EU Actoriness with and within Southeast Asia in light of Non-traditional Security Challenges

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in European Studies at the University of Canterbury by Naila Maier-Knapp

National Centre for Research on Europe University of Canterbury 2011
Statement of Authorship

I declare that this is an original piece of research by myself, Naila Maier-Knapp, and that the material has not been used for other awards from other institutions and that all sources are acknowledged.

Brisbane, 20 July 2011 (for amended version 13 August 2012)

Naila Maier-Knapp
Abstract

Nearly four decades of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-European Union (EU) relationship have witnessed the importance of ideas and identity alongside the economic interests in shaping the behaviour of the two sides. The study takes interest in understanding the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor with and within Southeast Asia through a reflectivist lens. The thesis is an attempt to provide a new perspective on a relationship commonly assessed from an economic angle. It outlines the opportunity of non-traditional security (NTS) challenges to enhance EU actorness and normative influence in Southeast Asia.

Against this backdrop, the study explores the dialogue and cooperative initiatives of two regions, which attach relatively little salience to each other. The study employs a NTS lens and draws upon the case of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, the haze in relation to forest governance, the Bali bombings of 2002 and the political conflict in Aceh. The study assumes that these NTS issues can stimulate processes of threat convergence as well as threat ‘othering’. It argues that these processes enhance European engagement in Southeast Asia and contribute to shaping regional stability in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, NTS crises present situations, where norms can become unstable, contested and substituted. This allows us to better examine the EU as a normative actor.

To establish an understanding of the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor, the empirical evidence will focus on the threat perceptions, motivations of action and activities of the EU and its member states. For the purpose of differentiating the EU as a normative actor, the study will also include the discussion of the normative objectives and behaviours of the EU and its member states and apply a reflectivist theoretical framework.

Hypothetically, NTS crises trigger external assistance and normative influence and thus, they offer an opportunity to establish a more nuanced picture of the EU in the region. At the same time, the study acknowledges that there are a variety of constraints and variables that complicate the EU’s actorness. The thesis seeks to identify and discuss these. So far, scholarly publications have failed to apply the NTS perspective systematically. This thesis provides the first monograph-length treatment of the EU in Southeast Asia through a NTS and reflectivist lens.
Acknowledgments

I am at the end of my journey and looking back, there many people and institutions that have made this thesis possible. I sincerely hope that this thank you reaches all of you who have been a part of this interesting adventure.

Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude towards the many Track 1 and 2 representatives within Southeast Asia and Europe, who have taken their valuable time to share their insights. I would like to thank the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in particular, for giving me the opportunity to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue.

A thank you also goes out to Clara Portela, Jörn Dosch and Richard Burchill, who have given good and insightful advice throughout my doctoral research project. I would like to thank Martin Holland and the National Centre for Research on Europe and the European Union Centres Network in New Zealand for making available financial resources to cover my tuition fees, one research trip to Europe, and two conference attendances. It was a delight to be based at the University of Canterbury in the beautiful city of Christchurch. The New Zealand government has also been very generous and financed my research trips to Brussels and Southeast Asia under the New Zealand Postgraduate Study Abroad Award. I am also very grateful for the research support from the EU Centre in Singapore and Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia.

Last, but not least, my biggest THANK YOU is to my partner and my family for their endless support and belief in me. I hope I do my parents justice by dedicating this thesis to them. They have been an inspiration to me and the many students they have taught and been a role model to over the decades. These days, it is hard to find true non-commercialised and selfless academics with a passion for in-depth research and a love to share their knowledge with the next generation. Thank you for being there!
Für Hubert und Jiraporn Maier-Knapp
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Preliminary Remarks

Since the concept of NTS encompasses a broad range of threats, I had to pre-select the case studies prior to starting my doctoral journey in March 2008. The thesis concentrates on the case studies, which provided sufficient empirical evidence for the analysis of the EU as a collective actor. It recognises that NTS actorness has controversial normative implications and further includes important areas such as disaster relief, food security and other issue areas, which are discussed in the published book version of this thesis.

Furthermore, I need to note that, during my research, it was still unclear whether the Treaty of Lisbon would ever be ratified by all EU member states. In addition to this, the selected NTS crises in the case studies happened prior to the Treaty of Lisbon coming into effect. In this light, the thesis assumes a pre-Lisbon perspective in regard to the EU’s activities and modes of interaction. For example, the relabelled Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is referred to in its former designation as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in the context of the Aceh Monitoring Mission.

Thus, the interviews were conducted in a time of change, where pre- and post-Treaty of Lisbon working modes and standards overlapped. Therefore, the study alludes to the norms and values defined by the Treaty of Lisbon as the ideational benchmark for the EU’s norms and values in its external relations. Although the selected case studies take place in a normative context prior to the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, this thesis refers to this Treaty, because it better matches the normative context of the interviewees.

Finally, the GTZ has changed its name to Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). However, since the activities and research proceeded prior to this name change, the thesis refers to the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>ASEAN Brussels Committee</td>
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<td>ACB</td>
<td>ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity</td>
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<td>AECEF</td>
<td>Asia Europe Cooperation Framework</td>
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<td>AEEM</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Economic Ministers’ Meeting</td>
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<td>AEISP</td>
<td>ASEAN Economic Integration Support Programme</td>
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<td>AEMM</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting</td>
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<td>AFC</td>
<td>Asian Financial Crisis</td>
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<td>AIPA</td>
<td>ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Assembly</td>
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<td>AIPO</td>
<td>ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Organisation</td>
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<td>AMM</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
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<td>APRIS</td>
<td>ASEAN-EU Programme for Regional Integration Support</td>
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<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<td>ASEAN-PMC</td>
<td>ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference</td>
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<td>ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies</td>
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<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
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<td>Asia Europe Foundation</td>
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<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
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<td>ATF</td>
<td>ASEM Asian Financial Crisis Trust Fund</td>
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<td>CARE</td>
<td>Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere</td>
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<td>CBM</td>
<td>confidence-building measure</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Crisis Management Initiative</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>civil society organisation</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>Directorate General</td>
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<td>DIPECHO</td>
<td>Disaster Preparedness ECHO</td>
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<td>DOM</td>
<td>Daerah Operasi Militer</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Community</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
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<td>ECFIN</td>
<td>Economic and Financial Affairs</td>
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<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>foreign direct investment</td>
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<td>Finance Ministers’ Meeting</td>
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<td>FIU</td>
<td>Financial Intelligence Unit</td>
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<td>FLEGT</td>
<td>Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade</td>
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<td>FLEGT VPA</td>
<td>FLEGT Voluntary Partnership Agreement</td>
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<td>FMM</td>
<td>Foreign Ministers’ Meeting</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of 7</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>G20</td>
<td>Group of 20</td>
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<td>GAM</td>
<td>Free Aceh Movement</td>
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<td>GFC</td>
<td>Global Financial Crisis</td>
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<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of Indonesia</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
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<td>ILEA</td>
<td>International Law Enforcement Academy</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IMP</td>
<td>Initial Monitoring Presence</td>
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<td>IPAP</td>
<td>International Promotion Action Plan</td>
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<td>JCC</td>
<td>Joint Cooperation Committee</td>
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<td>JCLEC</td>
<td>Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation</td>
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<td>JI</td>
<td>Jemaah Islamiah</td>
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<td>LoGA</td>
<td>Law on the Governance of Aceh</td>
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<td>MDF</td>
<td>Multi Donor Fund</td>
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<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
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<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<td>NTS</td>
<td>non-traditional security</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>ORHAP</td>
<td>Operational Regional Haze Action Plan</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>PD</td>
<td>preventive diplomacy</td>
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<td>READI</td>
<td>Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument</td>
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<td>RELEX</td>
<td>(for) External Relations</td>
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<td>RHAP</td>
<td>Regional Haze Action Plan</td>
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<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
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<td>SEARCCT</td>
<td>Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism</td>
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<td>SOM</td>
<td>Senior Officials' Meeting</td>
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<td>TAM</td>
<td>Technical Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>TFAP</td>
<td>Trade Facilitation Action Plan</td>
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<td>TREATI</td>
<td>EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNSCR</td>
<td>UN Security Council Resolution</td>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>VDR</td>
<td>Voluntary Demonstration of Response</td>
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<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Yen-Euro-Dollar</td>
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Introduction

Nearly four decades of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-European Union (EU) relationship have seen the two sides mature. Their relationship has progressed from a dialogue focused on trade and aid to a comprehensive interaction, where both regions are jointly engaged in tackling transnational issues of common concern. The transnational and unconventional security threats stemming from Southeast Asia have put the region on the EU's map and enhanced the cooperative efforts between the two sides. Although the EU is a latecomer and remote actor in Southeast Asia, these issues have provided it with an opportunity to contribute to the region's peace and stability.

This opportunity is particularly expressed through the EU’s and its member states’ development policies. Over the years, this development engagement has contributed to the mitigation of vulnerability and insecurity in Southeast Asia, given that the development concerns of the region have become closely related to the security issues. In spite of this, the EU’s track record suggests that it plays a very passive politico-security role in Southeast Asia. This raises the question as to what extent the EU has managed to use these challenges as a vehicle for actual politico-security influence in the region. Amidst the Eurozone crisis and the EU’s enhanced engagement with Asia, this question has become integral to the future of the ASEAN-EU relationship.

To understand the extent as to which the EU, as a remote and passive actor, has made an impact in Southeast Asia, requires an enquiry into the EU’s activities, as well as the normative dimension of its activities and motivations. This requires an examination of the behaviour of the actor and the recipient of action. This further demands an understanding of the notion of the EU as a collective actor in regions far from Europe, where seemingly its economic and political lever diminishes in significance.

Consequently, when looking at the EU in Southeast Asia, it is not always clear whether the EU is an actor at all. Particularly, this is the case when the term presence has been commonly used to describe the EU and is often interchangeable with the term actor, as presented by David Allen and Michael Smith (Allen and Smith, 1991, 1998). Whether actor or presence, both concepts have attracted
immense scholarly attention over the years. However, a clear definition of the individual concepts as well as a concept with immediate relevance of the EU as a politico-security actor in Southeast Asia still remains to be developed. A clear conceptualisation of these concepts is imperative in order to adequately capture the EU’s impact in the region.

Against this backdrop, the hypothesis of this study is that the transnational and unconventional security crises will enable us to identify the EU as an actor more clearly, but jeopardise traditional conceptions of the EU as a normative actor in world affairs. The question of the EU as a normative actor is important, because, today, power is multi-dimensional and dispersed. International actors understand this and are aware of the limitations of military power to pursue their interests. They draw upon other sources to shape their environment. In today’s time, it seems that actors are increasingly employing ‘soft power’ (Joseph S. Nye Jr., 1990).

The EU is strategising its soft power – more or less successfully – to assume a greater role in Southeast Asia. While the United States of America (USA) and the other powers are counting on both soft power and military power, the EU relies exclusively on its soft power when interacting with Southeast Asia. In its attempt to project soft power, its norms and values play a central role in framing and justifying its foreign policies. This raises the question on how successful and how unique the EU can be as an actor in shaping its environment when its normative foundations of influence are common to many actors and when increased demand-oriented and functional cooperation may compromise this value-laden external identity to some extent. In this context, we also have to ask, if it makes sense to speak of the EU as a normative actor on the basis of its intent and rhetoric of norm projection. This is important, because actors may use norms instrumentally.

The degree of normative influence also depends on the recipient of action, if the recipient of action is willing to accept the EU as such an actor as well as internalise the diffused norms. Being a normative actor goes beyond the EU’s self-conceptualisation. We have to take into account the EU’s actual normative behaviour and influence. We can establish that we can speak of the EU as a normative actor in those instances that show the prevalence of the normative motivations, behaviour,

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1 The concept of soft power refers to a notion introduced by Joseph S. Nye to characterise international actors, which are capable of attracting, persuading and influencing other actors based on sources short of the use of force.
output and impact of actions. We need to consider the EU as a normative actor in a nuanced manner, because the EU and its member states are neither motivated by purely altruistic reasons nor capable of projecting their norms one-to-one. The common two-pronged distinction between rational and appropriate behaviour in international affairs is difficult to apply.

This is complexity also stems from the increasing interdependence of international actors. It is presumed that whatever actors do, their actions are always interdependent and embedded in some kind of normative context. In relation to this, complex interdependence – an overused but nevertheless most accurate term developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph S Nye in 1977, describing the increased interaction of states, regions and societies – is noteworthy (Keohane and Nye, 1977). In light of complex interdependence, the management of unconventional security issues is important to both Southeast Asia and the EU, since Southeast Asia may be a putative source of contagious insecurity. At the same time, it appears to be a suitable regional partner to jointly manage global threats and contribute to global governance.

Why Consideration of the EU’s normative Dimension as an Actor?
The EU’s normative identity has been characterised as an important part of the EU’s interaction with the world (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006b; Manners, 2006). This is, for instance, expressed in the EU’s legal agreements with third parties. In recent years, the EU’s attempts to project its normative identity have included the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with Southeast Asia. The EU has embarked on “upgrad[ing] its relationship with ASEAN countries through the conclusion of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements” (EUROPA Press Release, 25 June 2010). In the PCA negotiations, the EU aims to incorporate the normative dimension through the ‘essential elements’ clause which reflects its liberal-democratic agenda.²

The PCA process has shown that the EU’s normative identity already played an important role in the early stages of the negotiations. Firstly, the region-to-region agreement was scrapped, and selected bilateral agreements were launched to

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² The ‘essential elements’ clause consists of the core values of the EU. These are, namely, human rights and democratic principles. Since 1992, the EU has systematically incorporated this clause in its bilateral trade and development relations. In the Communication: A New Partnership with Southeast Asia in 2003, the EU proposed to include this clause in any negotiations with the ASEAN member states.
circumvent the inclusion of Myanmar. Secondly, the initial rhetoric suggested that the bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTA) were contingent on the successful conclusion of the PCA. The intent to negotiate a FTA emerged subsequently to the PCAs in 2007, as an interregional endeavour. This interregional intent was then altered to a bilateral plan. Despite the linkage between the two processes, the PCA and FTA were considered to be separate processes (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010). Singapore and Malaysia advanced to the FTA negotiations with the EU from 2010, although their PCAs have neither been signed nor ratified. The Philippines and Indonesia – which require greater economic adjustments – had to wait for the PCAs to be concluded before they were considered for FTA negotiations.

Finally, Thailand is currently still struggling to find a solution with the EU on the ‘essential elements’ clause (Maier-Knapp, 2011). Thai officials involved in the negotiations have suggested that the asymmetry in bargaining power has played a role in the process and point to the EU’s persistent attachment to the ‘essential elements’ (Maier-Knapp, 2011). The case of Thailand indicates that the EU is a normative power *per se* and that there is a coupling of the economic and normative agendas. It seems that the EU uses its economic leverage to act according to its normative agenda. However, this contradicts the suggestion that a normative actor is guided by normative motivations and objectives and employs the appropriate means, which are in line with its norms. In the case of Thailand, some EU officials have suggested that they are also willing to be flexible in regard to some ‘essential elements’ (Interview with EU official, 19 November 2009). The PCA negotiations displayed a mixed picture of the EU. On the one hand, it is norm(oriented, but on the other hand, it is interest-oriented. Therefore, we cannot consider it as a normative actor *per se*.

We need to be critical of the way the EU portrays itself as a ‘force of good’ and a ‘force for good’ and move beyond the simplification of the EU as a normative actor, not least, because, as aforementioned, there are other actors in Southeast Asia which have a similar normative agenda. In fact, it appears that the uniqueness of the EU as a normative actor solely rests on its region-to-region sharing of experiences with ASEAN. Anja Jetschke has even gone a step further and argued that in some instances the ASEAN side has actively emulated EU norms of regional integration (Jetschke, 2009; Jetschke and Murray, 2012). In light of her evidence, it is not incorrect to portray the EU as a normative actor in international affairs. However, the
variation of the EU as a normative actor needs to be considered and, so far, scholarly research on the EU in Southeast Asia has not done this systematically.

The scholarly focus on the EU’s normative dimension in its international role has neglected the fluid nuances of a rather mixed normative and rationalist picture. Furthermore, a nuanced discussion in relation to Southeast Asia could provide vital insights in advancing conceptions of the EU as an actor, in general. This thesis attempts to substantiate these debates on the EU as an actor and its normative impact in regions far from Europe. The following paragraphs will discuss the analytical framework, research interests, operationalisation of these interests, existing body of literature on the ASEAN-EU relationship, methodology and structure of the thesis.

Outline of Analytical Framework
The succeeding chapters are dedicated to expanding our knowledge on the EU as an actor and normative actor. For this purpose, we need to identify and disaggregate the constituents of its agency. To respond to the hypothesis, that NTS challenges allow us a greater understanding of the EU’s actorless and the EU as a normative actor, the enquiry draws upon three guiding research interests. Firstly, the thesis seeks to identify the activities that the EU pursues in relation to unconventional security challenges in Southeast Asia. In this context, it also attempts to assess the extent to which the outcomes of the EU’s actions are consistent with its normative identity. In relation to this the threat perceptions on the European side also need to be addressed. Secondly, the thesis distinguishes between the drivers behind the EU’s actions. Finally, it examines to what extent the EU drew upon the interregional dimension in its interaction with ASEAN. These research interests will assist in confirming the hypothesis.

The third research interest revolves around the concept of interregionalism. The thesis understands interregionalism to be the interaction between regional cooperative arrangements (Hänggi, 2006; Söderbaum and van Langenhove, 2006). Heiner Hänggi distinguishes between group-to-group, bi- and transregional and hybrid arrangements. Jürgen Rüland has identified similar actor-centric typological

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3 The first arrangement is associated to old regionalism and the European Economic Community. It describes the interregional relations between two regional organisations such as the ASEAN-EU dialogue in this thesis. The second arrangement is related to the post-Cold War triadisation of world economy. The actors involved can belong to more than two regions and do not necessarily have to represent a pre-existing regional organisation.

5
arrangements, but has also included the concept of transregionalism. The latter is pertinent to the case of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and describes a heterogeneous and diffuse arrangement between two regions with multi-level stakeholders and member states with overlapping regional memberships (Rüland, 2002b). The transregional and interregional forms of foreign policy are inherent in and natural to the EU, because they legitimise and cement the EU’s role as an international actor. As Frank Söderbaum explains,

Thus, the EU’s preference for region-building and interregionalism has implications not only for the foreign policy of the EU, but also for the organisation of the world polity where regional actors such as the EU gain legitimacy. (Söderbaum, Stalgren, and van Langenhove, 2006: 123)

Söderbaum implies that the supra-Westphalian organisational nature of the EU is reflected in the international structures and processes, of which the EU is a part. However, the EU is also being shaped by its environment through its interactions with this environment. In some instances, it may be accused of emulating the features of a state. On the one hand, the EU displays adaptive capacity within the Westphalian system. On the other hand, it promotes region-building to strengthen non-traditional actors of the Westphalian system. Thus, interregionalism provides a means to achieve twofold legitimacy.

Operationalisation of Research Interests

To operationalise the research interests, I adopt a two-pronged reflectivist approach for examining the dialogue and cooperation between Southeast Asia and the EU in relation to selected cases of non-traditional security (NTS) challenges in the Southeast Asian region. These approaches are social action theory and (social) constructivism. Social action theory assists in distinguishing between the different modes of action. It gives insights into the activities and their motivations and impact. By contrast, (social) constructivism gauges the consistency between normative

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4 This central concept of the thesis is discussed in detail in Subchapter 1.3. Furthermore, please read David Capie’s and Paul Evans’ The Asia-Pacific security Lexicon published by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in 2007 for a succinct definition of the concept.
identity and outcome of action and interaction. It also assists in understanding the activities and threat perceptions that contribute to the EU’s actions.

The modes of action are assessed from the EU-as-agent standpoint. The thesis views the EU as an actor with and within Southeast Asia, primarily, through the European Commission and, secondarily, through the member state level. The threat perceptions, actions, inactions and interactions in relation to the selected NTS challenges constitute the elements of analysis. The selected challenges are discussed in chronological order, in connection to an event of crisis and according to the following scheme of enquiry for the individual chapters in the empirical part of the thesis.

Part 1
- What impact did the crises/challenges have in Southeast Asia (including allusions to the major assistance providers)?
- Who are the security referents?

Part 2
- What is the probability of contagion to Europe and what are the threat perceptions and crisis interpretations?
- What was the EU’s interaction with Southeast Asia (within ASEAN-EU, ASEM and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF))? 

Part 3
- What was the EU’s normative agenda and how did it translate? (including the sub-question: To what extent did the EU draw upon the interregional dimension in its interaction with ASEAN?)

In reference to the various crises that have occurred in the region since the late 1990s, a European Commission official has said that the regional architecture in the region became more dynamic and people realised that ASEAN will remain in the centre...I think it is fair to say that policy-makers in Europe became more alert about the region....The economics are driving the relationship, it was recognised as a dynamic area, where the European Union should be involved, have more presence
and the European Union should be more pragmatic...the [Asian financial] crisis played a role in the sense that it focused the people's minds on regional integration. (Interview with EU official, 16 February 2009)

This statement by a European Commission official suggests that the region has been economically attractive to the EU. However, since the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC), Europe realised that its interests are intertwined with Southeast Asia. The EU believed that its prescription of regional integration could contribute to a greater resilience of the ASEAN markets. This in turn would also give some sense of security to the European side.

As hinted on page 1, crises represent situations where the likelihood is higher for norms to become unstable and domestic constraints to be overridden. In these situations, norms could be suspended and replaced. If crises, as shapers of behaviour and constituents of behaviour, are to be adequately recognised, a crisis-centric and sector-specific analysis of the EU’s actions is urgently required. It is with a view towards addressing this need that this study is dedicated. The selected crises/challenges are the AFC in 1997/98, the haze in 1997, the Bali bombings in October 2002 and the political conflict in Aceh. The cases involve issues of the low politics, transnational challenges or sudden shock events that are a threat to both the state and society. They cover the broad spectrum of the NTS frame. In this regard, NTS is understood to be a security concept related to an extensive array of post-Cold War threats that are neither state-to-state nor military in nature. NTS has featured prominently in the rhetoric of scholars as well as practitioners of Southeast Asia (e.g. manifest in the declarations of the ASEAN Regional Forum). Since the AFC raised questions about some principles of the ASEAN Way, this security concept has been frequently used to describe the new types of security threats.

In addition to the concept of NTS, the thesis places importance on the concept of 'actorness'. The thesis considers this concept along the lines of Charlotte Bretherton’s and John Vogler’s definition. The following brief definition, based on their insights, can be given: An actor depends on being identifiable, able to aggregate interests, formulate goals, and purposes, and implement these. The core features of their conceptualisation were inspired by Gunnar Sjöstedt’s piece in 1977 on the European Community's (EC) actor capability (Sjöstedt, 1977). Despite European actoriness having evolved significantly between 1977 and now, Sjöstedt’s core assumptions remain. Today, his back-then empirically weak categories of actor
capability consisting of crisis management and management of interdependence have become more evident. In fact, they are associated with the central underlying assumptions of the EU as an actor on NTS in this thesis.

In light of the NTS crises, it is important to differentiate between NTS actorness and actorness on NTS challenges. The motivation behind NTS actorness has to be consistent with the overall goals of the EU and be from an NTS perspective. By contrast, EU actorness on NTS is concerned with the EU acting to address a specific sector identified generally, or by its counterpart, as belonging to NTS (for a detailed discussion on NTS and actorness, please see the following chapter).

The aim of the study is not to assess the EU's influence. Such an assessment is complex, given the multiple heads of the EU, the involvement of other international actors, and the divergence between donor contribution and domestic implementation. A credible quantification of EU NTS actorness/actorness on NTS challenges implies a comparative approach that distinguishes between the impacts of all of the involved actors. This would imply a thorough examination starting from the domestic process of goal formulation and decision-making to the implementation of these decisions within the counterpart. It would also require sectorial differentiation based on the sector-specific goals. It is very difficult to disentangle sector-specific impacts and devise verifiable indicators of macro-level influence that are comparable across sectors.

The two-pronged reflectivist approach avoids a quantitative materialist dilemma. Rationalist accountings will fail to capture the ideational dimension of the practices. Reflectivist theorising draws upon social processes and may better explain the ideational dimension behind the EU's actorness. Nevertheless, the study understands that the ideational and materialist dimensions are intertwined. Thus, the analysis seeks to substantiate the EU as an actor mainly through the EU's activities, threat perceptions and motivations of actions. At the same time, it is inclusive of verbal interaction. It looks at the ASEAN-EU dialogue and the dialogue frameworks of ASEM and ARF.

In the last decade, the EU has seemingly become more pragmatic in its relationship with Southeast Asia (Interview with EU official 16 February 2009; Interview with EU official 17 February 2009). Thus, there is a need for a deeper and more concurrent exploration of the EU's actorness. This displays the relevance of
the hypothesis and questions the EU as a normative actor in the region or, at least, suggests that this notion needs to be put under scrutiny.

Finally, in recent times, there is rising interest in the concept of NTS on the European side. This is not least because of European interest in using this frame for securing and contributing to the stability of the Asian markets amidst the Eurozone crisis. As an overarching conceptual frame, the concept of NTS may provide vital insights into our understanding of the EU’s actoriness in Southeast Asia, since it links between economic, development and security rationally; touches on securitisation dynamics and provides an avenue for strengthening military relations. At the same time, the NTS lens has certain ideological connotations and allows us to better contrast the Southeast Asian and European narrative behind the actions; it facilitates a distinction between rationalist and normative behaviour. This paragraph affirms the pertinence and utility of the NTS lens, but raises doubts about the reflectivist perspective in light of the putative pragmatism and increased bureaucratisation implied by NTS.

The advantage of endogenous and actor-centric approaches is that they allow us to better capture norms and normative behaviour, and discriminate the EU as a normative actor. Firstly, this discrimination builds on the urgency of threat perceptions. Secondly, it rests on the view that Southeast Asia is not a security priority to Europe, but a stability priority associated with objectives of good governance, human rights and other aims (Interview with EU official, 16 February 2009). As mentioned on the previous page, the reflectivist approach appears more suitable than rationalist theorising, because of the importance of perceptions and norms in this study.

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5 For example, at the Tenth ASEM Foreign Ministers Meeting in June 2011 the slogan of the meeting was Working Together on Non-traditional Security Challenges.

6 For example, this was expressed by a European Commission official in relation to the AFC on p.7.
Literature Review

In recent years, a growing body of literature has tended to break the traditional marriage of NTS crises and institutionalist/materialist treatments. Scholars have increasingly assumed a constructivist perspective examining the interpretation of crises by agents (Widmaier, 2007: 779). As Leonard Seabrooke explained,

[C]rises occur most importantly when a breakdown of extant understandings enables elite “norm entrepreneurs” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998) to use ideas to create a “turning point” that reshapes prevailing conventions. These entrepreneurs may then foster both domestic institutional change and international cooperation through the diffusion of norms and ideas. (Seabrooke, 2007: 795-96)

While contemporary scholarly research on crises suggests an increased attention to constructivist theorising, the scholarship on EU actoriness in Southeast Asia in association with NTS threats and crises has been sporadic and remained rather fixed to institutionalist/materialist and rationalist interpretations. Some exceptions include Maier-Knapp (Maier-Knapp, 2010), Sorpong Peou (Peou, 2002) and Jörn Dosch (Dosch, 2003). The majority of scholarship has focused on providing comparative studies on the regional security cultures (an exception is Peou 2002). Reflectivist theorising of the ASEAN-EU relationship in light of the NTS challenges have been limited. Furthermore, the majority of publications has focused on ASEM and policy-oriented studies (Fort, 2004; Hänggi, 2004).

In Miguel Neves’ policy-oriented report from a conference on the changes in Southeast Asia and their implications for the ASEAN-EU relationship in Lisbon in 2004, he summarised his and his fellow presenters’ comments in the following manner.

The relationship is below its potential, a circumstance recognised by both sides, and expectations have not been fulfilled. The ASEAN side has even argued that there was a decline in the EU’s political interest and commitment towards ASEAN, as recently stated in the last Meeting of ASEAN-EU Economic Ministers. This view also underlines the conclusions of the 14th EU-ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of January 2003, which pointed to the urgent need to reinvigorate the relationship by concentrating in two main priority areas: expand trade and investment flows; strengthen cooperation in non-traditional security issues. (Neves, 2004: 15)
This conference took place prior to the AMM and depicted the relationship to be in decline. Then, the scholars outlined the potential of NTS threats and already identified the putative incompatibilities with the EU’s normative agenda.

[T]he change in the security priorities in Southeast Asia [...] opens new opportunities for a greater involvement of the EU in regional security and a greater relevance of its potential constructive role than when a hard security perspective prevailed (when the EU role in regional security was negative and limited, basically as seller of arms).[...] The exploitation of this opportunity has two different implications. Firstly, the expansion of ties in the non-traditional security areas tends to contribute to reinforce the trend of governamentalisation of relations and might run contrary to the objective of greater decentralisation of relations and more civil to civil society exchanges which many sectors on both sides hoped to see develop faster. Secondly, the fight against terrorism and the ability of the EU to help implementing a comprehensive strategy can go a long way in terms of asserting the presence and role of the EU as a security player in Southeast Asia and strengthen its position in relation to the US in a crucial region (Neves, 2004: 18-19)

Some EU officials have argued similarly to scholars such as Neves and colleagues in regard to the opportunity that the changes in Southeast Asia present for the EU. At a conference in Brussels in April 2008, Kyriakos Revelas, a senior security policy analyst of the European Commission, illustrated how the EU’s foreign and security actorness may be beneficial to Southeast Asia (Revelas, 24-26 April 2008). Christopher Patten, a member of the European Commission, has also argued along similar lines.

On both our continents, the dark side of globalisation, failing states, the relentless rise of international organised crime, people trafficking and the drugs trade pollute the ordinary lives of people. Terrorist groups spread their tentacles across borders and their attacks know no boundaries.[...] The European Union believes that by bringing together all the instruments at our disposal – from diplomacy, development funding and technical assistance, to increased cooperation and trade relations – we can tackle the root causes of instability and the new threats which face us. This philosophy underpins the European Commission’s latest thinking on our relationship with Southeast Asia... (Patten, 2003: 481)

The two European Commission officials have not explicitly referred to the concept of NTS. However, they have emphasised that unconventional security challenges provide cooperative stimuli and call for the EU to act beyond its economic interests. Similarly, the official documents suggest that the EU should take greater
interest in NTS challenges in Southeast Asia. A prominent document that captures this is the communication by the European Commission in 2003, A New Partnership with Southeast Asia COM(2003)399final. Most recently, the Co-Chairs’ Statement of the 19th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in 2012 has highlighted,

The EU reaffirmed its commitment to intensify cooperation with ASEAN in building disaster resilient societies; enhancing maritime cooperation; combating sea piracy and armed robbery against ships in accordance with international law; combating terrorism and transnational crime; promoting cooperation in combating illicit drug production, trafficking and use; mitigating chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risks. (ASEAN and EU member states, 26-27 April 2012)

These documents outlined the commonalities between the both sides and the EU’s potential and increasing willingness in assisting Southeast Asia in tackling NTS threats. So far, the literature suggests that the scholarly treatments have only scratched the surface of empiricism and lag behind the official rhetoric. This thesis is an attempt to be more contemporary than the existing scholarly publications and make a case for a reflectivist and cross-sectorial view on the EU as an actor in Southeast Asia.

Methodology
The study discusses the EU as an actor in the context of four NTS issue areas, which can be treated as doctoral research topics individually. However, since the thesis aims to provide the first systematic and monograph-length treatment on the EU and NTS challenges in Southeast Asia, it examines more than one case in order to establish credible claims on the EU as an actor. These claims may then also be transferable to other regions and sectors.

The data drawn upon has been retrieved from a variety of sources. The main source has been secondary scholarly work on the ASEAN-EU relationship, ARF and ASEM. The study further uses the literature related to the EU’s external relations and global actorness. Newspaper articles and publicly available primary literature of the regional organisations has provided an additional source. These sources verify each other and are verified and complemented by information retrieved through person-to-person interviews with Track 1 and 2 practitioners and experts. Track 1 refers to officials of political bodies within EU and ASEAN member states. Track 2 describes
Informal communication with Track 1 and 2 representatives at high-level conferences were not considered as interviews. The interviews do not serve as the main source of information. They are treated as a reference for understanding the cognitive processes and mindsets involved in shaping action and interaction. They were semi-structured and averaging over thirty minutes interview time per person. Hence, leaving room for the interviewed officials to express their personal opinion alongside the opinion of the political entity they represent. The interview structure and content had been approved by the Human Ethics Committee of the University of Canterbury prior to the field research in Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Belgium, which started in September 2008. The last interviews were conducted in Jakarta in May 2010. All of the interviews were confidential and anonymous, except in the case of former ASEAN Secretary General Rodolfo Severino and former Head of Staff of the AMM Justin Davies, who gave permission for their names to be published. A total of 77 interviews have been conducted, of which the majority were held in English. One was held in German and another interview was held in Thai. Of the 77 interviewees, only fourteen did not want to be recorded.

**Table 1: Information on Interviews**
(Total: 77 interviews, 45 hours and 50 minutes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Interviewees</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Total Duration of Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Current ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Member State Officials</td>
<td>8 hours 50 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Former ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Member States Officials</td>
<td>2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Experts, Scholars, Track 2 Representatives (excl. Parliamentarians) and a Media Representative</td>
<td>11 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>European Parliament and</td>
<td>1 hour 15 minutes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although there seem to be plenty sources, there were two major challenges. Firstly, with regard to security and securitised fields, there is the general challenge of sensitivity minimising the amount of information open to the public. This has been the case, in particular, on terrorism, where ongoing assistance is not to be jeopardised. Thus, the analysis can only sketch a general picture of the situation. Secondly, the lapse of time of some crises has also been a problematic factor when attempting to reconstruct the perceptions and mindsets at a certain point in time.

Structure of the Thesis
Pursuant to this Introduction, Chapter 1 elaborates on the central concepts and the reflectivist theoretical framework. Chapter 2 is divided into three sections. The first section outlines the dialogue frameworks where verbal interaction between the two regions takes place. It introduces the technicalities and history of the frameworks. It provides an overview of the EU’s regional security evolution, instruments and its stance towards Southeast Asia. These three chapters provide the analytical context. The chapters following Part I discuss the empirical case studies.

Chapter 3 describes the outbreak of the AFC and the European attempts to assist Southeast Asia. In light of the official silence of communication within the ASEAN-EU framework, Chapter 3 highlights the important role of ASEM as an alternative framework for communication on activities pertaining to the AFC. Chapter 4 examines EU actorness in Southeast Asia through the case of the haze and
forestry sector. The case of the haze divides the long-standing assistance of the Europeans into two phases and further argues that current the European-supported initiatives in the forestry sector are targeting the problem of the haze indirectly by addressing the underlying causes. This chapter also introduces the possibility of so-called EU actorness by proxy through non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

Chapter 5 dwells on the case of the Bali bombings. It highlights the prerogative of the member states in offering support on counter terrorism and depicts the supranational level as a complementary and indirect path of engagement. Chapter 6 discusses the EU’s actorness and normative dimension in relation to the AMM.

Chapter 7 presents a summary of the research interests and major findings. It presents the constraints on the EU’s actorness and argues that the NTS lens is not facilitating a stronger EU politico-security profile in the region. In fact, the EU may reinforce existing domestic power structures that are inconsistent with its normative agenda. Nevertheless, NTS challenges do enhance the EU’s actorness and allow a nuanced understanding of the EU as a normative actor. EU actorness on NTS challenges matters, because of the EU’s humanitarian and development assistance commitment. This contributes to a more stable environment. The final chapter concludes the thesis by summarising the main features of the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor, referring to the European External Action Service, and construing the implications of this study for the ASEAN-EU relationship and the EU as an actor in international affairs.
Part I

Analytical Framework
Chapter 1
Central Concepts and Reflectivist Theorising

This chapter begins with a discussion of the central concepts. Firstly, I introduce the debate on the EU as a normative actor in world affairs. Secondly, the term actorness and its relationship to crises and securitisation are defined. Finally, the concept of NTS is discussed in greater detail. Following the discussion of these concepts, this chapter will lay out the theoretical framework. This chapter will provide an overview of the two-pronged reflectivist framework and discuss the central ideas of social action theory and (social) constructivism. This chapter reveals important analytical insights for the examination of a relationship commonly assessed from an economic angle (Langhammer, 1982; Alfredo C. Robles Jr., 2004).

1.1 The EU as a Normative Actor in World Affairs
The assumption that the EU is a normative actor compels us pay attention to the endogenous ideational factors. The use of this concept premises that norms and values of the EU’s identity constitute the foundation for certain preferences and behaviours to kick in. Evidently, it will be difficult to identify norms and values apart from interests. Thus, we need to be inclusive of interests and consider their potential as moderators of behaviour. While the EU’s external actorness should see the EU being guided by its values, norms and principles as written in the Treaty of Lisbon and other legal documents, it should also realise the EU’s interests. The Treaty of Lisbon and various other EU legal documents reflect a specific liberal-democratic identity (e.g. EU member states, 2007: Preamble and Title 5). The EU actively projects this normative identity onto third parties and has proclaimed itself to be a normative actor. As shown below,

The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. (European Union member states, 2007: Art. 1a)
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth,
solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. (European Union member states, 2007: Art. 2 para. 5)

The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations. (EU member states, 2007: Title V, Chapter 1, Art. 10a)

These excerpts clearly show the EU’s liberal-democratic agenda and suggest that the EU is committed to shape the outside world according to the its ideational core and regional experience. On a scholarly level, these Articles have inspired various international role concepts of the EU and triggered many analyses scrutinising the EU’s proclamations. Prominently, Ian Manners, describes the EU as a ‘normative power’ performing its foreign policy in accordance with its normative standards. As a normative power the EU aims to diffuse norms and normalise the international sphere (Manners, 2002: 244-245). It is “neither a military nor purely economic [power], but one that works through ideas and opinions” (Diez, 2005: 615). Other scholars have ascribed similar role concepts to the EU: soft power (Joseph S. Nye Jr., 1990, 2002; Joseph S. Nye Jr., 2004), civilian power (Duchêne, 1972) and, newly, ethical power (Aggestam, 2006). These roles are closely related to each other and to a specific EU identity premising appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. As mentioned in the Introduction, Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power is associated with the power of attraction, persuasion and influence of other international actors by non-military power means through economic and cultural sources (Joseph S. Nye Jr., 1990: 267).

The civilian power role concept similarly places emphasis on non-coercive modes of influence aiming to civilise international society. In fact, this concept has been commonly referred to in the interviews for this thesis. For example, a former
official from the European Delegation in Singapore has said, “the EU has established itself as a civilian and economic power in Singapore” (Interview with former EU official, 19 November 2008). In view of the former official’s academic background, it is assumed that she is familiar of the civilian power concept as defined by François Duchêne. However, in relation to the interview, it seems that this role concept was used to characterise the EU as a non-coercive, economic power per se.

In the early 1970s, Duchêne introduced the concept of civilian power and regarded the European Economic Community (EEC) as a regional ordering model to domesticate interstate relations (Duchêne, 1973). Deriving from his deliberations, succeeding scholars have defined civilian power in two different ways: in terms of means and in terms of ends. On the one hand, there are scholars who support a broad definition of civilian power. On the other hand, it is defined by the ends. The latter implies that a civilian power can resort to force to civilise its environment.

Lisbeth Aggestam reconciled this debate and introduced the concept of the EU as an ethical power. Her departure point is the ethics behind the EU’s international performance. This concept defends the notion of the EU as a norm-guided foreign policy actor. It is based on the idea that the EU is an actor that uses civilian and military power “as well as social and material power” (Aggestam, 2008: 2). This role concept shifts its focus on the means to a focus on the behaviour and ends. It acknowledges the evolving role of security and military force. Aggestam’s ethical power concept claims to bridge the gap between materialist and value-driven foreign policy choices (Aggestam, 2008: 4).

The problem with an ethical or ideational scheme is that the ethics or ideas are usually endogenous and associated with a specific cultural context. They may only reflect the good way of life envisioned by a particular community. Aggestam contested the universal legitimacy of the EU’s core values and considered them to be Western values (Aggestam, 2008: 5-8). These values reflect the desired qualities of a good life from a Western perspective. Aggestam herself has illustrated possible negative connotations of such a value-laden role concept (Aggestam, 2008: 5-8). The EU’s ambition to civilise the world according to its own successful model runs the risk of being perceived as an incipient ethical imperialism. The core issue of Aggestam’s young concept – which she herself views as an open conceptual question and not a statement – is the questionable centrality of values in determining the uniqueness of the role concept. Other international actors, such as the United
States of America (USA) and the EU member states themselves, can also be accused of a ‘missionary’ campaign of Western values and be classified as ethical powers.

The EU’s regional practices are a useful source of inspiration for some actors and the empirical evidence in the following case studies suggests this, although it also shows that there may be a negative differentiation between an alleged cultural ‘superior’ EU and ‘inferior’ other region. A former EU official mentioned the example of Benita Ferrero-Waldner who invited ASEAN officials to Brussels to “learn” from the European experience about drafting a charter. The ASEAN side rejected this invitation and “teaching” (Interview with former EU official, 19 November 2008).

Some interviewed Southeast Asian officials have expressed that the EU acts like a “lecturer of values” or appears to be on a missionary campaign to change other international actors (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 21 November 2008). In particular, the case of Myanmar has been raised in many interviews as a contentious topic, where “Europeans have a different approach in the form of scolding, whereas the Asian side tries to engage Myanmar” (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 21 November 2008). While the accusations on the EU’s harsh stance on Myanmar are not denied by the EU officials, some European Commission officials vehemently oppose the Southeast Asian accusations of the EU being a “lecturer” (Interview with EU official, 16 February 2009). Some argued,

People realise it is a learning process, people realise you don't go anywhere if you go to meetings where you lecture them, or the most part of the meeting and they take a defensive position, it is not fruitful, people realise that, again we make the point in principle. (Interview with EU official, 16 February 2009)

These statements by practitioners indicate that the concepts by Aggestam, Manners, Nye and others may be only partially pertinent to describing the EU’s behaviour. Thus, the EU as an actor in the world, as well as in Southeast Asia specifically, needs to be seen through a more differentiated lens. Whether an ethical, civilian or normative power, all comprise of what Manners has described as a principled foreign policy. This is influenced by norms and values and a collective learning process. All concepts are contested. They are questionable, because of the persistence of the conventional Westphalian concept of an actor, the militarisation of the EU and the conceptual commotion of overlapping definitions by various scholars.
Furthermore, there are numerous European Commission documents including the European Commission country strategy papers on the ASEAN countries that display the ‘soft power’ terminology (e.g. European Commission, 2006: 13).

So what is the normative uniqueness of the EU in Southeast Asia? Is its region-to-region approach? Is it its interpretation of its core values and its ability to create new norms and values that are based on these, as Lucarelli and Manners would argue (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006a)? And how do you characterise this putative normative actor? The conceptual solution cannot lie in differentiating and inventing role concepts, which describe the same content of norm-guided action. In the words of Karen Smith “we should move on from classifying or categorising the EU – and celebrating its distinctiveness – to debating what it actually does and what it should do in international relations” (Smith, 2005: 17). This thesis seeks to do this and deliver to Smith’s former demand, that is, to provide substance on the behaviour of the EU through the examination of the EU’s interaction with Southeast Asia, with particular focus on the activities of the EU to investigate the motivations and objectives of EU actorness.

1.2 International Actorness
The second concept to clarify is actorness. The previous discussion of normative power indicates that the last decades have seen an explosion of literature on the EU as an actor and its international role. In 1977, Sjöstedt stated that an international actor has the ability “to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system” and he devised characteristics of “actor behaviour” and “actor capability” (Sjöstedt, 1977: 16). Actor capability is the primary factor in understanding why there is actorness in the first place. It is composed of seven characteristics: community of interests, normal decision-making system, system for crisis management, system for the management of interdependence, system for the steering and control of the EC’s actor behaviour, network of external agents, and external channels of communication and community resources and mobilisation system (Sjöstedt, 1977).

Hedley Bull contested this assumption and denied the EC any form of actorness (Bull, 1983). His denial has to be seen against the backdrop of the Westphalian criteria of state actorness. Christopher Hill argued along similar lines and proclaimed the EU to be a presence instead of an actor (Hill, 1993). Since then,
the EU has changed significantly and Sjöstedt’s seven categories have become traceable. Today, a vast amount of literature has argued from a legal-institutional and cultural perspective, and chosen the EU to be a unique post-Westphalian actor (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006b; Cannizzaro, 2002; Rhodes, 1998; Telò, 2009). The EU poses a problematic case of actor-ness, because it is a political entity with a dual – if not more – political identity which cannot be grasped within the traditional schemes of state actor-ness.

At the same criticisms based on the traditional Westphalian scheme of actor-ness are in decline, because of the creation of state-like structures, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It seems that the question now can no longer be whether the EU is an actor or merely a presence. Furthermore, since the British-French rapprochement in St. Malo in 1998, scholars increasingly attributed security actor-ness to the EU (Bono, 2004; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007). This acknowledges collective security actor-ness beyond member state actor-ness.

Today, the EU has developed attributes fulfilling the majority of the criteria applicable to the Westphalian state and therefore, defied Bull’s Westphalian benchmark of actor-ness. It has proven that the scheme from 1648 is inadequate to gauge EU actor-ness to some extent. Newer concepts are inclusive of the EU’s multi-headed, cross-sectorial identity and perceptions of other international actors. Westphalian criteria have been important for traditional characterisations of the EU’s actor-ness in reference to state institutions. Increasingly, reflectivist theorising is complementing this understanding of the EU as an international actor by considering that the ideational dimension is inherent in actors. This new perspective is particularly relevant when EU activities are marginal and of limited tangible impact. This approach may yield useful insights in those situations, when EU member states or implementing agencies appear more active than the supranational EU actors.

Of the newer post-Cold War conceptualisations, the one provided by James Caporaso and Joseph Jupille has proven to be fruitful for numerous EU scholars (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998). Their concept is constituted by the varying interplay of recognition, authority, cohesion and autonomy. Caporaso and Jupille have defined the categories of actor-ness in the following manner.

