INVISIBLE

EPISTEME

THE MIRRORS AND STRING OF MODERNITY

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“The classification of the constituents of a chaos, nothing less here is essayed.”

_Moby Dick_, Herman Melville, 1851.¹

¹ Herman Melville, "Moby Dick," ([Google Books], 1851), 131.
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ABSTRACT

This thesis is an interrogation into the epistemological structures which underpin modernity, the project and claim which has come to significantly shape the contemporary world. Following a line of inquiry which analyses the intersections between knowledge, power, and history, this paper examines how signifiers such as religion and culture have come to designate ‘otherness’ in the context of modernity. The assignment of such terms to beliefs, values, worldviews, and ideologies that are not readily assimilated by the epistemological framework of modernity is problematised as a central obstacle to mediating social and political difficulties in modern contexts.

The argument is that the issue of ‘what counts for knowledge’ has been progressively ‘closed’ through particular historical processes in which the shift from a societal model based upon Judeo-Christian tenets, to secular modernity, has been rendered invisible. The ‘other’ has, through these processes, become twice-removed from epistemological validity: in the first instance, as the ‘pagan’ other in early Christian contexts; in the second instance, as the ‘religious’ or ‘cultural’ other within a secular that is falsely claimed to have been liberated from its theological roots. These epistemological marginalisations impact significantly on social life, especially in the areas of education and medicine. The invisibility of the shift from Christianity to secular modernity is also perpetuated by the separation of social life and knowledge production into distinct ‘spheres’, as mirrored by the arrangement of disciplinary spheres established within the modern universities. The conclusion is that a transdisciplinary space is therefore required to engage philosophically and critically with the now internalised Christian bias of modernity.
INTRODUCTION

“It is always a thankless and awkward task to introduce ideas using notions from which one intends to be set free.”

Media Manifestos, Régis Debray, 1996.²

Modernity is a story about how things should be – a utopian negotiation between order and chaos presented variously as an ideal, a claim, a project, an ideology, an age; a regulative politics that could, from the perspective of seventeenth century Europeans, be widely, if violently, distributed to all for the betterment of humankind. This has proved to be a compelling narrative; one fraught with hopes and dangers (or their alter egos – science, techné, ethnicity, and religion), and with a happy ending in which the heroes of progress, democracy, and reason will save the day. However, it’s a hungry story too: obeisance to this story is epidemic, viral; even chemotherapeutic. The project of modernity involves replacement, and demands compliance. What once was imposed through colonialism and disseminated with the promises of better, richer, softer, warmer, ‘Western dreams’³ now enjoys streamlined delivery via the speed and flourish of globalisation. Increased modernisation⁴ – the inevitable outcome of the implementation of such an ideology – is a total package, internal to which is an epistemological structure with central tenets that are, historically speaking, at least four hundred years old. To briefly signal the argument herein, it is precisely the invisibility of this episteme that appears to be at the centre of

³ As to the origin of the idea of the ‘West’, Le Goff writes: “...the notion of Europe was set in opposition to that of Asia and, more generally, the East. The “West” may thus sometimes designate a territory that essentially constitutes that of Europe. The West was... strengthened by Christendom being split between the Byzantine Empire and Latin Christendom, the two corresponding, respectively, to an Eastern empire and a Western one. This was the major division bequeathed by the Middle Ages. Since the demise of the Roman Empire, it had been magnified by the split, at once linguistic, religious, and political, between an eastern and a western Europe. The ‘western’ nature of Latin Christian Europe, which lies at the origin of present-day Europe, was further accentuated by a theory that certain Christian intellectuals developed in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries... that power and civilization had shifted from the east to the west... [The] westward march of civilization certainly encouraged a belief in the superiority of western European culture among many Europeans in subsequent centuries.” Jacques Le Goff, The Birth of Europe, The Making of Europe (Malden, MA, 2005), 4-5.
⁴ As sociologist Shmuel Eisenstadt has pointed out, classical theories of modernisation as promoted by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and the like, “...assumed, even if only implicitly, that the cultural program as it developed in modern Europe and the basic institutional constellations that emerged there would ultimately take over in all modernizing and modern societies; with the expansion of modernity, they would prevail throughout the world.” He notes that a multiplicity of ‘unique expressions of modernity’ (which he calls ‘multiple modernities’), have been observed instead. Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ‘Multiple Modernities,’ Daedalus, vol. 129: 1 (2000), 2.
many of the difficulties associated with ‘the modern world’. Yet modernity itself is not a common term, and the entanglement of history and power relations manifested through claims made in its name so often remain hidden: the ‘citizens of modernity’ are perhaps dissatisfied, but unaware. This is an issue of power and knowledge: where the former emits from, how it is maintained, and what counts for the latter.

In the words of Dean MacCannell, there is a restless and persistent “...belief that somewhere, only not right here, not right now, perhaps just over there someplace, in another country, in another life-style, in another social class, perhaps, there is a genuine society.”

The dream is that somewhere, all objections to the black-skinned, white-skinned, cultured, gendered, gay, politically radical, mentally ‘ill’, spiritually ‘different’, and religious bodies have been suspended in a utopian hope of radical (yet still financially ‘convenient’ – nobody likes to suffer) equality – the best of everything and everyone; the ultimate ‘overcoming’ of violence and oppression as the world becomes egalitarian and harmonious... rather similar to the fantasy of multiculturalism pictured in Jehovah’s Witnesses literature. The desire for a lost ‘golden age’ appears to possess remarkable cross-cultural consistency, but this is illusory: it reliant upon a dislocation that is both spatial and temporal, which makes it Judeo-Christian – or more accurately, based upon a set of older cultural ideas which eventually codified into what is now collectively known as Judeo-Christian – the

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6 For example, consider the following anecdote: “A few weeks ago I was shovelling out my driveway when a young African American man approached me. I instantly recognized him as an evangelist coming to save me. He first handed me a pamphlet with a painting of a beautiful paradisiacal landscape, and everyone in the picture was smiling and having a wonderful and wholesome time. There are what looks to be an Asian mother and daughter petting a bear near a berry bush, a Latino family petting an African lion, an African man and woman, as well as a white boy carrying food. This is all set in an idyllic landscape with farmlands and mountains in the background. And, of course it is a splendid fall day. Everyone is smiling. I have seen pictures like this one, and they give me a feeling of intense uneasiness simply because, in my experience, people should stay away from African lions and bears (especially around berry bushes), and people who are delirious happy for no apparent reason make me nervous. But what really made me mad was the title of the painting, ‘Life in a Peaceful NEW WORLD.’ The image that the young man gave me I will label a fantasy of multiculturalism. The reason it made me mad was that it was an image in which the challenge of diversity which has constituted the New World is stripped out of life. It is a very polite, cleaned-up fiction which we in the history of religions might jokingly refer to as the ‘take a Buddhist to lunch’ notion of religious plurality.” Philip P. Arnold, 'Sacred Landscapes and Global Religion: Reflections on the Significance of Indigenous Religions for University Culture,' in Religion and Global Culture : New Terrain in the Study of Religion and the Work of Charles H. Long, ed. Jennifer I. M. Reid (New York; Oxford, 2003), 43.
7 It is worth noting that the concept of Christianity itself is not singular, nor did not arise in a vacuum: if an archaeological excavation of Christian symbols were possible, theologians could neither locate
same ideas which have structured the epistemological orientations of modernity.\textsuperscript{8} Romantic and utopian notions of a return to the pre-modern, the ‘traditional’, or a ‘community’ are also strategic oppositions to where the problem is thought to be located: here and now, in the immediacy of ‘modern life’.

In MacCannell’s words, the dream denies any unpleasant reckoning with the guilty nature of the modern conscience, based “...in modern society's decadent assaults on savagery, peasantry, and on nature itself.”\textsuperscript{9} The excuses and justifications are ongoing:

“The primitives had to be converted because they were different: namely, not Christian, white, or clothed. They had to be removed because they were in the way; there simply was not enough room on this planet for both primitive and industrial life. They were occupying valuable real estate. Or perhaps the savages had to be destroyed because they were evil.”\textsuperscript{10}

An even more ingenious dodge is deciding that the category of \textit{primitive} is ‘just a scholarly invention’; a noted claim of the famous \textit{Writing Culture} anthropological school of thought headed by James Clifford and George Marcus.\textsuperscript{11} And yet, the racialised notions of the savage, traditional, religious (formerly, pagan), barbaric, irrational, and so forth, still exist in an uncomfortable tension with the privileges of ‘whiteness’ as specifically associated with the ‘progressive’, ‘modern’, and ‘civilised’ concepts of light, truth, beauty, logic, and rationality. To this, one could add the

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\textsuperscript{8} So to speak of the ‘Judeo-Christian’ – a term that arose as a Protestant response to Catholic anti-semitism – is actually the process of employing hindsight logic in order to approximate what traces of Biblical or prophetic instruction appear to have been influential on the later development of modernity. ‘Judeo-Christian’ does not make sense as a Jewish term. As argued by Ruprecht: “The hyphen that attempted to link these terms eventually drove a wedge between them... Ours is a culture deeply informed by, and still under the influence of, a Christian culture – specifically, the Protestant culture of northern Europe. That culture may have been deliberately Hebraizing itself, but there is little directly Jewish about it.” Louis A. Ruprecht, \textit{Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism} (New York, 2002), 40.

\textsuperscript{9} Dean MacCannell, \textit{Empty Meeting Grounds : The Tourist Papers} (London; New York, 1992), 20.

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 20.

\textsuperscript{11} James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., \textit{Writing Culture} (USA; UK, 1986). Noted in MacCannell, \textit{Empty Meeting Grounds : The Tourist Papers}, 22.
claim that ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ are also categories invented by scholars, as Jonathan Z. Smith notes.

“‘Religion’ is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their intellectual purposes and therefore is theirs to define. It is a second-order, generic concept that plays the same role in establishing a disciplinary horizon that a concept such as ‘language’ plays in linguistics or ‘culture’ plays in anthropology.”12

But it has become a native term – if even by sleight-of-hand or unconscious appropriation – and to brush it aside with scholarly flair is perhaps to offend a considerable number of the world’s population who now claim the word ‘religion’ for themselves. Further to this, as Tomoko Masuzawa writes:

“…the categories religion and culture… are both historically specific, fairly recent formations, and our daily employment of these terms, however natural and uncontroversial it may seem, is in fact mobilizing and energizing a powerful ideology of modernity, both feeding on and feeding into a certain logic that is central to our notion of who we are and what we are… the term ‘culture’ is dangerously capacious, semantically vague and confused, and finally, taken as a whole, inconsistent.”13

‘Culture’ and ‘religion’ as wielded by the scholar is especially so: reductions conveniently ascribed to elements of the worldview of ‘the other’ supposedly to prevent the loss of efficacy and context, but yet, this is so often its consequence. The difficulty is that these collective terms encompass both more, and less, than is intended by their use, and their meaning changes radically with context. The post-modern ‘push’ for cultural relativism appears to mandate for the equality of values, but in practice, does little to actually mitigate inequality. As Alex Callinicos notes,

12 Jonathan Z. Smith, 'Religion, Religions, Religious,' in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (USA, 1998), 281-282. Religion is also often ‘colonised’ into the thinking of non-Western scholars who are trained in the West and export the term to apply it in ‘non-Western’ contexts in ‘Western’ ways. Masuzawa writes: “In the social sciences and humanities alike, ‘religion’ as a category has been left largely unhistoricized, essentialized, and tacitly presumed immune or inherently resistant to critical analysis… [Religions] are often arranged by means of one or the other of various systems of classification… [and] what these systems do… is to distinguish the West from the rest… [a] demarcation… which is in all known cases historically aligned or conflated, though not without some ambiguity, within Christendom.” Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religions, or, How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (USA, 2005), 1-3. For the relationship between ‘the West’ and ‘religion’, also see Daniel Dubuissou, The Western Construction of Religion : Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology (USA, 2003), 1-6.
the main difficulty with post-modernist philosophers is “...their denial of any objectivity to discourse, their inability to ground the resistance to power which they claim to articulate, and their denial of any coherence or initiative to the human subject.”\(^{14}\) Despite the claim that cultural relativism empowers all perspectives, the failure to relativise the ‘modern’ – which derives from the failure to recognise the modern as ‘cultural’ – actually results in the disempowerment of other cultural positions. The post- of post-modernity does not transcend the modern:\(^{15}\) it remains complicit and thus facilitates the continuation of the project, whilst a pluralism of values as experienced in the cities, suburbs, villages, slums, ghettos, institutions and the various ‘marginalised’ sectors of society (to use an ‘outsider term’) carry on jostling for position, often antagonistically.

Culture has also been improperly attached to nationalistic, ethnic, and racial identities in a manner which may render other (often more immediately discriminatory) social demarcations invisible.\(^{16}\) This may force the inclination to make a ‘cultural’ justification for rights or resources in which culture (equally ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’) may actually play a minor role. Culture can be an instrument of power where the mismatch between the values or epistemological orientations of the claimant \(\text{vis-à-vis}\) the modern state is either concealed or inaccessible. Further, whilst the most visible outcome of epistemological difference is manifested socio-economically, education and medicine also present as common sites of resistance in the bid for an increased equality of values; both areas in which ‘experts’ transmit knowledge derived from universalistic values which are at odds with ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’ variations.

Culture as a term employed outside academia can be a reference to something important that is claimed, recalled, remembered, reinvented, or retrieved. The questions of authenticity commonly raised in existentialist and post-modernist salons have no traction among those scrabbling for rights or resources once the


\(^{15}\) Consider McLennan: “...definitive of postmodernism is its rejection of the primacy of epistemological discourse itself. In particular postmodernism refuses to depict the ‘object’ of knowledge as some independent, real order of being.” Gregor McLennan, ‘Feminism, Epistemology and Postmodernism: Reflections on Current Ambivalence,’ *Sociology*, vol. 29: 2 (1995), 394.

\(^{16}\) Perhaps, because all are modern taxonomies: personal communication with thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011.
juggernaut of modernity has arrived. The academic suggestion that there is no primordial or essential state of being to be recovered is reasonable, but the bid – which is often politically motivated – to ‘revive culture’ or ‘reclaim religion’ proceeds nonetheless. So what is particular about humankind that provokes this desire to retrieve something ‘lost’ (if often inaccurately articulated or identified) from a presumably ‘remembered past’? This is not only a post-colonial inclination, but a utopian aspiration seemingly common to many, if not all: this sense of loss is now shared by people the world over. Whether it is a yearning for culture, identity, tradition, values, community, family, happiness, wellbeing, security, inclusion, or satisfaction, the basis for utopian thinking seems universally oriented backwards (perhaps marked as the time before an event, such as colonialism, but often not), and oriented also towards ‘elsewhere’ – not here, not yet. As William Rasch notes, referencing a distinctly Christian narrative: “It is as if the City of Man, in which we are of necessity condemned to live, perpetually suffers from the knowledge that it is not, thought it somehow should be, the City of God. The resultant fever is messianic…”

There is a distinction between those who can identify something tangible which modernity has failed to replace (such as culture, religion, or tradition), versus those who are dissatisfied and/or displaced: it is socially unacceptable to be dissatisfied within modernity without a ‘legitimate’ claim to speak of. What is deemed legitimate is determined by a kind of legal logic which places the onus on the complainant to ‘make the case’ for their dissatisfaction. It is little wonder the former ‘primitives’, now modernised, relocated, ‘developed’ or assimilated into large urban centres, not only share in the anomie of the modern age but perhaps its apathy and nihilism too. This ‘loss’, as now experienced by all, is not the perpetual ‘state of humanity’ to which a philosopher or psychologist may refer, but an inherited dislocation which has been distributed via the replacement and compliance ethos of

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17 William Rasch, *Niklas Luhmann’s Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation*, ed. Hent De Vries and Mieke Bal, Cultural Memory in the Present (USA, 2000), 5. Consider Benjamin also: “There is a secret agreement between past generations and the present one. Our coming was expected on earth. Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. That claim cannot be settled cheaply. Historical materialists are aware of that.” *Illuminations* (1968) cited in Avery Gordon, *Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination* (USA, 1997), 164.
modernity. This is recognised as such within both post-colonialism and indigenous scholarship, though perhaps without explicit linkage to Judeo-Christian values.

Whilst no-one is disagreeing with the notion that something unpleasant accompanied the fruits of modernity, framing it generally as a ‘loss of culture’, a concern specific to indigenous groups, or a racialised concern which is somehow separated from the ‘privileges of whiteness’, is a gross under-analysis. The difference between the newly modernised/post-colonised and ‘the civilisers’ (of whatever geographical persuasion), is simply a ‘depth-of-time’ issue, that is: requiring the consideration of the speed with which the formerly Judeo-Christian ‘modern’ episteme becomes ‘culture’ in modernised groups, within which it eventually appears indigenous. As no one group can claim Judeo-Christian roots embedded in a particular territory, all must be thought of as ‘colonised’ through these ideas – even if they were later delivered in an embellished form by the proponents of modernity.\(^{18}\) The ascription of ‘the West’ to an imaginary territory – that is referred to, yet cannot be physically located – illustrates this well: to be ‘Western’ is ideally to be an indigene of the imagined terrain peculiar to modernity.\(^{19}\) That it is a morally and structurally Christianised West without a single individual (or founding ancestor) who is to be responsible for its perceived benefits, nor ‘evils’, seems too easily forgotten when the dialectic of alterity is invoked in either direction.

Theodore Zeldin writes: “The history of Paradise begins on the day its gates were shut for the last time. Until then, Paradise had no history. Nothing ever happened;


\(^{19}\) Though the use of the term ‘Western’ is incredibly problematic, cultural theorist Raymond Williams supplies a useful definition that summarises how its use is to be interpreted here: “...a whole body of practices and expectations over the whole of living: our sense and assignments of energy, our shaping perceptions of ourselves and our world. It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming.” *Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature* (UK, 1977), 110. He calls this a ‘selective tradition’ because it incorporates the entire social process. It is not just an ‘ideology’, but an entire way of thinking and being that transcends the purely mental: a collection of subjects, objects, and ideas which together form some sort of cohesive whole. Robert C. Ulin, *Understanding Cultures: Perspectives in Anthropology and Social Theory*, 2nd ed. (USA, 2001), 174. It is this whole which is governed by an epistemology that is fundamentally inhospitable to any forms of religiosity that escape their imaginary, yet designated, ‘sphere’.
everybody was happy: there was no more to be said.”

MacCannell’s view coincides with this. He writes:

“I suspect that the capital offense committed by the savages and the other non-European peoples was not that they were living a life entirely different from the Europeans who discovered them. It was that they were living a life entirely different, and evidently enjoying it. Human beings accept difference much more easily if those who are different from themselves also appear to be unhappy.”

MacCannell gives several examples to back up his observation, noting that it is generally completely overlooked by the social sciences, and “…strange that no one seems to have noticed this hatred of the pleasure of others, absolute to the point of being expressed casually, without any felt need for justification.”

This hostility to the contentment of ‘the other’ has since evolved into an ongoing attempt to overcome the dislocation particular to the Judeo-Christian myth of origins which continues to relocate the potential for happiness and enjoyment with the secular modern world to the past or future. The inclination to ‘romance the primitive’ is just a singular example of this attempt. At the heart of this argument, therefore, is the notion that with the loss of location, the ‘civilised’ (now ‘modern’) person also experiences a loss of identity – the ‘modern’ person in the ‘modern’ world is, by default, anonymously Judeo-Christian – thus, further propelling the scramble for happiness, security, cultural and religious identity, embeddedness in a distinct location or community, personal fulfilment, and so forth. This sense of absence, which underpins the conceptual structure of modernity, is the inheritance from Judaism: a cultural-religious matrix which rejected the concept of a local god

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21 MacCannell, Empty Meeting Grounds: The Tourist Papers, 22.
22 Ibid., 22-23. Implicit to MacCannell’s argument is the assumption that the contentment observed in the so-called primitive lifestyle was not just an invention transmitted through textual accounts over time, and it is noted that some scholars may take the position that this cannot be extrapolated from historical accounts with any certainty. However, there is some agreement amongst those groups who might have been identified as tribal or primitive by early anthropologists that there was a sense of contentment and balance enjoyed by their ancestors which they claim was disrupted by colonial or modern forces, etc. What is often argued for within post-colonial and indigenous scholarship is a return to ‘relationality’ between the inhabitants of an environment, their worldview, and the external world itself, a strategy that is essentially aimed towards closing the (invented, modern) gap between self and nature – in a bid to restore the sense of contentment or connection that is identified as ‘lost’.
23 Concept of ‘anonymous Christianity’ as applicable to modernity emerged from personal communication with thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011.
tied to a special location and devised a unique temporal-spatial context within which 'community' was reconfigured as nomadic.\textsuperscript{24} Melanie Phillips writes that “Judaism, which underpinned Western rationalism though its assertion of an orderly universe, can lay reasonable claim to being the most rational of all religions. Unlike Christianity, Judaism is all about this world, not the next, and is firmly grounded in man's deeds, in historical memory and in the here and now.”\textsuperscript{25} Christianity adopted the emphasis on history, but abandoned the here and now, except in its relation with salvation. The failure of Christianity to incorporate the cultural adhesion of the Judaic community – one that binds \textit{despite} this dislocation – culminates in the philosophical rationale underlying scientific progress.

Scientific inquiry has pursued the exploration, explanation, and the eventual conquering of every kind of space – internal and external – so as to ground humans conclusively in the corporeal natural world; leaving nothing to chance or fate by attempting to bring not only the world, but even the past and future under human control. Science, and as Paul Heelas argues, modernity itself, is “…characterized by the attempt to 'pin down': to establish the determinate; to find order by way of classification; to explain how things work by distinguishing between essences and finding relevant mechanisms of operation.”\textsuperscript{26} Scientific \textit{knowledge} – derived from experience, experiments, and equations – is the outcome; a response to a theological problem inherited along with other aspects of Judeo-Christian epistemology that were integral to the 'lived experience' of the pioneers of the Enlightenment. Biblical morality, monotheism, universalism, soteriology, teleology, eschatology, providence, authoritarianism, transcendental sovereignty, divine election, etc., are so

\textsuperscript{24} The use of the term ‘Judeo-Christian' as a \textit{combination} of Judaic structures of belief and practice, re-interpreted and reconfigured by Christianity (as against anti-semitism), is evident here.
\textsuperscript{25} Melanie Phillips, \textit{The World Turned Upside Down : The Global Battle over God, Truth, and Power} (New York, 2010), 330. Consider Benjamin: “We know that the Jews were prohibited from investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in remembrance, however. This stripped the future of its magic, to which all those succumb who turn to the soothsayers for enlightenment. This does not imply, however, that for the Jews the future turned into homogeneous, empty time. For every second of time was the strait gate through which the Messiah might enter.” Walter Benjamin, \textit{Illuminations}, ed. Hannah Arendt, Harry Zohn trans. (New York, [1937]1968), 264.
deeply embedded in modernity, so interiorised, as to appear legitimately secular, thus concealing their indelibly Judeo-Christian origins.  

This epistemological context has determined the values which possess salience in the modern world: whose have merit, what values are to be upheld? What voices have power, what ideas, what theories and practices? What is possible in light of this configuration of values and voices, and what is not? Understanding the epistemological context illuminates the logic behind the rejection of alternative visions; so often seen as a (faint) possibility or (merely) a personal/group preference instead of a force that compels action and requires legal and social accommodation. Any hierarchy of values (which translates to persons and institutions) requires the exclusion and subordination of particular kinds of knowledge in order to prop up the mechanisms of social control over any large body of people. Even the earliest examples of political organisation in cosmopolitan centres have conformed to this strategy.  

Increased violence results, however, when the majority of the population are dissatisfied with the dominant hierarchy of values; forcing the governing

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27 There have been several debates, especially among German scholars, about how these transfers actually occurred. Whereas Karl Löwith, Jacob Taubes, and others, consider progress to be clearly the result of secularised Judeo-Christian eschatology – in Carl Schmitt's case, the political and legal are natural extensions of the theological. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, USA, [1921]1985). Karl Löwith, *Meaning in History* (USA, 1949), ibid. Jacob Taubes, *Occidental Eschatology*, ed. Hent de Vries and Mieke Bal, Cultural Memory in the Present (USA, [1947]2009). Hans Blumenberg, arguing against Löwith and others, writes that modernity is not, as they claim, the transposition of the theological into 'secularized alienation' from their original context, but the "...reoccupation of answer positions that had become vacant and whose corresponding questions could not be eliminated." In short, the modern concepts we consider to have theological origins are modern responses to pre-modern questions. Hans Blumenberg, *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*, Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought (Cambridge, USA, 1983), 65. For the connections between Taubes, Schmitt, and Blumenberg, insightful also for presenting Taubes' respect for Schmitt's ideas, despite his Nazi associations, see 'Appendix A: The Jacob Taubes-Carl Schmitt story' in Jacob Taubes, *The Political Theology of Paul*, ed. Aleida Assman, Dana Hollander trans., Cultural Memory in the Present (USA, 2004), 97-106. An alternative view is found in Hubert Cancik (1979) "...who has shown that many of the traits associated with modernity, namely, the belief in progress and in a rational approach to nature that is to be the object of one's imperium and entrepreneurship, can be found in Rome." As Rome was notable for its Jewish, and later, Christian, populous however, it seems difficult to separate Roman 'culture' from whatever influence both Judaism and Christianity may have had in the absolute sense alluded to here. Cited in Gustavo Benavides, 'Modernity,' in *Critical Terms for Religious Studies*, ed. Mark C. Taylor (USA, 1998), 192.

institutions and governed populations to work to maintain, or resist, ongoing social controls.29

The Enlightenment claim that modernity would equal the end of violence has proven to be magnificently unsuccessful. Wars are now called ‘conflicts’, ‘insurgencies’, ‘occupations’, or ‘operations’ – for example, the ongoing war in Iraq is also called Operation Iraqi Freedom – but the promises that continue to be made in the name of modernity (or ‘Westernisation’, or globalisation) remain unfulfilled. In a present day context, increased modernisation does not amount to freedom, security, food, or housing, for a considerable majority of the world’s population. Modernity was fashioned through an ideological violence that systematically exorcised alternatives as it became increasingly purified and narrowed. In addition, the action of a secularised millenarianism paradoxically pushes forwards towards a utopia framed as the outcome of progress, whilst simultaneously generating momentum towards what is most accurately seen as an epistemological dead end.30

As Michel Serres notes:

“Mastery and possession: these are the master words launched by Descartes at the dawn of the scientific and technological age, when our Western reason went off to conquer the universe. We dominate and appropriate it: such is the shared philosophy underlying industrial enterprise as well as so-called disinterested science, which are indistinguishable in this respect. Cartesian mastery brings science’s objective violence into line, making it a well-controlled strategy. Our fundamental relationship with objects comes down to war and property.”31

Security in the face of such violence is difficult to come by. Harvey Cox points to similar dangers when he asks: “A question might legitimately arise... about those myriad modern men who feel the full weight of relativism but have no faith. Must it

29 For the argument that rising violence is essential to the maintenance of both social control and economic growth, see Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine : The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, 1st ed. (New York, 2007).
30 Take, for example, the difficulty of incorporating Heisenberg’s matrix theory of quantum mechanics into scientific experiments. As this represents an ‘epistemological limit’, beyond which science (as presently defined) has no validity, scientists have to reject the implications of this theory in order to continue the progression of ‘science’.
31 Michel Serres, The Natural Contract (USA, 1995), 32.
not be conceded that, for them, Ivan Karamazov is right when he says that, if God is
dead, then anything is possible?"^{32,33}

Within modernity, the relations between knowledge and power which perpetuate,
and are perpetuated by, the epistemological apparti in an ouroboric cycle of
repetition:^{34} one that appears to be maintained primarily in the service of capitalism.
Philip Goodchild writes: “To ask who will suffer for us so that we do not have to is
the implicit theology of the pursuit of money.”^{35} Slavery, colonialism, and the
expansion of empire (from Rome, to the Commonwealth, to globalised Euro-
American culture) always was, and always will be, about resources – regardless of
whether the articles of trade are defined geographically or in terms of human capital.
In the spirit of cultural Marxism via Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer,
therefore, this impetus that is unabashedly maintaining the totalitarian tendencies of
modernity invites a challenge that does not resort to a model based on war, violence,
or suspicion – all of which are internal to and thus, constrained by, the logics of

\(^{32}\) Harvey Cox, *The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective* (London, 1965), 44-48. Here, Cox is presuming faith to have a limited context – that of religion – though an alternative might be a faith in the modern, in techne, in one’s self or in a particular moral code. Cox’s argument is that modernity, or more pointedly, secularisation, forces us to become ‘citizens of the land of broken symbols’; self-reflexive enough to apprehend the full horror of an irreversible and absolute relativisation (in both ethics and belief) that no previous generation has had to comprehend. This multiplicity and indeterminacy which historical consciousness and psychology appear to have together contributed to, makes plausible the notion that all things, religious and otherwise, are the products of humankind which, all persons being equal, results in all things being relative; thus, *everything*, *and nothing*, is important. Importantly, the truth of this is also relative. He takes the notion of ‘broken symbols’ from theologian Paul Tillich, but what is either unstated or unrealised in the way he uses this idea is that there has *never been* any ‘authentic’ or holistic symbolic order which might ‘break’ – the notion of a progression from chaos, to cohesion, to chaos, is in itself a scholarly and social myth.

\(^{33}\) Tracking a citation is sometimes labyrinthine: citations act as what Giorgio Agamben calls the ‘go-
between’ in a ‘secret meeting’ which takes place between past generations and ours; and even within this citation, Agamben is drawing upon Walter Benjamin. Giorgio Agamben, *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* (California, USA, 2005), 139. Take this example: Cox is drawing upon a well known phrase attributed to Fyodor Dostoevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov* (London, 1920). Dostoevsky, in turn, is drawing upon Nietzsche, as Michael Gillespie points out: “Nietzsche believed that while the death of God and the consequent collapse of European values would throw humanity into an abyss of war and destruction, this event would also open up the world in a way unknown since the tragic age of the Greeks. While he recognizes that God’s death would produce a ‘monstrous logic of terror,’ he also believed that ‘at last long, the horizon appears free to us again.’ If God is dead and nothing is true, then, he concluded, ‘everything is permitted.’” Citations in text from original by Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, vol. 2 (Berlin, [1864]1967). Cited by Michael Allen Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (USA, 2008), 13.


\(^{35}\) Philip Goodchild, *Theology of Money* (Durham, USA, 2009), 238.
modernity. The equality championed by societies which are themselves a product of Enlightenment values must overturn this totalitarianism in the service of a self-reflexivity often cited as necessary and internal to the project of modernity; though this is rarely demanded, nor achieved. Such self-reflexivity must accommodate the question of whether the project of modernity has never been ‘modern’ enough – that is, true to the ideology or claim – to ‘progress’ beyond this totalitarianism; or whether project, claim, and ideology are faulty at base. In addition, all fundamentalisms essentially amount to rejections of modernity, as implied by John Gray:

“The Enlightenment is a part of the way we live and think. The point is not to accept or reject it but to understand it. This requires that we view it not as partisans or enemies but from a distance, as if we were excavating a lost religion... Just as religious fundamentalists present a severely simplified version of the faith to which they want to return, Enlightenment fundamentalists present a sanitized copy of the tradition they wish to revive. In so doing, they block understanding of the Enlightenment’s role in our present difficulties.”

36 The notion of Enlightenment as totalitarian derives directly from the Frankfurt School. As de Wilde writes: “...the early Frankfurt School [was] a philosophical movement that attempted to save the critical impetus of Enlightenment thought. In the eyes of the Frankfurt School, the First World War had discredited the Enlightenment’s dominant cultural and philosophical expression in Germany, that is, idealism... The crisis of idealism thus caused the members of the Frankfurt School to search for a radical alternative, which they eventually found in an unorthodox Marxist approach.” Marc de Wilde, ‘Violence in the State of Exception : Reflections on Theologico-Political Motifs in Benjamin and Schmitt,’ in Political Theologies : Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence Eugene Sullivan (New York, 2006), 189. With regard to the critique of modernity, Gillespie writes: “...questions about the modern project [have] been raised before. Indeed, while modernity had increasingly engaged the imagination of European intellectuals since the latter half of the seventeenth century, there had always been those who had doubts that it was an unqualified good. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the broadest claims of the modern project had been called into question in the famous Quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns, but this for the most part was merely a rear-guard effort by humanists defending the authority of classical thought against Cartesian modernists. Rousseau launched a similar but broader attack in his Discourse on the Arts and Sciences... And finally, Hume mounted a sceptical attack that called into question the idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect that was essential to the idea of an apodictic science. [But] the critique of modernity often fell on deaf ears.” Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, 256.


38 The idea that we have never been modern is the subject of Latour's noted book. Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge, USA, 1993). The notion that modernity is plagued by the improper use of Reason, which is therefore linked to the notion of the ‘irrational modern’ of whom Latour writes, is the claim of Immanuel Kant.

The Enlightenment project of emancipation from the ‘tyranny of tradition’, to borrow from Alasdair MacIntyre, was a genuine attempt to ‘found a social order in which the appeal to universal, tradition-independent norms’ would result in a liberal, individualist, and eminently rational society. As Condorcet’s famous essay on progress (1793) argued: “Once people in the West threw off the yoke of tradition and recognized at last that knowledge arises only through careful generalizations from the givens of sense experience, scientific growth and moral improvement were bound to accelerate as they had since the seventeenth century.” The project of modernity promised a great deal based on initial indications that perfection was possible: ‘Reason’ would bring about perfection on earth and progress was the means by which utopia would be realised. It is on this basis that many continue to philosophically uphold secular modernity as viable; despite the evidence that Reason has not brought an end to the collective suffering and violence experienced in the world. In fact, human life may arguably have become more savage and irrational as science has accelerated. Alexander Boot supplies a particularly rich metaphor: “Without the warmth of a metaphysical soul, reason is a cold-spermed warlock, capable of destruction but unable to procreate.” According to ‘the vision’, secular modernity is pursued by the individual seeking increased security and wellbeing (often via capitalistic gain), or moral freedoms; and on the societal level, motivated by the ideal of reduced violence between countries or various factions, or material security without ideological or economic opposition, especially in societal contexts where this is achievable. This is messianic, which is both its appeal, and its failing: as it remains – via Walter Benjamin – the ‘angel of history’ for most.
This entanglement of reduced violence and moral freedoms ties directly into the context in which secularity arose and became plausible; as a response to the wars over religion, sovereignty, and territory that proceeded from the Crusades onwards. Cox writes: “Christian and Arab scholars seemed able to get along surprisingly well when they stopped discussing the Holy Trinity versus the one God Allah and began dissecting animals, enumerating things, or peering through telescopes.” The failure of this project to translate into universal social improvement still appears mysterious to those who continue to advocate for the tenets of Enlightenment ‘faith’: such as ‘development’, democracy, and increased industrialisation. These same advocates continue to have the upper hand, and, in the face of any and all opposition, the juggernaut pushes onward: the question is, how? To take the lead from Karl Marx, the issue of how an idea becomes a material force is central: in this case, to inquire into the means by which the idea of modernity has become incorporated and embodied in a manner that has literally transformed the world.

The project of modernity maintains both transcendental power and an epistemological supremacy which has engulfed the world; primarily, by establishing ‘ideal’ types of governance, education, medicine, etc., and the reinforcement of ‘Western values’ through the media and popular culture. The transmission of this oppressive, is only justified by that fear. If we accept the presence in our midst of these uniformed men, who have the exclusive right to carry arms, who demand our papers, who come and prowl on our doorsteps, how would any of this be possible if there were no criminals? And if there weren’t articles every day in the newspaper telling us how numerous and dangerous our criminals are?” Michel Foucault and Colin Gordon, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 (UK, 1980), 47.

46 This line must be attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011. Benjamin’s most cited work on the angel of history (the first of three separate and distinct works which allude to the angel) is translated as follows. “A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though it is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turning toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurts it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.” Benjamin, Illuminations, 257-258.

47 Cox, The Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective, 228. Note that Islamic expansion and self-definition, which began in the seventh and eighth centuries CE, is often reduced to “Arab” in a way which decontextualises the actual nature of trans-Muslim identities – salient then, as now. See Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism, 79.

48 For a plausible view with regard to the role played by power in European modernity, consider Benavides citing Mark Elvin’s work (1986) as follows: “Elvin singled out the following characteristics:
epistemology is particularly reliant upon its maintenance within all secular institutions;\(^\text{49}\) however, the keystone of these is education. The latter maintains the epistemological rigour of the whole social system; thus, the epistemological boundaries are maintained via knowledge dissemination, creating a ‘closed system’: from the top down, and the bottom up. The institutions and the ways in which they reproduce and disseminate knowledge function as a vehicle for the specifically Judeo-Christian values and mechanisms which underpin the foundation of the institutions themselves, and upon which the ideologies of secular modernity rely: hence, establishing the ouroboric loop.

Universities legitimise ‘experts’ in all fields who are then deployed to the other institutions to act out the role of replicating knowledge \textit{en masse}.\(^\text{50}\) These same universities train experts who establish school curriculums, and, at a lower level, primary and secondary school teachers, who establish norms based upon the Western intellectual and philosophical traditions. Values and behaviours that are generated by said traditions are mandated via the curriculum – culminating in the social articulation of the epistemology. The education of each subsequent generation builds on the education of the earlier generations in a manner which extends the epistemological reach of ‘modernity’ until the corresponding values become embedded in the smallest social unit (the family) and ideally, begin to self-reproduce,
as in *autopoiesis*. This is what post-colonial scholars seek to dismantle when they talk of ‘decolonising education’. Thus, with the attainment of sufficient historical depth, the process results in the now indigenous ‘citizen of the world’: the Western individual.

The process of enculturation – it is suggested that the epistemology acts as culture – is supported by these institutional means in a manner that is epistemologically resilient enough to consistently marginalise ways of thinking and being that might destabilise its authority. Consider, for example, the area of ‘religion’, for which the necessary praxis (in order to be ‘modern’) is the orientation of spiritual matters ‘inward’, whilst outwardly expressing agreement with the distinction between ‘truth’ and ‘error’ that is characteristic of a ‘modern society’. Modernity does not ‘allow’ religion to be visible: the stamping of universality upon diversity ultimately requires religious expressions that refuse to be neatly contained within their designated sphere to be formally classified as liminal: confined structurally to the margins of public life, whilst simultaneously, remaining central to private life. As the ‘social’ is not an entity with its own agency, individuals who comprise the social – each with their own set of rationalisations, beliefs, faith claims, and degrees of enchantment – are forced into an uncertain position with respect to how they conceptualise and practice religiously within a similarly ambiguous modern world. Though there may be an innovative and creative human spirit buried within the superficial sterility of

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51 *Autopoiesis* is loosely defined as self-creation within a closed system, as generally used to describe the relations between structure and function in living systems, as formulated by biologists Maturana and Varela. “The autopoietic system is defined as a unity by its autopoietic organization... Accordingly, an autopoietic organization constitutes a closed domain of relations... and thus, it defines a ‘space’ in which it can be realized as a concrete system... the space defined by an autopoietic system is self-contained and cannot be described by using dimensions that define another space. When we refer to our interactions with a concrete autopoietic system, however, we project this system on the space of our manipulations and make a description of this projection.” Humberto R. Maturana and Francisco J. Varela, *Autopoiesis and Cognition : The Realization of the Living* (USA, 1980), 88-89.

52 The historical precedent for this is the Treaty (or Peace) of Westphalia, in which Protestants and Catholics became equal before the law in Europe, and religious observance became a matter of private conscience. As Bhambra writes: “The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 led to the inception of a new multi-state system which was characterized by the simultaneous centralization and impersonalization of political power, that is, states were now more likely to act independently of papal authority and the Church’s role as the arbiter of international affairs was greatly reduced (citing Pagden 2002). This separation between religion and state, as well as the emergence of theories of sovereignty, has been seen as uniquely European and as constituting a key aspect of European identity.” Gurminder K. Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity : Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination* (UK; USA, 2007), 91.
modernity, the ability of an individual to command agency in service to such a spirit is, alas, too often consumed by forces of history that appear overwhelming. 53

‘Acceptable’ negotiation with spiritual matters occurs in private; phrased by William James as the “…feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.” 54 In short, the liberty an individual possesses with regard to spiritual matters contains a caveat, that it is acceptable provided it remain private, which generates institution vs. institution debates within the public arena, whilst also justifying the individual’s pursuit of personal meaning, interpreted and practiced in accordance with their desires. 55 The visual politic attached to this propriety, that certain things are ‘permitted’ to be seen and others, such as spiritual matters, are supposed to remain invisible, is disrupted when the boundary between the public and the private is perpetually displaced, as noted by Jeffrey Weeks: “The boundaries between the political, social and intimate spheres of contemporary life are constantly shifting, or being shifted. The borderlines are extremely difficult to detect, let alone police.” 56

‘Cultural matters’ attract similar difficulties as religion: culture and religion, which were once attributes proudly claimed by the first colonisers of ‘the West’, have, in a

53 As science writer Jeremy Burgess asks, pointedly: “Is it just me, or does everyone else feel guilty for being alive too?” Theodore Roszak, The Voice of the Earth (New York, 1992), 37.
54 Cited in Paul Heelas, Spiritualities of Life : New Age Romanticism and Consumptive Capitalism (USA; UK, 2008), 36.
55 That these conflicts appear to arise predominantly between the modern nation states, and multiple variations of Christianity and Islam, suggests that these religions possess such an unsettling similarity to the theistic Christianity that historically structured the secular that they represent a ‘replacement’ threat. This is especially evident when liberal humanistic morality comes into conflict with a more specialised religious morality deriving from a group which is perceived as possessing communitarian strengths: conversely, they also possess an ideology which might compromise human rights for particular groups (such as women, children, or homosexuals). It is also instructive to consider that as this struggle is over values, rights, resources, and power, often explicitly linked to modern nation states, war, crime, punishment, and economic status, it is non-responsive to post-modern, humanistic, or ‘soft’ scientific solutions. Concepts like pluralism, religious tolerance, equality, and so forth, often fail to gain traction among participants engaged in such power struggles.
56 Jeffrey Weeks, Invented Morailities : Sexual Values in an Age of Uncertainty (Cambridge, 1995), 125. For the original scholarship regarding the division of social life into separate ‘spheres’, see Max Weber, ‘Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions,’ in From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology, ed. Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London, 1991). Consider also: “One can, of course, attempt to defend and reconstitute a purified public sphere, liberated from the interests of particular groups and perspectives. Once doubt is cast upon the integrity of such a project, however, one may either perform the self-contradictory and self-defeating task of dogmatically defending the public sphere, or one may return to the question of philosophy.” Philip Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion : The Price of Piety (New York, 2002), 14,fn.19.
spectacular reversal, become equal parts of the ‘Black Man’s Burden’; these may be expressed publicly (and in a limited fashion), only upon the condition that it is a temporary state of being on the way to being ‘fully modern’. In Cox’s words, the demand is “…that all men be drawn into the secularization process so that no one clings to the dangerous pre-critical illusion that his values are ultimate.”57 When Nietzsche called for a ‘polytheism of values’, as Gianni Vattimo notes: “The call is thus not for a society with no values, but for a society without supreme and exclusive values.”58 Both of these statements clash with the epistemic structures of modernity, within which particular emphasis is put on certain values whilst deference to justifications like the foregoing render this insistence invisible. Any conversation between modernity, ethics, values, and beliefs, however secular this may appear, is therefore perpetually referring to ‘Christian ideas dressed in secular garb’.59

Modernity, however, has also been the incubator for alternatives (or challenges) which have been incompletely exorcised throughout its gestation period: alternatives which possess an uncertain relation with the on-going project of modernity. Drawing upon Michel Foucault, Michel de Certeau argues that the applications of power exerted upon everyday life have never been wholly deterministic, which is a critical point. He writes that: “Beneath what one might call the ‘monotheistic’ privilege that panoptic apparatuses have won for themselves, the ‘polytheism’ of scattered practices survives, dominated but not erased by the triumphal success of one of their number.”60 The on-going existence of these beliefs and practices preserve the possibility for empowerment of alternative epistemological positions, though the use of the term ‘survivals’ must be taken into account. An evolutionary ordering system is still an implicit component of the dominant episteme, and the question of whose beliefs and values can be visible, where, and under what circumstances, is very much governed by invisible social codes: permitted, enabled, tolerated, and allowed are qualitatively different concepts to supported, endorsed, and empowered.

