The Uncanny Place of the Bad Mother and the Innocent Child at the Heart of New Zealand’s ‘Cultural Identity’

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of dominant forms of Pākehā banal nationalism within Aotearoa/New Zealand. A diverse range of contemporary non-fiction texts from Aotearoa/ New Zealand are analysed in order to explore the ways in which notions of a ‘New Zealand national identity’ are created. These texts include television programmes, advertisements, opinion columns, editorials and letters to the editor. The analysis of these texts reveals a complex circulation of ideas around innocence and guilt, history and nostalgia, childhood and good motherhood/bad motherhood. These ideas, as this thesis demonstrates, are central to the functioning of nationalism. Yet they also serve as a focus for the anxieties of nationalism: anxieties which arise from the impossibility of securing the desired nation. Drawing on Freudian psychoanalytic concepts such as repression and projection, and on Kristeva’s notion of abjection, this thesis examines the way in which attempts to secure a comfortable, homelike nation are forever undermined by the return of repressed elements of the nation’s past and present. Within Pākehā nationalism, a nostalgic vision of a unified, innocent, childlike nation is used as a defence against undesired knowledge of national disunity. National discomforts, which are generated by the impossibility of repressing the nation’s history, are projected onto those assigned an abject position in the nation. As a result of this process of projection, mediated by the association of national identity with childhood and home, the fantasised figure of the ‘bad Maori mother’ emerges as the ultimate uncanny element within the nation.
Introduction

“it’s the physical act of being a New Zealander” (Till, 2006, episode 1)

In the course of this thesis I will explore how a statement such as the one above comes to be not only possible but also intelligible. My thesis will be an exploration of specific, regional strands of nationalism in Aotearoa New Zealand. My analysis will centre on the ways in which notions of a ‘New Zealand national identity’ are created within dominant Pākehā discourses. Through this, I aim to both add to the study of the way in which Aotearoa New Zealand is conceived of as a nation and to add to the study of nationalism in general. I will particularly focus on the way in which ideas of innocence and guilt, history and nostalgia, childhood and good motherhood/bad motherhood are central to nationalism, and the way in which these ideas serve as a focus for the anxieties of nationalism in a settler society such as Aotearoa New Zealand.

Kiwi dishes… might serve to remind most of us that we were born not of Italian peasant stock, but were rather the children of sheep farms, summerhill stone houses and shingle beaches .... Kiwi Kitchen is about the food of New Zealand childhoods, before we embraced Tuscany, and the people who make it.... these are our own people, making and sharing "ordinary" food ....And ordinariness, and the old ways of cooking, are worth celebrating and remembering (Kirk-Anderson, 2006)

... there exists a sub-species of New Zealander I call ‘the ferals’....Ferals are disproportionately Maori but they are not exclusively so ...Nothing good has ever come of ferals, and nothing ever will. The only question is: how do we effectively stop the ferals from reproducing themselves? And that reply has only two possibilities – financial incentives or sterilisation. Frankly, it should be the latter (Laws, 2012, p.13)

The above quotations may appear unrelated, and indeed it may seem offensive to suggest any relation. Yet in the course of this thesis I will draw out the connections between these
two statements. Both of them, I will argue, take place within the same web of meanings about the nation. Through statements such as the above examples, nationed identities are simultaneously expressed and reproduced. The former statement defines a nationed identity by inclusion, by claiming ‘this is what we are’. The latter defines the boundaries of a nationed identity by exclusion, by claiming ‘this is what we reject’ or ‘this is what we are disgusted by’. Over the course of this thesis, I will trace an arc between two poles: from the most comforting evocations of national unity to the most violently exclusionary end of everyday nationalism. These apparent extremes, I will argue, are not opposites so much as two expressions of the same complex of emotions.

In exploring the most comforting evocations of nationhood, the evocations that make the nation feel like home, it is possible to track the recurrence of certain themes. Notions of childhood as being central to the nation come up again and again. They arise when the nationed identity of the ‘Kiwi’ is evoked as being a childlike figure. This figure is cast as innocent and curious by contrast with a grown up outside world. Yet it is not only in this construction of a pure and naïve ‘national character’ that the figure of the child is central to the nation. It arises again in references to childhood as the location of the truest form of the nation: a nation, in the years since childhood, seen as about to be corrupted or lost. To say ‘childhood’ is to raise the question of whose childhood is being referred to: the answer is everybody’s and nobody’s. The childhood that emerges again and again in discussions of the nation is a childhood shorn of all discord and danger, a childhood that never really was. This ‘childhood’ captures the emotions that attach us to our memories, while shedding all worry
or care. A carefree, innocent national childhood is posited as being the essence of the nation.

One of my main aims in this thesis is to explore how people come to be strongly emotionally attached to the nation. One major thread of this attachment is nostalgia. While this nostalgia may be for something that never quite was, this does not mean that it is superficial. The emotional heft of this nostalgia comes from its channelling of the yearnings of childhood through remembered objects. It is this that is at play when, for example, product packaging is seen as exemplifying the nature of the nation. A major task of this thesis is to explore how this emotional pull towards childhood functions to tie people to the nation, and what the side effects of this attachment might be. It should be noted that a yearning towards a partially mythical childhood innocence is not necessarily innocent in its effects. It can also generate resistance towards anything which could threaten this notion of innocence or undo the nostalgic connection.

An investigation of how a nostalgically fantasised childhood functions to define the nation leads to an investigation of what is covered up by this nostalgic fantasy. If an untouched childhood represents all that is desired about the nation, what is it that is undesired? This thesis will also investigate that which is rejected or hidden in order for the notion of a comfortable nation to flourish. These rejected aspects of the nation include the most violent aspects of the nation’s past and the most divisive aspects of the nation’s present. Furthermore, the violence of the past and the division of the present are irrevocably linked.
These aspects of the nation can never be truly expelled or completely silenced: it is around this that anxiety circulates. In Aotearoa New Zealand, much of this anxiety circulates around the violence of the colonial history and the inequality this has generated in the present. Thus, within Pākehā versions of the nation, anxiety circulates both around the history of Māori/Pākehā relations and around the existence of Māori today. In the course of this thesis I will investigate both how that which is anxiety provoking is silenced and how it continues to return, against the pressure that would keep it covered. Given the role of the fantasised innocent childhood in covering over anxiety about the nation, it is perhaps notable that ‘innocent’ means not just pure, naïve and unknowing, but also ‘not guilty’. This disavowal of felt guilt also forms part of my investigation.

Childhood surfaces once again in the form of the most vulnerable figure in the nation: the threatened child. I will investigate how the figure of the harmed child comes to symbolise that which is threatened within the nation. In addition to invoking horror at violence against the vulnerable, the figure of the abused child becomes a coalescing point for anxieties within the nation. These anxieties, about division within the nation, about the return of silenced histories, about the impossibility of securing continuity between the fantasised past and the desired future, gather around violent crimes against children. I will explore these anxieties through an investigation of which specific children become the centre of public commentary about the nation, and of what is said about them. Specifically, I will explore the meaning ascribed to abused Māori children within Pākehā discourses of nationhood.
As childhood continues to resurface in the investigation of how nationhood is secured, its counterpart, motherhood, has a more elusive role. Yet the figure of the bad mother appears prominently as a symbol of that which is worst within the nation. The collision of anxieties over harmed children is matched by an intense sense of threat to the nation: this threat is embodied in the figure of the bad mother. Within strands of Pākehā nationalism, the figure of the ‘bad Maori mother’ appears as a threat to national integrity. This figure of the bad mother appears as both terrifyingly fecund and promiscuous, and as a death-bearing destructive force. In addition to tracing hints of the figure of the good mother within the nation, I will explore the nationed anxieties expressed through the threatening figure of the bad mother. I will investigate how this figure, along with the actual women who are misidentified as the monolithic bad mother, comes to be held responsible for the disquiets of history, for all that is unsettling within the settler society of Aotearoa New Zealand.

**Theoretical background:**

In my investigation of the way in which a national identity is constructed within New Zealand, I have drawn on the works of a number of theorists. These works share an understanding that, although nations are often thought of as an ancient and natural way of dividing up the world and its inhabitants, nationhood is neither a natural nor inevitable state. Thus they seek to understand the mechanisms by which nationalism is produced and perpetuated and the entanglements it generates. It is these understandings that are crucial to the analysis of nationalism that I offer in this thesis. The publication in 1983 of separate works by Gellner (Gellner, 2006) and Anderson (Anderson, 1983), both highly influential
theorists of nationalism, is one starting point for a de-naturalisation of nationalism and a study of how nationalism might come to be.

In an important insight, Ernest Gellner describes the nation as the product of nationalism, rather than as its cause. Gellner offers an investigation of how the concept of the nation may have originated, and of how nationality comes to be naturalised as an inherent human quality:

A man must have a nationality, as he must have a nose and two ears; a deficiency in any of these particulars is not inconceivable and does from time to time occur, but only as a result of some disaster, and is itself a disaster of a kind. All of this seems obvious, though, alas, it is not true. But that it should have come to seem [emphasis Gellner’s] so very obviously true is indeed an aspect, or perhaps the very core, of the problem of nationalism. Having a nation is not an inherent attribute of humanity, but it has now come to appear as such (Gellner, 2006, p.6)

Gellner emphasises that: “Nationalism is not [emphasis Gellner’s] the awakening of an old, latent, dormant force, though that is how it does indeed present itself” (Gellner, 2006, p.46). Gellner considers the notion of national identity to be a myth based partially on a reprocessing of previous cultures, and partially on pure invention:

Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men, as an inherent though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth; nationalism, which sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates pre-existing cultures: that [emphasis Gellner’s] is a reality (Gellner, 2006, p.47)

Gellner also emphasises that nationhood is based on an arbitrary collection of cultural artefacts: “The cultural shreds and patches used by nationalism are often arbitrary historical inventions. Any old shred and patch would have served as well” (Gellner, 2006, p.55). Yet, he describes the principles of nationalism as being far from arbitrary: “But in no way does it
follow that the principle of nationalism itself, as opposed to the avatars it happens to pick for its incarnations, is itself in the least contingent and accidental” (Gellner, 2006, p.55). Nationalism, Gellner holds, is a form of collective self worship (Gellner, 2006, p.55), which industrialised society relies upon for cohesiveness.

Gellner also emphasises an opposition between “wild cultures”, which he describes as spontaneous and unsupervised, and “garden cultures”, which he considers complex and sustained by literacy (Gellner, 2006, p.48). This problematically implies that “wild cultures” are a natural form, and perhaps that they are naturally superior. Nationalism, in Gellner’s view, is the product of “garden cultures” and of industrialisation: this straightforward causality has been challenged by theorists such as Hall (Hall, 2006, p.37). Gellner considers industrialised society, and thus the nation created by nationalism, to consist of atomised individuals instead of cohesive local groups. He also, more problematically, considers social ills such as racism to be the result of social inequality in industrialised society (Hall, 2006, p.72). This implies that social problems are not inseparable from nationalism, but could simply be removed from it. Yet, as nationhood is based on a dynamic of ‘us’ and ‘them’, removing one such duality from the analysis of nationalism is counterproductive: it renders the analysis incomplete, leaving a gap in what can be explored. However, while Gellner’s analysis of nationalism is overly simplistic, his focus on the arbitrary nature of the production of the nation is extremely useful to the study of nationalism.
Benedict Anderson also traces the origins of the production of notions of nationhood, although his focus is somewhat different from Gellner’s. Anderson famously describes nations as “Imagined Communities”. Anderson contends that “nationed-ness” is “the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time” (Anderson, 1983, p.12). He uses the word “imagined” because “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members...yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1983, p.15). Anderson terms the nation an “imagined community” as: “it is imagined as a community because, regardless of the actual inequality...that may prevail...the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson, 1983, p.16). This community is imagined as limited and sovereign: “No nation imagines itself coterminous with mankind” (Anderson, 1983, p.16). Anderson locates the origin of nationalism in a specific conception of time: “homogenous, empty time” (Anderson, 1983, p.30). The nation is imagined as a community in which national citizens are linked by their “steady, solid simultaneity through time” (Anderson, 1983, p.63). Anderson stresses the role of books and newspapers in creating this sense of simultaneity. He argues that these forms of publication: “provided the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson, 1983, p.30). The notion of movement through history is, Anderson posits, essential to the notion of nationhood: “The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogenous, empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history” (Anderson, 1983, p.31). Nationalism is further linked to a naturalisation of the concept of the nation through a conception of the nation passing through history: “nations...always loom out of an immemorial past, and...glide into a limitless future” (Anderson, 1983, p.19).
Anderson further points out that nations, “imagined” though they may be, are the source of a deep attachment: “it is doubtful whether social change or transformed consciousness...do much to explain the attachment that peoples feel for the inventions of their imaginations – or...why peoples are ready to die for these inventions” (Anderson, 1983, p.129). Anderson describes this attachment as a form of love: “nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love” (Anderson, 1983, p.129). He links this love to the association of the nation to kinship and home: “Something of the nature of this political love can be deciphered from the ways in which languages describe its object: either in the vocabulary of kinship...or that of home” (Anderson, 1983, p.131)

One of the problematic aspects of Anderson’s description of the functioning of nationalism is his contention that racism does not derive from nationalism, but that racism erodes nationalism. Similarly to Gellner, Anderson posits racism as originating in “class, rather than in those of nation”. It is Anderson’s contention that racism and nationalism are opposed because: “nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations” (Anderson, 1983, p.136). Yet if this were the case, this would leave the question of why racism is so strongly associated with the idea of location, with the idea of people being in the wrong place, unanswered. It further raises the question of how a sense of the interiority of the nation could be created without a reference to outsiders. However, Anderson’s view of the nature of the nation as something ‘imagined’ is an important insight. His emphasis on the attachment that people feel to the nation and his exploration of the
way in which the nation is generated through the daily reading of texts are both starting points for a further exploration of nationalism.

Michael Billig (Billig, 1995) analyses the language used to reproduce nationalism, and ascribes a central role to daily unnoticed reminders of nationalism. He focuses on the way in which this daily reproduction of nationalism functions to divide those inside the nation from those outside the nation. To Billig, unlike Gellner or Anderson, shame and contamination are inherent aspects of the production of nationalism. Billig introduces the term “Banal nationalism” in order to “cover the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced” (Billig, 1995, p6). This terminology functions to remove the concept of nationalism from its common association with extremism and national crises. It is Billig’s contention that nationalism must be continually reproduced in order to be available to be called upon in times of national extremity:

Daily, they are reproduced as nations and their citizenry as nationals. And these nations are reproduced within a wider world of nations...these habits are not as removed from everyday life as some observers have supposed. Daily, the nation is indicated, or “flagged” in the lives of its citizenry. Nationalism, far from being an intermittent mood in established nations, is the endemic condition (Billig, 1995, p6)

Billig’s work focuses on the way in which nationality comes to be naturalised as a key aspect of identity: “one needs to look for the reasons why people in the contemporary world do not forget their nationality” (Billig, 1995, p.7). He contends that people are, in a multitude of ways, given daily reminders of their position as ‘nationed’ citizens: “whether literally in the form of the flag itself, or...in the routine phrases of the mass media” (Billig, 1995, pp42-43). He describes this as a continual ‘flagging’ of nationhood which goes unnoticed because of its
familiarity. Key to Billig’s argument is this notion of habitual reminders of nationhood, translated through embodied habits into a sense of national identity:

National identity embraces all these forgotten reminders. Consequently, an identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language. To have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood (Billig, 1995, p.8)

Much of the daily, habitual reproduction of nationalism, in Billig’s view, comes from constant use of language that designates national citizens as ‘us’. This habitual language uses metaphors to construct ‘us’ as a family within a national home:

In all this, a sense of ‘our’ uniqueness and integrity is conveyed. Integrity is frequently conveyed by the metaphors of kinship and gender: the nation is the ‘family’ living in the ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’... ‘We’ do not merely categorise ‘ourselves’, but claim that the object of ‘our’ identity possesses an identity, indeed a preciously unique identity (Billig, 1995, p.71)

This constant creation of national identity involves the routine production of a sense of the nation as a “home” for its inhabitants: “the national space...[is] imagined as a homely space, cosy within its borders”(Billig, 1995, p.109); “To be at home, ‘we’ must routinely and unconsciously use the homeland-making language” (Billig, 1995, p.109). This production of a cosy, home-like nation involves the routine forgetting or rejection of ‘un-homelike’ elements. The national “us” generates a “them”, constructing an opposition between the national citizens and those outside the boundaries of the nation or undesirable within it: “If nationalism is an ideology of the first person plural, which tells ‘us’ who ‘we’ are, then it is also an ideology of the third person. There can be no ‘us’ without a ‘them’” (Billig, 1995, p.71).
Key to this formation of national identities, and of a sense of the nation, is a complex relationship between remembering and forgetting: “The reproduction of nation-states depends upon a dialectic of collective remembering and forgetting, of imagination and unimaginative repetition” (Billig, 1995, p.10). The notion of national identity depends on a specific deployment of history as an originary story that naturalises the nation: “National histories tell of a people passing through time – ‘our’ people, with ‘our’ ways of life and ‘our’ culture. Stereotypes of character and temperament can be mobilized to tell the tale of ‘our’ uniqueness and ‘our’ common fate” (Billig, 1995, p.71). This national history is projected forward through time to give a sense of a common national destiny, with the nation being “imagined as a community stretching through time, with its own past and own future destiny” (Billig, 1995, p.70). Billig’s focus on the linguistic and habitual reproduction of the nation is compelling. However, he does not offer an investigation of the complexity of emotional entanglements that the nation spawns. In order to investigate these emotional complexities further, I will turn to psychoanalytic interpretations of the workings of the nation.

Slavoj Zizek (1993) discusses the fear of abandonment of a “national essence” — a fear which Billig briefly refers to — and also discusses the source of the anger against those held to threaten this “national essence”:

The element which holds together a given community cannot be reduced to the point of symbolic identification: the bond linking together its members always implies a shared relationship towards a Thing, toward Enjoyment incarnated. This relationship toward the Thing, structured by means of fantasies, is what is at stake when we speak of the menace to “our way of life” presented by the Other: it is what is threatened when for example, a white Englishman is panicked because of the
growing presence of “aliens.” What he wants to defend at any price is not reducible to the so-called set of values that offer support to national identity (Žižek, 1993, p201)

Thus, what is feared of the Other is that the Other will steal some special national “Thing”, something that “we”, the nation, believe is central to our existence as a nation: “what is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing. We always impute to the “other” an excessive enjoyment: he wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life)” (Žižek, 1993, p203). Yet, if this “Thing” that is our ‘nation-ness’ is exclusively ours, something that we have a privileged relationship with, why the hatred of the Other and the fear that the Other will steal it, or even may have already stolen it? Zizek locates the answer to these questions in the theory of castration:

What we conceal by imputing to the Other the theft of enjoyment is the traumatic fact that we never possessed what was allegedly stolen from us: the lack (“castration”) is originary, enjoyment constitutes itself as “stolen”, or, to quote Hegel’s precise formulation from his Science of Logic, it “only comes to be through being left behind (Žižek, 1993, p203 -204)

Homi Bhabha(1994) sites the nation in an ambivalent narrative strategy founded on lack:

[the will to nationhood] is itself the site of a strange forgetting of the history of the nation’s past: the violence involved in establishing the nation’s writ. It is this forgetting – the signification of a minus in the origin – that constitutes the beginning of the nation’s narrative (Bhabha, 1994, p160)

He places a split at the heart of national narrative:

...the nation’s people must be thought in double-time; the people are the historical ‘objects’ of a nationalist pedagogy, giving the discourse an authority that is based on the pre-given or constituted historical authority in the past; the people are also the ‘subjects’ of a process of signification that must erase any prior or originary presence of the nation-people to demonstrate the prodigious, living principles of the people as contemporaneity: as that sign of the present through which national life is redeemed and iterated...The scraps, patches and rags of daily life must be repeatedly turned into the signs of a coherent national culture (Bhabha, 1994, p145)
The unity of the nation depends on the attempted expulsion of knowledge of the inherent incoherence of the nation, and on the impossible attempted rejection of the anxiety this incoherence causes: “the political unity of the nation consists in a continual displacement of the anxiety of its irredeemably plural modern space – representing the nation’s modern territoriality is turned into the archaic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism” (Bhabha, 1994, p149).

Jacqueline Rose offers a Psychoanalytic analysis of the role of fantasy in forming and maintaining the nation/state. Rose argues that fantasy is not the private, individual matter it is often assumed to be: “Never completely losing its grip, fantasy is always heading for the world it only appears to have left behind” (Rose, 1996, p.3). She draws on Freud’s work Moses and Monotheism to explore the way in which fantasy acts to cement group identifications and forge a sense of collective will:

...Freud links fantasy to what makes group identifications possible and impossible at one and the same time....Fantasy is not therefore antagonistic to social reality, it is its precondition or psychic glue. But fantasy surely ceases to be a private matter if it fuels, or at least plays a part in, the forging of the collective will. More simply, you don’t have to buy into Freud’s account of hidden guilt to recognise the force in the real world of the unconscious dreams of nations (Rose, 1996, p.3)

In Rose’s view, it is this central role that fantasy plays in binding groups together that makes it crucial to understanding the way in which a sense of nationhood is generated and perpetuated:

...there is no way of understanding political identities and destinies without letting fantasy into the frame. More, that fantasy – far from being the antagonist of public, social, being – plays a central, constitutive role in the modern world of states and nations (Rose, 1996, p.4)
Fantasy, Rose posits, is a driving force behind the political actions that reinforce and regenerate the desired identity of the nation. The modern state, reliant on fantasy to give it authority to act, can never quite escape fantasy: “If the modern state is a fantasy – if it relies on fantasy for an authority it can ultimately neither secure nor justify – then fantasy will always be there to one side of it” (Rose, 1996, p.10). As a driving force behind political and group identifications, fantasy operates not solely at the level of the individual but serves to connect individuals in ways that may not be consciously recognised.

Fantasy, as described by Rose, is not merely a licentious vehicle for desire; it also serves to screen off that which is undesired: “If fantasy can be grounds for licence and pleasure...it can just as well surface as a fierce blockading protectiveness, walls up around inner and outer, psychic and historical, selves” (Rose, 1996, p.4). Yet as much as fantasy serves to block off that which is not desired to be known, it also serves as a way of letting in undesired knowledge in an altered form. Rose makes the case that that which is desired to be forgotten about history continues to make its way towards consciousness: “In terms of history, trauma reappears” (Rose, 1996, p.11). The repressed returns at a group level, as that which is hidden and unacknowledged is passed from one generation to the next, recurring throughout the history of the nation: “one generation finds itself performing the unspoken, unconscious agendas of the one that went before” (Rose, 1993, p31). That which is repressed or unacknowledged continues to resurface with the same force as the force with which it is suppressed. Thus, members of the nation can find themselves re-enacting the traumas of their historic opponents: “It can be demonic repetition, not subversion, which
forces the antagonists of historic conflict under each others’ skin...this is historic trauma transmitting and repeating itself across time” (Rose, 1996, pp31-32).

Rose’s argument suggests that that which is excluded from the story of the nation’s history always comes back, against the suppressing force of that which is publicly remembered about the nation’s history. Those within the nation, therefore, are burdened with histories they may actively wish not to know about: “To what extent are you carrying histories, geographically as well as through time, which you may not be conscious of living, that you may not want to live, histories set off, so to speak, long before you began?” (Rose, 1996, p.42).

In Rose’s analysis, the seeming certainty and concreteness of the nation’s landscape emerges as being founded on fantasy: “Only by stopping the movements of the earth – vertically through space, horizontally across time—can you enter the ‘once and for all’ and take possession. Of land, of others, of yourself....The fantasy on which state and nationhood rely” (Rose, 1996, p.21). The attempted foundation of the nation on the stability of the nation’s territory relies on the belief that it is possible to secure land permanently and without dispute. Yet land cannot be secured with this certainty. The attempt to anchor national identity in land, by its very impossibility, generates an endless instability: “Perhaps it is only when land fossilizes into identity that, like the symptom in psychoanalytic language, the real trouble begins”(Rose, 1996, p.48).
Rose posits that national politics is largely grounded in emotion: this is often punitive and sadistic emotion. Moralism emerges as a key way in which national boundaries are defined: “morality is emphatically a political concern; it is one of the most powerful ways in which the contours of a political landscape get drawn” (Rose, 1996, p.75). The political evocation of the nation as having a “special moral privilege in relation to the rest of the world” (Rose, 1996, p.61) is destabilised by the circulation of emotions that underlie this moral narcissism: “Stake your ground on the moral narcissism of the nation, and you render yourself prey to narcissism’s inherent vulnerability, to the ...uncertainty out of – or against which – any identity will have formed” (Rose, 1996, p.63). This interweaving of politics and morality generates, within the nation as well as between it and other nations, a system by which some national citizens are deemed innocent and some guilty: “Purity needs danger to be sure of its ground. Innocence needs guilt” (Rose, 1996, p.59). A sense of national guilt is expelled, projected on to those who cause nation’s people to feel guilty. This projection of felt guilt interacts with the ever-returning repressed histories noted earlier, the “histories barely acknowledged, lines of affiliation repudiated and yearned” (Rose, 1996, p.59).

“Violent innocence” (Rose, 1996, p.59) is thus a way for the nation to secure itself: "shedding, blinding itself to, the unspoken or even violent histories out of which it was made” (Rose, 1996, p.59). Based on fantasy and a submerged circulation of violent emotions, the nation, as Rose describes it, relies on a constant repression of that which would destabilise it.

Žižek, Bhabha and Rose offer complex analyses of the interrelation of lack, loss and forgetting in the creation of the nation. Through these analyses, it is possible to explore the
workings of forgotten histories and of otherness within the nation. However, in order to explore the connection of notions of motherhood to the nation, I now move on to texts with a more specific focus on the operation of concepts of gender within the nation.

Nira Yuval-Davis argues that gender is not tangential to the construction of the nation, but is central to the way in which nations define themselves as separate from other nations: “gendered bodies and sexuality play pivotal roles as territories, markers and reproducers of the narratives of nations and other collectivities” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.39). Women, Yuval-Davis argues, are figured as the biological means of continuing the nation:

The central importance of women’s reproductive roles in ethnic and national discourses becomes apparent when one considers that, given the central role that the myth (or reality) of ‘common origin’ plays in the construction of most ethnic and national collectivities, one usually joins the collectivity by being born into it (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.27).

This has an impact which extends beyond the monitoring of the behaviour of individual women: “consider the political implications of the ways in which women are constructed as biological reproducers of ‘the nation’” (Yuval-Davis, 1996, p37). Yuval-Davis argues that women have a central role in symbolising the continuance of national culture and the guardianship of national purity: “women’s roles as symbolic border guards and as embodiments of the collectivity, while at the same time being its cultural reproducers” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.23).

It should be noted that this role of women in symbolising the nation’s continuation hinges on a notion of women as mothers, reproducing the nation. Thus the figure of the mother
becomes central to the construction of the nation. Yuval-Davis notes that the nation is often symbolized by the figure of the mother: “A figure of a woman, often a mother, symbolizes in many cultures the spirit of collectivity” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.45). The figure of mother is here, through the connection of motherhood to childhood, associated with the nation’s future: “Women are associated in the collective imagination with children and therefore with the collective, as well as the familial, future” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.45)

Yuval-Davis notes an intersection between notions of motherhood, nationhood and race:

Control of marriage, procreation and therefore sexuality would thus tend to be high on the nationalist agenda. When constructions of ‘race’ are added to the notion of the common genetic pool, fear of miscegenation becomes central to the nationalist discourse (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.23)

If women as mothers are associated with ideas of the continuation of culture, women as mothers are then associated with the obverse, the possibility of loss or contamination of culture. Yuval-Davis’ analysis of the meanings of motherhood within the nation is convincing. It does not, however, offer a complex analysis of the source of the fears of contamination that circulate around the figure of the mother.

Radhika Mohanram (1999) analyses the relationship between the nation, landscape, and constructions of gender and race, investigating: “the identity of woman in the nation and the spatial construction of femininity, the identity of the black body and its natural relationship with nature and landscape as opposed to that of the white body and its relationship to knowledge” (Mohanram, 1999, p.xv). The national landscape, Mohanram
asserts, is inextricably intertwined with the construction of identities within the nation: “place/landscape is saturated with relations of domination which are relevant to the construction of identity” (Mohanram, 1999, p.xv). The landscape is metaphorically figured as the nation, and the location of the bodies of the nation’s citizens within this landscape serves both to create a unified identity and to mark off difference within the nation. The national landscape is saturated with emotion, linking the national past to the national present through the evocation of memory: “The emotion attached to the landscape relates to its ability to release memory, allowing the past to exist simultaneously with the present” (Mohanram, 1999, p.5). Thus it is central to the construction of a sense of a continuously existing nation. The repression of bodily interaction with the landscape, meanwhile, functions as part of a system whereby notions of racially identified bodies are generated:

In other words, the discourses of nationalism subscribe to a different form of embodiment (as in race/ethnicity) which requires the foregoing of an embodiment mediated through nature....Notions of race are a part of nationalistic discourse (Mohanram, 1999, p.7)

Mohanram notes that “whiteness” is symbolically associated with the mind “For the rich white man the mind spills over into the body, making it disappear altogether” (Mohanram, 1999, p.37). Meanwhile “blackness”, poverty and femaleness are associated with the body: “ for the black and/or poor man, it is the body that is highlighted” (Mohanram, 1999, p.37). Thus certain members of the nation come to be marked as material beings rather than conscious subjects:

If the ‘Body’ can only exist as a trace, its ontological spoor is left on the black body. In fact it is the process of displacement that allows the Negro/female/perverted
body to come into being. They are the body. They cannot attain the dialectic of subject and object, cannot transcend their materiality (Mohanram, 1999, p.51)

It is through this process that women, coded by race, are tasked with embodying the nation:

What I am suggesting here is that the woman’s body is coded not only racially, culturally, sexually and socially but also nationally, embodying the nation as well, carrying on and through her body the marks of the position she represents in the hierarchy among nations (Mohanram, 1999, pp82-83)

The racially coded body of the woman thus serves to signify varying meanings throughout the nation, embodying the nation’s fantasised timelessness while simultaneously marking difference and change within the nation. Mohanram provides a strong analysis of the interwoven relationship of race, gender and landscape within nationhood.

All of the works described above examine aspects of nationalism: many of them explore the relationship of notions of remembering and forgetting, home and outside, safety and contamination and of motherhood in creating the nation. Yet none of them offer a detailed analysis of the role of images of childhood, a counterpart to images of motherhood, within nationhood. It is to the exploration of the role of a fantasised, nostalgia-imbued childhood within the national imagination that I now turn.

Lauren Berlant investigates the role of the child as a symbol of the nation, highlighting the iconic figure of the “infantile citizen”: “This citizen form figures a space of possibility that transcends the fractures and hierarchies of national life: I call it the infantile citizen” (Berlant, 1997, p.27). While I find the infantile citizen a useful concept, I disagree with Berlant’s location of it specifically in industrialised America. Berlant offers a description of
a fantasised nation centred on a nostalgic notion of home and family, a fantasy which is privileged over the multiple social groupings of contemporary life:

In the new nostalgia-based fantasy nation ...the residential enclave where “the family” lives usurps the modernist promise of the culturally vital, multiethnic city; in the new, utopian America, mass-mediated political identifications can only be rooted in traditional notions of home, family and community (Berlant, 1997, p.5)

Berlant’s view of the origin and purpose of this nostalgia is again restricted to a specific time in America’s history. I would argue that nostalgia has a more complex origin, which requires deeper exploration.

Berlant describes the basing of the nation's value on an image of an innocent child, protected from all harm and from any alteration in the state of its fantasised national home:

...the nation’s value is figured not on behalf of an actually existing and laboring adult, but of a future American, both incipient and pre-historical: especially invested with this hope are the American fetus and the American child. What constitutes their national supericonicity is an image of an American...not yet bruised by history...not yet caught up in...ethnic, racial and sexual mixing, not yet tainted by money or war (Berlant, 1997, p.6)

This fantasised innocent figure, Berlant contends, bears the connection between the nation’s fantasised nostalgic past and its desired future:

This national icon is still tacitly white, and it still contains the blueprint for the reproductive form that assures the family and the nation its future history. This national icon is still innocent of knowledge, agency, accountability and thus has ethical claims on ...adult political agents (Berlant, 1997, p.6)
Berlant claims that this icon is figured as being the best version of the national citizen and thus as the national citizen around which the nation’s rules should be shaped:

Central to...so much ...national fantasy is a strong and enduring belief that the best of ...national subjectivity can be read in its childlike manifestations and in a polity that organises its public sphere around a commitment to making a world that could sustain an idealized infantile citizen (Berlant, 1997, p.28)

One key question here is that of what purpose this fantasised infantile citizen serves.

Berlant posits that “the fetal/infantile person is a stand in for a complicated and contradictory set of anxieties and desires about national identity” (Berlant, 1997, p.6). In its innocence and immutability, the innocent citizen covers over complex and irreconcilable differences within the nation. Berlant suggests that this iconic innocent figure appears as a response to political crises, presenting a consoling figure and serving to cover over that which cannot be represented:

...the overorganizing image or symbolic tableau emerges politically at certain points of structural crisis, helping to erase the complexities of aggregate national memory and replace its inevitable rough edges with a magical and consoling way of thinking that can be collectively enunciated and easily manipulated, like a fetish....This means that the politically invested overorganizing image is a kind of public paramnesia, a substitution for traumatic loss or unrepresentable contradiction that marks its own contingency or fictiveness while also radiating the authority of insider knowledge that all euphemisms possess (Berlant, 1997, p.48)
I would agree with Berlant’s hypothesis about the role of this iconic citizen. However, the sense of loss and contradiction that Berlant discusses is, I would argue, inherent in the construction of the nation. This raises the possibility that the figure of the infantile citizen is a response, not to political contingencies, but to the inherent anxieties of the nation.

All the theorists described above offer substantial analyses of the workings of the concept of the nation. What is missing, however, is an overarching analysis that connects the above strands of thought. There is a connection that has not been sufficiently articulated: between the nation, love, loss, history, forgetting, childhood and motherhood. It is my aim in this thesis to draw all these strands together, whilst working in a specific context of New Zealand nationalism.

**Methodology:**

In this thesis, I will use the theories outlined above, in addition to a reference to core concepts of psychoanalytic theory, to analyse a series of texts. I will draw upon a wide range of texts from Aotearoa New Zealand, all of which are examples of the daily re-presentation of the meanings of the nations. I will perform a textual analysis, examining the language used in the material I draw upon. Through an investigation of the words used in these texts, I will explicate the centrality to the nation of the themes that I explore in this thesis. My analysis is of contemporary nationalism. This is not a historical study, but an exploration of the way in which banal nationalism currently operates.
My research consists of the analysis of a diverse range of texts which have been produced in Aotearoa New Zealand within the last 12 years. These texts include non-fiction TV programmes, advertisements, opinion columns, editorials and letters to the editor. I utilise this wide range of texts in order to explore many of the ways in which the notion of the nation is generated. If nationed meanings are pervasive, it is necessary to explore many different avenues through which the sense of the nation is perpetuated. I have chosen not to analyse works of fiction: my focus remains on that which is presented as ‘non-fictional’, as telling the truth about ‘us’ as a nation. I have chosen a specific cut-off point for the texts I analyse: they all have the status of a public statement. For example, a television advertisement for a company is a public statement put forward by a company and an advertising agency working together: it may not represent the opinions of all of those involved in making it, but it is considered suitable to put forward publicly from an identifiable source. Similarly, a letter to the editor of a newspaper is a statement that a person has put forward under their own name for a public audience. It is for this reason that I have not used material such as comments on internet message boards or comments on online versions of newspapers. Given the existence of internet pseudonyms, the possibility of one person using multiple online accounts and of internet ‘trolling’, internet commentary falls below the level of public comment that I wish to use. While opinion pieces in printed sources may also have a ‘devil’s advocate’ aspect, they can be traced to the name of a person who is prepared to be publicly known as expressing a specific opinion. I have used online material only when this material has a clear and traceable source.
It may be noted that much of my material is sourced from newspapers, whether in the form of editorials or of less editorially sanctioned pieces such as letters to the editor. In drawing material from newspapers I am following the work of theorists of nationalism who describe newspapers as central to the production of the nation. Benedict Anderson describes the daily newspaper as crucial in providing “the technical means for ‘re-presenting’ the kind of imagined community that is the nation” (Anderson 1983, p30). The daily reading of the newspaper is a way of meshing readers into the nation: “each communicant is well aware the ceremony he performs is being performed simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion” (Anderson, 1983, p.39). It may be questioned, given the rise in web-based news sources, whether newspapers are still a relevant form to use in the study of the contemporary nation. I would suggest that, at least in the current period, newspapers still maintain an aspect of cultural dominance. For example, The Press (the main newspaper of Christchurch) is, according to its circulation statistics, read by “59% of all people aged 15+” within Christchurch("Newspaper details,"). Thus, newspapers are still read by a not insignificant portion of the population. Further, if the purpose of this thesis is to explore the dominant forms of nationalism in Aotearoa New Zealand, the nationalism of the socially powerful rather than of those on the margins, it is perhaps not irrelevant which sections of the public continue to read newspapers. Newspapers remain a form read by the centre rather than the marginalised: “62% of people earning $60,000 +, 60% of those in the top 3 occupations, 59% of business decision makers and 58% of home owners read a daily newspaper on a typical day” ("10 reasons why,".). Thus, while this piece of research might draw on very different sources if it were redone in the future, newspapers currently remain a rich and appropriate source to draw upon.
There is some variation in the range of material I analyse, in accordance with the focus of each chapter. Thus, for Chapter One, which offers a broad overview of the way in which notions of New Zealand are constructed, I have drawn upon a wide range of texts, such as television advertisements, printed advertisements, promotional material from a Government campaign, and brief newspaper articles. Chapter Two, which focuses on exploring the emotional underpinnings of the construction of the nation in more depth, is mainly based on an analysis of one television series, *Kiwi Kitchen*: this provides scope for a more detailed analysis of underlying connections. Similarly in Chapter Three, in order to look at the functioning of remembrance and forgetting in relation to New Zealand’s history, I have analysed the conversations recorded in a documentary, *Getting to Our Place*, which focuses on the creation of Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Te Papa). Chapter Four has a broader scope than Chapter Three. Thus, in order to investigate widespread opinions, I have analysed a wide variety of letters to the editor and opinion columns. Much of the material I investigate in Chapter Four does not have easily searchable keywords: in order to collate this material, I have focused on material published in Christchurch newspaper The Press over the years 2006 – 2012. Thus I have been able to distinguish themes which I could further investigate. Chapter Five has a similarly broad sweep. However, as it involves far more searchable key terms, I have used material from a range of New Zealand newspapers. In all chapters, the material I analyse has been sourced from New Zealand.
My research is qualitative rather than quantitative: I investigate what is commonly said, rather than the exact numbers of people making statements. It is not within the scope of this work to provide a detailed statistical breakdown. However at certain points it is necessary to include quantitative measures in order to back my claims that a certain strand of meaning is dominant. In order to provide a meaningful and consistent measure of how many times certain statements occur, I have restricted my research to articles found on one database. Thus I have used articles available on the Factiva database in order to gain an overview of patterns in what is said about specific cases. Other databases may offer a slightly different selection. However, given the impossibility of locating every piece of material written about a particular topic, I have selected a boundary that allows a consistent overview.

My research includes the analysis of both non-controversial and highly controversial material. It should be noted that this material comes from writers at various points on the political spectrum – I am not suggesting that all writers analysed support all of the views analysed. Thus, while I may locate nostalgic texts that evoke national unity within the same flows of meaning as potentially racist letters to the editor, I am not suggesting that the creators of the nostalgic texts espouse the potential racism of the letter writers. A TV programme about New Zealand that does not use the word “Māori” once in a series, as explored in Chapter Two, may be located on the same continuum of meaning as an opinion column that suggests sterilising Māori women, as explored in Chapter Five, but there is a clear difference between the two examples. It is not my intention to suggest that the former
example is the same as the latter, but rather to explore the way that strands of meaning interrelate.

Where I am dealing with controversial material, as with non-controversial material, my aim is to analyse what is said, and how ‘what is said’ fits into the dominant national ideology. Thus, for example, when analysing writings about the Nia Glassie case, I am not going to be investigating the level of guilt or innocence of Lisa Kuka, but rather analysing the way in which what is said about Lisa Kuka fits into patterns of ways that mothers are constructed in nationalist discourses. An exploration into the way that women whose children die of injuries inflicted by abuse are demonised should not be taken as a statement that all of these women are inherently above blame. My role is to explore the ways in which blame is distributed, not to suggest a blanket absolution. My exploration into the way in which ‘bad mothers’ are portrayed within the nation focuses specifically on Māori women. It should be noted that none of my research into the way Māori women are portrayed necessarily relates to the lives or experiences of any actual Māori women, although these portrayals may have a significant impact on people’s lives.

In exploring nationalism I am focussing on what Billig terms “banal nationalism”: the nationalism of the everyday, not the extremes. It is the nationalism expressed and created through bank advertisements and cooking programmes I here explore, not the nationalism of neo-Nazi parades. My study of this everyday nationalism is specifically about Aotearoa New Zealand. Some of the national notions I trace are common to the nationalism of many
countries (for example Berlant (1997) identifies the focus on the figure of the child as prevalent in U.S. politics). Some aspects of nationalism I explore may be common to settler/coloniser societies. Yet others may be unique to New Zealand. I have not attempted to trace which aspects of the nationed identity-making I study are specific to New Zealand and which are common to most nations. Readers of this thesis may draw parallels with the nationalism of many other nations.

Similarly, I have not tried to pinpoint which of the metaphors for the nation I here explore are recent developments in response to a particular political situation and which of these metaphors have been in use for a long time. This is outside the scope of my thesis. I think it likely that certain of these ways of making nationed meaning endure, but become more prominent at times of national stress, resurfacing as needed. It should be noted that the central figure of the ‘bad Maori mother’ remains dominant throughout the period I am analysing, and the accusations aimed at this figure show little variation. While the particular focal points of nostalgia which are publically favoured may alter over time, the prominence of nostalgia as a conduit for emotional attachment to the nation does not vary over the period of time that I have studied.

I have focussed on the nationalism of the dominant group in Aotearoa New Zealand: this can loosely be termed ‘Pākehā nationalism’. I have done this because this source of nationalism dominates political discourse, strongly influencing political decisions that have the potential to impact on the lives of many people. It is from this form of nationalism that
the nation is largely constructed: it dominates television programmes and news articles about the nation. To describe the nationalism I analyse as ‘Pākehā nationalism’ does not suggest that it is exclusively partaken in by Pākehā: recent immigrants may partake in parts of it, as may members of long-established non-Pākehā communities. Furthermore, describing such nationalism as Pākehā does not in any way suggest that Māori cannot or do not partake in any parts of it. Nor does it suggest that all Pākehā believe in or contribute to all the flows of discourse I analyse. To say that Pākehā nationalism is the dominant version of nationalism in Aotearoa New Zealand is not to say it is the only version of nationalism in Aotearoa New Zealand. It is not within the scope of this thesis to explore Māori nationalism or other forms of non-Pākehā nationalism within Aotearoa New Zealand, nor to look at their commonalities with and differences from Pākehā nationalism, though these are important areas for exploration. My intention in studying the dominant form of nationalism in Aotearoa New Zealand is not to shut out other forms of nationalism within the nation, but to explore how the dominant form maintains and asserts its dominance.

It is not possible to explore every strand of nationed meaning. Particularly towards the final chapter, the strands of nationalism I explore may be opposed by other sources of nationed meaning. There will always be counter-discourses, even within dominant socio-political groupings. I have however, focussed on nationed meanings which I believe to be pervasive. In looking at controversial subjects, I have not based my arguments on single pieces, but rather on a variety of sources.
**A note on terms used:**

**New Zealand:** The terms ‘Aotearoa’ ‘Aotearoa New Zealand’ and ‘New Zealand’ are all applied to the same geographical space. Yet they all represent slightly different concepts of a nation, concepts which do not necessarily remain stable over time. It should be noted that I have chosen to use the term ‘New Zealand’ to refer to the nation evoked by dominant strands of Pākehā nationalism, as this is the way the country is most frequently referred to within these national discourses. I use the term ‘New Zealand’ as I am referring to the construction of the idea of a nation called ‘New Zealand’. An exploration of the construction of the idea of a nation called ‘Aotearoa’ would probably explore a very different set of meanings, although some strands of meaning would undoubtedly be the same or similar, from those involved in constructing ‘New Zealand’.

**Maoris/Maori/Māori:** As with the use of ‘Aotearoa’ versus the use of ‘New Zealand’, the use of the words ‘Māori’ or ‘Maoris’ is not without meaning. The word ‘Maoris’, with its incorrectly imposed English plural ending can (very generally) be associated with writers or organisations with a negative view of Māori. The correct term is Māori; however the non-macron version ‘Maori’ may be a result of a publication’s editorial policy rather than the desires of the writer. I have left all words in quotes as they were written. In my own writing, I have used the term ‘Māori’, except when dealing with dealing with concepts regularly referenced by the writers I analyse. For example, if a number of writers refer to “Maori child abuse”, I have kept the description as ‘Maori child abuse’.
‘Us’, ‘we’, ‘our’: It should be noted that when I use these terms, I am referring to the concepts of ‘us’, ‘we’ and ‘our’ that nationalism creates and enacts. I am not referring to any natural or inevitable grouping. Nor am I referring to any grouping I, or any of my readers, will necessarily feel a part of. These groupings are by no means inclusive. Not everyone in the nation is included in the ‘us’ that strands of nationalism invoke: indeed, the idea of a national ‘us’ is partly generated by excluding people from that ‘us’. In the case of the strands of Pākehā nationalism that I explore in depth, ‘us’ may sometimes include Māori and sometimes exclude Māori or any other group: the nationed term ‘us’ expands and contracts, depending on the purpose for which it is deployed.