First, is recognition understood as acceptance of and interaction with the entity by others. Second is authority, which we use in the sense of legal competence to act. Third is autonomy, conceived as institutional
distinctiveness and independence from other actors. The final component is *cohesion*, or the degree to which an entity is able to formulate and articulate internally consistent policy preferences. (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998: 24)

Recognition is the minimalist requirement of actorness. In relation to this thesis, recognition is essential in understanding interaction and the EU as an actor in the first place. However, it is dismissible with regard to understanding specific EU NTS actorness, given that the intention determines whether actorness is NTS actorness. NTS is vaguely defined is, first and foremost, a yardstick for the actor in relation to a specific sector. Inter-subjectivity and NTS recognition by the ‘other’ is then of subordinate value. Drawing upon the category of recognition by Caporaso and Jupille, we can assume that the sociological ‘other’ in this thesis (central decision-makers and to a subordinate degree the public represented by interviewed civil society representatives) may minimally perceive the EU as an actor within the specific crisis-affected sectors. In line with social constructivism, the study views that an actor must be recognised in its actorness by other international actors. This does not suggest that the EU lacks general actorness visibility, but that, within this research, this shortcoming of actorness may crystallise and we may end up describing EU presence instead of EU actorness.

Jupille and Caporaso further distinguish between four dimensions of cohesion. These are, firstly, value cohesion, which refers to the similarity and compatibility of goals; secondly, tactical cohesion, which assumes that goals may differ, but can be linked to each other; thirdly, procedural cohesion, which describes cohesion in terms of procedures on goals or issues where conflicts exist; and fourthly, output cohesion, which implies that collective positions are possible apart from the level of agreement (Caporaso and Jupille, 1998: 215-220). These dimensions of cohesion are important in light of the EU’s multi-headed actorness. They are useful in cases where there may be discord among the multiple heads, as will be discussed in the case of the AMM in Chapter 5.

Actorness consists of sub-agents or ‘heads’ which contribute to the overall EU actorness. However, we should not decouple the sub-agents analytically from each other when portraying the EU as a collective actor,\(^7\) since this would distort the

\(^7\) For example, in 2011, Asle Toje has analysed the EU as a small power by itself, apart from the EU member states.
overall concept of actorness from a collective perspective. Furthermore, this would disregard the fine-tuned and complex coordination of the various EU levels and neglect the interactions between the individual heads that make up the EU’s collective actorness. In this thesis, EU actorness takes into account the sum of interactions from the EU system with Southeast Asia. This consists of both European Commission and member state actorness. As previously stated in the Introduction, the primary focus, however, is placed on the European Commission’s actorness.

When framing actorness along the lines of NTS, we further need to identify specifically whose NTS we are talking about. This results in NTS actorness to be defined as follows. NTS actorness is based on formulated goals and interests resulting in decisions, which affect NTS provision or which purposively transfer NTS interests and preferences into specific decisions and actions that do not necessarily impact a security or securitised sector. NTS actorness does not depend on the targeted policy sector but on the intention of the actor. The category of intention is connected with the constructivist approach of the analysis. By understanding how the EU has interpreted the crises and relying on the threat perceptions as an essential constituent of actorness, we can identify whether there has been an intention to manage insecurity through the activities.

In connection to NTS actorness, recognition as a typological category is mitigated. However, with regard to ‘EU actorness on NTS’, it is essential that the counterpart recognises, identifies and accepts the targeted sectors to be NTS fields. Thus, EU NTS actorness places emphasis on the intention as well as the crises and the degree of convergence of threat perceptions. By contrast, EU actorness on NTS does not require a high degree of threat convergence, but emphasises the identification by the counterpart that these areas of concern are NTS threats or NTS crises.

1.2.1 Crises as Facilitators of Action

NTS crises are an opportunity for international actors to promote the incorporation of their norms into the process of recovery both on the international and domestic level. The global financial crisis (GFC) from 2008 onwards, for instance, provided a chance for the EU to promote the idea of a carbon market on the international level. Greening the recovery has been the EU’s new favourite rhetoric since then. NTS crises have an effect on international political entities similarly to goals, interests, and
principles (Doidge, 2008: 39). In short, they can mobilise public opinion, replace goals, and trigger and guide action and thus, become the primary determinant of actorness. This is because they can overrule domestic constraints. As alluded to in the Introduction, the assumption that “even exogenous shocks must be endogenously interpreted” is important for the analysis (Blyth, Seabrooke, and Widmaier, 2007: 749).

Crises are subject to interpretation by both the affected and non-affected actors, which may not necessarily view the crisis elsewhere as a crisis or threat to the ‘self’. The more direct, severe, and extensive the crisis is, then, there is less room for interpretation. This also implies that there are higher chances in outweighing norms and values in goal, policy and responsive action formulation. If a crisis takes place in one part of the world, then it is very likely that there may be repercussions felt in other parts of the world depending on the degree of interdependence with regard to the specific issue area. In summary, crises compel international actors to respond, increasingly cooperate on responses. They mobilise, alter behaviour and norms and stimulate innovation. They are instances when norm differences can be overcome and a common cause be pursued.

Crises can present moments of normative conflict, norm contestation, and eventual norm replacement or invention. The normative or behavioural change can also come from within a political entity. Amitav Acharya explained that “a major security or economic crisis (war or depression) can lead to norm borrowing” (Acharya, 2004: 247). Crises can stimulate a reflective process that may lead to a questioning of one’s normative standards. Suddenly, with the change of the threat perceptions and urgency, normative standards that were once frowned upon have become possible alternatives and are being considered for implementation. The actor is not necessarily persuaded by external actors, but realises that given this new situation, it needs to adapt. This may imply inventing or borrowing norms. Acharya described the latter as a process in which actors actively integrate foreign norms into the local normative setting as localisation. He argued,

Local actors do not remain passive targets and learners as transnational agents, acting out of a universal moral script to produce and direct norm diffusion in world politics. Local agents also promote norm diffusion by actively borrowing and modifying transnational norms in accordance with their preconstructed normative beliefs and practices. (Acharya, 2004: 269)
In such a case, affected Southeast Asian states act as norm-takers. Crises are catalysts for states to become open to external influence or actively seek external influence to improve the situation. In these instances, states do not need to be heavily persuaded and may be more susceptible to changing norms based on alternative knowledge and better arguments, despite differing in normative identities. This does not signify a normative change per se, but initially a rational decision in view of the negative impact and lack of preparedness. Should the new norms be effective and decrease the vulnerabilities, these norms stand a chance of being internalised. Change can also be fuelled and influenced by external actors. A crisis provides an opportunity for non-governmental and external actors to gain ground and eventually expedite political change. The degree of influence is largely defined by the crisis-affected political entity's capability to tackle the crisis effectively. This implies that both the degree of external influence and the severity of a crisis depend on the level of preparedness and the given toolkit of the affected entity. Commonly, crises can occur whenever there are vulnerabilities and inadequate measures to respond to a potential crisis scenario. Vulnerabilities refer to a situation when a political actor is in peril or exposed in a manner liable to be hurt or damaged. It has been a common term to define the exposure of human society in the studies of natural hazards and climate change (Brauch, 2005).

Generally, vulnerabilities are of multiple dimensions. They can be, inter alia, institutional, legal, cultural, socio-economical, or technological. Therefore, vulnerabilities should always be seen in relation to the context and are not to be attributed as a general quality of less developed actors. The thesis does not seek to judge the degree of preparedness and vulnerability of Southeast Asia. The analysis starts from a crisis situation. This implies that there is a lack of preparedness and that the vulnerabilities are acknowledged, but not discussed. By premising this, I avoid a dissection of the failures and, instead, concentrate on a constructive and problem-solving approach and ask what the EU has provided and can generally offer as an additional cooperative value that also shows it as a normative actor.

Parallel to the impact of crises and threat perceptions on actorness, there is also the phenomenon of securitisation of the Copenhagen School. This phenomenon needs to be discussed, because within Southeast Asia this has been a tool to frame
state and military NTS activities. While this process does not directly contribute to our examination of the EU as a normative actor, it allows us to assess the people-dimension and degree of militarisation in the counterpart. This assists in our understanding of the EU’s normative influence, since the likelihood of norm internalisation by the Southeast Asian side decreases with regard to securitisation by the state and military. The securitisation process has been a prominent concept post-September 11 in understanding threat construction and the rising level of urgency of a phenomenon through speech acts (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, 1998: 23-26). It describes the inter-subjective process where leading political figures construct a threat with the affirmation and approval of the audience. The process either promotes a security concern to a security concern of higher priority or remodels a traditionally non-security issue to an existential threat requiring emergency responses. Buzan and colleagues have defined securitisation.

[A]s a more extreme version of politic[i]sation...[that] is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects....A successful securiti[s]ation thus has three components (or steps): existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules. (Buzan et al., 1998: 23-26)

They argue that it is a speech act that can be used by any level of society, although the main and most successful employers of such a strategy are political leaders, pressing for a political or even non-politicised issue to become an urgent security concern. Securitisation is also highly dependent on epistemic communities which can identify and pre-define threats and risks for society. The problem here is the marriage between researchers and their sponsors, as this may imply a pre-selection of risks and threats to society and may undermine relevant security threats that are never researched or brought into public debate. Securitisation has become a common tool used by international political actors to push their agenda. On the one hand, this phenomenon legitimises and triggers increased security activities that should protect the people within a political entity. On the other hand, it is exactly this legitimisation/normalisation of, as a rule, coercive and counter-liberal-democratic instruments that is concerning. This is viewed with scepticism among EU scholars and officials and will be discussed in greater detail in the next subchapter.

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8 This will be discussed in greater detail in the following subchapter on NTS.
Finally, it is important to note that the EU’s actorness consists of various components. In light of the NTS lens, the study will focus on the activities of the EU and its member states in relation to particular NTS challenges and sectors of governance. There are complex and intangible processes involved in aggregating interests, formulating goals and purposes, devising policies and implementing these. Hence, the discussion of the EU’s actorness in the empirical part of the thesis will concentrate on the EU’s and member states’ activities to assess EU actorness and the EU as a normative actor, while alluding to the various other definitorial dimensions whenever sufficient evidence exists.

1.3 Understanding Non-Traditional Security

This subchapter will begin with a brief introduction into the evolution of international security. This is then followed by a greater discussion of the NTS concept, which ties into the Introduction. The remaining sections will highlight the implications of this concept for international actors and answer why the NTS lens provides an opportunity to better assess the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor.

Generally speaking, human-beings have always looked for ways to minimise their worries or, rather, their risks and threats in order to secure their survival. The state represents the most important security framework to the individual and to a collective of individuals. In the political context of a state, the term security is distinguished by an internal and external dimension. The internal dimension of security alludes to threats affecting the security within a state or society. In the international realm, it is mainly the state itself which is the security referent and confronted to the manifold risks and threats of an anarchic system. In this kind of system, security is a fundamental survival interest of any state. This external dimension of state security refers to the protection of nation-states from external military violence, pressure, threat, boycott, embargo or extortion. Protection from these traditional and state-driven threats can be assured by cooperative means such as treaties and alliances or by means of threat.

Until the end of the Cold War the security of a state was mainly concerned with responses to conventional threats posed by other states. Consequently, a state will use any means given to protect its essential, corporate values from external threats. In a world of complex interdependence, military power appears to be less effective. In addition to hard power, soft power has become an alternative means of securing a
state’s survival. Despite the increasing significance of state actors as soft powers and the high costs of wars, coercive military power remains the ultimate defence of a state’s security. Under the condition of anarchy in international politics, state power in terms of military power still seems to play an important role (Art and Waltz, 1999: 3). In international politics military power is not under the control of a central world government, but a monopoly of each individual state constituting an important element of force for a stable international political order. Despite the proliferation of international organisations and norms, the international realm has remained relatively anarchic in its nature. Thus, force remains integral to the external relations of states, including as a tacit means of power for deterrence.

In the last two decades, the international system has undergone a dramatic structural change that has followed the removal of the stabilising stalemate situation between the Eastern and Western Blocs. This systemic change has raised the question of a new world order resolving the security dilemma in an anarchic system. The nature of this new system entails a high degree of instability and insecurity for state actors. Additionally, these actors are facing even greater economic and political challenges due to the acceleration of globalisation and regionalisation. National boundaries are fading and the security threats of the post-Cold War period are asymmetric, trans-boundary and non-traditional requiring new and comprehensive security strategies going beyond the traditional state-centric approaches.

Military power is merely the tip of the ‘security iceberg’. The scholarship of security has actively pierced through the ocean surface and is gradually discovering and creating the rest of the iceberg. The end of the Cold War delivered the crucial breakthrough for security developments and shifted the urgency from military security to more direct approaches of human suffering. The classical territorial and military understanding of security is less absolute and the new international security concepts have discerned the inefficiency of traditional principles of self-help and balance of power in providing regional stability. From collective security to common security, from cooperative to comprehensive security, it was increasingly recognised that one’s own security was interdependent with the security calculations of other international actors. These international security concepts extended the threat agenda to a wider range of non-traditional threats and non-military means to counter these threats and additionally refocused the security referent according to a more
liberal conception (Hoadley, 2006). Although in relation to NTS this is debatable, if one refers to the developments in Southeast Asia (Emmers, 2004).

NTS is a broad concept, initially introduced by the Western world to distinguish between traditional security and new forms of transnational security threats that have been increasingly unveiled after the Cold War (Capie and Evans, 2007: 172-176). Traditional security refers to threats that fall under the state-versus-state category. The majority of threats that nation-states and regions face today are NTS threats. In the beginning, I have defined NTS to be “related to an extensive array of post-Cold War threats that are neither state-to-state nor of military nature”. They pose a challenge to human-kind as a whole, and the zero-sum game by states associated with traditional security threats no longer applies to them.

Generally speaking, NTS describes security that goes beyond traditional security “that states can achieve through diplomacy and deterrence” (Caballero Anthony, 2009: 192). This implies that threats cannot be tackled effectively by relying exclusively on national defence, and that decentralised, transnational or sub-national and non-conventional action may be more adequate. NTS crises refer to crises that have been caused by a non-military security source of threat, which is not contained by national borders. One could view NTS as an umbrella concept that holds the potential to accommodate to both state and non-state actors as the security providers. Predominantly, scholars of East and Southeast Asia have contributed to the academic debate on NTS (Acharya, Caballero Anthony, and Emmers, 2006; Caballero Anthony, 2009; Dosch, Dürkop, and Thang, 2005; Emmers, 2004; Evans, 2004).

Since the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, Southeast Asia has presented as a region whose traditional security threats have been muted over the years (Huxley, 1993: 11-13). Instead, the last two decades have seen numerous NTS crises dominate the agenda; whether international terrorism, climate change, or financial turbulences. These crises have put the region into the spotlight of international humanitarian and developmental assistance and attracted the EU’s attention (Interview with EU official, 16 February 2009). As mentioned in the Introduction, they have put ASEAN and its member states back on the EU’s map.

The EU possesses, as will be described in Chapter 2, the mindset and means to assist with managing NTS crises effectively. Furthermore, both regional organisations share high ideational commonalities with regard to people-orientation
and Track 2 inclusiveness. The problem is that these commonalities are not shared beyond the ASEAN Secretariat on the member state level. The Secretariat relies on the will and resources of the member states. Thus, the ASEAN-EU commonalities appear limited substantive, if they are not carried by the ASEAN member states.

Furthermore, as a relatively developed region, the EU is facing different security challenges than the ASEAN region (Schuck, 2009). Christoph Schuck has drawn upon the Human Development Index and data from Freedom House to explain the divergence in NTS perceptions between the ASEAN and EU member states. This threat divergence implies that the EU’s cooperation with Southeast Asia needs to be seen from a developmental perspective. In this case, altruist and developmental motivations play an important role for short-to-mid-term objectives. While some scholars have argued in terms of threat divergence, other scholars have argued that there is increased threat convergence between the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries and developing Southeast Asian countries (Rüland, 2005). This implies greater consideration for rationalist calculations.

However, the NTS crises in Southeast Asia are far away and the EU seems generally unaffected or not immediately alarmed. Thus, it seems that the EU’s responses to these crises are commonly shaped by its normative identity. In fact, a European Commission official admits that European soft power in this context “is probably true” in ASEAN (Interview with EU official, 16 February 2009). Since crises afar are primarily a matter of assistance provision than politico-security or economic calculations for the EU, it appears that the EU’s actorness is motivated by altruist reasons. Then again, the EU likes to portray itself in this light. Nevertheless, this thesis presume that ideas will play an important role in relation to NTS crises in three ways: firstly, within the ‘self’ as a starting point for reflection on threat construction or protection or assistance; secondly, for the affected ‘other’ with regard to the volatile normative situation post-crisis; and, thirdly, based on the two previous deliberations with regard to the opportunity of openness towards norm transfer.

Hypothetically, NTS appears to be an appropriate frame to capture processes of threat interpretation, construction commonalisation and ‘othering’. It is broadly defined and has the potential to enhance EU actorness and include non-state actors. Therefore, it should appeal to the EU to some extent. However, it is the comprehensive and flexible nature of the concept that also raises concerns among
EU officials. The EU is reluctant to employ the concept of NTS, since governing political and military elites in Southeast Asia regularly strategise NTS crises for their purposes. Responses to NTS challenges in Southeast Asia have often been used by the military and the state to cement elitist power aspirations (Emmers, 2004). NTS from a Southeast Asian perspective views the state as the main security guarantor to tackle NTS crises, which impact within a state’s territoriality.

Countries are facing a catalogue of similar threats transcending the requirement of conventional national defence. In theory, the NTS concept allows other security providers, beyond the military and the state, to be considered. However, the reality in Southeast Asia is that the military is the only currently existing institution within the majority of countries trained, disciplined, and equipped enough to effectively respond to the majority of NTS crises affecting Southeast Asia. The outbreak of the avian influenza at the end of 2003 reveals that in many Southeast Asian countries the military is entrenched in the governance of the state. The mindset and method of governance of many political elites of Southeast Asian countries suggests that the military is a constant in their policy and political calculations. For instance, on 10 November 2005

in Vietnam, Prime Minister Phan Van Khai called on the army and police to help with anti-flu work as new outbreaks were reported despite mounting efforts to contain the virus, state media reported Friday [11 Nov 2005]. In a telegram sent to ministries and provincial governments, Khai called on local governments to “mobilize the armed forces, militiamen and university students,” according to the newspaper Pioneer. It didn't say what they were expected to do. (Associated Press, 11 November 2005)

Even in so-called Southeast Asian democracies, the military solution is considered for an extensive spectrum of NTS such as the Thai response to the dengue threat,9

Public Health Minister Sudarat Keyuraphan pledged that the ministry would limit the number of dengue fever patients to no more than 30 000 people a year through a three-year campaign on fighting against dengue. However, she said to reach the goal it needs help from the city administration and the Ministries of Education, Interior and Defense. (Xinhua News Agency (via COMTEX), 18 August 2002)

9 We need to take note that in many of these countries, the military has been a significant power in politics and society. Therefore, transforming the role of the military in accordance with democratic principles is still lagging behind.
Because these examples confirm military and state centrality, they display a certain degree of incompatibility with the EU’s normative foundations. NTS crises in Southeast Asia are an ambivalent blessing for the civilian governments and people of the region. They can compel the military to transform and adopt a human security-oriented approach. They may be an opportunity for democratisation and security sector reform to nest without risking power confrontations between the military and civilian governments. When social sectors are secured by the military, as mentioned previously, many civilians still view this as giving the military an opportunity to abuse their power. Transforming the military is an operational, but most importantly a normative task in light of the NTS crises.

NTS crises can spur illiberal and undemocratic developments in Southeast Asia and therefore, thwart EU normative influence. The normative connotations of the concept are a source of the EU’s putative wariness, since they go against the EU’s liberal-democratic identity. On the one hand, NTS crises may offer an opportunity to increase actoriness, since they stimulate enhanced threat perceptions and cooperation. On the other hand, they do not necessarily lead to normative actions. While it was argued previously that crises can trigger norm contestation and eventual norm replacement. It is also understood that normative influence is difficult to trace and may just be a matter of lip-service. The NTS frame raises the level of urgency and need for normative change and it may be a useful perspective to capture the nuances of actoriness and the EU as a normative actor. However, this needs to be proven systematically and will be done through Part II of this thesis.

If countries and regional and international organisations would develop a greater interest in defining NTS for the purpose of policy coordination and harmonisation, there may be an opportunity for greater policy relevance of NTS beyond the categorisation of threats. What has happened, so far, is an increased definition of its subconcepts such as climate security, cybersecurity, energy security and other subconcepts. If there was a clear interest in creating a consensualised definition on the interregional level, there may be an opportunity to jointly explore the value of such a broad concept in determining what NTS provision implies in terms of norms. In view of the high level of rhetorical commonalities on human security with the ASEAN Secretariat and some member states, it appears that finding a common definition for NTS would be an unnecessary step backwards. On the one hand, this demonstrates a presumed perpetual inferiority of the NTS concept, which nips any
cross-agency and policy-relevant definition in the bud. On the other hand, this inferiority is its virtue, because it concentrates on the threat and not on a normative script for the actor. To recap, this is because the concept seemingly allows continual state or military centrality when it comes to security provision.

Generally speaking, NTS should also provide an umbrella for state and non-state security referents and security provision by both states and non-state actors. NTS is very vague in its utility for policy-making. Therefore, some scholars may argue that a human security lens may have been more appropriate in the context of this thesis. However, human security is normatively more contentious among Southeast Asia’s political elite. For instance, more democratic Indonesia or the Philippines have made references to the concept in their recent military strategies whereas some of the newer and undemocratic ASEAN members are still wary of the concept.

Within the ASEAN states, which have applied human security, it seems as though the concept is often confused with the protection of the individual from the military or police. The fear that the security forces could abuse their power is high and depreciates the conceptual value of human security. The negative experiences of civilian authorities with the military suggest that human security is highly context-dependent. It appears less suitable to capture counter-liberal democratic developments, because of the state’s and military’s continual dominant role in some countries of the region. NTS remedies this and is the preferred concept of Southeast Asia’s most important neighbour, China, which the region has involved in communications on NTS, whether bilaterally or in the context of the ARF (Arase, 2010). Defining the concept with the EU would imply unnecessary internal divisions and negative implications when discussing NTS issues with China.

NTS implies both the state and the individual in society as the security referents while excluding direct implications of human rights. These are inherent in the Western understanding of human security. NTS appears to be a conceptual compromise, in the sense that it respects the security of the individual in society without challenging the low priority of the human rights dimension of some East Asian states. The thesis acknowledges the analytical shortcomings of NTS, but posits that it presents a useful frame for taking into account EU actorness along managerial lines and of various motivations, as well as the state- and military-centric security practices and vulnerabilities in Southeast Asia.
1.4 Reflectivist Theoretical Framework and Research Design

The research employs the reflectivist and semi-institutionalist/materialist theoretical framework to establish the EU’s actoriness and the EU as a normative actor. It uses social action theory to differentiate the drivers behind EU action. This is to either consolidate the normative rationale or verify the other rationales that are involved. At the same time, it applies (social) constructivism. Furthermore, to avoid agent-centrism, this thesis draws upon the distinction of the logic of appropriateness and consequentiality. The logic of appropriateness is an intentional rationale. It is not based on preferences and involves the fulfilment “of the [normative] obligations of a role in a situation” (March and Olsen, 1989: 160-161). It implies that the EU holds a certain role within the international sphere.

On the one hand, the EU has a self-concept of the role. On the other hand, there are external expectations of the role. From a reflectivist perspective, this implies the importance of ideas and norms as determinants of conduct. Materialist and rationalist theories lack an ideational dimension. They can explain the causality between structures and behaviour as well as interests and behaviour. However, they fall short in providing an in-depth understanding of behaviour that is influenced or constrained by norms. According to rational choice theories, actors act based on the logic of consequentiality. That is, they maintain “consistency between behavio[u]r and realistic expectations of the consequences” (March and Olsen, 1989: 160-161). By contrast, value-based approaches maintain “consistency between behavio[u]r and a conception of self in a social role” (March and Olsen, 1989: 160-161). Rationalist theories do not capture value-based action, unless values are used instrumentally.

1.4.1 Social Action Theory

Before delving into (social) constructivism, the following section will outline social action theory to provide a differentiated perspective on the logic of appropriateness and consequentiality. This is to understand the drivers behind the EU’s actions. The discussion of the modes of action accommodates both verbal action and actual action. Social action theory bridges the dilemma of rationalist and constructivist meta-theories, since it can distinguish between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality. For many scholars, the theoretical departure point has been Jürgen Habermas’ concept of communicative action in contrast to strategic
action. The latter refers to an actor which interacts with others on an instrumental basis in order to achieve his or her goal by any means the situation necessitates. Habermas defines the former as

the concept of *communicative action* refers to the interaction of at least two subjects capable of speech and action who establish interpersonal relations (whether by verbal or by extra-verbal means). The actors seek to reach an understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central concept of *interpretation* refers in the first instance to negotiating definitions of the situation which admit of consensus. (Habermas, 1984: 86)

The longstanding ASEAN-EU relationship can be seen along these lines to some extent. However, in light of the asymmetrical relationship, coordination and similar understandings of situations leave room for improvement. Furthermore, it is also questionable whether a fair consensus can be achieved. In light of the power asymmetry, it is very likely that the ASEAN side will tend to agree out of material necessity.

According to Habermas, speech is constitutive to social organisation and integration. It defines and redefines the subject in a social context in reference to three worlds, as described below. Speech acts, understood as broadly defined acts of verbal communication, have an internal and external world as their system of reference. Communicative action as well as the other modes of action that are discussed in the following paragraphs rely

on a cooperative process of interpretation in which participants relate simultaneously to something in the objective, the social, and the subjective worlds, even when they *thematically stress only one* of the three components….Speaker and hearer use the reference system of the three worlds as an interpretive framework within which they work out their common situation definitions. (Habermas, 1987: 120)

Following these Habermasian insights, speech acts are not limited to verbal communication. They may apply to other non-written acts of communication, including gestures and drawings. The internal world is the subjective world “to which someone has privileged access” (Habermas, 1987: 122). The external world consists

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10 Habermas also introduced a second purposive-rational concept of action, teleological action. This resembles the rationality underlying strategic action. In contrast to strategic action, the teleological model of action does not include other goal-directed actors in its calculation of suitable means for success.
of an objective and social world. The former is related to consensual interpretations, whereas the latter serves “as an intersubjectively recognized normative component” (Habermas, 1987: 122).

Habermas describes that “[s]ocially coordinated activities of its members…are established through communication” (Habermas, 1984: 397). Communication is the central theme of Habermas’ rationality. He argues that a social actor relates to other actors and the environment around him or her through speech. One constantly makes claims concerning emotions, intentions, the legitimacy of norms and other things. Claims are either accepted or disputed by our co-actors in the social system. According to Habermas, when claims are disputed arguing takes place in order to achieve mutual understandings.

We use the term *argumentation* for that type of speech in which participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them through arguments. An *argument* contains reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the *validity claim* of a problematic expression. (Habermas, 1984: 18)

By transferring Habermas’ argumentation onto an international social system, the ASEAN-EU relationship is understood as a form of coordinated social interaction. For a meaningful and long-lasting interaction to take place the primary step would be to establish a dialogue as a form of communication. Once this dialogue has overcome the communicative action phase, coordinated activities can take place. After reaching understanding, communicative action leads to coordination of action and the socialisation of actors. Communicative action is a collective truth-seeking process of appropriate behaviour and norms through theoretical and practical discourse in which the actors “avoid two risks: the risk of not coming to some understanding…and the risk of a plan of action miscarrying” (Habermas, 1987: 127). In fact, the case studies will show that despite consensus and coordination in action, parties can always defect.

Mutual understanding is the necessary prerequisite for coordinated activity. Habermas presupposes an ideal speech situation as the necessary pre-condition for communicative action to be effective. Firstly, the involved actors must be able to empathise with their counterpart. Secondly, Habermas argues that the social actors interact dialectically seeking mutual understanding of the situation, intention and action in order to agree to a reasoned consensus. The shared goal of the interaction
is the creation of a *Lebenswelt* (lifeworld) or “a background of culturally ingrained pre-understanding” of (Alfredo C. Robles Jr., 2008: 21). Habermas defines lifeworld as

the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or subjective), and where they can criticise and confirm those validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at agreements...speakers and hearers come to an understanding from out of their common lifeworld about something in the objective, social, or subjective worlds. (Habermas, 1987: 126)

This common lifeworld serves as the source of reference between the actors. The problem with cross-regional interaction is that the involved actors are in the context of this thesis highly incoherent and diverse in culture, history and language. In most cases, regions do not even share a common lifeworld within. In the context of the ASEAN-EU relationship, this mismatch is present and thus, the study concurs with Thomas Risse that “there is no ‘common lifeworld’ supplying collective interpretations of the world to the actors involved” (Risse, 2000: 14). Thirdly, both actors must recognise each other as equals in the discourse and be “open to being persuaded by the better argument” (Risse, 2000: 7). Since both regions are far away, the opportunity of an equal partnership is heightened as the impact of the power asymmetry is mitigated. Thus, in the case studies, it can be expected that European actors will also have to employ their persuasive skills and show greater patience.

Asymmetrical power relations and discourse accessibility are ideally irrelevant and “all force – whether it arises from within the process of reaching understanding itself or influences it from the outside – ” is excluded to “reaching understanding” (Habermas, 1984: 25). The reality, however, is that power is omni-present in the international sphere. The introductory case on the EU-Thailand PCA negotiations suggested that, despite the geographical distance, the power asymmetry does apply. International organisations are the only frameworks in which an ideal speech is virtually possible and where a kind of lifeworld can be created. Although the relationship between the EU and ASEAN is formalised and constrained by international and consensually agreed norms, the power asymmetry continues to play a role. This will be further discussed in the case studies. Fourthly, the discourse
has to be of public nature and open to other actors and society as a whole. This premise is difficult in relation to Southeast Asian systems of governance.

Communicative action as an analytical tool is suitable in situations where norms need to be generated and agreed upon. In situations where norms are unstable, contested, subject to change, as well as being, motivated by a combination of norms and interests Schimmelfennig has introduced the concept of rhetorical action. He defines it as “the strategic use of arguments…. [I]t is the strategic use and exchange of arguments based on ideas shared in the environment of the proponents and intended to persuade the audience and the opponents to accept the proponents’ claims and act accordingly” (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 199). The aim of the actors in the dialogue is to win an argument and impose a claim.

This approach is located in between the purposive-instrumental rationality of strategic action and the cooperative truth- and consensus-seeking rationality of communicative action. In contrast to communicative action, rhetorical action does not seek to achieve a reasoned consensus. Actors are not open to being convinced by the better argument. Instead norms are used instrumentally “to persuade others [or the audience to pressure the counterpart], they themselves however are neither prepared to yield to the power of the better of the arguments nor open to accepting their opponents’ counterclaims” (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 204).

The audience plays an important role in strengthening the effectiveness of rhetorical action in international society, since the impact of institutional decisions and sanctions are limited. The proponent appeals to particular norms and values of the majority or the most powerful group of the audience. It can happen that not only the behaviour is changed, but also the norms guiding the behaviour of the opponent. “Persuasion is deepest if the proponent succeeds in changing the cultural beliefs, that is the identity, values, and norms, of the opponents or the audience” (Schimmelfennig, 2003: 202). This may remind some readers of the human rights discourse between the EU and ASEAN (Manea, 2008).

In contrast to the aforementioned modes, normative action is solely based on the logic of appropriateness. Actors act in accordance with pre-defined and stable norms which have been internalised by the actor. Nicole Deitelhoff defines the rationality of normative action in terms of actors, which choose their mode of action based on the congruency of their action with their understanding of legitimate norms (Deitelhoff, 2006: 111). In contrast to communicative and rhetorical action, normative
action is based on stable norms whereas the other two modes do not require a pre-existing normative consensus. This is reminiscent of the concept of a normative power by Ian Manners on page 18. The concept of the EU as a normative power restricts the EU’s behaviour to normative action.

All four modes of action are prototypes which can be hardly found in their ideal form in empiricism. These modes occur in various combinations to varying degrees. These modes provide a good theory to identify the various motivations driving the EU’s actions. In reference to our discussion on crises and their impacts on norms on pages 25-28, we can assume that, although some NTS crises may be far away and not a threat to Europe, the EU will express its solidarity and offer some form of assistance, because it is motivated by normative grounds. Thus, despite the intertwining of material and ideational interests, the case studies in the second part of the chapter are expected to contribute to the confirmation of the hypothesis, because they relate to NTS situations of crisis which require urgent actions.

1.4.2 (Social) Constructivism

Social action theory provides an adequate framework to bridge the gap between the logics of appropriateness and consequentiality. The devised theoretical framework also builds on (social) constructivist theorising to test the consistency of the EU’s normative identity and normative output. Inter-subjectivity and, consequently, the agents, are important units of analysis, not least because of the ‘constructed’ NTS perspective. In contrast to the traditional theories, constructivist approaches view interests as endogenously developed and not as exogenously given. Interests that are defined through a reflectivist approach are alterable depending on the situation. The change of interest is important in altering and shaping the identity of an international actor. "In the constructivist view…actions continually produce and reproduce conceptions of Self and Other, and as such identities and interests are always in process" (Wendt, 1999: 36). He further says that “[p]ower and [i]nterest are important factors in international life, but since their effects are a function of culturally constituted ideas the latter should be our starting point” (Wendt, 1999: 41).

The following section will start with a discussion of the international system as a value-laden sphere. This feeds into the normative identity of an international actor. Furthermore, this subchapter will elaborate on security culture to explain the causalities and reactions of actors in instances of threats and crises. Culture
constitutes a prominently defined umbrella concept, which encompasses various elements that contribute to an actor’s normative behavior. We understand that culture builds on norms and values among others. Thus, discussing culture gives insights into the ideational dimension that links with the behavior of actors. By understanding security or NTS culture and unpacking this concept, this chapter provides a pre-understanding of the threat perceptions and responses within the individual chapters of Part II. This links to the next chapter, which will propose that the EU’s norms, values and toolkit are compatible with the needs of Southeast Asia in regard to NTS crises.

While constructivism is inclusive of a variety of constituents of culture, this thesis will only focus on those that are integral to the hypothesis that states that transnational and unconventional crises offer an opportunity to clearly identify the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor. Earlier, it was discussed that NTS challenges triggered processes of threat ‘othering’ and commonalisation. As explained in the previous section, culture assists in understanding the threat perceptions and behavioural norms. Although threat perceptions and norms play an important role in understanding the EU’s reaction and the choice of instrument for its response, the empirical evidence will show that the outcome of action may sometimes be incongruent with the EU’s normative identity. NTS crises provide an instance allowing a recalibration of the relationship along stronger managerial lines to tackle common NTS concerns. This may undermine the EU’s normative agenda as will be shown in some of the case studies.

Beyond the endogenous dimension of norms and values, the ideational dimension of the international system also feeds into an actor’s culture and thus, the EU as a normative actor, as will be discussed in the case of the AMM. Ronald Jepperson and colleagues have argued that there are three layers of the international system that influence an international actor’s identity. Firstly, there are security regimes, including the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other institutions. Secondly, they believe in a “world political culture” made up by universal values and norms, which are “carried by professional and consultancy networks, and a transnational discourse carried by such international social movements as Amnesty International and Greenpeace” (Jepperson, Katzenstein, and Wendt, 1996: 34). Thirdly, the international ideational patterns of
amity and enmity provide the normative lining of the international security environment (Jepperson et al., 1996: 34). These exogenous, ideational variables constrain actorness in addition to the endogenous, ideational foundations of an actor.

Building on the importance of values, norms and threat perceptions, social constructivism premises these to be subject to social discourse. Based on this assumption, NTS co-operation and symmetrical negotiation is difficult when there is insufficient normative commonality. On the one hand, globalisation may exacerbate the differences of diverging norms. On the other hand, it may play an important role in overcoming these normative differences through increased communication, namely communicative action as presented earlier on. However, as previously mentioned, the cooperation on NTS issues places emphasis on technocratic and managerial forms of cooperation and may tone down the normative dimension. For this thesis, the opinions of central-decision-makers, threat perceptions, pre-existing interaction, and international ideational dimension are considered as the central constituents of the normative/cultural dimension to understand EU behaviour.

Katzenstein and colleagues refer to norms as “collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity” (Jepperson et al., 1996: 34). They further define culture as “both a set of evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and to cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate” (Jepperson et al., 1996: 34). Similarly, Lucien Pye defines culture as a “set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments which give order and meaning to a policy process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the international system” (Pye, 1968: 218). Both definitions describe culture as delimiting and determining the preference ordering of certain behaviours. Furthermore, Colin S. Gray argues that cultural approaches need to include contextual variables in order to reflect a comprehensive picture of national, regional, or international security policies (Gray, 1999: 51). Gray captures the blurry reality on the international level, but he does not offer a clearly structured methodology. By linking strategic culture as the independent variable directly to behaviour as the dependent variable in his early works, he fell into a deterministic trap. He was unable to explain the divergence of thought and behaviour (Johnston, 1995a: 7-8; 1995b: 37-38).
In contrast to Gray, Alastair Iain Johnston offers a falsifiable theory that manages to distinguish between culture and behaviour and establish a causality link between the both. At the same time, he does not fall into the deterministic trap (Johnston, 1995a: 39). Jürgen Haacke and Paul D. Williams have paraphrased Johnston’s definition of strategic culture (Johnston, 1996: 222) and defined regional security cultures as “patterns of thought and argumentation that establish pervasive and durable security preferences by formulating concepts of the role, legitimacy, and efficacy of particular approaches to protecting values” (Haacke and Williams, 2007: 8).

Haacke and Williams identified referents of security (e.g. state, regime, community or individual), the dimensions of security (e.g. military, environmental, economic etc.), the nature of the political-security environment (i.e. benign or difficult, unipolar or multipolar etc.), the parameters of the corporate role of the arrangement in dealing with security challenges, and the efficacy and appropriateness of different approaches to security (Haacke and Williams, 2007: 8-9).

Furthermore, they involve an operational level of assumptions. These are defined as “a set of (ranked) preferences on effective and legitimate responses to security challenges that shape behaviour” (Haacke and Williams, 2007: 9). On this bedrock, regional organisations, or, rather the security understanding and thinking of the leading national and regional political elite of ASEAN and the EU, develop a distinct NTS culture. This biases their sense of urgency for a certain NTS threats, instruments and policies. Therefore, threat perceptions and the EU’s responsive activities to NTS crises are the ideal elements of culture for the analysis. The cultural dimension is expressed through them.

Given that NTS crises abroad are not necessarily security threats to the EU, it is mainly the central decision-makers concerned with development and humanitarian aid, which influence EU actoriness on NTS challenges. This then suggests that it is not security, but development and plight alleviation that are sought after. The achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) appears to be the guiding objective (Interview with EU official, 17 February 2009). As previously

mentioned, NTS crises can lead to securitisation and heightened threat perceptions. However, crises that are remote are rather instances of compassion and solidarity, in which the EU provides technical and financial assistance.

Conclusions
This chapter has clarified the central concepts and theoretical perspectives. It has argued that the concept of actorness consists of four main features. These are, recognition, interest aggregation, policy formulation, and implementation. Since the regional level is the departure point for the analysis, the case studies will focus on processes located on this level. Domestic processes are included to some extent in the case of the AMM. This case will discuss in greater detail the interest aggregation processes and refer to the concept of actorness cohesion introduced by Caporaso and Jupille, while the other case studies focus on the policy formulation and implementation processes.

Additionally, the role of crises and securitisation was introduced in relation to actorness. These elements were discussed to better trace and understand the EU's actorness and the EU as a normative actor in the case studies. Furthermore, these situations heighten the opportunity of change. While NTS is a useful umbrella concept to link between actorness, sectors and means, it also raises normative tensions in regard to the EU's normative identity. These tensions were outlined and will be referred to throughout the empirical case studies. The final section of this chapter introduced the logic of appropriateness and consequentiality. Furthermore, it discussed the central aspects of social action theory and (social) constructivist theorising to this thesis. Social action theory is drawn upon to determine the rationalist and normative drivers behind actorness. Social constructivism builds on culture as the umbrella concept for the endogenous as well as exogenous ideational dimension. The discussion has established that culture has been prominently discussed, but that only individual constituents of it are central to our study. Referring to culture would complicate a focused examination of the case studies.
Chapter 2

Empirical Framework

The previous chapters have outlined the research interests, as well as the conceptual and theoretical assumptions. The following paragraphs will introduce the empirical foundations for the analysis. The first section will give an insight into the three most important channels of interaction between ASEAN and the EU. This is followed by an overview of the politico-security dimension of the ASEAN-EU relationship. In line with social constructivist theorising, the final section discusses the EU’s contemporary politico-security toolkit and mindset towards the Southeast Asian region.

The EU participates as an active dialogue partner to Southeast Asia on NTS matters in a variety of bilateral and multilateral dialogue fora. The ASEAN-EU level of dialogue consists of the ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting (AEMM), the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) the ASEAN-EU Economic Ministers’ Meeting (AEEM), Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) meetings, the ASEAN-EU Senior Officials’ Meeting (ASEAN-EU SOM), and the ASEAN Brussels Committee (ABC). Furthermore, the two sides meet in the ARF and the ASEM frameworks.

Complementing these Track 1 channels of communication are a variety of Track 2 dialogue fora, including the EU-ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Assembly (EU-AIPA) meetings since the 1970s, the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership which is the inter-parliamentary meeting affiliated to ASEM, ASEAN-EU Think Tank

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12 The ABC appears to pose another possible channel of interregional communication. However, it has remained a rather informal ASEAN meeting in Brussels, which has been under-recognised by the EU as another platform of interregional communication. ABC’s lack of an actual budget has also limited its function. An ASEAN member state diplomatic officer said that, ABC is a useful institution for ASEAN countries to get to know EU officials in person, since they probably would be less willing to appear on individual invitations by smaller ASEAN countries and Myanmar. Overall, the ABC’s functions seem to be limited to a meet-and-greet of EU officials and the promotion of trade relations through the sub-committee on trade.

13 The European Parliament and the parliamentarians from ASEAN member states have had contact since 1976. From 1979 onwards these contacts were on a regular basis between the ASEAN Inter-parliamentary Organisation (AIPPO) founded in 1977 and the European Parliament which was from 1979 on directly elected by the European people. The European Parliament’s regular meetings with AIPPO and the parliamentarians from the individual ASEAN countries were intensified when the European Parliament was given observer status at AIPPO in 1997. In 2007 AIPPO was renamed AIPA. It is imperative to understand that AIPA does not act like the European Parliament in its institutional setting. Like the ASEAN Secretariat AIPA is dependent on the member states. It does not represent an ASEAN Parliament but rather a regular meeting of designated parliamentarians from national parliaments to exchange information with each other and thus, exchange information with EU parliamentarians. In contrast to the European Parliament, AIPA has absolutely no power in influencing regional policy-making. Accordingly, the relations appear of rather symbolic than substantial nature.
Dialogue\textsuperscript{14}, and the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation. The latter was the think tank dialogue for ASEM, bringing together European and Asian scholars from twelve research institutes across both regions. It has phased out now. The Asia-Europe People’s Forum is a meeting of civil society, organised by NGOs and civil society representatives outside of the official ASEM process. The Asia-Europe Business Forum is another Track 2 forum in relation to ASEM. It was initiated in 1996 to provide a forum for business people from both continents to strengthen the interregional trade and business ties.

In the specific context of Southeast Asia, the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) has been an important Track 2 network influencing the Track 1 political discourse within the region (May, 2000). The regional Track 2 players provide an additional value for the interregional Track 2 level. Despite singular cases of influence, overall, Track 2 does not really pose to be a conveyor level between the Track 1 and 3 levels. Generally speaking, it constitutes a layer with its own agenda that sometimes reflects and promotes items onto the Track 1 agenda.

This thesis understands the importance of Track 2 and 3 players as norm entrepreneurs and actors that may carry out the EU’s normative agenda. On the one hand, they can support national authorities in reaching out to all levels of society. On the other hand, they can promote norms that may not be favoured by the government. Analysing the role and dynamic of Track 2 would be a thesis in itself and therefore, its exploration within this thesis is limited. This thesis acknowledges the role of Track 2 as important in relation to the implementation of the EU’s policies, in particular. This thesis will argue in Chapter 4 that these Track 2 actors should be considered actors by proxy, because they either increase the EU’s effectiveness or provide greater congruency with regard to the EU’s normative identity. The chapter will present that the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor are notions that are reinforced by the activities of Track 2 and Track 3 actors by proxy.

\textsuperscript{14} In 2004, it has been renamed to ASEAN-East Asia Think Tank Dialogue.
2.1 ASEAN-EU dialogue

The informal meetings between the EEC and the ministerial delegation of ASEAN in Brussels on 16 June 1972, in Bangkok on 5-6 September 1973, and in Jakarta 24-25 September 1974, paved the way for the formal biannual ministerial meetings between the two regional groupings. The interaction between the two regional groupings is asymmetrical and has been part of the EC’s strategy to manage the development and trade relations with developing countries during the Cold War. The early ministerial meetings displayed a strong focus on economic issues (EC ministers, 1974: para. 5). This emphasis on economic matters is explained by the ASEAN member states’ eagerness to gain market access and the European Commission’s interest in Asia. The EEC member states showed less interest in the relationship with Southeast Asia (Interview with former Commission official working for Wilhelm Haferkamp, 15 February 2009).

The only Asian country that mattered to the EC member states back then was Japan. In fact, it also needs to be highlighted that the European Commission saw Southeast Asia as part of a greater Asian strategy. This strategy revolved around the idea of containing the communist threat emanating from China (Interview with former Commission official working for Wilhelm Haferkamp, 15 February 2009). While Southeast Asia instrumentalised the relationship with the European Commission for this very same political purpose, they also followed a market-based approach stemming from their “Afrikaneid”\(^\text{15}\) (Interview with former Commission official working for Wilhelm Haferkamp, 15 February 2009). They believed that other developing countries, in particular, the African countries had received preferential treatment and substantial support from the European Commission as well as the member states of the European Communities. They hoped that they could retrieve more economic gains out of the relationship through a market-based approach.

The focus on trade resulted in a special ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting on Economic Matters in 1985. The economic interests dominated the agenda and only one politico-security concern, which was on the Indochinese refugees, was included in the agenda in the late 1970s (ASEAN and EC member states, 1978). By the mid-1980s, the dialogue became more comprehensive and a wider range of international political issues were brought to the agenda. A Joint Statement on Political Issues in

\(^{15}\) Translation by author: “jealousy of Africa”.

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1980 was the starting point for this development. The statement reiterated the principles of cooperation, which included human rights, standards of national sovereignty and the prime role of the United Nations (UN). It further displayed a common position on the Cambodia and Afghanistan invasions. These two issues were to become the central political issues discussed in this interregional relationship during the Cold War period.

