that deep personal reflection “doesn’t seem to happen very often”.

So where does that place Haidt’s work? Given the six areas of morality that Haidt has discerned, and which reflect our elephantine heritage, there is not one of them that is not of social value in one way or another. The two main problems that I see resulting from them are, as previously discussed in Part 1, the universal discriminatory practices against women, as well as against those who are generally of lesser status within the group, and the discriminatory practices used against those “outside” our group. It is within these societal norms that Jesus—and the early Church in Paul’s authentic writings—offered an alternative. That has been eroded particularly with regard to the position and status of women in the Church and it needs to be rectified. But as pointed out in Chapter 5, all of Haidt’s six moral areas can be incorporated into my model of post-Protestant Catholicism, as long as we take a stance that sees a maturing process that also necessarily takes place (perhaps under the title of cultural evolution) whereby the rider and the elephant both grow smarter. To repeat, as we will see when we come to the chapter on Jung, he accorded the instincts (from Nature, corresponding to Haidt’s Elephant) an important role in the maturation/individuation process along with ideation (from Culture, corresponding to Haidt’s Rider).

So, bolstering the honesty of the rider through deep personal reflection is one response to Haidt’s research. Training the elephant is another, through the necessary return of virtue ethics (Haidt, 2006). Haidt (2006) uses Benjamin Franklin as an admirable guide for how to do the training required:

Franklin was a brilliant intuitive psychologist. He realized that the rider can be successful only to the extent that it trains the elephant (though he did not use those terms), so he devised a training regimen. He wrote out a list of thirteen virtues, each linked to specific behaviors that he should or should not do. (For example: “Temperance: Eat not to dullness”; “Frugality: Make no expense but to do good to others or yourself”; “Chastity: Rarely use venery but for health or offspring”). He then printed a table made up of seven columns (one for each day of the week) and thirteen rows (one for each virtue), and he put a blank spot in the appropriate square each time he failed to live a whole day in accordance with a particular virtue. He concentrated on only one virtue a week, hoping to keep its row clear of spots while paying no attention to the others. As a consequence I believe the Passion should serve something (God as Love and Truth is my choice; Plato’s Truth, Beauty and Goodness would be Iris Murdoch’s suggestion) but not the rider who merely thinks “saying it will make it so” as those riders captured by the rationalist delusion tend to do.

Both the rider and the elephant. As a consequence I believe the Passion should serve something (God as Love and Truth is my choice; Plato’s Truth, Beauty and Goodness would be Iris Murdoch’s suggestion) but not the rider who merely thinks “saying it will make it so” as those riders captured by the rationalist delusion tend to do.

171 Dreams can be full of animal imagery which then need the rational faculties in our waking hours to discern the message they are carrying. That is an example of the ideation-instinct continuum. Nevertheless, Haidt’s (2012) point about our rational faculties is well made: it is a good thing to have others pick apart our dream imagery as one’s own interpretations can merely continue our neurotic blindness. The problem is finding the right “Other” to carry out that function in a disinterested enough fashion.

172 Borg and Crossan (2009) seek to distinguish those parts of Paul’s epistles that were the genuine and radical article from those written later that took on a more problematic and conservative tone.
special attention to the other virtues, though he filled in their rows whenever violations occurred. Over thirteen weeks, he worked through the whole table. Then he repeated the process, finding that with repetition the table got less and less spotty. (pp. 158-159)

Haidt’s advocacy of virtue ethics is also a result of his criticism of the shift in ethics “from character to quandary” that was again the result of “the rationalist delusion”. Catholicism never moved away from a reliance on virtue and they still figure in its catechism. There is certainly no reason to recommend any departure from this stance as we move to Stage 5 Being; the heady heights of Stage 5 Being require the deep foundations of character brought forth through the acceptance and training of our animal instincts.

Haidt comes to a very important conclusion at the end of his second chapter and it ties in well with the theories of the second scholar who will be the focus of this chapter. While problematically heading up the section “How to win an argument” (Schaeff’s “Living Process” system would no doubt title that section differently—see Table 5.1), he goes on to conclude that seeing things empathetically—in the way the other person sees them—deeply and intuitively—is the antidote to individual righteousness, although he adds “it’s very difficult to empathize across a moral divide” (p. 49). Quite so. Nevertheless, McGilchrist (2009) goes into more detail about what is entailed in that particular process, which is a step from one “state of being in the world” to the other: from a left hemispheric preoccupation with “division” to an ultimately right hemispheric preoccupation with “cohesion” (p.140). In many respects, this probably occurs in an unsystematic way by way of Haidt’s “social process of moral judgement”, but McGilchrist solidifies the necessary pathway by which we place the parts of individual moral judgement into a Whole. To do this necessitates a move into the wilder territory to the right and below the Eco fault line into the realm of Rolheiser’s (1998) community and Mitroff’s (1998) interpersonal solutions.

The way McGilchrist (2009) characterises the development of philosophy, mathematics, and physics in the twentieth century is similar to the process that Chesterton describes in the quotation that opened Part 2. The wildness of all three which lay in wait has been uncovered; in physics with its counter-intuitive discoveries at the levels of the very large and the very small, in mathematics with Kurt Gödel’s theorems that proved that “there will always be truths within any system that cannot be proved in terms of that system” (p. 136), and in continental philosophy in an arc that extends from Hegel to Heidegger. He suggests it is time for the rest of the West to follow the example of those three specialties. McGilchrist speaks from the point of view of a modern psychiatrist who has some experience with stroke patients and how the sites of those strokes in the brain make a critical difference in terms of the effects on the patients (not to mention the myriad of other means one has to investigate these differences). The increase in brain research in recent decades has been staggering, revealing many “wildnesses” lying in wait in terms of the structure of the brain.

“There is no such thing as the brain”, writes McGilchrist (2009) in a remarkable statement; “only the brain according to the right hemisphere and the brain according to the left hemisphere: the two hemispheres that bring everything into being also, inevitably, bring themselves” (p.175). While “every identifiable human activity is actually served at some level by both hemispheres” (p. 1), the two cerebral hemispheres are asymmetrical he says and both have coherent and possibly irreconcilable sets of values. Moreover, their differences do not necessarily involve equality: in line with the title of his book, the right hemisphere is the Master, the left the Emissary—except that in the West, he states, the opposite has come to pertain because the Emissary has overthrown the rule of the Master and refused to acknowledge the Master’s primary role in the “kingdom”. (So far, that is all in tune with Haidt’s (2012) conclusions.)

McGilchrist’s (2009) underlying assumption is that the structure of the brain is significant with regard to its relationship with consciousness and the structure of the world it mediates. The most fundamental difference between the hemispheres lies in the type of attention they give to the world.

173 It would be an interesting study to see how the Catholic Church’s schema of ethics in its Catechism fit in with Haidt’s (2006) overview of Positive Psychology’s existing schema of virtues—or what is wittily called the “un-DSM”.

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A central theme is the importance of our disposition towards the world and one another, as being fundamental in grounding what it is that we come to have a relationship with, rather than the other way round. The kind of attention we pay actually alters the world: we are, literally, partners in creation. This means we have a grave responsibility, a word that captures the reciprocal nature of the dialogue we have with whatever it is that exists apart from ourselves. Ultimately I believe that many of the disputes about the nature of the human world can be illuminated by an understanding that there are two fundamentally different “versions” delivered to us by the two hemispheres, both of which can have a ring of authenticity about them, and both of which are hugely valuable; but that they stand in opposition to one another, and need to be kept apart from one another—hence the bihemispheric structure of the brain.

These are not different ways of thinking about the world: they are different ways of being in the world. And as this quote implies, attention is inescapably bound up with value—specifically relationship. “At its simplest” he writes, the right hemisphere creates a world in which “there is ‘betweenness’ and one where there is not” (p.31). There is a sense of mutuality in the right which is absent in the left which divides the world essentially into subject and object.

McGilchrist (2009) moreover identifies a hierarchy of attention; there is a grounding role and an ultimately integrating role for the right hemisphere, with whatever the left hemisphere does at the detailed level needing to be founded on, and then returned to, the picture generated by the right. “This is an instance of the right → left → right progression which will be a theme of this book” (p. 46). Certainly the first two progressions here describe the path between Haidt’s intuitive elephant and the rider on its back. It is that final progression to the right that needs more detail.

This right-left-right progression is an important finding for the structure of this thesis as well because it is postulated that this roughly parallels the Stage 3 → Stage 4 → Stage 5 progression in Fowler’s (1981) model. It also mirrors the design process introduced in Chapter 4. The left hemisphere world that we largely live in has already taken the right hemisphere’s information about what is “out there” and moulded it into academic and other specialities. It is the contention of this thesis that it now needs to “integrate” (a very “right hemisphere” description of how it works as opposed to the “division” of the left) those specialities into some sort of whole which is continually in process (another very “right hemisphere” description of how it works) just as indicated by the continuous loop in the model Figure 5.1(b).

Tacey (2004), when he talks about “the spirituality revolution” as “our recognition that we have outgrown the ideals and values of the early scientific era, which viewed the individual as a sort of efficient machine” (p.1), encapsulates this fundamental difference in the values of right brain “being in the world”. They are starting to be expressed in the post-modern world, even though many of its forms are, necessarily for such a young movement, egregious. The wisdom model, as I detailed in Chapter 5, involves the final descent of the clockwise arrow into the existential domain and over the Liberal/Conservative fault line and into an appreciation of one’s true inherent value within the benevolent cosmos we were born into. McGilchrist (2009) uses Scheler (1973) to show how value is seen differently as a result of the different viewpoints of the left and right hemispheres. This is depicted in Figure 8.3 in which what is holy (what I would broadly interpret as post-Protestant Catholicism) is supported by the intellect (Protestantism).

McGilchrist (2009) states that it is the right hemisphere that should be the Master because it is more inclusive:

I believe that the relationship between the hemispheres is not equal, and that while both contribute to our knowledge of the world, which therefore needs to be synthesised, one hemisphere, the right hemisphere, has precedence, in that it underwrites the knowledge that the other comes to have, and is alone able to synthesise what both know into a usable whole. (p. 176)

To start at the beginning of that relationship, McGilchrist (2009) identifies the primacy of broad vigilant attention. What the right hemisphere is already aware of is taken up by the left hemisphere and represented. [These observations] are however, “denatured by becoming the object of focussed attention,
which renders them explicit, therefore mechanical, lifeless [174]. The value of the left hemisphere is precisely in making explicit, but this is a staging post, an intermediate level of the ‘processing’ of experience, never the starting point or end point, never the deepest, or the final, level”. If the left hemisphere is in charge the world would be “relatively mechanical, an assemblage of more or less disconnected ‘parts’; it would be relatively abstract and disembodied; relatively distanced from fellow-feeling; given to explicitness; utilitarian in ethic; over-confident of its own take on reality, and lacking insight into its problems—the neuropsychological evidence is that these are all aspects of the left hemisphere world as compared with the right” (p. 209).

Much that marks us out, in the positive sense as well as the negative sense, as human beings requires the intervention of the left hemisphere, as long as it is acting in concert with the right hemisphere. Important human faculties depend on a synthesis of their activity. In the absence of such concerted action, the left hemisphere comes to believe its territory actually is the world. (p. 219, emphasis in the original)

As stated earlier, physics and philosophy had to move beyond the limitations imposed by the left-brain world once they came up against the boundaries of what they could do in terms of the left hemisphere. So, Einsteinian physics has replaced Newtonian concepts. As for philosophy, he lists the following truths:

... themes emerged from philosophical debate which, unknowingly, corroborate the right hemisphere's understanding of the world. These include: empathy and intersubjectivity as the ground of consciousness; the importance of an open, patient attention to the world, as opposed to a wilful, grasping attention; the implicit or hidden nature of truth; the emphasis on process rather than stasis, the journey being more important than the arrival; the primacy of perception; the importance of the body in constituting reality; an emphasis on uniqueness; the objectifying nature of vision; the irreducibility of all value to utility; and creativity as an unveiling (no-saying) process rather than a wilfully constructive process. (p. 177)

Philosophy in other words “shares the trajectory that I have described as typical of the relationship between the hemispheres. It begins in wonder, intuition, ambiguity, puzzlement and uncertainty; it progresses through being unpacked, inspected from all angles and wrestled into linearity by the left hemisphere; but its endpoint is to see that the very business of language and linearity must themselves be transcended, and once more left behind. The progression is familiar: from right hemisphere, to left hemisphere, to right hemisphere again. This would also be in keeping with other evidence for the primary role of the right hemisphere in yielding the experiential world” (p. 178). The attention of the left hemisphere (control) needs to be reintegrated with that of the right hemisphere (care) if it is not to prove damaging. This is a similar conclusion to the one formed in Chapter 5 in relation to Bruce Lincoln’s analysis of myth, and the way he appreciated the limits of what he was doing when he recognised the validity of the position of his grumpy female student.

McGilchrist uses Hegel’s concept of aufhebung to explain this right-left-right progression and he explains the concept as “the way in which the earlier stages of an organic process, although superseded by those that come after, are not repudiated by them, even though the later stages are incompatible with the earlier ones” (p. 205). He then quotes Hegel’s illustration of the concept which uses the progression from the bud to the blossom to the fruit while still being part of the one organic unity.

I have reified this description of aufhebung which “positively includes the idea of being preserved, as well as transformed” (McGilchrist, 2009, p. 205) in my Figure 8.4 which repeats Figure 5.1(b) in its structure and flow. The naïve SF quadrant is the bud which is preserved but transformed into the blossom of the left-brained ST and the (Fowlerian Stage 4) NT quadrants. But, like all blossoms, they are nothing if they are not cross-fertilised—by difference. This is where the “living process” has to be completed whereby the blossom becomes the fruit and the source of new life. This occurs within the right-brained—

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174 This “lifelessness” is the basis for Schaef’s (1992) criticism of White Male Society/Addictive Society, and is the reason why she calls her claim of an alternative, the “Living Process System”. What she is in essence describing is the tension between a left-brain and a right-brain Being-in-the-world. Unless you return the results of left-brain thinking to the right brain, then all you do have is the “dead” world that the left brain has provided and which Schaef derides for good reason.
and female parts—of the model, where the physical needs of all embodied life are adequately met. Control is used to produce care.

This model also expresses the nature of the design process introduced in Chapter 4. The ordering and conceptualising abilities of the left hemisphere produce information (divided into specialties) which then need to be re-integrated into a holistic picture by asking So what? of its participant specialty streams as well as What if we do this? or do that? as we try out various combinations. Finally, we need to test our “design” or more accurately, consult our indices of progress, to assess: Who suffers? and Who benefits? from existing and proposed integrations. That is the end point of the process, not that part of the model on the left wherein who suffers and who benefits is all too obvious: the Homo sacer (Agamben, 1998) who suffer, and the powerful beneficiaries of the capitalist order who benefit by being the most successful in “dead” systemising and control but, given the state of the world today, not in care.

McGilchrist (2009) also conceives of aufhebung by observing that “the best of Enlightenment values were not negated, but aufgehoben, by Romanticism” (p. 352). Romanticism, to be valid however, needs the Enlightenment to be robust enough to change what is mere Feeling into instilled Value. This is where so much of New Age mysticism has, I believe, the shallow roots that Tacey (2001) for example describes. But this is also how the aufhebung process described in Figure 8.4 is critical for my argument because, as McGilchrist also observes, “The idea of individual difference is central to Romanticism” (p. 353) in a way that the Enlightenment doesn’t—in fact can’t (because of its left-brained foundation)—recognise. Nevertheless, if one wants to be more than a mere hologram of the social system in which one exists, then one needs to go through some sort of Enlightenment process to get beyond it into one’s true Difference. What this means in essence is that to become a true artist of life as Bauman (2008) recommends (see chapter 4), we need to actively and expensively educate ourselves and then continually return (because this is a never-ending process) as an individualised and whole social actor within cultural life. By the same token, we need to regard the ostensibly Romantic with suspicion. Romanticism is too important to be cheaply won.

With regard to religion and its institutional expression, there are advantages for the modern, I would contend, in the direction and departure/arrival point of the journey in the SF quadrant as shown in both Figure 8.4 and Figure 5.1(b). The institutional pronouncing sector is seen as part of the journey. In other words, the individual is the final arbiter of what s/he as an individual does. It assumes the primacy of the individual conscience which is a way of reconciling the Protestant sensibility with the Catholic. It also assumes that this conscience is not sufficient unto itself; it must be continually educated. This is an extremely important point given the Romantic sensibilities that underlay the descent of Germany into Nazi rule. There must be continuing robust left hemispheric processing of right hemispheric intuitions. In the Nazi situation, the left hemisphere was delegated with the task of enforcing right hemispheric indulgence rather than questioning its premises. The loop has to be closed and, in fact, continually re-worked. To continue the point made above, living is always an unfinished process.

With regard to the institution (and I have in mind the male-dominated Catholic Church here), in the middle of his Chapter 6, McGilchrist (2009) makes an intriguing observation. After stating . . .

“... it is essential that what the left hemisphere yields is returned to the realm of the right hemisphere, where it can once again live. Only the right hemisphere is in touch with primary experience, with life; and the left hemisphere can only ever be a staging post, a processing house, along the route—not the final destination. The right hemisphere certainly needs the left, but the left hemisphere depends on the right. (p. 219)

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175 I say “expensively” because, as with much of the “cheap” content produced by the New Age movement, we don’t want shallow social actors in the sense that little time and energy has been expended on one’s role as a responsible citizen.

176 The point I am making here is aptly described in the popular expression, “Everyone wants to go to heaven but no-one wants to die.”
McGilchrist (2009) observes in a footnote that this “relationship has thought-provoking similarities with that described by Meister Eckhart between God and the human soul” (p.219fn).

Table 8.2 sets out the asymmetry between the two hemispheres of the brain and the relationships between them: if “Man” is equated with the left hemisphere and God with the right, then our imagery of God needs some serious rethinking. Again, this is “the wildness lying in wait”, the escapee from the pinnacle of masculinity and order that is modernity, or more accurately, the seeing of that so-called pinnacle within the bounds and processes of a much larger landscape. For a start, it gives a clue as to why the most radical depiction of God is that ultimate in human relationality—the new-born human baby.

Anything that expands our metaphorical repertoire for understanding God is to be fostered because such a concept is of course not ultimately knowable in our milieu. And that expansive metaphorical repertoire emerges in the fundamental tension in which we must live—between the worlds represented by the left and right hemispheres of our brains. Their incompatibility mirrors the central metaphor of tension that is Christ on the cross, stretched between incompatibilities that we need somehow to resolve. Jung’s belief is that the only way we can, is to grow out of them, and the dynamic nature of the claim of an alternative that I am presenting here, is represented by the diversity of my model’s components and the continually revolving arrow in Figure 5.1(b), and now Figure 8.4, that endeavours to link them together.

Before leaving McGilchrist’s work however I want to report another observation of his that sets the scene for the next chapter. It is the extent to which “we” are not only our conscious selves but also, and more primarily, our unconscious selves (what McGilchrist in fact describes as the Primacy of the Unconscious Will). McGilchrist uses Libert’s famous experiment to illustrate his point because Libert’s study is often interpreted to show the frailty of the concept of free will. However, as McGilchrist concludes:

“[W]e have to widen our concept of who “we” are to include our unconscious selves. The difficulties seem to arise, as so often, because of language, which is principally the left hemisphere's way of construing the world. (p. 188)

In this thesis, I am taking the unconscious very seriously indeed and the next chapter will continue that intent.

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177 This experiment is described by McGilchrist (2009, pp. 186-188) as follows:

Libet asked subjects to make spontaneous movements of their fingers at will, and recorded what was going on in the brain by monitoring the accompanying electroencephalographic data, recorded by electrodes on the scalp. . . . He confirmed earlier findings of a German neurologist, Hans Kornhuber, who had shown that there is a blip in the trace, known as a “readiness potential” (Bereitschaftspotential), about a second before the movement takes place. . . . But, much to his amazement, he discovered that the conscious urge to move the finger occurred, not before, but approximately 0.2 seconds after, the readiness potential. In other words the brain seemed to know in advance that its “owner” was going to make a decision to carry out an action.
THE WILDNESS LYING IN WAIT AS BECKER’S ESCAPE FROM THE “ESCAPE FROM EVIL”

My nephew, in common with what seems to be most boys, went through his computer war games phase. I remember popping by to see my sister whose son he was and she showed me with some amusement how he had set one particular game up so that, by way of a deadly pre-emptive strike, he could effectively wipe out his enemy in about ten seconds flat. I found it rather funny at the time, and of course it demonstrated the skills he had developed in order to be able to arrive at his “endgame”. On reflection however, there was a deeper lesson to be learned. This incident illustrated in one typical male descendant the struggle of our ancient forebears to survive in what were desperate circumstances where mastery of the tools at one’s disposal was a life-and-death matter whether as a result of the depredations of the environment or from one’s neighbouring tribe. My nephew was using his skill to symbolically “escape from [the] evil” of those depredations. In this chapter I will be arguing that post-Protestant Catholicism represents an escape from that escape from evil and I will be using Becker’s (1975) observations about Christianity in relation to our evolutionary history to support my claims. The ideas from Becker (1975) that underlie this chapter are summarised in Figure 9.1 which I will refer to throughout my account.

I never saw my nieces playing these sorts of games. Without wanting to sound like the start of a joke about there being two sorts of people in the world, there are indeed two sorts of tendencies when dealing with difference— lumping them together and splitting them apart. An example can be seen in the psychology of gender in which some theorists, termed maximalists, state that there are indeed significant differences between men and women, and the minimalists who tend to downplay any differences (Helgeson, 2012, p. 17). In this thesis I am variously taking both stances depending on the context, with a tendency overall toward the maximising thesis to the extent that “a little can go an awfully long way” and that that “little” is probably based more in the experiences of childhood than in any large inherent difference (as per Gilligan, 2002).178 This theme will be developed as this thesis progresses but the “striving for mastery” and “seeking connectedness” aspects of Smith and Mackie’s (2000) social psychological motivations have been typically gendered in human societies179. My nieces, although they may not have striven for “mastery” in computer war games, have done or are preparing to do so in other areas of life that were opened up to women in the course of my lifetime. “Striving for mastery” has become more of an equal-opportunity employer.180 Does that then leave the “seeking connectedness” shop relatively unattended? Certainly, in a patriarchal society, “striving for mastery” is always going to be the dominant motivation and “seeking connectedness” will be its poor relation in any sense that does not help the “striving for mastery” motivational principle.

As discussed in Chapter 7, Ferry (2010) defines what he sees as the necessary split between philosophy and religion. In discussing “philosophy versus religion” he begins by defining their common ground as responses to “the supreme threat to existence—death” (Ferry, 2010, p. 5). Religion’s response, he opines, is to have faith in God’s grace. “If you believe in Him,” he continues, “God will save you”. On the other side of that “versus”, philosophy claims to save us from the anxiety caused by thoughts of our ultimate demise, and, he emphasises, to “do so by the exercise of our own resources and our innate faculty of reason” (p. 6).

While there is some truth in this split, in the light of the Chesterton quote with which Part 2 began and my discussion in Chapter 7, the lumpers would say that reason is a common factor to both, and moreover,

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178 In Fowler’s Stage 5 for instance, just as men and women can start to look similar after mid-life, so also, I argue, at this stage of life, the minimalists are right, and indeed should be. The unfortunate fact is however that few choose to expand into the greater mental freedom that age can bring.

179 Smith and Mackie’s (2000) third motivational principle “valuing me and mine” has been a more generalised project.

180 In that sense one can also take the minimalist position, although the answer to this question is an ambiguous one; the scale of the question determines the answer in many respects, so whether the maximalists or the minimalist are right can never be satisfactorily answered.
that reason, along with (co)creation and humility, can bump along together as long as we become a little more precise and discriminatory about the how and the where and when. It is the nuances in the following quote from Chesterton (1909)—which are reflected in the cross-like structure of the wisdom model—that express this point well:

Any one might say, “Neither swagger nor grovel”; and it would have been a limit. But to say, “Here you can swagger and there you can grovel”—that was an emancipation. (p. 180)

That sort of fine discrimination is necessary for a discussion of Ernest Becker’s ideas because his theory addresses an educational phenomenon that was in vogue when I taught in a secondary school for a short period and which needs its own form of fine discrimination. Roy Baumeister, a social psychologist, was instrumental in the ascendency of the self-esteem movement because there were indeed statistically significant correlations between self-esteem and achievement. Baumeister and Tierney (2011, p.189) quote Andrew Mecca, “the drug-treatment expert who became chairman of California’s task force on self-esteem, [who] explained that ‘virtually every social problem can be traced to people's lack of self-love’”.

Baumeister, as indicated in the name of his most recent book—Willpower—has subsequently been instrumental in self-esteem’s demise, by identifying the real problem behind a lack of scholastic success: “the grades came first, and the self-esteem came afterward” (p. 190). Getting the direction of causality wrong had serious consequences with students feeling better about doing worse. Moreover, professional hit men and serial rapists “had remarkably high levels of self-esteem”, Baumeister and Tierney (2011) concluded that “the benefits of high self-esteem accrue to the self while its costs are borne by others, who must deal with side effects like arrogance and conceit”:

At worst, self-esteem becomes narcissism, the self-absorbed conviction of personal superiority. Narcissists are legends in their own mind and addicted to their grandiose images. They have a deep craving to be admired by other people (but don't feel a special need to be liked—it's adulation they require). They expect to be treated as special beings and will turn nasty when criticized. (pp. 191, 192)

Part of the problem can be seen in the quote above from Andrew Mecca that Baumeister and Tierney use, which is the conflation of “self-esteem” with “self-love”. It came as some relief to me as a teacher, embroiled as I was in this self-esteem question, to read the following distinction in the psychiatrist M. Scott Peck’s work. This expresses a duo-directional understanding of self-esteem/self-love which theoretically solves the problem. He makes an important distinction between regarding “ourselves as important (which is self-love) and insisting that we always feel good about ourselves (which is synonymous with constantly preserving our self-esteem)” and that this distinction must be reflected in our attitudes about ourselves:

In order to be good, healthy people, we have to pay the price of setting aside our self-esteem once in a while, and so not always feel good about ourselves. But we should always love ourselves and value ourselves, even if we shouldn’t always esteem ourselves. (Peck, 1993, p. 89)

Baumeister and Tierney (2011) reveal how we have created a narcissistic monster with the self-esteem movement, or more accurately—because it has always been with us as will become evident later—let a monster out of its cage. “This broad rise in narcissism is the problem child of the self esteem movement”, they conclude, “and it is not likely to change anytime soon, because the movement persists despite the evidence that it’s not making children become more successful, honest, or otherwise better citizens” (p. 193).

Narcissism, which was briefly defined above, is an important concept in the work of Ernest Becker who, in his turn, drew on the work of Otto Rank, one of Freud’s inner circle. Becker’s (1975) final work, Escape from Evil, and a summary of the phenomenon of evil as explored in another book by Baumeister

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181 Baumeister and Bushman (2011) provide a full definition: “The term narcissism describes the condition of thinking oneself superior or special, feeling entitled to preferential treatment, being willing to exploit others, having low empathy with ‘lesser’ human beings, and entertaining grandiose fantasies or other ideas about oneself as a great person.” (p. 320)
(which mirrors Becker’s work and which fits in neatly with the structure of the wisdom model), will be the focus of the rest of this chapter.

The predominant and generalised evil that Becker’s title refers to is death, what (Ferry, 2010) referred to in chapter 7 and at the start of this section as philosophy’s and religion’s central concern. While Ferry might maintain that philosophy uses reason to confront this concern, Becker would reply that we as social beings do not so much confront it, as “escape” from it, by repressing and redirecting that anxiety.

In Figure 9.1, the red arrow shows the successive Ego stages (see Figure 4.3 for the depiction of these in terms of the Fowler model); we have gone from the primacy of a Stage 2 to a Stage 4 ego-centricity as a consequence, I argue, of the primacy of that “striving for mastery” motivational principle. The narcissism inherent in egotism or ego-centricity is, I also argue, part of the human growth process that at best passes on from the paradoxical weakness of ego-centricity to the strong ego required for Stage 6 Being-in-the-World where the ego is directed outwards towards the well-being of others. That we have these weak egos in varying phases of growth is a function of the way individuals, and societies in general, have come to full rational consciousness. It is why I surmise that Keats, for instance, can refer to life as we encounter it as a “vale of soul-making”. Life, and our growth within it, is an extraordinarily difficult process. We are dealing here with deep existential forces which modern life without a deep existential appreciation is powerless to conquer with its technological version of “mastery”. What I am arguing for here is that we need to ultimately develop an existential, Christian (and therefore paradoxical), version of “mastery”.

The focus in this section is on society because that is the focus of Becker’s last book. That part (the neurosis) of Iris Murdoch’s twin problematic (social convention and neurosis) I will deal with more fully in the sections outlining Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis as the lens through which to appreciate that individual aspect182.

Becker (1975) maintains that cultures have illustrated two ways of dealing with the vulnerability and powerlessness that we feel in the face of death: *hopeful mystification or determined lying*. The first response he describes as a part of early human societal functioning at a time when difference was necessarily muted183. He describes the mutuality of tribalism in which each person, as a contributor to generative sacrificial and stomach-centred ritual (ritual as literally “a technique for giving life . . . a technique of manufacture . . . the atomic physics of the primitive world view” (pp. 6, 8, 20)) could be a true cosmic hero who added to the powers of creation (p. 95). Difference however became a more and more forceful dynamic as societies developed into increasingly sophisticated forms wherever the natural resources at the disposal of cultural groups allowed this to occur (see for example Diamond, 2005). In other words, in terms of my wisdom model (Figure 5.2), differences became stronger whereby the equality and mutuality of the Eco ritual was supplanted by the power-seeking or heroic Ego184. From the

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182 I speak there as if the two sides of the personal and the social are autonomous and distinct. They are not of course, as Figure 4.23 was at pains to illustrate.

183 However, the potential for more strongly etched difference—“the explanation for this profound dualism [which] lies in the real world of human ambitions and hopes” (p. 10) is obvious from the following in Becker’s (1975) account. It is yet another theory explaining the human propensity for dualism:

This passion for splitting things into two polar opposites that were complementary was a most striking and widespread feature of primitive man’s social organization. (The Chinese Yin and Yang is a survival of this phenomenon.) A person belonged either to one half or the other, traced his descent from a common ancestor, often identified with a particular animal totem representing his half, usually married someone in the other half, and had rigorously specified types of relationship with people in the other half, including the duty to bury them and mourn for them. One of the main things that took place between the halves was something *Homo sapiens* seems to thrive on: contests of skill and excellence. Hocart thinks that the teasing and mocking behaviors which anthropologists call “joking relationships” may have had their origin there. In fact, it is possible that all team games arose out of the dual organization. (p. 9)

184 The Ego I talk of here is that part of us that wants to win (as we will see in one of Argyris’s rules of corporate behaviour in Chapter 11)); “Man can expand his self-feeling not only by physical incorporation but by any kind of triumph or demonstration of his own excellence. He expands his organization in complexity by games, puzzles, riddles, mental tricks of all types; by boasting about his achievements, taunting and humiliating his adversaries, or torturing and killing them. Anything that reduces the other organisms and adds to one's own size and importance: a direct way to gain self-feeling; it is a natural development out of the simple incorporation and fighting behavior of lower organisms”. (Becker, 1975, p. 11)
assumed invisible sources of power underlying hunting and gathering tribal societies, developed more and more visible signs of power culminating in the modern mega wealth of a man like Bill Gates who, in spite of giving away billions of dollars could not resist also commenting to children on a school visit in London that he would still be the richest man “on the planet” if he hadn’t decided to share his wealth (Hurst & Bennett, 2012). The ego was still keeping score. Why? Because death is the ultimate reminder of our mere animal nature which, when boiled down, consists, as Becker observes, of a mouth at one end of a digestive system and an anus at the other which must keep itself fed to stay alive so as to carry on that digestive system for at least another generation by breeding. “Man” rightly questions this reductionist realisation, but still has to act according to this animal nature; his reaction takes the form of a continual quest for “prosperity”.

Not only is there a need to feed, but life also consists of physical stimuli, the sense of “one’s inner pulsations and musculature . . . [the] delight in the pleasures that nerves transmit” (p. 2). That is also part of the pursuit of prosperity. Moreover, and most importantly however, “man” knows that he is a remarkable and marvellous creature, surely destined for something much grander than an animal death. So the second set of reasons for the perpetual quest to escape from the evil of death is not related to man’s similarity with other animals, but to his perceived differences from them. The biggest difference of all of course is culture, and culture “is sacred, since it is the ‘religion’ that assures in some way the perpetuation of its members” (p. 4).

Bill Gates in the anecdote above knows what he thinks the “religion” of current western society is, and he expresses his position in it, as its grandest high priest—the greatest master of system and technology in the modern world. In relation to this, Becker’s hero is Norman O. Brown with his “combined essential, often overlooked work from classical anthropology and psychoanalysis in his analysis of economic motives” (p. 26) because economic activity is “sacred to the core”.

