CRISIS AND DECISION –
NEW ZEALAND
AND
THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
1990/1991

AN ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION BY NEW ZEALAND TO CONTRIBUTE MILITARY FORCES TO THE MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

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<td>ADSC</td>
<td>Area of Direct Strategic Concern</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia, New Zealand, United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIWS</td>
<td>Close In Weapons System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDF</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDS</td>
<td>Chief of Defence Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable New Network</td>
</tr>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Cabinet Strategy Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDI</td>
<td>Directorate of Defence Intelligence</td>
</tr>
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<td>DDIS</td>
<td>Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDS</td>
<td>Directorate of Defence Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESC</td>
<td>Domestic and External Security Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAB</td>
<td>External Assessments Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPP</td>
<td>First Past the Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSB</td>
<td>Government Communications Security bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMNZS</td>
<td>Her Majesty's New Zealand Ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEA</td>
<td>Middle East Africa Division, MERT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERT</td>
<td>Ministry of External Relations and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMP</td>
<td>Mixed Member Proportional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multi-National Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>National Security Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZDF</td>
<td>New Zealand Defence Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZSIS</td>
<td>New Zealand Security Intelligence Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACDAC</td>
<td>Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZAF</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>RNZN</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Navy</td>
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<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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It has been said that a person’s wealth can be judged by the quality of his or her friends. If this is indeed so then I must be filthy rich such is the quality of mine.
On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied the Emirate of Kuwait, setting in motion a chain of events that led to the largest military build up since the Second World War. These events, which have come to be known as the Persian Gulf Crisis and War of 1990/91 provide an important background for the analysis of New Zealand’s ‘decision’ to provide military personnel to the multi-national force being assembled in the Gulf in December 1990.

Unlike many of its traditional friends and allies New Zealand had not been invited to join the United States sponsored coalition and military force due to the strained relationship that had existed between New Zealand and the United States since the ANZUS dispute of the mid-1980s.

However, membership was not contingent upon an ‘invitation’ and New Zealand came under pressure from domestic and external sources to join the coalition, which it did so in December 1990. It is argued that this decision was possibly the catalyst for a significant improvement in the New Zealand-United States relationship and lead to a much more active international role for New Zealand in the following decade.
Chapter One

Introduction

The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the decision by New Zealand to contribute troops to the multi-national forces during the Persian Gulf War of 1990/91 within a foreign policy decision making framework utilising a levels of analysis approach.

There are a number of factors that make this thesis both unusual and important. Firstly this case study has not been addressed previously, so it will fill a gap in the literature. Secondly the events of the case study occurred at a time of considerable change in both New Zealand and the wider world, following the end of the Cold War. The impact of this is reflected in the methodology of the thesis. For example in terms of personality, outlook, and intellect there were three different prime ministers within a period of just two months. At the national level there were two separate governments, the first of which had been beset by a recent history of internal differences and leadership changes and impending electoral devastation. The defence establishment was in the process of adjusting to radical reshaping and was forced to feel its way through a new and unfamiliar policy process while dealing with a largely hesitant and uncertain political leadership. In the immediate post-Cold War era the international system was in flux, and the United Nations and member states adjusted to new roles, norms and opportunities.
The literature suggests that a political crisis impacts upon a routine decision making process in the following ways:

1. the number of individuals exercising authority is reduced;
2. the number of alternative solutions is reduced;
3. the rate of communication within and between domestic foreign policy agencies is increased;
4. the rate of communication with the foreign policy agencies of international actors is increased; and
5. the frequency with which decision makers are likely to take action increases⁴.

There is also a reduction in the amount of time available for the completion of the decision making process. Often foreign policy decisions are debated, written, rewritten, and debated again in various stages and fora for months, sometimes years before any action is taken. However crisis decision making places a premium on urgency. The fact that it took four months, two governments and three prime ministers before a decision was made to commit non-combatant forces indicates that it was either (a) a complex and important issue that could not be dealt with quickly, and/or (b) one that was hampered by hesitancy and uncertainty on the part of the decision makers. The logistics of the decision making process will form the basis for the substantive chapters in this thesis.

As well as the considerations of time and space, the decision making process in small states during a period of international crisis might be expected to be limited and constrained by the following factors:

1. geo-political forces,
2. limited flow of information,
3. limited resources for unexpected actions, and
4. ideological compatibility with the major political actors.

In theory this implies that the outcome of the decision making process should remain consistent despite changes in leadership and government. However, during the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 there was a degree of policy variation, evidenced by different responses of the Labour and National governments. The reasons for this I also propose to examine.

International crises rarely develop overnight, and the case of Iraq and Kuwait is no different. Chapter Two examines the crisis that led to Iraq invading Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and the request of Kuwait for assistance in the immediate post-invasion period. The reaction of US President George H. Bush will be analysed because it was he, and not the United Nations that was instrumental in the formation of the multi-national force (MNF)\(^2\). Finally the key actions and resolutions of the United Nations, as they relate to New Zealand's decision to join the multi-national force will be analysed.

Chapter three outlines the theoretical approach to the decision making process utilising three levels of interactive analysis: individual, domestic,

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\(^2\) When Bush formed and led the international coalition it was done without initial support from many within the American government. This resistance is highlighted by the voting pattern when, on 12 January 1991, Bush sought and obtained Congressional support for committing US troops to battle. The resolution authorising such action was only passed by a margin of 52-47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the House of Representatives.
and international. This approach was chosen because it offers scope for interactive analysis. Many foreign policy decision making studies concentrate on only one particular aspect of the process, whether it be a cognitive study of the decision maker, or an analysis of international interactions. However, many important interactive aspects and factors of a case study may be overlooked simply because they do not fit the specified criteria. For example in early October 1990, Mike Moore, as Prime Minister decided to send a series of international cables regarding a possible New Zealand military contribution to the US sponsored international force operating in the Gulf. This action clearly fits into the individual level. However, because he made this decision after consulting with officials whom he also ordered to carry out the action it also impacts upon the domestic level. Accordingly because the cables were sent to several international actors including the United Nations, Britain, and the United States it also falls under the international level. There are some examples of sectional interaction, however, repetition is avoided as much as possible.

Chapter four examines the decision making processes of the key individuals in the role of prime minister, who had different foreign policy experiences and approaches, including on the question of committing troops to the MNF, including their exposure to new ideas and information. This chapter has two distinct sections. The first examines comparatively the circumstances associated with leadership change during a period of international crisis. The second section deals more explicitly with the crisis, focusing on their decision making process including personality traits that influenced their decision making.

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3 This is important as the literature on small state makes very little comment on leadership change.
Chapter five examines some aspects of domestic politics in the context of the decision making process. Specific reference is given to the Ministry of External Relations and Trade (MERT), Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) who were most active in the decision making process at the domestic level. It also looks at the upheaval and reorganisation that occurred in the defence sector in the immediate years preceding the case study as this impacted markedly on the advisory element of the process.

Chapter Six examines New Zealand's place in the international environment, its relationships with its traditional allies, and its international interactions during the crisis period, including the recent ANZUS dispute and its impact on New Zealand's international relationships during the formation of the MNF. Communication with and reaction from New Zealand's traditional allies over a potential military contribution is also discussed in this context as this was important in terms of both the actual decision to contribute, and the nature of that contribution.

The final chapter of this thesis offers an explanation for the variability in New Zealand's policy towards the height of the crisis with some theoretical observations for further study.

The Literature

An analysis of foreign policy raises some interesting questions that require addressing\(^4\). For example, this review highlights the following inadequacies in the literature:

\(^4\) The biggest problem with doing a literature review on foreign policy decision making or the levels of analysis is that there is an abundance of literature in these areas. Any holes or deficiencies have long since been noted, explored and exploited. The likes of the Hermanns, Kaplan, Frankel, Rosenau, East, Et. Al.,
1. It tends to concentrate on either small European states, or developing states;

2. It concentrates on general foreign policy behaviour, while crisis decision making receives less attention;

3. Crisis behaviour is examined on the basis of involvement in, or in close proximity to, the conflict.

4. It tends to concentrate on the relationship between the small state and larger actors, both states and Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs).

A large preponderance of the literature tends to be either strictly theoretical or is written on smaller European states such as the Scandinavian countries and their relationships with primarily the larger European states. New Zealand, for example, barely features except as a part of tables relating to small states. One exception to this is the work of John Henderson (1991) who has examined New Zealand’s foreign policy behaviour and cites six characteristics of small state behaviour.

Small state theorists such as Vital (1967, 1971) and East (1973, 1978) concentrate on general foreign policy behaviour and ignore crisis decision making. When small states are considered in crisis analysis they are

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generally small European states. In the context of a larger crisis such as Vital's use of pre-war Czechoslovakia. In addition those who study crisis behaviour such as Lebow (1981) and Hermann et.al., (1972) largely ignore small states.

Because the literature almost exclusively concentrates on the foreign policy behaviour of small states in the context of larger states there are some important areas of foreign policy behaviour that have not been thoroughly examined. There are a very few studies that examine the crisis decision making behaviour of a small state. Because of these deficiencies this thesis will hopefully add to the literature as it examines the foreign policy behaviour of a small state indirectly involved in a mounting international crisis.
Chapter Two

The Persian Gulf War 1990-1991

The aim of this chapter is to provide a background to the case study of this thesis. This is necessary because it sets the context for New Zealand's decision by explaining the scope of the crisis and the international coalition assembled to deal with it. It will briefly cover the invasion that sparked the international crisis before giving more detail on the responses of the United States and the United Nations.

THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS OF 1990

From February through late July 1990 a state of crisis had effectively existed between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq had issued various threats against Kuwait, often backing up these threats with military manoeuvres. President Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait was waging economic warfare against Baghdad because (a) Kuwait had refused to give in to Iraqi demands to cancel Baghdad's war debts, and (b) to loan it US$30 billion for post-war economic reconstruction. At the Arab League summit meeting in Baghdad in May 1990, Saddam launched a stinging verbal assault on the Gulf States. Kuwait in particular, was singled out for inflating OPEC oil production quotas thus keeping oil prices down, refusing to forgive Iraq's debts from the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), and for failing to extend post-war reconstruction credits to Iraq.

The Kuwaitis attempted to ease the crisis and avert further trouble by making concessions at the negotiating table. These included
guaranteeing loans to the Iraqi government and sharing revenues from the al-Rumaylah oil field. The Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, and Saudi king, Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, offered to help settle the deepening crisis. However at a meeting in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, on 1 August 1990, in what is now seen with hindsight as a clear statement of intentions, the Iraqi representative walked out, citing Kuwait's failure to discuss Iraqi territorial claims or to forgive Iraq's debts.

On 25 July 1990 US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, met with President Saddam Hussein. She told him that the US did not want to become involved in inter-Arab conflicts. How badly Glaspie misread the situation can be seen in her report to Washington where she wrote "his emphasis that he wants a peaceful settlement is surely sincere". Thus, as Baghdad prepared for a military assault on Kuwait, Saddam successfully concealed his preparations by deceiving the United States and by agreeing to allow the Egyptians and Saudis to mediate an end to the quarrel.

**THE AUGUST 1990 INVASION**

Shortly before midnight of 1/2 August 1990, Iraqi scouts crossed the Kuwaiti border. At 2am the first Iraqi tanks and artillery of an invasion

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force that consisted of 140,000 troops and 1,800 tanks crossed at the Abdaly customs post and the invasion was underway\textsuperscript{10}.

While the battles in the countryside lasted for three days or so, the invasion itself was already successful by about noon on the first day. The Iraqi forces captured Kuwait City quite quickly and easily. The only real resistance was at the Palace of the Emir itself where the King's younger brother Sheikh Fahd died while leading the defence of the palace. The Emir, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, and the rest of the royal family fled to Saudi Arabia where he established a government in exile\textsuperscript{11}. Within hours of the invasion the U.S. acceded to a Kuwaiti request and froze both Iraq's and Kuwait's considerable overseas assets\textsuperscript{12}.

**INITIAL UNITED STATES RESPONSE**

The United States and its main allies saw the invasion as intolerable on two counts. First, there was the undeniable fact that Kuwait had been recognised as independent by the world community since 1961, and a member of the United Nations since 1963\textsuperscript{13}. Secondly its invasion and occupation by another state was a clear violation of international law.

A no-less important consideration lay in the fact that Kuwait was a major oil producer. Approximately 65 percent of the world's known oil reserves at the time were located in the Middle East. Iraq controlled 9.9 percent of


the world's total, Kuwait, 9.3 percent, and Saudi Arabia 25.2 percent. Saddam’s 9.9 percent was no mean figure, but if he were successful in annexing Kuwait, he would have controlled almost 20 percent of world oil production. If he took Saudi Arabia then he would have had an enormous 44 percent\(^\text{14}\).

Throughout August and September 1990 New Zealand closely monitored the international oil market and liaised with the International Energy Agency (IEA) in order to gain early warning should an oil crisis develop. However, by 15 October 1990 the situation had stabilised to an extent that allowed Cabinet to note that it believed that it could cope in the advent of a limited oil shortfall\(^\text{15}\).

**Building a Coalition**

In the first hours after the invasion President Bush met with his advisors to discuss a proposed American response. Having decided that some form of action was needed Bush then set about calling various world leaders that he had built personal relationships with over the years. It was a hallmark of Bush’s leadership style that was to play a great part in the building of the coalition. Some of the leaders he called included Presidents Turgut Ozal (Turkey), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), King Hussein (Jordan), and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher’s immediate and solid support for both Bush and “the cause” helped consolidate Bush’s own determination in the matter\(^\text{16}\).

\(^{14}\) *Ibid.*

\(^{15}\) *Cabinet Paper: CAB (90) M 36/31, 15 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 15.*

Dealing with the Saudis

Bush and his advisors met again on 3 August to discuss a reaction to the invasion. They decided that no matter how hard it was for the U.S. to respond due to the distances involved, they had to get the flag in the ground in the region. In this respect they looked towards Saudi Arabia as they believed that Saddam was obviously prepared to fight over Kuwait, but would he be willing to fight the U.S? A series of meetings were held at Camp David the following day, 4 August. At these meetings Bush and his advisors, who by this time included Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf, discussed the deployment of troops. Two options were considered: retaliatory strikes utilising aircraft carriers and cruise missiles; and Operational Plan 1002-90, that had been created some months earlier during the pre-invasion posturing. The plan called for 200,000 troops but was reliant on Saudi permission to use their territory as a staging area.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 49-51, 65-77.}

On 6 August Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and General Schwarzkopf travelled to Riyadh and sought approval from Saudi ruler, King Fahd. At the completion of this meeting Cheney telephoned Bush from the state guesthouse and let him know that Fahd had officially requested U.S. aid. Bush then gave the go ahead for the deployment of the first US troops.\footnote{Ibid. 1997, p. 14. And US News & World Report, 1992, pp. 62-64, 82-86.}

Bush Continues to Build His Coalition

After ensuring permission for US troops to be allowed to base themselves in Saudi Arabia, Bush continued to build a coalition against the Iraqis. On 7 August, he appeared in public with British Prime Minister Margaret

\footnote{Ibid., pp. 49-51, 65-77.}
Thatcher and Manfred Woerner, the Secretary General of Nato. Together they announced their mutual approval and acceptance of the UN embargo on Iraq and Kuwait. The next day Bush announced the deployment of US troops to the Persian Gulf. He claimed that the troops were there for defensive purposes only, that they were not there to remove Saddam, he said that that was the job of the UN embargo and sanctions\textsuperscript{19}. Turkey gave approval for combat missions to be flown out of the large airforce base at Incirlik, and Britain pledged naval vessels for immediate deployment\textsuperscript{20}.

Bush did not want the coalition to be a purely western force. It needed to be multi-national and especially to include Arab forces. On 10 August the Arab League voted 12 to 9 to send Arab troops to Saudi Arabia, and the first Egyptian troops arrived in Saudi on 11 August. Saddam responded by declaring \textit{Jihad} (Holy War) on Israel and the United States\textsuperscript{21}.

During this phase of activity Australia received a direct request from the United States to join the coalition while New Zealand did not, which some analysts saw as a deliberate snub\textsuperscript{22}. Australia responded promptly to its public invitation, announcing on 11 August that it would contribute two guided missile frigates and a support vessel to the multinational force\textsuperscript{23}.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} US News & World Report, 1992, pp. 91-94.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Summers, 1995, p. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{22} J.M. Malik, \textit{The Gulf War: Australia's Role and Asian-Pacific Responses}, Canberra, 1992, p. 91.
\end{itemize}
Building a multi-national coalition was not a cheap exercise for the Americans. Bush had to offer billions of dollars in aid and foreign loans to encourage some of the more hesitant countries whose commitment he needed. He did a deal with Malaysia, who were on the Security Council, over textile import quotas; he let Turkey onsell some of their F16 fighter aircraft to Egypt to raise hard currency, and quietly allowed Colombia to renounce a treaty on the extradition of drug traffickers. The Syrians, who were extremely reluctant to join the US sponsored international force, received billions in aid by way of inducement from Saudi Arabia.24

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

Operation Desert Shield, which was set in motion just one day after Bush’s warning to Saddam on 3 August, became one of the largest military deployments in history. Altogether Bush assembled a coalition that grew to include thirty seven countries by the end of the Gulf War. The coalition force included more than half a million soldiers with a 10,000 soldier brigade from the Arab Gulf states, 7,000 Kuwaiti soldiers, and 15,000 Syrian troops who fought only on Kuwaiti soil, due to their reluctance at fighting the Iraqis.25

The major European countries were dependent on Gulf oil, had significant business interests in the region, and wanted to protect their regional political influence. Accordingly they played a major role in the US led coalition. The British sent 43,000 troops and large amounts of military equipment, while the French sent 16,000 soldiers. Wealthy


countries such as Japan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Germany provided large amounts of money to help finance the campaign. In the case of Germany and Japan, this was in lieu of troops, which because of protocols related to WW2, they were prohibited from deploying overseas.  

However not all of the countries involved were major powers or wealthy, nor did they necessarily contribute large military forces. The small Australian naval taskforce assisted with an economic blockade of Iraq and Kuwait during this period and as we will see in later chapters, New Zealand provided transport aircraft and medical personnel. Other smaller countries such as the Netherlands, Sierra Leone, Honduras, and Romania also made modest contributions.

**THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS KEY RESOLUTIONS**

The response of the United Nations was, at the time, unprecedented. During the Cold War the Security Council had been polarised by the stand off between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the veto frequently used by the permanent members to protect their strategic interests. The Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 saw for the first time the two superpowers working together within the framework of the UN on the basis of collective security to force Saddam to back down.

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Between August and November 1990 the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a total of twelve resolutions beginning with UNSC 660, which condemned the Iraqi occupation, and finishing with UNSC 678, which sanctioned the use of force. Three were of particular significance for both this crisis and the UN as a whole. UNSC 661 was only the third UN resolution to impose economic sanctions against a state. UNSC 665 was the first time force had been authorised to enforce economic sanctions. And UNSC 678 was the first time states had been authorised to use discretion to achieve a UN objective.\(^{28}\)

On 6 August, the Security Council passed Resolution 661, which imposed a trade embargo upon Iraq.\(^ {29}\) On 8 August Saddam responded to pressure from the international community by announcing that Iraq was annexing Kuwait. The following day the Security Council passed Resolution 662, declaring the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait to be void. On 25 August, with no end to the crisis in sight the Security Council passed Resolution 665 authorising the use of force to enforce the embargo.\(^ {30}\) As will be shown in later chapters the allied countries with whom New Zealand consulted regarded this resolution as being sufficient to cover New Zealand’s wish for a specific UN request for military assistance.

On 29 November the Security Council, following strong urging from the United States, passed Resolution 678. This was the most important Resolution passed during the conflict, and by its nature was ground breaking. It set 15 January 1991 as a deadline for Saddam Hussein to


withdraw from Kuwait or face military action from UN authorised forces to remove the Iraqi troops. By manoeuvring the Security Council into setting a deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal, the Bush administration sought to weaken Congressional opposition to committing US troops in a war zone. Second, the deadline helped Bush strengthen the will of those members of the coalition who preferred to wait for sanctions or negotiations to work\textsuperscript{31}. For New Zealand UNSC 678 came at an opportune time and confirmed the intention of the New Zealand government to contribute troops to the coalition force.

While the coalition force operated under the banner of the UN it was not in actuality a UN force. In fact the UN Charter does not even envisage a UN force per se. Instead the Charter calls on members to hold their forces ready for use by the Security Council. A Military Staff Committee, drawing its members from the permanent five, has existed since 1945 with the role of advising the Security Council on military issues and Co-ordinating military operations\textsuperscript{32}. Article 46 of the UN Charter states that 'plans for the application of armed forces shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee'\textsuperscript{33}. However, it has never been used as it was intended and this continued during the Gulf Crisis\textsuperscript{34}. The Security Council therefore had no means of actually controlling coalition military operations. Instead, it effectively gave the coalition a mandate to carryout its objectives within the terms of the UN

\textsuperscript{31} Bickerton & Pearson, 1991, p. 53.


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., p. 63.

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.,
Security Council resolutions. Military judgement was left to the coalition\textsuperscript{35}.

When the US and UK came to the aid of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia at the beginning of the crisis they did so under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which authorises legitimate self defence until the Security Council acts to restore peace and security. At this point in the crisis they were acting as allies but not as agents of the UN. Before the US could take action to force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait it required a Security Council resolution authorising ‘all necessary means’ and a specific ultimatum date. UNSC 678 accomplished this for the US and transformed the coalition military build-up from a self defence operation under Article 51 to a ‘peace enforcement’ operation under Article 47\textsuperscript{36}. The willingness of the US to work through the UN Security Council also helped strengthen and enhance the legitimacy of the coalition and its military endeavours\textsuperscript{37}.

\textbf{LAST MINUTE DIPLOMACY}

The day after UNSC 678 was passed President Bush announced that he was prepared to go ‘an extra mile for peace’ and proposed diplomatic talks between US and Iraqi officials in order to avert further military conflict. However, Saddam Hussein asserted that he could not possibly meet US Secretary of State until 12 January and rebuffed Bush’s overtures. On 3 January 1991 Bush once again raised the possibility of a diplomatic solution and proposed that Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz meet in Geneva on 9 January. This meeting proved fruitless


\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 139-143.

\textsuperscript{37} Papp, 1996, p. 41.
with Baker accusing the Iraqis of stalling and attempting to test US resolve. Aziz also ‘refused’ to deliver a letter addressed to President Hussein from President Bush\textsuperscript{38}.

On 11 February 1991 when the aerial bombardment of Iraq and Kuwait was well underway and a ground war looked imminent another attempt at a diplomatic solution was made. On this occasion Yevgeny Primakov, a Soviet envoy travelled to Baghdad to meet with President Hussein in an attempt to mediate a settlement and avoid a potentially bloody ground conflict. However, Saddam Hussein made so many changes to the initial Soviet proposal that when it was delivered to the President Bush for consideration it had been severely watered down and he immediately rejected it on these grounds\textsuperscript{39}

**OPERATION DESERT STORM**

UNSC 678 had set a deadline of 15 January for Iraq to withdraw its military forces from Kuwait. If they did not, then UNSC 678 also authorised the use of force in order to remove the Iraqi forces\textsuperscript{40}. On 7 January 1991, the US Department of Defense announced that they believed Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO) to number in excess of 500,000 soldiers, and to include approximately 4000 tanks, 2700 armoured vehicles, and 3000 artillery pieces\textsuperscript{41}. On 12 January 1991, President Bush sought and obtained Congressional approval to commit US military forces to combat under the auspices of

\textsuperscript{38} Yetiv, 1997, pp. 25-27.

