Reflexivity reconsidered: a Wittgensteinian approach to the self-referentiality of psychology and persons

By
Gavin B. Sullivan

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PART 2

Personal reflexivity reconsidered: a critical study of self-referentiality and emotion through a surview of pride
In Part 1 reflexive issues in psychology were critically examined through examples of work on emotion and personal reflexivity that need to be challenged and clarified. The Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity examined a number of pertinent issues, the most important of which for Part 2 is that a critical, reflexive treatment of Rosenberg’s theory should aim to achieve a surview. A surview will therefore resemble social constructionist attempts to provide a “new paradigm” for psychology. The attempt to attain a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey of psychological concepts is also similar to discursive psychology as well as the results of interdisciplinary studies. While some of these issues will be addressed below, the main focus is an organized presentation of potentially unique, revealing examples and reminders of our linguistic and cultural practices: reminders that can be assembled to show how the impetus to construct theories and to conduct narrowly empirical studies has led to an impoverished and isolated psychology. With these points of clarification in mind, it is now possible to turn from the Wittgensteinian reconsideration of the limits and consequences of reflexive studies in psychology to a self-exemplifying application of these ideas in Part 2.

As noted at the beginning of Part 1, many psychologists, sociologists and other social scientists recognize and emphasize people’s reflexive skills and experiences (e.g., Harré, 1983; Howard, 1985; Parker, 1989; Rosenberg, 1990; Shotter, 1992a). However, a comprehensive account of personal reflexivity would need to include (or justify the exclusion of) an unmanageably large variety of theories and number of approaches (e.g., ranging from notions of self-presentation in everyday life to the details of particular self-evaluative emotions). A more realistic aim is to focus on
emotion and personal reflexivity rather than the reverse as suggested by Ellis (1991):

...reflexivity — thinking and feeling as a subject about oneself as an object — is so distinctively human, its place in emotion warrants considerations for systematic study. (p. 45)

Clearly, there is a sense in which a survey is systematic but we should not expect that the knowledge gained will form a system. In this respect, the word "systematic" in Ellis' remark will be augmented with "cultural, conceptual-discursive, reflexive and critical".

Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory of emotion has already been criticized in metapsychological terms, but more detail can be added to the philosophical, social and cultural critique. For although Rosenberg integrates sociological, social psychological and psychological accounts into a theory which can be contrasted with other theories (e.g., social constructionism), any metatheoretical comparison with the contrasting positions is avoided. More importantly, Rosenberg's general theory does not present important cultural and linguistic detail in relation to any particular emotion, but instead focuses on the view that reflexive processes "pervade virtually every important aspect of human emotions" (p. 1; without really saying whether reflexive agency and reflexive cognition pervade psychologically in observable, empirically-ratified differences or grammatically in a contentious form of representation). Moreover, while Rosenberg's categories provide a new vocabulary for summarizing our emotion expressions and experiences, an impression is also imparted that reflexive agency and reflexive cognition are distinct "things" to be investigated empirically. The vocabulary also does not appear to aid
psychologists' attempts to predict and to control their own and others' emotions, nor does it provide specific techniques that allow individuals to create and to control their emotions. And although Rosenberg's theory seems to present something familiar to many psychologists in a new light, it has considerable potential to move from patent nonsense to disguised nonsense.

Social interaction and language are also important to Rosenberg's theory, but he chooses to focus predominantly on people's understanding and interpretation of "cultural scenarios" and the causation-oriented "logic of emotions". This individualistic focus ignores important political and ethical attempts by groups to engage in "identity politics" or to react against restricted opportunities for success. Ethical issues surrounding the potential, perhaps through psychological research, to be able to decide which emotions we want to have and, in other cases, to control are not addressed by Rosenberg. The focus on cognition also has the potential to produce conceptual problems similar to those identified and "treated" in Wittgenstein's private language "argument" (e.g., with regard to emotional identification). Finally, although Rosenberg highlights reflexive processes which are supposedly essential to becoming a person, he fails to explore in any detail the developmental presuppositions and implications of his theory.

Part 2 will therefore focus on further aspects of Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory of emotion that have not been subjected to critical scrutiny. The details of emotional display, identification and experience will be examined in accord with Wittgenstein's intimation that these are not universal features of human existence. Notions of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition will be extended beyond Rosenberg's concern with the emotions that individuals try to create and to control in others as well as
themselves for their own or societal ends. The limits that individuals confront need to be examined because the constraints on individual "reflexive moves" are not best explained in terms of individual or collective causes (i.e., these constraints can be social constructs, institutions and arrangements capable of being changed through collective action). Also the central role Rosenberg accords to intention will be critically examined as it pertains to controlling the causes of emotion, either directly or indirectly, by acting on the "body", "mind", whole of the self or its components. Stated in other terms, a central feature of Rosenberg's theory is the importance attached to the explicit, reflexive and intentional creation and control of emotions as the most important feature of people (i.e., in contrast to pursuing goals that may or may not have emotional rewards or barriers). Furthermore, we need to assess carefully Rosenberg's implied view that reflexive processes create emotions such as pride, shame and guilt because they allow internal states of arousal "to be mixed with elements that are separate from the physiological experience" (Rosenberg, 1990, pp. 3-4).

In relation to Part 2, the aim is not to argue for a particular theory of emotion such as a social constructionist account over the variety of other realist-cognitive, sociological and philosophical alternatives. However, in a similar manner to Wittgenstein-inspired social constructionist studies, a critical account of the relations between emotion and the uniquely human potential for self-referential thought and action is provided through a detailed cultural and linguistic survey. In particular, the cluster of concepts surrounding pride provides the focus in Part 2 for several reasons. First, since much of the clinical research on emotion tends to focus on the avoidance and control of negative or extreme emotions, pride only seems to be problematic where it is excessive (i.e., delusions of grandeur) or entirely
lacking as in the global sense of a positive self-image (i.e., depression or personality disorder). Second, the experience and expression of pride have not been examined in all of their social, practical, cultural and linguistic detail (an oversight which is attributable to the individualistic and cognitive preoccupations of many psychologists). Many instances of the control and expression of pride, for example, suggest important connections with individual character and identity. Thus a third reason for focusing on pride is that no comprehensive account of pride and its cultural, linguistic and individual aspects exists (e.g., in the emotion, self, or personality literature of psychology).

The critical treatment of emotion and personal reflexivity begins in chapter 5 with an examination of the limits, consequences, surroundings and everyday detail of forms of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition. The first section examines the collective consequences of individual forms of reflexivity that are illustrated by examples of group pride (i.e., the sort of unpredictable and unique cultural manifestations of individual thoughts, actions and emotions that people may more or less accurately sense, represent and, to a lesser extent, control). The main interest is the ascription of pride to groups of other people and accurately representing the role of relevant cultural and linguistic practices (e.g., various symbols, institutions, obligations, etc.). The analysis then turns to forms of personal reflexivity that are only visible in comparisons and interactions between cultures and subcultures. These differences are indicated by self-inclusive expressions and descriptions of what "we" are proud of which implicitly or explicitly exclude others. Issues of moral autonomy and group movements to construct a positive identity are also explored. An analysis is also provided of social institutions that are implied by cases of pride and which ostensibly
involve individual views of responsibility and ownership. Examples of family, group and national pride as well as social limits on identity formation and choice are used to provide further insights into the nature and limits of the moves that individuals can make against the normative practices, social arrangements and reactions of a wider community. The last part of this section details important historical and natural historical continuities and discontinuities with respect to the creation, experience and control of emotions such as pride.

Chapter 6 examines the detail of social and relational aspects of emotion and personal reflexivity. It begins with an examination of the practical and personal details surrounding potentially transgressive cases of “self-elevation”. Social limits on personal autonomy are highlighted by examples of pride that seem to be independent of social comparison, confirmation and approbation. The reflexive potential to engage in acting and deception is also reconsidered through the detail of pride (i.e., issues of self-presentation and social circumstance that Kaplan (1986), Rosenberg (1990), Smedslund (1990) and others emphasize in more general terms). Other relational aspects of pride are then examined including the role that other people play as the “objects” or causes of many personal emotions (e.g., the underexplored sense in which pride can said to prolong arguments by making them a personal matter). The chapter concludes with two interrelated issues: the importance of forms of self-control to the maintenance of privacy, and the potential for private reasons to motivate positions, actions and stances which come to be regarded by other people as odd or unintelligible.

Chapter 7 examines personal reflexivity as it pertains to the individual expression, experience and embodiment of emotions such as pride. The
initial focus is on intense emotions and their relation to a potentially unique personal history. Some remarks are made with regard to how individuals make the "linguistic transition" from private feelings to public language, before examining points about the duration of pride and individual experiences of its components (e.g., in relation to self-control or the possibility that an embellished expression may prolong the feeling). The realist-cognitive fascination with underlying processes and mechanisms is assessed through the notion that some emotions are caused by cognitive self-evaluation. Suggested research directions for an alternative conceptual-discursive approach include a conversation-based account of pride which still addresses important cognitive, thoughtful and immediate aspects of emotion. Self-consciousness is also examined in terms of our lack of awareness and control over the neurophysiology of emotion (i.e., supposedly direct control over neurophysiological components). The chapter ends with examples of pride that raise a similar issue of how individuals identify, describe and explore vacillating and ambiguous emotions.

Chapter 8 provides a critical account of forms of emotion and personal reflexivity that are individually "created" while also being cultural and linguistic "constructions". The investigation includes the sense in which understanding the reflexivity of other persons is based on a person's own potential to express, to explore and to understand their emotions. The development of older children's independence and identity projects is explored through widely-available cultural and textual examples of pride. The investigation of personal reflexivity also involves a treatment of internalization accounts of the control of emotions in younger children and difficult issues about the personal effects of participation in linguistic and
cultural practices. In the last section, the importance of linguistic supplementation to the creation and extension of prelinguistic prerequisites of self-directed actions, thoughts and emotions is examined.

The Wittgensteinian reconsideration of psychological reflexivity and personal reflexivity is summarized in the section entitled "CONCLUSION: PARTS 1 & 2". 
CHAPTER 5: The collective surroundings, limits and consequences of personal reflexivity: an extension of Rosenberg’s theory of emotion through examples of pride

Introduction

Few psychologists and sociologists seem to be interested in the cultural surroundings, collective manifestations and background limits of emotion-related forms of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition. Rosenberg (1990), for example, illustrates the mutual ignorance of collective emotions and related practices with comments that are informed by discipline boundaries:

For the individual, emotions are both ends in themselves and means for the attainment of other ends. For society emotions are involved critically in social control, role performance, and interpersonal interaction. (p. 4)

Given the focus in this chapter on the importance of emotions to society, it is crucial to examine the limits of personal reflexivity confronted by individuals in relation to other people and collective practices. For the practices that surround individual judgements and expressions of what “we are proud of” are not mere adjuncts to individual experience (i.e., individual explanations of how and why “I feel proud” on a particular occasion). Instead, as collected instances of pride reveal, many ostensibly individual features of emotional display, identification and experience are so intimately connected to cultural practices that we often find it difficult to understand, to articulate, to control and to manipulate the individual-collective relations involved. Many aspects of our emotions are not only culture and collective-dependent but
also reveal cultural, historical and even natural historical differences, thus becoming "rationally visible" (Shotter, 1996) to "us", in quite specific interactions.

There is considerable potential for a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey to highlight and to document background features of the use of psychological concepts in a manner consistent with the approach developed in Part 1. This challenge to the essentialist and individual-centred biases of emotion and personal reflexivity research can be described as a conceptual-discursive survey of first person, second person and third person singular and plural discourse involving pride and its background of cultural and material practices. It will begin in section 5.1 with an examination of cultural and collective manifestations of pride which are largely independent of specific individuals. This section includes forms of group and shared pride that may explicitly or implicitly include or exclude other people. A major concern is to detail the limits of moves that individuals make to position themselves against a background of cultural and collective practices, institutions and commitments. In section 5.2 examples of continuity and discontinuity suggested by cases of pride are examined in terms of history and natural history (and which illustrate the limits of personal reflexive attempts to overcome such differences). Section 5.3 examines the more specific sense in which groups attempt to construct pride in themselves against a background of oppression, exploitation or exclusion. This section also includes an interest in the moral autonomy of individuals who challenge or stand out against a background of widely shared values, norms or group demands. Section 5.4 highlights social institutions of identification, responsibility and ownership against which many forms of group and individual pride are spontaneously expressed and experienced.
5.1 The collective limits of personal reflexivity and cultural differences in pride

Charting the limits of personal reflexivity goes hand in hand with a central problem facing cultural, historical and natural historical studies of emotion: "the difficulties of dealing with change and the characteristic inability to get beyond individual case studies" (Steams, 1993, p. 18). Furthermore, it is difficult to bypass sociological, anthropological, historical and other theories without the feeling that important general summaries of relevant facts are being swept aside. But the collective significance and background of thoughtful and intentional attempts by people to understand, control and change their own emotions can also reveal possible lines of investigation by nontheoretical means. For example, the results of a broad survey of pride reveal the following themes for potential future investigation that will be introduced below: indications of culturally unique collective manifestations of pride; some examples of the basis of judgements of cultural differences; the importance of cultural comparisons to forms of group pride; and, some of the "functions" of group pride.

Collective pride and cultural differences

One of the initial problems in examining people's self-directed and intentional activities towards their own emotions is the individual focus of many theories (i.e., individuals are not studied as participants in broader cultural and linguistic practices which they may potentially alter (cf. Mead, 1934)). With regard to social constructionism, the fact that Wittgenstein
seemed to have little interest in uses of psychological concepts beyond what
one individual might express or ascribe to another person does not help to
promote the development of useful alternatives or break down persistent
discipline-based boundaries. If viewed through the writings of many
Wittgenstein exegetes, anything other than a first, second, or third person
singular use of a word like pride would seem to be a social concept. But
ascribing psychological concepts to collectives is often meaningful because
it reflects the values and social arrangements of a collective and, moreover,
comments upon the individuals that constitute a particular group. However,
for talk of personal reflexivity to be useful it must do more than reconstruct
the relations between groups or nations, for example, in terms similar to the
interaction of individuals. Rather, it is more interesting to examine how
individual notions of reflexive cognition and reflexive agency can be
extended to the activities performed by individuals and groups of people,
usually consciously or intentionally, in a culture.

Although concepts included within the category of personal reflexivity
should be ascribed only to "what behaves like a human being" (Pl, §283), it
would seem odd to say that the ascription of psychological concepts to
human collectives said nothing of psychological interest. For example, it is
easy to imagine whole groups of people who could be described as
considerate and reflective or, alternatively, as reserved and arrogant. The
notion of reflexive cognition is therefore relevant to a consideration of
collective pride and cultural differences because a conceptual-discursive
survey has the potential to highlight the judgements involved, to explore
what we understand from remarks about collective pride and, more
specifically, to indicate how we react and respond to remarks about "us".
However, to begin with it is interesting to ask whether there is any interesting sense in which we can speak of human pride (i.e., the largest collective manifestation of individual pride)? One example is uttered by a character in Umberto Eco’s novel *Foucault’s Pendulum*: “it is impossible to ban cars because they are the pride of modern man” (p. 100). The remark is interesting because it suggests how difficult it is to judge the collective effects and manifestations of forms of individual pride, especially when they are unpredictable, culturally specific and historically unique. However, while the example suggests a possible sense of the pride of “modern man”, there would seem to be few, if any, genuine examples of shared “human pride” with a common focus. For example, it is possible that feelings of pride experienced during widely televised moments of human achievement such as the first walk on the moon evoke a sense of collective achievement (i.e., as opposed to an extension of American national pride). Philosophers such as Chakrabarti (1992) certainly misrepresent the issue when they suggest one reason for a lack of genuine expression and articulation of human pride is that explicit comparison with other species is required. In contrast, Dennett (1995) takes a different perspective when he argues that a sense of our own uniqueness as a species may blind us to the fact that evolutionary accounts focus on reconciling “man’s proud achievements with his humble descent” (Spiller, 1935). But the main point is that it is often cultural achievements and inventions that are regarded as the basis of human pride.

Such celebrations, however, are quite different to self-congratulatory recognition that we are the only species capable of actions that generate such (moral) emotions as pride, shame and guilt. In other words, it seems reasonable not to regard the possibility of feeling these emotions — as well as acting upon them for various reasons such as social cohesion (Shott,
1979) — as a human achievement (i.e., that "we" were responsible for). Any extension to collectives of Rosenberg's emphasis on individuals who "decide what to feel" and then produce it is therefore ruled out. We did not as a species, decide what "we" wanted to do with "ourselves" and which emotions we wanted as part of the broad intention to produce a self-created framework of culture. In contrast, it is what Wittgenstein would call a grammatical remark on the natural history of humans that "we" developed and "arrived at" these emotions as a consequence of initially unreflective and more narrowly intentional human activities. This conclusion applies to many of our present collective activities in which the goal is not to produce an emotion and the achievement is not to be confused with what we think and feel when a goal is achieved.

Considerations of this abstract form lead Chakrabarti (1992) to entertain the possibility from "evidence of the collective building skills of some ants and fidelity, etc., of dogs that they too can have shared features of varying excellence and can be proud or ashamed of those" (p. 42; cf. evolutionary accounts in section 5.2). However, we should not get caught up in Chakrabarti's consideration of the view that either such forms of animal pride exist, or "we" must instead entertain the possibility that human pride is ridiculous because "we do not have out-groups to compare our excellences with or expect recognition of superiority from" (p. 42). We may all, at various times in our lives, be impressed by the technological, moral, cultural and artistic achievements of humans (although this is usually in terms of the values of Western culture and does not rule out possible disgust about the price of our "progress"). While these sorts of judgements and feelings do occur to individuals, it is more relevant to examine the collective effects and
manifestations of shared forms of human pride and, more specifically, to examine the practices that construct and maintain this pride.

In order to understand what it means to make statements about human pride it is appropriate to examine cases that occur more frequently within our culture. Examples are required that are not merely generalizations or dispassionate judgements by individuals, but rather are cases in which a genuine evaluative feeling is expressed in relation to something widely shared, broadly admirable or important to humanity. An example of a form of pride in an exceptional human action or achievement is needed that would realistically lead an individual to exclaim "sometimes you are proud of your fellow creatures" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 August 1992a). In this case, the example attached to this remark is an individual's view of the behaviour of the athlete Gail Devers who, although she seemed to have the 100m hurdles race at the 1992 Olympics won, tripped and fell at the last hurdle before she "sought out the Greek woman who had won the gold that was rightfully hers . . . and she applauded the Greek woman (loc. cit.). The example is useful because it highlights the potential for individual judgements and expressions of pride about particular types of action to reflect something general and important about "us".

Perhaps it is this sense of engaging in behaviour that others may feel proud of which supports remarks by Shott (1979) and Scheff (1988) that emotions such as pride, shame and guilt are, along with their respective forms of self-regulation, crucial to the existence and maintenance of Western society. Moreover, this example need not be taken to illustrate a point about individuals and their feelings because it shows how laudable behaviour occurs against a complicated background of possible human actions and achievements. It is still the sort of example of forms of human
pride which Chakrabarti (1992) suggests will be expressed on the basis of such culture-based similarities as gender, religion, language, era or nationality. In this respect, a further and perhaps better example of the shared potential for pride to occur in specific cultural circumstances can be offered (i.e., a potential to feel pride in circumstances that we may not usually be aware of an individuals or in a more collective sense). In a further example centred on the Olympics, it was noted that the athletes from countries described as perennial boycotters of the Olympics nevertheless "marched with pride" on their return to international competition (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 June 1992a). A more comprehensive study would be critical of aspects of the reportage in this case and also provide a critical account of power and ideology issues related to such discourses. Nevertheless, the example indicates the potential for shared pride to occur spontaneously in a particular group given appropriate circumstances (i.e., the aim of their participation was not to feel pride on this particular occasion yet the example is still significant).

Another contemporary example of the way in which different groups can experience and express pride is also connected with the 1992 Olympics. In particular, an individual working in Barcelona at the time of the Olympics was reported as saying:

Barcelona is on the world map and we can be proud of what we have. What's a few years of mess compared with that?" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 June 1992)

The potential for a country to be, for a matter of hours or days, the focus of world attention is an important modern (or postmodern) sense of collective pride. Interestingly, whether the event concerned has been planned in
advance is secondary to the perceived attention and approbation of the world. For example, the praise and feelings of pride reported by television and newspaper media after the Australian Navy's rescue of Round the World Yacht Race entrants in 1997, show that international recognition of the successful completion of a difficult task can be used as an opportunity for a country to improve its "mood" and "confirm" its character.

However, it is also interesting that the notion of worldwide attention need not override local differences or involve recognition of alternative representations (which may be political and ideological). For example, an individual interviewed in Barcelona regards the world attention as offering an opportunity to demonstrate:

The capital city of the autonomous region of Catalonia is proud to show the world that it is different from the rest of Spain. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 June 1992)

As further sections will demonstrate, there are possibilities also of localized expressions of pride in particular groups that do not necessarily conflict with national pride. Nevertheless, the broad point remains that world attention can sometimes augment more specific forms of pride and, moreover, that both planned and unplanned events may provide circumstances in which pride is spontaneously experienced and expressed by members of a collective.

The awareness that we achieve by noting such complicated examples is based on cultural practices, symbols, commitments, education, training and rituals that reinforce individual judgements and feelings of pride. An obvious example in many countries is the power of symbols such as flags, national anthems and related ceremonies to become powerful
elicitors of feelings of pride (e.g., as illustrated again by the Olympics and, more specifically, the sometimes surprising potential of medal ceremonies to produce "tears of pride" and a fusing of individual achievement with national and cultural identity). These practices create and confirm national pride in a manner that is obviously not reducible to the potentially idiosyncratic and opposite feelings, judgments and actions of individual participants. Moreover, it is too simplistic to make claims such as that high levels of pride, for example, in the United States are the result of "generations of preaching and teaching immigrants' offspring to hold their heads high and say, 'I am American'" (Rose, 1994, p. 4). However, to do justice to this difficult issue a more comprehensive study would need to be undertaken.

Although it is important to examine how practices emerge and persist in a culture, the powerful role that symbols of nationhood can have in the lives of individuals need not be achieved solely through ceremonies and occasions when national anthems are sung, flags are raised or waved, representative teams and individuals succeed in international competitions, and other people offer praise in a manner that is seen to reflect upon or be shared by many members of a group. In an interesting combination of extended senses of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition, many individuals offer their own accounts for increasing national pride. For example, in New Zealand an individual was reported as holding:

... strong views on the doom-and-gloom malaise he thinks is gripping New Zealanders. This week, Mr Gillespie took the unusual step of issuing a press release on his recipe for national pride and economic recovery — flying the New Zealand flag. Mr Gillespie says that on a recent drive around Christchurch, he saw more Japanese than New Zealand flags displayed. He argues that a surge of patriotism would attend the flying of our flag from all commercial Government and local government buildings. Flag-flying would, under his theory,
also be compulsory in every school classroom and assembly hall and in the school grounds. If nothing else, it would do wonders for the flag-making industry. (Press (Christchurch Press, N.Z.) 26 April 1991)

Clearly many proposed means of increasing national pride, such as the compulsory flying of flags and daily singing of a national anthem in schools, are naïve and even objectionable. And in this case, it is unlikely the individual concerned would ever have the opportunity to experience feelings of "reflexive agency" in relation to a successful and widespread institution of this practice.