... It is not a rational, secular activity designed simply to meet human survival needs. Or, better, it is not only that, never was, and never will be. If it were, how explain man’s drive to create a surplus, from the very beginning of society to the present? (Becker, 1975, p. 26)\textsuperscript{185}

Economics is power (p. 29) and money\textsuperscript{186} is “the new universal immortality ideology” (p. 73). Moreover, Becker observes, “like the primitive [and the phenomenon of the potlatch], modern man feels that he can

The paradox of that last phrase is that, while we can view that concentration of power in the upper left quadrant of the wisdom model—that potent mixture of technology and system—as the highest evidence of our difference from the animals, it is actually a development out of that “simple incorporation and fighting behavior of lower organisms”. As a result of our animal nature we have a great stake, as Argyris recognises and Becker (1975) states, of blowing ourselves up “in size, importance, and durability ... to outshine ‘that fellow sitting over there, the one with the black eyes’” (p. 12, 13). Of course the Eco dimension must come in and try and redress the balance and it does so in ways that are seen as bleakly necessary by Becker and as dysfunctional by Schaeff (that is, it comes in as a mean and inadequate form of Eco) in Chapter 10:

... men in society manage to give to each other what they need in terms of good organismic self-feeling in two major ways: on one hand, by codes that allow people to compare their achievements and virtues so as to outshine rivals; on the other hand, by codes that support and protect tender human feelings that prevent the undermining and deflation that can result from the clash of organismic ambitions. (p. 14)

\textsuperscript{185} This sets Kotsko’s (2008, p. 158) note on capitalism in context:

... in his [Marx’s] famous formula M-C-M’ “—the capitalist starts with money (M), then uses that money to produce commodities (C), which he can sell for more money (M’). This is in contrast with a more “traditional” economic system that he formulates as C-M-C—I produce a commodity (for instance, shoes), which I then sell for money, so that I can buy other needed commodities (such as bread). The shift from pre-capitalist economics to capitalism is the shift from money as a tool to money as an end in itself.

Becker’s account shows how the latter is hard-wired. My point here is that it will therefore require self-reflexivity and will to overcome this “natural” inclination.

\textsuperscript{186} Becker makes an interesting observation here: “... money is obscure to analysis because it is still a living myth, a religion. Oscar Wilde observed that ‘religions die when one points out their truth. Science is the history of dead religions.’ From this point of view, the religion of money has resisted the revelation of its truth; it has not given itself over to science because it has not wanted to die” (p. 76). At another point he refers to Marx’s comments that money “is the perfect ‘fetish’ for an ape-like
Becker also isolates that other phenomenon of human life that we all have to deal with—guilt—which reveals “a central fact about social life” (p. 32) which is that we form societies so as to spread it around. One of the reasons Becker advances for the difficulty we have in dealing with guilt is that it is so difficult to “analyze is that it is itself ‘dumb’”; there are diffuse reasons for it. For one thing it’s “a feeling of being blocked, limited, transcended, without knowing why”. For another, our bodies are problematic: we “feel bound and doomed” by our “physical appendages and orifices”. We also “take up space”, and even by just doing that, as “a ‘fate-creating’ object”, we can be the cause of unfortunate effects on others. One can also “feel that one has not achieved all one should have”:

In other words, to live is to stick out, to go beyond safe limits; hence it is to court danger, to be a locus of the possibility of disaster for the group. (pp. 33-35)

Nevertheless, immersing oneself in a group is one way of actively defeating guilt: “groups alone can make big surplus, can generate extravagant power in the form of large harvests, the capture of dangerous animals and many of them, the manufacture of splendid and intricate items based on sophisticated techniques, etc. From the beginning of time the group has represented big power, big victory, much life.”

However, what this shows is that the principle of Eco as expressed in the wisdom model is fundamentally self-serving in modern western societies and this is expressed in Figure 9.1 in the three manifestations of the wisdom model that run along the lower margin of the diagram. “Man” expresses the Ego-Eco dichotomy by both protruding out of nature and tucking himself back in again, in a gesture of heroism-expiation. Is this then the end of history, or is there some sort of prospect of hope whereby religion as the Eco principle can operate not so much as an entity based on negative fear, but on positive love? What about Christianity for example?

In charting the rise of social inequalities and how men seek “to preserve their immortality rather than their lives” (p. 65) (although the latter has come into the picture with the hubris associated with modern technology), Otto Rank identified the “sexual era” because physical paternity was fully recognized as the royal road to self-perpetuation via one’s children—in fact, it was “one’s bounden duty”. Along with this, power was vested in the father to the extent he could dispose the fates of his family in any way he saw fit. Against this, Rank saw Christianity as “the ‘era of the son’ in revolt against the oppressions and inequalities of the era of the family”:

Christ posed a totally new and radical question: “Who are my mother and my brothers?” The son was now completely independent; he could freely choose his own spiritual father and was no longer bound by the fatalities of heredity. (p. 69)

animal who bemuses himself with striking icons. Money sums up the causa sui project all in itself: how man, with the tremendous ingenuity of his mind and the materials of his earth, can contrive the dazzling glitter, the magical ratios, the purchase of other men and their labors, to link his destiny with the stars and live down his animal body” (p. 84). Money is sacred power (p. 84).

187 And, in preparation for Chapter 10, it is this amassing of something dead (e.g. money) to counter one’s own death, that Schaefer (1987, 1992) rails against by positing against it, her Living Process way of thinking, which, at its best, will address what Oscar Wilde observed in the footnote above.

188 At this point in his discussion, Becker criticises Brown in relation to influences from Nietzsche and Freud: “When he does offer one explanation, he makes of guilt a simple reflex of the repression of enjoyment—something for which he has already so well castigated Freud in discussing the problem of animality. ‘The repression of full enjoyment in the present inevitably releases aggression against those ancestors out of love of whom the repression was instituted. Aggression against those simultaneously loved is guilt’” (p. 32). This repression of enjoyment is a central feature of Lacan’s psychoanalysis to be covered in Chapter 14.
What this meant was that “the individual could fashion his own salvation, independent of any earthly authority”. As such, Christianity represented the “great democratisation”, and as a result, Becker (1975, p. 69) notes, “The person recaptured some of the spiritual integrity that the primitive had enjoyed” in that previous hopeful mystification phase.

However, its promise was never fulfilled, writes Becker. “There never has been, historically, any fundamental change in the massive structure of domination and exploitation represented by the state after the decline of primitive society” although he notes that the Reformation reasserted the promise but got lost in historical events associated with the ascendancy of nation states. Nevertheless, Rank does record the emergence of “psychological man”, “a new kind of scientific individualism that burst out of the Renaissance and the Reformation” (p. 71) although “he” too has failed because “it did not eliminate economic inequality. . . . And so it was caught in the same fundamental and tragic contradictions as its predecessors” (p. 72). The second problem was that “Faustian man . . . had only the earth left to testify to the value of his life” (p. 72) because of the collapse of the sacred dimension in modernity.

Faustian man . . . is actually ruining the very theater of his own immortality with his own poisonous and madly driven works: . . . even one-dimensional politicians and bureaucrats, in both capitalist and communist countries, are becoming anxious about environmental collapse; the earth is the only area of self-perpetuation in the new ideology of Faustian man. (p. 72)

The other aspect, along with the overall trend in the waxing of heroism in Figure 9.1, is the waning of the idea of sin and repentance, but, because sin is defined by separation from God, “powers which are denied by the primary power of the visible things”, then sin no longer exists. There are consequences for this which Becker uses Brown to explain:

Brown says that the result of this secularization process is that we have an economy “driven by the pure sense of guilt, unmitigated by any sense of redemption.” . . . What has happened to guilt? It is “repressed by denial into the unconscious”—which can only mean that we are “more uncontrollably driven” by it. . . . The burden of guilt created by cumulative possessions, linear time, and secularization is assuredly greater than that experienced by primitive man; it has to come out some way. (pp. 88-90)

Evil is the way it comes out, and in the alternative meaning of Becker’s book title, it is something of a new bind that we have to escape from. It is psychoanalysis that reveals to us “the dynamics of human misery” on a world-historical scale (p. 91). Repression, the ways that we each hide our basic motivations from ourselves, is what psychoanalysis seeks to uncover, but for which the “symbolic engineering of culture” serves as an antidote (p. 92) and a cover-up.

In a few wonderful pages in The Mass Psychology of Fascism Reich lays bare the dynamic of human misery on this planet: it all stems from man trying to be other than he is, trying to deny his animal nature. This, says Reich, is the cause of all psychic illness, sadism, and war. The guiding principles of the formation of all human ideology “harp on the same monotonous tune: ‘We are not animals. . . .’” (pp. 92-93)

Schaef (1981) writes about her observations of this phenomenon in groups where she used to list adjectives associated with God and Humans as well as the characteristics of Men and Women and found that the two lists virtually mirrored each other; that is, men received similar attributes to God, and women got the human frailty. As a result, she ordered the hierarchy as God, Men, Women, Children, Animals, and down the bottom, Nature, in which each level tries or is encouraged to become like the one above it. For example, she describes one woman who derived some social status from the fact that her Siamese cats could use the toilet. She felt herself valorised (like a man, she was in control) by the fact that her animals were behaving like toilet-trained children. Similarly, we invest considerable emotion into causes for other animals like whales and panda bears, yet neglect the natural systems on which all flora and fauna depend for life. At the other end, women strive, quite understandably, for parity with men and the redemption that that status might provide. And men try to be like Gods and perhaps pay the price with their shorter life expectancies and greater tendencies towards violence when the fact that they are not gods becomes all too obvious.
This giving of ourselves over to structures which embody immunity power (p. 93), according to Becker, are the “desperate lies” we live by, and these desperate lies are problematic because when you try to deny the truth of your animality, “you instrument your own undoing”. The theory of German racial superiority, and thereby making others, like Jews and the handicapped, into the “real” animals who were “contaminating your purity and bringing disease and weakness into your vitality” (p. 93) illustrates the warped consequences of such lies. Becker brings in Jung and his theory about the “shadow” in the human psyche at this point:

The marvelous thing about psychoanalytic theory is that it took simple statements about the human condition, such as man’s denial of his own animality, and showed how this denial was grounded in the psyche from earliest childhood. Thus psychoanalysts talk about “good” objects and “bad” ones, about “paranoid” stages of development, “denials,” “split-off” segments of the psyche . . . In my view no one has summed up these complex psychic workings better than Jung . . . To speak of the shadow is another way of referring to the individual’s sense of creature inferiority, the thing he wants most to deny. (p. 94)

By pushing this shadow onto the other, a scapegoat, we discharge these “negative forces of the psyche” (p. 95). This phenomenon and other values inherent in Jung’s body of work will be discussed further in Chapter 13.

As far as society itself is concerned, the confluence of system and technology is illustrated in the middle section of Figure 9.1 as the “megamachine”, which, if we are to progress and escape the evils we have created as a species, we need to see through and control. People support tyranny because it “rewards not only to their stomachs but also . . . their souls” (p. 101). Becker calls the blood and soil philosophy of the Nazis a “death potlatch” by means of which death is thought to mystically replenish life (p. 103) and which became particularly lethal when the Germans began to lose the war. “They hastened the infamous ‘final solution’ of the Jews toward the closing days of their power, and executed their own political prisoners—like Dietrich Bonhoeffer—literally moments before the end” (p. 111). This is the extreme situation, and we must also realise that all our cultures run on similar lines unless, like Schaef (1992), we confront the dead and addictive societies we live in.

Individual narcissism is also strongly implicated in the cultural control of citizens in a way that draws on the logic of crucifixion, and why crucifixion is such a potent symbol for subverting the problematic aspects of the cultural project.

[Why was the crucifixion such a favorite form of execution? Because, I think, it was actually a controlled display of dying; the small seat on the cross held the body up so that dying would be prolonged. The longer people looked at the death of someone else, the more pleasure they could have in sensing the security and the good fortune of their own survival. . . . The whole meaning of a victory celebration, as Canetti argued, is that we experience the power of our lives and the visible decrease of the enemy. (pp. 110-111)]

“Sadism naturally absorbs the fear of death” because it keeps self-reflection at bay as can be explained in relation to Baumeister’s (1997) theory of evil as outlined in Figure 9.2. In terms of the wisdom model, sadism under Baumeister’s model is also existential and not in a way that is beneficial for healthy cultural functioning.

The way Baumeister’s (1997) categories of evil fit into the wisdom model go a long way in illustrating the psychic sources that Becker describes in the passages quoted. “Culture is a lie” (p. 121) Becker states, and the four types of evil that Baumeister identifies, build on that lie: firstly, an ideology underpins the system. Noble ends are seen as justifying violent means and egoic investment and identification keeps it going. The threatened egotism of narcissism is a potent cause of violence and aggression as well. The desire for, acquisition of, and identification with material goods are important status markers against others; Baumeister, wrongly in my opinion, observes that it is the means taken to acquire goods that is the problem here because the ends are not universally regarded as wrong. However, because material gain is used as a status marker, the underlying dynamic is one of other-ation and outer-directedness like the fourth root of evil, sadistic pleasure, which directs itself outwards as well, instead of into existential
introspection. “History is the saga of the working out of one's problems on others,” writes Becker (1975, p. 132) and all the roots of evil that Baumeister identifies have this characteristic.

The interplay between personal and social sources and the liberal and conservative faultline in assigning the blame to one or the other when the two ultimately cannot be separated, lies behind Becker’s desire to merge Marx (the part of the problem lying in social institutions) and Freud (the part of the problem lying within the human psyche). But on both these levels, the only testimonial that can be given to us, socially and personally, must lie with something outside ourselves, from the “the source of creation itself which alone knows man's value because it knows his task, the meaning of his life” (pp. 135-136).

As intimated above, relationship expresses the nub of our problem, but, while we mutually appropriate each other, it is a relationship that does no-one any good.

> We saw a direct example of this in the relation of the leader to the group. Gurus feed on disciples while the disciples are incorporating them; social life seems at times like a science-fiction horror story, with everyone mutually gobbling each other like human spiders. . . . [W]e can have no psychology of evil unless we stress the driving personal motives behind man's urge to heroic victory. . . . when action stops the gnawing realization of impotency and the dumb futility of animal life begins. (pp. 137, 142, emphasis added)

Nevertheless, we can express our place in biological terms of where we individually live in the “food” chain because of Becker’s metaphor. We are fix-ated on one another—“other-ated”. Somehow, that has to turn into an alternative “for-otheredness” in which our motivation is not to gobble the “other” up but to serve the “other”; looking out for their good before we think of how we might use them for our own purposes.

We have already seen however that there is no place to stand outside this world, no “testimonial . . . from the beyond, by the source of creation itself” except that which is received on faith; that is, revelation. For this thesis, that faith is the one espoused by Catholicism. However Becker observes above its failure, and rightly so I think. To repeat, from a woman’s point of view, the majority of the men in positions of power within the Catholic Church are still responding to theories-in-use that have more in common with evolutionary impulses related to sexual selection (in which women are viewed as the property of men) than they do with the teachings of Jesus and the authentic Paul in the earliest Church. There is little to distinguish that Church from the power-seeking heroic Ego of the secular world. And without that difference, why bother with a Church at all? The praxis of the Church needs to represent the real claim of an alternative that Becker’s analysis points to.

The third panel of Figure 9.1 shows what the contours of a post-Protestant Catholicism might consist of. Its “hopeful mystification” is however a more knowing “hopeful mystification” and it would be based on an “intrinsic religiousness” as well as on a self-reflexive appreciation of our limitations as established by the theory being presented in Part 2. The value of intrinsic religiousness—and how it differs from extrinsic religiousness (the attitudes that determined I believe Christianity’s failure as documented by Becker above)—comes from the limited research conducted on religious beliefs in Experimental Existential Psychology (Jonas & Fischer, 2006), the field that grew out of Becker’s ideas.

Jonas and Fischer (2006) provide evidence that it is indeed intrinsic religiousness that mitigates worldview defence and the problems that that leads to, such as in-group favouritism and the hostile reactions to anybody both within and outside one’s cultural group who threaten one’s worldview (Vail et al., 2010, p. 5). The importance of mental “accessibility” to one’s core beliefs (one of the three “processing principles” in the human mind identified by Smith and Mackie (2000) and depicted in Figure 4.23) which was illustrated in the Jonas and Fisher study, was shown by the necessity for affirming one’s beliefs—being reminded of them—for this effect to be observed when the death-thought accessibility of the participants was increased. Only those people who were intrinsically vested in their religion derived terror management benefits from religious beliefs.
There is also another point that is ironic given the content of this section. It is that rather than the smoke of our burnt offerings floating upwards to the perceived heavens as they did in the eras of that first hopeful mystification, the Incarnation “in a dug-out” (p. 175) is rather as Chesterton (1925, 2007) puts it: “The second half of human history, which was like a new creation of the world, . . . begins in a cave” (p. 163). It is an event that encourages us to face our worst underground fears—the ones that this section has concentrated on. This, I argue, is the great genius of Christianity and it is imperative that it be re-energised at a time when the System-Technology nexus is at the top of its game through the efforts of the men who mostly developed it, and the women whose evolutionary selection (both choosing and choice) and historical support was essential in that process. My fundamental point is that it is the reborn Eco archetype, which Jesus Christ embodied, that is now needed. In Church dogma, he is named as the new Adam, but, as the sequence in one of the two creation stories goes, he must also finally come to embody the new Eve. A statement like that of course has huge implications for the organization of the Catholic Church and, if that disturbs, then the more imperative it is to examine the reasons for it doing so. One of the reasons (“gut” reasons as opposed to the intellectualised) people often give for resisting the idea of Catholic women priests is that “what if a pregnant woman was to say Mass”? What indeed? Terror management theory has something to say on those sorts of reasons too. Pregnancy, like menstruation and breast-feeding, is too evocative of our animality for us to be fully comfortable with their manifestations, because our animality reminds us of our mortality. It is a neurosis we now need culture to overcome; otherwise it is women who carry the greater burden of that neurosis (Goldenberg & Roberts, 2004).

In line then with the previous chapters, and especially in accord with the work of Haidt (2006, 2012) in Chapter 8, it has become necessary to define exactly how Christianity forms a radical break with the human condition that has resulted from our evolutionary history. We have Becker’s observations above that Christianity represented an assault on the societal premise of patriarchy, and that is a cornerstone of my argument as well. Becker’s identification of the centrality of death and our consciousness of it is also central because Jesus Christ purportedly came to conquer death; Catholicism is an explicit literal immortality ideology. My argument in this chapter has been that the nature of a Stage 5 Fowlerian Christian literal immortality ideology trumps the secular symbolic immortality ideology because it moves history on in a way that must now happen if the modern progressive ideal is to be realised (albeit that it does it in a way that modernity never envisaged!) Given also the commitment to a Christian value reality, I am making the assumption that this “moving on” will bring us nearer to a position—and it is hard to express such matters without sounding pretentious—where we are more truly resonating with the value reality of a universe in which “God is Love”.

Our evolutionary psychology—expressed in terms of terror management theory and our existential need for some form of literal or symbolic immortality—leads us to fear threats from nature, threats from traitors and miscreants in our own culture, and threats from “the other” in foreign human groups. In Christianity, Jesus Christ conquers death and makes remarkable and counter-cultural claims about the way we each should live: Love and forgive your enemies; Return evil with good; Lose your life to save it; If you do it to the least of my brethren you do it to me.

There is also the legacy of Christianity in the dignity given to each and every individual and it is my belief (as expressed in earlier chapters) that the liberal ideal (in the sense that Haidt uses it) is the finest example of that emphasis to date, no matter that in its ambitious extension into Eco territory with its predominant value being that related to care/harm, it overrides its abilities to deliver properly in that area because it is still sexist and doesn’t see that because of its fundamental neurosis. This is not to deny the value that social conservatism holds but in my model its values are seen in a different light as explained in Chapter 5.

Chesterton (1909) gives a good illustration of the common sense that the idea of “losing one’s life to save it” embodies. So also is it with loving one’s enemies. The animosities that arise within us, as we shall see, in Chapters 12 and 13, are good indicators of where we need to grow up. Another thesis could be written on the essential common sense, and on the very enlightened “enlightened self-interest” of Christianity in both an individual and cultural sense.
If we define moral behaviour in the equation first introduced in Chapter 4, Performance = Ability * Motivation - Situational Constraints, then “A * M – SC”, where Doing the Right Thing (A) for the Right Reason (M) minus the constraints of one’s societal milieu (SC), equals moral behaviour, we need to assess, within a Christian/Catholic framework, how Haidt’s (2012) evolutionary values stack up using our design principles from Chapter 4, which is the need to ask So What?, Who suffers?, and Who benefits? Table 9.1 sets this out and Figure 9.3 depicts the process. If we adopt the Christian preferential option for the weak and vulnerable and accept the inherent corruptibility of power, then it is in the Authority and Loyalty moral domains and the way they can and often do interpret the other moral principles, that we can appreciate Christianity’s radical departure from taken-for-granted cultural norms.

In terms then of (1) the wisdom model, and (2) Haidt’s (2012) Authority and Loyalty principles invested in a God of Love in which the empathising dimension is dominant (rather than in a potentially corrupted earthly power in which the systemising dimension is dominant), we can conceptualise morality in the way shown in Figure 5.8. By placing authority and loyalty consciously and overtly away from patriarchy (no matter that we still have the problem of exclusively masculine conceptualisations of God) we can redefine everything, particularly sanctity, anew. Debauchery of various kinds is problematic, but it is so because it offends against the humanity of the debaucherer and any debaucheree. Certainly there is a role for earthly authority to protect and care for those under their guidance, but I see this as paternalism rightly expressed, with the vulnerable person’s needs in mind, not as patriarchy protecting its own interests.

This is the radical conclusion we can come to as a result of Becker’s valuable work in Escape from Evil. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, Christianity represents an escape from the escape from evil. The secular West and its progress represents the Ego side of the wisdom model at the top of its game and there have been considerable advances made as a result of that ascendancy, democracy not being the least of them. Nevertheless, the workings of that democratic tradition leave a lot to be desired, and, as I intimated above, it now needs to move on through the acknowledgment of its neuroses that now threaten its continued progression. The women’s movements were the first inkling of this reform and it is to women’s scholarship and its unique viewpoint, that I now turn.
Chapter 10

THE WILDNESS LYING IN WAIT AS SMITH’S “STANDPOINT THEORY”

Richard Tarnas (1991), in his analysis of “the passion of the western mind”, completes his philosophical journey by observing that our history has essentially been a masculine quest; one “driven by a heroic impulse to forge an autonomous rational human self by separating it from the primordial unity with nature” (p. 441). That “hero’s journey” is one charted in the mythological tale about Parsifal’s quest for the Holy Grail.

Parsifal’s adolescent beginnings parallel the awkwardness of youth everywhere and one specific error he incurs is his failure to ask a particular question when he happens to find himself completely out of his depth in the “Grail castle”. His chance to rectify his mistake comes again at mid-life after a successful lifetime of culturally-valorised knighting at the court of King Arthur. Now at the height of his powers, as he is being lauded and feted at a banquet in his honour, a miserable ugly old hag, riding an ass, intrudes on the proceedings. She stops the celebration cold, and, pointing a bony finger at Parsifal, recites the list of all his misdoings.

For many men, the appearance of the “hideous damsel” at mid-life, when, moreover, many women are enlisted against their will to carry the neurotic burden of that projection, prompts a change of some sort—a new car, wife, or job. Parsifal however, defies convention and accepts the hag’s remonstrations and leaves the feast to embark on a long and lonely journey back to the Grail castle. This time he has the presence of mind to ask the question: *Whom does the Grail serve?* This myth indicates that the final egoic journey is about solitude and service—“losing” one’s lifetime to save it.

My use here of the masculine questing myth to open a chapter devoted to feminist ideas is, like Erikson’s development model, just the way it has to pan out in most, if not all, cultures. And it is apposite here because of the appearance of the neglected feminine at that point generally prefigured by Chesterton in the quotation that is defining this part of the thesis: “just . . . where he most felt he was right, he would be wrong”. I could add, just when his self-esteem was at its highest because of all the praise that was being heaped on him, he would find that there was another life to live and it wasn’t one that his culture would necessarily reward him for.

She isn’t a pretty figure—the hideous damsel—and she doesn’t say pretty things. Many would say the same about feminist writing which points its metaphorical bony finger at patriarchal society over the millennia and catalogues its sins. Rolheiser’s (2004) three problems of modernity (*narcissism*, *pragmatism*, and *unbridled restlessness*), introduced in Part 1, are in the same league. But, as a similar myth also indicates (*Sir Gawain and the Lady Ragnall*), once one accepts what the hideous damsel has to say and takes it on board, she reveals the beautiful damsel that lies at the core of her being. Lady Ragnall was put under an evil spell by the patriarchal order and condemned to live as a hag until a man willingly chose to marry her in her hideous state and importantly then allowed her complete sovereignty over her own life and its conditions. In this myth the hideous damsel finds the required catalyst and existential hero in Sir Gawain.

Camille Paglia (1990) has a similar take to Tarnas regarding the effect of a chaotic nature, when she takes the view that men have been doing what came naturally (separating from primordial nature, and being

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190 The term “trophy wife” for instance implies she’s part of the baggage of a “successful” life.

191 After the wedding, and when they are alone in their bedchamber and Ragnall is transformed, she tells Gawain she can only be the beautiful damsel by day or by night, and he must choose which one it is. He refuses to do so because it is not his decision to make. By appreciating her sovereignty over her own life, the entire curse is overthrown. This myth represents a model of a man’s successful—that is, ungrasping, non-colonising—relationship not just with a flesh and blood woman but with his own soul or anima. In terms of my thesis (and this will become clearer after Chapter 13 where I look in more detail at Jung’s ideas)—it is the realisation that we are connected to the divine through our depths rather than through our “heights”—it illustrates a metaphysical *Thy will be done* taking precedence over the *My will be done* of an individualism that seeks to control others.
Apollonian as opposed to Dionysian) rather than oppressing women per se. The Apollonian is a “male line drawn against the dehumanizing magnitude of female nature” (Paglia, 1990, p. 28), and modernity and capitalism are the current end products of that Apollonian impulse. In a passage (pp. 96-97) heavily redolent of Baron-Cohen’s systemising and empathising schema, she connects Apollo with “objectification … the hard, cold separatism of western personality and categorical thought … obsessiveness, voyeurism, idolatry, fascism—frigidity and aggression of the eye, petrifaction of objects … law, history, tradition, the dignity and safety of custom and form”. Dionysus on the other hand is “identification … the empathic, the sympathetic emotion transporting us into other people other places … energy, ecstasy, hysteria, promiscuity, emotionalism—heedless discriminateness of idea or practice . . . energy unbound, mad, callous, destructive, wasteful. . . the new, exhilarating but rude, sweeping all away to begin again”. “Apollo is a tyrant, Dionysus a vandal”, she concludes.

As Mann (2011) points out, Paglia’s basic message is that Western culture hasn’t entirely moved on from ancient paganism. Becker’s observations in Chapter 9 that Christianity, while it supplied a valuable corrective to pagan culture, had never really “taken” in the West, testify to the truth of Paglia’s message here, as does Chesterton’s (1913, p. 39) statement about Christianity not so much having “been tried and found wanting”, as “found difficult and left untried”.

Mann documents three main areas where Paglia differs from second wave feminism. First, “equality of opportunity is not the same thing as erasing sexual difference, which Paglia sees as grounded, in part, in nature” (p. 355). Academe is another target echoing John Stuart Mill and his warning against the “tyranny of the majority” in liberal democracies, which he feared would “promote mediocrity and ignore true genius” (p. 356). This is a different criticism from Maxwell’s because Paglia’s critique sees the problem less as the tyranny of academe itself and more as that of popular culture: it is one thing to dominate; it is also another to allow oneself to be dominated. It is perhaps in this regard that the feminine alternative to the Parsifal myth becomes important; where the masculine myth is highly focused, the feminine myth—Cupid and Psyche—is more diffused, illustrated for me in the action that takes place between Aphrodite (Cupid’s mother) and her young rival, Psyche. Psyche, by employing various tools and emblems of masculinity in the four seemingly impossible tasks set for her by Aphrodite, grows into a marriage with Cupid who, it must be pointed out, cuts a figure of masculinity which has more in common with Donatello’s David than with Michelangelo’s highly muscular version.

Paglia’s “round three” relates to “the political meaning of masculinity” and male homosexuality in particular. Paglia defends gay culture as “intellectually and artistically stimulating” but does not believe it can ever be normalised because it is “against” nature where “procreation is the single relentless rule” (Mann, 2011, p. 356).

Paglia’s ideas are a direct affront to my proposal of moving from a pagan Stage 3 to a Christian Stage 5 and a “democracy of the different”. While Christ may be variously perceived by Paglia as Dionysian and Apollonian, the Christ of Christianity is neither the tyrant nor the indiscriminate vandal of the pagan view. Both the Dionysian and Apollonian are problematic—the feminine where it wallows in Nature and rejects Cultural progress except in a superficial way (Stage 3), and the masculine where it rejects Nature’s limits entirely in a neurotic escape into Culture (Stage 4). Wisdom (Stage 5) transcends both. Nevertheless, I will employ Paglia to the extent that she identifies the pagan that Western culture is

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192 This is a valid point and in no way does my advocacy of a So what? stance with regard to the topics of academic inquiry infer that that substance be judged necessarily on its comprehensibility; rather, the So what? should be directed at the problematic categories of research that Maxwell’s identifies in footnote 164. 193 I used Labouvie-Viet’s interpretation of this myth in my Master’s thesis and it and other interpretations (e.g. Gilligan’s, 2002) could be analysed at this point. Unfortunately, that will not be possible given the constraints of space, as well as the fact that the main aim of this thesis is to point out the neurotic underpinnings of the existing masculinist system and its potential repair by way of Parsifal’s mythical journey. In this sense, I will be following Maxwell’s critical position more than I will Paglia’s, albeit that both must ultimately be examined. 194 Given that David’s raison d’etre was to contrast his skill and cleverness with the brute force of the Philistines, Donatello’s statue is surely the more apposite.
reverting to in its uncritical embrace of New Ageism. My stance in this regard is somewhat ambivalent given that the neurosis of masculinity must be recognised and countered in some way if we are to “progress”—a masculine concept that must be defined anew in that same nuanced way.

Ernest Becker’s ideas in the previous chapter went a long way in establishing one basis of neurosis, if not the main one: our fear of death and therefore our fear of conspicuous animality. For that reason, anything that reminds us too much of that embodiment (such as menstruation and breast feeding) is problematic and in need of some technological solution. Two terror management theorists, Goldenberg and Roberts (2004), observe that “women have been perceived as inferior to men, but also have been elevated to the status of goddesses on earth” (p. 71). By way of illustrating the perception of woman’s inferiority to men, they cite Paglia (1990) who writes: “Every human being must wrestle with nature. But nature’s burden falls more heavily on one sex.” (p. 9). To illustrate their second claim, the elevation of woman to the status of goddesses, Goldenberg and Roberts turn to de Beauvoir (1952): “In women are incarnated disturbing mysteries of nature. . . . In woman dressed and adorned, nature is present but under restraint, by human will remoulded and nearer to man’s desire. A woman is rendered more desirable to the extent that nature is more . . . rigorously confined” (pp. 84, 179). Naomi Wolf’s (1991) “beauty myth” is certainly pertinent here but the problem remains that in these matters, one is fighting against impulses ingrained during humanity’s evolutionary development. Both sexes look for warm-heartedness in a mate as their primary preference, but second preferences importantly differ, with men looking for overt visual signs of youth and fertility in women, and women for signs of wealth and status in men (Fletcher, 2002). Both these strategies make sense in terms of sexual selectiveness and what men and women each deem important in a mate. Nature “present but under restraint” makes sense in two ways therefore. No wonder feminists are described so often as “hairy-legged” and no wonder most of us women find it hard (although not impossible) to resist the man-made technological cure of razors and depilatory creams.