\textsuperscript{39} Watson, 1993, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{40} Summers, 1995, p. 23.

UNSC 678. On 17 January 1991, two days after the deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal had passed, the first coalition air strikes began at 3am Baghdad time. This began an incredibly intense aerial bombardment of Iraqi military and infrastructure target in both Iraq and Kuwait. The bombardment utilised a variety of ordnance delivery means, ranging from Tomahawk cruise missiles, to 1950s era heavy bombers such as the B-52, to ultra modern and previously classified stealth fighters. By 3 February 1991 the bomb tonnage dropped on Iraq had reached 2,150,000 total tons. This was more than the total tonnage dropped by US forces during WWII.

On 22 February 1991, President Bush issued a 24 hour ultimatum to Iraq setting a deadline of 8pm Baghdad time on 23 February for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait in order to avoid a ground war. The Iraqis ignored this deadline and at 4am Baghdad time on 24 February the ground war began. The ground war proved to be a stunning success for the coalition as they swept through the Iraqi forces who were completely unprepared for the modern military juggernaut that opposed them. Many of them were conscripts with little training. Also as a result of the ferocious aerial bombardment that they had endured for more than a month much of their supply and communications network had been destroyed, leaving them isolated and starving. The ground war lasted just 100 hours before it was suspended when the Iraqis accepted that it must comply with all UN resolutions regarding their invasion of Kuwait. In this

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42 Summers, 1995, p. 25.


44 Summers, 1995, p. 27.

100 hours of war the coalition forces had not only expelled Iraq from Kuwait, but they had penetrated deep into Iraq itself, and captured more than 80,000 prisoners of war\textsuperscript{46}.

The ground war was halted when Kuwait had been freed as per UNSC 660. Because the US had legitimated its use of force under UNSC resolutions 660 and 678 it was careful not to overstep its mandate and endanger this legitimacy. It was also concerned that if its forces continued deeper into Iraq that the Iraqi military may either strengthen its resistance or resort to chemical warfare\textsuperscript{47}.

Of prime concern was the danger of the coalition collapsing if the ground conflict was prolonged. Arab support was essential for maintaining its stability and many of the Arab coalition members were already suffering significant domestic unrest over their participation. It was felt by many that this support would disappear should the US continue to prosecute the war\textsuperscript{48}. General Schwarzkopf was in doubt, claiming later that he believed that the Arab states would definitely have left the coalition and possibly France too\textsuperscript{49}. Adding to this was the possibility that the US Congress who had approved President Bush's commitment of US forces to combat may remove its approval\textsuperscript{50}.


\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., pp. 370-372.\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 372.\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 374.\end{flushleft}
Post war the US and its allies have continued to use limited military force when dealing with Iraq. The UN has maintained its rigorous economic sanctions as Iraq has failed to comply with intrusive UN inspections aimed at preventing Iraq from building a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. The US has continued to maintain a large and expensive military presence in the region. This military presence along with US foreign policy in the region has angered many Islamists and anti-US radicals.

**THE NEW ZEALAND MILITARY CONTRIBUTION**

New Zealand’s involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict began not with a military commitment but rather a humanitarian one. On 20 August New Zealand offered Saudi Arabia a civilian medical team, and two Andover aircraft for UN duties. Seven days later New Zealand agreed to send a C-130 Hercules to Egypt with 35,000 pounds of milk powder. On 7 September the Hercules began airlifting refugees out of Jordan, for this task it was joined by an RNZAF 727. By the time the two New Zealand aircraft had finished their airlift duties and returned home, they had carried 1500 refugees to countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

On 3 December 1990, a few days after the passing of UNSC 678, the new National government, which had replaced Labour following a General

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Election in October, announced its decision to send a small force of non-combatant troops, as a contribution to the multi national coalition forces in the Gulf\textsuperscript{53}. Cabinet chose to send transport aircraft and medical teams. The C-130H Hercules transport plane has been the backbone of the RNZAF since April 1965 and are in service with sixty-four different air forces worldwide\textsuperscript{54}. On December 23\textsuperscript{rd}, 1990, two Hercules and forty-six personnel from 40 Squadron, RNZAF, arrived at Riyadh, the Saudi capital. During the conflict they served with a British Hercules unit. The contingent's size was increased during the deployment with the addition of a fourth aircrew\textsuperscript{55}.

Altogether New Zealand provided, two medical teams, which comprised both regular and territorial (reserve) personnel and included doctors, nurses, and medics. The first medical team arrived in Bahrain, a small central Gulf Island State on 19 January 1991, serving at a 500 bed USN hospital located at Manama, the capital city. This hospital was just a forty-minute helicopter flight from the front lines. On 21 January 1991, the New Zealand government announced the deployment of a second medical team, drawn from all three services, which arrived in Bahrain on 5 February 1991, and served at a Royal Air Force (RAF) hospital in Muharraq, near the international airport\textsuperscript{56}. Following the liberation of

\textsuperscript{53} Ministry Of Defence, 1991, p. 9.


\textsuperscript{55} Ministry Of Defence, 1991, p.3.

Kuwait the New Zealand contingents were withdrawn and returned to New Zealand in mid-April 1991\textsuperscript{57}.

The Gulf War of 1990/1991 involved combat on the biggest scale seen since the end of World War II. The coalition forces completely dominated the Iraqi military during a short but intense period of air, naval, and land combat. The majority of the fighting was done by troops from the three main coalition members, the US, UK, and France. Like their counterparts from other smaller countries such as Bangladesh and the Philippines, the military forces that New Zealand contributed played only a very minor part in the coalition effort, and were not involved in any combat operations during their stay in the region. However, the participation of smaller countries such as these was considered important by the larger countries as it signalled a wider political and military solidarity.

\textsuperscript{57} J. Crawford, \textit{In the Field of Peace}, Wellington, 1996, p. 40.
Chapter Three

Foreign Policy Decision Making – The Levels of Analysis

As discussed in Chapter One, the Levels of Analysis approach has been chosen as the theoretical framework for this thesis. It comprises three levels of analysis: individual, domestic, and international. Some studies such as Rosenau’s Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, which had six, have defined more levels\(^58\). However, this study will utilise just the three primary levels in order to keep it both concise and firmly rooted in the theoretical literature.

This approach was chosen because it allows for a greater and more rounded examination of the case study. Foreign policy decision making studies often focus on only one particular level, or an aspect thereof. As was also discussed in Chapter One, these studies are, if they are framed correctly, both valid and important in their own right. However, many important aspects and factors of a case study may be overlooked simply because they do not fit the specified criteria. Also, in this case study, as in many others, there are events that do not fit neatly into just one level. It is for this reasons that the Levels of Analysis approach has been chosen.

As will be shown, there are a multitude of factors than can influence foreign policy decision making. However, these factors must be channelled through the various levels and filters of the political structure of the government. Within this governmental structure is a set of authorities with the ability to commit resources and make a decision not easily reversed. This is known as the decision unit. The identity of the decision unit will vary depending on the circumstances of the decision required. More straightforward and routine decision situation will be dealt with at the varying bureaucratic levels in line with established standard operating procedures. However, in the case of matters of vital importance the decision unit will be situated at the very highest levels of government, within the executive leadership. In these situations it is not unusual for the decision unit to be confined to a dominant political leader and a few key advisers.

Individual Level

INTRODUCTION

The Individual Level of Analysis is concerned with how individual characteristic differences among decision makers affects foreign policy behaviour. While the case study for this thesis is limited to the three Prime Ministers (Palmer, Moore, Bolger), this level of analysis does not

have to be limited to purely Heads of Government. For the purposes of analysis a decision maker can be defined as a high level official in a position whereby he/she as an individual can have an impact on the decision. The focus therefore is primarily on political leaders such as heads of government or heads of ministries. Depending on the circumstances, a decision maker's personal characteristics, such as his or her beliefs, motives, or interpersonal style, might influence government foreign policy in terms of (a) strategies in its foreign policy, (b) the style with which its foreign policy is made and executed, and (c) the actual content of the policy. Strategies relate to its basic plans for action, such as taking a generally co-operative or competitive stance with other nations, whether it prefers to act alone or with other nations, whether it prefers to engage in bilateral or multilateral agreements, or the emphasis it puts on its various self interests 60.

**POLITICAL LEADERS AS DECISION MAKERS**

The higher the level at which the decision maker operates the more likely his/her personal characteristics are to have an impact on the decision making process. However this will vary depending on the nature of the political system in which the decision maker operates. This will be explained further later in this chapter under the heading Political Culture. Lower level officials on the other hand, generally occupy more defined roles and may operate within a hierarchical infrastructure61.

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Because the decision makers targeted by this study were all Prime Ministers it is appropriate to single out characteristics that Margaret Hermann suggests impact on foreign policy behaviour. For example:

1. *Interest* in foreign affairs,
2. *Training* in foreign affairs,
3. General *sensitivity* to the international environment.\(^{62}\)

In effect a political leader’s interest, training, and sensitivity to the international environment act as filters on the relationship between their personal characteristics and the government’s foreign policy. These three variables indicate how much attention the leader is likely to pay to foreign policy, the type of foreign policy behaviours the leader is likely to display, and how consistent the relationship is likely to be.\(^{63}\)

Hermann also says that a political leader’s personal characteristics will have an impact on foreign policy behaviour under three sets of conditions. These are:

1. Situations that force the political leader to define or interpret them. For example ambiguous situations where varying participants present different analyses.

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2. Situations in which the political leader is more likely to take part in the decision making process himself/herself. For example in times of crisis.

3. Situations in which the political leader has a wide decision latitude. Examples of this include the “honeymoon” period following a landslide election.\footnote{M.O. Hermann in East, Salmore & Hermann, 1978, pp. 51-52. And Kissinger in Rosenau, 1969, p. 267.}

This is relevant in our case study because as the crisis in the Gulf unfolded Jim Bolger’s popularity enabled him to push through legislation leading to the commitment of New Zealand military personnel. See Chapters Four, Five, and Six for further discussion of this.

**COGNITION**

An individual’s environment contains so many stimuli, so much potential information, that he or she will require some mechanism to discriminate between what is or is not important, and to give some form of order and meaning to what would otherwise be an overwhelming mess of sensory data. Psychologists have labelled this process as cognition. Cognition therefore involves those mental activities associated with acquiring, organising and using knowledge.\footnote{J. Vogler, “Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Psychological Approaches” in M. Clark, & B. White, Understanding Foreign Policy, Aldershot, 1989, pp. 135-136.}

Cognitive decision making is making a choice within the limits of what you consciously know. Because there are often many things beyond the boundaries of what a decision maker knows or can possibly know, cognitive decision making has also been called “bounded rationality.”\footnote{G. Allison, & P. Zelikov, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd Ed., New York, 1999, p. 20.}
There are both internal and external factors that place cognitive limits on a decision maker. Internal factors include intellectual and physical limitations. No human decision maker has the intellectual or physical capacity to analyse completely and accurately the mass and complexity of information that is available. Another internal cognitive factor is human emotion. Humans will often ignore or suppress information or will not consider a policy option because they are emotionally unable to do so. This does not however mean that they are emotionally disabled, rather it is more a case of human beings sometimes not “knowing” something because they “don’t want to know” it.\footnote{J.T. Rourke, \textit{International Politics on the World Stage}, 5\textsuperscript{th} Ed., Guildford, CT, 1995, pp. 122-123, 139. And Frankel, 1988, pp. 97-99. And C.A. Powell, J.W. Dyson & H.E. Purkitt, “Opening the ‘Black Box’: Cognitive Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Decision Making” in Hermann, Kegley Jr. & Rosenau, 1987, pp. 206-209.}

Given that these cognitive boundaries exist, it is important to understand how decision makers cope with the limitations they operate under. Four possible mental strategies have been identified\footnote{W. Nester, \textit{International Relations: Geo-Political and Geo-Economic Conflict and Co-operation}, New York, 1995, pp. 128-129. And Rourke, 1995, p. 124. And Powell, Dyson & Purkitt in Hermann, Kegley Jr. & Rosenau, 1987, pp. 209-210.}. They are:

1. **Seeking Cognitive Consistency** - Seeking cognitive consistency is a process whereby decision makers can often attempt to suppress ideas and information that do not follow the accepted interpretations of events and actors.\footnote{R.N. Lebow, \textit{Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis}, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 102-103. And Rourke, 1995, p. 124. And Vogler in Clark & White, 1989, pp. 145-146.}

2. **Wishful Thinking** - When human beings make a decision they generally acquire some form of emotional stake in its wisdom and success. Often the decision maker will then be very...
reticent with regard to reversing a decision once made, and will increasingly believe that their choice will succeed\textsuperscript{70}.

3. **Limiting the Scope of Decisions** - Because it is easier to make small decisions rather than big ones decision makers will sometimes take an incremental approach to decision making\textsuperscript{71}.

4. **Using Heuristic Devices** - A heuristic device is a mental shortcut that allows an individual to skip the long and detailed gathering and analysis of information and come to a decision quickly. It works by screening out most of the flood of incoming information, while clinging to key elements. Examples of heuristic devices include belief systems, stereotypes, and historical analogies\textsuperscript{72}.

**Belief Systems**

A decision maker's beliefs represent his or her fundamental mental assumptions about the world. These beliefs can be very general, and include for example notions about his or her ability to control events in their own life, or they can be more specific such as notions about his or her ability to shape political events for their nation. In fact an individual’s prior beliefs and expectations will play an important role in their perceptions during the entire foreign policy decision making process from the initial definition of the situation through problem understanding, analysis, evaluation of alternatives, and choice. An

\textsuperscript{70} Rourke, 1995, p. 124.

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.

individual's beliefs will often cause them to react positively to events or individuals who share their beliefs. This also means a negative reaction is likely to occur with regard to events and individuals who contravene the belief set.\(^\text{73}\)

**Stereotypes**

Decision makers often operate in an environment that is not only highly complex and uncertain but which is also laden with threat and insecurity. This problem can be compounded by the difficulties of communicating across cultural and linguistic boundaries, and a pattern whereby national self-images are often sustained by the portrayal of foreigners in a stereotyped and rather less than flattering light.\(^\text{74}\)

**Historical Analogies**

History, and the use of historical analogies have an impact on both the decision making process and the individual decision maker. This impact generally occurs in areas such as defining the situation, and the determination and justification of strategy.\(^\text{75}\)

Two analogies that are often used in contemporary international relations are the "Munich Syndrome" and the "Vietnam Syndrome".

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\(^{74}\) Vogler in Clark & White, 1989, p. 137. And Rourke, 2001, p. 111.

The Munich Syndrome relates to the lesson drawn by post World War II leaders that you should not compromise with aggression. The Vietnam Syndrome relates to the concept of the danger of becoming tied down in a drawn out conflict with little or no realistic opportunity for a successful outcome. This syndrome in particular has played an important role in US foreign policy over the last twenty years. When the possibility of a military intervention has been discussed, particularly an intervention in a civil war, the term “no more Vietnams” has been used by those opposed. This was particularly so during the 1980s when the Reagan administration attempted several times to build up public support for an intervention in Central America.

When President Bush decided to go to war with Iraq over Kuwait, both “syndromes” were used in the debate in Congress, with supporters of Bush drawing on the Munich Syndrome while his opponents used the Vietnam Syndrome\(^76\). Since that time, these two syndromes have also been used to either advocate or oppose military action in areas such as Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor.

**PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS**

Why does a leader choose a certain path? What are the individual internal factors that helped motivate the decision? For the purposes of this thesis seven individual personal characteristics have been identified. These are:

1. Personality,
2. Motives - Ego and Ambition,
3. Decision Style,

\(^76\) Rourke, 1995, pp. 136-138.
4. Interpersonal Style,
5. Biological Factors,
6. Role Factors, and
7. Group-Behaviour Factors\textsuperscript{77}.

\textit{Personality}

Because each decision maker has a different personality, it will affect the decision making process in varying ways. The greater the interest in foreign policy of the decision maker the greater the impact of their personality. The wider the decision making latitude of the decision maker, the greater the impact of their personality. Also the behaviour of the decision maker in a crisis and the heuristic devices they use for filtering information will help determine the impact of their personality on the decision making process\textsuperscript{78}.

\textit{Motives - Ego and Ambition}

Another important personal characteristic that can have an impact of a decision maker is motivation, primarily its source. Motivation here is not what the decision maker perceives in terms of national interest but rather the individual’s ego and ambitions. The primary motivation is the


desire for power through either of two means (a) achievement, or (b) approval\textsuperscript{79}.

\textit{Decision Style}

A decision maker's decision style is his or her preferred method of making decisions. The various possible components of decision making style include factors such as an openness to new information, a preference for certain levels of risk, complexity in structuring and processing information, confidence, and an ability to tolerate ambiguity. Other positive/negative factors that may play a role in a decision maker's decision style include preconceived preferences for compromise as opposed to conflict, planning as opposed to activity, and optimising as opposed to satisfying\textsuperscript{80}.

\textit{Interpersonal Style}

Interpersonal style is the characteristic way one decision maker deals with other decision makers. Margaret Hermann points to two traits, paranoia, and Machiavellianism, that are often attributed to decision makers\textsuperscript{81}. Identifiable interpersonal characteristics include the decision maker's method of persuading others – threats or praise, his or her


\textsuperscript{81} Paranoia can be defined as a mental disorder characterised by delusions of persecution and self-importance or an abnormal tendency to suspect and mistrust others, while Machiavellianism is unscrupulous scheming.
sensitivity to others, sense of political timing, and he or she is a task orientated, or person orientated, decision maker\textsuperscript{82}.

\textit{Biological Factors}

An alternative explanation of political behaviour in general can be seen in the debate over “nature versus nurture”. This debate is centred around whether human behaviour is based on animal instinct and other innate emotional and physical drives (nature) or instead based upon a process of socialisation and intellect (nurture). With regard to political behaviour in particular, the field of biopolitics focuses on the relationship between it and the physical nature of humans\textsuperscript{83}.

Gender as a biopolitical factor is studied in an attempt to answer the question of whether or not gender can make a difference in the attitudes and actions of politicians. The principal focus of these studies is to find out whether an equal representation of women among policy makers or, even putting women almost exclusively in charge of foreign and defence policy would make a significant difference in international affairs\textsuperscript{84}.

\textit{Role Factors}

The role of the decision maker within the overall foreign policy decision making process is extremely relevant because it will often give an indicator of the motive behind a decision maker’s actions. The key to this is understanding expectations, primarily the self expectations of the decision maker and the expectations of others, related to a role. An


\textsuperscript{84} Rourke, 1995, pp. 126-128.
example of a role is that of the office of Prime Minister or President, while individuals who hold that office come and go, the role continues, though filled by another individual\textsuperscript{85}. This case study is a prime example of this as there were three people who filled the same key role of Prime Minister through the decision making period. The self expectations of an individual in regard to their role will determine the approaches that individual takes toward decision making. Also they will be aware of the expectations others hold towards them and the conduct of their role. Together these expectations will often influence the behaviour of the decision maker and can sometimes be used as an indicator of motive\textsuperscript{86}.

\textit{Group-Behaviour Factors}

It is a well established fact that people will act differently in organisations than if they are alone. This is due to the fact that they do not have the freedom to directly choose the course of action, instead they must take part in what is effectively a bargaining process with the other members of the enlarged decision making units that occur in the organisational setting\textsuperscript{87}.

Group decision making often becomes an essentially consensus building process. This is because consensus is seen by many as enhancing the efficient performance of the decision body\textsuperscript{88}. However consensus is not

\textsuperscript{85} There are of course some exceptions to this. In some Middle East countries Leaders hold onto their office for life. Examples of this include Libya's Qadhafi, and Iraq's Saddam Hussein.

\textsuperscript{86} Rourke, 1995, p. 130.

\textsuperscript{87} Maoz, 1990, p. 23.

\textsuperscript{88} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 341.
always a positive thing and in a process Irving Janis calls “groupthink”
can produce negative results. Examples of this include:

1. Ignoring or suppressing dissidents and discordant
   information and policy options
2. Reluctance by subordinates to offer discordant opinions, and
3. Limiting policy choices<sup>89</sup>.

Janis in fact goes much further than this when he says that in
circumstances of extreme crisis, group contagion sometimes leads to
collective panic, violent acts of scapegoating, and other forms of group
madness<sup>90</sup>. While he stresses that groupthink is not universal, in that
not all groups suffer from it, he does point to a number of these
potentially major problems than can occur as a result of group decision
making. However, he also points out that these problems can also arise
from other causes of human stupidity as well. These include factors such
as erroneous intelligence, information overload, fatigue, blinding
prejudice, and ignorance<sup>91</sup>.

An increasing trend over the last forty years, since the time of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, has been the preference for conducting foreign policy
decision making in a group setting. This is partly due to the widespread
belief that the interaction of several minds will broaden the range of
“experience,” and that “experience” is believed to be the best source of
knowledge<sup>92</sup>. Theoretically there are two main areas of concern with this

<sup>89</sup> I.L. Janis, *Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiascos*, 1972,

<sup>90</sup> Janis, 1972, pp. 3, 10-13.


<sup>92</sup> H. Kissinger, “The Policymaker and the Intellectual” in J.N. Rosenau, Ed., *International Politics and
Foreign Policy*, 1961, p. 274.
approach. The first is that the decision maker usually appoints people with similar beliefs and motives to his or her own as advisers, thus helping to ensure that their viewpoint will permeate the wider bureaucracy\textsuperscript{93}. The second area of concern is the use of committees when a decision maker comes under pressure from his or her subordinates with either conflicting or dubious advice and they decide to seek outside/unbiased advice\textsuperscript{94}. However committees themselves have several drawbacks. First, committee members require extensive briefing, thus placing further strain on the bureaucracy; second, by the time that the members are at their best, the committee is usually being wound up; and finally, the members usually come from the same social strata as the officials and therefore rarely provide significantly different viewpoints\textsuperscript{95}.

In fact, as Henry Kissinger points out committees almost seem designed to produce the status quo. He claims that the ideal “committee person” is one who does not make their associates uncomfortable, and does not operate with ideas that are too distant from those generally accepted. Thus, he claims the general thrust of committees is toward a standard of average performance. Kissinger bases this analysis on the rationalisation that because a complicated idea cannot be absorbed by ear, particularly when it is new, committees lean toward what fits in with the most familiar experience of their members. Hence they produce great pressure in favour of the \textit{status quo}\textsuperscript{96}.

\textsuperscript{93} Janis, 1972, p. 3. And M.G. Hermann in East, Salmore, & Hermann, 1978, p. 61.