Nevertheless, the idea is mentioned persistently and often, especially by right-wing politicians, as a further newspaper report from New Zealand suggests:

National Party members have called on a National Government to encourage the singing of the anthem and the flying of the flag in schools. The move would ensure national pride was heightened, according to a remit passed at the party's Auckland conference at the week-end. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 22 May 1990)

But in terms of effective cultural strategies for increasing national pride, especially when it is perceived to be low, it is more usual to encourage achievements that will produce the emotion than to create it. This is an increasingly obvious strategy in countries such as Australia where it is often reported "we get a strong sense of self from sport" (Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, Australia) 11 June 1997). A psychologist interviewed for the same article therefore argued:

The ordinary person on the street wants to feel proud about being Australian and does that through our sporting performances. So when sports men and women are not
producing the results they demand, we do not have as much tolerance as we should have. (loc. cit.)

Attempts to achieve success in a particular sporting or other culturally important endeavour are therefore not the same as self-consciously adopted strategies for creating particular emotions. Nevertheless, an increase in national pride is frequently used as a reason for, and explicit goal of, participation by individuals and teams in international sporting competitions.

There are many other occasions when individuals or groups attempt to create national pride. For example, celebration of New Zealand's sesquicentennial in 1990 was regarded by some as an opportunity for the country to affirm its nationhood and to reflect on its present position with the hoped for result that it would lead to an increased sense of pride. In practice, there seemed to be little enthusiasm for the events that were supposed to offer people in various centres a chance to say, as one local mayor noted, "this is who we are and we should be proud of that" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 3 January 1991). Similar problems occur with other occasions which should provide an opportunity for the expression of national pride, but which are widely believed not to. For example, it has been suggested in New Zealand that the name of a national holiday commemorating the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between the indigenous Maori people of New Zealand and representatives of the Crown in 1840, should be changed back to New Zealand Day in order to "restore national pride" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 January 1993). While criticisms of Waitangi Day by Maori leaders include the view that it has become a "staged performance of dignitaries" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 January 1993), the issue most often mentioned is a sense of pride and unity:
New Zealand Day should be reintroduced because Waitangi Day tended to alienate people and divide the country, a Northland Maori leader, Mr Matiu Rata, said yesterday.

"It should be a day we should observe with pride, which is not the case at the moment. Waitangi Day only brings out prejudiced views," Mr Rata, the Muriwhenua runanga (council) chairman said. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 4 February 1992).

It is therefore thought the day needs a "real boost" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 January 1993) to revive the national spirit even though the proposed name change might encounter political opposition. Moreover, as with similar attempts in New Zealand and other countries to change the nation's flag, the change may still create dissent because it is regarded as further symbol of the marginalization of indigenous people.

However, changing a flag, the name of a national day or a national anthem of a nation will often do little to restore national pride. Other comments about Maori nationalism provide more understanding of the cultural changes required to increase national pride. The same Maori Leader who was quoted in the previous report, Mr Rata, also notes in a debate about increases in the Maori electoral roll: "when there is economic and social uncertainty, people can look towards nationalism" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18, June 1991a). Interestingly, a spokesperson from a Maori tribe, the Ngati Poneke, said the rise was also a visible effect of the renaissance of things Maori:

The Waitangi celebrations and the tremendous pride Maori felt at their contribution, the opening of the Commonwealth Games and the coming together of the Kaumata and people under the Maori Congress, work schemes, cultural activities and the language itself have all been highlighted. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 June 1991a)
The example is useful because it supports remarks by Rose (1984) that feelings of national pride involve complicated interconnections of national symbols, family relations and material conditions.

Rose’s view is that through culturally-specific institutions such as work and family, “national pride is the psychological hinge that joins self-fulfilment with public purposes of government” (p. 85). Moreover, as Rose notes:

Whereas an economically prosperous and internationally powerful government can make both material and economic appeals for support, an economically insecure and internationally weak state no longer has the material inducements to ‘buy’ loyalty. (p. 85)

The point of assembling these examples is not to provide a comprehensive explanation, but instead to add some background detail to many individual self-inclusive remarks and judgements about changing, encouraging or increasing forms of collective pride in a culture. For example, the above remarks indicate why candidates for election, such as Ross Perot in 1992, would make such widely reported statements as:

Americans long for a leader who will bring back the things they feel they have lost: good wages, steady jobs, safe streets, God-driven values, pride in country. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 June 1992)

Many of these examples indicate that much of the talk about creating or increasing pride is hollow, especially when used by politicians close to an election. Thus in an extension of Rosenberg’s (1990) category, there seem to be few instances of reflexive agency in the broad sense in which, for example, a politician’s attempt to create a positive collective emotion will
actually lead to "an experience of being an active or efficient cause in the production of some outcome" (p. 3; except, perhaps, the sense in which individuals and teams may come, through their own achievements, to be both the cause and object of an increase in national pride).

Despite examples which suggest that particular occasions encourage and maintain rather than intentionally create feeling of pride, attempts are still made to use the media for such purposes. For example the organizers of Sydney’s Olympics announced a $40 million dollar television, newspaper and cinema "nationwide advertising and marketing blitz to instil a sense of national pride and Australian identity in the lead-up to the Olympic Games" (Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, Australia) 27 October 1998). It is interesting to speculate on the most effective means of using particular national images, myths, representative individuals, shared memories, aspects of national character, or people’s remarks in order to evoke a sense of pride. Such attempts are tempered by the fact that more intelligent members of a population are less likely to feel national pride and will instead favour a cosmopolitan perspective (Rose, 1984). Also it may be recognized that the project ultimately has a financial basis:

... a critical part of the campaign would be a definition of what it is to be Australian at the dawn of the next millenium as a way of generating enthusiasm for the Games. For the $600 million ticket sales to succeed, it was essential that demand for the Olympic and Paralympic Games was high when the sale started in June. (Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, Australia) 27 October 1998)

It is also possible, as following sections will investigate, for pride-creation attempts to use remarks by individuals from other nations to reaffirm what is unique and special about a country and its inhabitants. Subcultural and
other groups, however, may feel that such images and remarks have little to say about their place in a nation (i.e., such remarks do not include them in a collective sense of self-reference; see next section). Many individual experiences and expressions of national pride may also be far more idiosyncratic than the images, ideas and myths supplied and created by marketing and sales teams.

To reiterate, reflexive cognition and reflexive agency about forms of emotion were extended to our understanding of attempts, respectively, to represent and change forms of shared, collective and group pride. While the collective effects of forms of individual pride on a culture are often difficult to judge a number of examples were presented. Themes which emerged from these examples included the sense in which some human achievements and actions may produce, by reflecting generally on a group's values, a genuine feeling of pride. There is the potential for collective pride to occur in other unique circumstances as several examples connected with the Olympics indicated. In many cases, collective pride involves complicated cultural practices, symbols, commitments, education, training and ceremonies that reinforce individual judgements and feelings of pride. However, in an extension of the notion of reflexive agency to attempts to create positive collective emotions, common views of the most effective means of creating and encouraging pride tend to be unrealistic. The actual conditions that lead to increases in pride involve changes in complicated webs of economic conditions, family relations and cultural circumstances. While politicians, in particular, like to portray themselves as capable of effecting changes that will increase pride, it is extremely difficult to change the material conditions and manipulate the images that will lead to such an
increase. This is especially so when a nation’s population becomes more cosmopolitan, educated and culturally diverse.

Collective pride, self-inclusion and other-exclusion

The examples of collective pride presented to this point make it clear that pride in a group is woven into the practices of particular groups and cultures. While widespread forms of individual pride can have unexpected effects in a culture, it is pride in forms of group emotion and identity that provides the most salient and self-consciously considered examples of our age. For example, an article in *The Economist* describes the fact that “half a century after the end of the Second World War, how — and whether — to remember it still causes more anguish and ambivalence than pride among most of the peoples caught up in it” (1995, p. 21). This and other more recent and specific examples suggest further issues relevant to the creation, maintenance and manipulation of collective pride. In this section, the analysis centres on examples of collective pride which, while being self-inclusive in the sense that they can be felt to say something about “our group” and “our identity”, will inevitably exclude others. It will then consider some of the moves that individuals may make against such historical and political backgrounds in the last section.

Collective pride often does not mean a shared object of approbation or an unpredictable manifestation in a culture of individual values. By definition, it implies that expressions of “our pride” that “we” experience refer to collectives smaller than the entire human race which, therefore, implicitly or explicitly exclude other groups. However, such exclusion may not be
acknowledged because the focus is more on the fact that "people feel themselves to be interdependent parts of something greater than themselves" and are therefore "willing to sacrifice for a greater good and take pride in this sacrifice" (de Rivera, 1992, p. 208). Nevertheless, while it is not always the case that a collective sense of pride occurs, for example, when individuals talk proudly about their contribution to a greater cause, it is often illuminating to examine the limits of the inclusive sense of "us".

On some occasions, such as competitive events between groups or nations, a victory may lead a country to boast of its success at the expense of a rival. For example, a New Zealander commenting in a newspaper about his own sporting success also remarked:

... with pride [upon] a string of Kiwi triumphs over the last 10 days which have his country folk crowing at the expense of their traditional trans-Tasman rivals. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 February 1992b, brackets added)

While the example is parochial, the important point is that there are many ways in which forms of competition between groups provide the opportunity for expressions of pride. Further examples obvious in the news media and everyday discussions of most Western countries range from events such as the Olympic Games and political conflicts to the most specific of statistical comparisons. The latter is illustrated by the results of an OECD report on living and working in European countries based on disposable income, housing, holidays and possession of consumer goods and reactions which were reported as giving "offence and cause for pride in equal measure" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 9 May 1991). Perhaps for individuals from those countries who topped the scale, it could be seen as confirmation of what they already knew (although it probably did not summarize exactly why they
were proud of their country). In contrast, individuals from those countries at the bottom could be said to have been insulted, hence the description of Irish pride as being "stung" by the report.

Collective pride may be also be angrily defended along with any of the national symbols, notions of national identity or character, lifestyle, cultural practices or literary, artistic and sporting achievements that might be attacked by others. But it is also interesting to speculate about the extent to which notions of pride may not consider the positive opinions of other groups. However, the aim is not to extend theories such as Mead's (1934) account of the construction of the self in order to claim that national identity is created through the reflected appraisals of other countries. Instead, we need to examine how culturally specific and historically situated many forms of pride are to particular groups. For example, we could adopt a similar approach to Payne's (1960) literary comparisons of English, French, and German pride and use it to highlight important aspects of national and individual interactions. Appropriate background issues to pride might then be the willingness of individuals to defend the independence and autonomy of their culture. Rose (1984), for example, provides a brief account of political differences and their effects on current levels of national pride. In particular, he suggests that "the positive effect of having to struggle for national independence appears to have a long-lasting effect, enduring 200 years in the case of America" (p. 88). Rose also notes that:

... the great movement of colonial countries to independence in the decades since the Second World War has been a reminder of the potent and positive impact of nationalism and pride in nation. (p. 85)
Rather than add to Rose's account, it is sufficient to note that severing institutional connections with a "parental" country and attaining the right to collective self-determination are often connected with a lasting increase in the national pride.

An example of the former sense of attaining independence is evident in the following remark:

> It was almost inevitable that New Zealand would, as a matter of pride, eventually end its system of legal appeals to the Privy Council, Lord Gough of Chieveley said yesterday. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 6 March 1993)

More importantly, maintaining that independence may imitate a more global sense of pride recognizable as a robust self-image or national character and not just an occasional, intense emotion. The former sense of pride is suggested by an individual's retrospective explanation of why Vietnam won the Vietnam War:

> It is because we are proud — proud of Vietnam. We wanted our independence. We didn't want the country to be a slave colony for our citizens, and it is that which has helped us fight long and hard through 50 years. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 4 September 1992)

Although the criteria for evaluating such statements cannot be explored here, we can at least see that there is much to consider when judging the variations in national pride expressed by individuals in particular countries or cultures. In this case, the background to individual and collective manifestations (or effects) of national pride is a complex web of historical and political interaction.
Interestingly, the background of interaction evident in much of the national pride discourse is not a group equivalent of "reflexive role-taking" which explicitly considers what other nations think. As already noted, pride can occur when a country is obviously the focus of world attention even though no clear reason is provided as to why this attention is good (e.g., as the example of Catalonia and the Barcelona Olympics indicates (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 June 1992)). Sometimes it may seem as if nations seek the approval or approbation of other countries in a manner that does not suggest a robust national identity. For example, following a highly successful opening ceremony for the 1990 Commonwealth Games in New Zealand, the next day a television crew sought favourable opinions from people on a busy London street. The opinions were then played on a popular television news program with the aim, it seems, of confirming for viewers how good the opening ceremony really was. Other examples also suggest a background of dependence and approval-seeking rather than encouragement of a more robust national pride and identity. For instance, two interviewers who surveyed visitors' opinions of New Zealand and New Zealanders discovered:

> When we were interviewing overseas visitors they were keen to tell us how good our trains and coaches were and how helpful New Zealanders were. They were amazed at how much was done to make visitors feel welcome. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 10 January 1991)

What is most interesting is their speculation of the possible use of these remarks:

> Perhaps if more New Zealanders knew what overseas people thought of us we could feel very proud and have more
confidence in ourselves. We would certainly be doing ourselves a big favour. (loc. cit.)

It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that although expressions of what “we are proud of” are not always based on explicit comparisons and competitions with other nations or reflected appraisals, a background of political and historical interaction can persist in the uncertain opinions of a relatively young country\textsuperscript{22}.

When national pride is felt and expressed by such a group, a further lack of “reflexive role-taking” may occur in the failure to realize that the referential sweep of “our pride” does not consider the views and feelings of others. Although an important part of international sporting competitions and the motivation for athletes involves the clichéd image of “standing on the podium, a medal draped around their neck” as their “victorious face is beamed around the world” (\textit{Sydney Morning Herald} (Sydney, Australia) 11 June 1997), it is easy to forget that the world is unlikely to share this passion and excitement. Thus where pride is shared and deeply felt by many individuals within a group, it can play a significant role in their lives. But it is often expressed with little consideration for other groups or directly concerned with how they may view such parochial expressions of national pride.

\textsuperscript{22} If there is a culturally relevant sense of reflexive cognition in such cases it is the importance of challenging myths that surround some forms and objects of collective pride. An example from New Zealand indicates how years of speculation about a national sport and its role in shaping what other countries think of “us” can create a myth:

\ldots rugby has helped forge an international identity for New Zealand and its people, just as it has helped to forge unity and a national pride within the country. (\textit{Press} (Christchurch, N.Z.) 16 April 1992)

One particular aspect of the myth is that this is the predominant way in which New Zealanders see themselves and promote themselves overseas. In contrast, “modern Norwegians talk proudly of their heritage and dismiss their forebears’ clichéd association with rape and pillage” (\textit{Press} (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 July 1990). This is one way in which speculation and myths
Moreover, important issues of pride in relation to identity might be missed by the fact that individuals within our group (such as indigenous cultures) are not always included within the referential sweep of “we” and talk of “our achievements”. This is not to deny that international acclaim and approbation for, or recognition of, individuals and teams on an international stage can be experienced widely by members of a group. For example, in 1990 it was reported that:

... from President to pushcart vendor, most Mexicans have reacted with pride to Octavio Paz’s achievement on being the first Mexican awarded the Nobel Prize for literature. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 13 October 1990)

Obviously, even such well-judged remarks on behalf of a majority do not preclude a sense of pride within more specific group or subcultures. Rose (1984), for example, notes that the pride of a regional form of identity need not be incompatible with the greater whole of a nation. More specifically, there is no reason to think that more localized and specialized forms of collective pride are possible as indicated by a local player's win in an international competition:

An outpouring of nationalistic pride and fervour occurred at Eden Park on Saturday and a similar outbreak happened at Paraparaumu Beach yesterday as a home-grown golfer won the $250,000 AMP New Zealand Open. Whereas the Auckland crowd cheered the New Zealand cricketers to its upset World Cup cricket win against Australia, it was a 5000-strong Wellington gallery which roared its approval as Grant Waite, from Palmerston North, birdied the last hole to take the championship by two strokes and the first prize of $45,000.

... “To win the New Zealand Open only one hour from Hokowhitu where I learnt my golf and in front of family and friends is something I will never forget as long as I live. It is an about pride need to be challenged by further work on its construction and creation within and between cultures.
experience like that which enriches life. I'm proud and honoured as many great names are inscribed on the trophy over the years.” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 24 February 1992).

Nevertheless, there is considerable potential for specific “emotional climates” (de Rivera, 1992) to be felt within a country, without necessarily being shared, supported by, or even heard of by other members of a nation.

It is also worth considering that collective pride in international relations may also involve a background of unique cultural practices which is not immediately understood by individuals from another group (in the sense that we could “fully understand”, feel and share the same emotions). For example, when Swaziland’s 24-year-old King Mswati was reported by the Times of Swaziland as about to marry his eight wife, the version of the report that eventually reached New Zealand suggested:

Royal polygamy is a source of pride to the people of the southern African monarchy — Mswati’s father, Sobhuza, had more than 100 wives when he died in 1982 at the age of 83. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 10 July 1992a)

Although this example suggests many interesting issues about the values, traditions and social relations of Swaziland, it would seem to require further investigation to determine how this pride is experienced and expressed. Interestingly, it may also indicate a possible sense of what it means to talk of a new emotion or, at the very least, a shared emotion that is quite different from anything “we” celebrate. In this case, any talk of a different collective manifestation of pride is constrained by the conventions that contextualize and logically tie various criteria to the use of the expression. For that reason, it could be said that it does not make sense to talk of new collective emotions but only new forms of expression. A more specific example is the
American "hand on the heart" when expressing patriotic feelings and participating in relevant ceremonies. But in many countries such displays of love for one's country are regarded as a kind of gross indulgence. Moreover, there is a sense in which many individuals could not share anything like the sincerity of this expression because of their upbringing in a culture with quite different conventions surrounding the experience and expression of pride.

In summary, collective pride was examined in practices where it is usually shared with others rather than as a more idiosyncratic occurrence. However, in contrast to talk of inclusive talk of human pride, examples in which stating what "we are proud of" implicitly or explicitly excludes others were assembled. In this respect, group pride is not necessarily dependent upon what others think of "them" although where it is, a less robust sense of identity and independence can be inferred. Interestingly, a background of historical and political relations between groups may contrast with a group member's explicit pride-related considerations and explanations. Collective pride also does not preclude more idiosyncratic forms and "outpourings" of pride or alternative subcultural views. Group differences may also not be "fully understood" because the relevant collective pride is based on unique cultural practices and forms of training.

**Reflexive positioning and individual expressions of group pride**

In the previous sections, extended senses of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition have been used to understand collective manifestations of pride and related cultural symbols and practices. While it may be difficult to judge
the complicated issues raised by the brief survey of instances of collective pride, it is possible to examine some of the moves that individuals may make against background practices. Interestingly, Tan and Moghaddam's (1995) notion of reflexive positioning connects with this attempt to highlight the relations between individual experiences and expressions of group pride in relation to their own and other cultures. The potential for individuals to position themselves intentionally against background practices is therefore a further line of investigation in a conceptual-discursive approach to collective pride.

It has already been noted that feelings of pride, whether evoked in social practices or in more idiosyncratic and individual ways, often serve to connect the concerns and satisfactions of ordinary individuals with those of national institutions. In this sense, it is possible that forms of national, group and family pride that have individuals as their objects play a broader role than the individuals involved are aware of. For example, although Rose (1984) notes that "twentieth-century family histories everywhere bear unfortunate witness to the devastating effects that international wars can have upon families" (p. 85), it is clear that there is an equally strong potential for families to take pride in such sacrifices. In one recent instance, two identical twins were reported in the New Zealand media as doing their overseas experience together by both joining the British Army and serving in the Gulf War. The point is that the newspaper article emphasises that "their proud family, though anxious, say they are right behind them" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 January 1991b). Moreover, reminding ourselves that individuals within a family can be proud of family members who perform a difficult task on behalf of their country helps us to understand the variety of ways in which individuals relate to collectives and vice versa.
The issues here are complicated, but what the analysis highlights is that many possible objects and sources of pride would otherwise remain hidden without a comprehensive survey. A variety of political, cultural and historical factors explain why some individuals feel compelled to serve as exemplars of duty or service while others do not. Although national loyalty has a basis in economic security and a perceived strength in international relations (Rose, 1984), a feature of Western cultures is also that educated and intelligent individuals actively resist attempts by the state to appeal to this loyalty. The collective, cultural effect of scepticism about the commitment that individuals should have towards broader governmental aims is indicated by a commentary on a British newspaper's treatment of the Gulf War:

The “Sun” recruited the famous World War I poster of General Kitchener with outstretched arm, for some extremely unorthodox Gulf service. The old recruiting poster now features the slogan: “Girls, Gulf heroes need YOU!” and is an invitation for “Young, free and single” women to join the “Sun” Lonely Hearts Club. The intention is to match the young women with British soldiers fighting in the Gulf. In best jingoistic style the newspaper offers the girls “A fella to be proud of.” Remind you of any other war this century? (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 January 1991a)

National pride, it seems, was far more successfully evoked, instilled and manipulated by governments earlier in the twentieth century (i.e., in contrast to what is now a reduction in bellicosity connected with government appeals to pride (Rose, 1984)). However, while our lasting impression may be that manipulation occurred in a more naïve age, it is more realistic and relevant to explore forms of resistance still employed by individuals against these social forces.
Despite what we regard as a strong sense of our independence from state appeals to nationalism and civic pride, a small minority will always actively resist any appeal to national pride (in contrast to the lessons of family histories about the costs of military conflict). Moreover, they will not only distance themselves from their society but also attempt to persuade others that there is no reason for pride. Although, minority attempts to persuade others why "we should not be proud" are unlikely to be successful, nevertheless such individuals will stand out because "the proud majority of citizens are a relatively silent majority" (Rose, 1984, p. 93; i.e., so as long as "not being proud of" or even claiming "to be ashamed of" their country continues to attract a disproportionate amount of media attention). This type of resistance, whatever the argument involved, can be regarded as agentive and reflexive because it is intentional rather than accidental or due to a lack of effort. For example, it contrasts with the embarrassment of not knowing the words of a national anthem (which does not, of course, indicate a lack of national pride) since it is a more active attempt to go against shared feelings, norms and expectations (i.e., it is analogous to sitting when an anthem is played and everyone else stands).

On other occasions, expressions of group or national pride seem to involve a form of individual self-positioning against the people and practices of another culture. Sometimes the way in which a country and its history enter into the expressions and considerations of particular individuals does not exhibit obvious resistance or self-positioning:

I am proud of New Zealand, partly because of the way in which my forebears settled here. I have strong links with England — I still think of it as home — but New Zealand is like an opening flower. It has developed to the bud stage but when the flower
However, the foundation and combined effect of such individual uncertainty may only be made apparent in relations between cultures. For example, an American wrote of New Zealander he met while travelling that “they seemed to me the hardest people in the world to compliment” and:

... there was something Calvinist in this refusal to accept praise, but it was so persistent it was almost as though in their stubborn humility they were fishing for compliments. (Theroux, 1992, p. 22)

The misunderstanding in this case may make it seem as if the refusal to accept praise with regard to an individual’s country was intentional. In this respect, the New Zealand reaction resembles a similar approach towards visiting celebrities in Australia where, until recently, they were asked after just arriving in the country, “what do you think of Australia” (Clark, 1993, p. 71). In the latter case, there is no indication that Australians refused to accept any praise either then or later (perhaps due to the suspicion that it was not genuine). But it is possible that there are forms of positioning by individuals from Australasian cultures that reflect uncertainty about the world standing of their own country (i.e., between individuals that represent wider cultural attitudes and relations). Moreover, it may represent a widely shared, cultural resistance to statements or expressions that could be regarded as individual manifestations of a country’s indulgent, overly patriotic or potentially arrogant national character.