58 Gianni Vattimo and Santiago Zabala, ”Weak Thought” and the Reduction of Violence,’ Common Knowledge, vol. 8: 3 (2002), 454.
59 Gray, Heresies, 31.
60 Michel de Certeau, The Practice of Everyday Life (USA, 1984), 48.
As modernity appears insufficiently powerful to actually eliminate these challenges to its authority (despite countless affronts to 'the other', of all persuasions, undertaken in its name) it ought to be theoretically possible to expose and dismantle the logical foundations upon which the privilege, or hegemony, of the episteme is based. In methodological terms, by focusing on its historical and epistemological foundations to reveal the tenuous nature of Judeo-Christian content at its core and thus, create a space of possibility in which competing epistemologies (those which are neither Christian, nor scientific, and are thus twice-removed) might be realistically entertained. As Stephen Diamond writes:

“...it is we who are responsible for much of the evil in the world; and we are each morally required to accept rather than project that ponderous responsibility – lest we prefer instead to wallow in a perennial state of powerless, frustrated, furious, victimhood. For what one possesses the power to bring about, one has also the power to limit, mitigate, counteract, or transmute.”

And, to balance this assertion with the necessary humility, a cite from Desiderius Erasmus – Renaissance humanist – may also be appropriate: “Although I am aware that this custom is too long accepted for one to hope to be able to uproot it, yet I thought it best to give my advice in case things should turn out beyond my hope.”

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Part I: Methodology

A single belief can be the foundation upon which an entire epistemology is inferentially built, beginning with cohesion between the parts, and finally, establishing consensus – that is, expanding the number of individuals who ‘agree’ with the components sufficiently enough that the episteme comes to resemble ‘truth’. Since David Hume established the limits of consensus during the Age of Enlightenment, knowledge is ‘attested to’ only within the limits of rationality – there is no testimony, or consensus, which is sufficient to establish a miracle.\(^63\) Truth then appears as History, which is the backwards glance of the Triumph of Reason over Superstition. The subsequent consensual agreement among the eminently ‘Reasonable’ is, therefore, founded upon the ‘fact’ that the miracle and its relations are ‘prima facie’ false, or delusional.\(^64\) The sciences, including the social sciences, proceed from this point. This primary reduction is the foundation for a secondary reduction which is often performed upon constructivist positions: deemed false by the logic that social, cultural, or linguistic constructions are not ‘as real’ as the objects of ‘true’ scientific inquiry.

Epistemological constructivism cannot combat realism; just as relativism cannot topple rationality. Proponents of the ideology of modernity do not have to make a case for legitimacy (or what is ‘real’ and ‘true’). Though consensus may not be ‘informed’, it is nonetheless assumed. Constructivism gives only the illusion of power and resistance to those who seek to counter a realist and rationalist epistemology. As Charles Larmore writes, “...reason is not a view from nowhere... Consequently, the judgments we... make about moral and scientific progress will not simply express our own habits of mind.”\(^65\) No method can escape this absolutely; even the reflexivity which is demanded by a methodology is only reflexive to the degree already established as an acceptable response, or ‘zone of resistance’, towards the modern.\(^66\)

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\(^{64}\) Douglas Ezzy, ‘Religious Ethnography: Practicing the Witch’s Craft,’ in *Researching Paganisms*, ed. Jenny Blain, Douglas Ezzy, and Graham Harvey (UK, 2004), 116. Ezzy calls this methodological atheism, not agnosticism, as is claimed by the ‘impartial’ scholar and challenges on the basis it is simply ‘not good science’, proceeding from neither careful observation, nor reasoned argument.

\(^{65}\) Larmore, ‘History and Truth,’ 47.

\(^{66}\) Just as the critique of religion is enabled by the existence of, and requirement for, a critical theology, even the outright rejection of modernity would be limited in the same manner by a space...
METHODOLOGY 1: MEDIOLGY

“The in this field of research, the theory of knowledge, the history of praxes, the only thing ever considered is the set of relations of the subject, be it personal or collective, with the object, be it local or global.”


“Interdisciplinary work, so much discussed these days, is not about confronting already constituted disciplines (none of which, in fact, is willing to let itself go). To do something interdisciplinary it’s not enough to choose a ‘subject’ (a theme) and gather around it two or three sciences. Interdisciplinarity consists in creating a new object that belongs to no-one.”


The work that follows (despite having an ‘official’ location within the quickly disappearing discipline of Religious Studies) has considerable theoretical elements in common with Mediology, as innovated by French intellectual and philosopher Régis Debray. Mediology (an emergent discipline) is an area of study which is concerned with the intersections between intellectual, material, and social life: the ‘excluded third’ category which connects the ‘software’ with the ‘hardware’; or the processes of transmission that transform ideologies into socially lived realities. Mediology is, by design, multi-, inter- or trans-disciplinary, and shares philosophical commonalities with the work of Bruno Latour, Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Gauttari, whereby it investigates connections, hybrids, ‘rhizomatic’ networks, intersections, and go-betweens, though Debray’s point of difference is that he offers a fully developed methodology that suits an historical inquiry such as undertaken herein, thus inviting replication. Mediology, as employed herein, also capitalises upon the work undertaken by Foucault in his genealogies and archaeologies of history, in which...
he highlights the breaks and discontinuities found within the historical record. His ‘insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ is designed to excavate those aspects of history which have been disqualified, ignored, buried, or disguised; elements which are of great interest to the mediological undertaking. This method and its goals implicitly (though it is not always explicitly stated) underpins the historical excavations, connections, and assertions found within this work.

Mediology’s central concept, mediation, is a “...dynamic combination of intermediary procedures and bodies that interpose themselves between a producing of signs and a producing of events.” By focusing on the intermediary, Debray ‘changes elements’, shifting from ‘communication’, which he sees as fluid, to mediation, which he describes as infinitely more weighty: “…the intermediary makes the law. Mediation determines the nature of the message, relation has primacy over being... People are not influenced by words alone. Messages transmit themselves as well by gestures, by figures and pictures, the whole panoply of the signs ‘archives’.”

In mediology, the medium (which is a device or system of representation, in a material sense), is integrated with the actual use, or disposal, of resources – that is,
Take the migration from a concept of the ‘modern’, to modern art and architecture: the material proof of transmission. The Church that is built on the strength of a prophet’s words, the formation of a Party from a Manifesto, the radio broadcast of *The War of the Worlds* by Orson Welles on October 30th 1938, and the mass hysteria which followed. In other words, mediology is a theoretical framework that inquires into the structures of mediation by which ideologies – what is said or thought – become grounded: “…the fact that a representation of the world shall have modified the state of the world, and not just its perception (a fact we hold to be something natural), is worth taking the trouble reconfiguring into a real enigma.”

Mediology is primarily concerned with the means by which cultural meaning, or ideologies, are transmitted, and for Debray, this is explicitly linked not only to the materials of semiologists – ie. languages, signs, images – but the physical materiality of the world: technologies of transmission such as guilds, organisations, institutions, practices, discourses, selections, political moves; and physical objects, from books to buildings. Whilst being most closely allied with the history of mentalities (such as in the work of Jacques Le Goff), mediology purposefully ‘lowers the debate’ by fusing philosophy and history with the social sciences to translate a ‘revision of values’ by a ‘displacement of vectors’; revealing the “…skeletal structure beneath the flesh, what one could call ‘the hard of the soft.’” It is therefore possible to usefully apply this to excavate the theological from within the modern, and the modern ideology from within the material world. Debray writes that, in addition to “…removing the partition between vectors and values, we [need] to talk about strengthening crosscrossed lacings: an intertwined kind of understanding that would de-ideologize

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76 Ibid., 8.
77 Italics added. Ibid., 10.
78 Ibid., 19. Semiology, as most simply conceived by Charles Peirce, is concerned with ‘the sign that represents something to someone.’
‘ideologies,’ desanctify sanctities, but also mentalize the material bases of systems of inscription...”

To paraphrase Debray: the amateur mediologist herein is therefore required to set up her footstool between a selection of ‘more dignified armchairs’, such as those of the Philosopher, Historian, Sociologist, Theologian, and Political Scientist. Such breadth is essential to the focus of this work, as the central query – into how the symbols and ideas implicit to firstly, Judaism, and secondly, Christianity, became both internal to, and invisible within, secular modernity – is reliant on the transmission of ideas through multiple geo-cultural and socio-political networks over several thousand years. The result of this process is the now-dominant epistemological structure which was foundational to the formation of modern institutions and remains integral to modern societies. What counts for knowledge, or what is considered ‘normative’ – that is, scientific and universalistic – is oriented around the notion that there is an absolute ‘truth’ to be uncovered in the world, one that is objective and can be separated from power relations. However, as Nietzsche recognised, there is no truth, only interpretations imposed upon a world by the play of forces for domination; and it is this play of forces which is of central interest here.

As this epistemology is the silent referent (or absolute) upon which the legitimacy of all knowledge is contingent, and as all disciplines produce knowledge of a kind which complies wholly or in part with this maxim, no single disciplinary lens will be adequate to this inquiry. Debray writes: “Everything takes place as if one had always unconsciously disassociated 1) the technological question – which machine is at work here? 2) the semantic question – which discourse are we given to

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81 Ibid., 20-21.
82 In Debray’s conception he ascribes these armchairs to the historian of technology, the semiologist, and the sociologist. He calls this a demand for a ‘staggered approach’. Ibid., 18.
83 The desire for clean and uncorrupted narratives that are representative of ‘truth’, whether belonging to the self or society, seems to be peculiar to ‘Western’ ways of thought. The insistence on the consistency of identity, fixed narrative selves, history, and truth is extremely problematic when applied cross-culturally.
85 The term ‘silent referent’ is taken from Chakrabarty, though it is used in the original to refer to Europe as the referent for ‘historical knowledge’. See Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (USA; Oxford, 2000), 28.
understand? and 3) the political question – which power is exerted, how and on whom?”

A history of this nature is therefore not only interested in a corpus of doctrines and a totality of discourses, or principles, but in the changes in the systems of manufacture, circulation, transmission, and storage of ‘signs’ which have had a transformative effect upon the lived social reality. This requires a dual focus: the appearance and meaning of words, ideas, signs, and symbols; also, the transmission mechanisms by which these become either included in or excluded from the corpus of knowledge and normative praxis specific to the ‘West’. The process of excavation must not only investigate the content of normative, alternative, and juxtaposed knowledge claims, but also how the gap between different claims is mediated. Debray asserts that the mediologist prefers “...nothing more than immersion in the contingency of historical accidents and things, while at the same time mindful to posit or set off from the magma of events some structures of necessity of a more general character.”

This attempt (remembering that all ‘conclusions’ are always provisional, partial, contingent, and contextual) will, to follow Leibniz, inquire into the question of how ‘the order of successions can make contradictions appear in the state of things’ – though ‘succession’ has been reworked by Debray to be thought of “...more in terms of the staggered stages of the ziggurat than the linear suite of doorways or enfilade of trees.”

The aim of this analysis is to uncover whether there is any possibility for not just the expression, but the empowerment of alternative epistemologies despite the ongoing project of modernity, or whether this is a utopian aspiration that is destined to remain unfulfilled. This question hinges on another: can modernity, if it is recognised as culture, be relativised?

This is well illustrated by the issue of ‘who can speak’, also known as the ‘equality of voice’, a problem of alterity and power which has been put forward by neo-

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86 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 18.
87 Original quotation, paraphrased here, uses the Enlightenment as its example. Ibid., 19.
88 Ibid., 20.
90 This inquiry begins with Spivak’s paper dealing with her uncertainties on the possibility/impossibility of this speech, as focused upon the ‘itinerary of silencing’. The conclusion she comes to is that there is ‘no space’ from which the subalterns can speak and thus make their interests and experience known to others on their own terms. Gayatri C. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern
Marxists, social, political, indigenous, cultural, racial, post-colonial, feminist, gender, and pedagogical scholars for over twenty years now; generally on behalf of either gendered, religious, ethnic or indigenous claims wherein the right to speak, to be heard, and invoke action or social change is in conflict with an institutional or social norm.\footnote{Consider Bhabha: “The silent Other of gesture and failed speech becomes what Freud calls that ‘haphazard member of the herd’, the Stranger, whose languageless presence evokes an archaic anxiety and aggressivity by impeding the search for narcissistic love-objects in which the subject can rediscover himself, and upon which the group’s \textit{amore propre} is based.” Homi K. Bhabha, \textit{The Location of Culture} (London; New York, 1994), 166. This link to ‘language’ is also signaled by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee: “You can translate a word by a word, but behind the word is an idea, the thing which the word denotes, and this idea you cannot translate, if it does not exist among the people in whose language you are translating.” Cited in Partha Chatterjee, \textit{Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World : A Derivative Discourse?}, Third World Books (UK; USA, 1986), 61. His observations are interesting because he was writing in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, and as Partha Chatterjee points out, his “methods, concepts and modes of reasoning are completely contained within the forms of post-Enlightenment scientific thought.” Ibid., 58.} The grouping together of such a diverse repertory of academic positions makes sense only if the structures of marginalisation are shown to be based on degrees of ‘deviance’ from a ‘normative’ Judeo-Christian ethos. Any move against this dominant episteme (often referred to as the ‘hegemony of the system’) is generally met with overwhelming resistance, or accommodated \textit{outside} the system, rather than within it; thus, limiting the degree of power available to augment the propulsion of these alternatives. In mediological terms, these ideas (some of which may arguably have a significant contribution to make towards increased social justice or minimising violence) \textit{have not} translated into lived social reality, and not because they are irrational or anti-modern, but simply because the totalitarian enforcement of the episteme through the institutions and social norms prevents it. The transmission is ‘blocked’, which suggests something very hypocritical about the

claims made in the name of modernity. What is required, therefore, is a more nuanced history of modernity that illuminates the double-standard, such as the idea that scientific and technical progress can equal social progress; that social progress culminates in the end of violence or equality; or that there exist such things as secular humanitarian values or institutions. Secularity itself needs to be seriously questioned.

This exercise in historical exegesis will attempt to identify the moments at which the battle for the supremacy of certain ideas appeared to extinguish others, but instead, left a memory, or trace, that is carried over to the present: a series of events that has been selected to emphasise the ‘exorcisms’ specific to the process of epistemological purification. To frame this as a series of exorcisms is to incorporate a particularly Christian motif for understanding a complex issue of competing epistemologies and the history of their elimination; appropriate because it arises out of an issue of alterity forged in the fires of Christian cosmology. What is sought is the means by which various ideas have been either excluded, or incorporated into what we call modernity: the structuring, strengthening, and purifying of the episteme. Incorporation, as specifically meaning ‘to put something into the body or substance of something else’, or ‘unite into one body’, a concept as applicable to the episteme as it is to an institution. As the writing of history tends to favour some narratives over others on the basis of significance, this process of incorporation can be difficult to extract from the annals of ‘received wisdom’ which sometimes stand in for historical

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92 Consider Derrida: “The crossing of borders always announces itself according to the movement of a certain step [pas] – and of the step that crosses a line. An indivisible line. And one always assumes the institution of such an indivisibility. Customs, police, visa or passport, passenger identification – all of that is established upon this institution of the indivisible, the institution therefore of the step that is related to it, whether the step crosses it or not.” Jacques Derrida, Aporias : Dying - Awaiting (One Another at) the "Limits of Truth" (USA, 1993), 11, ibid.

93 As Gray writes: “When thinking about the idea that we live in a secular era, it is worth remembering that... the Biblical root of the secular state is the passage in the New Testament where Jesus tells his disciples to give to God what is God’s and to Caesar what belongs to Caesar. Refined by Augustine and given a modern formulation with the Reformation, this early Christian commandment is the ultimate origin of the liberal attempt to separate religion from politics. In this, as in many other respects, liberalism is a neo-Christian cult.” Gray, Heresies, 41-42.

94 ‘Incorporated’, Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 20 April 2011. Consider Debray also: “To put it in other terms, it is bodies that think and not minds. The constraint of incorporation produces the corporations – those intermediate bodies and institutions of knowledge, normalized and normative, which we call schools, churches, parties, associations, societies of thinker, etc. “Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 5-7.
accounts. These are attempted exorcisms, precisely because they fail: if they had not, it would not be possible to locate both the symbolic and literal traces of similarly structured competing epistemologies (often directly descended from earlier matrices) in the present day context. They would be unrecognisable, if indeed they were noted, within the historical accounts. Yet the claim that these exorcisms were successful is important because the dominance of the episteme (and the justifications for ‘scientific and technical progress’ hinges entirely upon this notion; which is especially interesting in light of the fact that these victories are constructed and illusory. The exorcisms were partial, at best. In the words of Gregory Bateson,

“...every important scientific advance provides tools which look to be just what [was] hoped for, and usually the gentry jump in without more ado... Behind every scientific advance there is always a matrix, a mother lode of unknowns out of which the new partial answers have been chiselled. But the hungry, overpopulated, sick, ambitious, and competitive world will not wait, we are told, until more is known, but must rush in where angels fear to tread.”

95 The problem of equality of voice is as much a difficulty for scholars reliant on published histories as it is for champions of the oppressed. Whose history? Whose version of history? Aso to be considered are the alternative histories: such as what is not being said, or what is not allowed to be said. All ‘versions’ must be considered, however, returning to Nietzsche, the claim to truth must be viewed as most suspicious in work of those who make the strongest bid for it. History privileges a certain type of narrative which translates into a lay explanation of how the ‘modern’ came to be – an initial meeting of Athens and Jerusalem which eventually culminates sometime around the 18th century – at which point modernity was supposedly fully ‘in play’. Whatever else historians have to offer remains accessible to only a small number of readers, whilst the simplified version is transmitted through the course of a primary and secondary education. At the university level, conservative accounts tend to dominate the curriculum until graduate level, at which point a certain percentage of the group leave the discipline and become ‘experts’ in other areas – knowledgeable ‘enough’ about history to discuss and disseminate concepts, whilst still remaining under-educated with regards the critical positions that may be taken with respect to this knowledge. Callinicos usefully cites Kuhn on this issue: “Kuhn notes the distorted image of the history of the sciences derived from ‘the study of finished scientific achievements as these are recorded in the classics, and more recently, in the textbooks from which each new scientific generation learns to practice its trade’. He argues that ‘a concept of science drawn from them is no more likely to fit the enterprise that produced them than an image of a national culture drawn from a tourist brochure or a language text.’” Alex Callinicos, ‘Review : Postmodernity as Normal Science,’ The British Journal of Sociology, vol. 46: 4 (1995), 735.

96 A contemporary example would be the attempted elimination of ‘traditional’ or ‘pagan’ local religious expressions in the Americas or Africa during the colonial period. The traditions which Christian missionaries attempted to overthrow and obliterate have rarely suffered from an absolute loss of context for their original beliefs and practices. Although substantial losses must be registered, and whilst an evolution into syncretic forms may have occurred, these could also be considered partial ‘exorcisms’ in the sense meant herein.

97 Rest of quotation reads: ‘I have very little sympathy for these arguments from the world’s ‘need.’ I notice that those who pander to its needs are often well paid. I distrust the applied scientists’ claim that what they do is useful and necessary. I suspect that their impatient enthusiasm for action, their rarin’ to go, is not just a symptom of impatience, nor is it pure buccaneering ambition. I suspect that it covers deep epistemological panic.’ Gregory Bateson and Mary Catherine Bateson, Angels Fear : An Investigation into the Nature and Meaning of the Sacred (New Jersey, USA, [1988][2005], 14-15.
Such affirmations of success, necessity, and perhaps, righteousness, also act to conceal the degree of violence required to maintain dominance in the modern world, especially where capitalistic gain – convenience, supply and demand, and so on – requires double-standards, particularly in the area of morality. ‘Religious’ or ‘cultural’ conflicts attract the publicity, and the juggernaut is quietly propelled forward, whilst its endemically violent nature remains obscured. As Rollo May writes: “Our age is one of transition, in which the normal channels for utilizing the daimonic are denied; and such ages tend to be times when the daimonic is expressed in its most destructive form.”98

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**Methodology 2: Epistemology**

“Truth is a thing of this world... Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctified; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.”

*Power/Knowledge*, Michel Foucault, 1980.99

“Without some degree of epistemic grounding, without some coherent notion of the knowing, acting, subject, distinctive political projects and articulations of any kind cannot be sustained.”

*Feminism, Epistemology and Postmodernism*, Gregor McLennan, 1995.100

The episteme internal to the modern defines and redefines the limits of ‘truth’ by determining what does, and does not, count for knowledge. To offer a definition, *epistemology* is literally ‘The Word on Knowledge’ or a way of knowing in which observation, experience, truth, belief, and reason, are bound into a cohesive framework.101 An episteme is generally thought of as a discursive practice, a theory on knowledge, a theory of the world, or a worldview.102 Both terms, to paraphrase Sandra Harding, are used “…to describe theories of knowledge adopted by individuals and created in collective contexts… theories of knowledge that make basic claims about the nature of knowledge: who can know, how we know, and what counts as evidence for our claims.”103 This emphasis on social construction is critical: epistemologies do not exist outside of the individuals who create, use, and reify them.104 In the case of ‘the episteme’ – the significant episteme, according to Foucault

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100 McLennan, ‘Feminism, Epistemology and Postmodernism: Reflections on Current Ambivalence,’ 393.
101 From the Greek episteme (knowledge or science) and logos (word or speech), or “…to know how to do, or understand”, literally to ‘over stand’ or stand over. ‘Epistemology’, Douglas Harper, *Online Etymology Dictionary* (2001-2010); available from http://www.etymonline.com. Retrieved 27 June 2010.
102 From the Germanic woruld (literally human existence or affairs, or humankind, or the age of man). ‘World’, *Online Etymology Dictionary*, retrieved 27 June 2010.
103 Italics added. Feminist Sandra Harding, paraphrased in Margaret Hunter, ‘Rethinking Epistemology, Methodology, and Racism: Or, Is White Sociology Really Dead?’, *Race and Society*, vol. 5: (2002), 120.
104 Ibid., 120.
– it is a “...slice of history common to all branches of knowledge, which imposes on each one the same norms and postulates, a general stage of reason, a certain structure of thought... a great body of legislation written once a for all by some anonymous hand... the totality of relations...”

Traditionally, epistemology has two key elements: “...the defining features of knowledge and justification, and their limits.” As Hannah Arendt writes: “Legitimacy, when challenged, bases itself on an appeal to the past, while justification relates to an end that lies in the future,” an insight internal to the structure of the ‘Western’ model which exposes the teleological thrust of the episteme itself. The justification itself is messianic, in that it is a correction yet ‘to come’. Legitimation is central: specifically, what gives meaning to social and cultural practices, and how this validity within the process of signification is established; returning always to the construction of networks of power.

Foucault, for whom power is central, conceptualises the episteme as *apparatus*, and his definition recognises its regulative effect upon knowledge (permitting or forbidding inclusions of particular kinds). For Foucault, the rationality associated with the episteme is what gives it cohesion, in that there is some observable coordination between its elements. His concept is not limited to science (though the following quote deliberately addresses that subject), but can be extended to an entire epoch, era, or any sort of collective – it is primarily a *discursive* apparatus. In attempt to refine what was originally presented in his works *The Order of Things* and *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, he makes the following clarification:

“I would define the *episteme* retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable within... a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say are true or false. The *episteme* is the ‘apparatus’ which makes

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108 This observation is attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011.
possible the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what may not be characterised as scientific.”

Foucault’s use of *field* here, in combination with the notion of discursive practice, emphasises the *embodied* nature of the episteme. A field is a human creation, a method of classification, indicating a habit of mind to group disparate (or chaotic) events or objects and create within them some cohesion or unity. Joseph Chilton Pearce phrases this poetically:

“There is a medical field, legal field, a field of education, a field of knowledge, the orbital or wave field of a particle, a field of potential energy, neural fields of [the] brain, fields of stars... Field as artefacts of memory or repositories of experience... No field could be bound into a finite system, yet our intellect, once it creates a field, continually tries to create finite boundaries for it.”

The epistemology sets the *rules* of inclusion or exclusion for the field, whether the latter is that of a wave, or of modernity itself. Moreover, a field is posited as not just an observable, but a *controllable* entity.

Foucault also nominates the term *threshold* to signal the point at which the discursive practice acquires ‘speed’, power, and validity (eventually, formalisation). The complexity of his thought on this topic requires lengthy quotation:

“The moment at which a discursive practice achieves individuality and autonomy... might be called the *threshold of positivity*. When in the operation of a discursive formation, a group of statements is articulated, claims to validate (even unsuccessfully) norms of verification and coherence, and when it exercises a dominant function (as a model, a critique, or a verification) over knowledge, we will say that the discursive formation crosses *threshold of epistemologization*. When the epistemological figure... obeys a number of formal criteria... its statements comply not only with archaeological rules of formation, but also with certain laws for the construction of propositions... it has crossed a *threshold of scientificity*. And when this scientific discourse is able... to define the axioms necessary to it, the elements that it uses, the propositional structures that are legitimate to it, and the transformations that

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111 Ibid., 197.
113 Ibid., 76.
it accepts, when it is thus able, taking itself as its starting-point, to deploy the
formal edifice it constitutes... it has crossed the threshold of formalization.”\(^\text{114}\)

By the end of this process it would appear that discourse has acquired a degree of
power, privilege, material-semiotic reality, and, apparently, agents who can formally
‘deploy’ its content; agents who, through the use of the discursive apparatus
(episteme), initially set, then sometimes reproduce, or perhaps, recreate, the rules or
limits for a particular field. This suggests these limits are not ‘fixed’, at least not
within Foucault’s type of philosophical inquiry. Judith Butler sums up his position
as follows:

“One asks about the limits of ways of knowing because one has already run
up against a crisis within the epistemological field in which one lives. The
categories by which social life are ordered produce a certain incoherence or
entire realms of unspeakability. And it is from this... tear in the fabric of our
epistemological web, that the practice of critique emerges, with the awareness
that no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning discourses have
produced an impasse... this exposure of the limit of the epistemological field
is linked with the practice of virtue... as if virtue itself is to be found in the
risking of established order.”\(^\text{115}\)

Foucault’s virtue, when conceived in this manner, is reminiscent of Adorno’s notion
of critique, which warns against “…the danger... of judging intellectual phenomena
in a subsumptive, uninformed and administrative manner and assimilating them into
the prevailing constellations of power which the intellect ought to expose.”\(^\text{116}\) In her
analysis, Butler notes that exposing these constellations is impeded by judgment,
which is a move that, for Adorno, “…serves to separate the critic from the social
world... For critique to operate as part of a praxis... is for it to apprehend the ways in
which categories are themselves instituted, how the field of knowledge is ordered,
and how what it suppresses returns... as its own constitutive occlusion.”\(^\text{117}\)

The type of analysis undertaken herein takes the threshold of epistemologization as the
‘point of attack’: in Foucault’s terms, scientificity does not serve as the norm, nor
will positivity suffice. He writes, “…what one is trying to uncover are discursive

\(^{114}\) Foucault warns against reifying the precise order of these stages. Foucault, *The Archaeology of
Knowledge*, 186-187.


\(^{116}\) Adorno cited in ibid., 213.

\(^{117}\) Adorno paraphrased in ibid., 213.
practices in so far as they give rise to a corpus of knowledge...”\textsuperscript{118}, the manner in which they acquire status as ‘fact’, ‘truth’, ‘right’, ‘good’, and so forth. What occurred to push certain ways of thinking to the point of formalisation? To the point where a particular set of relations have become systematised and institutionalised with excessive formality – demonstrating coherence, without necessarily signifying consensus – and disproportionate enough in terms of power relations to be considered not only dominant, but totalitarian. Juxtaposed with these questions is Debray’s concern (in which he draws upon Foucault) with “…locating certain thresholds of discontinuity within what would appear as a continuum...”\textsuperscript{119} In particular, the contradictions between what is claimed, and what is observed.

Another way of ‘thinking the episteme’ (which is related to Debray’s technologies of transmission) conceives it in ‘mechanised’ or ‘material-semiotic’ terms, as developed by Don Ihde and Evan Selinger.

“An epistemology engine is a technology or set of technologies that through use frequently become explicit models for describing how knowledge is produced. The most dramatic examples of ‘epistemology engines’ influence our notions of subjectivity, directly affecting how we understand what it means to be human and perceive things from a human perspective... An epistemology engine is thus a special case of a more general phenomenological notion that entails the ways in which life-world practices form the basis for what often become scientific theories.”\textsuperscript{120}

Ihde and Selinger relate their concept to particular technological apparati: the technology, art, and science of warfare and the intersections between these and the philosophical-historical conjecture upon relations between humans and machines; and in more contemporary times, the idea of returning to the ‘book of life’ through the codes of genetic mapping or the digital computer, which replaces the intuitive basis of expertise.\textsuperscript{121} To further illustrate their argument, they offer Lawrence Henderson’s well-known quote: “Science owes more to the steam engine than the steam engine owes to science.”\textsuperscript{122}

\textsuperscript{118} Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 190.
\textsuperscript{119} Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 134.
\textsuperscript{120} Ihde and Selinger, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Epistemology Engines,’ 362.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 362.
\textsuperscript{122} Lawrence Joseph Henderson (1917). Cited in ibid., 363.
Ihde and Selinger suggest that particular technological shifts (praxis) can start the ‘engine of theory’ towards social and epistemological changes, which amounts to “…a radical inversion between the traditional priority of theory over practice.” This suggests some compatibility might be found between the theories of Ihde, Selinger, and Foucault: whether the discursive construction of the epistemology is generated from the material to the semiotic, or the reverse, theory occurs through observation of praxis. Consider how certain periods of time come to be identified with particular technological shifts and are named in a manner which stands in symbolically for the milieu, such as the ‘Gutenberg’ Era, or the ‘Information Age’. These are retrospective: at the inception of one is the book, at the other, the digital computer, though formalisation of the limits of the field specific to each occurred prior to the identification and naming of the milieu. The modification of each field followed thereafter. The ‘linguistic turn’ for example, was generated at the inception of the Information Age, though its point of impact was, retrospectively speaking, the Gutenberg Era, and its culmination point (the end of ‘the book’) has not yet occurred. Rather than viewing history as one of mentalities, or the ‘intellectual history of ideas’, the notion of an epistemology engine therefore “…places philosophical thought on a continuum with lifeworld activity, provocatively suggesting that philosophical ideas can be generated from technologically mediated lifeworld praxes.”

The third theorist who has usefully configured the concept of episteme is Mark A. Schneider, clearly drawing upon Foucault. In his work the distinction between ‘fictional’, ‘factual’, ‘imaginative’ and ‘instrumental’ is highlighted; he calls this the epistemic register. Schneider’s formulation is useful for identifying the mental and

123 Ibid., 363. What connection can be made between the ‘engine of theory’ and the ‘angel of history”? Is the engine what the angel became? Modernity? Personal communication with thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011.

124 For essays interrogating this process see Geoffrey Nunberg, ed., The Future of the Book (USA, 1996). The hypertextual world of the internet is as dependent on the ‘death of the Author’ (a movement pre-empting the linguistic turn, as stimulated by an essay written by Roland Barthes 1967) as the digital domain is dependent on the expansion of human inquiry beyond the physical world into space. There is perhaps some connection also between the ‘death of God’ movement (reinvigorated in 1961), and the moon landing (1969). Time, space, and transcendence, all of which are theological in origin, have been shifted into cyberspace through various transfers of authority, of which the textual shift is but one aspect.

125 Ihde and Selinger, ‘Merleau-Ponty and Epistemology Engines,’ 375, fn. 7.

126 Mark A. Schneider, Culture and Enchantment (USA, 1993), 10-11.
cultural structures that are welcome ‘in principle’ within the ‘Western epistemic register’, or conversely, unable to be assimilated, bringing the division between ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ (that Foucault abandons) to the forefront of his analysis. Schneider’s concept can be understood contractually. General legitimacy is founded on a register that is historically compiled and provides a comparative index for assimilation or rejection of all subsequent claims. Though it may appear otherwise, there is no ambiguity as to the content of the register in any particular field: it is simply a matter of ‘narrowing’ the field until a particular niche is located and the necessary ‘warrants’ (or proofs) for legitimacy can be obtained.

Following this line of thought, it is possible to recognise the ‘warrants’ facilitated by concepts such as post-modernity, for instance, or internal to this school of thought, cultural relativism, and how the validity of the niche maintains cohesion. These examples also demonstrate, however, that the existence of a warrant does not necessarily translate to any power being acquired through occupation of that niche. Furthermore, there are scholarly niches such as phenomenology, for example, or some divisions of cultural studies, that via their own arguments and claims to exceptionality, inadvertently disrupt their own access and right to power: self-situating so far beyond the conventional structures of scholarship that they are not only niche, but easily ghettoised. Therefore, the notion of an epistemic register can be applicable on multiple levels, acquire consensus as a ‘truth claim’, and thus, retain coherence, but this is always dependent upon relationships between different orders of being. In thinking about the epistemic register indigenous to modernity, it is the normalised claims for justification and legitimacy (such as those asserted on behalf of ‘scientific progress’ or ‘democracy’, for example) which need interrogation. Particularly applicable is the observation by Gregor McLennan, that, “…epistemology has more often been about contriving strategies of justification for treating belief as knowledge.”

To combine Foucault’s apparatus (discursive), Ihde and Selinger’s engine (mechanical), and Schneider’s register (contractual/legal), is still to think about epistemology as a limit. All of these observations on ‘how’ an episteme works deal

only with what is permissible within the limits, there is no real discussion on what is beyond the limits other than an acknowledgment that there are persons, places, ideas, etc. inhabiting that position. Attempts to transverse the limit are antithetical to the episteme of modernity; the limit is rarely shifted. All three theorists recognise the limit and posit a way around it: Foucault’s ‘relations’ within the field are bounded by the limit, though the limit is not necessarily ‘fixed’ or stable; Ihde and Selinger attempt to reconfigure Cartesian dualism (via Merleau-Ponty) and, despite their material-semiotic argument, put forward an embodied mind inhabiting a world – absolute subjectivity – as the way out of the argument. Schneider argues for a ‘third space’ where the introduction of a moral, aesthetic, or naturalistic criterion might break the limits of the register in ways which make the limit inapplicable.

It is Jacques Derrida who really attempts to deal with the problem of the ‘limit as limit’. Derrida’s notion of aporia marks the place of ‘cutting’ – in this case, epistemicide – which, like all notions of –cide, ‘murder’ or ‘remove’ what is either extraneous or beyond the limit. The aporia is a blind-spot and a threshold – evoking the possibility of hospitality in both directions across the ‘border’ – or a place where the way is philosophically or literally ‘blocked’: Derrida’s ‘limits of truth’. Derrida demonstrates what Paulo Freire calls an ‘epistemological curiosity’, which is 1.) a willingness to go beyond the limits, to be reflexive about how the knowledge contained by the limit came to be considered important, or limited in this particular way, and 2.) to discern whose interests are served by both the knowing, and the limits imposed upon it.

Derrida’s method – deconstruction, as described by Christopher Norris – deliberately seeks out the “...‘aporias’, blindspots or moments of self-contradiction... to operate a kind of strategic reversal, seizing on precisely those unguarded details... which are always, and necessarily, passed over by...

128 Idea credited to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw 2011.
129 Derrida’s philosophy is sometimes called into question, primarily for ‘rejection of truth’ (it is all difference and representation) and his claim that ‘there is nothing beyond the text’ – a limited view of his philosophy centred on an impoverished reading of deconstruction, and one which fails to recognise that his philosophy has always circled back to real world issues, most notably the political interface with theology. For example: “In a series of lectures and seminars on the death penalty, for example, Derrida wished to expose the theological vestiges of a notion of sovereignty that asserts its powers, cruelty, and exceptionality most visibly in putting citizens to death, or, in the case of war, sending them off to face death.” Michael Naas, ‘Derrida’s Laïcité’ CR: The New Centennial Review, vol. 7: 2 (2007), 26.
interpreters of a more orthodox persuasion.” Deconstruction is also an act of defiance; undertaken in the name of something that is generally considered to be undeconstructable, and generally linked to justice. These are aporia’s of justice because justice is only possible if the way is blocked. Otherwise, as fellow philosopher John D. Caputo notes: “…we are just sailing along on automatic, with cruise control and with our hands barely on the wheel, staying inside the lines, applying the law, remaining securely within the horizon of the possible…” For Derrida, deconstruction, his method and project, is justice, and responsibility demands that a different understanding of justice which reaches beyond the political emerge, one that emphasises and is hospitable to the right of the human other to exist, appear, or reappear legitimately in ‘public’ space, or as Emmanuel Levinas would say, ‘to make welcome’. There is an assumption here that the dominant epistemological terrain is exclusive, and in a sense, this is correct, but only with respect to what is permitted within public space. To follow Derrida, if justice depends on deconstructing the undeconstructable, and the opportunity for justice presents at the aporia (where the way is philosophically blocked), then it is the aporia presented by the limits of what is permissible (and, internal to this, what counts for knowledge), within public space (including the institutions) that is of central concern.

This circles back to the political issues of who can speak, and who can be heard; the right to which is foundational for the establishment of legitimate claims. Vattimo

132 Jacques Derrida and John D. Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell : A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, Perspectives in Continental Philosophy, (New York, 1997), 128. It is the French philosophers, such as Emmanuel Levinas, Gabriel Marcel, along with Derrida, working out of a post-Shoah context for understanding humanity, who place the emphasis on justice as fundamental for an understanding of otherness, and in doing so, promote an engagement with ‘the other’ which hinges on responsibility. In Derrida’s terms, this is achieved by learning to speak with and to the ‘ghosts’, which he uses metaphorically to suggest those persons or ideas (using the example of Marxism) who are excluded and/or expired. “To exorcise not in order to chase [them] away, but this time to grant them the right, if it means making them come back alive, as revenants who would no longer be revenants, but as other arrivants to whom a hospitable memory or promise must offer welcome... out of a concern for justice.” Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx : The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International (New York, 1994), 176. “The key to understanding what Derrida is about here is to understand that by ‘justice’ he does not mean a Platonic eidos, or a Kantian regulative Idea, a determinable ideal or universal model, an identifiable paradigm to be applied as the universal is applied to the particular. What he means by Justice and its impossibility, in the typically unorthodox, exorbitant style of deconstruction, is the ‘singular,’ the Abrahamic exception to the law, the ‘remnant’ and the ‘fragment’ that drops through the cracks of the law, not as a merely factual omission or defect of existing laws, but structually, necessarily.” Derrida and Caputo, Deconstruction in a Nutshell : A Conversation with Jacques Derrida, 135.
links this to violence: “Philosophically, violence can only be defined as the silencing of questions... Burning heretics was a form of violence defended, in metaphysical terms, by a religion that professed an ultimate truth.”\textsuperscript{134} What is heretical within the epistemological framework of modernity if not the voices which challenge the claims to authoritative knowledge made in its name? The charge of heresy is levelled in cases of presumed or proclaimed epistemological and ontological error, and thus, has always been linked to violence of a kind. As Bateson writes: “Is there... such a subject of inquiry as Epistemology, with a capital E? ...Is it possible to be Epistemologically wrong? Wrong at the very root of thought? Christians, Moslems, Marxists (and many biologists) say yes – they call such error ‘heresy’ and equate it with spiritual death.”\textsuperscript{135} In turn, the expressions of religion and culture that refuse to be tamed by relativisation or refuse exorcism via the authorities of secular modernity are the heresies of modernity.

Such violence relies on implements, in this case Foucault’s formalisation of the episteme as ‘apparatus’, but it also requires a degree of complicity to maintain power: it capitalises upon the residual fear of breaking with the group within society.\textsuperscript{136} In the words of Adorno and Horkheimer, the Enlightenment was ‘mythic fear turned radical’\textsuperscript{137} and it would seem that collectively, because we are still living out the precepts of the Enlightenment, we default, perhaps unconsciously, to a

\textsuperscript{134} Vattimo and Zabala, “Weak Thought” and the Reduction of Violence,’ 455.
\textsuperscript{135} ‘Moslem’ [sic] Bateson and Bateson, Angels Fear : An Investigation into the Nature and Meaning of the Sacred, 23. ‘Heresy’. “Etymology: Old French eresie, heresie (12th cent.), modern French hérésie, < Latin type *heresia (whence also Italian eresia, Portuguese heresia), for Latin haeresis school of thought, philosophical sect, in eccl. writers, theological heresy, < Greek, taking, choosing, choice, course taken, course of action or thought, 'school' of thought, philosophic principle or set of principles, philosophical or religious sect; to take, middle voice, to take for oneself, choose... [defn] 2. By extension, Opinion or doctrine in philosophy, politics, science, art, etc., at variance with those generally accepted as authoritative.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 31 January 2011.
\textsuperscript{136} Also consider Asad: “The Church always exercised the authority to read Christian practice for its Religious Truth. In this context it is interesting that the word ‘heresy’ at first designated all kinds of errors, including errors ‘unconsciously’ involved in some activity... and it acquired its specific modern meaning (the verbal formulation of denial or doubt of any defined doctrine of the Catholic Church) only in the course of the methodological controversies of the sixteenth century.” Talal Asad, Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,’ Man, vol. 18: 2 (1983), 254, fn.20.
\textsuperscript{137} Arendt draws upon Hobbes on this issue: “Hobbes is the only political philosopher in whose work death, in the form of fear of violent death, plays a crucial role. But it is not equality before death that is decisive for Hobbes; it is the equality of fear resulting from the equal ability to kill possessed by everyone that persuades men in their state of nature to bind themselves into a commonwealth.” Arendt, On Violence, 68.
residual tribalism that subscribes to a ‘rule’ of conduct that demands faith in the authority of institutions and is complicit with social norms. “Transmission,” following Debray, “is a violent collective process... it puts into play all at once systems of authority and relations of domination. Every transmission is a combat...”138 Yet the obedience demanded by the social contract goes almost unnoticed, is barely articulated. Debray has a particular turn of phrase that is pertinent here, with an applicability that might be extended also to the replacement ethos of post-Christian modernity. “The doctrine’s influence and success wipe clean the memory of indoctrinations painful gestation; opus eclipses operation. Optimal transmission is transmission forgotten.”139

Vandana Shiva, who links violence explicitly to the destruction of epistemological validity in her discussion of reductionist science, renders this violence as a fourfold assault in the service of maintaining a monopoly on knowledge:

“...violence is inflicted on the subject socially through the sharp divide between the expert and the non-expert – a divide which converts the vast majority of non-expects into non-knower even in those areas of life in which the responsibility of practice and action rests with them. But even the expert is not spare: fragmentation of knowledge converts the expert into a non-knower in fields of knowledge other than his or her specialization.”140

Such fragmentation can also be a silencing. It is the overlapping terrain of imperialistic and epistemic violence, wrought through the nexus of Judeo-Christian theological concepts with historical sovereign powers, in which the subaltern voices locate the moment of attempted extinction; although the subsequent attempts to reverse this seem to frequently become stranded in the chaos of post-modernity. As Ward writes: “Attempts to delineate the cultural Zeitgeist, even provide a typology for it, inevitably involves simplifying; and sometimes the reduction involved leaves

138 “Christian theology was not unaware of this. The study of angels, angelology, was in mythic form our first science of transmissions, is at bottom a polemology. ‘Angel’ means messenger (angelos), and the angels of the Old Testament (the ‘Good News’ postal workers) are not isolated gyro-waves twirling at will. They are, like the clerics of yore, ‘incardinated.’ They are ranked in politico-military formations... under the dual sign of antagonism (combat against demons and the other army, Satan’s) and of hierarchy... These celestial pyramids served as models for the courtly protocol and caesaro-papist ceremonial in Byzantium, which in turn served as the matrix for our monarchical (and in its wake, Republican) protocol.” Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 45.