\textsuperscript{94} Kissinger in Rosenau, 1961, p. 275.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Ibid}.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Ibid}., p. 276.
CONCLUSION

What this level of analysis shows is that there is a great deal of scope for variance of behaviour between different individuals. How a decision maker views the various stimuli of the situation will play a role in the determination of the eventual outcome. Thus, it is essential when analysing decision makers to judge their cognitive ability. Do they seek consistency? Do they try and limit the scope of the decision? Or do they use heuristic devices as shortcuts? Is their decision making ability impaired by the basic assumptions of their belief systems?

Added to this are the factors of a decision maker’s personal characteristics, personality, motives, and style which will all influence the decision making process. How a decision maker views his or her role in the process, and how he or she interacts in a group situation impacts on the process itself.

Some of these factors will impact on the process, others will not. For different decision makers, different factors will play different roles. Thus the identification of the key decision makers and the factors that influenced them is an important indicator in the analysis of foreign policy decision making. This will be highlighted in Chapter Four which looks at the key individuals in greater depth.
The Domestic Level of Analysis for foreign policy decision making is a large and complex structure. It encompasses two main sets of factors, each of which provides for an important element of domestic level analysis. These two factors are political culture, and sub-national actors.

There are two main elements to political culture. These are the national historical experience, and the national belief system. They are important because lessons from the past sometimes offer appropriate pointers to contemporary situations, while levels of accountability and institutionalisation offer an insight into the domestic level decision making processes.

Sub-national actors are an important set of factors in domestic level analysis because the state is not a unitary actor. There are in fact many groups and organisations who are involved in the policy process, not just the small decision making unit at the top. For the purposes of this analysis seven key sub-national actors have been identified, which should be used as a baseline for this kind of analysis, and not used with rigidity. Not all of the identified actors will be relevant in every case, while in some case studies there may be other actors that can be identified and included.

Together these two sets of factors provide an analyst with the relevant details of a state's geography, economy, demography, political structure, culture and tradition, and its military-strategic situation. Together these
details show the structure from which the decision making process is formed. They also have the spin-off effect of showing the constraints that are then placed upon this process at the domestic level.

POLITICAL CULTURE

As described previously political culture has two main sources, the first is the national historical experience, and the second is the national belief system, or its ideas and ideologies\textsuperscript{97}.

The first of these two source dimensions is the national historical experience. History often provides "lessons" from past situations which can be applied to contemporary ones. Also by studying patterns that appear in a state's claims and actions, we can begin to understand its past, current, and possibly, future policy\textsuperscript{98}.

The second element, the national belief systems, or ideas and ideologies, is reflected in the form of political system under which the state operates. There are two main elements worth considering when studying political system structure. The first is accountability, which refers to the extent of democratisation within the system, with particular respect to the public's ability to participate in the political process itself. Institutionalisation refers to the wide acceptance of the political system processes, and their establishment as a feature of the political order\textsuperscript{99}.

\textsuperscript{97} Rourke, 1995, pp. 103-104. And Kissinger in Rosenau, 1969, p. 263.


Another distinction in political structure theory is that of open and closed systems. Openness refers to the level of the government's accountability, or the extent to which a government is subject to influences from society. States that are considered closed, are those of an authoritarian style where public opinion and political interests are less likely to have an impact. There are also some democracies, which are theoretically open, where one party or coalition dominates political life, while there are some authoritarian regimes which have a highly competitive internal political life with major exchanges of power between party factions and/or competition between party, state, and military institutions. As well as the distinction between open and closed systems, states also differ in many other ways. The governments of different states vary in the types and number of organisations and institutions within them, the distribution of influence among these organisations and institutions, the numbers and types of personnel in those institutions, and the societal interests they represent.

Political culture is also a changeable variable. However shifts in political culture are normally evolutionary, this is particularly so in stable political systems like New Zealand. Newer political systems, such as post-colonial or post-revolutionary systems, are however much more susceptible to dramatic changes in political culture, as has been seen throughout Africa and Southeast Asia.

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103 Rourke, 1995, p. 104.
SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS

Below the international level the state is not a unitary structure, instead it should be considered a shell with many actors who all have an impact on the decision making process to varying degrees. These sub-national actors include both governmental and non-governmental organisations as well as the media and the people\textsuperscript{104}. For the purposes of this analysis framework the following seven sub-national actors have been identified:

1. Political Leadership
2. Bureaucracies
3. Legislatures
4. Political Opposition
5. Interest Groups
6. The Media
7. The People

As each case differs in outcome, so too will it in the levels of input from each of the seven sub-national actors. Factors in this include the size of the state making the decision, and which specific part of the foreign policy spectrum is the decision affecting. Sub-national inputs on a question of defence and national security will naturally differ from those surrounding a question of immigration or trade. As each of the seven are explained in more detail their relevance to the case study will also be explored.

Political Leadership

The political leadership of a country is the strongest and most important sub-national actor in the foreign policy process. By political leadership we mean the country’s executive leadership, a President or Prime Minister, and their Cabinet. While these terms are generally generic to democratic regimes, for the purposes of this study we should also include the corresponding fixtures in authoritarian or monarchical regimes, such as, for example, the General Secretary and Politburo in a communist regime.

The executive leadership, however, does not get everything it wants. It too faces constraints. These constraints though, often differ depending on the institutional style of executive leadership. For example, the institutional arrangements in a parliamentary system will result in different constraints than those found within a presidential system\textsuperscript{105}.

In New Zealand for example it is Cabinet rather than the Prime Minister that is ultimately responsible for decision making. This is somewhat misleading in that the Prime Minister effectively operates as Chairman and will normally guide Cabinet’s policy directions. However, because Cabinet essentially relies on consensus it is possible for a Prime Minister to have policies he or she favours effectively vetoed by his or her Cabinet colleagues. Cabinet also has a policy of collective responsibility, whereby once a decision has been made or approved by Cabinet all Ministers are bound to support it, even those who may have dissented during Cabinet discussions\textsuperscript{106}.

\textsuperscript{105} Hagan, 1993, p. 25.

This is of vital importance to this thesis as Cabinet provided significant constraint on the ability to act of two of the three Prime Ministers in this case study. This will be examined in much greater detail however in Chapter Four.

Bureaucracies

Every state, whatever its size, strength, or type of government, is influenced by its bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are career governmental personnel, as opposed to those who are political appointees or elected officials. Technically, the bureaucracy is legally subordinate to the state's political leaders, however in many cases the bureaucracies are so large and powerful that they prove extremely difficult to control because the vast bureaucratic mechanisms develop a momentum and vested interest of their own\textsuperscript{107}.

The role of the bureaucrat should not be downplayed. While it is generally assumed that ministers create policy and bureaucrats execute it, it is the bureaucrats who preserve the continuity of policy, while the foreign ministers of different parties and views come and go. It is also important to note that these ministers (and Prime Ministers) usually rise to power based on their achievements in domestic politics; accordingly when they become responsible for foreign affairs they naturally become dependent on expert advice\textsuperscript{108}.


\textsuperscript{108} Frankel, 1988, p. 86.
An important purpose of the bureaucracy is to establish standard operating procedures, which will cope effectively with most problems\(^{109}\). In this way bureaucracies take on a distinctive organisational form. And it is as an organisation, or system of organisations that they should best be analysed.

While a leader handpicks his or her decision makers, they inherit a veritable army of career bureaucrats whose primary loyalties are to themselves and their respective organisations. It is not uncommon for each organisation within the bureaucracy to operate like an interest group, with its own values and priorities. This often results in a “behind the scenes” struggle between the different organisations over their separate interests on various issues\(^{110}\). This will be highlighted in Chapter Five by the strain in the relationship between the Ministry of Defence and New Zealand Defence Force that occurred during the decision making process.

Decision makers are dependent on their bureaucratic organisations for supplying them with facts, but what facts they are told often depends on what subordinates believe and what they pass on. It is relatively common for bureaucracies to filter information unintentionally. This can happen in several ways such as the passing on of information that they inaccurately believe to be true, tailoring its recommendations to suit its own preferred option, and altering the implementation of policy\(^{111}\).

\(^{109}\) Kissinger in Rosenau, 1969, p. 263.


The bureaucracy in New Zealand in 1990 was in the process of adapting to radical changes as a result of government reforms in the late 1980s. This impacted on the advisory component of the decision making process and will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Five.

**Legislatures**

The legislature often has much less of a foreign policy role than the executive branch leadership and the bureaucrats, but this does not mean that it is powerless, or has no role at all. However, its exact influence varies from country to country. In non-democratic countries legislatures have little impact as they do little more than rubber stamp decisions made at the executive level, and are otherwise used, generally, as a tool for mobilising the masses\textsuperscript{112}. This of course does not mean that legislatures never play an important role in foreign policy. However, legislative activity is most likely, and important, when there is an intersection between domestic and international spheres\textsuperscript{113}.

In a parliamentary system, the majority party can often be divided on an issue and debate it vigorously, but once a decision is made it tends to vote as a bloc within the legislature. Due to its size and factional nature a parliament cannot effectively initiate foreign policy in its own right, and instead is essentially limited, outside of debate, to the power of veto over policies proposed by governments, should sufficient support exist, including the ratification of treaties\textsuperscript{114}. In this case study, as will be examined in Chapter Five, the legislature had a minimal impact on the

\textsuperscript{112} Nester, 1995, p. 132.

\textsuperscript{113} Rourke, 1995, p. 112.

\textsuperscript{114} Frankel, 1988, p. 85. And Nester, 1995, p. 133.
decision making process with agreements made to debate identified
issues on the proviso that decision making be left to Cabinet.

One country in which the legislature does have an impact is the United
States. There is little party discipline within the United States Congress,
where every representative and Senator is able to vote for his or her own
interests regardless of the position encouraged by the party leadership.
Factions of similarly minded legislators, often representing powerful
interests, have the ability to have an enormous impact on policy. Due to
its constitutional powers over trade and the declaration of war, Congress
leads as often as it follows in American foreign policy. If the President
represents one party and the Congress is controlled by the other, as
often happens, the result can be either bi-partisan consensus or
legislative deadlock depending on the issue and the ability of the
President.\textsuperscript{115}

\textit{Political Opposition}

Every political system has a competitive nature between those in power
and those who seek to replace them. In democratic political systems, this
opposition is usually legitimate and takes the form of organised political
parties, though often rival politicians may also exist within the leader's
own party. In non-democratic systems, the very nature of the system
often means that the opposition is normally less overt and often less
'peaceful' than in most democratic countries, however it does exist\textsuperscript{116}.

\textsuperscript{115} Nester, 1995, p. 133.

\textsuperscript{116} Rourke, 1995, pp. 112-113.
Political opposition can generally be classified into one of four main groups. These are:

1. Opposition from within the ruling party or group,
2. Opposition from other political parties,
3. Opposition from the military and para-military actors, and
4. Opposition from locally and regionally based groups\textsuperscript{117}.

The strength of political opposition can be assessed by two key attributes of opposition actors. These are:

1. Their organisational strength, and
2. The intensity of their challenge\textsuperscript{118}.

The intensity of an opposition group’s challenge to the regime can be categorised into three basic levels. These are:

1. Opposition to the regime’s overall policy program,
2. Opposition to the continuation of the regime in power, and
3. Opposition to the basic norms and structures of the established political system\textsuperscript{119}.

In this case study political opposition came from two sources: (a) from within the ruling party (in the case of Labour), and (b) from other political parties. Labour suffered from factionalisation over several issues, much of which dated from the time of David Lange’s leadership.

\textsuperscript{117} Hagan, 1993, pp. 78-88.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 79.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., pp. 79-80.
factionalisation undoubtedly had an impact on the decision making process and will be examined in Chapter Four. There was also of course a General Election in the middle of the time period of the case study there was obviously active opposition from other political parties given New Zealand's free and democratic electoral process.

*Interest Groups*

Bureaucracies and political parties often operate as interest groups. However, interest groups are more generally considered to be associations of private citizens (rather than public officials) with similar policy views, who attempt to place pressure on the government in order to convince them to adopt these views as policy. Historically, interest groups have been less active on foreign policy than domestic policy due to the limited effect of foreign policy on their concerns. However the increasing inter-connection of domestic and foreign policy has led to a rise in interest group activity in the foreign policy sphere$^{120}$.

Interest Groups come in many different forms and sizes. Some have a broad area of interest, such as combined trade union movements, while others such as anti-abortion groups have a much more specific interest. Some are so large and organised that they have a bureaucracy of their own, or operate on a trans-national basis, while others are so small that they constitute just a handful of people, who come together in an informal and intermittent manner. Interest groups are often wide spread and include fields such as churches, labour, economists, ethnic identity and culture, research and development, and the media. The amount of

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influence that interest groups can have on foreign policy behaviour is determined by a combination of factors such as resources, exposure, and audience.121

The most active interest groups in the case study were the various peace groups, both established and ad hoc, who campaigned vigorously during the crisis period. While not directly influential in the governmental decision making process of this case study they did however have a role in influencing public opinion by raising their concerns publicly.

The Media

The media, both electronic and print, is an interesting category of sub-national actor as it actually crosses boundaries and sits in between interest groups and the people. The media does at times function as an interest group placing pressure on governments, as its content is generally a reflection of the views of management, readers, and viewers. However, it also has a major role as a prime information source for the people. With this dual function it is in fact worthy of discussion on its own merit.

The focus of this section is not on the media as a whole but rather on the news media in particular. This is because it is the most important faction of the media with regard to foreign policy. In fact, the quality of international news coverage has a major bearing on determining the role that the public is able to, and should, play in the conduct of foreign

affairs. This is because, for good or bad, this is the major way that the public is informed on international issues\textsuperscript{122}.

In New Zealand at the time much of the initial news was a mixture of international reporting by major news networks and local discussion pieces by politicians, academics, and other specialists. However as the crisis became prolonged it essentially reverted to reproduction of international reporting.

\textbf{The People}

To an extent, public opinion plays a part in the foreign policy decision making process of every state. This is particularly so in democratic countries where elected officials must always keep an eye on public opinion because after all it is the general public who will decide his or her fate at the next election. Authoritarian leaders while not beholden to voters, must still be mindful of the general public mood as they still need public support to maintain the regime or else face being overthrown. Public opinion can also be contradictory and fickle as it often changes day by day, issue by issue\textsuperscript{123}.

Public opinion on foreign policy issues varies because in many countries the general public is far more concerned with domestic issues and does not pay detailed attention to international issues. A crisis situation will draw the attention of much of the public, as will an issue that bisects the domestic and international spheres, however this tends to be an issue by


issue phenomenon\textsuperscript{124}. As has already been discussed, the main sources of information for the public come from the media, whether they are reporting government statements or international events, therefore public opinion can at time be an extension that promoted by the media.

Public opinion has the ability, if it is intense enough to be considered by decision makers, to place broad constraints on the foreign policy behaviour of a state. However, governments generally pay far more attention to political opinion, informed opinion from academics and political commentators, and to interest groups\textsuperscript{125}.

Public opinion played a role in this case study by virtue of the fact that the National victory at the October General Election essentially dictated that New Zealand troops would be committed to the coalition force. It also played a role in the nature of the military commitment as National sought to maintain public support for its position. This will be examined in more detail in Chapter Five.

CONCLUSION

Political culture will set the tone or context for the domestic setting. The national historical experience and belief system, along with levels of accountability and institutionalisation provides the framework in which the sub-national actors operate. Differences in these factors provide different political cultures such as democracies and dictatorships and will therefore also impact upon the process in a varied manner.

\textsuperscript{124} Rourke, 1995, pp. 116-117.

\textsuperscript{125} Reynolds, 1994, p. 88.
For the purposes of this analytical framework seven key sub-national actors have been identified. As will be highlighted by the case study they will not all be of equal importance in any given circumstance. Instead, depending on the nature of the foreign policy decision required, one or more will probably rise in importance. However, because the identity of these primary actors varies all must be considered in the analysis. It is far better to discuss and dismiss a factor than to overlook it and invalidate any conclusions.

INTERNATIONAL

INTRODUCTION

The international level of analysis is focused on contextual changes that occur within the international system. The international system itself can be defined as the patterns of interactions and relationships between major political actors, seen together as a single unit\textsuperscript{126}.

In the modern international system states are interdependent, no state can effectively isolate itself from the rest of the world, hence the behaviour of a given state will affect other states in the system. This can be either deliberate or accidental. In some cases, such as the Persian Gulf War of 1990/1991, the behaviour of one state can affect the entire system\textsuperscript{127}.


There are two important elements to understanding the international system. The first is identifying the actors in the system. Who or what impacts on foreign policy decision making at the international level? The second is establishing the balance of power within the system. Which actors are dominant? Which actors have an impact on the case study? How and why?

**ACTORS IN THE SYSTEM**

The actions and attitudes of international actors will have a bearing on the foreign policy decision making of all states. This is because no state is able to function independently in the system. All modern states, including the United States can only function properly with at least some level of international co-operation or inter-dependence.

So, how do you define an international actor? For the purposes of this thesis three main criteria have been selected. They are:

1. The entity must perform significant and continuing functions – significant in the sense that it has a continuing impact on interstate relations.
2. The entity is considered significant by the foreign policy makers of states and is given significance in the formation of states' foreign policies,
3. The entity has some degree of autonomy or freedom in its own decision making\footnote{Russett & Starr, 1985, p. 52.}.
Given this criteria, four main types of actors have been identified as existing in the international system. These are:

1. States,
2. Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs),
3. International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), and
4. Multi-National Corporations (MNCs)\textsuperscript{129}.

The first of these four, the nation-state, is the traditional unit of analysis for international relations and the international system in particular. However, the twentieth century, the last half in particular, gave rise to a number of other institutions who need to be considered as actors in their own right. The first type of these to be considered is Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations; the second is International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) like Amnesty or Greenpeace; and the third is Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) like Shell, Coca-Cola, General Motors, or Mitsubishi\textsuperscript{130}.

Why do organisations like Greenpeace or General Motors qualify? They qualify because any organised unit that is able to command the identification, interests, and loyalty of individuals, and that is able to affect interstate relations, becomes by default a competitor of states\textsuperscript{131}.

\textsuperscript{129} East in East, Salmore & Hermann, 1978, pp. 145-147.


It is a widely accepted fact that the state is the primary actor in the international system. There are a plethora of definitions of a state within the literature, none of which are necessary for the purposes of this analysis. What is relevant is that while the state has many competitors in the international system, it has several key advantages. The first is its legal status of formal sovereignty, but the state also it also possesses demographic, economic, military, and geographic capabilities that most if not all other actors are unable to match.\footnote{Russett & Starr, 1985, pp. 50-60.}

Most of New Zealand’s international interaction during the crisis period was with other states, primarily Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States. This will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Six.

*International Governmental Organisations (IGOs)*

Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) are associations of states established by mutual agreement. IGOs have at least two member states as well as a permanent structure and staff, whose primary loyalty is, theoretically at least, to the IGO. Most IGOs have a specific function, whether it be economic as in the case of IGOs such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or military like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The most important IGO is the United Nations, which in turn also has a number of specialised subsidiary IGOs such as the World Health Organisation (WHO).

While the activities of trans-national IGOs extend beyond national boundaries, they are still based on the principle of sovereignty, and each
state within the organisation is the legal equal of all the others\textsuperscript{133}. IGOs also provide a forum for co-operation, and an administration to assist in providing the means of implementation. They also provide channels of communication for states which are often either unable, or unwilling, to partake in bi-lateral, or even conventional multi-lateral communications\textsuperscript{134}. In 1909, there were just 37 traditional IGOs. By 1997 this number had risen to 1850, an increase of 5000\%\textsuperscript{135}. There are four main focus areas for IGOs: (1) Peace and Security, (2) Social and Economic Development, (3) Human Rights, and (4) Humanitarian Assistance\textsuperscript{136}.

By far the most important IGO, and the only one explicitly relevant to this case study is the United Nations. The power of the UN effectively rests with the Security Council, which has five permanent members – Russia, China, France, Britain, and the USA – and ten non-permanent members, who are voted onto the Council and serve on a rotational basis. The five permanent members also have the power of veto, which means that any and all matters voted on by the Security Council will be dismissed unless there is unanimity amongst them. During the Cold War the Security Council was effectively paralysed by constant use of the veto along strategic voting lines. In 1990 there was a subtle change of emphasis which had an important impact upon the outcome of the Gulf War. No longer constrained by their Cold War ideologies and strategies


\textsuperscript{135} Tafe in Cusimano, 2000, p. 217.

\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., p. 225.
the permanent members voted together on the many resolutions that related to this crisis.

New Zealand, as a small state, would generally be expected to expend most of its foreign policy resources through IGOs such as the UN. This is highlighted in the case study by New Zealand's initial emphasis on the role of the UN in the crisis. However, as it became apparent that it was the United States that was taking the lead role, albeit under UN sanction, this focus changed to bi-lateral interactions as will be discussed in Chapter six.

*International Non-Governmental Organisations*

The main distinction between IGOs and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) is membership. NGOs differ from IGOs in that their members are individuals or private associations, rather than states, as is the case with IGOs. Like IGOs they have a permanent structure and staff, but they are not always purely political organisations. Like IGOs, NGOs deal with a wide variety of matters. There are religious bodies, such as the Catholic Church; professional organisations: sports organisations, like football's governing body FIFA; trade union groups; and political parties, all of whom can be classified as NGOs.

INGOs are NGOs that operate across state boundaries. While these INGOs generally perform relatively low-level tasks, mainly promoting contact across state boundaries on issues of common interest and assisting in non-governmental communication between individuals of many nations. In many ways INGOs help to bring the global society together in a similar way that private groups do in building a civil society.

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within a state. While their total membership is only a fraction of the world’s population they can sometimes function as pressure groups, affecting national governments or international organisations.\textsuperscript{138}

INGOs played only a very minor role in New Zealand’s decision making during this crisis period, with New Zealand consulting with the Red Cross and contributing humanitarian assistance to the Egyptian Red Crescent. This will be further explained in Chapter Six.

\textit{Multi-National Corporations}

Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) are private business firms whose activities straddle at least one state boundary, though many of them have business operations spread around the globe. Unlike a state whose sprawling bureaucracy is multi-layered, they are often organised hierarchically, and run centrally. MNCs are not new to the international system. in fact many of them predate the states that have been created since the end of World War II. Since the end of World War II, MNCs have become major actors on the international scene. Like states, MNCs have their own spheres of influence through the division of world markets. In many cases they often engage in diplomacy and espionage. the traditional tools of states. However, more importantly, MNCs have very large economic resources, which gives them a huge advantage over not just many of the newer and smaller states in the system, but some of the older ones as well.\textsuperscript{139}

\textsuperscript{138} Russett \& Starr, 1985, pp. 57-58.

Despite the undoubted interest of MNCs, such as the major oil companies, in the crisis, a survey of the MERT archives and secondary sources such as newspaper and journal articles has found no evidence that MNCs played a significant role in the decision making process of this case study.

**STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM**

Foreign Policy is not made in a vacuum. In most cases foreign policy is a reaction to the behaviour of other actors in the system. Because of this, the policy options available to a decision maker are often shaped by the relative power of all actors involved\(^{140}\). All states are theoretically equal, but in reality some states are more equal than others. This is due to the unequal distribution of resources that exists in the international system. This unequal distribution of resources, such as land, population, and wealth, has led to the forming of a status hierarchy of size and power that exists in the international system. As a result states can be divided and classified by such variables as large and small, strong or weak\(^{141}\).

