THE ROLE AND STRUCTURE OF THE
NEW ZEALAND VOLUNTEER FORCE
1885 - 1910

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in the
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by
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes on Abbreviations</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The importance of Volunteering in New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Its origins</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER II &quot;OUR VOLUNTEERS&quot; - THE VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT AND THE COMMUNITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The role of Volunteering in the Community</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public attitudes to Volunteering</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER III THE VOLUNTEER CORPS: THE CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE FORCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Why become a Volunteer</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The composition of the Force</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Corps organisation</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Volunteer officer corps</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The ethos of Volunteer corps</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER IV - TWO MAJOR STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES OF THE VOLUNTEER FORCE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. New Zealand defence administration</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Volunteer conditions of service</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER V - THE VOLUNTEER FORCE 1885 - 1901</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Russian scare and reform 1885-88</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Retrenchment and decline 1888-90</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Politics and Volunteering</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The work of Colonel Fox</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Improvement in organisation and the South African War</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER VI - THE VOLUNTEER FORCE 1901 - 1910</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The 1901 - 06 period</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The 1906 - 10 period</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER VII - CONCLUSIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The place of Volunteering in New Zealand</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The nature of the Force</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

In this thesis I propose to examine the role and structure of the New Zealand Volunteer Force between 1885 and 1910; a period beginning with the upsurge of interest in defence matters due to the Russian war scare, and ending with the abolition of the Volunteer system. This has been a largely neglected area of study in New Zealand history, which this thesis goes in some way to redress.

I begin by outlining the development of Volunteering in Britain and New Zealand before 1885. The roles of the Volunteer Force in the defence of New Zealand, and in local communities are studied in some detail. A study is also made of the type of men who joined, and some conclusions are reached as to why they became involved in the Movement. Particular attention is devoted to the structure and operation of Volunteer corps. The weaknesses of the Volunteer system are studied in some detail, as are the resultant limitations on the Force's military effectiveness. The composition and activities of the Force over the period are surveyed and related to changes in New Zealand's defence policy and posture. Finally, the nature of the Volunteer Movement is analysed.
I would like to acknowledge the assistance I have received from the following institutions and their staff: the National Archives Wellington, the National Library, the Hocken Library, the Canterbury Museum, the Canterbury Public Library, the Canterbury Officer's Club and the University of Canterbury Library.

I also wish to thank my supervisor Professor W.D. McIntyre for his sound advice and encouragement. My thanks are also due to Elizabeth Thomas and Christina Coulter for their assistance in proof reading this thesis, and to my parents.
## NOTES ON ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C.M.A.</td>
<td>Canterbury Museum Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.M.R.</td>
<td>Canterbury Mounted Rifles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.T.</td>
<td>Canterbury Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.Y.C.</td>
<td>Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.L.</td>
<td>Hocken Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.T.</td>
<td>Lyttelton Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.R.</td>
<td>The Monthly Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.R.V.</td>
<td>Mounted Rifle Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>National Archives Wellington</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.A.I.</td>
<td>The Navy and Army Illustrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Z.I.M.</td>
<td>The New Zealand Illustrated Magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Z.M.J.</td>
<td>New Zealand Military Journal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.Z.V.G.</td>
<td>The New Zealand Volunteer and Civil Service Gazette and Naval and Military Chronicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O.D.T.</td>
<td>Otago Daily Times</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R.V.</td>
<td>Rifle Volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W.P.</td>
<td>The Weekly Press</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Volunteer Force is an institution which has not received the attention its size and significance justify. It has a two-fold importance. Militarily it dwarfed the other parts of New Zealand's armed forces, in 1909 there were more than 40 Volunteers to every member of the 270-strong regular force.\(^1\) New Zealand would have relied mainly on the Volunteers to meet any major threat to its national security in this period. Secondly, the Movement involved a substantial proportion of the population. In 1886 approximately 5.4% of adult males aged 15-49 were in the Force, and although in 1896 the proportion had fallen to 3.6%, by 1906 it had risen to around 8%.\(^2\) Volunteering was markedly more popular in New Zealand than it was in its birthplace, the United Kingdom, where in 1881, 2.8% and 1899, 2.4% of the same group were Volunteers. Moreover there was such a rapid turnover in the New Zealand Force's membership that even these figures do not fully reflect the extent of popular involvement in Volunteering. Between 1897 and 1907, when the size of the Force varied between 4,000 and 17,000 it was estimated that nearly 43,000 men had passed through its ranks.\(^3\) There can be no doubt that, as Sir Julius Vogel recognised, the Volunteers "were a most important portion of the community".\(^4\)

Volunteering had its origins in Eighteenth Century Britain, when groups of men formed themselves into small companies or corps of around 100 men and offered their services to the Government in response to fears about the safety of the country.\(^5\) The Movement in Great Britain revived during the great invasion scare of 1859, and by late 1860 the Volunteer Force had a strength of more than 100,000.\(^6\) The
principal objective of the British Force was defence against external aggression. However, in New Zealand Volunteer corps were first established in the 1840's in response to the threat posed by the Maoris; only later did the fear of foreign attack become the main reason for their existence. Throughout the Anglo-Maori Wars Volunteers saw extensive service, and made a useful contribution to the Colony's defence. Volunteers of the 1885-1910 period continued to cite the Force's involvement in these conflicts and later at Parihaka, as evidence of their value to New Zealand.

Volunteers were originally conceived in Britain as small bodies of marksmen who knew each other well, and who would operate in support of the Regular Army and Militia over country they were familiar with. In New Zealand the original concept of the Volunteers' role was very similar, but during the period covered by this study the absence of a sizeable regular force meant that the Volunteers had to perform a much wider range of tasks. At first it was not intended that the Volunteers of either country should receive personal payment for their services in peace-time and both Governments initially offered only limited support for arms, equipment and training. The basic structures of the New Zealand Force, the organisation of corps and the duties and requirements for Volunteers were clearly set out by the middle of the Century, principally by the Volunteer Act of 1865, and remained in essence largely unchanged until the abolition of the Volunteer system in 1910.

A number of traits which were of major importance during my period were evident in the Volunteer Force from its early years, such as the significant democratic overtones of Volunteering, perhaps most notably
the election of officers; but also apparent in other aspects of the Movement.\textsuperscript{13} In 1865, for example, Canterbury Volunteers established a Council consisting of one officer, one NCO and one private from each local corps, to draw up standing orders for the area's Volunteers. This body existed for several years before being abolished because "it was not conducive to discipline".\textsuperscript{14} The serious problems caused by the poor quality of the Force's officers, and conflict between Volunteers' employment and their military duties were evident long before 1885. Another long-standing weakness of the Force was its inadequate administrative structure, which was unable to adequately supervise the activities of the Volunteers.\textsuperscript{15}

The need to make considerable use of data from newspapers, especially when studying minor local Volunteer activities, has meant that this thesis relies to a marked extent on Canterbury examples. This may be of no great significance for most parts of the study as the same kinds of events took place throughout New Zealand. However, it could be significant for the section on public attitudes towards the Movement, as there is some evidence that Volunteering was more popular and better regarded in Canterbury than it was in other areas.\textsuperscript{16} The same qualification could be made about my analysis of the membership of Canterbury units, but other evidence suggests that the composition of the Force, and other subjects studied in this section, were not subject to major regional variations.

This thesis has two major themes: the role of Volunteering in the community, for participants, and for the defence of New Zealand.
Secondly, the structure of the Force, in particular the organisation and operation of its most important institution, the corps. The emphasis on Volunteer Corps and their place in the community has meant that I have not examined the higher organisation, composition, equipment, and training of the Volunteer Force in great detail.
NOTES:


2. Results of a Census of the Colony of New Zealand taken for the Night of the 28th March 1886, Wellington 1887, p.76.
Results of a Census of the Colony of New Zealand taken for the Night of the 12th April 1896, Wellington 1896, pp.158-59.
Results of a Census of the Colony of New Zealand taken for the Night of the 29th April 1906, Wellington 1907, pp.202-03.


4. L.T., 19 Mar 1885, p.6e.


6. ibid, p.15.

7. ibid, pp 7-11.


9. See for example W.P., 4 Jan 1894, p.46 c-d and 21 Sep 1904, p.58g.


14. ibid, p.20.


16. The Press, 12 Sep 1904, p.7c.
CHAPTER II

"OUR VOLUNTEERS" - THE VOLUNTEER MOVEMENT AND THE COMMUNITY

In 1885 the Volunteer Movement had been established in New Zealand for more than forty years. It had a proven record of service in the Anglo-Maori Wars and Volunteer corps were an accepted part of communities throughout the country.¹ In this period the sight of Volunteers going about their routine duties was a common one, especially in urban areas.² In Christchurch companies often drilled in Hagley Park³ or went by tram to the rifle range at Redcliffs.⁴ Being a part of everyday life gave the Volunteer Movement a good base from which to win positive acceptance and support from the public.

The type of individual attracted to Volunteering was an important element in the development of the close links with the community that were central to the Movement's success. They were on the whole respectable men, often active in a wide range of organisations besides the Volunteers. The leadership of patriotic and defence orientated bodies at this time contained many Volunteers. W.J. Napier, for instance, as well as being for nine years the commanding officer of the Devonport Coastguard Artillery which he founded was also President of both the Navy League and the Victoria League.⁵ A considerable number of active and former Volunteers were amongst the leaders of the newly formed National League of New Zealand, which was set up in 1906 to agitate for the introduction of compulsory military training.⁶

This sort of prominent role was by no means confined to the leaderships of bodies whose objects were related to those of
Volunteering. The great variety of organisations in which Volunteers were active is well illustrated by the interests of Captain R.W. Stiles, Commanding Officer of the Nelson Rifle Volunteers in 1906. In addition to his more than twenty years of service in the Volunteers, he was Vice President of the Nelson Rugby Union, a member of the New Zealand Cricket Association, Captain of a local cricket club, a member of the Federal Hockey Club, a Free Mason, and a Forrester.7

The involvement of men like Captain Stiles in a number of different bodies helped establish Volunteering as a respectable and useful activity in the community. More significant was the way in which such cross-membership promoted informal ties with other established local and national institutions, through which the interests of the Volunteer Movement could be advanced. Such a motivation can be observed in a speech given by Lieutenant Macbean of the Canterbury Scottish Rifles to a Caledonian Society dinner, in which he stressed the need for all patriotic young men to join the Volunteers.8

What can be broadly described as the ceremonial aspects of Volunteering were one way in which the Movement attracted public attention and encouragement. Volunteers regularly held Church parades which often drew substantial crowds.9 Military funerals for those associated with the Movement were another type of event which brought Volunteering to public notice. A good illustration of this is the funeral of Colonel Brett, a well-known pioneer, and a former commander of the Christchurch Reserve Corps. Present were
three hundred volunteers, including the Garrison Band and his old unit.\(^{10}\)

The popular appeal of military pageantry was much in evidence at major Volunteer reviews and indeed the main purpose of these was the entertainment of the public. Throughout this period the "very attractive spectacle" presented by these events drew large crowds.\(^{11}\) A crowd of 8,000 watched an inspection of and marchpast by Christchurch units in October 1885,\(^{12}\) and in 1908 nearly 20,000 people came to see the Dominion Day Review in Wellington.\(^{13}\) Such sizeable numbers testify to the extent to which the public enjoyed this "highly acceptable form of celebration."\(^{14}\)

The part played by these major ceremonial occasions in the relationship between "the citizen army of New Zealand"\(^{15}\) and the community is apparent in the views expressed at the time of the review in Christchurch to honour the Duke and Duchess of York. Firstly, the time and effort Volunteers went to in presenting an impressive show brought praise and calls for adequate Government support for the Movement.\(^{16}\)

More importantly, these martial displays served to enhance the Volunteers' image as an effective military force, ready to play its part in the defence of New Zealand and the Empire. The vast majority of New Zealanders at this time had little or no understanding of what constituted an efficient military force and in consequence they were easily impressed by the numbers, smart appearance
and drill of the Volunteers at reviews. Statements made by R.J. Seddon, the Premier and Minister of Defence, about the Royal Review show that he shared this interest in large numbers and impressive shows, rather than paying attention to what really went to make a modern military force.

The ceremonial role of Volunteering was also much to the fore at a whole raft of public events. As an important local institution, the Volunteers expected, and were expected to, take part in most community ceremonial occasions, along with other worthy groups such as friendly societies and volunteer fire brigades. The close association of these organisations at public events was a substantive manifestation of the strong links between them, which were principally derived from their overlapping memberships.

In addition to this general role of representing a significant group within the community, the Volunteers had an important part to play at public functions. Their task was to help create a suitably impressive spectacle. Volunteers on these occasions performed a variety of different duties, most commonly they took part in, and lined the routes of processions, provided escorts for dignitaries such as the Governor and fired royal salutes. The celebrations associated with the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in 1897 are a good example of how the Volunteers fulfilled this task. In a procession to mark the Jubilee in Christchurch, over 700 Volunteers took part, along with friendly society members, wearing sashes and carrying banners, fire brigades, representatives of business concerns,
the Canterbury Rugby Union, local bodies and a number of volunteer and other brass bands. After the procession the Volunteer artillery fired a 60 gun salute and the infantry a feu de joie in the Show Grounds. Later Volunteers staged a military display and a sham fight. The Movement played a similar prominent role in the celebration staged in other parts of New Zealand. At Timaru "Pride of place was given to the Volunteers" who "made a splendid show."

Just how important to people in this period military display was, is well shown by the attitude of most of those present at a meeting of the arrangements committee for the visit of Imperial troops to Christchurch in 1901. They felt that if the troops were not going to wear their full dress uniforms on the visit, they may as well not come. The extent to which the Volunteers were an integral part of even unofficial public events can be seen in E Battery's actions after the news of the ending of the South African War reached Christchurch. On their own initiative members of the corps assembled at the drill shed and then marched into Market Square (Victoria Square) where people were already gathering, and fired a salute. If the requisite martial aspect was lacking from a public event it was seen to suffer:

an address to the Governor in Cathedral Square was robbed of the pomp of pageantry by the absence of the Volunteer forces, and necessarily suffered from a spectacular standpoint.
Clearly the public wanted and enjoyed the impressive displays provided by Volunteers at public events and reviews. With the exception of the comparatively rare occasions when Imperial forces or New Zealand's own tiny regular force took part, the Volunteers had the field to themselves. It was a role which the Volunteers with their range of often showy uniforms were well equipped to fulfil.

The significant effect the ceremonial duties of the Movement had on the public's attitude towards Volunteering is evident in a Lyttelton Times editorial of 1905 which urged the public to support Christchurch Volunteers' fund raising efforts for a new drill shed, stressing the important defence work of the Movement. It went on to claim that quite apart from their military value, the Volunteers deserved support because "they have grown to be an almost indispensable feature to those spectacular civic and colonial functions in which the public delight." The dual nature of this appeal to the pursestrings of the citizens of Christchurch demonstrates the vital role of this Volunteer activity, which had little to do with the Movement's military functions, in determining the community's view of it.

Volunteers took part in a host of sporting, recreational and social activities in addition to their official duties. On many occasions these two facets of Volunteering went together. The action of the Wellington Navals in taking their families and friends along for a picnic when they conducted their annual field gun firing
is typical of the combination of duty and recreation much favoured by Volunteers.\textsuperscript{34}

One of the most important Volunteer activities, rifle shooting, is particularly illustrative of the close bonds within the Movement between the practice of military skills, sport, recreation and the formation of links with the community. With the exception of medical corps and bands, all Volunteer units placed much emphasis upon success in shooting contests. Canterbury Volunteer officers organised a special Volunteer Rifle Association to encourage good shooting by Volunteers.\textsuperscript{35} Corps competed against each other in a variety of contests. In Christchurch the most important event was the Annual Associated Corps Shield competition for which was keen and attracted considerable interest.\textsuperscript{36}

Volunteers also regularly competed with civilian rifle clubs.\textsuperscript{37} These events were usually held in conjunction with a social function, as when teams from the Canterbury Engineers and the Cust Morris Tube Club followed up their match with supper at the Zetland Hotel.\textsuperscript{38} Such contests helped establish good relations with members of the community who shared an interest in rifle shooting. The prominent role of Volunteers in this popular sport secured the Movement a sizeable amount of favourable attention.\textsuperscript{39}

The significant part that rifle shooting could have in the cultivation of close ties between a Volunteer corps and the community is shown by the situation of the Kaiapoi Rifle Volunteers
in the 1890s. In that decade the Kaiapoi Rifles were consistently successful in shooting contests, as in 1890 when it won all three of its matches with other corps, and carried off the Challenge Shield, which it then had displayed in the window of a local shop. The large, enthusiastic crowd and official welcome which greeted Corporal Simpson when he returned to Kaiapoi after successfully competing in a New Zealand Rifle Association meeting points to the extent of local interest in the successes of their Volunteers. Kaiapoi people certainly appreciated "the renown which a first class rifle corps brings to a town". The success of this corps in shooting competitions and its high level of overall efficiency were related to the degree of attachment it enjoyed with the local community. In his address to the 1894 Annual Meeting the Kaiapoi Rifle's commander attributed the strength of the company in large part to the willingness of local employers to let members have time off work for their Volunteering activities.

How the shooting activities of the company could be used to engender this type of positive attitude on the part of important local figures, is demonstrated by the involvement of such men in a match between the corps and the rifle club from a visiting Royal Navy ship. The Chairman of the woollen mill, the area's largest employer, along with other prominent men, including Mr Buddo, M.H.R., who also gave a prize to be competed for; all had an enjoyable time, taking part in the shooting contest. As early as 1887 the good support received by Volunteering in Kaiapoi drew comment. Why this good rapport developed initially is unclear. However, it is apparent that the Corps shooting prowess was central
to the local goodwill enjoyed by the Kaiapoi Rifles in the 1890s.

Volunteers took part in a number of other sports, which like rifle shooting, were at least partly to do with improving their military effectiveness. One of the more useful events of this kind was marching competitions, in which picked teams would compete to cover a set course in the shortest time. The marching contest held by Christchurch corps in 1898 was well organised, with independent umpires and strict rules. The winning team from the Christ's College Rifles covered the thirteen and a quarter mile course in a little more than two and a half hours. This feat was very warmly received by the assembled crowd, which was so large that mounted Volunteers had to be used to keep the course clear. The hard training needed to compete in this type of contest was useful in improving the fitness of those taking part. Thus, Volunteering in general benefited from the public interest generated by these unusual sporting contests.

A more common form of sports event was the military tournament, at which a variety of contests would be held. These events ranged in size from those held by a single corps with only its members taking part and attracting perhaps a few hundred spectators, to major tournaments with competitors from all over New Zealand and large public attendances.

Although more extensive than usual, the programme of the military tournament held during the New Zealand International
Exhibition provides a good guide to what was involved in these events. There were a range of special contests for teams representing corps from the different branches of the force, such as the bayonet fighting contest for infantry corps teams. In addition there were competitions to test basic skills like tent erection and a large number of horse, foot and bicycle races. Sometimes a military contest was held as part of a civilian sports tournament, such as when South Canterbury Volunteers staged a bayonet fighting competition at the local Caledonian Sports. How military tournaments advanced the cause of Volunteering was assessed in a New Zealand Volunteer Gazette editorial. Not only did they encourage Volunteers to improve their military skills, but because the public enjoyed such "manly" sports and had "a taste for military displays", these tournaments fostered public support for the Movement. This assessment is borne out by the large crowds, such as the 4,000 who watched the military sports held at the Hutt Racecourse in 1890, and by the importance attached by Volunteer corps in success in these events.

The sporting activities of Volunteers also included a wide range of civil sports. As with other recreational activities sport was often integrated with the Movement's military work. A good example of this is a meeting of the Dunedin NCOs Club where a talk on explosives by a member of the instructional staff, was followed by a boxing match between two NCOs who were also keen amateur boxers. Sporting pursuits of this kind although having no military character were nonetheless a major part of the Movement's life. This is apparent in the great rivalry in sailing and
rowing races between the Wellington and Petone Naval Corps. 57

To cater for and foster the sporting interests of its members, the Volunteer Movement established special organisations. One of the most important of these was the gymnasiums set up by corps or by groups of companies, which were popular with many Volunteers. 58 Athletic clubs were organised on a similar basis, and regularly held meetings with a range of serious sporting events along with contests of a more recreational nature. 59 Often these meetings included events for non-Volunteers, such as the ladies race at a meeting of the Rangiora Rifles Sports Club. 60

Individual Volunteers and teams took part in sporting contests with other groups. For instance eight man teams from Christchurch units competed in the Tug of War at a Pioneer Amateur Bicycle and Athletic Club's Meeting. F.M.B. Fisher, a well known athlete and Volunteer, also competed at the meeting winning the putting the weight competition. 61 Another facet of the Movement's sporting activities was social events such as a Volunteer officers against clergy cricket match. 62

The involvement of Volunteering in sports had two main beneficial effects upon its relations with the community. It was another avenue for convivial association with the public. Secondly and more importantly, sports gave substance to the idea actively propagated by the Movement, that Volunteering was good for the character and physique of young men. 63 This idea is evident in an account of the defeat by Captain Cotton of the
Canterbury Mounted Rifles, of Scott, a professional walker, in a twenty-four-hour match. The Volunteer did not simply display sporting prowess, but "true British pluck and endurance", qualities upon which the Volunteers prided themselves and which were basic to the image they endeavoured to project. 64

Sports were only part of the non-military activities of the Movement, which catered for many different interests. So important were these activities that corps often had a special committee to organise them, such as the Wellington Naval's Amusements Committee. 65 For those with a liking for table games, like euchre 66 and cribbage 67 companies held regular competitions amongst themselves or with other companies and community groups. As with sporting pursuits bodies were organised to undertake some of these activities. Wanganui Volunteers, for example in 1886 established a gymnasium and reading room as well as a Garrison Dramatic Club. 68 Volunteers made use of their talents to entertain others as when members of E Battery, with the assistance of two young women, staged a farce 'As Mad as a Hatter' as part of a show at Sunnyside Asylum. 69

Although the main reason for the establishment of clubs by Volunteer Officers and NCOs was educational, these organisations also had an important social function. At the Canterbury District Officers Club, for instance, activities included dinners, concerts and card matches. 70
Of all the social, sporting and recreational organisations associated with Volunteering one group stands out in importance; brass and military bands. Almost from the outset of Volunteering there was a close connection between it and the band movement. Bands were an important feature of many Volunteer events. The Christchurch Garrison Band, for instance, led a group of local corps to their annual church parade and accompanied the singing at the service. In return for these duties all Volunteer bands received support from the Movement, and those designated as Garrison Bands were also given a Government subsidy.

Some corps, like the Thames Naval Artillery, had a particularly long and close association with their bands. This company established a band in 1869 and actively supported it for more than thirty years. For several years the corps ignored a regulation which limited the number of bandsmen allowed to five. When Colonel Fox inspected the Thames Navals in 1892 no fewer than ten smartly dressed bandsmen paraded along with 48 members of the corps proper. Fox commented that it was "a very good band" but "quite contrary to regulations," and warned the corps' commander that the status of the band would have to be altered to comply with the regulations. This was something the corps was loath to do. Even in 1903 when the band was officially attached to the local battalion, the Thames Volunteers still regarded it as their band.
The proposed itinerary for a visit by the corps to a neighbouring unit shows how important the band was for the social life of the company. Over the weekend as well as a game of football and a shooting match, a "theatrical performance" featuring the band was planned. The value attached by the Thames corps to their band is demonstrated by the amount of money they spent on it. In the 1895-96 year the corps spent over £40 out of a total expenditure of around £250 on the band. That a Volunteer corps, a supposedly military unit, should devote such a high proportion of its resources to a brass band is indicative of the wide range of interests encompassed by Volunteering; many of which had little or nothing to do with its official role.

The association of so many brass bands, which were a popular form of entertainment with the Volunteer Movement, played a part in creating a favourable perception of Volunteering as a whole. This link is evident in an appeal for public donations to buy instruments to equip a military band for the Christchurch garrison. The twin themes of the appeal were the valuable patriotic services of the Volunteers and the entertainment that would be provided for Christchurch by a first rate military band. The fine impression made by popular Volunteer bands is well illustrated by the comments of Pat Lawlor, a boy of twelve or thirteen in 1906. He wrote in his diary of how proud Wellington people were of the successes of their garrison band in major competitions.
Volunteers were involved in many different purely social events. At the level of the individual corps there were official functions associated with the company activities. One of the most important was the annual smoke concert and prize giving. On these occasions prizes won by members for such things as rifle shooting were presented, along with musical items and refreshments. The corps holding the concert invited ex-members, members of other units, friends and supporters to join in the celebrations. Such events provided a forum at which people and organisations who had provided prizes and other assistance to the corps could be thanked, this was necessary if good relations with the community were to be maintained.

The need to secure support for the corps was also related to the practice of inviting important local figures to these functions. Local Members of Parliament were a popular choice; Mr G.J. Smith, a Christchurch member, attended the Canterbury Engineers Annual Smoke Concert in 1898. In his speech at the Concert Mr Smith called for more support for Volunteering and suggested that Volunteers should put pressure on their members of Parliament to secure better treatment from the Government.

Corps held social gatherings to mark a diverse set of occasions. Some were private affairs for members, such as the social evening organised by N Battery to present a clock to an NCO who was about to be married. Others were directly related to corps activities, such as the evening of singing, toasts and
speeches held by the Christ's College Rifles to celebrate their victory in a marching competition.\textsuperscript{87} Balls were also regularly held by the Volunteers, typical of such events was the Richmond Rifles annual ball of 1891. This was a highly successful occasion with about a hundred couples taking part.\textsuperscript{88} The drill halls owned by Volunteer corps were often important centres for many community activities. As in Hamilton where the local Volunteer Hall was for much of this period, the main venue for concerts and balls.\textsuperscript{89}

As well as these somewhat formal events, many informal social gatherings were part of Volunteering. After a Volunteer review in Temuka Captain Hayhurst entertained officers of the South Canterbury Battalion, and later the Temuka Rifles at his home. This is a typical example of the way in which the official and unofficial aspects of Volunteering were intertwined.\textsuperscript{90} The Sydenham Rifles decision to have a supper at the conclusion of its government parades is another instance of this.\textsuperscript{91}

The entertainment value of some Volunteer military activities and the talents of members were widely used to generate income for the Movement by the holding of military concerts and other events. This was necessary because it would have been impossible for Volunteering to function relying solely upon Government funding. Usually these events were organised to raise money for a particular project, and they were the main method the Movement employed to cover major items of capital expenditure. Timaru
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Volunteers, for instance, raised £450 of the £500 they needed to clear debts on their new drill shed, by holding a carnival.\textsuperscript{92} The successful 'grand military concert', put on by five Christchurch corps, to pay for improvements to their rifle range, is a good example of this type of event. It included items by the garrison band, a reel danced by members of the Highland Rifles, a drill display and songs by "leading Volunteer vocalists",\textsuperscript{93} and ended with a spectacular "night alarm and attack".\textsuperscript{94} Volunteers also took part in concerts organised by other groups. At the Ashburton Caledonian Society concert members of a local unit sang and performed a bayonet exercise, both of which were warmly received by the crowd.\textsuperscript{95}

Bazaars and fêtes were the other main fundraising events staged by Volunteers. The "Great Military Revel-Bazaar and Art Union" held in Christchurch to help clear debts on the King Edward Barracks was a major event of this type.\textsuperscript{96} More than 1700 people were involved in organising the bazaar which was opened by the Minister of Defence and lasted for two weeks. Much of the work was done by the sisters and wives of Volunteers and others associated with the Movement, while the Volunteers themselves put on displays of drill and other entertainments during the fortnight.\textsuperscript{97} These events point out once again how much a part of the local scene Volunteering was, and in particular they show how the Movement capitalised upon public goodwill.

The diverse nature and considerable extent of support
the Movement gave to and received from individuals and groups in the community, provides some of the best evidence of what a well established local institution the Volunteer Force was in the period 1885-1910. Local bodies were one group to give financial and other assistance to Volunteer corps, the Sumner Borough Council, for instance, laid water pipes free of charge for a Volunteer camp that was to be held there.98 A more significant example, in that it demonstrates the central role of Volunteering's non-military activities in gaining support for the Movement, is the subsidy given to the Petone Navals by the local Borough Council. The corps received £10 per annum to help with the upkeep of their cutters.99 This was probably in recognition of the lifeboat service provided by the corps.100 Some idea of the assortment of groups that regularly gave material help to the Movement, is given by the list of donors who received the thanks of the Ashburton Mounted Rifles at their first annual meeting. Donations had been given to the corps by the Winslow Sports and Racing Club, Messrs Freidlander Bros, an Ashburton firm of auctioneers, grain and wool merchants, and a local wheelwright, Mr C. Reid.101

Probably the most common form of support was the donation of prizes for Volunteer shooting competitions. An example of this was the prizes given by local businessmen for the Lyttelton Navals in 1898 artillery firing contest.102 Musical and dramatic groups sometimes assisted Volunteering by staging performances to raise money for the Movement. On one such occasion an amateur company filled the Theatre Royal in Christchurch for a performance of a
Gilbert and Sullivan opera in aid of the Christ's College Rifles.

Prominent individuals played an important part in fostering the Volunteer Movement. Mr J.C. Firth, an Auckland businessman, donated a sizeable number of Martini Henry rifles for Volunteers to compete for. At the ceremony to present the rifles to the successful competitors, he gave a speech stressing the noble tradition of the Movement, in defence of the liberties enjoyed by Englishmen and the need for more public support for Volunteering. These sentiments were noisily endorsed by the large crowd in the Auckland Town Hall. As well as such general support for Volunteering, particular units were sponsored by one person or a small group. One of the best examples of this was the lavish patronage of the Amuri Mounted Rifles by Duncan and Andrew Rutherford, both of whom were major local landowners; it included the gift of a drill hall and a maxim machine gun. Although more pronounced in times of international tension, community support for Volunteering was present throughout the period. In addition the variety of sources of this support provides material evidence of a widespread favourable public perception of the Movement.

Volunteering was not just a recipient of community support, as befitting a respectable local institution, it also performed good works. Corps and individual Volunteers, especially officers, routinely subscribed to worthy or patriotic causes. The Movement also took a more active role in assisting other groups in the community, as when Dunedin Volunteers staged an "assault at arms" in aid of the Knox Church organ fund. The members of the
Ponsonby Rifles were so concerned about the hardship being suffered by people in their area that they set up the Ponsonby Benevolent Society and gave their own and corps funds to finance its activities. A similar concern for the less fortunate members of society led Christchurch corps to stage a military concert in aid of the unemployed. The successful show, involved most local units, in displays of different kinds of physical, sword and rifle drill along with singing, juggling and acrobatics by members of the public.

The Movement also made use of its manpower and organisation to serve the community in other areas. The Sydenham Rifles, for instance, offered their services as a Fire Police and Salvage corps, to the Sydenham Borough Council. New Plymouth Volunteers exhibited a similar spirit of public service when they fought bush fires in Taranaki.

The encampments held by the Volunteers are the one type of event which better than any other shows the close connections between the community, the official duties and non-military activities embodied within Volunteering. These camps varied greatly in size, from those for a single corps to major Easter ones with perhaps 1,000 - 2,000 Volunteers from many different units taking part. Several activities which had little to do with their military training function took place during these camps. After 1905, however, the main Volunteer camps became much more concerned with practical exercising, with a consequent reduction in the amount of time spent on recreation and the like.
Sometimes a corps would hire professional entertainers to perform at their camp, as the Wellington Navals did in 1887. Usually the Volunteers would entertain themselves. At their 1896 camp the Wellington Navals engaged in swimming, sailing, rowing and other pastimes. During the C.Y.C.'s camp at the Meadowbank Estate of Mr G. Rhodes smoke concerts were held every night in a cottage set aside for recreation. Many people specially visited the camp on Sunday afternoons when the garrison band performed.

The most important regular events on the Movement's calendar were the large camps, held over Easter during most of the period. Here the same emphasis upon having a good time can be seen. The 1898 Easter camp of the North and South Canterbury Infantry Battalions at Sumner was typical in the amount of time spent on recreation and socialising. On Friday and Saturday some useful training was done in spite of the presence of many visitors at the camp. The officers of the two battalions held a smoke concert on Saturday night. Sunday saw a divine service attended by about 400 visitors, who also watched the drill and marchpast which followed. In the afternoon the Volunteers entertained their visitors, who included children from the "deaf and dumb institute", with among other things, a burlesque band and a display of trick riding by members of the C.Y.C. Round the camp fires in the evening the Volunteers sang and enjoyed performances by a contortionist.

Major camps were usually held near towns or cities. This was at least in part a result of the desire of Volunteers to have recreational facilities conveniently located near the campsite. This
is evident from the attitude of the New Zealand Volunteer Gazette when it replied to anticipated complaints that the site of a camp was too far away from Timaru by saying "the object of going into camp was for the purpose of improvement, and not merely for pleasure."\textsuperscript{117} It was a standard practice to allow Volunteers into town on at least one night during a camp. Often they seem to have spent much more time away from camp. Some Volunteers returned to their camp near Oamaru after spending much of the day there "noisily jolly".\textsuperscript{118}

The consumption of alcohol was a significant aspect of Volunteer camps and other similar events. At camps there was usually a licensed canteen.\textsuperscript{119} Volunteers even drank in the field. Two men who became ill while taking part in a field day in 1885 were revived by a rest and "a pull at a pocket pistol"\textsuperscript{120} (a pocket pistol being a dram bottle, able to be carried in the pocket).\textsuperscript{121} The prominent part drinking in these events gave rise to concern amongst some people, such as the correspondent to the Lyttelton Times who wrote on behalf of the parents of Volunteers who had attended the camp at Sumner. He questioned the need for a canteen at the camp when there were three hotels within easy reach.\textsuperscript{122}

At the sham fights held in conjunction with major camps a similar interest in recreation was apparent, as well as a strong public entertainment aspect. Such were the persuasive effects of these facets of sham fights, that as with Volunteer camps their efficacy as training exercises must be questioned.\textsuperscript{123}
There can be no doubt that activities which showed the excitement of war or military pageantry were in this period very popular and almost certain to draw large crowds, such as the 10,000 that watched the mock naval attack on Oamaru in 1886. The sham fight at the 1891 Oamaru camp is a good example of what a popular form of entertainment these occasions were. Special trains brought hundreds of people from Timaru and Dunedin to watch the engagement between H.M.S. Curacoa, which was acting as the enemy raider, and the defending force of Volunteers. The spectators were:

- treated to all the glories of a military show - gay uniforms, resounding bands, and artillery dashing along in clouds of dust.

Later it transpired, however, that many of the sightseers were not impressed by what they considered to be a poor show by H.M.S. Curacoa. In particular because the attack had not lasted as long as had been expected, many special excursion trains arrived too late for their passengers to see any of the action.

The overriding importance of making an entertaining show for the Volunteers and public, is most overtly illustrated by the way the conduct of sham fights was affected by this concern. At a sham fight on New Brighton beach the crowd was so eager to get a good view of proceedings that they obstructed the C.Y.C. forcing the corps to abort their charge. On this highly convivial occasion Volunteers and spectators engaged in rowdy behaviour at the local hotel and patronised fairground-style entertainments, which had been
erected for the occasion. 129 The whole event in fact had much more of the character of a fair or carnival than of a serious military undertaking. During the sham fight at the Sumner camp of 1898, one officer even deviated from the plan for the day in order to create "a spectacle for the public". 130

Certainly Volunteer camps and sham fights were "not all beer and skittles". 131 Nevertheless recreation and entertainment were at the heart of these events for Volunteers and the public alike. Until late in the period there was a well founded belief that in order to hold successful camps "the necessary rest and recreation" had to be available to the Volunteers taking part. 132 This state of affairs is indicative of how vital factors not related to the official functions of the Force, were in determining the nature of its activities.

How the public saw the Volunteer Movement in this period is difficult to assess, one approach is to look at how those actually involved in Volunteering viewed the treatment they received. Volunteers, in general with good cause, believed that they received inadequate and often half-hearted support from successive Governments. 133 Some also felt that the Movement's services were not given sufficient recognition by the community as a whole. One writer on defence matters claimed that the public had no respect for the commissions of Volunteer officers and no appreciation of the costs incurred by Volunteers in performing their duties. 134 Lieutenant Colonel Henry Slater, who was a diligent Volunteer involved in the Movement for over forty years, felt that the
Volunteers had not been given their due, being "despised by the 'superior' men of business, and jeered at by the ignorant." This element derided them as "feather-bed warriors," who were "playing at soldiers." What is particularly noteworthy about these attacks is that they were not confined to the Volunteers' military failings, rather they took a wider view of the Movement's undertakings.

This attitude can be seen in an exchange of letters which appeared in *The Press* in 1901 after a visit by a contingent of Imperial troops. One correspondent criticised the British soldiers' drill and officers, while praising the Volunteers as an effective force, and attacking those who maligned the Movement. A contrary position was taken by three other letter writers, who defended the standing of the Imperial Army and were critical of the Volunteers' lack of efficiency and military knowledge. The strongest censure, however, was directed at the pretensions of Volunteer officers; one correspondent commented:

> In England Volunteer officers do not pretend to be soldiers; they have sufficient sense and good taste not to call themselves by military titles, except when with their forces.

For this critic at least, the use of military titles by officers in their civil activities played a significant part in forming his
view of the Movement. The Volunteer Force was like other local institutions quite often satirised in the colony's press; however that directed at the Movement was generally of a good humoured kind. Members of the Force were also sometimes subject to "the jibes, the jeers, and the sneers of the lazy and the indolent who stand around in the streets." Harassment by larrikins while on parade or at camp, was a problem Volunteers in New Zealand shared with their British counterparts; but there appears to have been little real malice in these incidents. On many occasions especially early in the 1885-1910 period, Volunteers often under the influence of alcohol were guilty of oafish larrikin acts which harmed their image as a respectable body. as when men attending a camp near New Plymouth in 1887, disrupted a service being held by the Salvation Army. There are indications of a definite animosity between these two groups at this time. In Blenheim four members of the Salvation Army were convicted of offences arising from a confrontation in the town's market place, during which it was alleged they "deliberately obstructed and annoyed" local Volunteers who were there to hold a parade. Such open expressions of anti-Volunteer feeling were throughout the period very rare. This is perhaps only to be expected when the Movement was such an integral part of the community.