A role for an extended sense of reflexive agency or cognition as a form of discursive self-positioning might also be found in relation to estimates of “our” position relative to other countries and cultures. With
regard to New Zealand, complicated individual reactions occur against a background of considering what is unique about “our country” and also how “we” are developing as a culture. These issues are evident in the particular pride the director Peter Jackson took from the fact that a film produced within New Zealand was popular overseas:

We are not very successful at making other people laugh at our films or our television and one of the things I am most proud of about ‘Brain Dead’ is that it’s a comedy that is very New Zealand that is appreciated all around the world. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 22 August 1992)

Interestingly, a feature of some personal, idiosyncratic, and even private ways of expressing national pride is that feelings of a positive regard for a person’s national identity are more likely to occur in foreign settings. (e.g, Peter Jackson’s remarks were made at an international film festival). For example, a newspaper report on the visit by a New Zealand Prime Minister to an Expo pavilion in Spain in 1992 indicates how specific emotional reactions can be spontaneously and surprisingly evoked:

Jim Bolger will hear the New Zealand pavilion before he sees it. The floating cry of a gannet wafts across the dry Seville air. Then his eyes will focus on the rockface. It is strewn with fake guano from the mechanical gannets and surrounded by a rockpool. A burst of pride will stir in the Prime Ministerial breast, as it does in any New Zealander lucky enough to travel to what is exactly the opposite side of the world. . . .

Among the Spaniards, word is filtering out that this little country, Nueva Zeland, is rather special. They have a word for it: duende — something which is vivid yet dark, and has soul and depth. It is something captured in a gull’s cry and a replica cliff-face which New Zealanders have every reason to be proud of. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 25 June 1992)

Thus feelings of national pride can occur in such varied situations as conversations with individuals from other countries, by displaying a flag or
any other symbol overseas, or seeing something that represents "my country" in a foreign setting (see Figure 3 in Appendix, p. 694).

Perhaps the notion of a world stage is more important to smaller countries and those with a recent history. There is certainly a sense in which individual and team achievements can provide a powerful addition to national identity (e.g., individuals can become icons in the celebration, confirmation and vindication of "our" way of life). A more specific possibility also occurs for those individuals who are regarded as representatives of a national identity from the perspective of reflexive agency: individuals have the potential to be an active agent in producing an increase in group pride — to become the object or focus of national pride — in a way that is often denied opinion leaders and politicians. For example, the death of Bobby Moore, the captain of the World Cup winning English soccer team, was reported in the following way:

Moore was the focus of an entire nation on that July afternoon 27 years ago. That golden moment is remembered with pride and emotion by all Englishmen and women who saw it, making Moore's death an even greater shock to the nation. *(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 26 February 1993)*

There is clearly more than a little myth-making reflected in this report. Such myth making can usually be found in accounts of events which capture the widespread interest and support of almost every member of a particular group. In this case, it would certainly be worthwhile examining the experiences of individuals who not only achieve their own goals but can be said to be the intentional, "active or efficient cause" in the creation of a much broader emotional "outcome" (Rosenberg, 1990). This future study would also add extra detail to an account of how particular individuals, such as the
highly successful skier Alberto Tomba, come to be described as "Italy's pride and joy" (*Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 December 1992a).

A final consideration in this section also uses an extension of self-directed forms of agency and cognition: in particular, Rosenberg's (1990) view that "reflexive processes can be directed either toward the self as a whole or toward its constituent parts" (p. 3). In this case, where it is unlikely that an individual or team is able to increase "our" national pride because the interest and support of the entire nation is lacking, it is possible that pride may be taken as saying something more specific. For example, an achievement may be said to restore national pride in a more specific sense such as where the efforts of one English cricketer were described as helping to restore "England's pride as a cricketing nation" *Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 30 July 1990). Perhaps a better example than the usually empty talk of restoring team pride is where an individual shifts his or her attention to a redeeming feature of his or her country (i.e., in spite of all its other problems). For example, in Eco's (1989) novel *Foucault's Pendulum* one of the characters adds a conversational rejoinder:

... thank heaven this is a civilized country, whatever people may say; we have a public health system we can be proud of. (p. 516)

It is also important that some measure of commitment to the nation is implied by this remark even though the "source of pride" is selective and idiosyncratic. Otherwise, the result would be to adopt a kind of self-serving focus on whatever an individual wanted to choose as the basis for national pride.

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23 This format will be used to refer to individuals despite its apparent clumsiness and a personal preference for "they" and "their" as argued for by Mülhäusler & Harré (1990). Even though good reasons exist for using "they" as a gender-neutral alternative to "he or she" and
pride. Thus choosing components of "our country" which are used to say something about the "whole" cannot simply be a matter of choice as when, for example, "a person enrolls under a flag, with a political party, or with a football team" (Kundera, 1992, p. 258).

To reiterate, further extensions of Rosenberg's (1990) notions of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition were highlighted by potential forms of individual self-positioning about "us" in relation to others. The analysis began with the combined effects of individual criticism and resistance in relation to attempts to evoke a sense of loyalty through national pride (e.g., for the purposes of supporting a possible sacrifice in military conflict or national duty). Further instances of intentional reflexive positioning are attempts, usually by educated individuals, to distance themselves from such bellicose or arrogant aspects of their culture. Other forms of reflexive positioning were examined including the possibility of seeking the opinions of other countries and refusing praise in a manner which may only be obvious in interactions with individuals from other cultures. It was also suggested that individuals and teams may demonstrate a form of reflexive agency when their efforts make them both the object and source of pride for a nation. However, it is also important that a background of commitment is present in order for the achievements of others to be more than self-serving when they are used to say something about "us".

"his or her", its use often evokes a "surface grammar" corrective response that bypasses the point of, and need for, this grammatical change.
5.2 Constructing pride, the right to be exceptional and moral autonomy

This section continues the exploration of the limits, surroundigs and consequences of emotion and personal reflexivity by examining instances where an individual’s pride contrasts with the values of his or her collective. In particular, it is interesting to examine where such contrasts play an important role in the moral development of a culture because it provokes a change to existing political and social structures (i.e., because examples of pride indicate the reflexive autonomy of individuals against the moral, political and institutional features of a collective). This treatment of further cases of pride also connects with social constructionist remarks about “identity politics” (Gergen, 1996) and the “fleeting moments” (Shotter & Katz, 1996) which supposedly form the basis of many ethical and political struggles (see Part 1, chapter 4).

Individual pride and moral forms of reflexive positioning against collectives

While the concept of reflexive positioning developed by Tan and Moghaddam (1995) highlights individual discursive moves against a broader background, these moves may also be widely shared moral stances that are apparent only in the relations between cultures. For example, Chakrabarti (1992) argues that in more “modern” societies, denigration of one’s own class, culture or country is practised as a social grace. In some cases, this “distinctive ability to perceive the faults of one’s own group is flaunted as a matter of second-level individual — if not collective — pride” (p. 35). Although the expression “second-level” pride does not necessarily
mean that a culture or society is *proud of its humility*, it is worth exploring forms of self-positioning founded on the realization that it is unwise for a group to flaunt its power, wealth or achievements to such an extent that it causes resentment or envy in excluded groups.

Chakrabarti (1992) has recently described the "widespread belief that the larger or more inclusive the group with which I identify myself in feeling collectively proud, the less morally objectionable is the pride" (p. 35). While it is true that in some cases "implicit cultural or national pride counts as more pardonable than implicit individual pride" (p. 35), one of many notable exceptions is an attempt to use national pride as the reason for insulting another country's representative. For example, when the Prime Minister of New Zealand Jim Bolger attempted to dismiss an earlier description of the Premier of Victoria, Joan Kirner, as a "fat lady", the statement "I will respond because I am quite proud of New Zealand" was not seen as a convincing excuse for a poorly judged personal insult (*Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 August 1992b). The example is also revealing because such deference by an individual to collective pride shows that widely recognized or respected spokespersons, in particular, are responsible for accurately representing the thoughts, emotions and values of their group. In contrast, pride in an individual's own culture, community, or country is pardonable and potentially virtuous where it guards against selfish individualism. For example, a New Zealander awarded an honorary doctorate defers the honour to his Maori tribe (the Ngai Tahu):

I'm humbled by the honour that was done to me. I feel proud that Ngai Tahu has this adornment as a people. (*Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 8 May 1992)
Accordingly, a number of points emerge for future investigation about ways in which individuals are judged when they adopt a selfish or selfless stance towards individuals from their own or another group.

Interactions based on group pride are also worth exploring because they show how considerations of power enter into individual expressions of group pride. In particular, expressions of pride by members of a group that has a dominant role in a culture, nation or society are often regarded as insulting to other, less powerful and marginalized groups. A specific example is of a Caucasian individual in New Zealand who wore a T-shirt saying "Proud to be white" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 16 January 1991). Although we need not be concerned with the emotions of the individual concerned at the time he decided upon this form of display, such a postmodern expression of pride would be clearly understood by others. Interestingly, this example extends a point by Rosenberg's (1990) that clothes and costumes can themselves be intentionally chosen devices used to produce emotions in the individual wearing them as well as to produce "emotional impressions on the minds of the audience" (p. 10). The fact that the individual described in the report was the victim of a murder seems to confirm the care that most individuals in a powerful group normally take not to provoke hostile reactions in others.

The inoffensive and more appropriate sense in which group pride can be expressed is found where a minority needs to encourage pride in its own identity. In such cases, talk of group pride often fades into remarks about nationalism and the reasons for renewed pride by a group (e.g., some of the reasons for increases in Maori pride as noted in section 5.1). Interestingly, it is also objectionable to any sense of autonomy and independence to claim that the achievement of marginalized individuals should be within the
culture and systems of the dominant group. For example, an academic commenting upon the indigenous people of New Zealand and their problems remarked:

"Learning Maori language, and raising an awareness in the Treaty of Waitangi is good, but they don't get you jobs. "When Maori begin to achieve in the professions of the European system, then their pride will come by itself," Dr Newbold said.

He said he would probably be branded racist, and a Maori-basher, but refusing to recognise there was a problem would only make it worse. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 31 January 1992a)

There are a number of complicated political and historical factors that would need to be examined in order to account for a lack of pride in a group as well as any potential increase. But an important point which can initially be drawn from these examples it that "we" cannot object on moral grounds to attempts by marginalized groups to increase their own pride.

While challenging the power and dominance of a group is not necessarily an individual moral position, its form in a collective may originate in the individual realization that particular inequities need not persist. But, once again, complex cultural surroundings need to be examined. The position of the Maori in New Zealand again provides a good example. Although in the 1940s the "proud boast" went that the country had "the best race relations in the world", it is now clear that race relations are no longer a source of national pride in New Zealand (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 31 December 1990). In the 1990s many individuals express confusion "that racial tension should exist in a society in which, at the personal level, good will between the races is commonplace, though not universal" (loc. cit.). The result is that many non-Maori recognize the importance of an increase in
Maori pride and also distance themselves from their own group, especially when its expressions of pride border on monocultural arrogance and ignorance.

However, in other circumstances individuals are not afforded the luxury of being able to take such a position. In some cases, individual attempts to draw attention to injustices or engage in the “reflexive positioning” of a protest against their own group will lead those individuals to be characterized as wrong, evil, or attempting to subvert an otherwise “good” system. The fact that such potentially moral protests do not occur in a cultural and political vacuum is indicated by more extreme responses to such ostensibly unpatriotic individuals. For example, Allende’s (1988) novel Of Love and Shadows provides a plausible account of a South American country in which the official line against unrest is that the authorities must act “with all necessary strength to impose order and restore civic pride” (p. 238). In such cases, any discursive counterpositioning which refers to group or civic pride implies the power to control and limit future protests.

In many of these cases, it is easy to see how subsequent events give the impression of moral progress from the way in which the isolated moral positions of individuals lead to group political clashes and, eventually, a sense of progression to new shared values within a society. A relevant example from the history of Russia is an attempt by the leaders of a eventually unsuccessful coup in 1991 to characterize protesters as trouble-makers. The fact that their stance had the backing of a wider value change was illustrated by a news story in which the legitimate Russian Defence Minister “told reporters he was proud of the way the crowd had behaved” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 22 August 1991). Obviously, the important point is not the Defence Minister’s feelings of pride which, in this case, could be
regarded as his opinion of the crowd's behaviour. Rather, it is of greater interest to note the generalization made by Gorbachev when he thanked Boris Yeltsin and the Soviet people for their opposition:

This is what we can truly be proud of. The most important thing: everything that we have done after 1985 has already given its realistic fruits. Our people have become different...

(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 August 1991)

Political change and new values may therefore manifest themselves as an individual and group willingness to fight to maintain a way of life. These changes may, in turn, become a source of pride for many individuals and a reason for others to offer praise.

A similar source of pride is obvious when individuals adopt an ethical but unpopular position on national or international events before their view becomes widespread. For example, New Zealanders who protested against tours by South African rugby teams have the satisfaction of knowing that their actions had an important effect on the future of South Africa: that is, despite the fact that fighting against rugby tours in New Zealand at the beginning of the 1980s could be described accurately as a "lonely" battle against Apartheid (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 14 October 1991). However, persistent feelings of pride experienced by protestors are not based on the notoriety of their political stance which, at least in the case of Apartheid protestors, was subsequently vindicated. Rather, as indicated by an individual who described himself as proud to have been involved in a protest group, their pride is probably based on a feature of the group's activities:
There was a forthrightness, a stroppiness, a willingness to clash with police in support of the cause. People won't forget that. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 30 November 1992)

If we were to generalize Rosenberg’s account to this type of political activism, it is clear that the involvement of emotion is much more complicated than a purpose of social control or role performance (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 4). Indeed, given Rosenberg’s limited account of the relations between individuals and collectives, it is likely that the feeling of pride would not be explained in terms of individual autonomy. Instead, Rosenberg’s account might have used this as an example of the fact that mimicking the behaviour of a crowd can dramatically influence an individual’s judgements of her or his own emotions and the reasons for subsequent actions. If so this position illustrates Parker’s (1989) argument that labelling the behaviour of people in groups as the results of “mob” emotional contagion or “crowd” influence often serves a political purpose.

The conclusion here is that many individuals often find it personally important and satisfying to maintain a sense of autonomy about moral and political issues (i.e., despite various forms of coercion and persecution).

To reiterate, Tan and Moghaddam’s (1995) work on reflexive positioning was used to account for issues of political and moral value that provide the background to individual expressions and experiences of pride. In particular, some forms of individual positioning suggest moral issues that are only evident in the relations between cultures and subcultures. Many individuals recognize, for example, that it is inappropriate and even immoral to express forms of cultural pride if their group is dominant. Group pride is less objectionable and more considerate of others when it involves the deferment of an individual achievement to a collective. Individuals and
small groups may also distance themselves from their own broader collective when expressions of pride in the latter border on arrogance and ignorance. Unfortunately, autonomous moves made by individuals for predominantly ethical reasons are often the subjects of counterpositioning (e.g., by discourses that call upon a national and civic pride or talk of protestors as "crowds" and "mobs"). Thus although it is possible that active, reflexive positioning by individuals and small groups may be a lonely experience, the autonomy of efforts to make and to maintain political and ethical changes often produces strong and persistent feelings of pride.

Culture and the distinction between moral and immoral autonomy

It is clear that forms of moral and political reflexive positioning can spread through a culture to the point that their incorporation in daily practices is regarded as a virtue. However, it can often be difficult to judge the basis for a proper or improper pride in actions that may, for example, be illegal. Sometimes the eventual recognition and even popularity of positions that originally had little support demonstrates the extent to which moral autonomy is valued in Western culture (i.e., that the person adhering to the position resists social forces when it would be easier not to). With respect to the former issue, Stearns (1993) argues that changes in the history of emotions can be indicated by the introduction and amendment of particular pieces of legislation. The previous section examined the potential for protest groups to take considerable pride in the autonomy of their actions. Stearn's point is especially applicable to the results of those protest efforts, especially where they focus on what may be called the rights of individuals
to be exceptional (i.e., to be different without harassment as well as to succeed and to achieve without discrimination).

An important point is that although protests and social changes have led to the emergence of societal institutions which aim to guard against discrimination and other abuses of power, the existence of such institutions does not dissolve the responsibility, or potential solidarity, of individuals. In Western societies, moral autonomy is often expected of individuals even when it may seem that the institutions and broader structures of a society are appropriate and immutable. A good example of this issue is provided by East German border guards who were proud to carry out what they regarded as a difficult duty. Despite taking on a task that few of them found pleasant, they were still prosecuted for killing escapees after reunification in Germany, as media reports indicate:

A former member of what was once deemed the elite of the Warsaw Pact's defence forces — the border guards of Communist East Germany — sat shaking uncontrollably in the dock of Berlin's criminal court room No. 700 recently, his face wet with tears of remorse and despair. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 November 1991)

The psychological detail of this and other border guards' pride in carrying out a difficult role would be worth investigating (i.e., along with the reasons why the defence "I was just obeying orders" is unacceptable). But in this context it is more interesting to note the radical changes in East German society that were required for this individual's pride in being a model product and important member of the political machinery to be transformed into the shame of being prosecuted for murder. The border guard's reported shame seems to stem from the recognition that this was an occasion on which he should have made an individual moral decision, whatever the personal cost.
It is not necessarily the case that a lack of moral autonomy while proudly performing the duties of a particular role must lead to shame (i.e., when political and possibly moral changes cast an individual's actions in a new light). Some criminals, for example, can be described as affecting a kind of proud dignity in which they acknowledge their crimes, do not complain about their punishment and avoid public displays of shame. Iris Murdoch (1983) provides a brief but plausible description of a war criminal who "after many years in prison emerges not exactly repentant but full of stoical wisdom, facing the truth, quiet and proud, acknowledging his acts as his own" (p. 556). However, this possible outcome is reduced to a tactic in the following account of a lawyer's comparison of a crime boss with his informant:

John Gotti's lawyer portrayed the reputed boss of America's biggest organised crime family yesterday as a proud man who was unafraid to face prosecutors who he said had conducted a vendetta against him for years. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 15 February 1992)

In contrast, Gotti's informant is described by the lawyer as "a little man full of evil, connivance, manipulation and vanity" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 15 February 1992). An obvious point emerges from a brief comparison of the "border guard" and "organized crime boss" examples: when an individual recognizes his or her failure to act in morally autonomous way, the result is not always shame and tearful remorse. Culpability may also be accepted in a stoical manner or even defiantly rejected in what can be called a form of immoral autonomy.

Although there are many ways of describing a community and its values, it is common for representatives to summarize central features
through phrases such as a group priding itself "on being hospitable, warm and friendly" *(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 January 1992)*. The fact that this phrase was used in reference to the "shameful murder" of a visiting tourist by a member of the same community suggests a number of points about the role of social institutions. In particular, the fact that particular individuals within a community may not feel disquiet or display anything more than a frown in relation to such actions does not undermine the importance of what is talked about as a community's pride. The example therefore demonstrates the way in which talk of pride by group representatives is part of the expression of shared normative values that have become institutionalized and no longer specifically refer to the feelings and sentiments of particular individuals. The point is not to deny that a shared reaction of shame, anger, or disbelief can occur especially when an individual within a community seems to be proud of a deviant, odd or illegal act. For example, it may be difficult to understand how an individual could be proud of murdering his remedial teacher. In this case, the fact that the individual concerned bragged about his actions to other prisoners prompted the Crown prosecutor at his trial to say: "You were quite proud of the fact, weren't you?" *(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 10 April 1992)*. If this individual were genuinely proud of his actions and, moreover, expressed little remorse for them, it would demonstrate an example of immoral autonomy.

Faced with such individuals it is difficult to argue that they do not feel an emotion like pride, but nevertheless it is so far removed from normal praiseworthy actions that he or she may be difficult to understand. The individual would undoubtedly confront many of the same coercive and disciplinary practices that many others acting for moral or political change confront at some point. However, the distinction between moral and
immoral autonomy involves a number of criteria of which the most important seems to be the individual's recognition of the effects of her or his actions (i.e., which is why legal, police and corrective systems value confession as a sign of a fundamental cognitive reorientation towards society's norms and values). Moreover, a further important difference between moral and immoral autonomy with regard to illegal acts is that pride in immoral and illegal activities is not connected with an attempt to convert others to a new moral and political position. It is difficult to imagine an acceptable defence on moral grounds of the adolescent who murdered his remedial teacher or, to stretch the point further, to provide an account of his actions that anticipates a future change in societal values.

There are further cases where the content of an apparently sincere pride in something that others find objectionable and inappropriate can be subjected to critical analysis. For instance, although the report of an individual who claims "I'm proud my daughter is a sex star" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 April 1992) lacks useful detail, it nevertheless begs a number of interesting questions (apart from an opportunity to laugh at some of the more ridiculous topics on American television). Specifically, we may ask whether this statement has the characteristic expression of pride but not the usual content. This is simply because such statements may be made only to claim "I am not ashamed" therefore suggesting a positive but defiant reaction against the values of a group (rather than an act of praise or a sincere expression of genuine admiration). Furthermore, given the distinction drawn above, we could ask whether the sex star's mother is attempting to persuade others to adopt her values in the practices of their community? The point is that although the statement may express a strong and genuine feeling of pride, it does not seem to be based on a reasonable
argument to which the individual concerned is trying to convert others (i.e., why being a sex star is worthy of praise). Thus while values towards such careers have certainly changed in the last part of the twentieth century, tolerating this form of reflexive positioning by an individual (on behalf of herself and her daughter) is still quite different from sharing those values (i.e., since in the same situation many of us would probably feel embarrassment or shame and would not become advocates of this argument).

A variety of practical and discursive responses other than those already mentioned are directed towards individuals who actively contradict the implicit values of a group or its explicit sources of pride (e.g., by attempting to “convert” others to their perspective). For example, in response to an account on the reasons why New Zealanders should be ashamed of their country, one individual wrote:

I stand corrected (head bowed and shoulders sagging); of course Hugh Perry ... is right. A pride-laden national anthem must be earned and, apart from a few outstanding sporting achievements, we Kiwis have little cause for pride. Our sadly stratified society, with its tremendously wide spread from ultra-rich to desperately poor, is a matter more for shame, as it more and more resembles that of a tatty Latin republic. Therefore, our present “wishy-washy wish list” of an anthem seems appropriate. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 4 March 1992a)

In this case, it is possible that unpatriotic individuals have another form of pride (i.e., they are proud to be cosmopolitan rather than jingoistic). Rose (1984) suggests that an unpatriotic minority in many countries is comprised of educated individuals who usually seek to convince others of their view (i.e. rather than promote nonsense and invite ridicule). Nevertheless, where an attack on national pride is unconstructive criticism or unnecessary
pessimism, it may only succeed in distancing its individual advocates from their culture, group or society.

In summary, an additional aspect of the moral and political relations between individuals and collectives was explored through the example of an individual who is eventually prosecuted for actions performed in a role that he was proud to carry out. The example indicates the importance that is placed on moral autonomy in many groups even though engaging in moral actions may carry a large personal risk or cost. It also suggests the potential for individuals to maintain autonomy in other ways when confronting moral, societal and cultural changes. For example, individuals may not necessarily feel shame and express remorse but acknowledge the wrongness of their actions and accept their punishment. In contrast, a case of immoral autonomy would be to remain defiant in the face of moral and political changes or legal and disciplinary coercion. Perhaps the most extreme way in which individuals may position themselves against their own group is by being proud of an immoral and illegal act. Institutionalization of the judgements and reactions against such individuals may undermine our sense of personal outrage. But perhaps the most important feature lacking in examples of immoral autonomy is a genuine attempt to convince others of the correctness of an alternative view. Thus autonomous, proud but illegal, odd or unusual actions and remarks may only succeed in distancing the individuals expressing them from other members of their group (as well as inviting disciplinary institutions and a coercive response).
Individual pride, sources of moral realization and the right to be exceptional

An important feature of moral autonomy is that the correctness and autonomy of an individual's ethical or political position is eventually recognized by other members of a group. However, it is also interesting to examine the emergence of an ethical or political position in the contrast between the institutions of a collective and the rights of individuals. For example, a moral position may begin to form when an individual realizes that previously disadvantaged or discriminated groups do not forfeit the right to be proud of their identity and to have equal opportunities to achieve. Obviously, individuals who proudly work to maintain societal institutions are often not the innovators of social change. Instead new ethical and political stances come from individuals who recognize at first-hand the injustice of arbitrary discrimination against particular groups and seek to change the appropriate social, political and legal institutions.

