The European Union, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours

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Abstract

This thesis argues that the transmission of the European Union’s norms and values to Poland, and then to Lithuania and Ukraine, has helped those countries to better manage their relations. As a result of their integration into the EU and other western structures, relations between Poland and Lithuania have become more “normal”. The introduction of EU-mandated border controls has complicated relations between Poland and both Ukraine and Belarus. Poland has deep historic ties with Ukraine and is determined to ensure that Ukraine is offered a pathway that will lead to its eventual integration with Europe. However, relations between Poland and Belarus have worsened. Included in this thesis are the results and analysis of interviews and surveys carried out in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in 2008.
1 Introduction
Poland and its eastern neighbours have intertwined histories. The Polish, Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian languages derive from a common Slavic tongue spoken less than 2000 years ago. The Baltic Lithuanians share much history with their Slavic neighbours, particularly with Belarusians, Poles and Ukrainians. Poles and Lithuanians consider their countries to lie in the heart of Europe. Unlike Ukrainians or Belarusians, they have long looked to the West for cultural and political leadership and are well disposed to innovations sourced in the West – be those innovations democracy, the market economy or the European Union. Rich, democratic Western Europe has offered a model for development to Central Europeans and Balts. Proximity and easy access to Western Europe have fostered familiarity with democratic culture. Compared with other postcommunist states, Poland scores well in what has been termed “European compatibility potential”. Poland has been able to relay EU norms and values to its eastern neighbours Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.

This thesis has developed within this context of post-2004 EU membership in the region. The main theoretical approach used in this thesis is a constructivist one, with a focus on examining to what extent the EU’s normative power can be used as a tool to achieve desired outcomes in prospective member states in Central and Eastern Europe. The research question this thesis seeks to answer is: “To what extent is Poland contributing to the transmission of values and norms from the EU to Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine?”

It is important to be able to track the changes in relations brought about eastern enlargement and by the process of EU-isation of former communist countries such as Poland and Lithuania. It is also important to understand why EU policies and strategies with regard to prospective member states have been successful and others have not. This thesis is focused mainly on people-to-people interactions between Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. It does not delve deeply into traditional economic ties.

In 1989 three countries shared land borders with Poland (see Appendix 1 Map 1). To the east and north-east, the Soviet Union gripped Poland in a tight hug. The stable border of the Carpathian mountain range separated Poles from their southern cousins in Czechoslovakia. Poland’s immediate neighbour across the 44-year-old border to the west was East Germany. The nearest part of the West was West Berlin, lying just 60 kilometres west of the Polish border. By 1993, none of Poland’s immediate neighbours of just four years earlier still existed (see Appendix 1 Map 2). The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and East Germany were no more.
Poland had seven new neighbours, six of them new or reborn states. Running clockwise from the Baltic Sea these new neighbours were Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave, Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and the united Federal Republic of Germany. This transformation in the country’s immediate surroundings had a dramatic effect on Poland.

Solidarity’s sweeping election victory in 1989 brought Poland’s first postwar non-communist government to power. Abrupt independence forced the new rulers of newly postcommunist states to decide where to place their countries in the international system. Most chose integrating with the West as offering the best possible security for their people. Central Europe’s political, intellectual and business elites realised early on that there was no alternative for their countries in the 1990s.

With the collapse of Comecon, Poland’s new leaders decided EU and Nato membership offered the best possible security for the state. Since 1989, Poland, Lithuania and most other postcommunist European countries have become democracies, modelled after those of Western Europe. Poland’s first postcommunist government and its successors decided that for Poland to achieve its desired status and prosperity, a radical “shock therapy” economic and political programme would have to be initiated. The Polish “Big Bang” of 1990-91 was a sudden, radical break with the communist period. That programme would mean a period of hardship for the Polish people which would last a few years. However, for Poland’s new leaders, a successful navigation of that period held the promise of economic payoffs.

Western Europe’s leaders realised in 1990 that the peaceful revolution which swept Eastern Europe in 1989 was probably the most significant event in global terms since 1945. It represented a challenge and an opportunity to which the EC responded immediately. With the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Central and East European countries (CEECs) were obvious potential candidates for EU membership. Of great significance was the chorus of demands to “return to Europe” from CEECs. The discourse of “reuniting Europe” included notions of the West’s betrayal of and responsibility towards countries which had been trapped behind the Iron Curtain.¹

¹ Bretherton, C. & Vogler, J. 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor 2nd ed Routledge Abingdon UK
As the focus of successful West European political and economic integration, the EU was the key international organisation that Europe’s postcommunist states wanted to join. The EU and prospective member states in Central Europe saw enlargement as a way of strengthening European security. When the Cold War ended, it was felt that postcommunist European countries had a right to seek membership in an association that claimed to be open to all the countries of Europe. Given their economic disadvantages, most European postcommunist states became fervent advocates of an enlarged and deeper EU. The EU’s hands were tied, in essence because of its fundamental “claim to pan-European inclusiveness”. When postcommunist countries such as Poland and Lithuania proclaimed their eagerness to rejoin Europe, they meant joining the EU. For them, EU membership was a stamp of approval and path to prosperity.

The removal of trade restrictions and the lowering of customs barriers have been goals of the EU since the Treaty of Rome. From the 1980s, especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain, the EU built a complex network of multilateral and bilateral trading networks and agreements with eastern European states, Poland foremost among them. By the 1990s, the EU was coordinating Western aid to postcommunist Europe, using the Phare and Tacis programmes. CEECs assumed central importance in EU external relations. By 2000, the European Commission was coordinating the regional aid efforts of the EU, Switzerland, Norway, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. The EU’s leading role in this has helped define the Union’s foreign policy and made it a major actor in the CEECs and in relations between CEECs. The CEECs’ accession to the EU has brought important political and economic implications for all European countries.

In the post-Cold War world, the EU was determined to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond its new borders. It aimed to develop a zone of prosperity and a “ring of friends” with which it could enjoy close and positive relations. Its neighbours would benefit from the prospect of closer economic integration with the EU. Beginning with German reunification in 1990, when the former East

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4 Ibid. p.268
Germany became part of the bloc, the EU has expanded into the former communist lands of Central and Eastern Europe.

The 1993 Copenhagen summit of the European Council set down conditions candidate member states had to meet before being allowed to join the EU. Foremost among these was proof of respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and the protection of minorities. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the EU pressured CEECs to respect pan-European standards. Postcommunist states wishing to join the EU have had to play by the EU’s rules. Western European pressure helped persuade postcommunist Europe’s governments with mixed human rights records to improve their performance.

Enlargement was a slow process of many stages and breathing spaces. The first wave of new entrants from Central Europe would not join until a decade after the decision to admit them in principle. Negotiations with candidate countries were difficult and raised several foreign policy issues. Discriminating among prospective members had international fallout and complicated other aspects of the EU’s external relations. Entry negotiations to agree the terms whereby the new EU countries would assume the rights and responsibilities of membership took place between 1998 and 2002. In 2003, it was already clear that this enlargement would change the way the Union was run as the newcomers took their places in the EU’s key institutions. Enlargement would also bring about changes in the EU’s external relations, particularly with adjacent Balkan and post-Soviet countries such as Belarus and Ukraine.

For Europe’s postcommunist states, the ability to mobilise populations in favour of reform and a Western-orientated foreign policy was directly related to the strength of national identity, historical memory and political culture. A foreign policy of “returning to Europe” was most evident in those former communist states where national identity was stronger and, in the case of the former Soviet Union, where the population’s sense of ethnos and Europeanness was not weakened by russification. The Polish and Lithuanian governments implemented difficult domestic reforms and modified foreign policies to obtain the political, economic and security benefits of membership. For this dynamic to work, candidates must consider EU membership to be an objective attainable within a reasonable timeframe.

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7 Vachudova p.325
Ukraine and Belarus, sometimes grouped together with Moldova as the “BUM” countries, EU membership in the near future has never been a realistic goal.  

In 2002 EU states agreed the bloc should avoid drawing new dividing lines and act to promote stability and prosperity on both sides of its new borders. A policy paper from the European Commission in March 2003 offered neighbours such as Belarus and Ukraine closer ties with the EU in return for progress towards respect for democratic values and political, economic and institutional reforms. The EU offered participation in the Union’s internal market and regulatory structures, preferential trading, more cross-border cooperation, more scientific, cultural and education exchanges, research programmes, closer cooperation against common security threats and in preventing conflicts, integration into transport, energy and telecoms networks, more investment and more aid. The EU sought “a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood”. Different member states had different priorities with regard to the east. Finland and Sweden, for instance, promoted a “northern dimension” for the EU, including early accession for Lithuania and the other Baltic states.

Bilateral processes dominated relations between the EU and CEECs, while multilateral processes promoted good relations among prospective member states and their neighbours. The Stability Pact required prospective member states to resolve outstanding border and minorities issues. A structured dialogue fostered EU-style cooperation among prospective member states. The EU insisted that applicant countries adopt pre-accession the Union’s set of laws and rules, the acquis communautaire.

The culmination of these processes was the decision of the December 2002 European Council that Lithuania, Poland and eight other states would be ready to accede to the Union in May 2004. The 2004 enlargement was the EU’s biggest and most ambitious. The enlargement happened mainly for political reasons: to consolidate peace and democracy in CEECs and to graft on to new members EU values and a Western system of government.

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9 Commission of the European Communities 2003 ‘Wider Europe’ p.3-4
10 Ibid. p.6
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. p.4
13 Dinan p.270
The new member states acceded to membership because they saw their natural place as being within unifying Europe. For centuries, Poles and Lithuanians have considered themselves European. They now consider themselves part of “the West”.\textsuperscript{14} With some exceptions, the extent of Western influence can be mapped out geographically. Those CEECs closest to the Western European core have been those where the pull of the West has been strongest.\textsuperscript{15} Countries further east and south have been less susceptible to Western influence. In Poland and Lithuania the prospect of membership in the EU provided a strong incentive to build liberal democratic states.\textsuperscript{16} By the first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the Central European and Baltic states had functioning democracies. By 2004, according to the EU itself, Central Europe and the Baltic states had met the strict criteria for joining the Union.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>Democracy score*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>2.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>4.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>5.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>6.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress

Table 1.1 Central and East European democracy scores, 2006\textsuperscript{17}

Even before formal accession, the EU had opened its markets to exports from postcommunist Europe. Poland, in particular, and Lithuania also benefited from EU aid programmes.

\textsuperscript{15} Smith, K. 2001 ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’ in Zielonka & Pravda (ed.) 2001 p.457
Enlargement would stimulate economic growth in EU countries both new and old, for the benefit of all. The new member states are much poorer than the EU average. One of the first priorities of the enlarged EU has been to raise their living standards as fast as possible towards those of the other EU countries.

In 2003, the European Commission admitted that all the EU’s new neighbours, including Belarus and Ukraine were confronted by opportunities and challenges related to their being poor countries adjacent to the rich EU.\(^\text{18}\) The eastern shift in the EU’s border threatens to destabilise poorly integrated Ukraine by opening divisions between regions closer and further from the EU border. It could exacerbate tensions between western regions of Ukraine, such as Galicia, and Kiev. In Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with Ukraine, the EU agreed to base a strong partnership on “historic links and common values”.\(^\text{19}\) Relations between Poland and Belarus have been poor throughout the last 15 years, strained by a variety of issues, including the Lukashenko regime’s treatment of Belarus’ Polish minority. Poland’s striving for EU membership would appear to have negatively affected its relations with Belarus.

The ultimate borders of the EU depend on the amount of diversity the Union can accept as it enlarges. They also depend how external actors, notably Russia, China and the United States, will react to an EU with wider footprint. Also important is how open or closed the EU’s borders are and to what extent they come directly under EU control as opposed to national control. Many interlinked factors affect the type and scope of borders. Europe’s imprecise boundaries lead to confusion over the definition of Europe. Territories such as Cyprus, the Canary Islands and Reunion, which are clearly not part of geographic Europe, are part of the EU, yet Ukraine and Belarus remain outside the EU. If one accepts the Urals as forming part of the boundary between Europe and Asia, Belarus and Ukraine are part of Europe, but questions remain about those countries’ current and long-term status and prospects. The scope and type of the EU’s borders in a sense determines the Union’s profile. Despite the lack of a definite border to what can eventually become part of the EU, the Union cannot expand indefinitely without becoming very different from what it is.

\(^\text{18}\) Commission of the European Communities 2003 p.6
\(^\text{19}\) Ibid.
Other continents are defined by marine borders, but Europe lacks a clear eastern boundary. The extensive plains of eastern Europe, as historic shifts in the borders of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine have shown, offer neither defence nor a well-defined frontier zone between Europe and Asia. Yet Europe is seen as distinct from Asia, even if there is no universal consensus on where Europe meets Asia. No natural eastern border of Europe exists. One country has been rejected for membership (Morocco – for being non-European). Turkey has been kept out for decades, ostensibly for its human rights record and faulty democratic credentials.

Ukraine and Belarus are outsiders, “accidental nation-states”.20 They have loose, semi-detached associations with the EU and scant prospect of becoming full members in the foreseeable future. Many of Ukraine’s leaders profess a wish for their country to join the EU. As the results of surveys and interviews quoted later in this thesis show, residents of western Ukraine seem to be in favour of their country joining the EU and Nato. In contrast, Russian-speaking residents of eastern and southern Ukraine seem less enthusiastic about Ukraine joining the EU, and mostly against the idea of Ukraine joining Nato. For Ukraine, rejection of the prospect of the country’s eventually becoming a member of the EU could bring into question the country’s democratic consolidation, economic progress and positive interaction with Poland.

Since 2004, Ukraine has made strides towards becoming a proper liberal democracy, but it still has a way to go before it becomes a fully democratic country in the European sense. It remains corrupt and poorly governed. The authoritarian government of Belarus has been much more suspicious of Western institutions. In Belarus, democratic reforms have been mostly more a matter of rhetoric than practice. Institutional arrangements have been crafted to suit the aims of those in power with little room for genuine public participation and fair political competition. After a brief flowering of freedom in the early 1990s, Belarus has become a dictatorship. Belarus is a self-isolated state, ostracised by the international community. It can be argued that if national elites in postcommunist European states choose a reform path they have little choice but to choose also a foreign policy orientation of “returning to Europe”. From Europe they can receive inspiration and security, technical and financial

assistance. A postcommunist country, such as Belarus, which shifts away from democratisation towards an authoritarian regime, is more likely to seek integration with Russia than with the EU.

Ukraine and Belarus “have as much reason to welcome [EU] influence as the [Union has] to seek a role”. The EU is Ukraine’s largest trading partner. Many in the Ukrainian elite want to reduce dependence on Russia. Kiev and, belatedly and inconsistently, Minsk see closer ties with the EU as a way of reducing the risks associated with dependence on Russia.

Since 1990, many borders in Central and Eastern Europe have been changed, leading to many problems. In contrast, the tight Cold War border between East and West was stable. Little movement of goods and people occurred across the Iron Curtain. Those who did venture to cross it were subjected to strict scrutiny by border guards. In 1989-91 the Soviet empire collapsed, partly because the idea of a free, united Europe motivated resistance to it. Yet the Cold War’s legacy persists. Europe has found it hard to sort out the complicated issues of borders and mobility. A prime strategy of the EU in trying to cope with new border issues was eastern enlargement. But as borders between EU member states have come down, external EU borders have been tightened. The single market and Schengen system have made it harder for those left outside. Enlarging the EU to include only easier-to-digest postcommunist states such as Poland and Lithuania has replaced old dividing lines with new ones, with potentially destabilising implications.

Poland’s eastern border now forms part of the eastern boundary of the EU. The eastern enlargement of the European Union to include Poland and Lithuania, but not Ukraine and Belarus, must have had a significant impact on relations between all four countries, and on the quantity and quality of norms and values transmitted eastward. Research conducted for this thesis appears to indicate that relations between Poland and its neighbours Lithuania and Ukraine have improved since 1990, and particularly since 2000. In large measure, this improvement appears to be related to Poland’s move towards EU membership. As will be seen, data from a variety of sources shows that Poland and Lithuania prospered as a result of their gradual integration into the EU and other western structures. In contrast, living standards in Belarus and, especially, Ukraine have fallen far behind. The entry of 10 postcommunist

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countries into the EU erased the sharp east-west divide which ran across the European mainland from Lübeck to Trieste for half a century. However, despite stated desires that it should not happen, a more easterly dividing line has taken its place.22

Since 1989, Europeans have become more mobile. New patterns of migration, the movement of professionals employed by multinationals and the rise of mass tourism have broken down psychological borders between states. For most people in postcommunist Europe, the right to a passport and to use it to move without hindrance across borders is the most appreciated gain from the revolutions of 1989-91.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up the previously difficult-to-cross border between Poland and its eastern neighbours in the 1990s, the economies of eastern Poland and western parts of Belarus and Ukraine became much more interdependent. Informal cross-border trade and commuting became a means of survival for many residents of the mostly peripheral and rural border regions. Open borders provided opportunities for long-suppressed national minorities (ethnic Poles in the former USSR, and Ukrainians and Belarusians in Poland) to have more contact with their “mother country” and for positive encounters with “others” on both sides of the border, thus contributing to a reduction in mutual animosities. Generally good relations developed between Poland and Ukraine. Warsaw was also satisfied that the Polish minority in Lithuania, which had for the most part opposed Lithuanian independence from the Soviet Union and then complained about political discrimination, had by the time of EU accession become less disgruntled. Unfortunately, by the mid-1990s, the repressive political regime in Minsk, which has had no aspirations to EU membership, was making worse the situation of Belarus’ 400,000-strong Polish minority.

If one thinks of frontier zones rather than line borders, borderlands can be viewed as links between countries which facilitate trade and human contacts. Much of Poland’s long border with Belarus and Ukraine runs through open country, which makes it difficult and costly to patrol. Security concerns led the EU to encourage regional integration in postcommunist Europe, but the Union’s emerging internal security policies are reinforcing barriers between Poland and its non-EU neighbours. Border controls between Poland and its eastern

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neighbours have tightened since 2003, as Warsaw faced pressure from Brussels to cut down on smuggling of people and goods from the former Soviet Union. The advent of the Schengen zone loosened frontier controls in the West, but at the same time, borders between Poland and Lithuania on one side, and Belarus and Ukraine on the other are controlled more tightly. Paradoxically, “both of these border regimes are being wrought in the name of European integration”.23

Poland seeks to maintain a balance between EU obligations and relations with Belarus and Ukraine. One way of keeping good relations with Ukraine while imposing new barriers is to emphasise cross-border cooperation. With EU enlargement, one of the biggest benefits for regional governments is the EU funding which becomes available to partners on different sides of national borders.

In the lead-up to the 2004 enlargement, some feared that the accession of Poland and other Central European countries to the EU and then to Schengen would cause major problems for the EU’s border regime. Abolishing borders and controls inside the extended Schengen zone and their reinforcement outside could negatively affect economic relations between new EU member states such as Poland and excluded eastern neighbours Ukraine and Belarus.

In late 2003, border guards in eastern Poland noticed a sharp drop in the number of Ukrainian and Belarusian visitors following the introduction of new frontier controls. The controls include a visa regime for visitors from Belarus and Ukraine. Previously, Belarusians and Ukrainians had been able to enter Poland for three months with just a passport. Now they must apply for a visa in advance at Polish consulates. The move was part of Poland’s preparations to join the EU. The tighter controls mostly affected people living close to the border who engaged in small-scale cross-border trade, some of it in black-market items such as alcohol or cigarettes. The trade was threatened with collapse under the new visa regime. Clamping down on the border has been a tricky issue for Poland, as it does not want to be seen as turning its back on its eastern neighbours. The disruption of bilateral relationships and regional economic integration impinges on security in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, EU-driven border policies and visa regimes are reducing local actors’ ability to

cooperate on issues such as minority relations, migration, infrastructure and institution-building. Changing the status and porosity of the eastern borders of Poland and Lithuania has the potential to re-awaken unresolved issues over those borders. The EU’s external border and visa regimes are disliked by many living in the eastern borderlands, particularly those stranded on the outside. The external border regime might negatively affect the borderland’s economic and political stability, and combined with economic downturn, might encourage separatist sentiment in western parts of Ukraine and Belarus.

The thesis is organised into 12 chapters. After a literature review and an outline of methodology used, there is a historical overview. Then come individual chapters on Poland’s relations with each of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Chapter 8 looks at public opinion in the four countries. The next chapter looks at migration to and from Poland, and its effect on relations between Poland and its eastern neighbours. Migration flows in and out of Poland have been considerable since 1990. During the 1990s, there was a movement of Polish workers westward, mainly into Germany, and of workers from the collapsing economies of the former Soviet Union into Poland. Migration from Poland to richer EU states increased dramatically with Poland’s entry into the EU in 2004, contributing to a labour shortage in the country. However, with Poland’s move towards Schengen zone membership, Poland’s natural source of immigrant labour in Ukraine and Belarus was blocked off. The movement of people across borders affects relations between source and destination countries in many ways, not least by facilitating transmission of norms and values from one society to another.

Chapter 10 looks at the media in each of the four countries and how it relates to relations between them, particularly in the context of the 2004 EU enlargement and associated developments. There follows a chapter discussing possible future scenarios for the region and, finally, a conclusion chapter which ends the main body of the thesis. Maps are included in Appendix 1, while Appendix 2 includes an example of the survey questionnaire used in carrying opinion surveys in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in 2008 and other documents. A CD of interviews recorded on audio is included as Appendix 3. A full bibliography is included at the end of the thesis.
2 Literature Review
Understanding the EU can give a better understanding of how it might affect the transmission of norms and values from Poland to its eastern neighbours. It is important to establish if there is something distinctive about the EU’s foreign policy and if there is something unique about the way the EU interacts with external countries and peoples. This thesis makes most use of the “norms and values” approach of the particular branch of constructivism associated with 21st century writers such as Ian Manners and Helene Sjursen. This literature review chapter contains an overview of other possible approaches which were found less relevant for this thesis. Functionalism, neo-functionalism, regionalism, federalism, intergovernmentalism and realism are among the theories used to explain the EU.

**States, nations and Europe**

When people try to understand their place in the global system, most think in terms of states, and of themselves as citizens of a state.\(^1\) World maps show countries divided by state borders, delimiting areas ruled by “different governments and separate systems of law”.\(^2\) Realists consider nation-states to be the main transforming agents in global politics. The development of the state over the last 200 years is linked to nationalism’s ascent and attempts to assimilate ethnic minorities. “State” is not a synonym for “nation”. While a state is a legal and political unit, history, language and culture tie together a nation.\(^3\) Sometimes, a nation coincides with a state, but most states enclose more than one national group, blurring distinctions between countries. Divided loyalties and identities make it harder to apply labels to people. Wallace calls the nation-state “an artificial construct … heavily dependent” on the history of two European states: Britain and France.\(^4\) It is debatable if Ukraine and Belarus are as completely nation-states as are the countries of western Europe. Most ethnic Poles living in Lithuania and Belarus consider their nationality to be “Polish”, despite never having lived in a Polish state. Marks says that “a paradox of European integration is that national and regional identities become more salient, not less” during recent decades.\(^5\) Such a rise in regional salience is notable within Britain, Spain and Belgium, and even in relatively homogeneous Poland.

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid. p.3
Nationalism’s rise “as an organising political construct and as an objective social phenomenon” began in the 19th century as a result of economic changes. “Exclusive, belligerent nationalism” came to dominate people’s lives.

The fixation with states can curtail opportunities to think innovatively. Several schools of thought are based on the idea that the state, understood as an entity which governs territories which have defined geographical limits, is an irrational basis for governance and even has an inherent tendency to make war. For most, the Westphalian state form is the conventional image of the nation-state. Identification with the state was reinforced by waging war. The logic of such conflict demanded mobilisation of nation-state masses to fight wars with other nation-states. This culminated in the world wars, which wrought immense destruction in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, Ukraine and Belarus.

European integration has been accompanied by a weakening of this exclusive nationalism and signs of “nested” identity, which Marks defines as “multiple, coexisting identities to local, regional, and supranational territorial communities” alongside a national identity. Postwar European integration can be seen as a response to superpower rivalry in the context of the Cold War. In historical terms, the EU and its forerunners represent “an intensification of interstate cooperation”.

With the end of the Cold War, some thought cooperation among European states would become harder without a tangible external security threat. In a multipolar world, Europe might be more likely to be a venue for conflict than cooperation. Yet, for the most part, since 1990, aside from the western Balkans and Caucasus, Europe has been at peace and has seen unprecedented cooperation and integration. Europeans increasingly have strong attachments to multiple levels of community simultaneously: local, regional, national and European. Sjursen argues that “the EU is one of the most formidable machines for managing differences peacefully ever invented”.

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7 Marks p.88
8 Wallace 1994 p.154
9 Ibid.
10 Rosamond, B. 2000 Theories of European Integration Palgrave, Basingstoke p.133
11 Sjursen. H. 2006 ‘The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be’ Journal of European Public Policy Vol 3 No 2 March p.237
Europe’s zones

Some authors, such as Pal Dunay, see early 21st century Europe as consisting of three distinct geographical zones. Western Europe is already “an established security community”. Most states of Western Europe have long been cooperating with each other in various international frameworks, notably Nato and the European Communities. Since 1945, no violent conflicts have erupted between any of the states of Western Europe. The lethal strife that occurred has been related to relatively minor separatist and terrorist movements, notably those in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country.

Winn feels that the notion of territory is anachronistic in Western Europe, where territory is “a porous concept” given countries’ inter-connectedness. A “nexus of networks” operates across countries which ignores sovereignty and national borders. Transnational institutions could be more efficient welfare providers than national entities. This would lead to “a process of popular loyalty transference away from the nation-state”. The chances of international conflict would be reduced. According to Rosamond, applying “a technocratic and rationalistic approach” to governance brings about “a working peace system”. Sjursen says the EU, in contrast to nation-states and, indeed, other intergovernmental bodies, “seeks to overcome power politics through a strengthening … [of] cosmopolitan law, emphasizing the rights of the individuals in the international system”.

Rosamond asks if the emergence of regional blocs such as the EU has “implications for the construction of new identities and the deconstruction of established identities” at both elite and mass level. Regionalism might accelerate or retard free trade and multilateral exchanges between states if regional agreements and institutions form a threat both to the nation-state and the international system of states. The EU can be seen as being on the way to becoming a “regulatory state” composed of “a web of networks of national and supranational regulatory

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13 Ibid.
14 Excluding the Cod War between Britain and Iceland.
16 Ibid. p.23
17 Rosamond 2000 Theories of European Integration p.33
18 Ibid.
19 Sjursen, H. 2006 ‘The EU as a ‘normative’ power: how can this be’ p.236
20 Rosamond 2000 Theories of European Integration p.15
institutions held together by shared values and objectives, and by a common style of policy-making”. 21 Some, such as Chryssachoou, think EU membership has helped countries to “rediscover themselves as states, and even develop their sense of forming distinctive identities”. 22 Being part of the EU increases the likelihood that a country will adopt the norms which characterise the EU modus operandi.

In Central Europe and the Baltic states, an emerging security community is integrating into the western zone. Countries in this area “have sought to tackle problems and disputes by non-military means”. 23 Significantly, these states have all joined both the EU and Nato in the last decade.

To the east and south-east lies the third area of Europe, essentially the rest of the former Soviet Union and most of former Yugoslavia (and Turkey, if that is counted as being in Europe). For much of the last 20 years, these states have been “either actively fighting each other, enmeshed in other kinds of military activity or else are in situations of high tension with one or more of their neighbours which might potentially erupt into war”. 24 For some writers, Europe’s more easterly and southerly parts are a type of buffer zone, protecting the secure western Europe from the instability and poverty of Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 25 That buffer zone can be thought of as a “rolling march”, which moves east and south as the EU enlarges. 26 However, there is a crucial difference in the way the external east and external south are perceived. The Muslim, mostly Arab, lands south and east of the Mediterranean Sea are perceived by Europeans to be “profoundly alien”, beyond the borders of any kind of Europe. 27 “In this context the southern border is viewed as somewhat fixed.” 28 In contrast, the countries bordering the EU on the east are recognised as European and not intrinsically incompatible with EU values. For the eastern countries such as Ukraine, the main impediments to EU entry are poverty, poor governance and state failings, rather than innate

23 Smith & Timmins 2000. Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO enlargement in comparative perspective p.160
24 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid. p.34
28 Ibid. p.35
cultural incompatibilities of their inhabitants with EU values and norms. If poor, predominantly Eastern Orthodox, Romania and Bulgaria can become EU member states, despite having corrupt governance structures, then it seems strange to argue that Ukraine is not European enough to join the EU.

**Constructivism**

Constructivists claim that major aspects of international relations are historically and socially contingent, rather than inevitable consequences of human nature or essential characteristics of world politics. Constructivism challenges the dominance of neo-liberal and neo-realist international relations theories. A key tenet of the approach is the belief that “international politics is shaped by persuasive ideas, collective values, culture, and social identities”.  

Constructivists claim that the structures of international politics are outcomes of social interactions and that states are not static subjects, but dynamic agents. State identities are constituted through complex, historical overlapping and often contradictory practices, and are therefore variable, unstable and constantly changing. The distinction between domestic politics and international relations is tenuous. In Europe, supranational institutions develop links with lobby groups that insert “non-state preferences into the EU’s decision-making system”. These connections allow the EU to enmesh itself within member states’ domestic politics, bypassing national governments. This leads to a situation that brings about changes in domestic policies and institutions. States themselves are changed as a result of their participation in European integration. This appears to have happened in the case of postcommunist states such as Poland and Lithuania over the last two decades, as the two countries strove to achieve full membership of the European club by transforming their societies, economies and administrative structures.

Constructivists such as Manners, Sjursen and others believe the European Union is a unique, normative power, rather than a traditional military or economic power. Normative power is linked to the concept of “power over opinion”. The EU is, of course, not the world’s only normative power. Many writers have contrasted the EU’s normative power with that of the western world’s other superpower, the United States, seen by many as being primarily a

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29 Snyder, J. 2004 ‘One World, Rival Theories’ in *Foreign Policy* Nov/Dec 2004 p.52
31 Rosamond 2000 *Theories of European Integration* p.144-145
The EU, Poland and the transmission of norms and values to eastern neighbours

Literature review

military power. However, as Sjursen points out, the United States is a normative, as well as a military power.\(^{33}\) Due to its unique position in the world, and particularly in Europe, the EU has been able to re-shape concepts of what is “normal” in international relations. This reshaping has been particularly marked in countries which have made the transition from being neighbours of the EEC/EU to being members. Aspirant members, keen to demonstrate their European credentials, have taken on board “European” norms and standards, as enunciated by the EU, and thus have entered an EU sphere of influence before formally joining the list of EU candidate member states. It could therefore be expected that the EU’s impact on Poland’s behaviour on the regional and world scene would be considerable. In particular, Poland’s interaction with its eastern neighbours is likely to have been fundamentally affected by Poland’s moves to integrate with the EU.

We must define what we mean by norms, in particular, what we mean by EU norms. Manners identifies what he calls five “core” norms which characterise the EU: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights.\(^{34}\) These norms can be tracked as fundamental expressed desires in the various treaties establishing the European Communities and EU.\(^{35}\) The insistence on human rights, particularly in countries which aspire to EU membership, is something which does set the EU apart from other regional economic blocs, and indeed, from most other global powers (the United States partially excepted). This insistence can be seen as been contradictory to the principle of nation-state sovereignty.\(^{36}\) An adherence to the concept and practice of multilateralism can also be considered an EU norm. Four “minor” norms include social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable development and good governance. States aspiring to EU membership need to take on board these norms, or at least give the appearance of so doing, in order to progress to EU membership.

If the EU is a normative power, it should be possible to see evidence of diffusion of its norms into the surrounding region, particularly into countries aspiring to membership. Some diffusion may be intentional, while other diffusion might be a result of increased contact with the EU and knowledge of the way it operates. Manners terms the unintentional diffusion of norms to other actors “contagion”.\(^{37}\) One type of contagion is procedural diffusion involving

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\(^{33}\) Sjursen 2006 ‘The EU as a ‘normative’ power’ p.240

\(^{34}\) Ibid.

\(^{35}\) Manners 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ p.242

\(^{36}\) Sjursen 2006 ‘The EU as a ‘normative’ power’ p.246

\(^{37}\) Manners 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ p.244
the institutionalisation of a relationship between the EU and a third party, such as countries acceding to the Union. Another form of diffusion is “transference”. Such diffusion occurs as a result of trade and technical assistance, which requires the other party to adopt at least some EU norms. The EU operates a system of inducements and punitive measures to encourage partners to “normalise”. Manners notes the importance of the “cultural filter”: some countries and people are more disposed to adopting EU norms than are others. Factors such as state of economic development, the vigour of domestic civil society, religious tradition and language all come into play. In the words of Sjursen, in most of Europe, “the thickness of the social environment – a common cultural identity … [can] explain the emergence of, and commitment to, common norms”. Being in Europe, being part of a broader Western culture and having many of the prerequisites for EU membership all help in the transmission of EU norms to a receiving society. In other words, if a country is already pre-disposed to regard the EU and what it stands for favourably, it is more likely to accept a package of EU norms. Poland and Lithuania are examples of such countries. Poland should be able to act as a filter and relayer of norms and values from the established EU states into countries further east. And indeed, Poland’s elite and bureaucrats have taken it upon themselves “to promote democracy in the neighbourhood and import knowledge about Eastern Europe” into the EU.

Successful integration brings about an expectation of a significant reduction in the chances of integrated states waging war on each other. The mid-20th century moves to (western) European integration took place in the context of the aftermath of two world wars. This has a fundamental impact on the way in which the EU (and its predecessors) developed as a normative power. As a normative power, the EU promotes regional cooperation, human rights, democracy and good governance, prevents conflicts and fights international crime. In practice, as economic, cultural and social ties between states intensify, the risk of war between those states diminishes as the states become more interdependent “for supplies of vital materials and for export markets and will not wish to see their access to these disrupted”.

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38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. p.245
40 Ibid.
42 Kaminska, J. 2007. ‘New EU members and the CFSP: Europeanization of the Polish foreign policy’ Political Perspectives EPRU 2007 Issue 2 (2) p.2
43 Smith & Timmins 2000. Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO enlargement in comparative perspective p.153
Bretherton and Vogler note an “increasing disjuncture” between military and economic power. In the late 1990s, Therborn felt that “without the backing of force and a willingness to use it”, the EU would likely not become a normative power. While military power is territorially based and generally controlled by national governments, economic power is more dispersed and less easy to regulate at the state level. The EU has evolved into something beyond the traditional boxes of military power and economic power. Its internal governance is somewhere between that of a federal nation state and a community of nation-states, and has both supranational and international aspects. The EU’s external projection also displays a mix of characteristics. In some situations, such as trade negotiations, the EU functions as a single actor, while in other situations, such as involvement in military conflict, the EU’s individual member states are usually distinct actors, but nonetheless prone to consult other member states before using military force. The EU’s advent and continued development might be part of a reorganisation of the international order beyond the Westphalian system of norms.

**Liberalism**

Liberalism holds that state preferences, rather than state capabilities, are the primary determinant of state behaviour. Unlike realism, where the state is seen as a unitary actor, liberalism allows for plurality in state actions. Preferences will vary from state to state, depending on factors such as culture, economic system or government type. Integration can be seen as following on from bargaining between governments. Schimmelfennig sees a “liberal character” as the western world’s “defining feature”. The West is both a community of liberal states and a liberal community of states. Community organisations are built on liberal principles. They “pursue liberal values and act according to liberal norms”. In nation-states, the principles of pluralism, the rule of law, democratic political participation and representation, private property and a market-based economy can be seen to derive from, and be justified by, liberal values. “Only a state that bases its domestic political system on these principles is regarded as fully legitimate by the Western international community.”

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46 Manners 2002 ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ p.240
47 Schimmelfennig, F. 2003 *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* Cambridge University Press, UK p.77
48 Ibid. p.78
49 Ibid.
Internationally, “liberal political culture shapes the institutions of peaceful conflict management and multilateralist collaboration”.

Democracies externalise domestic norms when interacting with other democracies. To be considered democratic, a regime must meet certain criteria. These include the prevalence of civil rights and legitimate, competitive elections. A country that exhibits all these characteristics may be called a liberal democracy. Today, Poland and Lithuania fit into this category. Some regimes are partially democratic, conducting legitimate competitive elections, but without guaranteeing civil rights. Ukraine can be considered to be a country with a semi-functioning democratic process but poorly organised civil society. Belarus fails to make it even to the status of a semi-democracy in this sense.

The assumed fact that democracies do not go to war against each other has its roots in liberal states’ internal norms. These require conflicts to be resolved without violence, using constitutional procedures. These norms tend to be externalised out of custom. Democratic states perceive each other as sharing similar values, norms and practices. These perceptions aid positive identification among states. The belief that other democracies share a culture of managing conflicts peacefully and in an institutionalised way allows democracies to develop reasonable expectations of each other’s behaviour. In time, liberal democracies develop pluralistic security communities in which states positively identify with each other and neither expect nor prepare for organised violence as a means to settle interstate disputes.

Some authors hoped that with universal liberalism and a worldwide network of democratic states, systemic anarchy could be replaced. Collective security would be achieved with the spread of liberal values and liberal processes, and the establishment of international organisations and law bodies. However, in a world with many non-democratic states, positive identification between such states (and between them and liberal democratic states) does not occur and can even be replaced by negative identification, preventing a long-term, stable peace. This is highly relevant to relations between Poland and its eastern neighbours. Poland and Lithuania have together tracked a similar path internationally over the last 20 years, moving from economically fragile, insecure postcommunist states to members of the EU.

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50 Ibid.
51 Rosamond 2000 *Theories of European Integration* p.21
52 Schimmelfennig 2003 *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe* p.79.
Belarus’ trajectory has been almost in an opposite direction, away from the European Union, away from democracy and towards authoritarianism. Ukraine’s path and interaction with Poland and the EU has been erratic and inconsistent. Bearing all this in mind, one might expect Poland to have good relations with Lithuania, less good relations with Ukraine and poor relations with Belarus. This thesis will examine whether this hypothesis is true.

**International relations and the European Union**

In IR, the issue of the basic units that make up the international system and how these units interact is an important question. A decline in the ability of individual states to respond to the needs of citizens has led to more international cooperation on matters of mutual interest, particularly in Europe. International organisations (IOs) have taken on some of the responsibilities which nation-states cannot take on. Some have claimed IR is obsolescent as a disciplinary base for EU studies, while others have sought a shift of focus away from IR to comparative political science as the parent discipline of EU studies. This raises questions about whether it is still makes sense to use contemporary international theory to explain what the EU is and how it works. An implication of rejecting IR is that the EU defies categorisation and comparison in international terms. In other words, the EU is *sui generis*. 53

The EU only partly fits conventional ideas about the ways in which societies organise and govern themselves. The EU is a voluntary association of states in which many decisions are taken as a result of negotiations. Member states retain authority over their own affairs, although this authority is today much constrained by EU law. They have empowered new cooperative bodies when it suits them. Theoretically, they have reserved the right to take back that power. For most of its history, the EU and its predecessors lacked a strong and separate legal identity, political unity and sovereignty. 54 Half a century after the creation of the European Economic Community, the EU’s taxing abilities and revenues are still small relative to its size and responsibilities. However, over the decades, the EU has developed considerable levels of power and influence over its members. In some areas, EU law overrides national law. In areas such as trade the EU has the authority to negotiate on behalf of member states. Third countries work with the EU institutions rather than with the governments of the member states. EU institutions have the power to make laws and policies which are binding on

53 Bretherton, & Vogler 2006 *The European Union as a Global Actor* p.35
member states. European political integration involves leaders and citizens creating new
governing institutions and shifting loyalties to a new level of government. Rather than making
separate decisions over foreign and domestic policy, states either make joint decisions or
delegate decision-making powers to the new institutions, and so cease to function separately
and independently.\textsuperscript{55}

The European Union as a security community

As the EU is a voluntary union, member states are free, in theory, to leave it, though to date
none has done so.\textsuperscript{56} Most analysts believe secession of a member state is unlikely to happen,
as economic ties among member states make it more costly to leave than to stay in. Before the
Treaty of Lisbon came into force in December 2009, no provision in the treaties or law of the
European Union outlined the ability of a state to voluntarily withdraw from the EU. After the
failure to ratify the Treaty establishing a European constitution, that provision was then
included in the Lisbon Treaty.

Integration in a security sense can be considered to be the attainment, within a defined
territory, of a sense of community and of institutions strong enough to produce reliable
“expectations of peaceful change” among the general population.\textsuperscript{57} The EU has become such
a security community. However, amalgams such as the EU are vulnerable to potential
destabilising factors, among them “dissonance between government action and societal
expectations”.\textsuperscript{58} Although the pursuit of group-interests by relatively small elites can push
integration “it cannot continue indefinitely without some degree of European community
feeling ... among the wider public”.\textsuperscript{59} There must at least be “a permissive consensus”.\textsuperscript{60} If
national populations in each of the member states feel themselves to be part of the European
integration project, that project is more likely to succeed.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. p.13
\textsuperscript{56} Greenland entered the EEC as part of Denmark in 1973. After achieving home rule and conducting a
referendum on membership, it left in 1985.
\textsuperscript{57} Deutsch, K., Burrell, S., Kann, R., Lee, M., Lichterman, M, Lindgren, R., Loewenheim, F. & Van Wangeren, R.
1957 Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of historical
Experience Princeton University Press, Princeton p.5
\textsuperscript{58} Deutsch, K. 1968 The Analysis of International Relations Prentice Hall New Jersey p.195-196
\textsuperscript{59} Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. 1991. ‘Neo-functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the
Interpretations Dartmouth, Aldershot p.316-317
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid. p.317
As a significant civilian power, the EU contributes to European security in several ways. By enhancing member states’ economic and commercial strength and prosperity, the EU helps to promote peaceful relations among them.\textsuperscript{61} Some see the EU as a unitary foreign policy actor. Others see it as having separate “presences” on the world stage. Allen and Smith note the EU’s “structured presence” in the international arena.\textsuperscript{62} This presence has two elements: the first, distinctive external behaviour; the second, the EU is seen as being important by other world actors.\textsuperscript{63}

Rosamond says the EU has become “a genuine polity” which has taken on many of the features of national political systems.\textsuperscript{64} Others reject the image of a unitary EU and point to how different actors within the bloc have different relationships with and attitudes to globalisation. Bretherton and Vogler say that a state-centric worldview inevitably leads “to the conclusion that the EU is not (or not yet) an actor”.\textsuperscript{65}

This thesis will question to what extent the EU is an actor in Central and Eastern Europe and whether it has had a significant impact on the transmission of norms and values between the region’s countries. Reference will be made to the theories of European integration listed above, with particular use made of constructivism and the theory of norms and values, as expressed by Sjursen and Manners.\textsuperscript{66} The constructivist approach seems to be most useful in answering the research question of this thesis. Other possible approaches are considered below.

**Functionalism and neo-functionalism**

Functionalism as a theory of international relations arose mainly from the experience of European integration in the middle of the last century. In the interwar period, Mitrany called for “universal leagues” of states rather than continental unions, considering the two to differ fundamentally.\textsuperscript{67} While unions use territorial definitions to exclude outsiders, leagues choose

\textsuperscript{61} Smith & Timmins 2000. *Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO enlargement in comparative perspective* p.166
\textsuperscript{62} Allen, D. & Smith, M. 1990 ‘Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Arena’ in *Review of International Studies* 16 (1) quoted in Rosamond p.177
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Rosamond 2000 *Theories of European Integration* p.158-159
\textsuperscript{65} Bretherton & Vogler 2006 *The European Union as a Global Actor* p.12
\textsuperscript{66} Manners 2002 *Normative Power Europe* pp.235-58
and define functions to integrate in everybody’s interests. In the 1960s, Mitrany attacked various “fallacies” which had found expression in the postwar European Communities.\(^68\) One such fallacy was a move to draw boundaries and to impose artificial limits on which countries could join international entities such as the European Communities. Another was a tendency to build for political reasons a “United States of Europe” in the context of the European Community. Mitrany rebutted regional integration arrangements, setting functionalism aside from other major contributions to the debate about establishing conditions for peace.

Other late 20\(^{th}\) century authors viewed the developing European Community as a confederation. Some, such as Forsyth, claimed that the European Community, as a “voluntary association of states with a common interest in building larger markets” continued a theme in European history.\(^69\)

Federal systems institutionalise territorial cleavages and do not eradicate or transcend them. The rationale behind federalist solutions is the hope that tendencies for conflict inherent in the states system can be overcome. However, federalist engineering normally produces a state-like entity and thus replicates the nation-state format. Such is the case of the US and Australia, neither of which is an ideal model for a united Europe. Fuzzy borders are likelier consequences of an expanded EU than hard international borders of the Cold War-era kind. Rosamond says integrationists should accept the logic of “differentiated integration”, where the degree to which European countries are integrated varies considerably.\(^70\)

The fathers of European integration, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, had clear ideas about the road that would lead to an integrated Europe. Their strategy for building the European Communities was to integrate modestly in areas of low politics, creating a high authority to oversee and promote the integration process. Integration of particular sectors would create functional pressure to integrate other related sectors, making for gradual enmeshing of national economies. Interest groups within society would gradually shift loyalty from nation-states to a European system. Deeper integration would lead to more institution-building to regulate it. Political integration would follow economic integration, leading to long-term

\(^70\) Rosamond 2000 *Theories of European Integration* p.30
peace. The Community’s institutional architects made their decisions to formalise integration based on particular motivations and preferences.

Functionalists argue that the best people to build cooperation are technical experts, not government representatives. Mitrany advocated the creation of international bodies with authority over functionally specific fields, such as security, transport and communication. These international entities would be executive bodies with autonomous tasks and powers and do some of the same jobs as national governments. This focus on particular functions would encourage international cooperation more quickly and effectively than grand gestures. The dimensions and structures of these international organisations would be self-determined. IOs in this sense can be considered to be intergovernmental organisations made up of sovereign states, although they also have some of the characteristics of non-governmental organisations in that their main participants might not be government representatives. Functionalists argue that European integration has a logic that the EU member states find hard to resist. Although membership involves contracts that could be broken, in reality they have an almost irresistible authority. Functionalism can be considered as a theory of post-territorial governance.

However, Deutsch regarded the levels of communication undertaken by functional IOs as “insufficient to generate the necessary loyalties among mass publics and thus to secure a lasting peace”. International civil servants tend to interact more with governments rather than with ordinary citizens. Systems and human nature mean direct communication between such civil servants and the general populaces they are supposed to be working for are limited.

The neofunctionalist approach, integral to the study of European unity since 1950, can be considered an early theory of regionalism. Many political scientists have used neofunctionalist logic and vocabulary to analyse European integration and cooperation. For some, integration theory and neofunctionalism are virtual synonyms. A distinguishing feature of neofunctionalist analysis (as opposed to functionalism) is its claim that integration can take place within territorial limits. The EU’s predecessors evolved where and when they did within a defined territory (Western Europe) due to the existence and placement of the Iron Curtain. Following on from this, it can be argued that European integration represents the application of territorial logic.

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71 Mitrany 1966. p.27-31, 72
72 Deutsch, K. 1968 The Analysis of International Relations Prentice Hall New Jersey p.44-45
However, supranational entities, multinational corporations, other transnational entities and subnational entities are all key shapers of the world order. Their operation blurs old boundaries between domestic politics and foreign policy. Relations have become transnational as much as international. Structural changes in the global economy have triggered supranational activism. The dissolution or reorganisation of governance for domestic purposes might itself reorder the international system. The two main communication lines are between societies and national elites, and between the various national elites. Chryssachoou claims a major recentralisation “of political authority within the member states has ... taken place in favour of executive-centred elites”. 73

The functionalist and neo-functionalist approaches work well in describing developments in western Europe during the mid-20th century. They do not seem to work as well in explaining how norms and values are transmitted from liberal democracies into postcommunist states, where the normative approach seems to explain things better. The functionalist and neofunctionalist approaches were therefore not adopted as the conceptual framework for this thesis.

Globalisation and the European Union

Globalisation has encouraged the transfer of economic management from the nation-state level to the EU-wide level. At this level, tensions between moderate, non-revolutionary governance forms can be addressed in an arena out of the gaze of the general public. It can be argued that the transfer of macro-economic oversight from democratic nation states to the less directly democratic EU has disrupted the tradition of popular representatives’ political control over the general economy. European voters do have a say in the way they are ruled at the EU level, through European Parliament elections and, more effectively, by electing national governments, which form the European Council. However, an obvious gap in EU governance structures is the lack of a popularly elected executive.

Globalisation theorists point to a world where territorial conventions have lost meaning due to the great growth of cross-border economic activity. However, geography and political divides

are as relevant today as they were a century ago. The economic changes globalisation brings about are not all gains, and not all irreversible. Globalisation as an ideology, if it is purely business-driven, is a strategy with many holes. Globalisation does not explain the expansion of the EU into Central Europe and the Baltics, nor does it come close to explain the pattern of interaction between the EU, Poland and their eastern neighbours. Therefore, globalisation theory itself is not used as a conceptual framework for this thesis.

**The European Union’s eastern enlargement**

Geography, history and culture are all important factors in influencing how innovations, including changes in norms and values spread from one political unit and people to another. Alex Pravda, who was interested in political changes in postcommunist Europe in the late 20th century, claims that four sets of characteristics are of particular importance when analysing the role external factors have played in “domestic regime change” in postcommunist countries.74 The first is proximity to core Western values and traditions, “in the form of close political, economic, and cultural ties or inclusion within European empires.”75 The further away from the EU core one travels in postcommunist Europe, the less successful and complete has been the process of converting nation-states into western-style functioning democracies in the mould of the EU’s founder states. One has only to compare Poland with Ukraine, or Lithuania with Belarus. Historical and cultural legacies in Eastern Europe seem “remarkably resilient”.76 Recent historical experience provides a second set of distinguishing characteristics: the relationship between nationalism and communism. Here the distinction is between those states (such as most of the Soviet Union) where communism took root and those (such as Poland and Lithuania) where “national identity and interest” opposed communism.77 The third distinguishing feature concerns the ethnic composition of the state and its qualities of “stateness”.78 The division here is between states, such as Poland, “based on ethnically homogeneous historical nations and those [such as Ukraine] with fragile national identities and ethnically fragmented populations”.79 In the latter group, state- and nation-building figure prominently in the process of transition. The stage reached in

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75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
democratic transition is the fourth distinguishing characteristic. Advanced democratic consolidation is linked with conditions which anchor democratic institutions and processes. Kaminska claims that Warsaw’s “active participation in the creation of a coherent EU policy on the Ukraine and Belarus might be a chance for Poland to join the … decisive core” of the Union.\textsuperscript{80}

Democratic communities’ characteristics are “influenced by durable ‘inherited’ cultural traditions”.\textsuperscript{81} In classifying nations according to these traditions, authors use various indicators, including the country’s dominant religion, which empire (German, Habsburg, Russian or Ottoman) citizens’ ancestors lived in, the length of communist rule, socio-economic development and the depth of civil society.

