Engaging culture and science:
A scientific realist interpretation of Maori
mental health

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Abstract

The intersection of Maori culture and psychological science is engaged by analysing the problem of the mental health of Maori. It is the articulation of what this problem might comprise in terms of historical, conceptual, methodological and ethical features, that is of most interest. Scientific realism is the theory of science that I adopt in the pursuit of determining the key theoretical and empirical commitments that have characterised and continue to shape the received view of 'Maori mental health'. In developing an understanding of the features which create divergence between Maori culture and psychological science it is possible to develop a view of the more pervasive normative assumptions that maintain distance between these respective institutions. In using the vehicle of the mental health of Maori I explore the concept of cultural reification and the implications of this force to impede the interrelationship between culture and science. Complicit in the semantic project of cultural reification is the burgeoning support of postmodern theories, as they relate to cultural 'Others'. It is suggested that what emerges from this complicity is the denial that individual Maori possess mental states and that this is the essential factor which prevents the improving of relations between psychological science and Maori culture in explicit regard to 'Maori mental health'.
The concept of cultural difference focuses on the problem of the ambivalence of cultural authority: the attempt to dominate in the name of a cultural supremacy which is itself produced only in the moment of differentiation. And it is the very authority of culture as knowledge of referential truth which is at issue in the concept and moment of enunciation. The enunciative process introduces a split in the performative present of cultural identification; a split between the traditional culturalist demand for a model, a tradition, a community, a stable system of reference, and the necessary negation of the certitude in the articulation of new cultural demands, meanings, strategies in the political present, as a practice of domination, or resistance (Bhabha 1994, p. 35).

Chapter One

Maori culture and psychological science: the interface

This thesis is interested in defining the theoretical features that mark out the point of separation between culture and psychological science and produce the 'sacred' space of silence and resistance between psychological science and Maori culture in New Zealand. There is no hypothesis stated in this thesis; there is simply an attempt to articulate what I perceive to be a serious problem. In a rather candid style I fashion the problem thus: In the context of Maori cultural reification, 'Western science' is rejected as being able to contribute important knowledge to address problems as they exist for contemporary Maori. In basic form, the reification of Maori culture reflects a strategy committed to cultural preservation and maintenance. The re-interpretation, re-introduction and reinforcement of assumed 'traditional' values are methods of cultural reification.

Webster (1998) in offering an account of the Maori Renaissance movement beginning in the 1960's refers to the ideological tension evident where reified notions of culture conflict with other impressions such as those observed in the over-representation of Maori in negative social indices. According to Webster, the conflict manifests an image of Maori culture of being in one sense 'a whole way of being', or 'cultural totality' commensurate with Maori Romanticism, and in another sense, a culture fragmented and therefore fragile to social, economic and political forces.
Explicit in Webster's (1998) view is that the relationship between these contrasting images of Maori society must be understood within the history of New Zealand's political economy as well as the contemporary negotiation between government and iwi to resolve claims presented to the Waitangi Tribunal. (see also Rudd and Roper, 1997) For this reason, Webster proposes that the expression 'a whole way of struggle' might be a more fitting turn of phrase to describe the conflicting images of Maori society.

While acknowledging that prior knowledge of the historical influences that have impacted on contemporary Maori societies is to be commended, the approach taken in this dissertation is to contextualise the process of cultural reification as a 'new historical force' when addressing the interface between Maori culture and psychological science. Cultural reification as a 'new historical force' reflects the conflict between Maori romanticism and Maori realities, and for the discipline of psychology, provides an abstract means to understand the contrasting images of Maori societies. Importantly, cultural reification can be comprehended as implying a 'New History', because it is a project that attempts to recover the institutional memory of Maori as it has been affected by historical influences. Under the auspices of the Waitangi Tribunal the recovery of an institutional memory by Maori, and the direct relevance that such a recovery has to New Zealand's political economic history, can be understood.

Institutional memory in this context refers to the assumed 'traditional' aspects of Maori culture reified for the purpose of cultural maintenance and cultural preservation. My rationale for contextualising the interface between Maori culture and psychological science within the aegis of cultural reification is that the field which this thesis is most interested, namely 'Maori mental health', ought to be understood as a reified field. This is because as much as cultural reification may be intentionally organised to preserve and maintain aspects of cultural heritage another outcome of the reification process is cultural divergence. Affirming the solidarity of the group through accentuating a commitment to a shared heritage is not unique to culture. Religious groups and nations also participate in such a process and reconfirmation strategies of ancestral allegiance often occur when a group is under
threat, in crisis or alternatively, perceives some distinct advantage in reconfirming historical links (MacCannell, 1992).

Cultural divergence occurs as an artifact of accentuating an assumed normative basis of a group that is then compared with another group. In the process of Maori cultural reification the assumed normative basis of Maori is directly contrasted to an assumed non-Maori normative basis and it is the theoretical divergence between such a contrast that creates the perception of a boundary existing between presupposed ‘cultural totalities’. It is the assumption of normative divergence between contrasting ‘cultural totalities’ in a climate of Maori reification that this thesis seeks to address. Therefore, the interface between Maori culture and psychological science ought to be understood within a context of cultural reification that attempts to build allegiance within the group or tribe and simultaneously create divergence between groups and tribes. The vehicle of the mental health of Maori is used as a means to describe how the institutions of culture and science within New Zealand continue to ascribe normative distinctions to ‘cultural totalities’. The assumptions which come to represent the virtues, implicit values, or erroneous conclusions of ‘cultural totalities’, buttress the points of disparity and difference between the respective institutions of culture and science. For example, ‘Western science’ is often framed as universal, objective and value free, whereas Maori culture is encapsulated in a sentimental matrix that is often described as holistic, spiritual and collective.

In regard to the mental health of Maori the question presented is whether the mental health needs of individuals are currently configured within the ideology of Maori cultural reification. I pose this as an ethical concern for the simple reason that if the boundary between Maori culture and psychological science is maintained on the basis of normative distinctions of ‘cultural totalities’ then the mental health needs of individual Maori will also be circumscribed in a discourse of cultural divergence. As a consequence, the mental health of Maori becomes a population level issue reflecting a ‘cultural totality’ which may bear little relation to the expression of mental states at the individual level.
Snyder (1998) offers the suggestion that in order to expand on our creative views of 'mental paradigms,' abnormal mind states and historical transformations of different cultures are two fields from which we can build on current conceptions of mental states. The vehicle that I use to explore Snyder's contention is the mental health of Maori which I regard as both a theoretical and empirical subject. Importantly, I do not see 'Maori mental health' as a field *per se*, because I cannot accept the suppressed premise underlying such a descriptive label that presupposes the notion of a cultural pathology. The term 'Maori mental health' encapsulates a crude association between culture and specific mind states which for a number of reasons that I outline later, is unacceptable.

My rationale for making the mental health of Maori my reference subject is that in New Zealand this subject area is in crisis (Bridgeman and Dyall, 1996). The mental health of Maori can be framed as a phenomenon worthy of study for the simple reason that the data shows that in the last twenty years there has been an accelerated rate of Maori admissions to psychiatric hospitals (Spice, Trlin and Walton, 1994). Far from showing signs of abating this rate is currently accelerating. This fact should be a major concern for the institutions of both Maori culture and practitioners of science. However, because of the distance between each of these institutions there is little research being conducted, and almost no collaboration between them. Meanwhile the failure of practitioners from each institution to recognise the importance, relevance, and significance of each other's theories, ideas, and practices, actively reinforces the boundary existing between the institutions of culture and science. In this dissertation mental ill health is understood in its most obvious sense as a psychological disturbance, disorder, or condition, which affects the individual. Put simply, the mental health of Maori while often being cast within sociological frameworks is approached here from a psychological perspective. Although cultural frameworks might show variation in interpreting the contents of individual mind states the point remains that mind states are first and foremost, experienced at the level of the individual.

This brings me to the two assumptions that frame this work. The first assumption is that science as practised and theorised in New Zealand ought to recognise the significance of incorporating Maori processes in the procedures of
research where Maori participants are involved, or where a field of specific Maori interest is being investigated. An example of researchers acknowledging the importance of incorporating Maori processes into a research design is the research conducted by an Otago team which recently confirmed a molecular basis for familial gastric cancer and the significance of E-cadherin mutations in cancer (Guilford, P., Hopkins, J., Harraway, J., McLeod, M., McCleod, N., Harawira, P., Taite, H., Scoular, R., Miller, A., & Reeve, A, 1998). This research team collaborated with a Maori family who were first identified twenty-five years ago as exhibiting abnormal rates of familial gastric cancer which clearly indicated a genetic predisposition (Jones, 1964). However, the anonymity of the family's ancestry was not protected and having been published in a medical journal, public identification of the family was made with relative ease. Underlying the insensitivity of this action was the total disregard of Maori process in protecting a family's ancestry from the public arena, as well as a complete lack of understanding of the possible implications for the family in psychological and social terms. The Otago medical team re-initiated the research by showing flexibility in their approach, whereby family members became active collaborators in the research and were therefore able to ensure that elements of control and protection of rights were observed. The flexibility of this approach certainly has potential application to the field of psychology. However, the main point is the initiative shown by the medical team's acknowledgement that features of their research design could be improved upon, and that certain improvements were best guided by their participants, who became their eventual collaborators.

The second framing assumption is that Maori culture ought to recognise the salience of psychological phenomena at the individual level. My deliberate stand in conceptualising Maori individuality as agentic as opposed to structural is to avoid the essentialism evident in many critiques of the intersection between psychological science and Maori culture (see for example Stewart, 1997). Korsgaard (1991) suggests that agency must be considered to be about the integrated personal identity exhibiting consciousness through beliefs and actions. The integrated personal identity functions as a self determined totality and the definition I use here does not discount the importance of external stimuli impacting on an individual's actions and beliefs. By contrast, the theory of structuralism places emphasis on external stimuli constituting an individual's personal identity (Rosman and Rubel, 1998). When
structuralist thought is applied to 'individuals of indigenous descent' it is often the
case that individual consciousness is denied as an intrinsic component of personal
identity. In place of personal identity is the concept of a collective consciousness, the
essential qualities of which comprise distinct characteristics of common heritage
assumedly transmitted to the individual. In this way, subjectivity is essentialised in
accordance with the assumption that a cultural individual's personal identity simply
equates to the reduction of collective characteristics to the level of individual
identity. Conceptualising Maori personal identity as agentic intentionally places
emphasis on the psychological characteristics of identity and therefore contrasts with
the structural view.

Relative to the mental health of Maori, I believe that a common practice is
apparent in a number of fields, whereby a semantic conception of Maori identity is
conflated with personal selfhood. Moreover, I will argue that the suppressed premise
of a cultural pathology apparent in the notion of Maori mental health is partially
derived from the overdetermination of a semantic conception of Maori identity.
Perspectives generally offered on the mental health of Maori do not conceptualise
the individual outside of the social constructs of whanau, hapu, and iwi. Although
these broader constructs may have some descriptive power in being able to provide
relational foci for Maori individuals they do not compensate for the neglect of
psychological dimensions inherent in all individuals, nor should they be assumed to
do so. The discipline of psychology has as its primary focus individual affect,
behaviour and cognition, and as this dissertation is psychological in nature the
cognitive agency of individuals takes theoretical precedence over structural
determinants of social arrangement such as the collective concepts of whanau, hapu,
and iwi.

To this point two assumptions have been made regarding the interface between
Maori culture and psychological science. The first assumption is that the discipline
of psychology can incorporate Maori cultural processes into the conduct of research
inquiry. The second assumption is that the encapsulation of Maori personal identity
into a matrix of collective characteristics denies the critical importance of individual
agency. With this in mind, Maori cultural institutions need to recognise that
individual identity is agentic. This in no way promotes a 'two world' view nor does it
constitute a bicultural framework. The point is basically that the mutual overlap currently existing between the institutions of culture and science afford a meeting ground where improvements in the least can be initiated. The context of the mental health of Maori offers an opportunity to explore how this meeting ground can be developed.

The meta-theoretical perspective that I take in this dissertation is scientific realism. The works of Boyd (1984, 1990, 1996), Hooker (1987, 1995) and Rescher (1977, 1987, 1990, 1992) are used to shape the main themes of the dissertation. The epistemic desiderata which each of these theorists assume such as predictive accuracy, internal coherence, heuristic value, external consistency, unifying power, fertility, and simplicity have been used as probative guides in the theoretical development of this thesis. More specifically, these desiderata act as criteria for theory appraisal.

In wanting to move beyond 'neo-traditionalist critiques of modernity' (Rata, 1996), such as those evident within Maori reification discourses, I have endorsed Bhabha's (1994) perspective of cultural hybridity. Relevant to Webster's (1998) concern that Maori culture is paradoxically conceptualised as a 'whole totality' Bhabha's theory of cultural hybridity denies the assumed contemporary unity of whole cultures placed in juxtaposition to each other. More specifically, Bhabha argues for cultural difference and against the notion of cultural diversity which he describes thus:

Cultural diversity is the recognition of pre-given cultural contents and customs; held in a time-frame of relativism it gives rise to liberal notions of multiculturalism, cultural exchange or the culture of humanity. Cultural diversity is also the representation of a radical rhetoric of the separation of totalised cultures that live unsullied by the intertextuality of their historical locations, safe in the Utopianism of a mythic memory of a unique collective identity. Cultural diversity may even emerge as a system of the articulation and exchange of cultural signs in certain early structuralist accounts of anthropology. (p. 34:1994)

The concept of cultural diversity is possibly best illustrated in the local context as the underlying message of the bicultural project with its depiction of the Maori-Pakeha relation representing 'diversity within unity' (see Rata, 1996; Duric, 1998).
Cultural diversity only theorises 'the diverse' as the peripheral overlap of each culture. It does not enunciate the problematic of cultural interaction and instead reinforces cultural diversity as a juxtaposed set of cultural signs nestled side by side in a national framework. For Bhabha it is precisely at the point of cultural interaction that cultural difference emerges. He states:

> The enunciation of cultural difference problematizes the binary division of past and present, tradition and modernity, at the level of cultural representation, and its authoritative address. It is the problem of how, in signifying the present, something comes to be repeated, relocated and translated in the name of tradition, in the guise of a pastness that is not necessarily a faithful sign of historical memory but a strategy of representing authority in terms of the artifice of the archaic. (p. 35: 1994)

Cultural hybridity is therefore the peripheral space, or what Bhabha terms 'the Third space of enunciation', which represents the temporal juncture that always exists between theses which are constructed as being in opposition. As Bhabha explains:

> It is only when we understand that all cultural statements and systems are constructed in this contradictory and ambivalent space of enunciation, that we begin to understand why hierarchical claims to the inherent originality or 'purity' of cultures are untenable, even before we resort to historical instances that demonstrate their hybridity. (p. 37: 1994)

The pragmatic turn that I take in this dissertation is possibly best understood in the metaphor 'tribes of scientists' that Nola (1988) uses to describe the different positioning of relativists, realists, empiricists, and constructivists, all of whom occupy the supposed 'high ground' of science. 'Tribes of scientists' often use culture as a means to not only demarcate the boundaries between their respective camps, but to also gather ground for their particular position. 'Culture' becomes a category or natural kind, which is evidence for beliefs, views, and values different from the 'Western' mainstream, which is supposedly sufficient proof to justify in particular, relativist and constructivist claims. From either of these perspectives, culture is prefigured as static, omniscient, and as Bhabha (1994) suggests, pure and original. In contradistinction, the perspective explored in this thesis, theorises culture as
continuously emergent, intrinsically material, and organised to maximise strategic advantage (Sowell, 1994).

In this thesis the terms, ‘variation’, ‘selection’ and ‘retention’, which together represent human adaptability strategies, are utilised to explore the hybrid region which I postulate as existing between the institutions of science and culture within New Zealand. My main rationale for using this genetic algorithm of description (Hooker, 1995), which is more often used in strong evolutionary epistemology, is that the variation, selection, and retention of theories offers one important means by which normative assumptions embedded in scientific and cultural institutions and practices can be detected. Within this dissertation, the scientific realist interpretation of current conceptions of Maori mental health that is offered, is, in part, derived from deconstructing elements of variation, selection, and retention evident within certain theories on the subject. For example, the two framing assumptions I have already outlined above are representative of active selective mechanisms, which I suggest serve to constrain our understanding of the mental health of Maori as a fundamentally psychological subject. Maori culture, through construing the cognitive states of individuals as negligible, and psychological science, through eschewing alternative procedural processes, both create and maintain what is described here as ‘institutional distance’. The notion of institutional distance simply refers to a form of relationship or boundary, developed between different institutions whereby difference is emphasised over themes of commonality. I believe that this institutional distance, while retaining a normative influence within our current theoretical commitments, can be made intelligible without having to fall back into standard neo-Kantian dualisms (see Appendix B) which permeate discourses on the divide between culture and science. Thus, the mental health of Maori, in this context, is seen as a conjunctive site of potential mediation between science and culture.
The key components of this thesis are therefore situated within an interdisciplinary framework. The permutations of different disciplines influencing the account of the mental health of Maori which I offer is deemed necessary for ascribing a context to the received view of Maori mental health. The scientific realist perspective offered is predicated on the view that an intertheoretic integration of viewpoints produces a more complete perspective of the current conceptual divergences and convergences consonant with the standard view of Maori mental health. Philosophy of science, psychology, cosmology/teleology, and social policy, are the core components of this work as indicated in the diagram of Figure 1. It is argued that the conceptual basis of the standard view of Maori mental health is generally distributed within the confines of these four domains. By way of introducing the relevance of these fields to the standard view of Maori mental health, I will briefly sketch what I believe to be some of the more important influences operating between the components.
Philosophy of science and cosmology/teleology

In the flow diagram sketched in Figure 1 there is a weak connection made between philosophy of science and cosmology/teleology. My reason for making this connection is that often propositions are made which suggest that there is epistemic parity in beliefs drawn from cosmology/teleology and truth claims which are derived from the philosophy of science (for example see Cunningham, 1998). The so-called strong programme of the sociology of knowledge supports such a contention (Nola, 1988). Therefore, this diagrammatic line indicates the potential for conflict and convergence between what are often described as 'alternative world-views'. However, the distinction is made within this dissertation between claims of faith, belief and truth.

In offering a scientific realist interpretation of Maori mental health I suggest that theories of causation derived from either faith or belief are more correctly configured, within a teleological framework. In contrast, claims of truth are dependent on how well our conjectural theories, compare with respect to identifiable epistemic criteria. Neither belief or faith share the commitment to developing better approximations to the truth, and from the perspective developed in this thesis, neither should they. But, nor should they be perceived as being synonymous with claims of truth. In order to develop this distinction between faith, belief and truth more succinctly, I draw the association between notions of belief and faith and the role of causality within teleological frameworks, as described in a theory known as the Anthropic Principle (Barrow and Tipler, 1986). The Anthropic Principle opens the way to an understanding of both the hierarchical and sociological assumptions embedded within a cultural domain's theory of causation. After offering a sketch of the Anthropic Principle, I present a view of a Maori metaphysics where the institutional features of the supernatural, the genealogical, the natural, and the cognitive, combine to provide a system of cultural explanation for the notion of causation. Consistent with this approach, I suggest that the work of Levy, Mageo, and Howard (1996) expands on the Anthropic Principle, by offering an account of the belief presuppositions which undergird in particular supernatural theories of the causation of illness. It is from this perspective that I suggest the philosophy of
science can make intelligible the teleological percepts of belief and faith as they come to inform a cultural domain's system of explanation.

**Philosophy of science, psychology, and teleology**

Within this work it is argued that the teleological features which come to be institutionalised within a Maori metaphysical schema also come to regulate semantic conceptions of Maori mythology, kinship, notions of collectivity, and identity. As faith depends on doctrines or discourses of hierarchical authority, and belief generally depends on a form of sensory experience expressed socially (Levy, Mageo and Howard, 1996), it is suggested that the field of ethnicity offers one means by which the main tenets of the semantic regulation of culture can be understood. That is, the teleological basis of causal ascription is transferred from both hierarchical and sociological positions to produce a system of regulation, which in this thesis is framed within the structural and functional workings of tribal, national, political and social interests. It is here that I believe that the objectification of culture can be understood within a context of rediscovery, where the processes of cultural reification emerge from a theory of essentialism, yet are fundamentally motivated by historical materialism.

The field of Maori mental health is seen as epitomising the implicit reductionism of cultural reification for the simple reason that the mental states of Maori are also objectified within this process to produce the suppressed notion of a cultural pathology. Put differently, the mind states of Maori are conceptualised within the standard view of Maori mental health as not being essentially about the individual, but rather as being about the morbidity of Maori culture. The conjoint objectification of the mental states of Maori and the reification of Maori culture is characterised within this dissertation as a semantic project, the main tenets of which are described within the confines of what I term 'the sociological triptych'.

The sociological triptych offers a semantic exposition of what are perceived to be the central assumptions of current perceptions of the mental health of Maori. Observed within the sociological triptych is the tension evident between the simultaneous reification of cultural domains and their current diminishment, which is
expressed in both symbolic and symptomatic terms. However, as Appiah (1992) remarks relative to understanding the ideal of ontological autonomy perpetuated within predominantly relativist and constructionist commentaries on cultural world-views,

"... we need, I think, to bear in mind at least three separate types of understanding: first, understanding the ritual and beliefs that underlie it; second, understanding the historical sources of both ritual and belief; and third, understanding what sustains them". (p. 109)

In addressing Appiah's (1992) suggestion, I argue that both ritual and belief can be interpreted as normative forces within Maori domains that are largely generated from a metaphysical basis. Hierarchical and sociological theories of ethnic descent and cultural consent combine to imply both horizontal and vertical forces that are best described as normative. The historical sources of ritual and belief are captured within the claim of an ontological autonomy, which also informs the assumptions outlined in my view of a sociological triptych. The semantic project of cultural reification sustains both belief and ritual. And, while this might be perceived as stimulating a form of strategic advantage, it concomitantly circumscribes the mental states of individuals into a normative framework of cultural ascription. Beliefs, values, perceptions, and a discourse of control, are perceived as being the items that essentialise the Maori cultural domain, and it is from this basis that relativism and constructionism posit differences in 'world-view'. A critical analysis of Kaupapa Maori Research is undertaken in order to extrapolate a number of the stronger claims that adherents of a distinct 'Maori world-view' make in regards to the interface between the institutions of science and culture.

**Teleology and social policy**

The theoretical formulation of Maori mental health in social policy documentation must first be acknowledged as not being about anything particularly 'mental'. By 'mental' I mean psychological mind states. This is a level of abstraction that requires careful explication. As just noted, the term 'Maori mental health,' is in fact a misnomer because it purports to represent and describe the mental health of an indigenous people. As a relational construct the term 'Maori mental health,' if it is to
serve a useful purpose ought not to be interpreted literally. However, one possible literal interpretation could be that persons who share common descent also share common psychological mind states. However, this interpretation would lead to the crucial and misleading assumption that ethnicity is a biological conduit of specific ethnic mind states. Misleading though this literal interpretation is, I believe that it is a muted assumption apparent in the current approaches taken to the subject of the mental health of Maori. Therefore, my rational for drawing what at first glance might appear as a disjunctive association between teleology and social policy is to reveal the extent to which teleological features have become institutionalised within policy frameworks which ultimately seek to address a psychological problem of the mental health of Maori.

The articulation of Maori mental health social policy reflects an aggregate of biological and anthropological assumptions whereby the veneration of the 'collective essence' of Maori echoes what Appiah (1992) refers to as the 'topography of nativism'. The ideological ascriptions of Maori being imbued with quite distinct mind sets that are inherited biologically is the central presupposition of Maori mental health, and the key feature of modern Maori 'nativist discourse'. Underlying the homogenising contours of culture which nativist discourse perpetuates regarding the collective essence of Maori is a fundamental flaw which ironically is derived from the European myth of 'race' (Banton, 1987; Poata-Smith, 1997).

The idea that Maori descent has something vitally cognitive about it is an inference embedded within nativist discourse, but I believe it is an inference of the sublime form. Mirroring the ethnographer's search for the primordial essence, Maori mental health has been 'anthropologised' into a realm where confronting the reality that every individual has a mind capable of rationality and logic implies something pathological. The more debilitating aspect of this disabling paradox is that the proposed panacea for Maori who experience mental illness is simply to find their own image in the selective renditions of Maori identity subscribed to in the 'official narratives' of social policy. In order that the distinction between Maori and non-Maori is not missed this caricature of the cultural substrate needs to borrow heavily from teleology. The realm of relations where everything is connected is the exotic tableau of ethnicity, and the necessity of accentuating the 'authentic', enables culture
to be reunited with nature. It appears that it is the reunification of Maori with 'nature' that will signal the end of the increasing rates of Maori diagnosed with mental illness. Concealed in the reunification premise however, is the treatment of Maori with mental illness as an ontological resource that maximises the 'pastoral vision' of Maori.

The blending of the pastoral vision with the nativist vision of Maori, whereby Maori are simultaneously, and it appears intrinsically, connected to, yet estranged from, nature, leads to the rather precarious situating of Maori within a sociological framework exuding a form of cultural pathology. Furthermore, as I suggest later, nativist discourse also opens the way for Maori identity construction profiles and other 'essence detection' instruments. However, for the term 'Maori mental health' to make any sense it ought to be understood that the main problematic which social policy analysts fail to articulate is the means by which the minds of a cultural substrate become constructed within policy frameworks oriented to the distribution of goods and services.

**Knowledge and attitudes - prevention and promotion**

The direction in the flow diagram of knowledge and attitudes and prevention and promotion, depicted in Figure 1, indicates that each area can make an important contribution to social policy. But, as is also indicated in the flow diagram the influence of teleological tenets coming to inform knowledge and attitudes introduces a divergent influence which the discipline of psychology, is ill-equipped to deal with. The cachet of symbolic ascriptions which cosmology/teleology provides is the ideological template of the cultural substrate of Maori and it is argued that these ascriptions, interpreted literally, produce a conflict between what are generally described as 'Maori values' and 'Western values'. The question to be considered here is whether our knowledge of mental health aetiologies can be improved upon by insisting that our theoretical and empirical approaches to a subject, characterised by a cultural substrate, be value driven. That is, it is the heightened distinction between value systems that partially enables the mental health of Maori to be treated as an ontological resource for the purposes of cultural reification. Significantly, it is the framing of the distinction between Maori and Western value systems which
motivates the more elaborate distinction to be made between that which is 'particularly Maori,' and that which is 'universally Western'. The 'particularly Maori' value system is presupposed to have intrinsic epistemic potency because it has been transmitted from the teleological realm to become a normative legacy of Maori by virtue of descent and inheritance. From this, it can be argued that the systematic imbibing of Maori values as being representative of Maori knowledge depends largely on the oppositional force created by the heightening of distinctions between a 'particularised Maori view of the world' and a 'universalised conception of the Western world'.

The following diagram (Figure 2) provides a view of Maori (cultural) and non-Maori ('Western') knowledge bases placed in conceptual juxtaposition. The hybrid region where participation, interaction and integration are emphasised, reflects the potential for 'variation, 'retention' and 'selection' of percepts depending on individual choice. Furthermore, choice of percepts may also be contingent on the nature or gravity of a problem. If a problem reaches critical proportions then there may be more motivation toward participation, interaction and integration of percepts.

**Figure 2:** Intersection of assumed 'variation' 'selection' and 'retention' (V.S.R) features between Maori and non-Maori 'world views'.

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Howard (1985) stresses the observation that all scientific research is value-laden within a framework that acknowledges the constraints implicit in human complexity and subtlety. The assumptions, biases, and theoretical stance taken to a research field by a researcher, is the first constraint. Secondly, the current limitations of our research tools, is a further constraint. Lastly, human ability to conceptualise and develop new theories, tools, and methods for the conduct of research must also be factored in when acknowledging that research is a value-laden affair. Howard makes an important distinction between two types of values and accordingly refers to these as non-epistemic and epistemic values (see also McMullin, 1983). Non-epistemic values include emotion, ethical values, and what Howard refers to as characteristic values, which include a property or set of properties that count as being an advantageous characteristic of a particular entity. An epistemic value is the consideration of the truth-value of science and includes criteria that are used to evaluate the explanatory depth of competing theories. In pointing to the objective of psychology to expand on our current knowledge of human behaviour, Howard questions whether it is plausible to discount the role of non-epistemic values within the research process.

In referring to Harré’s (1979) perspective of active human agency where personal power, agency, moral responsibility and self determination are brought to the fore, instead of being background assumptions in psychological investigations of human phenomena, Howard (1985) suggests that psychology ought to accommodate non-epistemic values within the conduct of psychological research because they steer the reflexive abilities of researchers engaged in the research process. However, while I would agree that incorporating alternative values into the research process is necessary, I would suggest that their inclusion ought to be, limited to the level of procedure. In critiquing Kaupapa Maori Research I show that a research project that is fundamentally value driven does not necessarily expand on our current knowledge. In fact, I believe that research strategies such as Kaupapa Maori Research can perpetuate an implicit regressive idealism in which suppressed hypotheses are confirmed by virtue of prior conviction, rather than warrantable evidence. The circularity that characterises Kaupapa Maori Research occurs through non-epistemic values permeating the research practice from the initial formulation of hypotheses through to the confirmation of hypotheses. Put simply, from reviewing
the theoretical and empirical commitments of Kaupapa Maori Research, I accept that the incorporation of non-epistemic values has a place at the level of procedure. However, the heightening of these values to represent a cultural form of epistemic criteria is misguided because it ignores the need for clear and transparent standards by which our research processes may be directed, and the products of our research projects may be evaluated.

In view of the current status of Maori over-representation across the spectrum of negative social indices it is critical that research which is oriented to addressing empirical problems does so with the guidance of clear methodological principles. Our prevention and promotion efforts depend on how well our problems are formulated and if they are continually formulated within the self-referential regressive idealism that permeates a research strategy such as Kaupapa Maori Research, then the challenge of addressing problems where Maori are over represented will not be met. Therefore, the interconnection between knowledge and attitudes, and prevention and promotion, spells the need for a link between the premium that we place on epistemic criteria to guide our research efforts and knowledge of how our research efforts come to inform our prevention and promotion strategies.

**Prevention, promotion, social policy and philosophy of science**

The flow diagram (in Figure 1) makes a connection between prevention and promotion, social policy, and philosophy of science that feeds back into prevention and promotion. My rationale for making these connections concerning the mental health of Maori is because I am committed to the position that there is an ethical obligation to theorise the mental health of Maori realistically. Values imported from the knowledge and attitudes component of the diagram will influence the prevention and promotion strategies that are endorsed by social policy formulations. If non-epistemic values are given priority over epistemic values in the conduct of theoretical and empirical work which seeks to address current mental health problems of Maori, the teleological notions of belief will be given priority over epistemic commitments drawn from the philosophy of science. The prioritising of non-epistemic values over epistemic values and criteria is precisely what
characterises the standard view of Maori health, and it is suggested that this is the major impediment to a realistic theorising of the mental health of Maori.

In the perspective offered, I draw on the work of Seedhouse (1997, 1998) to situate the beginning of a realistic view of the mental health of Maori being developed within the context of ethics. The main assumption of the perspective developed is that the reduction of uncertainty is the underlying objective of conceptual innovations that seek to develop better explanations for current problems. Following from this, I suggest that the reduction of uncertainty about the mental health of Maori can be obtained by avoiding explanations that have been derived from supernatural notions of the causation of illness. Moreover, I suggest that the interpreting of the mental health of Maori although often framed within a conflict of epistemic and non-epistemic values, is better framed within a context of conceptual innovation which seeks to reduce uncertainty by producing improved theories of causation. Regarding this latter point, it is argued that the reduction of uncertainty is an ethical affair, for the simple reason that the mental states of individuals ought to be treated ethically in both theory and practice.

In Chapter 2 there are four sections. By way of introduction, the first section presents an exposition of the relevance of philosophy of science to the discipline of psychology. Although the association between epistemology of science and scientific psychology continues to generate debate (Koch, 1993; Kornblith, 1994; Slife and Williams, 1997) the main point is that the objectives of both domains facilitate a relationship of mutual exchange between aims, theories, and concepts. The second section provides a brief history of logical empiricism because often it is this theory of science to which postmodernists and cultural relativists direct their strongest criticisms in regard to the conduct of scientific inquiry. In the third section I look at a number of perspectives which being committed to a certain view of knowledge production come under the umbrella of postmodernism. Cultural relativism, social constructionism and post-structuralism are all briefly attended to, but these views are more fully covered in Chapter 5. However, the point of the third section is to offer a constructive critique of the postmodern project where I believe the standard views of the mental health of Maori are currently situated. Chapter 3 of this thesis extrapolates this latter point in direct relation to historical and
contemporary theories of acculturation as they relate to explanations provided for the mental health status of Maori. In the fourth section of the following chapter I offer an overview of the theory of science which has informed this thesis being scientific realism. The theoretical commitments of scientific realism are outlined by drawing on the works of some of the major contributors supporting this theory of science. In order to offer a contrasting view to the theory of science of scientific realism I briefly sketch Siegel’s (1987) refutation of epistemological relativism.
Chapter Two

Epistemology of science and scientific psychology

Corballis (1990), in referring to the historical fact that psychology emerged from philosophy, crystallises the congruence between both domains aptly by noting that they both pursue the common objective of understanding the nature of the human mind. Papineau (1996) considers that the philosophy of science ought to be regarded as two distinct sub-fields namely the epistemology of science and the metaphysics of science. While the epistemology of science takes as its subject matter the justification or warrantable evidence for conjectural theories of science, the metaphysics of science is more interested in laws and properties characterising or governing causation. Within the following analysis it is the epistemology of science which I believe more closely reflects the psychologist’s pursuit of developing conjectural theories of knowledge about human affect, behaviour and cognition. My main rationale for suggesting that the epistemology of science is the more fitting description is that psychology as presently theorised and practiced remains occupied with the objective of revealing generalisations about human thought and action. Developing a generalisation or normative account about human behaviour into a causal law may certainly be the higher goal of psychological inquiry, but it would be premature to suggest that this objective reflects the current status of psychology as a science. On the assumption that the causal connections between brain states and behaviours will in time become more clearly established many theorists anticipate that a future psychological science may in fact more closely mirror the metaphysics of science (Churchland, 1995; Wilson, 1998).

With the current status of scientific psychology in mind however, the main theme to be exhorted here is the role of explanation that the epistemology of science performs in direct relation to the role of description undertaken within psychology. It is the bi-directional influence between description and explanation which I believe, has fundamental importance in developing an understanding of the relevance of the epistemology of science for contemporary psychological theory and practice. In
coming to understand something of the inter-relationship between the explanatory objective of epistemology and the descriptive role performed by psychology a subject described as 'Maori mental health' may be demystified to better reflect the real world problem which such a descriptive title purports to represent. However, before embarking on an exposition of the important relationship between description and explanation it is necessary to first say something about the history of science. The following two sections attempt to sketch the movement from one theory of science, namely logical empiricism, to the popular account of social constructionism prescribed by the postmodern project.

**A brief history of logical empiricism**

In what has invariably been referred to as the 'crisis in psychology' (Gergen, 1979; Harding, 1987; Sherif, 1987; Murphy, 1990; Shames, 1990; Hoshmand and Polkinghorne, 1992; Haraway, 1991; Slife and Williams, 1997) the familiar argument of contemporary psychology harbouring empiricism within its psychological method arises as the critical factor characterising the 'crisis'. In framing the pervasive presence of logical empiricism in the history of science, Kukla (1989) reports that psychology has stood as one of empiricism's staunchest allies. Churchland (1986), in tracing the history of science describes the support of logical positivism up to the 1930's and the broad scale acceptance of logical empiricism up to the 1980's, a period that also marks the development of more transformative accounts of science. Logical empiricism, being the heir to logical positivism, advocated the view that sense data drawn from observations and interpreted through formal logic comprised the foundation of what there was to know about scientific knowledge. As Churchland describes it, the emphasis was placed on observation sentences putatively expressing sensory experience. The aim of logical empiricism was therefore to systematically produce a system of objective knowledge on the premise that the logical interpretation of sense data culminated in scientific facts about human experience.
The method used by logical empiricists to formally interpret observational statements was the hypothetico-deductive method (Popper, 1972). It was proposed that this method of justification for the purported truth-value of sensory statements led to the explanation of observational data. In truncated form, the hypothetico-deductive account of method specifies that the truth-value of a hypothesis can be corroborated through deducing observations, initial and speculative conditions, or consequences from empirical observations, which are then similarly subjected to test. Through a process of modification and elimination of selected consequences the idea is that eventually the hypothesis will be corroborated (Haig, 1992). While extensive criticisms have rightfully been levelled at logical empiricism, Churchland (1986) expresses the view that the conception of science that it fostered promised an overarching grand scheme of knowledge that in its simplicity was quite elegant. The problem of course was that it was flawed. Logical empiricism, in being built on the premise that a unified theory of science could eventually emerge through the amassing of ‘facts’ produced deductively by corroborated hypotheses, failed to confirm the assumed ‘fact’ of its own objectivity. In short, the truth-value of observational statements could not be guaranteed through conviction or experience alone. Logical empiricism did not produce an inviolable method of scientific inquiry where the movement from describing observational data to the production of explanatory theories ensured smooth passage. Observational statements were influenced by a priori background assumptions and unless the truth-value of the background assumptions could be verified, the bedrock of foundational science looked decidedly unstable. However, as a philosophy of science, logical empiricism prescribed a method that corresponded to the objectives of psychology, for the reason that it appeared to offer an algorithmic account of a research process which led to explanatory knowledge. Once it was acknowledged that ‘facts’ derived from observational data could not be assumed to have epistemic value by virtue of their hypothetico-deductive rendering it was also made clear that the relationship between description and explanation was considerably more complex than formerly thought. Logical empiricism, as the received view of the conduct of scientific inquiry required revision, a fact, which also had implications for psychological science.
In having to address the \textit{a priori} basis of the background assumptions that came to form the contents of hypotheses, not only scientific method was put into question, but concomitantly, the epistemological and ontological commitments of logical empiricist thought were also up for review. The assumption that facts led to theories which then led to truth was no longer tenable. In the context of summarising the interrelationship between evaluation theory and practice, Shadish, Cook and Leviton (1991) outline a number of reflexive questions which ought to be asked by evaluators before they engage in practice. My reason for listing a few of these questions is that they serve to illustrate the conceptual reflexivity required when matching theoretical objectives with empirical pursuits. Included are questions such as: What criteria is the evaluator to use to determine what constitutes knowledge? What standards are to be used to match the goal of an evaluation with the methods undertaken? How is an evaluator to determine a desired level of certainty? And, how is a critical evaluation to be undertaken of the evaluation performed? The answers to the questions posed by Shadish et al. (1991) will yield a number of theoretical responses which if correct, ought to reflect something of the nature of evaluation as an empirical activity. If there is a serious mismatch between the theoretical responses relative to the practical activities engaged in when undertaking an evaluation, then the practice of evaluation will have to be re-examined in terms of the theoretical assumptions underlying evaluation as an empirical activity. The conclusions drawn from empirical evaluation will also have to be submitted for re-examination and it was precisely the results obtained from this type of reflexive action that the main tenets of logical empiricism could not counter.

Logical empiricism became a casualty in the history of science, ill-equipped to sustain the barrage of assaults that came once the flag bearer of hypothetico-deductive method was found to be wavering. For psychology the downfall of logical empiricism as an adequate theory of science reverberated through its mainstay structures. Criticisms that were largely unsympathetic and unforgiving were levelled at the discipline's view of a 'subject' (Danzinger, 1988, 1990), and relatedly, the concepts of self and identity (Baumeister, 1987; Sampson, 1985, 1988), culture (Austin-Broos, 1987), gender (Cook and Fonow, 1986; Sherif, 1987), and sexuality (Rich, 1980; Brown and Jordanova, 1981). The implications of logical empiricism's dependence on assuming the objectivity of observational data went to the core of the
discipline of psychology reverberating out to the various sub-fields of psychology. In particular, clinical psychology was set the task of examining its value judgements and generalisations about the 'subject' who being a highly complex entity was now possibly a constructed one (Fabrega, 1979, 1989, 1992; Hoshmand & Polkinghorne, 1992). By retrospecting on the history of science and the assumptions that had come to form ordinary and professional opinion, the histories of alternative viewpoints, nationalities and cultural groups, were also brought into question. If logical positivism, and later, logical empiricism were governed by theories of science which produced knowledge of the world and their methods were flawed, then knowledge gained within these research paradigms was also fallible. Hence, the emergence of competing theories of science, such as social constructionism, arose out of the discourse of postmodernism, a discussion of which now follows.

The project of postmodernism: demystifying the West to reveal the 'Other'

The critique of modernity and its products across the spheres of knowledge production (Lennon & Whitford, 1994), industrial and technological progress (Postman, 1993; Todd, 1995; Feenberg & Hannay, 1995), political economy (Nelson & Grossberg, 1988), gender and ethnic exchange (Haraway, 1991), and territorial expansionist programmes (Mosse, 1978; Adas, 1989; Dicken & Lloyd, 1990), are the main expressions of postmodernist discourse. Postmodernism challenges the implied histories of all of these 'projects'. It deconstructs the assumptions embedded within the histories of science and technology, societies, geography, and literature, and in doing so, reconstitutes the absent 'voices' of those who have been unwitting and unwilling hosts and victims of the cultural imperialism which frames all of these projects (Seidman, 1994). The spatialisation of absence is characterised as silence and the postmodernist’s critical stance can be regarded as an attempt to extract from the invariably white noise of capitalist projects the silenced signals of the imperialised and colonised (Soja, 1993). ‘Western’ imperatives of patriarchy, progress and freedom, in excluding the marginalised and dominated have subsumed alternative modes of representation within a whitewashed narrative of how the ‘West’ was won (Munns and Rajan, 1995).
Postmodernism is a discourse on the West’s construction of ‘itself’ as the triumphant model society with liberal values, moral virtue, and democratic pride (Anderson, 1995). However, foreshadowing pious enlightenment and underlying the discourse of emancipation is the creation of the ‘Other,’ the sidelined and forlorn abstraction of only former novel and classificatory interest (see Dodds, Lawrence & Valsiner, 1997). The insignificant ‘Other’ is the nemesis of the ‘West,’ the closeted ellipsis of the normative account of historical progress provided by the West for the West. Accordingly, the official accounts of human nature have been written in a Western relativised genre whereby Western culture is synonymous with civilisation, liberation and advancement.

Postmodernism critiques the assumption that Western culture is the exemplar of human progress and brings into question the absence of alternative voices representing women (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1998), other cultures (Trask, 1991), other mentalities (Kleinman, 1980), and other possible worlds (Pere, 1994). As a critical discourse, postmodernism stresses the significance of the ‘Other’ and in deconstructing the historical relativism that has permeated all modernist projects offers an alternative vision of the West (Appleby, Covington, Hoyt, Latham & Sneider, 1996). Within the revisionist histories produced by postmodernism is the observing of a narcissistic tendency of the West to edit from official history the seemingly superfluous details and methods of power and corruption which enabled the West to assume the mantle of human achievement. Thus, the connection between power, politics and scientific progress become emblematic of the postmodernist’s search for representations of the ‘Other’. The absence of alternative voices, or ‘Other’ histories, was not a mere oversight on the part of historical scribes it was an intentional erasure of that which obscured the rendition of world history mandated by the West. Hence, postmodernism, in part, by retrieving alternative representations of the world has produced an ethnographic view of the West that doesn’t look as neatly uniform as it was once presupposed. Guibernau (1996) describes the West’s ethnographic reflection in Laing’s (1960) terms when he suggests that the image is characterised by an ontological insecurity comprising three forms of anxiety, namely engulfment, implosion and petrification. Reflective of an individual’s existential crisis, postmodernism has produced an image of the West which in historically
depersonalising and obliterating the identity of the ‘Other,’ reveals itself as distorted, fragmented and lacking solidarity.

The linking between postmodernism and anthropology is important here, as the anthropologist’s search for alternative domains of human expression has been particularly influential in furnishing postmodernity with its evidence for positive demarcation between the West and the ‘Others’. Appleby et al. (1996) refer to anthropology as the discipline which in advocating the principle of cultural relativism, developed the scientific concept of culture. Anthropology provided examples of alternative forms of the human condition where society was emphasised over human nature and successively contributed to the postmodernist’s view that the concept of human nature was in fact a Western construction. Western ideas of universal systems of human nature, knowledge, rationality, values, and social mores, had to be reconceptualised for according to the anthropologist there were cultural forms that the concept of universality just could not accommodate. Therefore, the postmodernist’s critical stance toward the concept of universality as being synonymous with colonisation complemented the anthropologist’s orthodox view that culture took precedence over ideas of human nature.

Anthropological studies such as Mead’s (1928) *Coming of Age in Samoa*, Benedict’s (1934) *Patterns of Culture*, and Malinowski’s (1927) *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* became famous and popular texts which showed that the West was not alone. There were ‘Others’ out there, and they thought differently, valued things differently, and had quite a different way of life. The anthropologist, in prospecting for human differences was able to contribute substantive ethnographies which in retrospect, confirmed the postmodernist’s point that if there was a true anthropocentricity it was the West’s preoccupation with ‘itself’ as the centre of the world. In order that there be no doubt that cultural domains cast sceptical shadows on any universalising principles developed by the colonising West, it was imperative that the distinctions made between the people of the West, and people of other cultures, went to the core of the assumptions about what might comprise the human condition.
Hippler (1985) offers the conjecture that this ‘going to the core’ of assumptions about the human condition is a distracting device which when applied to cultural domains avoids the within group variation of in particular, personality traits. Instead, major differences between the ostensible ‘Other’ and the Western ‘self’ are generally located when comparing extremes or central tendencies. On a more psychoanalytic note, Ebel (1986) perceives the tension that drives such distinctions as arising from the anti-scientific notion that all cultures have a pre-existent animus residing within them. The cultural ‘Other’ is therefore used as a tool to attack the animus of the culture in which the anthropologist’s reside. While Kuper (1994), with slightly more certitude if not poignancy, states relative to this disciplinary eclipse:

The intellectual contradictions within this consensus are nonetheless evident enough; and it also lays itself open to charges that are formulated in its own terms. If the focus is upon the experience of the ethnographer, the native may enquire why ethnography should serve as an exotic accompaniment to the psychotherapy of the Western self. (p. 543)

Brown (1991) in his book *Human Universals* offers an impressive critique of the mainstay assumptions of cultural relativism. Writing from within the discipline of anthropology, Brown suggests that it is at the level of motives where generic human traits and cultural similarities can be detected as implying signs of a universal human nature. For Brown, anthropology has placed itself in the unenviable position of insisting that culture is a distinct, yet arbitrary phenomenon, which cannot be reduced to phenomena studied in other disciplines. Committed to the premise that universals exist as a heterogenous set which are influenced by cultural conventions, Brown suggests that human biology and evolutionary psychology are two fields that have the potential to make important contributions to anthropology’s understanding of universal traits. More recently, Wilson (1998) has argued that there are invariant elements of human behaviour governed by primary and secondary epigenetic rules, which are present in all cultures throughout the world. Of interest, however, is Brown’s contention that anthropology is most vulnerable in its persistence in assuming that nature and culture represent disparate spheres, when the discipline itself does not have a viable method to test such an assumption.
In reviewing six key studies (covering colour classification, Samoan adolescence, gender roles of the Tchambuli, facial expressions, Sapir-Whorf's hypothesis of Hopi time, and the Oedipal complex) which have shaped anthropology's commitment to the premise that culture is the fundamental determinant of behaviour, Brown makes a critical case for re-examining how the central tenets on which these key studies were based and the conclusions drawn from these often cited studies both reinforce anthropology's adherence to cultural relativism. According to Brown (1991: 146), there is a hierarchy of propositions which embodies the dominant paradigm of anthropology. Paraphrasing Brown, these include:

1. Nature and culture are two distinct phenomenal realms.
2. Nature manifests itself in instincts (which are fixed action patterns) and culture manifests itself in learned behaviour.
3. Because human behaviour is the same everywhere, it is culture that explains differences between human populations.
4. Human universals are likely to reflect human nature.
5. Except for its extraordinary capacity to absorb culture, the human mind is a largely blank slate.
6. From 3 and 5 as listed above, it follows that culture is the most important determinant of human affairs.
7. Explaining what people do in biological terms is a reductionist fallacy; in extreme forms, explaining human affairs in any terms, other than culture itself, is a reductionist fallacy.
8. Being autonomous has an arbitrary and highly variable character.
9. Universals, because of 5 and 8 above, are few and insignificant in comparison to culture.

Supporting Wilson's (1998) contention that primary and secondary epigenetic rules may be our best window on understanding human nature as expressed through culture, Brown argues that the only valid assertion among this list is proposition 4. This, of course, is as long as it is not coupled with proposition 3. The overdetermination of culture in all of the above propositions illustrates the overlap in main assumptions between postmodernism and cultural relativism. In revisiting the claim made by Appleby, Covington, Hoyt, Latham and Sneider (1996), that anthropology developed the scientific concept of culture, it is worth considering it in relation to Brown's suggestion that anthropology does not have a valid method
of appraising its key commitments to cultural relativism. That is, like postmodernism, anthropology could be seen to rely on the central premise that cultural domains are enclaves removed from the normative influences of imperialism and colonisation, which it is assumed, also includes principles of scientific rationality. Anthropology's inability to test its key assumption reflects postmodernism's own assumption that cultural realms should be considered to be enclaves removed from other normative spheres, but concomitantly, also seriously influenced by imperialism and colonisation. This 'discourse of continuity of cultural domains' is therefore the foreground assumption and subject of anthropology, while for postmodernism it is the background assumption and object of reference. It is suggested that together anthropology and postmodernism co-construct what Rata (1996a) refers to as the unmediated critique of neo-traditionalism (pre-contact idealism) and modernity (post-colonial discourse), which ends in the rigid dichotomy of the West being either backgrounded (anthropology) as an influence or foregrounded (postmodernism) as an influence, upon cultural domains.

In relation to the discourse of continuity of cultural domains or alternatively, the unmediated critique of neo-traditionalism and modernity, it is worth noting the constructionist view of discourse as being the over-arching practice which according to Gergen (1994), constructs social objects and human minds. From the constructionist's perspective, language as the human species' primary mode of communication, dictates the way people come to know the world and come to know each other. The move from language being the principal mechanism by which we constitute and express knowledge of the world to the extension that distinct cultures will have alternative conceptions of the world is an implied assumption within the discourse of continuity of cultural domains. By definition, this view supports the notion of linguistic relativism. Language as bearer of social, historical and cultural knowledge forms is therefore, considered to be sufficient evidence to warrant the claims made by the constructionist that the cognitive and knowledge bases of 'Other' cultures cannot be understood from outside of the particular domain in which they have been developed. Hoare (1991), in her paper on the cultural relativity of identity epitomises this perspective when she says:
As is true for knowledge, identity is constructed from within the person and culture in which it is forged. Comparing Shawnee, Nootka, and Apache languages, for example, Whorf (1956) hypothesised that differences in world views exist because different languages reflect unique metaphysics that arise from their particular words, grammars and structures. These languages do not merely voice ideas, they shape and guide concepts and cognition itself. (p. 48)

Therefore, a useful connection can be made here between relativism and constructionism. That is, both the cultural relativist and the constructionist accept the view that cognition and behaviour are interned through culturally situated domains, and that language as the main communicative device within all human domains is complicit as a bearer of specific cognitions and behaviours. Constructionist thought, therefore, suggests that the cultural lexicon produces specific affect, behaviour and cognition. And the relativist expands on this assumption by evoking the premise that there is no inter-translatability between cultural domains of these 'culturally specific' affects, behaviours, and cognitions; because they are saturated with intra-cultural meaning.

Brown (1991) provides an example of the language and cultural interaction ascribed to in relativist and constructionist thought when reviewing the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Hopi time, or the absence of linguistic terms reflecting time within the Hopi culture, was supposedly evidence enough for Sapir and Whorf to contest the claim that the concept of time was universal and offer the radical hypothesis that time was culturally relative. I quote Whorf from Brown, who draws his quote from Carroll (1956):

I find it gratuitous to assume that a Hopi who only knows the Hopi language and the cultural ideas of his society has the same notions, often supposed to be intuitions, of time and space that we have, and that are generally assumed to be universal. In particular, he has no general notion or intuition of TIME as a smooth flowing continuum in which everything in the universe proceeds at an equal rate, out of a future, through a present into a past. (p 28, 1991)

As Brown reminds us, because time is a fundamental category of Western thought, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis provided support for the idea that there are no semantic universals. Extrapolated from this conjecture was the view that if time was
perceived differently in cultures, and language expressed different perceptions, then language builds different worlds. Heelan (1988) is one of the strongest advocates of this conjecture who supports the view that perception is the only valid instrument of ‘knowing’. However, Brown shows how Malotki (1983) refuted the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis by establishing that Hopi describe units of time and measurements of space metaphorically. Spatio-temporal metaphorisation is in fact, seen by Malotki as being favourably kept within Hopi culture through a system of calendrical records being utilised as time keeping devices. In looking for a reason as to why Whorf in particular, was led to draw his conclusions regarding Hopi time, Brown (1991) speculates that early students of American Indian languages required a better justification for their study than the accumulation of knowledge, and the search for extreme relativism provided such a justification. Also pertinent is the point made by Brown, that it is from the early German romantic thinkers such as Humboldt and Boas that ideas of extreme linguistic and cultural relativism, first emerge. Kuper (1994), in tracing the history of culture in anthropology, identifies the move from Berlin to Columbia University by Boas at the turn of the nineteenth century, where the orthodox view reflected in the Volksgeist expression of cultural domains as incommensurate and distinct ways of being, gained support and momentum. Kuper states:

The Boasian scholars identified culture as a distinct historical agency, the cause of variation between populations and the main determinant of consciousness, knowledge and understanding. In contradiction to the evolutionists, they insisted that cultural history did not follow any set course. A culture was formed by contacts, exchanges, population movements. Each culture was a historically and geographically specific accretion of traits. And if there was no necessary course of cultural development, cultures could not be rated as higher or lower. The Boasians favoured a relativist position. Values were culturally viable, and so there could be no objective evaluation of cultural traits (p. 539)

The extension of this view, known as neo-Boasian cultural anthropology, was expanded through the incorporation of anthropology into Parsonian social science at Harvard University in the middle of the century. Geertz is the notable graduand from this interdisciplinary programme which enlarged upon the theoretical bases of culture by insisting that culture was a web comprising physical, biological,
sociological and cultural concepts. The refining by Geertz of Boasian ideas of culture led to the interpreting of cultural domains as a system of symbols and from anthropology's new interpretative perspective, this meant the introduction of literary analysis into anthropology. Interpreting the symbolic meanings expressed within cultural domains further led to the appreciation that the anthropologist's own standpoint was complicit in the nexus of possible interpretations given to cultural expressions. And following this, anthropology acceded to the conclusion that it did not provide authoritative accounts of culture, but rather, bricolage, or 'inscribed texts'.

Kuper (1994) argues that it was the movement in the 1970's and 1980's by predominantly French theorists that saw the incorporation of a political consciousness into cultural and social anthropology. A politicised consciousness was, therefore, instituted into the discipline of anthropology, whereby the main intellectual enterprise moved from an awareness of global politics to a more personalised critique of identity, gender, and representation. The inclusion of literary analysis into anthropology demanded that the anthropologist become aware of their own gendered, economic, political and cultural complicity in shaping cultural texts as an 'outsider' who could never 'truly' access the inner sanctum of 'Other' minorities' enclaves. In rejecting global narratives and grand theories the postmodern anthropologist, now sceptical of the ethnographic method and armed with hermeneutic resources, moved to critiquing the value ladeness of observations made of the 'Other' in their discipline, as well as in other social sciences.

Scientific empiricism, framed as the grand theory of science, was identified as a major accomplice in the myopic and often distorted representations of the 'Other,' which led to the postmodern anthropologist's conviction that objectivity was a pernicious myth. But, as Kuper asserts, relative to cultural anthropology, if objectivity was a problem for social scientists then the same could not be said of the former ethnographic subject who had now become the native informer. The rhetorical move by anthropologists, whereby they became the mediums of native informers was also underscored by the tenet that any editorial mark on the text reflected the hand of domination. Yet, according to Kuper, the convergence between a mistrust in objectivity and the search for democracy led to the nativist
ethnographer being able to claim that by virtue of being native, they had access to intuitive and reliable knowledge. Moreover, as Kuper rightfully identifies, the fact that academia has offered little in the way of challenging this *reductio ad absurdum*, means that ethnic identity has become an abstract criterion of reliability and validity when social science theory and praxis attempts to make any engagement with culture. With an almost sardonic tone, Kuper (1994) sums up this situation quite succinctly in the following passage:

> The point is that one cannot trust every native. Only an authoritative native can say what is truly native; and authority is not necessarily bestowed by academic qualifications - on the contrary, these may be the stigmata of the sell-out. Others grant special authority to the avant-garde native, who understands what the natives think and feel tomorrow, whose role it is to crystallise their emergent consciousness. (p. 546)

As the above passage makes clear, within academia one finds the support, rather than scrutiny, of the juxtaposing of nativist discourse and what Kuper refers to as, ‘colonising metropolitan languages’. Like the political demand placed on the anthropologist to self-reflexively conscientise their own complicity in the construction of cultural texts, Kuper forwarns that the politics of culture are not immune from the random criterion of ethnic identity.

To summarise, both relativist and constructionist discourses are accommodated by and emanate from, postmodernism. Postmodernism’s critique of the West questioned the absence of the 'Other' in the 'totalising' discourses created by the West which spoke in terms of universalising principles. Anthropology, as a discipline concerned largely with human cultural domains, was able to offer contrasting accounts of cultural forms that did not necessarily reflect the principles of universality that featured in accounts of human nature. Texts were produced by anthropologists clearly outlining distinct differences between the people of the 'West' and the 'Other' who occupied alternative cultural domains. Within these texts, the emphasis was placed on society as the principal shaper of difference between people. This emphasis maintained the anthropologist's commitment to culture being the central influence in shaping affect, behaviour and cognition. An important belief, supported by both relativists and constructionist's is, therefore, the acceptance that
all human behaviour is constructed by the societal domain in which the individual develops. Both relativists and constructionists support a commitment to linguistic relativism for they emphasise language as being the main mechanism of deep transference between mind and culture. However, the prominence accorded to the West is backgrounded by relativism and foregrounded by constructionism. The convergence between anthropology and literary analysis which leads to post-structuralist accounts of cultural domains, including the West, has simultaneously led to the deep suspicion and subsequent rejection of the objectivity of ethnography authors. The repudiation of objectivity on the basis that it perpetuates domination and silence has led to the paradox in which the native is at once seen as an unwitting and generally subaltern subject of 'colonising metropolitan languages,' as well as the objective authority of nativist discourse.