Southeast Asia’s dialogue with the European Commission remained focused on trade, while the agenda of the foreign ministers’ meetings expanded to include the exchange of views on regional and international problems. The Cambodian problem posed an immediate threat to ASEAN’s stability and tested the national, regional and interregional humanitarian capacities to assist the refugees. The EEC member states supported the ASEAN position in the UN and contributed financially to the UN missions to solve the refugee and displaced persons problem. Both sides were deeply concerned about this situation until the Paris Agreements temporarily ended the instability of Indochina. For the first time, in the course of the ASEAN-EU dialogue, a political issue, that is, the Cambodian problem has given the relationship a political twist and heightened the importance of Southeast Asian security (Palmujoki, 2001: 98).

The ideological reality of the Cold War facilitated the conceptualisation of the common strategic interests between the two regions. Both pursued an anti-Soviet policy. The US withdrawal from Indochina and the increasing economic interdependence between the two regions generated a greater inclusion of the security dimension. The Soviet naval expansion in the Pacific, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were of concern to both sides. In view of the common threat perceptions and the systemic reality, there were possibilities of a nascent ASEAN-EC security community (Peou, 2002). Eventually, bipolarity came to an end and the common antagonist disappeared. Post-Cold War NTS issues were increasingly incorporated into the interregional agenda and posed a new opportunity of threat commonalisation. However, the ideological differences between the two regions became more apparent. Until then, they have been muted by the common communist threat. The divergence on China after the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989 was an appetiser for what was to become the bone of contention in this relationship for the following years.
Since then, ASEAN-EC/EU relations have been permanently under strain by the EC’s/EU’s normative agenda. Gabriela Manea observed that “ASEAN’s confrontational mode of interaction with the European Union regarding human rights policy has been a catalyst for the dynamic growth of a collective definition of self for ASEAN” (Manea, 2008: 370). She further stated that this process had “contributed to the development of a communicative space for negotiating human rights issues at a regional level, which has been central to the gradual transformation of ASEAN’s collective identity formation” (Manea, 2008: 370). The ASEAN-EU relationship has contributed to an intraregional discourse on regional identity within the counterpart. However, Manea did not account for the influence of other international actors with a similar normative agenda.

At the 11th AEMM in Karlsruhe, as well as in the New Asia Strategy of 1994, the EU recognised the limited utility of a politicised mode of interaction for its economic ambitions and rendered to a more pragmatic approach. The creation of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the growth of the economies of the Pacific compelled the EU to change its politicised course. In spite of increased pragmatism, Myanmar’s accession to ASEAN in 1997 faced strong European objections. By politicising Myanmar, the EU alienated the ASEAN member states. ASEAN became more determined to resolve the Myanmar issue the ASEAN Way and not succumb to external pressure of a value-lecturing economic actor like the EU. By contrast, a European Commission official explained,

Just a few years back, most political meetings were dominated by the discussion on Myanmar, now, at the Summit or Ministerial level, most of our Ministers or officials had to make statement about Myanmar in EU-ASEAN meetings and you know this created bad partnership, lack of faith, and, now, we again make the point on Myanmar, but meetings are not just dominated by it. We make our point, but we understand ASEAN’s constraints as well...It is an issue, but since it does not dominate meetings as it did a few years back, it makes our cooperation easier and, therefore more fruitful. (Interview with EU official, 20 February 2009)

The European Commission official indicated that the EU is now pursuing a stance towards Myanmar that is more compatible with ASEAN’s notion of engagement. Another European Commission official suggested that “we must learn to speak to Myanmar in order to achieve our objective. Greater democratisation and so on. And the dialogue with ASEAN enabled us to appreciate how we can engage
with Myanmar in a more positive sense” (Interview with EU official, 20 February 2009).

An ASEAN member state official admitted that progress on Myanmar has not been apparent through the ASEAN approach and thus, the EU has “rightly criticised” ASEAN (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 21 November 2008). However, Singapore and other countries have pursued a critical stance in informal bilateral dialogues with Myanmar (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 21 November 2008). The Asian side does not disagree with the EU on Myanmar, but there is a difference in approach. The reason Myanmar became a burden to the relationship was because it “is a smaller group than ASEM and at ASEM there are more political and security issues of greater importance” (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 21 November 2008).

ASEAN members believed that by integrating Myanmar into their association, Myanmar had to socialise and break-down its self-chosen isolation. In fact, the EU’s humanitarian assistance to the people of Myanmar post-Nargis has to be seen in this light. The EU has provided humanitarian assistance to Myanmar since 1994. Nevertheless, the single-most important facilitator of humanitarian assistance post-Nargis was not the EU’s long-standing support. It was ASEAN’s constructive approach to Myanmar that paved the way for European engagement post-Nargis in 2008 (Interview with EU official, 5 February 2009).

Despite the recent positive developments in Myanmar and the suspension of sanctions by the EU, this ASEAN country has been for a long time framed by the EU and its member states to be the most severe source of NTS threats for Southeast Asia. The EU was not shy to highlight that Myanmar is not only a vulnerable target for NTS threats but also the source of them (European Commission, 2003). The production and smuggling of narcotics, AIDS, cross-border incursions and the refugee flows to neighbouring countries, in particular to Thailand, are regional security problems that have been addressed in the ASEAN-EU dialogue.

The ASEAN members hold the responsibility to socialise and, when necessary, effectively punish their fellow members. The ratification of the ASEAN Charter provides a concrete document for this. However, it has been weak to penalise domestic events. While it is a concern for the EU that ASEAN cannot effectively punish its member states, it has learnt to understand the Southeast Asian approach to Myanmar, as mentioned on the previous page. This does not signify a normative
change in the official rhetoric of the EU. It and its member states still condemn the human rights abuses by the military junta. However, they have found alternative strategies to be consistent with their normative identity, while avoiding the isolation of Myanmar.

In this context, non-state actors or state-affiliated actors have been important in providing continual assistance to the people of Myanmar. They manage to circumvent the constraints to actoriness posed by the official European stance towards Myanmar. This does not resolve the normative dilemma that the EU faces, but it alleviates the plight of the people of Myanmar to some extent. Therefore, it is normative in a different way. A greater concern than the normative dilemma above is the engagement of European transnational corporations within the private sector, who have a strong lobby and favour a less harsh approach to Myanmar. Companies like *Total* have the resources and political pressure to influence high-level attitudes towards Myanmar and may counter the idea of the EU as a normative actor.

The case of Myanmar shows that ideational factors act as shapers of behaviour to some extent. Thus, the reflectivist assessment seems appropriate. The normative dimension of the EU’s actoriness in the region has been prominent, particularly, in the early 1990s. Its attempts to spread its liberal-democratic values have been often ill-received. However, it did open communicative space on human rights within ASEAN.

### 2.1.1 Issue Agenda

The evolution of the ASEAN-EU dialogue has displayed four different phases. During the Cold War, the superpower overlay determined the central security issues. These were the flow of Indochinese refugees and the Cambodian and Afghanistan concern (ASEAN and EC member states, 1978: para. 13; 1980). By the 4th AEMM on 25 March 1983 in Bangkok, the agenda broadened and addressed the problematic developments in the Middle East (ASEAN and EC member states, 1983: para. 20). By the 6th AEMM on 20-21 October 1986 in Jakarta, horizontal matters became more important. NTS threats, including narcotics and international terrorism, were addressed. Furthermore, the other regions outside of Asia increasingly attracted the foreign ministers’ attention. At the seventh AEMM, the political and security agenda was extended to include disarmament and arms control. The ending of the Cold War was near and NTS issues became of greater concern to both sides.
After the Cold War, the cooperation between the two sides was substantiated by various new mechanisms, including the Trans-Regional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI), Regional EU-ASEAN Dialogue Instrument (READI) and other mechanisms. Human security concerns became more important. For example, environmental protection was brought onto the AEMM agenda, prior to the Rio Conference in 1992 (ASEAN and EC member states, 1991: para. 61-4). This suggests that the ASEAN-EU relationship may not be reactive to global fora per se, but rather that it is sensitive to vital issues of international concern. In the recent years, the Nuremberg Declaration and the pursuant Plan of Action have attempted to bring a new dynamic into the ASEAN-EU relationship. The post-Cold War impetus of the Karlsruhe Declaration of 1994 had been short-lived and a new dynamic was urgently needed in the 2000s.

The Plan of Action to Implement the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-ASEAN Enhanced Partnership expresses the desire to deepen the interregional political and security cooperation (ASEAN-EU member states, 2007: Joint Action 1.2). It is based on the three pillars of the ASEAN community-building process. The plan seeks to enhance cooperation in the fields of crisis management and conflict prevention as well as capacity building. International terrorism, transnational crime and disarmament, arms control, and the non-proliferation of WMD are central security concerns within it. The role of the ARF is emphasised and the two regions envisage a rise in the joint hostings of seminars and workshops. This intention of action has already been translated into practical outcomes. For example, in the form of the ARF Seminar to Enhance Maritime Security from 5-6 March 2009 in Surabaya (EU-Indonesia) and numerous other joint activities of the Indicative Lists of Activities 2007-2008 and 2009-2010. NTS issues fall under three categories. These are the political and security, socio-cultural cooperation, and energy security and minerals cooperation (ASEAN and EU member states, 2008: Activity 1.XII and 4.IV and 2007: Joint Action 3).

The plan and the Indicative Lists of Activities bridge between the ASEAN and EU understandings of security and attempt to incorporate activities that involve multiple stakeholders and levels of governance. For example, Activity V. under the political and security cooperation of the Indicative List of Activities 2009-2010 expresses this. It states that the two sides should “[p]romote dialogue and partnership among private sectors, civil societies and other relevant organisations to
foster and enable new ideas, concepts and methods with a view to enhance transparency, accountability, participatory and effective governance” (ASEAN-EU member states, 2008: Activity 1.V). This suggests a high degree of consistency with the EU’s normative identity that includes multiple stakeholders and de-emphasises the centralisation of power. It seems that the EU has successfully persuaded the Southeast Asian side to incorporate some normative principles of the EU. However, one also needs to recognise that the implementation may diverge from the rhetoric and that there are indeed a few democratising ASEAN member states which have promoted these norms already from within to some extent.

2.1.2 Technicalities and Current State of Affairs

The ASEAN-EU dialogue is divided into two tracks. The first track is designed as a region-to-region dialogue and was formalised in 1978. The second track dialogue is the JCC and was endorsed at the second ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur to manage the implementation of the Cooperation Agreement of 1980. The EC/EU and the ASEAN and EC/EU member states are represented in the JCC by senior officials. Since 1994, the JCC has set up five sub-committees to focus on trade and investment, industrial and economic cooperation, science and technology, forestry, environment, and narcotics.

The AEMM is the main forum in the ASEAN-EU dialogue. It produces joint declarations or statements which have been agreed upon by the both sides months prior to the actual meeting. It should be the main forum to substantiate the notion of EU actorness in Southeast Asia. The AEMM has been complemented by the ASEAN-EU SOM since 1995. The meeting of the senior officials takes place in between the AEMM and commonly deals with the organisation of the next AEMM. Additionally, there is the ASEAN-EU ministerial meeting of the economic ministers that takes place less frequently.

Currently, there are five main characteristics of the ASEAN-EU dialogue and cooperation on NTS challenges, that will shape the future of this relationship. Firstly, the agenda and initiatives suggest that Southeast Asia is the primary region of concern and the reference point for developing joint activities. Although the global agenda also influences the activities, it appears that the EU and its member states are paying more attention to the needs of Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the focus of the relationship are the low politics. This is conducive to the NTS frame for
examination. Secondly, the nation-state as a whole is considered to be the security referent. That is, activities are designed in accordance with a comprehensive understanding of security that also encompasses understandings of human security. Thirdly, both sides promote multi-levelled and cross-sectorial activities.Fourthly, the activities in the field of political and security cooperation indicate the ambition to develop the AEMM to a meaningful dialogue forum with tangible outcomes that eventually stimulate further cooperation. Furthermore, they may lead to joint positions in other fora on the regional and global level. Finally, the EU seems to concentrate on deeper cooperation in niche areas. It supports regional integration and strengthens the ASEAN Secretariat, in particular.

2.2 Asia-Europe Meeting
ASEM was launched as the centre-point of the dynamic towards East Asia in the 1990s. It was designed to become the third leg of the geo-economic triangle of the major world regions. Hence, the structures of the economic dialogue of ASEM are more developed in comparison to the structures of the political and socio-cultural pillars. At the wake of ASEM, the EU insisted on a comprehensive and multi-sectorial forum that would comprise a politico-security dimension, where issues on democratisation and human rights could also be discussed. The Asian side was not opposed to the political pillar, but rejected the inclusion of human rights and liberal-democratic values in the formal dialogue. Instead an informal meeting on human rights was convened in 1997. By ASEM 3 in Seoul, the Asian side compromised and finally accepted the inclusion of human rights into the political dialogue. This seemed to be the exception and highly dependent on the South Korean President’s reception of the Nobel Peace Prize earlier that month. The following summits did not continue on this path. Even now, the Asian side, within the ASEM context, feels compelled by the Europeans to address the issues of democratisation and human rights (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 2 November 2008). A former EU official agreed with this to some extent and said that there is a “big ideological gap” between the European and Asian sides (Interview with former EU official, 19 November 2008). Already at the first ASEM, the Asian side tactically avoided human rights and other controversies to ensure a smooth start of ASEM. Despite the initial exclusion of human rights, they found their way back to ASEM directly and indirectly through the discussion of NTS challenges.
2.2.1 Issue Agenda

From the outset, ASEM’s priority was to consolidate the economic relations between the two sides. The first ASEM Summit was branded by this and the following summits continued along this line. However, incrementally, they became influenced by the developments on the global level. The second ASEM Summit was overshadowed by the AFC, the third by the situation of the Koreas, the fourth by the September 11 attacks, the fifth by the squabbles on Myanmar’s participation, the sixth by climate change, and the seventh by the GFC. In the short life of ASEM, it seems to have been less driven by an inherent ASEM interregional momentum, but rather by contemporary events on the global level.

Furthermore, the agenda is very similar to the ASEAN-EU agenda. The ASEAN-EU relationship is reinforced by ASEM through the direct reference of the ASEAN and ASEAN-EU levels. For example, at the 1998 ASEM Summit, ASEM member states recognised ASEAN as a region in need of environmental disaster management support (ASEM member states, 1998: para. 21). There are other cases, which show that the ASEM dynamic may not reinforce the ASEAN-EU relationship. As argued by Julie Gilson, ASEM has been an important catalyst for East Asian identity-building (Gilson, 2002). The stronger the East Asian identity within ASEM has become, the more inclined Southeast Asian states have been to adopt the East Asian ASEM position in the ASEAN-EU dialogue. Thus, these developments within ASEM have sidelined the value of an ASEAN-EU consensus on issues. This was manifest at the AEMM in 2009, where the ASEAN side was less open to talk about climate change, because this has already been discussed at the ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting earlier that month. Southeast Asian officials referred to the ASEM meeting and reaffirmed the stance taken by the East Asian side at ASEM. EU officials have found this experience frustrating and have expressed concerns that the Southeast Asian side may opt for the East Asian stance at ASEM by default (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010).

In this context, it seems that the Southeast Asian side has managed to overcome the power asymmetry within the ASEAN-EU relationship by drawing upon the ASEM framework. Already in the Introduction, the case of the EU’s PCA negotiations with Thailand has shown that the power asymmetry spurs the EU as a normative actor. For weaker actors to safeguard their interests and buffer against normative influence, they will draw upon their relationships with stronger partners
and memberships within more powerful groupings. This does not falsify the reflectivist approach, but demonstrates, as assumed in the Introduction, that the ideational dimension is intertwined with the material dimension (see page 8 in the Introduction).

2.2.2 Technicalities and Current State of Affairs

The ASEM process takes place on a biannual basis in a two-levelled format. The heads of state meet in a multilateral and in bilateral frameworks. The bilateral meetings are with selected counterparts on the first day of the Summit and in special cases so-called bilateral corridor meetings can be requested. In 2008, the Thai delegation organised corridor meetings of five minutes for the new Prime Minister to introduce himself to other leaders. This was arranged, because the time designated for the bilateral meetings would have limited him to only a few meetings.

Similarly to the process of the AEMM Chairman’s Statement, a chairman’s statement is circulated approximately six months before the ASEM summit. It starts out as a draft statement on general issues. It is then passed to the participating countries, the European Commission, and the ASEAN Secretariat. Corrections are made and, as a general rule, the EU participants regularly attempt to include their maximalist normative agenda (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 2 November 2008). In most cases, they are either dismissed or watered down in the final version. Since the admission of Myanmar to ASEM, Myanmar has been a target of EU criticism.

The ASEM Summit is flanked by preparatory meetings of the ASEM SOM, the meetings of labour, economic, finance and other ministers and the meetings of ASEM-affiliated Track 2 organisations. Generally speaking, two days before the ASEM Summit, the ASEM SOM is held. The member states and supranational organisations meet separately in their regional groupings. The enlargement of ASEM, including Russia in the European equation, and South Asia, Mongolia, and Australasia in the Asian equation has had structural implications for ASEM. A third temporary grouping was established for Australia, New Zealand, and Russia, because their identities were hardly compatible with the existing groups.

There are individual voices from Asia and Europe that are urging for deeper cooperation and institutionalisation of ASEM. Overall, both regions seem to be content with the status quo of the political and security dialogue and the format of
ASEM, as defined in the Asia Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) (ASEM member states, 2000: para. 8). The soft institutionalisation of ASEM produces outcomes that are not binding and seemingly serves the purpose of creating understanding. The ninth ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting indicates that ASEM will move along this talk-shop path for the near- to medium-term future. Then again, in the words of former ASEAN Secretary-General Rodolfo Severino, “what is wrong with a talk-shop” that increases understanding between the both sides (Interview with former Secretary General of ASEAN Rodolfo Severino, 24 November 2008)?

Although this may be the general rhetoric, it is also clear that the Southeast Asian side benefits from ASEM in more than just an ideational way. As mentioned earlier, from a Southeast Asian perspective, this format also allows the ASEAN states a greater bargaining power and accessibility to the European leaders. Furthermore, recent developments introduced new mechanisms to overcome the intangibility of the ASEM process. For example, in the annex of the Chairman’s Statement of ASEM 6 in Helsinki from 10-11 September 2006, the new mechanism of issue-specific leadership was introduced to instil a greater practical dynamic into the process. This initiative circumvents the need for enhanced institutionalisation by calling on the responsibility of the member states and their resources. However, there has been a lack in defining the modalities of it. This mechanism has fallen short of a common definition, which it needs to be applicable and of appeal to all ASEM members (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 2 November 2008). For the long-term, these kinds of mechanisms are not the solution. However, for the short- and medium-term, they are an acceptable means to the ASEAN member states to balance the talk and actual action within ASEM through intergovernmental or state-European Commission/ASEAN Secretariat cooperation.

2.3 ASEAN Regional Forum
At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting-PMC in Singapore in 1993, ASEAN leaders decided to create the ARF to address security matters in the region. This forum was designed to involve the major stakeholders of the Asia-Pacific. The ARF allows Southeast Asian states and their partners to reconcile differing views. According to the The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper, the ARF should develop in three stages. The Stage I plan designed for the early years, builds on the promotion of confidence-building measures (CBMs). It is based on
ASEAN’s core documents of security conduct, norms and practices, including *musyawarah* and *mufakat* (consultation and consensus). Furthermore, it relies on concrete CBMs for the short- to medium- to long-term future. These CBMs range from workshops on environmentally sound management of shipboard generated waste to seminars on the production of defence white papers. This first stage aimed to create an environment conducive to the development of ARF-own mechanisms to carry out the succeeding stages. These stages are concerned with preventive diplomacy (PD) and conflict resolution (ARF member states, 1995). By the 10th ARF meeting in 2003, the Chairman’s Statement expressed the success of the CBMs and the need for exploratory work on PD.

Since 1999, the ARF has identified an overlap of Stage I and Stage II. Despite the CBMs being a prerequisite for PD there are some PD principles overlapping with the CBM principles. In order to guarantee a smooth transition from one stage to the other this overlap is another task to be tackled by the ARF process. Therefore, at the 8th ARF the ARF Concept and Principles of PD paper was adopted with the intent to be implemented as exploratory work on PD in the following years. Currently, the ARF is still trying to create an environment conducive to meaningful cooperation. There are still numerous sensitive topics that limit the dialogue. The ever-increasing agenda reveals the ARF’s ambition to remain relevant. At the same time, this ambition has contributed to the standstill and the forum has become broad and vague. While newer topics including climate change and disaster relief offer a greater opportunity for active EU participation within the ARF framework, the overall dynamic of the forum seems to have been lost. An ASEAN Secretariat official has expressed concerns that ARF may be investing too much energy in every topic instead of being selective and moving the process forward by assuring that dialogue is maintained on less relevant topics at a minimal level (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 25 May 2010).

### 2.3.1 Issue Agenda

The ARF has an area-specific and issue-specific focus. The ARF meetings also discuss extra-regional issues that could have regional repercussions. The case of international terrorism after the September 11 attacks has been such a prominent case. The attacks have brought terrorism into the ARF’s discourse. Since then this topic has overshadowed the various ARF meetings, inter-sessional meetings, and
ARF activities for four years. With time, the prioritisation of terrorism and transnational crime lessened and gave room to re-focus on other topics.

The agenda and activities extended to socio-economic issues. For example, the AFC and its security implications have been intensively discussed in the 6th Chairman’s Statement of 1999. The ARF agenda is interest-driven and responsive to sudden events of crises that could generate regional instability. Disaster relief and management have been prominent topics in the ARF meetings from the late 1990s onwards until September 11. These areas seem to be the only area of incessant regional priority. Furthermore, they have long-standing and successful CBMs. They show less sensitivity towards national sovereignty. Disaster relief and management constitute a niche area where the ARF is developing at a faster pace and can promote the civil-military linkage. The workshop on Evolving Changes of Security Perceptions of the ARF Countries from 21-22 June 2005, recognised that solutions cannot be merely state-driven but need to comprise a people’s dimension (ASEAN member states, 2005).

Hence, in light of the EU’s capabilities and in light of the ARF’s advancement, disaster relief is an area where the EU may show enhanced actorness and normative influence. The involvement of European and Southeast Asian participants in the first ever ARF Voluntary Demonstration of Response (ARF-VDR) on Disaster Relief from 4-8 May 2009, and the ARF Disaster Relief Exercise (ARF DiREx) from 16-19 March 2011 show that both sides are interested in tangible outcomes and synergising capacities. These cooperative efforts further offer avenues of normative influence through the sharing of operational practices.

2.3.2 Technicalities and Current State of Affairs

The ARF builds on both Track 1 and Track 2 activities that are in coordination with the ARF Chairman. This reinforces the individual tracks and endows the overall process with a degree of legitimacy and acceptance from the Track 2 and 3 levels (ARF member states, 1995: para: 11). This multi-dimensional approach complements the ARF’s comprehensive view of security and corresponds to the recent developments of NTS and human security in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN is the official region of focus and in the driver’s seat. It ensures that the ARF’s development progresses at a comfortable pace to all participants. Accordingly, ASEAN’s diplomatic and security norms provide the normative basis for
this forum. The ARF is softly institutionalised, there are no voting procedures, and decisions are made by consensus. The ARF is held every year, immediately after the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. It is supported by the ARF SOM and reflects on the activities of the meetings of military officials and the Inter-sessional Support Groups and Inter-sessional Meetings. Today, the ARF suffers from the number and diversity of the members (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 25 May 2010). Similarly to ASEM, developing at a pace comfortable for all appears to be hindering effective cooperation within the ARF.

2.4 Security Threats and Strategies

So far, the chapter has shown that EU engagement with and within Southeast Asia on NTS challenges is also contingent on the opportunity provided by the fora, in which both sides meet. The following paragraphs tie into the discussion on (social) constructivism of the previous chapter and will introduce the general threat perceptions and worldviews of the EU in relation to Southeast Asia. They provide the empirical context for the case studies. The way the EU perceives its environment and Southeast Asia through a security lens influences the EU’s actoriness in the region.

Since the change of the Cold War polarity, the EU is facing an entirely different security environment. The danger of a nuclear or massive conventional strike between the former antagonistic Blocs has become obsolete and a variety of new global security threats have been unveiled. These threats are increasingly posed by non-state actors and are characterised by asymmetrical methods of the use of force (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2004: 6). The European Security Strategy: A secure Europe in a better World has addressed the key threats to the EU.

It identified five main threats to European security. These are terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, failed states, and organised crime. The EU believes that they can only be effectively tackled by cooperation across national borders. In this context, it emphasised the importance of multilateralism and the relevance of military action as a “preventive engagement” option only in conjunction with a decision from the UN Security Council (EU High Representative Javier Solana, 2003: 11). The propensity to act on a multilateral basis should be observed in the case studies of Part II.
Pre-emption or being “ready to act before a crisis occurs” is also an integral feature of the EU’s strategy, but it is interpreted differently than the American way (Council of the European Union, 2003: 7). In contrast to the USA, the EU stressed the importance of civilian, humanitarian, economic and diplomatic options over military means to prevent crises (Council of the European Union, 2003: 7). The European Security Strategy (ESS) acknowledged that achieving security requires more than a military mission to pre-empt and respond to a challenge. This is reflected in practice. The EU’s civilian resources used more extensively and deployed more frequently in comparison to the military resources that are available under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Sometimes, a clear distinction is difficult to make due to the possibility of dual-use of some of the capabilities.

The strategy paper was an attempt by former High Representative Javier Solana to provide a general guideline for the external dimension of the EU’s security actorness. It allows a case-by-case strategy development. For this purpose, operational concepts were defined vaguely and the ESS did not assume a clear-cut position on specific issues (Missiroli, 2008: 1-2). The ESS is a signal to the wider world that the EU is putting an effort into translating its economic power into political power. The follow-up document of the ESS, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security in a Changing World of 11 December 2008 is a continuum of the ESS in many ways.

Firstly, in terms of precise strategies, this document is also formulated in a vague manner. The new strategy document has fallen short in drawing upon concrete lessons learnt from the various civilian and military CSDP missions since 2003. Secondly, the key threats have remained mainly the same and are complemented only by a few new threats, including piracy and small arms and light weapons, cluster munitions and landmines. Furthermore, climate change, which has been part of the EU’s sustainable development agenda over many years, has become securitised. The old threats, namely, the proliferation of WMD, terrorism and organised crime are still on top of the EU’s agenda, although recent financial and economic troubles have undoubtedly led to an enhanced social dimension of European and international security.

Despite the various cooperative developments on the global, regional and national levels, in the follow-up document sees the world just as insecure as before.
Similarly to the ESS, this paper argued that the insecurity from outside is linked to the insecurity problem within the EU. It appears that the external activities of the EU to tackle NTS crises in other parts of the world are justified by the argument of insecurity over its normative commitment as a responsible fellow international actor.

Both the ESS and this document echoed the EU’s economic interests. International security appears to be linked to the EU’s economic well-being. This has been expressed in the new strategy document of 2008, for example, through the demand for a completion of the Doha Round (European Council, 2008: 12). The issue of the Doha Round has been discussed side-by-side with the issue of climate change and the reform of international institutions. Thus, readers of this document may rightly be suspicious about the EU’s motivations in managing common challenges.

Like the ESS, the ideational core of the revised version has been based on the EU’s guiding values, principles, and norms. Multilateralism with UN primacy, peaceful settlements and solutions, strong reluctance to the use of force and coercive threatening, cooperation with other actors and pre-emption remain the heart of the *modus operandi*. The 2008 strategy intended to mainstream human rights in CSDP missions even more. This was very ambitious, since the missions have shown that, in practice, it is very difficult to implement human rights standards. Clearly, in the realm of international security, where the EU has to think in terms of protecting its economic interests, effectiveness and the general well-being of its peoples, the normative dimension is drawn upon inconsistently. This tension will be further discussed in the empirical case studies and detailed in the case of the AMM in Chapter 6.

Despite the EU’s commitment “to step up [its] work with countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope”, the document did not outline ASEAN as a priority region that requires immediate EU attention (European Council, 2008: 6). ASEAN is not a region of critical concern and is only mentioned in connection with the Myanmar issue (European Council, 2008: 11). Both the ESS and the revised report of 2008 did not view ASEAN as a strategic – in both the broad and narrow military definition – priority to the EU.

By contrast, in the European Commission document A New Partnership with South East Asia (COM (2003) 399/4), the region has been officially recognised as an important trading partner to the EU as well as a region that requires security
assistance (European Commission, 2003). This document signalled the EU’s willingness to help and assist the region in crisis and conflict situations. Although the security dimension is mentioned in this document, the dominant perspective is the traditional donor-recipient scheme. Despite the EU’s intention of active talks and cooperation with ASEAN states on NTS issues, the EU has been mainly concerned with making proposals to solve Southeast Asia’s NTS issues. It did not necessarily consult with Southeast Asia on the development of the proposals to tackle NTS issues. The EU seems to draw upon its own experience very strongly and claims to know what is best for ASEAN.

Another problem is that the global agenda and securitisation trends in certain areas have led to a slight misinterpretation of some of the NTS issues in Southeast Asia. For example, the European perspective on terrorism in the region as expressed in the European Commission communication COM(2003)399/4 is highly influenced by the post-September 11 agenda. Therefore, the EU has identified the phenomenon of terrorism as an important strategic aspect of Southeast Asia, although EU member states did not necessarily agree upon the international connections of the Southeast Asian terrorist groups. Post-September 1,1 the EU was strongly influenced by the American security perceptions and agenda. Strategising Southeast Asia seemed to borrow extensively from the general international perspective. Despite diverging European stances on certain security intentions of the USA, international terrorism itself was unquestionably a threat in the eyes of all EU member states.

The document outlined terrorism among the EU’s top security priorities in the region. In the communication, a sum of € 21 million was designated to support counter terrorist projects in Southeast Asia. The EU’s approach to combat terrorism and other strategic priorities that have been listed in the document is comprehensive, multi-sectorial, and has a strong liberal-democratic foundation (European Commission, 2003: 6). The Communication document emphasised the shared values and common political and economic interests as the guarantors for enhanced cooperation between ASEAN and the EU. One wonders whether the EU and ASEAN member states really “…share enough interests and values…” (European

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16 The priorities are: supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism; human rights, democratic principles and good governance; mainstreaming justice and home affairs issues; injecting a new dynamism into regional trade and investment relations; continuing to support the development of less prosperous countries; intensifying dialogue and cooperation in specific policy areas.
Commission, 2003: 11). Beside the common economic interests, creating commonalities in domains where there are practically very little commonalities, arouses suspicion and underlines the importance of the economic interests in this relationship. The communication explicitly states that one of the EU’s main motivations for an enhanced partnership with Southeast Asia is based on its economic and trade interests with the region (European Commission, 2003: 6). This interest was in sync with the interest on the ASEAN side, which has been keen to gain economic and financial benefits from the relationship.

The document further outlined that the ASEAN-EU interregional dialogue should not thoroughly discuss security issues of a global or wider regional concern, since these issues are better addressed in the ARF and ASEM frameworks (European Commission, 2003: 23). In an era of trans-nationalisation of threats, this rhetoric limits the scope of the ASEAN-EU political and security dialogue. This allows other sectors of low politics to prosper. Overall, the document highlighted the EU’s interest in Southeast Asia’s regional stability. Accordingly, the EU then and now supports regional integration and acknowledges various development-security linkages such as terrorism/extremism-development (European Commission, 2003: 13). In general, the document’s emphasis was rather on development than on security.

Since 2003, the EU’s strategy towards Southeast Asia has undergone some changes. This was not least due to ASEAN’s integrational developments based on the ratified ASEAN Charter and the Community-building blueprints. The Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013 for Southeast Asia and the Plan of Action of Nuremberg have expanded the security and political dialogue and cooperation. Furthermore, in October 2009, the first ever visit of the chairman of the European Union Military Committee to the ASEAN Secretariat showed that the intergovernmental CSDP is interested in enhancing cooperation on NTS issues. This signalled to the ASEAN Secretariat that the EU as a collective actor is willing to take the ASEAN-EU relationship further and that it is open to region-to-region defence and security cooperation. The discussed NTS issues were maritime security, disaster relief and peace support operations. Despite this incipient rapprochement, the future of the ASEAN-EU dialogue on NTS challenges will continue to be subject to various constraints that will be outlined in the second part of this thesis.
Theoretically, the EU possesses the actorness qualities and instruments to be an important NTS actor within ASEAN. However, the reality is that the EU is cautious not to embrace and support Southeast Asia’s state-centric NTS concept, as discussed in the previous chapter. Despite the increasing acknowledgment of NTS issues, the EU has remained virtually invisible in Southeast Asia’s security order. The following paragraphs will detail the most important instruments that are available to the EU as a singular collective actor to assist Southeast Asia in tackling NTS threats. As Haacke and Williams have argued, security/NTS culture is also reflected in the preference for certain operational modes (Haacke and Williams, 2007).

2.4.1 Common Security and Defence Policy

For decades, the EU’s lack of hard power on the supranational level was not an obstacle for it as an external actor. However, the American hesitance to get involved in the Balkans required a European solution that needed military power and a coherent European position. This external pressure forced the EU member states to recognise that the ultimate concern for them in a new international system must be a common autonomous military power on the European level “in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world” (European Council, 1992). Since 1999, the EU possesses military means to project coercive power. At the Cologne summit it was declared that

> the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage. To that end, we intend to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defence...The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO (European Council, 1999).

In order to reach these aims Cologne provided institutional changes and innovations for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), now known as CSDP. Julian Lindley-French once said that the “neat dividing lines between hard and soft security, civil and military are rapidly dissolving, requiring far more flexibility on the part of Western state security institutions than has hitherto been the case” (Lindley-French, 2005: 2). The CSDP is such a new kind of all-encompassing security institution. For Americans, hard security remains the *leitmotif* in Southeast
Asia and the rest of the world, although this is also changing as mentioned in the Introduction. By contrast, CSDP has incorporated hard and soft security tools and policies from the very beginning.

While the EU now has CSDP to act militarily in Southeast Asia, it is far away and prefers to assist the region through development and humanitarian assistance. On the one hand, the EU may possess sufficient hard power to act. However, it does not act, because of its soft power and mindset. On the other hand, the EU may occasionally show the political will to act. However, because it does not pursue strategic interests in Southeast Asia and does not consider the region as a security priority, the EU falls short in procuring and developing capabilities for deployment to the region in the first place. Thus, the ideational and geographical setting of the EU shapes the EU’s weak security stance towards Southeast Asia. Vice versa this feeds back into the ideational foundations that shape the perspective and actoriness on Southeast Asia. States’ concerns about national sovereignty in the defence and security field are impeding greater CSDP capability development and actoriness in Southeast Asia. Sven Biscop has stated that, in general, the member states are a problem to themselves, because they lack the willingness to cooperate and develop military capabilities (Biscop, 2008: 19).

While CSDP operations have been successful and frequent in the EU’s near neighbourhood and Africa, there has only been one CSDP mission to Southeast Asia so far, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. In the context of Southeast Asia, CSDP is under-employed. In light of the enhanced opportunities presented by disaster relief, as discussed in the first part of this chapter, there may be a greater chance to employ CSDP in conflict-ridden areas that are experiencing natural disasters.

2.4.2 Rapid Reaction Mechanism and Instrument for Stability
At the European Council meeting in Helsinki from 10-11 December 1999, the establishment of a non-political and non-coercive crisis management mechanism was decided. This mechanism was created to respond to crises and inhibit the emergence of conflicts abroad “in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner” (Council of the European Union, 2001: 1). The long-term geographic and thematic instruments in the Asia and Latin America budget line of the European Commission did not have the desired effect. Crises and conflicts prevented the proper functioning of these instruments. With this in mind, on 26 February 2001, the Council Regulation No.
381/2001 was published to set the regulatory framework for the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) until 31 December 2006.

The RRM was a financial instrument of the European Commission to provide ad hoc and rapid finances to NGOs or other parties involved in tackling the crises or emerging crises. The RRM was designed to avoid time-consuming consultations and decision-making procedures. It allowed the European Commission to act by itself on behalf of the EU and in close coordination with the Council (Council of the European Union, 2001). The RRM is the European Commission’s short-term instrument complementing the EU’s thematic and geographic and long-term instruments.

Bernd Martenczuk identified three main advantages of the RRM over the other crisis-relevant instruments of the European Commission. Firstly, the RRM is more independent due to its own budget line (Martenczuk, 2004: 205). Secondly, it can be applied on a wider scope as it can be used for a greater number of operations that fall within the European Commission’s thematic and geographic instruments (Martenczuk, 2004: 205). Thirdly, as mentioned before, the RRM allows for rapid action because of its shortened consultation and decision-making process. However, action under this regulation is limited to six months. This short timeframe has been the major operational shortcoming of the RRM.

The successor instrument, the Instrument for Stability (IfS), can be used for a period of up to 18 months. If required this can be superseded by an Interim Response Measure or extended for another six months depending on the feasibility of the project, budget, and whether the objectives still need to be attained (Council of the European Union, 2006b: Art. 6.2). Juha Auvinen pointed out that “[c]ompared to the earlier Rapid Reaction Mechanism the crisis response component of the IfS represents a considerable increase in financial allocations (approximately 130 million euro in 2009)” (Auvinen and Wright, 2009: 116).

On 15 November 2006, Regulation No. 1717/2006 officially replaced the RRM. In comparison to the RRM regulation, the IfS regulation is more concrete in terms of measures, implementation, and methods of assistance and financing. This regulation captures the securitisation trend of the time (Council of the European Union, 2006b: Art. 3). Similarly to the RRM regulation, this instrument acknowledges the security-development nexus and places stronger emphasis on NTS issues as a cause for insecurity. The measures that can be supported by the IfS range from financial, logistical, and technical assistance for pre-or post-crisis capacity building to research
to law enforcement and even to the fight against terrorism. The IfS is very problematic, since the widening of its scope of application can be highly political and competitive to the CSDP operations. One can argue that the IfS has been established for the very purpose of creating stable conditions for the CSDP missions. The IfS strengthens the role of the European Commission as a security actor.

Despite controversies regarding the functional overlap between the European Commission and the CSDP, there is a practical advantage to this new strategic tool. It encroaches upon the responsibilities of the member states, but, at the same time, it complements their actions. This is the case when a timely response is needed, but the Council cannot achieve a consensus. This tool is flexible and accommodates to both long- and short-term security objectives. It has available emergency response measures and interim response programmes of up to 18 months after crises. Furthermore, the long-term component is three-pronged in focus. Non-proliferation of WMD, counteracting global and transregional threats and building capacity for effective crisis response are the three long-term priority areas. They are discussed in detail in the IfS Strategy Paper 2007-2011 and the IfS Strategy Paper 2012-2013.

So far, the EU’s supranational NTS actorness and actorness on NTS issues has been enhanced through the IfS. While the competence of the supranational level is expanded, this does not necessarily mean that the EU will show greater actorness. Furthermore, this does not necessarily contribute to the EU as a normative actor. In fact, the ad hoc and rapid nature of this instrument suggests that human rights and other normative concerns may be compromised to achieve effectiveness. An example for this will be given in Chapter 5 in the case of the Bali bombings.

### 2.4.3 European Commission’s Humanitarian Office

In view of the typology of NTS threats that ASEAN states are facing, it is mainly the European Commission’s Humanitarian Office (ECHO) which responds to the majority of these threats. ECHO was established in 1992 at the beginning of the worldwide humanitarian assistance debate. Since then, it has continually provided humanitarian assistance throughout the world, including to Myanmar since the mid-1990s. ECHO projects are country-owned and implemented in coordination with international and local partners via a community self-help approach. ECHO has an apolitical, humanitarian, and people-oriented mandate. Its motivation of engagement seemingly follows the logic of appropriateness, as the outcomes of the EU’s actions appear in
an altruist and non-political light. Thus, for this study, it appears to be a clear-cut tool to prove the EU as a normative actor.

ECHO’s engagement in Southeast Asia can be cross-sectorial and long-term or short-term. It can involve structural assistance or immediate relief. Below are some examples of ECHO’s activities in Southeast Asia:

1. Mainstreaming of disaster risk reduction in the education sector (Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), Philippines, and Cambodia)
2. Development of a national disaster risk reduction plan (Cambodia, Philippines, and Vietnam)

ECHO can provide assistance through geographic instruments, thematic funding, capacity-building, grants and services, support expenditure, technical assistance, and Disaster Preparedness ECHO (DIPECHO). Humanitarian crises caused by natural disasters, including floods, droughts, hazes, earthquakes, landslides, and typhoons, have been addressed by DIPECHO programmes. These programmes were launched in 1996 to provide various forms of assistance in disaster-prone regions. Southeast Asia is one out of six regions which has received support by the DIPECHO programmes. So far, a quarter of all the DIPECHO projects worldwide have been conducted in Southeast Asia. The general scope of ECHO support goes beyond natural catastrophes. It involves medical and food aid, and other forms of aid that alleviate the plight of people after man-made crises. For example, the case of the refugee camps along the Myanmar-Thailand border would be such an instance of assistance.

In the context of natural disasters, it is difficult to distinguish between sudden-onset natural catastrophes and actual man-made disasters. Globalisation and industrialisation have increased and triggered new vulnerabilities aggravating and complicating the onset and impact of natural disasters. Some examples are environmental degradation, migration to urban centres, and new and extensive types of plantations resulting in a higher vulnerability of societies to weather phenomena.
The dividing lines between man-made and natural disasters are fading and many NTS challenges are correlated.

Tackling natural disasters in Southeast Asia requires a comprehensive and cross-sectorial approach. In Southeast Asia, risk reduction is linked to poverty reduction, in particular. Given the multi-sectorial impact of natural disasters, ECHO encourages complementing strategies from other units of the European Commission. This implies the coordination with the various Directorate Generals (DG), including DG Environment, DG Development or DG for External Relations (RELEX). ECHO is an apolitical instrument that is highly compatible with the logic of appropriateness in managing NTS threats. However, by coordinating with the various DGs, some political objectives may sneak in. Furthermore, the fact that ECHO missions may involve experts that have a European bias and approach to their work could also moderate the normative motivations and outcomes behind ECHO's actions.

2.4.4 Development Cooperation Instrument

The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) is an important mechanism to provide long-term financial assistance to developing ASEAN countries. It is the new legal basis for specific EU-Asia development cooperation and sets out geographic, global and thematic programmes. The programmes consist of the following themes: the environment and the sustainable management of natural resources, non-state actors and local authorities, the improvement of food security, and cooperation in the area of migration and asylum. The programmes exclude the industrialised ASEAN states of Brunei and Singapore.

On 18 December 2006, with Regulation No. 1905/2006, DCI was introduced by the European Commission to replace the Asia and Latin America regulation. Since then it provided an alternative financial instrument for the European Commission to achieve the MDGs. In the context of Southeast Asia, this instrument contributes to the overall funding of the regional integration initiatives by the EU. These are in accordance with the Regional Strategy Paper for EU-Asia Cooperation (2007-2013) with third regions. This document outlines that “[t]he EU’s Multi-annual Indicative Programme has earmarked € 40 million to be spent on activities related to EU-ASEAN co-operation from 2007 to 2010” (European Commission, 2009). The strategy sets out three priority areas for co-operation: regional capacity-building and region-to-region dialogue, statistical capacity building, and immigration and border
management. This instrument also enhances the EU’s actorness, but through a developmental lens. Furthermore, it strengthens the interregional approach and thus, the EU as a normative actor. It transfers norms and acts as a source of inspiration for regional integration for some regional organisations, which imitate as well as voluntarily accept the EU’s export of its norms.

The previous paragraphs have demonstrated that the EU has managed to cast its feathers and outgrow the American security architecture of the Cold War period. In a short amount of time, it was able to create a comprehensive toolkit to address the security and NTS issues in the world. Through the intergovernmental CSDP, the EU developed military muscle for both civilian and strategic purposes. ECHO and DCI are supranational instruments that link to stability and security in the world, however, they are described as developmental and humanitarian tools. The security-development nexus is also applicable to the IfS to some extent. While it assists in the long-term development goals of a country, it encroaches upon the intergovernmental competences of the member states in the realm of security. The European Commission’s competence is extended and involves the actual deployment of staff. However, the Council can still thwart these IfS activities, if it does not agree with the deployment. These are the primary tools of the EU to address the broad range of NTS threats as a collective actor. The discussion has shown that they have varying degrees of normative implications, which will be discussed in greater detail in the following empirical case studies.

**Conclusions**

This chapter has presented the channels of communication, central assumptions of EU security/NTS thinking towards Southeast Asia and the main instruments for NTS challenges. Some of the problems that have become apparent within the channels of communication are the bilateral versus multilateral debate on the EU as a normative actor, Myanmar and the power asymmetry between the traditional conception of a donor and recipient region. The ASEAN-EU dialogue is the oldest and provides a stronger basis for substantive action through interregional instruments like READI, TREATI and APRIS. The ARF and ASEM are relatively young and preoccupied with confidence- and trust-building. Disaster relief and emergency response appear to be the only areas that allow deeper cooperation within all of the three fora.
The chapter outlined that in a new global security environment of NTS issues, regional stability complements national stability and is contingent on international security. This is expressed in the ESS and the revised version of 2008. Although Southeast Asia is mainly seen through a developmental lens, the recent years have shown that the development-security nexus is playing a greater role in the EU’s external relations. In fact, the EU and its member states consider their development and humanitarian contributions to Southeast Asia as important avenues to stabilise Southeast Asia. The EU as a collective actor can draw upon a wide range of intergovernmental, supranational, humanitarian, developmental, and military instruments to address the NTS challenges in a short-term and long-term manner.

The EU poses an alternative security actor to other external actors in the region in three ways. Firstly, its lack of a strategic presence and mindset make the EU a good mediator. Even the bigger member states are not considered as security actors in Southeast Asia, although they contribute considerably to the arms build-up in the region. Secondly, due to its non-intrusive approach, ‘soft’ security qualities, and civilian capabilities, it is an appealing actor to ASEAN in regard to peace-keeping and disaster relief. These are areas which need to be further explored by the two sides. Finally, it is an actor that possesses a high amount of capabilities and financial resources to address the NTS challenges adequately and effectively.
Part II
The Case Studies
The preceding chapters have outlined the theoretical framework and empirical context of the thesis. They have defined the central concepts and illustrated the parameters that assist in verifying the hypothesis. In the beginning, I hypothesised that instances of transnational and unconventional security crises will enable us to identify the EU as an actor more clearly, but jeopardise traditional conceptions of the EU as a normative actor in world affairs. It was further explained in the following chapters that this hypothesis stems from two primary effects of crises that clarify behavioural distinctions. Firstly, the severe scale of human plight generally triggers immediate and altruistic actions. Secondly, crises which involve a high degree of construction by policy-makers or securitisation normally provide a clearer assessment of interest-oriented behaviour of international actors.