“[I]t is possible to be God” is the fifth and final of the five myths that Schaef recognises as White Male Society. That need to maintain primacy, to continue to be the alpha males, can be seen for example in John Gatto’s (2001) previous observation that we are God: “we turned the night sky over the desert to flame and incinerated a hundred thousand retreating Iraqis in a matter of seconds” (pp. 179-181). And, if we are looking for a formulation that understands the gendered consciousness and the experiences of women, Schaef is a useful source. I was first introduced to her writings by a woman, who was at that time the Chair of the Liturgy Committee in the local Catholic parish I was a member of, and by a fresh-thinking young Catholic priest in the 1980s. Reading her first book (Schaef, 1981) was a profound experience for me. By naming society as a “white male system”, she was not criticising white male society so much as criticising any society that bases is values on what she calls “the illusion of control”. Schaef (1981, 1987, 1992, 1999) focuses her identification, delineation, and criticism of the White Male System and its neurotic fixation on power and control on its application in the field of her doctorate training—psychotherapy. In the1992 work, she details that training and her gradual realisation of the inherent violence and disrespect of its methods. She outlines its evolutionary replacement by the Living Process System. It is that difference, between psychotherapy and its underlying world view and Schaef’s claim of an alternative, which lies at the heart of this thesis. My argument is written (from within a world of academia which prizes the Rationalist viewpoint) as a self-reflexive criticism of all that purports to be logical, rational, and objective and yet which, with a little digging, can be found to have a rather large dog in the fight—in fact the largest (in terms of Chapter 8, the most left-brained and therefore the most powerful) dog in the fight. It is valuable in its own terms to be sure but when it over-reaches itself, as if it truly is an Archimedean point, it is capable of great harm. And like Maxwell (1984), in combination with other theorists in this part of the thesis, I will continue making the case that it involves, at base, a problem of neurosis.

Schaef’s (1981) initial work was based on the work she did with women—and men—in “individual therapy sessions, groups, and workshops” (p. xiii). It was in her words “soft research”—conducted by watching and listening. In her work she subscribes to underlying assumptions of evolution that are prominent in other theories relating to the West and modernity, specifically:
We are all engaged in a long and difficult process of growth and evolution. It is time to describe, affirm, and grow. . . . I have attempted to appreciate and affirm the intellect while also valuing and enhancing those other parts of being which nonfiction traditionally ignores—concepts, feelings, experiences, intuition, and awareness. (p. xii)

The link with McGilchrist’s work in Chapter 8 is obvious. The contrasts with so-called left-brain thinking are specifically evident, when Schaef (1981) writes the following:

Far too frequently, I have seen psychotherapists and social scientists use theory as a weapon. They have been trained in certain theories, and they have come to accept and believe in them. Because of this, they try to make their clients conform to their theories, regardless of what their clients really need. (p. xvi)

The answer is not to throw out theory however. It is to recognise its limitations and to put it into context. It is to recognise that as the physicists have found, there never can be a theory of everything, especially not where human beings are involved. While the physical world is complex, it has nothing on the complexity of the conscious life it supports. It is, in this respect, that “difference” as a concept becomes important, and it was in what Schaef (1981) called an emerging “Female System” (as opposed to a merely reactive female system), that she saw the possibility for women especially (although she ultimately also came to realise that men weren’t doing too well in “their” system either) to be who they are, as opposed to merely finding ways of coping within the strictures—the “myths, beliefs, rituals, procedures, and outcomes” (p. 2)—of the White Male System, which is the educational, political, economic, philosophical, and theological milieu in which we each find ourselves.

It was necessary to name and define the myths of the White Male System so as to move beyond them, into what Schaef now calls (1993) the “Living Process System” which takes a much more embodied approach to healing. It is also now necessary, in this work, to try and establish some relationships among the theories that have been introduced and those still to come because a pattern is emerging that substantiates the basic theory underlying Fowler’s faith development construct.

The four myths of the White Male System (enlarged to five in Schaef 1987) were and are as follows:

The first myth is that the White Male System is the only thing that exists. Because of this, the beliefs and perceptions of other systems—especially the Female System—are seen as sick, bad, crazy, stupid, ugly, and incompetent. (p. 8)

In a 1987 work, Schaef “added” the fifth:

All four of these myths can be summarized by another overriding myth: that it is possible to be God as defined by the system. If the White Male System is the only system that exists (reality), if it is innately superior to any other system, if it knows and understands everything, and if it values only the logical, rational, and objective, then it can be God as that system defines God. His God is all the “omnis,” omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent. The major role of this God is that of the ultimate controller. (p. 8)

All Schaef’s myths can be appreciated from a brief consideration of the modern history of colonialism. That “the White Male System is the only thing that exists” is seen in what is referred to as the “White Man’s burden”, the self-valorising of a system that white European society had alone created. That the White Male System is innately superior follows on from that.196 It was in charge after all. That a

195 The White Male System became the Addictive System and the Reactive Female System became the Co-dependent System.
196 Jared Diamond’s (2005) analysis of exactly why it was that the Spanish invaded the Americans and not the other way round, is a testament to the favourable geographical and biological factors of the European environment rather than anything innate in the European “race”.

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knowledge of the sensitive cultural and ecological partnerships in the colonised was considered insignificant is evident from their ready destruction at the hands of the cash croppers.

Addiction is a major focus of Schaef’s work because addiction is used to control the feelings and thoughts that one doesn’t want to deal with. Alexander’s (2008) work supports this inter-relationship between modernity and addiction, and Keating’s theoretical work on the importance of “centering” supports the ideal with how one reacts to it (centering the Self, rather than self-centering). These theories will be dealt with more fully as the content of subsequent chapters turns towards the importance of emotional matters and their enactment in the body. Schaef’s Living Process System is devoid of technique except for the “negative” one of providing a safe space as context for whatever participants need to express. There is no hierarchy; Schaef has plenty of her own addictions (relationship addiction is the major problem she struggles with) to work out and purportedly does so at the sessions she organises. To that degree there is no expertise or control except for the expertise and control that has set the context up. And to that extent it is a stage for whatever “wildness lies in wait” in the participants themselves.

Addiction also represents a fundamental problem with honesty. Schaef (1987) defines addiction as the need to deceive ourselves and others—to lie, deny and cover up. (p. 18). If the truth will set us free, we are nowhere near achieving it because it is not something we even aim for. Rather we aim for its semblance as Haidt (2006, 2012) for example in Chapters 4 and 5 has already drawn our attention to. In an addictive system, Schaef states, everyone is involved in some sort of manipulative behaviour. Even love comes down to either controlling or being controlled, a normal state of affairs challenged as we saw above by the Gawain and Ragnell myth.

Rather than going more deeply into Schaef’s analysis, I will return to Pagel’s (2012) use of evolutionary biology which, largely emanating as it does from masculine academe, puts the matter in terms that cannot be claimed as just some figment of the feminist imagination. Rather than seeing such ideas as a threat to feminism or Christian belief, I take these ideas and theories about current cultural “reality”, as testify to the neurosis that I seek to cure—in theory—by way of the claims in my thesis. Specifically, we can return to Figure 4.24. As I stated there, group selection was successful because it drew on the advantages cooperation conferred on individuals in a culture. In Figure 4.24, I also made a connection of group selection with Religion and Spirituality, and Relationship and Intimacy, and that there are as a result more positive (in terms of happiness derived) rewards associated with these life dimensions than those related to Work and Achievement. However, in light of what Pagel identifies, ego-centredness infects all these life dimensions as well as the compulsion to achieve. Schaef calls it “impression management” and Pagel “reputation” by which we become “other-ated” in our attempts to maintain a public face that convinces people in our respective societies that we are someone to be trusted even while we are manipulating and dissembling under the surface.

197 Generativity is a more complex phenomenon and I will leave it out of the discussion although I believe it is ultimately the important one of that group of four (corresponding as it does to the existential dimension in the wisdom model). It is no accident that green politics draws on the necessity of leaving our grandchildren a healthy planet. This corresponds to Fowler’s identification of “intergenerational responsibility” as important for a Stage 5 faith. Of course, the Pagels of this world would say that generativity also is a way of being self-interested.

198 Pagel puts it this way:

Group selection theorists believe that the most successful groups of people in our past . . . were those whose individuals submerged their own selfish interests to the interests of the group . . . The idea is that over time, this process molded our psychology and social behavior so that we became—as one of the proponents of group selection, David Sloan Wilson, puts it—like cells in a body, or bees in a hive, devoted to the well-being of our group, even willing to sacrifice our health or survival for it . . . But the account we have given is clear. Even dispositions that can predispose someone to an act of suicidal self-sacrifice can nevertheless evolve out of self-interest, by attracting benefits from others who share that disposition. . . . What seems far more likely than that we are somehow nobly disposed to the idea of self-sacrifice is that natural selection has duped us with an emotion that encourages group thinking. It is an emotion that makes us act as if for the good of the group; an emotion that brings pleasure, pride, or even thrills from coordinated group activities. It is the emotion we feel on the sports field, when singing together, and probably when going into battle. It is the emotion that national anthems, flags, war recruiting posters, patriotic songs, and military commanders exploit. And it is an emotion that by encouraging coordinated group behavior has brought our ancestors and us direct benefits. (Pagel, 2012, pp. 96-97, 98)
Pagel’s (2012) analysis also shows how cultural tendencies are geared toward specialisation and diversity although not in those aspects that are related to survival and reproduction. For example, almost all of us have ten fingers (with opposable thumbs being a highly significant feature of two of those ten fingers) that have been highly important in creating our natural dominance as a species. Culture, however, sorts us by our talents, with the result, Pagel states, quoting sociologist Peter Saunders, that “the essence of a meritocratic society is that it offers individuals equal opportunities to become unequal” (p. 125).

Our societies have to deal with these differences to the extent that our genetic endowment and its expression currently acts like a lottery that one just needs to accept albeit that there is some redistribution of wealth. Nevertheless, we continually need to ask ourselves, Is the radical redistribution of wealth a moral imperative? Rolheiser (1998), with his Catholic metaphysical beliefs, identifies this as one of the non-negotiable pillars of the Christian life (social justice), but adherence to the invisible hand of the market under neoliberal policies has certainly moved away from the more egalitarian state of affairs in the West’s past. Religion, for Pagel—and except for the US, this is a phenomenon of the past for Englishmen like himself—is merely a “cultural enhancer” defined as …

... something like what we now might call the arts, music, and religion to elicit or motivate emotions, to strengthen beliefs or resolve, to transmit information, to increase cohesion or remind people of shared history and interests. Like a gene in a body, we might have used these enhancers to alter our “expression” at different times and places in our societal vehicles, and in ways that served us. Maybe it is to gain courage before battle or seek hope in the face of uncertainty. (p. 134)

In this sense, empathising is seen as the servant of systemising. My argument is entirely opposite to this because I make a different religious assumption; earthly systemising is subject to the cosmic empathy expressed in the Great Commandment. Pagel condemns religion as asking “us to believe things that are palpably false” (p. 141); however, he concedes, it is vitally important for “understanding an inscrutable and even terrifying world” (p. 146) or “as Julian Barnes might have put it, a ‘convincing representation and a plausible explanation of the world for understandably confused minds’” (p. 149). One assumes that Mr Pagel would address the context of that latter quotation (the Haiti earthquake) if he were to experience it, with the strength of the Western rugged individualism of masculinist culture, although, to give him his due, he does admit to the ease of his supercilious tone199.

So, in systemising-dominant culture, as Becker in Chapter 9 also indicated, religion is written off and explained away once culture has achieved the levels of achievement and confidence through which the old cultural crutches can be jettisoned200.

The last thing we need to note about systemising White Male culture is the nature of God. As Daly (1973) points out, “If God is male, then the male is God” (p. 19) and so we have the hierarchy that Schaef identified in Chapter 9: God, Man, Woman, Child, Animals, Nature. The curious matter of Christianity which outwardly (by its prohibitions of women priests) would seem to adhere to this model, is that the

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199 And given continuing reports of the lack of progress in Haiti’s recovery and the chaos in those Haitian systems that could have rectified such matters, there is indeed a lot to be said for systemically enlightened masculinist cultures. On the other hand, given Haiti’s past, the case could also be made that it was marauding interference that created Haiti’s problems in the first place.

200 Becker (1975, p. 60) provides an interesting footnote about the dispensability of cultural crutches when they no longer accomplish their protective function:

This step in social evolution raises some fascinating questions about the basic nature of man and his attitudes toward the world around him. Often these days we tend to romanticize about how primitives “naturally” respected nature and animal life and handled them gently and reverently. Certainly this was often true, but we also know that primitives could be very casual and even cruel with animals. Hocart throws an interesting light on this by pointing out that once man got enough power over the world to forgo the old totemic ritual identifications, he became more and more eager to disclaim any relationship with animals. Hence the eclipse of animal identification historically. We know that primitives used animals in the ritual technics, but Hocart says this doesn't mean that they always revered them or that respect was the primary thing; the primary thing was identification for use. This would explain why, once man got more secure control over the visible world, he found it easy to dissociate himself entirely from animals. Otto Rank has discussed brilliantly the change from Egyptian to Greek art as the gradual defeat of the animal by the spiritual principle, the climax of a long struggle by man to liberate himself from his animal nature.
Church seems to fail to see the radical subversion that the figure of Jesus cuts in history and in contemporary culture; it fails to see the cosmic joke of the rejected stone then becoming the cornerstone. As we saw with Borg and Crossan’s (2009) observation in Chapter 5, the crucifixion tells us three things and the third is “the character of God”. As I have observed previously, the Passion of Jesus reads more like a feminine myth than a masculine one. God did not come in like the Hollywood calvary and rescue God. It is a radical mythology not so much of chosen powerlessness as a rejection of violence as false power. And Ditchen’s201—and Pagel’s (2012)—refusal to see anything beyond the autistic version of systemising culture is also the extreme masculinist way of looking at the world. That this continues from generation to generation is testament to the system that Gilligan (2002) identifies for explaining its persistence. To repeat, this is the system by which the boy child, who needs to separate from the Mother and connect with his same-sex parent, does so before the full conscious awareness that comes with later childhood. This relationship then functions like an imprint which requires a non-reflexive acceptance of the masculine role. Given the existence of the patriarchy, this milieu controls the girl child also, but she becomes more aware of this at puberty long after she has reached the age of reason and the fuller consciousness that the age of reason brings. Systemising thereby becomes a reality to be tolerated and worked around for the girl rather than the pervasive reality it is for the boy.

As we saw in Chapter 5 where Schaefer’s work with her female clients was a good candidate for a claim of an alternative, her work is also a good example of Dorothy Smith’s (1987) “standpoint theory”. Standpoint Theory is a good exposé of the way in which Marx delimits Freud’s description of those two important facets of life—Love and Work. Marx is all about work. Dorothy Smith, in what is described as the “new materialism”, exposes Work’s and Marxism’s underbelly—the Love that keeps work going but is ignored in the process. Her work points to the value of the wisdom model for showing the structure of a society that subtly devalues the lives of half of its citizens no matter how much it may protest to the contrary. In the end it really does matter who cleans the toilet and why—who takes care of the bodily needs of others that being fully human entails, and the state of mind out of which that behaviour emanates.

In Marxist theory, the concept of “Species-Being” is odd for the fact that it would appear to be misnamed. Rather than Being, it appears to describe “Species-Doing”. Allan (2011, p. 589) defines Marx’s concept as follows:

Species-being is one of Karl Marx’s basic assumptions about human nature. The idea links the way humans as a species survives with human consciousness. According to Marx, every species is unique because of and defined by the way it as a biological organism exists. Humans exist and survive through creative production.

I “work” therefore I am. With this reduced outlook on human life, it is no wonder that his theory concerns itself with the “means of production”—specifically in its latest incarnation which is capitalism. In other words, Marxism takes the whole world to be the Ego half of the wisdom model, that intersection of system and technology which men have historically almost exclusively inhabited.

Marxist theory in this respect is the manifest realisation of Michael Kimmel’s observation that “privilege is invisible to those who have it”. Dorothy Smith rectifies that limitation by postulating the existence of another realm that lies over what she calls the “fault line” (as depicted on the conceptual wisdom model in Figure 5.2). Again we can turn to Allan (2011, p. 571) for a definition:

Fault line A theoretical concept specific to Dorothy E. Smith’s feminist theory. Smith argues that a gap exists between official knowledge—especially knowledge generated through the social sciences—and the experience of women. This fault line is particularly important for understanding how men are unable to see the differences between objective, public knowledge and the reality of day-to-day existence. Women traditionally negotiate or obscure the disjunction for men through their caring for the daily administration of the household, including meeting the sustenance and comfort needs of both men and children.

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201 “Ditches” is Terry Eagleton’s compression of the names of two of the “new atheists”, Richard Dawkins and the late Christopher Hitchens.
In other words Smith contributes to and supports Connell’s (2009) concept of the “patriarchal dividend”. This is the area where rather than system and technology meeting, it is the inter-personal and the existential solutions that meet\(^\text{202}\).

Another illustration of it has already been introduced in footnote 54 to this thesis in which Schaeff records the existence of ways of Being-in-the-world that the dominant culture was totally unaware of. It illustrates the undercurrents that exist, and how subtly sexism and racism can be expressed—in ways that we are only subliminally aware of, until evidence for it stares us in the face. It works in this way.

Smith argues that the social and behavioral sciences have systematically developed an objective body of knowledge about the individual, social relations, and society in general. This body of knowledge claims objectivity and thus authority “not on the basis of its capacity to speak truthfully, but in terms of its specific capacity to exclude, the presence and experience of particular subjectivities” (Smith, 1987, p. 2). Because of this exclusion, social scientific texts are nothing more than an expression of the relations of ruling that continue to oppress women. Smith wants to center research on the actual lived experiences of women, and their encounters with these texts. (Allen 2011, p. 515)

The problem is that the broad requirements for empathising (Freud’s Love) inhibit the focus required for good systemising (Freud’s Work). The first requires optimising (one does not or should not have favourites among one’s children—it’s a cooperative model, plus, if one is looking after children, a diffuse sort of awareness is necessary to make sure their needs are being met), the second maximising (the theory that wins is the best—it’s a competitive model) requiring focus.

It could be argued of course that there are more equal relations between men and women now than there were at the time that Smith was first writing and at the time of the vignette referred to above. This is true and, as a result, those conflicts between Work and Love are much more visible (in the ubiquitous Work/Life Balance question for example). There is indeed a fault line between empathising and systemising and it is hard to balance the two opposing dimensions in a way that does not cause undue stress to both parents (if there are two parents) and to the children that need all the nurturing and love that their parents can spare (see Chapter 12). We are also seeing the greater scoring of the fault line inherent in the class divisions that separate the professional working woman from “the woman who does” back home. Nevertheless, while the patriarchal dividend exists, so does Smith’s fault line.

In professional and academic terms, what I am dealing with in this chapter is a sociology of difference, and Seidman (2013), as we saw back in Chapter 6, moves the discussion forward with his coverage of theories of “the Other”. To review, he makes an interesting and valuable distinction between “the Other” as representing a non-normative status and “the Other” as representing the outsider and a social threat (pp. 307-308). In many ways I interpret this distinction as paralleling my distinction between the interpersonal and the existential points on the Eco side of my wisdom model and I agree that his is a valuable discrimination to make, as long as we also recognise that there are two-way arrows connecting those two points on the Model. The point is that archetypal Woman as Stage 3 support is the first “Other” in Seidman’s distinction but she becomes the second if she rocks the boat and becomes “difficult” through a greater existential sensitivity to the betrayal that living in the White Male Society often involves.

To close, and in accord with the seeming opposition represented in the conceptual wisdom model, two concepts—of self-love and self-esteem—which, while they were introduced in Chapter 9, will be filled

\(^{202}\) A good example of this is shown in the 1990s TV dramatisation of the 1960s moon race (Grazer, Howard, & Bostick, 1998). There is arguably no more potent example of the meeting of system and technology than that episode in human history. The eleventh programme of the series “From the earth to the moon” titled “The Original Wives’ Club” includes a vignette in which Jim Lovell is suddenly reminded of all the work that has been done on the domestic front in his absence on the Gemini and Apollo programmes. While moving house years later, he finds the hospital tags for his three children’s stays in hospital for the removal of their respective tonsils. He is upset that he was not informed of these procedures, but his wife tells him that her job was to protect him from anything that might prevent him keeping his mind on what was a dangerous job. “And every day I had to decide what part of your life I was going to tell you about and what part of your life I was going to keep from you. . . . That was my job.” It is indicative of the social gaze that this episode on the support system provided by the astronaut’s wives makes up one-eleventh of the entire series. Nevertheless, it records a reality that Dorothy Smith’s “theory” seeks to highlight.
out by way of a preliminary explanation of where this thesis is going in terms of the conflict between the Addictive/White Male System and the Living Process System. In the final chapter, reference will be made to a conclusion from Jean Vanier, that self-esteem is the enemy of love. While the detailed exposition of the theories touched on in this chapter will be resolved in terms of the Whole in later chapters, the relationship of their content can be summarised within a dictum that states that it is within the individual ego’s over-valuing of and pursuit of power, prestige and comfort that the problems associated with the Addictive Society reside. And, as with any addict, it is the loss of honesty that is a sure sign of an addict out of control. One can never fully trust what an addict tells you, whether that addict be the President of the United States or prostitutes and substance abusers living by their wits on the streets. Addiction, both substance and process addiction, like sin, is the great leveller.

In a popular series of books in the 1980s and 1990s, the American psychiatrist M Scott Peck showed how available the theory was for a well-adjusted life and then showed by the manner of his life and demise (Jones, 2007) how knowing something is not at all the same as living it. While he was open about his serial affairs, as well as compulsive drinking and cigarette smoking, it became apparent that his relationship with his wife had perhaps not been quite as rosy or truthfully described in his books when they divorced in 2002. However, those books still remain a good resource for theory at least about living a good life, albeit in a gnostic sense (Smith, 1992). As a self-disclosed NT type (Peck, 1999), he illustrates well the hazards of that personality type which, at its most powerful, is well able to do what it pleases. It is a good illustration in fact of privilege being invisible to those who have it (Kimmel, 2008).

So, with regard to Peck’s (1993) important distinction between self-love and self-esteem, for both Schaef and Peck, at the centre of the complexity of the Great Commandment is the importance of one’s sobriety and self-love respectively and that that defines relationship—loving our neighbour as ourselves. If we do not love ourselves to our very core, we cannot love others to their very human core. The pursuit of self-esteem prevents that because we are outside ourselves, letting the social system define our value for us. In the previous chapter we saw how a system reliant on terror management relies on its participants gaining their self-esteem from the system itself and how considerable odium is poured out on those who oppose (actively and passively) this system either from without or within.

In terms of the conceptual wisdom model, there are both Ego and Eco elements to both self-love and self-esteem. Self-esteem is commonly concerned with the horizontal dimension of that model whereby we place the value of our being in the hands—and minds—of those with whom we co-exist. Transformation consists in transferring that primacy to the vertical dimension which (I am arguing is potentially the case with Christianity) provides a context to the horizontal dimension and judges it using an inclusive and benevolent set of values, that offsets the underlying fear and exclusiveness related to merely socially-derived values. There are both Ego and Eco aspects of that vertical dimension as well, and if the gnosticism of the upper part of the vertical element is to be avoided, it is important to incorporate the embodied or incarnated aspect of the vertical. In fact this thesis is arguing that it is that existential element that must now come to the fore if Christianity is to achieve its potential to transform. With this in mind, the conceptual wisdom model is amended in Figure 10.1 which makes the basic point that, like the original Christian cross, we are firmly embedded in earth and the physical far more than we are differentiated by the qualities of our intellect. This was the fundamental error that M Scott Peck seemed to have made, that while he derided his role as some sort of guru, he seemed to love it too much to give it up. The embodiment of his predicament—the predicament outlined in the diagram on the left side of Figure 10.2—is obvious from this article that appeared in Rolling Stone magazine at the height of his fame.

Arriving in Boston at 4 o’clock on this icy March afternoon, the author of the record-breaking self-help best seller The Road Less Traveled has just discovered that his suite at the Westin Hotel is not ready. It’s a minor irritation, one you might expect Peck to brush off. Especially since he’s one of those rare beings (just 5 percent of humanity, by his own calculations) who have ascended to the top rung on his self-created spiritual hierarchy—a rare “Stage Four” man who soars above life's anxieties.
Yet, strangely, Peck seems to be ticking toward meltdown. A roosterish, red-faced figure in a travel-wrinkled suit, he paces the Westin's blue broadloom. "I told them my precise arrival time," he fumes, stabbing a cigarette between his lips. "And now I'm standing around!" He's tired, he's hungry, and although it's still one hour before he allows himself his first martini of the day, Peck looks like he could use a drink.

To make matters worse, the hotel is swarming with Peck fans—some 1,200 Roadies who have gathered to hear him speak at the National Conference on Loss and Transition. Not that Peck dislikes his fans. He has even been known on occasion to grant their requests for a hug. But sometimes he is in no mood for robe touching. And that's a problem when you're the most successful self-help author in history, which Peck is, thanks to The Road Less Traveled, his spiritual-growth primer, which blends equal parts pop-psych jargon, New Age mysticism and hefty autobiographical passages from the life of M. Scott Peck. (Colapinto, 1995)

It is not his impatience that causes the greatest concern to Mr Colapinto. Impatience is a deeply embodied emotion especially for an addict who hasn’t had his or her fix. The problem lies with Peck’s claim that he is better, more elevated than almost everybody else. His ideas are valuable, but/and it is for the embodiment of knowledge that people like Nelson Mandela and Dorothy Day receive our greatest admiration. Hauerwas and Vanier (2008) make the point that patience is another term for peace, “... the politics of peace is a politics of time. ... time is not a zero-sum game” (p. 47). This sort of statement as a challenge to mainstream views of time, sounds nonsensical and, as such, is a statement of faith. Little such faith is evident in Peck’s reaction to his predicament and yet he claimed, after trying out Zen Buddhism, and Sufism, that he followed Christianity’s “Prince of Peace”.

It is in this respect that Peck is interesting for the use he makes of Fowler. He develops a more simplified version of Fowler’s theory that he then uses throughout his books. This is how he ends up locating himself in the top tier which corresponds to Fowler’s Stage 5. This illustrates a problem with Fowler’s conception if, that is, Peck’s parallel conception is correct. This is not a new criticism of Fowler’s model and the recommendation that emerges from this chapter is that unless Fowler’s Stage 5 is deeply embodied, it cannot truly be Stage 5 or 6. One must, at base, have a faith in life through one’s body as well as through one’s mind. Christianity is a religion of the heart and humility more than it is a religion of the head and importance. It is in this sense that it is more Eco than Ego, and that Jesus Christ, that most female of men, lies at its very valuable heart.

Schaef’s fundamental point about the White Male or the Addictive Society is that at base it represents an addiction to powerlessness where the powerlessness she is referring to is existential. It is at this point that Brown’s (2010, 2013) work on vulnerability is valuable. Her first myth203 of vulnerability is that vulnerability is weakness because of course those who have the strength to show vulnerability are anything but weak. Noting that the derivation of courage comes from the Latin for heart, she observes that people who march straight into their vulnerability have the courage to be imperfect. The rest of us use our addictions—our perfectionism, our people-pleasing, our overwork, our dishonesty, whatever our defence mechanism might be—to protect ourselves from our vulnerability. Nevertheless, while Brown’s work is admirable, and certainly important in the context of personal relatedness, one has to ask if her brand of honesty is the “wisest” course to take in an addictive system204. This was underscored in an interview she gave on Radio New Zealand National (Freeman, 2013) when, not long into the interview, the interviewer read out a message from a male listener who complained that time was being wasted on what was essentially a “women’s issue”. I wondered at the time whether the listener was actually making a clever point given that the defence mechanism was so obvious, but the fact indeed remains that what Brown was advocating would be, in the wider political world, much more often than not—certainly in Stage 3 and 4 worlds—social suicide.

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203 I use “myth” here in its common sense of being “a belief that is wrong”.

204 In Figure 4.7, this is the fact of culture, particularly at Stage 4 and below, that states that cultural phenomena must be “politically feasible”.

113
In other words, transformation out of an addiction to powerlessness, requires suffering, and coming up against the sort of difference that exposes one’s vulnerability, can cause that kind of suffering as Jackson (2013, p. 11) points out in his studies of existential anthropology—which he calls “the pain of seeing in the face and gestures of a stranger the invalidation of oneself”. That’s how we learn the lessons of life rather than “in European salons and seminar rooms”. It is in the border situations “that we may recognize and be reconciled to the painful truth that the human world constitutes our common ground, our shared heritage, not as a place of comfortably consistent unity but as a site of contingency, difference, and struggle” (italics in the original).

Rather, the comfort of the familiar that we usually seek is an example of what Jung calls neurotic suffering, the kind that leads to no growth. The suffering that Jesus carried through his Passion was of an entirely different kind, and showed the kind of vulnerability that Brown is advocating, but showing it within a wider social system. Chris Argyris is an academic from the business world who has important things to say about vulnerability as a potentially effective (albeit also perhaps politically “naïve”) business tool, and his views form an important part of the next chapter. However, before leaving this chapter, and as a way of linking this chapter and the next in with the idea of narcissism that was covered in the previous chapter, I want to make the following important point. Baumeister and Tierney’s (2011) definition of narcissism exposed the fact that, for narcissists, it is other people who bear the cost of their flaw and their consequent refusal to grow. We saw for instance that if one is honest with narcissists (and we are all of us narcissists to some extent) one is likely to feel their avenging wrath. For Catholic writer Richard Rohr however, the Christian ideal is that, like our model in Jesus, it is we who must pay the price for the Other’s growth. Right there is the claim of a radical post-Protestant alternative, as well as the very real necessity for communities of individuals to be able to put such alternatives into effective action.

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205 The appearance of the gated community is evidence of a very concrete defence mechanism in the sense that it keeps “difference” out. But I am also talking of the very real differences that are embedded in sick systems such as our political system in which participants seek to score points rather than to find out the truths of a situation.

206 Helen Luke wrote an important paper (1983) on the nature of suffering which showed clearly how real suffering differs from neurotic suffering and why the word “carried” here is exactly the right word to use.
Chapter 11
THE WILDNESS LYING IN WAIT AS ARGYRIS’S “SKILLED INCOMPETENCE”

In the very funny spoof of 1970s airline disaster movies variously known as *Flying High* and *Airplane*, (Zucker, Zucker, & Abrahams (1980)), Lloyd Bridges plays the role of the control tower boss who suddenly finds himself in charge of directing the safe landing of an aircraft on which all in the cockpit have succumbed to food poisoning. He barks out a number of orders to a series of airport employees, ending with his taking a call from his wife whom he treats in exactly the same manner: “I want the kids in bed by nine, the dog fed, the yard watered, and the gate locked. And get a note to the milkman NO MORE CHEESE!” Click!

And tell the milkman NO CHEESE has become a ritualised and light-hearted expression in my family whenever we find ourselves acting in or commenting on a similar “take charge” mode wherein all communication is outward, with little or no incoming traffic.

In another anecdote, Chesterton (1922) describes his experience of filling in the documents associated with a forthcoming trip to America. He describes his amusement on being asked such questions as “Are you an anarchist/polygamist?” and, “Are you in favor of subverting the government of the United States by force?” As Chesterton writes,

> . . . among many things that amused me almost to the point of treating the form thus disrespectfully, the most amusing was the thought of the ruthless outlaw who should feel compelled to treat it respectfully. I like to think of the foreign desperado, seeking to slip into America with official papers under official protection, and sitting down to write with a beautiful gravity, “I am an anarchist. I hate you all and wish to destroy you.” . . . Or again, “Yes, I am a polygamist all right, and my forty-seven wives are accompanying me on the voyage disguised as secretaries” . . . (pp. 4-5)

While Chesterton laughs, as anyone would, at the apparent absurdity of these questions, he also has a more serious notion to impart—literally a second thought:

> I [have no] intention of apologising for my laughter. A man is perfectly entitled to laugh at a thing because he happens to find it incomprehensible. What he has no right to do is to laugh at it as incomprehensible, and then criticise it as if he comprehended it. The very fact of its unfamiliarity and mystery ought to set him thinking about the deeper causes that make people so different from himself, and that without merely assuming that they must be inferior to himself. (p. 5, emphasis added)

At the beginning of this thesis, I observed that women have entered the workforce on terms established largely by men. In that sense the work environment remains a gendered environment. It is time now to establish what changes are necessary in work environments if they are to become more whole and less gendered. This inquiry is also designed to establish what is missing in one particular work environment where no women are yet allowed at all—Roman Catholicism’s ordained priesthood.

The two diversions above serve to illustrate important aspects of Chris Argyris’s (1993, 1999, 2006, 2008) theories about organizational learning. The first is the phenomenon that he calls “self-sealing” that occurs in hierarchical organizations where the people at the top who are paid to solve problems “out there” (single-loop learning), fail to look inwards to see their own contribution to organizational problems (a process which requires what Argyris calls “double-loop learning”). Lloyd Bridges spoofs that sort of “masterful” behaviour that we have come to expect from leaders who are supposed to know everything (as in Schaef’s (1981) “white male system”). In Chapter 14 we will see that behaviour defined as “phallus-bearing” and now, of course, women are freer to become phallus bearers as well, with all the possible long term consequences that that brings for health outcomes. Certainly, Lloyd Bridges was showing the effects. The film’s continuing gag had Lloyd Bridges saying, “Looks like I picked the wrong week to give up smoking”—addictive behaviour that then progresses through snorting cocaine, injecting heroin, and finally glue-sniffing as his problems become worse and worse as he is required to become more and more god-like. That particular conception of God results in the heightened problem of addiction in the modern world.
The reason I chose these two scenes was to illustrate the grave importance of a lack of introspection and a disregard for inward coming communication. One needs to inquire—to ask questions of oneself and other people. In other words, there is a paradoxical need for both introspection, self-reflexivity, and mutual sociability if our relationships with ourselves and others are to be realistic. It is, after all, completely in line with the second part of that great Judeo-Christian commandment once again: love others as you love yourself.