According to Norris (1997), the scepticism apparent within the denial that there are satisfactory criteria for evaluation of propositions emerges precisely from post-structuralist literary criticism. Central to Norris's perspective is the view that it is Quine's ontological relativism (1969) and Kuhn's (1962) radical meaning variance that provides post-structuralist theorists with the critical resources necessary to offer critiques of scientific domains and knowledge. However, Norris suggests that these two theses merely give a partial articulation of the constraints and conditions implied within the distinction drawn between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Therefore, accepting the view that observation statements are context specific, theory laden, and underdetermined by evidence, does not lead to the conclusion that there can be no meaningful comparison between rival theories, that progress and rationality are to be abandoned, and that scientific desiderata are metaphors for language games. For Norris, anti-realisitcs and cultural relativists borrow extensively from the authoritarian rhetoric espoused by post structuralism. The move from critiquing moralising discourses within literature to the critique of science, over-extends post structuralism's own 'boundary conditions' and as Norris argues, is unable to satisfactorily test its own presumptive warrant. In regard to this over-extension, Norris offers the following insight:

For what drops out of sight at this stage is the distinction between on the one hand those varieties of discourse (scientific, philosophic, theoretical, historical,
sociological etc.) where truth claims are always in question, and where the relevant criteria include - for instance - observational warrant, factual evidence, logical consistency and inference to the best (most adequate) explanation, and *on the other hand* language as deployed in the creation of fictive, poetic or imaginary worlds where such conditions are understood not to apply, or if so, then at a certain implicit remove from the normative sphere of veridical utterance. It is the difference, in short, between contexts of enquiry where statements may be judged true or false, and contexts, like that of literary interpretation - where the assignment of determinant truth-values is rarely (if ever) possible. This distinction is everywhere under attack in the more 'advanced' quarters of postmodern cultural debate. (pp 5-6)

Therefore, Norris's (1997) criticism of post-structuralism makes two points: First, the post-structuralist fails to observe the boundary conditions of his or her own discipline, namely literary criticism. Secondly, the context of literary criticism does not have standards of epistemic justification available to evaluate the presumptive warrant of post-structuralist assertions. The first concern relates directly to the context of discovery whereby Norris challenges post-structuralism to identify what it is within science that is of most concern to the post-structuralist. If the concern is simply with the motivations that drive science and the former heterodoxies of logical positivism and logical empiricism then the post-structuralist could stand accused of being a moralist without standards who persists in whipping a dead horse. In the second regard, Norris turns our attention to the absence of a context of justification within literary criticism. Basically, post-structuralist criticism of science is a self-refuting doctrine because it makes incoherent its central premise that there are no epistemic desiderata by which claims of truth in science can be assessed. If the post-structuralist is satisfied that the claim that there are no epistemic desiderata by which claims of truth can be assessed is true, then he or she must have standards by which their own claim of truth can be made and assessed. In fact, the post-structuralist does not have any such standards and therefore, their doctrine is self-refuting. Furthermore, epistemic desiderata by which claims of truth are assessed within the domains of science cater's for the fact, that human judgement is fallible. That is, there is a certain humbleness about the cognitive capacities of human beings, which is built into epistemic desiderata. Reducing science to the political sphere whereby the moralising discourses of the relativists, the constructionists and the post-structuralists, become the mainstay of public opinion leads not to a more liberal,
democratic and autonomous society, but to a doctrine which is dogmatically based on political correctness, 'other' institutionalised authorities, and mistrust.

To conclude this section I give a brief overview of Siegel’s (1987) analysis of epistemological relativism. My rationale for sketching the key tenets of Siegel’s critique is that epistemological relativism can be regarded as the theory of knowledge adhered to by postmodernists. For my purposes here, Siegel’s refutation of epistemological relativism serves as an important precursor to the following section on scientific realism. The main implication of Siegel’s analysis is that the endorsement of any theory of knowledge from a theoretical relativist position is seen to be not on the basis of epistemic merit, but rather motivated by aesthetic, social or political aims.

Siegel (1987) presents two basic arguments against the defence of relativism as a coherent epistemological thesis. The first argument he refers to as the ‘undermines the very notion of rightness’ argument. Basically, Siegel makes clear that theories of approximate truth require epistemic criteria to evaluate the epistemic value of theoretical propositions. Taking the position that a theory of knowledge can only be evaluated by those to whom it may be relative, or alternatively, refusing to accept that there are epistemic criteria available for theory appraisal, are insufficient reasons for disclaiming that approximate truth is an achievable goal. This has significant implications for postmodernism. Postmodernists must believe that their postmodern conceptions of subjectivity, culture and power are true, therefore, they must accept approximate truth as a warrantable if not achievable goal. In believing the truth-value of their own propositions, postmodernists are committed to supporting a theory of truth, yet they argue principally and stridently against truth. If postmodernists are in fact, only arguing against ‘alternative kinds of truth,’ but are committed to their own ‘kind of truth’, then they need to provide criteria to show why their ‘kind of truth’ is to be preferred over other ‘alternative kinds of truth’. Postmodernism cannot do this, but it still argues for the truth-value of its central arguments, while denying that truth exists. Therefore, postmodernism ‘undermines the very notion of rightness’ by insisting that the arguments it supports are epistemically justifiable in the absence of any criteria that confirm or disconfirm that this is the case.
The second criticism that Siegel levels against epistemological relativism is referred to as the ‘necessarily some beliefs are false’ argument. Using cultural relativism to illustrate this point, it could be the case that disputes about what qualifies epistemic knowledge cannot be adjudicated on the basis that what is true for one cultural group may not be true for another cultural group. A cultural group’s consensus about what is regarded as truth for that group may be ‘just so’. Concomitant with this view would be the opinion that what is true for the cultural group is epistemic by virtue of it being believed to be so by the group. This is the position supported by postmodernism in regard to cultural relativist discourse. If we accept the assertion that warrantable truth is granted on the grounds that the cultural group consensus justifies knowledge claims to be regarded as epistemic, then to be consistent with this view, we must also support the claim that all cultural groups’ beliefs are true. Accordingly, if the consensus of one cultural group maintains that the world is flat and another cultural group maintains that the world is spherical, then both beliefs are true. As a consequence, advocates of the ‘world is flat’ view would also have to submit to the truth-value of the ‘world is spherical’ position to remain consistent with the perspective that cultural group consensus represents epistemic knowledge. The fate of this argument is that a cultural group supporting the ‘world is flat’ view cannot accept the epistemic virtue of the ‘world is spherical’ position if they are to maintain that their own view is true. To say that the world is both flat and spherical would be contradictory and incoherent. Therefore, on Siegel’s (1987) terms, the cultural relativist is obliged to accept that ‘necessarily some beliefs are false,’ to avoid self-refutation. If some beliefs are false, then the cultural relativist must also submit to the possible conclusion that their own convictions of belief, perhaps formulated on the basis of consensus, may also be false. Thus, the doctrine of epistemological relativism is unable to be sustained. In the following section I outline the theory of science known as scientific realism. In contradistinction to the views of scientific knowledge advocated by logical empiricism and social constructionism, scientific realism neither over-extends the truth-value of observational data nor rescinds the scientific objective of advancing better approximations of the truth. Kukla (1998) offers an indepth analysis of the multitude of realist positions available, but for my purposes here the account provided, only attempts to forward scientific realism’s generally agreed on propositions.
Competing Theory of Science: Scientific Realism

Boyd (1996) contends that for scientific realism to be regarded as a viable theory of science it has to be able to defend its theoretical commitments against two related considerations. First, scientific realism must be able to offer an account of the history of science. Secondly, it ought to be able to forward a view explaining the success of science. In short, scientific realism must be able to explain the shortcomings of alternative theories of science as well as the features of these alternative conceptions of science that made them partially successful. In respect of these considerations, Boyd suggests that the realist considers science to be a pursuit engaged in driving toward better approximations of theoretical knowledge. Scientific realism, therefore, does not advocate that our scientific theories are developed and empirically deployed to arrive at the truth, but rather, that they aim to successfully approximate the truth. In comprehending the history of science as a succession of projects that worked toward obtaining better approximations of theoretical knowledge it is possible to understand the limitations and strengths of various accounts and methods of scientific practice. Following on from this, the success of science is comprehensible when we take into account the fact some scientific theories and methods produced better approximations of theoretical knowledge than others.

Sismondo (1996) explains Boyd's (1996) view by describing the point that the theory dependency of reliable methods, and the subsequent derivation of reliable knowledge from these methods, means that some theories guiding research practices are approximately true. Progress in science, from the scientific realist perspective, is therefore, at least in part, due to the successful interaction between theory and methodology. Importantly, scientific realism brings to the fore the theory dependency or value-ladeness of empirical methods. In doing so, the relationship between explanatory theory and descriptive methods is articulated as a theoretical and empirical pursuit. Hence, the exchange between philosophy of science and scientific psychology in regard to the study of human behaviour can be characterised as bi-directional. This is because scientific realism acknowledges what logical empiricism failed to acknowledge - empirical methods are theory-laden. The maxim that theory informs practice, which in turn informs theory, is especially pertinent in
describing the dialectical unity advocated by scientific realism in regard to theory and method (Boyd, 1996). The level of correspondence obtained between data drawn from empirical methods and the associated conjectural theories postulated toward the data, if successful, will be a reflection of the integral relationship between explanatory theory and descriptive method advocated by scientific realism (Haig, 1987). Kukla (1989) in an insightful exposition of the affiliation between theory and empirical method in psychology forwards a number of examples illustrating the critical significance of this relationship. The activities of theory construction, the development of evaluative criteria for theory appraisal, and the deriving of new empirical consequences from existing theories are, but a few activities he mentions.

On the basis of defending the view that the history of science can be understood in terms of its limitations and successes, Boyd (1984) offers a set of propositions that he believes characterise the main commitments of scientific realism as a viable theory of science. First, he argues that theoretical terms ought to be regarded as putatively referring expressions. In this statement, Boyd is suggesting that scientific theories should be interpreted realistically because such a view affords better epistemic access to the world. That is, our theories should be formulated on the basis of what they purport to denote of the world, and as a consequence, our interpretations of theories should be consistent with their denotation. In a sense, within this commitment, Boyd is articulating the view that our epistemic and ontological referents describing data or phenomena ought to correspond when we are constructing a theory. The successful correspondence between epistemic and ontological referents would demand that the theory, so constructed, be interpreted realistically. Therefore, the second commitment outlined by Boyd states that scientific theories, interpreted realistically are confirmable and in fact are confirmed as approximately true, by ordinary methodological standards. The point that Boyd makes is that if our theories correspond to their epistemic and ontological referents, then empirical methods are amenable to appraising the approximate truth-value of our theories. However, because theories are always revisable, and therefore, fallible, in light of new evidence being produced, the confirmation of a theory by ordinary methodological standards only provides a partial assurance of approximating truth. The third commitment of scientific realism described by Boyd states that historical progress of mature sciences is largely a matter of successively more accurate
approximations to the truth about more observable and non-observable phenomena. Implicit in this commitment is the critical interaction between our theoretical and methodological pursuits as mentioned above. As Boyd, in adding to this commitment notes, successive theories generally build on observational and theoretical knowledge embodied in other theories. That is, the accumulative gain of scientific knowledge is characterised by substantive revising of both theory and method where knowledge claims are always provisional and tentative. The last commitment that Boyd furnishes as a fundamental feature of scientific realism, is that the reality which scientific theories describe is largely independent of our thoughts. Sismondo (1996) describes this commitment of scientific realism as, the ‘mind-independence’ tenet. In short, scientific realism endorses the view that there are features of the material world that are independent of, or unobservable by human cognitive inquiry; objective reality exists independently of our cognising it. Hooker (1987), however, cautions that the term ‘independent’ needs to be understood as describing a logical independence, not a causal independence, from the notion of an objective reality. In summary, Boyd’s (1984, 1996) exposition of scientific realism culminates in a perspective which configures the interaction between epistemology, ontology and methodology, as being enmeshed within scientific endeavour.

Hooker (1987), in outlining a framework that for him incorporates the main tenets of scientific realism describes a configuration including metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic components. The metaphysics of a realist thesis simply subscribes to the premise as outlined above, that a ‘mind-independent’ reality exists, and that epistemic access to that reality, although constrained by our logical capacities, is knowable. Principally, this metaphysical thesis, while observing that cognitive constraints may frustrate our access to the world, doesn’t deny that the world is causally interconnected (Cherniak, 1986). Greenwood (1992) describes this premise of realism, as a refusal to set a priori limits on the contents of our theoretical descriptions. Manicas and Secord (1983) have described the same notion as thus: The world and science are stratified and the levels of stratification constitute a complex, interactive system of experience, events and mechanisms, which comprise reality. The laws of nature apply and operate even in the absence of experimental closure. Because the world is an open system we need to construct theories about structures and their causal properties.
In view of the interrelationship between causal structure and cognitive constraint, Hooker’s second component of scientific realism comprises a treatment on semantics. Constituting four sub-theses, the semantic component includes: (1) That truth consists in an appropriate correspondence relation holding between language and the world; (2) Accordingly, theoretical truth obtains or fails independently of all epistemic acceptance or rejection. (3) Theories of science are candidates for truth as well as for epistemic acceptance or rejection, and therefore; (4) Theoretical terms have semantic content appropriate to their being components of truth candidates and this semantic content is not wholly reducible to the semantics of observation terms. In paraphrasing Hooker, a realistic semantics presupposes the corresponding relation between language, cognition and reality. This is because it is accepted that conjectural theories that arise from the concordance between descriptive data and theoretical terms will always have semantic content. Acknowledging that conjectural theories do have semantic content is, in a sense, a statement that forewarns against reducing the truth-value of theories to the semantics of observation terms. Greenwood (1998) expresses this view most cogently in his account of the role semantics play in psychological ascription. In basic form, Greenwood postulates that often the roles of description and explanation are conflated in the ascribing of beliefs, emotions or motives to human behaviour. Critically, it is the semantic contents of observational and theoretical terms produced through ascription which according to Greenwood, causes the confusion between description and explanation.

Finally, the last component that features in Hooker’s realist framework is the epistemic component. This component strongly supports Boyd’s (1984, 1996) view that the approximate truth-value of our theories will be a testimony to their epistemic adequacy. Therefore, the attitude that we take to a conjectural theory’s virtue will be a function of how well a theory’s theoretical terms stand up to epistemic evaluation. In direct contrast to epistemological relativism, the epistemic component of scientific realism advocates rigorous evaluation of our conjectural theories. That is, if the objective of science is to move toward better approximations of truth then it is critical that our conjectural theories are justified to represent such an objective. Fletcher (1995) provides a diagram that clearly identifies the significant relationships between the core components of scientific realism as described by both Boyd and
Hooker. I have reproduced Fletcher's model here in Figure 3 because it serves the purpose of giving a succinct orientation of the main features of scientific realism as they relate to the principal aims of psychological science.

![Fletcher's (1995) model of a realist version of scientific rationality.](image)

**Figure 3:** Fletcher's (1995) model of a realist version of scientific rationality.

Fletcher's (1995) diagram of a realist version of scientific rationality poignantly represents the mutual overlap between the aims of realism and the objectives of psychology more generally. Psychological science, in being the study of human behaviour seeks to produce better conjectural theories and generalisations about human behaviour. To do this, the methodological rules guiding empirical methods employed by psychologists need to reflect the epistemic values that correspond to the objectives of psychological science. In turn, as a source of critical evaluation, the epistemic values may improve on the coherency of our conjectural theories. The characterisation of theories and empirical methods as provisional, tentative and revisable is relatedly reflected in Fletcher's model by the level of interaction proposed between aims, values, rules and theories.
Further support for Fletcher's (1995) exposition of scientific realism as a viable theory of science for the discipline of psychology, is that implicit in his model is the capacity for interdisciplinary practice. That is, if there is a common aim shared between disciplines, then submitting that aim in this model to evaluation is entirely plausible. Although Manicas and Secord (1983) refute the enterprise of methodological individualism, and then move to an endorsement of theoretical pluralism, the issue at heart, to my mind, would be better stated in reverse. Subjecting a common aim to a plurality of methodological rules governed by commonly accepted epistemic values would seem to improve the chances of that aim being approximated by a well supported theory. The interactive categories of Fletcher's model (1995), the commitments described by Boyd (1984, 1996), and the component theses of Hooker's framework (1987), combine to comprise the main tenets of scientific realism, the theory of science adopted throughout this thesis. My adoption of scientific realism is based on the belief that the accounts of scientific realism described all lend support to the view that science is a dynamic, interactive and complex affair. As a theory of science, scientific realism enhances the interrelationship between epistemology and psychological science as it strongly advocates the interactive association between theoretical and methodological pursuits. The world is not a closed system, as the social constructionist would have us believe, because although our epistemic access to the world is constrained by our cognitive capacities, laws of causation or unobservable entities still exist. Furthermore, scientific realism comes well recommended because unlike the epistemological relativist, the realist makes no assumption about the truth-value of conjectural theories. The realist submits his or her conjectural theories to a process of theory appraisal governed by epistemic desiderata. If the conjectured theory does not meet the standards required by the epistemic desiderata then the theory is revised. Scientific realism takes the business of science seriously and demands that truth propositions be well appraised. In order to provide a theoretical context for the issue of main concern in this thesis, namely the interaction between Maori culture and psychological science, I briefly describe Rescher's (1990) view of 'parameter space'. My rationale for doing this, is that there are features of Rescher’s ‘parameter space’ of science that correspond to Bhabha’s (1996) ‘Third space of enunciation’ of cultural domains.
In this context, the important feature of Rescher's (1990) view of realism is his articulation of the nature-investigative interaction that he perceives as being transacted in the "parameter space" of our natural environment. For Rescher, it is the detection of cognitively significant phenomena in our physical environments, which leads to more innovative penetration of the parameter space. The expression 'parameter space' by Rescher reflects his reluctance to view the world per se as a stratified place. Instead, he believes that human nature is fundamentally anthropocentric and that the physical world while being law governed remains largely as it is. The main imperative for science, from Rescher's perspective, is therefore, the extension and expansion of our range of experience which will lead to the detection of more complex data sets representative of the law governed physical world. Investigative procedures are given due emphasis by Rescher, and he enunciates a triangulated view which incorporates the researcher, the parameter space, and technology in a co-existing synthesis. Observation, detection and the increasing sophistication of our instruments are dependent on an active-interactive systematic level of inquiry, and it is our conceptual horizons that must work to push against any predetermined standpoint. As he states:

Ongoing cognitive innovation thus need not be provided for by assuming (as a working hypothesis or otherwise) that the system being investigated is infinitely complex in its physical or functional make-up. It suffices to hypothesise an endlessly ongoing prospect of securing fuller information about it. The salient point is that it is cognitive rather than structural or operational complexity that is the key here. After all, even when a scene is itself only finitely complex, an ever ampler view of it will come to realisation as the resolving power of our conceptual and observational instruments is increased. And so, responsibility for the open-endedness of science need not lie on the side of nature at all but can rest one-sidedly with us, its explorers. (pp 21-22)

The parameter space that Rescher (1990) identifies as the apex between our cognitive ambitions and our physical reality in the nature-investigative interaction is useful as an analogue in drawing a comparison to Bhabha's (1996) 'Third space of enunciation'. Both Rescher and Bhabha articulate the juncture or alternatively, dialectical region, between our experience of the world and our epistemic constraints in being able to access the world. That is, similar to Cherniak (1986), Rescher and
Bhabha advance the fact that not only is our experience fundamentally constrained, but also our cognitive abilities to access, or make sense of our experience, is bounded. From individual cognition and experience, to institutional practice and cultural histories, epistemic access to the world is constrained. It is the intersection between seemingly disparate domains that Rescher and Bhabha suggest needs to be opened for conceptual exploration. Manicas and Secord (1983) have also offered a version of this objective in their exposition on the stratification of social structure. The dialectical method of conceptual exploration is used by both Rescher (1977) and Bhabha (1996) to systematically probe the historical and environmental 'interior', and in doing so, provide disputation models of progress and regress of their respective fields. Rescher's (1977) 'paradigm model of dialectics' outlines a number of methodological concepts such as burden of proof, presumption and plausibility which he describes as regulative devices useful in the impartial fixed ground of rational controversy.

Burden of proof is regarded as a two-fold rule, where once a conceptual assertion has been initiated the initiator must be prepared to maintain their assertion in the face of ulterior challenges. Maintenance of the assertion is dependent on the evidential weight of the initial assertion and where there are opposing considerations, it is the burden of the first initiator to offer sufficient evidence against the opposing considerations. From a scientific realist perspective, this concept is illustrated in Siegel's (1986) refutation of epistemological relativism outlined above. Presumption is defined as a tentative and provisional statement that is neither absolute or indefeasible. It is an assertion that is generally in favour of the normative view of concepts and things and only in the face of counter-indications or contradictions is an alternative presumption developed. Contrary views opposing the normative value of presumptions are developed through evidence and weighted for their plausibility against the former presumption. Formally, this rational consideration does away with foundationalism by disavowing the constancy of claimed truths. The plausible truth-value of our presumptions is critically cognitive, or what Rescher (1990) refers to as a matter of 'epistemic prudence'.

Along with the credentials backgrounding a new or revised contention is the way in which a dialectical method ascribes or is committed to, the epistemic values
implicit in a conceptual framework. For Rescher (1990), this does not necessarily aid a process toward an emergent or convergent truth, but rather is instrumental in changing the framework itself. The standard inductive desiderata are used to evaluate the plausibility of a new contention as well as its subsequent fit within a conceptual framework. And as Rescher suggests, the utility of burden of proof, presumption and plausibility as a heuristic method moves debate from a method of controversy to a method of inquiry. The pursuit of the dialectical method of inquiry, is, therefore, primarily an engagement in the parameter space and the purpose is to increase our knowledge forms by appraising the evidential weight of as many alternatives as feasible.

In the following chapter, I offer a review of the available literature on the mental health of Maori, which is the vehicle I use to engage the interface, or alternatively, dialectical region between Maori culture and psychological science. As this chapter has hopefully shown it is important to note that a domain of inquiry can be revised in regard to the historical assumptions that may have contributed to our contemporary formulations of a subject. In light of this fact, the following review seeks to draw the conclusion that our current conceptions of the mental health of Maori require considerable revision.
Chapter Three

The mental health of Maori: a review of the literature

In undertaking a review of the literature pertaining to the mental health of Maori it must be noted that any attempt to formulate a reliable picture of the field is thwarted by a number of problems which can be observed in the historical as well as more recent literature. The most immediate problem appears to be an absence of either theoretical or empirical material which objectively reports on what the subject of the mental health of Maori might comprise and what makes it distinct from the mental health of non-Maori. Within the historical literature the assumption implied is that the mental states of Maori are distinct from non-Maori on the basis of biological inheritance, yet there is no empirical verification supporting this assumption in any of the literature reviewed. The contemporary literature supports the historical literature by remaining uncritical of the ideological assumptions apparent in earlier analyses. The result of such theoretical ambivalence is that a movement from primordial to postmodern conceptions of the mental health of Maori can be identified. This movement corresponds to a conceptual shift in the discipline of anthropology from the earlier endorsement of social Darwinism to the later acceptance by anthropologists of cultural relativism (Rosman and Rubel, 1998).

Inadvertently, contemporary views reflect the notion that the main feature which makes the mental health of Maori distinct is biology because by definition, this historical assumption is supported by Maori placing conceptual emphasis on the notion of whakapapa. Although it appears that the historical and contemporary interpretations taken to the relationship between the mental states of Maori and biological inheritance are synonymous, what fails to be made clear in the literature is the usage of biological descent to represent either inter-cultural or intra-cultural affiliation. That is, biological descent is not necessarily synonymous with whakapapa as the former interpretation commonly refers to an inter-cultural distinction whilst the latter term refers principally to an intra-cultural or tribal
affiliation. Reflecting the conventional, yet flawed approach of using the etic-emic distinction within psychology which incidentally was also derived from earlier anthropological methods (Jahoda, 1995), the erroneous assumption that the intercultural and intra-cultural interpretations of inheritance represent the same thing, remains. In Chapter 4, I outline the methodological dilemma caused by this misconception more extensively, but for my purposes here the pertinent point is that neither the historical or contemporary literature addresses this fundamental problem.

Further complicating the conceptual flaw in circumscribing the mental health of Maori to a normative distinction on the basis of biological inheritance is that historical researchers confounded their analyses by using inconsistent data collection methods. Incidence and prevalence rates of Maori admissions to psychiatric institutions form the basis of most literature on the subject, but the unreliability of this method of reporting has a long history characterised principally by its arbitrariness. More to the point, the reporting of Maori admissions to psychiatric institutions has relied on the speculations of those collecting data at admission to determine the ethnicity of those being admitted. This method of collecting data means that the historical and contemporary reporting of rates of Maori admissions to psychiatric hospitals is inconsistent which compromises any realistic evaluation of the nature and extent of the problem of ‘Maori mental health’ being formed. That is, to date there is no clear indication from the available data whether the rate of mental illness among Maori is under reported or over reported.

Perhaps the major tension evident within the literature is the attempt by social scientists to engage with a culture which by most accounts they had little access to, and therefore, knew little about. This theme is evident throughout the literature where analyses having often been informed by secondary sources alone, are generalised to present a normative view of Maori cultural mores, attitudes and behaviours. The latent eurocentricism in this approach has resulted in the construction of a homogenised view of Maori that has similarly coveted a stereotype of Maori ‘normalcy’ endorsed and perpetuated by non-Maori and Maori scholars alike. The paradox of Maori culture being concomitantly theorised as a ‘whole totality’ and a culture enduring severe disruption (Webster, 1998), is also conspicuous throughout the historical and contemporary literature. Demonstrative of
this collusion of disparate perspectives of Maori society is the pervasive strategy of acculturation stress theorists to predicate their analyses on either one of two descriptions of Maori society. From predicking their analysis on one view the remaining description is frequently endorsed as either the cause or cure to the problem of Maori mental health. For instance, if an acculturation stress theorist begins their analysis by framing Maori culture as a ‘whole totality’ then the cause of Maori mental health is assumed to be cultural disruption. Inversely, if the analysis is premised on a view of Maori culture as being fragmented then the cure to the problem of Maori mental health is seemingly to simply create, a ‘whole totality’. However, by implication, both perspectives unwittingly support the view that within Maori society the potential for, or perpetuation of, a cultural pathology, exists. It is the historical and contemporary complacency taken to the problem of the mental health of Maori that this literature review attempts to reveal. I believe that the stark picture presented convincingly indicates the need for a reconceptualisation of the mental health of Maori.

Early articulations of the problem of ‘Maori mental health’

In citing the observations made by Tawell in 1838 and Dr John Tuke in 1864, Gluckman (1962) contends that mental illness among Maori in the nineteenth century was reported as being relatively rare. Considering that this period represents the birth of New Zealand as a colonial nation and that psychiatric medicine was also in its infancy this observation is not surprising. The terms, ‘lunacy’ and ‘insanity’ while expressing Victorian descriptions of mental illness could not be so well applied to a population where no normative standard of behaviour had been developed. However, as Gluckman describes, the expression ‘Rapidly Fatal Melancholia of the South Sea Islanders’ first penned by Goldie in 1854, may represent the first colonial description of a condition impacting on the mental health of Maori. Interestingly, ‘fatal melancholia’ as it was known, meant the ability to will oneself to death through overwhelming fear, anxiety or guilt. Yet, it is uncertain whether this condition existed in the Maori population prior to colonial settlement, whether it came as a result of colonial settlement, or alternatively, if it was simply the first observation made by a colonial settler of a condition seemingly peculiar to Maori.
In compiling a data set from New Zealand’s Survey Year Books from the years 1905 to 1960, Gluckman (1962) maintains from an ethnopsychiatric perspective, that as early as 1910, Maori were being admitted to mental hospitals with diagnoses of schizophrenia, manic depression, and mental defective disorders. And furthermore, that the rate of admission of Maori was disproportionate in comparison to that of non-Maori. In making reference to Beaglehole’s (1939) study of the medical records of Maori who had been admitted to an unspecified hospital, Gluckman also addresses the problem of early anthropologist’s offering biologically based appraisals of the mental health status of Maori. In the case cited, Gluckman stresses that Beaglehole’s lay interpretations of the hallucinatory contents of Maori experiencing a psychotic episode, with primarily diagnoses of schizophrenia and manic depression, were constrained by a racial framework. Such a framework did not have the capacity to take into account the historical nature of Maori belief, nor the aetiological stressors of continuing economic and environmental uncertainty. However, to balance this view it ought to be acknowledged that Beaglehole did in fact, direct attention to the problem of institutionalised Maori with mental disorders between the years 1925 and 1935, being assessed against a statistical norm based on European-derived patterns of behaviour. Moreover, in a later paper Beaglehole (1968) drew attention to the way in which the statistical norm was extrapolated to imply a homogenising picture of Maori societies. Although the diagnostic manner by which Beaglehole formulates his theoretical considerations might be questionable the issues he raises remain today as central concerns in cultural psychology (Cole, 1996), cross cultural psychology (Malpass, 1977; Piker, 1998), and ethnopsychology (Lilliard, 1998). Just as significantly, Beaglehole’s (1939, 1968) contributions ought to rightfully be contextualised in the mode of cultural interpretation that was prevalent at the time (see Dewey, 1931; Benedict, 1934; Levi-Strauss, 1962).

Gluckman’s (1962) main thesis is that the manifestation of mental illness in Maori individuals ought to be understood within the framework of a local hermeneutics. Concerning the diagnosis of mental disorder in Maori, Gluckman expounds the view that a distinction ought to be made between disorders of the psychogenically derived emotions, and disorders that are constitutionally determined. Unless mental health practitioners understand this distinction, Gluckman perceives the potential for misdiagnosis. Essentially, the argument that Gluckman
develops is that it is imperative that those in the position of diagnosing Maori with mental illness need to have a comprehensive understanding of the concepts of tapu, mate Maori, and makutu, so that they are able to interpret the belief contents expressed by Maori exhibiting signs of mental disorder.

In referring to the 'art of interpersonal relationships,' Gluckman (1962) metaphorically articulates a method of developing rapport with Maori individuals within a clinical setting that places emphasis on the clinician respecting the individual as well as their cultural heritage. In noting the absence of any available training on Maori concepts of illness causation within the discipline of psychiatry in New Zealand between the years 1939 and 1961, Gluckman expresses the view that precipitation and aggravation can occur in cases where Maori are experiencing either a schizophreniform or psychogenic psychosis, when a mental health professional is unable to interpret the contents of their beliefs. Following from Gluckman’s (1962) comments, Older (1978), Abbott and Durie (1987), Brady (1992) and Jones (1993) have similarly directed attention to the serious lack of such training being made available in the discipline of psychology within New Zealand. The conclusion drawn by Gluckman in his thesis can be framed in terms of an ethical consideration. In short, Gluckman contends that because the strength of the association is known between Maori cultural belief and the production of psychotic symptomatology, the impassivity of a profession such as psychiatry within New Zealand to equip itself with suitable knowledge to interpret this interplay of influences, is unjustified.

Primrose (1968), in her thesis on the rate of mental illness in New Zealand between the years 1867-1926, records a very low rate of Maori admissions to psychiatric institutions in the early decades of the nation's development. In noting that between these years the Maori population had experienced a substantial decline which was only reversed from 1911 onwards, Primrose proposed that the trends of low admission of Maori to psychiatric institutions could be attributed to low population, the reluctance of Maori to access European health services, and a distinct difference between Maori and non-Maori attitudes towards mental illness. Combining these factors with the fact that the geographical location of Maori during this time was largely rural based, and that the system of health care available to Maori was underdeveloped, Primrose postulated that the few recorded Maori
admissions to psychiatric services could be comprehended as an outcome of all these factors. Primrose, however, emphasises the fact that the overall social, political, physical and economic conditions of Maori during this period, was in substantive decline. Furthermore, with the collision of Maori and European cultural values she suggests that if assistance was required for a mental illness then it would have been more likely for Maori to seek the services of tohunga as opposed to European medical professionals. Lange (1972) also mentions that Maori would have experienced high anxiety over their inability to pay for the services of medical professionals at the time.

The main limitation of Primrose’s (1968) assessment of the prevalence and incidence of mental health among Maori during this time is that her data is derived from early census reports. These reports did not include Maori who were married to Europeans and were further limited to the Auckland region when in fact Maori were still a widely dispersed people with restricted access to health care services. However, Camilleri (1979) in his thesis on the correlation between socio-economic status and mental illness in the Auckland area in the 1970’s, provides some support for Primrose’s (1968) earlier conclusions. Camilleri’s empirical study which included a sample representative of the Maori population of the time, draws attention to three specific areas, namely incidence rates of schizophrenia, the association between diagnostic group and socio-economic status, and the geographical distribution of individuals with a diagnosis of mental disorder. Camilleri provides tentative evidence, which is consistent with the international data that there is a correlation between incidence of schizophrenia and low socio-economic status. The two sociological explanations that Camilleri draws for his results is that first, social influences such as poverty, ethnic insecurity, and cultural mixing, actively influence the development of the disorder. And secondly, individuals who are already predisposed to mental disorder gravitate towards the lower point of the social and economic spectrum as a result of being insufficiently able to maintain a secure lifestyle. This latter point, which Camilleri refers to as ‘social selection,’ is also evident in the social morbidity data of other disabled groups, whereby a downward spiral or urban drift, is correlated with the increased onset of disability and disorder.
In setting out an acculturation hypothesis for the rates of Maori admission to mental institutions, Kelly (1973) outlines the objective of his research design with the flawed assumption that in the 1930’s, Maori could still be considered an isolated population. The reason that Kelly provides for this is that Maori had largely remained a rural dwelling population and it wasn’t until after World War II with the return of Maori servicemen that they were truly exposed to European culture. However, Maori had experienced well over one hundred years of colonial contact by the time World War II occurred. With this in mind, Kelly’s assumption ought to be questioned. The second assumption that Kelly makes relates to Maori performance in the war. According to Kelly, the lower reporting of Maori who experienced combat reaction and the fact that fewer Maori claimed war pensions are correlated which supposedly implies that Maori experienced a lower incidence of mental illness than Europeans before acculturation and rapid social change. Independent of the dubious method of drawing together two rather disparate factors to insinuate a correlation, the more questionable feature of Kelly’s approach is his attempt to generalise the effect of war experiences of Maori servicemen to the wider Maori population.

Kelly’s (1973) analysis is based on survey data of mental health admissions of Maori during the period 1953 to 1968. The definition of Maori used in the survey population is a person of one-half Maori blood or more, and the mental health diagnoses of the subjects were derived through clinical employment of the ICD-8 Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders. Beaglehole's (1939) earlier work between the years 1925 and 1935, on Maori hospital admission rates for psychosis is used by Kelly as a significant source of theoretical and statistical comparison. Kelly also issues a preliminary caution in acknowledging that the detected increase in Maori being admitted to mental hospitals during this period must be balanced against the maintenance and rise of the Maori population.

The analysis that Kelly (1973) forwards suggests that there was a slight increase in Maori admissions for psychosis from the middle of the 1930’s to the early 1950’s. After the 1950’s the admissions for psychosis stabilised. During the period 1953 to 1968, younger Maori were being hospitalised for schizophrenia while the older age groups were being admitted for manic-depressive psychoses. From the
years 1961 to 1968 there was a higher rate of Maori female admissions in comparison to Maori male admissions for both schizophrenia and manic depressive disorders and this trend is similarly observed in higher female admissions for character disorders. Kelly estimates the ratio of female to males for schizophrenia, manic depressive and character disorders as being approximately 3 to 2. Kelly notes a dramatic rise in the number of Maori admissions for neuroses between the years 1953 and 1968 which is represented by the data between 1953 and 1957 showing on average only three cases being treated or admitted per year, but escalating to a total of 52 recorded cases in 1968. An inverse trend is observed in rates of Maori admissions for psychoses; from 1953 to 1957, 89.5% of all first admissions were diagnosed with a psychotic disorder and from the year 1965 through to 1968 this rate decreased to 46.4%.

The conclusions that Kelly (1973) draws from the data analysis performed are decidedly obscure. Kelly acknowledges that the incidence of mental illness in the Maori population is subject to diagnostic error, yet after listing a number of factors as to why this might be the case (i.e., individual's symptomatology, availability of treatment, cultural mental illness definitions, individual and family perceptions and attitudes toward symptoms of illness and available care facilities), Kelly propounds the view that there has been a large increase in Maori admissions which can only reflect Maori being vulnerable to acculturative stress. However, preceding the data analysis Kelly provides an image of relative Maori cultural isolation to match the stated hypothesis, yet in contrast to the conclusion given, Kelly is committed to a view that the Maori population had been involved in acculturation for generations. In fact, by the time of Kelly's own work, Maori had been involved in cross cultural contact, intermarriage and communications for over 200 years. Secondly, the problem with Kelly's analysis is that the number of Maori being admitted or treated in any one year is an insufficient data base for an explanatory theory of population level acculturative stress being experienced by Maori. That is, between the years 1953 and 1957 there were on average only 68 per 100,000 Maori admissions to psychiatric hospitals. Lastly, in order to supplement what are quite obviously problematic conclusions, Kelly draws from the Ritchie's 'Rakau' Studies (see Ritchie 1956; Mulligan, 1957; Earle, 1958) to exchange one stereotype of Maori personality, developmental patterns, and intra-familial relations for another. From
Maori being stereotyped as family-centred, highly ingenuous and happy, Maori were regarded as fragmented, negligent and aggressive. Stewart (1997) has levelled fair criticism at these early studies noting that the results aided in developing prejudicial character stereotypes of Maori, such as Maori are inherently violent and generally of low intelligence. In effect, it is this latter move by Kelly that exposes the fundamental problem with acculturation studies *per se*, especially as they relate to mental illness.

Barth (1969) suggests that acculturation studies generally determine a list of trait inventories where the cultural bearing aspects of the group are given primacy (for an example see Durie, 1995). The presumption embedded within the acculturation hypothesis is that the trait inventories can be first inferred for an individual, and secondly, that they remain consistent over time. More often than not, the trait inventory conferred for a group will be characterised by its morphology and inculcated as a normative standard from which individual deviation or difference within a group may be detected (see Olson, 1993 for an acculturation scale of Maoritanga). However, underlying such an assessment of an individual is the theoretical imposition of the normative standard in actuality representing between-group difference. Moreover, it is the heightened distinction given to traits which come to comprise a cultural inventory that assumes consistency of traits over time, which in turn leads to the acculturation theorist’s dependency on locating the explanation for psychological causes of mental illness in the social sphere. That is, the determination of a cultural trait inventory which is assumed to persist over time means that locating causes of mental illness observed in individuals of ethnic descent is restricted to either an explanation in terms of an inherent flaw in the inventory, or alternatively that a change of context manifests such a flaw, which is then observed in the culturally determined individual.

LaFromboise, Colman and Gerton (1993) in their analysis of acculturation theories also emphasise the importance of examining the role of individual cognition, personality, and development when studying the impact of socio-cultural change on individuals. Furthermore, unless analyses take into consideration the concept of reciprocal determinism, whereby human behaviour is not simply perceived as being the product of social structure, but rather a consequence of the
interative forces between individual cognition, affective processes, biology and
social environment, individuals are often assumed to be unable to lose identification
with their culture of origin (LaFromboise et al. 1993). Kelly's (1973) work provides
an example of this latter assumption, and although it ought not to be denied that the
change in Maori demography during the period in which his work is drawn would
have impacted on Maori, any attempt to extrapolate from his data the likely causes
and effects for an incremental rise in Maori being admitted or treated for mental
illness would be erroneous.

Foster (1962) offers the first detailed statistical report on the mental health of
Maori. His data is drawn from hospital records of patients admitted to mental health
institutions between the years 1953 and 1960. The foreword to the report, supplied
by the Director General of Health at the time, commends the report for being able to
provide a seminal analysis of the racial characteristics of the mental health of Maori.
The report states that the ICD Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders
manual was used in the diagnosis of the Maori sample and that records were only
used for patients that had received a final diagnosis. The definition of ‘Maori’ used
was consistent with the Department of Statistics definitions being “a person of half
Maori blood or more”. A comparative analysis was performed with European
residents of mental hospitals in New Zealand. Because the size of the Maori sample
was small, considering the demography of the Maori population between these years,
data was aggregated across years in some analyses. However, Foster constrains his
use of aggregated data to age specific cohorts as opposed to diagnostic categories.
Moreover, Foster also acknowledges that his analyses are drawn from two distinct
data sets, one being for the period 1953 to 1957, while the other is the period from
1958 to 1960. The mid point of each data set is utilised by Foster to calculate the
mean annual rates per 100,000, of admission for both populations. All the rates that
Foster provides are calculated on that basis. In the year of Foster’s analysis, the
Maori population numbered approximately 168,000 (Schwimmer, 1968). It is also
important to observe that in the period when the data analysis was performed it was
general public health practice to institutionalise the intellectually impaired as
mentally disordered. Therefore, the practice of institutionalising the impaired under-
ten-years-of-age population, although not uncommon practice, was consistent with
the views propounded at the time. Brunton (1986) suggests that this practice was
motivated by the view that early institutionalisation effectively limited the development of residual chronic disability. A summary of Foster’s (1962) main findings follows.

Although the rate of Maori receiving a diagnosis for mental ill health was beginning to increase during the period from which Foster (1962) draws his data, he is careful to point out that the age structure of the two populations was markedly different. Maori population growth from the 1930’s onwards was consistently increasing and was being maintained largely because of a decline in the high infant mortality rate. The distinction in age structure is evident in the fact that in 1960, 58.8% of all Maori were under 20 years of age, in comparison to 39.4% of non-Maori of the same age group. Yet, only one in every thirty-three Maori was over the age of 60, in comparison to one in every eight non-Maori. Therefore, even though more Maori were entering mental institutions, any interpretation of this increase needs to be tempered with the observation that distinct differences existed, and continue to exist, in the age structures between the two populations (see Maori: Statistics New Zealand, 1997). Foster also recommends that because of the low rate of Maori admissions during this period any inference drawn from his analyses needs to be undertaken with caution.

Accordingly, between the years 1953 and 1960, Maori sought voluntary admission to mental institutions less frequently than did Europeans. Schizophrenia was diagnosed more often for Maori (35.2% of all first admissions) than for Europeans (16.5% of all first admissions), but the age of the patient receiving a diagnosis was slightly older for Maori than it was for Europeans. In terms of gender, nearly as many female Maori were diagnosed with schizophrenia as male Maori. However, more European females received a diagnosis of schizophrenic disorder than European males. The rates of diagnosis for paranoid, schizoaffective, and other or unspecified types of schizophrenic disorder was strikingly similar for both populations across all age groups. Europeans were admitted at a younger age for a manic-depressive reaction, in comparison to Maori whose admission rates were highest in the over thirty age group. Relative to age, in comparison to Maori, nearly double the number of Europeans were admitted before the age of ten years, while close to half of all Maori admissions were individuals in their teens.
Although Europeans received diagnoses of manic-depressive reaction more often than Maori did, the Maori rate of diagnosis for the sub-group of manic states was much higher than that of Europeans. Psychoses associated with older age were substantially higher for Europeans than for Maori as was admission for psychoneurosis, which for Europeans, accounted for close to a fifth of all admissions. Foster (1962) suggests that the low rate of Maori admission for psychoneurosis may not be particularly reflective of actual incidence considering that Maori might have been reluctant to seek treatment for symptoms of psychoneurosis. Therefore, Foster contends that the higher rate of Maori being diagnosed with schizophrenia, in comparison to Europeans, possibly correlates with the lower incidence of psychoneurosis. Maori admission for alcoholism was relatively rare comprising only 24 cases over the eight-year period. However, it ought to be noted that during the period of Foster’s analysis a distinction was made between psychotic and non-psychotic alcoholism, and that individuals were directed toward either mental or public hospitals, on the basis of this distinction. With this factor in mind, although Foster reports European rates of admission for alcoholism being twice the rate of Maori, this figure may be unreliable. In comparison to Europeans, a higher rate of Maori individuals who were diagnosed as being mentally defective, were admitted over this period. In the period between 1958 and 1960 there were 105 European admissions with Downs Syndrome, and not one single Maori case reported in the same period. However, Foster detected two such admissions in 1956, but states that these two cases were not of full-blooded Maori. Following this, Foster hypothesised that Downs Syndrome might only be found in Maori who have some degree of European blood and therefore, recommended empirical study of the hypothesis.

The re-admission rates of Maori and non-Maori between 1953 and 1960 indicated that except for Maori individuals with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, that Europeans were re-admitted more often than Maori, and more frequently with diagnoses of psychoneurosis or alcoholism. Maori admissions directed from either prison or from the Courts were more frequent than European admissions from the same source, and Maori individuals who were admitted on this basis were generally in the 15-27 years age group and found to be mentally defective. However, the numbers of both Maori and European psychiatric admissions directed from either
prison or the Courts were low in this period. Maori patients tended to stay in hospital longer than Europeans. Recorded deaths for individuals in psychiatric care between the years 1953 and 1960 also show that Europeans who died in hospital had spent less time in hospital at time of death than Maori who died while in psychiatric care.

Foster (1962) cautions that although his analysis offers a view of the comparative patterns of mental illness between both Maori and Europeans his findings are relatively crude and that they might not therefore be representative of the actual incidence rates of mental disorder experienced by Maori. Foster cites the limited access and availability of public health services to Maori at the time; he notes that the 1956 census reported 76% of Maori being rural based, in comparison to 35% of Europeans. Before moving to the more recent literature describing mental health patterns of Maori it is necessary to first reiterate the problem evident in earlier analyses of explanations for the representation of Maori in mental health indices being sought within acculturative stress frameworks. In order to do this, I will ‘unpack’ the conclusion made by Foster regarding the low incidence of psychoneurosis in Maori admission rates. By example, I hope to show that the conclusions often drawn from acculturative stress theorising are misleading in terms of the assumptions made about Maori individuality and Maori societies. My rationale for drawing out what I see as problematic is that often two flawed normative assumptions about Maori individuality and Maori society are combined within such analyses. What invariably occurs at the conjunction of these two flawed normative assumptions is the creation of a mythic exemplar of Maori character and culture. Disturbingly, such a mythic exemplar is evident within the earlier theorising of the mental health of Maori and continues to be a stalwart image portrayed in more recent analyses. Although there are variations of the image sporned from such theorising the main point to be made is that inevitably the idiosyncratic make-up of human character and culture is lost in the analysis.

To elaborate on the point immediately above, Foster (1962) first suggests that the low incidence of Maori being diagnosed with a psychoneurosis disorder could be due to several cultural factors which together mitigate against the development of psychoneurosis. By speculation, Foster suggests that perhaps Maori cultural values successfully induce a relatively stress-free lifestyle. This would explain the under
reporting of psychoneurosis symptomatology exhibited by Maori. Foster then refutes the plausibility of this suggestion by arguing that Maori attitudes to being hospitalised in mental institutions “lagged behind” Europeans who at the time showed an increased confidence in New Zealand’s health care system. On the one hand Maori cultural values induce a stress-free lifestyle; on the other hand, Maori attitudes towards institutions lead to Maori being under represented with psychoneurosis in psychiatric hospitals when compared with Europeans. Foster clearly attempts to reconcile what he perceives to be a discrepancy in the reporting of Maori with a diagnosis of psychoneurosis. The discrepancy is that fewer Maori received a diagnosis for psychoneurosis than non-Maori. The implicit assumption is that the European incidence of psychoneurosis is the normative standard with which Maori are being compared. Therefore, he first endorses the positive stereotype of Maori societies: Maori cultural values induce stress-free lifestyles, and then, concomitantly, the negative stereotype of diffident attitudes on the part of Maori towards psychiatric hospitals. This leads to the implication that Maori rates of psychoneurosis are in fact similar to Europeans and that the discrepancy in under representation lies in Maori attitudes towards the disorder’s symptomatology and not towards psychiatric institutions. Ironically, the mythic exemplar embedded within Foster’s analysis is a European who ought to be able to better self-identify the symptomatology of psychoneurosis. This is because Foster makes absolutely no attempt to explain the distinct differences in representation between Maori and non-Maori in similar terms for other diagnostic categories.

**Contemporary views of the mental health patterns of Maori**

The following trends noted by Sachdev (1989a) in his review of psychiatric illness in the New Zealand Maori indicates that up until the 1950's Maori rates of admission were relatively consistent with trends in the European population. However, between the 1960's and the 1980's even though first admission rates of both Maori and European individuals were comparable, a noticeable pattern was emerging whereby Maori were more often re-admitted either voluntarily or involuntarily, and more often for alcohol abuse and dependency, or for personality disorders. All diagnoses were taken by using either, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or the ICD Classification of Mental and Behavioural
Disorders. Sachdev also draws attention to the use of inconsistent definitions of Maori ethnicity being used across time to obtain psychiatric data. Moreover, Sachdev notes the distinctions between the two populations in terms of socio-economic status and age structure with Maori being a more youthful population in comparison to the European population in the period on which his analysis is centred (see also Jackson, 1994).

Sachdev's (1989a) paper is however, oriented to extending Kelly's (1973) observations about the incidence of mental health among Maori and although Sachdev furnishes a more extensive range of social factors which may have feasibly impacted upon Maori, his analysis is similarly focused on confirming an acculturation hypothesis. Drawn into what is now deemed the 'psychiatric morbidity of Maori,' is a nexus of negative social indices including educational under-achievement, unemployment, physical health, domestic violence and imprisonment, which quickly coalesce to form a picture of a culture under siege. Thus, as Sachdev (1989a) himself comments, the arraignment of social causation for mental ill health is presupposed in the formulation of the hypothesis undergirded by the notion of a formerly 'mentally healthy native'.

According to Sachdev's analysis, Maori psychiatric morbidity roughly corresponds to a rate which is represented by the number of Maori in psychiatric hospitals at any one time, and a prevalence which is indicated by the annual number of Maori first admissions to psychiatric hospitals. The pattern of Maori admissions over the decades beginning in the 1950's is characterised by Sachdev as relatively constant in the 1950's, a steady increase in the 1960's, which levelled out in the 1970's, and a significant increase in the 1980's. Age-specific rates for first admissions showed a convergence between both Maori and non-Maori in the mid-1960's with the representation of psychiatric morbidity of Maori overtaking non-Maori in the 1980's. This was particularly evident in the marked increase of first admissions for Maori aged between 20 and 40 in the 1980's. Maori children under the age of ten are over-represented in psychiatric hospitals in comparison to non-Maori children, with a significant increase being observed in the 1980's as well. Although historically, Maori over the age of sixty were hospitalised less often than
non-Maori, the trend is towards the hospitalised over sixty Maori age group rates converging with non-Maori.

The rate of involuntary admission for psychiatric illness is higher for Maori than non-Maori, and in the 1980's Sachdev (1989a) states that the source of referral from a law enforcement agency was more frequent for Maori than non-Maori. Of particular interest is the fact that the rate of self-referral for psychiatric admission shows parity between the two groups, which as Sachdev mentions, appears to suggest that during this period attitudes toward mental illness and psychiatric care were similar for both Maori and non-Maori populations. Concerning specific diagnostic categories, more non-Maori than Maori individuals received a diagnosis of manic depressive psychosis on first admission and more Maori than non-Maori were readmitted with a schizophrenic disorder. Sachdev suggests that there may be variation in the symptomatology, course and prognosis of schizophrenia between the two groups. However, after reviewing the records of a small sample of Maori patients with a schizophrenic diagnosis, he notes that apart from the cultural content in the delusions experienced by some patients, there was nothing particularly dissimilar in the course of the disorder for both populations. Acceptance of antipsychotic medication and treatment for some Maori at times involved Maori elders and tohunga, but responses to treatment between both groups were similar (see also Sachdev, 1989b). Cherrington (1994), in her comparative study of Maori and non-Maori schizophrenic diagnosis reporting cultural beliefs and themes, similarly found that Maori reported a higher frequency of cultural content when experiencing delusions or hallucinations. However, Cherrington's hypothesis that the degree of knowledge of Maori cultural beliefs held by Maori individuals would be correlated with the higher frequency of delusions and hallucinations reported by Maori with diagnoses of schizophrenia remained unsupported.

In the years on which Sachdev's work (1989a) is centred, Maori committed suicide less often than non-Maori, but males for both groups committed suicide at higher rates than females for all age groups. Maori admissions for neuroses and psychosomatic disorders have consistently been much lower than non-Maori admissions. As Sachdev states, there is yet no clear explanation as to why this is the case and, furthermore, psychiatric admissions for neuroses do not provide any
indication of the degree of neurotic illness being experienced by individuals in the wider community. However, increasingly higher frequencies of adolescent Maori males are currently being admitted to psychiatric institutions for personality disorders; this trend first became apparent in the data recorded in the 1960's.

Maori patterns of drinking behaviour are quite distinct from non-Maori. More Maori than non-Maori abstain from alcohol and even though Maori consume alcohol less regularly than non-Maori, they drink more excessively; this has led to alcohol related mortality and morbidity being higher for the Maori population. Maori, therefore, have a higher relative risk of developing cirrhosis of the liver, liver cancer, cardiomyopathy, and of being involved in car accidents caused by excessive alcohol intake. It follows from this last fact that alcohol related death is reported more frequently for Maori than non-Maori. As the Public Health Commission's (1994) Advice to the Minister of Health report notes, the link between excessive alcohol use, mortality, violence, and health illnesses, such as higher risk of developing psychological disorders and sexual health problems has been confirmed by both local and international studies. In citing a personal communication from Eru Pomare, the report maintains that from a health budget being available of $1.5 billion in 1993, $200 million dollars was specifically spent on alcohol rehabilitation programmes for Maori. Furthermore, in corroborating Sachdev's (1989a) review that showed that the age specific prevalence of young Maori male high-volume episodic drinkers, the report states:

Alcohol dependence is the most common cause of admission, for Maori, in to psychiatric hospitals. Maori are more likely to be referred from non-medical agencies such as law enforcement agencies. A high rate of apprehending for criminal offences among Maori people, especially if alcohol is a factor, could explain in part the over-representation of young Maori males in psychiatric institutions. (p. 16)

As has been formerly noted, the self-referral patterns for both Maori and non-Maori for psychiatric illness are approximately the same. However, the evidence indicates that the reverse pattern is observed in relation to voluntary admission for alcohol-induced problems or alcohol induced psychoses. Fewer Maori than non-Maori voluntarily seek support or care for alcohol related abuse and dependency
problems. It is plausible to suggest that this tendency for Maori to voluntarily delay seeking intervention for alcohol related problems leads to Maori coming to the attention of law enforcement authorities more often than non-Maori. The New Zealand Planning Council's publication 'Care and Control: The Role of Institutions in New Zealand' (1987) notes this specific tendency when stating that one of the central causes of Maori over-representation in psychiatric institutions and prisons is that Maori often only present to a service when a dependency or abuse problem has reached crisis proportions. Moreover, although annual rates of admission for alcohol misuse and dependency are available, the problem in being able to determine the actual extent of the association between alcohol use and psychiatric disorder is confounded by the current trend for people to be directed increasingly towards outpatient services. Data obtained in the late 1970's and the 1980's shows the rate of psychiatric admission for alcohol abuse and dependence among Maori as more than doubling within ten years (Public Health Commission, 1994).

In discussing the limitations of his data, Sachdev (1989a) suggests that his review of the patterns of prevalence of psychiatric morbidity between Maori and non-Maori is at best, an analysis which only reflects the utilisation of psychiatric services, rather than any true indication of psychiatric prevalence rates. This is because his data was compiled only from secondary sources. In this sense, Sachdev maintains his analysis only represents the more extreme manifestation of psychological disorder and ought not to be considered a representation of the prevalence of psychological disorder in the wider community. In fact, the representation of Maori in the mental health indices may be as low as five percent as suggested by figures which Sachdev provides from international studies. However, as he notes, a figure is not yet available for the New Zealand context. Sachdev proposes that there could be a correlation between the higher utilisation of psychiatric services by Maori and the demographic shift by Maori towards urban areas over the preceding three decades and that such a shift would have had an upward impact on the Maori figures recorded. The other limitation that Sachdev acknowledges, is the clear lack of uniformity in the definitions and criteria used in the collection of psychiatric data across psychiatric hospitals and psychiatric units in public hospitals.
In forwarding a plausible explanation for the increase of Maori presenting to psychiatric facilities Sachdev (1989a) makes the point that if one excluded the increase in alcohol abuse and dependency problems, personality and psychotic disorders, and the neuroses with the exception of depressive neuroses, then the rates of Maori first admission would have remained relatively consistent over time. Therefore, Sachdev suggests that it is plausible to accept that such an increase reflects either a real change in the psychiatric morbidity of Maori, or alternatively, as a pattern emerging from the increased utilisation of services by Maori. Because of the distinction in types of disorder with which Maori are more often presenting to psychiatric facilities Sachdev proposes that a heightened utilisation of these facilities would plausibly require an attitudinal change for which there is no evidence. In fact, the contrary situation appears to be the case where a greater reluctance to refer by Maori with either psychiatric morbidity, or alcohol abuse and dependency problems, is being noted.

Having effectively constrained the breadth of available explanations and having observed that the attitudinal change hypothesis toward increased utilisation of psychiatric services by Maori remains unsubstantiated, Sachdev (1989a) draws an association between increased urbanisation and acculturative stress. Although left unstated, Sachdev presents the view that the increased rates of Maori presenting with psychological disorders is evidence of a real change in their psychiatric morbidity. In short, Sachdev argues for the acceptance of a Maori cultural pathology. Sachdev is able to present a case for a Maori cultural pathology by associating the increase of Maori moving to urban areas in the 1960's with the onset of more Maori presenting to psychiatric institutions with psychological disorders. Underlying Sachdev's overview of mental illness experienced by Maori however, is the contemporary endorsement of a two worlds view of Maori and Pakeha traditions, institutions, and lifestyles. That is, the success of the acculturation hypothesis in leading to a summation of a Maori cultural pathology relies on Sachdev invoking increasing urbanisation of Maori as a discordant cause of affliction to the Maori cultural trait inventory. This cause comprises the ideal cultural bearing aspects of Maori culture before urbanisation such as those revered in Maori traditions, institutions, and former lifestyles (see Sachdev, 1989b, 1990a, 1990b). In a later paper, Sachdev (1990c) justifies his use of complex sets of cultural traits as opposed to individual elements.
in cross cultural research, as a way of avoiding spiralling towards universalist or relativist, and ethnocentric or evolutionary conclusions. Important to note, is that the Maori culture bearing criteria used by Sachdev to infer a Maori cultural trait inventory is almost entirely sourced from the largely historical work of field anthropologists. However, as with Gluckman (1962), a common theme throughout Sachdev's work is that in order for the mental health of Maori to be better addressed, institutions which offer training or services in the area of mental health need to improve their current understanding of the historical and sociological influences which have impacted on Maori.

Durie (1994a) identifies three distinct phases of Maori first admissions to psychiatric services. The first phase being characterised by fewer Maori admissions, the second phase indicating comparable rates of first admission for Maori and non-Maori, and the third stage where Maori are over-represented in certain diagnostic categories and this pattern being particularly evident for specific age groups. According to Durie's analysis, the first phase although showing that proportionately more Maori receive diagnoses of schizophrenia, indicates that overall the Maori first admissions were low. The second phase where Maori and non-Maori patterns of admission for psychiatric services were beginning to show parity is evident from 1970 where rates had converged. By 1974 Maori first admissions for all age groups had surpassed the non-Maori population. This pattern has persisted from the mid to late eighties, and represents the third phase during which Maori first admissions for certain diagnostic and age categories has remained consistently high.

Data compiled in 1988 shows that nearly half of all Maori admissions were for individuals in the under twenty-five age group and that the most dominant age group represented by Maori was the 20-29 year age group. The most common diagnostic category was for alcohol related problems and 25% of all Maori referrals were from law enforcement agencies. Committal rates for Maori are also exceptionally high and represent one quarter of all committed patients; at the time when the data were compiled, Maori only represented 12% of the population, but 67% of all special patients were Maori. Durie (1994a) frames these figures within a background of the rapid urbanisation of Maori and describes four possible reasons for the persistence of the over representation of Maori in the mental health indices.
First, is the issue of an increase in Maori accessing psychiatric services combined with an increase in accessible and available facilities. Second, Durie suggests that there might be a corresponding relationship between the promotion of a positive Maori identity emerging in the 1970's and a preference for self-identification of ethnic descent to be recorded at first admission. That is, there might be a higher rate of first admissions of Maori being recorded since the 1970's because more people identify as being of Maori descent. Third, the incidence of mental illness might in actuality be greater in the Maori population in comparison to non-Maori.

This third speculative explanation of Maori over-representation in the mental health indices is justified says Durie, if one compares the equally anomalous patterns in the rate of Maori imprisonment with the mental health figures. A statistic cited by Durie shows that in the 1987-1989 period, Maori in the 20-24 years age group were imprisoned at a rate of 523 per 10,000, in comparison to the non-Maori rate of 64.5 per 10,000. Pomare, Keefe-Ormsby, Ormsby, Pearce, Reid, Robson and Watene-Haydon (1995) present Maori rates of psychiatric admission in 1992 for the 15-24 years age group of 50.3 per 10,000 for males and 33.6 per 10,000 for females in comparison with non-Maori rates of the same age group being respectively 23.6 per 10,000 for males and 13.6 per 10,000 for females. The analysis provided by Pomare et al. (1995) also shows that alcohol abuse and dependence is the leading cause of Maori and non-Maori male first admission followed by schizophrenic psychoses for Maori males. Affective psychoses are now ranked as the principal reason for Maori female first admission followed by alcohol dependency and abuse. Of importance is the fact noted by Pomare et al. (1995) that these trends continue in the face of alternative treatments and approaches being made available for Maori, by Maori.