In Part 1, Shotter and Katz (1996) suggested that Wittgenstein's methods might be used to examine ethical and political positions in their initial formation. This point can be illustrated by individual actions that generate feelings of pride and which would not, if openly expressed or shared, be regarded by their community as worthy of praise. In particular, Ibsen's A Doll's House offers a relevant example because one of the characters, Nora, is proud of the fact that she illegally borrows money to help her husband:

Nora. But now I'm going to tell you something, Kristine. I too have something to be proud and happy about.

Mrs. Linde. I don't doubt that. But what is it you mean?
Nora. Not so loud. Imagine if Torvald were to hear! He must never on any account . . . nobody must know about it, Kristine, nobody but you.

Mrs. Linde. But what is it?

Nora. Come over here. [She pulls her down on the sofa beside her.] Yes, Kristine, I too have something to be proud and happy about. I was the one who saved Torvald's life. (Act One, pp. 12-13)

Adding to Shotter and Katz's account, it is the reactions of individuals towards Nora's act that eventually leads her to recognize the unfairness of the restrictions placed upon her and, more broadly, women within her society. If the example is representative of the formation of ethical and political stances, it provides an alternative to the view that individuals simply realize the nature of an injustice at some point (i.e., when a source of individual pride conflicts with social circumstances and milieu).

The arbitrary basis upon which women were restricted from pursuing many opportunities for personal achievement, independence from men and public recognition is also indicated by the following example from a 19th century writer:

To think that all in me of which my Father would have felt a proper pride had I been a man, is deeply mortifying to him because I am a woman. (Nies, 1977, p. 86)

Because this particular view was normal at the time, women who knew they had fulfilled all the criteria for success found it remarkable that they were criticized. Often such female achievement was thought to be inappropriate because it would embarrass and humiliate the males connected with them.24

24 However, this is not to deny that examples of solidarity can be found in various forms in the other half of the world's population. For instance, some men can be described as proud to have dropped words like "forbid" from their vocabulary (Kundera, 1992, p. 192). And other
Nevertheless, the argument here is that the persistence of a personal, positive and evaluative emotion against existing social relations is important to the emergence of a wider social and political movement (i.e., Gergen's (1996) "identity politics").

This background of disproportionate opportunities for male success and preoccupation with public recognition of men's achievements created the historical conditions for a type of national pride for countries that afforded equal rights to women. For example, New Zealanders proudly claim that their country was the first in the world to recognize legally women's right to vote. More interestingly, it also allowed for the construction of a sense of pride that can be found in many other areas of life: namely, where an individual can take pride in being the first person to achieve a particular role, position, goal or outcome. For example, the cultural significance of the relatively recent appointment in America of Janet Reno as the first female Attorney-General was recognized in her statement: "I hope I do the women of America proud" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 13 March 1993b). Women who achieve in areas traditionally dominated by men often feel a great deal of pride in this additional feature of a specific or local achievement. As a further example shows, a great deal of satisfaction can be gained even from being the first female to attain the position of station officer in the volunteer fire brigade of a small province in New Zealand: "I was very proud to get it. Very happy" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 July 1990a). Thus the notion of males may take pride in the fact that they are not a chauvinist like most of the other males they know (Allende, 1988, p. 103).

Interestingly, in all cases where an individual is the first person of a particular group to achieve something, a particular satisfaction is also gained from the fact that the achievement is not usually undermined by the subsequent achievements of others. However, while it is an exceptional individual who succeeds against social obstacles and inequities, it is also important for individuals not to be continually evaluated against this background. For example, a successful black reporter in the United Kingdom remarked of his achievements:
"proud to be first" in such cases can be thought of as a group social construction, a celebration of achievement, an active response to changes in the practices that our culture had previously "arrived at".

In other cases, marginalized groups celebrate their identity in a manner that is aimed at gaining acceptance within a wider community and increasing their pride. The former aim is crucial because it involves an attempt to challenge and eventually to change the values of the majority of society towards what is often seen as a exceptional identity (i.e., an exception to what is regarded as normal). More specifically, groups such as the gay community often counter the view that their sexuality is something to be embarrassed or ashamed about with the slogan "out, loud, and proud" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 30 June 1992). An attempt by a group to fashion pride in the very identity that wider society may still regard as a source of shame or embarrassment therefore provides a challenge to views of what is believed to be right, valued and normal.

However, not everyone attempts to inform themselves of these debates, nor do they anticipate how support for progressive or liberal policies now might be judged in 10, 20, or 50 years time. There are various reasons why individuals may lack solidarity or understanding of the problems and issues involved. For those not personally involved in the issues or aware of anyone engaging directly in a form of identity politics, surveyed examples provide some insights. In the case of gay people serving in the US military, for example, an openly discriminatory policy

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My blackness was never an issue. For God's sake I am. I'm not unproud about that, but I neither hang back nor ask favours because of it. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 5 October 1992)

Thus, people from groups who have suffered discrimination may eventually feel that their merits should be judged independently of the lack of opportunities faced by similar individuals who were previously denied such opportunities.
means continuing to live with the fear and stress of possible discovery (i.e., unless one or more individuals are prepared to make a potentially self-destructive stand on the issue). The irony for an individual faced with the need to keep their identity secret is that any institutional change in favour of open acceptance would, as the originating article suggests, probably “lead to an increase in pride and loyalty” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 17 November 1992).

The cluster of issues surrounding individual pride and its cultural background can also be connected with other issues surrounding the rights of individuals (i.e., as demonstrated by restrictions on personal autonomy and possible opportunities). The connection between identity and work demonstrated by the example of gay people in the US military can be extended to include many individuals in other countries and cultures. An important point is that the opportunity to find some pride in work or another productive activity is a widespread (Gold & Webster, 1989) and perhaps even universal motive. In contrast, a lack of opportunities for people to experience pride in their work is usually connected with additional problems. For example, in a report about London, a correspondent noted:

Demoralised London Transport and British Rail staff are denied pride in their employment. They focus mute hostility on passengers, although the proportion remaining civil and helpful (about half) is astonishing. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 5 June 1991)

A more detailed study would therefore be worthwhile of some of the individual and collective techniques and tactics that people use to cope with and to produce positive feelings in different productive activities (i.e., what
individuals do to create feelings of pride and to maintain a broader sense of self-esteem when these feelings and practical opportunities are denied).

It is clear that individuals do attempt to find feelings of pride and personal satisfaction in small achievements in the most onerous circumstances. For example, the longest serving commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höss, who established the camp in 1940, was reported as "proud of his administrative efficiency, and his tidy thinking brought praise from his superiors and led to his rapid promotion to Auschwitz" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 25 November 1992). More information would be required to determine whether Höss saw his role as difficult and unpleasant but necessary (i.e., a role that he might take pride in while recognizing its difficulties). Fortunately, there are other more recognizable examples of individuals who take some pride in performing a difficult task. For example, there is the following statement from the police squad commander of the team responsible for the death of a perpetrator of a mass shooting in New Zealand:

I believe what we did was justified. From a personal point of view, I was satisfied we had reacted correctly and was proud that we were able to do our job. That sort of operation is a test for any person. We performed well. There is a certain amount of satisfaction with that. It's just a sad reflection on society that such actions were necessary. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 November 1992)

These are only two of many possible examples of difficult jobs that still allow individuals to feel proud of some aspect of their performance. For this reason individuals will often take pride in doing a difficult or possibly demeaning job, rather than having no job at all.\[^{27}\]

\[^{27}\] Moreover, the possibility of pride in work of any form is arguably better than the potential for suicide. An example of the reasons for this preference is provided in a novel which, although it is set in a South American country, has a universal theme:
Where individuals or groups are not able to experience pride in work because of arbitrary discrimination or a history of exploitation, the issue is moral rather than simply a political matter. For example, it is reasonable to describe rickshaw-pullers in India as taking pride in the fact that they work hard and provide a service. This realization is expressed by a well-known American actor in an interview:

Actor Patrick Swayze went to the streets of India to make his latest film, "City of Joy". It proved a profound experience for the Hollywood hunk. . . . His immersion in total poverty in an alien culture stayed vividly in Swayze's memory.

"When I was there I refused to ride in a rickshaw, except when I had to do so for the film, because I didn't see why one human being should work like that for another human being."

"But then it dawned on me that the rickshaw pullers take pride and dignity in their work. They value the service they provide, and it gives them an honourable living. By not riding I was denying them all that. I was wrong." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 September 1992)

Although from a Western point of view it may seem wrong to participate in the exploitation and supposed humiliation of marginalized groups in society, one consequence of this ethical stance might well deny such groups an opportunity to experience some pride. Moreover, such Western ethical preoccupations should not obscure the wider cross-cultural fact that the

It was Francisco who collected the body and took charge of the funeral arrangements. As he completed the laborious bureaucratic details of death, he carried with him the vision of Javier lying beneath the ice-cold light of the fluorescent lamps of the Medical Institute. He tried to analyze the reasons for his brother's brutal death, and to adjust to the idea that his lifetime companion, the unconditional friend, the protector, was no longer of this world. He remembered his father's lesson: work as a source of pride. Idleness was foreign to the family. In the Leal household, holidays and even vacations were spent in some worthwhile undertaking. The family had its difficult moments, but they had never dreamed of accepting charity, even from those they had previously helped. When Javier saw the last door close before him, all that was left was to accept help from his father and brothers; he chose instead to leave without a word. (Allende, 1988, p. 122)

While the example is fictional, it nevertheless represents the importance of work to identity in many cultures and reflects a widespread impetus towards pride and self-esteem in work and life.
potential to experience pride in some form of productive activity is often preferable to no opportunity.

However, to put this need to experience pride into perspective a further cultural example can be assembled. A report that appeared in New Zealand suggested that some of India’s so-called “holy prostitutes” are said to be “proud of their status and cloak their behaviour with an aura of righteous spirituality” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 June 1992a). Claiming to be proud of their identity might also be a tactic which is used by these women to imply that they are valued in their society or, alternatively, that they somehow chose their situation and status. If the above analysis is correct, their “tactic” suggests a broader human tendency to find something positive in what are otherwise difficult life circumstances. However, it is also interesting to contrast the case of “holy prostitutes” in India with a similar report from China about the trade in commercial marriage. A crucial difference in the latter case is that an attempt was being made to “build up pride and confidence” in potential Chinese female victims through education (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 22 March 1991). Individuals might indeed take pride in a position where they are being exploited only because they have few other expectations and even fewer opportunities to achieve personal satisfaction through work. Any education to prevent this occurring would seem to be based on the increasingly widespread view that individuals have the right to achieve and, potentially, to become exceptional. However, this Western ethic clearly confronts extreme practical and political difficulties when attempts are made to extend it to the exploitation of marginalized individuals in the Third World. And, once again, such self-defining moves and their broader contextual constraints are not well captured by
Rosenberg’s notions of emotion-centred forms of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition.

In summary, two senses of being exceptional were examined through Western and Third-World instances of pride. The first sense of pride connected with being exceptional was the potential for marginalized groups to create a sense of pride in their own identity. The ethical importance of allowing individuals the possibility of experiencing pride in their achievements and identity were both illustrated with quite specific examples of women’s pride and gay pride. The possibility of discrimination or marginalization on the basis of identity was also extended to work and taking pride in productive activities. It was argued that Western individuals strive to experience pride in even the most onerous of activities and often regard the possibility of pride as a right (e.g., in contrast to boredom or unemployment). These culture specific preoccupations may make it difficult to understand how individuals in Third World countries, for example, may take pride in aspects of work and activity that seem to be exploitative and humiliating. Although it is odd to contemplate individuals who are proud of a role in which they are exploited, it is possibly a tactic to retain a sense of value and choice in their lives. In the latter case, education may help to encourage more autonomy and independence but there are huge practical and political obstacles to the widespread extension of the Western view of individual rights to Third World countries.
5.3 Further culture and institution-dependent forms of pride

In addition to the already revealed limits of emotion-centred reflexive agency and reflexive cognition, further examples of pride can be assembled for the purpose of highlighting the cultural practices and social institutions on which related expressions and ascriptions are in some manner dependent. For example, the correct use of the cluster of concepts surrounding the words “pride” and “proud” involves culture-specific knowledge of social levels, roles and responsibilities. But few attempts have been made to represent the background practices against which individuals improve, positively evaluate and self-consciously position themselves. An important theme to be explored with regard to personal reflexivity and its limits, therefore, is the extent to which social institutions such as the family reproduce and maintain themselves through events that are often of equal or greater personal importance. Consistent with these themes, the last section will explore cultural and social practices that provide the constraints on the identity that individuals “choose” and can be proud of.

Social relations, hierarchies and forms of “levelling”

Although assembling examples of pride has helped to highlight background practices to emotion-related forms of personal reflexivity, it is also possible that:
... research on differences in rates and direction of emotional change, even in the 20th century, provides new insights into the often hidden hierarchies of contemporary social and economic life. (Steams, 1993, p. 27)

At this point, the survey will not be restricted to social and economic hierarchies in the twentieth century, since an important aspect of this account is to include Harré's (1993) view that a widespread and perhaps universal occurrence is for people to form hierarchies of respect and honour. However, while it seems reasonable to argue that many societies have levels of social and economic competition built into their conceptions of the expression, experience and justification of pride, Harré's position will also be extended to provide an account of why it is that some individuals and groups are so determined to undermine other people at "higher" social and economic levels.

Recognition that there are levels within a society often contrasts with egalitarian myths, at least in Australasian countries, which are used to justify attempts to "level" successful individuals. For example, the "Tall-Poppy Syndrome" that seems to characterize Australia and New Zealand can reasonably be described as a collective and institutionalized reaction towards the success of others. Defined as a "desire to diminish in stature those who have attained excellence" (Delbridge et al., 1997), the "syndrome" seems to stem from the belief that only other societies have entrenched social and economic differences. This view may also manifest itself in a refusal by individuals to accept praise or to make direct and honest statements about their abilities and achievements even when such claims are justified. Moreover, an institutionalized dislike of individuals who succeed is also suggested by the resulting widespread sense of satisfaction when successful and arrogant individuals embarrass themselves or publicly
fail through their own actions. The widespread view that individuals should not stand out, therefore, cannot be explained solely as the product of individual angst or collective envy.

Interestingly, an analysis by Taylor (1985) centres on the way in which social and economic "levels" are part of the justification for an individual who "values himself highly on account of his rank, position, or possessions" (p. 17). Taylor argues that characterizations of high and low positions assume a system of reference for defining relative positions, with the most obvious example being "a hierarchical social system, like the feudal system of the Middle Ages" (p. 17). The specific point is that if an individual "is aware of his objective relative position and gives any thought to the matter he may either accept it as his due, or he may reject it as being higher or lower than is due to him" (p. 17). Although Taylor's analysis is insightful, many Western individuals do not think that social hierarchies and class differences justify abuses of power such as acts that require others to be humiliated or humbled. This is presumably why a British journalist described Chief Buthelezi of the Zulu tribe as having an "immense pride" because he "took it as a matter of course" that a man should throw himself on his knees "in front of the chief" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 26 February 1992).

Without condoning the Chief's pride, it is intelligible because of the fact that he views himself as an aristocrat. This elevated self-image is also indicated by what he is prepared to allow others to do for him. But when his pride is evaluated from the perspective of Western culture, it is not surprising to find that both his treatment of other people and the reasons used to justify his pride lead to a negative view of his character. Interestingly, this contemporary Western denigration of "immense pride" and some measure
of its history can be gleaned from the way in which Darcy's pride is judged by a friend in Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*:

> His pride . . . does not offend *me* so much as pride often does, because there is an excuse for it. One cannot wonder that so very fine a young man, with family, fortune, every thing in his favour should think highly of himself. If I may so express it, he has a *right* to be proud. (p. 8)

The Western ethic surrounding these differences is that individual worth should be judged on the basis of effort rather than wealth, an inherited social position or, in the case of the Chief, power and prestige within a tribe. Thus an important contrast between the Chief's actions and the Western view is that a position of power or authority carries with it the responsibility of not offending the pride of others (e.g., by allowing or requiring their humiliation).

The point, however, is not to explore the consequences of those situations in which individuals may humiliate others because of an elevated view of themselves. Rather it is to examine the cultural history of the relevant Western "person theory" since although the system of aristocracy in England probably produced similar interactions between individuals, *Pride and Prejudice* indicates a possible source of changing mores. In particular, Elizabeth's reaction to Darcy's pride suggests that she is challenging the view evident in the example of Chief Buthelezi. For in the already examined case, it seems that where there are no "grounds for dissatisfaction" between two individuals, an individual such as the Chief is likely to accept his position as what is due to him as a proud man. In contrast, the other individual can be described as "the man who accepts his lowly position as what is due to him who has humility, or the humble man" (Taylor, 1985, pp.
In contrast, the lack of "fit" between respective positions and worth in Elizabeth's and Darcy's case suggests an important example of a changing view on "objective" position as the means of determining status (i.e., along with a growing, almost moral, concern that "objective position" should not provide the sole basis for determining personal worth\textsuperscript{28}).

The theme of cultural change and evolution surrounding judgements of pride is important to explore because an investigation of the way in which this cultural innovation occurred in 19th century England may explain the egalitarian myth in Australia and New Zealand. In other words, the preoccupation with "levelling" other individuals may be a cultural combination of the English view of personal worth and a view that Australia and New Zealand do not have class distinctions. This brief cultural analysis, if correct, could also be argued to account for the way in which New Zealanders relate to some Americans. For example, the combined personal worth and egalitarian account would seem to explain part of New Zealand's quest to win the America's Cup in the 1990s: in particular, the media's interest in portraying the levelling of American arrogance in the form of the public fall of the Stars and Stripes Syndicate's Captain, Dennis Connors. The cultural clash described above seems to provide the background to a specific incident between Connors and an overzealous interviewer who, in effect, asked how it felt to experience such a humiliating loss. Although Connors' reply can be summarized as "You can be very proud of yourselves", he clearly felt that they were gloating in the face of his personal humiliation and what he viewed as his gracious acknowledgement of their victory.

\textsuperscript{28} It is also important to note that some individual differences in responsibility due to skill or experience need not imply a sense of hierarchical superiority. For example, as King (1981)
To summarize, the section began with a brief description of the potential to examine social and economic hierarchies through forms of emotion change. A rudimentary cultural analysis suggested that judgements of individual expressions and experiences of pride in social relations are based on mutually accepted notions of different levels. Present Western practices were highlighted by considering the case of an African Chief’s “immense pride” and also the arrogance of Darcy in *Pride and Prejudice*. The relevant contemporary Western “person theory” in relation to pride seems to be that regardless of how justified an individual’s pride is, other people should not be humbled or humiliated by them. A cursory investigation of conventions surrounding pride suggested that this cultural innovation may have originated in 19th century England. The combination of this stance on pride with an egalitarian myth may therefore have produced the “Tall Poppy Syndrome” that characterizes Australia and New Zealand. It is also possible that some recent events in New Zealand's history can be regarded as a cultural clash in which it was felt important that an arrogant individual deserved to be “levelled”.

**Social institutions and the reproduction of individual pride**

Although many examples of individual pride are dependent on cultural practices and social institutions, as noted above few attempts have been made to represent these interrelations. This is surprising given that many events of great personal importance, such as a wedding day or the birth of a

notes in a book on New Zealand soldiers: “few were saints, but they were men whom one was proud to command and in whose midst their commander felt humble” (p. 265).
child, are spoken of in terms of pride even though they are not achievements in the strict sense. Instead, this example invites an analysis of the institution of family because such proudly celebrated events contribute towards the maintenance and reproduction of persistent social arrangements. The same type of analysis will be extended to other examples of pride as they occur in work, sporting and educational institutions. The result will add to the critical account of personal reflexivity by showing the extent to which individuals take on, attempt to exemplify or rebel against the roles, standards, aims and expectations of institutions.

In addition to the way in which hierarchies may arise and, so to speak, mutate within a culture, there are many ways in which identifiable structures and persistent social relations can be understood to provide a background to people’s positions and aspirations. For example, representative sporting teams are an example of cultural institutions that have often formed only within the last century, but despite this recent formation many of them already have traditions and a history against which contemporary group members are judged. The previous section indicated how hierarchies play an important part in our considerations of the relative worth or stature of individuals and, more specifically, any of their indications or expressions of pride. But the hierarchy account can be complemented with a focus on institutions and an individual’s progression through them. For example, it is interesting to note the remark of a New Zealander who

29 However, some institutions may seem to continue without any apparent reference to individuals playing a role in maintaining or undermining standards. For example, one report of China’s “once proud” acrobats states that they are “getting sloppy and losing their edge” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 12 September 1992). The important point is not initially to examine the accuracy of the description but to see that this decline is not something any one individual can really be said to be responsible for. In this respect, some uses of “we are proud . . .” are at the limits of personhood because they include non-persons or ‘entities’ such as the corporate “we” that is often used in advertising (Mühlhäuser & Harré, 1990, p. 176; they appear to be an institutional “voice” not even attributable to any particular individual such as a
was promoted to Captain of the All Blacks rugby team. In particular, he describes this promotion as “another step up and an equally proud moment” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 4 August 1992). The example is revealing because in this case the pride of an elevated status is equal to the pride of becoming part of the institution.

Membership of many groups based on ability, experience, achievement or responsibility may also suggest the potential to produce an elite or, at least, for some individual members to be described as elitist. This may be more obvious where the role that some individuals are proud to perform can be connected with issues of political power and ideology (e.g., the example of the border guard in section 5.3). For example, with institutions such as the police or the military, individuals attached to these institutions may initially be proud of their uniform or particular abilities that they have acquired in order to be able to perform their work. But the point is that taking pride in the role and internalizing an institution’s standards and values can be dangerous when combined with power. For example, a character in Allende’s (1988) Of Love and Shadows seems to reflect accurately the thoughts, feelings and motivation of an individual who assumes a proud but difficult role in a South American society:

If the military had not made their move, the whole country would have been sunk into civil war, or would have been occupied by

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30 Similarly, achieving an initial position or role, such as joining a particular company or starting work, may at first be source of pride. However, an important feature of such initial pride is that the feeling will not persist indefinitely as new tasks and challenges are likely to emerge for individuals in any institution. For example, 42 years in the same job is usually not similarly something that one is proud of (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 26 June 1992) as it can be regarded as the type of service that serves the institution more than the aspirations of the individual employed in it.

31 The appropriateness of this charge should depend on how members of an "elite" group treat other people (see chapter 6 for a more detailed treatment of individual pride and arrogance in relation to character).
the Russians, as Lieutenant Juan de Dios Ramírez had explained to him. The timely and courageous actions of every soldier, Ranquileo among them, had saved the country from a terrible fate. That's why I'm proud to wear the uniform, although some things I don't like. I follow orders without asking questions, because if every soldier started arguing over what his officer told him to do, we'd be in it up to our arses, for sure — the whole country would go straight to hell . . . (p. 166)

and:

Anyone who stirs up trouble is asking to get it right in the fucking ass, begging your pardon, señora. That's our mission, and we're proud to carry it out. Civilians get out of hand at the slightest excuse. You can't trust them for a minute, and when you deal with them you have to come down with a heavy hand, as Lieutenant Ramírez always says . . . (p. 238)

Thus although Allende's examples are fictitious, they help to show how taking pride in a particular role (or aspects of it) often accords with the aims and values espoused by an institution.