There are many attempts at categorising states in a hierarchical manner available within the literature. However, many of these make the fundamental error of over simplifying their categorisation by relying on just one variable such as area, population, or GDP. As studies have shown, a single factor such as territorial size can be misleading, and in itself is an insufficient definition\(^{142}\). The yardstick should in fact be

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\(^{141}\) Russett & Starr, 1985, pp. 61-62.

power, which comes not only in many forms, but also from many
sources.

A good measure for analysing the power of a state is to look at its
national capabilities and attributes. This refers to the resources of a state
and the ability of the state to utilise them. Together these two factors
produce a capability, sometimes known as a “capacity to act”. Decision
makers consider their national capabilities and attributes when they
decide on the type of roles their state can play on the international stage.
National capabilities and attributes also provide a guideline or framework
for the state’s potential foreign policy behaviour\(^ {143}\). All countries have
different national capability and attribute levels, which lead to differences
in the substantive content of their foreign policy behaviour, differences in
their approaches to, and style of, statecraft, and differences in the
processes by which foreign policy is made in each country\(^ {144}\).

There are four main national capabilities and attributes, military,
economic, demography, and geography. Military power is, of course, an
important tool for influence or coercion, while economic power too, can
be just as influential. A country’s geography and demography also play a
large role as they constitute much of the country’s resource base.

\(^{143}\) N.B. Wish, “National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-Motivation
Model” in Walker, 1987, pp. 95-96. And K. Knorr, “Notes on the Analysis of a National Capabilities” in

\(^{144}\) East in East, Salmore, & Hermann, 1978, pp. 136-141.
POWER CLASSIFICATION

As a result of the analysis of their uneven capabilities, states can be classified according to five levels of power. These are:

1. Superpowers,
2. Great Powers,
3. Middle Powers,
4. Small Powers, and
5. Mini-states.

New Zealand is a small power, commonly referred to in the literature as a small state. Small powers are exactly that, small, with limited territorial areas, populations, and economic and military resources. This lack of resources generally allows them only a limited role in international affairs which often leads them to having a selective approach to foreign policy. This is highlighted by the fact that the foreign policy of small powers often has an economic or moral basis. In general, small powers support international norms and seek to avoid the use of force as a foreign policy tool. They like to emphasise their sovereign equality when dealing with larger actors, while preferring to act in a multi-lateral setting as opposed to a bi-lateral setting in order to best utilise their limited resources.

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ALLIANCES

The balance of power can also be affected by co-operation between states. This co-operation between states can be either informal or formal. Two or more states can be said to be acting in coalition if they act in a similar way towards a third state, even without a formal agreement. An alliance on the other hand is a formal structure, based on written or tacit agreements, with a range of reciprocal commitments\textsuperscript{148}.

There are two main reasons why states enter into alliances. The first is the aggregation of power. An alliance allows a state to add the military capabilities of others to its own. The second reason is deterrence, in order to constrain the options open to a potential opponent. In this way many alliances are in fact pre-emptive rather than reactive. Also should the deterrence fail to prevent conflict, the addition of extra military resources will prove useful\textsuperscript{149}. Alliances can also allow large states to dominate and control smaller states, smaller states to manipulate larger ones, and for an alliance leader to create and maintain order\textsuperscript{150}. All of which can be clearly seen in the behaviour of states during the Cold War.

New Zealand's traditional approach of relying on alliances to guarantee its security, and the changes to this in the 1980s are relevant to the decision making process in 1990. This will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Six.


\textsuperscript{149} Russett & Starr, 1985, pp. 95-96.

\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Ibid}, p. 99.
CONCLUSION

The international system is a complex environment with a multitude of actors. The primary actor is still the state, however the rise of IGOs, INGOs, and MNCs has further complicated an already myriad world. Within the international system exists a balance of power, effectively a vertical hierarchy. Where an actor sits in the balance of power is defined by their national capabilities, military, economic, geographic, and demographic. An analysis of these capabilities allows an actor to be classified according to a scale as either a superpower, great power, middle power, small power, or mini-state.

This balance of power is an ever evolving concept as actors move up and down the vertical hierarchy as their status changes. The status of an actor is also fluid, because it can change quickly with the loss or acquisition of capabilities such as natural resources or nuclear weaponry. The status of individual actors, and consequently the balance of power, is also affected by the forming or dissolving of alliances. Alliances allow for the sharing or enhancing of capabilities, thus the status of the actors involved is often also enhanced. The dissolution of such a relationship will of course remove any such enhancement, possibly with negative effects for the actors concerned.
Chapter Four

Three Prime Ministers in Two Short Months

INTRODUCTION

For the purposes of this case study the individual level analysis will be confined to Geoffrey Palmer, Mike Moore, and Jim Bolger, who held the office of Prime Minister during the crisis period. It is possible for this level of analysis to be broadened to include others who played a role in the decision making process such as Cabinet Ministers, and Bureaucratic officials. However, given the time and length constraints of this study a much narrower focus is the most pragmatic approach. This does not detract from the case study as the roles and inputs of these other decision makers on the process are examined in Chapters Five and Six.

This chapter will firstly examine the political backgrounds of the three individuals and point to some of the key experiences and factors that impacted upon their decision making during the Gulf Crisis period. The second section will examine their approaches and decision styles during this period highlighting the differences and similarities, and consequences for the decision making process.

At the beginning of August 1990 when the case study begins polls indicated that the Fourth Labour Government was heading for a severe
defeat at the upcoming October general election. Geoffrey Palmer, had succeeded David Lange as Prime Minister the previous year. However his leadership was being questioned by elements within an increasingly fragmented Labour Caucus, and on 4 September he was eventually supplanted by his Foreign Minister, Mike Moore. Seven weeks later Moore and Labour were defeated at the polls and replaced by the Bolger-led National Party.

As will be explained in this chapter, all three Prime Ministers had different backgrounds, training, and experiences; they all held power under quite differing circumstances, came into the office with different goals and ambitions, and exercised their leadership in different manners. However, one thing they did have in common was their use of small decision making units, comprising just two or three key Ministers. They also received consistent advice from the two main advisory groups, MERT and NZDF, as the main advisers remained the same throughout the crisis period. This consistency therefore should be taken into consideration when comparing their decision making.

**GEOFFREY PALMER**

Geoffrey Winston Russell Palmer was born 21 April 1942 in Nelson to urban middle class parents, both of whom were university graduates. A key factor in the personality and decision making style of Palmer was and is his love of the law. He was educated at Nelson College and then the Victoria University of Wellington (VUW), where he graduated with degrees in Politics and Law in 1965. He spent most of the next ten years
either, studying, teaching or practising law in both New Zealand and the United States.\textsuperscript{151}

Politics was something that Palmer was adept at, despite his failure to secure Labour's Nelson candidacy when he joined the party in 1974. After becoming MP for Christchurch Central in 1979, he eventually enjoyed a remarkable rise in the Labour Party. Within one year of being elected to parliament he became Labour leader, Bill Rowling's Parliamentary Assistant. In 1983, he was elected Deputy Leader to new leader, David Lange, beating Mike Moore and Anne Hercus, for the job. When Labour won the election of 1984 he became Deputy Prime Minister, as well as Attorney General, and Minister of Justice.\textsuperscript{152}

Palmer's rise to power came largely as a result of the fallout from the Lange-Douglas feud that beset the Fourth Labour Government. After winning re-election in 1987 Lange came to verbal blows with some of his senior ministers, led by the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas, over the shape of future economic policies. On 5 November 1988 Lange sacked Richard Prebble, a staunch Douglas ally, from Cabinet. On 14 December 1988, Douglas resigned from Cabinet after refusing to serve under Lange's leadership. At Caucus the following week Lange called for a leadership vote, which he comfortably won by 35-15 with 2 abstentions.\textsuperscript{153}


\textsuperscript{153} H. McQueen, \textit{The Ninth Floor: Inside the Prime Minister's Office – A Political Experience}, Auckland, 1991, pp. 124, 133-134.
On 3 August 1989, Caucus returned Douglas to Cabinet and Prebble almost won the second available spot, losing to Annette King on the third ballot. David Lange saw this as a vote of no-confidence and on Monday 7 August 1989 he resigned as Prime Minister. Succeeding Lange came down to a two horse race between Palmer and Mike Moore, as Douglas did not have enough support to seriously challenge for the top job. Moore who had stayed out of the Lange-Douglas feud was given no chance by many pundits, but Lange himself voted for him. The real battle was between Douglas and Helen Clark for the job of Deputy, a battle won by Clark, who became New Zealand's first woman Deputy Prime Minister. This series of incidents is also important in that its repercussions, in terms of factionalisation, were still being felt a year afterwards when the Gulf Crisis occurred.

Palmer claims that he did not especially aspire to be Prime Minister, and that his prime motivation in accepting the post in 1989 was out of a sense of duty: “I didn’t seek the post, and I didn’t want it: the reason being that I had a close opportunity for five years to observe what the position involved - having been Deputy Prime Minister for that time and Acting Prime Minister on many occasions”.

Palmer served as Prime Minister for just thirteen months before being replaced by Moore in the lead up to the 1990 General Election. After resigning as Prime Minister he remained Minister for the Environment outside Cabinet until the election when he retired. He then returned to

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154 Ibid., pp. 11, 38.
academia before launching his own law firm in 1995, where he continues to practice\textsuperscript{157}.

Palmer, as the only recent Prime Minister who neither won nor lost an election, was not bothered by the fact, and has been quoted on the subject as: "I'm perfectly content with that because I regard elections as pretty much a waste of time anyway. I went into politics to do certain things of a legal character which I largely did, and which I am very fond of, and pleased and concerned about still"\textsuperscript{158}.

This surprises few, as it is law and not politics that is his true calling. Politics was more or less a temporary deviation from a career which had been devoted almost wholly, one way or another, to the law. An opportunity to experience making law rather than merely teaching or practising it\textsuperscript{159}.

Keith Eunson, who served as a media consultant to Palmer when he was Prime Minister compares Palmer to former National Party Prime Minister, Sir John Marshall. Both came from reasonably prosperous middle class families and were well educated in the law. Both men were more attuned to the intellectual aspects of their parties than their political machinations. The strength of both men, he claims, was their excellent administrative skills, robust intelligence, and ability to shoulder a heavy administrative departmental load. And finally, the extensive legal knowledge they were able to provide to the upper echelons of their respective governments\textsuperscript{160}.


\textsuperscript{158} Geoffrey Palmer, cited in McMillan, 1993, p. 84.

\textsuperscript{159} Eunson, 2001, pp. 215-216.

\textsuperscript{160} Ibid., pp. 217, 226.
This is also reflected, as we shall see, in Palmer’s decision making style. Not possessed with a politician's cunning and instinct, he was cautious, studied, and determined to make the 'right' decision.

**MIKE MOORE**

Born in Whakatane in 1946, Mike Moore began an active life in politics at an early age. In 1964, at the age of just 18 Moore was elected to the Auckland Trades Council. A member of the Printer's Union, he also marched against the Vietnam War\(^{161}\). In 1972, when Norman Kirk and the Labour Party swept to power, Moore, at the relatively young age of 23 was elected as MP for the Auckland electorate of Eden. Moore's interest and experience in foreign policy began emerging during this first term as an MP when he also served on the Foreign Affairs Committee\(^{162}\). By the time of the next election in 1975, Kirk was dead, replaced by Bill Rowling. The widespread support that Kirk had in 1972 was also gone and the National Party, led by Robert Muldoon won a comprehensive victory. Moore was one of many Labour casualties, losing his Eden seat\(^ {163}\).

The years 1977 and 1978 were pivotal for Moore. In 1977 he stood for the Labour candidacy in the Mangere by-election, but lost out at selection time to David Lange\(^ {164}\). That same year he fought and beat

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cancer. In 1978 he left Auckland and moved to Christchurch in order to further his political career. After some initial suspicion as to his motives for moving, Moore was quickly accepted by his electorate, the historically safe Labour seat of Papanui. This was reinforced later that same year when he was elected as their MP at a general election. Moore was never defeated as MP for his new electorate and retired in 1999.

In his second term in Parliament as a Labour MP Moore’s star rose along with that of David Lange. When the charismatic Lange replaced Rowling as Leader of the Labour Party in 1983 Moore went up against Palmer for the role of Deputy. Moore was ahead after the first ballot, but eventually lost by a single vote on the second. When Labour, with Lange at the helm, won the 1984 election Moore became Minister of External Relations and Trade.

PALMER - MOORE LEADERSHIP CHANGE

The change of leadership between Palmer and Moore is an important factor to this study because of the disharmony it caused in the Labour Caucus. Labour was still feeling the effects of the Lange-Douglas feud which had to a degree factionalised the Caucus and led to the resignation of Lange. When Moore replaced Palmer in the lead up to the 1990 General Election a number of Labour MPs were not happy about the manner in which it was done and this led to further disharmony in an already unhappy camp.

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166 Ibid., and Moore, 1993a, pp. 60-68.

167 Moore, 1993a, pp. 88-89, 117.
By the middle of 1990 the writing was on the wall for the Labour government as a series of recent polls forecast disaster at the upcoming election. Unfortunately for Palmer the decline in his own support and the rise of that for Moore was also reflected in leadership polls conducted by a variety of reputable organisations.

Ultimately it was the polls that ended Geoffrey Palmer’s term as Prime Minister. Rumours of a ‘coup’ had begun to circulate as early as May and by June the newspapers were speculating that Labour’s poll position was beginning to look disastrous, and that Palmer’s position as leader was possibly at risk.

With Palmer seemingly hamstrung, bailing an increasingly sinking ship, Moore was beginning to attract much more attention from a meeting with United States Secretary of State James Baker, and leading an important trade delegation on a tour of Europe. Moore received kudos for both. If nothing else he was showing energy and enthusiasm, both of which were lacking in the existing Labour leadership. At the time Winston Peters

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168 These polls included an NRB poll for The New Zealand Herald at the end of April which showed National at 55 percent and Labour 30 percent; a Heylen poll for TVNZ in early May which had National on 64 percent and Labour 28 percent; a Dominion-TV3 Gallup poll in mid May showing National on 67 percent and Labour 24; and an MRL Research poll for The National Business Review in early June which had National on 46 percent and Labour on 18 percent. All cited in Sheppard, S., Broken Circle: The Decline and Fall of the Fourth Labour Government, Wellington, 1999, p. 227.

169 NRB, in its May poll for The New Zealand Herald had rated Moore at just 4 percent, well behind Palmer and Peters, at 16 and 13 percent respectively. By July he had gained ten points and was tied for first with Peters at 14 percent, meanwhile Palmer dropped to 12 percent. Heylen, in its April poll for TVNZ, had rated Moore at a lowly 6 percent. By July that had ballooned to 12 percent, narrowly trailing Palmer who was on 15 percent. Cited in Sheppard, 1999, p. 227.


was quoted as saying 'He's the only Labour Party politician who's never in the country, hence his appeal'.

By August 1990 it was apparent that some senior Cabinet members, aware of the electoral difficulties they were facing, were considering replacing Palmer with Moore. At its meeting on 27 August, with Palmer absent overseas, Cabinet, led by Helen Clark, agreed to consider “all options” in the fight to win the election. “All options” was code for “Palmer must go”. Losing the support of Clark, his deputy was the fatal blow for Palmer’s leadership.

But the fact that I was the Deputy and that I supported it was pretty important. It was a very difficult position. But I became convinced that he was in no shape to go to the election at all. And I suppose it was around that time that Mike Moore started talking to me about whether anything could be done. Mike genuinely believed that he had the ability to pluck victory from the jaws of defeat. And in the end I backed him and the caucus backed him on the basis that it couldn’t be worse.

Initially Palmer attempted to fight to retain his position, even taking charge of the Gulf crisis personally, thus driving Moore, the Minister of External Relations out of the limelight. He even announced that he would take the speaking slot that was scheduled for Moore in New Zealand’s address to the United Nations General Assembly debate on 1 October.

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172 Ibid.


Palmer also continued publicly to deny that there was any threat to his position as leader, even up until the day before he resigned. On Monday 3 September, when asked whether he would use that day's Cabinet meeting to confront Moore, he replied:

Confront him with what? There has been no indication to me by any MP that there is going to be a leadership challenge: none at all. To change the leader at this stage would show signs of panic and desperation. I don't think that the public would react at all well to that. I think it would focus attention on what people would think to be splits and divisions in the Labour Party. I want to make it absolutely clear to every New Zealander that I am not quitting, I am staying where I am. I am going to fight this election.\textsuperscript{176}

However any confidence that Palmer had in his own leadership must surely have been destroyed by the polling data, requested the previous week by the Party's Campaign Committee, and presented at that fateful Cabinet meeting. The data, from Insight Market Research, was based upon a telephone poll of 800 people conducted the previous day. It was not good news for Labour who it showed were 21 points behind National. For Palmer it was far worse: it concluded that the best possible outcome for Labour, if he remained in charge was a defeat by 19 points. If this result stood on election night then it would mean a swing against the Government of 14 percent, and would leave Labour in opposition with just somewhere between 13 and 18 seats in Parliament. More importantly for Palmer it showed that if Moore were to assume the leadership there was the possibility of Labour still having a fighting chance.\textsuperscript{177}

\textsuperscript{176} Sheppard, 1999, p. 230.

The next day, Tuesday 4 September, caucus was scheduled to meet at 11am. Instead of the expected vote of no confidence and leadership vote, Palmer surprised many by announcing his resignation. It was a surprise to many commentators as some believed that had Palmer forced a leadership vote himself he would have had enough support from outside cabinet to retain his position. Instead however he resigned and Moore was elected to replace him.\textsuperscript{178}

The two questions to arise out of this new circumstance were: to what extent had Moore acted to undermine Palmer? And why? To many it would have made more sense to wait till after the election before assuming the leadership so as to have a clear run to the 1993 election.

In public Moore had always denied that he had any leadership ambitions but others would disagree with those statements. David Lange, for one, was certain that Moore ‘engineered’ Palmer’s downfall, despite his own advice to him that he should wait until after the election.\textsuperscript{179} Helen Clark, who played a large part in Moore’s rise to power has been quoted on the leadership issue as saying ‘I would say Mike was eager, when was Mike ever not eager?’\textsuperscript{180}

Moore claims that he had told colleagues to ‘go away’ when they approached him to take the leadership in August. He said he knew that Labour would lose the 1990 election and that he had a choice between ‘taking up a poison chalice, or inheriting a toxic waste afterwards’. He claims that in the end he gave in to his colleagues’ wishes because he wanted a fundamental redirection of Labour, and by assuming the


\textsuperscript{179} Eunson, 2001, p. 233.

\textsuperscript{180} Sheppard, 1999, p. 229.
leadership he could position the party to become the government in 1993\textsuperscript{181}.

Regardless of the motive, many Labour MPs were unhappy about Moore's side-lining of Palmer, as Ruth Dyson, the then Labour Party President has commented:

\begin{quote}
I had to do a lot of pacifying of people in our Caucus, because they were very unhappy...really unhappy...that Geoffrey stood down...[A] lot of people in our Caucus saw it as very unfair to Geoffrey...They thought the Mike Moore had deliberately undermined him in the media and within the Cabinet...Geoffrey had really strong loyalty to the party, and that he was being abused\textsuperscript{182}.
\end{quote}

Division already existed within Caucus as a hangover from the Lange-Douglas feud, and between Caucus and the party's grassroots organisational and industrial wings over government policy directions\textsuperscript{183}. This new unrest, which lasted until well after the election, further fractured an already fragile unity as the crisis was deepening in the Gulf.

**1990 GENERAL ELECTION**

The replacement of Palmer with Moore was highly unusual in that it came just 53 days before the date already set down for a General Election. However it did add a spark to what had previously promised to be one of the dullest campaigns for many years, as the Palmer-Bolger

\textsuperscript{181} McMillan, 1993, p. 35.


battle had done nothing to capture the imagination and spirit of the population.\textsuperscript{184}

Despite the change in leadership, and Moore's aggressive and concerted campaigning Labour were heavily defeated at the Polls on 27 October 1990. Labour dropped from 56 seats to just 29. National rose from 41 to 67, and New Labour gained their first elected seat in Parliament when Jim Anderton retained his Sydenham seat. National went from a deficit of 15 to a majority of 37, a massive 52 seat swing in a parliament of 97. Forty percent of incumbent MPs were ousted, including 12 Labour ministers, both Labour whips, and the Speaker of the House. Despite the devastation many Labour supporters were privately satisfied as party polling had indicated that results might have been far worse.\textsuperscript{185}

How much effect Moore's aggressively promoted individual leadership had on minimising Labour's losses remains open to debate. However it was probably minimal because upon being installed as Labour Leader Moore quickly jumped into the lead in the polls for preferred Prime Minister, and even maintained that position immediately after the election.\textsuperscript{186}

**JIM BOLGER**

James Brendan Bolger, the son of Irish immigrant farm workers, was born in Opunake in 1935. A sheep and cattle farmer himself, Bolger became MP for King Country in 1972. After the Muldoon led National

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\textsuperscript{186} Jackson in McLeay, 1991, p. 54.
Party victory in 1975, Bolger became a Parliamentary Under Secretary for Agriculture, Fisheries and Maori Affairs. In 1977 he was appointed Minister of Fisheries, and Associate Minister of Agriculture. In 1978 he took the reins of both the Immigration and Labour portfolios. He kept Immigration for just one term until 1981 though he stayed on until electoral defeat in 1984 as Minister of Labour, a position that he is largely held to have excelled in\textsuperscript{187}. It was during this term as Minister of Labour that Bolger served one year as President of the International Labour Organisation in 1983\textsuperscript{188}. In Top of the Greasy Pole (1993) Neale McMillan points out that 'a senior official from this period rated him the best Minister of Labour that he had dealt with – at a time when ministers in this portfolio regularly found themselves arbitrating in disputes'\textsuperscript{189}.

After Labour defeated National at the 1984 election, Muldoon was replaced as Leader by Jim McLay and Bolger was elected Deputy unopposed. However McLay proved to be relatively ineffective as Leader of the Opposition and was in turn replaced by Bolger in 1986. This change of leadership bears many similarities to the replacement of Palmer by Moore four years later. Like Palmer, McLay was undone by opinion polls and a fickle caucus who did not believe he could win an upcoming election\textsuperscript{190}.

When Bolger assumed the leadership of National the party was divided as the structure that Muldoon had ruled over for so long and so firmly


\textsuperscript{189} McMillan, 1993, p. 52.

\textsuperscript{190} Ibid., pp. 34, 95, 116.
was dismantled. They lost the election in 1987, but they were never in a position to seriously challenge Lange and Labour at this point in time. Despite the defeat Bolger continued as leader and National's fortunes slowly began to change as the Fourth Labour Government began to self-destruct. Between the elections of 1987 and 1990 Labour were beset by internal disputes, leadership changes, and a growing disharmony in both the private and public sectors regarding the government's reform policies.