The fourth reason provided by Durie (1994a) for the over representation of Maori first admissions to psychiatric services is that there might be a cultural bias or cultural barriers, leading to a higher rate of Maori being treated through the misapplication of diagnostic criteria. The more serious charge that Durie makes is the possibility that there might be an attitudinal bias by non-Maori health care professionals to view Maori behaviour as more deviant, and therefore, in need of greater psychiatric admission. The proportion of Maori being admitted to psychiatric services with no formal psychiatric diagnosis being provided (12% in 1988), is noted
by Durie as one reason why the plausibility of this latter charge ought not be dismissed.

Durie (1994a) contextualises his work within the acculturative stress model whereby Maori dysfunction and distress have come as the result of rapid urbanisation. Failure to adapt to urbanisation is the underlying premise that informs his work. Accordingly, Maori are currently enduring a crisis which is not only reflected in the mental health indices, but is also reflected in educational underachievement, low social economic status, lower standards of housing, and high imprisonment rates. It is the loss of connection to cultural traditions, institutions, and values which for Durie, represents the causal basis of this crisis. Durie (1998) in a later work however, also notes that the reason for the move by Maori to the urban areas between the years 1945-1970 was to escape rural poverty. Durie (1994a) contends that although a fledgling biculturalism had begun to be incorporated into primary health care services in the mid-eighties paralleling the time in which Maori were more frequently being admitted to psychiatric care services, the pattern of high rates of Maori admission may reflect inherent cultural differences in attitudes towards primary health care services. Underlying this assertion is the problem of late intervention for Maori who experience the onset of mental illness. As Durie states:

Access to medical services might be compromised by financial barriers, including prescription charges. Maori patients may be insufficiently motivated to seek early health care or may be relatively uninformed about signs and symptoms of poor health. Health problems may be accepted as the norm and tolerated until severity demands hospitalisation. Biased attitudes on the part of both patients and professionals might mitigate against any genuine sense of partnership in the management of personal health problems. (p. 331)

My rationale for providing the following data is to give an indication as to what is currently known in regards to the status of mental health among Maori. The data is drawn from 'Our health our future: The state of the public health in New Zealand' (1994); 'Nga Ia o te Oranga Hinengaro Maori: Trends in Maori mental health' (1996), which represents trends evident in the decade 1984 to 1993; and 'An approach for action: Phase two in the development of a national strategy to help prevention of suicide' (1997).
In 1993, Maori females aged in the 15-19 years age group had the highest rate of hospitalisation for self-inflicted injury (544.2 per 100,000) for the entire population. Although the Maori rate of youth suicide has been historically lower in comparison to non-Maori the statistics for 1995 show that death resulting from suicide for Maori youth (aged 15-24 years) was 42.1 per 100,000 and 26.9 per 100,000 for non-Maori youth.

Maori female and non-Maori female rates of first admission have remained relatively consistent in the decade between 1984 and 1993, but Maori male rates have been consistently higher than non-Maori rates by approximately 25%. Maori male and female rates of admission have been between two or three times higher than Pacific Islands male and female rates, with an incremental increase being noted across the decade. Maori male readmission rates have increased by 65% from 1984 to 1993, and were nearly two times higher than non-Maori male rates and three times higher than Pacific Islands male rates. Maori female readmission rates have also increased during this period by 28%.

Drug and alcohol abuse and psychoses are still the major reason for Maori being admitted to a psychiatric hospital or ward for the first time and constitute 32% of all Maori first admissions in 1993. There has been a 49% increase in Maori female first admissions for drug and alcohol abuse and psychosis in the period between 1984 and 1993. Drug psychosis admissions have increased and make up 21% of all Maori admissions compared with 5% for non-Maori. Seventeen percent of first admissions are for schizophrenia and nearly half of all readmission’s are for this illness. Maori male first admissions and readmission’s are around 60% higher than Maori female rates and the gap between Maori male and Maori female rates of admission continues to increase.

Maori readmission rates of illness for affective disorders and psychotic illness other than schizophrenia or drug or alcohol psychoses have also risen and are now 36% (for women) and 75% (for men) higher than non-Maori rates, and two to three times higher than the Pacific Islands rates. Maori are more often cared for in an institutional setting such as a psychiatric service rather than in a community setting. Maori rates of admission and readmission for non-psychotic illness (i.e., depression,
stress and adjustment disorders, eating disorders, obsessive compulsive disorders) are lower overall than for non-Maori. Thirty-eight per cent of Maori referrals now come from law enforcement or welfare services, compared with 27% of non-Maori and 31% of Pacific Islands first admissions. One third of admissions for Maori men are non-voluntary and Maori rates of non-voluntary admissions are 154% for Maori males and 55% for Maori females higher than non-Maori rates.

In conclusion, it must be noted that the data presented offers only a limited view of the historical and more contemporary status of mental health among Maori. No consistent data sets are available and the definitions of Maori ethnicity used in the analyses referred to have been shown to be variable and generally based on degree of assumed biological inheritance. Such a situation has both conceptual and methodological implications that are covered in Chapter 4 in this dissertation.

From this review it can be seen that the mental health of Maori people has historically been conceptualised as a population level phenomenon on the basis of a biological contrast being drawn between Maori and non-Maori. This method of drawing an inherent contrast between people on the basis of genetic inheritance is consistent with the nineteenth century's focus on social Darwinism and did in fact form the conceptual basis of early health services delivery in New Zealand. However, I believe that in offering a review of the available data on the mental health of Maori the factors which come to constitute the 'problem' of Maori mental health require further extrapolation. The reason is that the available data depicting Maori admissions to psychiatric services does not actually tell us anything specific about the mental health of Maori. This is a particularly poignant point when we are attempting to address the interface between Maori culture and psychological science. Therefore, the following four chapters address what I perceive to be the more significant conceptual, methodological and procedural issues which arise at the interface between Maori culture and psychological science in New Zealand.

As has already been stated, my principal interest is to move toward a more informed understanding of how the interface between culture and science intersects in New Zealand. In view of this objective the following chapter entitled, 'The social construction of Maori ethnicity,' outlines some of the conceptual, theoretical, and
methodological implications for analyses oriented to addressing the problem of 'Maori mental health'. Some of the conclusions developed in the following chapter specifically allude to both the theoretical and methodological limitations of conceptualising and operationalising a variable such as 'Maori ethnicity,' in contemporary New Zealand society. These conclusions have implications for the discipline of psychology in New Zealand.
Chapter Four

The social construction of Maori ethnicity

Ransom (1997), in forwarding an analysis of Foucault's work on the politics of subjectivity states that Foucault stressed the significance of two related points in an analysis of modern power formations. The first point was the essential function of knowledge as it pertained to population trends of either psychological or physical disorder. The construction of population level trends in terms of subjectively experienced mental or physical states created a normative discourse of 'difference' or deficit which actively objectified individual experience of psychological or physical disorder. The second point was the way in which distinct and even opposed rationalities at times converge in a more opportunistic form of power, which in being unconventional, is difficult to confront. Donald and Rattansi (1992) suggest that because the concept of culture is ideologically rooted in people stressing not only shared ethnic descent, but also convivial concerns in broader structures and material interests, there is only a brittle coherence between normative identity and ethnic tradition. That is, it cannot be assumed that the criterion of shared ethnic descent 'naturally' fuses with contemporary material interests resulting in a uniform view of cultural tradition or identity. The field of ethnicity offers a theoretical context to the broad-spectrum level of inter-cultural exchange. There is no singular definitive ontological account of ethnicity and the exploration of the field indicates that the semantic rendering of ethnicity has become increasingly problematic (Sollors, 1986).

In this section I will first canvass the theoretical conceptions of ethnicity. Primordial, sociobiological, instrumentalist, transactionalist, ethno-symbolic, and ethnic-semiotic versions of ethnicity are all briefly considered. I have chosen to use the terms 'culture' and 'ethnicity' interchangeably even though I am fully aware that ethnicity generally comprises a descent component of biological inheritance, while culture usually refers to the symbolic contents of a specific ethnic group (Sollors, 1986). Thomas (1986) makes clear the distinction between these two terms in the local context. However, Maori ethnicity has currently been demonstrated at least in its methodological utility, to be a construct determined through cultural identification (Pool, 1991). Therefore, I prefer to maintain a perspective that reflects the flexibility
of the term itself, while still acknowledging the limitations this imposes on delivering some definitive conception of ethnicity. To arrive at such a definitive conception is not the intention of this overview.

From a realist perspective, the increase in significance of ethnicity is seen to be widely variable, consistent with the fact that the concept of ethnicity is a social construction (Smaje, 1996). The terms 'ethnicity' and 'culture,' in reflecting elements of both identity and structure, are seen as operating contemporaneously in a capacity of mutual constitution (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). In being continuously improvised, ethnicity generates new markers of cultural identity and the suggestion is that the repertoires of ethnic referents, whether they be subjectively impugned, or structurally inculcated, operate within a bi-modal frame of influence. David and Kadirgamar (1989) have suggested in relation to the politicisation of ethnicity that the State in New Zealand has paradoxically become the principal agent in determining the peripheral attributes of what is to be included in both ethnic and cultural inventories as representing the colonial construct of 'Maori'.

The main challenge that this dissertation advances is whether ethnicity as it is currently theorised in the contemporary context of New Zealand society is a viable category for psychological research. By providing an overview of the plasticity of ethnicity and hence the limitations that this can pose for psychological researchers, it is argued that conceptual and methodological assumptions of what ethnicity might in actuality comprise, requires rethinking. Put simply, although 'ethnicity' as a term may be seemingly saturated with meaning and significance it is a difficult construct to operationalise. Relatedly, theory and practice that attempts to incorporate ethnicity into projects often does so on the basis of trading a realistic approach to problems for one which is more explicitly ideological. In acknowledging that psychological researchers and Maori cultural domains might appear to represent disparate communities of interest the main point to be made is that both communities share the common objective of addressing contemporary problems as they exist in New Zealand society. That is, while we may agree that research is value-laden (Howard, 1986), as are Maori cultural domains, we must balance this awareness with the acceptance that values ought not to present as insurmountable barriers if we are oriented to addressing problems.
Primordial theories of ethnicity

The construct 'ethnicity' is a term characterised by a number of defined core cultural elements that are conjointly expressed at both the level of the individual and the ethnic community. More specifically, the definition of core cultural elements, and their respective statuses can also be determined by a superordinate nation, or government in which the ethnic community resides (Roosens, 1989). Accordingly, the literature on ethnicity identifies six core cultural elements that can be regarded as the main referents of ethnic groupings. They include: a name which comes to identify the essence of a particular group; a myth of common ancestry which provides the sense of a fictive ethnic origin; shared historical moments, events, and personalities; shared cultural components such as religion, customs, and language; a link with an ancestral land which may be a symbolic attachment; and a sense of solidarity between the individuals comprising the ethnic group (Spoonley, 1988; Pearson, 1990; Banton, 1987; Wilson and Yeatman, 1995).

'Ethnic communities' is the preferred term used by ethnicity theorists (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996), as it makes quite clear the shared features of ethnogenesis and ethno-histories as expressed in varying degrees, in each of the core elements. However, 'ethnic category,' 'ethnic network,' 'ethnic grouping,' and 'ethnic association,' are also terms used to describe a distinct relationship between an individual and an ethnic community which is characterised by any one or more of the core cultural elements (Hutchinson & Smith, 1996). Underlying the concept of ethnicity is therefore a committed orientation to the past whereby origins, descent, and ancestry all contribute significant elements, memories, and myths to the way in which ethnicity is currently theorised and practised.

There are numerous perspectives that can be taken within the field of ethnicity, but largely they can be grouped into either a primordial approach, or alternatively, an instrumental approach. Even though the two approaches tend to agree on what constitutes the core elements of ethnicity they often diverge in terms of determining what the genesis, structure, and function, of ethnicity is for both the individual and the ethnic grouping. The primordial approach, which also includes sociobiological analyses, attaches more significance to the collective grouping.
Ethnicity from this perspective is distinguished by its connection to the past, thereby assuming a largely static, intact, and stable notion of ethnic groups. This approach has been criticised for being both *aprioristic* and asociological, as it implies that the individual within an ethnic grouping exhibits a trajectory of behavioural traits which are only reflections of the larger ethnic group (Eller & Coughlin, 1978). The implication of this is that primordialism is reductionist, and therefore, cannot account for the processes of adaptability and diffusion that have occurred historically and continue to occur throughout the world within ethnic communities. Furthermore, primordialism, being reductionist, can only benignly offer normative and structuralist accounts of ethnic communities, the result of which, sees both individuals and ethnic communities as constants within an ever increasingly dynamic and diffuse environment. For this reason, the primordial conception of ethnic analysis is usually referred to as 'essentialist' (Smaje, 1996) as it presumes the ontological autonomy of ethnic groups.

Primordialism - therefore, conceptualises the existence and continuation of ethnic groups as pre-industrial units where the strategic site of primordialism itself is transferred through seemingly indissoluble percepts of origin, descent and ancestry. The percepts of origin, descent, and ancestral ties to land become the idioms of alliance within ethnic groups which afford the temporalising of ethnic culture as being fundamentally 'traditional' (Sollors, 1986).

Geertz (1963) offers six criteria that describe the assumptions underlying the primordial conception of ethnic bearing features. These are: assumed blood ties, phenotypic characteristics such as, skin colour and facial features; language, region, religion and custom. Grosby (1994) builds on these criteria by suggesting that the main aspect of ethnicity is transferred through blood ties which provides a cognitive element to ethnic kinship. The proposal being that the assumed connection between ethnic inheritance and cognition is both phenomenological and existential. However, it is the questionable *a priori* assumption that the phenomenological and the existential are "natural categories" underlying the cultural components which either by degree, or compositely, form ethnicity. Kinship, as a proposed cognitive property may allude to the possible semantic contents of ethnic cognition, but it does not tell us anything about the way this ascribed attribute is transferred. Primordiality,
according to Grosby, is a classification that is existentially bounded and
indissolubly traditional. The "collective consciousness" is the main classification
which ties the biological (kinship blood ties) to the cognitive (belief systems) and
this connection is transmitted through familial ethnic relations. Ethnicity from this
view is “naturally” enduring, but also non-empirical.

Van den Berghe (1995), in his sociobiological perspective of ethnicity
attempts to provide a link between the cognitive referents of ethnic groups and
certain behavioural traits which ethnic groups especially tribes, exhibit. His analysis
suggests it is the amount of shared biological inheritance between kinship members
which will determine the number of altruistic behaviours or the extent of inclusive
fitness transmitted within the group. According to this account, nepotism is a
biologically rooted phenomenon derived from the favouring of selected biological
and cultural markers within an extended kinship group. The inclusion of cultural
markers serves to act as a symbolic replacement of biological markers when
individuals from different ethnic or cultural groups can no longer discriminate
between each other on the basis of physical appearance.

It can be seen how symbolic markers may come to represent metaphoric
evidence of perceived biological differentiation through examples such as the
symbolic use of the Star of David to distinguish Jews in Nazi Germany, the use of
facial tattooing to demarcate tribal membership, and circumcision on the basis of
different religious ethnic groupings. Active visibility of perceived phenotypes
become less a question about the behavioural orientation of the individual and more
about their cultural and hence cognitive, connection to a specific ethnic group (and
assumed gene pool), which supposedly enhances the fitness prospects of the kinship
group. The inter-relationship between human genes and cultural markers is therefore
played out within ethnic groups as a means of maximising the groups’ inclusive
are oriented to the cultural continuity and preservation of blood ties. Selection
strategies whether acted out in a voluntary or involuntary manner are largely nepotist,
because they favour the selection of certain assumed phenotypal markers, displayed
culturally or symbolically, over those which are perceived to have minimal inclusive
fitness value.
Underlying both Grosby's (1994) and Van den Berge's (1995) primordial approaches to ethnicity is the commitment to the pervasiveness and continuity of kinship groups as largely static social entities. By these two accounts, individuals who comprise ethnic communities are fundamentally predetermined and predisposed to a cognitive and behavioural trait inventory, supplied largely by the mere existence of the ethnic group. However, even though the 'superficial primordial veneer' may offer a promise of authentic ethnicity being neatly transmitted from generation to generation, thereby producing ethnicity as an enshrined 'nature' (existential, phenomenological, sociobiological) inherent in each ethnic individual, the background assumptions of such a theoretical perspective are not very robust. First, and foremost, the collective characteristics of a perceived ethnic group do not necessarily transfer to individuals who may bear a kinship relationship to that group (Meyerowitz, Richardson, Hudson & Leedham, 1998). Even though primordialists may further reduce their assumptions of the composition of ethnic communities to being simply a 'powerful experience' such as that described by Fishman (1996), or alternatively in the local context 'a cultural feeling' (Pool, 1991), there is no guarantee that successive generations uniformly inherit the traits, rituals, language, powerful experiences, and cultural feelings, of their forbears. This point becomes particularly pertinent in the situation of diminishing cultural domains where the opportunity to learn cultural traits, ritual, and language, may be severely restrained by the lack of available institutions or human and material resources.

Balibar (1991) argues against the primordial notion of the 'natural' and predestined categorisation of ethnicity by suggesting that although language usage within ethnic communities may represent as a powerful testimony to an ethnic community's continuation, the main content of the linguistic exchange is in the very act of the exchange and not necessarily in the exchange's contents. Pearson (1990) makes a similar claim in relation to the New Zealand context where often Maori language is understood as an ethnic marker to signify a distinct cognitive tradition. Nepe (1991) confirms this claim by suggesting that the conceptualisation of Maori knowledge is exclusive to te reo Maori. However, for Balibar, an ethnic identity cannot be linguistically constructed especially when seeking out the origins and memories of forbears and ancestors. Instead, Balibar construes language usage within ethnic communities as symbolic and metaphoric of origins and descent, which
she terms the 'second degree fiction'. The use of this expression exemplifies the use of ethnic language as not being formally about communication, but more about being a political tool to differentiate ethnicity apart from national interests within an ethnic or national context. Paradoxically, the inverse of this situation is that the nation in which the ethnic community resides uses an ethnic cultural marker such as language (see Kuper, 1994; Sissons, 1993) to further promote a connection between nation, and what Balibar refers to as, 'the modern idea of race'. As a consequence, this leads to what Balibar calls the 'second mode of ethnicisation'.

A second defence against primordialism is made explicit in the theory of symbolic ethnicity proposed by Gans (1979), which he characterises as a nostalgic allegiance to a remote vision/version of a more 'purified' or alternatively, 'repugnant' past. Symbolic ethnicity is generally exhibited in the third successive generation of a migrated ethnic community. Ethnicity in this sense is far from primordial. There is a pragmatic imperative to display and institute the symbols and emblems of a former generational ethnic connection to such an extent, that they become embellished in collective notions such as rites of passage, or architectural sites, so that attendance to events or buildings minimally interferes with the main routines of the third generation. Gans’ conjoining of third generational nostalgic allegiance to an ethnic or territorial past and contemporary pragmatic practices, is in itself a pragmatic perspective of certain ethno-histories. His perspective highlights the inter-generational influence of a traumatic or pained past, experienced by an originating ethnic community, family or individual. Gans’ basic premise is that with the passing of time a third generation is more easily able to cope with former traumatic events. And, even though the ethnic community may only be using the symbols of a former ethnic community, such symbols still have the capacity to inculcate pride and identification in the third generation ethnic community. However, unlike the primordialist account, Gans does not avoid facts of history. His account also includes the notion of hybridity, whereby cross sectoring between religions, language, and other cultural elements can produce individuals who as a result of intermarriage or cultural element enmeshment are able to identify with multiple ethnic identities. Therefore, Gans’ approach leads to a reviewing of the alternatives to primordialism.

In contrast to the essentialism characterised by the primordialist approaches,
materialism features as a main component of instrumental and transactionalist perspectives of ethnicity.

**Instrumental and transactional theories of ethnicity**

Instrumental and transactional approaches to ethnicity emphasise the individual element of ethnic allegiance, thereby ensuring that the psychosocial dimension of ethnicity is not construed as a preconceived given. From this broad perspective, ethnicity is a relational construct or an elastic referent, which can always be mobilised according to the predominantly social needs of the overarching organisation. As sketched below, Nash (1989) forwards a conceptual model of ethnicity which he proposes constitutes a core trinity of ethnic elements, a second trinity which he describes as surface pointers, and a tertiary index which are described as easily identifiable markers of difference. Analogously, these elements also reflect Fishman's (1980) primordial account of ethnicity, which he describes as being (kinship), knowing (commensuality), and doing (deity). Nash also offers secondary and tertiary features, which provide a more extensive account of the features of ethnic groups.

![Diagram](https://via.placeholder.com/150)

**Figure 4:** Hierarchical arrangement of key ethnic markers.

With his conceptual instrumental model, Nash suggests that ethnicity is generally about individuals demarcating difference through their affiliation to respective cultural markers. The self ascription by individuals to any of the cultural elements within the primary, secondary, and tertiary levels enables a more complete view of the social, cultural, and historical influences that shape ethnic individuals,
groups, networks, and communities (see Figure 4). Nash's emphasis on the boundary marking of index features of ethnicity complements Barth's (1969) analysis, which also attests to the limitations of the primordial schema.

Barth (1969) suggests that primordialism offers a view of ethnicity, which although attending to ethnic criteria, does so only in a way where observations are taken of individuals exhibiting what are perceived to be collective criteria of a particular ethnic grouping. The 'culture bearing aspect' of individuals within ethnic groups is therefore classified in a diagnostic form, which for Barthes attests to the normative function evident in models such as those construed for acculturation studies. By this Barth means that the construction of a cultural scheme using primordial criteria for evaluation, while producing a normative and deviance scale of requisite culture bearing aspects, fails to identify the normative feature with which the culture or ethnic group itself is being compared. (Berry, 1992). Like Bhabha's (1994) cultural hybridity conception of change, Barth is more interested in the way in which ethnic individuals and collectivities organise and develop themselves around the conceptual boundary which leads to the constitution of ethnic difference. That is, from Barth's perspective, the enhancing of distinctive ethnic qualities emerges in the form of a territorial statement. Therefore, according to Barth, it is not necessarily the cultural contents that distinguish an ethnic group, but more the boundary, theoretically construed, and empirically constructed, between ethnic groups.

It is also worth noting that Barth's (1969) view corresponds to Foucault's (Ransom, 1997) concern, regarding the construction of normative criteria at a population level to evaluate individuals in terms of psychological and physical dispositions. In effect, both theorists are arguing for the suspension of the normative model of evaluation. While Barth's suggests that normative criteria are developed to make ethnic distinctions at a population level as a territorial statement, Foucault argues that population trends exposited in terms of physical and mental dispositions, emerges as a result of the function of knowledge as it pertains to power. Therefore, both Barth and Foucault make salient the connection between the development of normative criteria that designates membership to specific populations and
mechanisms that serve such a purpose. Respectively, Barth suggests that territorial statements are the main mechanism while Foucault argues that it is power.

Barth (1969) identifies boundary maintenance by ethnic groups as entailing an exclusion and valid membership component, or alternatively, features of ascription and identification. Being able to ascribe membership to ethnic individuals who are in the same group enables those individuals to expand on their interactive repertoire of meanings and understandings. At the same time the criteria of exclusion allow an active bifurcation to occur between those who share the ascriptive and membership criteria, and those who don't. A secondary use of ascriptive and identification criteria is to serve as an active maintenance strategy of the boundary at the level of inter-ethnic contact. That is, membership criteria can be intentionally enhanced at the point of inter-ethnic contact for the deliberate purpose of heightening the value of 'culture bearing criteria'. This strategy maintains the presupposition of 'inherent difference' between both observers and ethnic individuals, or between other ethnic groups, which ensures at least the maintenance of the conceptual barrier.

Clifford (1995) scrutinises this problem within the confines of interpretive anthropology. He suggests that with the increased visibility of the creative imagination at work within cultural and indigenous domains the ethnographer can no longer guarantee the truth of images. In arguing for a generalised ethnography where the diversity of idiomatic expressions of culture and ethnicity are conceptualised as heteroglossic (multi-vocal), Clifford claims that we have arrived at the second moment in the dialectic of experience and interpretation. As an example, Geertz (1975) refers to the Balinese propensity for public performance which is a dramatic response, or a theatre of status, played out in social interaction. Behind the scenes however, is an elaborate casting system where according to order of birth, Balinese individuals are intimately aware of their cultural and status location. Geertz suggests that what might appear, as public frivolity is in fact, a fear of committing a social faux pas by revealing one's own personality, as opposed to one's birth order, which is the correct character of public Balinese display. Therefore, implicit in Clifford's analysis is the question of what is involved in the representations of a culture, especially when such a representation is reflected back on the culture. Put another
way, one cannot assume participant nor ethnographer acquiescence in the active construction of collective representations of ethnicity or cultural domains.

Both Clifford's (1995) and Geertz's (1975) work illustrates Barth's (1969) contention that ethnic boundaries can be presupposed and even accentuated through the actual interaction between seemingly disparate groups. The primordial prototype of ethnic individuals acting within entirely separate and enclosed structures does not offer any analysis of cultural difference, cultural transactions resulting in cultural hybridity, or intentional performance, whether it be on the side of the observer or on the side of those displaying cultural bearing criteria. In arguing from what is proposed as a distributive model of culture, Rodseth (1998) suggests that cultural populations are best understood as semantic populations. Ethnicity is therefore seen as being a malleable, variable, and diverse mode of determining the meaning of the world, which may be displayed differently across generations, or symbolically when interacting with other ethnic groups. The instrumental approach postulates an ideological contribution to ethnicity, while the transactionalist approach emphasises the expression of ethnicity across inter-ethnic boundaries.

Kallen (1996) refers to primordial conceptions of ethnicity as 'old ethnicity', which were generally recognised through largely geographical and social boundaries brought about through limited interactive contact. 'New ethnicity' is a term which for Kallen, reflects a fundamental theoretical shift within contemporary social scientific usage where along with the subjective experience of ethnicity, acknowledgement is also given to the situational contexts in which ethnicity is accorded heightened value. Owing much to the seminal work of Barth (1969), Kallen believes that with the major developments in technology, communications, and geo-political shifts, the concept of 'old ethnicity,' being supposedly descriptive of collectivist and holistic isolates is now obsolete. Accordingly, ethnicity as a construct should only be conceptualised within the context of an ever-dynamic interaction between different groups and in relation to boundary maintenance strategies. Even though ethnicity is an arbitrary classificatory device, conjoining bio-geographical and sociocultural considerations together, the major criterion of ethnicity in a modern and progressive context of inter-ethnic relations is therefore common ancestry or ancestral origin. As Kallen states:
Common ancestry, in turn, is a multi-faceted concept implying at least three criteria: biological descent from common ancestors; maintenance of a shared ancestral heritage (culture and social institutions); and attachment to an (actual or mythical) ancestral territory or homeland. These criteria provide the foundation for the (actual and assumed) distinctiveness of an ethnic category - a people classified as alike on the basis of ethnicity. (p. 117)

Kallen (1996) makes it clear that the arbitrary nature of ethnicity is largely brought about through the contingent influences of societal conditions and changes. Ethnic bearing criteria can be selected by ethnic groups and individuals to heighten their allegiance to a particular ancestral location, or to make an appeal to structural autonomy within the nation state to lay claim to political and economic resources, or alternatively to access institutional or local bodies where they are under-represented. Therefore, boundary-maintaining mechanisms become evident in the way in which ethnic bearing criteria are apprehended as a means to gain access to or control of particular resources. In making the distinction between voluntary minorities (intentional immigration) and involuntary minorities (groups who by territorial conquest, war, or frontier adjustment, find themselves a minority in a larger nation state), Kallen claims that if the objective of an involuntary minority is to gain a measure of autonomy then the success of such a campaign will be largely dependent on the methods implemented to make salient the relationship between ethnic bearing criteria and specific resources.

The three interactive dimensions, which she perceives as being most instrumental for this purpose, are symbolic ethnicity, structural ethnicity, and anti-discrimination. Symbolic ethnicity as mentioned above, can be displayed by successive generations in order to establish a positive connection to a group collectivity. The main relevance of symbolic ethnicity in this context is to ensure that due reverence, authority, and preservation rights are sanctioned within the ethnic group as a means of connecting the past with the present and, therefore, the future. Ideologically, the ethnocultural is symbolically signified, by implication, as having a tied fate to the beginning of origins of the genealogical, the cultural and the spiritual. Structural ethnicity is the development and maintenance of an ethnic group's internal institutions such as educational, political, and economic-producing resources, which can organise the social context of ethnic members. Anti-discrimination is observed...
in the ability of an ethnic group to mobilise its members effectively and efficiently to demand action for autonomy or to access resources or institutions. The strength and vitality of an ethnic group will therefore depend on the way in which these three internal features of new ethnicity cohere and interact within the ethnic group, as well as how effectively they are mediated and transacted, across ethnic and national boundaries.

The movement towards the concept of 'new ethnicity' also draws closer the connection between modem ethnicity as an interactive constellation of features exhibited largely at the group level, and individual ethnic identity. Roosens (1989) offers a synthesised and realistic view of ethnic identity emergence, which like Kallen (1996), she suggests cannot be divorced from the social dimensions in which it is, or is not, expressed. Therefore, from Roosens account, ethnic identity is understood to involve an 'internal,' intrapsychic dimension as well as a social context in which the ethnic identity is ascribed, affirmed, and reinforced. Cultural, social, and psychological factors are generally characterised as being enmeshed. A sense of belonging, of uniqueness (belonging to one's culture or social category), or being distinguished as a sub-group of the ethnic conglomeration, all afford a degree of psychological security. Roosens takes the view that interactive individuals have multiple membership to social units, social networks, and social categories. Having an internal sense of ethnic affirmation enables the individual to determine their association and degree of contact to an ethnic group as a matter of personal prioritising in a hierarchy of multiple social identifications.

Ethnicity is therefore a relational construct, which for Roosens (1989), is distinguished predominantly by its elasticity to define both the criteria and the extent or degree of membership, individuals have to an ethnic group. The flexibility of ethnic identification is also relative to the perceived strategic advantage of maintaining, or making redundant, certain cultural nuances, symbols, and markers. From her extensive studies with the Huron and other Indians of Quebec, Roosens (1989) makes clear that ethnic identity can also be institutionalised through governmental accreditation, legislation, and mandate practices. With the example of New Zealand the connection between the government determination of ethnic definitions, the practice of tribal registration by ethnic beneficiaries, and individuals'
perception of strategic advantage, all reflect Roosens perspective of ethnic flexibility, or what she calls, 'ethnicity creation'. Craig (1997) expands on this concept within the aegis of postmodern pluralism, arguing for an understanding of social, moral, and legal selves, which, although constituting a coherent singular identity, are also mutable, expansive, and selective.

Hechter's (1986) rational choice theory of ethnicity has as its key element individual and group perceptions of strategic advantage. Basically, his model perceives ethnic individuals as selecting and learning both the internal and external constraints provided to them through their identification of, and connection to, a larger collective group. Preference formulation is an adaptive strategy, whereby individuals determine whether they will maximise their net gain or strategic advantage, by either associating with the ethnic community, or alternatively, disassociating with the community. As in game theory, the ethnic community is aware that in order to obtain maximal strategic advantage, they must maintain a collective action focus, which requires as large a membership as possible, and that members must show compliance to the social order. Compliance is best negotiated between ethnic individuals and their communities through the offering of incentives and rewards, which should tip the strategic balance in favour of the ethnic community. However, along with compliance is the necessity to monitor non-compliance. This is achieved through public sanctions and punishments, such as loss of promotion within a tribal structure. The mediation between institutional arrangements and individuals, is therefore, organised around the concept of profit sharing in resources, which means the maximising of strategic advantage for the collective, and then for the individuals comprising the collective.

Sowell (1994) also utilises the rational choice model to discredit any primordial notions of ethnicity, which he sees essentially as doctrines lacking any intrinsic and contemporary meaning. Sowell posits a more radical view than Hechter (1986). He suggests that even though the environment in which an ethnic community lives will partially shape that group's behaviours and institutions the more important features are the cultural patterns and values inherent in the particular group, which enable its members to advance their group's welfare relative to scientific and technological advancement, knowledge formation, and organisation. Culture, for
Sowell, is not an abstract set of contents symbolically maintained and displayed, but is instead an active, existing set of values and attitudes about education, economy, entrepreneurship and specific labour skills, which together constitute the human capital of a particular ethnic community. Whether it is the development of high culture, or the necessity for survival, Sowell believes that the human capital of a distinct culture will be expressed through the material resources in their possession.

From this perspective, the economic and social advancement of an ethnic group will be dependent on the way in which the cultural equipment of that group is valued, utilised, and expanded to maximise the group's advantage and progression. Cultural diffusions, transfers, imitations, influences and inspirations, are recorded in both the internal and external materiality of a given people. And, even though Sowell suggests that there is no static tableau of differences, there are different imperatives from which particular groups will gravitate. As a consequence, Sowell argues that the persistence of cultural differences should not be explained away through social ascription of external and objective forces, as this denies the very substance of culture by assuming a universal tabula rasa – that is, a static universality, which is clearly not the case. Instead, for Sowell, cultural differences should be seen to emerge from the way in which ethnic groups receive alternative cultural imports (1994). Cultural receptivity, is therefore, a key element in determining whether a cultural group will respond to new ideas and products, either passively or actively. The corresponding relation between receptivity and response can therefore, lead to cultural reciprocity in terms of cultural transfer and exchange of technology, knowledge, education and skills. Underlying Sowell's rational choice theory is the law of diminishing returns. The basic premise of this law is that there are inferior and superior methods for the conduct of an action or process, and that the most effective means of reaching the most satisfactory output, or conclusion, will eventually come to dominate.

Sowell's (1994) analysis is drawn from an international perspective. His main point is that there are pervasive cultural patterns in the world, a point consistent with the thesis that independent of discrimination and persecution, certain values and attitudes towards human capital prevail to determine the rate of progress evident within a given ethnic group. Sowell explicitly contends that the main social
doctrines, which describe disparity between groups in terms of treatment, are insufficient to explain difference. Two reasons he puts forward for this contention are as follows. First, the assumption that ethnic groups maintain cultural insularity is not empirically validated. And secondly, the disparity of capital possession is first made apparent within groups through the emergence of internal elites. Sowell provides further evidence supporting this latter contention when he notes, that in comparison to intra-group exchange there is a higher rate of cultural transfer and diffusion between internal elites and external authorities. This conclusion is further supported by Brass (1991), who proposes that such a system of exchange advantages both groups, through maintaining or advancing respective vested interests. Strategic advantage is, therefore, the maximising of cultural exchange between groups, which will optimally enhance the human capital within a specific group's possession.

To summarise, the concept of ethnicity has been shown to be a highly variable dimension that generally refers to a specific set of criteria for membership in a particular group. Common to all definitions reviewed is the heightened value given to themes of origin, ancestry, and descent. Because ethnicity is so strongly associated with these temporal notions it is often assumed that ethnicity implies a form of biological continuity. Hence, the fallible connection between ethnicity and race (Wade, 1993), which can be reflected in primordial conceptions of the construct, ethnicity. Banton (1987), in his book *Racial Theories*, documents the collusion between percepts of lineage, appearance, and classification, which can come to constitute an aberrant 'naturalism' whereby phenotypic variation is seen as being consonant with behavioural or cognitive distinctions at a population level. Phenomenological and existential theories of ethnicity posit that the main property of ethnicity is a form of consciousness, or an intrapsychic connection, operable between members of an ethnic group. In supposing an ethnic intersubjectivity these approaches perceive that an experiential element of ethnicity is transmitted at either a psychological or somatic level.

The transactionalist approaches to ethnicity emphasise the way in which core cultural elements or referents of ethnicity are used to demarcate boundaries between populations, groups, and individuals. From these perspectives, ethnicity is a symbolic resource. As a symbolic resource, the contemporary re-constitution, and
therefore, elasticity of ethnicity as a marker of 'tradition,' has been described as the 'second degree fiction,' the 'second mode of ethnicisation' (Balibar, 1991), and by Clifford (1995), as the 'second moment in the dialectic of experience and interpretation'. Implicit to the analyses provided by Balibar and Clifford is the belief that ethnicity is best described within a meta-level domain of reference. The reason for this is that cultural maintenance and preservation presupposes a condition of constancy, and although ethnicity may allude to an element of historical situatedness, the contemporary rendering of ethnic forms is often benignly semantic. While Hechter (1986) and Sowell (1994) suggest that the principle function of ethnicity is to serve as a resource to maximise individual or group level strategic advantage, the ethnicity of individuals and groups, as a socially constituted referent, can show active selection, retention, and variation of core elements depending on the perceived advantage gained by heightening, mediating, or negating the significance of ethnic allegiance. From this stance, ethnicity has a pragmatic imperative built into its maintenance as it can be mobilised as a referent of negotiation for the accumulation of resources.

MacCannell (1992) moves the theorising of ethnicity to an alternative plane when he describes the subject 'ethnicity' only in terms of reconstructed ethnicity. From his perspective, ethnicity is, and shall always remain, a conceptual construction. The theorising of ethnicity, therefore, is in the first instance a construction, which indigenous peoples adopted by their being categorised as ethnic identities, authentic and different from those who made such observations. The conceptualisation of ethnicity is considered as an abstraction from a universal normative standard where measurements of difference are articulated by both insiders and outsiders, resulting in internal and external culture bearing criteria such as those proposed by primordialism.

In the second instance, ethnicity is reconstructed as the exotic and the local. With the advent of communications, media and technology diffusion, exotica and localised culture, offer a view of the 'genuine' and 'original' past. Ethnicity becomes a commodity in the global market place and because of its intrinsic comparative value, it is reproduced in more deterministic and complete forms. MacCannell calls his perspective a 'tourists approach' to ethnicity. 'White culture', which is not a direct
ethnic referent, but is rather a cultural totalising term, has commodified ethnicity as the rhetorical complement to itself. And it is the element of rhetoric that provides reconstructed ethnicity its exchange value. White culture, or the cultural totality, only allows indigenous groups to express themselves through the ethnic construction for the purpose of measuring progress, and its own seemingly non-contrived objective neutrality. This is the value of the touristic exchange between White culture and ethnic groups.

MacCannell (1992), identifies three features which he considers to be principal tactics for marking out the boundaries between White culture and ethnic groups which are always conceptualised in binary opposition. First, the focus of White culture is usually on the manner in which ethnicity is expressed in the social order. The manner of ethnic expression, in being measured against White cultural constraint and order, is interpreted only rhetorically. Secondly, the rhetorical interpretation of ethnicity removes any need to advance a penetrative view of White culture itself. The attitudes underlying rhetorical analyses of ethnic communities are assumed and hardly ever challenged. Third, the aversion that White culture might have to the social arrangements and values of ethnic groups is only expressed indirectly in order to maintain the air of neutrality and objectivity thought as being inherent in White culture and absent in ethnic communities. White cultural analysis on ethnicity, therefore, produces an abstruse alternative to the universal conception of the social, the behavioural, attitudinal, and ultimately, the normative construction of human relations.

Accordingly, by occupying the conceptual space between the biogenetic and the socio-genetic, ethnicity becomes an arbitrary construct where the contents of its meaning are co-determined from both the inside, as well as the outside. Emphasis, by White culture, of ethnic communities' use values is compared with White culture's drive to universalise a system of exchange values. Both sets of values are conceptualised as being incommensurable, yet it is precisely their being theorised as such, which leads to the commodification of culture and the rhetorical production of cultural forms (see Appendix B). Interestingly, it is the theoretical incommensurability of proposed disparate values that leads MacCannell (1992) to
the conclusion that the concepts of freedom and authenticity have now been fully mythologised.

**Maori ethnicity: A concept and a feeling**

In Pool's (1991) demographic analysis of the Maori population he makes clear that historically the term 'Maori ethnicity' has been subject to considerable methodological and constitutional manipulation. Census data up until 1921 made a social distinction between 'half caste' Maori, who were living either tribally, or who were living a European lifestyle. Maori living European lifestyles were not included as Maori. Between 1926 and 1951 Maori who identified as also being of other than European descent, such as being of Pacific Islands descent, were excluded from the Maori category. Yet, in the 1956 census all such persons were included in the Maori category. The Hunn Report of 1961 included ten separate statutory formulae for determining both Maori ethnicity and degree of biological inheritance. The limitation of biological criteria as constituting a reasonable assessment of Maori was first noted by Sir George Grey in the 1840's, and was later to be reinforced by Te Rangi Hiroa's observation of the high rate of inter-ethnic mobility in 1924. However, census data collected up until 1981 still required respondents to determine in biometric fractions their quotient of Maori blood in order to arrange Maori into subgroups representing full blood, half blood (half caste), and quarter blood (quarter caste). The last subgroup was placed in the non-Maori population.

McCreary (1968) also notes that census data relating to Maori inclusion obtained before 1945 was almost random, because enumerators were not entirely convinced that their safety could be assured when travelling to more remote areas. It was only after 1946, when Maori became eligible for Family Benefits without having to be means tested, that McCreary observes a marked increase in Maori birth registration.

In 1975 self-identification was instituted through the Electoral Amendment Act whereby individuals of Maori, or part Maori descent, could select whether they wished to be on the general or Maori electoral role. On consequence, the census of 1976 included the new category 'Maori descendants', which according to Pool
(1991), was so over-subscribed and inconsistent with any census data collected before 1976 and after that time, that he recommended that data derived from this census be used with caution. In 1986 the census formally introduced a self-identification category which enabled respondents to identify with more than one ethnic group. The censuses of 1991 and 1996 included questions relating to Maori ancestry, ethnic self-identification and iwi affiliation, which enabled three different options for estimating the Maori population to be used. The inclusion of a specific question on iwi affiliation of Maori respondents is also noteworthy because data pertaining to tribal affiliation had not been taken in a census for over one hundred years (Pomare, Ormsby, Ormsby, Pearce, Reid, Robson & Watene-Haydon 1995).

As Pomare et al. (1995) have outlined, the three population categories are Maori ancestry, Maori ethnic group, and sole Maori. Therefore, according to Pomare et al. (1995), the Maori ancestry category reflects the constitutional rights of all individuals of Maori descent to take a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal or to enrol on the Maori electoral role; the Maori ethnic group reflects cultural identification, whereas the sole Maori category represents ethnic affiliation. In the context of health, Pomare et al. (1995) suggest that the sole Maori definition be used as it represents a population who choose to nominate Maori as their only descent group. From this it is implied that it is more likely that this population better approximates the criterion of former definitions, i.e., persons of half, or more, Maori origin. The sole Maori population recorded in the 1991 census numbered 323,998, while in the 1996 census the same question recorded 273,693 respondents which represents a decrease of fifteen per cent. This decrease however, in no way reflects Maori mortality rates for according to the 1996 census from the years 1991-1996, the 'Maori ethnic group' had grown by twenty per cent and the Maori ancestry group had increased by thirteen per cent. For this reason, the 1996 census states that the sole Maori category is to be used only for historical purposes, and that it is the Maori ethnic group concept, which has been adopted by Statistics New Zealand to standardise the presentation of Maori statistics. In 1996 eighty-five per cent of people who identified as having Maori ancestry belonged to the Maori ethnic group.

Pool (1991) notes the methodological and conceptual difficulties involved in making any attempt to reconcile disparate data sets drawn from either census data or
from other sources in regards to Maori ethnicity. A more significant problem from Pool's point of view is that the self identification category means that individuals who identify equally with Maori and European ethnic groups may potentially confound future analyses which attempt to draw an association between Maori social reality and Maori ethnic descent. Principally, what this indicates is that the ethnic descent question contained in a census ought to be properly construed as a cultural definition. However, the policy implications of this problem have more recently been noted in the document entitled 'Progress towards closing the social and economic gaps between Maori and non-Maori' (Te Punī Kokiri, 1998). This document more commonly referred to as 'The closing the gaps report' notes that in view of the change in both population and health statistics since 1995, that data drawn from 1995 onwards is not directly comparable with data collected before 1995. The example provided in the same report is that of fluctuating hospital rates for Maori between 1996 and 1997 being the result of substantially fewer Maori identifying as sole Maori because of the changed 1996 census definition on ethnicity. As has already been noted, this change in choice of ethnic category is concordant with the general trend for more people to equally identify with two or more ethnic groups.

In reviewing data collection sources other than the censuses, Pool (1991) maintains that there is wide variability in ethnic descent definitions, which has also led to different data collection and coding methods. While the census has moved to a cultural definition relying on self-identification of respondents, many data sets across a wide range of fields still use ancestry or observation of appearance to determine ethnic descent. The critical problem with the variability in these methods of data collection and coding is that basically there is no guarantee that the denominator baseline measure and the numerator, which could be determined by any one of many disparate methods, are consistent measures amenable to sound statistical analysis. Pomare et al. (1995), writing in the context of Maori health describe the problem thus:

It is essential that the same definition of 'Maori,' is used in the numerator data and the denominator data. If this approach is not followed, then the resulting statistics may be misleading and this may have major implications for resource allocation and for the monitoring of trends in Maori health status. (p. 43)
Pool provides examples that show that, from determining Maori fertility rates through to estimates of Maori mortality, there are inconsistencies in the data collection methods and statistical analyses used. Also confounding this theoretical and empirical problem is the fact that second hand informers such as partners, teachers, and funeral directors, are often used to report ethnic descent on behalf of other individuals. Pool illustrates the degree in which second hand reporting can confound analyses by stating that in 1988 the Waikato Hospital had misidentified twenty-eight per cent of patients of Maori descent as being European. This parallels the national abortion statistics where twenty-six per cent of women who identified themselves as Maori were recorded as being of Pakeha descent. Moreover, Pool citing Graham, P., Jackson, R., Beaglehole, E & De Boer, G (1989) notes that the ethnic origin section of New Zealand death certificates is only completed if the deceased is of Maori or Pacific Islands descent. Of almost quintessential irony is the fact that if descent is unable to be determined then the deceased is listed as "other".

The reconciliation of statistical data with social reality is therefore observed by Pool as reflecting the merging of ancestry and self-identity. He states,

The major difficulty will be to reconcile data collected on the basis of ancestry with the social reality they attempt to represent: that ethnicity is primarily a self-expression based on a feeling of cultural identity. In earlier years the two concepts may have been relatively close, but as time has passed the gap has widened. (p. 23)

And according to the most recent census of 1996 (Statistics New Zealand, 1997), 523,371 individuals responded as having such a feeling. Pool is critically aware of the conceptual, methodological, social, political, and constitutional problems that such a definition imposes on the conduct of theoretical and empirical research. Moreover, Pool, even in acknowledging that such a definition necessarily undermines the reliability and validity of any analysis in which the definition is used, suggests that the standardisation of ethnicity measures could be enhanced if improved protocols of data collection and coding were developed. Even though this might appear to be conceptual avoidance of a fundamental issue, Pool makes explicit the fact that politics are not removed from the field of demography. In his opinion, the cultural maintenance of difference can still be observed in a climate of cultural
convergence where more people are choosing to identify equally with two or more ethnic groups. And, although it is precisely this last point which Pool considers to be the major factor which jeopardises the life expectancy of ethnicity as it is currently formulated, he insists that as long as the variable of ethnicity constituted as a ‘cultural feeling’ is able to advantage the underprivileged then its continued use should be supported.

Durie (1998) advances the notion that by 1984 a new type of Maori identity had been forged and being based on tribal affiliation such an identity was actively promoted by the State (see also Spoonley, 1988; Pearson, 1990). The reaffirmation of Maori culture particularly in the 1980’s was the impetus for this development, and as I have suggested elsewhere in this dissertation, this period also marks what I refer to as the second phase of the politicisation of Maori health. Spoonley (1995) situates the development of the post-colonial constructs of both Maori and Pakeha ethnicity within the 1980’s and suggests that during this time there was a clear bifurcation between Maori and Pakeha. Although this bifurcation was often shielded by a discourse that centred on biculturalism what emerged within academia according to Spoonley, was a sociology of being Pakeha. From Spoonley’s view, the constitution of Pakeha ethnicity as a counterpoint to a reified Maori ethnicity was necessary in order to create imaginary communities where the very act of identifying as Pakeha in itself, implied similarly to Maori, a set of shared experiences, value orientations, and lifestyles. Articulating ethnic descent from Spoonley’s perspective is both a political and a positive act as it actively encourages a binary politics, which in the climate of tribal authorities and the Crown negotiating the meeting ground between history and the present, favours the movement towards an idealised biculturalism.

In order to conclude this section on the social construction of Maori ethnicity, I offer an alternative view to the 'sociological imagination' which Spoonley (1995) implies and which Pool (1991) confirms, through his theoretical appraisal of Maori ethnicity being a 'feeling' about cultural identification. The underlying point being made is that the social construction of Maori ethnicity can be considered to be principally a political aberration (see in particular Hazlehurst, 1993). Although I do not discount the fundamental significance of self-development being intersubjectively interred and expressed through social and cultural relations, the
fertility of Maori ethnicity as a useful variable for psychological analysis ought to be carefully reviewed in the New Zealand context.

Betancourt and Lopez (1993), in analysing the use of the concepts 'culture' and 'ethnicity' in American psychological research, suggest that substantive theorising is required in terms of what the contents of 'culture' and 'ethnicity' might include. They suggest that substantive theory development is required before developing either concept into a potential explanatory variable or factor, independent of whether cultural specificity or cultural generality of conclusions is the objective of the research design. According to Betancourt and Lopez when 'culture' and 'ethnicity' have been included as explanatory factors in a research design there is often little, if any, theory developed to explain the inferred relationship between the cultural variable and the behavioural phenomenon under investigation. Betancourt and Lopez make this observation in regard to both general and cross-cultural psychological research. They suggest that for the concepts' 'culture' and 'ethnicity' to become amenable to measurement, neither, race or 'identity', are sufficient terms of reference to attribute meaning to culture and ethnicity as potential psychological variables. More importantly, in the context of this dissertation an expression such as 'the psychiatric morbidity of Maori' also requires re-examining. This is because implicit in such an expression is the presupposition that the mental states of individuals of Maori ethnic descent have something inherently and culturally cognitive and communal about them. No empirical evidence to date can support this conclusion. Furthermore, such an expression also assumes that the psychiatric morbidity of Maori may be compared with the psychiatric morbidity of non-Maori and this cross-cultural comparison on the basis of ethnicity is also similarly unwarrantable. As the evidence presented suggests the construct of ethnicity may very well suggest ancestry and cultural identity, but it also has a history of substantive variability and in its contemporary construction is immersed in the politics of identity. I believe that the politicising of ethnic identity may have a place in determining the state of the nation, but in its current theoretical formulation it has no place in determining the mental states of the nation's people.

While accepting that Maori have been exposed to colonial disadvantage the main consideration here is that implicit within nativist discourses which actively
politicise identity is the suppressed notion that all Maori exhibit some form of pathology as a mark of their oppression; and that this supposition becomes the primary symbol denoting Maori ethnicity. To be Maori, and not to be oppressed, calls into question the deeper paradox of 'traditional' Maori being socially constructed through colonisation, and contemporary Maori being similarly constituted through urbanisation. These ancestral 'texts' have actively circumscribed the means by which problems can be formulated and it appears that underlying the politics of Maori subjectivity is, therefore, the reunification premise that Maori have failed to thrive for the simple reason that loss of attachment to the land through colonisation and urbanisation has caused a cultural pathology. By way of conclusion, the following summary of Greenland's (1991) work usefully draws attention to the way in which the appropriation of culture can be utilised to confer cognitive categories of 'communal well-being'.

Greenland (1991) clearly traces the development and perpetual use of Maori ethnicity as a vehicle of paradigmatic resources used to attack the legitimacy of contemporary New Zealand society. The absorption of seemingly culturally imbued beliefs, values, and concepts into a secular stereotype of Maori identity effectively combined the ideology of the Maori activist movement of the 1960's and 1970's with what Greenland refers to as 'the cosmological, mythological, and spiritual nexus' to construct an organic Maori identity quite antithetical to the presumed non-Maori stereotyped identity. According to Greenland, land became the pivotal symbol by which Maori identity construction became ideologically imbued with its fundamental connection to the primordial past. The metaphor of kin was apprehended as a means of consolidating a view of common origin and identity contextualised by an intrinsic attachment to the land. Alienation from the land became the root cause of contemporary problems, which in Greenland's words, ended in rhetorical fiat when explanations were sought for personal and social problems. The loss of attachment by Maori to Papatuanuku was delivered as a fait accompli to secular New Zealand society as evidence for the superimposed non-Maori identity, where attachment to patriarchy and capitalism was elaborated to cement a deep contrast based on ethnic descent.
The more vigorous Maori identity that emerged from the 1970's also built upon an alliance between unionism and the working class whereby the Treaty of Waitangi was interpreted as a moral charter rather than a legal document which enabled a radical critique of democracy, nationhood, and the State to develop. As Greenland states,

Thus, as a moral and political critique, the issue of land was the device by which radicals sought, on a holistic basis, to question Pakeha society using its own proclaimed values. They claimed that social and economic development had led to cultural and economic 'genocide'; that the empty and possessive pursuit of material wealth had debased the communal and organic Maori way of life; and that the welfare state was in fact oppressive and hegemonic. (p. 97)

The challenge to the legitimacy of New Zealand statehood on the basis of an ideological fission between organic Maori society and the artificial Pakeha metropolis also led to the movement toward an ethnic nationalism which rather than being based on territory, was entrenched in affirmation of, and pride in, asserting one's identity. Signalling a retroversion from social constructivism to cultural relativism this movement was based on three central themes which permitted the induction of a new generation of ethnic initiates.

The first theme can be termed an 'identity of interest', whereby the assertion of a positive Maori identity symbolically represented the underlying kindred spirit of Maori who being of common origin, were intrinsically united through their mutual oppression. With the diminishment of cultural identity markers such as language the emphasis was placed on supplementary symbols of external distinction. As Greenland suggests, "Such changes transformed the attributes of phenotype into an overt semiotic combat. This contesting of the conventional and traditional categories of Maoriness propagated a collective identity and solidarity" (p. 99). The second theme was expressly psychological whereby the commensurability of the natural Maori collective was exaggerated to confer an idealised genetic predisposition toward a Maori cognitive identity. However, the polemical requirement of this psychological rebirth was the necessity to expunge the influence of the coloniser from the personally oppressed psyche. Hence, 'decolonisation of the mind' became a personal strategy to engender a deeper connection to the 'traditional' collective of
Maori sovereign thought. Beliefs, values, and perceptions were identified and promoted as being of specific Maori origin (see Metge and Kinloch, 1978; Patterson, 1992), and explanations for Maori youth problems in particular, were connected to a metaphysical rupture of the psyche caused by colonisation. Contemporary responses to contemporary problems were therefore circumscribed by the need for Maori to acknowledge their own personal oppression, and redeem themselves in a show of reattachment to culturally relative ideals of collectivity. Greenland refers to this second theme of resurrected Maori identity as the mental and spiritual corollary to social and political emancipation.

The third theme can be regarded as a stress on separatism and exclusion. In order to extricate Maori interests from the collapsing of anti-racist and indigenous issues, Pakeha were excluded from participating in the formerly common ground of race relations. Greenland believes that this disconnection from the common ground of race relations to the more specific territory of Maori issues paved the way for mass Maori support of a particular type of Maori leadership. Emphasis on the resurrection of Maoritanga led the way to a 'typology of nativism' which was uniquely Maori and no longer necessarily tied to the 'black consciousness movements' which promulgated the initial radical rhetoric of the 1960's. In drawing the distinction between black nationalism and indigenous rights, Maori drew ranks with other indigenous, colonised, minorities such as, Australian Aboriginals and Native Indians, to create a new consciousness, which was firmly grounded on the political critique of ethnicity. The main element of indigenous commensurability evident in the association drawn between Maori, Australian Aboriginals, and Native Indians, is the connection between alienation from the land and ethnic descent. The assertion of an indigenous identity vis-à-vis other indigenous groups who are all bonded through a common historical experience, therefore, leads the circumscription of the contemporary problems experienced by such indigenous groups, within the parameters of that which makes them commensurate. In this instance, the commensurate referent is land.

In order to address the means by which ethnicity in New Zealand society has emerged in its contemporary form I now offer a scientific realist interpretation of cultural reification. The metaphysical, semantic and epistemic features which I
outline, enable an understanding to be developed as to how Maori ethnicity has recourse to a commensurate marker such as land, which serves to orient the normative, strategic, and seemingly consensual views of Maori development as observed in the current resurgence of Maori culture. It is important to acknowledge that in the following chapter the view of the cultural reification process which I present is intentionally limited to extricating the conceptual bases of institutional, regulatory, and normative systems of Maori cultural belief. The diagram which accompanies my explication of Maori cultural reification (refer Figure 5) serves to guide the reader through a complex process. In short, the metaphysical component of cultural reification presented specifically refers to Maori percepts underlying forms of belief. The semantic component identifies ethnic specific markers and their relationship to institutional processes while the epistemic component alludes to the conjoining of cultural relativism and social constructionism to produce a Maori-specific brand of postmodern cultural relativism.

I am fully aware that the process of Maori cultural reification is a subject, which in its own right demands more attention than what is provided here. But in keeping with the nature of this dissertation, I only attempt to offer a sketch of what I perceive to be the more fundamental tenets of the reification process of Maori culture. I believe it to be extremely important that an understanding of cultural reification is developed by the discipline of psychology in New Zealand as it enables a more informed view to emerge as to how the current public and academic discourses formulate concepts about the mental states of Maori. In the perspective provided, it is precisely through the heightening of macro level claims of what constitutes Maori individualism that the mental states of Maori are either denied, or alternatively, encapsulated in an aggregate of social relations whereby notions of Maori agency are actively suppressed.
A scientific realist interpretation of Maori cultural reification

The necessity of considering what Maori metaphysics might look like as a process of cultural reification is important as it establishes a connection to the semantic and epistemic dimensions of a particular body of thought (Hooker, 1987). The inter-relations between the metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic components of a conceptual scheme enables a more penetrating view of the ideas and concepts which shape and reinforce particular contemporary perspectives of the world which come to be reified. The reason for reviewing the metaphysical basis that underlies a cultural conceptual scheme for scientific psychology is that in order to understand the informal intuitions that might constrain a view of the psychological realm, it is vital to be aware of the cause and effect relationships apparent in alternative metaphysical schema. The rationale for suggesting this is that the identification of causal routes of description and explanation within metaphysical cultural schema enables an improved understanding of the features that inform the schema at the semantic and epistemic levels. It is considered that the detection of an interdependency of the stratified levels of a conceptual scheme provides an improved understanding of the main mechanisms which actively reinforce that scheme's contemporary influence.

Implicit within the process of cultural reification are specific explanatory routes of causal phenomena which constitute a feedback loop bringing into their sphere institutional, regulatory, and normative features of psychological significance. In this context, cultural reification is seen as a process of negotiation between culture and nation which is represented in this example as characterised by the vested interests of tribal authorities and the Crown's agents. As Hooker (1987) states in relation to the nature of social processes involved in determining the decisions that both cultural and scientific institutions make about our future theories of both science and society:

What makes an enterprise a scientific enterprise has to do with the structure of the institution which realizes that enterprise and the structure of the culture generally (value systems, modes of communication, etc.) within which that
institution is imbedded. There are more or less thoroughly critical, or scientific cultures and these have the capacity to pursue scientific enterprise to a greater or lesser extent, but it follows from the above that there will not be, cannot be, a characterization of that enterprise which makes no reference to the policies, procedures, communication forms and so on which the institutions in question embody. (p. 152)

By analogy, the First and Final Cause symbiosis of a Maori metaphysics which is presented in this chapter is seen as emerging with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. Here the construct 'Maori' was first constituted (Davidson, 1981), and the movement toward a resolution of New Zealand's culture-nation origins is being finalised within the confines of the findings of the Waitangi Tribunal. Thus, embedded within the view presented here is the notion that the interface between science and culture within New Zealand cannot be theorised apart from the relationship of resolution (and resistance) currently being undertaken by tribal authorities and the Crown. The pervasiveness of cultural reification as a process of Maori self determination within a discourse of nation building is also observed in more grand scale objectives such as social cohesion (Bates, 1996), and the model of managed evolution currently being undertaken by the New Zealand government toward Maori health development (Ministry of Health, 1996). So pervasive is cultural reification that I believe it ought to be observed as a dual directional force operating between both culture and nation.