Chapter overview:

In Chapter One, I explore the way in which a sense of a nationed, ‘Kiwi’ identity is established. I investigate the establishment of the ingenuous, ‘innocent’ national character, the definition of ‘the Kiwi’ as simple and pure. Here the notions of New Zealand as a family home are first explored and the portrayal of the ‘New Zealander’ as the child of the nation first emerges. I also explore the way in which the creation of the ‘Kiwi’ character creates an opposition between inside the nation and outside the nation. With the ‘Kiwi’ established as the natural inhabitant of the nation, this creates a boundary in which the non-‘Kiwi’ is deemed not to belong in the nation. This boundary is both internal and external. It excludes ‘foreigners’ but also silences groups of people within the nation deemed to be non-‘Kiwi’. It remains ambiguous whether Māori are considered to be inside or outside the ‘Kiwi’ group.
Chapter Two introduces the role of nostalgia in attempts to establish a comfortable nationhood. I explore the importance of notions of an idealised national childhood in attempts to secure a stable ‘national identity’. This fantasised national childhood functions both in relationship to an idealised lost past and an impossible future. I explore the emotional complexities of this nostalgic yearning, and trace the mysteriously absent figure of the mother.

In Chapter Three I explore what happens to the history that is rejected by the nostalgic view of the past. I investigate an attempt to secure a comfortable national history, and the way in which this attempt continually fails to achieve its ends. I trace the way in which an undesired history continues to surface, bringing division and unease. Here gaps, silences and lack come to the fore. The impossibility of securing a comfortable national home in the face of the continual re-emergence of undesired knowledge becomes clear.

Chapter Four presents a less innocent aspect of the refutation of history explored in Chapter Three. Here the refuted knowledge of a violent history can be seen as projected onto those who serve as reminders of this history. I here explore the way in which Māori come to stand accused of violating the comfort of the nation. I investigate the way in which accusations aimed at Māori mirror Pākehā anxieties about the past and present. I demonstrate the way in which accusations that Māori are taking too much from Pākehā serve as a reversal of that which Pākehā feel themselves accused of. I trace a line from accusations that Māori are
speaking too much about history to accusations that associate Māori with dirt and contamination.

In Chapter Five I explore the way in which the anxieties generated by the inevitable failure to secure a comfortable, innocent Pākehā national identity are displaced onto the figure of the ‘bad Maori mother’. I look at the connection of ‘the woman/mother’ to notions of national/cultural purity and the connection of nation to home. Here the way in which children are figured as the future of the nation becomes crucial to my investigation. I explore the evocations of murdered Māori children and of bad Māori mothers that form a core of anxiety within the nation. In exploring what is said about Māori women as mothers, I highlight the ways in which they stand accused of failing to protect Pākehā from that which is hidden and disavowed within the nation.


Laws, M. (2012, 3 June). Pay them, sterilise them, but don’t let them have kids, Opinion column, *Sunday Star-Times*.


Chapter One: A Real Kiwi

...innocence (if you will take this word according to its etymology, which is: ‘I do no
harm’) (Barthes, 2000, p.69)

Within this chapter, central themes of the construction of nationhood in New Zealand first
emerge. The key notions of innocence and childlikeness, which will be explored in the first
chapters of this thesis, are here introduced. Berlant has noted the centrality of an appeal to
the childlike in other nations: “Central to...so much other national fantasy is a strong and
enduring belief that the best of...national subjectivity can be read in its childlike
manifestations” (Berlant, 1997, p.28). I will here explore how New Zealand’s notion of
national subjectivity is created through the valorisation of simple, childlike characteristics.

In this chapter, I will trace the construction of an imagined national character, which is
commonly referred to as ‘Kiwiness’. I will do this first through an analysis of the ways in
which ‘Kiwiness’ is constructed in opposition to ‘foreignness’, and then through an analysis
of the qualities of the supposed ‘Kiwi’ character. I have taken this approach as the notion of
national character is created both through a definition of who ‘we’ are, and through a
definition of who ‘we’ are not. Billig describes the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dynamic thus: “If
nationalism is an ideology of the first person plural, which tells ‘us’ who ‘we’ are, then it is
also an ideology of the third person. There can be no ‘us’ without a ‘them’” (Billig, 1995,
p.71). It is my aim in this chapter to investigate both of these aspects of the construction of
a notion of national character in New Zealand. My initial focus is on the way in which the ‘foreign’ is defined as that which has no natural right to access the land of New Zealand. This is a definition which has its source as much in a fantasised relation of ‘New Zealanders’ to the nation as it does in the practical concerns that those who discuss ‘foreign ownership’ claim to address. I will look at the ways in which this, in turn, defines ‘New Zealanders’ as those with a natural right to the land and affinity with it. Within this notion of the land as the ‘birthright’ of ‘New Zealanders’ — a notion which reverses itself as the notion that ‘New Zealanders’ are the ‘birthright’ of the land, that somehow it wants ‘us’ here — the uneasy presence and absence of Māori within the Pākehā definition of ‘New Zealanders’ can here be discerned. Within the narratives here explored, Māori serve to legitimise the presence of ‘New Zealanders’, but are not quite included as fully ‘Kiwi’. The exploration of the notion that ‘New Zealanders’ have a natural affinity with New Zealand by virtue of the qualities which they have and ‘foreigners’ lack then leads to the question of what these qualities are. These are qualities which ‘foreigners’ are deemed unable to have because they are not ‘Kiwi’; although it is asserted that they covet these qualities. What is the nature of the ‘Kiwiness’ which ‘we’ are purported to naturally possess, to have been born with by virtue of having been born here?

In looking at the ways in which ‘Kiwiness’ is constructed, I am seeking to investigate the way in which national stereotypes are created and utilised: stereotypes of character and temperament can be mobilized to tell the tale of ‘our’ uniqueness and ‘our’ common fate (Billig, 1995, p.71). I will look at the way in which a sense of nationed identity is reiterated in everyday life through reminders that ‘we’ are ‘Kiwi’ and others are not ‘Kiwi’:
National identity embraces all these forgotten reminders. Consequently, an identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language. To have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood (Billig, 1995, p.8)

Thus, I will look in depth at the way in which ‘Kiwness’ is referred to in a variety of everyday sources. I will use sources such as newspaper articles and advertisements which are incorporated into the fabric of everyday life and thus serve to reiterate what it means to be ‘Kiwi’. Such sources, with their inbuilt references to a national identity, provide a good illustration of the ways in which it is possible to speak about ‘Kiwness’. In looking at the way in which nationed identity is constructed in New Zealand, I will focus on one major strand of meaning within New Zealand banal nationalism. While there will always be counter-discourses to any dominant strand of discourse, I have chosen to focus on a dominant set of meanings that exert a strong cultural force. I have chosen to look at what ‘Kiwis’ are reminded of when they are reminded that they are ‘Kiwi’, as the character of these reminders has a political impact: “nationhood provides a continual background for ...political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the daily structuring of newspapers. In so many little ways, the citizenry are daily reminded of their place in a world of nations” (Billig, 1995, p.8). I have not looked at the ways in which the set of meanings associated which the ‘Kiwi’ character may change over time, but rather at the dominant set of meanings in contemporary New Zealand.

In looking at ‘Kiwness’, the ‘innate’ quality of New Zealanders which is alleged to distinguish ‘us’ from others, common themes emerge. The ‘Kiwi’ is held to possess a childlike nature, a simplicity of character which is considered to be a virtue superior to the ‘sophistication’ of
outsiders. Rhetorically, as I shall illustrate over the course of this chapter, ‘we’ are innocent children in opposition to the rest of the world’s more adult nature. The association of the figure of the innocent child with that which is held to be precious about the nation is not exclusive to New Zealand: Lauren Berlant notes the “national supericonicity” (Berlant, 1997, p.6) of the image of “the American fetus and the American child” (Berlant, 1997, p.6). In later chapters, I will explore what it is that makes the association of childhood with the nation so compelling, what it is that makes this association a driving emotional force behind nationalism. There are links between this national focus on childhood and an idealisation of innocence, a valourisation of lack of knowledge, which is produced by in reaction to the history of colonisation of New Zealand. This, too, will be explored in more depth in later chapters. My concern in this chapter is to outline the ways in which the ‘Kiwi’ is defined in opposition to the ‘foreign’: what is it that ‘we’ assert ‘we’ have which ‘they’ lack?

A preoccupation with nostalgia has been noted by previous authors writing about everyday nationalism in New Zealand. Over the course of the next two chapters, I will explore the nature of this “nostalgia”, which I consider to have two parts: one a fetishised focus on ‘innocent’ and childlike aspects of culture, and the other a wished return to the nostalgically fantasised past. Bell offers an example of a school of thought that holds that this retreat to the childish is a response to an outside threat:

Are the threats coming from globalisation provoking this preoccupation with nostalgic versions of our culture? Observer Roland Robertson suggests that the homogenising requirements of the modern nation state...could well be the impetus to nostalgia as a feature of contemporary life (Bell, 1996, p.181)
Yet this raises questions that will be explored throughout this chapter. Is globalisation the real threat, the real source of the discomfort which leads to a retreat to a cultural identity rooted in childhood? Is the desire to take shelter in a simple national identity, as explored in this chapter, a symptom of a partially unrecognised global incursion? Is this also the case with the kind of nostalgia explored in Chapter Two, which reaches back to an imagined, racially homogenous nation-in-the-past? If this is the case, what is the threat that outsiders pose? What is it that is feared to be lost through the incursion of the outside world? Or, to reverse the question, in what ways is our sense of what ‘we’ have to lose generated by the notion that the outside world is capable of taking something from ‘us’? It can be convincingly argued that globalisation brings negative economic consequences for members of the nation. This could be considered to be the real fear that underlies the fear of the ‘foreign’ intruding on the nation. Yet what if these ‘real’ fears are working in the same way, drawing on the same emotional sources, as the ‘unreal’ fears they ostensibly underlie? In the early parts of this chapter I will explore the ways in which seemingly practical concerns about access and the use of land are animated by a residue of quite other fears.

Hocking off great chunks of God’s Own

Public access to the lakes, mountains, rivers and pastures of the high country is a cherished birthright of Kiwis. Unfortunately, it’s not one provided for adequately in law. How best to protect it, then, has become a highly charged political issue. The foreshore and seabed fiasco was proof if the Government needed it that it is not only Maori that consider parts of Aotearoa their turangawaewae. The Government has been forced to walk a tightrope between keeping foreign investment flowing into New Zealand and acknowledging growing public suspicion that it is hocking off
great chunks of God’s Own to the highest overseas bidder….As pressure from wealthy foreigners for a slice of one of the world’s last great wildernesses increases, it’s far from clear that the Government has the processes to deal with the influx (Espiner, 2004, p.11)

The above paragraph is one illustration of the way in which “foreigners” are held to be a threat to New Zealand, or to New Zealanders. What is at stake here is the “birthright of Kiwis”, a birthright consisting of access to a landscape felt to be natural, to be “one of the world’s last great wildernesses”. The possibility that neither the landscape nor the “birthright” are natural is raised by the inclusion of the “pastures of the high country”, a phrase which refers to farms, in the list. It is not clear what is threatened by “foreigners” here: it could be “public access”, but the article suggests it may also have something to do with the ability of “not only Maori”, of Pākehā, to “consider parts of Aotearoa their turangawaewae”. More problematically, it is not made clear in what way “foreigners” pose more of a threat than New Zealanders. The article is written in terms of public access, yet “wealthy foreigners” would be subject to the same laws on public access as “Kiwis” would be. The answer could instead lie in the uses “wealthy foreigners” would make of their “slice of one of the world’s great wildernesses”. It could be considered that they would not use it as “Kiwis” would, that they would turn it into something other than farmland. While this may be accurate, it is based on the assumption that farming is a natural and proper use for the land. There is a further assumption that land is still ‘ours’ while occupied by New Zealand-born farming families, but no longer ‘ours’ when occupied by those from overseas. While there may be compelling arguments about possible economic consequences of overseas ownership of New Zealand properties, it is worth asking if the perception of threat, of an urgent need for protection of the “birthright of Kiwis” is not also coming from an entirely other direction.
The threat posed by “wealthy foreigners” is described as being their ability to block Kiwis’ “cherished birthright” of “Public access to the lakes, rivers and mountains of the high country”. Yet little interest is generated by the ability of New Zealanders to deny this same “public access” when placed in the context of wider fears about foreign ownership. Much public discussion was generated by Canadian singer Shania Twain’s purchase of land in the South Island. The creation of the Motatapu Track, a condition of Twain’s purchase of the land, was, for a time, held up by the refusal of a New Zealand couple, Don and Vicky McRae, to allow public access to part of their property. As was reported at the time:

A public access court case is brewing over the Motatapu Track, which crosses the high country station of Canadian country singer Shania Twain. Department of Conservation (Doc) Otago conservator Jeff Connell announced in a media release yesterday the owners of Alpha Burn Station, Don and Vicky McRae, had instituted proceedings in the Invercargill District Court against the Commissioner of Crown Lands and Doc. At the centre of the case is public access along the marginal strip of the Fern Burn at the Wanaka end of the Motatapu Track, linking Wanaka to Macetown and Arrowtown.... The spat between the McRaes and Doc has prevented Doc from finishing the part of the track which crosses the McRaes’ property. It has also prevented the full track from being opened to the public (Cook, 2007)

While Twain’s purchase of land triggered fears of a lack of access to land, the McRaes enacted this feared blockage of land. Yet the McRaes’ actions in blocking public access were not subject to the same level of discussion as Twain’s purchase of land. As New Zealanders, the McRaes do not trigger the same fears of loss of access as “wealthy foreigners” do. This may be because, as New Zealanders, the McRaes are ‘us’: ‘we’ New Zealanders still have access to the land via the McRaes. To rephrase it, they are there so that ‘we’ don’t have to be: they are ‘our’ stand-ins. The discrepancy between the concern generated by the idea of “wealthy foreigners” denying ‘us’ access and the lack of concern generated by New
Zealanders actually denying ‘us’ access reveals the mythic dimension of fears about “foreign ownership”. These fears draw, not only on actual possibilities, but also on imagined ones. They draw on the fear that ‘our’ nation will be stolen away from us. The neglected possibility here is not that there might be nothing to fear from “foreign ownership”, but that land might be just as inaccessible to ‘us’ in the hands of New Zealanders.

His father and uncle had done so much work to bring the land into production and on improvements. They would turn in their graves if they knew the station had been sold to a foreigner, he said. “The Government is giving away our heritage.” Instead it should have bought the station, just as it had bought Castle Hill Station, in Canterbury. He also accused Land Information Minister John Tamihere of selling off Maori heritage. Motatapu means “valley of the sacred dead” and there was believed to be a Maori burial ground at the foot of Mt Mototapu, Mr. Emerson said. He also knew of Chinese graves scattered around the station. (Gerken, 2004, p.9)

In the above, the amorphous but overwhelming threat posed by ‘foreigners’ is more obviously present: “The Government is giving away our heritage” and “our” ancestors “would turn in their graves”. Yet it is not made clear what kind of destruction will be wrought by the “foreigner”. It is assumed to be obvious that the “foreigner” is destructive: it simply goes without saying. It is possible that after Emerson’s father and uncle “had done so much work to bring the land into production”, less “productive” use of the land is seen as a violation. It may be assumed here that a “foreigner” would reverse the “improvements” previously done, and thus would bring about the decline and degradation of the land. Yet the mention of “a Maori burial ground” and “Chinese graves” implies that the “foreigner” is seen as an inappropriate custodian for the ‘Kiwi’ dead. The dead will “turn in their graves”, the presence of a “foreign owner” a desecration in a way that the presence of a ‘Kiwi’ owner could not be. Here the duty of the ‘Kiwi’ to protect the nation by tending the past is
invoked: “a sense of shame lurks forcefully around the rhetoric of nationalism...if ‘we’ fail
the past – if ‘we’ abandon our precious national essence – then ‘we’ would be shamed”
(Billig, 1995, p.101). To abandon the nation’s “sacred dead”, and through them the nation’s
history, to the hands of a “foreigner” is seen as a shameful loss of national integrity. The
extent to which the notion of ‘Kiwness’ is flexible can be seen here. Māori, Pākehā and
Chinese New Zealanders are all counted as part of “our heritage” in the context of
opposition to foreignness now, although at other times the definition of ‘us’ is much more
narrow. Or, to rephrase it, everyone in New Zealand in the past is ‘us’, in the context of
someone not from New Zealand being here now. The ‘foreigner’ present here now is not
‘us’ but ‘them’, irrevocably alien to the land.

Concerns about the threat posed by ‘foreigners’ create a narrative that legitimises the
presence of New Zealanders in New Zealand. By asserting that ‘they’ should not have access
to New Zealand, that they do not have the ‘right’ to be here or to have the use of ‘our’ land,
‘we’ also assert that ‘we’ do have these rights, that it is natural that ‘we’ are here. The
composition of this ‘we’ is flexible. As can be seen above, it can encompass Pākehā, Māori,
Chinese New Zealanders, and potentially others. However, more often this ‘we’ seems to
encompass only Pākehā: while Māori occasionally called upon to legitimise the presence of
Pākehā in New Zealand, they more often fade from view. The process by which the
legitimising narrative is reiterated and reinforced can be seen in the following extract from
the book New Zealand’s Wilderness Heritage, published in the Weekend Herald:
This was a New World phenomenon, an egalitarian ethic which stressed access to the public land “commons” and became enshrined in our legislation through provisions like the Queen’s chain. Just as Maori expected the Treaty of Waitangi to guarantee them continued use of their forests and fisheries, so too was the crown expected to acquire public lands where all New Zealanders could freely enjoy their natural and historic heritage (Molloy, 2008, p.B3)

Here, the focus quickly narrows from acknowledging an international context — “a New World phenomenon” — to the national. The second sentence creates an impression of a natural and inevitable descent of rights sparked by the original egalitarian impulse. While the use of the phrase “so too” should give both halves of the sentence equal weight, it instead serves to conceal the historical inequalities that furthered the ends of the “egalitarian ethic” allegedly at work here. The use of “so too” as a fulcrum suggests that “Maori” are being contrasted with “all New Zealanders”, and are therefore excluded from that group at the same time that they are being used to shore up the legitimacy of its claims. The use of the active voice in the first half of the sentence — “Just as Maori expected” — references the assumed expectations of a group of people. Meanwhile, the switch to the passive voice in the second half of the sentence — “so too was the crown expected” — gives an additional sense of inevitability. This expectation is grammatically positioned as being beyond the fallibility of human groups: it is not stated whose expectations are being referenced. The sentence structure also creates the impression that both expectations have been met: the possibility that the latter may have been met while the former was not is disallowed. So too is the possibility that “free enjoyment” might only be available at a cost to others. It is at the end of the second sentence that the key message is conveyed. The phrase “where all New Zealanders could freely enjoy their natural and historic heritage” does double duty. This “heritage” is “natural” and “historic” in that it relates to “nature” and “history”, but also in that it ‘naturally’ and by reason of history
belongs to “all New Zealanders”. Here, the “egalitarian ethic” guarantees “all New Zealanders” the free enjoyment of what is naturally theirs. There is both an appropriation and a sidestepping of the history of the effects of colonisation on Māori. A history is constructed in which “all [Pākehā?] New Zealanders” have a natural and inevitable right of access to “natural” New Zealand, an enjoyment only they can freely partake in.

Today, in the huts on DoC’s great walks, Kiwis are very much a minority. Ask most local trampers why they no longer frequent the Tongariro crossing or the Abel Tasman Coastal walk, and they are likely to say it is because of the loss of solitude and the crowds of overseas visitors who make them feel like strangers in their own country. The tourism tiger is no longer content to pace its package tour cage; it is indeed out, stalking the back country....DoC is required to foster recreation on conservation lands...but only to allow tourism....Concessionaire activities must not “compromise the intrinsic natural values of areas managed by the department...” and must safeguard the “qualities of solitude, peace and quiet.” Yet these fine policies are being steadily eroded...from overcrowding of Milford sound...to unscrupulous tour bus drivers disgorging ill-prepared tourists on to the Tongariro crossing (Molloy, 2008, p.B4)

In the above, the presence of “overseas visitors” in “natural” New Zealand can be seen as a threat to New Zealanders’ “natural and historical” free enjoyment of their “heritage”. “Kiwis” are made “strangers in their own country” by the experience of being “very much a minority”. They are alienated by the existence of others who appear to be interposed between them and their land. “Crowds of overseas visitors” are elided with the “loss of solitude”, becoming collapsed into the same thing. Furthermore there is an elision between the ‘lost’ “qualities of solitude, peace, and quiet” and the “intrinsic natural values of areas”. Ultimately, then, “overseas tourists” are accused of destroying the “intrinsic natural value” of national parks. This accusation is linked to their ability to make “Kiwis” “feel like strangers in their own country”. Turned out of their national home, having lost their solitude, peace
and quiet, “Kiwis” are unable to achieve recreation. “Recreation” here is asserted to belong to “Kiwis”, while “tourism” is assigned to “overseas visitors”: the practical difference between the two activities is not explained. “Recreation” is presented as both the natural purpose of New Zealanders and the natural purpose of the land: together they are united with one purpose, made for each other. Tourists, on the other hand, simply don’t know how to recreate: they are “ill-prepared”, and this ill-preparedness serves to disrupt the “natural” bond between the Kiwi and the land. This is worth comparing with a letter to the editor which talks of: “tourists pooping near or possibly in rivers, cows doing the same thing” (Holiday, 2008). Overall, tourists are described as an inept introduced species. The value of the land is wrecked, the “tiger” is “loose, stalking the back country”. It is never asked whether this destruction of enjoyment would take place if the “crowds” were of New Zealand trampers.

This accusation that ‘foreigners’ are wrecking ‘our’ land, wrecking our ability to enjoy our land in the way the land intends us to, is reminiscent of Žižek’s claim that:

The element which holds together a given community...always implies a shared relationship towards a Thing, toward Enjoyment incarnated. This relationship toward the Thing, structured by means of fantasies, is what is at stake when we speak of the menace to “our way of life” presented by the Other (Žižek, 1993, p.201)

I will explore the nature of this fantasised relationship with the nation in more depth in Chapter Two. Yet here it is already clear that an accusation is being made that outsiders are stealing something from ‘us’, something that is essential to our nation, by using up all the goodness that should be ‘ours’. The “crowds of overseas visitors”, in their excess numbers and excessive behaviour, stand accused of ruining our “free enjoyment”. They are thus
considered to be alienating ‘us’ from the land, making us “strangers” to “our own country”.

This accords well with Žižek’s claim that: “What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing. We always impute to the “other” an excessive enjoyment: he wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life)” (Žižek, 1993, p.203)

This imagined ‘stealing’ of ‘our’ way of life will also be explored in more depth in later chapters. Here, it is ‘foreigners’ who are accused of ‘stealing’ something from ‘us’. In later chapters I will explore a belief that something is being stolen from inside the nation. This sense that something is being stolen from the nation is an inherent part of nationalism, for reasons I will explore over the course of this thesis.

At the same time, a subtle undermining of the Conservation Act has begun with the erasure of the word “tourism” from the Conservation General Policy (2005), and attempts by the tourism bureaucracy to imply that indigenous visitors to conservation lands have no more rights than foreign tourists – all are deemed to be just tourists. Just as Tangata Whenua are accorded a privileged position as the first people of Aotearoa, so too should all New Zealand citizens expect that their recreational needs in the back country will take precedence over those of overseas tourists (Molloy, 2008, p.B4)

Here, the terms are more overtly displayed: New Zealanders are “visitors”, while those born overseas are “tourists”. “Tourism bureaucracy” is condemned for eliding these boundaries. It is only the “indigenous” who are described as having “needs” which must be fulfilled by the “back country”. These “needs” are presented as indisputable. The purpose of the Tangata Whenua in this statement is to provide legitimacy for the claims of “New Zealanders”. However, the use of the conjunction “Just as... so too” indicates that Tangata Whenua are excluded from the group described as “New Zealanders”. Māori are “accorded
a privileged position” in order to assert the rights of “indigenous” non-Māori to access the land. Once this assertion has been made, they vanish from the rhetoric.

The best long-term proposition for keeping the number of visitors to the carrying capacity of any wilderness area in New Zealand is still physical difficulty, [which] is the intent of DoC’s Wilderness Policy – not to deny access in the hope of protecting it, but instead to leave the wilderness open for those with enough physical and mental toughness to travel there, enjoyably, safely, and without the need for “mountains with handrails” (Molloy, 2008, p.B5)

Beyond the legitimacy conferred by indigenousness, it can be seen here that “New Zealanders” are also being ascribed the right to access the land on the basis of their qualities. These qualities consist of a “physical and mental toughness” it is presumed they, and only they, possess. These qualities, it is inferred, are demanded by the land: no one else can meet this demand. While Māori exist, in this framework, to shore up Pākehā legitimacy, “foreign tourists” should not exist: they lack the qualities that would make them fit for the land.

**Buy Kiwi made**

The above association of purported national qualities with an assumption of rights of access to New Zealand is also at play in the Buy Kiwi Made campaign. Originally proposed by the Green Party, the Buy Kiwi Made campaign was officially intended to address specific economic and environmental concerns. The Green Party website described the purposes behind the campaign thus:
The decision on what and where to spend our money is vital to the well-being of our community. Buying local boosts local communities. For every dollar we spend on foreign-made products, we take a dollar away from our families and communities, and we must reverse this. New Zealand manufacturers and retailers, who have provided centuries of commitment to their communities, are being undermined by the introduction of 'big box' complexes and cheap imports. The further food travels, the greater the impact of carbon emissions, as well as the wider environmental impacts of global shipping and air freight ("Buy local," 2007)

This makes it clear that the campaign was initially based on notions that it is better to buy locally produced goods for economic, environmental or social reasons. However, the debates that took place before the official launch of the campaign illustrate the extent to which this reasoning becomes entangled with other impulses. These other factors include the notion that it is better to buy locally produced goods because they make concrete a unique national character, a national soul not present in goods produced overseas. The Green Party argued that the campaign should only promote goods made in New Zealand: “It is all about supporting businesses and workers who make goods here in New Zealand. It is not, and never has been, intended to provide support for companies who have taken their production offshore” (Sue Bradford, "Buy Kiwi made issue hits snag," 2006). Yet arguments were presented that the campaign should also promote goods manufactured overseas by New Zealand companies. This would not address the environmental concerns raised by the Green Party. However, these concerns seemed to be secondary, in the arguments presented by those favouring the inclusion of overseas-manufactured goods, to the capacity of goods to embody a certain New Zealandness, a set of national virtues:

Prime Minister Helen Clark had earlier appeared to favour a broader campaign. “If you’re talking about wanting to promote iconic Kiwi companies, you have to find a way for companies like Icebreaker to be promoted within the concept of Buy New Zealand Made because the raw material comes out of here, the ideas come out of here, the design, the branding, the marketing, the entrepreneurship,” she said on Monday ("Buy Kiwi made issue hits snag," 2006)
The idea that the Buy Kiwi Made campaign should be about the promotion of ‘New Zealandness’, about the affirmation of the nation through a campaign promoting its products, can be most clearly seen in the following:

If you’re a New Zealander and you have a New Zealand idea, shouldn’t you be able to leverage your New Zealandness? (Simon Shattkey, Smith, 2007)

Made from New Zealand is about what is inside us as people; it’s about the characteristics we have as Kiwis, whether tenacity or creativity, ingenuity, all those things we like to think are inherently Kiwi qualities and that is what this campaign is all about (Simon Shattkey, Smith, 2007)

It could be argued that these are the statements of a manufacturer trying to promote his company’s products. Yet such statements are possible because of a pre-existing notion of a “New Zealandness” that is “inside us as people”. They are based on a concept of “inherently Kiwi qualities” that can be accessed and expressed in certain ways.

If “New Zealandness” is considered to consist of a set of “characteristics we have as Kiwis”, it is worth exploring what characteristics ‘we’ are asserted to have that ‘foreigners’ lack. In order to analyse these qualities, I have turned to a source that offers a more comprehensive view of what these shared national characteristics are believed to be. The publication of a series of articles, entitled “We’ve got it made”, as part of the Buy Kiwi Made campaign, ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007), provides a good source for investigating these “inherently Kiwi qualities”. Given that the purpose of the campaign is ultimately to encourage New Zealanders to buy New Zealand made goods, it is worth exploring what is considered to be the best means of encouragement. In a campaign designed to spur national pride, the presumed triggers of this pride can be clearly seen.
Every Kiwi company that’s doing well here or overseas is making the same thing. And that’s a reputation we can all be proud of, for innovative work, reliability, and often, a better way of doing things. And once you’ve read their stories...you might have another reason to be proud of our little country ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007, Introduction)

An already-assumed-to-exist pride is re-invoked, drawn upon anew. The introduction aims to give “you” “another reason to be proud”, not to create pride in a place where none previously existed. With pride asserted as already existing, the reasons for more pride are then given:

Solving unique problems, or just coming up with a unique way of doing something, has given us a manufacturing sector that...employs a quarter of a million people...New Zealand manufacturers relying less on scale, than they do on being more canny in business, innovative in the way they work, and quicker on their feet ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007, Introduction)

The primary need expressed here is for uniqueness, a uniqueness which must be reiterated: “unique problems”, a “unique way of doing something”. This reiteration does not allow for the possibility of doubt about whether the invoked uniqueness actually exists. There is a level of ambiguity here: are ‘we’ asserted to be unique in that all nations, all people, are unique, or is this uniqueness a special source of pride? To rephrase this, is every nation unique, or are ‘we’ uniquely unique? The former would seem to make sense, but the repeated references to uniqueness in a document intended to invoke pride suggests that the latter is the case. In this view of the nation, ‘Kiwis’ are the only ones who are unique, with other nations merely similar to each other. It follows from its inclusion in a list of positive features that this uniqueness is a virtue: if ‘we’ are unique, ‘we’ are not uniquely bad, but uniquely good. In the above quote, this ‘goodness’ takes the form of canniness, innovation and quickness. Below, I will explore other virtues that ‘we’ are asserted to have.
The bond between an assumed national character and the imputed ‘character’ of the national landscape, explored earlier in this chapter, can be seen again in this material. Thus, a product can be described as “developed for distinctly New Zealand conditions and unavailable anywhere else” (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007). This invokes a sense that the New Zealand environment, and by association the New Zealander, is quite distinct from that found “anywhere else”. The source of this distinctiveness is not specified: what is it that New Zealand has that other nations lack? It is difficult to provide an answer that would not have a convincing counter-example. Broad claims such as claims that New Zealand has wild weather can be countered with examples of other countries’ wild weather, while specific claims such as references to unique species can be countered with references to other nations’ unique species. However, this “unique...environment” is considered to generate innovation: “Possumdown knitwear came up with, reportedly, the first natural fibre in a hundred years, thanks to our unique natural environment” (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007).

The same ambiguity lingers around this “unique” environment as around the ‘Kiwi’s’ unique virtues: is every nation’s landscape unique, or is ‘ours’ considered the only one? The location of this ‘uniqueness’ appears partly to lie in a ruggedness or toughness of ‘our’ environment. This can be seen in the following examples:

Now the boys have a cultivator that can handle the rugged conditions (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007)

Rugged ladders that meet the tough conditions we get in New Zealand...Many of these products are made specifically for our local conditions – whatever they might be on any given day in this changeable and challenging group of islands (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007)

Here a circulation of virtues takes place. In the emphasis on the uniqueness of the environment, on its “rugged”, “tough”, “challenging” nature, desired personal
characteristics are projected outwards onto the landscape, while simultaneously the perceived virtues of the landscape are taken into the national ‘us’. The ‘Kiwi’ is desired to be rugged and tough and thus the environment is described as rugged and tough. Once again, this description breaks down under questioning. Questions about which parts of the “group of islands” are considered to be rough, or about which other environment they are being compared to, cannot be satisfactorily answered. The ‘Kiwi’ is deemed to be rugged and tough by virtue of his or her ability to survive in such a “rugged”, “tough” environment. Even the weather is invoked as a source of pride. The circularity of this set of virtues is not incidental: the forces underlying it will be investigated further in the next chapter.

The emphasis on the interrelation between the ‘Kiwi’ and the natural environment is reinforced by a positioning of farming as a central element in the nation. Although references to farming form a relatively small part of the narratives offered in the Buy Kiwi Made campaign, farming is positioned as being at the core of the nation. The section of Buy Kiwi Made which specifically deals with farming is headed “Every country needs a backbone” (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007, Agriculture). Furthermore, farmland is referred to as “the heartland” (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007, Agriculture). Thus, farming is, metaphorically, both the spine of the country, its central support, and its heart. In both cases, it is placed at the centre of the nation: in the former drawing on images of strength and support, in the latter of life and love. Farming is evoked as deeply embedded in the “unique natural environment” which is seen as a primary generator of “our” pride. Farming, positioned as the “backbone” of the country, provides a naturalised backdrop for the ‘Kiwi’.
It is worth asking what place Māori have in the “unique natural environment” described above: where do Māori fit in the narratives offered in the Buy Kiwi Made campaign? Māori are overtly included in the story, with references such as: “From the moment they arrived in Aotearoa, Maori began crafting goods from the local environment” (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007, Introduction). However, these references almost exclusively mention Māori in connection with the period before Pākehā arrived. The timeline offered in the “Buy Kiwi Made: Timeline” section has three mentions of Māori (pre-Pākehā), followed by fifty-five mentions of non-Māori, and only one specific post-colonisation mention of Māori. It may be argued that the reason for the absence of Māori is that Buy Kiwi Made is a campaign to encourage consumers to buy goods made in New Zealand. An argument could be made that Māori simply are not involved in manufacturing the goods which New Zealanders are being directed to buy. Yet the timeline includes for example, the colonial boat building industry and the invention of a coin-operated letter franking machine (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007, Timeline). This suggests that the purpose of the timeline is not to discuss the origin of goods still available for purchase, but to create a national story that will generate a sense of pride and unity, and through this to sell goods. This national story functions in the manner that Billig describes: “National histories tell of a people passing through time – ‘our’ people, with ‘our’ ways of life and ‘our’ culture” (Billig, 1995, p.71). Thus placement on the timeline provides an example of what “‘our’ people” and “‘our’ culture” are considered to be. The place of Māori in this national story, then, is at the beginning. Their purpose is to provide a legitimate start for the story. There is no great detail provided in this start: Māori are assigned one fifteen-word sentence in the introduction, whereas the invention of the
electric fence takes two sentences, with a total of fifty-three words. While Māori cannot be left out of the story – they must be seen to be included – they are not truly part of the story being offered here. Their position Māori hold in this story can be discerned in the following statement:

As soon as the earliest population came to grips with the climate of Aotearoa and the available plant fibres, flax was being weaved into piupiu, mats and other articles. Once sheep turned up, winter, farming and wool soon forced the manufacturing of clothes for the farm, bush and mountains ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007, Fashion)

Māori, paraphrased as “the earliest population”, form a stage in the history of New Zealand. The next stage is centred on sheep, which are said to have simply “turned up”, triggering a natural progression from “the earliest population” to farming.

A family story

The story of New Zealand manufacturing has a cast of a quarter of a million people. That’s 250,000 workers who are making something in this country, for this country. If it’s not you or I, it’s our parents, our children, our brothers, sisters or mates. It is their skills, determination, sacrifice and sheer hard work that allows this story to be told ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007, Agriculture)

The story of New Zealand manufacturing, as can be seen above, is a family story: the story of “our” family. The nation is made by and of “our parents, our children, our brothers, sisters or mates”. Rhetorically, at least, we all have parents, children, brothers, sisters and mates, even if we do not, in actuality, have one or more of the items on the list. The metaphor of the nation as a family is a common feature of nationalism: “...a sense of ‘our’ uniqueness and integrity is ...frequently conveyed by the metaphors of kinship and gender: the nation is the ‘family’” (Billig, 1995, p.71). Here the conflation of the nation and the family is absolute: to not be proud of or to not believe in the nation would be a betrayal of those “parents...children...brothers...sisters or mates”. In this context, lack of children, brothers, sisters or mates is positioned as a dereliction of one’s duty to the nation. The
nation, in “this story”, simply is the family, and the family is assumed to be inherently good. It is because of this that the family can be invoked as a sign of virtue, casting all that is associated with it in a positive light. The following examples make this visible:

In Dunedin...McKinlays footwear are still operating as a family owned enterprise ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007, Agriculture)

Yarrows is huge, with 250 of the good folk of Taranaki on the payroll, the family name still on the door ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007, Agriculture)

Because the family is ‘us’, it follows that anything to do with the family must be good for ‘us’, good for the nation. Any enterprise, no matter how large, can be viewed as ‘ours’, as the work of our family/nation. This family/nation of ‘ours’ includes children: “When the kids aren’t at home, hopefully a good number of them are at school”("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007).

The reference to “the kids” rather than simply ‘kids’ illustrates the assumption that “the kids” must exist. It is presented as inevitable that the ‘Kiwi’ belongs to a family that has children. If the nation and the family are as one, “the kids” are both the nation and its ultimate product.

Making stuff for people who make stuff

When you buy something that’s made in New Zealand, you’re contributing to the story too. You’re keeping wheels turning, people working, and our prosperity growing ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007)

If the nation is a story to which “you” can contribute, it is here presented as a very simple one. The following are some examples of the language used in this “story”: “Making Stuff for People Who Make Stuff”; “a heck of a lot”; “30-odd staff”; “They’re basically using science to make things really, really tasty”("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007). Beyond an attempt to make a series of articles about manufacturing more accessible to casual readers, the choice of
phrasing appears to be aimed at children. In these articles, “the story” appears as a children’s story. Yet this cannot be the case. Given that it was originally published as an insert in a number of daily newspapers, the series is aimed at literate adults. Thus, the choice of childish phrasing must serve a purpose other than comprehensibility. As part of an advertising campaign designed to generate patriotism, the level of language is chosen in order to create a patriotic appeal. Its purpose is to reincorporate ‘us’ into an already-familiar notion of who ‘we’ are. The simplicity of tone is itself an act of patriotism: ‘we New Zealanders’ are framed as simple, childlike people.

Famous for taking the complex and making it simple, Scott make these somewhat simple and obvious production-line components, just because they don’t know any other way. Apparently, simplicity is very hard to achieve and highly sought after in the production technology world. Most of this type of thing is made in the States, where they’re made big and strong, or in Italy, where they’re made with a lot more ‘flair’. As you can well imagine, in Christchurch they just make sure these things work ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007)

“Simplicity” is here presented as a national virtue of New Zealanders: “hard to achieve” for outsiders, but so ingrained in the national character that New Zealanders simply “don’t know any other way”. This simplicity is constantly re-iterated. As an example, it is repeated twice in the same sentence: “Famous for...making it simple, Scott make these somewhat simple...components”. Simplicity appears here as the main quality ascribed to New Zealanders. Concepts associated with knowledge or intelligence —such as “thought” or “genius” — are paired with, and neutralised by, simplicity: “Sheer genius in the simplicity of thought, though no doubt tricky to make”. The series of articles acknowledges qualities such as intelligence or knowledge through the use of the words “smart” and “clever”. These here
function as euphemisms, bringing adult qualities down to a childlike level. Indeed “cleverness” often appears as something that has had to be developed in order to respond to a situation rather than as an intentionally cultivated quality:

For decades, they’ve had to be smart (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007)

another example of some fellows who couldn’t get what they wanted, until they started making it themselves (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007)

For years, it was impossible to get a boat up the McKenzie country rivers… These waterways simply get so shallow there isn’t enough water – not [for] a conventional propeller, in any case. In 1954, after a lifetime of tinkering on this and that, Bill Hamilton…emerged from Irishman’s Creek with the first Hamilton Waterjet engine, and up the river he went (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007)

Walter Smaill wanted a cabinet to house his home stereo, and ended up becoming a cabinet maker. Then he started making home and office furniture. Now he’s a company called Criterion (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007)

In the stories of “good old Kiwi ingenuity” (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007), there is a notable absence of agency. Rather than being the result of an active decision, or of a process of learning, innovation appears as a response to a stimulus, something someone simply “ended up” doing. These stories of ingenuity are told as simple stories about simple folk, framed for a simple audience: “Frank Simpson was making wash tubs and showertrays…with the new wonder-material, fibreglass. It didn’t take him long to figure out that this stuff would make an excellent boat, which of course it did” (“Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007).

The telling of these stories unites the writer, the reader and the subject of the story in a shared national naivety: ‘we’ are called upon to recognise ‘our story’ by virtue of the
simplicity we share. The narrative of “good old Kiwi ingenuity”, of “tinkering”, is not dependent on the details of any story it purports to relate, as the following shows:

Never afraid of taking a risk, the company’s founder, Alf Yarrow, was first to install a mechanical mixer...’You’re mad’ they said ‘It’ll never catch on’. Alf’s other mad ideas were to use egg pulp, which meant you didn’t have to crack hundreds of eggs, and compressed yeast...And all those half-baked ideas seem to be working just fine ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007)

Here, the use of already existing products as part of a manufacturing process is accorded the same status of “tinkering on this and that” as any more “ingenious” invention. Even large corporations can be incorporated into this narrative framework:

If you drink milk, eat yogurt, cheese, or ice-cream or have butter on your toast, you are a consumer of Fonterra products....responsible for more than a third of the world’s dairy trade, exporting to 140 countries, and dropping some off at your local dairy for good measure. But, just because they’re big, it doesn’t stop them from having heaps of neat little ideas ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007)

In this framework, big is equated with small, complex is equated with simple, and intelligence is a function of instinct: “Without the distractions they might face in a bigger country, they’re able to act more instinctively, act just because they have a hunch that something others find baffling, can actually be done” ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007). Again, there is a loop here: the unique “Kiwi ingenuity”, the ability to act on “a hunch” appears as a product of the physical dimensions of New Zealand. These physical dimensions are considered to be a reflection of the character of its inhabitants. Comparisons with other nations show that New Zealand isn’t as small as these descriptions imply: there are other countries with smaller land space or smaller populations. Thus, the littleness of the country shares the same mythological dimension as the simplicity of its inhabitants. It is because of the asserted smallness of New Zealand that New Zealanders can have so many “neat little ideas”. The lack of “the distractions they might face in a bigger country” confirms them in
their “simplicity of thought”. And what are these “distractions” that would impinge on the “simplicity of thought” of the Kiwi, if said Kiwi were to live in “a bigger country”? The key to this may be in those simple stories of “good old Kiwi ingenuity”.

If the contents of the “story of New Zealand manufacturing” are a re-iteration of the qualities that are valorised as the national character, then that which is left out in order for the narrative to function must be an indication of qualities which are rejected as other or foreign. What is left in the stories is simplicity, naivety, smallness, instinct, a simple response to the demands of a “unique” environment. Thus, what is left out of the stories as “the distractions they might face in a bigger country” must be agency, choice, planning, learning, knowledge, and even size. These are the qualities of adulthood. In these stories, the “New Zealander” emerges as a childlike figure, especially in the context of work: “these food technology boys and girls are always up for a bit of research and development” ("Buy Kiwi Made,” 2007). This figure is more specifically that of a little boy: “if there’s one thing in the world that is every little boy’s dream, it would be this: Fraser engineering in Wellington actually make fire engines” ("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007). In contrast to this valorised, infantile New Zealander, the rest of the world is populated by adults, “big and strong” and possessed of sophistication, “flair”. These adults may yet show their approval — for after all “Who said we’d never make it big?”("Buy Kiwi Made," 2007) — but cannot achieve our innocence.

**What you say no to will always define you**
You’re a New Zealand business; we’re a New Zealand business. Simple ("Scenic Circle advertisement," 2007)

The aspects of the construction of New Zealand’s “national identity” that are present in the Buy Kiwi Made campaign can be seen in distilled form in the Scenic Circle hotel chain’s advertisement. The common purpose that the Scenic Circle hotel chain shares with the Buy Kiwi Made campaign can be seen in the company’s phone number: “0800 NZ OWNED”. The advertisement is printed in the most simple of colours – white lettering on a black background – with no decoration aside from the colourful, but relatively small company logo in the corner. The circle here is a circle of simplicity: “You’re a New Zealand business; we’re a New Zealand business”. What is made simple and clear here is that only “we” New Zealanders can understand our own simplicity, a simplicity that shuts outsiders out. There is no room in this statement for anything other than the simple: the straightforward likeness of New Zealander to New Zealander is made natural and inevitable.

Here’s some food for thought, New Zealand. In 1926, the great Phar Lap was born down at mighty Timaru. Less than a year later, Australia claimed him for themselves. Now, he’s their national icon. The cheeky sods also stole your favourite band...The politically correct stole bullrush and the Swiss took off with Coutts and Butterworth. Let’s face it, everyone’s always stealing your stuff and that’s why you need to insure yourself, New Zealand ("NZI Insurance commercial," 2006)

In the circle of simplicity in which only the New Zealander can fully recognise the New Zealander, can the outsider really steal “your stuff”, the national character of the New Zealander? The NZI commercial claims that outsiders — other nationalities, or those, the “politically correct”, who violate the rules of “simple” common sense — have already stolen “our way of life” (Žižek, 1993, p203), that they have it now, and we do not. Yet “our stuff” is somehow still ours: the Aussies may have “claimed” Phar Lap, but he is still part of “our
stuff”. “Our stuff”, here, appears as something that others want, but cannot truly have: even in their possession, it is not theirs. “Our stuff” is somehow inaccessible, unalterable: the “stealing” of our stuff merely indicates that outsiders want what is ours, not that they truly can have it. The circle is unbroken, still ‘simple’. The alleged theft functions both as an assumption of the desirability of “our stuff”, and as a hint of the constant need for reinforcement of this desirability. If ‘we’ are innocent children, we need the ‘adults’, the rest of the world, to acknowledge the greatness of our achievements. In the logic of this advertisement, “our stuff” is great, ‘we’ know it’s great, and only ‘we’ could have produced such greatness. Yet the desire of the other for “our stuff” is needed to show us its greatness.