139 Debray, Transmitting Culture, 14-15.

the dominant category-term itself (postmodern, late-capitalism etc.) suffocating in its own vacuity.”

This insight verifies the earlier warning that the ‘warrants’ extracted through the contractual nature of a particular epistemic register may not succeed in generating power.

In Serres’ prose then, “…the former imaginary subject of knowledge, taking refuge in his stove-heated room to conjure up the Devil and the Good Lord, or bent under his transcendental conditions, gives way to a group, united or dispersed in space and time, dominated and ruled by agreement.” This ‘social contract’ is loaded in two directions: obedience protects the privileges (usually called ‘freedom’) of living in a modern society, but this obedience is frustrated by the inability to profess or remedy any cause for objection or obstacle to freedom due to the absence of any singular authority that might take responsibility. Responsibility, knowledge, and authority are divided. The issue of ‘who can speak’ therefore shifts to become the problem of who to speak to. How do you argue with a dominant paradigm? And how to access the networks of power in order to try and change it? Such difficulties not only frustrate the efforts of those championing alternative epistemological positions, but even the most general attempts to negotiate the modern bureaucratic terrain. Arendt makes this point clearly:

“...the latest and perhaps most formidable form of... domination [is] bureaucracy or the rule of an intricate system of bureaus in which no [one]... can be held responsible, and which could properly be called rule by Nobody. (If, in accord with traditional political thought, we identify tyranny as government that is not held to give account of itself, rule by Nobody is clearly the most tyrannical of all, since there is no one left who could even be asked to answer for what is being done. It is this state of affairs, making it impossible to localize responsibility and to identify the enemy...)”

Within the epistemological limits of modernity, what is legitimate within shared public space typically conforms to a binarised, or dialectical form: only binaries are permitted, however illusory these may be. The only way to ‘cross the border’ is to

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144 Consider C.P. Snow: “Attempts to divide anything into two ought to be regarded with much suspicion.” The Two Cultures (1959) cited in Patricia Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 1st ed. (Oxford; New York, 2009), 154.
philosophically commit to the process of binarisation, which ultimately may be epistemologically fatal. The dialectical form is a part of the modern episteme itself, and possesses both a theological origin and a twist, as Arendt recognises:

“Hegel’s and Marx’s great trust in the dialectical ‘power of negation,’ by virtue of which opposites do not destroy but smoothly develop into each other because contradictions promote and do not paralyse development, rests on a much older philosophical prejudice: that evil is no more than a primitive modus of the good, that good can come out of evil; that, in short, evil is but a temporary manifestation of a still-hidden good.”

To enter into the dialectic is therefore to risk epistemological compromise, extinguishment, or attempted exorcism/exclusion. The alternative is to submit to the normative processes of relativisation and privatisation, in short, agreeing to private and limited freedoms. This insight can be identified in the work of Carl Schmitt: “Schmitt views the history of modernity as driven by a continuing quest for a neutral and safe haven on earth in denial of the necessity to take a side between good and evil…” As any neutral position is the outcome of full relativisation then all knowledge claims, in the context of a liberal society, are also fully relativised: thus (in the thinking of Schmitt’s contemporary, Leo Strauss), denying any possibility of any definitive account. The exception is:

“...the step undertaken by the seventeenth century from traditional Christian theology to the system of a ‘natural’ science. Until this day this has determined the direction that all ensuing development had to take... Therewith the direction to neutralization and minimalization was taken and the law accepted, according to which European humanity has acted and that has shaped its concept of truth.”

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145 Arendt, On Violence, 56. Further: “Marx’s idea, borrowed from Hegel, that every old society harbors the seeds of its successors in the same way every living organism harbors the seeds of its offspring is indeed not only the most ingenious but also the only possible conceptual guarantee for the sempiternal continuity of progress in history; and since the motion of this progress is supposed to come about through the clashes of antagonistic forces, it is possible to interpret every ‘regress’ as a necessary but temporary setback.” Ibid., 26.

146 As this dialectic, that of negation and overcoming, is thus theological and therefore still internal to modernity, the preference here is to follow Goodchild who frames criticism in terms of ‘turning our attention toward that which matters’ – to consider a third way which is outside of the dialectic. Goodchild, Capitalism and Religion: The Price of Piety, 252.


As Foucault and Shiva have recognised however, the ‘definitive’ episteme, the *exception*, remains *unrelativised*. Foucault (though he eventually settles on the negative), even questions whether *all* such interrogations of epistemology necessitate the analysis of scientific discourse.¹⁵⁰

The limits of the episteme do, however, overlap with other epistemological terrain which co-exists in the same spaces as modernity; hence, Foucault’s recognition that the limits are not ‘fixed’. The limits present as *aporias* or opportunities for hospitality and justice, but only if a ‘third position’ with respect to these limits is taken. This third position (as sought by not only Derrida, but Serres, Debray, and others) is not possible either *inside* or *outside* the binarised area, but may only be philosophically possible *beyond* them, which is more to do with the difference *between* ‘truth’ positions than the attempt to *reconcile* truth positions, either via universalism or relativism. The structure of this dominant modern episteme and the power relations specific to it have to be sought in the *interface* between ‘relations of forces which are supporting, and supported by, types of knowledge,’¹⁵¹ and the material-semiotic *apparati* (such as Schneider’s *register*, or Idhe and Selinger’s *engines*) which are deployed by human agents who are creating, negotiating, and modifying the epistemological *field*. This field is isomorphic with the ‘terrain’ indigenous to the ideology of modernity: the ‘modern West’, which, true to its conception within popular culture – as if it were a ‘frontier’ – has expanded at the borders and epistemologically engulfed the world. Vincent Crapanzano puts this particularly well: “Unlike borders, which can be crossed (unless they are closed) and boundaries, which can be transgressed, frontiers... cannot be crossed. They mark a change in ontological register.”¹⁵² Impressions of the world are altered: history, globalisation, tourism, migration, and trade, bring with them new kinds of evaluating the quality of ‘here to there’, ‘mine to yours’, and the present in relation to the past.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 196.
¹⁵³ In Zygmunt Bauman’s terms, power has become *extraterritorial*, no longer slowed down by the resistance of space: “Time acquires history once the speed of movement through space... becomes a matter of human ingenuity, imagination and resourcefulness.” Zygmunt Bauman, *Liquid Modernity* (Cambridge, USA, 2000), 9, 11.
Immersion in the epistemology of the ‘West’ also, ironically, forces confrontation with the guiding beliefs and practices employed to secure meaning in a local and personal sense. Ultimate questions of purpose, fate, the control of illness, birth, death, and the anxiety of an unknown future must still be mediated. The scientific and technological advances of a secular modernity supply tools for only a partial mediation, one that is explanatory, yet often, unsatisfying. The question arises (to borrow from Rasch): “If this is modernity, do we really want to be here?”\textsuperscript{154} Thus, the attempt must be made to begin the process of relativising the ‘culture’ and epistemology of modernity through the interrogation of its origins, structure, and outcomes.

\textsuperscript{154} Rasch, Niklas Luhmann’s Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation, 2.
Part II: Definitions

Jacques Le Goff, in his histories, notes that historians do not pay enough attention to the way in which words mark, with their appearance, a significant moment in time, and alter in meaning through the course of their use. Words – indeed, language(s) – are vehicles of transmission, for Roland Barthes, the ‘object in which power is inscribed’, for Umberto Eco, the means by which it becomes established. Words are not just communicative, but are creative: in the theological sense of the Word (in the Hebrew, a verb); in the educational, discursive, and rhetorical senses; and in the direct sense of supplying the connection between related meanings, based upon cultural conventions, and mental, semantic, and other associations. Their inception occurs within a particular historical milieu, in which their appearance is a part of a method of organising information within a particular horizon of meanings. Words are neither singular, nor static, but are situated somewhere between message and medium. Eco writes, against Marshall McLuhan: “The medium is not the message; the message becomes what the receiver makes of it, applying to it his own codes of reception, which are neither those of the sender nor those of the scholar of communication.” Words are go-betweens, because one word may possess multiple meanings or ways of reading, yet one way of reading or a single meaning can be derived from a selection of quite different words. In Debray’s terms, the ‘weighty plots’ of any milieu are often underestimated: “...usage is more archaic than the tool... if the medium is ‘new’, the milieu is ‘old,’ by definition. It is a stratification of memories and narrative associations... [a] repertory [of] representational structures and symbols from all preceding ages.”

155 Le Goff, The Birth of Europe, 3.
156 “Christianity helps along the victory of the codex (our own form of book) over the volumen (or scroll), unfit for liturgical reading because so little able to be easily handled, and the victory of the codex helps along that of Christianity over pagan practices.” Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 15.
158 Ibid., 244-245.
159 Consider Tracy on this also: ‘The recent theoretical work on Western ‘logocentrism’... needs to be explicitly related to a study of Christian self-understanding within... theology, the discipline that asks ‘Greek’ (logocentric) questions of Jewish and Hellenistic Jewish scriptural texts... This... alliance [has] helped to occasion... categories as spirit over letter, ideality over materiality, reason over feeling, content in written sign over form, signified over signifier, identity over difference, and self-presence in self-understanding over all ‘derivative,’ distancing forms of writing.” David Tracy, ‘Writing,’ in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (USA, 1998), 385.
160 Last fragment paraphrased from Eco, Travels in Hyperreality : Essays, 298.
161 Ibid., 235.
162 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 16-17.
DEFINITIONS 1: MODERNITY

“...a condition of modernity presupposes an act of self-conscious distancing from a past or a situation regarded as naïve.”

Modernity, Gustavo Benavides, 1998.163

“Naïve: 1. Originally: natural and unaffected; artless; innocent. Later also: showing a lack of experience, judgement, or wisdom; credulous, gullible. 2a. Of art... produced by a person without formal training. b. Of an artist: not trained in a formal manner; eschewing sophisticated techniques. 3. Science. Of a person or animal: not having previously had a particular experience or been the subject of a particular experiment; lacking knowledge of the purpose of an experiment; unconditioned.”


“It is never a waste of time to study the history of a word.”

Civilisation, Lucien Febvre, 1930.165

The concept of utopia is conceived via the connections between the spatial and the temporal... from urbanus... to urban – the implicit promise of the city; from saeculum... to secular – the aeon or world; from modus... and modernus... to modern... to modernity. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who first used the term moderniste in the sense that we have come to use it today, took as his symbol for modernity ‘the agitated street life of Paris – le tourbillon social, the social whirlwind’, an image which entwines speed and the city in the image of the ‘new’.166 Deriving from modo, or ‘now’, modernity sets temporal and structural boundaries, a definition condensing both time and space: pushing forwards towards utopia without cognisance of the irony that utopia is ‘no place’ at all, and thus, the future is both open and devoid of any intrinsic meaning; whether this evokes Sartrean nausea or inspires the

164 ‘Naïve’. “Etymology: Middle French, French naïf natural, unspoilt (late 12th cent. in Old French; attested earlier in Anglo-Norman with sense ‘native’ (c1150)), foolish (13th cent.), imitating nature, without artifice (mid 16th cent.), unsophisticated, credulous (1642) < classical Latin nātīvus.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 26 January 2011.
166 Cited in Harvey Cox, Religion in the Secular City : Toward a Postmodern Theology (New York, 1984), 181. Speed and the city are also entwined in the manifestos of Marinetti’s Futurism, which glorified youth, technology, war, and progress. "An art-movement, originating in Italy, characterized by violent departure from traditional forms, the avowed aim being to express movement and growth in objects, not their appearance at some particular moment. Also applied to similar tendencies in literature and music.” ‘Futurism’, Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 26 January 2011.
contemplation of infinite possibilities. Meaning is always in potential; thus, intrinsic to the promise is that it can be a catalyst for the creation of meaning, but it possesses none of its own. In fact, it could be argued that modernity has failed to provide meaning. As Rasch writes, albeit employing a deliberately theatrical tone:

“Rationalization and pluralisation, we have heard, are really reification and alienation, really social and psychic fragmentation. Rationalization has epistemologically separated us (subjects) from our natural surroundings (objects), whilst pluralisation has voided us of our moral centre. With no vision of the whole and our place in it, we have no sure knowledge how to live.”

The question must be asked as to whether nihilism and relativism are the unavoidable outcomes of such a ‘meaningless modernity’?168

Our current concepts derive from a strange fusion of classical and religious thought: the age old debate between ‘Athens and Jerusalem’ (as originally posed by Tertullian).169 To the Greeks, utopia was an ideal place that could be realised in the polis; to the Jews and Christians, utopia was an ideal time, structured through the expectation of the messiah; and thus, the culmination of history in the millennium.170 The term is ‘evocative’ and, in the thought of Vattimo (extending Mannheim, the Hegelians, the Frankfurt School), it is an ideal that is potentially

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167 Further: “Rationalization and pluralisation have therefore been emphatically rejected, have been sublimated in a variety of historical and political theodicies: and even when grudgingly acknowledged as irreducible and necessary, they have nevertheless been quarantined, kept at a distance from that lifeboat named the Lifeworld, the last remnant of authenticity and free intersubjectivity equipped with a rudder. And yet now – after the postmodern critique has once again questioned the wisdom of a too narrowly defined Enlightenment project, and as we enter another millennium without the benefit of Messianic guidance – it seems that neither our quasi-theological rejections of the world nor our political theodicies and ethical lifeworlds have been able to move us beyond the barren landscape of rationalization and pluralisation.” Rasch, Niklas Luhmann’s Modernity: The Paradoxes of Differentiation, 2-3.

168 Ibid., 3.

169 Tertullian (155-230) was a native of Carthage in Roman Africa who was well educated in philosophy, medicine, and law. Tertullian was convinced that philosophy led to heresy, and it was particularly Gnostic heresy to which he was opposed, though he was not (as is often presumed), opposed to philosophical reason generally and defended the possibility of rational knowledge of divine things; as is evidenced by his other writings. The original quote reads: ‘What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from ‘the porch of Solomon,’ who had himself taught that ‘the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart.’ Away with all attempts to produce a mottled Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no curious disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! With our faith, we desire no further belief. For once we believe this, there is nothing else that we ought to believe.” Cited in David C. Lindberg, ‘Science and the Early Christian Church,’ Isis, vol. 74: 4 (1983), 515-516.

made real through action. An ideal fundamentally oriented toward the relations of dominance, albeit Biblically derived, between humankind and nature; that of man over nature, and nature over man. The modern desire to harness the resources of the planet and effectively control outcomes in terms of human fate is the extension of an urge to mitigate uncertainty by deliberate management and control of the 'unknown'. In any tradition or cultural milieu, persistent ambiguities – such as knowing what the future holds, or the direction of personal and collective fate – are managed via proven strategies (ritual, belief, or science) from which a sense of purpose, solace, or an explanation can be obtained. The drive behind the Age of Enlightenment and the recourse to Reason was no different. Reconstruction of the world left little to fate; specifically, death, suffering, and cosmological insecurity. Religious practices such as prayer, sacrifice, ritual, and magic, and their role in placating invisible forces, could be gradually abandoned in light of the fact that human destiny could be more reliably controlled with science and technology. The dominance and authority of a single, all-powerful deity thereafter became replaced with the authority of the human who ‘dwells godlike at the centre of the world he constructs for himself’, a world constructed through logic and science.

To use a theological term, it is the *kenosis*, or self-emptying of the transcendental deity into the now mechanically administered offices of the state from which this authority descends: according to Foucault (recalling Eric Voegelin): “…we still have not cut off the head of the king.” Kenosis is also a critical part of Vattimo’s philosophy on ‘weakening’, in that it is the “…weakening of the transcendental potency of the divine and its metaphysical essence… has produced the progressive

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174 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality, Volume 1 : An Introduction*, 88-89. Berger links this symbolically to the institutions of social control: “…the institution of divine kingship, and the several roles representing it, is apprehended as a decisive link between the world of men and the world of the gods. The religious legitimation of power involved in this institution does not appear as an ex post facto justification of a few theoreticians, it is objectively present as the institution is encountered by the man in the street in the course of his everyday life. Insofar as the man in the street is adequately socialized into the reality of his society, he cannot conceive of the king except as the bearer of a role that represents the fundamental order of the universe – and indeed, the same assumption may be made for the king himself. In this manner, the cosmic status of the institution is ‘experienced’ whenever men come into contact with it in the ordinary course of events.” Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, [1st ed. (New York, 1967)], 36.
destructuring and draining away of *all the ontological truths* that have characterized mankind’s history and thought.”

It is unsurprising, therefore, that political philosophy tends to lead back to Nietzsche and the ‘disquieting nihilism’ that characterises the modern age. In Vattimo’s terms, kenosis results in the progressive reduction of the violence of the sacred, thus it is ‘emptied’ into the secular, where it appears to have neither limits, nor accountability; as evidenced by the mechanisation of war, death and the atrocities of torture which accompany the modern age. Violence as the outcome of secularity is atheist in the sense meant by Jean-Luc Nancy when he names it as “*...the element with which the West invented itself,*” in that it requires the ultimate denial of any authority beyond the state. As Voegelin writes: “It does not suffice, therefore, to replace the old world of God with a new world of man: the world of God itself must have been a world of man, and God a work of man that can therefore be destroyed if it prevents man from reigning over the order of being. The murder of God must be made retroactive speculatively.”

*Modernus*, as contrasted with *antiqii*, or the traditional, is to be ‘unprecedented’, novel, autonomous, to understand one’s self and world as ‘free and creative in a radical sense’, governed neither by fate nor providence, to demonstrate both superiority and originality in contrast to what has gone before. Such a claim must be queried when modernity is also saturated thoroughly with a theistic, yet largely invisible, Judeo-Christian ethos, which structures morality, perpetuates fantasies of aseity, and interiorises the eschatological impulse towards progress. Modernity (and its predominant vehicle, Enlightenment science) was to provide the answers to the questions typically forwarded by religion; however, it also prompted a type of cultural vertigo as ‘modern’ quickly became the designator for a ‘contemporary’ artistic style, and then ultimately a creative and liberating manner of being which

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176 Ibid., 87.
celebrated progress and freedom, along with a messianic enthusiasm for being on perpetually on the *cusp of the new*.\footnote{Ibid., 4-5.}

Graham Ward notes that, for the Judeo-Christian traditions, the key questions of the relation between God and the world are essentially temporal: all notions of salvation, history, election, ecclesiology, the coming of the Kingdom, the work of creation, revelation, etc., are oriented towards the central inquiry – ‘what time is it?’\footnote{Ward, *Cities of God*, 2-3.} The modern concept of ‘progress’ derives from the same question: a moment suspended between a genesis and eschatological moment. According to Michael Gillespie: “…to think of oneself of modern is to define one’s being in terms of time. This is remarkable. In previous ages and other places, people have defined themselves in terms of their land... place... race... ethnic groups... traditions... gods, but not explicitly in terms of time…”\footnote{Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, 2.} Further: “To be modern consequently means not merely to define one’s being in terms of time but also to define time in terms of one’s being, to understand time as the product of human freedom in interaction with the natural world. Being modern at its core is thus something titanic, something Promethean.”\footnote{Ibid., 2.} Baudelaire, in *The Painter of Modern Life* (1863), described modernity as “that which is ephemeral, fugitive, contingent upon the occasion.”\footnote{Cited in Callinicos, *Against Postmodernism : A Marxist Critique*, 29.}

Despite the emergence of the ‘modern’ in medieval times, and the link to a medieval Christian notion of the world as ‘the unfolding of God’s plan’, there was no sense of ‘progress’ as it is understood today.\footnote{Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity*, 3-4.} The view of the universe during the ‘European’ Middle Ages was limited by Biblical teachings on history and, despite some influence from Greek theories of time, the earth was regarded as a ‘steady-state system’ as opposed to an evolving one: people simply awaited the end-of-days.\footnote{J.L. Russell, ‘Time in Christian Thought,’ in *The Voices of Time : A Cooperative Survey of Man’s Views of Time as Expressed by the Sciences and by the Humanities*, ed. J. T. Fraser (UK, 1968), 70.} It took some time for humankind to be self-actualising and motivated towards the goal outside of, or perhaps in reaction to, the closed system of theological absolutism, or predestination. Max Weber’s theory on this was that, in the age of the Reformation,
‗salvation‘ was central, but the Calvinist doctrine of predestination eliminated any and all means of attaining the grace of God. Human efforts were therefore redirected towards work, thereafter providing the motivation for the growth of capitalism and the industrial revolution. Following this logic, the ‘steady-state’ conceptualisation was slowly transformed and ‘change’ became linked to ‘progression’. As Gillespie writes: progress was a continuous and natural ‘...process that free human beings could master and control through the application of the proper scientific method. In this way they could become masters and possessors of nature and thereby produce a more hospitable world for themselves.’

This shift in the meaning of ‘progress’ is vaguely linked to the scientific revolution or thereabouts, because, as the opening quotes suggest, the designation of all that has gone prior as ‘naïve’ was designed to deliver a death-blow to religion. Enlightenment thinkers shaped the notion of progress from a Christian narrative of sin and redemption that was fused to the Greek philosophy of liberation through knowledge. Despite the fact there was no ‘sudden break’ from the past to speak of, these thinkers also reconfigured the historical narrative so as to nominate the ‘Enlightened Renaissance’ as the fracture point with the ‘dark’ Middle Ages, as if the shift was immediate, final, and could be applied across continents. The distribution of these ideas was via the universities, which operated like guilds, organising learning into strict hierarchies which prized both theology and Greek philosophy at the highest levels. As Patricia Fara writes, “...in Victorian England,

188 Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity, 5.
189 As Arendt notes, the notion of progress shifted in meaning between the 17th century, in which progress was thought ‘in terms of an accumulation of knowledge through the centuries’, and the 18th century, when the word came to imply an ‘education of mankind whose end would coincide with man’s coming of age.’ To quote her directly: “Progress was not unlimited, and Marx’s classless society seen as the realm of freedom that could be the end of history – often interpreted as the secularization – of Christian eschatology or Jewish messianism – actually still bears the hallmark of the Age of Enlightenment. Beginning with the nineteenth century, however, all such limitations disappeared...” Arendt, On Violence, 25-26.
190 Gray, Heresies, 13-14.
191 In Bhambra’s words: "John Hale’s definition of the Renaissance, as the recovery of ‘the sounds of classical antiquity after the long medieval winter that closed in with the loss of Rome to the barbarians’ (1994: 189), elegantly, if ultimately misleadingly, encapsulates the dominant themes of the Renaissance as modern and as European...” Bhambra, Rethinking Modernity : Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination, 84.
192 With respect to the establishment of the universities: "By 1200, Europe boasted three – first in Bologna, then Paris, and Oxford – and during the next three centuries, around seventy more were founded in cities seeking to advertise their importance. Universities became powerful institutions that
engineers were... seen as socially inferior to scientists, and hard labour was rated lower than intellectual speculation.”

The error was, as Gray points out, was linking scientific progress to ‘social progress’ and expecting the two would go hand in hand. He writes: “In science, progress is a fact, in ethics and politics it is a superstition.”

Conceptually, the project of ‘the modern’ is structurally perfect, in that it is always ‘about to be’ achieved and (like classic utopias), it has retained a degree of privilege by remaining eternally ‘just’ ahead, on the other side of the now. Though it may appear so, ‘modernity’ itself has no real world presence: in ‘the lived-in reality of actual people’, modernity is something in the name of which a promise is issued, and those promises are either delivered on or they are not. In Gray’s view, we are living in the latest succession in a line of

“Enlightenment faiths, in which the Christian promise of universal salvation reappears as a political project of universal emancipation... Secular societies are ruled by repressed religion. Screened off from conscious awareness, the religious impulse has mutated... most cling to the hope that science can succeed where politics has failed... not from real conviction but from fear of the void that looms if the hope of a better future is given up. Belief in progress is the Prozac of the thinking classes... The illusion is in the belief that it can effect any fundamental alteration in the human condition.”

Modernity is an ideology in the name of which a power is appropriated. Modernity itself does not exist: it possesses no agency, has no territory, nor even (despite being a temporal designator) any bounded time period. Modernity itself, to borrow from Baudrillard, is a hyperreality. Modernity perpetuates as a type of ‘monotheism by other means’, the secularisation of an ideal attached to the monotheistic

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193 Ibid., 74.
194 Gray, Heresies, 3.
195 Ibid., 2-3.
196 See Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, Foreign Agents Series (New York, 1983). As Bauman writes in a critical review of Baudrillard: “Baudrillard’s simulation... effaces the very difference between the categories true and false, real and imaginary. We no longer have any means of testing pretence against reality, or know which is which. Nor is there any exit from this quandary... In fact we do not know the difference between map and territory, and would not know it even if we had our noses pressed up against the thing itself.” Zygmunt Bauman, ‘Disappearing into the Desert,’ Times Literary Supplement., Issue (Date December 16-22,1988).
transcendental Judeo-Christian God; a juggernaut driven by capital, fuelled by its own logic, and consuming ‘all cultural and social formations which obstruct its progress’. Utopian, but in the words of Bauman: now, “…within the logic of the globalized world, a contradiction in terms… The ‘u’ of ‘utopia’ bereaved by the topos, is left homeless and floating, no longer hoping to strike roots, to ‘re-embed’.” In addition, the present ‘modern moment’ is suspended between two fictions – an idealised past and an idealised future – and it has been thus since sometime between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. The ‘Western’ moment and imagined terrain which is generated by these fictions continues to dictate present understandings of what counts for knowledge, especially in the context of religious and cultural exchange, as defined by the specific trajectory modernity ‘should’ take. This absolute futuristic orientation of modernity, coupled with the inherited Judeo-Christian insistence on historicism, displaces it in a manner which makes it impossible to definitively ‘nail any objections to the door’. Modernity is elusive. It is therefore best to deal with the effects of the idea, rather than the idea itself, and perhaps map the ways in which the idea is used to generate power.

Gray writes that the political thought of modernity is, “…in all its varieties, liberal and otherwise… an application of the Enlightenment project... of giving human institutions a claim on reason that has universal authority.” Modernity (via secularity) assured a new revelation (via revolution): an end to religious conflict through the reinvention of the world, and ‘freedom from the cycle of anarchy and

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199 This is an issue which Rorty calls the “epistemological problem” – recommending that we simply ‘drop it’ and shift our focus to politics (and what he calls a ‘poeticized culture’). However, it is difficult to see how this is achievable in the context of on-going subscription to the theological and epistemological tenets that continue to shape the political orders – the fact of which blocks Rorty’s possibility absolutely. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge, UK; New York, 1989), 67-69. A rejoinder by Carl Schmitt and John Gray is useful here, in that they both constantly argue for epistemological inseparability between the theological, legal, and thus, the political.

200 Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake : Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, 97.

201 ‘Revolution’. ‘Late 14c., originally of celestial bodies, from O.Fr. revolution, from L.L. revolutionem (nom. revolutio) ‘a revolving,’ from L. revolutus, pp. of revolvere ‘turn, roll back’ (see revolve). General sense of ‘instance of great change in affairs’ is recorded from mid-15c. Political meaning first recorded c.1600, derived from French, and was especially applied to the expulsion of the Stuart dynasty under James II in 1688 and transfer of sovereignty to William and Mary.” ‘Revolution’, Online Etymology Dictionary, retrieved 4 January 2011.
tyranny’ via the growth of knowledge. Secularity, though once thought of as somewhat less blessed than a life in the cloisters of contemplation, acquired its status from the same ‘this-worldly’ hue which had formerly set it apart as vaguely inferior. In the words of filmmaker Ben Stewart: “Enter the infamous rulers of the earth, the patriarchs of civilization, political, social, economic, and spiritual dictatorship, psychic tyranny.” With the inception of secular modernity, as Voegelin understood, God could be ‘decapitated’, and the state would take the place of the world-transcendent deity as ‘the ultimate condition and the origin of its own existence’.

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202 Gray, Heresies, 3.
203 Of this reversal, consider Geering: “Those who withdrew from the world to live the life of Christian devotion in the monastic cloister were the ‘religious’, while those who ministered in the everyday world were the ‘secular’ priests.” Lloyd Geering, God in the New World (London, 1968), 60.
Definitions 2: Secularity

“...we must recognize, on the one hand, the nonfunctional status of an increasing number of concepts, and on the other, the inadequacy of procedures for thinking about [them].”

The Practice of Everyday Life, Michel de Certeau, 1984.206

“Seculere, in Christian Latin”, to read its definition via William Connolly’s précis of the Oxford English Dictionary, “...means ‘the world’ as opposed to the One Church of heaven.”.207 Saeculum is one of two words denoting ‘world’ (the other is mundus) and is frequently used to translate the Greek aeon, which means ‘age’, ‘epoch’, ‘eternity’ or ‘eternal’.208 Connolly notes:

“The early (Christian) Church treated the secular as a necessary but residual domain of its way of life. It was... mostly ‘a negative term,’ even though a restricted secular domain of life was deemed essential... By the modern period secularism, as a distinctive political perspective and social movement, is represented positively as ‘the doctrine that morality should be based solely in regard to the well-being of mankind in the present life to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from the belief in God...’”209

In contemporary times, secularity is upheld as a solution to the dangers of tribalism, ethnic, national, and religious difference which might interfere with the rights of individuals to remain (or become) ‘modern’, whilst specifically aiming to ensure that religion never goes ‘public’ in ways which might jeopardise the transcendental and totalitarian powers of the state.210 Connolly writes that secularity is oriented towards extracting “...out of public life as much cultural density and depth as possible so that

207 William E. Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist (USA, 1999), 21.
208 Cox, The Secular City : Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective, 32-33. Geering, God in the New World, 60. “...the word ‘secularization’ was first used in 1648, at the end of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe, to refer to the transfer of church properties to the exclusive control of the princes. What was a matter-of-fact statement then became later, after the French Revolution, a value statement as well: on November 2, 1789, Talleyrand announced to the French National Assembly that all ecclesiastical goods were at the disposal of the nation... Still later, when George Jacob Holyoake coined the term ‘secularism’ in 1851 and led a rationalist movement of protest in England, secularization was built into the ideology of progress. Secularization, though nowhere more than a fragmentary and incomplete process, has ever since retained a positive connotation. ...‘Secularization’ is nowadays generally employed to refer to, in the words of Peter Berger, ‘the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols.’” T. N. Madan, ‘Secularism in Its Place,’ The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 46: 4 (1987), 748.
209 Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 21.
muddy ‘metaphysical’ and ‘religious’ differences don’t flow into the pure water of public reason, procedure, and justice.”

The origins of the secular are not often highlighted in historical exegesis, because the assumption that even the most mundane of practical human activities was always structured inside of a larger religious or mythic discourse seems a persistent habit among scholars. Likewise, the parallel tendency of scholars to fixate on the etymology of the term itself can obscure the underlying concept, which is ultimately much older and broader. For example: ancient India, though its laws were structured by religious practice, had a concept of secularity which was attached to law-making, custom, and tradition; certain aspects of philosophical inquiry had a deliberately secular and empirical focus, and kingship in the Vedic period was a purely secular institution – this is also true of early Mesopotamia. In China, there was a notion similar to secularity which referred to the life of the Buddha or a Chinese Buddhist individual before their ‘conversion’ to Buddhism.

The difference between these notions of secularity and the modern idea arises when, in the early modern period, ‘religion’ is relegated to a distinct sphere and acquires the distinction of being something that can be ‘possessed’ (such as ‘faith’). Internal to this is the idea of an absent God who requires belief without proof. When compared with cross-cultural understandings of deity, ritual, relationship, and belief that habitually extend into every area of social life (praxis), this orientation can be recognised as uniquely Judeo-Christian. This distinction also assumes that the Judeo-Christian and later, the modern individual, is somehow set apart from other cultures and elevated via this rationalisation and taming of the religious. Such arrogance persists despite the fact that there is not now, nor has there ever been, any

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211 Connolly, Why I Am Not a Secularist, 22-23.
212 This is a distinctly evolutionary mode of thinking which privileges the modern as ‘advanced’.
213 A.S. Altekar, State and Government in Ancient India (India, 2002). Madan notes also that in the Brahmanical political period in India the idea of a state religion was never entertained. Madan, ‘Secularism in Its Place,’ 752.
214 The exception here is within Islam, as explained by Muhammed Iqbal: “The ultimate Reality, according to the Quran, is spiritual, and its life consists in its temporal activity. The spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being…. There is no such thing as a profane world…. All is holy ground.” Cited in Madan, ‘Secularism in Its Place,’ 753, ibid.
distinct religious sphere to speak of.\textsuperscript{215} Despite efforts to create such a sphere (one that is distinct from the dominant claim for a public secular space), neither the differentiation of ‘spheres’, nor the ‘dis-embedding’ of individuals from their corporate or tribal groups, has been successful. Even within post-colonial contexts, re-embedding, collectivisation and communalism persist in resistance to increased homogeneity. These tensions translate to a lived experience of the world (as compared with a notion of the world which is purely conceptual), in which neither ‘religion’ nor ‘culture’ will be confined to any ‘sphere’, private or otherwise.

A segue to clarify what is meant by ‘religion’ is required here. Its etymology is uncertain, though it appears to stem from the root *leig, meaning ‘to bind’, suggesting a collective of some kind.\textsuperscript{216} Its historical uses are explicitly Christian in orientation, but as Connolly argues, “...the word ‘religion’ now becomes treated as a universal term, as if ‘it’ could always be distilled from a variety of cultures in a variety of times rather than representing a specific fashioning of spiritual life engendered by the secular public space carved out of Christendom.”\textsuperscript{217} Religion is also an ‘outsider term’, in that its applicability to a wide range of belief and praxis is, at source, a gesture that is consistent with the post-Enlightened classification of the world, and one that continues within the culture of scholarship on religion. Religion is locked into the same temporal understandings that accompany a Christianised modernity, meaning that all religions, once historicised, are thereafter neatly

\textsuperscript{215} The notion of faith as something that can be possessed (and the presumed existence of a ‘sphere’ in which this occurs) has confused scholarship on religion with social understandings (or misunderstandings) of religion for the last few hundred years, obscured further by the assertion that one can now have ‘faith’ in progress, or modernity. In practice, the Christian, the modern secular individual, the religious self, and the religious ‘other’, all navigate the world in pursuit of ‘proofs’ which validate whatever it is they happen to believe; whether this translates into a verification of faith in an invisible transcendent deity, a political ideology, or an exceptional motor vehicle.

\textsuperscript{216} Smith, ‘Religion, Religions, Religious,’ 269.

\textsuperscript{217} Connolly, \textit{Why I Am Not a Secularist}, 22-23. Consider Serres also: “...religion presses, spins, knots, assembles, gathers, binds, connects, lifts up, reads, or sings the elements of time. The term religion expresses exactly this trajectory, this review or prolonging whose opposite is called negligence, the negligence that incessantly loses the memory of these strange actions and words. The learned say that the word religion could have two sources or origins. According to the first, it would come from the Latin verb religare, to attach. Does religion bind us together, does it assure the bond of this world to another? According to the second origin, which is more probable, though not certain, and related to the first one, it would mean to assemble, gather, left up, traverse, or reread.” Serres, \textit{The Natural Contract}, 47. Contra, consider modernity, by also citing Serres: “Modernity neglects, speaking in absolute terms. It cannot and will not think or act toward the global, whether temporal or spatial.” Ibid., 48.
relegated to tradition (explaining why the specific combination of the terms ‘modernity’ and ‘religion’ immediately present in an uncomfortable opposition).

In the classical world, though secularity was not conceptualised in the absolutist sense that it is understood now, the terms by which secularity was understood emerge from the basic contrast between the sacred and profane in the Latin sense. As Lloyd Geering notes:

“In Christian usage in the course of time we find the word ‘secular’ being used to describe this visible tangible world in contrast with another world, the unseen supernatural world, which is the world of eternity. Any activity directed mainly to the natural world is described as secular, while any activity directed to the supernatural world is ‘religious’. “218

The ‘secular’ gradually became synonymous with the ‘profane’, which was then juxtaposed with religion, and this secular/profane realm is now that which has become allied with modernity. For both the classical and early Christians however, the concepts of the sacred and profane remained relative within a religious context (the Latin profanum referred to the space in front of a temple) and the removal of this sacral reference point would have been seen to be heretical and idolatrous.219 In Greece, as Stanley Tambiah suggests, “…the ‘divinity of nature’ was taken for granted and was not a matter for disputation. They believed that the divine pervaded everything… [and] thus it could be said that if the early Greeks distinguished between magic and medicine (‘science’), they did not oppose ‘religion’ to them as a third category.”220 Such categories have constantly shifted, as evidenced by the closure of the split between biology and science within the last century alone, or similarly, the gradual incorporation of psychology and medicine. David Lindberg writes: “One need only recall that Plato demanded solitary confinement (and in

218 Geering, God in the New World, 60.
219 Bronislaw Szerszynski, ‘Rethinking the Secular: Science, Technology, and Religion Today,’ Zygon, vol. 40: 4 (2005), 815. Consider Asad: “...‘sacred’ in early modern English usage generally referred to individuals, things, persons, and occasions that were set apart and entitled to veneration... [Yet] it was late nineteenth-century anthropological and theological thought that rendered a variety of overlapping social usages rooted in changed and heterogeneous forms of life into a single immutable essence, and claimed it to be the object of a universal human experience called ‘religious’. The supposedly universal opposition between ‘sacred’ and ‘profane’ finds no place in premodern writing. In medieval theology, the overriding antimony was between ‘the divine’ and ‘the satanic’ (both of them transcendent powers) or ‘the spiritual’ and ‘the temporal’ (both of them worldly institutions), not between a supernatural sacred and a natural profane.” Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular : Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Cultural Memory in the Present (California, USA, 2003), 31-32. 
extreme cases, execution) for those who denied the existence of the gods and their involvement in human affairs.”\(^{221}\) Science, which was known as ‘the philosophical arts’ in Greece, had sources inherited from South Asia and the Near East, though these ancestors tend to disappear in the formal narration of the history of the West. The ‘sciences’ that were expanded upon and developed in ancient Greece, such as medicine, metallurgy, geometry, mathematics, and astronomy, all had their origins elsewhere and were adopted as a part of the larger philosophical enterprise.\(^{222}\)

It is also important to note that both pre and post-Aristotelian science retained mystical dimensions; Pythagorean sects cultivated esoteric doctrines and practices, and Ptolemy and other astronomers combined and interested and belief in magic with their inquiries into nature.\(^{223}\) Tambiah notes that a similar point can be made about intellectual activity in the late medieval/Renaissance period in Europe, and about several ‘heroes’ of the Enlightenment.\(^{224}\) Linearly constructed histories of the birthing process of a scientific revolution cast in the mould of a ‘great tradition’ must, therefore, be abandoned, along with abstractions, binaries, or any concept that streamlines the disparate religious, nationalistic and factional interests which led up to and impacted upon the Age of Enlightenment.\(^{225}\) To suggest that the ‘reality’ of supernatural or preternatural occurrences hinged on either assertion or denial is also reductionist, for the discourses or categories by which they were explained, authorised, or discounted were (and continue to be) entirely subject to royal, ecclesiastical and political interests.\(^{226}\)

Secularity, as it is understood now, was harmonised with the pursuit of truth in ‘the world’ through the investigation of nature; but the truth to be found in nature was not \textit{claimed} to have replaced religious truth until relatively recently. Proof by miracle and proof by authority (that is, by validity derived historically and genealogically

\(^{221}\) Lindberg, ‘Science and the Early Christian Church,’ 512.

\(^{222}\) Ibid., 511.


\(^{224}\) Ibid., 11.

\(^{225}\) Roy Porter, ‘Introduction,’ in \textit{Science, Culture, and Popular Belief in Renaissance Europe}, ed. Stephen Pumfrey, Paolo L. Rossi, and Maurice Sliwinski (UK; USA, 1991), 4-6. In addition, it should be remembered that despite the convenience of this term, there is no accepted ‘scientific revolution’ to speak of, but a continuity of events which stretch back into prehistory and reach far wider culturally than the Eurocentric view of history would indicate.

\(^{226}\) Ibid., 5.
from *antiquity*) were regularly attributed to the subjects of medieval science, and observable natural phenomena (earthquakes, comets, and eclipses) were generally interpreted with a religious lens.\(^{227}\) The ancient terms *scientia* (Latin), and *episteme* (Greek) were applicable to any system of belief characterised by rigour and certainty, whether or not it had any relation to nature, and thus, in the Middle Ages it was common to refer to theology also as *scientia.*\(^{228}\) As Lindberg notes:

“The church fathers used Greek natural science, and in using it they transmitted it… Until the twelfth century, [following] a wave of translation… patristic writings constituted a major repository of scientific learning… [but] what the church transmitted, it also altered – and had its own doctrines altered in return. Christian doctrine and Greek natural philosophy must be viewed not as independent, unchangeable bodies of thought… but as interacting and mutually transforming views of the world… Christians learned to read the Bible with Greek, particularly Platonic eyes; and Christian theology became thoroughly embued with Greek metaphysics and cosmology.”\(^{229}\)

Science quickly became the ‘handmaiden’ of the church (with theology as the ‘queen’ of the sciences), because this was the arena in which the intellectual arts had been preserved, so it is inescapable then, that even the conceptualisations of ‘nature’ that science purports to investigate are encumbered with this inheritance. Lynn White Jr. maintains: “From the 13th century onward, up to and including Leibnitz and Newton, every major scientist, in effect, explained his motivations in religious terms… it was not until the late 18th century that the hypothesis of God became unnecessary to many scientists.”\(^{230}\) Bill McKibben summarises this well:

\(^{227}\) Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization 400-1500*, 329.


\(^{229}\) ‘embued’ [sic] Lindberg, ‘Science and the Early Christian Church,’ 530. Consider also: “In Europe it was the monasteries which kept alive what learning there was in the Dark Ages, and as the Middle Ages emerged, there grew out of these the first of the great European universities. They were founded for the study of theology… Theology was seen, as the core of all sound learning… The very idea of a university was that it should bring together all academic pursuits and give a man a completely balanced, an all-round, a universal education. Theology was the queen of the sciences, and these latter gradually began to emerge as individual disciplines. From the Renaissance onwards, the young sciences struggled to get to their feet, and later, with the vigour of adolescents, they broke free from theological restraint and ecclesiastical control. …By the nineteenth century, universities were being founded which had no faculty of theology at all, and some had constitutions which declared that they were purely secular institutions in which no religious subjects could be pursued.” Geering, *God in the New World*, 61.

“The hope that science could replace religion as a way for human beings to cope with the world… was really a hope that ‘nature’ could replace ‘God’ as a source of inspiration and understanding. Harmony, permanence, order, and an idea of our place in that order – scientists searched for all that as diligently as Job, with the unceasing attention to the ‘web of life’ and the grand cycle of decay and rebirth.”

What is commonly referred to as the scientific revolution was quite literally a combination of the linear sense of progress derived from the fusion of Genesis and Eschaton, and the observable cycles of the ‘secular’ natural world. The manner in which science ‘captures’ the notion of revolution leads directly into the inability of modernity to be hospitable to alternative epistemologies; the demand being that the cycles of nature remain wedded to the scientifically administered linear concept of progress, whilst also being fused to Biblical instructions wherein the natural world is to be approached from a distance. Richard Hull notes:

“In well-known passages of the creation story, God gives human dominion over fish, bird, cattle, and ‘every living thing that moves upon the earth.’ Light, night, soil, wind, rain, and fire exist for human use. Other sections of the Bible make it clear that being human means being different than nature and that Earth is but a temporary home – the soul is eternal and transcends Earth.”