APPROACHES TO THE CRISIS

Geoffrey Palmer

Geoffrey Palmer's approach to the crisis reflected very much his general style of governance, studied, firm, judgmental, but unexciting and without risk\(^{191}\). Palmer had limited foreign affairs experience. What experience he did have came largely as a result of being, firstly, Deputy Prime Minister, and later, Prime Minister, and not from any specific interest or training. He also lacked the political instinct and opportunism that is found in most senior politicians. As a result he often fell back upon his legal training and experience and used a studied and controlled approach to decision making and politics in general.

One consequence of this approach was that Palmer maintained an open mind towards decision making. He had no set belief system or ideological background that acted as a heuristic device to colour his judgement. For example he had very positive feelings towards the United States, where he had studied and taught law on several occasions. He believed that it was possible to negotiate a rational solution to the ANZUS dispute that

\(^{191}\) Eunson, 2001, p. 216.
had affected bi-lateral relations in the mid 1980s. He was also one of very few world leaders to endorse the US invasion of Panama in December 1989\textsuperscript{192}.

This then raises the question of why he did not push for an early decision to join the US led coalition during the Gulf Crisis? Firstly he knew any such decision would require Cabinet’s approval and this was highly unlikely. Instead of rushing to make a decision Palmer hesistated. This was clearly articulated by his actions in early August 1990 where he relied on diplomatic convention. He condemned the invasion, on the basis of international law, and offered to support any UN imposed sanctions. In addition he sent his Ambassador in Baghdad, John Clarke, to visit the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to convey New Zealand’s concerns\textsuperscript{193}.

Once the UN did imposed sanctions on 6 August, Palmer quickly moved to endorse them. However, he shied away from getting New Zealand involved in any potential military activity outside of a full and unambiguous UN mandate\textsuperscript{194}. He did not rule out the possibility of New Zealand military action, but he insisted initially on a legal and constitutional framework being applied irrespective of the situation.

As the crisis escalated Palmer formed a small governmental decision making unit comprising Moore (as Foreign Minister), Minister of Defence Peter Tapsell, and himself, which was supplemented by a small group of


\textsuperscript{193} Media Statements by Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister. 3 & 5 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/4 Vol. 1.

key advisors. This was made up of Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade Graeme Ansell, his Middle East and Africa Division Director Richard Woods, Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant General Sir John Mace, and the Director of the Prime Minister's Advisory Group Simon Murdoch195.

During August and early September while Palmer was still Prime Minister the United States pushed ahead with its military build-up in the Middle East. Both ME&T and NZDF kept Palmer updated and advised on New Zealand's diplomatic and military options and capabilities but Palmer maintained his stance: no New Zealand action without UN consent. This increasingly frustrated NZDF, who by early September were beginning to suggest quite firmly that New Zealand should make a military commitment to the US led multi-national force196. When Moore replaced Palmer as Prime Minister on 4 September there were many that hoped Moore would also change this stance.

Mike Moore

In many respects Mike Moore found himself in a most unenviable position during this crisis period. He had just seven weeks in which to run an election campaign, try to alleviate rising discontent within his Caucus and guide Cabinet towards a decision over the issue of sending troops to the Gulf. During this period there was also the issue of the New Zealand hostages in the region. This issue disturbed Moore greatly and is one on which he often dwelt197.

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195 Transcript of informal meeting held at Premier House on 12 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 3.

196 As early as 7 September Mace was making submissions suggesting that the Prime Minister be advised that NZDF had military options immediately available. On 27 September he submitted a document that opened by proposing that it was in the best interest of New Zealand to make a military contribution to the coalition forces.

197 Further explanation of this issue will be given in Chapter Five when the Ministry of External Relations and Trade is examined.
In contrast to Palmer's inexperience, Moore was possibly the most experienced Labour MP in terms of Foreign Affairs. He had served on Labour's Foreign Affairs Committee as far back as 1972, and been in the role of Minister of External Relations and Trade (Foreign Minister) since 1984. Also unlike Palmer, who had no real political instinct and was more studied and guided by convention, Moore was a much more pragmatic and "gut" politician. He also came from very low socio-economic background and unlike many of his colleagues had no tertiary education background. points that he often dwelt upon^{198}.

However one thing they did have in common was an open mind on the issue of making a military contribution to the US led coalition. Moore has been an 'internationalist' who believed that New Zealand, despite its relatively low power status, had a role to play in international affairs, with and without the UN. He believed that the Labour Party should reject its traditional policy of isolationism and become much more proactive internationally^{199}. However even by his own admission he did not always find common ground on this issue within his party:

When I became Minister of Foreign Affairs I invited the Labour Party's Foreign Affairs and Defence committee to lunch. All had been appointed to this committee: most had never been to party conferences, most had never been elected to anything inside the party, and none had been elected to any public office. All were vegetarians. They said I was out of touch and unrepresentative. I knew I had problems^{200}.

\begin{flushleft}
^{198} \text{Moore, 1993a, pp.9-17.}
^{199} \text{Ibid., pp. 207-209.}
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While he believed that it was possible for New Zealand to contribute to the multi-national force being assembled in the Gulf, he also believed that it should be done in a wider collective security context. While Moore believed in an internationalist approach to foreign policy he also believed that New Zealand should and could maintain its independence:

A nation's foreign policy should be an expression of the ideals and values of its people. As a Pacific nation, New Zealand must have its own unique set of values. Our foreign policy should be determined in Wellington, not in Washington, London, Canberra, or Moscow\textsuperscript{201}.

Moore, like Palmer, also believed that the relationship with the United States could, and should be repaired. Moore, who had a long standing interest in international trade believed that a better relationship with the United States would lead to increased trade opportunities\textsuperscript{202} However unlike Palmer, Moore expressed no specific strategy for the repairing of this relationship. He did however rule out contributing troops to the coalition solely for the purposes of accomplishing this goal.

When Moore assumed the leadership in early September he came under at times quite intense pressure from his bureaucracy to make a military commitment, a position that as discussed he was open minded enough to consider. However, he did not have the freedom to make such a decision on his own, as Cabinet would have to sign off on any such commitment. His Cabinet and Caucus were heavily split and a majority of his colleagues, led by Deputy Prime Minister Helen Clark and Minister of Disarmament and Associate Foreign Minister Fran Wilde, opposed such an action.


\textsuperscript{202} Henderson in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991b, p. 214.
Moore was aware of the many divisions within both Cabinet and Caucus. Being in the middle of an election campaign he was also aware that he needed their support for his leadership in order to present a united front to the electoral public. Likewise, he was also aware that the polls pointed to electoral devastation for Labour and he was wary of alienating Labour's traditional leftist voter base who were already upset with Labour's economic reform package. In the end he made a pragmatic political decision and on 8 October 1990, along with his Cabinet colleagues, decided to put off any decision on the issue until after the upcoming election\textsuperscript{203}.

While putting off any decision was possibly not the outcome that Moore wanted, he was extremely frustrated by the approach chosen by many of his Parliamentary colleagues:

\begin{quote}
After advancing for a generation the proposition that the UN should be more proactive, the old left in New Zealand wrung their hands in dismay when the UN rallied against Saddam Hussein. One MP even claimed the war was fought for TV ratings. It was immature, anti-American, 1960s hippie doublespeak...There are a substantial number of New Zealand MPs, in more than one party, who believe the Gulf War was a mistake. Yet I believe protecting 80 percent of the world's oil was of importance, as were the inhabitants of Kuwait\textsuperscript{204}.
\end{quote}

\textit{Jim Bolger}

Jim Bolger's approach to the crisis was quite different to both Palmer and Moore on three distinct points. Firstly, whereas the two Labour leaders had been open minded on the issue of contributing troops to the

\textsuperscript{203}Cabinet Paper: CAB (90) M 35/21, 8 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 15.

\textsuperscript{204}Moore, 1998, p. 121.
coalition forces, Bolger was not. He firmly believed that New Zealand should make some form of military contribution. Secondly, he did not see the lack of clear UN oversight as a hurdle as Palmer and Moore had. And thirdly, he had the clear backing of his Cabinet and Caucus.

Whilst Bolger was an experienced politician and MP, he did not have a great deal of experience in foreign affairs. While this is also true of Palmer, he at least had an experienced Foreign Minister to help him (ironically Moore). Bolger’s Foreign Minister, Don McKinnon, was himself quite inexperienced in this field when he assumed that mantle, having previously been Opposition Spokesman on Defence, and latterly Health.

Throughout the entire crisis period National’s position was clear cut and this was conveyed to both the Labour leadership and the wider public. Indeed whilst still in opposition prior to the October election National looked on with some satisfaction as successive Labour leaders struggled with the issue.\(^{205}\)

During this period Bolger was kept informed of the MERT and NZDF positions regarding a possible military commitment, and he had frequent discussions with his own shadow Cabinet appointees - Doug Graham, Foreign Affairs, and Doug Kidd, Defence. Bolger made approaches to Palmer in late August offering to consult on a bi-partisan approach to the crisis but Palmer rejected these advances.\(^{206}\)

Once the election was completed and National returned to government Bolger made several personnel changes in his decision making unit. He

\(^{205}\) Don McKinnon, Interview, 28 November 2001.

brought in McKinnon as Foreign Minister. McKinnon, the new Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the House had been shadow Defence spokesman up until earlier in the year when he stood down in opposition to National's about turn on the anti-nuclear legislation. However, when National changed its policy to supporting Labour's anti-nuclear stance prior to the election he resigned from that post in protest. As a result McKinnon was in the shadow Health portfolio when the crisis erupted and was therefore not a part of the initial Bolger discussion groups. McKinnon, who went on to become an extremely well regarded Foreign Minister had little in the way of a foreign affairs background, having been a farm management consultant and real estate agent before entering Parliament in 1978. Despite this lack of experience he and Bolger maintained a very close relationship that allowed them to work very effectively together.

The new Minister of Defence, Warren Cooper, bought with him experience gained as Foreign Minister in the previous National government led by Muldoon. Between the election date in late October and the decision to commit military forces in late November there were a number of informal discussions in the new decision making unit, which included Bolger, McKinnon, Cooper, and Ruth Richardson, the new Minister of Finance, who would, of course, have to sign off on any expenditure.


The view of Bolger and his group was that the commitment of New Zealand troops to the gathering multi-national force in the Gulf was a chance to reassert New Zealand's flagging international role. The opportunity to improve the relationship with the United States was seen as extremely important. It was also believed that it would help strengthen ties with other allies such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada which had been adversely affected by the ANZUS dispute. McKinnon has described the crisis as 'a perfect opportunity – a ready made vehicle if you like' in accomplishing this long signalled goal of National's\textsuperscript{212}.

In making the decision to commit forces there was minimal discussion within the Bolger Cabinet and instead the decision was driven very much from the top. Two considerations were taken into account. Firstly, the contingent had to be significant enough to signal to New Zealand's allies that their commitment was true and solid. Secondly, they were conscious of public opinion – as all democratically elected governments are – and did not want to compromise their huge election victory by over committing militarily. McKinnon was very pleased with the make up of the contingent selected. He felt that by including transport aircraft it gave the commitment a certain amount of military credibility and would have been personally disappointed if the contingent had been limited to medical personnel\textsuperscript{213}.

\textsuperscript{212} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{213} Ibid.
CONCLUSION

This individual level analysis makes a significant contribution to the overall conclusions of this case study. Whereas the domestic and individual levels, which will be examined in Chapters Five and Six, essentially set the scene for, and provide the information, on which the decision process was based, it was individuals who made the actual decisions. Without an examination of why one action or course of behaviour is chosen over another this study would be fundamentally invalid.

In comparing the three New Zealand Prime Ministers of the relevant time period, this study has essentially been one of contrasts between the different styles, approaches, and personalities of the three individuals concerned. It has also shown that while there were many differences between them, there were some commonalities, such as the size of their decision making units and the roles of the individuals concerned.

For ease of comparison the table below highlights some of these similarities and differences:

Table 1. Comparative Decision Factor Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Open Minded Approach</th>
<th>Foreign Affairs Experience</th>
<th>Political Pragmatism/Instinct</th>
<th>Cabinet/ Caucus Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey Palmer</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mike Moore</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jim Bolger</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Palmer, ever the constitutional lawyer and with little political instinct, sought to make a legally and constitutionally correct decision by waiting for UN approval and requests, as opposed to what could possibly be defined as a morally right decision, by contributing to a collective security operation, even though at the time was without UN mandate for force. He was, however, open minded on the issue, and did authorise several humanitarian missions in the form of milk powder deliveries and the transport of refugees out of the theatre of operations. Given the respect in which Palmer's judgement was held by his Cabinet/Caucus colleagues it would be interesting to see what approach he would have taken had he still been leader in late September/October when Moore came under both internal and international pressure to join the coalition.

The far more politically instinctive and pragmatic Moore was also relatively open minded on the issue of a military commitment. By the time he took the reins of government in early September it was obvious that the military operation being assembled in the Gulf was going to be significant both in terms of size and importance. Accordingly Moore, an avowed internationalist with much foreign affairs experience, believed that New Zealand could play a role, albeit a small one. However he had assumed leadership of a heavily divided Cabinet and Caucus, which had been split by several issues including his rise to power. Without any sign of consensus, Cabinet, under his leadership, decided to delay any decision until after the election.

Bolger was, like Palmer, inexperienced in foreign affairs terms, but more like Moore in that he was an experienced and somewhat pragmatic politician. However, unlike either of the two Labour leaders he had a much more closed minded approach, and really only saw one course of action. Moreover, he also had the necessary Cabinet and Caucus support
to make a substantive decision, a factor that had constrained both Palmer and Moore.

The fact that all three leaders adopted similar styles of decision making, in that they used small consultative decision units, and maintained the same key advisers is probably best explained by the lack of available resources and alternatives faced by a small power such as New Zealand. Few Cabinet members had the requisite skills, knowledge, and need to be involved. Likewise within the advisory organs such as MERT and NZDF there were only very small teams of officials available to work on the projects. Also unlike many other political systems which give leaders more freedom to act, in New Zealand Cabinet approval is needed for all such decisions, hence Moore's failure, and the need to consult with key Cabinet figures.
Chapter Five

New Zealand - The Domestic Setting

INTRODUCTION

An examination in Chapter Three of the theory governing the analysis of the Domestic Level produced a number of factors that wield influence upon the decision making process. This chapter will address these factors and highlight the key areas of importance. The chapter has two distinct sections. The first is Political Culture, as a state’s political culture will define the scope of behaviour available to the individual sub-national actors that have also been defined. The second section is an assessment of the roles played in the decision making process by the specific Sub-National Actors, concentrating on those that are the most relevant to this case study. The most important domestic factor in this case study is the input of the bureaucracy, primarily the Ministry of External Relations and Trade, the Ministry of Defence, and the New Zealand Defence Force. It was these three organisations that provided a majority of the advice to the decision makers during the crisis period.

POLITICAL CULTURE

New Zealand is a former British colony and Dominion. In 1990, the year of the Iraqi invasion, it celebrated 150 years since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between the British Crown and the indigenous Maori
Chiefs in 1840. This treaty is commonly seen by New Zealanders as the founding document of its nationhood, however it was only granted 'self-governing colony' status in 1856, before becoming a 'Dominion' in 1907.\textsuperscript{214}

New Zealand therefore has had, by its standards, a long and close relationship with Great Britain. This is reflected domestically by the fact that most of New Zealand's immigrants traditionally came from Britain and New Zealand's political and judicial systems have followed the British paradigms.

The New Zealand political system has high levels of both accountability and institutionalisation. Accountability is best seen in the form of electoral voting. General elections are held every three years in New Zealand, giving politicians little respite before facing the electorate once again. This means that any instances of non-performance are fresh in the minds of the voters, and have led to the New Zealand electorate gaining somewhat of an unforgiving label. It is also not uncommon in New Zealand for Cabinet Ministers, or even Prime Ministers to be replaced if they are believed by their peers to be either under performing or if their actions are considered to be undermining their colleagues. Geoffrey Palmer was replaced as Labour Leader and Prime Minister by his colleagues in the lead up to the 1990 General Election. While they believed that they would almost certainly lose the election regardless of who the leader was, they felt that the losses would be more severe if Palmer stayed as leader. In more recent times, current Prime Minister Helen Clark has removed several of her ministers from Cabinet for failing to meet her standards in various areas, mostly for their behaviour outside the office they held. These actions have included convictions for drunk driving, claiming expenses to which entitlement is disputed, and

\textsuperscript{214} McKinnon, 1993, p. 1.
the non-disclosure of previous convictions for a variety of offences. This, some would claim, is accountability at the highest levels.

New Zealand also has a high level of political institutionalisation. Democracy, the three year electoral cycle, and the electoral process as a whole are all widely accepted. There have been no attempts to overthrow the government outside of the electoral process, and apart from the change from First Past the Post (FPP) to Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) in the mid 1990s, no significant changes to the process itself.

New Zealand is a stable western democratic state, it has always held fair and free elections, and was even the first state to grant female suffrage. It has a free and independent media, and the military has always remained outside the political sphere. While its politics have traditionally been dominated by just the two main political parties this has lessened with the electoral reforms of the 1990s. New Zealand could not be considered anything but an open system state.

BUREAUCRACIES

The academic literature on bureaucratic and organisational behaviour is full of examples of bureaucratic failures. In this case study there were three main bureaucratic organs involved in the crisis: the Ministry of External Relations and Trade (MERT), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). MERT, it appears functioned quite smoothly with a small leadership team led by a key individual providing a consistent policy advice stream. However recent reforms in the defence sector led to a number of problems regarding defence advice, as will be examined and discussed.
Within MERT the workload in relation to the Gulf Crisis of 1990/1991 was largely the responsibility of one man, the Director of the Middle East Africa (MEA) Division, Richard Woods. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Graham Ansell, and his Deputy, Chris Beeby were responsible for the policy advice process, however the day to day burden mainly fell on Woods. To aid him he had just two or three individuals that made up the MEA Division. Woods was also involved in conducting some of the liaison work at the officials level with New Zealand's main allies. In addition he also spent a lot of his time liaising with officials from other government department such as the MOD, NZDF, and the Prime Minister's Department.

In the first few days of the crisis in early August 1990, New Zealand condemned the Iraqi aggression and supported the imposition of economic sanctions as specified by UNSC Resolution 661 of 6 August 1990. After Australia announced its decision to commit naval forces to help enforce the embargo on 10 August, New Zealand made its first tentative steps at assessing its options for a similar contribution. A meeting of key advisers and decision makers at Premier House on 12 August prepared a Memorandum titled *The Iraqi Situation: Defence Options* which was submitted to Minister of Defence, Peter Tapsell, for

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215 Richard Woods, Interview, 18 April 2001. The MFAT Files also bear this out as they show him as the point of contact at the officials level for not only NZ government departments but for foreign diplomatic missions as well. He also appears as the drafter of most submissions made for the Minister of External Relations and Trade, and Cabinet.

216 Malik, 1992, p.3.
Cabinet. This was the first of many, from both Defence and MERT to be presented to Cabinet on the subject of military action\textsuperscript{217}.

The two main tasks for MERT during August and early September were the monitoring of the well being of the nineteen New Zealanders being held hostage by the Iraqis, and the arranging of humanitarian assistance for the many thousands of refugees in the region\textsuperscript{218}. At the Cabinet meeting on 13 August, Geoffrey Palmer, defined New Zealand’s objectives vis-à-vis the Gulf Crisis as:

1. To protect the welfare of New Zealand citizens in the area,
2. To play a full and responsible role in the international response to this outrage, and
3. To minimise the damage to New Zealand’s trade interests in the area\textsuperscript{219}.

MERT was therefore very busy during the entire month of August communicating with its staff in Baghdad, as well as with its allies such as Britain and Australia, in order to ensure that New Zealand citizens were accounted for and their safety ensured. At the end of August the Saddam Hussein allowed all of the New Zealand women and children to leave Iraq. MERT arranged for Germany to transport them out of the region along with its own hostages\textsuperscript{220}. The remaining male hostages were

\textsuperscript{217} MFAT File 267/2/16 Vols. 3 & 5.

\textsuperscript{218} While Woods and MERT were kept informed of developments as they occurred, the options and possibilities for a New Zealand military contribution to the multi-national force were primarily being driven by NZDF in this period.


\textsuperscript{220} Media Statements by Palmer, 31 August, and 2 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/4 Vol. 1. And a Submission to the Minister of External Relations and Trade by MERT staff covering the details of the
finally released in November 1990, after former Prime Minister David Lange made a private and unofficial visit to Baghdad to plead for their release. Lange’s successful mission, prompted by the pleas of the hostages’ relatives, was ostensibly a private and unofficial one because the National Government refused to give it official sanction given their position on the Iraqi invasion. However, the road was smoothed somewhat for him as he was accommodated at the embassy in Baghdad, and MERT personnel assisted him with establishing the right contacts and appointments. Certainly much of the assistance, such as embassy accommodation, was merely the extension of the courtesy due any former Prime Minister\textsuperscript{221}. Lange, however, claimed that the Government could have been more helpful, “but chose not to”\textsuperscript{222}.

The other main task of MERT in those first two months was humanitarian assistance for refugees in the region as discussed in Chapter Two. The Cabinet also approved the sending of a civilian medical team, funded by the government, to operate in Saudi Arabia with the Red Cross/Red Crescent, however this offer while accepted in principle, was never realised in operational terms\textsuperscript{223}.

While all of this was evolving, the options were being considered in Wellington for a potential military contribution. As has been discussed evacuation. Nine New Zealand women and children were evacuated from Baghdad to Amman via a German chartered Iraqi Airways flight. They were then flown from Amman to Frankfurt via a German military flight. The new New Zealand Prime Minister Mike Moore sent Chancellor Kohl a cable thanking him for the German assistance.

\textsuperscript{221} Various Submissions to the Minister of External Relations and Trade were made in November 1990 about the Lange trip and the status of the refugees in general, MFAT File 267/2/16/3 Vol. 2. And Woods Interview 18 April 2001.

\textsuperscript{222} Unattributed, “MPs Snipe Over Gulf Mission” in \textit{The Press}, 8 November 1990.

earlier and will be elaborated on in Chapter Five, this option assessment was mainly being run by NZDF, however there were many interested parties. In mid to late August MERT were particularly busy dealing with enquiries as to New Zealand’s position\textsuperscript{224}.

The week of 13 August, the day of the Cabinet meeting that first discussed defence options was a particularly busy one for MERT. On the Monday, 13 August, the British High Commissioner, on his own initiative, called on Ansell in an attempt to assess New Zealand’s position\textsuperscript{225}. On 14 August, Stanislav Kudriakov, the First Secretary with the Soviet Embassy came into MERT and met with Woods and a member of his MEA staff to explain the Soviet position\textsuperscript{226}. On 15 August, Woods met with David Weller, the Political Counsellor, from the US Embassy, who had some enquiries regarding a possible New Zealand naval contribution, and how such an event would sit with New Zealand’s anti-nuclear legislation\textsuperscript{227}. On 16 August, the US Ambassador, Della Newman, along with Weller and the Naval Attaché visited Palmer and the Minister of External Relations and Trade, Mike Moore, at the Beehive. This meeting and other related matters will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Six.