What you say no to will always define you: You say no to nuclear power, even though you invented it. When the world said Everest couldn’t be conquered, you said no. And when they said box office hits could only be made in America, you said no to that, too. And now you are saying no to genetic modification. I like that (“Steinlager Pure commercial,” 2007)

This appears as an assertion of strength, of national pride: albeit a national pride that still requires a representative of “the world”, a famous person from overseas, to tell ‘us’ of our difference from ‘the world”. Yet there is a sense here of a retreat to a childish stage, the stage at which a child learns to say “no”, a moment of self-definition: “what you say no to will always define you”. While the “no” defines “us”, it is, of course, inherently negative. The no is insular, it isolates us, it takes ‘us ‘ back to the home: to whatever “the world” has said, ‘we’ say “no”. ‘We’ refute the world. If there is a yes behind this no it is yes to the past, to not leaving. What is a no but a refusal that telescopes backwards into nothing? Saying “no” may be a rebellion, but it is a rebellion that stays stuck in the moment of rebellion,
expressing a desire for stasis, for nothing. This backwards trajectory will be investigated in greater depth in Chapter Two.

A theme in the material explored above is the need for innocence, for simplicity. This is reminiscent of Berlant’s claim that the: “national icon is still innocent of knowledge, agency and accountability, and thus has ethical claims” (Berlant, 1997, p.6). Why the removal of claims to adulthood, to complexity, to knowledge? What is being denied in the denial of these things? Or, alternatively, who or what is being looked after, being protected by these claims of innocence? Why would a nation require an assertion of innocence, and why should this assertion of innocence be protected from the possibility of knowledge that all is not, after all, so simple, so innocent? In this chapter, I have looked at the way ‘Kiwis’ are defined to themselves. I have drawn on a range of wildly available materials in order to explore the way in which the ‘Kiwi’ is marked off from the ‘foreign’. This division takes place through an association of the ‘Kiwi’ with the physical landscape. This landscape is considered to both generate and reflect the ‘Kiwi’ character. It is this national character which is considered to make the ‘Kiwi’ unique: a uniqueness that must be continually re-asserted. The components of this national character are considered to be ruggedness and practicality, but also simplicity and innocence. In Chapter Two I will explore the way in which the appeal to the childlike, which is first encountered in this chapter, functions to tie the national citizen to the nation. In all chapters subsequent to this one, I will explore the way in which the claims to national innocence, first met in this chapter, are constantly challenged by undesired aspects of the nation, and constantly re-affirmed. In this chapter, the ambiguous position of
Māori within the nation has been delineated. In later chapters, it will become clear that Māori have a constantly troubling position within the desired Pākehā nation. It is this constant troubling of the desired nation by the undesired that gives the claims to innocence seen in this chapter their emotional force. They are made to avert a felt accusation that cannot be defended against. This will become clear over the course of this thesis.

Chapter Two: The Physical Act of Being a New Zealander

Paradise is nothing other but the mass fantasy of the childhood of the individual... (Freud, 1999, p.188)

In this chapter I will use a recent television series, *Kiwi Kitchen*, as an illustration of several of the key threads of Pākehā nationalism within New Zealand. At a superficial level, *Kiwi Kitchen* provides an illustration of the way in which the ‘Kiwi’ is defined. This term, ‘Kiwi,’ ostensibly refers to all New Zealanders, but frequently excludes all but Pākehā. As a cooking programme, *Kiwi Kitchen* is intended as light entertainment: it is not intended to be controversial in the way that other texts explored in this thesis may be. Yet it provides a good demonstration, not only of the pleasures that link the national citizen to the desired nation, but of the exclusions that are required to maintain these pleasures. These exclusions may be of undesired knowledge or of undesired people. In *Kiwi Kitchen* it is possible to see both the ways in which nostalgia — reiterated memories of a partly fantasised past — is essential to nationalism, and the kinds of forgetting that are essential to maintain this nostalgia. While the nation centres on the connection nation-memory-childhood-home, there are omissions from all parts of the sequence. The childhood posited as being shared by all ‘Kiwis’ is portrayed as innocent and safe. This is achieved by the denial of all knowledge of racial and class divisions within the nation, a denial that is based on the refusal to acknowledge *difference* within the nation. The present-day nation is then posited as having lost, or as being just about to lose, the pleasures it had in this ‘childhood-that-never-was’. At the heart of both the pleasures of the nation and the sense of loss that haunts these pleasures, there is a broken link to the mother. Thus, while *Kiwi Kitchen*
provides an overt example of things which are considered to be good in the nation, to be the innocent heart of national identity, it carries with it both the more violently exclusionary impulses that mark the nation, and the sense of loss that generates these impulses.

He [Freud] suggested that screen memories play a role in the individual psyche comparable to the ‘childhood reminiscences as laid down in the legends and myths of nations’ (King, 1983, p.1201)

It is commonplace for “the nation” and “the family” to be figured as ‘one and the same thing’ in the rhetoric of politically conservative organizations such as Family First. This can been seen in the formulation “Wreck the family, wreck the nation” (“Wreck the family, wreck the nation,” 2007). What interests me in relation to this is the extent to which “the family” and “the nation” map on to each other in less conservative concepts of “the nation”. To what extent is the conflation of “the family” and “the nation” foundational to the notion of nationhood? Or, to change the focus slightly, to what extent is the idealised nation at the centre of nationalistic texts a fantasised/idealised version of the childhood of the creator of the text, and, by implication, a fantasised/idealised version of the childhood of those who the text is addressed to, who are incorporated into the text’s national ‘us’?

My central text here is Richard Till’s television series _Kiwi Kitchen_ (Till, 2006), a series described as focussed on “iconic New Zealand food” as “part of our cultural identity” (description on DVD case for Kiwi Kitchen, 2006). The link between the food in the series and notions of national identity is made more explicit in a newspaper article
describing the series as ultimately relating to “what we are and how we came to be” (Collett, 2006, p.D1). What is striking about newspaper reviews and articles describing *Kiwi Kitchen* is the extent to which they incorporate the words “we” and “our”. In an example of this, Mary Kirk-Anderson writes of the programme as a reminder to “most of us that we were born, not of Italian peasant stock, but were rather the children of sheep farms, summerhill stone houses and shingle beaches” (Kirk-Anderson, 2006). She also states that “these are our own people, making and sharing ‘ordinary’ food” (Kirk-Anderson, 2006). What is noticeable about Kirk-Anderson’s article is the speed with which the qualifier “most of us”, which allows for some diversity of “us”, is erased by the assertions about who “we are”. “We” are hailed in articles such as Kirk-Anderson’s as a homogenous group: as Kiwis, “we” know who “we” are and our experiences and indeed feelings are held in common. It was impossible to find a review or article that did not speak in terms such as Kirk-Anderson’s. The internal tension in this model comes not from the possibility of diverse experiences — a possibility which simply disappears — but from the phrase “these are our own people”. Are “our own people” us, or are they our possession, in some need of protection, childlike? Is “‘ordinary’ food” ours, being equal and held in common, or is it lesser, belonging to “ordinary”, simple, plain, perhaps naïve folk? Thus, the people cooking in the programme are simultaneously “us” or kiwis like us, and lesser, childlike, something “we” as a nation possess. This pattern is echoed in a larger scale by the series *Kiwi Kitchen*: “we” are hailed as Kiwis and (re)incorporated into a nation, a culture, a community of experience and emotion. We are assumed, and are assumed to assume ourselves, to have always belonged to this nation and culture. Any space for conflicting experiences, such as being of “Italian peasant stock”, is erased. A unitary ‘ordinary’ origin of Kiwiness is asserted, yet somehow this Kiwiness bears a childlike, ‘not us but ours’ stamp that renders it innocent yet other.
What is noticeable in *Kiwi Kitchen* is the extent to which the series centres on an attempt to define the ‘kiwi’ as both unified and unique. It is an attempt that positions itself as an acknowledgement of what “we” already know about what ‘Kiwi’ is. What is remarkable about this attempted definition is both the grandiosity of its claims and the immediacy with which those claims fall flat. In reference to whitebaiting, Till says:

> It’s the physical act of being a New Zealander, it’s one of the few opportunities that you can get if you’ve just got a net in the back of the car to go out and do something that makes you *uniquely* New Zealand [emphasis his](Till, 2006, episode 1)

With reference to scallops: “You can have ‘em for nothing...you’re always going to have to be giving them away, showing hospitality, it’s just, it’s the real kiwi way” (Till, 2006, episode 3). A guest on episode 3, Jack Vallance, offers a similar piece of rhetoric: “Where else in the world can you come to a motor camp...go out and get some scallops and come back within an hour? There’s not many places in the world you can do it” (Jack Vallance, Till, 2006, episode 3). These statements offer a checklist of stereotypes of Kiwiness — close to nature, ‘can-do’ attitude, egalitarian, physically active, friendly, comfortable in the wild — while offering nothing definitive. Do all New Zealanders catch whitebait? Does no other nation use nets to catch small fish in rivers? Does no other nation offer hospitality? Are there no other camping grounds in the world where you can go out and gather scallops? There is an air of ridiculousness about the questions which proliferate around these assertions of national uniqueness that is matched by the unimportance of the answers. Rhetorically speaking, it does not really matter if there are any other places in the world where one can catch scallops near a motor camp: what matters is the repeated assertion of a unique national identity. There is a pattern in these sentences. They seem inwardly propelled
towards greater and greater claims: from “you can have ‘em for nothing” to “it’s the real Kiwi way”. The statements are further driven towards a reconsolidation of their claims: from “Where else in the world...” to “There’s not many places in the world”. Yet they conceal an underlying emptiness. There is a loop here: whitebaiting is “the physical act of being a New Zealander” because you can catch whitebait in New Zealand. Because you can catch whitebait in New Zealand, catching whitebait makes you “uniquely New Zealand”. This structure of a loop overlaid on a lack, driven by full rhetorical and emotional force, is reminiscent of Žižek’s description of the Nation-Thing: “It appears as what gives plenitude and vivacity to our life, and yet the only way we can determine it is by resorting to different forms of the same empty tautology” (Žižek, 1993, p.201). Žižek further states:

National identity is by definition sustained by a relationship with the Nation qua Thing.... If we are asked how we can recognise the presence of this Thing, the only consistent answer is that the Thing is present in that elusive entity called “our way of life”. All we can do is enumerate disconnected fragments of the way our community organizes its feasts, its rituals...in short, all the details by which is made visible the unique way a community organizes its enjoyment (Žižek, 1993, p.201)

This sense of a national “Thing” present in “feasts” and “rituals” can be seen throughout Kiwi Kitchen.

In the attempt to list what is definitively ‘Kiwi’, the nation, which is ostensibly being reclaimed, keeps disappearing. The following ‘Kiwi’ items are referred to by Till: “good old-fashioned Kiwi stew”(Till, 2006, episode 4), “a real Kiwi roast”(Till, 2006, episode 1), “a classic Kiwi mushroom sauce”(Till, 2006, episode 6), “Blue cheese, fruitcake. How Kiwi can you get? The whole thing is a symphony of Kiwiness”(Till, 2006, episode 7). None of the items listed here are cooked only in New Zealand; it is debatable to what extent any of them
have uniquely New Zealand variants. At an extreme, this leads to the absurd: “that most
Kiwi of all desserts – crêpes!” (Till, 2006, episode 2). This would seem to leave the nation as
nothing at all, with national identity as the valourisation of a collection of random objects
which symbolise uniqueness without being in any way unique. A great deal of emotion
appears to be being invested in trivialities. Yet, to return to Žižek:

To emphasise ...that the nation is not a biological or transhistorical fact but a
contingent discursive construction, an overdetermined result of textual practices,
is...misleading: such an emphasis overlooks the remainder of some real, non-
discursive kernel of enjoyment which must be present (Žižek, 1993, p.202)

This remainder of something more, this underlying kernel of enjoyment, will be explored in
increasing depth later in this chapter, as it is to this that the emotion surrounding
proclamations of nationhood relates. The theme of absence, lack and disappearance which
is suggested by the emptiness of the above assertions of national uniqueness will also recur
in examples of discourse about the nation.

Within Kiwi Kitchen there is a repeated conflation of the concepts “Kiwi” and “ordinary”,
where “ordinary” has a highly specific meaning: “I like the stuff I grew up with. You know,
the ordinary shit” (Till, 2006, episode 1). “Ordinary”, and implicitly “Kiwi”, is opposed to
complicated, expensive, international and knowledgeable. This can be seen in the following
quotes: “So now it’s all become so confused and there’s bits of every kind of nation jammed
onto every plate and piled up and all that sort of stuff, I now find it’s a huge relief just to sit
down with some of the really plain old stuff” (Till, 2006, episode 1); “it’s a real New Zealand
thing. I love it because it’s so damn plain” (Till, 2006, episode 1); “The art of being a cook is
not being able to make really flash expensive stuff taste good, but if you can make the
ordinary cheap frozen stuff taste good” (Till, 2006, episode 3). Several things can be seen in these quotes. There is an expected association with the definition of the ordinary ‘Kiwi’ as practical: “it’s similar...to mixing up a batch of concrete” (Till, 2006, episode 6). The ‘Kiwi’ is also sporting: “...as a fisherman and sort of general kiwi sporting guy” (Till, 2006, episode 6). Furthermore, the ‘Kiwi’ is loyal to the country rather than the city: “In the city, all I could find was pre-cooked crayfish” (Till, 2006, episode 5). There is something childlike about this image of the “ordinary Kiwi”, “confused” by international food. The audience are positioned as knowing, as knowledgeable about food, as knowing more than New Zealanders used to: “These were the days when people hadn’t heard of pesto. Can you believe it?” (Till, 2006, episode 4). Yet they are simultaneously positioned as naïve; unfamiliar and uncomfortable with non-ordinary food: “it’s gonna taste better than anything that any fancy chef in a restaurant could knock up” (Till, 2006, episode 6). The audience is positioned as being “everybody”, as can be seen when Till speaks of using plastic cups “just...like everybody” (Till, 2006, episode 4). Yet this is an “everybody” that has been stripped of anything outside the plain/ordinary.

There is a continual shifting of language from the non-ordinary/Kiwi to the ordinary/Kiwi, where “fancy” terms are downgraded to “plain” terms: “there was something...ephemeral or whatever you want to say, fancy about it” (Till, 2006, episode 2), “sauté slash fry” (Till, 2006, episode 3). This downgrading functions as an in-joke, pointing out that “we” used to use terms like “fancy” to describe the unfamiliar. Yet it simultaneously positions the audience, “everybody”, as unable to understand a vocabulary positioned as “non-Kiwi”. It positions them as needing a translation into “ordinary” terms. An imagined audience is
constructed of innocent Kiwis, unknowing and mistrustful of anything outside a narrow cultural circle: “If you call it beef bourguignon, people are intimidated. If you call it red wine stew it sounds a whole lot simpler” (Kevin Ireland, Till, 2006, episode 4). Who are these “people” who are intimidated? They cannot be the people watching the series, many of whom presumably watch other cooking programmes, and are comfortable with common terms such as “sauté” and “beef bourguignon”. Yet the audience are interpellated into this group of “people”, which somehow includes “everyone”. The effect of this linguistic twist is to rhetorically strip the audience of knowledge. Thus, the “real” “ordinary” ‘Kiwi’ is someone without certain kinds of knowledge, without certain kinds of vocabulary perhaps without education. There is a childlike aspect to this presentation of the ‘Kiwi’ as a person without knowledge. There is a driving force backwards in these statements, taking the audience back to a time before they knew words such as “sauté”. It travels backwards in history, to a partly imagined time when “flash” was commonly used to describe anything considered sophisticated. It goes back to a supposed rural source, and back into a personal history presumed to be shared between the viewers and the host. Returning to the statement at the beginning of this paragraph, “the ordinary shit” is “the stuff I grew up with”, the stuff of the past.

The “ordinary” which is returned to is in the past, as it is “the stuff I grew up with”, “plain old stuff [emphasis mine]”. It is simultaneously present, as it is now “a huge relief just to sit down with some of the really plain old stuff”. In the past, eating at a restaurant was considered “fancy” by the “ordinary” kiwi. The use of the word “fancy”, which in this context functions as if it were a translation the audience requires in order to understand the
notion of a restaurant, deposits us back in that time. The present is collapsed into the past. There is a link between this and Freud’s figure of the neurotic, who King describes as suffering from: “...a fundamental desire to defeat time by regressing to or remaining caught in the past. At the heart of neurosis was a kind of hubris, a failure to acknowledge time and separateness” (King, 1983, p.1203). In *Kiwi Kitchen* time and separateness are repeatedly refuted. In parallel to this, there is an ambiguity as to the status of “ordinary” food: is it lost or is it still present? *Kiwi Kitchen* is to some extent structured around a sense of loss. This could be loss that has already occurred: “I suddenly became aware that somewhere in the big rush to be internationally savvy we had lost a little bit of what we are and where we have come from” (Richard Till, Kirk-Anderson, 2006). Yet it may also be a loss that is about to occur: “We’re going to have lousy baking in a few years’ time unless somebody goes round to their grandmother’s” (Till, 2006, episode 5). This future/already past loss may be of a style of food, but it is felt as a loss of identity, of “what we are and where we have come from”. This sense of loss functions in a similar way to the “theft of enjoyment” which Žižek claims nationalism attributes to an “other”. The feared/already happened loss of part of our nationed identity works to conceal a lack at the centre of identity: “the lack...is originary...it ‘only comes to be through being left behind’ [emphasis Žižek’s ]” (Žižek, 1993, pp203-204).

*Kiwi Kitchen* functions as a project to reclaim what is/is about to be lost — where what is lost is something “we never possessed” (Žižek, 1993, p.203)— while simultaneously proclaiming it *not to have been lost or to have been in danger of being lost*. It locates/reveals the ‘not-lost-at-all’ in places throughout New Zealand: “From whitebait in Haast, to muttonbird on Stewart Island, to steamed pudding in Gisbourne” (description on DVD case for *Kiwi Kitchen*, 2006). These examples of lost/not lost “iconic New Zealand food” are shown to have been held in the keeping of “ordinary” New Zealanders: “from West Coast gal Betty, who has
been catching whitebait...for most of her 80 years, to Jan, from Stewart Island, for whom fresh muttonbird is an annual treat” (Kirk-Anderson, 2006). Thus, a loop is created: “we”, “everyone”, “ordinary” New Zealanders, are shown items of “ordinary” food that compose part of “what we are and where we have come from” by “ordinary New Zealanders”. There is a failure inherent in this circuit: if this food is “ordinary”, is part of “what we are”, why the need for it to be shown to “us”? The project of reclaiming the “ordinary” reveals its nature as no-longer-ordinary. Thus the loss is carried through the process that ostensibly denies it: the location of the “ordinary” is in a past that is not fully reclaimable.

What is this past where the “ordinary” is located? The follow examples provide an answer:

- I haven’t had this since I was a kid (Till, 2006, episode 1),
- Well, I had an experience when I was quite young (Till, 2006, episode 2),
- When I was a kid (Till, 2006, episode 3),
- ...the thing I remember I suppose most from my childhood about tomatoes (Till, 2006, episode 3)
- ...as a child I remember really clearly (Till, 2006, episode 4)
- My experience of dinner parties as a boy (Till, 2006, episode 6)
- I remember when I was a kid (Till, 2006, episode 7)

The lost/reclaimed past which is considered to contain national identity is located firmly in memories of the speaker’s childhood. This is assumed to overlap with the memories of the audience, who are “everyone”: “you must remember that!”(Till, 2006, episode 3). This is not unintentional: “His crucial awareness, he says, is that memories evoked by mum’s kitchen are deep and direct for all of us. ‘It’s a shame if we separate ourselves from our actual experiences of childhood’” (Collett, 2006, p.D1). It is notable that this linking together
of Kiwiness and "memories evoked by mum’s kitchen" elicited a powerful response from viewers: "It was like absolution for some people because they would all be telling their stories" (Till, Collett, 2006, p.D1). Here, “our actual experiences” of childhood seem both individual, with everyone having “their stories”, and unified. They are “our” experiences, assumed to be held in common.

Yet there are limits to the national shared childhood invoked. One of the few segments not to begin with an “I remember” begins instead:

The legend of crayfish in the New Zealand psyche is...you’re having a feed of crayfish. You don’t have a ‘meal’ you have a ‘feed’...there’s probably crates of beer and stuff around and they’re boiling up. I’m sure that just happens less and less and it’s just something that lives in our imagination (Till, 2006, episode 5)

After the intimacy of “I remember”, the sense of distance is striking: this section is located, not in childhood memory, but “in our imagination”, a “legend...in the New Zealand psyche”. There are suggestions in the description that the people in this “legend” of crayfish may be Māori — such as the phrase “having a feed”, the reference to having a “boil-up” — though perhaps they are just marked as working class. The people in this description are somehow marked as “outside”. This is problematic for a project oriented around a notion of national unity. By invoking an ‘us’ it implies a ‘them’, yet any difference within the nation must be disavowed or concealed. It is noticeable in the series that the word “Māori” is never mentioned, perhaps because it would bring with it knowledge of division within the nation. Only difference from other countries is allowable, yet difference within the nation resurfaces. The suppression of difference works to invest the childhood here invoked with an extra level of innocence, erasing any tension or difference that may have existed in the
nation in the past. It is as if the remembered childhood must be protected in the same way that children are often considered in need of protection: protected from trouble, protected from knowing about trouble.

As explored above, *Kiwi Kitchen* is firmly lodged in a period of history that roughly corresponds to the presenter’s, and by extension the target audience’s, childhood. This is not accidental: what is referenced in *Kiwi Kitchen* is that which is considered to be ‘the past’, rather than ‘history’. The links between this positively emotionally involving past, a childhood smilingly recalled, and the more disconnected past narrated as history are obscure, in the sense that they cannot easily be discerned or felt. There is a felt opposition between the *past*, which is ours, which is *us*, part of an assumed-to-be-shared national culture, and *history*, which is gone, which is dead, which, it is felt, maybe never really existed. This view, it should be noted, is specific to certain cultures: indeed, different concepts of the presentness of the past are at play in Māori and Pākehā divisions over Treaty claims. Where ‘history’ is of New Zealand, about the *place*, ‘the past’ is Kiwi, about the people in the nation. ‘History’ is not only distant and alienating, it also carries with it discomforts: the mention of history always has the potential to bring the violent history of the nation into the frame, raising questions about the legitimacy of the present nation. Thus, ‘the past’ often provides a firmer support for ‘national identity’ than ‘history’ does: ‘history’ can be awkward. Nevertheless, ‘history’ is occasionally invoked in order to legitimise the national narrative that is offered.
For as long as we’ve been here, thousands of people have been flocking to the riversides for the three months of the whitebait season (Till, 2006, episode 1)

So, the big question has to be, as we head off to the rivers every year to catch these crazy little fish: why on earth do we want to eat them, heads, tails and all? Whitebaiting is like so many things all rolled into one: on the one hand it’s like being a forager, hunter-gatherer...it’s like winning Lotto, when you throw your net in you just have no idea what you’re going to get back, and it’s the physical act of being a New Zealander (Till, 2006, episode 1)

Who does the term “we” refer to in the statement: “For as long as we’ve been here, people have been flocking to the river banks to catch these crazy little fish”. Is the starting point of New Zealand history in this statement the moment when Polynesian people first settled in Aotearoa, or is it the arrival of European settlers? When does “Kiwi” history begin, and are Māori part of it? There is an ambiguity here which is not dispelled by the fact that Māori caught and ate whitebait long before Pākehā started doing so. Carolyn Morris has pointed out that food that Māori have traditionally eaten and which are now widely eaten by Pākehā—for example, kumara, koura/crayfish, inanga/whitebait — are considered to be, not ‘Māori food’, but ‘Kiwi food’. In contrast to this, food traditionally eaten by Māori which is not widely eaten by Pākehā —such as ‘stinky’ muttonbird/titi, ‘rotten’ corn — is considered ‘yucky/inedible’ (Morris, 2007). This positions Māori as having ‘no food’, as having subsisted on nothing, save a few ‘yucky/inedible’ items, until Pākehā arrived. The arbitrary fact that Pākehā eat whitebait means that it must be located with other ‘nice’ foods. Till’s description above uses a certain amount of linguistic manoeuvring to achieve this end. The ease with which whitebait could be aligned with the ‘yucky’ is illustrated by the question “Why on earth do we want to eat them, heads, tails and all”. Whitebait could, “heads, tails and all”, be located as what was previously termed “foreign muck” (Tui Flower, Till, 2006, episode 4). They could be classed with the eating practices of ‘foreigners’ who eat whole fish rather than hunks of roast meat, or with other ‘yucky’ Māori foods.
Here, the description of whitebait as “crazy little fish” marks them as firmly Kiwi, with “crazy little fish” serving to categorise them as ‘quirky’ — a term frequently deployed to describe ‘Kiwiness’ — rather than ‘strange’. The question “why on earth do we want to eat them?” is left without an answer: the answer proffered explains why people would want to catch whitebait, not eat them. The possible answer ‘because Māori have been catching them and eating them for a long time, and used to sell them to Pākehā’ is left unsaid, and may be unable to be said. So the question of whether Māori, and around 800 years of history, are included in the phrase “as long as we’ve been here” is unanswered, and unanswerable. As whitebait is “Kiwi food”, and as “Kiwi” maps on almost exactly to Pākehā, Māori could be included, or, depending on the viewer’s tastes, could disappear out of history altogether.

An entirely clearer narrative is provided in the section dealing with roast lamb:

In 1861 to 1881, half a million people arrived in New Zealand, and they came from a kind of hungry England and when they got here there was a hell of a lot of this stuff [Till gestures to a flock of sheep] walkin’ around, so they could behave like rich people, eat like rich people, as long as the rich people they were eating like were eating legs of sheep (Till, 2006, episode 1)

Here, New Zealand appears as a kind of paradise: like the biblical land of milk and honey, this fantasised New Zealand offers a land of abundance to people who have travelled long distances to find it. The contrast between the “hungry England” — a land that cannot nourish, that may itself seek to devour its inhabitants — and the bountiful New Zealand is stark. New Zealand offers endless nourishment without effort, as “there was a hell of a lot of this stuff just walkin’ around”. New Zealand here offers not only plentiful food, but rich food: richly nourishing, the food of rich people. The “half-a-million” people here have
travelled from a land of inequality and poverty where they could not “behave like rich people, eat like rich people” to a land of plenty and equality. While the use of dates and numbers – “1861 to 1881”, “half a million people” – marks the narrative as ‘history’, closer investigation of its gaps and exclusions reveals its mythological status. The description of those “half a million” people as coming from a “hungry England” leaves out those who came from a “hungry” Scotland, a “hungry” Ireland or any other nation, regardless of the level of its hunger. Meanwhile, the utopian presentation of a society where “they could behave like rich people, eat like rich people” almost completely erases class divisions, hooking into a common representation of New Zealand as a “classless society”. There is a slight revelation of class divisions here: the people “could behave like rich people, eat like rich people”; they did not become rich people. Interestingly, rich people are not included in this description of the “half a million people”: in this fantasised egalitarian paradise, the real people of the nation are not rich. The “classless” Kiwi is one of the “common people”, and is English, rather than “foreign”. In this telling of history Māori simply do not exist. The fantasised New Zealand described here was bountiful, welcoming, and completely empty of people. The history of colonisation is erased: those sheep were just “walkin’ around”, no-one cleared forest, no-one raised sheep, no-one killed sheep, and no agency was involved. So too is the history of colonial violence —no-one killed anyone to get the land the sheep were raised on —and even the history of interaction between the colonisers and Māori. The only interaction is between the ‘Kiwis’ and their delicious, ceaseless supply of sheep.
The narrative that *Kiwi Kitchen* offers about the colonisation of New Zealand bears the marks of a forgetting of history. Devoid of Māori, devoid of violence, the fantasised land stands empty, a void filled only with sheep, waiting for the settlers from “hungry England”. What this narrative offers is innocence: the settlers are innocent. They did not confiscate anybody’s land, they merely arrived and ate; they were not “rich people”, capable of buying and selling, they merely ate like “rich people”. The audience is also left innocent of knowledge about what the settlers were innocent of. With no reminders of the presence of Māori people, the audience, presumed not to be Māori, does not have to think about the rightness or wrongness of the settlers’ actions. As escapees from a “hungry England”, the settlers bear little responsibility for their actions, simply and inevitably drawn from a land of hunger to a land of plenty. As they were not rich people — even though some rich people must have been included in the half a million people — they bear no responsibility for any decisions that were made about New Zealand. This innocence travels backwards and forwards through time. If New Zealanders *then* were innocent of violence, then their descendants must be innocent of responsibility for making reparation for their ancestors’ actions. If New Zealanders *now* are innocent of knowledge of any past violence, New Zealanders in the past must have been innocent of violence. The empty land evoked in the narrative is all there is: there is *nothing* to see here except sheep.

**We are one people (Hobson, Brash, 2004b, p.2)**

The omission of the word “Māori” from *Kiwi Kitchen*, and the erasure of Māori from the ‘New Zealand history’ it references, seem to erase Māori from the nation in the service of unity. There is a parallel with Don Brash’s divisive speech at Orewa, which hinged on the
notion that “We [New Zealanders] are one people” (Brash, 2004b, p.2). In order to draw out the ways in which “Kiwi Kitchen” parallels the version of the nation presented as ideal in the Orewa speech, I will here briefly explore Brash’s speech. The Orewa speech’s purpose is to deny certain differences which are held to be disruptive to “our ability to build a prosperous nation of one people” (Brash, 2004b, p.9), while simultaneously acknowledging “a highly distinctive Maori culture” (Brash, 2004b, p.7). Yet its rhetorical thrust is towards total effacement of Māori from the nation:

The short cut of referring to Maori as one group and Pakeha as another is enormously misleading. There is no homogenous, distinct Maori population – we have been a melting pot since the 19th century – although there is, of course, a highly distinctive Maori culture, which many people see as central to their identity (Brash, 2004b, p.7)

The qualifiers in the tail of this passage – “which many people see as central to their identity” – dilute its intent to acknowledge the existence of “culture” and “identity”, or at least to deny that they are being denied. Thus the speech is unable to defuse the statement “There is no homogenous, distinct Maori population”, which stands as the main thrust of the paragraph. This leads on to the statement “The Maori ethnic group is a very loose one” (Brash, 2004b, p.7). There are associations here with promiscuity, with contamination, brought out again in the un referenced statement: “Anthropologists tell us that by 1900 there were no full-blooded Maori left in the South Island” (Brash, 2004b, p.7). Māori are, in this speech, tainted, diluted, diffused, ultimately disappearing altogether into the nation of Pākehā who are held to be neutral New Zealanders. There is a ghostly quality to Māori in this rhetoric, reminiscent of “the already dead, but uncannily still present” figure of the “Uncanny Jew” (Shapiro, 1997): Māori are to blame both for disappearing and for still existing.
Brash’s speech refers to a “highly distinctive Maori culture” (Brash, 2004b, p7) which “there is, of course” (Brash, 2004b, p.7). Yet it disallows certain elements of this culture, or only allows them as long as they are not allowed to influence decisions about legislation (Brash, 2004b, p.5), roading (Brash, 2004b, p.6), education (Brash, 2004b, p.2), health (Brash, 2004b, p.2), language or commercial development. A particular focus is “spiritual beliefs” (Brash, 2004b, p.6), which, the Orewa speech claims, “should be respected. They should never be mocked” (Brash, 2004b, p.6). Brash describes these beliefs thus:

It is bizarre that...we fly Maori elders around the world to lift tapu and expel spirits...we allow courts to become entangled in hearings about the risks to taniwha of a new road or building...we allow our environmental law to be turned into an opportunistic farce by allowing metaphysical and spiritual considerations to be taken into account in the decision process. It is a farce that could all to quickly turn to tragedy (Brash, 2004b, p.6)

There is a level of contempt conveyed by the description of a “bizarre” “opportunistic farce” which renders the addendum “Spiritual beliefs are important in any society....They should never be mocked” (Brash, 2004b, p.6) powerless. What is being rejected here is difference on a large scale, obvious differences in ways of structuring the meaning of public acts. This is replaced by the rhetoric of personal choice, “personal spiritual beliefs” (Brash, 2004b, p.6). The “highly distinctive Maori culture” becomes something that can only be expressed, can only be, in limited terms deemed acceptable to the “modern, democratic and prosperous nation” (Brash, 2004b, p.8).

Brash’s assertions also set limits on who is allowed to speak for Māori:
There seems to be a vacuum at the top, and that gap is being filled by the strident, by the radicals, and by self-appointed spokespeople for Māori who in reality have no mandate to speak on behalf of anybody, let alone the Māori people (Brash, 2004a, p.4).

In this model Māori leaders are defined as either too much, too radical, too strident or as not existing at all, as a vacuum, a gap. Indeed, this disappearance adheres to the “strident”: “self-appointed”, with “no mandate to speak on behalf of anybody”: they may exist, but anyone who supports them is erased, left without the right to “appoint” those who can speak for Māori. Speaking is here determined to be a violent act against “New Zealanders”: “I think it is clear now that most New Zealanders are fed up with having bi-culturalism rammed down their throats and drilled into their children” (Brash, 2004a, p.2). There are limits, not only to who can speak and what tone they can speak in, but to what language they can speak in: one of the examples of “the parade of race based political correctness we have endured over the past decade or more” (Brash, 2004a, p.3) is “bilingual rebranding of the public sector” (Brash, 2004a, p.3). The use of the Te Reo Māori is presented as too much, as a burden “we”, “the general public” (Brash, 2004a, p.3) must endure.

**The Kiwi way**

Richard Till: No flavouring in the water? Like French guys would put some of that wine in or something

Daren Coulston: Would they? Well, that wine looks delicious but that’s just not the kiwi way (Till, 2006, episode 5)

*Kiwi Kitchen* operates differently from Brash’s Orewa speech, allowing into the unified nation elements which Brash’s rhetoric casts as disruptive to the nation and therefore debarred from it. In episode 5, guest Daren [sic] Coulston is identified as Māori in the
footage that is shown before he appears. The camera focuses first on the Tino Rangatiratanga flag outside his house and then on a woodcarving in his front yard. He is initially marked as Māori—at the same time that the word “Māori” is never spoken—by a symbol that, in the terms of the Orewa speech, represents the “radical”, the “strident”, those who “have no mandate to speak on behalf of anybody”. Yet the Tino Rangatiratanga flag is presented in “Kiwi Kitchen” in the same way that the “quirks” of other guests’ houses are presented: it becomes not so much strident as silent. It is full of meaning, as the camera focuses on it for longer than it does on the woodcarving, referencing some element of meaning without acknowledging what it might be. Yet it is simultaneously emptied of meaning. With no acknowledgement in the series of any history before Europeans arrived in the series, the Tino Rangatiratanga flag stands as a reference to nothing.

The “bi-culturalism” that Brash’s rhetoric casts as “rammed down their [Kiwis’] throats” is here easily incorporated. Coulston describes providing crayfish as: “a great chance for manākitanga, for, y’know, for sharing and swapping and acknowledging each other” (Coulston, in Till, 2006, episode 5). This slides a not entirely Pākehā concept into the definition of “Kiwiness” established earlier in the series. “Manākitanga” is presented as a variation on “showing hospitality... the real Kiwi way”(Till, 2006, episode 3). Here, difference becomes sameness, the “y’know” categorising the audience as already knowing the meaning of manākitanga at the same time that the instantly proffered translation lets slip that they do not know. Any lack of knowledge of other languages, of other ways of being, within the nation is denied. This is a reversal of the process in other sections of Kiwi Kitchen, where knowledge of other languages outside the nation, of other styles of food outside the
nation, is denied. The “real Kiwi” knows what manākitanga is, but cannot cope with Beef Bourguignon. Pākehā unfamiliarity with Te Reo Māori cannot be acknowledged, yet neither can knowledge of the existence of otherness within the nation. It is otherness from other nations that must be reaffirmed: “we” are “Kiwi”, not “French guys” or anything else.

Yet acknowledgement of otherness within the nation, of specifically Māori otherness from the Pākehā-assumed-to-be-everyone, keeps slipping back in. It is here that another difference from the model of the nation offered by Don Brash becomes apparent. The Orewa speech aims contempt at “spiritual beliefs”, contempt that locates in these beliefs a source of division within the nation, and marks them as something that must be cast out to create the desired unified nation. In Kiwi Kitchen, this contempt is replaced with expressions of respect:

He walked into the sea and he just paused briefly and sort of offered a brief *inward* karakia to *providence* and that was what really struck me as so valuable about Daren’s approach to it is that is respectfulness for the gifts that we receive from the sea (Till, 2006, episode 5)

Yet this is a respect that cannot acknowledge what it is that it is respecting for fear of dragging division into its *cosy* united national vision. It presents itself as knowing: knowing what karakia are, knowing their role in Māori culture. It simultaneously denies its knowledge: offering a karakia is “Daren’s approach”, and any knowledge that it is not uniquely, individually Daren’s approach is refused. Thus “Kiwi Kitchen” reverts to similar premises to the Orewa speech. Difference becomes a matter of “personal spiritual beliefs”, presented as an adjunct to Kiwiness indistinguishable from any other adjunct. Offering a karakia ostensibly becomes equivalent to liking mint sauce with your whitebait fritters: a
lovable quirk. Yet at the same time the respectful terms in which it is described fail to conceal that there is something more going on here than “Daren’s approach”.

A clinging sort of odour

I was expecting a very, very powerful odour. I mean it’s, probably is quite a clinging sort of odour, but it’s nothing like as bad as I’d expected (Till, 2006, episode 7)

The seventh episode of Kiwi Kitchen, presented as the “fusion episode” (Till, 2006, episode 7) promises to “celebrate the multicultural diversity” (Till, 2006, episode 7). The nature of this diversity is not clearly marked. A section of the episode focuses on the history of Chinese settlers in Otago, before moving on to “fourth generation New Zealander” (Till, 2006, episode 7) Jean Lai’s recipe for chow mein. Here, Chinese New Zealanders are proclaimed as part of “us” or at least as eligible to cook for “us” by virtue of their “fourth generation” status. It is notable that Pākehā New Zealanders within the series are not given the qualification of having been backed by many generations. Jean Lai’s “fourth generation” status is presented as a rebuttal to an unspoken objection to her status as a New Zealander. History is invoked as a qualification for inclusion in the national “us”. It is because of the history of Chinese settlement in New Zealand that, in the definition of ‘Kiwiness’ offered by Kiwi Kitchen, there is room for “the great New Zealand Chinese food” (Till, 2006, episode 7).

Yet this one example of “diversity” — the one clearly given example of otherness within ‘Kiwiness’ that Kiwi Kitchen offers — is not enough to mark the episode as multicultural. There is another example of “multicultural diversity” in episode 7, and it is presented in a way that stands in contrast to the simple narrative of New Zealandness offered in the “Chinese food” section.
Till’s other key example of “multicultural diversity” involves a visit to Rakiura/Stewart Island to eat muttonbird. There is an element of what Don Brash’s speech describes as “bilingual rebranding” in this episode. Till refers repeatedly to “Rakiura” and only once to “Stewart Island”, while the caption refers only to “Stewart Island”. The use of the island’s Māori name of Rakiura positions “Rakiura” as a name the innocent “ordinary” Kiwi ought to know and be comfortable with. At the same time, the use of “Stewart Island” hints that it is not. Yet the section is devoid of any other reference to Māoriness. As noted earlier, Till speaks of “the families that have rights to go muttonbirding” (Till, 2006, episode 7) without mentioning that these families are Māori. When Till notes that if he wanted to catch muttonbirds “I know I’d have to be a member of one of the families that have rights to go muttonbirding” (Till, 2006, episode 7), an alternate New Zealand is set up, in which anyone could be a member of a family with rights to go muttonbirding. In this version, as in Don Brash’s speeches, “We are one people”, ‘we’ are interchangeable. Yet the families who go muttonbirding are also presented as more Kiwi than others. Till notes that in order to go muttonbirding he’d “have to have the grit and resolve to head off to a sort of sub-Antarctic island.” (Till, 2006, episode 7). Here, all that is privileged in stereotypes of Kiwiness is attached to the muttonbirders: toughness, practicality, a sense of being at home in the outdoors. Those who catch muttonbirds are more Kiwi than Till: he lacks this “grit and resolve”. What is inverted and denied in this insertion of the not-acknowledged-to-be-Māori families who catch muttonbird into the position of privileged Kiwiness is the overwhelmingly dominant discourse that holds Māori to be less-than-Kiwi.
The positioning of (Māori) families that go muttonbirding as super-Kiwis attempts to refute the history of racism. The refusal to mention the word “Māori” attempts to erase racism altogether, uprooting it from reality and making it something that never has been. It is as if any mention of Māori would bring the full history of colonisation with it, fracturing both ends of the equation that connects comfortable childhood memories with a unified nation/home. The equation underlying Brash’s speeches, Māori=division, is not absent here.

This doubling up, a double avoidance of the discomforts of the present and the past, serves to create a strangely confused and detached version of the nation. This version of the nation appears to float above the nation-as-experienced-by-its-inhabitants. In this fantasised nation, past and present are continuous — the present is still the past — and neither of them is troubled by any kind of racial division. We are one people and we always have been. This level of detachment from reality is increased as the programme approaches topics that could reference division. The fantasised unity is emphasised when topics are introduced that would bring into the programmes view of the nation both a history of different ways of living within the nation, and the racism that has saturated Pākehā views of these differences. Where, in episode 5, the word “karakia” could be mentioned, in episode 7 the equally well-known-to-Pākehā word “whānau” is not used, being replaced with “extended family” (Till, 2006, episode 7). There are no Māori words used to describe a concept strongly marked as Māori. It is as if the inclusion of muttonbirding in the programme is the limit of the Māoriness that the audience can take. One word of Te Reo Māori would be too much, would be, to return to the terms of the Orewa speech “having biculturalism rammed down their throats” (Brash, 2004a, p2). Or, to reverse the terms of Brash’s speech, having a history of racism, of division, of refusal to countenance biculturalism “rammed down their throats”. In texts concerned with national unity, a
reference to race always brings with it an undesired reference to racism. In a linguistic version of the one-drop rule, one word of Te Reo Māori would bring *everything* to do with race in New Zealand flooding in, dragging disunity into the frame. This would render the desired comfortable/comforting nation so uncomfortable, so discomforting, as to be impossible.

Thus, the section on muttonbirding is permeated by a blurring of history: the past it references is a past that never was, in which everybody was the same as everybody else aside from the odd personal quirk. Where Māoriness becomes unspeakable, it becomes impossible to trace who is saying what, about whom. Till notes “I’ve heard a lot of people say their mothers would refuse to cook muttonbird in the house because of the smell”(Till, 2006, episode 7). Whose mothers are these? Are these mothers who would have been likely to cook muttonbird, who were probably Māori? Or is this something said by mothers who would never have cooked muttonbird, re-iterating and re-emphasising their refusal? In the version of New Zealand offered by *Kiwi Kitchen* there is no difference: anyone could have chosen to cook muttonbird, anyone could have expressed a like or dislike for it. Yet, while it is relatively unlikely that Pākehā would have been cooking and eating muttonbird in the past specified in *Kiwi Kitchen* (which seems loosely located in the 1950s/60s/70s), there is a history of Pākehā expressions of ritualised disgust about muttonbird. As a food commonly eaten by Māori and not by Pākehā, muttonbird served as a target for revulsion by people who may not have ever eaten it, its smell taking on a mythically vile status. *Kiwi Kitchen*, despite its attempted suppression of division, is marked by traces of this history of
revulsion. The most prominent feature of Till’s introduction of muttonbird is his constant reiteration that it’s not really all that bad: “it isn’t really whiffy” (Till, 2006, episode 7), “I was expecting the smell to be far more pungent than that” (Till, 2006, episode 7), “it’s nothing like as bad as I’d expected” (Till, 2006, episode 7). This over-reassurance marks muttonbird as different, as frightening, at the same time that the series positions it as “ordinary”.

Difference comes to the fore in Tills description of eating muttonbird: “Reaction to it when it arrived on the plate was sort of a moment of terror because I realised now that I was hard up against it and that I couldn’t really do anything other than not like it but it was really easy to like” (Till, 2006, episode 7). While Kiwi Kitchen works on the premise that we are all ‘Kiwi’, and all ‘Kiwi’ food is ordinary to ‘Kiwis’, both the fear and the relief in Till’s description of eating muttonbird highlight that this is not so. It is here that counter-meanings can be read in Till’s descriptions, meanings that are the opposite of what is intended to be conveyed: “The proposal wishes to mean something, means to say something. Its counterpart, the contra-idea, means to say the opposite” (Schur, 2001, p.587). Here the proposal that ‘we’ are all the same kind of ‘Kiwis’ is repeatedly disrupted by hints that ‘we’ are not.

Muttonbird is the subject of a particular kind of shying away in the series, ultimately mimicking/repeating the Pākehā revulsion — to muttonbird, to Māori — that it positions as never having existed and not existing now. This avoidance is particularly noticeable in the scene where guest Jan West guts fresh muttonbird. The camera shies away from showing the birds being gutted, with Till remarking “it’s probably a little too close to tea time for you folk at home” (Till, 2006, episode 7). This stands in contrast to episode 6, where the camera focuses in on fish being gutted, showing in detail what is being done — the use of knives and
fingers, the tearing away of the skin. Unlike the section on fish, the section on muttonbird is marked by a kind of hypersensitive preparation for disgust, with disgustingness carefully guarded against, and the audience offered constant reassurances that everything is ok.

The jumpiness that marks the section on muttonbird is driven by a dual motive. The first force at work here is the desire to avoid racism. In a series where only warmth and unity are mentionable, this desire creates huge areas that cannot be touched, lest something painful and unpleasant be brought to light. There is a sense of having to tread carefully in order to avoid giving offence, yet there is ambivalence about the direction in which this offence could be given. Where the ostensible purpose is to avoid speaking offensively about Māori, it carries with it a desire to avoid giving offence to Pākehā: it is the sense of imminent offence that dominates, that contaminates. The carcass of the muttonbird becomes imbued with notions of disgust and offence, a dangerous object. The desire to avoid racism, to avoid mentioning racism, brings with it many of the contents of racism: fear, avoidance, disgust. The sense of revulsion/contamination/dirt that is a driving force in racism is carried through untouched, underlying/undoing the desire to avoid racism. The “clinging sort of odour” in episode 7 is the history of racism in New Zealand, and the reassurances that it’s ‘not really all that bad’ fail in their overt purpose to neutralise it.