Badescu notes a continuous falloff in Europe from west to east in democratic communities’ quality and level of consolidation.\textsuperscript{82} While Poland and Lithuania fit into the broad category of “democratic communities”, Ukraine (despite recent competitive elections) and Belarus do not.\textsuperscript{83} Location is among the most important factors “in conditioning the overall impact of the international context”.\textsuperscript{84} In the case of postcommunist Europe, countries such as Poland, which maintained consistently good relations with the West saw a “steady thickening of relations” with major Western institutions in the run-up to EU entry.\textsuperscript{85} Kaminska notes that “the potential of EU membership was a motor of the Polish transformation” and that European integration “enabled democratization and stabilization in Poland”.\textsuperscript{86} The democratisation of Central Europe and the Baltic states stands out because of the specificity of the international environment, the outward orientation of the region’s elites and peoples and the fact that democratisation and the development of a market economy occurred at the same time. States further east, such as Ukraine and Belarus, have gone through periods of volatility and regression in their relations with the EU and West as a whole. One argument for further enlargement is that the EU will have fewer problems when postcommunist countries

\textsuperscript{80} Kaminska, J. 2007. ‘New EU members and the CFSP: Europeanization of the Polish foreign policy’ p.3
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid. p.87
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{84} Pravda 2001 p.22
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{86} Kaminska, J. 2007. ‘New EU members and the CFSP: Europeanization of the Polish foreign policy’ Political Perspectives EPRU 2007 Issue 2 (2) p.4
are subject to the socialising effects of European integration rather than “left outside to fester”.  

Central and Eastern Europe’s political and military elites see EU and Nato membership as bringing several security advantages. Foremost among these is that the direct and indirect security guarantees of Nato and the EU are seen as deterrence against any Russian or regional military threat. This has played a major role in Lithuanian, Polish and (sometimes) Ukrainian policies, where Nato membership or special relations with Nato were “seen as the best and cheapest reassurance against any Russian military threat or political blackmail”. As Kaminska states, “[t]he issue of territorial defence has been an obsession for Polish policy makers”. Poland’s decision makers know “that it is only though an active policy in the EU that Poland can realize its Eastern policy, which is the priority in Polish external relations”. Lacking the power and standing of Germany, France or Britain, Poland must “find its own place within the EU, and its own methods of wielding influence, corresponding to its potential and capabilities”.

As the “the most powerful and integrated set of resources for promoting democracy” of any Western organisation and the “embodiment of … economic and political success”, the EU became the “main pole of attraction” for most democratising CEECs. The attraction derives from the price of being left outside the EU as much as from the benefits of accession, says Pravda. Small states on the outside find it costly to exist beside the protectionist EU and difficult to negotiate economic and political problems with larger states. Once inside the Union, they have protection, access to budgetary inflows and the opportunity to punch above their weight in decision-making councils. Two obvious examples are Ireland and Luxembourg. Lithuania is another small country whose international footprint has been significantly increased by its accession to the EU.

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89 Kaminska, J. 2007. ‘New EU members and the CFSP: Europeanization of the Polish foreign policy’ p.2
90 Ibid. p.12
91 Ibid. p.19
92 Pravda 2001 p.12
93 Ibid.
The EU attracts CEEC elites who associate the Union with what they see as European civilisation’s hearth. Another factor pushing CEECs towards the EU is a long-established regional tendency to look beyond the region for solutions to problems. For decades, CEE elites, particularly those in Central Europe and the Baltic states, have “coped with external constraints by a combination of adjustment and resistance”.94 These strategies fostered an “elite preoccupation with external factors which remains evident in current concern to engage outside involvement in their economic and political development”.95

Writing from a left-wing, eurosceptic, perspective, Field calls the relations between the EU and applicant countries “an exercise in subtle racism using colonialist control mechanisms”.96 However, this misrepresents how the EU has engaged postcommunist European states. Winn calls the relationship between the old EU member states and the new postcommunist members “asymmetrical, heavily favouring the west”.97 This is more valid. In the 1990s, CEECs reasserted national sovereignty within a framework “which depended on access to sovereignty-constraining western institutions”.98 Prospective member states looked west while the west determined who could join its international institutions “according to western criteria and standards”.99 To meet EU standards, Poland and Lithuania had to reorientate their political and economic systems. The prospect of eventually joining the EU added impetus to Polish and Lithuanian reform and affected their direction.100 Smith & Timmins see system transformation as a process of “the creation of a western-style multi-party democratic system and liberal market economy”.101

For many in 21st century Belarus and Ukraine, the EU’s presence mirrors the “mystical attraction” evident in Poland in the early 1990s.102 The European Neighbourhood Policy has been a way for the EU to interact positively with its new neighbours, including Ukraine and Belarus. However, most commentators agree that it is unlikely that the European

94 Ibid. p.2
95 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
101 Smith & Timmins 2000. Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO enlargement in comparative perspective
102 Bretherton & Vogler 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor p.159-160
Neighbourhood Policy alone will achieve the EU’s aim of ensuring the economic and political stability of Belarus and Ukraine. Field criticises enlargement moves “for not focusing on a wider Europe, but instead encouraging” countries such as Ukraine “to feel excluded due to the construction of a ‘hub and spoke’ pattern of bilateral relations” between the EU and neighbouring countries.\textsuperscript{103} It is widely accepted that all Yugoslavia’s successor states will eventually join the EU, while Ukraine and Belarus have been excluded from the list of prospective EU members. Making such a distinction between EU candidates and neighbours “is divisive and, given the high expectations of Ukraine in particular, may be unsustainable”.\textsuperscript{104}

Many authors suggest that while it is not impossible for Ukraine to becoming a candidate country eventually, it will not be admitted to the EU before regional and ethnic tension in the country is eased and its unstable democratic system made stable. Much will depend on the EU’s commitment and consistency and its ability to manage relations with Russia, which still considers Ukraine and Belarus as part of its “near abroad”. Almost all authors agree that Russia stands no chance of joining the EU in the foreseeable future. Issues of EU inconsistency arise, with Paris and Berlin tending to prefer to placate Russia at the expense of relations with Ukraine, while Warsaw and Vilnius urge that relations with Ukraine be made a priority.\textsuperscript{105}

Schimmelfennig says that the expansion of the “European community of values” to postcommunist Europe, the stabilisation of the region, a “pan-European stability community of law”, the stabilisation of “economic transformation processes” in the new and prospective member states and the “provision of pan-European stability and conflict prevention” are the main components of the benefit side of EU enlargement.\textsuperscript{106} Internal and external preconditions affect the direction and magnitude of political and economic change. Internal preconditions include the transformation from a centralised economy based on state ownership into a free market economy “with its own criteria of success and failure”.\textsuperscript{107} External preconditions include the EU’s expectations. External actors prioritise promoting the

\textsuperscript{104} Bretherton & Vogler p.161
\textsuperscript{105} Recent (2010) joint initiatives by Poland and Germany to improve relations with Belarus could indicate a convergence in viewpoints in Berlin and Warsaw towards eastern neighbourhood policy.
\textsuperscript{106} Schimmelfennig 2003 The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe p.64
market, claiming this will strengthen democratisation and secure ties with the West.\textsuperscript{108} For domestic leaders, building power is most important.

What Schimmelfennig calls the “inclusive strategy of community-building” is aimed at socialising new member states from within.\textsuperscript{109} The EU admits aspiring states, then teaches them EU rules, which new members are obliged to learn. With an inclusive strategy, a state which aspires to membership is admitted. In contrast, an exclusive strategy involves socialisation from outside. The EU communicates its values and norms to prospective members and informs them to what extent they must adopt those values and norms before being admitted. Once it has fulfilled the requirements, the state is admitted to the club. Full accession means socialisation has been successful. So, if the EU pursues an exclusive strategy of socialisation, a state is admitted to the Union if it has internalised the EU’s basic values and norms.

\textbf{Security aspects of enlargement}

The opening of the EU’s eastern borders took place at the same time as the EU’s internal security agenda developed a stronger profile. The EU responded to threats to its citizens’ security by developing new EU-wide instruments. Many of these threats were perceived to be from Poland and former Soviet states. In the lead-up to eastern enlargement Germany and Austria warned of emerging threats to internal security from Poland and its eastern neighbours.\textsuperscript{110} Today, Poland and Lithuania as states no longer pose a security threat to Western Europe. However, Ukraine is another matter. During the 1990s, Polish and Lithuanian appeals to join the EU and Nato consistently emphasised the difference between their country and the “barbarous East” and that while the appellant’s state was definitely European, the next state to the east was not European.\textsuperscript{111} Poland expected Nato to differentiate between it and the likes of Romania, Lithuania and Ukraine. Lithuanian diplomats insisted that the Commonwealth of Independent States was “foreign to most Lithuanians”.\textsuperscript{112} No nation-state chose to call itself a Balkan state, but many often used the term to describe their

\textsuperscript{108} Pravda p.2-3
\textsuperscript{109} Schimmelfennig p.74-75
\textsuperscript{110} Grabbe, H. 2006 \textit{The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe} Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK 2006 p.2
\textsuperscript{111} Schimmelfennig 2003 \textit{The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe} p.231
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
more southerly or easterly neighbours. Romanian authors tried to detach Romania from the Balkans.

Bringing countries like Poland and Lithuania “into the European polity implies the inheritance of their geopolitical security problems”.\textsuperscript{113} Acceptance of the \textit{acquis communautaire} makes new member states “part of ‘western’ concerns relating to security, society, economics and politics”.\textsuperscript{114} It forces new members to perform and transition towards EU-required political and economic systems. Human rights regimes in acceding states must be brought into line with those of existing member states. More importantly, new member states must align foreign and security policies towards the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. They must work vigorously towards protection of human rights, promotion of democracy, acceptance of the market economy and acceptance of CFSP rules and procedures. As much as they are political or economic, the problems of transition are “socio-psychological” in nature.\textsuperscript{115} It takes time to implant democracy and capitalism into a people’s psyche.

\textbf{Conditionality and leverage}

Convergence and conditionality are discussed by Pridham, who sees “gradual movement in system conformity based on a grouping of established democratic states that has the power and institutional mechanisms to attract transiting regimes and to help secure their democratic outcomes”.\textsuperscript{116} Provided new democracies want to accede to the EU, the bloc has “compelling leverage over their elite groups and a channel of influence over their socio-economic interests and ... public opinion”.\textsuperscript{117} Pridham says that “perhaps more telling is the impact and influence on elite mentalities in new democracies”.\textsuperscript{118} This influence and closer contacts can reinforce the new democratic and economic structures in candidate countries. To apply for membership, CEECs had to show they were moving in the right direction, were politically stable or potentially so and met a set of democratic standards. Pridham says conditionality is “suggestive of deliberate efforts to determine from outside the course and outcome of regime change”.\textsuperscript{119} Applicant countries which comply with the EU’s democratic conditionality

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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\bibitem{113} Winn p.21
\bibitem{114} Ibid.
\bibitem{115} Ibid. p.25
\bibitem{116} Pridham, G. 2005 \textit{Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe} Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, UK p.8
\bibitem{117} Ibid.
\bibitem{118} Ibid. p.9
\bibitem{119} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
requirements are eligible for membership. Democratic conditionality depends on domestic actors’ responsiveness and, in particular, their commitment to the European project.

When political conditionality is used to relegate states in the membership queue, it has mixed effects on democratisation. In some cases, such as happened in Serbia and Slovakia in the 1990s, “leaders may try to strengthen the nationalist basis of their support through more authoritarian and sustained defiance of international criticism”. This can lead to “a downward spiral” of marginalisation, with national leaders championing supposed self-reliance and the West writing off the state as a permanent “outsider”. Sometimes, international pressure may help replace authoritarian governments with more democratic ones. This happened in Ukraine in the Orange Revolution, but has not happened in Belarus.

The progressive process of driving towards EU membership enhances a national government’s domestic legitimacy. It is easier to justify and implement domestic and foreign policy changes and transformation hardships if they are seen as being demanded by the EU “as a condition of closer cooperation and accession”. Accession to the EU adds prestige to governments, boosts societies’ self-esteem and makes harder authoritarian reversals. The EU exerts leverage over acceding countries and is “a powerful external force for changes”. The process of EU accession has encouraged “new perceptions of national identity” and the “return to Europe” and has allowed CEECs “to shuffle off more easily associations with the dictatorial past”.

**Ethnic relations**

Today, almost all the states of Central and Eastern Europe are based around a single, dominant ethnic group or nationality, united by a common language, usually specific to that country. This is the case for Poland and Lithuania and, to a much lesser extent, for Ukraine and Belarus. The latter two have less clear national identities and large Russian-speaking populations due to their long period of close ties with Russia. Minority rights is one area where the EU has provided “a consistent pressure for improvement”. A new minority rights
A regime has emerged in Europe since 1989. This regime has the institutional support of all the European organisations, including the EU. In the case of Poland and Lithuania the emergence of the new minority rights regime owes as much to western countries and the EU as to shifts in identity within the nation-states.\textsuperscript{126}

Gurr credits the end of the Cold War and ensuing spread of democracy and the increasingly important role of the EU as primary reasons for the observed decline in ethnic conflict in Central and Eastern Europe since the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{127} International efforts at publicising and preventing violations of group rights increased markedly after the Cold War. Compared with the rulers of authoritarian states, such as existed in communist Eastern Europe, elites in democracies “are less likely to rely on strategies of assimilation and repression” and more likely to follow policies of recognition, pluralism and group autonomy.\textsuperscript{128}

Heisler assumes that in developed Western democratic societies, where discrimination and overall salience of ethnic groups is less, ethnicity becomes less important relative to other forms of self-identification.\textsuperscript{129} It is not clear that this is the case. One might argue the opposite has taken place in at least some instances, such as in Britain. It is true that as nationalism has become less important as a motor for political and social change after the heady days of the early 1990s, the propensity for ethnic differences to be the main contributor to violent conflict has lessened. Fleming says that in today’s Europe “the treatment of national minorities has become an indicator of ... progress”.\textsuperscript{130}

Yet, while border disputes in western Europe have become less important since 1950, it seems that even in the early 21\textsuperscript{st} century, most Poles and many Lithuanians are not happy with their country’s borders.\textsuperscript{131} However, from the early 1990s Poland and Lithuania made considerable progress “towards democratic and civil society norms (as defined by the West)”, in a process led by national elites, with strong encouragement from the EU, its member states and the US.\textsuperscript{132} Schimmelfennig notes that in the early 1990s, postcommunist “Poland granted

\textsuperscript{126} Fleming 2003 \textit{National Minorities In Post-Communist Poland} p.94
\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{129} Heisler, M. 1990. ‘Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in the West’ in Montville, J. (ed.) \textit{Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies}, Lexington, Massachusetts p.45
\textsuperscript{130} Fleming 2003. \textit{National Minorities In Post-Communist Poland} p.1
\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.
minority rights to its German-speaking population and made no claims to Lithuanian, Belarusian and Ukrainian territory that had belonged to its prewar area”. The reasons for this difference are several but probably most important was the greater “westernisation” of Poland, the greater impact of EU-type values of tolerance and “European standards” on Poland’s new leaders and the belief among those leaders that rejoining the “civilised” West was a realistic prospect for their country.

**Conclusion**

An examination of the literature points to a conclusion that European integration may be leading to the development of new state-type entities which are not nation-states in the sense understood in the 20th century. The EU itself can be regarded as a new type of transnational state or as another, so far unique, category of human collective entity. The entry of Poland and Lithuania into the EU has been an important event for those countries and their neighbours. The exclusion of Belarus and Ukraine from the EU is at least as important for Eastern Europe as a whole. This thesis begins with the hypothesis that the EU has had a significant impact on the countries of postcommunist Europe and on relations between those countries. It examines the belief that the EU has had a particularly strong impact on Poland, which for historical, cultural and geographical reasons is well disposed to innovation from the West. A reading of the literature reviewed in this chapter gives some pointers about what should be looked for when investigating the EU’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours and the way in which Poland has functioned as a filter and relayer of EU norms and values to its eastern neighbours. The approach of this thesis will be primarily a constructivist “norm and values” one, as this appears the most apt, but in certain places and times, use is made of other ideas and approaches mentioned in this chapter.

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133 Schimmelfennig 2003 *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe* p.95
3 Methodology
This thesis builds on research carried out for two master theses (at Curtin University of Technology, Perth and the Jagiellonian University, Kraków); other studies at the Jagiellonian University in the mid-1990s, including a Postgraduate Certificate in Central and East European Studies; a BA dissertation at University College Cork, which looked at the Changing Information Fields of the Cracow Region; and other studies and research. Sources of this PhD thesis include the author’s personal experience of life in each of the countries concerned, especially more than three years spent in Poland; an extensive bibliography; and a survey and interviews conducted in June-July 2008 in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. Most of the interviews were conducted in English. Some were conducted in Polish.

This thesis investigates how Poland has been a vector and filter for the transmission of values and norms from the old EU to Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, particularly in the years leading up to the 2004 eastern enlargement. It also looks at how a new political, economic and social border for “Europe” is being defined and how it is affecting communities on either side of it. While relations between Poland and Lithuania are now those of two nations within the EU, a new dimension in relations between Poland and non-EU members Belarus and Ukraine has been created by Poland’s accession to the EU. Separate chapters look at the EU’s impact on Poland’s relations with each of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. As it is impossible to comprehensively cover the whole ambit of the EU’s impact on relations between these countries, particular aspects of the relations are singled out for study. Chapter 8 looks at public opinion in Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, particularly in as much as it relates to the transmission of European norms and values. The findings of the author’s survey of public opinion in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in June-July 2008 are including in this chapter. Migration to and from Poland, particularly as it relates to the transmission of European norms and values to and from Poland and its eastern neighbours, is examined in chapter 9. Chapter 10 looks at the media’s role in relations between the countries concerned, with a focus on Poland’s media. Chapter 11 looks at prospects for the future. There is a final concluding chapter.

The author was in New Zealand during most of the time study for this thesis was taking place. Most of the research was conducted using written sources: books, magazines, periodicals, most available at the University of Canterbury library, and many electronic resources, including the Factiva database. Most source materials were accessed in English and Polish, though during the course of research, the author was able to learn sufficient Belarusian and
Ukrainian to be able to utilise some sources in the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages, particularly from websites and radio stations. Listening to online audio news broadcasts in Belarusian (RFE/RL and Radio Racyja) and Ukrainian (BBC, RFE/RL) helped improve the author’s understanding of those languages, as did reading texts and news websites in Ukrainian and Belarusian.

All forms of media were used as sources. Much use was made of internet sources, particularly academic papers online and news websites, in particular the BBC News and the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty websites. The latter website was viewed in its English, Ukrainian and Belarusian-language versions. Many newspaper websites were also accessed, including in particular the websites of popular Polish daily newspapers Gazeta Wyborcza (www.gazeta.pl), which has a liberal, generally pro-EU, orientation and Rzeczpospolita (www rp.pl), a more conservative publication. Other sources included EU and government websites. A full bibliography has been included at the end of this thesis.

Free-to-air state and commercial television programmes were viewed in two periods in Poland (May 2006 and July 2008) and in July 2008 in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Throughout 2006-2009, many relevant video clips from television stations in Poland, Ukraine and Belarus and elsewhere, were accessed on YouTube. Television appears to be the most popular medium in each of the four countries in the study, in terms of audience. As in other parts of the world, newspapers appear to have a declining readership. Internet users are predominantly young, and overall levels of internet use in the countries concerned, particularly in Ukraine, are on average still low compared with most of the western EU.¹

Field research

It was felt there should be at least one field-trip component of the research. A decision was made to visit Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine in 2008. In addition to the main series of interviews conducted in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine in June and July 2008, other, informal, interviews of experts in the fields of migration and European Union studies and Polish accession to the EU were undertaken in Ireland and New Zealand. An earlier field trip was made to Poland in May 2006. A short visit was also made to Ireland in June 2008, when University College Cork academics involved in studying Polish and Lithuanian migration to Ireland were interviewed, mainly about Polish immigration to Ireland.

Purpose of the research trip

The main purpose of the 2008 field trip to Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland was to interview and survey people in all four countries to determine their impressions of the EU’s impact on relations between the countries and to observe at first hand how EU norms and values were being transmitted between the peoples of the countries concerned. Previous visits to the region had been made between 1988 and 2006, including several months-long periods based in Kraków, so it was possible to compare the overall economic and social environment in Poland in the 1990s and the period post-2000.

Most of the people interviewed and surveyed in 2008 were students, academics or teachers. This was because such people were the most willing to be interviewed, were generally well informed and comparatively well travelled, and for the most part had a reasonable or good command of English. Some interviewees were business people. Interviews were undertaken in cities and areas near the borders of Poland and its eastern neighbours, where the impact of the EU on relations between Poles and their eastern neighbours might be assumed to be greater and the transmission of EU norms and values more in evidence.

A further purpose of the 2008 trip was to collect data from publications (particularly newspapers) and universities en route and to investigate at first-hand the situation at land and air border crossings in the area.

Where the research was carried out

The primary areal focus of the thesis is on Poland, Lithuania and areas in Ukraine and Belarus within 200 kilometres of the Polish border. In Kaunas, many surveys and interviews were carried out in a university dormitory, among students from various faculties of Vytautas Magnus University and the Kaunas University of Technology. Interviews in Vilnius were carried out mainly at university buildings. One was carried outdoors on a busy square. The author visited the town in Ireland that in 2006 had the highest proportion of Poles in its population: 14 per cent, according to Ireland’s census that year.

Three overland international border crossings were made, all by public scheduled bus, from Lithuania to Belarus, from Belarus to Ukraine and from Ukraine to Poland. Three intra-EU
flights were made in 2008, from London to Dublin, from Dublin to Kaunas and from Warsaw to London. Most of the passengers on these flights were Polish or Lithuanian.

**Why certain areas were chosen for the survey**

Because of geography, history and family ties, it can be expected that inhabitants of western Ukraine and western Belarus would be more familiar with Poland and Poles than inhabitants of eastern Belarus and eastern Ukraine would be, and the impact of the EU on relations between the nations concerned should be more evident in areas closer to their mutual borders. It appeared to make sense to focus on those areas. It was decided that universities would be good places in which to find interviewees who spoke English, had some knowledge of the EU and who were amenable to being interviewed.

Apart from their ease of access, the three Lithuanian survey locations were chosen because they were representative of three different categories of regions in Lithuania.

Kaunas is a largely ethnic Lithuanian city with relatively few ethnic Poles, where day-to-day contact with Poles was limited or non-existent for most residents.

Vilnius has a large Polish minority and a recent Polish past, being ethnically predominantly Polish from the 1700s until 1945 and part of Poland in the interwar period. Today, about one in five of the city’s residents speaks Polish as a mother tongue. Most residents of Vilnius have day-to-day contact with ethnic Poles in their city and have met visitors from Poland, particularly because Vilnius is an attractive tourist destination for Poles. Domestic Polish television channels are available to Vilnius cable television subscribers.

The third Lithuanian interview location, Alytus, is in the south of the country, close to the borders with Poland and Belarus. It is predominantly ethnic Lithuanian, but has a long history of interaction with Poland. Many Alytus residents have some Polish ancestry, and many older residents can speak Polish. Terrestrial Polish television signals can be picked up in Alytus.

It had been intended to survey and interview people in at least three locations in Belarus: Navahrudak/Novogrudok, Hrodna/Grodno and Brest. These locations were specifically

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2 In general, in this thesis placenames are rendered in the language which is official in that country, except for cities and regions such as Warsaw, Kiev, Brest and Galicia, which have widely known English names. Belarus has two official languages, Russian and Belarusian, and names of cities are written in both languages within the
selected. All three locations have strong links to Poland. Grodno is located near the borders of both Lithuania and Poland. Brest is located on the Polish border. Grodno and Brest are both on major transit routes between Poland and the former Soviet Union. Brest is on the main road and railway lines between Berlin and Moscow. Grodno is on the historic main route from Warsaw to Vilnius and St Petersburg. Navahrudak is an ancient settlement associated with the histories of both Lithuania and Poland.

Who was interviewed

Most interviewees were either academics or students, as these people were generally most conversant in English, amenable to being interviewed and reasonably knowledgeable about the EU. It was felt that such people would provide the most useful data within the time constraints available. In Lithuania, most academics were helpful and amenable to being interviewed. Most interviewees had a reasonable command of English. Respondents varied in age from 18 to nearly 60, although most were under 30. Most Polish respondents were based in Kraków, while all but one of the Ukrainian respondents were students or academics based in Lviv.

Three academics at University College Cork interested in the topic of recent migration to Ireland were interviewed together informally, as were people with first-hand experience of the wave of Polish migration to Ireland. In New Zealand, Paweł Świeboda, an expert on Polish-EU relations and a negotiator during Poland’s accession negotiations with the EU, was interviewed in September 2009.

Semi-structured interviews were carried out in three cities in Lithuania (Vilnius, Kaunas and Alytus), one city (Lviv) and one village (Skelivka) in Ukraine and three cities (Kraków, Warsaw and Rybnik) in Poland. A total of 48 respondents (23 in Lithuania, 15 in Poland and 10 in Ukraine) completed two-page survey questionnaires, an example of which is included in Appendix 2. Twenty people living in countries concerned (nine in Lithuania, five in Ukraine and six in Poland), most academics or students, were interviewed in relatively formal sit-down face-to-face interviews, usually one-on-one.

country. In general, Russian is the vernacular of the cities of Belarus and the east of the country, while Belarusian is used in rural areas, especially in western Belarus. Largely for this reason, the transliterated Belarusian spelling is used in this thesis for Navahrudak (Novogrudok in Russian), while the more widely used Russian (and Polish) spelling is used for Grodno (which is called Hrodna in Belarusian).
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours

Methodology

Nationality | Number of interviewees (A) | Main language used for interview | Number of questionnaires completed (B) | Total A + B
---|---|---|---|---
Polish | 6 | English (5)*, Polish (1) | 15 | 21
Lithuanian | 8 | English | 22 | 30
Ukrainian | 5 | English (4), Polish (1) | 10 | 15
German | 1 | English | 1 | 2
Total | 20 | | 48 | 68

*One interview carried out on 16/9/2009

Table 3.1 Survey respondents by nationality

One of the Polish respondents, political analyst Paweł Świeboda, was interviewed in Christchurch at the National Centre for Research on Europe. Most of the interviews were recorded on audio and are contained on the CD attached as Appendix 3. Interviewees in Ukraine did not want to be recorded on audio. The tabulated survey and interview results later in this thesis reflect data collected from the above sources. In addition, about a dozen people (mainly in Poland and Ukraine) were interviewed on a less formal basis, mainly because these respondents exhibited signs of being uncomfortable being put in a semi-formal interview situation.

Where interviews took place

| country    | Number of interviewees (A) | Main language used for interview | Number of questionnaires completed (B) | Total A + B |
---|---|---|---|---|
Poland     | 5 | English (4), Polish (1) | 15 | 20
Lithuania | 9 | English | 23 | 32
Ukraine   | 5 | English (4), Polish (1) | 10 | 15
New Zealand | 1* | English | 0 | 1
Total     | 20 | | 48 | 68

*NZ interview was conducted on 16/09/2009

Table 3.2 Survey respondents by location

Most of the interviews took place in universities; some were carried out in the respondents’ homes or on the street. Apart from the interviews and surveys in the region, interviews were also carried out in Ireland and New Zealand. As a prelude to the field trip to Lithuanian,
Belarus, Ukraine and Poland, a visit was made to Ireland to research Polish and Lithuanian migration to Ireland, particularly in the period after the 2004 eastern enlargement, when Ireland lifted restrictions on Poles and Lithuanians working in Ireland.

How the interviews were carried out

In most cases, interviews were carried out in English, although Polish was also used in Poland and Ukraine. In Lithuania and Ukraine, a local interpreter (a student or academic) was sometimes present to facilitate communication. Initial contacts in Lithuania included a student friend in Kaunas, met on Facebook in 2007, and a language school director in Alytus, known to the author from a previous visit to Lithuania in 1996. With the Kaunas friend’s help, more prospective respondents were found, using a snowballing method. These in turn then helped access more students and academics at Kaunas universities. A visit to the EU information office in Vilnius provided one interviewee and a university contact who was also interviewed. Visits to the university led to more respondents being found. Interviews in Lviv were conducted in English, although sometimes Polish and Ukrainian were used to help interviewees understand some questions.

Constraints

Time and other constraints meant it was not possible to undertake on-the-spot interviews in eastern and central Ukraine. It is probable that the opinions of respondents interviewed and surveyed in Lviv are not entirely typical of Ukraine as a whole, but they are probably typical of educated people in western Ukraine. While Ukrainian, Belarusian, Russian and Polish are all Slavic languages, with a high degree of mutual intelligibility (varying depending on region and dialect), the Lithuanian language is not mutually intelligible with Slavonic languages. However, most young Lithuanians encountered on the 2008 field trip to the region could speak at least some English and interviews were conducted in English. Though the timing of the field trip meant that the academic year was finishing in the countries in question and it was not possible to get more than a handful of interviewees in most interviewing locations. In Lviv, unsuccessful attempts were made to interview students and academics at the main university, the Ivano-Franko National University of Lviv (Львівський національний університет імені Івана Франка), with academics saying that neither they nor their students...
had time to complete the surveys. More success was had with interviewing students and academics at the Institute of Tourism and Trade in L'viv.

It is probably the case that the respondents would be more favourably disposed to the EU than the general population, because other surveys and polling quoted later in this thesis indicate a link between education level and attitude towards the EU in the countries of the region. The level of knowledge of the EU varied with location and nationality of respondents, with Poles and Lithuanians, in general, giving the impression of understanding the workings of the EU much better than Ukrainians, understandable given that Lithuania and Poland are in the EU, and that Ukrainians now find it much more difficult to visit EU countries for financial reasons and also because of visa requirements. The opinions offered by Polish and Lithuanian respondents are felt to be genuine.

The strong similarity of responses from Ukrainian respondents, particularly the students who completed the survey questionnaire, might indicate some answered questions in a manner to elicit a favourable response from the interviewer. It might also be the case that the language used in the surveys (mainly English) might predicate respondents to answer questions in a particular, probably more positive, way. A study in the United States examined the effects of using different languages (in that case English and Spanish) when interviewing respondents about issues that have a social bearing on particular nationalities and ethnicities.\(^3\) The study found that the language that interviewers used affected the answers that the respondents provided.\(^4\) Because English is the major Western language, using it might encourage Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Polish respondents to adopt a frame of mind which predisposes them to answer questions in a way which fits in with the way they feel questions should be answered. This is particularly likely if there are other environmental factors that encourage respondents to answer in a certain way. The interviewer tried to adopt a neutral tone in the structure and delivery of questioning, but it is inevitable that certain unconscious cues or signals might be picked up by respondents.

Respondents in L'viv were surveyed and interviewed in the same room. Some interviewees were able to hear the responses of others previously interviewed. The survey questionnaires were handed out to three batches of students in L'viv, with the help of staff members of their

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\(^4\) Ibid.
institute. There was some discussion about the survey questions among the students in each group, partly because some students’ grasp of English was less than ideal. This discussion might have encouraged students to answer the survey questions in a more similar way than they might have without such discussion.

The 2008 Ukraine survey data included in the public opinion chapter is mainly based on interviews and surveys carried out in Lviv. The few informal interviews carried out in the village of Skelivka were in Polish (no-one encountered in Skelivka spoke English). Only one interview in Skelivka took place largely indoors. Owing to the circumstances in Skelivka, where existence for most is rather rudimentary, potential respondents were spoken to on the street and/or outside their houses. Among the oldest villagers, most perceptions of Poland seemed based on prewar days, when they lived in Poland. Villagers were able to understand Polish, though their responses to questions were in a mixture of Polish and the local dialect of Ukrainian. Most respondents in Skelivka had a basic schooling and little knowledge of the EU. Because of potential respondents’ apparent bewilderment at the interviewer’s presence in the village and, in some cases, reticence to communicate with the interviewer, it was decided not to proceed with a series of semi-structured interviews in Skelivka.

Some interviewees in Ukraine and Lithuania were reluctant to sign consent forms, having had previous negative experience of bureaucracy and officialdom, especially in Soviet times. According to University of Canterbury PhD regulations, any surveys and interviews carried out as part of a PhD require approval from the university’s Human Ethics Committee (HEC). To obtain such approval, survey questionnaire forms and pages outlining the purpose of the survey and interviews and why and by whom they are being carried out, must be drawn up and shown to the HEC. On approval, these forms must then be shown to respondents at the time of survey. Interviewees are required to read and sign a form acknowledging they understand the purpose of the research.

Several potential interviewees in Ukraine and a couple in Lithuania were unsettled by being presented with papers to sign, particularly those who grew up in the Soviet Union, during whose existence signing documents was not always a safe activity. Several potential interviews in Ukraine were lost because of this requirement. The author feels that many of the

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5 Skelivka was in Poland until World War II. The population of the town today is made up mainly of Ukrainians who lived in the area before World War II and Lemkos resettled from rump Poland in the 1940s, and their descendants.
“ethics” requirements deemed essential in New Zealand, presumably for legal reasons, are not helpful in obtaining data in countries such as republics of the former Soviet Union, where people’s life experience is much different from that of New Zealanders’, and where the legal and social system is also hugely different. None of the respondents surveyed in Poland, Ukraine and Lithuania in 2008 were native English speakers. It is probable that being presented with a document in English to read and sign was an unnecessary additional stress to them.

Language difficulties were expected, as much source material is not in English or Polish. While the spoken forms of Ukrainian and Belarusian are similar to Polish, allowing for a level of oral communication between a Polish-speaking interviewer and Belarusian and Ukrainian-speaking respondents, nuances and subtleties in meaning may be missed. In addition, speaking in Polish to Ukrainians and Belarusians tends to invoke a certain image and attitude among the respondents. Many Belarusians insist on speaking Russian (less similar to Polish) when speaking to someone using Polish, believing perhaps this gives them a higher standing in the conversation. Many Belarusians appear to regard the Belarusian language as a folk-tongue rather than a “proper” language of standing like Russian or Polish.

It was expected there would be difficulties accessing information from Belarus, because of the authoritarian nature of the regime in that country. In Belarus, people were reluctant to be interviewed and it proved impossible to conduct even semi-structured interviews or distribute survey questionnaires. Prospective respondents in Belarus became evasive and uncooperative when they understood they were being asked to be part of this research project. The lack of freedom in Belarus was obvious and expected, though the degree to which people were reticent to contribute to the research was surprising, given that other authors have gained polling data from Belarus. The reticence was most obvious in the case of academics who, the author was told, were “unavailable” for interviews and would be unavailable the next day and the next. Students were also said to be “unavailable”.

Belarusians in the lower ranks of society were more talkative, perhaps because they felt they had least to lose and fear by talking with a Westerner asking questions about their country’s links with Poland and the EU. The conversations with such people were informal and are not presented in this thesis, though in essence they tend to back up the main contentions of this thesis as regards the EU’s impact on relations between Poland and Belarus. There was some
tension between Belarus and the EU at the time of the survey. In July 2008, a small bomb attack on an event in Minsk attended by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko unsettled many Belarusians.

Media sources

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Table 3.3 Main print, website and newswire media sources

Media sources used included newspapers, internet, television and radio. A wide range of newspapers was accessed during the whole period between February 2006 and March 2010. Most of the newspapers were accessed through their respective websites. Major reference sources were Polish newspapers Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita. Other sources were English-language newspaper websites in Lithuania and Ukraine (Kyiv Post and others) and other countries in the region, for example Latvia’s Baltic Times (www.baltictimes.com),
which covers Lithuanian news. Articles from British and United States newspapers were also accessed.

Other media websites accessed frequently included the BBC News website and the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty website, the latter particularly for Belarus and Ukraine news. RFE/RL’s radio services in Belarusian, Ukrainian and Russian were listened to as was Polish radio, including Radio Racyja (a Polish-based station broadcasting in Belarusian, mainly for an audience in Belarus). EU websites were also accessed, including those of the EU information offices in Lithuania, Belarus, Ukraine and Poland. Many more articles and news stories were accessed from other sources, notably through the University of Canterbury’s Factiva system.
4 Historical Overview
In 1957, representatives of six Western European countries signed the Treaty of Rome and a major step was taken in the long road to establishing what became the European Union. The creation of the EU was one of the last century’s most remarkable advances. A set of treaties, laws and institutions has altered Europe’s human landscape, changed the way Europeans relate to each other, made Europe an economic superpower and helped bring to most of the continent the longest period of peace in its history.

**Historical background**

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have long historical ties. Relations between the peoples of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine have been particularly close. Poles, Belarusians and Ukrainians are Slavs, speaking closely related, somewhat mutually intelligible, languages. Most of the territory that forms Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine was for long united in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and later most of it came under rule from Moscow, first in the form of the Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union. At times relations between the nations were bad. The first half of the 20th century was a time of particularly bad relations, with a low point reached during World War II, when conflicts turned bloody, particularly between Poles and Ukrainians. In World War II and its aftermath, borders were shifted wholesale and ethnic cleansing reduced the sizes of ethnic minorities. The decades of communist rule limited interaction between Poland and its eastern neighbours and kept a lid on ethnic tension. The post-Cold War period has been marked by a big improvement in relations between the governments of Lithuania, Ukraine and Poland. This improvement is partly a result of the EU’s interaction with the region. Meanwhile, Belarus remains relatively isolated.

Poles regard themselves as having belonged to Western civilisation since the dawn of the Polish state a thousand years ago.1 Historically, Polish elites have seen themselves as conveyors of enlightenment and Western civilisation to the less advanced east.2 Lithuania and the western parts of Ukraine and Belarus have particularly strong historical links with Poland. Those links have had the effect of accentuating national feeling in those areas, particularly in western Ukraine, as local populations reacted to attempts to polonise them. In both Belarus

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1 Lukowski, J. & Zawadzki, H. 2001 *A concise history of Poland* Cambridge University Press p.3
and Ukraine, the main social divide is between those who identify more with Russia (who live mainly in the east of those states) and those who have a greater sense of national identity (who live mainly in the capital cities and in areas close to Poland). For historical reasons, national identity is far stronger in Ukraine than in Belarus.

Poland has played a central role in European affairs for much of the last millennium. For 300 years Poland “was the anchor of Eastern and Central Europe”. Ukraine and Belarus first came into existence as independent states in the last century – first briefly at the end of World War I, and again when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. Poland and Lithuania have long been predominantly Roman Catholic societies. They remained strongly so throughout the years of communist rule. In contrast, mainly due to their longer experience of Soviet rule, in Belarus and Ukraine, religion has been less closely associated with national identity and independence. In both Ukraine and Belarus the dominant religion is Orthodox Christianity, which experienced a different history to western Christianity. It lacked a “Renaissance, Reformation or Counter-Reformation”. This, for some, helps define “what is European and what is not”.

The 1569 Polish-Lithuanian Union of Lublin led to the nobility and much of the urban population throughout what later became Belarus and western Ukraine becoming Roman Catholic. In these lands, this process of Catholicisation was also, in large measure, a process of polonisation, as within a century of the union the landed class throughout the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was Polish in language and culture. Today Belarus has a large Roman Catholic minority in its western half, while Ukraine has a Greek Catholic minority in its far west (Galicia).

After being partitioned and vanishing from the map of Europe for 123 years, an independent Poland re-emerged in 1918. The post-World War I Republic of Poland, which included Vilnius, Lviv and what is now western Belarus within its borders, was a multi-ethnic state, with ethnic minorities amounting to almost a third of the population. Census data from 1931

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3 Ibid.
4 Many Belarusians consider the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to have been “their” state as much as modern-day Lithuanians’. Ukrainians can point to Kievan Rus as a progenitor state of Ukraine.
6 Ibid.
indicate that at that time only 69 per cent of Poland’s population were ethnic Poles. While western and central parts of interwar Poland were predominantly Polish (with significant Jewish and German minorities in urban areas), eastern Poland was ethnically mixed. A strip running along the border with Lithuania, including Grodno and Vilnius, was predominantly Polish. After World War II this area was divided between the Lithuanian and Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republics. The area south of this as far as Brest and the Pripyat marshes had a mixed population of Belarusians, Poles, “Tutejsi” and Jews. This area now forms most of western Belarus. Further south, Volyn and Galicia had Ukrainian majorities, but until the 1940s also had significant populations of Poles and Jews.

The relationship between interwar Poland on the one hand, and its minorities and neighbouring countries on the other, was often tense, and occasionally violent. Poland’s seizure of Vilnius from Lithuania in 1923 resulted in no diplomatic contact between the two countries until 1938. The new Polish state in 1920 inherited a “national” division of labour, a further factor militating against tolerance of ethnic minorities. The Belarusian and Ukrainian minorities languished as “poor illiterate peasants” in the backward eastern provinces. The murder of Polish officials in the early 1930s by Ukrainian separatists led to repression. The Belarusian minority also “suffered at the hands of state-sponsored violence”.

World War II “solved” Poland’s minority problem. It saw the extermination of 95 per cent of the Jewish population of the area, as much as quarter of the populations of Belarus and Ukraine and a sixth of the population of Poland. The post-war settlement moved Poland’s borders about 240 kilometres westward, and reduced the country’s area by almost a quarter.

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8 Musgrave, T. 2000 Self-determination and national minorities Oxford University Press p.57
9 The people who called themselves Tutejsi were Slavs without a clearly defined sense of national identity. The Soviet authorities decided that the Tutejsi were Belarusian, although some (Poleszuzs) spoke dialects more similar to standard Ukrainian than standard Belarusian.
10 Galicia here refers to that (eastern) part of the Austrian province of Galicia and Ludomeria that is now in Ukraine. The main city of this area is Lviv.
12 Fleming p.45
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid. p.46
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Various sources. It is impossible to get an accurate count of the number of dead, but the total number of those killed in these countries during World War II was certainly more than 10 million and perhaps more than 20 million.
The eastern provinces, which contained most of Poland’s Ukrainians and Belarusians, were annexed by the USSR in 1939. In the late 1940s and 1950s the Polish population of those areas was deported west into the lands taken from Germany and given to the new Polish state. Rebels, intelligentsia and others seen as threats to communist rule were killed or deported, or fled to the West, during and after World War II. Most of the Germans who had been living in what became Poland’s “recovered” western and northern territories fled the Soviet advance or were deported to Germany in the late 1940s. This territorial shift left Poland comparatively homogeneous. Communist Poland aimed to assimilate all remaining ethnic minorities. The everyday social contacts between neighbouring nationalities that had persisted until Soviet rule ended.

The communist period

Communist rule had a calamitous effect on society in Central and Eastern Europe. Communism destroyed “the fabric of all spontaneous, immediate, interpersonal ties ... stretching between the micro-level of the family and macro-level of the state”, producing a social vacuum. The degree of destruction of pre-communist social structures, many of which lend themselves to transmission of European values and ideals, was greater in Belarus and Ukraine, intermediate in Lithuania and much less in most of Poland. The shorter period of communist rule and the continued existence of an intelligentsia with strong links to the west and with democratic ideals meant Tischner’s anti-ideal of man, homo sovieticus, was less omnipresent in Poland than in the Soviet Union.

Stalin’s death in 1953 saw an end to the period of state terror in the region. The post-Stalinist era saw comparatively little physical abuse in Poland. Instead, the emphasis “was on creating widespread mistrust”. Poles were encouraged to be suspicious of fellow citizens, neighbours and, to some extent, even family members. Lithuanians were encouraged to believe that Poland would seize Vilnius if given the chance, while Poles were taught in

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18 Fleming p.47
19 Nowak, S. 1987 Społeczeństwo polskie drugiej połowy lat 80-tych [Polish society in the second half of the 1980s], Polskie Towarzystwo Socjologiczne, Warsaw
22 Ibid.
schools to count Ukrainians (after the Germans) “as the greatest and most vicious wartime enemy”.  

To this end, school texts [in communist Poland] placed the war against Ukrainian partisans at the centre of Polish-Ukrainian relations. Ukrainians were treated as Slavic counterparts to the Nazis, bound to them by a wild spiritual kinship ... Ukrainian patriotism was thus reduced to a kind of mindless collaborationism with fascism, which fitted an older Polish prejudice of believing the Ukrainians to be something less than a nation.

The Cold War and the hostility of the Soviet Union towards the West “helped cement [western] European integration”. However, the Soviet Union prevented the European Community from establishing diplomatic relations with Poland, insisting instead that it deal instead with the Soviet Bloc’s supposed EC equivalent: the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. The EC recognised the CMEA only in 1988, when events in CEECs were making it obsolete.

The overthrow of the Soviet order

In 1989-1991, Central and East Europeans escaped from the old system without a clear idea of what the new system was. Snyder calls the “return to Europe” slogan of opponents of communism and reformers of postcommunist states an oxymoron. Few had a clear vision of what it meant. For most, it was a vague, heavily loaded catchword. “Europe” was a “synonym of good life”. In the 1980s, with better communications, consumers in Poland and Lithuania became more aware of the higher living standard enjoyed by western Europeans. What Poles meant by the “return to Europe” was “a leap forward to the achievements of postwar Western Europe”.

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24 Ibid. p.51-52


bankrupt and so “vulnerable to external influences”. Solidarity’s apparent defeat and the imposition of martial law in 1981 in a land facing economic catastrophe meant that Poland in the 1980s was discontent, and a step away from open revolt. Since 1945 there had been several unsuccessful attempts at economic reform in Poland. These attempts aimed at Poland’s catching up with Western Europe economically, but did not deal with the fundamental problem: the communist system. Rulers played the Russian card till the Soviet Union’s obvious weakness forced them to negotiate with the opposition.

The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989-1991 led to the CEEC new leaders looking to the EU, which represented all that CEECs “hoped to achieve with their new-found liberty – stable democracy, economic prosperity [and] a powerful international voice”. So began the long process of seeking EU membership. In the early 1990s, some warned that it was probable that rather than being able to successfully transit to western-style developed economies, postcommunist countries would “sink into the Third World”. Some authors thought CEECs’ rapid transformation from communism to “peripheral capitalism” would lead to “Third World characteristics” such as “vertical international division of labour, asymmetric investment, tight elite cooperation and increasing inequality and unemployment, even misery”. One author warned of a mutinous society and “social outburst”. To some extent, he was right, particularly with regard to the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine.

Pravda stresses the diversity among CEECs. Communist “rule covered a collection of states and societies which always differed in fundamental respects”. As the transition proceeded, these differences became more noticeable. The “general openness of the elites to international influences, and particularly to the Western project” distinguished relatively liberal Poland and Lithuania from illiberal Belarus and Ukraine. The Western orientation of Poland’s leaders made them more receptive to an EU values package, which included democracy, a market economy and human rights. Some were attracted to western models of democratisation, some

31 Dunkerley et al. p.142
33 Ibid. p.199
34 Ibid. p.199
36 Ibid. p.25
by a general identification with things Western and what seemed modern and fashionable, others by the absence of an alternative.

The reasons for Poland’s relative success in the 1990s were many. Polish society and especially its elite were orientated to the West. The West supported Poland’s efforts to transform into a western-style society. Poland’s history, its national character and overall cohesion helped it make the huge adjustments necessary to adapt to a new system quickly. Being next to Germany and close to the EU core helped. The experience of the Solidarity years and the establishment of non-government organisations had strengthened Poland’s civil society. Economic “shock therapy” in the early 1990s cemented the change, making the process of democratisation irreversible. Poland had a pathway to EU membership. That provided a goal and made it easier for Poles to accept temporary hardship.

The early 1990s saw a huge gap in economic and political performance between Poland and, to a lesser extent, Lithuania on the one hand, and Belarus and Ukraine on the other. In 1990, Ukraine had a higher per capita GDP than Poland. While Poland’s GDP per capita rose substantially during the 1990s, Ukraine’s GDP per capita slumped. In Belarus the fall was less extreme. This gap was reflected in the growing disparity in mortality rates. United Nations figures show that while death rates in Poland remained stable between 1990 and 2007, they increased in Belarus and Ukraine, so that by 2005 the crude death rates in Belarus and Ukraine were about 50 per cent higher than in Poland.

Postcommunist states such as Poland and Lithuania, which had the most national unity and ethnic cohesion, were the states where reform moved fastest. In contrast, sharp regional (to some extent also ethnic and religious) differences in Ukraine and the lack of a strong sense of nationality in Belarus, combined with the persistent fatalism of the general population which had endured seven decades of Soviet rule, hampered the reform effort in those countries. Corruption and bureaucratic incompetence were (and are) widespread problems in all

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38 Ibid.
postcommunist countries, but in general the countries of Central Europe, including Poland, were better able to overcome these obstacles to progress than were the post-Soviet states such as Ukraine and Belarus.

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Table 4.1 GDP per capita in Poland and its eastern neighbours, 1990–2002

The experience of having an independent nation-state in the inter-war period was an important factor for Poland and Lithuania. Pre-war independence had strengthened national consolidation in both countries. Poland also benefited from the fact that it remained outside the Soviet Union and thus had developed an indigenous bureaucracy and civil service. In contrast, the lack of experience of a period of independence made it even harder for Belarus and Ukraine to successfully transit from a centrally planned economy to a free-market one. Ukraine and Belarus lacked an indigenous national governing class. The ruling caste in Soviet times had been Russian or Sovietised.

**Central European co-operation**

The EU accession issue is linked to regime change and democratic consolidation. Poland had no real alternative to joining the EU. In Poland and Lithuania, opposition to EU membership was associated with “nostalgia for the past”, either to the immediate communist past, or to a memory of national glory days. In the 1990s, most Poles and Lithuanians knew that their benchmark of success in the reform process was joining the EC/EU and Nato. The 1991 Visegrad Declaration by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland pledged mutual support towards this objective.

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With its history of dissident activity and resistance to the Soviet system, Poland could claim a moral force among newly independent postcommunist European countries. After an inaugural meeting in April 1990, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland met in February 1991 in the Hungarian town of Visegrad to sign a joint declaration. This pledged mutual support for their common objectives of achieving

the restoration in full of each state’s independence, democracy and freedom, the dismantling of the economic and spiritual structures of the totalitarian system, the building of parliamentary democracy and a modern constitutional state, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the total integration into the European political, economic, security, and legislative order.  

The Visegrad declaration eventually led to the establishment of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (Cefta), which initially grouped Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Within a few years, their eastern and southern neighbours, including Lithuania and Ukraine, were seeking membership in the Visegrad Group. This set the stage for Poland and the other Visegrad countries “to create their own membership requirements and occupy themselves with judging the political reforms of their post-communist neighbours”. Cefta later expanded to take in other pre-accession countries. As postcommunist countries joined the EU, they left Cefta. Entities such as Cefta were a “practical means of integration, creating interdependence and solidarity”, fostering “cooperative behaviour and reduced tensions”. Cooperation across frontiers also helped economic development within states. Cefta and other such groups offered experience of multilateral cooperation. They facilitated cross-border interaction, “thus helping to build wider social foundations for stability and understanding”.