The importance of doing this is well shown by a composite sample of conversation that Argyris (2006) provides (see Table 11.1), comparing what is actually said with what the subject is actually thinking, and how a lack of analysis of such conversations and the testing and verification of our attributions results in serious consequences for organizational functioning. In fact, this phenomenon has serious consequences for social functioning in general.

We have already seen in Chapter 8 above and elsewhere, that the so-called “mastery” (recall that McGilchrist (2009) states that this “master” is actually only an “emissary”) of the left brain and its control of speech, gives it an unfair advantage and is the reason for the prevalence of the masterful occupations (war commanders and strategists) that the people who are strong in that left-brain cerebral function have. As I was writing this, I read in the daily newspaper the following “thought of the day” (quoting Stanley Kubrick the film director): “If you can talk brilliantly about a problem, it can create the consoling illusion that it has been mastered.” That is it exactly.

The solving of problems (as an emissary) is one thing. What the Chesterton anecdote exposes is something which in social psychology theory is called correspondence bias. It is characterised by superficial rather than systematic processing of first impressions by the perceiver of social behaviour. So the first impression and attribution that Chesterton describes himself as having is one of the inferiority and naivety of the questioner. That is superficial processing. Chesterton’s point is revealed in the rest of his chapter in which he sets out a very thorough systematic processing of his experience—something that most of us obviously don’t bother to do given the fact that the bias is a part of the psychological literature. There are circumstances when correspondence bias is justified say Smith and Mackie (2000), but they write: “Astute observers know that people say and do things for many reasons: the desire to flatter others, the demands of social situations, or the wish to receive something in return. Because we know that actions do not always reflect the inner person, we sometimes try to avoid the correspondence bias, correcting our first impressions by considering other possible causes of behaviour” (p. 77). That is systematic processing. On the other hand, “initial impressions formed with minimal effort and thought on the basis of just one or two obvious attributes, such as impressions based on the assumption that inner characteristics correspond directly to observed behaviour, are one example of superficial processing” (p. 77). Superficial processing does not require us to understand or “stand under”. It is a position that gives us power—we “overstand”—and it saves time and the energy of thinking and perhaps changing our minds, or worse perhaps, remaining uncertain.

In terms of the wisdom model outlined in Part 1 (see Figure 5.2), these phenomena can be characterised by that dotted line that runs from the top right to the bottom left separating Ego from Eco. That line is like the defensive line of the aquiclude described in Chapter 6, separating the pure water-bearing aquifers from the pollutants which would otherwise encroach on its patch, except in this case the “pollutants” are threatening from below. By means of the positive water pressure or head which the power of speech and position provide, the water-bearing gravels and departmental heads can persist in splendid defended

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207 This is in essence Maxwell’s (1984) conclusions too. We have to inquire into the complexity of humanity as well as seek to understand the simple patterns that help determine the forms and processes underlying our physical and, to a lesser extent, our biological environment.

208 This is not to suggest that in a good definition of the problem there is not a sizable percentage of its solution. Nevertheless there needs to be a return of such solutions into their context in the “real” world, and that can involve a whole new set of skills.
isolation in the way that Argyris (2008) describes. And certainly, we keep Ego on, because those water-bearing gravels and departmental heads are very good at solving immediate problems.

The “pollution” that threatens—that is, the Eco—is that combination of the existential and the interpersonal that the bottom right quadrant in Figure 5.2 represents. Argyris (2008) calls its constituents variously, embarrassment, threat, vulnerability, incompetence, doubt. No wonder we want nothing to do with it. Argyris’s point is that we need to use that quadrant’s contents as input to decision making in just the same way as we use all the other incoming information that underlie “strategy, finance, marketing, manufacturing, and other management disciplines” (p. 45–6). Otherwise it’s garbage in, garbage out. The garbage in, is defensive reasoning about attributions that are not tested.

So, Argyris’s term “skilled incompetence” refers to the fact that it is in the very education, commitment, professionalism, and mastery of those in charge of organizations that the sources of problems lie, in the sense that those people don’t learn or allow the organization to learn. In fact they are armoured against learning—they are “self-sealing”. Teaching smart people how to learn is his answer to the problem. And there are at least two ways of correcting problems: single-loop learning changes the behaviour. Double-loop learning—the better option—aims to change the master programme that controls the behaviour. These master programmes are what he calls “theories of action” and these are derived from the underlying values that govern the practice of organizations.

The problem is however that there are two types of Theories in Action. There is an “Espoused Theory” which is what people say they believe, and then there is the “Theory-In-Use” which is what they actually do. Therefore people’s “Action Strategies” are determined by the latter. Why does this discrepancy occur?

. . . most theories-in-use rest on the same set of governing values. There seems to be a universal tendency to design one’s actions consistently according to four basic values:

1. To remain in unilateral control;
2. To maximise “winning” and minimize “losing”;
3. To suppress negative feelings; and
4. To be as “rational” as possible—by which people mean defining clear objectives and evaluating their behaviour in terms of whether or not they have achieved them.

The purpose of all these values is to avoid embarrassment or threat, feeling vulnerable or incompetent. In this respect, the master program that most people use is profoundly defensive. Defensive reasoning encourages individuals to keep private the premises, inferences, and conclusions that shape their behaviour and to avoid testing them in a truly independent, objective fashion. (Argyris, 2008, pp. 24-26, emphasis added)

In teaching, theorists called this defensive reasoning “deficit theorising” to put off the bad feelings that we might have to face should we be confronted with the fact that it wasn’t the pupils who were at fault but (and I will add “also”) us. So, our “premises, inferences and conclusions” were all designed to make us look good. In Baron-Cohen’s terms (2003), it was the highest systemising / lowest empathising solution because the other option of lowest systemising / highest empathising would have been too painful and depressing, something that Argyris’s consultants call the “doom loop” or the “doom zoom”.

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209 Argyris defines the doom loop as follows:

Often, consultants will perform well on the case team, but because they don’t do the jobs perfectly or receive accolades from their managers, they go into a doom loop of despair. And they don’t ease into the doom loop, they zoom into it.

As a result, many professionals have extremely “brittle” personalities. When suddenly faced with a situation they cannot immediately handle, they tend to fall apart. They cover up their distress in front of the client. They talk about it constantly with their fellow case team members. Interestingly, these conversations commonly take the form of bad-mouthing clients.

Such brittleness leads to an inappropriately high sense of despondency or even despair when people don’t achieve the high levels of performance they aspire to. Such despondency is rarely psychologically devastating, but when combined with defensive reasoning, it can result in a formidable predisposition against learning. (pp. 31-32)
Learning, Argyris says, is not so much training to increase the motivational (M) aspect of performance (as in Performance = Ability*Motivation – Situational Constraints) but for the cognitive ability (A) that is needed for analysing responses in the way that one analyses any form of incoming and significant data.

All this however depends on the context. This is not a bottom-up change.

The first step is for managers at the top to examine critically and change their own theories-in-use. Until senior managers become aware of how they reason defensively and the counterproductive consequences that result, there will be little real progress. Any change activity is likely to be just a fad. (Argyris, 2008, p. 47)

Change from below is hazardous for those lower in the food chain: “If professionals or middle managers begin to change the way they reason and act, such changes are likely to appear strange—if not actually dangerous to those at the top.” (p. 48) And this is where Argyris (2008) makes one of many problematic attributions which Schaeff and Fassel (1988) criticise him for. Argyris states, “the result is an unstable situation where senior managers still believe that it is a sign of caring and sensitivity to bypass and cover up difficult issues, while their subordinates see the very same actions as defensive” (p. 48).

Women like Anne Wilson Schaeff, Diane Fassel, and I are probably more sensitive to this sort of “buzzword bingo” thinking (Gunder & Hillier, 2009, p. 1)—because we are more often on the end of it, although it is becoming an equal opportunity employer as more women assume management positions. But Argyris’s attribution just serves again just serves to valorise the attributor and his/her beliefs.

We agree with Argyris that the culture of chaos remains intact in organizations and becomes systemic. We think however, that he misses the root cause of its stability. We believe it is because the organization has become an addictive system and has that disease process underlying the defensive routine. When one works with addicts, it is easy to see that this behaviour is clearly characteristic of addiction. (Schaeff and Fassel, 1988, p. 142)

Again, like all addicts, we don’t want to deal with uncomfortable feelings, just as Lloyd Bridges’s character must find a way of coping with his, when all the traffic is one-way. Interpreting our behaviour as “caring” for the other person is part of the self-centred addiction process aimed at feeling good about ourselves, and there is a level at which we know that. In other words, we act this way because we can. It’s a sort of “stinkin’ thinking” characteristic of addiction, in both individuals and organizations.

The difference between the espoused-theory and the theory-in-use is perhaps more understandable in a secular institution (although with the rise of the fad of mission statements as creeds it is becoming less defensible) than it is in the Catholic Church where the violation of supposed core values (the sexual abuse of minors and the associated cover-up by some Church authorities) in relation to its weakest members (the violation of its espoused value210) was part of its theory-in-use. In that situation, where no-one blew the whistle long and hard enough to enable change, we are back to an implied and dominant underlying value-in-use of “loyalty”211 (no doubt more coerced than personally felt) which underlies Rorty’s truth quoted earlier, that other-ated sentiment of “what our peers [and overlings] will let us get away with saying”. I said then Catholics had no business supporting that sort of thinking, and the Catholic Church, more than its secular equivalents given its stricter espoused values, has the bigger case to defend.

Being an active, although now rather distanced member of the hierarchical Church, I appreciate the wisdom in the Gospel advice for dealing with the difference between espoused-theory and theory-in-use: “The teachers of the Law and the Pharisees are the authorized interpreters of Moses’ law. So you must

210 As Robinson (2007, p. 7) notes: “It is hard to imagine a more total contradiction of everything Jesus Christ stood for, and it would be difficult to overestimate the pervasive and lasting harm it has done to the Church.”

211 Note that Loyalty is one of the core moral values that Haidt (2012) identifies and that this thesis canvassed in Part One. In line with Bonhoeffer’s “religionless Christianity”, such conservative values need to be qualified and superceded by those related to the commitment to a mature individual autonomy, the possibility of which Protestantism introduced.
obey and follow everything they tell you to do; do not however, imitate their actions, because they don’t practice what they preach.” (Matthew 23: 2-3)\(^{212}\).

This is where a subversive like Zizek can also shed light on the problem, having himself lived within an authoritarian (Communist) milieu for a significant length of time.

[Althusser] assigned the crucial role in the reproduction of an ideology to “external” rituals and practices with regard to which “inner” beliefs and convictions are strictly secondary. And is it necessary to call attention to the central place of such rituals in “real socialism”? What counted in it was external obedience, not “inner conviction.” Obedience coincided with the semblance of obedience, which is why the only way to be truly subversive was to act naively [that is, to take the ideology literally], to make the system “eat its own words,” i.e., to undermine the appearance of its ideological consistency. (Zizek 1993, quoted in Kotsko, p. 26, 2008)

The uproar over the Church’s behaviour is making the Church “eat its own words” and naturally, like any system that seeks its own survival beyond all else (belying its espoused faith in God), isn’t liking it very much. None of us in that situation do\(^{213}\).

A lot of the espoused-theory of the Catholic Church is admirable (especially its teaching on social justice) and it is the reason that I stick with it. One soon learns however what the self-serving theory-in-use of an organization like the Church is, when one violates that principle of obedience that Zizek identifies, and “rocks the boat”. There were, no doubt, many people in power who knew the extent of the problems in the Church and did not blow the whistle. Nevertheless, I continue to belong to what is an authoritarian institution both in its workings and the power that its citizens give to it (that is, the Church contains both addicts and enablers) in spite of that, because another espoused tenet is that the church is one of, and for, sinners. The answer then is not to ditch the espoused-theory, as was necessary in the Communist regimes\(^{214}\). In a church of sinners, the answer is to recognise the gap—between the espoused-theory and the theory-in-use. In Catholic parlance this is called avoiding the “unforgiveable sin”—the sin against God-with-us, the Holy Spirit. The “unforgivable” sin is the fault we don’t admit to having. Its unforgivability therefore stems from its definition, not from some inherent irreversibility. In a thesis devoted to a theme of transformation, this is an important distinction to make. And it entails crossing the Ego—Eco line of the wisdom model and seeing life from below. Ultimately, that empathising (and secondarily the systemising) is what the Church’s social teaching is about.

The problem remains however that while men-without-women fail to recognise their own neurosis, the situation is not likely to change. And the conditions within the Catholic Church are such that the men in it are protected from facing up to that neurosis. As with Philip Zimbardo’s Stanford Prison experiment, if you set the environment up right, you can get all-American nice boys to act like thugs\(^{215}\). Philip Zimbardo testified at the Abu Ghraib trials for just that reason; that the people who had set the system up were by

\(^{212}\) I’m not too sure about the following of “all they tell you to do” either, conditioned as all that might be by Agyris’s (2008) unexamined “premises, inferences, and conclusions” (p. 26) above. For example, we in the pews in New Zealand are continually being asked to “pray for vocations” without there being any obvious appreciation of the fact that such prayers may have been answered already.

\(^{213}\) I am as guilty of following the two theories in parallel as anyone or anything. On the one hand, there is the gospel claim of the needlessness of anxiety; yet I am a walking, talking, medicine-taking example of a diagnosed anxiety disorder.

\(^{214}\) Dogma is an important part of the Church’s role, just as scientific dogma—adherence to the scientific method and so on—is an important part of the scientific establishment’s role. Nevertheless, it is part of the dignity of each individual that, after careful (and careless) consideration of such dogma—or even with none—personal action is ultimately the responsibility of each person because of our God-given free will. Post-Protestant Catholicism necessitates visiting all sectors of the wisdom model and that includes the magisteria of religion and science.

\(^{215}\) Those all-American nice boys were also turned into passive and mentally disturbed victims as a result of the “prison” that Zimbardo created where half of the experimental subjects were given the role of the prison guard to play and the other half the prisoners. While all had of course agreed to take part, they arrived at the “prison” after a very realistic and unexpected (with regard to its exact timing) arrest sequence, and with that level of reality then being maintained within the “prison” walls, the participants adopted their personas quickly and lost their former identities within those roles.
far the more culpable, albeit less visible, perpetrators of the atrocities\textsuperscript{216}. In any situation, there are always those he calls “heroes” who resist the easy socially- and environmentally-induced pulls of bad behaviour, but they are invariably in the minority, especially among the young and inexperienced, just as Fowler’s model would predict.

My fundamental point here, is that one could write a separate thesis looking into the social and environmental factors that made the latest scandals in the Church inevitable. However, in the limited space available, what I will do is enlarge on the Schaef model from the previous chapter as a way of also illustrating the views of a retired Auxiliary Bishop of the Catholic Church, Bishop Geoffrey Robinson of Sydney, who was perturbed enough by the sexual abuse\textsuperscript{217} in the Catholic Church to write a book in response. It is worthwhile noting that I am not decrying the magisteria of either science or religion that the \textit{Theorists} in the upper left quadrant of the wisdom model represent. What I am postulating is that that sector is a part of wisdom in the same way that the other three sectors are, and that its disproportionate access to power is unfortunate because it inoculates the \textit{Theorists} from outside messy influences. Again, privilege is invisible to those who have it (Kimmel, 2008). One needs to ask the outsiders how the system works because they are the ones who beat their heads up against it. An episode of powerlessness is quite possibly the only remedy for it, unless, as in Paul’s case, there occurs an episode of blinding insight in which the still small voice within becomes suddenly amplified.

While I have no intimate knowledge of his circumstances, Bishop Robinson would seem to qualify as one of Zimbardo’s heroes. As he stated, “Granted the present structures of the church, what we must cry out for is a pope who will say publicly, ‘Yes, I am genuinely serious about confronting both abuse and the response to abuse, and I will ruthlessly change whatever needs to be changed in order to overcome both of these problems. Please help me to identify all contributing causes’” (Robinson, pp. 19-20).

Figure 11.1 continues the structure that was started in Figures 10.1 and 10.2. Firstly, there must be an end to the clericalism that has developed in the Catholic Church which concentrates power in the official Magisterium of the Church—in the upper left quadrant of the wisdom model, just as the secular society does for the left sectors of the wisdom model in general. Figure 11.1 is centred on the lower right hand quadrant—that common humanity which unites us. So, Robinson’s first question is, Are we—the laity—“citizens or civilians”? (p. 293) because “civilians” is a problematic term.

The Greek word \textit{laos} (people) expresses the common element shared by all members of the church. The Latin term \textit{laici} (laypersons) was derived from the term \textit{laos}, but in the process came to refer only to those who were not clerics.\textsuperscript{218} \textit{Laos} expresses a positive concept (people), \textit{laici} expresses a negative concept (those who are not clerics). (p. 293)

Calling those in the pews “laity” is like calling the citizens of the country civilians—defining them in relation to the military. Civilians or laity are not our primary identities in a State or a Church in other words\textsuperscript{219}. We are all priests, just not ordained ones.

\textsuperscript{216} Zimbardo in fact recognised his own culpability in the evil that the Stanford Prison experiment degenerated into. He records, in his book \textit{The Lucifer Effect}, that it was only at the urging of his then girlfriend—later to become his wife—that he suddenly realised what he was perpetuating by continuing with the experimental setup. When he realised his folly, he stopped the experiment immediately and early.

\textsuperscript{217} “Sexual abuse of minors by a significant number of priests and religious, together with the attempts by many church authorities to conceal the abuse, constitute one of the ugliest stories ever to emerge from the Catholic Church. It is hard to imagine a more total contradiction of everything Jesus Christ stood for, and it would be difficult to overestimate the pervasive and lasting harm it has done to the Church.” (Robinson, 2007, p. 7)

\textsuperscript{218} Lumen Gentium, no.31.

\textsuperscript{219} Robinson states:

… the major rights and duties of any individual flow from being a citizen, and the negative and relative term “civilians” cannot express the whole reality of citizenship. In a similar way, the term “laypersons”, which is also negative and relative, cannot express the whole reality of the vast majority of the members of the church, and their major rights and duties cannot come from this term … [T]he terms tend to be elitist and discriminatory, denying the essential contribution of e.g. army reservists in relation to the military, nurses in relation to doctors, law clerks in relation to lawyers and religious and laity in relation to clerics. The terms also deny such things as the citizen’s concern for the defence of the country, first aid and care of the sick in the home, the concern of people to know the law and obey it in driving a car or filling in a tax form, and the marvellous variety of charisms that exists within the church. (pp. 293 -294)
The next thing to notice is that while the concentration is on the lower right quadrant the intention is to regularly visit all the other sectors. By doing so—especially with the array of thoughtful scholarship available in the magisteria of the upper left quadrant (of religion and of science)—we actively develop a conscience of our own, which is the second dominant point I wish to make.

Responsible growth is Robinson’s (2007) answer to the existential questions of Who am I? Where do I come from? Where am I going? What is the purpose and meaning of my existence? In this sense the idea of Conscience and its conscious formation is highly significant in his discussion. He acknowledges the tension between the Nothing Goes and the Anything Goes mentalities that we are torn between, with the latter enjoying the ascendancy in the current social milieu (and just as unacceptably from his point of view). Morality is a serious issue because it is fundamentally implicated in the three important relationships we each have and which are described by the Great Commandment—with God, with Ourselves and with Others, and finally with the environment of which we are a part. The division in Church documents about conscience between Augustine and Aquinas is one of many ambiguities that the Church has not resolved. Robinson (2007) does resolve it in terms of his knowledge of Church history and in terms of its importance in relation to this idea of “responsible growth”. He comes down firmly on the side of Aquinas, in line with the universal values that Haidt (2006, 2012) identified back in Chapter 5 and the interpretation I put on them, by affirming that Authority and Loyalty come after the Liberty, Fairness and Care of secular liberal society. Robinson parallels that viewpoint when he writes of the necessity for the freedom in which to grow and to take responsibility for ourselves:

... the ultimate difference between Augustine and Aquinas is that, at least on this one point, Augustine was serving a sterner god who demands obedience, while Aquinas was serving a god of love and challenge who desires growth. For the God of Aquinas what is important is that people should grow towards all they are capable of being, and obedience is not sufficient, of itself alone, to achieve this goal. If we are to grow towards the higher levels of morality contained in the bible, two things are equally essential: we must do right things and we must take responsibility for them. (pp. 160-161)

The progression around the model that Figure 11.1 shows is exemplified in the different types of organization that the four Jungian personalities assume into existence. Mitroff’s (1983) four types of organizations are shown, with those on the left (just as McGilchrist (2009) would predict for the left-brainers) assuming that the non-living facts of systems are the most important. Those on the right look to people to give their organizations their pre-eminent values. In this thesis I privilege the familial organization in Figure 11.1, but only as long as it keeps doing the circuit. The Catholic Church resembles a Fowlerian Stage 3 domestic patriarchal (the overturning of which Becker (1975) in Chapter 9 identified as Christianity’s greatest value) and dysfunctional nuclear family in its existing incarnation. Just as modern and alternative forms of family are showing that it is not the structure so much as what it delivers to its members that counts, so also the global “Sisterhood of Man” (Daly, 1973) can be judged by how well everyone is doing within it. To achieve a healthier commonwealth, everyone needs to take up that response-ability within a global “democracy of the different”.

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220 The “organic adaptive” would in fact be my organization of choice because I am a strong “N” instead of an “S” and, moreover, I am an introvert. (The more boisterous members of the “family” are okay for short periods, as long as they leave me alone for most of the time with my books! Nevertheless . . . ). The great value of Jung’s personality model is that it makes explicit the assumptions we all make as a result of our respective dominant personality type. The non-stating of one’s assumptions was an important part of Maxwell’s complaints about the philosophy of knowledge employed within the Magisterium of Science.
Chapter 12
THE WILDERNESS LYING IN WAIT AS EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE

At the end of the 1986 television adaptation of Jane Austen’s *Northanger Abbey*, Henry Tilney played by Peter Firth, approaches Catherine Morland (Katherine Schlesinger) with marriage on his mind. “Don’t be afraid,” he says, “I promise not to oppress you with too much remorse, or too much passion . . .”

I’ve had a bit of a soft spot for Peter Firth ever since. There is indeed something very oppressive about unprocessed emotion in human interaction and some emotions are more oppressive than others. I recall seeing a television programme about New Zealand romance fiction writers where one writer explained the popularity of Mills & Boon titles by the fact that for many women, relationships with men started with the romantic promise but ended with an angry man; whereas in her books, the convention was to start with the angry man and end with the romantic one—happily ever after. It is a female conceit for sure, that a good woman will sort out a man’s problems with himself, but like the parallel in men’s fiction (James Bond, Jack Reacher, and their ilk) it is again part of Samuels’ (1993) “splitting and projection” that occurs in real life. In the equation \( P = \text{Abilty} \times \text{Motivation} - \text{Situational Constraints} \), James Bond is all about Ability because the motivation is staying in control, whereas our romantic heroines are all about—his Ability for sure, but primarily—his Motivation and how that includes her, as its major focus. They are both ego-centric in their own ways which is why both genres represent the sort of fiction that can support their writers full-time. Both genres feed into the evolutionary dictates that sexual selection has bred into our DNA.

The sociology of emotions is a recent field of academic inquiry, relying, at its current stage of development, on existing social theory such as dramaturgical, exchange, and structural theory. As Turner and Stets (2005) observe, sociology has had a tendency to neglect the “body” believing at the extreme, that all emotion is socially constructed. Turner himself, in his sociological theory of emotion, brings in the necessary psychoanalytic viewpoint to offset this fundamental bias. He also recognizes the value that structural and symbolic interactionist theories of emotion have for the possible prediction of not only the effects of social structures on emotions but also for the effect of human emotions on changes in social structures. Turner’s analysis of the four levels, or dimensions, of human emotion holds promise for a more Marxist analysis (see Figure 12.1) in the way of Marx’s description of the proper philosophical basis for sociology being to change the world, not just to interpret it, or even just describe it. His recent (2011) work *The problem of emotions in societies* is a valuable addition to the literature in this area, particularly in the emphasis it places on the distribution of positive and negative emotions as mirroring the existing stratification in our societies. We need to regard emotions in other words as resources—like the more conventional socio-economic resources. The problem is of course that with the unprocessed emotions like anger, people are likely to get hurt in the social unrest that results from violent social change.

Not only is emotion stratified, it is also, I argue, gendered. Emotional support as Connell (2009) observed in Chapter 2, is part of the patriarchal dividend. Women’s work includes what I refer to as “matronising”; one has to be more mindful of the emotional needs of the more powerful person in any relationship, and, given the coverage of Argyris’s theory in Chapter 11, that includes the workplace. Unless one has an emotionally intelligent employer, it is generally more dangerous for an employee to be open about the employer’s deficiencies, than it is for the employer to express his or her opinions about the deficiencies of the employee.

While there is still some argument about what constitutes the primary emotions, Turner operates on the assumption that the primary emotions are probably those about which most theorists agree. The four primary emotions then are Satisfaction-Happiness, Aversion-Fear, Assertion-Anger, and Dissatisfaction-

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221 I have been unable to locate a copy of it unfortunately so I do not have a reference for it or a name for the author whose valuable observations I remember.
Sadness. The four primary emotions are like primary colours; they can be mixed and matched to produce the full panoply of human emotion. Interestingly, three of these (fear, sadness, and anger) are negatively valenced—testament no doubt to the rigour of human evolutionary environments and the need to be circumspect about potential dangers. The other is happiness which is regarded as positively valenced. In fact, a considerable amount of research has been devoted in recent years to happiness research now that we have the mass wherewithal in modernity to “enjoy” ourselves.

I identify the four primary emotions in Figure 12.2 and I have also gendered them. While there is evidence that, indeed, men are more aggressive than women (Helgeson, 2012), my gendering in Figure 12.2 is based largely on the western social context in which “feeling rules” are generated. My assumptions are that it is easier for men to be angry in our society than it is for women. It is easier for women to express their sadness and fear in our society than it is for men. Finally, men have greater access to the resources that are seen as socially desirable and satisfying

However, is the classification of happiness as a positive emotion justified in the sense that is it not part of the same yoke of instinctual responses that determine the three other primary emotions? The philosopher Raymond Belliotti believed as much (although he did not employ evolutionary psychology in his considerations) when he opined that “happiness is over-rated”. Happiness at best is a by-product of “a life lived well, one filled with meaning” (Belliotti, 2004, p. 120). Happiness should be sacrificed for a life of value.

So it is with that in mind, that I class Satisfaction-Happiness, where that happiness is the result of our evolutionary programming, in with all the other “afflictive emotions” that Keating (2001) identifies. Keating’s theories are explicitly Catholic; he takes developmental psychology’s research and blends it with a rethinking of the doctrine of original sin by stating that our “afflictive emotions” can be a valuable tool for facilitating the maturation process towards transformation should we choose, either individually or societally, to desire that transition. It relies on a Christian belief, but Hamilton’s (2008) ideas, as previously discussed, could extend it into the secular realm as well.

Keating’s ideas rely on the introspection and meditation of a pre-Reformation Catholic tradition and are related to Schaefer’s (1987) ideas (her work appears in his reference list) and the twelve-step theory that endeavours to overcome addiction. To me, the conceptual basis of his thinking represents a means of bringing together a lot of the theory in Part 2.

Keating is a Roman Catholic monk, so a central metaphor of his theory draws on the biblical account of Christ’s temptation in the desert after his baptism. It is those three temptations that are pivotal in deciding how to deal with one’s life. While this was not the central concern of Maxwell’s philosophy—he was more interested in our collective approach—our personal psychology is an important building block in societal change as well. How we collectively live is determined by how we individually react to the three temptations of possessions, prestige, and power in the desert of modern life, a context (representing as it does Baron-Cohen’s (2003) systemizing dimension at the height of its powers) which is focused on, and streamlined for, their production.

When Keating describes our “programmes for happiness” (for security/comfort (possessions), affection/esteem (prestige), and power/control (power)—the order in which Christ was tempted), as

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222 It is Henry Tilney who arrives on horseback at Catherine Morland’s because he has the independent mobility and she doesn’t. It is he who expresses remorse because he had previously accused her for judging his father harshly when she had actually seen him in a metaphorical way for the blackguard he truly was. While matters are of course different now, while men earn more than women on average, the patriarchal dividend remains extant.

223 This order for me reflects the clockwise progression around the wisdom model from our earliest beginnings in the SF quadrant (the need for security/comfort) through to the self-esteem we merit (affection/esteem) if we are a good upstanding Stage 3 member of our societies (what Keating calls Mythic Membership after Ken Wilber’s work), through to the Power/Control of the NT quadrant wherein System and Technology combine to create the Military/Industrial and Capitalist Complexes.
acting like centers of gravity in our lives, he might as well be describing what Jungian theory calls “complexes”. Jungian theory is the subject of the next chapter, and in particular, that aspect of Jungian theory that postulates the relationship of the human executive ego with what Jung calls the Self. After discussing Jungian theory, I will return to Keating’s work as I believe it supplies the best explanation for the relationship of the ego with Self that I have come across. Where Jung advocates the more esoteric activities of active imagination and dream analysis (and I am not decrying these methods, having experienced at first hand their efficacy), our affective emotions can also give us plenty of clues as to where we were damaged in our childhood pre-rational experiences, and how we have swallowed hook, line and sinker, detrimental cultural belief systems, which now need to be questioned as part of my claim of an alternative. This work, derived from the monastic tradition of which Keating is a part, gives us the clue as to how we can heal the damage that arises from our own and humanity’s development in both proximal and distal time respectively. The requirements for such healing are shown in Figure 12.3 in the second-order SF quadrant that uses a form of the conceptual wisdom model to model what a process centred on transforming union with God would look like, as opposed to the more normal model which is centred on one’s union with—most commonly in all our fantasies—a great deal of Money. In the second-order quadrant of relatedness which is based on a relationship with a Christian God, “Simplicity” constitutes the systemic solution of Rolheiser’s (1998) social justice; “Silence” is part of the interpersonal response which requires a hearing of quiet or non-existent voices within Rolheiser’s (1998) community (what Chesterton (1920, p. 213) refers to as the “real democracy” of bringing “the shy people out”); “Solitude” allows us our unique existential condition to manifest itself in Rolheiser’s (1998) mellowness of heart and spirit; and “Discipline for prayer and action” is the technology we require to fulfill our vocational purpose as activated by Rolheiser’s (1998) private prayer and private morality.

Before moving on, I want to return to the proximal sources of affective emotions that I referred to above which Keating identifies as one of affective emotion’s two classes of causes. In their book A general theory of love, psychiatrists Lewis, Amini, and Lannon (2000, p. 230) state that those “with the wisdom to do so will heed their hearts and draw strength from their relatedness, and they will raise their children to do likewise”. They know why the raising of children in emotionally secure households matters because they see the damage in those who haven’t had that extraordinarily important advantage.

In The way of love, Irigaray (2002) makes an observation about her book in general that is apposite to Lewis et al’s general theory of love. Her book outlines, she writes, “another philosophy, in a way a philosophy in the feminine, where the values of intersubjectivity, of dialogue in difference, of attention to present life, in its concrete and sensible aspects, will be recognised and raised to the level of a wisdom. A philosophy which involves the whole of a human and not only that mental part of ourselves through which man has believed to succeed in differentiating himself from other kingdoms” (pp. vii-viii, emphasis added). Lewis et al certainly make a differentiation between human beings and the reptilian kingdom because the constituents of the latter cannot love. It is true that reptiles and human beings share that part of the brain that keeps us ticking over (the reptilian brainstem) but if that is all we are doing—ticking over—then Lewis et al suggest that we are no longer persons. They however make no pretences about our relationship with other mammals. We share a kingdom and at least two of our three brains with them. These authors also conclude with the recommendation of a dialogue that may bear some resemblance to what Irigaray envisages.

Our culture or “what we do around here” in its broadest sense is partly characterised by Lewis et al (2000) as following the “rules” of both physics and the emotions; if we don’t, we end up breaking bones and hearts, the latter in “failed marriages, hurtful relationships, neglected children, unfulfilled ambitions, and thwarted dreams” (p. 13). Our culture quite simply needs to learn the emotional laws in much the same way that we learned the laws of physics.