This analysis also allows for the fact that individuals can be members of several institutions and therefore evaluate themselves in relation to the aims and values of relatively permanent and more ephemeral institutions. Indeed, explicit connections between particular institutions can be found in the discourse surrounding pride such as between nationhood, military service and family in times of war (Rose, 1984). A relevant example is of twin brothers in New Zealand who, before departing to serve in the 1991 Gulf War, were described as supported by proud but apprehensive family members (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 January 1991b). The example also indicates the sense in which expressions and experiences of pride are not always based on personal achievement. For in another case, becoming a member of a sporting team may also serve the purpose of carrying on a proud family tradition (e.g., where a former All Black rugby player's son joins
his same senior team and is thus described as doing the "family name proud" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 3 February 1991).

The intersecting traditions of several institutions may seem to create added responsibilities for individuals to the point that they may feel that their actions are compelled. But it is also useful to examine the relations between individuals and particular institutions that are indicated by pride (and possibly many other emotions). For instance, another example of pride only seems to be explicable in terms of an intersection between an institution and one of many individuals who has passed through the institution: the example of an ex-employee who is reported as being proud of the concern that the present workers express about maintaining the standards of a newspaper and, more specifically, its tradition of journalism (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 March 1992). There are numerous other examples of individuals who are no longer directly involved in such an institution but who nevertheless maintain an interest in their former place of work\textsuperscript{32}. But the overall point is that many individual cases of pride and their related judgements and feelings occur in relation to the standards, history and traditions of many institutions\textsuperscript{33}.

\textsuperscript{32} Moreover, although an individual may not have improved the standards of a workplace or made an outstanding contribution through their work, there is still the possibility of taking some pride in long service. However, an awareness of this lesser sense of pride is not lost on many people's considerations as indicated by a report on an individual who said she had been employed by a London-based dance academy as an examiner for more years than she cared to remember:

"That doesn't mean, however, that I am not very proud of being part of the academy" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 2 October 1992).

\textsuperscript{33} Similarly, the goals and standards of more specific and ephemeral institutions may remain the same despite the individuals that exemplify, accept or reject these aims. Institutions in which pride can be generated by individuals pursuing broader goals include corporations, schools, or sporting teams. For example, a New Zealand newspaper reported the following summary upon the retirement of an international player:

The Federation Cup captain, Jeff Simpson, says Wellington's Belinda Cordwell can be proud of her contribution to tennis. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 November 1991)
A further example of the relations between individuals and specific institutions is the similarly ignored notion of family pride. As with other institutions, families vary greatly in their structure but may nevertheless have traditions and a history that plays a strong role in people’s considerations of their own value and achievements. Examples of family pride may also mimic proud events in educational institutions and the workplace because an individual exemplifies the aims of a broader social arrangement. For example, engagements and marriages are often “proudly announced” and also provide an opportunity for more specific experiences and expressions of pride by family members (e.g., mothers of daughters, fathers of sons, etc.). Moreover, instances such as the birth of a child are often talked about, celebrated and therefore constructed as proud events even though there is nothing about these events that is a specific achievement (i.e., except perhaps that the event is “properly” achieved otherwise it may be regarded as bringing shame or embarrassment to a family). Thus although pride is genuinely experienced, expressed and even shared by many members of a

Many forms of pride occur either as part of maintaining a tradition or demonstrate the extent to which an individual has personally adopted or internalized the aims of the institution (i.e., that goals, ambitions or “identity projects” are adopted that may play a lifelong role in people’s lives).

However, other examples are more complicated, at least for the purposes of analysis. Family pride (which cannot be reduced to the pride experienced by individual family members) may be connected with broader cultural institutions of private ownership and public display (or displays). A great deal of information can be ascertained in everyday life about the social and economic conditions of a culture including what is regarded as attainable, valuable, or special, from even the simplest mention of pride. For example, in 1992 it was normal to find ordinary Russians described as “posed proudly beside the new television set or family Lada” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 2 March 1992). Since similar scenes were probably evident in many Western countries some 20 to 30 years earlier, the point is not to argue that economic conditions determine what will count as a legitimate object of pride for a family in a particular country or, more specifically, what such a purchase will say about themselves: for example, whether the purchase is something that others would envy, whether it shows good taste or instead does not say much more than a kind of cheap vanity and excitement about something that others want (perhaps indicative of a particular type of lifestyle or class affiliation) but do not have the means to buy. Instead, it is worth emphasizing that the values and conditions surrounding such expressions of pride can still be readily understood by most Westeners (although they are often not subjected to more rigorous analysis). More broadly, whether this means that material objects and relations “socialize” emotions as much as social institutions is a question which will be explored in future work.
family in such situations, related actions are not self-consciously viewed as contributing towards a structure with a history that transcends those individuals\(^\text{35}\).

A further important point is that talk of family pride can also resemble expressions of pride in relation to individual self-esteem: in particular, an extended sense of self-worth often leads individuals to defend their “family name” against criticisms and slights. Interestingly, this sense of family pride indicates maintenance of relations within the whole “unit” and, moreover, provides the potential for a loss of pride that cannot be restored. For example, Faulkner’s (1929/1986) *The Sound and the Fury* illustrates the decline of a family in terms of the contrasting morals and achievements of the individuals concerned. In particular, the mother of the family’s two sons, one of whom is mentally disabled, is described as contemplating the family’s degeneration into selfishness:

... and the mouse-sized mouse-coloured spinster trembling and aghast at her own temerity, staring across it at the childless bachelor in whom ended that long line of men who had had something in them of decency and pride even after they had begun to fail at the integrity and the pride had become mostly vanity and selfpity. (p. 294)

Clearly, many complicated considerations surround the way in which individuals contribute towards family pride and also share in any achievements or exceptional events\(^\text{36}\). A final point is that the decline of a

\(^{35}\) An ostensibly unusual example of family pride reported in the New Zealand media concerned a policeman who was posthumously awarded the George Medal in the 1991 Honours List. Of particular interest is the widow’s reported comments that “her husband would have been delighted to be recognised in the Honours List” and that “the medal would be a source of great pride to her, their two daughters, and to Mr Umbers’ family”. *(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 19 December 1991)*

\(^{36}\) The following example illustrates the way in which an individual may take pride in the achievements of his or her ancestors from a relatively early age (although it might also be imagined that this might cause some sadness also if he were the last surviving descendants):
"once proud family" also demonstrates one of those occasions in which the reflexive efforts of one individual can be ineffectual. Thus it is not possible for an individual in such circumstances to restore a sense of family pride when there will be no successive generations to take pride in the past achievements of family members.

In summary, many examples of pride that are not obviously personal achievements can often be examined in terms of the role or status of the individual concerned in one or more institutions. As people find themselves involved in or becoming committed to such institutions as work, education, a team or family when they, for example, get a new job or marry, many of these events are constructed by others and personally felt as worthy of pride. In addition, individuals may find that overlapping commitments in different spheres reinforce pride in a role or position (e.g., families may "proudly support" family members who are required to do military service or "take pride" in a posthumous award for police work, etc.). Pride is also constructed around the notion that individuals have exemplified the aims of a particular institution or, at the very least, made a contribution to it. However, in terms of reflexive cognition, many individuals do not self-consciously regard the pride they experience and express at various proud

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**Descendant proud of region's achievements**

A descendant of the family which organised the European settlement of Nelson says he is "enormously proud" of their achievements. Sir Humphry Wakefield, descended indirectly from Captain Arthur Wakefield who chose Nelson's site, said the region's achievements over the past 150 years had been "little short of miraculous". Sir Humphry is in Nelson to play the role of Captain Wakefield in a re-enactment of the landing of the first European settlers, to take place next Monday. He will greet "settlers" dressed in period costume arriving from ships off Tahunanui. He said he was "absolutely thrilled" to take part. "All my thinking life I've been proud of what my family has done in this part of the world," he said. The Englishman, who is on his first visit to Nelson, said he wanted to stay in New Zealand long enough to do some climbing. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 31 January 1992).
moments of family life as dictated by the aims of an institution (e.g., even when they are defending their “family name”). It was also noted that reflexively agentive moves by individuals to maintain or restore the pride of a particular exemplar of an institution can be ineffectual when they have played a role in the institution’s decline.

**Practices of identification and pride in a “chosen” identity**

Continuing with the theme of the relations between individuals and institutions, expressions of pride in public ceremonies and announcements can be assembled and analyzed to highlight interrelations between pride, identity and cultural practices. It is particularly important that the construction of pride in an identity is not seen as the outcome of a psychological process of identification: that is, a private sense of identification with which we might examine the groups “to which the proud person . . . thinks she belongs” (Chakrabarti, 1992, p. 1). Instead, individual pride in a shared identity will be examined in terms of relevant public aspects of identification (e.g., which might include a uniform, accent, particular style of dress and other indications of a group identity) and further material, cultural and discursive practices that shape and constrain the identity individuals are able “to choose”.

One of the most obvious ways in which Western societies require individuals to express or to adopt a group identity is through identifying documents such as passports. While this form of identification may at least offer some certainty about an individual’s current nationality and origins, it is more interesting to examine emotional aspects of people’s identity. For
example, an individual might have a New Zealand passport but demonstrate strong connections with England (to the extent that he or she would declare him or herself as English). In an age where transnational movement is common, it can be interesting to explore the contrast between what individuals are required to call themselves (e.g., on the basis of geographical location) and a stronger emotional sense of identity. A relevant example is provided by a rugby player's decision about which country he will represent:

"When Bryan Williams asked me to play for Western Samoa I never considered my chances of playing for New Zealand," Seinafo said. "I would love to play for the All Blacks. But Western Samoa is very special to me. I call myself a Samoan and I am very proud to be playing for them." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 May 1992)

In this case, the choice of which country an individual will represent is clearly influenced by a sense of identity and emotional commitment (i.e., there is no sense of divided loyalties). The decision of which team to represent, therefore, is similar to being faced with the choice of which passport an individual would prefer, given the choice, and will probably be decided in accordance with what an individual calls him or herself.

The institutions and practices that construct nationality are therefore indicated by identity documents such as passports which show affiliations and allegiances that are, in a sense, chosen for them. However, there are also more ephemeral social structures which occur against a background of group allegiances and may, in some circumstances, undermine any identification with otherwise similar individuals. For example, in one case an American sailor who captained an Italian America's Cup Challenge
seems to exclude himself from the group and, not surprisingly, a shared sense of national identity:

... the big picture is that Il Moro di Venezia achieved a lot and I'm very proud of that and they should all be very proud of that as well. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 May 1992)

An intermediate case is one in which identification with a group is not a prerequisite for feeling pleased or proud of involvement with a team (so different allegiances need not undermine a feeling of pride). For example, a New Zealand-born individual who was asked to coach an Australian state representative team remarked:

I'm a New Zealander and proud of it but when Queensland won the third game at Lang Park last year it was the best day of my life. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 31 March 1992)

Perhaps a reasonable reply which avoids the issue of national loyalty and whether an individual can share in a victory as an identifiable member of a group, is to state "I like to be associated with winners". Nevertheless, it is widely thought that the issue of identity can compromise feelings of pride even though the involvement is not as self-serving as enrolling "under a flag, with a political party, or with a football team" (Kundera, 1992, p. 158). Some forms of individual pride therefore involve an awareness of the potential to be publicly identified as a member of a particular group but, with regard to possible reflexive moves, this is not a type of group membership from which individuals can easily "disenrol themselves".

The latter case may be demonstrated in circumstances where individuals do not strongly identify with the group or country of their birth or upbringing, but who are nevertheless regarded by people from "home" as a
“product” of a region or country. This can be seen especially with individuals who have grown up in one country and subsequently succeeded in another country or overseas, but are still claimed as “ours”. It is often claimed “they grew up here” and hence there is still some legitimacy to the fact that “we” are proud of them (i.e., because of this connection). However, while a proud group or nation will prefer to tell of a connection with a successful individual, this pride contrasts with disowning individuals whose actions are a source of shame or embarrassment. For example, a boxer who won an Olympic gold medal on a technicality over the American fighter Evander Holyfield in 1990 was “disgraced in Yugoslavia for lifting Holyfield onto the winner’s dais at the medal ceremony” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 November 1991). Presumably because it was thought that he had legitimately won the gold medal, the Yugoslavian people were described as “so proud of him until he did that, and were horrified at his action” (loc. cit.). Although a more thorough investigation would reveal further aspects of this story, the main point is that this example illustrates how quickly an individual can be distanced from his or her “parent” country (and presumably for any similarity to the “national character” to be dismissed).

To this point, we have considered some of the pressures and practices that require individuals to identify themselves with a particular community or group (i.e., with nationality being a prominent issue in connection with such documents as passports). However, other possible groupings on the basis of religion, accent, language, skin colour and, more recently, sexuality and gender admit further variations of psychological identification and public identificatory practices. The point here is not to detail every possible form of pride in a group identity, but to explore revealing cases that might otherwise be overlooked. To be specific, it is not
obvious in many cases what a person's religion is, but people nevertheless derive a sense of pride from being a member of a particular religious community. Although there is normally no identificatory practice in relation to religious affiliation, it is interesting to examine some of the rhetoric surrounding an attempt to institute such a practice. For example, an international news item in 1992 reported a Pakistani minister's decision to identify people by their religious faith and the resulting reaction from Christian groups:

The decision last month to add religious affiliation to identity cards has sparked protests from Christian groups fearing discrimination in the Muslim nation. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 November 1992)

The interesting point with regard to identity, pride and practices of identification is the reasons for people's reluctance to be identified in this manner. For despite concerns about possible discrimination, the Minister conveniently discussed the issue in terms of pride:

"People should be proud of their own religion," said the Interior Minister, Chaudry Shujaat Hussein. "Why do they object to being asked their religion?" (loc. cit.)

However, given the Christian view of pride as a sin as well as the possibility of discrimination it seems reasonable to reject this argument. Although the same case cannot be made for gender pride, it is clear from previous cases that there are good reasons for keeping private such aspects of a not immediately obvious but nevertheless shared identity (e.g., such as sexual orientation even though at other times this identity can be a source of pride and is publicly displayed). It is not surprising, therefore, to find individuals who fear a combination of identification and discrimination also resist being
positioned within a discourse in which reluctance to be identified is equated with a lack of pride in their group affiliation.

In contrast to publicly obvious and widely understood markers of identity such as a "Proud to be Union" T-shirt (see Figure 5 in Appendix, p. 696), many identity-related affiliations are private and cannot be identified by other people. Interestingly, where formal identificatory practices are not employed, a shared or group identity may only emerge discursively where individuals are able to state "I'm proud to be . . ." or use the expression "I'm proud to be called . . .". Often the terms chosen by an individual or displayed as in the case of the Union member not only imply emotion and commitment, but also are part of a "conversation" with a contrasting group. A good illustration of this point is a New Zealand politician's remark that "he was proud to be identified as a 'sickly white liberal'" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 14 October 1991). The report also provides useful detail about the context of the remark and its background:

Recalling a term coined several years ago by the member of Parliament for Tauranga, Mr Winston Peters, to describe pro-Maori-activist pakeha, Mr Moore said there was nothing wrong with being a sickly white liberal in 1991. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 14 October 1991)

The reason why Mr Moore states that he is proud of this ostensibly derogatory "label" is revealed accordingly:

"It is we sickly white liberals who fought slavery in the old country. It's we sickly white liberals who stood up against injustice.

"I'm proud that in this room there are people who took a stand on the great issues of our age when it was lonely to be against such things as rugby tours from South Africa," he said. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 14 October 1991)
The remark can therefore be understood as expressing a strong personal commitment to particular values as well as an allegiance to other individuals involved in a tradition of emancipatory struggles (see section 5.2). It can also be seen as a discursive technique for resisting a form of conversational identification which has the aim of embarrassing and silencing the speaker.

Many of these examples indicate that feelings of pride in a shared or group identity are based on commitment that is so strong that life in a community without it would be inconceivable. Although there is the potential to explore developmental aspects of the individual formation of shared and group identities, the focus has been restricted to cases of pride that cannot easily allow more fickle forms of association and disownment. The latter are illustrated by the self-serving nature of sharing in a group’s achievements by claiming “we won” or “we did it”, but then claiming “they lost” when the same group fails. A contrasting example of loyalty, shared interest and the type of committed involvement that supposedly deserves a reward of some kind can be found in the following, admittedly parochial, example of a statement of support for the New Zealand All Blacks by the Mayor on behalf of the city of Auckland before the 1991 Rugby World Cup:

"Mr Mills said the city was proud of the All Blacks now and would be proud of them when they returned". (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 24 September 1991)

The return for a commitment towards a representative individual or group is not only the enjoyment of victory but the possibility of being able to share publicly in a victory. As a result, it is possible for winning individuals such

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37 As with other institutions, companies also indicate their supposedly proud support for and continuing association with a successful event, team, or individual in a manner that trades on similar talk in everyday life. For example:
as the captain of a winning team to generalize their pride by making statements, for example, about the character of a nation and its national identity:

I'm proud of the team. I'm proud of what Australians can do and what we did today. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 August 1990)

The example nicely counters the earlier case of a Captain who did not share the national identity of team members and did not therefore feel compelled to make any generalizations about the group’s identity and character. This is not to deny that individuals in both circumstances can feel intense pride, but only in the latter case is the achievement taken to reflect and exemplify the identity and character of a larger group.

In summary, many cases of pride in a shared or group identity are closely connected to identificatory practices. For example, national identity is constructed by the need "to choose" a particular form of group identification and constrained by strong emotional commitments (i.e., the latter may determine what an individual is proud to call him or herself and

We are proud to be associated with the NZRFU and the All Blacks as they continue to bring great honour and pride to the people of New Zealand. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 16 April 1992a)

However, the test of this and any other similar relationship is provided by the level of support that is offered after a particularly bad loss. We might also ask whether the "object" of pride feels the same way about the supporter or supporters with whom they are publicly identified. Intermediate cases can also occur such as the following example of statements by the winning Captain of an Australian Rugby League National Final:

"This is the best feeling in my life . . . to be a team member, to be part of a team you're proud of." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 September 1991)

There are, of course, more specific forms of identification with teams and individuals that might be indicated by subtle linguistic changes such as where one coach says "I'm proud of what they achieved" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 March 1992) while another talks about "our victory". Obviously this type of example requires further investigation as grammatical shifts cannot be used as easily to avoid the issue of responsibility (although the choice of pronoun may indicate respective temptations to distance ourselves from failure or to bask in reflected glory).
also whether a person chooses to be identified with, or in some circumstances represent, a particular group). The assembled examples also suggested that our focus should be on discursive identity practices rather than private psychological process of group identification. For example, some of the background to ways in which individuals may actively or inadvertently distance themselves from a group was also highlighted through examples of pride. The overall point was that such decisions are intimately connected to cultural practices in which individual and group achievements are taken to provide a public affirmation of group identity.

5.4 The history and natural history of pride

One of the difficulties in studying the history and natural history of psychological phenomena is that there are obvious impediments to a complete discursive engagement with and understanding of groups in the past. As any gap between present groups and past collectives increases it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the different words, actions and practices of other ages are based on similar forms of emotion and personal reflexivity. Although the problem can be examined as the issue of interpreting past emotions in terms of current categories (Stearns, 1993), the critical account of Rosenberg’s (1990) theory leads to further consideration of the relations between individuals and the complicated backgrounds that afford such intentional and self-directed emotion-regulating and identity-constructing activities. Additional instances of collective and individual pride will be assembled in order to extend a surview to conceptual issues that
Wittgenstein-inspired psychologists do not traditionally examine or engage with (cf. Part 1, chapters 1 & 3). Moreover, it is hoped that by highlighting the changing background to many specific instances of pride, the study will render "rationally visible" (Shotter, 1992) significant historical and natural historical continuities and discontinuities (i.e., as they relate to "our" emotions as well as the emotions and reflexive abilities of "our" cultural and biological ancestors).

The importance of historical discontinuities

To this point, a focus on complicated and not necessarily emotion-centred forms of personal reflexivity has highlighted relevant linguistic, cultural and material background practices. More specifically, a sharp distinction between forms of collective and individual pride has been dismissed in favour of people's participation in and confrontations with their own and other broader communities. Some of the themes that emerged in the previous section are also relevant to further examples of pride which admit interesting and striking historical aspects. The result is timely because transhistorical investigations of emotion and identity have only recently begun to consider historical continuities and discontinuities (Greenwood, 1989; Stearns, 1993). These issues might be avoided by succumbing to the temptation to regard historical differences as similar to cultural differences and the sense in which "the past is a foreign country; they do things differently there" (Hartley, 1953, p. 9). But it is crucial to represent clearly issues such as how we retrospectively construct our view of the past
as well as the effects of generational differences and limitations on reconstructions of the experiences and lives of people in previous ages.

In terms of historical differences, one way in which it is possible to misrepresent the actual and possible emotions of an age is to compare the experiences of individuals with narrative constructions of events in which they were participants and witnesses. For example, Tolstoy (1904/1971) suggests in *War and Peace* that a general historical interest in another age may be combined with an understanding of the personal experiences of individuals by examining "the tales and descriptions of that time" (p. 1015). In particular, it is important to challenge myths and misunderstandings that are created after broad events occur: accounts which come to invest those events with purpose and direction. For Tolstoy notes that the personal experiences and private interests of individuals who moved through the historical events in which the novel is set contrast sharply to stories of the time which:

... without exception speak only of the self-sacrifice, patriotic devotion, despair, grief, and the heroism of the Russians. (p. 1015)

The example is useful because it demonstrates that it would be ridiculous to claim that collective pride was the sole motivation for the actions and sacrifices of many individuals. Also it provides an example of a critical approach to individuals' reconstructions of their passage through historical events.

It is also worth considering the way in which narrative reconstructions of events create a "community of recollections" (Mill, 1861/1946) out of the different perspectives on the same incidents in the past (i.e., in a manner
which is different from the type of detached understanding of large scale events that is provided for us by television and print media). Because of generational differences, for example, any personal emotional engagement of individuals in Western culture with previous generations is likely to be based on family histories rather than historical education. In other words, although we can understand many past examples of collective and individual pride, it is unlikely that we would share the emotional content and commitment of a previous "community of recollections". For example, Rose's (1984) research on national pride in the United Kingdom suggests that while older individuals who went through the Second World War tend to have high levels of national pride, later generations have little understanding of their experiences. Moreover, later generations may take pride in the sacrifices or achievements of previous generations only perhaps in the sense in which they praise and have respect for those individuals (e.g., such as soldiers in Australia and New Zealand who provide last tangible links to events that occurred in the First World War at Gallipoli). While understanding what people were proud of in a previous generation or age does not necessarily mean that we should share their emotions, nevertheless there is considerable potential to misrepresent the detail of predecessors' emotions and actions (i.e., as international relations and the pride of other countries are often misrepresented by news media).

It is especially important to examine discontinuities of experience that render attempts to construct pride in the past meaningless (and which also provide an indication of how many of the historical examples provided by the survey of pride are told from the perspective of a dominant Western culture (see chapter 4, section 4.1)). In particular, it is fascinating to consider the limits confronted by individuals in their attempts to create, in the first
person plural sense of reflexivity, a meaningful form of pride in the heritage and history of a people that is lost to a new generation. For example, an individual attempts to construct pride in ancestors of children with Mexican Indian features by telling them:

You have a proud ancestry. We are Azteca! We built the pyramids! We built empires! We invented our own mathematics! Don't let the Anglos make you ashamed of being Azteca. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 25 September 1992)

However, the attempt make children "remember" that "inside you are proud Azteca" and to construct pride in this shared and collective identity fails for reasons of historical distance and cultural discontinuity. Instead of creating a sense of pride, the children concerned are reported to be bemused and their teachers are described as "mildly annoyed". In this respect, the example helps to understand the personal effects and loss of pride in a shared and collective identity that occurs when indigenous peoples are the victims of imperialism. However, while Maori and Aboriginal people, for example, seem to have experienced a recent cultural renaissance, the attempt by a lone individual to share a reflexive strategy for recreating a personal connection with a decimated culture seems unlikely to produce a genuine feeling of connection or continuity. In other words, it would difficult to reconstruct a meaningful sense of pride in "our" ancestors if this occurred 100 to 200 years after their culture began to be destroyed.