Don Brash’s Orewa speech acts on a desire to create unity by erasing differences it holds to be divisive: “We are not all the same. We all have different preferences and interests and sympathies. But we are still all unquestionably, and proudly, New Zealanders” (Brash,
Yet by mentioning these differences, by describing them and expressing anger and contempt about them, it brings them back with full emotional force. The attempted banishment of elements held to be divisive about the nation fails: the naming of elements to be erased reiterates the division it seeks to annul. *Kiwi Kitchen*, inclusive of elements, such as the Tino Rangatiratanga flag and the use of Karakia, that the Orewa speech would seek to expel, succeeds in fulfilling the purpose of the Orewa speech in a way that the speech itself is fundamentally unable to do. The fantasised nation offered by *Kiwi Kitchen* is the desired nation of the Orewa speech: everything is fed in together, the nation is unified, there is *no difference*, and only individual quirks exist. Yet the dream state of *Kiwi Kitchen* is haunted by traces of division, faint marks of the discomforts it seeks to avoid.

**Bits of every nation**

So now it’s become so confused, and there’s bits of every nation jammed onto every plate and piled up and all that sort of stuff, I now find it’s a huge relief just to sit down with some of the really plain old stuff (Till, 2006, episode 1).

This statement is worth exploring in depth. It is clear that the “confusion” referenced here is not only to do with “now”, with the present as opposed to the “simple” past imagined to have existed, but also to do with having “bits of every nation jammed onto every plate”. There is a sense of overload here, an overload brought on, not by having too many *flavours* piled together, but of having too many *nations* piled together. These nations are charged with having been jammed into the space formerly, and rightfully, occupied by “the really plain old stuff”. It is the international that confuses, that has overtaken the national space assumed to have been previously occupied by a simple, singular culture, a nation-at-one. The “confused” international has “stolen” the simple pleasures of the past.
The international is not universally condemned in *Kiwi Kitchen*. There is a strong demarcation between the allowable international and the bad “confused” international: the difference is chronological. This can be seen in the following statement:

The THC was a government hotel chain set up in 1956. There were heaps of tourists coming to New Zealand, and we were keen to impress them with a swanky new hotel chain. Because not many New Zealanders became chefs in the 60s, they all had to be imported from England and Europe (Till, 2006, episode 2).

This can be contrasted with the description of one of the THC hotels, the Hermitage: “It’s been here since 1854…and now it’s an enormous great thing full of foreigners” (Till, 2006, episode 2). Where the first description is celebratory, the second has the air of condemnation that always attends the word “foreigners”. Yet both statements are describing the same thing: a hotel full of “tourists coming to New Zealand” and “imported” chefs would inherently be “full of foreigners”. People from overseas coming to New Zealand now are seen as violating the sanctuary of the nation, where they were not in the past. The key to this contradiction lies in the location of the ideal nation in the past. Nationalism situates the “real” nation in the past or in the future, and considers all in it to be safe, where the present is always associated with corruption and loss. In the past, people from other nations were here, and could not steal the national “Thing”. They could not have stolen it, because we “know” it was here in the past. Yet if they are here now, our national “Thing” is in peril: “What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing. We always impute to the “other” an excessive enjoyment: he wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our way of life)” (Žižek, 1993, p.203).
There is a great deal of ambiguity in the way “foreigners” —in this case, anyone other than Pākehā New Zealanders whose ancestors came from the United Kingdom—are represented in *Kiwi Kitchen*. Are they New Zealanders or not? If they are New Zealanders, are they ‘Kiwi’? Did they fully exist or not? Although there are traces of the history of non-Anglo-Saxon New Zealanders mentioned, they are never fully incorporated into the story of a unified national childhood which *Kiwi Kitchen* is centred around. In episode 3, Till explains his childhood perception of the Nelson region, “when I was a kid, I thought Nelson was just a place where tomatoes came from”. He notes that he was right about this: “Most of downtown Nelson was glasshouses, all *Italians* in glasshouses. Even up until the 70s there were as many as 50 Italian families growing tomatoes” (Till, 2006, episode 3). In this snippet of history, “Italians” serves partially as people who were there, who were part of the nation’s past. Yet they are not part of it completely. Rhetorically, the viewer is placed alongside Till, one of the people eating tomatoes from Nelson. The viewer is not positioned as one of the “Italians in greenhouses”, but as one of the people who would be surprised to know about “as many as 50 Italian families growing tomatoes”. Thus, Italians are granted a place in the Kiwi past, but a tenuous one: they existed in the way that tomatoes and glasshouses existed, visible within the national childhood but not partaking in it.

The ambiguity of the position of Italians in New Zealand’s history is revealed more clearly in the exclamation “but let’s face it, who on earth was eating eggplant in 1978 who wasn’t an Italian tomato grower!”(Till, 2006, episode 3). Here, Italian tomato growers represent the exotic, the ‘not-from-here’. They had knowledge, here symbolised by eggplant, that ordinary kiwi did not have: the same knowledge that makes the present “so confused”. The
knowledge available in present can be acknowledged in certain situations in order to highlight the naivety of the past: “These were the days when people hadn’t even heard of pesto – can you believe it?” (Till, 2006, episode 4). Yet the existence of people in the past who also had this knowledge is barely acknowledged: the “Italian families growing tomatoes” in Nelson may well have “heard of pesto”. To emphasise the insularity of New Zealand in the past, food writer Tui Flower notes: “I used to get people terribly upset because I had the cheek to use garlic, oil and wine...it was ‘Why are you using that foreign muck?’” (Tui Flower, Till, 2006, episode 4). While this anecdote condemns the New Zealanders of the past who spoke in such terms, the Kiwi Kitchen series often seems to be asking the same question – “Why are you using that foreign muck?” – with slightly different phrasing.

Richard Till: I wanna find out about the old savouries and I can go to plenty of caterers who can show me how to make some sort of fancy Italian stuff on top of crostini or whatever, but nobody really seems to have the skills to make large quantities of good old-fashioned savouries

Bronwyn Richards: It’s no use giving people what they don’t expect and don’t need (Till, 2006, episode 4)

In the exchange above, “fancy Italian stuff” functions partly as a symbol for excess knowledge and sophistication. The existence of crostini in New Zealand is held responsible for the (imagined) disappearance of sausage rolls; the “exotic” crostini having taken up all the culinary space available for the humble, “good old-fashioned”, kiwi sausage roll. It is of no importance that sausage rolls are available in service stations, bakeries, cafes and supermarkets, in both pre-cooked and frozen varieties. They are proclaimed as lost in order to invoke a felt loss to the nation. Something is felt to have been lost, to have been taken
away by excess knowledge, and the imagined invasion by crostini of sausage rolls’ cultural space is used to illustrate it. Although the level of disgust conveyed by the phrase “foreign muck” is absent, the sense of the “foreign” taking over the space that rightfully belongs to the “kiwi” is present. Here, the “foreign” is what people “don’t expect and don’t need”. Richards is here talking in the context of a company that provides “comfort food” (Judy Woolley, Till, 2006, episode 4) for funerals. The foreign, what people “don’t expect and don’t need” cannot be “comfort food”, cannot provide comfort.

*Kiwi Kitchen* makes no mention of what happened to the “50 Italian families”, giving the impression that they were demolished along with their greenhouses when central Nelson became more developed. Yet the “Italian” represents a borderline: the limits of acceptable foreignness. The Italians of the past are granted a mention as included within the national space, while simultaneously having the power to symbolise excess knowledge, that which is alien to the kiwi. This ambiguous position is not granted to many people of other ethnic origins. Till states: “it’s a retro sort of fashion sort of thing where you can just enjoy stuff that you don’t get to enjoy anymore because there’s a whole bunch of Thai spices fighting each-other in everything. It was just plain old cookin’” (Till, 2006, episode 2). Where “Italian” had the power to partly symbolise the exotic and partly signify people who actually existed in New Zealand, “Thai” exists purely as a symbol for excessive knowledge and sophistication. “Thai” references an internationalism that is far too much, that overwhelms the “Kiwi”, that renders life far too confusing. “Thai” cannot reference Thai people living in New Zealand: it is never mentioned that there could be a possibility of Thai people living in New Zealand. Nor, in this context, can it represent the food cooked by Thai people for themselves: there is
no allowance for the possibility that for some people, “Thai spices” might be “plain old cookin’”. It can only reference flavours added by New Zealanders who have been corrupted/mislead. The real Kiwi is innocent: “Thai” is too confusing. Yet in the last, “multicultural” episode, Till reveals that he does know “Thai”: he uses Nam Pla, found in a number of South East Asian cuisines, but commonly associated with “Thai” food. He uses this as a base for a dipping sauce for “Vietnamese spring rolls” (Till, 2006, episode 7) filled with muttonbird. The introduction of “Thai” flavours acts as a symbol for “multiculturalism”, but also acts as a revelation of a more knowledgeable self, as self not confused by the “multicultural”. Here “Thai” is used to represent knowledge gained as an adult, which the ‘Kiwi’ pretends not to have in order to reclaim the fantasised security of childhood. The ‘Kiwi’ can reclaim this knowledge at any time in order to demonstrate mastery of the present. “Thai” is not used here to reference Thai people or the food they cook in any other context than to feed the ‘Kiwi’ with exoticism he/she can refute or claim.

Richard Till: Well then, this is the new tomato sauce isn’t it?
Judy Woolley: No, well actually, well it is really, isn’t it? Well, that’s actually a mild chilli and ginger sauce, so again for those people who want to be a little more adventurous; they can take your more traditional foods and use the dipping sauce.
Till: You’d have to be very careful to put it mild in case Nana had the top of her head pop off in the middle of the funeral, that wouldn’t work would it? (Till, 2006, episode 4)

The above exchange takes place at a funeral catering company run by Bronwyn Richards and Judy Woolley. The introductory shots for the segments show them seated with their Asian employees seated in a semicircle around them: the employees wear hairnets for hygiene reasons, while Richards and Woolley have their hair down and carefully styled. The generic
term “Asian” is necessary, as the employees are not interviewed, and viewers never find out their origins or opinions. Richards and Woolley are shown making cheese muffins by hand, although industrial mixing equipment can be seen in the background; the employees are not shown cooking. Where Woolley and Richards wear cardigans over their aprons, the employee wears an apron over all her clothes. After Till has spoken to Woolley and Richards about their company, the “back catalogue”, several large platters of sausage rolls and other “Kiwi” savouries, is brought out. It is not clear whether the “back catalogue” was made behind the scene by the employees. What is revealed and then whisked away here is something different from the egalitarian paradise mentioned in the section on lamb. There is difference here, both of class and race. There is a trace of the history of immigrants from non-English-speaking countries working in poorly-paid jobs. It is this history, both of racial and of social inequality, that narratives such as those offered in Kiwi Kitchen leave untold. Inequality is unspeakable, in that speaking of it would make the past less homely, less like a paradise. So, in this section of Kiwi Kitchen, it is the middle-class English-speakers who get to speak, who are seen in the foreground, while the “Asians” are silent. The “traditional” hand-mixing of muffins is foregrounded, while other work takes place off-scene. Yet even while the warm, home-like “Kiwi” preparation of food is displayed, there are hints as to the amount of work that has to take place off scene for the “traditional” to be produced, and to who it is that is doing this off-scene work.

Well, that’s actually a mild chilli and ginger sauce, so again for those people who want to be a little more adventurous, they can take your more traditional foods and use the dipping sauce (Judy Woolley, Till, 2006, episode 4)
The “new tomato sauce” is here revealed to be “a mild chilli and ginger sauce”. While “chilli and ginger sauce” signals “Asian”, it is carefully designed to be mild and inoffensive: “Nana” is not going to have “the top of her head pop off” (Till, 2006, episode 4). It is also decontextualised: it is served with sausage rolls and savouries rather than with any “Asian” foods. The key thing about a dipping sauce is that the ‘Kiwi’ can have as much or as little of it as he/she likes: even none. As Woolley notes, it is “for those people who want to be a little more adventurous”. As a mild addition that is totally under ‘Kiwi’ control and can be refused, and which is served with “your more traditional foods”, “mild chilli and ginger sauce” offers the most comfortable presence possible that the ‘international’ can have within the ‘Kiwi’ nation. If “tomato sauce” represents the “homely” within New Zealand – a comforting condiment found in every “Kiwi” home – then the “new tomato sauce” represents the new “homely” for the nation. Foreignness is allowed into the national home on the condition that it is completely under “Kiwi” control. The “Asian” people who produce “Asian” food are left silent: they have no part in the decision on how the Kiwi will use the dipping sauce.

A lot of Chinese came to this part of the world to do second scoop through the goldfields. Greater migration came in the 1940s and by that time the majority of Chinese were working in market gardening, selling fruit and vegetables, and in the laundry business and then gradually as those industries faded away...a lot of those Chinese workers turned to opening fish and chip shops, takeaways, and restaurants and that’s where the great New Zealand Chinese food was born (Till, 2006, episode 7)

Given that, despite the pervasiveness of the past in Kiwi Kitchen, history is seldom mentioned, and given the exclusion of ‘foreigners’ from the national story it narrates, it may
seem odd that a history of the presence of Chinese people in New Zealand is given in episode 7. What is it about the history of Chinese New Zealanders that makes it tellable, and why is it told here? The inclusion of the history of Chinese people in New Zealand does secure them a legitimacy that is not granted either to other, more recent immigrants, or to Māori. Chinese New Zealanders are positioned as legitimate New Zealanders because of their presence in the past, a presence that is both relatively pervasive and relatively non-threatening. As purveyors of both fish and chips and ‘Chinese’ takeaways, the Chinese provided food that was widely available in the “Kiwi” past. As such, they are the least threatening possible inclusion in the otherwise monocultural ‘Kiwi’ nation. Not new enough to represent a feared change in the remembered past, yet not having been here long enough to represent a challenge to Pākehā legitimacy, Chinese New Zealanders are the least threatening possible face of “multicultural diversity” (Till, 2006, episode 7). The narrated history serves to render New Zealand Chinese inoffensive, incapable of disrupting the desired nation. Newer immigrants, or those who did not provide takeaways that were part of the fetishised Kiwi childhood’, are simply eradicated from view.

**Poor old sausage rolls**

Nor can children have their pleasurable experiences repeated often enough, and they are inexorable in their insistence that the repetition shall be an identical one. This character trait disappears later on (Freud, 1955, p.35)

As explored above, there is a level of unreality about the national shared childhood invoked in *Kiwi Kitchen*. Yet this national childhood that never quite was — a childhood in which racism did not exist, in which division did not exist, in which class did not exist, in which we were all one — is the subject of a fierce protectiveness. Not only is the imagined childhood
separated off from anything negative in the past, leaving large sections of the past inaccessible and creating an innocence that never could have been, it is also heavily protected against the changes of the present. Childhood is created as a sanctuary, untouchable. Till becomes mock-angry in episode 3 when ex-All Black Grahame Thorne cooks an altered version of his (Thorne’s) own recipe from a 1970s cookbook, exclaiming “ Doesn’t say that in your recipe” (Till, 2006, episode 3). Till notes: “Grahame’s method that time was completely different to his one in the book. I thought that was a bit shabby and was trying to point that out to him all the time that he was doing it completely differently” (Till, 2006, episode 3). This feigned petulance mimics the annoyance of a young child whose parent has changed a family tradition. It is identifiable in Freud’s description of the childhood desire for repetition:

And if a child has been told a nice story, he will insist on hearing it over and over again rather than a new one; and he will remorselessly stipulate that the repetition shall be an identical one and will correct any alterations of which the narrator may be guilty (Freud, 1955, p.35)

The impulse here is towards complete preservation of the past in the present: to do it “completely different” is to get it wrong and to get it wrong is to violate the past. The notions of protecting the past of the nation and protecting the childhood of the individual are superimposed, and both are considered in some way essential, as if the present could damage the past, as if, in doing so, it could damage the lives of children who lived in the past, as if that were the same as damaging a child now.

Kiwi Kitchen valourises an impulse towards repetition: the pleasure in Kiwi Kitchen is largely the pleasure of doing things the same way, over and over again. There is a return, here, to
the pleasures of childhood: to the same food “we” ate when we were children. It is also a return to a way of experiencing pleasure — pleasure in experiencing the same thing over and over again, without variation — that seems to belong in childhood. Variation is experienced, not as a pleasurable novelty, but as a diminution of pleasure. In episode 3 of the series, chef Tersha Copel cooks a fruit crumble which Till describes as “top of the line” (Till, 2006, episode 3). Yet there are traces of disapproval for Copel’s innovations and additions: “I’d expressed my reservations about the nuts and stuff, having been a straight down the line kinda guy” (Till, 2006, episode 3), “I mean I would’ve said earlier it was gilding the lily” (Till, 2006, episode 3). In Till’s own cooking segment at the end of the episode, there is a return to the style of crumble he considers standard: “I’m making a different one, it’s a whole lot simpler, there’s no muckin’ round with the fruit to start with, it’s just a flour, butter, sugar topping....If you want crumble, you want crumble” (Till, 2006, episode 3).

The sense that there is greater pleasure in things being as they were than in changes is conveyed more strongly in episode 4, when Till expresses surprise and delight at being offered sausage rolls: “Oh look! And here are my favourite sausage rolls”. The pleasure expressed here is because the sausage rolls are the size that Till believes they should be:

...the small pieces of sausage roll were just brilliant because I think what’s happened with poor old sausage rolls is they’ve felt everybody’s attention slipping away towards salmon and this and that and the other thing and to compensate the sausage rolls have just got bigger and bigger and going ‘Look at me! Look at me!’ and that’s really not how a sausage roll should be (Till, 2006, episode 4)

Here there is pleasure in the return of something that was felt to be lost —although, as noted above, sausage rolls were not really lost at all —as evidenced by the exclamation “Oh look”. There is a sense that there is a way that things —in this case sausage rolls — “should
be” and that deviations from this standard are not acceptable. There is only pleasure in the return of something from the past if it is unchanged. By eating a sausage roll that is exactly the same as the sausage roll experienced in the past, it is possible to experience the present and the past as exactly the same thing. The sense of violation expressed in the phrase “that’s really not how a sausage roll should be” is related to the inability of a non-standard sausage roll to effect this collapse of the distinction between past and present. Also notable is the affection expressed for sausage rolls: they appear not only as pleasures from the past but as characters from the past. The oral satisfaction offered by sausage rolls is a return to an earlier experience of pleasure:

The first of these is the oral or, as it might be called, cannibalistic pregenital sexual organisation. Here sexual activity has not yet been separated from the ingestion of food; nor are opposite currents within the activity differentiated. The ...aim consists in the incorporation of the object – the prototype of a process which, in the form of identification, is later to play such an important psychological part (Freud, 1953, p.198)

The affection with which sausage rolls are greeted harks back to this earlier stage, as does all affection: “the affectionate current comprises what remains over of the infantile efflorescence of sexuality” (Freud, 1953, p.207). “Poor old sausage rolls” are not only ‘Kiwi’, they are ‘Kiwis’: simple characters whose position has been usurped by the effete “salmon, this that and the other”(Till, 2006, episode 4). Salmon retains the ability to symbolise the exotic despite its presence at dinner parties in the same era that Kiwi Kitchen locates as the source of real ‘Kiwi’ food: “They’d be having...things like sausage rolls, pastry cases with...maybe salmon” (Tui Flower, Till, 2006, episode 4). There is a sense of loyalty here to the pleasures of childhood: they can be betrayed.
Comfort food

What is the nature of the comfort offered by these nostalgic foods? It is here that Starobinsky’s exploration of nostalgia becomes relevant, as does the connection between food and motherhood that he elaborates:

Why...are the young Swiss so frequently inclined to nostalgia when they go abroad?” “It is hard for them to forget the loving care with which their mothers surrounded them. They miss the soups which they used to have for breakfast, the thick milk from their own valley, and perhaps also the freedom which they enjoyed in their own country... The modern psychiatrist should be thankful to Johannes Hofer for understanding straight off the role of this deprivation: the loss of childhood, of “oral satisfactions”, of motherly coaxing (Starobinski, 1966, p.87)

What is this food that generates pleasure in repetition? Why do certain foods generate this pleasure, and the sense of loyalty that comes with it? As described above, it is the foods of childhood that exert an emotional pull, and these foods bring with them associations with home and warmth. When talking about crumble, Till makes an explicit connection between food and the nation: “it’d be a pretty shoddy sort of show about New Zealand if we didn’t have crumble...crumble’s the one that makes the wheels of the nation go round”(Till, 2006, episode 3).

He then makes a connection between food and home: “You’ve gotta have a crumble. I think it’s the best thing to come home to on a winter evening or any evening”(Till, 2006, episode 3). Here, crumble is something to “come home to”, to return to, specifically on a winter evening. “Home” and “crumble” are both warm, and stand in opposition to the cold outside world. Till describes his fruit crumble as “my lovely, buttery, kitchen table crumble” (Till,
2006, episode 3), bringing in associations that hold the kitchen as the centre of the home, the place of the mother. The same sense of returning home from a cold outside world to a home full of warmth is conveyed in episode 7, where the centre of warmth is not the kitchen, but the fireplace:

   Dunedin and fruitcake for me will always be fused...I remember when I was a kid down there it was, always seemed to be forever raining but somehow inside a slice of fruitcake and a hot mug of Milo or something and you’d be set up for eat (Till, 2006, episode 7)

If certain foods are what “makes the wheels of the nation go round”, the nation is driven by a return to the idealised, partly imagined, warm centre of the family home.

   We believe the traditional foods are what people want on such an occasion. It just evokes memories from days gone by, it’s ‘what Mum would have liked’, and just provides that comfort food that’s not going to shock anyone, it’s tried and true (Judy Woolley, Till, 2006, episode 4)

The food which provides the pleasure of repetition is “comfort food”: it comforts by reassuring the eater that home is not lost, it is still here. The fantasised national home is as it was: it is warm, it contains nothing shocking, and everything in it is “what Mum would have liked”. This, then, is why “foreign” food would not do “on such an occasion”: it is incapable of calling up the warm family home fantasised as the centre of the nation.

There is a great deal of emotion invested in the childhood memories described as connecting “ordinary” kiwis to a national identity. Despite the pleasures of repetition — of repeatedly devouring the familiar — described above, there is something striking about the nature of the memories described with the most intensity:
As a child I remember *really* clearly the [pause] y’know, I had to go to bed when I was really little so it was that noise and the hubbub and stuff out in the room and there was all the smell of cooking late at night (Till, 2006, episode 4)

...it only came out on special occasions and it was kind of flasher and more mysterious...from the corners of my memory (Till, 2006, episode 1)

there was something just so mmm...ephemeral or whatever you might want to say, fancy, about it (Till, 2006, episode 2)

the thing I remember I suppose most from my childhood about tomatoes is the *smell* of the things on the vine (Till, 2006, episode 3)

What these statements have in common —and all of them were delivered with particular intensity — is that none of them relate to the experience of eating “ordinary” food. They all relate to the ephemeral —the sound of dinner parties, the smell of tomatoes — or that which seemed intensely mysterious. The association of the ephemeral with nostalgic yearnings has been noted by Starobinsky:

...a fragment of the past, strikes our senses, but it also revives in the imagination all our former life and all the “associated” images with which it is connected. This “memorative sign” is related to a partial presence which causes one to experience, with pleasure and pain, the impossibility of complete restoration of this universe which emerges fleetingly from oblivion. Roused by the “memorative sign”, the conscience comes to be haunted by an image of the past which is at once definite and unattainable. The image of childhood appears ...only to slip away, leaving us prey (Starobinski, 1966, pp92-93)

It is this haunting, fleeting quality that is expressed Till’s descriptions. He refers to the unattainable fragments from “the corners of...memory”. There is a sense of wistfulness to this nostalgia, which is generated by the simultaneous presence and absence of the past in these memories. This is reminiscent of Starobinsky’s description of the power of fragments of recalled music: “All this as a result ...of a little phrase which had the unusual power to provoke an attack of emotional hypermnesia: the illusion of a sort of presence of the past, all the more pervasive owing to the sadness caused by departing” (Starobinski, 1966, p.90).
In all of the ephemeral examples given by Till, there is a sense of a surplus, an unreachable “something more”. It is this that gives them their power, makes them memorable. This is reminiscent of Žižek’s statement:

It would... be erroneous simply to reduce the national Thing to the features composing a specific ‘way of life’. The Thing is not directly a collection of these features; there is ‘something more’ in it, something that is present in these features, that appears through them (Žižek, 1993, p.201)

My intention here is not to suggest that the nation has a “something more” at the heart of it. It is rather to suggest that the equation by which “national identity” is mapped onto the idealised childhood memories of those deemed to be its citizens draws its power from those childhood memories which are animated by a feeling of “something more”.

The sense of striving towards something out of reach which animates these memories of the mysterious in the past is an echo. We are, now, striving backwards to recapture memories of a time when we were striving to capture something. This something is forever out of reach:

In his Anthropologie, Kant has given a subtle interpretation to this desire: what a person wishes to recover is not so much the actual place where he passed his childhood, but his youth itself. He is not straining toward something which he can repossess, but toward an age which is forever beyond his reach.... His childhood is not given back to him (Starobinski, 1966, p.94)

There is a double impossibility here: we cannot return to our childhood, but even if we could, we would not be able to grasp what it was we were striving to have at that time.

Indeed, if we could have had it, it would not have had any emotional power. Thus, at the heart of the most potent memories, there is an absence, a gap, in which can be felt the presence of something unknown. What is the source of this unknown presence? There is a
spectre haunting Kiwi Kitchen: despite the professed focus of the series on “memories evoked by mum’s kitchen” (Collett, 2006, p.D1). Indeed, despite the fact that episode 7 is dedicated to Till’s mother, there is almost no mention of mothers. This is somewhat remarkable, given that the series is centred on an equation between the nation and childhood: here, there is a childhood without mothers. It is as if the “comfort food” that is repeatedly devoured stands in for the mother, providing warmth, welcome, home. Till names and describes his father at one point, so there is not an absence of parents. One of the two mentions Till makes of his mother is when he describes a dessert she used to make, Spanish Cream: “It only came out on special occasions and it was kind of flasher and more mysterious” (Till, 2006, episode 1). He notes: “I don’t know what recipe my mother used to use for her one and I don’t think I’m gonna be, I don’t think I’m doing it the same way it was done then”. Here, there is backtracking: the sentence structure changes in the middle from the more straightforward ‘I don’t know what recipe my mother used to use for her one and I don’t think I’m gonna be doing it the way she did it’ to something more complex that avoids mentioning the mother twice. It is notable that Spanish Cream has the mysterious quality that is associated with powerful childhood memories: not only is it “flasher”, “mysterious” and only for special occasions, it is part of a memory that is not fully grasped, coming “from the corners of my memory” (Till, 2006, episode 1). Yet it has the power to compel affection: “I’m very fond of it” (Till, 2006, episode 1). If the mother is present in the fantasised national childhood, it is in translated form. She is partly reclaimed through the eating of foods that are experienced as saturated with affection, and partly unreachable: a haunting absence/presence that animates fragments of memory that reach to an un-reclaimable/un-rememberable time.
Thus, while repetition enacts the fantasy that the past is not lost but is completely present, the trace, a fragment of a memory, calls up an intensity of feeling itself imported from further back in the past than can be remembered. Where repetition holds that the fantasised past nation is here, it is not lost, repetition is itself haunted by the feeling that the source of repeated pleasure, and by extension the nation itself, is in imminent danger of being stolen away. By contrast the intensity of emotion evoked by traces of memory, the sense of “something more”, just beyond recall, lends to the nation a sense of momentousness: the sense that there is something special about the nation, about us, if we could only remember or articulate what it was. The mother is present and absent at the centre of this “something more”: while the repetition of childhood pleasures is a return to a warm, secure, enveloping nation/home, it is a home haunted by the irreclaimable. The sense of loss that attends the pleasures of the nation may be the residue of the loss of the mother. The sense of nostalgia that animates the nation is nostalgia for something that could never be reclaimed: “Nostalgia is always for something that is forever lost because it was never present. Nostalgia for the mother is a longing for an impossible return to the peace of the maternal womb, the silence of a tongue that does not speak” (Oliver, 1997, p.66).

In this chapter, I have explored the nostalgia that binds national citizens to the desired nation. I have also investigated the boundaries of what is allowable in the nostalgic nation. The yearning that animates the nation is for a past that never was. This longed-for past is inhabited by unreachable memories of maternal warmth. Boundaries are set up around this
past to protect it from knowledge of division within the nation. Yet reminders of division are continually present around the borders of the desired nation. These reminders of division are suspected of stealing the fantasised nation: an accusation that serves to cover the unattainable nature of this nation. In the next chapter, I will explore how encounters with division are played out in a public attempt to display the nation. Where this chapter has delineated the functioning of nostalgia in securing the nation, the next chapter will make clear how knowledge of history disrupts this warmly desired nation.

Chapter Three: The Void

What you’re creating in terms of that place there which is a big whole place is that you’re putting a ghost in it for some of those culturally sensitive people (Cliff Whiting, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)

If Chapter One was an exploration of the Kiwi’s defences against the outside world, and Chapter Two was an exploration of the construction of an inside world, Chapter Three could be considered an exploration of the Kiwi’s defence against an inside world. This chapter functions as a pivot point in my thesis. While Chapter One and Two were explorations of attempts to celebrate New Zealand as a nation, in this chapter I explore the limits of this celebration. I will here explore a vanishing point at which celebration becomes overwhelmed by unmentionable parts of the nation. In this chapter I explore a gap in the nation’s celebration of itself. Subsequent chapters will explore the violent and exclusionary impulses which inhabit the other side of this gap.

In this chapter, I explore a defensive strategy: a strategy of ‘un-knowing’. This defence is erected against a sense of threat from within. The ambiguity here – about whether this threat comes from within the country, or from within the self – is an inherent part of the themes I explore in this chapter. Within Pākehā nationalism, this sense of threat from within circulates around Māori. In this chapter I will show how this feeling of threat is worked out in a public, ostensibly celebratory, setting: a setting intended to solidify a national narrative. I will suggest that New Zealand’s attempts to secure a sense of nationhood are haunted by a refuted knowledge of the violence and injustice that
surrounded the founding of the nation. The refutation of knowledge of past violence is foundational to national narratives, as Bhabha describes:

[The will to nationhood] is itself the site of a strange forgetting of the history of the nation’s past: the violence involved in establishing the nation’s writ. It is this forgetting – the signification of a minus in the origin – that constitutes the beginning of the nation’s narrative (Bhabha, 1994, p.160)

It is a key concept of Psychoanalytic theory that material which is repressed continually returns. In the course of this chapter I will demonstrate how the refuted parts of New Zealand’s history, channelled through the focal point provided by the Treaty of Waitangi, stage a repeated haunting return. This repeated ghostly return, simultaneously expected and dreaded, functions similarly to that noted by Derrida: “After the end of history, the spirit comes by coming back [revenant], it figures both a dead man who comes back and a ghost whose expected return repeats itself, again and again” (Derrida, 1994, p.10). The Treaty is continually wished out of existence and continually resurrects itself, bringing with it aspects of a past believed to be dead.

This chapter will centre on an investigation of a public attempt to display the history of New Zealand. The focus of my analysis will be on the problematic role of the Treaty of Waitangi (commonly known as simply “the Treaty”) at the core of notions about New Zealand’s history. This is important because notions of the nation’s history are central to the construction of the nation’s identity. I will use material that suggests the difficulty of approaching the Treaty and the ambiguous position it holds at the centre of Pākehā narratives about the history of New Zealand. The Treaty, I will argue, is overburdened with meaning, called upon to stand for nobility and unity, yet dragging with it reminders of
negative aspects of New Zealand’s history and present. The ambivalence surrounding the Treaty gives it a haunting presence in the story of the nation, making it something frequently invoked, yet simultaneously shied away from as a source of revulsion. Simultaneously present and absent, the Treaty holds a troubled and troubling position.

In tracing the complex functioning of the Treaty within attempts to celebrate New Zealand’s origins, there is an element of difficulty. How does one show the presence of an absence? How does one fix an avoidance, bring to light an aversion? If, as I am suggesting, the Treaty is a slippery absence/presence at the centre of the nation, how do I show this to be true? In the material I analyse, I will initially focus on suggestions in the language of display, turns of phrase that hint at discomfort, hints and slips that reveal the ambiguity of the Treaty’s position. Later, I will provide more concrete examples of the argument and disruption that gathers around the discussion of how to display the Treaty, giving force to my argument that the Treaty is a source of extreme discomfort in desired Pākehā narratives of the nation. I will show the way in which this discomfort and disruption is generated by the association of the Treaty with the parts of history which are desired to be absent from the nation. The Treaty, I will argue, holds an uncanny position, constantly bringing to light that which is desired to be hidden. The suggestions of discomfort that I explore in this Chapter will be reinforced by the more unequivocal material that I explore in Chapter Four.

I will, in this chapter, explore the role that history plays in the construction of the fantasised Kiwi nation. History, in the public narrative that explains why the nation exists and what the
nation consists of, is the ultimate source of authority. It is used to provide a coherent narrative that naturalises the existence of the nation, linking it to an idealised past and pointing towards a desired future:

...the origin of the nation’s visual presence is the effect of a narrative struggle.... ‘the necessity of the past and the necessity of its place in a line of continuous development...finally the aspect of the past being linked to the necessary future’ (Bhabha, 1994, p.143)

Yet while history is called upon to authenticate the nation, to provide a concrete source for its existence and an irrefutable story of origin, it is itself the source of a radical instability in the narrative it is required to provide. Any appeal to history to secure the nation’s authority is inherently destabilised by the contents of the history it seeks to utilise. The violence with which the nation was established is required to be forgotten in order for a comfortable national narrative to be established: “Every nation must have its history, its own collective memory. This remembering is simultaneously a collective forgetting...nations forget the violence which brought them into existence” (Billig, 1995, p.38). Yet the invocation of history always threatens to re-expose the violence at its heart. To phrase it differently: the violence of the past cannot be acknowledged if history is to provide authenticity for the nation, yet it must be acknowledged in order for history to carry its full weight of authority. Thus, to call upon history to secure the nation is to bring up an endless instability, an unbalanced cycle of remembrance and forgetting, in which the distasteful past constantly threatens to resurface and is constantly suppressed.
In New Zealand, the fulcrum on which this unstable pattern pivots is the Treaty of Waitangi: as Walker and Clark put it: “The Treaty of Waitangi has become the ground on which New Zealand negotiates its identity: cultural, political and legal” (Clark & Walker, 2000, p.162). The Treaty of Waitangi is commonly presented as “New Zealand’s founding document” ("The Treaty in brief,"), required to stand in the place of a constitution: a piece of paper on which the origin of the nation has been written. Yet the Treaty, invoked as a symbol of a unified nation, cannot avoid referencing disunity. Within commonly held notions of ‘Kiwi’ history, the confiscation of Māori land is often forgotten or dismissed as unimportant. The Treaty is irrevocably associated with attempted compensation for these confiscations, while the reason for compensation disappears from sight. Thus the Treaty has come to be seen as the source of discord in itself, rather than as a source of possible remedies to this discord. The Treaty functions as a screen, standing in for the violence which violated its terms. In addition, it stands in for the sense of injustice felt by those who consider, having refuted all knowledge of the unpalatable contents of the past, the remedying of injustice to be itself an injustice. Officially elevated as an overarching document, the Treaty is, in the narrative of the Pākehā nation, a nucleus of abjection, something shameful and disgusting. In order to secure the nation’s narrative, the Treaty must be mentioned, yet it cannot be mentioned: it constantly surfaces, and then sinks out of sight. This endlessly unstable system haunts the nation, an uncanny reminder of the rift on which the nation is founded. The notion of a unified nation is constantly destabilised, rendered endlessly uncomfortable.

In this section I will be working with material that deals with the Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (Te Papa). The material I use here comes from Gaylene Preston’s 1999
documentary *Getting to Our Place*, which follows the meetings that took place as Te Papa was being set up. As a national museum, Te Papa is fundamentally concerned with the way in which history provides a basis for the nation. It, like other museums, achieves this through the display of objects, which are linked together interpretively to form narratives considered to be representative of the nation. The national museum could be considered to function as a stand-in for the desired nation:

> It could be argued that the programme of the national museum – broadly to represent national identity through the objects and interpretations presented in the museum – has a metaphoric relation with the nation as a whole (Clark & Walker, 2004, pp.163-164)

Along with a representation of national identity, Te Papa’s stated purpose is to be:

> ...a forum for the nation to present, explore, and preserve the heritage of its cultures and knowledge of the natural environment in order to: better understand and treasure the past, enrich the present and meet the challenges of the future (“Legislation and accountability,”)

Rather than an attempt to provide a single overarching foundational narrative for the nation, Te Papa was officially created to provide a forum for the exploration of a plurality of stories of cultural heritage.

According to Te Papa’s official website’s summary of the 1992 Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa Act ("Our history,"), Te Papa was intended to:

- unite the National Museum and National Art Gallery as one entity
- unite the collections of the two institutions so that New Zealand’s stories could be told in an interdisciplinary way
- be a partnership between Tangata Whenua (Māori, the indigenous people of New Zealand) and Tangata Tiriti (people in New Zealand by right of the Treaty of Waitangi)
• speak with authority
• represent and appeal to New Zealand’s increasingly diverse society
• be a place for discussion, debate, involvement, and celebration
• link the past, present, and future

Thus, Te Papa was designed to encompass both unity and diversity, whilst “speaking with authority”. There is, however, an element of ambiguity about the source from which this authority is derived: does it derive from the multitude of unified but diverse voices, or does it stand apart from and above them, a separate entity? This ambiguity is perhaps the first hint of the difficulty of Te Papa’s goals. This difficulty is generated by the impossibility of reconciling the desired diversity with a desire for an authoritative narrative that reasserts Pākehā primacy and makes no mention of division. It is this desire that I will explore and make clear later in this chapter.

While the official website’s summary of aims contains a hint of ambiguity, Pete Bossley puts it less ambiguously when he describes the design brief he received:

The new Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa (as it was to be known) would ‘powerfully express the total culture of New Zealand’ and represent the bicultural nature of the country, recognising the mana and significance of each of the two mainstreams of tradition and cultural heritage, and provide the means for each to contribute effectively to a statement of the nation’s identity (Bossley, 1998, history)

Here, the aim of the museum is an equal balance of authority between Māori and Pākehā, with no privileging of one culture over the other. Both stand equally strong. There is, however, a complication in this brief, in that one aim is to recognise “two mainstreams”, while another speaks of multitudes: “It [the museum] would ‘acknowledge and reflect the diversity of New Zealand’s peoples with their different ethnic origins and the contributions
they have made, and continue to make, to our cultural life’” (Bossley, 1998, history). It is unclear whether this “diversity” is a subdivision of the “two mainstreams”, or is set apart from them. Nor is it clear whether this range of “different ethnic origins” has the “mana and significance” that the “mainstreams” have, or whether this mana belongs to only to the mainstream. This ambiguity further illustrates the complexity, and potentially the impossibility, of Te Papa’s official aims. It is, however, here made obvious that Te Papa’s aim is to speak equally for Māori and Pākehā, or rather, to have them both speak equally through the medium of the museum. Both have a say in stating the “nation’s identity”.

Charlotte Macdonald writes of Te Papa: “The museum is unashamedly a monument to national pride” (Macdonald, 2009, p.35). The notion of nationhood which underpins museums – the idea that history is a source of pride and reveals the essence of a country – is further illustrated in the following statement from one of the designers involved in setting up Te Papa:

When I first came here, I expected the museum to be presenting our history and our past with real strength and pride, and real elegance; that it was going to be our cultural treasure box, and we’ve got these beautiful objects we can show them and say ‘This is the soul of our country’ (Sharon Janson, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)

Here, it is the notion of treasure and of beauty that is placed at the heart of the nation. Each individual “beautiful object” is considered to reveal and reflect an inner truth: the soul of the country. Yet these objects are also expected to assemble into a narrative, “presenting of history and our past with real strength and pride”, telling a story not only of who “we” were, but who “we” are: “the programme of the national museum... is also a kind of metonymy: parts of the nation (or at least parts of its material culture and such narratives as can be
Both the objects and the story are intended to be a source of pride. The act of creating the museum is seen as itself a source of pride: “We’d be a pretty dull people, I think, if we didn’t all share some of that pride in the creation of what we see today” (Sir Wallace Rowling, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). There is pride in not being “a pretty dull people”. In the logic of Rowling’s statement, we know that we are not a dull people because we have pride in the creation of the museum. By this circular reasoning, we can be proud of our pride. The museum not only narrates our past with pride, shows us our soul in individual objects with pride, but is itself a construction of our pride, of which we can be proud. This circulation of pride is not an unintentional side effect of the creation of Te Papa. Macdonald notes that “The museum worked hard to produce a place where an experience of pride and recognition is on offer” (Macdonald, 2009, p.44). Macdonald suggests that this invocation of pride works to elide any conflict and contradiction that could be generated by the aims of the museum:

Binding the contrary imperatives together was an overarching theme of celebration – emphasizing the uniqueness of New Zealand/Aotearoa’s natural and human histories and the success of its peoples, narratives bearing clear messages of resolution and pride. Conflict was sublimated beneath a celebratory populism (Macdonald, 2009, p.32)

At the centre of this circuit of pride, in the case of Te Papa, stands the Treaty of Waitangi: “the Treaty as a sort of central experience, large overarching encounter...that sort of pulls together the whole museum” (Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). The Treaty is allocated a position, not only at the centre of the museum, but at the centre of the nation: “We thought that...it was really important to somehow present the Treaty as a noble document that could unify everybody, that was above issues of day to day politics” (Jock Phillips,
Here, the Treaty of Waitangi is accorded a mythical, quasi-religious status: noble and unifying, above quotidian concerns such as politics. The Treaty is the ultimate “beautiful object” revealing the soul of the country. “New Zealand’s founding document” is itself to be presented as a source of national pride.

The Treaty of Waitangi’s presentation as a national “founding document” gives it a status that is worth investigating. It is notable that the Treaty of Waitangi is commonly referred to as “the Treaty”, as if it were the only treaty ever signed. It is granted a solitary status within the history of New Zealand, needing no description. As a concrete object on display, any copy of the Treaty is presented as the real thing, as the one Treaty, worthy of respect as an object. Yet it also serves as an avatar of a ghostly sense of principles, a uniting spirit, a (single) document that “could unify everybody”. Walker and Clark point to this in their description of the finished Treaty exhibit at Te Papa, where the Treaty is presented as a single, enormous, hallowed object: “Most telling is the privileging of the glass object itself. This reduces the treaty to a singular thing” (Clark & Walker, 2004, p.173). The Treaty leads a double life, “both a singularity and a facsimile” (Clark & Walker, 2004, p.174), displayed as a double of itself. Yet the monolithic, semi-mythological status which the Treaty is ascribed in official contexts is always inherently destabilised from within.

The depiction of the Treaty as a “founding document” is itself inherently subject to the same slippages as all claims to the foundation of a nation. As Derrida writes, when speaking of the constitution of South Africa:
It is probable... that... a coup de force always marks the founding of a nation, state, or nation-state. In the event of such a founding or institution, the properly performative act must produce (proclaim) what in the form of a constative act it merely claims, declares, assures it is describing. The simulacrum or fiction then consists in bringing to daylight, in giving birth to, that which one claims to reflect so as to take note of it, as though it were a matter of recording what will have been there, the unity of the nation, the founding of a state, while one is in the act of producing that event. But legitimacy, indeed legality, becomes permanently installed, it recovers its originating violence, and is forgotten only under certain conditions (Derrida, 1987, p.17)

Acts of founding, or the “foundational documents” which both assert and memorialise them, stake a claim to a unity that they claim to have always existed, or to having been always waiting to be called into existence. This claim travels back and forth in time, projecting into the past a narrative leading up to its existence, and creating a future narrative leading forwards from the moment of its inception. Yet there is always the chance that such a claim will reveal the violent acts which lead to its being staked. Derrida, speaking of South Africa under Apartheid, describes one such failure of concealment: “certain “conventions” were not respected, the violence ... cannot manage to have itself forgotten, as in the case of states founded on a genocide or quasi-extermination” (Derrida, 1987, p.17).

The situation in New Zealand is not the same as the one Derrida was referring to. Yet here too violence “cannot manage to have itself forgotten”, or not entirely so. Here it is the nature of the “founding document” as a treaty that renders it troublesome. Protest from Māori about violations of the Treaty makes it impossible to entirely forget or cover over the violence of the past. Though many Pākehā are unaware of the historical background of these protests, it is difficult to be unaware that there have been protests about something about the Treaty. This knowledge engenders the sense that there is something wrong with the Treaty, some hint of contamination, of injustice, of wrong. In popular Pākehā views of history, the violence involved in the ‘settling’ of New Zealand circulates around the Treaty. It
is never entirely acknowledged but always there, always returning, even if it is sometimes only there as a gap in what is publicly acknowledged about the Treaty. Violence haunts the Treaty, never quite disappearing. This is haunting in the sense that Rose describes: “haunting can also work in the other direction, not only of loss but of uncanny persistence” (Rose, 1996, p.44).

To return to the previous claims of the nobility and grandeur of the Treaty, it is notable that they were made to ward off the taint of controversy, the whiff of violence:

We thought that it was such a fraught and highly controversial issue [emphasis mine] that it was really important to somehow [emphasis mine] present the Treaty as a noble document that could unify everybody, that was above issues of day to day politics (Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)

The desire to present the Treaty as noble and unifying is a pre-emptive defence against controversy, and is something that may only “somehow” stand a chance of being fulfilled.