To subdue, or dominate nature, or even the softer instruction of stewardship, places the human at the centre of the relationship with the surrounding world, as reflected by the modern term, environment, which refers to something in which we live (en = in), that encircles around, surrounds, or turns (viron), and is perpetually exterior. Relationality, which is a scholarly term employed by both academics and indigenous spokespersons to represent the holistic, egalitarian, and inclusive approach to nature common in non-Christian contexts, is therefore in direct opposition with the goals of any theo-scientific reduction of the environment. Scientific progress requires that the

transcendental orientation of Judeo-Christian thought, ultimately resulted in the psychic victory of Christianity over paganism, effectively making it possible to exploit nature with a ‘mood of indifference’. Ibid., 188-189.

232 R. Bruce Hull, Infinite Nature (UK; USA, 2006), 125.
233 Usage, which comes into English from a French origin, was originally in a sense of ‘neighbourhood’ or environner, though ‘environment’ is first documented in 1827, passing into common usage in a specialized ecological sense in 1956. Online Etymology Dictionary, retrieved 25th June 2010.
secular natural world remain distinct and independent from human personhood; yet relationality disrupts this.

In Bauman’s terms, what followed historically was ‘all strategy’:

“If the ‘spirit’ was modern, it was so indeed in so far as it was determined that reality should be emancipated from the ‘dead hand’ of its own history… That intention called in turn for the ‘profaning of the sacred’: for disavowing and dethroning the past, and first and foremost ‘tradition’ – to wit, the sediment and residue of the past in the present...”

Yet the prediction that Freud made in *The Future of an Illusion*, that the religious urge would inexorably and progressively decline as science took over, did not eventuate. Despite scholarly acquiescence to the contrary, such as Weber citing Friedrich Schiller on the disenchantment of nature (which sent him passionately in pursuit of some comprehension of rationalization); or Peter Berger’s secularization thesis (well-argued, but recanted); the myth of secular modernity remains just that. It is worth noting that, in some places, the on-going pursuit of this myth has transformed modernity from a promise into a nightmare.

The models for progress, the bounties of science, the march of capitalism, and globalised Euro-American cultural products appear to be taking over the world, and in this sense the ideals of modernity appear to have been successfully implemented, but not at the expense of religion. The proliferation of spiritual expressions that continue *despite* secular modernity are not defined by locale, cultural persuasions, the particularities of religious institutions, nor any other identifiable ‘sphere’: this is an unregulated and unofficial belief and practice which transcends the boundaries set by temporal, spatial, and epistemological frames; ‘invisible’ because they are not

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236 “The fate of our times is characterized by rationalization and intellectualization and, above all, by the disenchantment of the world. Precisely the ultimate and most sublime values have retreated from public life either into the transcendental realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and personal human relations. It is not accidental that our greatest art is intimate and not monumental.” Max Weber (1918) Max Weber, Hans H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills, *From Max Weber : Essays in Sociology* (London, 1991), 155.
237 For the thesis itself, see the preface in Berger, *The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*. In 1974 he began to query his thesis, stating: “In the last few years I have come to believe that many observers of the religious scene (I among them) have over-estimated both the degree and irreversibility of secularization.” Peter L. Berger, *Religion in a Revolutionary Society*, [1st ed. (Washington D.C., USA, 1974). Berger recanted it entirely by 1999.
permitted to ‘exist’, and yet, the spectre is there. As Mark C. Taylor argues: “It is... misleading to speak of a ‘return of’ or ‘return to’ religion. Religion does not return because it never goes away; to the contrary, religion haunts society itself - perhaps especially – when it seems to be absent.” Religion does not ‘re-emerge’, because religion has always been at the very core of modernity. Diversification and neo-tribalism (even if one’s ‘community’ is simply one who ‘share an interest in golf’) have supported the relocation of many of the benefits that were once supplied by organised religions to ‘the broader cultural patterns of the modern age’. In addition, in Bronislaw Szerszynski’s terms, religion itself has ‘gone feral’: escaped from its modernist incarcerations in distinct religious zones and institutions. Regardless of efforts to privatise and ultimately eliminate it, ‘religion’ proliferates in the gaps which defy easy categorisation as sacred or profane; in the mundane, the ‘everyday’, the space in between the idealised public and private ‘spheres’. In short: “Eliminating God means reproducing divinity everywhere.”

It is the ‘concealed theology’ within modernity which presents the difficulty and the solution for interrogating the episteme for, as Szerszynski points out, modern thought is dominated by the idea that the secular is an ‘unmarked’ term, or one that appears to require no explanation; whereas it is the origins and emergence of the secular, rather than the religious, from within the context of the modern, that ought to be problematised. If modernity and its apparatus, secularity, are recognised as a

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238 Consider Richard Jenkins, drawing upon Weber: “Enchantment conjures up, and is rooted in, understandings and experiences of the world in which there is more to life than the material, the visible or the explainable; in which the philosophies and principles of Reason or rationality cannot by definition dream of the totality of life; in which the quotidian norms and routines of linear time and space are only part of the story; and in which the collective sum of sociability and belonging is elusively greater than its individual parts.” Richard Jenkins, 'Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment: Max Weber at the Millenium,' Max Weber Studies, vol. 1: (2000), 29.


242 Concept of religion occurring in the ‘mundane’ emerged from personal communication with Dr Michael Grimshaw 2010.


244 Szerszynski, 'Rethinking the Secular: Science, Technology, and Religion Today,' 814-816. Consider also Jeremy Carette: ‘Religion needs to be rediscovered outside the superstitions, misconception, and illusions through which ‘secular’ academics have so far dismissed the subject. We need to find religion in the very fabric of the ‘secular’ – in its absence...’ Jeremy R. Carrette, Foucault and Religion: Spiritual Corporality and Political Spirituality (London; New York, 2000), 152.
continuation of the Judeo-Christian tradition, then a subtle reconfiguration of the perceived binary between religion and secular modernity would more accurately conceive of it as a particular type of opposition: one between different truth-claims or ideals. The post-Christian modern institutions (that deny any Judeo-Christian heritage) come into conflict with the religious institutions (that often reject modernity), because the conflict underlying this is between a post-Christian episteme (responsible for all institutionalised forms of law, politics, ethics, education, commerce, the scientific worldview, etc.), and alternative epistemes, which, in the case of Christian institutions, for example, retain a context foregone within the so-called ‘secular’.

As Schneider points out, certain ‘enchanted phenomena’ prove too ‘quirky’ to be readily accepted within a register which prefers scientised, naturalistic types of explanation. In the cases of non-Christian ways of knowing, the conflicts are more obvious. The ‘other’ is twice-removed from epistemological validity: in the first instance as the pagan other to Christianity, in the second instance as the religious other to a secular that claims to be intellectually liberated from its theological roots. The invisibility of this shift from Christianity to secular modernity is perpetuated by the separation of knowledge production into disparate disciplinary spheres (organised by the same hybridised theo-scientific logic that designates a specific nature-culture division), and the lack of any transdisciplinary space to engage philosophically and critically with the now internalised Christian bias. The codification of types of ‘otherness’ and their relation with epistemological framing must therefore be interrogated carefully. Critical is the understanding that it is a Judeo-Christian perspective that, in all cases, conflicts with alternative ways of knowing and types of praxis; in the main, the opposition generally takes a dialectical and epistemological form, in that it is the truth of a theory or opinion (as against the usefulness or presence of either) that is central to the debate. To borrow from Gray, what is, and has always been, central to this problem is the tension between the morally neutral ideals of the group (such as state, polis, or tribe), and the requirement

245 Schneider, *Culture and Enchantment*, 12.
that such collectives encompass different ways of living, thinking, and being: “...the problem of what is to count as a *bona fide* way of life.”

Part III: Exorcisms

Charles Taylor argues that a key fact in understanding our present spiritual predicaments is that they are defined by the notion that we have ‘overcome’ a previous condition: enchantment, magic, myth, fantasy, or being of a ‘medieval mind’ (naïveté), is reproached via the disciplines of disenchantment to which we ascribe.247 Our sense of where we are is therefore historicised, or fundamentally determined by the story of how we got there, and as he notes, “…we are doomed to misidentify ourselves, as long as we can’t do justice to where we come from.”248 ‘Faith’ in the ‘tradition’ of the modern was established, as Callinicos understands it, in precisely the same manner as it becomes imbued in a nation state, wherein a historical mythology is constructed, portraying its origins in the light of what it regards as its accomplishments.249 This story, however, is haunted by remnant spirits that persist, sometimes as a vague memory or bare trace, at other times as a raging poltergeist; “...an unwelcome visit from something that will not quite die,”250 nor be denied, nor rendered mute. Lingering on are the residual explorative philosophies of the medieval alchemists who indulged Gnostic treatises equally as they pursued science and reason; by the spirits of what would not be contained by Romanticism, spilling over from the arts, culture, and leisure quarters to inundate public space; by the old war between science and religion in which the power, visibility, and voice of the latter have persistently refused to atrophy. The foreign gods and philosophies; a bounty collected from earlier violent acts propelled by missionary zeal, in which the spirits and aesthetics of the ‘other’ travelled home with the conquerors, quietly incubating and awaiting rebirth in the nascent spiritualities of the ‘modern’ individual. These are the religious and cultural remnants in which the incomplete exorcisms denied by the origin story of modernity are revealed; apparitions that have since become residual and spectral. The attempt to exorcise that which cannot be assimilated into the paradigm of the times leaves its mark, as a boundary, between that which is permitted, and that which is not; the attempt in itself is sufficient to define the limit. In Derrida’s terms, death is a border: the corpse is left at the crossing point.251

247 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, USA, 2007), 28-29.
248 Ibid., 29.
249 Callinicos, ‘Review: Postmodernism as Normal Science,’ 735.
251 Derrida, Aporias : Dying - Awaiting (One Another at) the “Limits of Truth”, 6.
EXORCISM 1: BANISHING SPIRITS, DEPOSING GODS

“A unique and jealous god, once he becomes the central and dominant notion of an intellectual structure erected and carried by a given clerisy, constitutes an overwhelmingly powerful impulse towards a single strand system. It was jealous Jehovah who taught mankind respect for the Principle of the Excluded Middle.”

_Ernest Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book, 1988._

“Scratch a Christian and you find the pagan — spoiled.”

_Italics added._

_Israel Zangwill, Children of the Ghetto, 1914._

The enculturation process normative to the imagined ‘Western’ territories of modernity establish certain primary ‘codes’ which govern its language, its schemas of perception, its exchanges, techniques, and values, and the hierarchies of its practices, or practical ‘grids’. These, in Foucault’s terms, “...establish for every man, from the very first, the empirical orders with which he will be dealing and within which he will be at home.” The work from which this citation derives — _The Order of Things_ — was concerned with tracing the creation of the positive basis of knowledge, indeed, the _episteme_ which underpinned the establishment of the human sciences, yet, Foucault’s genealogical inquiry extended only as far as the sixteenth century. The project of inquiring into the theological roots of the modern, however, necessitates a far longer reach back through time.

Berger argues that the most effective way of continuing and legitimating a ‘new’ institutional order (in this instance, _modernity_) is to employ the means necessary to situate the tenuous realities of the social world within a sense of a larger cosmic

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253 _Israel Zangwill, Children of the Ghetto_ (1914), Project Gutenberg —
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/2/6/8/12680/12680-8.txt
254 _Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, xx._
255 Italicized added. Ibid., xx.
256 _Ibid._. Geroulanos, writing on Foucault, notes that “Religion provided him with (often mostly Christian) categories and concepts, which fundamentally affected his fascination with the historical construction of possibilities and forms of transcendence.” He refers to this as an ‘awkward shadow’ within Foucault’s work as Foucault seemed unwilling to explicitly present theology as “proving in the realms of power.” _Stefanos Geroulanos, Theoscopie : Transparency, Omnipotence, and Modernity, in Political Theologies : Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence Eugene Sullivan (New York, 2006), 636-637. See also the essays in Carrette, Foucault and Religion : Spiritual Corporality and Political Spirituality._
order; but to hide, as much as possible, its constructed character.\textsuperscript{257} In hindsight, the following advice (as poeticised by Berger) appears to have been followed precisely.

“Let that which has been stamped out of the ground \textit{ex nihilo} appear as the manifestation of something that has been existent from the beginning of time, or at least from the beginning of the group. Let the people forget that this order was established by men and continues to be dependent upon the consent of men. Let them believe that, in acting out the institutional programs that have been imposed upon them, they are but realizing the deepest aspirations of their own being and putting themselves in harmony with the fundamental order of the universe. In sum: Set up religious legitimations.”\textsuperscript{258}

The historical endeavour must therefore begin with the self-congratulatory story told by the essentialist myth of origins specific to modernity. “The ‘cult of modernity’”, as Charlene Spretnak notes, “promised a world of peace, freedom, and fulfilment if we would just trust in an instrumental rationality and never look back at our past, so embarrassingly superstitious, communal, and constraining to the freewheeling, autonomous individual...”\textsuperscript{259} The temporal novelty of the ‘modern’ commands a view of history which highlights not only strengths drawn from the past, but suitable justifications for overcoming opposition in the quest to establish dominance; a quest inherited from the religions that the proponents of modernity were to eventually set themselves against. In the words of Vrasidas Karalis: “We are born (and re-born) in Jerusalem through the persistent and inexplicable question about origins; and we end up in Athens through grand projects of social instituting and self-invention.”\textsuperscript{260}

This geographical juxtaposition, long thought of as the dialectic through which the ‘West’ was wrought, sets up a presumed conflict (or negotiation) between philosophy, science, and religion, though this is blatantly ignorant of a far more complex, and on-going, historical exchange.\textsuperscript{261} In Foucault’s prose: “The silence, or rather the prudence, with which... unitary theories avoid the genealogy of

\textsuperscript{258} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{259} Charlene Spretnak, \textit{States of Grace : The Recovery of Meaning in the Postmodern Age} (USA, 1991), 11.
\textsuperscript{260} Karalis,’Reflections on the Project of a Renewed Polis: After Athens and Jerusalem,’ 18.
\textsuperscript{261} “Repeat something often enough, and people will believe it.” Fara, \textit{Science : A Four Thousand Year History}, 43.
knowledges might therefore be a good reason to continue to pursue it.”

Brian Treanor also critiques this impoverished historicism:

“Theologically and philosophically, the mixing of wisdom traditions and religious traditions has created a situation where the question: ‘What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?’ hardly scratches the surface. What has Athens to do with Beijing? Jerusalem with Mecca? Washington, Cairo, Paris, or Lima with Katmandu, Moscow, London, or Dar es Salaam?”

Scholars still gloss over the early contributions to Greek culture from Mesopotamia, Egypt, and India, relying also on a ‘cradle of civilisation’ view of Mesopotamia which reconfigures the timeline for both Egypt and India to ‘fit’ with the received wisdom on history, and the cultural and scientific contributions of China, India, and the Arabic nations to the ‘New Europe’ disappear into an historical ‘vacuum’ between the fall of Rome and the Renaissance revival – “…the so-called ‘Dark Ages’ when… supposedly, nothing much happened.”

As Fara argues in her history of science:

“The notion of Europe’s glorious origins was boasted during the Renaissance, when classical revivalists located the cradle of European civilization in the Athens of Plato and Aristotle. Imbuing this small and remote city-state with the quasi-mythical aura of a bygone golden age, artists, scholars, and politicians linked themselves directly to ancient Greece, and disassociated themselves from everything in between.”

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264 Fara, *Science : A Four Thousand Year History*, 44. As Lindberg notes, the use of the expressions ‘dark ages’, ‘Middle Ages’, or the ‘medieval’ do not have firm chronological limits but are blurred, because whatever we designate as ‘medieval culture’ appeared and disappeared in different times and regions. He writes: “The idea of the Middle Ages (or medieval period) first arose in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries among Italian humanist scholars, who detected a dark middle period between the bright achievements of antiquity and the enlightenment of their own age… If we must have dates, then the Middle Ages may be taken to cover the period from the end of Roman civilization in the Latin West (500 is a good round number) to 1450, when the artistic and literary revival commonly known as the Renaissance was unmistakably underway.” Lindberg, *The Beginnings of Western Science : The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 1450*, 183.
265 Also: “Metaphorically, the term ‘Dark Ages’ was loaded with meanings, suggesting not only that the light of intellectual illumination had been dimmed (after all, to see is to know) but also that a gloomy cloud of superstition had descended to stifle rationality and originality. While Europe lolled in its Dark Ages – or so ran the conventional story – Arabic scholars acted as caretakers of Greek knowledge. Muslims were cast as neutral transmitters of European expertise, even though they were experimenters and theoreticians in their own right, who actively transformed the skills and beliefs they had gathered together from diverse cultures. Similarly, China was viewed as a remote, esoteric place, and the impact of its agricultural and industrial success on Europe remained unacknowledged.” Fara, *Science : A Four Thousand Year History*, 44-45.
Against the claims of the Churches (as the story goes) science was born in Greece, was incubated (unaltered) by Arab scholars for around a thousand years, and was transferred directly to Spain in the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{266}

Despite the unsophisticated conception of this view which marries Athens with Jerusalem, it has nonetheless generated the socially distributed ‘catalogue of Ideas’ which have established the epistemological foundations of modernity, globalised Euro-American culture, and the universities, institutions, and individuals which reproduce these ideas. The myth of origins which harmonises the Greco-Roman with the Judeo-Christian has been so systematically privileged that a particular set of inclusions and exclusions have emerged from a few critical transfers.\textsuperscript{267} Among these are the shifts from multiple religious and sovereign authorities, to a monotheistic transcendental deity, to the transcendental invisible powers of a nation-state that continues to demand obedience, and thus, the replacement of religious authority with scientific, legal, and technological authorities which now operate as sovereign discourses. Historically speaking, what did not serve Christianity as it established religious authority does not serve scientific and political rationalism either: the power and privilege that is commanded by this worldview is absolute and exclusive, and the result is the potent combination of arrogance, power, and technological supremacy characteristic of modern societies. As Tambiah argues, the kind of ideological dominance the scientific revolution, with its instrumental and secular claims, has exerted on the world at large results in a ‘spill-over effect’ from the hard core of science to the surrounding spheres, having the monopolising consequence of imperialistically expanding to fill all the moral and social space in which we live.\textsuperscript{268} He writes: “This process of alleged scientific reasoning… is reluctant, even opposed to admitting other modes of consciousness or other world orientations into any

\textsuperscript{266} Ibid., 45. In fact, Islamic physicians, astronomers, and philosophers, added their immense repertoire of ‘scientific’ knowledge of plants, minerals, animals, physiology, etc., to the updated knowledge which they had accumulated during a considerable interactive period with Indian, Persian, and other cultures, and appropriated the Greek knowledge inside this context. Note also that the idea of ‘Islamic philosophers’ (used in an historical context) is not at all reflective of the multiple local traditions and knowledges which contributed and continue to contribute to the cultural complex, now reduced by the simple designator – ‘Islamic’.

\textsuperscript{267} Note that the use of the term ‘Greco-Roman’, whilst convenient, is a descriptor which determines that we read Greek texts through the lens provided by Romanisation. Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism, 41.

\textsuperscript{268} Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, 151.
space it already occupies..." Scientia (with its internalised theology) and techné (the chariot which speeds towards the Eschaton) have become omniscient discourses; a revelation via revolution which remains true to the theo-scientific character of modernity.

Gray identifies this unwillingness as a dogmatic ‘article of humanist faith’ which survives in spite of its intrinsic irrationality: “If the Enlightenment myth of progress in ethics and politics continues to have a powerful hold, it is more from fear of the consequences of giving it up than from genuine conviction.” Gray is not pushing for more rationality however; but an honest appraisal of what drives humankind toward particular ends, relinquishing the scholarly ritual of moving around the blame like a game of musical chairs. ‘Naïveté’ is an issue, but not in the social institutions, nor the psychological makeup of humankind; this is more literal, in that we are largely naïve as to the mechanisms by which social controls have been legitimated. In concurrence with Berger, faith in the ideals of modernity and the power they acquired did not arise ex nihilo; they were empowered by the collective to become a dominant force. Foucault links this, in his discussions of sovereignty, to the relations between truth, knowledge and power. Foucault’s view of power is that it comes from everywhere, it is productive, and that it is operative in the relations between truth and knowledge as conferred not by the sovereign, per se, but its subjects and vehicles. Re-reading Foucault through Mark Philp:

“Domination does not radiate from the peak to the depths... Rather, we need to see domination in terms of a ‘microphysics’ of power: the way in which particular mechanisms of power, with particular histories and rationales, are colonized, invested, utilized, and so on, by ever more general mechanisms.

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269 Ibid., 151.
270 Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, xiv-xv.
271 "‘Truth’ is centred on the form of scientific discourse and the institutions which produce it; it is subject to constant economic and political incitement...; it is the object, under diverse forms, of immense diffusion and consumption (circulating through apparatuses of education and information whose extent is relatively broad in the social body, not withstanding certain strict limitations); it is produced and transmitted under the control, dominant if not exclusive, of a few great political and economic apparatuses (university, army, writing, media); lastly, it is the issue of a whole political debate and social confrontation (‘ideological’ struggles)... ‘Truth’ is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distributed, circulation and operation of statements. ‘Truth’ is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it. A ‘regime’ of truth. This regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism. “Foucault and Gordon, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, 131-133.
which built up into forms of global domination... Foucault offers us a
discursive determinism. The power/knowledge nexus of discourse establishes
regimes of truth, which, with their techniques and practices, discipline the
social body.”

The establishment of *monotheism*, with its ethical core and universalistic logic, is in
Jean-Luc Nancy’s terms, the condition of possibility for the West itself.273 Close
symbiosis was required between the Greco-Roman consciousness and monotheistic
disposition to produce the now unrecognizable yet universalised Christianity which
constitutes the Western ‘in its depths’. 274 Monotheism was also foundational for the
normative conception of *sovereignty*, as later dissolved into the offices of the state.
Sovereignty rests, to borrow from Paul Kahn, on the freedom (or lack, thereof)
extended to the individual: a prudential response to diversity (deriving from the
Reformation) which, in turn, rests on a deeper theological principle.275 As Kahn
notes: “The truth, and the true virtue of the individual, is located in the interior
working of the will, in the way in which the subject brings himself into a relationship
with God. Politically, this point supports a conception of the truth of the nation as a
manifestation of interior self-realization, rather than outward power.”276 This has to
be taken back logically to the concept of firstly, divine kingship, and then, with the
emergence of the *polis*, the gradual shift from the deification of the king or emperor,
to the association of the king or emperor with emerging institutionalised church
powers. It is possible that, in this instance, the theological (if the meaning of this
term is tied specifically to Christianity) added another layer to an already existent
ancient and widespread notion of divine power and authority.

To ‘amend’ history: contrary to the view that the transcendent monotheism of the
modern nation state (or globalised world) is a *direct* inheritance from Judaism, and
prior to this, Persian Zoroastrianism, a more nuanced recollection of the history of
the Israelites would recognise that Judaism was originally polytheistic with a gradual
move toward becoming institutionally monolatristic; or tolerant and accepting of the

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272 Mark Philp, ‘Foucault on Power : A Problem in Radical Translation?’, *Political Theory*, vol. 11: 1
(1983), 36-37.
273 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘A Deconstruction of Monotheism,’ in *Religion Beyond a Concept*, ed. Hent de
Vries (New York, 2008), 381.
274 Ibid., 383-385.
275 Paul W. Kahn, ‘The Question of Sovereignty,’ *Stanford Journal of International Law*, vol. 40:
(2004), 260.
276 Ibid., 260.
existence of other ‘gods’. Due to the historical presence of the early Israelites in both Egypt and Babylon, there is no shortage of theories speculating on influences from early Egyptian and Mesopotamian monotheisms, although whether there are any connections between these monotheisms appears lost to history. What **can** be said is that until the Persian rule of the Near East (539BCE-332BCE) the ‘descendents of Judeans’ intermarried with Egyptians and worshipped a number of deities besides YHVH (Yahweh), until they became unified under the Biblical narrative which reorganised this history. As Naomi Janowitz notes: “Despite modern stereotypes of ancient Israelite monotheism, Biblical texts mention the gods of other nations and a repertoire of other supernatural figures.” Although there is disagreement as to when exactly this occurred, it would appear that monotheism appeared gradually as Jews forewent this ‘theological promiscuity’ and came to believe that YHVH was not just the only god worth worshipping, but the only god that existed.

The propitiation and cultivation of spirits or gods as entities resident in nature (specifically, as agencies capable of supplying assistance in the procurement of remedies designed to mediate human health and manage life and death) was also

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277 Monolatry is the exclusive worship of one god without excluding the existence of others. The early Israelites did not originally deny the existence of other gods, they just condemned the propitiation of them, as multiple examples in the Old Testament (such as in Exodus) illustrate.

278 What this does illustrate is that monotheism does not necessarily emerge purely from a people in exile from their local god, as is often argued on behalf of the Jews. Interestingly, YHW (Yahweh), denoting a place (which perhaps infers a deity also), and YSRL (Israel), denoting a people, first appear separately on Egyptian stele in the second half of the second millennium BCE, which is in accord with the timing of both these prior attempts at a universalistic monotheism. Robert Wright, The Evolution of God, 1st ed. (New York, 2009), 114. See also, Simo Parpola, ‘The Assyrian Tree of Life: Tracing the Origins of Jewish Monotheism and Greek Philosophy,’ Journal of Near Eastern Studies, vol. 52: 3 (1993). Karen Armstrong, The Great Transformation : The Beginning of Our Religious Traditions, 1st ed. (New York, 2006), 49-49. Jan Assmann, Moses the Egyptian : The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism (USA, 1997).

279 W. D. Davies et al., The Cambridge History of Judaism (Cambridge; New York, 1984), 219-278.

280 Though ‘Judahite’ (yehudai) was originally the designation for one of the twelve tribes of Israel, by the second century BCE the designation could be held simultaneously with the actual tribal name (for example, a Persian Jew may be identified as both a Judahite and a Benjaminite). Judaism (Judah-ism) at some point shifted therefore from a tribal to collective identity, and came to be the name of an entire religious movement. Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism, 78-79.


282 Wright, The Evolution of God, 166.
somewhat normative throughout ‘the ancient’, as opposed to ‘classical’ world.\textsuperscript{283} This is important because it impacted tremendously on the weight given to epistemological challenges to the medicalised (scientific) models employed in contemporary times. Both the Egyptians and Jews residing in Egypt had employed physician priests or healers, who were equipped with herbs, rituals, amulets, incantations and so on, and were primarily responsible for maintaining the health of the community by managing the evil spirits or forces that were made accountable for illness.\textsuperscript{284} The general belief in the usefulness of prayers, spells, and related phenomena was wedded to a particular cosmological framework which, though regionally variable, accommodated multiple gods, spirits and forces which were often tied to natural localities, objects, and concepts that may be grouped under the later definitions of pagan polytheism and/or animism. In Egypt, for example, though plant medicines were in use, their efficacy was tied to the appeasement of ‘demons’ through magical rites.\textsuperscript{285}

With the introduction of codified biblical instruction, a ban was placed on ‘magic’ (defined as a form of causal action to manipulate God), and the interpretation of prophecy was redefined as God speaking directly to a prophet.\textsuperscript{286} The prophet then relayed the message to the people: as opposed to the alternative notion of being ‘possessed’ by, or a ‘vessel’ for, a deity or spirit.\textsuperscript{287} As John Leavitt notes: “Throughout much of Western history, we find a division between the Greeks, seen as beauty-obsessed masters of craft, and the Hebrews, seen as god-obsessed..."
mouthpieces.‖ Literary sources suggest, however, that the mechanics of inspiration from spiritual sources were viewed by both Greeks and Hebrews in much the same way, but the production of Western history gradually subsumed poetics into the notion of ‘craft’. The Greeks were adopted as the reason-seeking ancestors of modern science, whilst prophecy became sequestered and designated as Hebraic and thus, religious. Nancy calls this ‘Greek atheism’ and argues that its ‘meeting with Jewish monotheism’ was a comfort, and a contradiction, “...a double and violent movement in which... the unicity of god... has evidently let itself be subsumed or absorbed through the unity of the principle.”

As Matthew Dickie writes:

“...in Deuteronomy 18.9-14 various forms of divination, spell-casting and consultation of the dead are declared to be the practices of the nations that will not enter the land of Israel and pronounced abominable. The practices abominated are, accordingly, alien to the religion of Israel and for that reason occupy a position akin to that of magic in relation to religion.”

When contrasted with the emerging Judaic notions of divinity as transcendent, pagan cosmologies accepted a primordial realm anterior to, parallel with, and occasionally even independent of the gods: one which was bound to nature. The attempted exorcism of ‘spirit’ from nature (through institutionalised transcendent reconceptualisations of deity, as specifically illustrated by the changes in medical practice) therefore marks a radical shift, as it is plausible to assume that alternative cosmologies including what we now call ‘animistic’ views were somewhat universal before the distribution of the idea that the propitiation of nature (or ‘other’) spirits was idolatrous. Whilst the healing arts were previously indistinguishable from

289 Ibid., 9-16.
290 “Hence, Christianity became, through its own interventions, a humanism, atheism, and nihilism.” Nancy, 'Atheism and Monotheism,' 396.
291 Deuteronomy is the fifth book of the Jewish Pentateuch and one which sets out a very particular code of conduct. By the fifth century BCE there are also clear signs in Greco-Roman thought which set magic apart as a discrete category, generated perhaps out of conflict between certain forms of religious, but also, medical practices, as it is philosophers and doctors who appeared to have been chiefly responsible for promoting this distinction. Matthew Dickie, Magic and Magicians in the Greco-Roman World (London; New York, 2001), 22.
293 Although this is a huge claim to make, it is nonetheless reasonable as there is plentiful evidence within the Judeo-Christian lineage alone to suggest these were also religions of nature based on ‘proofs’ of ritual efficacy, only later becoming religions of ‘faith’ in a distant God, though a proper
what we would call religious practices, certain forms of healing became increasingly seen as forbidden and perverse, and most especially if they invoked spirits, forces, or powers which were not formally sanctioned. This is central to the reconfiguration of the human relationship with the natural world and the emergence of the authorising mechanisms of scientific discourse as mediators of this relationship.

Some clarification on the context for the centrality of this point is required. Any comprehensive understanding of what occurred later in European contexts, when medical and other texts were retrieved from Muslim sources and translated by medieval scholars, hinged absolutely on the selection of materials that were available for translation. The majority of medical texts were from Hippocrates and Galen, and this is significant for the following reasons. As Dickie writes: “The idea that the magician coerces the divine and lacks proper respect for it is first found in the Hippocratic treatise On the Sacred Disease (and can be traced down to the end of Classical Antiquity and beyond).” Specifically, it was the first instance in which a body of beliefs was explicitly declared to be ‘magical’ or occult, and in Tambiah’s terms, represented an intellectual ‘paradigm switch’. Tambiah notes he is borrowing from Kuhn here. To expand this point:

“The text is landmark for these reasons: it rejected this disease [epilepsy] (and certain others) as being the result of divine intervention; in other words, it rejected a certain kind of explanation and action that was labelled ‘magical’ or occult. It proposed as a substitute explanation a naturalistic explanation of disease, which itself was tied to a doctrine of the uniformity of nature and the regularity of causes…”

However, because “…the medical doctors of the Hippocratic School appealed to naturalist causes without possessing a real positivist methodology or an efficacious technology of curing, including pharmacopeia,” they contributed mostly theory to
a body of practices which were actually incubated in Islamic contexts; upon which modern medicine was founded, and for which the Greeks have retained credit. The authorisation processes which have constructed an illegitimate history of science which appears legitimate hinge on this sleight-of-hand with regard to lineage, and are implicated in the rational-irrational binary which sets apart Islam and confines it to the latter category right into the present day.

Robert Wright makes some critical observations which help illustrate why an understanding of the shift to monotheism is so important for figuring modernity: firstly, whilst polytheism leaves room for the validity of other people’s gods, the theology of monotheism breeds a belligerent intolerance; indeed, intolerance may be an intrinsic property of a monotheistic worldview. Secondly, looking for mechanistic laws of nature (as science came to do) does not make much sense ‘if nature is animated by the ever-changing moods of various gods.’ The eradication of polytheistic pagan rites, the elimination of pagan spirits and gods, and the disempowerment of the local ‘priest-healer’ were therefore absolutely fundamental to the emergence of modernity; most especially its institutions. The irony is of course that despite the ‘rational necessity’ of eliminating these ‘others’, multiple, if unsanctioned, pagan worldviews, polytheistic beliefs, and priest healers never actually submitted to the hegemonic new world order but simply became marginalised; surviving in an everyday context which was never absolutely controlled by the proliferation of institutions which have sought to codify belief.

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298 As an example of monotheistic intolerance: in the 14th century BCE, Akhenaten, banned all images of the divine except for those of the solar disk (Aten) and destroyed references to other gods.  
300 Philosopher Hans Blumenberg, in his writings on the origins of modernity, identifies the birth of Christianity as the first attempt to overcome this ‘problem of Gnosticism’ (and he argues that modernity is the second attempt). Whilst the use of the term Gnosticism does not quite summarise the abundance of still surviving practices, Blumenberg’s argument certainly prefigures the one being made here: the first attempted exorcism of paganism by Christianity did fail. Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. As Voegelin notes, citing Clement of Alexandria: ‘Gnosis is ‘the knowledge of who we were and what we became, of where we were and whereinto we have been flung, of whereto we are hastening and wherefrom we are redeemed, of what birth is and rebirth.’ The great speculative mythopoems of Gnosticism revolve around the question of origin, the condition of having-been-flung, escape from the world, and the means of deliverance.” He also identifies the spirit of modern Gnosticism, as residual within modernity, in Bohme, Schelling, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Heidegger, Marx, Nietzsche, and others: ”...the assumption of an absolute spirit that in the dialectical unfolding of consciousness proceeds from alienation to consciousness of itself; or through the assumption of a dialectical-material process of nature that in its course leads from the alienation resulting from private property and belief in God to the freedom of a fully human existence; or through
The notion that there is ‘no magical means for attaining the grace of God’, an observation made by Weber,\(^\text{301}\) was too radical a demand, and – as evidenced by the on-going persistence of alternative ritual-belief structures within modernity – perhaps \textit{remains} too radical a demand.

Monotheism, increased transcendentalism, and the codification of thought in biblical terms also had a wider geographical influence wherever the presence of Judaism was felt: the Judaism inherited by Christianity was overall a \textit{Hellenised} Judaism, the combination of two distinct \textit{rationalisms}.\(^\text{302}\) Louis Ruprecht, writing on the ‘uses and abuses of Hellenism’ by historians, stresses that the core ethnic identity which must be attached to early Christianity is overwhelmingly \textit{Greek}.\(^\text{303}\) In fact, the he considers the successful \textit{detachment} of the Latin churches from this ‘Greekness’ did not occur until Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks in 1453 CE; far later than is often claimed.\(^\text{304}\) Ruprecht argues that Byzantium culture is central to understanding the bridge between pagan practices and Christianity, but often gets ignored because scholars do not know how to think about a culture which claims \textit{both} an ancient (pagan and Judaic) and modern (Greco-Roman and Christian) identity.\(^\text{305}\)

As Christianity became further entrenched throughout these historically critical regions, a complex angelology and demonology emerged, supplying an alternative framework for understanding spirits and mediating the gap between the cultic abode of the deity and the isolated human communities. The demonological aspects were derived from a range of different cultural traditions, which in hindsight appear to

\textit{the assumption of a will of nature that transforms man into superman.” Voegelin and Henningsen, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Modernity without Restraint, 255.}


\(^{302}\) John Ferguson, ‘Athens and Jerusalem,’ \textit{Religious Studies}, vol. 8: 1 (1972), 8. Further: “...the Jews of the Hellenistic Age had been... imbued with the prevailing Hellenism... Judaea was for the most part subject to the Seleucids or the Ptolemies. Greek cities sprang up to east and west... As early as 300 B.C. there was alliance with Sparta, renewed in the second century... and subsequently with some of the Greek cities of Asia. In the third century it was bilingual Jewish scholars from Jerusalem who translated the Law and Prophets into Greek... The establishment in Judaea were not averse from reading Greek; to speak Greek was apparently normal among the lower classes...” ibid., 5-6.


\(^{304}\) Ibid., 80.

\(^{305}\) Ibid., 80-81.
have been ‘fitted’ into a dualistic system which quickly became politically useful. As Janowitz explains:

“The deity was still to be the focus of certain prayers… [but] some of the supernatural manifestations on earth which might earlier have been thought to be the work of the deity were now considered to be the work of angels and daimons… The divine presence no longer dwelt in a Temple… instead the deity was everywhere, with a special cultic abode in the highest reaches of heaven. The Ancient Near Eastern theological staple that the deity/deities are to be pleased by and partake of animal sacrifice was rejected throughout the Mediterranean basin… The hereditary priest who watched over the cult lost his domain of expertise and power. Classical prophecy died out as well.”

In addition: “In the hands of the Roman lawmakers… the practice of mageia became a capital offense.” As the discourse on magic and religion developed, power was systematically shifted away from the independent priests and diviners, undermining their social influence. Under Constantine I (whose conversion to Christianity early in the fourth century set in motion the fusion of church and state in Rome), any diviner who operated privately, as opposed to practicing as a part of the standard public rites, was likely to be burned alive. These dictates were designed to effect social controls through the elimination of challenges to Christianised Roman authority. Spirits, in the modern (that is, post-Judeo-Christian) conception, are fundamentally different to gods, in that gods introduce, maintain, and reaffirm order, whilst spirits often pose a threat to it. This is meant very generally, but when comparing their ontological status, spirits seem to be perceived cross-culturally as more liminal. Within the Christian framework, in which there is a singular God, there is no space available for other gods to exist, so the act of classifying gods as spirits immediately increases their volatility whilst dis-locating their power. This occurs quite literally, as the obliteration of the concept of a local god is central to the success of both Christianity and modernity. Thus, the volatility of the god is transferred to the person who maintains a relationship with the god. The material

307 Ibid., 11.
means of control that can be effected upon a person, cannot be effected upon a non-material or spiritual being. Recalling that ‘spirits exist’ during the time period under investigation here, the elimination of persons who are ‘attached’ to any god that is not Christian (and resists conversion) is therefore a means of dealing with this volatility, though the appearance of other gods could never be assured: there was always the possibility that persons would ‘carry’ the god (now reframed as a ‘demon’) with, or within them.310

This divide between the human world and a controlled transcendental supernatural realm is critical to an understanding of the period because this sharp divide between self and deity creates the other divisions: between religion and magic; between ‘scientific’ medical practices and the ‘occult’ healing arts; between the natural world, the human world, and the ‘otherworld’; and ultimately, between subjects of the late Christian Roman Empire and the ‘other’. These conceptual oppositions – derived from the sense of isolation or ‘home elsewhere’ foundational to Christian thought – came to support the transition from theism, to deism, to secularity.

Monotheistic concepts became gradually strengthened, for although both dualistic and monist thought had been evident in earlier philosophical treatises, by the time of the Roman Empire philosophy had become increasingly dominated by monist thinking; reducing everything to a single principle.311 If the world was to be subdued by one state and a single autocratic ruler, in heaven also would be a single and omnipotent god to whom the leader and the inhabitants of the Empire were answerable.312 The shift from Judaism to a Christian interpretation and re-interpretation of Judaism is both the first secularisation and the most significant, for it eliminated conclusively whatever Judaic tribalism remained through breaking the necessity for familial inheritance and promoting the universalistic ethic of Christianity as its replacement. Concurrently, the adoption of a monotheistic worldview gradually wedded power to the state, forcing out (often polytheistic) alternative claims to power. As noted by de Certeau, following Foucault, institutions

310 The notion that immigrants of unknown religious persuasions could be accompanied by ‘demons’ of various kinds (‘social evils’, for example) is a prejudice that continues into the present day.
312 Ibid., 2.
were slowly ‘colonised’ by silent procedures which increased in determinism concurrently as this determinism became less obvious.\(^\text{313}\)

Though the rise of the secular institution as a mark of ‘advanced culture’ occurred much later, the formation of the institutions themselves and the conformity of the institutions to a particular Christian ethos and worldview certainly becomes evident during this period. In addition (and keeping in mind that the history of ancient education is \textit{particularly} romanticised), the new simplicity of alphabetic writing (as developed by the Greeks) made it possible for the Greek city states to establish a literate citizenry, and establish educational institutions in which the learning of languages – which was a central goal of education – was greatly reduced.\(^\text{314}\) This insight, as opposed to the common, yet essentialist notion that ‘\textit{The Greeks were the first to consider consciously the perennial problems of education}’,\(^\text{315}\) has possibly more to do with the voracity with which the Greek style of education (and implicit goals) became distributed, than the particular \textit{type} of education they offered, which was no more or less innovative than those of the Mesopotamians or Egyptians. Whereas in the latter cases the epistemological and structural orientations of the educational system were confined by language, territory, and class distinctions, the Greek and Roman systems (as the latter derived from the former) were more immediately accessible. Thus, particular types of institutions (political, educational), Christianity, and the early expansion of the Roman Empire with its military strength, became interconnected in a particular manner under a sovereign power: a disciplinary arrangement of forces which has persisted.

\(^{313}\) \text{de Certeau, \textit{The Practice of Everyday Life}, 49.}\n\(^{314}\) \text{Butts is instructive on this: ‘The best evidence seems to be that fully alphabetic writing in Greek was introduced into the Ionian city-states sometime in the ninth century B.C. Since their language did not have so many consonants as the Semitic language of the Phoenicians, the Ionian Greeks had five signs left over, so they applied these signs to their five vowels. Every basic sound now had a written letter. This meant that reading and writing could be learned in something like three years instead of ten. Since writing could spread so rapidly through the population, a special class of scribes... was not necessary. The estimate is made that it took only 100 years from the introduction of the alphabet to its widespread use... It was this achievement which really ‘democratized’ literacy and made it possible for the knowledge of reading and writing to be learned by virtually every person in a society... The Greeks made a demoliterate society possible and created the school to go with it.’ Robert Freeman Butts, \textit{The Education of the West : A Formative Chapter in the History of Civilization} (New York, 1973), 83, 85. See also Jack Goody, ed., \textit{Literacy in Traditional Societies} (London, 1968), I.J. Gelb, \textit{A Study of Writing} (Chicago, 1952).}\n\(^{315}\) \text{Christopher J. Lucas, \textit{Our Western Educational Heritage} (New York, 1972), 49.}\n
In philosophical terms, the struggle between Christianity and paganism is far more complex than is revealed by the contrast between monotheism and polytheism, largely because there has never been any monolithic Christianity to speak of. Unlike their Judaic predecessors, Christians have always lacked a united voice and coherent position; this was supplied through the alliance of the institutions of the church with the political institutions, but it has never overcome the inconsistencies between what different groups of Christians practiced and believed. It follows, then that institutionalised Christianity would become progressively divorced from the institutions of the state over the long period leading into ‘modernity’, especially as Christian sects and churches continued to diversify and absorb local ‘powers’ and traditions. This tendency of early Christianity to absorb multiple mythic and ‘pagan’ rituals, festivals, and beliefs, is foundational to the ultimate triumph and spread of the religion, as it became adept at ‘incorporating elements from other religious cults that were flourishing at the time’.

In accordance with the replacement ethos which has come to characterise Christianity, churches were established on sites formerly sacred to other traditions, and the efficacy of these traditions was reconfigured by a Christian hermeneutic; entrenching the distinction between truth and error within philosophically influenced Christian rhetoric. To recall Debray once more: “Optimal transmission is transmission forgotten.”