The next chapters will elaborate on specific sectors of governance that have experienced crises and vulnerabilities. In reference to the Introduction, these case studies are the AFC, the severe case of the haze in 1997 and forest governance, the Bali bombings of October 2002 and the political conflict in Aceh. The case studies are analysed according to the following scheme as already presented in Chapter 1:

Part 1
- What impact did the crises/challenges have in Southeast Asia (including allusions to the major assistance providers)?
- Who are the security referents?

Part 2
- What is the probability of contagion to Europe and what are the threat perceptions and crisis interpretations?
- What was the EU’s interaction with Southeast Asia (within ASEAN-EU, ASEM and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF))? 

Part 3
- What was the EU’s normative agenda and how did it translate? (including the sub-question: To what extent did the EU draw upon the interregional dimension in its interaction with ASEAN?)
Chapter 3

The EU and the Asian Financial Crisis

The following paragraphs will focus on the AFC to discuss the EU’s actorness and identify the EU as a normative actor in Southeast Asia. The discussion of this event is integral to our understanding of the EU’s NTS opportunity in Southeast Asia, since this crisis sparked greater regional cooperation and provided an erosive impact on the rigid principle of non-interference. To gauge EU actorness in relation to NTS in Southeast Asia adequately requires an examination that begins with the crisis that shaped the emergence of the NTS debate in the region.

3.1 Outline of the Asian Financial Crisis

From June 1997 onwards, the stock markets of the ASEAN member states were melting down and increased capital flight took place. The banking and financial sectors of these countries were insufficiently developed and the governments became overstrained with the tasks of resolving the crises of the financial markets, the real economy, and the human plight. The AFC stemmed from a variety of causes, which were, inter alia, currency speculation and volatile and unregulated capital flows that led to a shortage of foreign exchange. Having experienced three decades of unprecedented growth, many ASEAN states were left unprepared for the risks of the financial markets.

The main external assistance provider was the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It stepped in as the stabiliser of the international monetary system, assisting the affected Asian countries in containing the AFC. Many Asian states were sceptical about the IMF’s involvement. At the Group of 7 (G7)-IMF Summit from 24-25 September 1997 in Hong Kong, Japan even suggested the creation of an Asian Monetary Fund to resolve the AFC. This controversial proposal was vehemently opposed by the US Treasury and the other Western IMF members (Lipscy, 2003). One of the G7 representatives involved in the meeting in Manila, where Japan’s proposal was dismissed, stated that the overall Asian perception of the IMF was exaggerated and that the objective of the IMF is
to raise the standard of living and welfare of the IMF member states.... Because the Asians who advocated the Asian Monetary Fund, particularly, the Japanese wanted to avoid IMF conditionality and, in my view and the view of the G7 including the four European countries, conditionality is important when a country gets IMF resources... The Asian Monetary Fund would have been a way out, avoid conditionality but take money and not fix the problem. (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008)

On the Southeast Asian side, the predominant popular perception was opposed to this position. One Asian scholar said that “we do not only need to rely on the IMF or World Bank in case of financial turmoil. And during the 1997 financial crisis what ASEAN countries learnt is that the IMF and the World Bank are not really our friends because they compel the banks to impose some regulation[s] that hurt people” (Interview with Asian Think Tank representative, 10 November 2008). Thailand and Indonesia were among the worst-affected ASEAN member states that were supported by the “unloved” IMF packages (Interview with Asian Think Tank representative, 10 November 2008). These rescue packages comprised funds and loans and linked to conditionality. Thailand and Indonesia also experienced political instabilities following the outbreak of the crisis. In both countries, the AFC enhanced political cleavages among the political elite. The devaluation of the currency and the rising prices of commodities in Indonesia led to demonstrations, violent clashes, and rampages by anti-Suharto protesters, resulting in hundreds of deaths in Jakarta. In Thailand, the cross-sectorial damage by the AFC hit the political arena and obliged Prime Minister Chaowalit Choonhavan to resign from his position. Both the state and society were the victims and, therefore the security referents of the crisis.

3.2 European Assistance
This section will delve into the European threat perceptions on the AFC and discuss the various types of European responses. The AFC has been analysed in numerous ASEAN-EU studies and discussions (Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation, 2000; Langhammer, 2001; Lee, 2000 and Alfredo C. Robles Jr., 2004). Even today, both European and East Asian scholars still disagree on whether it showed the EU’s true colours of a fair-weather friend, which is there only when it can benefit from the relationship. These accusations still echo in the heads of some Asians, who seem
unaware that there were EU member states which were indeed concerned when the AFC broke out.

The unfolding of the crisis showed that Asia’s problem affected Europe in many ways. There was a degree of *Schadenfreude* on the European side that the Asian Miracle was no longer miraculous (Higgott, 1998). However, Europe’s glee was short-lived. Firstly, there were fears that the outbreak was contagious and could impact the European financial markets. Secondly, there were fears that the loans given to some Asian states might never be paid back. So, how was the issue of contagion perceived and framed? What were the threat perceptions and crisis interpretations that allow us to trace the normative motivations?

The EU began to fear the spread of the AFC in light of the continual reporting Japanese bank failures, in particular. The rising interest rates and the downturn of the stocks in Moscow in mid-January of 1998 also contributed to the growing concerns of many European financial experts. They were concerned that the crisis could become a global crisis. This fear was not shared equally across Western Europe. For example, in January 1998, the European Commission President, Jacques Santer, downplayed the impact of the AFC on the EU (Bridges, 1999; Alfredo C. Robles Jr., 2008). In June 1998, Germany’s Minister of Economic Affairs, Günter Rexrodt, defused speculations of a global financial crash. He expressed his faith in the IMF and said that the situation was under control (Follath and Wagner, 22 June 1998). By contrast, the chief economist of the Deutsche Bank, Norbert Walter, warned that the West had so far underestimated the AFC (Follath and Wagner, 22 June 1998).

In fact, European exporters were already feeling the pressure. The employment rates decreased and the profit of many of the European exporting companies sunk. Once the Yen fell below its lowest point of the past seven years, the reactions rapidly changed to become more negative across the EU. At the European Council meeting from 15-16 June 1998 in Cardiff, the AFC was an important topic. It was discussed as a threat to the European markets and to be closely monitored. This was necessary in order to protect the European economies as well as ensure a successful introduction of the Euro on 1 January 1999 (Presidency of the European Council, 1998). At the meeting, the host, Tony Blair, even spoke of the AFC as the greatest threat for the global economy in the last 20 years (Blustein and Richburg, 16 June 1998).
The EU’s interpretation and perceptions of the crisis and, consequently, its assistance to Southeast Asia were dependent on the degree of interdependence and contagion. Prior to the AFC, the EU constructed the image of Asia as the greatest opportunity for European investors and companies. For example, Germany supported this image and loaned approximately DM\textsuperscript{17} 16 billion to Indonesia. During the AFC, Germany actively engaged in diplomacy with Indonesia to recover some of its loans. Despite great concerns about the repayment of the loans, Germany continued with technical assistance in the financial sector (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008). The successful cooperation with Indonesia on the new central bank law in the early 1990s contributed to Germany’s continual support (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008).

The interdependence caused problems for Germany and explained Germany’s activism to regain its loans. However, this example further shows that the negative impacts in one area did not lead to an overall German reaction that was solely based on the logic of consequentiality. Germany’s overall long-term assistance to Indonesia did not depend on the issue of the loans. This suggests that many areas of cooperation function independent from each other and that short-term benefit calculations cannot thwart the longstanding development cooperation. Thus, an international actor’s actions are not driven by one single underlying logic, and the logic of consequentiality and appropriateness can co-exist in the external relations of an actor.

Amidst the AFC, the technical assistance did not cease, but, the idea that Asia was an investment opportunity evaporated. The EU was relieved that not many companies had followed its ‘Go East’ slogan. It supported the IMF in containing the spread, although some members criticised the IMF and called for a new Bretton Woods system (Siemens, 14 November 2008). Initially, the European perceptions displayed a mixed picture on the AFC. In the beginning of the crisis, it was portrayed as a threat only by some European political and business elites, as exemplified above. With greater unfolding of the crisis, the threat perceptions grew and it was understood across Europe that the EU needed to act to safeguard its economy.

The AFC was a socio-economic threat for the EU and therefore, the EU member states provided substantial material help. As Julie Gilson described,

\textsuperscript{17} Deutsch Mark
Governmental attempts were made to address a number of problems resulting from the crisis. The EU pledged bilaterally US$5.9 billion to the Republic of Korea’s second line of defence (compared with US$10 billion from Japan and $5 billion from the US), in addition to the bilateral technical assistance offered by some EU member states. Meanwhile, private European banks also rolled over some of their short-term credits. On one side, Asian participants recognised the need for European investment and funds to help trade relations between Europe and East Asia redress the economic chaos and to keep European markets open to Asian goods,.... On the other, the EU recognised long-term benefits in aiding the Asian recovery. Since Asian borrowers were still paying off the estimated US$365 billion they owed to European banks (as of June 1997, and compared with US$275 billion for Japan and US$45 billion for the US), there was a need to recoup European investment. (Gilson, 2004: 193-94)

Gilson’s description is in line with the example of Germany and Indonesia and clearly suggests cost-benefit calculations behind the EU’s actions.

The trade barriers were not raised and large amounts of financial assistance were made available by individual EU member states. This financial support was mostly channelled to Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia under the auspices of the IMF. The EU member states allocated approximately US$ 154 million in total to the international financial institutions (Brittan, 1999: 492). This amount was second to Japan’s contribution of about 20% of the total budget.

In the dialogue framework of ASEM, the ASEM Asia Financial Crisis Response Trust Fund or, in brief, the ASEM Trust Fund (ATF) and the European Financial Expertise Network (EFEX) were immediate structures created at ASEM 2 in response to the AFC. The ATF was administered by the World Bank. The EU and the World Bank placed importance on country ownership and met with the recipients on a regular six-month basis to design country-tailored programmes.

The ATF started in the summer of 1998 with ATF 1 to provide help for immediate social and financial recovery. ATF 1 closed at the end of 2002 and gave way to ATF 2. The latter was more long-term oriented and phased out in 2006. ATF 1 had a total of US$ 47.5 million at its disposal and this amount was disbursed to 71 projects in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines (World Bank, 2003: ii). South Korea and China also received benefits from this scheme. Beyond the country programmes, ATF 1 also included eight multi-country or regional approaches that totalled US$ 4.7 million (World Bank, 2003: viii). Five of these
projects aimed to help the social sector. The other three were designed to aid the financial and corporate sector.

The AFC affected the ASEAN member states differently. Thus, the region-to-region approach was a secondary means mainly aimed at strengthening the regional integrative dynamics. The EU is interested in supporting and shaping other regional organisations due to a variety of reasons, of which some of the main motivations presented by Söderbaum have been discussed in the Introduction.

The following figures illustrate the percentage of financial support given to the individual states and the region through ATF 1 and 2.

**Figure 1: ATF 1 Recipients**

![Figure 1: ATF 1 Recipients](image1)

*Data Source: Asian Financial Crisis Response Fund 1 Completion Report (2003)*

**Figure 2: ATF 2 Recipients**

![Figure 2: ATF 2 Recipients](image2)

*Data Source: Financial Crisis Response Trust Fund Report 2 (2007)*
The EU rated the projects as a success, because they met the “initial objectives, [produced] a substantial body of materials and [conducted] important learning workshops” (World Bank, 2003: 26). The ATF projects were flexible and depended on the priorities of the countries of ownership. This format increased the chances of success and guarded against unanticipated problems within the recipients. Finally, the regional programmes strengthened the role of the ASEAN Secretariat. For example, the project Forming Shared Regional Views on Economic Prospects (TF022371) looked at regional information sharing and development analyses to advocate a greater role for the ASEAN Secretariat in regional monitoring and surveillance. It supported the regional bodies in balancing the interests of the member states. With this project, ASEAN started to consider creating a permanent monitoring and policy review facility within the Secretariat (World Bank, 2003: 27). Southeast Asia was given merely seven regional projects and the allocated amount to the regional projects was comparatively minimal as shown in Figures 1 and 2. While the AFC was the main catalyst for regional integration in this area, the regional projects supported by the ATF acted as additional stimuli.

The European Commission also initiated EFEX to provide a network and database of European and Asian financial experts who can be consulted and employed for the implementation of projects concerning the AFC. This initiative was adopted at ASEM 2 and was put under the responsibility of DG Markt. It became fully operational in January 1999, but phased out shortly after, because of lack of interest. The following European Commission communication describes the purposes of EFEX.

The main objective of this network is to increase both the quantity and quality of advice provided by European experts to Asian countries seeking to restructure their financial sector. The Commission has set up a “clearing house” to manage EFEX. The network will be open to all private and public financial sector experts with the experience required in Asia. When the network is established the clearing house will act as a “marriage broker” by finding the right experts to be assigned to the different approved technical assistance projects. Requests may come directly from Asian countries or through international financial institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank and private sector operators. Experts should be available to advise their counterparts in Asia on all topics relevant for the financial sector. (European Commission, 1998)
This clearly shows, firstly, that Southeast Asian countries are reluctant to draw overly upon foreign expertise in restructuring the financial sector. Secondly, EFEX divided the relationship into executive-recipient relations and thus, lacked appeal to a region already deeply suspicious of foreign assistance. While the intentions of this project were commendable, it displayed a strong European perception of Southeast Asia’s needs and evidently this did not persuade the sovereign ASEAN countries. By believing that the EU knows what is best for Southeast Asia, the EU acted as a normative actor lacks appeal to Southeast Asia.

The third response launched by the ASEM members at the London summit was the ASEM Trade and Investment Pledge. This pledge was to assure that the ASEM participants would not succumb to protectionist measures and keep their markets open. Former Vice-President Sir Leon Brittan of the European Commission even claimed that this interregional pledge “set the tone for the response of other fora to the crisis – for example, in the G7 and the [World Trade Organisation (WTO)]” (Brittan, 1999: 492). ASEM participants are also members of other international fora, where they meet and refer to ASEM discussions. ASEM’s role in coordinating a common stance and perspective on the AFC was important in the interregional context and undoubtedly helped facilitate the later discussion on the higher multilateral plains. However, Brittan’s claim of ASEM being an active vehicle in shaping and streamlining the issue-specific discourse on the international level lacks clear evidence.

Additionally, this pledge, to some extent, confirmed Asian suspicion about the EU’s motivations. The EU and its member states as trading partners also greatly benefited from the non-protectionist measures and the continual market liberalisation in Southeast Asia. The pledge helped push the trade between the both sides and facilitated the recovery. The EU seems to have acted like a normative actor, but, in fact, it can also be accused of acting in its own interest. This example demonstrates that solidarity is not the only calculus, and that self-protection and preservation are closely linked notions driving EU interaction with Southeast Asia. Expressions of solidarity appear to be a method for framing economic interests. This example showed that the interests were framed in an altruist manner. It displayed that interests and normative objectives can be intertwined or used instrumentally to reinforce each other. Thus, the motivation of action is not necessarily in line with the logic of appropriateness, although the EU’s behaviour is framed in this manner.
The EU and its member states have formulated and developed a variety of responses to assist Southeast Asia. So far, the evidence has suggested the EU to be a significant financial donor. The ATF 1 and 2 region-to-region projects, as well as the funds channelled through the IMF, suggest the opportunity of some normative influence within Southeast Asia. So far, the EU’s actorness in this chapter has been described on the basis of the threat perceptions and activities. The implementation of the activities was not necessarily carried out by the EU.

The objective of the hypothesis was to better understand the EU as a normative actor. This has been difficult to establish, since, for example, interdependence complicates the identification of clear-cut motivations. The preceding paragraphs showed how economic interests were framed by the rhetoric of solidarity. We can distinguish between two phases of EU actorness in the aftermath of the AFC. The early phase was characterised by diffuse threat perceptions and Schadenfreude. Since the initial outbreak was localised, the EU and its member states were unaffected and not alarmed, and so, the immediate assistance through the IMF appeared in a normative light. This suggests the logic of appropriateness and consistency with the EU’s primacy of multilateralism. Furthermore, it emphasises the exogenous ideational factors that shape the behaviour of international actors, as presented by Jepperson and colleagues on page 43. The international realm is value-laden and the EU will comply and act according to the norms of international institutions and assist other regions.

The pledge was conceived at a later stage, when the European markets were more affected. It seems that the logic of consequentiality underpinned the activities within the pledge. This logic suggests the dependency on the degree of contagion or interdependence, as exemplified through the case of the German loans and Germany’s unilateral activism in Indonesia in 1998.

In order to measure up to the pledge, the second ASEM summit initiated the Trade Facilitation Action Plan (TFAP) and the Investment Promotion Action Plan (IPAP). These aimed at deepening the interregional economic and financial cooperation. They were designed to reduce trade barriers and promote investment. These institutional innovations have been the umbrella for a multitude of trade- and investment-related seminars and working groups, including the Investment Experts Group or the Working Group on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures. While they
facilitate information exchange and confidence-building, they have been primarily designed to serve economic interests.

Despite the pledge, in the following two years, the foreign direct investment (FDI) figures between the two sides shrunk, before they regained volume. Furthermore, Gilson criticised,

While both of these initiatives were intended to offer a flagship policy for ASEM, they, too, have suffered from the broader problem of sustaining interest among participants of the ASEM process as a whole. This is in part due to the ways in which business activities function independently of regional and political structures, and in part due to the very loose framework of ASEM, which imposes no strict regime of accountability. (Gilson, 2004: 190-91)

While Gilson argued that TFAP and IPAP lacked momentum, because of ASEM’s soft institutions and the independent dynamic of Asia-Europe trade beyond ASEM, I would add that Southeast Asia was not interested in a solution that was primarily designed by Europeans. Although Southeast Asian interests were accounted for, TFAP and IPAP imply an EU-design and sense of superiority within the EU’s external relations. Similarly to EFEX, they therefore failed to sustain Asian interests. Arguably, even if stronger institutions were created, this may mitigate the problem of low interest among the participants, but it would not increase the contingency between business activities and ASEM structures. As Gilson indicated, this may be circumvented if some form of free trade regime was linked to the ASEM process. The following paragraph will take a closer look at the specific dialogue on financial matters within ASEM.

The AFC gave the ASEM Finance Ministers’ Meeting (ASEM FinMM) a limelight position in enhancing the interregional dialogue and cooperation in the financial sector. The first meeting clearly showed how ASEM FinMM echoes the various global fora. In this meeting, it was “agreed that it would be useful to schedule the meetings of ASEM Finance Deputies to discuss international financial issues raised in other monetary and financial fora” (ASEM Finance Ministers, 1997: para. 18). The first meeting did not coherently link between the internal and external developments. Rather, it emulated the agenda of the international fora without any local contextualisation. The ASEM FinMM process was launched prior to the AFC. In the aftermath of the crisis, it assumed greater pertinence.
The ASEM FinMMs discuss a broad range of issues that cut across sectors and range from the volatility of oil prices to the WTO and anti-money laundering. Accordingly, the AFC was one out of many issues that received special attention. It was mainly discussed at ASEM FinMM 2 on 15 February 1999. At this meeting, Japan and China committed to concrete efforts and declared they would provide substantial financial support in assisting the crisis-affected states in the region. Among other aspects the participating finance ministers “agreed to deepen the exchange of views among ASEM partners concerning the international financial architecture” (ASEM Finance Ministers, 1999: para. 7).

After the AFC, ASEM FinMM also initiated long-term projects for financial development, including the ASEM Public Debt Management Forum, the Kobe Research Project\(^{18}\) (both in 2001), Bali Initiative, the Symposium on combating underground banking and supervising alternate remittance systems (both in 2003) and the Tianjin Initiative on Closer Economic and Financial Cooperation. The Tianjin Initiative acknowledged the various dialogue-based efforts and called for a stronger action-oriented focus of the forum. It specifically addressed the creation of the ASEM YES (Yen-Euro-Dollar) Bond Market, and the ASEM Bond Fund. These long-term measures appear in line with the normative mode of action. They serve immediate interests marginally and, first and foremost, they are designed to strengthen the relationship between the both sides. The Tianjin Initiative further called for the

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\(^{18}\) At the third ASEM FMM the Kobe Research Project was adopted. It aimed to facilitate interregional research cooperation on macroeconomic and financial issues through knowledge collaboration, exchange, analysis and collection of information gained through regional experiences; by creating a network of expertise among ASEM policymakers and think tanks; and by making policy suggestions to the ASEM Track I members. Similarly to ATF 2, this project belongs to an interregional response to the AFC targeting the long-term and sustainable development of the financial sector. It is an interregional initiative of the second phase after the first phase consisting of fire-fighting responses has been completed.

The goal of the initiatives of the second phase is to sustain the post-crisis development through reforms. The Kobe Research Project comprises research projects conducted by the Asian Development Bank, the IMF, the European Central Bank and individual ASEM member states under the following headings: Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging East Asian and EU Accession Countries, Currency regimes: The European Experience and Implication for East Asia, Strengthening Financial Cooperation and Surveillance, Enhancing Regional Monitoring and Integration: Instruments, Steps, and Sequencing, The European and Asian Financial Systems in Perspective: The Cases of Spain and China, China in a Regional Monetary Framework, and Banking Sector Reform and Capital Market Development. These national and regional case studies serve to show best practices that can be introduced to avoid certain problems from occurring or recurring. Although the project is designed to be a platform for sharing research results and experience, it is suspiciously dominated by pro-regional integration jargon on the European side. This glorification is abetted by the fact that the Asian counterpart model had failed. However, if there was to be a re-launch of the Kobe Research Project now there might be a change in tone on the European side of what East Asia should do. Despite the tendency of the European side to extol its experience, this project enables the Asian side to better understand regional integration.

The research papers that were presented then stressed the success of the European monetary and financial integration on the one hand. On the other hand, they also advised East Asia to learn from the European experience and adopt best practices from international declarations, including the Basel Core Principles.
establishment of the ASEM Contingency Dialogue Mechanism for Emergent Economic and Financial Events to address the financial and economic insecurity after natural disasters. This mechanism supports the relief and reconstruction efforts and allows a timely launch of these. While it progressively links between different sectors of governance, it has not been implemented so far.

Following the AFC, ASEM FinMMs sought to link better between global and regional issues. This was explicitly articulated at ASEM FinMM 5. More recent initiatives within the ASEM FinMM process reflect this understanding. In fact, it seems that there are emerging chances of establishing a distinct sector-specific interregional layer that could serve as a clearing house layer for the international fora (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). For example, in the case of the quota misrepresentation of emerging economies and some other states in the Bretton Woods system, the IMF had two years to reform the quota system.

Within the IMF the members met every six months, but they could not reach an agreement. So, by September 2006, after two years, they had to find a consensus and they finally managed to do so. In the opinion of a DG Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN) official, this was mainly because half of the world met within the ASEM framework from 8-9 April 2006 and had this additional opportunity to exchange views on the problem (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). The consensus was not necessarily found within the ASEM framework since the “so-called other part of the world was missing” (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). Nevertheless, it facilitated the consensus-building process on the international level, since the two big groups of players of the Bretton Woods system had already discussed and created a basis for the pursuant agreement at the IMF.

The majority of the ASEM initiatives appear to be along the lines of information exchange. There is a learning experience both ways, however, it is obviously the EU’s practices that are viewed as the benchmark (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). The Asian side takes a completely different approach to regional economic and financial integration and thus, according to an ECFIN official, “it is also quite interesting for the European side to hear” the Southeast Asian perspective (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). This “learning” by the Europeans is not necessarily about what the Asian side is doing, as this is “limited” and the dialogue partners are usually informed about each other’s measures (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). It is rather “a little bit knowing about the new measures
and what they have got in the pipeline...and then it is learning why they are not doing more, what their concerns are and what they aim to achieve realistically” (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). This suggests that ASEM itself is a normative tool. It is a mechanism to improve better understanding between the counterparts.

When the EU shares its experience or gives advice, it is also attempting to move Asian integration towards a direction it likes and serves Europe (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). The ECFIN official explained,

I think so in a way. It is not so much about defending Europe [but] trying to shape what is going on at the global level in a way that is either more favourable, but also already underway in Europe [and] convincing Asia through ASEM that what Europe is doing is good. (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009)

This is clear evidence of a European normative agenda intertwined with long-term economic and political interests of the EU. It suggests that, even within putatively technical sectors of cooperation, the EU will try to promote norms as a means to achieve its objectives in the wider world. The question here is, whether a matter that is ‘good’ for everyone to see as ‘good’ does necessarily need “convincing Asia” to be accepted as ‘good’ by the counterpart (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). The ECFIN official further stated,

In terms of concrete action, so, you don’t really have concrete action and I would probably [say that this is] good that with such an informal framework, people come, they discuss and they don’t have the pressure to come up with something veritable at the end of the day. (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009)

This is very important because even in the financial sector, which is, as indicated above, a very technical and less value-laden sector, there are ideological and structural differences. For example, the different types of national bureaucracies within Asia complicate and decelerate coordination and communication among themselves, as well as between Asia and Europe (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009).

Overall, the ECFIN official’s words suggest that the EU is a normative actor. However, this does not mean that it is not driven by the logic of consequentiality. In fact, here again, norms appear complementary to interests. In her view, the ASEM
FinMM dialogue and cooperation needs to be seen as a means to create lasting structures that are conducive to greater EU influence.

In light of the proposals for the agenda of the ASEM FinMM, the guiding motivations on the EU side seem to be based on a cost-benefit rationale that shows normative traces. The EU seeks to spread its norms and values and, at the same time, bring the Asian side into a constructive dialogue on issues that can interest both sides. The ECFIN official further argued that “while on our side, while we wanted cooperation. Cooperation in terms of, as we said, when we want to try that when we meet on the global level they are on our side and not on the US side....So it is less material[istic]” (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009).

One objective of the dialogue revolves around the content of the discussion. The second aim considers the dialogue itself as the end goal. It sees the dialogue as a channel to achieve political objectives. On the Southeast Asian side, there seems to be considerable interest in profiting economically and financially from the interaction with the richer European side (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). This can be observed in the proposals for the agenda. For example, the Southeast Asian side likes to propose Public-Private Partnerships, since these are an instance of where they can expect to receive EU financial support (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). This shows a divide between Asia and Europe in terms of economic and political interests. There is also a general ideological divide apparent, although another ECFIN official viewed this in a more differentiated manner.

He said that, “[t]here are differences in how Asians and Europeans address certain problems. Asians want to prepare very well and they are not very spontaneous as we know, except in the nightlife in Singapore” (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008). He added, “I don’t think one can say that the Europeans want to talk about a certain range of topics and the Asians want to talk about a certain range of topics” (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008). He added that the talks are in general driven by “country-based interests” and that the ideological split between Europe and Asia is not clear-cut (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008). The ECFIN official described the ASEM FinMMs as reflecting a broad agenda ranging from climate change to counter-terrorism. These issues have financial implications and primarily are an issue of enforcement. However, they do not clearly point to an ideological divide between Asia and Europe. He explained that
“on counterterrorism there might be a more systematic split; if there were weaknesses in enforcements of money-laundering, it was probably mainly on the Asian side” (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008). He further said that when the EU enlarged and weaker countries joined, systematic problems concerned with enforcement also became apparent on the European side (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008).

Based on his observations, there are certain practical preconditions underlying the Asia-Europe interactions, which do not necessarily suggest that the EU acts more normatively than Southeast Asia. He argued that, in his opinion, the different interests and actions stem from the difference in development and availability of resources and capacities. The first ECFIN official clearly observed differences in terms of the economic and normative interests, while the second official toned down the ideological differences. The first ECFIN official portrayed the EU as a normative actor in the sense that it was not solely driven by the logic of consequentiality and shared best practices that are associated with a specific ideational context. The second ECFIN official pointed to the different approaches, but argued that, in the end, both sides are interest-driven in light of the technical nature of the sector. Generally, the broad thematic spectrum of the ASEM FinMMs complicates a clear identification of the various types of motivations and modes of action.

The ASEM FinMMs lack focused action and cross-sectorial linkage. The cross-sectorial linkages are important, since the region is experiencing manifold vulnerabilities that affect multiple sectors of governance. The EU could enhance its actorness and its normative influence through these linkages by addressing individual sectors and the areas of overlap.\(^\text{19}\) Currently, this idea remains confined to a few examples. An example that has been previously discussed would be the ASEM Contingency Dialogue Mechanism for Emergent Economic and Financial Events.

So far, the chapter has displayed ASEM as a prominent channel of communication to discuss the AFC, whereas the ASEAN-EU dialogue was not used

\(^{19}\) From an NTS perspective, as advocated by this thesis, this linkage is an important development. However, it also rings alarm bells since the NTS view would imply securitisation of the financial realm. On the national level, several EU member states have provided such cross-sectorial technical assistance in the form of bilateral development aid with ASEAN member states. For instance, implementing non-state organisations, including the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit are involved in decentralisation projects with Indonesia. These projects target, among others, the auditing and distributive elements of the national and local financial systems of development assistance.
until the AFC was improving. The various AEMMs and JCCs were postponed, because of Maynamar’s accession in 1997. In the same year, the AFC broke out. The EU objected to Myanmar’s accession, while ASEAN rejected the outspokenness of the European side and viewed the EU’s rhetoric as interference into the internal affairs of Southeast Asia. The official communication was suspended and resumed at the AEMM in Vientiane on 11-12 December 2000. The joint declaration of Vientiane stated,

We welcomed the successful launch of the Euro in 1999, as well as the economic recovery that had taken place in ASEAN. We agreed on the importance of continued economic and financial reforms at the national level, and of global cooperation in the reform of the international financial architecture, for sustainable economic recovery and the prevention of a recurrence of the crisis. We recognised the economic dynamism of the two regional groupings and agreed that this reinforced the rationale for enhanced cooperation in all fields. (ASEAN and EU member states, 2000: para. 16)

This meeting did not come up with concrete plans of cooperation and assistance. However, it was a positive signal that promised “enhanced cooperation in all fields” (ASEAN-EU member states, 2000: para. 16). The meeting was held well after the low-point of the AFC. The essence of the AEMM statement above, as well as other AEMM and JCC communications following 1999, is that the EU showed solidarity towards the grave situation in the region. This solidarity appears to stem from an understanding of market interdependence. Similarly to the rhetoric within the ASEM framework, the various AEMM declarations suggest that the EU was interested to see Southeast Asia continue to liberalise in trade and investment in order for Europe to uphold its market interests. Within the JCC, the joint response from 1999 stated,

Both sides agreed to work together to meet the challenges raised by the recent economic crisis faced by ASEAN. The European side expressed its support to the ASEAN countries affected by the crisis, and was confident that ASEAN would emerge stronger from its present difficulties. In this respect, the [Commission] stated its willingness to maintain its contribution in the region to support ASEAN’s efforts in its economic recovery process. The [Commission] suggested priority actions on trade, investment and economic restructuring in response to the crisis. Both sides reaffirmed their commitments to further trade and investment liberalisation and to the multilateral trading system, and their determination to fight any protectionist pressures, which might arise from the crisis. The JCC stressed the importance of the European continued support and
assistance for ASEAN to effectively deal with the economic and financial crisis (ASEAN member states and European Commission, 1999: para. 3).

Here again, there was a strong commitment to counter protectionist measures. Overall, within the ASEAN-EU dialogue, the European engagement remained primarily declaratory and referred to other fora for guidance. On the one hand, this reflected the delicate situation after the clash on Myanmar. On the other hand, it proved to Southeast Asia that the EU was a fair-weather friend and that its engagement, in the aftermath of the AFC, was predominantly concerned with protecting the European economies through greater trade and investment, and fighting protectionist measures.

The two tracks of the ASEAN-EU relationship have not been a platform for tangible cooperation during the financial crisis. In the aftermath, they have been used as a platform for economic sweet-talk, as has taken place at the first ever ASEAN Economic Ministers and the European Trade Commissioner meeting on 6 October 2000. Nevertheless, these symbolic interactions are not to be underestimated. They reinforce the initiatives within the other fora the two sides meet. Within weak institutional frameworks, mutual trust and confidence are important in facilitating cooperation, particularly after a phase of silence or miscommunication.

Similarly to the ASEAN-EU dialogue, the ARF also displayed low European actorness in response to the AFC. Within the ARF framework, the AFC was considered an important security concern. It acted as a catalyst and strengthened the role of the ARF as a safeguard for regional stability. The EU as one of many dialogue partners within the ARF supported this view. According to the definition of actorness, the EU possesses minimal actorness capacity in the context of the ARF. This is because it was a dialogue partner and did not propose and initiate concrete AFC-related activities. The ARF only provided room for discussing the AFC. It did not seek to devise actual cooperative efforts. The following excerpt shows that the participants in the ARF Summit were highly concerned about the situation. However, in light of the nature of the ARF, it was also made clear that the members will only initiate actions when there is a spill-over into the peace and security of the region.
The Ministers discussed extensively the prevailing financial situation in the region. They were encouraged by initial signs of progress toward financial stability in the Asian region. The Ministers welcomed the various individual, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures that were undertaken to restore financial stability.[...]

The Ministers called for a balanced approach in addressing the socioeconomic impact of such reforms, particularly its impact on the less privileged sectors of society. They noted that certain aspects of the regional financial crisis could impact on the peace and security of the region and agreed that the ARF would have an important role to play in addressing these effects. The Ministers agreed that the current Asian economic difficulties should not undermine the process of ARF and other regional security dialogues and cooperation. (ARF member states, 1998: para. 11-12)

Consequently, the function of the institution confines the degree of actorness of the member states or dialogue partners. Thus, even if the EU felt more strongly about assisting the region through the ARF, there was no opportunity to express this within the ARF.

3.3 Summary of EU Actorness and the Normative Dimension

The preceding subchapters displayed that we can trace the EU’s actorness, in terms of activities, mainly within the frameworks of the IMF and ASEM. The ASEAN-EU relationship and the ARF did not provide significant evidence beyond the declaratory level. Beyond the various activities, the preceding subchapters also discussed the threat perceptions of the EU member states. The threat perceptions varied across Europe, but, overall, the EU and its member states perceived the crisis to be a threat. Some of them were immediately affected by the crisis in the form of loans and unemployment rates. Hence, Europe offered significant financial support to Asia through various channels. Overall, the financial contribution was only vaguely registered by the Southeast Asian side, since it was mainly channelled through other international actors.

The EU and its member states were important financial contributors and decision-makers within the IMF. However, they were not visible as actors to ASEAN in this context. According to the interviews, Southeast Asia viewed the IMF and the USA as the main actors. In the end, this proved to be useful for the EU to some extent, since the IMF’s conditionality-linked assistance was perceived negatively by the East Asian side. The conditionality of the IMF loans generated an increased distrust toward the USA and the Bretton Woods system. The overall perceptions of
the IMF and general Western assistance were viewed critically. The EU was accused of being a fair-weather friend, since its actorness seemed weak and was virtually invisible to the Southeast Asian side. Thus, action that was not in the interest of the affected as well as inaction were regarded as similarly adverse. As a consequence, actorness in relation to the European contributions to the IMF was generally not recognised by the sociological ‘other’.

By definition, the EU and its member states do not undermine the international institutions and benefit from the administrative burden-sharing. Although funds passed on to multilateral international donors may alleviate the EU’s workload, a recent study by Stephen Booth and Siân Herbert suggested that this practice may actually decrease the EU’s aid effectiveness (Booth and Herbert, 2011). They speak of a “wasteful chain of transfers” and that EU funds may be recycled up to three times among donors; this means administrative costs at each stage before they reach the recipients (Booth and Herbert, 2011: 12, 13).

The IMF is the appropriate multilateral financial institution to manage a transnational and global crisis in this sector. The EU is not interested in duplicating efforts and competing with the IMF, of which the EU states are members. When assistance is executed by an international institution with a set of issue-specific international standards, this appears to be a more effective method. Furthermore, the EU upholds multilateralism and circumvents the quarrels with third parties over the conditions of the implementation of the funds. The international institutions themselves sometimes put multilateralism into question. This was suggested in the example of the discussed Bretton Woods voting quotas.

The EU and its member states behave as committed members and adhere to the principle of multilateralism, because this also strengthens the EU’s international legitimacy. However, channelling financial assistance through the international institutions decreases the EU’s visibility as an actor. The sociological ‘other’ cannot perceive the EU as an actor, unless the IMF and other international institutions clearly flag the origin of the financial contributions. There is an actorness asymmetry in recognition. The EU is a payer, but does not appear as an actor. Although this is not a constitutive element in defining NTS actorness or actorness on NTS challenges – as explained in Chapter 1.2 –, it weakens the EU’s international standing.

Besides the financial contributions, the EU and its member states distinguished themselves as expertise providers in the various seminars and
initiatives related to the ASEM framework. Within ASEM, both the European Commission and the individual member states were active in proposing projects that targeted the long-term dimension of the financial sector and cooperation. ATF1 also included short-term fire-fighting activities and loans. However, within the ASEM framework, the EU’s main engagement seemed to focus on the long-term dimension and providing structural resilience of the financial sector.

Furthermore, there seemed to be an interest to create greater confidence between the two sides. Thus, the objective has been less to change the structural environment conditioned by the Bretton Woods system, but rather, to improve the situation on the operational level. The EU failed to enter into a constructive dialogue with the ASEAN side on reforming the Bretton Woods system. Thus, the EU also missed out on the possibility of mobilising ASEAN and Asian sympathies in order to have a bigger weight when pushing its case against the USA in the WTO and other multilateral fora.

Within the ASEAN-EU dialogue and the ARF, the interaction on the AFC has remained limited to the declaratory level. The historical burden of the ASEAN-EU relationship, being a donor-recipient interaction, does not exist in the rhetoric any longer. However, it still persists in the factual wealth distribution and in the heads of the Southeast Asians and Europeans. This implies that the Southeast Asian side will have certain financial expectations when interacting with the EU. One can argue that this perception has unconsciously become an integral element of the ASEAN-EU lifeworld.

In summary, the EU has shown its support to Southeast Asia during the AFC in many ways. Principally, this support was expressed in the form of declaratory speeches of solidarity and compassion. So far, the discussion suggests that the EU’s actorness was mainly based on aggregating interests and formulating policies. It seemed to be more like a presence than an actual actor. This is particularly said by the Southeast Asian side, who have called the EU a fair-weather friend. So, what does this imply for our research interest in the EU as a normative actor? How do we gauge the EU as a normative actor, when the criterion of recognition was limited detectable? Generally speaking, we can say that, there is always an inherent normative dimension involved in the EU’s actorness, or presence.

In the case of the AFC, the ideational context also played a role to some extent. It constituted the framework in which practices were embodied. These practices
were then shared with the Southeast Asian side. The EU and its member states did not directly link these practices to certain liberal-democratic conditions, although this is implied with the eventual transfer of practices. European proposals and initiatives can ultimately best function within specific cultural contexts. Thus, the EU as a normative actor in this case study is to some extent implicit and relates to the best practices of the EU.

Furthermore, the chapter has suggested that contagion and interdependence are key variables in determining the EU’s actorness as well as the EU as a normative actor. Through the example of Germany seeking to recover its loans from Indonesia, it was displayed that contagion and interdependence play the following roles. Firstly, they trigger threat perceptions and compel urgent actions. Urgent actions can be based both on the logic of consequentiality and logic of appropriateness. If the urgent actions are attached to threat perceptions and interdependence, they are based on the logic of consequentiality, although they may be framed by the logic of appropriateness. The EU’s actorness does not always follow the logic of appropriateness and its normative identity in a pure and distinct manner.

When the AFC broke out, the EU as an actor displayed mixed motivations. The EU member states channelled immediate funds through the IMF. This response builds on both the logic of appropriateness and consequentiality, given that in the early stages European states did not appear particularly concerned with regard to the spread of the crisis. At a later stage, as previously mentioned, some member states were concerned about getting their loans back once the AFC spread to certain countries that had received immense European financial support and were defaulting.

Furthermore, the treatment of this crisis among EU political decision-makers suggests that there was a fear that the crisis could spread to the European financial and real markets. This puts the EU’s actions in a rationalist light. A prospering ASEAN implies greater trade and market opportunities for the EU than a failing ASEAN. Despite this, many EU member states have been slow to react and the immediate funds channelled through the international financial institutions appeared to be for the purpose of helping ASEAN and complying with the international institutions. The early stages of the crisis suggest that self-protection from eventual contagion was not the primary motivation. This assumption is based on the initial
reaction of the European Commission and EU member state. Initially, they were not alarmed. Once the economic powerhouse Japan was hit, the AFC became more alarming and was perceived to be a threat.

However, the negative impact on the European economies was limited and the IMF was responsible in providing fire-fighting assistance. In this light, it appears appropriate that the EU was mainly concerned with long-term projects, including the various ASEM seminars for best-practice-sharing. They addressed the structural weaknesses of the financial sector and aimed to build confidence between the two sides. Despite the common argumentation by the EU that the dialogue and cooperation with Asia and ASEAN are about creating understanding, some instances post-AFC have suggested that the EU’s intentions are based on cost-benefit calculations.

William Kerr and colleagues argued that the trade and investment pledge can be interpreted as an EU attempt to hinder Southeast Asian protectionism and guarantee continual EU access to Asian markets (Kerr, Perdikis, and Yeung, 1999). Thus, as I already observed, Kerr and colleagues also believed that altruism was used as a frame for materialistic intentions. Since the pledge served both the short- and long-run, it delivered to immediate interests as well as long-term mutual benefits in the far future. Kerr and colleagues stated that by 1998, the EU increasingly realised that ASEM could serve as a vehicle for it to collectively gain better access to Asian markets (Kerr et al., 1999: 74). This case study argued that the EU had cleverly packaged interests in a normative frame. Kerr and colleagues also came to this conclusion and, furthermore, accused the EU to actively use Asia’s vulnerability to impose its will on the region. In their view the pledge is an emergency mechanism as well as an instrument of political strategy. From a Southeast Asian perspective, the international funds linked to the conditionality of the IMF loans provided an opportunity for the West to harness Southeast Asia’s economic potential. They aimed at “restructuring” the financial sector of some Southeast Asian countries (Interview with Asian Think Tank representative, 10 November 2008).

Furthermore, the activities related ASEM emphasised the importance of mutual understanding and learning. On the one hand, it was expressed that the European side takes an interest in understanding its counterpart and knowing what they have in the pipeline (Interview with EU official, 9 February 2009). On the other hand, the EU builds on its soft power and hopes that its engagement with Southeast Asia will
also persuade its counterpart accept European ideas and internalise them. Despite a certain degree of attractiveness, EU soft power appears less convincing than the American approach. This is because the financial system is primarily an American construction (Interview with Asian Think Tank representative, 10 November 2008). Although various long-term initiatives described above within the ASEM context showed that the EU sought normative influence, the EU did not manage to compete with American influence, backed by the ‘American’ Bretton Woods system.

Generally speaking, when the EU has had disagreements on financial and economic issues that were resolved in the various multilateral fora, the EU lacked allies against the USA. An EU official explained,

One example is, you may have heard about fair-value accounting....When this was negotiated the Europeans tried to stop that and we lost against the Americans. [...] if the Asians had been more outspoken, more involved in drawing this regulation, they also dislike short-termism, we could have won the argument maybe against the Americans[...]. It is not that we want to be anti-American, it is just natural for Europeans and for Asians to have a more longer term view. How that can be helpful than to make certain recommendations even before it gets to the question that you have more or less. Even those that you have can be more longer-term oriented or shorter-term oriented and there I think we should be great partners, the Asians and the Europeans....The objective is not to isolate or criticise or fingerpoint at the US. That is not the objective. But I think it could be a productive objective to just discover that Asia and Europe have many things in common[...]. [The Americans] will have a very important voice, they are the biggest economy in the world. But if Asia and Europe are convinced that their instincts are better in certain aspects they will have a good chance to outvote the US better than before. (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008)

This observation clearly illustrates the American dominance of the international financial system. In light of this, the hopes of EU officials that Asia, including the ASEAN member states, may become more outspoken, appears empirically unsubstantiated. While there may be some compatibility between the European and Asian sides, there are also compatibilities between the Asian and American sides. The AFC appears to be a missed opportunity for the Europeans in the sense that it did not consistently assist the Southeast Asian side in demanding a reform of the Bretton Woods system. The EU also shares a high degree of ideological commonality on international finance with the USA. Therefore, it had to carefully balance its interests. The AFC was not a grave concern for the EU and thus, the
AFC did not mobilise anti-Bretton Woods sentiments on the European side. Furthermore, it is understood that the main player of the game will “be more equal” than others (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008).

Nevertheless, should the EU and Asia share a common perspective on an issue in an international multilateral institution, “the chances are better than before that their economic importance” could influence the American stance on certain issues (Interview with EU official, 18 November 2008). So far, this remains speculative. The Euro-crisis and the ongoing global economic recession suggest that there is a lack of urgency on the Asian side to vocalise the need for a Bretton Woods II. An ASEAN member state official observed after the ASEM Summit of 2008,

Basically, because Asia needs to do trade with Europe and we do get quite a bit of trade surplus, as a consequence we need to keep this trade benefit going on. If Europe fails, we fail. If we don’t introduce measures to help Europe or at least to stabilise the financial crisis as a whole then we cannot trade with Europe. Our collective interest is in maintaining our trade relations with Europe and that is why we stand united. I think the most we got out of ASEM or even the bilateral meetings, or even the ASEAN or even the APT because they were held in conjunction, the most use we got out of it is we sent a message to the world that the leaders are taking this seriously to make sure the financial crisis is not getting out of hand but tangible outcomes you won’t expect that from ASEM because it is probably the loosest kind of institutionalised body that you could find....But to be honest I have been looking for something tangible that might come out of this. The closest thing is probably that EU and Asia have agreed to take this seriously and bring forward to the [Group of 20 (G20)] in summit in Washington....they weren’t in a position to come to concrete solutions. (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 2 November 2008)

Whether the GFC can account for a nascent interregional ASEAN-EU economic and financial community is highly questionable, given the different negative impacts of the crisis, institutional dispositions, and paradigms. Nevertheless, similarly to the AFC, the GFC poses an opportunity to reactivate the dialogue on financial markets and monetary systems between the ASEAN and the EU member states. However, the quotation from the ASEAN member state official indicates that the solutions won’t be found within ASEM. Furthermore, the compatibilities, mentioned by the EU official on the previous page, do not seem to be playing a role on the global level. Both the EU and ASEAN clearly expressed the guiding solutions to be found on the international level, namely in the form of the
Thus, the ASEAN-EU interaction on the GFC may re-activate the dialogue, but it does not seem to offer an avenue for active problem-solving of the GFC.