Against this uncertainty, against the possibility that it may be impossible to display the Treaty as a unifying document, are set attempts to solidify the Treaty, to make it larger and more concrete: “I’ll talk about the need to depoliticise the whole thing, make it a sort of monumental experience” (Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). The larger the Treaty, in this equation, the greater its status, the further above petty concerns such as politics it is set. The space in which it is set is designed to enhance its mana, to create an air of reverence: “bringing them [museum patrons] past the big ideas of the treaty...and then creating a big space, a contemplative space where they can actually read the treaty” (Pete Bosley, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Macdonald notes how clearly this reverential design comes across in the finished display: “The central treaty exhibition is large in scale,
deliberately spare, and reverential in tone. The design is drawn from religious models....the atmosphere is one of tribute” (Macdonald, 2009, p.36). Yet in this devotional space, there is still room for division to slip in. What is it that those who enter the space are supposed to be contemplating? Is there any way in which contemplation of the Treaty could not include some reference to violence and turmoil? The Treaty is positioned high, above the space for its contemplation: “and then the mother of all treaties up there”(Paul Thompson, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). It is thus not only figuratively but literally “above ...day to day politics”. Yet the phrasing used to describe it — a reference to Ruth Richardson’s hugely divisive “mother of all budgets” (“Story: National Party,”), itself a reference to Saddam Hussein’s promise of the “mother of all battles” — suggests an ominous, looming quality. The stated intent to show the Treaty as “a large, overarching encounter”(Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999) itself has an air of ambiguity. Does a large overarching encounter bring together and protect, or does it shadow and overwhelm? The attempts to solidify the Treaty of Waitangi’s status at the centre of New Zealand’s history are marked by traces of discomfort and dissension.

**The Wedge**

In the design of Te Papa, the Treaty of Waitangi is allocated a space which is imbued with meanings officially ascribed to the Treaty itself:

The Treaty of Waitangi, signed by Māori chiefs and the Crown in 1840, is central to the definition of the parameters by which New Zealanders share this land. It is only fitting that the ideas expressed within this document...inhabit the commanding inner space in the centre of the building. This central wedge of space grew from the idea ‘to cleave’, suggesting a coming together or a separating, a place of fluid possibilities. Locating the treaty exhibition ...in the Wedge zone offered an ideal opportunity to develop the original architectural concept through exhibition design. Just as the
treaty allows mediation between the two cultures, so the Wedge offers a linkage or separation between the differently oriented Māori and Pākehā sections of the building... at the concept stage it was felt to be important to express the central significance of the treaty for all to see (Bossley, 1998, from concept to exhibition: the treaty of Waitangi)

Thus the Treaty is desired to be seen as a means of “fluid possibilities”, of “coming together” and “separating”, a central pathway between two cultures. The space within which the Treaty is so monumentally displayed is constructed to create a core of meaning in the design of the museum: “a monumental space bridging between Māori and Pākehā sections, at the point of cleavage where both coming together and separating are possible” (Bossley, 1998, the developed concept). The space, the “Wedge”, is central to the design of the museum, a design deliberately divided into “Māori and Pākehā sections”. The hollow core of the building is set as a “commanding inner space” of the museum and perhaps of the nation, with the Treaty commanding the core itself. The Wedge is designed to allow for multiple meanings of the linkage between Māori and Pākehā, and, by association, the Treaty is ascribed the same multiple roles:

During development the central space became a Wedge expressing the idea ‘to cleave’ which means both ‘to split’ and ‘to adhere’. This allowed us to usefully develop the space as sitting between (separating) and also arching over (linking), thereby expressing the shifting nature of the relationship between the two cultures in a process of continual re-definition (Bossley, 1998, the developed concept)

Here the Treaty is granted an overarching role, a means of linkage as much as of separation. It is held to be central to a continual process of redefinition, and this is expressed in the design of its display space. In this design concept the Treaty hangs, not in an empty, isolated space, but in a dynamic intersection of meaning.
The Void

Yet the space which had been set aside for this encounter with the Treaty became known, during the setting up of the museum, not as “the Wedge” but as “the void”: a space not full of meaning but gapingly empty. This void is repeatedly returned to in the discussions leading up to the opening of Te Papa: “I think it’s serious. I think the void really needs some attention….Do you have ideas for doing something in the void?” (Robin Neil, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Here, the void needs attention: attention needs to be paid to the filling of the void. The constant return of this void within the museum to discussion, this constant return to the void, bears an uncanny symbolism. It is as if a hole in history, in acknowledged history, were constantly demanding attention. This is akin to Rose’s description of: “forms of remembrance …which hover in the space between social and psychic history, forcing and making it impossible for the one who unconsciously carries them to make the link” (Rose, 1996, p.5). In its constant perceived neglect and its nagging return, the void seems to be haunting the museum. If the space in which the Treaty or its magnified simulacrum is to be placed stages a haunting return, this raises the possibility that the Treaty is doing the same. The process of setting up the Treaty exhibition is troubled by an avoidance of discomforting reminders of the past. It is this that renders the filling of the void so problematic, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter. The avoidance of discomforting topics, the unpleasant necessity of thinking about these topics, the question of how to fill a void which is in itself a hole in what is acceptable about history: all of these issues circulate throughout the material I am here exploring. Their recurrence is a function of the vigour with which they are suppressed: “...these are traces which persist and colour the present to the exact extent
that everything inside people and psyche are willing themselves not to remember, not to know “(Rose, 1996, p.12).

Rather than a central connecting core it was designed to be, the void is described as isolated and meaningless:

Most of the museum space is conventional double-height space except the void, what we call ‘the void’ is a bit like a large shoebox on end…. And because it’s on the outside of the building, it’s not adjacent to, well, anything else (Paul Thompson, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)

The void itself, the “large shoebox on end” allocated for the display of the Treaty, is described as being cut off from “anything else”. This is contrary to its stated purpose as a space for the display of a document intended to unify, to overarch, everything else in the museum. In this description, the potential contents of the void appear to be quarantined, far from the “beautiful objects” of the rest of the museum. The History Team Leader complains:

We’ve been given this space, which is the farthest-most space from anywhere where entry...where people get into the museum. It’s a huge cavern of a space, and we finally persuaded them today that we should get some additional help to cope with this space. And so we’ve been battling about it for about three months and today I think we got some recognition, you know, that that was a legitimate claim on museum funds(Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)

A huge “cavern”, as far as possible from any entry point for visitors, requiring a battle to be recognised as having a “legitimate claim”: the void is positioned in this complaint as having been wilfully forgotten or ignored. Its problematic positioning suggests the problematic position of the Treaty of Waitangi within the national narrative of New Zealand. Bhabha describes the way in which national narratives work to surmount the ghostly presence of undesired stories thus:

...the origin of the nations visual presence is the effect of a narrative struggle....the ghostly (Gespenstermässiges), the terrifying (Unerfreuliches) and the unaccountable
(Unzuberechnendes) are consistently surmounted by the structuring process of the visualisation of time: ‘the necessity of the past and the necessity of its place in a line of continuous development...finally the aspect of the past being linked to the necessary future. National time becomes concrete and visible in the chronotype of the local, particular, graphic, from beginning to end. The narrative structure of this historical surmounting of the ‘ghostly’ or ‘double’ is seen in the intensification of narrative synchrony as a graphically visible position in space (Bhabha, 1994, p.143)

The void, and by extension the Treaty, functions as a ghostly hole in the planning of the museum. The stated purpose of Te Papa is to tell “New Zealand’s stories” (“Our history,”) through the presentation of its collections and the visual display of “the heritage of its cultures” (“Legislation and accountability,”). Yet there seems to be a cavernous hole in what is tellable. This suggests that not all stories are presentable within the confines of the desired national narrative. Something about the Treaty seems to incite banishment. Yet the descriptions of the void as a cavern cut off from everything else are not the only views on its location. The positioning of the void is also described as: “such a pivotal space for the whole museum that if we have a nice big vacant space sitting right there up front we’ll be crucified, and rightly so” (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Here, the void is pivotal and at the forefront, not cut off and far away. The void appears to be advancing and retreating with the concerns of those supposed to fill it. An ambiguity seems to surround the position of the Treaty: is it too far away or too much in the foreground, too ready to provoke crucifixion?

It was never our intention to sort of give you a list of contradictory instructions (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)
In the discussion of how to fill the void, there is a repeated back and forth of contradictory decisions. Those tasked with filling the void complain of being told to take certain things out and put them back in again: “We had personal stories on the pillars to start with and the board expressly asked us to take them out” (History team member, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). The response to this complaint is: “Don’t ask for any logic in this” (Ken Gorby, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Yet there is a form of logic behind the contradictory instructions being issued:

...there are some statements in the design brief ...that I think are a bit self-contradictory. We’re talking about the entry to be attractive, interesting and welcoming and yet we keep using the word ‘provocative’ (Paul Thompson, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)

The driving force behind the contradictory instructions given seem to be a desire to make the Treaty perform functions that are in themselves contradictory. The Treaty is desired to be an “attractive, interesting and welcoming” part of New Zealand history. Yet as it is impossible to not acknowledge some controversy around it, it is given leave to be provocative: “provocative” can, after all, be seen as the desirable version of “disturbing”.

The following interchange (Cottrell & Preston, 1999) provides a more detailed example of the forces driving the contradictory directives as to what is to fill the void:

Paul Thompson: If we have a look at the bigger thing, it is the forming of modern New Zealand, the encompassing, um, I’m worried that that’s actually a change of concept in that the original concept was very strictly directed towards the Treaty and people’s misunderstandings or lack of understanding of it and now we’ve changed the concept, that’s no longer the purpose of the exhibition

History Team Member: Can you explain why that change has been suggested, because there’s no logic why that should be the case.
Ken Gorby: It’s been called in the name, I think, of this broad discussion about cultural balance within the museum.

Here, the force is away from the Treaty, away from discussions about Pākehā people’s misunderstandings of it and towards a far more comfortable narrative about “the forming of modern New Zealand”. The void is avoided: material that more properly belongs elsewhere is brought in to bridge the gap. Rather than a misunderstood part of history being addressed, other parts of history are extended to cover it over. That this is part of “this broad discussion about cultural balance” is intriguing: which way does the balance tip?

“Cultural balance” suggests fairness, equality, the partnership laid down in the 1992 Te Papa Tongarewa Museum of New Zealand act: “partnership between Tangata Whenua (Māori, the indigenous people of New Zealand) and Tangata Tiriti (people in New Zealand by right of the Treaty of Waitangi)” (“Legislation and accountability,”). Yet the leaning away from potentially uncomfortable discussion of the Treaty towards more comfortable stories of the forming of modern New Zealand raises questions about who is deciding what counts as balanced. This concern is raised by Apirana Mahuika: “I hope that I’m wrong in my perception; that we are not doctoring up the Treaty so that it’s all nice and proper sort of thing” (Apirana Mahuika, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). His concern is met with the response: “What’s changed is a strategy of display. It is not a censorship of content at all” (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Whether the Treaty is considered to be being “doctored”, or to merely be the subject of a careful “strategy of display”, there seems to be something troublesome, something troubling about it. It does not seem to be an object that can be simply displayed. Some of the instructions about its display, leading to “…what was the Treaty exhibition, which is now the forming of modern New Zealand exhibition” (Paul
Thompson, Cottrell & Preston, 1999), suggest that the preferred strategy of display for the Treaty is not to display it at all.

...people have got to commit to some of those central ideas: that is has to provoke, that it has to be speculative, that it has to be dramatic, that it has to be attractive, that it cannot be curricular. You know, it’s not just us sitting here, having to take a decision that quite frankly makes me feel sick saying it has to go (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)

The question of how to create a Treaty exhibition that properly fills the void seems near irresolvable. Southeran ascribes it to a lack of commitment by the Treaty team to “central ideas”, ideas which, as seen above, continually shift. This inability to “commit” to a plan for the exhibition seems in excess of the difficulty of planning a large project. The necessity of making a decision, or perhaps the possibility that a decision cannot be made, sickens, it is too much. The Treaty exhibition seems to be the only exhibition which is halted by irresolution, unable to be created. Southeran’s comments indicate that it is the only “empty space” in the planning of the museum, a notable vacancy in the display of history being prepared for the public: “if we have a nice big vacant space sitting right there up front we’ll be crucified, and rightly so”(Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). It seems that the competing imperatives – to provoke, yet to be attractive; to be speculative, yet not to be curricular – cannot be reconciled, they overwhelm:

...if we can’t manage to integrate everything, and come up with what we consider to be a meaningful experience that will actually engage the visitors and, um, mean something to them, we’ll have to come back and say ‘It’s bigger than we are’ (Paul Thompson, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)
The desired exhibition seems impossible to create, simultaneously too large – “It’s bigger than we are” – and too scattered. It is overwhelmingly difficult “to keep the concept of the exhibition together without it falling into a lot of disparate bits” (Paul Thompson, Cottrell & Preston, 1999).

The Treaty exhibition somehow cannot be achieved, cannot fulfil the contradictory desires it is required to embody. The role of Treaty in the museum is to “unify everybody”, (Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999), to provide “bridging between Māori and Pākehā” (Bossley, 1998, the developed concept). Yet the near impossibility of settling on a Treaty exhibition speaks to an inherent instability of this role. Something doesn’t add up: equilibrium cannot be achieved. The Treaty is called upon to provide balance, “mediation between the two cultures” (Bossley, 1998, from concept to exhibition: the treaty of Waitangi). Yet the difficulty of filling “the void” suggests a radical lack of balance, an inability to achieve mediation. If, in standing for balance, unity, justice, the Treaty unavoidably references unbalance, disunity, injustice, this irresolvability becomes explicable. Balance cannot be achieved because the injustices done in contravention of the Treaty cannot be cancelled out. Rose describes the insolubility of injustice thus: “Set justice, not in opposition to rights, but to injustice, and you are up against an ‘irreducibly subjective component that the normal model of justice cannot easily absorb’” (Rose, 1996, p.44).

The Treaty cannot be used to reference unity without carrying with it reference to injustice. This injustice, in its irresolvability, endlessly haunts the desired Treaty display, “a ghost
whose expected return repeats itself, again and again” (Derrida, 1994, p10). It is this that renders the filling of the void so daunting, so sickening. The resurfacing of injustice and the rejection of knowledge about injustice are both evident in the following exchange (Cottrell & Preston, 1999):

Georgina Te Heuheu: Going forward to the Treaty exhibition, how do we actually make that underpin all our exhibitions? If one of our corporate goals is biculturalism, then what does that mean? If we’re talking about peopling ourselves and exhibiting ourselves, I think somehow we have to; we have to bring Māori into that exhibition too, because they were there. So while the sheep runs were being developed, Ngai Tahu, in the space of 20 years, lost all their land. Unless people get a sense of why it is that Māori keep on going on the way they are, then, then, I think we’re likely to fail on that Treaty exhibition.

Sir Ron Trotter [in response]: I come from tough, Scottish farming stock who came out in 1860 to the South Island. There were no, ah, no, umm, none of Tipene’s people near where they were, instead it was too cold.

Georgina Te Heuheu [interjects, softly]: They were wiped out; they were wiped out by then.

Sir Ron Trotter [ignores Georgina Te Heuheu’s interjection]: but, but they worked like hell and developed the land, and if we don’t give pride to that, hell, we wouldn’t be here, you know. I mean, it really, we wouldn’t be the country we are today I should say. And if we only stole things, and, God, they never thought they were stealing if they did. I mean, that’s part of getting an understanding. But if you, I mean, then, they won’t get, we talk about cultural cringe and so on, a lot of people say ‘I don’t want to be a bar of it if you don’t give them a sense of pride in themselves’

In the above exchange, Te Heuheu makes it clear that she believes one of the problems with the Treaty exhibition is how to “bring Māori into that exhibition too, because they were there”. Uncannily, Māori have disappeared from the exhibition that was intended to “[bridge] between Māori and Pākehā” (Bossley, 1998, the developed concept). This would leave the Treaty exhibition either bridging between Pākehā and Pākehā or between Pākehā and nothing at all. It is striking that the assertion Te Heuheu feels needs to be made about
Māori is that they “were there” at all. This suggests that Māori have been written out of the story of “peopling ourselves and exhibiting ourselves”, leaving “ourselves” referring to everyone but Māori. This perceived banishment of Māori, of the history of what happened to Māori from the planned Treaty exhibition—as seen in Te Heuheu’s reminder that “while the sheep runs were being developed, Ngai Tahu, in the space of 20 years, lost all their land”—is comprehensible as a response to the reminder of injustice infused in the Treaty. The Treaty is to be presented as “a noble document that could unify everybody” (Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999) yet it fails to do so because of the uncomfortable reminders it carries. One solution is to eliminate reminders of this discomfort: the Treaty can stand for unity as long as Māori are eliminated from this unity. Te Heuheu draws attention to the self-contradictory nature of a Treaty exhibition cut off from the history of the Treaty when she says: “Unless people get a sense of why it is that Māori keep on going on the way they are, then, then, I think we’re likely to fail on that Treaty exhibition”. The proposed exhibition has somehow managed to eliminate the purpose of the exhibition.

Trotter’s response to this is an example of the impulses which lead to the possibility of Māori being obliterated from the Treaty exhibition. He proffers a narrative of New Zealand’s history in which his Pākehā ancestors were naturally suited to the land: “I come from tough, Scottish farming stock who came out in 1860 to the South Island” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). In Trotter’s narrative Māori were not compatible with the land: “There were ...none of Tipene’s people near ...it was too cold” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Pākehā, in Trotter’s view deserved the land by reason of hard work: “they worked

1 Trotter is referring to Tipene O’Regan, chairman of the Ngāi Tahu Maori Trust Board at the time this discussion took place.
like hell and developed the land” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). They also, in this description of events, got there first: “There were ...none of Tipene’s people near where they were...” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). In Trotter’s narrative of “peopling ourselves” there were no Māori, there was no injustice. Te Heuheu’s interjection refers to a history in which Māori “were there” (Georgina Te Heuheu, Cottrell & Preston, 1999), in which there was violence, in which there was injustice. It goes unheard, overrun by Trotter’s story of his ancestors “work[ing] like hell”. The story of Māori people being “wiped out” is itself “wiped out”. In a double expulsion, the story of people being eliminated is itself eliminated. What Trotter’s statements point to is a double impossibility of knowledge, a violent past that cannot be known now and could not have been known at the time. The settlers were innocent, both in the sense that they did not commit any wrong, and in the sense that they did not know. Yet this doubling reveals a weakness in the desired narrative. Trotter’s double assertion of innocence dilutes itself: “And if we only stole things, and, God, they never thought they were stealing if they did” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Claiming ones ancestors did not steal, that there was no-one there for them to steal from, yet also that they “never thought they were stealing” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999) reveals an awareness that perhaps they did steal, that the desired narrative may not be the whole story. His redoubled refutation “but, but they worked like hell” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999) suggests that he has an awareness that Te Heuheu may have offered a different story.

Trotter’s narrative reveals a desire to place the Treaty in a void in which there was no history of violence. The motive force for this narrative is a desire for pride:
...if we don’t give pride to that, hell, we wouldn’t be here, you know. I mean, it really, we wouldn’t be the country we are today...a lot of people say ‘I don’t want to be a bar of it if you don’t give them a sense of pride in themselves’ (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999)

Again, there is a doubling: Trotter twice mentions the need to “give pride” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). It is unclear who is required to “give” this pride: Trotter speaks of “we” and “you”, which may refer to the museum planners or to New Zealanders as a group. There is no similar ambiguity as to who “people” refers to. In the context of Trotter’s statement, the “people” who are to be the recipients of “pride in themselves” — a donation made by the laudatory telling of their history — can only be Pākehā. Trotter’s emphasis on the need to “give pride” suggests that this pride is not already secure. Trotter speaks of an outright refusal as the inevitable consequence of any failure to “give pride”: “a lot of people say ‘I don’t want to be a bar of it if you don’t give them a sense of pride in themselves’” (Sir Ron Trotter, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). The refusal, the revulsion of which Trotter speaks is a defence against emotions other than pride which could potentially be generated by certain tellings of history: emotions such as shame, or self-disgust. It is this defence against the possibility that such emotions could be summoned up that generates the desire to privilege the telling of certain narratives of history over others: narratives that reflect positively on Pākehā, narratives that silence any mention of injustice. If knowledge of injustice in history is repressed — “the essence of repression lies simply in the function of rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness” (Freud, 1915, p.101) — then any reference to history that can be associated with the repressed parts of history also risks repression.

Freud describes this process thus:

The second phase of repression, *repression proper*, concerns mental derivatives of the repressed instinct-presentation, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it. On account of this
association, these ideas experience the same fate as that which underwent primal repression (Freud, 1915, pp101-102)

It is this that is behind the desire, expressed most clearly by Trotter, but also at play in the contradictory instructions about the display of the Treaty, to cut the Treaty display off from unpalatable parts of history. The end point of this is a desire, given that it is guilty by association, to not display the Treaty at all.

**Comfortable and warm and part of the place**

The following exchange between Sir Ron Trotter and Cliff Whiting is illustrative of a particular impulse at play in the planning process:

Cliff Whiting: I personally don’t see any great problems with that as long as the partner can accept the fact that a marae is Māori.

Sir Ron Trotter: I gather it’s not going to be entirely traditional and I’m anxious to think that we’re developing ideas that will be into the next millennium: respecting the past and taking the best from the past but being a little more liberal. If, we, the concept of a place to stand for all New Zealanders is really to be respected in the marae and it’s to work in a, in a way that really makes it both comfortable and warm for any Iwi who come here but comfortable and warm and part of the place for any Pākehā who are part of the mana taonga that we talk about and the concept that we are trying to develop.

Cliff Whiting: There are two main fields that have to be explored and the one that is most important is its customary role in the first place because ‘marae’ comes from the tangata whenua, who are Māori. To change it...

Sir Ron Trotter [interrupting]: But it’s not just for Māori. You must get that! If it is a Māori institution and nothing more, this marae has failed and they must get that idea because we are bicultural. Bicultural talks about two and if it is going to be totally Māori and all driven by Māori protocols and without regard for the life. Museum is a Pākehā concept. ...But at least within Māoridom there are both sides to that debate and so we’ll go, we want to be able to put a bicultural spin on the ball, is what I’m saying. This has to satisfy both cultures.
Cliff Whiting: Yes, and I would say I would support that. But it has to satisfy both, not be compromised.

The concerns previously introduced by Apirana Mahuika and Georgina Te Heuheu over the planning of the Treaty exhibition raise the question of to what extent the key goal of Te Papa — to recognise the mana and significance of two cultures — is actually played out in the planning process. The concept of biculturalism holds a troubled position within this process. Here Whiting asserts of the origin of marae: “‘marae’ comes from the tangata whenua, who are Māori”. This is met with Trotter’s vehement “But it’s not just for Māori. You must get that”. In Trotter’s model, any “totally Māori” space in Te Papa, no matter how many non-Māori spaces there may be, is a violation of the goal of biculturalism because “bicultural talks about two”. Biculturalism as deployed by Trotter means that Pākehā must be made to feel “comfortable and warm” in all situations. It is notable that biculturalism for Trotter means that the marae must make Māori feel “comfortable and warm” but Pākehā feel “comfortable and warm and part of the place”: more comfort is required for Pākehā. The marae must be “not just for Māori…. If it is a Māori institution and nothing more, this marae has failed”. This is because to do otherwise would be to assert that Pākehā are not “part of the place”, to fail to make them feel at home. Māori culture is here required to reiterate that Pākehā belong. The fear that a “Māori institution” might assert that Pākehā are not “part of the place”, or that there is nothing benign about having become so, is unspoken. Yet it provides the force behind the requirement that Māori culture assure Pākehā of the legitimacy of their position and make them feel “comfortable and warm and part of the place”. The requirements of this are reflective of the impulses explored in Chapter Two: where is one ever really “comfortable and warm and part of the place”, beyond the womb? Hage notes the womblike nature of the imagined nation:
That the conceptions of national mothering and homeliness are both rooted in spatial images of the nation as container is itself symbolically important, for the container is an abstract projection of the imaginary womb: a place where one feels totally fulfilled, both in feeling a kind of ‘total fit’ and in feeling fully nurtured (Hage, 2003, p.34).

There is an accusation in Trotter’s words: that Māori have “failed” to make Pākehā feel “comfortable and warm and part of the place” in New Zealand. Māori are here held responsible for the inevitable failure of the nation to be a totally enclosing, motherly, womblike space.

This dynamic is also at play in the discussion of the Treaty exhibit. If the museum is required to give, pride, comfort, warmth and a sense of belonging to Pākehā, it becomes extraordinarily difficult to display anything that calls up the relationship between Māori and Pākehā. This is at play in the avoidance of the Treaty which is evident in the following statement:

This is more than an exhibition about the Treaty. This is an exhibition about how we came to be this funny, quirky, whatever, you know, different kind of nation. And the Treaty is a fulcrum or a pivot or something or other in there, and that there’s no denying that. But let’s not simply have it as a discussion about the Treaty: let’s have it about the discussion of the formation of modern New Zealand because that’s the interesting story (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999).

The solution here for the problem of how to display the Treaty is to “not simply have it as a discussion about the Treaty” (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999), to shy away from the Treaty towards more comforting stories. These stories are more pleasant, being “about how we came to be this funny, quirky, whatever, you know, different kind of nation” (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). The Treaty is too much, there is a feeling that it has been spoken about too much, that any mention of it is more than enough: “already Treaty equals boring for so many New Zealanders” (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston,
The finalised exhibition focuses on: “engagement at the entrance without creating polemic, without creating shouted voices, and so what we’ve gone for is quiet discussion” (Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). The effect of this “quiet discussion” is described elsewhere as almost silent: “The level of these voices from anything but a close distance is a whisper; again, like the barely audible human voice in a church” (Macdonald, 2009, p.18). This soft whispered discussion is a counterbalance to a feeling that any discussion of the Treaty is too “shouted” too “polemic”, too much. The finalised exhibition is built on the acknowledgement that “the real drama of New Zealand, in a way, are those stories that emerge out of conflict between Māori and Pākehā” (Jock Phillips, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Yet the main example given for this in the design meeting was of a Pākehā voice: “People were thinking of no more than one provocative quote, you know, a person who might be totally ‘Am I going to lose may farm, my god’, you know, um, that sort of thing” (Ken Gorby, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). Again, there is a shying away from Māori voices. Anything said around the Treaty must be spoken quietly, and the first voice to be heard is a Pākehā voice. This difficulty of mentioning the Treaty, and the desire for it to be mentioned mainly by Pākehā voices, reflects a feeling that the Treaty is mentioned too much and too often by Māori. It is to the causes of this feeling that I will turn in the next chapter. As has been seen in this chapter, the Treaty in official displays of the nation becomes a vanishing point for what cannot be said. In the next chapter I will explore the effects of this vanishing history in less official settings.

Southeran describes the Treaty of Waitangi as: “a fulcrum or a pivot or something or other in there, and that there’s no denying that” (Cheryll Southeran, Cottrell & Preston, 1999). In
the complex relationship between Pākehā and knowledge of their history with Māori, the Treaty functions as a “fulcrum or pivot or something”. It is a fulcrum between what can be acknowledged and what is repressed, between what gives pride and what is feared to be shameful, between what is “comfortable and warm” and what is discomforting. In the Pākehā quest to be “part of the place”, the Treaty serves, by its association with injustice as a discomforting reminder of how Pākehā came to be in “the place” in the first place, a void between Pākehā and feeling at home. In Chapter Three, I analysed the longing for a warm, motherly national home which imbues national sentiment. This longing, which secures the national citizen to the nation, is for something that can never be attained. In this Chapter, I have begun to explore the way in which history, focussed through the Treaty of Waitangi, functions as an unbridgeable gap between Pākehā and this longed for maternal home. I have also introduced the way in which Māori are held responsible for the impossibility of securing a comforting national home. In the following chapter, I will explore these topics in greater detail, bringing to light the way in which Māori are deemed responsible for the failure of the desired Pākehā nation.


Chapter Four: Null and Void

In Chapter Three, I investigated relationships of remembrance and forgetting in an official and celebratory setting. In this chapter I will focus on the way in which these relationships work in less official contexts. Chapter Three showed the ways in which undesired knowledge returns to disrupt attempts to generate a sense of national unity and pride. Chapter Four will be a deeper investigation into the circulation of meanings that underpin this disruption. Where Chapter Three explored the way in which a sense of threat irrupted into an attempt to celebrate national history, in this chapter I will trace the way in which this sense of threat functions through a number of interlinked themes, all of them gathering points for Pākehā unease, discomfort, disgust or rage. Having established the way in which the nation is haunted by refuted knowledge of violence and injustice, the discomfort of which is projected onto Māori, I will now look in more detail at the emotions this discomfort is transformed into. Thus, in this chapter, I will particularly focus on projection, which Rose summarises as:

...a particular syndrome of denial and defence. Dreading his or her unconscious thoughts, feeling those thoughts to be criminal ... You pass across to the other facing you what you least like inside your own head, so that they hold it and become responsible for it at the same time (Rose, 1996, pp59-60)

I will look at the way in which the shame and guilt felt to be cast upon Pākehā by Māori are projected back onto Māori, and the way in which this felt shame is transformed into rage. This transformation of shame into anger, which is coupled with a sense of threat to the nation, is noted by Billig: “Shame easily turns to anger...the rhetoric of the patriotic card evokes anger against those who would cause ‘us’ to abandon ‘our’ heritage” (Billig, 1995,
p.101). I will explore this relation of shame and anger, in which Māori are accused of perpetrating injustices which mirror the injustice done to Māori in the past. I will further look at the way in which the process of repression generates a perception that Māori are continually and endlessly persecuting Pākehā. Finally, I will trace accusations against Māori to the extremes that position Māori as a source of contamination of the nation.

In order to explore the way in which Māori are deemed, within Pākehā nationalism, to be a threat to the nation, a source of internal peril, I will first explore accusations that are often levelled at Māori. I will do this mainly by exploring common themes in letters to the editor about Māori. I use letters to the editor as they are examples both of what people are prepared to say publicly, and of what people feel they need to say publicly, what people feel should be said publicly. While there is a large amount of relevant material available on internet message boards, it does not have the status of a letter to the editor, which serves as a public declaration of what should or should not be. I will also use material from opinion columns, which have a similar status to letters to the editor. While it could be argued that opinion columns have a more official status than letters to the editor, they do not have the same status as editorials: they are not representative of a newspaper’s editorial policy. While letters and opinion columns could both be described as a public declaration of an individual’s views, this does not necessarily indicate that they are solely the opinions of one person. The letters I have selected are all representative of a group of similar statements from a number of people. They therefore offer a sample of a shared set of understanding within sections of New Zealand society. While the more extreme views that I analyse
towards the end of this chapter may not be shared in full by all who partake in this understanding, they arise from the same complex of beliefs as the less extreme statements.

Letters to the editor written about Māori share a striking similarity of tone: it is common for all the letters about a particular topic to be accusatory, while letters in support of Māori are rare. While the ethnicity of the letter writers is not necessarily traceable, almost all letter writers identify themselves as part of a New Zealand mainstream and refer to Māori as ‘other’, as external to their group. It is not in the scope of this thesis to provide an exact count of the proportions of letters that speak negatively of Māori to letters that speak favourably of Māori. However, as an example of the predominance of letters that are negative towards Māori, in looking at letters to the editor published by The Press in June 2009, all of which referred to Pita Sharples’ proposal of open university entrance for Māori, I found 10 letters which were contained negative statements about Māori and only one which was positive. That they are negative towards Māori, rather than solely towards Sharples’ proposal, can be seen in their use of terms such as “the IQ of a pot plant” (Grigor, 2009, p.8), and “doing nothing, achieving nothing” (Muschamp, 2009, p.8) to refer to Māori. These letters will be investigated in more depth later in this chapter. In many cases I could find no letters to the editor about a specific topic which did not refer negatively to Māori. Thus, letters to the editor are representative of a discourse which speaks overwhelmingly negatively of Māori and is not met with a counter-discourse which would oppose its terms.

“Money for nothing”
What is noticeable in many letters to the editor about Māori is the sense that something is being stolen, or at least taken undeservedly, from ‘New Zealanders’ by Māori. As to what it is that is being taken, the following examples make it clear that money is a common theme. Some writers focus on amounts of money: “Maoris get close to a billion dollars in handouts each year” (Harrison-Smith, 2009, p.8), “Maori are set to claim millions in compensation…. Compensation why?” (Blair, 2009, p.6). For other letter writers, a perceived lack of reason for money to be paid is the key: “Maori must be in dire straits to need money for nothing” (Kearns, 2009b, p.8), “There is no need to pay Maori one dollar in compensation” (Sanders, 2009, p.10). The sums of money are large: “millions” “close to a billion”. They are seemingly taken arbitrarily, given for no reason, “handouts”, “money for nothing”, given despite there being “no need”. The accusations of “handouts” from the government would seem to leave Māori less culpable than accusations that they are taking or stealing things. Yet they also rhetorically place Māori, as the recipients of these “handouts”, in a position of passivity, uninvolved in action beyond the act of stretching out their hands. Whether Māori are described as actively or passively involved, it is clear that money is considered to be being taken away and unfairly given to Māori.

It is not only a measurable loss of money that concerns these letter writers: less concrete things are also said to be being taken or unfairly given. ‘Rights’ are specified as being taken away, as in the following excerpt: “The Minister of Fisheries, Phil Heatley, has given Maori the rights to manage customary food gathering …. Where are our customary rights as New Zealanders?” (R. Patterson, 2009, p.19). ‘Rights’ are further combined with ‘access’, which is considered to be taken by the government and given to Māori: “The National Party even
considering going along with the recommendations of the review would result in a wholesale sell-out of the rights of access to the beach and the sea of non-Maori New Zealanders” (Shuker, 2009, p.10). Beyond money, rights, and access to land, there is a sense that language itself is being stolen away: “As a European New Zealander, my rights are being ignored. I refer to the changing of names [from English to Maori] without all New Zealanders having their say.” (Mullaly, 2009). Through language, access to useful knowledge is felt to be eradicated: “An hour more studying Te Reo is an hour less on science” (Robinson, 2009, p.10). Beyond this, hope of future attainment is perceived to be stolen: “On the day we learn our children are ranked way below Kazakhstan for attainment in science, Labour’s Grant Robertson...tells us every Kiwi child should learn Maori until age 14. Interesting opposition priorities” (Mandly, 2008, p.8). The pervasive sense that something is being stolen away by Māori thus stretches from the practical to the abstract, from the present to the future. The certainty expressed in letters to the editor is that something necessary to the nation is being taken by Māori.

If this unnecessary taking is said to be happening, these undeserved handouts to be being given, who is it that is being taken from? Some victims of this ostensible taking appear in the following statements. ‘Taxpayers’ are commonly referred to as the source of the ‘taken’ money: “stop giving taxpayers’ money to Maori” (Jones, 2009, p.10). This elides into a claim that it is ‘ordinary New Zealanders’ who are being taken from: “The taxpayer is already overburdened by Treaty settlements...If this is what National had to do to appease Maori...they have betrayed ordinary voting New Zealanders”(Blair, 2009, p.6) . ‘The people of New Zealand’, or ‘Kiwis’ are commonly mentioned as victims of this unfair taking: “The
people of New Zealand have more than paid for any reparation” (R. Patterson, 2009, p.13), “Whigram [sic] does not belong to Kiwis anymore” (Brady, 2009). The money is said to be taken from ‘the nation’, “I’m concerned about brown tax payments to Maori organisations – hundreds and millions from the nation’s coffers, our coffers” (Tabak, 2009, p.14). More directly, it is said to be taken from ‘you and I and all other non-Māori’: “How long will it be before you and I and all other non-Maori will have to pay to walk on a beach?” (Sims, 2009, p.10). The money is thus described as being taken from the nation, from the nation’s citizens, who are ‘us’, “you and I”. The only phrase here that does not clearly refer to the nation is “taxpayers”. This is a slippery phrase as it technically includes everyone who pays any kind of tax, yet is intended to refer to a specific group. In narrowing down who “taxpayers” are in this context, one limit is clear. Whoever “taxpayers” are, if “taxpayers” money is being “given” to Māori, “taxpayers” cannot be Māori. “Taxpayers” here has a similar meaning to “you and I and all other non-Māori”.

In the terms of these letters, Māori cannot be “ordinary voting New Zealanders”, “the people of New Zealand”, “the nation”, “Kiwis”, or “You and I”, as it is these groups they are receiving money from or taking “rights” from. A nation is invoked which includes the audience of the letters but excludes Māori. Māori are not the “you and I” invited to identify with the letters. They are not conceived of as potential readers: the “you and I” addressed here are “non-Māori”. Curiously, in letters about Māori, Māori themselves seem to disappear, displaced outside the nation, rendered unimaginable as addressees. This erasure of Māori resurfaces throughout the material explored in this chapter. Bollas discusses the

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2 This is a portmanteau alluding to the name-change from Wanganui to Whanganui while referencing the return of land at Wigram to Ngai Tahu ownership.
functioning of such an erasure when he describes Said’s work on:

...the psychology of the refusal to recognize an other’s being, or to think psychoanalytically about the questions he raises; it invites us to consider the effects of ‘negative hallucination’: of not seeing the existence of an object or an other. ...we must not only look at what the oppressors project onto the oppressed...but we must also take into account a refusal to recognize the actual existence of this other (Bollas, Rose, & Said, 2003, pp5-6)

This combination of a refusal to see the existence of the other and a projection of that which is undesired onto the other is continually at play in the relation of Pākehā nationalism to Māori. In the material above, the nation, the national circle of “ordinary voting New Zealanders” is placed in opposition to Māori: a duality is set up in which a one way flow of money, rights, land and reason is conceived of as drained from “the people of New Zealand” to Māori, after which it disappears, becoming “nothing”.

This claim of the nation, of ‘Kwis’, being drained of money and rights is marked by a sense of endlessness, of eternal repetition. Writers repeatedly refer to reparations without end, “The taxpayer is already overburdened by treaty settlements. When is enough enough?” (Blair, 2009, p.6), or to punishment without end: “We endlessly acknowledge the crimes against our brown brothers”(Ferguson, 2009, p.14). Compensation is perceived to be demanded again and again: “Things change. How one can be expected to receive compensation for that change, over and over again, is beyond me” (Burrows, 2011, p.14). This sense of endlessness even has the power to dilate perceptions of time. This can be seen in one writer’s claims that “us taxpayers [are] mired in treaty payouts and ...Maori kept at bay with our money.... nearly 200 years of it has achieved nothing” (M. N. Richards, 2009b),
which place the beginning of compensation for violations of the Treaty of Waitangi in around 1809, 31 years before the Treaty was signed. This repetition, this endless recurrence stretching backwards though time and forwards seemingly forever is reminiscent of Freud’s uncanny “compulsion to repeat” (Freud, 1953, p.238), the daemonic “endless repetition of the same” (Freud, 1920, p.172) in which a seemingly passive agent “always meets the same fate over and over again” (Freud, 1920, p.172). Here, it is the acknowledgement of an unwelcome history that seems to resurface again and again, against the wishes of those who ostensibly know nothing of it. The “[recognition of] the crimes against our brown brothers”, and the compensation that concretises this acknowledgement seemingly will not go away, it keeps coming back, coming to light again.

The money paid in compensation to Māori is claimed not only to be wrongly taken and taken too often, but also to be wrongly given, wrongly used. It is claimed to be unjustly given to the undeserving, while the deserving wait. An example of this is the claim that:

A retired couple who have to demolish their leaking house and rebuild get no help from this Government …yet the Government can give hundreds of millions of dollars to part-European Maoris for supposed problems that happened nearly 200 years ago. Where’s the justice? (Sanders, 2009, p.19)

There is an unbalanced equivalency here, with “a retired couple” held in opposition to a mass of “part-European Maoris”. By the internal logic of the letter, the couple are positioned as non-Māori, marked as those who deserve to receive money but do not receive it. The retired couple are balanced against the whole of Māoridom, as no individual Māori person has ever received “hundreds of million dollars of compensation”; yet Māori are held culpable as individuals. An image is created of individual “part-European Maoris” each being
gifted hundreds of millions of dollars. Furthermore, the Māori people described in this argument seem to only partially exist, as the descriptor “part-European” subtracts the European portion from their existence as Māori people. “Part-European” Māori are here held as undeserving because their existence as Māori is considered to be diluted or incomplete. They are claimed to be undeserving of compensation as the injustice they are being compensated for is deemed not only to have happened too long ago, “nearly 200 years ago”, but also, as “supposed problems”, to have merely partially existed itself. Thus, money is considered to be withheld from deserving people in order to be given, in large amounts, individuals who are deceitful about their ethnicity and have no compelling basis for their claims.

There is a wrongness ascribed to the way in which Treaty settlement money — in the terms of the letter writers “our money” — is used. It is therefore suggested that it should be given away to the more deserving in order to cancel out this wrong: “I wouldn’t feel so bad about treaty settlements if Maori would give some of our money to the Australia Fire Relief Fund” (Bargh, 2009, p.8). Compensation money is held to have been misused, or to be in the process of being misused: this misuse is considered to negate any claim Māori may make for social justice. Claims that political, legal or social changes need to be made in New Zealand are be met with the assertion that Treaty settlements should have rendered them unnecessary, and that Māori are at fault for not rendering them unnecessary. This can be seen in the following quotation, which combines a claim that there is no reason for incentives for Māori to attend university with an assertion that the relative scarcity of Māori in higher education is a sign that treaty claim settlement money has been misspent: “Since
1989, Maori have received over $952 million in settlement claims. I suggest Pita Sharples acquires some of this money and builds his own university” (S. Brown, 2009, p.8). The existence of social and economic disparity is held up as evidence that compensation money has been spent on nothing: “I believe the legal costs alone would have provided every Maori family with a new house. So where has the money gone? To line the pockets of a few?” (E. Patterson, 2008, p.13). Money that has been paid out in compensation for Treaty breaches is here considered to have disappeared, to have gone for nothing.

This money, considered to have been spent on nothing, is seen as being paid for nothing, for no reason: “money for nothing” (Kearns, 2009b, p.8) in all ways. There is a disappearance of knowledge of why compensation might be paid: “Maori are set to claim millions in compensation .... Compensation why?” (Blair, 2009, p.6). Compensation is deemed unnecessary because all that was lost is thought to have been returned: “If people lose something, they are entitled to compensation. But if they get back that which was lost, compensation becomes unnecessary. They cannot have both. That is why the treaty settlements are a trick” (K. Brown, 2009b, p.8). The loss is further considered to have been outweighed by gains: “If Maori acknowledged all the benefits that they have received over the last century then all treaty settlements would be null and void” (Brown, 2008, p.16). It is also argued that there never was anything “lost”. The notion of a “trick”, the “null and void” status assigned to Treaty settlements, is generated by a belief that there never was a reason for Treaty settlements at all. One letter writer draws on this view of Treaty claims when he writes: “I would like to join all of the people wanting something for nothing. So, if there is anyone who thinks they are breathing too much free air, I respectfully ask that they send
$20 (cash) to me, urgently” (Kyte, 2010, p.15). Here Treaty claims are “something for nothing”, their origins as insubstantial as “air”. In this framework, history has vanished: rather than a dispute about what happened in the past, or about whether the past contained severe injustices or not, it is a view in which nothing happened at all. The question “Compensation why?” begins to seem genuine rather than rhetorical, as if reasons for compensation cannot manage to have themselves remembered. Here it is history that is “null and void”, with Treaty claims floating above this void, underpinned by nothing.

What could cause this disappearance? How does knowledge disappear? One means of making an idea disappear is repression: “the essence of repression lies simply in the function of rejecting and keeping something out of consciousness” (Freud, 1915, p.101). Under repression, that which is powerfully offensive is kept out of consciousness: “as soon as an idea which is fundamentally offensive exceeds a certain degree of strength, the conflict takes on actuality, and it is precisely activation of the idea that leads to its repression” (Freud, 1915, p.105). Yet this is not a simple expulsion, in which that which is repressed simply disappears and does not return:

The process of repression is not to be regarded as something which takes place once and for all, the results of which are permanent, as when some living thing has been killed and from that time onward is dead; on the contrary, repression demands a constant expenditure of energy, and if this were discontinued the success of the repression would be jeopardized, so that a fresh act of repression would be necessary (Freud, 1915, p.104)

That which is repressed must be continually re-repressed, over and over again. It is perhaps this that gives force to the notion that Maori are “endlessly” repeating their accusations, demanding acknowledgement again and again. It further provides an explanation for the
claim that Māori are repeatedly demanding compensation for “supposed problems” that never fully existed. The pattern of eternal resurfacing something claimed to not exist can be seen in much of the material quoted above. Freud was describing the repression of terrifying instincts, hidden urges which caused those having them fear and revulsion. The rest of this chapter will explore the ways in which this could be held to apply to the terrifying notion of otherness within a nation. To what extent is the derision and fear evident in the materials I analyse is this chapter symptomatic of the “sterile and never-ending struggle” (Freud, 1915, p.110) of repression? It is perhaps this constantly applied force of repression that shoves the acts being compensated for back in time, “200 years ago” (Sanders, 2009, p.19), erases them entirely from sight, “compensation why?” (Blair, 2009, p.6), or warps them into endless recursions of shame.

“The Shame that is your own”

With the history that underpins claims for compensation repressed into invisibility, only the money paid out as compensation is publicly visible. This money is then balanced, not against the injustices that it is intended to redeem, but instead against the perceived failings of Māori: failings which, adrift from the history of injustice which creates unequal social outcomes, are seen as generated from nothing or from an internal source of contamination. Money and violence are held in balance: not the violence of the past — which cannot be seen — but the violence of the present. It is these dynamics that are at play in the following passage:

Among the platitudes expressed in the latest $300 million Treaty of Waitangi settlement was the statement: ‘We all agree it is time to move on and focus on what
we can achieve for future generations’....When the money is flowing so does the rhetoric. Rarely does it become a reality. ...My grievance is the shame felt when, time and time again, we see the sad, troubled faces of our indigenous race paraded through the courts for killing or raping our toddlers, tourists and teachers. These youth share the malaise of being born in families that lack the skills or the inclination or the maternal/paternal instincts to raise them. ...So, you great leaders of our indigenous tribes, get out of the BMWs, take off the dark glasses and address the shame that is your own (Evans-Mcleod, 2009, p.8)

Here, not only is money alleged to be paid out for nothing reasonable, and spent on nothing important, there is nothing that Māori could plan to spend money on that would be correct. Plans by Māori to use money to attempt to create a more positive future are seen as already a failure, as not “reality”. The ownership by any Māori leader of a BMW or a pair of dark glasses is deployed as a symbol of a misuse of money and of failure to engage with problems which are considered purely Māori. Violence, seen as springing from nothing, is held to be the responsibility of all Māori, to be something that should already have erased with money. Considered to have been wrongly used in the past, present and future, money, as much as violence, is seen as the “shame that is [Māori people’s] own”.