In the hands of Greek philosophers, mythos and logos had been intimately related: Hesoid’s Works and Days associated the speech of mythos with truth and logos with lies and dissimulation. Bruce Lincoln argues that whilst mythos originally marked

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316 Chris Harman, A People’s History of the World (London; New York, 1999), 93.  In his discussion of ‘the art of oblivion’, Assman is instructive on this point. He writes: “…the best way to make people forget an idolatrous rite is to put another rite in its place. The Christians followed the same principle by building their churches on the ruins of pagan temples and by observing their feasts on the dates of pagan festivals,” Assmann, Moses the Egyptian: The Memory of Egypt in Western Monotheism, 59. Also, consider this note from Asad: “The series of booklets known as the Penitential manuals, with the aid of which Christian discipline was imposed on Western Europe from roughly the fifth to the tenth centuries, contain much material on pagan practices penalized as un-Christian. So for example, ‘The taking of vows of releasing from them by springs or trees or lattices, anywhere except in a church, and partaking of food or drink in these places sacred to the folk-deities, are offenses condemned’... At the same time Pope Gregory the Great A.D. 540-604 ‘urged that the Church should take over old pagan temples and festivals and give them a Christian meaning’... The apparent inconsistency of these two attitudes (rejection or incorporation of pagan practices) is less important than the systematic exercise of Church authority by which meaning is assigned.” Multiple citations in Asad, ‘Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,’ 253, fn.13.

317 Debray, Transmitting Culture, 14-15.

the speech of heroes or powerful males in positions of authority, *logos* was ‘feminine’ and soft, or gentle and persuasive, however, these categories were deliberately disrupted by Platonic thought to become eventually reversed: the persuasiveness of Reason commanding *logos* (stylistically speaking), whilst the harshness of *mythos* was consigned to ‘the poets’.319 This did not at all resemble what their predecessors had taken the two terms to mean.320 Lincoln’s conclusion is that, at some point or other, because aristocratic Greek males could no longer maintain their dominance via force, they adopted a discourse of well-crafted persuasion, shifting the basis for their claim to pre-eminence and thus, labouring to redefine and revalorise the terms in question.321 He writes: “…these words... were the sites of pointed and highly consequential semantic skirmishes fought between rival regimes of truth.”322

The reputation of Rome as a ‘tolerant’ environment for a variety of religions (formally established in 311CE) became eclipsed as Christianity became dominant, and by the fifth century the conversion was complete. For Romans, the shift in the meaning of the word *fabula*,323 which built on the distinction between *mythos* and *logos*, created a fictitious genre into which non-Christian mythologies and pre-Christian Roman mythologies could be relocated. Originally possessing a very broad usage (primarily oral transmission of stories, proverbs, sayings, prophecies, etc), in

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320 “What Heraclitus championed as *logos* – ‘not simply language but rational discussion, calculation, and choice: rationality as expressed in speech, in thought, and in action,’ as one commentator puts it – is not what his predecessors took *logos* to be. Similarly, the mythos Plato sought to devalue had little in common with what Hesiod and Homer understood by that term.” Bruce Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth : Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship* (USA, 1999), 18.
321 Lincoln, 'Gendered Discourses : The Early History of Mythos and Logos,' 11-12.
323 The Latin *fabula* is derived from two words in the Greek, which are in turn derived from Sanskrit, and was originally a vague term which was used with modifiers to fix its meaning. Used alone, it came to refer to a myth or any fabulous story; a much narrower meaning than it had in the Greek sense. Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, ‘History of the Graeco-Latin Fable: Introduction and from the Origins to the Hellenistic Age, Part 3,’ ed. Gert-Jan van Dijk (Leiden, The Netherlands; Boston, USA, 1999), 3-5. ‘Fable’ c.1300, ‘falsehood, lie, pretense,’ from O.Fr. *fable* (12c.) ‘story, fable, tale; fiction, lie, falsehood,’ from L. *fabula* ‘story, play, fable, narrative, account, tale,’ lit. ‘that which is told,’ related to *fari* ‘speak, tell,’ from PIE base *bha- ‘speak’ (see fame). Sense of ‘animal story’ (early 14c.) comes from Aesop. In modern folklore terms, defined as ‘a short, comic tale making a moral point about human nature, usually through animal characters behaving in human ways.’ Most trace to Greece or India.” Also, ‘fabulous, early 15c., ‘mythical, legendary,’ from L. *fabulosus* ‘celebrated in fable; rich in myths,’ from *fabula*. Sense of ‘incredible’ first recorded c.1600.” *Online Etymology Dictionary*, retrieved 25 September 2010. We also get the words prophet, proverb, fame, and fate from the same PIE root *bha*. Note also, the shift to ‘animal story’ as stories about animals suggests a parallel with the notion of ‘myth’ as a racialised category.
Roman contexts it begins to more closely resemble our modern notion of *fable* or *fabulous*; equivalent to a fiction, a rumour, or a persistent lie, as directly underwritten by the emerging notion of *mythos* as fiction. This shift is foundational to the entire genre of modern ‘secular arts’; a classification which contains a wealth of what might previously have been called ‘religious’ materials, and distinguishes between ‘good’ or ‘true religion’ (later, ‘truth’), and fiction in a manner which continues to structure the episteme into the present day.\(^\text{324}\)

The on-going attempt of Christianity to expel other gods and traditions was concurrent with the gradual narrowing of the category of *logos* and its attachment to, on the one hand, the ‘speech’ or ‘word’ of the Judeo-Christian God, and on the other, truths identified through the application of philosophical reason. In a very real sense, what was called *logos*, was more properly *doxa* (belief and opinion). Christians set *mythoi* “…in stark opposition to the one story they judged authoritative, but emphatically nonmythic: that of the Bible and, above all, Christ’s passion.”\(^\text{325}\) The shift from *mythos* to myth occurred as the newly conceived ‘rationality’ of the *logos* perpetually put the *myths* into question; never the other way around. As the *logos* became more firmly attached to philosophically educated Christian apologetics, so did religious claims that were competing with Christianity become progressively divorced from the notion of ‘truth’.

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\(^{324}\) These re-translations of meaning, or that which Saussure would have noted as a subtle shift between signifier and signified, have enormous significance for the configuration of the episteme: the modern distinctions between *truth* and *fiction* emerge from Romanised Christianity directly. Gradually the episteme became monolithic in a manner which has overwhelmed Christianity, and, wherever the political powers were supportive, has become hegemonic, as evidenced later by the witch trials of the European Middle Ages, the widespread violence of colonialism, and the ascendency of the sciences. In fact, the episteme has only lost its inherent compatibility with the religions of Christianity in relatively recent times with the rise of the anti-modern ‘obsessively secular’ institutions, as illustrated particularly well by the debates over bio-ethics. Further, as Althusser hints: “…art can function as a privileged category that provides an ‘internal distance’ from ideology by relating histories, writing reports.” As paraphrased in Robert Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (London; New York, 1990), 72.

\(^{325}\) Lincoln, *Theorizing Myth: Narrative, Ideology, and Scholarship*, 47. In the second century Christianity began to develop a distinct intellectual tradition which attempted to make Christian doctrine compatible with Platonic metaphysics and Stoic ethics. Lindberg, ‘Science and the Early Christian Church,’ 513. Notable figures such as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, Tertullian, and Augustine are representative of this tradition, Augustine especially for his Christianisation of Neoplatonism: his use of reason to defend faith. Ibid., 513-517. “Augustine rightly said that he read about the Logos in the Greek philosophers but had to come to the Christian gospel to read about the Word made flesh... the contrast between the world of reason and the world of flesh is a Platonic contrast.” Ferguson, ‘Athens and Jerusalem,’ 11.
Reconfiguring how the mythic was to be thought about did not immediately alter everyday practice. Paganism was interwoven with Christianity right through until late medieval times, as was perhaps unprecedented violence – perhaps a more apt reason for the appellation of ‘dark ages’ to this period. Le Goff gives an account of this period in ‘Western Europe’ which notes the gradual emergence of professional and social compartmentalisation as a response to increased mobility. He writes: “The avoidance of certain professions and the mobility of rural labour had led the late Roman emperors to make certain traded hereditary and had encouraged the great landlords to attach tenant farmers to the land, the farmers being destined to replace the slaves who were becoming increasingly scarce.”

The ‘tenant farmers’ le Goff is referring to here were often former nomads from ‘barbarian’ tribes, as the attachment to individual rural property was, in his view, more attractive than it was to Romans ‘on the morrow of the invasions.’ Also, as the predominant religious views among these farmers were primarily pagan, the gradual expansion of Christianity was reliant upon its accommodative and syncretic tendencies. Roger Osborne’s observation is central:

“Even in Roman times, around 90 percent of western Europeans lived in the countryside. Rural dispersal gave Christianity the opportunity to become the religion of these ordinary peasant people; but in doing so the faith had to adapt to the needs of its new adherents. This process was subtle and unconscious, but there is plenty of evidence that western Christianity took on many aspects of old Celtic and Germanic pagan cultures. Eastern Christianity, with its Jewish inheritance and urban background, was utterly concerned with humanity and its relation to God, but the western faith showed signs of a greater interest in the natural world. The state of the harvest, the magical nature of ‘sacred’ plants and animals, the tangible spirituality of the great forests, as well as festivals of spring, midsummer, and midwinter, and specific beliefs such as the magic nature of threefold objects, were all brought within the Christian orbit.”

327 Ibid., 27.
328 Roger Osborne, *Civilization: A New History of the Western World* (London, 2006), 140. There is an interesting connection here between this type of modified ‘barbarian’ pagan/Christianity and its ‘secular’ successors: both the Enlightenment (and the pursuit of ‘nature’ through science) and its Romantic counterparts (including the *volksgeist*, or ‘blood and soil’, philosophy which underwrites modern concepts of ethnicity, culture, and nationalism) reflect this desire for synchronicity between humanity and nature. Focus upon ‘nature’ discourses and practices can often be observed as providing continuity amongst disparate parties in the modern world; even the ‘most urbanised citizens’ appear to be susceptible to the habit of locating something transcendent in nature. The most
The cosmopolitanism of Greece and Rome had birthed a particular type of philosophy which, though originally quite rich, had narrowed almost to the point of non-existence in the West by the fall of Rome. As Christianity grew through Roman expansion, pursuit of the natural sciences became particularly scarce in the Roman world as scholarly interests became reoriented towards ethics and metaphysics. As Lindberg writes:

“With the declining economic and political fortunes of the Roman Empire in late antiquity, people of independent means decreased in number and initiative was directed elsewhere. Moreover, changing educational and philosophical values were diverting attention from the world of nature. Inevitably, the pursuit of science suffered. Christianity did little to alter this situation… Christianity regarded science as important only insofar as it served the faith” and this remained so throughout the medieval period and beyond.

Critically, successive administrative divisions of the Empire into eastern and western halves meant that Rome progressively became isolated from original Greek science and natural philosophy, and by the fifth century had managed to preserve only a very limited version of the Greek intellectual tradition. In addition, Judaism and Hellenism had, by the seventh and eighth centuries, become somewhat heretical. John of Damascus, who had a decisive influence on Christian thought in the medieval world, named the four heresies (circa 700CE) as Barbarism, Scythianism, Hellenism, and Judaism; of which the last two are arch-heresies, the prototype for every subsequent (specifically Christian) ‘folly’.

In terms of the Church (Roman Catholic), le Goff calls it a ‘false ally’ for Rome and a false ally for the disparate powers thereafter. Following the sack of Rome, the church maintained a degree of autonomy from up until the point when: “Finally, banal ‘health’ practices derive from the elevation of what is ‘natural’ in the body of the human (and this is further capitalised upon by advertisers). There is also a theological angle that might be perceived within this: the compensation that is promised by maintaining good ‘health’ practices is longevity but also, a ‘good life’; thus, relocating the other-worldly promises of Christianity to a ‘this-worldly’ natural world context.

329 Lindberg, ‘Science and the Early Christian Church,’ 519-520.
330 Ibid., 522-523.
332 Ruprecht, Was Greek Thought Religious? On the Use and Abuse of Hellenism, from Rome to Romanticism, 81-82.
wishing to make use of each other, the kings and bishops neutralized and mutually paralyzed each other.” Clerics wished to ‘restore Rome’ but the powers in Western Europe had become diluted to the point where five hundred years of history reads like a list of vaguely interesting battles, kings, and religious disputes. As previously noted, and aside from widespread (though false) assertions that Aristotle dominated the philosophical scene in the interim, the ‘received wisdom’ on philosophy only picks up again with the Italian Renaissance.

The major sources translated in the twelfth century were Arabic, and can be thought of as ‘restored’ in the sense that Greek thought disseminated by Muslim scholars was interpreted very differently than it had been in Rome. Underlying Greek thought is Egyptian, Persian, and Indian thought. Despite the fact that Islam follows in the Judeo-Christian lineage of traditions, there are what might be called ‘cultural’ aspects to Islam that owe more to the geography of its early Empire – similar to how paganism and Christianity had intermingled in a Western European context. When Muslim scholars approached Greek texts, they did so (in Lindberg’s terms) ‘faithfully’, which means they did not attempt to pull down the edifices of Greek thought, but applied themselves diligently to ‘completing the project of Greek philosophy’ by bringing their own innovations to the process. In addition, Islamic philosophers

“…picked up and developed those aspects of Greek philosophy that chimed with Islamic theology, insisting that human beings are not only part of the entire Universe, but are also miniatures of it. For Muslims, every individual is reflected in the cosmos, and the cosmos itself is a mirror image of life. This

333 Le Goff, *Medieval Civilization 400-1500*, 35. “…Christianity was a false ally for Rome. To the Church, the Roman structures were only a framework on which it could model itself, a foundation on which it could support itself, an instrument for strengthening itself. As a religion with a universal vocation, Christianity was hesitant to shut itself up in the limits of a particular civilization. Of course it was to be the principal agency by which Roman civilization was to be transmitted to the medieval west. Of course it was to inherit from Rome and from its historical origins a tendency to turn in on itself. But against this closed religion the western middle ages were also to know an open religion, and the dialogue between these two faces of Christianity was to dominate this whole period. The medieval west took ten centuries to decide whether it was to be a closed or an open economy, a rural or an urban world, a single citadel or many mansions.” Ibid., 4-5.

334 Fara, *Science : A Four Thousand Year History*, 77. Note that Aristotelian philosophy dominated medieval scholarship outside Western Europe until the twelfth century, and translations of his work (and others) after this ‘influx’ were mostly from Arabic sources.

macrocosm-microcosm model of humanity... was tremendously important in Renaissance Europe.”

Despite the fact that this idea is culturally logical in many other near Eastern contexts, such as India, it is not difficult to see how the translation of this idea in a Christian European monastic context challenged and altered the Christian pursuit of science, eventually leading to secularisation. Though the monks had been preserving the natural sciences and philosophy, were known to openly discuss both religious and secular texts, and did not reject classical learning as pagan or heretical, the direction of their inquiries appears to shift radically around the twelfth century. After the Crusades, and with places like Spain passing from Islamic to Christian hands, monastic scholars, prompted by the influx of classical sources, began moving away from the view that ‘God is the direct, immediate cause of everything that occurs’, and towards the view that there was a ‘harmony’ to nature that could be interrogated: the beginnings of deism.

Also, by insisting students complete ‘rational logic and natural philosophy’ before being admitted to the ‘divinity’ faculty, the new European universities founded by the churches sowed the seeds for their own demise. It was not so much that the pagan classics displaced Christian sources, as Lindberg notes, but “...rather, the newly recovered sources took their place alongside the Bible... simply expanding the sources from which one might legitimately learn.” Despite the supposed innocence of this assertion, the expansion of legitimisation beyond its previously limited religious frame meant that it was inevitable that reason and faith were destined for conflict on

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336 Italics mine. Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 67.
337 Ibid., 72. Lindberg, The Beginnings of Western Science : The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional Context, 600 B.C. To A.D. 1450, 193. The other significant thing that occurs at this time is the establishment of actual Churches en masse. The impulse to ‘contain’ the growing religious community in buildings cannot be divorced from the growth of the idea of the institution and its relation to architecture; consider specifically the ‘correct’ form for churches, universities, and public buildings such as courts and government offices versus the relative unimportance of the private dwelling. The similarities between the ‘house of God’ and the ‘house of Law’ are not accidental. To borrow from Berger, this may act as proof of the successful transfer of the ‘plausibility structure’ of the former to the latter. For the theory of ‘plausibility structures’ see Berger, The Sacred Canopy : Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion, 47.
338 Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 72.
339 Ibid., 73.
epistemological grounds, though it took until the inception of the Age of Enlightenment for this to be fully realised.
EXORCISM 2: WITCHES, HERESY, & LAW

“In a sense, we might say that ‘modern’ philosophy has always attempted to bury this irrational Other in some neat crypt, forgetting that it would thereby lead to further ghostly reappearitions.”


“…justice, which is wrested from fatality, bears the marks of fatality…”

_Dialectic of the Enlightenment_, Theodor Adorno & Max Horkheimer, 1944.

Despite the widespread belief that the gods fell into the gap between Athens and Jerusalem, and irrespective of the relatively harmonious co-existence of Christianity and magic for over a thousand years, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation heralded another (and much more deliberate) attempted exorcism. In Berger’s succinct terms: "Protestantism cut the umbilical cord between heaven and earth.”

Scholasticism pursued under the rubric of ‘learned’ or ‘natural’ magic helped bolster scientific inquiry in ways which quietly advanced it beyond the purview of the churches, in fact, Renaissance thinkers identified consistencies between ‘natural’ magic and the doctrines of Christianity. Thomas Aquinas had devoted a treatise to the use of astronomical talismans, and Renaissance thinkers, such as Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, clearly distinguished between ‘natural magic’ and the demonic and drew their inspiration from newly rediscovered Greek and Egyptian occult texts as interpreted with a Christianised lens. Hermetic inquiry attempted to seize those very methods of inquiry into nature that had been rejected.

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343 Osborne, _Civilization: A New History of the Western World_, 300.
345 Anthony Gottlieb, _The Dream of Reason : A History of Western Philosophy from the Greeks to the Renaissance_ (London, 2001), 415-417. Consider Scarborough: "...intellectuals were searching for an archetypal religion and science... Once magic had emerged from the depths of a medieval necromancy and rise to a vaunted respectability, equipped with classical philology, philosophy, exegesis, and an aesthetic balance, it took on the role of a desired path through which Renaissance savants could rediscover the very ancient sources of pre-Christian knowledge... the Renaissance found that Aristotle, the medieval Scholastics, and ancient Jewish, Arabic, Indian and Persian sources could also be marshaled to the defense of a Christian mysticism... Ficino and Pico became major players on this stage...” John Scarborough, ‘Hermetic and Related Texts in Classical Antiquity,’ in _Hermeticism and the Renaissance : Intellectual History and the Occult in Early Modern Europe_, ed. Ingrid Merkel, Allen G. Debus, and Folger Institute of Renaissance and Eighteenth-Century Studies. (Washington, USA; London, UK, 1988), 20.
by medieval theology. Anthony Gottlieb writes with regard to early natural philosophy: “...one scarcely knows where science begins and the séance ends.”

Simultaneously, the industry with which the churches were converting local communities gradually increased. The discourse on ‘heretics and magicians’, as incubated by the churches since Roman times, also impacted on how the churches viewed ‘learned’ magic. In a medieval context, these evils were central: magic was the most illicit form of human commerce with demons, and heresy was shaped by the same fears. Edward Peters notes however that: “The chief theological problem faced by hermetic magicians was the Church’s firm statement that there were only two kinds of spirits, angels and demons.” This immediately excluded any liminal positions or beliefs: phenomenon that could not be tied directly to churchly or angelic sources was a priori demonic and thus, incurred whatever penalties were in vogue at the time. As the rise of science and the attempted exorcism on the ‘magician’ or ‘heretic’ were simultaneous and intertwined, any treatises that were too heretical and made church authorities’ uneasy created arguments over ‘truth claims’ (such as the trial of Giordano Bruno and the Galileo affair) which intensified over several hundred years.

Peters holds that there is a need to delineate sharply between the rhetoric on superstition, idolatria, and maleficium (salient until approximately 1450), and the distinctions that came after, which included a more complex idea of ‘making a pact with the demon’ in combination with a new sense of sacramental responsibility, principally on the part of secular magistrates. Of particular interest is the notion of curiositas – ‘the passion for knowing unnecessary things’ – and its relation to legitimate knowledge, which came to conclusively exclude the magician, the heretic,

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348 Italics added. Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law, xiv. Note: as this section is pre-Reformation, where ‘church’ is used without a modifier the institution referred to here may be denominationally Catholic or Protestant. Though the designator ‘Protestant’ is a post-Reformation term there were churches which can be retrospectively identified as pre-Protestant, or had sufficiently self-identified as divorced from the Catholic orthodoxy prior to the Reformation to be somewhat set apart.
349 Ibid., 163.
350 Peters is to be noted for his careful use of words: maleficus, from the Latin, was a word employed for both the magician and the witch, the latter of which does not appear in a form that corresponds to the ‘sixteenth century ideal-type’ until the mid-fifteen century. Ibid., xiii-xvii.
and the witch, and collapse all three into a single understanding that was explicitly linked to demonology. Thomas Carlson notes:

“Taken as the unrestrained desire to look and to see, as a restless greed for inquiry and knowing without determined, productive, and hence justified end or purpose, curiosity has been met with deep suspicion, if not dread, and often prohibition and condemnation, throughout a Christian tradition shaped decisively by Augustine and subsequent heirs, such as Bernard of Clairvaux and Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages, Blaise Pascal in the early modern context, and on the later end, Keirkegaard and Heidegger…”

It would be incorrect, then, to misinterpret the fusion of Christianity and pagan nature-magic (which was absorbed, transformed, and viewed as relatively benign), or the relative cosmopolitanism of the late medieval period within Europe, as a general tolerance of magical practitioners by either the churches or the secular courts, which is an issue concerned with legitimacy, justification, and power. The limits of tolerance were shifted by degrees until they became defined in response to the extent of public influence or respect garnered by any person who was thought to ‘compel’ supernatural forces: as opposed to the perceived ability of the churches or courts to manage these ‘threats’ (specifically, hinging upon how powerful the institution in question wanted to be perceived as in the eyes of the same public). Edward Bever argues that, as opposed to a purely ‘top-down’ management of said threats, medieval social controls rested on four main types of repression: the judicial system, the local church, the bonds of the local community, and the workings of individuals’ psychophysiologies. Thus, the individuals who surrounded the accused, even if only via compliance with social or religious norms, have to be counted as complicit in the empowerment of the authorising bodies. According to Bever:

“Prosecutions were generally initiated by individuals with specific complaints about their neighbours... With literacy limited among the ordinary people, sermons formed an important source of ideas and information... the ‘official

351 The idea that curiosity is ‘aimless erudition’ and is potentially dangerous is found as early as Greece, though it becomes attached to deception, injury, compulsion by demons, and all things forbidden, in approximately the ninth century. Ibid., xiv, 3, 17, 90-91, ibid., xiv.

352 Thomas A. Carlson, The Indiscrete Image: Infinitude & Creation of the Human, Religion and Postmodernism (USA, 2008), 51. Curiositas was for Augustine, the ‘lust of the eyes’ which he linked to the temptations of science, technology, art and entertainment; limited theologically by their relation to what is forbidden by God, and encouraging the ‘neglect of the everlasting father’. Ibid., 52-53.

duty of the preacher... to hold witch sermons... was the strongest impulse behind a rapid popularization of the witch demonology. Sermons not only conveyed important ideas to the people, but, at least when delivered well, also generated strong emotions in them, instilling fear and inspiring devotion, which exert a stronger influence on behavior than ideas alone.\textsuperscript{354}

Additionally, the churches enculturated their congregation by way of direct religious instruction, which was the main element of the curriculum within elementary schools: administered by the churches and the first point of service for junior clergy.\textsuperscript{355}

In Osborne’s view: “The effect of the Reformation was to sever the [official] links between Christianity and the natural world, which was the source of all customary magic.”\textsuperscript{356} Contrary to the notion that the Reformation was about the liberation of the masses from authoritarian Catholic rule, the Churches within the later medieval period had not yet been pushed to their epistemological limits and were still tolerating mystics, magicians, visionaries, and so forth.\textsuperscript{357} The Reformation was therefore more accurately a deliberate correction of what was viewed by Calvinists, Puritans, and others, as religious impropriety.\textsuperscript{358} Peters writes that

“…certain implicit contradictions in late medieval theological approaches to the subject of magic became explicit, and reformers could and did attack Catholic ceremonial practices and beliefs as manifestations of demonic magic. Indeed, one of the themes that sustained much of the literature concerning magic and witchcraft throughout the sixteenth century was the diabolical magic of which the Catholic church was accused.”\textsuperscript{359}

\textsuperscript{354} “The church’s admonishments and symbolic sanctions were far less powerful external forms of repression than the punishments that the secular arm could impose, but the church had far more potent means of instilling internal forms of repression than the state. To begin with, sermons served to both educate and indoctrinate, informing parishioners of the do’s and, more importantly from the point of view of magic, the don’ts of Christian morality, and of the rewards to be gained by conforming to them and the penalties in this world and the next for transgressing against them. By the late sixteenth century pastors were generally the best educated people in villages and among the most educated in towns, having passed through a stringent educational process starting with elite ‘Latin’ schools for the university bound, continuing in special cloister schools for prospective clergy, and culminating in a course of study in a special section of the university... and generally an additional year or two of theology.” Ibid., 350, 358.

\textsuperscript{355} Ibid., 359.

\textsuperscript{356} Osborne, \textit{Civilization: A New History of the Western World}, 300.

\textsuperscript{357} Ibid., 230.

\textsuperscript{358} Ibid., 230. “The general secularization of life in the West after the Reformation is significantly, though only partly, an unintended consequence of [a] religious idea. Luther was indeed a man of his times, a tragic medieval figure, who ushered in a modern age that he would hardly approve of.” Madan, ‘Secularism in Its Place,’ 753-754.

\textsuperscript{359} Peters, \textit{The Magician, the Witch, and the Law}, 163.
In response, the Catholic Counter-Reformation, in Osborne’s words, achieved its momentum by ‘stealing its opponent’s clothes’, opening the way for the Inquisitions and the order of Jesuits to clamp down on unorthodox beliefs, visionaries, prophets, and heretics.\textsuperscript{360} Thus, the second attempted exorcism was aimed, once again, at the medieval equivalent of the priest-healer (generally, the witch) and whatever claims to power they exercised, with the subtle difference of including the heretic as an equally ‘evil’ threat.

The angelology and demonology unique to Christianity, with its pervasive distrust of all ecstatic, spiritual, sensual, and experiential states, thus collapsed these parts of the religion conclusively into the demonic realm, along with all religious expressions which were deemed ‘not Christian’.\textsuperscript{361} The privileges of Christianity that had been somewhat reified when it first became the state religion in Rome fused the ideological to the political in a manner which had locked into place the distinction between Christianity and its ‘others’, exorcising any obeisance to, or right to pursue, alternative conceptions of divinity. Christian authorities in the early modern period, who had considerably more power at their disposal due to the gradual strengthening of the churches in the intervening years, simply expanded upon this division. Whilst the existence of a demonic realm had always been taken for granted, the legitimacy of the cosmological order was now reinforced; thus, supplying a new framework for reconceptualising the ‘gods’ in nature (a problematically polytheistic belief) as ‘evil spirits’ that could be exorcised, whilst remaining consistent with the external monotheism and internal dualism of Christian belief and practice.

This second attempt to exorcise ‘spirits’ is the last that occurs within the framework of Christianity (as a pre-modern, pre-secular distinction), although it is often an ongoing attempt for contemporary adherents of the Christian traditions. It pays to note that reframing gods as firstly, ‘spirits’, and then ‘evil spirits’ does not necessarily ‘eradicate’ them however, but simply creates a new legitimate means of mitigating whatever influence or powers they may possess. In fact, neither the prevailing episteme of the churches, nor the beliefs of people generally, allowed for the

\textsuperscript{360} Osborne, \textit{Civilization: A New History of the Western World}, 232.
possibility that spirits did not exist, as this would have been an incomprehensible notion. Such an idea is only possible in the wake of replacement discourses emergent from a belief in Reason, such as science, atheism, and secularity. Spirits existed; it was just a matter of what discursive frame was used to name them, and how their nature and powers were to be understood.362

Further, the discourse on sexuality, animals, nature, and women that extended from the classical period into medieval times was eventually reified in the figure of the witch. Although the witch was an ancient liminal (generally female) figure mythologically dispersed across various cultures, the stereotype was codified under Christianity.363 As Ruether writes: “Ruling class males come to be seen as closer to mind and reason, women and lower class people as... more ‘carnal’, both in the sense of irrational, prone to sensual impulses, and... prone to evil. This pattern of thought is particularly developed in Plato and Aristotle. Christianity took over these patterns but also exhibited countervailing theories of evil.” 364 This notion combined three powerful mythological constructions that were popular with early theologians: Hebrew Eve, Greek Pandora, and the Virgin Mary.365 By the time of the writing of

362 It is only with the emergence of post-Enlightenment hindsight and the comparative powers of scientific judgment that such ways of conceptualising are referred to as ‘incorrect’, the result of human error, ‘religion’, or ‘superstition’.
363 There are an enormous range of other cross-cultural versions of the ‘witch’ archetype, found as widely distributed as in early Mesopotamia, India, and Egypt, but also in mystical Judaism and early Celtic and Germanic folk conceptions of the sorceress or magician. The stereotypical witch has loose hair and dubious sexual morals; has a negative effect (often culminating in death) upon fertility, pregnant mothers, and infants; is generally associated with birds (such as in the flight of Diana, or as the yogini’s of India); female horses (as in the origin of the term night-mare); herbs, drugs, or potions; dangerous knowledge; and blood rituals of all kinds. The line of cultural inheritance which culminates in the witch trials considered herein is therefore impossible to pin down geographically because the idea of the witch was so widespread as to have no clear fixed origin, per se.
365 To clarify, it is important to point out that the creation story in the biblical chapter of Genesis has two forms: in the first, Adam and Eve are created simultaneously, in the second, Eve is created from Adam’s rib, and Christianity directly appropriated the idea of Eve’s subordination from a rabbinic tradition which favoured this second version, wherein the creation of Eve is secondary. As John Phillips notes, overwhelming preference for the second account shows that interpreters preferred an Eve who is religiously, socially, politically, and sexually under the control of her husband. Eve’s culpability with respect to the fall of humankind occurs when, according to Phillips, the story is somewhat fused with the Mesopotamian story of Lilith (in Judaism, Adam’s ‘first wife’), from which the relationship between the woman and the serpent ‘devil’ is developed; New Testament writings on the proper ‘place’ of women (especially those of Paul); and the pagan story of Pandora, ‘which seems to have both repelled and fascinated the earliest Christian theologians.’ John A. Phillips, Eve, the History of an Idea, 1st ed. (San Francisco, USA, 1984), 16, 27-30, 70, 135. Whilst Eve is subordinate to Adam, all is well: but the evidence for her ‘sin’ (however that is interpreted) is reflected in the on-going susceptibility of women to indulge in deceit; thus, reinforcing the necessity that they be controlled.
the *Malleus Maleficarum*, the tendency of a woman to be a ‘witch’ is justified as follows:

“[Woman] ‘is more carnal than a man, as is clear from her many carnal abominations’. She is deceitful, with a ‘slippery tongue,’ ‘a liar by nature.’ She is naturally credulous and impressionable, therefore ‘quicker to waver in her faith, and consequently quicker to abjure the faith, which is the root of all witchcraft.’ Since women are ‘feebler both in mind and body,’ they have weak memories, are undisciplined, impulsive, and particularly dangerous when given authority over anything. The author’s conclusion is a testimony to the strength and tenacity of blending [these] stories...”

The dangerous sexual powers attributed to women may be particularly ancient, however the place of women in the new cosmological order was far more rigidly enforced than it was previously, and the method of control – accusations of, and punishments for, ‘consort’ with the Devil – had become increasingly legal and contractual in the secular (or *temporal*) courts. As Peters writes,

“…certain innovations [of the thirteenth century], such as the spread of torture, the introduction of the inquisitorial process, and new rules of evidence, were common to a number of societies. They were not... solely the invention of ecclesiastical inquisitors. Although heretics were more severely handled by the law after 1225, the same is true of all classes of criminal offenders, and one could be tortured for other offenses besides heresy and executed by public authorities acting as other than the ‘secular arm’ of an ecclesiastical tribunal. When the legal aspects of heresy, magic, and witchcraft are considered, it should be remembered that the law in general had grown more severe, more remorseless, and more systematic, for the hardened criminal as well as the heretic.”

That penalisation of heresy in the temporal courts was often more severe than Papal law (with the exception of the Inquisitions) illustrates the earlier point regarding the

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366 ibid., 135.
impact of the sovereign fusion of ‘one ruler, one state, one God’ in Rome. Roman law had been revived in twelfth and thirteenth century Europe, and had carried within it particular Judeo-Christian prejudices which were compatible with, and thus, disappeared into, civil law by the Middle Ages. This point evidences the aforementioned transfer from theology to jurisprudence or the sovereignty of institutionalised law (in Schmitt’s terms),\(^{369}\) that is: the reproduction of hierarchy in the model of authority and fields of discourse and authorisation (structured through biblical instructions, such as found in the Commandments), is clearly already developed by the time of the European witch trials. Though the sovereignty of law appears fully secularised (and historical accounts stress this point), the obscured detail is that it became so via a combination of the hegemonic enforcement of a sharpened cosmology and strengthened legal administrative powers: effectively resulting in more conclusive punishments for those individuals who challenged the dominant epistemology. The institution of law (already established as a power independent from the Churches) was thereby the channel through which the theological ideal became tied to actual physical practice: the internal state of possessing beliefs designated as heretical was translated into external punishment.

As to the issue of gender and its entanglement with law (a popular trope when navigating scholarship on witchcraft), it is important to note that it is not that there was any marked increase in misogyny, but that the power relations between the churches, ‘secular’ institutions, and the public were served more readily by more rigorous constructions of femininity.\(^ {370}\) This was considered especially important in light of the numerous women (with specific religious agendas) who had risen to

\(^{369}\) Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*. Also significant for the development of the concept of sovereignty are Schmitt’s predecessors: Bodin and Hobbes. For sovereignty to become secularized, as Fitzpatrick (citing Bartelson) points out, the ‘epistemic underpinnings’ must remain ‘neglected’, as they carry traces of a previous age. Sovereignty must mediate between two orders, the worldly and the otherworldly, and must be indivisible, determinate, and transcendent for successful bringing together a ‘free, unchained, people’ (in Rousseau’s terms) in a civil society. Rousseau, of course, concluded that this ‘freedom’ was enforced. Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘What Are the Gods to Us Now?’: Secular Theology and the Modernity of Law,’ *Theoretical Inquiries in Law*, vol. 8: (2007), 168.

\(^{370}\) Further: “A general increase in misogyny around 1500 has not been demonstrated so far ... The antifeminine cultural tradition is at least two thousand years older than witchcraft doctrine, and it is difficult to accept that this tradition would suddenly have led to witch persecutions between 1480 and 1680.” Pieter Spierenburg, *The Broken Spell* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), p. 117. Cited in Jonathan Barry and Owen Davies, eds., *Palgrave Advances in Witchcraft Historiography* (UK; USA, 2007).
power within the same time period.\textsuperscript{371} Carolyn Merchant interprets this as a reification of the nature-culture divide (a key factor in the advance of ‘civilization’) in which women are fixed in place in the established hierarchical order of things, below the men in their status group.\textsuperscript{372} She writes: “The reaction against the disorder in nature symbolized by women was directed not only at lower-class witches, but at the queens and noblewomen who during the Protestant Reformation seemed to be overturning the order of nature.”\textsuperscript{373} The need for the reinforcement of control and the maintenance of the social order also coincided with ‘new’ conceptions of nature extending from natural philosophy, and especially its medical aspects.\textsuperscript{374} The designation of ‘witch’ was a convenient means for resolving difficulties within any area of perceived failure pertaining to the ‘healing’ arts (including midwifery). Illness and death, especially in childbirth or among children, required satisfactory ritual mediation, but the Christian faith had largely failed to supply any replacement equal to that supplied by those who could ‘compel’ the supernatural. As God could not be similarly compelled, the only possible theodicy hinged on a demonological explanation, which also had the effect of marginalising any remaining female ‘health’ practitioners so effectively that a general suspicion of, and prejudice against, herbal medicines, along with female doctors and midwives, has persisted right through until the twentieth century.

It is important to note that the epistemological uncertainty of the time does \textit{not} necessarily confirm, following Peter Elmer, that: “The widespread victory of Enlightenment values, of which scientific and medical progress were staple

\textsuperscript{371} Merchant, \textit{The Death of Nature : Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution}, 144-145. It is important to recognise also that the conflicts between Protestants and Catholics were reaching their height at around the same time.
\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., 144.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 144.
\textsuperscript{374} “\textit{Nature} in ancient and early modern times had a number of interrelated meanings. With respect to individuals, it referred to the properties, inherent characters, and vital powers of persons, animals, or things, or more generally to human nature. It also meant an inherent impulse to act and sustain action; conversely, to “go against nature” was to disregard this innate impulse. With respect to the material world, it referred to a dynamic creative and regulatory principle that caused phenomena and their change and development. A distinction was commonly made between \textit{natura naturans}, or nature creating, and \textit{natura naturata}, the natural creation. Nature was contrasted with art (\textit{techne}) and with artificially created things. It was personified as a female-being... The course of nature and the laws of nature were the actualization of her force. The state of nature was the state of mankind prior to social organization and prior to the state of grace... In Latin and the romance languages of medieval and early modern Europe, nature was a feminine noun, and hence, like the virtues (temperance, wisdom, etc.) personified as female.” Ibid., xxiii.
elements, thus sealed the fate of antiquated superstitions like magic and witchcraft. Many scientists were ‘radically supernaturalist’, thus, the argument seems to hinge on the legitimacy, or lack thereof, of the practitioner, on which the distinction of ‘licit’ (learned) or ‘illicit’ magic hinges. Whilst Ficino, Pico, and their successors argued for two kinds of magic (distinguishing their own interests as ‘spiritual’), the largely female practitioners of a particular kind, in possession of a particular medical knowledge, especially knowledge regarding reproduction and herbal medicine, lost all formal or informal credibility as a result of the rhetoric on witchcraft. In addition, as Stuart Clark notes: “Witches were the deviants of Christianization, with ‘witchcraft’ acting as a catch-all term of cultural censure and conquest.” The subsequent symbolic construction of the ideal Christian woman meant that female roles could be increasingly defined in terms of domestic functions and economic subordination, divorced from any illicit powers over life, death, illness, and childbirth (a field which was subsequently medicalised).

In terms of the epistemological reconfiguration that occurs, critical consideration of the following introduction from a recent textbook on the historiography of witchcraft demonstrates the significance of what is occurring at this time.

“Scholars of witchcraft have often been pioneers of new forms of historical study and interdisciplinary developments, as the... witch trials cannot be understood properly without considering the development of science, medicine, religion and the political and economic apparatus of the modern European state. The analysis of witchcraft accusations demands an understanding of the processes of social negotiation, the structure of communities, and the nature of gender relations. Decoding the meaning of witchcraft beliefs requires grappling with the research and theories of anthropology, folkloristics

375 Peter Elmer, ‘Science, Medicine and Witchcraft,’ in Palgrave Advances in Witchcraft Historiography, ed. Jonathan Barry and Owen Davies (UK; USA, 2007), 34.
376 “Demonism then, just like Newton’s concept of gravity, occupied a central place in the thought of many of the natural philosophers associated with the new science in late seventeenth-century England. Like gravity, it ‘was held to be intelligible in its effects but not in its causes, something real and manifest as an ‘experienced’ matter of fact but as yet unexplained’. Accordingly, witchcraft was designated as a suitable topic of investigation by certain members of the Royal Society, who wished to construct a natural history of the demonic by amassing well attested and verifiable (that is, Baconian) matters of fact. The process, as outlined by Glanvill, was collaborative and empirical, and like other forms of knowledge studied there, it was neither dogmatic nor doubting, but based on the precepts of probability and reasonable hypothesis.” Stuart Clark, Thinking with Demons : The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe (New York; Oxford, 1997). Paraphrased in Elmer, ‘Science, Medicine and Witchcraft,’ 45.
377 Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law, 163.
378 Clark, Thinking with Demons : The Idea of Witchcraft in Early Modern Europe, 510.
and psychology, even if their application raises serious issues regarding the application of contemporary notions and behaviour to people in the past. Few topics in historical research invite so much interdisciplinary engagement, demand such a broad exploration of historical processes and yet give so much free reign to our historical imagination."³⁷⁹

Performing a ‘reversal’ on this statement illustrates very effectively that the combination of 1) the collapse of witches, heretics, magicians, herbal medicines, and so on, into a Christian cosmological framework simultaneous with 2) the transposition of ‘natural’ or ‘learned’ magic into science, culminates in a ‘moment’ of epistemological fragmentation. This is evidence of Foucault’s threshold, as isomorphic with Derrida’s aporia (or a place of ‘cutting’). As opposed to the general ascription of this moment to the scientific revolution and the Age of Enlightenment, fragmentation actually occurs with the events which peak simultaneously and just prior. That this history cannot be accessed except via distinct disciplinary spheres is evidence that the ‘way’, as demonstrated by the above quotation, is thereafter ‘philosophically blocked.’³⁸⁰

As feminist scholars maintain, this epistemological break is also critical to an understanding of how a ‘white, male, and western’ spirit of conquest came to power – under the guise of a universalistic claim – which cloaked a reality in which some human characteristics were valourised, whilst others were suppressed and devalued.³⁸¹ Writing on the witch trials, Shiva notes:

“After this orgy of violence against women… came a new yearning for the ‘feminine’... It seems that real living, and strong and independent women had first to be physically destroyed and subdued before the men of the new bourgeois class could create a new romantic ideal of womanhood... the necessary complement to the strong, enterprising, bourgeois white man who began to conquer and colonize the world for the sake of capital accumulation.”³⁸²

The threading together of discourses on sex, gender, power, class, and general deviance that derive from a normative (yet, increasingly hidden) Christian ethos was therefore expanded to include colour (or racial difference as deviance) with the

³⁸⁰ Derrida, Aporias : Dying - Awaiting (One Another at) the “Limits of Truth”, 11, ibid.
³⁸¹ Kathryn Dean, Politics and the Ends of Identity (Aldershot, 1997), 22.
³⁸² Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism (New Delhi, 1993), 134-135.
advent of colonialism. Thus, the contemporary perspectives forwarded by scholars working in the areas of gender, religion, and race (or culture) find their common ancestor for the dialectic of alterity that has structured power relations thereafter. The Age of Exploration was simultaneous with the reconfigurations within European society that amounted to a new totalising order and new regime of truth. Cosmologically, because the only possible ‘correct’ religion was Christian, and the only permitted spirits were either angels or demons, the criteria for discrimination through which the radically different others encountered during the Age of Exploration (and thereafter, the colonial expansion) would be ‘understood’, was determined in a manner which continues to underwrite the civilising project of ‘development’ of modernity right through to the present day.

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383 It therefore becomes evident how Marx, Gramsci, Fanon, Foucault, Spivak, and others derive a similar theoretical basis for all these academic fields when the structures of marginalization are demonstrated to be based on theologically construed discourses on deviance.
EXORCISM 3: PAGAN ‘OTHERS’

“The strange God settles himself humbly on the altar beside the God of the country. Little by little he establishes himself firmly. Then one fine morning he gives his neighbour a shove with his elbow – crash! – the idol lies upon the ground.”

Rameau’s Nephew, Denis Diderot, 1762.384

“Power is the passage from the local to the global.”