Underlying the themes that I present is the acknowledgement that any view of the metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic properties, of a Maori system of thought is not to be regarded as an actual embodiment of a Maori cultural paradigm (see Irwin, 1994). On the contrary, implicit in the views presented is the notion that there has been a systematic cross-fertilisation of ideas engendered through what Hooker (1995) refers to as the variation, selection, and retention process. Although this process is not disputed as an evolutionary process of biological organism adaptability (Hahlweg and Hooker, 1989), it's viability as a suitable explanation for cognitive evolution is currently being held in theoretical check. However, for my purposes, I am only assuming that the process of variation, retention, and selection of ideas, concepts, and theories serves as a useful heuristic in understanding historical diffusion within a climate of cultural reification which results in a form of
cultural hybridity. It is the element of human activity that remains complacent or receptive to a conceptual innovation, which reflects the process of variation, selection, and retention in which I am most interested. For example, Campbell (1990), in arguing for foundationalism to be replaced by selection theory, suggests that the creative process is better understood by a view which makes explicit the presuppositions underlying choice. As he says,

What is needed is a sociology of intra-scientific mutual persuasion, belief retention and belief change which make it plausible that in some scientific traditions the referents of the beliefs have participated in the selection of new belief consensus's. (p. 2)

Analogous to the point of engaging in trial and error behaviour, Rogers (1983) suggests that diffusion, is motivated by the role of reducing uncertainty such as risk, within any human domain. The reduction of uncertainty through either the adoption or rejection of novel ideas, is dependent on an interactive process involving base rate knowledge, persuasion or conversion, decision or consensus, implementation or modification, and confirmation or dissonance (Rogers, 1983). Whether it be toward an introduced concept or new technology, the conceptual activity engaged in to determine variation, selection, or retention of the novel is generally characterised by these choice mechanisms. Underlying the view I present is the perspective that for culture and science to engender a healthy respect for each realm, process and products, it is critical that we acknowledge that the objective of reducing uncertainty and therefore, cognitive risk, is part of a larger and more collaborative project.

Tomasello, Kruger, and Ratner (1993) posit a similar view in regards to cultural learning, which they propose, is best comprehended by the integrative matrix of imitation, instruction, and collaboration among conspecifics. Maruyama (1994), in arguing for epistemological heterogeneity both within and across cultures, provides empirical evidence to conclude that: (i) individual epistemological heterogeneity exists in each culture; (ii) any individual epistemological type found in a culture can be found in other cultures, i.e. the types exist across cultures and they are not subtypes confined in a culture; (iii) cultural differences arise from the way some type becomes dominant and suppresses, transforms, influences, or utilises non-
dominant types, but not in the absence of any type. The point being made is that belief variation, belief selection, and belief retention, when applied to either scientific or cultural domains, is often assumed to gravitate toward a mean and this often becomes the conceptual maypole from which debate about difference circulates.

In contrast, the view presented here takes the position that when theorising the interface between culture and science, fundamental to the human condition is a proclivity for choice, as opposed to dominance, which aids in expanding our conceptual horizons. Diffusion and hybridity are the result of intercultural and interscientific processes, which reflect human choices first and foremost at the psychological level. Illustrative of the process of variation, selection, and retention of ideas across cultural domains is the contention made by Te Rangi Hiroa (1950) and Hanson (1989), that the Io cult first documented by S. Percy Smith and Elsdon Best, shows too many aspects of the biblical account of creation to be considered a genuine story of Maori origins. Even though the Io cult in the contemporary context may be seen as a sanctified metaphysical view (Marsden, 1988), the idealisation and subsequent reification of its most central tenets into a Maori viewpoint, possibly owes more to the influence of missionaries and anthropologists than to a representation drawn from a Maori ancestral past (see Appendix A). Put simply, I suggest that the received view of a Maori metaphysical schema such as that represented by the Io cult conception, is one example of a post-colonial adaptation, which can be understood through the concept of diffusion as reflected in the heuristic of variation, selection, and retention. Groube (1964) and Jackson (1967) have also provided substantial evidence that supports this conclusion.

Therefore, transparent in the perspective I present is the avoidance of what Keesing (1989) refers to, as the 'pastoral vision' of Maori thought whereby Maori society is theorised as comprising 'mystical wisdom', 'oneness with the land', 'ecological reverence', and 'social harmony'. The 'pastoral vision' permeates many modern Maori conceptual schema, especially those presented in specific fields of interest such as health. However, at this point, my purpose for offering a provisional sketch of a Maori metaphysics is to provide a means by which the prominent properties evident within Maori concepts of cause and effect can be indicated.
Obviously the scheme is somewhat speculative, but for the purposes of elucidating more clearly the main themes advanced about the mental health of Maori, it is deemed necessary to offer one version of the plausible cross-sectarian influences which have culminated in producing the contemporary process of cultural reification (see Figure 5). The deeper rationale of this exposition, is therefore, to undertake what Hahlweg and Hooker (1989) refer to as a remedial function, whereby anthropocentric presumptions are demystified as a way of moving toward a more realist view of the mental health of Maori.

Figure 5: A top-down scientific realist interpretation of the Maori cultural reification process. The metaphysical, semantic and epistemic components correspond to the institutional, regulatory and normative features outlined, thus producing a cultural conceptual threshold whereby the mental states of Maori are either actively suppressed or denied.
The Anthropic Principle

Metaphysical schema that emerge from specific cultural bases can be regarded as descriptive conceptual schema arising through human and environmental dependency and interaction (Hahlweg and Hooker, 1989). In one sense, they are fundamental views which describe the origins of time and space and a particular people's emergence into existence (Soja, 1993). They are modes of observation, which seek to communicate through description, a particularised history from which a cultural homeostasis or cultural diffusion, has arisen (Whitehead, 1978). In another sense, they are broad scale attachment theories, whereby the causal order of nature is alluded to only in relation to a specific cultural group from which the metaphysical scheme has been derived (White and Kirkpatrick, 1985). Therefore, although metaphysical schema are universal, what makes the content of specific schema local, is the perceived attachment that a people will have to their particular environment, and this attachment comes to be reflected in their respective metaphysical framework.

The connectedness between a local people, their environment and the physical attributes of nature observed within their environment, can be regarded as the fundamental building blocks of any metaphysical scheme. In this sense, the function of metaphysical schema ought to be understood as historically emerging from a niche dependency between human beings and their respective environments. Hahlweg and Hooker (1989) characterise this interplay between human cognition and environmental experience simply as an inextricable interaction between subjects and objects.

Barrow and Tipler (1986) suggest that because human bodies are measuring instruments there is an innate tendency for human beings to self select certain properties from their physical environment and attempt to draw a connection between the properties and exigencies of human life, and those exhibited in physical nature. Hooker (1995) draws a similar association between the role of behaviour and the development of cognition when he says:
Cognition evolved because adaptive control of behaviour was reinforced. Central to that control is anticipative intervention to disturb the environment in order to learn by its response and subsequently, to modify the environment so as to reduce risk. From this flows the central role of technology in the scientific process. Our earliest technologies were provided by our bodies. Subsequently, they evolved in delicate and increasingly intimate interactions with both practice and theory. Technologies are essentially amplifiers. (p. 32)

Hooker (1995) describes a process of human development within which there is feedback and circularity between the human body, the human mind, and the environment. Thus, mind and body are encoding devices or organic instruments, which filter environmental information through perception and sensory channels in order to improve the organism's ability to better interact with the environment (Brown, 1991). Hickman (1992), in describing Dewey's genetic method of inquiry frames this relationship as thus:

Since human beings are within and part of nature, the development of intelligence with respect to the control of human environments in order to effect increased meaning and significance within those environments is for Dewey emergent with nature. (p. 10)

Implicit in this view, is that meanings and significances are the goals of reflexive action, whereby increased understanding or optimally, problem solving, has resulted from human action preceding the movement toward an effective solution to a problem. The intelligent selection of 'ends-in-view' produces outcomes such as awareness, habits, algorithms, descriptive laws and theories, which extend the cognitive capacity of the organism to interact and hence, regulate their interactions with the environment. Selective behaviours are therefore, accorded the status of preferential action or as Hickman (1992) describes it, 'choice is freedom'. That is, although the causal element of a particular event and object may not be known the human species learns largely from effect. Dewey regarded this adaptive quality of the human species as being evident in the fact that human beings are able to consider a wide number of competing and mitigating factors simultaneously. Observation and foresight are seen as adaptive qualities, which fundamentally extend the cognitive and behavioural repertoire of the human species to interact more effectively with the environment. As Hickman (1992) puts it:
In short, human beings are capable of choice in the following sense: though they are caught in a nexus of natural behavioural preferences, such preferences function for human beings as complex, competing, flexible, and capable of being anticipated by means of symbolic behaviour such as warnings, mathematical calculations and analogical thinking. (p. 156)

The main postulate of the human-environmental interaction is, therefore, that the environment supplies multiple referents from which visual perception as a cognate technology of the human intellect observes, and then attempts to cognitively map an attachment or direct association, relative to the conditions of existence of the observer. Meanings and significances of human and environmental interaction, such as those described in anthropocentric views ought to be framed as cognitive articulations of cause and effect relations, as observed between human experience and environmental exigencies. Importantly, although causes of effects may not be known, anthropocentric theories may symbolically describe an antecedent event preceding an effect, as a method of maintaining a basic coherence within a conceptual schema (Levy, Mageo and Howard, 1996).

The Anthropic Principle is therefore, the acknowledgement that observation is primarily selective, and that a basic metaphysics will nearly always be of an anthropocentric form. Before the Copernican revolution (Whitehead, 1978), metaphysical schema positioned human life at the centre of the universe; so historically, natural phenomena observed in the world would have largely been relative to the conditions of existence experienced by the observers of a particular environment. Human imperatives to understand the world are fundamentally constrained according to Barrow and Tipler (1986), because as spontaneously generated and evolved creatures of the universe the human species, in being a product of the same carbon-based substance as the universe, is inherently constrained by a self-reference limitation. The analogues which Barrow and Tipler supply to illustrate this include the inability of a computer to understand itself, as well as the necessity for complex mathematical systems to produce accurate statements of truth which cannot be proven. Therefore, Barrow and Tipler claim that within the Anthropic Principle is the notion that the extent of our observations is constrained by humanity's need for consistency between external phenomena and internal perceptions of such phenomena. The scope of our respective metaphysical
views is, however, limited by our conceptual horizons. If we suspect that an observed property is not necessary for the continued evolution of human life or if it is not consistent with our current perceptions of the universe, then there is a good chance that we will overlook it, simply choose to ignore it, or in more extreme cases, fiercely oppose any evidence that is contrary to the received view about it (Suppe, 1989).

The way in which an environment is perceived in terms of causal order will be largely dependent on the integrated synthesis created between observed external properties of the world and the internal imperatives of human existence. Implicit in the Anthropic Principle is therefore, another feature of plausible constraint. The suggestion being made is that where the synthesis between the physical world and the conditions of human existence is destabilised through diffusion, there is an active extension of constraint, which emerges, with the introduction of choice. Barrow and Tipler's (1986) self-selection mode of observation, which they frame as being fundamentally anthropocentric, also has the further potential for intentional constraint, or in a weaker form, conceptual complacency. That is, if modes of self-selection are anthropocentric then it is plausible that there will be a deep-seated reluctance for any synthesis of human and environmental interaction in a metaphysical schema, to be self-refuting. Rescher (1992) locates this consideration within the confines of philosophical relativism, the two components of which include basis contextualism and basis egalitarianism. Basis contextualism simply suggests that the traditional opinion or conceptual conformity to a viewpoint is made relative to a norm of acceptability that is accepted by an individual or a group. Basis egalitarianism extends the referential reach of basis contextualism by suggesting that all viewpoints are rational and equally justified if a group accepts the normative standards undergirding a viewpoint.

Sowell (1994) and Rogers (1983) both make similar observations by illustrating the point that the uptake by cultural groups of scientific advances will be largely dependent on the social implications to a culture's specific synthesis of human and environmental order. In referring to Magallen's journey, which began after Copernicus's discovery that the Earth spun on its axis, Sowell (1994) offers an example of the dual influence of modes of self selection and the desire to avoid self-
refutation, as a means of preventing any disruption to social order. Even though Copernicus had made his discovery before Magallen's journey around the world, Magallen's meticulously kept travel log corroborated Copernicus's revolutionary theory. Magallen arrived back to Spain on a Saturday, whereas it was Sunday on shore and his travel log was the data that confirmed Copernicus's theory. However, Copernicus was fully aware that the confirmation of his theory would directly self-refute the canon of knowledge accepted by both Church and State at the time. Therefore, he selected not to publish his findings and Magallen's travel log was burnt. This example also supports Hooker's (1987) contention that social processes, which are regulated by social institutions, have an important part to play in shaping our theories of both science and society. The relevance of dominance and authority in perpetuating standard views is also illustrated in the example of Magallen's journey.

The reluctance to accept new ideas even when there is the reduction of uncertainty within a cultural group's metaphysical scheme of existence can therefore, be regarded as being influenced by both the desire to maintain modes of self selection, as well as to keep in abeyance the potential for self refutation. Tantamount to this postulate is the view that institutions as well as regulatory and normative processes, within a particular group's configuration, will be largely governed by the ability of their respective metaphysical scheme to offer a cohesive view of the mutual dependency between human and ecological interaction. Hooker (1987) remarks on the resilience of anthropocentric views, primarily derived from the sociology of knowledge programme which impede the deeper exploration of theoretical and cultural understanding between groups:

Anthropocentrism is widespread in contemporary philosophy. It has a current fashionableness derived from such claims as (a) humans can never escape their concepts to grasp reality directly, from which truism it is (wrongly) inferred that a truth must be 'internal' to a conceptual scheme, or (b) the nature of linguistic reference is such that we could never refer to the unverifiable (or perhaps unconfirmable, certainly unknowable). Alternatively, humans are held to be locked in deterministically to their culture, or locked semantically into their theories, so truth must be truth-for-the-social-group. (p. 266)
In summary, the Anthropic Principle maintains that human beings generate conceptions about their existence in the world by a self-reference mode of observation, which is ultimately constrained by their particular condition of existence. According to Barrow and Tipler (1986), the self-selection bias evident within observations of external phenomena is driven by internal imperatives consistent with the human condition, which is fundamentally anthropocentric. It can be argued that implicit in the anthropocentric limitation of self selection is the need to maintain homeostasis, or a conceptual equilibrium, as a means to prevent any disruption to the status quo of a social group, i.e., Church, State, scientific or cultural authorities. Therefore, an auxiliary feature of self selection is the maintenance of social order through the tempering of metaphysical conceptions which may self-refute a particularised and synthesised view of historicised human and environmental interaction. With the advent of the Copernican Revolution the postulate that human beings were a privileged species occupying the centre of the universe changed, and it is this narcissistic property of the human condition, an underlying predicate of teleological arguments of design, to which I now turn.

**Teleological Arguments**

Embodied within teleological arguments is the premise that the design of nature has been constructed in the unique way that it has, for the express purpose of, humankind. Human life is the pivotal centre from which teleological arguments of design emerge and the nature of the world has been created for either an ultimate purpose, or for the benefit of human beings to co-exist in harmony with their respective environments (Whitehead, 1978). However, because of the causal nature of the universe a distinction can be made between design arguments. One form of design argument argues for the primacy of a predetermined goal of human and world co-existence. While an alternative form of design argument is predicated on the view that because of the composition of the universe and humanity’s relationship to it, there must be an ultimate cause. The main distinction being made here is that the first form of design argument emphasises purposefulness in the world's construction, which leads to the conclusion that there is a predetermined goal to which humanity is being led. By contrast, the latter argument emphasises that because of the composition of the universe there must be an ultimate cause.
The importance of this distinction is that with the Anthropic Principle in mind, the direction in which causal influence is understood to go will be an essential determinant in a particular people's metaphysical scheme. Barrow and Tipler (1986) refer to the first form of design argument as being rightfully teleological, whereas the second form of design argument is referred to as being eutaxiological. From their perspective, teleological arguments of design are more apparent in holistic, synthetic, global worldviews, whereas eutaxiological arguments are more consistent with local, analytic perspectives. The synthetic orientation reflects a general acceptance of the law of causal order, while the analytic view, being more self-referencing, perceives that because of the world's material composition, there must be an end cause.

In offering a defence against the position that teleological arguments of design are purely manifestations of Western thought, Barrow and Tipler (1986) advance the tentative view that teleological arguments may be universal. They qualify this view, however, with the observation that few if any studies have been conducted on non-Western based teleological schema. What they do detect are teleological notions exhibited in Mayan, Indian, Sumerian, Bantu, Egyptian, Chinese and South-East Asian cultures, where metaphysical conceptions of origin and purpose are inherent in these respective traditions. White and Kirkpatrick (1985), in their studies of Pacific ethnopsychologies also show that teleological notions of origins are apparent in a number of Pacific cultures. Of interest, is the fact that the basis of many of these metaphysical conceptions are thought to be in the form of the broad scale attachment theories noted above, theories which generally posit an Earth Mother and Sky Father as being the causal agents of the world's creation.

The argument to be presented here, is that a Maori metaphysics reflects both teleological and eutaxiological notions of design. It is suggested that the conjoint expression of both forms of design argument is consistent with the view that the variation, selection and retention process is evident within a Maori metaphysics which emerges as a composite of anthropocentric and introduced cosmogonic commitments (see Appendix A). The core assumption being made is that the myth of Paptuanuku and Ranginui represents the main mode of Maori self-referential anthropocentric thought. A metaphysical matrix of supernatural, genealogical, natural, and cognitive features is presented as an explanatory system of causation
It is proposed that the analogical terms, 'tapu' and 'noa', provide the transcendental meaning and significance of the explanatory system proposed, as well as providing the terms for the system's latent application in human environments (Shirres, 1979). Because this explanatory system is fundamentally self-referencing, it is suggested that the system is principally eutaxioloigical in composition.

In contrast to the anthropocentric view is the cosmogonic perspective of a Maori metaphysics, which exhibits teleological notions of purposefulness. The underlying assumption regarding the cosmological view of a Maori metaphysics is that too many of its commitments are Christian in origin, which prevents one concluding with certainty, that a cosmological view existed in pre-contact Maori thought. Jackson (1967), Lange (1972), Groube (1964) and Andrews (1968), in their respective theses on Maori development in the nineteenth century, all point to the unreliability of the early New Zealand ethnographic record which prevents one from verifying the existence of such an account (see Appendix A). The main reason for this, is that Marsden conducted the first sermon for a Maori audience in 1813 (Lineham, 1996), while the first ethnographic record pertaining to the existence of a cosmological account of Maori origins was recorded in 1913 (Groube, 1964). Therefore, it is important to note that the following views while representative of current conceptions of a Maori metaphysics, are seen to be partially derived from a cross-fertilisation of Maori and European ideas, promulgated largely by the ethnographic work of Elsdon Best (1974, 1978).

**Maori Metaphysical Design**

In describing a Maori worldview, Williams (1996) draws on Marsden's (1988) account of whare wananga (schools of learning) teachings. Maori cosmogony and fundamental knowledge are seen as stratified spheres in which the symbolic, the genealogy of creation, the narrative form, and ultimate reality, are represented as a cosmic process. Marsden (1988), in providing a teleological design argument, claims that the linear emergence of the material world from the spiritual world was caused through an omnipotent Creator Being (Io-take-take), from which flowed energy, deep mind, wisdom, the breath of life, form, space, and then the natural world. As Marsden (1988) states: "Shape and form came into being in Time (Wa) and Space
(Atea). Thus Heaven and Earth were formed”. (Williams, p. 90) The incorporation of the Ranginui and Papatuanuku story of origins follows from this account of the genesis of Maori, as Marsden (1988) makes clear:

"Processes of a new order now began to operate in the spacetime continuum in which the world of Sense-perception was located. Out of the Black Hole (Te Kowhao) Rangi and Papa emerged clinging to each other. Dim light alone filtered between them. Into this constricted space were born their seventy children, the lesser gods who, chafing at their incarceration, resolved to part their parents. Under the leadership of Tane their efforts were successful and they too emerged into the broad day, they became the departmental gods over natural resources. From them were descended the myth heroes and from those tupuna came our own tupuna”. (Williams, p. 90)

Marsden’s (1988) characterisation of the permutation of creative forces in a Maori metaphysics represents the ordering of creation events into a genealogical framework, where the emergence of an ultimate reality is a priori dependent on a First Cause Creator. The stratification of causal events emanating from a creative and cosmic process serves to produce a system conjoining the Creation view of origins and the sociological imperative of human materialisation. This leads to the perspective that the Maori worldview in one sense is holistic, because the supernatural realm makes manifest genealogical order, which in turn produces the ecologically based departmental gods from which humanity emerges (see Figure 6).

![Figure 6: Stratification of two world tropes of paradigmatic incommensurability detecting disparate metaphysical views.](image-url)
Barlow (1994) claims that a taxonomic system is implicit within this teleological ordering of origins when he describes genealogy as being the organising principle of transmitted knowledge forms from which a Maori metaphysics emanates. He offers a classification of four genealogies as representing the systematic ordering of knowledge between the supernatural and the natural spheres. They include the cosmic genealogies, genealogy of the gods, genealogy of mortal man or primal genealogies, and the genealogy of the canoes. Knowledge is regarded as a sanctified possession and the origin of different knowledge forms is observed in the perception that Tane (a departmental god), travelled to the abode of Io-take-take, apprehended three different knowledge forms, metaphorically described as the 'three baskets of knowledge,' and deposited them in the whare wananga. The three different knowledge forms represent ritual knowledge, occult knowledge, and secular knowledge.

Tizard (1940), in his thesis on the study of psychology and Maori folklore, takes an anthropological approach to the subject of a Maori metaphysics by attempting to conjoin a Jungian psychoanalytic interpretative underlay, and a functional analysis of Maori myth. The first distinction Tizard makes, although couched in historical and geographical contingencies, is a mind-body split, where Maori are seen to be in his terms, physically uncivilised yet mentally 'Western'. The public-private divide is the second distinction made by Tizard. Traditional Maori society is therefore, described as comprising a lower and inferior public domain, and a higher and superior private domain. This leads Tizard to suggest that two separate systems of belief were in operation in Maori tribal society. The anthropocentric account of Papatuanuku and Ranginui was the system of belief known at the public and inferior level, while the cosmogonic Io cult was circumscribed to the private and superior domain. From Tizard's perspective, a Maori metaphysics contains both terrestrial and celestial forms, which reflects a deeper dualistic quality existing within Maori thought and Maori social arrangement (also see Nepe, 1991). Accordingly, this fundamental stratification is reflected in the simultaneous existence of an inferior secular scheme of knowledge and a superior esoteric scheme of conceptual thought. From Tizard's analysis, esoteric knowledge was only transferred to initiates by virtue of birthright. This enables him to propose that within pre-contact Maori society there existed an aristocratic tradition of the intellect.
In building on this framework of bifurcated distinctions within Maori society, Tizard (1940) makes a point of comparison between Maori and European intellectual thought. By drawing largely from Smith’s (1913) *Lore of the Whare Wananga*, the existence of a superior and celestial cult of knowledge is taken by Tizard as evidence for claiming what he refers to as a Polynesian counterpart to the European university. This movement by Tizard from a structural to a functional analysis of the whare wananga, where the whare wananga is conceptualised as an institutional feature of pre-contact Maori society presided over by aristocratic intellectuals, is plausibly the principal basis for Maori claims of an epistemological tradition (see for example Salmond, 1985; Smith, 1996).

The connection between genealogy and knowledge forms is, therefore, enmeshed within a view of Maori metaphysics. I suggest that because of this enmeshment, the Maori view of knowledge and genealogy exhibits predicates of both First Cause and Final Cause. As noted above, teleological notions presuppose a First Cause or predetermined law of causal order (Barrow and Tipler, 1986). Therefore, the argument can be made that the induction of Io, as a First Creator, into a Maori metaphysics, signifies the introduction of the holistic, synthetic and global, into what was formerly the local and analytic anthropocentric view. By analogy, this conceptual innovation from an anthropocentric view, to one which exhibits teleological purposefulness, also reflects the movement of the local and regional specificity of a people to a more global constituent body, constructed as Maori (Davidson, 1981). In this sense, the metaphor of colonisation becomes the First Cause of Maori social construction, and therefore, enables a view of Maori metaphysics to be understood as emerging from a dual diffusion within Maori, as well as between Maori and European ideas, which can be termed ‘efflorescent’.

In order to extricate the connection between First and Final Causes, I use Riedl’s (1984) definition of Final Cause. Riedl suggests that correspondence between the origin and the function of an event or the outcome of a system, is interpreted as purposive, and furthermore, that it is used as an inferential system to establish categories of relations between seemingly divergent entities. From Riedl’s perspective, the human species’ ability to cognise rationally depends on teleological notions being inherent in the cognitive system. Hahlweg and Hooker (1989) make a
similar claim with their suggestion that such notions, being intrinsic to our cognitive apparatus, enable a better understanding of why common sense is so successful. Underlying the Final Cause hypothesis are therefore, three interrelated notions. The first notion is that states, events, and actions can be predicted if conditions remain constant, and the reappearance of similar circumstances can lead to confirmation of states, events, and actions. Second, similarities have heightened value compared with dissimilarities. This is a feature of the human drive toward confirmation of states, events and actions. Third, the expectation that coincidences are related, and that repetition of similar states, events and actions confirms this expectation. Riedl (1984) suggests that this teleological ascription of cause, from events to origins, explains the dependent transference of traditional knowledge forms within subsystems. As he states:

>[It] contains the expectation that similar systems are to be regarded as subfunctions of the same super system, that identical structures follow the same aim. This also explains the thought pattern of tradition. The two hereditary forms of conception of first causes and final causes show us that we cannot grasp anything without its origin, that we ascribe forces and intentions to everything, even when there couldn't be any: in an Atlas, holding up the globe, in the stars supporting the heavenly vault. (p. 45).

A useful example of Riedl's extension of the inferential use of Final Causes across a system is Williams' (1996) acknowledgement that even though there is tribal specificity in any rendition of a Maori metaphysics, all renditions are to be regarded as 'fundamental knowledge' (p. 95). Independent of this specificity, with the idea of 'fundamental knowledge' Williams makes an interesting distinction between the supernatural and ethnobiological spheres. He suggests that there is a classificatory system, which he refers to as 'traditional ecological knowledge'. Traditional ecological knowledge is thought to be a separate taxonomy that organises the interactions between humans, animals and plants.

The ecological taxonomy is both structural and functional in that it serves as a cognitive system that organises the inter-relations between humans, animals and plants. The features of traditional ecological knowledge include the absence of a human nature dichotomy (humans are nature, and nature is human; nature is thus
cultural), the relatedness of all things, and the ascription of power to all things (there is no distinction between the natural and supernatural; thus power is everywhere). Furthermore, traditional ecological knowledge is supposedly rule governed by respect and reciprocity. However, Williams (1996) identifies two problems with traditional ecological knowledge.

First, he mentions that traditional ecological knowledge could be perceived as a static body of knowledge that does not allow for the inclusion of additional material. This could lead one to conclude that traditional ecological knowledge is historically constrained, and therefore, not of contemporary significance. And secondly, misunderstandings could arise with traditional ecological knowledge when the perceived interrelationship between the ecological and the supernatural worlds is conflated. Williams (1996), therefore, suggests that 'Indigenous Knowledge,' would be a more suitable name for those knowledge forms that include the collation of the terms, 'ecological' and 'spiritual,' although they denote different spheres.

Williams draws the distinction between these two 'different' spheres haphazardly because it is clear that these two quite different conclusions indicate an attempt to accommodate both the supernatural and the empirical within the same system. Williams' suggestion of conceptualising the supernatural as a sphere distinct from that of the ecological is insufficient as the ecological is seemingly saturated with supernatural significance. Moreover, because it is from the supernatural sphere that the mythological basis of Maori origins is drawn, the separating of the supernatural and the ecological creates a vacuum with no place for the Maori-environmental interaction. However, for my purposes, it is suggested that what hinders Williams' account, is his attempt to make the supernatural and ecological spheres intrinsically dependent, yet empirically distinct. It can be argued that what this anomaly reflects is the co-existence of two separate First Causes, one being eutaxiological in origin, and the other being a more teleological First Cause that emerges from the social construction of Maori through colonisation. The invocation of a Final Cause principle is Williams' attempt not only to draw the association between these two First Causes, but also to keep them separate as a way of maximising the terms of causal inference contained within a Maori metaphysics. Put simply, Williams is arguing for the complementariness within a Maori metaphysics.
of both the supernatural and the scientific. The moot and elementary point is that a supernatural theory of causation fundamentally constrains scientific development.

Therefore, the First Cause principle as outlined by Marsden (1988) reflects the self selection bias of anthropocentric thought evident in Barrow and Tipler's (1986) review of the Anthropic Principle. The First Cause is further reinforced by the representation of *a priori* genealogical categories provided by Barlow (1994). In Williams (1996) perspective of traditional ecological knowledge one finds the Final Cause of inference across sub-systems. In being framed as a fundamentally ethnobiological system, traditional ecological knowledge also affords a taxonomy of cognitive organisation that embraces the exigencies of the environment, and the internal imperatives of human existence. Furthermore, Williams also makes a strong case for keeping self refutation in abeyance, by suggesting that even though there is a distinction between traditional ecological knowledge and indigenous knowledge, independent of whether they relate to disparate spheres, both should be regarded *aposteriori* as 'fundamental knowledge'. The simultaneous inclusion of First and Final Causes within my overview of Maori teleological notions, is represented in a complex system where the supernatural, the genealogical, the natural, and the cognitive, combine as institutional features of a Maori metaphysics (see Figure 7 below).

**Figure 7:** Interlinkages between institutional and regulatory features of Maori metaphysical design.

The supernatural element represents a theory of causation, which is implicit in the interaction of genealogical (human), natural (environmental) and cognitive (cognogenesis) factors. Tapu and noa are seen as being the transcendental concepts,
which mediate this system of belief where their latent application is dependent on the belief presupposition that supernatural causation produces empirical effects. Although there are many definitions of 'tapu' and 'noa' (see Smith 1974; Lyndon, 1983; Durie 1994), the definition adopted here is drawn from Shirres (1979) who argues that tapu is not a univocal concept, but an analogical construct which depicts the 'act of being'. Therefore, tapu ought to be thought of as the 'act of being', which by virtue of its encompassing conceptualisation also brings attributions or extensions of 'being' into the realm of tapu. Noa is not necessarily the contrast to tapu, but rather is to be thought of as the symbol of opposition to extensions or attributions of tapu. For cultural domains it is the single recursive metaphor of ethnicity (Nash, 1989), which includes religious belief, blood and commensurability, that augments the systematic transference 'of being' between metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic features implicit in a cultural framework of thought (refer to Figure 7). Schrempp (1992) suggests that the infusion of supernatural-natural forms with genealogical-cognitive forms within Maori cosmological thought represents a quantitative schemata of stratification. Schrempp's (1992) analysis, guided by a theoretical blend of the philosophy of Kant and the ethnological view of culture as provided by Levi-Strauss, was developed under the tutelage of Tainui Maori.

Schrempp's (1992) first schema refers to the First Cause story of origins where Ranginui and Papatuanuku are in a deep embrace. He refers to this configuration as 'the one and the two,' which leads to 'the indefinitely many' as represented by the seventy departmental gods which Marsden (1988) describes as the progeny of the original parents. Schrempp proposes that this schema, which also represents an ambiguous primordial androgyny idiom, enables the possibility of a dualism to exist with in any singular interpretation of Maori origins. From this schema, the primordial androgyny idiom represents a 'grand philosophical paradox' between Ranginui and Papatuanuku. Because the paradox is characterised by the inertia of Ranginui and Papatuanuku the conflict that arises between them is stimulated by their offspring. The resulting separation of Sky Father and Earth Mother resolves the inertia and enables a unitary system to emerge, whereby the children become the departmental gods in a stratified system characterised by a generative force of disparity and opposition. As Schrempp suggests, the co-existence of dual formulations of origins is therefore possible, as everything is ultimately
related through the original configuration, which exhibits features of both unity and separation.

For Schrempp (1992), underlying the supernatural, genealogical, natural, and cognitive forms are a further four apriori categories, namely, quantity, quality, modality and relationship. Riedl (1984) also makes reference to these aprioristic forms or categories of relations, which he suggests, are useful as guiding principles in determining products of selection evident within systems of thought. Products of selection, which Riedl identifies, include normativity, interdependency, hierarchy, and tradition. Although they are socially manifest the distinct quality which all of these products of selection possess is that they favour an active abeyance of self-refutation. Riedl emphasises this point, by remarking on the absence of variation in such systems, which he suggests is sacrificed as a means of maintaining safety and simplicity. Moreover, as Maruyama (1994) notes, it is the element of human dominance within a system of belief which also ensures that human rank, status, and authority, are maintained as a means of repressing the variation that could potentially introduce a challenge to the social order. In this context, the construct of ethnicity (Nash, 1989) and the semantic concepts of mythology, kinship, collective, and identity actively forges the alliance between the features which comprise the metaphysical matrix (refer to Figure 7).

Accordingly, Schrempp (1992) postulates that his inventory of forms can be perceived as a structural representation of teleological design that is reflected in the social arrangement of Maori relations. Importantly, the connections made between the supernatural-quantity, the genealogical-quality, the natural-modality, and the cognitive-relationship, provides a view of the modes of explanation by which cause and effect are assigned to human and environmental interaction. The supernatural-quantity form is expressed in the origins story of Papatuanuku and Ranginui as a hereditary configuration of conception, which leads to the genealogical-quality form which reflects the emergence of Maori into the world. The natural-modality form makes manifest the human-environmental interface such as that described by Williams’ (1996) Maori ethnobiological taxonomy. Whereas the cognitive-relationship mode displays the informal intuition of knowledge as being an aggregate
of the interrelations between environmental exigencies and human imperatives, made implicit through the story of origins.

In extending Shrempp's analysis I suggest that the categorical forms that he outlines can be regarded as the institutional features of Maori teleological thought. Concomittantly, the regulatory features which reinforce the categorical forms, hierarchical (vertical) and sociological (horizontal) force, are most clearly discerned in the notions of mythology, kinship, collective, and identity (refer to Figure 5). The presuppositions, which reinforce the connection between the metaphysical and the semantic features, include religious belief, blood, and commensurability. Therefore, there is an engagement between the supernatural and mythology, the genealogical and kinship, the natural and collective, and the cognitive and identity. The products of selection, which Riedl (1984) notes, namely, normativity, interdependency, hierarchy, and tradition, become apparent in extricating regulatory features from their institutional forms.

The primacy of normativity is encapsulated at all levels, but I would suggest it becomes more poignant at the natural to collective (cognogenesis) and cognitive to identity (psychological) levels. That is, the transfer of normativity is a necessary component of human development and interaction which serves as a localised function for reflex conditional responses and inference across the spectrum of affect, behaviour and cognition. Therefore, normativity as a product of selection, emerges from and is enhanced by, the need to regulate and make consistent, patterns of cultural and social organisation. Interdependency is evident in the capacity by which the categories of relations are able to be organised in other meaningful assemblies such as the mythological to the genealogical, kinship to the natural, and the collective to cognition (refer to Figure 7). It is postulated that the higher order forms such as the mythological to the genealogical, and kinship to the natural, are the central organising principles, which gestate the concept of a collective consciousness. Both hierarchy and tradition are sustained at all levels as they express the commitment to the conceptual system's regulatory features of mythology, kinship, the collective, and identity.
Within this rendition of a metaphysical scheme is the assumption that all of these features are reinforced by both ideological and practical demands. In the ideological sense they are seen as providing conceptual transmission links between disparate mechanisms and relationships, resulting in an ideology of preferred unity. In the contemporary context and directly related to practical demands they are able to offer a means by which interrelationships are identified between individuals and groups. More specifically, the regulatory features enable associative links to be drawn that become 'cultural,' as a homogenous need of organisation between culture and nation. However, the major demand of a Maori metaphysics is the reduction of cognitive risk in the negotiation between patterns observed in nature and the requirement for an organised structure, which maximises the advantage of human existence within a particular environment. The process of cultural reification ought therefore to be understood precisely as a method that seeks to maximise human organisation in both ideological and practical terms.

The interconnectedness between teleological principles and knowledge forms, which emerges as a result of observation between natural phenomena and the organisation of a social structure, are the main institutional features of a Maori metaphysics. To this point, I have suggested that the teleological design of a Maori metaphysics exhibits the institutional features of the supernatural, the genealogical, the natural and the cognitive. The means by which these institutional features are organised is through a conceptual dual directionality existing within and between, First and Final Cause principles, hierarchical and sociological structures, and \textit{a priori} and \textit{aposteriori} points of reference (refer to Figure 5).

\textbf{The semantic component of Maori cultural reification}

In attending to the semantic categories of a Maori metaphysical conceptual schema, I propose that there is an active change in objective when one moves from the metaphysical level of the cultural reification process to the semantic level. At the metaphysical level the objective of understanding environmental and human concerns is reflected in the development of cause and effect postulates. However, I suggest that at the semantic level, the objective becomes more clearly centred within the realm of human relations. For this reason, I suggest that the cultural reification of

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metaphysical features such as the supernatural, the genealogical, the natural (environmental), and the cognitive serve to complement the regulatory features of mythology, kinship, collective and identity by acting as a form of 'institutional memory'. Put another way, I believe that the cultural reification of Maori culture is largely a semantic project, which I describe within the model provided as 'the sociological triptych'. This model comprises three temporal and spatial shifts in New Zealand history and because I believe that the interpretations commonly given to each of these 'shifts' often reduce culture to being either symbolically or symptomatically affected by history, I have chosen to include the model as an accompanying resource to the larger model of the reification process provided (see Figure 8 below).

**Figure 8:** Sociological Triptych showing three core assumptions imbedded within New Zealand historical interpretations of Maori and non-Maori interrelations.

Mythology, kinship, the collective, and identity are important organisational principles because they aid in regulating the normative basis of a particular people. The linearity observed between these features indicates a connection between the supernatural and natural spheres, and provides an atemporal influence between creating and continuing human relationships. The conjoining of mythological
kinship and collective identity reflects the fact that the relationship between the supernatural and the natural spheres is precisely of an ideological atemporal nature. As the anthropic - First Cause, mythological kinship forms the basis of the antecedent relations expressed in supernatural form from which the concept of a collective identity emerges.

The relevance of myth in being able to provide abstract representations of supernatural, human and environmental interconnectedness enables an anthropocentric force to be maintained within a conceptual framework. Bascom (1984) suggests that the acceptance of mythological accounts of origins and connection is a matter of the combined influences of faith, belief, dogma and authority. From Bascom's view the maintenance of narratives that emerge from the remote past to serve as explanatory devices for human life and function as well as external phenomena, can only be regarded as over-emphasised and speculative. De Vries (1984) offers the view, that in the nineteenth century, myths were generally concerned with origins, whereas in the twentieth century the main emphasis moved to the structure and function of myths. In accordance with this movement, Honko (1984) states that there has been a strong tendency to remove the word 'myth' from accounts of origins, yet retain the stories embedded within the myths, which leads to the transformation of mythological narratives into history. Important to note is the fact that the central development that altered the significance of mythological narratives was the emergence of empirical science.

As an adjunct I would advance the view that the critical rate of diffusion within a group will also have some bearing on the way in which the acceptance of mythological accounts drawn from antiquity maintain their strength and force within a cultural group. With the advent of empirical science comes the reduction of uncertainty relative to the interface between external phenomena and human needs. This is a feature of progressive knowledge being produced through improved instruments and the other products of a technologically advancing society. Furthermore, I would also suggest that the corresponding relationship between empirical science and the reduction of uncertainty through diffusion is further strengthened with the production of improved theory. This may have more bearing on whether myths are maintained as adequate accounts of origins than on the actual
products of empirical science. As Rogers (1983) makes explicit, knowledge as a technological product has the capacity to make the relations between cause and effect more coherent. If the relationship between cause and effect accrues strong support through predictable outcomes being observed then there will generally be a movement towards accepting the innovation. Darwin's publication *The Origin of Species* in 1859 is perhaps one of the most pertinent illustrations of the force with which a conceptual can reconfigure knowledge forms.

The semantic undertones of the mythological basis of a Maori conceptual scheme are largely allegorical. Sissons (1993) refers to the allegorical nature of Maori thought in the contemporary context as 'the systematisation of tradition' variously described as 'invention,' 'reinvention,' 'construction,' 'inversion,' 'fetishisation,' 'folklorisation,' 'objectification,' 'reification,' 'substantivisation,' 'reactive objectification,' 'codification,' and 'formalisation' (p. 97). Goldsmith (1992), in acknowledging the transformation of tradition makes a number of important concessions by suggesting that the intentional enhancement of tradition needs to be considered within the context of discourses competing to define and interpret culture and tradition as a means of maximising strategic advantage. A finer point that he also makes is that parody and irony should not be overlooked in the symbolic enhancement of both culture and tradition. However, the embeddedness and influence of allegory within a cultural framework of meanings spans the historical, the psychological, and the sociological and structural realms. Rodseth (1998) makes this specific point in describing culture as a semantic population of meanings. Honko (1984) proposes that in the history of demythologisation there have been at least twenty-two interpretations for the form, content, function and context of myths. The definition that Honko (1984) provides for myth is as follows:

Myth, a story of the gods, a religious account of the beginning of the world, the creation, fundamental events, the exemplary deeds of gods as a result of which the world, nature and culture were created together with all the parts there of, and given their order, which still obtains. Expresses norms and provides patterns of behaviour to be imitated, testifies to the efficacy of ritual with practical ends and establishes the sanctity of the cult. (p. 49)
Encapsulated within this definition is the conjoining of intrinsic metaphysical features and their semantic counterparts which leads to the emphasis on a privileged ontology inherited through the allusion of special authority. This privileged status is made salient by the manner in which Williams (1996) claims that the organisational relationship between the supernatural and natural spheres is observed with respect and reciprocity. Therefore, the ritualised and sanctified aspects of myth are promulgated within the conceptual scheme as testimony to a culture's privileged ontology, seemingly imbued through the alignment to a special authority. Four of the descriptive functions of myth that Honko (1984) identifies become important here; Namely: (i) myth as a cognitive scheme representing categories operable between human thought and external phenomena (ii) myth as a charter for behaviour, (iii) myth as legitimation for social institutions, and (iv) myth as mirror of cultural, social and group structure. The relevance of these descriptions of the function of myth is that it is within the realm of human relations and specifically through cognition and behaviour, that the operation, chartering, legitimation and reflecting of special authority is manifest. The structure of human relations within a Maori conceptual scheme can therefore be taken to be an allegory of the supernatural realm. And, through semantic claims of special authority, the ontological basis of kinship, collectivity and identity, come to signify the idealised regulatory formation of Maori relations. It is the structural and functional notion of these arrangements to which I now turn.

Basically, I maintain that the semantic plasticity of these regulatory forms, where the word 'plasticity' refers to the generalisation that human interrelationships, are malleable and can be expressed most clearly through tribal and national structures, both of which have political and social functions. Before briefly examining Maori relations it must be noted that my use of the structural-functional form is only for the purpose of emphasising the semantic nature of these arrangements. I fully acknowledge the limitations of the structural-functional distinction, specifically in the sense that it is premised on an essentialist mode of analysis, especially in the case when it is utilised to over-view the social organisation of cultures. Therefore, in contrast to using such a distinction to advocate essentialist notions residing within Maori structural forms, I utilise the distinction to identify a number of semantic aspects of the cultural reification process.
Van Meijl (1995), in an ethnographic deconstruction of the standard model of Maori relations, proposes that the socio-political organisation of Maori kinship along the levels of whanau, hapu, iwi and waka, with a paramount chief residing over all levels is a relatively recent occurrence. More specifically, Van Meijl identifies Raymond Firth's thesis entitled, 'Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori', published in 1929 as the definitive text, which being accepted by both Maori and Pakeha scholars as the authoritative account of Maori social organisation, heralded the advent of the kinship structural forms being theorised as delineated levels that were constant and continuous over time.

In observing that Firth's dissertation offered no historical contextualisation and that the sources of his work were derived from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Van Meijl (1995) proposes that the model presented by Firth, and endorsed by later scholars, is fraught with problems. The most significant problem in this context is what Van Meijl refers to as the use of Firth's model to justify the projections into the past about Maori structural forms, which culminates in a view that Maori social organisation, is immutable.

As a result, such retrospection seemingly justifies the use of these projections being sustained in the present to yield the current view of Maori social organisation as a direct reflection of a former past. Van Meijl also makes a critical connection when he suggests that Firth's main data being derived from Elsdon Best's ethnographic work with Tuhoe Maori, perpetuated the impression that the immutability of Maori social arrangements transcended the influence of diffusion, both within internal Maori structures, as well as externally through post-colonial contact (see Appendix A). As Van Meijl states:

Firth's analysis of 'traditional Maori society was to a large extent based on data derived from Best's publications, while he also adopted many of his theoretical assumptions. Firth might courteously have circumvented Best's racial assumptions, for instance about the Aryan origin of the Maori, but he was uncritical of Best's evolutionary framework and the assumption of a rigorous rupture between pre- and post-European Maori society, between tradition and modernity. (p. 313)
The chronology of Maori social organisational patterns, which Van Meijl provides, is largely based on linguistic and archaeological evidence from which socio-political and economic patterns that emerge are seen as characterising Maori prehistory. The accentuation of Maori tribal structure as a timeless framework comprising levels that accommodate all forms of Maori relations is also disputed by Webster's (1995) contemporary analysis of Maori organisation. In tracing the theoretical developments emanating from anthropology in the past and now being revitalised through postmodernism, Webster suggests that the merging of essentialism with cultural relativity produces an aesthetic version of Maori cultural forms which is conspicuous by virtue of its determined search for a primordial essence. Whereas anthropologists of the past selectively chose cultural forms which provided evidence for earlier unadulterated human development, the postmodernists offer critiques of adulterated cultural forms as a means of reinforcing their wholesale scepticism of modernity. Both Van Meijl (1995) and Webster (1995) point to the political economy as the major stimulus for the restructuring of Maori tribal structures in the past, and also in the present. In an earlier paper, Webster (1993) provides a strong argument for the view that the development of Maoritanga occurred in the 1920's. In Webster's analysis, Maoritanga emerged as an outcome of cultural inversion, perpetuated by both administrators and anthropologists so that Maori societies became 'traditionally' stratified to more effectively reflect the nation's own contemporary social ordering. The catalyst of this development was the discovery of a common material interest between both privileged Maori and Pakeha, and as a consequence this led to the systematic invention of Maoritanga in the 1920's. Webster's (1993) view affords a deeper expression of Sowell's (1994) contention that the interface between cultural boundaries is more often brokered by internal elites and external authorities as a means of maximising strategic advantage for both parties.

Material causality is regarded by Rata (1996a) as the main impetus for the development of different approaches by Maori to maintain social and political autonomy while simultaneously engaging in the nation's political economy. Rata develops a convincing argument, which emanating from the philosophical underpinnings of historical materialism establishes the view that the emergence of tribal capitalism comes as a consequence of two former phases. The prefigurative
traditionalist phase is characterised as the attempt by Maori to engage in the political economy without dismantling the social networks of production and exchange. Following this is the 'strategic' phase, which is seen as the attempt to make complementary the preservation of Maori political and cultural autonomy and the material advantages of capitalism. According to Rata (1996a), these two phases brought with them new conditions of organisation and meaning, which through the legal bindings of government, (i.e., Treaty of Waitangi (1840); Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975), and the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act (1985)), enabled a materialist ontology to be formed. As a result, Maori connections to material resources were reforged and accentuated as a means of gaining a capitalist-inspired advantage within the global market.

The hapu and iwi structures in offering the most viable mechanisms for Maori grievances to be addressed by government were also reshaped and mandated by both Maori leaders and Government as representative of Maori interests. It is Rata's (1996a) contention that biculturalism as a project of synthesised interests of Maori social and political structures and governmental ministries and institutions emerged precisely as a consequence of the strategic phase. Implicit within Rata's dissertation is the view that the dialectical arrangement of seemingly disparate interests being forged into a semblance of bicultural unity operative between Maori and Government, is the over-determined reach of both agency and structure.

Although Rata (1996a) rejects the influence of teleological notions to initiate retribalisation, she elsewhere accedes to the point (Rata, 1996b) that a major product of the bicultural project has been the commodification of knowledge. I would agree that teleology alone is not sufficient to initiate a transformation of tribal proportions, but the antithesis of the dialectical syllogism that she uses in establishing the over-determined reach of agency and structure, is characterised by teleological notions which partially form the contents of commodified knowledge. Therefore, along with the reification and transformation of tribal structures is the further reification of knowledge forms which being a product of the bicultural project must emphasise the metaphorical duality existing between Maori and Pakeha, as a means of justifying its own structural formation. Being of a fundamentally semantic kind the contents of commodified knowledge can generally be characterised in the 'two world' trope.
design, the embedded assumption of which is incommensurability, and the goal to obtain a bicultural synthesis of unity (see Figure 6). Hence, the anthropic principle re-emerges in a contemporary and reified form.

To summarise to this point the semantic component of the Maori conceptual framework presented, is underpinned by mythological notions of kinship, the collective and identity. It is primarily the mythological basis that provides Maori with a sphere of reference, i.e., 'institutional memory' to claim the status of a privileged ontology which Rata (1996a) suggests can also be formulated as a materialist ontology. Maori structural organisation is not immutable and indeed can be seen to have undergone numerous transformations the evolution of which still continues. The bicultural project succeeds former projects engaged in by Maori as a means of maximising socio-political strategic advantage. Therefore, both tribal and national structures perform political and social functions in stabilising and regulating Maori and Pakeha conceptions of their fundamental interrelationship. However, it is suggested that the most pertinent illustration of the semantic influence apparent in the transformation of Maori structural organisation is at the level of reified Maori identity. This suggestion supports Rata's (1996b) contention that structure and agency are the central forces of Maori transformation.

With Rata (1996b), I propose that tribal and national structures show a concordant approach to Maori agency, which is formed through the selection, variation and retention of basically semantic features. It is suggested that the transmission channels conveying semantic attributes of Maori agency become evident first at the higher institutional level, which is characterised by the supernatural, genealogical, natural and cognitive features. These features are then reinforced at the mythology, kinship, collective and identity levels (see Figure 7), which being underpinned by the assumption of a privileged ontology, are then regulated through the tribal, national, political and social levels (refer to Figure 5). The significance of the latter level is that the intertwining of a privileged and materialist ontology is underscored by the transformations evident within each of these macro level organisational forms. Included in this perspective is the view that the macro level of organisation commands considerable influence in determining, at least conceptually, the meso (i.e., Maori individualism) and micro level (i.e., mental
states) characteristics of both Maori identity and Maori agency (refer Figure 8). More specifically, the influence that the macro level organisational forms wield is identified as being primarily semantic because the contents of Maori identity and agency which is ascribed to Maori individuals does not necessarily have an empirical equivalent.

I suggest that the culmination of each of these potent macro level forces initially results in a particularised view of Maori identity, which being reinforced through the epistemic component, which may not have an empirical equivalent, results in a distinct conception of Maori agency. The movement from the regulatory to the normative features in the conceptual model presented, generates an historical alignment of the politicisation of Maori culture and the emergence of a prototype Maori identity and following this, a specific view of Maori agency (see Webster, 1992; Te Whaiti, McCarthy & Durie, 1997; Wilson and Yeatman, 1995; Spoonley, 1993).

Sissons (1993) considers that the main normative force operative between the politicisation of Maori culture and the development of a prototypal Maori identity is the process of rationalisation that has occurred between tribal and national structures. In outlining the process of rationalisation, Sissons depicts the system of transforming key domains of Maori culture, namely language, marae and hui ceremony, beliefs and values, to produce a complementary synthesis of a heightened 'national consciousness' through biculturalism, and the elevation of indigenous esteem through the initial display and then eventual accreditation, of cultural markers. Two examples suffice to illustrate the semantic undertones explicit within this systematised transformation.

The restoration of Maori esteem through the promotion of Maori language revitalisation emerged firstly through the Treaty of Waitangi Act (1975) which recognised that both the Maori and English versions of the Treaty of Waitangi were to be given equal interpretation. Secondly, through the operations of the Waitangi Tribunal the Te Reo Maori claim was resolved by recognising that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori language was to be officially recognised as a taonga (Te Puni Kokiri, 1996). In being recognised as a taonga under Article 2, the
Waitangi Tribunal in 1986, recommended that the Crown had an obligation to protect and sustain the use of te reo Maori. These two significant developments led to the passing of the Maori Language Act in 1987, which also saw the establishment of the Maori Language Commission. The celebration of Maori language as being a taonga occurred in 1995, and in the same year the National Maori Language Survey identified 24,000 fluent speakers of te reo Maori.

Although the Native Schools Act (1867) directed that English should be the preferred language of use in schools the historical decline in Maori language usage is most readily understood as being an outcome of diminishing domains where te reo Maori was the primary language spoken (Te Puni Kokiri, 1996). Andrews (1968) offers further historical support for this claim by identifying the enthusiasm of Maori communities to participate in an education system where English was the primary language spoken, as an instrumental method of improving the impoverished material conditions of Maori society at the time. According to Andrews, the demand for education by Maori well exceeded the government's ability to supply suitable facilities. But more importantly it is the correlation between spread of literacy and the improvement of Maori participation in the political economy, which heralded the developing amalgam between Maori and Pakeha to institute methods that reflected Maori aspirations of the time. Therefore, even in acknowledging that the Native Schools Act of 1867 would have been influential in discouraging the use of Maori language by denying a place within the schooling system for Maori to be used, the central influence in the decline of Maori language usage has been the decrease of domains where Maori is spoken exclusively. This latter point underlies the Maori Language Commission's focus in increasing the number of domains where Maori language or a combination of Maori and English, is spoken.

The antecedent condition for increasing Maori language domains is the development and fostering of positive attitudes towards Maori language and this is perhaps one of the key components of the language revitalisation process. The following passage drawn from Te Puni Kokiri's Post Election Brief (1996), highlights the expedient means by which the process of rationalisation can occur at the level of state mechanisms to induce an ideological shift. Reflective of an Althusserian state apparatus where the need to produce a politically informed
consciousness is made manifest through a process of Crown censorship the passage is of interest here, because it exemplifies the very semantic nature of the cultural reification process, precisely at the level of language. The passage's context was to identify strategic activities that would enable the development of favourable attitudes to the Maori language and its use. It states:

To encourage more favourable attitudes toward the Maori language the following actions could be taken:

- histories of New Zealand which present a more balanced view, particularly with regard to relations between Maori and non-Maori, could be referred to as appropriate in the work of Government agencies, and in legislation and regulations for activities such as radio, television and education;

- up-to-date, accurate and well informed statements about the characteristics, current use and potentiality of the Maori language could replace the older, inaccurate evaluations of the Maori language;

- programmes in Maori and sections in Maori could be included in mainstream radio and television broadcasting and in mainstream newspaper and magazines with the aim of demonstrating to New Zealanders that Maori is a valued New Zealand language (p. 175: 1996).

These proposed connotative devices clearly show the high level of orchestration and participation required between the Crown and Maori interests to promote the instantiation of public attitudinal change towards Maori language. Arguably, the process of rationalisation that Sissons (1993) argues is necessary for the systematisation of cultural 'tradition' to occur is organised at the level of re-interpreting national history. Moreover, in making an appeal for the revising of history to produce 'a more balanced view' the underlying assumption, which is only subtly alluded to, is that history in being framed as a semantic domain enables the relations between Maori and non-Maori to be reconfigured. That is, the balanced view is to highlight through both semantic and semiotic means, the distinct differences between Maori and non-Maori to produce what Barthe's (1996) refers to, as a signifying consciousness. Even though the enshrining of Maori language as a distinct ethnic marker is legitimated through Article 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi,
whereby the reverence accorded to it also becomes part of the 'national consciousness' the main factor here, is that Maori language in being ascribed such symbolic prestige, functions as a contemporary idiom of Maori alliance.

The denotation of Maori language in being selected as a primary sign of difference between Maori and non-Maori rationalises the latent view that Maori language usage is an essential signifier of Maori collective and individual identity. The formation of a signifying consciousness depends on historical revision to obtain a view that draws associative links between the diminishment of Maori collective domains, the decline of Maori language and following this, the fragmentation of Maori identity. Maori language, therefore, becomes the indissoluble marker in establishing the linkage between a cultural consciousness and Maori identity, which is evidenced in the following comment made by Sir James Henare to the Waitangi Tribunal in 1986:

The language is the core of our Maori culture and mana. Ko te reo te mauri o te mana Maori. If the language dies, as some predict, what do we have left to us. Then I ask our people who are we? (cited in Durie, p. 59, 1998)

Within the concept of a signifying consciousness being instrumentally developed within the State's 'national consciousness' mechanisms there is also the elevation of Maori language to what Nash (1989) describes as the single recursive metaphor of ethnicity. The scheme that Nash presents is based on determining the minimal cultural items for membership or alliance to an ethnic group. Referring to such elements as index features, Nash proposes, similar to Bell (1975) before him, that the constitution of ethnic boundaries between Maori and non-Maori relies significantly on the creation of new symbolic traditions, whereby overt codes and languages are formulated or reintroduced to emphasise distinct differences between ethnic groups.
The main point here is that Nash (1989) proposes that both secondary and tertiary markers of ethnicity must stand for, or imply, a fundamental difference between ethnic groups at the primary level. Therefore, in this scheme, the proposed elevation of te reo Maori from a surface marker to a primary marker moves beyond being a mere indication of difference at the secondary and tertiary levels. This movement reflects, in part, an expansion of the surmised privileged ontological core, through which the semantic representation of te reo Maori usage is conceptualised as an internalised ethnically distinct marker. A social and largely symbolic category of ethnic representation is, therefore, extrapolated to serve as a cognitive indicator of Maori identity and Maori agency (see Figure 9). However, in 1995 there were only 24,000 fluent speakers of Maori identified (Te Puni Kokiri, 1996), when the Maori population numbered 524,000 in the 1996 consensus (Te Puni Kohri, 1998). The implication of this under-representation of Maori who possess such an idealised cognitive criterion, which supposedly functions as an indicator of a fundamental alliance between an ethnic consciousness and a Maori identity is at best conceptually over determined.

In regard to Rata's (1996a) view of Maori tribal-capitalism being stimulated and motivated by a materialist ontology, which in this scheme is largely operative at the structural level of tribal and national interests, Sissons (1993) provides a complementary analysis by drawing the connection between the corporate display of Maori language and the political and social functions which it serves. Sissons' (1993) basic argument is that the underscoring in te reo Maori of government
brochures, letterheads, administrative positions, government ministries, departments and institutions, acts as a pedagogical mechanism to disseminate the message of 'Maoriness' to the wider public. As a symbolic gesture such underscoring systematically fragments, objectifies, and standardises difference. Thus, it serves two purposes simultaneously namely it acknowledges the privileged ontology of Maori through the symbolic use of Maori language, as well as providing a bicultural overlay to a corporate identity. Corresponding to the selection of what Sissons refers to as the 'usable bits' of Maori language is the further selection of an inventory of idealised Maori beliefs and values, which similarly to Maori language, come to represent standardised features of Maori identity and agency.