The Volunteers and their supporters were well aware that the Movement had its detractors and took deliberate steps to foster positive public opinion. One device they used was direct appeals for public support, especially from women, during military
tournaments and concerts. A more striking example is the drill display by squads drawn from Christchurch corps in 1897, which was staged solely as a public relations exercise. Some three to four hundred people attended the display, including important local figures personally invited by senior Volunteer officers. After the display the crowd were addressed by Colonel Gordan, the Officer Commanding the Canterbury District. He emphasised the need for public sympathy for the movement and pointed out that contemporary Volunteers were not like those satirised in Punch, rather the modern Volunteer was:

A modest, law-abiding citizen, and a very good soldier, calculated to excite nothing but respect and admiration for his discipline and work.

Colonel Gordan then called upon one of the special guests, the President of the Chamber of Commerce, Mr E.W. Roper, to give a citizen's opinion of Volunteering. The main points of Roper's reply were that he was sure that Volunteering was the best system of defence for New Zealand, that the Volunteers had made a good impression upon him by their part in the Queen's (Diamond) Jubilee celebrations and that he was proud of the success of Christchurch Volunteers in the route-marching competition. Finally he recommended to all young men that they should join the Volunteers, because of the mental and physical benefits they would derive by doing so. The fact that only one of the four major points of Roper's speech was directly related to the military role of the Force is a graphic illustration of the crucial part the ceremonial, athletic and social aspects of Volunteering played in determining the community's
perception of it.

The importance of the Volunteers' position as the main element of New Zealand's defence forces should however be underestimated. It was the reason for the Movement's existence and was usually the basis of its appeals for public and Government support. This was particularly so in periods of international tension and patriotic enthusiasm such as the war scare of 1885 and during the conflict in South Africa.

The portrayal of the Volunteers heroically defending Auckland against a well armed Franco-Russian raiding force in "The Story of the Auckland Raid" can only have enhanced the Movement's public image. Such was the social prestige of a soldier's uniform during the South African war, that Volunteers and returned members of New Zealand's contingents could hire their uniforms to "young bloods" intent upon impressing women at balls and other social events. In 1885 The Lyttelton Times expressed the opinion that the threat of war had led to a "recognition of the true value of the force", and that:

a volunteer is looked upon by sensible people at least, not as one who has dressed himself up in a gay uniform...merely for amusement but as a man who may be called upon to lay down his life in the public defence.

Volunteers consciously advanced this image of a patriotic force ready to defend New Zealand and the Empire. A poem by William J. Steward, a notable poet of the period and "an
ardent Volunteer. "The Boys of Sixty-five" extolls the manly virtues of the Volunteers and attacks the "Little England idiots who decried them. The subjects of tableaux, which included "Balaclava", "New Zealand Defenders" and "Rule Britannia" at a Christchurch Volunteer concert also express these patriotic and imperialist images which were associated with the Movement.

One major factor above all influenced the relationship between the Volunteer Movement and the community, namely the pervasive apathy in New Zealand at this time regarding defence issues. Only at the end of the period was there real concern amongst politicians and significant elements of the public over the bad state of New Zealand's defence forces. Volunteering was always a minority interest, Volunteers complained that only one young man in twenty was interested in joining. Most preferred to play sports and engage in other pleasurable pursuits rather than "waste time over stupid drills".

A number of factors shaped the public's view of the Movement. As has already been shown many of these were connected to the non-military activities of Volunteering. The part that the Volunteers played in sporting, social and recreational elements of community life was important in this respect, as was the prominent role of the Movement in providing military pageantry at public ceremonies. Volunteer reviews and sham fights were also popular as good free entertainment. The laudable object of the Movement, the defence of New Zealand, assured it of at least the nominal support of
most New Zealanders and in times of crisis gave the Volunteers considerable popularity and prestige.

All these factors went together to produce an appreciation based upon a broad conception of the Movement's place in the community. Generally Volunteering was seen as a positive influence in public life. As one contemporary observer put it:

the training and discipline entailed [in Volunteering] have had a direct and indirect beneficial effect, which it would be impossible to over-estimate. 162

Certainly some people believed that the Volunteers were a ridiculous feature of the New Zealand scene.163 However, the extent of financial and other support for the Movement, and the fact that favourable comments are more numerous in newspapers and other sources of the period, points to this being a minority opinion. Perhaps the best clue to the close and mainly propitious relationship between the Volunteers and the community was the almost universal use of the expression "our Volunteers" in the period.164
NOTES:

1 A good example of the generally favourable portrayal of the Volunteers role in the New Zealand Wars at this time is T.W. Gudgeon, Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand, London 1879.


3 See for example L.T., 12 Mar 1891, p.4g.

4 See for example W.P., 21 Oct 1903, p.43.


6 Defence, Nov 1906, pp:10-11, later the League added Defence to its title, see pp.22n-21.


8 L.T., 1 Dec 1890, p.2d.

9 3,000 - 4,000 spectators for instance attended a large church parade held at the Addington Show Grounds, The Press, 8 Oct 1900, p.6a.

10 The Press, 19 Jun 1889, p.5e.

11 L.T., 28 September 1908, p.7g.

12 L.T., 10 Oct 1885, p.5c.

13 ibid, 28 Sep 1908, p.8a.

14 ibid, p.7g.

15 The Press, 25 June 1901, p.8d.

16 The Press, 25 June 1901, p.6c.

17 ibid, p.7b.

18 ibid, p.8b.

19 See for instance the Diamond Jubilee Celebrations in Rangiora, W.P., 23 June 1897, p.40c.

20 See for example The Press, 27 November 1889, p.5e-h.

21 See for example ibid, 22 Jun 1906, p.8a.

22 See for example ibid, 18 Dec 1900, p.9b.

23 See for example ibid, 23 Jun 1897, p.5g.
24 The Press, 23 June 1897, p.5e.
25 ibid, p.5g.
26 ibid, p.6c.
27 ibid.
28 ibid, 31 Jan 1901, p.4f and 1 Feb p.9d.
29 ibid, 3 Jun 1902, p.5d.
30 ibid, 17 Aug 1904, p.8d.
31 See for example the role of landing parties from Royal Navy ships at the opening Ceremony of the New Zealand and South Seas Exhibition in Dunedin. The Press, 27 Nov. 1889, p.5e-h.
32 See for example the role of the Royal New Zealand Artillery at the funeral of R.J. Seddon, ibid, 22 Jun 1906, p.8a.
33 L.T., 9 Mar 1905, p.5e.
34 N.Z.V.G., 7 Dec 1886, p.6.
36 See for example The Press, 15 Oct 1900, p.2d.
37 See for example L.T., 4 Dec 1885, p.5d.
38 W.P., 14 Oct 1903, p.43b.
39 See for example the extensive coverage of the New Zealand Rifle Association Championship, W.P., 2 Apr 1896, p.44-47.
40 L.T., 23 Jan 1891, p.3e.
41 W.P., 26 Mar 1896, p.48c.
42 W.P., 18 Jan 1894, p.45d.
43 ibid.
45 W.P., 25 Jan 1894, p.46b.
46 The Press, 20 Apr 1887, p.4e.
47 L.T., 7 Mar 1898, p.6d.
48 See for example The Press, 26 Oct 1900, p.3e.
49 See for example W.P., 2 Jan 1896, p.40b.
52 N.Z.V.G., 7 Jun 1887, p.6.
53 L.T., 11 Nov 1890, p.5e.
54 See for example comment at the Annual Meeting of the Wellington Civil Service Rifles, W.P., 1 Apr 1908, p.65 c-d.
55 O.D.T., 3 Jul 1908, p.2.
57 Haversack, 30 Jan 1908, pp. 8 and 16.
58 W.P., 23 Jun 1897, p.47d.
59 See for example L.T., 11 Dec 1908, p.7c.
60 L.T., 12 Dec 1908, p.11b.
61 The Press, 1 Apr. 1901, p.2e. F.M.B. Fisher was a leading footballer and athlete, representing New Zealand at Tennis, Who's Who in New Zealand and the Western Pacific 1908, Wellington 1908, p.53.
62 W.P., 23 Jan 1896, p.38e.
63 See for example ibid, 29 Sep 1897, p.47e.
64 N.Z.V.G., 7 Jun 1887, p.7.
65 ibid, 1 Feb 1886, p.6.
66 W.P., 29 Sep 1897, p.47d.
67 The Press, 14 Jun 1902, p.9d.
69 ibid, 16 Jun 1885, p.5 and 1 Jul 1885, p.6.
71 The first band associated with a Volunteer corps was set up in New Plymouth in 1858. S.P. Newcomb, The Music of the People :The Story of the Band Movement in New Zealand 1845-1963, Christchurch 1963, p.16.
72 W.F., 7 Oct 1903, p.44b.
73 See for example the Canterbury Engineers donation to the Christchurch Garrison Band, The Press, 5 Jun 1901, p.6a.
74 Para 103 of the Regulations of the New Zealand Volunteer Force, in force March 20 1899, allows for a £25 annual allowance.
75 Newcomb, p.22.
77 N.A., Thames No.1 Rifle Company Letterbook 1903-1912, letter No.2. A.D. 106/12.
78 ibid.
79 N.A., Thames Naval Brigade Cashbook May 1878–Nov 1903, N.B. The Thames Naval Artillery, Thames Naval Brigade and Thames No.1 Rifle Company are the same unit under different names, A.D. 106/9.
80 L.T., 1 Apr 1898, p.5d.
81 P. Lawlor, Old Wellington Days, Wellington 1959, pp.105-106.
82 See for example L.T., 5 Jun 1891, p.6a.
83 See for example The Press, 1 Oct 1900, p.5f.
84 Mr Smith had been a Volunteer in both Great Britain and New Zealand. N.Z.I.M., Sep 1901, p.875.
85 L.T., 5 May 1898, p.5b.
86 The Press, 16 Mar 1901, p.8e.
87 The New Zealand Volunteer Gazette & Markmen's Record, 12 Aug 1897, p.4.
88 L.T., 17 Jul 1891, p.4g.
90 L.T., 11 Nov 1885, p.3e.
91 ibid, 13 Jan 1885, p.4f.
93 L.T., 7 Jul 1891, p.1e.
94 ibid and L.T., 10 Jul 1891, p.2e.
95 **ibid**, 26 Oct 1885, p.5f.
96 **ibid**, 26 Sep 1908, p.1g.
97 **ibid**, 28 Sep 1908, p.5d-g.
98 **ibid**, 24 Mar 1898, p.3c.
99 **W.P.**, 1 Apr 1908, pp.65e – 66b.
100 The Nelson Navals, also provided this type of service B. Lowther, *The Jubilee History of Nelson from 1842 to 1892*, Nelson 1892, p.195.
101 *The Press*, 3 Jun 1901, p.6c.
102 *L.T.*, 26 May 1898, p.3e.
103 *L.T.*, 28 Sep 1885, p.5b.
104 *N.Z.V.G.*, 1 Nov 1887, p.3.
106 See for example the Native Rifles subscription to the Diamond Jubilee Memorial Fund. *The Press*, 21 Jun 1901, p.4g.
108 **ibid**, 7 Sep 1886, p.7.
109 *The Press*, 28 Sep 1894, p.3f.
110 *L.T.*, 13 Jan 1885, p.4f.
111 *N.Z.V.G.*, 1 Feb 1886, p.6.
113 *N.Z.V.G.*, 1 Mar 1887, p.3.
114 **W.P.**, 30 Jan 1896, p.47e.
116 *L.T.*, 11 Apr 1898, p.6a-c and 12 Apr 1898, p.3d.
117 *N.Z.V.G.*, 7 Dec 1886, p.8. Indeed such was the business generated by major Volunteer camps that some towns petitioned the Government to have camps held nearby, *N.A. A.D.1.*, 98/381.
118 *L.T.*, 31 Mar 1891, p.3e.
119 These seem to have been remunerative concerns; the caterer at a camp in 1900 made a profit of £130 on the sale of alcoholic liquors. *The Press*, 7 Sep 1900, p.6d.
120 L.T., 17 Dec 1885, p.6 b-d.
122 L.T., 13 Apr 1898, p.2e.
123 See p.164.
125 L.T., 31 Mar 1891, p.3f.
126 ibid, p.3e.
127 ibid, 2 Apr 1891, p.5c.
128 ibid, 26 May 1885, p.5b.
130 L.T., 12 Apr 1898, p.3d.
131 The Press, 9 Apr 1887, p.3c.
132 ibid, 3 Sep, p.2e.
133 See p.115.
134 M.R., Jan 1890, p.61.
135 Slater, p.178.
136 Defence, 25 Sep 1908, p.6.
137 N.Z.V.G., 19 May 1885, p.4.
138 ibid, 7 Jun 1887, p.6.
139 For an example of criticism of the Force's efficiency see Defence, 24 Aug 1907, p.16.
140 The Press, 12 Feb 1901, p.3e.
141 ibid, 12 Feb 1901, p.3e., 16 Feb 1901, p.10a, 19 Feb 1901, p.6b.
142 ibid, 16 Feb 1901, p.10a.
143 See for example W.P., 13 Apr 1893, p.7 c-e.
145 Cunningham, pp. 78-79.
146 See for example N.Z.V.G., 1 Sep 1885, p.8 and L.T., 11 Apr 1898, p.6a-c.

147 The Press, 11 Apr 1887, p.3e.

148 L.T., 27 Feb 1886, p.5c.

149 See for example The Press, 28 Sep 1894, p.3f.

150 W.P., 29 Sep 1897, p.47e.

151 ibid.


154 L.T., 10 Oct 1885, p.5d.


159 See pp.234-39.

160 Defence, 25 Sep 1908, p.6.


162 The Press, 18 Dec 1900, p.3c.


Volunteer corps, although ostensibly military units, were in their organisation and ethos essentially civilian in nature. In these respects they had much more in common with other community organisations like volunteer fire brigades, sports clubs and local bodies. The substantial degree of autonomy enjoyed by corps, along with the limited extent of supervision and control exercised by the Government defence administration, meant that in this period the functioning of New Zealand's defence system was largely determined by the strengths and weaknesses of these units. Understanding how corps operated and what kind of men comprised their membership, is therefore of central importance in any study of the Volunteer Force as a whole.

Why Become a Volunteer?

Many different motives could lead to a man becoming a Volunteer. Those involved in the Movement stressed the patriotic and self-sacrificing service of members. Indeed, some Volunteers were so attached to the Movement's idea of freely given service that they had reservations about expanded Government payments to Volunteers. The great interest in Volunteering during war scares and other crises was undoubtedly related to the upsurge in patriotism and concern for the Empire evident at such times; sentiments which as we have seen were the cornerstones of the Movement's appeal. This type of manifestation of popular feeling had a rather ephemeral quality which
meant that Volunteering could not rely upon it to keep up membership levels at other more settled times. At such times patriotism was supplanted as the main motive for becoming a Volunteer by a variety of more prosaic reasons.

Friendship or family connections could play a part, as when W.C. Robinson joined D. Battery in Wellington. There were already four members of his family, which had something of a military tradition, serving in the corps. A few men would have been obliged to join the Force under Government policies during much of the period which required recruits for the Permanent Militia and Civil Service cadets to be Volunteers. The recreational and even the business interests of men could be related to their decision to join. Many members of mounted units were keen horsemen or involved with horses in their business activities. Similarly cycling enthusiasts and those engaged in the cycle trade played a prominent part in cycle corps.

Simply being a soldier, albeit part-time, appealed to many young men. Cadet corps, which gave boys an early introduction to drill and rifle shooting, were a useful source of recruits. Some schools in particular, such as Otago Boys High School and Nelson College seem to have had strong cadet corps for most of this period, and to have provided a significant number of men, especially officers, to the Volunteer Force. One indication that routine corps activities were widely seen by Volunteers as a worthwhile way to spend their free time, is the extent to which corps and individual Volunteers exceeded the requirements for capitation. The Wellington City Rifles, for instance, in 1886 held 46 parades with an average attendance of 44 out
of a strength of 64, with two members attending every parade. 11 Although the amount of work done by Volunteers did vary markedly, in general efficient men attended considerably more parades than they were required to by regulation.

Certain aspects of Volunteering were especially important as inducements to recruits. One of the most basic of these was the elaborate uniforms favoured by the Movement. The introduction of a standard Khaki uniform was opposed by Volunteer officers appearing before a Parliamentary Committee, largely on the grounds "that a bright uniform attracts many young men to the Force." 12 Volunteers, like the public generally, enjoyed the ceremonial occasions which enabled them to display their smart uniforms. 13 Some men joined the Force mainly for the competitive rifle shooting which was one of its main activities. 14 So important were shooting contests that a corps success in them could have an affect upon its ability to gain recruits. 15 For Volunteers who took part, it was an absorbing and enjoyable pastime 16, with the additional advantage that it could be said to improve the military effectiveness of the Force. 17

Camps were the other part of Volunteer military activities that drew many men into the Force. For most of the period they were in large part just enjoyable outings for Volunteers and their families and friends. 18 The Marlborough Mounted Rifles showed an awareness of the attractiveness of a holiday at the seaside when it decided to hold its annual camp at Nelson "with a view to popularising the corps". 19
Inducements associated with the Movement's official duties were not by themselves sufficient to draw a requisite number of recruits. To do this Volunteering was obliged to broaden its appeal. The establishment of gymnasiums was one of the means of doing this. These institutions not only served to improve the physique of Volunteers, but also to attract men interested in body-building and other such activities into the Movement. More significant were the purely social and recreational past-times which took up so much of the time and energies of Volunteers. Their role can best be seen in the importance attached by corps to their orderly rooms and drill halls, in which most of these events took place. In 1898 the Force's Commandant stated that Volunteer gymnasiums, athletic and cycling clubs were important as "the Volunteer movement in the large towns has to compete with... cricket, football, cycling", and other activities. Having good facilities of this kind was useful both in keeping existing members, and in attracting new ones. Membership of the Bluff Navels for instance, increased markedly after their new hall opened. Corps spent large sums on making their accommodation comfortable and in providing means of diversion. Members of a well established corps like the Kaiapoi Rifles could pass their time with games and other amusements in their company orderly-room on most nights. Volunteering was engaged in competition with other community organisations for the free time of young men. The Navy and Army Illustrated went so far as to attribute the strengths and popularity of the Kaiapoi Rifles mainly to the fact that Kaiapoi was:

Situated...away from the large centres, where so many other means of passing the time detract from the interest taken in Volunteering.
The result of the Forces' response to the need for an adequate supply of recruits, was as one officer put it, a "form of recreation" that cost little. In return for a limited amount of military service the Movement provided a variety of sporting, social and recreational opportunities for its participants. One could assume that such attractions would appeal to men of all social classes and that this would be reflected in the make up of the Volunteer Force. In fact as we shall see this was not the case.

The Composition of the Force

The rank and file of the Volunteer Force usually only appear in contemporary accounts en masse at official functions, sham fights and other such events, drawing comment only on their appearance or behaviour. Rarely was anything said about what kind of individuals made up this body, whereas Volunteer officers were often commented on as individuals.

Most Volunteers were young men aged between 17 and 30 years. In the six Canterbury corps which I have studied, the average age at which rank and file Volunteers joined the Force was 23 years, while the average age of those serving in these units was just under 26 years. NCOs were a little older, with about 32 years being the average age in these corps. New Zealand Volunteers were, it seems, somewhat older than their contemporaries in the British Force, where the average age was probably in the early twenties. The age structure shown by my study appears to be much closer to that of the British Force in the 1860s.
## Table 1

### The Occupations of Canterbury Volunteers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>Number in Rank</th>
<th>1 HIGH WHITE COLLAR</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
<th>2 LOW WHITE COLLAR</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
<th>3 PETTY PROPRIETORS, MANAGERS AND OFFICIALS</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
<th>4 SKILLED WORKERS</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
<th>5 SEMISKILLED AND SERVICE WORKERS</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
<th>6 UNSKILLED LABOURERS AND MENIAL WORKERS</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCOs</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank and File</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>1149</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Source: C.M.A. Ashburton Rifle, C.Y.C., C.W.R., Lyttelton Navals, Christchurch City Guards, and E Battery roll books for 1886, 1896-97, 1907-08. See Appendix for details of occupation categories and methods used.
Although the age structure of the Force was quite uniform, there were major differences in the types of occupations followed by the members of different corps, as a comparison between the members of the Christ's College Rifles and the Lyttelton Navals demonstrates. The first of these units drew most of its recruits from the old boys of an exclusive Christchurch private school, virtually all of whom had higher status white collar vocations. The membership of the Lyttelton Navals on the other hand was comprised mainly of wharf workers, tradesmen and seamen from the port. There were similar differences between country units. There were, for example, an unusually high number of wealthy men in the ranks of the prestigious C.Y.C.

Although corps roll books contain much useful information, including the occupations of most men in the Force, practically no use has been made of them. Certainly the vocations of men involved in the Movement are highly significant as they provide not only vital information on the kind of man attracted into the Force, but also one of the best guides to individuals' social status; and as we shall see, Volunteers were generally a markedly status-conscious group. My study is based on the roll books of two corps from Christchurch, two from rural areas of Canterbury, one from the small country town of Ashburton and one from the port of Lyttelton. In it the membership of these units in the 1886, 1896-97 and 1907-08 years is analysed using Thernstrom's occupational ranking system which has been adapted for New Zealand conditions by C. Toynbee. It divides occupations into six categories from high white collar, to
the lowest status category VI, unskilled labourers and menial service workers. Along with other data this analysis enables some tentative conclusions to be reached concerning the occupational and status structure of Volunteering. These conclusions bring into serious question Major General Sir George Whitmore's claim that the Volunteers were "fairly representative of all classes." In the corps in my study, half of the rank and file Volunteers, and more than half of the N.C.O.s. come from two ranks, III Petty Proprietors, managers and officials, and IV skilled" (workers), as can be seen in table 1. When this result and the overall mix of occupations shown in table 1 are compared with Toynbee's admittedly rough estimates of the proportion of the New Zealand work-force as a whole in each category, some significant differences are apparent. Although members of all sections of the work-force could be found in the Volunteers, lower status unskilled and semi-skilled workers were under-represented while higher status self-employed men, white collar workers and artisans were substantially over-represented. This finding is supported by J.O.C. Phillips' analysis of men in New Zealand's South African contingents. This study shows that the members of the first two contingents, who were virtually all Volunteers, had higher status civilian occupations than the men of later contingents. Other evidence generally supports the view that the great majority of Volunteers were, like the NCO's of the Hauraki Rifles, 'steady workers' and respectable members of the community.

There were two principal reasons why the ranks of the Force were to such an extent composed of men with higher status occupations. Firstly, participation in Volunteering required both time and money.
Artisans, white collar workers and others who enjoyed higher incomes and more security of employment could more easily afford the expenses involved. In addition these types of workers and the self-employed were probably better able to arrange their working hours to suit their Volunteer duties. That the costs entailed by membership of the Force could present problems to men with limited means, was recognised by some of the wealthy supporters of the Movement who gave financial assistance to such men. Entry into Volunteer mounted units was restricted by the need for members to have a suitable horse. In Hamilton men who were prevented by this requirement from joining the local mounted corps, instead formed themselves into an infantry company.

The second major reason for the Force's occupational structure was directly related to the image and role of Volunteering in New Zealand society. As has already been shown, Volunteers saw themselves, and were seen as, a respectable patriotic body. The members of the Force were very proud of their association with such figures of authority as the Governor and their involvement in such important state occasions as the opening of Parliament. Men who joined the Force were therefore, at least in part, expressing a commitment to the existing social order. As in Britain it seems probable that 'Volunteering was, for the status-conscious, a socially acceptable activity and a mark of having risen in the world.' In this respect one group in particular stands out, namely clerks who comprised an important section of both British and New Zealand urban corps. This can be seen in the membership of the Christchurch City Guards in the 1896-97 year, when three of the
eleven NCOs, and nine of the 52 rank and file Volunteers belonged to this group, which falls into category II in the Thernstrom ranking system.\textsuperscript{49} The explanation given for this fact in Britain, that the strong attraction Volunteering had for clerks was due to the opportunities the Movement provided for men to express their attachment to, and aspirations for, middle class status, also appears likely to hold good for New Zealand.\textsuperscript{50} Service in the Force both in Britain and in New Zealand was believed to inculcate in young men the virtues of respect for and obedience to their superiors.\textsuperscript{51} Volunteering also enabled upwardly socially mobile young men to establish contacts with the kind of high status individuals who provided the New Zealand and British Forces with most of their officers.\textsuperscript{52} While there are certainly many major differences between the societies of Britain and New Zealand, the composition, role and image of the Volunteer Forces of both countries are sufficiently similar for useful parallels to be drawn.\textsuperscript{53} Such a comparison strongly suggests that the New Zealand Force, like its British counterpart, fulfilled a significant role in the articulation of social status.

The Formation, Amalgamation and Disbandment of Corps

From the beginnings of Volunteering in New Zealand, corps were closely connected with the community. This was in large part due to their being the products of local activism rather than of Government policy. Normally corps were formed at the instigation of an individual or a small group, who decided to establish a unit based on their district or upon an existing organisation.\textsuperscript{54} Those behind the new corps would usually call a meeting to discuss its formation and have it addressed by a senior officer or well known local figure,
who would speak on the merits of Volunteering and outline what was required to establish a corps successfully. The role of the promoters was crucial. They were mostly men of some standing in the community and would often later be active, usually as officers, in the unit. A good example of this is the part played in the formation of the Linwood Volunteer Rifle Corps by the Mayor of Linwood, Mr T.N. Horsley. Firstly he gauged whether there was sufficient support for setting up a company in the borough, and then organised a meeting to be addressed by the Officer Commanding the Canterbury District. At the meeting it was decided to establish a corps with Mr Horsley in command. The central role of Mayor Horsley and members of the borough council in raising a corps in Linwood is indicative of the way community leaders gave their support to the formation of Volunteer units. After the decision to form a new corps had been taken a letter would be sent to the local district commander, offering the corps' services to the Government. The decision to accept or reject a proposal would then be made by the Minister of Defence after consultations with his advisers.

Although corps based upon particular Localities like the Linwood Rifles were the most numerous type, those associated with different kinds of organisations were also common. The New Zealand Natives Association, a body of New Zealand born Europeans, concerned mainly with fostering patriotism, brotherhood and various forms of recreations, also took an interest in defence matters, establishing Volunteer corps in Christchurch and elsewhere. Many corps were recruited on a
parochial basis. For instance the Canterbury Highland Rifles, which was supported by the Caledonian Society, gave preferential entry to recruits with Scottish parentage. An indication of how popular Volunteering was in 1900 when this corp was being raised, is that it seems to have insisted on a standard of physique higher than that required by regulation. This policy led to an irate letter appearing in the Lyttelton Times from "Tall as Roberts", who complained bitterly at being rejected as too short by the Highland Rifles.

The Maori community had a limited involvement in Volunteering. In 1886 a group of Papawai near Greytown in the Wairarapa, an important centre of Maori social, economic, and political resurgence, proposed the formation of the first specifically Maori corps. Their proposal was well received by John Ballance, the Defence and Native Minister, when it was referred to him for special consideration as a policy issue. The Native Volunteer Rifle Corps at Papawai was as a result quickly officially sanctioned and established. The company existed for more than five years, before disbanding in August 1891, a victim of the slump in Volunteering. Seddon's Liberal Government did not share Ballance's enthusiasm for Maori Volunteer corps, rejecting at least three proposals to form such corps on the east coast of the North Island. These plans had the support of both Colonel Penton and General Babington, the Force's Commandants for most of this period. Nevertheless Colonel Penton seems to have had some doubts about the reliability of Maori Volunteers, as he believed special arrangements would have to be made for the storage and care of arms issued to Maori units.
was some opposition in Parliament to the formation of Maori Volunteer corps, a step which had the support of such Maori leaders as Mr Tame Parata, M.H.R. for Southern Maori. In Mr Parata's own electorate, during 1897 Maoris at Kaiapoi attempted to form a mounted rifle corps so that they could "join with their European friends in... the defence of their country". In spite of what can at best be called Government indifference, Maoris continued to have a presence in the Force. In 1904 the Wairarapa M.R.V. was described as a "Maori corps, very little discipline, and difficult to instruct." There were also Maori sections, with Maori officers in some European units, such as the Hawkes Bay and North Canterbury Mounted Rifles. Individual Maoris were also involved in Volunteering - Colonel Penton stated in 1898 that this kind of mixing of the "two races is quite desirable in a corps". Officers of the Permanent Staff generally seem to have had a high regard for the martial qualities of the Maoris, although they did have some reservations about the discipline of Maori Volunteers.

Two of the more important kinds of organisations to establish corps were high schools, such as Wellington College and Christ's College whose old boys founded the College Rifles, Wellington and the Christ's College Rifles and sporting clubs. There can be no doubt, for example, about the origins of the Star Boating Club Submarine Mining Volunteers, a corps established in Wellington in 1898. Business concerns were also involved in raising units, although on a smaller scale, as the number of enterprises able to provide the 50 to 60 men required was limited. More corps were associated in an unofficial way with a specific occupation. The corps at Thames was one such,
being comprised almost entirely of goldminers. Corps linked with a particular business clearly illustrate how status in the parent organisation was transferred to the Volunteer unit. In the Auckland Rifles, which was made up of men connected with a large firm of drapers, the corps' first CO was a partner in the company, and its other two original officers were senior employers, while the other ranks were lower grade employees.

The involvement of supporters of temperance in Volunteering is an interesting but hard to define aspect of the Movement. Some corps were definitely under the control of proponents of this cause, such as the Wellington Highland Rifles, whose CO attributed the company's strength to its being run from its formation "on temperance lines". Within the Canterbury Garrison Library this issue led to much debate and division, with temperance supporters, of whom G.J. Smith and H. Slater were prominent, attempting to stop or at least restrict the consumption of alcohol at the club.

Differing attitudes towards liquor led to much more serious problems in the Onehunga R.V. during 1900 when a dispute developed centering on disagreements between two factions in the unit, over drinking at company smoke concerts. The majority of members, led by the company's commander, were in favour of alcohol being served at these events. This was, however, vehemently opposed by a group headed by a Lieutenant.

There were a number of ways a Volunteer corps could go out of existence. The Governor could order the disbandment of a
unit for breaches of discipline, inefficiency and other shortcomings set out in the 1886 Defence Act and Volunteer Regulations. These powers seem to have been used infrequently, mainly in serious cases like that of the Clive Rifles, which was disbanded after members had circulated a "round robin" letter asking their CO to resign. Much more commonly corps would themselves decide for a variety of reasons to wind up their activities and disband. The major cause was simply a decline in interest, which would result in a fall in membership, and an inability to gain new recruits. Many different factors could lead to such a decline in interest, economic conditions could certainly be important. The severe depression that affected Auckland in the late 1880s resulted in a sharp decline in Volunteering, with several companies disbanding and a general reduction in efficiency. The marked reduction in Volunteer numbers after the great upsurges of popularity associated with the 1885 was scarce and the South African War shows just how rapidly enthusiasm could wane. In many cases corps formed at such times could not remain viable under less auspicious conditions. The Patea Rifles for instance, decided in 1888 to disband, having concluded that Patea's population was insufficient to support a corps. The two other important reasons for corps disbanding appear to have been disputes between them and the defence authorities and problems in getting officers.

Disbandment was not the only course of action open to corps with such problems. An option available to rural corps between 1889 and 1894 was conversion into Government Rifle Clubs. This scheme was introduced after several country units, whose members were experiencing difficulty in meeting official requirements for corps,
made representations to the Minister of Defence. One company
to take this step was the Tuapeka Rifles, which disbanded after being
criticised by Fox in his 1893 report, and reformed as a rifle club.

A more important option available to corps with serious
problems was amalgamation with another unit. The Christchurch City
Guards and the Christchurch Rifle Volunteers which, in spite of being
highly efficient companies were greatly under strength, chose to
amalgamate to form the Christchurch City Guards Rifle Volunteers.

The Size and Organisation of Corps

The maximum and minimum sizes of Volunteer corps were set
by regulation and were not altered greatly throughout this period.
Regulations in force in 1887, for instance, set the maximum size
for mounted units at 83 officers and men, and the minimum at 43. For
all other types of corps the numbers were 103 and 43 respectively,
however, capitation was paid only on a maximum of 63 for all corps.
Apart from imposing severe handicaps to military effectiveness, this
small size had a major influence upon the internal workings of corps,
in that with perhaps an average of fifty to sixty men in a company,
officers and other ranks would get to know each other fairly well.
Along with the links provided by the raising of corps from particular
localities or from members of another organisation, and the many
social activities undertaken by companies, this fostered and in part
made practicable, the co-operative spirit which pervaded Volunteer
corps.
To get new members corps relied mainly on personal contact between members and men interested in joining. Sometimes corps would also advertise or hold special recruiting meetings, as when two officers of the Ellesmere Mounted Rifles visited the hamlet of Dunsandel in a successful effort to boost the strength of their unit. Popular corps such as the City Rifles, Wellington had no need to actively seek recruits as they usually had waiting lists of those wishing to join. The usual process for inducting new members was for them to first be nominated by two members, after which the company would hold a ballot or the recruits would simply be approved by the corps. As in many other aspects of the administration of corps, there were substantial differences between companies in these procedures. In 1889 for instance, O Battery of Auckland changed from a system in which new members had to be unanimously elected by the corps committee, to one of approval by its commander. Many corps, like the Imperial Rifles which had a Selection Committee to vet prospective members, took steps to ensure that recruits would make satisfactory members of their company.

Corps received most of their income from Government payments, of which the principle one was the capitation grant, paid annually for every member of the company who, by performing a set minimum of duties, qualified as an efficient Volunteer. The level of this payment was set by Parliament and was subject to considerable variation. In 1888 as part of efforts to cut Government spending it was reduced from £2.15 per annum to £1 10 per annum. The next year the grant was raised to £2. Then in the 1894–95 year the level of
Capitation was again increased to £2 10s per annum. In 1898 with the granting of pay to Volunteers who attended Government daylight parades, major changes were made in the financing of the Volunteer Force in an effort to improve efficiency. Capitation was intended primarily to cover the cost of a Volunteer's uniform and general corps expenses. It did not by itself provide enough income for a corps to operate. Indeed a Parliamentary committee concluded in 1892 that it barely covered uniform expenses.

A Wellington corps for instance, spent much more than the £189 it earned in capitation in 1886 on purchasing greatcoats and ammunition, along with camp and rifle shooting expenses. Clearly if capitation was insufficient for even such basic expenditure, corps needed other sources of revenue.

Members' contributions were the most important part of non-Government income for corps. There were four kinds of payments by members; firstly entry fees which were paid by men when they joined the unit. During periods when Volunteering was very popular and corps had no trouble attracting recruits, some corps charged substantial fees of this kind. In 1885 for instance the Invercargill Rifles charged a fee of £3, while in 1900 prospective members of the Otago Mounted Rifles had to be prepared to part with £5. At other times entrance fees were less, mostly being between 12 shillings and £1. The annual subscription paid by all members was the most important part of these payments. It seems usually to have been paid in monthly instalments and generally to have been in the range of 12 shillings to £1. Each corps set its own level of charges to members. Some like the prestigious Otago Hussars, which had an annual subscrip-
tion of 25 shillings in the mid 1890s, were particularly expensive to belong to.\textsuperscript{116} Members would also occasionally be called upon to contribute to the cost of particular corps activities such as camps, and travelling expenses.\textsuperscript{117} Fines levied on members by the corps were another minor source of revenue. For instance, during 1905 fines totalling £8 10s were imposed on members of E Battery.\textsuperscript{118} Although there were those who regarded it as "objectionable...to ask young men to spend their own money when they joined a Volunteer corps", it was widely accepted as part of being a Volunteer.\textsuperscript{119}

Most corps had honorary members who were permitted to wear its uniform on ceremonial occasions.\textsuperscript{120} Honorary membership was granted either in recognition of the service of members who were retiring from the company,\textsuperscript{121} or to people who financially supported the corps. An example of this was the granting of honorary membership of the Amuri Mounted Rifles to the Rutherford brothers and other large landowners who backed that unit.\textsuperscript{122} Usually honorary memberships could be obtained by paying a lump sum or an annual subscription.\textsuperscript{123} These charges could be a useful form of income. The twenty honorary members of I Battery in Westport, for instance, paid a guinea each year to the corps.\textsuperscript{124} A few corps had associations of former members which had the aim of furthering the units' interests by assisting in such things as fund-raising.\textsuperscript{125}

Balls and concerts held by corps and attended by members and the public, could provide modest sums for corps funds.\textsuperscript{126} Many corps generated considerable income by renting their drill halls.\textsuperscript{127}
This was especially welcome as Volunteer corps, before an amendment to the 1886 Defence Act in 1900, had to pay rates on their properties. The use of drillhalls for other than Volunteer purposes was often so extensive as to interfere with the activities of the Force. Direct donations from the public and the proceeds of fetes and other fund-raising events, although important for the funding of specific projects such as the purchase of equipment or the building of orderly rooms, were not a significant part of a corps' regular income.