**Reasons for the eastern enlargement**

In 1963, Robert Schuman stated clearly the EU’s responsibility to remain open to eventual membership applications from eastern Europe:

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44 Kaminski 2001 p.334
46 Ibid.
We must build the united Europe not only in the interest of the free nations, but also in order to be able to admit the peoples of Eastern Europe into this community if, freed from the constraints under which they live, they want to join and seek our moral support. We owe them the example of a unified, fraternal Europe. Every step we take along this road will mean a new opportunity for them. They need our help with the transformation they have to achieve. It is our duty to be prepared.\textsuperscript{47}

French President Mitterrand “floated the vague idea of a pan-European confederation in 1990”.\textsuperscript{48} By the 1980s West German politicians “had established contact with Polish dissidents who were to become members of the new governing elite at the beginning of the 1990s”.\textsuperscript{49} These Germans “felt that Germany had a special responsibility for … [Poland’s] democratic consolidation and stability”.\textsuperscript{50} For newly united Germany, two countries in the east mattered: “Russia first, plus Poland.”\textsuperscript{51} In 1996, German Defence Minister Volker Ruhe said that opening the EU and Nato to Poland was “vital” to Germany.\textsuperscript{52} Ruhe was blunt: “One does not have to be a strategic genius to understand this. You only have to look at the map.”\textsuperscript{53} Germany’s eastern border could not remain the border “between stability and instability in Europe” indefinitely.\textsuperscript{54} Neither could it remain the eastern border of the EU and Nato. “Either we export stability or we import instability.”\textsuperscript{55}

From the perspective of the existing EU member states, enlargement would boost the European single market’s size and “generate access to new and wider markets for both EU and accession states”.\textsuperscript{56} The entry of Poland and the other accession states would “offer new production locations for EU enterprises and contribute to greater market competition”.\textsuperscript{57} EU enlargement would boost international confidence in CEECs and encourage inward foreign

\begin{footnotesize}
48 Smith & Timmins p.12
49 Schimmelfennig, F. 2003 \textit{The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric} Cambridge University Press, UK p.240
50 Ibid.
52 Quoted in Smith & Timmins p.101
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Smith & Timmins p.2
57 Ibid.
\end{footnotesize}
direct investment. The net effect would be “a more flexible market and growth in prosperity”. 58

EU enlargement would help stabilise CEECs. It would help resolve problematic border issues, such as those between Poland and its neighbours, and would help quash the potential for ethnic conflict. CEECs’ interest in joining the EU was mainly economic. They wanted market access, agricultural subsidies, structural funds and help consolidating democracy. Events in CEECs in the early 1990s brought common interests among Western states into sharper focus, especially stabilisation of the region to prevent mass immigration and economic opportunities. Enlargement was an obvious focus of populist slogans. It proved “easy to exploit popular fears of unrestricted flows into Western Europe” of Poles and others. 59

**From assistance to association**

The European Stability Pact, which promoted good relations among CEECs, was among the EU’s and most successful joint actions. An initiative led by French President Francois Mitterrand resulted in the establishment of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. With the EC and member states as its main shareholders, the bank became a major provider of loans to promote economic development in CEECs. 60 In 1990, the European Commission proposed an association agreement with Poland, seen as one of the most economically advanced and strategically important CEECs. 61 The agreement dealt with free trade, economic cooperation and an institutionalised political relationship.

The European Council built a single negotiating framework with all applicant countries. The Amsterdam European Council summit and the publication of Agenda 2000, which backed starting accession negotiations with the “ins” and not the “pre-ins”, a position backed by Britain, France, Austria, Finland and the Benelux states, led to much discussion about the best way in which to begin accession negotiations. 62 Some member states wanted accession negotiations to begin concurrently with all postcommunist applicants. Denmark and Sweden applied political pressure by publicising the plight of the Lithuania and Latvia. Eventually, a compromise permitted formal accession talks to start with all postcommunist applicant states.

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58 Ibid.
59 Dinan p.314
60 Ibid. p.315
61 Ibid. p.173
62 Smith & Timmins p.127
In the early 1990s, Poland and Lithuania were in poor shape administratively, economically and environmentally. Ukraine and Belarus were in a much worse position. All faced the legacy of “decades of Communist mismanagement” and “struggled with the transition from communism to capitalism and from dictatorship to democracy”. In the case of Belarus the democratisation process failed. In Ukraine’s case, it has been partially successful.

Reconstruction and rehabilitation involved a wide range of reforms, privatising state-owned companies, modernisation and social welfare reform. There would have to be “a revolution in public administration”, a new educational system and an overhaul of infrastructure. The prospect of EU membership encouraged CEECs to persist with necessary painful reforms. However, “the EU model of economic management” which CEECs had in their sights “was not necessarily the most appropriate” for them.

Once membership negotiations started with the EU, it became more possible to identify that organisation’s own impact because of the gradual effects of the acquis communautaire ... and because the Commission from 1998 annually featured the different conditions and progress over them in each country.

At the June 1993 European Council the principle of CEECs’ membership was formally acknowledged and the Copenhagen Criteria for membership established. The Copenhagen criteria drawn up by the Commission for the accession of new member states included: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities; existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces in the EU; and the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. The 1995 Madrid summit added the criterion “that countries should have the administrative capacity to meet these obligations”. The EU began the process of integrating Poland and Lithuania into the single market. It reformed the Phare programme and started other initiatives

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63 Ibid. p.274
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Pridham, G. 2005 Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, UK p.193
67 Szczerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (eds.) 2005. EU Enlargement and Referendums Routledge, Abingdon UK p.2
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours

**Historical overview**

The EU was tasked with helping CEECs introduce EU single market standards. The Commission was charged with devising a pre-accession strategy for postcommunist European countries, “which involved two major tasks – assessing the readiness of candidates for accession; and assessing the potential impact of enlargement upon the EU itself”. The results were presented in June 1997 as *Agenda 2000*. Due to its size, location, and economic importance, Poland was at the top of the accession queue.

In 1999, Lithuania was shocked by being excluded from the list of CEECs put on the fast track to EU membership. The exclusion may have helped Lithuania to redouble “reform efforts in order to rejoin the first division as soon as possible”. But as late as 2002, most thought that although Poland would join the EU in 2003 or 2004, Lithuania would join a few years later. By 2003, the integration process was already well under way. Even before the formal accession of Poland and Lithuania in May 2004, the EU had opened its markets to exports from the newcomers. In November 2003, the EU’s Directorate-General for Press and Communication said the EU’s 2004 enlargement had healed “the rift opened up by … the Cold War”. Poland and Lithuania had met the criteria for joining the EU.

### Polish reform in the 1990s

The changes in Poland since 1990 are far-reaching. A multi-party parliamentary democracy has replaced the one-party system. The old communist political elite has been removed from government. In its place, a democratic, mostly formerly dissident, elite is in power. However, Lomax argues, changes at the elite level in Poland in the 1990s were not matched by equivalent social changes.

In the early 1990s, many new political parties were established in Poland. Many had roots in the Solidarity movement. There were parties composed of intellectuals such as Tadeusz

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68 Dinan p.275
70 Dinan p.276
Mazowiecki, the first Polish postcommunist prime minister. Others grouped nationalists and Catholic fundamentalists, still others socialists or libertarians. Most of the remaining Polish communists regrouped to form the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratyczny - SLD) which was led by leading members of the communist party, notably Aleksander Kwaśniewski (who became president after Lech Wałęsa). This latter group proved to be the most stable political grouping throughout the 1990s and right up to EU accession, and claimed some of the credit for Poland’s successful completion of its journey to EU membership, though it would later split into multiple parties, most with little electoral support.

In the 1993 general elections, Solidarity supporters disillusioned with fratricidal disputes and the speed and effects of economic restructuring, avoided voting. The former communists regained power, in coalition with their Peasant Party allies. However, the new government continued the policy of economic reform. The national march to the west would continue to be headed by the state, although the state’s rulers were mostly the same people who had toed the Moscow line in the 1970s and 1980s. The old Communist Party power structure remained under a different name and gradually returned to dominance in the 1990s, but there was a general acceptance among Poles that Poland’s future lay with the West and particularly with the EU. The new self-proclaimed “social democrats” of the SLD, swapped slogans like “revolution of the proletariat” for catchphrases such as “pluralism”, “road to Europe” and “the market economy”.

The period between 1995 and 2005 saw a gap between Polish society’s expectations and reality. During the late 1980s and early 1990s the situation had “seemed to be clear cut”. 74 On the one hand, was the old establishment: the postcommunists and their allies. On the other, there was the Solidarity-led opposition camp. Solidarity was a trade union but in addition to workers it included politicians and intellectuals who opposed communism. The late 1990s brought significant changes in the political landscape, particularly on the right side of the political spectrum. Parties emerged that stressed their ties with the Catholic Church. Other parties emphasised allegiance to liberalism. Others still stressed national traditions.

Poland began the process of administrative reform in 1990, when the first local government elections in the country in 50 years were held. A new constitution in the early 1990s provided for governmental reform. Poland saw further local and regional government reforms as the country prepared for entry into the EU. In the biggest administrative change, in 1999, 16 relatively large regions (most based on historical regions) were created to replace the communist system of 49 smallish centrally administered regions. This change means that there are now similarly sized subnational administrative regions in Poland, Ukraine and Belarus.

**Independent Poland’s foreign policy: ‘European standards’**

Between 1989 and 1991 Poland’s foreign policy towards its eastern neighbours had little to do with the EU. Poland’s leaders aimed to help build nation-states in Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. Then, from early 1992, Polish diplomats, led by foreign minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski, articulated a policy of “European standards” to their eastern neighbours. This policy “exaggerated the clarity of European legal norms, thereby contributing to their transmission to [Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine]”. The change was designed to prevent problems that could harm Poland’s image in the EU and US, to improve Poland’s position in the east and to justify support of eastern neighbours to Poles worried about Polish minorities in the eastern neighbours.

The foreign policy priorities of Polish governments in the 1990s were straightforward: first, to join the EU and Nato and prevent any future threat from Russia; second, to work for political stability in the country’s neighbourhood; and third, to protect Polish minorities in the post-Soviet states. The principles of Poland’s eastern strategy were also fairly straightforward: first, to promote “European standards” of governance and democracy and decent behaviour of states towards their citizens and other states; and, second, early support for the newly independent states on its border. This support included moral support and other aid, such as supplying military equipment to Lithuania. To prevent a rise in national tensions, Poland early on sought mutual recognition of the state borders inherited from the communist system. In other words, Poland indicated it would not seek the return of territory seized by the Soviet Union in 1939. “This strategic concept implied reconciliation and the rejection of imperial

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76 Ibid. p.255
ambitions as well as territorial claims by both Poland and Russia.” Efforts were made to encourage social and economic interaction between Poles and their eastern neighbours, an example being the providing of scholarships for people from Belarus, Ukraine and Lithuania to study in Poland.

From as early as 1990, when Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine were still officially republics within the Soviet Union, Poland began treating each of them as nation-states. In 1991, Poland established relations with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine, then still officially part of the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of the Moscow coup of August 1991, the Polish government formally recognised Lithuanian independence. When the Soviet Union dissolved a few months later, Poland recognised the independence of Belarus and Ukraine. Embassies were set up as soon as Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine were recognised as independent countries. After 1991, negotiations started on treaties to regulate bilateral relations. The most important issues during these talks were border regulations and rights of ethnic minorities. From 1992 on, Warsaw treated Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine as partners in European integration. Poland’s leaders in the early 1990s showed a common sense approach to reorienting Polish foreign policy. “[S]uch a policy could work only when Poland itself was perceived … as an integral part of Europe”. To understand what motivated the European standards policy, one must begin with Polish interests. The first priority of newly democratic Poland’s governments was to join the EU and Nato. Poland’s priority with regard to its eastern neighbours was that problems with those neighbours not impede Poland’s integration with those organisations. Poland’s leaders knew that perceived problems with eastern neighbours would be used as arguments against Poland’s inclusion in the EU and Nato. They aimed to prevent such difficulties by establishing good relations rapidly.

Poland also wished to ensure Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine remained independent from Russia. Even in the early 1990s, Poland already feared future Russian imperialism. In Polish eyes, the EU in the 1990s seemed to be more interested in developing good relations with Russia than with helping stabilise other post-Soviet countries, such as Ukraine, Belarus and

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78 Kaminski 2001 p.316
79 Snyder 2003 The Reconstruction Of Nations p.255
the Baltic states, which “were struggling to free themselves from Russian domination”. Poland’s third interest in the east was the protection of the Polish minority in the neighbouring states. The treatment of Poles in the east sometimes seized centre stage in Polish domestic politics, but it was consistently a lower priority in foreign policy than the return to Europe or the independence of the eastern neighbours.

The three interests of integration with the EU, eastern consolidation and minority protection were furthered by treaties with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. These treaties included “European standards”. European standards meant the territorial integrity of nation-states and the protection of the cultural rights of minorities. The policy of European standards, “set aside special pleading on behalf of this or that abused minority or this or that poorly designed frontier” in favour of “an immediate and comprehensive legal settlement between states within their present borders”. This was a policy of voluntary Europeanisation. Poland aimed to “dampen conflicts” before Brussels was aware they existed and to introduce European norms to Poland’s eastern neighbours before alternatives could emerge.

“Poland’s ambition has always been to promote democracy and economic development in Eastern Europe, while exporting the success of its own transformation process.” Poland was defining as well as introducing norms, as strictly speaking, no European standards for minority rights existed in the early 1990s. While claiming to appeal to a set of generally understood “European standards”, Poland was consolidating them, in an approach designed to meet the approval of Poland’s western neighbours. The best way for Poland to be accepted as European was to avoid territorial disputes. When some Polish MPs pushed for more energetic protection of Polish minorities in the former Soviet Union, Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski “scolded” the MPs for not knowing “European standards”.

Warsaw at first focused on the security vacuum in Central Europe and the potential Russian threat to justify requests for Nato and EU membership. This, says Schimmelfennig, was close to Poland’s true motivation. By the later 1990s though, Polish diplomats were stressing “the

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80 Cianciara p.8
81 Snyder 2003 The Reconstruction Of Nations p.257
82 Ibid. p.258
83 Ibid.
84 Cianciara p.5
85 Ibid. p.275
86 Schimmelfennig 2003 The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric p.235
western integration of Poland” and arguing that enlargement could strengthen Polish-Russian ties.\(^{87}\) Polish diplomats at the time appreciated the importance of taking “the moral high ground”, saying that Nato and EU enlargement would consolidate democracy and promote European stability.\(^{88}\)

As the eastern neighbours became more stable economically and politically, and especially after Poland joined Nato in 1999, Poland’s eastern policy altered somewhat. As it became clear that Lithuania, like Poland, was bound for a future in the EU and Nato, Polish policy towards Lithuania changed to become less mentoring and more comradely. Warsaw accepted that Lithuania was becoming a stable, democratic European state with a similar international outlook to Poland. On the other hand, things were not progressing well in Belarus and Ukraine. Increasingly, Zbigniew Brzeziński’s view that an independent Ukraine was in Poland’s vital interest came to the fore, and greater importance was attached to supporting democratic and pro-Western groups in Ukraine and Belarus. Poland stepped up efforts to encourage contact between Poles and their eastern neighbours, but as years went by the EU’s insistence that Poland beef up its eastern border worked against this.

### Belarus and Ukraine

In the Soviet Union’s dying days, Solzhenitsyn expressed a hope that Ukraine and Belarus “would choose to remain in union with their Russian brethren”.\(^{89}\) Solzhenitsyn proposed the formation of “a Pan-Russian Union” to accomplish this.\(^{90}\) Aware that separatist sentiment had grown in western Ukraine, Solzhenitsyn said that Ukrainians “should not be held in union with Russia by force”.\(^{91}\) Instead, they should be free to vote on whether they remained in union with Russia, on a region by region basis.\(^{92}\) Like some other Russian thinkers at the time, Solzhenitsyn believed that Ukraine would break up, with Galicia, Volyn and some other western areas voting for independence, while the country’s eastern regions would choose to stay with Russia.\(^{93}\) Like most Russians then and now, Solzhenitsyn neither expected nor accepted the idea that a united Ukraine could separate itself politically from Russia without

\(^{87}\) Ibid.
\(^{88}\) Ibid.
\(^{90}\) Ibid.
\(^{91}\) Ibid.
\(^{92}\) Dunlop p.41
\(^{93}\) Ibid.
losing its Russian-speaking eastern part. In his view and that of other Russians, Belarusian separatism was weak.  

The collapse of communism in Belarus and Ukraine did not lead to the ruling elite’s total replacement. In essence, three surviving groups “constituted the base for the ‘new’ political class”. The first group included “members of the previous bureaucracy who coped successfully with the new political and economic situation”. The second included “leaders of the new bourgeoisie (oligarchs), who merged with both the political elite and some criminal elements”. The third group was the secret service. While the secret service remained in the background in Ukraine during the 1990s, from 2000 its members’ political impact increased. This third group includes “major players who determine the rules of the game and change them if it fits their own interests.”

The severity of the early 1990s economic downturn in Ukraine and Belarus made for “unfavourable conditions for the inculcation of new loyalties” in eastern Ukraine and Belarus. Sustained economic reform can succeed “only if the population remains strongly supportive … and willing to tolerate the short-term hardships of the transition”. In eastern Ukraine and Belarus, support for independence actually fell during the 1990s, which explains the electoral success of Aleksander Lukashenko and Viktor Yanukovych. In Belarus, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, “disappearance of the ‘imperialist centre’” and lack of a strong national identity, Belarusians became disillusioned. This created “a legitimacy crisis” for the country and quashed what support for reform there had been among ordinary Belarusians. Meanwhile, in Ukraine, the 1990s saw ethnic divisions between Ukrainians and Russians rapidly sharpen.

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94 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 Ibid. 
Differentiation in the 1990s

Communism was imposed on Poland and Lithuania in the middle of the last century by Soviet force, against the will of the people. During the 40-year period of occupation, elites and masses in both countries used “Western democracy” as a reference point for their dissatisfaction with rule from Moscow. In the early 1990s, Poles and Lithuanians broadly supported a return to “European” values. Civic culture in Poland and Lithuania differs from that of Ukraine and Belarus. The former two experienced only 45 or so years of communism and “living memories of pre-war systems of government” remained. Although for most of the interwar period, both Lithuania and Poland had undemocratic, authoritarian governments, they were not totalitarian. There was some party competition and free speech. This gave the Polish and Lithuanian elites of the early 1990s “half-remembered experiences to build on”. In contrast, communist rule in most of Belarus and Ukraine had been considered normal and was unquestioned. The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to “genuine bewilderment” in both countries.

From 1991, relations between the EU and post-Soviet states “underwent a process of differentiation”. This began in 1991 with the transfer of the three Baltic states, from “neighbour” to candidate status. From the mid-1990s, the increasing priority afforded relations with Russia and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine was a further source of differentiation. The Helsinki summit of 1999 set an eastern border to Europe. EU membership would be open to the Baltic States, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria. But Ukraine and Belarus, “with more or less similar legitimate claims”, and European identities and locations would not be admitted.

It is possible that the unfortunate developments in Belarus and Ukraine in the 1990s had an impact on the way the EU regarded Poland’s accession bid, but this is uncertain. Said Pawel Świeboda, one of Poland’s chief negotiators during the country’s accession talks with the EU:

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106 Ibid. p.217
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. p.218
109 Bretherton & Vogler 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor p.149
110 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
Poland and the others in the region posed a sufficiently tough challenge for the EU that probably what was happening even further to the east wasn’t so much on the radar screens. I suppose we presented such a challenge ourselves that probably no-one really looked beyond ... there was always a qualitative difference between the countries that were part of the Soviet Union and those which were not, with the exception of the Baltic states...  

Ukraine’s ambassador to the United States, Yuri Shcherbak, warned that to “avoid new dividing lines in Europe, the principle of the indivisibility of security should be observed”. Starys Sakalauskas of the Lithuanian Embassy in Washington claimed that “all the new democracies should have the same starting points in terms of opportunities”. Starys Sakalauskas of the Lithuanian Embassy in Washington claimed that “all the new democracies should have the same starting points in terms of opportunities”. Including Lithuania in the “accession process would thus be an act of recognition that all of us together are members of the Western community of nations”. Lithuania’s Ambassador-Extraordinary Česlovas Stankevičius also referred to the principle of “indivisible security” in order to promote the Baltic states’ inclusion in Nato enlargement. At the same time, “the proponents of the indivisibility principle cared little about dividing lines running east of their countries”. Stankevičius said “the existing line between the European and Eurasian areas of political, economic and defence integration can hardly be regarded as a dangerous division of Europe”.

In 2006, The Economist said the EU had “never … had a policy towards its neighbours, except enlargement”. When CEECs became members, the EU faced a new issue. For the first time, the EU mainland directly bordered multiple countries that could not be offered the possibility of membership. The EU’s neighbourhood policy encouraged stability and reform in countries like Belarus and Ukraine, but now that policy’s incoherence mattered.

113 Author’s interview with Paweł Świeboda, Polish negotiator during EU accession talks, 16/09/2009
114 Quoted in Schimmelfennig p.234
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 Schimmelfennig 2003 The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe p.234
119 Quoted in Ibid.
121 The EU had had a land border with Russia since Finnish accession in 1995.
Co-operation between Poland and Lithuania

EU policy towards Ukraine and Belarus is a key area of interest for Poland and Lithuania. However, Lithuania’s influence on EU foreign policy outputs remains marginal. As early as the 1990s, Poland and Lithuania were complaining “about their lack of involvement in EU activities”. Some member states were concerned that Poland and Lithuania were tougher towards Russia than the EU was. “Poland seems to be Russia’s natural adversary in the region.” Postcommunist states were excluded from the 1995 declarations on Chechnya as the EU was afraid associating them with the declaration might “antagonise Russia and … confirm her fears that closer relations with the CEECs would be directed against her.” CEECs were invited “to associate themselves with the presidency statement on the Russian elections in December 1995, but not on Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe in October 1995”, about which Poland and Lithuania were critical. On those few issues on which Poland and Lithuania asked for EU support, the EU “refused politely”. One attempt to enhance the role of the CEECs in the CFSP was a Polish-Lithuanian “non-paper”, which suggested CEECs be allowed to initiate draft proposals for CFSP joint actions and positions. Poorly coordinated with supporters in Brussels and opposed by most member states, the initiative failed. EU officials later suggested that “after substantial initial differences”, political dialogue led to a shift in the positions of Warsaw and Vilnius and a “more relaxed and pragmatic attitude” towards Russia.

“The year 2004 should be regarded as an important turning point for the Polish Eastern policy.” In the 21st century, Poland is having some influence on the EU policy and the policy of individual western European states towards Russia. In particular, there appears to have been a mild shift in Germany’s Ostpolitik “away from over concentration on Russia towards the rest of the eastern neighbourhood”.

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123 Cianciara 2008 ‘Eastern Partnership’ p.5
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid. p.170
127 Ibid. p.176
128 Ibid. p.174
129 Cianciara 2008 ‘Eastern Partnership’ p.7
Partnership showed Poland’s “desire to accelerate Ukraine’s pace of European integration, as a test case for the other ENP countries”.\textsuperscript{131}

### The region today

From the early 1990s Poland’s leaders exploited the attractions of the EU even when there were few signs that an eastern enlargement would take place. Until 1993 the EU refused to consider an eastward enlargement. But just as it had anticipated the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Polish government anticipated the EU’s eastern enlargement. Poland’s “European standards” policy, which could only have a chance of success in the context of the existence of an EU-type body, led directly to improved relations between Poland and its eastern neighbours Lithuania and Ukraine and, even, temporarily, Belarus. In the end, Lithuania and Ukraine, which “had become more or less clearly defined nation-states with European aspirations”, reacted positively to Poland’s “European standards” eastern policy, while Belarus, which had no aspirations to join the EU, reacted negatively.\textsuperscript{132}

Poland wants the EU to enlarge further east, not just because of economic and political reason, but also “partly out of a sense of historical destiny” and a sense of responsibility and kinship towards the lands and peoples of Ukraine and Belarus.\textsuperscript{133} In line with what would be expected by Manners and others, Poland was able to use some of Europe’s normative power to improve its standing with its eastern neighbours, in particular with Lithuania and Ukraine. Lithuania and Poland have been predisposed to accepting influences from western Europe, while Belarus has not. Ukraine is torn between its west, with strong ties to Poland, and its east and south, with much closer ties with Russia. Cultural and historical filters meant that Lithuania and Ukraine were more open to positive approaches than was Belarus, whose national orientation remains directed towards Russia.

\textsuperscript{131} Copsey p.6
\textsuperscript{132} Snyder T. 2003. The Reconstruction Of Nations p.277
\textsuperscript{133} Copsey, N. 2008 ‘Member State Policy Preferences on the Integration of Ukraine and Other Eastern Neighbours’ p.6
5 Ukraine
Besides Russia, whose Kaliningrad exclave borders Poland on the north, Ukraine is Poland’s largest neighbour in area.\(^1\) Stretching about 1200 kilometres from west to east, Ukraine bridges a huge cultural and geographical gap between Central Europe and Russia. After decades of poor relations, particularly in the first half of the 20\(^{th}\) century, Polish-Ukrainian relations took a sharp turn for the better in the 1990s, when for the first time Poland was dealing directly with an independent Ukraine.\(^2\) As Poland strove to towards EU membership, relations with Ukraine were considered an important part of Warsaw’s overall foreign policy. Polish leaders have put in much energy to support Ukraine in its efforts to become a successful, modern market economy with a healthy democracy. Over the last few years, Ukraine has seen Poland as an important supporter of its efforts to join western institutions, especially the EU. There are two main formations in Ukrainian politics: one broadly pro-Western and the other what Trenin calls “nativist”.\(^3\) “\[C\]onstantly torn between a European and an East Slavic choice, Ukraine constitutes a critical test case for the viability and success of the European Union Neighbourhood Policy.”\(^4\)

**Ethnicity and language**

According to official data, ethnic Ukrainians today make up 78 per cent of Ukraine’s people.\(^5\) Russians, the only ethnic minority to account for more than 1 per cent of the republic’s population, accounted for about 17 per cent of the population of Ukraine in 2006, down from 22 per cent in 1990.\(^6\) The proportion of Russians has decreased mainly due to large-scale emigration to Russia, but is also related to a greater tendency for people of mixed Ukrainian/Russian background to identify themselves as Ukrainian rather than Russian. The Russian population lives mainly in eastern and southern Ukraine. In some areas, such as Crimea, ethnic Russians form a local majority.

The Ukrainian, Belarusian and Russian languages belong to the East Slavic sub-group. Most Ukrainians say Ukrainian is their mother tongue, though the actual language used at home and

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\(^1\) See Appendix 1 Map 5
\(^4\) Tudorowski, M. 2009 ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy towards Ukraine’ *Biuletyn Opinie* No 18/2009 Fundacja Aleksandra Kwaśniewskiego Warsaw p.2
\(^6\) Ibid.
on the street varies across the country. Ukraine is split between a Ukrainian-speaking west and centre, and a Russian-speaking east. In most of western Ukraine, more than 95 per cent of the population uses the Ukrainian language on an everyday basis. In contrast, in the Donbass in eastern Ukraine, only about a quarter of the population uses Ukrainian on a daily basis. In the Crimea the figure is 10 per cent. In Crimea, the Donbass and Odesa, Russian is the main language. Many people in central and eastern parts of the country speak a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian, known as “Surzhyk”. In western Ukraine fewer than 4 per cent of the residents use Russian as their everyday language. Most Russians are reluctant to view Ukrainians as a distinct ethnic group. This attitude has influenced Russian perceptions of independent Ukraine. Said Russian President Boris Yeltsin: “We cannot get it out of our systems that the Ukrainians are the same as we are. That is our destiny. Our common destiny.” According to this view, the Ukrainian people wish to reunite with Russia, but are prevented from doing so by the United States and nationalist elites.

**Poles in Ukraine**

Many Ukrainians, particularly in the west of the country, have Polish ancestry, but in contrast to the situation in Belarus and Lithuania, relatively few people in Ukraine today consider themselves to be Poles. Poland has some concerns about the fate of the remaining ethnic Poles living in Ukraine. Census data in 2001 indicated that just 0.3 per cent of the population (some 200,000 people) called themselves Poles. A similar number claimed to speak Polish, but all of those people also speak Ukrainian and/or Russian. The Polish minority is concentrated in western Ukraine (especially in Lviv) and in some of the larger centres in the centre of the country, notably Kiev. Polling carried out in Ukraine between 2004 and 2008 which looked at the attitude of Ukrainians to other nationalities found that Poles were not particularly badly viewed, although the image of Poles was much worse in eastern Ukraine and in Crimea – the areas which have had the least contact with Poles. Most residents of eastern Ukraine have never (or rarely) met Poles and yet have a bad opinion of them because

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7 See Appendix 1 Maps 6 and 7
9 Quoted in Kuzio 2001
12 Ibid.
of national mythologies. In contrast, for western Ukrainians, who have more contact with Poles, the image of Poles is decidedly better, as evidenced by the results of the interviews and surveys carried out for this thesis.

**Ukrainians in Poland**

The Polish census of 2002 records Poland’s Ukrainian minority as amounting to 27,000 people. Some authors give a much higher figure (up to 300,000) for the size of Poland’s Ukrainian minority. During the communist era, official Polish government policy was to ignore the continued existence of minorities and make every effort to assimilate national minorities (particularly Belarusians and Ukrainians, who were considered easier to assimilate than non-Slavic minorities) into mainstream Polish society. Unlike Poland’s Belarusian and Lithuanian minorities, which live mostly near the borders of Belarus and Lithuania, respectively, the Ukrainian minority is scattered over Poland, owing to its enforced resettlement after World War II. When the Polish-Soviet border was redrawn after World War II, many ethnic Ukrainians living within the borders of the new Poland were encouraged or coerced into moving to western Ukraine.

In 1947, owing to ongoing inter-ethnic violence and, in particular, guerrilla activities by the Ukrainian insurgent movement along the borders with Czechoslovakia and Ukraine, a Polish communist operation called *Akcja Wisła* (Operation Vistula) saw Ukrainians and related ethnic minorities living in southeastern Poland forcibly resettled on land taken from Germany. Today the largest concentrations of Ukrainians in Poland are in those northern and western regions, especially Warmińsko-Mazurskie (formerly the southern portion of German East Prussia) and West Pomerania. Since the end of communism in Poland, Ukrainian minority organisations have been established and there is now an active Ukrainian minority social scene, with activities focused in northern and western Poland. A remnant population of a few thousand Ukrainians lives in southeast Poland, along the border with Ukraine.

13 Ibid.
14 Polish National Census 2002. results sp.stat.gov.pl/spis/ludnosc/index.htm. Figure quoted includes Polish citizens only; there is also a large Ukrainian immigrant population in Poland.
16 In Skelivka in 1997, the author met ethnic Ukrainians and Lemkos who had been resettled from communist Poland to western Ukraine in the late 1940 and 1950s.
The mountainous area along the Slovak-Polish border was once the home of ethnic groups who spoke dialects of Ukrainian. The national identity of these people was ambiguous. Traditionally they were referred to in English-language literature as Ruthenians. Some (particularly in the extreme southeast corner of Poland) regarded themselves as Ukrainian, but most (generally those living further from Ukraine, in what is today the southern fringe of Małopolskie region) saw themselves as Rusini (Ruthenians) or Łemkowie (Lemkos) related to, but distinct from, Ukrainians. Some identified more with Russia than Ukraine. Official communist policy was to regard all these people as Ukrainians. The area was depopulated by 1947, as this population was dispersed to western Ukraine and to the territories taken from Germany. Most of the deportees’ descendants were assimilated into the majority Polish community, but some continue to identify as Lemkos and/or Ukrainians.

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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>5850**</td>
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* 2002 census count of Polish citizens
** includes smaller numbers in other regions

Table 5.1 Poland’s Ukrainian and Lemko minorities in 2002

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Historical baggage

Ukraine’s territory was the core of Kievan Rus, during the 10th and 11th centuries the largest state in Europe. The cultural and religious legacy of Kievan Rus laid the foundation for Ukrainian (more often termed “Ruthenian” until the 20th century) nationality. Weakened by invasions, Kievan Rus was gradually incorporated into greater Lithuania in the 14th century. When Lithuania formed a union with Poland in 1569, most of Ukraine then became part of the Polish kingdom within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Over centuries much of the Ukrainian nobility was polonised. As part of the polonisation process, much of the upper class converted from the Eastern Orthodox Church to Roman Catholicism. This was particularly the case in western Ukraine, where religion was often seen as a marker for nationality as late as the 20th century.18

Following the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, by the end of the 18th century most of Ukraine (with the important exception of Galicia) was in the Russian Empire. After the collapse of czarist Russia in 1917, Ukraine endured a few years of fighting involving several military and paramilitary groups, during which two short-lived independent Ukrainian republics (1917-18) were declared, before most of Ukraine was conquered by the Red Army and absorbed into the Bolshevik state that became the Soviet Union. After the end of the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-21, the Treaty of Riga assigned Galicia and Volyn to Poland. Galicia and Volyn remained in Poland and outside the Soviet Union until 1939, a fact crucial to developments decades later.

For most of the last century, Ukraine was subjected both to sovietisation and “the psychologically dislocating impact of ‘Russification’”.19 Ukraine’s ties with the non-Soviet world were cut and the nation “lost most of its historical memory”.20 Ukrainian society’s diverse organisational forms were destroyed and the Ukrainian population “regimented”.21 During the interwar period, Soviet Ukraine endured brutal rule. More than 8 million Ukrainians died in two artificial famines in 1921 and 1932-33.22 During the Stalinist Terror of

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
the 1930s and 1940s millions of Ukrainians “were shot, exiled, or incarcerated”. Many of Ukraine’s more independent leaders and other opponents of Stalin’s russification strategy were killed, while Ukrainian culture was russified. The budding Ukrainian intelligentsia was destroyed.

The Polish-Ukrainian borderland

Interactions between Poles and Ukrainians in the borderland areas, where the two ethnic groups were in competition for dominance, deeply affected the Polish attitude to Ukraine and Ukrainians in the 20th century. Of particular importance were the violent events which took place during the two world wars in what is now western Ukraine, mainly in Volyn and Galicia. The events which took place in this area between 1914 and 1956 still affect relations between Poles and Ukrainians today.

In its broader meaning, Galicia refers to a large area stretching from Kraków in the west to Ternopil in the east, corresponding roughly to the Polish regions of Małopolskie and Podkarpackie (together forming western Galicia), and the Ukrainian oblasts of Lviv, Ternopil and Ivano-Frankivsk (eastern Galicia). In a narrower sense, the term Galicia refers to just the three Ukrainian oblasts. Most of western Galicia, the part which remained in Poland after 1945, has been ethnically Polish for centuries, although the mountain ranges along its southern border were populated by east Slavic people until 1947. Galicia passed from Polish to Austrian rule in 1772, as part of the first partition of Poland. Volyn, which corresponds to today’s Ukrainian oblasts of Volyn and Rivne, together with small parts of Zhytomyr and Ternopil oblasts, passed from Polish to Russian rule in 1793-1795, in the second and third partitions of Poland.

Galicia was part of the Habsburg Empire until the end of World War I, when there was a multisided violent conflict in eastern Galicia between the new Polish state, supporters of a short-lived West Ukrainian Republic (1918-1919) and the Red Army. Following the Soviet-Polish War of 1919-1920, all of Galicia and most of historic Volyn were confirmed as part of Poland in the Treaty of Riga. At that time both Volyn and eastern Galicia had Ukrainian

23 Motyl & Krawchenko p.241-242
25 Ibid.
majorities, but had large Polish populations and several other minorities, notably Jews. Lwów (Lviv in Ukrainian) was a predominantly Polish city surrounded by territory which had a Ukrainian majority. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Polish authorities suppressed the Ukrainian language and attempted to polonise Volyn and eastern Galicia. These measures resulted in an expanded population of ethnic Poles in eastern Galicia and Volyn.\footnote{Burds, J. 1997 'Agentura: Soviet Informants’ Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48’ in \textit{East European Politics and Societies}, Vol 11, No 1 p.118} For most of the 1920s and 1930s, Poland had authoritarian regimes but it was not a totalitarian state like the Soviet Union. The level of oppression of Ukrainians in interwar Poland was much less than in Soviet Ukraine. “Ukrainians in Poland enjoyed enough freedom to organise themselves, but were denied the political options which might have satisfied the ambitions of their elite.”\footnote{Snyder, T. 2002  ‘Memory of Sovereignty and sovereignty over memory: Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, 1939-1999’ in Muller, J-W. (ed.) Memory and Power in Post-war Europe: Studies in the Presence of the Past Cambridge University Press 2002 p.42} By 1939, most villages in eastern Galicia had mixed populations, with a Ukrainian majority (of 70-90 per cent) and Polish minority (10-30 per cent).\footnote{Burds p.118}

On 17 September 1939, under the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the Soviet Union invaded and annexed eastern Poland, including Volyn and Galicia. Ukraine’s mortality rate during World War II was higher than that of any other countries apart from Poland and Belarus. An estimated 5 million to 8 million Ukrainians were killed in World War II, according to official Ukrainian sources.\footnote{Державний комітет телебачення і радіомовлення України 2004 ’ВТРАТИ НАРОДУ УКРАЇНИ’ ‘Losses of the Ukrainian Nation’. Retrieved on 10/4/2009 from www.peremoga.gov.ua/index.php?3450000000000000010} The chaos and brutality of World War II spawned “bands of marauders” who terrorised local people.\footnote{Burds 1997 ‘Agentura: Soviet Informants’ Networks & the Ukrainian Underground in Galicia, 1944-48’ p.96} Following the deportation and killing of the area’s Jews during World War II, Poles were the main victims of atrocities committed in Volyn. Tens of thousands of Poles were murdered in Volyn between 1942 and 1945, most at the hands of Ukrainian militias, notably the Ukrainian Insurgent Army or Українська Повстанська Армія (UPA).\footnote{Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, \textit{Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army}, Chapter 16, p. 247-295}

UPA was the military wing of one faction of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), a grouping which had resisted Polish rule in Galicia and Volyn in the interwar period. The activities of “bandits” worried organised resistance organisations like the Polish Armia
Krajowa (Home Army), which was loyal to the Polish Government-in-Exile in London.\textsuperscript{32} Ethnic Ukrainians were often also treated brutally by Ukrainian nationalist paramilitaries, particularly as the Soviet Army advanced into western Ukraine in 1944.

The Soviet pacification of western Ukraine was brutal. Data from formerly top secret NKVD files held in Russian state archives, show that between February 1944 and June 1945, the Soviets conducted 15,733 military and paramilitary operations against Ukrainian nationalists.\textsuperscript{33} The stated results of their efforts included: 91,615 Ukrainian “bandits” killed; 96,446 captured and 41,858 surrendered.\textsuperscript{34} In addition 10,139 Ukrainian families (26,093 people) were deported during the first year of Soviet pacification of western Ukraine.\textsuperscript{35} Tens of thousands more were deported in the following years.\textsuperscript{36}

The longstanding enmity and strife between Poles and Ukrainians did not end with the coming of the Red Army. Instead, each tried to use Soviet power to crush the other. The Soviets played Ukrainians against Poles. In Galicia, at least in 1944 and 1945, Polish nationalists were more likely to form a common front with Soviets than were Ukrainian nationalists, as the former two sought to root out the latter.\textsuperscript{37} Atrocities committed by UPA units in Volyn and Galicia eventually made it easier for a significant portion of the local population - Ukrainian and Polish - to accept Soviet rule, which was seen as preferable to the risk of becoming victims of the bandits.\textsuperscript{38} In 1944 and 1945, there were numerous reports of ethnic Poles (and some ethnic Ukrainians) providing information to the Soviet forces fighting Ukrainian nationalist groups in Galicia and Volyn.\textsuperscript{39} UPA remained active and fought against communist Poland until 1947 and against the Soviet Union until 1949.\textsuperscript{40}

During and after World War II, most of the Polish population of Volyn and Galicia was deported. By the late 1950s, most of the surviving deportees were living in communist Poland, mainly in former German Silesia. Soviet power was able to achieve what years of conflict between Ukrainians and Poles had not: the mass removal of Poles from western

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Quoted in Burds p.97. Burds gives the name of the archive as Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid. p.115-116
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. p.106
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. p.116-117
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid. p.117
Ukraine and the creation for the first time of a clear territorial border between the two nationalities.

Polish and Ukrainian memories of World War II are different.

_For Poles, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 was an act of unprecedented treachery. For Ukrainians, its division of Poland allowed all Ukrainian lands to be united into a single political unit. For Poles, the enemies in the Second World War were the Germans and their (sometime) Ukrainian henchmen._

In recent years, there had been more open discussion in Ukraine of the wartime events in Volyn and Galicia. In 2008, Taras Wozniak, an adviser to the mayor of Lviv and an expert on events in wartime Volyn, told Poland’s _Gazeta Wyborcza_ that the debate within Ukraine about the Volyn events was not confined to western Ukraine. The wartime killings were discussed not just in Lutsk and Lviv but also in eastern Ukrainian cities, where there was no Ukrainian-Polish conflict during the war or since.

In May 2005, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Arturas Paulauskas and Volodmyr Lytvyn, chairmen of the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian parliaments respectively, signed the founding declaration of an Inter-Parliamentary Assembly of the three countries. The ceremony was held in Lutsk, in Volyn. The new inter-parliamentary assembly can be viewed as a symbolic distant successor to the diet of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Lutsk is the chief city of Volyn, which over “centuries passed from Lithuanian to Polish to Ukrainian control”. The choice of venue symbolised “Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation in the post-nationalist era”. The forum’s main goals included advancing Ukraine's aspirations to join the EU, “helping transfer Poland’s and Lithuania’s successful reform experience to the legislatures of Ukraine” and advocating an EU open-door policy towards Ukraine.

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42 Wozniak, T. ‘Nie bądźmy jeńcami tamtej wojny’ [‘Let’s not be prisoners of that war’] in _Gazeta Wyborcza_ 12/7/2008 p.23
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
Independence

Galicia mobilised the Ukrainian nation in the lead-up to Ukraine’s independence, with former dissidents in Galicia pressing for the launch of a Ukrainian “people’s front”, in the style of the popular movements which had taken the Baltic states by storm. The national movement rapidly spread from Galicia to other areas of western Ukraine. Miners from eastern Ukraine, were exposed to ideas of independence by strike committee colleagues from Lviv and Volyn. In September 1989, the People’s Movement for Restructuring (Rukh) held its constituent congress in Kiev.

In the elections of March 1990, “the Communist Party for all intents and purposes collapsed in Galicia”. Rukh’s language was nationalistic. Its core objective was independence for the Ukrainian people, whom the movement defined in non-ethnic terms that allowed minority Russians and Poles to support it. A “de-Sovietization” programme which involved removing visible symbols of Soviet rule, changes to school curricula and so on, took place. Radical market reform, beginning with serious moves to de-collectivise agriculture, began. At the same time as the March 1991 referendum on the fate of the Soviet Union, a separate referendum in Galicia produced an almost 90 per cent vote in favour of Ukrainian independence. Days after the attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic declared its independence from the Soviet Union.

The abrupt and unexpected independence had major consequences for Ukraine. Ukraine’s task was immense. Inexperienced elites faced an uphill struggle to transform Ukraine into an independent state and to create “everything that totalitarianism had destroyed or stifled”. Attaining all its goals quickly after seven decades of totalitarianism and centuries of imperialism proved impossible. On independence, the country “lacked a civil society, a market, and a state ... a coherent sense of national identity, democracy, and rule of law”. Democracy proved difficult to attain. Ukraine’s political system remained centralised.

46 Motyl & Krawchenko 1997 ‘Ukraine: from empire to statehood’ p.247
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. p.250-251
51 Ibid. p.251
52 Ibid. p.258
53 Motyl & Krawchenko p.258
Ukraine had a sizable, well educated, population and many informal non-governmental organisations, administrators, former dissidents and prospective elites. But the Soviet collapse had left Ukraine in “an institutional vacuum”.  

The “legacy of state control and endemic corruption” slowed reform efforts. Ukraine was insufficiently consolidated to be a stable independent state. Its legacy of division and decades of communist rule from Moscow haunted independent Ukraine. Apparent unity covered up a myriad of regional and social divisions. The country’s leaders had to build “all the characteristics of a ‘normal’ country”.

The country’s Soviet legacy precluded a rapid full-scale introduction of a market economy. Without the rule of law, the drive to a market economy amounted to “gangster capitalism”. Organised crime and a black market thrived. Ukraine was strangled by corruption, which remains widespread in the country. Corruption and organised crime’s penetration of the highest echelons of government contaminated the political scene. As politicians restructured “support bases, they discovered the usefulness of parties”. Murky economic elites “found it convenient ... to invent attractive party images”. A premature “big Bang” approach, a poorly executed attempt to emulate early Polish reforms, discredited the reform process.

**Ukrainian dilemmas**

Faced with a daunting road to building a modern nation-state, Ukrainian leaders searched for models. Ukraine’s new leaders prioritised “collective and territorial integrity” and a pro-European foreign policy. Integrating with Europe “has been on Ukraine’s agenda since its independence”. Next door, in Poland, they found a country which had already embarked on a dramatic transition from communism to a western political and economic system. On the eve of Ukrainian independence, Ivan Drach, leader of Ukraine’s Rukh nationalist movement, said:

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54 Motyl & Krawchenko p.258
56 Motyl & Krawchenko 1997 ‘Ukraine: from empire to statehood’ p.258
57 Motyl & Krawchenko 1997 ‘Ukraine: from empire to statehood’ p.258
59 Ibid.
We want to travel the Polish path. We know that the path to Europe (and perhaps this makes us different from Lithuania) really does lead through Poland.\textsuperscript{62}

In October 1990, while still part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine concluded an agreement with Poland, recognising the existing border between the two countries. Leonid Kravchuk, post-Soviet Ukraine’s first president, accepted that Poland was Ukraine’s route into Europe and even felt Poland was “a more important partner for Ukraine than Russia”\textsuperscript{.63}

From Poland’s viewpoint, Ukraine’s independence from Russia is “crucial to preventing the re-emergence of Moscow as a major regional security threat”.\textsuperscript{64} One Polish academic interviewed for this thesis said in July 2008:

We are always – we as Poles – saying ‘Ukraine’ thinking ‘Russia’. So we are positive toward Ukraine at the same time being negative to some extent toward Russia. So a strong Ukraine is actually protecting us from Russia. So we are promoting pro-Western Ukraine, at the same time guaranteeing us a more secure environment.

In a 1991 German study evaluating all Soviet republics “on the basis of their potential to integrate into the European market”, Ukraine ranked first with 83 points out of 100, ahead of the Baltic states and Russia.\textsuperscript{65} Ukraine had the most mature civil society of any CIS country.\textsuperscript{66} Ukraine was aware of the preferential treatment Poland received due to its candidate status.\textsuperscript{67} EU membership has been an aim for Ukraine since 1998. A Decree on the Strategy of Integration into the European Union was issued that year reflected a belief that Ukraine is at the centre of Europe. The country tried to get the West to recognise it as a European or even

\textsuperscript{62} Quoted in Burant, S. 1993. ‘International Relations in a Regional Context: Poland and its Eastern Neighbors’ in Europe-Asia Studies, 45, 3 p.410
\textsuperscript{64} Karatnycky, A. 2001. ‘Meltdown in Ukraine’ in Foreign Affairs May/June 2001 Vol 8 No 3 p.73
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. p.246
\textsuperscript{67} Bretherton & Vogler 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor p.153
Central European nation and launched an ambitious strategic agenda of membership of the EU. 68

In the early 1990s, motivated by Ukraine’s “strategic importance ... and worried that it might become a Russian puppet”, the United States “provided $2.8 billion in aid to encourage democratic reform”. 69 The funds were supplemented by billions from the EU and large International Monetary Fund and the World Bank loans.

In 1992, Leonid Kuchma was appointed prime minister, a role in which he was relatively successful. His main backers were the Dnipropetrovsk regional clique, many of whose members later became oligarchs, and managers of state companies. In 1994, Kuchma rather unexpectedly won presidential elections, defeating Kravchuk. In his first year in power, Kuchma disrupted the networks of corruption and pursued market reforms. Then, however, the oligarchs came to an understanding with him and “the Kuchma regime had become corrupt”. 70 Kuchma won re-election in 1999 and remained in office until Viktor Yushchenko’s inauguration in 2005. Although his presidency was surrounded by numerous corruption scandals and the lessening of media freedoms, under Kuchma’s watch the Ukrainian economy grew rapidly, bringing relative prosperity to many residents. But Ukraine’s “endemic corruption and lack of progress in reforming its economy, together with the brutal harassment and murder of journalists and others ... angered the West”. 71

**Ukraine and Russia**

Unlike Poles, most Ukrainians do “not regard Russia as a hereditary enemy”. 72 According to a 2006 poll quoted by Mangott, 42 per cent of Ukrainians consider relations with Russia to be a priority. 73 The same poll indicated that one in five Ukrainians wanted the Soviet Union to be

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69 Ibid. p.73-74
71 Karatnycky, A. 2001. ‘Meltdown in Ukraine’ in Foreign Affairs May/June 2001 Vol 8 No 3 p.74

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restored. In 1996, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed an agreement to establish a customs union. In reaction to this move and to developments in the relationship between Belarus and Russia, in 1997 Ukraine joined Georgia, Azerbaijan and Moldova to set up the Guam group. When Uzbekistan joined Guam in 1999, the group became Guuam. The grouping can be seen as a response to pressure to follow a Moscow-controlled foreign policy and as a pro-EU initiative.

However, in 2002, as much as 77 per cent of Ukraine’s exports still went to Russia and other CIS countries, while only a fifth of exports went to the EU. In 2003, the European Commission noted that Ukraine would be the enlarged EU’s poorest neighbour (apart from Moldova), with a per capita GDP of just €855. In 2004, Ukraine’s parliament ratified a Single Economic Space agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

Poland and Ukraine are heavily dependent on Russian oil imports. Much Russian gas is piped to Europe across Ukraine. In September 2006 the EU and Ukraine signed a deal paving the way for European financing of oil and gas meters on pipelines across Ukraine’s borders. In December 2006, Russian President Putin visited Ukraine. Energy was high up the agenda, with a number of agreements signed. The timing of the trip, almost a year since a dispute over the price Ukraine paid for gas led to supplies being briefly cut by Moscow, was symbolic. Putin’s trip to Kiev came when there was a power struggle between President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych. Yanukovych helped to negotiate a deal with Moscow for 2007.

Yanukovych wanted “to keep both Russia and the West on his side”. In September 2006, he said Ukraine “should be a reliable bridge between” the EU and Russia. In November 2006, Yanukovych expressed readiness to help improve relations between Poland and Russia after the first meeting of a Ukrainian-Polish commission on economic cooperation. He repeatedly

74 Ibid.
75 Bretherton & Vogler 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor p.153
78 Ibid.
79 Reuters 2006 ‘Ukraine puts Nato on hold’ wire story 14/9/2006 Brussels
said he favoured joining the EU but slowed moves towards membership of Nato and was amenable to the Single Economic Space trade bloc of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, even though membership of this bloc would likely harm Ukraine’s chances of joining the EU. Ukrainian public opinion is divided on the question of the desirability of Ukraine participating in the moves to recreate an economic bloc centred on Russia. A quarter of Ukrainians “support both Ukraine’s membership in the EU and the country’s participation in the union with Russia and Belarus”. However, Shumylo says, few Ukrainian “politicians are ready to endorse a customs union with Russia and CIS countries [or] to transfer national power to a supranational body”.

Three opinion polls taken in 1994, 2001 and 2005 respectively show a marked regional variation in support for such an option. In 1994 a majority (70 per cent) of residents of eastern Ukraine wanted Ukraine to orientate itself towards Russia and/or the CIS. By 2005 this figure had fallen to a quarter. Meanwhile, the proportion of people in western Ukraine who favoured the “eastern” option fell from 28 per cent to just 7 per cent. Throughout the period, western Ukrainians generally favoured either intensified cooperation with the west or for Ukraine to develop using “the country’s own resources”.

Ukrainian nationalists, who come mainly from western Ukraine and Kiev, regard Russia as the “Other”, while they see Ukraine as the easternmost outpost of European civilisation. In this, Ukrainians have a similar view to their eastern neighbours as Poles do to theirs, and Germans, in turn, to theirs. Evidence suggests an association in Ukraine between support for democratisation and a pro-Western orientation.