In citing the opening of Whai Ora psychiatric unit at the Tokanui Hospital in 1984 (see Rankin, 1986), Sissons (1993) parallels the movement in Maori language revitalisation with the production of a set of Maori beliefs and values which came to constitute the core elements of identity distinction between Maori and non-Maori. About the Whai Ora therapy unit, Sissons suggests that due to the large number of Maori patients in the unit, a philosophy was developed which considered that a strong sense of Maori identity could be promoted through individuals rediscovering an inherent relationship to the concepts of 'group' and 'place'. The underlying philosophy promoted at Whai Ora (according to Sissons) was the assumption that Maori individuals' identity had been impaired through socio-historical influences. As he suggests:

Each member of the unit, patient and staff, was given knowledge of his or her genealogy and encouraged to examine differences and similarities between Maori and Pakeha belief and value systems. This, it was hoped, would help patients integrate 'the two halves' of an identity shattered by colonialism. (p. 111)

Adding to Sissons' (1993) analysis, I would suggest that the generative dynamism with which such distinctions arise is largely created through a dialogical oppositional force, which leading to a consensual view of contrasting Maori and non-Maori identities, obtains a pervasive normative influence. Reflecting an inverse linearity to Maori language usage where select components are used publicly to signify 'Maoriness,' the metonymical process apparent with Maori identity evaluation appears to work in reverse when it is applied to the private domains of
Maori individuals. That is, there is a systematic objectification of Maori identity first, where the cognitive aspects of individual identity are obscured through the sociological ascription of cultural beliefs, values, perceptions and controls. Examples of this objectification include, the 'pastoral vision' of Maori alluded to by Keesing (1989), the popular trend in Maori health to centre on a 'holistic,' albeit latterly 'diverse' conception of the Maori individual (Durie, 1994), and the standard procedure within policy documents to allude to the Maori individual as being an implicit complement to an iwi, hapu, and whanau (MHC, 1998). The latter term has recently being exchanged for the word 'Maori' in policy documents, or alternatively 'whanaungatanga' in research design involving Maori, to possibly counter the fact that the Maori whanau has undergone considerable structural collapse since 1981 (see Jackson, 1994; Ratima et al. 1996; Te Puni Kokiri, 1998).

Secondly, implied in all of these examples is the standardisation of Maori identity in sociological terms in order to reflect the cognitive domain of Maori individuals (refer to Figure 8). Whether it be 'pastoral,' 'holistic,' or 'family centredness,' underlying all of these conceptions is the assumption that they are informed by beliefs and values which constitute a cultural template, inherited through the regulatory features of mythology, kinship, collectivity and identity. It is suggested that it is at the structural and functional levels of tribal, national, political, and social organisation that the semantic overtures insinuated within all of these sociological ascription's gains its normative influence, sufficient enough to infer a cultural consensus of Maori identity (refer to Figure 5). A corollary to this supposition is that with the over ascribing of sociological categories to represent psychological dispositions in Maori individuals the resulting identity template will be a reflection of the sociological realm from which the categories are drawn, i.e., the 'sociological imagination' will reconstitute ethnic markers within the 'institutional memory' to configure a contemporary Maori cognitive identity template.

Therefore, the socio-historical influences that are emphasised at the macro level as the major causes of Maori societal transformation are also endorsed as causal influences at the psychological level of Maori identity. However, even though the normative fusion of the sociological and psychological categories inferred as
being representative of Maori identity, may be imbued with an originating disposition of unity, the extension of this view is that the causal influences at the societal level have also impacted upon the template of Maori identity at the individual level. Following this, the standardisation and objectification of Maori identity concludes with a view of a loss of connectedness and mental continuity within and between Maori individuals, which leads to the sceptical position that Maori identity is of a fundamentally fragmented form (refer to Figure 8).

The concept of a fragmented cultural identity is the premise that underlies most critiques on the subject of Maori identity (Te Whaiti, McCarthy & Durie, 1997), and is the main theoretical postulate that guides the recent ground swell of Maori acculturation studies (for an example see Ratima, Potaka, Durie & Ratima, 1993). Maori identity must reflect the fragmentation of wider Maori societies because it is composed of the attributes which have come to symbolise the primordial metaphysical and semantic components comprising the model of precontact Maori society disrupted through colonisation, and promoted as having done so, by tribal, national, political and social levels of organisation (refer to Figure 8).

The main interlocutor of conceptions of Maori identity has been the psychiatrist Professor Mason Durie. Durie has published extensively on Maori identity (Durie, 1994, 1995, 1997, 1998) and his Te Hoe Nuku Roa Framework (1993) represents a longitudinal study designed to provide qualitative and quantitative measures of what he proposes are 'Maori realities'. In listing eight different models of Maori identity, variously described in metaphorical terms as the 'whare model,' 'the octopus,' and 'the four pillars,' Durie prefaces his review of each respective model with the following:

Several frameworks have been developed in order to conceptualise and locate Maori individuals according to characteristics of Maori identity, culture, well-being and knowledge. Sometimes known as "Maoriness scales," they have all sought to capture the key aspects which best describe Maori, to provide measures (qualitative and quantitative) for specific purposes, and to distinguish Maori experience and realities from non-Maori. (p. 462)
In the same paper Durie offers the objective for developing a measurement of Maori identity. As he states:

The framework is intended as an instrument to aid in conceptualising the current position of respondents and their households and to provide a substrate upon which the philosophical and methodological aspects of Te Hoe Nuku Roa study can be grafted. (p. 464)

Underlying Te Hoe Nuku Roa is the concept of Maori identity fragmentation. The focused units of inquiry upon which personal identity is to be evaluated, are conceptualised in terms of identification with and access to, ethnic affiliation, language, tikanga, land, fisheries, forests, environment, marae, hapu activities, and iwi links (Te Hoe Nuku Roa, 1993). Although Durie does not provide any methodological information as to how these social institutions and environmental resources equate to core features of Maori personal identity it is assumed that the measurement taken would have been a rating of the degree in which an individual does access and identify with, these resources and institutions. As the cultural indicators section of the Te Hoe Nuku Roa questionnaire shows, respondents were asked how often they visited a marae and how comfortable they felt at a marae, or alternatively at a tangi. Yet, from the information gathered, Durie (1998) after collating 200 responses has this to offer:

Cultural identity is conceived as an amalgam of personal attitudes, cultural knowledge, and participation in Maori society. Particular attention is focused on self-identification, knowledge of whakapapa (ancestry), participation in marae activities (customary social and cultural centres), involvement with whanau (extended family), access to whenua tipu (ancestral land), contacts with other Maori people, and use of Maori language. Underlying this approach to cultural identity is the assumption that despite personal values and beliefs, the development of cultural identity also depends on access to key cultural institutions and resources such as land, whanau, language and marae. Preliminary analysis has enabled the construction of four cultural identity profiles: a secure identity, a positive identity, a notional identity, and a compromised identity. (p. 58)

This intimation of four cultural identity profiles emerging from the data of Te Hoe Nuku Roa shows both the objectification and standardisation of Maori identity
to reflect psychological dispositions through the over extension of sociological
categories, as well as methodological analysis. Moreover, I would argue that the
concepts of cultural identity, in being arranged along a continuum of secure,
positive, notional and compromised identities, also shows a striking resemblance to
Freud's ego defence mechanisms of projection (secure), sublimation (positive),
formation (notional) and repression (compromised) (Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith,
Bem & Hilgard, 1990). It is suggested that within Durie's (1998) perspective on
Maori identity is the suppressed premise that the degree of association that Maori
individuals show to cultural institutions and 'nature' reflects the internalised
mediation between the 'instinctual' id and the 'cultural' ego. Underlying this
assumption is the further premise that colonisation has caused a substantive rupture
to the primordial essence or the metaphorical id (refer to Figure 8). Thus, the
protective ego defence mechanisms in dictating the degree of association that an
individual displays to their 'instinctive' culture and environment reveals the impact
of colonisation on the psyche of individual Maori.

Hence, the First Cause of colonisation is interpreted as being the main agent
of anxiety and frustration, which is internalised as an acculturative stressor
producing it is assumed a form of cultural pathology that can only be neutralised by
the degree of social association that one has to their cultural origins or 'primordial
essence'. Even though the development of four Maori identity profiles based on 200
responses from the Te Hoe Nuku Roa questionnaire is certainly suspect, what is
more disturbing is the rapidity with which this conception of Maori individuals has
been accepted without question. Taking the form of cultural exegesis the following
quote is drawn from a review of developing 'Kaupapa Maori Psychology' which is to
be included in a handbook on professional practice issues and guidelines for New
Zealand psychologists:

The concept of a secure identity rests on definite self identification as Maori,
ongoing contact with other Maori and te reo. Involvement with and/or
knowledge of whakapapa, marae, whanau, whenua tipu are also seen as
characteristic of this identity profile. The positive identity profile is a variant of
the secure identity that is characterised by lower levels of involvement in Maori
society in general and one's own whanau, hapu, iwi. The third profile, the
notional identity, involves self-identification as Maori, but extremely limited, if
any knowledge of, or contact with te ao Maori. Finally, a compromised identity reflects non-identification as Maori, at times in a quite derogatory way. This stance may often be in the face of considerable contact with and access to the resources of te ao Maori. While these profiles are presented here as categorical variables, they actually represent orthogonal continua, which reflect varying degrees of acculturation and deculturation. (Glover and Robertson; p. 4, 1997)

It becomes apparent that the view of Maori identity on which Durie's (1998) work is founded is of a primordial form where consciousness, identity and agency, all of which are displayed through the degree of active association an individual has with cultural institutions, are sociologically predetermined. The internal forces of Maori identity can therefore be interpreted in two possible ways. First, internal forces are sociological, as they primarily pertain to cultural institutions. Yet, the second interpretation is that they are inherently psychological as they also reflect the degree to which an individual is able to mediate between the dictates of an environment and the impulse to satisfy basic drives. It is suggested that Durie's (1998) notions of Maori identity contain both of these interpretations and that the suppressed premise on which his conception of Maori identity is anchored can best be described in the following terms.

First, cultural institutions are assumed to have phenotypical transmission qualities and capabilities. As Durie (1995) suggests in relation to his te ao Maori (Maori cultural identity) axis in the Te Hoe Nuku Roa questionnaire, "This axis moves beyond equating a Maori identity with knowledge of Maori culture. Instead the focus is on a range of quantifiable measures potentially available to Maori by virtue of ethnic inheritance" (p. 467). Ethnic inheritance is therefore, the trope that signifies an originating set of Maori identity attributes, which are transmitted through a process of, orthogenesis. Moreover, this assumption also indicates that there is a primordial Maori essence against which contemporary Maori can be evaluated. The main indicator is the degree of association one has to the 'originating' cultural institutions and environment. Identity and agency attributes being borne from association to cultural institutions lead to the concept of a collective consciousness, or alternatively, a collective ego, which, it is assumed, was intact before colonisation. Therefore, history becomes a homogenising adhesive whereby
pre-contact Maori tribal organisation is assumed to have been intrinsically psychologically connected.

Secondly, the catastrophic event that ruptured the collective ego was colonisation. Imbued with aetiological force, colonisation led to the fragmentation of the collective mindset causing a form of cultural pathology. Even though the logical conclusion to this linear scheme is often left unstated, the echoes of a causal link existing between a collective ego, colonisation, and cultural pathology, abound in most analyses of Maori societal transformation. One example suffices to illustrate this assumed causal linkage. By citing a number of passages it is intended to trace the development of the sociological triptych which I provide upon which, contemporary Maori problems are generally formulated (refer to Figure 8). Taken from a report called Maori Family Violence in Aotearoa (Te Punu Kokiri, 1997), I have selected the following passages because the report's subject matter is contextualised precisely within the view that colonisation was the 'first violence'.

Colonisation resulted in loss of te reo, traditional beliefs, culture and structures, and Maori identity. Other residual effects include low educational attainment and high levels of unemployment. (p. 14)

According to Ritchie and Ritchie the church and state combined to undermine the system of social control which had protected Maori society from aberrant individuals and interpersonal violence, and thus totally disrupted the balance between the individual and collective controls. (p. 15)

There is a lot of debate within Maori circles over the forms of social control which existed before European contact. Given what is known about Maori society and structures there are some assumptions which can be made. For example: a person was not believed to exist as an individual, but was linked through their whakapapa to their whanau, hapu, iwi and ecosystem. (p. 21)

The imposition of a new reality and new values began to alter the collective consciousness of Maori towards one of individual consciousness. The importance of self superseded the responsibility to the group. Maori attitudes were influenced by the outside world but also by the teachings of spiritual leaders and the church. As the consciousness of self changed so too did the values of the collective. (p. 23)
The breakdown of structures and mechanisms of social control within Maoridom meant that there was often no internal mechanisms to control or even contain the violence. Increasing physical and economic isolation of families from their tribal regions or hapu, compounded the problem of maintaining Maori lore or governorship over its own people. The Maori community's ability to impose and enforce sanctions against their own people dwindled as Pakeha institutions continued to resource, legislate and assert their right to define social norms and standards. (p. 23)

The sociological triptych model is used as a means of describing the three pictures of Maori experience which emerge from these passages, namely collective consciousness, colonisation and cultural pathology (see Figure 8). The explicit formulation of contemporary problems on the basis of the sociological triptych conveys the perspective that there is only one frame of reference within which Maori identity and agency can be conceptualised. My claim is that it is precisely within this frame of reference that Durie (1998) has developed his profiles of Maori identity. Therefore, not only does the frame of reference or sociological triptych obtain considerable normative influence by providing the context within which contemporary problems are to be formulated, it also generates a prototypical profile of Maori identity by which Maori individuals can be objectified and standardised in terms of their association to and reflection of, cultural institutions. Because cultural institutions are diminished domains, which is an underlying predicate of post-colonial analyses, and evidenced in the decline of Maori language usage and the structural collapse of the whanau, the degree of association that a Maori individual can show towards cultural institutions is limited. Significantly, the actual diminishment of cultural domains betrays the semantic overtones implicit within the encapsulation of Maori identity attributes as it rates degree of association to social institutions in symptomatic terms (for an explicit example see Olsen's (1993) scale of Maoritanga).

The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is therefore, that the construction of a prototype Maori identity serves as a semantic mechanism to indicate an absence of symptoms emanating from the rupture of collective consciousness caused by colonisation. Colonisation led to the diminishment of cultural domains, which caused a cultural pathology to emerge. An individual's
assumed pathology can be assessed by the degree of association that they have to diminished cultural institutions and the degree to which they reflect the pre-contact Maori identity prototype. As provocative as this conclusion might appear it is suggested that this is the logical extension of the sociological triptych, which is the suppressed premise underlying Durie's (1998) Maori identity profiles. If, as Sissons (1993) suggests, Maori language revival in acting as a signifier of 'Maoriness' follows a systematised and rationalised path of fragmentation, standardisation and eventually objectification, then I would argue that the suppressed premise underlying Maori identity profiles, reflects an inverse linearity in which Maori identity is first objectified, then standardised, leading in the end to the view of Maori identity fragmentation. Therefore, it is proposed that the framing of Maori identity within the sociological triptych model belies the semantic constitution and foreclosure of Maori identity conceptions. Significantly, the prototypical profile of indigenous identity, which is created through such semantic conceptions, and generated from the macro levels of organisation, produces a normative force that leads to a consensual view of Maori identity.

The epistemic component: Capturing the 'paradigmatic subject within cultural domains'

In order to see how the semantic conception of Maori identity is reinforced through macro level discourse it is necessary to examine the epistemic bases of relativism and constructionism. Norton (1993) in a comparative analysis of culture and identity in the South Pacific, which includes Maori, identifies the disjunction between macro level discourse on identity and routine experience of identity as comprising three main variables. First, he argues that the oppositional force of identity construction is formulated on the basis of inter-ethnic conflict. Secondly, the invention or reinvention of cultural beliefs and values that come to comprise an ethnically distinct framework of identity are selected from both pre-colonial, as well as post-colonial, conceptions of indigenous identity. Thirdly, the objectification of cultural traits, rituals, and institutions, as being distinct from routine experience, enables an exemplary identity to be formed as a reference point for contrast in inter-ethnic contexts. Norton's analysis, therefore, claims that macro level discourse in being informed by macro level organisations such as tribal, national, political and
social agencies, produces a metalanguage of indigenous identity which makes distinct the attributes of contrast between people.

Figure 10: Intersection between claims from both cultural and scientific institutions leading to denial of cognitive agency in Maori individuals.

The analysis that follows is necessarily brief, but the main point that is to be drawn from the following perspective is that the macro level discourse(s) of social constructionism and cultural relativism have conceptually captured 'paradigmatic subjects' within cultural domains (refer to Figure 10). I believe that it is often the case that the cultural domain is theorised as a 'paradigmatic' framework in which the cultural individual is conceptualised within the theoretical enclosure of sociological analyses. However, the turn that I make here is that it is not necessarily the domain, which is theorised as being 'paradigmatic,' but the 'cultural subject'. To my mind, cultural relativists and social constructionists embellish their accounts with concordant themes of the 'paradigmatic' subject being a theoretical resident within cultural enclaves. In the local context the projects of cultural relativism and social constructionism project a reified image of individuals of Maori descent as being ensnared within the sociological triptych. The means by which cultural relativists and social constructionists are able to project such an image of Maori is through asserting the 'epistemic' nature of cultural domains, which leads to Maori individuals being viewed as inherently 'paradigmatic'.

It could be claimed that the birth of a semantic Maori identity was in 1975 with the founding of the Waitangi Tribunal and that the testimonies received by the
tribunal since its inception have been references attesting to the conjoint relations of 
estrangement and connection that such an identity has had by reason of origins and 
descent. In Haraway's (1997) terms, the 'semiotics of blood' and the 'rhetoric of 
unity' have been the life force of the semantic identity, which is presupposed to 
having always been attached to its Anthropic apron strings by virtue of its kinship 
ties. However, the semantic Maori identity has been borne from both national and 
tribal structures and it has evolved through its adolescence as the sometimes 
privileged, sometimes deeply misunderstood, exemplar of both political and social 
discourses. With glib sentimentality the Maori semantic identity is a quartered agent, 
not only of tribal, national, political, and social proportions, but also by degree, as 
Durie (1995) informs us with his secure, positive, notional and compromised Maori 
identity profiles.

The connection between relativism and constructionism and the semantic 
conception of Maori identity is that the semantic Maori identity proposed above, is 
co-dependent on both cultural relativism and social constructionism for its 
preservation and maintenance. In this regard, the semantic Maori identity could be 
considered an artefact of modernity, which derives its main mode of theoretical 
sustenance primarily from the influential works of Quine (1969) and Gergen (1994). 
Therefore, the epistemic component of this scheme proposes that Quine's ontological 
domains and constructivist thought, together comprise a substantive element of the 
relativist's and constructionist's main defence for a semantic Maori identity. For the 
cultural relativist, Quine's ontological relativity complements the view of a pre- 
contact idealised epistemic cultural knowledge base. Concomitantly, Gergen (1985) 
offers the social constructionist the means to extend the claim that all knowledge is 
context dependent, or alternatively, historically and socially situated, and therefore, 
all knowledge is equally valid in its own terms. The appeal that both relativism and 
constructionism have is therefore that knowledge claims are inherent in 
particularised cultural or social domains.

An important distinction between cultural relativism and social 
constructionism, however, is that relativism argues for an originating source of 
knowledge, such as the 'traditional' basis of a 'worldview', while constructionism
argues, that all knowledge is constructed, or of human artifice. In this way, relativism over extends its view of cultural knowledge by assuming that it is epistemic because of its originating source and the constructionist, while denying the epistemic validity of any knowledge base, can only support this claim through its commitment to the ontological parity of different 'world views,' or alternatively, the inscrutability of cultural and social domains.

Therefore, the following epistemic component of the scheme (refer to Figure 5), proposes that relativism and constructionism afford a synthesis between the First and Final Cause features of the metaphysical component outlined in my model by offering a view of epistemic continuity between a pre-contact and post-colonial Maori ontological domain. The First Cause is the \textit{a priori} view of Maori relative knowledge being derived from hierarchical notions of 'tradition,' (i.e., 'institutional memory'), while the Final Cause is the \textit{aposteriori} view of knowledge being constructed from the sociological sphere. Both the hierarchical (First Cause) and sociological (Final Cause) ideals of relativism and constructionism respectively, are identified as having both vertical and horizontal influence.

The cultural substrate of Maori as organised in this scheme is dependent upon the macro level discourses perpetuating the view of tribal ontological arrangement, which may be better described in Hardings's (1998) words as 'strategic categories' as opposed to an ontological domain. By this it is meant that from a realist perspective, it is difficult to sustain the notion of a Maori ontological domain, as its categorical form was historically and politically constructed, and to the present day, new categorical forms continue to emerge (see Waitangi Tribunal Report: Wai 414, 1998). In this sense it could be said that the temporal continuity of the ontological domain as inferred through the First Cause and Final Cause synthesis, is also relied upon by the macro level organisational forms such as tribal, national, political and social structures to reinforce a complementary and consistent view of Maori relations.

It is suggested that the complementary synthesis between relativist and constructionist conjectures leads to a denial of Maori individual agency, the conceptual over determination of collectivity, discursive relative knowledge
formulations and knowledge regulation. It is proposed that implicit within this ontological arrangement is the veneration of culture by both the relativist and the constructionist, but I would suggest that the forms of veneration taken by both the constructionist and relativist are motivated by quite disparate considerations. For the relativist there is a vested strategic advantage in accentuating cultural conceptual closure and I believe that the maintenance and preservation of rank, status, and authority of persons and traditions, are the main motivating factors. Conversely, the constructionist has a vested interest in relativism supporting a particularised and ontologised domain as it gives constructionism one of its principal (and anthropological) benchmarks from which to criticise scientific empiricism.

The term 'hierarchical' within the conceptual scheme alludes to the propensity for Maori knowledge claims to be framed within the concept of a cultural consensus, which is distinguished by its reliance on rank, status, and authority of persons and traditions to determine the 'right consensus'. The term 'sociological' refers to the ambitious 'right consensus' of constructionism to deny the ranking of beliefs, status and authority of theories within science, and instead maintains that social, historical and political circumstance and context should be the principal mitigating factors in determining the reliability of knowledge claims. Thus, it can be said that the synthesis between relativism and constructionism leads to the conclusion that Maori knowledge claims are not epistemic and the ontological domain on which both relativism and constructionism depend is not paradigmatic.

In regard to the conceptual scheme presented it is necessary to move to Quine's (1969) ontological relativity thesis, and Gergen's (Misra and Gergen, 1993; 1994) critique of cultural domains as a means of ascertaining some of the central tenets within a more localised critical theory. Quine's thesis of ontological relativity sets out an argument for meaning holism. Basically, Quine forwarded the proposition that observational statements about objects, people and things, are dependent for their epistemic warrant on the truth value of an entire network of antecedent beliefs and background theories. The thesis of ontological relativity makes overt the point that observational statements are covert. Barthes (1996) emphasised the connotative character of language some years before Quine, by observing that language requires special conditions in order to become myth. The
myth that Quine exposed was that observational statements were similarly contingent upon the epistemic value of the auxiliary assumptions that come to inform any part of an observational statement. Meaning holism, is therefore, the appreciation that a framework of antecedent theories and beliefs will organise the contents of an observational statement and that this point needs to be taken into consideration when determining the truth value and subsequent generalisability of a statement.

In regard to the justification of isolated observational and theoretical statements being made within scientific inquiry, Churchland (1986) sees Quine's thesis as undermining a fundamental axiom of logical empiricism that confirmation of hypotheses (either by falsification or verification through the hypothetico-deductive method) leads to theories of explanation. Even drawing the distinction between observational statements and statements of sensory derived data did not lead logical empiricism any closer to descriptions of private experience because as Quine stated in paraphrasing Dewey, 'there is no private language'. In contrast to the logical empiricist, Quine was saying that because there is no private language there is also no independent observational language to which science has unimpeded and exclusive access; that is, there is no system of logic which may dispense with meaning holism (Churchland, 1986).

Quine's thesis of ontological relativity being derived from the behaviourist tradition was predicated on the generalisations that first, language formation is developed through ostension (the conjoint reinforcement of pointing and naming of objects), and two, observational statements are always revisable in the light of new information or theories that may supercede a former belief embedded in an individual's mental vocabulary or network of beliefs (Churchland, 1986). These two predicates simply equate to the generalisation that observations are theory laden and theories are underdetermined by the observational evidence. That observations are theory laden is a consequence of ostention being the system used in language development. So, as Quine tells us, our cognitions are object-directed patterns of thought. It is Quine's extension of this thesis to claim the linguistic determinacy of all cognitive domains such as developmental, scientific, and cultural domains, which for my purpose here, is of most interest.
In his *Speaking of Objects* Quine (1969) mentions that 'the case of the child resembles that of the heathen,' and with this statement Quine reasserts the behaviourist tenet originating from Watson, that the emission of linguistic responses will be dependent on domain specific linguistic stimuli. The analogy between child and heathen is therefore, undergirded by the relationship between stimulus and response, and because neither child nor heathen has any internal mental activity (private language) to 'speak of,' it must be the case that to 'know' the child, or to 'know' the heathen, will be to 'know' the linguistic and preferably ostensive, stimulus-response relations formed within respective child and heathen domains. As I understand it, this is Quine's basis for claiming ontological relativity for he is suggesting that the linguistic determinacy of observational statements, whether they be uttered or interpreted, is of the cognitive-lexicon relation and domain specific kind. Indeed, this seems to be what Quine is saying when he extends his argument to suggest that meaning indeterminacy and inscrutability of reference are the products of non-permeable co-ordinated systems formulated through the cognitive-lexicon relation. If we recall Brown's (1991) analysis of the Whorfian hypothesis outlined in Chapter Two, linguistic relativism is put into clear dispute as a sufficient argument to support a different and distinct world-view. Yet, in the sense that linguistic relativism denies semantic universals (Suppe, 1989), which is precisely what Quine is advocating, then we are able to propose that Quine would have direct membership to the camp of cultural relativism. However, we do not have to go off in search of Hopi calendrical devices to prove the point that Quine's thesis of inscrutability of reference is in this regard, flawed.

Levine (1984), in making direct reference to Quine's assertion of the 'inscrutability of reference' intrinsic to ontological relativity states that "The heart of Quine's claim that reference is not uniquely determinable is that two stimulus-synonymous terms need not refer to the same things, and that stimulus-synonymy exhausts the objective facts about language use". (p. 135) Of the first claim, Levine accepts that it seems to be right, but regarding the second assumption, Levine argues that Quine has made the fatal flaw in pinning his argument on the view that the stimulus meaning leading to linguistic expression is all that there is to know about language use. That is, Quine, makes trite the conventional use of language and rests
his case on the assumption, in Levine's words, that the only objective fact about a speaker's use of a word is its stimulus-meaning.

In making the distinction between stimulus and other distal and equally plausible prompts of stimulus meaning, Levine (1984) suggests that the fact remains that the stimulus itself does not necessarily cause the response. That is, Levine reminds us to uphold the distinction, also noted by Norris (1997), between observed phenomena (the context of discovery) and the theories that supposedly account for them (the context of justification). From a realist perspective, Levine proposes that Quine in snapping the causal chain of speech provocation at the surface or superficial level of stimulus meaning, over-emphasises the potential for inscrutability of referential terms, and in doing so, ineffectively negates the objective realm of actual language usage.

Anderson (1980), in his analysis of the relationship between language and thought suggests that the irrevocable evidence for concluding that thought should not be confused with language comes from the claim that thinking can proceed in the absence of any muscle activity, and therefore, "[T]hought is not just implicit speech, but is truly an internal, non-motor activity" (p. 341). And further, that the evidence accrued, relative to propositional memories, provides a convincing case for accepting that people do not retain the exact terms transferred through linguistic communications, but rather retain abstract representations or propositional codes, of meaning retention. Moreover, Anderson notes that there are case examples of non-language using individuals showing definite signs of being able to think, as well as evidence provided through the abilities of apes to undertake problem solving tasks. Holyoak and Thagard (1996) enlarge on this latter point by providing an illustration of the remarkable skills of Sarah a chimpanzee who was able to clearly demonstrate the coding of causal connections, as well as the ability to use analogy to problem solve. Even though they qualify their point by noting that Sarah had undergone substantive training in symbolic representations and that her ability was limited to thinking explicitly about first order relations, this does not discount their conclusion that there is clear evidence that other primates are able to form explicit knowledge of relations. Therefore, we can agree with Anderson (1980) when he says, "Thus, the apparent dependence of thought on language may be an illusion which derives from
the fact that it is hard to obtain evidence about thought without using language" (p. 341). However, as Holyoak and Thagard demonstrate, it is not impossible to access the cognitive realm of thinking beings who have no language in order to determine the capacities other primates have to make sense of the world.

In going well beyond the superficial realm of language use, Holyoak and Thagard (1996) have shown that there is a way of articulating deeper commonalities than what the surface distinctions allow for, even across species, and that the horizons of interpretation are not inscrutable walls reserved for a cognitive-lexicon relation and domain specific interpretive community. As Levine (1984) suggests, Quine's ontological relativity can lead to the misperception that ontological domains are understood by distinct and relativised conceptual schemes, whose limitation of surface language prevents access to, and comprehension of, alternative schema. Norris (1997), in observing that language use is obviously a precondition of being able to participate in interpretive communities relegates Quine's meaning holism to a self evident argument which trivialises the pervasiveness of language use. He says:

Without language, that is to say, we should possess no means of articulating these or any other distinctions, let alone of pursuing science (and philosophy of science) as an enterprise aimed towards better understanding of these knowledge-constitutive interests. But there is a large - and highly questionable - leap of thought from this point about the ubiquity of language in our dealings with the world to the further (cultural-relativist) argument which views that world, or our knowledge of it, as nothing more than a construction out of the various language games, discourses or scientific 'paradigms' that happen to prevail at some particular time and place. For one may grant, in the former (unobjectionable) sense, that without language there could be no possibility of advancing truth claims, observation statements, explanatory theories and so forth, while not going on to draw the extravagant conclusion - with proponents of cultural relativism - that those claims, statements and theories can only make sense according to the localised (language- and culture-specific) criteria. (p. 81)

To this point, I would suggest that the interpretive impasse that Quine intimates with his inscrutability of reference is insufficient, unless as Quine suggests, one succumbs to the temptation of infinite regress. Quine tells us that at the
point where inter-translation is deemed impossible there is no form of interlocution available, that there is no universal language, and therefore, the threat of infinite regress inevitably leads to the acquiescent resort to our respective mother tongues. The idea that language is so saturated with meaning, and that the cognitive-lexicon relation preserves, maintains, and reflects domain specificity is perhaps, the most psychologically significant postulate illustrated in the conceptual model that I provide. Affect, behaviour, and cognition, in turn, supposedly come to reinforce domain specificity (refer to Figure 5). It is not just scientific, cultural and other domains that are incommensurate, and non-comprehendable, in comparison to other domains, but more importantly here, it is the cognitive-lexicon relation (domain) of individuals who have membership to specific domains where inscrutability of reference becomes over-subscribed. That is, individual mental states are similarly described as being inscrutable domains of interpretation.

As I have argued above, there is a strong case for suggesting that the concept of a Maori identity has been over-extended to vindicate both the relativist and the constructionist positions, and that the continuity between pre-contact and post-colonial Maori ontological domains supposedly resides somewhere in the minds of Maori individuals. Although, I explore this concept in more depth later, it is worth noting here, that the routine treatment within the social sciences of recruiting the ethnographic Maori subject as an exemplar of inscrutable reference is somewhat tendentious. In arguing for the relativity of emotions, Lilliard (1998) illustrates this practice,

In some cultures, one sees radically different ideas regarding how some mental states are caused or altered. Some of these stem from beliefs about specific acts. The Maori rid themselves of fear by crawling between the legs of a high-born woman or chief. High-born Maori women are thought to carry special energies in their legs, which can remove fear from another person who passes through them. (p. 17)

Gergen (1985) in setting out his social constructionist program provides a similar example. In arguing for the inherent preservation of cultural variation within cultural domains, he says:
Conceptions of psychological process differ markedly from one culture to another. Accounts of emotion among the Ifaluk, of identity among the Trobrianders, of knowledge among the Ilongot, and of the self among the Maori all serve as challenges to the ontology of mind in contemporary Western culture. (p. 267)

Both Lilliard (1998) and Gergen (1985) might be excused for misinterpreting the original source (Smith, 1981) from which both of their concepts of the 'Maori psyche' are drawn, for Smith does not make it particularly clear that her work is largely ideological and metaphorical. However, the deeper problem is that both Lilliard and Gergen use the distinct and ontologically relativised concept of 'the Maori psyche' as a method of juxtaposing and atemporalising simultaneously, the ethnographic subject's mind and domain with that of the 'West'. The conceptual 'Maori self', which has supposed intrinsic Maori responses to fear and anxiety, becomes the exotic cachet of Quine's (1969) heathen, unable to be understood and therefore, inscrutable. Using Quine's own terminology, 'referential quantification as a key idiom of ontology,' requires the 'Maori psyche' to be extrapolated as 'real' evidence for 'original' incommensurability, and continuation of incommensurate cultural domains. Both Lilliard and Gergen lack a sense of the contemporaneous as both of their examples conveniently historicise and, therefore, objectify Maori as being the quintessential cultural subject, exotic to the core.

In a later paper that Gergen co-authors with Misra (1993), there is the active slicing up of the confirmed features which make distinct the Indian and Western constructs of reality. The conflation of the existential and the epistemic enables Misra and Gergen (1993) to describe the 'main features of the Indian perspective on reality and human functioning,' and then forward an absolute quality of 'Indianness'. Furthermore, they suggest, there is no point in searching for the basis of such orientalist absolutism as the Indian individual enjoys synchronous spatio-temporality. As they state:

Individuals have no independent existence. Instead, they are always people in the social situation where situation and person interact to mutually define each other. It is also evident that such a search for a simple cause-effect relationship would be futile, since the individual is said to function at several levels in time as well as place. (p. 235)
And later,

The shift toward multiple psychologies, each embedded within its cultural traditions, may also have a strong liberalising effect. Through such an approach the realities of "others," "primitives," and "savages" who were formerly objects of study would become as authentic as ours. Acquiring empathic sensitivity to other cultures requires, what Kukla envisages as ethnophenomenology, in which knowing other cultures means "immersing oneself in that culture's worldview in order to observe oneself the effect of such an immersion. (p. 238)

The authentication of 'other' cultural domains can therefore, be seen to be the active process of generating or causing, a theoretical psychological syncretism. However, with remarkable candour Misra and Gergen propose that there is no purpose in searching for any cause and effect relations within the Indian cultural realm. Yet, according to their view there is every reason to search for if not cause, a liberalising effect, as well as an immersion effect, through coming to 'know' other cultures, phenomenologically. The insinuation within Misra and Gergen's treatment of cultural domains is that those who belong to the 'authentic as ours' band are change catalyst's, or causal agents whereas the 'cultural other' is not. Ontological relativity is the baseline predicate of Misra and Gergen's approach to culture, but it is a weak ontological relativity because as long as an individual has the requisite empathic sensitivity they may come to 'know' other worldviews.

Reminiscent of earlier anthropological ethnographic accounts, Misra and Gergen's assumption is that cultural domains are to be respected as immutable, but not so immutable that one cannot draw out (with empathic sensitivity), the paradigmatic features of a cultural domain. The features of cultural paradigms are construed as being phenomenological in their account, and therefore, subjective. That is, the basic doctrine of phenomenology, which interestingly enough is most strongly identified with Rogers' model of psychotherapy, is that the psychological reality of phenomena is exclusively a function of the way in which an individual observes and interprets such phenomena (Hjelle and Ziegler, 1981). This seems to lead to the somewhat precarious conclusion that former objects of study, or 'cultural others,' should now be treated as subjects whose inner cognitive lives are entirely organised by the assumed paradigmatic features of the cultural domain. The change in epistemic context that Misra and Gergen claim has enabled alternative
possibilities of understanding the person, new views of knowledge, new intelligibilities, and new modes of inquiry to arise, appears to comprise the change in status of the 'cultural other' from a 'former object of study' to what I refer to here as an assumed 'paradigmatic subject'.

By exchanging objectivity for empathic sensitivity, epistemic access to 'alternative worldviews' and 'indigenous paradigms' has never looked easier. Misra and Gergen in setting out their agenda for a 'new pluralistic social science', utilise the method of juxtaposition to draw up respective lists of what an idealised image of the Western reality might look like in contrast to the Indian psychological-behavioural reality (see Appendix B). Predictably, the Western list is individualistic and reflects the way scientific knowledge is supposed to be characterised from within the discipline of psychology, whereas the Indian list is collectivist, having been drawn from a rich yield of anthropological and sociological studies.

The point to be made here, is that Misra and Gergen generate an a priori list of normative ideals (drawn from both anthropology and sociology) which essentially come to represent a metaphysical and semantic view of things Indian, (i.e., holistic-organic worldview, coherence and natural order across all life forms, continuity across various life forms, knowledge as moral and sacred). According to Misra and Gergen, these 'surface' values which manifest the 'cultural otherness' of an Indian domain relative to the Western domain, are also the epistemic markers which constitute the psychological-behavioural realm of the assumed paradigmatic subject. That is, the subjective experience of Indian individuals will be a reflection of the paradigmatic features which represent the normative ideals made distinct in contrasting Indian and Western cultural domains.

Rather sanguinely, Misra and Gergen are saying that the assumed paradigmatic subject's affect, behaviour and cognition can be nothing more than what is taken apriori to be the metaphysical and semantic ideals which make one normative system of belief distinct from another. Similar to the Maori semantic conception of identity proposed above, Misra and Gergen's assumed paradigmatic subject has been encapsulated within a rationalised process of objectification. The 'former object of study' is still an object of study, but now with a few degrees of phenomenological freedom it becomes the paradigmatic subject, who having been released from a
Western conception is ushered in to the anthropologically and sociologically inferred ideal, of what it is to be a 'real' Indian. The circumscribing of personhood on the basis of metaphysical and semantic features of 'Indianness,' or for that matter, 'Maoriness,' may tell us something about idealised population level (if not national or theological level) ascriptions of people, but they do not make coherent the affect, behaviour and cognition's actually experienced, or made manifest by individuals. That is, the paradigmatic subject is captured in a spatio-temporal domain of interpretation.

With the 'Indianness' and 'Maoriness' examples, the social constructionist's first metaphysical and semantic overture is to remove the individual from the psychological field. It is suggested that such an overture has two important and related outcomes. First, it conjures a conceptual cloning of cultural forms, which aids in producing the paradigmatic subject. Second, it attempts to displace the epistemic loci of cause and effect relations evident within a body of thought by suggesting via the paradigmatic subject, that human nature is conceived as being quite distinct from the ubiquitous Western example. As cited above (Te Puni Kokiri, 1997), the relativist states in regard to pre-contact Maori extended group formations that the individual was not thought to exist. While in the constructionist example, the Indian individual also has no existence apart from the social group. By proxy, both framing assumptions forge a continuity between cultural relativism and social constructionism by implying that there is no parity between the juxtaposed Western, and 'cultural other,' conceptions of human nature, as evidenced through distinct views of personhood. This, in turn, makes any likely epistemic intentions supposedly redundant.

However, it is assumed that Misra and Gergen in making an appeal to empathic sensitivity must accept that such sensitivity is instituted by virtue of an intersubjective consciousness, which recognises commonality between persons to be a viable alternative to the objectivity that they appear to be arguing against. That is, empathic sensitivity is about developing rapport between individuals which supports intersubjective consciousness or better, communication. Yet, if it is an inter-communal empathic sensitivity that Misra and Gergen argue for, then the most plausible means by which this can be established is by doing precisely what they
contend, and that is to objectify both the cultural domain and the paradigmatic subjects which supposedly reside within it. A consequence of this approach, however, is the appraisal of subjective states as they mirror the features of objectified cultural domain features, identified as being the most reflective of distinct difference or conventional contrast, between other cultural domains. From Misra and Gergen's perspective, gaining knowledge of the psychological realm of individuals, is, therefore, a matter of finding out what personal and social attributes a population accepts as its most prized values. Once these values have been determined they are taken to be the defining features of the cultural realm which purportedly enables empathic sensitivity to be developed intersubjectively.

By contrast, I would suggest that the value-ladeness of this approach inherently historicises the paradigmatic subject potentially leading to a discourse of deviance. This may occur through the development of 'essence' detection instruments, which enable the paradigmatic subject to be assessed (even with empathic sensitivity) relative to the degree to which they reflect the stereotype obtained through the operationalisation of conventional contrasts made between domains. Simply put Misra and Gergen's line of constructivist thought either unwittingly, or intentionally, supports the sociological assumption of a cultural pathology underlying cultural domains. Misra and Gergen want to heighten cultural values to the epistemic level, and in doing so, they also want to maintain that the individual has no causal agency, a claim they believe is evidenced by the examples they provide.

Howard (1985) makes a clear distinction between the role of epistemic and non-epistemic values as they pertain to the conduct of psychological research. In making apparent the fact that science is value-laden, Howard argues that one of the most important preliminary features of the conduct of inquiry is to identify the constraints that will shape the course of an investigation. One such constraint is the observation that non-epistemic values are imported into the context of research, despite attempts to minimise their influence within the discipline of psychology. However, Howard is not arguing for the elevation of non-epistemic values to the level of epistemic values. Rather, he is suggesting that the fact that they are imported into psychological research reveals something about the human condition. For this
reason, he believes that the importing of non-epistemic values into the research context may present a fertile area for empirical investigation. Howard (1985) contextualises his view within the aegis of Rom Harré's (1979) perspective on human agency. Personal power, agency, moral responsibility and self determination are the central tenets of Harré's perspective, which for Howard are assumed to be the cohering elements that combine to create the motive for, and movement toward, improved reflexivity. Therefore, while Misra and Gergen (1993) want to raise non-epistemic values to cultural epistemes, and remove causal agency from their paradigmatic subjects, Howard offers an alternative view where epistemic values are left intact, and the inference of intersubjective causal agency becomes the very element from which reflexivity may emerge.

Secord (1990) expands on the problem that faces social constructionism when an individual's entire agency is believed to be socially constituted. According to Secord, there is an undue emphasis placed on needing to have an understanding of an individual's perspective in performing certain behaviours for the simple reason that quite often social actions are readily observable and easily interpreted through external observation. Although replicating social conditions within experimental settings may prove to be more difficult than observing behaviours in natural settings, this still does not detract from the method of external observation commonly used within and outside of experimental settings. It simply means that we can acknowledge that there is room for improvement in our ability to replicate social conditions. Similar to the feature of moral responsibility in Harré's (1991) conception of active causal agency, Secord stresses the significance of requiring an understanding of a person's attributes in formulating precise social definitions of actions. In the case of murder, or malevolent crimes against other persons, an understanding of an individual's intention to commit such crimes, enables such acts to be aggregated according to the degree of active intent which motivated the criminal behaviour. In regard to this last point, Secord also notes that for the benefit of formulating improved understandings of particular human actions, we require improved criteria for evaluating both the intentionality and commitment of individuals to engage in certain behaviours. From the perspective presented here, social constructionism and, in particular, Misra and Gegen's (1993) constructivist thought, does not do this. The assumed paradigmatic subject who has been culturally
constituted, and therefore, who can only be understood as meaningful within the cultural domain, is left bereft of their own active causal agency. The implications of such a view is that the internal processes of causal agency in being denied to cultural individuals, leaves them psychologically passive and incapable of intentionality, which in turn, leads to the adverse assumption of a cultural pathology. Within the New Zealand context it is proposed that this is the most damning feature of the Maori cultural reification process.

In conclusion, I suggest that the scientific realist interpretation of the cultural reification of Maori which I have outlined, has systematically covered the institutional, regulatory and normative features of a process, which leads to the denial of individual agency in Maori. In my mind, this is the central problem in developing effective strategies for improving our current conceptions of the mental health of Maori. Put simply, mental health requires mental states to be respected as the expressly psychological domain of cognising individuals. When we theorise individuals as paradigmatic subjects encaptured within cultural enclaves where mental states do not exist, we are also removing the possibility of their having mental health. I firmly believe that through the process of cultural reification we cannot even begin to address the mental health of Maori, because in advancing the notion of 'communal well-being' within the objective of self determination, the mental states of Maori have been objectified. That is, complicit with the notion of self-determination is the denial of the mental states of Maori. I would suggest that this form of denial fundamentally distorts any objective attempt to addressing what has clearly become a problem. Without surrendering to the conclusion of a cultural pathology, I would argue that such a problem ought to be construed as a psychological issue and in order for this to be achieved, we need to balance self-determination with self-reflexivity. In doing so, we may begin to reinstate, rather than reify, mental states in individual Maori. I believe that it is important for the discipline of psychology in New Zealand to have an understanding of the mechanisms implicit in the process of Maori cultural reification. In this chapter I have attempted to offer a plausible understanding of what the reification mechanisms are from the position of a scientific realist. I now offer a view of the relationship between belief and theories of illness causation. I do this by developing
what I refer to as a 'local hermeneutics' in the hope that a more comprehensive view of the mental states of Maori may begin to emerge.

Chapter Six

'The ontology of invisible agents' and theories of illness causation: Developing a local hermeneutics

The maintenance of boundaries between culture and science is often upheld by assertions being made that claim an incommensurability of beliefs of cultural tribes and beliefs of scientists. The spokespersons making these assertions are generally characterised by their rank, status, and authority within their respective tribal domain. They can speak on behalf of 'Others' because through idioms of fraternal alliance they represent and occupy the central institutions of their specific domains. However, the point of their diffusion is precisely to determine in their dialogue, on behalf of their constituent bodies, the components of conflict, which maintain the distance between cultural and scientific spheres. They may also apprehend and amplify ontological metaphors as a means of emphasising the centrality and embeddedness of their own person in their respective niches. Such amplifications come in the form of propounding generic systems of belief, which are then claimed to represent cognitive categories inherent in those who are also included as members of a designated and often circumscribed domain.

Consistent with my commitment to theoretical realism, I offer in this section an interpretation of the way in which the realms of gods, spirits, humans and the environment intersect to produce stations of rank, status, and authority within cultural domains. Kwame Appiah (1992) refers to belief in disembodied agency as 'the ontology of invisible agents' and while his analysis is centred on the act of ritual that accompanies such belief, I am only interested in pursuing the nature of belief contents as they relate to theories of illness causation. My rationale for selecting this aspect of the 'ontology of invisible agents' is that I believe it to be one of the more significant markers used in the maintenance of boundaries between Maori culture and psychological science in New Zealand. I believe this to be the case because theories of illness causation go to the core of both cultural and scientific domains.
They symbolise in a sense, archetypal systems that make comprehensible the existential and eschatological dialectic between the risk of life and the fear of death.

From this perspective, theories of illness causation are both poetic and pragmatic. This is because such theories reflect the justifiability of human perceptual and conceptual apparatus to be attuned to invisible agents, i.e., viral or supernatural, which may attack and threaten our lives. That is, explanations for the abnormal, the diseased, the unbalanced, the dying, and the dead, do conceal a powerful prose simply because they are attempts at rationalising uncertainty. In this way theories of illness causation can regulate the social body because they guide our behaviour against risk in order to optimise our chances of survival. Conceptual thresholds, however, are raised with the development of instruments and technologies which enable the invisible (i.e., virus, gene, biochemical) to be detected, thereby actively reducing uncertainty and leading to improved theories of illness causation. Former invisible agents, i.e., supernatural beings, lose their aetiological force and their explanatory power as our conceptual thresholds are enhanced.

Maintaining the enigmatic in a context where improved explanations for illness causation are available can present a dilemma because as I have suggested, often theories of illness causation signify, either metaphorically or realistically, a core component of a system of belief. It is the reviving of former theories of illness causation within the New Zealand context of Maori cultural reification, which I believe to be particularly pertinent for the discipline of psychology. In the view I present aspects of illness causation in being reintroduced as representative of contemporary 'Maori belief schema', require serious attention as they actively perpetuate the revival of the supernatural. I believe that the reintroduction of such theories is understandable in a context of economic, political, and social uncertainty where many Maori are categorised as 'at risk'. However, I believe that the discipline of psychology ought not to remain complacent in its awareness of how the apex of Maori cultural reification and psychological science meets in the form of human roles.

The role of tohunga as interpreters of psychological and behavioural disturbance have an extensive history in New Zealand and their function can be
described within the bounds of 'applied religion'. Murdock (1980) refers to the practitioners of 'applied religion' as being the ancestors of psychiatry, while Lange (1972) suggests that in the pre-contact Maori context the customary practices of tohunga largely performed a psychoanalytic function. Schwimmer (1968) also notes the relationship between religious notions and disease in Maori thought, alluding to the connection between spiritual diagnosis and cathartic interventions. Winiata (1967) describes the perceived psychoanalytic function of tohunga as more of a cross between the confessional and charismatic persona. He also notes the ability of their rituals to perpetuate supernatural belief where the success of a curative method reinforced the power of the tohunga while an error reinforced the potency of the supernatural realm.

Stewart (1997) makes the blatant claim by arguing that in 'traditional' times the tohunga ahurewa (public) were Maori 'psychologists' who being imbued with power derived from the gods were able to mediate directly between the supernatural and human realms. Te Rangi Hiroa (1910) explicitly notes in regards to health that while tohunga in the 'traditional' Maori context may have been efficacious in maintaining systems of balance and control that this changed dramatically in the post contact period. Writing in the midst of the Maori health reforms at the beginning of this century, Te Rangi Hiroa also observes that often the products of empirical science were confounded by the methods of the tohunga in terms of implementing health prevention and intervention strategies. From Te Rangi Hiroa's perspective, the 'modern' tohunga were corrupt and dangerous which is a view similarly elaborated upon by Blake-Palmer (1954, 1956), who in outlining numerous tohunga practices, records the admixture of ideas and beliefs comprising tohunga 'methods'.

As 'cultural assessors', tohunga have re-emerged in the Maori mental health industry and in confirming their role, 'The Blueprint for Mental Health Services in New Zealand' (1997) states that Maori presenting to health services who are experiencing mental illness will have, "The capacity to utilise aspects of Maori culture in the treatment process, both as therapy and communication, and the involvement of traditional healers or Tohunga" (p. 33). In reflecting the objectification of Maori culture and the concept of 'Maori mind,' Objective 6 of the 'Guidelines for Cultural Assessment' (Ministry of Health, 1995) states cultural
assessors of individuals presenting with mental disturbance should have the following abilities:

The assessor must have a good understanding of the concepts of whakapapa, mythology, kawa, tikanga and te reo because this is the context under which cultural assessments take place. The assessor may not know specifics in relation to a particular patient but when talking to the patient, aspects of these concepts need to be assessed in order to determine whether there are any cultural aspects to the client's behaviour. Certain cultural constructs may effect certain behaviours and create further unacceptable behaviours that can resemble schizoid type signs and symptoms. The cultural assessment process also validates Maori healing methodologies such as karakia, rongoa, spiritual assistance, tohunga, whanaungatanga, te waitea, whi and manaaki. (p. 26)

And further in the same guideline:

Cultural assessors should have an in depth knowledge of tikanga Maori. This knowledge has to be applied to various situations and circumstances and the assessor must be flexible in their outlook in order to do appropriate cultural assessments. The clients will be from differing backgrounds and the cultural assessor must be skilled in understanding the degree of involvement each client has had with tikanga Maori. It is important that the cultural assessor has a good working knowledge of mate Maori and makutu. Cultural assessors should have some knowledge of mental illness. The extent of this knowledge should be such that the cultural assessor understands the effects of mental illness has on the client, the effect of medication, the various stages of the illness, the problems surrounding a client who also has a drug and alcohol problem. (p. 27)

In this chapter I first provide a framework which outlines the ways in which belief in gods and spirits come to be institutionalised within cultural domains. I then outline external and internal theories of illness causation. Following this, I overview Maori concepts of illness causation within the context of supernatural belief and maintenance. The principal purpose of these analyses is to offer a means by which local belief can be understood within a more global frame of reference. In this sense, I deconstruct the realm of gods and spirits in order to extricate the bases of supernatural theories of illness causation.
Deconstructing the realm of gods and spirits in the Pacific Basin

Religious experience of gods and spirits is a historical and universal phenomenon. Being integrated and interspersed within the histories of human experience, gods and spirits have an important collective value because they provide an important vehicle for human experience. Levy, Mageo and Howard (1996) offer a number of important propositions for understanding the structural, psychological, experiential, and moral roles that gods and spirits play within Pacific cultural domains. Before outlining a number of these propositions it is important to note that gods and spirits are best theorised on a continuum of numina. The word 'numina' is used to describe gods and spirits because there are commonly numinous sacred places and distinct experiences associated with such phenomena. Although both gods and spirits occupy a zone of indeterminacy, i.e., a supernatural realm, gods are specifically more socially encompassing in contrast to spirits, who occupy a more peripheral place. Gods are more often objects of collective legitimation, whereas spirits feature more predominantly as objects of subjective possession or dispossession. Levy, Mageo and Howard (1996) also make the observation that the discourse of spirits within cultural domains is generally overdetermined and experience of such entities underdetermined.

As reflections of human experience, gods are often the foci of social institutions. In marking out the boundaries of time and space within human experience, gods come to be bounded within the social structures of human expression by affording a conceptual-perceptual function, which offers both meaning and security to the collective (Helman, 1990). It is the boundedness of gods within social domains' which enables their objectification to be supplemented with high priests or attendants who come to elaborate the god-human interrelationship within the cultural context. Discourses of sanctity are generally the express reserve of high priests, however, if there is change in the collective social and moral order of a cultural domain, overseen by a realm of priests, then the boundedness of gods can disintegrate in to a more spirit like or profane dimension. In contrast spirits are seldom institutionalised and objectified because they are less reliable than gods. However, spirits can become bounded to the social body through mediums, shaman, or spiritual healers, if they are called upon within a controlled arena of cultural
interpretation, or alternatively, are required to perform a specific act within a cultural frame (Helman, 1990). Concerning the latter point, 'spirit performance' is often associated with significant occasions within the social structure, such as birth, illness, or death.

In regard to the psychological dimension of gods and spirits, gods generally occupy a central position within a cultural domain, and because they are numinally analogous to high status individuals or cultural authorities, they can be manipulated through the use of interpersonal moral techniques. Praise, supplication, and gift giving, are three ways of gaining the favour of gods that Levy, Mageo, and Howard (1996), mention. With gods and high status individuals sharing a pivotal position within social structures the reserve of spirits is customarily at the margins. The argument that Levy et al. (1996) present is therefore, that the relationship between gods and spirits is similar to the relationship in social spheres between high status individuals and those with low or marginal status. The deeper nature of this relationship is reflected in the perception that gods have human-like familial relations, whereas the attributes of spirits have more to do with appearance, power, and transformative or amorphous abilities.

An experiential distinction is made by Levy et al. (1996) in regards to how numinal impressions come to be constituted either through doctrinal authority, or through personal experience. They state:

Gods and spirits have different ontological status and do different kinds of social, cognitive, and psychodynamic work. Gods generally represent forces of social order but are characteristically more distant from sensual experience. Their acceptance is more likely to be grounded in doctrine or "faith". Spirits, while they can be made use of for social order, more often represent and give form to poorly socialised psychological and social processes. They are more often directly experienced; people know they exist through the sensory warrant of their own experience or from accounts by people like themselves. (p. 15)

The longevity in belief in gods is, therefore, dependent on intergenerational faith being reconstructed, conveniently through institutionalised education and ritualised practices, which also serve to mark out a boundary based on faith.
However, the reconstruction of spirit belief, being associated with personal sensory experience, does not necessarily serve either an intergenerational or a boundary marking function. Counterintuitively, it is more often the case that spirit belief is maintained and preserved longer than god belief in particular communities because the doctrinal authority in faith on which god belief is dependent is more vulnerable to historical change than the ongoing sensory experience associated with spirit belief.

Both gods and spirits perform important and different functions within the moral order of a social structure. Gods, being imbued with more human-familial attributes, which are to a greater extent consonant with the hierarchical and sociological stratification of a social sphere, can respond to and sanction a community's moral order through a system of rewards and punishment. The boundedness of gods reflects the moral boundaries of a social domain. They represent the parameters of the moral conscience of a domain and in turn, induce and reinforce that which orders and controls a social structure. By contrast, spirits being on the margins of quotidian experience represent the potential for amorality, for those who move outside the boundaries of the social order. Being of vague constitution, spirits are fleeting impressions of possibility, ephemeral fictions of the will, which reside on the periphery of the moral order. The tempestuous nature of spirits is derived from their being either bounded within the realm of a local hermeneutics or free and fluid to cause unpredictable chaos to individuals through possession or mischief. Their potential to disrupt the social order is harnessed only through the more potent influence of the gods who may restrain the power of spirits in order to maintain moral order. Of psychological interest is the complementarity of the moral invocations of the gods in restricting the impact of the generally more physical encounters of the spirits. Yet, Levy, Mageo and Howard make the distinction implicit within this complementariness quite evident:

Whatever it is that generates the cultural and personal presence of the spirits, and whatever cognitive and expressive forces form them, they support social order in quite a different way than gods - by vividly representing the danger of its absence. (p. 16)
According to Levy, Mageo and Howard, religious schema may therefore, differ according to historical and cultural context, but the fact that such schema are evident throughout history and found within all cultures, indicates a connection between particularistic contents and psychological universals. Levy et al. (1996) also note that the cultural production of god and/or spirit-centred phenomena should be understood as a means by which people attempt to comprehend uncertainty in their particular cultural domain. It is important to note here that domains are dynamic and as a consequence, religious cultural constructs can and often do, accommodate change. That religious schema are malleable indicates the psychological, historical, and social roles that they play within human experience; as human experience changes so do religious schema. The introduction and influence of colonisation, Christian proselytisation, and modernisation within the Pacific basin makes salient the way in which contextual change comes to be reflected in the religious schema of a particular culture. Ross (1994) makes this particularly clear in his exposition on the introduction of Mormonism to the Pacific. Specific to the historical New Zealand context, Andrews (1968) similarly notes the development of a more sophisticated approach by missionaries to religious induction of Maori. That is, religious methods of inducing conversion of Maori were tuned to accommodate Maori conceptual aspirations at the time. Considering the aforementioned association between high status individuals and gods, there is also good reason to suggest that the higher the social status of a convert, the more widespread a potential cultural conversion will be. Sowell (1994) draws precisely this conclusion in his global examination of cultures, while Winiata (1967) records a similar finding for Maori.

Because supernatural theories of causation can be considered the historical antecedent to empirical theories of causation, a religious schema is often held to be the most emblematic institution of a cultural domain. Moreover, it is often the case that the religious schema will continue to hold its place within a cultural domain as that which exemplifies the 'traditional' for a particular people. Phrased another way, religious systems are not exempt from the changes that occur in the material culture or political economy, of a particular domain.

Although the changes may be different, Lambek (1996) makes the contrast between 'enchantment' and 'enlightenment,' as a means of describing the ways in
which social, economic, cultural, scientific and political factors can come to
demystify a particular worldview. The resonance of which also comes to be reflected
in the religious scheme of a culture. An example of demystification is provided by
Howard (1996), who was interested in exploring the means by which cultural change
and dimensions of belief intersect to produce new variants of belief that may still
have an attenuated hold on both collective and individual notions of numinal
presence.

My rationale for selecting Howard's fieldwork with the Rotumans as a viable
example of comparison to Maori belief in gods and spirits is that Rotuma offers a
microcosmic view of many of the same influences which have led to Maori cultural
transformation in New Zealand. Of note is the fact that Howard's work focuses on
intragroup variation of belief, thus avoiding the homogenising assumption that a
conceptual notion is held constant and consistently by all members occupying a
cultural domain.

Howard, in referring to his extensive experience with the Rotumans, suggests
that there is a correlation between the increasingly underdetermined experience of
numinal beings and the diminishment of domains within cultural spheres believed to
be favoured by numina. With the introduction of Christianity, electricity, the
construction of roads, and increase in education, Howard found that over a period of
thirty years, Rotuman discourse and experience of numina had substantially
decreased.

Physical changes to formerly indeterminate zones such as cemeteries, bush
areas and dark places produced less environmental uncertainty; in addition with the
politicisation of chieftainship, the former conduits of powerful curses lost their
ability to facilitate social control on the basis of potential numinal reprimand. Infant
and child mortality in particular, has been radically lowered with improved access to
and availability of, health care services, this latter development leading to a
substantive decrease in supernatural explanations being invoked for causes of illness.
Naturalistic explanations for illness and death have generally supplanted
supernatural interpretations, which according to Howard, provides evidence for the
reduction of contexts of numina presence. Directly relevant to the diminishment of
cultural contexts where numinals were perceived to have a presence, is the enhancement of certainty about alternative modes of causation and thus, explanation, which formerly would have been fashioned using the vernacular of the supernatural.