Overall, the case study has shown that interregionalism has not been the prominent avenue of tangible interaction. It was important for the purpose of declaring solidarity, best-practice-sharing and confidence-building. There were also regional projects funded by the ATF. They supported regional cohesion within ASEAN, but did not actively draw upon the European experience. Thus, the region-to-region approach within the ATF was only normative in the sense that it was mainly driven by the logic of appropriateness.

The interregional responses that involved region-to-region norm transfers were restricted from the outset, because of the temporally and spatially uneven affectedness of the ASEAN states. Additionally, the ASEAN Secretariat did and does not possess the capacity to coordinate and channel vast amounts of region-to-region assistance. Furthermore, in light of the Myanmar crisis, the ASEAN-EU level of dialogue was purposely avoided as a dialogue platform. The crisis was not severe or threatening enough for the EU to disregard the cultural clash and re-activate the interaction. It also displayed the lack of commonalities and interregional institutions to moderate the impact when the normative dimensions collide. Conclusively, the region-to-region approach did not hold a unique normative role. In fact, in light of the EU's advanced economic and financial integration, it would have been expected that the EU would show greater ambition to influence the restructuring of the Southeast Asian financial markets in the aftermath of the AFC.

Conclusions

The chapter has emphasised the EU as a financial assistance and expertise provider. The EU's actorness was not always clearly identifiable and heavily relied on the activities initiated within the ASEM framework. There was sporadic evidence of the EU as a normative actor. In fact, the possibility of contagion and the negative impact of the AFC on the real economies, suggested that the European initiatives have used the logic of appropriateness as a frame to protect the EU's interests. The AFC has shown that the EU's responses included self-interest.

In the early days of the AFC, the European strategy seemed to involve the logic of appropriateness to a greater extent, as evident through the financial assistance channelled through the IMF. However, there is a fine line between altruism and
altruism used strategically as a frame for interests. These altruisms are sometimes difficult to distinguish and it seems that the EU and its member states use the second form of altruism in cases, where NTS threats could be contagious or the EU sees an opportunity to strategise the vulnerability of the counterpart for its political objectives. In a way, we can employ the concept of rhetorical action, since the EU has used values and morality to strategically achieve its own economic interests.

EU actorness was motivated by mixed rationales and targeted both the short- and long-term dimensions. The EU could be described as a normative actor to some extent, since it was motivated by the logic of appropriateness to varying degrees and since it did seek to diffuse its norms. The AFC acted as a trigger for enhanced interaction, but it lacked the salience to stimulate greater EU actorness in a normative manner. The chapter revealed that the EU shared a range of normative commonalities with Southeast Asia. However, the EU failed to seize the opportunity that the AFC provided to form a coalition with ASEAN and demand reforms of the Bretton Woods system. The AFC did not trigger change of the systemic reality of the sector.

Instead, the EU’s actorness in relation to the AFC seemed to focus on providing support that improved the national dimension. The EU as a normative actor in terms of actual influence was difficult to quantify and hence, actorness in this chapter mainly revolved around the threat perceptions, activities, and motivations of the EU and its member states. These were minimally linked to the interregional level. Based on this, we can assume that crisis interpretations and threat perceptions between the two sides, currently, virtually completely refer to the ‘self’s’ normative foundation. Therefore, there is a lack of an interregional ideational background to support a stronger EU normative influence by default.
Chapter 4

EU Actorness on the Haze and Forest Governance

This chapter examines the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor through the study of the land and forest fires in Indonesia, the resulting smoke of these fires, dubbed ‘haze’, and forest governance in Southeast Asia. Prominently, the EU holds the image of a global advocate for the environment (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006a; Vogler, 1999; Wurzel, 2008). The examples within this chapter will contribute to our understanding of this image. They will elaborate on the activities of the EU and its member states in tackling the haze and issues of governance pertinent to the forestry sector in Indonesia. Both issue areas are correlated, since the EU’s influence within the forestry sector creates conditions that indirectly mitigate the causes of the haze.

The first section discusses the case of the haze and the regional integrative efforts of ASEAN to mitigate the recurrence of this smoke blanket. The inclusion of ASEAN’s regional integration into the discussion slightly deviates from the general scheme of enquiry, as is outlined in the Introduction and at the beginning of Part II. However, this discussion is useful, because it helps us understand why the EU and its member states could not contribute more to this integration process. It ties into the discussion on the different normative foundations of regional integration that limit the EU as a normative actor. The second subchapter highlights how the EU has reacted and employed its tools in regard to this environmental concern. The case of forest governance is discussed in the second part of Subchapter 4.2 in relation to the EU’s actorness.

In contrast to the case of the AFC, this chapter discusses NTS issues that do not have a sudden onset and a high degree of contagion. Despite the non-existence of contagion and threat perceptions, I argue that the EU needs to act on both issues. This is because, firstly, it needs to cater to public interests. One can argue that the problems of illegal logging and timber trade do have a ‘contagious’ impact, because the European public is interested in seeing these activities curbed. Secondly, if the EU wants to effectively assist stabilising governance structures and achieving sustainable development in Southeast Asia, it will need to act at the ‘softer’ end of the NTS spectrum. Since there is a considerable people-dimension and normative
agenda inherent to environmental protection, we can further expect a greater discussion on the EU as a normative actor in this chapter. The first section will focus on the case of the severe haze in 1997 as a crisis event that triggered enhanced European activities.

4.1 Outline of the Issue of the Haze and ASEAN’s Regional Response

The land and forest fires are common phenomena in Southeast Asia. They recur on an annual basis and depend on the interplay of climatic phenomena (El Niño Southern Oscillation in the case of Indonesia), socio-economic and institutional factors. The smoke from the fires in Indonesia is particularly extensive and sometimes spreads to neighbouring countries. It has severely impacted the people, economies and states of the region. Over the years, it has affected Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and Singapore and to a lesser extent Thailand and the Philippines. Although this issue is of concern to Southeast Asia as a whole, it is hardly addressed within the ASEAN-EU relationship.

Beyond the traditional causes, mainly associated with the agricultural practices, trade globalisation is the most important contextual variable that has led to an expansion of burning land for profit. In Indonesia, burning land is illegal, but so far punitive measurements by the Government of Indonesia (GoI) have not halted this trend and suggest that external assistance on this issue needs to emphasise the rule of law. Despite the annual recurrence of the haze for over two decades, law enforcement remains weak. It was not until 1997 that the Government actually started penalising large companies for their devastating role in the fires of that year (Dennis, 1999: 14-15).

In 1997, the haze from the fires was particularly extensive and studies estimated the economic and social costs to be between US$ 3-6 billion. The ASEAN Response Strategy document of 2001 stated that the 1997-1998 haze period caused an economic loss, excluding social and environmental costs, estimated to be about US$ 6 billion and a spatial distribution of 8 million ha for Indonesia (ASEAN and Asian Development Bank researchers, 2001: xv). Rona Dennis estimated the losses resulting from the fire and haze for Indonesia to be US$ 3.8 billion and for the neighbouring ASEAN members to be US$ 0.7 billion (Dennis, 1999: 16). In Indonesia alone “an estimated 20-70 million people suffered health problems [...] and 40,000 people were hospitalised” (Timmer, 2000: 9). Beyond the cancellation of
flights from Indonesia, the general adverse effects on the economy and other national inconveniences, the haze also reached neighbouring countries affecting their infrastructure and functioning. The tables below give a general idea of the devastation caused by the fires of 1997 in Indonesia. They include spatial and financial assessments, the area burnt, pollution, impact on human health, and economic suffering. The impact of the 1997 was transnational, severe and showed that, similarly to the AFC, both the state and the people were the security referents.

Table 2: Forest Status and Burnt Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forest Status</th>
<th>Total Area Burnt (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection Forest</td>
<td>21 963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production Forest</td>
<td>163 444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature Reserves and Wildlife Sanctuaries</td>
<td>17 238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation Forest</td>
<td>1 415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Parks</td>
<td>54 331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Forest Park</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Forests</td>
<td>4 741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Forest</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunting Park</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Forest Land</td>
<td>263 992</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Ministry of Environment of Indonesia (1998)

Table 3: Land Status and Burnt Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Status</th>
<th>Total Area Burnt (ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-forest land cleared by burning</td>
<td>16 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burnt by escaped fires</td>
<td>8 444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantations</td>
<td>88 237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4 391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total non-forest land</td>
<td>117 258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data Source: Ministry of Environment of Indonesia (1998)
### Table 4: Fire-related Damage in US$ millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Loss</th>
<th>Loss to Indonesia</th>
<th>Loss to other Countries</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timber</td>
<td>493.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>493.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>470.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>470.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct forest benefits</td>
<td>705.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>705.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect forest benefits</td>
<td>1 077.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 077.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capturable biodiversity</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire fighting costs</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>25.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carbon release</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>272.1</td>
<td>272.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fire</td>
<td>2 787.9</td>
<td>285.5</td>
<td>3 073.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data Source: Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia and World Wildlife Fund (1998)*

### Table 5: Haze-related Damage in US$ millions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Loss</th>
<th>Loss to Indonesia</th>
<th>Loss to other Countries</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-term health</td>
<td>924.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>940.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism</td>
<td>70.4</td>
<td>185.8</td>
<td>256.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>181.5</td>
<td>199.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total haze</td>
<td>1 012.0</td>
<td>384.1</td>
<td>1 396.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data Source: Economy and Environment Program for Southeast Asia and World Wildlife Fund (1998)*

The haze of 1997 affected many Southeast Asian countries. Therefore, the Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) was immediately adopted and led to the launch of the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze. The RHAP was introduced to strengthen regional capabilities and support the national efforts. Despite its unbinding status France and Germany were among the international donors to support the RHAP’s implementation. The contribution was part of a bulk amount given to Indonesia by international donors and therefore, specific European donor
actorness and visibility was indiscernible to Indonesia. Nevertheless, it did display that EU member states were supportive of ASEAN’s regional integrative efforts.

This was not ASEAN’s first attempt at regional cooperation on pollution. In 1990, at the 4th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment in Kuala Lumpur, transboundary pollution, including the haze, had been on the agenda and resulted in the creation of the Accord on the Environment and Development. In 1992, ASEAN’s environmental ministers agreed to harmonise policy directions, starting cooperation on transboundary air pollution, with specific reference to the haze. The problem of the haze was addressed in the major ASEAN environmental documents throughout the 1990s. In 1995, the ASEAN Meeting on the Management of Transboundary Pollution adopted the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution. This agreement was vague and unbinding but managed to formulate a regional approach, to be complemented by national measures. In 1995, the Haze Technical Task Force was created, but remained ineffective in its response to the 1997 haze. ASEAN member states preferred national initiatives.

In 1999, the Haze Technical Task Force approved the Operational RHAP (ORHAP) that allowed responsive action of ASEAN. The following years saw the implementation of ORHAP. On 25 November 2003, the Haze Agreement or ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze came into force. This document provided the binding legal framework for the RHAP. However, as of 2012, this document is still not ratified by all ASEAN member states. Indonesia, the most important player, has not ratified the agreement, because it does not want any form of external interference on this matter. This shows that a binding commitment on the regional level is disliked and still sensitive for some ASEAN states. Instead, Indonesia initiated a regional counter-haze development, the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee on Transboundary Haze Pollution, in accordance with its domestic standards. This Committee is developing under the influence of Indonesia, which places emphasis on its national counter-haze strategy rather than region-wide efforts. This has held back the regional development in this area and the regional institutions in place remain hollow structures.

Nevertheless, ASEAN has continued to institutionalise and integrate on this issue. This is displayed, for instance, in the annual Conference of the Parties to the Haze Agreement, the establishment of the Haze Fund, the various regional and bilateral simulation exercises, and the segregation of the haze from the
environmental sector as a topic in its own right within the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community. On the one hand, transnational crises like the AFC and the haze have questioned the principle of non-interference. On the other, they have strengthened national positions which favour inertia of the principle of non-interference to some extent.

Despite continued regional coordination, the threat of the haze has not diminished. For example, in 2006 another severe spread was observed (ASEAN Ministers on the Environment, 2006). Indonesia’s stance limits the opportunity for external actors to influence ASEAN integration in the case of the haze. Furthermore, the ASEAN Way backs Indonesia’s stance. This is not to say that external actors could not provide assistance in tackling the issue. They have been supportive of the regional ambition. However, the process did not offer an opportunity for the Europeans to become involved (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). Nevertheless, by cooperating and sharing region-to-region best practices on other environmental issues, the EU and its member states indirectly assist in improving the underlying conditions affecting the haze issue, including forest governance.

In fact, for the haze of 1997, Dennis listed various international actors, which contributed significantly in managing the crisis and creating sustainable capacities. These actors ranged from the European Commission to the World Wildlife Fund and the Asian Development Bank to state actors, including the USA and Singapore (Dennis, 1999: 33-47). The European Commission was an important donor (Dennis, 1999: 33-34). The EU’s overall activities will be elaborated in detail in the following subchapter.

4.2 EU Assistance in Indonesia
The EU and its member states have provided assistance to Indonesia and the ASEAN Secretariat to tackle the haze issue. This assistance was mainly driven by the logic of appropriateness, since the probability of contagion to Europe was and is non-existent. Although the Europeans do not view the haze as a threat, they do recognise the negative impacts it has on Southeast Asia. European actors have identified this issue as worthy of support. Over the past three decades, the EU and its member states have officially assisted Indonesia in this area. The European embassies and NGOs in Indonesia keep the respective EU and member state
agencies informed about severe cases of the haze (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010).

Since the EU is remote and its member states hardly suffer from this form of transboundary air pollution, the likelihood of strong issue convergence is low. While there has been assistance to combat the haze, these efforts appear sporadic and seem to depend on the severity of the haze in any given year. Nevertheless, this suggests that the European Commission and some EU member states have formulated an interest in this issue and developed a policy to address it. An Indonesian public servant observed in reference to the haze issue that “they [the Europeans] offered a bit of aid, but aid also has some problems, because when they give aid, Indonesia does not get the full aid, they want European experts and so they also spend the money on the European side” (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 31 May 2010). Her colleague added that, with regard to NTS concerns in general, “sometimes you can say that [the] European Union does not understand the problem” (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 31 May 2010).

While there seems to be a certain degree of awareness that there has been European support to Indonesia in managing the haze problem, it seems that the Indonesian side does not fully agree with the European approach and the way the EU and its member states implement the activities. Furthermore, it was highlighted that the interviewed officials were “aware mostly of aid by individual member states” (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 31 May 2010). De facto, both the member states and the European Commission have provided assistance, as will be detailed in the following paragraphs.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, European assistance, predominantly in terms of member state assistance, revolved around fighting the fires that caused the haze. For instance, in October 1983, the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) funded by the German Government was involved in researching and providing technical assistance in two projects in East Kalimantan. The support was practice- and short-term-oriented and served as a good baseline for future cooperation. From 26 June-3 July 1992 the European Commission sent a mission to Sumatra for capacity-building and training purposes. This short-term envoy paved the way for long-term European missions that went beyond capacity-building and addressing the underlying causes of the haze. This initial phase of European pragmatism and short-termism could be viewed as the trust-building phase.
The second phase emerged in parallel with the EU’s heightened politicisation of development policy in the early 1990s. While the end of the Cold War compelled the EU and its member states to increasingly pursue a comprehensive foreign policy in their external relations, it also sharpened ideological differences. The ideational dimension became more important within the European long-term projects that addressed the haze of Indonesia in the 1990s. One long-term project was launched in 1995 as part of the EU’s Forestry Programme for Indonesia. The EU Fire Response Group and the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry launched the Forest Fire Prevention and Control Project with an initial budget of US$ 4,879,759 for a seven-year period (Dennis, 1998). The Forest Fire Prevention and Control Project linked EU activities with the local community level in South Sumatra. It was supported by the EU member state agencies, including the Department for International Development (DFID), and the state-affiliated agencies, such as the GTZ.

These state and state-affiliated agencies were important in the implementation phase of the initiatives. They were involved in the training of fire-fighters, satellite monitoring, early warning, fire danger rating and other activities with the Indonesian side. This teaching and sharing of European knowledge presents an opportunity for norms to be transferred and nested. A GTZ official looking back on the Forest Fire Prevention and Control Project, commented that “it was, if I am not mistaken very successful and we developed generic guidelines or procedures, so they have well-documented lessons learnt and we even had to distribute some of the lessons learnt in a best-practice-manual, distributed on the regional as well as national level” (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010).

The objective of the Forest Fire Prevention and Control Project was to provide both short-term (e.g. give information and advice on alternative land clearing techniques, along with warning letters from the government on punitive action and organise public awareness campaigns) and long-term (create job opportunities and raise the economic standard in rural areas) remedies (Dennis, 1998). Initially, the Forest Fire Prevention and Control Project was considered as a pre-emptive firefighting and capacity-building project. Owing to the haze developments in 1997 in Southeast Asia, this project evolved to a crisis response project. The long-term dimension of this project focused on improving the structural conditions surrounding issues of impunity, transparency, and best practices. This matches the logic of appropriateness.
This initiative was followed by the European Commission’s South Sumatra Forest Fire Management Project, which was operational from 2003-2008. Over these years, haze-related assistance by the European Commission evolved from practical short-term assistance to comprehensive long-term support. The EU’s support linked between the sectors and included multiple stakeholders from the rural population to the ministerial officials and the business elite. Over time, these projects have increasingly targeted the various underlying facets of the haze problem.

The stronger focus on the underlying causes as well as the inclusion of multiple stakeholders, consisting of civil society actors, indicated that the EU wanted to strengthen all levels of society. It showed the EU’s interest in the people-dimension and in supporting sustainable development on the local level. Implementing European agencies have been important actors on behalf of the European Commission and member states. The GTZ rated its engagement under this scheme as a success in terms of raising local and national awareness, capacity-building, enhancing coordination and information exchange among the ministries (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010).

Early European projects, such as the GTZ project in October 1983, were concerned with direct fire-fighting responses. The more recent projects were designed to improve the living standards of the rural population and offer alternative sources of income to the various stakeholders involved in profiting from burning-land-practices (Interview with GTZ staff, 25 May 2010). This broad spectrum of implementation suggests that the implementing agencies play a vital role in ensuring and upholding EU actorness.

Development agencies affiliated with or sponsored by European countries were the central players in the early years. Since the Cold War, the European Commission has become a more prominent assistance provider to tackle the haze. It has commissioned anti-haze projects that included multiple stakeholders ranging from ministerial counterparts to non-governmental actors on the grass-roots level. However, today, the agenda has altered and addressing the haze is no longer an immediate objective of the European Commission and the EU member states. A GTZ official explains “[t]wo years ago, the two most important topics were Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and REDD, before that, haze has been an important issue, of course, it is still linked to some of those issues” (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). Today, the European implementing
agencies are more concerned with addressing the underlying causes, common to an array of environmental issues.

Specifically, in the severe case of the haze of 1997, the EU in cooperation with the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry had already incorporated a long-term element within the response looking at root causes and impacts of the problem (Dennis, 1999). Under the EU Fire Response Group the fires in Sumatra and Kalimantan were monitored and assessed, with information collated and liaison and coordination with other international donors. The Monitoring Tropical Vegetation Unit of the Joint Research Centre of the Commission launched two research activities to detect, map and determine the deforestation and biomass loss of the burnt areas. Denmark, Finland, France, Sweden and the United Kingdom (UK) channelled considerable sums through the UN institutions to assist Indonesia in managing the negative effects of the fires and haze in 1997 (Dennis, 1999: 54-59). The more severe the crises, the greater was the overall European engagement.

*De facto*, the haze is not a significant issue between Europe and Southeast Asia. On the regional level in Southeast Asia, the haze is a concern, but it has neither led to any toppling of a regime nor significantly impacted the ideational foundations of the ASEAN Way. Rather, it has hardened the national perspective of the main perpetrator. The issue lacks salience within the ASEAN-EU relationship and did not act as a stimulus for lasting interregional cooperative efforts. If ASEAN could manage to overcome the deadlock in regard to the cooperation on the regional level, the EU would very likely be interested in supporting ASEAN, making resources available, and sharing its best practices (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). A GTZ official says, “[i]t used to be discussed, but there are many limitations and political problems involved, if ASEAN were to identify this as a priority area, we will of course indicate our support” (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). Therefore, European actoriness in normative terms was confined from the outset by the principle of non-interference and the strong cleavage to national sovereignty, as outlined by the ASEAN Way.

In summary, European activities prior, during and in the aftermath of the haze crisis of 1997 can be summed up as technical assistance. They were both pre-emptive and responsive, and arguably an important part of international assistance to support Indonesia’s quest of fire prevention and control (Dennis, 1999). The success of the assistance has been mixed. In reality, the haze has not been
contained and it continues to recur annually. In the absence of a more affordable method of land-clearing accessible to all layers of society, the underlying problems, and therefore, the forest fires are likely to continue. Beyond addressing the underlying problems of the haze, the EU will also need to focus on supporting research and development to find new land-clearing methods.

Although, in recent years, the target of European assistance has altered and moved away from the fires and the smoke, various lessons have been learnt and are still being disseminated to ASEAN member states (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). In the early projects, there has been an overemphasis on the initial response of fire control (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). There were problems of coordination and overlap with other international actors. Currently, there is an overly strong focus on combating the underlying social causes. As mentioned above, fire is the cheapest way of clearing land and this traditional culture of land-clearing among rural farmers will very likely not change unless a similarly cheap way of land-clearing is introduced.

So far, the chapter has shown that despite the haze being remote and the EU being unaffected by this problem, the EU and the member states do show actoriness. This actoriness has been mainly displayed through the various initiatives of the European Commission and the EU member states. It showed that EU actoriness on NTS challenges is not dependent on European threat perceptions or the degree of NTS threat convergence. In fact, the paragraphs have suggested that the developmental perspective as well as the logic of appropriateness played an important role in understanding the motivations on the European side. The examples also showed the varying degrees of normativity of the actions based on the drivers, objectives, and bearers of action.

The following paragraphs will extend the focus and refer to some agricultural and silvicultural developments that relate to the underlying problems of the haze. In the last decade, the rise of the climate change agenda and the UN’s Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries have created an increased international awareness about the conversion of forest and peat land to farmland. On the one hand, the international discourse has expanded the domestic platform for environmental concerns. On the other hand, the rising global demand for biofuels and the obligation on European
countries to use biofuels and subsidise these, have adversely affected the degree of
deforestation and haze in Indonesia.

It is very difficult to disaggregate the individual factors impacting the haze. Some
scholars have argued that there is a link between European demand for
biofuel and the deforestation and haze problem in Indonesia. Eric Wakker and
colleagues write,

Europe’s Renewable Energy Directive does not require biofuel companies
to guarantee and demonstrate the legality of their imports. It is likely that
palm oil from illegal sources ends up being subsidized and promoted by
EU member state governments. At the same time, palm oil that is
imported into the EU for food applications is not even bound to any legal
or sustainability requirements. (Wakker, Theile, and Zakaria, 2009: 6)

In Indonesia, European and global demand led to a large-scale conversion of
peat land and forests to palm-oil plantations. And seemingly, in early 2010, the
European Commission consented to these environmentally ominous developments
by considering redefining palm oil plantations as palm oil “forests” (Phillips, 4
February 2010). In light of this example, one needs to view European initiatives –
regardless of the normative and altruistic motivations expressed in the rhetoric – with
a certain degree of interpretative precaution acknowledging unsaid economic
implications of EU actorness. While this is understood, there are also numerous non-
state actors in Indonesia attempting to counter these influences.

European projects offering an economic incentive are attractive to Southeast
Asian governments. Namely, the licensing of the carbon market appeals to the
political and business elite, as an alternative income to timber from the forests
(Interview with FLEGT official, 24 May 2010). In the future, the carbon market may
provide a more abundant source of licensing income for Southeast Asian
governments than the licensing of logging. Therefore, the EU has integrated this
aspect into its Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) scheme
(Interview with FLEGT official, 24 May 2010). Some EU officials believe that this
form of incentive may persuade the Indonesians to initiate and continue with
democratic reforms (Interview with FLEGT official, 24 May 2010). Although there are
many cooperative projects in the forestry sector, a DFID official contended that “[i]f
you just work with forestry there is a limit to what you can achieve” (Interview with
EU member state official, 26 May 2010). He argued that European engagement in
this area should involve greater outreach to the industry and civil society, and facilitate greater transparency.

So far, the discussion on the haze has suggested that the EU and its member states address multiple stakeholders and approaches this issue from a comprehensive and cross-sectorial perspective. At the same time, European economic interests impact on issues underlying and related to the haze problem affecting central questions about governance and transparency.

The DFID official also argued that transparency is an issue. Information is power and as soon as you hand that over you lose the ability to extract fees, money or whatever when you are a government official....I think that is a huge challenge. They should be able to go to government, to get the plans for the forestry sector in a province or a district, they should be able to get the concession map, so they can check the boundaries, that information is not yet available, so civil society is still struggling with that. (Interview with EU member state official, 26 May 2010)

Corruption and bad governance are ubiquitous features of Southeast Asian forestry. The control of resources is for many developing Southeast Asian governments a source of income in terms of possible personal enrichment. In many cases, they do not view the resource in a managerial sense. That is, in the sense that they are merely the bureaucracy to manage the country’s extraction of revenue from this resource for the common wealth. Instead, the quotation suggests that the authorities involved in the management of resources seek to keep their power and continue enhancing their wealth. Thus, projects that provide an economic incentive to the government are a double-edged sword. On the one hand, the economic incentive may have state officials show greater accountability to the people. On the other hand, this is not guaranteed and could exacerbate the dilemma by further enriching and empowering the political elite.

There are some democratising states in the region that are keen to implement some EU initiatives that involve both an economic incentive and normative conditions. They are motivated by the economic benefits in absolute terms and the potential of long-term political stability (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). For example, following the end of Suharto’s regime there was a power vacuum. Indonesian officials found it difficult to control the forestry sector. They sought external assistance because they believed that the country could benefit as a whole
from this resource, if problems of governance were tackled (Interview with FLEGT official, 24 May 2010). Interviewed personnel from European implementing agencies have said that the Indonesian civilian authorities have become more open towards external influence in the forestry sector post-Suharto (Interview with FLEGT official, 24 May 2010; Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010).

In addition to Indonesia’s domestic environment, the interviewees have alluded to two international developments that have been imperative in stimulating the changes within this sector (Interview with FLEGT official, 24 May 2010; Interview with EU member state official, 26 May 2010). Firstly, the Western public’s increased consumer awareness. This has led to the boycott of illegal timber and timber products and has put pressure on European governments and companies. Consequently, this has also pressured the suppliers. Secondly, the public pressure also triggered American and European legislative amendments concerning illegal timber (Lacey Act and due diligence legislation). This provided peer pressure on the Indonesian authorities.

Within Indonesia’s Ministry of Forestry, moderate officials have allowed soft reforms to take place. For example, the outsourcing of auditing and checking of external exports by civil society organisations (CSOs) and private accredited companies have become accepted practice (Interview with GTZ staff, 25 May 2010). Alongside market and peer pressure, intensive liaising and persuasion by European actors has also contributed to Indonesia’s power decentralisation and diffusion (Interview with GTZ staff, 25 May 2010). The EU may not have immediate control over the forestry sector any longer like in the colonial days. However, as a large export market for Southeast Asian timber and wood products, it possesses the means to shape forest governance beyond the commercial presence of European companies.

In reference to EU official documents, sustainable development, the protection of biodiversity and local agricultural lifestyles are presented as the main motivations behind the EU’s external forest policies of today. Prior to this, the economic rationale has been the main explicit driver of the EU’s actions. The new rhetoric does not offset the economic motivations. In fact, similarly to the previous case study of the AFC, it seems rather that the European Commission and the EU member states have only repackaged and reframed the economic agenda in a normative context, as exemplified by the following discussion.
The FLEGT Action Plan of 2003 is an interesting example. With FLEGT, the EU uses its economic leverage to tackle illegal logging and link sustainable forestry management with good governance and the harmonisation and reform of existing legislation in third countries. It matches the EU’s overall comprehensive approach to the foreign policy issues. The European Commission and Indonesia have signed up to the FLEGT voluntary partnership agreement (VPA) in January 2007. Since then, both sides have been negotiating the FLEGT VPA. At the same time, as part of the pre-FLEGT projects, local forestry information centres have been established in the West Kalimantan and Jambi regions to provide information transparency on forest governance. These pre-FLEGT projects are inclusive of all stakeholders, including indigenous people. They seek to inform the local population and increase the level of accountability and transparency. However, as already criticised by the DFID official above, in reality rural villagers are still finding it difficult to access the cadastral land registers of the local authorities.

Furthermore, it is important to note that the European embassies and the EU delegation on site played a vital role in liaising and facilitating talks on FLEGT between the national ministries and the implementing agencies. The bilateral negotiations with Malaysia and Indonesia are at an advanced stage and on 25 January 2010 the EU created the European Forest Institute in Kuala Lumpur as the regional headquarters for FLEGT that is run by a Finland-based international organisation. Other Southeast Asian states have expressed their interest in FLEGT with particular interest in the FLEGT licence that would legitimise and facilitate timber trade with the EU. This licence is the economic incentive for the ASEAN member states. By linking forest governance principles to timber certification for access to the EU market, the EU serves its and Southeast Asia’s trade interests as well as attempts to inhibit illegal logging in the region. This example, however, also cements the confused perception that some Southeast Asian governments have of the EU as a normative actor, since the EU is not clear-cut about its normative agenda.

Despite the aim to stop illegal logging, it remains to be seen to what extent FLEGT will be effective. Military control of the sector and corruption appear to be continual problems for the timber trade in Southeast Asia. It appears that offering incentives to the political elite could strengthen their power in domestic politics and counter the normative agenda of the EU in its external policies.
Furthermore, FLEGT may address the issue of illegal logging within national territories, but this does not significantly alter the problem of general trade of illegal timber from non-FLEGT VPA countries. The problem with the labelling modified wood products of third country origin may be remedied, if Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia also start with the FLEGT VPA negotiations. FLEGT offers an incentive to trade legitimately. However, it does not guarantee the exclusion of illegal products within this process. Officially, the EU has imposed a ban, so that EU member states will not import from and invest in Myanmar’s timber sector. This does not stop Burmese wood from being processed in third countries and entering the European markets. The origin is altered along the trade chain and hence, when entering the EU market, the product may no longer be of Burmese origin. Once the timber enters another country the following EU Community Customs Code may serve as a loophole.20

Goods whose production involved more than one country shall be deemed to originate in the country where they underwent their last, substantial, economically justified processing or working in an undertaking equipped for that purpose and resulting in the manufacture of a new product or representing an important stage of manufacture. Any processing or working in respect of which it is established, or in respect of which the facts as ascertained justify the presumption, that its sole object was to circumvent the provisions applicable in the Community to goods from specific countries shall under no circumstances be deemed to confer on the goods thus produced the origin of the country where it is carried out within the meaning of Article 24. (Council of the European Union, 1992: Article 24-25)

A positive impact of FLEGT so far is that the VPA negotiations have led to a redefinition of timber legality within the negotiation partners. On the one hand, these bilateral negotiations will facilitate ASEAN intraregional discussion on timber legality and standards. On the other hand, they also pose a problem in the following manner. These national legalities induced by the FLEGT VPA negotiations have also led to an increased divergence of legality definitions among ASEAN states. This may adversely affect any attempt at regional harmonisation in the future, although it is understood that Southeast Asian states generally share information about the negotiations with the EU with each other. This bilateral approach may complicate

20 The helplessness of the EU resulted in the Council issuing a draft due diligence regulation on 28 January 2010 to address this and squelch the opportunity for illegal timber operators.
future interregional endeavours of the EU, since it does not necessarily promote similar legalities in the Southeast Asian partners. Here, normativity in terms of region-to-region best-practice-sharing is compromised for immediate normative influence on the bilateral level.

Beyond the outlined haze projects and the FLEGT – which indirectly impact the haze problem through forest governance –, the EU shows actorness through the discussion of concerns of transboundary pollution within the various dialogue fora where both sides meet. From the 1980s, forest matters were discussed within the ASEAN-EC JCC and since the 1990s, the environment has been part of the AEMM agenda. In 1986, within the JCC framework, the ASEAN Timber Technology Centre was founded in Malaysia. Although the initial JCC cooperation appeared to be limited to economic interests, it was visible that the high environmental standards of the European side compelled the transfer of norms and structural adaption. Although the EU may pursue economic interests, its interaction with less developed actors forces these to adapt. The adaptation on the side of its counterpart to meet European expectations for economic engagement shows that, the EU may be an indirect normative actor. This is because the adaptation to European standards and policies implies a specific normative context and is therefore an indirect normative influence.

Despite ASEM being the forum for the discussion of global issues since the mid-1990s, the ASEAN-EU level is also addressing both global and regional environmental developments. Forest fires have not been on the official agenda but have been mentioned within the dialogue between the both sides (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 31 May 2010). The following paragraphs will focus on the extent, as to which the EU’s actorness in normative and general terms is carried by state-affiliated or non-state actors. The previous allusions to their role as implementers of EU projects compel us to take a closer look at the involvement of these actors. The following discussion on these non-state actors is vital for understanding the EU’s actorness, because they alter the definition of actorness provided in Chapter 1. In the interviews with GTZ officials on the issues of the haze and forest governance, it seemed that the GTZ and other assistance implementing agencies displayed a stronger consistency with either the EU’s normative identity or agenda of effectiveness than the European Commission and the EU member states themselves. As a GTZ official expressed,
Very specifically we have a comparative advantage to some other donors, also, to the official and high-level European engagement in the region, and that at least at the technical level, we do have quite some flexibility also to get officials, also lower level officials of Myanmar involved in our programme. (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010)

This quotation indicates that state-affiliated and non-state implementing actors can avoid the normative commitments of the official level to some degree. For example, they can engage with Myanmar in order to ensure effective implementation of their tasks. Other examples, including the FLEGT case, reveal that non-state actors as implementers have greater understanding of the local realities. They can better design projects that do not defy local sensitivities and meet the normative objectives of the contractor. The perceptions of third parties indicated that, during the implementation process, these non-state actors play an exceptional role in upholding the normative guidelines whilst ensuring effectiveness (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 31 October 2010). Therefore, when understanding the EU as a normative actor, we will have to pay close attention to the non-state actors.

It seems that in some instances the European Commission and its member states are bound to their official rhetoric and this limits their engagement. While the EU and its member states satisfy the official normative rhetoric, they realise that they nevertheless fall short in their actorness and in alleviating the plight of persons. The people-dimension is a very important objective of the EU’s external engagement and an essential aspect of the EU’s normative identity. Some instruments employed by the EU and its member states may not necessarily promote the people-dimension within a state, which is considered to abuse human rights and violate various norms and values. These examples highlight the importance of the non-state actors in filling the gap between actorness and normative identity. Hence, we can say that these actors act by proxy.

The following examples substantiate this form of actorness and are related to the haze. They move beyond the Track 1 level of EU actorness. While non-state actors are not the main focus of this thesis, understanding the role they play is essential to build better understanding of the contemporary ASEAN-EU relationship and the normative dimension of the EU as a global actor. Generally speaking, the more these non-state actors are funded by the European people directly, the higher is the consistency with the EU’s normative identity. In light of the technocratisation of
cooperation on NTS challenges, these actors may provide a countermovement to this process. The technocratisation is to some extent implicit to the processes of threat convergence. While issue-specific cooperation and management on NTS threats stimulates integration across states and sectors, the non-state level may offer an alternative, community-oriented and grassroots bottom-up solution.

For example, the GTZ, funded by the German Government, is such a non-state implementing actor which has been involved in anti-haze activities since 1983. It was concerned with the provision of research and technical assistance in two projects in East Kalimantan. In the 1990s, the GTZ conducted a study on the health impacts of haze and implemented an Integrated Forest Fire Management Project in East Kalimantan. The second phase of this project ended in 2000. Another German non-state actor, which is affiliated with a German party, is the Hanns Seidel Foundation. This political foundation directly supported the Strengthening ASEAN’s Capacity to Prevent and Mitigate Transboundary Atmospheric Pollution Resulting from Forest Fires (RETA 5778-REG) with funds and interns. There was also the University of Freiburg, which established a Southeast Asia Fire Monitoring Centre to link up with the activities of the ORHAP (ASEAN and Asian Development Bank researchers, 2001:220-221). While these examples do not necessarily highlight how these non-state actors uphold the EU’s normative dimension, they show that European actorness strongly draws upon non-state actors in terms of expertise and implementation.

Another example would be the GTZ in relation to forest governance. The GTZ has been engaged in a double-tiered capacity development project, known as the ASEAN-German Regional Forest Programme since 2003. This project aimed to strengthen both the role of the ASEAN Secretariat and the intergovernmental cooperation level of the member states. The GTZ was a decisive promoter of the external non-intergovernmental advisory group to the ASEAN Senior Officials Group. Prior to the creation of this body, the GTZ had to communicate and persuade intensively for this body to be endorsed by the member states, including Myanmar. In fact, the negotiations showed that the proposal for this body was watered down to meet the normative reality of the Southeast Asian negotiation partners. Furthermore, the question remains whether the acceptance of the normative standards is genuine and implies an understanding and eventual openness to internalising the standards of governance or whether it is mere lip-service.
Generally speaking, the EU and various European non-state actors have found it difficult to persuade Southeast Asian states, because they are far away. Furthermore, the majority of ASEAN states cleave to state-centrism and prioritise economic growth over environmental protection. At present, it is mainly the ASEAN Secretariat and more liberal-democratic ASEAN states, including Indonesia, which are willing to be persuaded by Western actors. For example, the Indonesian government post-Suharto had difficulties regulating the forestry sector. This power vacuum, combined with international consumer pressure and the will of soft reformers within the government to restructure the forestry sector, provided a favourable environment for the EU to initiate projects. During Suharto’s period in power, such proposals faced constant rejection and lacked implementation. This has changed. While Indonesia is still sceptical of external interference, it has become increasingly open to being persuaded, because it sees the economic and political benefits from this openness (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010).

Despite the difficulties in persuading its counterpart on the external non-governmental advisory group, GTZ officials argued that “having this body is better than not having it at all” (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). The creation of this body suggests that the GTZ has been successful in promoting greater participatory elements within the ASEAN process. On the one hand, the project sought to reflect the European liberal-democratic agenda. On the other hand, it offered tangible outcomes for the ASEAN member states. For instance, at the ASEAN level, the ASEAN Timber Legality Standard was an outcome of the ASEAN-German Regional Forest Programme and was embraced by the member states. This supports the harmonisation of the timber sector and hence, the economic community-building process. On the interregional level, the creation of the Peer Consultation Framework allowed increased intergovernmental coordination and learning (GTZ and ASEAN Secretariat, 2009). Although the people-dimension is of particular interest, the GTZ and ASEAN officials appear to focus on the impact on the macro-level. GTZ officials have said that the impact of a regional projects on the micro-levels will always be difficult to quantify and is currently negligible in light of the outcomes on the intergovernmental level (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). An important element of the German project and other newly designed European projects is that they attempt to incorporate multiple stakeholders into the decision-making process. Thus, they also contribute to ASEAN’s objective of becoming more people-oriented.
Generally speaking, the examples within the forestry sector have shown that the projects affiliated to the EU have emphasised the role of non-state actors. They addressed the diffusion of the power monopoly of the state and the military, increased the transparency and accountability, and to some extent strengthened the role of the ASEAN Secretariat. This suggests the EU and its member states to be normative actors. It is important for the EU to assist Southeast Asia in a comprehensive manner, because structural changes on the domestic level are paramount when it comes to the success or failure of the projects. This has been exemplified by the case of forest governance in Indonesia. The EU has understood that sector-specific objectives are intertwined with the overall normative and material setting. Therefore, for its assistance to be effective, a cross-sectorial, multi-level and comprehensive approach is imperative.

Implementing state-affiliated agencies take action according to international normative standards and their conception of situative ‘good’ development cooperation, but remain in line with the guiding principles and objectives provided by the ministries (Interview with GTZ staff, 25 May 2010). As a dependent contractor they are under pressure to yield maximal effectiveness of the assignment and please the contracting entity. Despite this confinement, the state-affiliated agencies have sufficient flexibility to integrate values and normative standards.

By contrast, non-state actors that are funded and steered by civil society are more flexible in terms of implementing their own agenda. They can translate their normative convictions into action seemingly one-to-one. When the haze of 1997 spread, Greenpeace’s Southeast Asia climate and energy campaigner Athena Ronquillo-Ballesteros was active and complained about the ASEAN member states’ inability to manage the haze. Although it is the local Greenpeace showing activism, we need to conceive the actions as part of a larger global movement, since Greenpeace Indonesia is also supported by European counterparts and donors.

The above examples have shown that European governments can make use of non-state actors in implementing projects that may counter their official normative rhetoric or are in need of effective implementation. Their flexibility and local expertise makes state-affiliated and non-state actors indispensable components of EU actorness. The European Commission and the various EU governments support them because they further the normative objectives and substantiate the actorness of the EU, while circumventing ideational conflicts.
4.3 Summary of EU Actoriness and the Normative Dimension

Similarly to the first case of the AFC, the case of the haze/forestry governance is associated with a field of governance that has been traditionally located in the realm of socio-economic politics. However, it has become a general global security concern in the last two decades. The EU has been at the forefront of the securitisation of the environment. It and its fellow believers in environmental protection have been convincing developing countries of the nexus between environmental issues and their people’s plight. They have managed to push the topic, with particular regard to climate change, onto the global agenda of security concerns (High Representative and European Commission, 2008). Aside from the economic calculations based on the EU’s advanced market and technologies in environmental protection and climate change, one could argue that the EU’s ambition in these fields reflect the EU’s normative identity. That is, ensuring a clean and green environment for the well-being of its people and the wider world. The discussion so far also suggests that the EU attempts to interweave its interests with its normative identity, as shown in the case of FLEGT.

The EU and Southeast Asia share the perception that the environment is an important common good to be protected, but that the strategies in the developed and developing countries as well as within the respective regions differ. In addition to the geographical, climatic and biological cleavages that this sector displays, there are intraregional and societal fault lines that complicate the regional and interregional cooperative efforts. As a result of these differences, both sides are generally affected by environmental threats differently. This constrains the EU’s actoriness from the outset.

The difference in climatic and socio-economic factors is not only a problem for the relationship between the two regions, but also within the two regions themselves. The European Commission and some EU member states may be proactive in promoting the securitisation of environmental issues. However, intraregionally perceptions on environmental issues diverge. This internal divergence on some environmental issues makes it difficult to formulate a coherent external position. This internal incoherence also transpires onto the international level and complicates coherence and the ability to convince other regions about the benefits of some environmental norms of the EU and its member states. On the ASEAN-EU level, internal problems caused by incohesive stances have been minimally evident.
However, Southeast Asian officials have pointed to the internal cleavages within the EU. They have argued that the environmental sector is not only a problem between the ASEAN and EU side, but also within the EU itself (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 31 May 2010). Thus, if the ASEAN-EU level does not seemingly produce tangible outcomes in this field, it cannot be blamed on the ASEAN side (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 31 May 2010). Against this backdrop, it is questionable, as to what extent, the EU can actually agree on norms that may appeal to Southeast Asia. This then raises questions about the degree of actorness of the EU, as already mentioned above.

This chapter revealed that the EU and its member states were most of the time responsive in their actorness following severe events of the haze. In relation to forest governance, EU actorness can be seen through an economic as well as developmental lens. It was long-term-oriented and aimed at shaping forest governance in a sustainable manner. The focus on the underlying problems of the forestry sector links this sector-specific with the actorness on the haze issue, in the sense that, current anti-haze projects also address the underlying problems of forest governance.

Juxtaposing European actorness on the haze to that of other international actors, suggests that European anti-haze actorness ranks similarly in scope and impact (Dennis, 1999: 14-15). The EU’s activities ranged from fire-fighting support to long-term projects. They showed that the EU evolved from a short-term and practice-oriented actor to an actor with long-term ambitions. They further revealed that the EU’s actorness consists of a normative dimension, particularly aimed at good governance within the forestry sector. This evolution paralleled the European Commission’s increased outward orientation and emphasis on a comprehensive and normative external approach in the 1990s.

The haze problem is geographically confined and therefore, threat perceptions do not stimulate European activities. In the first phase of the haze assistance, prior to 1997, the European side seemed mainly motivated by the logic of appropriateness. In this phase, European actorness was short-term, technical and relied on confidence-building measures. The first phase was short-term, responsive and appeared demand-oriented. It was characterised by narrowly defined and focused responses providing a quick relief to the problem. By contrast, the long-term projects have been more diffuse and less focused on combating the fires and the
haze directly. The second phase also had stronger normative underpinnings with regard to addressing the underlying causes of the haze problem in an indirect manner. However, this change in approach may also be the result of the EU’s enhanced awareness of globalisation.

The EU has recognised that it needs to shape the global level according to its standards to safeguard itself and keep other regions stable. It shows that the EU has become more interested in projecting and diffusing its standards. Hence, responses to the haze from the mid-1990s onwards suggested that the EU and its member states have largely acted according to the logic of appropriateness. This indicates a mixed picture of rationalist and normative accountings that are not contingent on threat perceptions. Rather, they depend on the EU’s development agenda and solidarity with Southeast Asia.

On the one hand, both the authorities and people within the provinces that the EU anti-haze initiatives targeted, perceived the EU’s forest fire-related actorness as an act of salvage and less as security actorness (Interview with GTZ staff, 25 May 2010). The haze is perceived as a security threat to the people but the EU’s comprehensive approach to address this threat is not defined as a security measure and hence, there is a threat-actorness divergence. This perception also stems from the socially entrenched understanding of who traditionally provides security in Indonesia.

On the other hand, the EU and its member states did not regard their engagement along the lines of security. The EU views its external assistance as development aid to defuse the recurrence of the land and forest fires. This raises the question whether the NTS concept should involve the dimension of recognition and intention. We should not prematurely condemn the utility of the NTS concept, because of this case. It is useful in light of the many instances in Southeast Asia that show that environmental problems do indeed have an impact on the security of the state (e.g. McNeil, 2002).