There is shame ascribed to the connection between Māori and money. This is perhaps because of the buried connection between Pākehā and shame. If claims for compensation are felt to be injunctions to feel shame, as is suggested by statements such as “we endlessly acknowledge the crimes” (Ferguson, 2009, p.14), then compensation money becomes imbued with shame, which is then transferred to Māori. Yet beyond this connection between money and shame, there is a judgement conveyed that Māori, in order to be properly Māori, should not be concerned with money. Using land in order to gain money is described as an illegitimate action for Māori:
It was a sad day indeed when Wigram closed. It revealed the true nature of Ngai Tahu. After years of posturing and saying how their land is sacred and they have a spiritual connection to it, etc, what will they do to Wigram? Parcel it up and sell it off for profit. The real connection is the sacred dollar (Gilbertson, 2009, p.12)

In this passage, Māori are condemned for using their own land to generate profit: alongside a disagreement about the uses of land, there are terms of condemnation which are specifically aimed at Māori. The sale of land at Wigram is considered to reveal a true nature that is antithetical to the sacred and the spiritual. The underlying accusation here is that Māori have lied about themselves, have claimed a cultural set of meanings that were merely a cover for an illegitimate concern with money. Thus Māori terms such as ‘mana’ become inverted into accusations of lack and incorrectness:

Where is the mana in removing such an iconic place and turning it into a block of houses? A wonderful opportunity for goodwill between Ngai Tahu and the rest of us has been missed. They are perpetrating the sort of injustice they claim they have suffered (Gilbertson, 2009, p.12)

Lacking “spiritual connection”, lacking “mana”, Māori are here accused of being insufficiently Māori. “Mana”, a Māori concept, is appropriated and used against Māori: the authority to determine whether or not Māori have mana is here assigned to non-Māori.

“Mana”, in the terms of this letter writer, is achieved by acting in ways that generate “goodwill between Ngai Tahu and the rest of us”: there is an imperative here that Māori act in ways that are pleasing to Pākehā, and condemnation if they do not. In other examples, this accusation of lacking mana clings to both action in the present and perceived lack of action in the past: “Where is your mana in that shame/ Address the anguish and torment of your mokopuna” (Evans-Mcleod, 2009, p.8).
“They are perpetrating the sort of injustice they claim they have suffered”

Shamed by financial success, unjust in their claims for justice, un-Māoried by acting in a way that could offend Pākehā, Māori are fantasised as endlessly demanding, endlessly in the wrong: “‘Iwi’ is an acronym for ‘I want it’”(K. Brown, 2009a, p.12). Justice and injustice, concepts that underpin the return of land to Māori, are inverted — the return of land held to be unjust —and held against Māori: “They are perpetrating the sort of injustice they claim they have suffered” (Gilbertson, 2009, p.12). Here justice is seen as ultimately determinable by Pākehā, with Māori seen as only “claiming they have suffered” injustice, while a Pākehā claim to injustice stands as unassailable. This claim on justice operates in multiple ways: it sets Pākehā up as having the sole right to determine what is just and unjust, yet it also carries an echo of its own weakness, an acknowledgement that Māori claims on justice will not go away. Rose writes of the irresolvability of injustice when she states:

Justice and injustice are not ‘psychologically complementary or symmetrical’; they neither fully cancel each other out, nor quite add up. Justice may be sought after, but it is also eminently forgettable; unlike injustice, which nobody ever asks for but which never goes away (Rose, 1996, p.87)

It is perhaps this uncanny persistence of injustice, the inability for it to be undone, that provides the emotional force behind assertions that there never was injustice, and that Māori merely “claim to have suffered”. Seen in this light, Pākehā claims that Māori are the true perpetrators of injustice begin to be perceivable as a means of psychologically evading a confrontation with the unsettling and with that which can never be fully settled.
In addition to a claim on justice, the discourse of rights is invoked: ‘rights’, it is claimed, are being confiscated from Pākehā and given to Māori. The rights mentioned are seemingly concrete, such as the right to manage fisheries: “The Minister of Fisheries, Phil Heatley, has given Maori the rights to manage customary food gathering from Koutourarara south to Waihora” (R. Patterson, 2009, p.19). Yet this elides with a claim that more generalised “equal rights” are being taken from Pākehā: “Where are our customary rights as New Zealanders? ...Would Heatley inform us New Zealanders when we can expect to receive equal rights with Maori?” (R. Patterson, 2009, p.19). Pākehā, here, are seen as the natural owners and arbiters of rights — rights can be “given” to other people but are already “customary” to Pākehā — yet also as already dispossessed of them, still awaiting “equal rights”. Equality, in this context, is a fantasised state in which everyone arises from the same neutral history and has the same neutral desires and needs. An exact balance — “How about next year we balance things up a bit? Fifty-fifty would do” (Kearns, 2009a, p.8) — is then desired to be struck against this fantasised neutral background. The right to determine this balance of rights falls to “us [non-Māori] New Zealanders” (R. Patterson, 2009, p.19). In this context, the discourse of “equal rights” is not only based on an erasure of history and social equality, it also serves to perpetuate this erasure: in Rose’s words “the discourse of rights today serves above all to deny the constitutive forms of social inequality on which it rests” (Rose, 1996, p.82). If rights are claimed as something taken from Pākehā by Māori, there is little room for competing claims.

There is a struggle over the right to mention the past, with reminders of past injustice treated as an unbalanced and never-ending recital: “We endlessly acknowledge the crimes
against our brown brothers, without a word of the collective achievements of European settlers” (Ferguson, 2009, p.19). The underlying belief in this assertion is that the Pākehā story of the past is silenced. New Zealand is claimed to be cast adrift from its past by this lack of acknowledgement of its Pākehā constructors: “Without the skills brought by those people, where might New Zealand be?” (Ferguson, 2009, p.19). The proposed solution to this perceived imbalance is to silence Māori complaints:

Let’s ...celebrate ...as a country. Yes, there have been wrongs and those wrongs continue to be put right every other day of the year. But let February 6 be a day we put all of that aside and celebrate being Kiwis (Ferguson, 2009, p.19)

Thus, the country can be celebrated only by silencing parts of the past. The sense of reiteration here with endlessly acknowledged crimes and wrongs put right every other day is reminiscent of Freud’s “sterile and neverending struggle” (Freud, 1915, p.110). If force to suppress knowledge needs to be constantly reapplied, it creates the impression that the troubling knowledge is being referenced over and over again.

**Waitangi Day**

As can be seen above, Waitangi Day has a particularly troubling position within attempts to assert a Pākehā nation. This is not only because of Māori protests held on the date, but also because its name is saturated with discomforting associations. It is here that the desire to repress anything connected to undesired knowledge comes into play. The existence of some unacknowledged shameful matter contaminates all that comes into association with it, as in Freud’s description of the second phase of repression:

The second phase of repression, repression proper, concerns mental derivatives of the repressed instinct-presentation, or such trains of thought as, originating elsewhere, have come into associative connection with it. On account of this
association, these ideas experience the same fate as that which underwent primal repression (Freud, 1915, pp101-102)

Thus, Waitangi Day is held to fail as a national day because it brings with it a troubling reference to a shame whose source is seldom referenced:

Well, there we go again – another national day to be ashamed of. When will we recognise that Waitangi Day is too fragile a day to be observed as a day of national unity? Let’s get rid of this farce which causes so many New Zealanders to cringe and find a way to have one day of togetherness (Winkworth, 2012, p.18)

This ‘shame’ is associated with the reminders of division that come from protests on Waitangi Day: “Our national day of division and shame carries on as usual at Waitangi. The contempt and posturing is pathetic and what’s worse ... [is] the same diatribe year upon year” (Forster, 2012, p.18). It initially seems that the shame springs, not from the events of which the protests remind, but from the existence of the protests themselves, “the same diatribe year after year”. This indicates that if these were silenced, “togetherness” could be more comfortably achieved. Yet reminders of division are not restricted to protests: the name “Waitangi” has a metonymic relationship with the cases brought before the Waitangi tribunal and the reparations decided upon by the tribunal. More abstractly it is associated with a belief that Māori are angry about the Treaty of Waitangi itself, a belief that there is something distasteful and false that can be invoked by mentioning the Treaty of Waitangi. Thus, “division and shame” are associated not just with Waitangi day, but with the Treaty that it celebrates. This creates a wish that both the Treaty and the day be abolished and erased:

I ...had lots of Maori mates. We never had any separation and did everything together, never any mention of the Treaty. Over the years I have seen Waitangi Day deteriorating in demonstrations against imagined grievances. If only there had been a public burning of the Treaty in the 1950s and an announcement that everyone is a New Zealander (Bowker, 2012, p.16)
In this desire to abolish the Treaty and Waitangi Day, the contamination of associated ideas by a submerged shame can be seen, with banished knowledge attaching itself to related concepts, creating a wish that they too be hidden from sight. It is this ‘gravitational pull’ which shameful matter exerts on related notions that creates the sense that to mention Waitangi is to be dragged backwards into darkness. Reminders of the existence of the Treaty of Waitangi are held to keep the nation stuck to an unpleasant past, unable to access the future: “It’s time for this country to move forward instead of looking back. Anzac Day is our true national day” (Forster, 2012, p.18).

**Te Reo**

Yet this is not the only thing that gives Waitangi Day its disruptive force. There is a belief that, because “Waitangi” is a Māori word, Waitangi day is for Māori, while a day named in English would be for all New Zealanders: “Norman Kirk named the day NZ Day for all of us, not just the 15 per cent Maori who live in this country” (Sheilds, 2009a, p.14). The use of a name in Te Reo is considered to empty the day of meaning, rendering it purposeless or even insulting:

> Each year those of us who are European wonder why we have this holiday, as it means nothing to us. Each of us has many nationalities in our heritage, pioneers who came here with nothing, and yet this is routinely ignored. Let’s change things so this day means something to everyone (Sheilds, 2009b, p.14)

Here, the use of Te Reo is regarded as making the day solely about Māori history, a history held to be simultaneously irrelevant and shameful to Pākehā. The mention of an aspect of history involving Māori is regarded as an attempt to obliterate “those of us who are European” (Sheilds, 2009b, p.14) which is held to be synonymous with “everyone” (Sheilds,
Names themselves carry the same ability to remind of “division and shame” as more overt references to history do.

It is here that the struggle for the right to control language becomes apparent. The use of place names in Te Reo Māori, even as an alternate for English place names, is treated by letter writers as a justifiable cause for anger among (Pākehā) New Zealanders: “New Zealanders...have become incensed that alternative names for the main islands are being considered” (Wilms, 2009). The discourse of rights is invoked in the context of language, “As a European New Zealander, my rights are being ignored. I refer to the changing of names without all New Zealanders having their say” (Mullaly, 2009), with a ‘right of naming’ considered to belong to Pākehā. The formalisation of Māori place names is treated here as an act of dictatorship: “Changing geographic names lies in the orbit of dictatorships: African, communist and military” (Wilms, 2009). Here, alternate place names not only place “New Zealanders” under control, they also alter and displace New Zealand, making it “African”. A contrast is presented in which unchanged names in European languages belong to continuity and benevolence, while altered place names result in wars, poverty and degradation:

When Nelson Mandela came to power he did not go about changing names of cities or of the country South Africa to African names....North of South Africa, the continent is afflicted with wars and poverty in countries that have changed their names and the names of cities within them (Wilms, 2009)

While race is not specifically mentioned, unchanged place names are cited in connection with Nelson Mandela, a black “great liberator” (Wilms, 2009), changed place names in connection with African dictators. Though the letter refers to the geographic board rather
than to Māori, it presents the threat of dark dictators controlling the nation through the use of Te Reo place names. Here, to formalise the use of Māori place names is to alter the nation irrevocably, rending it with war and poverty and surrendering control to a dark-skinned dictatorship.

Land, language, rights taken away, history forced into silence: there is an uncanny echo here. The accusations levelled at Māori bear a striking similarity to descriptions of the impact on Māori of the colonisation of New Zealand. That which has been erased from the most comforting Pākehā version of history resurfaces in an inverted form. Freud’s description of the compulsion to repeat holds that repetition is a product of the forcing of unwelcome knowledge out of consciousness:

The patient cannot recall all of what lies repressed, perhaps not even the essential part of it, and so is obliged rather to repeat as a current experience what is repressed, instead of... recollecting it as a fragment of the past (Freud, 1920, p.171)

Rose suggests that this cycle of repression and repetition is not restricted to individuals but can also be a determiner of social, political motives within the nation: “In terms of history, trauma reappears” (Rose, 1996, p.11). Rose writes of: “forms of remembrance...which hover in the space between social and psychic history, forcing and making it impossible for the one who unconsciously carries them to make the link” (Rose, 1996, p.5). Thus repression can be applied not purely to personal history but also to social history:

...that part of historical being, passionate and traumatized, which runs backwards and forwards, never completely in the grasp of its subjects, through psychic time. ... these are traces which persist and colour the present to the exact extent that everything inside people and psyche are willing themselves not to remember, not to know (Rose, 1996, pp11-12)
It thus gains the ability to pass between generations, “one generation finds itself performing the unspoken, unconscious agendas of the one that went before” (Rose, 1996, p.31), and ricochet between antagonists, “It can be demonic repetition, not subversion, which forces the antagonists of historic conflict under each others’ skin….this is historic trauma transmitting and repeating itself across time” (Rose, 1996, pp31-32).

In earlier chapters I investigated the circulation of emotions that ties people to the nation: here it is the disbarring of knowledge, the broken connection to emotion that causes revulsion and rage against people within the nation. Disavowed knowledge keeps coming back in inverted forms, causing rage against the possibility of discomfort that acknowledgement of history would bring. The key to the inversion of accusations, to the uncanny mirroring whereby Māori stand accused of enacting upon Pākehā the very same wrongs which were initially inflicted upon them, lies with projection, with “violent innocence”:

...the violent innocent unconsciously passes his or her crimes onto the ‘other, who now stands accused’ ....the contents of the mind can include...histories barely acknowledged, lines of affiliation repudiated and yearned. ...shedding, blinding itself to, the unspoken or even violent histories out of which it was made (Rose, 1996, pp59-60)

The possibility of guilt for the past, the possibility of a past for which guilt could be a possibility, is refuted, expelled onto those towards whom guilt could be possible. Māori, from whom land was confiscated, stand accused of confiscating land. Māori, whose history is desired to be silenced, stand accused of silencing the history of Pākehā. Māori, whose language was nearly obliterated by English, stand accused of trying to stage a takeover of language and thereby seize control of the country.
Beyond the theme of linguistic theft, a further accusation levelled at the use of place names in Te Reo is that these names are foolish and childish: “Hamilton-Kirikiriroa? Yeah right” (Bailey, 2009), “If Heyder actually believes that New Zealand’s name will one day be changed to Aotearoa he [she] must be living in cuckoo land” (Morris, 2009). Te Reo is here considered to be not a suitable language for official place names, perhaps not even a real language at all, partly because it was originally an oral language:

I find it somewhat incongruous that a group descended from those who had no written language and a very limited vocabulary, return our courtesy by trying to teach us how to spell (M. N. Richards, 2009a).

Te Reo is held in contrast to European languages, and deemed “ludicrously” unequal to them, unable to reach their level: “just because world literacy levels were considerably lower a few centuries ago, it is ludicrous to argue that English, French or German therefore equate to oral languages” (Churton, 2009, p.21). Te Reo, as depicted here, has somehow failed to become a real language. Without “written language” (M. N. Richards, 2009a), with a “limited vocabulary” (M. N. Richards, 2009a), it seems illegitimate, unable to have functioned. Thus, a fantasised past is created where Māori, with a patchy, fractured, un-real language, would have been unable to fix names to the places they lived in. The land, in this vision of the past, lay unnamed until European settlers arrived to name it correctly.

This line of reasoning does not simply assert that Pākehā place names carry more authority than Māori place names: “Hamilton” rather than “Kirikiriroa”, “New Zealand” rather than
“Aotearoa”. It also attests that Pākehā have the authority to determine how Māori names are used and spelled, an authority it deems that Māori lack:

Many years ago, the pronunciation in English of `\"wh\" was from the back of the throat, and was somewhere between `\"f\" and `\"w\" (as in what or where)...the early transcribers of Maori into written form needed to distinguish between `\"w\" and `\"wh\" and also to take into account the local dialects, so that we now have Whakatane, Whangarei but Wanganui (R. L. Richards, 2009)

Thus, the history of Pākehā transcribers of Te Reo is considered a legitimate determiner of correct names, whereas Māori knowledge of Te Reo is considered insufficiently legitimate. Beyond this, claims to a larger history of naming are deployed:

The History of New Zealand by J H Wallace, published in 1890, says that in 1840, 200 Wellington settlers migrated by sea to Wanganui and established a settlement on the Wanganui River. The settlement was called Petre. In old maps the river was called Knowlsley. From 1844 the settlers petitioned to change the name to Wanganui, partly because they didn’t like the name Petre and partly because they felt that being named the same as the river was more appropriate. It seems the name of Petre was changed to Wanganui in 1854. Nowhere does Wallace spell the river, district or the town with a “wh” (Prince, 2009)

An official narrative of history is offered in which Pākehā choices of names are proper and accurate, and Māori, completely erased from history, have no role at all in determining the correct use of names. In contrast to the legitimacy and permanence conferred on Pākehā place name choices, Māori place names seem to fade into insignificance.

A cursory knowledge of New Zealand history

Not only is Māori history erased, Māori people are claimed to be unable to speak accurately about the past:
I was astounded to read in yesterday's article on the correct spelling of Wanganui, by Dr Rawiri Taonui, that “a century or two ago most Europeans couldn't write” and that ‘at one time more Maori were literate than Pakeha’. Where does he get this information from - his Maori oral history? (Rich, 2009, p.8)

“Māori oral history”, in this context, is seen as deeply untrustworthy, having a childish, fairytale aspect in comparison to a perceived official, Pākehā, version of history. Taonui, despite his academic credentials, is assumed not to be correctly accessing history: “Has the good doctor seen a copy of the Treaty of Waitangi, where many of the chiefs, who were the leaders of their tribes in the 1840s, signed with a cross?” (Rich, 2009, p.8). Taonui’s description of history is described as not only comically inept, “historically laughable”(Churton, 2009, p.21), but as marking a failure as an academic: “Taonui’s ...borderline racist rant ...would be bad enough coming from an ill-informed layman, but from a university head of department it is troubling”(Churton, 2009, p.21). Here, not only is “Māori oral history” considered to be invalid, to be a nonsense, Māori are considered to be illegitimate as academics if what they say contrasts with the beliefs of Pākehā. The only genuine study of history, within this framework, is one that reflects well on Pākehā in the past and poorly on Māori:

Steven Peters stated that “a cursory knowledge of New Zealand history shows that Maori society suffered from the deeper violence of Pakeha abuse ...”. If Steven Peters would make a genuine attempt to learn New Zealand history, he would find that, when the white man arrived, Maori society was pathological (Moon, 2012, p.12)

Thus Māori descriptions of history are desired to be erased and Māori deemed unable to talk accurately about the past, creating a blank space for Pākehā stories of the pre-European past. Here, what Māori claim of the past is dismissed as just a story, a mix of fantasy and lie: “Claims today for vast tracts of land are a pipe dream and named features, including spelling
lessons, a fabrication” (M. N. Richards, 2009b). In this view, the only evidence of how, and perhaps of whether, pre-European Māori lived is oral history, which is void of legitimacy, a “pipe dream” or “fabrication”. Other forms of information about pre-European Māori, such as physical evidence provided from archaeological digs, are utterly erased, leaving no trace. This account is based on the belief that there has been no research into Māori history, that there are only stories, and the stories cannot be believed. Thus, Māori are stripped of history: “Maori have no verifiable history prior to white settlement” (M. N. Richards, 2009b). Into the space created by this process of erasure, a different version of the past is asserted as authoritative: “Maori prior to the arrival of the settler claimed only the land they stood upon and could defend. Their fishing was coastal foraging and walking distance and paddling depth only” (M. N. Richards, 2009b). This version of the past positions Māori as having had extremely limited skills and knowledge, and no ability to develop techniques or technology. They were, in this view, restricted to “walking distance and paddling depth”, stuck on “only the land they stood upon”. With limited land and language, the fantasised Māori in this version of the past were incapable of any but accidental achievements. The knowledge and skills that pre-European Māori had are inverted, “What’s next [from Māori], lessons on pacific navigation?” (M. N. Richards, 2009a), converted to accidental survival from a series of near disasters. Barely able to survive, the Māori of this fantasised past seem to have been waiting for Pākehā to show them how to properly live in New Zealand.

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3 Such as the navigation skills that brought their ancestors to New Zealand: see (Irwin, 2009, p.5) for a brief overview of these skills.
With Māori deemed incompetent or degraded, “when the white man arrived, Māori society was pathological, with widespread incest, tribal warfare, cannibalism and female infanticide” (Moon, 2012, p.12), the arrival of Pākehā becomes an act of salvation: “The white man brought good food, medicine, literacy, engineering skills and, after 1840, law and order that saved the native population from themselves” (Moon, 2012, p.12). Māori, here, were monstrous spectres: starving and devouring each other; diseased, dying and killing each other; raping family and killing babies; and unable to record any of this in writing, outside the reach of engineering and the written law. While Moon’s statements are extreme, they are part of a larger discourse that creates an image of Māori as having lived in chaos until Pākehā arrived to construct the country. In this vision of the past, Pākehā brought to New Zealand everything necessary for it to function as a country, writing it into order; feeding, disciplining and designing it. Without Pākehā, by this reasoning, New Zealand could not properly be: “We endlessly acknowledge the crimes against our brown brothers, without a word of the collective achievements of European settlers. Without the skills brought by these people, where might New Zealand be?” (Ferguson, 2009, p.14). A history is asserted, and then asserted to have been silenced, in which New Zealand was not only solely constructed by “achievements of European settlers”, but in which this construction was the only correct option. In this view, no work was done by Māori, or indeed by non-European immigrants to New Zealand, in the construction of the nation: I thought of the early European settlers of New Zealand: the shipwrights, the builders, the drovers, the farmers, the forestry workers, the road builders, the people who did the hard work and laid the seeds of infrastructure for this country (Kearns, 2009a, p.8)
Thus Māori claims to have been disadvantaged by colonisation are not only silenced but reversed, overlaid with a claim that colonisation was necessary for the survival of Māori and of the nation.

A one way flow of skills and knowledge is asserted, from Pākehā to Māori:

Iwikau signed the treaty because he could see that European skills and knowledge would greatly advantage Maori. They have. Today he would have been able to sign his name, go to school, learn a trade, or earn a university education, and get a job – that’s if he could be bothered (Kearns, 2009c, p.6)

Māori are held to have benefited greatly from colonisation, greatly enough to annul any losses: “If Maori acknowledged all the benefits that they have received over the last century then all treaty settlements would be null and void” (Brown, 2008, p.16). Māori, in this vision, owe Pākehā a debt for having been taught how to function in a nation that Pākehā dutifully assembled. There is no room in this vision of past for the possibility that Māori could have learned skills from other nations without being colonised: Māori, like the land they lived in, are fantasised as having existed in a state of chaos that could only be civilised by Pākehā through the means of their language. The skills and creations of the industrialised world are held to belong to all Pākehā, regardless of their connection to these skills, as a birthright, and to no Māori: “If some Maori think having some ancestors means they own the hydro water, then I own the electricity because some of my ancestors invented and built the power stations” (Etherington, 2012, p.18).
This reiteration of a story asserted to have been silenced, the story in which Pākehā gave and did everything, functions to silence other stories of what happened in the past and indeed of what could have happened in the past. There is no space for the knowledge that Māori and other non-Europeans could do or did do any of the work asserted to have been necessary to build a nation. Beyond this, no possibility is allowed that Māori could have determined which skills and technologies they wished to learn from other nations, while maintaining their own sovereignty. In this vision of the past, Māori were and had nothing, Pākehā did and gave everything. Māori here are partially erased from the past, stripped of intelligence and agency, and partially transformed into something less than human. It is here that another aspect of the attempted expulsion of Māori from the story of the past begins to appear. Bollas writes of rejected people within the nation: “the oppressed [is required to be] like a fecal entity that is so odious that it cannot be recognized, except if and when it is out of sight, and finally eliminated” (Bollas et al., 2003, p.6). It is to the connection between attempts to move Māori “out of sight” and a sense of contamination that I will now turn.

“Icky and Poo”

The view of Māori in the past as having done nothing of worth is matched by a view of Māori in the present as tainted by an inferior culture:

...huge numbers of Pakeha do not accept that...inequality of outcome necessarily results from inequality of opportunity. They believe that Maori have as many opportunities to excel as Pakeha or Asians have, but perhaps that something in Maori culture or lifestyle stands in the way.... merely stating the statistics of disadvantage by one group is not in itself evidence that the group suffers
discrimination; it may be that most of its members do the wrong things.... Just as one person may miss opportunities, so may a culture. Cultures are different and not necessarily not equal (Joyce, 2012, p.18)

With all history of disadvantages or discrimination against Māori disallowed, Māori are held to shame New Zealand with a destructiveness driven by some internal source of failure:

My grievance is the shame felt when, time and time again, we see the sad, troubled faces of our indigenous race paraded through the courts for killing or raping our toddlers, tourists and teachers. These youth share the malaise of being born in families that lack the skills or the inclination or the maternal/paternal instincts to raise them (Evans-Mcleod, 2009, p.8)

This source of failure is assumed to be sited in families, in lifestyle or more overtly in an inborn stupidity: “I am told by many people that I have the IQ of a pot plant and I do get darker in summer, so can I ask [for university entrance as Māori]” (Grigor, 2009, p.8).

Attempts to counterbalance discrimination are, in the face of this assumption of failure driven by innate inferiority, considered to result in the perpetuation and spread of failure:

The result of Sharples open university policy would be some Maori secondary school pupils doing nothing, achieving nothing, draining teaching resources, distracting pupils who need to learn because they don’t have open access to university, and then going to university unprepared, with the life lesson that you don’t need to try because you’re Maori (Muschamp, 2009, p.8)

This failure is held to be the responsibility, not only of the Māori assumed to have failed, but of all Māori: the “killing or raping [of] our toddlers, tourists and teachers” considered as much the shame of “great leaders of our indigenous tribes” as it is of “the sad, troubled ...indigenous...youth”. In this reasoning, negative or criminal activity by any Māori person is held to require apology from all other Māori “It is slightly disquieting that Dr Taonui does not mention, let alone condemn, the violent attack on Michael Laws’ house [by someone presumed to be Māori]” (Churton, 2009, p.21). In their responsibility for the worst acts
committed by any Māori person, Māori appear as a threatening mass, incompletely differentiated from each other.

The failure these texts describe as endemic in Māori is asserted to have the ability to contaminate non-Māori, weakening and draining them: “The result...would be some Maori secondary school pupils ...draining teaching resources, distracting pupils who need to learn” (Muschamp, 2009, p.8). This ability to spread failure, undermining the value of education and attainment, seems to cling particularly to Te Reo:

The fault is ... the young Maori ... demanding their own brand of goods [i.e. the learning of Te Reo] that have little value in international markets. An hour more studying te reo[sic] is an hour less on science (Robin, 2009, p.10)

In this passage, Te Reo appears as a valueless replacement for more valuable knowledge. This uselessness is not claimed to infect other languages such as French and Chinese: perhaps Te Reo’s “little value” is solely because it is the language of Māori. The contagion of failure assumed to be carried by Te Reo is not restricted to Māori but has the power to affect all of New Zealand’s children, “On the day we learn our children are ranked way below Kazakhstan for attainment in science, Labour’s Grant Robertson... tells us every Kiwi child should learn Maori until age 14” (Mandly, 2008, p.8), condemning the future of the nation. Beyond failure, Te Reo slides into association with dirt and excrement: “Te Ika A Maui and Te Wai Pounamu. How long before it’s Icky and Poo?” (Talbot, 2009, p.8). This association with dirt is applied to Māori people as well as to language: “Water cannon and a bar of soap should greet each [Māori] protestor” (Forster, 2012), “Political correctness [in context of a letter about Māori] is a doctrine...which holds forth the proposition that it is entirely possible to pick up a turd by the clean end” (Prince, 2009). The association with
excrement is evocative of Kristeva’s discussion of “these bodily fluids, this defilement, this shit” (Kristeva, 1982, p.3) which constitute the abject. The abject is uncannily positioned between life and death: “It is not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect borders, positions, rules” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4). Māori thus are positioned as contaminated outsiders within New Zealand, violating its nationhood, taking a position of “defilement…shit” by violating the boundary between that which is within the nation and that which the nation would expel.

Beyond language and people, Māori culture in itself is claimed to be a source of contamination. This is occasionally applied to the inclusion of Māori cultural performance in public ceremonies, “I cringe when New Zealand is portrayed on the world stage as a land of primitives decked out in grass skirts and waving spears at all and sundry” (Jordan, 2009). Yet it is more commonly applied to the inclusion of Māori cultural practices and concepts in medical, legal or intellectual settings such as universities:

People who believe in this kind of Maori culture in the 21st century do not deserve respect. To think we have ... a lecturer at Canterbury University, going along with this insanity is too much. …There is only one truth, and that is scientific truth. A university is a place of learning and truth, not ignorance and superstition. (Walker, 2010, p.16)

The inclusion of Māori concepts in such settings has the power to destroy “learning and truth”, occasioning “horror and disgust” (Walker, 2010). This stupidity attributed to Māori culture is credited with a destructive power, the power to destroy rational choices and create fatal outcomes. Thus, writing of the respect accorded to Māori beliefs in the Human Tissue Act (2008), Michael Laws writes:
Stupidity. In specific, a fatal combination of medical mindlessness and cultural ignorance. All wrapped into one piece of PC legislation called the Human Tissue Act (2008). [...] It also elevates superstitious gibberish and cultural gobbledegook to the same pantheon as reason and logic (Laws, 2009)

Similarly, when speaking of legislation requiring local government to adhere to principles associated with the Treaty of Waitangi, Don Brash says:

We fly Maori elders around the world to lift tapu and expel evil spirits from New Zealand embassies...we refuse to undertake potentially life-saving earthworks on Mount Ruapehu lest we interfere with the spirit of the mountain; ...It is a farce that could all too quickly turn to tragedy (Brash, 2004)

The fatal consequences foretold by Brash and Laws have not eventuated. Yet this “cultural stupidity”(Laws, 2009) is considered to “condemn...people to...lingering disability or death”(Laws, 2009). Māori culture, as perceived here, carries death with its “stupidity”. This death, it is implied, can only be prevented by the intervention of Pākehā. Pākehā appear as the keepers and protectors of “21st century”(Laws, 2009) New Zealand culture: “There must be times when New Zealanders get bold enough to challenge the superstitious or silly excesses of other cultures”(Laws, 2009). Pākehā are positioned as keepers of rationality, protecting against the abject power of Māori to be “death infecting life” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4).

“Who is a Maori?”

Associated with failure, death, stupidity and shit, Māori are positioned in these texts as utterly abject. Yet beyond this, Māori are written out of existence entirely: beyond the erasure of history, beyond the assumption that Māori do not exist among those addressed by letters or columns, Māori are questioned then erased. Māori, in the discourse I here
investigate, do not fully exist: “According to history, there are no full-blooded Māoris left” (Grigor, 2009, p.8). The myth that there are no Māori left whose ancestors were all Māori is referred to in terms of purity of blood: “Maori blood lines have become so diluted” (Basset, 2006) that “no full-blooded Maori [exist] any more” (Basset, 2004). The reference to blood is an unacknowledged metaphor that presumes a racial cleanliness carried through the bloodstream. It references blood quantum laws and calls to mind animal breeding regulations: there are no references to full-blooded Pākehā. Māori appear diluted, impurely blooded. Yet beyond this, the myth is then used to create an ostensibly scientific argument that no Māori exist:

Having suffered 58 years of cultural servitude in New Zealand... I am roused... to ask who is a Maori? As a scientist manqué, I expect a rational answer to that question...If it is a matter of genetic inheritance, then I would expect adequate, peer-reviewed, genealogical research to refute the myth that there are no individuals left descended exclusively from ancestors living in New Zealand before 1642. Such people, in that framework, are entitled to call themselves Maori (Coles, 2009, p.8)

Here, the only way to exist as Māori is to pass a “genetic” requirement certified by multiple researchers. Māori people’s accounts of their own ancestry are considered irrelevant, and Māori people without solely Māori ancestry are not counted as Māori. Under these terms, there is no way to be Māori; Māori people simply cannot be. Thus Māori people, in their perceived nonexistence, are accused of using fabricated Māoriness to gain benefits from “New Zealanders”: “Maoriness is just an excuse given false validity by 40 years of special pleading” (Coles, 2009, p.8). Māoriness is deemed to be impossible, to be an act of wilfulness, as indicated by the phrase “those who would be Maori” (M. N. Richards, 2009b).

It is then positioned as a deliberate avaricious lie: “Maori as presented today do not require proof of identity to ride this gravy train and the myriad of tribes, hapu and the like belie the
claims of seven canoes (waka)” (M. N. Richards, 2009b). Thus Māori stand accused, both of not existing, and of lying about their existence.

Is it possible to be both nothing and filth, both a ghost and a contaminant? Wished into nonexistence, Māori continue to return, haunting the desired nation “haunting can also work in the other direction, not only of loss but of uncanny persistence” (Rose, 1996, p.44), resurfacing with apparently “daemonic repetition” (Rose, 1996, pp31-32). Wished into death by the insistence that “full-blooded” Māori are dead, Māori seem to return, not cleanly as ghosts, but as uncleanly as corpses:

The corpse ... is cesspool, and death... refuse and corpses show me what I permanently thrust aside in order to live. These bodily fluids, this defilement, this shit are what life withstands, hardly and with difficulty, on the part of death. ... the corpse, the most sickening of wastes, is a border that has encroached upon everything (Kristeva, 1982, p.3)

Perhaps it is impossible to attempt to erase someone, to wish them into death, without bringing filth and dirt into the picture. Within the fantasised Pākehā nation, Māori fill the role of “fantasy as ‘spectral apparition’ or ‘phantom’” (Rose, 1996, p.5), a haunting kernel of discomfort that will not be wished away. As possible bearers of causes for guilt, Māori are made a receptacle for guilt, held responsible for everything they could be expected to accuse Pākehā of. As a potential source of discontinuity within the fantasised nation, Māori are designated as abject, “outside, beyond the set” (Kristeva, 1982, p.2), “On the edge of non-existence and hallucination” (Kristeva, 1982, p.2), treated as a horrifying source of contamination within the nation.
The texts that I have analysed in this chapter have been part of a powerful strand of discourse within New Zealand nationalism. While some of the views these writers express are extreme, they are part of a complex of meanings associated with Māori within Pākehā views of the nation. I have here examined a stream of associations: between Māori and endless wrongful taking, between Māori and shame, between Māori and loss, between Māori and contamination and death. These associations are a reversal of a submerged knowledge of New Zealand’s history. The associations continually resurface, marring the discourse around Māori within Pākehā understandings of the nation. It is through an investigation of these associations that the void around the Treaty, as described in Chapter Three, becomes comprehensible. Thus, this chapter and the preceding chapter, taken together, give an understanding of the background to the phenomena that will be discussed in the final chapter.

Brown, K. (2009a, 11 March). In a few words, Letters to the editor, The Press.


Richards, M. N. (2009a, 26 February). In a few words, Letter to the editor, The Press.


Sheilds, J. (2009b, 11 February). In a few words, Letter to the editor, The Press.


Chapter Five: something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light

Throughout this thesis I have traced the interaction between the desired, comforting ‘home-like’ nation, and the eternally disruptive, discomforting, ‘un-homelike’ elements within the nation. These ‘un-homelike’ elements are constantly repressed but constantly resurface. In this chapter I will be investigating one of the most disturbingly disruptive elements within the nation – the existence of murderous violence towards small children. The murder of children has a position of utter abjection, as noted by Kristeva: “The abjection of...crime reaches its apex when death which, in any case, kills me, interferes with what, in my living universe, is supposed to save me from death: childhood, science, among other things” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4). It is not my aim here to argue that the killing of children is anything other than horrifying: I do, however, wish to investigate the way in which this particular crime is seen as a crime against the nation. I wish to interrogate the way in which this specific crime brings to light the collision between the fantasy of the nation as a universal safe childhood, and the rejected, abject elements that render this fantasy impossible. While other crimes may also, at various times and in various political circumstances, be seen as a violation of the nation, severe child abuse has a consistently prominent position as a ‘nationed’ crime.

I will argue that child killing is considered to say something about the nation in a way that other crimes, for example corporate fraud, are generally not. I will then focus on an exploration of which child murders are assumed to say something about the nation, what
they are assumed to say, and who they are assumed to say it about. Not all child murders, as I will demonstrate below, are equally laden with national meaning. In this chapter I will explore the way in which public disgust about child abuse is focussed particularly on Māori women, and the reasons why this might be the case. In order to do so I will look at the way in which women come to symbolise cultural/national purity and the impact this symbolic role has on indigenous women. I will revisit the role of children in symbolising both the future and the past of the nation. I will also explore the role of the fantasised ‘good mother’ in the nation, by investigating the way in which the land/nation itself is fantasised as a good mother. It is against the imagined ‘good mother’, the bearer of national purity, that the spectre of the ‘bad mother’ stands in contrast.

As with Chapter Four, I have sourced the material for this chapter from letters to the editor and editorials. I will be using this material as an example of a widely distributed discourse about the nationed meanings of child abuse. While the material I explored in Chapter Four was often not met with a public counter-discourse, the material I analyse in this chapter is occasionally met with public counter-arguments. At key points in this chapter, I have noted the quantity of articles found on certain topics in order to give an indication of the dominance of the stream of discourse which I here explore. As with the material explored in Chapter Four, the most extreme views quoted in this chapter may not be shared by all of the writers whose work I analyse. My aim in this chapter is to investigate how such views come to be possible, what they are underpinned by, and how they could come to be anything other than an outlying opinion. While the discourse I analyse in this chapter may be publicly contested, it is partaken in by many and remains politically influential.
Throughout this chapter, I will explore the way in which public discussion about child murders or manslaughters is almost solely focussed on the death of children publicly pronounced to be Māori. I will also analyse the way in which this public discourse centres on the mothers who have ‘failed to protect’ these children: a discursive focus which operates regardless of the culpability of the particular women involved. In order to do this I will first investigate who is included and who is exempt from the ‘child abuse roll call’: the list of names of murdered children which is referenced in many articles about child abuse in NZ. I will make a case that it is largely Māori children who end up on this ‘roll call’ and I will contrast this with cases of children who have not ended up on the ‘roll call’. Some cases of child abuse, I will argue, are deemed not to have meaning for the nation in the way that cases of child abuse in Māori or even part-Māori families are.

It is of particular significance, I argue, that Māori mothers are held to bear a preponderance of guilt for the abuse of children. I will look at texts that accuse Māori mothers of mindless animalistic fecundity and of hopeless contamination by things outside the nation. Here I will return to the theme of Māori as the abject within the fantasised Pākehā nation, a theme I introduced in Chapter Four. I will explore the ways this projection of abjection, of filth, of death-bringing, is particularly cast onto Māori women, or onto a terrifying fantasy of the Māori mother. I will highlight the way in which all of these accusations are at play in the cases of Māori women whose partners kill their children. From this, I will examine the way in which the cluster of accusations against these women betrays, beyond disgust at violence against the helpless, a deep anxiety about the nation. The image of the ‘bad Maori mother’, the ‘mother who failed to protect’, carries with it, I will argue, all that is uncanny, ‘un-
homely’ within the nation, everything that should be hidden that continually comes to light.

Ultimately, I will argue that ‘the mother who failed to protect’ stands accused of failing to protect Pākehā from knowing about all that is unwanted within the nation, about all that prevents the fantasised ‘homelike’ nation from being possible.

Throughout this chapter, I will argue that severe child abuse is considered to be a nationed crime, a crime seen as springing from and illustrating some deep disturbance within the nation. This can be seen in the following examples from letters to the editor and opinion columns, which refer to child abuse as being generated by a problem with New Zealand: “...child abuse ...is a New Zealand problem” (Claridge, 2006), “New Zealand... has been engaged in a dangerous social experiment ...That has ...put children, and in many cases, mothers, at risk” (Logan, 2006), “the curse and destruction of this nation is partly responsible for the heinous crime of the murder of these two wee babies” (Weston, 2006, p.10). It should be noted that child murder is not the only crime to be considered to reveal something about the nation. Other murders are occasionally described as having some meaning for the nation, as in this example: “It used to be that people could recall the names of all those murdered in a year in New Zealand... Now in one week we have six murders, and who remembers their names?” ("The climate has changed, and the chill wind that comes....", 2000, p.4). Yet in this statement, unlike more specific discussions of child abuse, it is the number of murders rather than the existence of murders that is considered to be meaningful. It is unusual for individual publicly prominent murders of adults to be discussed as having meanings to do with the nature of the nation or the character of the nation’s people. In contrast to this, it is noticeable how frequently child murders are referred to in a
nated context. It is not my intention to argue that severe child abuse should not be a cause for discussion, nor to argue that this discussion should not take place in the context of national policy. However, it should be noted that not all crimes are discussed in terms of national meaning. As an example, letters to the editor and opinion columns about the Lombard Finance case discuss the actions of those convicted of making misleading statements and occasionally discuss the actions of the government in failing to prevent such cases, but make no reference to the crimes as being a New Zealand problem or having meaning for the nation as a whole (based on results from Factiva search for “Lombard Finance AND fraud”). Thus, with child abuse considered to have a nationed meaning that other crimes may not have, it becomes relevant to investigate which child abuse cases are considered to have the most meaning for the nation, and what meanings they are considered to have.

It is worth noting that public comment about the murder of children in abusive homes tends to focus in great detail on the mothers involved in these cases, despite the relative lack of involvement of many of these publically commented-upon mothers in the physical aspects of abuse. While there is a disparity between the number of children killed by men and by women, with 37 percent killed by women and 63 percent by men (Merchant, 2010, p.107), it is notable that women are referred to in connection with child murders at least as frequently as men. Thus, in the case of Nia Glassie, who was killed while her mother was absent, a survey of articles, opinion columns and letters to the editor on Factiva finds 560 references to her mother, Lisa Kuka, and 554 references to her stepfather, Wiremu Curtis. This occurs despite the fact that Curtis was physically involved in Nia’s death and Kuka was
not. I am not intending to discuss the moral culpability or lack thereof of the women in these cases: there may be compelling arguments to be made that many of these women could have done more to protect their children, but that is well beyond the scope of this thesis. It is however, significant that a public discussion about murder should focus as much on those who did not murder as on those who committed murder: I will explore the significance of this in greater detail in the later stages of this chapter. At this point, however, I wish to investigate why it should be that the combination of women, children, home and violence should be such a potent one in terms of meaning for the nation.

The ‘motherland’

It is perhaps no surprise that extreme violence within the family home should be seen as a crime against the nation when the nation is so strongly associated with home and family. Billig describes this association thus:

There is a parallel between the language of home and homeland...The national space most noticeably bears this trace [of home], being imagined as a homely space, cosy within its borders, secure against the dangerous outside world. And ‘we’, the nation within the homeland can so easily imagine ‘ourselves’ as some sort of family. If the national home is to be homely, then ‘we’ must make it so (Billig, 1995, p.109)

This imagining of the nation as a secure family home is not gender neutral, as Billig notes: “a sense of ‘our’ [national] uniqueness and identity...is frequently conveyed by the metaphors of kinship and gender: the nation is the ‘family’ living in the ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’” (Billig, 1995, p.71). Yuval-Davis also emphasises the inherently gendered nature of this imagining of the nation as home:
...because of the central importance of social reproduction to culture, gender relations often come to be seen as constituting the ‘essence’ of cultures as ways of life to be passed from generation to generation. The construction of ‘home’ is of particular importance here (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.43)

Billig further points out that failure to secure and maintain this cosy national ‘family home’ is seen as a cause for national shame: “a sense of shame lurks forcefully around the rhetoric of nationalism...if ‘we’ fail the past – if ‘we’ abandon our precious national essence – then ‘we’ would be shamed”(Billig, 1995, p.101). Given the gendered nature of this imagining of the nation as a family home, the possibility of shaming the nation, of failing to render it secure and homely, falls along gendered lines. The sense of the nation at home, of a continuous national homeland, is conveyed through a gendered set of imaginings, “gendered bodies and sexuality play pivotal roles as territories, markers and reproducers of the narratives of nations and other collectivities”(Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.39). Thus, the ability to fail to maintain the nation is itself gendered. Yuval-Davis traces the gendered reproduction of the nation, beginning with the association of women with the biological reproduction of the nation: “consider the political implications of the ways in which women are constructed as biological reproducers of ‘the nation’”(Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.37). This leads to the association of women with the cultural reproduction of the nation: “very often it is women...who are given the roles of the cultural reproducers of ‘the nation’”(Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.37). Women, according to Yuval-Davis, do double duty as both the physical/cultural reproducers of the nation and as symbolic guards of the purity of the nation: “[women function] as symbolic border guards and as embodiments of the collectivity, while at the same time being its cultural reproducers” (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.23). Beyond the association with safeguarding and continuing the nation, women are associated with the desired future of the nation or with the destruction of this future: “Women are
associated in the collective imagination with children and therefore with the collective, as well as the familial, future “(Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.45). Women, here, are metaphorically rendered as the mothers of the nation, charged with making the nation homelike, tending it, protecting its future. Yuval-Davis points out that the nation itself is often figured as a woman, a mother: “A figure of a woman, often a mother, symbolizes in many cultures the spirit of collectivity”(Yuval-Davis, 1997, p.45). Thus women, especially mothers, carry layers of symbolic meanings related to the nation as a home, to the possibility of failing to protect the nation, and to the possibility of the nation itself failing to continue.