The various types of non-Government revenue comprised a significant proportion of corps' income although there were wide differences both between corps and over time in the extent of this. However it is possible to estimate that about 20 - 30% of corps regular income came from non-Government sources. The Wellington City Rifles for instance, in 1886-87 received approximately 20% of their income from these sources. In the same year the Thames Naval Artillery derived about a third of their income from non-Government sources. The Christchurch City Guards provide a good example of how much the value of such revenue could vary over a few years. In 1895-96 it accounted for around 20% of total income, while in 1898-99 the proportion of income from non-Government areas was about double that. There appears to have been a general trend for the proportion of unit income from private sources to decline as Government support for the Movement increased during the latter part of the period. Although in the case of the Christ's College Rifles the proportion of income from non-Government sources only fell from about 40% in the mid-1890's to around 30% towards the end of the period.
Well established corps usually had substantial incomes and assets. In 1895-96 for instance, the Kaiapoi Rifles had an income of nearly £300 and assets of over £1200.133

The extent to which Volunteer corps were like other community organisations can be clearly seen in their administrative structures and procedures. This is apparent at corps annual meetings, which in the way they were conducted and even in much of the business carried out were virtually indistinguishable from those of such organisations as Volunteer fire brigades.134 There were two main parts to these meetings; firstly the corps' CO would give a speech reviewing the corps' activities during the past year and looking forward to the coming year.135 With the company finance committee he would then present the corps' annual accounts, which had to be approved by the meeting.136 The other major business was the election of committees and officers. In a corps with the kind of well developed internal organisation prevalent from the mid 1890's, there would probably be finance, general, firing (charged with the corps' rifle shooting activities) and social committees, as well as corps' auditors and a secretary.137 Most positions would be held by any member of the company.138 Although the officers and NCOs usually held most of the positions, all classes of members were represented. The make up of the office-holders and committees of the Christchurch City Guards for the 1888-89 year demonstrates this. Of the 14 places available 4 were held by the officers, 5 by the NCOs and 5 by rank and file members.139

After the corps CO the most important position in the
management of company officers was its secretary. This "arduous post"\textsuperscript{140} entailed responsibility for all the company's day to day administration, such as dealing with its correspondence.\textsuperscript{141} The importance of the office and the heavy workload it carried are reflected by the honorarium paid by the corps to their secretaries usually being the highest for any company post. The secretary of E Battery, for instance, was voted one of £10 in 1896.\textsuperscript{142} An efficient secretary was a great asset for a corps, indeed \textit{The Navy and Army Illustrated} believed that Sergeant Suiter, the secretary of N Battery was responsible in large measure for its strength, as he "spared neither time nor money in advancing the interests of the battery."\textsuperscript{143}

The way in which the internal organisation of corps developed in this period can best be seen in the management of financial affairs. This was a crucial facet of company administration because of the often sizeable income and assets of corps and their considerable financial autonomy. At the opening of this period control of a corps' finances was effectively in the hands of its commanding officer, a situation which "led to more than one scandal."\textsuperscript{144} Captain Mayhew CO of the Spring Creek Rifles was at the centre of one such affair. His corps launched a private prosecution of Mayhew after he refused to account for more than £90 of company funds. Mayhew was convicted of embezzlement and sentenced to gaol for "a shameful breach of trust".\textsuperscript{145} This and other similar cases prompted the \textit{Volunteer Gazette} to call for regulations giving the control of company funds to a committee of members.\textsuperscript{146} Volunteer Regulations introduced the following year 1887 instituted such committees and later regulations further tightened these provisions.\textsuperscript{147} Most
corps developed more sophisticated financial structures, than those required by regulation by having corps members or someone from outside the company acting as auditors.

This trend towards a more complex system of internal organisation was evident in other areas of administration as corps dealt with the increasing scale and scope of their activities. The organisation of the Christchurch City Guards exhibits this tendency. In 1888 it had a firing committee, a general committee, which also served as the finance committee, and a secretary. Eight years later company affairs were handled by finance, shooting and social committees, an honorary secretary and treasurer, two uniform custodians, two arms custodians and an ammunition custodian, as well as two auditors and two representatives on the Associated Range Committee.

Throughout this period however, the most striking feature of corps administration was the democratic bias, evident in its structures and office-holding. This was much in evidence at a meeting held by the Rangiora Rifles to discuss the building of a drill hall. Captain Fulton the corps CO chaired the meeting and began it with a review of the funds available to pay for the building. He recommended that construction should begin as soon as possible. A motion to this effect was then moved by Lieutenant Torlesse and seconded by a sergeant. Then "to test the opinion of the meeting" Lieutenant Helmore proposed that building be delayed until after a fund-raising bazaar had been held, a motion seconded by a private Jones. After a lengthy discussion Lieutenant Helmore withdrew his motion and it was
unanimously decided to start work on the drill hall as soon as plans could be drawn up. The meeting then dealt with the second item of business: in whose name the title of the drill hall should be vested. Captain Fulton suggested that it should be in the names of the commissioned officers of the Rangiora Rifles and of the northern contingent of the C.Y.C. This however, did not meet with much support in the meeting, with Lieutenant Torlesse proposing that the hall "be vested solely for the benefit of the Rangiora Rifles Corps". Eventually it was decided that a committee made up of the corps three officers and two NCOs should consider the matter and report back at a later meeting. Although the officers and NCOs played the leading role in the meeting, rank and file Volunteers also played an active part and were by no means prepared to simply rubber stamp decisions made by their superiors. Most important of all was the overriding concern of all members from Captain Fulton down that these major steps in the corps' life be openly discussed and a clear consensus arrived at upon what should be done.

If the consensus within a corps broke down the likely result was serious internal conflict. Usually at the centre of such problems were disputes over the management of the corps affairs. The Richmond Rifles for instance, was racked by disagreements between its commander, Captain Bowron and most of the rest of the membership over how new members were to be recruited and the use of company funds. Matters came to a head after the leading dissident, Lieutenant Swain resigned, following which most men in the corps asked Captain Bowron to also resign. When he refused to do so more than twenty members resigned en masse at a company parade. The
conflict within the Devonport Navals in 1887 was, if anything, even more acrimonious. Most of its members resigned saying they had lost all respect for their CO Captain Fenton, after he had refused to call a special meeting of the company to discuss allegations against him concerning the corps' finances. Such disputes led to the appearance of an editorial in the Volunteer Gazette which stressed the need for good relations between the officers, NCOs and men of corps and commented that:

> Neither officers nor privates can expect to have it all their own way in matters appertaining to the financial business of a corps.

Corps Military Activities

The military activities of corps for most of the year consisted of regular parades usually held indoors on one evening a week. The type of training that could be carried out under such conditions was limited. In infantry units there was a strong emphasis upon repetitious drill which was condemned throughout this period as being boring and largely useless in preparing Volunteers for active service. Because their members were usually widely scattered, mounted corps met much less frequently, concentrating instead upon holding a training camp and fewer longer parades. In addition to their specialised mounted and dismounted drill, mounted units undertook rifle or carbine practice and competed in shooting competitions. The pattern of activities for engineer and bearer, and the different types of artillery corps, was similar to that of the infantry units
except that they increasingly confined their training to the particular skills needed for their branch of the service. 161

Although corps carried out most of their regular parades under the control of their own NCOs and officers, they were heavily dependent upon members of the Permanent Staff for training, especially in more advanced or technical matters. 162 This system under which staff instructors who were mainly NCOs moved around different units in an area, was far from ideal and on occasion led to conflict with corps' officers. 163 During the latter half of the period Volunteer units began to do more themselves to enhance their military effectiveness. One of the most popular means of doing this was the organisation of competitions within corps. 164 An event of this kind was run on an annual basis by B Battery of Dunedin. The contest pitted the battery's sections against each other in written and oral examinations and tests of practical skills. 165

Rifle practice, parades and most other Volunteer activities had to take place outside working hours because of the limited time the majority of Volunteers were able to, or could afford to, be away from their occupations. 166 Often corps would hold their 'daylight' parades either early in the morning or late in the evenings. A Christchurch corps for instance, practiced outpost duty in Hagley Park between 5.30 and 7 one morning in the summer of 1896. 167 Company corps were also affected by these time constraints, usually being held at the weekend, 168 or over a longer period, with training before and after Volunteers went to work on weekdays, and during the weekend. 169
Rifle shooting had a significance for the Movement far in excess of its military value. Not only was it, as we have seen, central to the development of a favourable public image and to the corps' social life, it was also the activity which brought most prestige to corps and individual volunteers. Success at rifle shooting, and to a lesser extent military tournaments, was what mainly determined a corps' standing. Contemporary sources only rarely make this connection explicitly. The emphasis upon such success at corps annual meetings and in publications dealing with Volunteering however, provides ample evidence of its existence. The resources devoted to shooting are also an indication of its great importance in Volunteering. Typically shooting expenses were one of the major items of expenditure for a company. Nearly a fifth of the Thames Navals' expenditure in the 1895-96 year, for example, was of this kind. Almost without exception, well established corps had shooting committees, made up principally of their competitive shooters, to control this vital part of their work.

The Volunteer Officer Corps

The decision to become an officer in the Volunteer Force was in most cases prompted by the same factors that led men into the Movement as a whole. Most enjoyed their work, one Dunedin officer for instance, described Volunteering as "His chief hobby". Many were real enthusiasts, prepared to put time, effort and money into enhancing both their own, and the Force's military effectiveness. Instructional works such as Slater's Notes on Minor Tactics for
Cavalry show the intelligent interest taken by some Volunteer Officers in their duties.\textsuperscript{176} It was also not unknown for officers to undergo instruction at their own volition while visiting the United Kingdom,\textsuperscript{177} or to personally purchase equipment needed by their units.\textsuperscript{178} For a few of them a commission in the Volunteers could be the starting point for a military career in the New Zealand\textsuperscript{179} or Imperial forces.\textsuperscript{180} Some men became officers with the specific aim of competing for one of the scholarships provided by the British Government to members of colonial forces, which offered commissions in the Imperial forces.\textsuperscript{181} This group who became officers mainly because they liked and were interested in their military duties made up the predominant element within the Volunteer officer corps.

Probably second in importance was the search for status, a factor which seems to have had a persuasive though variable part in men's decisions to become officers. It was particularly significant during periods like 1885 when "Volunteering became the rage".\textsuperscript{182} There were, however, always officers who obtained their commissions mainly "to get a handle to their name", and "whose chief delight is to be dubbed 'captain' or 'major' and to appear in uniform."\textsuperscript{183} Such individuals were certainly a minority of the officer corps, but as a group Volunteer officers were very concerned with the standing in the community which they derived from holding a commission. A good example of this concern is the determined efforts of a former corps commander, Mr J.L. Wilson to get the right, allowed other retired officers, to the continued use of his rank.\textsuperscript{184}
A small group of Volunteer officers were politicians who saw a commission, especially the command of a corps, as a useful means of advancing their ambitions. Such men were attracted by the respectable and patriotic image of Volunteering, along with its prominent part at many public occasions, as well as the opportunities it provided for the cultivation of support amongst volunteers and members of other bodies. A leading conservative politician, William Russell, became commander of a Volunteer corps in his constituency of Hawkes Bay, as part of a wider policy of forming links with the community through office-holding in local organisations like the Jockey Club and Building Society. In a letter to his nephew, Russell candidly explained his involvement in the Movement.

The Captain of the Hastings Volunteer Corps I assumed it by way of working my politics. I do not care 'tuppence' about it am lazy and practically ignorant of the new drill, and being constantly away at Tuanui, or at session or somewhere am not often at Parade. 185

This from a man who was in the following month to become Minister of Defence. 186 Such political officers, who in the words of Colonel Fox had "no interest in their corps except as a step to other power," 187 although comprising an insignificant proportion of the officer corps, had a disproportionate and largely adverse effect upon the Force. 188

The election of officers and NCOs in the New Zealand Volunteer Force was not only highly unusual in a modern military force but was also a feature that had a great impact upon the whole Movement. 189 Section 42 of the Defence Act 1886 stated that officers below the rank of major or its equivalent in naval corps were to be
elected by two thirds of the members of a corps at a specially called meeting. 190 A man so elected would then be granted an acting commission; 191 he was then required, normally within six months, to pass the examination for the rank to which he had been elected. If he successfully did this he would be granted a commission in the corps which had elected him. 193 There were few restrictions set down by regulation upon the type of man who could become an officer. 194

Elections by their very nature tend to promote conflict, something which Volunteer corps were at pains to avoid. The factionalism and bitterness which could spring from a contested election were seen as extremely destructive influences within a company. 195 Even when there were several candidates for a position there was still a strong tendency to strive for a widely acceptable settlement. The outcome of a contested election for the captaincy of the Wellington Rifles demonstrates this. At the first election meeting none of the three candidates could obtain the two thirds support needed. At a second meeting the candidate from outside the company withdrew, leaving the corps' existing officers to contest the position. Lieutenant Tatum, the junior of the two, then retired in favour of his rival, saying that he hoped "the company would work in harmony and unanimously elect Lieutenant Tait" who was then elected by acclamation. 196

Arrangements of this kind were not common. Normally the choice would be made before the election meeting was held, then only one candidate would be put before the members, who would unanimously elect him. 197 Captain Quick, writing in 1890 stated that "in nine cases out of ten" the corps' other officers decided who
would fill any vacancy. The other ranks of the Force do not appear to have been much concerned about this effective abrogation of their right of election. Indeed, the promoters of the Canterbury Scottish Rifles had to form a special committee to find a suitable "gentleman" to be the corps' commander, because of the reluctance of many prospective members to join until they had a good idea who their CO would be. The extent to which election was a sham is clearly shown in the address of the Officer Commanding the Canterbury District to a meeting to form a new corps. He told those interested in joining the company that:

they had the power of electing their own officer, but he would expect them to elect as captain Mr Charlewood, who would afterwards nominate his lieutenant.

Charlewood was elected without opposition and became the corps' first CO. Generally as Quick put it "The men do as they are told", if they did not there was trouble, as when the men of the Awarua Rifles rejected the candidate proposed by their officers for a lieutenantcy in the corps. This led to a second election meeting being held, at which the same man was put forward. The officer in charge of the meeting stated plainly that he did not want the officers' candidate rejected again, and that "the men should have confidence in their superiors' nominee." This warning had the desired effect with the officers' nominee being elected without any further problems. This kind of dispute was a rare event. Normally the officers would try to get a candidate who would get the support of members, as one corps C. said, it was:
his desire to bring forward a gentleman who he considered would make an efficient officer and the same time be acceptable to the corps.

It was common for a corps to approach a suitable individual directly and offer him a commission. Clearly in most cases election was merely a formality, more important as an exercise in cultivating consensus than as a real decision-making process.

The way in which NCOs were selected was in theory quite different from that for commissioned officers, with the Volunteer Regulations laying down that they were to be appointed by each corps' CO. As with many other aspects of Volunteering, however, what actually took place often did not conform with the official position, for in fact NCOs were often elected. When this was done the men would elect those who were to become NCOs and the corps' CO would then appoint them in accordance with the regulations.

In an editorial on the subject the Volunteer Gazette stated that the existing situation where some NCOs were elected while others were appointed was unsatisfactory because some corps commanders were appointing men who did not enjoy the confidence of members. To remedy this problem the Gazette suggested that all NCOs should be elected. The views expressed in the editorial and the practice of NCOs election itself, show once again the high value Volunteer corps placed on the cohesion derived from collective decision making.
One of the most serious problems facing the Movement as a whole, as well as individual corps, was the chronic shortage of officers during most of the period. For example, of the 99 corps inspected by Lieutenant Colonel Hume between October 1888 and March 1889, 43 were a total of 51 officers below establishment, and several had only one officer. A similar situation is apparent in the Wellington district during 1904, where 25 of the area's 63 corps were short of more than 30 officers. In many cases corps were forced to disband because they could not get even one man to take up a commission. This fate befell the Hikurangi Rifles in 1908, as it was left with no officers and no likelihood of getting any replacements after its CO left the district and its other officer resigned.

This shortage of men able and willing to become officers and the desire of corps to avoid conflict explain the rarity of contested elections. The difficulties the Movement experienced in attracting enough officers had two main causes, the most important of which was the expense involved. A Volunteer officer had to "pay heavily for the privileges of his rank". The Volunteer Gazette saw the cost of about £30 for uniform and accoutrements as preventing many well qualified NCOs from becoming officers, leading to a shortage of subalterns. It was not just this initial "outlay, but the annual drain on an officer's pocket", that made a Volunteer commission such a financial burden. The situation of Captain Loveday CO of the Herentunga Mounted Rifles, who along with many other Volunteer officers was criticised in Colonel Fox's 1893 report, illustrates the onerous financial responsibilities holding a commission could bring. Loveday wrote to the Minister of Defence to protest at the way Fox had
treated him and stated that the only reason he had not resigned his commission was that he was personally responsible for more than £300 owed by his corps for uniforms and equipment. Corps commanders often had to guarantee major company debts of this sort, probably because of the doubtful legal status of corps. It seems some types of contract could not be enforced unless an individual made themselves personally responsible. Similarly the CO of a corps that was disbanding was responsible under the Volunteer Regulations for any money owed to the government by the company.

As well as these commitments, officers were usually expected to support their corps in a variety of ways. This could take the form of a contribution to company funds, as when Captain Wildman, CO of the Thames Navals, advanced his unit £98 and 8 shillings in 1886. Much more common was the giving of prizes for shooting, drill and other facets of corps work for members to compete for. There were many other ways in which an officer could demonstrate his generosity, such as providing food and drink for his men at a sham fight. One popular Christchurch Officer, Captain Bishop, CO of the Christchurch Guards, was well known for his liberality and on the occasion of his wife's birthday showed that he was "The Right Sort" by entertaining his men at his home. The situation was, as an astute observer commented, one where many officers were:

popular amongst the men in accordance with the length of their purses, shouting, prize-giving and general jolly-good-fellow capabilities.
To be able to accept all these substantial commitments meant that in most cases an officer had to be "in a good financial position." This requirement prevented many men who were otherwise well qualified from becoming officers and forced some efficient officers to retire. In his 1906 report Major General Babington attributed the difficulties in getting sufficient officers for the Force to the absence of a "leisured class" in New Zealand. An editorial in The Press was even more to the point when it correctly noted that:

the number of suitable men who can give up their time...and who can afford the demands on their pockets at present entailed on acceptance of commissioned rank in a Volunteer company, must always be limited.

The other major reason for the shortage of officers was concerns related to the status value of being an officer. One writer in 1890, when admittedly Volunteering was at a low ebb, went so far as to claim that Volunteer commissions were respected by no-one, not even by those who held them. This commentator and Captain Quick, who was writing in the same year, believed that the status of Volunteer officers could be improved by granting them commissions in the New Zealand Militia, warrants which were widely respected. Quick felt that this was in essence because holders of militia commissions had their names entered in Her Majesty's Army List, something which again shows how important marks of prestige and respect were for Volunteer Officers. This is also evident in Quick's other suggestion for raising the status of officers, namely that Volunteer captains, like Justices of the Peace should be able to append the title esquire to their names. This privilege he thought would
demonstrate "that Her Majesty's commission when presented to a Volunteer officer placed him in a position of respect", and that commissions would then "be much more sought after by a class of men in every way fitted". 232

Concern over the status of officers and the need for steps to improve it can also be seen in official circles. 233 As we have seen, Volunteer officers were a markedly status-conscious group, if a commission did not bring with it a requisite degree of social standing, then the number of men prepared to invest the time and money necessary was likely to be considerably reduced. For those primarily interested in gaining and articulating status, other organisations such as friendly societies may well have appeared to be more efficacious avenues for their endeavours.

Why there was a certain lack of respect for a Volunteer commission is difficult to determine. 234 The apathetic, sometimes derisive attitude of some sections of the public must have adversely affected the Movement's appeal. Government neglect and bad treatment by the defence authorities were widely felt to be a major factor in discouraging men from becoming officers as well as harming the Movement. 235 As well as these issues which affected the whole force, there were problems specifically associated with the officer corps. The ignorance and lack of ability of many officers, as well as the use of political influence within the Force, were features that put many suitable men off seeking a commission. 236 Abuses related to the election of officers and the lack of respect often shown by Volunteers for their officers also diminished the appeal of being an officer. 237
Although having sizeable means was an important pre-requisite for holding a commission, especially for corps commanders, a number of other qualities played a significant part in determining who was elected. Being well known to the members of a company was certainly useful as "their choice usually falls on comrades with whose disposition, manners, and address they were already well acquainted." Previous experience in the Volunteers or other forces, and a degree of popularity were other useful attributes. Many officers were, or had been, active and successful sportsmen. Sporting prowess was definitely the main reason for the election of some officers. For instance, when a noted marksman came to live in Christchurch from Australia, he was immediately offered a Lieutenancy by a local corps.

Above all Volunteers, senior officers, and the defence authorities, wanted officers to be gentlemen. In New Zealand this was a wider category than in the United Kingdom where efforts were made to keep shopeekpers and other tradesmen out of the Volunteer officer corps. The characteristics of gentility were in essence, however, the same—education, background and most of all, social position. It was consideration of this kind which made Mr W.T. Charlewood, a man of 41 with no previous military experience, such an admirable prospective commander for the Imperial Rifles of Christchurch. His status credentials were impeccable: the son of an Admiral, educated at a public school and at Oxford University, a member of the St Albans Borough Council, Canterbury Chamber of Commerce, a mason and a partner in a firm of liquor merchants. Clearly Charlewood was a gentleman with the means to financially support his company. Most officers
were anxious to conform, as best they could, with the idea that holders of commissions should be gentlemen, as is demonstrated by the career of the perhaps aptly named Mr G.C. Proudfoot. When at the age of 28, Proudfoot first became an officer in B Battery, a Dunedin field artillery unit, he gave his occupation as clerk. However in the following year 1884, he began to describe himself as an accountant in the corps roll book. This was still his occupation when in 1886 he was elected to the command of B Battery. The year after this promotion Proudfoot began to call himself a gentleman, just as he had changed his occupation after first being commissioned. This officer's progression from clerk to gentleman in the space of five years was clearly related to his rise in the Force, and illustrates the concern for social status that was a significant feature of the Volunteer officer corps.

Just how significant social status was to most of those involved in Volunteering can perhaps best be seen in their attitude to officers who did not have the necessary standing in society. In an editorial The Volunteer Gazette attacked officers who were not true gentlemen and expressed surprise that Volunteers would obey the orders of such "scrubbers". One writer blamed the election system for granting commissions to men who might be good NCOs, but who were socially unsuited to become officers; men who he felt were "more to be pitied than blamed" for their predicament. This view led to the CO of the 1st Battalion Otago Rifle Volunteers to Lieutenant-Colonel Stoneham, to refuse to certify that Sergeant Major Benfell of the North Dunedin Rifles was in all "respects
Benfell was a well liked efficient NCO, who had passed the Lieutenant's examination and had been unanimously elected to that rank by his corps. Stoneham believed that there was much more to being an officer than just having the knowledge to pass an examination and that Benfell lacked the qualities needed to gain the respect of the men or to lead and discipline them. Although he does not state it directly, it is clear that Alfred Barclay M.H.R. for North Dunedin was correct when he charged in Parliament that Stoneham considered Benfell unsuitable because he was a manual worker.

There may have been more than snobbery to Stoneham's belief that officers of low social standing would be unable to properly carry out their duties. The Volunteer Gazette acknowledged that there was resistance amongst the rank and file to such officers, when it said that it was the duty of Volunteers:

> to obey the lawful commands of their superiors in rank - no matter what the social position of an officer may be.

The view that serious problems sprang from having officers who were not markedly socially superior to the rank and file was widely accepted by British military authorities.

This concern with social status was reflected in the composition of the Volunteer officer corps. As can be seen in Table 1, nearly 30% of the officers in the roll books covered by my study had occupations in the top rank of Thernstrom's system, against
about 7% of the work-force as a whole. The officers occupational structure displayed in Table 1 can be characterised as a more exaggerated form of that of the other ranks of the Force, with high status occupations being grossly over-represented, while men with low status occupations are notably lacking. An analysis of the vocations of more than a 100 officers who appear in the Cyclopedia of New Zealand shows a similar distribution of officers' occupations. Another study of officers in the first three echelons of the Second New Zealand Expeditionary Force, using a modified form of the Thernstrom ranking system, also reveals a predominance of individuals with high status civilian occupations. The domination of the Volunteer officer corps by lawyers, bank managers, businessmen, landowners and the like, is not at all surprising, as it was exactly these kind of men who were the leaders of most community organisations at this time.

The desirable attributes for a Volunteer officer: status, free time and funds, as well as the Volunteers' preference for men they knew, led to the officer corps having a mature age structure. The average age of officers in my roll book study is for instance 36 years. This is almost exactly the same as that of the 125 officers included in the Cyclopedia for whom it was possible to estimate their ages. On grounds of age alone these figures must raise questions about the ability of many Volunteer officers to lead their men effectively on active service had they ever been called upon to do so.
The first officers of the Malvern Mounted Rifles provide a good example of the kind of men who led most country corps. All four were substantial landowners in their own right or members of leading local families, who were active in local government and other community organisations. In urban areas most officers were members of the professions, businessmen and different types of officials. Schoolteachers were an important group, often holding cadet as well as Volunteer commissions. The CO of the Newton Rifles at the time of the South African war, Captain A.M. Myers, a partner in a major firm of brewers and liquor merchants, is typical of the kind of businessmen that formed another substantial part of the officer corps. As Volunteering was mainly a pursuit for younger men, the sons of prominent men made up a significant section of officers. For instance, two sons of Wellington Parliamentarian and businessman, John Duthie, were officers in different local units. In general, Volunteer officers were men of some standing who in their civil pursuits made decisions and gave orders as they did in the Force. The way in which authority relationships within the Volunteer Movement mirrored those of society at large could be explicit, as in corps based on business concerns. More commonly the relationship was simply implicit, as in the case of the Hawkes Bay Mounted Rifles in 1906, where one of the corps' senior NCO was the manager of an estate belonging to its CO, Captain A.H. Russell, a large landowner and a member of an eminent local family.

The election system was a major reason for the unsatisfactory nature of the Volunteer officer corps. It placed most value upon considerations like the socio-economic status and popularity of men,
rather than the qualities really needed for commissioned rank.
This is evident in the election process itself, where such
practices as 'shouting' in hotels favoured wealthier candidates, and
also in the way officers carried out their duties once elected. District commanders were convinced election was "most subversive of
discipline and unsatisfactory", stating that "officers elected by the
men are at once placed under an obligation to them; and few, if any,
have the strength of character to carry out their duties properly,
knowing that their future advancement depends on the vote of the men
of the company."

It was not unknown for a corps to pass over a
conscientious efficient officer for promotion in favour of a more
popular, less demanding candidate. Clearly under such conditions
the military effectiveness and especially the discipline of the Force
suffered. Indeed it was widely believed that to be a successful
Volunteer officer, one could not be too strict a disciplinarian.

Volunteer NCOs shared many of their superiors' failings.
As with officers their selection either by election or nomination
often had little to do with the Force's military role. Although
an increasing number of corps held examinations for men wishing to
become NCOs, it is difficult to determine how widespread and rigorous
these tests were. In many cases men were made NCOs in recogni-
tion of their long service in a unit, a practice which led to their
being older than was desirable. That promotion to non-commissioned
ranks was one of the few rewards a unit could offer a loyal member.
This probably also explains why corps tended to have more NCOs than
could be justified by their strength. The 57 officers and men of the
Napier Rifles in 1885 for instance, included six sergeants.
Corps also selected men to be NCOs on the basis of their work as secretaries, or their abilities in areas other than military activities. These men might be ineffective leaders and lack military knowledge but under the corps system of organisation more importance was often attached to a man's worth as a fundraiser or book keeper.²⁷⁵

Most senior officers and others interested in the Volunteer Force were aware of the harm done by election and advocated its abolition.²⁷⁶ General Babington was a constant opponent of the system and succeeded during 1903 in having an amendment to the 1886 Defence Act drawn up for Cabinet to consider.²⁷⁷ The Bill replaced election of officers with appointment by the Governor, and was accompanied by draft regulations for the establishment of a list in each district of suitable men who wished to be commissioned.²⁷⁸ Almost certainly because of Seddon's continuing support for election, the Government, in spite of repeated requests from the Commandant, did not proceed with the amendment.²⁷⁹

Election was however a thorny issue, difficult to deal with in isolation as it was bound up with the other democratic aspects of Volunteering, especially of corps administration. Supporters of the system stressed how illogical and unworkable it would be to expect Volunteers to financially support their corps and to take an active part in the management of its affairs, while denying them any say in who was to lead it. This argument and the likelihood of serious problems developing within corps if unpopular officers were imposed upon them, were the main points made by MPs who successfully opposed an amendment to the Defence Act, put forward in 1907, to end the
the election of corps commanders.\textsuperscript{280} The election of officers was a politically sensitive issue because it was so central to the concept of Volunteer service, and possibly because it was a system which favoured influential community leaders, whose views politicians had to take account of.\textsuperscript{281} As an important question with major implications for overall defence policy, election was best dealt with as part of a comprehensive review of New Zealand's forces and defence system.

\section*{The Ethos of Volunteer Corps}

Like other military forces, Volunteer corps cultivated with varying degrees of success an esprit de corps, which was widely seen as being crucial to the long term health of a company.\textsuperscript{282} Central to this spirit was the pride Volunteers took in the traditions and history of their units. Incidents in the life of the Nelson Rifles demonstrate what a major influence this interest could have.\textsuperscript{283} For most of the period 1885-1910 problems arose between this company and the rest of the Force over the corps' precedence. In a letter to the Volunteer Gazette in 1886 for instance, the reported decision to give the Nelson Navals priority in being equipped with new guns because of their precedence was attacked. The writer pointed out that the old Nelson Naval Brigade had been disbanded in 1881 for "mutinous conduct" and that the Nelson Naval Artillery which was formed shortly afterwards was therefore only eighth or ninth in precedence.\textsuperscript{284} Just how important this question was for the corps itself can be seen by the crisis in its affairs in 1898. At a parade of Nelson
district units more than thirty members of the Nelson Coast Guards refused to fall in because their unit was not given its accustomed position as the senior company at the head of the column. This act of defiance led to serious disciplinary action against most of those involved. Clearly the men who took part in this incident were prepared to go to great lengths to uphold the prerogatives of their corps, even to the extent of jeopardising their own future in the Force, and that of their company. The more positive side of this pride in their corps' traditions was apparent at the reunion of past and present members organised in 1904 by the corps CO. More than two hundred men including Volunteers from other corps and local notables took part in the various social activities at the reunion, which saw steps by a former commander and by a past mayor of Nelson to set up an association of former members with the initial aim of improving or replacing the corps' unsatisfactory drill shed. The most notable aspect of the esprit de corps of Volunteer companies was that its primary orientation was towards one's fellow members and to the corps to which one belonged, and only marginally to the Force as a whole. In a well structured military force the potential for conflict inherent with such feelings could be effectively controlled, but under the Volunteer system it gave rise to serious disorder.

The small size, autonomy, consensus-seeking administration and extensive social interaction characteristic of Volunteer corps fostered the development of strong bonds between all members. One senior officer for instance, attributed the strength and efficiency of the Kaiapoi Rifles to "the men" being "in full sympathy with their officers". More importantly these factors led to the club-like
ambience of corps.\textsuperscript{290} One of the most striking expressions of this was the usually relaxed and informal relations between the different ranks within a company. It was not uncommon for officers to address their men as "gentlemen" while other ranks were very lax in their saluting of officers.\textsuperscript{291} This kind of attitude was to an extent necessary if a corps was to function smoothly, but in essence it was inimical to the Volunteers' role as a military force.

Both the \textit{esprit de corps} and club-like atmosphere of Volunteer companies promoted an insular mentality which put corps interests ahead of other considerations. This attitude was very damaging to the Force's military effectiveness, frustrating attempts to organise corps to function in concert. A dispute over how Christchurch area Volunteers should spend the Queen's Birthday, a public holiday, is a good example of this kind of problem. Local corps planned to hold a field day near the city, providing Volunteers with much needed outdoor training. However, the proposed field day clashed with the Kaiapoi Rifles' annual shooting contest, which was usually held on the holiday. This prompted a member of that corps, who signed himself "Kaiapoi Rifle" to write to the \textit{Lyttelton Times} to complain that the field day was a unreasonable imposition and that his unit would instead carry on with their usual activities.\textsuperscript{292} In response to this, another Volunteer "Discipline" angrily attacked the Kaiapoi man for showing a lack of discipline and for bringing Volunteering into disrepute.\textsuperscript{293} "Kaiapoi Rifle" wrote a scornful reply to his critic, commenting "that the Kaiapoi Rifles will never play second fiddle to the company he belongs to", thus clearly showing the inter-corps rivalry that lay behind this dispute.\textsuperscript{294} The
field day went ahead and was attended by more than 300 Volunteers, but not by the Kaiapoi Rifles, who conducted their usual shooting contest. This kind of "unhealthy rivalry" amongst corps could be even more damaging when they were organised into larger formations.

Corps liked to manage their affairs as they saw fit; this is well illustrated by the way regulations were routinely broken. The flouting of regulations governing the appointment of NCOs, uniforms and the composition of finance committees seems to have been widespread. Even more serious was the enmity this mentality fostered between corps, for:

instead of a general camaraderie being developed between corps of the same branch of the service, there was often a strong antagonistic feeling.

Different kinds of problems could cause ill-feeling between units, such as the enticing away of a crack-shot from one corps by another, or an incident at a military sports. The essential cause was, however, the Volunteer system and the mentality that went with it. Whitmore, for instance, believed that some of the Movement's problems were the result of corps being, "all split up, and to some extent separated by the class distinctions of the community". Certainly, the way the ethnic and social make-up of New Zealand, as well as issues like temperance, were reflected in Volunteering, suggests that tensions within society would affect it. Many of the Movement's major difficulties were generated internally. As one commentator succinctly put it:
The very fashion of our Volunteer Army, self-created as it is, and fulfilling only the purposes of those who raise and control the innumerable petty corps throughout the colony, engenders selfishness and resistance to organisation and control.

2. Col. H. Slater was one such. See Slater, p.99.

3. The Russian scare of 1885, for instance, saw 37 new corps formed. 1886 Report, A.J.H.R., p.1-3, 4-4A.


7. See for example Cyclopaedia of New Zealand: Canterbury Provincial District, Christchurch 1903, III, p.539 and Cyclopaedia of New Zealand: Taranaki, Hawke's Bay and Wellington Provincial Districts, Christchurch 1908, VI, pp.326 and 472.

8. See for example Cyclopaedia, III, p.138.


11. N.Z.V.G., 1 Mar 1887, p.4 The Volunteer Regulation in force 1 Jan 1887, Wellington 1887, para 132(a) required a Volunteer to attend at least 18 Government Parades.


See for example L.T., 18 Feb 1886, p.5g.

See for example W.P., 5 Nov 1896, p.47 a-b.

See for example ibid, 10 Apr 1907, p.64b.

This was at best a doubtful claim, see p. 232-33.

See for example N.Z.V.G., Jan 1887, pp.6 and 9.

W.P., 16 Nov 1898, p.39b.

See for example The Canterbury District Officers Club, Minute Book, 17 May 1906, pp.192-93.


See for example ibid, 7 Feb 1888, p.8, and W.P. 10 Apr 1907, p.63d.

C.T. Supplement, 24 Sep 1891, p.1e.

N.A.I., 24 Feb 1900, p.580.

W.P., 9 Nov 1898, p.38c.

See Appendix Table 3.

ibid Table 4.

Cunningham, p.45.

Ibid, p.44.

See for example C.M.A. Christ's College R.V. and Lyttelton Naval Artillery 1901-02 Roll books.

N.A.I., 23 Dec 1899, pp.383-84.

Cunningham, p.33.

See Table 1, p.48.

36 See Appendix.
37 N.Z.V.G., 6 Mar 1888, p.11.
38 Toynbee, Table I.5, p.188.
40 N.A.I., 2 Sep 1899, p.555.
41 See for example L.T., 11 Mar 1891, p.2d.
42 See pp. 76-77 and 124-25.
43 Gardner, n.10, p.370.
45 N.A.I., 23 Dec 1899, p.384.
48 Cunningham, Table 1, p.34.
52 Price, p.229.
53 Cunningham, pp.30 and 68-75.
54 Cyclopedia, VI, p.329.
55 See for example The Press, 11 Jun 1900, p.3g.
56 W.P., 2 Nov 1898, p.40a.
57 Volunteer Regulations 1899, Appendix B, p.89 and N.A. A.D.I., 97/2511.
58 For an outline of the association's platform see the L.T., 6 May 1898, p.6f.
59 ibid, 5 Nov 1900, p.5c, 4 Dec 1900, p.6e and N.Z.N.O., Nov 1900, p.126.
60 L.T., 27 Oct 1900, p.2e.
61 ibid, 17 Nov 1900, p.4d. Although a higher than normal standard of physique was not mentioned at the meeting to establish the corps, that the average height of its recruits was five foot ten inches lends credence to the correspondent's complaint, see ibid, 13 Nov 1900, p.5e.


63 N.A. Whitmore to Ballance 11 Jan 1886 and Whitmore to Gudgeon 18 Feb 1886, A.D.1, 86/463.


65 N.Z.C., 8 Sep 1892, II, p.1264.


67 Penton to Seddon 17 Sep 1900, A.D.1., 00/3831.


69 ibid, p.371.

70 L.T., 18 Oct 1897, p.2g.


72 ibid and L.T., 26 Nov 1900, p.3g.

73 Penton to Thompson 25 Jun 1898, A.D.1., 00/3831.

74 See for example Penton to Seddon 17 Sep 1900, ibid.

75 See for example N.A.I., 16 Sep 1899, pp.610-11 and ibid, 4 Nov 1899, p.170-71.


78 N.A.I., 19 Aug 1899, p.507.


80 W.P., 1 Apr 1903, p.65e.

81 The Canterbury District Officers Club, Minute Book, p.188 and 235.
82 N.A. A.D.I., 00/3083.
83 New Zealand Statutes 1886, p.53.
87 See pp.75 and 154-55.
93 Volunteer Regulations 1887, para.8.
94 See for example W.P., 29 Sep 1897, p.47.
95 See for example The Press, 21 Jan 1888, p.1e.
96 W.P., 10 Apr 1907, p.63e.
97 N.A.I., 16 Sep 1899, p.610 and 2 Dec 1899, p.288.
98 See for example N.A. O Battery Private Rules, rule no.7, A.D.I., 89/474.
99 See for example N.Z.V.G., 1 Feb 1886, p.6.
100 See for example Volunteer Regulations 1899, Appendix A, p.87.
101 A.D.I., 89/474.
102 W.P., 4 Apr 1900, p.47b.
103 For example, in 1899 engineers, infantry and cycle corps members were required to attend 18 parades including three whole afternoon parades, with at least two thirds of the corps' strength present at four parades, Volunteer Regulations 1899, para.139.
N.A. Circular No.8 29 Feb 1888, A.D. 9/3.

Circular No.42 17 Dec 1889, ibid.


Volunteer Regulations 1899, para. 159, for example, specified that £1 5s. of each years capitation grant be used for uniforms.


ibid, 19 May 1885, p.8.

W.P., 4 Apr 1900, p.47 c-d.

See for example N.Z.V.G., 1 Feb 1886, p.8 and A.D.I., 89/474.


Volunteer Regulations 1899, paras. 130, 131, and 133.


See for example Slater, p.97 and C.M.A. E Battery Company Order Book, 1903-1907, 3 Feb 1903.

E Battery Order Book, for 1905.

W.P., 9 Nov 1898, p.38c.

Volunteer Regulations 1899, Appendix A, p.88.

See for example N.Z.V.G., 1 Apr 1886, p.7.

The Press, 12 Jun 1900, p.6e.