Throughout September of 1990 the NZDF continued to push for affirmative action, submitting in the process several papers to Cabinet. They also requested that officials be permitted to open a dialogue with

\textsuperscript{224} The MFAT archives show that during this period a number of representatives from foreign diplomatic missions visited MERT in order to both inform MERT of their countries position, and to inquire regarding any developments in New Zealand’s.

\textsuperscript{225} Note in file by Ansell, 13 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 4.

\textsuperscript{226} Note in file by Woods, 14 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 4.

\textsuperscript{227} Note in file by Woods, 15 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 4.
their allied counterparts so that if and when a decision was made the NZDF would be better able to act quickly. In this MERT was consistently supported by NZDF, who made their own submissions on contacts between officials. However to the consternation of senior officials in both departments they were continually denied this permission by Government. Finally, on 1 October 1990, at a meeting between Prime Minister Mike Moore, Ansell, and Woods, MERT was finally authorised to begin making some enquiries at the ‘officials’ level. The nature of this international contact and the reasoning behind it will be examined in Chapter Six.

**Defence**

In the late 1980s there were a number of important developments within Defence that had a substantial impact on the decision making process, as well as wider defence policy formulation. The cumulative effect of these changes in structure and personnel can be seen in two key ways during the Gulf crisis. The first was that the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), Lieutenant General Sir John Mace, was essentially the chief adviser for both the military and Defence, with the MOD having only a limited role. As a consequence there was a great deal of strain at times in the relationship between NZDF and the MOD, and their officials, mainly over subjects such as the costing of various options and actions. This was most visible in the submissions made to Cabinet by both parties. The NZDF provided a multitude of submissions, and responses to requests for advice as well as position papers, while the MOD made just a few
submissions, generally providing extra advice to an NZDF document, or
drawing attention to cost related matters\textsuperscript{229}.

These changes in the defence environment have their origins in the mid
1980s when the Lange government became particularly disaffected with
the defence establishment and the advice it was being given. In
particular they were concerned by the opposition to its anti-nuclear
stance from senior officials, the leaking of documents, and by the lack of
contestable advice being offered by the Secretary and the CDS. Lange
believed that this was a sign of undue influence on the process by the
military. Together, these three factors saw a loss of confidence in Defence
on the part of the government\textsuperscript{230}.

This was further complicated by the poor relationship that existed
between the then Minister of Defence, Frank O'Flynn, and both his
senior officials, and the Prime Minister, David Lange. The relationship
between Prime Minister and Minister of Defence is the most important
political one in the defence policy process. However O'Flynn, was a
reluctant Defence Minister to begin with, and a combination of this,
several defence crises during the late 1980s, a breakdown with his own
ministerial staff, and his often being overruled in Cabinet, led to Lange
becoming more involved in defence than would otherwise be
necessary\textsuperscript{231}.

\textsuperscript{229} MFAT File 267/2/16 Vols. 5-17. A majority of these submissions were made in the month of September
1990, when the government was most keenly looking at its options. Most of the few MOD submissions
followed just a day or two after a NZDF submission and their content suggests that there was little or no
consultation between the two departments at all.

\textsuperscript{230} J. Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships, Wellington,
of Defence Restructuring in New Zealand” in Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 52, No. 2,

\textsuperscript{231} Rolfe, 1993, pp. 24-25.
In early 1987 the Labour Government issued its Defence White Paper, followed in mid 1987 by a major review of resource management by the Ministry of Defence. This task was given to Strategos, a private consultancy firm, headed by the former National Cabinet minister Derek Quigley. This report, known as the Strategos Report, or more commonly as the Quigley Report, was submitted in December 1988, and had several radical recommendations that have had a long term effect on defence in New Zealand\textsuperscript{232}. However, more importantly for this case study it radically altered the formation and provision to Cabinet of defence advice. These changes to the policy process had not been fully assimilated by either MOD or NZDF which led to the straining of their bureaucratic relationship during the crisis.

The most important recommendation of the Quigley Report, later enacted in 1989 by the new Secretary of Defence, Basil Walker, and given statutory legitimacy by the Defence Act 1990, was the splitting of the previously unified Ministry of Defence into two separate organs. The first was the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), headed by the Chief of Defence Force (CDF), which was responsible for the operations of the armed forces. The second was a much smaller Ministry of Defence, headed by the Secretary of Defence, who was responsible for defence policy and major capital expenditures\textsuperscript{233}.

The concerns of the Labour Government over the unanimity of defence advice were shared by Quigley, who felt that splitting the two functions, policy and operations, in line with similar state sector reforms occurring


elsewhere would alleviate this. He believed that the two departments would no doubt work closely, but that ultimately they would at times have separate, contestable, advice on defence.

Under the Defence Act 1990, the Secretary of Defence was appointed to be the principal civilian defence adviser to the Minister of Defence and other ministers, and to formulate advice in consultation with the Chief of Defence Force on defence policy. The CDF was appointed to command the armed forces, and be the principal military adviser to the Minister and other ministers. The Secretary is therefore the policy adviser to the government, but any advice he or she provides must first be run through the CDF, whereas the CDF is able to provide military advice without consultation.

The reality is that little has changed: the overall defence policy direction is determined by the Secretary, with military consultation from the CDF. The two streams of advice are then integrated by the defence bureaucracy before being presented to the government, with the same two key players. However this was not the case during the period 1989 to 1991. During this time frame the CDF provided most of the policy advice to government while the recently reorganised MOD, in a period of transition under a series of short-term secretaries, attempted to create its own internal procedures and policy directions.

The problems within MOD were no doubt influenced by the uncertainty and instability that existed in its leadership. There was a delay in naming

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236 Ibid.
a new Secretary after Basil Walker left at the end of 1989. The preferred candidate of the State Services Commission was Gerald Hensley, but he was rejected by the Labour government. David Swallow was appointed as the interim Secretary, but he suffered from a credibility problem due to the fact that he had no defence background at all. Eventually, Harold Titter, who was a businessman with no previous defence policy experience was appointed. However Titter not only had the confidence of the Labour Party but he had very good management skills, which were soon recognised by an initially hesitant and apprehensive defence establishment. Hensley, who had been appointed as a strategic adviser, working on the 1991 Defence Review, eventually replaced Titter at the end of his contract in mid 1991. This development no doubt was only able to occur because of the change of government in October 1990\textsuperscript{237}.

NZDF

As has been discussed earlier, during this transitional period the Chief of Defence Force (CDF) became by circumstance the main source of defence advice to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The CDF, Lieutenant General Sir John Mace, became actively involved in the decision making process at an early stage. As discussed earlier, on 12 August an informal meeting of senior Ministers and officials was held at Premier House. A key point of interest here is that Mace as CDF was present with the Minister of Defence but David Swallow, the Secretary of Defence, was not. This is further highlighted by the fact that Ansell and Woods were present with their Minister, Mike Moore. This was the first time that the key decision makers and their senior advisers had met to discuss military options. The result of more than an hour of extensive discussions was a

Memorandum for Cabinet by Peter Tapsell, the Minister of Defence, which was discussed the next day at Cabinet. This memorandum presented three initial options:

1. A frigate for the blockade,
2. A-4 Skyhawks for combat, and
3. A battalion of soldiers to the Sinai to replace US troops\footnote{238}{Transcript of meeting in file, 12 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 3. And Memorandum for Cabinet by Tapsell, 13 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 5.}

Later that week, in response to a request from Cabinet for more information Mace submitted to Tapsell for Cabinet a paper entitled *Iraq: Extended Defence Options*. This paper studied two distinct scenarios: peacemaking and peacekeeping. It also reiterated the initial three options but also stressed the possible deployment of medical or engineer personnel as well as the fact that an army deployment would need suitable sea/air transport and would have an effect on overall NZDF capabilities\footnote{239}{Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, undated but week of 13-19 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 3.}

On 17 August, Swallow submitted his own submission to Tapsell, also entitled *Iraq: Extended Defence Options*. It was essentially an addendum to Mace's paper and set out the position of the MOD with reference to Mace's proposed options. In his submission he argues strongly against any substantial deployment, especially the three principal options mentioned above. The main thrust of his argument was twofold, citing the cost of any substantial deployment in fiscal terms, and the potential effect on New Zealand's capabilities in its Area of Direct Strategic
Concern (ADSC)\textsuperscript{240}. The ADSC Swallow refers to was defined by the 1987 Defence White Paper and will be further explained in the next chapter.

Following further discussions at Premier House on 19 August 1990, Mace submitted a new paper to Tapsell for Cabinet the following day. Entitled \textit{Iraq: Further Detail on Extended Defence Options}, it looked in more detail under two broad headings: if the situation in Kuwait stays the same, and if it deteriorates into conflict. If the situation did not change the paper recommended three primary options:

1. Medical teams deployed with the Red Cross,
2. The deployment of either HMNZS Endeavour or Monowai, or
3. Air support, including Andovers already deployed with the UN in Tehran, or C-130 Hercules.

If the situation deteriorated into conflict it recommended five possible contributions:

1. A frigate force,
2. A detachment of SAS,
3. A battalion group,
4. A detachment of A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, or
5. Other lesser air detachments including helicopters or transport aircraft\textsuperscript{241}.

\textsuperscript{240} Submission to Minister of Defence by Swallow, 17 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 5.

\textsuperscript{241} Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, 20 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 5. The paper also gives details on such things as lead in times for deployment, and the preferred deployment location. It does not however specifically define which, if any, other nations New Zealand forces would work with directly.

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On 23 August, Cabinet's Domestic and External Security Committee directed Defence to submit a paper setting out the options for responding to a UN request for either a peacemaking or peacekeeping contribution. Mace tabled a paper with Cabinet on 27 August entitled *Gulf Crisis: Defence Options*. This paper once again discussed the varying alternatives given the different scenarios and also stressed the need for chemical weapons defence equipment for any forces deployed along with the need for a close-in weapons system (CIWS) on any frigate deployed.\(^\text{242}\)

It is over these two items that it appears NZDF and MOD clashed markedly. NZDF emphasised the essential requirement for them if forces were to be deployed, while MOD, in a recurring theme as will be seen shortly in an examination of documents from the following month, emphasised the cost of the items and the effect on the wider procurement budget. However Cabinet noted these requirements on 27 August and possibly in a response to MOD’s warnings over costs requested a paper on possible non-combat options be presented.\(^\text{243}\)

This paper, entitled *NZDF Non-Combat Options in the Gulf Crisis*, was presented to the DESC on 30 August and stated that NZDF could provide military observers, helicopters, transport aircraft, as well as land transport or communications troops to any UN observer mission. It also stated that RNZAF transport aircraft had a limited capability to provide refugee airlift, and that army medics could train a civilian medical team. The DESC considered this paper and then directed NZDF to table a

\(^{242}\) Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, 7 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 10. The CIWS is a computer controlled multi barrelled anti-aircraft gun system that was later fitted to RNZN frigates in the 1990s. When I interviewed him on 20 April 2001, I asked former CDF Vice Admiral (Retd) Sir Somerford Teagle about this system and whether or not its purchase was as a result of the Gulf Crisis. He assured me that it had always been planned for that time frame but he did agree that the crisis had highlighted the need for its deployment.

\(^{243}\) Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, 7 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 10.
report to Cabinet on the possibility of New Zealand playing a role in the blockade of Iraq. NZDF did so when Mace, via the Minister of Defence, tabled a paper entitled *Gulf Crisis: Support to the Blockade* with Cabinet on 3 September 1990. It discussed options including the RNZN tanker HMNZS Endeavour, C-130 Hercules aircraft, helicopters, and P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft. Cabinet then referred the paper to DESC, who considered it along with another NZDF paper on chemical warfare defence equipment requirements on 5 September244.

Following the frustration of this bureaucratic nightmare of round about referral and submission Mace decided to submit a paper entitled *Gulf Crisis: NZDF recommendations for Action* on 7 September 1990. This submission summarised the various papers submitted to that date, reiterated the need for defensive equipment for personnel and the frigates, and made four recommendations of advice for the Prime Minister:

1. that a frigate could be provided to assist with the enforcement of a UN directed blockade of Iraq;
2. that a detachment of Skyhawks could be provided to operate alongside, say, the RAF detachment in Oman;
3. that HMNZS Endeavour could be assigned in a non-combat role to support the UN directed blockade, in concert with the Australian task force; and
4. to approve the preliminaries to procurement of further chemical warfare defence equipment, and a CIWS, as contingency against deployment being directed245.

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244 Two separate submissions to the Minister of Defence by Mace, 3 & 7 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 10.

245 Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, 7 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 10.
On 11 September, the new Secretary of Defence, Harold Titter, submitted a paper to Tapsell, also entitled *Gulf Crisis: NZDF Recommendations for Action*. Titter advised against a combat role but added that, if approved by the government, the MOD recommended the frigate as the best option and a battalion group as the worst option. This of course flies in the face of the legislation and convention that the CDF and not the Secretary provides operational military advice. Also coming from Titter, who was not only brand new in the job, but also had no defence background, it is easy to see why there was so little co-operation between the two departments. The MOD also advised that it would be a waste of time to acquire more chemical warfare defence equipment and they could easily procure a CIWS if the time came. Titter also made the point that he believed that the MOD's Capability Procurement Division had been wrongly left out of the loop, and should have been involved from the outset. The biggest outcome of this submission was that once again the inter-departmental relationship between NZDF and MOD suffered.

On 12 September Australia requested that the RNZN tanker, HMNZS Endeavour, be deployed on the east coast of Australia to assist with build up training for the first rotation of the Australian task force during the period 8 October to 5 November. This request was granted and the Endeavour did indeed carryout the task as requested. This of course gave the government the benefit of appearing to do something positive without having to actually commit troops to the Gulf.

Throughout September the NZDF was actively assisting with humanitarian refugee flights in the Middle East but the fact that they...

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247 Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade by Beeby, 17 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/3 Vol. 1 and 267/2/16 Vol. 12.
believed they could contribute in a more substantial way was beginning to show. On 27 September Mace made a very strong and somewhat controversial submission to the Prime Minister, Mike Moore. Entitled *Iraq/Kuwait: Recommendations on Defence Response*, its tone was set in the very first paragraph: 'I propose that it is now in the best interest of New Zealand to make way for a pointed and unambiguous operational military contribution to the multi-national forces grouped against Iraq'248.

The submission continued, covering such topics as international responses, blockade, diplomacy, war, command matters, and capability, before ending with a recommendation that Moore authorise officials to consult with Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States. He recommended they consult without commitment, but based on three options including (a) an accompanied frigate, (b) Skyhawks, or (c) Orions, so as to determine their applicability, and to report back249.

Mace's submission met with a mixed reaction from Moore, who agreed with much of what Mace was saying. On 1 October Moore directed Ansell to begin consultations at the officials level but he also requested Ansell get Mace to "back off a little", a direction that Woods passed on.

The contents of the responses of New Zealand's allies will be dealt with in Chapter Six, but the general response was positive. However, it became a moot point after Cabinet was unable to reach an agreement on the issue and delayed any decision until after the election.

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248 Submission to the Prime Minister by Mace, 27 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 13.
249 Ibid.
At this point both NZDF and MERT were actively supporting the idea of a military contribution, while MOD remained sceptical, mainly for fiscal reasons. However all three had to wait until the election results were known and the new government formed. During this time NZDF and MERT continued to monitor events and to consult about options and proposals. This was partly due to the impending election of a Bolger led National government, which was widely expected to guarantee a swift decision to commit, particularly given the tone of many of Bolger's pre-election speeches on defence and foreign policy\textsuperscript{250}.

On 2 November 1990, Mace submitted a paper entitled \textit{The Gulf Crisis and New Zealand: A Defence Force View}. This paper addressed NZDF capabilities, strategic and political considerations, and the UN dimension. It concluded by recommending that New Zealand's broader interests would be best served by committing NZDF resources to the multi-national forces, and listing several preferred options\textsuperscript{251}.

This paper along with a separate MERT document, also recommending a military deployment, was put to Cabinet on 26 November. Cabinet referred them to the Cabinet Security Committee, which met the following day. This committee had the power to act, and did so approving the decision to commit, and identifying potential options. The following day an Aide-Memoire listing these options for the force structure was distributed to Canberra, Ottawa, London, and Washington for feedback on preferences. This feedback and the consultation process will be discussed in more detail later in the international level analysis but it did

\textsuperscript{250} Transcript of Bolger's speech given to the Wellington Branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 18 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 12.

\textsuperscript{251} Submission to the Minister of Defence by Mace, 2 November 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 17.
decide the eventual force structure which was then approved by the full Cabinet on 3 December.

The Intelligence Services

The intelligence services in New Zealand are modest by world standards, and in many regards they have had to rely on the support of friendly states such as Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States. However, the New Zealand intelligence services all had a part to play during the Gulf crisis.

There are four agencies that make up New Zealand's intelligence and security community. These are:

1. the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS),
2. the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB),
3. the External Assessments Bureau (EAB), and
4. the Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS).

The SIS is essentially a counter-intelligence agency, responsible for domestic security. Its main role is to protect New Zealand from espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion. During the period of the Gulf Crisis the SIS, along with the New Zealand Police and customs

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254 Ibid., pp. 8-14.
officials, maintained an increased security overwatch and reported to Cabinet, via the Domestic and External Security Committee (DESC), on a weekly basis255.

The GCSB is responsible for signals intelligence (Sigint). Sigint is essentially the interception and analysis of foreign communications and other signals such as radars. The GCSB has close ties to the American National Security Agency (NSA) and is involved in a global Sigint network also involving the United States, United kingdom, Canada, and Australian known as ECHELON256. During the Gulf Crisis the GCSB provided assistance with the communication of classified material between New Zealand and its allies.

The EAB is part of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and is responsible for the researching and assessing of overseas developments, situations, and issues that are likely to have an effect on New Zealand's interests. This is generally done through the collation of open and classified source material and not secret intelligence gathering (spying)257. During the course of the crisis EAB provided Cabinet, and others, with weekly intelligence summaries regarding the deployment of both Iraqi and Coalition military forces, and other related material258.

DDIS is part of the NZDF and is the chief defence intelligence and security agency. It is staffed by a combination of military and civilian personnel. Until the late 1990s it operated as two separate organisations:

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255 MFAT File 267/2/16 Vols. 1-34.


258 MFAT File 267/2/16 Vols. 1-34.
the Directorate of Defence Intelligence (DDI) and the Directorate of Defence Security (DDS), though the two have since been combined. Throughout the period of the crisis, from the time of the Iraqi invasion until after the conclusion it provided the intelligence support for the NZDF, who in turn provided Cabinet with operational military advice. The three services Army, Navy and Air Force also have personnel operating in various intelligence capacities within their own organisations, though only the Army has its own organic intelligence career stream and units.

In 1985, as a result of the deepening ANZUS crisis, the United States ceased providing intelligence support and material to New Zealand. This cessation however did not include the material provided via the ECHELON network, as New Zealand was still seen as a vital cog in that process. Instead for some a period of time the routing indicators at the beginning of a message that show the origin of the material were left off. On 20 February 1991, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don McKinnon, confirmed on a Radio New Zealand Morning Report broadcast, that the level of intelligence provided to New Zealand had increased after the commitment of troops. Previous to that commitment though, the United States had of its own accord, provided copies of White House and State Department briefings and conferences from the outset of the crisis via the New Zealand Embassy in Washington.

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259 NZSJS, 1999, p. 8. And the Author served in the New Zealand Army’s New Zealand Intelligence Corp (NZIC) from 1993-1996.


262 MFAT File 267/2/16 Vols. 1-34.
LEGISLATURES

In New Zealand at the time, the legislature had very little impact on the decision making process. All three Prime Ministers confined the decision making process to a handful of senior ministers, though all three also used Cabinet to legitimise their decisions/indecisions. In New Zealand substantive parliamentary discussions of foreign policy are rare. If a major foreign policy issue does arise a member can move to adjourn the House to debate it. This did happen during the Gulf crisis, and in January 1991 Parliament met for a special day log session. However the debate was held on the understanding that decisions remained with Cabinet.²⁶³

POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Opposition from Within the Ruling Party or Group

Both Geoffrey Palmer and Mike Moore faced some level of opposition from within their own party over the Gulf crisis. Right from the start of the crisis Palmer refused to rule out making a military contribution, but made the point that it would be reliant on a request from the UN before doing so.²⁶⁴ During the early stages of the military build-up in the Gulf many Labour MPs believed the US actions to be hasty and premature, and this was reflected by an early Cabinet vote of 18-2 against direct action.²⁶⁵

²⁶⁴ Post Cabinet Press Conference, 6 August 1990, Palmer was quoted as saying “if the UN decided that the use of force was appropriate, New Zealand would most certainly seriously consider making a contribution to that”, MFAT File 267/2/16/4: Iraq/Kuwait Relations, Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Media Statements and Coverage, Vol. 1.
²⁶⁵ Malik, 1992, p. 92.
By the time Moore had assumed the leadership from Palmer in early September, several UN Security Council Resolutions had been passed and the multi-national forces were beginning to assemble in the Gulf. Moore came under increasing pressure from several quarters, both domestically and internationally, to make a firm decision and commit New Zealand forces. However it is clear that a majority of his Caucus, led by his deputy, Helen Clark, and Minister of Disarmament and Associate Minister of External Relations and Trade, Fran Wilde, opposed any direct involvement in the crisis. Others to vocally oppose a military role included Peter Dunne, Elizabeth Tennet, and Sonja Davies. Moore, as discussed in the previous chapter, was open to the possibility of joining the coalition. However, given that by this stage Moore was heavily involved in fighting an election campaign which threatened to destroy his party, and the residual resentment within his Caucus over his replacing Palmer, it is not surprising that he accepted the position of his colleagues and agreed in early October to put off any decision until after the election.

After the General Election of 27 October 1990, the new Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, faced no such internal opposition from within his own government and there was minimal debate on the issue in Caucus. They had swept to power with an overwhelming majority and his leadership was assured. With the approval of the Prime Minister, Mike Moore, he had been kept informed via regular briefings from officials.

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during his time as Leader of the Opposition, and the bureaucratic and military machinery had continued to work during the interim period\textsuperscript{268}.

\textit{Opposition from Other Political Parties}

The New Zealand Parliament at the time was still operating under the first past the post system, and of the ninety seven seats only one was not controlled by either of the two major parties, Labour and National. The Labour government controlled fifty five seats, six more than was necessary to have a parliamentary majority\textsuperscript{269}. Therefore there was no significant party opposition within the parliament itself. However, private polling conducted by the Labour party prior to the election showed that they faced a potential disaster at the polls in October\textsuperscript{270}. National too, was aware of this and attempted to broach the subject of a bi-partisan approach to the Gulf crisis with Palmer. This would have both allowed for continuation of policy post-election, and given any decision to commit a certain level of domestic credibility, but Palmer was adamantly opposed to any such approach\textsuperscript{271}.

After the election of 27 October 1990, when Labour was in opposition they were in no position to offer any resistance. Their number of parliamentary seats had fallen from fifty six to just twenty nine, and while this figure was higher than their own pre-election polling had

\textsuperscript{268} Richard Woods, Interview, 18 April 2001. Woods personally briefed Bolger, as Leader of the Opposition, on a weekly basis during August-October 1990.