Women are figured as protectors of the nation: children, in multiple ways, come to symbolise both the nation and its citizens, both the national future and the national past. As I explored in Chapter Two, the nation is imagined through a nostalgic fantasy of childhood. The desired nation is fantasised to be the childhood ‘we’ misremember, a childhood innocent of harm. Thus, while women are desired to make the nation a safe, warm, unchanging home, it is childhood that is imagined to be inside this comforting national home. In the desired nation, we are all children. It is this fantasised state of childhood that anchors the nation’s citizens to a desired national past, and drives a desire for continuity through the nation’s present. Yet in addition to symbolising this past, ‘our’ past, children also strongly symbolise the nation’s future. Berlant discusses this in the context of America: “the nation’s value is figured not on behalf of an actually existing and laboring adult, but of a future American, both incipient and pre-historical: especially invested with this hope are the American fetus and the American child” (Berlant, 1997b, p.28). The hoped for national future is imagined through the nation’s children, who are desired to inherit a
nation that is exactly the same as our fantasised past. In the rhetoric of the nation, children are both ‘ours’ and ‘us’, our past and our future. Berlant speaks of the power of the idealised “infantile citizen” (Berlant, 1997b, p.28) to symbolise absolute innocence: “This national icon is still innocent of knowledge, agency and accountability” (Berlant, 1997a, p.3). Childhood, within the fantasy of the nation, is an innocent, untouchable state, located in the imagined past and the wished-for future, yet vulnerable to the intrusions of the present.

Like the “national essence” (Billig, 1995, p.101), the national childhood can be failed; ‘we’ can shame ourselves by failing to protect it from change. Thus, while it is no surprise that child abuse should evoke public emotion and political debate, the nationed imaginings that the idea of childhood is imbued with add a weight of nationed meaning to public discussion: if children are ‘us’ and ‘ours’, then child abuse must be a crime against ‘us’.

In the course of this chapter I will investigate the role of the partly-fantasised figure of the ‘bad mother’ as a threatening, destructive element within the nation. It is worth exploring whether there is a corresponding fantasy of a ‘good mother’ within the nation. While Chapter Two focussed on a nostalgically longed-for, forever lost or never grasped childhood, there was no clear presence of a ‘good mother’ in this fantasised childhood. The nostalgically yearned-for mother disappeared, always out of sight, around the corner, unreachable, leaving only a trace. Yet there is another possible hint of motherhood within the nation, another trace of a fantasised grasped-for mother. It is not unusual for the land to be referred to as a woman. The predominance of the equation between land and woman in some strands of New Zealand literature is pointed out by Stephen Turner:
Charles Brash famously described the need for a man to ‘lie with the hills like a lover’. The figure of the land as a woman is commonplace. Desire in the country works by a process of reflexive substitution. Land and women are interchangeable (Turner, 1999, p.27).

Kay Schaffer describes the connection between notions of land and woman as an originary point for national identity: “The land signified as woman is the site of origin for national identity” (Schaffer, 1988, p.79). Yet could the land be seen, not as an adult’s lover, but as a longed-for mother? The national landscape, and by extension the nation itself, is figured as a woman’s body: “the woman’s body is coded not only racially, culturally, sexually and socially but also nationally, embodying the nation as well, ...It is the imbrication of the woman’s body with the nation/national landscape that interests me” (Mohanram, 1999, pp82-83). It is also imagined specifically as a comforting woman’s body: “In short, the woman’s body functions as a mediator for ...citizens to experience the landscape and the nation as nurturing, comforting and familiar”(Mohanram, 1999, p.83). This comforting, nurturing womanly body could be seen as a maternal body. Kolodny speaks of the association of the landscape with the maternal: “was there perhaps a need to experience the land as a nurturing, giving maternal breast”(Kolodny, 1975, pp8-9). Combine this with Kristeva’s description of the idealization of the relationship with the archaic mother, “this motherhood is the fantasy that is nurtured by the adult, man or woman, of a lost territory”(Kristeva, 1987, p.234), and it seems possible the national landscape functions as a stand-in for the fantasised lost territory of this idealised maternal relationship. This can be understood in terms of the associations discussed in Chapter Two. In Starobinsky’s description of nostalgia, motherhood and homeland stand side by side, equally nourishing and nurturing, almost interchangeable:
Why, Johannes Hofer asked himself, are the young Swiss so frequently inclined to nostalgia when they go abroad? ‘It is hard for them to forget the loving care with which their mothers surrounded them. They miss ...the thick milk from their own valley...’ ...the role of this deprivation: the loss of childhood, of “oral satisfactions”, of motherly coaxing (Starobinski, 1966, p.87)

If the landscape, and by extension the nation, given the “slippage of meaning from landscape to nation” (Mohanram, 1999, p.6), functions as a fantasised ideal mother, sheltering and familiar, then the bad, insufficiently nurturing mother stands in contrast, not simply to ‘better’ mothers, but to the nation itself. It is perhaps this that gives emotional heft to the nationed condemnation of the ‘bad mother’; ‘she’ is held in opposition to that which ‘we’ love and misrecognise in the nation.

The child abuse “rollcall”

Against this network of nationed meanings of motherhood and childhood, of fantasised good mothers and uncanny ‘bad mothers’, child abuse is loaded with public meaning. Yet not all child abuse cases are the subject of public debate. While some child killings are the focus of public discussion years after they occur, other child killings disappear from public memory, or never make it into public sight. Raema Merchant points out the disparity between the number of children killed in New Zealand each year in abusive households and the number of these children who become household names, with only 21 of the 62 children killed over a seven year period becoming publicly known (Merchant, 2010, p.118). Merchant describes the child abuse roll call, a litany of names of murdered children that is recited in articles that deal with child abuse:
There is a tendency for the same children to be mentioned and re-mentioned at subsequent child deaths, which creates a number of ‘household names’ that are synonymous with child abuse (Merchant, 2010, p.114)

This ‘roll call’ can be seen in the following examples, which demonstrate a notable consistency of names mentioned:

Delcelia Witika and Nia Glassie and James Whakaruru and ‘Lillybing’ Karaitiana-Matiaha and Saliel Aplin and Olympia Jetson (Woodham, 2010)

Delcelia Witika, James Whakaruru, Lillybing Karaitiana-Matiaha, Craig Manukau, Chris and Cru Kahui ("Let Nia leave a positive legacy," 2010, p.4)

the Kahui case ...James Whakaruru, ...Tangaroa Matiu, ...Hinewaoriki Karaitiana-Matiaha (Lillybing) ...Saliel Aplin and Olympia Jetson ...Tamati Pokaia ...Kelly Gush...Coral-Ellen Burrows ...Ngatikaura Ngati ...and Nia Glassie ...form a national roll of dishonour("The children of neglect," 2008, p.4)

Delcelia Witika, Craig Manukau, James Whakaruru, Hine Karaitiana-Matiaha and Anaru Rogers ("More offensive to kill kids," 2000, p.4)

Delcelia Witika, James Whakaruru, Lillybing Karaitiana Matiaha or the Kahui twins (DuFresne, 2006a)

A striking number of the names that recur on these lists are recognisably Māori names.

Children on this list who are of mixed ethnicity are included in discussions of ‘Māori child abuse victims’. Nia Glassie, for example, although of part Māori and part Polynesian descent (Merchant, 2010, p.85), is specifically discussed as a Māori child. In the following statement, she is given as an exemplar of a poor future for Māori children: “The hell Nia Glassie must have gone through is an indictment of our sad society and a sign of the prevalent violence of Maori towards the young....The future holds a poor outlook for young Maori children” (Ellis, 2008, p.10). Glassie is also given as an example of the prevalence of Māori children on the “roll of dishonour”: “The names of...Nia Glassie, Saliel Aplin, Olympia Jetson, Chris and Cru
Kahui represent a roll of dishonour. Too many of them are Maori” ("Too many Maori in child-abuse statistics," 2012, p.4). She is further described as being part of a “disturbing reality” about Māori children:

... just days after Social Development Minister Paula Bennett spoke to iwi leaders about the disturbing reality that Maori children comprise half the cases of child abuse that Child, Youth and Family social workers must deal with each year, the Rotorua coroner opened his inquest into one of New Zealand's worst recent cases, the death of little Nia Glassie ("Let Nia leave a positive legacy," 2010, p.4)

As can be seen in the above statements, in the context of public discussion of child abuse, to be part Māori is to be classified as Māori. This is in marked contrast to the views explored in Chapter Four, where to be anything other than “full-blooded Maoris” (Paul, 2006, p.22) is to not be “entitled to call themselves Maori”(Coles, 2009, p.8). In the context of child abuse, the kind of questioning of Māori identity which is common in discussions of topics such as land or financial compensation is not applied. It is partly through this mechanism that many “household names” on the “roll of dishonour” are those of children publicly known to be Māori, children publically considered to be victims of “Māori child abuse”.

It could be argued that there is something about the cases of child abuse that become publicly known that causes them to be the focus of public attention, some especially compelling horror that makes them memorable. Merchant notes:

...the few children who are mentioned frequently tend to be those whose death or injury has captured the public imagination because of the defining features of the abuse. This may be because the abuse was of a particularly long duration as for Hinewaoriki Karaitiana-Matiaha, particularly severe as seen for Nia Glassie, or because the children were tiny twins and both died in the case of Chris and Cru Kahui (Merchant, 2010, p.114)
Unusual features of certain child abuse cases are a focus for public discussion: as an example of this, I was able to find 262 references to Nia Glassie being put in a clothes dryer (results of Factiva search for “Nia Glassie AND Dryer” conducted 18 May 2012). However, this is not all that is going on in the inclusion of names in the “roll of dishonour”. It is to a comparison of one specific case included in the ‘roll call’ and one excluded from it that I will now turn.

One of the main sources of comment around the murder of Chris and Cru Kahui was the initial failure of the whānau to tell police who was responsible for the children’s death. The Kahui family’s lack of communication with police was referred to as exceptional in many public commentaries. I will here offer a sample of these comments. In the excerpt below, the failure of the family to name a killer is described as a suitable cause for national “scorn” and “anger”:

The scorn of the nation rains down on the wretchedly inadequate family of brutally killed babies Cru and Chris Kahui. It is all but impossible not to be provoked to anger by the sorry spectacle of a family misappropriating the grieving process as a shield against accountability ("Waiting our patience?,” 2006, p.10)

In another source, the Kahui family are compared to the Mafia for this lack of communication with the police: “South Auckland's Kahui ‘family’ have certainly perfected omerta, the Mafia code of silence. ...it seems quite possible that no one in the Kahui circle will give up to police the savage who killed defenceless 12-week-old twins Chris and Cru” ("Blame welfare, not colonialism," 2006, p.4). Further to this, the ‘gutlessness’ of the Kahui family is remarked on, as is their ‘exploitative’ nature:
Maori Affairs minister Parekura Horomia slams as "gutless" the Auckland family that has been holding out against police after the killing of three-month-old twins Chris and Cru Kahui....the killings are not - nor should they have ever been seen as - ‘a Maori issue’. To have given it that exceptional qualification manufactures any number of explanations and excuses for the tragedy. The Kahui family is merely exploiting the generosity that classification provides("Where are the cries of outrage?," 2006, p.6)

The “closing of ranks” by the Kahui family is described as something exceptional, something terrible enough to alter the views of “New Zealanders”:

Something about the deaths of the Kahui twins, the subsequent closing of ranks by the whanau ...and the attempts by Ms Hawke to justify their behaviour under the pretext of Maori custom clearly touched a raw nerve among otherwise politically correct New Zealanders (DuFresne, 2006b, p.15)

The family’s silence is seen as a source of guilt that marks them off from other New Zealanders: “So no one in the house when the Kahui twins were killed will admit their guilt. ...It seems there are a number of separate rules available to New Zealanders depending on what sort of New Zealander one is” (Byers, 2006, p.4). The family are accused of exploiting Māoriness, or more particularly of exploiting (Pākehā?) generosity towards Māori: “merely exploiting the generosity that classification [as Māori] provides.” ("Where are the cries of outrage?," 2006, p.6). They are further accused of using Māoriness as a pretext and an excuse with “attempts to...justify their behaviour under the pretext of Maori custom”(DuFresne, 2006b, p.15). Ultimately, they are held responsible for exploiting a perceived double standard that advantages Māori over other New Zealanders, as when Byers refers to “separate rules available to New Zealanders depending on what sort of New Zealander one is” (Byers, 2006, p.4). The Kahui family’s initial lack of co-operation with the police is seen as an outrageous offence which is inseparably intertwined with their being Māori and with their using their ethnicity in unacceptable ways. This perceived misuse of
Māoriness is seen as an affront to the nation, as something that touches “a raw nerve among otherwise politically correct New Zealanders” (DuFresne, 2006b, p.15). Thus, the Kahui family’s behaviour after the children’s deaths is seen as driving factor in generating national comment, a source of anger and disgust for “New Zealanders”. This behaviour is seen as exceptionally horrific and as specifically Māori.

Yet the Kahui case is not the only child abuse case in New Zealand in which the family maintained silence about the identity of the person responsible for the death of a child. In the case of Sarah Haddock-Woodcock, a three month-old baby killed in an abusive household in March 2005, no murder charges were laid until January 2008 ("Man charged with baby's 2005 murder," 2008, p.1), as both members of the household denied responsibility for the baby’s death. Explicit parallels were drawn between the silence of Haddock-Woodcock’s parents and that of the Kahui family at the time of the Kahui murders: “Police say it mirrors the killing of the Kahui twins in South Auckland - the extended family has clammed up and has failed to provide information that could crack the case” (Wall, 2006, p.1). Yet of the forty-seven newspaper items I could find about Haddock-Woodcock’s death (based on a Factiva search for “Sarah Haddock-Woodcock”, conducted on 11 May 2012), only five had an aspect of commentary about the case. I could find no letters to the editor about the case. It was not until September 2006, eighteen months after Haddock-Woodcock’s death, that any newspaper commentary was made about the meaning of Haddock-Woodcock’s parents’ denial of responsibility: this mention was in the context of a comparison to the Kahui case (Wall, 2006, p.1). Despite Haddock-Woodcock having been at a similar age to the Kahui twins when she died, and the similar circumstances of denial of
responsibility surrounding her death, Haddock-Woodcock has not been included in the “roll of dishonour” as they have. The only reference I could find to her in context of this “roll call” was a reference to her being excluded from it:

The roll of shame contains many familiar names...Nia Glassie, Delcilia Whittaker[sic], Hinewaoriki Karaitiana-Matiaha (Lillybing), Cris and Cru Kahui. There are other equally shocking cases of victims without such high profiles: Sarah Haddock-Woodcock, Serenity Scott-Dinnington, Jacqui Davis... ("The hardest way to break the cycle," 2011, p.13)

While the death of the Kahui twins and the behaviour of the adults in their family seemed rich with public meaning, inciting commentary about the affront to the nation it constituted, the death of Haddock-Woodcock seems almost completely empty of nationed meaning. Of the five articles I could find which offered commentary on her death, three were commenting on the relative lack of attention to it ("The hardest way to break the cycle," 2011, p.13), (Wall, 2006, p.1), (Wall, 2008, p.9). This demonstrates the lack of public discussion about her death. It is notable that while the Kahui twins were publicly identified as “Maori children” (Espiner, 2006, p.1), Haddock-Woodcock is identified as “Pakeha” (Wall, 2008, p.9). It is impossible to say that any one case of a Māori child abuse victim being included in the “roll of dishonour” occurs because they are publicly identified as Māori, or that any one case of a Pākehā or other non-Māori child abuse victim being omitted from this “roll” occurs because they are Pākehā. But overall it appears that the deaths of children identified as Māori have far more meaning for the nation. Their names are more likely to appear on the “roll of dishonour”, their deaths to be discussed as an outrage to the nation.

While Māori children are more likely than non-Māori children to be named in the “roll of dishonour”, the preponderance of Māori names on the “roll of dishonour” is then used to
name violent child abuse as a Māori problem. The children on the list are sometimes
defined as being brown: “All those who died suffered at the hands of family. All have brown
faces” (Taylor, 2000, p.2). At other times they are described as part-Māori: “Each name on
that rollcall of death had a Maori or part-Maori background” (“Godzone a paradise for kids?
Get real,” 2000, p.4). Frequently, they are simply defined as Māori: “The obvious link
between all these tragedies has finally been acknowledged. The victims and their assailants
are all Maori” (“A long list of small tragedies,” 2000, p.8). While some versions of the
“rollcall of death” do include some Pākehā children, the above statements are an example
of a circular argument whereby a “roll call” with only Māori children’s names is used and it is
then pointed out that all the names on the list are Māori. Severe child abuse is named as a
“Maori problem” (United Future NZ Party, 2007), “up to Maori themselves to sort
...out”(DuFresne, 2000, p.4). This takes place within a strand of argument that focuses on
ethnicity while claiming to have removed children from ethnicity: “a suffering child is a
suffering child, regardless of ethnicity” (DuFresne, 2000, p.4). While children on the “rollcall
of death” are named as “Maori children”, they are simultaneously figured as the children of
the nation, listed as “another New Zealand child” ("Letting evil triumph," 2007), “the
children of New Zealand” (Peck, 2001, p.6) or “Kiwi kids” (Roberts, 2008, p.4).

“Our kids” and “toxic adults”

Beyond the inclusion in the nation noted above, these children are commonly referred to as
“our” children, as can be seen in the following examples: “We’re sick and tired of doing
nothing while our babies and children have been beaten and murdered”(McCroskrie, Lewis,
“upgrade the Plunket services ...so that our children can be truly and safely monitored” (Dermody, 2007); “Saving Our Innocents” (Doolan, 2005, p.19); “Chorus of Concern for Our Kids” (“Chorus of concern for our kids grows louder,” 2001, p.10); “Torturing Our Toddlers” (“Torturing our toddlers,” 2000, p.4). The children on the “rollcall of death” are figured as belonging to the nation not only in the sense of being members of the nation but in the sense of being owned by the nation: they are ‘ours’. “Our Kids” or “our babies and children” are being beaten: this creates an image of an outside agent coming into ‘our’ home to beat members of ‘our’ family. Given the close mapping of ‘nation’ onto ‘home’ and ‘family’ onto ‘national citizen’ there is a suggestion here of an alien agent intruding upon the nation, killing members of the national family.

If “our kids” are being murdered, this raises the question of who they are being murdered by: is it ‘our adults’ who are doing this killing? Violent child abusers are occasionally referred to as part of the nation, as part of New Zealand: “What is it about this fantastic country that means we can murder and torture and brutalise our babies?” (Rankin, Lewis, 2007); “New Zealand has an unenviable record of killing its children through abuse or neglect” (Doolan, 2005, p.19). However the examples of this that I could find were outnumbered by references to child abusers as standing in opposition to ordinary New Zealanders: “ordinary New Zealanders are victims of Lisa Kuka and those like her” (Campbell, 2010, p.6); “Mr Hide said New Zealanders, who worked hard to look after their own children, were feeling angry and frustrated that the taxpayer was supporting a family which ‘gave no care to their babies’” (“Hide questions $2087 a week in benefits to family of kahui twins,” 2006). While abused children may be “the children of New Zealand” (Peck, 2001, p.6), the adults who
abuse them are rarely considered as the adults of New Zealand. These adults may be referred to as “toxic adults” (Woodham, 2010) or “violent adults” (McCroskrie, Lewis, 2007), but never as “our adults” (A search of the Factiva database on 11 May 2012 failed to find any reference to “our adults” in this context). They are not considered to belong to the nation in the way their victims do: suffering children may stand in for “us”, but violent adults seldom do. Violent “toxic adults” (Woodham, 2010) appear as a poisonous non-New Zealander element within the nation, internal but alien. In the nation, yet alien to ‘us’, a “toxic” element within the national ‘home’, “violent adults” take the position of the abject. This abject state is, according to Kristeva, threatening and poisonous but neither able to be assimilated nor able to be fully ejected: “a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated” (Kristeva, 1982, p.1).

The perpetrators of severe child abuse are occasionally referred to as New Zealanders in order to highlight a specific group of New Zealanders, as can be seen in the statement: “If you’re Kiwi and male, take a long hard look at yourself in the mirror today….Men are killing our children” (Calvert, 2007). However, more typical is a shying away from the possibility of child abusers as part of the nation, towards the naming of them as a separate group:

This national scandal shows no sign of stopping, despite all the publicity about our culture of violence…None of that seems to affect the people most in need of getting the message. ...But where is the famous whanau we always hear about? What is the value of this nurturing, caring extended Maori family unit when so many of the maimed and killed children are Maori? ....Maori are often saying they would like to have the opportunities to run their own lives and sort out their own problems. Well, here you are then ("It's up to whanau to make the first move," 2007)
In this passage, the slide is from acknowledging that the problem could be “ours”, “our culture of violence”, towards a location of the problem within the “extended Maori family”, who are suggested to be not “us” but merely people “we always hear about”. It is common for child abuse to be described as a problem solely located within Māori families, “within Māoridom” (DuFresne, 2000) or perhaps within Māori themselves individually, as in the following:

It’s time to stop pretending that the kind of child abuse suffered by Nia Glassie and the Kahui twins is not a Maori problem. Within some families there is a culture of cover-up and collaboration that condones long-term child abuse. While it is only a small minority within Maori where this level of violence and the culture of cover-up exists, it seems to be deeply embedded. Until Maori leadership accepts that they are the key to finding a solution for child abuse by Maori we will continue treading water waiting for the next child to die (Dunne, "Dunne urges Maori to sort out Maori child abuse," 2007)

Here “the kind of child abuse suffered by Nia Glassie and the Kahui twins” is specified as a “Maori problem”, with “the kind of child abuse” suffered by Sarah Haddock-Woodcock and other severely abused Pākehā children erased from sight. There is no corresponding reference to any child abuse as a ‘Pākehā problem’. This problem is described as internal to, “deeply embedded” “within Maori”: the image is of a corrupting violence lodged within Maori, simultaneously an intrusive outside element and an irremovable internal defect. While this internally embedded violence is located within “only a small minority within Maori”, it is simultaneously stated as a problem for all Maori. Doubly embedded, within a group within Māori, violence thereby contaminates Māori as a group, who then contaminate the nation, bringing “national shame”.
Yet not all references to child abuse as a “Maori problem” locate the problem within a specific group of Māori. In the following example, child abuse is referred to as an inherent problem with all Māori:

It is unacceptable that Maori child abuse continues while so much money is poured into promoting their culture. I can see no value to themselves and to the wider community while they continue to educate themselves in such violent, obscene and offensive cultural practices. They should be forced to evolve into a modern world or surrender the funding that has actively promoted a culture that I, and many others, find repugnant in this age. These sad and sick failures are a legacy this society cannot tolerate much longer (Brown, 2006)

Beyond the reference to violence as a problem within a “small minority” of Māori, it is common to find references to violence as a problem with the majority of Māori: “The hell Nia Glassie must have gone through is ...a sign of the prevalent violence of Maori towards the young...The future holds a poor outlook for young Maori children unless Maori can shake off their dysfunctional drug and alcohol abuse” (Ellis, 2008). This is phrased more simply as: “Why is it that so many Maori kill the youngsters in their care?” ("We must stop the slaughter," 2000, p.8). Here the conceptual slide is much shorter, from the “prevalent violence of Māori” to dysfunction being ascribed to all Māori. Violence is framed as a specific badness within Māori, different from the violence of Pākehā: “All domestic violence is shameful, but Maori violence in what should be the protection of the home is doubly bad” ("A one-woman crusade to expose the cruelty of domestic violence," 2000). The home, dominant metaphor of the nation, is violated by “doubly bad” “Maori violence”.

From the existence of violence within some Māori homes and families, a line of thought is drawn which holds Māori whānau in general to have failed to offer protection:
But where is the famous whanau we always hear about? What is the value of this nurturing, caring extended Maori family unit when so many of the maimed and killed children are Maori? It’s not Maori bashing. We've always been taught that Maori have this incredible family bond that goes beyond the Pakeha convention of mum, dad and two kids—a net that is both wide and strong.... That’s where most of the blame must lie. How can you rail against the neighbours, against the Government, against the schools, against the myriad social agencies when it all would have been fixed if the whanau had just done their job and stepped in ("It’s up to whanau to make the first move," 2007)

Here, the concept of whānau is held as a deception, a lie that was told to “us”, to Pākehā New Zealanders. It is portrayed as something which should have offered protection but failed to do the job that “we always hear” it should do. The anger expressed here is that whānau “let [abused children] down”, yet it also hints at an anger that whānau have let “us” down. “We've always been taught that Maori have this incredible family bond that goes beyond the Pakeha convention of mum, dad and two kids”, yet “we” have been disappointed by the failure of this “incredible family”. The “blame” here is portrayed as being removed from anyone other than whānau members. It is said to belong not to “the neighbours…the Government…the schools…the myriad social agencies”, but exclusively to the whānau. The whānau is here seen as being one coherent unit with “personal responsibility”. “Whanau” in this context seems to stand in for all Māori, who are then accused of hypocrisy and of a failure to take action: “Maori are often saying they would like to have the opportunities to run their own lives and sort out their own problems. Well, here you are then” ("It's up to whanau to make the first move," 2007). There is an implication that it is all whānau who have failed to act, “But where is the famous whanau we always hear about”. All whānau are implied to be valueless: “What is the value of this nurturing, caring extended Maori family unit”. While whānau is presented here as a fantasy of an “incredible family” that has failed to live up to what it promised “us”, this elides with claims
that it is an inherently flawed way of being a family, doomed to failure. This can be seen in the following quotation:

The death of the Kahui twins has brought claims that not only did the extended family not know who killed them, they didn’t even know who was caring for them. ...Maori tell us that their extended family shared parenting practice is something to be admired and emulated, yet at the same time Maori leaders, Maori MPs and so on tell us that Maori are disproportionately represented in many areas of society, such as learning difficulties, family violence, obesity, addiction to cigarettes, alcohol and drug abuse, crime statistics, prison numbers and so on....If we're to believe that Maori are equal to all other "races", and I do, then what does that leave? If it’s not genetic, not nature, then it’s nurture, the environment that they’re raised in. Perhaps it’s time that Maori realise that their extended family model is another tradition, along with utu and taniwhas, that doesn't prepare their children for the 21st century ("Tradition," 2006, p.6)

While the anger at what “we” have been told remains, here Māori concepts of family are held, not to have failed to live up to their promise, but to be actively detrimental to survival. Associated with both the violent and the childishly imagined (which “utu” and “taniwhas” represent in this line of argument⁴), the Māori “extended family shared parenting practice” appears as something that cannot function properly in “the 21st century”. It is held to be something that cannot correctly “prepare ...children” for the nation’s present or the nation’s future. Māori are said, in this argument, to have failed to participate properly in the nation — failed to learn, failed to not be obese, failed to stay out of prison, failed to not be violent — by failing to change their “extended family model”. The “Maori...extended family” is presented as something that has already failed and continues to fail, dragging past failure into the present. To return to Billig’s statement that:

The national space [is] imagined as a homely space, cosy within its borders, secure against the dangerous outside world. And ‘we’, the nation within the homeland can

⁴ The complex meanings of the concepts of “utu” and “taniwha” are explained in the glossary of this thesis. In statements such as the one quoted above, the words “utu” and “taniwhas” are commonly deployed to signify ‘violent revenge’ and ‘imaginary monsters’ respectively.
so easily imagine ‘ourselves’ as some sort of family. If the national home is to be homely, then ‘we’ must make it so (Billig, 1995, p.109).

The “Maori...extended family” is here held to have catastrophically failed to make the nation homely. Beyond failing to “secure [the nation] against the dangerous outside world”, the “Maori...extended family” is accused of having failed to protect against a dangerous inside world, a source of danger within the nation.

“The obvious link”

The description of child abuse as “a Maori issue” appears in conjunction with claims that it has previously been forbidden to speak of child abuse as a Māori issue: it is asserted as a truth that has only just been allowed to be acknowledged. Thus, in 2000, the following is asserted by two sources:

The obvious link between all these tragedies has finally been acknowledged. The victims and their assailants are all Maori ("A long list of small tragedies," 2000, p.8)

The conspiracy of silence around child abuse and neglect in Maoridom has been ripped apart by the recent tragedy in the Wairarapa. A tapu has been lifted. Suddenly it is acceptable to debate an issue that has been crying out for exposure for years (DuFresne, 2000, p.4)

The “conspiracy of silence” is said to have been broken: it is finally “acceptable” for ‘us’ to speak of “the obvious link”. “Maori” child abuse appears as something that has been silenced that is finally able to be spoken of, something partly hidden that has finally been allowed to come to light, a secret ‘we’ are finally allowed to discuss. The echo here of Freud’s uncanny “something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light” (Freud, 1955, p.241) will be discussed in more depth later in this chapter. Six years after the
initial statements shown above, the same silence is said to have finally been broken, the same claims said to be finally permissible:

I wonder whether the violent deaths of the Kahui twins have brought us to some sort of watershed in race relations in this country. ...Something about the deaths of the Kahui twins, the subsequent closing of ranks by the whanau...clearly touched a raw nerve among otherwise politically correct New Zealanders....Perhaps, I thought, well-intentioned Pakeha liberalism has finally been tested to its limit....let's explode, once and for all, the myth of the warm, nurturing embrace of the whanau (DuFresne, 2006b, p.15)

Once again it is said to only now be possible for “New Zealanders”, now more clearly declared as “Pakeha”, to confront child abuse as being “Maori”, to “explode...the myth...” that is declared to have been in force. Again and again, “Maori child abuse” (“Dunne urges Maori to sort out Maori child abuse," 2007) seems to have only just now become mentionable: a constant resurfacing of permission to discuss with a concurrent forgetting of all previous permission to discuss that mimics the pattern of the compulsion to repeat, an “endless repetition of the same” (Freud, 1920, p172). Warnings are issued that “now” things are changed, “Well Maoridom has real problems now. Don’t expect sympathy and understanding for past or present grievances”(Richardson, 2007). It is stated that now “it is time” to deal with the “Maori problem”: “It’s time to stop pretending that the kind of child abuse suffered by Nia Glassie and the Kahui twins is not a Maori problem” (Dunne, "Dunne urges Maori to sort out Maori child abuse," 2007). The image here is of a previous tolerance, a “sympathy and understanding”, that has come to an end, a pretence that has been given up.
The driving force behind this “silence” that is repeatedly said to have only just been broken is named as “political correctness”:

...why, then, can’t we prevent the abuse occurring? If it is because many of the at-risk families are also Māori, and there is an aversion to singling them out, we need to ask ourselves if it is right that their children pay the price for society’s political correctness (“Start making sense,” 2007)

“Political correctness” is described as antithetical to ‘our’ speaking truth: “We’re sick and tired of doing nothing while our babies and children have been beaten and murdered….We’ve allowed political correctness to get in the way of speaking truth” (McCroskrie, Lewis, 2007). This attributed silencing of truth is held to be a barrier preventing the protection of potential victims: “Pita Sharples claims the abuse of Māori children is not a simple matter of ethnicity. This is no time for political correctness so what can be done to protect these hapless victims?” (Brooks, 2007). It thus becomes a matter of duty to defy “political correctness” by “speak[ing] out”:

I could not agree more with Christine Rankin’s statement that this country has gone too far in its political correctness in not stating loudly and clearly the distressing fact that Māori are among the worst known child abusers in our society. We must speak out in defence of the defenceless and protect them from the out-of-control monsters who attack the innocent (Elliot, 2006)

In these statements, “Political correctness”, defined as an “aversion to singling... out” Māori, is held responsible for ‘our’ not “speaking truth”. This failure to speak “truth” is then held responsible for “our babies and children” being “beaten and murdered”. It follows that, in order to “protect these hapless victims”, “we” have a duty to “single out” Māori. A line can be traced from the child abuse “rollcall” which focuses largely on Māori children, through versions of this “rollcall” that only include Māori children, to the claim that child abuse is a “Maori problem”. From this the claim is made that “we” have been prevented from
speaking of this “Maori problem” and this leads to a claim that child abuse has not been prevented because “we” have not spoken of it as a “Maori problem”: the implications of this for child abuse victims in non-Māori families are not explored. In the light of this, the repetition of the names “Delcelia Witika, Craig Manukau, James Whakaruru, Hine Karaitiana-Matiaha and Anaru Rogers” (“More offensive to kill kids,” 2000, p.4), “Delcelia Witika, James Whakaruru, Lillybing Karaitiana Matiaha or the Kahui twins” (DuFresne, 2006a), “Delcelia Witika, James Whakaruru, Lillybing Karaitiana-Matiaha, Craig Manukau, Chris and Cru Kahui” (“Let Nia leave a positive legacy,” 2010, p.4) appears as a duty, something that has not been said enough and must be reiterated.

While Māori are not the sole or overwhelmingly predominant perpetrators of child abuse in the way that they are portrayed in the “rollcall of death”, Māori are over-represented amongst cases of severe physical child abuse (Merchant, 2010, pp99-108). Any reasons why this — either the imagined predominance or the real statistical overrepresentation — might be are commonly disallowed as blame-shifting or as unacceptable “excuses” (“No excuses possible,” 2006, p.15). Thus, attempts to discuss violence in Māori families in the context of the proportionally greater number of Māori living in poverty are dismissed as meaningless excuses: “Nothing - not poverty and deprivation, social alienation or any other factor - excuses what happened to these three-month-old baby boys” (“No excuses possible,” 2006, p.15). Poverty is described as not being a problem as it is considered to not truly exist. In this line of argument, “welfare” negates poverty:

Blaming colonisation and too little money simply will not wash. In fact, too much money in the shape of welfare surely plays a bigger part. Reports suggest that the
Kahui whanau survives largely on handouts -- that is, tax dollars paid by working Kiwis -- and booze ("Blame welfare, not colonialism," 2006, p.4)

It is argued that if poverty were truly a problem, then no family would ever escape poverty:

Breaking the cycles of violence, neglect and benefit dependence are massive challenges without easy answers, whatever some might claim. It is not a question of poverty as such because many families with as little money or even less live productive, caring lives. It is, rather, a matter of attitudes ("Crying shame," 2006)

Overall, the argument that family violence is a problem often associated with poverty is dismissed with the argument that Māori families like the Kahui family are instead spoiled by the lack of poverty, by “too much money”, or by misusing their poverty: “It is not a question of poverty…. It is, rather, a matter of attitudes” ("Crying shame," 2006). Poverty is thus barred from the conversation about causes of violence.

A discussion of violence within Māori families as taking place in the context of colonialism is refuted as an unacceptable ‘scapegoating’ of Pākehā:

Over the past decade Maori radicals have created a fun new national sport, Pakeha bashing. The game’s only rule is to direct all blame for anything bad that has occurred to Maori on the white devil…. As for Turia, who has blamed Pakeha for genocide, it's funny that on matters of Maori domestic violence the former Associate Maori Affairs Minister falls silent. Where was the hikoi for Delcelia Witika, Lillybing or James Whakaruru? In the end it is easier to blame convenient white scapegoats for Maoridom's problems (Ensor, 2004, p.10)

To trace Māori issues back to colonisation is seen as a ‘demonization’ of European presence in New Zealand:

Mrs Turia tracks all Maori woes back to colonisation and seeks to demonise 200 years of variously welcomed and resisted European immigration. This is despite the countless generations of Maori success stories in every spectrum of society .... To blame the ancient, global and inevitable pattern of cultural disruption for the child-
rearing, health, educational, vocational and crime failings of a Maori minority today is cruel deception ("Behind the statistics is an even more worrying story," 2000, p.8)

Ultimately, discussion of colonisation is portrayed as a reprehensible and racist attempt to divert attention away from a failure assumed to be inherent in Māori “social structure”:

This issue of Metro is dedicated to the memory of Tangaroa Matiu. Another child whose horrific death has... become a political football and vehicle for the self-deception and reverse racism of some Maori leaders. Tangaroa Matiu was not, as Associate Maori Affairs Minister Tariana Turia would have it, a victim of colonialism. He was murdered by a sadist and allowed to die ... Turia’s statement makes all Maori victims, and her portrayal of them as suffering some invented collective psychological disorder does nothing to enhance her people's self-esteem or to improve the chances of those in trouble rescuing themselves from their plight. ...

What she was saying is that Maori should be protected from the truth of failures in their social structure that are causing such havoc because they are subjected to "Post Colonial Traumatic Stress Disorder". But Turia's position does far worse damage ... What are we supposed to put on the boy's headstone? "Here lies Tangaroa Matiu. He died of Post Colonial Stress Disorder. No one was to blame apart from pakeha" ("What others are saying," 2000, p.4)

Colonisation is here disallowed as a contributing factor in child abuse partly on the grounds that not all Māori live in poverty or kill their children, that there are “countless generations of Maori success stories” and on the basis that colonisation has happened many times to many different nations, “the ancient, global and inevitable pattern of cultural disruption” ("Behind the statistics is an even more worrying story," 2000, p.8). As an “ancient...and inevitable pattern”, colonisation is presented as a natural and by implication unquestionable process. As colonisation has happened globally it is implied to have happened to every group equally, with any effects on one group therefore cancelled out. The argument that colonisation cannot have had an effect on Māori because there are Māori “success stories” holds that for colonisation to be allowed as a cause of disadvantage, every Māori person must be ‘unsuccessful’: the success of any Māori person negates any claim about disadvantage. Colonisation is presented as a neutral process, with positives and negatives
that cancel each other out: “200 years of variously welcomed and resisted European immigration” ("Behind the statistics is an even more worrying story," 2000, p.8). By this reasoning it cannot have caused any harm. In other examples no reason is given for dismissing colonisation as a contributing factor. It is simply dismissed without a stated cause: “Tangaroa Matiu was not...a victim of colonialism. He was murdered by a sadist and allowed to die” ("What others are saying," 2000, p.4).

In this line of argument there is no room for the possibility that severe child abuse could be the result both of individual abusers violent actions and of historical and social situations that made these actions more likely. One single cause must, by this argument, be chosen, and since it was the fault of “a sadist” it cannot also be the fault of “colonialism” ("What others are saying," 2000, p.4). Another line of argument holds that, while colonisation can be allowed to have had negative effects on Māori, these effects were too long ago to matter and thus should not be referred to:

Mr Sharples' co-leader, Tariana Turia, prefers to blame "colonialism" for the plethora of issues low-income Maori families face. Few dispute that early colonists forcibly took Maori land. But such theft happened more than 100 years ago and successive recent governments have worked hard to atone for Pakeha sins. Neither colonists nor Pakeha killed Chris and Cru Kahui ("Blame welfare, not colonialism," 2006, p.4)

Colonisation is described as something that happened in the past and has ended, and thus as something that should be “laid to rest”:

The homicide of the Kahui twins has produced another raft of excuses and complaints regarding racism and social marginalisation by the predominant culture. While there is undoubtedly truth to these claims, much of the injustice is historical and as such needs to be laid to rest. To continue to justify this latest horrifying example of violence as understandable because of past injustice only perpetuates
the cycle, allowing those responsible to abrogate their responsibilities yet again, in a maelstrom of recriminations (Kostanich, 2006)

Here, the “past injustice” (Kostanich, 2006) of colonisation is seen as a factor that could have been relevant in the past but can no longer be used as an “excuse” for child abuse because it has been “atone[d] for”. There is no explanation offered as to whether, by these terms, violence against children committed by Māori at some time in the past when injustice was not fully “atone[d] for” would have been considered excusable. Thus any negative effects of colonisation are dismissed as irrelevant, as non-existent, or as having existed in the past but not now. There can be a lack of clarity about what is being discussed when a connection between past injustice and present child abuse is referred to. This can be seen in the statement: “She [Mrs Turia] was going down the track of ... telling me it was all the fault of the Treaty of Waitangi that these children have been killed” (McClay, "Maharey will summon children's commisioner," 2000). Turia has stated that her argument, which McClay was referring to, was about “colonisation and its social and economic effects on whanau" (Turia, "Maharey will summon children's commisioner," 2000). Here the argument about a link between colonisation and high rates of violence against children among Māori is believed to be an absurd argument that the Treaty of Waitangi is causing child deaths, an argument that is then dismissed because it is absurd.

To speak of colonisation is here considered to equate to being wrongfully silent about child abuse: “As for Turia, who has blamed pakeha for genocide, it's funny that on matters of Maori domestic violence the former Associate Maori Affairs Minister falls silent.” (Ensor, 2004, p.10). Discussion of colonisation is positioned as a “cruel deception”("Behind the
statistics is an even more worrying story," 2000, p.8) which is actively harmful to attempts to prevent child abuse:

Turia's statement makes all Maori victims, and her portrayal of them as suffering some invented collective psychological disorder does nothing to enhance her people's self-esteem or to improve the chances of those in trouble rescuing themselves from their plight. ... What she was saying is that Maori should be protected from the truth of failures in their social structure that are causing such havoc ... But Turia's position does far worse damage ("What others are saying," 2000, p.4)

Speaking of the effects of colonisation is here held responsible for making “all Maori victims”, for failing to enhance “self esteem”, for making it impossible for Māori to rescue “themselves from their plight”, and for doing “far worse damage” than “the truth of failures” would do. The act of speaking of colonisation, in this depiction, is almost in itself responsible for child abuse: it may not kill children, but it stands accused of maintaining the situation in which they are killed. In an inverse of the situation where describing child abuse as a “Maori problem” appears as an imperative, as something that must be done in order to prevent further child abuse, there seems to be an imperative not to speak of colonisation. Māori are held to have failed in their duty to not speak of colonisation, and therefore to have perpetuated “Maori child abuse”. It is notable that the person mentioned by name as needing to be silent about colonisation is a Māori woman, Tariana Turia. Turia is described as: “one who carries a great burden of mental poison...She suggested we should all learn about the effects of "colonisation", which adds to the suspicion that the poison was acquired at public expense at university” (Sandbrook, 2000, p.10). Here, she appears as a bearer of “poison”, both poisoned and poisonous. The poison Turia is accused of attempting to spread in the nation takes the form of knowledge “acquired at...university”. Knowledge of the past here appears as a contamination, an attempt to kill off the nation. There is a
troubled connection here, between Māori women and knowledge of the past, which will be explored in more detail later in this chapter.

The mention of colonisation is held to be a direct accusation that Pākehā are responsible for the fatal abuse of Māori children:

“What are we supposed to put on the boy's headstone? ‘Here lies Tangaroa Matiu. He died of Post Colonial Stress Disorder. No one was to blame apart from pakeha’” ("What others are saying," 2000)

This is held to be part of a system of “Pakeha bashing” which is said to be used to shift blame for “Maori” failings onto Pākehā:

Over the past decade Maori radicals have created a fun new national sport, Pakeha bashing. The game’s only rule is to direct all blame for anything bad that has occurred to Maori on the white devil...In the end it is easier to blame convenient white scapegoats for Maoridom's problems (Ensor, 2004, p.10)

Māori are held to be telling Pākehā, who are figured as ‘us’, that child abuse is “all our fault”: “It was as drearily familiar as Dr Paparangi Reid... telling the New Zealand Herald a few days earlier that the Kahui twins died because of Maori powerlessness and frustration. In other words, it's all our fault “(DuFresne, 2006b, p.15). This is described as part of an overall pattern of blaming non-Māori: “Failure to accept blame is not just a Maori issue. But when Maori are to own their own wrongdoing, they are encouraged by the resurgent need to establish a Maori identity, causing them to blame non-Maori for their woes and fail to accept our laws as relevant” (Barber, 2006, p.4). Felt as an accusation aimed directly at “us”, at Pākehā, any talk of a link with colonisation is vehemently refuted: “Neither colonists nor Pakeha killed Chris and Cru Kahui” ("Blame welfare, not colonialism," 2006, p.4). ‘We’ Pākehā or ‘we’ “non-Maori” did not kill children — in this argument, there is no
acknowledgement that most Māori did not either—yet “we” are said to be being “blame[d]”, scapegoated, subject to “bashing”. The accusation that Pākehā are being unfairly accused acts to separate Pākehā from any association with child abuse. Not only does child abuse committed by Pākehā parents or caregivers disappear from sight, any suggestion that child abuse could be in any way related to any previous actions of any group of Pākehā is refused. The accusations which Māori are considered to aim at Pākehā are very similar to those which the descriptor “Maori child abuse” aims at Māori. Through the term “Maori child abuse”, Māori are held to be “at fault”; they are, en masse, “blamed”. Thus there is a double refusal: a refusal of any Pākehā involvement in creating a background for child abuse and a refusal to recognise that the accusation these writers claim to suffer are a mirror of the accusation they aim towards Māori. This refutation of perceived accusations works in a way that is similar to Jacqueline Rose’s description of the actions of a ‘never mind’, which “never recognises its own psychic activity, its compliance with what it abhors...never sees as part of its own psychic landscape the contents it deposits and punishes elsewhere” (Rose, 1996, p.60). The vehemence of the refusal of alleged accusations makes it clear that child abuse is not to be associated with Pākehā, with “us”.