The Malvern Mounted Rifles, for example, charged £1 1s per annum for honorary membership and £3 3s. for life membership, ibid, 11 Jun 1900, p.32.

Cyclopedia, V, p.168.

See for example W.P., 28 Sep 1898, p.38c and 3 Apr 1907, p.64b.

See for example ibid, 1 Apr 1908, p.65e.

For example, the Petone Navals in the 1907-08 year earned nearly £90 in rentals, ibid, pp.65e-66b.

This and following figures are calculated from balance sheets presented at corps annual meetings N.Z.V.G., 1 Mar 1887, p.4.


C.M.A. Christ's College Rifle Volunteers Minute Book, 1894-1910.

W.P., 12 Apr 1896, p.47d.

See for example the annual meeting of the Southbridge Volunteer Fire Brigade L.T., 29 Oct 1900, p.4h.

See for example W.P., 12 Mar 1896, p.47e.

The holding of a meeting and the presentation of the accounts for its approval was required by regulation, Volunteer Regulations 1887, para.284.

See for example W.P., 3 Apr 1907, p.64a.

Volunteer Regulations 1899, para 287, stipulated that only the corps' officers and two NCOs could form its finance committee.

The Press, 14 Feb 1888, p.6a-b.

ibid, p.6b.

See for example Thames No.1 Rifle Company Letterbook, A.D.106/12.

W.P., 2 Apr 1896, p.47d.


ibid, 7 Dec 1886, p.12.

ibid, p.7.

Volunteer Regulations 1887, para 283 and Volunteer Regulations 1899, paras 100, 287, 288 and 289.

See for example W.P., 3 Apr 1907, p.64a.

See for example ibid, 4 Apr 1900, p.49 a-b.

The Press, 14 Feb 1888, p.6 a-b.

W.P., 12 Mar 1896, p.47e. After its amalgamation with the Christchurch Rifles in 1894, this unit was known as the Christchurch City Guards Rifle Volunteers, see p.58.
Members of a corps, though they could elect their officers, had no lawful means of instigating their removal.

See for example N.Z.V.G., 5 Jul 1887, p. 5 and E Battery Order Book, 19 Sep 1906.

Support by the Christchurch Garrison Library (later the Canterbury District Officers Club) for the early rising movement, as daylight saving was then known, was probably prompted by a desire to have more daylight hours after working hours. Canterbury Officers Club Christchurch, Christchurch Garrison Library Minute Book, p. 67.

E Battery, for instance, held a camp in South Hagley Park between the 3rd and 18th of Dec 1904, E Battery Order Book, 21 Nov 1904.
For example, at least five of the seven men on the Imperial Rifles 1900-01 shooting committee were competitive shooters, *W.P.*, 4 Apr 1900, pp. 47e and 49a-b.

Cyclopedia, IV, p. 107.

H. Slater, *Notes on Minor Tactics for Cavalry*, Christchurch 1886, this work received a favourable review in a United Kingdom Military journal, the *Broad Arrow*, *N.Z.V.G.*, 4 Oct 1887, p. 9.

See for example *N.Z.V.G.*, 7 Sep 1886, p. 7.

See for example *ibid.*, 4 Oct 1887, p. 11.


Hughes, p. 12.


M.A. A.D.1, CO/4223.


See pp. 151-52.


*New Zealand Statutes* 1886, p. 54.

*Volunteer Regulations* 1899, para. 40.

*ibid.*, para. 41.

*ibid.*, para. 44.

*ibid.*, paras 40 and 48, for instance, required O.C. Districts to certify that a man was fit to hold a commission, and that Lieutenants be at least 18, and Captains 21, years of age.

See for example *L.T.*, 9 Jun 1891, p. 4e.
197 See for example The Press, 6 Jan 1901, p.4g.
198 M.R., Apr 1890, p.182.
199 L.T., 26 Mar 1885, p.5 d-e.
200 Ibid, 2 Oct 1897, p.3g.
202 M.R., Apr 1890, p.182.
203 W.P., 4 Apr 1900, p.48b.
204 N.Z.V.G., 1 Mar 1887, p.4.
205 See for example W.P., 23 Jun 1897, p.49b.
206 Volunteer Regulations 1887, para 108.
207 How prevalent this practice was is difficult to estimate, however, the available evidence suggests that, at least in the early part of the period, it was very widespread.
208 See for example The Press, 6 Jun 1901, p.4g.
210 Figures derived from 1889 Report, A.J.H.R., Table III, pp. 12-13-14-16 and Volunteer Regulations 1887, para 8 which set the establishment of all corps at three officers.
212 N.A. A.D.1, 08/2186.
216 N.A. Loveday to Seddon 30 Jul 1893, A.D. 104/11.
218 The Press, 26 Apr 1901, p.2c.
219 Volunteer Regulations 1889, para 156.
220 Thames Navals Cashbook, p.43 A.D. 106/9. Although listed as an advance, I believe this sum was a gift, as there appears to be no record of the corps repaying the sum, also Wildman was a wealthy

221 See for example L.T., 29 Oct 1900, p.6d.

222 N.Z.V.G., 1 Jun 1886, p.6.

223 ibid, 6 Sep 1887, p.7.

224 J.S. Small, Suggestions Relating to the Defences of New Zealand and the Reorganisation of the Volunteers, Auckland 1882? p.7. Although undated, internal evidence shows that this work was written at the earliest late in 1881 and probably published in 1882.


228 The Press, 24 Sep 1900, p.4d.

229 M.R., Feb 1890, p.61.

230 ibid, and Captain W.H. Quick, "Our Volunteer Forces" in ibid, Apr 1890, p.183.

231 ibid, Apr 1890, p.183.

232 ibid.


234 This situation and the reasons for it resemble that which faced the British Force, Cunningham, pp.59-61.

235 M.R., Apr 1890, p.182, and Slater, p.97.


237 See for example 1889 Report, A.J.H.R., p.4-H-16.

238 Dispatches from the Governor of New Zealand to the Secretary of State, A.J.H.R. 1891, p.10-A-1.

239 See for example L.T., 19 May 1898, p.3e and 1 Nov 1898, p.3d.

240 See for example W.P., 23 Jun 1897, p.49a.

241 ibid, 18 Nov 1908, p.61e.

242 Cunningham, pp.55-56.

243 Cyclopaedia, III, p.138 and L.T., 2 Oct 1897, p.3g.

244 Cyclopaedia, III, pp.138-39.
See for example, Charlewood's gift of £5 for company shooting prizes, L.T., 17 Mar 1898, p.6a.

N.A. E Battery Roll book, A.D.- D1, 2 and 3.


N.Z.V.G., 6 Dec 1887, p.10.


Stoneham to O.C.Otago District 16 Aug 1909, ibid.

N.Z.P.D., Vol 143 8 Jul 1908, p.216. Benfell's foolish conduct when he did become an officer raises the possibility that Stoneham thought him unsuitable because of his personal failings, see the documents relating to proposed disciplinary action against Benfell A.D.1, 09/3442. I consider this most unlikely, as Stoneham refused to specify what made Benfell unfit to hold a commission, and because of the general tone of his references to Benfell.


Toynbee, Table 1.5, p.188.

See Appendix Table 5.


See for example D.G. Pearson, Johnsonville : Continuity and Change in a New Zealand Township, Sydney 1980, pp.78-79.

See Appendix Table 4.

Figures calculated from data on officers in Cyclopaedia, I-VI.


See for example N.Z.I.M., Apr 1900, p.492.

Cyclopaedia, II, p.170.

Cyclopedia, I, pp.333-34. Such family backgrounds show the weakness of a status ranking system based on occupation.

See p.56.

Cyclopedia, VI, p.325.

See for example N.Z.V.G., 1 Nov 1887, p.8.


See for example 1889 Report, A.J.H.R., p.4-H-16 and N.A. Babington to Pitt 12 Sep 1906, A.D. 58/54.


See for example 1889 Report, A.J.H.R., p.4-H-16.

See for example W.P., 3 Apr 1907, p.63b.

See for example Lieutenant Colonel A. Bell, Military Lectures and Speeches on National Defence, Hamilton 1909, p.6.


N.A. Babington to Seddon 4 Aug 1903, and defence act amendment A.D. 58/30.


Babington to Pitt 12 Sep 1906, A.D. 58/54.

See for example N.Z.I.M., Nov 1900, p.128.

The Nelson Naval Artillery, Nelson Coast Guards and Nelson Rifles referred to below, is the same unit under different names.
The corps itself took 1875, when the Naval Brigade was established, as the year from which its precedence should be calculated, as the corps history published in 1904, covered the years 1875-1904. See *Cyclopedia*, V, pp. 51-52.

The strong feelings raised by these issues are consistent with Volunteers' general concern over status and, although most evident in long established corps, can be seen in most units.

*Cyclopedia*, V, p. 52.

W.P., 21 Sep 1904, pp. 57e-58b.


See for example *N.Z.V.G.*, 2 Nov 1883, pp. 8-9. New Zealand soldiers generally are reputed to have a relaxed attitude towards military etiquette, see for example P. Singleton-Gates, *General Lord Freyberg V.C.: an unofficial biography*, London 1963, p. 238. With the Volunteers, however, it was symptomatic of a situation that affected the substance as well as the form of discipline.

L.T., 1 May 1891, p. 3e-f.

ibid, 14 May 1891, p. 3e.

ibid, 18 May 1891, p. 3b.

ibid, 26 May 1891, pp. 3c and 6b.


*N.Z.I.M.*, Jan 1902, p. 327.

*N.Z.V.G.*, 7 Sep 1886, p. 9.

ibid, 2 Nov 1885, p. 3.

L.T., 6 Jun 1886, p. 3f.

The *Press*, 6 Sep 1901, p. 4d.
CHAPTER IV
TWO MAJOR STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES
OF THE VOLUNTEER FORCE

PART A - NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE ADMINISTRATION

As the Volunteer Force was an organisation of many widely scattered, semi-autonomous parts, it needed a sound administrative structure if it was to function well. However, before 1907 New Zealand's defence administration suffered from severe shortcomings. These were of two kinds; those related to the administrative organisation, and those caused by a chronic lack of resources, especially staff.

Although the Governor was Commander-in-Chief, the Minister of Defence was effectively in charge of both the defence forces and their administration. Ministers were very protective of these powers and resisted any attempt at encroachment by the Governor or other imperial authorities.¹ This situation dated back to disputes over the control of military forces in New Zealand during the Anglo-Maori Wars of the 1860s.² Within the administration, the Minister exercised a close personal supervision. For instance, he had to approve even very minor items of expenditure.³ This involvement in the routine workings of the defence system made it much easier for the Minister to make decisions motivated by the considerations of patronage and political advantage, as was common throughout the period, 1885-1910.⁴ The new administrative structure introduced in 1907 defined the role of the Minister to a limited extent, and reduced his involvement in its day to day operations, but did not effect his overall control.
The Central Administration

The Defence Department, which controlled the Volunteers along with the other elements of the forces, was divided into two sections, civil headed by the Under Secretary for Defence, and the military under the Commander of New Zealand Forces who was also commonly known as the Commandant. At the direction of the Minister, the Department implemented Government policy, and controlled expenditure as well as all other matters relating to the operation of New Zealand's defence system. To discharge these duties, the Department had a small administrative staff, based almost entirely at its offices in Wellington. Before 1907 the number of staff was always too small for the work required. The situation was particularly serious between the late 1880s and the mid 1890s when the Government pursued a policy of retrenchment. After this period staff numbers rose but so too did their workload, as the strength of the forces, especially the Volunteers, increased.

The weaknesses caused by inadequate administrative resources were compounded by problems related to the role of the Commander, and the relationship between the civil and military sections of the Department. Since the 1870s there had been no military commander of the forces and they had effectively been under civilian control. As part of the response to the war scare of 1885, Sir George Whitmore was placed in command of the colony's defence forces and made Commissioner of the Armed Constabulary. After his resignation in 1888, the post was again vacant until 1892, when an Imperial officer, Colonel F.J. Fox was appointed Commandant of the New Zealand Forces for a five year
term, a step which Major General Edwards had recommended in his report compiled in 1889. Fox had only held the position for a short time when in April 1894, he resigned because of serious disputes between himself and Defence Minister Seddon. Although he was shortly afterwards appointed to a new office, Military Adviser to the New Zealand Government and Inspector of the New Zealand Forces, there was once again no proper commander until the arrival of Colonel Penton in 1896, after which the local forces were not left without a commander for any length of time. Even when the post was occupied, the Minister and the civil administration continued to exercise a pre-eminent degree of authority over the forces, as the military commander lacked real power. There were a number of reasons for this, the most basic of which was that the Defence Act of 1886, which governed the forces until the 1906 Defence Amendment Act came into operation, referred only to a Commander of the Forces with undefined rights and powers and made no mention of the position of Commandant, who therefore had no statutory authority. This anomalous state of affairs was only partly remedied by an amendment to the Act, passed in 1900, which gave the Commander of the Forces the official title, Commandant of the Defence Forces, and made him responsible for their discipline, training and efficiency. The amendment was ambiguous, as it failed to define the roles of the Minister, the Commandant, and the civil administration, and also the relationship between them. The second major reason for the Commander's weak position was the civil administration's control, not only of all matters to do with expenditure, but also of the procurement, distribution and care of defence stores and equipment. With these vital functions outside his jurisdiction, the Commandant could not...
be in effective charge of the Forces. The amendment of 1900 made provision for the Minister to grant control of defence supplies to the Commandant, but this was not done. Because both the civil and military parts of the Department were involved in the day to day workings of the forces, the administrative system was thoroughly inefficient and incapable of dealing with a crisis. Thus it was repeatedly censured by Commandants and others. Before 1899-1900 the Commandant was further handicapped by having very few staff to assist him in his duties. Before 1906 nothing effective was done to remedy the problems caused by the division of the Defence Department, mainly because of Seddon's strong support for the existing administrative system.

**District Administration**

The next level of administration below the Defence Department was the Militia and Volunteer districts and sub districts which later in the period were known as military districts. Before 1895 there were quite a few of these. In 1888 for instance, the North Island was divided into twelve, and the South nine. Many of these were small inland districts unsuited to the situation prevailing from the 1880s onwards when the main threat was external rather than internal. Only after calls in various reports on the Colony's defences, was a much more rational system introduced. This instituted fewer, but larger districts; Auckland which covered the upper half of the North Island, Wellington the lower half, Nelson which included Marlborough and Westland, Canterbury, and Otago which included Southland. Each of which had an Officer Commanding District whose major
responsibility was the control, inspection and instruction of the district's Volunteer units. Although military officers they were responsible to both the civil and military elements of the Defence Department. To assist them in their duties they had a small staff, largely made up of drill instructors. District commanders and their staffs had a heavy administrative workload, which obliged them to spend too much time on such duties, rather than on instructing and supervising the Volunteers. This unsatisfactory situation was only in part remedied during the later part of the period by the appointment of a clerk to assist each O.C. District, and other additional staff. Until 1895, many officers commanding small districts and staff in all districts were employed on a part-time basis, and were often unable to devote sufficient time to their duties because of other commitments. This practice persisted to a limited extent after the reform of 1895, most notably in the small Nelson district. The pay and conditions of employment of O.C. Districts and other officers of the Permanent Staff were poor, making it difficult to attract able men.

The problems with district administration, caused by heavy workload, insufficient staff and poor employment conditions, were as in the central administration, aggravated by serious structural faults. One of the most serious of these was the existence before 1907 of largely separate chains of command for the Volunteers and Permanent Militia. The small detachments of regular soldiers at the four main centres which formed the nuclei of the harbour fortifications garrisons, were not under the effective control of the respective district commanders, instead in most matters being directly responsible to the Defence
Department in Wellington. If the defence system was to function efficiently, close co-operation between the regular force and the Volunteers was essential, but this system of command and administration made it very difficult to attain. The other main fault of the district administration system was overcentralisation. The authority of O.C. Districts was extremely limited, even the most petty matters had to be referred to Wellington. This was not only highly inefficient, but also undermined the standing of district commanders and encouraged Volunteers to appeal directly to the Defence Department through unofficial, usually political, channels.

The 1907 Reform of Defence Administration

Nothing of real consequence was done to improve New Zealand's defence administration until the Defence Amendment Act of 1906 was passed as part of a wider effort to place the defence system on a better footing. The Act established a new central administration, the New Zealand Defence Council. This resembled the British Army Council, which had been set up after the Boer War had revealed serious administrative weaknesses in the army. The Council, which began its work in 1907, was charged with advising the Minister of Defence, implementing government policy, and taking overall control of the defence system. Its structure was modeled on suggestions by the Committee of Imperial Defence. The positions of Commandant and Under Secretary for Defence were abolished, along with those of their staff, and their duties taken over by the various members of the Council, each of whom had a definite area of responsibility:
- The President, the Minister of Defence: overall policy.

- The Chief of the General Staff: operations, field organisation, staff, training, intelligence, planning and the examination of officers; first military member.

- The Adjutant and Quartermaster-General: recruiting, organisation, veterinary and medical services, appointments, promotion, discipline, movements, transport, tenders, supplies; second military member.

- The Inspector-General: review and report on policy and report on the state of personal fortifications and equipment; third military member.

- The Finance Member: control of expenditure, estimates and other financial matters.

- The Secretary: Administrative and clerical functions. The Council and its staff performed more of the routine administrative work, somewhat restricting the role of the Minister.

It also controlled the work of three new specialist posts: the Directors of Artillery Services, Engineer Services and Stores.37

The new structure effectively addressed the major faults of the old system by ending the division of the administration, and by defining the role of each part. In particular, it brought all military matters under the control of the three military members and restricted
civilian staff to their proper financial and administrative roles; steps which had been seen as essential to efficient administration for many years. 38

Less sweeping but still highly significant changes were made at district level, with the principal faults being dealt with. District commanders were given wider powers enabling them to make more decisions themselves. 39 The staff in each district was to be augmented so that it could deal adequately with both instruction and administration. 40 The divisions in command, between the O.C. Districts and the commanders of the Permanent Force detachments, were rectified by making the Permanent Force officers members of the district staff. Close co-operation between the forces in each district was further facilitated by combining the Permanent Force detachments with local Volunteer garrison artillery and submarine mining units into a Coast Defence Force. 41 The area covered by each district was not changed, although the Council's policy was for the Nelson district to be eventually absorbed by Canterbury. 42 The only significant move in district organisation before 1910, was their division in 1908 into sub-districts, which were equal to Parliamentary Electorates, and the appointment in each of these of an enrolment officer, responsible for making a list of all males between the ages of 17 and 21, a step which foreshadows the Territorial system. 43

The reforms after the passing of the 1906 Defence Amendment Act, along with an increase in staff numbers, did much to remedy the faults which had previously severely handicapped defence administration. For the first time in the period 1885-1910, they gave New Zealand an
administrative structure able to formulate and effectively implement a comprehensive defence policy.

The Relationship Between The Volunteers And The Defence Administration

One of the main factors determining how the Volunteers and the defence administration related to each other was the weakness of the administrative structure. Because it lacked resources and was too centralised, the administration had to rely to an unhealthy extent upon often badly drafted and unworkable regulations to control the Volunteer Force. The frustrations and difficulties caused by this policy form one of the major themes of Slater's book on Volunteering, which is sub-titled "The Army of Regulations". Typical of the kind of problem caused by poorly-framed regulations was the unenviable position Captain Snow, CO of the Canterbury Mounted Rifles, was placed in during 1897 after one of his men had started legal action against him over a disputed fine. The Defence Department informed him that the widely used regulation under which he had levied the fine was contrary to the 1886 Defence Act. Because of this, the Department told Snow that he should either repay the fine or be prepared to lose the case in court. Such bungling left many Volunteers with an ill view of the defence administration.

As has already been noted, Volunteer corps were inclined to ignore or break regulations. Many of these breaches were of a minor nature. Others, especially those connected with fraudulent claims for capitation, were more serious, as they made it very difficult for those in command of the Force to determine how many efficient men
there actually were. Such practices seem to have been particularly prevalent in the late 1880s and early 1890s, when Government retrenchment reduced support and supervision of the Volunteers, and the depression made it hard for corps to attract members and raise funds. In 1889 for instance, Colonel Humfrey, the Under Secretary for Defence, complained of the "gross irregularities being constantly perpetrated by members of the Force". These abuses included having non-Volunteers stand in for absent men at camps, having members of corps impersonate other men at Government inspection parades and during the firing required for capitation. He went so far as to admit that some NCOs were so adept at "cooking" the parade state of their units to ensure that as many men as possible qualified as efficient, that it was almost impossible to detect their malpractice. In any case, many members of the Permanent Staff in the districts were at this time being very lax in their inspections of units, sometimes not even carrying them out. It is not easy to estimate how prevalent these kinds of abuses were. However, the financial inducements to commit such frauds, combined with limited administrative supervision, and the introduction of harsher penalties for incorrect capitation returns, suggest that at least before the late 1890s, when defence administration and funding was improved, they were quite widespread. Misconduct over capitation and the use of Government railway passes made the defence administration wary in its dealings with the Movement, and soured relations between it and the Volunteers.
view of the administration. Also significant was their strongly held belief that the Movement never received adequate support and recognition from the Government for the valuable work it performed. The level of capitation, refusals of requests for funds for Volunteer activities and Government cuts in defence expenditure were all frequent objects of criticism. Staff of the Department were often depicted by Volunteers and their supporters as being idle, ignorant and overpaid, with no concern for the welfare of the Volunteer Movement. Indeed, it was even occasionally alleged that they intended to destroy the Movement. This conflict was the unavoidable outcome of the opposing interests of parochial Volunteer corps and the administration which had to control the whole defence system and implement policy. The general effect of the unhappy relationship between the administration and the Movement was to make the already onerous task of organising New Zealand's defence forces even more difficult.

PART B - VOLUNTEER CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

How the Volunteers functioned as a military force was in large measure determined by their conditions of service. These were in turn greatly influenced by the idea which underlay the Movement, that Volunteers were citizen soldiers, retaining the rights of the former while freely accepting the duties of the latter. The conflict inherent in this concept was one of the Force's most serious and intractable weaknesses.
The belief that Volunteers should not have their rights as citizens too circumscribed led to a liberal attitude towards discipline within the Force. Except when on active service they were not subject to military law as set out in the Army Act, although in theory Volunteers in training camps were also subject to military law, in practice only the Force's usual disciplinary measures were enforced at these events. Volunteers were therefore normally only liable to the limited sanctions embodied in the 1886 Defence Act and later statutes, these only allowed for dismissal from the Force, demotion or for the levying of fines. Dismissal from the Force was the most serious action normally available. It was used infrequently for major offences. For instance, in 1896 when there were about 5,000 men in the Force, only three were dismissed. One after being convicted of a crime in the civil courts, one for being drunk on parade, and one for insubordination. Demotion was a more common punishment used in respect of NCOs for quite serious offences. The most important disciplinary measure, especially for the rank and file of the Force, was the imposition of fines. This power was principally vested with corps commanders although battalion commanders and later O.C.Districts and the Inspector General also had limited powers to fine Volunteers. Fines could be imposed either for offences covered by statutes such as failure to obey a lawful command or for breaches of corps rules. The majority of fines were levied for quite minor offences, such as being absent without leave from a parade, which in the case of the company rules adopted by O Battery Auckland in 1885, made an officer liable for a fine of three shillings, NCOs two shillings, and others one shilling. Most fines were only of a few shillings, but on
occasion they could be substantial, as when gunner Frederick Mills of E Battery Christchurch was fined two pounds for being absent without leave from two parades. This was a sizable sum for a Volunteer to find out of his own pocket and could easily have represented nearly a week's pay. Such a heavy fine for being absent from parades is somewhat unusual, indeed some officers felt that fines for non-attendance were contrary to the Volunteer spirit of freely given service and were loath to impose them.

Fining was an unsatisfactory disciplinary device, being fraught with technical and practical problems. In the last resort fines had to be recovered through the courts, where officers could become involved in costly legal actions with men who felt they had not been properly dealt with. Such difficulties had the important effect, as one officer put it, of encouraging "negligent Volunteers" in their belief that "nothing can really be done to punish them" and that because of this, discipline suffered. Most officers were aware that an overly rigorous use of the power to fine could easily destroy the necessary consensus within a corps, and usually only imposed them for repeated or serious offences. In fact, many officers were "absolutely afraid to inflict fines" because of the trouble which could result. It was in any case, widely believed that Volunteers did not need, nor should be subject to, the kind of stern discipline imposed within the Imperial Forces.

With such limited powers of coercion, the maintenance of discipline within the Force rested to a great extent upon the respect the men had for their officers as individuals.
Barclay put it in 1889 "If an officer commanding a Volunteer company cannot have absolute personal control over his men, much better for all concerned that he should resign at once."\textsuperscript{78} This requirement was one of the reasons for the domination of the officer corps by men of superior social status.\textsuperscript{79} This style of discipline which relied upon a personal rather than an institutional framework for its success, was in practice a deficient means for ensuring good order within the Force.

Someone favourably disposed to the Volunteers could describe the Force's discipline as "mild",\textsuperscript{80} but a more realistic appraisal is that it was dangerously lax, although it did improve over the period 1885-1910, and was probably better then, than in preceding years.\textsuperscript{8} Throughout the period there was a wide variation in the standard of discipline between units.\textsuperscript{82} The influx of new Volunteers, and corps associated with the Russian scare of 1885, and the South African War seems to have adversely affected the conduct of the Force.\textsuperscript{83}

Perhaps the most obvious evidence for the unsatisfactory state of discipline is Volunteer larrikinism such as the trouble in Auckland after the opening of Calliope Dock, when drunken Volunteers caused a disturbance and fought with the police.\textsuperscript{84} This kind of rowdy indiscipline could occur in any force, but what makes these incidents highly significant are the many occasions when Volunteer officers and NCOs were unable, or unwilling, to control their men. Officers on a train returning from a Volunteer review in Wellington were unable to stop members of their units firing blank ammunition at members of the public.\textsuperscript{85} Routine Volunteer activities also show a want of proper
control by officers; men taking part in shooting matches at a Christchurch rifle range often ignored requests by officers to observe safety rules. 86 The Force's poor discipline was seen as one of its greatest problems, making the achievement of a high level of military efficiency impossible. 87 Often the election of officers was seen as the major reason for the lack of discipline. 88 Although this and the weaknesses of the disciplinary machinery were important, they are both simply aspects of the central issue, the nature of the Volunteer's service.

The democratic basis of the internal organisation of corps shaped the Volunteers' view of their service. They generally felt that, as in their units, their interests, wishes and rights should be respected in the military work of corps and the Force as a whole. Volunteers expressed this view in words and actions on numerous occasions; as in the winter of 1887, when the men of the Wairoa Rifles voted unanimously to cancel a musketry instruction class because of bad weather. 89 One of the most striking illustrations of this belief is the attempt to establish a Volunteer Union. The "Volunteer Union Committee" which was behind this move, was made up of NCOs and troopers of the Te Awamutu Cavalry. 90 Sergeant Gresham, the committee's secretary, had previously advocated in the Volunteer Gazette, that Volunteers use their electoral strength to have the act and regulations governing the Force altered so that they did not impinge on their personal freedom in an unnecessary way. 91 This was also to be one of the main objectives of the union, along with improved remuneration for Volunteers. As initial steps towards these goals, the committee wanted sub-committees established by
corps throughout New Zealand, and for Volunteers to lobby their MPs. The Volunteer Gazette strongly endorsed the concept of a union, stressing the need for the Movement to ensure that it received its due from politicians. An unfavourable reaction from the Defence Department which believed that a union would be contrary to military principles, obliged the committee to stop its activities. There was an angry response to this hostile official attitude, from Gresham, and a Volunteer Gazette columnist "Scout" who scathingly described Volunteers as 'serfs' deprived of their civil rights. This initiative aimed at establishing an organisation with the specific object of defending Volunteer interests was most unusual. Much more commonly, Volunteers took action on an ad hoc basis. One of the most public actions of this kind was the protests during a camp at Newtown Park in 1901. Volunteers incensed by bad conditions at the camp, demonstrated there and in the streets of Wellington. This conduct greatly annoyed the Commandant, but attracted support and sympathy from other Volunteers and the public.

The other part of Volunteers' conception of their service was the belief that, in normal circumstances their obligations were strictly limited. They certainly were by statute, as most notably Volunteers could not be compelled to serve outside New Zealand. However there was provision for Special Volunteers to be enrolled, who, as well as being liable for service both within and outside New Zealand, were, like ordinary Volunteers on active service, subject to the Army Act. More significant for the routine operation of the Force was the idea prevalent amongst Volunteers, and to an extent accepted by the defence authorities, that because they gave up their time in this patriotic
task for little or no reward, a Volunteer's duties should not be too onerous. A good example of how this attitude affected the work of the Force is the way some members of the Wellington Navals refused to attend their Easter Camp in 1898 because they felt they were being asked to spend an unreasonable length of time at camps.

This was not an isolated incident. The belief that Volunteers had important, sometimes even overriding, interests, and that their service obligations were limited, had a profound effect upon the Force, most importantly by restricting its military activities largely to those which most Volunteers would find agreeable. For instance, a lengthy route march by Canterbury Volunteers was attacked by men who had taken part and by the Volunteer Gazette as being too demanding and likely to harm the Movement by reducing numbers. Volunteer officers generally avoided if they could, actions which would upset their men. Sometimes they even put such considerations before compliance with an order, as during an exercise in Auckland. One night three garrison artillery corps were ordered to man the coastal fortifications which defended the city. Two of the units failed to obey this order and instead submitted medical certificates, which stated that the health of their men would have been threatened by compliance, as it was a cold, wet night and the men lacked greatcoats. The officers attitude was a practical response to the need to keep their men content, and to attract recruits; objectives which were of paramount importance in all corps.

When official policy came into conflict with the Volunteers' conception of service there was usually resistance from the Movement and its supporters. In 1908 the defence administration attempted
to curtail the long established practice of Volunteers hiring caterers to do the cooking and washing up at their camps. A senior Volunteer officer and Member of Parliament, James Allen, was critical of departmental efforts to get Volunteers to perform this "dirty work", and was unconvinced by the Defence Minister's argument that soldiers needed to know how to cook in the field. Another Member, William Massey, also opposed the policy, suggesting that if a Volunteer had "to devote part of his holiday to the unpleasant work of cooking" he would be less inclined to attend camps.

Concomitant with the freely given nature of the Volunteer's service, was his right to easily terminate it. In normal circumstances Volunteers could resign after completing a year's service. Often not even the few restrictions in this right were applied. Many men for instance, simply stopped attending their corps parades and were discharged within twelve months of joining.

The ease with which Volunteers could end their service created a number of serious problems for the Force. Perhaps the most basic of these was that it made it too easy for men who were having trouble with their superiors to leave, or threaten to leave, a corps, thereby undermining discipline. More significantly it caused the high turnover in membership and short length of service which severely handicapped the Volunteer Force. In its report of 1907, the Defence Council stated that the average length of time spent by men in the Force was two and a half years in urban areas, and two and three quarter years in the country. My rollbook analysis supports these
figures, with the average length of service of rank and file Volunteers being just under two and a quarter years.\textsuperscript{114} This short period of service made advanced training of the type which became increasingly necessary between 1885 and 1910 very difficult to undertake.\textsuperscript{115} The consequent high level of turnover in the Force's membership also adversely affected training, and hence efficiency. Arms of the Force which required specialised training, such as the artillery, were especially badly affected.\textsuperscript{116} Table 2 which shows the turnover in the rank and file of one artillery unit, E Battery of Christchurch, illustrates the rapidity with which corps had to replace trained men with new recruits.

\textbf{TABLE 2}

\textbf{TURNOVER IN RANK AND FILE MEN IN E BATTERY}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1886</th>
<th>1896/97</th>
<th>1907/08</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of rank and file Volunteers</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number discharged during year</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number discharged as a percentage of total</td>
<td>$42.4$</td>
<td>$42.6$</td>
<td>$31.7$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Source E Battery Rollbooks for 1886, 1896-97 and 1907-08, the number of rank and file Volunteers is the total number of adult rank and file Volunteers who appear in that years rollbook.

Because Volunteers had only limited opportunities for training this had a particularly adverse affect on efficiency. The instructor at N Battery's camp near Lyttelton in 1898 was critical of the way the
type of work undertaken by the unit was restricted by the number of recruits who needed basic training. The Force's leadership had a much longer involvement in Volunteering than the bulk of the rank and file. Officers in my rollbook analysis had an average length of service of nearly eight and a half years, and NCOs only a little less. These men were the Movement's back-bone, giving it much needed continuity and experience. The only major initiative to reduce the problems caused by the high turnover and short average length of service amongst rank and file Volunteers, was the extension of the period for which they had to enrol, from one to three years in 1900. This was useful in that it gave a degree of stability to the Force's membership, and made it easier to improve its level of training. However, it proved to have very serious consequences for recruitment, as many men were not prepared to commit themselves to the Force for three years. This prompted a reversion to a one year enrolment term in 1906.

The work of the Force was plagued by large variations in the numbers of men turning out for parades and other activities, because duties in excess of the limited requirements set out in the regulations were for practical purposes, optional. On some occasions many Volunteers would not attend a review or parade when it coincided with another event such as a race meeting. A much more important reason for men being absent, especially from daylight parades and camps, was difficulties they had in getting time off from their regular employment. Throughout this period employers were criticised for their negative attitude towards Volunteering. Being away at camp could cost a man
not only pay but also his job. Those in command of the Force were well aware that "the men's daily bread must in Volunteering always be considered", and did what they could to alleviate the problem. The seasonal work patterns of the country also posed problems for the Movement. In the annual report for 1891 it was stated that during the shearing and harvesting seasons, when much outdoor daylight training should have been done, only a third of the country corps' strength was "available for duty." The effects of Volunteers' freedom to decide the extent of their service commitments, and the difficulties they faced in carrying out their duties, can be seen most clearly during camps. Making arrangements for, and planning the work to be carried out at these vital training events was made very troublesome, as it was not possible to be sure beforehand how many Volunteers would attend. Artillery units in particular suffered, usually having to form gun crews on an ad hoc basis from whoever was present. Often there was a great difference in the numbers attending from various corps. At the Otago District Camp of 1891, 51 of the 59 officers and men of the Dunedin Engineers were present, which only one man from the 36 strong Bruce Rifles was there. The more efficient units generally had the best musters, while weak corps, like the Albert Rifles, which had only 13 members at the 1893 Wellington camp, attended poorly. These two major structural problems of the Force, its weak administrative system and its conditions of service, differ from each other in one vital respect. As was shown after 1906, the administrative could be much improved by reforms which had little impact on the Volunteer system itself. However, it was impossible to make the kind of major changes to the Force's conditions of service needed if
efficiency and discipline were to be significantly enhanced without compromising the system. The freedom Volunteers enjoyed under their conditions of service, along with the democratic structure of corps and the election of officers, were central to the life of the New Zealand Volunteer Movement. None of these three facets of Volunteer ing could be substantially altered without undercutting the whole Volunteer system.
NOTES

1 This view can clearly be seen during the dispute between Governor Glasgow and R.J. Seddon over the treatment of Colonel Fox's Report of 1893 on the defences of New Zealand, see for example D.K. Fieldhouse (ed), British Colonial Policy in Relation to New Zealand 1871-1902, Christchurch, 1956, I, p.240.

2 Stevens, p.125. I would question how critical these disputes were, as other self-governing colonies and dominions were protective of local forces, see F.A. Johnson, Defence by Committee: The British Committee of Imperial Defence 1885-1959, London, 1960, p.87.


4 See p.157.


8 Stevens, p.118.

9 Scholefield, II, p.504.


15 Fieldhouse, I, p.261, and New Zealand Statutes 1886, p.46.

See for example Colonel A.P. Penton, Annual Report on the


See for example 1900 Report, A.J.H.R., pp. 7-8-H-19,
1906 Report, p.3-H-19, and N.Z.P.D., Vol 130 21 Sep 1904,
p.417.


Major-General Shaw, Report on the Defences of the Colony,
A.J.H.R. 1887 sess II, pp.2-3-A-7, and Edwards Report,

Edwards Report, A.J.H.R. 1890, pp.4-5-H-10, Proposals by


Before 1902 they were, for example, also in charge of
all cadets in their district. See R. Openshaw, The
Patriotic Band : The School Cadets from their evolution
to the Great War, M.A. Thesis, Massey University, 1973,
p.28.

Vol 114 18 Sep 1900, p.39 and Major-General J.M. Babington,
Report on the Defence Forces of New Zealand, A.J.H.R. 1902,
p.3-H-19.

1900 Report, A.J.H.R. p.8-H-19, and Major-General Babington,
Report on the Defence Forces of New Zealand, A.J.H.R. 1904,


See for example ibid, and Nominal Roll of Persons Employed
in Each Department, A.J.H.R., 1907, pp.30-33-H-5, also

See for example 1889 Report, p.5-H-16.

See for example 1901 Report, p.7-H-19, and 1904 Report,
p.5-H-19. Perceptive unofficial observers also saw
the overcentralisation of defence administration as a
major problem. See for example 'Achilles', "The Defences
and Defensive Forces in New Zealand", N.Z.I.M., Jan 1902,
pp.331-32, and 334.


ibid, pp. 1-2-H-19, and see for example A.D.1,08/2186.


ibid, p.2-H-19.

ibid, p.4-H-19.

ibid, p.2-H-19.


The improved administration from 1907 alleviated this situation but by that time new strains were beginning to have a major impact on the relationship, see p.231.

See for example L.T., 8 Jan 1891, p.4d-f.

Slater, Fifty Years of Volunteering: The Army of Regulations pp. 15 and 77.

N.A. A.D.1, 99/4281.

See for example L.T., 22 Jan 1891, p.3C, and Slater, pp.68-77.

N.A. Confidential circular No. 31, 21 Aug 1889 p.100, A.D. 3,3.

ibid, pp.100-101. The parade state was a form filled in by a corps NCO and signed by an officer, showing the number and names of men at each parade of the corps.

ibid.

The 1887 regulations made an officer who, through fraud or negligence, put in a false capitation return (a form showing the number of men in a corps who qualified for capitation), liable for immediate dismissal. Those in force in 1899 made him liable, in addition, for a fine of up to £100, Volunteer Regulations 1887, para.135, Volunteer Regulations 1899, para-141.

See for example W.P., 23 Jun 1897, p.46b, and Slater, p.97.