\textsuperscript{269} Vowles & Aimer, 1993, pp. 1-2.

\textsuperscript{270} Ib. id.

\textsuperscript{271} Bolger raised the possibility on Radio New Zealand's 'Morning Report' programme on Monday 20 August 1990. The following day he sent a letter to Palmer raising the subject with him. Palmer replied with a letter dated Friday 24 August to the effect that he was disturbed that Bolger had raised the subject in the media before consulting himself, and that he saw no requirement for such an approach. MFAT File 267/2/16, Vol. 6.
forecast, they were still well behind National who held a massive sixty seven seats. With twelve Labour Ministers, both Labour Whips, and the Speaker of the House all removed from office by the voters Labour was far too pre-occupied with re-organising and re-building to mount an effective opposition in this immediate post-election period272.

Moore, as Leader of the Opposition, offered the National government support over their handling of the Gulf crisis, but only as long as they did not commit combat forces273. As discussed earlier Moore had been open to the idea of making a military commitment when he was Prime Minister. This caveat of support based on non-combatants is most likely as a result of a combination of continuing dissatisfaction within his own Caucus and polling showing this to be the general mood of the public regarding troop deployments274.

**Opposition from the Military and Paramilitary Actors**

In New Zealand during the time period of the case study there was no military opposition to government. In New Zealand the military is constitutionally responsible to the Governor-General, not the Prime Minister. However the Governor-General is bound to act on the advice of the Prime Minister. The New Zealand military has no partisan political role, nor any role at all in civil governance. In fact subordination to

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274 A Heylen Research Poll conducted 18/19 January 1991 showed 73% support for New Zealand's non-combatant role, 5% support for an increase in non-combatant and combatant forces, and 16% for withdrawal of all New Zealand troops. The National government received a 68% approval rating on the issue. Cited by R. MacIntyre, "New Zealand and the Middle East: Policy Evaluation and War in the Gulf" in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, p. 118.
civilian masters is not only a well accepted but an actively encouraged state of affairs in a military that lacks the need, will power or organisation to act in its own interests\textsuperscript{275}.

\textit{Opposition from Regionally Based Groups}

As with opposition from the military, in the case of New Zealand there was/is no regional split. Government in New Zealand is run centrally, not federally, there are no regional governments operating under a national umbrella. There are no ethnic minorities of such a size, possessing the will power and the means to cause a split. At the time of the case study, the Treaty of Waitangi settlements that marked the 1990s had not occurred, so even the more powerful Iwi, such as Ngai Tahu, had no means to battle the government. Even today it would be hard to imagine such a body wishing to challenge the authority of a government that has aided in building their resources and influence, yet remains quite capable of checking their power should the need arise.

\textbf{INTEREST GROUPS}

During the period of the Persian Gulf Crisis, there were two main interest groups that attempted to sway the decision making of the New Zealand government. The first fits under the economic label. In the first days following the invasion of Kuwait, both the Dairy Board, and Waitaki International, a dairy exporter, made direct submissions to the government and released media statements pressing the case for the

\textsuperscript{275} J. Rolfe, \textit{The Armed Forces of New Zealand}, Sydney, 1999, pp. 35-37. However this has began to be questioned as several scandals emerged during 2001 that involved such matters as an alleged conspiracy proposal to influence defence policy, improper accessing of personnel files, and the improper shredding of documents.
continuation of New Zealand trade with Iraq, and the wider Middle East region.

On 5 August 1990, a senior representative of Waitaki International sent a letter to Moore, who was then Minister of External Relations and Trade, stressing that time was money, and urged that any New Zealand response stopped short of sanctions. He reiterated the fact that they currently had representatives in Jordan, accompanying meat shipments inbound for Iraq, though they also agreed to hold off on further discussions with Iraqi officials until the government’s position was clearer\textsuperscript{276}. On 7 August 1990, the Dairy Board released a media statement declaring that they expected to lose between NZ$50 million and NZ$70 million if sanctions were imposed upon Iraq, and if this happened they expected to discuss compensation with the government\textsuperscript{277}. This call for holding off on sanctions fell on deaf ears as following the adoption, on 6 August 1990, of UNSC Resolution 661, which imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, the Prime Minister announced on 7 August 1991 that New Zealand would implement the sanctions\textsuperscript{278}.

The other form of interest group that was prominent during this period, in New Zealand, were the peace groups, both organised and ad hoc. New Zealand has a long history of peace activism, which is probably best encapsulated in the anti-nuclear legislation in the government statutes, and the fight to get it there. From the outset of the crisis, there was an extensive letter writing campaign, from both peace groups and concerned individuals that was directed towards the government. While there is no

\textsuperscript{276} Letter from Waitaki International to Mike Moore, Minister of External Relations and Trade, 5 August 1990. MFAT File 267/2/16: Iraq/Kuwait Relations, Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, General, Vol. 2

\textsuperscript{277} New Zealand Dairy Board Press Statement, 7 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 2.

\textsuperscript{278} Prime Ministerial Media Release, Sanctions Against Iraq, 7 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 2
evidence that points to the government taking these concerns directly into their decision making processes, they were taking note of the volume of submissions, and the general direction of their views\textsuperscript{279}.

As well as the letter writing campaign, the organised peace groups, such as Just Defence, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the New Labour Party, and the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control (PACDAC) regularly released media statements, and published journals such as \textit{Peacelink}. Both the organised groups, and the more ad hoc groups that sprung up during the crisis, held regular public meetings.

As has been stated earlier, there is no evidence to show that the government took the views of the peace lobby directly into their decision making calculations. However, this galvanising of the left, just three months short of an election, came at an opportune time for Jim Anderton and his New Labour Party, who were individually and collectively vocal on the issue. The outcome of the General Election of October 1990 was already a foregone conclusion, but one question that must be asked is what would the impact of the peace groups have been like if the election had been seen as a close contest? Labour's 1984 electoral victory was influenced by the peace groups, and had the polling gap been closer they may have been able to use this issue, and the peace groups, to save themselves. However, as it was the Gulf Crisis proved not to be a central factor in the campaign.

Post election the new National government paid little attention to the peace groups in relation to their decision making. McKinnon in

particular was not concerned that the peace groups opposed the new
government's military and political commitment to the US led coalition\textsuperscript{280}.

**THE MEDIA**

With the advent of cable and satellite news channels like CNN, the Gulf War became the most widely broadcast, and scrutinised conflict in history. From the time of the invasion those with access to CNN had 24 hour a day coverage of the latest in Gulf Crisis news and footage. In New Zealand, where CNN access was limited to those with the fledgling Sky Network system, both TV One and TV3 also spent many hours covering the crisis with formerly hour long news broadcasts becoming extended for several hours, especially in the early days of the crisis. In the first two or three weeks of the crisis while events were unfolding, and before they became more routine, much of the local coverage was still based on CNN and BBC footage, but there was also local input. Television personalities such as Paul Holmes and Lindsay Perigo hosted "specials" on the crisis and local academics and commentators were utilised for their input. However, once it had been established that the crisis was not going to end quickly, New Zealand coverage became far more routine and almost exclusively sourced from western news agencies such as the BBC and CNN, with New Zealand input based largely on politicians. It is possible though, that this was merely the channelling of limited resources into coverage of the election that was looming large on the horizon.

The print media largely followed the same pattern as their television counterparts, whereby after a short time most of the articles on the Gulf Crisis were coming from foreign sources and New Zealand content was

\textsuperscript{280} Don McKinnon, Interview, 28 November 2001.
almost exclusively from political journalists and politicians. However the tone of much of the editorials was at times quite critical of what was termed government hesitancy and inability to make a decision. Radio was somewhat different, with talkback being a key factor. Any development in the crisis, at home or abroad, no matter how small, was able to provide talkback radio hosts with hours of feedback.

THE PEOPLE

Public opinion was an important factor in New Zealand at the time of the Gulf Crisis, though this was largely due to the impending election. The Labour government was aware that it was staring down the barrel of a heavy defeat at the polls. They were also aware that the left was their traditional voter powerbase, that they had caused much distress to this element of the population in the previous three years, and that if they were to survive beyond the next election, let alone win it, they had to be careful not to alienate them any further. Labour was also aware that a Heylen research poll taken on 18 August 1990, showed that 47% of new Zealanders opposed sending troops, while just 36% supported such a measure\textsuperscript{281}.

When National took power after the election they did not face the same public opinion constraints. Not only were the left not traditionally disposed towards National, they had a significant parliamentary majority, and were assured of power for at least three more years. Also while the public may not have been overly supportive of sending troops before the election, they seemed to accept the committing of non-combatant forces

afterwards as two Heylen polls in early 1991 showed. On 18 January 1991, 68% approved the new government’s handling of the crisis, while just 20% disapproved and 12% were undecided. Two weeks later, on 2 February 1991, the approval figure had risen to 74%, with disapproval falling by just one point to 19%, but the undecided had dropped from 12% to just 8%282.

CONCLUSION

A review of the domestic level of analysis has provided a number of factors that constrained the decision making process. The splitting of Defence into policy and operations had marginalised the MOD as it struggled to find its place in the policy process, complicated by multiple leadership changes. Instead, under the strong leadership of General Sir John Mace the NZDF dominated the provision of defence advice to government. MOD were further sidelined as the high levels of cooperation between NZDF and MERT soon produced a consistent stream of advice to the decision makers. MERT promoted the idea that New Zealand’s absence from the coalition was being progressively viewed in a negative context by its traditional friends and allies, while NZDF not only provided options for commitment but also actively encouraged a decision to commit.

The legislature had little or no role in the process as both governments kept the decision making unit confined to a handful of key individuals within the executive leadership. Political opposition had little or no role to play as while Labour was in power National were aware of the inability of Palmer and Moore to woo their Cabinet, and were prepared to wait until after the election. Post-election National had such a heavy

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parliamentary majority that any opposition to their actions by Labour would have a minimal effect. Moore, as Leader of the Opposition, openly supported the National decision as long as New Zealand troops remained in a non-combatant role.

The only interest groups to have any impact on the decision making process were the peace groups who provided much of the grass roots political support for the Labour Party. Despite the wishes of both Palmer and Moore to commit, the opposition to such a move by these groups helped to prevent them from doing so. Both Palmer and Moore were aware that if Labour were to have any chance at the impending election the support from this traditional power base would be much needed.

The media placed no constraints on the decision making process. However some observations can be made. Firstly the reliance by both television networks on British and American news reporting in relation to the crisis no doubt had an impact on the public perceptions of the crisis and its related issues. Secondly, the general tone of two of the three largest daily newspapers, The New Zealand Herald and The Press, was generally critical of perceived Labour Government hesitancy. It is entirely possible that a combination of these two factors is partially responsible for the general public support for the eventual commitment of New Zealand troops, though the scale of this support was possibly also influenced by the non-combatant nature of the contingent.
Chapter Six

New Zealand in the International System

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will analyse New Zealand's place in the international system, its relationship with the United Nations, and its relationships with its key allies. This is important because New Zealand's initial policy position was guided by its preference for a collective security operation under the auspices of the UN. When this was not possible New Zealand's policy was influenced by discussions with its traditional allies.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, New Zealand moved quickly to condemn the invasion itself, and to endorse President Bush's call for an emergency session of the UN Security Council (UNSC)\(^\text{283}\). The following day the Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, repeated the Government's condemnation of the invasion, calling the Iraqi aggression "an outrage, an affront to international law", adding that "should mandatory sanctions be called for by the Security Council, New Zealand will of course join in fully". Palmer followed this the next day by sending the

\(^{283}\) Media Statement by Hon. Bill Jeffries, Acting Minister of External Relations and Trade, 2 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/4 Vol. 1.
New Zealand Ambassador to Iraq, John Clarke, to visit the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, ostensibly to register New Zealand's views.\footnote{Media Statements by Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister, 3 & 5 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/4 Vol. 1.}

The firm retrort of Palmer continued the next week. When questioned about the crisis at his post-Cabinet press conference on 6 August he reiterated the Government’s position:

> The government’s stance on that has been clearly articulated, it is one of total condemnation of that naked act of aggression. The Cabinet has decided that if the UN Security council agrees to call for mandatory sanctions then New Zealand will do its duty. We also designated the Minister of External Relations and Trade and myself to keep the situation under continuing review to develop any other policy options that might emerge as a result of what is quite a rapidly changing scene at the moment.\footnote{Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Post-Cabinet Press Conference, 6 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/4 Vol. 1.}

When asked where then New Zealand stood? He replied:

> Well, New Zealand's position is that we want to see the action through the United Nations. As a small nation the best protection is through the UN. Under the UN Charter there are a great many things that the UN can do. It can use mandatory sanctions as I've indicated, but it can also use force, and as I've already suggested, if the UN decided that the use of force was appropriate New Zealand would most certainly seriously consider making a contribution to that.\footnote{Ibid.}

New Zealand was firmly of the view that the UN should take the lead role in any possible military action against Iraq. Following the US decision to commit troops to the Gulf Palmer released a statement, commenting that
he appreciated the US position but New Zealand had not been invited to join any potential military operation. He also reiterated his government's belief that any New Zealand contribution was reliant on a UN decision deeming the use of force appropriate\(^{287}\).

NEW ZEALAND IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

*National Interests*

It is a truism that government policies are guided by national self interests and constitute the state's most vital needs. These include self-preservation, enhancement of the nation's economic development, independence from intervention by foreigners in domestic affairs, territorial integrity, military security, prestige, and preservation of a "way of life", culture, or ideology. National interests may be defined by political leaders, whether they be dictators or political parties and they are ever changing and developing because different leaders have different perspectives\(^{288}\).

New Zealand's national interests at the time of the case study were undergoing a process of introspection following the break-up of ANZUS and the end of the Cold War. New Zealand's foreign policy focus has always been largely economic rather than military or power based, with an emphasis on internationalism and moral leadership\(^{289}\). However, this is not to say that New Zealand has ignored the realities of the often

\(^{287}\) *Ibid.*


volatile international system and its place in it. Indeed, New Zealand has always maintained a strategic outlook, even though it has often had to change as circumstances have evolved.

This is clearly articulated by the changes in security policy that have occurred since the end of the Second World War, when New Zealand primarily concentrated on containing three potential military threats. Firstly the threat of a powerful country such as Russia, China, or Japan sweeping down through South East Asia into Australasia. Secondly, the destabilisation of a South East Asian country, or a superpower/greatpower conflict in the region. These threats were heightened by the Communist victory in mainland China in 1949, the Sino-Soviet Treaty in January 1950, and the Korean War six months later. It is against this backdrop that New Zealand signed the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and the United States in 1951.²⁹⁰

As a result of this South East Asian focus, and participation in deterrence based defence agreements such as ANZAM (Australia and New Zealand in the Malayan Area), SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation, and ANZUS, New Zealand became militarily involved in a number of conflicts in Malaya, Borneo, and Vietnam²⁹¹.

With the admission of Communist China to the UN in October 1971, and the end of the Vietnam War in January 1973, the strategic focus changed under the leadership of Robert Muldoon (1975-1984). Muldoon, an avowed anti-Communist, took a more global perspective in focusing New


Zealand's threat perceptions on the Soviet Union. The demise of the Soviet threat, and the rise of violence and destabilisation in the Pacific region saw yet another shift in emphasis in the mid-to-late 1980s.

David Lange's Labour government was swept to power in the 1984 General Election on a platform based on proposed anti-nuclear legislation that had captured the groundswell of public opinion. The eventual passing of this legislation in 1986, and its poor reception by New Zealand's main nuclear ally, the United States, led to the virtual demise of the ANZUS arrangement and defence co-operation of any kind. As a result, New Zealand was forced to withdraw from playing any form of significant role in the western alliance. With the concurrent fading of any Soviet threat as that country began the process of fundamental political and economic change under Gorbachev, this was deemed to be of little consequence by many in New Zealand at the time, and Labour was re-elected in 1987.

At the same time instability was on the rise in the wider South Pacific region. There were two coups in Fiji in 1987, along with secessionist conflict in New Caledonia and Bougainville, as well as violence in Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. This was reflected in the diplomatic and military approaches of the Lange government. In the 1987 Defence White Paper, the South West Pacific was defined as New Zealand's Area of Direct Strategic Concern (ADSC) and in 1989 the New Zealand infantry battalion was withdrawn from Singapore and returned to New Zealand. On the diplomatic front, by 1990 New Zealand had

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ten diplomatic posts in the region, one fifth the total of New Zealand’s overseas diplomatic missions\textsuperscript{295}.

New Zealand is a small country, with a population at the time of the case study of just 3.3 million occupying a land mass of approximately the same size as Great Britain or Japan. Its status as geographically remote from most of the rest of the world is highlighted by the fact that it has a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), among the largest in the world\textsuperscript{296}.

As a small power, according to the literature, New Zealand would be expected to have a low participation in the international system. However this is not the case. Despite its size and relative powerlessness, New Zealand has had a long history of activity in both the League of Nations and United Nations, promoting global co-operation, collective security, and the rights of small states\textsuperscript{297}.

\section*{NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS}

The theoretical literature suggests that small states such as New Zealand have a preference for conducting foreign policy in multi-lateral settings such as the United Nations. This allows them to gain a better return for the expenditure of their limited foreign policy resources. This is particularly true in the case of New Zealand, which has a long and proud history of activity within, and on behalf of, the United Nations.

\textsuperscript{295} J. Henderson, "New Zealand and the Other Pacific Islands" in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991c, p. 17.


New Zealand was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945. New Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser chaired the committee that wrote the trusteeship chapter of the UN Charter\(^{298}\). Fraser was a strong supporter of the notion of collective security and wanted a strong UN organisation in order to achieve this. It was for this reason that he argued against the veto powers awarded to the permanent members of the Security Council\(^ {299}\).

During its time as a member of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) New Zealand has served three terms on the Security Council, 1954-55, 1966, and 1993-94. This has led to New Zealand involvement in UN discussion and decision making on issues such as Indochina in the 1950s, the Vietnam War and the Congo in the 1960s, and the internal conflicts afflicting Rwanda, Somalia, and the Former Yugoslavia in the 1990s\(^ {300}\).

Geoffrey Palmer refused to rule out the possibility of New Zealand contributing to a peacekeeping force in the region should it be required. New Zealand has a long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping operations. The first New Zealand peacekeepers were three officers who served as observers with the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1952\(^ {301}\). Since that time New Zealand troops have served as peacekeepers and observers in locations as diverse

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\(^{299}\) McKinnon, 1993, p. 57.


as Lebanon, the Congo, Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, Angola, Somalia, Iran, and Iraq.  

**NEW ZEALAND AND ITS ALLIES**

Historically, in times of both war and peace, New Zealand has maintained close links with its three main allies, Britain, Australia, and the United States, and to an extent Canada, including military commitments stretching across every continent of the world. It was therefore not surprising that New Zealand should turn to its traditional allies as the Gulf Crisis developed. Interaction with these four traditional allies had a significant impact upon the decision making process. In this context New Zealand’s previous relationships with them should be considered.

**Great Britain**

The link between New Zealand and Great Britain is a strong one. As a result, the foreign policy of New Zealand has also developed a history of being linked closely to Great Britain. New Zealand troops have joined their British counterparts in both World Wars, and several smaller Imperial/Commonwealth based conflicts in countries such as South Africa, Malaya, and Borneo, at a high cost in terms of human life. Even as recently as 1982, New Zealand assisted the British during the Falklands War, by supplying the frigate HMNZS Canterbury to assist the Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean, thereby freeing up a British warship for duty in the South Atlantic.  

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Australia

Australia and New Zealand have always been closely linked by geographical ‘closeness’ and common ties to Great Britain and the British Empire/Commonwealth. They have very much a big brother/little brother relationship, and while several agreements such as Closer Economic Relations (CER) exist, periodically calls are made from a variety of sources for greater unity between the two countries. In 1944 the Australian-New Zealand Agreement (known as the Canberra Pact), which identified that both countries had mutual security interests in the South Pacific was signed. By the late 1980s there were more New Zealand officials based in Australia (47) than in the United States (36) or in Great Britain (33)\textsuperscript{304}.

United States

The relationship between New Zealand and the United States, while stretching back to the beginnings of New Zealand’s existence as a British colony, have flourished since the Second World War. Before this time Britain’s dominance of international affairs, particularly for New Zealand, was absolute. However by the end of the Second World War, Great Britain had faded substantially as a world power, having been replaced by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the superpower category. New Zealand’s political and defence ties to Britain had also been shaken by the inability of the British to protect New Zealand in the event of Japanese aggression in the South Pacific. Instead, the United States stepped into the breach, sending many thousands of its troops to

New Zealand and Australia as well as leading the fight against the Japanese305.

Diplomatic representation was established with the United States in 1941, and from that time until the mid 1980s New Zealand and the United States maintained close political and defence ties, including the ANZUS agreement, with New Zealand an active participant in the broader 'Western Alliance' during the Cold War. New Zealand also sent troops to assist in the garrisoning of Japan at the end of the Second World War, and to the conflict in Vietnam306.

ANZUS Dispute

The effects of the ANZUS dispute were still being felt in New Zealand in 1990 when the Gulf Crisis began to impact upon the decision making process. Firstly the same Labour Government that was at the centre of the dispute with the US was still in government. Thus many of the politicians who supported the anti-nuclear stance in the early 1980s had now to decide whether or not to become involved in a major conflict where the possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a source of open debate. Being an election year the government was aware that the anti-nuclear stance was an important component of both its 1984 election victory and its ongoing policy profile. To rush quickly to the side of the nuclear armed United States in a then regional conflict without what it perceived to be clear cut UN sanction would be perceived by much of its supporter base, including the peace lobbies, as an unacceptable about turn. Also due to the scaling down of co-operation

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and communication between the two countries there was in 1990 a high level of uncertainty in Wellington about the nature of its relations with the US. For example would a military contribution be welcomed by the United States and its military forces.

The period 1985-1990 was a tense one in terms of the New Zealand - United States relationship with little or no contact at any level. Since 1991 the relationship has thawed somewhat and contact has for the most part returned to a high level. However, the anti-nuclear policy passed into legislation in June 1987\(^ {307} \) and the rival National Party abandoned its opposition to it in 1990.

The Crisis

When Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke decided to commit a naval force just a week after the invasion he was contacted by Geoffrey Palmer to discuss the matter. While Palmer ruled out any similar contribution at that time due to (a) the lack of clear UN authority, (b) the lack of an invitation to contribute, and (c) the preparation time required, he did offer the use of New Zealand naval assets to substitute for Australian vessels that had been deployed if they were needed\(^ {308} \).

On 14 August Palmer received a letter from Jaber Al Ahmed Al Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait, requesting New Zealand assistance to reclaim Kuwait from Iraq.


I thereby request on behalf of my government and in the exercise of the inherent right of individual and collective security as recognised in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter that the government of New Zealand take such military or other steps as are necessary to ensure that economic measures designed to fully restore our rights are effectively implemented.