The Parasite, Michel Serres, 2007.385

The Age of Exploration, mediologically speaking, was reliant on ‘the map’. The influx of classical sources translated during the Renaissance included a handful of obscure maps which, when distributed, invigorated interest in the exploration of the unknown regions of the world. The explorers, and the sovereigns they represented, conceived of themselves as ‘those with maps’ and thus, power, compared to those without.386 Maps delocalised knowledge and incited a cartographic revolution which, by the seventeenth century, was extended to all fields of ‘modern’ inquiry.387 Though early exploration was motivated largely by the availability of means (and an eager curiosity), potential for the acquisition of new territories arose when the character of the ‘races’ encountered was appraised and found wanting. Europeans of the times self-identified as ‘civilised’ persons who were privileged members of a state, country, or empire, and they claimed to possess moral and elect ‘virtues’ supplied by devout religious observance. The combination of these elements all fed into a spirit of exploration, conquest, and domination that quickly became resource-driven and opportunistic. As David Goldberg writes regarding the rapid shift from exploration to imperial acquisition: “Imperatives of European empire and expansion entailed territorial penetration, population regulation, and labor exploitation...
racialized slave labor seem necessary for [resource exploitation]... in spite of
Christian humanism."\(^{388}\)

Modernity, according to Enrique Dussel, had its ‘originary moment’ in 1492, when
Europe defined itself as the centre of the world in its relation with the non-European
‘other’. As he notes, “...if 1492 is the moment of the birth of modernity as a concept,
the moment of origin of a very particular myth of sacrificial violence, it also marks
the origin of a process of concealment or misrecognition of the non-European.”\(^{389}\)
This time period not only gave rise to the notion of a collective ‘we’ (which
designated ‘Europe’, and internally, ‘Europeans’) as a whole, but the idea of ‘race’,
and the notion of the ‘primitive’; albeit only as a rather neutral designator for origins
found in a ‘past age’.\(^{390}\) Race itself was hardwired into the conception of community
inherited from Judaism, and despite being largely unarticulated before this point, the
Christians of the time had internalised a sense of divine entitlement, conferred by
theological lineage, which closely resembled ‘race’. Christians – in particular,
Christian Britons and Europeans – were the *chosen people*.\(^{391}\)

As Caputo emphatically argues: “Religion is most dangerous when it conceives itself
as a higher knowledge granted a chosen *few*, a chosen people of God: that is a formula
for war... the dangerous and absolutizing triumphalism of religion... is what spills
blood.”\(^{392}\) Thus, the notion of chosenness, also known as *divine election*, must be
considered as central to the violence and politics of exclusion which characterise
modernity. Deriving from a theological notion of *supersession*, this sense of mission
(or proselytisation), when combined with the ‘flattering belief that Christians were


\(^{389}\) Enrique Dussel, ‘Eurocentrism and Modernity,’ *boundary*, vol. 2: 20/3 (1993). No pagination given,

\(^{390}\) The use of ‘Europe’ in this sense is noted in papal letters from the mid-fifteenth century. Goldberg, *Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning*, 21, 155.

\(^{391}\) This is especially so via the Protestant Reformation for they are further ‘chosen’ over and against Catholics. Idea courtesy of thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011.


Richard J. Mouw points out that there is a “...deeply entrenched pattern in the United States of seeing
the American people as a ‘chosen people’... influencing foreign policy, through which [we] often acted
as if we were a nation with a messianic mission in the world.” Richard J. Mouw, ‘The Chosen People
god’s elect’, 393 united to become a power which, when distributed through ‘empire’ and expansion, ought not to be underestimated. 394

Bruce Cauthen notes that England was the first ‘proto-typical nation’ to arise in the Middle Ages with an internal philosophy of ‘choseness’, and that the pre and post-Reformation Protestant communities were particularly susceptible to the concept. 395 Cauthen quotes that “…without such symbols as the ‘Old Testament’ account of a chosen people… the frequently powerful union of nationalism and Christianity might have been less feasible in nations like Great Britain, Germany, and the United States.” 396 To appropriate his argument here: “The myth of divine election… of a people anointed by God to discharge a providentially-ordained mission… who collectively possess a divine warrant to subdue, and propagate the faith in… a heathen land [or face]… the prospect of eternal damnation” 397 has fostered the arrogance that is well illustrated by numerous historical examples of religious persecution attributed to the bearers of the Christian doctrines.

The biblical mission of the Jews, as described by Avi Beker, was to “…act as a ‘Light unto the Nations,’ [Isaiah 42.6]… and to deliver a special moral message whether in religious or secular life… imbued with this sense of a special mission to ‘repair the world’.” 398 Biblical instruction dictated, as Karen Teel writes, that “…the strangers must be destroyed because, in presenting other gods as viable candidates for worship, these people threaten Israel’s identity as the people of the covenant. Racial purity is deeply connected with Israel’s identity and relationship to the divine.” 399 Both Christianity and Islam claim to have inherited this designation of choseness, and the inherent idea of ‘purity of bloodline’, after the failure of the Jews to satisfy

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394 “From the second century the Christian literature claims that God had himself rejected the Jewish people and that the Church has completely taken over the position of the elect or Chosen People. This was not just a change in tone but rather becoming a central pillar of Christianity: the theology of supersession (sometimes called ‘replacement theology’ by critics).” Avi Beker, The Chosen : The History of an Idea, the Anatomy of an Obsession, 1st ed. (New York, 2008), 40.
397 Ibid., 20.
399 Author also cites Yves Dubois, Slaves and Other Objects (n.d.) in paraphrasing this passage. Karen Teel, Racism and the Image of God (USA, 2010), 3.
God’s commands. It would be incorrect to assume, however, that the appropriation of this election was immediate. Imbued as it was with anti-semitism, election was explicitly linked to corresponding discourses on magic that had been galvanized against Judaism for a thousand years. This was enhanced by the encouragement among Christians to denounce any means of financial or material acquisition that appeared as disassociated from ‘hard work’ and was thus, perceived to be *illicitly linked* to the concept of ‘compelling’ supernatural forces for personal gain. Election became ‘rightfully’ Christian, and Judaism remained explicitly tied to sorcery. Peters notes that:

“Jewish magicians… loomed large in Christian rhetoric. Jews were associated with the triumph of the Antichrist. Jews had been accused of widespread practice of magic and possession of magic lore in the Roman world before Christians made these charges their own, and the fondness of non-Jewish magicians for Hebrew lore and their use of the Hebrew language helped perpetuate the Jews’ reputation as sorcerers down through the Middle Ages. From Origen on, the Jew as sorcerer remained a learned and popular motif.”

Anti-semitic propaganda drove the various forced conversions, expulsions, and persecutions particular to Jewish peoples throughout England and Europe from the thirteenth to seventeenth centuries, capitalising on grotesque caricatures of the Jew-as-other to incite political and social consensus which then *reified* the image of Judaism as a template for the ‘civilised’, yet ‘fallen’ other; not dissimilar to early conceptualisations of Islam. As Beker writes: “Christianity ingested Judaism almost whole, turning it into one of the basic building blocks of European culture.”

\[^{400}\text{Beker, The Chosen: The History of an Idea, the Anatomy of an Obsession, 39.}\]
\[^{401}\text{Peters, The Magician, the Witch, and the Law, 13.}\]
\[^{402}\text{As Bale writes: “Extrabiblical anti-Semitic stories and *topoi*, largely developed from the twelfth century, were a staple of the wider devotional lives of late medieval English Christians: the Jewish grotesque appeared in ecclesiastical art, in personal devotional artefacts, in civic drama, in vernacular literature.” Anthony Bale, ‘Christian Anti-Semitism and the Intermedial Experience in Late Medieval England,’ in The Religions of the Book: Christian Perceptions, 1400-1660, ed. Matthew Dimmock and Andrew Hadfield (Basingstoke [England] ; New York, 2008), 24}\]
\[^{403}\text{Consider Goldberg: “...the primary objection of medieval Christians to Islam was stated in theological terms - that is, in terms first of the absence of miracles from Muhammad’s experience in contrast with Christ’s, and second in terms of the emphasis on the Trinity as basic to Christian theology and its denial in the Islamic. Similar sorts of distinction were seen to define the differences between Christian and Jew. These doctrinal differences, in turn, were taken by medieval Christianity as signs of the cultural (or moral) incapacity of others to reap the fruits of salvation. In short, medieval exclusion and discrimination were religious at root, not racial.” Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 24.}\]
But at the same time, the Church found it necessary to stamp the old religion as null, void, surpassed, and of no further consequence." 404

With respect to morality, the distribution of early modern values to the ‘others’ encountered initially during the Age of Exploration was mediated via cultures possessed of churched orientations; in particular, a predominantly Catholic Church which claimed the material authority to preside over ‘moral’ conduct. The notion of what was ‘moral’ was implicitly tied to concepts of ‘justified’ domination (on the basis of perceived ‘barbaric’ behaviour of the ‘others’), and the imperative to spread the Christian gospel. First contact, to follow Tzvetan Todorov, occurred in a “…transitional period between a Middle Ages dominated by religion and a modern period that places material goods at the top of its scale of values.” 405 At the lower end of the scale, the main organising category for otherness was derived from Christendom, the division between pagans and believers; at the upper end of the scale, the natural order of the Great Chain of Being, which derived from within Christianised Greek philosophy (notably, recalling Aristotle) and had formidable explanatory power. 406 As Kenan Malik writes:

“Man’s relation was fixed to God and to nature. The world was ordered according to God’s will and true knowledge was available only to the Supreme Being... In an age when witches were burnt because they were ‘different’, fear of the unknown led to irrational suspicions about people who spoke a different dialect... worshipped a different God or had a different colour skin.” 407

The Great Chain of Being, a static interpretation which proceeded from divine ordinance, dictated that “…the process of assimilation in practice meant a collapsing of diverse cultural types and histories into a single hierarchic conception of anthropos and concomitantly, human civility.” 408 Conceptions of ‘the other’ therefore, were formulated according to an absolutist, universalistic, hierarchical and static

404 Beker, The Chosen : The History of an Idea, the Anatomy of an Obsession, 41.
406 Ibid., 97.
407 Kenan Malik, The Meaning of Race : Race, History and Culture in Western Society (Basingstoke, UK, 1996), 44.
408 Mandalios, 'Being and Cultural Difference: (Mis)Understanding Otherness in Early Modernity,' 93.
cosmology, yet one which could not reconcile difference in human associations.\textsuperscript{409} Thus, as a result of this difficulty, plus the fact that the historicism of the Bible had not yet been challenged, medieval Christians fell back equally on the division between the believer and the pagan for classificatory and justificatory purposes. The dispute between monogenetic and polygenetic origins was not yet resolved, and increased ocean travel contested the previously held beliefs that ‘lesser’ or ‘savage’ peoples (such as the Celts, Africans, Mongols etc.) had simply migrated across land masses – the origin of the people of the America’s and the basis for their humanity, for example, was incredibly difficult to ‘explain’. As John Mandialos notes:

“From Aristotle to Leibniz the plurality of the human as well as natural life forms was conceived primarily in terms of a great hierarchy of beings... [which] posed major implications for the way in which significant civilizational encounters in the early stages of modernity unfolded... The idea of a subhuman being, who did not completely manifest either the attributes of a human soul or an ‘animal soul’, created formidable problems...”\textsuperscript{410}

The politics of discrimination and exclusion normative to Greece and Rome had embedded the notion of ‘humanity’ within a polis, in which slaves, barbarians, and (to a lesser degree) women, were represented as culturally inferior; that is, lacking the virtue [arete] essential to citizenry within political space.\textsuperscript{411} According to Mandalios: “...man [was] a political animal who could only realize himself as a rational and communicative being within the public life of the polis, i.e. civility, civic virtues and the establishment of a polity were necessary prerequisites for full inclusion into the human Oikoumene.”\textsuperscript{412} The Greeks had possessed no concept of race per se, but conceived of relations between disparate groups entirely in political, as opposed to biological, terms.\textsuperscript{413} Spirit and intelligence were thought to combine to create a

\textsuperscript{409} Ibid., 93-94.
\textsuperscript{410} Ibid., 92, 101.
\textsuperscript{411} “As a general category of discriminatory sociolegal exclusion, barbarianism was the invention of fifth-century Hellenism. A barbarian was one of emphatically different, even strange, language, conduct, and culture and lacking the cardinal virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. The principle distinction was political.” Goldberg, \textit{Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning}, 21. Arete, as in virtue, or the culmination of an individual’s human potential.
\textsuperscript{412} Mandalios, ‘Being and Cultural Difference: (Mis)Understanding Otherness in Early Modernity,’ 100. Oikoumene, as connected to the oikos or household, as come to refer to a household within the ‘inhabited world’, from which the modern notion of ecumene derives.
\textsuperscript{413} Goldberg, \textit{Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning}, 21-22.
capacity for governing other people – those who did not possess this were thought of as inferior.\textsuperscript{414}

In contrast, individuals and groups were perceived within European medieval thought according to mythological and theological constructions of otherness.\textsuperscript{415} As Goldberg writes: “...the exotic people of the Middle Ages were referred to as monstra (monstrous)... on one hand, the prophetic but awful births of defective individuals, and on the other, strange and usually mythological people...”\textsuperscript{416} The implied threat from strangers, as mediated through this lens, translated into debates as to whether they possessed souls and could be saved, whether they were rational, and if they had the capacity for ‘civilised’ behaviour, which translated into whether they could be successfully ‘governed’.\textsuperscript{417} Furthermore: “This defining of humanity in relation to rationality clearly prefaces modernity’s emphasis on rational capacity as a crucial differentia of racial groups.”\textsuperscript{418} Medieval categories of inclusion and exclusion mirror later racial categorizations, though – as within classical conceptions – there was not yet any formal acknowledgement of ‘race’ as such.\textsuperscript{419} Goldberg describes the transition as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{414} Ivan Hannaford, \textit{Race : The History of an Idea in the West} (USA, 1996), 53. Hannaford also writes, of the transition from Greek to Rome: “As Voegelin shows, the principle idea that the Romans brought forward from Greece and put into practice in much larger units of human association is not to be confused with the modern liberal democratic notion of popular participation in the activity of state, as so many modern theorists infer. For Rome, the principle idea was the politics was a way in which human beings in a mortal existence could reconcile the different beliefs, traditions, motives, and interests according to the best procedures and practices of the Aristotelian nomocratic model. The emphasis was not democratic, but eunomic [rougly translated, as ‘of good order.’]” Ibid., 63.
  \item \textsuperscript{415} Goldberg, \textit{Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning}, 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{416} Ibid., 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{417} Ibid., 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{418} Ibid., 23.
  \item \textsuperscript{419} Ibid., 23. This is evident in the following historical anecdote from Biddick. “On 18 February 1366, Lionel Duke of Clarence, third son of Edward III, presided over an Irish parliament that passed the Statutes of Kilkenny. These statutes, which expressed deep anxiety about the Gaelicization of the Anglo-Irish, gathered together and codified a series of prohibitions against the mixing of the Anglo-Irish with the Irish. Most saliently the statutes produced a notion of racial purity by proscribing, under pain of excommunication, any intimate Anglo-Irish alliance with the Irish, whether it be by marriage, godparenting, fostering of children, concubinage, or sexual liason... a racializing moment, rather than an ethnicizing one, since they prohibited marriage between various Christians and denied the Irish entrance into English monastic communities. The statutes thus define both domestic and spiritual miscegenation and in so doing fabricate blood as a juridical substance... The statutes juridically constituted Englishness, even at the expense of ‘Christianness.’” Biddick also notes that the statutes legislated language law (Anglo-Irish were forbidden to speak Gaelic), customs such as fashion and style of riding, the ‘Englishness’ of ecclesiastical space, and so forth. Kathleen Biddick, ‘The Cut of Genealogy : Pedagogy in the Blood,’ \textit{Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies}, vol. 30: 3 (2000), 453.
\end{itemize}
“The generic image of the savage represented violence, sexual license, a lack of civility and civilization, an absence of morality or any sense of it. Thus, with the... interiorizing of the moral space in late medieval thinking, the savage... came to represent the wild man within – sin or lack of reason, the absence of discipline, culture, civilization... morality – that confronts each human being.”

Goldberg writes that the concept of race was gradually codified in the late fifteenth century, coterminous with the exploration and acquisition of imperial possessions (other lands) by European powers. ‘Race' was loosely defined in the same sense as ‘root’ – that is, a vegetable metaphor alluding to races as ‘of different roots' which ‘took' in different geographic ‘soil', and as signifying a ‘genus, species, breed or stock of animal' (circa 1580-1605). The “...absolutized moral distinction between good and evil,” as Rosemary Ruether writes, reified the differences between light and dark skin colour: “On one side stands Pure Spirit, Pure Goodness and Truth, which Christianity identified with God; on the other side, 'brute' matter that also comes to be seen as the principle of evil.” This conflation of spirit with the daemonic, and ‘the other' is, to paraphrase Latour, the exportation of the human/non-human distinction into a human/human discourse of radical alterity.

The identification of ‘positive' concepts of 'light', 'beauty', ‘intelligence', ‘truth’, ‘strength', ‘purity', 'goodness' etc., with both whiteness (white skin) and God, meant that “...the negative aspects of that dichotomy,” as George Sefa Dei and his co-authors write, “...have been reserved for the savage and exotic other. The visibility, or rather, invisibility of Whiteness positions ‘them' as the repository of civility and knowledge...” Whiteness itself is primarily a metaphorical distinction which is

420 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 23. Consider also Mandalios: “...nakedness, lawlessness, propertylessness, cannibalism, incest, licentiousness and disease-susceptible bodies... gave rise to notions of a Wild Man who was in kind closer to the beasts that the species of the civilized European... they manifested characteristics... that were antithetical to the European self-image of Man... traceable at least as far back as Solon...” Mandalios, 'Being and Cultural Difference: (Mis)Understanding Otherness in Early Modernity,' 100.
422 Ibid., 62-63.
424 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 97.
difficult to historically locate: it is an ambiguous Christian subject that possesses a ‘whiteness’ of Spirit and thus, a civilising power, because, in many instances, power was appropriated by early Europeans who are identified only retrospectively as ‘white’. The racialised body is primarily a natural and social conflation of assumptions which amount to ‘not White’, which derive from biological racism and other non-biological distinctions such as uncivilised, pagan, and so forth. Whiteness is more of a respondent discourse than a primary self-designation, in that it is always posited against the notion of the other. The power of racialised discourse is therefore generated and maintained defensively. In Goldberg’s terms: “Racial knowledge consists ex hypothesi in the making of difference: it is in a sense [and paradoxically] the assumption and paradigmatic establishment of difference. An epistemology so basically driven by difference will ‘naturally’ find racialized thinking comfortable; it will uncritically (come to) assume racial knowledge as a given.”

What has occurred, through the process of early European exploration, and later, a colonial spirit that was absolutely saturated with Christian morality, is the normalisation of racial discriminations which occur through these dialectics of alterity, especially through moral, or value-laden, contrasts.

The combination of elements which contributed to the modern classification and hierarchical division of human subjects into value-laden categories rely, according to Goldberg, upon five central inheritances. Classical virtue, inherited from Greece and Rome; evil and sin, which are basic within medieval Christian thought, and upon which morality is contingent; autonomy and obligation, as proposed within the Enlightenment shift to secular ethics; utilitarianism, as proposed by 19th century bureaucratic and philosophical treatises; and rights, which derive from universalistic and individualistic moral concepts, as applicable to the modern citizens of nation states. It is from these, Goldberg surmises, that the modern conception of race and

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426 The particularly racial mixtures and facts of skin colour appropriate to the countries from which these early explorers came is no longer always considered to be ‘white’, so it is critical to separate the notion of historical ‘whiteness’ from the fact of skin colour.

427 Furthermore: “Power is exercised epistemologically in the dual practices of naming and evaluating. In naming of refusing to name things in the order of thought, existence is recognized or refused, significance assigned or ignored, beings elevated or rendered invisible... Naming the racial Other, for all intents and purposes... [denies] all autonomy to those so named and imagined, extending power, control, authority, domination over them.” Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 150.

428 Ibid., 14.
associated racial discourses – including those of ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nationalism’, ‘indigeneity’, ‘the Third World’, ‘developing nations’, and so on – derive. Drawing upon Foucault, he writes:

“The political economy and culture... act upon the categories employed, and... inform the knowledge being produced. By furnishing assumptions, values, and goals, this economy and culture frame the terms of the epistemological project. Once produced, the terms of articulation set their users’ outlook. Epistemological ‘foundations’, then, are at the heart of the constitution of social power.”

What occurred within the Age of Enlightenment and thereafter supplied the classificatory ‘glue’ which has come to co-ordinate the elements of this epistemology; though the underlying ethical base has remained explicitly Judeo-Christian. It was via the transference of the discourse of election to modernity that the explanatory mechanisms of science eventually attained primacy over religious equivalents. As suggested previously, what is understood as ‘modern science’ may find historical precedents in Greek, Roman, Islamic, and Renaissance thought, but it is primarily the fields of natural philosophy and natural history which shaped it. Thus, election was transferred through the mediating discourses of shifting nature/culture and nature/human relations as biology and geology became independent from clerical influence as late as the nineteenth century. Darwin is central here, as it was his attempt to understand creation which led to the theory of evolution.

In addition, the fusion of the philosophy underpinning the Great Chain of Being with the value-laden contrasts internal to Christianity had prefigured the specific

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429 Ibid., 149.
430 Note also: ‘If there is no single ‘relationship between science and religion’, if each faith tradition has encountered the sciences in very particular ways, and if neither ‘science’ nor ‘religion’ has ever had a stable meaning across time, then it becomes extremely difficult for a discussion to take place about common experiences and shared concerns... [yet] historians efforts have been directed almost exclusively towards the destruction of conflict narratives.’ Thomas Dixon, ‘Introduction,’ in Science and Religion New Historical Perspectives, ed. Thomas Dixon, Geoffrey Cantor, and Stephen Pumfrey (Leiden, The Netherlands, 2010), 13.
431 ‘The nineteenth century saw the baton of authority pass from those pursuing the religious vocation to the new breed of scientist. As historian A.W. Benn observed firsthand, “[a] great part of the reverence once given to priests and to their stories of an unseen universe has been transferred to the astronomer, the geologist, the physician, and the engineer.” Peter Harrison, ‘Science’ and ‘Religion’: Constructing the Boundaries,’ in Science and Religion New Historical Perspectives, ed. Thomas Dixon, Geoffrey Cantor, and Stephen Pumfrey (Leiden, The Netherlands, 2010), 28.
432 As noted by thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011.
hierarchical and classificatory system that is unique to modern thinking. Within Enlightenment thought, skin colour was connected to rational ability, which proposed innate distinctions (especially those which were mentally conceived as ‘lower’ or ‘higher’) to explain perceived behavioural disparities. The shadow of biological racism, despite the egalitarian ethic of the Enlightenment, was never quite overcome. Subjugation of those deemed hierarchically lower was enacted according to religious presumptions. The first distinction was the subjugation of nature (as per Biblical instruction) by the human intellect. Secondly, subjugation of the racialised others through colonial, physical, and cultural domination, as justified largely by the colonial right to autonomous governance, utilitarian means, and the moral obligation to ‘improve’ (or progress), which, by default, included moral improvement via the Christianisation of colonised subjects. The third subjugation was enacted via economic superiority through the mastery of the laws of the market, which was driven by a renewed focus on intense ‘worldly activity’ (following Weber) after the Reformation; thus, invigorating the teleological and eschatological thrust underpinning continued ‘progress’. As Goldberg writes:

“The confidence with which the culture of the West approached the world... is reflected in the constructs of science, industry, and empire that principally represented the wealth of the period... This recovered confidence was both expressed in and a consequence of the epistemological drive to name the emergent set of conditions, to analyse... catalog, and map them. The

433 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 28.
434 The key to understanding the persistence of this particularism is the Romantic backlash against the Enlightenment, Romanticism being defined as several different and fragmentary strands of thought which both drew upon, and reacted against, Enlightenment precepts. Tradition, instinct, community, nation, and the importance of the collective over and above the individual were central components in the development of a racialised discourse. Johann von Herder, in particular, maintained that every situation, historical period, and civilization was possessed of a ‘unique character’ (the volk) which was expressed through its spirit and history (volksgeist). Unintentionally, von Herder thus invigorated the very specificity of culture (later, to become ethnicity) which the egalitarianism of the Enlightenment had sought to cancel out. Malik, The Meaning of Race : Race, History and Culture in Western Society, 73-79.
435 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 29.
436 Ibid., 29.
437 Ibid., 29.
438 Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis argued that the difficulty of determining election by grace or works, so relevant to the religious wars of the early modern period, may have been overcome by the early modern focus on an ‘intense worldly activity’ aimed towards dispersing religious doubts, guaranteeing grace, and counteracting feelings of anxiety. Combined with the emerging individualism, the ability to own property, accumulate wealth, distribute information, increase literacy, etc. that followed the Protestant Reformation, it is not difficult to observe that ‘intense worldly activity’ quickly became a means to an end, in and of itself. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 112.
scientific catalog of racial otherness, the variety of racial alien, was a principal product of this period."\(^{439}\)

The discourse of election was central to these subjugations in that it configured relations between humanity, and an elect authorising and elevated figure upon whom responsibility for maintenance of the cosmic order rested. This is patently religious in terms of both structure and outcomes. Furthermore, not only is the sovereign elect, but the subjects upon whom edicts (dominating discourses of all kinds) are conferred are also elect, in that they are part of a chosen community, and thus, may retain the privilege of being selected for the exception, which it is the exclusive right of the sovereign to grant.\(^{440}\)

The transfers of authority occurred as election shifted from humanity’s relation with a transcendent all-knowing God, then a local all-knowing and all-powerful sovereign, to, by special dispensation via said sovereign, the superior discourses of scientific inquiry. The Jews had possessed exceptional status under their God. During the Middle Ages and through to the Enlightenment, the Christians of Europe and similar countries possessed exceptional status under both God and his earthly

\(^{439}\) Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 29. Further: “The paper world... did not simply provide a means for accumulating and storing what everyone knew. Rather it was a matter of inventing the conceptual means for coordinating the bits of geographical, biological, mechanical and other forms of knowledge acquired from many sources into an adequate and common frame of reference. This common frame of reference became the theoretical model into which local knowledge was inserted and reorganised. This is the sense I believe in which Western science of that period acquired the distinctive property of being theoretical science.” David R. Olson, The World on Paper : The Conceptual and Cognitive Implications of Writing and Reading (New York, 1994), 232.

\(^{440}\) Power over the exception represents ultimate authority. Consider Schmitt: “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception... It is precisely the exception that makes relevant the subject of sovereignty, that is, the whole question of sovereignty... If the individual states no longer have the power to declare the exception... then they no longer enjoy the status of states.” Schmitt, Political Theology : Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, 5-11. Giorgio Agamben has historically situated the precedent in Rome: the iustitium, which literally means ‘standstill’ or ‘suspension of the law’. In this reading, citing Nissen (1877), Agamben writes “…the iustitium suspends the law and, in this way, all legal prescriptions are put out of operation. No Roman citizen, whether a magistrate or private citizen, now has legal powers or duties.” Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (USA; London, 2005), 40-51. Thus, if the state of exception is, by designation, applicable to those for whom the law does not apply, then it is a kind of grace, but may also constitute a withdrawal of rights, as administered by the sovereign or state. In the Jewish example, the ‘special’ or elevated character attributed to the Jewish people was attached to both privilege and obedience – God possessed absolute power to determine the exception. Exceptionality is rendered here as specifically related to divine election (as opposed to the political-legal connotations it possesses within Schmitt, Agamben, and others) for the reason that sovereignty and exceptionality appear to have a much broader influence that a purely political reading allows. Consider Taubes, as cited in de Wilde, for whom the intersection of sovereignty and exceptionality ultimately constitutes a ‘separation of friend and foe’. Such a reading is therefore interpreted as being isomorphic with the self/other distinction discussed herein. de Wilde, ‘Violence in the State of Exception : Reflections on Theologico-Political Motifs in Benjamin and Schmitt,’ 193.
representative, the sovereign. Citizens of a modern nation state, particularly those considered to be ‘Western’ are no less privileged, provided (which is true of all the above instances), the moral conduct proscribed by the authorising agency is adhered to without question. However, to follow Goldberg, because the “…colonising of the moral reason of modernity has been effected… by constituting racial others outside the scope of morality”, the type of moral conduct inherited by modernity is already compromised. Adhering to the ‘law of the land’ henceforth requires secularity, and conduct befitting ‘white’ citizens, which is by proxy, adherence to the dominant epistemic structures and networks of power institutionalised in accordance with these. The ideals of equality and autonomy hinge upon the notion that rational subjects recognise common interests, and therefore, the moral person and the good citizen become conflated and attached to the obligation for moral improvement, vis-à-vis compliance with moral (read: Christian, Western, secularised) norms. These norms include the awareness of categorical prerogatives and their equivalent disentitlements as understood from within a secular hermeneutic framework, especially within the public collectives.

Conduct befitting ‘white’ citizens also derives from an evolutionary standard which aligns gradual ‘civilising’ processes (as reliant on rational minds) with progress; specifically, consensual participation in the increased industrialisation and thereby, economic ‘development’, which is seen to rely on secularity in order to maintain the fictional and humanitarian ‘world without violence’, as discussed previously. Evolution, though presumed to be absolutely scientific, and thus, ‘objective’, internalises moral distinctions via the application of gradated stages of human progression, which culminates in the goal of the eventual elimination of religion as the opposite pole to ‘rational’ thought. Despite the claims of the social sciences to have moved ‘beyond’ evolutionary modes of thinking, political and economic ‘progress’ still relies on ‘development’ as a central model, and ‘religion’ as a central problematic or obstacle to progress. The stages of progression are thought broadly to advance from animism, to polytheism, to monotheism, to atheism, to scientific

\footnotesize{Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 39.  
Ibid., 17.  
This last observation with regard the ‘secular hermeneutic framework’ courtesy of thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011.}
rationalism; the latter two being covert forms of monotheism, which remains structurally predominant within the transcendental modern state.

As the contemporary authorising agencies of such states continue to reproduce the religious/other, and modern/traditional binaries in various forms, exclusionary politics await application at the moment of making public whatever variance is to be confessed (or observed), at which point exceptional status may be withdrawn. Several variances may act as a priori designators of exclusion: the visibility of race or ethnicity (specifically, colour), the visibility of religious observance (on which point the French have recently been most emphatic), and/or a location which is outside the episteme, though not necessarily outside the imagined territory of ‘the West’.\footnote{This last designation includes liminal spaces within modern Western countries, such as churches, marae, natural food or health stores, or other spaces labelled similarly; and conversely, may not apply to ‘Western’ spaces (such as McDonald’s, or an internet cafe) in otherwise liminally designated countries.} In accordance with the logics particular to modernity, these act as permanent exclusions.\footnote{This follows the same logic as with Christianity. Consider Zizek: “What the Christian all-inclusive attitude (recall St Paul’s famous ‘there are no men or women, no Jews and Greeks’) involves is a thorough exclusion of those who do not accept inclusion into the Christian community.” Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, 1st Picador ed. (New York, 2008), 46.} In the language of exorcisms, modernity has been structured as if the pagan and religious others were already eliminated, though their continued presence requires ongoing mediation: the pagan and religious others may remain ‘in the territory’, yet are not included ‘on the map’. Inclusion depends, to borrow from Niklas Luhmann, on the manner in which humans are ‘indicated’, or made relevant in communication;\footnote{Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (California, 1995), 241. Furthermore, in Luhmann’s scheme, the differentiation of society may block total inclusion by establishing different rules for different societal institutions, e.g. successful economic inclusion may not automatically result in political or educational inclusion. Additionally, exclusion from one system invariably leads to exclusion from others. e.g. In some parts of India, children cannot be enrolled in school if their families live on the street and have no permanent address. Ibid., 259. Whilst I agree with this point about exclusion, I disagree with the first – differentiated societies are perhaps over-inclusive, in the sense that once counted within one system (e.g. education) a person is statistically represented as having membership in all regulated systems and is thus, accountable, responsible, and/or culpable on multiple levels.} thus the equality of voice problem is linked to not only to compliance with social norms, but is also reliant on the elimination of difference. Those who are permanently excluded do not always possess the ‘right’ to ‘indication’. The ideals of modernity are not hospitable to difference but, in line with universalistic Enlightenment thinking, prioritise utility; thus requiring an ethic of toleration, which attempts to impute rational meaning to inequality.

\textsuperscript{444} This last designation includes liminal spaces within modern Western countries, such as churches, marae, natural food or health stores, or other spaces labelled similarly; and conversely, may not apply to ‘Western’ spaces (such as McDonald’s, or an internet cafe) in otherwise liminally designated countries.

\textsuperscript{445} This follows the same logic as with Christianity. Consider Zizek: “What the Christian all-inclusive attitude (recall St Paul’s famous ‘there are no men or women, no Jews and Greeks’) involves is a thorough exclusion of those who do not accept inclusion into the Christian community.” Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, 1st Picador ed. (New York, 2008), 46.

\textsuperscript{446} Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems (California, 1995), 241. Furthermore, in Luhmann’s scheme, the differentiation of society may block total inclusion by establishing different rules for different societal institutions, e.g. successful economic inclusion may not automatically result in political or educational inclusion. Additionally, exclusion from one system invariably leads to exclusion from others. e.g. In some parts of India, children cannot be enrolled in school if their families live on the street and have no permanent address. Ibid., 259. Whilst I agree with this point about exclusion, I disagree with the first – differentiated societies are perhaps over-inclusive, in the sense that once counted within one system (e.g. education) a person is statistically represented as having membership in all regulated systems and is thus, accountable, responsible, and/or culpable on multiple levels.
As Gray notes, toleration is grounded in the acceptance of the imperfectability of humankind. It is also “…unavoidably and inherently judgemental. The objects of toleration are what we judge to be evils. When we tolerate a practice, a belief or a character trait, we let something be that we judge to be undesirable, false or at least inferior; our toleration expresses the conviction that, despite its badness, the object of toleration should be left alone.”\textsuperscript{447} The alternative, when toleration is deemed to be impossible, is an apocalyptic that has now ‘gone global’. Gray writes that, in the twenty-first century, spectacular violence is almost commonplace, and the justifications, once again, echo the theological: “The ‘war on terror’ is another version of the secular faith in the evanescence of evil”,\textsuperscript{448} an ironically violent promise that freedom and safety will be conferred only upon the condition of faith or trust being extended to the benevolent governmental powers which rule on who has the right to life or death: that is, power over the exception.\textsuperscript{449}

Brian D. McLaren considers these politics of inclusion and exclusion to be fatally flawed.\textsuperscript{450} He writes:

“In this view, to put it baldly, God plays favorites, electing some and rejecting others, calling some to grace and condemning others to despair… God could be expected within this scenario to act on behalf of his favorite people without regard for the dignity, well-being, or even survival of those who were not so chosen. The historic injustices done by Christians to Native Americans and African slaves in the Americas, to Jews by anti-Semitic Christians across the centuries, and to Palestinians today in the Middle East,

\textsuperscript{447} Gray, \textit{Enlightenment’s Wake : Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age}, 28. Further: Gray considers the abolishment of prejudice, like the Marxist project of transcending alienation, an epistemological impossibility, and thinks we should reconsider prejudice as inevitable and be prepared to curb its expression where it has demonstrably harmful effects. He writes: “In general… we should guard against the harmful effects of prejudice, not by engaging in the futile attempt to eradicate it, but by trying to ensure that everyone has the same civil and personal liberties. A policy of toleration… will even be one that tolerates the many false beliefs we have about each other – providing these do not result in the deprivation of important liberties and opportunities. When prejudice does have such an effect, it is usually the liberties and opportunities it threatens that we should aim to protect, rather than the prejudice we should seek to eradicate. The argument so far, then, is that we will do better if we seek to rub along together, tolerating each other’s prejudices, rather than attempting the impossible task of ironing them out from social life.” Ibid., 41.

\textsuperscript{448} Gray, \textit{Heresies}, 12.

\textsuperscript{449} The inherent power of determination of the exception and its relation to culture, race, and religion, is discernible in several modern examples: the ‘return of the camps’, counter-terrorism legislation and policy, increased focus on border controls, military interventions legitimated by humanitarian ethics and international law, Guantanamo Bay, etc. See Jef Huysmans, ‘The Jargon of Exception - on Schmitt, Agamben and the Absence of Political Society,’ \textit{International Political Sociology}, vol. 2: (2008).

\textsuperscript{450} Brian D. McLaren, ‘Chosen for What?,’ \textit{Tikkun}, vol. 23: 3 (2008), 60.
all flow, in part, from this dangerous misunderstanding of what it means to be God’s chosen or elect.”\textsuperscript{451}

To take McLaren further, the influence of the doctrine of divine election was never limited to Christianity (though it is still covenantally upheld by many, if not all, Christians), but generates an evangelistic fervour towards conversion that now underpins globalisation and the chief discourses of development and modernisation as a means of salvation. The notions of both election and salvation remain present within modernity but paradoxically, sans God: the ultimate authority (formerly) capable of judging both what election means and what achieving salvation requires.

To draw upon the work of Gerrit Berkouwer:

“Soteriology is immediately evoked by and connected with an emphasis on God’s free will. If we separate these two from each other we can speak of election on in an abstract manner. Our salvation is then causally and objectivistically ‘derived’ from God’s sovereignty, and the consolation of election gives way to a powerless submission which cannot be distinguished from submission to destiny and fate, and in which the Savior of the world can no longer be detected.”\textsuperscript{452}

The damnation of the pagan other, who is separated from the grace of God and must be ‘saved’, has evolved to become the damnation of the cultural or religious neighbour who is self-othered by either their failure to comply, or their ‘ignorance’ of the benefits of compliance. An inordinate percentage of the world’s people are presently living in the shadow of the consequences of this ‘ignorance’, often in extreme poverty. The evolutionary trajectory which underpins this exclusion determines that, according to the underlying mission of proselytisation, the ‘other’ (of whatever marginalised or ‘deviant’ persuasion) ought to be ‘saved’ by the fruits of a messianic modernity. The moral injunction determining precisely how this salvation is to be achieved was just as questionable in the hands of Christian colonialists as with the bearers of globalisation: both elect, and both interpreters of morality on behalf of a partially exorcised sovereign God.

\textsuperscript{451} Ibid., 60.

It is also possible that salvation via modernity is blocked for those who display any of the visible signs of variance. As Goldberg notes, and this can be extended beyond race to include all such marginalisations:

“In the case of discriminatory exclusions it can be concluded... that what the moral order fails to explicitly exclude it implicitly authorizes... So though the formal principles of moral modernity condemn and discourage some racist expressions, they fail, and fail necessarily, to condemn and discourage such expression exhaustively. Indeed, where they fail in this way, they extend discriminatory racialized expression either indirectly and inadvertently by seeming to condone and approve what they do not explicitly disapprove, or directly by enabling racialized expression and effectively authorizing discriminatory racial exclusions on the basis of the principle of moral reason itself.”

As religious, and especially, racial prejudices run extremely deep in modern societies, albeit under the guise of seemingly controllable ‘ethnic’ prejudices, the double shift that is required to accommodate epistemological positions which are neither white nor Christian poses an enormous challenge.454 The ‘double’ or ‘contradictory’ consciousness of racialised and post-colonised positions also blocks this hospitality, in that the racialised other may have internalised exclusionary politics to the point of normalisation.

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453 Goldberg, Racist Culture : Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 39.
454 Goldberg notes that the production of social knowledge about the racialized other establishes a library or archive of information which prefigure a set of guiding ideas and principles about otherness; characteristic behavior or habits, and predictions of likely responses. Additional, the other may be a subject of study, but only as informant, as a representative translator of culture. This set of representations thus confines those defined by the constraints of the representational limits, restricting the possibilities available to those rendered racially other as it delimits their natures. The ‘locations’ of the other (prisons, cities, ghettos, and so on) become ‘laboratories’ for testing the epistemological precepts. Literature, art, languages, and general cultural expression of these ‘others’ are appropriated as proper objects of ‘scientific’ evaluation; judged not as works among works of art in general, but expressions of otherness, and representative of the cultural condition and mentality – thus reifying and condoning the processes of marginalisation. For instance, artifacts are not art, primitive formulations are not rationally ordered linguistic systems, and so forth. Ibid., 150-151.
455 For theoretical history of this idea see W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (Millwood, New York, 1953), Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (Hammondsworth, UK, 1967). Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 1st Evergreen Black Cat ed. (New York, 1968). Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. Consider this example from Sefa Dei, which signals both an unsettling gratitude at recognition, and gratitude with regard inclusion: ‘Resistance... means seeing small acts’ as cumulative and significant for social change. As one of my Caribbean-born, African graduate students wrote, ‘I can’t tell you how affirming it is to see “patois” in the books I am evaluating for my thesis. A few years ago, this would never have been possible... The fact that these languages make their way into texts at all is a phenomenal act of resistance.” George
In summation, the formerly Christian, ex-Judaic, privileges of election, transcendent power, moral authority, and soteriological promise were relocated, via modernity, to a new rational worldview that rapidly became hegemonic. In effect, all theological derived transfers now central to modernity were transformed from being internal components of Christianity to being internal components of the new scientific modern worldview simultaneously with this final shift of authority. The transition of authority from God to the new scientific worldview abandoned theism, then deism, for a theo-scientific logic in which humankind would possess ultimate power and control through knowledge of creation and consequence. To borrow a metaphor from Harrison: a new myth of power in which science was the victor arose as ‘Galileo finally overcame the Inquisition’. The heirs of Galileo, then, inherited the clothes of the Inquisitors. Whilst science and technology made the manipulation and transformation of nature possible, capitalism supplied the economic tools, and Christianity, the hidden justifications, to exploit the rest of the world.

According to Charles Taylor, prior to the shift “...God was the ultimate guarantee that good would triumph and the forces of darkness would be held at bay.” Thereafter, although God was gradually erased as science, technology, and the transcendental state powers became authoritative, the promise of this remained; albeit concealed within an ideology that became progressively more persistent with the next few hundred years. The twist is that the precise point wherein Christianity and the Judeo-Christian God were dismissed as ‘unnecessary and primitive explanatory devices’ (to be quickly eclipsed by Enlightenment science), the attempt was made to confine ‘religion’ to its own sphere: a clearinghouse for the irrationalities of the other


456 Tambiah suggests that our overreliance on employing technological means for organising our space has resulted in a kind of ‘moral cul-de-sac’. He writes that: “...the “technical sciences” that we have allowed to proliferate may not be able to deliver the best moral rules we wish to live by.” Tambiah, *Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality*, 151.

457 Harrison, ‘Science’ and ‘Religion’: Constructing the Boundaries,’ 29.

458 Poetic turn of phrase attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011.


460 Charles Taylor warns also that the story of modernity is not just a story of loss, or subtraction. He writes: ‘...what happened between 1500 and 2000? ...The key difference we’re looking for between our two marker dates is a shift in the understanding of what I called ‘fullness’, between a condition in which our highest spiritual and moral aspirations point us inescapably to God, one might say, make no sense without God, to one in which they can be related to a host of different sources, and frequently are referred to sources which deny God.’ Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 26.
‘outside’, and the other ‘within’. Modern ‘Western’ Christians became ‘once-removed’ from the secular modern (which became the sole arbiter of the messianic thrust), and the ‘others’ were defaulted to the twice-removed category of not-Western, and not-Christian. Yet, as the Christian roots of science had determined its moral and epistemological orientations, the deity was erased in name only, appearing to have been shifted by sleight-of-hand into this new sphere, though the transfer was incomplete. The God of the Jews, adopted by Christians and overthrown by science, thus became the most significant ghost to haunt the modern episteme.

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461 Thus, the ‘map’ of modernity is often twice-removed from the ‘territory’ it is purported to represent.
**EXORCISM 4: THE BIRTH OF THE MIND**

“Every truth passes through three stages before it is recognized. In the first place it is ridiculed. In the second it is opposed. In the third it is regarded as self-evident.”

Attributed to Arthur Schopenhauer, 1788-1860.\(^{462}\)

“What I tell you three times is true.”