See for example N.Z.V.G., 6 Mar 1888, p.6, W.P., 2 Jan 1896, p.40a, and ibid, 10 Apr 1907, pp.65 e-66a.

See for example N.Z.V.G., 2 Nov 1886, p.31, W.P. 23 Jun 1897, p.46b, ibid, 25 Jan 1894, p.45d, and L.T., 11 Nov 1890, p.2d. The civilian staff of the Department seem to have been disparaged more than the military. See for example L.T., 13 May 1895, p.4e.

See for example L.T., 26 Nov 1890, p.6b-c.

For an example of the type of problem this led to, see 1889 Report, A.J.H.R., p.2-H-16.


New Zealand Statutes 1886, p.66.

ibid, p.67, and see for example N.Z.G., 4 May 1893, I, p.577.

New Zealand Statutes 1886, pp.55 and 58.


New Zealand Statutes 1886, p.55 and 58, and New Zealand Consolidated Statutes 1908, II, p.62.

New Zealand Statutes 1886, p.55 and 58.

N.A. A.D.1, 89/474.


This was also the case in Great Britain; Wilkinson, p.95.

See for example N.Z.V.G., 16 Jun 1885, p.2, and The Press, 7 Jul 1903, p.3f. This type of dispute had been a continuing problem for the Force. See for example New Zealand Volunteer and Armed Constabulary Service Gazette, 17 Nov 1883, p.2.
N.A., Fairburn to Gordon, 14 Aug 1897, A.D.1., 99/4282.


See for example N.Z.I.M., Apr 1900, p.494.

This also applies to N.C.Os.


This was also the situation in the British Volunteer Force. See J.H.A. MacDonald, Fifty Years of it : The Experiences and Struggles of a Volunteer of 1859, Edinburgh, 1909, p.502, and Cunningham, p.52.

L.T., 1 Nov 1898, p.3d.


See for example Hughes, pp.11-13.


N.Z.V.G., 6 Mar 1888, p.4.

L.T., 29 May 1885, pp.4g-5a. See also for a similar incident, L.T., 1 Apr 1891, p.3c.

W.P., 19 Oct 1898, p.38a, and ibid, 26 Oct 1898, p.38b-c.

See for example The Press, 10 Oct 1904, p.9c.

See p.84.


ibid, 2 Nov 1885, p.2.

ibid, 16 Jun 1885, p.2.

ibid, 2 Nov 1885, p.2.

ibid, p.4, and ibid, 4 Jan 1886, p.5.

ibid, p.9.

ibid, p.8.

ibid, 1 Feb 1886, p.9.

See for example New Zealand Statutes 1886, p.66.

Ibid, p.64.


N.A., Bell to Duncan, 21 Apr 1898, A.D.1, 98/2306.

During the last four to five years of the Force the work done expanded markedly and this idea became somewhat less important, see pp.214-15.

N.Z.V.G., 1 Jul 1886, p.6, and ibid, 3 Aug, pp.3 and 4.


See for example Christ's College Rifles Minute Book, Committee Meeting, 23 Mar 1899.

Defence, 25 Sep 1908, pp.4-5.


New Zealand Statutes 1886, p.57.

See for example C.M.A., Ashburton Rifles Rollbook 1907-8.


See Appendix, Table 6.

See for example N.Z.M.J., Jan 1912, p.20.


118 See Appendix, Table 7.

119 New Zealand Statutes 1900, p.562.


123 See for example N.A., O.C. Wellington District to Secretary Council of Defence 29 Oct 1907, A.D.1, 10/3354.

124 See for example L.T.,27 Feb 1886, p.6e, and Slater, p.67.


129 See for example N.A. A.D.1, 99/2586.


Apart from the opening and closing years of this period there was little concern about defence issues in New Zealand. If they considered the possibility of foreign aggression at all, most people continued to believe that the might of the Royal Navy would provide the colony with most of the protection it required. For the few who did consider these problems, there was one major question: what kind of defence system would best meet the colony's needs? Expert opinion was generally in favour of coastal defences to guard the major cities. These would be manned by a small professional military force, supported by a larger auxillary force. The Volunteers were the obvious choice for the supporting role. However, their conditions of service and corps structure rendered them basically unsuited to it. Proposals for a smaller auxillary force better adapted to this role were rejected, because there was still strong support for the Volunteer system in New Zealand and no significant public or political pressure for major changes in defence policy. Thus at the outset of the Twentieth Century New Zealand found itself committed to a defence system whose most important element was militarily ineffective and incapable of significant improvement.

PART A - 1885-1888

Between January and mid-April 1885 New Zealand was swept by a great war scare. This was prompted by a dispute between Great Britain and Russia over their interests in Central Asia.
It was feared that war with Russia could lead to the colony being raided by enemy naval forces. This produced much interest in the state of New Zealand's armed forces, and the direction of its defence policy.²

This war scare is highly significant because it marks the point when external threats clearly become a predominant factor in the defence thinking of both the public and the politicians of New Zealand. This point had been reached some years earlier by Imperial military authorities, and had formed the basis of Colonel Scratchley's comprehensive report on the defences of New Zealand, compiled in 1880.³ The Maoris no longer posed an internal threat, but from the mid 1880s onwards, Russia, France, and to a lesser extent Germany, were seen as the most likely sources of external danger.⁴ A fictional account of a naval raid on Auckland published in The New Zealand Illustrated Magazine during 1901, is a good example of the kind of threat New Zealand was seen to be under at this time. As part of a major war pitting France and Russia against Japan and Britain, a Franco-Russian flotilla of cruisers and fast troop transports suddenly appears off Auckland and launches an attack upon the city by both land and sea. Despite valiant resistance by the city's defenders, principally local Volunteer units, the enemy forces gain the upper hand. Only at the last minute is Auckland saved from occupation and despoilation by the timely arrival of the Royal Navy.⁵

In the first part of the period it was generally thought that all that was required of New Zealand towards the defence of the Empire was that it should put its own defences in a reasonable state. There was little consideration of, or support for, the idea of sending local
forces overseas, although some Volunteers were keen to take part in the expedition to relieve General Gordon in Khartoum. However, by the mid 1890s there appears to have been a considerable growth in Imperial sentiment. The idea that New Zealand might remain uninvolved during a war between the United Kingdom and another power was occasionally aired during the 1860s and 70s, but by this time such notions had certainly been left well behind. The fortunes of New Zealand and the Empire as a whole, were increasingly seen to be inextricably linked. Rather than standing aloof, it was now believed that the colony should play a more active part in the Empire's defence and its affairs generally. The use of New Zealand forces outside the colony to defend the Empire's interests was the logical outcome of this view, and this came to prominence in the late 1890s with the offers of forces for service in Samoa and South Africa. The extent to which overseas service was accepted by 1900 is demonstrated by the fact that the South African War was more popular in New Zealand than in either Canada or the Australian colonies, and also by the widespread support enjoyed by Seddon's proposals for an Imperial Reserve. New Zealand's defence system, including the Volunteer Force, needed to undergo radical changes to fit it for the new roles entailed by the shift in the colony's defence posture; first to defence against external attack and later the additional requirement of overseas service.

In 1885 the colony's defence forces were in no condition to meet any act of Russian aggression. The only regular armed force was the paramilitary Armed Constabulary, scattered in small
detachments mainly in the centre of the North Island, to guard against any further problems with the Maoris. As well as being stationed in the wrong areas it did not have the training, equipment or manpower to repel a naval raid. The Volunteer Force had suffered from years of neglect and was weak in every respect. It consisted simply of a collection of small infantry, cavalry and artillery corps, all of which were very poorly equipped. There was little organisation. Apart from the New Zealand Regiment of Volunteer Artillery, a paper unit formed in 1878, which grouped all Volunteer field artillery corps together, there were no formations larger than corps, which had a strength of up to 100 men. This had been identified in Scratchley's report as a fundamental weakness of the Force. He had recommended that the Volunteers be organised into field forces based upon small infantry battalions at each of the four main centres, and that support for country corps be reduced, as they would be of little use in the event of a naval raid. However, little was done to implement Scratchley's proposals between 1880 and 1885.

The concerns raised by the war scare created a favourable climate for defence reform and the expenditure it required. Between the financial years 1884–85 and 1886–87 spending on the Volunteer Force nearly doubled to almost £48,500. During 1885 the Government moved belatedly to implement more of Scratchley's report. New equipment, including modern heavy guns, was ordered and work began on fortifications centred around this new ordnance at Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton and Dunedin. The Government also took the important step of appointing Sir George Whitmore, an ex-Imperial officer who had led colonial forces in the latter stages of the Anglo-Maori wars, to
the command of both the armed constabulary and the Volunteer Force.\textsuperscript{19}

The policies Whitmore was to pursue during his three years in office, had as their central objective the establishment of a defence system able to deal with the kind of external threat New Zealand was now subject to.\textsuperscript{20} The fortifications at the main centres which were to be the basis of the new system, needed troops with specialised training to garrison them, and also the support of a field force. To provide for the first of these requirements the Armed Constabulary was abolished in 1886 and its military role taken over by a Permanent Militia formed from members of the old force.\textsuperscript{21} The Permanent Militia was a tiny force, in 1887 having only 343 officers and men who were stationed at the main centres.\textsuperscript{22} It was intended that the Volunteers would assist it in manning the coastal fortifications, and also provide the bulk of any field force.\textsuperscript{23}

The war scare prompted public enthusiasm for Volunteering, and rapidly swelled the ranks of the Force. Membership rose from 4,313 in April 1884 to about 8,000 in 130 corps by June 1885.\textsuperscript{24} Large crowds turned out to watch Volunteer activities, most notably at the large sham fight in Auckland late in 1885. The units posing as the attacking force at this event left no doubt as to who the enemy was by using the Russian flag.\textsuperscript{25} This augmentation of the Force, although welcome, did nothing for its grave weaknesses in organisation and materiel. The Force's new commander was well aware of this. From the beginning of his tenure Whitmore was convinced that the Volunteer Force needed a thorough reorganisation, which would see it formed into
larger units, with better discipline, more efficient knowledgeable officers, specialist ambulance and signals units, and the support of an enlarged Permanent Staff, able to provide much needed expertise.26

Central to any re-organisation was the need to move away from the corps as the basis of the Force's structure. A body of 50 or 60 men might well be an effective force in irregular warfare, but it was not suited to combat with even a small raiding force of regular troops.27 Therefore, Whitmore began in 1885 to establish administrative rifle battalions at each of the four main centres. In following years the battalion system was extended to include corps scattered throughout the country. For instance in 1887 the Blenheim City Rifles and the Brunnerton Rifles, whose headquarters were separated by more than 200 kilometres of rugged country, both belonged to the Nelson and Westland Battalion Rifle Volunteers. These formations were not true battalions as the individual corps within them retained most of their independence.28 The policy was extended to the mounted branch with the establishment, in 1885 of the 1st Regiment of New Zealand Cavalry Volunteers. With its headquarters in Wanganui, this unit was organised like the infantry battalions. The corps forming the regiment were scattered over a large part of the North Island which made its operation and administration very difficult.29 The setting up of these larger units was an important step away from corps organisation, which Whitmore intended, at least in the case of the infantry battalions, only as an interim arrangement. It was his policy eventually to disband all the corps that comprised the battalions and then re-enlist the men in the battalions, and so institute a fully battalion based system.30
This would have been a crucial development, which would have done much to improve the Force's military effectiveness. However, it was never done, probably because of problems with the existing battalions, and opposition from those, including the then Defence Minister, Thomas Fergus, who were anxious that the rights of corps and the idea of Volunteer service should not be compromised too much. Nevertheless, even the limited form of higher organisation that was set up, proved to be a useful structure for improving the training, and the ability to work together, of the constituent companies.

The other major initiative undertaken by Whitmore to deal with some of the Force's basic failings, was the improvement of the system of instruction and examination of officers. This was essential if their quality was to be enhanced. During 1885 a school of instruction in Wellington, run by members of the Permanent Staff on a part-time basis, was opened to Volunteer officers. The school offered lectures on various topics to officers who had already become competent at drill. The personnel of the school were also responsible for the preparation of examination papers for the whole colony. The school, although a good idea in theory, was not a success. Between 31 July 1886 and 30 November 1887, only four officers from Wellington, and two from the rest of New Zealand attended it. The Government, which by late 1887 was implementing a retrenchment policy, decided to close the school in the belief that its cost outweighed any good it did. The school clearly had little appeal for Volunteer officers anyway. This was probably because nearly 90% of candidates passed the examinations for commissions at this time, so there was little incentive to undertake advanced instruction.
The Volunteer Force entered 1886 in good heart, at the end of March it had 141 corps and 8,253 officers and men. Already, however, public support for the Force was ebbing. As one writer said: "The war scare has passed away, and the Volunteer seems to have been forgotten"; a pattern that was to be repeated several times in coming years. During the year Whitmore continued to implement policies designed to fit the Force's organisation to its new role. This included measures such as the conversion of existing corps into garrison artillery units able to assist in manning the fortifications. He was also critical at this time of honorary Volunteer corps, which were little more than social and shooting clubs for elderly men, suggesting that they should be changed into normal Volunteer corps. Although pleased with the progress made by the Force since the beginning of 1885, Whitmore stressed the need for corps to do more training with greater emphasis on shooting, discipline and movement in the open, rather than drill. The major events of 1886 were the large camps held near Camarau and Wanganui, involving nearly 4,000 men. They were very popular with the public, and judged a success by the Force's commander, although only a limited amount of practical work was undertaken.

Late in 1886 a new system for the education and examination of Volunteer officers was introduced. It was headed by The Council of Military Education, which had under its direction a Central Board of Examination in Wellington, and local boards covering the rest of New Zealand. The function of the boards, which were composed of Permanent Staff officers and senior Volunteer officers, was to hold examinations for acting officers, and officers seeking promotion.
The Council drew up a syllabus and set the examinations, a task it took over from the School of Instruction. Indeed, it appears the two bodies were comprised of basically the same group of Permanent Staff officers under a different designation. The preparation of texts on such matters as artillery drill for Volunteers, was also undertaken by the Council. The syllabus it produced in 1886 placed most emphasis upon various types of drill, but the one for more senior officers, adjutants and those of field rank, also included elementary tactics and field fortifications, as well as some study of administrative matters. In addition to the written examination, a superficial practical test of a candidate's ability to drill a corps or battalion was required. With the assistance of Permanent Staff members in the districts, the Council also supervised musketry training and shooting for Government prizes, with the general objective of improving Volunteer musketry. This task and the Council's major function of administering the examination system, were generally well conducted by it. Between its establishment in September 1886, and April 1887, it conducted one examination for field officers and adjutants, at which two of the 18 candidates failed, and three for company officers, at which 105 of the 188 candidates passed. In both types of examination about 11% of candidates were unsuccessful. This and the nature of the syllabus, suggest that the Council's examinations were not very demanding. The Council virtually admitted this in its report, but stated that because the existing knowledge of officers was so deficient, the examinations could not be too difficult at the outset, and that it intended to gradually improve the standard required to pass. The Council of Military Education was abolished early in 1888 as part of Government efforts to reduce expenditure. Control of the examination of
candidates for Volunteer commissions passed to a new central examination board in Wellington, while the local boards continued to operate as before.53

The large camps held during 1887 were probably even less satisfactory than those of the preceding year. Volunteers taking part in the New Plymouth camp's sham fight made a number of serious mistakes, such as failing to make use of cover, and these went uncorrected by the officers in command.54 The latter part of the year saw loud calls to cut Government expenditure because of the colony's poor economic situation.55 The need to do this was the main condition underlying Major General Schaw's report on New Zealand's defences and forces, which was ordered by the Minister of Defence in November 1887.56 The report was similar in many respects to Scratchley's. It called for the establishment of permanent force and Volunteer coast brigades at each of the four centres, supported by Volunteer field forces, and what was very controversial, the disbandment of most corps in rural areas.57 This last proposal provoked a great deal of opposition from supporters of Volunteering.58 None of the major points of the General's report were implemented, in large part because they were not politically feasible. In particular, Schaw's proposal to abolish Volunteer units in rural areas would have raised thorny political problems. This is evident in one Minister's reply to questioning as to why the Government did not "sweep away"corps in country districts. He answered, "Why, they would sweep us away".59

The appearance of Schaw's report on the problems of external defence, coincided with rumours that Te Kooti was planning to return
to the East Coast. These reports raised bitter memories of past conflicts, and led the Officer Commanding the East Coast District to alert local Volunteers that it was likely they would be called out for duty if this occurred. Volunteer units were called out in 1889 when the Maori leader was arrested in Poverty Bay. Concern about Te Kooti’s movements prompted an editorial in the Volunteer Gazette that vilified him as "a sneaking coyote" and a "devil", who should not be allowed near European settlements. While the danger posed by foreign powers now dominated defence thinking, old animosities had clearly not passed away entirely. Indeed, one North Island rural Volunteer Corps. in the mid 1880s used the possibility of "renewed native disturbances" as an argument for a rise in the level of capitation, in a letter to the Members of the House of Representatives.

Early 1888 saw draconian cuts in defence expenditure, with the Permanent Militia and the Volunteers bearing the brunt of the savings. Spending on the Force fell from £56,609 in 1887-88, to £23,183 the following year. The level of capitation was cut to 30 shillings, there were large reductions in the salaries of Defence Department staff, and other administrative costs. The size of the Permanent Militia was reduced, making it necessary for Volunteer naval and garrison artillery corps to play a larger part in manning the fortifications, a role for which most of them had not yet been trained. The Force's commander was aware that these units needed a higher level of expertise than other branches, and suggested that, in return for undertaking more training, they should receive a higher rate of capitation. The 1888 Annual Report, Whitmore's last, depicts the Volunteers as being in a fair condition,
still with a strength of more than 8,000, although there were signs that Volunteering, especially in Auckland, was going into a decline. 

In April 1888 Whitmore resigned as Commander of New Zealand Forces. He left in place a defence system consisting of the fortifications at the main centres, a small permanent force and a larger Volunteer force, which was to remain basically unchanged for the next 20 years. By 1888 the forces were better equipped and organised to meet the threat of external aggression than they had been in 1885, although they were still far from entirely satisfactory. The major initiatives of the period in relation to Volunteering, that is, the move to larger units, and the implementation of an education and examination system aimed at improving standards among the Force's officers, show an appreciation by Whitmore of the need to make basic changes to fit the Force to its new role. Whitmore's major failings as a commander were a tendency to place too much emphasis on display, and to exaggerate the capabilities of the New Zealand forces. Nevertheless, Whitmore seems to have been generally popular with the Volunteers, and their effectiveness certainly improved under his command and the influence of his sound management.

PART B 1888-1896

After Whitmore, control of the Volunteers reverted to the system which had been in place previously, with the Under Secretary for Defence and an Inspector of Volunteers in control of the Force. Captain Hume, an ex-Imperial Officer, was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and given the second of these posts, in addition to his existing
position as Inspector of Prisons. This was a very unsatisfactory situation, as neither of these men had the time, authority, or knowledge, needed to lead the Defence Forces, and it was symptomatic of the neglect defence matters were to suffer over the next few years.

The new regime made a number of policy changes, of which the most important was the abolition of battalions early in 1889. This was done, said Hume, because Volunteer officers did not have the knowledge to control large units, and thus, corps had suffered from a lack of competent instruction, and had deteriorated in numbers and efficiency while formed into battalions. Also the Volunteer officers who commanded the battalions had enjoyed independence from the control of O.C. Districts, and this had led to serious friction. There was some truth in these charges, but they do not correspond with the opinions of most other observers, who saw the operation of even a restricted form of battalion organisation as a very positive step for the Volunteer Force. Even if the criticisms had been valid, reform of the way battalions operated, rather than their abolition, would have been a more appropriate measure. The Force's inspector gives a clue to the real reason for this step in his report of 1890. Hume admits that a battalion structure was needed, but status-conscious corps commanders had been unwilling to take orders from other Volunteer officers, who were not their social equals. It seems probable that political pressure from such discontented officers was a major factor behind the dismemberment of the battalions. Certainly the reasons put forward officially do not provide an adequate explanation.
During 1889 and 1890, the Force became, in Colonel Slater's words, 'very heart-sick'. Its strength at the end of 1890 was only 6,700, a drop of about 1,000 on a year earlier, and only 4,939 of these qualified for capitation. Attendances at camps and inspections were poor. In Wellington less than 15% of local Volunteers turned out for an inspection held for General Edwards, a visiting Imperial officer. Despite some improvement, grave equipment deficiencies remained. Volunteers lacked such basic items as haversacks and water bottles. The field artillery was particularly badly affected, with obsolete guns and grossly sub-standard harness. At the Oamaru camp in 1891 they were forced to improvise, using dray ropes as traces and clothes-lines for reins. The most important innovation of the period was the introduction of a standard khaki uniform, designed "for service rather than display". It was hoped this would ease the financial problems faced by many corps.

The position of the Force improved somewhat in 1891. Although its strength fell slightly to 6,582, more men gained capitation. The naval and garrison artillery corps, which had a central role in the defence system, had initially shown little interest, but now began to make progress in their submarine mining and heavy gun training, demonstrating that the instruction provided by the Permanent Militia, as well as the mounting of guns at drill sheds for them to practice with, and other steps, were beginning to take effect.

The sorry condition of the Force in the late 1880s and early 1890s, led to an examination of its future. In his first report in 1889, Hume concluded that the only way real progress towards efficiency
could be made was through a partly paid system, which placed men under a contractual obligation to provide a certain level of service in return for pay to be introduced, a view reiterated by the Under Secretary for Defence the following year, in his next report. The system had recently been introduced in some of the Australian colonies, and drew the support of Captain William Russell, the Minister of Defence. The replacement of the Volunteer, with the "more reliable" partly paid system, was also the central recommendation made by Major General Edwards in his report. The Military Forces and Defences of New Zealand which appeared in 1890. This work, which was similar to Schaw's, pointed to the need for better organisation and training of the local forces, and their division into coastal defence and field force components. This wide support for the partly paid system was influential in shaping Government defence proposals of July 1890, under which it was to be instituted at the four main centres, while the Volunteer system was to be maintained in the country, but with new payments aimed at encouraging daytime training and attendance at camps. In an even greater break with existing practice, the Government proposed the compulsory drafting of men from the First Class Militia into the partly paid force if not enough men enrolled voluntarily. The new force at each of the main centres was to be made up of a balanced combination of garrison and field artillery, mounted infantry, engineers, signals, and infantry units, as recommended by Edwards, and under the command of an Imperial officer. The new defence structure would have resembled that successfully instituted in Queensland by the Defence Act of 1884, and appears to have offered the prospect of a significant improvement in New Zealand's defence system.
Volunteering still had many defenders, who were prepared to admit that the Force was in a weak state but placed the responsibility for this on cuts in defence spending and bad policy rather than on problems inherent in the system, as those in favour of a partly paid force tended to do. Any plans Russell had for radical changes to the defence forces were forestalled by the defeat of the Atkinson ministry by the Liberals in the general election held late in 1890.

Politics, Politicians and the Volunteer Movement

The new Defence Minister was Richard John Seddon, who was to hold the office for eleven of the next fifteen years. The profound influence Seddon and other politicians had on Volunteering make a study of the relationship between the Movement and politics necessary. From early on in his Parliamentary career, Seddon displayed a marked distrust of professional soldiers, which led him to favour placing local men in positions in the defence forces, even on occasions when members of the Imperial Forces were the only men with the necessary expertise. This distrust contributed to the lack of understanding Seddon had of the impact rapid advances in technology and military thinking could have on New Zealand's defence requirements. In particular, he failed to realise the necessity of proper organisation and training for the forces. This can clearly be seen in his plan during 1895 to make Major Arthur Douglas, commander of the forces, even though he was totally unsuited to the position. Seddon really had only a limited interest in defence matters. He, like many of his contemporaries, put military show and posturing above the reality of effective defence forces. Perhaps the best example of this is the large review of Volunteers, cadets and veterans held in Christchurch during the visit of the Duke and Duchess of
York in 1901. This impressive martial display cost Seddon's Government more than £46,000 to stage, a sum equal to almost a fifth of that year's military expenditure. Apart from the period of the South African War, Seddon was anxious to keep defence expenditure at a low level, both on grounds of economy and because he was personally opposed to heavy spending in this area. As was shown during the Fox affair, Seddon would brook no interference in his control over New Zealand's forces. This was in large part the outcome of his awareness of the political impact defence policy could have. The decision to accept all Volunteer corps offered during 1900 and his response to Fox's 1893 report were probably the most notable examples of Seddon's willingness to place too much weight on political considerations when deciding defence policy. Like other areas of Government, defence was prey to Seddon's often arbitrary and wilful decisions. He regularly over-turned established policies in order to fulfil some personal objective. Promotion of officers within the defence forces was, as in the civil service, subject to his personal approval. Seddon's discharge of his duties as Defence Minister was for the most part unsatisfactory, and he must take a large measure of the responsibility for the failure to address the fundamental faults of the New Zealand defence system during his time in office.

It must, however, be noted that Seddon's attitude to defence matters was similar to that of most New Zealand politicians at this time. For most of this period, issues such as the need to develop New Zealand's roads and railways, or to limit Government expenditure, were of much greater political importance than any defence question. Like the public, most politicians had little interest in, or understanding of, military matters. There were definitely "no luods" for a Government in tackling defence problems, and as a consequence they
generally tried to avoid policies in this area that could be expensive or unpopular.\textsuperscript{109} Until the last years of this period the Volunteer system enjoyed the support of most politicians, who often showed a strong distrust, and even dislike, for standing armies and professional soldiers.\textsuperscript{110} One Member of Parliament, Richard Meredith, summed up this attitude well when he stated that Volunteering "was the only form of militarism he believed in".\textsuperscript{111} This support for Volunteering was in part due to the significant proportion of men in Parliament who were, or had been Volunteers. In 1894 for instance, at least ten of the 75 Members of the House of Representatives had at some time been officers in the Force.\textsuperscript{112} Parliamentary defence debates were usually dominated by current or former Volunteers, such as William Russell, James Allen and Walter Cunliffe.\textsuperscript{113} The fact that a considerable number of Members of Parliament were serving Volunteer officers proved to be a largely undesirable facet of the Movement, as it encouraged the use of political influence within the Force. On many occasions these Volunteer parliamentarians and their units used their political connections to air grievances or for special pleading.\textsuperscript{114} It also tended to involve the Force in political controversy in an unwelcome manner, as Volunteer officers who were Members of Parliament could have their activities in the Movement used against them in politically inspired attacks.\textsuperscript{115} Apart from the notable exception of Seddon, virtually all Ministers of Defence in this period were former Volunteers.\textsuperscript{116}

Politicians were aware of the importance of the Volunteer Movement as a substantial community organisation, with a large membership headed by men
who were often local community leaders. Most members of Parliament seem to have been keen to ensure good relations with corps in their electorates by donating prizes, attending Volunteer events and assisting units to gain Government aid.\textsuperscript{117} For example, Edward Richardson, M.H.R. for Kaiapoi and Minister of Public Works, won the gratitude of the Kaiapoi Rifles for his efforts to secure Railways land for the site of the corps' new drill hall.\textsuperscript{118} Some politicians, like John Holmes, M.H.R. for Christchurch South, the "father of the Canterbury Irish" \textsuperscript{119} Rifles, were closely associated with a particular unit.\textsuperscript{120} Men raising a new corps would often seek the assistance of local Members of Parliament to ensure that it would be accepted by the Minister of Defence. When the Imperial Rifles was being formed in Christchurch, the promoters, who included a senior Volunteer officer, had William Halker, M.L.C., a cabinet minister from Christchurch, approach the Minister of Defence to clear any obstacles to the corps' quick acceptance.\textsuperscript{121}

Volunteers knew their numbers and local connections gave them electoral significance. There are many references in newspaper columns and periodicals aimed at the Movement, to Volunteers' ability, when not in uniform, to put pressure on Members of Parliament and the Government, in the interests of their corps or the Force as a whole.\textsuperscript{122} Much less common were attempts to mobilise Volunteer voting strength behind a particular political candidate, as happened during the Christchurch bye-election of February 1896. As part of their successful campaign for Charles Lewis, the conservative opposition candidate in the election, the \textit{Press} and \textit{Weekly Press}, which were bitter opponents of Seddon's Liberal administration, appealed to local Volunteers for support. The conservative newspapers depicted Lewis as a friend of the Movement,\textsuperscript{123} and claimed that
"a conservative government was a soldiers government". 124  In addition, harsh criticism was levelled at Seddon for his shoddy treatment of Volunteering 125 and at the Government candidate for his lack of interest in defence issues. 126 A Press columnist also "coached" Lewis on questions of interest to Volunteers. 127 The opposition probably made a special effort to secure the support of the Movement during this campaign because Christchurch Volunteers had recently been aggrieved by a dispute with the Government over the granting of rail passes. 128 Although it was quite proper for politicians to appeal for the support of Volunteers, the enlistment of political influence by members of the Force was forbidden by regulation. 129 However, this prohibition was frequently openly flouted, and the practice was widely accepted as part of the Volunteer system's operation.

Another aspect of the relationship between politicians and Volunteering, the covert use of political influence within the Force, was not widely accepted. Indeed, most well informed observers realised that such considerations had a pernicious affect upon the Force. 130 Charges of jobbery and influence peddling were an almost everyday part of New Zealand's political discourse in this period. 131 It is therefore only to be expected that the Defence Department, Permanent Militia and Volunteer Force should be subject to these kinds of allegations, both in Parliament and in the press. 132 At least in the case of the Volunteer Force, they appear to have had a substantial basis in fact. Henry Slater, a Volunteer officer with nearly 40 years of service, was, for instance, convinced that "the welfare of the Force" was often "subservient to political considerations". 13
The controversy surrounding the North Dunedin Rifles from early 1908 to late 1909 provides a good illustration of how political influence could be brought to bear, and also of the close relationship between local communities and their Volunteer corps. The affair began with the commander of the battalion to which the North Dunedin Rifles belonged, Lieutenant Colonel Stoneham, refusing to certify that Sergeant Major Benfell was fit to hold a commission, although he had been elected to a lieutenancy in that corps. The members of the North Dunedin Rifles were incensed by their battalion commander's decision and convened a meeting to discuss it. At the meeting, which was attended by the corps CO, Lieutenant Begg, Stoneham was angrily attacked and it was unanimously resolved to disband the North Dunedin Rifles in protest at the insult they had suffered. Disbandment and mass resignations, or at least the threat of such, were commonly used by units in disputes with senior officers or the Defence Department, often to good effect, as was the case in this instance. The North Dunedin Rifles meeting had important consequences. Firstly it led to the holding of a large public meeting in Dunedin to express loud disapproval of the treatment the local corps had received, and to the formation of a citizen's committee, headed by the Mayor of North East Valley and consisting mainly of local businessmen. The committee was to lead and orchestrate the agitation in support of the corps throughout the affair, and its principal rationale was that the whole North Dunedin community had been slighted by the way their area's Volunteers had been dealt with, and that as the community gave the corps considerable assistance it had a right to be concerned in its fate. The men of the North Dunedin Rifles were heartened by this public support and as a result decided not to disband their company.
The second major development was the bringing of disciplinary charges against Lieutenant Begg for actions prejudicial to good order and military discipline at the corps' protest meeting. Begg was quite correctly found guilty, and as punishment had his commission cancelled. In reporting the findings of the court of inquiry into Begg's conduct, the Volunteer correspondent of the Otago Daily Times commented that, although there had been 'whispers of political influence', the defence authorities had acted properly to uphold discipline within the Force. The newspaper columnist was, however, mistaken, for behind the scenes the citizens' committee was doing all in its power to sway the Acting Defence Minister, Robert McNab, in Begg and Benfell's favour. The committee's communications with the Minister often contained menacing references to the political damage which could result from a failure to accede to their demands for the North Dunedin Rifles to be allowed the officers of its choice. The Member of Parliament for Dunedin North, Alfred Barclay, also raised the affair in the House, and worked closely with the committee in its dealings with the Minister. After some initial reluctance, McNab proved to be only too willing to accommodate the wishes of the corps supporters, with the result that on a number of occasions he overrode the advice of his most senior military advisors, for what can only have been political reasons.

Not long after the court of inquiry had delivered its judgement, the corps held another election meeting at which Begg was elected Captain and Benfell Lieutenant. With the strong support of the O.C. Otago District, Lieutenant Colonel Stoneham refused to certify that they were fit men to hold commissions. McNab, however, had already moved to circumvent such opposition by enacting an amendment to the defence act, which gave the Minister of Defence power to grant commissions without the need for certificates of fitness.
Although McNab stated in Parliament that the amendment was at the behest of the Defence Council, the veracity of this statement is open to the most serious doubts, as there appears to be no evidence in the Defence Department's files to support this contention. Indeed, members of the Council involved in the affair did not favour the granting of commissions to Begg and Benfell.

Before McNab could grant commissions to the men elected by the North Dunedin Rifles he lost his seat in a general election, and it was left to the new acting Minister George Fowlds, to resolve the affair. Fowlds took a slightly firmer line than his predecessor, a stance which may be related to the fact that the general election had now been held. With the backing of the Defence Council, he insisted that Begg wait a year before receiving his commission. This turn of events outraged the citizens' committee, which began to lobby Fowlds as it had McNab. In response the Minister, although prepared to admit that the committee had an interest in the case, stressed the need for discipline in the Force to be maintained and that the people of North Dunedin had no right to interfere in its internal workings. The committee further hardened Fowlds' attitude to the affair when it foolishly made public its dealings with the Minister. Neither the committee nor the corps were prepared to compromise with Fowlds, and as a result the North Dunedin Rifles disbanded late in 1909, although not before the company committed a number of serious breaches of regulations. These went unpunished because the Minister was anxious to bring the embarrassing affair to a close as quickly as possible. During most of this affair both Ministers had shown a reprehensible willingness to put political expediency before the best interests of the Force, much to the dismay of the senior Volunteer arrl
Decisions motivated by political considerations had been a feature of the administration of the Volunteer Force for many years before 1885, and during this period had a damaging impact upon the Force on two levels. At one level, as in the case of the North Dunedin Rifles, political influence enabled individual Volunteers and corps to contravene regulations with relative impunity or gain special treatment. In his 1903 report, General Babington complained bitterly of how "Political influence is only too often sought and accorded, and the existence of partisanship is in cases evident." He went on to condemn such partisanship as "a most pernicious influence", which impaired discipline and did "much to undermine the efficiency of the Force." On a higher level, the way "political interference" was allowed to "run riot through" the administration of New Zealand's armed forces often frustrated attempts to implement sound defence policy.

Shortly after entering office, Seddon put forward his own defence proposals, the major points of which were: the appointment of an Imperial officer as Commandant for a five year term, nomination of Volunteer officers rather than election, enrollment of Volunteers for a three year term, and for men in corps at the main centres to receive 2s. 6d. per day, for eight and a half days field training each year. These measures, while not being as wide ranging as those of the previous Minister of Defence, were constructive and practical. They were generally well received, although when Seddon presented them to Christchurch Volunteer officers, several officers stated that the Militia should be called out to fill the ranks of the Force. Seddon's proposals are significant, in that, over the next ten years, a number of them
were to be implemented. At much the same time that Seddon made his defence ideas public, Captain Moritz Rowron of the Richmond Rifles, Christchurch, put forward his Scheme for Efficient Volunteer Defence. This involved the threat of militia service if the Volunteer Force was not kept up to strength, and a system of payments to compensate Volunteers for the time spent on their duties. This scheme also includes interesting suggestions on how to attract more men into the Volunteer officer corps, and on the need for more outdoor training and other matters. 

During 1891, another Volunteer, Julian Grix, a corporal in D Battery, Wellington, wrote a paper for the capital's Naval and Military Institute. He argued that the partly paid system would be best for New Zealand, but that its cost, which he estimated at between £44,000 and £54,000 per annum, was likely to make it unacceptable to colonial opinion. If it was not feasible to introduce this system, Grix thought the Volunteer Force should be placed on a better footing with improved equipment, organisation, discipline, and training. Grix's proposals, which included the establishment of schools of instruction run by the Permanent Militia at the main centres, were well thought out and constructive. 

The paper was not published until 1894, but was nevertheless a significant contribution to the debate on the colony's defence system of the late 1880s and early 1890s.

The first part of Seddon's defence proposals to be put into effect was the procurement of an Imperial officer, Lieutenant Colonel F.J. Fox R.A., to take command of the forces. Fox arrived in May 1892, and began the series of inspections which were to form the basis of his report on New Zealand's defence
Relations between the Defence Minister and the Colonel were soon soured by Fox's refusal to speed work on his report as requested by Seddon, and the Minister's refusal to give Fox an estimate of defence expenditure, upon which to base his recommendations.

The report which Fox submitted to Seddon in three parts between February and June 1893 was a thorough and frank examination of New Zealand's forces, as well as their organisation and administration. He was generally satisfied with the performance of the Permanent Militia and most of the Permanent Staff, apart from the Government drill instructors, most of whom lacked the up to date knowledge needed to instruct Volunteers properly. Colonel Fox recommended that eight of the twelve Staff Sergeant-Instructors be retired immediately or kept on only temporarily, and their places taken by six Sergeant Instructors from the Imperial service, on three year contracts.

All the corps in the Force were inspected by Fox, who then made pithy reports on the state of each unit, as well as putting forward recommendations on future policy for each of its branches. Naval and Garrison Artillery: Less than a quarter of the more than 1,200 men in naval and garrison artillery corps were even partly trained in heavy gun or submarine mining work. Corps in outlying areas, such as Nelson, which were useless as artillery units, should, thought Fox, be disbanded or converted to rifle companies, while those at the main centres should receive an increased capitation grant of £3 per annum, and other incentives for undertaking more training, including going into a corps camp for a fortnight each year.
Field Artillery: All the field artillery units were inefficient. Most of their equipment was old and worn out, while batteries in provincial areas lacked proper instruction. The report suggested that these units be disbanded and that only the four batteries at the main centres be maintained. Fox advised that these batteries should also be granted a £3 capitation, as well as receiving more training and being properly equipped.

Cavalry and Mounted Rifles: Volunteer cavalry units were in a satisfactory condition, with the Otago Hussars, whose object was "work, not show" being the best. They required more practical training and, like the mounted rifles, a higher level of capitation to compensate for the extra expense of providing for their horses. Fox was critical of the mounted rifle corps. He wished to disband two of the existing nine corps, stating that inefficient cavalry and infantry units had converted to this branch because of its lower capitation requirement of only nine parades a year.