Howard (1996) offers a number of underlying presuppositions regarding dimensions of belief in numinous beings that are worth brief mention. First, existential beliefs ought to be differentiated from evaluative and pre/proscriptive beliefs. In this context, existential beliefs simply presuppose the existence of numinous beings. Evaluative beliefs about numina presuppose distinct dispositional categories for spirits and gods, generally on the basis of what Howard refers to as 'the problems of good and evil and their variants' (p. 139). Therefore, evaluative beliefs signify the type of character or nature a numen is presupposed to have. Prescriptive and proscriptive beliefs presuppose a relationship between human actions and causes relative to type of propitiation demonstrated by a numinal believer. Howard explains, "The belief that performing a specific ritual will bring blessings from the gods is prescriptive; the belief that stealing will bring misfortune is proscriptive" (p. 140). In also drawing our attention to the fact that the way a society is organised can in part determine the truth value of a belief proposition, Howard suggests, that if a society is hierarchically organised then pronouncements delivered by authority figures will be given heightened credibility. Like Maori societies, the Rotumans relate truthfulness to the mana of speakers so that it is the credibility of the speaker that is evaluated, rather than the contents of their pronouncements.

At the individual level, Howard suggests that beliefs can be characterised according to the degree of precision of belief formulation, the centrality of a belief to an individual’s mental schema, the degree of confidence or conviction that an individual has in a belief, the tenacity with which they will maintain the belief in the face of contrary evidence, and the potency of a belief to motivate an individual to action. The degree to which these dimensions are integrated at the individual level will vary and, therefore, belief propositions may be organised into a coherent structure or alternatively, they may show lower or higher levels of integration, depending on the way in which certain propositions entail other propositions. Context dependency is also an important factor in the organisation and integration of
beliefs that are inferred more strongly at the group level. At this level, forms of expression may vary according to the array of channels available for the belief to be expressed and any constraints on possible channels can lead to redundancy of beliefs.

In drawing the distinction between individual and group beliefs, Howard makes an important point in suggesting that with cultural transition comes a shift in the locus of belief. Because of the contemporary transformations evident within the Rotumans’ social, material, and political culture, statements made relative to a Rotumans’ belief system ought to be more appropriately interpreted as an indicator of an individual's belief system, as opposed to a group proposition. That is, statements containing explicit reference to the Rotumans’ belief in spirits as being an organising if not central tenet of a cultural view are no longer warrantable because the Rotumans’ cultural view has been substantially diffused. In this, Howard makes clear that in order for a belief to be stated as a characteristic dimension of a cultural group, it requires objectification.

To summarise, numinal beings are claimed to exist on a continuum with gods and spirits belonging to quite distinct categories. Gods will tend to occupy a central position within a cultural domain, which is analogous to figures of authority within social spheres. Discourses and doctrines of authority propagate belief in gods on the principle of faith. Spirits on the other hand, tend to reside on the periphery of a social sphere and generally occupy a marginal place representative of lower status individuals. Belief in spirits is either directly or indirectly, associated with sensory experience of a somatic form. Gods and spirits perform quite different, but at times, complementary functions depending on the way in which a society is structured. In being bounded to social institutions the influence of gods permeates the structural, psychological, experiential, and moral orders of a cultural realm.

Depending on the degree of environmental and social uncertainty evident within a cultural domain, belief in gods and spirits will be reinforced through the elaborate roles that they are perceived to play within respective social institutions. When a cultural domain changes with the introduction of alternative technologies and systems of belief, social institutions also change, and this can impact on the
abilities of gods and spirits to maintain their position within a cultural sphere. Variation, retention, and selection of beliefs will undergo divergence and convergence with the incorporation of new beliefs into a cultural domain, which may operate to supplement or replace older ideas.

Belief in gods and spirits, therefore, changes with successive generations, and spirit belief is thought to have a higher rate of longevity than belief in gods because individual sensory experience of spirits is correlated with spirit belief. While gods and spirits may formerly have been invested with causal agency this changes when other modes of describing cause and effect relations enter into a cultural domain. In the case of the Rotumans the introduction of improved health care services and a subsequent decrease in rates of illness and mortality led to supernatural explanations for disease and death causation being supplanted by more naturalistic conceptions. In short, with the reduction of uncertainty in contexts of a fundamentally eschatological nature, belief presuppositions relative to the causal agency of spirits and gods are attenuated to accord with improved explanations of causation. In order to offer an interpretive context in which to situate Maori concepts of illness causation, I will briefly overview Helman's (1990) work on lay theories of illness followed by a brief report of Murdock's (1980) main findings in his world survey of supernatural and natural explanations of illness causation.

**Externalised and internalised lay theories of illness causation**

Helman (1990) suggests that lay theories of illness causation will often be organised around an internally coherent view of misfortune more generally. Helman provides four sites of aetiology for understanding alternative conceptions of ill health. These include disease being located within the individual; disease in the natural world; illness in the social world and illness being located in the supernatural world.

Individual centred lay theories generally ascribe the cause of illness to the personal responsibility of individuals. Incorrect behaviours, bad diet, injuries, 'carelessness,' and physical vulnerability based on ideas of resistance and weakness in personal constitution are some of the more commonly described individual
centred aetiologies which Helman cites. In ascribing causes for illness to the natural world, both living and inanimate elements of the natural environment are commonly invoked. Climate, astrological influences, animals, birds and environmental irritants, are the most often identified aetiological factors.

In terms of the social world, Helman suggests that the allocation of blame to external others for physical ill health is more evident within smaller-scale societies where interpersonal conflict is a common feature of existence. Envy between factions, which reside in close proximity to each other, can result in claims of witchcraft and sorcery. The presupposition within such societies is that malevolent practices can be asserted either with free volition or unconsciously by individuals, who have the ability to inflict harm or ill health on others. The skills of the witch or sorcerer are deemed to be genetically inheritable or alternatively, are developed through having personal membership to a particular kinship group or class. Periods of social change, social conflict, and uncertainty are the primary antecedent conditions where an increase in competition or conflict between competing social factions can result in a resurgence of belief in the 'magical' means of illness. The collective circumstances of groups that maintain the social aetiology of illness are characterised by Helman as being poor, powerless, insecure, and immersed within a context of danger and apprehension. Stress and physical injuries caused through interpersonal conflict are also located within the social realm of illness aetiology.

In specific regard to the supernatural realm, illness causation is more often than not interpreted as resulting from the influence of gods, spirits, or what Helman refers to as, 'ancestral shades'. The transgression of socially accepted behaviours is punished by supernatural beings as a means of maintaining equilibrium within a cultural domain, thereby reinforcing the group's values and belief system. Illness is caused through supernatural entities having knowledge of an infringement, an omission of duties or a lapse in behaviour, by an individual. Pathogenic spirits of former ancestors which have entered the bodies of the living are seen as being causally responsible for antisocial behaviours which aids in removing the blame from an individual for their behaviour. Helman explains the relationship between symptomatology and expressions of cause in this system of belief:
Like 'germs' or 'viruses' in the Western world, these pathogenic spirits reveal their identity by the particular symptoms that they cause, and can only be treated by driving them out of the body," and the process by which the supernatural relates to the social forms of a particular social group, "Diagnosis takes place in a divinatory seance, where illness is seen as punishment for these transgressions, and the moral values of the group are reaffirmed. (p. 109-110)

All four aetiological sites may be inferred within a specific group's diagnostic method as a process of deriving the causal basis of illness. For this reason, Helman suggests that the four aetiological sites may be more generally classified as either externalising or internalising explanations for ill health. Externalising explanations locate the causal basis of illness outside the individual and Helman notes that this form of explanation is the more prevalent type found across different cultural domains. By contrast, internalising explanations in placing more emphasis on the physiological and pathological dispositions of individuals are found to be less prevalent.

Murdock (1980) makes a similar observation by providing a typology of natural and supernatural explanations for lay causes of illness (see Appendix C). Natural causation aetiologies include knowledge of infection, stress, organic deterioration, accident and overt human aggression. While supernatural causation aetiologies can be distinguished by theories of mystical causation ('consequential' theories), theories of animistic causation ('etheric ascription' theories), and theories of magical causation ('intentional maligning' theories). Murdock's work was based on a sample of 139 primitive, historical, and contemporary societies, using a comparative analysis to document disease relations within basic belief systems. A central pattern that Murdock observed in his analysis was the tendency for supernatural causation to be strongly correlated with fear, frustration, guilt, helplessness, and most significantly, aggression.

The connection between the deployment of magical or mystical retribution and physical illness is that it is the projection of human aggression as being an attribute of supernatural beings that reinforces the strength of association between supernatural, natural, and human realms. That is, the supernatural realm is perceived to have the ability to inflict illness on human beings through human mediums,
because human beings have projected their own aggressive attributes onto supernatural beings. Similar to Lange (1972), Murdock makes the observation that in the absence of medicine, pre-scientific societies had developed systematic notions best described as 'applied religion'. Although isolated cause and effect relationships were known within such societies no broad categories of causation were established and therefore, the system of 'applied religion,' in resting on a limited number of basic propositions, enabled classification of illnesses to be conducted with relative ease. Similar to the method of trial and error the interpretations provided for illness causation by practitioners of 'applied religion' may have gradually been supplemented by successively better interpretations.

Of the 139 different societies included in Murdock's analysis only one society (the inhabitants of Okayama) had any causal notion of bacterial infection. Three societies reported knowledge of physical or psychological stress, twenty-nine societies had an understanding of the connection between the developmental lifespan and organic deterioration, only thirty-eight societies cited accident as a cause of illness, yet there was universal understanding of the ability of overt human aggression to substantially impair physical health. From Murdock's perspective, the misuse of the word 'disease' as a synonym for illness has meant that aggression as a major cause of illness within pre-scientific societies has largely gone unnoticed. Murdock, therefore, suggests that it is aggression and not disease, that has been projected on to the supernatural realm and we see the motive of aggression as being thematically central to supernatural theories of causation. In expanding on this claim, Murdock argues that next to death, aggression is the most dominant motif evident within supernatural ideology.

Murdock's typology of natural and supernatural explanations of illness causation draws a distinction between the ascription of causes, which were seen to be the result of mystical causation, and those causes that were perceived to be the result of animistic and magical causation. Murdock defines mystical causation as "Any theory which accounts for the impairment of health as the automatic consequences of some act or experience of the victim mediated by some putative impersonal causal relationship rather than by the intervention of a human or supernatural being" (p. 17). The four main theories of mystical causation are:
fatalistic belief; ominous sensations such as potent dreams; contagion or contact with a potentially polluting object, substance or person; and mystical retribution, otherwise known as taboo violation theory. Mystical retribution is defined by Murdock as "Acts in violation of some taboo or moral injunction when conceived as causing illness directly rather than through the mediation of some offended or putative supernatural being" (p. 18). This theory was absent in only twenty-nine of the societies included in Murdock's comparative analysis. The major categories where relevant taboos were acknowledged included food, sex, etiquette, ritual, property, and verbal behaviour.

Theories of animistic and magical causation include soul loss, spirit aggression, sorcery and witchcraft. Spirit aggression is defined by Murdock (1980) as "The attribution of illness to the directly hostile, arbitrary, or punitive action of some malevolent or affronted supernatural being" (p. 19). Murdock found that spirit aggression was the most predominant cause of illness within his study, being identified as the primary explanation for illness within seventy-eight societies, a secondary cause in forty societies, and a rare or minor cause in nineteen societies. Overall, spirit aggression was absent as a causal explanation for illness in only two societies included in Murdock's sample. Murdock also provides a description of the types of beings thought to be responsible for causing illness when he states:

"The principle types of supernatural aggressors are identified as natural spirits, disease demons, or other less divinities in 104 instances, departed ancestors or kinsmen in 33, ghosts in 32, and higher deities or gods in 22". (p. 20)

Murdock believes that it ought not to be surprising to find that spirit aggression is the most prevalent theory of supernatural causation of illness as it represents the most direct and obvious projection from overt human aggression. There are two forms of magical causation described by Murdock as, "Any theory which ascribed illness to the covert action of an envious, affronted or malicious human being who employs a magical means to injure his victims" (p. 21). Similar to Helman's (1990) description of sorcery and witchcraft the distinction made between the two forms is that sorcery involves the aggressive use of magical techniques such as verbal spells, prayers or curses, rites of exuvial magic performed over hair, nail
parings, excreta, or discarded clothing of the intended victim, or the dispatching of alien spirits to possess a potential victim's body. By contrast, witchcraft is viewed as being either the voluntary or involuntary aggressive action toward an intended victim by a special class of individuals who have either inherited or come to be endowed with, what Murdock describes as a special propensity for power and evil.

The conclusion that Murdock draws from his extensive study is that there was a far higher incidence of supernatural theories in comparison to natural theories evident within the societies included in his analysis. The most predominant theory of illness causation in his sample of societies was the animistic theory of spirit aggression, which was followed, by the magical theory of sorcery, and then the mystical theory of retribution for taboo violations.

A local hermeneutics of gods, spirits, and illness causation: The ontology of invisible agents

Lyndon (1983), in her thesis entitled, "Beliefs in tapu, mate Maori and makutu and the relevance of these beliefs to the diagnosis of mental disorder amongst Maori," states that the only individuals who were perceived to have died a 'natural death' were those who were killed in battle. In introducing the principal theme of her work, Lyndon refers to the maintenance of Maori belief in the supernatural realm and claims that the objective of her thesis is to challenge the assumption that Maori and Pakeha belief schema are equivalent. In contextualising this presupposition within the sphere of schizophrenic and other psychotic disorders, Lyndon suggests that on the basis of Maori and Pakeha having distinct belief systems this distinction will affect how causation and cure of psychotic based illness is to be perceived and determined. Therefore, her primary concern is to distinguish culturally induced illness experienced by Maori from those who exhibit the genuine symptoms of schizophrenic or psychotic disorder. I offer an overview of Lyndon's thesis, as I believe that the claims that she outlines serve two important and related aims for the purpose of this section. First, the schema of Maori belief that Lyndon describes enables a clear association to be drawn to the general belief schema of the Pacific Basin depicted above (Levy, Mageo, and Howard, 1996; Howard, 1996). Secondly, because Lyndon's perspective can be considered a generalised rendition of
'traditional' Maori thought, the observations that she makes can also be compared with the theories of illness causation canvassed above, as described by both Helman (1990) and Murdock (1980).

Therefore, the purpose of this exposition is to locate the main features of what might be called a 'local hermeneutics' of illness causation within a more global frame of reference (see Figure 11). It must be noted that the results that Lyndon (1983) obtained from her work are not cited here because of the methodological limitations of her research design. It is only the concepts which she presents as being representative of a localised Maori schema of mental illness causation in which I am interested (see Cherrington, 1994, who similarly studied the belief patterns of Maori with schizophrenia in comparison to non-Maori with a sample of 14 Maori respondents). The overview of Lyndon's work presented is supplemented by the observations made by other contributors about Maori health concepts and lay theories of illness causation.

In presenting a 'traditional' account of illness causation, Lyndon develops a polytheistic schema of Maori 'applied religion', which is framed as originating from the Io cult. (See Appendix A) From Lyndon's perspective, there are four different categories of gods, which include the supreme god, the departmental gods, the tribal gods, and the familial gods. The supreme god was until recent times a concealed god and Lyndon provides as a rationale for the relatively modern emergence of this god, the fact that Pakeha in having no system of tapu knowledge, were not instructed on...
the existence of such a god because knowledge is tapu. The reason why relatively few Maori knew about this concealed god was because knowledge of the supreme god was restricted to an elite few. According to Lyndon, it is the supreme god who created all things and in doing so imparted knowledge pertaining to both good and evil, environment and humanity, rituals and formulae. Gluckman (1962) provides a rendition of this account:

It was believed that in the beginning there was a vast expanse of space inhabited by Io. There was nothing but darkness and water. Io then created light. The Sun, Ra, represented the male principle, leading to Ao or Light. The moon or Marama, represented the female principle, leading to Po or darkness. Then Io separated the waters and in the cleavage appeared sky and earth, symbolised as Rangi the sky father and Papa, the earth mother. From Rangi and Papa have evolved all forms of animate and inanimate life. Io had many names of which the unchanging, the eternal, the origin of all things that begat no being, he who cannot be looked upon, no one can behold him, are a few. (p. 18)

The departmental gods are proposed to be shared by all tribes and in being the offspring of Papatuanuku and Ranginui, represent a fraternity of converged supernatural-environmental forces. The tribal gods are primarily deified ancestors who would symbolically come to be personified within respective tribal mythologies. Te Rangi Hiroa (1910) adds to this description by suggesting that the tribal gods would often emerge as manifestations of nature in supernatural form. The familial gods were confined to particular families.

Lyndon identifies four subtypes of familial gods and of interest is the fact that even though it is clear that she has drawn directly from the work of Te Rangi Hiroa (1910) who also lists four subtypes, there is a slight deviation in their respective accounts. Both Lyndon and Te Rangi Hiroa list the familial gods as including: the wairua (spirit essence) of those who have died; the offspring of a living woman and a man from the underworld; and an actual man who may physically manifest the appearance of a god or a spirit. However, Lyndon (1983) includes still born children, miscarriages, and abortions as her fourth familial type, while Te Rangi Hiroa collapses the first three categories together to represent a fourth category as being influential in causing disease. From Lyndon's account, if unsafe disposal of dead foetuses occurred, then they could enter host creatures such as dogs, reptiles and fish
to become an atua kahukahu, which symbolised a god. In not being able to become mediums of the higher gods, women were purportedly capable of becoming mediums of the 'inferior' gods, which included atua kahukahu. The power of the respective atua corresponded to the personality of his or her medium and Lyndon contends that the atua kahukahu were employed to defend a family's honour, as well as defend a medium who might be under threat from an atua kahukahu sent by another medium.

In citing Best's (1924: see also Appendix A) elaborate classification of tohunga, Lyndon states that the ordering and grading of this system was determined on the basis of what particular god each class of tohunga served. The role of tohunga is stated as being an inheritable station and Lyndon in her presentation is explicit that tohunga were believed to be the intermediaries between the gods and people as they could interpret the messages of the gods delivered through natural phenomena. Concomitant with the claim that the role of tohunga is inherited is the further proposal that educated and learned men usually of high birth, were the mediums of the departmental and tribal gods, whereas the tohunga of the family gods were more often self appointed and self taught. Respect and reciprocity characterised the nature of the relationship between the gods and in particular, the 'superior' ranks of the tohunga system. The corresponding relationship between tohunga and the gods was marked by degree, where the higher the tapu station of a tohunga the closer he was to the gods.

The term tapu although having both positive and negative connotations, permeated individuals, material resources, and events as a protective mechanism. It is in the conjoining of the term reciprocity and the more negative aspect of tapu, which produces the aberrant practice of makutu. However, Lyndon (1983) makes it clear that the method of makutu was largely performed by the 'inferior' ranks of tohunga and familial based mediums as a practice of reciprocating perceived vengeful acts, or alternatively, intentional maligning directed by others. The main objective of makutu was to destroy the mauri, or essence, of another individual or a family using prayer and incantation to cause death to the individual or family who was the subject of intentional maligning.
Te Rangi Hiroa (1910), in examining the concepts of tapu and makutu, describes fear and anxiety being produced through the power of suggestion and primarily exerted by the influences of tohunga to maintain the belief in the supernatural basis of illness aetiology. As Te Rangi Hiroa has stated, "Tapu and makutu, then, are the two great causes, according to the Maori, of disease and death" (p. 42). And with specific reference to mental phenomena, "It was natural also that any mental departure from the normal, should be looked upon as possession by some god" (p. 50). The distinction which Lyndon (1983) makes between makutu and tapu is that tapu was manifested spontaneously through the divine retribution of the gods who had been insulted, whereas makutu required the active intervention of a medium, or tohunga, to call upon an atua to punish a potential victim. Therefore, misfortune or disaster was caused through a transgression of tapu, and illness was perceived to have been created either through a transgression, or the result of intentional maligning. Implicit within this belief system of illness causation is the perception that all illness and disease was of supernatural origin.

Fear and respect of the gods by the 'common people' was also similarly observed towards tohunga, for as Te Rangi Hiroa (1910) says, "By means of secret incantations he could bring about or avert disaster for was he not the 'kaupapa' or medium of the gods" (p. 16). Causal attributions for transgressions either knowingly or unknowingly performed, required interpretation by tohunga and the principal method of analysis was to determine behaviours and actions which preceded a transgression toward a tapu individual, material resource, or event. It is the cause of disturbance to the mauri implied within the tapu nature of individuals, material resources, and events, which was divined for by tohunga.

Lyndon (1983) describes the tapu rites as being a diagnostic ceremony and explains that if the protection of tapu had been removed from an individual through the committing of an offence or by way of intentional maligning, then the strategy was to use a polluting substance to counteract the effect of the transgression. However, before the tapu rites could begin it was important for the tohunga to detect whether the illness was caused through a transgression of a tapu or the product of makutu, and in doing so, determine which particular atua was implicated. In simple terms, the diagnostic strategy is analogous to a double negative equation where
reinstatement of tapu is restored through negation, which compounds to a positive, thus producing a resolute balance. According to Lyndon, cooked food and women were the main sources of 'pollution' used to negate the influence of an offending or maligning atua. The eating of cooked food was perceived as an act of aggression and the passing through the legs of a woman simulated the spatial movement out of the dark into the light which symbolised the departure from death to the retrieving of one's life. Alternatively, an intervention was precipitated through the direct counteraction of a curse by a tohunga or an act of contrition being witnessed by the medium of a maligning atua, who could provide a path of exit for the atua to depart, thereby restoring equilibrium to the intended victim.

In contextualising a Maori theory of illness causation within the transcendental concepts of tapu and noa, Durie (1994) suggests that the healing activities of Maori were principally oriented to addressing a symptomatic effect, and secondly, a spiritual effect. As he states:

Healers focused on two aspects of a health problem. The underlying aetiological hypothesis was based on tapu/noa considerations, while the symptoms and signs were regarded as the outward manifestations of the problem. Thus, shortness of breath, a skin rash, tumours, psychotic behaviour, infertility, swollen and painful joints were all regarded as the superficial aspects of an illness while the underlying cause was thought to relate to imbalance at a more fundamental, spiritual level. (p. 17)

In setting out his base assumptions of the pervasiveness of the tapu and noa system to balance, constrain, and order the intersection between human experience and environmental exigencies, Durie contends that the traditional Maori approach to health is best described within an ecological model that makes no firm demarcation of mind and body. According to Durie, the ecological model of traditional Maori health theory and practice pertains to a classificatory system whereby the aetiological basis of illness causation distinguished known causes from unknown causes. The distinction made by Durie sees unknown causes as emanating from a spiritual basis (mate atua) and known causes being regarded as 'symptomatic' (mate tangata). Moreover, Durie proposes that this arrangement of unknown and known causes comprising the ecological and traditional health system of Maori can be considered a scientific process. The reason he provides for this claim is that the
outcomes procured from such a system were subject to community and collegial scrutiny. On the basis that the system was evaluated, Durie contends that the Maori health model ought to be considered scientific.

In offering five different categories of traditional healing activity, including the use of incantations and ritual, medicinal applications, massage, water aspersion and immersion practices, and surgical interventions, Durie suggests that the Maori approach to illness intervention traversed the spiritual, psychic, physical, and ecological levels (also see Kinloch, 1984). In his eclectic approach, Durie propounds the view that a public health system regulated and controlled by tapu and noa was practised by Maori, and being basic needs driven was characterised by a form of communal pragmatism. Moreover, explicit in Durie's exposition is the view that this system was specifically oriented toward maximising the survival advantage of the group, which in part, explains the model's emphasis on control and regulation of social behaviour. Durie provides the questioning of a family in relation to a violation of tapu as an example of the diagnostic method, purportedly characterised by this model to safeguard the welfare of the group. Durie summarises the traditional matrix of specific physical and mental health concepts of Maori in a later paper (1998), by suggesting that the unknown and known causes framework, encapsulates the aggregate of tapu, noa, makutu, and tohunga, within which the health of Maori individuals can be understood.

Durie (1994) draws the connection between a model of health based on control and regulation and the role of hereditary leaders and those ascribed specific roles within traditional Maori societies, i.e., tohunga. In paraphrasing Best (1924), Durie describes tohunga within the vernacular of reverence, respect, and reciprocity, and considers that the complementariness of rangatira (hereditary leaders) and tohunga, was that together their roles covered the social circumference of political, spiritual, and professional spheres of traditional Maori life. Winiata (1967) also makes comment that at times the role of rangaitira or ariki, and tohunga, were collapsed into one, depending on the needs of the group at the time. It is important to note here that the assumption of the inherent social stratification of pre-contact Maori society where in particular, tohunga are ordered strategically into specialised categories, remains a point of contention. (See Appendix A)
Evident within the description of Maori health concepts provided by Durie (1994), however, is the essential role played by tohunga as the interpreters of both cause and effect within an explanatory system of causation, purportedly encompassing the broad spectrum of Maori engagement with their respective society and environment. Therefore, of note is Durie’s explication of the fundamental relevance of tohunga to his ecological model of health, which although being presumably socially derived and sanctioned, was dependent on individuals being able to interpret on behalf of the group. That is, although theories of Maori health often posit the 'Maori worldview' as being inherently sociological, explicit in the communal (ecological, humanistic) focus is the vocational agency of particular individuals to function as interpreters and mediums of other individuals’ behaviours and cognitions.

In appealing to a distinct terminology Durie (1995) draws a semantic association between the presumed elements of a traditional Maori view of health and features of contemporary psychological science. Durie, in contextualising his perspective within a discourse of colonisation suggests that the Maori health framework has a diagnostic function because it is drawn from an aetiological basis. Moreover, the framework has the facility for observing symptomatic clusters, which means that it is also a viable classificatory and treatment system. It is the Tohunga Suppression Act of 1907, which Durie holds as being responsible for the amelioration of the extensive methodology used by tohunga, as well as the usurping of tribal elders as being leaders in health. As a consequence, contemporary Maori have become passive consumers in a system that fails to recognise traditional Maori values and although unsubstantiated, Durie states that the acceptance by Maori of alien values is largely superficial. By way of general conclusion and in specific relation to mental health, Durie advocates the reification of the traditional Maori framework of health concepts in the following:

While there is general recognition that Western medicine has much to offer Maori people, there is a parallel observation that it is limited in many respects and that the concepts of tapu, noa, makutu, and the role of the tohunga provide a residual reality for many Maori people, including those living in urban situations. (p. 335)
The strong association being drawn by Durie between the 'superficial' acceptance of 'alien values' and a 'residual reality' being held by many urban Maori means that the Maori schema of illness causation he proffers (Durie, 1994, 1995) ought to be considered a generic Maori belief system (for 80% of Maori now live in either minor or major urban areas). Also contingent on Durie's unsupported contentions is the notion that Maori at a population level, in superficially accepting 'alien values' and being provided a 'residual reality' through the schema of tapu, noa, makutu and tohunga, are subject to a cultural pathology characterised by a dissonance between that which is accepted as 'alien' and that which remains as 'real'. It does seem clear however, that Durie is arguing that Maori health should be theorised from within an ecological model that observes a set of central Maori social percepts including authority, balance, and control. Significantly, Durie is also suggesting that because of the 'intrinsic' ecological and traditional nature of Maori health, specific aspects of health such as psychological health should not be separated from wider dimensions which include spiritual health, physical health and family health.

Lange's (1972) analysis of traditional Maori health concepts is also centred on the violation premise of tapu. However, Lange contextualises the conceptual aggregate provided by Durie (1994, 1995, 1998) in an historical frame of reference, thereby providing a deeper understanding of the nexus of influences which have led to our current theoretical formulations of the mental health of Maori. According to Lange, Maori health concepts ought not to be collapsed with scientific notions of causation. This is because no distinction is made within pre-scientific societies between that which is empirically based and that which is religious or supernatural in origin (see Helman, 1990; Murdock, 1980 above). Lange therefore, proposes that because of the subservience of a pre-scientific society to an environment interpreted as being imbued with conjoint natural and supernatural influences, sickness and illness ought to be considered in the specific context of such an environment as a moral problem, and not a scientific issue. As Lange states:

The Maori, as members of such a society, did not regard sickness as a problem to be attacked by scientific action (i.e., medically), but as a moral problem: it was the result of a temporary disharmony with nature. Good health was appreciated, but not as such. On the Maori scale of values, health did not rank as something to
be sought after for itself (as it ranks in the Western scale), but merely as an
indication that all was well, that there had been no improper behaviour. (p. 7)

In providing a clear explication of the function of tapu and noa to order the
sanitation and hygiene aspects of communal life within Maori societies, Lange
contends that the pervasiveness of the supernatural within the communal
environment was thought to permeate objects, persons and places. The mauri or the
hau (life giving principle) of an individual was the presence of the supernatural
within persons and an infringement (or hara) against a tapu determined object, other
person or place, led to the subsequent withdrawal of the supernatural element within
an individual. In simple terms, an individual who was thought to have committed an
infringement against a designated tapu object, person, or place, was rendered
defenceless and unable to counter any hostile attack from either mate atua (unknown
causes) or mate tangata (known causes).

Figure 12: Sociological Triptych (2): components of the explanatory system of illness causation
implied within an historical interpretation of Maori views of illness.

Therefore, mate atua refers to the supernatural phenomenon of physical or
mental illness manifestation, effected through the departure of the supernatural
element (refer to Figure 12 above). The cause of withdrawal is an individual's or
family member's transgression against a socially imposed tapu. Mate tangata, in this sense, implies intentional maligning being projected on to an unprotected individual, thus causing abnormal behaviour, illness, or death. On the latter point, the relationship between mate tangata, mate Maori, and makutu refers to illness afflication being caused by the human intention to malign. The principal distinction between mate Maori (mate atua and mate tangata) and mate Pakeha is therefore contextualised as an historical one. This is because the interpretation of illness causation for mate Maori is circumscribed by the features outlined within the perceived traditional framework as offered by Durie (1995). Hence, mate Maori is considered the reserve of Maori and mate Pakeha refers to the introduction of causes, which are neither mate atua or mate tangata in origin (refer to Figure 12).

Lyndon (1983) speculates that the term 'mate Maori' may have evolved as a boundary setting device between Maori belief and introduced Christian concepts in the internecine period of inter-tribal warfare of the 1820's and 1830's. The underlying proposal is that the terms 'mate Maori' and 'mate Pakeha' would have represented disparate forms of 'supernatural' protection with the former signifying belief in the pantheon of stratified Maori gods, and the latter denoting belief in a powerful new atua, namely the Christian god. What makes Lyndon's speculation plausible is that with the introduction of new causes of disease, infection, and death, individual choice of retaining belief in the customary system or selecting to convert to the introduced system of Christian belief, would have been motivated by an individual wanting to maximise their own survival in a rapidly diffusing environment. Jackson (1967) emphasises this point by example when he suggests that Maori literacy was prolific during this period because the desire to emulate European modes of behaviour, thought, and custom, including conversion to Christianity, meant that individual Maori and especially those who were prisoners of war, slaves, or victims of disease and illness, could look for salvation and protection in an alternative system of belief.

By undertaking an extensive historiography that included over one hundred case studies on the resonance of Maori beliefs in makutu and mate Maori, Gluckman (1962) offers a number of interesting observations which are worth noting. Gluckman explains that Maori used magic as an explanatory device in the absence of
scientific knowledge. Therefore, tohunga bestowed supernatural causal attributions to symptoms, which in their original context would have been pseudo-rational, but in their contemporary form, are superficial. Although the use of supernatural explanations would have been coherent within their original contexts, Gluckman's central premise is that the perceived traditional system came to be grossly exploited over time and that the movement from the supernatural to the spiritual was largely interned through the proselytisation of Maori, with the introduction of Christianity. A small digression is needed to describe Gluckman's distinction between the supernatural and spiritual as it involves a fundamental spatio-temporal shift in Maori traditional thought. Paralleling Lyndon's (1983) speculation about Maori belief maintenance and belief transition, Gluckman similarly suggests that Maori conversion to Christianity shifted the domain of causal influence of illness from the supernatural to the spiritual realm.

Gluckman (1962) proposes that the system of tapu and noa, through imposing behavioural constraints on individuals, produced a regulative system of control, balance, and retribution, whereby the supernatural was invoked to explain any capricious anomalies in behaviour. Punishment or retribution was therefore, meted out in the temporal-spatial sphere of the transgression because of the intervention of the atua within the empirical world. That is, punishment was administered in the natural world because of the perceived supernatural influences abounding in the empirical world. However, in direct contrast to the supernatural schema of Maori is the spiritual schema of Christianity, which proposes that punishment of human sins will be judged in the spiritual sphere of heaven. As the interpreters of efficacious and transgressive behaviours, tohunga were the mediums of intervention between the worlds of the supernatural and the natural. Tohunga in this sense consolidated and reinforced not only the belief patterns of Maori, but also regulated systems of social control and behaviour already in existence by interpreting the perceived intersection between both the supernatural and empirical spheres, which were regarded as the principal influence on an individual's behaviour (see Figure 13 below). Therefore, in their archetypal forms, the term's 'supernatural' and 'spiritual' appear to represent quite different schema of causation, control, and spatio-temporal punishment.
The distinction made by Gluckman is that Maori interpretations provided for the human intersection between the supernatural and natural spheres by requiring that balance and retribution be implemented in the natural world. In contrast, the spiritual based Christian schema meant that transgressions would ultimately be punished in an ulterior time and space. The intertwining of Christian belief with Maori traditional concepts of causation, which has resulted in belief syncretism, is also illustrated in the common framing of tohunga as faith healers (Jackson, 1967), and the description of contemporary Maori health theories as being spiritually based (Van Meijl, 1993).

Figure 13: A model showing Maori explanations for illness causation leading to impoverished theories of ill health.

Te Rangi Hiroa (1910) describes mate Maori as a fear based psychological phenomenon, which could manifest itself as a specific state of mind, mental disorder, or physical ailment. In making direct reference to the 'fear of the past' and 'coincidences in time', which produced associations between cause and effect Te
Rangi Hiroa says, "Chronic cases, fatal cases, hereditary ailments and most of those which cannot be explained to him, the Maori regards as "Mate Maori" or disease peculiar to himself alone". (p. 104) Of interest, is that inheritable disorders or afflictions such as leprosy and tuberculosis were interpreted within the confines of the explanatory system as being warrantable evidence for the power of the supernatural to be transmitted from generation to generation (see Figure 13). Lyndon (1983) also suggests that inherited afflications were restricted to an explanation of makutu, as it was presupposed that the genetic transmission of abnormal traits attested to the failure of a tapu removing rite to successfully intervene in the mark or bite of the atua. Thus, although there was no knowledge of gene or germ theory within pre-contact Maori society, the manifestations of abnormal genetic transmission actively reinforced the system of supernatural explanation of illness causation through confirmation by 'coincidences in time' (Jackson, 1967).

Lange (1972) conjectures that because of the pervasiveness of supernatural explanations of illness causation within pre-contact Maori society, a system of treatment for physical illness in particular, would have been inherently constrained. That is, the development of a body of medicinal knowledge requires experimentation in order that systematic trial and error methods eventually produce consistent results which may effectively treat an afflication (Murdock, 1980). As Durie (1994, 1995) notes, cause and effect relations relative to illness were construed and constrained within the system of mate atua and mate tangata. Put simply, because the type of system of explanation is proposed as encompassing the supernatural, the natural and human spheres, there would have been little reason to conduct experiments to detect the medicinal properties of flora. This is because the conduct of empirical investigation of medicinal properties would fundamentally contradict the locus of cause and effect intrinsic to the Maori explanatory framework of illness causation.

However, Lange (1972), in noting that the development of medicinal knowledge within Maori societies was a post-colonial adaptation (see also Walker, 1996), suggests that there were elementary practices for treating a basic set of external afflictions such as, boils, sores, swellings, bruises, and skin diseases. Moreover, knowledge of the human skeletal structure was quite advanced, which Murdock (1980) citing Te Rangi Hiroa (1950) also mentions because of the practice
of cannibalism and the ritual cleaning of human bones. The main tenet of Lange's thesis is that although it must be accepted that Maori lacked physical immunity to the introduction of new diseases (see Pool, 1991), the more significant constraint evident within an historical overview of Maori health was the inability of the Maori conceptual system of illness causation to develop in conjunction with the rapidity of environmental change, that is the impact of material culture and the introduction of explanatory innovation. McCreary (1968) similarly draws this association by suggesting that the fight against disease at the point of Maori population decline was principally a conceptual battle. And conversely, the rapid growth of the Maori population once this battle had been fought was prolific because Maori, with the birth rate of a developing society, were effectively receiving the medical benefits of a more developed society.

In conclusion, Levy, Mageo and Howard (1996) provide a framework that indicates that belief in gods and supernatural forces can be interpreted as a system of belief, which reflects and protects the social institutions within a cultural domain. Howard (1996) in his analysis of the Rotumans over a period of thirty years shows how decreases in environmental uncertainty impact on a belief system where supernatural theories of illness causation are gradually supplanted with more naturalistic conceptions. Helman (1990), in outlining four sites of illness aetiology (individual, social, natural and supernatural) provides an important basis from which Murdock's (1980) internal and external explanations of illness causation can be understood across a wide range of different societies. The Maori concepts of illness which have been described reflect aspects of both Helman's and Murdock's analyses and can be interpreted as a local hermeneutics within the global based framework of god, spirit, environmental, and human interaction depicted by Levy, Mageo, and Howard (1996). The re-emergence of the role of tohunga within the contemporary New Zealand context parallels the role of interpreters determining the god and human relationship as delineated by Levy, Mageo and Howard. The point in drawing the connections between cultural based theories of illness causation and human roles, which are specific to interpreting and maintaining belief in supernatural agency, is that within a context of Maori cultural reification the development and subsequent acceptance of cultural assessors within institutions of health, reflects the objectification of the mental states of Maori within the aegis of a false industry,
namely, 'Maori mental health'. I believe it has been shown that belief in supernatural agents is strongly correlated with environmental uncertainty, and although the creation of specific roles within health institutions may be perceived as exhibiting a degree of complementarity with alternative beliefs, the empirical question as to how widespread such belief in actuality is, remains. Once this question is answered, we may look to the environment to detect features of uncertainty that require changing, rather than create institutions of thought, or an industry of pathology, which will require dismantling in the future.

In order to establish a view of the way, in which 'sacred' belief comes to inform postmodern conceptions of Maori thought and process, in the context of Maori cultural reification, I now provide a rigorous critique of what is termed 'Kaupapa Maori Research'. My main rationale for providing this critical review is that the blending of nineteenth century social Darwinism with twentieth century cultural relativism by Maori theorists has resulted in the emergence of what is often held to be a Maori specific 'methodology'. I question the theoretical assumptions underlying Kaupapa Maori Research and the utility of its purported 'methodology,' to formulate constructive problems as they exist within contemporary New Zealand. The significance of the following critique for the issue of the mental health of Maori, is that I consider that Kaupapa Maori Research as an emerging Maori 'methodology,' has gained approval through its Maori specificity, rather than the merit of its theoretical rigor or practical application. If Kaupapa Maori Research is a 'methodology' unique to Maori by virtue of the ethnic specificity of its adherents and practitioners then this suggests that, within New Zealand, the research context is politicised. In specific regards to the mental health of Maori the seriousness of this claim cannot be under-estimated. The ability of Kaupapa Maori Research to generate theory and practices that improve on our current understanding of contemporary Maori problems requires investigation. Whether Kaupapa Maori Research actively informs or obstructs improved understandings of the factors influencing contemporary Maori problems being developed, is the primary question that the following chapter addresses.
Chapter Seven

A critique of Kaupapa Maori Research

An introduction:

Kaupapa Maori Research (KMR) is a developing approach to research, which has emerged largely out of the discipline of education (Irwin 1992; Nepe, 1991). However, KMR is beginning to influence other disciplines such as sociology, anthropology and psychology. Reverberating in certain fields such as the health research field is the claim that KMR is an 'alternative methodology' for the conduct of inquiry that is employed when one includes Maori participants in a research population, when one is conducting research in a Maori context, or when one researches a topic of specific Maori interest. The origins of KMR are outlined by Bishop (1995) who traces the movement from the 1980's and early part of the 1990's to the present when Maori interests for autonomy have increasingly become the focus of many Maori organisations and government funding bodies. Due to a dearth of substantive work available to serve as a source of KMR, I undertake a meta-narrative analysis of Bishop's work to elicit an understanding of the postmodern origins of Kaupapa Maori Research, and to identify both the methodology endorsed by KMR adherents and its research method.

The perspective taken in this analysis is that KMR is a fledgling method with few strengths and that it is essentially unable to secure realistic or useful research outcomes. Framed as a discursive practice, it is deconstructionist and 'hyperrelativist' in formulation. KMR attempts to revise colonial history through the insights of a number of continental theorists, namely Foucault, Habermas and Gramsci. The modus operandi of KMR is discourse analysis where textual readings or interpretations are performed on narratives secured by informants. Focus groups or 'whanau groups of interest' (Bishop, 1995) are the primary unit of analysis. The reason for this is that KMR claims to be a holistic and emancipatory research practice. Adherents of KMR describe their research conclusions as explanatory texts, which reveal the hegemonic state or, metaphorically, the impact of colonisation on Maori. KMR seeks to empower Maori cultural revival through providing 'statements
of fact' from their informants that validate the researcher's rhetorical and polemical views of dominance, disempowerment, authority and cultural history.

As a critical discourse of the human and social sciences, KMR actively creates a force field of difference which, anchored on the over-privileging of history, delimits the expressions of contemporary Maori realities. Its objective of confirming what I describe as the 'abstract colonisation hypothesis', as an explanatory mechanism for current disparities between Maori and non-Maori across all substrata, is a retrograde move which produces impoverished theory and arbitrary research practices. More specifically, I argue that within the KMR charter, socio-historical determinants of disparity between Maori and non-Maori are over determined. Therefore, the fallacy of affirming the consequent continually arises in the conclusions drawn from KMR because of the endemic nature of over determining the socio-historical component incorporated into initial hypotheses. Within the conduct of inquiry, I would suggest that this strategy of interpretation is logically invalid to be perceived as a sound method. In the following analysis I restrict my critique of KMR to showing what the method comprises, and in doing so, I demonstrate the limited utility of the method for research practice within the human sciences. Although KMR may be defensible as an interesting method for describing a particular viewpoint, the fact that it is beginning to have influence in research funding areas means that there are both practical and political implications attached to the research findings purportedly obtained from KMR. For this reason alone, the empirical reliability and validity of KMR requires scrutiny. While being in full support of the realisation of Maori aspirations, I argue that, although KMR may appear to support Maori advocacy, such support, may in fact be to the detriment of Maori. To be more explicit, I suggest that KMR actually supports the status quo of current disparities existing between Maori and non-Maori by offering an ill-informed explanatory justification for the existence of such disparities. As Larrain (1994) concludes in his critique of postmodernist ideology:

The postmodern relativism and distrust of reason make it impossible for anyone to believe in a better future or in the possible resolution of major societal problems. Consciously sought change and politics in general seem to lose all sense. In the end reality and agency themselves have been dissolved. In openly attacking the concept of ideology but secretly using it to unilaterally criticise the
theories (meta-narratives) which propose critical concepts of ideology, postmodernism not only contradicts itself but also becomes a convenient ideology of the status quo. By suspecting those who suspect the established system, postmodernism explains away the problems of, and hence cannot but implicitly support, the status quo. (p. 313)

As a scientific realist, I am arguing against KMR, positivism, and postmodernism, which I suggest all exhibit negative epistemic features such as negative prejudice, distortion, oversimplification and loss of advantage in the conduct of inquiry due to the unsustainability of the method to secure robust results (Rescher, 1977). Postmodernism is the primary position from which KMR emerges. Cultural relativism, as a theoretical construct, enables adherents of KMR to over determine an ontological basis from which a specific Maori 'way of knowing' is presented as being in absolute conflict with all other forms of knowledge production. The most serious problem of KMR is the total absence of parameter setting for the use of the method. Because KMR is an anti-realist doctrine, the empirical viability of its research conclusions cannot be substantiated. This in turn serves to mystify Maori research rather than strengthen it. More explicitly, KMR adherents do not advocate any need for correspondence between the hypotheses that they propose and the conclusions that they derive. However, as will be shown, the limitations of the KMR configuration are most clearly observed in the contradictory contention that one version of truth is preferable to another. That is, KMR cannot sustain an anti-realist position on one hand, while advocating that the conclusions drawn from their research endeavours have truth-value. This marks KMR as being a fundamentally self-refuting doctrine.

In reviewing the main postulates of KMR, the following conclusions will be drawn. First, adherents of KMR express a limited knowledge of the range of scientific methods available for social science research. That is, the multifarious scope of methods available to researchers in both qualitative and quantitative research practices is seldom represented in a critique of 'Western science'. Quite often an argument is pitched solely against the general philosophy of scientific empiricism (see e.g., Lawson Te Aho, 1993; McCreanor, 1993) without contributors noting the prescriptive value of the approach for scientific method. The value-ladenness of scientific empiricism is too often given undue emphasis, whereas the
values and assumptions inherent in all alternative perspectives of research are either denied, or not commented on. 'Western science' is therefore, made synonymous with scientific empiricism, this misleads about the alternative approaches available to researchers, and the value-ladenness of all research perspectives. In positioning itself in opposition to positivism, KMR only serves to reflect equally biased accounts of idealised conditions and practices. Examples of the limited knowledge of alternative methods are Smith (1992) and Walker (1992) who both argue against positivism before making the suggestion that cross-cultural research practices should be endorsed. However, if the issue is adopting a suitable methodology, then cross-cultural research is not the answer, for it maintains the same methods as positivism, albeit with a comparative element of interpretation tacked on to the analysis (Piker, 1998).

Second, underlying the postmodern cultural relativist method of KMR, is a deliberate strategy to mount a research approach that claims incommensurability with 'Western science' by virtue of its strategic positioning rather than its content (see Smith, 1996). That is, KMR is primarily a collaborative, participant driven qualitative method and yet, the ethnicity of its practitioners is presented as the defining criterion of the methodology. The adoption of ethnicity as a criterion for research practice illustrates negative prejudice, distortion, oversimplification and loss of advantage, because it actively dissuades general evaluation of research products, research replication, comparative research, and collaborative research occurring between groups. Hence, another contradictory feature of KMR is observed, where the ethnocentrism posited by KMR adherents as the primary bias of Western scientific and research practice is exchanged for an ethnic specific criterion.

Third, because KMR adherents assume a postmodern position, I argue that their contention that a Maori epistemology is emerging from which Maori scientific research can be conducted, is derived from constituting an abstract Maori ontology based on an idealised notion of kinship solidarity (see Salmond, 1985). I present an argument tracing the conjunctive influences in Bishop's work of Foucault at the level of genealogy (Foucault, 1972), Habermas at the levels of symbolic and material reproduction as well as social and system integrated action contexts (Bronner and Kellner, 1989), and of Gramsci's global system's concept of hegemony (Hoare and
Smith, 1971; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). My principle contention here is that adherents of KMR attempt to validate a counter-epistemology on the basis of ontological relativism (Nola, 1988). I suggest that it is only in this way that KMR adherents can make an appeal to a separate methodology based on the criterion of ethnicity. I conclude that KMR is grounded within an unacceptable framework of epistemic, ontological and methodological relativism.

Along with this conclusion I make the further claim that prior to the formation of an idealised notion of ontology, is the conceptual flaw accepted by KMR adherents (see Irwin, 1994) that a pattern of belief is tantamount to an epistemology. Patterns of belief, no matter how homogenous they may appear, or how well they are supported, do not by themselves constitute epistemologies. The issue here is not socio-political, nor is it semantic; epistemology is characterised in its methodological formulation by regulative principles for the construction of explanatory knowledge (Hooker, 1987; Fodor, 1994). Rescher (1977) offers a number of desiderata such as explanatory power, heuristic value, systemic worth, fertility and empirical adequacy, which are used in the evaluation of postulational theories. Although a pattern of belief may be systematic in nature, it is not subjected to any such regulative mechanisms whereby its epistemic and empirical value can be evaluated. Insisting that KMR is based on cultural traditions and metaphysical principles, illustrates the confusion by its adherents that belief composition equates to an epistemology (see Salmond, 1985). As has been discussed elsewhere, mythological accounts of origin are able to constitute an interpretative mechanism for creation, symbolic expression, and social form, but they do not serve as an aetiological basis for explaining empirical regularities.

Postmodernism, with its scepticism of totalising discourses, reason, and universal truth, is employed by adherents of KMR to frame an alternative method based on the rejection of these principles, only to succumb to the appearance of its own totality, reason, and truth value. Larrain (1994) in his critique of Foucault, Baudrillard and Lyotard states, "While they (postmodernists) doubt the validity of total discourses and of their ideological critique, they must assume the validity of their own critique of total discourses" (p. 289). Belief composition derived from cultural and cosmological traditions is taken by adherents of KMR to comprise
sufficient grounds for the claim that a counter-epistemology is emerging (Irwin, 1994; Smith, 1996).

In arguing that KMR is not a fertile method for conducting research within the human sciences, I conjecture that KMR, through the over privileging of history, and the absence of a viable epistemology, works from the basis of a regressive idealism. Because of this, adherents of KMR fail to apprehend a relational ontological basis that reflects their claims of an emerging epistemology. The point is, that the claim that a Maori worldview representing a cultural artefact, which is socially formed and transmitted exists, remains unsubstantiated. Espousing the existence of a worldview that is peculiar to Maori is not the same thing as claiming particular worldviews exist. In contrast to KMR, and consistent with my scientific realist commitments, I advocate the discovery of empirical regularities as they exist within contemporary Maori societies. It is my belief that scientific research cannot be conducted from a purely regressive idealist foundation. There are numerous methods available, which for the best part offer realistic representations of current problems, as they are experienced within Maori groups, communities and general societies. I argue that if our research aims to solve problems, then it is absolutely necessary that we identify and formulate our problems as they currently exist in fact, and not in ideology.

Principally, I will be arguing that KMR can offer insights into how research involving Maori, or conducted within Maori contexts, or on a topic of specific Maori interest, can be improved at the procedural level. The sensitivity that both Bishop (1995) and Smith (1996) argue for, are, I believe, characteristics of empathy, compassion and awareness which ideally should be practised 'reflexively' at all levels of research, but most importantly in respect of procedure (Harding, 1998). Furthermore, KMR also reveals an improvement in the process of dissemination by arguing for a feedback process between researchers and their participants or communities (Smith, 1996). This is a practice that needs to be strongly endorsed. In elucidating the main tenets of KMR, I first locate KMR as a 'method' emanating from the postmodern project.
Revealing ‘cultural realities’ through postmodern cultural relativism

The first issue that needs to be addressed is the fact that adherents of KMR, such as Bishop, are deconstructionists, or what Baudrillard terms 'hyperrelativists'. According to Baudrillard (1994); (see also Levin, 1981;), there appeared in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a number of 'critical epistemes,' which are modes of obtaining practical knowledge about the world. Webster (1993a), in a critique of postmodernist theory and Maori cultural revival practices, outlines Baudrillard's successive phases of the image in society as comprising of a reflection of basic reality which corresponds to European naturalism or positivism; an image of society that masks and perverts a basic reality corresponding to the modern critiques of naturalism or positivism offered by Hegel, Marx and Freud; an image that masks the absence of a basic reality as evidenced in the modern scepticism of the 1920-1930's aesthetic avantgardes; and finally, an image that bears no relation to reality at all where the image is its pure simulacrum.

The two critical epistemes useful in this analysis are metaphorically known as 'the mask' and 'the simulacrum'. The mode of 'unmasking' is an approach to knowledge by which theorists and researchers attempt to reveal what is under the surface of what is deceptively taken to be reality. Instantiated in this episteme is the committed belief that reality is an illusive disguise, a false and deceptive curtain that requires lifting to reveal what really lies underneath. Followers of critical theory, or 'unmaskers,' are searching for an original, or a counter, reality. The method of unveiling 'reality' as it has been constructed is generally through deconstruction, or alternatively, a re-rendering of history (Sismondo, 1996). A determined search for a counter-epistemology ensues where aspects of the original can be identified and re-situated in their rightful place. When found, these 'markers' of the original act as the signs of the future to warn us that we are not to be subsumed by the realm of the false again (Levin, 1981).

The movement toward the critical episteme of the simulacrum is identified as the transition that occurs when the 'markers' of the original ascend to the position of the real and authentic (Baudrillard, 1994). There is no denoting or connoting; the metaphor crystallises into the original and becomes the absolute. That is, the
'markers,' or the images of the 'real,' come less to signify the absence of a reality and transcend to the position of the 'hyperreal'. In this sense, the 'hyperreal' may be cast as the 'traditional' in which the contemporary construction of cultural referents remains unobserved in the desire to produce the 'authentic'. As Soja (1993) points out in his essay on the dominance of historicity in critical theory,

The simulacrum is indicative of a transition from the mere masking of appearances to the 'liquidation of all referentials' where the substitution of signs or representations of the real become the real itself. The simulacrum, an exact copy of the original that has either been lost or did not exist in the first place, threatens to erase the very difference between the "true" and the "false", the "real" and the "imaginary", the "signifier" and the "signified". (p. 119)

I would suggest that the programme of KMR moves between the two critical epistemes, metaphorically known as the 'mask' and the 'simulacrum'. Detection of suitable markers by which a counter-epistemology can be launched based on the first episteme is observed in the amplified appeal to socio-historical determinants within KMR. And following this, the objective is to materialise a seemingly authentic and absolute way of knowing Maori, of doing Maori research and as will be seen later, of even being Maori. The inauguration of these two critical epistemes is the claim that there exists a Maori paradigm, or the more absolute claim that there has always existed a Maori paradigm (Irwin, 1994). As a corollary, it is often also the case, that the word 'paradigm' is used in the absence of any defining terms of reference to dramatically infer an explicit boundary between Maori and 'Western' 'world-views' (see Peters, 1993; Stewart, 1997).

Underlying Baudrillard's thought is the wholesale dismissal of an objective reality. Instead, what is observed to be reality is an active distortion. By primarily appealing to the socio-political dimension of social relations, postmodernity is a discursive practice which is ultimately oriented to revealing, through deconstructionism, the lack of an objective reality (Sismondo, 1996). Limitations of some of the central theses of modernism, such as the tenets of positivism (universal, objective, value-free knowledge), are posited as evidence for a tacit reality. Bishop (1995) positions Kaupapa Maori Research within postmodernity. As he states:
The modernist mission of the human sciences, with their belief in truth, objectivity, linearity and inevitable progress, which have constituted normality of some and marginalisation for others. Marginalisation has been the result of the pursuit of definitions and experiences of unity and generality through the production of 'grand narratives,' whether they be of normalisation, interpretative potentialities or oppressions. Kaupapa Maori can be seen as the deconstruction of those hegemonies which have disempowered Maori from controlling and defining (researching) their own knowledge within the context of unequal power relations. (p. 26)

Haraway (1995), in an abbreviated form, describes the latent assumptions of this perspective:

All knowledge is a condensed node in an agonistic power field. The strong program in the sociology of knowledge joins with the lovely and nasty tools of semiology and deconstruction to insist on the rhetorical nature of truth, including scientific truth. History is a story Western culture buffs tell each other; science is a contestable text and a power field; the content is the form. Period. (p. 176)

The variant of postmodernism that KMR adherents actively pursue is deconstructionist. The deconstructionist project, in this context, rejects what are termed dominant epistemologies such as positivism, and instead insists on the authenticity of a Maori way 'of knowing;' or more strongly, the claim that there is a Maori epistemology (Salmond, 1985; Irwin, 1994; Peters, 1993). Assuming the viability of their own assertions, KMR adherents argue instead for a hyperrelative account of science that is Maori specific. The prefix 'hyper' indicates not only an intensification of the relativist perspective, but also the movement toward a more absolute position (Bogard, 1996).

In rejecting 'objectivity,' KMR adherents adopt the antithetical position of cultural relativism which, taken to its logical extension, must assume an absolute, seemingly non-evaluative, and therefore uncritical perspective, on scientific research (Siegel, 1987; Norris, 1997). Because of this, it is suggested that KMR argues for an ontological relativism that has more relation to Baudrillard's simulacrum than an empirical equivalent (Baudrillard, 1994). Nola (1988) makes the connection between deconstructionism and ontological relativism explicit:
Ontological relativism finds a natural home in the doctrines of many theorists of society, e.g., those who speak of the 'social construction of reality' where that reality concerns social facts, objects or kinds. What is meant by that phrase needs careful investigation from author to author. Suffice to mention here that the entities allegedly constructed are not *sui generis* but are held to be dependent, in some sense, on other entities. Some might treat their dependence as simply one way of talking about their relative existence in which case the variety of relativism alleged is only as problematic as the notion of dependence advocated.

(p. 14)

Arguing against objectivity in science is combined by KMR with the argument against subjectivity in social reality where the spatio-temporal locating of the individual is circumscribed by a seemingly ahistorical idealised positioning. This is a mode of cultural reproduction which extends from the socio-political (see Ransom, 1997) realm to the psychological (i.e., 'colonisation of the mind' see Ho, 1998; Lawson-Te Aho 1994), and the force that it creates actively reconstitutes the 'subject,' producing a composite image of Maori as an 'exemplar' of the critical episteme, the simulacrum.

As Webster (1993a) notes:

Given the theoretical approach of postmodernism, critical distinctions between Maori society itself, Maori culture, and its integral history tend to be merged in representations: discourse, symbolism, images and their meanings. This persistent contradiction arises between these representations and ordinary experience of Maori society by Maori and Pakeha alike. This contradiction arises at a point which is ever more problematic in modernist perceptions of the world, but claimed to be irrelevant or nostalgic in a postmodern world where (As Baudrillard might say) an image of Maori culture 'bears no relation to any reality whatever; it is its own pure simulacrum. (p. 224)

With particular reference to psychology, the rhetoric and polemic embedded in KMR, as indicated in the term 'decolonisation of the mind,' signifies that the Maori individual requires a conversion or re-constitution experience in order that their identity becomes more 'authentic' (Durie, 1997). In the current climate of cultural reification, the ideological has taken precedence over actual experience. History is exploited by KMR to the point of denying substance to the present.
Rationality is framed as relative, consciousness is ideologically collective, and the subject is salient only in terms of internal and external subjugation. In order to establish the connections between ontological relativism, deconstructionism and KMR, an over-view of Bishop's work is provided.

**Revealing the 'self' as 'Other'**

Bishop (1995) identifies KMR as emanating from the project of cultural revival spawned initially from Maori urbanisation, then followed in the 1980's and 1990's by the development of Maori education initiatives such as Te Kohanga Reo and Kura Kaupapa Maori (also see Nepe, 1991). Kaupapa Maori is an emancipatory project oriented to legitimising "The philosophy and practice of being and acting Maori. It assumes the taken-for-granted social, political, historical, intellectual and cultural legitimacy of Maori people, in that it is a position where Maori language, knowledge and values are accepted in their own right" (Smith 1992, p. 26 cited in Bishop, 1995). Bishop provides a litany of assertions such as "....the legitimation of diversity of cultural epistemologies and cosmologies' (p. 21), "Kaupapa Maori research is challenging the dominance of individualistic, Kaupapa Pakeha research which primarily, at least in its present form, benefits the researcher and their kaupapa" (p. 23) and "Kaupapa Maori research, based in a different world view from that of the dominant discourse, makes this political statement while also acknowledging the need to recognise and address the ongoing effects of racism and colonialism in the wider society" (p. 28). All these claims serve to characterise KMR as a socio-political, relativist and deconstructionist standpoint.