Instead, we should also consider whether one can only be a security actor if one is perceived or wants to be perceived as such by the recipient of the action. Some Southeast Asian central decision-makers have realised that some EU member states have advanced environmental knowledge and technologies to aspire to and learn from. They have also understood that learning from the EU and its member states extends their power temporally, as well as materially.
Recognition, as part of actorness, implies the importance of the visibility of the anti-haze and forest governance activities. Visibility is a result of action and continual presence. In general, some implementing agencies have a long-term presence, but this does not necessarily signify that the projects will last for the same period in view of budgetary cuts or the refocus on a different issue (Interview with GTZ staff, 25 May 2010). Furthermore, visibility of the implementing actors does not automatically suggest EU visibility. To achieve this, the EU and its member states are enhancing their coordination and ensuring that the implementing agencies give credit to them. In most instances, the implementing agencies are the actors, which benefit in terms of visibility and overall actorness. Even if the European Commission and European governmental actors receive greater acknowledgment, this would not necessarily mean that the EU as a single collective actor will increase its actorness profile. There are still the member states, which complicate the EU's visibility. In its external representation, the EU is multi-headed. This complicates the EU as a collective environmental actor also in terms of effectiveness.

Some scholars have argued that the efficiency of the EU is dependent on the internal cohesion and the acting presidency (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006a: 99, 101). Small and environmental avant-garde states may be more productive presidencies than bigger states with strong national interests (Dessai, Kracht, Lacasta, and Vincent, 2007: 216). Furthermore, we need to point out that in most Southeast Asian states the urban and rural levels are different political domains. Rural areas are to varying degrees relatively detached from national policy developments and their functioning is interwoven with traditional relations of kinship and patronage. Trickle-down effects of national policies are rare, if they do not directly include a bottom-up dimension. Central decision-makers are only heard on the micro-level when they cooperate with local power structures. This implies that EU environmental projects targeting either level will only achieve visibility on that one level. So far, the discussed activities in the first two empirical chapters have focused on the macro-level, that is, the Track 1 activities.

Nevertheless, this chapter has also revealed that the EU’s cooperation on environmental concerns takes place on three levels. Firstly, there are supranational initiatives by the European Commission, secondly, governmental ones by the

21 Referring to the first level of assistance, there is, for example, the ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity (ACB), which followed the ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation in 2005. Since 1999, the European
member states, and, thirdly, non-governmental projects by civil society or NGOs. On the first and second level, the governmental side commonly delegates policy-implementation to non-state development agencies. These agencies act according to their mandate, but still possess a certain degree of detachment from the governmental positions. European state-affiliated agencies and NGOs are not directly bound to the same principles as the states. They have more freedom in interpreting and implementing policy guidelines, as long as the policy goal is achieved. This chapter has shown that the EU and its member states are highly dependent on these so-called proxy actors to implement their decision effectively, as well as uphold the EU’s normative identity. For example, the official exclusion of Myanmar by the EU may be circumvented on the practical level, as exemplified by the ASEAN-German Regional Forest Programme. This saw GTZ experts also negotiate with officials from Myanmar.

The EU’s increased demand-orientation in its development cooperation with Southeast Asia is an ambiguous strategy that may counter the EU’s normative objectives in its external relations. Recent initiatives, namely the FLEGT VPA, seem to put the EU’s normative identity in question. FLEGT has revealed a new trend in EU actorness, that is, an increased demand-orientation and flexibility. FLEGT attracts ASEAN interest by offering an economic incentive for legitimising timber trade with the EU. Earlier projects were along the lines of normative conditionality and offered very little in the way of economic trade-offs to attract Southeast Asian interest. FLEGT is a new type of project that may achieve the normative goal and secure project implementation, while benefiting both sides. However, the people orientation is downscaled to some extent and the focus is shifted from directly supporting non-governmental norm entrepreneurs to engaging the central decision-makers. They are attracted by an economic incentive which could stimulate normative influence. While FLEGT may trigger normative change directly, it also does this indirectly through the negotiations of timber legalities.

Commission and the EU partners have been providing funds for the ACB and its predecessor. In 2009, at the 17th ASEAN-EC JCC, the European Commission and the ASEAN representatives committed to enhance cooperation within the Programme on Biodiversity to support the ACB. Biodiversity is a good to be preserved but in Southeast Asia frequently aspects of human security collide with this value. Why should a starving villager not be allowed to kill an animal that he has been hunting for decades just because it has now become an endangered species? The security dimension is apparent, but not immediate, to the governmental actors. The ACB constitutes a preemptive measure to protect the environment. This follows the rationale that biodiversity is worth protecting for its own value and not for its value to mankind.
Conclusions

This chapter has discussed EU actorness and the EU as a normative actor with specific regard to the issue of the haze from Indonesia and the forestry sector of Indonesia. It has presented the short-term and long-term, responsive and pre-emptive actions to combat the haze and address forest governance issues by the European Commission and member states. Initially, the anti-haze activities were responsive and addressed fire-fighting, whereas the latest projects have been more concerned with the underlying causes of the haze. The projects were generally between European actors and Indonesia and lacked an interregional dimension. If ASEAN regional integration in this field should advance, there may be opportunities for the EU to share its experience on regional integration on the environment. The EU and its member states perceive the haze mainly as an Indonesian problem. Therefore, regional integrative dynamics have been only supported by individual interested European states. Similarly to the previous case of the AFC, the nature of the crisis is a factor in determining the foreign policy method of the EU.

The EU as a normative actor was recognised prominently in two ways. Firstly, it was traced through the different phases of cooperation entailing specific types of support and outcomes. In this instance, the support in the 1990s constituted a prime example of the EU as a normative actor. The EU was a normative actor, in the sense, that it focused on the underlying structural causes of the haze. This involved greater focus on sharing and implementing European norms. Secondly, through the role of the implementing state-affiliated agencies and non-state actors, it was shown that the normative dimension was strengthened by these actors. Since they are more flexible than governmental actors, they are not bound to the official normative agenda.

This chapter showed the importance of patience and persuasion on the European side. Non-state actors were of added value in regard to the negotiation and persuasion with the counterpart and the implementation of the projects. They possessed local expertise and were able to engage with all actors, including Myanmar. In relation to this, the concept of actorness by proxy was introduced. In Chapter 1, it was said that actorness will be mainly defined through the activities of the EU and its member states. Thus, actorness was met to some extent. However, the chapter highlighted that the definition needs to be expanded to include non-state actors or state-affiliated agencies, in particular.
Chapter 5
The Bali Bombings

The two previous chapters have referred to the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor at a time when the EU was keen to lecture its values to Southeast Asia. In the 1990s, the EU’s emphasis on its norms and values in its relations with the region compromised the ASEAN-EU dialogue for three years. The following case studies take place in a less politicised environment. However, this environment has become highly securitised by the September 11 attacks. This chapter discusses the case of the Bali bombings, the EU’s response to the attacks and the EU’s general approach to terrorism in Southeast Asia. The chapter will move beyond the scheme of enquiry and also illustrate the terrorist threat to the respective regions in the first subchapter. Then, subchapter 5.2 takes a look at the European activities in combating terrorism in Southeast Asia and identifies the degree of normativity of the EU as an actor. It suggests that there are also opportunities for the European Commission to address counter terrorism, although this issue falls under the competence of the EU member states.

5.1 Outline of the Attacks and the Terrorist Threat to ASEAN and EU
The three Bali bombings on 12 October 2002 in the Indonesian town of Kuta took the lives of 202 people and injured 209 (Australian Federal Police, 2008). This act of terrorism linked to the al-Qaeda-affiliated Jemaah Islamiah (JI) was a major shock to Indonesia. Countries, which had citizens injured or killed, offered assistance and stayed in close contact with the Indonesian authorities. This included some European countries like France. While clearly the victims were the people, Indonesia also suffered from the attack in terms of travel warnings and revenue loss. Furthermore, the act itself was addressed to the state. Here again, we can broadly say that both the state and people should be considered as the security referents.

The bombings enhanced the Indonesian counter terrorist cooperation with external powers. In particular, the cooperative efforts with the major cooperation partners on international terrorism, the USA and Australia, intensified after the bombings. A Southeast Asian think tank representative suggested that the bombings also triggered greater regional cooperation and that, since then, ASEAN-ISIS and
other Track 2 institutions have actively discussed the case of terrorism in Southeast Asia (Interview with ASEAN ISIS representative, 31 October 2008). The following paragraphs will provide a brief overview of the regional and interregional perspectives on terrorism to outline the context of the EU’s actorness.

Insurgencies and international terrorism are problems that the Southeast Asian and EU states have been facing over many decades. In both regions, the state and society have been victims of this threat. The terrorist concern was placed on the ASEAN-EU interregional agenda already at the 6th AEMM in Jakarta on 20-21 October 1986. A terrorist attack by Libyan terrorists on a West Berlin discotheque popular among Americans in April of 1986 necessitated an interregional exchange of views. Since this attack, international terrorism was incorporated into the dialogue. Both sides covenanted to cooperate closely. In particular, the Southeast Asian side was interested in learning more about Germany’s response to this attack.

On the interregional agenda, both sides agreed on the necessity of sharing experiences and a comprehensive approach beyond the narrow strategic-military thinking. In 1988, the EC and ASEAN member states declared that they will seek to find “political solutions to the problems which form the roots of terrorism” (ASEAN and EC member states, 1988: para. 27). In the 1990s, the topic vanished from the agenda and was overshadowed by the new international structure and the various new issues on the agenda that ranged from environmental concerns to disarmament and arms control. It reappeared on the agenda in 1997 as one of many points to be raised within a newly modified political and security dialogue following the comprehensive strategy outlined at the 12th AEMM in Karlsruhe. International terrorism was not perceived as a major threat to both sides and, by then, the ARF and ASEM had been established to create alternative fora to discuss this issue. Since international terrorism was not considered to be a major threat to the EU and ASEAN member states, this lurking menace was not closely examined within the three fora until 2001. It was not until the September 11 attacks that the threat of international terrorism was brought to the top of the regional and interregional security agenda of both sides.

22 US military clashes with Libya over Libya’s territorial claims in the Gulf of Sidra in the 1970s and 1980s fuelled the anti-Americanism within the Arab world. Libya’s revenge was in the form of international terrorism, which was primarily directed against the USA.
At ASEM 4 on 22-24 September 2002, international terrorism overshadowed the summit. This was prior to the Bali bombings and showed that the September 11 attacks heightened the urgency perception of the ASEAN and EU member states. However, there was still some distance and scepticism towards the American approach. In Southeast Asia, some governments were wary about the American influence, while others embraced this as an opportunity to coalesce with the Americans to tackle domestic insurgencies. Despite a sense of solidarity towards the USA, which was formalised in the signing of the US-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism on 1 August 2002 and the US-EU Terrorism Pact on 25 June 2003, it was the terrorist attacks within the respective regions that galvanised national efforts. The member states that were at the centre stage of the attacks were under pressure to improve and develop their existing counter terrorist measures. In the case of the affected European states, they went as far as to pressure for enhanced regional cooperation and coordination.

In particular, in the aftermath of the Madrid and London attacks, Spain, and the UK played leading roles in promoting resilience on the regional level. Al-Qaeda in Europe claimed responsibility for the bombings and showed Europe in a painful manner that it, too, was the target of violent acts by international terrorism. The ten bombs, detonated on four commuter trains in Madrid on 11 March 2004, killed 191 people and injured up to 1800 people (The Guardian, 2007). This bombing was the moment-generating attack for Spain. These attacks suggested that the new measures introduced in the aftermath of the attacks on the Twin Towers were either lagging behind in implementation or did not suffice. This compelled the EU member states to revisit and enhance their efforts.

Already in 2003, the ESS identified that “Europe is both a target and a base for terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for al-Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium” (Council of the European Union, 2003: 3). Spain and its fellow EU countries had to learn the hard way that international terrorism as an external threat had gained local-reach and that more action was required. The attacks raised concerns about the degree of preparedness of the EU and the public seemed to be sceptical towards some of the new anti-terrorist measures. This scepticism was associated with the fear that civil liberties inherent in liberal-democratic states were being
curtailed. For example, Germany’s *Sicherheitspaket* provoked widespread protests, because of its potential to erode civil liberties and human rights.

On the one hand, Europe was divided by the tension between the counter terrorist actions of the state and the civil liberties. On the other hand, it was divided on the American War on Terror. The discord on the American invasion of Iraq epitomised this tension and incoherence of the EU as a unitary foreign policy actor. The Bali bombings were not a threat to Europe. However, they contributed to Europe’s increased awareness of international terrorism post-September 11. They neither triggered any united conception of Southeast Asia as a source of the terrorist threat nor directly led to domestic policy impulses to address the threat more strongly. However, in light of the internationally operating terrorist networks, contagion of the threat was possible. Furthermore, al-Qaeda has established training camps in Southeast Asia that are still operating (Gunaratna, 2006: 4). Thus, the European side could possibly view the region as a source of threat. This will be exemplified and discussed in Subchapter 5.2, this view was indeed adopted by some EU member states.

So far, this section has introduced us to the negative impact, the major cooperation partners, the security referents, the regional and interregional cooperative context. Al-Qaeda was associated with both ASEAN’s and the EU’s ‘September 11’. This terrorist organisation emerged at the end of the Cold War to continue the work of the Afghan *mujahidin* providing training of recruits and financial, ideological and operational support to Islamist terrorist groups throughout the world (Gunaratna, 2006: 1). In Southeast Asia, the organisation has been linked to local separatist and ethno-nationalist groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, Lashkar Jundullah in Indonesia, Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia in Malaysia, Jemmmah Salafiyah in Thailand, Arakan Rohingya Nationalist Organisation and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation in Myanmar, and JI. The last-mentioned organisation is based in various Southeast Asian countries and also has a presence in Australia (Gunaratna, 2006: 1).

The threat posed by al-Qaeda in Europe is of a different nature. In Southeast Asia, the threat revolves around local terrorism that may or may not receive support from international terrorist organisations for its operations. This has also been heavily discussed within the EU and its member states. As has been indicated in the previous paragraph, the EU member states “agree to disagree” on the linkage
between local and international terrorism in Southeast Asia (Interview with EU member state official, 24 May 2010). Within the EU, it is al-Qaeda itself that is the synonym for the terrorist threat. Old terrorism has faded away in Europe (Neumann, 2009). By contrast, in Southeast Asia, old terrorism persists and risks entangling itself in al-Qaeda’s international network.

The difference in threat perception also stems from the diverging degree of internationalisation of the terrorist threat. In Southeast Asia one is still dealing with states that are fragile and feel threatened by domestic separatist groups. In industrialised Western Europe, domestic nationalist and ideological terrorist groups rarely exist and are widely considered as a phenomenon of the past. The terrorist threat of today emanates particularly from the internationally networked al-Qaeda cells and the local jihadist groups which “are coalescing into a united front prepared to follow Osama bin Laden’s global strategy” (Brooke and Leiken, 2005).

In the last decade, the EU and its member states have been actively creating and coordinating counter terrorist capacities. The Western world is still the desirable target for al-Qaeda. However, “[w]ith the difficulty of striking targets in North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand, al-Qaeda and its associated groups are aggressively scouting for targets in lawless zones of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East” (Gunaratna, 2006: 5). Aurel Croissant observed that since 2001, the Thailand-Philippines-Indonesia area is part of the five major areas in the world where over 80 per cent of the terrorist incidents occur (Croissant and Schwank, 2006: 12). Southeast Asia functions as a logistical and launching base for terrorist acts by al-Qaeda as exemplified on September 11 (Gunaratna, 2002: 232-270). In light of this reality, it is imperative for the EU and its member states to show greater acknowledgment of the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia and enhance activities with the region.

5.2 EU Actorness in the Case of the Bali Bombings/International Terrorism

The preceding paragraphs have suggested that terrorism within the two regions is not a new phenomenon and that it is a threat to the people and the state. They have further indicated that the terrorist threat stemming from Southeast Asia is perceived differently among European countries. It was also said that the USA and Australia have been the major Western actors cooperating with Southeast Asian countries on this issue. Finally, only a few EU member states were directly affected by the Bali
bombings, because their citizens were either injured or killed. Based on these conditions, we can presume that European counter terrorist cooperation will be on a case-by-case basis. The discussion will begin with a look at EU activities at the ASEAN-EU level, then, ASEM, and, finally, the ARF.

When the Bali bombings happened, the EU and the member states were quick to condemn the attacks\(^{23}\) and declared solidarity with Indonesia. In the Council’s conclusions, the Council supported the European Commission’s “intention to consider Indonesia as a pilot country for assistance in the implementation of [UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR)] 1373” and further “[a]ccelerate EU assistance to Indonesia as well as other parts of South East Asia in other fields relevant to the fight against terrorism, including good governance, rule of law and border monitoring” (European Council, 2002).

Within the ASEAN-EU dialogue, it was not until the 14\(^{th}\) AEMM from 27-28 January 2003 that a joint effort by both sides was seen. The Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism was adopted in line with the UN provisions. It said,

As a follow to the Declaration, an ASEAN-EU Consultation was held in Ha Noi in June 2003. During the Consultation, both ASEAN and the EU stressed the desire for a regional approach and agreed to focus their cooperative efforts particularly in the following areas: technical assistance and capacity building in regional counter-terrorism operations and systems; border security, including travel document security and combating trafficking in persons particularly in women and children; immigration border control including customs procedures; cooperation among law enforcement agencies; programmes/projects on anti-money laundering and suppression of terrorist financing; new techniques/technologies to combat money laundering; adoption of international anti-money laundering standards and exchange of best practices; development of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), exchange of experts and bank regulators; funding for computer equipment and software for FIUs; and training for bankers specifically in reporting of suspicious transactions. (Pushpanathan, 2003)

At the meeting a variety of areas of potential collaboration were envisaged. Following the Ha Noi Consultation the EU, the European Commission agreed to undertake an RRM assessment mission to the region to explore these suggestions. Based on an agreed Terms of Reference, ASEAN members and the EU aimed to jointly organise

\(^{23}\) Please read, for instance, Javier Solana's press statement or the Council's conclusions on the terrorist attacks in Bali in October 2002.
the mission. The EU further declared in its ASEAN Regional Indicative Programme 2005-2006,

It will endeavour to build a regional capacity to assist ASEAN members to implement UNSCR 1373, and to address the impact of terrorist activities. As a first step the [European Commission] has deployed an expert mission to investigate possible areas for this cooperation. In assessing its support the [European Commission] looked at measures which could have an added value at regional level and which could be coherent with the [Commission] Country Strategy and on-going projects in this field. It was decided at the ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting on transnational crime in Hanoi (June 2003) that the mission should focus on two fairly broad issues: a) border management and immigration control and b) anti-money laundering/combating terrorist financing. The subsequent expert mission to the ASEAN region found that border management offered better prospects of successful (first time) cooperation between the EU and ASEAN than fight against 'financing of terrorism'. 'Financing of terrorism' requires much more country-specific actions, notably on the law enforcement side. (European Commission, 2004: para. 5.3.1)

The two paragraphs clearly illustrate how initial ambitions touching on various possible areas of common action were narrowed down to two areas of potential European engagement. The European Commission concentrated on the improvement of existing national border management systems and capacities of regional border management cooperation to achieve an Integrated Border Management System. Awareness training and document security were provided over an implementation period of three years starting from 2006. The budget for this endeavour accounted for € 4-6 million for 2005-2006. By the time the implementation phase started, the ASEAN side seemed to have lost interest and the regional approach was aborted (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010). Alternatively, bilateral projects were pursued; and with the Philippines a border management initiative was implemented through inter-agential cooperation between 2006 and 2009.

Post-Bali bombings, the European Commission “has initiated support in the area of counter-terrorism, through backing anti-money laundering activities and assistance to the Jakarta Centre of Law Enforcement Co-operation (JCLEC) under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism” (European Commission, 2002: 5.2). This may have been premature, since a national anti-money laundering initiative without other member states in the region had limited chances of being successful. Indonesia
expressed its interest in European anti-terrorist assistance, because the EU holds the image of a “civilian power” in the region and carries “less luggage” (Interview with EU official, 16 February 2009).

A Singaporean counter terrorist expert similarly suggested that there are Southeast Asian governments, which would welcome greater European efforts in this field (Interview with Singaporean counter terrorist expert, 13 November 2008). While some governments may be interested to attract the most support they can get, an American counter terrorist expert contended that the USA will remain the primary partner on counter terrorism and that most ASEAN states neither need nor wish for European assistance in this field (Interview with American counter terrorist expert, 13 February 2008).

Rhetorically, the EU displayed ambition to assist Southeast Asia in a wide spectrum of anti-terrorist efforts. It did not lack the expertise and goodwill, however, when it came down to the actual execution, the envisaged EU ambitions fell short of implementation and impact. Thus, in reference to the actorness criteria, the European side managed to aggregate and decide on interests and policies. However, the implementation and enforcement of these initiatives seemed to have fallen short. For example, the mentioned immediate response by the European Commission to the Bali bombings in the form of the RRM on anti-money laundering lacked the necessary research and appeal to Southeast Asia. In fact, an EU official argued that the decisions on the projects are not only based on what the counterpart needs, but are also a matter of how you approach and attract the interest of the Southeast Asian counterpart (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010). Thus, the domestic context plays an important role in facilitating EU activities to take place.

This has been evident on the bilateral and interregional level. Despite the commitments in the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism from 2003 and the pursuant region-to-region meetings, tangible output in the interregional context has been marginal. This Joint Declaration aimed to enhance cooperation on counter terrorism in the aftermath of the bombings. Many commitments were made, but appeared difficult to implement, as exemplified below.
The Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress and follow up of the ASEAN-EU Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism adopted at the 14th AEMM and reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen cooperation to combat terrorism as well as transnational crime. In this regard, the Ministers expressed their commitment to support regional efforts in combating terrorism, including centers established in ASEAN countries, namely the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, Thailand, the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and the Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang, Indonesia. (ASEAN and EU member states, 2005: para. 7)

This commitment to support the listed centres is clearly black on white in the declarations, however, in reality, the European Commission’s contribution to these centres ranks below that of the individual member states and the share of other external powers. In this connection, one should not forget that counter terrorism falls under the competence of the EU member states. Therefore, the European Commission has to be very careful and clever in packaging EU money for counter terrorism purposes. Generally, as displayed above with the post-Bali initiatives, EU funds can only be channelled to counter terrorist-related projects. 

*De facto*, there has not been any financial contribution by the EU and its member states to ILEA since the adoption of the Joint Declaration in 2003. ILEA was founded in 1999 and has since then been jointly funded by the USA and Thailand. The USA has been allocating more than 90 per cent of the centre’s budget. Since its establishment there have been only two courses that were sponsored by the Europeans; one in 2007 and one in 2008. SEARCCT was created on 1 July 2003. Since then numerous courses on counter terrorism have been held, ranging from nine to twelve a year. France and the UK were the only European countries which managed to provide some courses.

The law enforcement centre in Jakarta seems to attract more European assistance both from member states and the European Commission. In contrast to the courses offered at ILEA, the courses at JCLEC directly touch on topics related to counter terrorism. The British Embassy has sponsored projects and is on its board of supervisors. In general, the UK has been the most active European country in Indonesia, but also elsewhere in Southeast Asia. This relates, to some extent, to its former colonial ties and commitment within the Five-Power-Defence arrangement. Since JCLEC became operational in 2004, the British have hosted various counter
terrorist workshops and courses there. The Danish have also funded courses on Advanced Analysis of Terrorist Organisations and Operations and one on Islamic Law and Politics in 2006. Spain funded the Counter Terrorism Investigations Management course from 14 January-1 February 2008.

So far, the main motivation behind the European counter terrorism activism in Southeast Asia seems to stem from the historical bilateral ties with the former colonies as in the case of the Netherlands, the UK and France. At the same time and as indicated previously, the degree of affectedness of European citizens by the Bali bombings also influenced the varying degree of activism among the EU member states. The following paragraph will argue that the motivation to act is also based on national threat and urgency perceptions of new terrorism.

This explains particularly the engagement of the Danish in Southeast Asia. As previously mentioned, the Danish funded a course at JCLEC in 2006. In this case, we can say that the Danish government has linked its domestic concerns with international terrorism. The Mohammed cartoon controversy of September 2005 sparked a widely felt anti-Danish resentment within the Muslim world. In the years after the cartoon controversy, various anti-Danish protests and attacks were made on Danish embassies abroad. Denmark, a small and rather Nordic-oriented EU state, has become caught up in the War on Terror campaign. A Danish state official has described the cartoon controversy as a second decisive moment after September 11, which had changed Denmark’s terrorist alert (Interview with EU member state official, 24 May 2010). Since then, Southeast Asia has become more important to Denmark from a security perspective and security advisor positions to the Danish embassies have been created throughout the world, including Southeast Asia.

The dividing line between the internal and external dimension of counter terrorism has vanished and the threat construction and narrative for national security has become increasingly contingent on security developments abroad. To Denmark, terrorism in Southeast Asia is not a localised, but, it is an international threat that requires cooperation with the bigger external players in the region. Being a small state that lacks capacities and resources, Danish engagement in the region is limited to core funding and collaboration with the “bigger players” (Interview with EU member state official, 24 May 2010).
In fact, the American Second Front campaign in Southeast Asia saw the Americans emphasise their own operational role and mitigate that of their allies. For instance, in reference to Denmark’s strategic alliances with the USA, Danish diplomats said that their country was appreciated by the bigger players but that it “did not see its interests fully realised” (Interview with EU member state official, 24 May 2010). Hence, beyond the common budgetary issues that small-size allies experience, Denmark was expected to fulfil a certain narrow role that was pre-determined by the USA.

In general, it appears that Australia and the USA shape the anti-terrorist agenda and operationalisation of counter terrorist activities in the region (Interview with Director of ILEA, 3 December 2009). The director of ILEA added that there are Europeans, namely the British who have their own facilities in Southeast Asia and offer training. However, in his years in office, he has only been approached once by an “EU guy” to discuss an ASEAN-EU training course (Interview with Director of ILEA, 3 December 2009). It appears that only a few EU member states take an interest in collaboration with American and other partners on counter terrorism. At the same time, it goes without saying that European engagement in this field is only sought after on a financial and sporadic case-by-case basis.

The reality of the ASEAN-EU dialogue and cooperation in the field of counter terrorism is that it is still lagging behind the official rhetoric and that it is driven by bilateral ties. The indicative list of ASEAN-EU activities (2009-2010) pursuant to the Nuremberg Plan of Action only displays one counter terrorist activity related to the ASEAN-EU Migration and Border Management programme. This displays the difficulty of the EU to overcome the collective-bilateral divide in view of the European Commission’s ambition, but inability to act, given the member states’ competence. As a whole, the EU, – exclusive of a few states – is tending towards a non-robust or non-military security approach to Southeast Asia. As exemplified with the case of Denmark, these few states which view Southeast Asia through a greater security lens have either domestic security calculations involved or, to a lesser extent, still feel committed to their ties based on their former colonial relations.

The preceding paragraphs have sketched the activities and various motivations behind the European activities in the aftermath of the Bali bombings within the ASEAN-EU framework. They have sketched the importance of domestic factors and Southeast Asian interest. The following section will shift attention to the ASEM
framework. As explicitly stated by the European Commission, the ASEAN-EU dialogue should focus on region-to-region concerns, whereas ASEM is designated for discussion of global issues. In the European Commission’s document on Southeast Asia, it says that the “[p]olitical dialogue should, to the extent possible, concentrate on region to region subjects of interest and concern, leaving global issues to ASEM” (European Commission, 2003: 13). Thus, ASEM is expected to provide more empirical evidence on the EU as a singular, collective actor in the field of counter terrorism than the ASEAN-EU method.

Already in 2002, the EU urged the ASEAN member states to “develop further their co-operation in this area and emphasised the need to implement the series of activities agreed in the ASEM Copenhagen Co-operation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism of September 2002” (European Council, 2002). The EU referred to the ASEM activities and highlighted the importance of this framework for the ASEAN-EU cooperation in this field. The belief was that the ASEM initiatives would unite the East Asian side and have a trickle-down effect improving domestic and regional policies of Southeast Asia (Interview with EU member state official, 26 May 2010).

Since the 1st ASEM, combating international terrorism has been part of the interregional agenda. However, it was not until the 4th ASEM on 22-23 September 2002 in Copenhagen, that ASEM initiated concrete counter terrorist measures. At Copenhagen, leaders adopted the ASEM Copenhagen Declaration on Cooperation against International Terrorism and the ASEM Copenhagen Cooperation Programme on Fighting International Terrorism. And for the first time they convened a session on cultures and civilisations that aimed to promote understanding, unity, and tolerance among the culturally diverse participants. This cross-cultural concept was to be adopted on all levels of ASEM and promoted by the Asia Europe Foundation (ASEF). The comprehensive lens and the cultural activities clearly display the EU’s normative agenda in counter terrorist cooperation.

The summit emphasised the people-to-people approach in fighting extremism and terrorism and acknowledged the importance of education in overcoming stereotypes. The launch of the annual Seminar on Anti-Terrorism, or now known as the Conference on Counter Terrorism, under the political pillar was exclusively concerned with the terrorist threat whereas other ASEM counter terrorist activities
worked on an indirect basis (e.g. ASEM Inter-faith Dialogue since 2005 or ASEM Anti Money Laundering Initiative launched in Bangkok on 12 September 2002).

Similarly to the ASEAN-EU level, ASEM declarations and activities are in line with the UN resolutions and call for counter terrorist efforts with respect to the UN Charter on Human Rights. ASEM places emphasis on the ideological and cultural roots of extremism and terrorism. As exemplified by the Inter-faith Dialogue, ASEM also pursues a people-to-people approach to the issue. The workload is dispersed and does not solely rest on ASEM’s Track 1 but extends to ASEF, which acts like a secretariat for ASEM.

ASEM counter terrorist declarations have not crystallised an Asian-European position distinct from the American perspective. In fact, there are various similarities between the ASEM and American positions on terrorism and the counter terrorist approach (Alfredo C. Robles Jr., 2008: 136-137). Within ASEM, there has been a division on some issues such as the controversy on pre-emptive action. However, officially ASEM did not produce a unique ASEM perspective on terrorism and tags along behind the American leadership on international terrorism.

Furthermore, Alfredo Robles Jr. remarked that the importance of international terrorism on the international agenda has also led to a reversal of a founding principle of ASEM. The dialogue was envisaged as excluding development assistance and creating an equal partnership. The various ASEM terrorist responses have corrupted this principle and allowed development assistance to sneak in. Robles Jr. criticised that, “[t]here is, however, a risk that these [ASEM] countries and their citizens are increasingly identified with new security threats” and hence, a potential of viewing immigrants from these countries as part of the threat for Europe (Alfredo C. Robles Jr., 2008: 138). In a nutshell, the activities within the ASEM context have been mainly designed in consideration of long-term and underlying social objectives to the problem of terrorism and extremism.

The third forum is the ARF. The years following the September 11 attacks saw the ARF expand inter-sessional meetings, conferences, workshops and seminars to address a broad range of terrorism and terrorism-related issues (ASEAN Regional Forum, 2009). The focus of the ARF initiatives was on best-practice-sharing. In this context, the EU has attempted to share particularly its OSCE experience to ASEAN. It sought to show how greater coordination on combating terrorism can be achieved. Axel Berkofsky observed in 2003 that
the EU could become more active, using experience gained from OSCE confidence-building and preventive diplomacy mechanisms and strategies to address conflicts in Asia. For instance, France, Germany, Italy and Britain have wide-ranging experience with fighting terrorism, including intelligence gathering and sharing, drafting and implementing anti-terrorist legislation, and trying and convicting suspected terrorists. In all these areas, the EU could assist Asian member states of the ARF individually, as well as the organisation as a whole: perhaps ARF could act as a centre for sharing anti-terrorist intelligence collated by all its member states. (Berkofsky, 2003: 2)

Berkofsky’s suggestions are still valid today. However, the opportunities to fully share and transfer the European experience and knowledge are still waiting to be created. The interviews with ASEAN and EU officials showed a mixed picture of the OSCE’s role as a model for the ARF in anti-terrorism cooperation. EU officials believe that the OSCE is a good source of inspiration for the ARF, since it includes a normative agenda and thus, strengthens the states from bottom-up. Since the experiences in the 1990s, when the EU was accused of lecturing the Asian side about values and norms, the Southeast Asian side has been wary about this offer from the EU. The EU is keen to project the OSCE model, but realises that in the past and even now, its actorness may have been “pushy” (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010). An official from an EU delegation in Southeast Asia expressed that the current European approach is to sit back and “let the Asian side learn by themselves” (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010). That is, if they should approach the EU at some stage in the future, the EU would be ready to assist.

An ASEAN Secretariat official contradicted this and said that the European side seemed keen to showcase or teach the OSCE experience on PD to ASEAN. The Europeans offered facilities and assistance for showing how PD is done under the EU framework (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 25 May 2010). She does not criticise this European ambition but raises concerns about the general operational manner in which the EU’s activities have been conducted (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 25 May 2010). They appeared to be indirect or gradual, ad hoc, and lacking a concrete workplan. In contrast to American projects, they were not thoroughly followed through (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 25 May 2010). Furthermore, she argued that the European side strongly supports human rights but appears more lenient than the USA (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat
official, 25 May 2010). Within the ARF the EU’s stance is unclear and “fuzzy” and therefore, the Asian side favours the American clear-cut stance and rates the Americans as more accountable and committed to the region (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 25 May 2010).

The Southeast Asian rejection of the European ‘teaching’ or ‘lecturing’ has not ebbed over the years. Both European governmental as well as non-governmental actors were perceived similarly “pushy” when attempting to share the European lessons (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 25 May 2010). Non-governmental and governmental actors have fared similarly. For example, an Asian think tank representative observed in regard to security sector reform that the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces “came a bit strong” and therefore, Indonesia turned down the offer of assistance (Interview with Asian Think Tank representative, 25 May 2010).

So far, European actorness has been based on a broad range of activities. The European Commission was concerned with activities that were related to counter terrorism. It has been an important driving force behind various interregional projects addressing the ideational and underlying problems of terrorism. Within the ASEM framework, a variety of normative and long-term projects were mentioned. In the ARF, the EU also built on the normative dimension in terms of best-practice-sharing of PD. Despite, the various forms of collective activities, it is clear that the member states hold the prerogative of action in this field and may engage directly with ASEAN member states on issues of terrorism. The chapter has suggested that this highly depended on domestic experiences and international threat perceptions.

5.3 Summary of EU Actorness and the Normative Dimension

This subchapter will summarise the EU’s actorness and how the EU fared as a normative actor. The EU’s response to the Bali bombings and the terrorist threat in Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the attacks has involved the EU and member state dimension. In keeping with the varying competences, EU collective engagement was limited and confined to actions addressing underlying causes of this problem. European Commission activities cannot directly support counter terrorist efforts and need to be packaged in a different context that may relate to counter terrorism. Direct counter terrorist action is the prerogative of the member states. There are only a few grey areas, including the Customs and Border
Management initiative, which allowed the European Commission to be active. Hence, the engagement of a few EU member states outperforms the EU as a single actor in this area. This suggests that the different competences within the EU also limit the scope of interregional activism per se. When the EU member states find it difficult to coordinate and harmonise counter terrorist efforts among each other as well as to share competences on this with their supranational body, sharing one’s own experience in this field with an external partner, which is less coordinated, is an even greater challenge. Additionally, the ASEAN-EU level does not provide any significant value for the combat of international terrorism on both the national and global levels. It echoes the guidelines of the international level and showed various rhetorical commitments. However, the implementation of these commitments lagged behind the official rhetoric. Furthermore, the region-to-region level did not actively draw upon the national best practices.

ASEM offers greater room for engagement and may produce greater tangible outcomes in the future. However, given its size and talk-shop format, it has focused on best-practice-sharing and the people-to-people approach. The ARF as the region’s primary security dialogue forum has been mainly concerned with providing workshops and seminars for best-practice-sharing that improve the immediate operability of counter terrorist efforts. However, there did not seem to be an active European involvement in this forum. The ASEAN and EU member states’ bilateral relations hold added value, since they hold the primary responsibility to act in this field. For the time being, the bilateral relationships may be essential stepping stones for the EU to become a more serious collective politico-security actor in the region in this field.

The Bali bombings were a localised event of crisis and did not lend themselves as an opportunity for the EU to offer substantial region-to-region best-practice-sharing. However, the events did attract European attention and the EU has since initiated interregional programmes on border management and money-laundering indirectly addressing the terrorist problem in Indonesia and the region as a whole. The majority of EU actions in the aftermath of the bombings was prominently declaratory. Solidarity and compassion were expressed and the EU and the member states condemned the attack and offered assistance. In particular, the European countries, which had citizens injured or killed by the blasts and had to account to the families back home, offered practical support for the investigation. The European
Commission drew upon the RRM immediately after the bombings to support Indonesia and provided funding towards the Southeast Asian institutions combating this threat.

EU assistance in the form of European Commission funding and best-practice-sharing focused on counter terrorist related projects that addressed the underlying causes of terrorism. Given that the EU as a collective actor does not regard Southeast Asia as a region of priority for the terrorist threat, European engagement is less motivated by threat perceptions, but by the drive to inhibit international terrorism per se. The ESS and the individual defence white papers of the European countries have identified the Middle East and South Asia to be the major regions of this threat. In the eyes of the EU as a collective actor, Southeast Asia is remote and not regarded as the geographical source of terrorism and, consequently, not to be perceived as immediately threatening.

However, some member states, which have been targets of attacks and anti-Westernism by Muslim terrorist groups, have a heightened threat perception of Southeast Asia. Their perceptions align with those of the Americans and they view the region as the Second Front. They believe that Southeast Asia holds terrorist groups that are linked to international terrorism. States with a heightened threat perception of Southeast Asian terrorism vary in their assistance depending on their resources. The example of Denmark showed that a small EU member state is limited to providing core funding to anti-terrorist initiatives in the region. By contrast, the UK with more resources and a larger security and intelligence apparatus is involved in many ways: from intelligence-sharing to financial support to operational training.

The EU’s engagement in the form of individual member state activities showed that domestic threat perceptions play an important role in framing international engagement on this. Southeast Asia is not necessarily viewed as an imminent source of the threat, but part of a greater international problem that requires cross-country cooperation. Policies are formulated on the basis of these two perspectives: the immediate dimension addressing the local threat in Southeast Asia and, secondly, as part of a greater coalition against international terrorism. Thus, domestic norms are transferred and play an important role.
Based on the preceding discussions, it is unsurprising that Indonesia and other Southeast Asian states regard individual EU member states as actors, but do not perceive the EU as an actor in this field. In comparison to the American and Australian support, the EU member states' contribution is marginal in quantitative terms. Southeast Asian politico-security leaders do not view the EU as a hard power variable in the region.

The EU as a collective actor is, first and foremost, a soft power to the Southeast Asian central decision-makers. It promotes comprehensive instruments that address the underlying and long-term dimension of combating terrorism and extremism. This is visible on the ASEAN-EU and ASEM levels, where the EU has been successful with ‘soft’ programmes including the border management initiative and the Inter-faith Dialogues. This implies that the EU as a collective actor concentrates on indirect means and ends in addressing the terrorist threat. On the single state level, the individual EU member states are ‘harder’ in their approach. Although the EU as a collective actor prefers to portray itself as a complementary and soft power to the USA, the reality is that the USA has evolved in its strategy to ASEAN and has become ‘softer’.

The military support of the American hub-and-spokes system persists in the field of counter terrorism, but is increasingly supplemented by technical support and humanitarian assistance; American troops are on site to train on combat and, at the same time, they build schools. If the EU does not want to become completely obsolete in strategic terms, it may have to reconsider its actorness agenda. This requires a substantial change of the EU’s rationale towards defence integration and external engagement. At the same time, it is suggestive that the EU maintains its ‘soft’ profile, which makes it a welcome humanitarian actor in the region as will be discussed in the following chapter. Generally, there is a shortfall in European counter terrorist collaboration with ASEAN member states comparative to the actorness of other global economic heavyweights.

In this chapter, the EU’s overall actorness, including that of the member states, appears to be primarily driven by the idea that the terrorist threat – whether localised or not – may weaken structural conditions for development and stability in already vulnerable societies. This perspective explains the EU’s focus on structural issues in its collective actorness. This chapter further suggests that EU activities will aim for long-term goals and very likely focus on combating the ideational root causes of
terrorism. Thus, the chapter has also suggested a normative dimension to the EU’s actorness.

Within the context of ASEM, this normative dimension is manifest in the cross-cultural approach on all ASEM levels and the strong people-to-people orientation of the third pillar. The Inter-faith Dialogues are such a mechanism to promote the overcoming of cultural disparities. They contribute to repealing cultural and religious prejudice. While some initiatives contribute to our understanding of the EU as a normative actor, there are also some decisions that undermine the EU as a normative actor.

Immediately in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, the European Commission launched the RRM for Indonesia. The European Commission did not consider linking the RRM to Indonesia’s human rights record and conditioning the assistance. For the purpose of offering immediate support, Indonesia’s human rights track record was overlooked. It seems that in cases of crises, the EU acts according to the logic of appropriateness. At the same time, given the urgency crises exude, actorness is influenced by timeliness over normative identity. This compromises the EU as a normative actor to some extent. It has also been suggested that the USA is more clear-cut as a normative actor in Southeast Asia.

If the EU wants to continue to champion its profile as a soft power, it will need to emphasise efforts that make it more distinct from other powers. Furthermore, it will need to be consistent with its normative identity. Despite seeing itself and being perceived as a major advocate of civil liberties, the EU and its member states have struggled occasionally to uphold their normative standards. On the national level, many member states followed the securitisation trend and curtailed civil liberties. Inconsistency and timidity on the external level, and discrepancy on the internal level obscure the EU as a normative actor.

**Conclusions**

In accordance with the limited competence of the European Commission in the field of counter terrorism, EU region-to-state and region-to-region activities were confined to counter terrorist-related activities, namely, border management and anti-money-laundering assistance. EU member state actions superseded the communitarian approach, but were lacklustre in comparison to the engagement of other international
actors. EU member state engagement varied and depended on the threat perceptions as well as historical ties to the region.

Already in the 1980s, as well as particularly within the ASEM framework, both regions placed emphasis on tackling the underlying causes of extremism. For example, the ASEM Inter-faith Dialogue addresses the ideational and long-term dimension of the problem. Although the EU stresses this ideological objective, it sometimes displays a degree of inconsistency with its normative agenda. That is, immediately after the Bali bombings, an RRM was made available to Indonesia, despite a track record of human rights abuses that were incompatible with the EU's normative identity. Furthermore, the national measures within some EU member states in the aftermath of September 11 obfuscated the EU's high moral ground.

The EU as a collective actor has so far targeted the underlying causes while the member states which hold the prerogative and resources have focused on combating terrorism in the Middle East and Pakistan. Since the threat perceptions within the EU will continue to diverge and neglect Southeast Asia as a source of terrorism, the EU as a collective actor may want to remain focused and effective within niche areas that address the underlying causes and hence, allow it to have a comparative advantage to other international actors.

The case of the Bali bombings suggests that European counter terrorist engagement in Southeast Asia leaves room for improvement. Firstly, on the strategic level, the EU needs to develop greater coherence in its strategy towards Southeast Asia. This implies greater co-ordination between member state perceptions and collective attitudes to better dovetail actions on the operational level. Secondly, the EU needs to concentrate on marketing its strengths in niche areas where it holds comparative advantage over other actors, namely, its regional integrative efforts in this field. This is for Southeast Asia to become and remain interested in European engagement. Thirdly, the EU and its member states should consider re-discussing to what extent they will mainstream their core values and norms in a manner that serves their and the counterpart’s counter terrorist agenda while human rights and civil liberties are upheld.
In 2005, Katzenstein observed that “Asian states view human rights and election-watch commissions as unacceptable intrusions into their domestic affairs” (Katzenstein, 2005: 141). In the very same year that Katzenstein published this observation, its truth was tested through the work of the AMM and the pursuant EU Election Observation Mission of the European Commission in Indonesia. The AMM aimed to implement peace in Aceh, which had been suffering from a political conflict for over thirty years. The political conflict was triggered by a long series of domestic developments that had given economic and political concentration of power to Jakarta and disadvantaged and deprived the Acehnese of their autonomy fuelling anti-Javanese sentiments in the region. Sukarno’s reign from 1945-1967 initially aimed for a secular and federalist nation-building process. However, this was dismissed by Sukarno himself in 1950 in favour of a secular and centralised process. This led to discontent amongst the Acehnese and the populations of some of the other provinces of Indonesia. The planned incorporation of Aceh into North Sumatra in 1951 led to the Acehnese joining the wider Islamist rebellion movement of Darul Islam from 1953-1962 (Braud and Grevi, 2005: 9).

To resolve the problem the Government of Indonesia (GoI) promised special status to Aceh in 1957. On the political and religious level, Jakarta ensured that the local elite of Aceh, the ulamas, supported the capital. They were embedded in Jakarta’s religious network as part of an ulama national council structure (Braud and Grevi, 2005: 10). The centre-periphery gap was widened by selective filling of the local administrative positions by non-Acehnese. In addition to this, those Acehnese who were part of the political elite, were attracted by the possibility of affluence and power when they implemented government policies from Jakarta. Under Suharto, the New Order regime continued on the path of centralisation and political, religious, educational, economic, and cultural paternalism, but on a greater scale, including violent suppression of dissent. The discovery of natural gas reserves within

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24 General Suharto and his security forces established security and order through brutal anti-communist and anti-separatist campaigns terrorising the country. Force was the first and only resort in his reign of terror, whereas in the first decade of Sukarno the military had not yet tightened its grip. There was still room for the Acehnese to negotiate with the government.
Acehnese territory in 1971 shifted the focal-point of discrimination from the political to the economic sector and, consequently, led to further tensions within society. The industrialisation of Aceh brought profound change to the social structure and raised more resentments towards GoI among the Acehnese population. They had suffered the most from the GoI’s radical industrialisation course involving land eviction and migratory programmes of predominantly Javanese manpower into Aceh (Braud and Grevi, 2005: 11-12). The aims of the GoI were focused on maximising revenue and creating an infrastructure to achieve and sustain this. The Acehnese and other peripheral regions felt patronised and exploited.

In 1976, Hasan di Tiro and a group of Acehnese intellectuals founded the Free Aceh Movement (GAM). In contrast to Darul Islam, the GAM movement then known as the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front was localised to Aceh and sustained by an elitist group on a small-scale that was not aiming for an Islamic Indonesia but demanded an independent Aceh. Security forces crushed the movement from 1977 onwards, so that by 1979 the ideological leaders went into exile to Sweden, while the middle-ranked and operational leaders and the foot soldiers fled into the remote and mountainous areas of Aceh. In spite of this setback, the ideological leaders managed to continue their propaganda campaign from abroad.