It should be obvious that the point of the individual's actions is to counteract a view of history in which the role of Columbus in building a nation is stressed (i.e., as opposed to destroying an existing and successful indigenous culture). More specifically, the aim is to "tell kids to be proud of what they are" (Christchurch Press, 25 September 1992) where it is likely
that the institutions of a country discriminate against an indigenous population while also presenting this as the only possibility for personal success (see section 5.2 for an example of opinions about Maori pride). However, a number of further questions can be raised, such as the fact that cultural discontinuity makes it more difficult to judge what the Azteca themselves took pride in. Was their society mainly focused on individual achievements? What practices supported or celebrated individuals with particular skills and attributes? To what extent were everyday experiences and expressions of pride dependent upon specific actions and activities that could only be culturally maintained? And is it possible to speculate on any of the standard narratives, ideologies, shared practices or power imbalances that dictated when it was appropriate for individuals to feel, to express or to suppress pride in their everyday lives?

The limitations of access to relevant material and the scope of this investigation mean we must settle for written accounts and histories that are already available and comprehensible (i.e., Western histories). This allows us to focus on those occasions where cultural and linguistic evidence implies the emergence of a form of shared or collective pride (i.e., the first time that a group could be said to have experienced a particular form of pride). For instance, Manning Clark's (1993) History of Australia indicates the conditions in which a sense of national pride began to develop. It is suggested these early sentiments first emerged when "the native-born were becoming aware of themselves as Australians" because they "regarded the colony as their future home" and some of them also "believed the colony belonged to themselves and their descendants" (p. 71). All of these views helped to create the conditions in which a feeling of pride emerged although an important point also mentioned by Manning Clark is that "these early
sentiments of belonging to the country went hand in hand with ideas of exclusive ownership: their passion of patriotism was fed by xenophobia” (p. 71).

This example indicates how a first sense of group pride is usually founded at the expense of others although as with the exclusion mentioned in previous sections, it is not necessarily condoned by all members of the collective. Moreover, as already demonstrated, an attempt to create a sense of pride will initially occur for political and ethical reasons. For example, groups that were denied various forms of proud achievements, such as women in male-dominated societies, not only create a new sense of group pride but also allow individuals within those groups to be proud of the fact that they are the “first to achieve” a particular goal, standard or aim. With respect to the history of Australia, enduring myths that the growth of the country was “fostered by British genius and enterprise after a ‘melancholy and ignominious beginning’” ensured:

... the British past would continue to weigh on the brain of the living, that the myth of the past would come between the people and the realization of their own powers. (p. 405)

This example complements earlier remarks about the relations between pride, independence and national identity as well as providing a sense in which personally held notions of a shared identity serve wider social purposes. Moreover, an indication is provided of how the themes of a critical history of emotion and personal reflexivity can emerge from the assembled examples of a conceptual-discursive survey.

A further example of views of society that constrain or enable the realization of a group’s “powers” is provided by a brief examination of
communist countries (i.e., as manifest in the lives of constituent members in relation to historical and cultural changes). An important aspect of countries such as China or the former countries of the Soviet bloc is the extent to which attempts were made in each of these countries to cultivate a sense of solidarity, loyalty and pride in serving the state. Although the success of these ideologies as well as specific reactions to cultural variations cannot be addressed, there are some indications of the effects on particular individuals. As already indicated by the example of an East Germany border guard who was called up to do military service and then later prosecuted for his actions, many individuals in communists countries were proud of their country and their position:

I was happy in East Germany. It was my country. I thought I was doing right by joining the border guards. (*Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 November 1991)

More specifically, the individual in the report is described as saying:

... he was "proud" to have been a member of the Communist Young Pioneers, which he had joined at the age of 10. He was equally proud to join the Communist Free German Youth movement, the trade union movement, and the Soviet Friendship Association. (*loc. cit.*)

Although the individual in this case was prosecuted in 1991 for a lack of moral autonomy, it is interesting to speculate whether communism could be regarded as a social theory and ideology that failed because it underestimated the importance of personal pride, individual achievements and notions of private ownership (i.e., many individuals were still proud of private possessions and personal achievements). Future work could address the relations between the overarching ideology and any specific
statements about the selfishness of particular emotions as well as relevant accounts of individual resistance (including the socializing role of material objects).

At this point it is important to note that the history of forms of emotion and personal reflexivity through pride is not part of a general account of emotion that includes notions of human progress. For example, the aim is not to produce or even to assess accounts such as one mentioned by Stearns (1993) in which changes in emotion are as seen as evidence of how "new levels of 'civilization' began to constrain emotional expressions" (p. 17). However, the assembled cases of pride as well as recent work in the history of emotion do suggest some means of examining the interrelations between cultural practices, history and individual expressions and experiences. The account of "new levels of civilization and constraint" on emotions, for example, could easily be seen as a product of an English concern in the 18th and 19th centuries to construct and maintain notions of civilized sentiments as well as to justify imperialism. However, when the forms of emotion from those times are examined, it may be that "the actual experience may have changed less than . . . the old standards imply" (Stearns, 1993, p. 21). Stearns therefore implies that many emotions and the actions or impulses related to them may have changed less than the personal and "emotion standards" of a particular time. If Stearns' account is accurate, a focus on forms of reflexive cognition and reflexive awareness is important because people should be aware of the standards to which their forms of emotional display and experience should conform. But are there any relevant historical examples to prove this point?

An indication of the way in which standards and ideals of emotion-related conduct can change in relation to individuals is provided in Jane
Austen's (1811/1979) *Sense and Sensibility.* Obviously while including such an example is part of a comprehensive survey of easily available texts, other literary examples and forms of nonliterary evidence would need to be included in a future history of pride. Nevertheless, Austen's text is relevant because it is likely that it both reflects and contributed towards a sense of changing emotion standards. This possibility of a changing attitude towards an emotion standard is manifest in an interchange between Elinor and Marianne after the latter has been "wronged" by a potential suitor:

Elinor would not contend, and only replied, 'Whoever may have been so detestably your enemy, let them be cheated of their malignant triumph, my dear sister, by seeing how nobly the consciousness of your own innocence and good intentions supports your spirits. It is a reasonable and laudable pride which resists such malevolence.'

'No, no,' cried Marianne; 'misery such as mine has no pride. I care not who knows that I am wretched. The triumph of seeing me so may be open to all the world. Elinor, Elinor, they who suffer little may be proud and independent as they like — may resist insult, or return mortification — but I cannot. I must feel — I must be wretched — and they are welcome to enjoy the consciousness of it that can.' 'But for my mother's sake and mine—' 'I would do more than for my own. But to appear happy when I am so miserable. Oh! who can require it?' (p. 179)

With respect to standards of conduct that a culture may seem to demand, Marianne's reaction is important because it suggests the potential to dismiss the standard by quite reasonably asking "who could require that I appear happy when I am miserable?" Although it is important not to read too much cultural significance into the exchange, it is clear that the standard that Elinor articulates (which is assumed to have been widespread at the time), is unreasonable (i.e., that individual pride implies a form of noble self-presentation and stoic regulation of emotion). Accordingly, a provisional conclusion on the basis of a cursory analysis is that a lack of individual
ability to conform to such a standard may undermine the related person ideology.

It is therefore possible that discrepancies between a framework of "emotion standards" and people's experiences reach the point that a cultural change occurs. In Austen's example, the sense of pride is the character rather than emotion aspect of the cluster of concepts: a form of pride that is more about maintaining adult standards than attaining a standard (i.e., such as that demonstrated by a child). The example could be said to demonstrate the beginning of a change of emphasis from the Christian sense of pride as personal dignity to the focus on self-esteem as a feeling that is much more likely to occur in contemporary usage. It also indicates that the cluster of concepts surrounding pride might be drawn quite differently in other periods of history as indicated by such archaic words as "self-love" in historical examples. But since the character sense of pride is emphasized over the sense of pride as selfish and sinful, the example may imply the declining role of religion as a framework with which to understand and to guide everyday emotion-related conduct. The diminished role of religion is evident in contemporary Western attitudes towards talk of sin, in general, and pride, in particular, as the root cause of human evil.

The analysis presented of admittedly limited text-based historical examples of pride accords with Rorty's (1990) view that it is "not theology, but reflective history, bringing the scientific method to moral subjects, must be the judge of pride" (p. 269). Although Rorty's primary concern is to discuss Hume's (1740/1978) extended remarks on fame and other relevant cultural, collective and individual aspects of pride, a future study could

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39 Interestingly, by comparison Chaucer's (1400/1974) recommendations in the Parson's Tale at the end of The Canterbury Tales seem more realistic and relevant to everyday, interpersonal problems with pride.
examine some of the similarities and contrasts with the results of the conceptual-discursive survey examined here. It might also be possible to provide a more in-depth examination of the cultural and personal significance of the clash between naturalistic and religious views of pride. That investigation might even confirm the sort of framework clash that is suggested by Eco's (1983) historical novel, *The Name of the Rose*. For if the novel even partially succeeds in describing the clash of these two approaches, it is in the Abbot's remarks that the monks of the Abbey are:

... proud of the truth we proclaim, humble and prudent in preserving those words hostile to the truth, without allowing ourselves to be soiled by them. (p. 3-9-9)

The sin of pride, at least for monks in the time in which the novel is set, is accordingly described as the temptation "of considering as his task not preserving but seeking some information not yet vouchsafed mankind" (p. 3-9-9). In historical terms, a naturalistic approach could be said to have paved the way for individuals not to risk a potential transgression and resulting censure by proudly seeking knowledge that can only be humbly received. A clearer picture of pride and its place in our intellectual practices and cultural history would benefit from a much more comprehensive survey of all available historical experiences, expressions, accounts and even pictures of pride (i.e., which may have been more important in periods of history where monks were probably the only individuals able to read and write).

To summarize, the history of pride suggests the importance of collective continuity and discontinuity to understanding pride in the cultural and historical practices of "our" familial and cultural ancestors. A number of forms of pride were examined and explicated in terms of the potential to form
and also misrepresent a shared "community of recollections". Generational and broader differences were used to indicate the possibility of not being able to share or to understand fully forms of pride in other periods of history. However, the example of the emergence of a first sense of national pride in a culture was explored along with the possibility of ideological differences affording particular reflexive moves and forms of pride in particular periods of history. Interestingly, it is quite possible that broad changes in emotion standards and cultural frameworks create particular types of collective or culturally-dependent pride, it also seems possible that the individual experience in people's everyday lives has not markedly changed. Nevertheless, a much more comprehensive investigation would be needed to substantiate many of the points made in this section.

Culture, language and the natural history of emotion and personal reflexivity

One of the major themes of social constructionist accounts of emotion and personal reflexivity is that cultural and linguistic practices have played a crucial role in creating particular forms of pride, created particular types of relational arrangements between people and left a resource of photos, films, philosophical works, sermons, stories, books, paintings and accounts for us to assemble and to analyze. The importance attached to the constitutive role of culture and language also suggests a mild form of scepticism such as whether the meaning of Descartes' 17th century use of pride correspond to its contemporary Western meaning (Harré, 1983) as well as the possibility that some historical emotions have no contemporary equivalents (Harré, 1986). But if emotions really are tied to the display and expressive
possibilities afforded by cultural and linguistic practices, the possibility of examining emotions and emotion-related actions in prehistorical periods would seem to be extremely limited. This section is an attempt to provide an account of emotion and personal reflexivity that provides more detail than a focus solely on speculation about forms of cognitive discontinuity.

A central part of Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory is the view that only reflexive organisms who "can look upon their own bodies and decide intentionally what to do with them in order to produce the emotions they want — are capable of such self-regulatory behaviour" (p. 11). However, since a major problem with Rosenberg's account is that the role of language is not adequately examined, it is important to extend the recognition of points such as the following to accounts of prehistoric emotions:

... humans are language users, and the most striking feature of a language user is the ability to monitor the control of his or her own actions. (Howard, 1985, p. 260)

It was appropriate in Part 1 to examine Wittgenstein's remark that it is only appropriate to apply particular psychological concepts such as hope to beings that use language within complicated forms of life. However, in this context, it is more appropriate to begin to consider the circumstances surrounding the natural history and possible causes of our psychological concepts (PI, xii, p. 230).

However, it is important that we assemble what is presently known and can be reasonably asserted about "prehistoric emotions" without undue speculation. Within the scope of the latter we might also include the problems of adopting a realist-cognitive ontology about the existence of
particular emotions and the evidence supporting any inferences (see chapter 2, section 2.3). For example, Mandler (1992) exemplifies such a realistic-cognitive view with the claim that cognitive development:

... took place before the emergence of verbal language and its particularly powerful ability to encode and communicate evaluations and values. (p. 105)

But in accord with the position adopted in Part 1 (chapter 2, section 2.3) it may be better to think that many "underlying" cognitive abilities and processes such as memory and attention are intertwined with the emergence and refinement of linguistic, expressive and social skills. If accepted on the basis of given evidence, this position avoids the need to speculate that, for example, after the development of specific response tendencies and action syndromes:

... the next evolutionary step was probably the emergence of mental representations of these actions, which are the 'affective', cognitive evaluation of actions and situations. (p. 105)

Mandler's preoccupation with the exact sequence of individually embodied changes necessary for particular types of emotion and emotion-related behaviour to occur can therefore be shifted to an investigation of the relations between culture, language and the evolution of psychological phenomena.

Dennett's (1995) work, in particular, can be used to attack the cognitive account and its implied view of humans almost magically creating the conditions for their own evolutionary success. Instead, Dennett prefers to describe how the "crane" of culture helps to provide a localized "lifting up"
of evolution towards our current capabilities (i.e., that we "alone among species, can rise above the imperatives of our genes—thanks to the lifting cranes of our memes" (p. 365). Dennett is therefore aware of the need to account for the developments that some theorists examine in individual cognitive terms, but his main concern is to show:

... we are the only species that has an extra medium of design preservation and design communication: culture. (p. 338)

Thus Dennett recognizes that culture allows for the preservation of all manner of important innovations:

... each individual human brain, thanks to its communicative links, is the beneficiary of the cognitive labors of the others in a way that gives it unprecedented powers. (p. 381)

The emergence of these powers presumably include some of the changes that allowed more complicated emotions to begin to develop: including greater possibilities of emotion control and expressive behaviour in relation to language.

An useful and central component of Dennett's account which has already been alluded to is the notion of "memes". Memes are defined by Dennett as "the smallest elements (in a culture) that replicate themselves with reliability and fecundity" (p.344). In relation to individuals, Dennett argues:

The haven all memes depend on reaching is the human mind, but a human mind is itself an artifact created when memes restructure a human brain in order to make it a better habitat for other memes. (p. 365)
And he concludes that the:

... radically new kind of entity created when a particular sort of animal is properly furnished by—or invested with—memes is what is commonly called a person (p. 341)

However, the aim in this section is not to follow Dennett in setting up the conceptual basis for a potential "science of memes" (which is why the reduction of culture to "useful units" is regarded with suspicion). But since Dennett's account resembles some of the more useful culture and language based approaches to psychological phenomena examined in Part 1 (of which a consistent feature is a wariness of putting more into the head of the individual than is required for explanatory purposes), Dennett's account should therefore shed some light on the natural history of emotion and personal reflexivity40.

However, it is unfortunate for present purposes that Dennett's main consideration is to examine in detail the role of language in intelligence rather than the role of culture and language in the development of forms of "emotional intelligence" (see Part 1, chapter 4). Nevertheless, Dennett tentatively explores the connections between cultural and biological evolution through an example of a collectively manifest form of pride:

Memes that are (relatively) benign to their hosts but vicious to others are not uncommon, alas. When ethnic pride turns to xenophobia, for instance, this mirrors the phenomenon of a tolerable bacillus that mutates into something deadly—if not necessarily to its original carrier, then to others. (p. 364)

40 Interestingly, Dennett's account of the development of our cognitive abilities resembles the account of technology provided in chapter 2, section 2.3 and also the "cultural externalization" view of emotion mentioned in chapter 4, section 4.2.
Dennett (1995) also notes that many cultures are "clever" not to include memes about the virtue of destroying outsiders" (p. 516). But the interest here is to search for any evidence of individual pride that might be used to make reasonable inferences about the development of emotion and personal reflexivity. The concern is not to examine how a culture contains memes to counter excessive self-importance, but what we might infer about individual reflexive abilities in relation to emotional display, identification and experience.

At least one potentially mistaken account of the natural history of personal reflexivity and emotion can be discerned from Dennett's remarks. In particular, he argues against the mistaken view that:

... language couldn't have evolved through selection pressure for communication, because we can ask people how they feel without really wanting to know. (p. 392)

It is clear that language did not evolve for the sole purpose of allowing people to say what they feel, talk about what they think or spend time talking and thinking about their feelings and thoughts. The selection pressures that favoured language and communication developed from activities which could not be described as the self-conscious intention to create or control emotions (i.e., in ourselves or other individuals). However, it does seem reasonable to think that being able to control emotions such as anger or pride would have been beneficial to survival when interacting with unreceptive individuals from other groups.

But what evidence is there for the existence of such interrelations and activities in relation to selection pressures? Although it is difficult to examine precisely the sort of activities that might have motivated and accompanied
the tasks that produced "prehistoric" emotions, work by anthropologists such as Spindler (1991) and Walker and Shipman (1996) indicates some practices in which the display and control of emotions like pride might have been important. Spindler (1991), for example, reports on the discovery and analysis of a remarkably well-preserved male body trapped in a European glacier for 5000 years. In particular, a careful reconstruction of the man's possible life 5000 years ago and the discovery of tattoos on the body led Spindler to argue that the marks are probably socially and psychologically significant indicators of:

... rank and dignity within a society, property rights, executive power, descent or identity, membership of a group or, last but not least, personal achievements, such as the number of enemies slain, animals killed or women subdued. (p. 171)

A severe limitation of any natural historical fact is that we are not able to observe or to engage linguistically with such individuals in their initial context (i.e., in a similar manner to our linguistic engagement with more recent ages through the cultural product of written language). Still it seems reasonable to think that their achievements were displayed and expressed in culturally specific but widely shared ways and that they also felt personal emotions such as pride in private as well as when recalling these achievements (e.g., in forms of story telling perhaps stimulated by questions about the tattoos in social gatherings). Thus along with relevant linguistic practices such cultural-based symbols could be said to extend and render "external" and "public" an otherwise fleeting feeling of self-enhancement or identity confirmation.

This sort of inference may be used to make similar judgements about the emotions and environmental demands on much older human ancestors.
For example, Walker and Shipman (1996) provide further inferred evidence of prehistorical emotions and emotion-related activities by examining other enduring cultural inventions. In particular, they paraphrase other studies of humans in the Upper Palaeolithic period (approximately 30,000 B.P. to 7,000 B.C.):

... clothing, jewelry, and makeup or body paint are all means of projecting an identity. Then, as now, personal adornments almost certainly symbolized both individual identity and that individual’s allegiance or membership in some larger group. What clothes or jewelry you wore, your style of body paint or scarification, or your haircut was a symbolic way of telling others who you were. (p. 230)

An important aspect of their reasoning is to imagine the opposite state of affairs and its implications:

There was no need for personal adornment as long as everyone was familiar; as in a small village, everyone would know everyone else from birth. The lack of personal adornments attests to a small social world, restricted perhaps to a few wandering bands who encountered one another regularly. (p. 230)

Thus Walker and Shipman argue that:

The rise of personal adornments in the Upper Paleolithic, the greater density and larger size of archaeological sites, and the contents of those sites show clearly that people traveled substantial distances to congregate (at least periodically) into much larger groups. (p. 230)

The resulting changes provide a possible account of the evolutionary pressures on communication within these groups as well as reasons why self-regulation and refinements in types of culturally available display occurred:
This new pattern of living meant that suddenly there was both a need and an occasion for demonstrating visually that you were part of this group and distinct from that. Lines were drawn between us and them; ethnicity was born. (p. 230)

Although the notion of a conceptual-discursive surview is clearly stretched when we consider the prehistory of emotion and personal reflexivity, the issues that emerge nevertheless indicate how a reasonable culturally oriented, noncognitive account could be produced of the origin of many obviously human psychological phenomena.

In addition to the possible instances of new forms of life, cultural pressures and changes to individual emotion, it is also possible that cave paintings provide a relevant example of symbol creation and use. Walker and Shipman (1996), for example, note that many cave paintings:

... were made with great care and considerable effort on the part of the artists. The sites where they were created are not always easily accessible; the pigments had to be gathered, ground, and carefully prepared; scaffoldings and lights were needed in many locales (and their traces have been found). (p. 228)

They accordingly conclude:

These artistic expressions were much more than idle doodling or scribbling; they were deeply important to the artists... Almost certainly these are not the earliest symbolic (and hence linguistic) behaviours in the human lineage; they are simply the convincing earliest evidence of manifestly symbolic behaviours. In evolution, new behaviours routinely precede the appearance of concrete adaptations that facilitate those behaviours. (p. 228)

Clearly, the task of painting was a co-ordinated activity that required considerable effort and may have preceded the emergence of more
complicated activities and innovations. The analysis of this effort may also complement other evidence about the psychological effects of close attention to the production of material items (e.g., working with pottery or natural materials can provide a kind of emotional flow, engagement and investment from which a sense of personal achievement is taken (see chapter 7, section 7.3)). Whether other emotions may have needed to be controlled to achieve this overarching goal would also indicate a possible and relevant form of reflexive agency. Finally, the fact that others must have viewed the product of this labour may have produced a sense of personal achievement because of the appreciation and approbation others directed toward the artist or artists.

In summary, the importance of culture and language to the emergence of emotion-related forms of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition requires a natural historical account. Given the importance also of collective and cultural practices to forms of emotional display, identification and experience it is clear that accounts such as Dennett's (1995) offer some useful indications of further work. Although Dennett's notion of memes as units of cultural transmissions was introduced as a means of countering cognitive explanations, it did not provide the basis for this account. Instead, the details of possible examples of pride were examined in order to highlight the sort of evolutionary pressures and cultural innovations which might favour emotions like pride along with appropriate forms of self-regulation. Anthropological and archaeological studies of tattoos, body adornments, jewellery and cave paintings, it was argued, provide the kind of evidence from which the existence and development of forms of personal reflexivity and emotion might reasonably be inferred.
Culture and the borderline of biological discontinuities

A number of historical and cultural discontinuities have been presented of relevance to studies of emotion and personal reflexivity, with the most obvious being our lack of linguistic (and symbolic) engagement with prehistorical cultures and individuals. While it is tempting to stress the continuities, it is inevitable at some point that an investigation of emotional and related activities in our ancestors will need to consider biological discontinuities. In other words, although Dennett (1995) notes that “thanks to earlier evolutionary pressures, our innate quality spaces are species-specific, narcissistic, and even idiosyncratic from individual to individual” (p. 378), we must eventually find an ancestor who would not be capable of many of our emotions (i.e., regardless of possible linguistic and cultural “supports”). Thus although it is possible to imagine pride occurring before many of the forms of writing and description that form such a large part of a history of pride, this last section explores some of the difficulties of being able to infer when distinctly human emotions such as pride first occurred.