In grounding his perspective, Bishop (1995) further draws from Irwin (1992) and Olsen (1993), who both make the claim that KMR is epistemologically based and hence, epistemologically productive. KMR is based on a 'different world view' from that of the dominant discourse, which in Bishop's view is political. The Maori worldview, which Bishop proposes, is based on traditional cultural practices. The objectives of KMR are to challenge current authority and representation which both collude to form an ideology of cultural superiority within and across a variety of fields including 'social, economic, political and educational institutions' (Bishop, 1995: p. 30). Maori problems are framed as 'injustices' and are located in the
'systemic' hegemony of colonisation. Methodologically, KMR is constituted as a post-positivist position specifically oriented to the reduction of distance between researchers and the researched. And, as Bishop states:

The Kaupapa Maori position is that Maori cultural practices ensure that Maori aspirations will be met, simply because Maori cultural practices grow out of these aspirations. Researcher participation within these practices will facilitate agency by the research participants, that is self-determination within a Maori discursive practice. Researchers need to position themselves in relation to this desire for self-determination. (p. 35)

The primary aim of KMR, in Bishop's (1995) terms is, therefore, the production of agency, or to become 'agentic' within the realm of discursive practices. In attempting to answer his own question on how theory is generated, or explanations drawn, from a KMR position, Bishop disregards any agency his forbears might have had by conducting a retrospective historiography of his own family's ancestry. In describing his 'bicultural ancestry', Bishop talks about a "conspiracy of silence" which is "mysterious", and his "surprise" in finding out that his North Island relatives, whom he assumed by virtue of geography "...would have remained Maori," also lived a "Pakeha life-style". Bishop states that his numerous searches conducted over the course of four years revealed that "...an inexorable process of Europeanisation had overtaken my family" (p. 38) and that "Members of the family appear to have been persuaded to make a cultural choice, that is, a firm resolve to choose one cultural life-style above another" (p. 39). Bishop then hypothesises that the educational system might have been to blame for what he terms the "...diaspora of my family" (p. 39), but unable to validate this assumption, goes on to say that "...the process of colonisation had in itself contained mechanisms for suppressing families histories" (p. 39). Bishop then turns to critical theory to elicit an understanding of the "colonial suppression" of his family history. Endorsing Gramscian theory he notes:

...the Gramscian concept of hegemony was employed to explain how the persuasiveness of ideas could enable colonisation of the mind to occur, and thus to explain why the majority of the fourteen siblings of my grandfather chose to raise their children in the culture of their father, that is as Pakeha, and not in the culture of their mother, that is as Maori. Further this concept of hegemony was
used to explain why the information about our ancestry was suppressed and knowledge of our Maori ancestry was not passed on. (p. 40)

The main problematic for Bishop (1995) in his personal historical narrative is that, in using Gramsci as a theorist, he believes that he might be thwarted in understanding the "colonisation of Maori minds" (p. 40). Bishop's underlying motive and objective is thus revealed: "In other words, I assumed that we, as descendants of Maori people, had been denied access to knowledge about our heritage due to unknown 'historical processes' and my research sought from critical theory a methodology that could liberate individuals from the effects of hegemonic processes of suppression of alternative views of the world" and following this, "the study sought to 'release' my family from the oppression that colonisation had foisted upon them, to 'clear the opacity' of history that they had 'succumbed' to and to question 'false realities that they lived within'". (p. 41)

Apart from the selective moral indignation underscoring his treatment of his ancestors' histories, Bishop offers an explicit view of the connection between epistemic and ontological relativism within the project of postmodernity. His ancestors' cultural choices of 'life-style' are deconstructed to affirm 'false-realities' whereas the alternative worldview symbolises the Baudrillardian markers of 'authenticity' and 'truth'. In 'unmasking' his 'other' cultural heritage, Bishop actively polarises representations of both the epistemic and ontological by describing hegemonic processes as mechanisms of distortion which subvert individual choices of socio-political and psychological kinds.

In a moment of awareness, Bishop acknowledges his own imposition in assuming such an omniscient perspective of his family's history and retreats to a slightly less assertive perspective describing a position of facilitation and the constructing of understanding of his family's history with other family members. In explicating his method of inquiry, Bishop (1995) asserts that he will negotiate the meaning of the data, which one assumes is the information provided by other family members, and because his descendants cannot confirm his negotiating of the data forms, "...reconstruct their likely motives from a consideration of the options facing them at certain crucial points in their lives". (p. 42) This leads to "...using
reconstructed life histories as a methodological tool since understanding the relevant socio-political contexts within which our ancestors lived became necessary. Other clues to likely attitudes of these tupuna (ancestors) was (sic) the attitudes and behaviours held by their children" (p. 42).

Bishop then goes on to talk about the necessity of adopting a 'Polynesian world view', where ideas are not construed dialectically, but instead in triplets or interrelated matrices. It is suggested that through this claim Bishop tentatively advances a form of methodological relativism. This means that Bishop denies the usefulness of dialectical reasoning, because he acknowledges the contradiction evident in forwarding an emancipatory project within a claim of incommensurable theses. That is, incommensurability of theses rests on the critical concept of it being impossible to evaluate one form of discourse from the perspective of another discourse (Larrain, 1994; Siegel, 1987). If Bishop deigns to emancipate KMR from dominant discourses then he is suggesting, by way of proxy, that KMR is subordinate to, and emergent from, dominant discourses. In wanting to avoid self-refutation, Bishop cannot support a process of probative substantiation of competing theses as this would attest to their commensurability. Therefore, he moves KMR into the realm of methodological relativism as a way of supporting the aforementioned commitment to epistemic and ontological relativism.

Bishop's thesis can be regarded as the first substantive text on what KMR represents, and in his summing up of what KMR actually is, he offers the following theoretical commitments. Kaupapa Maori research is not simply another paradigm shift within Western epistemology. KMR, is not 'grounded theory', even though it adopts a bottom-up approach; this is because explanations are sought from within a cultural context. KMR, is not a neo-Marxist theory-driven emancipatory project, because such a project breeds a new form of evangelism which according to Bishop (1995), ",...is only a little different from the evangelism of those monogenetic, benevolent, paternalistic, evangelistic missionaries who arrived in New Zealand in the early 19th century" (p. 54). Instead KMR is located within an alternative world view in which features of Maori cosmogony may also be included, and where theory construction is a function of the individual's constructing meaning about the perspective they hold within a culturally specific discursive practice. For Bishop, it
is precisely an individual's situatedness within a culture that enables him to claim that KMR moves beyond critical theory to occupy a position of inscrutability within an ontological, epistemic and methodological relativist framework.

In summary, Bishop develops an 'alternative' research methodology that he calls whakawhanaungatanga ('relationship through genealogy'). This alternative methodology is based on a method of collaborative, participant driven, qualitative research. Bishop describes the research tools as comprising hui (meetings), whakawhanaungatanga (blood relations), whakamihi (introductions), and techniques and information (framed as technology) sufficient to develop empowering actions, narratives and texts. Furthermore, the researcher who undertakes the research process becomes what he terms, 'somaically involved'. That is, the researcher is immersed in the research process "...physically, ethically, morally and spiritually, and not just as a 'researcher' concerned with gaining knowledge and with knowing through the intellect only" (1995, p: 235). Although the methodological description of KMR offered by Bishop might seem to emanate more from a semantic overture than a credible alternative, the main point of interest is that the methodology is linked inextricably to the notion of genealogy.

Smith (1996) offers a more pragmatic version of KMR, arguing that underlying the 'theory' of KMR, are principles of practice that need to be heeded when a researcher engages in research in Maori contexts, or in an area of specific Maori interest. For Smith, KMR is localised critical theory. In challenging the ability of scientific positivism to reflect 'Maori realities', Smith suggests that the products of research developed from a scientific positivist framework distort Maori views of knowledge by not reflecting the oral tradition of Maori, nor the general culture of Maori people. The principles which she presents as representing the central tenets of KMR include the principle of whakapapa, the principle of te reo Maori, the principle of tikanga Maori, the principle of rangatiratanga, the principle of whanau, and lastly, Maori cultural ethics (Graham Hingangaroa Smith (1992) offers similar principles which are directed specifically toward the field of education). Accordingly, Linda Smith (1996) argues for an intersection of context and theory to be acknowledged within Maori research, and from her perspective, the Maori context is fundamentally value-laden.
The principles which Smith (1996) outlines operate as an organisational strategy of observing and being aware of Maori values and if research is to be conducted in a Maori context, or with the inclusion of Maori participants, Smith questions whether non-Maori researchers have the requisite understanding of Maori values to be able to conduct research with Maori. From Smith's account, KMR is a contemporary response to traditional Maori epistemologies that have re-emerged in the context of cultural renaissance. The value-ladeness of KMR actively reconstitutes Maori values as a modality of Maori epistemology, but not necessarily as a direct reflection of the contents of a Maori epistemology which Smith identifies as the prose contained in Percy Smith's (1913) *The Lore of the Whare Wananga*. In this sense, Kaupapa Maori Research strives to offer a normative account of research, which is seen as being imbued with the central features of a symbolic Maori collectivity, i.e., genealogy, language, Maori process, leadership, and family. Advocates of KMR, therefore, pit the assumed holism of Maori culture against the value-ladeness of scientific positivism, which effectively reduces the intersection of culture and science to an argument about ideals.

To the question of whether KMR is paradigmatic, Smith responds that this is not an essential question, because as a site of resistance, KMR opposes any active comparison with western science. Therefore, although Smith's central thesis is developed by stressing in her own words, "[T]he production of theories which have dehumanised Maori and in practices which have continued to privilege western ways of knowing, while denying the validity for Maori of Maori knowledge, language and culture" (p. 14), there is according to her, no reason to compare KMR to western science because there is no point of comparison. It is suggested that underlying both Bishop's and Smith's contentions is a conjoint expression of Baudrillard's critical epistemes and the incommensurability thesis, which having been amalgamated with Maori socio-political ambitions, posit a Maori hyperrelative view of scientific research. Incommensurability of 'western' thought with a Maori worldview apparently suffices to warrant the further claim that a Maori paradigm is emerging which sets itself aside from colonising discourse, western science, ethnocentrism and scientific racism.
Adherents of KMR, therefore, subscribe to the view that 'situatedness' within a cultural frame represents an ontological, methodological and epistemic uniqueness, where expressions of an alternative (indigenous) epistemology are warranted by virtue of this placement. At variance with these claims I advance an alternative perspective which suggests that KMR manifests a view of scientific research which is fundamentally biased and in most cases not proscriptive of the actual conduct of research at all. In fact, the descriptions of KMR which are forwarded, erroneously support the view that research can be conducted in the absence of method and evaluation criteria. Put simply, it appears that advocates of KMR assume that ethnicity can be converted to an epistemic criterion, which by itself, is sufficient to claim that any information generated by KMR is reliable and valid. Although the presentation of one biased view of scientific research may present a nemesis by which KMR can be compared, I think this is a retrograde and obstructive manipulation. Bishop contrasts his perspective with what appear to be quintessential and atemporal qualities of theoretical and empirical science, and in doing so he 'universalises' the object to which KMR is opposed. Whether such a 'universalised' object actually exists is an empirical question that Bishop fails to acknowledge.

The charter of KMR that Bishop promotes is primarily based on genealogy, which would appear to have more to do with cultural reification than the conduct of research. The means by which Bishop is able to extrapolate his own personal cultural quest out to the wider Maori population is derived from the continental theorists Baudrillard, Foucault, Habermas and Gramsci. While on the surface, the projects of continental postmodernists may appear extraneous to the charter of KMR, I would suggest that it is precisely in the postmodernisation of Maori, that KMR has been able to emerge as a seemingly viable 'method' of research (Webster, 1993a).

Bishop attempts to 'unmask' the hegemonic practices of history, the State, grand narratives, authority, representation, cultural superiority, positivism and those individuals exhibiting the 'condition' of 'colonisation of the mind'. Therefore, his appeal for hegemony to be revealed covers a wide range of human endeavors, including the political, the social, the scientific, the collective, and the psychological. For Bishop, hegemony is aetiological. All causal explanations can be inferred from the processes of hegemony. Bishop has no doubt that hegemony permeates all levels
of existence from the micro through the meso to the macro levels. As his historiography attempts to show, the power of hegemony, in Bishop's view, can also be used as a mechanism for resurrecting former and contemporary identities. The validity of hegemony is, therefore, established! Yet, Bishop argues foremost against truth. Bishop's self-refutation of the contents and form of truth is further expressed in his totalising of a Maori way of knowing which shows all the hall-marks of a cultural hegemony.

Furthermore, his argument is deeply reminiscent of social Darwinism (Wright, 1996) in that he posits the essential criterion of genealogy as the 'marker' which makes thought, experience, and in this context, research, as being fundamentally incommensurate. Supposedly, what makes this position unassailable is the endorsement of traditional cultural practices and cosmogony. But, Bishop needs to realise, that if one is attending to empirical regularities as they exist within the natural world, then traditional cultural practices and cosmogony might be of cognitive interest as belief patterns, but not as explanations of natural phenomena (Hooker, 1987). The implicit paradox in Bishop's position is that the ideology of hegemony is needed as a truth from which Bishop can weight his own charter of KMR. Therefore, in being organised around the inferred causal mechanism of hegemony, KMR orders its central theses on a regressive idealism which seeks to confirm what is described as the abstract colonisation hypothesis. Bishop's rendition of KMR clearly illustrates both the regressive idealism and confirmation strategies implicit in the deconstructionist project of Kaupapa Maori Research.

**Genes as critical epistemes: The criterion of cultural ‘objectivity’**

The first critical episteme embedded within KMR is, therefore, the privileging of an alternative way of knowing which is essentially based on genealogy (Bishop's whakawhanaungatanga); that is, the assumed somatic relationship between individuals who share common descent. Historicity and the somatic become the two modes of contemporary production of situatedness, and through these two forms, the primacy of difference, necessary for any form of postmodern relativism, arises. The 'unmasking' of modernity produces both a contextual and functional epoch where reflections of a former, ulterior reality are revealed (Norris, 1997). In this critique, it
is assumed that the representation of 'authenticity' is taken to be a traditional version of Maori society. By most accounts, the 'authentic' representation is an homogenous exemplar which serves the purpose of polarisation. Wade (1993) refers to this strategy of conventional contrast between people on the basis of genealogy as appropriating the concept of race as a symbolic resource. The reproduction of a binary system of difference reflects the romanticism underlying the KMR project, where all empirical representations of diffusion, adaptability, and selection, are ignored or obscured for the seemingly greater ideological good.

It is here that the postmodern eclectic mix of theoretical models produced by Foucault (Hoy, 1986), Gramsci (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) and Habermas (Bronner and Kellner, 1989) appear in the charter of KMR. Foucault's method of genealogy merges with Habermas's materialist and symbolic forms of reproduction, which is the foundation of his system and social integrated action contexts. Over-arching both Foucault's method and Habermas's categories is Gramsci's conception of hegemony, which makes distinct the nature of history and ideology as the producer of social hierarchies (Hoare and Smith, 1985). It is my claim that KMR obscures the social reality of Maori individuals by invoking selective tenets of the work of Foucault, Habermas and Gramsci. Rather than 'emancipating' Maori subjectivity, a theoretical value-laden image of the Maori individual is abjured which potentially subverts, or acts as an inordinate constraint, on the formulation of research. That is, with the emergence of a postmodern cultural relativism, KMR actively produces a simulacrum of Maori identity that is bound in a cultural isolate of an idealised ontological basis of Maori social relations. The mystification of both identity and context within cultural postmodern relativism presents a formidable dilemma for the conduct of research which is oriented to detecting empirical problems as they are currently observed in their appropriate contexts. The logical extension of the dilemma means that the actual formulation of problems as they exist for Maori individuals, or within groups, communities, and general society, is continually thwarted by the reduction of empirical facts to the realm of interpretative and dialogic analyses.

Foucault's genealogy of method is primarily a reflection of power in modern societies (Ransom, 1997). Foucault framed his analyses outside of the requirements
of normative and epistemic justification because of his contention that truth, knowledge and belief were modern modalities of the discursive regime of power (Fraser, 1989). His suspension of both normative and epistemic justification represents an aversion to the claims of objectivity, relativity and truth, which he regarded as being active forces in subjugating alternative social and historical discourses. Therefore, Foucault's genealogical method sought to release from discursive regimes of power, oppressed knowledge sources or critical discourses, which required no normative justification because they were to be intrinsically incommensurable with the dominant regimes of knowledge which had actively suppressed them.

The word 'genealogical' for Foucault was emblematic of his proposal that power was simultaneously expressed at both the micro capillary level and the macro levels. In a symmetrical system of influence, power both descended and ascended, through individuals who comprised the social body (Hoy, 1986). As Fraser (1989) outlines it, "Genealogy takes it as axiomatic that everything is interpretation all the way down, or to put it less figuratively, that cultural practices are instituted historically and therefore contingent, ungrounded except in terms of other, prior, contingent, historically instituted practices". (p. 20) Foucault postulated that the disciplinary and normalising function of power was exercised and invested in individuals where 'ways of knowing' were equated with the operationalisation of power at the micro level. Subjectivity was, therefore, severely restricted, and objectivity was a mythological manifestation promoted by the macro influence of discursive regimes of power (Ransom, 1997). Any resistance to power had to start at the capillary level of the social body and ascend sufficiently from the bottom up to disrupt the influence of the normalising influence of macro power. Sawicki (1991) provides a description of the socio-historical component of Foucault's genealogical method:

In short, genealogy as resistance involves using history to give voice to the marginal and the submerged which lie a "little beneath history" - the voices of the mad, the delinquent, the abnormal, the disempowered. It locates many discontinuous and regional struggles against power both in the past and the present. These voices are the sources of resistance, the creative subjects of history. (p. 28)
Bishop's reconstruction of his own lost identity is ideally Foucauldian and his KMR charter fully captures Baudrillard's critical episteme of the 'masking of appearances'. Bishop, in developing an historiography of his own ancestors, 'unmasks' an alternative ethnic 'marker' which enables him to suspend both normative and epistemic justification and in their place substitute 'other, prior, contingent, historically instituted practices' which have lain 'a little beneath' his own history. In this sense, Bishop becomes his own creative subject.

In order for Bishop to conduct his project, he must first 'naturalise' Foucault's concept of genealogy. Genealogy in Bishop's case is less figurative and more biological, or in his own words, 'somatic'. Even though his choice of words when he refers to his 'bicultural ancestry' or 'monogenetic evangelists' might seemingly debilitate his argument, Bishop pursues his personal historiography to Foucault's capillary level within a postmodern cultural relativism. Underlying Bishop's rendition of the somatic power of genealogy is the assumption that his own subjectivity is sufficient to constitute a heuristic device for other Maori. However, the important point is that genealogy, in being 'naturalised' by Bishop, also commands a polarised consciousness between Maori and non-Maori, and it is in this way that Bishop connects his reconstructed identity to the denial of objectivity. The counter reality that Bishop seeks is embedded in the concept of a Maori consciousness. As he states:

Such understandings of (consciousness) speak to the participants in the Kaupapa Maori research matrix that constitutes this thesis. For these participants in research, objectivity is impossible and further, it is a denial of identity. Just as identity to Maori people is tied up with being part of a whanau, a hapu, an iwi, in the research relationship, membership of a metaphoric whanau of interest also provides its members with identity and hence the ability to participate. For Maori researchers to stand aside from involvement in such socio-political organisation is to stand aside from one's identity. This would signal the ultimate victory of colonisation. (p. 231)

Immediately obvious is that Kaupapa Maori Research, as described by Bishop, is couched in a postmodern cultural relativism, which although denying regimes of truth such as 'objectivity,' propounds alternative grand narratives, albeit
with a primordial overtone which are principally normative in both foundation and function. In developing his analogy of the somatic with Foucault's genealogy, Bishop sees his own expression of subjectivity at the capillary level compelling enough to suspend objectivity and in its place provide the empirically indefensible substitute 'consciousness'. In order for 'consciousness' to be accorded any form of value, Bishop embeds the concept in an aggregate of idealised normative relations (whanau, hapu and iwi). This movement by Bishop to appeal to an indigenous somatic based consciousness which resides in a matrix of normative communal relations may appeal to a modernist prescription of Maori as sublime, but the empirical reality may not be as complementary. The coercive element within Bishop's prose affords a challenge that suggests that scientific research issues can be settled politically. However, Bishop's argument still remains impervious to what the empirical content of his research products might actually represent.

The second distinctive influence in Bishop's work is Habermas. Habermas's social critical theory distinguishes two regulative themes of social reproduction (Bronner and Kellner, 1989). The first source is material reproduction and the second source is symbolic reproduction. Material reproduction regulates the interface between human beings interacting with the physical environment and other social systems, whereas symbolic reproduction acknowledges the transference between human beings of the symbolic, linguistic, and interpretative domains required for the reproduction of social identities. Fraser's (1989) succinct analysis of Habermas's theory describes material reproduction as social labour and symbolic reproduction as that which, "[c]omprises the socialisation of the young, the cementing of group solidarity, and the transmission and extension of cultural traditions" (p. 114). Two plausible interpretations that can be given to Habermas's social-theoretical categorical framework are a functional interpretation, or alternatively, a pragmatic-contextual interpretation where specific activities are accorded dual-aspect status in both material and symbolic reproduction. Both sources of reproduction are embedded in what Habermas termed a "socially integrated action context" or a "system integrated action context" (Bronner and Kellner, 1989). Fraser (1989) outlines the distinctions between these two contexts:
Socially integrated action contexts are those in which different agents coordinate their actions with one another by reference to some form of explicit or implicit inter subjective consensus about norms, values, and ends, consensus predicated on linguistic speech and interpretation. System integrated action contexts, on the other hand, are those in which actions of different agents are coordinated with one another by the functional interlacing of unintended consequences, while each individual action is determined by self interested utility maximising calculations. (p. 117)

It is suggested that adherents of KMR formalise their position by endorsing aspects of both the symbolic and materialist forms of reproduction, as well as both the system and social integrated action contexts. From this perspective, the symbolic form of reproduction, combined with the social integrated action context, delivers a particular view of Maori which is contemporaneously compatible with the materialist form of reproduction amalgamated within the system integrated action context. The symbolic-social dyad presents an abstract idealised view of Maori identity that operates within a particular and idealised normative context, while the materialist-system dyad offers a more contemporary formation. Theoretically, both dyads represent a unified view of Maori social relations, in which a high degree of reciprocity is thought to be exchanged between the symbolic-social and the material-system contexts in various forms. I suggest that both of these dyads offer abstract simulacra of the dualism's often presented in value-laden representations of difference between Maori and non-Maori from the psychological level to the cultural level. (for example see Patterson, 1992).

Bishop's analogous 'genealogy of method' favours symbolic reproduction of identity ('somatic' transference of norms and values through linguistic and interpretative domains) which is accredited to the individual by virtue of their embodiment within the normative matrix of a social integrated action context (inter subjective consensus between whanau, hapu and iwi). And the encapsulation of this idealised conception of Maori cultural forms is posited in a concept of a unified totality. The 'unified totality' in this sense is both an oppositional force to secure difference and hence, distance from non-Maori, as well as one that adheres to the concept of a Maori matrix of normative social relations.
**Hegemony: Adhesing nativist discourse with continental theory:**

It is my contention that the over-arching device that frames Bishop's somatic method, to produce his rendition of Kaupapa Maori Research, is Gramsci's concept of hegemony (Hoare and Smith, 1971). Hegemony is endorsed by adherents of KMR to represent an oppositional force (a world system's theory) that is both aetiological and antithetical to the particularised view of the symbolic-social integrated context underpinning the ideological unified totality of Maori social relations. Therefore, hegemony, as a representational construct in this sense serves three functions described respectively as strategicality, normativity and consensuality (Bellamy, 1994).

In the first instance, the charter of KIVIR as proposed by Bishop, is strategically placed in opposition to a world system's view. The 'unified totality' of Maori social relations is situated in opposition to the hegemonic state, which results in a particularised view of a 'Maori world view' being incommensurate with the 'universal' or theorised 'Western world view'. Incommensurability, on Bishop's depiction, is genealogical which in also being 'somatic' means innate, inherent, and biological. The genealogical is extrapolated theoretically to encompass all substrata of thought, relations, histories and phenomena. In Bishop's case, the strategic positioning of the researcher is of primary importance and it is through genealogy that a fundamentally existential shift in position can take place. As Bishop (1995) makes clear, "It is significant that this movement has not been a shift from paradigm to paradigm within the Western epistemological and cosmological domain, but rather the movement has been from within the world-view of Western thought to another world-view". (p. 221) However, even though Bishop refuses to acknowledge his re-positioning as a 'paradigmatic shift,' he in fact exemplifies Kuhn's (1962) gestalt switch, which Kuhn himself metaphorically described as a conversion experience:

> The man who embraces a new paradigm at an early stage must often do so in defiance of the evidence provided by problem-solving. He must, that is, have faith that the new paradigm will succeed with the many large problems that confront it, knowing only that the older paradigm has failed with a few. A decision of that kind can only be made in faith. (p. 158)
Bishop's strategic re-orientation is primarily about the reduction of distance between the genealogical and the epistemological which would seemingly be more suitably characterised from an evolutionary naturalistic realist perspective (Hooker, 1987). Evolutionary naturalistic realism is a theory that proposes that the genotype, phenotype and environment are causally organised in a complex function which provides the basis of a population's cognitive characteristics. But, Bishop prefers to build on the oppositional force provided to him by hegemony, and through this conceptual mechanism buttress his argument by exacerbating the polarity between what is assumed to account for Maori and non-Maori theory and practice. Following this, he creates a Maori normative framework by attaching an epistemic value to assumed somatic variation, which is based principally on the criterion of ethnicity. He states:

"Therefore rediscovery of a family is more than just a genealogical exercise. Knowing who we are is a somatic quest for connectedness with our surroundings" And that: "The process of colonisation removed us from understanding the fundamental principle of life; that we do not objectify nature, nor do we subjectify nature either, for us as we learn our whakapapa, we learn of our total integration, connectedness and commitment to the world and the need to let go of the focus on self. We also learn that there is another way of knowing, different from that which was taught those of us colonised into the western way of thought. (p. 230)

The particular form of 'knowing' that Bishop ascribes to is called "somatic knowing" which purportedly engenders a cognitive and esoteric integratedness. He describes it thus:

Although able to identify criteria that describe how I knew and was able to fully engage in narrative discussion with the researchers, this ability to know is not as quantifiable, or as measurable a commodity as might seem from this discussion. It is knowing in the sense as described by Berman as 'somatic' or 'bodily' knowing. Perhaps it could be described in terms of the concept of 'cultural consciousness' as 'cultural knowing'. (p. 236)

Through the genealogical stems the phenomenological which leads to the 'intuitive'. Bishop is not presenting his rendition of Maori research processes as empirical; he is instead arguing for what he see's as a customary way of knowing
which cannot be evaluated either quantitatively or qualitatively. The mistake that he makes is to try and extend his genealogical account to a generic system or normative method of Maori research. The generic method that he uses to do this assumes consensuality of a theorised collective symbolic-social system embedded in a view of Maori social relations as a unified totality. In order to do this, he must first mystify the research process by apprehending the esoteric as the following passage on data collection indicates:

It is an issue so fundamental to Maori society that there are existing and long standing, strong prohibitions and cultural benefits ascribed to the research processes of knowledge production and definition. Knowledge is powerful and is to be treasured and protected for the benefit of the group, and not for the individual." And following this; "In other words, there is a strong cultural preference for research to be conducted in a participatory manner, in a manner where the researcher is inextricably and consciously connected to the processes and outcomes of the research. This position is based upon the need to recognise the tapu of knowledge. Tapu, a generic, somatic concept, fundamental to Maori society, guided the researchers in this thesis in their endeavours. (p. 240)

The imminent reductionism, or what I describe as regressive idealism, within Bishop's charter originates from the oppositional force of hegemony which is able to polarise and circumscribe KMR as a cultural isolate of both theory and practice. Bishop makes the strategic leap from the genealogical to the generic, which produces the notion of a normative unified totality view of Maori relations and research. His extension to the esoteric represents the normative element of assumed cohesive consensuality where the symbolic and customary conjoin to resist any empirical evaluation of any form or kind other than that which is 'somatically known'. Incommensurability for Bishop is derived wholly from hegemony and is the singular force by which he is able to describe an entirely absolutist account of postmodern cultural relativism.

Underlying the hubris of Bishop's rendition of Maori research is a pernicious politicisation of knowledge acquisition and a total disregard of the need by Maori for rigorous, empirically based research methods. Transformative accounts of identity exchange may be psychologically interesting, but the expansion of such accounts to a heuristic culturally bound method is not warranted. As Haraway (1995) warns, the
negating of the prescriptive feature of objectivity is insufficient reason to deny that
good science exists:

I, and others, started out wanting a strong tool for deconstructing the truth claims
of hostile science by showing the radical historical specificity and so
contestability, of every layer of the onion of scientific and technological
constructions, and we end up with a kind of epistemological electroshock
therapy, which, far from ushering us into the high-stakes tables of the game of
contesting public truths, lay us out on the table with self-induced multiple
personality disorder. We wanted to go beyond showing bias in science (that
proved too easy anyhow) and beyond separating the good scientific sheep from
the bad goats of bias and misuse. It seemed promising to do this in the strongest
possible constructionist argument that left no cracks for reducing the issues to
bias versus objectivity, use versus misuse, science versus pseudo-science. We
unmasked the doctrines of objectivity because they threatened our budding sense
of collective historical subjectivity and agency and our "embodied" accounts of
science. (p. 177)

**Kaupapa Maori Research: An exchange of rigor for rhetoric**

In critiquing KMR from a scientific realist position I have argued that the
account of research which KMR promotes is of extremely limited potential to
academic and research disciplines which seek to secure empirical knowledge about
the world. KMR is primarily a postmodern cultural relativist semiological method of
analysis. That is, the method of textual analysis that is conducted by KMR adherents
favours one specific meaning-based interpretation which is primarily socio-political
in form, content, function and structure. The circularity of argument that this method
supports can be generalised in the following way. First, a hypothesis is forwarded. In
this context the hypothesis is that colonisation is sufficient to explain the problems
experienced by contemporary Maori across personal (e.g., cognitive and
behavioural) and public (e.g., social and political) substrata. Second, narrative texts
are gathered through informants. And third, a discourse analysis is performed on the
texts and all supporting material, which matches the researcher's view of history, is
accredited as evidence, for the confirmation of the hypothesis. This generalised
account of KMR is what I term the 'confirmation of the abstract colonisation
hypothesis'. The word 'abstract' refers to the tension evident within KMR practice
which, being an anti-realist doctrine, seeks to confirm a particular view of history on
the one hand, which one assumes can 'be known,' while on the other hand denies that a contemporary objective reality exists. This is one of the major self-contradictions evident within a KMR account of research that I suggest favours an historical and regressive idealism over a contemporary progressive realism.

The unsubstantiated claims emanating from KMR fundamentally diminish the crucial association between theoretical and empirical research (Hooker, 1987). For problems to be addressed effectively, our research strategies need to be realistic, robust, and able to be evaluated with objective criteria and standards. Harding (1998), in arguing for a programme of stronger standards of objectivity makes it clear that different cultures' systems of knowledge, having emerged at different times for different purposes, are not all equal. Nor can they be justified as being equal, by reverting to an epistemological relativism. From Harding's perspective, incremental gains of knowledge are to be made by distinguishing between reliable and unreliable knowledge claims, and this requires developing consistent and stronger standards of objectivity. KMR fails on both of these accounts, and in doing so, reduces research to an argument about values which largely centres on the politics of subjectivity (Ransom, 1997).

Explicit to KMR, therefore, is a form of authority that attempts to apprehend absolutist renditions of both collective and subjective representations of cultural identity and experience. And, it is for this specific reason that KMR can be seen to simulate precisely what it has attempted to avoid mainly a new brand of hegemony ensconced within a discourse of localised cultural hyperrelativism. That is, the *sine qua non* of Bishop's account is the criterion of ethnicity. Underlying the rejection of a 'Western hegemony' therefore, is, the heightening of nepotism, which ironically favours a justificatory absolutism for new forms of authority based on blood (biological kinship categories). Wade (1993), in providing an in-depth analysis of the distinction between nature and culture, calls into question the potency of both descent and appearance to reproduce an inverted ethnocentrism. He has this to say:

And if political projects based on an us-them distinction - whether mounted by 'us' or 'them' so to speak - already encounter problems of reversed ethnocentrism, and of representing the interests of, and speaking for the destiny of, a
homogeneous Other, then mystifying and misrecognising that distinction can only increase such pitfalls. (p. 27)

In conclusion, the main problem with KMR is that in its self-referential regressive idealism it can't avoid being perceived as paralleling some of the excesses of logical positivism. The simple reason for this is that the metaphor of colonisation has become the principal premise, and symbolic resource, for justification of its most central claims. In oscillating between deconstructionist thought and assertions of secular and sacred belief, KMR continually spirals in its value-ladeness to the foundation of colonisation. The contemporary experiences of Maori are interpreted and circumscribed within the metaphor of colonisation, and with the stress being placed on historical and external influences, the agency of individuals is relegated to the rhetoric of unity, blood, and more formally, to the past. The ability of KMR to be able to identify aetiologies which would have theoretical and empirical utility becomes extremely precarious when the First Cause of current problems continues to be located in the common denominator of colonisation, by which all Maori are seemingly constituted. Research strategies which are based on confirming the consequent of colonisation may have an archival use, but it is suggested that, if we are concerned to empower Maori individuals, groups, and communities to better identify their problems, then our methods ought to be rigorous enough to achieve that objective.

By critiquing Kaupapa Maori Research, I have principally attempted to outline the conceptual and methodological limitations of incorporating such a political process as KMR into the discipline of psychology within New Zealand. In order to develop the notion of how the mental states of Maori have been similarly politicised within social policy formulations, I now offer a critique of social policy as it relates to the 'field' of Maori mental health. The main objective of the following chapter is to clearly show how the 'field' of 'Maori mental health' emerged as a second phase response by Maori and non-Maori to the politicisation of a Maori identity in the early 1980's. I argue that, although the concept of Maori health is strategically, normatively and by most accounts consensually, viewed as being 'holistic,' (where the mental health of Maori is theorised as a population level issue) this method of theorising the mental states of Maori is a modern conceptualisation. It
is the active endorsement by social policy formulators of this modern conceptualisation that reflects the politicisation of the mental states of Maori. The model of the cultural reification process, which I have provided (refer to Figure 5), serves as a frame of reference to detect the horizontal and vertical influences that have compounded to produce the 'field' of 'Maori mental health' through the politicising of Maori individual agency.
Chapter Eight

Social policy and the politicisation of the mental states of Maori

Cheyne, O'Brien and Belgrave (1997) in their analysis of the place of the Treaty of Waitangi within contemporary New Zealand are explicit in their view that Maori interests within the realm of social policy are to be theorised at the group or collective level. They describe two notions that are of central relevance. These are: that there remains a key distinction between Maori emphasis on the well-being of the group and European individualism; and that Maori concepts of individual's social rights are complex, non-egalitarian and specific to group participation. From their analysis Cheyne et al. (1997) argue that the imposition of liberal individualism on Maori, through the State, was a strategy which effectively denied Maori collectivity sovereign rights over the group. Of specific importance within the analysis that I present, is the question as to whether the above notions are antithetical to a psychological perspective that views mental states as being primarily self determined and the express property of individuals independent of ethnicity, culture, history, or politics. My rationale for framing this question within the aegis of Maori collective self determination is that, if Cheyne et al. (1997) are correct, then from a psychological perspective, we cannot begin to theorise the objective of 'well-being' as it relates to the agency of individual Maori.

In referring to an earlier paper co-authored by Cheyne (see Maharey and Cheyne, 1990), Peters (1992) offers overwhelming support for Cheyne's major contention that social policy frameworks should be built on postmodernist structures. From the viewpoint of Habermas's perspective of the intersection between crisis and reaction, Peters (1992), in summarising Cheyne's strategy for a 'critical social policy,' outlines eight distinct features which in brief form include the following: an emphasis being placed on the relative autonomy of culture; to operate with a Foucauldian conceptualisation of power and to build theoretical links with a Gramscian concept of hegemony; to have an awareness of the constructedness of knowledges, practices and policies; to challenge reigning Libertarian approaches and recognise the limits of Enlightenment liberalism and socialism; to deconstruct
notions and categories in order to reveal power-knowledge relations in the exercise of oppression; to focus on new social movements; to be based on a theoretical understanding of the replacement of modes of production with modes of information in the locus of power relations; and finally, to be practically oriented to formulating specific strategies for addressing social inequality and for redistributing wealth and enhancing well-being.

Advocating the merger of postmodernist theory and social policy has a further implication for determining the 'contested' meaning of a 'field' described under the banner of 'Maori mental health'. If we are to follow Peters' (1992) prescriptive litany, then any attempts to formulate realistic problems, and for that matter, plausible solutions as they may pertain to the mental health of Maori, becomes entirely self-defeating, because implicit in Peters' endorsement of Cheyne's framework is his approval of cultural relativism. This is extremely problematic because to date the field of Maori mental health, while being an overwhelmingly ideological and sacred field is empirically empty. Van Meijl (1993) similarly draws attention to this discrepancy in Maori health. In noting that the gap between Maori health ideology and practice has become increasingly more difficult to breach, Van Meijl suggests that because the construction of a Maori perspective of health was developed for political purposes, it is unable to meet the needs of its reputed communities. Put another way, the ideal characterisation of Maori health on which the field's politicisation depended remains idealistic and unproductive.

Spicker (1995) suggests that social policy, not being a discipline, but a broad field of interest and influence, has an underlying assumption which he describes thus: "...social policy has a chameleon-like-quality; whatever it is taught with, it tends to adopt something of the character of that subject". (p. 8) To make a straightforward point, current analyses have formulated Maori mental health through what has been described as the 'sociological imagination,' which comprises historical, anthropological, critical, and structural dimensions. According to Willis (1993) the 'sociological imagination' (see Mills, C. Wright, 1959) must take into account the cultural sensibilities which the historical, anthropological, critical and structural components of any sociological analysis will demand. The two cultural sensibilities which Willis deems important are, on the one hand, being aware that
human organisation comes in different forms, and on the other hand, avoiding ethnocentrism by having a sociological understanding, and acceptance of, cultural relativism. Sensitivity to cultural difference requires the sociological imagination to distinguish between intersocial and intrasocial difference, both of which are socially constructed, in terms of cultural dominant and subcultural distinctions. In terms of Maori mental health policy, the sociological imagination can be seen to be the main political influence in the field's current theoretical formulations.

It is suggested that the sociological triptych, which I have formerly presented (refer to Figure 8), shows all the components which Willis describes as being essential for a sociological imagination. The historical component is shown in the movement from pre-contact, proto-historic and contemporary periods. The anthropological component is shown in the circularity of reference evident within the basic assumption that there is a connection between a primordial essence and a cultural identity by way of degree of attachment to cultural institutions. Moreover, in regard to the anthropological component, the subordination of the psychological realm of Maori individuals is consistently theorised as being negligible in relation to the greater 'whole'. The critical component comprises the underlying systematic rationalisation of Maori mental states as being either symptomatic or symbolic of the historical influences that have impacted on cultural institutions. The fragmentation, standardisation, and eventual objectification, of Maori mental states leads to the association drawn between degree of attachment to cultural institutions and mental health. Structurally, the sociological triptych represents the broader objective of Maori resurgence within the national context. Of note, is that the objectification of the mental states of Maori represents the means by which the 'field' of Maori mental health is also submerged within the broader objective of Maori development.

The 'Maori psyche' (see Olson, 1993; Ritchie, 1992) is a concept which organises the theoretical foundations of the sociological imagination as it pertains to the mental health of Maori. This is evidenced most clearly in the description of family resemblances, which permeates Maori health analyses. Maori health is commonly referred to as being 'holistic' in character (see Durie, 1995, 1998), where no dimension can be separated out from any other dimension. Yet, there are no standardised measures of Maori health, whether this be for any of its supposed core
components, or for the 'holistic view' in toto (Ellis and Collings, 1997). Therefore, by way of introduction I suggest that the 'official narratives' of social policy, although presenting quite convincing accounts of the mental health of Maori, have failed to articulate the politicisation of the mental states of Maori. The conspicuous absence of any substantive theoretical or empirical accounts of what 'Maori mental health' might actually be, in part, corroborates this view.

Therefore, the main premise which organises this analysis is that the current social policy formulations that pertain to the mental health of Maori have contributed to the politicisation of Maori health, which I perceive to have occurred in two distinct phases. The first wave of the politicising of Maori health issues began in the 1880's, and the impetus for this development was principally for the most pragmatic of reasons namely, the physical survival of the Maori population. In this work it was the dialectic between impoverished Maori theories of illness causation and social Darwinist theory that characterised the lack of state intervention toward Maori health evident in this period. Maori theories of illness causation had lost their coherence with the introduction of new causes of disease and death, which confounded a belief schema not equipped to explain or cure new effects. On the other hand, social Darwinist theory justified the diminishing Maori population as a 'natural effect' under the auspices that the demise of 'races' ought to be altruistically construed as a causal issue of poor genetic performance. Therefore, preceding the Maori health reforms which were initiated by Maori and Pakeha in the late nineteenth century (Oliver, 1981), was the conservative view of illness causation held by Maori, which being formerly directed at individual and social control, had not sufficiently adjusted to accommodate new theories of disease causation. In contrast, the radical theory of social Darwinism posited that the cultural demise of Maori could be understood at the population level, where weaker 'races' were superseded by successively stronger (and fitter) 'races'. It was only the emergence of conceptual innovators who recognised that Maori theories of illness causation could be adjusted through education which led to Maori health interventions and preventions being implemented.

To my mind, this first phase of the politicisation of Maori health by being focused on the physical survival of Maori was clearly realistic. In order to
contextualise the foreground of Maori and State interaction toward perceived 'Maori health problems,' I offer a brief overview of Lange's (1972) work on the antecedent conditions preceding Maori health interventions which culminated in some making the claim that Maori had become one of the fastest growing populations in the world by the 1950's (McCreary, 1968).

The second wave of the politicisation of Maori health is theorised in this dissertation as occurring in the 1980's, and from my perspective, the primary object of politicisation has been the mental states of Maori. Paralleling the fragmentation, standardisation and objectification of Maori language (Sissons, 1993), the mental health of Maori has been similarly encapsulated in a rhetorical frame where a 'field' has developed which fails to identify with its core subject, principally the mental states of Maori. I argue that it is the conjoint influence of the mental states of Maori being commonly theorised as a population level issue, and the construing of the mental states of Maori as being distinct from non-Maori, which has been crucial to a 'field' of Maori mental health emerging. It is suggested that the legitimacy of this field ought to be challenged because the two premises on which it is based, (i.e., mental states of Maori being theorised as a population level issue and the mental states of Maori being distinct from non-Maori mental states) have not been empirically substantiated.

At a more fundamental level, the two premises provide the basis for inferring that a cultural pathology exists at the Maori population level, through reinforcing the flawed perception that there is comparative value in contrasting the mental states of Maori with non-Maori. That is, the field of Maori mental health legitimises the assumption implied within a cultural pathology that acculturative stress manifests as a population level phenomenon. Within the analysis provided, it is suggested that advocating an acculturation model of stress to explain mental ill health experienced by individual Maori, demands a set of political presuppositions to be endorsed, which in the contemporary setting constitutes a normative framework. Therefore, the second phase of the politicisation of Maori health is considered to be more specifically oriented to the mental states of Maori (in contrast to the first phase's focus on the physical state of the Maori population) where the engineering of instrumental notions such as 'Maori identity,' and 'the Maori psyche,' have arisen as
the psychological complement of cultural reification. I now outline what I perceive to be the defining features of both the first phase and second phase of the politicisation of Maori health.

**The first phase of the politicisation of Maori health; Physical Health.**

According to Lange (1972) Maori health problems that were known to have existed in pre-contact Maori societies included gastroenteritis, pneumonia, tuberculosis, leprosy, skin and eye diseases, infant mortality, toothache and rheumatism. Durie (1994) also notes that a high rate of degenerative disorders were experienced by Maori, and combined with variable food supplies, probably led to the rate of life expectancy of Maori, before contact, being limited to between twenty-five and thirty years. Pool (1991) compares this seemingly low rate of Maori longevity to mortality levels in eighteenth century Europe, and concludes that in comparison, the life expectancy of pre-contact Maori was not so removed from that of pre-revolutionary France and Italy, and higher than the expected lifespan in Spain.

Therefore, the first sociocultural reason, which Lange provides for a decline in Maori health standards in the nineteenth century, is the retention of aspects of traditional Maori culture which, in resisting adaptation to an ever increasingly diffusing environment, led to Maori being extremely vulnerable to illness and contagion. Living arrangements such as overcrowding, poor ventilation, and inappropriate siting of houses required adjustment as the style of communal living exacerbated Maori susceptibility to illness, through the easy spread of disease. Knowledge of water pollution, the effect of consuming raw milk or rotten food products, and the virulent mode in which disease spreads through human contact with the contagious or extensive contact with the dead, all required instruction in a new system of cause and effect relations. A change in the material culture, where dependency on former activities such as hunting and gathering were no longer vital for survival, also meant a movement in some cases to a more sedentary lifestyle characterised by idleness and excessive alcohol consumption (see Te Puni Kokiri, 1995).
Because illness in the mate atua (unknown spiritual causes) and mate tangata (known causes of human origin) systems was seen as evidence for transgression, not only of an afflicted individual, but also of his or her family, there was often a delay to access any available health care facilities. This delaying tendency meant that disease or affliction would often be in an advanced stage of onset before treatment was sought, or alternatively, the expectation for instantaneous cure meant that instructions would be misunderstood. Moreover, the combining of the practices of tohunga with instructions received from medical professionals frequently led to the success of medical treatment being compromised through following conflicting instructions (Te Rangi Hiroa, 1910). The inverse of the situation was, that if medical treatment was unsuccessful, it would reinforce belief in mate atua and mate tangata through Maori having recourse to the practices of tohunga.

This state of belief transition is therefore, characterised by the persistence of traditional beliefs in the same manner as the interpenetration of European derived concepts of illness causation. Blake-Palmer (1956) makes the observation that at times there were elements of complementariness between these different systems of explanation such as the principle of isolation in cases of contagion being followed under the aegis of supernatural affliction. However, Lange suggests that, this example of procedural compatibility must be gauged within the situation, where if death did occur, a dwelling would be burnt, and with material values being well entrenched in Maori societies at the time, the objective of isolation may have had a more pragmatic motivation. By contrast, the collapsing of conflicting instructions received from both tohunga and medical practitioners, could also lead to disaster such as the use of water immersion in the treatment of influenza which could lead to pneumonia.

Although the introduction of Christian based faith may be interpreted as a plausible mechanism by which belief transition could have been better facilitated, Lange speculates that the Christian doctrine further compromised adaptability and adjustment of concepts in issues of Maori health, because belief in evil spirits was not inconsistent with the Christian faith. For example, the power of prayer as a method of faith within the Christian belief system was similarly reflected in the faith of tohunga to offer supplications to the gods and spirits as a method of illness.
intervention. However, as Lange remarks, it was the conjoint expression and belief in unseen forces shared by both the Christian faith and Maori, that led to the innovative procedure developed between Maori and European, whereby medical treatment was supplemented by faith supplication, dispensed commonly within a religious context. An ancillary point of interest worth noting, is that the observation by Maori of European immunity to introduced diseases in the era in which the Christian religion was being widely dispersed, might have also brought closer the association between faith and cure (Jackson, 1967).

The second sociocultural reason given by Lange for the persistence of Maori ill-health is framed within the culture-nation interface of land alienation and the development of a national political economy. Uncertainty prevailed in a context of colonialism, where the introduction of new technologies being rapidly diffused into a politically unstable environment, created a multitude of Maori responses from incorporation, production, apathy, dissonance, to immersion. Rogers (1983) describes the spatial interval of technology transfer, between innovation and decision, as a gestation period. Todd (1995), in commenting on the introduction of colonial technologies to Australia, points out that the adjustment to technology transfer requires the active reduction of dissonance, being mediated by conceptual innovators. While from an anthropological perspective, Andrews (1968) contends that in the New Zealand context, the core problem of cultural exchange is a conflict in economies.

From Andrews' stance, reciprocity, redistribution, and market exchange regulate the form of participation and integration that emerges across cultural economies. The success of ideas and innovations being implemented is, however, constrained by conceptual limitations. Literacy, as an introduced mode of communication, is regarded by Andrews as being one of the most important innovations introduced to New Zealand, as it expanded the conceptual repertoire of Maori, who were able to engage in communication without having to do so face to face, as well as enabling ideas to be more rapidly diffused (see also Jackson, 1967). Significantly, Andrews, in associating the introduction of literacy with the Christian drive to civilise first, and convert later (see Lineham, 1996), notes that by the 1870's Maori had observed anomalies between the ideals propounded by religious
authorities and actual behaviour being performed by Europeans. Therefore, mirroring Roger's (1983) model of diffusion, where the decision to either adopt or reject an innovation is characterised by uncertainty, Andrews offers the following:

In a situation of rapid social change a decision in favour of, and commitment to, new goals may long anticipate their actual realisation, and however vaguely formulated, aspirations may be at striking variance with the concrete reality of the social situation. For some people the quandary posed by such discontinuities may be eased by the adoption of some religious belief. When the Maori response is considered in terms of the two systems postulated in the model, it quickly becomes evident that most patterns of behaviour do not conform fully to the norms of either system. Instead, for the most parts, they represent a compromise or immediate position. (p. 123)

The marked increase in uncertainty by Maori in the 1870's was also reflected in the subsequent withdrawal of missionaries, who by this time were more often identified with post-war colonialism, as opposed to conceptual instruction in matters pertaining to either theology or literacy. Both Jackson (1967) and Andrews (1968) consider that the development in this period of prophet cults, from which regional specific political unities were beginning to emerge, attests to Maori innovation in attempting to reconfigure elements of introduced sanctity with secular aspirations.

According to Lange the health and welfare of Maori during this period of adjustment was described within the racial theory of social Darwinism. The context of justification for Maori adjustment to the context of colonialism, was therefore, metaphorically described in racial and population level terms as rise and fall, of growth and decline, of superiority and inferiority, and of strength and weakness. As Wright (1994) makes clear, the crude capture of evolutionary theory within political philosophies and aberrant ideologies at the turn of the century, often vindicated the lack of initiating social action to address a problem, on the basis that suffering was the handmaiden of human progress. By confusing phenotypical appearance with inherent genotypical disposition, the justification for Maori health and welfare issues, within a context of nation development, was essentially 'naturalised'.

Brunton (1986) examines the introduction of a style of eugenics into New Zealand in the early 1870's when debates about population, evolution, and
degeneration converged to become the theoretical platform on which a lack of state intervention toward Maori health problems became defensible. Brunton also notes a shift in professional attitudes towards mental illness during this phase of the nation's development where causes and treatments of psychiatric conditions moved from being considered within a moral framework, to one that was hereditarian in view. As a consequence, the practice of psychiatry in New Zealand focused less on a clinical assessment of individuals with mental illness and more on determining the hereditary component of an individual's social behaviour. Brunton provides an aggregate of statistics drawn from the nation's lunatic asylums between the years 1873-1910 and 1922-1945, with the exclusion of Seaview. In summary, the data shows that the range of mental patients deemed incurable was from 60.0% (in 1945) to 93% (in 1905), with the mean being 80.85% (with 80.1% in 1922).

In terms of primary preventions for mental ill health, Brunton (1986) cites the influence of Duncan McGregor who was the foundation Professor of Moral and Mental Philosophy at the University of Otago and Visiting Medical Officer of the Dunedin Lunatic Asylum, as well as holding the position of being the highest paid civil servant between the years of 1886 and 1906 when he was the Inspector General of Lunatic Hospitals and Charitable Institutions. Commensurate with the theory of social Darwinism, McGregor is charged by Brunton as promoting two types of policy for the prevention of mental illness. The first was clearly eugenic, where disincentives were to be advocated as a means of inhibiting 'unfit' couples from procreating. This, it was proposed, was to act as a form of state insurance scheme. Secondly, children were to be instructed in the danger of violating 'natural' laws. Apparently, McGregor thought it plausible that the newly registered state midwives could incorporate this form of instruction in their capacities of educating postpartum women on the benefits of proper feeding, fresh air, and hygiene. In 1910, groups, which took their origins from the Eugenics Education Society in London, were established in four centres in New Zealand. And in 1911 The Mental Defectives Bill was passed which expanded the definition of lunatic to include mentally defective persons, as well as increasing the power of the Mental Hospitals Department, to incorporate the community in to its sphere of jurisdiction. In 1928 the Mental Defectives Amendment Bill was introduced to Parliament. This Bill emphasised the need for marriage restriction, segregation, and sterilisation of the mentally defective,
and Brunton notes that it was only after prolonged debate that the sterilisation aspects of the Bill were removed.

With the Maori population recorded at its lowest point of decline in the 1896 census, the theory of eugenics served to 'explain' the rate of Maori mortality on the basis of poor genetic performance. By prefacing his diatribe with a list of extinct 'races', Newman (1881), lecturing to the medical fraternity of the time, epitomises the professional apathy shown toward Maori health and welfare problems before the turn of the century. Like his contemporaries, such as Dugsdale (1877) and Galton (see Skultans, 1975), Newman actively perpetuated an abhorrent view of misconceived evolutionary theory:

Such a race is the Maori, a small race inhabiting a strange land, multiplying rapidly, giving birth to one weakly offspring, the Morioris, and now steadily dying, just as do individuals. The race is 'run out', it is effete; seems thoroughly worn out, and its approaching death has been hastened by the struggles with a newer and fresher race. (p. 16)

In listing a number of causes for the inevitable extinction of Maori, Newman concludes his paper with an absolutism: "Taking all things into consideration, the disappearance of the race is scarcely subject for much regret. They are dying out in a quick, easy way, and are being supplanted by a superior race". (p. 30) Ngata (1899), in also being swayed by a social theory of biological determinism, advances a view of Maori cultural neoteny in an hierarchical scheme of humanity. In the context of offering a statistical overview of census data between the years 1857 and 1896, Ngata suggests that the only way in which extinction could be averted was through the rapid 'biological assimilation' of Maori with Europeans, in order that Maori could be brought out of the dark into the light of civilisation. Webster (1992) draws the association between Ngata's continuous political commitment to an anthropological view of culture and Firth's (1929) analysis of political economy, as it related to Maori culture being transformed through successive phases of development.

Therefore, Lange (1972) proposes that before the year 1900, Maori health and welfare issues were summarily reduced to a moribund discourse of cultural extinction, which Ross (1994) refers to elsewhere, as the 'fatal impact' thesis from
which the West-Pacific collision dialectic first emerged. An ancillary, yet significant, point that needs to be noted here, however, is that such a discourse was in fact, proactive in producing a sense of urgency for the collection of Maori ethnological and ethnographic data (Groube, 1964). The arrival of the Mormons proceeding the reduction of influence of, in particular, the Wesleyans and the Church Missionary Society in the late 1870's, is portrayed by Andrews (1968) as being noteworthy because the Mormon missionaries lived in Maori villages rendering attention to the social needs of Maori communities and did not take collections. Yet, in the discourse of imminent cultural extinction and the urgency to preserve not the Maori people, but the artefacts of their existence and subsequent passing, the arrival of the Mormons into Maori communities can also be regarded in the context of a more universal ethnographic collection.

Even though often only cited in bland comparison to the earlier missionaries, Mormonism heralded the advent of a peculiar form of American colonialism into the Pacific, which in having its own historical version of Polynesian origins and identity (from the House of Israel), was particularly strident in capturing the convert market. Ross (1994), in describing the doctrine of Mormonism, suggests that Mormonism effectively combines theocracy with biological determinism because according to the Mormon doctrine, redemption will only be successful when those who have strayed from the original gospel, and, therefore, carry the mark of the Lamanite (dark skin), are reinstated to their privileged Caucasian birthright position through converting to Mormonism. In resonating with the Polynesian fervour for the preservation of genealogies, the main historical objective of Mormonism is contemporaneously contextualised by Ross, within the Latter Day Saints construction of a database, which aimed to record the genealogical histories of the entire human species. Ross makes the connection by stating:

The Granite Mountain archive, far and away the most extensive on record, will be used for all sorts of purposes: it is increasingly consulted, for example, in the age of genetic medicine to ascertain hereditary lines of disease. In this story, it figures as a high-tech version of the oral genealogies that structured traditional cultures, biblical and Polynesian alike. (p. 87)
Andrews (1968), in detailing the concatenation of belief syncretism apparent in the Maori prophet cults of the 1880's, provides a number of examples which attest to Maori aspirations of trying to make sense of ever increasing political, social, cultural, and environmental uncertainty. The social sanctions, which Gluckman (1962) proposes, such as tapu, mana, and makutu, which were originally manipulated through the psychological mechanisms of fear, anxiety, and guilt to induce a personal opprobrium are evident in new forms through out this period (Gudgeon, 1907, 1909; Hammond, 1908; Blake-Palmer, 1954). Therefore, implicit to simultaneous land alienation and the nation's development of a political economy, is the deep impact of European certainty that Maori were facing impending extinction, and this belief, being similarly reflected in a benign form of ethnographic altruism (Lange, 1972; Groube, 1964)

It can be suggested that it is this period of intersection of Maori belief syncretism emerging from uncertainty, and the ethnographic altruism emanating from European certainty of Maori cultural demise, which inspired the seminal politicisation of Maori health. Jackson (1967) argues that the tapu system in pre-contact Maori society functioned primarily as an enforced system of economic activity. However, in the specific context of environmental uncertainty and rabid ethnography, the fundamental premise of this system was decontextualised to better reflect the ideal aspects of an assumed dying culture. The principal reason for the decontextualisation of tapu as a pragmatic system is as Andrews (1968) submits, a cultural conflict in economies, where the dismantling of the tapu system is found in Maori being alienated from the land, which was 'justified,' in terms of the more universal project of developing a viable national political economy. Hence, the capture of the concept tapu in a religious frame of reference, both in historical and contemporary ethnographies (see Webster, 1992; Prytz-Johansen, 1958, 1960; Bowden, 1979; Smith, 1981; Harré, 1981; Sachdev, 1989), which more often than not, allude to the spiritual and sacred reverence of the term, in contrast to its more pragmatic and economic relevance.

Lange (1972) argues that before the year 1900 the government of New Zealand saw no reason to actively intervene in the area of Maori health and welfare. The only fund available to meet Maori welfare issues was the sum of £7000.00 for
'Native Purposes', which comprised The Civil List (1863), although small sums were also made available for vote Native Schools and vaccination. However, a sizeable proportion of the stipend was used for head office salaries of the Native Department, whereas the single preventative measure cited by Lange before 1900 was the administering of the small pox vaccination to Maori, and the first practical measure was the sporadic provision of water tanks to Maori communities. In fact, Lange insists that it was primarily the responsibility of the teachers of Native Schools, who were entrusted with the position of teaching English and the principles of sanitation to Maori, to dispense medical and healthcare services. For this reason, Lange refers to the teachers of this time as the agents of change.

One teacher singled out for special attention by Lange is John Thornton, who was the headmaster of Te Aute College between 1878 and 1913. Thornton is particularly important in Lange's analysis of Maori health reform, because it was he who ensured that Maori students of Te Aute College received a good education as well as maintained a healthy respect for their cultural identity. Regarding some of Te Aute College's most significant graduands of the time, Lange has this to say:

Until the end of the century the Maori people did not recognise western medical science as an answer to their problem of numerical decline. The Pakeha could not make them see this: it was to be an achievement of young Maori equipped with the means of seeing both sides of the question. Once this new element had been introduced Maori society was quite capable of undertaking the necessary action. It was a true case of reform from within. (p. 112)

In referring to Apirana Ngata, Te Rangi Hiroa, and Tutere Wi Repa as 'medical missionaries,' Lange provides an extensive account of the social, sanitary, intellectual and religious views of reform practices that these students initially disseminated through the Te Aute College Students Association (TACSA) paper Te Pipiwharauoro, and then went on to introduce to their own communities. This initiative, according to Lange, was the principal influence in the Maori public health campaign, as it stimulated wider debate and led to the active reduction of dissonance by Maori in the acceptance of new principles, methods, and attitudes toward health sanitation and hygiene. As conceptual innovators, these change catalysts recognised that the Maori understanding of illness causation had to be modified, and that by
working alongside traditional elders, the opportunity for action to be implemented would be enhanced.