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224 Lewis et al (2000) rely on MacLean’s (1973) theory of the triune brain: the reptilian, the mammalian, and finally the neocortex (which along with various aspects of the mammalian brain is most highly developed in Homo sapiens sapiens).
While Lewis, Amini, and Lannon use the pharmacology at their disposal as well as the literature of neurodevelopment through to computer science, they also recognize the limitations of science and the need to also look at human lives as “the richest repository of [the mysteries of love]” in their efforts to “illuminate relatedness” (p. 12). They wrote their book following the Nabokov dictum that there can be no science without fancy and no art without facts (p. 12). In other words, they compared and combined the scientific research with the personal and subjective experiences of their patients, families, and themselves as well as the artistic legacy of western culture.\footnote{In doing so, it must be said, they found Freud and his notions of id, ego, and Oedipus of no help for their pragmatic task of dealing with those in difficulty who came to see them. Certainly the talking cure can only have limited effect confined as they do to one part of the brain.}

Lewis and et. al’s (2000) analysis is of interest in this thesis because its discussions and conclusions draw on similar models to those that underlie the wisdom model. While I have previously identified the close relationship between reason and emotion (for example in the equation \( P = A*M - SC \)), Lewis and et. al (2000) recognize the distinction between intellect and emotion that underlies those two component parts (A and M) that, while overstated in Western culture, is still a reflection of the brain’s design:

\[ \text{. . . we know that the neural systems responsible for emotion and intellect are separate, creating the chasm between them in human minds and lives. The same rift makes the mysteries of love difficult for people to penetrate, despite an earnest desire to do so. Because of the brain’s design, emotional life defeats Reason much as a poem does. (p. 4)} \]

In particular, they return to MacLean’s (1973) triune brain model to make their points, and in doing so, they mirror the separation of the T and the F in Jung’s typology and the path of the Cupid and Psyche myth whereby we must ultimately return to the ground of our mammalian being. This lies in the limbic brain—the part of the brain we share with the other animals that care for their young. The attraction of their analysis lies in its potential explication of those biblical passages for which Paul’s famous passage from the Letter to the Corinthians can stand in, in as good as an example as any: “I may have all knowledge and understand secrets . . . but if I have no love, I am nothing” (1 Corinthians 13: 2).

This is not to denigrate the intellect and the scientific journey of modernity (but what the authors refer to as “the pancognitive fallacy: I think, therefore everything I am is thinking” (p. 32)): it is just to make the point that that journey’s endpoint lies elsewhere and in a more humble location. No less an intellect than Einstein’s had something to say on this matter: “We should take care not to make the intellect our god; it has, of course, powerful muscles, but no personality. It cannot lead; it can only serve” (p. 32).

The Education Model (Figure 5.5) divided brain functioning and learning modes into four quadrants representing the cerebral (neocortex) and limbic brains of MacLean’s triune model\footnote{That is, the bottom reptilian brain, the limbic brain that overlies it, and the neocortex which lies on the top—the latest evolutionary brain and of course at its most developed in human beings. Lewis et al (2000) note criticisms of MacLean’s model and it is important for this thesis to write out Lewis et. al’s answer in full: Critics of MacLean’s triune model have disparaged its deliberate separation of intellect and emotion as unfashionable Romanticism. While the three brains differ in lineage and function, however, no one has argued for neurological autonomy. Each brain has evolved to interdigitate with its cranial cohabitants, and the lines between them, like dusk and dawn, are more shaded transitions than surgical demarcations. But it is one thing to say that night gives way to day and day fades into night, and it is quite another to declare light and dark equivalent. The cleavage between reason and passion is an ancient theme but no anachronism; it has endured because it speaks to the deep human experience of a divided mind. The scientific basis for separating neocortical from limbic brain matter rests on solid neuroanatomical, cellular, and empirical grounds. As viewed through the microscope, neocortical areas exhibit a far more primitive cellular organization than their neocortical counterparts. Certain radiographic dyes selectively stain limbic structures, thus painting the molecular dissimilarity between the two brains in clean, vivid strokes. One researcher made an antibody that binds to cells of the hippocampus—a limbic component—and found that those same fluorescent markers stuck to all parts of the limbic brain, lighting it up like a biological Christmas tree, without coloring the neocortex at all. Large doses of some medications destroy limbic tissue while leaving the neocortex unscathed, a sharp-shooting feat enabled by evolutionary divergence in the chemical composition of limbic and neocortical cell membranes. Nor is there much room for doubt that nurturance, social communion, communication, and play have their home in limbic territory. Remove a mother hamster’s whole neocortex and she can still raise her pups, but even slight limbic damage devastates her maternal abilities. Limbic lesions in monkeys can obliterate the entire awareness of others. After a limbic lobotomy, one impaired monkey stepped}, as well as
distinguishing a right and a left brain (see McGilchrist, 2009). The focus in this chapter is on the right, limbic quadrant to tie in with what Lewis et al (2000) are postulating in their “general theory of love.”

There are three processes of the limbic system which are vital for human (and mammalian) life227, let alone its flourishing. These are limbic resonance, regulation, and revision. The following quotation defines these three necessary processes in a nutshell: “Because our minds seek one another through limbic resonance, because our physiologic rhythms answer to the call of limbic regulation, because we change one another's brains through limbic revision—what we do inside relationships matters more than any other aspect of human life” (p. 191-2, emphasis added).

Reason has a tendency to recognise only itself, just as Einstein warned. But, as Lewis et al (2000, pp. 228-229) explain, our cognitive processes, compared to our emotional legacy (at 100 million years old), have only been around “a few hundred thousand years . . . at best”. That didn’t stop western minds drawing their plans “by the light of this guiding disposition, including as weight-bearing beams their faith in a veridical reality, the supremacy of analytic thought, and the ultimate rule of rationality”. The mind's “quieter limbic inhabitant” didn’t stand a chance.

Limbic resonance, regulation, and revision are of course important at the individual level as Lewis et al, as psychiatrists, recognise228. However, they do not and cannot neglect the sociological level, and they appreciate well the vital role of culture in achieving transformation:

> Cultures transform themselves in a few decades or centuries, while human nature cannot change at all. The likelihood of collision between cultural dictates and emotional exigencies is significant. Some cultures encourage emotional health; others do not. Some, including modern America, promote activities and attitudes directly antithetical to fulfilment. (p. 193)229

227 Infants who only receive the physical wherewithal for life, literally die for the lack of human warmth and handling.

228 “It is not the reactivity of the limbic system that is a barrier to change, but the strength of its connections to other parts of the brain” (Lewis et al, 2000, p. 196).

229 Lewis et al’s discussion thereafter focuses on the controversy regarding infants sleeping with their parents. Allowing the latter to occur is an example of the wisdom that is tied up in our evolutionary development, and they use Robert Wright to address it: “According to Ferber, the trouble with letting a child who fears sleeping alone into your bed is that ‘you are not really solving the problem. There must be a reason why he is so fearful.’ Yes, there must. Here’s one candidate. Maybe your child’s brain was designed by natural selection over millions of years during which mothers slept with their babies. Maybe back then if babies found themselves completely alone at night it often meant something horrific had happened—the mother had been eaten by a beast, say. Maybe the young brain is designed to respond to this situation by screaming frantically so that any relatives within earshot will discover the child. Maybe, in short, the reason that kids left alone sound terrified is that kids left alone naturally get terrified. Just a theory” (p. 194). “Small wonder that the human societies with the lowest incidence of SIDS are also the ones with widespread cosleeping” the authors conclude (p. 195). “The family bed debate dances around an American conundrum: we cherish individual freedoms more than any society, but we do not respect the process whereby autonomy develops . . . love and security are the patient midwives whose ministrations bring forth a new soul” (pp. 196, 197).

In a similar way it is “the specificity of a child’s limbic needs . . . [and] that children form elaborate, individualized relationships with special, irreplaceable others” (p. 198) that makes a myriad range of caregivers in early life problematic in terms of its long term neural consequences.
“[R]elationships live on time” they stress (p. 205). It is, they say, the equation of love. “Relatedness is a physiologic process that, like digestion or bone growth, admits no plausible acceleration” (p. 205), thus exposing forever the fundamental folly of the one-dimensional love of speed that was introduced in Chapter 7 above. Instead, we are “encouraged to achieve, not attach . . . The faster they spin the occupational centrifuge, the more its high-velocity whistle drowns out the wiser whisper of their own hearts” and in “a dazzling vote of confidence for form over substance, our culture fawns over the fleetingness of being in love while discounting the importance of loving. . . .” In love merely brings the players together, and the end of that prelude is as inevitable as it is desirable. True relatedness has a chance to blossom only with the waning of its intoxicating predecessor” (p. 206).

Nature uses the same circuits involved in child-rearing for romantic attachments as the research by Bowlby and Ainsworth has shown: “A steady limbic connection with a resonant parent lays down emotional expertise.” But a lack of that “falters in its efforts to meet another's rhythms, to catch another's tempo and melody in the duet of love” (pp. 207-208), and this has implications for culture and its focus on the three temptations of possessions, prestige and power.

Lewis et al. (2000, p. 209) compare the time spent on the mutuality required for love and that spent on following the siren calls for happiness that our culture sends out. “A culture wise in love's ways would understand a relationship's demand for time” they state, but unfortunately “Limbic pursuits sink slowly and steadily lower on America's list of collective priorities” . . .

Top-ranking items remain the pursuit of wealth, physical beauty, youthful appearance, and the shifting, elusive markers of status. There are brief spasms of pleasure to be had at the end of those pursuits—the razor-thin delight of the latest purchase, the momentary glee of flaunting this promotion or that unnecessary trinket—pleasure here, but no contentment. Happiness is within range only for adroit people who give the slip to America's values. These rebels will necessarily forgo exalted titles, glamorous friends, exotic vacations, washboard abs, designer everything—all the proud indicators of upward mobility—and in exchange, they may just get a chance at a decent life. (p. 209)

Anxiety and depression, Lewis et. al state, “are the first consequences of limbic omissions . . . The brains of insecurely attached children react to provocative events with an exaggerated outpouring of stress hormones and neurotransmitters. The reactivity persists into adulthood. A minor stressor sweeps such a person toward pathologic anxiety, and a larger or longer one plunges him into depression's black hole” (pp. 210-211) and of course the authors note that both conditions have become epidemic in modern American society230.

Like Alexander (2008) and many others, Lewis et.al point to the efficacy (albeit limited) of groups like Alcoholics Anonymous. Prevention is always better than cure, but such communities have a better hope than most of somewhat reversing some of the problems that addicts face. At least, Lewis et. al would say, it is usually mammals rather than functioning reptiles that are in charge of such organizations (p. 224). They quote Walker Percy who states “modern man is estranged from being, from his own being, from the being of other creatures in the world, from transcendent being. He has lost something—what, he does not . . .

230 Lewis et. al write:

A person who lacks a stable center feels an urgent need to fill the gap—he needs something to orient himself as he tries to navigate the world. Since he cannot use the limbic tools that penetrate to the core of self and others, he will look to external cues—those he can be sure about. Thwarted attachment and limbic disconnection thus encourage superficiality and narcissism. People who cannot see content must settle for appearances. They will cling to image with the desperation appropriate to those who lack an alternative. In a culture gone shallow, plastic surgery supplants health; photogenicity trumps leadership; glibness overpowers integrity; sound bites replace discourse; and changing what is fades before the busy label-swapping of political correctness. When a society loses touch with limbic bedrock, spin wins. . . . If the attachment fabric of a civilization frays, if people cannot get from their relationships the emotional regulation that those bonds were designed to furnish, they will commandeer whatever means of limbic modulation they can lay hands on. Their hungering brains will seek satisfaction from a variety of ineffectual substitutes—alcohol, heroin, cocaine, and their cousins. As a society produces more people who lack access to the neural process that engenders emotional balance, the ranks of street drug users will grow . . . Will lectures on the evils of chemical dependency deter teenagers from a life of substance dependence? Don't believe it. While their end is worthy, such talk targets the neocortical brain, not the limbic one. (pp. 211-212, 214)
know; he only knows that he is sick unto death with the loss of it.” The mysterious, absent element is a deep and abiding immersion in communal ties (p. 225).

In the end the concentration of Western culture on the systemic/technological quadrant of the wisdom model has made society degenerate into that stereotyped image of the third world village where the men sit around talking while the women do all the work. Some aid agencies have realised that the funds must go to the women because in any society, they seem to be the ones that end up being the guardians of the limbic dimension, and therefore most involved in their own and others welfare. Western society would be wise to imitate this in the emphasis it accords to the lower right as opposed to the upper left quadrant of the wisdom model.

In ending their penultimate chapter, Lewis et. al make a very telling observation when referring to Charles Dickens and his identification of Ignorance and Want as monsters horrible and dread:

> Our culture might trade back these devils for the divinity that our mammalian heritage accords us, if only we had the inclination to attend to limbic imperatives. (p. 225, emphasis added)

Where Schaef in Chapter 10 observed that white male western society sees our intellectual faculties as closest to God’s, we are back with McGilchrist’s (2009) alternative finding that divinity is in fact in its opposite location. We are also back with Irigaray’s espousal of the theology of the Incarnation, “the physical, fleshly embodiment of the divine in the world”.

> In taking the body seriously as the site of God’s coming into the world, born of a woman, incarnational theology has the potential to affirm the uniquely embodied experiences of women. (Deal & Beal, 2004, p. 107)

However, this section must also end on a note of caution, and it is a warning about the dangers that also lie in what could be termed limbic—and feminine—chauvinism. Lewis et.al put their finger on it when they state, “History brims with the brutality that flows between groups when no limbic tie unites them” (p. 216). If there is one thing that the upper left hand quadrant has opened up, it is the awareness that there is such a thing as a universal humanity beyond our cultural groupings. The upper left quadrant should highlight to us that (1) there can be a need to over-ride some of our evolutionary settings, and (2) to fundamentally distrust any system without a limbic brain. Systems can be exclusively reptilian in their outlook:

> The urge to embed oneself in a family—to hold an endeavor in common with others, to be part of a team, a band, a group that struggles together toward a common victory—is an indomitable aspect of the human mind and brain. In a culture whose members are ravenous for love and ignorant of its workings, too many will invest their love in a barren corporate lot, and will reap a harvest of dust. (p. 217)

It is in those two areas that sitting around talking under trees can be of benefit, and it is why I am essentially participating in that activity by writing this thesis. However, it also must be realised that our society contains increasing numbers of people who, because of lacks in positive limbic resonance, regulation, and revision function like reptilian organisms (heads of companies as much as armed gangs) but are armed with the cunning of the neocortical brain, and who thereby make such intellectual enterprise redundant.

> … the brains of neglected children show neurons missing by the billions. Lest anyone think those vanished cells are inconsequential, our own children prove otherwise. (p. 219)

In this context, that is, in the extremely important context within which children grow up, the ideas and methods of Hendrix (2008), although popularly based in the sense that Hendrix is a working psychotherapist rather than an academic in the university system, are important in terms of his postulation

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231 I for one would be quite happy if that were not the case, but it is. This quality in women is most evident in their reaction to stress. Whereas Fight or Flight was assumed for many years to be the universal response to stress, health psychologist Shelley Taylor in her research has found that the response in women is more likely to accord with a Tend and Befriend model.
that, given the parity between love and attachment systems in childhood and adulthood referred to above, it is in marriage and similar relationships that adults get a second opportunity to “grow up”.

Perplexed by the fact that divorced subjects often reappeared at his consulting door bemoaning a second failed relationship with partners who fundamentally replicated the previous one, he, and his partner in both senses Helen Hunt, began to formulate their imago theory whereby they theorize that we “fall in love” with those people who provide the potential for healing our childhood wounds. This however is not as simple a project as it sounds. The theory, and the therapy consequent on its principles, is reasonably complex and I do not wish to go into it further here. However, in terms of this thesis, it provides an important basis for re-evaluating the importance of the erotic relationship in a way that Catholicism in its over-emphasis on celibacy and the seeming primacy of the ordained priesthood, has perhaps neglected. I say that with some reservation because I do not want to jump on that particular bandwagon which criticizes matters it fails to fully understand. Nevertheless, as Hendrix maintains, where other systems have failed—and this includes the Church—the erotic relationship, if it matures, can provide the best means of “growing up” into emotional maturity that there is.

As Hendrix (2008, p. xxxv) states, “We are born in relationship, we are wounded in relationship, and we can be healed in relationship. Indeed we cannot be fully healed outside of a relationship”. That of course does not necessarily mean that the physically erotic relationship is the only one that suffices. I contend that our relationship with God is also erotic as is our relationships with certain Others where there is no physical intimacy involved. That is, there are relationships in our lives that we know are more important than others because we learn more from them in ways that make us grow. Nevertheless, it is the more-or-less committed and monogamous relationship of coupledom that is the most common and that admits of the most intimacy, or should do. The most successful of these I would suggest are those where each takes the prime responsibility for his or her own emotions. These relationships would in that sense not conform to the gendering of emotion shown in Figure 12.2. The best way I personally have found of achieving the emotional maturity that derives from that sense of responsibility, has been through Jungian individuation and it is to Jung’s theory that I now turn.
Chapter 13

THE WILDNESS LYING IN WAIT AS JUNG’S PROCESS OF INDIVIDUATION

In an analysis of Hitchcock movies, the Lacanian philosopher Zizek (1991) isolates “three successive forms of the libidinal structure of the subject exhibited in capitalist society during the past century”: the “autonomous” individual of the Protestant ethic, the heteronomous “organization man”, and the type gaining predominance today, the “pathological narcissist” (p. 102).

It is on this basis of “pathological narcissism” that the insights of Ernest Becker and Jacques Lacan can be joined with those of Carl Jung to address the issues that Maxwell, Haidt, McGilchrist, Smith, Schaef, Gilligan et. al raised in the first chapters of Part 2. What do we do with the self-absorbed ego— Greenwald’s (1980) “totalitarian ego”232—the Lacanian fiction that we live by? How can we get it to grow “up” and “out” to others. The answer will be a paradoxical one; it first requires growing “down” and “in”—by connecting with what Jung called the “Self”.

However, Zizek (1991) notes that the pathological narcissist is the typical Hitchcockian hero of the 1950s and the 1960s (for example Mitch in The Birds) and he is dominated by “the obscene figure of the maternal superego” (p. 104). He is a regressive phenomenon in other words.

With the challenging of the patriarchy, Tacey (1997) points to a similar social phenomenon from a Jungian point of view. There is a danger that, as a reaction to the psychological (but not social) decline of the patriarchy, we regress into an archetypal maternal feminine state for which the capitalist system is only too happy to offer itself as a surrogate for.

Once again, it is necessary to employ the wisdom model to illustrate the main points that Tacey (1997) is making. Firstly, he identifies two sets of thinking, the political and the mythic, Logos and Eros. The latter two parallel my Ego and Eco categories, and to all intents and purposes, the former two do as well. In making those distinctions he is advocating what this thesis is also advocating: “Unsparing of either a purely mythopoetic or socio-political approach to masculinity, [Tacey] demands that the mythic be politicised and the political recognised as mythic” (Peter Tatham quoted in Tacey (1997), p. ii). In other words, it is the arrows within the wisdom model (Figure 4.17) that are as important as the entities represented therein, especially those that pass across the NW to SE gradient.

That his stance is a radical one is indicated in a quote he uses from James Hillman which represents the priority that a mature Communion dimension must ultimately have over Agency (see Figure 4.3) if western history is to arrive at some sort of peace with itself.

We are cured when we are no longer only masculine in psyche, no matter whether we are male or female in biology. Analysis cannot constellate this cure until it, too, is no longer masculine in psychology. The end of analysis coincides with the acceptance of femininity. (p. xiv)

Immediately underneath it, Tacey quotes Tom Absher who also recognises the problem of a system that does nobody any favours—least of all those ostensibly in charge:

In maintaining a privileged position in the patriarchy, men cooperate in an ironic subjugation of themselves. (p. xiv)

That is a very radical233 notion—one that is calculated to raise many fears given that such a notion would fundamentally undermine many of the assumptions and attitudes we take for granted in the West. In the

232 This “operates much like a totalitarian office of misinformation, fabricating and revising our personal histories to cast us in unrealistically positive light” (cited in Leary, 2004, p. 56). Leary (2004) believes that coming to terms with this “burden of the self” is one of the challenges associated with human consciousness.

233 And this is what I would call the radical existential position underlying Stage 5 functioning as opposed to the conservative existential position typified in Stage 3 functioning. While I have classed the latter as stereotypically feminine / communion / ecoic, it is, by way of its inherent conservative nature, unlikely to change a faulty culture. Gossip for example is a feature of Stage 3 culture, and while it keeps people in line, which in the case of amoral individuals is a very valuable function, gossip is
end, what else is Christianity but a radical overturning of patriarchal and egocentric values by Irigaray’s “most female of men”. In the turn to the feminine however, there are very real pitfalls to avoid and Tacey (1997) identifies what they are, using Jungian ideas. Overall, Tacey seems to be saying what was stated earlier: Stage 4 Ego is subsumed by the Stage5/6 partnership where its agency is used for and secondary to the needs of others in community. “Masculinity must not be eroded or washed away by the rising tide of the feminine”, but instead “remade, reconstructed, and allowed to become the intelligent and self-critical partner of the new feminine reformation” Tacey (1997, p. 1) writes.

This feminine reformation would not be made up of female egos to replace the male ones; men and women would all be defined as the “intelligent and self-critical” partners in this new feminine reformation. This however is not as simple as it sounds given the experiential histories of both culture and individuals that have been outlined above. In other words, it is a fraught process, because, as Tacey observes, “lost femininities” and “alternative masculinities” have been “systematically devoured” (p. 2) by the patriarchal system; it is a process that cannot be underestimated in its level of difficulty. Nevertheless, Christianity provides the model for its possibility although, like the journey of its central figure, Jesus of Nazareth, it is not a model that many feel inclined to actively follow and participate in.

Tacey (1997) notes that even a system like Jung’s has been and continues to be used for regressive rather than the progressive purposes for which it would be most valuable. He is under no illusions that one of these offenders was Jung himself in some of his writings about the limitations of men’s and women’s respective psyches. Tacey mends these weaknesses in the Jungian canon by insisting, as James Hillman indicates in the quotation above, that the psyche is an androgynous phenomenon. It includes masculine and feminine dimensions as the wisdom model does, but ultimately, there is no distinction between the psyches of men and women as a whole. In that sense Jungian theory is progressive.

The actual regressive result is Zizek’s “pathological narcissism” whereby, as Tacey observes, the social-political system hasn’t changed but the mythic dimension has regressed into a state shown in Figure 4.3. As that diagram shows, a Stage 3 herd mentality, using the technology of the Stage 4 culture, can indulge in a wide variety of pleasurable pursuits, thinking it is enjoying an ersatz Agency when in reality, it is merely serving to cement in the power relations of capitalism. What Tacey has in mind is a lot less pleasurable than this. It is the process of individuation which takes the psyche from Stage 4 to Stage 5. It is this process that the death and resurrection of Jesus, and the Catholic Mass, models.

A short time before I was engaged in writing this section, short-lived, but destructive, riots occurred in London and they can be used as an example of the difference between the immature agency of a Stage 3 and the mature agency of a Stage 5 psyche. The young participants of these riots could be somewhat “excused” from condemnation of their excesses given the milieu they occupied and the fact that individuation is not possible—or at least usual—until middle age; but their behaviour exhibited for the .

often an example of superficial mental processing and therefore a blunt instrument and one unfitting for sophisticated analysis. Stage 3 thinking is the sort of thinking that changes a Palm Sunday crowd into a mob baying for blood. There is no substantial or original thinking going on in it. Stage 5 thinking is the feminine / communion / ecoic thinking that I am postulating is the feminine that Hillman for example refers to. It is certainly the type of feminine that I am referring to. Stage 3 thinking is our evolutionary inheritance born of a social milieu and refined in dangerous circumstances. Spirituality and soulfulness however mean more than mere survival. They are about maturation in the fullest sense of that term.

234 A summary of Tacey’s (1997) position and the regrettable examples of Jungian-derived theory that he wishes to debunk can be appreciated from the following quote: While a few creative souls dream Jung's work onward into the future, a great many public and high-profile Jungians exploit the murky or muddled elements of Jungian theory to their own popular and commercial ends. What takes place . . . is a series of dangerous fusions and confusions. Archetype is fused with gender to produce a new Jungian fundamentalism; archetype is fused with the individual person to manufacture inflationary fantasies; and archetype is confused with stereotype to produce a guilt-ridden and superego-driven politics of conformity. This new gender fundamentalism is upbeat and wildly enthusiastic. Like a religious fundamentalism, it knows what is right for us and caters directly to our fears and anxieties. In a time of rapid change and uncertainty, our weaker natures are magnetically attracted to “healers” and “prophets” who are absolutely certain about human behaviour and psychology. (pp. 32-33)

235 Androgynous is a rather dangerous word in that it could be used to mean a dilution of the qualities of the feminine and the masculine. It should actually mean something like Chesterton’s two colours, co-existent and pure.
following social commentator the very real problems that exist underneath the glossy surfaces of neoliberal capitalistic societies:

What we have on the streets of London and elsewhere are welfare-state mobs. The youth who are “rising up”—actually they are simply shattering their own communities—represent a generation that has been more suckled by the state than any generation before it. (O’Neill, 2011)

Although Zizek (1991, p. 106) does not define exactly what he means by the “obscene figure of the maternal superego”, she is presumably the figure that keeps the “suckling” relationship alive and disallows the opportunities for change and individual growth. Zizek illustrates the importance of The Birds as a resolution of this problem by recalling the moment, at the end of the movie, when Mitch’s mother, through the smile she and Melanie exchange, abandons her superego role. The birds, Zizek states, are the counterpart of the reign of maternal law, and it is this that defines the kernel of the Hitchcockian fantasy.

Tacey’s (1997) book however is all about men changing albeit that this includes the resolution of the mother-complex in the way Zizek describes. The detour above into the maternal archetype and the narcissism that is a necessary phenomenon for and in the developing child (and in the developing culture as we saw with Becker) was to sound the necessary warning note that change should (1) be progressive and not regressive and (2) it must be socio-political within the context of the patriarchal system if it is to be effective, or to be a sign that something fundamental (on a mythic level) has happened. This triumph of the patriarchal system is evident in Bauman’s (2011) commentary which saw the London event as “riots of defective and disqualified consumers” which is what we have all become.

From cradle to coffin we are trained and drilled to treat shops as pharmacies filled with drugs to cure or at least mitigate all illnesses and afflictions of our lives and lives in common. Shops and shopping acquire thereby a fully and truly eschatological dimension. Supermarkets, as George Ritzer famously put it, are our temples; and so, I may add, the shopping lists are our breviaries, while strolls along the shopping malls become our pilgrimages. Buying on impulse and getting rid of possessions no longer sufficiently attractive in order to put more attractive ones in their place are our most enlivening emotions. The fullness of consumer enjoyment means fullness of life. I shop, therefore I am. To shop or not to shop, this is the question.

It is a grossly deficient religion but a religion to which neo-liberal capitalism has led us. For those at the wrong end of it and with no other coherent system of value to take its place, “non-shopping is the jarring and festering stigma of a life un-fulfilled—and of own nonentity and good-for-nothingness. Not just the absence of pleasure; absence of human dignity. Of life meaning. Ultimately, of humanity and any other ground for self-respect and respect of the others around” (Bauman, 2011).

Jung’s mythic theory then must be examined with both regression and lack of progression firmly in mind. Tacey’s underlying point is that we have to challenge and grow beyond both paternal and maternal archetypes, and I would also add, the masculine and feminine archetypes underlying the Ego and Eco dimensions of the wisdom model. It is the “ego” with a small “e”—the executive decision maker in the middle of that model—that I now wish to fully acknowledge as one of the central figures in all our individual dramas (the other being the Self). The SNAG (sensitive new age guy) as just another “Ego” type was correctly seen as a regression and it is indeed the masculine journey that is arguably the more problematic because of the inflation that automatically comes from identification with an Ego archetype. In addition, while the equally forceful identification with a feminine (read submissive) Eco archetype has been problematic for women in the past, it is now more as Lacanian theory (see Chapter 14) posits: the little girl has a choice about which path she takes; the little boy is bound to the phallus-bearer role.

David Tacey sets out a neo-Jungian guide for this journey and one that, because of his background and the fact that he has seen and experienced the territory, seems to be relatively unthreatened by it, because threatening it is. It is, for most, uncharted country—the arena of the Lacanian Real. In Figure 4.3 it is the
move to Stage 5 that exacts the very real costs of individuation in the sense that we move from Lacan’s Symbolic and Kierkegaard’s Ethical stages into their Real and Religious stages respectively.\(^{236}\)

Zizek (1991) refers to a science fiction novel by Robert Heinlein, The Unpleasant Profession of Jonathan Hoag that well observes the chill of the Real. It may be a pale and rather banal and even somewhat false representation of it, but its lack of religiosity is its strength, and I also use it here because it conveys the overall sense of undifferentiated greyenss that depression, for example, can confront one with:

The action takes place in contemporary New York where a certain Jonathan Hoag hires the private investigator Randall to find out what happens to him after he enters his working premises on the (nonexistent) thirteenth floor of the Acme building—Hoag is totally unaware of his activity during this time. Next day, Randall follows Hoag on his way to work, but between the twelfth and fourteenth floors Hoag suddenly disappears and Randall is unable to locate the thirteenth floor.

The same evening, a double of Randall appears to him in his bedroom mirror and tells Randall to follow him through the mirror where he is called by the committee. On the other side of the mirror, the double leads Randall to a great meeting hall where the president of the committee of twelve informs him that he is now on the thirteenth floor, to which he will be called from time to time for interrogation. During these subsequent interrogations, Randall learns that the members of this mysterious committee believe in a Great Bird supposed to breed small birds, her offspring, and to rule the universe together with them. The denouement of the story: Hoag finally becomes aware of his real identity and he invites Randall and his wife Cynthia to a picnic in the countryside where he relates to them the whole plot. He is, he tells them, an art critic—but of a peculiar kind. Our human universe is just one of the existing universes; the real masters of all worlds are mysterious beings, unknown to us, who create different worlds, different universes as works of art. Our universe was created by one of these universal artists. To control the artistic perfection of their productions, these artists from time to time send into their creations one of their own kind, disguised as an inhabitant of the created universe (in Hoag’s case disguised as a man), who acts as a sort of universal art critic. (With Hoag, there was a short circuit; he forgot who he really was and has to ask for the services of Randall.) The members of the mysterious committee interrogating Randall were only representatives of some evil lower divinity striving to interrupt the performance of the real “gods,” the universal artists. Hoag then informs Randall and Cynthia that he has discovered in our universe some minor defects that will be quickly repaired in the next few hours. They will never even notice, if they simply make sure that when they drive back to New York, they do not—under any circumstances and despite what they might see—open the window of their car. Thereafter Hoag leaves; still excited, Randall and Cynthia start to drive home. Things proceed without mishap until they reach the Acme building where he is called by the committee. On the other side of the mirror, the double leads Randall to a great meeting hall where the president of the committee of twelve informs him that he is now on the thirteenth floor of the Acme building—Hoag is totally unaware of his activity during this time. Next day, Randall follows Hoag on his way to work, but between the twelfth and fourteenth floors Hoag suddenly disappears and Randall is unable to locate the thirteenth floor.

The sunny scene was restored; through the glass they saw the patrolman, the sidewalk, and the city beyond. The formless grey flux was out there, too; through the glass, city traffic and sunny street were plain, nothing. (pp. 13-14)

The mid-life depression—an awareness that all is not right in one’s world—or that there is another alternative world beyond it—takes some courage to walk into. It is the “inchoate” gloom that exists outside the window, although, with depression, one can have no choice if we choose to grow up. While Jesus can and does function as the model in the Jungian schema in terms of the intensity of the change required, there is no journey quite like the character of the individual journey we must each take. It is the fact that no exact individual map exists that makes it terrifying. This is the point for which the “appreciation of difference” comes at a true personal cost. No wonder regression looks the more attractive option—at least it is familiar—and, given the levels of process and substance addiction in western society, it is one most of us choose, and the reason why some theorists see it as symptomatic of a poverty of spirit (Alexander, 2008). I would go further and define it as a poverty of soul as well—what I see as the

\(^{236}\) Seligman’s (2002) “meaningful” stage (see Figure 4.3) is the parallel of Lacan’s and Kierkegaard’s levels, but as with a lot of mainstream psychology, it doesn’t really get to grips in sufficiently rigorous terms with what can be involved in human growth after mid-life.
existential dimension of spirit. In other words, there is no route map (albeit that the paschal mystery provides a template), and one doubts if one has the wherewithal to make the journey required at all.