Engineers: The corps in Christchurch and Dunedin were in a good condition, but Auckland's was not, mainly because of the failings of its officers, who included Lieutenant Jackson Palmer, M.H.R. for Waitemata. Under Fox's proposals, all three corps were to be retained, as well as given more specialised training and, like the infantry, granted an increased capitation of £2. 10s.

Infantry: There was a wide variation in the standard of infantry corps. Some were very useful while many were of little or no military value. Like corps in other branches they suffered from bad equipment, and both their instruction and outdoor
training were inadequate.\textsuperscript{179} Fox proposed to disband 24 infantry companies, and to organise the remaining units into four battalions based at the main centres.\textsuperscript{180} Capitation requirements, which had previously been so lax as to allow inefficient men to qualify, were to be raised and were to include three whole afternoon daylight parades each year.\textsuperscript{181} A good indication of the Force's grave \textit{matériel} shortcomings was its small arms Snider rifles and carbines, which had been produced mainly between 1859 and 1864, and converted to breech-loading in 1886. They were unsafe and outdated weapons, which Fox thought should be replaced with Martini Henry arms of the type which had been in service with the Imperial forces for many years. He believed these stronger, cheaper weapons were better suited to less well trained troops than the kind of magazine rifle, with which it had earlier been intended to re-equip the Volunteers.\textsuperscript{182}

As well as making specific reports on each corps and branch of the Force, Fox made general comments on different aspects of its operations. Fox was critical of the poor quality of the Volunteer officer corps, in particular he attacked the election of officers as a practice that promoted indiscipline and encouraged men with the wrong type of motives to seek commissions.\textsuperscript{183} The examinations officers had to pass to gain their commissions were of a very elementary standard. They did not devote enough attention to such things as basic tactics, the conduct of reconnaissance and other matters officers needed to understand in order to be proficient. The examination board system itself was in need of reform, as many board members lacked the knowledge needed to properly examine candidates, and were passing men
who did not even meet the low standard supposedly required, which was basically the ability to drill a corps. Little progress was made in raising the standard required to pass commission examinations before the end of the century. In 1900, for instance, Colonel Slater described them as "a farce."

The absence amongst Volunteer officers of the knowledge and skills needed to properly carry out their duties, noted by Colonel Fox, was mainly due to the fact that there was no system for instructing officers. Apart from the short-lived training school in Wellington, the only places Volunteer officers could receive education in military subjects between 1885 and 1901 were officers clubs. These institutions combined social, recreational and educational functions. Although they often co-operated with the defence authorities, these clubs were independent organisations established in the major centres by Volunteer officers. The Christchurch Garrison Library was, in 1885, the first club to be formed, and provides a good illustration of the kind of educational activities they conducted. Probably the most important of these was the presentation and discussion of papers on military topics, by members and invited speakers. In 1900, for example, papers entitled "The Maxim Gun", "Practical Field Works" and "A Commentary on the Defence Scheme" were amongst those presented at the Christchurch Garrison Library. One of the most popular activities at the club in Christchurch was the holding of Kreigspiele (war games), which were useful in improving officers' grasp of tactics and strategy. The Christchurch Garrison Library, as its title suggests, maintained a small collection of books on military topics for its members to consult. The work of officers
clubs to enhance the professional skills and knowledge of officers can only have had a beneficial effect upon the Force. However, only a minority of officers were able or willing to take part in these educational activities. At least in the case of the Christchurch Garrison Library, it was the keen progressive officers, and not those who most needed to improve their professional knowledge, who made best use of the limited educational opportunities.

In 1897 the Christchurch Garrison Library expanded its educational efforts by establishing a school of instruction under the control of a committee of senior members. The school held classes at night on various military subjects, spasmodically until 1910.

NCO clubs were organised along similar lines to officers clubs, but do not appear to have been as numerous, or as popular. They carried out the same kind of educational activities, although naturally with a bias towards matters with particular relevance for NCOs.

Another aspect of the Force to receive particular attention was its chronic lack of field training. Apart from during their regular Easter camps, Volunteers rarely trained in the open. Some of the field days occasionally organised by units on a local basis did give the men taking part useful practice in the skills required on active service. However, the Easter camps, the most important, indeed usually the only, opportunity for the Force to engage in field training on a large scale, were, throughout the 1885-1901 period of only limited value.

There were a number of reasons for this: firstly the number of Volunteers who attended was often not satisfactory.
Secondly, the camps did not last long enough, the considerable amount of time spent travelling to and from the camps, meant that many units could only be present for about three days.\textsuperscript{199}

Especially early in the period, best use was not made of the time in camp, because too many recreational and ceremonial events were included in the programme.\textsuperscript{200} The sham fights and other training activities at Easter camps were often carried out on "the principle of the minimum of work with the maximum of show".\textsuperscript{201}

These problems led Colonel Hume to question, in his 1891 report, whether Easter camps in the present form were worth the time and effort expended on them.

Such doubts were well founded. In his 1893 report Colonel Fox condemned the work previously done at Easter camps, which had been restricted to "company, battalion, and brigade drill", and a sham fight. At his instigation, basic field work and manoeuvres were introduced at the Easter camps of that year. Fox also directed naval and garrison artillery units to concentrate on their specialist gunnery and mining training when they went into camp, rather than wasting their time doing infantry drill and joining sham fights as they had in the past.\textsuperscript{202} Under Fox, and later Penton, the amount of useful training carried out at camps increased.\textsuperscript{203} The plan for the Otago Easter camp of 1898, provides a good example of the kind of operation practiced in each district from the mid 1890s. The basic concept behind the training at the Otago camp, and most others in this period, was the need to respond to raids by naval forces and raiding parties on New Zealand's ports. The O.C. Otago District's plan for 1898 had two main ports. One was the
manning and later reinforcement of Dunedin's coastal defences by the local naval artillery and engineers corps to meet an attack by enemy warships. The other was operations by the district's Volunteer cavalry, field artillery and infantry, who were to encamp on the outskirts of Dunedin to prevent forces, landed from the warships, from outflanking the city's fixed defences. The Easter camps of 1893 onwards, while an advance over those held earlier in the period, were still affected by such basic problems as their short length and the inadequate number of Permanent Staff or Volunteers able to instruct and command the large forces assembled on these occasions. Attempts, during 1898 and 1899, to extend the Easter camps to seven days, met with only a limited response. Sham fights and other activities which Volunteers and the public enjoyed, continued to take up a disproportionate amount of time in camp, at the expense of training in such basics as the use of cover and entrenchments. In consequence, the Volunteer officers and men who took part learnt little of real importance. However, from the late 1890s, the holding of more company or battalion camps and field days gave Volunteers more opportunities for field training outside Easter camps.

The main thrust of Colonel Fox's recommendations for the Volunteer Force was the improvement of its quality at the expense of its size. As he put it:
I have to impress upon the Government that it is better to have fifty well-trained men under good instruction, with their hearts in their work, well dressed and well cared for than to have a hundred men the large proportion of whom do not really care to learn, ill dressed, badly provided, and uninstructed.

He advised the disbandment of 41 corps. These were either very inefficient, or located in areas like Westland, where they would be of little or no use in the event of a surprise naval raid, this being the most probable type of threat to New Zealand.211

This would have left a Volunteer Force of 61 corps, plus three new corps to be raised in Auckland and Dunedin, concentrated around the main centres.212 The plan was an essentially sound response to New Zealand's defence needs, taking account of the limited resources available, problems with transport and the need to defend the major ports. It was, however, unacceptable to Defence Minister Seddon as the wholesale disbandment of country corps, which were in a number of instances efficient units, would have caused a great deal of resentment and was likely to have serious political repercussions.213 Similar proposals by Schaw and Edwards had been rejected by previous Governments on these grounds.214 In any case, a scheme which called for the abolition of all six Westland corps was most unlikely to find favour with R.J. Seddon, M.H.R. for the district.215 As well as these factors, the outcry from officers, including Cabinet Minister Joseph Ward and other parliamentarians criticised in the report, made it even more desirable for Seddon, at least in part, to disown Fox's plan.216 The report sparked a major public debate on defence matters, a rare occurrence, with people taking up positions for or against.217
Seddon displayed his great political acumen in defusing the awkward situation Fox's report had created. One part of his response was to prevent Fox taking effective charge of the forces, and to subject him to official harassment. The other was to implement some of the less important and less controversial of the report's recommendations, such as ordering Martini Henry rifles and changing the Volunteers' Year, so that it started and finished on the last day of February. While at the same time, expressing doubts and criticisms of many of the proposals, in particular those which, like the disbandment of country corps, were politically sensitive. Colonel Fox was angered and frustrated by Seddon's actions to such an extent that, in April 1894 he submitted his resignation. The way Fox had been treated displeased Lord Glasgow, the Governor of New Zealand, who came to his defence in a series of strongly worded exchanges with Seddon. Glasgow was able to achieve little in the face of Seddon's contention that matters relating to Colonel Fox's position were entirely the concern of the colony's Government. He was also hampered by an absence of support from the Colonial Office. This left Seddon, who had in 1893 become Premier, in a strong position, in full control of defence policy. Cleverly, he then moved to secure Fox's professional services by appointing him Military Adviser to the New Zealand Government, and Inspector of the New Zealand Forces.

During September 1894, the Defence Minister called a conference to discuss and make recommendations on the future of the Volunteer Force. Attending the meeting, which was chaired by Sir George Whitmore, were fourteen Members of Parliament who
were all past or current members of the Force, including some who had been criticised by Fox. The latter, and other officers of the Permanent Staff and the acting Under-Secretary of Defence, also attended. The report of the conference did not deal with the vexed issue of what was to be done with the country corps, but did in general support Fox's proposals on other matters, perhaps most notably on the contentious question of officer election. Much of what the conference and Colonel Fox had recommended was not at first implemented, but over the next six to seven years many of their proposals did become official policy, and had an important influence on the Force's development.

Most of the duties he would have performed as commandant, were carried out by Colonel Fox in 1895 and 1896, in his new capacity of Military Adviser and Inspector, but he lacked real authority. Nonetheless, some limited progress was made at this time, with the overall standard of the Force improving, except in Auckland, where the majority of units were "absolutely useless". However, the number of Volunteers fell from 5,206 in 1894-5, to 4,949 the following year, because of the disbanding of some of the units identified as being inefficient in the 1893 Report. An increase in the capitation grant to £2 10s. a man for all branches gave the movement some much needed encouragement.

The idea, put forward by Fox, that artillery and mounted corps should receive a higher grant, was rejected because the conference believed such a measure would cause division within the Force. Steps were also taken to remedy some of the Force's serious deficiencies in equipment. However, the main policy objective was to have the Volunteers "efficiently organised, commended
New Volunteer Regulations enacted in 1895, provided the basis for this policy, and included a number of the reforms advocated by Fox and the conference. These included badges and £1 payments for naval and garrison artillerymen who passed a proficiency examination. Nevertheless many long-standing problems were left, such as the absence in the capitalisation requirements of any real incentive for infantry Volunteers to make themselves passable shots. Provisions in the 1895 regulations for the payment of forage and other allowances to Volunteers who attended camp, were not even put into effect.

One of the first steps taken at this time to improve the organisation of the Force, was the division of naval artillery corps into two groups: the A Branch, made up of units at the main centres, which were to man the coastal fortifications, and the B Branch, the naval companies at places like Bluff and Nelson, that were to become rifle corps in name as well as practice, as Fox and the conference had recommended. Further changes in this branch's organisation were instituted in 1896, after an exercise in Wellington had shown that, under the existing arrangements, the forts guarding the city could not be properly garrisoned. More significantly, during 1895-6 infantry battalions were re-established in the Wellington, Canterbury and South Otago districts. It was not possible to do this in other districts, because there were not sufficient numbers of efficient officers and men in these areas. The new formations were similar to the earlier battalions, in that corps retained much of their autonomy. The development of the battalion system in South Canterbury provides a clear illustration
of how the new organisation was established under Fox and his successor Colonel Penton. In 1895, the Canterbury Battalion of Infantry Volunteers was formed out of all the province’s infantry corps, along with others, such as the Timaru Navals, which were to act in that role. This battalion, which encompassed companies from Rangiora and Waimate that were more than 180 kilometres apart, was a most unwieldy formation. This problem was somewhat alleviated when, in 1897, the three Timaru corps and those in Ashburton, Temuka and Waimate were formed into the South Canterbury Battalion of Infantry Volunteers. Positions in the new battalion were filled mainly by Volunteer officers from units in Timaru, where it had its headquarters. Although more compact than the formation it in part replaced, there was still more than 60 kilometres between the South Canterbury battalion’s northern company at Ashburton and its headquarters. The large areas, over which the companies of the South Canterbury and other Volunteer battalions were often scattered, made the development of an effective battalion structure very difficult.

In the face of Seddon’s support for election rather than nomination, nothing could be done to remedy this weakness of the officer corps. Fox had a little more success with the other main problem with Volunteer officers, namely their poor military education. In this he received considerable assistance from a Royal Artillery Master Gunner, who had recently been hired as an artillery instructor. Members of the Permanent Staff also prepared some useful manuals for the Force, which were suitable for New Zealand conditions.
resources available for the instruction of both officers and other ranks remained hopelessly inadequate. In the Wellington district there were only three infantry drill instructors: one dealt with the five Volunteer corps and four cadet corps in the capital, while also working as a clerk at the district office, another instructed six corps between Palmerston North and New Plymouth, and the third worked with five corps scattered between New Plymouth and Napier. Inefficient instructors were retained it seems, because of Seddon's opposition to hiring infantry instructors from the British Army. Fox stressed that the modest amount of expenditure that would have been needed to establish classes for officers at the main centres, and to hire competent instructional staff would have been well spent, and would "enormously benefit the Force". However, by the end of 1896 little was done.

PART C 1896-1901

Late in 1896, Colonel A.P. Penton, another former Royal Artillery officer was gazetted Commander of the New Zealand Forces, a post he was to hold for the next five years. Circumstances were much more propitious for the new commandant than they had been for his predecessor, as in June 1896 a much to the attention of Government and the public alike. Also the new commandant had, from the outset, another Imperial officer, Lieutenant Madocks, to assist him with his heavy workload as his staff officer, something Colonel Fox had requested but had never been granted. Penton made some minor changes to the Volunteer policy pursued under Fox. For instance, he was opposed to the retention of cavalry units, but the general direction of policy, the improvement of the Force's organisation and military effectiveness, remained the same.
This is apparent in his first report made in 1897. Here Penton outlined his ideas on the need for a national plan for the mobilisation, and concentration, of the Volunteer Force in the event of war, as well as better training for officers and an end to election.\textsuperscript{253} The implementation of the policy of converting naval and field artillery units in outlying districts into rifle corps, was speeded up under Penton and, despite some opposition from the corps effected, for the most part, successfully completed during the year 1897-98.\textsuperscript{254} These points were developed by Penton during 1897 and 1898 into a set of comprehensive policies for re-organising the Volunteer Force. Central to this was a scheme setting out the type and number of Volunteer units to be maintained in each military district. Such a control on the number, distribution and type of units was a pre-requisite for any systematic attempt to improve the quality of the Force and provide it with an appropriate mix of arms. The scheme called for each of the four main districts to have two infantry battalions, a field artillery battery, an engineer corps, an ambulance corps, and a cyclist company, along with naval or garrison artillery corps and mounted units. The total strength of the forces required to complete this establishment was about 7,000.\textsuperscript{255} The other major planning measure during 1897 and 1898 was the beginning of work on a Defence Scheme for New Zealand.\textsuperscript{256} As part of this process a conference was held in April 1898. It was attended by the Commandant, the Under Secretary for Defence and senior officers
from throughout the colony, and was held to discuss the issues to be covered in the Defence Scheme.\textsuperscript{257} The plan was not completed until 1899, after which it was submitted to the Colonial Defence Committee in London for study.\textsuperscript{258} The committee approved the scheme, which set out how the colony's forces would be deployed in the event of various kinds of threat.\textsuperscript{259} It also provided procedures for the requisition of supplies and transport in an emergency.\textsuperscript{260} Preparation of this plan showed that, in the event of attack, New Zealand's forces would suffer greatly from a lack of trained staff officers.\textsuperscript{261} I have been unable to locate a copy of the 1898 Defence Scheme. It was, however, probably similar to later schemes, as both the kind of threat envisaged and the composition of the New Zealand forces remained much the same up to 1910.

The extension of battalion organisation to infantry corps outside the main centres during 1897-98 was a significant part of the reform programme.\textsuperscript{262} If corps were to be of any "practical value",\textsuperscript{263} they needed to train in the larger formations they would have to operate in during wartime.\textsuperscript{264} Like Whitmore and Fox, Penton wanted to do away eventually with corps' semi-independent status, and move to a proper battalion based system.\textsuperscript{265} Most of the Force's infantry had by this time gained a reasonable knowledge of work that could be done in drill halls, but were "sadly deficient in their knowledge of practical soldiering". This was largely because of the way the Volunteer system failed to give them enough opportunities to practice such skills. In an effort to alleviate this grave failing, it was decided to introduce a system of personal payments of 2s. 6d. per Volunteer, for each one of the six special daylight parades he attended.\textsuperscript{266} This scheme was very similar
to one of Seddon's 1891 proposals. 267

Colonel Penton was also aware that action was required to provide the Force with an effective reserve organisation, as earlier attempts to establish reserve lists or corps of men who had served in the Volunteers, had met with little success. 268 Penton's major initiative in this regard was to have the police compile lists of men liable for service in the first class militia. Calling out the militia however could not provide the type of trained men who were needed if the Volunteer Force was to be expanded in a rapid and orderly fashion. 269 The basic problem was that the corps basis to the Force's organisation meant that it could only be quickly expanded by the formation of many new corps, a process that was both time consuming and highly inefficient. Measures taken later in the period, most notably the formation of reserve corps composed of South African veterans and Volunteers whose corps failed to maintain their minimum establishment or which were too isolated, also failed, and the Force remained without any kind of efficient reserve system in 1910. 270

In conjunction with the setting of establishments for each district, a policy of only accepting new units if they were required to complete a district's authorised strength was implemented. 2 This was an essential step if the type of balanced force envisaged in the plan was to be achieved. There were two substantial difficulties with this policy: firstly given the way corps were raised, the Commandant could only encourage the formation of a particular type of unit. In Wellington for instance, there was no corps of engineers as called for in the district establishment. 272 It took Penton nearly two years of effort to procure the formation
of such a unit in the capital. Perhaps because engineer units did not have the glamour associated with other kinds of units, they were not very popular, and the Commandant had great difficulty finding a suitable man prepared to take command of this corps. In the past, the way corps were raised had also created problems, such as the proliferation of the popular naval artillery corps in unsuitable locations. Secondly, the policy obliged the administration to decline offers of corps which did not fit into a district's establishment. Some 50 such proposals were turned down during 1898 and 1899. This was politically embarrassing for the Government, as irate citizens, whose offers of patriotic service had been rejected, complained to their Members of Parliament. During 1898 and much of 1899 the pressure on the Government which resulted from this was withstood and the policy generally adhered to.

Penton recognised that the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Force was severely handicapped by its paucity of support units, and this was behind his efforts to establish engineer corps at each of the four main centres. In 1898 there were only two such units, in Dunedin and in Christchurch, and despite their own best efforts these were not very efficient as they lacked equipment and proper instruction. The ordering of new equipment and the provision of some limited instruction by members of the Permanent Force (from the late 1890s the Permanent Militia was usually known as the Permanent Force) led to an improvement in the capabilities of the engineer corps between 1897 and 1899. During 1899-1900 the authorised strength of these units was raised by one officer and 20 other ranks, they continued, however, to be handicapped by
In a similar manner Penton attempted to improve the medical services of the Volunteer Force as part of his re-organisation begun in the year 1897-98. Before 1897 virtually the only medical resources available to the Force were the honorary medical officers of corps and battalions. Some of these men did good service but many were Volunteers in name only. Some units made their own quite extensive medical arrangements. One example is the C.Y.C., which in 1893 owned its own ambulance, and by 1900 had the wife of one of its NCOs as the only female Ambulance Sergeant in the Force. In general, however, there was no organisation and often medical officers even had to pay for the supplies they used in their Volunteer duties. At the prompting of Colonel Penton, steps were taken during 1897 to establish an ambulance, or bearer corps as they were called, in the main centres. By mid 1899 corps had been established in Auckland, Christchurch and Dunedin. They proved to be a "great boon" to Volunteers at the Easter camps of that year, doing a lot of useful work. Shortly after this another corps was formed in Wellington, like the other three it had a maximum establishment of two officers and 25 other ranks. The officers of these units were doctors, while many of the other ranks already had an interest in first aid or a background in health care. During the year 1899-1900, however, the Force's medical services deteriorated. Penton was particularly critical of honorary medical officers, saying:

It is only a small number of these medical officers who seem to take any interest in Volunteering beyond getting the Military medical titles and having their names registered on the general medical list.
In an effort to deal with at least some of the service's faults, more equipment was ordered, and organisational changes made. In addition, the establishment of the four existing bearer corps was doubled, and a new unit formed with the old establishment in Nelson.

In his 1898 report Penton also recognised the need for more training for field, garrison and naval artillery units. He advocated the extension of the system of 14 day training camps to include the field artillery as well as the coastal batteries. The naval and garrison artillery corps had certainly benefitted from these camps, attendance at which formed part of their capitation requirements. The camps were introduced in 1895 and were based upon proposals made by Colonel Fox and the Volunteer Conference. Corps camped normally at the fortifications they would man in an emergency, while still going to their civilian jobs. A good example of the tiring regime this entailed is provided by Lyttelton Navals camp at Fort Jervois in November 1898. The routine each day, except for Sundays, at this 15 day camp was — reveille 4.30 am, gun drill 5 am, breakfast 6.30 am. At 7 am a launch took the Volunteers to work in Lyttelton and returned with them at 5.30 pm. Tea 6 pm, drill 7 pm to 8.45 pm, first post 9.30 pm, last post 10.00 pm and lights out 10.30 pm. As part of a wider policy of placing greater emphasis upon the particular skills needed by each branch of the Force, the Commandant also wanted to introduce a new set of capitation requirements for the field artillery. These would replace rifle shooting criteria with artillery skills. The report of 1898 also included a plan that each year one of the field batteries at the main centres should be refitted with modern guns and equipment. During the year 1897-98 the .303 Martini Enfield rifle was brought into service in some Volunteer units.
Penton doubted that this was a wise step, thinking that it would have been better to introduce a magazine rifle instead of another single shot weapon. He expressed concern at the Force being armed with three small arms, the Snider, the Martini Henry and the Martini Enfield, which all used different types of ammunition.

This report was once again critical of the system of officer election, and the general standard of commissioned and non-commissioned officers. There was little Penton could do about election, but he was able to improve the opportunities the Force's leadership had for education, by the engagement of a Royal Artillery officer, an ex-officer of the Royal Engineers and two additional artillery instructors. In addition, he succeeded in having included in the estimates, money for the hiring of Imperial officers to act as adjutants in the four main districts, and men of the Imperial service to act as infantry instructors to replace the existing inefficient instructors. Unfortunately the salaries offered to the adjutants were not attractive, and largely as a consequence of this, two years later only one officer had been obtained. Penton called for the establishment of a school of instruction in Wellington, where Volunteer officers and NCOs could attend three or four week courses. These would be held four times a year, and cover both basic and more advanced subjects. This kind of facility was sorely needed, as apart from occasional lectures by members of the staff or the Permanent Force, and the efforts of Volunteer officers and NCOs clubs, there was at this time no system of military education available.

There was some opposition to the policies of Colonel Penton during 1897 and 1898. In particular, his wish to expand the Permanent Force was attacked as an unwelcome manifestation of militarism in
New Zealand. Most Members of Parliament seem to have been committed to keeping the colony's professional military establishment as small as possible, but were much more amenable to calls for more support for the Volunteers. The Commandant's moves to give the Volunteer Force a more developed structure, and plans to bring Government Rifle Clubs under tighter control and stop support for the New Zealand Rifle Association, were also criticised, principally by the proponents of a less formal defence organisation based upon the popularisation of rifle shooting.

The substantial initiatives in defence policy taken between 1897 and 1899, saw military expenditure grow by more than 25%, from £83,004 in the 1897-98 year to £114,789 in 1898-99. This owed much to events both within and outside New Zealand. Early in 1898 the outbreak of the Spanish-American War led to talk of sending a privately organised New Zealand force to fight in Cuba, and fears that the war might spread, involving the British Empire. Such concerns prompted delegations of community leaders from Auckland and Wanganui to approach the Premier about the state of their cities' defences. Then in May, discontent amongst Northland Maoris led by Hone Toia resulted in the so called 'Dog Tax War', in which a force of armed Maoris threatened the settlement of Rawene. The Government's main military response was to dispatch a Permanent Force detachment to the area. However, before the affair was resolved without fighting, preparations were made for the use of Volunteers. When it was still unclear whether or not hostilities would break out in Northland, Colonel Penton ordered the O.C. Auckland District, Lieutenant Colonel Ranks, to organise a picked force of one hundred local Volunteers, to be led by officers who preferably had experience in dealing with Maoris. The Volunteers
were, if necessary, to be dispatched at short notice to operate along the east coast of Northland in support of the Permanent Force.\textsuperscript{311} This unit was to be made up of the best men available from the different corps in Auckland, and its organisation closely resembles that of the Volunteer Active Service Companies formed in the United Kingdom for service in South Africa.\textsuperscript{312} The members of the special force were to be subject to the discipline and other conditions entailed by "actual service" under paragraph 89 of the 1886 Defence Act, and a draft proclamation to this effect was drawn up.\textsuperscript{313} It appears there was no shortage of Volunteers willing to take the field in Auckland,\textsuperscript{314} and also in Wellington, where the Kelburne Rifle Volunteers offered their services.\textsuperscript{315} Even further south in Christchurch, members of E Battery volunteered to serve.\textsuperscript{316} It was probably just as well the inadequately trained and often ill-disciplined Volunteers were not deployed, as in the tense Northland situation errors of judgement or conduct could easily have had very serious repercussions. Late in the year the Fashoda crisis involving Britain and France produced a war scare in New Zealand which enhanced interest in Volunteering, with many new corps being offered to the Government.\textsuperscript{317} Such was the concern generated by the crises of 1898, that the strength of the Force greatly increased from 5,121 late in 1897 to more than 7,000 in June 1899.\textsuperscript{318} This expansion enabled the virtual completion of the establishment set out in the 1898 report, and raised the possibility of further growth in 1899.\textsuperscript{319}

A critical point in the development of New Zealand's defence posture was reached in late 1899, when, for the first time, forces were dispatched to serve overseas. Before the outbreak of the South African War in October, some further improvements were made to the Force's
effectiveness under Colonel Penton's direction. Volunteers seem to have taken a particular interest in the rising tension in southern Africa. Late in 1898, for instance, the Volunteer column of The Weekly Press recommended to members of the Force, a patriotic print entitled "Jameson's Last Stand".

The war was generally very popular in the colony. Even before it had begun, New Zealand had offered to send a contingent to the Transvaal. It was believed that the dispatch of a force would be of great benefit to the Volunteer Force, giving its members active service experience and enhancing its esprit de corps. Preparations were quickly made to send the first contingent, which was to be followed between 1900 and 1902 by nine more, with a total of 6,495 officers and men. The organisation of these units was quite separate from that of the colony's existing forces. However, members of the Permanent and Volunteer Forces played a leading part in running the camps where men for the contingents were selected and trained before their departure. The first two contingents, which, like the others, were basically mounted rifle formations, were composed almost exclusively of Volunteers. In the Second Contingent, out of 258 officers and men, at least 175 were from Volunteer mounted rifle and infantry units. Apart from four former members of the Imperial Forces, virtually the entire contingent had belonged to the different branches of the Force. Later contingents probably contained a majority of men who had not been Volunteers, but the Force continued to provide a substantial proportion of the men serving in South Africa, especially of officers and NCOs. The calibre of the contingents' officers left much to be desired. Apart from senior posts, which were occupied largely by members of the Permanent Staff or Imperial Forces, the
contingents' officers were apparently selected by the Minister of Defence and granted commissions in the New Zealand militia. Many were Volunteer officers, who showed in South Africa the limitations of their training and military education. Often the best qualified men were not selected. Instead, men with little or no military experience, but of high social status were made officers.

The patriotic fervour provoked by the war produced a great surge in Volunteering, with more than 120 corps being offered to the Government in the twelve months up to 6 July 1900. During the first four months of the war, the Minister, on the advice of the Commandant, accepted only some of these offers, in an attempt to keep the Force's size within manageable limits and to preserve the integrity of the 1898 defence scheme. This policy produced a clamour, much greater than that of 1898, from Members of Parliament, who pressed the claims of units proposed in their electorates. Seddon became Minister of Defence again in January 1900, and did not agree with this policy. By June 1900 he had accepted the services of many new corps, which boosted the Force's strength from over 7,000 to around 11,000. In the following month he stated that he would gladly accept all corps that were offered, provided that Parliament voted the necessary funds. The much larger Volunteer Force entailed by such a step was one of the major parts of Seddon's statement on defence, delivered to Parliament on 20 July 1900. In this he also put forward his plans for an Imperial Reserve and a subsidy from the Imperial Government for colonial defence expenditure. The Joint Defence Committee formed late in July, and comprised mostly of Parliamentarians who were current or former Volunteers, also pressed for a larger
Volunteer Force. They recommended that all corps offered should be accepted, thereby increasing the number of Volunteers to around 18,000. The committee also made some useful proposals on the equipment, training and conditions of service of the Force.

The decision to accept new corps, for which Seddon must take principal responsibility, resulted in the Force growing to more than 17,000 in 1901, which was most unwise. It was motivated by the Defence Minister's desire to court popularity and to make impressive gestures, rather than to implement sound policy. Even by early 1900, astute observers were warning against a repeat of the mistake made in 1885, when too many new corps were accepted, as these failed once enthusiasm waned. However, Seddon rejected this view. The costs imposed by this policy were considerable. In 1898 the Defence Minister, Thomas Thompson, had estimated that it cost the Government £600 to establish a new corps and £300 per annum to maintain it. When it is considered that the number of corps in the Force increased from 119 to 218 between July 1899 and September 1901, the profligate nature of the unrestricted acceptance policy becomes clear. Certainly much of the great increase in defence expenditure during 1900 and 1901 was due to the implementation of this policy.

The Commandant was opposed to the acceptance of new Volunteer corps with little or no consideration of what useful role they might play in defence of New Zealand. In his report of 1900, he was specially critical of the way rapid fluctuations in the Force's strength nullified long term planning such as the Defence Scheme of 1898. The next year Penton pointed out that the Permanent Staff and organisation was unable to deal properly with a Volunteer Force of more than
17,000 men scattered throughout the country. As well as over-riding Penton's views on the acceptance of new corps, Seddon opposed his chief military advisor on other policy issues. For instance, he wanted to distribute the new field guns and equipment amongst the existing Volunteer batteries, rather than re-equip one unit completely at a time, as the Commandant intended.

Debate on defence issues during 1900 demonstrated Seddon's limited understanding of modern warfare. Like many other New Zealanders, he believed the South African War showed that colonists were naturally good soldiers, who required only a little training to be highly effective. Opposition politician, William Russell, aptly commented that the Defence Minister was obsessed with numbers at the expense of the many, often mundane, steps needed to give New Zealand an efficient defence system. Another Member of Parliament with Volunteer experience, Walter Cearns, pointed out the fallacious nature of Seddon's observations on the success of New Zealand's South African contingents. He noted that it was an unusual situation, in which all support services, like transport and supply, were handled by the Imperial Forces, and stressed the need for the colony's Forces to be able to carry out these functions themselves. Leading opposition politicians interested in the Volunteers, generally agreed with the Commandant that qualitative improvements to the Force should take precedence over its expansion.

The interest in defence caused by the South African War provided a favourable environment for improvements to the Volunteer Force. Funds for new small arms and other equipment were much more freely available than previously. The mounted rifles, a type of unit
made very popular by the war, were, along with cavalry corps, granted an increased capitation of £3. 10s. and a forage allowance when they were in camp, as Fox had suggested years before. Plans to organise the mounted units, where at all possible, into battalions of four corps were hampered by a severe shortage of officers capable of taking the senior positions within them. These units were in fact little more than paper creations, with the corps only really operating as battalions at Easter camps. Efforts by Colonel Penton to get infantry corps to undertake more practical musketry and outdoor training during the year 1899-1900 met with some success. D. Battery of Wellington was equipped with new guns, and also given improved access to horses and the limited use of Permanent Force as drivers, all of which greatly enhanced its efficiency. This is a good example of the need for improved equipment to be combined with better organisation for real advances in the Force's capabilities to be made. The most important measure for the Force as a whole in this period, was the setting up of a new School of Instruction for Volunteer officers and NCOs, which was to begin work in 1902.

Colonel Penton could justifiably claim that after his five years in command, the Volunteer Force was in a much better state than when he had arrived. But it still suffered from the basic weaknesses with which it had started the period. The corps remained the real basis of organisation, with the battalions, especially in country districts, having little more than notional existence. The election of officers, though repeatedly attacked as one of the Volunteers' most pernicious faults, remained in effect, and little had been done to improve officer standards. Essential specialist and support units were either non-existent, as was transport, or grossly inadequate, as
in the case of medical services. The equipment of the Force had improved markedly between 1885 and 1901, and some ground had even been made up vis a vie the armies of the major powers, with the Volunteers at least receiving some up-to-date small arms. However, the small size of the Permanent Staff, and the dearth of staff officers, made the proper control and instruction of the Force impossible. As a whole, the defence system in 1901 was, like the Volunteer Force, unable to meet effectively the colony's defence needs.
NOTES


2 See for example N.Z.V.C., 4 May 1885, p.4.


4 See for example L.T., 16 Mar 1885, p.6b, N.Z.V.C., 1 Nov 1887, p.3, and ibid 7 Feb 1888, p.6.


6 See for example N.Z.V.G., 4 Oct 1887, p.5.

7 L.T., 21 Feb 1885, p.4.

8 Barratt, pp. 37-38.

9 See for example W.P., 18 Jan 1894, p.33.


14 N.Z.C., 3 Dec 1878, II, p.1711.


16 See for example L.T., 19 Mar 1885, p.6e.


19 Scholefield, II, p.504.


21 ibid, p.1-H-4a and New Zealand Statutes 1886, pp.62-64.


M.Z.V.C., 1 Dec 1885, pp. 4 and 7-8.  
N.Z.G., 7 Jul 1885, II, p.914.  
Whitmore to Gudgeon 11 Aug 1886, A.D.1, 86/1703.  
See for example N.Z.V.C., 7 Sep 1886, p.9, and M.R., Apr 1890, p.181.  
N.Z.C., 14 May 1885, I, p.621.  
See for example N.A. Inspection of Westland District Corps A.D.1, 86/273.  
ibid and L.T., 15 Feb 1886, p.5e.  
ibid, and Slater, pp.58-59.  
ibid, and N.A. A.D.1, 86/1577.  

49 M.Z.C., 7 Oct 1886, II, pp.1283-84.

50 M.Z.V.G., 6 Dec 1887, p.9.


54 The Press, 19 Apr 1887, p.2e.

55 See for example, M.Z.P.D., Vol 59 19 Dec 1887, p.927.


57 ibid, pp. 3-4-A-7.

58 See for example N.Z.V.G., 3 Jan 1888, pp. 6-7 and The Press, 26 Jan 1888, pp.ZT-3a.


60 C.T., 4 Nov 1887, p.28h.


63 N.A. undated copy of a letter from the officers, NCOs and men of the Whangaru County Rifle Volunteers to the Members of the House of Representatives, internal evidence shows that it was probably written between 1883 and 1886, bundle 8 A.D.106/9.


65 See for example N.A. circular No.1 1 Feb 1888 A.D.9,3 and C.T. 17 Feb 1888, p.21b.


68 ibid, pp.1-4 and 7-H-5.

69 M.Z.C., 5 Apr 1888, I, p.416.

70 See for example M. Moake, To the Taxpayers of New Zealand: How We May Save £50,000 A-Year by Re-Organisation of our Forces, Wanganui 1887, pp.E-9.
See for example N.Z.V.G., 6 Mar 1888, p.3 and C.T., 10 Feb 1888, p.22e.


Slater, p.57.


See for example N.Z.V.G., 6 Dec 1887, p.9.

See for example L.T., 12 Jun 1889, p.2b.


L.T., 8 Jan 1891, p.4d-f and Hughes, p.13.

Slater, p.80.


ibid, p.6-H-15.


M.R., Apr 1890, p.184.


ibid.

The First Class Militia was made up of virtually all able bodied, unmarried men between 17 and 35 years, New Zealand Statutes 1886, p.49.

L.T., 23 Jul 1890, p.3c.

See for example L.T., 8 Jan 1891, p.4d-f.


Seddon was Defence Minister from 24 Jan 1891 to 22 Jun 1896, and again from 23 Jan 1900 to 10 Jun 1906. G.H. Scholefield (ed.), New Zealand Parliamentary Record 1840-1949, Wellington 1950, p.40.


See for example N.Z.P.D., Vol 430, 21 Sep 1904, p.766.

Burdon, p.218.

Figure calculated from The New Zealand Official Year-Book 1910, Wellington 1910, p.79, and Expenses connected with the visit of the Duke and Duchess of York, A.J.H.R. 1903, H-28a.


Slater, pp.82-84.

Burdon, p.288.


W.P., 11 Jan 1894, p.33 c-d.


See for example The Press, 24 Mar 1900, p.4g.
L.T., 22 Feb 1886, p.5c.

M.Z.V.G., 7 Sep 1886, p.7.

ibid, 1 Jul 1885, p.7 and 1 Oct 1885, p.5.

L.T., 2 Oct 1897, p.3g, 14 Oct 1897, p.3b and 19 Oct 1897, p.2g.

See for example N.Z.V.G., 2 Aug 1887, p.6, 4 Oct 1887, p.7 and W.P., 17 Apr 1907, p.64d.

The Press, 10 Jan 1896, p.2a and W.P., 23 Jan 1896, p.38d.

W.P., 16 Jan 1896, p.38d.

ibid, 2 Jan 1896, p.40a-b.

ibid, 6 Feb 1896, p.47a.

The Press, 11 Jan 1896, p.8b.