The legislating of the Bubonic Plague Prevention Act 1900 signified the nation's government perceiving that the country could be under impending threat of epidemic plague. Lange suggests that the inclusion of Maori in the new Health Department service resulted from official and public apprehension that Maori villages, in being more exposed to such a threat, could exacerbate the spread of plague to wider areas. The subsequent appointment of Native Sanitary Commissioners ensued, and in a matter of days, they were addressing Maori on the principles of health prevention and eradication of infectious diseases, and helping organise local villages to set up Sanitation Committees. By Lange's own admission, the association drawn between the threat of plague and the appointment of Native Sanitary Commissioners has only ever been given brief historical attention. Of interest, is that according to his analysis, it was only through government officials observing the enthusiastic and positive response by Maori, to sanitary reform, that it was agreed upon by the state that the work be continued for the physical salvation of Maori.

Together, the passing of The Public Health Act 1900 and the Maori Councils Act 1900 are posited by Lange as representing, at least partially, an instrumental approach being taken by government to Maori health and welfare issues. The Public Health Act effectively maintained central government authority, but directed responsibility back to local authorities. The Maori Councils Act was the perfect complement to the Public Health Act, because in being framed in the vernacular of conferring a limited measure of local self government to Maori, it in effect, placed responsibility back on to Maori committees to regulate, Maori health in particular. Although Section 17 of the Maori Councils Act lists a number of seemingly aberrant activities which were to be regulated by the introduction of Maori councils, in this context it is Section 18 of the Maori Councils Act which most clearly parallels the impetus of the Public Health Act. It states:

Section 18: For the purposes of this Act and of the "The Public Health Act, 1900," the Governor may, by notice in the Gazette and Kahiti, declare any Maori
district hereby established to be a health district under the provisions of "The Public Health Act, 1900," and there-upon the Maori Council shall be a Health Committee, and shall have power to do such sanitary works, and make and enforce such sanitary rules and observances amongst the Maoris, as the District Health Officer may approve or the Governor by regulations prescribe.

Lange suggests that the Maori Councils Act 1900 actively legislated principles of economy, employment, health, morality, politics and religion, which had been fervently advocated by, in particular, the former Te Aute College students, Apirana Ngata, Te Rangi Hiroa, James Carroll, and Maui Pomare. By allocating civil jurisdiction to Maori committees, health reform was effectively directed back to Maori communities within a framework evincing elements of both self-determination and social welfare. Therefore, the new mechanism of the Maori Councils Act 1900 served two purposes simultaneously. On the one hand, Maori political autonomy was seen to be respected by government ratifying the regulation and control of Maori activities to Maori communities. That is, the localised function of Maori councils being able to create by-laws and collect rates, fines, and taxes, promoted the favourable impression that the government had, in part, yielded to Maori agitation for political autonomy. On the other hand, the stress on sanitation, which was emphasised in the bill, enabled prevention and intervention health issues to be highlighted. Therefore, the government produced, what in Althusserian terms, could be called a new ideological state apparatus, where control over the implementation of the reforms was maintained by the state under the guise of Maori social welfare, and Maori regulated the system, under the perception of increased autonomy.

In characterising the government's actions toward Maori health problems before 1900 as a laissez faire approach, Lange suggests that the introduction of the Maori Councils Act 1900 signalled a clear attitudinal shift by the government from a position of sacrificial altruism, to a perspective of cultural preservation. Although the emphasis on Maori welfare issues effectively diluted the political intent of the Act, it was a mechanism that instigated the dialectic between impoverished Maori theories of illness causation and the justificatory theory of Maori population decline as advanced by adherents of social Darwinism. The Act's focus on developing a sanitary consciousness meant that prevention and intervention methods were largely

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educative and curative, and as Lange proposes, the development and implementation of the Act's principles were centred on encouraging the cultivation of a new rationality toward health by Maori, and concomitantly, a new attitude toward Maori health issues by government. Lange cites Te Rangi Hiroa who informed parliament in 1911 that the impending extinction of the Maori population had been successfully averted largely because of the health reforms implemented through the introduction of both the Public Health Act 1900, and the Maori Councils Act 1900.

Although the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 (which was subsequently repealed with the Maori Welfare Act 1962) is often cited (see Lawson-Te Aho, 1993, 1994; Stewart 1997; Durie, 1994) in relation to the state's intervention in Maori beliefs and practices as they relate to the modern emergence of psychology within New Zealand, the Maori Councils Act 1900 had already clearly directed that the practices of tohunga were to be actively admonished. Moreover, from the literature it is clear that the generally postmodern descriptions of tohunga, which serve to invoke deeply symbolic impressions of normative difference between Maori and non-Maori, fail to make a distinction between a customary view of tohunga and the modern counterpart which emerged around the turn of the century (Gudgeon, 1907; Te Rangi Hiroa, 1910).

Lange describes how the prophet Rua Kenana Hepetipa (1869-1937), in heading the Rua cult at Maungapohatu in 1906, agitated the Maori councils through disrupting the system of organisation and regulation that they had implemented with the passing of the Maori Councils Act 1900. Voyce (1989), in building a defence of Rua, suggests that the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 was engineered by the state to outlaw indigenous medical practices so that non-Maori could monopolise the health market. However, although Voyce is possibly correct in the sense that the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 was engineered by the state, the reasons he provides as to why this was the case, are insufficient. The health campaigns were still in a process of being implemented, and it was Maori who were leading these campaigns, as well as the call for the activities of tohunga to be legislated against. At the time there were no available Maori mortality statistics available, and because post-mortem was unacceptable to Maori, the health reformers were possibly trying to control for the confounding influence of tohunga practices at the same time when they were trying
to implement new standards of health care. Therefore, Rua may have been the scapegoat for the rapidity with which the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 was legislated, but the activities of Rua were not the complete reason for the rationale behind the Act being passed.

Of note however, is that it is the Tohunga Suppression Act 1907 which is commonly featured in what I regard here, as the second phase of the politicisation of Maori health, to which this analysis now moves. In contrast to the first wave of the politicisation of Maori health which centred on the physical health of the Maori population at a critical point of cultural transition, the second wave is characterised by emphasis being placed on the mental states of Maori. Furthermore, while the first phase was oriented to the implementation of improved standards of hygiene and health care, the second phase can be seen to be primarily ideological in objective. In order to offer a context in which the politicisation of the mental states of Maori can be observed within social policy formulations, I first offer a brief overview of Van Meijl's (1993) empirically based analysis of the contemporaneous social construction of the 'traditional' view of Maori health.

The second phase of the politicisation of Maori health: Mental states

Van Meijl (1993) presents a view of the politicisation of Maori health in the early 1980's in which he suggests that concepts such as 'cultural' and 'traditional' were constructed in relation to a Maori view of health as a device for 'contesting' both the meaning and the budget of the public health care system in New Zealand. Although Maori health status had improved dramatically over the preceding decades before the politicisation of Maori health, the capturing of a part of the health care sector by Maori, was principally by using the term 'holistic' as a semantic strategy to include into its conceptual jurisdiction associations between health and all other negative social indices where Maori were over-represented. In providing an assessment of the origins of the 'holistic' view of Maori health, Van Meijl cites a speech delivered by Ngata in July of 1983, where the cultural metaphor of the 'traditional' view of Maori health, encapsulated within 'four (inextricable) dimensions,' was first introduced. Being delivered to an audience in te reo Maori (te taha wairua, te taha hinengaro, te taha whanau and te taha tinana) and in the context
of a monocultural health system, the newly-traditional cultural metaphor effectively set in motion the politicising and postmodernising of Maori health. As Van Meijl states:

The traditional Maori view of health, may of course, reflect an indigenous tradition, but the four dimensions distinguished above were unrenowned until the early 1980's. While it is possible that the concepts may have been in use locally, they have only become canonized as the Maori perspective on health since 1983. Concomitantly, these concepts have been reified, and now dominate Maori discourse on health throughout New Zealand. (p. 287)

Although Van Meijl (1993) also draws the association between the 'traditional' view of Maori health and a definition of health first canvassed by the World Health Organisation in 1943, it is the detection of practices in his field work with a Tainui Maori health community centre which parallel the ideals reflected in the construct of Maori health that he has difficulty in extricating. The dimension of te taha wairua (spiritual), while given cardinal importance is found to comprise the notion of ascertaining the degree of Christian belief held by individual clients so that community health workers can decide whether it is necessary to start the interaction between client and worker with a prayer. The notion of te taha hinengaro (mental), while purporting to represent mental attitudes to tapu violation percepts and an understanding of mate Maori, is found to resonate with the community workers only in a very minimal way. Few cases were known of mate Maori, and in the situation where 'spiritual' or psychological problems were perceived as emanating from tapu violation, an elder would be called in to conduct a faith healing service firmly based on Christian principles. Te taha whanau (family) is the concept which Van Meijl finds most difficult to articulate because although this notion deigns that diagnoses of an individual's health condition cannot be determined outside of economic, social and family constructs, it is often the case that the family lifestyle is the primary cause of physical or mental ill-health. Van Meijl describes this dilemma as thus:

Ironically, the disintegration of Maori kinship ties is often the cause of health problems rather than offering the vehicle through which whanaungatanga can provide solutions. Te taha whanau of a Maori perspective on health thus follows a romanticization of family life in the "good old days," while in practice it more often points to the need to restore family bonds. (p. 291)
Te taha tinana (physical) is the dimension that Van Meijl found to be considerably downplayed within the Maori perspective of health, as the spiritual and mental dimensions actively took precedence over physical health issues. Although the community workers with whom Van Meijl worked explained that 'unique' to the Maori view of health was the inextricable links between all four dimensions, Van Meijl suggests that the understanding of a human person as a system influenced by multiple factors is the underlying tenet of public health care philosophy. However, two assumptions explicit in the notion of te taha tinana are firstly, that mind, body, and soul, are interrelated, which means that physical health cannot be distinguished apart from mind and soul dimensions, and secondly, that an individual cannot be seen as a separate entity from his or her family.

In fact, what Van Meijl observed was that within the aegis of providing clinical health care services, which were entrusted to the community members, the community workers largely performed an identity promotion function. Reflecting Sissons’ (1993) 'fragmentation' stage of cultural identity objectification, the dictum promoted consisted of expressions such as "To be healthy is to know who you are" and that being a 'healthy Maori' required knowledge of genealogy and Maori language. It is the ambivalence with which the community workers in Van Meijl's analysis attended to the taha tinana dimension, and instead centred their attention on promoting cultural identity, where neither 'mental' needs nor clinical screenings were given due attention, that Van Meijl emphasises. He suggests that the divergent attitudes which arose between the community and the community health workers, relative to the expectations and objectives of providing health care services, is best understood within the politicisation of Maori health. The function of cultural identity promotion which the community workers performed, while being framed as a 'prevention' exercise, was consistent with political objectives, but did not address the health prevention or intervention needs of the community to whom they were accountable.

In fact, Van Meijl notes that it is precisely the total lack of community based health needs assessments that have led to the 'holistic' conception of Maori health. Van Meijl proposes that the primary motive behind the politicisation of Maori health was to acquire control of health delivery services to Maori communities from health
authorities through emphasising the specific identity needs of Maori. His rationale for offering this suggestion is that because ‘holistic’ health invokes an exceedingly wide sphere of reference, coupled with the main task of Maori health being cultural identity promotion, that by virtue of this encapsulation, Maori are required to promote Maori health, precisely as an identity issue.

To summarise Van Meijl's main points. The holistic conception of Maori health promoted as a traditional view and approach to health care practices is a contemporary construct. The 'four dimensions' schema which comprises te taha wairua, te taha hinengaro, te taha whanau and te taha tinana, articulates a framework where no component may be viewed in isolation from another component, and the individual cannot be separated from his or her family when diagnosing an individual for health problems. While the holistic construct exudes tenets which may reflect ideal practice, the actual observance of practical interventions and preventions emanating from this contemporary construct are difficult to detect, because from Van Meijl's perspective, they are implicitly abstract and, therefore, difficult to operationalise. The principal function of Maori health services observed by Van Meijl in his fieldwork was to promote cultural identity, which was characterised by its emphasis on enhancing self-esteem and a positive Maori identity. However, this led to the neglect of providing health services, which was justified by community workers who claimed that a Maori view of health was quite distinct from a Western view of health. In order to see how the politicisation of Maori health has enabled a specific feature of health, namely, mental health, to also be submerged within this form of rhetoric, I now offer a short review of social policy documentation within the mental health field. Importantly, it can be observed that both the theoretical and practical treatment of the mental health of Maori individuals is also encapsulated within the cultural identity promotion function.

In what could be regarded as the seminal paper focusing on the politicisation of the mental states of Maori, Durie (1984) opens his presentation by first exposing the limitations of Cartesian dualism in the context of holistic theories of health. Following this he states:
The holistic approach is, in fact, a very familiar one in traditional Maori society. Health, from a Maori perspective, has always acknowledged the unity of the soul, the mind, the body and the family: the four cornerstones of health: te taha wairua, te taha hinengaro, te taha tinana, te taha whanau. Mental health as a separate entity has little traditional meaning, although the profound influences of mental attitudes, thoughts and feelings have long been recognised by Maori practitioners as vital forces affecting the health of individuals and the community as a whole. (p. 2)

Of particular interest is the fact that Durie (1984) cites Blake Palmer (1954) as his principal source for this view of the mental health of Maori. Blake Palmer's original paper entitled, 'Tohungaism and makutu,' was delivered to the Anthropological Section of the Royal Society of New Zealand Seventh Science Congress in 1951, and also contained the following view:

Tohungaism of today is seemingly eclectic and essentially debased. When firmly established in a district it often hinders the more suggestible Maori from taking advantage of the freely available services of the New Zealand hospital system. To some extent it serves to perpetuate vague fears and hostilities to present day European medicine in much the same way that certain ill-informed groups in the European community prefer to foster old prejudices, fears and hostility towards modern methods when practised in State institutions for the treatment of the mentally ill. (p. 149)

However, independent of the selective interpretation that Durie (1984) makes of Blake Palmer's (1954) work, the more important feature explicit in his presentation, is that the mental states of Maori cannot be extricated from a holistic conception of Maori health. Taken to its logical extension, this means that individual psychological states are synonymous with communal 'well-being'. As Van Meijl (1993) notes above, Durie's perspective parallels Ngata and Dyall's (1984) conception in which they state:

Maori people in general believe that their current health status is ultimately linked to their historical, social, cultural, economic, political, and environmental circumstances. In order to achieve any improvement in health status, health initiatives must incorporate a holistic definition and approach and be part of a developmental strategy to improve the overall status of well-being of a Maori community, tribal or family group. (p. 3)
Considering that the literature before 1984 is decidedly bereft of the holistic view of Maori health, it is quite incredible how Maori traditional holism soon became, as Van Meijl rightfully notes, canonised across a wide range of disciplines contributing a view of the mental health of Maori. In 1986 Potaka-Dewes, after listing a broad range of activities and initiatives, states:

This list, of course, does not mention organisations set up in the Maori community to examine specific issues relating to Maori land, forests and seabeds. The Maori approach to life is completely holistic. All these things taken together contribute to the mental health status of Maori people - that is a sense of worth, belonging and identity. (p. 3-4)

Kinloch (1984) prefaces her anthropological perspective with the admonition of Western health professionals, whose Western ideas about health constitute a fundamental conflict with the traditional and holistic Maori approach to healing. In attempting to outline the nature of Maori traditional healing methods, Kinloch proposes that the 'gift' of healing comes from the Christian God, and therefore, healing methods are to be acknowledged simply as 'idiosyncratic'. The psychiatric unit Whai Ora at Tokanui Hospital in submitting a rendition of Maori health theory to the journal of Community Mental Health in New Zealand (1987) noted that the Maori perspective of individual self-hood, the world, God, people and behaviour, is completely holistic. This, it was proposed, is because it is based on the notions of spirituality, family, well-being, physiology, environment, compliance, old world, new world, and self. Jungersen (1992) is able to combine the socio-political tenets of Freire (1972) with occupational therapy by advocating the position that occupational therapy models could be reconceptualised according to the holistic view of health held by Maori. The rationale provided for this claim is that Maori culture may be defined as a blueprint for human behaviour. Milne (1996), from a health and disabilities perspective, notes that the 'four cornerstones' of Maori health are now recognised within the Health and Disability Code.

In 1987 the New Zealand Board of Health published a document entitled 'Tribal authorities as advocates for Maori health'. In brief, the introduction of this publication clearly acknowledged that Maori health was now to be observed as having a spiritual dimension which encompassed social, economic and
environmental relationships. Durie (1994), in tracing the contemporary emergence of a 'traditional' view of Maori health, describes his delivery of the 'te whare tapa wha' model of health (see Appendix D) to two separate hui in 1982 and 1983 as the principal initiatives which culminated in Maori accepting a spiritual view of health, rather than one that was somatically oriented. In making more specific the theme of Cartesian dualism in his seminal paper cited above, Durie elaborates in generic, yet unsubstantiated form, the inherent differences between Maori and non-Maori, which from his view are expressly cognitive. He states:

Maori thinking can be described as holistic. Understanding occurs less by division into smaller and smaller parts, the analytical approach, than by synthesis into wider contextual systems so that any recognition of similarities is based on comparisons at a higher level of organisation. Consistent with this style of thinking, health is viewed as an interrelated phenomenon rather than an intra-personal one. Healthy thinking from a Maori perspective is integrative not analytical; explanations are sought from searching outwards rather than inwards; and poor health is typically regarded as a manifestation of a breakdown in harmony between the individual and the environment. (p. 72)

This overtly anthropological, and seemingly omniscient, view of the mental states of contemporary Maori ironically reflects a number of the main themes contained in papers which invariably relate to interpreting 'the savage mind' (see Dewey, 1931; Benedict, 1934; Levi-Strauss, 1962; Goody, 1977). Durie (1994), however, does not need to inform his audience as to how he arrived at his postmodern and culturally relative conclusions about the 'Maori psyche' because by the time he had published this synthetic view of Maori cognitive thought, the objectification of the mental states of Maori had been truly institutionalised within social policy documents.

The Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988) included Maori health as a taonga collectively owned by Maori iwi through re-interpreting Article 1 and 2 of the Treaty of Waitangi. The document 'Whaia te Ora me te Iwi' (Department of Health, 1992), is widely regarded as the principal text which has guided Crown and Iwi negotiations in legislative, regulatory and contractual procedures toward Maori health. Developed under the auspices of Professor Mason Durie chairing the
Ministerial Advisory Committee of Maori Health at the time, this document formally instituted Maori as a 'special needs' category. In stating that a health revolution had taken place within New Zealand during the preceding decade, led largely by Maori challenging the definitions of 'health' and 'health professional', this document directed that greater participation by Maori in the health system was to be encouraged. Other recommendations included, resource allocations taking more cognisance of Maori health needs and perspectives, and that culturally appropriate practices and procedures were to be implemented by health care services. Included within the culturally appropriate services are traditional Maori healers whose methods are based on traditional Maori values and methods.

Bridgeman in his publication on behalf of Te Puni Kokiri, 'Trends in Maori mental health' (1993), effectively enshrined Durie's (1984) view of Maori health with the Treaty of Waitangi by making emphatic the following connection:

Te Taha Hinengaro - mental health for Maori is promoted and protected by the four cornerstones of health - te taha wairua, te taha hinengaro, te taha tinana and te taha whanau. Good health for Maori means more than good access to health services. It is seen as a taonga which enables people to participate in their whanau, hapu and iwi with a sense of belonging and self-esteem and to be able to live socially and economically productive lives. (p. 8)

The report, 'Towards a Post-Institutional Response to Mental Health', asserted that "Any treatment which fails to enhance Maori identity not only continues colonisation but will fail to improve mental health" (Burns, Barret, Daley, Duignan & Saville-Smith, 1994). Relatedly, the text 'Our health - our future' (Public Health Commission, 1994) stated, that with the launching of Hui Taumata (decade of Maori development) in 1984, that the view of Maori health had substantially changed:

Of particular significance was the conclusion that health could not be separated from other social and economic considerations. The Maori development model underlines the direct and indirect associations between people, the environment, political power, culture, and economic standing'. And furthermore that, "An integrated approach is necessary for further Maori development. The decade of Maori development emphasised that Maori wish to remain Maori, and any
measure of Maori health status must therefore include not only prevalence of disease and illness but also measures relating to the maintenance of cultural integrity, within a healthy environment. (p. 54)

The publication Kia Pumau Tonu (1995) describes the more significant initiatives during the decade 1984-1994, which represented the Decade of Maori Development (Hui Taumata). Within this publication, Jackson (1995) argues that the key to a Maori future is in the development and maintenance of Maori identity, which extends from the revitalisation of Maori spirituality. Walker (1995) in citing Foucault, Fanon, and Gramsci, remonstrates against grand narratives, which subverted Maori spirituality and cosmogony. Dewes (1995) states that Maori identity is a relative concept, while Puketapu (1995) emphasises that one social group, which is universal to Maori is the family. The publication 'Policy Guidelines for Maori Health 1995/6 (1995) in reporting on the hui 'Te Ara Ahu Whakamua' in 1994, declares in the context of describing culturally appropriate practices and procedures that:

Health for Maori places emphasis on the four cornerstones of health. This perspective of health and well-being contrasts with the western model in which the physical aspects of health and sickness are emphasised. This is a key consideration in developing the purchasing strategies to address both Maori and non-Maori health needs. (p. 21)

By 1996 the report entitled 'Inquiry Under Section 47 of the Health and Disability Services Act 1993 in Respect of Certain Mental Health Services' stated that the authors of the report were not prepared to submit a definition of mental health, even in the context of the nature of their brief, but rather would "...leave that expression to receive its broad, ordinary meaning" (p. 109). The 'Guidelines for Purchasing Personal Mental Health Services for Maori' (Durie et al., 1995) asserts that, "Importantly mental health services for Maori should not stand apart from other aspects of Maori development" (p. 2). In the same document the authors in describing the responses that they had received from a sample of 73 subjects, suggest that greater attention needs to be directed towards makutu as a Maori diagnostic category. The submission by Te Puni Kokiri (1996) to 'The Inquiry into Mental Health Services' stated that:
Maori health philosophy is essentially holistic. Maori consider all aspects of a person together. The mind is not split off from the body or the spirit; and the individual is perceived in relation to their whanau, hapu and iwi. (p. 14)

Workman (1996), in describing Maori as architects of positive health policy, paraphrases Durie's (1994) main sentiments by arguing that:

The integrated development of Maori policy in itself relies upon intersectoral collaboration and a collective mindset. The impact of the market ethos and the cult of individualism is reflected not only in the way in which government does its business, but in the way public servants address policy development. (p. 2)

'The National Mental Health Plan for More and Better Services' (MOH, 1997), in describing the strategic directions for Maori in mental health services specifies that by July 1999 all mental health services will be using cultural assessment procedures for Maori consumers and that by mid 2000 all mental health services will be operating under cultural effectiveness protocols. Furthermore, it asserts that Professor Mason Durie has been commissioned by the Ministry of Health to develop a cultural effectiveness tool to measure outcomes. The main reason for the necessity of developing such a tool is described in this report as being the result of the cultural, physical, and emotional needs of Maori being historically neglected in the mental health services, which are characterised as being monocultural. Relatedly, Dyall (Ellis and Collings, 1997), in first observing there is currently no available national data on the mental health needs of Maori, advances the proposition that Maori self-identification is a cultural marker of 'mental wellness', which also provides a valuable image of the Maori population profile. As she states:

The number of individuals who positively state they are Maori, and changes in patterns of self-identification, are important indicators of mental wellbeing at a population level. (p. 87)

Within Dyall's exposition, the transcendental concepts of tapu and noa are also reified into the realm of contemporary Maori activities, and in exhorting their re-introduction for the development of Maori mental health programmes and strategies, Dyall, offers her own newly traditional view of psychological disturbance experienced by Maori:
When Maori present to the health system, they come with their own world view and cultural concepts and values. In presenting, Maori may feel that they are unwell because they may have breached certain cultural protocols, perhaps by not according respect to an event or a place or by not requesting sufficient spiritual or ancestral protection. They may describe their sickness as mate Maori, or makutu, and their whanau may describe their behaviour as disturbing or porangi. (p. 90)

In a rare twist of irony worth noting in the context of Van Meijl's (1993) analysis on the origins of the Maori health theory of holism, Dyall posits that "Maori have challenged the World Health Organisation to broaden its view of health and to recognise also the importance of wairua and the whanau" (Ellis and Collings, 1997). The Maori Health Commission, in setting out terms of reference for the development of Maori health services for 1997-2000, describes four priority areas for Maori health development. These are Maori identity, whanaungatanga, wairuatanga, and working together. The National Mental Health Funding Plan 1998-2002 (HFA, 1998) in providing an overview of the continuum of currently purchased health services, which are described as ranging from services which are 'totally Maori in nature' to those that are 'non-Maori in nature,' state the following:

Maori not only need to have more mental health services provided for them but the services they access must also meet their needs and expectations in an appropriate manner. Services must incorporate cultural assessment and cultural safety, whanau participation, te reo Maori, tikanga Maori, and a Maori workforce, and have outcome measures which are relevant to Maori and incorporate Maori concepts of health and well-being. (p. 24)

What the above passages show is a clear process of the politicisation of Maori health beginning in the 1980's, and which is still currently being pursued, whereby the mental states of Maori have been entirely objectified within the broader framework of Maori development. The mental states of Maori cannot be a subjective affair, because they are inextricably linked to the objective of wider 'communal well-being' which is now an objective firmly entrenched within the health system of New Zealand. However, as the last quoted passage makes explicit, although the rhetoric of Maori health pervades the national agenda, especially in social policy formulations, more Maori require mental health services. Yet, the types of services that it is
suggested they be provided with are specifically in the cultural identity promotion arena. I believe that this analysis confirms the basis of the sociological triptych which I have provided (see Figure 8), and furthermore, that the sociological imagination can be seen to be the most dominant force underlying the triptych's central themes.

The 'te whare tapa wha model,' (see Appendix D) has institutionalised a specific view of Maori health, in which the mental states of Maori are conceptually enclosed by the four cornerstones or walls which metaphorically characterises the 'te whare tapa wha' model. Although one could ask what specific foundation supports this metaphoric model, I believe that Harding (1998) reviews such a situation saliently in suggesting that culture is at its most effective when it utilises its products as a tool box, and at its most dangerous when culture becomes a prison house.

It ought to be remembered that Maori with mental ill health in the 'traditional' context were considered to be cursed or subject to an intentional maligning (Gluckman, 1962). With the reification of Maori culture, any support of the above views, no matter how orthodox their presentation they may appear, needs to be questioned. Independent of mutual agreement of what constitutes the mental health of Maori reached between the Crown and iwi Maori, I believe it is paramount that the discipline of psychology as theorised and practised in New Zealand avoids to what my mind is the exploitative use of the mental states of Maori (see Figure 14). Especially pertinent is the use of the mental states of Maori with mental disorders as an ontological resource to maximise Maori control of health services. I take this to be a simple ethical issue. Because once we politicise the mental states of the mentally ill who are at a distinct disadvantage as citizens, let alone as political subjects, then the mentally ill, to whom our best interests are supposedly directed, become encaptured within a normative combat conspicuously characterised by the absence of Maori with mental illness.
Figure 14: Scientific realist interpretation of the 'field' of Maori mental health as currently conceptualised in social policy formulations. The conflating of mythological percepts with scientific demands has resulted in the politicisation of the mental states of Maori as an ontological resource to maximise strategic advantage framed as 'communal well-being'. In contradistinction the route between psychological science and social policy indicates the need for strengthening degree of influence when attending to the mental states of individuals of Maori descent.
Chapter Nine

Conclusion

*Reconceptualising the standard view of Maori mental health*

Laudan (1984) in his book *Science and Values* has argued that one method of understanding problems is to offer a brief history of the elements which demarcate a field in terms of its broad-scale consensus, or alternatively, its dissensus. Moreover, Laudan proposes that since the publication of Kuhn’s (1962) *Structure of Scientific Revolutions* there has been a preoccupation with dismantling the formerly consensual view of scientific thought and practice. That is, the ‘new consensus’ shows a preoccupation in doing away with the ‘old consensus’. The four canons where attention has most notably been directed are: Revealing the controversy-ladeness of science; providing examples of the thesis of incommensurability; a strong advocacy of the underdetermination of theory by data thesis; and finally, revealing the extent of counternormal methods developed and employed by scientists. However, independent of where consensus might gravitate to in regard to these four domains, in the end analysis, Laudan argues that it ought to be accepted that dissensus is a normal function of scientific progress. Dissensus effectively demands rival positions to emerge, and concomitantly, stimulates debate over what constitutes a reasonable theory or practice, on what grounds, and for whose benefit.

In the pursuit of provoking the problem of the mental health of Maori, this thesis has attempted to engage the intersection of Maori culture and psychological science. The perspective presented has attempted to offer a rational review of the historical, conceptual, methodological limitations, and political implications, of the consensual view of ‘Maori mental health’. As a realist, my principal motivation has been to draw attention to many of the influences and factors impeding a realistic assessment of an area clearly in crisis, so that a re-evaluation of the field might begin.

In Chapter One, I advanced the view that in order to develop an understanding of how the intersection of Maori culture and psychological science might be engaged, it was necessary to comprehend the process of cultural reification. As a ‘new historical force’, the cultural reification of Maori accentuates traditional aspects of culture by invoking an ‘institutional memory’. Exhibiting the process of
'variation', 'retention', and 'selection', cultural reification is an ideological and semantic project that creates cultural divergence, or what I refer to as 'institutional distance' between Maori and non-Maori. A secondary effect that cultural reification has, is that it creates divergence within the Maori community by developing and accentuating a normative standard of Maori identity. I have referred to this normative view of Maori identity as the 'mythic exemplar'. Concurrent, with the pervasiveness of cultural reification is what Webster (1998) describes as the paradox of theorising Maori culture as 'a whole totality' in light of the over-representation of Maori in most negative indices. Bhabha's (1994) concept of cultural hybridity was endorsed as a means of understanding the composite image formulated by these conflicting views of Maori culture and individuals. Consistent with my realist persuasions, and in contrast to the standard view of theorising 'Maori mental health' as a cultural phenomenon, I contended that the mental states of Maori are principally an individual phenomenon. My rationale for arguing that the mental health of Maori needs to be addressed as a psychological issue was that Maori individuality is principally agentic. In regard to incorporating Maori processes into psychological practice it was suggested that this needs to be encouraged mainly in respect of methodological procedure. The interdisciplinary diagram of Figure 1 sketched what I believe to be the permutations of the more significant fields influencing our current conceptions of the mental health of Maori. The various interconnections between philosophy of science, psychology, teleology/cosmology and social policy were described.

In Chapter Two I described three contrasting theories of science. Logical empiricism, social constructionism, and scientific realism were delineated in terms of their main commitments to the conduct of theoretical and empirical inquiry. The former consensual acceptance of, and eventual dissensus toward, logical empiricism was described, and the implications for psychological science briefly reviewed. The rise of social constructionism within the postmodern project was given extensive coverage, because it is within this project that I believe the mental health of Maori is situated. Anthropology's veneration of the 'cultural Other', largely caused by the incriminations of its former embrace of social Darwinism, has created a pendulum swing toward cultural relativism. I suggested that, while cultural relativism might be considered to be a moral positioning that acknowledges historical grievances, it is an
inadequate theory of knowledge to advance suitable knowledge for understanding problems within cultural domains. My commitments to scientific realism were then outlined by drawing on the insights of some of the major theorists of this theory of science. Scientific realism was advocated as being the most suitable theory of science to address the mental health of Maori.

A review of the historical and contemporary literature on the mental health of Maori was undertaken in Chapter Three. The main problem evident within the material reviewed was that the mental health of Maori was seldom theorised realistically. Reflecting the swing of support in the discipline of anthropology from social Darwinism to cultural relativism, the mental states of Maori were historically encapsulated in a discourse of biological determinism, and more recently, in a discourse of cultural dependency. Most contributors to the field were reluctant to engage mental illness as a subject of psychological inquiry and instead, focused their analyses on historical and social causation. This impoverished method of inquiry was clearly evidenced in the consistent endorsement of acculturation stress to account for the seemingly surprising presence of Maori in the mental health indices, and later, their over-representation. The main conclusion drawn from the literature review was that currently there is little information that provides a realistic and empirical account of what the actual status is of ‘Maori mental health’. Furthermore, little research has been conducted that identifies what the main contributing factors might be to Maori over-representation in the mental health indices, and what is a likely course of action to address this critical problem. Although the discipline of psychology is the domain most suited to pursue these lines of inquiry, at present, there is scarcely any research being undertaken which principally focuses on these issues.

A critical analysis of the social construction of Maori ethnicity was developed in Chapter Four. Reviewing primordial, instrumental and transactional theories of ethnicity covered the conceptual and methodological issues associated with the construct ‘ethnicity’. The work of Greenland (1991) was used to address the recent politicisation of Maori ethnicity. Following this, the demographic analysis developed by Pool (1991) was utilised to extract some of the more pressing issues of constructing Maori ethnicity as a suitable variable for methodological application.
The critical problem that my analysis of Maori ethnicity revealed was that, in its current formulations, the construct was considered to be composed of, 'a concept and a feeling'. Although this phenomenological description of Maori ethnicity might suit certain purposes, its potential use as a methodological variable in psychological science requires a considerable amount of work to ascertain what 'a concept and feeling' might realistically comprise. For the mental health of Maori, the constitution of a 'field' on the basis of 'a concept and a feeling' requires deeper inquiry.

Chapter Five attempted to sketch what I perceive to be the structural and functional mechanisms of Maori cultural reification from a scientific realist perspective. In undertaking an analysis of the metaphysical, semantic, and epistemic components of a system of reification I presented a model in Figure 5 which represented the institutional, regulatory and normative features of Maori cultural reification. The linkages between metaphysical, semantic and epistemic constructs were identified. In applying my model of Maori cultural reification to the function of positive Maori identity promotion, I described the core assumptions embedded within interpretations of the interrelations between Maori and non-Maori. I referred to the model that emerged from this analysis as the 'sociological triptych'.

My analysis in Chapter Six comprised a deconstruction of supernatural notions of causation as they apply to the New Zealand context when addressing the mental states of Maori. This review sought to make transparent a number of concepts that are still prevalent within Maori societies relative to understanding psychological disorder. In addressing what Gluckman (1962) has referred to as a need for a 'local hermeneutics' to comprehend 'traditional' concepts of mental illness in Maori thought, I made such an attempt by extending my 'sociological triptych' model to reflect a proposed explanatory system of mental illness. My diagram presented in Figure 13 enlarged on this initial attempt by showing more concisely the mechanisms and mediating factors which comprise a proposed system of illness causation in Maori thought. My main objective in proposing what might comprise a system of causation of illness in Maori thought was to make transparent what I believe to be an impoverished system of conceptualising mental disorder among Maori.
In moving from a local hermeneutics to a critique of Kaupapa Maori Research, my central interest in Chapter Seven was to describe and critique this popular account of Maori research theory and methods. The critique that I undertook of the core commitments of Kaupapa Maori Research showed that this method of inquiry is inadequate to address the theoretical and empirical needs of rigorous research in regard to Maori issues. Largely speculative and rhetorical, Kaupapa Maori Research is a blend of postmodern cultural relativism that has drawn its principal commitments from the Continental theorists namely Foucault, Gramsci, and Habermas. Although sympathetic to the grievances that have motivated the emergence of Kaupapa Maori Research, I believe that this research supports the status quo by offering an approach to research, which is seriously misguided. Essentially, this is because Kaupapa Maori Research offers no standards, criteria, or method of evaluating its own commitments or claims. In terms of the mental health of Maori, Kaupapa Maori Research can offer little of a cultural-specific view of inquiry. For this reason, it is concluded that Kaupapa Maori Research is a poor candidate to stimulate robust inquiry in the field of the mental health of Maori.

In Chapter Eight I argued that the history of a field described as ‘Maori mental health’ could be understood according to two distinct phases within New Zealand’s historical and contemporary development. I suggested that the first phase was characterised by an emphasis being placed on the physical health of Maori. For pragmatic reasons, this was a necessary focus, because in the context of the late nineteenth century, the Maori population was in serious decline. The second phase of the politicisation of Maori health was identified as emerging in the early 1980s. The focus of this latter phase was more clearly on the mental states of Maori. By undertaking an analysis of the social policy documentation that purports to provide guidance to the field of Maori health, I showed that the concept of a ‘traditional’ view of Maori health is of relatively recent construction. However, this construction known as the ‘te whare tapa wha model’, has gained considerable consensus as representing ‘traditional’ Maori views of health theory and practice. It is within this model that the mental health of Maori has been captured. Although described as reflecting Maori views of ‘holism’, I have argued that this model is insufficient to begin addressing the mental health needs of Maori.
In this final part of my conclusion I will briefly offer some final thoughts on the dialectic of Maori culture and psychological science. In their argument that Maori ethics is a virtue ethics, Perrett and Patterson (1991) presented the view that, *metaethically*, traditional Maori thought comprised identifiable moral rules and principles in regard to concepts of selfhood, moral education, and socio-political order. In relation to the concept of selfhood, Perrett and Patterson contend that, distinct from contemporary individualistic liberalism, was the traditional Maori view that selfhood was developed through an amalgam of potent historical, social and political influences. The normative account of traditional Maori 'identity' supplied by Perrett and Patterson suggests that because 'traditional' Maori society was narrative-based the frame of reference by which an individual could pursue distinction, was defined by the narrative. Traditional narratives, being character-based, depicted traits and roles of historical identities that supposedly served as exemplars for identity construction. Conscious imitation of historical exemplars provided the means by which self-identity was constituted. However, in supplying exemplary models of virtuous selves, the narrative concomitantly inhibited identity construction by constraining the status of individuals in accordance with their historical, social and political consequences. The 'traditional Maori self' could not escape the prescribed and predetermined context delineated through narrative-based oral tradition because the context was framed as exemplary. That is, according to Perrett and Patterson, an individual's concept of selfhood was shaped through the history and actions of their forbears' narratives, which circumscribed the social and political positioning of the individual in relation to the broader contemporary context. For this reason, Perrett and Patterson (1991) while calling the Maori traditional model they describe a 'virtuous context', also refer to it as a closed society. While not necessarily accepting the normative account of a 'traditional Maori self-hood' expressed by Perrett and Patterson, I believe that they offer a pertinent description of many of the forces that currently impede the emergence of a realistic conception of the mental health of Maori.

This dissertation has attempted to address the historical, social and political consequences of the treatment of mental states of Maori encapsulated within a discourse modelled on many of the normative assumptions which Perrett and Patterson (1991) have forwarded. I have, in a sense, attempted to lever open the
closed societies of culture and psychological science in order that the critical problem of the mental health status of Maori may be better addressed. The unequivocal perspective throughout this thesis has been that the problem of ‘Maori mental health’ as currently theorised, remains poorly articulated and ought to be revised. Reinstating the mental states of Maori within individuals is I have suggested a good place to start. In contrast to the vague theory of Maori health popularly described as being holistic, a rigorous investigation into each of the core components that come to comprise an individual’s health status is required. In terms of mental states and mental health the discipline of psychology is the most equipped domain to begin such an investigation.

In support of Seedhouse’s (1997, 1998) philosophy of health ethics, I have accepted the view that as currently conceptualised the mental health of Maori is a value-driven affair. For this reason, my attempts here have generally been to engage in a form of conceptual intervention. Seedhouse (1997) suggests that the world of healthcare is presently enduring an intellectual crisis characterised by debate over the fundamental tenets underlying health theory and practice. Familiar debates, which have reverberated throughout antiquity, have surfaced in the area of health and are currently in dense circulation. For example: What is moral practice? What constitutes a person? Does mind have precedence over body? In using the analogical expression of a paradigm shift, Seedhouse contends that health is a moral and not necessarily evangelical endeavour that requires in its theoretical formulations at least, the acceptance of the view that an individual plays a large role in determining their own health status. However, because health is, according to Seedhouse, principally driven by political values the promotion of what constitutes good health is a conservative view, which fosters the status quo and the ‘state of the nation’ objectives. I believe that this is a concise framing of the approach taken to Maori issues and in particular, the mental health of Maori. In 1994 the New Zealand Government published the ‘Strategic Directions for the Mental Health Services’. Strategic Direction 2 of this slim document contained the following aspiration:

This strategic direction is aimed at improving the mental health of Maori, so that it is at least as good as that of New Zealanders as a whole. The prevalence of mental disorders is considerably higher for Maori than for
the rest of the population. Maori rates of first admission and re-admission to psychiatric services have risen steadily, while Pakeha rates have stabilised or fallen.

Quite clearly, this passage acknowledges the negatively skewed direction in which the mental health rates of Maori are moving in comparison to non-Maori. But following this dictum, comes a prescription for the approach to be taken:

Mental health institutions in the past have not provided for the holistic healing needs of Maori. Mental health services are still mainly monocultural with an emphasis on clinical treatment. Services in the future will need to be culturally safe and be able to provide treatment at a spiritual, physical, emotional, and cultural level. This will apply to both mainstream mental health services and any services managed or delivered by Maori themselves.

What ‘holistic healing’ might be and how it might serve to change the status quo of the current over-representation of Maori in the mental health indices, is not mentioned. However, as emphasised in Chapter 8, such conceptual complacency represents the current view of ‘Maori mental health’ and I believe it also represents a conservative view primarily motivated by political values. Such a view is similarly reflected in the Health Funding Authority’s ‘National Strategic Plan for Maori Health 1998-2001’. In outlining a defence against moral and cultural relativism in health theory and practice, Seedhouse (1998) contends that considering what is at stake when addressing health concerns, approaches to health should not be reduced to issues of opinion and emotion. Instead health theory and practice should be motivated to discover the most favourable outcomes that have the most proven success in enabling individuals to follow their potential. One of the examples cited by Seedhouse, where the empirical study of the relationship between individuals and potential has provided substantive information, is the discipline of psychology. However, concurrent with the capacity for the discipline of psychology to contribute knowledge about the relationship between individuals and their potential, is the facility to provide empirical evidence that supports such knowledge. To date, any evidence supporting the success of ‘holistic healing’ in improving the health of Maori with mental ill health has not been forthcoming. On the contrary, there is a
correlation between the emergence of the ‘holistic’ view of Maori health and the steady rise of Maori admissions to psychiatric services. Because of this, I believe that it is timely that a reconceptualisation of the mental health of Maori be undertaken. The discipline most qualified to initiate a new approach to ‘Maori mental health’ is psychology. And the theory of science most useful to guide a proposed new approach is scientific realism.
Appendix A

Elsdon Best's ethnographic discoveries

The methodological flaws evident in Best's ethnographic work need to be outlined for the simple reason that in this dissertation I have chosen not to use Best as a reliable historical informant, even though he is one of the most often cited sources of Maori history in New Zealand. Jackson (1967) provides six features of Best's ethnographic method, which he suggests ought to be considered when determining the reliability and validity of his findings. First, Best's work was performed 120 years after initial contact. Second, the Tuhoe of the Urewera's were atypical of the majority of Maori at the time, because they were a non-agricultural and non-fishing tribe. Third, (and related to the first feature), Best relied on informants rather than on direct observation for his data and many of his informants had been mission educated. Fourth, Best is renowned for his pre-occupation with detecting the unadulterated essence of 'original' Maori tradition because he was intent in drawing a connection between Maori and ancient Babylonian and Sumerian civilisations (i.e., Best, 1974, 1978). Because of this pre-occupation, Best's ethnographic records indicate a bias toward favoured aspects of Maori life observed in his fieldwork. Fifth, Best did not work within any identified theoretical framework. His focus was clearly on the more exotic features of Maori life and he did not provide any functional or structural analysis of an action system in operation. Jackson (1967) suggests that this bias of Best's, to favour a recording of meaning over action, may have at least in part, been due to a concern that Maori were assumed to be, in the terminology of the day, 'a dying race'. Finally, Best failed to see that he was recording aspects of an emerging system rather than a traditional system, hence, his interpretations provide a static, absolute, and idealistic description of Maori social structure.

An important corollary to Jackson's (1967) outlined list of reservations is that Percy Smith the editor of 'The Polynesian Society Journal' prompted Best's fieldwork in 1892. This was the same year that 'The Polynesian Society' was formed, and also the same year acknowledged as representing the end of the telehistoric period of contact, with the extensive development of roads through out New Zealand.
(Groube, 1964). Reflecting what Lambek (1996) describes as 'the work of imagination in its social context, in history', Elsdon Best's work, in large part aided by Percy Smith, significantly contributed to the transformative character to the view of pre-contact Maori social structure and religious schema. First of all, there was the concept of the 'lore of the whare wananga', a pre-contact institution of learned high priests who have variously been described in terms analogous to philosopher's of science or ancient theologians (Te Rangi Hiroa, 1910; Tizard, 1940). This hitherto unknown institution was contrived by the informant Whatahora, who being born in 1841, used as his two main sources, Te Matorohanga and Nepia Pohuhu, who were both mission educated men born at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Secondly, Best in incorporating the 'lore of the whare wananga' into the ethnographic record did so by contrasting the now 'high-class' cosmogonic account (the cult of Io) with the less extraordinary anthropogenic account of genealogical creation (Papatuanuku and Ranginui). The following paragraph is a suitable illustration of Best's ethnographic discovery of an esoteric cult which had not previously been known to the more ordinary Maori of the time, but had been fully and ceremoniously outlined to Best by Tuhoe Maori,

The subject of Asiatic-Polynesian parallels - that is to say, of usage's, customs, myths, rites, beliefs, and conceptions common to the peoples of these two regions - is one of much interest, and a revelation to the student. To note that the Maori at our door has for long centuries taught quaint old-time myths of Babylonia - the story of Eve and the serpent, the fashioning of the first human being from earth, the name of the Supreme Being in southern Asia of olden times - is to marvel at parallel workings of the human mind, or at the wondrous voyagers in the far-off centuries that lie behind. (1974: p. 3)

The archaic eloquence with which Best delivers such a revelation belies the more realistic parallel of the Io cult and the widely disseminated contents of the bible at the time in both oral and literary forms. Hymns, extracts from the scriptures, and catechisms were well in circulation before the first printing press arrived in New Zealand in 1830, the year which also marked the first Maori baptisms (Lineham, 1996). With the introduction of the printing press to New Zealand came what Jackson refers to as a new technological revolution. Biblical texts were printed in Maori, and the responsiveness to Christianity by Maori must be measured against the
fervent drive to acquire the new skill of literacy. Jackson estimates that by 1845 there was at least one Maori New Testament to every two Maori in New Zealand, which is a strong indication of biblical saturation.

Six points that Jackson (1967) makes in regards to the phenomenal spread of literacy and Christianity within New Zealand are worth noting. First, direct and indirect agencies of distribution and dissemination of literacy and Christianity were responsible for the rapidity with which it spread. Both Maori and non-Maori were involved in distribution and dissemination. Second, the demand for literacy was just as high in peripheral areas of settlement as it was within missionary settlements. Envoys were sent from peripheral areas, and literate Maori were requested to visit more remote regions, so that they could instruct communities in literacy and Christianity. Third, the importance of this new form of knowledge was blended into the Maori social values of the time. Jackson suggests that because the bible was the text which introduced Maori to literacy, that the contents of the bible were interpreted literally and therefore, were perceived as being the literary complement to the tapu system of prohibition, which was traditionally imbibed through oral communication. Fourth, the introduction of the biblical text and literacy meant that new groups gravitated toward each other to discuss the contents of the texts, thus adding a new dimension to the meeting house.

Fifth, the extent to which the bible circulated and was incorporated into the Maori social system meant that a new role developed, and this role was generally the position of a native teacher who had considerable literacy skills in providing interpretations of the bible. The last point relates to the widespread confusion created through the Maori inter-tribal wars. The destruction and displacement that these wars caused would have led many Maori to try and detect the power behind the introduction of new technologies, which made such a decisive impact on Maori social structures. Jackson speculates that Maori would have confused missionaries with the general European population and, therefore, would have perceived that the power of the European's tools lay in the missionaries books because they represented superior power. Exacerbating this situation would have been the introduction of new diseases to which the Europeans were largely immune. Because missionaries also brought with them curative aids and techniques, Maori would have been motivated
to create both the means and ends for emulating a new powerful knowledge source to combat the rapidity with which Maori social structures were changing. That is, Maori would have been engaged in a process of active syncretism, brought about through the introduction of new technologies, alternative modalities, and new expressions of knowledge. The spheres of reference available to Maori had expanded dramatically and the possibilities for divergence, convergence, and parallelism would have been extensive. Therefore, the variation, selection, and retention of the old and the new would have impacted on the Maori social structure creating both dissonance and diffusion.

The importance of all of the above points is that when they are examined in relation to Best's ethnographic accounts, which appeared more than sixty years after the introduction of the first printing press the idea that Best had uncovered an unadulterated source of esoteric lore, intact and hidden, from any of the multifarious changes evident in the rapidly changing milieu, appears patently untenable. As Levy, Mageo and Howard (1996) infer in relation to the transformative nature of religious schema to stimulate an efflorescent diffusion within cultural domains, the more plausible explanation for Best's 'lore of the whare wananga' is that it was a creative Maori innovation paralleling the contents of the European bible. More significantly, Groube (1964), in first noting the unreliability of the ethnographic data preceding Best's work, and also the problem of subsequent records which drew on Best as a secondary source, offers a contrary perspective to the received view regarding pre-contact Maori social structure. Developing an argument which outlines many of the chronological, theoretical and methodological problems associated with making any type of conclusion about pre-contact Maori society where there is a paucity of archaeological evidence and unreliable ethnographic aids, Groube suggests that the political economy of pre-contact Maori societies would not have been able to support Best's main contentions, often colloquially expressed by Best as 'the Maori as he was'.

In Groube's view, while earlier ethnographic accounts were content in offering descriptions of Maori life, Best was the first major 'reconstructor' of a conceptual Maori 'tradition'. Significantly, with the further contributions to Best's 'revolutionary' work, supplemented by Te Rangi Hiroa and Raymond Firth, the
'authorised version' of Maori traditional social and economic life had been firmly cemented by the 1920's. Groube's main problem with the work of these theorists is their failure to make and maintain a distinction between pre-historic and historic conditions of Maori social structure. This problem is further compounded by the fact that it is implausible to draw comparisons between Best's accounts and any earlier ethnographic records for the simple reason noted above that the population within which Best conducted his field work was not representative of the rest of the Maori population of the time. From Groube's perspective, the resulting syntheses and projections from these ethnographic aids to the pre-contact period ought to be treated with caution.

In qualifying his own method of inference and analogy from archaeological evidence, Groube states that the temporal-spatial relationship between culture and economy is organised through an interaction between the needs and aspirations of a population and the resources available from a particular environment. Three important factors which impinge on the synthesis of a settlement pattern are that: the more mobile a population, the lower the level of economic achievement that they achieve; the upper threshold of skills evident within a particular population will limit the potential use of resources available, which may circumscribe both the style and mode of economy; and the scale of complementarity between availability of skills and resources with needs and aspirations will, to a large part, determine the social organisation of a population. The sociological implication of these factors is that the spatio-relationships within a settlement pattern such as class, wealth and status distinctions including kinship, political and commercial alliances can be surmised. A cursory overview of some of Groube's main speculations will suffice here.

From the archaeological record, Groube informs us that the communal house was not a common feature of early ethnographic observations, that there was no evidence of kainga, that storehouses were not mentioned in the eighteenth century records, and that considering the type of pattern evident at the time it is highly unlikely that the social structure would have been able to support a 'traditional' priesthood. The main reason why it is highly implausible for pre-contact Maori social organisation to have been able to support a priesthood is that the political
economy at the time would not have had the requisite food surplus available to support separate classes of specialists (Jackson, 1967).

In contrast to the view that Best provides, Groube suggests that the Maori social structure in the pre-historic era would have been highly flexible and mobile, with a predominantly dispersed settlement pattern. Both mobility and flexibility would have been expected because of the wide variation in environmental and climatic conditions. The counterpoint to Best's perspective, is therefore, that the existence of a highly organised system of belief, unbeknown to 'ordinary' Maori, could not have been feasible at the time because the Maori social structure was stratified only in accord with the organisation of food storage. The family, as the main productive unit, only amalgamated in to bigger groupings as a means of defending against possible raids. As Jackson (1967) notes:

> It is against this necessity of storage and the effort needed to create storage facilities upon which we can postulate the organisation of people into hapu at certain times during the year. And with supervised storage went supervised distribution and collective defence. (p. 17)

Reflecting Sowell's (1994) theory of strategic advantage which sees the heightened emergence of different forms of cultural organisation develop in conjunction with the introduction of technology transfer into a population, both Groube and Jackson suggest that Maori social organisation was introduced through European contact, and not before. Material and economic culture, social structures, leadership patterns, value and belief systems, and population patterns were integrated and modified according to the access that Maori groupings had to the new technologies. With the introduction of new crops more efficient agricultural implements and reliable food sources, Maori social organisation underwent a tremendous change in the early nineteenth century, which having the capacity to control for food surplus, meant the movement from being a wholly subsistence economy to a partly commercial one (Jackson, 1967). It is within this framework of concerted change and innovation, which Groube (1964) suggests that the more institutionalised forms of control and authority would have emerged.
Jackson (1967) provides three reasons as to why the late nineteenth century appearance of the whare wananga as an institutionalised form of education and cultural lore transmission among tribal elite's ought to be regarded as suspect. Framing these three reasons is the implicit denial in both Percy Smith and Elsdon Best's ethnographies that extensive structural change had occurred to Maori social societies through out the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is worth quoting Jackson in full here:

"First, evidence to date has indicated no specialised religious structures for the late 18th century, and the development of the Meeting House with specialised functions as a School of Learning on certain occasions is probably 19th century. Secondly, there were probably no religious specialists to organise and run such an elaborate system of 'monastery education'. Thirdly, it has been suggested that the function of genealogical connections and lineage principles in creating, preserving and severing inter-hapu and inter-tribal fusion's is a development consequent on the economic and political need for such groupings in Maori society during the 19th century" (p. 79).

Jackson perceives that the idea of whare wananga emerged as a notion which ascribed an institutional distinction between Maori and European on one hand, and on the other also enabled themes of commonality to be conceptualised between Maori and European. The supposed sanctity and secrecy of the cults also offered an expression of common identity to Maori which mirroring other politico-economic developments of the nineteenth century further aided the social stratification of Maori to be reflected in the religious institution of the whare wananga. In succinct form Jackson describes this emergence as thus,

"So, by a system of prohibited and permitted religious cults, the stratification of Maori society into rank and grade was affirmed and the genealogical ordering of man extended into the religious sphere" (1967: p. 81).

It is the movement of stratified levels of being and belief from the social structure into the religious sphere which in turn comes to be reflected back into the social organisation of a cultural domain which Jackson describes. Murdock (1980) also mentions this movement relative to the prominence of themes of aggression within supernatural theories of illness causation and argues that the aggression motif
is intelligible because it is one of the most overt and universal behaviours performed by the human species. It is also worth noting here that Best was appointed as a Sanitary Inspector and Advisory Counsellor with Tuhoe Maori from 1903 to 1909 when the Maori health reforms were being implemented. According to Lange (1972) Best left this position disappointed that he had not been selected as a Native Sanitary Inspector and complaining that Tuhoe Maori were apathetic toward sanitary reform. Lange (1972), proposes that Best's frustration can possibly best be understood in relation to the Tuhoe commitment to the Ringatu cult which in exhibiting an amalgam of Old Testament and Maori beliefs placed more emphasis on faith healing than on sanitation and medicine. However, it is also plausible to speculate that the feedback loop effect already mentioned above is evident in Best's work whereby; in experiencing what Lange (1972) refers to as 'one of the least amenable communities' (p. 297) of the time, Best projected his own covert and seemingly indelible impressions of Maori history and thought back to Maori. For not only did Best record the history and functions of the whare wananga in his time, but he also recorded its passing, as he states,

"That highly tapu institution that had existed from the days when the gods walked the earth, instituted by Io the Parent in celestial regions, brought from hidden islands beyond the far-spread realm of Hine-moana, carried on from island unto island at the gateways of the day, had at last, after many centuries, been lost to man here at the ends of the earth. When the whare wananga closed its door for the last time the world-worn Children of Pani knew that never more would they regain the tapu of the ira atua (divine life), that the mana (prestige) of their race had gone forever" (1974: p.31).
## APPENDIX B

### Dualistic conceptual devices of division

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDIGENOUS – CULTURAL</th>
<th>WESTERN – EUROPEAN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authentic</td>
<td>Plastic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primitive ‘Little - Traditional’</td>
<td>Individualistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communalistic</td>
<td>Advanced ‘Great - Traditional’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atemporality</td>
<td>History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small population</td>
<td>Large population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolated</td>
<td>Corporated into vast networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Sub-cultures, contra-cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homogenous</td>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple</td>
<td>Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equalitarian</td>
<td>Stratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inequality simply organised</td>
<td>Inequality organisation complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin and role ranking</td>
<td>Class and ethnic ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable - slow changing</td>
<td>Unstable - fast changing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-sufficient</td>
<td>Depending on other units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consensus based complexity</td>
<td>Power based conformity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total society</td>
<td>Part society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>Modern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacred</td>
<td>Secular</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family and kin</td>
<td>Status and territory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role integration</td>
<td>Role segmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status summation</td>
<td>Status segmentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalised roles</td>
<td>Specialised roles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power diffuse</td>
<td>Power concentrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td>Social disorganisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation</td>
<td>Conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive interaction</td>
<td>Extensive interaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity (unity)</td>
<td>Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rigidity</td>
<td>Mobility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Ambiguity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal controls and sanctions</td>
<td>Formal (bureaucratic) controls and sanctions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing</td>
<td>Developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold</td>
<td>Hot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed</td>
<td>Open</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-logical</td>
<td>Logical</td>
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</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mythopoetic</th>
<th>Logical-empirical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wild</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science of the concrete</td>
<td>Science of the abstract</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analytic</td>
<td>Synthetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magical thought</td>
<td>Scientific thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricoleur</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concrete thought</td>
<td>Abstract thought</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Using signs</td>
<td>Using concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritualism</td>
<td>Materialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total visibility of persons</td>
<td>Specialised, fragmented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniform distribution of knowledge</td>
<td>Uneven distribution of knowledge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-literate (pre-literate)</td>
<td>Literate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total accountability</td>
<td>Situational accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>Impersonal or depersonalised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close social contacts</td>
<td>Distant social contacts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary relationships</td>
<td>Secondary relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual relations</td>
<td>Mass or group relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on conformity</td>
<td>Emphasis on independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kin reliant</td>
<td>Self-reliant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal property</td>
<td>Individual property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatalistic</td>
<td>Belief in self efficacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Permissive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Often prefers company</td>
<td>Often prefers privacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status relatively fixed</td>
<td>Status variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unused to ambiguity</td>
<td>Copes with ambiguity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

Typology of natural and supernatural explanations for causes of illness

Natural Causation
Type 1: Infection
Type 2: Stress
Type 3: Organic deterioration
Type 4: Accident
Type 5: Overt human aggression

Supernatural Causation
(i) Theories of mystical causation (consequential)
Type 6: Fate
Type 7: Ominous sensation
Type 8: Contagion
Type 9: Mystical retribution

(ii) Theories of animistic causation (etheric ascription)
Type 10: Soul loss
Type 11: Spirit aggression

(iii) Theories of magical causation (intention maligning)
Type 12: Sorcery
Type 13: Witchcraft

Appendix D

The whare tapa wha model

Taha Wairua:
Focus: Spiritual
Key aspects: The capacity for faith and wider communion
Themes: Health is related to unseen and unspoken energies

Taha Hinengaro:
Focus: Mental
Key aspects: The capacity to communicate, to think, and to feel
Themes: Mind and body are inseparable

Taha Tinana:
Focus: Physical
Key aspects: The capacity for physical growth and development
Themes: Good physical health is necessary for optimal development

Taha Whanau:
Focus: Extended family
Key aspects: The capacity to belong, to care, and to share
Themes: Individuals are part of wider social systems

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