In the wisdom model, I see spirit and soul as the two ends of the vertical dimension. In Jung’s schema, the (feminine) anima is the soul of man and the (masculine) animus is the spirit of woman. Within the context of culture, the conscious ego identifies with its socially-derived sexual identity leaving the anima and the animus subsumed in the unconscious of men and women respectively. To the extent that they remain unconscious phenomena, the anima and the animus interfere in the relationships of men and women with men projecting their (undeveloped) anima onto women and women projecting their (undeveloped) animus onto men. As Figure 13.1 shows, the relationships between men and women must be ones between flesh and blood people. It is up to each individual to develop the relationship with the unconscious anima and animus within, using such Jungian methods as dream analysis, active imagination and, as I argue in Chapter 12, the emotions. Until we do, we are at the mercy of socio-political and mythic forces we do not understand. As Tacey stresses, we must identify both these sets of forces so that we might become the intelligent and self-critical partner of the new feminine reformation.

Up to this point, the focus has been predominantly on the past with hints here and there of what might be entailed in a mapping of the future. The reason that Jung is the penultimate subject of the substantive part of Part 2 is that his theory provides both the framework for transformation and a way of showing why our Christian heritage is so relevant for the West’s future. While Freud looked backwards into childhood, Jung sought to show that the psyche was urging us onward to create a new and broader personality (Tacey, 2006, p. 4). Given that Plato and Aristotle are haunting every step of this thesis, it is pertinent to include here Tacey’s (2006) observation that in “many ways, Jung is the intellectual descendant of Plato, who postulated an ideal realm of abstract forms (invisible metaphysical constructs), whereas Freud is the heir of Aristotle, who strove to understand the world through reason and logic” (p. 5). Jung was first of all a Freudian and for any Platonist—such as Iris Murdoch—there is, one hopes, the realisation that Plato cannot healthily exist without Aristotle. The Ideal can be dreamed of, but we must also realise that one has to get “down and dirty” to realise that Ideal. In addition, mindful of the dangers that Baumeister (1997) earlier identified about the potential evils that lie within Idealism, the Ideal is best tackled first within the psyche of the Idealist him- or herself. It is better for the old ego to “die”, than for others to pay that price for what is ultimately an individual journey. It is important however at this point to realise that Jung, like Murdoch—the other Platonist—sees the problem both in individuals and the societies they live in—both in neurosis and in social convention—both in the Imaginary and the Symbolic Realms. In this sense, the secular society was a problem for Jung because religion he claimed was “a product of psyche” and not to be dismissed by the mind. “We have to face the consequences of the collapse of religion,” he states, “which are quite simply, a troubled mind, a disturbed soul . . . We are not designed to live encapsulated by the ego, but need to see ourselves in relationship with sacred forces . . . The ego makes a good servant of life, but a lousy master” (Tacey, 2006, pp. 97, 89, 91).

Having just made the assertion above that the ego is the executive decision maker of the psyche, what is it then that Tacey seems to be asserting here? It is that, in the individuation process, the decision has to be consciously made to open up the channel in the psyche that connects us with the Self, Stevens’ (1994) “archetype of all archetypes”, and the one that allows us “to see ourselves in relationship with sacred forces”. Only then can we free ourselves of our inherent guilt. In a view reminiscent of Becker (1975), Tacey (2006) states:

Jung believed that modern men and women seek to atone for their guilt by hard work and industry. We are guilty about our nakedness, our squandering of tradition, and we channel this guilt into activity and creativity. (p. 97)

Ultimately Jung had to split with Freud because it is Jung’s system of thinking that wants to see the amalgamation of science and religion; who saw in fact that religion is vital for growth rather than an expression of infantile regression:
Carl Jung wanted to see religion “in here”, in the cosmic forces of the psyche, in the interplay of psychic opposites, in dreams and visions, in the structures of mind that become visible in art, imagination, myth, literature and symbolism. This was Jung’s myth for modernity, offering it something to believe in. God was not dead but had changed his name and location. Salvation had become individuation, the spiritual art of becoming a whole person. (Tacey, 2006, pp. 7-8)

The question here is not an “either-or” so much as which system on each side of a “both-and” is big enough to include the “other” without devaluation. In this sense the option must be for a religion that does not discredit science—for a Stage 5 sensibility that assumes Stage 4 along with it so that the latter can serve as Fowlerian Stage 6 for the society in which it lives; for a mature femininity that values relationship as much as it values the egoic identity that allows it to give without sentimentality.

Tacey (2006) identifies the main archetypes of the psyche, as anima, animus, shadow, spirit, soul, Self, the mother, and the father which are spontaneous products of the unconscious. We have covered the anima and animus, spirit and soul, the mother and the father. The shadow and the Self remain.

Stevens (1994) provides a map of the psyche (Figure 13.2) which gives it structure and helps to identify where each of the main archetypes and their manifestations in complexes exist in relation to one another. The most important archetype in terms of a resource is the Self, and the ego-Self axis serves to reiterate McGilchrist’s main point about seeing the ego as the Emissary of the Master—which is the Self (often spelt with a capital S to distinguish it from its more everyday meaning).

The Self is both architect and builder of the dynamic structure which supports our psychic existence throughout life . . . Its goal is wholeness, the complete realisation of the blueprint for human existence within the context of the life of the individual. Individuation is the raison d’etre of the Self . . . [We] can experience it as a profound mystery, a secret resource, or a manifestation of the God within. . . . (Stevens, 1994, p. 45)

This is not to devalue the ego but to see it in its Catholic sense (given the unashamedly Catholic flavour of this thesis)—as being the hands and eyes of God if you will, which in Augustinian terms is that entity in which we live and move and have our Being.

The shadow on the other hand has an archetypal core in the archetypes of the Enemy, the Predator or the Evil Stranger (Stevens, 1994, p. 48). In as much as our vulnerable childhood was predicated on avoiding such threats, it was a resource that enabled our survival, if not in our personal life, then at least in terms of our evolutionary history as a species. Nevertheless maturity comes when we lose the ego defences of repression, denial and projection, and make the shadow conscious. It is to lose Samuels’ (1993) splits and projections that prevent the appreciation of our Wholeness (and our continuing imperfections). To own one’s shadow is, states Stevens (1994, p. 50), to become responsible for it—so others don’t have to pay for our deficiencies. Shadow consciousness is important therefore as a basis for greater social harmony and international understanding.

For example, we are all racist as taking the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) may convince. Nevertheless there must be a continual challenge to these consciously-owned predispositions. The quest for perfection and the disavowal of natural and cultural inclinations like racism, is not the goal. The quest for wholeness is, and that involves the continuing, albeit incomplete, ownership of our shadow and a conscious confession of our limitations. This is not the normal way either in one’s own cultural milieu or in the milieu of the Other; confessions of limitations are seen as signs of weakness rather than strength. This may be one reason for the reluctance with which the Church has reacted to the response of the general public to its internal scandals. To the extent that the Church does this in the belief at best that it is too dangerous to open oneself up to an angry mob that is unmindful of its own limitations, then perhaps this reluctance is understandable. But it doesn’t make it excusable. The belief in God and the way of the Cross demands a sincere apology to those offended against, and a “firm
purpose of amendment” so as to ensure such crimes do not occur again. After all, it expects the same of its “lay” members237.

The final import of the shadow then is that it is the entity that most interferes with a religion of relatedness whether that relatedness be with others, ourselves, or with God. That failure to see the beam in our own eye is in effect what Rolheiser (1998) identifies as the sin against the Holy Spirit; the only sin which is by definition, unforgivable, because it is not admitted. But as Haidt writes in his 2006 book, in which he devotes a whole chapter to the subject, the failure to do so is so very common, as is the difficulty of overcoming this human failing. And yet in Christian thinking, the Time we have allotted has, as far as one can tell, this sort of difficult maturation as its main object. That is how I interpret it anyway.

It is in relation to the shadow that we can join up not only Lacan and Jung but also Becker and Jung. Our ways of dealing with the shadow through the projections we make onto others—our Freudian defence mechanisms in other words—are a part of the way we express our narcissism, our “gobbling up” of others.

How does Jung—and how do his ideas—relate to the other systems covered in the earlier chapters of Part 2. As explained above, with regard to Freud, Jung, in predominantly looking forward rather than backwards, helps us frame an explicit vision of the teleology of the personality rather than just its history. By doing so, he “endorsed the freedom of the will, extended the developmental process beyond childhood to the whole span of life, proposed that illness is itself a form of growth, and saw religion as the fulfilment of a basic human need” (Stevens, 1994, pp. 125-126).

As a social theorist, Stevens (1994, p. 123) states that Jung’s theories supply an antidote to fascism through the potential that the individual psyche affords for the resistance of dogmatism and collective pressures. For example, “Those who toe the party line do not choose their own way but submerge their potential for wholeness in a relatively unconscious existence of collective conformity”. Jung saw the increasing role of the State and an individual dependence on it as a dangerous development.

Stevens (1994) also explains how Jung, an introverted visionary in the same manner as William Blake, was compensatory for the times he lived in. Jung’s psychological ideas, in his time, were the compensation for behaviourism, “with its dogmatic insistence on rigorous investigation of quantifiable behavioural responses to outer stimuli, banning the psyche and introspective techniques from the psychology laboratory, and denying the influence of innate structures on behavior” (Stevens, 1994, p. 126).

Jung’s ideas were also cultural compensation for “Western society, detached from its Judeo-Christian roots . . . compulsively materialistic, spiritually impoverished, and technologically obsessed” encouraging us to “to treat each other as economic commodities and exploit the physical resources of the planet while neglecting, to our own detriment, the spiritual resources of the Self. The only remedy for our civilization's ‘loss of soul’ was a massive reinvestment in the inner life of the individual, so as to re-establish a personal connection with ‘the mythic world in which we were once at home by right of birth’ . . . Deprived of the symbolism of myth and religion, people were cut off from meaning, and society was doomed to die” (Stevens, 1994, p. 126).

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237 As identified in Chapter 11, therein lies the danger inherent in using terms such as “lay” and “laity”. A double standard arises which privileges the class that one, as a “lay” person, is defined against. The fact that the Church comes across as above mere apology, underscores the dangers that accompany the existence of elites.

238 “… it means that the whole nation is by way of becoming a herd of sheep, constantly relying on a shepherd to drive them into good pastures. The shepherd's staff soon becomes a rod of iron, and the shepherds turn into wolves” (Stevens 1994, p. 123).
In response to criticisms that he was also scientific, he claimed to look beyond science: “I cannot experience myself as a scientific problem. Myth is more individual and expresses life more precisely than does science” (Stevens, 1994, p. 126).

It is with this sense of compensation, or, in a spirit of counter-culturalism, that all the theorists covered in Part 2 highlight aspects of the Fowler model, the wisdom model and the Becker model in both space and time. Those models help chart the West’s personal and cultural history as well as where it might potentially go from here. To the extent that Catholicism is free of the collective conformity of Stage 3 Christendom, it will become a counterculture in opposition in many ways to the secularism of Stage 4 Protestantism. As Jung himself put it—redolent of Chesterton’s remarks with which Part 2 began: “Science comes to a stop at the frontiers of logic, but nature does not: she thrives on ground as yet untrodden by theory” (Stevens, 1994, p. 126).

The models referred to above cross the divides that carve up the wisdom model and they therefore also open up the domain of the psyche in the vertical as well as the horizontal directions. There is the Ego-Eco divide, the Left Brain-Right Brain divide, the Conservative-Liberal divide and the Organizational-Individual divide. In all cases, it is the second partner (arguably admittedly in the Conservative-Liberal case which is a bit more complex) that is the devalued one, and therefore the one for which Christianity preferentially came into the world, according to my thesis. In other words, in all of these systems, I have interpreted them counter-culturally—just as Christianity is and should be counter-cultural. The reason for this comes from another Freudian-derived system which I have mentioned only in passing to date. This is Girard’s (2001) partisan and radical take on Christianity as a completely different system of religious belief compared to all others in global human history. In this regard he and his followers would take issue with Jung and the so-called inherent wisdom of his collective unconscious as available to and reflecting all. It is as if in our origins—and grace is part of that in a Christian view—we also necessarily came equipped with the means to survive in a world that is fraught with dangers, not only from the elements but from our fellow human beings who also came equipped with the same defence mechanisms. Jung does not adequately address the consequences of that—for my Catholic mind at least. To return to the story that Zizek related earlier, it is as if that kink that developed out of necessity in a world to which we had condemned ourselves in order to discover the difference between good and evil, needed an intermediary (in the story—Jonathan Hoag) to come in and “debug” the programme. In other words, Christianity (and its eponymous intermediary) is a unique phenomenon and Jung is not sufficiently cognisant of this—or at least many of his followers like Joseph Campbell are not (the reason I have extensively used Tacey’s work in this chapter to avoid the more occult and self-serving interpretations of Campbell’s work). Nevertheless, all the systems covered in Part 2 are useful in the sense that Stage 4 in Fowler’s schema is part of the journey to Stage 5. It is their shared similarity as products of Stage 4 that is another connection among them. The “tweak” that Jesus Christ (part product not only of Mary but also part product of our own “wombs” if we care to give birth to it) provides, is what Girard’s work seeks to show and unravel from the accretions of two thousand years of history.

To return to the diagram that Stevens (1994) supplies (Figure 13.2) of the Jungian psyche, its womb-like nature, which Catholicism exploits in its symbolism of Mary, can now be appreciated. McGilchrist’s (2009) “Master” is the Whole that grows in the womb of each of us in the manner that Meister Eckhart described when he observed the futility of Christ born of Mary unless Christ grew in his womb also. With Jesus Christ’s incarnation, the singularity of the wisdom model is achieved in which there are no longer only the four quadrants (of the masculine God the Father, that “most female of men” Jesus Christ, and the masculine (fire-Paraclete) and feminine (water-Sophia) aspects of the Spirit) but also the Wholeness that they together represent (see Figure 13.3).

It is the event in human history that the Incarnation represents which nudge human history into a distinctly different orbit. Underlying it, in the sense that this thesis is being written in the context of a Catholic faith, is the assumption that the over-riding impetus and trajectory in human history has been and would have continued to be, masculine. It is doubtful therefore that such an event would have been
possible for any single individual to institute, let alone an entire culture. A rupture was needed, what Chesterton describes as the only real miracle that has occurred (“he was made Man”), thereby setting the model for all Men forever.

It is at this point that the importance of Difference in the sense that it is being used in this thesis can begin to be more fully realised. As Stevens (1994) puts it,

There can be no doubt that Jung was an odd and unusual man, but his extraordinary achievement would not have been possible had he been any other than as he was. He expressed his credo at many different times in different ways, but there is one passage that sums it up better than any other: “Personality is the supreme realization of the innate idiosyncrasy of a living being. It is an act of high courage flung in the face of life, the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence coupled with the greatest possible freedom for self-determination”. (p. 128)

According to Catholicism, Jesus Christ was the one in whom that courage was the most tangible. And courage is just one of the four cardinal virtues identified in Greek and Christian thought. Courage is indeed the “manly” virtue, and, for wholeness, we also need to identify Jesus with the three others: justice, temperance and most importantly for this thesis, wisdom, which lies at the existential pole which is the one most closely connected to the Self.

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While, it was stated above, Jung’s theories supply an antidote to fascism, there needs to be some discussion of Jung’s role in German life specifically before and during the second World War. This is important for this thesis for many reasons. It serves for example as a commentary on the limits of what I call the “knowledge effect”. One may know what the right thing to do is, but actually living it is another matter entirely, and “living it” is what ultimately matters as far as other people are concerned. Secondly, an analysis of a biography of the theorist might point to a problem in the theory. Thirdly, German and European life, indeed human society more generally, has illustrated, since the Enlightenment, a problematic “either/or” conflict between Rationalism and Romanticism that needs to be resolved in a way that all such conflicts need to be resolved, which is to get off the dualism. The equation, “Performance equals Ability times Motivation minus Situational Constraints” points to the intimate relationship that Reason and Emotion have always had in the human project. To make Reason king, as the Enlightenment ostensibly endeavoured to do, is absurd unless one looks closely into the motivations for which Reason is to be used. Finally, as regards the “Situational Constraints” in that equation, Jung’s biography from this time acts as a warning illustrating the kinds of critical decisions that each of us might have to make when we find ourselves in problematic cultural contexts.

So, how did \( P = A^*M-SC \) play out as far as Carl Jung, and another related psychologist whose ideas I admire, Fritz Künel, are concerned?

German history prior to the institution of the Third Reich, and, in particular, as it applied to psychology as described by Cocks (1997), was indeed marked by the predominantly “either/or” currents, of Rationalism and Romanticism, the university and hospital/therapy, the psychiatrists with their empirical and somatic emphasis, and the psychotherapists and the psychoanalysts who variously investigated the role of the mind in psychological disturbances. As Cocks observes, it was actually Sigmund Freud who borrowed from both streams but psychoanalysis struggled to a certain extent with its reputation as the so-called Jewish science in anti-Semitic Europe. In that sense, the entry of Jung into Freud’s circle in the early

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239 Cocks writes, “it was precisely Freud's great contribution to combine Romantic preoccupation with ‘hidden forces’ in the psyche with the materialism of the late nineteenth-century scientific tradition to produce a method by which the unconscious could be revealed and treated” (p. 6).

240 Nevertheless as Cocks reports “… even among German psychiatrists there was some interest in Freud's psychoanalysis. This was due not only to scientific curiosity but also to some sense of frustration at the inability of formal descriptive psychiatry to make significant headway in the search for the causes and cures of mental illnesses” (p. 10).
years of the twentieth century brought a welcome Aryan presence and the possibility of greater social acceptance. That alliance was not to last, as Jung developed his teleological approach in contrast to Freud’s emphasis on causality. This was not the only difference according to Freudian socialist John Rittmeister: he disliked the “refined egoism” of Jung’s archetypal mysticism.

Rittmeister’s observations are in line with Cock’s observation that the Romantic approach imparted a “philosophical and religious grandeur . . . to the human psyche, a quality that was to make Carl Jung’s spiritual outlook as well preferable to Freud’s instinctual one in the minds of many German psychotherapists” (p. 6). With regard to Baumeister’s typology of evil covered in Chapter 9, it is in the realm of the potential evils lying in Idealism that the cerebral NT and the NF quadrants share a common propensity; that is, when the enthusiasms for Ideas overrun concerns for basic human needs, people suffer, and they tend to be the humbler people and organizations who keep our collective societies ticking over. As Pagel (2012) illustrates, innovation is a scarce commodity in cultural development and this is reflected I would argue in the lower numbers of “people” who inhabit those two upper quadrants. Most of us learn through imitation and follow the leader. Innovation has moved culture forward but often at great personal cost to many.

Cocks casts Jung’s involvement in German society prior to the Second World War in this sort of light. While the Nazis despised the Jewish science of psychoanalysis there were other types of psychotherapy that suited their ambitions much better and, in the early years, these included Jung’s ideas as well as his name. His influence faded however as the thirties progressed; certainly by 1936 Jung at least had gauged what was happening to some extent as is evident in this quote from a 1936 article:

The impressive thing about the German phenomenon is that one man, who is obviously “possessed,” has infected a whole nation to such an extent that everything is set in motion and has started rolling on its course to perdition. (Cocks, 1997, p. 142)

Many have been critical of Jung’s actions at this time, not least that critic of therapy Jeffrey Masson. Cocks however evaluates it in a way opposite to Masson. Rather than being caused by collaboration with the Nazis, Cocks states that Jung’s “airy approach to human experience manifest in Jungian therapy . . .” was, rather, one of the historical factors that led Jung to rhetorical and organizational flirtation with the Nazis.

The case of C. G. Jung and psychotherapy in Nazi Germany, therefore, reveals the perils of fascination among those who because of their position, privilege, and prominence must maintain an especially critical, rational, and ethical distance from destructive enthusiasms, recognizing the crucial difference between saying “This is amazing” and saying “This is wrong.” (Cocks, 1997, p. 150)

Fritz Künkel, identified by Cocks as an Adlerian, was possibly even more deeply implicated in terms of tacit support of the Nazi regime as it rose to power, but, as Cocks observes, he had personal concerns he was intent on protecting. His children were in fact the product of his 1920 marriage to a Jew who had died by the end of that decade. Cocks states that Künkel’s “response to Hitler was . . . born of fear for his children and some deeply held religious and professional beliefs. Still”, he concludes, “what he had to say

241 Cocks writes:

Rittmeister saw the opposing poles in human relations as subjectivism/egocentrism on the one hand and the sovereign independence of the individual self on the other. By subjectivism and egocentrism—what Schopenhauer and Hartmann called egoism—Rittmeister meant the tendency toward enlargement of one's ego at the expense of others, a sort of psychological imperialism. This subjective tendency, Rittmeister believed, deprived others of their own essential individuality, what Schopenhauer and Hartmann labeled the experience of the generous and respectful unity between the self and others. Rittmeister saw this dangerous, grasping subjectivity as “a consequence or at least a danger of the Jungian world view.” . . . For Rittmeister, Jung taught the virtues of introversion, a subjective immersion in the self to the exclusion of others, while Freud instructed humanity in the ecumenical virtues of love. Furthermore, against the “refined egoism” of Jung’s archetypal mysticism, Rittmeister praised the systematic doubt of Descartes, seeing in such doubt a humble and necessary acknowledgment of human imperfection. (Cocks, 1997, p. 40)

242 The scare quotes are an indication that the people who occupy the NT and NF quadrants possess the “N” trait in a dominant, rather than exclusive sense.
represented public support for the regime, whatever its actual effects on that regime or on people in general” (p. 82).

This was to change and when war broke out in September 1939 he elected to stay in the United States where he happened to be on a lecture tour. He had managed to get his children out of Germany the previous year.

Although Rittsmeister is now mostly unknown, I included him above as he expresses I think one lesson to be taken from Jung’s actions in the thirties. While Steven’s observations above about the value of Jungian theory for the resistance of fascism or any collective are well taken, we must also not forget the dangers of individual psychological inflation—“enlargement of one's ego at the expense of others, a sort of psychological imperialism” (Cocks, 1997, p. 40). It is in terms of avoiding both collective and individual inflation, or polarity on axes such as that separating Rationalism and Romanticism, that I want to address the journey implied in Eliot’s quote from Little Gidding, the journey that takes us east of Eden and towards the new Jerusalem. This invariably takes us to a discussion of how Jungian psychology and religion—specifically Catholicism—are interlinked. An important event in this regard is the ongoing relationship that Jung had with the Dominican Father White. Main (2006) puts it this way:

. . . a fundamental tension remained between White’s metaphysical view of God and Jung's psychological view. This emerged especially in discussions of the problem of evil, where White considered Jung to misunderstand the doctrine of the privatio boni, the concept of God as Summum Bonum, and the notion of opposites. (p. 311)

As a Catholic, I too have problems with Jung in this regard, and although I have not investigated this enough to come to a conclusion based on an exhaustive study, I find Jacoby (1985) illuminating with regard to the concept of evil, and both Jacoby and Samuels (1993) illuminating with regard to the notion of opposites.

Jacoby makes an important distinction and confirms my understanding of the Self when he points out the difference between the Self as God and the Self as God-image. I also tend to think of the Self as less of an archetype and more of a channel, although perhaps “channels” are what archetypes can be characterised as—channels of energy that take on symbolic form to give some sort of representation to the limited human psyche. I am reminded for example of the biblical image of the tree located on the bank of the stream whereby it can easily partake of the “living waters” when all land around it dries up.

Jacoby (1985) also provides a valuable linguistic analysis of the Garden of Eden story which explains the nature of evil as less of a Manichean struggle and more of a simple and tragic consequence of the distal and proximal human development of consciousness. We saw with Becker that guilt is our constant companion but guilt is only possible if we are aware of our guilt, and when “a glimmer of the idea of good and evil is perceived, the child's paradisial existence in innocence is immediately forfeited” (p. 127). So it was with our distal ancestor Eve if we take the myth semi-literally.

Jacoby (1985) starts his analysis of language in this way: “In the Genesis tale of Paradise the first impetus toward the Fall is provided by doubt”, and the doubt—raised by the serpent (God’s opponent or the Devil)—is about the perfection of Paradise. Jacoby traces the etymology of “Devil” back to the Greek verb diaballein, “which literally means “to throw into confusion” and was understood to connote “to bisect, to create enmity, to slander or insult.” He concludes,

In brief, then, “to doubt” connotes “to fall into two parts” or “to fall out of an initial unity” or “to waver in the face of two possibilities.” (pp. 127-128)

243 Rittsmeister was to ultimately pay for his socialist ideas with his life after he was accused of being a Russian spy.

244 We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time.
For Jacoby, “The serpent thus represents a deep-seated human instinct to eventually cast doubt on the validity of taboos, articles of faith and value systems” (p. 128). If it is “evil”, it is the “evil” that dissolves complacency and which “gives rise to new orientation” (p. 128). It is in other words part of a vigorous human developmental process, but one, importantly, that is not devoid of risk. Jacoby ends his chapter by quoting anthropologist A. Gehlen who indeed termed man as a “creature at risk.”

Why? Because the serpent in Paradise is impulse.\textsuperscript{245}

It may be “Part of a power that would alone work evil, but engenders good.” But it may also be a mad temptation to the hubris of “god-like knowledge” [both quotes are from Goethe’s Faust]\textsuperscript{246} and thus an impulse to catastrophe (viz., the Third Reich under Hitler). In any case, the impulse generated by doubting what has been handed down, is a prerequisite for the soul’s vitality, no matter how many risks are involved (Jacoby, 1985, p. 128).

Jacoby represents life as a “longing for paradise” and if our romantic yearnings are correctly identified in that way, they will, in terms of my thesis, be seen in the context of Paul’s paradox “When I am weak I am strong”—that is, when I am focused on and linked to the Self, I am strong.

It is first the unitary reality of the Maternal and then the differentiation\textsuperscript{246} offered by the Paternal archetype that guides the human ego along its journey of conflict and suffering towards the second order unitary reality—that is now paradoxically made up of differentiation because we know it for the first time—of the new Jerusalem; and, as I also like to put it, the unguarded western gate of Eden, unguarded but for the singular effort it takes to reach it. It is that effort that perhaps entitles one, by definition, to eat of the fruit on the Tree of Life. Zizek’s “obscene figure of the maternal superego” with which this chapter began, is a regression back to the eastern gate of Eden without that important roundtrip journey. Taking drugs—in fact, all addiction—is escape from the crucifixions that life presents. Those crucifixions must however be endured for consciousness’ sake.

What then is this end state of the process of individuation? In terms of the conceptual wisdom model, it is the state of pure Being, separated finally from Doing but consequent on it. It is Soul from which all meaning is derived. In other words, it is most purely that which is made in the image of God. It illustrates the Great Commandment and the order in which we love: as God, our self, then our neighbour. We cannot love our neighbour if we do not come to a full realisation of our value in terms of pure Being as if drained of Doing. There is no better quote to illustrate this state than this passage from Jung which expresses the level of self-regard we must have to love others. It really is the “acid test”:

\begin{quote}
... acceptance of oneself is the essence of the moral problem and the acid test of one's whole outlook on life. That I feed the beggar, that I forgive an insult, that I love my enemy in the name of Christ—all these are undoubtedly great virtues. What I do unto the least of my brethren, that I do unto Christ. But what if I should discover that the least amongst them all, the poorest of all beggars, the most impudent of all offenders, yea the very fiend himself—that these are within me, and that I myself stand in need of the alms of my own kindness, that I myself am the enemy who must be loved—what then? Then, as a rule, the whole truth of Christianity is reversed: there is then no more talk of love and long-suffering: we say to the brother within us “Raca,” and condemn and rage against ourselves. We hide him from the world, we deny ever having met this least among the lowly in ourselves, and had it been God himself who drew near to us in this despicable form, we should have denied him a thousand times before a single cock had crowed. (Collected Works 11: 520)
\end{quote}

It is in this that the claim of an alternative that Christianity represents comes into its own as a real and

\textsuperscript{245} Ronald Rolheiser comes to a very similar conclusion in this regard; he refers to original sin as a grasping and a taking of something we haven’t asked for or been given. I have also seen it referred to as “unbridled consumption”.

\textsuperscript{246} This would seem to be in contradiction to an earlier observation in Part One, Chapter 2, by David Tacey that patriarchy does not tolerate difference. I believe that the positive masculine sees itself within a context of human growth and thereby valorises differentiation. The negative masculine embodied in a tyrannical patriarchy sees the end in itself and thereby is intolerant of difference. It is with regard to this difference that one can appreciate the positive patriarchy that is Abba God. Differentiation—“gifts differing”—within the Mystical Body of Christ is highlighted therefore in Paul’s descriptions of it.
fundamental claim of an alternative to the addictive society. The addictive society relies on a “man of whatever sex” (Samuels, 1993) for Doing and a “woman of whatever sex” for supporting that Doing. This “Woman of whatever sex” however is also the Hysteric whose desire/Desire is thwarted and who thereby endeavours to find happiness in all the wrong places as Keating postulated in the previous chapter. This is also the point that Schaeff (1981) more broadly makes when she draws the distinction between her “living process” and the “addictive” systems.

For Samuels (1993), it is necessary that we become therapists of the world. His analysis is complex enough for that to be a more profound conclusion than the glib one it at first seems. Samuels is predominantly concerned with “the political psyche”—with how the clinical and the political are linked. In terms of the wisdom model, I am too, as is Tacey and his mix of Logos and Eros. Part of Samuels’ analysis was also directed at Jung’s actions in pre-World war II Germany and he paints a less rosy picture than Cocks. He is, he states, offering reparation, because, as a Jew, he (Samuels) didn’t feel entirely welcome in Jung’s parish. With regard to Cock’s (1997) analysis, he states boldly that “I disagree with Geoffrey Cocks who, in his pathbreaking history of psychotherapy in Germany during the Nazi era, offers a version of this defense when he writes that “Jung conceded more to the Nazis by his words than by his actions” (p. 301). While rejecting analysis of Jung the man, Samuels points to the problematic aspects of Jungian theory which led to a certain proximity of Jung’s ideas with those of Hitler. Fundamentally this boiled down to two factors “that were central to the ideology of fascism in the 1930s . . . (1) the idea of nation and (2) the principle of leadership” (p. 288).

In coming to conclusions about Jung’s problematic views of the psychology of nations, (and there isn’t the room to cover them adequately here except to say that they were problematic and they did bring him “into the same frame as Nazi anti-Semitic ideology” (Samuels, 1993, p. 287)), Samuels makes a valuable point connected to the thesis of difference being examined in this thesis, which is that “his intuitions of the importance of exploring differences, preserving them, even celebrating them”, must remain intact, while “staying unhindered by excessive dependence on complementarity, on the dogma of ‘the opposites’, on oppositional thinking and, above all, on essentialism—the argument that things are as they are because it is only natural for them to be that way” (p. 329).

247 Samuels as a psychotherapist quotes Jung who states that when you treat the patient, you are also treating the culture in which s/he resides although he is quick to point out that any influence there might be is a very slight one and in no way points to the superiority of the individuated analysand.

248 Here, Samuels (p. 287) is making a link with that other well-known prominent anti-semitic T. S. Eliot, whose name also appears in my pages. It refers to a poem written by Emanuel Litvinoff (“I am not accepted in your parish/Bleistein was my relative”) which refers to a poem written by Eliot in the 1920s, “Burbank with a Baedeker: Bleistein with a Cigar” which included the lines “The rats are underneath the piles/The Jew is underneath the lot/Money in furs”. As Samuels states, while accepting the wisdom in their (Eliot’s and Jung’s and previously Chesterton’s) bodies of work, we also need to make reparation for those problematic attitudes that also lie within and under them.

249 Samuels (1993) explains this defense as follows:

This defense attempts a divorce of Jung’s behavior (including any casually expressed attitudes) from the formal presentation of his ideas in books and articles. These defenders do not excuse Jung’s actions but dispute that the true importance of his ideas is affected by them. This defense of Jung can find expression the other way round: though Jung wrote stupid and offensive things about Jews, which he should have corrected, he did not do anything that could be regarded as destructive in the real world. The problem with the defense is that, even if one could make such a dissociation between life and work credible in the case of a psychologist, the problem of the influence of the writer’s words on the behavior of others still remains an issue. The use of the writer’s words by others has to be considered. Obviously the writer cannot prevent exploitation, but he can protest at it. Did Jung? (p. 301).

Not nearly enough, states Samuels.

250 As Samuels (1993) states,

Readers of what follows may be disappointed that I scarcely mention Jung’s personal psychology or psychopathology — his father complex, the scars of the break with Freud, his shadow problems, his Swiss bourgeois mentality, and so forth. . . . I never saw him as “a perfect leader, a saint, someone who guides us, a guru” so I do not have a reaction when he turns out to be a “very average collective human being” (to use the dichotomy set out by Adolf Guggenbühl-Craig) . . . For a while I worried that these omissions added up to a failure of feeling on my part. But gradually I have come to see that the true failure of feeling is found when the personal dimension is given too much weight or used to close an awkward issue once and for all. (pp. 288-289, italics in the original)
The problem of inflation comes to the fore when Samuels discusses the second factor of leadership. He believes there is evidence that suggests Jung was not “beyond a power drive, and, therefore, beyond the opportunism to which he is often accused of succumbing in his dealings with the Nazi establishment regulating psychotherapy in Germany in the 1930s” (pp. 321-322).