*The Hunting of the Snark*, Lewis Carroll, 1874.\(^{463}\)

As Raimundo Panikkar writes: “Historical man stands alone in the world theatre – without Gods or other beings, living or inanimate... If some still accept God, he is transcendent, impassive, perhaps good for another life, but certainly not about to meddle in human affairs. God has left the world to the strivings of Men.”\(^{464}\) Prefiguring the context within which the final ‘exorcism’ in this sequence can be understood, Panikkar argues that the world we inhabit has rendered the ‘forces’ described by belief as impotent, innocuous, and subservient to human reason: “If at all, they are energies to be studied by psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, parapsychologists... and so forth”.\(^{465}\) In short, by the sciences of the mind. Yet spirit and mind (* psyche*) remain intrinsically related, as evidenced by the etymological history provided by Jean-Michel Rabaté: “From the Greek *pneuma* or *psyche*, from the Hebrew *ruah*, all suggesting ‘breath’ and ‘wind,’ to the Latin *spiritus* or the German *Geist* – a term that is never far... from ghost on the one hand and gaz on the other hand... a whole prehistory of our spectral delusions remains possible...”\(^{466}\)

To recall the sequence, whilst the first three exorcisms attempted to reclassify *gods* as *spirits* in the context of classical Greece and Rome, early modern Europe, and European expansion throughout the world (replacing the local gods with the Judeo-

\(^{462}\) Despite an exhaustive search, an original and un-paraphrased source for this citation has remained elusive. Cited from the opening pages of Christian De Quincey, *Radical Nature : Rediscovering the Soul of Matter*, 1st ed. (Montpelier, Vermont, 2002).


\(^{464}\) Raimundo Panikkar and Scott Eastham, *The Cosmotheandric Experience : Emerging Religious Consciousness* (USA, 1993), 106. Panikkar, now 75, is a particularly well-respected transdisciplinary scholar – Eastham, in the cited work, introduces him as follows [sic]: “You are told that his father was Indian and Hindu and his mother Spanish Catholic, that he holds doctorates in the sciences, philosophy and theology, that he speaks about a dozen languages and writes books and articles in at least six. As if this were not enough, he himself says, ‘I “left” as a christian, “found” myself a hindu and “return” as a buddhist, without having ceased to be a christian.’” ibid., v.

\(^{465}\) Ibid., 106.

Christian God), this last exorcism appears as an attempt upon the Judeo-Christian God (and all residual claims for the reality of spirits or gods) within the Modern.\footnote{This attempt must be thought of as the legacy of Protestantism, which upheld the right of self-interpertation. In addition, all of these exorcisms therefore possess a special relationship to each other, in that they supply interconnected means for the on-going removal of religion from public life at the global, local, and individual levels. Global ‘eruptions’ of spirit are mediated by politics and war, in service to the twin goals of progress and capitalism, most especially when the irrational religion of ‘the other’ ceases to remain ‘contained’. Locally, societies which are predominantly ‘Western’ identify eruptions of spirit through signifiers such as culture, ethnicity, religion – catch-all categories to watch in the event that the private becomes public. Individually, the mind is cultivated, socialised, educated, and marginalised or ‘treated’, perhaps institutionalized, if unacceptable ‘eruptions’ are observed. Furthermore, Christianity in its modern forms continues to operate at all levels, colonising consciousness wherever the project of modernity appears to have come unstuck. Similarly, world church-based charity organizations distribute very specific forms of education and healthcare.} This last attempt is also further localised, in that it deals with whatever residual beliefs may ‘contaminate’ the individual. Unstable or unseen phenomena – already rejected by science and loaded negatively with anti-Christian sentiment – were collapsed entirely into the unconscious and relegated to psychology (and its siblings); generating multiple biomedical ‘management models’ to deal with any irregularities relevant to an individual’s ‘correct’ perception of the world.\footnote{Such incorrect perception is thought to lead to incorrect behaviours, which contributes to the already existing rhetoric on ‘religious violence’. Though religio-cultural beliefs and practices often escape being publicly derided as such, they have come to be tacitly classified as a component of ‘rights’ only up until the point where they are judged as intrusive upon the ‘public’ sphere. This distinction often spills over into legislation pertaining to the designated private sphere, especially in countries where cultural and religious differences are perceived to contribute to increased violence within private households, often against women, children, homosexuals, and animals. There is also a gendered component, in that the perpetrators claiming or requesting exclusion from punishment under the local law are generally heterosexual men. Cultural difference and religious violence can become entangled in such situations. Although in some of these instances the designation of ‘religious violence’ is certainly warranted, the use of the term in the media is often shorthand for what amounts to misunderstood ‘cultural difference’.} Furthermore, although the individual may accept the scientific concepts of ‘mind’ and hold these ideas in parallel with religious or cultural beliefs (as ‘explanatory devices’), the dominant epistemology employed within modernity mandates that only the former retains any validity. This position is reinforced through the various legal and medical systems (or institutions) which supply the classificatory tools whenever belief ceases to be socially ‘benign’.

Bennett Simon, in his history of psychiatry, asks a revealing question: “Does all of religious experience and all religious phenomena pertain to the history of
psychiatry?" His conclusion is yes. In Simon’s terms, the common assumption is that the history of the mind sciences begins with Greek and Roman thought, not just as a single “...current in the stream that becomes modern psychiatry, but [as] the caput Nili, ‘the head of the Nile.’” Yet, the construction of a ‘history’ of psychiatry, citing origins in Greece and Rome, occurs in the nineteenth century as an attempt to create an “…illustrious and interesting past... sometimes by way of showing how far we have come from a primitive and naïve view... sometimes to show that our seemingly modern concept has indeed the authority and dignity of millennia behind it.” Like the scholarly interrogation of the witch trials, what are now referred to as the sciences of the mind are the products of a unique epistemological ‘break’ which obscures their cultural origin; again, as derivative from the Judeo-Christian nexus of beliefs.

Whilst the core ways of thinking about the mind are indeed derived predominantly from ancient Greek thought (perhaps extending even further back in time), the interpretation of these ideas within the medieval ‘period of revival’ was perpetually subject to the religious gaze. As noted previously, the Hippocratic corpus became pivotal for medieval and early modern scholars who sought to determine the codification point of ‘philosophical’ (as opposed to ‘superstitious’) medical inquiry in Greece. Hippocrates decried magic, yet elevated the ‘mental’ aspects of disease and correlated these with physical phenomena, although, as Simon argues, “…this model... never entirely removes a place for the divine either in causation or cure of mental disturbance.” As church scribes in the medieval era had a choice as to whether to focus on the differences or similarities between their own perspectives and the vast number of ‘religious’ beliefs and practices detailed by hermetic texts, their manner of selection becomes central. Debray’s view is pertinent: “A historical milieu

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470 Ibid., 175.
471 Ibid., 177-178.
472 Consider: ‘The history of psychiatry, therefore, must include the study of the interplay in any given age between what is considered ‘official’ or ‘scientific’ or ‘medical’ knowledge (including the methods of study that are deemed appropriate to those forms of knowledge) and other forms of knowledge that those holding the keys to ‘scientific’ knowledge consider ‘superstition’ or ‘folk medicine.’” Ibid., 180.
473 Italics added. Ibid., 176.
of transmission crystallizes concretely in, and through, the socialized operators of transmission...‖

Furthermore, citing de Certeau, he adds: “They select, make available and control the dynamos of information; they render it desirable and assimilable, they are the active agents of its appropriation and transformation.”

With respect to Hippocrates, for instance, the ‘creation of ancestry’ occurred very early, as Simon notes:

“Hippocrates as the “father of medicine” was a creation of physicians writing some three to five centuries after he lived, practiced, and wrote whatever few works of his own that we may actually have. As the work of Wesley Smith has shown, Galen, in the second century C.E., in particular was responsible for elevating Hippocrates to this status and thereby canonizing him. Galen had his own reasons in terms of needing to justify and elevate his own theories, and there is also the distinct possibility that Galen created a particular Hippocrates out of several possible (and somewhat contradictory) available notions of Hippocratic medicine.”

Hippocrates, therefore, was already a representation by the medieval era, so his second representation and appropriation during the medieval and early modern periods (as termed paradigmatic, recalling Tambiah) needed only to be further harmonised with natural philosophies – by-products of both ‘Galenesque’ and Islamic influences – in order to offset the religious view. Demonic possession, which was already mandated against by the churches, was reconfigured in Hippocratic treatises as an ‘impossible superstition’, thus, complementing the religious position. The notion that healers could mediate in situations where unusual or disturbed mental states were observed, was superseded by prayer, petitions to saints, and official versions of exorcism; all acceptable within the Christian framework.

The shift towards a ‘modern’ view and what were to become the ‘neurological sciences’ must begin with Rene Descartes, who is often lauded as a ‘founding father’ of the scientific revolution for his attempts to deal conclusively with the ‘mind-body’

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474 Debray, Media Manifestos : On the Technological Transmission of Cultural Forms, 16.
475 If the original work by de Certeau were in English, as opposed to French, it would be cited directly. As it is not, Debray’s citation will have to suffice. Ibid., 16.
problem. Duane Schultz writes that: “During the Christian Middle Ages the
dominant concern was with the eternal salvation of the... [immortal] human soul... as
divorced from the body and composed of an immaterial substance always striving
to unite with God.” In contrast, Descartes’ approach was a physical-psychological
one in which mind and soul were possessed of an ‘insubstantial’ or ‘free’ quality
which were ‘diffused’ throughout, and thus, could ‘interact’, with the body. The
difficulty, as later critics have been keen to point out, is that Descartes never decided
upon the means by which this occurred, creating, in John Cottingham’s terms, a
“...nest of problems that were to become notorious stumbling blocks for Cartesian
philosophy”. However Descartes never omitted God from his philosophy, and
though he supported Reason, the application of his senses to problems with which
he was enamoured (and their solutions) were the endowment of a benevolent deity,
and are therefore characteristic of the shift to deism.

The other major attribution scientists and philosophers make to Descartes is the
adoption of a ‘mechanised’ view of the body. Schultz argues that the success of
Descartes’ concept must be linked to a zeitgeist that was ‘ready’ for a mechanised
worldview: the idea of predictability was attractive, and there was considerable
enthusiasm in general for machines leading up to the industrial revolution. The

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479 Ibid., 16.
480 Ibid., 16.
482 Deism is the attempt to harmonise early science, focused on the natural world, with religious beliefs, and is intimately connected with the removal of ‘gods’ from nature. The world became ‘alive’ as the creation of the Judeo-Christian God in a way which has persisted as an ‘awe’ to be found in nature for its own sake – ‘the Ionian Enchantment’.
483 Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology, 17. It is possible that the inspiration for this enthusiastic appropriation of a ‘mechanised’ worldview was taken from China, as argued by Joseph Needham in the twentieth century. In Fara’s words: “One of Needham’s coups was to rewrite the timescale of human invention... Most famously, Needham’s table [of Chinese innovations] includes the magnetic compass, and printing - placing them all in China and giving them earlier dates. As he point out, the Silk Road not only enabled exotic goods to travel westwards, but also encouraged the migration of technological and agricultural products... Needham argues that China needed to be reassessed – instead of being a scientific backwater steeped in ancient mysticism, Chinese civilization had be technologically vibrant and way in advance of Europe’s during the so-called Dark Ages. By studying China... Needham queried the very nature and origins of science in Europe. Writing to convert rather than to convince, Needham introduced the heretical notion that modern science is not uniquely Western but is ‘ecumenical’, depending on local truths which flow into it like rivers into the sea. In particular... traditional Chinese knowledge made vital contributions to the scientific enterprise of producing universal knowledge.” Fara, Science : A Four Thousand Year History, 49. As to the reasons
notion that the functions of the body could be explained using this type of reductionist logic has never entirely been overcome. The model of the heart as a ‘pump’ is still derivative of the nineteenth century fascination with steam engines, which contrasts with the electromagnetic and neural components central to heart function. Nor has a type of Cartesian dualism been transcended, despite popular claims it has been entirely enveloped by monist views. In Descartes’ opinion, humans were physical machines with a ‘mind-soul’ that was absolutely distinct, thereby establishing the ground upon which the notion of a ‘secular mind’ could be later founded. This absolute distinction between a transcendentental mind and body *mirrored* the theological gap between humankind and a transcendentental Christian God; thus, the dualism which underpinned psychology had, from the onset, the familiarity necessary to become a logical epistemological replacement discourse. In addition, Descartes’ idea (posed *scientifically*) that animals do not possess souls and are thus, *automata* (or machines that move themselves), preserved the chasm between humans and animals that was integral to Christian thought. For Descartes, thought exists: *cogito ergo sum*, and humans were the creations of a deity who was in control of a radically infinite universe.

Despite Descartes’ noted religious perspectives and theological solutions, Margaret Wertheim notes: “To many of his peers Descartes seemed to have written God out of the universe in any meaningful way... yet many scientists of the seventeenth century wanted to accept some form of mechanism... What they wanted, in effect,
was a more Christian machine.‖ Thomas More, Isaac Newton, and others, were therefore responsible for making acceptable, within just two centuries, the notion of an infinite formless universe pervaded by infinite void space that was, in Newton’s terms: “...God’s ‘sensorium’ – the medium through which the deity exercised His all-seeing eye and His all-encompassing power.” This is the central pivot point for the notion of a transcendentalist power which can be re-located, re-attributed, and secularised, as occurred relatively quickly following Newton’s death. Wertheim writes:

“...while the divinization of space had been psychologically necessary to overcome initial resistance to infinity... a theological view of space was not in truth necessary to the new cosmology. ...in the eighteenth century... we witness the spectacle of less religiously inclined scientists stripping away the theological frills from his system. By the middle of that century the new cosmology had been almost totally secularized, and it is this essentially atheistic Newtonianism that has come to dominate the modern West. In the end, the anti-Cartesians were right: Mechanism leads almost inevitably to an atheistic world picture.”

Wertheim’s conclusion is that it is the ‘homogenisation’ of space – a scientific view which accommodates only one possible reality – which has finally reduced Western philosophical thought to appear as a singularity in which there is no ‘room’ for any kind of ‘spiritual space’. The consequence of this is the inevitable collapse of Heaven and Hell and the loss of any celestial ‘location’ for God: in Euclidian space, Heaven and Hell become ‘empty symbols’. As Wertheim writes: “...from the late seventeenth century on, the... physicalist vision has been invoked as a powerful epistemic scythe to hack off anything that could not be accommodated into the

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486 Italics added. Ibid., 146-147. Descartes, in the words of Thomas Berry, was the ‘master magician’ who plunged humanity into a darkness of disconnection with the natural, from which the edifices of modern civilisation emerged. Berry cites the division of the world into a collection of objects, rather than a communion of subjects, the separation of res extensa from res cognitans, as the foundational event which determines our contemporary relationship to the world around us. Thomas Berry, 'Into the Future,' in This Sacred Earth : Religion, Nature, Environment, ed. Roger S. Gottlieb (New York, 1996), 410.
487 Ibid., 150.
488 Ibid., 151.
489 Ibid., 152-153.
materialist conception of... reality [which] has come to be seen as the physical world alone.\textsuperscript{491}

Essential to this physicalist conception was the discovery of the ‘neurological body’, in which the conflation of mind-soul attributed to Descartes begins to merge with a replacement discourse which conflated mind and \textit{brain}. As Foucault notes, there was a \textit{double absence} of the body and the cure in psychiatric practice of the nineteenth century,\textsuperscript{492} which left ‘madness’ outside the field of ‘medical practice’ and located it in the realm of religion, or as a kind of physical phenomenology. Neurology represented the beginning of a process of \textit{localisation} of madness within the brain, which was vital for the abolishment of ‘superstitions’ and vague medical theories regarding madness. Foucault determines there to be a critical link between ‘madness’ and ‘dreaming’, drawing upon Moreau de Tours (1845), who postulated that sleep acts as a barrier between the internal and external life. Because the dreaming state can be empirically observed and reported upon, and as the content of dreams appear to conform with a pattern of ‘irrationality’ or an absence of logic, the dream was said to ‘envelop’ madness and enable its comprehension.\textsuperscript{493} Furthermore, between 1860 and 1880, a new definition of the body appears in which the notion of a body as ‘organs and tissues’ becomes a body with ‘functions, performances, and behaviours’\textsuperscript{494}. As Foucault notes:

\textsuperscript{491} Ibid., 153. Consider Weber also: “Every increase of rationalism in empirical science increasingly pushes religion from the rational into the irrational realm...” Weber, Gerth, and Mills, \textit{From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology}, 351. And commenting on Weber, Jenkins writes: “Weber is drawing our attention to the decline of magic... the presumption that... the world is embarked on a path at the end of which there will be no more mysteries. All things are taken to be potentially capable of explanation in terms that are acceptable to the rationality of science, and susceptible to intervention the outcomes of which are predictable. As a result, religious and magical understandings of the world become at best charming, at worst, ignorant and backward.” Jenkins, ‘Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment : Max Weber at the Millenium,’ 15.

\textsuperscript{492} Michel Foucault et al., \textit{Psychiatric Power: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1973-74} (Basingstoke, UK, 2006), 275.

\textsuperscript{493} “the mad are waking dreamers”, Esquirol, cited in ibid., 282. Further: “In other words, the founding point was not Descartes, who said that the dream goes beyond madness and includes it, but Moreau de Tours, who put the dream in a position such that it envelops madness, includes it, and enables it to be understood. And following Moreau de Tours, the psychiatrist says, and the psychoanalyst basically never stops repeating: I can well understand what madness is, because I can dream. With my dream, and with what I can grasp of my dream, I will end up understanding what is going on in someone who is mad. This is in Moreau de Tours and his book on hashish.” Ibid., 283.

\textsuperscript{494} Ibid., 288. “However, we must be clear here, because it is absolutely certain that, on the one hand, from the beginnings of the development of nineteenth century psychiatry, there was a search for organic correlations, the domain of lesion, the type of organ that might be involved in an illness like madness. There was the search for this, and in some cases it was found; in 1822-1826 it was Bayle’s definition of general paralysis, and meningeal lesions as after-effects of syphilis. This is true, and we
“All of these clinical differences of performance between different levels of behavior make possible the clinical analysis of the individual at the level of his intention... the will, in fact, on which and to which disciplinary power had to be applied... Neuropathology now provides the clinical instrument by which it is thought the individual can be captured at the level of this will itself... [the] patient can be circumvented and short-circuited... So, neurology is... a new apparatus which replaces questioning with injunctions, and... seeks to get responses, but responses which are not the subject’s verbal responses... [but] responses which can be clinically deciphered at the level of the body... Broadly speaking, the neurologist says: Obey my orders, but keep quiet, and your body will answer for you by giving responses that, because I am a doctor, I alone will be able to decipher and analyze in terms of truth.”

As Foucault is concerned with power and the disciplinary mechanisms by which the individual ‘will’ is controlled, the clinician, in his estimation, becomes elevated to a sovereign authority in matters of mind, which also involves elitist discourses that persist into the present day. State sovereign authorities then capitalise upon already existent networks and institutions which have elite leadership, or discourses, becoming ‘superstructural’ in relation to a whole series of already existing power arrangements involving the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so forth. ‘Truth’, in this constellation of relations, is produced by virtue of multiple forms of constraint.

Psychoanalysis, which represents the Freudian strand of thought allied with psychology, is also significant in the creation of the modern ‘mind’. Whilst Freud is preceded by Plato and Leibnitz with respect to the idea of an unconscious, his work hinged upon understanding behaviours which had eluded conventional psychologists. As Schultz notes, psychoanalysis developed as a type of revolt against those ‘somatic' (or organic, brain-based) explanations which dominated the mind can say that the body was no more absent from the psychiatric order than it was from standard medicine.” The significant shift occurred at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Michel Foucault et al., Psychiatric Power : Lectures at the Collège De France, 1973-74 (Basingstoke, 2006), 266.

Italics added. Ibid., 302-304.


Ibid., 131.
sciences throughout the nineteenth century.  

Freud’s work was characterised by its overwhelmingly introspective nature, as noted by Eli Zaretsky:

“In the modern West there have been two episodes of genuine, widespread introspection: Calvinism and Freudianism... Calvinism urged people to look inside themselves to determine whether they had been saved... Freudian introspection aimed to foster the individual’s capacity to live and authentically personal life... In both cases, finally, the turn towards self-examination generated a new language. In the case of Calvinism, the language centered on the Protestant idea of the soul, an idea that helped shared such later concepts as character, integrity, and autonomy. The new Freudian lexicon, by contrast, centered on the idea of the unconscious, the distinctive analytic contribution to twentieth-century personal life.”

Although the ‘individualisation’ and elevation of the elites via the artistic excesses of the Renaissance paved the way for the increased individualisation that followed the Reformation (culminating in the modern ‘self’), this self was still cosmologically situated. What Freud did, which was unique, was to merge the notion of the unconscious with the idea that it was personal, as opposed to the amorphous and cosmic unconscious already surmised by Gnosticism, medieval alchemy, and German Romanticism. The unconscious takes on the role and status of the soul. 

To borrow from Charles Taylor:

“The process of disenchantment is the disappearance of this world [of spirits, demons, and moral forces acknowledge by our predecessors], and the substitution of what we live today: a world in which the only locus of thoughts, feelings, spiritual élan is what we might call minds; the only minds in the cosmos are those of humans...; and minds are bounded, so that these thoughts, feelings, etc., are situated “within” them.”

The Freudian legacy (which as Zaretsky noted, links into Protestantism) was this concept of the distinctly personal: a combination of body-mind dualism and individualism which resulted in an individual self that was absolutely private.
Simultaneously, to recall Foucault, this same privacy is illusory by way of a medicalisation process which locates ‘truth’ within the observable body-brain.\(^{503}\) This ‘private’ mind is also subject to disciplinary mechanisms of authorisation, which determine what may, or may not be, expressed, and by whom. The mind, despite appearing as a value-free construct, must therefore be viewed also as a political object and discourse. As an example, following the scientific ‘establishment’ of an isomorphism between brain and mind, the two primary discourses which emerged were that of ‘hysteria’ and ‘madness’; both, often sexualised and determined as ‘deviant’. A plethora of discourses on ‘deviant’ behaviour subsequently emerged, many of them moral ascriptions, which were nonetheless accommodated by the new mind sciences.\(^{504}\)

Once the agency of the individual was superseded by the physical and mechanical epistemology pertinent to the body, and more specifically the mind-brain, all explanations could be located by the recourse to mind as 1) a priori existing, and 2) as first cause. The very concept of ‘mind’, therefore, contains within it a series of propositions which are internally agreed with just by acknowledging the existence of ‘mind’. This epistemological territory is shaped, as in all scientific inquiry, by facts and values which are combined to create the so-called ‘value-neutral’ sciences of the mind and a host of practices (such as diagnostic tools) which accompany it. However, in the attempt to correlate mental phenomena with brain states, any anomalies are not admitted as data, but remain excluded; thus, structuring the episteme that is attached to ‘mind’ in a very specific way. Sub-disciplines of ‘mind’

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\(^{503}\) Once behaviour had been categorised as a product of mind within the brain, the default to pharmacological mechanisms of control took less than a century to become entrenched. Deinstitutionalisation, which is the conclusive action which reifies the location of the mind (and thus, mental illness) as within the brain, started in the 1950s and continued throughout the 1960s. Psycho-pharmacology also developed quickly following World War II, and has subsequently become a normative control for mental behavior classified as anti-social, or involving an increased risk of self-harm, harm of others, or, more recently, personal psychic comfort. Psychoanalysis, though respected, eventually lost ‘respectability’ as a scientific method and was overshadowed by the dominance of somatic psychological medical practices which have since gained and retained this authority.

\(^{504}\) Whilst there is certainly a notion of being ‘of a deranged mind’ or ‘madness’ in antiquity, key to this discussion is the confluence of categories within the scientised model, so that religion or cultural epistemologies may at any time be shifted into the realm of deviance. All kinds of marginalisations and exclusions work together and can be conflated (including divergence from the temporal normative model e.g. working 9-5) – prostitution, drug use, rock stars, mad folk, sexual deviants, etc., all working ‘under the cover of night’ as opposed to ‘clean-living’ day-folk. The sexualisation of all kinds of deviance (as formulated by Freud, and interrogated by Foucault) should not be underestimated. For example: the criminal or rapist is probably a black, young, drug addict with no religion, who frequents bars, has no job, and sleeps late.
(such as parapsychology) exist to continue the attempt to deal with these anomalies, but are epistemologically blocked from attaining any results which could be deemed ‘successful’. The anomaly cannot be admitted because it ‘breaks faith’ with the ideologies of modernity, altering the trajectory of progress (optimally leading to secularisation) and disrupting the cumulative successes of ‘Western’ (scientific) thought.\(^5\) The knowledge filters in operation are still very much constructed out of a Judeo-Christian heritage, and data that fits into neither an acceptable chronology nor an empirically testable category becomes clustered under ‘belief’ and remains metaphysically uncertain.

The birth of the mind, therefore, could only occur at the expense of the reality of the soul, and, eventually, via the death of God: belief in whom was ultimately seen as the antithesis of a Reason which must be upheld.\(^6\) Marx’s writing is particularly characteristic of this kind of thinking, thus, to expand Marx via Voegelin:

“‘The critique of religion is the pre-supposition of all critique.’ God was never anything but a human product. The critique of religion yields this revelation and thereby restores man to the fullness of his nature... ‘The summons to abandon illusions about his condition is a summons to abandon a condition that requires illusions. The critique of religion is therefore in embryo the critique of the vale of tears of which religion is the halo. The struggle against religion is therefore indirectly a struggle against that world of which religion is the spiritual aroma.’ It is therefore the task of history, ‘once the world beyond truth has disappeared, to establish the truth of this world...’”\(^7\)

The issue of ‘truth’ and its association with the secular, and now scientific, logos appears self-evident in this citation. Yet despite appearing secular, the discourses

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\(^5\) The status of any data set as rational or irrational is often less to do with scientific judgment as it is to do with mediation of knowledges and power relations. The epistemological limits or borders of modernity are maintained against the influx of ‘orphans’ en masse. This general strategy is structured into the institutional arrangements themselves. Consider Chakrabarty (as paraphrased in Pouchepadass): “The overarching general language of science, which pretends to mediate between the infinite diversity of particular languages, effectively suppresses cultural differences which, by essence, are untranslatable... In other words, the problem of capitalistic modernity should not any longer be seen as a sociological problem of historical transition, but as a problem of translation as well.” Jacques Pouchepadass, ‘Review : Pluralizing Reason,’ History and Theory, vol. 41: 3 (2002), 384.

\(^6\) Reason and God thus became mutually exclusive, as the location of Reason, is of course, found within the mind itself.

\(^7\) Emphasis Voegelin’s. Marx cited in Voegelin and Henningsen, The Collected Works of Eric Voegelin: Modernity without Restraint, 284-286. See also Marx: “…the criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism.” From Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, 1844, in Neil J. Smelser, ed., Karl Marx on Society and Social Change (USA, 1973). 13. The argument could also be made (via the Frankfurt School) that theology is the criticism (and therefore, self-reflexivity) of religion.
attached to psychology *et. al.*, have *never* been detached from the Western ethical structures of a post-Christian modernity which upholds monogamy, is based on the Ten Commandments, and is imbued with particular notions of sin/evil (and the soteriologically-based mandates which are attached to these). Neither the loss of Heaven and Hell, nor the loss of the certainty of God, changed the categories by which behaviour was ordered and controlled. Mind as an *a priori first cause* can be thought of as having replaced God in the cosmological order; and the unconscious as the only possible realm of enchantment, though remaining dangerously close to madness. Thus, the post-Christian (secularised) human community is separated first from God, and then from each other, and finally, atomised and isolated within bodies and minds that remain utterly separate from each other. Nihilism, alienation, apathy, and fundamentalism(s) become understandable in the wake of such an epistemological break. Luhmann encapsulates this sense of apathy: “…calls for revolutionary action have become wholly archaic: ‘it is not possible to make revolution any more. There is no aim, no objective, no centre, or no top of the system which you could eliminate and then you would have a good society.’”

Yet the exorcism remains an ‘attempt’ because the recourse to mind is by no means universally accepted as a ‘truth’. How knowledge about ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ behaviour is constructed is entirely reliant on the type of *priorities* and *religious* (or *anti-religious*) inclinations that were inherent to the inquiries into ‘mind’ throughout this period of modern history. As there is no room, to recall Wertheim, for any legitimate ‘spiritual space’ in this atheistic conception of reality, what is excluded may be *tolerated*, but is nonetheless deemed (officially) not to ‘exist’. In the words of Panikkar: “Man… has spread the net of his intelligibility like DDT and killed all the intermediary beings he cannot master with his mind – the spirits, once his

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508 Italics added. Luhmanns view is ultimately in support of a ‘functionally differentiated’ society. He suggests it represents a ‘radical contrast’ to totalitarianism. To read him through Borch: “Whereas totalitarianism is characterised by centring society on one of few systems (either politics or religion), with all the associated misfortunes (e.g. lack of independence and functional specialisation), a functionally differentiated society accepts the independence of the systems and uses this feature… not only for purposes of specialisation, but also as a democratic resource.” Luhmann cited in Christian Borch, *Niklas Luhmann* (London; New York, 2011), 95. What is missing from Luhmann’s analysis is the recognition that it is precisely religion which characterises global society. In his attempt to create a cohesive theory for sociology, he has committed the error of ignoring the anomalies in order to keep the data ‘clean’ – thus, whilst his observation with regards differentiation is logical, it is perhaps idealist to set this opposite totalitarianism in the manner he presents it.
companions, are no longer credible, the Gods have flown, and a solitary and even more superfluous God fades away.”

Culturally, this poses a great difficulty for non-Western knowledge paradigms, which are often possessed of non-differentiated religio-medical practices. To follow William LaFleur, tracing the initial divide between medicine and religion as a point of pride among Christians:

“...trust in the use of modern medicine became an index to the difference between a civilization with ‘enlightened’ religion... and the rest of the world. A major difference in paradigms of the body and in healing modes became... [central] to what was seen as the uniqueness and superiority of Christianity. The connections between this view of religious difference, the empirical success of modern medicine, and Western colonizing moves were intimate.”

The uniqueness and superiority of this Western, Christian, Modern culture (to which a medical layer is now added) was simply transferred to the sovereign transcendental and secular state(s) and institutions in toto. As Talal Asad writes: “At the very moment of becoming secular, these claims were transcendentalized, and they set in motion legal and moral disciplines to protect themselves (with violence where necessary) as universal.”

All hospitals, governments, schools, universities, courtrooms, banks, shops, factories, unions, newsrooms, prisons, and so on which

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509 Panikkar and Eastham, The Cosmotheandric Experience: Emerging Religious Consciousness, 41. Consider Asad also, whose thoughts complement the historical trajectory of this argument well: “From early modern Europe – through what is retrospectively called the secular Enlightenment and into the long nineteenth century, within Christian Europe and its overseas possessions – things, words, and practices distinguished or set apart by “Nature Folk” [others] were constituted by Europeans as ‘fetish’ and ‘taboo’. What had been regarded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in theological terms as ‘idolatry’ and ‘devil-worship’ (devotion to false gods) became the secular concept of ‘superstition’ (a meaningless survival) in the framework of eighteenth and nineteenth-century evolutionary thought. But they remained objects and relations falsely given truth status, wrongly endowed with virtuous power. They had to be constituted as categories of illusion and oppression before people could be liberated from them, as Freud knew when he used ‘fetish’ and ‘taboo’ to identify symptoms of primitive repressions in the psychopathology of modern individuals.” Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 35.

510 Italics added. William R. LaFleur, ‘Body,’ in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (USA, 1998), 41. As LaFleur argues however, the same point of pride taken in the ‘modern miracles’ of science has been transformed into shame by the atrocities of the Third Reich, Hiroshima, Chernobyl, Thalidomide, and so forth. He writes: “The specter of man-made atrocities hovers closely.” Ibid., 43. Also consider Serres: “Science’s rise to power supposes such a level of recruitment that soon, all-powerful, it creates a vacuum around itself. Which is the reason for the sudden decline of all the surrounding areas of culture – the humanities, arts, religion, even the legal system. Science has all the power, all the knowledge, all the rationality, all the rights, too, of course, all the plausibility or legitimacy, admittedly – but at the same time all the problems and soon all the responsibilities.” Serres and Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 87.

511 Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, 36.
conform with, or are modelled upon, the Western epistemological structure, are instruments of this culture. Secular modernity is an entirely spectral construct. Modernity is Judeo-Christian, and secularity as an apparatus of modernity is Judeo-Christian, and any debates which appear as a binary between modernity and religion are constructed for what are usually political ends. As Gray writes: “Of all modern delusions, the idea that we live in a secular age is the furthest from reality.”

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512 Madan writes: “...once a cultural definition of a phenomenon or of a relationship (say, between religion and politics, or society and the state) has crystallized, it follows that subsequent formulations of it, whether endogenous or exogenous, can only be re-definitions. Traditions posit memory.” Madan, ‘Secularism in Its Place,’ 754.

513 Gray, Heresies, 41-42.
Part IV: Conclusions

The reliance of the epistemological structures of modernity on the ‘successful’ execution of these exorcisms is not to be underestimated, illusory though it may be. The proponents of modernity claim as ‘history’ the elimination of competing gods and spirits by the agents of Christianity, followed by the swift dethronement of the Christian God himself. These are the victories via which the authority of the episteme has secured power, and the sources from which the secular institutions, including liberal humanitarian democracies, derive confidence. What is at stake is the singularity of Truth: dependent, to cite Asad, upon “…the subjection of all practices to a unified authority, to a single authentic source which [can] tell truth from falsehood.” As with Christianity, the maintenance of authority within modernity relies upon a very particular leap of ‘faith’ – one that is coercive – a fourth and final ‘hidden’ exorcism, or illicit transfer, which reifies this claim of ‘success’ and establishes Foucault’s ‘threshold of epistemologization’ for modernity itself. This fourth exorcism occurs when the historical process is ‘black-boxed’, a term coined by Latour to describe the means by which discursive processes become sealed off and hidden, leaving only a ‘fact’ or ‘settled truth’ which is subsequently considered a priori; a transfer which converts a culturally and historically situated discourse, involving multiple truth claims and levels of inquiry, into fact (or ‘knowledge’). Consequently, the dogma of positivism is now shaping our ‘secular priesthood’, with its doctrinaire insistence that science has the explanation for all things, and an epistemological dominance which appears overwhelming. The energy and messianic thrust of modernity are generated through the ‘cold fusion’ of secularity and science which ‘fixes’ the limits of truth (to return to Arendt) through legitimacies derived from history, and justifications based on the ideal of ‘progress’. As May writes: “Science, Nietzsche had warned, is becoming a factory, and the result will be ethical nihilism.” So – in the words of Latour – where then, do we land?

514 Asad, ‘Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,’ 244.
515 Bruno Latour, Science in Action : How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (USA, 1987), 1-17.
517 As McLennan writes: “...why be worried about having a justificatory epistemology in the first place if one were not concerned to establish superior validity or objectivity?” McLennan, 'Feminism, Epistemology and Postmodernism: Reflections on Current Ambivalence,' 396.
519 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 128.
CONCLUSIONS 1: SECULAR MODERNITY

(Tertium non Datur)\(^{520}\)

“Did they get you to trade your heroes for ghosts?
Hot ashes for trees?
Hot air for a cold breeze?
Cold comfort for change?
And did you exchange your walk on part in the war
For a lead role in a cage?”

*Wish You Were Here*, Pink Floyd, 1975.\(^{521}\)

If modernity is *culture*, then what, precisely, does this entail? Any relativisation of said culture reveals, to borrow from Bruce Robbins, that it is not a universal, but ‘particular content’ which “…has been throwing its weight around under cover of positions either for or against… large abstractions.”\(^{522}\) The categories of ‘secularity’ (with its internalised Christianity), ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ (as clearinghouses for the ‘irrational remnants’ of history and conquest), and ‘relativism’ itself (which, in its usual contextual position, can neither command power nor muster influence against the dominant episteme), must all be considered ‘trojan horses’ which placate and conceal. None of the above are ‘unmarked terms’, but obscure the demand for rigorous adherence to one permissible kind of truth which blocks the very ‘freedom’ promised under the auspices of modernity.

This ‘truth’, in Homi Bhabha’s terms, is nonetheless “…informed by the ambivalence of the process of emergence itself, the productivity of meanings that construct counter-knowledges *in medias res*... within the terms of a negotiation... of oppositional and antagonistic elements.”\(^{523}\) The sequence of exorcisms as *failure*, therefore, bolsters the truth claims of a scientised and secularised modernity in a paradoxical, yet equivalent relation with, the claim of *success* which reifies them. The dialectical relationship between these two elements, though contrary to the epistemological structure they support, conforms to Arendt’s conception of the


\(^{521}\) Pink Floyd, *Wish You Were Here* (USA, Canada, Europe, 1975).


theology of the dialectic. She notes that both elements in any dialectical relationship are in a negotiation wherein even the negative (theologically, evil) becomes a force in service of ‘the good’: neither obedience to the invisible powers, nor disobedience (generally, revolution), will materialise an exit from the dialectic. The proposed exit is by way of an ‘epistemological break’ with the dialectical forces of modernity as sought by scholars such as Derrida, Serres, and others, who refer to a ‘third’ position. If the theological basis for the dialectic fails to be properly reconciled with then this ‘third’ possibility remains blocked, and the dialectical forces continue to transform what appears as ‘revolution’ into either ‘failure’, or ‘reform’. Post-colonial scholars and critical educators come up against this difficulty when proposing alternatives which eventually come to be seen as counter-dominational strategies. This difficulty is consistent with Schneider’s formulation of the contracts and warrants available within any epistemic register and the manner in which said strategies may fail to acquire power. As Strauss recognised, it thus becomes clear how the pursuit of freedom (in and of itself, and in terms of freedom from responsibility) can inevitably decline into nihilism.

Modernity has failed to provide meaning because sovereign power (now, driven by capitalistic gain) relies on an articulation of difference to maintain a universal ideal; thus, blocking the self-reflexivity necessary to recognise and admit a moral and cultural identity which has been a priori deemed to be a disempowered position. The ‘politics of location’ which emit from this denial are maintained through what are often violent and totalitarian means more as a matter of historically-inherited habit than of intention, especially when epistemological compliance in the ‘public sphere’ is entrenched through socialisation. What appears as the pursuit of ‘freedom’ in the Western imaginary terrain requires non-engagement with either reform or revolution. The position of the revolutionary, essentially disobedient, engages with the promise of the dialectic by default; whereas the position of acquiescence or obedience (if only via fear) is fundamentally non-engagement, which recalls Schmitt’s warning against any ‘neutralisation’ or a continuing pursuit of a ‘safe

524 Arendt, On Violence, 56.
haven’ on earth, that which he considered as modernity’s ‘continuing quest’.
Invisibility and neutrality ‘protect’ the freedoms granted by the sovereign powers of
modernity, whilst capitalism redirects piety toward perpetual acquisition as the new
‘ultimate concern’, reflected in the wide-spread fetishisation of objects, often
virtual or technological. As Gray observes, technology also enables the affluent
majority to live in the virtual world created by mass media: “New media
technologies enable us to blank out the environments in which we live. Plugged into
our Walkman, we can forget the squalor by which we are actually surrounded… in
the virtual world conjured up by interactive television we are all only a moment
away from wealth and freedom…”

Obedience (and the protection of liberty and justice it promises) is also contingent
upon trust in the ability of the authorising mechanisms of modernity in firstly,
securing dependable knowledge and secondly, the characterisation of said
knowledge as a collective good. In Steven Shapin’s terms: “That means that the
relations in which we have and hold our knowledge have a moral character…”
These authorising mechanisms descend directly from the medieval edict, following
Asad, “...that only a single Church could become the source of authenticating
discourse.” This formal authority, which establishes the foundations for Truth
within modernity, governed the boundary between the ‘religious’, the ‘heretical’, and
the ‘secular’ in precisely the same manner as is found in the present day. Drawing

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525 As cited earlier, though a refrain seems appropriate: “Schmitt views the history of modernity as
driven by a continuing quest for a neutral and safe haven on earth in denial of the necessity to take a
side between good and evil... His entire work can be understood as taking sides against all attempt to
‘neutralize’ the truth...” Schmidt, ‘The Problem of Carl Schmitt’s Political Theology,’ 221.
526 Paul Tillich and Robert C. Kimball, *Theology of Culture* (New York,, 1959), 8. For the argument on
piety, which updates both Marx and Weber on the relations between religion and capitalism, see
Goodchild, *Capitalism and Religion : The Price of Piety*.
527 In addition, as Barber argues, capitalist consumerist culture increasingly infantilises adults into a
fear response where egoism is privileged over altruism, rights over responsibilities, ignorance over
knowledge, and impulse over everything else. The suspension of the requirement to deal conclusively
with challenging experiences or process new information means that the prospect of forgoing
pleasure for pain in the service of any ‘higher ideal’ often becomes incomprehensible. Benjamin
Barber, *Consumed : How Markets Corrupt Children, Infantilize Adults, and Swallow Citizens Whole*
(New York, 2007), 83, 88. Berger comments also that the surrender of the self to the ordering power
of society (the transcendence of individuality) is both commonplace, and entirely irrational. Berger,
529 Steven Shapin, *A Social History of Truth : Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England*
(USA, 1994), xxv.
530 Italics added. Ibid., xxv.
531 Asad, ‘Anthropological Conceptions of Religion: Reflections on Geertz,’ 244.
upon Foucault’s notion of ‘repeatable materiality’, or the process by which statements, thresholds, and limits from one institution can be transferred into the discursive apparati (or episteme) of another,\(^{532}\) it is instructive to thoroughly consider Asad’s historical account of heresy whilst reflecting upon its transposition into modernity.

Asad writes: “[heresy] constitutes... a dangerous departure from objective Truth. For heresy is the stubborn denial that the practices which guarantee universal Truth do in fact do so... What is immediately at stake... is the authority to judge the Truth, and...the disciplines... by which that authority is secured.”\(^{533}\) Furthermore, and recalling the specifically Christian context in which these powers were constituted:

“Every time a Christian suspect is tried by the inquisitorial process, and sentenced, or cleared... the authority of the Church is affirmed. Every time heretical beliefs and practices are defined or identified as error, the single Truth is maintained. Every time the Church establishes a new rule, elaborates an existing doctrine or allocates a fresh responsibility, the forms and consequences of transgression are multiplied. Every time a transgression is properly dealt with, a danger is successfully overcome and the authority of the Church confirmed.”\(^{534}\)

Heresy, in a ‘churched’ context, only became an issue when a religion of ‘instability’ was created, roughly coinciding with the Reformation, and began to overtake the stable monastic religion;\(^{535}\) thus, heresy was recognised as a danger precisely because it threatened whatever stability remained for an increasingly fractured church.\(^{536}\) Heresy is also explicitly verbal, not just based in praxis, and is an act of will – which not only evokes Foucault’s conception of the requirement for the subjugation of the will by the authorising discourses of psychiatry, but vastly extends its applicability cross-nationally and cross-culturally, via the dissemination of institutional and ideological influences. To cite Asad again, but re-reading in reference to modernity:

“The heretic’s attachment to error is... a wilful act, dangerous to his or her own soul and the souls of other Christians [Moderns]... A heretic [The

\(^{532}\) Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 102-103.

\(^{533}\) Talal Asad, ‘Medieval Heresy : An Anthropological View,’ *Social History*, vol. 11: 3 (1986), 355.

\(^{534}\) Ibid., 357.

\(^{535}\) Ibid., 356.

\(^{536}\) Supplement the word ‘church’, which denotes a congregation, circle, assembly, body of select counselors, or a group conceived of in relation to – ‘what’, is unspecified, though in the Judaic sense, signifying God – (Oxford English Dictionary Online, retrieved 30 June 2011) the ‘fractured’ group or community which ‘ought to be’, yet is not, ‘the West’.
Other], properly speaking, is someone who wilfully chooses to resist the virtuous will of the guardians of Truth... So a battle of wills is an essential feature of heresy: an objective relationship, nor a subjective experience. It is not by destroying the heretic [Other] that the Church [Modern] can win this battle, but only if it can first overcome his or her will by using whatever means are available. Yet undermining the heretic’s [Other’s] will to resist is merely a necessary pre-condition of victory, not the victory itself. The danger of heresy to the Christian soul [Modern spirit] is truly removed only when the heretic [Other] makes the Church’s [Modern] will his or her own as the will of Truth. There must be, in other words, a willing acceptance of the Church’s [Modern’s] authority.”