From 1989-1998 the Indonesian security forces launched a military offensive, the Daerah Operasi Militer (DOM). Aceh was declared a military operation zone. In 1990, the Jaring Merah counterinsurgency operations began wiping out GAM but within a year GAM reappeared. The DOM experience lasted nearly a decade and created a breeding ground for a radical generation of GAM combatants to emerge. Many of these combatants had been scarred by DOM and their number quintupled by the new millennium. GAM became a popular movement which expanded its geographical outreach immediately after the end of Suharto’s regime. The expansion from 1999-2000 was paired with an escalation in violence. In 2000 alone, approximately 1000 people were killed in relation to the political conflict. This death toll in a single year matched that of the entire period from 1977-1995. While the GAM leadership was striving to internationalise the conflict, GAM’s base was increasing its acts of terrorism. The case of East Timor’s independence showed GAM’s ideological leadership quite plainly that internationalising the Aceh conflict could be favourable for Acehnese independence. After Suharto, Jakarta’s policy towards Aceh seemed
inconsistent and confused by a variety of elements that foremost reflected the civil-military power struggle in Jakarta (Braud and Grevi, 2005: 17).

Prior to the EU's involvement in 2005, there had been several other foreign attempts to end the conflict. In spite of the failure of previous peace talks and the pacifying attempts of external non-state actors, these past experiences of failure provided a more positive and open environment for the EU and ASEAN to operate in. On the one hand, the EU's engagement was not completely unfamiliar and on the other, a culture of peace had already been instilled to a minor degree. For example in 2001 and 2002, the Henri-Dunant Centre managed to achieve ceasefires which, however, were brittle, and could not work since they lacked the genuine support of the antagonists. Furthermore, the ASEAN member states, which acted as monitors, appeared to tolerate the military's hard line and could not prevent the two sides from clashing and committing atrocities.

The September 11 attacks and the War on Terror campaign by the USA had an impact on Southeast Asia. The USA largely viewed Southeast Asia as the Second Front. This played into the hands of many Southeast Asian governments and provided a legitimate base for Indonesia to continue cracking down on GAM, despite lacking evidence to connect GAM with JI or international terrorism, namely al-Qaeda. The conflict has been geographically confined to Indonesia, with some impacts in Thailand, Malaysia and the Malacca Straits through small arms trade and piracy attacks used as a source of income for GAM. To what degree the AMM exactly contributed to the decline in piracy is difficult to assess because of the criminalisation of GAM by the Indonesian Government, resulting in difficulty in differentiating between free-riders, splinter groups and actual GAM piracy (Sukma, 2004). The better preparedness and coordination among the littoral ASEAN states, for example through the trilateral cooperation known as the Eye in the Sky initiative on maritime security in the Malacca Straits, effectively reduced the number of piracy cases and also raises the question of how to quantify the actual success of the AMM in relation to piracy.

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25 Libya has been the guerrilla warfare training ground for the second generation of GAM rebels and therefore, this raised allegations that GAM had links to international terrorism during the mid-1980s. However, this lacks evidence and logic in the context of international terrorist works, including al-Qaeda. These connections would only apply to a small faction of GAM.
Organised crime in the form of illegal small arms shipments out of Thailand and financial support by Malaysian sympathisers could be interpreted as the transnationalisation of the conflict in the broadest sense and may have provided a convenient pretext for Indonesian authorities to assume a hard-line approach. In May 2003, President Megawati Sukarnoputri imposed martial law on Aceh and declared a military emergency for a six month period after GAM failed to accept the Special Autonomy offer issued by the Indonesian government. A large-scale offensive was launched against GAM. Once again, it seemed as if the rebel movement had been effectively wiped out. A year later the military emergency was downgraded to civilian emergency and another year later the civilian emergency was lifted.

The AFC in 1998 and the tsunami in 2004 occurred while there was conflict in Aceh. They had spill-over effects into the course of the conflict, re-orienting the focus of the security referent on to the people. Both NTS crises reminded Indonesia of the human plight and the individual in society as the main victim. For two decisive moments in history the traditional view of the state as being Indonesia’s main security referent and guarantor was temporarily perverted. The AFC had negative effects on Indonesian politics and led to the end of Suharto’s regime, indirectly influencing the new moderate policy orientation towards GAM. The new government was more open to dialogue with the GAM but, by 2003, the approach changed and the government declared a military emergency to eradicate GAM once and for all. At the end of 2004, the tsunami exacerbated the crisis in Aceh and allowed external influence into the region.

On the day of the tsunami, the European Commission immediately granted € 3 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and activated the Community Civil Protection Mechanism which coordinated experts from various EU member states. This pro-active behaviour was facilitated by the fact that the crisis caused by the tsunami compelled the GoI to welcome humanitarian assistance from outside whereas any other form of intervention prior to the tsunami would have been a gross interference in Indonesia’s internal affairs. Briefly after the tsunami struck, ECHO operations were already under way. ECHO distributed funds to UN agencies and NGOs that were in situ. By April 2005, the EU had activated three RRMs for the post-tsunami recovery and by 15 December 2005 the Commission had allocated a total amount of € 123 million for humanitarian assistance in Asia, including € 60
The European Commission has also earmarked €207 million for post-tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction in Indonesia. From this package, a total of €203.5 million is being delivered through the Multi Donor Fund (MDF) for Aceh and Nias. The European Commission is the largest contributor of the MDF and acts as one of its co-chairs. The MDF is also supported by several EU member states. Of the €440 million available under MDF, €372 million (85% of total) is contributed by the European Commission and EU member states. A total of €871.4 million has been provided and committed by the Commission and EU Member States for relief efforts, reconstruction assistance and the peace process in Aceh. These contributions were provided through the MDF and direct bilateral aid through United Nations Agencies, Government of Indonesia and non-governmental organisations. (EU Delegation to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam, 2009)

The MDF supported and administered, among others, the following projects in Aceh: Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System Project, Aceh Forest and Environment Problem, Flood Mitigation Program for Banda Aceh, Tsunami Recovery Waste Management Programme, and Strengthening Civil Society Organisations in Community Recovery in Aceh and Nias. These projects are mainly long-term oriented and aim to create infrastructure and strengthen the political maturity of the Acehnese.

The fields of disaster preparedness and crisis management are areas in which the EU can provide expertise and financial help, which is welcomed by ASEAN states. EU engagement in these fields cuts across various European Commission DGs, the civilian arm of the ESDP, the EU member state bilaterals with ASEAN member states, ASEM, AEMM, and ARF. Alongside the rather development-oriented projects of DIPECHO and the information exchange and confidence-building activities of ASEM and AEMM, the ARF has embarked on a new path in 2009 in disaster relief. The first ever robust civilian-led, military-supported ARF-VDR was conducted in Manila and Luzon, where in response to a simulated typhoon hitting these cities contributing ARF member states were asked to help the Government of the Philippines tackle potential negative impacts of the typhoon. This exercise provided a coordinated display of national capacities in action on land, in the air, and in maritime search and rescue, in medical assistance and evacuation and engineering reconstruction. It also put the National Disaster Coordinating Council
and United Nations Clusters Coordination mechanism to the test. This localised exercise supports the potential coordination on disaster relief of ARF members on the global level. Thus, it is not only a robust and tangible advancement of ARF cooperation, but can also be viewed as a nascent sub-global institution in rationalising disaster relief and facilitating coordinated action on the global level.

Beyond the big bulk of humanitarian assistance, the EU also funded two political projects under the RRM in Aceh. One was concerned with the peace negotiation between the GoI and GAM while the other focused on the civil society dimension of the tsunami recovery. After the tsunami the EU became actively engaged in the crisis management and peace process in Aceh.

6.1 The Peace Process
The Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) and the GoI were in contact about solving the conflict in Aceh before the tsunami struck (Gorman and Kivimäki, 2008: 10). After the catastrophe, the connections were given a new impetus and funds were made available by the European Commission to support the GAM-GoI mediation process. Following the mediation process, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was brokered by Martti Ahtisaari and the CMI and agreed on by the GAM and the GoI on 15 August 2005. The MoU is the heart of the operation. Once it was agreed upon in all its aspects (self-government, political participation, economic arrangements, security arrangements and amnesty) after six months of negotiation under the mediation of the CMI, the operational task of implementing was discussed in-depth. An AMM official elaborated,

"The negotiations were ongoing in Helsinki in the first part of 2005 and during the negotiations the question came up as who would monitor any agreement that was reached between the parties. The UN was a non-starter. There was no way the UN would get called in to monitor after what had happened in East Timor. (Interview with AMM official, 10 February 2009)"

The UN and other potential Western actors besides the EU have made a negative impression on Indonesia in the past. Furthermore, the ASEAN states failed to manage the preceding ceasefires. As indicated above, the case of the ASEAN monitors and peace-keepers was problematic. They lacked credibility, because they were accused by GAM of acting in favour of the Indonesian state. Moreover, the
peace-keepers were sent by states that were fellows as well as regional competitors at the same time.

Indonesia post-Suharto and post-tsunami experienced a surge of foreign assistance and presence, facilitating a certain basis of trust towards European actors. The poor infrastructure and lack of institutions to effectively coordinate and distribute aid in a vast archipelagic terrain, necessitated this opening. The democratisation from within also added to this openness towards material and ideational influx from the West. Thirdly, the MoU clearly outlined the tasks and predefined the scope of the AMM. These preconditions meant that the EU was the most plausible and well-equipped option.

During the negotiations, the GoI consented to Ahtisaari’s proposal to invite the EU to monitor the peace process. The peace agreement was not yet established, but already, at the end of June, the EU had sent a team of experts to Indonesia to research the feasibility of a mission in Aceh. This was consented to by GoI. In July, GoI was encouraged by the EU to invite two non-EU countries and five ASEAN member states to participate in the monitoring mission. In Jakarta, the European side met with GoI and the ASEAN member states to discuss their contribution of 20 staff each. From 15 August until 15 September 2005, an Initial Monitoring Presence (IMP) bridged the gap from the ceasefire to the commencement date of the mission. The IMP was financed by bilateral contributions from CSDP member states. On 9 September 2005 the Council adopted the joint action on AMM and specified the mandate as follows:

(a) monitor the demobilisation of GAM and assist with the decommissioning and destruction of its weapons ammunition, and explosives;
(b) monitor the relocation of non-organic military forces and non-organic police troops;
(c) monitor the reintegration of active GAM members;
(d) monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this field in the context of the tasks set out in points (a), (b) and (c) above;
(e) monitor the process of legislation change;
(f) rule on disputed amnesty cases;
(g) investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU;
(h) establish and maintain liaison and good cooperation with the parties

(Council of the European Union, 2006a)
The Planning Team was given the task to design an Operation Plan (OPLAN) to be approved by the Council for the execution of the mandate on site. This decision was made based on the Technical Assessment Mission (TAM). There was some lack of clarity about the budget prior to the mission, however, a European presence was necessary in order not to jeopardise the launch of AMM. Thus, the TAM and IMP staff had to improvise (Braud and Grevi, 2005: 24). The IMP had already been present in Aceh since 2 August 2005. On 18 July 2005, DG RELEX presented a work in progress document that specified the ways AMM could be financed. The timeline available for the financing process was limited and on 18 July 2005 after the General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions, it was also clear that for the mission to be launched on 15 August 2005 would be cumbersome and the question about financing the process would very likely not yield any outcome soon (Braud and Grevi, 2005: 22). In addition to this, it was the summer break in Brussels. The DG RELEX document led to a dispute that revolved around the legal obligations and competencies of the European Commission and the European Council.

The question of financing ESDP operations is directly related to the exercise of political control and strategic direction on the mission itself. This is the reason why some Member States felt that, had its proposal been accepted, the Commission would have acquired excessive political influence on the running of the operation....[T]he Council Legal Service submitted its opinion on the proposal of the Commission, and rejected it on legal, budgetary and political/institutional grounds. From a legal standpoint, it was argued that the RRM and the [Asia and Latin America] programme could not finance a crisis management operation pertaining to CFSP objectives. (Braud and Grevi, 2005: 25)

These budgetary squabbles and the reluctance of some member states to get engaged in Aceh, required Solana’s “assertive intervention” (Braud and Grevi, 2005: 25). On 26 July 2005, he and Ahtisaari addressed the Political and Security Committee and the EU’s ownership of the AMM was confirmed and the financing technicalities assigned to CFSP. Solana’s intervention, however, did not necessarily resolve the budgetary issues in practice, but it clarified the competences of the multiple bodies within the EU.
The AMM illustrates the necessity of adapting and transforming such cumbersome procedures and introducing new mechanisms to CSDP responses of high urgency in order not to be financially dependent on the good-will of individual states. A failure of the AMM during the implementation phase would have probably not singled out the institutional shortcomings in such a pronounced manner, since the financial mechanisms have worked very well in other cases. A failure of the AMM on operational grounds would have completely distracted from the financing squabbles prior to the deployment.

In general, the EU and its member states have market concerns as the most important variable when deciding on a specific action, because they are in a zone of peace where economic well-being is the main objective of political survival, and now even more so. This rationale is one out of many features that distinguishes the EU and other Western political entities from developing ASEAN member states, which are living in a rather realist regional environment. This rationale is complicated by the diversity of interests of the individual member states. The logic of appropriateness becomes subject to cost-benefit calculations of the individual member-states. Furthermore, interregionalism becomes dependent on the two-level game of regional and domestic interests.

In the case of Aceh, it was mainly the Nordic countries which persuaded sceptical fellow member states to consent to an engagement in a remote area. For example, Sweden, previously mentioned as being the place of exile for the GAM leadership, pushed and argued on the basis of humanitarian grounds in favour of the AMM. Overcoming the domestic and near-neighbourhood focus and cost-benefit calculations to provide funds and resources for a greater and rather idealistic global stability good was the underlying question for many countries.

Six days after the Council’s decision on OPLAN, the European Commission’s decision was made and the AMM was given a budget of € 9.3 million from the EU and € 6 million by the participating states and EU member states (Aceh Monitoring Mission, 2005). Within a limited timeframe of two months the EU has managed to draw up an operational plan, organise the staff and come up with a budget. On 15 September 2005 the AMM was launched in Aceh.

The EU and ASEAN teams started the AMM by monitoring the decommissioning of weapons on the GAM side and the withdrawal of the government’s troops out of the region and conducted the other tasks. Justin Davies,
Head of Staff of the AMM, said that at the launch of the mission, there were some concerns about whether any GAM rebels would show up in the stadium where they had organised the first decommissioning of GAM weapons (Interview with AMM official, 10 February 2009). According to the interviewed AMM personnel and EU practitioners, all aspects of the mandate were fulfilled to their and the GoI’s satisfaction. On 15 December 2006, the AMM mandate to assist and monitor the peace process was completed.

In addition to the AMM, the European Commission drew up long-term and flanking projects. Following the deployment of the AMM, the European Commission came up with a support package of € 8.5 million to help reintegrate former combatants and amnestied prisoners (EU Delegation to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam, 2009). Furthermore, it allocated € 15.85 million for the organisation of the local election in 2006, reform of the police and jurisdiction as well as the re-establishment and reform of the public sector (EU Delegation to Indonesia and Brunei Darussalam, 2009).

6.2 “Erfolg hat viele Väter” – success has many fathers

Despite the CSDP’s ownership of the AMM, the ongoing peace emphasises the complementing approaches of the multi-headed NTS actorness of the EU in specific crisis management situations. In order to establish permanent peace in such a conflict, there is a clear difference in approach and competences towards crisis and conflict management between the European Commission and the European Council. In simplified terms, the European Council pursues a military and security approach, whereas the European Commission is more concerned with the long-term dimension of establishing peace. The latter concentrates on structural projects, for instance, rule of law and capacity-building in the public sector. This is not to deny that the European Council does not outline a few structural objectives. There are grey areas in coordination. However, it is quite clear that the long-term, ideological and cultural objectives are to be found in the majority of initiatives by the European Commission, although the European Council holds the responsibility on human rights matters.

One European Commission official explained that the success of the AMM and the ongoing peace are results of two parallel approaches to the implementation of peace. That is, the AMM is complemented by projects of the European Commission that aim for the two other dimensions. In this context he added that “[w]ith a security
approach you can win the war but not the peace” (Interview with EU official, 5 February 2009). He clarified this division of labour in the following metaphor of the European Commission being the ‘software’ and the CSDP being the ‘hardware’.

The main purpose of the AMM was to safeguard an unproblematic transition from an unstable, violent situation to a stable peace where human rights and the rule of law were implemented. From the outset of the AMM, according to the head of the TAM “the mission was never in question because the EU knew they could do it” (Interview with AMM official, 10 February 2009).

The translation of the mandate to the operational level was the responsibility of Pieter Feith and his team of civilian crisis management experts. Their vision was that of a gender and culturally mixed teams. The staff was a combination of experienced European experts who possessed knowledge on international crisis management, human rights, and other technical expertise, while on the ASEAN side, there were staff with local knowledge and cultural awareness in a Muslim society.

The mission consisted of a total of 220 staff. They were unarmed and trained for civilian crisis management. During the TAM four ASEAN officers were involved and agreed to the EU’s vision and “were quite happy to have the EU lead” and in Justin Davies’ opinion the mission “wouldn’t have been as effective without the ASEAN side”, because of their local and cultural know-how (Interview with AMM official, 10 February 2009). The history of the EU itself is a multicultural experience suggesting that the EU must be capable of conducting cross-cultural operations. Antje Wiener has argued that the EU’s past has given it a highly differentiated pool of knowledge to draw upon and taught it to be a tolerant actor from within (Wiener, 2008), although some national incidents such as the recent controversy of the burqa ban in France suggest a difference between the supranational and domestic level.

While the interviewed AMM officials portrayed cultural issues to have had minimal or virtually non-existent impact on the functioning of the teams, Kirsten Schulze suggests that there is room for improvement. The limited timeframe for drafting the mission resulted in a lack of training and language preparations and the organisation of qualified translators (Schulze, 2007: 5). In fact, Justin Davies admitted that there were language and cultural differences, but these obstacles did not interfere the smooth running of the operation (Interview with AMM official, 10 February 2009). Another aspect that intrigued Schulze was the AMM’s “lack of focus on implementing the human rights elements at the beginning of the process, which
made it possible for the AMM to ultimately complete its mission in the highly sensitive context of Indonesian domestic politics” (Schulze, 2007: 14). She states that human rights lacked incorporation throughout the AMM process.

The MoU includes various human rights clauses, but, in practice, these clauses seemed to have had very little influence as, for example, in the case of the Law on the Governance of Aceh (LoGA). The passing of the LoGA raised criticism from the European Parliament, GAM and international as well as local NGOs (Schulze, 2007: 9-10). The LoGA was perceived as a central government legislation that neglected the dialogue with the Acehnese ethnic minority. Its incorporation of Sharia Law further raises questions about liberalisation and democratisation processes within Indonesia. International NGOs pointed out that the document fell short in guaranteeing minority rights, religious freedom, freedom of expression and gender equality (Schulze, 2007: 10).

In particular, in view of the EU Council’s adoption of the UNSCR1325 in 2005, Schulze argues that the AMM was not in line with the EU’s own standards. She has raised a valid point, in light of Title V, Chapter 1, Art. 10a, and the various international conventions on human rights, to which the EU and its member states are signatories. However, with regard to the AMM’s specific task (d) on human rights, it is also evident that the focus of the human rights mandate is only in relation to points (a), (b) and (c). Hence, the case of the AMM does not directly support her argument in a clear-cut manner since the AMM was concerned with monitoring human rights aspects revolving around the decommissioning, withdrawal of GoI-associated troops, amnesty and reintegration of ex-GAM combatants.

In reference to the interviews with the EU and AMM officials, any other form of human rights surveillance and intervention would have jeopardised the mission. “Let’s say, it is not a contradiction in first place. It is a Realpolitik, a recognition of Realpolitik. You aim for goals. You have a certain vision....We thought human rights, democracy [etc.] are important” but “normative influence was limited from the outset notwithstanding a vision that we have” (Interview with EU official, 5 February 2009). EU officials have argued that the CSDP staff were not in a position to promote human rights either during the negotiation or peace process since, first and foremost, it was Indonesia’s problem and not the EU’s problem. The EU was not actively negotiating in Helsinki and only consented to Ahtisaari as the mediator. Ahtisaari was paid by the EU but he did not represent the EU. He might have wanted a
stronger focus on human rights during the process, but this was his personal ambition and not to be mistaken for the EU's official rhetoric (Interview with EU official, 5 February 2009).

The only dimension of the EU’s engagement in Aceh which supports a value-consistent and coherent picture of the EU as an NTS actor is the long-term development assistance that has been in place for decades as part of the European Commission’s and the individual EU member states’ approach to Indonesia. This assistance should be seen as part of a greater European strategy facilitating and shaping the perception of a diverse but united EU as actor.

The success of the AMM brought along expectations towards the EU’s actoriness in the region. In reference to the AMM, it appeared that the interviewed Southeast Asian officials automatically associate the EU with managing NTS threats and soft power. The problem herein, is that this role attribution might not translate into actual political weight in the region. There are certain role expectations to be met. The EU’s monitoring role is now a major characteristic of the EU as an NTS actor in Southeast Asia. This role is projected onto it and compels the EU to analyse its success critically. It will have to continue to live up to the role pressure and explore options in improving and cementing its newly gained reputation as an expert in civilian crisis management and monitoring missions.

The EU is not interested in a military or strategic presence in the region like the USA and deems this economically unviable. Furthermore, the relationship lacks salience to overcome the divergence of the member states and trigger ASEAN as a vital ‘other’ in collective identity-building. Since the EU and the majority of its member states officially reject any deep strategic commitment to the region – beside the Five Power Defence Agreement between the UK and selected ASEAN states or arms trade –, European engagement has proven to be compatible with ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and the strong sense of national sovereignty in the region. The EU’s quick-in-and-out approach, once the AMM mandate ended, was regarded with favour and was a positive signal to Indonesia and ASEAN that the EU will not be intrusive and go beyond its mandate. For now, the EU would like to retain a certain presence in the province, namely in the form of the Europa House. The EU believes that the reintegration and disbursement tasks of ex-combatants are still uncompleted and there are certain fears that an entire European withdrawal could allow tensions to rise again (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010). This extension of the Europa
House is viewed with a degree of scepticism by Indonesian officials and the EU’s initial quick-in-and-out commitment appears diluted and indicates mission creep.

A concern that was raised on the European side by the head of TAM and IMP was the lack of interregional follow-up cooperation in the field of security building on the success of AMM. He regarded the AMM as a missed opportunity to institutionalise something more lasting, such as an interregional crisis management mechanism that can be drawn upon in future scenarios to avoid the complex financing process. A senior advisor to the European Commission also expressed that the ASEAN side seemed marginally interested in establishing regular follow-up cooperation with CSDP (Interview with EU official, 6 February 2008). Despite this shortcoming, the AMM gave a small impetus that led to the Nuremberg Declaration, which stimulated a new dynamic within AEMM. The CSDP’s first action in the region contributed to a positive image of the EU, but the reality of Southeast Asia is that peace-keeping actors attract limited interest in a region preoccupied with hard security.

The case displayed the EU as capable of projecting capabilities to remote regions. It showed that European staff successfully planned and executed a programme that integrated the actors of the other region. It indicated the putative collective political willingness to act in Southeast Asia and fulfil its self-proclaimed role conception of a crisis manager abroad, as expressed by Benita Ferrero-Waldner below.

In our foreign policy we will prioritise conflict prevention and crisis management; promoting human rights and human security; and strengthening effective multilateralism....We will continue to champion human rights and put particular emphasis on human security....responding to the full range of threats afflicting the most vulnerable in societies across the world, such as hunger, deadly diseases, environmental degradation and physical insecurity. (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005)

Mainstreaming human rights into the implementation of the tasks is a problem and it seems that “to champion human rights” might not adequately reflect the EU’s actions within the AMM and calls into question whether the EU’s toned down practices actually “do put emphasis on human security”. The example of the LoGA suggested that stability of the sovereign may be prioritised over human security. The increasing tendency within the CSDP to mainstream human rights and
democratisation and the call of some EU officials for CSDP to become more executive and interventionist abroad may pose problems for its future engagement within the ASEAN region.

First and foremost, the AMM was a success story for GoI. The various stakeholders and influential figures on the EU and ASEAN side contributed to Aceh’s peace and so, in the end, every side can claim to be part of this success. However, the following claims have proven to be overly optimistic. This may have been the result of a certain degree of post-mission euphoria on the European side.

The EU, which has proved with AMM that it can considerably contribute to peace and stability in South East Asia, should build on the new political prestige in the region and will take steps towards enhancing both the EU-ASEAN relationship. [...] Moreover, COASI ([Council Working Party on Asia-Oceania]) concurs that AMM has given an important impetus to EU-ASEAN cooperation, as both the evaluation prepared by the AMM Chief of Staff and the comments by CIVCOM ([Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management]) underline. COASI noted and welcomed that the lessons learned are already being incorporated in the Action Plan to be adopted by the EU-ASEAN Ministerial [M]eeting in March in Nuremberg. The EU is in the unique position to be able to contribute to this process by offering ASEAN an opportunity to learn more about the ESDP, its structures and processes, with a view to fostering the development of capabilities and procedures appropriate for ASEAN-specific needs. (Council of the European Union, 2007)

This positive outlook did not end in concrete follow-ups in terms of enhanced security cooperation. The AMM may have paved the way for potential future engagement of this type in the region. However, the positive image of the EU as an impartial and non-violent security actor which is welcomed again, may, in practice, counter the EU’s normative identity. It may prove that certain norms and values may be more difficult to translate into practice. In the case of Aceh, the EU has to some extent compromised its values for the greater good.

6.3 Summary of EU Actorness and the Normative Dimension

The case of the AMM presents an instance explained by the logic of appropriateness, given that the crisis was remote and did not offer any incentives for action. Furthermore, it is a case that shows the applicability of Caporaso’s and Jupille’s definition of actorness, involving the dimensions of actorness cohesion described on page 23. There appeared to be a degree of actorness incoherence,
because the interests and goals of the EU member states differed in the early stages. The AMM has displayed the validity of tactical cohesion in the sense that the interests and goals of the EU member states differed, but that they can be linked to each other for the EU to act as a single actor internationally. Value and procedural cohesion were less problematic among the EU’s multiple heads, given the strong legal anchoring of values and procedures on the intergovernmental and supranational level. The main problem of cohesion appeared to be on the level of interest cohesion.

My simplified definition of actorness in the Introduction assumes that the EU as an actor should be able to aggregate interests, formulate goals and policies and implement these. For instance, in the case of the AMM, the process of interest aggregation was outlined and showed active and passive EU actors involved. It displayed the increased complexity, because of the EU’s complex policy-making structure that consists of more policy levels and stakeholders than a state. The EU did not formulate the goals or purposes, in fact, they were pre-defined by the GAM and GoI. As discussed on page 25, crisis situations automatically premise the goal or purpose and render its formulation obsolete. The EU conceptualised OPLAN and implemented it and in this instance exhibited clearer evidence of actorness.

In connection to crises, the overall goal is simple; it is responding to a crisis. Yet, the overall goal or purpose is only the general rationale explaining the action. It needs to be differentiated and understood that the policy- and operation-related purposes substantiate the general goal and constitute actorness. Across the case studies the degree of EU goal and purpose formulation varied. In the case of the AMM, the guidelines and objectives were virtually standing and defined by the counterpart, whereas post-Bali bombings the EU was actively seeking for a purpose to assist and to be accepted by Indonesia and ASEAN. Here again the argument applies that the lower the sensitivity and the higher the commonality of the area of cooperation or dialogue, the higher the chance for the EU to define and formulate the goal and purpose. One needs to consider that within international relations, there is rarely a case where a state will allow or where it is legitimate for an outsider to exclusively define the goal of an interaction or action. In this context, it is important to note the importance of the exogenous ideational variables that facilitate the cooperation of some actors, as discussed by Jepperson and colleagues on page 43.
The mission incorporated tasks consistent with the EU’s normative identity, however, it was not an executive mandate and appeared watered down in translation. Thus, scholars such as Schulze have criticised the mission as having compromised EU values to some extent (Schulze, 2007). The AMM may have lacked a certain normative dimension in implementation, but the European Commission has attempted to compensate this shortcoming with its complementary engagement. The multiple heads of the EU that are involved in the EU’s policy process enable the EU to relocate the normative agenda when paths of influence are blocked. The case can be made that the official EU rhetoric as well as the European Commission’s flanking engagement displays normative output and identity consistency. Schulze’s concerns are relevant; however, in light of the AMM’s objectives they are slightly misplaced. This the case, in particular, because persuasion and the transferral of norms can only be effective, if the counterpart is open to being persuaded and is willing to adapt and adopt norms. Since Schulze’s criticism the EU has been aiming to mainstream human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The EU has recognised the role of women in building peace. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security and UNSCR 1612 on Children and Armed Conflict is essential in this context. (European Council, 2008: 10)

This document answers Schulze’s criticism in a declaratory manner but is still waiting to be consistently implemented in practice. The EU’s normative agenda raises questions of actorness compatibility with and within Southeast Asia. However, its quick-in-and-out approach and its lenient stance on democratisation and human rights in comparison to the USA, make the EU a suitable partner for Southeast Asia to some extent. This is opposed to findings within Chapter 5, where a ASEAN Secretariat official said that the EU needs to be clear and consistent about its normative agenda. The EU appears non-threatening and open to being persuaded to tone down its normative expectations. It is not interested in a permanent military or strategic presence in the region and thus, it has proven to be compatible with ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and its strong sense of national sovereignty.

In the case of Aceh, the conflict-torn societies were additionally affected by a sudden natural catastrophe which deprived the people of their sources of livelihood.
The ideological problem became a real human-centric survival problem over-night. In such a situation where the state is usually overburdened and unprepared, it will be more willing to let external actors in to help and allow the human security debate and thus, the human rights debate to sneak in. In such a vulnerable society, there is a greater chance for external actors to create space for discourse on contested norms and values as the faith of the crisis-ridden people in their own government is at a low-point. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), ICRC, the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE) and other international organisations provided humanitarian aid immediately after the Tsunami and, at the same time, they propagated human rights awareness (Jamil and Hersutanto, 2007: 5). This presence and normative activism of other international organisations alleviated the EU’s normative burden.

Societies in despair are usually characterised by a slight degree of anarchy and a higher willingness of individuals to violence. Elderly people, women and children are then in an even weaker position and easy targets of any form of aggression. The presence of alternative actors, who are external and international actors, can strengthen the societal basis and contain societal collapse. Consequently, the AMM also created an environment conducive to future intraregional cooperation with fellow ASEAN countries and interregional cooperation with the EU and its member states.

The AMM attests that the EU is capable of planning, deploying funds, resources and civilian manpower to a remote region in Asia and executing its operational plan outside other multilateral frameworks. The EU played a distinctive and significant role in overcoming the crisis. It took up the leadership role in monitoring and implementing the peace process. The EU was not merely one out of many contributors in alleviating or resolving the problem as it has been in other case studies. It was an active, yet multi-headed actor, both strategist and executor of the operational plan. It provided the overall strategy and operational plan for its partners and led the mission. The ASEAN partners played an important support role in executing the plan. As aforementioned, the EU ensured that this interregional operation ran smoothly despite cultural and language barriers.

On the one hand, the EU has proven that it can act as a coherent collectivity and overcome intraregional issues of competency overlap and inter-institutional rivalry to effectively strategise, lead, and delegate. In the case of Aceh, competency overlap and inter-institutional rivalry functioned positively and were useful in terms of
flexibility and functional substitution of actors. While the case traced all four aspects of actorness, it also highlighted the issues of actorness in relation to the categories of interest aggregation and incoherency in view of multiple stakeholders. On the other hand, the AMM has proven that the circumvention of multilateral frameworks is necessary from time to time and that the EU can live up to the global governance responsibility that falls on it.

This does not mean that the EU only displays rhetorical commitment to its norm of upholding multilateralism. The EU acts in accordance with the given situation. If an approach via an international organisation or a multilateral forum appears inappropriate, although these bodies may be better prepared or equipped to act, the EU will take responsibility. This depends on whether it views the problem as manageable and its actorness as appropriate. The AMM boosted the EU's confidence and the rhetoric of EU foreign policy officials in the following years built on this success story to further define the EU's role in the world. For instance, the following statement by Ferrero-Waldner in 2006 was inspired by the success of the AMM.

The EU is the world's biggest donor, but we often lack the flexibility to move quickly. We will make crisis management a particular focus in the coming years, building on our strategy for disaster alert and preparedness. Our aim is to develop flexible and responsive solutions to crisis situations and so be a better partner for the military component of crisis response. (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006)

Conclusively, despite the EU's clear and significant actorness in Aceh, the notion of the EU as a crisis manager in Southeast Asia does not appear to be a role conception inherent in the EU, yet. Of course, the underlying norms and values of EU external action and its civilian-military toolkit suggest this type of EU NTS actorness is a natural step in the EU's evolution to a consolidated actor with and within Southeast Asia. It seems that, at the present stage, the EU's NTS actorness stands for a mask that the EU puts on for a limited time in a specific situation. Thus, the EU's engagement in NTS concerns of Southeast Asia is regularly perceived as sporadic cooperation. This mask satisfies the European public's humanitarian concerns overseas and, at the same time, it allows an eventual creeping adaptation towards a more robust role that is still in tune with the opinion of the European public. The EU has to meet the domestic humanitarian-oriented expectations of a
public accustomed to democracy, civil liberties, and human rights. Furthermore, it has to live up to the hard security-oriented environment of its international partners.

With regard to the EU’s specific role as an NTS actor in Southeast Asia, William I. Zartman’s general argument concerning mediators holds higher grounds. He argues that “[a]ll non-state actors have an interest in enhancing their positions as useful third parties, not out of any venal egotism but because they believe they have something to offer; furthermore, a reinforcement of their standing and reputation helps them do their job” (Zartman, 2008: 160). The EU is still seeking to establish its security role in Southeast Asia and did not have any immediate politico-security interests in resolving Aceh. The fact that the European Commission pushed for the AMM and that it initially aspired for greater involvement affirms that a young and non-state member of the international community like the EU may have considered this instance as a step towards greater EU actorness recognition and parity with states.

Conclusions
The final case study described the only case of an ASEAN-EU joint security operation with and within Southeast Asia. The AMM had impetus on the AEMM level and enhanced dialogue and cooperative efforts. It elucidated CSDP actorness and displayed the process of how the intergovernmental agreement was achieved, the mission came about and how it failed to attract any concrete follow-up interest on the Southeast Asian side. It illustrated the complex interplay of the EU’s multiple heads and the lack of salience of the relationship. The interest to engage and provide funding was only advocated by a few member states and high-ranked EU personalities who worked hard to persuade the other member states and make their case. The problem was not a lack of capabilities, but a lack of willingness and perception of urgency. In the end, a consensus was achieved and the European Commission provided financial assistance for the TAM and IMP and CSDP was responsible for devising and implementing OPLAN.

In addition to the AMM, the European Commission launched flanking projects. These were able to go beyond the MoU and address human rights and social issues. The AMM was tasked only to monitor the human rights violations and legislation drafting, whereas the Commission projects tackled these sensitive issues directly. The EU’s normative identity was expressed, but inconsistently implemented in the
AMM. Instead, it was the European Commission, particularly, in the form of the flanking projects, which reconciled normative identity, behaviour, and output. In spite of this successful cooperation between the two regions, there was a lack of follow-up to cement EU peace-implementing and -keeping actoriness in the region. CSDP’s first action in the region contributed to a positive image of the EU as a collective security actor. However, the reality of Southeast Asia is that international actors limited to peace-keeping attract marginal interest in a region preoccupied with hard security.
Chapter 7
Characteristics and Constraints of the EU

Throughout the case studies, it has been shown that the EU and its member states displayed actorness and could be perceived as normative actors to varying degrees. The general pattern of EU engagement in the aftermath of a crisis starts with research endeavours, fact-finding missions or joint information exchange with Southeast Asia. This was exemplified in Chapter 5 through the expert team that was sent to Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the Bali bombings, or, in Chapter 6, when the TAM was sent, before the AMM was launched. These missions are to establish potential areas of cooperation and determine what added value the EU can provide to manage an NTS threat or crisis. On this basis, proposals are made in consultation with the Southeast Asian side. Projects are devised, funding made available, and implementing actors selected. Not every project is implemented in the end, as exemplified by the Integrated Border Management System in Chapter 5.

NTS challenges within the post-Cold War environment provided an opportunity for the EU and Southeast Asia to increasingly jointly manage problems of transnational scope and common concern. They have suggested enhanced activism in severe cases of NTS crises. It was premised and shown throughout the thesis, that the main evidence and tangible source of reference were the activities, from which we could then derive the motivations and normative dimension.

In the Introduction, the following brief definition of actorness was given as a guideline. Actorness must "depend on an actor being identifiable, able to aggregate interests, formulate goals and purposes and implement these". The EU has been an identifiable actor, but to differing degrees. Across the case studies, the European side aggregated interests, formulated goals and purposes, and policies in response to the NTS challenges and crises. It offered assistance to the counterpart and contributed to the implementation and enforcement of the decisions. These features of actorness were detectable in the case studies.

In the case studies, EU actorness was composed of member state and European Commission actorness as well as actorness by proxy through NGOs and state-affiliated organisations. Since our focus is on the EU as a single actor, the EU's multiple heads are sub-components of the singular collective identity. The defined
criteria of actorness assume a regional perspective and the examples of the bilateral member state activities contextualise this perspective. State-affiliated or NGO actors by proxy are not accounted for in the definition of actorness. It is suggested that future definitions of actorness will need to incorporate this aspect.

In many cases, the EU was a considerable financial donor of funds for projects channelled through international partners. Since the EU was often neither present on site nor part of the implementation project, the counterpart was in some instances not aware of the EU’s involvement and actorness. An EU official has expressed that it has been very difficult to negotiate some form of visibility with the implementing partners or proxy actors (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010). Sometimes the EU may act but remain invisible and unidentifiable. Furthermore, because the EU holds multi-headed authority in policy-making and representation, member state or non-state agencies complicate a clear regional perspective on actorness. They blur the recognition of actorness by the sociological ‘other’. In the field of security, this recognition by the counterpart has become more complex since the establishment of the ESDP/CSDP. Before ESDP/CSDP, EU security actorness has always been associated with NATO and the OSCE. In some of the interviews with Southeast Asian officials, it was apparent that some of these officials were more familiar with the OSCE than the ESDP/CSDP (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 25 May 2010).

In general, for an institution to accomplish actorness is very difficult when there are marginally coherent perceptions, goals and purposes. Additionally, if the actor itself remains diffuse and a presence rather than an actor to the sociological ‘other’, the concept of actorness does not necessarily apply. The only case that showed clear-cut EU NTS actorness through interest aggregation, goal formulation, decision-making and implementation was the case of the AMM. In this case, the EU had a clear and prominent role to play and was visible to the counterpart as an actor.

The other cases were obfuscated mainly by the limited activities and the numerous other international actors who provided assistance. Furthermore, the EU remained largely invisible as an implementer on site. In light of these observations, EU actorness was difficult to quantify in terms of recognition and implementation. In regard to interest aggregation and goal formulation, these processes were discussed in detail in the context of the AMM. In the other cases, the threat perceptions or the developmental agenda were primarily discussed as the starting points for policy
formulation, given the intricacy in identifying the various national and regional interests and processes with regard to interest aggregation and goal formulation. In general, we can assume that these processes have taken place prior to the individual activities that have been described in the empirical chapters, as has also been acknowledged in the beginning of the thesis.

The thesis has emphasised the role of NTS challenges as triggers for European action. It has illustrated that these challenges have been a threat to the security of the individual as well as that of the state. These challenges were important catalysts for attracting European attention and enhancing the interaction with Southeast Asia. The thesis highlighted that these crises involved unstable norms, threat ‘othering’, and the commonalisation of threats. These are the general starting points for EU engagement and they raise the opportunity for the EU and its member states to influence Southeast Asia. The chapters indicated that these processes are related to the threat itself and the potential of threat contagion.

Specifically, in relation to the process of threat ‘othering’, the case studies showed that the European side sought to protect itself from contagion through enhanced cooperation. For example, the case of the AFC displayed that this process did not result in a deterioration of the relationship. Instead, it revealed greater European actorness and a new pragmatic dynamism in the relationship within the ASEAN-EU context post-AFC.

Until recently, the EU has prominently portrayed Myanmar as a source of NTS threats destabilising the ASEAN region. Undoubtedly, a variety of NTS threats ranging from drug trafficking to infectious diseases stem from Myanmar.\(^\text{26}\) However, singling out this country distorts the fact that there are other ASEAN member states which are also of concern to their neighbours. This has been mentioned in the chapter on the haze and forest governance. Here, Indonesia thwarted regional integrative dynamics in relation to the haze. In situations, where there is limited regional cohesion and the opportunity for norms to become unstable, NTS challenges open the door for external actors. In these cases, the EU, as the champion of development and humanitarian assistance in Southeast Asia, has a good opportunity to make an impact. However, in the case of the haze the international and regional normative foundations, as well as Indonesia’s disinterest in

\(^{26}\) Please see Subchapter 2.1.
regional cooperation hindered European regional best-practice-sharing in relation to the environment. The responses in the majority of the case studies reflected a humanitarian and developmental rationale. Both the EU and the Southeast Asian sides perceived the EU’s responses along these lines.

The chapters have highlighted the extent to which the EU is an actor and acts according to its normative identity. The chapters have shown the EU as a multi-headed actor supporting the region and individual ASEAN member states through development, humanitarian assistance, RRM’s and other mechanisms. The case studies have displayed the EU’s comprehensive toolkit in action. The EU’s use of these capabilities was based on a comprehensive strategy. It preferred to make use of the ‘soft’ tools, since the selected case studies were located on the softer spectrum of the NTS threats. The use of force is the EU’s last resort. It has not been utilised in the context of NTS threats in Southeast Asia. Military staff has been deployed in the case of the AMM, but this was related to peace-keeping. Training, best-practice-sharing, and equipment sales take place. However, the EU and its member states do not hold a robust and executive role.

There are only individual member states which are actively pushing for a greater strategic role. For example, at the 11th Shangri-La Dialogue in 2012, French Minister of Defence, Jean-Yves Le Drian said that France is a power in the Asia-Pacific.27 In a time of austerity, it will be interesting to see whether in the near future, the EU as a collective actor will change its operational capabilities and strategies to adapt to the ambition and rhetoric of individual heads of state. The growing interest in NTS threats by the European Commission and individual EU member states as confirmed through the most recent AEMMs, suggests that the EU as a collective actor is seeking to expand its role in the region.

In general, the empirical evidence largely conflated with the definition of actorness provided in Chapter 1. However, there was divergence from the definition of actorness in terms of implementation in two main ways. Firstly, in most instances, the final implementer was not the EU, but an international organisation or state-affiliated agency acting on behalf of the EU and its member states. Secondly, the visibility of European actors also depended on the extent to which implementing international organisations, including the UN, would acknowledge the European

27 Please see the full speech at www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2012/speeches/?esctf3017559espagelisterespager_p=4 , accessed on 24 June 2012.
involvement. The following paragraphs will take a closer look at the features contributing to our understanding of the EU as a normative actor.

I have assumed that transnational NTS threats and crises hold an important part within the actorness of international political entities and suggested that crises act similarly to goals and interests in the absence of crises. However, the neat dividing line between interests and identity has become blurred. Common global goods have provided greater approximation to the idea of a common lifeworld and relativised the power distribution. NTS management is the new prominent guideline of the ASEAN-EU and overall Asia-Europe relationship. It is imperative for the EU to recognise its financial, technocratic and technological advantage and embrace the concept of NTS as an opportunity to share its experience. While this is an opportunity to enhance cooperation between the two sides, the EU needs to ensure that it remains true to its normative identity.

Southeast Asia relies heavily on external assistance for capabilities to manage and drive development. The ASEAN-EU relationship is a source of gaining resources to this end. At the same time, the relationship is a gateway to enhance Southeast Asia’s integration into the global economy as well as the EU’s opportunity to strengthen its politico-security profile in the region. Clearly the NTS frame enhanced EU activities and the ASEAN-EU relationship. However, did the NTS frame do justice to the EU’s normative agenda in the region?

In times of crises, EU NTS actorness/actorness on NTS threats followed the logic of appropriateness to varying degrees. The case studies showed that the variation depended on the degree of contagion and interdependence. In times of crises abroad, but with the potential to harm the region, the EU will mainly act according to its threat perceptions. This emphasises the logic of consequentiality as the driving force. For example, the AFC has shown that the pledge within the ASEM context was not altruist and included a high degree of self-interest. It crystallised that the EU’s initial responsive assistance is sometimes altruist as the case of the Bali bombings showed. However, here, the EU’s normative identity was compromised to some extent, since Indonesia’s human rights record was not an obstacle to launch the RRM.

Furthermore, the EU is demand-oriented in regard to its short-term and responsive action. That is, its response is narrow and focused on providing a quick relief to the ill, which is, for example, evident in reference to the anti-haze projects in
the first phase of cooperation. By contrast, the long-term projects are more diffuse and less focused on combating the fires and the haze directly. This can be explained by the EU’s regional integration process that became outward-oriented and involved the projection and diffusion of its standards in the 1990s. In this time, the responses to the haze appeared according to the logic of appropriateness, because they were preoccupied with structural and pre-emptive measures.

All the case studies indicated that the EU’s long-term and structural actorness does not always follow the logic of appropriateness distinctively. Actorness may be appropriate in some instances, but because Southeast Asia is far away or the NTS threat neither immediate nor an actual threat to the EU, the EU will be less inclined to act. To not act according to what is appropriate to the international society does not mean a contradiction of the logic of appropriateness. It appears that this logic is based on what the ‘self’ deems appropriate in the first place. The international society currently lacks sufficient cohesion and authority to influence significantly the role and identity of many actors.

The logic of appropriateness was particularly traceable in events of crisis, when the EU was unaffected and showed solidarity in light of the severe plight. These actions are identity-guided and not subject to lengthy political deliberations. In these cases, the crises were registered and interpreted by the EU supranational bodies and the member states for the purpose of immediate assistance provision. This has occasionally led to enhanced intraregional cooperation, in particular, if the threat had contagious impact. In these instances, the logic of consequentiality paralleled the logic of appropriateness. Sometimes, the self-protective measures have been altruistically packaged.