According to Plutchik (1993) there are many cases in which “an individual’s attempt to cope with hierarchical issues implies competition, status conflict, and power struggles” (p. 62). However, Spindler’s analysis of the ice man’s hasty departure from a community in which he seemed to have a high status, may contradict Plutchik’s further claim that:

... people near the top of a hierarchy tend to feel dominant, self-confident, bossy, and assertive, while those near the bottom feel submissive and anxious. (p. 62)
It has already been argued that pride is likely to occur wherever there are hierarchies of social arrangement of honour and status, competition and contact between one group and another, as well as opportunities within a group for public recognition of individual achievements. But what do speculations about individuals who stand out in a group and assuming a proud status have to do with a critical treatment of biological discontinuities? One answer is that talk of hierarchies in which individuals feel pride in dominating, competing against and defeating others often provides the cue for an evolutionary "just so" story.

Weisfeld and Beresford (1982), for example, highlight similarities between human and nonhuman primate dominance interactions in order to assert that at some point in our history "a capacity for dominance hierarchization evolved in humans" (p. 113). It is difficult to challenge such arguments on the basis of nonexistent evidence about the prehistory or natural history of pride. Nevertheless, it is possible to see how problems emerge with the simplistic view that pride in humans has an analogous role to the dominance, erectness of posture, raised head and swaggering behaviours which occur in many hierarchical primate societies (Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982). Although it seems important to account for the biological differences between ourselves and our biological ancestors such as *Homo erectus* that emerged perhaps 500,000 to 1 million years ago, it would be far too simplistic to claim that the biological capacity for pride and related forms of personal reflexivity can be found in changes to the orbitofrontal cortex (Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982, p. 126; cf. Part I, chapter 2, section 2.2.3).

Nevertheless, Weisfeld and Beresford ignore other issues to stress the similarities between the physical expression and posture of human pride and other animals' displays of hierarchical dominance. It is therefore not
ridiculous to predict the extension of this view to a treatment of pride as a "reinforcement" for prowess in courtship or other aspects of survival (i.e., as an account of why, when and how pride and its related social and psychological surroundings first emerged). However, some brief remarks can be offered about the conditions required for an individual within such a prehistoric collective to be the source of the biological innovation that lead to the development of pride. This question could be expressed as a commitment to the fact that at some point in the natural history of humans there must have been an individual who was the first to exhibit a variation in the expression of a particular emotion and, therefore, serve as a possible site of collective change.

It would seem odd to talk about the potential or actual existence of forms of individual and shared pride without the human possibility of linguistic and expressive communication in complicated group activities. But the further back we go the more difficult it is to determine whether the people and emotions of another age were different for biological reasons. A common strategy, as indicated by Weisfeld and Beresford, is to compare the cognitive and expressive capabilities of humans with the nearest remaining biological relatives and then put this comparison into an evolutionary perspective. Many of the psychological phenomena investigated in this fashion include the relations between language use, cognitive abilities and particular areas of the brain (i.e., indications of biological discontinuity). Walker and Shipman (1996) therefore pose the following question which, admittedly, seems to have little to do with pride, emotion or personal reflexivity:
If toolmaking indicates the possession of the cognitive faculties necessary for language, how is it that chimps can and do make and use tools (in the wild and in captivity) and yet never master full language, even with intensive training? (p. 227)

However, if we extend Walker and Shipman's (1996) account to the relations between language and the type of distinctly human abilities that can be described as forms of "emotional intelligence" or literacy, then it is reasonable to examine the biological and evolutionary reasons why only humans demonstrate these psychological phenomena.

With regard to this potential study of emotion and personal reflexivity (or emotional intelligence), it is important to consider Dennett's (1995) argument against comparing our brains with those of other species:

Our human brains, and only human brains, have been armed by habits and methods, mind-tools and information, drawn from millions of other brains which are not ancestral to our own brains. This, amplified by the deliberate, foresightful use of generate-and-test in science, puts our minds on a different plane from the minds of our nearest relatives among the animals. This species-specific process of enhancement has become so swift and powerful that a single generation of its design improvements can now dwarf the R-and-D efforts of millions of years of evolution by natural selection. Comparing our brains with chimpanzee brains (or dolphin brains or any other non-human brains) would be almost beside the point, because our brains are in effect joined together into a single cognitive system that dwarfs all others. They are joined by an innovation that has invaded our brains and no others: language. (p. 381)

Although sympathetic to Dennett's position, it is possible in this case to examine current archaeological evidence of the biological differences between us and our closest predecessors, the Neanderthals. This specific focus may reconcile our recognition that biological discontinuities do exist with the specific evolutionary conditions created by linguistic and cultural developments.
The main reason for this focus is Walker and Shipman's view that "elaborate grave goods and body treatments" in the burial sites of what are presumed to be modern humans are significant in comparison to earlier Neanderthal burials because the former "unquestionably reflect symbolic behaviours" (p. 229). Although it may seem unlikely, these comparisons are relevant to the present topic through Walker and Shipman's further remark:

The difference between Neandertal and Upper Paleolithic burials is the difference between a burgeoning ability and one that is so fully developed as to be unmistakable. It may also be the difference between proto-language and true language. (p. 229)

In particular, the last point is consistent with some of Wittgenstein's remarks about human language use and the way in which individual developments extend an early proto-language of actions, gestures and instincts (i.e., an argument that is usually applied to the individual development of human emotions; see chapter 8). A proto-language can be regarded as expressions and actions that provide the basis for language use but do not themselves constitute a form of linguistic communication. Language, in contrast, is very closely connected to the conventional use of words and narratives which can, moreover, represent a local environment and disseminate information through social participation.

These points allow us to consider recent sources of biological discontinuity in relation to modern human forms of emotional expression, identification and experience (i.e., the sort of differences which would be apparent even if, to offer a science fiction example, a genetically-reproduced Neanderthal were to be brought up in a contemporary culture). In Rosenberg's terms, Neanderthal individuals would not demonstrate the
potential, through social interaction and language-use, to "work over" the organismic foundation of emotions and radically transform them. Thus, if we were forced to provide an account of the emergence of emotional intelligence and language use, it would probably involve a "reverse engineering" account of the requisite natural history of "research and design" until a point of disjunction occurred. The latter difference would describe the point for Neanderthals where "earlier design decisions come back to haunt—to constrain—the designer" (Dennett, 1995, p. 376).

A further theme for possible exploration from the biological and emotional intelligence literature is accounts of the potential of the limbic system "to hijack" many of the more considered and rational reactions we might prefer to have (Goleman, 1995). Given that it has probably always been dangerous for humans to have complete control over emotions such a fear or anger, the limbic system can be described in terms of "choices that evolution has already made" which "put major constraints on the options for design improvements" (Dennett, 1995, p. 376). For example, at some point it would have become impossible for chimpanzees ever to develop the same or similar abilities as ours (although this may have been due to selection pressures and limitations that are difficult to model). Thus Dennett's most obvious concession to the focus on biological differences is to note:

... the only hope of making a major revision of the internal environment to account for new problems, new features of the external environment that matter, is to submerge the old hardwiring under a new layer of pre-emptive control. (pp. 376-77)

However, in order to avoid producing the same type of biologically-based account of complicated, language and culture-dependent emotions, it is
wise to consider potential evidence that may emerge from future archaeological work. Moreover, it is important to consider the way in which ostensibly unrelated changes may have impacted upon the evolution of the biological and cultural potential for human emotional intelligence. An example of such a potential account is provided by considering the effects of behavioural changes in other human predecessors such as the Australopithecines: in particular, the fact that becoming a predator probably meant a shift from six to only two hours per day spent feeding, a change which Walker and Shipman (1996) suggest would have resulted in a gain of four hours or one third of the daylight time on the equator. This change is potentially significant because while “most carnivores sleep and socialize this extra time away”, a point that probably also applies to early hominids, we may also ask: “what if this free time were crucial to the innovation and creativity upon which we hominids pride ourselves?” (pp. 140-141).

To summarize, considerations of the natural history of culture and language-dependent forms of emotion and personal reflexivity will inevitably lead to a consideration of biological discontinuities. It is tempting to provide accounts of the evolution of emotions such as pride and our ability to create or control them for particular purposes by putting existing biological differences between species into an evolutionary time-frame. Problems with accounts of the evolution of our emotional intelligence can include inattention to the role of cultural and linguistic practices as well as the relations between “true language” and proto-linguistic behaviour. Rather than comparing humans with nonhuman brains it is more relevant to consider some of the relevant evidence from archaeological studies of the differences between modern humans and Neanderthals. This focus suggests the potential for further archaeological discoveries to inform us of
the circumstances that helped to create and sustain forms of personal reflexivity and emotion. Moreover, there is also the potential to provide a "reverse engineering" account of the some unexpected changes that may have been crucial to the biological discontinuities that are now obvious between us and our most recent ancestors.

Summary

This chapter began the critical treatment of Rosenberg's theory and the exploration of alternatives by comprehensively assembling and analyzing relevant examples of pride. Rosenberg's brief comments that individual emotions provide the "means for the attainment of other ends" and "for society emotions are involved critically in social control, role performance, and interpersonal interaction" (p. 4) were examined in minute detail. An important theme was the importance of identifying the limits of personal reflexivity confronted by individuals when they attempt to control or create emotions such as a shared or group pride. Moreover, Rosenberg's notions of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition were extended to include individual judgements and feelings of collective emotions and their background practices. For example, in section 5.1 unpredictable collective effects of personal pride were examined along with examples of emotions and related actions that are only evident in the relations between cultures. Further examples of pride highlighted the complicated ways in which the relations between individuals and various collectives play a role in many of our views of emotion and identity. Also some of the specific cultural symbols
such as flags and the practices in which they are used to construct pride were examined. It was also noted that a sense of reflexive agency due to a role in creating group pride is more likely to come from an individual's achievement on a global stage rather than a government policy or advertising campaign. Other important reflexive strategies of note include individuals' attempts to distance themselves from their own country or, in some cases, actively stating that they are not proud of their country. In many cases, these forms of personal reflexivity are not engaged in with the explicit aim of controlling or producing particular emotions, although an analysis of background practices often implies a sense of emotional commitment to a shared or group identity.

These issues led to a consideration of moral issues and the fact that denigration of an individual's country can occur as a kind of moral grace. Deferring to the wishes of another group is also especially appropriate when performed by members of a dominant culture (i.e., since any celebration of group pride is likely to be regarded by marginalized groups as arrogant and offensive). Marginalized groups are also judged as having a moral right to construct a sense of pride in their identity and achievements. But there are a host of other ways in which expressions of pride by individuals and ascriptions of collective pride may be used to justify and position people, respectively, as ethical individuals or mobs. In particular, a strong sense of pride can be gained by individuals who exercise the autonomy to agitate for political and ethical change. Although to some extent taking pride in a role as a protestor or enforcer of the status quo also depends upon whichever group is in power, nevertheless many Western countries maintain a strong emphasis on moral autonomy. Although legal systems can institutionalize punitive measures when individuals fail to
exercise an autonomous morality or protest too vigorously, it is more interesting to examine people's reactions of anger, shock or disbelief when individuals take pride in odd, immoral and illegal activities. And these forms of pride are different again from activities to create and recognize the rights of people to be exceptional: in both the sense of being different from more accepted identities and also to succeed and to achieve without discrimination.

Attention then turned to the institutions upon which many Western forms of pride are dependent but which do not often enter into our reflections on pride. Failure to "render visible" the background to our psychological experiences may mean that we ignore significant changes in cultural and linguistic practices. For example, although pride can be based on an individual's standing, wealth, or achievements, an important change in the Western view of personal worth is that it cannot be determined solely on the basis of "objective" social position (i.e., individuals should not be encouraged to be humble or allowed to humiliate themselves because their position is "lower"). This led to an investigation of the way in which individuals perceive themselves as moving up the levels of a social hierarchy when, for example, they enter particular institutions, take on their ideals and occasionally find themselves exemplifying broader goals and standards of work, family and nation. It is equally possible that individuals in countries with an egalitarian myth may delight in public failures and mistakes that "Tall Poppies" make to level themselves (or the efforts of others to cut them down). A brief attempt was made to produce a cultural analysis of changing practices which surround and inform our understanding of many expressions of pride. This analysis included many instances of pride where individuals feel the emotion but cannot fully
explain why it occurs (e.g., such as feeling extremely proud at a wedding, birth or other important occasion). In such cases, self-conscious and reflexive attempts to challenge these institution-produced values are often regarded in negative terms because they have the potential to undermine the institution. Similar considerations apply to the institution of nationhood and practices in which individuals “choose” the groups they identify with and, more specifically, what they prefer to call themselves.

Many of these points about the background against which individuals make various emotion-related and unrelated moves to position themselves also have historical aspects. A brief survey of examples of pride in the past focused on discontinuities which cannot be overcome by individual or coordinated reflexive work (i.e., historical instances of pride that cannot be fully shared or understood by us). Although the individual experience of pride may not have changed markedly, many of the cultural and linguistic practices to which pride is wedded reveal changing emotion ideologies and standards. It was also noted that at some point an investigation of the history of emotions will invite a natural historical analysis of prehistoric human life. Although the potential to engage linguistically or symbolically with previous ages is severely limited, recent anthropological and archaeological work suggests that early forms of pride may have been constructed and expressed through practices of personal adornment. Tattoos and other visual means of asserting an individual and group identity may also have been supplemented by language-based interactions and culturally-transmitted skills (e.g., such as when it is appropriate to control an expression of pride in relation to other individuals and groups). Finally, speculative points about when forms of pride first emerged and their biological basis were briefly examined. It was suggested that the biological
and evolutionary prerequisites for emotions such as pride and related reflexive strategies may be best accounted for in terms of the distinction between "true language" and proto-linguistic behaviour. If this position is adopted it is less important to provide a "reverse engineering" account of the biological differences, for example, between modern humans and Neanderthals which provide the grounding for uniquely human emotions and forms of emotional intelligence.
CHAPTER 6: The social, practical and individual limits of personal reflexivity: further improvements to notions of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition through the survey of pride

Introduction

In the previous chapter, the relations between collectives and individuals were examined in order to provide an alternative to the individualistic and acultural focus of Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory. In particular, individual displays and expressions of pride were argued to work within cultural, institutional, moral and political limits (as well as to succeed, occasionally, in changing those practices and the people involved). Building upon this critical treatment of Rosenberg's theory in terms of background practices, further examples will be assembled and analyzed to provide a relational-responsive account of individual pride (Shotter, 1996). For example, in the following chapter it will be recognized that "the same anecdote might seem boastful according to one expressive convention, but an expression of proper pride according to another" (Davies & Harré, 1990, p. 48; Cooley, 1902/1956, p. 185; i.e., it is important to describe the relativity of pride to social surroundings, linguistic resources and individual experience). But, in addition, further specific instances of personal reflexivity which, pace Rosenberg, are not necessarily emotion-centred will be emphasized: these include people's use of language-based skills and other abilities to position themselves in relation to others as well as to change themselves and to manipulate others.
The following sections attempt to describe some of the important ways in which individuals are positioned by talk of pride as well as what individuals say and do in order to position themselves. Consistent with the interest in producing a surveyable but comprehensive account of pride, prevailing notions of arrogance, stubbornness, deception and honour that cluster around talk of pride will be included. Section 6.1 examines the type of autonomy that the proud person demonstrates by "self-ishly" standing out against others and which includes an examination of the social surroundings of arrogant pride and sources of inappropriate pride. Section 6.2 assembles instances of pride that occur when individuals demonstrate their autonomy by overcoming social obstacles, interpersonal competition, personal problems and bodily limitations. Section 6.3 explores the complicated family of reflexive skills that involve acting, deception, and denial as they are demonstrated in relation to pride. This section also includes the use to which various reflexive skills are put in deceiving others or denying that one feels something. Section 6.4 investigates cases of pride that highlight relations to other people and demonstrate how considerations of others' values and reactions are incorporated in the thoughts, emotions and actions of individuals. Section 6.5 adds to the alternative account of personal reflexivity and emotion with a brief treatment of identity and privacy issues suggested by examples of pride and self-control.
6.1 Standing-out, “self-ishness” and sources of inappropriate pride

Although emotions such as pride, shame and guilt can be described as characteristic of individuals who “have a self”, it is often only pride that is regarded as “self-ish” in the further sense of self-centred or indulgent. Moreover, there is a great deal of potential for the feeling of “standing-out” from others to be expressed in a manner that implies a person “stands above” others and is therefore inclined “to look down upon them”. And as Murdoch (1983) quite rightly states in The Philosopher’s Pupil “the sin of pride may be a small or a great thing in someone’s life” (p. 81). But the focus in this section is on the way in which pride is ascribed to particular individuals, the strategies that may be used against that individual, the physiognomy of pride and conventional means of preventing and “curing” arrogant pride. In this respect, pride is clearly not restricted to its emotion sense which allows us to explore important issues in relation to character and identity.

Some similarities and differences between persons of “proud character” and displays of arrogant pride

The difficulty in representing the cluster of concepts surrounding pride is that no strict line can be drawn between cases of character and emotion (i.e., even when an expression of pride the emotion can provide the basis for character criticism by others)\(^41\). The difficulty in making what seems to be a

\(^41\) A further distinction may also be made between the emotion of pride and pride as a type of judgement. With some cases of “abnormal pride” there is only a contradiction between these two senses of pride if it is thought that every use of the word must involve the expression of emotion. For example, in the American Psychiatric Association Diagnostic and Statistical
clear distinction between two forms of pride, at least in Western culture, is indicated by the following newspaper article:

The Australian boxing hero, Jeff Fenech, believes Sunday's world title rematch with Azumah Nelson, of Ghana, will go the distance.

... The two boxers met for the final time before the fight at a joint news conference in Melbourne yesterday.

"The man on my right is very, very proud — I think he proved that when we fought in Las Vegas and I'm certainly proud of what I do," Fenech said. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 February 1992a)

Being a "proud man" is not the same as being "proud of what I do" even where the object of pride is closely connected with an aspect of their identity (e.g., such as "I'm proud to be a boxer"). In a similar way, it can be difficult to judge the differences between an expression of pride and forms of arrogant pride, especially where a particular statement or action is used to remark upon an individual's character.

A good place to begin a conceptual-discursive analysis of pride and arrogance is to note that individuals can be said to be characterized and even "consumed" by pride. Indeed, we could imagine the latter in the same way as Marlowe (n.d./1985) when he wrote of a conversation with the sins themselves in the play Doctor Faustus. Some of the central features of arrogant pride are revealed when Faustus asks pride to introduce itself and

Manual of Mental Disorders (III-R) section on personality disorders, the associated features of Paranoid Personality Disorder are described:

The affectivity of these people is often restricted, and they may appear "cold" to others. They have no true sense of humor and are usually serious. They may pride themselves on always being objective, rational, and unemotional. They usually lack passive, soft, sentimental, and tender feelings. (p. 337)

Thus, it is not a contradiction in terms to discover people who "pride themselves on being unemotional" and it is clearly of great interest to explore connections between such instances of pride and issues of character and personality (see section 6.2).
a presumably male pride (which nevertheless attaches itself to a woman) responds:

I am Pride. I disdain to have any parents. I am like to Ovid's flea. I can creep into every corner of a wench. Sometimes like a periwig I sit upon her brow. Next, like a necklace I hang about her neck. Then, like a fan of feathers, I kiss her. And then turning myself to a rough smock do what I list. But fie, what a smell is here! I'll not speak a word for a king's ransome, unless the ground be perfumed and covered with cloth of Arras. (Act II, Scene II, p. 289)

Further literary examples abound such as the more well-known example of *Pride and Prejudice*. In Austen's (1813/1985) novel, Mr Darcy provides a central example of pride as described in the following excerpts:

The gentlemen pronounced him to be a fine figure of a man, the ladies declared he was much handsomer than Mr. Bingley, and he was looked at with great admiration for about half the evening, till his manners gave a disgust which turned the tide of his popularity; for he was discovered to be proud, to be above his company, and above being pleased; and not all his large estate in Derbyshire could then save him from having a most forbidding, disagreeable countenance, and being unworthy to be compared with his friend. (p. 8)

and:

Darcy danced only once with Mrs. Hurst and once with Miss Bingley, declined being introduced to any other lady, and spent the rest of the evening in walking about the room, speaking occasionally to one of his own party. His character was decided. He was the proudest, most disagreeable man in the world, and every body hoped that he would never come there again. (p. 8)

Pride in the character sense is therefore different from an expression of emotion that is taken, for example, as a boast. The former may be said to indicate a person's elevated view of himself or herself and a related sense
of maintaining a standard, while the latter may be a character defect which is evident upon attaining a standard. Hence Darcy is described as disagreeable while an individual experiencing the pride of an achievement would be a good deal happier (i.e., an arrogantly proud person is often said to exhibit a kind of emotionless “cold-hearted selfishness” (Austen, 1811/1979, p. 215)).

It is also worth noting that where individuals do not realize that they are causing offence — either because they are not directly challenged or their actions have some sense of justification — social strategies such as gossip and ostracism may be employed to “level” the individual (see chapter 5, section 5.3 for a related cultural account). For example, one of the characters in *Pride and Prejudice* says of Darcy:

> Upon my word I say no more here than I might say in any house in the neighbourhood, except Netherfield. He is not at all liked in Hertfordshire. Every body is disgusted with his pride. You will not find him more favourably spoken of by any one. (p. 74)

Thus, instead of any direct challenge it seems that gossip and avoidance are the most common strategies to undermine an individual’s social standing when his (or her) pride offends and disgusts others. Moreover, the passive, non-confrontational nature of this response not only indicates the importance that is attached to self-regulation in Western cultures, but also suggests why “‘how are the mighty fallen?’ is always a theme for rejoicing” (Murdoch, 1983, p. 413).

Another issue worth examining in relation to the pejorative sense of pride is that the person concerned is often capable of pleasant, agreeable or reasonable conversation with others but chooses otherwise. This
unwillingness to act in social settings gives the distinct impression that no one else is sufficiently interesting, worth talking to or worthy of acknowledgement. A further description in *Pride and Prejudice* illustrates this point:

They were in fact very fine ladies; not deficient in good humour when they were pleased, nor in the power of being agreeable where they chose it; but proud and conceited. They were rather handsome; had been educated in one of the first private seminaries in town, had a fortune of twenty thousand pounds, were in the habit of spending more than they ought, and of associating with people of rank; and were therefore in every respect entitled to think well of themselves, and meanly of others. (p. 12)

The central feature of arrogant pride is simply the failure to consider the feelings of other people. It should be noted, however, that statements such as the following from *Through the Looking Glass*, are hardly proof of a lack of pride: “to show you I’m not proud, you may shake hands with me!” (Carroll, 1872/1989, p. 182). In order to avoid the charge of arrogance an individual must not even position other individuals within a narrative which suggests the former is allowing the interaction to proceed. Such a statement may be taken as a personal offence and might provoke a later remark of the form that Elizabeth makes about Darcy: “I could easily forgive his pride, if he had not mortified mine” (p. 8).

The proud individual might therefore be said to be blinded to the concerns of others and even to the truth of his or her own situation — an interpretation that certainly applies to both Darcy and Elizabeth — by a reluctance to engage in conversation with others, to entertain another point of view or acknowledge another person. Of the many literary examples that
could be assembled to reflect our cultural and linguistic practices, the following exemplar should suffice:

'Exactly. Perhaps he’s made worse by our opinions. But I’m sure he is terrible to Stella.' (Gabriel)
‘You said it was an accident.’ (Father Bernard)
‘Of course — but I mean — I think she ought to get away from him.’
‘Because he might kill her?’
‘No, to be alone and have another life, she’s obsessed by George, she’s wasting herself, her love doesn’t do him good, it just enrages him. Her love is like duty, like something sublime, made of idealism and awful self-confidence. She thinks she’ll elevate him. She ought to kneel down beside him.’
‘Do you tell her this?’
‘Of course not! She’s too proud, she’s the proudest person I know. I wish you’d talk to George.’ (Murdoch, 1983, p. 53, *brackets added*).