This citational ‘experiment’ ought to have made the parallels with modernity quite obvious: the more dissention, the greater the perceived need for violent control or subjugation of the will by the sovereign powers, whilst simultaneously preserving the illusion that said subjugation has a compassionately motivated soteriological agenda. It is not only obedience, but consensual submission which is the demand underlying the empowerment of the Truth claims central to the epistemological authority of modernity’s agents.538 Gramsci, writing on the subaltern relation to hegemony, coined the term ‘contradictory consciousness’ to account for this submissive posture, a term which cannot be restricted to subaltern or marginalised groups but must also extend to the ‘Western’ indigenes. In Gramsci’s words:

“The active man-in-the-mass has a practical activity, but has no clear theoretical consciousness of his practical activity, which nonetheless involves understanding the world in so far as it transforms it. His theoretical consciousness can indeed be historically in opposition to his activity. One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or one contradictory consciousness): one which is implicit in his activity and which in reality unites him with all his fellow workers in the practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially explicit or verbal,

537 Amendments mine. “It is worth noting that institutionalized techniques for securing this aim are foreign to Islamic history.” Asad, ‘Medieval Heresy : An Anthropological View,’ 356.
538 Grundmann (1968) as cited by Asad, “...has pointed out that the concepts ‘heresy’ and ‘heretic’ are essentially negative, that they are constituted by the mere contrast with and contradiction to the Faith of the Church, to its dogma and cult, to the morals of its clergy or to the attitude of its hierarchy. The only thing all heretics had in common, he observes, was their conviction that they understood and practiced Christianity better than the Church which condemned them.” Italics added. Ibid., 355. Consider then, how this arrogance has been transferred into the ‘heretical’ categorisations inherent to, and projected from, and onto, the project of modernity. A central claim of modernity, though obscured, is that ‘secular’ modernity practices a Christianity-inspired absence of Christianity better than self-defining members of the ‘Christian’ religion: a claim upon which secular liberal humanitarianism is founded, and through which mechanisms the religious ‘other’ (for whom modernity itself is the ‘heresy’) is subjugated.
which he has inherited from the past and uncritically absorbed. But this verbal conception is not without consequences. It holds together a specific social group, it influences moral conduct and the direction of will, with varying efficacy but often powerfully enough to produce a situation in which the contradictory state of consciousness does not permit of any action, any decision or any choice, and produces a condition of moral and political passivity.”  

Implicit to the success of the episteme is not only trust in its authorising agencies, but belief as a pre-condition for knowledge, which again, complies to the Christian orientation, in that what is believed, is believed ‘because it is true’. Negotiations around ‘truth’ which result only in the edict that ‘it has no single expression’ result in what looks to be a pluralistic and relative worldview but is, in fact, the replacement of plural truths with the single ‘no truth’ made possible by the dialectic; the expression and distribution of which becomes the Truth. The idea that ‘different people live in different worlds’ can only occur from within a cultural context that can accommodate alternative positions, but the a priori exclusionary tactics of rationality, which eliminates all truths outside the evaluatory capacities of the scientific method, create a closed methodological system that cannot admit ‘different worlds’ on any basis other than that which affords them a ‘reduced truth’. Dialogic methods, which are promoted as a ‘process of constructive conversation that works to grasp truly alternative points of view’, with the aim of ‘genuine intellectual progress’, cannot grasp any point of view without submitting it to a reduction which forces either the socio-political or aesthetic integration of the religious ‘remainder’, or its abandonment.

This silent referent takes a familiar ouroboric form: the Enlightened and scientific worldview is absolute, a substitution of ‘false’ explanation with ‘true’ explanation, which is ‘true’ because it is a rational product of Reason, as opposed to irrational, which the domain of the ‘cultural’ and ‘religious’. By definition then, neither of these designators can be applied to modernity. Clearly, this creates a loop, an authorising

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539 Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci, 641.
mechanism which explains itself by reference to itself, or what psychology calls a homunculus problem,\textsuperscript{541} which can be illustrated by the academic organisation of knowledge. The two claims of the ‘rationalisation’ thesis, as elaborated in Helen Longino’s treatment of the sociology of knowledge, hold that rational or true beliefs are explained by the fact that they are true or rational, and that irrational (or false) beliefs call for a sociological or causal explanation.\textsuperscript{542} As all social scientific explanations are also rational, all explanations must be rational.

Jonathan Z. Smith’s claim that ‘religion has no data’,\textsuperscript{543} Bellah’s ‘empty sign’,\textsuperscript{544} and Wernick’s ‘black hole where meaning used to be’\textsuperscript{545} are the progeny of this homunculus (or perhaps the outcome of the war initiated with it); the virus in the academy which seeks and destroys all residual ‘ghosts in the machine’.\textsuperscript{546} As de Vries argues, scholars have simply flipped the theological doxa of privileged truth to its epistemic opposite, asserting falsity or unverifiability instead.\textsuperscript{547} This is not to suggest that any of the abovementioned claims do not have any heuristic value, but to highlight the incommensurability of rationality with the claim that modernity is either cultural or religious. The Gods are not invited to the academic feast. As Shiva writes: “…the Age of Enlightenment, and the theory of progress to which it gave rise, was centred on the sacredness of two categories: modern scientific knowledge and economic development.”\textsuperscript{548} Furthermore, as argued by Shiv Visvanathan: “The violence of modernity arises not merely from the violence of the state, but from the violence of science seeking to impose its order on society... it is the grammar of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{541} Crapanzano, Imaginative Horizons : An Essay in Literary-Philosophical Anthropology, 151.
\bibitem{542} Helen E. Longino, The Fate of Knowledge (USA, 2002), 16.
\bibitem{546} Like the early Christian Churches, the study of religion, having been liberated (yet, not entirely set adrift) from theology, has absorbed the irrereligious and pagan doctrines of science for fear of persecution, and to prevent loss of territory, and thus, their ultimate disappearance. The heightened stakes for those who seek to study religion in the wake of Enlightenment means that attempts to systematically annihilate it finds scholars positioned between two incommensurable poles: rationality, and the continued existence of religious belief. One must have an object to study, but yet, said study must be undertaken with acknowledgement of the dominant modus operandi of Academia.
\end{thebibliography}
science that provides for the everyday fascism of modernity-as-technocracy... The increasing accumulation of science is seen as a sign of ‘grace’. The legitimating boundaries engineered via the application of Reason control what counts for knowledge and determine what kinds of knowledge remain forbidden, approving only the scientific and rational kinds of curiosity that are certain to generate (and propel) increasingly scientific knowledge and economic gain. Scholarship and ‘modern society’ are founded on this axiom.

To consider modernity as a ‘culture’ and to query the claim for ‘secularity’ – which by default, makes modernity ‘religious’ – is therefore immediately heretical. Yet, as signalled earlier, there remains a significant ‘ghost in the machine’. The ‘spectral’ secularity of the modern, which hinges on a metaphysics of presence and absence, is central to understanding the successful maintenance of its epistemological structure. According to Stefanos Geroulanos, Foucault confirms that “…modernity is marked not only by the lack of a distinct process of secularization but also by the survival and persistence of idealist and theologically laden motifs, according to which man comes to know and understand himself.” The status and position of humanity is characterised by a theoscopy: the ‘eyes of an absent God’; yet concurrently, the epistemological unavailability of the Gods-eye view. Following Nietzsche, and reading through both Foucault and Guy Debord, Geroulanos writes that the operations of technology are deliberately distinct from any theological content that would tie them to the affirmation of God, but this is precisely what institutes God as
the unfailing observer.\textsuperscript{554} It is only in his death “...that the formalization, dehistoricization, and discharging of all religious content in the divine can be emphasized, that a dechristianized Christian God can be reconstructed in order to fill in the divine.... to affirm a divine presence in its conceptual and empirical impossibility.”\textsuperscript{555} Where the influence of this God is most present is in precisely those areas of modern life defined quite literally by his absence: that is, in the public ‘secular’ institutions.

These modern institutions operate as if secularity had ‘hardened and cooled’ to become an immovable ‘fact’ of modern existence – which is actually against the spirit of modernity as it was originally conceived.\textsuperscript{556} Bauman puts this well:

“We was not modernity a process of ‘liquefaction’ from the start? Was not ‘melting the solids’ its major pastime and prime accomplishment all along? In other words, has modernity not been ‘fluid’ since its inception? ...once we recall that the famous phrase ‘melting the solids’, when coined a century and a half ago by the authors of \textit{The Communist Manifesto}, referred to the treatment which the self-confident and exuberant modern spirit awarded the society it found much too stagnant its taste and much too resistant to shift and mould for its ambitions – since it was frozen in its habitual ways... [the spirit] therefore called for the smashing of the protective armour forged of the beliefs and loyalties which allowed the solids to resist the ‘liquefaction’.”\textsuperscript{557}

This requirement for a ‘hardened’ secularity is linked to the necessity for ‘epistemological closure’ as demanded by the rationalisation thesis, against the ‘impossibility’ declared by the Foucauldian maxim that knowledge can never been ‘closed’ but occurs in an indefinite field of relations.\textsuperscript{558} The rigour with which this secularity is claimed is directly relevant to the failure of modernity to admit alternative epistemologies. It is precisely because the episteme acts as culture – as underpinned by a theology that is concealed by the hard secularity as administered via the institutions – that alternative epistemes fail to ‘translate’. In addition, there is

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{554} Ibid., 651.
\item \textsuperscript{555} Ibid., 651.
\item \textsuperscript{556} Which is the institutional rejection of the variety intended by the spirit of modernity in favour of a fixed interpretation that deliberately attempts to eradicate challenges to tenets like ‘progress’ and ‘secularity’, which have in themselves become dogma.
\item \textsuperscript{557} Bauman, \textit{Liquid Modernity}, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{558} Foucault, \textit{The Archaeology of Knowledge}, 191.
\end{itemize}
possibly no conceptual apparatus available for translating the alternatives in such a way that can be comprehended by the dominant and largely scientific paradigm. As Kuhn is famous for arguing, the only way out of this bind appears to be revolution; and, to wit, the only way to achieve revolution is to disrupt the paradigm by recognising that 'belief' drives 'science' just as powerfully as religion.

Any alternative worldview that is not doxastically permitted by an individual’s belief system is an impossibility, which emphasises the urgency with which the chief mediological instruments *par excellence*, the educational institutions, should be examined. The ‘closure’ of knowledge within these institutions contains the subject of ‘cultural difference’ and *forecloses* on it, by which it is meant that the enculturation process initiated through the pedagogical exercise generates a very particular human, discursive, and epistemological *product*. Freire calls this the ‘banking’ system of education, in which “…the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits… knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those whom they consider to know nothing.” Though the libertarian models for education may profess more equality, the ‘banking’ system constructs the acquisition and expansion of knowledge as if it were an open-ended possibility, but paradoxically, within a closed system of epistemological certitude. Clarence Joldersma, reading Freire, notes that it is “through this model… students are… implicitly indoctrinated to believe that all the activity, power, authority, and expertise to develop knowledge is held by the teacher and the expert…” This model co-opts students into a system that treats them as passive objects rather than active humans, thus, creating a dehumanising epistemological passivity. Simone de Beauvoir, rephrased here by Freire in
connection with his argument for educational oppression, echoes the earlier points made with regard to the coercion of the will: “Indeed, the interests of the oppressors lie in ‘changing the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them’... for the more the oppressed can be led to adapt to that situation, the more easily they can be dominated.”

Implicit to this model is not only the theological breach between humanity and the world (where the human is merely in the world and not in relation with it), but also, the assumption (from psychology) that the human is not a ‘conscious creator’, but rather, the ‘possessor of a consciousness’; existing from the outset as an ‘empty vessel’ to be socialised and educated according to cultural norms. What follows logically from this is the formalisation of an educational system that can ‘mediate’ the way the world ‘enters into’ the students. In Freire’s words:

“The educated man is the adapted man, because he is more ‘fit’ for the world. Translated into practice, the concept is well suited to the purposes of the oppressors, whose tranquility rests on how well men fit the world the oppressors have created, and how little they question it... The theory and practice of banking education serve this end quite efficiently.”

Whilst Freire writes somewhat problematically of ‘the oppressors’ as if there is some agential force that can be named and identified within modernity, his central ideas are nonetheless pertinent. Furthermore, an understanding of how the mechanisms of sovereign authority work; knowledge of what is permissible, ‘possible’, and specifically forbidden; and the will to participate in a manner which is compliant with the dominant epistemological structures of modernity, are all prefigured in the moral incubator known as the ‘family unit’, and concretely established through education. Explanations for social ‘deviance’ generally fall back upon a perceived failure by the family, or alternatively, it is framed as an inability of the education system to ‘even out’ pre-existing difficulties which are seen to originate with the moral failure of the

564 Simone de Beauvoir, ‘La Pensee de Droite Aujourd’hui’ in Priviléges, 1955, as cited in Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 47.
565 Inspired in part from the ideas found in Freire. Ibid., 49.
566 Ibid., 49.
567 Ibid., 50. Consider Chakrabarty: “How do we think the political at these moments when the peasant or subaltern emerges in the modern sphere of politics, in his or her own right, as a member of the nationalist movement against British rule or as a full-fledged member of the body politic, without have had to do any ‘preparatory’ work in order to qualify as the ‘bourgeois-citizen’?” Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference, 10-11.
family. Cultural, religious, political, racial, or moral differences (when problematised in this manner) are therefore inscribed retrospectively at the level of family, or personal, influence and liability. In many popular modern discourses, the secular institution and its representatives are not culpable.

The university simply extends this, as David Lloyd argues, “…by shaping its curricula around an assumption of Western cultural centrality.” The priorities and procedures of the universities are modelled on a European system that promotes a mono-ethnic and universalistic culture which is assumed to supersede local or ethnic values and knowledges. The ‘disciplinary structure’ is also a reproduction of the model of ‘spheres’ by the division into ‘faculties’, such as the technological, economic, political and cultural. The result is a structure that closely resembles the nation-state, conforming, to follow Lloyd:

“…in all respects to the West’s notions of modernity, academic objectivity, relevance, and hierarchy of bodies of knowledge. In this sense, the terms ‘Western,’ ‘European,’ and ‘white’ all designate... not merely another ethnicity... but a principle fundamentally antagonistic to the social

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569 Ibid., 20.
570 The history of the word ‘discipline’ comes from the Latin disciplina, meaning the instruction of disciples, and referred to an educational context and specifically to teaching doctrina, or doctrine. Disciplinarity was originally restricted to education, the teaching of an established body of knowledge and its transmission, but did not apply to research, experiments, or any other form of empirical exploration and validation. Johan Heilbron, ‘A Regime of Disciplines : Toward a Historical Sociology of Disciplinary Knowledge,’ in The Dialogical Turn: New Roles for Sociology in the Postdisciplinary Age, ed. Charles Camic and Hans Joas (USA, 2004), 26. The relation between the word ‘discipline’ as used in a university context and the notion that ‘all aspects of life ought to be disciplined’ can be linked to the Protestant Reformation, especially its Calvinist version. Benavides, ‘Modernity,’ 199.
571 Lloyd, ‘Foundations of Diversity : Thinking the University in a Time of Multiculturalism,’ 20. Consider Monroe: “…any discipline’s explicitly articulated terms of value, its sense of what counts and what doesn’t, deeply shapes that disciplines self understandings and writing practices and the forms of knowledge such practices inscribe and disclose.” Jonathan Monroe, ‘Introduction: The Shapes of Fields,’ in Writing and Revising the Disciplines, ed. Jonathan Monroe (USA, 2002), 10. Disciplines define what it is permissible to know, legitimate and limit the number of books one must have read, provide a specific tradition and lineage, and bind knowledge by the employment of a common set of research practices which unify their members. Andrew Delano Abbott, Chaos of Disciplines (USA, 2001), 130. Furthermore: “Disciplines themselves amount to a containment strategy designed to prevent conflict and promote the uncritical acceptance of the institution. That is to say, disciplinarity is the regulatory mechanism which assures the continued success of the institution itself.” Diane Elam, commenting upon Samuel Weber, as cited in Helen C. Chapman, ‘Becoming Academics, Challenging the Disciplinarians,’ in Breaking the Disciplines : Reconceptions in Knowledge, Art and Culture, ed. Martin L. Davies and Marsha Meskimmon (London, 2003), 40.
formations it has designated differentially as ‘ethnic’… actively and continually [producing] irreconcilable categories.”

The university, and the ‘experts’ produced therein, simultaneously represent the ultimate expression and embodiment of ‘closure’, and, the possibility for preventing this closure throughout the entire constellation of modern secular institutions. For Lloyd, the rationale for the initial formalised autonomy of the university – to secure a space for freedom on inquiry within autocratic states and to permit critical thought outside the limits of dogma and religion – is precisely the opening which has come to possess a crucial (if not covert) political significance; specifically illustrated by the university’s role in ‘forming citizens’. Unfortunately, this same possibility is undermined by the increasing corporatisation of the universities. Academic freedom is not the same as ‘freedom of expression’. To cite Lloyd again:

“An autonomy whose initial function was to preserve critical thinking against one state form has now become the alibi of subordination to another state form, and critical thinking an observation of disciplines. Objectivity becomes

573 Ibid., 26-27.
574 “Knowledge’, as produced within the universities, has come to be thought of as a ‘success term’ that affords status to the beliefs, claims, theories, and so forth, which satisfy certain conditions. Gilbert Ryle, as paraphrased in Longino, The Fate of Knowledge, 10. Knowledge also becomes somewhat reified through the economic relationship a scholar has with the university, and its various publishing divisions, which are responsible for the manufacture and distribution of ‘serious’ books and journals. Increasingly, acceptance of papers and manuscripts must meet certain criteria to be considered academic as opposed to commercial, and thus justify the lower revenue generated by the production and sale of scholarly works. For an in-depth analysis of this problem see T. David Brent, ‘Merchants in the Temple of Scholarship: American University Press Publishing at Century’s End,’ in Critical Anthropology Now: Unexpected Contexts, Shifting Constituencies, Changing Agendas, ed. George E. Marcus (USA, 1999), 361-386. The importance of the peer review process to publishing also provides a type of guarantee that the articulated terms of value distinct to a discipline will remain constant, and as the quickest method of extinction in scholarship occurs through an individual’s inability to publish, the networks of power that control publishing become integral to the question of what counts as knowledge. As Latour writes: “No matter what a paper did to the former literature, if no one else does anything with it, then it is as if it never existed at all. You may have written a fierce paper that settles a controversy once and for all, but if readers ignore it [it] cannot be turned into a fact… Fact construction is so much a collective process that an isolated person builds only dreams, claims and feelings, not facts.” Latour, Science in Action : How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society, 40-41. As Menard writes, making explicit the links to capitalism: “...by being free to regulate itself, the profession is free to reject what does not intellectually suit it and essentially to compel, by withholding professional rewards... the work that it does.” Cited in D. G. Hart, The University Gets Religion: Religious Studies in American Higher Education (USA, 1999), 248.

575 “The former does not give license (though it has) to any point of view, no matter how reasonable or noble its pedigree. Instead, academic freedom is designed to protect the university from external restraints, especially those of politics and religion, and thereby establish its own professional standards.” Louis Menard, as paraphrased in Hart, The University Gets Religion: Religious Studies in American Higher Education, 248.
the code word for a positivistic acceptance of the status quo and the recirculation of unquestioned and immobilized objects of knowledge.”

In addition, the dominant curricula, in theorizing the individual as ‘free’ yet simultaneously subject to the ‘authority’ of a higher power (whether a text or tradition), responds to an ideology which privileges the autonomy and liberty of the subject along with the legitimising agencies to which the subject must be obedient. As Rousseau famously claimed: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” This contradiction leads to a ‘transcendental’ solution which privileges theory and the elevation of the expert intellectual; the response to which is the urgent call to re-ground theory in the pursuit of acquiring an effective politics. “This demands,” to follow Bhabha, “that we rethink our perspective on the identity of culture.”

An alternative to the present status quo is to relativise the secular institutions of modernity via the incorporation (in Debray’s sense) of the self-reflexivity demanded by Adorno and Horkheimer. If a bridge between different knowledge spaces is to be created, it must be approached from multiple directions simultaneously; taking into account the epistemological contradictions and finding ways of synthesising what might ultimately become a socially valuable conversation. What must be entertained is the possibility of ‘talking from two directions’, for as Serres writes: “Who can’t give a thousand examples of material that was not a part of the sciences a little while ago and that suddenly became included in them?” Furthermore, if the Enlightenment (recalling Gray) has become integral to how we think, then it is pertinent to recall that to become ‘enlightened’ relies on two or more sources of

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576 Lloyd, ‘Foundations of Diversity : Thinking the University in a Time of Multiculturalism,’ 27.
577 Morton and Zavarzadeh, Theory/Pedagogy/Politics : Texts for Change, 3.
579 Morton and Zavarzadeh, Theory/Pedagogy/Politics : Texts for Change, 3.
580 Bhabha, ‘The Commitment to Theory,’ 19.
581 The idea forwarded by Miller is that: “A university of respect rather than of knowledge, one based on disensus rather than the search for consensus, would certainly be a transformation of the traditional university based on the search for a universalized truth... Nostalgia for the old... or even the hope [for] ...a new unified multicultural university to replace the monocultural one will not be effective... The responsibility of those who teach and do research in the new university... is to see as clearly as possible where we are... and figure out how to make use of what is left. This remnant must be the instrument of our transformative praxis.” J. Hillis Miller, ‘Liberty and Cultural Studies in the Transnational University,’ in “Culture” and the Problem of the Disciplines, ed. John Carlos Rowe (New York, 1998), 64.
582 Serres and Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 129.
light, or it is simply a ‘position’. Serres calls the new scholar who is capable of integrating these two sources of light the ‘Troubadour of Knowledge’, the hybrid offspring of the scientist and the humanist who finds ‘as much rigor in a myth or work of literature as in a theorem or experiment’, and simultaneously, myth in these also.

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583 Ibid., 178.
584 Ibid., 183. As Latour writes: “…we cannot retain the illusion[s]... that moderns have about themselves and want to generalize [and distribute] to everyone: atheist, materialist, spiritualist, theist, rational, effective, objective, universal, critical, radically different from other communities, cut off from a past that is maintained in a state of artificial survival due only to historicism, separated from a nature on which subjects or society would arbitrarily impose categories, denouncers always at war with themselves, prisoners of an absolute dichotomy between things and signs, facts and values.” Latour, *We Have Never Been Modern*, 133.
CONCLUSIONS 2: MEDIATING THE THIRD
(Tertium Quid)\textsuperscript{585}

“Enchantment conjures up, and is rooted in, understandings and experiences of the world in which there is more to life than the material, the visible or the explainable; in which the philosophies and principles of Reason or rationality cannot by definition dream of the totality of life; in which the quotidian norms and routines of linear time and space are only part of the story; and in which the collective sum of sociability and belonging is elusively greater than its individual parts.”

\textit{Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment},
Richard Jenkins, 2000.\textsuperscript{586}

As Eco suggests: ‘we are the primitives of an as-yet unknown civilisation’.\textsuperscript{587} That our insistence, for a few hundred years, on the epistemological dominance of modernity may yet become a ‘quaint relic’ of an out-dated and primitive way of thinking is both a peculiar and hopeful thought. If the project of science has been de-animation, the new challenge is re-animation. How, then – to borrow from Dipesh Chakrabarty – do we claim the right to re-enchant a world that has been disenchanted by the nihilism of modernity?\textsuperscript{588} If the solution is pedagogical, as scholars like Serres argue, then what does this necessitate? How can scholarship be navigated, but also, grounded in a politically relevant and socially applicable manner which can go beyond secularity, in order to leave behind perpetual deference to the maxim that religion is the ‘primitive’ error of the ‘primitive’ remnants of incomplete modernisation – the ‘cultural’? As this question follows on from the deconstruction of the epistemological structure, and subsequent relativisation of modernity, potential answers can only be signalled herein, taking the premises tentatively established as its precondition of possibility. It would be a failure of theory (if theory is defined as the attempt to respond to a problem) to neglect the articulation of some of these possibilities.

Considering culture and religion seriously means, ultimately, to consider all that the scientific discourses eliminate, and to be open to existing tensions and


\textsuperscript{586} Jenkins, ‘Disenchantment, Enchantment and Re-Enchantment : Max Weber at the Millenium,’ 29.

\textsuperscript{587} I carry this quote in my head, perhaps paraphrased. Exact source, alas, unknown.

\textsuperscript{588} As compiled from multiple sources in the original text: Chakrabarty, \textit{Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference}. Paraphrased in Pouchepadass, ‘Review : Pluralizing Reason,’ 385.
contradictions. This is not to suggest that there is no empirical value in scientific models of observation and explanation, but to situate them in their proper context as post-theo-scientific – that is, after theology. This leads directly into the issues that arise from the dominance of the social scientific reductionist methods that are generally employed to render objects of study, as designated by these terms: counter-balanced by hermeneutic, symbolic, and phenomenological methodologies.

Scientific reductionism can be illustrated best by the discourse on spirits. There are no spirits, there never were spirits, and there never can be spirits, so any claim for said spirit ‘phenomena’ is categorised as the irrational behaviour of individuals who falsely, if rationally, yet, contextually, believe in forces beyond that which science suggests as a reality. Social, psychological, and political explanations (such as those found in Marx, Freud, Weber, etc.,) conform to this scientific approach, with some alternation of emphases on the type and nature of explanation, in accordance with the social climate of a particular time period and location.

A hermeneutic or symbolic approach to this same problem is an analysis enacted from a critical distance, maintaining relativism, and therefore makes no value judgments or truth claims. This approach results in a narrative account which is generally literary, ethnographic, or comparative. “The hermeneutic tradition,” as Chakrabarty writes, “‘produces a loving grasp of detail in search of an understanding of the diversity of human life-worlds’... But it imposes no ‘third term of equivalence’ supposed to ‘successfully mediate between differences’...” Proponents of the hermeneutic approach refuse to enter the dialectic, or to go beyond it, and it

590 Many examples of the reductions extended to possession phenomenon are possible, but as just one example consider the work of Michael Lambek, who has studied possession in Mayotte. He states boldly that attempts to deal with possession must consider it to be within the realm of the imaginative, preferring to follow Evans-Pritchard in avoiding propositional assertions (“spirits exist”) in favour of various kinds of attitudes or degrees of focus. At no point does he consider alternative medical or epistemological frameworks for moving the discussion beyond what he has clearly decided to be ‘imaginative’ and related to ‘belief’ (religion). Michael Lambek, ‘Afterword: Spirits and Their Histories,’ in Spirits in Culture, History, and Mind, ed. Jeannette Marie Mageo and Alan Howard (New York, 1996), 242, 247.
592 As compiled from multiple sources in the original text [Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference.] and paraphrased in Pouchepadass, ‘Review : Pluralizing Reason,’ 386.
therefore fails to be grounded in any manner which makes the interrogation of alternative epistemological claims possible. Furthermore, the claim of such scholars that it is not their ‘place’ to investigate epistemological claims is only valid if they are aware of their own epistemological positionality, and can stand apart from this, which, at this time, appears structurally impossible given the nature of the academic idiom and its formalised reductions.

The phenomenological (or transcendental) approach, in which religious and cultural phenomenon appear *sui generis* – neither reducible, nor contingent upon other empirical causes – protects the object of study absolutely, but also renders it impenetrable. An explanation procured by the use of this method claims the same distinction and the same difficulty as the scientific method, in that it also explains itself via reference to itself, and is thus, a ‘closed’ inquiry. The institutionalised rational bias, which drives scholarship in one direction and spiritual ‘phenomena’ in the other, is impossible to match to data procured via this process.

All of these methods occur *within the limits* of the epistemological structure and in relation to, the silent referent for truth/knowledge. As Serres writes:

“The subject of knowledge... is much less a matter of a common oral or written language, fluctuated and varied, than has commonly been believed. It amounts, rather, to a tacit and stable contract behind or under this language, a contract whose legal subject is the subject of science: virtual, current, formal, operational.”

In addition, the only possible relationship between the scholar and object of study is representational: in fact, an excess of *proximity* to the object of study creates its own difficulties, as is illustrated by the ‘insider/outsider’ problem which plagues disciplines such as anthropology. To cite Basarab Nicolescu: “Our modernity—what we call modernity in academic terms—appeared via a split between the Subject and Object. We say there is an Object, there is a Subject that observes it, and in

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595 To cite Jacques Pouchepadass: “...at question here is the a priori valorization of ‘reason’ understood as a liberal-secular form of reasoning, the underlying rationality built into the knowledge protocols of the social sciences... With this totalizing principle, the social-scientist can only create a subject-object (‘anthropologizing’) relationship between himself and the evidence.” Pouchepadass, ‘Review : Pluralizing Reason,’ 383.
between there is nothing else. That’s the basis of what we call classic reality.”

There is a total separation between the knowing subject and reality, from which the subject is assumed to be completely independent. If Christian transcendentalism, the dislocation of time and space, Protestant individualism, Descartes, the nature-culture division, and so forth, are re-considered here, then it becomes clear how this one assertion of ‘fact’ has been built upon a long history of negotiations.

What is missing in this modern conception of reality is the incorporation into the core conception of identity (or, in modern parlance, ‘personhood’), of the various dimensions (and re-conceptualisations) of time, space, and nature/culture relationality which differ from the received post-Christianised version. As argued by Margaret Somers and Gloria Gibson, this abstraction of identity into a singular concept underpins the ontological impasse between actor and society in social theory. The human object of knowledge (the actor) is conceived of in what are claimed to be universalistic terms, whilst, in actuality, this universalism conceals a particular concept of the human individual transposed from (most recently) Enlightenment thought. Somers and Gibson write: “The classical story of modernity was constructed... through a particular epistemological filter conjoining eighteenth and nineteenth-century social naturalism with a revamped seventeenth-century ontology of the social agent. Both were epistemological escapes from... time, space, relationality.” This ‘universalised’ individual is classified (to follow Freire) in accordance with the degree of ‘normative’ socialisation and type of education to which they have been exposed, and can be represented and socially constructed only in reference to a similarly particularised social structure. Within the context of modernity there appears to be no possibility of any alternative representation; especially so in the system of ‘closed’ modernity.

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596 Volckmann and Nicolescu, 'Transdisciplinarity : Basarab Nicolescu Talks with Russ Volckmann,' 83.
597 "Objectivity, set up as the supreme criterion of truth, has one inevitable consequence: the transformation of the subject into an object. The death of the subject is the price we pay for objective knowledge." Basarab Nicolescu, Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity, Karen-Claire Voss trans. (USA, 2002), 9, 13.
598 For an application in the area of social construction and narrative strategies within sociology, see also Margaret R. Somers and Gloria D. Gibson, 'Reclaiming the Epistemological "Other": Narrative and the Social Construction of Identity,' in Social Theory and the Politics of Identity, ed. Craig J. Calhoun (UK; USA, 1994), 41.
599 Ibid., 47.
600 Ibid., 58.
How, then, to create a space of hospitality, or even reciprocity, with respect to the alternative epistemological positions forwarded under the signifiers of religion, culture, ‘worldview’, race, gender, and so forth? The pedagogical solution is exemplified in the transdisciplinary model of scholarship.\textsuperscript{601} This third position is projected ‘beyond’ the dialectic via a critical and philosophical self-reflexivity similar to that which is attempted by the internal critiques of disciplines taken up by scholars in the Philosophy of History, the Philosophy of Science, and the Sociology of Knowledge.\textsuperscript{602} Transdisciplinarity attempts to move beyond the heavily restricted spaces of disciplines by \textit{combining} these critical positions in order to deal with the dynamics of several types of reality simultaneously – a possibility which only becomes evident when differentiated knowledge positions are unified. Key to this is the assertion that knowledge is not an ‘object’, but emergence from an interaction or point of interface/coherence ‘between’ subject/object positions: transdisciplinarity ultimately claims to capture the action of the \textit{third}, the interaction between the Subject and Object.\textsuperscript{603} As Nicolescu writes: “The hidden third is there is mediate. This is the new aspect of what we can call transmodernity… which means three components of reality: Subject, Object, and the interaction term.”\textsuperscript{604} In Bhabha’s terms, a third space rejects any \textit{primordial} unicity or fixity to enable some repositioning in response to seemingly irreconcilable cultural difference.\textsuperscript{605}

\textsuperscript{601} Consider Nicolescu: “The term \textit{transdisciplinarity} first appeared three decades ago almost simultaneously in the works of such varied scholars as Jean Piaget, Edgar Morin, and Erich Jantsch. It was coined to give expression to a need that was perceived – especially in the area of education – to celebrate the transgression of disciplinary boundaries, an act that far surpassed the multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches.” Nicolescu, \textit{Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity}, 1.


\textsuperscript{603} Volckmann and Nicolescu, ‘Transdisciplinarity : Basarab Nicolescu Talks with Russ Volckmann,’ 83.

\textsuperscript{604} Ibid., 83.

\textsuperscript{605} Bhabha, ‘The Commitment to Theory,’ 18-21.
An example of this epistemologically rendered cultural difference is required. Consider this passage on hunting practices from British Columbia, as documented by Hugh Brody:

“Some old-timers, men who became famous for their powers and skills, had been great dreamers. Hunters and dreamers. They did not hunt as most people do now. They did not seek uncertainly for the trails of animals whose movements we can only guess at. No, they located their prey in dreams, found their trails, and made dream-kills. Then, the next day, or a few days later, whenever it seemed auspicious to do so, they could go out, find the trail, re-encounter the animal, and collect the kill.”

Such intuitive techniques involving dreaming or meditative practices are generally interpreted as ‘religion’, ‘storytelling’, or ‘myth’, despite the claim that they are utilised as a part of subsistence practices. The ‘impossibility’ of this narration of events prevents it from being seen as anything but ‘religious’, or perhaps, a ‘mythical’ re-ordering of reality which has ‘story-value’. Even when it is presented by the anthropologist, it is relegated to the realm of the ‘cultural’. The potential legitimacy of this manner of acquiring information is excluded by science and thus, excluded from the dominant episteme. Of the three kinds of knowledge valued by the Canadian people (from whom this recollection is drawn), the first two – traditional, and empirical knowledge – may be considered as possessing potential knowledge ‘value’, but the third – revealed knowledge – does not. The silent referent which rejects a Christian context for ‘revelation’, as against a scientific explanation, blocks any interrogation of this type of claim as rational. Revelation is also claimed in the modern tradition as the false assertion of Christianity, over, above, and against other religious traditions.

Transdisciplinarity recognises simultaneous modes of reasoning: the rational and the relational. The aporia, in Derrida’s conception, ceases to become a limit by the

607 In the history of the study of myth by scholars of religion, myth has been generally seen as a ‘cultural product’ as opposed to a knowledge storage system. Although it does sometimes conform to the former category, the understanding of how myth and storytelling may operate as educational devices is woefully underrepresented. For an exception, see ibid.
608 Categories derived from ibid., 23-24.
609 Idea attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011.
610 See Nicolescu, Manifesto of Transdisciplinarity.
recovery of an ‘open’, as opposed to ‘closed’, idea of knowledge – correlated with the Foucauldian ideal. Things of ‘mysterious origin’ are traditionally thought of as things we cannot ‘know’, as their ordering is impossible utilising classical scientific notions such as proof and experiment, in which proof is verifiable. However, as Roelof Oldemon writes, defending a new and radically inclusive science, in matters of the psyche or of human communities neither innocent experiments, nor strict repetitions, can exist. A transformation in the general codes governing the production of discourse (an epistemological ‘break’) would allow the conception of reality to become sufficiently ‘elastic’ to make viable the interpretations and epistemological models that employ alternative causal chains. This necessarily involves overthrowing what Magoroh Maruyama has called the ‘monopolarisation of Euro-American thinking’ to become ‘transpective’, which is Maruyama’s term for going beyond empathy (a projection between two persons sharing a single epistemology) in the attempt to experience a foreign belief or knowledge perspective; the result being the ability to hold multiple epistemological perspectives at any one time – a ‘polyocular’ vision. This extreme openness may sound ambitious, but Maruyama is one of the very few scholars who can suggest theory which approaches what may be required in order to overcome this impasse. Questions which might have considerable impact on how education is structured at all levels arise from the contemplation of such ideas; especially if it is recognised that the primary incompatibilities that necessitate co-operation between different worldviews are either moral or soteriological at base. A similar set of questions might arise from

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611 In Nicolescu’s conception, the action of the logic of the included middle on the different levels of Reality (which, being a physicist, he articulates in accordance with a quantum version of reality) induces an open structure that implies the possibility of a self-enclosed, yet complete theory. “Knowledge is forever open.” Volckmann and Nicolescu, Transdisciplinarity: Basarab Nicolescu Talks with Russ Volckmann, ’76.

612 Roelof A. A. Oldeman, ‘To Know or Not to Know, One Way or Another,’ in Worldviews, Science and Us: Redemarcating Knowledge and Its Social and Ethical Implications, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, 10 June 2003, ed. Diederik Aerts, Bart D’Hooghe, and Nicole Note (Singapore; USA, 2005), 86.

613 Ibid., 86.

614 Oldeman, p. 83 As Riegler, citing Glaserfeld, notes: “Those who merely speak of the construction of knowledge, but do not explicitly give up the notion that our conceptual constructions can or should in some way represent an independent, objective reality, are still caught up in the traditional theory of knowledge.” Alexander Riegler, ‘Inclusive Worldviews: Interdisciplinary Research from a Radical Constructivist Perspective,’ in Worldviews, Science and Us: Redemarcating Knowledge and Its Social and Ethical Implications, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, 10 June 2003, ed. Diederik Aerts, Bart D’Hooghe, and Nicole Note (Singapore; USA, 2005), 31.

negotiating the incommensurabilities between different ideas of how knowledge and medicine are related.

Transdisciplinarity also incorporates the Kantian ideal of a ‘mature Reason’ and allows for the possibility of an ‘Enlightened’ universality, which recovers and upholds the human as a relational subject possessing legitimate individual difference, as opposed to an object defined according to particularised classificatory logic. Moral equivalence between subjects rendered in conventional humanistic terms may be impossible, but a co-operative and reflexive relational ethic, grounded in re-education, could generate a more integrated political theory that does not evade difficult political issues. It is in this arena where the reconciliation between legitimate speech and issue of silencing is most urgently required. Though humanism and universalism seem almost indistinguishable, as Robbins notes, the possibility to go beyond a ‘blanket endorsement’ of old-school universalism is actually found in the cohesive ‘accident’, in which marginalised positions have become invested in solving similar social issues. The collective ‘others’, who are racialised, gendered, religious, cultural, and so forth, are arguing in the language of diversity for what amounts to a universal humanitarian ethic of inclusion, provided that this is not depoliticising.

As Celia Haig-Brown writes in favour of reciprocity between knowledges: “Something decent, respectful, and human disappears in the space between as one

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616 It must be noted that Kant’s notion of ‘truth’ was implicitly Judeo-Christian in its moral orientation. Consider Goldberg: “The shift from religious to secular morality is reflected in the fact that Kant began by assuming that ordinary moral judgments in the Judeo-Christian tradition must legitimately be claimed to be true.” Goldberg, Racist Culture: Philosophy and the Politics of Meaning, 17.

617 Robbins, ‘Race, Gender, Class, Postcolonialism: Toward a New Humanistic Paradigm?’, 559-562.

618 Cultural belonging, aside from providing a reassuring illusion of fixed identity, is also a claim that is professed to confer ‘rights’ within liberal democracies. The example of successful homosexual law reforms provides a case in point: though not generally thought of as members of a ‘cultural minority’, collectivised political action conferred rights, but also transformed sexual practice into a culture or way of life that demands protection in exactly the same sense claimed by ethnic or religious minorities. Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age, 21. Affrontery is the only appropriate response to this when it is properly examined, which circles back to Gray’s thoughts on tolerance. If there is ever to be an ‘appropriate’ application of Reason, perhaps it ought to be directed at the strongly incompatible moral views between Christianity, Judaism, Islam, and ‘secular’ modernity, especially given their common heritage. Unfortunately, due to the incommensurability of certain faith claims and the type of ‘Western’ education that is presently offered throughout much of the world, this application may continue to prove both elusive and resisted.
knowledge insists on dominating the other.” Justice, returning to Derrida, requires an engagement with the other which hinges upon responsibility, but also, either the removal of the ‘otherness’ which modernity appears to require as the ‘other party’ within the dialectic, or alternatively, a new type of universalism. The hybrid identity promoted by Bhabha does not attend to these issues as it is asserted against the humanist self and the right to claim ‘pure’ otherness; in Robbin’s terms, promoting a ‘wrong’ universalism. The ‘otherness’ cannot be ‘removed’ per se, but rather, the adjustment must occur in relation to the requirement for modernity (as normative) to be set against the category of otherness. As Robbins argues, there are no ‘global conditions’ or ‘universal solutions’, globalisation is, itself, a ‘Western demand’ and imposition via modernity and the inherited distribution of ‘empire’. Other assertions include that of Spivak: “It has appeared to some of my readers recently [1991] that I seem to be moving towards some notion of universal humanity, and this has surprised them – I am expected to emphasize difference.” Spivak argues that “the principles of a universal humanism – the place where indeed all human beings are similar – is... lodged in their being different” To cite Latour: “Perhaps it is easier today to give up belief in our own strangeness. We are not exotic, but ordinary. As a result, the others are not exotic either. They are like us, they have never stopped being our brethren. Let us not add to the crime that of believing we are radically different…” In Nicolescu’s terms, it is the transdisciplinary project which might enable this mediation between unity and difference:

“When we speak about transreligion and transculture—these are the two key words in transdisciplinarity, in this field of the principle of relativity—we don’t speak about unity in the sense of dogmatic unity. Each religion has to have dogmas in order to speak in a clear way. In culture, you have to have a set of rules to identify American culture, European culture, the various types of cultures. When we speak about transculture, we don’t mean one culture all over the world. We say there is unity of cultures, but in a transcendental way... It is like a strange attractor in the sense you have an asymptotic point

620 Robbins, ‘Race, Gender, Class, Postcolonialism : Toward a New Humanistic Paradigm?,’ 565.
621 Ibid., 565.
622 Idea attributed to thesis supervisor Dr Michael Grimshaw, 2011.
623 Cited in Robbins, ‘Race, Gender, Class, Postcolonialism : Toward a New Humanistic Paradigm?,’ 565-566.
624 Cited in ibid., 566.
625 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 126-127.
that is there, but you cannot put your hands on it. If it’s very carefully done, we avoid the wrong turns of transdisciplinarity.”

In conclusion, what is being proposed is a model for re-engagement with the excluded epistemological positions within modernity, by way of a shift towards the transdisciplinary mode of thought and praxis as an opportunity for reconfiguring what counts for knowledge. This thesis argues that the present strategies, as particularly organised within education, must be strategically revised in order to become hospitable to what are currently permanent exclusions as designated via the illusion of the epistemological purification sequence. The inanimate nature of knowledge, especially its post-theo-scientific manifestations, demands to be situated and remobilized by human agents who are capable of the radical revision of the singularity of the episteme, ontology, and intellectual tradition upon which the secular institutions are founded. The question of (im)possibility with respect to hospitality is therefore critical. If the interrogation of modernity as a religious and cultural position can be regarded as successful, then perhaps the subject-object myth of critical distance, as inherited from the transcendental orientation of Christianity, will, like the accompanying myth of epistemological purity, eventually be exorcised; although it is necessary to also surrender the myth of secularization and the privileged positionality of ‘being modern’ in order to achieve this. A suitable last word, as eloquently stated by Max Weber:

“The fate of an epoch that has eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must... recognize that general views of life and the universe can never be the products of increasing empirical knowledge, and that the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, are always formed only in the struggle with other ideals which are just as sacred to others as ours are to us.”

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626 Volckmann and Nicolescu, 'Transdisciplinarity : Basarab Nicolescu Talks with Russ Volckmann,' 85.
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