See for example W.P., 2 Jan 1896, p.40a-b.

Volunteer Regulations 1899, para.192.

See for example 1889 Report, A.J.H.R., p.6-H-16.

See for example The Press, 14 Jan 1896, p.5b-c.


Slater, p.103.

See pp.80-81.

O.D.T., 18 Jan 1908, p.5.


Evening Star, 29 Sep 1908, and Fairbairn secretary of citizens committee to McNab 1 Oct 1908, A.D.L., 09/3442.

O.D.T., 30 Oct 1908, ibid.


O.D.T., 4 Sep 1908, A.D.L, 09/3442.

See for example Fairbairn to McNab N.D., internal evidence suggests this telegram was sent in the second half of Sep 1908, and Fairbairn to McNab 1 Oct 1908, ibid.
See for example McNab to Fairbairn 5 Oct 1908, O.D.T., 30 Oct 1908, O.C. Otago District to Secretary of Defence Council N.P., Secretary of Defence Council to O.C. Otago District 26 Nov 1908 and Stoneham to A.A.G. Otago District 15 Apr 1909, A.D.1, 39/3442.

Stoneham to O.C. Otago District N.P., O.C. Otago District to Secretary of Defence Council N.P. and Secretary of Defence Council to O.C. Otago District, ibid.


O.C. Otago District to Secretary of Defence Council 27 Jul 1909, A.D.1, 09/3442.

Adjutant General and Quartermaster General to Fowlds 9 Jun 1909, ibid.

Notes on a meeting between Fowlds and Citizens' Committee 29 Jun 1909, and Fairbairn to Fowlds 23 Jul 1909, ibid.

Notes on a meeting between Fowlds and Citizens' Committee 29 Jun 1909, ibid.


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Adjutant General and Quartermaster General to O.C. Otago District 11 Nov 1909, ibid.

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The Round Table : A Quarterly Review of the Politics of the British Empire, Nov 1901 - Aug 1911, 1, p.360, and see for example The Press, 24 Mar 1900, p.9a.

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See for example ibid, 9 Jun 1891, p.4e.

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163 ibid, pp.11-20.
164 ibid, p.14.
166 Richardson, p.8.
168 ibid, p.42-N-9 and N-9c.
170 ibid, p.36-N-9.
171 ibid, pp.38 and 50-N-9.
173 ibid, pp.39 and 50-N-9.
175 ibid, pp.39-40-N-9.
176 ibid, pp.17 and 40-N-9.
177 ibid.
178 See for example ibid, pp. 23 and 36-N-9.
179 ibid, pp.40-42-N-9 and 10-N-9a.
180 ibid, pp. 10-11-N-9b and p.50-N-9.
182 ibid, p.43-N-9.
185 The Press, 7 Sep 1900, p.2.
187 See for example Slater, p.59 and A.D.I., 89/404.
188 Canterbury Officers Club (Christchurch) Rules of the Christchurch Garrison Library and Slater, p.59.
189 Canterbury Officers Club (Christchurch), list of papers presented between 1888 and 1914.
See for example Christchurch Garrison Library Minute Book, 2 Aug 1899, p.103.

Rules of the Christchurch Garrison Library and Canterbury Officers Club (Christchurch), list of books held, E.P. but probably compiled about 1900.

See for example Christchurch Garrison Library Minute Book, 2 Nov 1898, p.90 and 7 Dec 1898, p.91.


L.T., 27 May 1898, p.6c and Christchurch Garrison Library Minute Book, 7 Jun 1899, p.75, I have only been able to gather data on the operations of the Christchurch 100 Club in this period, however, it seems likely that there were similar clubs in other centres.

L.T., 14 Oct 1897, p.3b and 24 Mar 1898, p.3c.


See for example N.Z.V.C., 3 Jan 1888, pp.10-11.


See for example The Press, 11 Apr 1887, p.3c-e.

Moake, p.9.


F.A. C.C. Otago District to Fenton 22 Feb 1898, A.D.1., 98/2306.

See for example ibid.


See for example L.T., 11 Apr 1898, p.6a-c.

See for example The Press, 23 Jul 1900, p.2c.


196.


212 ibid, p.10-H-9b.


217 See for example The Press, 4 Jul 1893, p.5d-e and 10 Jul 1893, p.6d.

218 Purdon, p.216.


220 Purdon, p.216.

221 ibid, pp.216-17.

222 See for example Fieldhouse, pp.248-49 and 254-55.


225 ibid, pp.2-3-H-24.


232 N.Z.V.G., 1 Sep 1885, p.7 and 5 Nov 1885, p.8 and New Zealand Volunteer Force Rifle Exercises and Musketry Instruction, Wellington 1895, pp.61-75.


236 ibid, p.5-H-9.


240 ibid, 1 Jul 1897, II, p.1270.

241 N.A.I., Dec 1899, p.287.


246 ibid, p.2-H-19.


250 Burdon, p.218.


253 ibid, pp.4-5 and 7-H-19.


256 ibid, p.12-H-19.
257 L.T., 21 Apr 1898, p.5c.
263 South Otago Report 1896-97 A.D.1, 97/601.
267 See, p.157.
270 See for example The Press, 31 Mar 1900, p.4b, L.T., 10 Dec 1908, p.6b-c and 1910 Year Book, p.48.
276 ibid, p.2-H-19.


W.P., 9 Nov 1898, p.38b.


ibid, p.6-H-19.

ibid, p.12-H-19.

ibid and pp.9-10-H-19.


See for example W.P., 26 Oct 1898, p.39a-b.
See for example N.Z.P.D., Vol 105 18 Oct 1898, pp.123-24 and New Zealand Herald, 4 May 1898, p.3c-d.

1910 Year Book, p.79.

L.T., 23 Apr 1898, p.4f.

ibid, 7 May 1898, p.10e.

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N.A. undated copy of telegram Penton to Banks, internal evidence indicates this telegram was sent on 3 or 4 May 1898, A.D.1, 99/3191.

Newell to Penton 5 May 1898 ibid and L.T., 28 May 1898, p.10d.

Cunningham, p.128 and Dunlop, pp.100-01.

Penton to Thompson 5 May 1898 and draft proclamation, A.D.1, 99/3191.

L.T., 28 May 1898, p.10d.

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F.A.I., 18 Nov 1899, p.237.


ibid, pp.2-6-H-19.

W.P., 9 Nov 1898, p.39a.


Hall, pp.10-11 there is some debate over the exact figure.

See for example W.P., 4 Apr 1900, p.47b and J.G.H. Moore, With The Fourth New Zealand Rough Riders, Dunedin 1906, p.16.

Hall, pp.6 and 29.

ibid, p.11 and data compiled from the Souvenir of the Second New Zealand Contingent For the Transvaal January 1900, Wellington 1900.
See for example The College Rifles, p.8 and N.Z.I.M., Apr 1900, p.492.

Stevens, p.37.


Return of Volunteer Corps Accepted and Rejected, A.J.H.R. 1900, H-19b.


See for example ibid, p.89.

ibid, p.93, 1899 Report, A.J.H.R., p.2-H-19 and 1900 Report, A.J.H.R., pp.2-3-H-19 at this time the Force grew so rapidly the defence authorities were unsure of its exact size.


Defence Committee Report, A.J.H.R., 1900, pp.2-3-I-12.


1910 Year Book, p.79.

See for example N.Z.P.D., Vol III 13 Jul 1900, p.541.


ibid, Vol 115 18 Oct 1900, p.447.


357 ibid, p.4-H-19.

358 ibid, p.8-H-19.

359 ibid, p.9-H-19.

360 See for example The Press, 31 Mar 1900, p.4b.

CHAPTER VI
THE VOLUNTEER FORCE 1901 - 1910

New Zealand's failure to pay sufficient attention to its defence needs during the latter part of the Nineteenth Century left it, in the first decade of the new century, with a thoroughly defective system of defence. The most important element of that system, the Volunteer Force, did, with more equipment, better organisation and training, marginally improve its military effectiveness during these years. Such minor advances were, however, a totally inadequate response to New Zealand's changing national security situation.

Undoubtedly, the most striking feature of the defence debate in this period was the rising sense of unease and menace which took hold in New Zealand. The danger of war breaking out at any time was often referred to. New Zealand and the rest of the British Empire were seen as being threatened by powerful hostile states. The Commandant of New Zealand's forces captured the mood of the period in his 1905 report:

Coalitions cannot all be foreseen, and the balance of power may be upset without warning. The question of the mastery of the Pacific is daily becoming a more momentous one; vast interests are involved, and the protection of New Zealand will not be the only matter England will have to consider when complications arise.

While Germany was perceived as the main danger to the Empire as a whole, in New Zealand, Japan, and to a lesser extent China, were also thought of as likely aggressors. Russia, after its defeat by Japan, and France, with the improvement in Anglo-French relations, rapidly receded from view as possible adversaries.
This atmosphere lead to a further strengthening in the commitment to imperial defence already evident during the last years of the Nineteenth Century, as was demonstrated in 1902, when an increase in New Zealand's subsidy to the Royal Navy met with little opposition. Naval raids on the country's ports or communication routes were still believed to be the most probable direct threats, but the idea that 'New Zealanders should be ready...not only to defend their own country against attack, but also to lend aid to the Mother Country wherever it may be needed' became increasingly prominent and influential. Acceptance of this type of role had major implications for New Zealand's defence system, as did pressure towards the end of the period from the British military authorities, for the Dominion to bring the organisation of its forces more into line with the rest of the Empire. The Prime Minister and Defence Minister from 1906, Sir Joseph Ward, was, like Seddon, an ardent imperialist, but was more inclined to heed these promptings, a stance which would, at the very least, involve a major restructuring of the Volunteer Force.

PART A - 1901 - 1906

Apart from the great growth in numbers and general interest in defence issues, the South African War had some less obvious but nonetheless significant effects upon Volunteering. One of these was the increased currency given to the belief that New Zealand could be adequately defended by large numbers of marksmen, who would need only a modicum of military training, organisation and discipline.
As one proponent of this view put it, the colony did not need "ornamental Volunteer corps", but only "...plenty of ammunition and plenty of modern rifles", supported by a national system of rifle clubs. Although such ideas had been present in New Zealand before the War, it was the success of the Boer Commandos, and of British colonial forces, in South Africa which made this concept so popular during the war and for some years afterwards. These ideas were used to attack attempts to improve the training, discipline and organisation of the Volunteer Force.

A much more positive influence on the Force was the experience of active service and military organisation gained by members of the Permanent Staff and Volunteers. In the first of these groups, two officers in particular stand out: Lieutenant-Colonel A.W. Robin and Major R.H. Davies, had, shortly before the outbreak of war, been appointed instructors of mounted corps, in the South and North Islands respectively, and both saw extensive service in South Africa with the New Zealand contingents. After the war they held senior posts in these New Zealand forces and had a major role in the development of military policy, especially after 1907. A number of officers who had been in the contingents later joined the Permanent Staff, under a Government policy of filling Staff positions with South African veterans. These officers brought back to the Permanent Staff an understanding of the realities of modern warfare, which had previously been somewhat absent. They were aware of the necessity for good organisation, practical training and discipline. The knowledge of men who had been in the South African contingents was also useful in the Volunteer Force, where they helped to promote
a greater emphasis on useful training and exercises instead of formal drill. Captain F.M.B. Fisher, the controversial CO of the Christchurch Civil Service Rifles, was well known for his progressive views on training and tactics, which had been shaped by his overseas service. His pungent criticism of senior Canterbury officers, which sprang from these views, seems to have been in part responsible for the disputes which lead to his resignation from the Force.

The policies pursued under the new Commandant, Major-General J.M. Babington, who came to New Zealand in late 1901 after serving in South Africa, were also influenced by the war. In his first report, submitted in 1902, he pointed out how the war had shown that infantry, in the face of modern small arms, needed to operate in more open formations and make good use of cover; skills which required "better discipline and greater knowledge by junior ranks". He believed that ceremonial drill should be replaced by realistic field training, and that musketry training should more closely mirror service conditions. These ideas were expounded to Volunteers by members of the Permanent Staff at meetings of officer and NCO clubs throughout the colony. They were also embodied in a comprehensive new infantry manual published in 1903, which devoted much of its space to previously neglected areas, such as skirmishing skills and field entrenchments. A similar stress on the need for more outdoor training can be seen in other Volunteer manuals which appeared after the war. The new course for small arms training, which was produced in 1902, broke important new ground with the use of small and disappearing targets, and in the setting of a modest standard of marksmanship which Volunteers had to attain for capitation.
Views on equipment were also affected by the war, with Babington calling for Volunteers to be equipped with the entrenching tools which had proved vital on active service.24

The early part of Babington's term in office was marked by a resurgence in the traditional colonial indifference towards defence issues, with more concern being expressed about how defence expenditure could be cut rather than how the defence forces could be improved.25 The level of expenditure did decline from £292,081 in the 1902-3 year, to £195,028 in 1905-06, but like the strength of the Volunteer Force, which fell from its 1901 peak of more than 17,000 to 13,162 in 1906, it remained well above its pre-war level.26 One of the Commandant's main priorities was the expansion of the Permanent Staff, which he believed was essential if the quality of instruction available to Volunteers, and the organisation of the Force were to be improved. The situation was better than it had been, at least by 1902-03 there were adjutants to assist O.C. Districts.27 The number of instructional staff was still wholly inadequate for a force of around 13,000 men. By 1903 there were only two instructors for mounted rifle corps, of which there were 72 throughout New Zealand.28 Despite repeated requests, the only significant addition to the staff was the engagement of a Royal Engineers officer, who did much to raise the efficiency of the field engineers.29

One of Colonel Penton's last achievements was gaining the authority to establish a school of instruction. This began operation in 1902, after he had left New Zealand. The school had a full-time staff of three: the Commandant, a retired British Army officer,
and two senior NCO instructors, specialising in field engineering and musketry training. The organisation of the school was a marked advance over its predecessor, with classes being held in each of the main centres, as well as some smaller towns; making it easier for more officers and NCOs to attend. Volunteers who took courses received small payments, which partially compensated them for any loss of earnings they might incur. Units were encouraged to send members to the school by grants given to each man who successfully completed a course. There were two types of courses: part-time, spread over six weeks, for men from corps at the centre where the school was operating, and full-time, three-week courses for men from outside the centre. The syllabus for officers and NCOs was similar, and quite comprehensive, with much importance being attached to developing the type of command and administrative skills needed on active service. It was expected that the school would do much to improve the quality of the Force's leaders, enabling them to do more of the training of their men, rather than relying to such an extent on staff instructors. Substantial numbers of men attended the school: 396 in 1903-04, and 231 the following year. The courses which it ran were much more basic than had at first been envisaged, because the standard of knowledge amongst those attending was poor. Few senior officers took advantage of the school's work, probably because they were under no obligation to attend and were unlikely to advance further in the Force. Also, in most cases they had to compete with junior officers, hence a failure to do well at the school could place a senior officer in an unenviable position. The school certainly did useful work, for the first time making many Volunteer officers and NCOs aware that there was much more than a knowledge of drill required by their duties. It suffered, however, from serious defects. Not enough centres
could be visited and, given the scattered nature of the Force, this restricted the number of men that could attend. Also, the officers and NCOs needed regular instruction if real progress was to be made, whereas two or more years were likely to pass between the school's visits to a particular centre. These problems, and the decision of the officer in charge of the school to leave New Zealand when his contract expired, led to the school's closure during the 1905-06 year. 38

Throughout the 1901-10 period, Volunteer officer and NCO clubs in the main centres and some provincial cities performed a significant military education function, holding war games, collecting books useful to the Force, and organising lectures and debates on military topics. 39 Papers presented at the Canterbury Officers Club during 1907 included "Aerial Warfare", "The Work of Mounted Rifles as Scouts" and "Interesting Facts About The Russo-Japanese War", indicating the wide range of subjects that were covered. 40 The clubs were valuable additions to official education activities, providing the Force's leaders with opportunities to exchange opinions and information. The publication of papers by Officers' Clubs, meant that men in units outside the main centres could also benefit from their work. 41

One of the most critical failings in the education of officers in the New Zealand Defence Forces was the lack of staff training. The situation had not improved since Colonel Penton pointed out in 1899 that no officers in the Volunteer or Permanent Force had any staff training. 42 This lack of staff officers led to major problems, one of the worst examples of which was the breakdown in organisation, and consequent disorder in a large Volunteer camp at Newtown.
Park in Wellington. A Parliamentary Committee which enquired into
the conduct of the camp found that the officer in command, Lieutenant-
Colonel Somerville, and his staff, had not only sited the camp
badly, but had also made no proper arrangements for the distribution
or supply of rations, and had failed to regulate its operations
in a fit manner. Indeed, the Volunteer officer who was quarter-
master took offence at the way men at the camp were treating him,
and went home at an early stage. The enquiry recommended that the
mounted rifle battalions, which had made up most of the troops at the
camp, should be given full establishments of Volunteer staff officers,
and that the Force's officers as a whole should be given training in
this work. Steps were only taken slowly to implement these
suggestions, at the end of the 1904-05 year some of the Force's 14
mounted rifle battalions still did not have complete staffs.

A speedier establishment of staffs would in any case have been of no
real value, as only in 1903-04 did the school of instruction begin
to train Volunteer officers in these types of duties. During 1905
Babington tried to establish a rudimentary staff organisation at his
Wellington headquarters and the appointment of Volunteer staff
officers was approved, but it was difficult to find suitable men
able to devote the time needed for this work. These efforts met
with little success, and New Zealand remained without an effective
Staff organisation at Defence Headquarters or in the districts.

Babington continued his predecessor's efforts to organise
corps into larger units. The two most important branches of the
Force were divided into 14 battalions of mounted rifles and 16
battalions of infantry in 1905. Especially in rural areas, these
formations remained battalions "in name only", as their corps
were dispersed over a wide area, making it very difficult for corps to work together or for the Volunteer officer in command to inspect and co-ordinate their work. 50 These formations did, however, at least provide a better base for training and the rudiments of a proper command structure. 51 Another aspect of this policy was the creation in 1903 of a regiment of engineers, which grouped together the four Volunteer engineer corps and the two submarine mining corps in Auckland and Wellington. 52 The maximum establishment of the field engineer companies was increased between 1905 and 1906 to five officers and 100 men. The corps were divided into three parts: a field engineering section with 50 men, along with 25-man signalling and field telegraph sections, thus reflecting the wider range of tasks they were now required to perform. 53

More significantly, during 1903 major changes were made to the Volunteer units which manned the coastal fortifications. The anomalous title of naval artillery was abolished, and a new structure modelled on the imperial forces instituted. This comprised a regiment of garrison artillery Volunteers, made up of the former naval and garrison artillery corps, split into divisions at each of the main ports. 54 The internal workings of the individual corps were not affected, but each division had a Volunteer officer in command with a small staff. 55 This structure and the increase in the maximum establishment of garrison artillery corps, strengthened New Zealand's harbour defences. 56

The appointment of a commander for the Auckland garrison artillery division provoked a drawmnout dispute, which did great harm to the units involved, and demonstrates the serious difficulties that could arise from forming essentially independent corps into larger formations. The affair began with the CO of one of the three corps in the division successfully challenging on legal grounds, the appointment of an officer initially select
by the O.C. District and Commandant.\textsuperscript{57} After this, the most junior of the three Auckland garrison artillery corps commanders was appointed to command the division, which greatly offended the officers and men of the other two corps, who felt that they had been slighted. They refused to co-operate with the divisional commander and the men of one corps staged a virtual strike, refusing to carry out many of their duties. These protests prevented the Division from operating normally for more than two years.\textsuperscript{58} During the same period there were similar problems with the Wellington Navals, which objected to plans by the Commandant to organise the formation of another garrison artillery corps in the capital, a step members of the existing unit believed would harm their company.\textsuperscript{59}

One of the most sensible proposals put forward by Babington was the establishment of supply and transport corps in the main centres, or at least the nucleus of such units.\textsuperscript{60} He pressed for this throughout his term as Commandant with no success, apparently being unable to convince Seddon that these units were essential elements of any large force.\textsuperscript{61} The Force's medical services, which basically consisted of five poorly equipped bearer corps and four ambulance wagons, "would barely meet the requirements of one battalion", and remained very weak in all respects in this period.\textsuperscript{62} With such a large component of mounted units, some kind of veterinary service was essential. Provision was made for the establishment of a veterinary corps headed by a Principal Veterinary Officer during the 1904–05 year, but little was actually done.\textsuperscript{63}

The equipment of the Force underwent some improvement at this time, new heavy guns for the coastal defences were procurred, and the
field artillery units at the four main centres were formed into three gun batteries, with new guns and equipment. All Volunteer corps were equipped by 1903 with the Magazine Lee Enfield rifle. But infantry and mounted rifle Volunteers were still for the most part without such basic items as mess tins, haversacks, entrenching tools and waterproof sheets. Virtually all units, by the end of the period, had a khaki field service uniform, usually as well as full dress. Small quantities of signalling, engineering and medical equipment were also bought. Meanwhile, for the first time, reserves of rifles and ammunition of different types were established.

Probably the best insight into the success or otherwise of Babington's policies and their general tenor can be seen in the types of training programmes carried out under his direction. The training of infantry and mounted rifle Volunteers certainly reflected the impact of the South African War, with greater attention being given to skirmishing and other skills needed in the field. There were, however, not enough opportunities for field training, and it is evident that too much time was still spent on drill. Although handicapped by the limited time they had to fire or practice in the country, field artillery corps between 1902 and 1906 made some progress. Garrison artillery units outside Auckland made even more progress as a result of improved equipment, new training aids and a better training system, which allowed them to spend more time at the fortifications.

A major part of the drive for more practical training was an expansion of the time Volunteers spent at camp. The system of company camps, originally introduced for garrison artillery corps,
was expanded to include all branches of the Force. Some corps had been holding such camps, where the men trained at the weekends and before and after going to work, for many years with some success. But in general the scheme proved a failure, the long tiring days entailed by combining camping with Volunteers' regular work, proved too much to expect of them, and usually little training was done. For the most part, Volunteers only slept at the camps to fulfil their capitation requirements, and learnt little of even basic camping skills, as corps usually employed caterers. By 1906 the Commandant, Permanent Staff and many Volunteers believed that company camps were a waste of both time and money, and should be abolished. The company camps of mounted rifle units were usually carried out on a fulltime basis, and were much more useful. When he had arrived in New Zealand, Babington was not impressed by the military value of the large Easter camps and ordered that they should not be held in 1901. As well as criticising Easter camps for achieving little, he dismissed the idea that they were important recruiting attractions, saying that the great interest in military matters in New Zealand made such inducements unnecessary, disclosing thereby a lack of appreciation for local conditions. Only company camps were held again the following year, but the Commandant stated his intention to re-introduce major camps for the 1903-04 year, which would include modern style manoeuvres with general and special ideas, and be controlled by umpires. He was convinced of the value of such events as long as practical training was carried out, saying "A man will learn more in camp in one day than he will be in a drill-hall in a month". Because of organisational
problems, few Easter camps were held in 1903 and 1904, but at those that did take place, more realistic training was undertaken. The following year more camps were held, but attendances were poor and Babington remained unhappy with their conduct, suggesting that fewer and better organised camps might be more beneficial. 79

A field day held in 1906 at Miramar by the 1st Battalion Wellington Rifle Volunteers, along with cadets and members of Government Rifles Clubs, demonstrates the advantages of the new kind of manoeuvres over the old style sham fights. The general idea was that an enemy force had been landed on the Miramar Peninsula and the Wellington garrison had been mobilised to meet it. Both forces received special ideas, which required them to seize strategic high ground overlooking the city. The field day was generally well conducted, with Volunteer officers being "active and alert". Quite good use was made of natural cover, but fire control and discipline were not satisfactory. Although the day revealed some important weaknesses, it was a very useful piece of training. A report on the exercise shows that the Permanent Staff members involved were well aware of the damage modern weapons could quickly inflict, and the consequent need to take account of this in all aspects of an operation. 80

After several years in command of New Zealand Forces, General Babington came to the conclusion that the Volunteer Force was "in no sense an organised body as at present constituted. It is costly, badly equipped, and inefficient as a fighting force." In May 1905 he submitted a plan for its replacement with a partly-paid force of 7,000 - 8,000 men, in which officers would receive payment of £10 per annum; NCOs £5 and other ranks £5 for doing twelve whole
days camp each year. This force, the Commandant believed, would "not only be infinitely more efficient than the present one, but would also be much more economical". The Force was to be made up only of units at places where they could be easily concentrated for training and service. A commander with a properly organised staff and administration was to control the force, which would be supported by an improved system of rifle clubs and cadets. The General believed New Zealand would have to adopt this or some similar scheme, if it was to avoid some form of compulsory military service. Babington's scheme, which had the potential to save more than £10,000 per year in defence expenditure, was worthy of serious consideration. Like earlier plans which aimed to improve the quality of the Force by reducing its size, it was unacceptable to Seddon, who had the previous year expressed his opposition to a partly-paid system; which apparently both Colonel Penton and General Babington had advocated to him. The Defence Minister believed it was better to have a larger Volunteer Force, rather than a smaller partly-paid one. He also doubted if enough men would be able to get time off work to do twelve days of training. However, the Commandant believed his proposals were rejected on political grounds, stating this quite plainly in his 1906 report.

The Defence Scheme of New Zealand, revised to 31 July 1906, reveals that the country's forces were numerically more than sufficient to meet the kind of attacks to which it was likely to be subjected. However, it is also evident that the organisation and quality of the forces, those aspects addressed by General
Babington's 1905 proposals, were far from satisfactory. The scheme assumed that in any major war the Royal Navy would maintain overall control of the sea, but that New Zealand might face raids by a force of at most two or three cruisers, able to provide a landing force of up to 400 men. There were two parts to the plan: at a time when war appeared imminent the "precautionary stage" would be put into operation, under which most Volunteer units would go into camp for intensive training while some were detailed to guard vulnerable points and make other defence preparations. During this stage garrison artillery and submarine mining Volunteers, along with the Permanent Force, would man the harbour defences. If hostilities did break out, the second "war stage" came into operation, with forces at each of the district headquarters being joined by most units from outlying areas to form a field force at each centre under the command of each O.C. District, who was also in overall charge of each district's defence. At the same time, the forces manning the harbour defences would move to an increased state of readiness. Should an attack eventuate, the role of the harbour defence forces was to resist naval attacks on the main ports. The field force was to prevent a successful landing being made. If an enemy force did succeed in landing, the general strategy was defensive. The scheme acknowledged the problems the Volunteer field force would face in mobile operations, and relied to a large extent on it taking up naturally strong defensive positions. If the emergency was drawn out, it was envisaged that a "system of reliefs" would be organised, whereby a certain portion of Volunteers would be allowed to return to their homes. The Defence Scheme seems to have been a sound plan, but certainly shows the weaknesses of
of the Volunteer Force; not all units could be relied upon, such as one Company described as "practically moribund". The absence of any proper staff organisation at the headquarters in Wellington or the district headquarters, was a most serious problem, raising the question of how effective the Defence Scheme could have been when put into operation. The proposal for a well-organised partly-paid force would have still provided sufficient troops to meet the kind of threats outlined in the Defence Scheme and seems to have offered the possibility of a substantially more effective defence system.

Later in 1905, General Babington organised the first of a series of meetings to discuss New Zealand's defence forces and defence policy. Each O.C. District was to meet with senior Volunteer officers in his area, to examine issues of concern, in the hope that useful suggestions could be made, and many of the misunderstandings which had married relations between the Volunteers and the administration could be avoided. The District Commanders were then to hold a conference in Wellington and make recommendations to the Commandant and Minister. The first conference of this kind took place in September 1905, and is highly significant as it shows that the district commanders were, like the Commandant, convinced that the Volunteer Force had to be abolished or at least radically altered. The O.C. Districts' preferred option was the establishment of a system of compulsory military training, similar to the Swiss system, as they believed that "it is the duty of every able-bodied man to take part in the defence of his country." Their second option was almost identical to Babington's proposals, except that the district commanders wanted the Militia called out in areas where corps fell below
strength, and under both options wanted service in the cadets made mandatory. The Commandant supported the O.C. Districts proposal, saying that without doubt a "system of universal training" should be adopted, but if this was not possible, the second option should be instituted. The Defence Minister's only comment on these proposals was to query their cost. The other major part of the O.C. Districts' report, the abolition of officer election, also did not get a positive response from Seddon, who wrote only that it would be considered. He did, however, approve some of the Conference's minor recommendations.

General Babington's annual report on the 1905-06 year, the last he presented before returning to the British Army, having refused to serve another term as Commandant, contained some positive comments on the improved knowledge of officers and NCOs, but was also critical of the failure to deal with basic problems like the lack of outdoor training in the Force. Its overall tenor was one of disillusionment with New Zealand's lack of interest in defence, and the way expert advice was ignored. The Commandant's frustration was shared by other senior officers, who complained, for instance, that no action was taken on the major recommendations of a further O.C. Districts conference held in March 1906.

PART B - 1906 - 1910

Only after Seddon's death in May 1906 did there appear any real intention of carrying out substantial reforms. The new Minister of Defence, Albert Pitt, who had in the 1890s been O.C.
Nelson District, stated his intention to put the Force in a state of efficiency, with better equipment, and a transport and supply unit. He planned to make it easier for Volunteers to gain capitation by removing the provision that a certain proportion of a corps had to qualify before capitation was granted to its members, and to improve administration by establishing a British style Army Council in New Zealand. These were two of the main innovations taken in the 1906 Defence Amendment Act which was introduced shortly before Pitt's death in November of that year. In his speech at its introduction, the Prime Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, who was to take over the Defence portfolio on Pitt's demise, stated that the new Defence Council would solve the problems of dual administration, and set out plans for better instruction as well as strengthened specialist units for the Volunteer Force.

Most Members of Parliament supported the government's measures, but several felt that they were not sufficiently comprehensive, and did not do enough to improve the quality of the Force. One Member, David Buddo, M.H.R. for Kaiapoi, believed that the bad state of Volunteering required the introduction of some form of compulsory military training.

This was the principal objective of the National Defence League of New Zealand, formed in August 1906. Like similar organisations in the United Kingdom and Australia, it launched a campaign in favour of a scheme of military training for all youths and young men, similar to that operated in Switzerland. Over the next three years the Defence League built up a large, well-developed national organisation and a substantial membership.
It held many public meetings, distributed literature widely, primarily its journal, Defence, and waged an active campaign of lobbying politicians and other community leaders. Volunteer officers were prominent amongst office-holders in the League, most notably Lieutenant-Colonel Allen Bell, one of its most important figures. Compulsory military training already had limited but significant support in the community, including that of Sir William Russell, the former Defence Minister, and an astute commentator on military affairs, who had advocated the Swiss system in Parliament as early as 1898. Some officers, like Lieutenant-Colonel De Lautour, who had put the case for compulsory service in a paper delivered to the Dunedin Officers' Club in 1905, had been early supporters of this policy. Much of the League's agitation was focussed on the Volunteer Force. The proponents of compulsion were normally careful to differentiate between the Volunteer system, which was attacked as hopelessly inadequate, and the Volunteers themselves, who were depicted as doing their patriotic best in a thoroughly bad situation. Indeed, the League suggested to its members that they give practical expression to their commitment to the Nation's defence by joining the Force. There was also a column in Defence catering for Volunteers. However, individual members of the League were less well disposed to the Force than its official stance would suggest. The Honorary Secretary of its Wainui branch, for instance, wrote to the Defence Minister alleging that the Seddon Horse Mounted Rifles were not conducting their musketry practice as required by regulation, and to complain that most Volunteers were only interested in fancy uniforms. Within the Force there were differing
attitudes to the League's activities and the question of compulsory military training. "Most Volunteers seemed to welcome the increased interest in defence matters generated by the agitation for compulsion. While a significant group welcomed and actively supported the Defence League's work, many others had serious reservations about abandoning the Volunteer system. For instance, when the need for compulsory training was debated at the Canterbury District Officers Club in 1908 there was little support for compulsion. Only Lieutenant-Colonel Slater, the local President of the Defence League, spoke from the floor in favour of the system. It was only to be expected that Volunteers would continue to support a system they knew well, and which gave them considerable freedom of action. Perhaps the most common view was a resigned acceptance that Volunteering's day had passed, and that a compulsory system was probably inevitable.

Under the new defence administration instituted by the 1906 amendment to the Defence Act, three military members of the Defence Council controlled New Zealand's Defence Forces: Colonel A.W. Robin, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel H.D. Tuson, Adjutant and Quartermaster-General, who was an Imperial officer, and Colonel R.H. Davies, the Inspector-General of the Forces. They and the other members of the Council, in their first annual report submitted in August 1907, clearly set out the essential issues facing the Defence Forces: either the effectiveness of the Volunteer Force had to be substantially improved, or a system of "universal or compulsory" training would have to be instituted. The report stated that the Volunteer Force's objective was the defence of the Dominion, and that any forces for service overseas would be raised separately, as they had been for the South African War. To implement its policies the Council had only a moderate level of funding. Military expenditure rose from
£167,818 in the 1905-07 year, to £195,685 in the 1908-09 year, before falling back a little in the 1909-10 year.123 A significant element of the Council's policy from 1907 was the development of a cadre of well-trained officers in the Permanent Force and Staff; more officers were sent to the United Kingdom for advanced training so that they would be able to fill senior staff and command positions.124 The intelligence apparatus of the Force was also enhanced under the Council, with Volunteer intelligence officers in each district gathering information on matters like availability of such things as wagons and supplies which would be needed if the Force were to be mobilised. This data was then collated at national headquarters. Information was exchanged with other parts of the Empire and intelligence officers began to be appointed at manoeuvres for the first time.125

The Council set the improvement of the training and instruction of the Force as one of its major priorities. Although the staff available for this work had been augmented, the situation in 1907 was still most unsatisfactory. This was especially true for the mounted rifles and infantry; there being, for example, only 16 Sergeant Major instructors for nearly 7,000 Volunteer infantrymen.126 With such inadequate numbers of instructors, the Council was surprised these two branches knew "anything at all beyond the merest rudiments of drill and musketry."127 It intended to establish a "progressive policy of military education", with District Instructional staff working all the time in each district, and a General Instructional Staff, of two officers and an NCO of the Imperial Service, moving around the centres offering short full-time and part-time advanced courses on subjects like tactics and administration to Volunteer officers. It
was also planned to carry out a series of tactical exercises and staff rides in each district. The Council intended to raise the standard required in examinations for commissions, condemning the existing tests as exercises in rote learning of regulations and drill. The Council's attempt to improve the education of the Volunteer Force's leadership was conspicuously unsuccessful. In the 1908-09 year no classes were held by the General Instructional Staff because there was so little interest from Volunteer officers and NCOs. During the same year only 57 of 1,347 officers in the Force attended classes at night run by district instructional staff. This represented a marked deterioration from the scarcely satisfactory response of the previous year, when 175 officers had attended full-time courses of between one and ten days duration. The poor results achieved by its education policy initiatives lead the Council to adopt new policies. In 1909 planning for Senior and Junior Officers training corps at universities and high schools was begun as a longer term solution to the problem of providing the Forces with efficient officers. In the shorter term, the defence authorities concluded that the only way real progress could be made with Volunteer infantry battalions and mounted rifle regiments was for each unit to have an adjutant and NCO of the Permanent Staff attached to it so training could be carried out on a regular basis. The instruction Volunteer artillery and engineers units received was more satisfactory, as was the level of expertise in these branches, although field artillery and engineers were handicapped by the limited field training which they did. As for the examination of officers, little, if any progress was made in improving the standard required
to pass. between the years 1906-07 and 1909-10 the proportion of officers passing varied between 77.94% and 89.41%. 135

Between 1907 and 1910 the Volunteer Force's support units received considerable attention. In particular the medical services, which were remodelled to resemble the structure of the Royal Army medical corps improved markedly, with the bearer corps being converted to field ambulance units, and the establishment of a sanitary branch. Much needed equipment and supplies were procured, while the personnel resources of the service were strengthened by the formation of reserve lists of doctors and nurses. 136 Volunteer bandsmen were, for the first time, properly trained to act as stretcher bearers, and medical officers became more active in an educational role within the Force, 137 although there were still some problems with medical officers not taking enough interest in their duties. The organisation of this branch under a Surgeon General, with Principal Medical Officers in charge of the services in each district, was a marked advance on the previous organisation, but still had substantial weaknesses. 138 The veterinary services of the Force were also improved at this time, but still remained in need of further development by 1910. 139 Like General Babington, the Defence Council saw the formation of a supply and transport corps as essential if the Volunteer Force was ever to be fit for active service. 140 The Government, however, remained unresponsive, and in 1910 the Force was still without even the nucleus of such a unit. 141 The Council had more success in improving the Force's communications capability. It converted
the Volunteer cycle corps to a mainly signalling role. They joined the existing sections in the field engineers corps, and the Wellington Company, drawn from Post and Telegraph Department staff, in concentrating on this work. All these units received much better instruction. For instance, by 1909 the four field engineers companies each had an NCO instructor attached. The strength of the engineers branch was also enlarged during the 1908-09 year by the formation in Dunedin of the first Volunteer pioneer corps.

The most efficient branch of the Force was the garrison artillery. During the last years of the Volunteer system these units steadily improved their performance in the various aspects of their duties. They suffered the least from many of the Force's major problems, receiving better training than other branches because the Permanent Force was mainly a garrison artillery unit, and thus able to provide many competent instructors in this field. Also much of their training could, with the help of various aids, be carried out at night in their own drill sheds. Being a static force, each unit of the garrison artillery was assigned a part of the fortifications, so they knew where they would serve and precisely what kind of duties they would have to perform.