Child abuse, often framed as a “Maori issue”, is occasionally described as coming from an inherent corruption and worthlessness in Māori culture, as in the following example:

It is unacceptable that Maori child abuse continues while so much money is poured into promoting their culture. I can see no value to themselves and to the wider community while they continue to educate themselves in such violent, obscene and offensive cultural practices (Brown, 2006)
Here Māori culture appears as a reservoir of obscenity and vileness, lodged within the “wider community”, from with violence against children inevitably erupts. In this view, while Māori are to blame for continuing to “educate themselves in violent...offensive cultural practices” (Brown, 2006). It is never specified what these horrifying cultural practices are, but the description endows them with a nightmarish quality. A reason is provided for “Maori child abuse”: it springs naturally from the nightmarish vision of Māori culture. It is however, unusual for this view that Māori culture is a direct source for violence to be stated. Against the background of claims that child abuse is “a Maori problem”, ‘Māoriness’ is more commonly described as an unacceptable excuse used to deflect responsibility for child abuse. This can be seen in the Kahui case, where accusations that the Kahui family were using their culture as an excuse to avoid talking to the police:

The baby Kahui twins tragedy highlights a confused society. Upholding the law is tough enough. Attempting to accommodate cultural issues - real, imagined or deliberately manufactured - while upholding the law is a recipe for disaster.... If anything, it has provided further fertile ground for muddled thinking, fuelled by a foggy vision on cultural and rights issues (Arthur, 2006, p.6)

While it is conceded that “cultural issues” may be “real”, this possibility is doubly outweighed by the possibility that they are “imagined or deliberately manufactured”, that they are fake “cultural issues” which both spring from and contribute to “foggy vision on cultural and rights issues”. The claim that Māori culture is being intentionally or unintentionally manufactured to gain extra rights can be extended into a claim that Māori culture is being used as an excuse for child abuse. Thus, in an editorial that states “…the killings are not - nor should they have ever been seen as - ‘a Maori issue’.” ("Where are the cries of outrage?,” 2006), Hawkes Bay Today states:
To have given it that exceptional qualification manufactures any number of explanations and excuses for the tragedy. The Kahui family is merely exploiting the generosity that classification provides....Why must there be an ethnic context for violent or murderous behaviour that gives grounds for mitigation, even before anyone knows what happened in the Kahui case? There was a time when a diagnosed inability to accept responsibility for one’s actions was grounds for committal to a psychiatric institution. Nowadays the absence of free will has acquired a distressing respectability. How can one defeat that prejudice when many of its proponents are Maori leaders (witness, too, the number of politicians who are beneficiaries of the “exception” made for Maori)?("Where are the cries of outrage?," 2006, p.6)

Here the argument against child abuse being seen as “a Maori issue” is that if it were seen that way some “grounds for mitigation” of “violent or murderous behaviour” would be provided. Māoriness here is seen as a “classification” that can be exploited to provide “explanations and excuses” for one family’s behaviour. Yet, while describing child abuse as not “a Maori issue”, the piece claims that “a diagnosed inability to accept responsibility” is a Māori issue, locating it both within the Kahui family and among “Maori leaders”. Clearly, something is being named as “a Maori issue”: either a desire “to avoid responsibility”, a willingness to provide or accept “excuses”, a desire to exploit unfair “exceptions”, or a combination of all these “issues”. While “Maori leaders” can be accused of avoiding responsibility by “pretending that... child abuse...is not a Maori problem” (Dunne, "Dunne urges Maori to sort out Maori child abuse," 2007), they can equally be accused of avoiding responsibility by giving child abuse the “exceptional qualification” of being “a Maori issue”.

The imperative that child abuse be described as “a Maori problem” is met with an imperative that child abuse must not be described as a “Maori issue” as doing so would provide “explanations” that cannot be permitted. With no explanations permitted for the existence of child abuse in Māori families, the only permissible reason for “Maori child abuse” to occur appears to be some internal source of corruption.
“Breeding”

If “Maori child abuse” is deemed to spring from some internal source of wrongness, it is worth investigating the nature of this corruption that is considered to be the cause of child abuse. It is not my intention here to express surprise at public condemnation of people who inflicted, participated in, or failed to act to prevent child abuse, nor to express surprise that derogatory terms are used in this condemnation. I do however, wish to interrogate the terms in which that condemnation is commonly expressed, in order to unearth the anxieties such terms provide a conduit for. It is not uncommon for the parents of children on the “rollcall of shame” to be discussed in terms that render them less-than-human. Little distinction is made between parents who participated in abuse and parents who did not. It is suggested that they should be the subject of similar bodily controls as those applied to animals: “If chipping dogs will prevent injury to children, perhaps we should consider chipping humans. Then, maybe horrible events, such as the killing of the Kahui twins, would no longer occur” (Stevens, 2006, p.4). The suggestion that children in New Zealand are afforded less legal protection than dogs is elided with a suggestion that child abusers are more akin to dogs than humans: “a licence is required for a dog. If parents fail to meet these requirements, abortion should be enforced” (Tame, 2006, p.8). The following statement expresses these connections clearly:

...a Northland couple have been...forbidden from owning a dog for at least 10 years following their conviction for cruelty to eight dogs...compare this with Lisa Kuka’s recent conviction for the manslaughter of her helpless 3-year-old daughter Nia Glassie. Sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, she will be out in just four and her conviction certainly doesn’t state she is no longer entitled to breed (Marrah, 2009, p.6)
It is notable that the reference here is to being “entitled to breed” rather than being “entitled to have children”. The parents of children on the “rollcall of shame” are rarely referred to as performing the human act of “having children” but rather of performing the animal act of “breeding”. The connotations that go with “breeding”, of large litters of young and of overabundance, are not absent here. The following are some examples of this frequent reference to “breeding” in the context of child abuse: “taxpayers have to stop paying repeat abusers to breed” (Coddington, 2011); “mothers who continue to breed after a child's murder” (Akraman, 2011); “I have a simple message to the parents of the murdered twins...don't breed” (Larkin, 2006, p.8); “they breed like rabbits and only for habit and money” (Hodgson, 2007); “no more child abuse from these people who are being paid to breed” (Clark, 2008, p.9); “Parents who beat their children to death are scum paid by the government to breed children they don't want” (Perigo, 2009); “Such liberalism is the reason children are abused, maimed and killed...We offer financial incentives for such persons to breed” (Laws, 2009, p.8).

The solutions offered for this excess of “breeding” include withdrawal of the money that is assumed to be the sole motivation for “breeding”: “taxpayers have to stop paying repeat abusers to breed. We know they carry on having kids on the public purse while CYF struggles to cope” (Coddington, 2011). In a slight variation of this approach, they also include financial incentives to not “breed”: “We offer financial incentives for such persons to breed. What I am suggesting is the opposite: encourage the unsuitable not to have children” (Laws, 2009, p.8). Yet there are also references to an unspecified prevention of “breeding”: “her conviction certainly doesn't state she is no longer entitled to breed. Should this not in fact
be the case?” (Marrah, 2009, p.6); “anyone...who abuses children should never be allowed to sire or give birth to another baby” ("Let Nia leave a positive legacy," 2010); “The people who should breed the least, breed the most. Something needs to be done” ("Andy", 2010). Beyond this, there is the more openly stated option of compulsory sterilisation: `Bugger their human rights. Neuter them. You cannot abuse children you haven't got’ (Marc Alexander"Spay parents who abuse their kids ", 2006), “Compulsory sterilisation of both parties (they breed like rabbits and only for habit and money)”(Hodgson, 2007). The theme of “breeding” child abusers as overly fecund animals is extended through the language used here: “neuter them” and “breed like rabbits”. Breeding like dangerous pets or invasive vermin, “such persons”, it is stated, must be forcibly neutered. 

Who is this breeding-prevention, this sterilisation, intended for? Some references are made to the sterilisation of both men and women, “sterilisation of both parties” (Hodgson, 2007), of any race, “anyone - no matter their skin colour - who abuses children should never be allowed to sire or give birth to another baby” ("Let Nia leave a positive legacy," 2010).Yet many references are more specific about who needs to be “neutered”. Thus in the press release “Spay parents who abuse their kids”, the cases are listed:

Remember five-year-old James Whakaruru killed by his step-father in 1999, or two-year-old Hinewaoriki "Lillybing" Karaitiana-Matiaha, killed by her aunt in 2000...How about three-year-old Tangaroa Matui who was killed by his step-father; Pirimai Simmonds killed by his father in 2001, or two-year-old Delcelia Witika, beaten to death by her parents in 1991? (Marc Alexander"Spay parents who abuse their kids ", 2006)
All of these children are Māori: just as Māori children are more likely to appear on the “rollcall of shame”, the parents of abused Māori children are more likely to be recommended for sterilisation. “Neutering”, or revocation of “breeding” rights, is commonly recommended for women rather than for men, as can be seen in the following examples: “adults having too many rights. Like mothers who continue to breed after a child's murder” (Akraman, 2011); “Perhaps it is time to consider enforced sterilisation for women who allow their children to be used as punching bags by their violent, dysfunctional partners” (Youl, 2007); “She needs to be sterilised. She’s had the privilege of being a mother and should lose the right to breed” (Otto, 2011); “Sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment, she will be out in just four and her conviction certainly doesn’t state she is no longer entitled to breed” (Marrah, 2009, p.6). Uncontrolled “breeding” is here given as predominantly a problem with mothers: fathers drop out of sight. It is noticeable that this “compulsory sterilisation” is not desired to be applied only to women who participated in the abuse of their children, but to those who “allow their children to be used as punching bags” (Youl, 2007) or who were in any way unable to prevent their children from being murdered, such as “mothers who continue to breed after a child's murder”. This call for sterilisation of mothers who have in any way participated in or failed to prevent the abuse of their children may be presented as an extreme but necessary action:

The concept of forcibly removing the reproductive capabilities of people deemed undesirable by the state is anathema to most thinking people....But our child abuse stats are absolutely appalling and every option to save kids' lives should be considered, no matter how extreme we might think it (Woodham, 2010)

Yet there is a slippage between this and the suggestion that all poor women should be either financially penalised for or forcibly prevented from “breeding” in order to prevent child abuse:
If we want to reduce the number of our babies who ...die abandoned or at the hands of a brute, we need policies that encourage lifelong commitment of parents to their children and to each other. We've got to stop paying children to have children and all the other things the state does to reward dysfunction ("State should not reward dysfunction," 2003)

In this line of argument, large families are considered to be ‘amassed’ by mainly single mothers in order to acquire money, and this is cited as the source of the problems that result in violence: “The only way the system is failing is by allowing the lowest of the low to amass huge families and rewarding such improvident behaviour by bumping up the welfare payout for...the family (or, more often than not, the single mother)” (Campbell, 2010). This is associated with a notion that to have a child while receiving welfare payments is to create an abusive situation: “a practical solution to child abuse....Re-establish the dole queue. You want the money - you take the Pill. Social Welfare record by photo who takes the Pill and gets the money" (Anderson, 2011).

As can be seen below, these arguments conflate of the death of young children with the birth of children to single women:

Is the welfare state complicit in sponsoring infanticide in Godzone?...Our country quite literally pays people to procreate with little or no thought to what kind of world these babes are born into....The benefit should not be granted unless the father is named or proven by DNA (Evans-Mcleod, 2008, p.4)

At the end point of this line of thought, single motherhood is directly equated to being the mother of a murdered child: “mothers who continue to breed after a child's murder and single women who continue to have children when they have neither the resources nor intelligence to rear them” (Akraman, 2011). Single motherhood, or motherhood while
receiving the unemployment benefit, is here considered the same thing as being the mother of an abused child, which is itself deemed to be the same thing as abusing a child.

Motherhood, especially unmarried motherhood, in poverty of a large number of children is treated, not as correlated with murderous child abuse, but as the cause of child abuse. To be a poor or unmarried mother of many is to be a murderer.

It is impossible to determine whether this desired sterilisation of “breeding” women is specifically aimed at Māori. Yet with one exception — a woman of Polynesian descent — the women who I could find named as requiring sterilisation were Māori: Tania Witika (Woodham, 2010) and Lisa Kuka (Marrah, 2009, p.6) were both named more than once. The accusation of mindlessly “breeding” rather than having children is also applied to Māori women outside the context of abuse: “If Lisa Ngatai is comfortable having her difficulties published in the media, she could be more forthcoming about the reality of her circumstances. Questions arise in respect to the number of children…. if you can't feed them, why breed them?” (Evans-Mcleod, 2012, p.15). While references to “lowest of the low” (Campbell, 2010) excessively “breeding” may or may not be referring to Māori, there is an association of Māori with the notion of criminal ‘overbreeding’:

If Turia wants Maori to go forth and multiply, will she expect New Zealand taxpayers to fund her irresponsible behaviour and will she go forth and set an example, or just allow the progeny to suffer further and help Don Brash build bigger and better prisons? (Patterson, 2004, p.16)

Māori women with many children are here categorised as bad mothers, “breeding” irresponsibly and bringing suffering. The association of poor and/or brown-skinned women with the animalistic process of “breeding” can be seen as part of an overall ideology
whereby poor/non-white women are associated with the bodily and the bestial, considered incapable of human consciousness: “The bestial, poor, black and marked body cannot transcend itself to consciousness” (Mohanram, 1999, p.38).

A contrast is set up between good women and bad mothers. Good women “have babies” with effort, struggle and care, while bad mothers effortlessly, mindlessly “breed”:

It is a cruel irony that thousands of New Zealand women struggling with infertility are desperate to have children, while beautiful babies ...are subjected to a life of degradation and torture at the hands of uncaring parents who take their ability to conceive very lightly... Civil libertarians will no doubt be outraged at the thought of curtailing a woman’s right to breed (Youl, 2007)

This is presented as an inevitable, though cruel, division between the caring and the uncaring:

It's one of life's cruel jokes that those who are responsible for the most vicious treatment of children seem able to pop out babies at will, while other people spend years of emotional pain and thousands of dollars trying to have just one baby they can nurture and adore (Woodham, 2010)

‘Good women’ are granted emotional depth, “emotional pain” (Woodham, 2010), and the will to keep “trying” (Woodham, 2010), and “struggling” (Youl, 2007), while ‘bad mothers’ are granted no plans, emotion, wishes or desires, no reason for “breeding” other than avarice or inattention. Rather than undergoing the human process of giving birth, bad mothers — poor mothers, murderous mothers, Māori mothers — “pop out babies”(Woodham, 2010): “That sounds like a fantastic incentive to keep the baby factory popping one out every few years whether you want them or not” (Clark, 2008); “Lazy parents popping out children ad nauseam in order to remain on benefits are the primary cause of society's ills” (Thomas, 2008, p.8). Here, bad mothers are mindless and bodily,
while good mothers are mindful and act intentionally. This is reminiscent of the pattern

Mohanram notes “For the rich white ...the mind spills over into the body, making it
disappear altogether; for the black and/or poor..., it is the body that is highlighted”
(Mohanram, 1999, p.37). The opposing categories that Mohanram notes serve to reinforce
each other, with the poor/black body taking on the excess embodiment that the rich/white body sheds:

If the ‘Body’ can only exist as a trace, its ontological spoor is left on the black body.
In fact it is the process of displacement that allows the Negro/female/perverted
body to come into being. They are the body. They cannot attain the dialectic of
subject and object, cannot transcend their materiality (Mohanram, 1999, p.51)

Yet here ‘Bad mothers’ are both utterly bodily — breeding like rabbits, exempt from
emotion and reason — and strangely disembodied, “popping out children” (Woodham,
2010) effortlessly, and perhaps unknowingly, without the bodily struggles of good “New
Zealand women” (Youl, 2007). The bad mother “popping out” her babies appears monstrous
in the manner of the mother-monster in the Alien series of films: depositing an unending
stream of offspring, “unheimlich, monstrous, gothic, alien” (Zwinger, 1992, p.81). Her
horrifying fecundity reveals that which is fearsome about motherhood: “Fear of the archaic
mother turns out to be essentially fear of her generative power” (Kristeva, 1982, p.77). She
is a nightmarish mother, effortlessly and emotionlessly producing her criminal or doomed
“brood” (Campbell, 2010).

Beyond her terrifying tendency to “breed”, there is a strong focus on the behaviour of the
‘bad mother’: “ordinary New Zealanders are victims of Lisa Kuka and those like her. Six
children with three different fathers smacks of irresponsibility” (Campbell, 2010); “The twins
were Macsyna King’s fifth and sixth children. Her interests included partying, clubbing, karaoke, alcohol, drugs and sex. Chris Kahui was the third man to father children with her” (Taylor, 2008). Here bad motherly behaviour — too many children, too much sex, too many partners — appears not so much a feature of a dysfunctional life as a cause of death in and of itself. Kristeva discusses the association between the sexual, sinning mother and death in her piece Stabat Mater: “Mary was contrasted with Eve, life with death” (Kristeva, 1987, p.239). The good mother, sinless and life-giving, is created by separating her off from the sinful and therefore death-giving mother, dividing her off from “the intertwining of sexuality and death...they are mutually implicated with each other, one cannot avoid one without fleeing the other” (Kristeva, 1987, p.239). Thus the good mother is separated from death: “by depriving her of sin to deprive her of death” (Kristeva, 1987, p.238). ‘Bad mothers’ such as Kuka and King, despite the differences in their individual behaviour, fall on the other side of this equation, unable to separate themselves from sex, sin and death. As ‘bad mothers’, they appear voracious, excessive in consumption — of sex, drugs, relationships — and in production of children.

The notion of “Too much”

This bad motherly behaviour is considered to be combined with the perceived bad behaviour of the (Māori?) poor: “References to a ‘party house’ with numerous people drifting through implies that some on the property were connected with that great underclass that has been, if not created, then certainly sustained by the benefit system” (Hopkins, 2006). The badly behaved “underclass” is set in opposition to “working Kiwis”: "In fact, too much money in
the shape of welfare surely plays a bigger part. Reports suggest that the Kahui whanau survives largely on handouts -- that is, tax dollars paid by working Kiwis -- and booze” ("Blame welfare, not colonialism," 2006, p.4). Rather than an indication of a problem, parties appear as the problem itself. Here, the idea of too much — “too much money”, too many “handouts”, too many “tax dollars paid”, too much “booze”, too many parties — drives out the possibility that too little — too little space for eight adults, too few options — may have been a contributing factor in generating abusive behaviour. “Too much” appears as the overarching problem, excluding other possible explanations of why some families are abusive. Child abuse, framed as “Maori child abuse”, appears as driven by some internal excess, some desire for too much. The poor, this argument holds, are corrupted by “too much” money, money in amounts that would not be considered “too much” for the non-poor: “more than $1000 a week” ("Taxpayers shell out for kahuis," 2006) between eight adults and four children is described as an excessive amount of money in the Kahui case, despite being below the poverty line.

This excess is not depicted as a problem that is restricted to families, such as the Kahui family, in which violence has taken place. Rather it is portrayed as a widespread flaw from which child abuse is inevitably “spawned”. This can be seen in a series of articles that claim “We went in search of the squalor and neglect that in June spawned the tragedy of three-month-old twins Chris and Cru Kahui”(Van Beynen & Hargreaves, 2006b, p.2). It is indicated that the worthy poor and the unworthy poor can be distinguished: “we find the poor. The worthy poor, and plenty who are poor through their own fault” (Van Beynen & Hargreaves,
An example of the worthy poor is Owen Butler, rendered worthy by his age, pride and cautiousness:

In Dunedin, washed with waves of sleet and an icy wind on the day we visit, is Owen Butler, 89, who spends the day sitting by his fire which he is slowly feeding from a pile stacked around his feet. Not too much, mind. Butler is a proud man who, although now bent and failing, is determined to see out his days in his old, leaking house (Van Beynen & Hargreaves, 2006b, p.2)

By contrast the “poor through their own fault” are marked by excess, an excess of the wrong things: “late-model Japanese imports sit perched on the driveway, many houses have a Sky TV dish” (Van Beynen & Hargreaves, 2006b, p.2); “She is also a drain on the state and a study in the attitude of entitlement. We find her in Otara, South Auckland, near the Ferguson Road shops...The shops have become de rigueur for new rap and hip-hop videos” (Van Beynen & Hargreaves, 2006a, p.9). This poverty is seen as self-generated by an internal fault in those who suffer from it: “poverty is a symptom rather than a cause of dysfunction” (Van Beynen & Hargreaves, 2006b, p.2). Self-inflicted conditions of poverty appear as the cause of the “squalor and neglect” (Van Beynen & Hargreaves, 2006b, p.2) that “spawned the tragedy of three-month-old twins Chris and Cru Kahui” (Van Beynen & Hargreaves, 2006b, p.2). The undeserving poor here are marked as undeserving by their ownership of modern technology —“a Sky TV dish” rather than an open fire —and their desire for things from the outside world, beyond New Zealand: “late-model Japanese imports” and “new rap and hip hop videos”. The “poor through their own fault” are charged with overspending, but beyond that, with desiring the new and the foreign too much. To be poor in an undeserving way involves letting the present and the outside world in, to be poor in a worthy way is to protect the past and shutting the outside world out. The undeserving poor appear as a
breach in the nation, “drain[ing]” the state of funds and letting squalor, neglect, and foreign desires in.

The mother who failed to protect

The ‘bad mother’, horrifically fecund, insufficiently protective, poor in an undeserving way, is at the intersection of a number of cultural anxieties. It is this that makes the figure of the ‘bad mother’ so prominent in discussions of “Maori child abuse”, while the men responsible for the majority of murderous child abuse fade from view. This confluence of anxieties provides the emotional force behind the statement “Mothers are the biggest killers of Kiwi kids” (Roberts, 2008). The figure of the mother who failed to protect her children is a figure of particular horror. The act of ‘failing to protect’ appears as a failing almost worse than the act of inflicting violence:

Maori violence ...is as much the fault of the women as the men. They have stoically, foolishly accepted the beatings of their husbands...and, worse, have allowed this brutality to extend to their children ("A one-woman crusade to expose the cruelty of domestic violence," 2000)

The possibility of a mother failing to protect children is described as a shocking revelation: “some Maori mothers could stand by while their small children were battered to death” (DuFresne, 2000). The existence of a mother who would fail to protect her child is treated as an ultimate source of shame: “But let's not forget who is really responsible for Hail-Sage's death - her mother - who chose to bring her into the world (or probably "fell pregnant")....If we can't tolerate it, how could their mothers stand by?” (Coddington, 2012). The mother who fails to protect is referred to as having failed to be human through her failure to offer
up her life: “And Lisa Kuka? She should forever hang her head in shame. She has also failed
as a human - and a mother. It was her duty to love and nurture Nia. It was her duty to
fiercely protect Nia with her life” ("Barbaric killers have failed as humans," 2008). The
existence of a mother who cannot protect is considered a reason for utter disgust:

...my greatest disgust has to be for the little girl’s mother Lisa Kuka. She was found
guilty of manslaughter - in that she failed to protect her daughter from the Curtis
animals and didn't provide medical treatment for her - but that can't cover the
shameful neglect of someone who claimed to be a parent ("Nia's loathsome killers
deserve all they get," 2008, p.8)

This could be seen as a combination of the disgust and fear engendered by the death of a
child, “The abjection of...crime reaches its apex when death ...interferes with what... is
supposed to save me from death: childhood...amongst other things” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4),
and the failure of motherhood to live up to the imperative to separate “any conceivable
connection between...violence...and anybody’s mother” (Zwinger, 1992, p.80). Perhaps this
could be more completely figured as the failure of the mother to protect ‘us’ from the
knowledge that childhood cannot “save me [or us] from death” (Kristeva, 1982, p.4): both
the child and mother have failed to guard us from knowledge of death here. The failure of a
mother to protect her child stands out as a singular horror, capable of provoking disgust
worse than the disgust provoked by actually murdering a child: “my greatest disgust has to
be for the little girl's mother” ("Nia's loathsome killers deserve all they get," 2008, p.8).

Yet this failure to protect seems to cling particularly to Māori mothers, as seen in the
phrase “some Maori mothers could stand by” (DuFresne, 2000): it is impossible to find a
reference to this failure that singles out Pākehā mothers in the way Māori mothers are here
singly out. This disgust collects around Māori women, whether named, as is Lisa Kuka, or as an undifferentiated group. The nation’s children are seen both as belonging to the nation—as can be seen in the question “Who are abusing our children?” (Merchant, 2010)— and as representing the nations past, future, and the best of its present. Thus, the question arises of what these Māori women are accused of failing to protect. The nationed meanings ascribed to childhood imply that, not just actual suffering children, but the connection to the nostalgic past and to a hopeful national future are here left unprotected. Thus the horror of a mother who does not protect her child from death meets a particular set of nationed meanings of childhood. If children are figured as the nation’s, as ‘ours’, as ‘us’, perhaps Māori mothers stand charged — along with other charges — with failing to protect ‘us’. Here Māori women appear as unable to keep the national home homely: unable to secure a “familiar, tame, intimate” (Freud, 1955, p.222), heimlich space. In her disgusting state, the mother who fails to protect is “‘daemonic’ ‘gruesome’” (Freud, 1955, p.221), uncan:ny:

...for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated from it only through the process of repression. ...something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light (Freud, 1955, p.241)

Perhaps the answer to the question of why the figure of the ‘bad Maori mother’ is so prominent lies in the incompatibility of her uncanniness with the comfortable nationhood which is desired. Through the figure of the mother who failed to protect, it becomes obvious that fantasies of a perfect childhood cannot be used to secure the nation: the perfect national childhood is revealed as a mirage. Attempts to secure the nation’s future fail though her mediation: dead children, wronged children and excessive children cannot be incorporated into the fantasy of a national future that looks like the past. Perhaps most
uncanny, in the sense of “something...familiar and old-established...which has become alienated...only through the process of repression”, is what the figure of the ‘bad Māori mother’ could reveal about the nation: the refuted history of violence and inequality. The ‘mother who fails to protect’ fails to protect ‘us’ from knowledge: through her, that which is desired to be hidden threatens to become revealed. The threatened revelation, through the figure of the ‘bad Maori mother’, of all that cannot be secured about the nation, of all that is violent about its past and unequal about its present serves as the ultimate “something which ought to have remained hidden but has come to light”.

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Conclusion

Through this thesis I have worked to achieve two things. The first is to trace dominant strands of Pākehā nationalism in New Zealand from their most comforting points to their most divisive extremes. I have, in other words, traced banal nationalism from innocence to cruelty, showing how these two aspects are intimately connected. Some of what I have outlined is specific to New Zealand; other aspects of nationalism that I have explored may be common to other coloniser societies. The second thing I have done with the thesis is an in depth exploration of the roles of notions of childhood and motherhood in creating a sense of nationhood. The circulation of notions of motherhood and childhood may prove to be a widely spread mechanism by which nationalism functions. I have focussed on Pākehā banal nationalism as it is politically dominant within New Zealand. To say that I have explored dominant strands of nationalism is not to say that I have explored the only strands of nationalism that exist: there are many variants that I have not investigated. However, I maintain that the ideological pathway I have here delineated, no matter how much or how little individuals may subscribe to it, remains overwhelmingly culturally and politically influential in New Zealand.

I have traced a number of threads of meaning running through Pākehā nationalism in New Zealand. What has emerged has been an endlessly unstable system in which forgetting and remembering, comfort and discomfort, homeliness and horror are forever out of balance. Attempts to secure a comfortable, homelike nation are forever undermined by the return of repressed elements of the nation’s past and present. The return of this unacknowledged
knowledge is met with increasingly forceful attempts to secure a sense of the nation as an innocent homeland. Yet, the greater the emotional force that is expended on forgetting the past, the more it returns, haunting the edges of the national discourse. The discomfort this haunting return of knowledge engenders is partly transformed into a sense of outrage. This outrage is turned upon Māori, who are held responsible for the discord of which they serve as a constant reminder. The Pākehā nation, as with any nation, emerges as a fantasy, deeply felt but utterly unable to be secured.

I have initially traced the way in which a sense of New Zealand as a nation is continually created. A perception of difference from other nations is invoked in which the ‘Kiwi’ is posited as having a relationship to the land that a foreigner cannot have. The ‘Kiwi’ is shown as knowing how to use the land correctly. From this a notion emerges that the land is in need of protection from the foreign. The ‘Kiwi’ is positioned as the guardian of the physical nation. Beyond the protection of the land from outsiders, there is a sense that ‘Kiwiness’ itself could be threatened by outsiders. Foreigners, it seems, want ‘our stuff’, the stuff that is produced from our ‘Kiwiness’. The ‘Kiwi’ is produced from the land and produces physical tokens of ‘Kiwiness’. Yet if the ‘Kiwi’ is construed as indigenous in opposition to the foreign, where does this leave Māori? Are Māori considered as part of this indigeneity? Are Māori, in the terms of Pākehā nationalism, Kiwi? The answer is elusive. Māori fade in and out of this definition of the ‘Kiwi’ as not-foreign, at times part of the general ‘Kiwi’ mass, at times playing a different role. Māori function as an indicator of indigenousness against which the Kiwi claim to indigeneity is measured. Māori are used in order to assert a ‘Kiwi’ claim to belong to the land, yet in order to do so Māori must be seen as not quite Kiwi.
In separating off ‘New Zealandness’ from ‘foreignness’, a national character is asserted. This national character, posited to be the essential nature of ‘Kiwis’, has a number of key aspects. Many of these reputed national characteristics involve childishness and innocence. The ‘Kiwi’ character emerges as simple, naïve and innovative in opposition to a world seen as knowledgeable, intellectual, and set in its ways. Simplicity is posited as a characteristic that binds ‘Kiwis’ to each other: ‘we’ recognise ‘our’ own simplicity in each other. ‘We’ know each other through our shared unknowingness. New Zealand is figured as a child in the face of the adult outside world. This innocence and childishness is imagined as extending back in time through the history of the nation, though there is an element of ambiguity as to whether pre-European history is part of this national history. Through the projection of the innocent national character backwards through time, a sense of inevitable national continuity is established. ‘We’ have always been simple but innovative; ‘we’ have never been complicated and intellectual. The story of continual national innocence drowns out other stories.

The notion of the nation/national citizen as a child works in conjunction with a valorisation of the family. The family is posited as central to the nation, while the nation is rhetorically figured as a family unit. Through this model, it is assumed that members of the nation are connected to each other in a familial model: ‘we’ relate to each other as brothers, cousins, mums and dads (even if we are none of these things). Membership of this national ‘family’ is highly flexible: even large companies can be figured as ‘family’ in order to connect them to the nation. While the connection between nation and family is central to nationalism in all nations, it here interacts with the valorisation of childlike qualities. The family is a shelter for the childlike national character, but is itself in need of sheltering. ‘Mum and dad’ are not
figured as knowing, but as cheerfully naïve themselves. The innocent national family is seen as the natural home of the ‘Kiwi’.

What is the nature of this innocence, this unknowingness? Why is childlikeness so strongly asserted? Who is in this national family, and who does it exclude? How are the emotional borders of the nation maintained? What happens to those who do not comfortably fit within this innocent national circle? Where do the emotional forces that drive people to identify with the national character come from? These questions have been explored throughout the latter part of my thesis. I have not completely traced the reasons why the valorisation of the childlike is so prominent in New Zealand nationalism: it may well not be completely traceable, a combination of history and happenstance. Yet the emotional underpinnings of this figure of the childlike national citizen are crucial to this thesis. The way in which this national childlike figure meshes with a valorisation of nostalgia is also central to this thesis.

Investigating the childlike nature of the ‘Kiwi’ character leads to an exploration of the function of nostalgia in creating an emotional connection to the nation. In Chapter Two, I investigated the way in which this nostalgic past functions. Initially, I focussed on public attempts to characterise what is best about the nation and what makes it unique. Through these attempts, New Zealand is characterised as a uniquely wonderful country, yet this characterisation is based on unsustainable claims. Thus, an emotional attachment to the nation is formed on the basis of unique national features that are only fantasised to be
unique: an attempt to pinpoint the nature of this uniqueness produces nothing solid. These evocations of the nation often draw on a ‘New Zealand’ set somewhere in the past. This past is seen as the source of the nation’s uniqueness and as the nation’s best exemplar. The past evoked as being the source of the nation has certain specific characteristics: it is a past devoid of conflict and difference. In this past, ‘we’ were all the same, ‘we’ were all comfortable, and the nation was unified. This past, glossing over the disorder and difficulty of anyone’s actual past, has a strong element of fantasy: it is a past that never quite was. Descriptions of the past are shorn of all reference to racial or economic difference: everyone can be included in this past, as long as they make no mention of their difference from anyone else. This national past, devoid of trouble and unease, may be a fantasy but it still exerts a powerful emotional pull. The emotional pull is derived from a yearning to return to the pleasures of childhood. The national shared childhood of this fantasised past leaves out actual childhood - which is an entirely messier and more conflict-ridden state - but draws upon emotions of childhood to give it force.

The attempt to repeat the pleasures of childhood creates a desire for items that are exactly the same as items remembered from childhood. Through these items, an attempt is made to defeat time and change, to recover the unrecoverable past. The emotional thread that attaches people to the notion of the nation is thus based in lack and longing. This lack has multiple dimensions: lack because the past cannot be reclaimed, lack because the past so strongly yearned for is a fantasy, and lack because the desired past was based on an earlier past that cannot be remembered. The sense of lack is animated with a yearning for
something about the past that cannot be fully articulated. This something, which carries complex traces of childhood feeling, is misidentified as the heart of the nation, as the thing that makes the nation different from other nations.

The unrecoverable past is associated with warmth, with home, with motherly comforts. There are hints within it of an irreclaimable motherly presence, a ghostly trace of the mother’s body that cannot be recaptured. It is the circulation of love and loss that drives the sense of yearning that attaches the national citizen to the fantasised nation. The past, simultaneously felt as personal and as nationally shared, is lost and never quite existed. The present is underpinned by a fear that the items and practices which attach us to the nation are already lost or are about to be lost. This sense of loss drives a desire to secure the nation through a reiteration of that which is associated with the nationed past. Thus anything that would disrupt this fantasised connection with the past is defended against. The fantasised national past is walled off from any acknowledgement of division or injustice in the past. Division and discomfort in the nation’s present are seen as disrupting this connection with the comforting past, and thus cannot be mentioned when a sense of national continuity with the past is asserted.

It is here that the border between national comfort and discomfort becomes evident. The nation’s comfort and unity is secured by refuting anything disturbing or by expelling it to the outside of the nation. This creates pockets of silence within the nation, things that cannot be acknowledged if the nation’s coherence is to be maintained. In terms of Pākehā
nationalism this puts Māori on the boundary of what can and cannot be mentioned. Māori can be mentioned as part of the nation only if they fit into the pattern of comforting sameness that is valorised by Pākehā nationalism. It is perhaps this that is behind the assertion that Māori were ‘good’ in the past but are ‘bad’ now: division in the past can be forgotten, but division in the present makes itself known. The difficulty of mentioning division works in multiple directions. In many nation-affirming texts which are ostensibly inclusive of Māori, there is a reluctance to mention cultural difference, a sense that to do so would cause offence.

Having explored the nostalgic fantasy of the nation’s past, I then moved to an investigation of what is covered over by the desired version of the past. The establishment of a comfortable national past requires that undesirable aspects of the past be hidden or forgotten. This is particularly apparent in the contradiction inherent in attempts to establish a public narrative of the nation’s history. History is called upon to provide an authoritative source for the nation. Thus within Pākehā nationalism, history is desired to provide a secure story of origin for the Pākehā-dominated nation. This story is simultaneously desired to both accurately outline the nation’s past and to provide the comfort and reassurance associated with the nostalgic fantasy of the past. These two aims are contradictory: violence and injustice in the past must be acknowledged in order for history to be comprehensive and authoritative, yet they cannot be acknowledged if history is to provide comfort and confidence to the Pākehā nation. History is required to comfort the Pākehā nation by conferring legitimacy on it, as all nations must be legitimised, yet it can never fully do so. Any invocation of history in order to secure the nation brings up an endless instability, a
complex cycle of remembrance and forgetting. Undesired aspects of the past continually resurface and are continually pushed aside. Within the Pākehā nation, this cycle of remembrance and disavowal is centred on the Treaty of Waitangi. The Treaty of Waitangi is called upon to act as a foundational document for the nation, anchoring the nation’s origin. Yet the Treaty of Waitangi cannot be mentioned without invoking the land confiscations of the past and compensation claims of the present: any mention of the Treaty of Waitangi becomes too much. Thus attempts to secure a foundation for the nation carry reminders of unease and disunity. The unified national past of the fantasised shared childhood cannot be underpinned by a narrative of national history, as this narrative cannot avoid referencing division.

The undesired knowledge of the violence of the past haunts the nation, continually returning as it is continually forced out of sight. A Pākehā narrative of history is created in which Māori are pushed aside, leaving the Pākehā colonists of the past in direct contact with the land. Māori continually disappear from Pākehā narratives of the colonisation of the land: Pākehā of the past are claimed to have had virtues that rendered them fit to shape the land. Just as the ‘Kiwi’ is posited as an innocent character, so the Pākehā colonists of the past are described as innocent in that they did not know that the land they were on was stolen even if it was stolen. Thus colonists are declared doubly innocent: both not guilty and not knowing of their guilt. This narrative continually breaks down at mention of the Treaty, which comes to symbolise all past injustice. The Treaty thus becomes a haunting presence, carrying with it reminders of all that is desired to be forgotten. Attempts are made to defeat this haunting nature of the Treaty by elevating it to a noble, overarching status within the
nation, a source for national pride and nationed meaning. Yet this elevation fails: the Treaty functions both as a screen, blocking off history, and as a void in which memory disappears. It symbolises an unbridgeable gap between Pākehā and the desired national home.

The blame for this continuing discomfort, for the haunting presence of knowledge of past violence, falls upon Māori. Māori, their continuing presence serving as a reminder of their existence in the past, are held responsible for disrupting comfortable Pākehā narratives of history. Māori are accused of standing between Pākehā and the comforting, homelike nation. Thus Māori are held responsible for all the discomforts of history, for everything that makes the nostalgically fantasised nation impossible to secure.

Having explored the way in which uncomfortable parts of the nation’s history are ushered out of sight, I have then turned to a more detailed analysis of the way in which Māori are held responsible for the discomforts of the past. I have explored the accusations that are commonly levelled at Māori by Pākehā. It should again be noted that these accusations do not come from all Pākehā but are nonetheless part of an overall system of Pākehā nationalism. Accusations frequently levelled at Māori are generated by the system of forgetting and remembering that was explored previously. Thus, Māori are accused of continually and repeatedly complaining. The force with which unpleasant parts of the nation’s history are driven from knowledge creates the sense that any mention of this past is a renewed dragging up of a history that should be buried. The silencing of a history of injustice creates a sense that Māori are complaining of injustices that finished hundreds of
years ago, despite land confiscations being a far more recent phenomenon. Thus sense of endless repetition distorts time, pushing injustices far into a forgotten past, and multiplying the years over which protests have occurred, creating the sense that protests are eternal and unchanging. The strength with which knowledge of injustice is refuted also magnifies the sense that Pākehā are being accused of something, even though the nature of this something is banished from mind. The discomfort that this sense of being accused of wrongdoing generates is then projected onto Māori, who are held responsible for splitting the nation. This projection of guilt onto Māori creates a series of accusations against Māori which uncannily mirror past injustices against them. Thus, Māori are accused of endlessly grabbing the nation’s land, taking and despoiling “Kiwi” property and history over and over again. The use of Te Reo is treated as a means of stealing something from speakers of English. This theft is treated as either a theft of the nation’s future, in the case of Te Reo being taught in schools, or of the nation’s past and present, in the case of place names being changed back to Te Reo. Place names are treated as something belonging to Pākehā which are being stolen by Māori.

As a reminder of discomfort and division within the nation, a reminder that refuses to stop speaking, Māori are deemed a discomfiting factor within the nation. Thus accusations that Māori demand too much and protest too much are mixed with more pointed accusations. Māori, in their disruption of the desired comforting nation, are a haunting presence within the nation. It is through this that Māori become accused of being a source of contamination and death within the nation. Māori are deemed contaminated by their perceived lack of ‘full-bloodedness’. Thus they are seen as disqualified from existing by a lack of purity:
unable to speak as Māori because they cannot prove their own existence. Māori are willed into non-existence: their continued insistence on their own existence seen as a lie. Māori are assigned an abject position within the nation, willed out of the nation yet continuing to exist. Māori come to symbolise contamination of the innocent nation with foolishness and impurity.

Thus I have explored initially the establishment of an innocent ‘Kiwi’ character and the way in which this character is constructed as different from the rest of the world, secure in the nation. I have then explored the way in which this innocent, childlike national figure interlinks with the nostalgic fantasy of the nation as a universal idyllic childhood. It is from this that the anger aimed at Māori for making this fantasy impossible, anger which covers over the fact that it always was impossible, is generated. Māori, in threatening to bring to light the violence of history, are held responsible for stealing the comfort of the innocent and childlike ‘Kiwi’.

In tracing both the comforting desired nation and the discomforting elements within the nation, I have reached a point of ultimate discomfort within the nation. It is here that gender enters the frame and the figure of the mother, so elusive in Chapter Two, returns. Gender, although not fully explored in earlier chapters, is an inherent part of the association of the nation with ‘home’. To associate the nation with childhood and require the nation to be a comforting national home is to bring the gendered meanings associated with family and home into the frame. Women become charged with maintaining national and cultural
purity and defending this national home. This association of women with the protection of the nationed childhood and the guardianship of the national home interacts with the dynamics of guilt and blame explored in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. If Māori in general are held responsible for disturbing the comfort of the nation, Māori women are doubly accused. The association of Māori with contamination and impurity combines is strongly applied to Māori women.

The nationed meanings of gender and race collide with the nationed meanings of childhood. Children, as I have indicated in the earlier chapters of this thesis, are figured as ‘us’, simultaneously the nation’s best exemplar and the property of the nation. Children within the nation are referred to as ‘our children’, belonging to the citizens of the nation. Thus vulnerable, injured or murdered children are assigned meanings beyond their own individual suffering. As childhood is positioned as both the nation’s past and the nation’s future, to harm a child is to harm the nation. Anxieties about the nation — which can, after all, never be secured from disruption — coalesce around the figure of the harmed child. This figure of the threatened child comes to symbolise all that is threatened within the nation. Thus those who violently abuse children stand accused of abusing ‘us’, of harming ‘our children’ and of abusing the nation itself.

It is the conjunction of nationed meanings of race, gender and childhood that drives a national focus on ‘Maori child abuse’, a focus which passes over child abuse in Pākehā families. With the discomforts of history and of the present disallowed from the nation’s narrative, no explanation of relatively high rates of physical child abuse in Māori families is considered acceptable to the nation. Thus, within dominant Pākehā discourses, child abuse
is considered a stain derived some internal corruption in Māori. What is termed “Maori child abuse” is deemed a failure by Māori to live up to the standards of the (Pākehā) nation. Children killed in abusive families are simultaneously figured as Māori and as the children of the nation, while abusive parents are highlighted as Māori but not considered to properly belong to the nation. The figure of the ‘bad Māori mother’ is prominent in the nationed discussion over child abuse. While it may seem natural and inevitable that child abuse should provoke horror and disgust, and that child abusers should be treated with outrage, I have argued that there is an excess in the way that ‘bad Maori mothers’ are discussed which is explicable through the exploration of nationed meanings. Māori women stand accused of “failing to protect” their children, an accusation somehow worse than an accusation of murder, which is regarded as a violation of their duty as mothers and their duty to the nation. Māori women are further accused of a horrifying excess — of childbearing, of sex, of relationships — which is construed as deeply threatening to the nation. The figure of the ‘bad Maori mother’ is construed as a dark force within the nation, breeding carelessly and inhumanly, both having too many babies and letting too many die. This monstrous figure is seen as devoid of human emotion, as breeding destruction within the nation. Thus, through this figure, all that is terrifying about motherhood and all that is terrifying within the nation intersect. The threat to national integrity seen as embodied within the ‘bad Maori mother’ is attributed the power to destroy the nation’s hope for the future.

Ultimately, the figure of the ‘bad Maori mother’ is a point where several dominant strands of nationalism intersect. The association of the nation with an idealised childhood and the desire to protect this childhood from all outside influence and inside disruption; the
displacement of anxiety about the impossibility of securing this national childhood; the desire to suppress knowledge of the nation’s violent origins; the anxiety generated by the return of undesired knowledge: all of these meet in the horror with which the figure of the ‘bad Māori mother’ is met.

In tracing a dominant form of Pākehā nationalism from its most unifying point to the point where its most exclusionary impulses are expressed, I may appear to have travelled between two extremes. Yet this pathway can also be seen as a circle, in which the association of the nation with childhood is continually expressed. The strands of nationalism I have here explored are, of course, not the only forces of nationalism within the nation. I have here explored the way a partly fantasised childhood functions to attach members of a dominant culture to a nation. If, as I suspect, the association of the nation with childhood is a crucial way in which people come to feel themselves members of a nation, how does this function for non-dominant cultures in a nation? How do the patterns of remembering and forgetting that I here follow work for people who are part of that which the dominant culture wishes to forget? Many studies of nationalism have previously done, but, given the intimate relationship between emotional connections to the nation and political decisions, both nationally and internationally, there is always room for further study of the emotional dynamics that bind people to nations.
Glossary of Māori words

All definitions sourced from Te Aka Māori-English, English-Māori dictionary ("Te Aka Māori-English, English-Māori dictionary,")

hapū: kinship group, clan, tribe, subtribe - section of a large kinship group

karakia: incantation, ritual chant

Ngai Tahu: tribal group of much of the South Island

mana: prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, spiritual power, charisma - mana is a supernatural force in a person, place or object

manākitanga: support, hospitality

marae: courtyard - the open area in front of the wharenui, where formal greetings and discussions take place. Often also used to include the complex of buildings around the marae.

Pākehā: New Zealander of European decent

piupiu: a type of skirt made of flax

tangata whenua: indigenous people of the land

taniwha: water spirit, monster, chief, something or someone awesome - taniwha take many forms from logs to reptiles and whales and often live in lakes, rivers or the sea. They are often regarded as guardians by the people who live in their territory

taonga: treasure, anything prized - applied to anything considered to be of value

tapu: sacred, prohibited, restricted, set apart, forbidden
Te Ika A Maui: the North Island of New Zealand

Te Reo Māori: Māori language

Te Wai Pounamu: the South Island of New Zealand

tino rangatiratanga: self-determination

tūrangawaewae: place where one has rights of residence and belonging through kinship and whakapapa

utu: revenge, cost, price, wage, fee, payment, salary, reciprocity - an important concept concerned with the maintenance of balance and harmony in relationships between individuals and groups and order within Māori society, whether through gift exchange or as a result of hostilities between groups

whakapapa: genealogy

whānau: extended family, family group

wharenui: meeting house, large house - main building of a marae where guests are accommodated

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