While Samuels wishes to contribute more than a “psychological cheap-shot that Hitler was Jung’s shadow” (p. 322), in terms of two of the three “ps”, or of two of Keating’s three temptations of Christ—power and prestige—there is no reason to suggest that Jung was any different from the rest of us.

Samuels’ overall conclusion is a valuable one in terms of the point made above about the Hysteric discourse. By “finding echoes of Jung in Hitler and Hitler in Jung . . . depth psychology can joyfully renounce the top table, the level of nation states—for we have seen what a terrible mess it makes when it tries to sit there” (p. 335). It needs, as well, to stand with those at the other end of the social hierarchy, “the materially disadvantaged and the socially frightened” (p. 335).

There are echoes of this conclusion in contemporary mainstream psychology as well which I reported in Clayton (2008). It is what Maxwell, in Chapter 7 stated we should expect of professional endeavour, and it is in this respect, that we are almost at the stage where we can move on to the penultimate chapter—to investigate how we can become therapists of culture in a way that engages both the people and the leaders.

The next chapter which outlines Lacan’s model of the four discourses is the source of the term “Hysteric discourse”—the discourse of the desiring, complaining, and protesting subject—and it is the model by which these relationships can be understood in a systematic way. My use of it importantly assumes that through non-neurotic suffering, there are Souls who are those “Hysterics” who have found their meaning in life. To find our meaning, to connect our egos with the Self, we need to look deeply into our motivations. Motivations are the central focus of Keating’s (2001) work which was introduced in Chapter 12. Before addressing Lacanain discourse theory, there is a need to get to grips with the neurosis that arises from (1) our childhood pre-rational emotional programmes for happiness, and (2) our cultural emotional programmes for happiness. Our emotions are, I argue, a way of connecting with the Self just as the more arcane Jungian methods of dream analysis and active imagination are, and an easier way I suspect for the Hysteric discourse to mature.

Keating’s summary of these programmes is reproduced in Table 13.1 which shows how emotions are the great leveller in all areas of human social endeavour. We are also all personally implicated in this problem—academics, just as much as others with less academic intelligence. “Academic excellence” in the third column for instance is a fine example of “Pride” in the first. Always having “to be right” is a neurotic defence against our human vulnerability, and yet “always being right” is highly valorised in our cultural systems. Why we have these problems in our psyche is a direct result of the distal and proximal factors in humanity’s and our own developmental processes.

To review, as concerns the latter, our big heads mean we each have to be born out of a comfortable womb before we are mature. There is no automatic system that addresses our needs in the way the womb was

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251 “... if we look at Jung’s earlier career, the part played by Jung’s own desire for power in bringing about the break with Freud is often underestimated (and here I am engaging psychologically with Jung the man). Jung himself was emphatic that, unlike Freud, he had no ambitions to be a leader and was not interested in forming a school of psychology, in actively spreading his ideas, or taking part in the training of analysts. In Jung and the Post-Jungians, I sought to show that Jung displayed many of the features of a typical leader: sometimes maintaining his rule by dividing his followers, selecting individuals for particular support (often by writing forewords for their books), and eventually laying down rather tough academic criteria for the professional training of analysts... How can we reconcile this skillful dissemination of influence with Jung’s claim to be a solitary thinker and his corollary exclamation ‘Thank God I’m Jung and not a Jungian’? Jung’s denial that he participated in the making of Jungians is often repeated by those most closely associated with him. I think that Jung’s technique was to flatter his followers by maintaining that he did not want disciples; therefore those involved with Jung could never have been mere disciples.” (Samuels, 1983, p. 322)
able to. Our needs begin to be largely, but imperfectly met, by the parents who “fuck us up” in Philip Larkin’s parlance, with the consequence that our prerational brains record and store up the emotions we feel—fear, anger, shame—all the emotions that come flooding back when we face difficulties in later life. We also take at face value the cultural values our parents and then the peer group feed us; after all as social beings we are dependent on them for our physical and then our social survival. It is all this conditioning that we need to actively work on, especially in the second part of life, and we need to work on it in a way that addresses the emotions at an emotional level. For this we need Keating’s “contemplative prayer” and the solitude in which to do it.

In line with Schaeff’s thinking, and in the value reality I am assuming, this is not a technique. That is, this practice does not come from the NT quadrant where technology and system meet even though seventeen or so centuries later the theory can now explain why it works. Importantly, it is not a technique but a relationship that we choose to forge—or not. This activity occurs in the SF quadrant where the interpersonal and the existential meet—Lacan’s Hysteric discourse. Contemplative prayer is all about developing a relationship between our most humble identity and God, or more accurately, our image of God in the Self. This process is summarised in Table 13.2, which shows the parallel between cultural and human development and the process we each and all need to go through to “grow up”. At best, the Enlightenment gave us the Mental Egoic level; in fact Keating observes this is the level Jesus operated at as a challenge to the domination systems of his day, which, in Table 13.1, is predominantly the religious (Legalism, Pharisaism, Hypocrisy, Prejudice/bigotry, Cults) and social (Status, Prestige, Racism, Nationalism, Forms of domination, Authoritarianism). This course is charted by the Beatitudes which progress from the first, Blessed are they who mourn because those who mourn are in the process of giving up those instinctual things that trap us at a reptilian level. We reach full unity with the Godhead with the last Beatitude, Blessed are those who are persecuted in my name whereby we willingly lose our lives in our cultural milieu to save them as Christ did. At this level—in fact from the fifth Beatitude on according to Keating—we are living beyond the instinctual needs and the Great Commandment, and loving others as Christ loved us. But we can’t do that unless we live out of our bodies first. Therein lies the meaning of the Incarnation and the requirement that all our social systems meet the needs of the most vulnerable among us as a matter of priority. Lacan’s theory illustrates why that currently is not the way the wisdom model, and his discourse theory which can be laid directly on that model, works.

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252 Philip Larkin’s (1971) This be the verse is as follows: “They fuck you up, your mum and dad./They may not mean to, but they do./They fill you with the faults they had/And add some extra, just for you.//But they were fucked up in their turn/By fools in old-style hats and coats,/Who half the time were soppy-stern/And half at one another’s throats./Man hands on misery to man./It deepens like a coastal shelf./Get out as early as you can,/And don’t have any kids yourself”. //
Chapter 14

THE WILDENESS LYING IN WAIT AS LACAN’S “HYSTERIC DISCOURSE”

On the 100th anniversary of the publication of Freud’s *Interpretation of Dreams*, Zizek (2006) documented attempts to proclaim the death of psychoanalysis and its consignment to a similar status with all those other “pre-scientific obscurantist quests for hidden meanings, alongside religious confessors and dream-readers” (p. 1). Zizek agreed that certainly psychoanalysis seemed to be endangered given the following modern realities:

1. the current cognitivist—neurobiologist model of the human mind;
2. the current psychiatric treatments of pills and behavioural therapy; and
3. the current social context, in which the idea of Freudian sexual repression does not describe modern hedonistic permissiveness (p. 2).

It is noteworthy that all three of those realities describe different sorts of technological (Ego-consciousness) quick fixes rather than the more (Eco-consciousness) relational model adopted by Freud and carried on by Jung and Lacan to name but two. Given his adoption of Lacanian theory, Zizek unsurprisingly disagreed with the psycho-analytic nay-sayers: Lacan, he writes, developed the potential of Freud’s ideas by showing how the unconscious “talks and thinks” (that is, functions like a language) about unbearable and traumatic truths that one needs to learn to live with (p. 3). Then he points out something that is critical in establishing the value of any systems of ideas that tries to probe the unconscious: “psychoanalysis at its most fundamental is not a theory and technique of treating psychic disturbances, but *a theory and practice that confronts individuals with the most radical dimension of human existence*” (p. 3, italics added). The quick fix, while not entirely inappropriate in the sense that medication can supply stability while deeper issues are addressed, is ultimately far too shallow to solve a person’s existential problems although it achieves the social aim that Zizek identifies, which is that the individual accommodates him- or herself to the demands of social reality. Rather, he says, Lacanian psychoanalysis “explains how something like ‘reality’ constitutes itself in the first place” (p. 3). I agree.

Social reality in my thesis is an inferior interpretation to that of Judeo-Christian value reality and of that reality described by Jung as set out in the previous chapter (along with the reservations I have about it). That the truth of a deeper value reality will emerge in human lives is a tenet of faith in both Jungian and Lacanian theory, and in that sense “the goal of psychoanalytic treatment is not the patient’s wellbeing, successful social life or personal fulfilment” (p. 4). Neither is it in Jung’s theory. Life, Jung says, has addressed a question to each one of us. While I would argue that there is personal fulfilment to be derived from answering that question, it is certainly not what personal fulfilment commonly means in current western society.

There in a nutshell is the *raison d’etre* of this chapter. It accords with my own experience of psychotherapy conducted along cognitive–behavioural lines (although Freud did make the odd appearance) which, while certainly being of help, was hampered for me by my continuing suspicion that its underlying rationale lay in patching up its clients like wounded WWI soldiers who were still needed on the front line. To me, my travails seemed to be intimately related to the society that I was living in and therefore, the lack of mutuality in my exchanges with the psychotherapist, as well as the lack of relatedness with something deeper that I believed existed, seemed to make the whole process somewhat deficient. That part of it which seemed to be making me “accommodate . . . [my]self to the demands of social reality” and participate in that goal seeking my “wellbeing, successful social life or personal fulfilment” was problematic even while acknowledging the dysfunctional part I was playing in the relationship and in society in general. For me, there had always been a conception and a subsequent rejection of the social command to “Enjoy!” (Zizek, 2006, p. 37). Zizek’s identification of the traditional “No!” seemed at least a more realistic determination of what life might really be about—as a basis for a life at least, if not as a long term and individuated prescription. As Chesterton observes, the list of ten “Noes!” is surprisingly short. They leave an awful lot of life still to be lived.
I don’t agree with Zizek in his singling out of Lacan as alone valuable among Freud’s successors. In Part 2, I have used Becker’s (after Rank), and Jung’s (which arguably branched off more radically than the others) interpretations to address Iris Murdoch’s twin problematics of social convention and personal neurosis, the two problematics that I referred to above in my own experience of therapy. The intertwining and inseparability of those two is shown nicely in another observation Zizek (2006) makes. He illustrates, in the following quote, the unworkability of Rawls’ concept of social justice while human existential realities remain at what I have termed the “other-ated” stage:

*Rawls proposes a terrifying model of a society in which hierarchy is directly legitimised in natural properties, missing the simple lesson of a tale about a Slovene peasant who is told by a good witch: “I will do to you whatever you want, but I warn you, I will do it to your neighbour twice!” The peasant thinks fast, then smiles a cunning smile and tells her “Take one of my eyes!” No wonder that even today’s conservative are ready to endorse Rawls’ notion of justice: in December 2005, David Cameron, the newly elected leader of the British Conservatives, signalled his intention to turn the Conservative Party into a defender of the underprivileged when he declared: “I think the test of all our policies should be: what does it do for the people who have the least, the people on the bottom rung of the ladder?” . . . The very injustice of capitalism is a key feature that makes it tolerable to the majority (I can accept my failure much more easily if I know that it is not due to my inferior qualities, but to chance). (pp. 36-37)*

The Slovene peasant is an excellent example of Gore Vidal’s well-known meditation that it is not just necessary for me to succeed, but for my neighbour to fail. That the latter is the more pressing ambition is shown by the peasant’s choice whereby her loss (in comparison to the neighbour) is a far more significant matter than any personal gain. On the contrary, not only is generosity of spirit important (refer for example to Luke 6:26 and his “good measure, pressed down, and shaken together, and running over”) but psychologically resisting one’s place in the social hierarchy by living to a different yardstick is the very essence of the Christian journey, and for me, Jung is necessary for that resistance based on a discernment, using his insights, of what that journey might be (the “Yes!” in other words to accompany the “No!”). The difference between the Slovene peasant and a reconstituted Slovene peasant (that is a Slovene peasant who undertook T. S. Eliot’s exploratory journey and ended up knowing the place from whence she started for the first time253) would be, at the very least, a healthy indifference to the neighbour’s condition, except in those terms as exemplified by the Good Samaritan when a “for-othered” stance would be necessary or in a circumstance when a friendship exists. At best, a Christian peasant’s good will would be universally expressed, with delight taken in the neighbour’s good fortune, made all the better for one’s part in facilitating it.

Nevertheless, the following interpretations of the Freudian legacy other than Jung’s are necessary for an outline of the problems related to that vertical dimension of the wisdom model whereby the systemic and the existential are linked just as Zizek’s (2006) quote illustrates. That dimension, along with the horizontal dimension, creates the four quadrants which are variously utilised and implicated in the interpretations of Freud’s legacy, and Lacan’s discourse theory is no exception.

Others have endorsed the exploration of the existential. MacCannell (2011), for example, belying those who trumpet the demise of psychocanalysis, states that he also has “no problem integrating insights from classic social theory –Marx, Durkheim, Levi-Strauss—and psychoanalytic constructs” (p. ix), in his case, Freud and Lacan. Schaef’s work was an important milestone in my development and her findings and reflections over the years find resonance in more formal academic work. One of these, Standpoint Theory, and the way it can be utilised as a way of formulating a claim of an alternative, has already been addressed. Another example comes from Schaef’s notion of women bearing the “original sin of being born female” for which women need to gain absolution from men. This has echoes, albeit oblique ones254,

253 As in Eliot’s *We shall not cease from exploration, and the end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started and know the place for the first time.*

254 In fact in Lacan’s formulation it is the “La” that is the important word, not the “n’existe pas”. That is, women ultimately can have more freedom in the sense that they do not have the serious “object” focus of men necessitated by the processes of sexuality in early life. My point here is however that while this is Man’s greatest weakness it also gives him the dominance that derives from that focus on “objects” of which Woman is one. It is in this sense that I theorise women as subjects missing in action in a man’s world.
in Lacan’s “La femme n’existe pas” in the sense that if women do exist (and the ubiquitous use of “he” and “man” was and is, when it still occurs, evidence enough that women didn’t and don’t), there is something rather deficient about us. Likewise, Lacan’s notion of lack finds an echo in her documentation of the “cavern” her women patients felt inside.

A nun in one of my workshops had been doing some very deep process work in relation to her cavern—or “hole” as she preferred to call it. Near the end of the workshop, she came up with this play on words: “My hole is my wholeness. My wholeness is my hole. Without my hole, I would not have my wholeness.” Because of her, I reached a new level of understanding. I began to realize that women’s caverns contain the essence of being female in a White Male System. Unless we recognize this and accept it, we cannot grow. To establish an identity is only a part of the growth process. We must understand the forces that are working against this process both within us and without. (Schaefer, 1981, p. 36)

These ideas of “wholeness” and “lack” also have their counterparts in Lacanian theory (the Subject (loosely) and castration) as well as the idea expressed in the quotation above of a process of “becoming”. For that reason it is important to go more deeply into the theory that surrounds Lacan’s “Subject” which is something like, but more complex than, one’s sense of “identity” (although Bracher (2009) in a recent work seems to be elevating identity to a comparable level).

As already mentioned, human beings need to be born before their time, and development that might have happened in the womb (given that it does for our mammalian kin) continues after birth. From about six to eighteen months, what Lacan refers to as the “birth of the Subject” takes place. The “Subject” is a different entity from the ego although the two are related within Lacan’s identification of what he terms the “mirror stage”. This occurs when the child looks in the mirror and sees herself—not some other entity as a monkey say would—but herself. However, it is a divided self; it is an “I”, looking at a “me”. The mirror stage is “the crucial moment at which the baby’s Subject is “split” or alienated from itself” (Bailly, 2009, p. 90). While the subjective “I”—as a separate entity from the mother—is established at this stage, the language that the child first uses is the objective “me” (“me hungry”, for instance). From then on, it is the ego (the Ideal-I) that develops, repressing as it does, the signifiers of the Subject. The “Subject” may have been born, but “She” goes underground in the social milieu in which she finds herself. Given that she is helpless, vulnerable and dependent in this milieu, this is not surprising.

Lacan divides the psyche into the Imaginary (which is this first stage and the realm of the senses), the Symbolic into which the child is soon initiated as she develops language (although it includes all societal elements such as laws and social structures as well as language), and the Real which is all that cannot be expressed in language—the meaning that is “left over” in other words. The RSI (standing for the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary) in Lacan’s formulation is as a knot made up of the three threads (Bailly, 2009, p. 89) as depicted in Figure 14.1. The Imaginary contains the mirror image of the “other” with a lower case “o”; the image of himself and the others with whom he deals as part and parcel of everyday social life. However the “Other” with a capital “O” occurs within the Symbolic field. It is “a radical otherness which is beyond the Imaginary” (Bailly, 2009, pp. 65-66). The Real is ineffable; however a small piece of it “materialises” in association with the objet petit a that occurs at the junction of all three realms.

Bailly (2009) supplies examples of this conjunction which can be found in common human activities:

A girl buying “pampering products”—moisturisers, body creams, bath salts, aromatherapy oils—is a good example of someone in search of a small a object, which sits in the Borromean knot of the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real.

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255 For Lacan, “The unconscious is what the Subject represses, and by definition is therefore not consciously expressible by the Subject; however, it constantly manifests itself, quite without the Subject’s intentions, in dreams, unsuccessful/self-defeating acts, slips of the tongue, and even pathological symptoms” (Bailly, 2009, p. 42). Note that the “unconscious” here is a differently defined entity to Jung’s notion of the unconscious as “archaic function” (p. 41).

256 However it also needs to be realised that this is the process that needs repair at a later stage: “One of Lacan’s most important maxims is that human beings are very largely oblivious of their own Subject; the ego is what a person says of him/herself, the Subject is the unrecognised self that is speaking. Psychoanalysis is about accompanying the patient towards his/her subjective truth, or towards the point where the objective “me” and the subjective “I” can be united (Bailly, 209, p. 34). This is a good definition in Lacanian terms of the word “transformation” in this thesis’s title.
She imagines, somehow, that these products contain the object cause of desire of some perfect imaginary state. The Imaginary creates the sensuous fantasy involved with skin, softness, warmth; the Symbolic extracts that into words, and piles on many other signifiers that have nothing to do with the product in question—to the point that it often seems that the purchaser is buying signifiers. However, the Real is present too, “stuck to the sole of your shoe” as Lacan would have it—for what motivates the purchase must be the anxiety attached to the loss of the perfect state and also the (libidinal) drive—both of which belong in the Real. (p. 104)

The Symbolic is the stage when I, and I assume Gilligan (2002) above—“assume” because Gilligan does not speak in Lacanian, just Freudian terms—are postulating that the little boy and girl run into “trouble” although it is “trouble” that is necessary and valuable (Bailly, 2009). This stage is represented in Lacan’s schema as the “Name of the Father”: while the infant was obviously the focus of the mother’s attentions, there was also a rival for her affections, exemplified by the fact that the mother is not always present. This object of the mother’s desire is the phallus. “The word denotes its imaginary quality: a phallus is never a “penis” but a representation or image of potency . . . the Name-of-the-Father comes to represent the Other where previously there was only her mysterious desire.” (Bailly, 2009, pp. 76, 78). This arrival in the Symbolic realm of the Other, necessitates an awareness of one’s castration.

“Castration”, Bailly (2009, p. 79-80) explains, “is the acceptance that one is less-than-perfect, limited, not all-powerful and able to control or satisfy the world. Castration is therefore a symbolic process which allows the child to situate itself within the Law, and to accept that its own desires are not paramount.” Here is pre-Protestant Catholicism and Protestantism if you like; the acceptance of the value reality as the societal system interprets it.

Bailly (2009) also concludes, “[The child] has acquired in place of the already disintegrating fantasy of omnipotence, the solid hope that it can gain by its own powers the lost object of desire [its objet petit a], hidden beneath the Name-of-the-Father” (p. 87). It does this by becoming a bona fide member of the culture and using its language. “Language,” states Bailly (2009, p. 95) “contains elements belonging in the Symbolic and in the Imaginary. In order for the linguistic sign to be of any use, this relationship must exist, denoted by the Saussurian ‘bar’. The originality of the human mind lies in the act of ‘crossing the bar’ between signifier and signified.”

What Bailly means here is Lacan’s reversal of Saussure’s notation regarding the Signifier and the Signified in language expressed thus, including, between them, the bar:

\[
S = \text{Signifier} \\
s = \text{the signified}
\]

We communicate with each other using Signifiers but the signifieds that we refer to are unavailable to the other.

A good way of illustrating how useful Lacan’s conception of language is, is to look at his (1969-70) formulation within his schema of the four discourses—those of the University, the Master, the Hysteric, and the Analyst. These four discourses “offer the means, respectively, of understanding four key social phenomena: educating, governing, protesting, and revolutionizing . . . The purpose of Lacan’s schemata of the four discourses is to show what sorts of changes are possible and how they might be brought about” (Bracher, 1994, p. 107, 108 emphasis added). Lacanian discourse theory is therefore an important way of charting how cultural transformation might be achieved, and importantly how that transformation might be achieved through analysis of the protesting hysteric.

Bracher (1994, p. 109) describes how the “differently structured discourses mobilize, order, repress, and produce four key psychological factors”—knowledge/belief (S2), values/ideals (S1), self-division/alienation ($), and jouissance/enjoyment (a)—in ways that produce the four fundamental social effects of educating/indoctrinating (the University discourse), governing/brainwashing (the Master discourse), desiring/protesting (the Hysteric discourse), and analyzing/revolutionizing (the Analyst
discourse). Those four psychological factors (that is, S2, S1, $, and a) variously slot, depending on the discourse, into the following general model of relationship:

\[
\text{Agent} \rightarrow \text{Other} \\
\text{Truth} \rightarrow \text{Production}
\]

which is expanded and further explained in Table 14.1. For each discourse, the four key psychological factors identified above (S2, S1, $, a) occupy different positions.

In the Lacanian Model (Figure 14.2), I show a series of arrows and a big arrow proceeding from the bottom right quadrant to an ultimate destination in the bottom left quadrant because in this thesis I am interested in the path of transformation. However this is the opposite direction to which they are “done” to us. In focusing on transformation, I will deal with the latter first at least as concerns the dominant discourses in western and other cultures which start in the left hand side of the model and in particular in the bottom left quadrant in which we assume the role of the “student”, from the time we are born, to the day we die.

Table 14.2 identifies the disposition of the four psychological functions in the University Discourse. As Bracher (1994) states: “Our first role in discourse is ... as the a. Before we learn to speak—and even before we are born—we occupy the position of the other or receiver of speech, and we do so in the form of the a, as the as-yet-unassimilated piece of the real that is the object of the desires of those around us, particularly our parents”. This “other-ated” state, as I term it, continues on in our dealings with the bureaucracy in general as we proceed through life and deal with various institutions that are part of our culture. However this discourse ensures that we remain as an alienated (or other-ated) subject in the thrall ultimately to the master signifier/s that underlie the systematic knowledge that we receive. These master signifiers remain hidden beneath the knowledge imparted to us. Bailly (2009) again provides an example of how this might work:

A man loves sailing and has built much of his image and identity around this; many of his desires revolve around the sea and sailing and the sort of society that goes with it—all this is observable in his choices of clothes, homes, women, etc. “Sailing” is among his master signifiers. In his early life, this man’s father was a keen sailor, and in his identification with his father and fierce rivalry with his brothers for his father’s attention, the boy’s skill at the helm became his main “weapon” of power—his representation of the Phallus (or objet petit a). If you think of how the Name-of-the-Father hides the true object of the mother’s desire (who was, after all a seaman), one can easily see how “sailing” has replaced the Name-of-the-Father as the metaphorical representation of the object of desire. (p. 133)

So does this man really love sailing? He might do. If he does, it also functions in this case as the container of something else—an unquenchable desire—which was inculcated from his earliest beginnings. And as far as his parents are concerned they are no doubt quite happy with the alienated subject they have produced—the chip off the old block. Likewise universities and other educational institutions crow about their graduates who have made good in the world. However, would Lord Rutherford—a graduate of the institution I attend—had he been able to look into the future, have thought twice before conducting research into physical phenomena that would ultimately be used to kill millions in Hiroshima and Nagasaki? Maybe; maybe not. It would depend on his buy-in to his culture’s master signifiers.

The master signifier is dominant in the Master Discourse (see Table 14.3) and we have all been subjected to it whenever we have come under another’s authority or power. If the CEO of a company instructs us as an employee to do something, we need to be able to satisfy him and her, using our systematic knowledge and producing what they want, their demands for jouissance that are ultimately the reason behind the Masters’ requests. However one way of looking at this is to acknowledge we are doing them no favours in doing as they request because their alienation from themselves continues with the encouragement gained from our acquiescence. But few ever say “no” to powerful people; if they do, they do not survive long enough to say it again, unless that is, the master is not a completely alienated subject.
If all our jouissance is derived from our salary, and the status that goes with a job, then we will be completely happy and fulfilled. But if our desire is more complex than that, and for an adult it always is, then we will be left in the scenario above as a desiring and protesting subject (Table 14.4), albeit a silent one. In that position we are the agentic but alienated subject. In this state we need to get in touch with our truth and our master signifier because the master signifiers we have been forced to stomach to that point no longer satisfy, if they ever did.

It is in this discourse that another is needed to excavate the subject’s a and the master signifier and systematic knowledge that supports it.

It is this quest to which the receiver of the hysterical subject's message is summoned to respond by providing a master signifier, $S_1$ in the form of a secure meaning that will overcome anxiety, meaninglessness, and shame and give a sense of stable, meaningful, respectable identity. Such responses are given by counselors, therapists, and priests to distraught individuals; by advertisements and political speeches to the desiring masses; and by all sympathetic people to needy friends. And as the schema indicates, such a provision of master signifiers covertly entails or produces a system ($S_2$) of knowledge/belief within which the master signifiers take their bearings and assume their force, and within which the hysterical subject can thus find its stability. (p. 123)

At this point in Lacan’s schema the Analyst Discourse needs to come in so as to identify a new master signifier to reduce the lamination of the Subject (see Table 14.5).

It is also at this point that the dynamic of the Lacanian Model can be appreciated because transformation relies on the change that the two discourses on the right side of the model can precipitate in a society. It begins with the desiring/protesting Subject and his/her reliance on someone to extract a new master signifier peculiar to that Subject.

Bracher (1994) constitutes the new master signifier in this way:

Such production does not constitute a radical break with tyranny and an accession to freedom, for the subject remains in thrall to a master signifier. This means that what is produced in the discourse of the Analyst is another discourse of the Master, thus rendering the process circular rather than progressive.

There is a crucial difference, however, in this new discourse of the Master: its master signifiers are produced by the subject rather than imposed upon the subject from the outside. In this way, one “shifts gears,” as Lacan puts it. The analytic discourse, that is, makes it possible to produce a master signifier that is a little less oppressive, because it is of a different style . . . a style that, we might surmise, is less absolute, exclusive, and rigid in its establishment of the subject's identity, and more open, fluid, processual—constituted, in a word, by relativity and textuality. (pp. 123-124)

It is at this point that it is necessary to introduce Jung as the final arbiter of whether the new master signifier is “relative” or not. What exactly does that word mean and what relevance does that meaning have for Catholicism? That is fodder for the next section of this chapter where the Hysteric and Analyst discourses can be evaluated in the light of Jungian theory.

However, before moving on, it remains in this section to draw the connections among the four discourses outlined above, and—this is another link with Jungian theory—to explain the Lacanian Model in terms of the structure of the wisdom model which, as well as having its empirical basis in the work of Ackerman and Heggestad (1997, see Chapter 4), was also derived from Jung’s topology of the four types—NT, NF, ST and SF (Chapter 4). It doesn’t take much imagination to see the parity between Jung’s NT and the Master discourse, the NF and the Analyst discourse, the ST and the University discourse, and the SF and the Hysteric discourse. The Lacanian Model therefore disposes the discourses in a similar way to the wisdom model, and also links them in a way that somewhat reverses the order in which we naturally come into contact with them.

My thesis is that, based on our identity as the one compromised by our primary identification as the Ideal-I at the “mirror stage”, and thereby the one that is primary for our Christian identity (as among “the least of our brethren”, an image that the Ideal-I edits out from its image), transformation necessitates the rescue
of this alienated or denied Subject. This latter is the agent in the Hysteric discourse which needs the discourse of the Analyst to draw out and identify the surplus jouissance or the a that has been repressed by the Hysteric Agent. Once these have been identified s/he can identify her Master signifiers and expand her knowledge systems to back up those master Signifiers—a process that I, for example, at mid-life, am more or less engaged with in the writing of this thesis. In so doing, the Analyst and the Hysteric discourses subvert the status quo as represented on the left side of the diagram. The Master discourse and its organs in the bureaucratic structure of society are no longer taken for granted because the hysteric has found their a and their own Master discourse which is as individual to them as their bodies. This sort of transformation of course has the potential to end up as a dispersed society of isolated individuals so long as the society remains one in which the cultural master signifiers are not universally questioned. This is also the identified danger in Jung’s individuation process for which Christ’s Passion is the template. This mythic identification is the third way in which Jungian and Lacanian therapy seem to coincide as Bracher (1994) explains:

The analyst's activity of interpretation—that is, of representing the a, cause of the patient's desire—is sustained by the analyst's implicit knowledge. S2 in the place of truth. This knowledge, Lacan says, can be either the analyst's already acquired knowledge . . .—for example, of the Oedipus complex . . .—which functions as the basis of analytic savoir-faire, or it may be knowledge acquired from listening to the analysand . . .—that is, specific knowledge of the analysand's particular psychic economy and of the nature of the analysand's a. In either case, this knowledge is very different from those found in the discourses of the University and of the Master. It is what Lacan calls a mythic knowledge. While the knowledge of Master and University discourses—or mathematical knowledge, as Lacan characterized it—emphasizes identities as absolute and self-referential, mythic knowledge emphasizes relationships . . . Logical, mathematical knowledge thus forms a completely coherent but static, tautological (i.e., self-referential, self-enclosed) system, and it is precisely such a knowledge/system that, rejecting truth as dynamic, produces the a. Mythic knowledge, on the other hand—that is, the form of the knowledge that constitutes the truth of the discourse of the Analyst, and is repressed by the patient—is a disjoint knowledge, a form that is completely alien to the discourse of science . . . In the mythic knowledge of the discourse of the Analyst, that is, “the truth only shows itself in an alternation of things that are strictly opposed, which it is necessary to make turn around each other” . . . It is only the mythic form of knowledge that can avoid excluding the a, because it offers not absolute, clearly established, self-referential identities, but rather a system of oppositions embodied in images and fantasies that offer no unequivocal identities, meanings, or values. (p. 125)

Here we have not just the parity with the Jungian theory in Chapter 13, but also with the theorists that have preceded this section and chapter, particularly McGilchrist’s (2009) descriptions of the differences between left and right-brain “being in the world” as described in Chapter 8.

Before going there however, I want to return to the place where I started, and look at the phenomenon of castration which, at the beginning of this section, I linked to Schaeff’s woman patients and to Woman as subject in a man’s world that perceives women as objects.

Bailly (2009) makes an interesting observation in his discussion of “that obscure object of desire” that we seek in vain (that is, the “unquenchable desire”) to fill our “unspeakable need”, when he writes:

Desire exists in tension with anxiety, and the ultimate object of desire and power exists in tension with the ultimate anxiety-creating lack of it (which could be experienced as total helplessness in the face of incomprehensible persecution). . . Just as the primordial desirable object is the Phallus, the primordial lack that causes anxiety could be seen as the castration. (pp. 133-134)

Women of course arrive already “castrated” although Lacan does not interpret this literally as Freud did and in fact states that “castration” is more terrifying for the boy than the girl. Girls have more options because the mother is the same sex. The boy has two problems: he hasn’t got the Phallus and given that he is a different sex, he must find some new kind of identity which can be gained by identifying with the father. The girl can do this too if she so chooses, but that is the difference. She has a choice.

Here we are back with Gilligan’s (2002) observation (Chapter 10) about the crucial and life-changing developmental options a boy has to make before reaching the age of reason, and which therefore are pre-rational and not open to processes of rational self-reflexivity in later life. In other words, the search for
the Phallus is emotionally hard-wired in the boy in ways that it isn’t in the girl. For the girl, her problems come later at adolescence when her options become more limited because she has to fit into the patriarchal order which is all the more lethal for her by the fact that the system itself is hard-wired by masculine repression and thereby resistant to change.