In comparison, the other combat arms of the Force were much more disadvantaged by the operation of the Volunteer system. The field artillery, apart from Easter manoeuvres, only went into the outdoors for their 14-day part-time camps, and for a day or two for their annual firing practice. In addition, all field batteries, except for D Battery in Wellington, where the Defence
Department owned some horses, had to rely on often unsuitable hired horses during their training. It was evident to the Defence Council, as it had been to earlier commanders of the Force, that under such constraints this branch would never master their work. While other branches improved their level of efficiency, that of the two largest elements of the Force, the mounted rifles and infantry, declined. The strength of the mounted rifles fell from 4,189 to 3,759 between the 1906-07 and 1908-09 years, and more seriously, the proportion of men who were active Volunteers suffered an even greater decline; only 1,016 men from this branch attended the 1909 Easter manoeuvres. This sorry state of affairs was mainly due to failure of units, formed during the South African War in country areas, where the population was too scattered or insufficient to support a corps once the original members lost interest. An early casualty of this process was the Ahuriri Mounted Rifles of the Hawkes Bay. At its 1904 annual meeting this corps, against the wishes of its keen, hard-working officers, voted by 34 to 9 to disband. This kind of apathy was also apparent in the reduction in the training these units were doing. By 1908, instead of having full-time company camps as in the past, increasingly only part-time camps were held. While some individual squadrons were quite efficient, others were virtually useless. The mounted rifle regiments almost never worked as complete units. As a result regimental commanders and their staff gained very little experience in controlling large formations, while squadron commanders knew virtually nothing of how to work in a regimental organisation. The condition of the infantry was equally bad, its strength declined slightly from 6,881 in
1907 to 6,187 in 1908-09, but probably only half this number were active Volunteers who did more than a minimal amount of work. 152 Colonel Davies was extremely critical of the capitation requirement which meant Volunteer Infantry "never need sleep under canvas". Since the requirement for company camps had been abolished, infantrymen had only to put in three daylight drills and their usual night-time parades to be deemed efficient. 153 A majority of men in this branch, Davies estimated in 1908, never did a whole day's work in the field. 154 Two Otago infantry companies had, for instance, between 1907 and 1909 sent only one man to any type of camp. 155 To be efficient, infantry units, like the other Volunteer elements of the Field Forces, needed lengthy periods of continuous training and a suitable number of good instructors. Infantry battalions, especially those in the main centres, enjoyed more opportunities for working together than did mounted rifle regiments, but this rarely included camps and exercises. 156 The standard of the infantry's equipment did, however, markedly improve in this period, with most men receiving such basic items as haversacks, water bottles, and waterproof sheets. Additional supplies of rifles and significant numbers of Maxim Machine Guns were procured, with the Auckland District, for instance, having five of these weapons by 1909. 157

The best test of how the Volunteer Force would perform on active service was exercises and manoeuvres. Although some infantry battalions and mounted rifle regiments did conduct some work of this kind, by far the most important were the manoeuvres held during Easter at various locations throughout New Zealand. 158 Those carried out under the Defence Council continued the trend
towards better organised, more realistic useful manoeuvres, started under General Babington. Easter manoeuvres were usually held in each district, under a general idea formulated at defence headquarters. In 1907 and 1908 it was a combined land and sea raid upon one of the Dominion's ports; the kind of threat the defence scheme was designed for. Members of the Permanent Staff acted as umpires, and afterwards analysed the performance of the forces involved. The Volunteers who took part were the most enthusiastic and efficient elements of the Force; even so, the manoeuvres showed only too plainly their limitations.\textsuperscript{159} The little practical training the Volunteers received was apparent in the way they exposed themselves to fire unnecessarily. At the Canterbury manoeuvres near Sheffield in 1907, units on several occasions advanced along the tops of ridges in full view of 'enemy' forces. Officers and men generally did not appreciate the capabilities of modern artillery and small arms. In particular, they failed to take account of, or make proper use of, the machine guns that were from 1907 being more widely used by New Zealand's Forces.\textsuperscript{160} Manoeuvres of this period clearly demonstrated that senior Volunteer commanders and their staffs did not have the knowledge or experience their positions required. The weak organisation of Volunteer formations and the absence of serviceable transport and supply arrangements were two of the most glaring failings evident during these operations.\textsuperscript{161} Without doubt, however, the manoeuvres of 1907-1910 were the nearest Volunteers ever got to training under "active service conditions", and were of great value to the Force.\textsuperscript{162} A notable innovation in the 1908 manoeuvres was the introduction of payments to the Volunteers who attended, ranging from over a pound a day for Lieutenant-Colonels
to four shillings for privates.\textsuperscript{163} This scheme boosted attendances at the manoeuvres to nearly 6,000\textsuperscript{164} but was seen, at least by Colonel Slater, as attacking the basis of Volunteer service and marking its imminent demise.\textsuperscript{165} In his report on the manoeuvres of 1909, Colonel Davies concluded that neither the Volunteer Field Force, nor any of its units, could "be reasonably expected to cope in war", but he was convinced that under a better system the same personnel could perform well.\textsuperscript{166}

The policy pursued by the Defence Council to enhance the military effectiveness of the Volunteer Force had two parts. The first of these was the development of the Force's infrastructure by improving defence administration, the Permanent Staff and the quality and availability of instruction, as well as the measures taken to strengthen its organisation, mix of arms and material resources. The other part was the granting of much more extensive inducements to men to serve in the Force and to improve their own efficiency. During its last years the Volunteer Force received Government assistance by way of grants, allowances and concessions, which had for many years been advocated as a means to enhance its popularity and capabilities. As well, the Force's capitation requirements were relaxed, making it easier for men to qualify as efficient.\textsuperscript{167} It soon became apparent to the Council that the policy of more support and less demanding conditions for Volunteering was an almost complete failure. While the strength of the Force remained static at around 13,000, and the number of men qualifying as efficient at around 11,000, there was no significant advance in the overall capacity of the Force.\textsuperscript{168} Plainly, it had failed to take advantage of "its last chance" and would have to be replaced.\textsuperscript{169}
The Council's policy had not achieved the required results because of the limitations inherent in the Volunteer system. No force in which the majority of men undertook at best four or five days of outdoor training in a year could hope to be militarily effective. The Volunteers were unable or unwilling to do more; unable principally because of difficulties with employers, and unwilling, in that many men, as long as they completed their capitation requirements, felt no obligation to do more. The failure of officers and NCOs to take advantage of the improved military education offered by the Council went beyond problems caused by commitments to employers and such like. Rather, it must be largely attributed to the way officers and NCOs were appointed at company level, where efficiency and ability were less important than personal popularity and other considerations. The independence enjoyed by Volunteer corps remained one of the most important obstacles to the efficient functioning of the Force. More than ten years after most corps were organised into battalions, these formations remained mere shells. Not only did they rarely train together, but because each component corps maintained its autonomy, they did not have any real corporate existence. Corps actively resisted attempts to give the larger formations more power over their affairs. The Nelson Rifles, a company which had a long history of actively defending its rights, expressed vehement opposition to the payment of capitation grants to battalions rather than to individual corps at its 1908 annual meeting. By 1908, it was clear to the Defence Council that attempts to reconcile the military requirement of larger formations and the strong Volunteer tradition of corps independence did not work in practice. The former could only be
met satisfactorily by the abrogation of the latter. The poor discipline and other problems related to the Volunteers' conditions of service continued to plague the Force. This is perhaps best seen in events relating to field training, as when members of Auckland mounted rifle units threatened to boycott the 1908 Easter manoeuvres in protest at conditions attached to the attendance payments. At the 1907 Canterbury manoeuvres, Volunteers largely ignored an order by their commander to entrench their positions. Volunteers in the Council period remained devoted to a restricted conception of their duties, insisting that conditions during manoeuvres should not be too demanding and that the recreational aspects of outdoor training should not be overlooked.

Musketery training provides a good illustration of how Defence Council attempts to improve the effectiveness of the Force could be frustrated by the operation of the Volunteer system. For most of the 1885–1910 period, but more noticeably from the time of the South African War onwards, there was an awareness of the need for Volunteers to undertake musketery practice that more closely replicated service conditions, and for a general improvement in their standard of marksmanship. Both these sensible objectives ran contrary to the style of shooting favoured by the Volunteers. This centred on competition between teams of the best shots from the different corps in matches fired under competitive conditions at bulls-eye targets and using technical aids. Not only was this type of shooting of little use in military terms, but it also lead the corps to neglect the shooting of most of their members, and concentrate instead on producing successful competition teams. As a result, most Volunteers did little musketery practice.
and were poor shots. A corps' marksmen often seem to have been given special treatment so that they could concentrate on their shooting, a practice that undermined discipline. Attempts by private individuals and the defence authorities to encourage a change in the kind of shooting done by the Force to one more in keeping with its military role, met with a mainly apathetic or even hostile response from Volunteers. The Defence Council made little headway in its efforts to encourage shooting under service conditions; and Volunteering, up until its abolition, remained wedded to a style of shooting which put sporting values ahead of military needs. In this matter, as in many others, the Council did not have the ability or authority to impose its will upon Volunteer corps.

As early as April 1908, both the Chief of the General Staff and the Inspector General were convinced that the Defence Council's policy would not markedly improve the Force's military capabilities. In a confidential report submitted to the Minister of Defence, Colonel Davies condemned not only the existing state of the Force, but the Volunteer system itself, as making the achievement of any real efficiency impossible. Colonel Robin supported Davies' views and drew up detailed suggestions on how the Dominion's defence forces could be reorganised. A system of compulsory training for youths between the ages of 18 and 21 was, Robin believed, "the most, if not the only, satisfactory solution" to the problems facing the defence system. Robin, Davies and other district commanders had already put forward this view, after their 1905 conference. If this change was not possible, a smaller Volunteer Force, paid for daylight training and supported by
reserve Volunteer corps and rifle clubs was the only feasible alternative. Even this, Colonel Robin felt, was unlikely to prove satisfactory. After considering the Chief of General Staff’s suggestions during May, the Cabinet confirmed its continuing support for the Volunteer system, and ordered that further steps be taken to encourage field training by the Force. When the annual report for the 1907-08 year appeared, it confirmed the weak state of the Volunteers, although not in such drastic terms as the confidential documents. The report provided the National Defence League with further evidence for its case against the Volunteer system, which it was quick to make use of. More noteworthy was the critical response of many major New Zealand newspapers, such as the Evening Post in Wellington, which likened the Volunteer Force to a "moribund horse" which the Defence Council was attempting to flog. A number of editorials called upon the Government to replace Volunteering with a structure that would produce a strong defence force.

By 1908 there was considerably more support for the introduction of some form of compulsion than there had been even a year or two earlier. As late as November 1907, a resolution in favour of compulsory universal military training was defeated by 21 votes to four in the Legislative Council. Like the Defence Council, many Members of Parliament had begun to conclude that, although the additional Government support for the Force had done some good, the system itself was the real problem. Even the Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Sir Joseph Ward, was, by 1908, expressing cautious support for the idea of compulsory training.
His comments suggest that he was already personally convinced of the need for compulsion, but was wary of the political consequences of such a move.  

Ward's reluctance to introduce compulsory service was dissipated by the events of the last few months of 1908 and early 1909. Within New Zealand, the Defence League's campaign was, in the face of little or no organised opposition, meeting with more support, especially among a wide range of community leaders. Its most important recruit was the former acting Defence Minister, Robert McNab, who, after leaving Parliament at the end of 1908, vigorously supported compulsory training. The former Minister wrote an important article for Defence on why he changed from being a keen supporter of Volunteering to a proponent of compulsion during his time in charge of the defence portfolio. The inability of both officers and men under the Volunteer system to undertake the extensive training needed for modern warfare was, McNab believed, the main reason for the system's failure. None of the various reforms and incentives introduced in an effort to make the Volunteer system function more effectively had dealt with this fault, which would only be solved by a compulsory system which obliged employers to make their staff available for service.

International events were also making the introduction of compulsory training in New Zealand seem both more desirable and more acceptable. Originating in London in March 1909, and soon spreading to other parts of the Empire, a panic over the pace of German naval construction produced agitation about the strength of the Royal Navy, and demands for its immediate expansion.
New Zealand's Prime Minister was quick to respond, offering to pay for the construction of one of the dreadnoughts needed to redress the balance of forces with Germany. This dramatic gesture of imperial solidarity by Sir Joseph Ward met with almost universal support in the Dominion. These events demonstrated the widespread acceptance of the need for better defence preparations and a willingness to bear the additional expenditure this required, and this seems to have encouraged Ward to go ahead with substantial reform of New Zealand's Forces. Before leaving for the special Imperial Conference on Defence, which was one of the outcomes of the naval scare, Ward committed his Government to the introduction of a new military organisation before the close of the year. The main focus of the conference was naval defence, but it was the sub-conference on Military Defence which was probably of equal significance to New Zealand. Discussions at this meeting were concerned with how the dominions' forces could be "organised, trained and administered," so that they were "a more effective part of an Imperial Army". The proposals put forward at the conference by the Chief of the British General Staff stressed the importance of the dominions' forces being capable of rapid and orderly expansion in case of war, and set out the territorial system introduced in the United Kingdom as a model. The need for dominion troops to achieve a high level of training in peace-time so that they could be used against well-organised and equipped enemies at an early stage in any conflict, and for legal provision to be made for service outside of their state of origin, was also emphasised. The reorganisation of their forces along the lines discussed at the conference was seen as the most effective way the dominions could prove their own defence capability and that of the Empire.
The conference was marked by a "sense of approaching conflict," and considerable progress was made towards closer co-operation between the Empire's naval and military forces.

It would have been apparent to Sir Joseph Ward at the main conference, and to Colonel Davies who attended the sub-conference, that New Zealand's existing military forces could not contribute effectively to imperial defence. Although the dominions were under no definite obligation, it was simply expected that they would wish to assist if necessary in the defence of the Empire. The Volunteer system was quite incapable of providing the type of large well-trained force complete with the requisite support services called for at the conference. Indeed, the better organised and equipped British Volunteer Force had already been abolished in 1908 because of these deficiencies. Schemes for a revamped Volunteer Force, like the one devised by the Wellington Volunteer officers during 1908 and 1909, which called for limited compulsory training for youths, but retained several features of the existing system, such as a degree of corps autonomy, would also not fulfil these imperial requirements. Neither would the kind of partly-paid forces suggested by General Babington and also by Colonel Robin, both of whose plans envisaged forces for overseas service being raised as special formations like the South African contingents; exactly the kind of improvised organisation that had been condemned at the conference. Only a territorial system supported by compulsory military training, would give New Zealand, with its small population and limited resources, forces adequate for her own defence and able to contribute effectively to that of the Empire.

After returning from the Imperial Defence Conference, Ward
introduced into Parliament in late 1909, a defence bill which established a Territorial Force similar to that of Britain, but with provisions for compulsory training which had not been adopted there. Although the Prime Minister had been committed to changing New Zealand’s defence system before attending the conference, Ward’s statements in Parliament make it clear that it was proceedings there which determined what form the Dominion’s new military organisation would take.216

The new organisation met nearly all of the objectives of the Defence League, which as a consequence ceased its activities in early 1910.217 The bill, which was to become the 1909 Defence Act, provided for compulsory cadet training for youths between 12 and 18, followed by three years’ service in the General Training Section of the Territorial Force. The Volunteer Force became the Territorial Force when the new act came into force.218 Although the designation and conditions of service had changed, Volunteer units continued to exist with essentially the same personnel. Only some time after the official abolition of the Volunteer Force on 28 February 1910, did significant changes begin to occur at company level.219 The new organisation ushered in by the bill was a great advance over what had gone before, avoiding or remedying the weaknesses of the Volunteer system. If the Territorial Force could not be kept up to strength by voluntary enlistment, the bill made provision for the transfer of men from the General Training Section.220 Also included were legal sanctions against employers who attempted to prevent men from undertaking military training, a factor which had been a major problem with the Volunteer system.221 Selection by district
boards replaced election of officers, while examination requirements were to be tightened under the new system. Each battalion or regiment of the Territorial Force was to have a permanent adjutant and a small administrative and instruction staff. All elements of the new Force were to spend much more time in full-time field training. For instance, mounted rifles would spend ten days in camp and infantry six. The autonomy of individual units and the freedom of action enjoyed under the Volunteers' conditions of service were done away with. In all respects the new organisation met the guidelines set out for the forces of the dominions at the 1909 Imperial Conference, and would enable New Zealand to provide "complete units and formations" for a "homogenous Imperial Army".

There was little opposition in Parliament to the abolition of Volunteering and the establishment of a new system. Most parliamentarians agreed with Ward that the Volunteer system was "not able to meet the legitimate requirements of the country", and that New Zealand now needed forces with large reserves and capable of rapid and orderly expansion in an emergency, as would be created by the new system. In the country at large, the new defence organisation met with general, but by no means universal support. The reaction of Volunteers to the Defence Bill appears to have been rather muted, as it was widely accepted that substantial changes had to be made to the defence system. There was some concern about various aspects of the bill, such as the passing of all corps assets and liabilities to the Crown. However, most Volunteers seem to have responded favourably to the new scheme.
The object of the 1909 Defence Act was to provide New Zealand with a defence system which met its national security needs. More specifically, it was the result of three separate but related factors. Firstly, governments throughout the British Empire were at this time taking steps, in the light of a dangerous international situation, to strengthen their defence capabilities, and New Zealand's policy must be seen in this context. Secondly, the activities of New Zealand's first effective national pressure group, the National Defence League, did much to dispel local apathy on defence issues between 1906 and 1909. Lastly, the Volunteer system played an important part in the establishment of the new organisation. In a negative sense, the utter inadequacy of the Volunteers as a military Force made change absolutely necessary. More positively, Volunteering had developed wide support in New Zealand for the concept of citizen soldiers, thereby making the introduction of compulsory military training and the Territorial system more popular and acceptable than it would otherwise have been.
NOTES


5 See for example Moorhouse, pp.1-2.

6 L.T., 10 Dec 1908, p.6b-c.

7 See for example N.Z.P.D., Vol 142 12 Nov 1907, p.775.


10 New Zealand Herald, 4 May 1898, p.3c-d.


12 See for example Bell, p.6.

13 1900 Report, A.J.H.R., pp.3-4-H-19, and Hall, pp.6 and 36.


15 The Press, 6 Aug 1901, p.5b.

16 ibid, 13 Sep 1902, p.8c and C.T., 27 Dec 1905, p.52b.


18 Hall, p.45.


20 See for example The Press, 22 Sep 1902, p.2e.


22 See for example New Zealand Defence Forces : Manual for For Mounted Rifles 1903, Wellington 1903.
Provisional Course of Target Practice For The New Zealand Defence Forces: March 1902, Wellington 1902, and 1902/3 Class Firing Requirements. Table B, for trained men armed with rifles.


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See for example Dunedin District Officers' Club Papers on Discipline, Dunedin 1906.


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ibid, p.19-H-19a.

ibid, p.5-H-19a.


See for example N.Z.G., 8 Dec 1904, II, p.2891.


73 See for example N.Z.V.C., 6 Mar 1888, p.8.


75 N.A. Babinton's views on O.C. Districts Conference recommendation 10a, A.D. 58/46, Conference Report, ibid and O.C. Otago District to Chief Staff Officer Wellington 15 Aug 1906, A.D. 58/53.


80 N.A. Report on 1st Battalion Wellington R.V. field day at Miramar, A.D. 58/56.

81 Babinton's proposals for re-organising the Volunteer Force 2 May 1905, A.D. 58/46.
84 ibid, margin comment on Babington's reorganisation proposals
86 N.A. Defence Scheme of New Zealand : Revised to 31 Jul 1906,
part I, pp.12 - 13 G. 49/34(a), the 1908 scheme is almost
 identical G. 49/34.
87 1906 Defence Scheme, part I, p.13 and see for example part II,
pp.17-21 G.49/34(a).
88 ibid, part I, p.13 and see for example part II, pp.10-11 and
15 - 16.
89 See for example ibid, part II, pp.12-13 and part IV, pp.11-12.
90 ibid, part I, p.13.
91 ibid, part II, p.19.
92 ibid, part I, p.16.
93 N.A. Babington to Seddon 10 Aug 1905, A.D.58/46.
94 O.C. Districts Conference Report, point 10, A.D.58/46.
95 Babington's comment on O.C. Districts Report, point 10, ibid.
96 Seddon's comment on O.C. Districts Report, point 10, ibid.
97 O.C. Districts Report, point 12 and Seddon's comment on
point 12, ibid.
98 ibid, passim.
101 O.C. Otago District to Chief Staff Officer Wellington
16 Aug 1906, A.D. 58/54.
102 N.Z.P.D., Vol 137 21 Aug 1906, p.6, 23 Aug 1906, p.105 and
104 ibid, pp.432, 437-39 and 444-47.
105 ibid, p.444.


108 See for example W.P., 1 Apr 1908, p.6b-c.

109 See for example Defence, 21 Dec 1907, p.5.


111 Lieutenant Colonel De Lautour, The Importance of Military Training in the Colonies, Dunedin 1906.

112 See for example Defence, 24 Aug 1907, p.6.

113 See for example ibid, 31 Oct 1908, p.3.

114 See for example ibid, 1 Nov 1906, p.14.

115 See for example ibid, 22 Aug 1908, p.15.

116 N.A. Kinsey to Minister of Defence 6 Jun 1908, A.D.1, 08/2040.

117 See for example The Haversack, 30 Jan 1908, p.1.

118 See for example W.P., 3 Apr 1907, p.63b.


120 See for example W.P., 10 Apr 1907, p.65b-d.


123 1910 Year Book, p.79.


127 ibid, p.5-H-19.
128 ibid, pp.5-6-H-19.
129 ibid, p.6-H-19.
131 ibid, p.16-H-19.
132 ibid, p.3-H-19.
138 Carbery, p.6 and M.A. Auckland Military District Report 1908-09 Year, p.6, A.D.I., 09/4085.
142 Auckland Report 1908-09, p.6, A.D.1, 09/4085, Otago Report 1908-09, p.2, A.D.1, 09/1755 and W.P. 1 Apr 1908, p.65c-d.
144 Otago Report 1908-09, p.2, A.D.1, 09/1755.
150 Davies to Ward 6 Apr 1908, p.3, A.D.1, 08/1953.
154 Davies to Ward 6 Apr 1908, p.4, A.D.1, 08/1953.
155 Otago Report 1908-09, p.2, A.D.1, 09/1755.
158 See for example Auckland Report 1908-09, pp.4-5, A.D.1, 09/4085.
160 W.P., 3 Apr 1907, p.65c and e.
162 W.P., 10 Apr 1907, p.63a and The Press, 20 Apr 1908, p.4b-f.
163 Defence Forces of New Zealand: List of the privileges and encouragements given to Volunteers as such under existing regulations, A.J.H.R. 1908, p.1-4-19c.
165 Slater, p.156.
167 Encouragements given to Volunteers, A.J.H.R. 1908, pp.1-6-4-19.
170 Davies to Ward 6 Apr 1908, pp.1-4, A.D.1, 08/1953.
174 W.P., 1 Apr 1908, p.64c.
176 W.P., 11 Mar 1908, p.60b, and see also a similar incident The Press, 21 Apr 1908, p.5e-f.
177 W.P., 3 Apr 1907, p.65b.
178 ibid, 17 Apr 1907, p.64d, The Press, 20 Apr 1908, p.4e and The College Rifles, pp.19-20.
179 See for example L.T. 9 May 1905, p.6d-e.
180 See for example W.P. 1 Dec 1897, p.37a.
182 See for example L.T. 27 Feb 1886, p.6d.
186 Davies to Ward 6 Apr 1908, pp.1-4, A.D.1, 08/1953.
188 O.C. Districts Conference Report, A.D. 58/46.
190 Ward to Robin 1 Jun 1908, ibid.
192 Defence, 25 Sep 1908, p.8.
195 ibid, Vol 142 13 Nov 1907, pp. 796-804.
196 see for example ibid, Vol 144 26 Aug 1908, p.395.
197 ibid, Vol 145 30 Sep 1908, p.710 and Defence, 25 Sep 1908, p.3.
198 See for example Defence, 15 May 1909, pp.9-10 and Milburn, pp.48 and 75-77.
200 Defence, 15 May 1909, p.5.
201 Gordon, p.221.
205 ibid, pp.41-42-A-4a.
207 ibid, pp.33-34-A-4a.
208 Gordon, p.233.
211 ibid, pp.33 and 40-41-A-4a and Gordon, p.238.
212 Cunningham, pp.2 and 139-146.
213 Defence, 31 Oct 1908, pp.5-6 and 15 May 1909, p.11.
217 Defence, 31 Mar 1910, p.3.
218 New Zealand Statutes 1909, pp.302 and 306-09.
219 See for example The College Rifles, p.21.
220 New Zealand Statutes 1909, p.303.
221 ibid, p.311.
222 ibid, p.303.
224 W.P., 22 Dec 1909, p.81d.
228 ibid, pp.1000-27.
229 See for example W.P., 1 Mar 1910, p.22d-e.
230 See for example ibid, 15 Dec 1909, p.89d.
231 See for example ibid, 8 Dec 1909, p.90a.
The Volunteers were an important feature in New Zealand during this period. The Military role of the Force is easily defined as defence against internal and external threats to national security. What is more difficult to elucidate is the wider role of Volunteering in New Zealand society. Certainly, it was only in part related to the Force's military role. It is, however, clear that the structure of Volunteer corps, and the way they fitted into the community, largely determined the character of the Force. It has become clear that in this period, the Volunteers were never a defence force which would have been able to effectively meet possible threats to New Zealand. Thus the question arises, why did New Zealand persist with a defence organisation which, even before this period had commenced, had been condemned as thoroughly inadequate? By way of contrast, most of the Australian colonies which had similar defence problems, had abandoned the Volunteer system as unsatisfactory in the 1880s. In part, this can be explained by the successful role of Volunteers in the Anglo-Maori Wars, which had left many New Zealanders with a favourable view of Volunteering. There was also in the country a widespread aversion to the creation of substantial regular armed forces, which, in the words of the Hon Jeremiah Twomey, M.L.C.; would be "a menace to our liberty." More important was the low priority an effective defence system had amongst the public and politicians during most of this period. This not only resulted in a general neglect of the defence forces, but lead politicians to put more weight on political considerations in deciding policy, than was desirable. However, when defence became an issue of some real
importance, and considerable pressure was put on politicians to reform the forces, the Volunteer system was done away with.

Non-military aspects of Volunteering did much to shape its character. For most Volunteers the social, recreational and sporting facets of the Movement were very important. Indeed, they were essential, as Volunteers believed that, because they gave up time and money to serve, they were "doing the country a favour", and therefore their duties should be reasonably agreeable. This imposed definite limitations on the amount and type of work Volunteers could or would do, which meant the Force had "to remain inefficient to survive". The part played by social status considerations in the Volunteer Movement, also had an adverse impact on military effectiveness. The election system for officers stressed values and qualities not related to the Force's military operations.

In many respects Volunteers' entertainment and ceremonial roles were more important to the public than their military function. Volunteer sham fights and demonstrations were very popular, while major ceremonial occasions were seen as being greatly enhanced by the presence of Volunteers. The desire, indeed the need, to cultivate public support lead the Force, in matters of uniform and training, into "sacrificing efficiency to prettiness and picturesqueness".

The Volunteer Force, with its infantry battalions, mounted rifle regiments, and field batteries, had much of the outward appearance of a substantial military force. A close examination of its structure, operation and ethos, however, showed that this impression was illusory. In particular, the Volunteers lacked the hallmark of military organisation, namely a clear chain of command along which information
travelled up, and orders passed down.\(^7\) Orders were certainly given and received within the Force, but there was no effective way of ensuring obedience under normal circumstances. The absence of any real ability to coerce meant that the operation of the Volunteer Force had to depend mainly on "good will", and a spirit of co-operation between the different ranks.\(^8\)

It is the operation and structure of corps which most clearly belies the Volunteer Force's military character. In a normal military unit the commanding officer plays the principal part in the management of his command. The commanders of Volunteer corps, both in theory and practice, were only one element of the decision-making process, in many respects not even the most important. Ultimate authority rested effectively with all the members of a company. They could override the wishes of their officers on such basic matters as whether a corps continued in existence.\(^9\) Company committees and a secretary elected at the annual meeting made most of the day-to-day decisions, controlling not only such important matters as corps finances, but also usurping many of the powers which by regulation belonged to corps COs. For instance, at a meeting of the Christ's College Rifles General Committee, under the chairmanship of Colour-Sergeant Smith, it was decided to hold in abeyance fines incurred by a private for non-attendance, providing that, in future, he attended more parades.\(^10\)

Volunteers' conditions of service, and the extent to which members controlled corps, meant that the Force had to "be lead, not driven" by officers who had the support of their men.\(^11\) The election of officers and NCOs was therefore a natural extension of member authority. The relaxed informal relations between ranks which were characteristic of the Volunteer Force, reflected the need for consensus, and the
strong position of rank and file Volunteers. In the United Kingdom the passing of officer election, corps annual meetings, and committee organisation during the 1870s has been seen as symptomatic of a move away from "democratic control", and towards a more military ethos as Regular Army control of the Force was strengthened. In New Zealand this never occurred. All these features of Volunteering continued unabated till the Force's abolition. As a result, the principal unit within the New Zealand Volunteer Force - the corps - remained quite different from the normal pattern of military forces. In the Force as a whole, relations between corps often resembled the conduct of clubs or societies organised into a national federation, rather than a centrally controlled body.

In theory, the Force had a reasonably clear chain of command from the Commandant or Defence Council through the O.C. Districts to battalion or regimental commanders and to corps commanders. The actual situation was, however, somewhat different. Not only were the powers of district commanders limited, but Volunteers frequently disregarded or went outside the Force's military hierarchy to appeal directly to Members of Parliament or Ministers. An argument over military drills being held on Labour Day provides an excellent example of the limited control the defence authorities had over the Volunteer Force. The Minister of Defence in 1907, Sir Joseph Ward, received complaints from the Wellington Trades and Labour Council, amongst others, about Volunteers holding parades on the workers' holiday. When these complaints were investigated it was discovered that the parades in question had been ordered by Volunteer unit commanders, in the capital's case by the O.C. 1st Battalion Wellington, R.V.. As a consequence, neither the Minister, nor the Defence Council could
prevent the Volunteers from carrying out parades on this public holiday. Indeed, they had to grant the Volunteers a personal payment for these daylight parades. Under the new system introduced in 1910, the Minister did not have his powers restricted in this way and was able to ban parades by Territorials on Labour Day.

The significant aspects of the New Zealand Volunteer Force's ethos, organisation and operation which do not follow those accepted in most military organisations, have one fundamental trait in common; major decisions were made at what were ostensibly the lower levels of the Force, that is by individual Volunteers and their corps. These decisions and their effects then flowed up the structure of the Force, in direct contradiction to the system in military or other bureaucratic institutions. The manner in which the size, mix of arms and distribution of the Force was decided is the most graphic illustration of this fact. For, although the defence authorities could encourage the formation of particular types of units in different locations, and refuse to accept or disband corps where and when corps were formed, and their continued existence, was effectively determined by the community or the members of a particular company. Only slightly less significant was the control Volunteers exercised over the Force's leadership. It was the wishes and opinions of the rank and file, not those of the Permanent Staff or Minister, which really decided who led the Force.

Given these circumstances it must be problematical at best to describe, or attempt to define, the New Zealand Volunteers as a military force, as the term is normally understood. The Force could more accurately be termed a uniformed, disciplined community service movement, supported and to an extent controlled by the Government.
NOTES

4 O.C. Districts Conference Report, point 10, A.D.58/46.
5 Defence, 25 Sep 1908, p.11.
6 The Press, 13 Oct 1894, p.78.
10 Christ's College Rifle Volunteers Minute Book, 31 Jan 1894.
12 Curmingham, p.54.
13 See for example W.P., 1 Apr 1908, p.64b.
14 N.A. Wellington Trades and Labour Council to Ward 23 Oct 1907, A.D.1, 10/3354.
15 O.C. Wellington District to Secretary of Defence Council 29 Oct 1907, ibid.
16 Robin to District H.Q. Auckland 2 Aug 1911, ibid.
17 Feld, p.78.
APPENDIX

Notes on Occupational Categories and Methods used.

- Only data on adult Volunteers whose occupations appear in the occupational ranking compiled by Toynbee, or whose occupations are very similar to those appearing in the ranking, have been used in the study. For example, a Volunteer who gave his occupation as farm worker would be included in category VI.

- The occupations of a few Volunteers do not appear in the roll books.

- The occupations of some Volunteers were illegible.

- Where the occupation given could place an individual in either category I, Major Proprietors, or category III, Petty Proprietors, I have, where possible, used the Cyclopedia of New Zealand, and Wise's Post Office Directories, to assist in determining into which category a Volunteer should be placed. Where it has proved impossible to decide which is the proper category, I have placed the individual in the lower category.

- Volunteers aged under 20 years, whose occupations would have placed them in category IV, skilled (workers), have been placed as apprentices in category V.
# Table 3

## Age of Rank and File Volunteers

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<tr>
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<th>1886</th>
<th>1896-97</th>
<th>1907-08</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number in sample</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age at enrolment in years</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age in years</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Source Ashburton Rifles, C.Y.C., C.M.R., Lyttelton Navals, Christchurch City Guards and E Battery roll books for 1886, 1896-97 and 1907-08. The sample used is made up of every fifth adult rank and file Volunteer who appears in the roll books. The average age is calculated from the age of enrolment given in the roll books, and refers to the age of men at the end of the Volunteer year covered by the roll book or, if discharged or transferred during the year, their age at that date.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1886</th>
<th>1896-97</th>
<th>1907-08</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number in group</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age of NCOs</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>31.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number in group</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average age of officers</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Source Ashburton Rifles, C.Y.C., C.M.R., Lyttelton Navals, Christchurch City Guards and E Battery roll books for 1886, 1896-97 and 1907-08. The study includes all officers and NCOs who appear in the roll books. The average age is calculated from the age at enrolment given in the roll books and refers to the age of men at the end of the Volunteer year covered by the roll book or, if discharged or transferred, or if they resigned during the year, their age at that date.
### TABLE 5
THE OCCUPATIONS OF VOLUNTEER OFFICERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>I HIGH WHITE COLLAR</th>
<th>II LOW WHITE COLLAR</th>
<th>III PETTY PROPRIETORS, MANAGERS AND OFFICIALS</th>
<th>IV SKILLED WORKERS</th>
<th>V SEMISKILLED AND SERVICE WORKERS</th>
<th>VI UNSKILLED LABOURERS &amp; MENTAL WORKERS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>60</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>* 24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in category</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Source *Cyclopedia of New Zealand*, I – VI. These figures should be treated with caution as they almost certainly overstate the dominance of high status individuals, because high ranking officers or those prominent in other spheres, such as business and politics, are substantially over-represented in the *Cyclopedia*. Only officers whose occupations were given and could be placed in the ranking system have been included in this study.
### TABLE 6

LENGTH OF SERVICE OF RANK AND FILE VOLUNTEERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1886</th>
<th>1896-97</th>
<th>1907-08</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number in group</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of service in months</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Source Ashburton Rifles, C.Y.C., C.M.R., Lyttelton Navals, Christchurch City Guards and E Battery roll books for 1886, 1896-97 and 1907-08. This study is based on all adult rank and file Volunteers discharged during the years covered by the roll books.

### TABLE 7

LENGTH OF SERVICE OF VOLUNTEER OFFICERS AND NCOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1886</th>
<th>1896-97</th>
<th>1907-08</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number in group</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of service in months of NCOs</td>
<td>50.</td>
<td>102.3</td>
<td>120.5</td>
<td>94.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in group</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average length of service in months of officers</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>136.4</td>
<td>117.6</td>
<td>101.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Source Ashburton Rifles, C.Y.C., C.M.R., Lyttelton Navals, Christchurch City Guards and E Battery roll books for 1886, 1896-97 and 1907-08. This study included all officers and NCOs who appear in the roll books. The length of service is calculated from the date of enrolment to the end of the Volunteer year covered by the roll book, or if discharged or transferred, or if they resigned during the year, to that date.
AN OCCUPATIONAL RANKING FOR NEW ZEALAND (AFTER THERNSTROM, 1975)

I. HIGH WHITE COLLAR

Professionals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Architect</th>
<th>Editor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Solicitor</td>
<td>Professional engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergyman</td>
<td>Pharmacists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil engineer</td>
<td>Physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemist</td>
<td>Scientist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterinarian</td>
<td>Social worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary teacher</td>
<td>Teacher (university, headmaster)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreter</td>
<td>Surgeon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Proprietors, Managers and Officials

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Merchant</th>
<th>Banker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheriff</td>
<td>Broker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturer, brewer</td>
<td>Corporation and government officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotelkeeper, publican</td>
<td>of high rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Builder, contractor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheepfarmer, grazier, runholder</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

II. LOW WHITE COLLAR

Clerks and Salesmen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Auctioneer</th>
<th>Advertising man, auditor, cashier, dispatcher, insurance adjustor or salesmen, mail carrier, office boy, secretary, typist, bank teller, bookkeeper, canvasser, baggageman</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agent, land agent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadets</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Semiprofessionals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Photographer</th>
<th>Actor, librarian, airplane pilot, musician, artist, newspaperman, athlete, optician, chiropractor, osteopath, dietician, technician, draftsman, writer, embalmer, entertainer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Optician</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveyor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher (primary, pupil)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. PETTY PROPRIETORS, MANAGERS AND OFFICIALS

cab proprietor, coach proprietor
dealer
storekeeper
boardinghousekeeper
caterer
daifyman
master mariner
harbourmaster
mine manager
police inspector
postmaster
station manager
ship builder
ironmonger
grocer, fruitiser, draper
book seller
saw Miller
settler
farmer, hop grower

foreman
huckster, peddler
minor government official
small managers
officers in prisons
station manager

IV. SKILLED

shoemaker
stonemason
coach painter
printer
pattern maker
compositor
imagemaker
carpenter, joiner
tinsmith, blacksmith, millwright, wheelwright
baker, butcher
jeweller, watchmaker
tailor, upholsterer, cabinet maker
dressmaker
painter, Slater, plumber
saddler, currier, tanner
engine driver, engineer

boiler maker
mason
caulker
confectioner
coppersmith
electrician
fireman
goldsmith
machinist
molder
roofer

shoemaker (craft)
silversmith
steamfitter
tool & die maker
engraver
glazier
lithographer
mechanic
paper hanger
V. SEMISKILLED AND SERVICE WORKERS

platelayer
cook
storeman
flaskman
watchman
sawyer
puntman, boatman
millman
coachman
warder
laundryman
carter, expressman, teamster, carrier
hawker
haiderdresser
waiter
fireman
brickmaker
shepherd, ploughman,
shearer, drover, dairyman
gardener

VI UNSKILLED LABOURERS AND MENIAL SERVICE WORKERS

groom, porter
ganger
bushman
quarryman
chairman
labourer
miner
mariner
seaman
farm servants, hands

hostler
lumberman
porter
packer

NOTES

1 Toynbee, pp.177-79
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II UNPUBLISHED