Ukrainians’ support for Yanukovych’s Party of Regions and allied parties “should not be attributed to increasing support for pro-Russian and/or ... anti-EU views”. Ukrainian

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81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid. p.9
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
national identity is stronger now than when the Soviet Union disintegrated. The regional divides within Ukraine “are not premised on ethnic or religious intolerance and hatreds”. This is despite Russia fomenting “destabilizing developments” in Ukraine, “deepening the historical division of the country and halting Ukraine’s drive to Nato”. However, throughout the country there is widespread disappointment with Ukraine’s economic difficulties. Yanukovych did not turn Ukraine back towards Russia, but Ukraine’s integration with the West proceeded slowly.

**Ukraine and the European Union**

Many businessmen-politicians in the Party of Regions want closer ties between Ukraine and the EU so that Ukrainian exporters (including many PoR members and supporters) could gain access to the EU’s internal market. In September 2006, Ukraine won the promise of negotiations early in 2007 on broader ties with the EU that could include a free trade deal. Ukraine aspired to eventual membership of the EU, but Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the EU’s external relations commissioner, reiterated the EU’s position that this was not a prospect for the time being. Ferrero-Waldner said that signing a free trade deal with Ukraine was dependent on Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organisation. In September 2006, Yanukovych said Ukraine aimed to pass all the laws needed to join the WTO within four months and that his government was working on reforms to deal with corruption and boost economic growth. Energy cooperation would be part of the talks with the EU. In May 2008, Ukraine became a member of the WTO.

In October 2006, President Yushchenko met EU leaders and pushed the case for membership talks to start by 2008. Yushchenko has sought closer ties with the West since coming to power in the Orange Revolution of 2004. But the EU remains concerned that reforms are being slowed by political divisions. In October 2006, EC President Jose Manuel Barroso said Ukraine needed to carry out more reforms before accession talks could begin. “Ukraine is not

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90 Kuzio, T. 2007 ‘Prospects for the Political and Economic Development of Ukraine’ in Ibid. p.35
92 Shumylo 2007. ‘The Debate on the EU Membership Prospects of Ukraine’ p.10
93 Ibid. p.9
“ready and we are not ready,” Barroso told Yushchenko. Barroso said that the EU and its member states were “not ready to assume new membership obligations”. EU leaders offer the prospect of closer political and economic ties with Ukraine, with a free-trade area with Ukraine as the first aim.

In January 2007, Polish and Ukrainian oil supplies were badly affected by a commercial row between Russia and Belarus, which led to the closure of the main transit pipeline to Europe. Later in 2007, the presidents of Poland and Ukraine announced plans to build a pipeline which would reduce their dependency on Russian oil. Yushchenko expressed hopes that the EU would co-finance the project. The Odessa-Brody pipeline would be extended to Płock, site of Poland’s main refinery, PKN Orlen, which relies entirely on Russian oil supplies. The extension of the pipeline could help bring Caspian oil to Poland, bypassing Russia. Yushchenko gave EU leaders renewed assurances over security of energy supplies.

Until the Orange Revolution of 2004, most international organisations and media persisted in viewing Ukraine as part of the Russian sphere of influence, a problem in east-west relations rather than an independent country in its own right, whose inhabitants seemed to have resigned themselves to post-Soviet apathy.

An opinion poll in 2006 showed that most Europeans did not think Ukraine would join the EU before 2020. Central and East Europeans were even less likely to think Ukraine would join the EU by then, although in the same poll, 77 per cent of Poles said they were in favour of Ukrainian membership, a figure much higher than in other EU states, such as Germany (41 per cent in favour) and France (58 per cent in favour). “Germany believes that Poland is too

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95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
101 Ibid.

99
focused on the East and Ukraine in particular.”\(^\text{102}\) With the exception of Poland, EU member states “have not had a wide public debate on Ukraine’s place in the EU”.\(^\text{103}\) Ukraine is “a land routinely dismissed if not forgotten”.\(^\text{104}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Typical supporter</th>
<th>Typical opponent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ethnic Ukrainian</td>
<td>ethnic Russian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian-speaker</td>
<td>Russian-speaker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident of western or central Ukraine</td>
<td>Resident of eastern or southern Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident who identifies with Ukraine</td>
<td>Resident who identifies with USSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident of city with &gt;250,000 people</td>
<td>Resident of small town, village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Person aged less than 40</td>
<td>Older person (especially over 50)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2  Supporters and opponents of Ukraine’s European integration, 2006\(^\text{105}\)

Shumylo warns of the “euroindifference’ of Ukrainians.\(^\text{106}\) Ukrainians perceive European integration as a foreign policy issue, not “a framework for domestic reform”.\(^\text{107}\) When it comes to the European integration process Ukrainians remain outsiders. The concept of European integration is not understood well by most Ukrainians. Public information drives have failed.\(^\text{108}\)

Ukrainians divide into three main groups as regards foreign policy. One group supports both EU and Nato membership for Ukraine. A second group wants to see Ukraine join the EU but not Nato, while the third group is opposed to both EU and Nato membership for Ukraine. Support for EU membership among Ukrainians has been falling in recent years. Shumylo notes that 56 per cent of Ukrainians supported EU membership in 2000 and 2001, while only 10 per cent and 8 per cent, respectively, of Ukrainians opposed membership.\(^\text{109}\) By 2005, 44 per cent of respondents favoured EU membership, while 28 per cent were against. A National

\(^{102}\) Copsey, N. 2008 ‘Member State Policy Preferences on the Integration of Ukraine and Other Eastern Neighbours’ SIPU report for the Swedish International Development Agency August 2008 p.4

\(^{103}\) Shumylo 2007 p.14

\(^{104}\) Ibid.

\(^{105}\) After Ibid. p.12

\(^{106}\) Shumylo p.11

\(^{107}\) Ibid. p.8

\(^{108}\) Ibid.

\(^{109}\) Ibid. p.15
Institute for Strategic Studies poll in 2006 put support for Ukrainian membership at 43 per cent.\textsuperscript{110}

The international community has more “possibilities to influence Ukraine than Belarus”.\textsuperscript{111} The European Neighbourhood Policy laid a “foundation for Ukraine’s integration with the EU”.\textsuperscript{112} Including the political Copenhagen criterion in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan encouraged further democratisation.\textsuperscript{113} Although there is scant enthusiasm in western Europe for Ukrainian membership of the EU, membership of the ENP “does not close any doors to European countries that may at some future point wish to apply for membership”.\textsuperscript{114}

There is “a close relationship between international assistance and the progress of the transition process”.\textsuperscript{115} Western anger with Ukraine’s slow pace of reform, widespread corruption and misgovernance, caused Ukraine “to shy away from the West” and move towards “Russia’s more accepting embrace”.\textsuperscript{116} Some feel that Ukraine’s “endless failures to implement the reform” mean the country will never qualify for EU membership.\textsuperscript{117} Ukraine’s “elites do not offer a clear and coherent strategy for Ukraine’s relations with the EU”, feeling that if Ukraine does “not have membership prospects, [it] should focus on the benefits of the ENP and ‘four freedoms’ promised by the EU”.\textsuperscript{118} The carrot of an EU-Ukraine Free Trade Agreement could be a tool for modernising Ukraine’s economy and help bring about greater integration with the EU.\textsuperscript{119} The EU and other western institutions have “powerful leverage” over Ukraine.\textsuperscript{120} However, because Ukraine is not a prospective EU member, the Union’s leverage is weaker than it has been in Central Europe.

Ukraine’s main backer remains Poland, “a powerful ‘behind-the-scenes’ player in the geo-political ‘sandpit’” of Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{121} Despite Poland not being a member of the CDC “a strong Polish-Lithuanian axis within the EU [has had] a significant impact on the CDC

\begin{footnotes}
\item[110] Quoted in Ibid.
\item[112] Shumylo 2007. ‘The Debate on the EU Membership Prospects of Ukraine’ p.7
\item[113] Ibid.
\item[114] Bretherton & Vogler 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor p.153
\item[115] Pridham, G. 2005 Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, UK p.60
\item[116] Karatnycky, A. 2001. ‘Meltdown in Ukraine’ p.73
\item[117] Shumylo 2007 p.10
\item[118] Ibid. p.10
\item[119] Ibid. p.7
\item[120] Ibid.
\item[121] Chaban & Vernygora 2008 p.140.
\end{footnotes}
activities". Ukrainians do not see other Central European countries like the Czech Republic or Hungary as possible supporters or advocates of Ukraine’s interest in the EU.

One Polish academic interviewed by this author in July 2008 said: “As long as Ukraine is pro-democratic and pro-Western, there will be friendly relations.” What is important for Poland is not who is running Ukraine but what their programme is. Warsaw wants to ensure that Kiev is orientated towards Europe and the West, and to ultimate membership in the EU and Nato. It is also important that Ukraine consolidate and strengthen its democracy and ensure human rights in the country. “Poland will work with anyone who will go that way.”

In October 2006, at an economic forum in Lviv, EU Commissioner for Regional Policy Danuta Hubner (who is Polish) said that transborder cooperation between Ukraine and the EU had great potential to speed up Ukraine’s integration into Europe. Under the terms of the EU Regional Policy programme for 2007-2013, Ukraine would participate in four transborder cooperation projects with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania.

In 2006, Ukraine and Poland made a joint bid to host the 2012 European Football Championship and in 2007 won the right to host the event. Referring to this, one Ukrainian interviewee said in July 2008: “We must work together, improve infrastructure [and] border crossings.”

Ukraine’s participation in the Community of Democratic Choice, an intergovernmental organisation established in 2005 by nine postcommunist states in Kiev, whose main task is to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the region, may earn the country “the reputation of being a reliable and enthusiastic political partner; an important image for attracting external supporters for Ukraine’s perspective bid for EU membership”.

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122 Ibid.
123 Shumylo 2007 p.15
126 Ibid.
127 Interview with author in Lviv July 2008
128 Chaban & Vernygora p.140
The Orange Revolution

In 2004, Ukraine was dominated by three wealthy regional oligarchic groups. These oligarchs enjoyed close connections with President Leonid Kuchma. They had large parliamentary party factions, owned media empires, had extensive governmental privileges and controlled many officials.

The Orange Revolution of 2004 forced the authorities to overturn a rigged presidential election and allow a new internationally monitored vote that swept into power a reformist slate under Yushchenko. As one Polish academic says: “Poland was clearly openly involved in the Orange Revolution.” A “remarkable sight in Kiev was the image of Lech Wałęsa … striding onto the makeshift stage in Independence Square to the acclaim of 200,000 Ukrainians”. Walęsa’s Kiev visit was important because it emphasised the link between the Orange Revolution and Solidarity’s traditions, which share many common themes: “their peaceful nature, an uncompromising demand for dignity and freedom, and a desire for statehood independent of Russian tutelage”.

Poland’s main political parties helped Yushchenko in his campaign, sensing that despite the negative legacy of history, the interests of Ukraine and Poland were in harmony.

Poland’s involvement in the Orange Revolution has important implications for Europe’s future. Ukrainians “reminded the world that politics is about more than the technical art of governing and managing the distribution of resources”. At crucial moments, “it becomes the expression of the difference between right and wrong, of deeper moral instincts of individual dignity and the desire for freedom”. While western leaders “failed quickly to grasp” the importance of what was happening in Kiev, “the rapid engagement of Polish politicians in the unfolding Ukrainian events allowed Poland … to show that it is at the heart, not the periphery,” of Europe.

The Orange Revolution thrust Poland into the position of leading the EU’s involvement in Ukraine. The slogan “Back to Europe!” helped mobilise Western-orientated Ukrainians, while those who looked east lacked a fighting spirit.

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129 Author’s interview with Jagiellonian University academic, Kraków July 2008
130 Maatraszek, M. 2004. ‘Ukraine, Poland and a free world p.1
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid. p.2
133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
In its reaction to events in Ukraine, Poland had one eye on Russia. In 2009, Paweł Świeboda, founder of Polish think-tank demosEuropa said:

> Clearly, democratic Ukraine is seen as increasing the chances that Russia will evolve in the right direction and so, in that sense, supporting the Orange Revolution was also an activity with Russia in mind. But at the same time, Ukraine is a case in itself. There are strong enough ties between the two countries for Poland to support Ukraine’s case. ... but obviously Russia plays a big role because ... it’s becoming increasingly unpredictable. ... this is seen as a source of great concern ... It could very easily lead to some cases of confrontation.  

The EU’s first reaction to the Orange Revolution “was ambivalent and hesitant”. The new EU member states favoured promoting democracy in Ukraine but France and Germany had a Russia-first position. As the situation developed, all member states backed the pro-democracy position. The Orange Revolution was seen in Moscow as a humiliation and as a rebuff to Russian President Putin. The resistance of Polish officials to the preference in some EU capitals for stable relations with Russia prevented Yushchenko from being sacrificed. Paris and Berlin could “no longer monopolise or dictate the ‘European’ position”. Poland’s history allowed it “to recognise a time of historic opportunity and to find appropriate responses”. The democratisation of Ukraine could “shift the dynamic of European politics” to the east.

Interest and sympathy created by the Orange Revolution gave more prominence to Ukraine’s aspirations to join the EU, aspirations strongly backed by Poland and Lithuania. This “may herald the emergence of a discourse of ‘responsibility’ towards Ukraine and, ultimately, accordance of candidate status”. Accession might be essential for the survival of Ukraine’s democracy. The EU, having accepted Poland’s standpoint on Ukraine, including support for Yushchenko and his allies, must consider the possibility of eventual Ukrainian membership of the EU.

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136 Author’s interview with author 16/9/2009
137 Aslund & McFaul p.6-7
139 Matraszek, M. 2004. ‘Ukraine, Poland and a free world’ p.2
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Shumylo 2007 p.4
Poland will be in the forefront of this unfolding process, helping to translate Ukrainian aspirations into practical realities, and constantly reminding the older EU states of the need to maintain and accelerate the process of EU-Ukrainian dialogue.¹⁴³

Yanukovych’s comeback in the 2006 parliamentary elections was a disappointing development for Poles, many of whom regarded Yanukovych as a Moscow puppet. At the 2006 parliamentary election, support for the pro-Moscow Party of Regions was concentrated in the east and south of Ukraine. Support for President Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine bloc was concentrated in Galicia, traditional hotbed of Ukrainian nationalism, while Yulia Timoshenko’s pro-Western bloc drew support mainly from central and western Ukraine.

Political impasse led to another parliamentary election in October 2007 which produced a slim majority for the Orange parties and led to Yulia Timoshenko becoming prime minister again. In general, the south and east of Ukraine voted for the pro-Moscow Party of Regions, while the west and centre of the country voted for pro-Western parties. In the 2007 election Timoshenko’s bloc dominated the west and centre. Map 8 in Appendix 1 shows the political divide in Ukraine in 2007, which displays a remarkable similarity to the linguistic divide illustrated in Maps 6 and 7. Other elections, including the early 2010 presidential elections, which saw Yanukovych defeat Timoshenko in the second-round runoff, have produced a similar geographical split.

Polish leaders constantly stress the importance of Ukraine in Polish foreign policy.

[In] Poland’s view Ukraine’s European vocation is a key foreign policy objective and too much has been invested in it for that to change even though there is a sense of unease ... with the way the situation in Ukraine is shaping up. There is a feeling that Ukraine is not living up to expectations, that it is wasting an opportunity. So that creates a sense of unease, but not to the extent of anyone openly questioning Ukraine’s European vocation. In fact, you wouldn’t come across anybody in Warsaw ... who would not be in favour of Ukraine joining the EU at some stage in the future. ... In spite of the difficult history between the two countries or maybe because of that history, Poland has identified Ukraine and its EU membership as a mission in foreign policy

¹⁴³ Matraszek 2004 p.2
and that is likely to continue even though, again, there is a huge sense of
disappointment about the way the Orange Revolution ended up. ... [Government] in
Ukraine is still to a large extent a top-down exercise in which there is a power vacuum
at the top. Things don’t function lower down.144

In 2007, Ukrainian military officers were receiving training at Polish military academies.145

However, by 2008, some Polish commentators feared that the battle for Ukraine had been lost,
and that the country was set on a path away from integration with Europe and towards
rapprochement with Russia.146 Some blamed the new centre-right Civic Platform government
led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk which had moved to patch up relations with Moscow after
the disruptive era of the nationalist PiS-led government of the Kaczyński brothers: “Polish-
Ukrainian relations are ruined and that Donald Tusk has lost Ukraine.”147

Conclusion

Between 2000 and 2010, relations between Poland and Ukraine have been the best they have
ever been. The EU has played a considerable part in improving relations between the two
countries, in particular by improving Poland’s image among Ukrainians and by creating a
successful, established framework towards which Poland and Ukraine could gravitate. The
Polish-Ukrainian relationship has become “a pivot” of Polish foreign policy, its importance
recognised “across the Polish political spectrum”.148 Ukraine’s stability, its independence
“and eventual integration into the west are ... vital national interests in Poland”.149 Poles “will
never give up” on Ukraine “because we believe in democracy”.150 Poles, who achieved so
much thanks to their own efforts and ample assistance from western governments and
international organisations, are now in their turn helping “less fortunate” kindred peoples.151

144 Paweł Świeboda interview 16/9/2009
Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova Center for Transatlantic Relations Washington p.243
146 Cianciara, A. 2008 ‘Eastern Partnership’ p.13
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Smolar, E. 2006. ‘Ukraine: Poland Disappointed, But Won't Give Up On Its Neighbor’ Radio Free
www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/07/18625d2d-5b56-4a12-93b6-0a4de725d4bb.html
151 Ibid.
Despite political difficulties, the Polish establishment “will never abandon democracy and human rights” in Ukraine.\(^\text{152}\)

The rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine since 1990 has been “one of the most positive and hopeful developments in post-communist Europe”.\(^\text{153}\) Polish officials continue to express support for Ukraine’s integration into the EU and Nato. Despite more than century of unsatisfactory, often tense, relations between Poles and Ukrainians, in the early 21\(^{st}\) century Poland and Ukraine established a “strategic partnership”, with Poland promoting Ukraine’s “European vocation”.\(^\text{154}\) Poland, along with Lithuania and the United States is the strongest proponent of Ukrainian membership of the EU.\(^\text{155}\) Good Polish-Ukrainian relations are of great importance for the European Union. The research would indicate that the EU appears to have had a positive, normative influence on Poland’s interaction with Ukraine, in line with the theories of Manners and others.

\(^{152}\) Ibid.

\(^{153}\) Batt, J. 2001. ‘The Impact of EU Enlargement on Regions on the EU’s New Eastern Border’ Audition to Governance WG6 20 March 2001 University of Birmingham UK

\(^{154}\) Ibid.

6 Belarus
Belarus has pursued a unique path in postcommunist Europe. Alone of Poland’s neighbours, since the mid-1990s it has a policy of integration with Russia, to the extent of announcing a Union of Russia and Belarus. Polish-Belarusian relations have suffered, especially as Poland moved in the opposite direction, towards closer ties with Western Europe and membership of Nato and the EU. Warsaw’s western-orientated foreign policy and Minsk’s Moscow-orientated one have driven the two neighbours apart. Although the EU has, on several occasions, adjusted its policy to Belarus to encourage the regime in Minsk to democratise the country and open up the country more to the West, it has had limited apparent success. This might serve to show the limits of the EU as normative power.

Żukowski, writing in Polish, says Belarus is a country lying on the borders of two worlds – the EU to the west and the Russian Federation to the east – and between two economic, social and cultural systems. Strongly linked with Russia, Belarus cannot decide which model of economic development to choose. Unlike its western and southern neighbours, Belarus is not a democracy. Economic and political reform such has taken place in Lithuania and Poland, and even Ukraine, has no equivalent in Belarus. A short-lived attempt to pursue a neutral path in international affairs was curtailed by the rise to power in 1994 of Aleksander Lukashenko. Since Lukashenko became president, the Belarusian regime has progressively isolated itself from Europe. Belarus has seen frequent human rights violations, including jailing and beating critics of the government, exiling of dissidents and sometimes murder by security forces. According to Mangott, “Lukashenko’s sultanistic regime” has more in common with Central Asian regimes than its neighbours.

One Belarusian media commentator describes the current Belarusian system as:

... much like the old Soviet system ... It is a banal paternalistic autocracy. All its stable continuance needs is for the people to show up once every five years for the presidential election in order to demonstrate their loyalty to the Leader

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Historical background

It is claimed a distinct Belarusian identity came into being after the Mongol conquest of Russia in the 13th century. This identity was incorporated into the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which later united with Poland. Many speak of Belarusian history as being characterised by the conflict between two traditional rival components. For many writers, the territory that became Belarus was thus for centuries a border zone between settled Europe and “the East”. The “ongoing political struggles in Belarus [reflect] ... an age-old confrontation between Rus (Old Russia) and Poland”. The Polish-Catholic tradition dominated western Belarus for centuries. After centuries of Polish rule the local nobility had become Polish in language and culture and was largely Roman Catholic. The Russian Orthodox tradition remained strong among the peasantry throughout the years of Polish rule and came strongly to the fore after the territory became part of the Russian Empire in the late 18th century.

Apart from in a band of territory running along today’s border between Belarus and Lithuania, the mass of Belarusian peasantry remained mainly Belarusian speaking, but in the 19th century, the growing urban population in the area largely spoke Polish. In the early 20th century, Polish cultural influence on Belarus was as strong as Russian influence. Lukiewicz says Poland’s exceptional role in Belarus is due mainly to the legacy of the centuries Belarusians found themselves in one state with Poles.

After World War I, western Belarus was absorbed into re-born Poland, while eastern Belarus, including Minsk, was organised into the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the 1930s, the Polish minority in the BSSR was largely eliminated, mainly through deportation to remote parts of the Soviet Union. At the time, western Belarus (then northeastern Poland) had a mixed population of Belarusians (48 per cent in 1931), Poles (36 per cent), Tutejsi (“locals” –

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5 Drakokhrust, Y. 2007 ‘Belarus: An Outpost of ‘Old Europe’?’ in Russia in Global Affairs No 2 April-June 2007. Retrieved on 13/09/2008 from http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/19/1113.html. Note: Drakokhrust and Drakakhurstt appear to be the same author, but his name is spelt differently in the two sources. One spelling is transliterated Russian, the other Belarusian.
Slavs with no stated nationality) and Jews. The distinction between Poles and Belarusians in the area was as much a class and religious divide as an ethnic one. Most of the educated class in the area, in particular teachers, public servants and army officers, were Roman Catholic Poles. On the other hand, 92 per cent of Poland’s Belarusians were described in the 1931 Polish census as chłopów (peasants) or children of such. Most Belarusians were Russian Orthodox, but some were Roman Catholic. Poles formed the absolute majority of the population in the arm of territory stretching from Grodno through the Vilnius district to the Latvian border, including most of the area now covered by Grodno oblast.

In 1939, the Soviet Union invaded Poland and annexed the territories that became western Belarus. All of Belarus would remain under Soviet rule until 1991, apart from three years of Nazi occupation in 1941-1944. Much of the Polish population of western Belarus was deported to Russia and Kazakhstan in 1940-1941. Most remaining Poles were transported west into communist Poland in 1945-1956, although a significant number, mainly less educated and rural Poles, remained in Grodno region. The future of local border traffic is especially important on the Polish-Belarus border because the border drawn in 1944 divided areas which for centuries had formed one region. The border divided families and residents from their cemeteries.

The Polish minority in Belarus

With regard to Belarus, Poland’s policy differs from that of most other EU member states. “Poland has sought to maintain dialogue with Minsk, despite the undemocratic and authoritarian practices of its president.” The late former Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek said Poland found itself “in a particularly complicated situation when matters concern Belarus because that is the country where hundreds of thousands of our kin live”. Official data show that the Polish minority in Belarus numbers about 400,000 people, 4 per cent of the country’s population. The number of Belarusians with Polish ancestry is much higher. The proportion of Poles varies greatly within Belarus, from less than 1 per cent of the

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7 1931 Polish census data, which probably exaggerates the percentage of Poles by a few percentage points.
8 Ibid.
9 See Appendix 1 Maps 10 and 11
11 Quoted in Łukiewicz p.203. “...Polska znajduje się w szczególne skomplikowanej sytuacji, kiedy sprawa dotyczy Białorusi, bo to jest ten kraj, gdzie mieszkają setki tysięcy naszych rodaków.”
population in eastern Belarus to 25 per cent in the Grodno region, which hosts about three-quarters of the country’s Polish minority. The city of Grodno, close to the borders with Lithuania and Poland, holds the major concentration of Poles in Belarus. In some villages in Grodno region near the Lithuanian border the population remains almost entirely Polish.

What is striking about the figures in Table 6.1 is that most residents of Belarus who describe themselves as Poles speak Belarusian at home, while most who describe themselves as Belarusian speak Russian. In other words, at least in one respect, Poles in Belarus are more effectively Belarusian than the Belarusians themselves. Many Belarusians consider the Belarusian language to be a folksy holdover from their past. As early as 1960, most Belarusian-language schools in the country had closed. During his term of office, President Lukashenko has derided the Belarusian language as “inferior” to the “two great languages in the world – Russian and English”.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ethnic group</th>
<th>language spoken at home, %</th>
<th>Belarusian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>8,159,100</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1,141,700</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>395,700</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>237,000</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>27,800</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>95.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,045,000*</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* includes less numerous ethnic minorities

Table 6.1   Belarus: population by ethnicity and language, 1999

About three-quarters of Belarusians belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. Roman Catholics form about 15 per cent of the country’s population. The relationship between Belarusian Catholicism and Polish sentiment is complex. Catholics in Belarus who describe themselves as Poles “are strongly attached to ‘collective farm ethics’”. These ethics provide a “refuge for those unable to join” the wider Polish, Belarusian or Russian cultures. The self-declared Poles of Belarus are “elderly, poorly educated people who promote an

12 Drakokhrust 2007 ‘Belarus: An Outpost of ‘Old Europe’
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
environment of ‘Polishness’”.\(^\text{17}\) For such folk, “Lukashenko represents a guarantor of an accustomed lifestyle, while to Lukashenko, they are the most reliable part of the electorate”.\(^\text{18}\) The urbanised grandchildren of such folk tend to consider themselves to be Belarusian and to declare Belarusian as their maternal tongue. Belarusian nationalists see the link between Catholicism in Belarus and Polishness as playing into the hands of Lukashenko. The Belarusian Catholic intelligentsia is “wary of attempts to expand Polish influence in Belarus”.\(^\text{19}\) In the early 1990s, the Belarusian opposition led demands for a reduction in the number of Polish-born Catholic priests in Belarus. According to one Belarusian journalist “most of Lukashenko’s opponents are members of the pro-Belarusian Catholic movement”.\(^\text{20}\)

**Friction over the Union of Poles in Belarus**

Throughout the period of Lukashenko’s rule, the situation of the Polish minority in Belarus has been a concern to the Polish government and society. Several incidents strained relations between the two governments. For example, in May 2005 a diplomatic spat erupted between Poland and Belarus after the Belarusian Justice Ministry refused to recognise the newly elected leadership of the Union of Poles in Belarus (Związek Polaków na Białorusi or Саюз Палякаў Беларусі - SPB), preferring instead to push for the re-installing of a more compliant figure who had been leader of the SPB from 2000 to 2005. Most saw “the conflict as primarily an attempt by ... Lukashenko to get full control of the country’s largest NGO before the 2006 presidential election”.\(^\text{21}\) The SPB claimed to have 25,000 members on paper, which would make it the largest NGO in Belarus, but its active membership is much lower.\(^\text{22}\) In July 2005 Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Andrzej Załucki ordered the expulsion of a Belarus diplomat from Warsaw.\(^\text{23}\) Poland’s foreign ministry explained the move as a response to Minsk’s “totally unjustified expulsion of the head of the Polish consulate in Minsk”.\(^\text{24}\) Three days later, Poland withdrew its ambassador from Minsk, in protest at a police raid on the premises of the SPB. In July 2005, after “reciprocal diplomatic expulsions and the recalling”

\(^\text{17}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{18}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{19}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{20}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{22}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{23}\) Bordonaro 2005. ‘The Poland-Belarus Controversy and the Battle for Eastern Europe’
\(^\text{24}\) Ibid.
of the Polish ambassador to Belarus, the conflict between Warsaw and Minsk over the SPB entered “a calmer stage”.25

At the time, Polish foreign ministry spokesman Piotr Paszkowski said the Belarusian authorities “knew very well” that one of the conditions for improving Polish-Belarusian relations was the normalisation of the situation of Poles in Belarus.26 Warsaw hoped SPB members would choose a new leader in free elections.27 The duly elected new leader, Andzhelika Borys, was arrested in 2007.

Poland’s free media sometimes complicates the work of the Polish government in its relations with Belarus. In September 2008, Gazeta Wyborcza reported that the Polish foreign ministry denied it had put pressure on Andzhelika Borys to resign from her position and chair of the SPB.28 Gazeta Wyborcza quoted rival broadsheet Rzeczpospolita as saying that the foreign ministry had suggested to Borys that she step down in the name of “geopolitical rationality” and repairing Polish-Belarusian relations.29 The request was made shortly before a meeting between the diplomatic chiefs of Poland and Belarus. The article in Rzeczpospolita said that the Polish and Belarusian governments had a plan of action with regard to the SPB.30 In November there was to be a combined meeting of the two SPBs – one led by Andzhelika Borys and the other “legal” one by Józef Łucznik. A new candidate for the position of head of the SPB had been proposed. If the report was true it would mean that the Polish government had caved in to the Lukashenko regime. Sikorski said that Poland was working hard to bring about the return of democratic elections in Belarus and that the Rzeczpospolita article had made that work harder, adding that talks with the Belarus authorities on the topic were at such a delicate stage that it would be better to be discreet.31 Sikorski said he hoped for an end to

26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid. “Rozmowy z władzami białoruskimi na ten temat nie są łatwe i na takim delikatnym ich etapie lepiej by było zachować dyskrecję.”
“political games” over the Polish minority in Belarus, adding that “the last time that happened it led to the virtual breakdown of Polish-Belarusian relations and the isolation of Belarus”.  

Belarusians in Poland

For as long as a Belarusian identity has existed, Belarusians have had low levels of national consciousness, when compared with their neighbours. This is so both in Belarus and in Poland. The Belarusian minority in Poland numbers about 48,000, according to official Polish census figures. Some Belarusian minority advocates claim figures of a few hundred thousand Belarusians in Poland. Poland’s Belarusian minority is concentrated in Podlaskie, the poorest region of Poland, near the border with Belarus. After 1945, developments in Soviet Belarus, particularly russification, encouraged Belarusians in Poland to embrace Polishness. Poland’s Belarusians assimilated throughout the period of communist rule in Poland, mainly due to rural-urban migration and the weak salience of Belarusian ethnicity. “Assimilation to the high culture (Polish)” has been rapid. The Belarusian language in Poland is seen as a rustic patois. However, in the 1980s, Solidarity’s abundant use of Catholic imagery and association of being Polish with being Catholic turned the largely Eastern Orthodox Belarusians away from embracing Polishness. At least in the Bialystok region, in the early 1980s Solidarity excluded and alienated the Belarusian community by stressing the link between Catholicism and being Polish. Today, the few ethnically Belarusian communes in Poland are a stronghold of the postcommunist left and register the lowest levels of electoral support for parties with roots in the Solidarity movement.

Poland’s Belarusian minority leaders have since 1989 tried to promote Belarusian identity, but have been hindered by several factors, which include low economic development in areas of Poland with a Belarusian majority and a negative image of Belarus and Belarusians. Poland’s Orthodox church has not helped. The Orthodox mass is in Old Church Slavonic and

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32 Ibid. “Gdy ostatnim razem miało to miejsce doprowadziło praktycznie do zerwania stosunków polsko-białoruskich i do izolacji Białorusi.”
34 Polish census 2002
36 Ibid. p.78
37 Ibid. p.88-89
38 Ibid. p.89
39 Ibid. p.16
sermons in Russian. The exclusion of Belarusians “from effective democratic participation is a major factor contributing to their disappearance” in Poland. The government of Belarus has little interest in the situation of Belarusians in Poland, except to occasionally raise the matter of their relative deprivation when Minsk is criticised for its harsh treatment of the Polish minority in Belarus.

Accidental independence

Belarus became an independent state when the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, much to the dismay of many in the country. Independent Belarus was among “the least national of the Soviet successor states”. The March 1991 referendum for a “revived (Soviet) union” was backed by 83 per cent of Belarusians, the highest figure outside Central Asia. Had there been an independence referendum, it would have been defeated. The early 1990s saw a largely unsuccessful attempt at nationbuilding.

In October 1991, the authorities in Warsaw and Minsk signed a joint state declaration that reduced fears that Poland would make a claim to any of western Belarus. It also marked the end of Belarusian pretensions to the Białystok area in Poland. In 1992, Poland offered newly independent Belarus a treaty which confirmed existing borders and established “clear principles of minority rights”. When the treaty was signed in April 1992, Polish Prime Minister Jan Olszewski said relations between Belarus and Poland could “serve as a model for relations among other countries in our region”. The fact that Poland and Belarus confirmed their border so soon after the Soviet Union’s disintegration was important. It conveyed to the region “the norm that nation-states are to be built and secured within inherited borders” and that Poland had no claim to the territories it had lost during World War II. By legally

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40 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
confirming its borders with Belarus and Ukraine by mid-1992, Poland “sent a clear signal that it had no interest in eastward expansion”.

When the Belarus parliament’s then speaker, Stanislau Shushkevich, went to Warsaw in June 1992 to sign the treaty with Poland, he accepted the idea of “European standards” to overcome problems associated with minorities. Shushkevich regarded Poland as Belarus’ “best available road to Europe”. He “believed that the interests of Belarus would be best served by the integration of a Belarusian nation-state within its present borders into European institutions”.

When in November 1992, Shushkevich began to lose power within Belarus to others with a more eastward-looking inclination, Poland’s new Prime Minister Hanna Suchocka stressed in Minsk that: “Poland is interested in the independence of Belarus and wishes to be one of the elements connecting Belarus to Europe.”

Snyder says that:

The lasting success of the Polish policy of European standards toward Belarus was that it created a legal framework of European standards between the two states, before it was too late.

The great dictator

The election of Aleksander Lukashenko as president in 1994 “ended fruitful cooperation with Poland and began a dictatorship of Soviet nostalgia.” The main issue in the 1994 election “was the economy which, in the absence of reforms, had gone into free fall”. Angry Belarusians, “fed up with old-guard rule” voted for Lukashenko. The latter’s criticism of the government won him massive support from a citizenry whose average monthly salary was

48 Ibid. p.268
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. p.266
51 Ibid.
52 Quoted in Kosobudzki, T. 1994. ‘Stracone szansy’ in Kultura 560 p.20
55 Zielonka 2001 Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering p.307
less than $20 in a time of 40 per cent inflation. However, Belarusians rejected a candidate of the old nomenklatura only to elect another figure of the same ilk. In the July 1994 second round of voting, Lukashenko won a landslide victory, polling 80.1 per cent of the total vote. Lukashenko “personified all the characteristics of the republic’s Supreme Soviet – incompetence, populism, inconsistency, hatred of democracy and utter disrespect for the law”. After his election win, key figures in the previous administration who had campaigned against Lukashenko defected to his side.

Lukashenko used the lack of an independence referendum in Belarus to his advantage. He based his legitimacy on the March 1991 referendum for a “revived (Soviet) union”. The new president, with significant public support, sought to re-unite Belarus with Russia. Poland and Lithuania opposed this move, seeing a union of Russia and Belarus as giving Moscow more leverage in influencing their countries. In the 1990s, several Russian leaders, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, publicly backed Lukashenko and Russia repeatedly intervened to support him.

**Moving in different directions**

During the 1990s, as Poland pursued a foreign policy course with twin main priorities of achieving membership of Nato and the EU, Belarus moved in a different direction, towards closer integration with Russia. While Poland has become a western-style liberal democracy, Belarus has become more authoritarian and clamped down on civil liberties.

Unlike Russia and Ukraine, Belarus did not have a nomenklatura liberalisation phase. The country’s nomenklatura “did not have a chance to amass fortunes sufficient to form a class of owners”. Lack of natural resources meant “no export quotas for oil, gas, or metal to make quick millions”. Belarus stagnated. It became “the land that time forgot”. There were no new advertising, companies or tourists. Lack of economic reforms meant huge state debts

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56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.  
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  
66 Zielonka 2001 *Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering* p.308
were incurred supporting collective farms and the military-industrial complex, “which was high-tech but useless”.\textsuperscript{65}

Poland’s move to EU accession during the late 1990s did not help improve relations with Belarus. If anything, Poland’s obsession with the West and joining the EU contributed to the worsening of relations with the authorities in Minsk. After the turn of the century, when Poland was surer of its acceptance in the West, the country began once more to become actively interested in Belarus.

Lukashenko and his government violate human rights, rig elections and suppress the opposition. Opposition to his rule is weak and largely confined to the intelligentsia and students. The russified, denationalised masses, with ambivalent identities, are “amorphous”, hard to mobilise and “susceptible to ... Soviet nostalgia”.\textsuperscript{66} The mass of the population seeks the relative comfort of the known Soviet way of doing things to the unknown and apparently dangerous Western way. Lukashenko has played to this mass. He continues to have much more public support than any other politician in Belarus.\textsuperscript{67} The lack of political freedom has prevented the growth of political parties. When Minsk hosted several major anti-government rallies, the authorities crushed the protests brutally. Opposition leaders were forced to flee the country and hundreds of their supporters were arrested. The authorities “issued a number of rulings restricting various constitutional freedoms”.\textsuperscript{68} The constitution of Belarus is, “at best, an occasionally used tool for manipulation by” Lukashenko.\textsuperscript{69}

**Poland and the Belarus opposition**

In 1992, concerned by the lack of political and economic reform and “threats to Belarusian sovereignty”, a group of Belarusians opposed to the authorities in Minsk established the Biełaruski Narodny Front (Belarusian People’s Front or BPF), which began to agitate for a referendum on having early parliamentary elections.\textsuperscript{70} The BPF strongly opposed plans to establish closer political ties or a union between Belarus and Russia.\textsuperscript{71} However, in a speech

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Kuzio 2001. ‘Belarus and Ukraine: Democracy Building in a Grey Security Zone’ p.462
\item \textsuperscript{67} Zielonka 2001 \textit{Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering} p.309
\item \textsuperscript{68} Ibid. p.312
\item \textsuperscript{69} Ibid. p.293
\item \textsuperscript{70} Zielonka 2001 \textit{Democratic Consolidation in Eastern Europe Vol. 1 Institutional Engineering} p.297
\end{itemize}
to the BPF’s founding meeting, one of its leaders said that all the country’s ethnic minorities, including Russians, Poles, Jews and Lithuanians, would have a place in independent Belarus. “The Poles and Lithuanians are our brothers, and we have countless examples of shared and truly fraternal coexistence.”

Claiming that the mentality of western Belarusians is “genetically” orientated to Europe, Lukiewicz notes that there are still Belarusians alive today who lived in Tsarist Russia, interwar Poland, fascist Germany and the Soviet Union. Their personal experience was handed on to new generations and cannot but be reflected in the worldview of western Belarusians.

In 2005, one Belarusian academic said

Nie możemy zapominać, że stosunki z Polską są bardzo ważne dla białoruskich elit intelektualnych. Wystarczy przypomnieć, że dzisiaj najlepiej mówią po białorusku Białorusini, którzy mieszkają w Polsce.

[We cannot forget that relations with Poland are very important for the Belarusian intellectual elite. It is enough to remember that today the Belarusians who live in Poland speak Belarusian best.]

In contrast to the Belarus regime, the Belarusian opposition, both democratic and nationalist, sees in Poland an ally and supporter. Poland has emerged as the main supporter in the EU of the Belarusian pro-democracy movement. This is a significant development, as historically the Belarusian national movement did not see Poland as an ally, and tended to consider Poland to be a greater threat to the Belarusian nation than Russia was. The “beleaguered Belarusian national movement, anti-Polish at the beginning of the 1990s, was pro-Polish by the end of the decade”.

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74 Lukiewicz 2005. ‘Pograniczne białorusko-polskie in nowy reżim wizowy’ p.204

75 Snyder 2003. The Reconstruction Of Nations p.280
Table 6.2  Belarusians’ perceptions of living standards in neighbouring countries

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<tr>
<th>country</th>
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Figures in %

After having helped the pro-Western forces during Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, “Poles as a whole seem enthusiastic about supporting democracy in Belarus”.  

In early 2006, Poland’s “parliament adopted a resolution condemning the Belarusian authorities for their intimidation of opposition candidates and activists”.  

Polish universities have offered Belarusian students and academics internships and scholarships. Polish NGOs “remain intent on helping Belarus in the long term”. For many Polish NGOs, Belarus is a priority. For their efforts, Polish and other EU-based NGOs have run into trouble with the Belarusian government. For example, in July 2005, the authorities in Minsk accused the apolitical Dialogue European Fund, which promotes cooperation between scientists across Central and Eastern Europe, of spying and ordered it out of Belarus.

In March 2006, thousands of Poles attended a Solidarity With Belarus rock concert in Warsaw, featuring Belarusian rock groups banned in their homeland. Agnieszka Komorowska, the coordinator of the European Choice for Belarus programme at the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw, said Poles’ interest was inevitable. Poland did not have a dialogue with Belarus.  

“So democracy seems to be a guarantee of change and of having

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76 Ibid. p.206
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Quoted in Ibid.
85 Ibid.
someone in power with whom we can work.” In January 2006, Belarusian opposition candidate Alyaksandr Milinkevich met President Kaczyński in Warsaw.

**The European Union and Belarus**

In the 1990s, Belarus “retreated completely to the status of a Russian dominion”. Integration with Russia “questions the very sovereignty of Belarus”. EU policies of the early 1990s that focused on Russia accelerated the drift. In the early 1990s, the EU struggled to see Belarus as separate from Russia. When the Soviet Union broke up, EU policies towards Belarus during the early 1990s “reflected a mixture of indifference and lack of interest, and were highly Russophile”. The EU continued these policies for years afterwards. No CIS country made it into even the “slow track” group of prospective member states. Bordonaro says Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy seems to be “a mere set of institutional instruments” unable to “effectively coordinate” member states’ policy priorities. After 1994, some EU countries began to adopt less Russo-centric policies towards Belarus but the election of Lukashenko “destroyed any hopes that the slow pace” of democratisation would continue. Oppositionists, dissidents and outspoken journalists have been jailed and murdered. Pro-democracy elements within Belarus are weak and have not been strong enough to effect the type of political advance that occurred in Ukraine from 2004.

After Belarus became independent, relations with the EU initially progressed well towards the adoption of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (negotiated in 1995) and an interim trade agreement. Both agreements were, however, frozen as a result of the deterioration of the political situation in Belarus following the election of Lukashenko as president. The EU became interested in Belarus only after Lukashenko smashed moves to democratisation, “by which time it was too late”. Even then, the EU “followed double standards”. Anxious not to offend Russia, the EU muted its criticism of Yeltsin’s support for the Lukashenko regime after 1995. With Nato enlargement, Moscow geopolitical interest in Minsk increased. This

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85 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
had a detrimental effect on political and economic reform in Belarus. As relations between Russia and the EU deteriorated in the later 1990s, the reform agenda in Belarus suffered.

In early 2002, the EU launched a new attempt to improve relations with Belarus. This approach aimed at clearly identified steps towards democratisation to be paralleled at each stage by gradual resumption of dialogue with the government and provision of broader assistance, ending with full normalisation of relations. EU-Belarus relations deteriorated in 2002 as Belarus failed to make any progress towards democratisation. In the light of Minsk’s clampdown on OSCE activities in Belarus, 14 out of 15 EU member states decided in November 2002 to prevent the entry into their territories of President Lukashenko and other Belarusian leaders. In February 2003, the European Parliament expressed strong concern at the increasing self-isolation of Belarus and declared its support for the approach taken by the European Commission and Council. In 2003, the European Commission stated that the EU faced “a choice in Belarus: either to leave things to drift ... or to engage.” The visa ban was lifted in April 2003 after the establishment of a new OSCE office in Minsk.

In 2003, the European Commission admitted that the EU’s relations with Belarus had “progressed little since 1996”. Kuzio says the EU and other international organisations found it hard to influence Belarus because of three factors. First, they did not want to offend Russia. Second, Lukashenko had been elected by a large majority of Belarusian voters and had significant domestic popularity. The EU stopped recognising Lukashenko as the legitimate president of Belarus only after his term officially expired in mid-1999. Third, “the democratic opposition remained weak, divided, and unable to pose a serious threat to the ... regime”.

In 2004, the European Commission had several contacts with the Belarus regime with a view to bringing Belarus “closer to European democratic standards”. But restrictions on the media

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93 Ibid.
95 Ibid. p.4
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
“and other negative developments” demonstrated the reluctance of Belarus “to move towards democratic standards”.  

The 2004 enlargement increased EU interest in the situation in Belarus. The fact that Belarus now shares a border of more than 1000km with the EU has increased the will to normalise relations with the pariah. This will is especially strong in Poland. In December 2002, Poland presented a proposal for an “Eastern Dimension” which included coherent policy proposals on which EU policy towards Belarus should be based. At the same time as the 2004 enlargement, the EC presented its new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), designed to intensify relations between the expanded EU and neighbouring countries and permit effective support for social and economic reform in those countries. In May 2004, the Commission put forward a proposal on relations with Belarus in the context of the ENP. An ENP strategy paper states that under the existing conditions in Belarus it was not yet possible to offer the full benefits of the ENP to Belarus.

In May 2004, the European Commission’s Country Strategy Paper National Indicative Programme Belarus stated that the EU’s long-term goals included:

that Belarus be a democratic, stable, reliable, and increasingly prosperous partner with which the enlarged EU will share not only common borders, but also a common agenda driven by shared values.

The strategy paper said that the EU had tried to help Belarus begin “the transition towards a stable democracy that can ensure respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in line with its UN and OSCE commitments”. The EU also attached importance to the Council of Europe and OSCE “being able to maintain smooth relations with Belarus and enjoy favourable working conditions in the country”. The paper added that “the process of rapprochement between Belarus and the CoE should continue and reach a positive conclusion”.

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid. p.17-18
102 Ibid. p.3
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
Belarus was not among the group of countries which could make full use of the ENP. There was no mention in the document of establishing contact at the highest level with Belarus or to activate the plan there.\textsuperscript{106} The EC stated that Belarus must make fundamental political and economic reforms before it could benefit from the ENP.\textsuperscript{107} In the meantime, the EU and Belarus would have only a common border until reforms in Belarus allowed a common agenda based on common values.

Minsk used the presence of Polish observers at the 2004 Belarusian elections and referendum for propaganda purposes. In 2004, European Movement Secretary-General Henryk Krener said that for Belarus to become a member of the EU, it would have to reform and, in particular, establish a democratic system and rule of law.\textsuperscript{108} The Belarusian economy would need to be restructured to become stronger and more competitive in the global market.\textsuperscript{109} However, a change in regime “is needed before Belarus can fully participate in the ENP process.”\textsuperscript{110} Without a regime change, Belarus “has no chance of becoming an EU member”\textsuperscript{111}

In August 2005, thanks partly to lobbying by Poland, the EU released a declaration condemning Belarus in strong language for its failure to meet basic European human rights standards, for persecuting its Polish minority and jailing opposition figures following flawed elections.\textsuperscript{112} The declaration said the EU was deeply concerned at developments in Belarus which had demonstrated “once again the systematic and increasing repression of civil society, the political opposition and the independent media”.\textsuperscript{113} The EU went on to condemn government repression of the Union of Poles in Belarus. It said that such interference undermined minority rights and contravened “standards of governance to which Belarus has signed up to as part of its OSCE commitments”.\textsuperscript{114} The EU also called on Minsk to halt the

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{108} Quoted in Lukiewicz 2005. ‘Pograniczne białoruskie-polskie in nowy reżim wizowy’ p.204 “Żeby stać się członkiem Eurosojuszu, powinno sе reformować siebie wewnątrz. To jest ważne dla każdego kraju. Powinniście ustanowić niezawodny system demokratyczny, prawe państwo.”
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid. “Co do gospodarki, powinniście stworzyć strukturę i mieć siły do tego, aby stać się konkurencyjnymi na wolnym rynku.”
\textsuperscript{110} Bretherton & Vogler 2006 The European Union as a Global Actor p.150
\textsuperscript{111} Quoted in Lukiewicz 2005. p.204 “Z dzisiejszym reżimem politycznym na Białorusi na członkostwo w zjednoczonej Europie wasz kraj nie ma żadnej szansy.”
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
repression of its own citizens “and to ensure full compliance with its human rights obligations, including on minorities”. The declaration expressed disappointment that Minsk continued “to hinder the development of closer EU-Belarus relations and prevent the Belarusian people from enjoying the benefits of the European Neighbourhood Policy”. Further, the declaration said the EU would continue to assist “Belarusian civil society and the population at large in their efforts to promote a democratic and pluralistic society in Belarus”.

In signs of a rapprochement between Poland and Belarus, in September 2008, Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski called for the lifting of EU visa sanctions on Belarusian government officials “as soon as possible”. However, a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Brussels that month was more cautious. It decided that “further friendly gestures” towards the Lukashenko regime should be conditional on the regime showing respect for democratic values in upcoming parliamentary elections.

**Visas and borders**

Since the 1990s, the Polish-Belarusan border has been the scene of illegal migration to Poland of citizens of African and Asian countries trying to reach Western European countries, the flow into Poland of members of criminal groups originating in countries of the former Soviet Union, smuggling of cars stolen in western Europe and Poland and the bribing of border guards and customs officers by organised criminal groups.

New laws on aliens were introduced in Poland in 1998-2000, causing the withdrawal of the Belarusian ambassador from Warsaw. The opening of internal EU borders means that the function carried out by border controls must be realised in another way. Detailed provisions regulating private traffic between Poland and Belarus are contained in an agreement signed in

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115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
August 2003.\textsuperscript{121} The charge for a single-entry visa would be €10 and for a multiple-entry visa €50, a significant sum of money for an average Belarusian.\textsuperscript{122} Among those who do not have to pay for a visa are academics, students, teachers and members of the Bug, Niemen and Białowieża Forest Euroregion working groups.\textsuperscript{123} Half-price multiple-entry visas are given to those visiting family.\textsuperscript{124}

A visible result of the introduction of the visa regime was a considerable reduction of smuggling and localised cross-border movements of small traders. Zięba and Kowalczyk consider that a “decidedly positive result”, as the trade often had a criminal character and its temporary blossoming was a result of an economic “pathology” on both sides of the border.\textsuperscript{125} On a local scale the limiting of such cross-border trade has had negative impacts for some communities. In 1992, for the first time in 45 years it had been possible to cross Poland’s eastern border without a visa. The return to a visa regime might be understood by some to mark a negative step.

Despite the difficulties, co-operation between the border services of Poland and Belarus is “is not the worst”.\textsuperscript{126} The modernisation of the Polish-Belarusian border infrastructure in the run-up to Polish EU accession was carried out reasonably effectively, better than on the more porous border with Ukraine.\textsuperscript{127} In 2004, dialogue at the highest level was renewed with a meeting between the foreign ministers of Poland and Belarus. Negotiations permitted work on, among other things, relatively liberal visa rules. On a macroeconomic scale both Poland and Belarus could both benefit from more regulated border traffic.