We can speak of the EU as a normative actor to some extent. The logic of appropriateness was identified as a driver in many case studies and many of the activities included a normative dimension. In those case studies that show a prevalence of the logic of consequentiality as the driving force, we can still perceive the EU as a normative actor. However, this depends on the extent to which the EU’s behaviour and outcome of behaviour suggest the EU to be a normative actor. The overall rhetoric of the EU in relation to these NTS challenges displayed the EU’s liberal-democratic agenda. The EU and its member states have advocated and promoted this in their external relations with Southeast Asia. Sometimes, the norms
and values were compromised for the sake of dialogue and effectiveness, as will be reiterated below. Ferrero-Waldner once said,

In our foreign policy we will prioritise conflict prevention and crisis management; promoting human rights and human security; and strengthening effective multilateralism. The EU firmly believes that preventing conflicts is not only a moral imperative, but also considerably less costly in the long run. We must address the root causes of conflicts and deny support to terrorism. We will continue to champion human rights and put particular emphasis on human security...; respond to the full range of threats afflicting the most vulnerable in societies across the world, such as hunger, deadly diseases, environmental degradation and physical insecurity. (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005)

This excerpt reflects the difficulty in disentangling the different logics behind the EU’s actions. It exemplifies the ambiguous character of actorness that drives this study. That is, on the one hand, EU actorness is based on a “moral imperative” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005). On the other hand, it recognises that it will also be “considerably less costly in the long run” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005). The logics of consequentiality and appropriateness underpin the EU’s actorness. They are manifest in a mixed fashion and complicate a clear categorisation of the EU as a normative actor. To define the EU as a normative actor based on its output, provides only limited insights into the EU as a normative actor. In the mentioned examples, including the ASEAN-German Regional Forest Programme in Chapter 4, the agenda and projects were highly watered down by the Southeast Asian side. However, the fact that the people-oriented dimensions were accepted in the end is a positive signal. In general, it is difficult to establish whether there was an internalisation of the norms or whether the Southeast Asian side was paying lip-service. Furthermore, in some cases the EU itself seemed to have compromised its normative identity to some extent. For example, there was the case of FLEGT that emphasised the economic dimension. Another example was the human rights monitoring in the AMM.

The majority of cases showed that the EU and its member states did not cooperate on the basis of short-term goals for individual gains. Rather, the engagement built on previous development cooperation or ad hoc financial and technical support, as a means to address the underlying problems of NTS issues. That is, in the majority of the case studies European activities involved long-term goals for collective gains. In relation to these kinds of activities, normative
motivations act as the driving force. Overall, the case studies suggest a mixture of drivers in response to the NTS issues in Southeast Asia.

Furthermore, we need to note that the EU does not cooperate only because it can cooperate. The Integrated Border Management System followed careful assessments of: (a) what is feasible with high success chances, (b) what can provide an added value and boost the EU’s identity and (c) what is not a mere duplication of resources. The EU picks and chooses where it cooperates depending on whether it can cooperate and whether it is worth cooperating. The latter depends on three factors derived from the case studies: the body politic and the intraregional coordination, jurisdiction, and legislation of the interregional counterpart, the probable outcome, and the added value of such cooperation. Of course, reputation and face-saving are also background factors directing towards a certain decision. They are ideational benefits for the EU’s international role and identity. However, they are not necessarily traceable in official documents but sometimes appear through during interviews with former and current EU officials. This has been particularly observed on questions around the visibility of the EU as an actor (Interview with EU official, 27 May 2010).

A high amount of communication and interpretation of crises between the Southeast Asian and European sides is indicative of a common lifeworld and meaningful dialogue. Because the crises were either mainly localised to one counterpart or subject to more regions than just the two, the case studies did not show a pure ASEAN-EU inter-subjective interpretation of the crises. Furthermore, the empirical evidence displayed the EU interpreting the crises minimally to justify its financial contribution or engagement. Because the EU and its member states have a history of providing development assistance to Southeast Asia and since this assistance does not excessively burden European budgets sponsored by EU taxpayers, there was very little public debate involved. Only in instances of excessive and new forms of development aid does the need for public debate arise.

In the European context, inter-subjectivity of crisis interpretations may be elitist, but incorporates the influence of the people. By contrast, this dimension is virtually non-existent in the Southeast Asian process of crisis interpretation. Hence, responsive policy formulation and implementation within ASEAN are short of the people-dimension, given the prevalence of semi- or non-democratic systems of governance. This premises Southeast Asian crisis-responsive learning processes as
state-centric and elitist-driven and complicates the EU’s normative influence. Despite manifold vulnerabilities and crises in the region, behavioural and normative change is limited by a variety of factors including the domestic system of governance. Thus, European projects with the objective to remedy this and be more people-oriented contribute to our understanding of the EU as a normative actor in terms of intention and activities.

In the case of the haze and political conflict in Aceh, EU interpretations of the Southeast Asian crises did not lead to apparent threat constructions. These crises were not immediate and did not trigger threat perceptions. However, the interpretation of these crises was still imperative for the EU to identify and justify EU assistance. The more severe these crises were, the more interpretation the EU invested. The case of the political conflict in Aceh required substantive elite-to-elite persuasion to create an argument convincing enough for all member states to accept ESDP/CSDP to be deployed to Aceh. Here, there was no sudden crisis to convey urgency and support the persuasion process. In addition, the public was not involved, but indirectly included in the cost-benefit calculations of some EU member states, which opposed the mission. The case of the AMM is not a case of crisis interpretation and threat creation.

Then, there was the case of the AFC entailing threat construction with intra-mural as well as external policy implications. The interpretation of the crises and the response construction were minimally linked to the ASEAN-EU level. Based on this, we can conclude that crisis interpretations and threat constructions refer, first and foremost, to the ‘self’.

Furthermore, some case studies showed that Southeast Asia resisted the EU’s normative influence. This was seen in the case of the ASEAN-German Regional Forest Programme. Thus, the EU is minimally intrusive, firstly, because of its foreign policy principle of a ‘light foot-print’ and, secondly, because of the resistance on the Southeast Asian side. Furthermore, the recent developments towards greater demand-orientation and country ownership in development co-operation have enhanced the responsibility of the ASEAN Secretariat and member states.

This approach is compatible with the principle of non-interference. However, in some instances, the commitment to non-interference may make the EU appear to be a timid actor, as expressed in Chapter 5. In this chapter, an ASEAN Secretariat official was not convinced by the EU’s normative agenda, because of its timid stance.
on human rights, democracy and other values. By contrast, Chapter 6 suggested that in the case of the Europa House in Aceh, the EU is stretching the principle of non-interference. The EU may be pushing Indonesia’s hospitality by extending the mandate.

So far, both the input and output of actions obscure rather than affirm the EU as a distinct normative actor, since, among other reasons, norms can be used to frame interests, as exemplified in Chapter 3 in regard to the trade and investment pledge. Thus, the clear-cut and central determinants of the EU as a normative actor have been the degree of contagion, the urgency of assistance, the existing cooperation in a specific field, the distinction between NTS actorness and actorness on NTS.

Finally, the EU as a normative actor also relates to the method of norm projection. The transfer of norms through the region-to-region approach is a method that the EU has mastered. It takes into account that the region-to-region/interregional method has normative repercussions, since the method is based on regional integrative experiences that involved and generated specific norms and values. In the Introduction on page 4, it was argued that sharing the region-to-region experiences constitutes a method that shows the EU as a unique normative actor. Namely, this implies the transfer of norms including multilateralism, consensus, subsidiarity, permeable national sovereignty, and others. These norms are salient to the region-to-region approach by the EU. While Jetschke has argued that ASEAN has actively emulated EU institutions, the case studies showed that the European side is also very keen to share its regional experience with Southeast Asia (Jetschke, 2009).

The case studies illustrated that the interregional level appears to be one of many EU foreign policies. In fact, many case studies displayed the prevalence of bilateral interactions. This was due to a variety of reasons including the uneven degree of affectedness, the weakness of the ASEAN Secretariat, the prerogative of intergovernmental policies in some sectors and other reasons. In fact, the prevalence of bilateralism over interregional interaction in some instances suggested that national interests were the drivers of action. For example, on page 80, Germany’s bilateral activism to get its loans back exemplifies this. Another example is bilateralism within ASEM.

Furthermore, an ASEAN member state official suggested that the EU member states appeared more interest-oriented in their bilateral discussions, whereas within
the multilateral format discussions there was greater incorporation of the normative agenda (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 2 November 2008). Although the ASEAN-EU interregionalism relativises power asymmetries in comparison to bilateralism, to some extent, the world economic developments as well as protectionist interests are more conducive to new bilateralism (Ravenhill, 2003). Despite the focus of the thesis on the politico-security dimension, we cannot disassociate the trends in the economic realm from the political, since both realms are mutually reinforcing from a power-based perspective.

The case studies have depicted interregionalism as a complementary form of risk management. The cases have presented that ASEAN-EU interregionalism is not an established and independent layer of global governance, but rather an occasional means of the EU to shape other regional settings. It may contribute to economic growth and strengthen regional cohesion within the ‘self’ and the counterpart. ASEAN-EU interregionalism seems to be the seam between the national and global policy levels. In summary, the case studies have shown that interregionalism has not been the prominent avenue of interaction. Thus, actorness in normative terms, based on the region-to-region transfer of norms, has to be seen as one out of many sources that contributes to our understanding of the EU as a normative actor.

Beyond the central features of actorness and the EU as a normative actor, we also need to discuss actorness in relation to the NTS lens. NTS actorness does not predefine the targeted sectors, the capabilities nor the authorities to address the threats. According to the case studies, NTS actorness largely rests on the existence of a non-traditional threat identified by an actor. Consequently, it rests on the intention of the actor to manage this threat. On page 18, it was argued that

NTS actorness is based on formulated goals and interests resulting in decisions, which affect security or which purposively transfer security interests into specific decisions and actions that do not necessarily impact a security or securitised sector. Security/NTS actorness does not depend on the targeted policy sector but on the intention of the actor.

In the majority of the case studies, the EU and its member states acted as development assistance providers. Both the European and Southeast Asian side perceived the actorness in this manner. This suggests that the concept of NTS had only limited applicability as a distinctive way of framing actorness. It seemed that the official use of the NTS frame in Southeast Asia served the political purposes of some
military and political elites. This offered an opportunity for greater European engagement through a comprehensive range of instruments. Recently, the NTS frame has provided the frame for greater European security engagement in Southeast Asia, including maritime security and disaster relief. In the case studies, NTS threats did not appear to causally upgrade the politico-security profile of an actor. The example of international terrorism showed that the Danish perceptions of this threat were framed as an NTS threat stemming, *inter alia*, from Southeast Asia. However, being a small state, Denmark’s contributions did not necessarily translate into greater NTS actorness.

Beyond the member states, the European Commission also displayed NTS actorness with regard to the terrorist threat. The actions of the European Commission were limited to technical cooperation and financial assistance only related to counter terrorist areas. Given its limited competence, the European Commission did not act in areas directly related to counter terrorism. While the European Commission’s stance on terrorism clearly revealed that its intentions were based on security calculations, its actorness did not target the NTS threat directly. Thus, we speak of EU NTS actorness in this case. Whereas in relation to cases that show developmental and humanitarian instruments, activities and objectives, we should perceive the EU acting as an actor on NTS issues. There is utility of the NTS frame, however, this utility appears inconsistent and unsystematic. From a Southeast Asian perspective, the NTS lens could also be viewed as a new way of engaging and extracting funds from the EU, given the security-development nexus.

In this thesis, EU NTS actorness consequently refers to an umbrella concept of actorness, which includes civilian and military aspects. The EU has actively contributed to the increased level of preparedness and mitigated the vulnerability of the ASEAN states in specific sectors. However, in Southeast Asia’s security environment, it does not suffice to be an economic power to attract and persuade. Military muscle is important and impacts the perception and role expectations of the ASEAN states. The appreciation of EU NTS actorness by the ASEAN states depends on whether the EU can adapt in this environment. The other option would be for the environment to become more Kantian to suit EU NTS actorness. The second scenario would entail the everyday security of the individual in society becoming more important.
7.1 Constraints of EU Actorness and the EU as a Normative Actor

The reflectivist approach placed importance on the drivers and the normative behaviour, objectives and influence of the European actors. The starting point for this study was that instances of transnational and unconventional security crises will enable us to identify the EU as an actor more clearly and make a better distinction in terms of the EU as a normative actor. This hypothesis was made, because the EU is a remote and economic actor in Southeast Asia and, so far, scholarly publications did not manage to provide systematic analyses of the EU as a politico-security actor. While the previous subchapter has summarised the central aspects of the EU’s actorness and its role as a normative actor, the following paragraphs will discuss the constraints of the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor.

Robert D. Putnam once argued that the concerns on the domestic level shape the international level (Putnam, 1988). The case studies showed that the interaction across the two regions was to some extent contingent on a variety of domestic factors. The first constraint is concerned with domestic realities. The section on the timber trade and forestry governance within Chapter 4 illustrated the influence of the European public. It mentioned that public pressure forced governments and the European Commission to act on timber companies. The public pressure translated to market pressure, which then affected the companies within the importing state and the supplier state. This pressure also influenced regional legislation on due diligence. This case saw the generation of norms and their transfer to Southeast Asia. This example reveals the important role of the people-dimension driving the EU as a normative actor.

By contrast, within Southeast Asia bottom-up pressure is curbed by the need for development, including decentralisation. For example, centralised structures of governance inhibit bottom-up normative processes. Overall, the difference in development constrains a comprehensive and multi-level engagement of the EU. Activities at the community and grass-roots levels, as described in the case of the FLEGT VPA negotiations in Indonesia, enhance transparency and knowledge of the public. They offer an opportunity to directly reach the people and diffuse norms. The flanking projects of the FLEGT VPA negotiations seem to have an impact at the community-level (Interview with FLEGT official, 24 May 2010). However, they are at an early stage and are localised. So, the question remains whether these new practices of transparency and information-sharing can be internalised and spread to
other projects and communities within Indonesia. The EU as a normative actor is bound by the opportunity given by the domestic level.

In recent times, the political crisis in Thailand has been a clear example of how domestic problems slow-down regional integration and Thailand’s effectiveness as the ASEAN chairholder. On the extra-regional level, this hindered a productive political exchange with third parties. The postponement of the ASEAN Summit and its various related events led to a general delay in the regional policy-making which also affected ASEAN’s various dialogues with third countries. Furthermore, ASEAN’s limited reaction to the GFC was not only due to the GFC’s low-impact on the Asian financial markets, but can be blamed partially on the lack of Thai leadership to initiate joint action during its presidency. In the case of the ASEAN Charter, the document has been successfully ratified during these turbulent times, but it is evident that Thailand’s performance and, consequently ASEAN’s performance was suffering from the domestic troubles of one nation. Conclusively, regional actoriness and the EU as a normative actor correlate to domestic realities.

Another major constraint stems from the diverging institutional history, structures and modes of interaction. In short, the asymmetry in institutional design may inhibit certain cooperative efforts. This implies that the EU will take a greater interest in interpreting crises that occur where similar institutions and contexts exist, given that such crises may become a crisis scenario for the EU one day. Member states of a region will base their institutional preference on an opportunity-cost balance and prioritise the option of low-risk and low-cost, that is, soft institutionalisation (Rüland, 2002a: 4-5). This minimises the risk of high costs when the benefits from the ASEAN-EU level are relatively low in comparison to their governance costs. The institutional development has progressed to the extent that any reversal or ignorance of the existing institutions may be associated with high costs. Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol argued from a historical institutionalist perspective and declared that,

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28 The thesis is based on a broad understanding of institution comprising political organisations and policy bodies as well as normative standards.
outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern into the future....once actors have ventured far down a particular path, however, they are likely to find it very difficult to reverse course. Political alternatives that were once quite plausible may become irretrievably lost. (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002: 699)

Supranational and deep institutions provide a stronger basis for enforcement of institutional standards and policies. By contrast, the ASEAN Secretariat is small and softly institutionalised. Given the intergovernmental paradigm, it is steered by the member states. Since the states determine the implementation, regional standards face enforcement problems, whether they are binding or not. Member states can even opt for defection, if the penalising function of the institution is weak. For example, despite an ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights, the interpretation of human rights is subject to the individual ASEAN member states’ assessment. In some cases, there is a clear discrepancy between the international standards, Terms of Reference and the evaluation of member states. In particular, within intergovernmentally organised institutions, enforcement problems are ubiquitous. Soft institutions may lack the necessary centralised enforcement capacity, that is, the competence, resources, and sovereignty to enforce regulations and policies. The ASEAN Secretariat is understaffed, under-funded and softly under-institutionalised to represent an appropriate dialogue and implementing partner.

In the case of the ATFs during the AFC, the confined capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat was a reason why only a few regional projects were implemented. Both the ASEAN Secretariat and EU officials have expressed that overall more can be done on the interregional level (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 26 May 2012; Interview with EU official, 17 February 2009). However, this would also depend on the strengthening and the availability of resources for the ASEAN Secretariat (Interview with ASEAN Secretariat official, 26 May 2012; Interview with EU official, 17 February 2009). Given that we have premised the interregional interaction to contribute to the EU’s uniqueness as a normative actor, the lack of interregionalism does not necessarily limit the EU as an actor, since the case studies have shown the prevalence of bilateral cooperation. However, this does limit the EU

29 Its budget is constituted by equal shares of its member states. This implies that the poorest state determines the scope of the budget. For example, for 2010, this budget was only US$ 14 million.
as a normative actor, given the discussed normative uniqueness of the interregional approach.

Institutional design also constrains the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor to the extent that it relies on like-minded members. If there is a large number of like-minded members that adhere to an institution’s set of rules, they can exert social pressure on a member which defects. Although the ASEAN Way is underlying the various institutional fora, where the EU and the Southeast Asian side meet, the importance is deflected from the institutional norms to the social norms. Institutional norms are important, but social pressure and influence also need to be taken into account.

Thus, the EU needs to display actorness that can persuade the majority of ASEAN member states to follow. This can be directly or indirectly. The case of the FLEGT VPA negotiations with individual ASEAN member states spurred interest in other ASEAN countries. These countries did not need to be persuaded to follow suit. The ASEAN-German Regional Forest Programme provided a case where the German side had to directly engage with the member states and convince them of the benefits. However, there are other instances, where persuasion failed and the Southeast Asian side became uninterested as in the case of the Integrated Border Management System. Intensive research by the EU resulted in this project, which they believed would benefit ASEAN states and capture their interest. However, as time passed, ASEAN states lost interest in this project. This is a general dilemma of development assistance. Where does your control over resource distribution and project design end in order not to waste your money? Where does external input and control end for aid to be interactive and problem-solving-oriented instead of being merely free money for corrupt receivers to waste?

In the examples of NTS actorness relating to development assistance, we saw that the EU emphasised country-ownership. However, in the end, these initiatives still presented, to a great extent, European ideas. The case of the European Commission project on gender flanking the AMM illustrates an example, where the European Commission has managed to shape the normative agenda. The AMM and the flanking projects were launched in a post-Tsunami environment favourable to EU norm diffusion. Since the notion of gender could not be pursued in relation to the AMM and was even undermined through the LoGA, this project offered a direct avenue to directly assist women in Aceh.
Furthermore, the interviews with ASEAN member state officials revealed that within the ASEM process, states pursued their interests over their normative and collective identity (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 2 November 2008; whole paragraph refers to him). In the multilateral meetings the Asian and European sides presented their normative backgrounds more strongly. In an ASEAN member state official’s opinion, the EU seemingly preferred to act as a normative actor in multilateral fora, whereas the EU and its member states were less normative and more interest-oriented in the bilateral meetings. At the same time, the ASEAN member state official suggested that within the multilateral dialogue, the acting European Presidency and the European Commission displayed stronger actorness in normative terms than the EU member states. He further added that in the bilateral meetings with the European side, the European Commission seemed to be more normative in its demands than the member states. However, overall the bilateral meetings suggested greater interest-orientation.

In this context, it is insightful to refer to Kenneth A. Oye who has elucidated the difficulties with large numbers involved in actions. They raise questions of cost- and benefit-sharing and whether a collective action can be broken down into a sum of bilateral interactions (Oye, 1986). Derived from this, EU actorness as a whole benefits from the various bilateral interactions. Furthermore, although these bilateral interactions may display minimal normativity in comparison to the multilateral format, they do have normative repercussions. For example, the AMM clearly influenced the dynamic on the interregional level and stimulated enhanced cooperation. Despite strengthening interregionalism and contributing to a summation of European actorness, the sub-interregional and bilateral activities may also complicate the EU’s visibility as a single actor in light of the various representations and interactions.

The case of the AMM also highlighted that problems of institutional overlap between the supranational and intergovernmental regional bodies of the EU may pose a problem for the EU’s actorness. In this case, the grey areas between the Council and the European Commission were internal obstacles that complicated EU effectiveness and representation in its external relations. From an NTS perspective, these opaque areas have widened and are still in the process of extending, because of the continual broadening and deepening of international security concepts and the European Commission’s increasing interest to extend its competence, as through the IfS. Being a fragmented and multi-headed political actor suggests a dependency on
the national foreign ministers – in particular the Big Three – and the Troika in intergovernmental fields. However, they have regularly contributed to incoherent and nation-oriented NTS policies. Diverging ideological, socio-economic, transatlantic and security orientations among the 27 EU member states pose cleavages, where EU crises thrive and occasionally prove difficult to bridge.

On some NTS issues in Southeast Asia, the European Commission feels under-informed about the EU member states’ bilateral activities (Interview with EU official, 4 November 2009). Despite the EU’s intensive bureaucracy, there still seems to be a communication problem between the central organs of the EU and the member states. The internal competence overlap and communication and coordination problems within the EU have occasionally had a visible negative impact on the EU’s image in Southeast Asia (Interview with ASEAN member state official, 31 May 2010).

Additionally, one must consider that security is the prerogative of the member states and therefore, the European Commission needs to be very careful in packaging security policies. The subchapter on terrorism listed cases where EU funds were made available for anti-money-laundering and border management projects. The European external anti-terrorism agenda is subject to national urgencies, perceptions and dependent on national resources. Hence, actoriness in relation to the case of counter-terrorism is mainly carried out by the member states. The normative dimension was visible in connection to the Inter-faith Dialogue in the ASEM context and through the European Commission and the member states, which supported the combat against the underlying problems of terrorism.

Furthermore, in many Southeast Asian states institutional inertia persists, despite some liberalisation and democratisation processes. While NTS crises may stimulate normative change, Southeast Asia’s institutional culture only shows minimal openness towards normative influence. Even within the ASEAN Secretariat, this is difficult to achieve. The member states seek to limit regional integrative developments that could possibly erode national sovereignty. As expressed by the GTZ staff, they have invested patience and endless persuasion to ensure that an expert advisory body to the ASEAN Secretariat was set up under the ASEAN-German Regional Forest Programme that may lead to different institutional structures in the long run (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). National agencies are the key in allowing cooperation and external influence to materialise and bear
fruit (Interview with GTZ staff, 26 May 2010). This institutional design is a reflection of the reluctance of the member states to share their sovereignty. The ASEAN Secretariat has the political will and ambition but lacks the capacity and will of its member states to act. Alongside the problem of resource shortage and institutional asymmetry, there is also the problem of the intergovernmental mode of cooperation related to the institutional design.

Previously, it was mentioned that in the case of the ATFs, the interregional dimension lacked an adequate counterpart to implement region-to-region projects. ASEAN member states preferred bilateral assistance and only showed marginal interest in coordinating regional measures in cooperation with external partners (Interview with Asian Think Tank representative, 10 November 2008). The cases have displayed that the European side has a strong interest in strengthening the ASEAN Secretariat through various programmes. Beyond the mentioned examples, this is particularly pursued through APRIS I and II, now superseded by ASEAN Economic Integration Support Programme (AEISP).

In Chapter 3, an ECFIN official said that the rigid work ethics and hierarchical bureaucracy of some Asian states slowed down the interregional process. This suggests that the institutional norms associated with a specific institutional design on the domestic level influences the pace and nature of the interregional interaction. This links to the firstly described constraint about domestic realities.

Beyond institutional problems which transpire from the national and regional levels, there are institutional issues located on the interregional and bilateral levels. An outdated Cooperation Agreement from 1980 and the current bilateral PCA negotiations excluding some member states do not necessarily strengthen regional cohesion. This mitigates the idea of the EU as a beacon of interregionalism.

Furthermore, the AEMM, ASEM and the ARF lack their own coordinating and implementing bodies and resources. Weak, multi-issue and flexible institutional design accommodates to state actors and the intergovernmental mode of cooperation, because it limits the inclusion of norms that contest state sovereignty. These institutions are dependent on the interest and resources of the member states. This institutional design does not fully deliver to the Southeast Asian interests, since the European side is generally underrepresented in the meeting. This could be because fora with tangible and binding outcomes may attract greater interest among the European members. Despite this, the Southeast Asian side will
not compromise stronger institutions for national sovereignty. Noteworthy is that strengthening these institutions may not necessarily to increase European interest.

Geopolitical and materialist assumptions also constrain the EU as an actor. Against the backdrop of transnational NTS threats, geographic proximity necessitates dialogue and cooperation. Obviously, this does not apply to the ASEAN-EU relationship. However, geographical distance can be overcome by functional dependencies or similarities. For example, NTS crises occurring in regions of geographical and climatic similarity may attract EU interest, particularly in regard to climate change. In connection to this thesis, the lower the likelihood of immediate threat constructions, the lower the chance that the EU and its member states will relate this to their own agenda. Although there is a general convergence on issues and threat perceptions, the selected NTS cases have been mainly localised to Southeast Asia. The likelihood that they will have a contagious impact on Europe in a short amount of time is low in view of the geography.

In the case of the political conflict in Aceh, Bali bombings or the haze, the likelihood that the events would cause severe repercussions in Europe was very low. The AFC provided a case that involved threat constructions and contagion. Furthermore, the chapter on the Bali bombings suggested that some EU member states were strongly concerned about the international ties of Southeast Asian terrorism. Europe may not be the origin of the threat or crisis, but these cases show that it may be the target and that the EU and its member states are to some extent aware of this.

The example of the Madrid or London bombings, years after the Bali bombings, showed that the counter terrorist agenda highly depended on the degree of affectedness. The affected countries pushed for greater regional integrative dynamics and relations with Southeast Asia on this matter. In light of this, cooperation is pre-emptive and based on the logic of consequentiality. The higher the urgency and danger of the threat, the higher is the degree of actoriness. This actoriness is driven arguably by cost-benefit calculations. The EU as a normative actor is usually only relevant in relation to the long-term actions that target the underlying issues related to counter terrorism.

Since the discussed crises in this thesis take place in the ‘other’ region and the European ‘self’ is, in most of the cases, not directly affected, securitisation may be involved on the EU side. With regard to many crises with shock impact, such as the
example of the tsunami in Chapter 6, the European epistemic communities, politicians and their constituencies did not need to embark on the process of securitisation. Firstly, the disaster was localised. Secondly, the devastating impact of the tsunami was omnipresent in all media and the threat and negative impact were plainly visualised. When crises outside of the EU’s borders have the potential to immediately impact the EU negatively, the EU will reveal more securitisation efforts as well as internal and external cooperative activities. When there is a lack of immediate affectedness, concerns are generally raised about the legitimate purpose of securitisation and whether this may be a case of scaremongering30.

It is noteworthy that the analysis examines EU NTS actorness predominantly in areas that are not treated as security but development assistance by the EU. In spite of the synergies of the fields of development and security, the European Commission’s staff working in areas of development cooperation will continue to keep securitisation at a minimal level and will focus on the MDGs (Interview with EU official, 17 February 2009). In their view, enhancing regional security and stability is considered to be a side-effect (Interview with EU official, 17 February 2009). Richard Youngs has observed that the security-development nexus “appears to be more of a conceptual battleground pitching the development and security communities against each other” rather than an area of active synthesis (Youngs, 2008: 422).

The next constraint relates to the systemic power distribution and normative lining of the international realm. The environment of the international actors influences the behaviour and the degree of normativity in their behaviour. This deviates from the reflectivist approach to some extent, since it views an actor’s behaviour as constrained by exogenous norms and power realities. The Introduction outlined that the EU is not a traditional security actor in the region and that it has a tendency to portray itself as a complementary soft power to the USA. Chapter 4 illustrated the USA and Australia as the most important Western countries in the eyes of Southeast Asia in regard to counter terrorist efforts. In Southeast Asia, the USA is the most important player which constrains the scope of actorness of other

30 Anthony Giddens has coined this term and defined it in the same way securitisation has been used in International Relations theorising. I have drawn upon this concept to differentiate between the purposes of securitisation for the protection of the state and the people. However, I depart from Giddens’ definition to some extent and use scaremongering as the negative definition of securitisation. I refer to securitisation as an intersubjective process for the purpose of protecting the nation-state as a whole. By contrast, I conceive scaremongering as the interpretation and creation of threat for other than protective purposes. That is, I understand it in relation to actors who pursue personal gains.
actors including the EU. Katzenstein has even referred to *Asia and Europe in the American Imperium* (Katzenstein, 2005).

In the case studies, the power asymmetry between the EU and ASEAN provided an unfavourable setting for cooperation in the form of a partnership and the creation of a common lifeworld. There was the rhetoric of partnership and equality, but in the mindsets of the dialogue partners, the roles were clear. This was, for example, evident in the introductory case on the EU-Thailand PCA negotiations. Furthermore, Chapter 4 provided an example for this in regard to the ASEM FinMM. Here, the ECFIN official accused the Southeast Asian side only wanting to extract financial support from the EU, whereas the European side also wanted to create common foundations for a long-standing and deep dialogue.

The EU seeks to establish its political profile in Southeast Asia while, at the same time, it does not want to jeopardise the supranational-bilateral representations and its relationships with the other international actors. The international system lacks a central authority, but still entails a tacit hierarchy. Beside the state hierarchy, there are international regimes and institutions that are concerned with specific issues. These international actors and norms shape the EU’s responsibilities and areas of engagement. Furthermore, they limit the functional utility and depth of cooperation on the ASEAN-EU level. The EU understands its limitations in the region and needs to find a niche for itself as a latecomer. Unfolding EU actorness needs to consider upholding the hierarchic structure of powers. In summary, the cooperation between ASEAN and the EU is subject to the structure of the system and the various interdependencies and hierarchies. The systemic level impacts the degree and type of actorness directly, at the same time, it provides normative influence.

Power asymmetries imply influence flows that may not be reciprocal. Between and within ASEAN and the EU, there is an asymmetry of power distribution. By means of the global communications advancement, Stephen D. Krasner has illustrated that asymmetric power distribution can subvert cooperation (Krasner, 1991). The case studies could not verify this, but attested that the power asymmetries contributed to the hardening of the donor-recipient relationship.

Over the years, the power inequalities have cemented the roles, identities and areas of specialisation. While the power asymmetry clearly characterises the relationship according to a donor-recipient scheme, the cases have shown that power does not guarantee influence. The Southeast Asian side needs to be
interested in the projects and actively involved in the implementation and internalisation. Power is relative to the situation and rather “the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate” (Barnett and Duvall, 2005: 42). The EU’s degree of actorness is supported by the power asymmetry, however, in the end, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Southeast Asian side do determine the extent to which the activities are implemented.

Furthermore, we need to consider that the EU’s general actorness and its actorness in normative terms are dependent on the ability of the powerful member states to convince and compel other EU member states. The case of the AMM, showed, however, how power asymmetries did not matter in the end. The Nordic states managed to persuade the Big Three and the other EU member states to engage in a region far from Europe on the basis of solidarity and moral responsibility. Prior to the launch of the AMM, Solana and the Nordic states managed to persuade fellow ESDP states that it was a necessity to engage in Aceh. The Nordic states did not apply power capabilities, but based their argumentation on the feasibility of action and the logic of appropriateness for a common good. The other member states were relatively uninterested in this operation, because it did not serve national interests and seemed to be a waste of resources. These resources could have been better spent domestically than in an unknown terrain.

However, they were then convinced for three reasons. Firstly, the total of the financial burden did not fall on the individual member states, but was partially shared with the European Commission. Secondly, they did not refrain from a consensus in ESDP, since the mission did not pose a considerable cost and was mainly carried by the interested states. Vetoing would have led to unnecessary frictions among the members. One could say that, to avoid problems in the future, the other states agreed to this mission. This shows that the “shadow of the future” influences what kind of cooperative agreement actors enter (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986: 232; Oye, 1986: 13). Thirdly, and of lesser importance from a member state perspective, the AMM provided the opportunity to test the ESDP/CSDP in Southeast Asia and contribute to the EU’s global actorness profile.
Conclusions
Firstly, this chapter discussed the features of the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor to varying degrees. The NTS challenges played an important role in crystallising the specific characteristics and constraints that allowed us to identify the variation in actorness and the EU as a normative actor. Geographical proximity, institutional design, systemic power asymmetries and domestic constraints were identified as the central confinements of the EU’s actorness and the EU as a normative actor. The chapter showed how the empirical case studies affirmed the hypothesis, which saw NTS crises as an opportunity to look at EU actorness and the EU as a normative actor in a differentiated manner.

The degree of interdependence, crisis localisation, and the role of contagion played important roles in confirming the hypothesis. While the case studies delivered to the research interests, they also suggested that the NTS frame could have been replaced with a developmental or humanitarian lens in light of the European toolkit, activities and objectives. Furthermore, the only foreign policy method with normative influence unique to the EU, interregionalism, proved to be a less prominent path. Finally, we have discovered that, while the hypothesis was confirmed, the EU as an NTS actor only mattered to ASEAN on a case-by-case basis and with particular regard to development and humanitarian assistance.
Conclusions

The thesis started with the assumption that the EU likes to portray itself as a normative and soft power in Southeast Asia and that, despite the long-standing relationship, the EU’s politico-security impact in the region leaves room for improvement. In the beginning, I hypothesised that NTS challenges offered an opportunity for a better understanding and differentiation of the EU’s actorness and the extent to which the EU acted as a normative actor. The thesis outlined the different cooperative dynamics on the interregional and bilateral levels, the responsive and pre-emptive measures and the cooperative constraints. It drew upon a broad range of tools, including development and humanitarian assistance, the RRM/IIFs, the civilian arm of CSDP and the financial and technical support by the individual member states.

In terms of the EU as a normative actor, the case studies displayed a mixed picture. I premised that NTS challenges enhanced cooperative efforts and heightened the need to act according to the logic of appropriateness in regard to short-term immediate relief and long-term structural responses. This, however, was also contingent on the degree of contagion and interdependence. In fact, the case studies illustrated the importance of both norms and interests as the drivers of action. The degree of interdependence and the possibility of threat contagion contributed to the logic of consequentiality as the driving rationale behind many activities. There were numerous examples that suggested that the EU and its member states used the rhetoric of solidarity to disguise and frame their own interests and cost-benefit calculations.

In the Introduction, it was also premised that normativity is inherent in any action of an actor, because whatever an actor does, this is also based on its own experience. Thus, the EU may still be considered a normative actor in terms of output, if it falls short in regard to the normative behaviour or input. That is, even though the EU may act according to the logic of consequentiality, its behaviour may involve the transfer of norms that influence and shape the structure and behaviour of states in Southeast Asia in a normative manner. Overall, the EU has been a normative actor in many instances and from many perspectives.
Normative impact was observed in some cases and in other cases it seemed that such actorness was intertwined with material interests or difficult to disentangle from the assistance of other international actors. In one case study, non-state actors acted as proxy normative actors. In various cases, the EU compromised the normative dimension to ensure the effectiveness of its actions. Individual examples were mentioned to show the difficulty in implementing projects and transferring norms. The cases suggested that it was very common for the Southeast Asian side to water down the EU’s demands or reject European proposals that did not meet Southeast Asian interests. They also revealed that distinct European influence was particularly considered with regard to region-to-region projects and initiatives that included the people-dimension and NGOs.

Against the backdrop of contagion and interdependence, the crises triggered greater outward-orientation and activism towards Southeast Asia. Enhancing the EU’s engagement and actorness in relation to NTS challenges is an imperative for the EU for two main reasons. Firstly, it allows Europe to become more involved in the dynamics of the Asia-Pacific. Secondly, building on the first reason, it also provides a stepping stone to expand the EU’s security profile in the region. The empirical discussion confirms that the EU’s awareness of and engagement in Southeast Asia increased in light of NTS challenges and that it would like to make greater use of the NTS challenges as instances for norm instability, contestation, and replacement.

Overall, the outward-orientation to the region was also dependent on the dynamic of the ASEAN-EU relationship, which received renewed impetus with the Nuremberg Declaration. Despite a difference in threat perceptions, the EU takes an interest in human security and managing NTS threats in Southeast Asia. This has been mainly pursued from a developmental and humanitarian perspective. If the EU wants to be pertinent to Southeast Asia, it will need to enhance its activities in areas that matter to Southeast Asia and seek opportunities to employ CSDP.

The ASEAN-EU cooperation increases in response to NTS crises, but has a tendency to be ephemeral, unless institutionalised within specific frameworks of cooperation, including APRIS/AEISP or the JCC working groups. The volume of the interactions between the two sides is further contingent on the role of other external actors, recognition and openness towards certain norms as well as the general compatibility of the institutional design and domestic realities. These constraints do
not stop actorness and normative influence. However, they complicate actorness and the extent to which the EU can act as a normative actor. Challenges that threaten both personal and state security open up for normative influence, albeit possibly displaying a certain degree of lip-service on the Southeast Asian side.

Current initiatives between the EU and Southeast Asia are function-oriented and designed according to the needs of ASEAN’s community-building process. Functional cooperation does not premise a high level of shared norms and values, but may produce these as a by-product. This indicates that once actors have sufficient trust and understanding of each others’ interests and needs, their focus will shift to a deeper pragmatic relationship and increasingly concentrate on functional cooperation. The EU needs to cautiously deliberate on its increased focus on pragmatism and demand-orientation in its cooperation with Southeast Asia. De-emphasising the liberal-democratic agenda may strengthen state-centric trends and cement the role of certain values and norms that may counter the EU’s liberal-democratic identity.

NTS threats and humanitarian emergencies allow threat convergence and the both sides to overcome the normative divide to some extent. However, they have also increased the processes of threat ‘othering’. This has contributed to a greater linkage between the notions of security and development. In relation to actorness, the development-security nexus may enhance the EU’s politico-security profile in Southeast Asia in the long-run. However, it has not led to an active practical linkage between the security and development communities. This linkage through the NTS concept has attracted European interest and given Southeast Asia greater status in its relationship with the EU. However, we are just at the beginning and both sides need to better jointly conceptualise NTS. Furthermore, they need to jointly develop a vision that outlines the role and objectives of cooperation on NTS challenges and relate this to the wider ASEAN-EU relationship. The NTS perspective provides a frame of interaction that enables the EU to diffuse its norms in a more acceptable manner, since the NTS issues are of immediate concern to the state and its people.

The expansion of the security understanding in Southeast Asia offers new points of entry for greater EU involvement that could lead to greater influence in the politico-security sphere. While the EU seeks greater effectiveness and influence, it will also have to weigh up the potential concessions of its normative identity and objectives. This questions the utility of normative and ethical role concepts as
guiding concepts for actors. In fact, the thesis has suggested that promoting oneself in accordance with a normative role clearly raises issues of sincerity, hypocrisy, double standards and effectiveness. While the EU aspires to shaping the international sphere according to its normative identity, it is also obvious that the world is shaping the EU. Since actorness in normative terms is inherent in actors and strategising such actorness as a role concept is neither analytically useful nor empirically accurate, we should refrain from considering states and regional organisations as referents for normalisation processes. Instead, we need to focus on their normative practices, as provided by this thesis.

Being far away and lacking any strategic interest and influence, the EU is an outsider in Southeast Asia’s regional security order. Traditional security does not hold a great opportunity for the EU to become involved as a collective actor. Southeast Asia does not seek to engage the EU in security and defence arrangements, beyond peace-keeping, the bilateral arms trade and the ARF. The EU realises this and is attempting to “make the best of what we have” (Interview with EU official, 16 February 2009).

The thesis provided an understanding of what the EU is and does in the region from a normative perspective and within the NTS frame. The case studies have shown the EU to be a source of inspiration, a mentor, and a promoter of liberal-democratic values, however, more so for the ASEAN Secretariat than the member states. Contemporary literature has neglected the NTS perspective and marginally discussed the potential of the EU as a political and security actor in Southeast Asia. The research has expanded this and complemented the current body of knowledge on the ASEAN-EU relationship, ASEM and the ARF. It has displayed an innovative and cross-sectorial departure point for future scholarship that is increasingly concentrated on multi-agent and sector-specific dialogue and cooperation.

The study suggests that while the ASEAN-EU relationship may continue to push the boundaries of the ASEAN Way and open space for non-state actors and new norms to sneak in, it reinforces some conventional identities and principles of the ASEAN Way. To make the most with all counterparts and within all sectors may be a virtue in an anarchic international system, but sooner or later it will be more than just a source of confusion and mistaken identity. In fact, the EU could possibly entrap itself in a role paradox. The findings suggest that strategising according to a soft power or normative power image appears to be an ineffective strategy for the
EU in Southeast Asia. The EU is undoubtedly important as an actor and normative actor in Southeast Asia. However, it does not appear distinct from any other major power, unless it acts through interregionalism or within niche areas. Furthermore, achieving sector-specific effectiveness of cooperation may increasingly foreclose the inclusion of the normative agenda.

**European External Action Service**

While the selected case studies have referred to the EU as an actor prior to the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, it is imperative to take note that meanwhile the Treaty of Lisbon has been adopted. There are changes that are being implemented, which influence our conceptualisation of the EU’s actorness. Most importantly, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to support the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy suggests that the EU is working to become a more recognisable and coherent international actor. By emulating to some extent the state in its structure and work mode of the diplomatic and foreign services, the EEAS may indeed stimulate greater recognition of the EU as an actor. Despite being in its early days and in need of being fully engineered and implemented, the EEAS holds the potential to address some of the issues of EU actorness that have been observed in the case studies.

Namely, it has the structural capacity to mitigate the gap between the recognition by the sociological ‘other’ and the empirical actions. Furthermore, it allows streamlining of the operational mode among the various stakeholders involved in producing the EU’s external policy. This could benefit engagement on NTS challenges in Southeast Asia. While it offers solutions to some common challenges to EU actorness, it may only veneer the underlying institutional rivalry and tension between the European Commission and the EU member states. For example, EEAS representations overseas will continue to co-exist alongside member state embassies. To enhance greater coordination and cooperation, the national and EU external policies will be better aligned.

First and foremost, the EEAS should be seen as the outward-oriented extension of the EU’s advanced internal integration process. It is a reinvention of the supranational dimension to strengthen the European position in the world. Conclusively, on the one hand, it may ease the supranational versus national dichotomy. On the other hand, however, it may entrench the separate identities and
increase the disconnection between the national and European identity. As this thesis has argued, if ideas and identity are shapers of behaviour, they need to be sufficiently attuned to the overall identity and actorness of the EU. From time to time, they may appear conflicting and, in these cases, the EU appears like a confused actor, albeit not yet ‘schizophrenic’.

**An Outlook: construing broader implications**

In the beginning, it was further said that in most cases the EU would claim itself to be complementary to the American security engagement in the region. Understanding the EU as a normative actor, which can contribute to the stability and cohesion of Southeast Asia, pertains to the grand debates of International Relations theorising. This is because in an international structure of complex interdependence and waning American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific, we cannot rely on an American hard power approach in the region. In a world of multilateralisms that strengthen transnational networks and other forms of multi-level and multi-actor cooperation, we cannot merely focus on the regional powers. We cannot exclusively rely on materialist and rationalist treatments of the International Relations of the Asia-Pacific. In East Asia, die-hard realists need to acknowledge that security is also about socialising China and engaging Southeast Asia for the purpose of socialising China.

The American focus on strengthening its strategic alliances in the region contributes very little to making the region more secure. A stable and secure region necessitates the active inclusion of China into the security architecture. This implies the strengthening and socialising of China’s neighbours, whether they are middle, small powers or no powers. It implies that in a time of American rebalancing, we need to refrain from the realist paradigm and view the security situation through a sociological lens. We need show greater acknowledgment of interdependence and the potential of insecurity contagion in the security thinking of the Asia-Pacific. We need to place emphasis on international norms, non-state actors, and soft power as an alternative means to ease the tensions and build bridges for sustainable peace in the region.
In a world where a nuclear crisis in a remote East Asian country can arouse European primal fears, impact domestic policies, and mobilise a nuclear-free greening of the electorate, we need to take soft power and norm entrepreneurs seriously. Hypocrisy and inconsistency are omni-present in the international sphere and tempt us to eventually foreclose the tangibility of normative influence. We need to refrain from viewing norms as a means for other intentions and value them for what they are and what political and cognitive learning processes they can trigger. In line with the notion of soft power, ideas can be of direct influence to attract, persuade and convince. They can also be an indirect stimulus for self-reflection as exemplified by the greening of Germany’s electorate and policies post-Fukushima.

From a North American perspective, the liberal world order is in crisis (Ikenberry, 2009). There is a question of authority. Who will now promote a global liberal order, given the decline of American preponderance and the reluctance of other actors to accept American hegemonic moves? This has been observed in the Asia-Pacific with China’s rise, in particular. The increasing challenge of the Westphalian and liberal-democratic system by non-state actors and rising authoritarian regimes complicates the smooth transition of the global order. Lending Jürgen Habermas’ words on the post-national constellation and transferring them to the broader dimensions of the international system, the EU as a normative regional actor may be a “normatively satisfactory alternative...that points to a future cosmopolitan order sensitive both to difference and to social equality” (Habermas, 2001).

This envisages that the European integration experience, which showcases Westphalianism and post-Westphalianism co-existing, may be an important tenet of Liberal Internationalism 3.0. While its mere existence may erode the absolute claims of the Westphalian system, its quest for normalisation in the international sphere has also resulted in state-similar capabilities and structures within. When the EU faces the outside world, it seeks to project its norms. At the same time, it also seeks acceptance. When looking from an EU perspective of multi-level power and permeable sovereignty, the new global order is not a question of authority. Furthermore, from this perspective, there does not seem to be a crisis of the liberal-

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31 This is exemplified through the various German elections in 2011. For example, after 13 years, the Greens managed to re-enter the parliament of Saxony-Anhalt on 20 March 2011, or, for example, for the first time ever the Green Party had their candidate become the Premier of a state in Germany (Baden Württemberg).
democratic order in a world of multiple poles of power. Rather, it appears that fading American dominance may be an opportunity for the EU’s vision of a multipolar and liberal-democratic world. The EU’s vision of world order may be more inclusive and accepted in many parts of the world than Liberal Internationalism 2.0, which is phasing out.

Although the primary focus of this thesis is the assessment of the EU with and within Southeast Asia in relation to NTS challenges and crises, it can also be considered as a small puzzle piece or a small contribution to a greater global debate on world order and how we have to engage with neighbouring countries of rising great powers. It is an example of which actors will be part of upholding and shaping Liberal Internationalism 3.0 and how this could be done. In this light, we can assume that the ASEAN-EU relationship – being the most advanced interregional interaction – may hold an important reference role for other region-to-region interactions that strengthen a multipolar global order.


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