And this is another point at which Lacanian theory comes into its own in terms of explicating the dynamics underlying the death and resurrection mythology of Jesus. When Bailly (2009) observes above that “the ultimate object of desire and power exists in tension with the ultimate anxiety-creating lack of it (which could be experienced as total helplessness). . . ” he could be referring to The Passion itself which literally was “total helplessness in the face of incomprehensible persecution”. This can also be seen in the light of Schaef’s “original sin of being born female”, when it is redeemed by a man, the new Adam, who chooses complete castration and in doing so—by becoming the stone rejected by the builders—becomes the cornerstone. In this way Christ also becomes the new Eve. Existential castration is “the way, the truth, and the light” so as to reach that state in which as Chesterton (1909) puts it, “The poet only desires exaltation and expansion, a world to stretch himself in. The poet only asks to get his head into the heavens. It is the logician who seeks to get the heavens into his head. And it is his head that splits” (p. 27). The difference between pre-Protestant Catholicism and post-Protestant Catholicism is however that the Master discourse has changed. As with Christ, we respond to the new Master discourse which is God is Love.

For post-Protestant Catholic Jungians, Jesus Christ’s Passion is the supreme exemplar of how to cope with mid-life should this be the occasion of the suffering associated with change. Remaking oneself at this time is an example of the Yes! that perfects the No! of the first part of life and rejects the facile Enjoy! that has in recent times overtaken it. It is a celebration of age and not a rejection of it. That is one of the differences that can be appreciated with one’s transformation. The final chapter will look at others albeit in a necessarily brief way.
To begin this conclusion, I want to relate a very trivial personal occurrence to illustrate the more profound conclusions that form the end-point of this thesis.

Approaching my house by car from the east, I need to turn right from a main road into a street that feeds the road I live on. To accommodate the right-turning vehicles, a manoeuvre that has its own dedicated red and green arrow traffic signals, the left westward side of the Avenue (one of four that circle the central business district in Christchurch, New Zealand) broadens out into four, instead of the normal three, lanes. The right-turning lane is however of limited length and therefore not always able to cater for all the cars wanting to turn right at any particular time. Also, if one is stuck behind a number of cars that want to go straight ahead, one cannot get into that right-turning lane to either trip the mechanism that activates the right-turning arrow at the beginning of the next cycle, or to benefit from the signal that preceding cars have tripped. Many have been the times when I have found myself behind cars that have lazily drawn to a halt at the stop light leaving me insufficient room to squeeze past into the right lane. If these cars had used the road more efficiently and drawn closer to the car ahead of them, I would have had that room. I have never tooted because it is not the normally reserved New Zealand way, and secondly, it is a coarse method of communication because a toot could mean any number of things. Instead I close in on them with my indicator blinking hoping they get the hint which they invariably don’t, and I start cursing what I perceive as their lack of empathy as well as a lack in their ability to systemise—that is, to understand how this traffic system works. In other words, in this situation (and using Baron-Cohen’s (2003) dichotomy) Guideline 1: Really Good Empathising can follow on from Good Systemising.

My impatience with the drivers who don’t see my predicament also illustrates of course something about me when I get behind a wheel. If I empathised more and systemised less at these lights on the Avenue, I would appreciate that the person in front of me quite possibly has more on his or her mind than my transient “problem” of getting home in the least amount of time possible, let alone an intimate knowledge of how the traffic cycle works at the Bealey Avenue/Durham Street North intersection. Such is the egotism, the limited viewpoint, and intense focus of the efficiency-maximising destination-driven driver. My New Years’ Eve plans could usefully include resolutions that can be classed under the general heading of what I have heard described as “living gracefully”: Guideline 2: Living Gracefully means choosing to over-ride or live beyond Rabid Systemising.

“Living gracefully” was a term used on a Sunday radio programme (Rose, 2011) that broadcast after two significant earthquakes—two bolts from the blue—that occurred in Christchurch on September 4, 2010 and February 22, 2011, when living gracefully—taking life, with confidence, as it comes—became an important imperative. Ian Brown, the Canadian father of a severely disabled son Walker, was talking about his visits to the L’Arche network of homes for the disabled and how, in their founder Jean Vanier’s words, they do there what they (the disabled) are capable of doing—and that is capable enough. “The spirit of the place is created by the disabled people, not the helpers”. As Brown continued, this is the opposite of how accomplishment is usually measured in terms of content and the speed with which it is done.

Living gracefully is one way of describing the end-point of all the counter-cultural constructs/theories from academic, popular, religious and even business sources that have been dealt with in this thesis. Living gracefully means arriving at post-Protestant Catholicism and catholicism at Stage 5 (that is,

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257 A title that draws on images of Noah’s Ark as both a refuge and a starting over.
258 This marginally Durkheimian and emergent notion of catholicism as something that emerges from a community of all those who—Christianity at least believes—are made in the image of God, no matter how unchurched, was expressed by the Anglican Bishop of Christchurch (Victoria Matthews) at a memorial service for those killed in the second Christchurch earthquake:

A summary of these positions is to formulate it as the “paradox, depth and intergenerational responsibility” that Fowler (1981) states is characteristic of Stage 5 functioning. It is expressed in the two rules I came up with above but in the end that little scenario doesn’t amount to much as an example of living in the world but not being part of it; or to put it in the language of this thesis, in terms of living a life on the horizontal dimension in the context of the vertical dimension of the conceptual wisdom model. To really understand the complexity and grandeur of a truly Christian response, I need to enlist a weightier example.

Before doing that, there is a need to briefly review what paradox is. In his discussion of “the paradoxes of Christianity” Chesterton (1909) observes how Christianity was able to combine “furious opposites” –“two colours, co-existent but pure” (p. 177)—in a way that paganism couldn’t.

\textit{It separated the two ideas and then exaggerated them both. In one way Man was to be haughtier than he had ever been before; in another way he was to be humbler than he had ever been before. In so far as I am Man I am the chief of creatures. In so far as I am a man I am the chief of sinners. (p. 171)}

There we have the two sides of the wisdom model that are separated by the ego-eco faultline, and in that statement we have their resolution. In terms of systems and our individual tasks within it, “we must be much more angry with theft than before, and yet” in terms of community and our fundamental essences as made in the image of God, “much kinder to thieves than before” (p. 173).

When Chesterton (1909) describes Christianity as a context in which, “[t]here was room for wrath and love to run wild” (pp. 173-174), he is referring to the social justice exhibited by Thomas and his speaking of truth to kingly power, and the existential gratitude passed on by Catherine to the despised criminal, the two examples of Christian living described back in Chapter 3.

Sanford (1996) uses Fritz Künkel’s insights when he writes of the two kinds of ego responses:

\textit{The first, the response the ego makes out of its egocentricity, is “characterized by inflexibility, panic, defensiveness, rage, and sterility.” In contrast, the creative ego response is a response “that is exactly appropriate to the kind of situation with which the person is faced. It cannot be stylized or characterized because the creative Ego response is always unique and one-of-a-kind.” (p. 170)}

In the second type of ego response, we have the parallel to Baron-Cohen’s second-order empathising and Aristotle’s definition (quoted by Goleman (1995)) of emotional intelligence\textsuperscript{260}, systemising is about the general rules of the system, and/but empathising is all about the unique and individual characteristics of the people involved, and what they need in any particular situation. One biblical account that clearly

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{259} The well-known expression of “born again Christian” pertains I think to a transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3 in Fowler’s (1981) schema. It is a coming into a society rather than a more mature moving out of it.
\item \textsuperscript{260} “Anyone can become angry—that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose, and in the right way—this is not easy.”
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
shows the wholeness of Jesus in this respect is described in John 8:1-11 in which Jesus is tested by those who would seek to discredit him. John Sanford, a Jungian Episcopalian priest, uses this story of the woman caught in the act of adultery to show the creative difference between the ego allied with archetypal Ego—the egocentric ego—and the ego allied with the Self. It is an illustration of both Fowler’s paradox and depth. Jesus’s response was creative, unique, and one-of-a-kind and he did it in one sentence: Let him who is without sin cast the first stone. Moreover he took his time to think this response through by, seemingly absent-mindedly, writing in the sand as he centred himself. His reply was no quick come-back and as such was sufficiently complex to serve as an example of Wendall Holmes’ “simplicity on the other side of complexity”; as a second-order empathising that realises the systematic realities of the milieu it is empathising within.

The wisdom of Jesus’s simple, one-sentence reply has, as John Sanford observes, four important functions:

First, it throws the ball back to his detractors without the need for defensiveness on Jesus’ part. Second it shows compassion for the woman taken in adultery without condoning her actions. Third it gives her detractors something to think about that, if they do so, may lead to their own greater consciousness and growth. Fourth, it leaves no room for his enemies to use his answer against him. (Sanford, 1996, p. 170)

Everybody’s needs (for growth) are taken care of and the integrity of the moral system is upheld. In the terms of another biblical paradox, Jesus shows the wisdom of serpents and the gentleness of doves.261

Emotional intelligence is characterised by both interpersonal and intrapersonal awareness. With regard to the interlinked nature of both, Jean Vanier’s insights are important ones to examine. As Vanier makes plain in his work with the handicapped, “frailty [is] strength, peace no longer [lies] in the tolerance of difference, but in the bridging of it through a mutual concession of weakness”. . . . The enemy of love is self-esteem [just as Peck (1993) postulated262], . . . The purpose of intellectually disabled people like Walker might be to free us from the stark emptiness of the survival of the fittest263 (Brown, 2009, pp. 210, 233-234). However it may be even more complicated than that. Brown, an atheist, goes on to quote Darwin from The Descent of Man:

[Walker] may be a deleterious effect of evolution as far as a geneticist is concerned, but he has few peers as a route to developing what Darwin himself . . . called the evolutionary advantages of “the social instincts . . . love, and the distinct emotion of sympathy.” Darwin’s opponents pointed out that man was weaker than the apes, and so there was no logical way he, man, could be the result of the survival of the fittest. But evolution is smarter than that, Darwin replied. “We should . . . bear in mind that an animal possessing great size, strength, and ferocity, and which, like the gorilla, could defend itself from all enemies, would not perhaps have become social: and this would most effectually have checked the acquirement of the higher mental faculties, such as sympathy and the love of his fellows. Hence it might have been an immense advantage to man to have sprung from some comparatively weak creature. (p. 285)

That is a catholic view of value reality. The Catholic view is Vanier’s:

Every time we meet someone who is severely handicapped, Jean Vanier believes, they ask two questions: Do you consider me human? Do you love me? The more we meet the handicapped on their own ground, Varner believes, the more our answers evolve. We begin in fear of their appearance and behaviour; move on through pity; pass through the stage where we help them and respect them, but still see them as lesser beings; until finally we experience “wonderment and thanksgiving,” and “discover that, by becoming close to disabled people and entering an authentic relationship with them, they transform us . . . And so those we see as weak or marginalised are, in fact, the most worthy and powerful among us: they bring us closer to God.” (Brown, 2009, p. 284)

261 In terms of Mitroff’s (1998) four solutions to any problem, and Rolheiser’s (1998) four non-negotiable pillars of Christianity it illustrates I would submit, in the order in which Sanford addresses them in the quotation above: interpersonal/community; technologically/private prayer and private morality; existential/mellowness of heart and spirit; and systemic/social justice.

262 Although, as he also postulated, not in its opposite which he called “self-love” (p. 89).

263 Darwin never actually used this term. It was coined by Herbert Spencer as a summary of Darwin’s theory.
And so it is the difference that most disturbs that ultimately is the most transformative: transformation occurs through appreciation (primarily that appreciation that comes from experience—both value and intellect-driven) of the difference that disturbs, whether that is mental and bodily disturbance posed by my relationship with an enemy, or the mental and bodily disturbance stimulated by the proximity of a handicapped person who reminds me of my own death and weakness and dependency on others. Both make us feel powerlessness and so both, at best, make us think. At worst both make us angry, because as Vanier (1977) observes, and what every student at a school knows when they test their teachers, when “our anguish” (p. 20) is touched we “explode” (p. 20).

I think every student wants to know when the teacher is going to explode. So you do little things and you play little sneaky games and it’s funny to see a teacher going off the rocker. You look for the stress point of the person in front of you. A child knows the stress point of their parents. You know children are very wise people . . . (p. 20)

And that inherent wisdom, if or when it is recaptured at middle age, if one has the courage to move beyond the quest for power, is the indication of strength—of spiritual strength, Vanier (1977) maintains (p. 21). Ultimately, wounded people want to know if the “other” is spiritually strong enough to cope with the following questions:

. . . can I really depend on you in times of trouble? Can I depend on you to love me, even though there is all this phenomena of violence and hatred inside me? Are you really somebody who can help me grow? Can I depend on you? . . . Do you really care for me in the depths of my being? Are you prepared to sacrifice yourself for me? That’s what they want. (p. 21)

This requires more than the “high” thinking of the Enlightenment. It requires the “deep” feeling of an enchanted world. Re-enchantment is needed to provide ballast for Enlightenment rationalism. As Clayton (2008) concluded, deep feeling is like the 90% underpinning of the top 10% high thinking of the iceberg. That is, the higher that one ventures into the heady realms of systemic idealism, one must also ensure that there are sufficient existential depths to compensate. Another way of stating this is that systems must be judged by the quality of life of those on the bottom level of its effects.

The normal escapist thought is to be the clever and powerful problem-solving “symbolic analyst” (Reich, 1991); the claim of an alternative is to be the embodiment of a prophecy of weakness, to withdraw our projections from other people and own our own shadows. Loving our enemies, whether they be in human form or as spectral presences representing our own existential terror, lies at the radical core of the Christian message. There is ultimately no greater test of the Christian—except perhaps for that related one of losing our life to save it, both of which go against the ingrained evolutionary psychology that emphasises “valuing me and mine” (Smith & Mackie, 2000)264.

Valuing empathising is not to denigrate the very important value of systemising but to see it as a means by which we can empathise and create the physical conditions by which the health of all may be maintained. We need to ask, How do we get a system whereby all are comfortably housed with enough to eat and the wherewithal to support themselves and their families, to name just a few of the basic human needs? Likewise, “empathy” comes from those who are able to provide these things when needed with no fuss and no self-serving agenda265. As Helen Luke (1983, p. 67) observes, the etymology of the word

264 Chesterton (1909, pp. 168-169) makes the point that losing our life to save it is at base a very valuable guide for life:

“He that will lose his life, the same shall save it,” is not a piece of mysticism for saints and heroes. It is a piece of everyday advice for sailors or mountaineers. It might be printed in an Alpine guide or a drill book. This paradox is the whole principle of courage: even of quite earthly or quite brutal courage. A man cut off by the sea may save his life if he will risk it on the precipice. He can only get away from death by continually stepping within an inch of it. A soldier surrounded by enemies, if he is to cut his way out, needs to combine a strong desire for living with a strange carelessness about dying.

Loving one’s enemies is also good practical advice. If we reflect deeply enough on why certain people are our enemies, we have the opportunity to gain an insight into our values and motivations and their worthiness or not.

265 Helen Luke (1983, p. 69) explores the difference between what she terms “objective suffering” and “subjective emotional reaction” in terms of their effects on other people. She uses the example of a nurse or anyone who is close to those who are seriously ill: “if she reacts with intense personal emotion to the patient’s misery, [she] will either repress what she cannot bear
“suffering” (for others) is a “bearing up” from beneath or a carrying of the weight. It is not the neurotic suffering described by Jung of a soul that has not yet found its meaning, a soul in other words, which is “pressed down” under the weight. With deep empathising, we are often called on to pay the price, as Jesus ultimately did, for others’ growth (Rohr, 2001, p. 29).

If the vertical dimension of the wisdom model is so significant in terms of the ego-Self connection, then it must also be appreciated that this dimension and this connection can be easily swamped by the cares and concerns of a life where the social context is focused on the material and the immediate. It is in this sense that a post-Protestant Catholicism needs to actively work on the “accessibility” of post-Protestant Catholic thinking. “Accessibility” was identified as an important “processing principle” of our social psychology in Figure 4.23. It is in this sense that “doing the right thing” becomes more important than “doing the thing right” (see Figure 4.3). In other words, maintaining “accessibility” is important, when doing the right thing is more important (in terms of “providing the context for”) than doing the thing right. There is a difference in the activities that emanate from our Being and from our Doing, in the sense that Doing is understood as our professional or public social role—our participation in system. This quote from Chesterton (1909) makes this distinction (again, between systemising and empathising) clear:

This is the first principle of democracy: that the essential things in men are the things they hold in common, not the things they hold separately. And the second principle is merely this: that the political instinct or desire is one of these things which they hold in common. Falling in love is more poetical than dropping into poetry. The democratic contention is that government (helping to rule the tribe) is a thing like falling in love, and not a thing like dropping into poetry. It is not something analogous to playing the church organ, painting on vellum, discovering the North Pole (that insidious habit), looping the loop, being Astronomer Royal, and so on. For these things we do not wish a man to do at all unless he does them well. It is, on the contrary, a thing analogous to writing one’s own love-letters or blowing one’s own nose. These things we want a man to do for himself, even if he does them badly. (p. 81)

The fact that we are currently doing democracy badly is entirely to be expected. That shouldn’t be a reason to jettison it but a reason for each individual to try and do it “better” in the sense that we think of ourselves and respond as part of a collective.

Another example of matters that are not “essential” in terms of systemising but are “essential” in terms of empathising is the work of Betty Edwards (1982) and her endeavours to teach people how to draw, an area of expertise in which we tolerate childish skills where and when we wouldn’t in matters numerical and literary. For Edwards, it really doesn’t matter what the final product looks like. It is the process of learning to “see” that matters; to positively relate to what one sees. The fact that her students’ drawing skills do improve dramatically is the product of that learning to see, rather than a conscious striving to capture a great likeness; the product is in this sense a fortunate side-effect. It is the same with activities like Keating’s (2001) centering prayer and meditation and Rolheiser’s (2004) suggestions for following St John of the Cross. The more important matter in all these activities is to maintain accessibility to a chosen value reality. The important thing is to just do them in other words, even if, especially if, we are doing them badly.

In terms of the depth that such practices engender, the next question to ask is, How does this more existentially profound life influence those other aspects of the wisdom model—those values, in other words, that Rolheiser (1998) states are the non-negotiable aspects of the Christian life; one’s personal prayer and morality or vocation, community, and social justice?

In terms of one’s personal vocation, it is to see that one’s personal work is a prayer and a morality. To return to the story already related in footnote 43, there is the example of the three stonemasons on a

and become hard and unfeeling or else will increase the sick one’s burden through her unconscious identification”. The true nurse, who exemplifies objective suffering, is compassionate but not “invaded by emotional reactions”. She “carries” the patient in other words, doing whatever is appropriate for the patient’s recovery.

266 As Rabbi Heschel (1965, p. 83) has observed, “Mankind will not die for lack of information; it may perish for lack of appreciation”. The skills that Betty Edwards teaches are very “essential” indeed.
building site who are asked what they are doing. One states that he is cutting stone; the second states that he is building a wall; but the last one explains that he is building a Cathedral. He is combining Freud’s *Work* and *Love* and keeping these two colours co-existent and pure.

Nevertheless there is a wider social context for the Cathedral. In combining *Love* and *Work*, we are working within a system that may or may not be socially just. Is our work oppressing rather than liberating our fellow men and women? There are systemic options that one can draw on as claims of alternatives. Cavanaugh (2002, 2008) canvasses a few such as Mondragon in which the highest paid member can earn no more than 12 times the amount of the lowest paid. Morgan and Guthrie (2011) detail a system whereby individuals would be free to decide where to spend their time because the State would guarantee them the bare necessities of living through the payment of a universal income. Nair (2011) looks to the impending take-over of world capitalism by the more collective cultures of Asia whereby the welfare of all would be a more pressing concern that in the current Western individualistic hegemony.

Finally, with regard to Community, we come to “a religion of relatedness” in its most interpersonal sense. As Sennett (2012) for example observes, the tribalisms of today as illustrated in gated communities and sectarian cultural beliefs are the opposite of what he terms a dialogic community where relatedness fundamentally consists of a willingness to listen, a parallel perhaps with the silence of the monastic community that Keating recommends should be more widely practised. Peck’s (1987) *A different drum* also looks into the difficult dynamics involved in creating community. No matter how much the word “community” is thoughtlessly bandied about, what we actually have is what Peck identified as “pseudo-community”. The paradox at the heart of community is a valuing of difference; the separation inherent in systemic tribalism does not.

A religion of relatedness—both to ourselves, each other and to the environment of which we are a part (as well as its “steward” as mandated in Genesis) brings us to discussion of the final descriptor of Stage 5 in Fowler’s (1981) schema: *intergenerational responsibility*. Where the Fowler model (Figure 4.3), the wisdom model (Figure 4.17) and the Personal and the Social model (Figure 4.23) were brought back into the discussion above in relation to paradox and depth, it is in regard to the Cultural Design model (Figure 4.7) that I wish to make some final points. Specifically, in relation to the equation, \( P=A \times M - SC \), “SC” refers to the *Situational Constraints* or the limits that we all need to live by in a finite material world. Rolheiser (2011), for example, interprets original sin as the snatching of resources that we were not freely given. The unbridled consumption facilitated by modern technology is that same original sin but with better muscles to accomplish its problematic task.

We are not lone or atomised individuals and cultures; nor should we continue the narcissism of our youth into middle age. To be good husbanders, we need to understand inter-relatedness. Limits on our autonomy need to be observed. In that sense we in the West have created systems in which no-one—and everyone—is in charge; capitalism proceeds apace like a runaway train on a planet that runs on a finite track. I, in the West, live at a level of comfort that has come to me simply by virtue of being born into a time and a culture that was on the right side of a past colonial ledger, funded through its ability to snatch resources that weren’t freely given.

It is important that we conceive of relatedness in a way that pays attention to the situational constraints on our activities that our fellow men and women and Earth’s other animal inhabitants place on us. What

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267 While this looks like an attractive option the way he expresses it, would that mean a reversion to a situation whereby the best legacy of Protestantism—the freedoms of vulnerable individuals like women—would be compromised?

268 Rolheiser (2011) states, “Simply put, the original sin was a failure in gratitude and receptivity, the failure to respect a gift. It is no accident that the author of the story employs images (nakedness, shame) that are suggestive of sexual violation. That is the very point of this story, except that the rape being talked about here is wider than sex. In turning away from the posture of receptivity to the posture of seizing, Adam and Eve began to take by force, as by right, what was theirs only as gift. The result of that is always shame, a darkened mind, rationalization, and the beginnings of a dysfunctional world” (pp. 98-99).
indeed are the social, economic, and political systems whereby these situational constraints become most salient to us? How can social justice be achieved? The economic globalisation that has taken place over the last four decades could be interpreted as a system whereby the inequalities between countries have been alleviated, but it has created considerable inequalities within countries, thereby maintaining the tendency identified by both Becker (1975) and Pagel (2012) for social power to be concentrated in the hands of the few. Some sociologists point to the need for some sort of over-riding world order that could even out labour and environmental standards so that at the very least no-one slips below a defined basic level in terms of specific social indicators—most importantly, those describing health, most importantly of people, but also of ecosystems.

Therein lies the challenge. To conceive of a system that treats empathising as more important than systemising while still fully appreciating the importance of systemising in achieving that empathising. Samuels (1993) talks of the necessity for a “political psyche”—for analysis that draws out the difference of the individual so that the analyst and the client can thereby play their full political part in a world that needs a “democracy of the different”, or Surowiecki’s (2004) “wisdom of crowds”, Schaef’s (1987) “holographic paradigm”269, or Vattimo’s (2011) “hermeneutic communism”. However, current Hysteric discourses are largely represented by the confused yearnings expressed for example within the banal New Age religiosities as described by Tacey (2001). Nevertheless, no matter how egregiously expressed, if one accepts the value reality that Christianity reveals, this movement, at base, expresses the metaphysical desire for Truth, Goodness, and Beauty that we all fundamentally share as children of God. To take just the last, the yearning for Beauty, I can do little better than to quote one of Betty Edwards’ students who, after learning how to see and draw faces, said, “I don’t think I ever actually looked at anyone’s face before I started drawing. Now, the oddest thing is that everyone looks beautiful to me” (Edwards, 1982, p. 8, emphasis in the original). Indeed they are, whether we have trained our eyes and brains to look for and see it, or not.

In Christian belief we are all beautiful because we are made in the image of God, and if we do not see that in ourselves or in others, the fault lies in ourselves. In that respect we need to take ourselves and others and the cultures we create a little less seriously while also taking all of those three entities very seriously indeed. That paradox is similar to the one that Amy Adams’ character tells her troubled husband in the movie Junebug: God loves you just the way you are, and he loves you too much for you to stay that way. In other words, it is to our existential advantage to grow into a bigger identity that integrates the contrasexual “other”. We are not enough like God if we don’t, because God is not devoid of sex and gender but replete with it. Perhaps Paul got it slightly wrong in Galatians. Perhaps it should be expressed differently, or interpreted differently, to incorporate a new understanding which underlines the problematic identities and social structures we have created for ourselves as a result of sexual selection in our evolutionary history:

There is neither, and there is both, Jew and Greek; there is neither, and there is both, slave and free; there is neither, and there is both, male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.

We should also realise that, in the final analysis, as Chesterton (1909) observes, the reality of Christ is like his garment; it is not made of “silly strips, labelled egoism and altruism”, but rather, “without seam woven from the top throughout” (p. 78).

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269 As Schaef (1987) states, “The essential feature of a hologram is that each piece of the hologram contains the whole structure of the hologram” which means that the ‘system is like the individual and the individual is like the system” (p. 37).
Appendix 4.1. Notes on Mitroff’s use of Jung’s personality typology

The difference between the “T” and the “F” viewpoint

Mitroff (1998, (pp. 120-121)) provides this helpful illustration of the differences between the “T” and the “F” viewpoint:

Since all situations have both T and F aspects, one can pick any situation to illustrate how T and F personality types see the world differently. A personal favorite of mine is the following story about a couple who attended a dinner party with my wife, Donna, and me:

After dinner, we witnessed an unfortunate replay of an argument between the couple. A few nights before, the wife had gone out for the evening and left her husband to care for their two small children. She returned home much earlier than she had planned and was horrified to find that her two small children had been left alone. The husband had ducked out for a few minutes to go to his office to pick up some important papers on which he was working. When he returned home, his wife was furious. The husband's rationale was this: “I figured that the probability of anything happening to the children was only one in ten thousand.”

In the years since this incident happened, I have used it repeatedly in classes and workshops to illustrate the differences, to put it mildly, between T and F types. The wife was horrified at her husband's T logic. What made the situation even worse, and hence more tense, was the fact that the wife felt at a loss to counter her husband, who was a scientist. She knew instinctively that he was wrong, but she lacked both the basic vocabulary and the self-esteem to say how or why. As a result, she was unable to utter the following, which is my retort, although her every word and manner implied it:

Let me tell you why I am so outraged. First of all, I don't have ten thousand children. Even if I did, I wouldn't want to sacrifice any of them, as the main female character in the movie Sophie's Choice had to do. Second, you're looking at the denominator in this situation, the ten thousand. I'm looking at the numerator. I have only one pair of children who are precious to me. They are absolutely unique. They are the only “ones” of their kind. Putting the situation in the way you did utterly trivializes their humanity. You have reduced a human situation to a game of chance. That is absolutely intolerable!

The moral of this story is not that F types are always right and T types are always wrong. In this particular case, T was wrong, especially since he couldn't see the Feeling components of the situation. I could give just as many examples where F is wrong as where T is wrong. If I am overly critical of T types, it is only because they are so dominant in our culture. Being a Thinking type myself, and having been surrounded by them throughout my educational and professional life, I'm entitled to be critical.

“Relatedness” with respect to the “T” polarity involves the systematised communication in scientific journals and the like whereby knowledge can communicate with itself. Another assumption is that unless it is written down and thereby communicated, information is valueless. Likewise culture for many sociologists is something that people “do”. What goes on in people’s heads is immaterial. That is similarly the case in behavioural psychology to take one instance from another discipline. The “F” side of polarity can be a different phenomenon in that sense; it may find it hard to speak its name in the “T” context, just as the intuitive young wife did in Mitroff’s example above. And the “T” type did not recognise its own limitations enough to draw this “shy” intuition out. Ian Mitroff, with his fuller appreciation of T and F difference, could. This story then is an excellent illustration of how Maxwell (1984) sees an adroit academia working as a public service. Here the professional thinker has encapsulated an argument that would not otherwise be heard because it is inarticulate in terms T could readily grasp.

It is quite obvious, as Mitroff (1998) maintains, that the “F” viewpoint in the story above is the correct one in that situational context; it does see beyond itself in terms of its relatedness to another, in this case in empathy to one’s blood relations. If one saw one’s relationships only in terms of oneself, the other is likely to disabuse you of your limited purview fairly rapidly even if, in the case of a young child, it is the wider society that does so—neglect of one’s family is not taken lightly in our or any other culture. However in terms of relatedness, empathy to one’s blood relations and social group is an instinctual given. Empathy in this situation—of a young mother before mid-life is, by necessity, limited in range and ego-invested (as for example illustrated in social psychology research which can predict pro-social behaviour depending on the gene investment of the protagonist). Empathy can however be more
complicated than this: it can mean for example not doing something out of consideration for another. And another difference between the two stances is that although it is nigh on impossible to prove, there are some in our society—a group of enclosed nuns for example—who believe in the power of prayer (a conventionally perceived “passive” activity) to effect change in the cosmos. In other words, for people with these sorts of religious beliefs, the cosmos, as well as a system of matter, is seen as a sort of “Feeling” entity. That that is seen as aberrant nonsense by those in the “T” camp is indicative of the assumptions they as a type make about the cosmos and the difficulty of forming a proof that would convince them otherwise. However it must be remembered that even in Western modernity—that stronghold and purveyor of the “T” mindset as Ian Mitroff observes—there are substantial numbers of Christians for example who support the nuns’ viewpoint—not to mention the New Agers who subscribe to a parallel sort of idea albeit in a more individualistic and material fashion (one that personally I, as a card-carrying “F” type, have little sympathy with).

The extent of the polarity
While there are the two polarities, most of us are probably bunched up towards the middle of the continuum rather than towards the poles. As Haidt (2006) observes “Human rationality depends critically on sophisticated emotionality. It is only because our emotional brains works [sic] so well that our reasoning can work at all” (p. 13). I suspect in Mitroff’s story above that the husband was trying to rationalize the priorities that underlay the choice he made—in other words he was trying to make his self-centred action look less self-centred in its inherent evaluations than it actually was. The husband and wife were thereby arguing about the wrong thing. The actual topic of conversation should perhaps have been about the priorities accorded to the husband’s role (as empathizing father or systemising provider) in such situations, a related but slightly different conversation.

The T/F distinction with regard to difference
An important point to make about the T/F distinction, is in terms of the idea of difference which is central to this thesis. As Mitroff (1983) states, “thinking emphasises sameness; feeling, characteristic differences or uniqueness, for example, that no two people are exactly alike” (p. 57). So, for the wife in the story above, her children represent uniqueness (they also of course represent much more than that); for the husband, at least in the story (and no doubt for the purposes of his argument and the winning thereof), they are exemplars in a unified system of probabilities.
Appendix 7.1. Is Science neurotic?

Maxwell (2004, pp. 1-2) draws on his conception of Freud’s Oedipus Complex in deciding that Science is indeed neurotic. He offers the following explanation using a parable of an adult man who acts out the neurosis implanted in his childhood.

A boy loves his mother, and as a result is furiously jealous of, and hates, his father. But his father is big and powerful, and not easy to get rid of; and besides the boy also loves his father. So the hatred is repressed: . . . Nevertheless it persists into adult life, and one day, purely by accident, while caring lovingly for his elderly and ill father, the son mixes a lethal dose of medicine, and finally succeeds in fulfilling his long-repressed desire. But the act is rationalized away as a ghastly accident.

Put in a more abstract way, what one has here is something like the following. The son, whatever else he may be, is a being with aims, whether acknowledged or repressed. There is a basic desire or aim, A: to love his mother. There is a secondary, highly problematic, repressed aim, B: to kill his father. There is a third, declared, but somewhat unreal aim, C: to love, to care for, his father. The son supposes himself to be pursuing aim C while in reality he is pursuing aim B: actions performed in pursuit of B (administration of a lethal dose of medicine) are rationalized in terms of the pursuit of C (it was an accident . . . .

The advantage of construing the Oedipus complex as a very special case of something much more general, namely the pursuit of problematic, repressed (or unacknowledged) aims under the smokescreen of apparently pursuing some unproblematic, acknowledged aim, is that it becomes possible to attribute neurosis to anything that can be construed (1) to pursue aims more or less successfully, (2) to represent (to itself or to others) the aims it pursues, and (3) almost inevitably, to misrepresent (some) aims that it is pursuing.
References

Notes:
References to the Bible follow the usual form which is to quote the name of the Book within the Bible, and then its chapter and verse (e.g. Matthew 5: 1-5).
References to Carl Jung’s works quote the volume number in his Collected works (Read, Fordham & Adler (Eds.) (1959-1979)), followed by the paragraph number (e.g. CW 9: 150)

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Jung, C. G. (See note at the beginning of the References section)