**The Russian factor in Belarus**

While the EU supported the transition process in Belarus, the influence of Russia has been more negative. Belarus “can be described as a national-populist regime that pairs a strongly pro-Russian geopolitical stance with resistance to pro-market policies and to Nato expansion”.\textsuperscript{128} Russia “supported the imposition of an authoritarian regime in Belarus for

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid. p.195
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid. p.196
\item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Bordonaro 2005. ‘The Poland-Belarus Controversy and the Battle for Eastern Europe’
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
selfish geopolitical purposes”. Since the Soviet Union’s collapse, Belarus has gained geostrategic importance. In 1991, Belarus hosted 23 rocket bases and 42 military airfields and a tenth of the country’s territory was under the jurisdiction of the Soviet military. In 1995, Moscow and Minsk signed an agreement allowing Russia to keep two bases in Belarus. Belarus has become a “semi-sovereign state” due to its “being entangled in the Belarus-Russia dyad and counting (depending) on Russian oil and gas to fill the country’s pipelines”. While the oft-trumpeted union with Russia has not been completed, it has remained a principle of Minsk’s foreign policy.

Poland’s difficulties with Belarus are not limited to the social sphere. In Minsk and Moscow, a future where Belarus and Russia become one country seems natural and desirable. In Warsaw, such a prospect is alarming. Russia - especially if it controls Belarus and Ukraine - is considered by Poland’s decision-makers as the country’s main geopolitical threat. If a “small Soviet Union” including Belarus and Ukraine was created, Poland would share more than 1000 kilometres of borders with it.

For Poland, the full integration of Belarus into western economic structures, if not the EU, would hasten an end to Russia’s grip on strategic energy routes in the region. The energy issue is one of the causes of the deterioration in Polish-Belarus relations. It is “linked to the new geopolitics of Eastern Europe as a whole”. In 2005, Vladimir Putin announced changes in Moscow’s energy policy orientation, notably that Russia’s Gazprom and Germany’s BASF would build a new gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea. This would be a blow to Poland’s energy security and economic growth. The new pipeline would provide an alternative route for Russian gas, bypassing Poland. After Putin’s statements, Warsaw said it would use its position in the EU to support alternative strategic projects. One idea was to build a new pipeline from Russia to Europe via Belarus and Poland. This Polish plan would be in danger if relations between Minsk and Warsaw continue to worsen. So Warsaw has mulled the

129 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
133 Bordonaro 2005. ‘The Poland-Belarus Controversy and the Battle for Eastern Europe’
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
possibility of a pipeline via the Baltic states, bypassing Belarus. This plan “increased Minsk’s irritation with Warsaw”.

Poland has actively pursued its own agenda as a power in the region and functions as a close ally of the US in Europe. Since 1991 the main geopolitical issues in Central and Eastern Europe have been the eastward expansion of the EU, Nato and capitalism, and the US “struggle to roll back the remains of Russian influence”. Belarus can be considered as Russia’s last satellite state in Eastern Europe. In 2005, the US aimed at bringing about a “regime change” in Minsk in the style of the colour revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. To bring this about, the US financed and supported pro-Western dissidents and social movements in Belarus. In July 2005, Lukashenko said Poland was “pursuing a clear policy aimed at reducing Belarus-Polish relations”, adding that Warsaw was working with Washington in order to take over Minsk. The crisis occurred two months after US President George W Bush’s speech in Vilnius in May 2005 in which he called Belarus “the last dictatorship in Europe”. Poland’s quarrel with Minsk signalled that US and Polish interests coincided “on several fundamental issues in Eastern Europe”.

Belarus survives

Since Belarus’ unsought independence in 1991, the relationship between Poland and Belarus has varied from lukewarm to confrontational. On the face of it, the EU’s impact on relations between Poland and Belarus has been negative. Thus far, Polish efforts to ensure Belarusian progress to a freer, more Western way of doing things have been a failure.

In the Polish assessment there is always a discussion as to whether one should talk to Belarusian authorities and identify those who could lead the change from the inside or whether one should opt for the black-and-white scenario, meaning we only support the democrats and you rule out working with members of the establishment and policy is vacillating between these two. At the moment it’s more in the camp of those who think

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136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Quoted in Bordonaro 2005. ‘The Poland-Belarus Controversy and the Battle for Eastern Europe’
142 Ibid.
143 Bordonaro 2005. ‘The Poland-Belarus Controversy and the Battle for Eastern Europe’
that working with the establishment is more promising. There were high hopes at the
time when the Georgian war happened and Lukashenko was clearly concerned and it ...
was seen as feasible that he would open up a bit more, but the war subsided, the
Russians did what they wanted to do and in the elections ... Lukashenko didn’t allow a
single opposition politician to enter the parliament which was to be a token case of his
commitment to working with the EU.144

The changes which have taken place in Belarus-Polish relations reflect two general integrative
tendencies whose directions are opposed: Poland has entered the European Union while
Belarus has sought a union with Russia. Belarus stands almost alone in Europe as a state
implacably hostile to values such as liberal democracy, pluralism, human rights, free media
and a capitalist economy. Its “national-populist regime” combines “a strongly pro-Russian
geopolitical stance with resistance to pro-market policies and to Nato expansion”.145

The experience of the 1990s, when for the first time in half a century people could freely
communicate across the border, is an asset which cannot be wasted, if one has as goals the
improvement of relations between the EU and Belarus and the transmission of EU values and
norms to its eastern neighbour. The economic, social and political development of Belarus in
a positive direction would likely be accelerated by close economic, social and cultural
interaction with the EU and its people. The fact that Poland is richer, freer and happier than
Belarus has served to enhance the country’s image among Belarusians, particularly among
younger, educated Belarusians. Membership of the EU has improved Poland’s leverage over
Belarus and made many Belarusians respect the country more. For pro-western and pro-EU
Belarusians, Poland can have a desirable role as “a guide to Europe, mentor in the art of
democracy”, and relayer of EU norms and values.146

It is in the interests of Poland and Belarus that the eastern border of the EU does not become a
new barrier dividing Europe in two major parts. In addition, the EU as a whole should ensure
that the process of European integration is not viewed by some Europeans through a prism of
marginalisation and exclusion, which might well preclude the possibility of them being
positively affected by the EU’s normative power to change.

144 Paweł Świeboda interviewed 16/9/2009
145 Bordonaro 2005. ‘The Poland-Belarus Controversy and the Battle for Eastern Europe’
146 Drakokhrust 2007 ‘Belarus: An Outpost of “Old Europe”’
7 Lithuania
This chapter contains a historical background to Polish-Lithuanian relations, added information about the response of Poles and Lithuanians surveyed for this thesis in 2008, and information about the general geopolitical and economic context that Lithuania found itself in between 1990 and 2010.

Since Lithuania regained its independence in 1990-91, the two countries have enjoyed good relations. These good relations are due both to obvious common objectives between the two states, and to decisions made in Brussels and Strasbourg. Allowing both Poland and Lithuania to travel the path leading to EU membership encouraged the two countries to cooperate more than might otherwise have occurred.

Despite excellent government-to-government ties, when it comes to popular sentiment, Polish-Lithuanian relations are not as warm as they could be. The traditional Polish view of Lithuania is of a country “civilised” and “Europeanised” by its traditional association with Poland. The competing nationalisms of the early 20th century saw a change in the view of the Lithuania. It came to be seen as anti-Polish. This view came to the fore again after Lithuania had secured independence in 1991, when it seemed to Poles that the Polish minority in Lithuania was being discriminated against.

Apart from Lithuania’s ethnic Polish minority, popular affection among Lithuanians for Poland is limited mostly to the upper echelons of Lithuanian society and then mainly only in so far as Poland is seen as a geopolitical counterweight to Russia. As late as the 1990s, some Lithuanians feared Poland more than Russia, not because Poland was a military threat, but because they saw Polish culture as having dominated and assimilated Lithuanian culture, with the potential to do so again.

**Historical background**

Lithuania’s history is tied more closely with Poland’s than with any other country. The two countries spent long centuries together in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and have had common geostrategic interests and stances for most of the period they have existed as states. Relations between the two countries reached a low in the aftermath of World War I, when the two newly reborn states fought over Vilnius. They remained strained throughout the interwar period.
At the end of the 14th century, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was the largest country in Europe. It included the territories of present-day Belarus, most of Ukraine, and parts of Poland and Russia. Circumstances and geopolitics drove Lithuania and Poland to seek an alliance. “The young states of Lithuania and Poland encountered in both the East and West powerful and threatening forces which could be resisted only through joint efforts.”\(^1\) Lithuania officially became Christian in 1385, following Poland’s offer of its crown to Lithuania’s Grand Duke Jogaila.\(^2\) For the next two centuries, Lithuania and Poland were ruled by the same Lithuanian dynasty. The 1569 Union of Lublin between the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania led to the consolidation of the two countries into Europe’s largest state, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, or \textit{Rzeczpospolita}, and also led to the growth of the Polish community in Lithuania.\(^3\)

The Union of Lublin and Commonwealth period is viewed differently by Polish and Lithuanian historians. Poles emphasise its peaceful creation and role in spreading Polish culture. Lithuanians point out that the union was dominated by Poland. During the Commonwealth era, Lithuania’s nobility and higher culture was polonised, “resulting in the relegation of the Lithuanian language to the peasant class”.\(^4\) Many Lithuanians (especially in western Lithuania, which would later form most of today’s Republic of Lithuania) saw Poland as a cultural oppressor, and resisted polonisation, even as the joint state was dissolved and Lithuania was taken over by the Russian Empire in the late 18th century.

Importantly for the growth of Lithuanian national consciousness, a small part of Lithuania (known as Lithuania Minor, or Memelland in German) around the city of Klaipeda was annexed by German Prussia and remained in German hands until after World War 1. The Russian Empire banned the written use of the Lithuanian language, but texts in Lithuanian were printed in Lithuania Minor and smuggled into Russian-occupied Lithuania. By the end of the 19th century, the developing Lithuanian national movement had begun a “move away from Polish language and culture and toward a declaration for an independent statehood”.\(^5\)

\(^2\) The Lithuanian-ruled lands inhabited by Ruthenians, corresponding roughly to today’s Belarus and Ukraine, had adopted Orthodox Christianity earlier.
\(^3\) \textit{Rzeczpospolita} can be translated as “Republic” or “Commonwealth”.
\(^4\) Valionis et al 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.1
\(^5\) Ibid.
Vilnius (Wilno in Polish) and its surrounding area had become Polish in language and identity by the 19th century. By World War I, Poles accounted for well over half of the city’s population. Most of the rest were Jews. Less than 2 per cent of the city’s population was ethnic Lithuanian. At the end of World War I, the emergent nation states of Poland and Lithuania both claimed Vilnius, as did Soviet Russia. After a few years of struggle between these entities, Poland was able to take control of the city and surrounding region. The Lithuanian government, which continued to claim Vilnius as its de jure capital, fled to Kaunas, which became the de facto capital of Lithuania until 1939.

Vilnius and the surrounding district were in Poland until September 1939 when the Soviet Union occupied the area. At this time, many Polish soldiers fled across the border into Lithuania rather than surrender to the Soviets or Germans. These soldiers were generally well treated in Lithuania. During World War II, unlike what happened in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, “Poles and Lithuanians did little direct harm to each other”, although the dispute over Vilnius would continue to prevent good relations between the two ethnicities.

The Polish occupation of Vilnius in the interwar years still impinges on relations between Poles and Lithuanians.

Lithuanians fear Polish more than Russians. It was still like a big trauma, losing Vilnius to Poland, having Polish people have so much influence in Lithuania, coming as tourists, being very present ... they still have the fear.

In October 1939 Stalin gave the city to Lithuania, then in June 1940 annexed the whole of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. When in October 1939, Lithuanian soldiers occupied Vilnius, they “were astonished to find that they could not communicate with the local population”. The soldiers even resorted to French and German to ask for directions. The city had a Polish majority and Jewish minority. At that time, even by the official Lithuanian

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6 Data from a census carried out by German occupiers during World War I.
7 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Author’s interview with German resident of Vilnius June 2008
11 Snyder 2002 ‘Memory of Sovereignty and sovereignty over memory p.47
12 Ibid.
count, only 6 per cent of the city’s residents were Lithuanian.\textsuperscript{13} “Vilnius, so desired and so dear to Lithuanians, turn[ed] out to be entirely non-Lithuanian.”\textsuperscript{14}

In 1940, the Soviets began large-scale deportations of Poles from Vilnius to remote parts of the Soviet Union, a process interrupted by the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. The Nazis occupied Lithuania from 1941 to 1944, exterminating most of the country’s sizable Jewish minority. In 1944 the Red Army reconquered the country. Lithuania remained in the Soviet Union until 1991.\textsuperscript{15} Between 1940 and 1954, according to US State Department figures, Lithuania lost over 780,000 of its citizens.\textsuperscript{16} The Soviets killed or exiled to Siberia as many as 300,000 Lithuanians.\textsuperscript{17} Many Lithuanians, including Valdas Adamkus, who became president of the reborn Lithuania in 1998, fled to the West after the war rather than risk deportation or death at the hands of the Soviets.

The Lithuanian nationalists who had brought about the creation of the interwar Republic of Lithuania had deliberately created a largely homogeneous nation-state, based on the compact Lithuanian-speaking parts of the much larger historical Lithuania. The resulting state was too small to defend itself in the environment in which it found itself in the 1930s, particularly in the absence of a regional defence alliance. By the end of World War II, Lithuania’s leaders realised, in the words of the country’s pre-war President Antanas Smetona, that “the restoration of the Lithuanian state on narrow national foundations was a mistake”.\textsuperscript{18} Nonetheless, Lithuania’s 20 years of existence as an independent nation state gave it a historical and modern foundation on which to base realistic hopes of re-emerging as an independent country. It gave newly independent Lithuania a legitimacy and perceived naturalness in the 1990s.

**Lithuania under communism**

Between 1945 and 1956, most of Lithuania’s Poles (including almost all the surviving white-collar Poles) were expelled to Poland. This “had serious consequences in forming the national

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\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Lithuania declared independence on 11 March 1990. Its independence was internationally recognised in 1991.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Valionis et al 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.2
consciousness of the Poles [left behind] in Lithuania and in shaping their social and cultural life”. Many rural and lower-class Poles were left in their homes. Depopulated Vilnius was repopulated principally with Lithuanians, although thousands of Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians were also moved in from other parts of the Soviet Union. Most satellite towns and villages near Vilnius remained predominantly Polish, notably Naujoji Vilnia (Nowa Wilejka in Polish). Strong local resistance (including armed resistance to the 1950s) to Sovietisation and Lithuania’s more rural demography ensured that the proportion of Russians in Lithuania’s population was kept much lower than in Estonia and Latvia.

In the communist period, as part of the Soviet Union, Lithuania was kept under much tighter control by the Kremlin than was Poland, which as a Soviet satellite had nominal independence. Given the proximity to Poland, widespread knowledge of Polish in Lithuania, traditional ties between the two nations, and the relative freedom in Poland, the latter emerged as a major conduit for the transmission of western ideas and knowledge into Lithuania. Inhabitants of much of Lithuania could watch Polish television channels, while Polish newspapers and translations of Western books became for most of the Soviet period an important source of free information in Lithuania. Middle-aged Lithuanians interviewed in June 2008 for this thesis said that they remembered learning Polish from watching Polish television as youngsters. The events of the early 1980s in Poland inspired the Lithuanian nationalist movement in the late 1980s. In this respect, Poland functioned for Lithuanians somewhat as Lithuania Minor had in Tsarist days, linking Lithuania to a relatively freer outside world.

The Paris-based Polish-language *Kultura* periodical, whose founder editor, Jerzy Giedroyc was born a Russian citizen in Minsk of a polonised Lithuanian family, regularly published information about Lithuania, and analysed Lithuanian-Polish relations and the possibility “of the two states drawing together”. In the 1950s, *Kultura* was the first émigré, non-communist Polish intellectual circle to openly advocate the recognition of Poland’s postwar eastern border and abandon historic claims to Vilnius. In 1981, during the Polish Solidarity spring, a periodical called *Lithuania*, devoted to Lithuanian questions, was launched in Kraków. However, “all these things were known only in a narrow circle of intellectuals”.

19 Snyder 2002  ‘Memory of Sovereignty and sovereignty over memory p.47
20 Valionis et al 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.2
21 Ibid. p.3
22 Ibid. 
The greater part of both nations continued living in the so-called ‘informational vacuum’, nurtured by Soviet clichés and unhappy recollections of the two countries’ relations in the inter-war period. This ‘vacuum’ froze and allowed many old stereotypes ... to survive.23

Lithuania’s Polish minority

Soviet Lithuania was a “national state”.24 In comparison with most other Soviet republics, especially its northern neighbours, the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic had a relatively homogeneous ethnic profile. Its leaders considered Lithuania “to be an ethnoregional concept blending language and territory into a single whole with its own distinctive political imperatives”. Although some nationalists insisted that much of Lithuania’s territory was outside the borders of the Lithuanian SSR, Lithuania’s leaders, both communist and non-communist, accepted the borders of the Lithuanian SSR as the final borders of independent Lithuania. Within these borders, ethnic Lithuanians made up 80 per cent of the population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>2,925,300</td>
<td>79.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>345,450</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>257,250</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusians</td>
<td>62,475</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>44,100</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>40,125</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,675,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1 Lithuania’s ethnic composition in 198925

Ethnic Poles, Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians living in Lithuania tend to be grouped together as “Slavs” (a word which tends to be used pejoratively by ethnic Lithuanians) by the majority community, whose attitude has veered between advocating minorities’ expulsion and

23 Ibid.
25Soviet census Natisional’nyi sostav naseleniya SSSR 1991 quoted in Senn p.357
assimilation. Lithuanians’ belief in their distinctiveness from Slavs has a basis in linguistic and cultural differences. Lithuanian is a Baltic language whose closest extant relative is Latvian. The Baltic languages are related to, but distinct from, the Slavic languages. Importantly, the Lithuanian language is not mutually intelligible with any Slavic language. Lithuanians also tend to consider themselves to be more “northern” than their Slavic neighbours and emphasise links with Scandinavia, particularly Denmark and Sweden. To some extent, the historic links are exaggerated. Lithuania, unlike the other two Baltic states, was never ruled directly by either Denmark or Sweden; Lithuanians are mostly Roman Catholic, not Lutheran.

Since the 1980s, the Polish minority in Lithuania has numbered about 250,000 to 300,000 people - about 7 per cent of the country’s population. The minority is concentrated in the Vilnius area. (There is a much smaller Lithuanian minority in northeastern Poland.) Poles living in the Soviet Union were particular targets for repression. Although they suffered discrimination in Lithuania, conditions for Poles living in the Soviet Union were least bad in Lithuania, where their relative numbers were higher than in any other Soviet republic. In the latter 1980s, some ethnic Poles had moved from other parts of the Soviet Union to Lithuania to take advantage of the Polish schools there. Meanwhile, many Polish families were sending their children to Russian-medium schools, believing that such training would best prepare them for life.

Unfortunately, the existence and situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania casts a shadow over relations between the two countries.26 When Lithuania strove towards independence in the late 1980s, the Polish minority, fearing the stated objectives of Sajudis and other Lithuanian nationalist groupings to “re-Lithuanianise” Lithuania, found itself in the anti-independence camp. In 1990, having won a comfortable majority in the new parliament, Sajudis deputies elected nationalist Vytautas Landsbergis as chairman of the republic’s Supreme Soviet. In effect, he became Lithuania’s head of government. In March 1990, Lithuania became the first Soviet republic to declare its independence, or more exactly, in “a carefully orchestrated series of votes, ... deputies declared the restoration of the [pre-war] Lithuanian republic”.27 They announced “they had no obligations toward the Soviet

27 Senn 1997. ‘Lithuania: rights and responsibilities of independence’ p.359
constitution” and “spoke of dismantling the occupation regime”.28 Such talk unnerved Lithuania’s Slavic minorities. Lithuania’s Poles feared they would lose out in an independent Lithuania and began “reasserting their national heritage”.29 Attendance at Polish schools began to grow, and Polish leaders demanded recognition by both church and state in Lithuania. Lithuanians considered much of the Polish minority to be hostile to the idea of an independent Lithuanian nation-state. In the 1980s, for the most part, Poles in Lithuania “considered themselves citizens of the Soviet Union rather than of Lithuania”.30 Support for the Lithuanian Communist Party was strongest in ethnically Polish districts surrounding Vilnius.31 Many Poles in Lithuania rallied to an organisation opposed to independence. As Lithuania pushed for independence, districts with ethnic Polish majorities “began using Sajudis arguments to promote their reannexation to Poland”.32 However, “the right to self-determination was reserved for ethnic Lithuanians and [the Poles’] demands were promptly denied”.33

In April 1990 the Soviet authorities imposed a blockade on Lithuania, stopping fuel, coffee and sugar shipments to the republic. However, ethnically Polish areas continued to receive supplies. The Soviet Communist Party encouraged ethnic Poles to demand autonomous regions within Lithuania.34 Some Poles in Lithuania called for the establishment of a Polish Soviet Socialist Republic within the USSR. In 1991, the Lithuanian government suppressed local self-government in the Polish regions in the southeast, saying that the local councils had consistently supported reactionary forces in Moscow. The Polish minority had a wide range of demands, including the establishment of a Polish university, Polish-language masses in Vilnius cathedral and a ban on Lithuanians moving into ethnically Polish regions around Vilnius.35 When it was suggested that Poles in Lithuania send their children to universities in Poland, community leaders responded that those students might not return to Lithuania and that therefore this was not in the interests of the ethnic Polish community.36 After 1991, Poles in Lithuania received support from Poland’s ambassador in Vilnius, who acted forcefully on

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28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid. p.362-363  
30 Ibid. p.356  
31 Ibid.  
33 Ibid.  
35 Ibid. p.363  
36 Ibid.
their behalf. Yet Polish organisations in Lithuania criticised Warsaw for not doing enough for Poles in Lithuania.37

In the early 1990s, as the country fell behind Poland in the race to Westernise its economy and society, Lithuania was haemorrhaged by mass emigration. Lithuanian independence dismayed most of its ethnic Russian residents, whose relative standing in the republic deteriorated dramatically. Faced with the apparent alternatives of emigration or assimilation, many left the country. Between 1989 and 2006 Lithuania’s population fell from about 3.9 million to 3.6 million people.38 Until 1995, the rapid decline in Lithuania’s population was caused mostly by emigration of Russian-speakers to Russia and Belarus. Ethnic Russians account for a declining single-digit percentage of Lithuania’s population, and are now outnumbered by ethnic Poles, whose numbers have not declined as fast. The ethnic Polish community, which feels itself to have deep historical roots in Lithuania and is heavily concentrated in the Vilnius area, is more resistant to assimilation than is the more scattered ethnic Russian minority. There is a strong argument for allowing bilingual street signs in districts with Polish majorities or large minorities. These districts mainly surround Vilnius. The inclusion of Vilnius city itself in such a bilingualisation move will be politically more difficult but might eventually happen.

The fact that Poles and Poland were seen as offering a bridge to Europe, and Poland was seen as more advanced along the road to Europe and the West, helped bring about an improvement in the situation of ethnic Poles in Lithuania as the 1990s wore on. In the 1990s, there was also a considerable flow of Lithuanians to Poland for work. After 1995, and increasingly from 2000, emigration rates accelerated among the majority Lithuanian-speaking population. The destination of emigrants became increasingly EU states, particularly Germany, Britain and Ireland, with large outflows in 2004 and 2005, after Lithuania joined the EU.

Unlike in many other parts of the former Soviet Union, ethnic conflict in Lithuania has been contained peacefully. Lithuanian voices which called for the expulsion of Slavic minorities were silenced as EU entry drew closer, but the official policy of assimilation has continued. It is unclear what the long-term future holds for Lithuania’s Slav minorities, but the likeliest

37 Ibid.
38 CIA World Factbook. 2006.
future is one where the Polish and Russian communities gradually decline, through assimilation and emigration.

**Sentiment and history**

Opinion polls conducted in 2000 and 2001 reveal that although the number of Poles who expressed antipathy towards Lithuanians had decreased slightly since 1994, Lithuanians (along with Germans) were still listed among the nations towards which Poles had “more negative rather than positive feelings”. Other polls showed that for their part, throughout the 1990s Lithuanians liked Poles less than Russians and much less than Germans. Korzeniewska-Wolek says the less-than-positive attitudes towards Lithuanians among ordinary Poles, when compared with other neighbours, “call for an explanation by reference to historic imagination”.

Poles believe in the Jagiellonian myth. In school, Poles learn the legendary history of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and for Poles, Lithuania features prominently in history, as Poland’s longest-standing ally. Such opinions affect international relations. In 2001, then Polish Foreign Minister Bartoszewski admitted publicly that he felt deep sentimental attachment to Lithuania. When in 1997, the Polish and Lithuanian parliaments created a combined assembly, Polish daily *Gazeta Wyborcza* waxed lyrical on the common political history of the two countries, and particularly on the Union of Lublin. The Jagiellonian “era still constitutes a reference point for the Polish political elite and for some it is still the basic line of thinking about Poland and Lithuania”. However, this sentiment is much more strongly felt among Poland’s intellectual, political and administrative classes and among the clergy, than it is among the masses. For many less educated Poles, the exclusive Lithuanian nationalism which came to the fore in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a sign of disloyalty to the memory of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and, therefore, anti-Polish.

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39 Korzeniewska-Wolek 2001. ‘Leaving history behind?’ p.3
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. p.4
43 Gazeta Wyborcza 44, 21/02/1999, p.7 quoted in Korzeniowska-Wolek 2001. ‘Leaving history behind?’ p.4
44 Korzeniowska-Wolek 2001. ‘Leaving history behind?’ p.4
[H]istorical memory seems to exert significant influence on the way contemporary Poles see Lithuanians and relations with Lithuania. This capability also manifests itself in mutual relations between other nations.\textsuperscript{45}

Szporer claimed Polish-Lithuanian relations “resemble post-divorce bickerings of wounded spouses”.\textsuperscript{46} On signing the Polish-Lithuanian treaty of 1994, President Wałęsa said “Poles and Lithuanians are nations entangled in history. We should overcome this entanglement.”\textsuperscript{47}

During Lithuania’s struggle for independence, most Poles in Poland sympathised with Lithuania’s efforts to free itself from Soviet domination.\textsuperscript{48} Sajudis was viewed in Poland as a movement similar to Solidarity. Solidarity’s leaders, including the new Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek, welcomed Sajudis and expressed a desire to cooperate.\textsuperscript{49} However, the warm words and personal relations between Polish and Lithuanian politicians did not find resonance among their peoples, particularly on the Lithuanian side.\textsuperscript{50} For many Poles in the 1990s Lithuania remained a “terra incognita”, a “small, unimportant land inhabited by strange persons and nationalists”.\textsuperscript{51} Warsaw’s eastern policy in the 1990s, which was supportive of the new governments and states of Lithuania and Ukraine, was not in line with Polish public opinion.

At first, Western countries avoided making moves that might accelerate the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{52} Although Poland’s leaders felt duty-bound to support Lithuania’s drive for freedom, the West’s cautious attitude meant that Warsaw delayed recognising Lithuania’s independence and establishing diplomatic relations with Vilnius.

However, Poland early on emerged as one of the main supporters of an independent Lithuania and signed a treaty recognising the current border between the two countries even before Lithuania has become a member of the UN. At the end of 1990, Poland’s foreign ministry

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid p.1
\textsuperscript{46} Szporer, M. 1995. ‘Politics of Intolerance in Europe’s Center: Rhetoric of ‘Us’ Against ‘Them’ in Poland and Lithuania’ presented at the 5\textsuperscript{th} World Conference of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw 6 August 1995
\textsuperscript{47} Quoted in Korzeniowska-Wolek 2001. ‘Leaving history behind?’ p.1
\textsuperscript{48} Valionis et al. 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.3
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Korzeniowska-Wolek 2001. ‘Leaving history behind?’ p. 2
\textsuperscript{52} Valionis et al. 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.4
created the “two-track” concept, which provided for parallel contacts with the Soviet Union’s leaders in Moscow and leaders of the Soviet republics seeking independence. In early 1991, the first foreign visitor to address Lithuania’s new parliament was a Polish senator.\(^5^3\) In September 1991, following the abortive coup in Moscow, the Soviet Union recognised Lithuanian independence, allowing Lithuania to join the UN the same month.

Lithuania soon found that independence brought problems. Soviet troops, which remained in the country, were “a constant threat”.\(^5^4\) The economy remained entangled with the collapsing Soviet one. Debate “raging as to which former Soviet institutions should be scrapped and which should be saved”. In addition, Lithuania “had to assume new responsibilities toward the minority nationalities in their new state”.\(^5^5\) Independent Poland and Lithuania strove “to convince the West of their abilities to conform to Western (democratic) norms of behaviour”.\(^5^6\) This was “especially the case on the issue of human rights, including treatment of national minorities”\(^5^7\). Some in Poland sought to link the issues of support for Lithuania with the rights of Lithuania’s Polish minority.\(^5^8\)

Unlike its Baltic neighbours, independent Lithuania declared that “all persons residing and working in Lithuania as of 1989 [would be] eligible for citizenship”.\(^5^9\) The Lithuanian government also allowed minority groups (mainly Poles and Russians) to organise as such and supported the development of schools for the major groups. Lithuania’s liberal citizenship law substantially erased tensions with its neighbours.\(^6^0\) While Lithuania’s

\[\text{ suspension of two strongly ethnic Polish district councils on charges of blocking reform or disloyalty during the August 1991 coup had cooled relations with Poland, ... bilateral cooperation markedly increased with the holding of elections in those districts and the signing of a bilateral friendship treaty in 1994.}\(^6^1\)

\(^{53}\) Ibid. p.3
\(^{54}\) Senn 1997. ‘Lithuania: rights and responsibilities of independence’ p.361-362
\(^{55}\) Ibid.
\(^{57}\) Ibid.
\(^{58}\) Valionis et al. 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.4
\(^{59}\) Ibid.
\(^{60}\) United States Department of State 2006. ‘Lithuania’
\(^{61}\) Ibid.
After a testy period in the early 1990s, when it was still unclear where the two newly independent countries of Poland and Lithuania were heading, from the mid 1990s there was a substantial convergence of interests between Vilnius and Warsaw.

Incidents involving the Polish minority in Lithuania were resolved institutionally, the Polish side invariably invoking European standards and the value of Polish help in European integration. In these ways, Lithuania and Poland approximated the preemptive dispute resolution characteristic of the EU.62

Lithuanian nationalists, who had long regarded Poles with a similar disdain to Russians, began to change their attitude as it became increasingly clear that the major – perhaps only – threat to Lithuanian independence was from Russia. Poland emerged as a major counterbalance to Moscow’s clout and malevolence. Among Lithuanian nationalists, Warsaw was increasingly seen as a friend and ally. “Lithuania is not tied with any other neighbouring country as closely and with so many multifaceted relations as with Poland.”63 In 1998, new Lithuanian President Adamkus declared Poland to be Lithuania’s “historically closest neighbour”.64

Lithuania’s drive to Europe

Lithuania “balanced its negotiations with Moscow by asserting that it belonged to ‘Europe’”.65 Newly independent Lithuania’s main concern was the “return to Europe” and search for security.66 However, in the early 1990s, EU accession lagged “far behind as an external policy priority”.67 Instead, the main concerns were gaining membership of the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe and Nato. In 1994, Lithuania was the first post-Soviet country to apply to take part in Nato’s Partnership for Peace programme.

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63 Valionis 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.13
64 Adamkus, V. 1998. ‘Lithuania and Poland – Past and Future’ Lithuania No. 3(28)
65 Senn 1997. ‘Lithuania: rights and responsibilities of independence’ p.366
67 Ibid.
From the mid-1990s Lithuania worked intensively to gain entry to the EU. In a 1990 document, the country’s political leaders agreed that: “The closest road to Western Europe for Lithuania will continue to be through Poland, and therefore good relations are important”. Lithuania and Poland signed a free trade agreement in 1995 and then in 1997 an agreement on the creation of a combined battalion. That same year many other political, particularly parliamentary, institutions were created linking Poland and Lithuania.

The EU signed a Europe Agreement with Lithuania in June 1995, four years after Poland. This “act meant the end of discussion about a possible ‘third way’” for Lithuania. The signing of the Europe Agreement meant that Lithuania would in principle be treated in the same way as Poland. However, the Commission’s 1997 recommendation that Lithuania be left out of the selected Luxembourg group impacted on Lithuanians’ attitudes towards the EU issue, despite the country being eventually included in the Helsinki group of accession countries in 1999. The 1997 recommendation and Luxembourg decision shocked Lithuania. This proved to be positive in stimulating Lithuania to improve its performance in relation to accession requirements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Political criteria</th>
<th>Economic criteria</th>
<th>Membership obligations capacity</th>
<th>Administrative and legal capacity</th>
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<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory tendency</td>
<td>Satisfactory tendency</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Satisfactory</td>
<td>Unsatisfactory</td>
<td>Satisfactory tendency</td>
<td>Unable to form conclusion</td>
</tr>
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Table 7.2 Commission opinions on Polish and Lithuanian applications, 2000

A defining moment in the westward shift in Lithuania’s trading links was the Russian financial crisis of 1998, which had a “shattering” impact on Lithuanian companies still dependent on trade with “the East”. The crisis led Lithuania “to disengage from Russia and pursue more determinedly trade with” the EU. Many in Lithuania saw EU membership as a “consolation prize”, assuming Russian opposition would rule out the country’s accession to

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68 Valionis et al. 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.5
69 Mikkel & Pridham 2005. ‘Clinching the ‘Return to Europe’ p.161-162
70 Ibid. p.162
71 Pridham, G. 2005 Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, UK p.106
72 Agenda 2000: Summary and Conclusions of the Opinions of Commission Concerning the Applications for Membership to the European Union presented by the Candidate Countries, DOC/97/8, Strasbourg/Brussels quoted in Smith & Timmins p.57
73 Mikkel & Pridham 2005. ‘Clinching the ‘Return to Europe’ p.162
Meanwhile, a small eurosceptic movement argued that Lithuanian accession to the EU would be bad for “national identity and independence”.

During the EU accession negotiations, Warsaw and Vilnius cooperated “very closely”. In September 2006, while hosting his Polish counterpart, President Adamkus called relations between Lithuania and Poland a “perfect example of cooperation between neighbouring countries”. He added that the two countries had harmonious, long-term neighbourly relations and were in a “strategic partnership”. Poland and Lithuania had “laid secure foundations together” and were together working to create “an open and competitive Europe without borders”. Calling for an “alliance of hearts” between the Lithuanian and Polish people, Adamkus noted that Lithuania and Poland had strengthened their partnership on joining the EU and had enhanced political and military links. The advantages of EU membership, such as common infrastructural projects would enhance the welfare and security of the region.

**Lithuania at Poland’s side**

Poland’s relations with the rest of the EU were negatively affected after the right-wing Catholic Law and Justice Party won power in 2005, particularly after Jaroslaw Kaczyński, President Lech Kaczyński’s twin, became prime minister in 2006. Poland found itself in diplomatic isolation within the EU. However, partly as a result of this isolation, Poland developed even closer ties with Lithuania. In the 1990s, Poland had been “Lithuania’s assistant” on the road to Europe. In 2006, Lithuania could repay its debt to Poland by helping its bigger neighbour overcome EU scepticism towards the Kaczyńskis. Lithuania and Poland have many common interests as new members of the EU. Speaking as one in Brussels might “achieve more than acting individually”.

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74 Smith, M. & Timmins, G. 2000. *Building a Bigger Europe: EU and NATO enlargement in comparative perspective* Ashgate, Aldershot p.10
76 Pawel Świeboda interview 16/9/2009
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
82 Karosas, J. 2006. Quoted in Racas
83 Ibid.
In November 2006, Lithuanian foreign minister Petras Vaitiekunas told Polish daily *Rzeczpospolita* that Lithuania declared “solidarity with Poland, supports Poland from start to finish”, because Poland was defending its own interest as well as the interests of other EU member states, such as Lithuania.\(^{84}\)

**How Lithuanians viewed Poland in 2008**

Lithuanian public opinion today seems to be aware that Poland and Lithuania are cooperating closely on a government level within the EU. One Lithuanian interviewed for this thesis in June 2008 said that as new members of the bloc, Lithuania and Poland “have to support each other if they want to ... influence ... [EU] decisions”. However, not all agree that Polish-Lithuanian relations are close. Some interviewees pointed to the size disparity between the two countries as a reason why they might not always have similar interests at the EU table. While accepting that Lithuania and Poland had better relations since they joined the EU and were communicating with each other better, one respondent said: “Lithuania and Poland are very different in the EU, because Lithuania is much smaller.” Nonetheless, the respondent thought that relations were “getting better, especially if we think about Poland and Lithuania’s historic problems”.

Another respondent said:

> [The] two countries have some similar interests so they can cooperate in order to get better outputs. It’s hard to evaluate if the relationships between two of them are better now, but it’s obvious that they are more intense now.

Another said that the two countries’ membership of the EU “is strongly linked with the emergence of more cooperative relations”, adding that:

> Positions that are linked with national interests must be ... coordinated. Much more can be gained if [the two countries] acted together now. Thus I think that EU’s impact on [Lithuanian-Polish] relations was positive.

Not all agree that the EU has had a positive impact on Polish-Lithuanian relations. Some respondents said they felt there had been little such impact. Said one: “I believe Polish-Lithuanian relations are not strongly dependent on the membership of the EU.”

**How Poles viewed Lithuania in 2008**

Polish respondents surveyed in July 2008 were generally more positive about the EU’s impact on relations with Lithuania. One academic in Kraków said that joining the EU had led to increased integration of the two countries’ economies and defence arrangements. She mentioned in particular the lowering of border barriers and increased scientific contacts, often within the framework of EU programmes. Some Polish respondents mentioned that the lowering of border and migration controls had increased tourism between the two countries and migration for work, and had improved the conditions for setting up joint-ventures. A few respondents said that Poles and Lithuanians were becoming more familiar with each other. Said one: “Poles and Lithuanians started to learn each other and visit the other country thus contributing to the mutual understanding and weakening of distress.” Another respondent said: “Ludzie po prostu poznaje się [People are getting to know each other].”

The majority of Polish respondents interviewed and surveyed stated that they felt relations between Poland and Lithuania had improved since the two countries acceded to the EU. One respondent listed three particular areas in which the two countries were cooperating together: the winning of structural funds, protection of trade interests and protecting Polish industry.

Other Polish respondents mentioned the relevance of cooperation between the two countries for the Polish minority in Lithuanian. One respondent said:

*Dochodzi do integracji Polski i Litwy w celu zwiększenie bezpieczeństwa i rozwoju gospodarczego oraz poprawy sytuacji Polaków mieszkających na Litwie.*

*[Poland and Lithuania are being integrated with a view to increasing security and economic development and correcting the situation of Poles living in Lithuania.]*
The EU, Poland and the transmission of values and norms to eastern neighbours

Lithuania

The Russian factor in Lithuania

Lithuania and Poland increasingly found themselves with similar perspectives on regional issues, particularly with regard to Belarus and Russia. One important factor linking Poland and Lithuania is a mutual distrust of Russia. Both countries fear that the Kremlin wants to dominate its near-abroad again. This fear is particularly strong in Lithuania. In late 2006, relations between Russia and Poland deteriorated. Russia banned the import of Polish meat, while Poland decided to block the start of EU-Russia negotiations on a new strategic partnership agreement. By late 2006, Poland found itself isolated within the EU over its stance, with only one supporter: Lithuania. When Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński hosted his Lithuanian counterpart Gediminas Kirkilas in July 2006, the two countries were in accord on energy security policy, EU politics and environmental issues.85 The two governments were also keen to maintain a common approach to Belarus.86 Kaczyński said that Poland was grateful for Lithuania’s support on the matter of the Polish veto on relations with Russia.87

Lithuania has also found itself functioning as a bridge linking Poland with Latvia and Estonia. In November 2006, the presidents of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia met the Kaczyński twins to discuss bilateral and EU relations. President Kaczyński said “cooperation between the Baltic states and Poland in [the EU could] bring significant results”.88 The meeting indicated “that Poland, using its long-time cooperation with Lithuania”, was “now reaching out to all three Baltic states”.89 This could “be in the interest of Lithuania, especially if bilateral cooperation becomes more pragmatic than before”.90 In November 2006, shortly after a major confrontation between Georgia and Russia, foreign ministers of the New Group Of Georgia’s Friends, which included both Lithuania and Poland, drafted a motion supporting Georgia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and measures taken by the Georgian government for conflict resolution and democracy recovery.91 When Lithuania’s Kirkilas visited Warsaw in 2006 for “friendly and fruitful” talks, Prime Minister Kaczyński said Polish-Lithuanian relations were “exemplary”.92 Kirkilas emphasised that Lithuania backed Poland’s position on the EU’s

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85 *Dziennik Polski* July 2006 London
87 Ibid.
88 Quoted in Racas 2006 ‘Polish, Lithuanian leaders hope for ‘more pragmatic’ relations’
89 Lopata, R. 2006. Quoted in Racas
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
negotiations with Russia and also noted that “mutual investments” between Poland and Lithuania were “increasing, with our support”.  

In 2006 Presidents Kaczyński and Adamkus stated that it was their “moral duty to work for the enlargement of the Union”.  

For both Poland and Lithuania, the priority country to bring into the EU is Ukraine, which neither country wants to see revert into the Russian sphere of influence.

**Economic factors**

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<td>-35.0</td>
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<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
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Table 7.3 Change in GDP in Poland and Lithuania in the 1990s

Independent Lithuania’s economy had a slow start towards a free market. As in all postcommunist countries, corruption was an issue. A 1995 World Bank survey of businesspeople active in Lithuania showed that about 90 per cent were unwilling to invest any more in the country “unless corruption was brought under control”. After a significant collapse of the economy in the early 1990s, Lithuania undertook significant reforms and managed to halt the decline by 1994. In most of the years since 1995, Lithuania has grown at a healthy rate. By 1998, “the economy had survived the early years of uncertainty and several setbacks, including a banking crisis, and seemed poised for solid growth”.

The Russian financial collapse of 1998 shocked the economy back into negative growth and forced the reorientation of trade from Russia toward the West. In 1997, exports to former Soviet states were 45 per cent of Lithuanian exports. Lithuania’s rebound from the 1998 Russian financial crisis was slow. Lithuania’s government in 1999 “managed to control

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93 Ibid.
96 United States Department of State 2006. ‘Lithuania’
98 US State Department 2006
raging budget deficits in the midst of the crisis, and all successor governments have maintained that fiscal discipline”.\(^9^9\) In May 2001 Lithuania joined the WTO. Lithuania subsequently restructured its economy for integration into Western European institutions. In 2005, exports to the Commonwealth of Independent States were only 18 per cent of Lithuania’s total, while exports to the EU-25 were 65 per cent of the total.\(^1^0^0\)

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<td>7500</td>
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<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>5800</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>13.1</td>
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Table 7.4 The Polish and Lithuanian economies, mid-1990s\(^1^0^1\)

**Lithuania’s economy improves**

After 2000, the Lithuanian economy picked up and began to make up some of the ground it has lost to Poland in the early 1990s. In the years immediately before accession, the Lithuanian economy grew much faster than Poland’s. In 2002, Lithuania’s economy grew 6.8 per cent.\(^1^0^2\) In 2003, it grew 6.6 per cent.\(^1^0^3\) The corresponding figures for Poland were just 1.4 per cent and 3.3 per cent.\(^1^0^4\) By the time Lithuania and Poland joined the EU in 2004, per capita income in Lithuania had almost drawn level with Poland. By 2006, Lithuanians’ per capita income (US$13,700) was higher than Poles’ (US$13,100), though still much lower than that of western Europeans.\(^1^0^5\) Unemployment fell sharply from 11 per cent in 2003 to 5.3 per cent in 2005.\(^1^0^6\) A rise in domestic consumption and investment furthered recovery. Privatisation of large state-owned utilities, notably in the energy sector, had taken place. By 2006, more than 80 per cent of state enterprises had been privatised.\(^1^0^7\) Support from EU governments and business helped in the transition to a market economy.

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\(^9^9\) CIA World Factbook. 2006
\(^1^0^0\) Ibid.
\(^1^0^1\) OECD and Eurostat quoted in Smith & Timmins 2000. *Building a Bigger Europe* p.130
\(^1^0^2\) Quoted in Szczerbiak, A. & Taggart, P. (eds.) 2005. *EU Enlargement and Referendums* Routledge, Abingdon UK p.16
\(^1^0^3\) Ibid.
\(^1^0^4\) Ibid.
\(^1^0^5\) Ibid.
\(^1^0^6\) CIA World Factbook 2006
\(^1^0^7\) Ibid.
In 2006, Lithuania still depended on Russia for about 90 per cent of its oil and almost all its natural gas supplies and risked “becoming more reliant on Russia for electricity imports”.\footnote{The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006 ‘In NATO but still nervous’ The Economist 1/12/ 2006. Retrieved on 3/12/2006 from www.economist.com/daily/news/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8371331} That year, Lithuania’s Lietuvos Energija and Poland’s PSE-Operator agreed to jointly build a 1000MW electricity link between the Baltic and European transmission systems. The project comes under the ambit of the EU’s TEN-E programme. On his visit to Warsaw, Kirkilas welcomed the entry of Polish oil refinery company PKN Orlen into the Lithuanian energy supply market, stressing that it would increase the security of Lithuania’s energy supplies.\footnote{The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006} In July 2006, Russia closed the pipeline supplying Lithuania’s Mazeikiu Nafta oil refinery, supposedly “for repairs”, but probably to prevent the sale of Mazeikiu Nafta to PKN Orlen.\footnote{Gazeta Wyborcza. 2006. ‘Premier: poparcie Litwy w sprawie weta - więcej niż cenne’} Part of Lithuania’s Ignalina nuclear power plant was closed in December 2004, as a condition of Lithuania’s entry into the EU. The rest of the site was due to close in 2009. In July 2008, the power companies of all three Baltic states and Poland agreed to set up the Visaginas Nuclear Plant Company, which will be responsible for construction of a new power plant expected to be completed between 2015 and 2018.

Lithuania has adequate and mostly well-maintained infrastructure. Thanks to EU funds, facilities at border checkpoints with Poland are much improved. Regional infrastructure projects, such as Rail Baltica, a railway to connect Helsinki to Warsaw via Lithuania, the north-south Via Baltica highway and energy links between Lithuania and Poland “are projects where Lithuania and Poland … can closely work together”.\footnote{Lopata 2006} In October 2006, transport ministers from Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Hungary signed a declaration concerning the construction of a highway more than 1000km long running from Kaunas through Poland and Slovakia to Hungary.\footnote{Polish News Bulletin. 2006. ‘Via Baltica Scheduled for 2013’ 30/10/2006 Retrieved on 26/11/2006 from Factiva} Via Baltica was scheduled to be completed by 2013.\footnote{Ibid.} The enterprise is an opportunity for eastern Poland, as the 600km Polish stretch of the route will run from Białystok, via Lublin and Rzeszów. The EU would finance the Polish stretch of the highway, to cost some €2.6 billion.\footnote{Ibid.} The project would become a priority in the transport policy of Poland and Lithuania, with the entire Via Baltica being included in the Trans-European Transport Network.
In 2006 and 2007 Lithuania and Poland jointly organised conferences in Vilnius. The May 2006 Common Vision for Common Neighbourhood conference called for “initiatives to expand cooperation across Europe” and promote European integration.\(^{115}\) The Vilnius Energy Security Conference of October 2007, which “had a similarly high resonance”, was dedicated to “challenges and opportunities in shaping the global and European energy landscape”.\(^{116}\)

In November 2006, the presidents of the Baltic states and Poland met at a summit in Vilnius. The four presidents said their countries would intensify and deepen their relations within the framework of the EU, Nato and other international organisations. They stressed the importance of implementing joint energy projects to advance the integration of the regional Baltic energy market into the common EU market and agreed on the importance for the region of building a new power plant in Lithuania.\(^{117}\) The project would enable energy to be produced more cheaply and make the Baltic states less dependent on Russian energy resources. The leaders also agreed to stand united in negotiations with main power-providing countries in the EU. The leaders called on Russia to ratify an Energy Charter Treaty as soon as possible.

**Case study: The Rospuda controversy**

In 2006 and 2007 the EU Commission and the Polish government clashed over the latter’s plan to build a highway to Lithuania through an environmentally sensitive area. The Commission started an “infringement procedure” against Poland in April 2006 which threatened to lead to the blocking of EU funds for projects in the Polish-Lithuanian border region.\(^{118}\) In February 2007 Poland said it planned to hold a referendum in its north-eastern region of Podlaskie on whether to build the controversial road.\(^{119}\) Prime Minister Kaczyński said the dispute had become a “national problem”.\(^{120}\) The EU warned Poland not to build the road through the Rospuda valley, a boggy area which borders Lithuania.\(^{121}\) The plan to build a trans-European highway through the area predated Poland’s accession to the EU but EU Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas said the project would lead to a “catastrophe” in a

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\(^{115}\) Chaban & Vernygora 2008 ‘New Europe and its Neo-regionalism’ p.134

\(^{116}\) Ibid.


\(^{118}\) Ibid.


\(^{120}\) Ibid.

\(^{121}\) Ibid.
“precious area of Poland”. Polish authorities said they wanted to relieve congestion through the town of Augustów, crossed daily by about 4500 trucks on their way to and from Lithuania. The EU had already warned Poland in 2006 it could face legal action and penalties for failing to adequately protect its natural habitats. The Rospuda area has protected status under the EU’s Natura 2000 network of conservation sites. Commission biodiversity expert Agata Zdanowicz said Poland had not complied with Natura 2000, describing the situation as “serious”.

In July 2007, the European Commission asked the European Court of Justice to order Poland to halt preparatory work through Rospuda. The Commission said it would be unprecedented for a member state to go ahead with such work in defiance with an EU order. It wanted the work halted until the court delivered a final verdict on whether the motorway construction in the area was compatible with strict EU environmental laws. Commission officials said that building the motorway through the valley might compromise EU funding for the whole Polish stretch of the planned Via Baltica motorway, which could amount to hundreds of millions of euros. Eventually a new Polish government backed down and agreed to change its highway plans. The Rospuda dispute could be a prelude to more conflicts between the EU and its new members over the environment as they seek to upgrade infrastructure, with Poland and Lithuania finding themselves on the same side of the debate. In the end, the EU’s views on environmental issues will probably be transmitted in the bulk to Poles and Lithuanians, though in the short term, some defensiveness among the elites of Poland and Lithuania might serve to increase a feeling of common interest among the elites of the two countries, but in this case, a common interest distinct from the common interests of Europe as a whole.

**Poland and Lithuania on the same side**

Poland and Lithuania today have close, cordial relations, although the 2008 survey has shown that relations between the peoples of the two countries are not as close as relations between the governments. The changes in Polish-Lithuanian relations are striking when compared to

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122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
the situation in the early 1990s. As Lithuanian foreign minister Antanas Valionis wrote in the Polish journal *Lithuania*, Polish-Lithuanian relations “should be set as a model to be followed by other nations”.128

The EU’s normative power seems to have served to bring Poland and Lithuania, particularly the two countries elites, closer together. The comparatively few disagreements between the two countries generally relate to the situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania. For example, the recently introduced Karta Polaka, the Polish identity document which citizens of former Soviet countries (including Lithuania) with Polish ancestry can apply for and which gives such people certain rights to work and visit Poland, is one issue which has seen recent public disagreements between Lithuanian and Polish politicians. Another problem is the lack of people-to-people social contacts, notably the lack of youth exchange programmes and mutual “normal” tourism (as opposed to business trips and Poles’ visits to Polish heritage sites in Lithuania).