On 17 August Palmer released a media statement announcing the arrival of the Kuwaiti letter. He added that Washington had been asked by Kuwait to provide co-ordination and liaison in order to help establish a multi-national force to implement the UN Resolutions.

A copy was also passed on by US Ambassador Della Newman when she and two of her key staff members visited Palmer and Moore on 16 August. Details were provided of the most recent meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council held in New York on 14 August. Palmer outlined the Cabinet meeting of Monday 13 August and said that the External Security Committee of Cabinet would meet on Tuesday 14 August to hear advice from officials on the various options available to the government. As a result of this advice he said he felt it unwise to send RNZN vessels into the Gulf at present given the self defence and chemical warfare 'limitations' of said vessels. Ambassador Newman counselled Palmer to avoid limiting his options prematurely, while her Naval Attaché raised the possibility of medical, dental, or communications personnel as a potential contribution.

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309 Copy of original letter, dated 14 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 4.


While New Zealand remained non-committal for the present on any military action, it began to concentrate on the humanitarian front. At the post-Cabinet press conference on 20 August, Palmer announced that the government had decided to offer to provide a civilian medical team in Saudi Arabia, functioning under the umbrella of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/International Federation of the Red Crescent (IFRC) organisation. He added though, that the government had yet to confirm any of this with the ICRC/IFRC, and the Saudi government. The team would be staffed by New Zealanders, and the New Zealand government would pay for it. He also announced the offer to provide to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, two RNZAF Andover transport aircraft for diplomatic flights\textsuperscript{312}.

A week later, on 27 August, Palmer announced the offer of 35,000lbs (16 tonnes) of milk powder to be donated to the Egyptian Red Crescent organisation. The Red Crescent had requested 100 tonnes, however the transport of that much milk powder was deemed to be beyond New Zealand's means. The 16 tonnes donated amounted to a fully laden C-130 Hercules aircraft, and was believed to be more appropriate\textsuperscript{313}.

After discussions with the International Office for Migration, in Geneva, the government agreed to allow the Hercules to be used to transport Pakistani and Filipino refugees to their home countries. An RNZAF Boeing 727, which had taken personnel to the Battle of Britain


commemoration was also diverted to the region where it flew refugee resettlement missions to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Philippines. Between them the RNZAF aircraft were responsible for returning between 1600 and 1700 refugees.\footnote{Rt. Hon. Mike Moore, Prime Minister, Press Statement, 7 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/4 Vol. 1. And Rt. Hon. Mike Moore, Prime Minister, Media Release, 19 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/3 Vol. 1.}

During September 1990 New Zealand was firmly committed to humanitarian operations relating to the Gulf Crisis. At this stage the military option was on 'hold' and New Zealand officials were embargoed from entering into discussions over military options with their counterparts in other nations.\footnote{Richard Woods, Interview, 18 April 2001.}

**CABLES**

On 1 October a crucial meeting was held between Moore, Ansell and Woods, at which Moore directed MERT to send a number of diplomatic cables to New Zealand posts in members states of the multi-national force. He wanted to know how these countries justified their decisions. He was particularly interested in the cases of Argentina, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands.\footnote{Note for File by Woods, 1 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 14}

The second cable was to go to the Saudi capital, Riyadh. The broad message he wanted to send was that the New Zealand government was inquiring into what it could usefully send in event that the situation deteriorated and if the UN requested, in terms of transport or surveillance aircraft. Another cable was to be sent to the New Zealand
mission at the UN in New York, repeating the earlier offer of Andover aircraft, and inquiring into the ability of fitting a New Zealand contribution into a wider UN military structure. The last set of cables were to be sent to New Zealand's four main allies and prospective military partners, namely Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States. These cables were to be more detailed and include information such as the numbers of aircraft available.

There was, however, a certain naivety about these cables. They placed an emphasis on two things: firstly a deterioration of the military situation in the Gulf, which if it had occurred would have left no time for the necessary pre-deployment planning and logistical preparations as well as ruling out one of the two preferred options. Secondly, according to the cables a further request for contributions from the UN was required by New Zealand. This requirement was seen as not only unnecessary but somewhat bewildering by the other countries consulted, thus pointing to New Zealand being, to an extent, out of touch the true nature of events. Also the cable to the UN regarding a UN military structure is if anything bizarre given that at no time was there any attempt to initiate the long dormant Military Staff Committee.

On 2 October Woods met with representatives from Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States, who were given a draft copy of the cable being sent to their capital. They were also briefed on the cables being sent to New York and Riyadh.

The replies from all four prospective partners were in their own ways positive though all questioned New Zealand’s emphasis on a further UN

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317 Note for File by Woods, 1 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 14
318 Note for File by Woods, 2 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 14
request for assistance. They believed that sufficient UN coverage existed under Article 51 as examined in Chapter Two. The point was also made that if hostilities were to break out then there would be insufficient time to formulate such a request.\(^{319}\)

The Australians responded by welcoming the spirit of the New Zealand offer, but noted that they had no use for transport aircraft, as their contingent was a naval one. They also expressed concerns about the current congestion at military airfields in the region and the abundance of surveillance support within the Gulf itself. They did point to the possibility of Orions operating outside the Gulf in a blockade assistance role.\(^{320}\)

Canada was committed to political solidarity and the possibility of working with New Zealand, but did not require any further transport assistance and reinforced the Australian message regarding surveillance aircraft.\(^{321}\)

The British welcomed a possible New Zealand contribution, but stressed that New Zealand risked “missing the boat”. They emphasised that at the onset of hostilities Orion surveillance aircraft would become unnecessary, but they did see a need for extra transport aircraft as they were struggling to meet their own needs in this area.\(^{322}\)

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\(^{319}\) Graham Ansell, Submission to Prime Minister, 8 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 14

\(^{320}\) Ibid.

\(^{321}\) Ibid.

\(^{322}\) Ibid.
The US position was much more 'complicated', due to the aftermath of the ANZUS dispute of the mid 1980s. The initial response from the Pentagon was cautious and non-committal but after more serious consideration at higher levels an official Administration response was conveyed via both the US Embassy in Wellington and through State Department channels, which contained three points:

1. The US did not want to discourage participation by any nation in the multi-national force but that any offers should be directed to the governments of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia,

2. That for safety and logistical reasons New Zealand must coordinate its operations with those of other nations, and that any co-operation must in no way be interpreted as a change in New Zealand – United States relations,

3. That the US had no objections to New Zealand’s co-operation with a country other than the US.

A US Embassy official also remarked that this position had been arrived at without consulting any of New Zealand’s other potential partners though they would be informed. This official also stressed that no one in the State Department wanted to 'slam the door' on New Zealand, and that everyone wanted New Zealand to demonstrate that it can be part of the world security community.

As well as sending the cable to Riyadh, the New Zealand Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Win Cochrane, spoke with Saudi and Kuwaiti officials on the matter. A mid ranking Saudi official conveyed to Cochrane his government's deep appreciation for New Zealand’s stance and what it had

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323 Ibid.
324 Ibid.
already been prepared to do and offer. The Kuwaiti Ambassador to Saudi Arabia undertook to talk to the Emir immediately, and asked if Cochrane wished to meet with the Emir personally. A week later the Saudis responded further by reiterating their genuine thanks for the offer but after due consideration they believed that there were sufficient transport and surveillance assets in theatre.\textsuperscript{325}

On 8 October Cabinet met to discuss the cables and the international replies to them. Unable to achieve a positive consensus on making a unilateral military contribution Cabinet instead proposed to offer to the UN transport and surveillance aircraft if the situation so determined.\textsuperscript{326} One week later when Leslie James, the Acting Canadian High Commissioner, visited Woods to follow up on the possibility of a New Zealand contribution as raised in the cables, he was informed that Cabinet had decided to postpone any decision until after the upcoming election unless there was a major change in the current situation.\textsuperscript{327}

**POST ELECTION**

The General Election on 27 October 1990 led to a new National government, headed by Jim Bolger, who was not constrained by the indecision of the previous government, nor distracted by an impending election. Also he was far more committed in principle to joining the multi-national force, and repairing the NZ-US relationship.\textsuperscript{328}

\textsuperscript{325} *Ibid.*

\textsuperscript{326} Cabinet Paper: CAB (90) M 35/21, 8 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 15

\textsuperscript{327} Note for File by Woods, 15 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 15

\textsuperscript{328} Hon. J.B. Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, Address to the Wellington Branch of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 18 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 12.
In early November the new government received a series of briefings from officials from both MERT and Defence regarding the crisis. The overall direction that these briefings took was clear: (a) New Zealand armed forces were both capable and ready to make a contribution to the multinational force, (b) given the wide membership of the coalition, New Zealand’s friends and allies were somewhat concerned at its absence from the collective action and stood ready to accept any suitable contribution offered, and (c) MERT and NZDF believed that the MNF had sufficient UN authority for New Zealand to make such an offer.\footnote{Lt. Gen. Sir John Mace, Submission to Minister of Defence, 2 November 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 17. And Graham Ansell, Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade, 6 November 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/3 Vol. 2.}

The decision to commit troops was made at the Cabinet Strategy Committee meeting on 27 November 1990. On 28 November the Heads of Mission of the four key allies were handed copies of an aide-memoire, which contained options for deployment currently being considered by the government, requesting feedback on appropriate options. They were also asked to identify which if any of the options they wished to be considered for deployment with their own forces. It was requested that replies be received by 1 December so that Cabinet could make a final decision at its Cabinet meeting two days later. It was made clear that the replies would decide the action taken.\footnote{Graham Ansell, Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade, Aide-Memoire, 28 November 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 19.}

The options offered were the choice of:

1. 2 x P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft,
2. 1 x Leander Class frigate,
3. 2 x C-130 Hercules transport aircraft,
4. 1 x medical team,
5. 1 x support tanker.

The contribution would be either one, two or three, with one being preferred. The possibility of adding option four or five to the main contribution was left open for consideration.\footnote{Cabinet Strategy Committee Paper: CSC (90) M 3, 27 November 1990, MFAT Files 267/2/16/3 Vol. 2 and 267/2/16 Vol. 19.}

Because the military connection between New Zealand and Australia was considered to be of prime importance, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (DCDS), Air Vice Marshall Robin Klitscher (and a small staff), was also dispatched to Canberra to confer with Australian defence chiefs. Initial discussions between the two groups were very positive and the Australians seemed enthusiastic at the possibility of some form of ANZAC co-operation within the multi-national force. At this stage the deployment of a frigate to work alongside the Australian taskforce was the primary option considered in the discussions. However the official reply was much more circumspect and far less inspiring. This was most likely due to some form of consultation in the interim between Australian and US officials\footnote{Robin Klitscher, Interview, 19 April 2001.}.

The preferred British option was the C-130 aircraft, the naval tanker, and medical personnel, all of which they would be most happy to accommodate within their order of battle\footnote{Letter from Acting British High Commissioner S. I. Scoutar to Chris Beeby, Deputy Secretary of External Relations and Trade, 29 November 1990, MFAT File, 267/2/16 Vol. 20.}.
The Canadians welcomed the decision of the New Zealand government and appreciated being consulted and offered the proposed New Zealand assistance. The offer of a frigate with or without the tanker was the most appropriate option for co-operation with Canadian forces. The Canadians also offered assistance with obtaining a CIWS air defence system for the frigate if necessary\textsuperscript{334}.

The US made it clear that it welcomed the New Zealand decision and would accommodate any contribution that New Zealand decided to make, though it expressed particular interest in medical personnel and to a lesser extent the C-130 aircraft. Like the Canadians they too offered to obtain CIWS for any frigates that should be deployed\textsuperscript{335}.

On the recommendation of officials and after discussions with its allies Bolger and his cabinet decided to approve the contribution of two Hercules aircraft to work with the RAF in Saudi Arabia, and an army medical team to be based at a US Navy hospital in Bahrain. Initially both the Australian and New Zealand defence chiefs sought to combine their medical resources and form an ANZAC unit to be based on a US Navy hospital ship. However this was not possible due to a shortage of available onboard space\textsuperscript{336}.

One mistake that was made by New Zealand was the way it handled relations with both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Firstly the New Zealand government made the mistake of publicly announcing the intended

\textsuperscript{334} Robin Klitscher, Interview, 18 April 2001.

\textsuperscript{335} Joint Submission to Prime Minister Bolger by Graeme Ansell, Secretary of External Relations and Trade, D.K. McDowell, Chief executive of the department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Vice Admiral P.R. Adamson, Acting Chief of Defence Forces, 3 December 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 20.

\textsuperscript{336} Note for File by Woods regarding conversation with US Embassy and Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade, 12 December 1990, MFAT Files 267/2/16/3 Vol. 3 and 267/2/16 Vol. 21.
deployments to these countries before any consultation on the matter had taken place. Understandably this caused both offence and diplomatic embarrassment, which was compounded when it became obvious that New Zealand had chosen to consult its ‘allies’ prior to the decision being made, but had not included potential host countries\textsuperscript{337}.

On the other hand something they got right was the decision to dispatch the DCDS, Air Vice Marshall Klitscher, to London and Riyadh in order to assist with the necessary co-ordination for Operation FRESCO as the deployment was now being called\textsuperscript{338}. This was particularly important when dealing with the Saudis, who put great credence on protocol. Klitscher was a very senior officer with a long and distinguished record including combat service flying helicopters in Vietnam. By sending such a representative the New Zealand government sent the message that they were very serious with their undertaking.

On 31 December 1990 the British High Commission presented a request to the New Zealand government for the provision of a second medical team to serve with British forces in the Gulf. By this time Britain and the United States were calling up reservists and struggling for numbers in key areas such as medical personnel. After discussions with officials it was decided to send a 20-member medical team drawn from all three military services\textsuperscript{339}. This team would be based in Manama, Bahrain with an RAF hospital.

\textsuperscript{337} Robin Klitscher, Interview, 18 April 2001.

\textsuperscript{338} Robin Klitscher, Interview, 18 April 2001.

New Zealand has a long history of championing 'collective security' and the role of the United Nations in such actions. Thus it is no surprise that the initial New Zealand reaction was to condemn the invasion, follow the UN's lead and impose sanctions, and standby waiting for a UN request for military assistance. However, in this particular case the UN did not take the lead role in the international response to the invasion of Kuwait, the United States did. As a result, while the US set about building a significant multi-national coalition New Zealand remained on the sidelines.

As time progressed the fact that New Zealand was absent from the coalition being assembled in the Gulf was increasingly becoming a political issue. New Zealand's absence surprised and concerned its close allies such as Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States. Likewise senior officials in New Zealand conveyed their concerns along with those of their foreign counterparts to the New Zealand government. The allied governments that New Zealand consulted with on the matter also expressed their belief that the UN need not make a further request for military forces as they believed that they had sufficient coverage under the aegis of earlier UNSC resolutions.

When in power the Labour Government was heavily factionalised and the executive leadership could not muster the required Cabinet support for a decision to commit military forces. The key factor in the change of policy was the election of a new government on 27 October. The incoming National Government was concerned that the absence of New Zealand from the coalition exacerbated relations with the US and its wider allies.
As a result they decided to take the initiative and make a military contribution to the coalition.

Because any military role that New Zealand might play in the Gulf would be minor it was deemed necessary that New Zealand forces would be required to conduct operations from within the force structure of another military contingent. To accomplish this New Zealand contacted its closest allies in order to seek the most appropriate contribution form, which contained several troop options, and requested feedback as to appropriateness and the possibility of operating with each addressee country’s forces. The decision on the composition of New Zealand’s military contribution was based directly on this feedback.

This analysis shows that New Zealand’s commitment to, and belief in, the United Nations, played a role in delaying an early decision to commit troops. It also shows that New Zealand’s closest friends and allies were able to influence not only the eventual decision to commit troops, but also the non-combatant nature of the military contingent. However in both cases they were not the only mitigating factor as has been shown in Chapters Four and Five.
The significance of this thesis is that it contributes to the literature in two key ways. Firstly, the depth and scope of this study adds to the literary analysis of what is an important piece of New Zealand foreign policy history. Secondly, the theoretical literature of small state foreign policy behaviour has tended to concentrate largely on smaller European states and this study adds to the much smaller pool of studies on non-European small states.

A comparative analysis of the three prime ministers during the crisis period has produced a number of observations. As shown in Table 1. There was considerable variance between the three individuals in four key areas. The first of these is the level of 'open-mindedness' in the general approach to the issue of whether or not to commit New Zealand troops to the MNF. Palmer was the most open minded, being prepared to consider all options while waiting for the situation in the Gulf to clarify before any decision was made. Moore also tried to be open minded however his preference for an 'internationalist' foreign policy probably clouded his views to a degree. Also the situation had clarified somewhat by the time he became prime minister and the range of options available

340 There are a number of research papers that cover several aspects of New Zealand's involvement in the Gulf War 1990-1991 held at The Macmillan Library, which holds the University of Canterbury's research collection of New Zealand and Pacific Islands materials.
had narrowed. Bolger was the least open minded of the three having signalled his belief that New Zealand should play a military role in the Gulf as early as September 1990.

The second variable was 'foreign affairs experience'. Moore was the most experienced in foreign affairs by a considerable margin with almost twenty years of foreign affairs committee or portfolio experience. Palmer on the other hand had a very low experience level being primarily legal and constitutionally minded. Bolger too had a low level of foreign affairs experience having spent most of his parliamentary career in domestic portfolios. He did however gain some experience as Head of the International Labour Organisation in the mid-1980s.

The third variable was political ability and pragmatism. Moore was once again clearly dominant in this area, as evidenced by his replacement of Palmer as Labour Party Leader and Prime Minister. He had a high level of political charisma which he utilised by portraying himself as a 'man of the people', capable of making hard decisions. Like Moore, Bolger first entered Parliament in 1972 and was therefore in 1990 an experienced politician. However compared to Moore, Bolger was a somewhat more conservative and cautious politician. In contrast Palmer had a low political instinct, often criticised for being too academic and legalistic. While a very effective political 'tradesman' he failed to inspire as a leader and was replaced by his colleagues.

The fourth variable was Cabinet support. In terms of effecting a decision to join the MNF this was the most important variable, as within the New Zealand political system even a highly motivated and determined Prime Minister cannot achieve such an outcome without the backing of his or her Cabinet. Palmer was well respected and on the issue of the Gulf Crisis he maintained a high level of Cabinet support, however, he lost
Cabinet support for his leadership in the lead up to the General Election and was replaced by Moore. When Moore replaced Palmer he received a muted support from his Cabinet who were primarily concerned with the Party’s political survival. However, in the wider caucus there was a great deal of unhappiness over the way Palmer had been forced out and for which Moore was blamed. Bolger maintained a high level of caucus and Cabinet support throughout the crisis period.

Within the domestic political component of the decision making process the most important factor was the bureaucracy, in particular the three main policy advice organs of government - MERT, MOD, and NZDF. Throughout the crisis period MERT maintained a consistent and effective policy advice stream to Cabinet. MOD were effectively sidelined from the process as it struggled to adapt to the various reforms and restructuring that had taken place over the previous two years. NZDF pushed for the government to make a military commitment to the MNF from the outset of the crisis though the nature of the desired commitment became significantly diluted as the crisis developed and many initial suggestions were ruled out as inappropriate.

Other domestic level factors were much less important. The Intelligence Services continued to provide a secure channel for the flow of information, though this was generally filtered through the US and UK. The Legislature was preoccupied with the General Election and an agreement was made to allow Cabinet to make a decision without significant parliamentary debate. Interest Groups such as the Dairy Board and the peace groups were active but had a limited impact upon the process, though government did monitor public opinion. For the most part the media merely relayed international sourced news material while the people were generally supportive of government policy with a majority clearly preferring a non-combat role for New Zealand troops.
New Zealand has had a history of supporting ‘collective security’ under the auspices of the UN. Therefore the Palmer government’s approach was not only predictable but also consistent with previous policy. When it became obvious that any military action in the Gulf would be led by the United States and not the UN the New Zealand government had to decide whether it would participate in this form of collective security. The decision was complicated by the continuing fallout from the ANZUS dispute of the mid-1980s which had adversely affected US-New Zealand military relations. Despite the leadership change from Palmer to Moore New Zealand was still governed by the same Labour government whose anti-nuclear stance had initiated the dispute. With an impending General Election this Labour government could not afford to jeopardise its traditional supporter base by joining the MNF and so no consensus to do so was achieved.

A positive decision to commit military forces to the MNF was effectively assured when National won a large victory at the October General Election. This new National government free from the factionalisation and ‘baggage’ of the previous Labour government had previously signalled its intent to repair the New Zealand-US relationship. This factor along with the desire of New Zealand to play a more active international role initiated the decision to commit non-combatant military resources to the MNF.

The decision to join the US led multi-national force in the Persian Gulf War showed that New Zealand had moved on from the ‘isolation’ that had clouded its post-ANZUS relations with the US. Indeed the commitment of non-combatant forces to the MNF marked a new era of improved relations with the US and might therefore have been the catalyst for important change in New Zealand’s foreign policy in the decade of the
1990s and beyond. Throughout the 1990s New Zealand maintained a high level of international activity as an IGO member state (including the UNSC and APEC) and as a peacekeeper operating on behalf of the UN. By the end of the decade New Zealand had played or was playing major roles in a number of significant peace monitoring/keeping operations including Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Bougainville, East Timor, and Afghanistan.

This thesis has utilised three levels of analysis in assessing the decision making process that ultimately led to the commitment of New Zealand military forces to the MNF during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991. Several key conclusions have been reached as a result of this analysis. Firstly the decision making ability of New Zealand Prime Ministers is often constrained through the requirement for Cabinet consultation and approval. This was clearly articulated in Chapters Four and Six, where it was shown that despite the open-minded approach taken by Mike Moore, and his authorising of initial discussions with New Zealand's allies he was not able to achieve a decision to commit to the MNF because he did not have the backing of his Cabinet on the issue.

The second substantive conclusion is that despite some problems in adapting to recent reforms and re-organisations the bureaucracy operated smoothly and efficiently during the crisis period. The chief reason for the delay in a final decision being reached was not the high number and frequency of bureaucratic submissions but the fact that the Labour government waited for two months before initiating substantive discussions with New Zealand's main allies. The uncertainties that surrounded such as issues as the appropriateness and welcome of a New Zealand military contribution and the role of the UN in the MNF would have been alleviated much sooner had either Palmer or Moore acceded to bureaucratic requests and initiated contact at an earlier date.
The third important conclusion is that despite New Zealand's desire for an independent foreign policy it was in fact significantly guided by the wishes of its closest allies. There is no doubt that the decision to make a military commitment was in part guided by the reactions to the cables Moore authorised on 1 October 1990. This reaction commented that New Zealand's reliance on a specific UN request was inappropriate, that a New Zealand military contribution would be welcomed, and that New Zealand's absence from the coalition was of potential concern to its allies.

The decision to use an integrative analysis approach has been justified by the identification of the three most important factors that impacted on the decision making process. The fact that all three come from different 'levels' highlights the fact that a more narrowly focused examination may not have produced an entirely accurate outcome. The three key factors were Jim Bolger's high level of Cabinet support, the support of the bureaucracy for a military contribution to the MNF, and likewise the international support for New Zealand's membership of the coalition.
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