Lithuania’s integration into the EU means it has returned to its natural place in the world. Despite 50 years of suppression, Lithuania “managed to preserve [its] affinity” to Western Europe.129 The EU’s existence and influence has led to increased cooperation between Lithuania and Poland than would have been the case otherwise. Poland and Lithuania generally work together within the EU context and have similar objectives in international relations. Being by far the bigger of the two states, Poland is the dominant partner in relations between the two. In EU contexts, Lithuania usually acts in a supportive role to Poland.

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128 Valionis 2001 1998. ‘From Solidarity to Partnership’ p.56
129 Schimmelfennig, F. 2003 *The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric* Cambridge University Press, UK p.231
8 Public Opinion
The first part of this chapter presents an overview of trends in public opinion in Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine between 1990 and 2008, particularly as such trends relate to the relationship between Poles and their eastern neighbours, and to the EU’s impact on that relationship. Public opinion polls taken over the course of the last two decades indicate that Poles’ perceptions of their eastern neighbours have, on the whole, improved. The neighbours’ opinions of Poles seem to have changed less, but on balance are reasonably positive. There has been a particularly marked improvement in mutual regard between Poles and Ukrainians (at least inhabitants of western Ukraine). Despite poor relations at a government level, most Belarusians appear to like Poles, while most Poles are neutral or slightly positive towards Belarusians.

The second part of the chapter includes the results of public opinion surveys and interviews undertaken for this thesis in June and July 2008. These surveys and interviews appear to tally with findings of previous surveys, although there seems to be an even greater improvement in mutual regard between Poles and Ukrainians than was shown in other surveys. It appears that the relationship between ordinary Lithuanians and Poles is less warm than it could be. This contrasts with the excellent relations between the Polish and Lithuanian governments and state elites.

**Polish public opinion**

Polish society was highly politicised in the 1980s, a decade dominated by the experience of martial law and the continued underground activities of the banned Solidarity movement and associated opposition groups. In 1990, politics was “very important” or “important” in the lives of 42 per cent of Poles surveyed in one poll. Poles were dissatisfied with their governments’ performance in the early 1990s.

At the beginning of the 1990s, there was a large increase in the proportion of Poles perceiving a threat to Poland from the east, primarily from Russia, but also from chaos in other post-Soviet states which might spill over into Poland. In 1992, 63 per cent of Poles surveyed felt their country faced threats from its neighbours, with Russia, Germany, Ukraine and Belarus.

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all being seen as possible threats.\(^3\) However, the period of political stabilisation in the post-Soviet states after 1993 calmed the Polish populace so that by the late 1990s there was little anxiety about any military threat from neighbouring states. By 1999, when Poland joined Nato and was well on the path to EU accession, only one in seven Poles felt their country was at risk of military attack from a neighbour.\(^4\) The equivalent figures in Belarus and Ukraine were even lower: 11 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively.\(^5\) This represented a turnaround from attitudes prevalent in the early 1990s. From the mid-1990s, as the Polish economy began to improve, the proportion of Poles giving a positive assessment of the communist period declined slowly, as support grew for the democratic system in the country. By 2002, only one in seven Poles surveyed favoured a return to communism.\(^6\)

**Attitudes to democracy**

In the 1990s, among the postcommunist nations of Europe, Poles demonstrated the highest support for the democracy. In 1991, slightly more than half of Poles supported the new political system.\(^7\) Over the following years, the proportion of Poles supportive of the new political system grew steadily, reaching 76 per cent in 1996.\(^8\) Throughout the 1990s, polling by the Centre for Public Policy at the University of Aberdeen and others showed that most Poles with tertiary education supported democratic ideals.\(^9\) From a low of 65 per cent support in 1994, the proportion of Polish graduates who supported democracy rose to 86 per cent by 1998.\(^10\) In Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine support for democracy among those with a tertiary education was much lower than in Poland. The proportion of tertiary-educated Belarusians expressing support for democracy rose in the mid-1990s, while in Ukraine there was movement in the opposite direction.\(^11\)

\(^3\) Ibid. p.99 
\(^4\) Ibid. 
\(^5\) Ibid. 
\(^6\) Ibid. p.19 
\(^7\) Haerpfer 2002 *Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe* p.23 
\(^8\) Ibid. 
\(^10\) Haerpfer 2006 ‘Hungary: structure and dynamics of democratic consolidation’ p.164 
\(^11\) Haerpfer 2002 p.23
Given historical and cultural factors, it might be expected that Poles would show more pro-Western and Western-type attitudes than Ukrainians and Belarusians, who might be expected to have attitudes more similar to those of Russians. One might also expect Lithuanians to display attitudes somewhere between those of Poles and the East Slavs. However, while Poles do appear to be generally more pro-Western than their eastern neighbours, the case for Ukrainians and Belarusians as being “essentially anti-Western ... does not appear to have been made”. In fact, during the 1990s, polls consistently indicated that Lithuanians were more eurosceptic than Belarusians and Ukrainians.

In 1998, Rose et al. estimated the proportion of citizens of each postcommunist country who supported the contemporary regime, and the proportion which supported “autocratic alternatives”. Belarus and Ukraine had the lowest “prevalence of democratic attitudes among” among the people. Bashkirova found that while during the late 1990s most Belarusians and Ukrainians had a highly positive attitude to democratic rule and a moderately positive attitude to autocratic rule, support for the contemporary political regime in both

Table 8.1 Attitudes to political transformation in EU candidate countries, 1991-1998

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<td>All postcommunist candidates for EU membership</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
Belarus and Ukraine was low.\textsuperscript{17} Belarussians’ support for democracy seems to have increased during the 1990s.\textsuperscript{18} Yet during those years, President Aleksander Lukashenko’s regime adopted more of the attributes of a dictatorship. Belarussian society apparently became more democratic in sentiment at the same time as the Belarussian government lost what democratic characteristics it had held. In the lead-up to the EU’s eastern enlargement, an increasingly politicised minority of Belarussian students and graduates looked to the EU, and especially Poland and Lithuania, for examples of how their country should be run.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“When you compare the overall economic situation of your household before the big changes in the economy in 1989, would you say that in the past it was better?” (% saying yes)</th>
<th>1991</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1996</th>
<th>1998</th>
<th>change 1991-98</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>+8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>+10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.2 Nostalgia for communist times\textsuperscript{19}

**The European Union and identity**

*Central and Eastern Eurobarometer* data show that EU membership had the broad support of Poles in the late 1990s.\textsuperscript{20} In 1998, only 6 per cent of Central Europeans surveyed felt that “EU membership would worsen the economic crisis, would be too expensive or of no benefit”, while 2 per cent felt “EU membership would result in a loss of identity or independence”.\textsuperscript{21} Only one in 100 “thought EU membership would promote instability and disintegration”.\textsuperscript{22} On the other hand, 35 per cent of respondents who favoured EU membership mentioned “the general progress membership would facilitate”.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{17} Bashkirova, E. ‘Russia, Belarus and Ukraine: construction of democratic communities’ in Klingemann, H., Fuchs, D. & Zielonka, J. (eds) 2006 *Democracy and Political Culture in Eastern Europe* Routledge Abingdon UK p.369

\textsuperscript{18} Haerpfer 2006 ‘Hungary: structure and dynamics of democratic consolidation’ p.165

\textsuperscript{19} Haerpfer 2002 *Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe* p.12

\textsuperscript{20} European Commission *Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 1998* quoted in Smith & Timmins p.4-5

\textsuperscript{21} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
of “anticipated economic improvements”, while 17 per cent supported membership because they expected higher living standards in Poland after accession.\(^{24}\)

In a 1998 survey, 22 per cent of residents of Poland’s largest cities called themselves “Europeans”, while one in seven rural Poles identified with Europe.\(^{25}\) Another study in the late 1990s showed that 60 per cent of Poles “believed their European identity to be as strong as their national identity”.\(^{26}\) European identity in the CEECs in question was most strongly felt among elites, the young, urban dwellers, the more educated and Poles.\(^{27}\) Some authors go as far as to say that Poles were more likely to feel European than were most western Europeans.\(^{28}\) However, while Poles identified with Europe, this did not automatically correspond with identification with the EU.\(^{29}\)

This enthusiasm for Europe was not confined to Poland. The proportion of Belarusians and Ukrainians who claimed a European identity grew during the 1990. *Eurobarometer* surveys showed the proportion of Belarusians “with a European identity” grew from 12 per cent in 1996 to 19 per cent in 1998, while the proportion of Ukrainians who expressed a European identity grew from just one in 17 in 1996 to one in seven in 1998.\(^ {30}\) It was the young who were most inclined to express a European identity. While one in four Belarusians under 30 admitted to a European identity, only 8 per cent of Belarusians over 60 considered themselves as “Europeans”.\(^ {31}\) In Ukraine in the late 1990s the situation was similar. In 1998, almost a quarter of Ukrainians under 30 called themselves “Europeans” but just 7 per cent of Ukrainians over 60 identified with Europe.\(^ {32}\)

A pro-EU shift in Polish society took place in the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, Poles were among the most enthusiastic prospective EU entrants. After hitting a low in 1994, the image of the EU among Poles improved until well over half of Poles had a positive opinion of the EU by the late 1990s.\(^ {33}\) In 1994 only a quarter of Polish respondents strongly supported

\(^{24}\) Ibid.
\(^{26}\) Ibid.
\(^{27}\) European Commission Central and Eastern Eurobarometer 1998 quoted in Smith & Timmins p.4-5
\(^{28}\) Dunkerley et al p.35
\(^{29}\) Ibid.
\(^{30}\) Haerpfer 2002 Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe p.109-110
\(^{31}\) Ibid. p.112
\(^{32}\) Ibid.
Poland joining the EU, but in 1998 a third did so.\textsuperscript{34} In that year, 87 per cent of Poles supported the integration of Poland into the EU, a figure higher than that of any other postcommunist country.\textsuperscript{35} During the late 1990s, Poles, along with Romanians, had the most positive image of the EU of all the candidate nations.\textsuperscript{36} Throughout the period, an average of 51 per cent of Poles rated the EU positively.\textsuperscript{37} In every other candidate state apart from Romania, only about a third of respondents had a positive image of the EU.\textsuperscript{38} Moreover, Poles who did not have a positive image of the EU tended to have a neutral rather than a negative opinion.\textsuperscript{39}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All postcommunist candidates for EU membership</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.3  The EU's image in Poland and Lithuania during the 1990s\textsuperscript{40}

After 1998, Poles, although “aware that they were not going to join [the EU] on the most favourable possible terms and that there would be negative consequences to accession … remained broadly pro-EU”.\textsuperscript{41} This suggested “a much greater solidity in Polish public opinion than in other candidate countries”.\textsuperscript{42} An overwhelming consensus existed among Poland’s political elite in favour of EU membership. That helped transmit pro-EU attitudes to the general population. Only in fundamentalist Catholic circles were reservations about western liberal and secular threats to traditional values expressed.

\textsuperscript{34} Haerpfer 2002 *Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe* p.121  
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{36} Smith & Timmins 2000. *Building a Bigger Europe* p.7  
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid. p.7-8  
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid. p.8  
\textsuperscript{40} Smith & Timmins 2000. *Building a Bigger Europe* p.8  
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid.
Poland was a special case among the nine countries that in 2003 held EU accession referendums and in 2004 joined the EU. It was the largest new entrant, which meant it was the most difficult to accommodate in the enlargement round. Polish public opinion registered a large shift in attitudes towards the EU when accession negotiations began at the end of the 1990s. Surveys showed support for EU membership beginning to fall and a significant anti-EU minority appeared. Given the overwhelming pro-EU consensus among the political elite, opinion polls might have overstated the level of public support for EU accession. With a lack of serious debate about accession’s potential costs and benefits, earlier high levels of support may not have been considered positions.

Poland’s accession negotiations focused on concessions the country would have to make. This “raised the profile of the European issue in Polish politics in a ... negative way” Levels of support fell when “it became apparent that conforming to EU norms would involve negative ... consequences” in addition to benefits. The start of accession negotiations saw cracks develop in the pro-EU elite consensus in Poland and the EU membership debate was politicised. For the first time, significant anti-EU political forces emerged, while the pro-EU camp argued over tactics. Social and geographical divides within Poland with regard to opinion on EU accession became more noticeable. EU membership was supported most by better-educated Poles living in larger cities and those closer to Germany, while more eurosceptic Poles were disproportionately found among less-educated rural dwellers and in the eastern regions along the borders with Belarus and Ukraine.

One of the arguments made against EU membership was that Polish accession to the Union would serve to reduce everyday contact and trade with neighbours to the east, in particular Belarus and Ukraine. Support for EU membership fell from almost 80 per cent in June 1994 to less than 60 per cent in mid-1999. Over the same period, the proportion of Poles opposed to membership rose from 5 per cent to as much as a quarter.

Political groups hostile to EU accession did well in a parliamentary election in 2001 held in the middle of accession negotiations. But although openly anti-EU parties gained a significant

\[43\] Ibid. p.115  
\[44\] Ibid.  
\[45\] Ibid.  
\[46\] Ibid. p.1  
\[47\] Ibid.
parliamentary presence for the first time in 2001, it was unlikely their success was because of their anti-EU policies. Moreover, parties that backed EU membership won most seats and support for accession remained high right up to 2004. Even in the difficult years of negotiations in 2000-2002, when support fell somewhat, more than half of Poles felt that EU membership would be good for Poland, with stronger support among the young. Interestingly, at that time, the percentage of Belarusian citizens who felt strongly that their country should join the EU was only a little lower.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If your country were to join the EU would you feel strongly in favour?</th>
<th>18-29 years</th>
<th>30-59 years</th>
<th>&gt; 60 years</th>
<th>difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>+11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>+13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.4 Pro-EU sentiment in Poland and Belarus by age cohort, 1998

By the time of the June 2003 referendum on accession, the result was not in doubt. Poles voted overwhelmingly to join the EU (by 77.5 per cent to 22.6 per cent). Polls indicated that most Poles made their minds up about the issue well before the referendum. Most Poles “accepted the historical significance” of the EU accession referendum and separated the issue of EU membership from that of confidence in what was then “an extremely unpopular government”. Key actors, including opposition parties and civic organisations, campaigned for a Yes vote. Yes campaigners pointed to a lack of alternatives, warning that Poland risked becoming “another Belarus”, isolated or “in limbo”, if Poles voted against EU membership.

The Yes vote in the EU referendum was much higher in western Poland (as high as 85 per cent in some regions) than in the poorer eastern regions bordering Belarus and Ukraine. The No vote was highest in relatively eurosceptic Lubelskie, the only Polish region to border both Ukraine and Belarus, where only 63 per cent of voters favoured EU membership. The second-lowest vote for EU membership was in Podlaskie, the only other Polish region that borders

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48 Ibid. p.116
49 Ibid.
50 Smith & Timmins 2000. Building a Bigger Europe p.117
51 Ibid.
52 Haerpfer 2002 Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe p.125
53 Ibid. p.116
54 Szczepanik 2005. ‘History Trumps Government Unpopularity’ p.116
55 Ibid. p.122
56 See Appendix 1 Map 4
Belarus. There, 69 per cent voted in favour of EU membership. The southeastern region of Podkarpackie, which borders Ukraine, recorded the third-lowest pro-EU vote (70 per cent).

Various explanations have been put forward for this voting pattern. The former German areas that became part of independent Poland after World War I formed – and still form – the most industrialised and urban part of the country. The populations of these areas tend to be the most economically vigorous, politically active and pro-European of any part of Poland. Together with areas which became part of Poland in 1945, these areas saw the biggest majorities (77 per cent to 85 per cent) in favour of EU membership. Those areas of southern Poland, such as Podkarpackie, which were under Austrian rule until World War I, tend to be the most strongly Catholic and to vote nationalist and conservative. The population of these areas has a strong attachment to the memory of Galicia, the eastern part of which is now in Ukraine. In these regions, the Yes vote in the accession referendum was 70 per cent to 76 per cent. In Podlaskie, Lubelskie and Podkarpackie, where Ukrainian and Belarusian cross-border traders contributed significantly to the local economy, many feared joining the EU would negatively impact the productive trade and social ties with neighbouring Ukraine and Belarus.

In 2006, two years after accession, 61 per cent of Poles expressed confidence in the EU.\(^{57}\) An opinion poll published in October 2006 and quoted on the website of the Polish Committee for European Integration showed that 72 per cent of Poles rated Poland’s membership of the EU positively.\(^{58}\) Only 6 per cent of Poles felt that Poland should not be a member of the EU, while 19 per cent said membership had no negative or positive results.\(^{59}\) Overall, compared with a year earlier, there was a slight increase in the number having a favourable view of Polish membership in the EU.\(^{60}\) Those who rated membership positively were above all those who thought that Poland’s entry into the EU and changed their lives for the better (98 per cent) or who thought that membership had a positive influence on the situation within Poland (92 per cent) or its position in the world.\(^{61}\)

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57 Siemienska 2006 ‘Poland: citizens and democratic politics’ p.214
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Should the following be created?</th>
<th>2003*</th>
<th>2006*</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Common EU government</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU President</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armed forces under joint EU command</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU foreign minister</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* CBOS poll July 2003, IPA poll April 2006

Table 8.5 Poles’ support for common EU institutions, 2003-2006

There was a clear relationship between level of education and perception of the EU. Among better educated Poles (those who had completed high school or tertiary studies) the proportion favourably rating Polish membership was as high as 84 per cent, while only 58 per cent of Poles with primary school education approved of EU membership.

In April 2006, most of 1005 Poles surveyed by Poland’s Institute for Public Affairs said they favoured a highly integrated EU with strong institutions and closer cooperation among all member states. About half said they supported a common EU government, armed forces and foreign minister. Several studies show that, unlike western Europeans, Poles trust EU institutions more than their own government. Poles see their national institutions as “corrupt, inefficient and dealing with unimportant matters”. When asked on what issues the Polish government should be particularly active in the EU, the most popular response was “abolition of restrictions in undertaking work and providing services in the territory of the whole” EU. “Support for human rights and democracy in EU neighbouring countries” came low down the list, with less than a fifth rating it as an area the Polish government should be particularly active in.

A Europe-wide opinion survey whose results were released in 2006 indicated that 93 per cent of Poles thought their country corrupt, the worst result among all 21 European countries.

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej 2006.
67 Ibid
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
surveyed. Relatively fewer Russians (88 per cent) and Ukrainians (84 per cent) thought their nations corrupt. Eighty-one per cent of Poles surveyed in 2006 said they did not bribe, a figure almost as high as the equivalent for Austrians and Britons. Only 43 per cent of Ukrainians said they did not bribe. More than 70 per cent of Poles surveyed said they would not tell the authorities if they came across an instance of corruption. Ninety per cent of Ukrainians said they would not. The fact that “Poles held their political elites in such low esteem ... made them ... look favourably upon Brussels as a relative haven of honest and efficient public administration”. Poles seem to think that the EU can help to clean up their country’s politics and bureaucracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>My country is corrupt</th>
<th>Percentage agreeing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.6 Europeans’ perception of corruption in 2006

Lithuanian public opinion

Lithuanian public opinion has trended differently from Polish public opinion throughout the period since 1990. Over the last 20 years, Lithuanians have tended to be more sceptical of the EU and the west than have Poles. In the 1990s, Lithuania’s economic decline was even worse

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70 Stankiewicz 2006. ‘Polacy: korupcja wszechobecna’
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Szczerbiak 2005 ‘History Trumps Government Unpopularity’ p.122
and more prolonged than Poland’s. This had a major effect on popular sentiment. The image of the EU among Lithuanians took a beating during the decade, with a low of 22 per cent of Lithuanians having a positive opinion of the EU in 1997. In 1998 Eurobarometer noted that Lithuanians’ low opinion of the EU, showed “no detectable tendency towards improvement”.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you for or against your country joining the EU?</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Undecided</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All postcommunist candidates for EU membership</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.7 Polish and Lithuanian attitudes towards EU enlargement 1998

Alisauskiene claims that Lithuania joins Belarus and Ukraine in the group of postcommunist “countries with the lowest share of strong democrats and the highest share of autocrats and undecided citizens”. In 1995 only 22 per cent of Lithuanians had a positive opinion of the EU. This figure then rose consistently year by year so that by 1998, 45 per cent of Lithuanians felt the EU to be a good thing. By 1998, the clear majority of Lithuania’s elite (some 85 per cent) favoured Lithuania becoming an EU member. However, although Lithuania’s economic situation was much improved by the time of EU membership in 2004, Lithuania was one of the most eurosceptic of the candidate nations at the time of accession.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How confident are you in the EU?</th>
<th>Very</th>
<th>Quite a lot</th>
<th>Not much</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.8 Lithuanians’ confidence in the EU 1997

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78 EC Central and Eastern Eurobarometer No. 8 1998 quoted in Smith & Timmins 2000. Building a Bigger Europe p.5
79 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Alisauskiene 2006 ‘Lithuania: civic society and democratic orientation’ p.270
After Lithuania became an EU member, opinion surveys indicate that Lithuanian public opinion became more positive about membership. For example, Eurobarometer surveys in 2007 and 2008 found that 58 per cent and 52 per cent of Lithuanians respectively felt that things were going in the right direction in the EU.\(^8^5\) In 2008, just over half of Lithuanians said they had a positive opinion of the EU, slightly above the EU27 average, while 60 per cent considered Lithuania’s membership of the EU to be “a good thing”.\(^8^6\)

**Ukrainian and Belarusian public opinion**

Out of 11 postcommunist countries surveyed in 1994 the image of the EU was best in Ukraine and Belarus.\(^8^7\) In 1998, 49 per cent of Belarusians expressed a positive opinion of the EU.\(^8^8\) Young Belarusians were particularly enthusiastic about the idea of EU membership for their country. At the start of the 21\(^{st}\) century, a third of Belarusians under 30 were “very much in favour of Belarus becoming a EU member state”, while only a fifth of Belarusians over 60 wanted their country to join the EU.\(^8^9\) Only 9 per cent of Ukrainian villagers express a European identity, while 17 per cent of inhabitants of cities like Kiev and Lviv do.\(^9^0\)

In 1994, slightly more than half of Ukrainians and 47 per cent of Belarusians viewed the EU positively.\(^9^1\) In Ukraine, 96 per cent of the population favoured the integration of their country into the EU.\(^9^2\) More than two in five Ukrainians strongly supported the integration of Ukraine into the EU.\(^9^3\) The EU was seen as one of “few hopes for economic recovery and political stability” in the crisis-stricken country.\(^9^4\) However, as Ukrainians realised they would be left out of any EU enlargement project and even any kind of association agreement with the EU, sentiment cooled. The percentage of Ukrainians with a positive image of the EU fell to as low as 44 per cent in 1998.\(^9^5\)

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\(^8^5\) European Commission 2008 Eurobarometer 69: First Results 2008  
\(^8^6\) Ibid.  
\(^8^7\) Haerpfer 2002 *Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe* p.120  
\(^8^8\) Ibid.  
\(^8^9\) Ibid. p.127  
\(^9^0\) Ibid. p.115  
\(^9^1\) Ibid.  
\(^9^2\) Ibid. p.122  
\(^9^3\) Ibid.  
\(^9^4\) Ibid.  
\(^9^5\) Ibid.
In the late 1990s, more than a third of Belarusians and Ukrainians favoured a return to Soviet rule. Throughout the 1990s the “level of nostalgia” for the communist political system was higher in Ukraine than in any other country in Europe. In 1992, 80 per cent of Ukrainian households surveyed said their living standard had been better in the Soviet Union. This figure rose to 90 per cent in 1998. In 1992, a year after the break-up of the Soviet Union, 55 per cent of Ukrainians rated the Soviet system positively. This figure rose steadily during the 1990s.

In 1998, 82 per cent of Ukrainians expressed a positive assessment of the Soviet regime. A persistence of such a high level of nostalgia for the Soviet past imperils political stability and democracy in Ukraine. If political dissatisfaction in Ukraine cannot be addressed effectively, a risk exists of “non-democratic alternatives” taking over the country. During the mid to late 1990s, Ukrainians’ approval rate for their country’s democratic political system oscillated between 22 per cent and 33 per cent. However, a contrast existed between political discontent in Ukraine and a “general support for parliamentary democracy”. Although Ukrainians had the most anti-democratic attitudes of any major European nation in the 1990s, only about a third of Ukrainians polled supported a return of communism.

In the early 1990s there was a fall in levels of optimism about the new Ukrainian system of government. By 1994, barely more than half of Ukrainians thought their national parliament would survive. However, 1994 was an apparent turnaround year in Ukrainian attitudes to their new-found democracy. After 1994, a steadily increasing proportion of Ukrainians felt their parliament would survive. By 1998, 75 per cent thought their parliament would survive, a figure which, though “lower than the average” for postcommunist Europe, is high compared to many other political indicators in Ukraine, which indicate considerable

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96 Bashkirova 2006 ‘Russia, Belarus and Ukraine: construction of democratic communities’ p.369
97 Haerpfer 2002 Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe p.14
99 Ibid.
100 Haerpfer 2002 Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe p.14
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. p.25
104 Ibid. p.29-30
105 Ibid. p.19
106 Ibid. p.29-30.
107 Ibid. p.30
dissatisfaction with the country’s political system. Ukrainians appear to have been generally dissatisfied with political and economic conditions in their country during the last decade.

Figure 8.1 Ukranians’ view of their country’s democratic credentials, 1999-2008

Meanwhile, Ukrainians’ attitudes to the EU have remained surprisingly positive. When the International Foundation for Electoral Systems asked a sample of 1254 Ukrainians in 2008 whether they would vote in favour or against Ukraine joining the EU in any future referendum on the issue, 41 per cent indicated they would vote in favour, while 28 per cent would vote against (the remainder did not know or did not answer). The main reason those in favour gave for their choice was the “higher living standards” that would result from Ukraine’s accession to the EU. This was most likely related to Ukrainians’ perceptions of the successful 2004 enlargement, particularly the experience of Poland.

108 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
Belarusians also demonstrated nostalgia for communism in the early 1990s. In 1992, 71 per cent of Belarusian households believed their economic situation had been “much better or somewhat better” in the Soviet Union. That share rose to 82 per cent in 1994, before falling slightly to 79 per cent in 1998. In 1992, 60 per cent of Belarusians said they had a positive opinion of the Soviet political system. This proportion rose steadily to 77 per cent in 1996, almost as high as the contemporary figure in Ukraine. Since then there has been a considerable falling off of the level of Soviet nostalgia in Belarus. In 1998, Soviet nostalgia rates had fallen back down to 1992 levels. The proportion of Belarusians with favourable attitudes to their government increased between 1994 and 1998. During those years, President Lukashenko gradually tightened his grip on the country, and political freedoms were severely curtailed. In 1994, 29 per cent of Belarusians rated their state’s political system positively; this proportion increased to 35 per cent in 1996 and to 48 per cent in 1998. This indicates that most Belarusians supported, or at least, were not against, the Lukashenko regime by the late 1990s, despite the regime’s authoritarian characteristics. This is probably

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113 Ibid.
114 Bashkirova 2006 ‘Russia, Belarus and Ukraine: construction of democratic communities’ p.8
115 Ibid.
116 Haerpfer 2002 Democracy and Enlargement in Post-Communist Europe p.14
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid.
due to the regime fulfilling Belarusians’ basic needs. The close relationship between Belarus and Russia, and living in a state that continued to possess many of the traits of the Soviet Union gave many Belarusians a sense of comfort, especially when they were aware of the social and economic turmoil in neighbouring Ukraine.

However, an apparent shift in the attitudes of Belarusians towards democracy took place during the earlier Lukashenko years, a shift particularly noticeable among students and graduates. In 1994, just under a third of Belarusians with tertiary education were professed democrats.\textsuperscript{120} By 1998, almost half said they were in favour of democratic institutions.\textsuperscript{121} Belarusian society seems to have become “more democratic” in its attitudes, while simultaneously the government of Belarus became less democratic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you approve or disapprove of the political course of the following states?</th>
<th>approve (%)</th>
<th>don’t approve (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>59.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>61.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.9   Belarusians’ view of countries’ foreign policies, 2006\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid. p.49
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid. Poll taken May 2006
In a May 2006 poll, Belarusians were asked if they approved or disapproved of the political course of various countries.\textsuperscript{123} Table 10.9 shows some of the results. Drakokhrust says the figures reflect “massive state propaganda blackening certain countries ... especially disliked by the Belarusian authorities”.\textsuperscript{124} However, Germany’s high ratings appear to be “at odds with the objectives of state propaganda”.\textsuperscript{125} Other polls show similar results. Belarusians see Germany “as a role model for Belarus”.\textsuperscript{126} Germany is ranked in the top five countries in terms of “friendliness of foreign policy” with respect to Belarus.\textsuperscript{127} German leaders are more popular in Belarus than are leaders of East European countries or the United States. This pro-German sentiment is surprising given that Belarus lost a quarter of its population in World War II, a war which still forms a central element of the country’s state ideology.

In another May 2006 poll, Belarusians were asked which group of member states should Belarus orient itself to in the event of its becoming an EU member.\textsuperscript{128} The results are presented in Table 8.10. Leaving aside the obvious point that there is little chance of Belarus becoming an EU member in the near future, what is striking in Table 10.10 is that Belarusians would prefer their country to align itself with the likes of Germany and France, rather than neighbours Poland and Lithuania. In several polls over the last few years, about a third of Belarusians said their country should join the EU, but the “number of latent pro-EU Belarusians appears to be higher”.\textsuperscript{129}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toward what countries should Belarus orient itself if it became an EU member?</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Old” Europe (Germany, France, Spain and so on)</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“New” Europe (Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia and so on)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>undecided/no answer</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.10 Who Belarusians think their country should align with, 2006\textsuperscript{130}


\textsuperscript{124} Drakokhrust 2007 “Belarus: An Outpost of ‘Old Europe’?”

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid. The other four countries in the top five are Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and China.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid. Poll taken May 2006
In another poll, Belarusians were asked what ethnic groups they were prepared to see as their in-laws, colleagues or neighbours. Here, Belarusians “seem to feel the strongest affinity for ethnic Russians, while the runners-up are Ukrainians and Poles”.\(^\text{131}\) West Europeans ranked next, followed by other Central Europeans. Below them, in order, were Lithuanians, Jews, Latvians and Americans. In their affinity for Poles, “Belarusians differ from Russians, who do not regard Poles as one of their own”.\(^\text{132}\) Drakokhrust says that “Poles remain one of the closest nations to Belarus, but Poland’s powerful ideological and cultural influence is history now”.\(^\text{133}\) Today, says Drakokhrust, “Poland is not much of a role model for the pro-Western minded Belarusians who are oriented mostly toward ‘Old Europe’, primarily Germany”.\(^\text{134}\)

Overall, public opinion data over the past two decades appear to indicate that of the four nationalities studied, Poles display the most pro-EU attitudes and are also most ready to identify themselves as Europeans. However, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians also seem to have basically positive attitudes to the EU. The 2004 eastern enlargement of the EU to include Poland and Lithuania is seen favourably by Poles and Lithuanians, with the caveat in Poland that the toughening up of the country’s eastern border is seen somewhat negatively due to the enforced curtailment of trade and social ties with border areas of Ukraine and Belarus. Citizens of Poland and Lithuania believe that EU enlargement has helped their countries become more prosperous. Ukrainians and, to a lesser extent, Belarusians are also aware that EU membership has been good for Poland and Lithuania. In both Belarus and Ukraine a large proportion of citizens appear to believe that the accession of their country to the EU would also boost their economies and living standards.

The polling referred to thus far in this chapter looked at the overall attitudes of Poles, Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belarusians to the EU. However, for the purposes of this thesis and to attempt to answer the research question, more data was required about how the attitudes of Poles to their eastern neighbours and of those neighbours to Poles and Poland has changed as a result of the EU’s presence, enlargement and activities in the region. Data collected in the opinion survey carried out for this thesis in 2008 helps answer the initial research question.

\(^{131}\) Ibid.  
\(^{132}\) Ibid.  
\(^{133}\) Ibid.  
\(^{134}\) Ibid.
Overall, all groups of respondents (Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians) surveyed and interviewed for this thesis in June-July 2008 had a positive impression of the EU. Most respondents saw their country’s relations with the EU as the most important of the issues raised in the survey.\textsuperscript{135}

How Poles viewed relations with their eastern neighbours

When Poles were asked how important relations were with the EU and with eastern neighbours, most respondents rated them important or very important. Of second greatest importance was “democracy in my country”. Poles felt relations with Lithuania and Ukraine were better now than 10 years ago. When asked how the EU had affected Poland’s relations with Lithuania, Polish respondents said that there was more cooperation, more people-to-people contact and easier travel. Poles felt that travel to and from Lithuania and Ukraine had become easier, but felt that it had become more difficult to travel to Belarus. Polish respondents felt that relations with Belarus had worsened since Poland joined the EU. When Poles were asked how the EU had affected Poland’s relations with Belarus, they pointed to problems crossing the border. Poles, like all EU citizens, now require a visa to visit Belarus. This was not the case in the 1990s. Belarusians also require a visa to visit Poland.

Polish respondents felt that relations with Ukraine had become much better and were now in fact better than with any other of their eastern neighbours. Some respondents said that they thought that now that Poland is safely within the EU and Nato, Ukraine had become the most important partner in the east for Poland, and that, specifically, good relations with Ukraine had become more important for Poland than good relations with Russia. Respondents, some of whom had visited Ukraine, usually for tourism, did mention problems on the border, though Poles, like other EU passport-holders, no longer need a visa to visit Ukraine.

Poles noted that it was harder for Ukrainians to work in Poland to fill jobs made vacant by Poles who had left to work in Britain and Ireland. Respondents also noted that EU membership had made Poland “more attractive” for Ukrainians. Relations between Poland and Ukraine “are very good”, one Polish interviewee said “and they are even better because there are certain groups in power in Ukraine”.

\textsuperscript{135} Appendix 2 includes a copy of the survey questionnaire and sample interview questions.
The interviewee acknowledged that Poland “pulling Ukraine to the western zone will be perceived in a specific way by those who are more pro-Russian in Ukrainian society and politics, and that would be always a problem”. But the Polish position was clear. “Poland is strongly supporting integration of Ukraine with … Europe ... and as long as Ukraine is pro-democratic and pro-Western, there will be friendly relations.” Normalising relations with Russia, said this respondent, will not influence relations with Kiev.

In interviews, informed Poles expressed disappointment with Ukrainian politicians’ perceived failure to make the most of it Orange Revolution, particularly as it was felt Poland had helped bring about the revolution.

*Poland was ... quite influential in getting [the] Orange Revolution underway. President Kwaśniewski at the time played a key role in negotiations with former President*
Kuchma, leading to the rerun of elections in which Yushchenko won a mandate. So it’s always hard to see success being turned into qualified failure.\textsuperscript{136}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How important are these issues to you?</th>
<th>1 = very important</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5 = not important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland’s relations with the EU</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democracy in my country</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being able to work in other European countries</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland’s relations with Ukraine</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland’s relations with Lithuania</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>energy supply reliability</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland’s relations with Belarus</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.12  Poles’ rating of issues’ importance, 2008
Figures in %

How Lithuanians viewed relations with Poland

Lithuanians were enthusiastic when asked how the EU had affected relations between Lithuania and Poland. They volunteered answers such as “Poland is an important ally for Lithuania within the EU”, “government links are close and good” and “there is easier travel and more contact”. Several interviewees contrasted the ease of crossing the Polish border with the difficulties with visiting Belarus since Lithuania joined the Schengen zone.

Almost all the Lithuanians surveyed had a favourable impression of the EU but there was little interest in working in Poland, which is understandable, given the much higher salaries on offer for Lithuanians working in Ireland, Britain and other western EU states to which Lithuanians gained easy access to in 2004. Very important for Lithuanians were democracy, energy supply reliability and Lithuania’s relations with the EU. Lithuania’s relations with Poland were also considered important.

\textsuperscript{136} Paweł Świeboda interview 16/09/2009
Table 8.13  Lithuanians’ view of the EU and its effect on relations with Poland, 2008
Figures in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you agree or disagree with these statements?</th>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU is a good thing for Lithuania</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is a good thing for me</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU has made travel to Poland easier for me</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations between Lithuania and Poland are better now than 10 years ago</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for me to be able to work in Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.14  Lithuanians’ view of issues’ importance, 2008
Figures in %

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How important are these issues to you?</th>
<th>1 = very important</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5 = not important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>democracy in my country</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>energy supply reliability</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania’s relations with the EU</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania’s relations with Poland</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>being able to work in Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

How Ukrainians viewed relations with Poland

For Ukrainians interviewed, the greater difficulty in crossing the border into Poland was the main effect of the EU on relations between the two countries. Poland’s entry into the Schengen zone has made it much harder for Ukrainians to visit Poland. One interviewee
mentioned the lack of a free visa scheme as the biggest impediment to closer Polish-Ukrainian relations. The “Schengen visa is hard to get”. The process of applying for a visa to visit Poland was, she said, “humiliating”. She felt that the “number one benefit” of Ukraine joining the EU would be “visa-free travel”. Respondents mentioned how easy it was for Poles to cross the border to visit Ukraine as tourists.

Some highlighted that many goods were cheaper and more readily available in Poland than in Ukraine. One respondent said joining the EU would provide “great possibilities for Ukrainian business”, though she noted that the experience of Poland and Lithuania meant there would likely be a rise in prices of everyday goods and more competition for Ukrainian companies should the country join the EU. Another respondent noted that trade between Poland and Ukraine was increasing at a rate of “more than 40 per cent a year”, and was worth as much as US$4 billion in 2008. One respondent noted that many Ukrainians had crossed the border into Poland several times a day to buy and sell goods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Do you agree or disagree with these statements?</th>
<th>strongly agree</th>
<th>agree</th>
<th>neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The EU is a good thing for my country</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU is a good thing for me</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations between Ukraine and Poland are better now than 10 years ago</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The EU has made travel to Poland easier for me</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important for me to be able to work in Poland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.15 Ukrainians’ view of the EU and its impact on relations with Poland, 2008
Figures in %

Ukrainian respondents noted that Poland had become richer when it joined the EU. One said Ukrainians were aware that living standards in Poland were much higher than in Ukraine, and that Ukrainians sought equality with Poland. One tertiary-level lecturer interviewed noted that there was as yet “no sign” of EU money in Lviv and particularly, no sign of such money at her institute. She hoped that Ukraine would eventually join the EU but accepted that this
could only be achieved after “many years”. Many respondents mentioned their disappointment with their government, which they felt had let them down. Indeed, all who expressed an opinion on the matter were critical of the Ukrainian government and state apparatus. They felt that Ukraine’s only hope was to follow the path of closer integration with Europe espoused by Ukraine’s pro-Western parties.

One respondent said the EU represented a “great prospect for the future” for Ukraine. Another said Ukraine must go through many “procedures” to prepare for EU membership, adding that “Poland in the EU is an example for Ukraine”. Another interviewee said the EU was good for Ukraine, “good for a better life, better level of life”. Being a member of the EU “gives more possibilities” and allows a more “positive attitude” to many things.

The students who answered the written surveys appeared to be more enthusiastic about the EU than their lecturers who were interviewed on a one-to-one basis. But all respondents in Ukraine expressed a favourable opinion of the EU and Poland. In contrast to Lithuanians, many Ukrainian respondents were interested in working in Poland, though democracy and Ukraine’s relations with the EU were considered much more important issues.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How important are these issues to you?</th>
<th>1 = very important</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5 = not important</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine’s relations with the EU</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy in my country</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine’s relations with Poland</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy supply reliability</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being able to work in Poland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8.16 Ukrainians’ view of issues’ importance, 2008
Figures in %

Most respondents indicated a closeness, familiarity and affection for Poland. One respondent stressed that Poland and Ukraine are neighbours, with close “historical and geographical relations”. As Slavs, Ukrainians and Poles feel “close to each other”, she said. Many people in
Lviv have relatives in Poland. Another interviewee noted that Poland was “a neighbouring country” and Ukraine’s “largest partner”. Most respondents were optimistic about the future of Ukraine’s relations with Poland. One respondent said the general relations between Poland and Ukraine were “not bad” before Poland joined the EU and are now getting even better. This, the respondent said, might be because Poland had joined the EU, but might not be directly related to Poland’s membership of the EU.

Respondents noted that Poland was Ukraine’s main supporter in the EU. Some respondents said Ukrainians were unsure of what the EU is. One said that although the EU is known and accepted in Lviv, the city’s residents “do not know if it is useful”. Another said most Ukrainians, particularly those from areas far from the EU border “don’t know much about it [the EU]”. Some respondents linked the EU and Nato, saying that many countries were in both. The two organisations, one said, are “similar”. Nato provides “protection” while the EU provides “freedom and protection”.

Respondents noted that many university students from Lviv, and not only those with Polish ancestry, go to Poland to study. There are several Polish-language schools in Lviv, catering mainly to the Polish minority. Many people in Lviv can speak Polish, and even more can understand it. One respondent estimated that about a quarter of Lviv residents could speak Polish. Others noted that more Poles were visiting Lviv and most expected that contact with Poles would increase. There were some exchanges with Polish academic institutions and many teachers and students came to Lviv each year. There were particularly close links with the Polish city of Jarosław, just across the border. A director of a tertiary institution said Ukraine was able to access Council of Europe funding for student exchanges with Poland, but there were problems with the visa cost, prohibitively expensive for Ukrainian students.

Some respondents mentioned the frequent meetings between the presidents of Poland and Ukraine as a positive sign. The two leaders had been “discussing vital problems”, one respondent said. Football was mentioned as another bond between the two nations. Poland and Ukraine had been named joint hosts of the 2012 European Championships and as such, one respondent said, they “must work together ... improve infrastructure” and border crossings.
A few respondents were keen to stress that Lviv is “Polish-oriented”. “Ukraine is closer to Poland than to Russia,” one said, adding that “many people here have Polish ancestors” including herself. Some respondents said they did not want a return of Russian domination of Ukraine. Ukraine’s relations with Russia are “good in public ... good in sentiment” but Ukraine has a “not positive history with Russia”, said one. Some respondents blamed Russia for Ukraine’s current situation. “Russia is guilty for present situation in Ukraine,” one said. Another said that “most people ... in Lviv” think that “Russia doesn’t want Ukraine to be successful”.

**Conclusion**

Overall, the evidence of opinion surveys is that since 1990, and particularly since 2000, public opinion in all four countries has become less idealistic and more realistic. Now safely ensconced in the EU, Poles remain more consciously “European” and pro-EU than their eastern neighbours, although since the late 1990s a vocal eurosceptic minority has become established in the country. With regard to attitudes towards eastern neighbours, Polish public opinion has tended to follow (with a few years’ lag time) Polish government policy.

Since 1990, and particularly since 2005, Poles have become much more favourably disposed to Ukrainians, seeing the latter as a potential buttress in the great geopolitical game with Russia. Poles seem to widely hold their leaders’ belief that good relations between Poland and Ukraine are of great importance to Poland. They attach less importance to links with Belarus. There is a perception among Poles that Polish membership of the EU has improved relations between their country and both Ukraine and Lithuania, but has not helped the already strained relations with Belarus. Poles appear to have a reasonable positive or neutral attitude to the Belarusian people but a very negative attitude towards the Belarusian regime.

On the whole, Lithuanians remain much more eurosceptic than Poles, but are content to be tied into the European project with their Polish neighbours, who they increasingly see as allies in Brussels and in the face of a resurgent Russia. Ukrainians, who in the early 1990s were enthusiastic about the EU and the prospect of integration with the west, have become disillusioned, and most accept Ukraine will not join the EU in the near future. But in a positive development, residents of western Ukraine appear to have developed strong pro-Polish sentiments, seeing Poland as Ukraine’s main promoter and supporter in the country’s
long march to EU membership. Poland’s economic success has helped improve the country’s image in Ukraine.

Economic, political and social changes which have taken place in Poland as a result of the country’s striving towards EU membership and as a result of enlargement itself have led to many changes in Poles’ attitudes to Europe and to their neighbours. Now that Poland has successfully made it into the EU, Poles feel more secure and more prosperous and also more confident in themselves when interacting with their eastern neighbours, whom they see as having fallen behind Poland economically. Their Ukrainians and Belarusian neighbours, in contrast, perceive Poland as having benefited from EU membership. Ukrainians, in particular, seem to be envious of Poland’s success and frustrated with their own state’s failure to match the great strides made by Poland. The EU seems generally to have had a positive impact on Ukrainians’ and Lithuanians’ perceptions of Poles and Poland. The opinions of Belarusians are more difficult to gauge, but it does seem that many younger Belarusians and the Belarusian democratic opposition see a supporter and example in Poland.
9 Migration
The removal of barriers to free movement has made Europeans more mobile. Increased individual mobility has allowed Europeans to become more familiar with other European countries and nationalities. Migration flows have become more complex, with an increase in the movement of professionals and managers. In 1995 the total number of border crossings of income-seeking East Central Europeans, mainly Poles, was estimated at some 25-30 million.\(^1\) Most migrants crossed borders multiple times. The total number of legal East European (mostly Polish) workers in western Europe was estimated at about 400,000-450,000 people in 1995, with the largest number in Germany.\(^2\)

The EU’s success and enlargement accelerated a westward movement of workers and their families from Central Europe to Western Europe. Migration to and from the country is “an integral element” in Poland’s incorporation into the EU.\(^3\) From May 2004 there was a sharp increase in migration from Poland and Lithuania to the British Isles, as Poles and Lithuanians were given free access to the British and Irish labour markets. Throughout the 1990s, because of economic collapse in the successor states of the former Soviet Union, thousands of Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians went to Poland to obtain short-term jobs, mostly in unskilled and semi-skilled areas.

As Poland readied to join the EU, tighter visa controls curtailed the movement of Belarusians and Ukrainians into Poland. Ironically, while Schengen rules have led to an easing of border controls between Poland and its new EU partners (including fellow new member Lithuania), those same rules have made more difficult the movement of ordinary people between Poland on the one hand, and Ukraine and Belarus. This has made more difficult the lives of people living near the border, particularly in western Belarus and western Ukraine, who are dependent on cross-border trade for everyday existence. It has also hindered contact between Poland and residents of Belarus who are most sympathetic to the EU and Western values, thus making adding more obstacles to the transmission of EU values and norms to Belarusian society.

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\(^2\) Ibid.

An important factor in Poland’s rapid and largely successful adoption of a Western model of society was the relative openness of Poland to Western influence during communist times. Compared with their neighbours, Poles were able to travel to Western Europe in much greater numbers. They “were able to acquire knowledge, albeit limited, of how the West operated”. From the 1960s, Polish academics and students spent time at Western universities and colleges. Millions of Polish émigrés “maintained close contacts with their families in Poland”. Thus, “Polish society was relatively well prepared for the change of regime”.

In the early 21st century, most Polish and Lithuanian emigrants are still bound for the West, “the source of the ideas and practical models of democracy” for Poland and Lithuania. It can be expected that when Poles and Lithuanians move to Western Europe, they would observe the daily workings of democratic societies. They might then be expected to be more sympathetic to the democratisation process in their own countries. Migration has allowed Poles to improve their material wealth and social status. In the 1990s, as many as one in eight Polish returnees from Western Europe founded their own companies, an investment that might have made them “active supporters of democracy”. Migration is an influential factor in strengthening local economies. It can also help consolidate democratic attitudes.

By the late 1990s, highly skilled people made up about one in seven of the total number of westbound migrants from Poland. These skilled migrants were often young managers of successful businesses. They included employees of multinational firms, for whom increasing numbers of highly skilled, multilingual Poles, scientists and researchers work. Migration in and out of Poland can be seen as part of the population movement resulting from globalisation. The migrations are thus an integral element of Poland’s joining the global economic system. As they persist, they will help make intra-EU borders more porous.

In 2002, Morawska predicted that westbound movement of Poles and Lithuanians and migration from Ukraine and Belarus into Poland would “maintain their current volume or

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Morawska. 2001. ‘International Migration and the Consolidation of Democracy’ p.163
8 Ibid. p. 172
9 Ibid. p.184
10 Ibid.
even increase” after the 2004 EU enlargement.\(^\text{11}\) Most migration would be of “short-term income-seeking migrants who [would] draw from their home countries any public welfare provisions they receive”.\(^\text{12}\)

In the run-up to the 2004 enlargement, many academic surveys and estimates had suggested “that allowing free movement of labour on accession” was “unlikely to provoke large migratory flows”.\(^\text{13}\) However, fears of mass migration from the poor, crisis-ridden Eastern Europe prompted governments in Western Europe “to reassure their voters that the abolition of internal EU frontier controls would be complemented by the preservation of tough external border controls”.\(^\text{14}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you interested in working in another EU country once Poland enters the EU? (%)</th>
<th>September 2000</th>
<th>May 2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Yes, I am interested and will certainly try</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Yes, I am interested and will probably try</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.1  
Poles’ attitudes to working in other EU countries 2000-2001\(^\text{15}\)

The EU had a significant impact on border regimes between Poland and its eastern neighbours partly because of the limited development of migration policies in Poland before 1989. Communist states lacked immigration policies as such as they focused on preventing or regulating emigration. Few non-nationals were keen to immigrate to those countries. Wholesale transfer of EU border policies filled institutional gaps left over from communism. After 1989, Polish border guards no longer had to keep Poles inside Poland, they now had to keep foreigners out.

Just as Poles have sought new employment opportunities in Western Europe, so Ukrainians and Belarusians have sought work in Poland and elsewhere in the EU. Much of the 1990s

\(^{11}\) Morawska 2002. ‘Transnational migration in the enlarged European Union’ p.162
\(^{12}\) Ibid.
\(^{14}\) Zielonka, J. (ed.) 2002 Europe Unbound: Enlarging and reshaping the boundaries of the European Union Routledge London p.2
emigration from Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine was due to the economic turmoil associated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet economy and opening of Eastern Europe’s borders saw a rapid increase in immigration into Poland from the former Soviet Union. At first, the bulk of immigrants were ethnic Poles, mainly from Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.\textsuperscript{16} However, from the mid-1990s, the immigration of ethnic Poles tailed off. After 1993 there was a rapid increase in immigration of people with no Polish family connections from Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, with numbers tripling between 1993 and 1997.\textsuperscript{17}

Overall immigration into Poland and Lithuania accelerated from the early 1990s.\textsuperscript{18} By the late 1990s, Poland had begun to receive significant numbers of immigrants from more distant countries. In 1998, legal immigrants from the former Soviet Union and developing countries, mainly Ukrainians, Russians, Vietnamese and Armenians, numbered more than 40,000 people, still not a large number for a country of 38 million people.\textsuperscript{19} However, the number of short-term working “tourists” and undocumented workers, mainly from the former Soviet Union, was greater.\textsuperscript{20}

Throughout the 1990s, thousands of Belarusians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians travelled to Poland to obtain short-term jobs, mostly in unskilled and semi-skilled areas. Temporary cross-border migrations into Poland after 1990 included undocumented traders and working holidaymakers, mainly from Ukraine, Lithuania and Russia. Particularly large numbers went to Warsaw, which boomed throughout the 1990s and 2000s, and to border areas both in the west near Germany, and along the eastern border with Ukraine and Belarus, where an extensive amount of cross-border trade was taking place.\textsuperscript{21} By the mid-1990s, a large proportion of the workers on building sites in Warsaw were from Belarus or Ukraine.

With the mass exodus of Polish workers to Britain and Ireland from May 2004, Polish companies were soon looking for labour. In mid-2005, Poland and Ukraine signed an agreement regulating the status of an estimated 200,000 Ukrainian seasonal workers in

\textsuperscript{16} Morawska 2002 ‘Transnational migration in the enlarged European Union’ p.174
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid. p.170
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid. p.174
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. p.170
Poland. In January 2006, Gdańsk shipyard appealed for workers from Ukraine to help fill thousands of jobs vacated by emigrating Poles.\(^{22}\) In 2006 the EU and Ukraine signed an agreement to make it easier to issue short-stay visas to Ukrainian citizens travelling to the EU. An agreement was signed establishing procedures for repatriating illegal immigrants to Ukraine.\(^{23}\)

Since the 1990s Poland and Lithuania have experienced an influx of Westerners. Half of these are communist-era Polish émigrés, who for the most part shuttle between their home nation and another country. In contrast to westbound Polish emigrants, most of whom had no tertiary education, the great majority of Western immigrants to Poland were educated to tertiary level.\(^{24}\)

The 1990s saw a rapid increase in the number of highly skilled Westerners who moved to Poland and Lithuania to work, often for multinational companies. Between 1992 and 1995, the number of tertiary-educated Westerners (excluding people who qualified for Polish citizenship) in Poland on long-term work permits more than doubled to about 30,000.\(^{25}\) The number of short-term Western business visitors, most from EU states, was much larger.

It was only in the late 1990s that the undocumented Western workforce in Poland began to attract attention from Polish authorities and media. Turn-of-the-millennium estimates by the country’s National Bureau of Labour estimated the number of “illegally employed Western migrants” in Poland at more than 50,000.\(^{26}\) Migrations of highly skilled west Europeans seeking work have been common within the old EU. Their appearance in Poland and Lithuania can be seen as reflection of those countries’ “progressive incorporation into the European ... system”.\(^{27}\) As the integration of Poland and Lithuania into the EU and wider Western world continues, more Western professionals can be expected to migrate to the two countries.

\(^{23}\) BBC News 2006 ‘EU says Ukraine not ready to join’
\(^{24}\) Morawska 2002. ‘Transnational migration in the enlarged European Union’ p.176
\(^{25}\) Morawska 2001. ‘International Migration and the Consolidation of Democracy’ p.188
\(^{26}\) Morawska 2002 p.176-177
\(^{27}\) Ibid. p.177
Case study: Polish and Lithuanian migration to Britain and Ireland

Greater interaction between peoples can aid in the transmission of values and norms. The common experiences of European migrants working and living side by side in other European countries can help the “normalisation” of relations between them. Poles and Lithuanians, in common with other Central Europeans and Balts, gained free access to the British, Irish and Swedish labour markets with the 2004 eastern enlargement. The months following May 2004 saw a sharp increase in migration from Poland and Lithuania to the British Isles. It is hard to measure the scale of the new migration. Official British figures in late 2005 gave a total number of 175,000 workers registered in Britain from the countries which joined the EU in 2004.28 But other estimates suggested there were 300,000 Poles alone (and another 100,000 in Ireland).29

In 2005, the Lithuanian government estimated that more than 100,000 Lithuanians, or 3 per cent of its country’s citizens, had gone abroad to work.30 Official statistics probably underestimated the numbers. Though Poles and Lithuanians arriving in Britain were officially required to register before seeking work, many did not. According to official statistics, in late 2005 there were only 95 Polish plumbers living in Britain.31 However, a newspaper found that number in a day, by advertising in an area of west London which had attracted a large number of migrant Poles.32 In 2006, the British Home Office estimated that some 427,000 Poles moved to Britain to work legally in the two years to mid-2006.33 Somewhere between 100,000 and 200,000 Poles and Lithuanians migrated to Ireland over the same period. This “new reservoir of good, cheap labour” was a boon for British and Irish employers.34 In fact, business leaders, desperately short of labour, had “pressed repeatedly for the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the free movement of workers” in the enlarged EU.35

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29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
34 *The Economist* 2005 ‘The brain-drain cycle’
Official data “put the number of Poles in Britain at about 264,000” but the real number was “much higher”, according to a 2006 report. Other official figures indicated 447,000 people from Poland and other 2004 accession countries arrived in Britain after the 2004 enlargement. The bulk of these migrants were Poles. Poles felt “at home in London because it already had a thriving Polish community” thanks to a wave of Polish immigration during World War II and further influxes in the 1980s and in the years leading up to Poland’s EU accession.

This new wave of Polish immigration spread out all over Britain, with local concentrations in areas short of agricultural workers, such as East Anglia and Inverness. In several British towns, newspapers moved to cater for the new Polish immigrants. Several local British newspapers set up Polish-language versions or supplements. For example, in October 2006, The Reading Chronicle printed 5000 copies of its regular edition in Polish, as an experiment in catering for the large number of Poles living in the town, and to help reach out to that section of its population. Poles had contributed much to the town, especially in areas such as trades and the service industry. The newspaper aimed to work towards “community cohesion”, getting Polish migrants “involved in the fabric of the community”. The Chronicle’s Polish version was “a Reading paper for Polish people, not a Polish paper for Polish people”. Some national newspapers in Britain looked at going down the same route.

In September 2006, the Welsh town of Llanelli opened a support centre for its new Polish residents. The centre was supported by Welsh Assembly government funding. Estimates indicated that by 2006 over 1500 Poles were living in the area, many arriving in the two years since Poland joined the EU. Of about 1100 foreign nationals who applied for National Insurance numbers in Carmarthenshire in 2005/2006, more than 60 per cent were Poles.
After 2004, Poles in Britain, as EU citizens, were entitled to vote in local and regional elections. In 2007 Poles living in Scotland were urged to register their vote for upcoming elections, in a campaign launched by the Scottish Executive and the Electoral Commission.\textsuperscript{46} Voter registration forms were translated into Polish.\textsuperscript{47} Backing for the registration campaign came from a bus operator, 200 of whose drivers in Scotland came from other EU member states, mainly Poland.\textsuperscript{48}

Poland and Lithuania are well placed to be “brain factories”.\textsuperscript{49} Demand in Britain for Polish bus drivers has offered an “incentive for Poles with related skills ... to adapt”.\textsuperscript{50} Poland and Lithuania have a surplus of members of some professions and trades. In 2005, a European Bank for Reconstruction and Development spokesman said both countries had “up to twice as many doctors per head of population” as it needed.\textsuperscript{51} With a fall in the number of children, Poland and Lithuania have too many teachers.\textsuperscript{52} The task is “to make returning home a case of ‘when’ rather than ‘if’, by removing bureaucratic obstacles and maintaining ties between diasporas and the homeland”.\textsuperscript{53} The Lithuanian government sponsored “new Lithuanian-language schools in places like Dublin” in the hope that they would “remove a barrier for émigré families who are considering returning”\textsuperscript{54}.

Official figures indicate that in the year to April 2006, 86,900 immigrants arrived in Ireland, “the highest number since modern record-keeping began in 1987”.\textsuperscript{55} Most of these immigrants were Poles. Between 2004 and 2006, the number of Poles in Ireland grew from a few thousand to over 120,000 according to several estimates.\textsuperscript{56} This had a significant impact on both Ireland and Poland. Ireland fast became “a second home for Poles”, with “Polish shops, pubs, bakeries, barbers, newspapers, priests and translation services to help access services like bank accounts and social welfare”.\textsuperscript{57} Polish “flying doctors” took advantage of low-cost air services between Poland and Ireland to work for “a few days or weeks per month” in Irish

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49} The Economist 2005 ‘The brain-drain cycle’
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{51} Quoted in Ibid.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid.
hospitals, while continuing to treat patients in Poland.\(^{58}\) A weekend working in Northern Ireland paid a Polish doctor as much as three weeks in Poland.\(^{59}\)

Ireland has not proved be the promised land for all immigrants. Irish President Mary McAleese outlined some of the problems for the people the media designated “new” Irish.

> The new immigrants now feature among the homeless and with them come new issues around language, culture, legality of status, access to education and to jobs.\(^{60}\)

The biggest barrier to Poles working in Ireland is language. Many highly skilled Poles have problems speaking English, which led to difficulties getting a good job.\(^{61}\) Despite the large increase in numbers migrating west, the overall number of East Europeans moving west was not as much as was feared by some. In October 2006 the European Commission said that overall migration from Poland and Lithuania to Western Europe had been “lower than expected” since the 2004 enlargement.\(^{62}\) A study by the Irish-based European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions concluded that although migration from east to west would continue “geographical mobility within Europe has been, and is likely to remain, relatively low”.\(^{63}\)

### The effect of migration on Poland

The post-enlargement migration of Poles and Lithuanians to western Europe was “driven by economics not politics”.\(^{64}\) Most Poles who moved west for work pointed “to the necessity to make additional money to ‘make ends meet’”.\(^{65}\) Most of the remainder sought “to elevate their socioeconomic status through the accumulation of material goods”.\(^{66}\)

Polish authorities worried about the impact of the departure of so many skilled people. The migrant workers left labour-thirsty industries in Poland such as construction and retailing short of workers. Polish enterprises had to import labour from further east, principally

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\(^{58}\) Ibid.
\(^{59}\) Ibid.
\(^{60}\) Irish President Mary McAleese quoted in Bushe 2006
\(^{61}\) Bushe 2006
\(^{62}\) Ibid.
\(^{63}\) Ibid.
\(^{64}\) *The Economist* 2005 ‘The brain-drain cycle’
\(^{65}\) Morawska 2002 ‘Transnational migration in the enlarged European Union’ p.164
\(^{66}\) Ibid.
Ukraine and Belarus, or raise wages. Poor, rural areas in Lithuania and eastern Poland have been depopulated to the extent that children and the elderly “feel abandoned”. There was a danger that the outflow of skilled workers might “aggravate a bad situation, with so many people leaving a poor country that its problems worsen”.

In the 21st century, returning home is inexpensive and fast. A notable change brought about by the single market programme was the loosening of regulations on air transport. The number of cut-price airlines has grown. Europeans now have greater choice and can fly more cheaply than before. By 2005, budget flights between Britain and Poland cost just a few dollars. That made “migration more efficient”. Migrants within the EU could “choose easily how long they go for, and where”.

After reaching a high of 20.7 per cent in 2003, Polish unemployment fell steadily in the following years. In August 2006, Polish unemployment reached its lowest level in five years, spurred in part by the rush of people seeking work abroad. But although the jobless rate fell to 15.7 per cent in July 2006, it was still the highest in the EU. A column in *The Irish Times* in 2006 claimed that although the Polish jobless rate was still high, relatively few jobless Poles had left the country for work abroad. Most Polish migrants were “young, dynamic, skilled and educated” people who “should have no problems finding a job in Poland”. The columnist noted that: “Poles working abroad improve their language skills, gain new experiences, know-how and contacts, all of which can be useful in their future careers.”

Since 2004, all sorts of specialists, from hairdressers to lifeguards, have left Poland for more lucrative jobs in western Europe. Meanwhile, the Polish economy boomed in the years following accession, with exports growing by 20 per cent a year. Polish companies faced a new dilemma. In parts of northwest Poland where the jobless rate exceeded 30 per cent companies found it hard to locate new staff.

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67 *The Economist* 2005‘The brain-drain cycle’
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
The coming years will see a large influx of EU money into Poland, as the country becomes the biggest beneficiary of EU cohesion and regional policies. However, due to the westward outflow of young workers, local governments across Poland lacked engineers to plan investments, while building firms lacked workers to build the infrastructure and housing planned in the national development plan for 2007-2013. By 2006, Polish officials were encouraging UK-based Poles to return to job opportunities back home. In July 2006, officials from the city of Wrocław travelled to Britain to convince Polish migrants that more job opportunities existed in the city than when Poland entered the EU. The officials visited bars and pubs frequented by Poles in London to try and lure them back, concerned that a shrinking labour pool would mean Wrocław would attract less investment.

In November 2006, Polish President Lech Kaczyński downplayed the negative aspects of the migration of young skilled to Britain and other western European countries, saying that while such large pay differentials existed between Poland and those countries, it was natural such migration would take place. Kaczyński pointed out that the biggest pay differentials between Britain and Poland were in trades such as painter and carpenter. In fields such as IT the pay difference was much less.

After 1989, the huge increase in the number of visits made by Poles and Lithuanians to western Europe gave them “a more realistic view of the West, of both its democratic achievements and their social consequences”. Short tourist stays may not have a major impact on attitudes towards democratisation. On the other hand, longer stays abroad associated with migration for work might encourage adherence “to democratic norms”. The migration of Poles and Lithuanians westward helped ease domestic unrest following “the traumas of economic transformation by providing subsidiary work and income abroad”. Migrants who invested in businesses might contribute to creating a “democratic investment” for the future. However, Morawska believes that most westbound migrants have had

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Morawska 2002 ‘Transnational migration in the enlarged European Union’ p.172-173
85 Ibid.
“minimal or no impact on the consolidation of democracy in” Poland and Lithuania.\textsuperscript{86} Most stays in the West “reinforce undemocratic attitudes and habits, as traders and migrants find that informal methods get things done abroad as well as at home”.\textsuperscript{87} Pravda argues that even those well-heeled travellers “who generally support democracy, tend to help strengthen ... cronyism and corrupt practice”.\textsuperscript{88}

**Border security**

In the 1990s Poland, Lithuania and other prospective members were seen by the EU not just as countries to be protected by the embrace of international security organisation, but as sources of cross-border crime. The collapse of the Iron Curtain and other barriers within Europe led to security worries. With the breakdown of state authority in the former communist bloc in the early 1990s, crime became rampant and black markets flourished.\textsuperscript{89}

The security of Poland’s eastern borders had long been of concern for the EU.\textsuperscript{90} There were fears that border problems would arise when the EU frontier moved to Poland’s border with Belarus and Ukraine. Many feared the “chances of this border being well policed” would be low.\textsuperscript{91} German newspapers warned that “chaos and corruption” prevailed on Poland’s frontiers with Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{92} Corruption is “widespread on both sides of the Polish-Ukrainian border”.\textsuperscript{93} There was considerable corruption among Polish customs and borders officers, despite them receiving their (low) wages regularly.\textsuperscript{94} Corruption in Poland appears to have worsened considerably in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{95} The data shows that Poland in the late 1990s and early 2000s was more corrupt than in the last decade of communist rule.\textsuperscript{96} In 1995, 36 Polish customs officers were arrested, and “legal proceedings were ... mounted against 102 officers”.\textsuperscript{97} Of particular concern “was the widespread collusion between customs officers and

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Pravda 2001 p.7
\textsuperscript{90} Mungiu-Pippidi 2002. ‘Facing the ‘desert of Tartars’’ p.67
\textsuperscript{93} Mungiu-Pippidi 2002. ‘Facing the ‘desert of Tartars’’ p.64
\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{96} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} Holmes 2006 *Rotten States?* p.73
criminal gangs”. In February 1997, an official campaign was begun against corruption in the border service, with more arrests of border service officers and as many as 41 officials put under investigation. In mid-1997, after a major corruption scandal at a border crossing with Belarus, the head of the Main Customs Office resigned. Ethics classes were introduced for Polish customs officials in response to their high levels of corruption.

In Ukraine, many law enforcement officers were “not paid at all” for months or even years. By the late 1990s, Ukrainian border guards who had stopped receiving salaries were helping illegal migrants cross into Poland. Customs officials’ poor pay, training and equipment invited corruption and meant Poland’s eastern border was far from tight. Highly organised Russian, Ukrainian and Polish mafias took advantage. The resulting levels of crime and migration were “hard to stem”. There were problems with policing Poland’s eastern borders, because Ukraine and Belarus could not or would not, cooperate. The biggest problem was the largely uncontrolled “green border” which crossed forests, rivers and fields. Poland’s border with Belarus stretches for about 407km. The border with Ukraine is 526km long. In Belarus, the army exercises control from the east. But by 2002, Ukrainian authorities had become “totally deficient in their policing of the border”. In response, the EU (first through the Phare programme) provided money and technical assistance to help Poland to control its borders. German patrols were stationed on Poland’s borders with Belarus and Ukraine. Germany also supplied “financial and technical assistance to upgrade Poland’s border infrastructure” and in particular, border policing. Joint operations and training for German and Polish border guards was introduced. This sped up the development of mechanisms for migration control, meaning that would-be migrants

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98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
102 Mungiu-Pippidi 2002. ‘Facing the ‘desert of Tartars’ p.64
103 Bort 2002. ‘Illegal migration and cross-border crime’ p.196
104 Hill 2002 ‘The geopolitical implications of enlargement p.105
105 Ibid.
106 Bort 2002. ‘Illegal migration and cross-border crime’ p.196
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Mungiu-Pippidi 2002. ‘Facing the ‘desert of Tartars’ p.67
110 Ibid.
111 Grabbe, H. 2006 The EU’s Transformative Power: Europeanization through Conditionality in Central and Eastern Europe Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK p.18
heading for Germany would be stopped and held in Poland. After 1993, asylum seekers arriving in Germany were no longer accepted as refugees if they had previously passed through Poland, due to a bilateral readmission agreement signed that year.\textsuperscript{112}

Long before joining the EU, Polish and Lithuanian leaders were already thinking about future EU enlargement. In 1997, then Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek said Poland did “not want barriers at its eastern frontiers”.\textsuperscript{113} Poland’s Minister for Europe, Ryszard Czarnecki, spoke “of a tightly controlled border” that could simultaneously be a bridge to Belarus and Ukraine.\textsuperscript{114} Czarnecki said that stabilising Ukraine and Belarus was in the interests of both Poland and the EU.\textsuperscript{115} With eastern borders “only controllable if there is cooperation with the other sides”, Poland attempted “a delicate balancing act”.\textsuperscript{116} From the mid-1990s, Polish authorities stabilised and effectively controlled the country’s borders but avoided “total closure towards the east”.\textsuperscript{117} During the 1990s, more than 80,000 illegal immigrants, virtually all crossing from east to west, were arrested at the Polish-Ukrainian border.\textsuperscript{118} As the situation on the Polish-Ukrainian border continued to be unsatisfactory and as Ukraine seemed far from becoming a prospective EU candidate, Poland seemed more inclined to harden its eastern border.

A greater distinction between “hard and soft borders” was a feature of EU migration policy after 1996.\textsuperscript{119} The “sharper edges” of the external EU border would be “harder to penetrate from the outside”, while intra-Schengen borders became even “softer and more porous”.\textsuperscript{120} In the run-up to enlargement, the European Commission told Poland that the country’s “chances of joining the EU depended to a large degree on how well it could police its borders”.\textsuperscript{121} In Germany in particular, the hardening of Poland’s eastern border was seen as “necessary ... to erect a first serious obstacle to illegal migration and illegal trade from east to west”.\textsuperscript{122} German officials made it clear “that progress in opening the German-Polish border” depended

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Quoted in Bort 2002. ‘Illegal migration and cross-border crime’ p.196
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{117} Bort 2002. ‘Illegal migration and cross-border crime’ p.196
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{120} Grabbe 2006 The EU’s Transformative Power p.14
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{122} Bort 2002. ‘Illegal migration and cross-border crime’ p.195

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partly on “the effectiveness of Polish controls on their country’s eastern border”. But EU-mandated, more effective, control would choke off “the flourishing cross-border trade that had developed between eastern Poland and western Ukraine in the mid-1990s, opening Poland to the west at the expense of shutting its borders to the east”. 

Poland and Lithuania tightened controls on their eastern borders to comply with the _acquis communautaire_. Measures in the late 1990s led to a halving of border traffic between Poland and Ukraine. Warsaw was keen to allow Ukrainians continued access to the Poland for as long as possible before it would have to clamp down in the face of EU pressure, so in 1997, Ukraine and Poland initiated a visa-free regime. Part of Poland’s role in helping Ukraine advance economically and socially has been to provide jobs for Ukrainian migrant workers. Many Ukrainian households depend on the earnings of family members working in Poland as their main source of income. The fact that thousands of Ukrainians were able to experience life in “a large Slavic state where public institutions work and the free market functions” helped build societal “support for reform in Ukraine”. Poland introduced a new aliens law at the beginning of 1998. From then on, Ukrainians and Lithuanians crossing into Poland had to prove that they had sufficient means to sustain themselves while in the country. As a result, there was a significant fall in the amount of “undocumented trade in the borderland areas” and the number of “worker-tourists” also fell. Border traffic was curtailed, “reducing economic, political and civil societal interactions”.

After 1998, Belarusians were required to have Polish invitations or pre-paid hotel-vouchers if they wanted to enter Poland. In protest at the change, Belarus temporarily withdrew its ambassador from Warsaw. Polish traders who depended on cross-border traffic also protested. In eastern Poland, more than 1000 local traders protested against the “economic catastrophe” caused by tighter border controls. With the sharp fall in trading, incomes in 

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124 Ibid.
125 Mungiu-Pippidi 2002. ‘Facing the ‘desert of Tartars’:p.67
126 Ibid. p.18
129 Morawska 2002 p.171
130 Grabbe 2006 *The EU’s Transformative Power* p.19
131 Bort 2002. ‘illegal migration and cross-border crime’ p.195
132 Ibid.
eastern border towns fell dramatically and jobs were lost. At Warsaw’s “Russian bazaar”, trading fell almost a third after the introduction of the new aliens law and the new visa regime.

The Polish minority in Belarus, already persecuted by the Lukashenko regime, has also been disadvantaged by the new regulations. Since 1991, most Belarusian traders have had ties with Poland “and thus to a wider world of free trade and democratic institutions”. Some pro-democracy activists in Belarus worry that the tougher border regime could isolate them further. To “keep Belarusians from Poland is to close one democratic possibility in Belarus”.

In 1998, the number of recorded illegal crossings of Poland’s border with Germany fell by 40 per cent, yet “the overall number of illegal crossings of Polish borders increased”. Unlike the Polish-German border, the Polish-Ukrainian border “lacks the favourable circumstances of economic transition and European integration to nurture cooperation”. In 1999, there were only four official crossing-points on the Polish-Ukrainian border. The same year, there were 26 crossings open on the Polish-German border. The ability to replicate the effective arrangements along the Polish-German border along Poland’s border with Ukraine is limited by economic disparities and political problems “but also because the EU accession framework inhibits it”.

A “re-weighting of the relative strengths of the eastern and western borders of Poland, in favour of the eastern border” was in Poland’s interest and “the long-term interests of the other

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133 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Snyder 2003 The Reconstruction Of Nations p.292
137 Snyder 2003 The Reconstruction Of Nations p.292
139 Grabbe 2006 The EU’s Transformative Power p.19
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
member states”. For Poland, it was important to see extra resources and manpower on the country’s eastern border, “a fact recognised in the Polish Strategy on Integrated Border Management, which states that the eastern borders of Poland should have priority in all EU-related funding”.

By 1999, Polish customs officials began to police the border in line with EU expectations. German-trained Polish border units tightened surveillance and “curtailed the vibrant ‘bazaar economy’ that was flourishing in the border regions” at a political cost within Poland, contributing to a swing away from support for pro-EU parties to anti-EU parties which would form the Polish government a few years later. German leaders gave Poland “little credit for exercising tighter control, despite the fact that they recently experienced similar problems themselves and were considerably more conciliatory towards the Poles than they expect[ed] the Poles to be towards” Ukraine and Belarus. Polish police officers showed “signs of disillusionment”. Poles desired EU membership “for economic reasons but enthusiasm for EU values” waned. By 2000, only 59 per cent of Poles were in favour of EU membership, down from 80 per cent in 1996, with the negative impact of a tightened eastern border being part of the reason for this decline in euro-enthusiasm.

Under German pressure the Commission “suggested that free movement of labour would not be extended to new member states from the day of their accession”. By 2001, a perception grew that Poland might be excluded from the first eastern enlargement. The new Polish government decided a change of approach might accelerate the country’s progress. It decided to accept restrictions on Polish workers’ access to current EU member states’ labour markets for as much as seven years. It also eased restrictions on the sale of Polish land to foreigners.

144 Ibid. p.246
145 Mungiu-Pippidi 2002. ‘Facing the ‘desert of Tartars’ p.67
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
Ukraine was deeply affected by the introduction and extension of the Schengen arrangements. As early as March 1999, Ukraine announced it would implement visa regulations based on the Schengen arrangements and planned “to meet EU requirements on borders”. Until 2001, Poland had resisted pressure from Brussels to end its visa-free arrangements for Ukrainians, saying that it would meet its Schengen obligations when it joined the EU.

Poland did not follow EU demands to introduce even tougher visa requirements on visitors from its eastern neighbours, because the restrictions it had already implemented had hurt trade with those countries. By one estimate in 2001, the informal export trade was earning Poland £5.9 billion per annum. When new measures to seal the border with Ukraine were introduced, they had “a dramatic effect”, causing a fall of as much as a third in Polish-Ukrainian trade, according to at least one source. In November 2009, Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski and his Ukrainian counterpart committed themselves to working towards a smoother, more efficient border regime between their two countries. However, a year later, border infrastructure was still inadequate.

In 2003, a European Commission communication to the European Council and European Parliament said that Ukraine and Belarus “should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integrations and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – person, goods, services and capital”. From October 2003, new regulations governing the movement of people across Poland’s border with Belarus came into effect, a direct result of Poland’s decision to join the EU. When Poland joined the EU, its special arrangements with Ukraine ended. After May 2004, the number of Belarusians and Ukrainians crossing the Polish border fell to a fraction of what it had been in 2003.

154 Grabbe 2006 The EU’s Transformative Power p.17
155 Ibid.
156 Snyder 2003 The Reconstruction Of Nations p.292
157 Bort ‘Illegal migration and cross-border crime’ p.195
158 Grabbe 2006 The EU’s Transformative Power p.18
With Poland’s entry into the Schengen zone in December 2007, visa restrictions on Ukrainian visitors to Poland became much tougher. The reintroduction of visas for Ukrainians visiting Poland “drastically reduced cross-border trade and investment, causing severe economic problems, especially in the border regions”.161 Partly in response, the Polish government planned for the introduction of a “Karta Polaka” (“Pole’s Card”) for ethnic Poles living in the former Soviet Union. People who qualified for such a card would get a refund of visa fees and study rights in Poland. The main requirement for the award of the Karta Polaka is links with Poland, with knowledge and use of the Polish language being considered the foremost marker of Polishness. Those who have at least one Polish parent or two Polish grandparents can also qualify for a Karta Polaka.

Zielonka notes that “the Schengen system has evolved in a direction not originally envisaged”.162 Not only do hard borders make trade more difficult, they alienate the EU’s neighbours and jeopardise the “system of civic rights and freedoms”.163 In 2006, Legrain estimated that the EU as a whole had “seven or eight million illegal immigrants”.164 EU border controls can foster this illegality by raising the costs and risk of migration and encouraging labour laws to be broken. Zielonka sees “little evidence that attempts to control terrorism, international crime and migration at the EU’s rigid border are effective”.165 Instead, hard borders encourage more sophisticated organised cross-border crime operations.166 In the run-up to Polish accession, EU states seemed “more interested in promoting their own border surveillance technology than in sharing intelligence” to combat cross-border crime.167

Far from protecting society from the waves of immigration, the EU’s external border controls have helped “to undermine the fabric of law and order”, in the EU and in neighbouring countries.168 In the 21st century, many of the “new risks” facing Europe involve borders, “but the function of borders in security has changed”.169 Borders are no “longer used primarily to

161 Zielonka 2002 p.11
162 Ibid. p.2
163 Ibid. p.10
165 Zielonka 2002 Europe Unbound p.2
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid. p.11
169 Grabbe 2006 The EU’s Transformative Power p.iii
deter military attack and to keep unwilling populations [in]”.\textsuperscript{170} Instead, “borders have become multi-functional”.\textsuperscript{171} They are seen by many “as a discriminatory division between peoples”.\textsuperscript{172}

### Conclusion

Poland’s implementation of Schengen external controls on its eastern border had significant implications for Poland’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus. Erecting an external Schengen border presented “a major challenge to Poland’s eastern policies”.\textsuperscript{173} Polish leaders had “consistently presented their country as a bridge to Ukraine [and] Belarus. They had pursued “active bilateral political engagement with these countries”.\textsuperscript{174} Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Polish leaders have stressed that the stabilisation of Belarus and Ukraine is a key foreign policy goal for Poland. In particular, Poland has pushed for expanded EU links with Ukraine. Poland and Lithuania were allowed to enter the Schengen zone only after applying more vigorous controls on their eastern borders.

Freedom to travel, work and live in other EU countries has had a huge, largely positive impact on Poland and Lithuania, and on relations between the two countries. In contrast with the situation on Poland’s borders with Belarus and Ukraine, the border between EU members Lithuania and Poland is an open intra-Schengen one. For one Lithuanian businesswoman interviewed for this thesis in June 2008, the end of border controls between Lithuania and Poland has been a boon to cross-border interaction:

\begin{displayquote}
I think the main change is that ... the border with Poland is open. That is the main change in our life. ... We have a lot more contacts with Poland.\textsuperscript{175}
\end{displayquote}

On joining the EU in May 2004, Poles and Lithuanians gained access to the labour markets of several EU states, including Britain and Ireland. Belarusians and Ukrainians, locked out of the expanded EU, have not been able to migrate in such numbers. Not only have Ukrainians and Belarusians not been able to work freely in Western Europe, they have also lost the relatively easy access they had to jobs in Poland. The EU’s migration policy and border controls have

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{173} Ibid. p.18 \\
\textsuperscript{174} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{175} Interview with author in Alytus on 28 June 2008. \\
\end{footnotesize}
served to make more difficult interaction between Poles and their eastern neighbours, and have, in particular, negatively affected economic and social ties between eastern Poland and western parts of Belarus and Ukraine. The EU’s normative power, so successfully in evidence in Poland and Lithuania in the 1990s and early 2000s, is not operating at the strength it should be in the Union’s post-Soviet near abroad, specifically Ukraine and Belarus. In the interests of continuing the areal expansion of EU values and norms, every effort should be made to expand social and economic ties between EU peoples and the peoples of neighbouring states. One way of doing this is to allow easier access of young Belarusians and Ukrainians to Poland, Lithuania and the wider EU.

EU policies for dealing with its external borders have been at variance with the idea that regional integration is a way “of ensuring long-term stability and security”. The EU needs a smarter approach to border management on its eastern frontier. As a country at the front of the EU membership queue Poland was forced to adopt stricter immigration controls on Ukrainians and Belarusians. This contributed to tensions between Poland and its eastern neighbours and could hamper democratic consolidation in Ukraine and, potentially, democratisation in Belarus.  

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176 Grabbe 2006 The EU’s Transformative Power p.iii
177 Smith 2001 ‘Western Actors and the Promotion of Democracy’ p.56.
10 The media
This chapter presents overviews of the media in Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus, before looking at the media’s role in transmitting European values and norms through Poland to each of the other three countries, particularly in the context of EU enlargement. The focus is primarily on Poland’s media, which, in general, seem to have displayed more convergence with media in western Europe, in terms of reporting, ownership structure and lack of government interference, than have the media in post-Soviet countries. In the last 20 years, Poland’s media filtered and retransmitted western and EU ideology to Ukraine and Lithuania.

Since 1990, West European, notably German and Italian, companies have invested heavily in the media markets of the countries which joined the EU in 2004, including those of Poland and Lithuania. This level of investment has been impossible in Belarus and difficult in Ukraine.

During the 1990s and run-up to eastern enlargement, many media commentators highlighted the divide within postcommunist Europe between Western-orientated countries such as Poland and Lithuania on one hand, and the traditionally eastward-looking countries such as Belarus and Ukraine. In this, apart from highlighting a convenient prospective new border for integrating Europe, the media was also emphasising a divide that exists in Europe between countries whose predominant religion and traditions are within the sphere of Western Christianity and those whose history owes more to Byzantine and East Slavic traditions.

During the Cold War, Eastern Europe had been another world for Western Europeans. After 1990, the media helped to redefine what was understood by the term “European”. The media helped move the dividing line between the European “Us” and post-Soviet “Them” eastward, so that Poles and Balts moved from the Eastern European “Them” category to the Central European “Nearer to Us” category.

On balance, Western media’s portrayal of the region served to increase public support in Western Europe for the entry of Central Europe and the Baltic states into the EU. Some media in Poland took on a similar role with regard to Poles’ perceptions of their eastern neighbours, in particular the Lithuanians and Ukrainians. During the 1990s and 2000s, most of the mainstream media in Poland and Lithuania had a generally pro-EU attitude and helped transmit a pro-EU attitude to their audiences. In the run-up to the EU’s eastern enlargement, much of the media in Poland, notably the popular daily Gazeta Wyborcza, served to enlighten
Poles about the situation of their eastern neighbours and move beyond the stereotypes of the communist period. This “positive journalism” helped promote peaceful conflict-resolution and “stimulate the identification of common ground” between and within the societies of Central and Eastern Europe.¹

An overview of Poland’s media

To understand the role and position of Poland’s media for Polish society and the impact of that media on Poles’ perception of neighbouring countries and peoples in the 21st century, it is important to be aware of historical developments in the 1980s and 1990s. Here, the role of one popular Polish daily newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza, is instructive.

In the 1980s, during the last decade of communist rule in Central Europe, the Polish underground press prepared for its role in a postcommunist state. Poland’s Solidarity-led opposition recognised the power of the written word. It inherited from the communists a belief that the manipulation of the masses was both possible and desirable. The 1980-81 alliance of intelligentsia activists such as Adam Michnik and Bronislaw Geremek with Solidarity was the most powerful and enduring opposition force Poland’s communist government had had to deal with. Aid from the US and Western Europe was channelled to Poland’s opposition, mainly to Solidarity and closely allied groups. Access to a free media and the abolition of censorship were key demands of the Solidarity leadership during the 1980s.

In 1989, Solidarity won semi-democratic national elections and took power in Poland, helped by new access to national media and its own newspaper, Gazeta Wyborcza (whose name can be translated as “Election Newspaper”). In March 1990, Poland’s new democratically elected Sejm closed down the communist-controlled Robotnicza Spółdzielnia Wydawnicza (Workers’ Publishing Cooperative), which had controlled and distributed Polish newspapers for 40 years.

In the early 1990s, Gazeta Wyborcza was a strong supporter of both pluralism and the drive to independence in Poland’s neighbours. Edited by Michnik and with substantial US financial

backing, Wyborcza represented the liberal, most pro-EU, voice within Poland’s mainstream press, complemented to some extent later by new commercial radio stations, such as RMF-FM. For many Poles, Wyborcza’s main competitors were seen as being rather staid and old-fashioned (broadsheet Rzeczpospolita for instance), or too closely aligned to either reactionary right-wing nationalist (Gazeta Polska) or postcommunist (Trybuna) political groupings.

During the first half of the 1990s, Gazeta Wyborcza featured a slogan saying “Nie ma wolności bez Solidarności” (“There’s no freedom without Solidarity”) under the masthead until President Wałęsa banned the paper’s use of the Solidarity logo after it supported Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s bid for the presidency. Despite the early 1990s spat between then President Lech Wałęsa and Wyborcza’s editor-in-chief Adam Michnik, Gazeta Wyborcza consolidated its position as Poland’s most-read daily. This is despite the fact that the party to which its editorial line and owners were closest – the liberal, pro-Western Freedom Union – hovered at only 5 per cent to 15 per cent support in opinion polls throughout the mid-1990s, and would eventually be merged with other political groupings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Date of launch</th>
<th>Average Print Run in 1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Super Express</td>
<td>November 1991</td>
<td>461,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gazeta Wyborcza</td>
<td>1989 (as legal paper)</td>
<td>450,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rzeczpospolita</td>
<td>1940s</td>
<td>274,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurier Polski</td>
<td>September 1957</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sztandar Młodych</td>
<td>May 1950</td>
<td>130,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Życie Warszawy</td>
<td>October 1944</td>
<td>128,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trybuna</td>
<td>February 1990*</td>
<td>100,000-120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Słowo-Dziennik Katolicki</td>
<td>January 1993</td>
<td>60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Express Wieczorny</td>
<td>May 1946</td>
<td>40,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Trybuna is the revamped Trybuna Ludu, which dates from the communist takeover of Poland

Table 10.1 Poland’s main national dailies in the 1990s

By the mid-1990s, with its role as the only source of real news available to many Poles superseded, Gazeta Wyborcza began broadening its market appeal to increase profitability. By the mid-1990s, the newspaper had a circulation of about half a million. No longer associated with the Solidarity movement, it had become a national newspaper. For many years, Wyborcza was Poland’s most popular newspaper, until the circulations of sensationalist

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2 Catalogue of the Polish Media 1995
tabloids such as *Super Express* and, later, *Fakt* began to exceed it. Various regional editions of *Wyborcza* appeared during the 1990s. In the early 21st century, *Gazeta Wyborcza* remains Poland’s most popular serious daily newspaper, appealing to a wide section of the population. Its readership tends to be younger on average than other serious dailies such as *Rzeczpospolita*.

*Gazeta Wyborcza*’s political slant can be described as mildly centre-left. Throughout the postcommunist period in Poland, led by Michnik, the daily has tended to support the liberal and centrist parties which grew out of the intellectual wing of the Solidarity movement, although it has remained open to other forces in Polish politics, including the postcommunist SLD and its erstwhile leader, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, Poland’s president from 1995 to 2005.

The 1990s were a turbulent period for the Polish media, as Poland became increasingly westernised and “Europeanised”. In the 1990s, print runs of Polish newspapers were lower than in most west European countries. Faced with declining readerships, Poland’s media tried to adapt. For example, by 1997, a breakaway from *Życie Warszawy*, a tabloid called simply *Życie* (which had a print run in the late 1990s of about 140,000) made inroads into the market. But within a few years, both *Życie Warszawy* and *Życie* were forced to shut due to lack of readership and poor management. Many papers were put up for sale at auction, drawing the interest of Western investors.

Foreign-owned titles in Poland were frequently printed abroad, thereby avoiding local taxes. The papers were then sold cheaply, undercutting locally owned competitors and thus took a lot of money out of the country.3 By 2002, foreign concerns owned many of Poland’s 50 daily newspapers.4 Although the country’s expanding print and electronic media were independent, media empires controlled much of Polish journalistic output. By 2001 *Gazeta Wyborcza*’s founders controlled 14 local radio stations and printing presses and had significant internet interests.5

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5 Ibid.
By the mid-1990s, Poland’s press was among the world’s freest, ranked by Freedom House between the Czech Republic and Japan, and slightly ahead of Britain, Canada and France.\(^6\) This surprising result was a sign of Poland’s dramatic progress in developing an open society since 1989. Press freedom declined somewhat as the 1990s wore on, with a reduction of diversity of media ownership. During the late 1990s, Poland’s media developed a reputation for investigative journalism and the country’s newspapers were zealous in exposing corruption. For example, in 2000, Polish newspapers reported that about 200 judges were being investigated for corruption, a figure that seems to have been an exaggeration.\(^7\) Only 65 judges were under investigation by the end of 2000.\(^8\)

However, Polish government and state officials exerted increased pressure on Poland’s public and state-owned media from the late 1990s. By 2002, although the Polish constitution guaranteed press freedom and forbade censorship, Poland’s libel law was treating slander as a criminal offence. Journalists faced a growing number of lawsuits. Seats on regulatory agencies and directorships of state-owned media became political appointments.\(^9\)

Poland’s robust political and social debate ensured though that in the early 2000s a new, much debated, Polish media law remained in draft form for years. The proposed law’s critics argued it was “motivated by successive governments’ desire to strengthen control over public media and to rein in private sector media through constraints on ownership”.\(^10\) The latter months of 2005 saw a reorganisation of Poland’s State Committee on Radio and Television, with a new law reappointing an entirely new committee. Media advocates criticised these changes for the accelerated manner in which they were conducted, the lack of public consultations and what they called an unclear vision for the future of the media.\(^11\)

State-owned Polish Television and its five channels remain the major source of information for Poles, but the country also sustains a number of private television stations, among them TVN and Polsat, which have gained a considerable share of viewers. In 2006 about a third of the population accessed the internet. During the last decade, there were no reports of the government restricting internet use.

\(^8\) Ibid. p.75
\(^9\) Ibid.
\(^10\) Freedom House 2002 ‘Poland (2002)’
Poland’s media, the European Union and neighbours

While the Polish print media’s presentation of neighbouring countries varied between publications and even between issues, Poland’s media, in general, presented the EU in a positive light. With *Gazeta Wyborcza* in the vanguard, most Polish newspapers, television and radio, adopted a largely positive attitude towards the EU in the 1990s and early 2000s, although linked to extremist groupings did not.

Since its founding, *Gazeta Wyborcza* has tended to portray Lithuania and Ukraine in a much more positive light than those nations were portrayed by most other Polish media. In common with other Polish media, *Wyborcza* has generally been critical of the Belarus regime, in particular the regime’s clampdown on civil liberties, press freedom and the Polish minority in Belarus. In 2006, an EU-funded radio station began broadcasting into Belarus to offer Belarusians independent news. The Polish Government itself has sponsored a number of media initiatives related to Belarus, including a Belarusian-language radio station, Radio Racyja, which broadcasts from Poland into Belarus.

Some Polish media, notably the anti-Western and anti-EU Radio Maryja, run by ultra-conservative factions of Poland’s Roman Catholic Church, have discouraged positive relations with neighbouring peoples. In the run-up to the EU referendum in Poland, most of the Polish media backed a Yes vote. The only mass medium firmly in the anti-EU camp was Radio Maryja.\(^\text{12}\) In the 1990s, with almost 3 million, mostly older, poorly educated listeners, Radio Maryja mobilised the religious right, which accounts for about one in 10 Poles. After 2000, however, Radio Maryja was pressured by the broadly pro-EU Catholic hierarchy to tone down its anti-EU stance.

An overview of Ukraine’s media

The Ukrainian media began to develop a separate existence when Ukraine achieved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. By 2008, Ukraine had 647 television stations

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and 524 radio stations.\textsuperscript{13} As is the case in other postcommunist countries, television is the dominant media in Ukraine. The three main public broadcasting companies are the First National Television Channel, the National Radio Company of Ukraine and the State Television and Radio Company. The main non-state broadcasters are listed in Table 10.2. Commercial networks attract most viewers.\textsuperscript{14}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TV channels</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inter</td>
<td><a href="http://www.inter.ua">www.inter.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novy</td>
<td><a href="http://www.novy.tv">www.novy.tv</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1+1</td>
<td><a href="http://www.1plus1.ua">www.1plus1.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Kanal</td>
<td><a href="http://www.5.u">www.5.u</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STB</td>
<td><a href="http://www.stb.ua">www.stb.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRK Ukarina</td>
<td><a href="http://kanalukraina.tv">http://kanalukraina.tv</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTV</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ictv.ua">www.ictv.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTN</td>
<td><a href="http://www.ntn.tv">www.ntn.tv</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radio stations</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gala Radio</td>
<td><a href="http://www.galaradio.com">www.galaradio.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europa FM</td>
<td><a href="http://www.europa.fm">www.europa.fm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio Svoboda</td>
<td><a href="http://www.radiosvoboda.org">www.radiosvoboda.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit FM</td>
<td><a href="http://www.hitfm.ua">www.hitfm.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA-FM</td>
<td><a href="http://www.era-fm.net">www.era-fm.net</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.2 Main broadcasting stations in Ukraine, 2009\textsuperscript{15}

The main print media are listed in Table 10.3. Most are in the Ukrainian language, though some, such as Zerkalo Nedeli are available in English and Russian versions online. The Kyiv Post is Ukraine’s main English-language newspaper. Several of the biggest-selling tabloids publish only in Russian. As of 2009, Ukraine had four main news agencies: the National News Agency of Ukraine (Ukrinform), Unian, Interfax-Ukraine and Ukrainian News.

Despite an expanding advertising market, many media outlets rely on the support of wealthy sponsors. Under former President Leonid Kuchma, some opposition papers were closed and several journalists investigating high-profile crimes died in mysterious circumstances.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.
Prominent journalist Georgiy Gongadze disappeared in September 2000; his body was found two months later. A parliamentary investigative commission said it believed that Kuchma was one of the organisers of the abduction.\textsuperscript{16} The former president denied his involvement in the crime.\textsuperscript{17}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media Title</th>
<th>Website</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holos Ukrayiny</td>
<td><a href="http://www.golos.com.ua">www.golos.com.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dzerkalo</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dt.ua">www.dt.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Den</td>
<td><a href="http://www.day.kiev.ua">www.day.kiev.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Po-Ukrayinsky</td>
<td><a href="http://www.gazeta.ua">www.gazeta.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td><a href="http://www.investgazeta.net">www.investgazeta.net</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korrespondent</td>
<td><a href="http://www.korrespondent.net">www.korrespondent.net</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommersant</td>
<td><a href="http://www.kommersant.ua">www.kommersant.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segodnya</td>
<td><a href="http://www.segodnya.ua">www.segodnya.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td><a href="http://24.ua">http://24.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakty i</td>
<td><a href="http://www.facts.kiev.ua">www.facts.kiev.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silski Visti</td>
<td><a href="http://www.silskivisti.kiev.ua">www.silskivisti.kiev.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vecherniye Vesti</td>
<td>vv.com.ua</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrayina</td>
<td><a href="http://www.umoloda.kiev.ua">www.umoloda.kiev.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zerkalo Nedeli</td>
<td><a href="http://www.mw.ua">www.mw.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrayinska</td>
<td><a href="http://www.pravda.com.ua">www.pravda.com.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyiv Post</td>
<td><a href="http://www.kyivpost.com">www.kyivpost.com</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.3 Main print media titles in Ukraine, 2009\textsuperscript{18}

Ukrainian media were prominent actors during the Orange Revolution. This was particularly the case with the internet and television stations. Before the Orange Revolution, Ukraine was dominated by three wealthy regional oligarchic groups which enjoyed close connections with President Leonid Kuchma and owned media empires. Non-governmental media organisations include Internews-Ukraine, International Public Organisation (www.internews.ua), the Ukrainian Association of Press Publishers (www.uapp.org) and the International Philanthropic Foundation (www.openukraine.org/ua). Mainstream newspapers were government-controlled and of poor quality in the early 2000s, and Ukrainian oppositionists,

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.  
young people and eventually many others, turned to the internet, particularly the online publication *Ukrainska pravda*, which served as the main news medium of the Orange Revolution. A few years earlier, the same website played an important role in events leading up to the Orange Revolution, particularly when its first editor-in-chief, Georgiy Gongadze, was murdered, apparently on the orders of the President. After the Orange Revolution, the state’s and media owners’ influence on editorial policy weakened, although politicians continue to launch partisan attacks on opponents via the media. After the 2004 Orange Revolution, the influence of the state and media owners on editorial policy became weaker. However, partisan attacks on political opponents continued to be made on some TV channels, in newspapers or on websites.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Website</th>
<th>URL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Ukrayinska Pravda</em></td>
<td><a href="http://www.pravda.com.ua">www.pravda.com.ua</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glavred</td>
<td><a href="http://glavred.info/">http://glavred.info/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From-Ua.com</td>
<td><a href="http://www.from-ua.com">www.from-ua.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obozrevatel</td>
<td><a href="http://www.obozrevatel.com">www.obozrevatel.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ForUm</td>
<td><a href="http://www.for-ua.com">www.for-ua.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBC</td>
<td><a href="http://www.rbc.ua/">www.rbc.ua/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LigaBusinessInform</td>
<td><a href="http://news.liga.net/ukr">http://news.liga.net/ukr</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.4 Main internet news media in Ukraine, 2009

The number of Ukrainians using the internet increased significantly during the latter months of 2004. According to a December 2004 summary, Ukraine had 5.9 million internet users, 12 per cent of the population. In October 2004 that number had been about 4 million. In 2006, Ukraine had 5.5 million internet users in a population of about 46 million. By 2008, there were between 6.7 million and 10.4 million internet users in Ukraine. The internet has

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20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
24 Prytula, O. 2006 ‘The Ukrainian Media Rebellion’ in Aslund & McFaul (eds.) 2006 *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough* p.120
25 Ibid.
26 CIA World Factbook. 2008
27 BBC News 2009 Country Profile: Ukraine
become a popular source of news, with more than a dozen leading sites of various shades of opinion.

Of note in Table 10.5 are the relatively high number of mobile phone subscribers, television stations and, particularly, the high circulation of daily newspapers given in the data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Radios</th>
<th>45,050,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Televsions</td>
<td>18,050,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with television</td>
<td>97.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television stations</td>
<td>647</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile phone subscribers</td>
<td>17,214,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper circulation</td>
<td>8,683,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily newspaper circulation</td>
<td>8,683,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of daily newspaper titles</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cinema attendance</td>
<td>5,138,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10.5 Ukrainian media-related statistics, 2003

Ukraine’s media, Poland and the EU

People-to-people contacts are a primary source of information about the EU for little more than a third of Ukrainians (36 per cent in 2006). Visa and other restrictions on the movement of Ukrainians to the EU explain this relatively low figure. In contrast, Ukraine’s mass media is a primary source of EU-related information for many Ukrainians, with as many as 61 per cent of Ukrainians obtaining EU-related information from their country’s mass media. Unlike the case in Poland, Ukraine’s media has not thus far acted as a transmitter of EU values and norms to the Ukrainian population. Ukrainian affairs feature regularly in Polish newspapers. In contrast, in the Ukrainian media, at least before the Orange Revolution, there

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30 Ibid.
was comparatively little coverage of Poland, either in newspapers or on television.\textsuperscript{31} Shumylo advocates “more advanced training for the Ukrainian journalists to turn them into an effective, impartial transmitter of the EU-related information”\textsuperscript{32}

**An overview of Lithuania’s media**

Lithuania’s media has followed a similar path to Poland’s, with liberalisation and a growth of private media in the early 1990s followed by increased concentration of ownership in later years. Lithuania’s media sector is competitive and generally free from direct government interference, as might be expected in a northern EU country. Lithuania’s constitution and two laws regulate mass media competition and activity. The only subsidy granted to Lithuanian media is a fund for the media financed from the state budget.\textsuperscript{33} The revised version of the Code of Ethics of Lithuanian Journalists and Publishers, adopted in 2005, lays down the main ethical provisions for media in the country.\textsuperscript{34} An ombudsmen and Commission of Journalism and Publisher Ethics regulate the industry.\textsuperscript{35}

Lithuania has no laws regulating the media market and lacks an anti-monopoly law. Thus, by default, the state allows both monopoly rights and cross ownership.\textsuperscript{36} As a result, large sectors of the media belong to conglomerates. During the early years of the 21st century, the print media attracted foreign, especially Scandinavian and Estonian, investors.\textsuperscript{37} All newspapers are privately owned. Fourteen dailies are published in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{38} As in other European countries, tabloids have the highest circulation figures among the newspapers, but the total number of newspaper readers in Lithuania is much lower than that of television viewers.\textsuperscript{39} There are as many as 543 published magazine and other periodical titles, with a total yearly circulation of almost 60 million copies.\textsuperscript{40}


\textsuperscript{33} European Journalism Centre 2009 ‘Media Landscape - Lithuania’ Retrieved on 13/1/ 2009 from www.ejc.net/media_landscape/article/lithuania

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
magazines) and English (four newspapers and 34 magazines).\(^{41}\) There are two news agencies in Lithuania: ELTA and BNS (Baltic News Service). BNS, the first private news agency in Lithuania, is by far the bigger

Lithuania has three public radio channels.\(^{42}\) There are 47 commercial radio stations in Lithuania, including 11 national, 7 regional and 30 local radio broadcasters.\(^{43}\) With the exception of the national broadcaster, all radio stations and television channels are commercial entities that have been established since 1990.

The television market began to develop after foreign capital (mainly from the United States, Britain and Scandinavia) poured into Lithuania. The country’s television market has become increasingly fragmented. By late 2008, Lithuania had 31 television stations. Apart from two state channels, all the stations are privately owned and operated. A large proportion of Lithuanians are exposed to international broadcast media on a daily basis. Polish television channels are readily available in Vilnius and the surrounding area and are watched by many members of the Polish minority. They play a role in the “normalising” of relations between the two countries and peoples. The proportion of Lithuanians able to watch multi-channel television (cable or satellite) exceeded 40 per cent in 2005.\(^{44}\) Digital television broadcasting started at the end of 2007 in the country’s five largest cities, its development greatly dependent on state policy. In 2008, analogue television was still the most widespread way of watching television in Lithuania but by the beginning of 2009 a digital terrestrial television network covered almost all of the country’s territory.\(^{45}\) The gradual switch-off of analogue television is scheduled to start in 2012.\(^{46}\) The advertising market of both television and radio grew every year between 2000 and 2008.\(^{47}\)

Internet use in Lithuania is low compared to the European average. In 2008 less than a third of Lithuanians had an internet connection, a figure which was much lower than the equivalent in Belarus.\(^{48}\) After 2000, many Lithuanian media websites were turned into news portals.

\(^{41}\) Ibid.  
\(^{42}\) Ibid.  
\(^{43}\) Ibid.  
\(^{44}\) Ibid.  
\(^{45}\) Ibid.  
\(^{46}\) Ibid.  
\(^{47}\) Ibid.  
\(^{48}\) Ibid.
Examples of these include Verslo žinios and Lietuvos rytas. Broadcasters have also created their own mini portals. For example, Lithuanian national broadcaster’s LRT. It provides domestic and foreign news. The Law on Electronic Communications, which came into force in 2004, applies to internet content.

From 1990 onwards, Lithuania’s mass media enjoyed high levels of public confidence. Polls showed that the media and the Catholic Church were the only social institutions that Lithuanians trusted. In the late 1990s, as many as four in five Lithuanians believed what the country’s mass media told them. Although Lithuanians in that decade were less pro-EU than were Poles, it was clear that if Lithuania’s media began a campaign to develop pro-EU sentiment among Lithuanians, “public opinion would probably change”.

Not all parts of Lithuanian society were positive about the country’s national media. As far as the media in both Lithuania and Poland is concerned, the one major sore point between the two countries is the status and situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania. In May 2008, the Association of Poles in Lithuania (Związek Polaków na Litwie or ZPL) wrote to the government of Lithuania to complain about anti-Polish rhetoric in Lithuania’s mainstream media, a move extensively reported by media in Poland. That year’s parliamentary elections were cited as a motive. The ZPL asked for better treatment of ethnic minorities in Lithuania, lodged a legal complaint and appealed for investigation of the issue.

Overall, Lithuania’s media fills an information and entertainment role similar to that filled by media in Poland and other EU countries and quite different from the role of Belarusian media.

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49 Verslo žinios www.vz.lt and Lietuvos rytas www.lrytas.lt
50 European Journalism Centre 2009 ‘Media Landscape - Lithuania
53 Ibid.
54 Tapinas 1998 ‘Integration of Lithuania into the European Union and what the mass media can do’
An overview of the media in Belarus

The media in Belarus has a very different profile to the media in the other three countries. In Belarus, the state continues to hold a virtual monopoly of the media. While Poland and Lithuania have comparatively free media, and Ukraine’s media is largely controlled by oligarchic groups, the Lukashenko regime maintains firm control over media in Belarus. The Belarus regime’s ideology portrays the West, chiefly the United States, but to a great extent also Poland and the European Union, as enemies or, at least, not friends of Belarus.

In 2005, the limited amount of press freedom that did exist in Belarus diminished further as the government tightened its control over the media leading up to the March 2006 presidential elections. Disregarding constitutional provisions for freedom of the press, December 2005 amendments to the penal code made criticism of the president and government a criminal offence punishable by up to three years in prison. These amendments permitted the jailing of those who presented “false information” concerning Belarusian policies to foreign entities.

In May 2005, a Lukashenko decree banned all non-state media from using the words “national” or “Belarus” in their names, in effect forcing many titles to re-register. The courts often sentenced local and foreign journalists who reported on opposition events. In 2005, Belarusian journalists who covered rallies demanding rights for the SPB were jailed for weeks for “participating in an unauthorised gathering”.\(^{57}\) Courts restricted criticism of the government by being pedantic in their interpretation of libel laws and forcing independent newspapers to pay high fines for libel. The twice-weekly Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta was fined US$22,800 in 2005 for raising queries about another publication’s article about Lukashenko, while Narodnaja Volja, a leading independent newspaper, was found guilty of defamation and forced to pay about US$53,500 in damages.\(^{58}\)

The written press in Belarus includes both privately owned and state-owned newspapers. As of 2009, state-owned newspapers account for about 85 per cent of total circulation.\(^{59}\) The newspaper with the highest circulation is state-owned Sovetskaya Belarussia – Belarus segodnya, with a circulation of 500,000.\(^{60}\) Other newspapers include Rehijanalnaya Hazeta, Respublika, a daily newspaper published by the Cabinet of Ministers, Beloruskaya Gazeta,

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\(^{57}\) Freedom House 2006 ‘Belarus 2006’
\(^{58}\) Ibid.
\(^{59}\) European Journalism Centre 2009 ‘Media Landscape - Belarus’.
\(^{60}\) Ibid.
Sovietskaya byelorussia, Svaboda, Komsomolskaya Pravda v. Belarusi, private newspaper Intex-press, Hantsavitski Chais, Brestskiy Kuryer and Inform-progulka.\textsuperscript{61} In 2008, there were about 30 privately owned political newspapers operating in Belarus.\textsuperscript{62}

About half of these non-state-supported periodicals are excluded from state-backed means of distribution such as kiosks and subscription.\textsuperscript{63} State-run newspapers have the advantage of administrative support and financing, an amount which increased every year in the early 2000s.\textsuperscript{64} Non-state media face strict supervision from local executive bodies. In order to survive and continue their work, Belarusian journalists are reviving traditions of underground printing, publishing material without any official registration.\textsuperscript{65}

The Belarusian State University is the only university in the country which provides journalism training.\textsuperscript{66} The non-governmental Belarusian Association of Journalists, a non-partisan and non-profit professional union of media workers, seeks to defend journalists’ rights and campaigns to promote the freedom of expression in Belarus.\textsuperscript{67}

Belarus’ independent press is systematically harassed. In 2005, the Belarusian KGB and police raided the homes of many editors and journalists. Journalist Vasil Hrodnikau was found dead with a head wound in his locked flat. Authorities excluded homicide and shut the case.\textsuperscript{68} The inquiry into the murder of Veronika Cherkasova, a journalist investigating Belarus arms sales to Iraq, was shelved in December 2005 when the court declared it to be a case of domestic violence in which the police would be incapable of identifying the assailant. In April, just before the UN was due to comment on Belarus’ human rights record, prosecutors reopened the inquiry into the July 2000 abduction of cameraman Dmitry Zavadsky.

The state uses other measures to harass independent media. Authorities routinely pressure managers of state enterprises to advertise only in state media. They pressure distributors and printing presses to restrict printing access for independent media. Courts ordered the liquidation of two independent publishing companies in 2006 and state-owned newspaper

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid.
distribution companies ceased distribution of numerous privately owned papers.\textsuperscript{69} Many independent journalists practise self-censorship. Belarus has about nine press organisations. Most run their own websites, six of which are available in English.\textsuperscript{70} Since 2000, internet use has increased enormously within Belarus, as can be seen in Table 10.6. Belarus has six radio and television channels which can only be found online.\textsuperscript{71} National telecommunications agency Beltelcom is the only internet service provider, allowing the regime to watch over internet usage and block sensitive content. Officials have claimed that the internet has “a negative influence on state ideology and would incite public disorder”.\textsuperscript{72}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|l|l|}
\hline
Year & Users & Population & % of population with internet access \\
\hline
2000 & 180,000 & 10,073,600 & 1.8 \\
2003 & 1,391,900 & 9,755,025 & 14.3 \\
2005 & 2,461,000 & 9,714,257 & 25.3 \\
2007 & 5,477,500 & 9,678,864 & 56.6 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Internet penetration in Belarus, 2000-2007\textsuperscript{73}}
\end{table}

The licence needed for television broadcasting is available at the Republican Commission on Television and Radio Broadcasting.\textsuperscript{74} The chair of this group is the Belarusian minister of information. In order to start broadcasting, groups have to meet stringent criteria.

As political relations between Poland and Belarus worsened in 2005, Polish and other EU reporters in Belarus faced greater difficulties. During the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus, the government suppressed the media, shutting down many newspapers. That year the government jailed more than 30 Belarusian journalists and 12 foreign journalists from countries such as Poland, Ukraine, Canada and even Russia.\textsuperscript{75} They were arrested for covering the elections and opposition demonstrations. By law, citizens of Belarus are guaranteed freedom of speech and information. But the president largely controls the content of media and the appointment of senior editors of state media. With no laws on freedom of

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} These websites are the Belarusian Information Company, Belarusian Telegraph Agency, Ecopress Information Agency, Vladimir Grevtsov Agency, Belarus Bureau Prime-Tass and Belarusian News Agency Belta.
\textsuperscript{71} European Journalism Centre 2009 ‘Media Landscape - Belarus’
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Freedom House 2006. ‘Belarus 2006’
expression, the government has become co-owner of nine mass media publications. Most of the press and all national radio and television are controlled by the government. 

Svaboda, Minsk’s last main Belarusian-language newspaper and only independent weekly, was banned in November 1997, on the eve of that year’s general election.76 Two liberally oriented programmes on state radio were also silenced and their producers fired.77

Two national newspapers, Ezhednevnik and Neopolis, publish only online.78 More recently, the internet has played a significant part in the democratisation process in Ukraine and Belarus.79 All radio channels, television channels and newspapers also publish on the internet.80 Belarus has a lively blogging scene. Many blogs about the political situation in Belarus have been created outside the country.81 Belarusian authorities frequently block independent internet sites. Sometimes, the authorities redirect website visitors to pro-government websites.82 Beltelecom has a monopoly on telecommunications within Belarus. Of the 216 media outlets operating in Belarus in 2009, 183 are state-owned.83 The National State TV and Radio Company dominates the broadcast market. Non-resident foreigners are not allowed to set up a television or radio station in Belarus. The only producer of broadcast news is the Belarusian Television and Radio Company, which runs 27 television channels.84 Most channels broadcast in either Belarusian or Russian. Some broadcast in English.

**Belarusian media, Poland and the European Union**

For media in Poland and Lithuania, the situation in Belarus is of more pressing importance than it is for media in west European countries. The European Commission in 2006 funded a consortium of Polish, Lithuanian, German, Russian and Belarusian broadcasters to increase access to independent news via radio, television and the internet.85 The two-year project gave rise to European Radio for Belarus and Radio Baltic Waves. These stations’ broadcasts are directed at young people.

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77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Pridham, G. 2005 Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe Palgrave Macmillan Basingstoke, UK p.5
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Among these are www.politoboz.com, blog.inf.by, 19-03.blogspot.com, and radzima.info
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
Poland has sponsored a number of media initiatives related to Belarus, including the Belarusian-language Radio Racja (Radio Reason), which broadcasts from Białystok into Belarus.\(^86\) Launched in 1999, Radio Racja suspended operations in 2002 because of a lack of funding. Following “the flawed elections in Belarus in 2004”, the EU increased support for Belarusian NGOs and civil society.\(^87\) In 2005, €8.7 million was earmarked for the support of democracy and human rights in Belarus.\(^88\)

In January 2006, the European Commission announced which media consortium would undertake a €2 million project to increase access in Belarus to independent sources of news and information.\(^89\) The selected consortium, led by Media Consulta (Germany) includes implementing partners from Poland (European Radio for Belarus), Lithuania (Radio Baltic Wave), Belarus (journalists, civil society and NGOs), and Russia, which would broadcast by satellite from Germany.\(^90\) It would be supported by a number of EU NGOs specialised in the media sector. The two-year project covered radio and television broadcasts, internet, support to the Belarusian written press and training of journalists.\(^91\) Broadcasting of radio and television programmes started in February 2006 before the presidential elections in Belarus. Lithuanian-based Baltic Waves, run by a team of Polish, Lithuanian, German, Russian and Belarusian journalists, broadcast a daily hour-long bulletin of news, music and information on Europe.\(^92\) In March 2006, at about the same time as the launch of Baltic Waves, Radio Racja was brought back on air.\(^93\)

In 2006, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, warned that “tight controls on the media in Belarus make it hard for Belarusians to find independent sources of information”.\(^94\) Ferrero-Waldner looked “forward to the day when Belarus will have its own free media, because this is crucial to the

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\(^87\) European Union 2006. ‘New EU broadcasting initiative for Belarus’


\(^90\) Ibid.

\(^91\) Ibid.

\(^92\) Ibid.

\(^93\) Ibid.

functioning of a democracy”. In response, a Belarus foreign ministry spokesman said: “If our EU partners have money to cast to the winds, that’s up to them.”

Thus far, owing to the unfavourable conditions for the propagation of EU norms and values in Belarus, as in other sectors, the EU’s impact on Poland’s relations with Belarus with regard to the media has not as positive as would have been hoped. This stands in sharp contrast to the developments in Poland and Lithuania, and to a lesser extent in Ukraine, where the local conditions have been more favourable to allowing a freeing of national media and their use in the transmission of EU values and norms to the societies in each of those countries.

95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
11 The Future
The EU’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours will develop and change over the coming decade. Poland and Lithuania are now firmly part of the EU and the Schengen area. The EU’s border can be seen as a rolling zone. As of 2010, the EU includes 27 states. Several more states are set to join the Union over the next decade. Any of the EU’s immediate neighbours could be considered as a prospective member state. Eventually, all of the west Balkan countries will become part of the EU. Several other European countries are interested in joining the EU at some time in the future, including Ukraine.

The present configuration of states and borders in Central and Eastern Europe dates only from the early 1990s. Few national borders in the region are older than a century. A century ago, Lithuania’s capital Vilnius was a largely ethnically Polish city in the Russian Empire. Over the past century Vilnius has passed from Russian to German (1916) to Lithuanian (1918) to Soviet (1920) to Polish (1921) to Soviet (September 1939) to Lithuanian (October 1939), back to Soviet (1940), to German (1941), to Soviet (1944) and finally back to Lithuanian rule (1991). During most of that time it was not the capital of a nation state. Poland’s borders with Ukraine and Belarus were fixed along their present alignment in the 1940s. It is not impossible to imagine that there would be circumstances where those borders might again change.

**Poland and Lithuania together in Europe**

Poland’s role as the leading nation among the postcommunist EU states is likely to continue. The close relationship between fellow EU members Poland and Lithuania is likely to strengthen. The only significant source of tension between the two countries is the treatment of the Polish minority in Lithuania. However, it is likely that those tensions will continue to be handled peacefully and with a positive attitude from the leaderships of both countries. Extending the pattern of treatment of minorities in western EU countries to new members like Lithuania should mean that Lithuania’s Polish minority will be afforded enhanced rights in future years.

It is probable that over the next 10-20 years, Poland’s political system will further mature and more moderate and progressive parties and leaders will come to the fore.

In 2002, one analyst noted that even if the economies of Poland and Lithuania grew at 6 per cent a year, their per capita gross national products would require a dozen years to reach the
2002 levels of GNP per capita in Portugal or Greece, the poorest of the EU-15 member states.\(^1\) Poland and Lithuania would need 20 years to attain the 2002 GNP levels of Austria or Britain.\(^2\) If, in the more likely scenario that Poland and Lithuania developed at their median rate of the late 1990s, it would take them 30 years to catch up. Even with more EU financial assistance, Poland and Lithuania are unlikely to maintain such a high growth rate, for various reasons, including a fast-growing trade deficit and too-slow increases in productivity. With the growth of the Polish and Lithuanian economies, the large discrepancy in wages between those countries and “old Europe” will diminish, but it will still be wide and “a push/pull factor” for many years and so it is likely that there will be net migration from Poland and Lithuania to western Europe for years to come, although that net migration should lessen as the relative wealth disparity diminishes.\(^3\)

**Poland’s relations with Ukraine and Belarus**

EU leaders are uncertain not only about how deeply existing EU member states should be enmeshed but also about how far the EU should expand. Following the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, the EU is suffering from enlargement fatigue. Public opinion in the EU does not favour further EU enlargement. The EU’s final eastern border, if there is to be one, has not been determined. In the 1990s, the ambiguity concerning Europe’s borders helped the EU to stabilise its neighbourhood. But in the 21\(^{st}\) century, that ambiguity has become a source of instability for Ukraine, and potentially, Belarus.\(^4\)

“Although participation in the ENP does not formally exclude future accession, the widespread belief is that it does *de facto* define the frontiers of Europe.”\(^5\) It is important to work out what to do with those countries left outside the EU following the 2004 and 2007 rounds of enlargement. Moving towards EU candidature would be the best path for both Ukraine and Belarus. If the EU is permanently closed to Ukraine and Belarus, the outlook for those two countries is bleak. The EU must seek new ways to prevent instability in Ukraine and Belarus. Some commentators have argued for Poland to take a more prominent advocacy

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\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid. p.165-166


role for Ukraine and Belarus, in a similar manner to the way Germany acted as an advocate for Poland and other Central European countries in the 1990s.⁶

In 2003, the European Commission acknowledged that in the decades ahead the EU would have to work with its neighbours

\[\text{to reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic integration [and] intensified political and cultural relations}.\]⁷

The EU will have to work within an adaptable framework based on progress in political and economic reform made by Ukraine and Belarus. If Brussels is not ready to admit Ukraine and Belarus to the EU as full members, it might have to devise forms of associate membership that give the two countries improved access to EU markets.⁸

Russia’s relations with Belarus and Ukraine will become more critical as Moscow seeks to mitigate its “perceived isolation, leading either to heightened tension” or an embattled sense of EU unity.⁹ In the coming decade, Ukraine and Belarus will need to resolve “questions about their relationship with Russia and how quickly they make the transition to free market policies”.¹⁰ Kovalova claims that Ukraine can choose to “join Europe” or to remain “part of the post-Soviet space”.¹¹

Russia is unlikely to join the EU or Nato. EU enlargement to include Ukraine and possibly Belarus could provoke a further deterioration in EU-Russian relations. The EU must be involved in stabilising Ukraine and Belarus “not only for their own sake, but to fend off Russia and diversify away from its energy”.¹² If Russia continues to exert heavy pressure its neighbours, the short and medium-term prospects for Belarus and Ukraine, caught between

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⁶ Ibid. p.14
⁸ Ibid.
¹⁰ Ibid.

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the EU and Russia, are bad. It is difficult to see any Russian government willingly withdrawing its military forces from Belarus and Ukraine in the next 20 years.

Establishing and maintaining a civil society in post-Soviet countries is more difficult than in Central Europe. Creating a politically active citizenry and democratic political culture depends on the legitimacy voters allot their governments. The democratisation of Poland and Lithuania, with ensuing political pluralism, free elections and a market economy, were externally supported “and even directed” by the EU and other western institutions. Western assistance has produced much better outcomes in Poland and Lithuania than in Ukraine and Belarus.

The Soviet bloc’s collapse in 1989 happened mainly because of the collapse of the Soviet economy and “failure of political elites to satisfy the material aspirations of the masses”. Poles, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians will assess the success of their future governments in a similar way. Where living standards fail to match public expectations, political elites might not be able to deal with the disenchantment which follows. Widespread disenchantment among Ukrainians with unsatisfactory economic developments over many years could destroy Ukraine’s imperfect democracy.

Ukrainian leaders no longer believe “vague EU hints about eventual membership”, but want “something more substantial” than they have been offered so far. Germany and others in the EU have sought to expand the Union’s engagement with Kiev, “by extending bits of the single market eastwards to Ukraine, to bind it closer to the EU”. Much will depend on how Ukraine’s relations with Russia develop and on domestic factors within the EU, including whether member states eventually agree to the principle of further enlargement beyond the west Balkans.

Bringing countries into line with EU regulations is expensive. For example, The World Bank has estimated that over 20 years, Poland would need to spend up to 7 per cent of its 2000

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14 Ibid.
15 The Economist 2006. ‘Europe, Russia and in-between’
16 Ibid.
GDP to implement EU environmental policy.\textsuperscript{18} EU accession has clear advantages but puts economic strain on old and new members. Smith & Timmins argue that delayed accession to the EU means higher accession costs in the long run.\textsuperscript{19} In other words, if a state such as Ukraine or Belarus accedes to the EU earlier, the costs of that accession for the EU and the joining state are likely to be less.

However, Ukraine and Belarus have different historical, socio-economic and cultural experiences from the countries of “old Europe” and from the 2004 enlargement countries. In particular, Ukraine and Belarus have limited experience of democracy. Further eastern enlargement of the EU to include Ukraine and Belarus would impact on the EU’s “institutional frameworks, decision-making processes and policy outputs”.\textsuperscript{20} It could lead to socio-economic and political tensions if businesses shifted production to low-wage Belarus and Ukraine.

**Future relations between Poland and Ukraine**

Ukraine is as yet not close to being prepared to meet the obligations of membership, to open up its economy to global market forces or even effectively police its own border. But Ukraine should not be permanently excluded from the EU because of an outdated belief in a black-line fixed European border.

A “privileged partnership” with Ukraine would give the country a “voice within EU councils without the complications that would follow” it becoming a full member.\textsuperscript{21} The European Commission has said that all neighbouring countries, including Ukraine, “should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital”.\textsuperscript{22} Ambiguously, the Commission went on to say that: “If a country has reached this level, it has come as close to the Union as it can be without being a member.”\textsuperscript{23} It is unclear whether there is an implication

\textsuperscript{18} Sedelmeier, U. 2005. *Constructing the path to eastern enlargement: The uneven policy impact of EU identity* Manchester University Press, UK p.133
\textsuperscript{19} Smith & Timmins 2000. *Building a Bigger Europe* p.138
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. p.3
\textsuperscript{22} Commission of the European Communities 2003 ‘Wider Europe – Neighbourhood’:p.10
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
that if a country such as Ukraine successfully integrates to the required degree with the EU that that country would then be in a position to apply for membership.

Realising membership ambitions would require a much more concerted effort by Ukraine’s leaders and opinion makers. Unlike in Poland and Lithuania, where the drive to EU membership was supported across the political spectrum and among most of the elite, in Ukraine a significant proportion of citizens, particularly in the east and south of the country, are ambivalent to EU membership.

If Ukraine’s economy continues to underperform and the country falls further behind its neighbours, it is likely that the pressures to split the country will become stronger. Western anger with Ukraine’s slow pace of reform, widespread corruption and misgovernance at times have caused Ukraine “to shy away from the West” and move towards Russia. Repetition of this shift “could have dire geopolitical consequences”. As noted previously, Crimea and the city of Sevastopol have ethnic Russian majorities. Large Russian and Russophone populations live in eastern and southern Ukraine, in many areas forming a majority of the population. These populations are often ambivalent or hostile to the government in Kiev, and especially to anything they consider might distance them from Russia. Russia might yet intervene in Ukraine again in a decisive way to subvert and reverse Ukraine’s westward tilt. However, on balance it would seem that Ukraine, unlike Russia, does not have an autocratic future.

The geographical distribution of votes in all presidential and parliamentary elections in Ukraine since 2004 have shown a clear and consistent divide between an EU-leaning western and central Ukraine and a Russian-leaning eastern and southern Ukraine. A reasonable fear is that by not entertaining the idea of Ukrainian accession, the EU might be tipping the scales in favour of Ukraine’s pro-Russian forces, and helping to produce election results which will not help Ukraine’s modernisation and Europeanisation. A zero-sum point of view among some in Moscow sees good relations between Poland and Ukraine as having developed at Russia’s expense. If Russian pressure on Ukraine increases so much that Ukrainian independence is in jeopardy and the pro-Western and pro-EU forces in the country feel they cannot bring the

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24 Karatnycky, A. 2001. ‘Meltdown in Ukraine’ in Foreign Affairs May/June 2001 Vol 8 No 3 p.73
25 Ibid.
whole of Ukraine into the European sphere and out of Moscow’s control, then it is conceivable Ukraine will divide in two, with its western, more consciously Ukrainian, part moving towards the EU and looking towards Poland as a shepherd to guide it into the EU. As Trenin notes, in recent years “the chances of a split within Ukraine … have dramatically reduced”. Trenin feels that “Ukraine will join Europe” by 2027. However, the next decade will tell us where Ukraine’s future lies and whether the country will hold together as an independent nation-state.

In the last 10 years, several western European countries have expressed openness to further eastern enlargement into post-Soviet states, with Britain actually “signalling a membership perspective for Ukraine”.29

**Future relations between Poland and Belarus**

Belarus finds itself in a new ideological and military-political borderland. New Belarus-Poland and Belarus-EU relationships are appearing.

In March 2008, a demonstration in Minsk marked the short period of Belarusian independence in 1918. The authorities reacted violently to the demonstration.

_In violent clashes the police dragged some protesters along the ground. They confiscated European Union flags and the red and white banner of the pre-Soviet state._30

Here, it is noteworthy that the (mostly young) protesters carried the flags both of the short-lived pre-communist Belarusian Republic (which was also the flag of newly independent, pre-Lukashenko Belarus in the early 1990s) and that of the EU. Nationalism and euroenthusiasm are on the same side in Belarus, although both remain weak in the face of the fatalistic post-Sovietism which pervades the country.

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28 Ibid. p.211
30 Agence France-Presse 2008 ‘Dozens beaten, detained in Belarus opposition rally’ wire story 25/3/2008 Minsk
Pawel Świeboda, for one, does not expect a dramatic change in Belarus in the near future, even if Lukashenko’s reign ends soon.

Once you get used to a certain system, even if there is a change at the top, it takes time for that change to trickle down, because people will have been used working under a certain regime of governance and they will be relatively less willing ... and less open to adopt new ways and means. It all depends on who [any new leader] ... will be, whether it will be someone with the aspirations to repeat Lukashenko’s stint or is someone who is a reformer. ... There is no obvious answer, no natural successor.31

One scenario is that Belarus will be absorbed into Russia either by simple annexation or “union” or some other guise “although this looks increasingly unlikely”.32 The Russian-Belarusian Union State as envisaged by Lukashenko and Yeltsin “is no longer an option”.33 A second alternative is that the country manages to retain some independence and becomes a semi-permanent buffer state between the EU and Russia. Perhaps there will be a dramatic change in the country’s orientation after Lukashenko finally leaves office and the country sets sail down the long road to integration with Europe. Within Belarus, a variety of viewpoints are found among opposition forces. Some want Belarus to pursue a path which would bring the country closer to the EU and further from Moscow. Part of the Belarusian opposition seeks to emphasise the period in history when Belarus was Lithuanian, and wants Belarus to rebrand and reimagine itself as a contemporary descendant of the old Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Grand Duchy’s legacy and history offers Belarusians an alternative source on which to base their national consciousness, rather than the Soviet-based version of history still propagated by the regime in Minsk.

The EU must continue to support the efforts of Poland and Lithuania to positively engage Belarus and provide support for Belarusian opposition groups, particularly those which have a pro-EU outlook. If Belarus does integrate fully with Russia, EU membership for Belarus will effectively become impossible in the foreseeable future. If Russia absorbs Belarus, there will be increased pressure on Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine to conform with Moscow’s wishes, at

31 Pawel Świeboda interview with author 16/9/2009.
least to the extent of toning down expression of suspicion of Moscow’s machinations in Central and Eastern Europe. For Russia this would be a return to the old days of Russian “Big Brothership” in its near abroad. For the EU, allowing Russia to have such an influence on governments and states in the region would be a serious mistake which could lead to a reversal in fortune for the Union or its decline into something other than a free union of wealthy, democratic and peaceful countries.

If Belarus does not integrate with Russia, then a new path for the country will be possible after the demise of the Lukashenko regime. Repeated efforts by Poland, Lithuania and the EU as a whole to engage Belarus could pay dividends. Some see a future role for the EU Baltic Sea Strategy, launched in 2009, which groups the EU member states bordering the Baltic Sea. This grouping might enhance relations between Poland and Lithuania, and potentially Belarus, much of whose territory lies in the Baltic drainage basin. However, Świeboda sees in the current Polish frame of mind a preference for fluid *ad hoc* alliances rather than permanent ties with any particular country or group of countries within the EU.

A post-Lukashenko Belarus might take a path that leads to EU candidate status. That path could ultimately lead to EU membership, particularly if Ukraine makes it into the ranks of EU candidate countries. Despite its democratic failings, Belarus might be an easier country for the EU to absorb than the much larger, poorer and less stable Ukraine would be. However, if Belarus were to join the EU, its role in the union might “differ substantially” from the roles of Poland and Lithuania. Because Belarusian society has markedly different political and cultural views from those of Poles, Lithuanians and even Ukrainians, Belarus would not fit easily into the “new Europe” camp. With its communitarian inclinations, a future EU member Belarus might conceivably become “an outpost of ‘Old Europe’” on the EU’s eastern marches.

Belarusians and Ukrainians think of themselves as European and many believe they stand “a chance of getting into the EU one day”. Ukraine and, potentially, Belarus are important partners for the EU, but the countries are unlikely to become full members soon. Practical

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34 Paweł Świeboda interview 16/9/2009
35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
reasons exist for the EU not admitting Ukraine and Belarus in the near future. This means that Poland and Lithuania will probably lie on the EU’s central-eastern frontier for many years to come. An external EU border which separates Poland from countries and peoples with which it has been entwined for centuries cannot be a permanent border. Europe’s internal and external borders have been defined and redefined many times. They will be redefined again. “[S]omewhere between the depths of Russia and the heart of Europe a new dividing line will have to be established”.

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38 Davies, N. 1996 *Europe: A History* Oxford University Press p.1136
12 Conclusion
How well the conceptual framework worked

Overall, the conceptual framework for this thesis worked well. As predicted, there has been easier and greater transmitting of EU norms and values from Poland to Lithuania than from Poland to Ukraine and Belarus. Because of its unique role, the EU has been able to reshape ideas of what is “normal” in relations between CEECs. As the survey data and findings of this thesis show, the EU’s normative power has, overall, had a positive effect on relations between and among Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. The transmission of the EU’s norms and values to Poland and then to Lithuania and Ukraine has encouraged Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians to engage each other more positively and productively. The three countries have managed to successfully negotiate many issues of past conflict, thanks largely to the favourable international situation resulting from the EU’s success.¹

The transformation from communism to democracy was difficult in the CEECs. Poland and Lithuania endured their toughest years of postcommunist transformation in the early 1990s. In those years, most observers would not have thought it possible that Lithuania and Poland could so successfully make the transition from the difficult situations they were in to be able to become part of the EU in 2004. From the mid-1990s, economic conditions improved in both countries. The goal of EU membership mobilised Poland and Lithuania and provided momentum to reform programmes. The two countries became richer, freer and happier than they would have been had they not successfully strived to join the EU. Having to adopt the acquis communautaire during their accession negotiations helped Poland and Lithuania advance. The drive to achieve EU membership and full integration into Western political, economic and cultural structures has been the dominant catalyst for improvement in living standards, security and governance in Poland and Lithuania, and has helped improve relations between the two countries.

The presence of a rich, peaceful and stable normative model on its doorstep helped Poland develop positive relations with Lithuania and Ukraine. Poland’s proximity to and positive view of the EU, together with its striving for EU membership, helped in the transfer of EU norms and values to Poland. EU enlargement has changed the dynamics of the relationship between Poland and its eastern neighbours. Poland and Lithuania, predisposed to regard the

EU and what it stands for favourably, have accepted a package of EU norms by which to abide. Poland has been a conduit for the transmission of EU norms to Lithuania and Ukraine, and, to a much lesser extent, Belarus. This is as predicted by Manners’ and Sjursen’s visions of Europe as a normative power. A western-style market economy and democratic system are secure in Poland and Lithuania, with both countries now firmly within the EU.

**The relevance of receptivity to European norms**

Part of the reason for the improvement in relations was realisation in the 1990s by most Lithuanians and Ukrainians that it was Poland, more than any other country, that could help theirs gain entry to Western and pan-European structures. During the 1990s, Lithuanians and Ukrainians increasingly saw Poland as a modern, successful postcommunist state with European credentials and prospects of joining the EU. Leaders in Lithuania (successfully) and Ukraine (less successfully) sought to emulate Poland’s successful transition to a western-style economy and integration into Western institutions. Poland’s striving towards EU membership and the 2004 enlargement helped change Poles’ attitudes to their eastern neighbours. With Poland now an EU member state, Poles feel more secure, more prosperous and more confident interacting with their eastern neighbours.

The EU’s self-image includes the idea that the Union has broad responsibilities towards the rest of Europe. During the last decade, the EU invited those postcommunist states that have travelled furthest along the road of democratic consolidation to become members. The 2004 EU enlargement transformed Europe’s social, political and economic landscape. By 2008, the EU had embraced most of the CEECs. This is a continuation of the policy which saw the earlier enlargements which brought Greece, Spain and Portugal into the European Community and, in the middle of the last century, the admittance of West Germany into the structures of integrating Europe.

The EU reinvigorated the sense of European identity among Poles and Lithuanians. The prospect of EU entry greatly helped the work of democratic activists in Poland and Lithuania. The activists did not have to convince their fellows that democracy was worthwhile in itself. Ideological appeals could be combined with the “bread-and-butter benefits” of joining the

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2 Sedelmeier 2005. *Constructing the path to eastern enlargement* p.21
EU. EU aid has been important in encouraging and maintaining the post-communist transition in CEECs. It has helped reform programmes and reward CEECs that do well. EU entry offers many benefits to the elites and masses of acceding countries. EU subsidies and access to a vast market provide a stable framework on which to build strong economies which will attract foreign and domestic investment. Compared with less democratic, “less normal” states, countries that have adopted most of the EU’s values and norms are more likely to enter into institutionalised relationships with the EU, to apply for membership and to be invited to accession negotiations. The less democratic a state is, the more likely it is to be excluded from the EU, or have its membership application frozen or suspended.

**Poland and Lithuania**

After Poland and Lithuania ratified their mutual treaty in 1994, political relations between the two countries improved dramatically. It became obvious that Poland and Lithuania had no significant strategic differences. Lithuanians saw Poland as the road to Europe. The entry of Poland and Lithuania into the EU is an important step in the erosion of the scars of Yalta. For Poland and Lithuania, membership in the EU shows the world they have successfully transformed their states into modern European countries. They are increasingly regarded as a part of the West. Poland’s relations with Lithuania on a government-to-government level are very good. On the whole, Lithuanians see Poles as allies in Brussels and in the face of a resurgent Russia. EU membership has allowed Poland and Lithuania to permanently cast off the shackles of their communist, “Eastern European” past. The EU’s influence has helped Poland and Lithuania transform their relationship into one between two “normal” European countries.

Lithuania’s main weaknesses are its small population, dependence on Russian energy and location on the EU’s eastern march. The loss of a huge proportion of its population to emigration (first of Russian-speakers to Russia, then of Lithuanians as a whole to Western Europe) has haemorrhaged Lithuania. In the two decades since 1990, Lithuania’s population has fallen from about 3.9 million people to as few as 3.3 million people by some estimates, a 15 per cent decrease. It must be hoped that Lithuania’s population loss (particularly the loss

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4 World Bank and other sources.
of such a high proportion of skilled and educated people) will be stemmed soon, otherwise difficulties may be experienced in continuing to build a stable and prosperous country.

Poland and Ukraine

The great improvement in relations between Poland and Ukraine since 1990, which has been aided by Poland’s success in its efforts to move towards EU entry, has been one of the most positive features of the international system in postcommunist Europe. This improvement could rank on a par with the Franco-German rapprochement of the 1950s and 1960s in its importance as a stabilising factor in Europe.

Aiming to join the EU gave Poland the tools to enhance its relationship with Ukraine, while joining the EU meant that Poland’s image among Ukrainians improved. These improvements were possible because Poland was accepted EU norms and values. The EU is Ukraine’s largest trading partner. In the 1990s, Ukraine performed poorly by most economic and political measures, but EU policy since 2000 – particularly support for the Orange Revolution – brought some dividends, with improved economic growth and prospects, at least temporarily, after 2005.

Today, Poland is playing an active role in EU internal politics and is at the heart of a developing eastern bloc within the EU, which supports Ukraine’s bid to join the EU and favours active steps to engage Belarus. Since its entry into the EU, Poland has usually led the EU response to developments in Ukraine, particularly at the time of the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution. The creation of the joint Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian inter-parliamentary assembly in 2005 was a positive portend of continued good relations between the three countries.

All Ukrainian respondents interviewed and surveyed in July 2008 for this thesis expressed a positive opinion of the EU, though many voiced concern about the imposition of visas on Ukrainian visitors to Poland after the latter joined the EU. Ukrainians interviewed for this thesis saw the toughening of the visa regime on the Polish border because of Poland’s accession to the Schengen zone as the main negative effect of the EU on Polish-Ukrainian relations. Respondents said it was more difficult for them to obtain visas after Poland became part of the Schengen zone. Ukrainians, once enthusiastic about the prospect of integration
with the EU have become disillusioned. Most Ukrainians accept that Ukraine will not join the EU in the near future. However, in a positive development, the surveys and interviews carried out for this thesis show that many Ukrainians, at least in Lviv, appear to have developed strong pro-Polish sentiments, seeing Poland as Ukraine’s main promoter and supporter in the country’s long march to EU membership. Poland’s economic success has helped improve the country’s image in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s future orientation is still undecided. Ukrainians consider themselves part of Europe, but the deep, geographically based political split in Ukraine is negatively affecting stability and economic growth in the country. Unfortunately, Ukraine’s attempts at economic transformation have been half-hearted, ineptly managed, and stalled and even reversed by inopportune political developments. Much in the country could go wrong without more effective internal political leadership and continued strong support for the country’s European vocation from Poland and the rest of the EU.

**Poland and Belarus**

Just as being part of the European integration process increases the likelihood that a country will adopt the norms which characterise the EU *modus operandi*, it is also true that a state which chooses to isolate itself from that process is unlikely to adopt those norms and is, instead, likely to have severe difficulties interacting positively with countries which have accepted the norms.

While Polish diplomacy has helped the country engage with Lithuania and Ukraine on a positive basis since 1990, Poland has found it difficult to engage Belarus as a partner, especially since 1994. Relations between the two countries – on almost all measures – have deteriorated since a highpoint in the early 1990s. It appears that the EU’s impact on Poland’s relations with Belarus, especially on a government-to-government level, has not been positive. The main reason for this appears to be the different conditions (“the cultural filter”) which existed in Belarus in the 1990s (such as a lack of a strong sense of distinct identity, the psychological closeness of Belarusians to Russia, lack of political and economic dynamism among Belarusians, particularly non-governmental groups) and the choices Belarusians made in choosing a leader and path that carried them away from democracy, the EU and a market
economy. Belarus has failed to carry out major reforms and has over the last 15 years reverted instead to a Soviet-style system.

Once Poland chose its trajectory of aiming to join the EU and Western institutions and made the substantial efforts required to achieve its goal, it was inevitable that its relations with the undemocratic state of Belarus would suffer. Most Belarusians have little interest in or understanding of the EU, and are, on the face of it, reconciled to an autocratic future as part of a revived political entity dominated by Russia. Belarus’ future existence as a nation state is still uncertain, but the country’s identity is maturing.

The isolation of Belarus has served to increase the salience of a Belarusian identity distinct from all neighbouring national identities. Alexander Lukashenko has preserved a sovereign Belarusian state, despite itself and himself. He has been “a bizarre dictator” who has promised to unite his country with Russia. However, in many ways Belarus has functioned better as an organised state than Ukraine and Russia have since the mid-1990s. Being Belarusian today is something more than merely living in Belarus. The Roman Catholic Church in Belarus is gradually loosening its close association with Polishness. The longer that Belarus continues to exist as a separate country from Russia, the more difficult it will be for Russia to re-absorb it as a vassal state or junior partner in a union.

Belarusian nationalism, if it survives, will probably involve co-opting the legacy of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. That should lead to closer ties between Belarusian nationalists and Lithuanians and Ukrainians, primarily, but also with Poland. Despite difficult state-to-state relations, the Belarusian people share an affinity for Poles. The attitude of ordinary Belarusians to Poles remains reasonably positive. The weak Belarusian opposition of democrats and nationalists looks to the EU, and especially Poland and Lithuania, as an inspiration to continue to fight for democracy and civil liberties, and against the Lukashenko regime. In the opinion of many Poles, including some who were interviewed for this thesis, Poland has over the last 20 years been “a guide to Europe, mentor in the art of democracy, and a kind of ‘big brother’ for the Belarusians”.

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5 Ibid.
6 Ackerman 2004 ‘And Now for the Bad News?’ p.220
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Drakokhrust 2007 ‘Belarus: An Outpost of ‘Old Europe’?’
**The Russian factor**

Closer ties with the EU can help Ukraine and Belarus manage risks to their countries. Russia has shown it is ready to use energy prices, and the threat to cut off supplies to put pressure on Ukraine and Belarus. It has used its control of gas and oil supplies to pressure Belarus and Ukraine to act more submissively to Moscow. The 2008 Georgia conflict accentuated concerns in Ukraine, Poland and Lithuania, and even among the Belarusian leadership, that cashed-up Russia was in a more belligerent mood and could threaten the security of these countries.

For Poland, it is important that Ukraine be stabilised and brought into a wider European zone of prosperity. Closer links between Warsaw and Kiev could provide a strong counterweight to a revival of Russian influence in the region. Warsaw feels that the EU must act to stabilise Ukraine partly to deter Russia.\(^\text{10}\) It is vital for Poland’s security and sense of well-being, and important for Europe as a whole, that Ukraine is able to maintain its independence from Russia. Acting individually, European states can do comparatively little to contain Russia. EU membership, with its associated economic benefits, has possibly been as important as Nato in deterring potential Russian revanchism targeted at Poland and the Baltic states. An EU of 27 countries and still growing can remind Russia that Belarus and Ukraine are in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood, and thus of immediate strategic interest to the Union.

**The movement of people**

Visas are an important issue for contacts between Ukraine and Belarus and their EU neighbours. Before Poland joined the EU, many Ukrainians and Belarusians had obtained work in Poland. Visas were easy to acquire or not required. In the 1990s, contacts among educated elites in Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania and, even, Belarus helped the reconstruction and reconciliation of Poland and its eastern neighbours. EU enlargement and the associated treaties have allowed Poles and Lithuanians to move to richer parts of Europe. However, the transmission of EU norms and values to Ukraine and Belarus has been curtailed dramatically by the imposition of expensive visa requirements on citizens of Belarus and Ukraine who

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wish to visit Poland or Lithuania for tourism or trade. The bureaucracy and cost associated with obtaining the required tourist visa deter Poles and Lithuanians from visiting Belarus. Poland’s accession to the EU’s migration zone restricts the access of Ukrainian and Belarusian elites to Poland. With Poland in the EU and Schengen zone, Belarusians and Ukrainians “find themselves materially and symbolically separated from ‘Europe’”.

With Poland in the Schengen zone it is much more difficult for Ukrainians and Belarusians to get a Polish visa.

Poland’s introduction of the Karta Polaka document, which allows citizens of post-Soviet countries who can prove Polish ancestry or cultural ties to visit Poland without requiring an expensive visa, has the potential to produce an increase in the number of people in Belarus and Ukraine who declare themselves to have Polish connections. This is likely to have more repercussions in Belarus, given the greater size of the Polish minority there and the more weakly held sense of nationality among Belarusians, compared with Lithuanians and Ukrainians. Potentially, some Catholic Belarusians of Polish or part-Polish ancestry might declare themselves to be of Polish ethnicity.

**The media’s role**

European media have played a considerable role in the transmission of European norms and values through Poland to its eastern neighbours. After 1990 and especially after 2000, Western European media’s coverage of CEE served to increase public support in Western Europe for the entry of Poland and Lithuania into the EU. The media helped to redefine what was understood by the term “European”. The Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian media’s portrayal of the EU has generally been positive. In Poland and Lithuania, mainstream media during the 1990s and 2000s helped transmit a pro-EU attitude to their audiences.

In the early 1990s, Poland’s media at times portrayed the country’s eastern neighbours in a stereotypical light as being crime-ridden and less European than Poland, but at times over the past 20 years has taken a genuine interest in publicising and promoting positive developments in those neighbours. Poland’s media have been a filter and transmitter of EU ideas, behaviour and ideology to Ukraine and Lithuania. Ukrainian media were prominent actors during the

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Orange Revolution. But unlike the case in Poland, Ukraine’s media has not transmitted EU values and norms to the Ukrainian population. The media of Poland and Lithuania, and to some extent Ukraine, have tended to adopt similar postures towards the situation in Belarus.

The new Europe

The countries of East-Central Europe have become part of the European integration project for the first time. The EU has changed the lives of Poles and their eastern neighbours. “Europe” has come to be defined by inclusion in the democratic zone of prosperity and peace with the EU as its core. Although its prospects of becoming a military great power are uncertain, the EU is already a normative and economic superpower which has fundamentally recast Europe. The result has been a fundamental redefinition of what Europe is. The “Europeanness” of countries is now measured by how intense institutional relations are with the EU and other Western organisations and by how comprehensively those countries have adopted EU values and norms.12 The EU’s eastern enlargement “asks rather than answers the question of the eastern border of Europe”.13 The EU’s final eastern border, if there can be such a thing, is unlikely to be its current one.

EU enlargement has played a huge part in reform and reconciliation in Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine. The EU’s role in dampening national and social tensions in Central and Eastern Europe is often underestimated. Had the EU lacked its normative power and not enlarged to include Poland, the relationship between Poland and its eastern neighbours would be very different. Western European political procedures and mentalities have become more familiar to CEE elites. Nations live on within the EU but no longer threaten to war with each other. In Vilnius and Warsaw, foreign and defence policies have been rebuilt to bring Poland and Lithuania into line with Nato and EU norms. The changes the EU has brought have spun a mesh of links among states that would not unravel easily. Rarely has a Western policy had such a positive effect in eliciting change.

After a period of rapid change and often chaotic conditions in the 1990s, Poland and Lithuania, which have re-orientated to the West and particularly the EU, have become

12 Schimmel-Fennig, F. 2003 The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe: Rules and Rhetoric Cambridge University Press, UK p.1
relatively stable and their long-term future looks promising. Poland’s relative wealth and success has encouraged those Ukrainians who see their future as a nation state within the democratic European community and has played a significant role in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. However, the already pronounced orientation of Belarus towards Russia has been accentuated. The border between Poland and Belarus has proved to be a much bigger barrier to the transmission of EU norms and values eastward than the Polish-Lithuanian and Polish-Ukrainian borders.
Appendix 1  Maps
Map 1

Poland and its neighbours 1989
Map 2
Poland and its neighbours since 1993
Map 3

2008 survey and interview locations
Map 4
Ukraine
Map 5
Ukrainian language use 2001
(% using Ukrainian as first language, by region)

Map 6

Russian language use in Ukraine 2001

(\% using Russian as first language, by region)

Map 7
Ukraine parliamentary election 2007
Map 8
Belarus on the eve of World War II
Map 9
Grodno region in Belarus
Map 10

Lithuania on the eve of World War II
Map 11

Lithuania and its neighbours 2009
Map 12

Lithuania’s Polish minority: Polish population by municipality 2001

Map 13

Polish referendum on EU accession: % Yes vote by region
Appendix 2  2008 survey and interview questions
The following were some of the questions asked of interviewees in Lithuania and Ukraine.

**Open-ended questions**

1. How has the EU affected relations between your country and Poland?

2. How has the EU affected your life?

3. How have relations between your country and Poland changed over the last 10 years?

4. How do you feel about the future of your country’s relations with Poland?

The following is an example of the questionnaire distributed to respondents. This version was given to respondents in Poland. A slightly different version was used in Lithuania and Ukraine.
The European Union’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours

Survey questionnaire

1. What is your age group? (tick box)

   18-29 □  30-39 □  40-49 □  50-59 □  60+ □

2. What is your occupation?  

   ..........................................................................

3. What is your citizenship?  

   ..........................................................................

4. What is your home country?  

   ..........................................................................

5. In which country do you live now?  

   ..........................................................................

6. How long have you lived in this country?

   Less than 6 months □
   6 months - 1 year □
   1-5 years □
   More than 5 years □

7. Which of these countries have you lived in, worked in or visited?

   Country       | lived in | worked in | visited |
   ---------------|---------|-----------|---------|
   Poland         | □       | □         | □       |
   Lithuania      | □       | □         | □       |
   Belarus        | □       | □         | □       |
   Ukraine        | □       | □         | □       |
   Ireland        | □       | □         | □       |
   Britain        | □       | □         | □       |
8. Do you agree or disagree with these statements?

<table>
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<th>Statement</th>
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<th>agree</th>
<th>neither agree nor disagree</th>
<th>disagree</th>
<th>strongly disagree</th>
</tr>
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<td>The EU has made travel to Ukraine easier for me</td>
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<td>Relations between Poland and Lithuania are better now than 10 years ago</td>
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<td>Relations between Poland and Belarus are better now than 10 years ago</td>
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<td>Relations between Poland and Ukraine are better now than 10 years ago</td>
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<td>The EU is a good thing for Poland</td>
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<td>The EU is a good thing for me</td>
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9. How important are these issues to you?

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<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>1 = very important</th>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5 = not important</th>
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<td>being able to work in other European countries</td>
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<td>democracy in my country</td>
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<td>energy supply reliability</td>
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<td>Poland’s relations with Lithuania</td>
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<td>Poland’s relations with Ukraine</td>
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<td>Poland’s relations with the EU</td>
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10. How has the EU affected relations between Poland and Lithuania?
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11. How has the EU affected relations between Poland and Belarus?
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12. How has the EU affected relations between Poland and Ukraine?
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Thank you for your time.
Information Sheet

INFORMATION

You are invited to participate as a subject in a research project looking at the European Union’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours.

The aim of this project is to examine the European Union’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours.

Your involvement in this project is limited to being interviewed or filling in the attached survey. You have the right to withdraw from the interview or survey at any time.

There are no known risks involved in this project.

The results of this project may be published, but you may be assured of the complete confidentiality of data gathered in this investigation: the identity of participants will not be made public without their consent. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality, no record of your name will be kept with the answers to your questions.

The project is being carried out as part of research for my PhD thesis by Desmond Brennan under the supervision of Professor Martin Holland and Doctor Natalia Chaban of the National Centre for Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury, New Zealand who can be contacted at the NCRE on +64 3 364 2348. They will be pleased to discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project.

The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee.
Consent form

Desmond Brennan
PhD Candidate
National Centre for Research on Europe
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch 8140
NEW ZEALAND

18 May 2008

CONSENT FORM

The European Union’s impact on Poland’s relations with its eastern neighbours

I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this basis I agree to participate as a subject in the project, and I consent to publication of the results of the project with the understanding that anonymity will be preserved.

I understand also that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including withdrawal of any information I have provided.

I note that the project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee.

NAME (please print):..............................................

Signature:

Date:
Appendix 3  CD of interviews
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