Another example from *The Philosopher’s Pupil* fills out the picture of a “proud person” with a description of the character Emmanuel Scarlett-Taylor:

The Irish boy was something of a novelty. He was two years older than Tom, at an age when two years counted for much. Tom had been vaguely aware of him as being a bit of an intellectual ‘grandee’, tipped to get a ‘first’, a gloomy proud solitary sort of fellow. He had a reputation for being arrogant and rude. (p. 123)

It seems that unless a proud individual is amongst equals he or she is likely to isolate him or herself from others; inviting rejection and ridicule. Moreover, in terms of reflexive cognition and reflexive agency, it might be said that an elevated self-image informs the actions that lead such individuals to isolate themselves (whether that is their intention or not). Thus although attempts to maintain a sense of being above others is often
pursued consciously, it may also be unintentionally effective in producing feelings of gloom and isolation.42

To reiterate, a feature of Western talk about pride is that it may not be clear whether a person is talking about the character or emotion sense of the word. Because this problem can extend to arrogant pride, central features were highlighted with literary examples including: the sense in which pride involves a view of being above others, the fact that individuals suffering from pride are often left to “level themselves”, and the potential for others to be positioned as being allowed to speak to the proud person. A further feature of arrogant pride is that the person is capable of agreeable conversation but refuses to consider the feelings of others (i.e., his or her actions offend other people’s sense of pride). In terms of reflexive cognition and reflexive agency, it may be said that the elevated self-image leads to a style of interaction which unintentionally makes the arrogantly proud feel isolated and gloomy (except perhaps where they are able to find equals).

42 When faced with the effects of an elevated self-image it is possible that a person characterized by pride could still derive some enjoyment from interaction with social and intellectual equals. For example, although Darcy’s pride is said never to desert him it is noted by one of his friends that he has a brotherly and familial pride and is different among his equals:

"Do you know Mr. Bingley?"
"Not at all."
"He is a sweet tempered, amiable, charming man. He cannot know what Mr. Darcy is."
"Probably not;—but Mr. Darcy can please where he chuses. He does not want abilities. He can be a conversible companion if he thinks it worth his while. Among those who are at all his equals in consequence, he is a very different man from what he is to the less prosperous. His pride never deserts him; but with the rich, he is liberal-minded, just, sincere, rational, honourable, and perhaps agreeable,—allowing something for fortune and figure." (p. 79)
“Puffed up” or “pumped up”? why some forms of pride transgress norms of self-elevation

Despite the aloofness that seems to accompany arrogant pride, there are some similarities between character and emotion senses of pride which indicate the potential for an analysis of intermediate cases. In particular, proud individuals are often described as “puffed up” in a manner that suggests additional postural and emotional criteria (i.e., in addition to gloominess or righteous indignation). Darwin’s (1872) account of pride in the *Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals* is interesting in this respect because it indicates similarities between the character and emotion forms of pride which include the position of a person’s head along with his or her facial expressions and posture:

A proud man exhibits his sense of superiority over others by holding his head and his body erect. He is haughty (*haut*), or high, and makes himself appear as large as possible; so that metaphorically he is said to be swollen or puffed up with pride. A peacock or a turkey-cock strutting about with puffed-up feathers, is sometimes said to be an emblem of pride. The arrogant man looks down on others, and with lowered eyelids hardly condescends to see them; or he may show his contempt by slight movements... about the nostrils or lips. (p. 263)

A host of literary, photographic and artistic representations may not only be assembled to support this description (e.g., Darwin, 1872, p. 264; see Figure 4 in Appendix p. 695), but also used to indicate that the “puffed up” postural aspects of arrogant pride are not entirely unemotional. For

43 In relation to already mentioned instances of pride which indicate personality problems and a potential mental illness or disorder, it is worth noting that the photographs used by Darwin to illustrate the proud man (see figure 4 in Appendix, p. 692) were “of patients affected by a monomania of pride” (p. 263) in which:

... the head and body were held erect, and the mouth firmly closed. This latter action, expressive of decision, follows, I presume, from the proud man feeling perfect self-confidence in himself. (pp. 263-264)
example, it may be accompanied by extreme confidence and possibly a feeling of buoyant energy. This position seems to be supported by Kövecses' (1990) analysis of metaphors and expressions of inappropriate pride which emphasizes the following features: the head held unnaturally high, the chest unnaturally thrust out, boasting and a self-important striding.

A further interesting result of Kövecses' analysis is his view that the following model underlies and informs many common expressions of pride: "as pride increases, its physiological effects increase" and "there is a limit beyond which the physiological effects of pride impair normal functioning" (p. 89). Although the folk theory aspects of Kövecses' account are not endorsed here, the description does provide some insights into feelings and expressions of pride that can be criticized as arrogance. In particular, the analysis indicates that it is relatively easy for individuals to lose judgement about their actions, gestures and statements when feeling excited or superior to others. In contrast to the colder, dispositional sense of pride, the lack of judgement with emotional forms of pride can occur in a variety of ways. For example, if the captain of a team repeatedly uses "I" rather than "we" to talk about a victory, the excitement of winning may lead to statements that could be construed as arrogance. The Captain of the Pakistan cricket team, Imran Khan, could be accused of such an error when he remarked:

"I feel very proud that at the twilight of my career, finally I've managed to win the World Cup". (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 26 March 1992)

Accordingly, Darwin's remarks about the expression of pride say little about more subtle cultural, linguistic, personal and private aspects (see chapter 6).
Accordingly, it is often safer to acknowledge publicly the importance of other people even referring to an individual achievement\textsuperscript{44}. For example, an individual who was made an honorary fellow of the Royal Aeronautical Society in London stated that he was very proud “but not in a personal way” because the title “honours the people I served with and who served me during the war and in peacetime” (\textit{Press} (Christchurch, N.Z.) 28 December 1990). Thus although it may be tempting to make extravagant and exaggerated claims especially when feeling confident, buoyant or ecstatic after an achievement or form of recognition, good judgement involves controlling the urge to make statements that might be taken as self-centred arrogance.

Although it is important to use forms of self-control and to choose appropriate words when expressing pride, other exaggerated displays connected with pride and a lack of reflexive skill are worth analyzing. For example, it is easy to imagine an individual “pumped up” from producing his (or her?) best competitive result yet who reacts by putting his chin up in the air, maintaining a serious expression and strutting around in a manner that suggests arrogance (i.e., almost as if the person expected to be No. 1 and is more than comfortable in assuming this position). While such displays may reflect the individual’s belief in his or her ability, still there seems to be something personally disagreeable about an arrogant, almost defiant display (e.g., such as the reactions of some of the American athletes in the 1996 Atlanta Olympics which, it should be noted, had the crowd’s approval). As with more linguistic expressions of pride mentioned above which might lead to the charge of having a “swelled head”, part of the reason for

\textsuperscript{44} The contrasting case is that in which the captain of a winning team stated:
personal distaste may be “traced to an element of the ridiculous in an exaggerated or excessive display” (Harre, 1986, p. 9). Thus arrogance seems to occur with overtly physical expressions of pride not simply because there is a lack of judgement when an individual is “pumped up”, but also the victory or achievement justifies a “puffed up” display45.

Much of the ordinary content of ascriptions and expressions of pride is usually about issues of justification and appropriateness. For example, in a self-explanatory extract from Ibsen’s (1879/1982) play A Doll’s House, Christine says to Nora: “I’m sure I don’t look down on anybody. But it’s true what you say: I am both proud and happy when I think of how I was able to make Mother’s life a little easier towards the end” (p. 12). This is not to deny that individuals may seem to stand above others because they are special, unique, or convinced that on a particular occasion they are “No. 1” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 9 October 1990)46. An elevated sense of self can be represented pictorially in a variety of ways ranging from portrayals of Queen Superbia with an uplifted head and train of admirers (see Figure 2 in Appendix, p. 693) to an expanded “I” in “pride” (Vipper, 1994, p. 4; see Figure 6 in Appendix, p. 697; the latter of which will be taken to represent the

This is the best feeling in my life . . . to be a team member, to be part of a team you’re proud of. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 September 1991)

45 Some of these differences in expression have important cultural aspects. It is tempting to claim, for example, that Americans might be more likely to engage in such displays than English or New Zealander citizens (although a critical feature of how likely it is that individuals will experience the “glow” of pride in a culture may be the extent to which they are allowed to “shine”). For example, Americans seem to admire and celebrate the achievements of individuals and Germans respect a kind of defiant independence. New Zealanders, in contrast, seem to be more pleasantly surprised to find individuals who, even after a pivotal and “commanding display”, are “unassuming” and show “no trace of boastfulness” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 3 February 1991).

46 Moreover, not all cases of arrogant pride are capable of being described as hubris or false pride. For false pride often describes the celebration, reporting, and boasting to others of an achievement that is, in fact, not really special or worthy of praise at all. Instead, if there is any reason at all for claiming that the majority of case of pride are actually hubris, this can be traced to the suspicion that “even a little proper pride can so easily lead to a lot of improper pride” (Swinburne, 1989, p. 78). While the sin of pride in part describes inappropriate and excessive personal celebration of achievements and abilities, the attempt to redescribe cases of pride as hubris seems to warn against the consequences of a character weakness and lack of restraint.
widespread sense of pride as an inflated ego). It may also be said that theories of pride as the product of self-evaluation introduce an additional and misleading self-referential picture of individual pride (see Figure 7 in Appendix p. 698; cf. chapter 7). However, we need not endorse pictures of pride that allude to a private, reflective or feeling aspect which accompanies the outer behaviour and invests these actions with meaning. Instead, the "physiognomy" of pride — the expressive feel of the words, expressions, postural peculiarities and displays — can be examined without adopting a dualist perspective on the feelings of being elevated that may make an individual conspicuous in standing out from others (or receiving their attention; see next section and chapter 7 for more specific remarks about particular embodied features of pride the emotion such as duration and intensity). It is an empirical matter as to whether the following statement, for example, is accurate: "as pride increases, its behavioural reactions increase" so that "the increase in pride is seen as being accompanied by an increase in the physical proportions of the body" (Kővecses, 1990, p. 90). The complicated syndrome of exaggerated actions, gestures and posture may change as pride is expressed (or incompletely suppressed), without necessitating the claim that physiological changes cause an increase in pride beyond conventional limits.

Often when experiencing pride individuals feel very good about themselves and it is perhaps because such occasions are relatively rare that we may not know exactly how to act in expressing these thoughts and feelings and sharing them with others\textsuperscript{47}. However, a common strategy is to

\textsuperscript{47} Interestingly, the expression of intense pride may also resemble occasions upon which individuals speak of feeling humbled. For example, an enduring picture of pride is often of individuals crying upon hearing their national anthem (e.g., upon winning an international competition). The feeling of being overwhelmed by intense pride at a point of personal achievement, upon seeing laudable behaviour enacted by others, due to recognition by
adopt a form of humility which might also extend, for example, to self-deprecatory humour. It is interesting to note that humility may be practised on some occasions while pride is also expressed on others, thus indicating that the strategy of humility need not be the dominant aspect of an individual’s character. A person may therefore exhibit a complicated mixture of humility and pride, thus resembling fictional characters such as Mr. Collins in *Pride and Prejudice* whose position as rector in combination with his personality and social connections “made him altogether a mixture of pride and obsequiousness, self-importance and humility” (p. 66). A more recent example of the uneasy coexistence of pride and humility appears in Theroux’s (1992) *The happy isles of Oceania: paddling the Pacific*. In particular, Theroux notes that while many New Zealanders were “smug and self-congratulatory about David Lange’s nonnuclear policy” (p. 22), they also demonstrated a refusal to accept praise which “was so persistent it was almost as though in their stubborn humility they were fishing for compliments” (p. 22).

Taken too far, a cultivated humility is almost as bad as boasting about a success because it is a quiet exaggeration of a character virtue. Paradoxically, claiming to take no pride in achievements or, in other cases, not to be worthy of praise still seems to elevate an individual or individuals above others. Accordingly, some people believe that “modesty is hypocrisy” (Kundera, 1992, pp. 11-12) and, not surprisingly, a similar view is expressed by Darcy in *Pride and Prejudice*:

persons of high status within a culture or by the sheer number of unexpected supporters may explain why Hume (1739/1978) described humility as a “passion”. Moreover, this also accounts for the fact that rather than crying when genuinely moved, people use methods of self-control such as clenching their teeth (i.e., so as to appear “deeply moved” rather than overwhelmed).
... nothing is more deceitful ... than the appearance of humility. It is often only carelessness of opinion, and sometimes an indirect boast. (p. 46)

But humility is also associated with the fact that achievements and praise may bring fame which may alter the character of an individual. Individuals who are modest about their achievements are said to be "little-touched by fame" but are still able to be proud of their achievements, as in the following example:

America's greatest teacher, Jaime Escalante, whose story was told in the movie "Stand and Deliver", is now 60 and still at the chalkface. Marita Vandenberg spent a morning in his Californian classroom and found that even Escalante sometimes deserps of the present generation.
... He speaks kindly, softly, and in slightly broken English. He seems little-touched by his fame but at the same time proud of his achievements. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 12 January 1993)

Moreover, although in some cases humility may appear to be a source of pride, this is not the same as a person being proud of his or her humility. The important point about humility and examples even of unassuming famous people is that it is only reasonable to describe others giving this compliment: individuals should not *elevate, compliment or flatter themselves* in conversation with others (or themselves).48

48 This point is illustrated by the following story offered by a famous Irish band that toured New Zealand in 1991:

The band prides itself on being easygoing and O'Braonain tells the story of being approached by a botany student in the restaurant of their Christchurch hotel.

"She started the conversation by saying we looked cosy in the alcove where we were eating dinner.

"We got chatting, and when we told her who we were she couldn't believe we were so unassuming — it was a real nice compliment." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 December 1991).

While the band clearly likes to recount this story (and thus it resembles examples of pride that spontaneously occur in many conversations), it clearly does not constitute a boast or form of self-elevation (and complimenting themselves).
An extended sense of reflexivity beyond inappropriate reflexive speech-acts is also worth exploring with regard to pride, arrogance and humility. In particular, it is the fact that individuals who are proud of a particular achievement or action may exercise some control over the people who congratulate and celebrate with them. An obvious example is the potential for an arrogant display of patriotism after a military victory by the relevant commander. The "swaggering" behaviour of General Schwarzkopf upon returning to America after the 1991 Gulf War helps to illustrate the relevant point that he was clearly basking in the praise and adulation of the welcoming crowd. The fact that he may have been capable of playing down the victory but did not made his actions more offensive (especially to members of the defeated nation). A more common example comes from Theroux's (1982) novel *The Mosquito Coast* where correct advice by the narrator's father about the weight distribution of the ship in a typhoon leads to the humiliation of the captain (after he is proved wrong in front of the crew and passengers):

Father discussed various possibilities. He basked in their praise and he called the crewmen by name and joshed them in Spanish.

Captain Smalls remained on the bridge. He did not invite anyone to eat with him. In fact, we never saw him again.

"He's just ashamed," Father said. "It's only natural. I suppose he thinks I've got a college education." (p. 106)

The point is that even though a person may not necessarily boast about his success, the fact that he allows others to praise him and is happy to bask in their praise may still invite the charge of arrogance (i.e., because his actions do not consider the feelings of the defeated party). Thus a measure of self-presentation that controls the reactions of other people can be important to
avoid the humiliation of any unsuccessful individual or defeated group (i.e., so that relations, for example, are not fractured and the motivation for revenge is avoided).

To summarize, Darwin's description of pride was used to highlight the similarities between the account of pride as “puffed up” and the sense also in which pride may result in an exaggerated display when “pumped up”. If “emotional display” (Rosenberg, 1990) is taken to include the use of words to express emotions then it is quite possible that the physiological arousal of excitement upon winning, for example, may explain why some individuals make statements which appear self-centred and arrogant. The charge of arrogance may also be based on exaggerated gestures and excessive displays which have a particular physiognomy (i.e., the expressive feel of particular expressions and displays of pride). But it is more common for individuals to display some measure of humility, at least in conversation, although complicated combinations with occasional pride and self-importance are still possible. In terms of personal reflexivity too much humility may almost suggest a form of self-elevation that is similar to arrogant pride. Thus if individuals are not sufficiently aware of the effects of their actions on other “competitors” and are content to bask in any praise, then a lack of consideration and self-control may still invite the charge of arrogance.

The physiognomy of potentially inappropriate pride and relevant forms of personal reflexivity

While the criteria and conditions for ascribing or admitting to inappropriate pride are known and used by many individuals, there are further aspects of
the expressive feel of pride that are relevant when considering the potential for arrogance. In particular, private features of the physiognomy of pride provide important cues for the individual ability to avoid, or to find personally unpleasant, the sort of actions and expressions that are taken as arrogance in Western culture. It should be clear that the point of using the term "physiognomy" in this context is to avoid a sharp, almost Cartesian dualism between "those features of the self which are external and those which are internal" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 3). For this reason the critical and detailed treatment of issues captured by Rosenberg's theoretical categories will not use the same sharp division between emotional display and emotional experience.

The point of this section is not to provide a psychological or physiological explanation, for example, of the phenomenon described by various metaphors of obvious and offensive forms of pride (see chapter 7 for an account of embodied aspects of pride such as intensity and duration). Instead, surveyed examples of pride will be used to illustrate points about the regulation, containment and control of emotion. For example, in Eco's (1989) *Foucault's Pendulum*, the Piedmontese phrase "Ma gavte la nata" or "Take out the cork" is used by one of the characters and explained thus:

49 In this respect the term "expression" will be preferred in conjunction with "experience" because it allows us to elevate the importance of language use (rather than focus on "displays" and "facial expressions") which is particularly appropriate to emotions like pride (see Schulte (1989) for an account of the relevant Wittgensteinian reasons for this preference). Rosenberg (1990), in contrast, argues that:

There is a fundamental difference between intentional efforts to convince others that we are experiencing certain emotions — a reflexive process—and the inadvertent emotional impact that we may have on another person — a nonreflexive process. (p. 3)

However, the emphasis placed on intention and emotional display contradicts the fact that we may choose when and how and to whom we express emotions such as pride that are the products of self-evaluation (i.e., what Rosenberg regards as a form of reflexive cognition). Rosenberg's main concern, of course, is to show how central and human it is to use self-directed cognitive processes such as memory, attention and perception to create or control
You say it to one who is full of himself, the idea being that what causes him to swell and strut is the pressure of a cork stuck in his behind. Remove it, and phsssssssh, he returns to the human condition. (pp. 55-56)

The description of an individual as “puffed up”, “full of”, “strutting”, or “swelling” with pride not only supplies us with a picture of the expressive feel of the emotion, but also indicates the desirability of “deflating” that individual (i.e., by removing the hot air upon which the expression and experience of pride is based). Moreover, it implies the absence of a type of concern that most “reflexive” or “emotionally intelligent” individuals usually have which can be described as the use of a variety of techniques and strategies to control an accompanying emotional impulse (or, at the very least, to limit any personal and social “damage”).

The colourful nature of many of these metaphors should not distract us from the genuine point that most people sense the point at which an emotional expression will cease to be regarded as reasonable. Clearly, the situation involves a complicated interplay between the individual and a particular group, hence the importance of judgement about the appropriateness of quite specific statements, expressions, gestures and postures. One example of the last item is the characteristic expression and experience of pride that is easily gleaned from the description of an individual effortlessly striding “proudly forward with head held high” (Kundera, 1992, p. 235). This posture and gait is quite rightly described as effortless because it contrasts with the feelings that accompany the defeated posture of “head bowed and shoulder(s) sagging” (Press (Christchurch,

emotions in the individual concerned or other people. Many of these forms of personal reflexivity are detailed in chapter 7 in relation to pride.
N.Z.) 4 March 1992a\(^{50}\). However, while Stepper and Strack (1993), for example, provide some empirical support for a close relation between posture and the feeling of pride, the main point is to note the dispositional results of training from childhood to adhere to such rules as "you should not draw attention to yourself" (Allende, 1988, p. 221) or do so well that you "stick out" (Wharton, 1987, p. 59): that is, the uncomfortable feelings that can be generated even when only pretending to boast or be arrogant.

Uncomfortable feelings can occur in a variety of circumstances such as when individuals realize that their statements and actions appear arrogant to others, when praise from others is effusive, or attention and approbation makes an individual conspicuous. In many of these cases, the feelings generated provide a kind of internal cue that prevents the characteristic features of arrogance from occurring. Indeed, it is possible for some individuals never to allow themselves to feel pride for these reasons (although this may be for reasons provided by an ethical or religious framework). A reaction of a shy pride may be part of the normal recognition and discomfort of an individual who is uncomfortable accepting another person's compliments, comments, or misrepresentations. The following example from James Joyce's (1914, 1974) The Dead, illustrates the potential for a "meek" or "shy" pride:

He was laughing very heartily at this himself when Freddy Malins turned to him and said:

"Well, Browne, if you're serious you might make a worse discovery. All I can say is I never heard her sing half so well as

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\(^{50}\) The notion of "holding one's head high" would be obviously misunderstood if it were regarded as an instruction about an individual's actions or posture and the feelings it should generate (i.e., as if mimicking the posture and gestures of extreme pride were a successful strategy to produce the feeling; see section 6.3 Acting, deception and denial). The expression is, of course, used to describe the fact that particular forms of failure are not necessarily the basis for shame or embarrassment, even though the individual concerned may feel bad about his or her lack of success.
long as I am coming here. And that's the honest truth.”

“Neither did I,” said Mr. Browne. “I think her voice has greatly improved.”

Aunt Julia shrugged her shoulders and said with meek pride:

“Thirty years ago I hadn’t a bad voice as voices go.” (p. 134).

By adopting this strategy it may seem as if an individual would not only never have to “guard against” the supposedly pernicious aspects of pride, but may also not eventually experience pride in any usual spontaneous sense (which is a matter for further empirical research). Thus, it may be difficult for an individual to “catch him or herself” feeling or expressing a kind of arrogant pride without some prior experience of transgressing relevant conventions.

However, when pride does occur there are a variety of possible reactions, two of which are illustrated by remarks from Monk’s (1990) biography of Wittgenstein. The first example drawn from a letter exemplifies the ordinary sense in which individuals may feel an unjustified sense of pride that they would probably not share with anyone else:

Often, when I have had a picture framed or have hung it in the right surroundings, I have caught myself feeling as proud as if I had painted it myself. (p. 317)

There are many occasions in people's everyday lives where a feeling of pride occurs but would not, if expressed to others, be regarded as an action or event of which an individual could reasonably be proud. While pride the emotion is constructed in this manner, it is also possible to find reflexive strategies that are more obviously relevant to the issue of character. For example, Monk (1990) describes an episode in which Wittgenstein went to a
small village in Austria to apologize to pupils he bullied as a teacher. Monk notes that Wittgenstein did not seek humiliation or:

\[ \ldots \text{to hurt} \] his pride, as a form of punishment; it was to \text{dismantle} it — to remove a barrier, as it were, that stood in the way of honest and decent thought. (p. 371)

Although the problem of distinguishing between the emotion and character senses of pride has reappeared, Wittgenstein’s example demonstrates the connection between them. For on other occasions, Monk reports that Wittgenstein’s:

\[ \ldots \text{belittling of his own achievement may have been a way of guarding himself from his own pride} \] — from believing that he really was, as he once lightheartedly described himself in a letter to Pattisson, ‘the greatest philosopher that ever lived’. (p. 317)

In one respect, we could say that Wittgenstein was motivated by the widespread but declining view that individuals should not take pride in any superior ability that could be called a “gift of God” supposedly because “people in their right minds never take pride in their talents” (Lee, 1960, p. 104).

But it could also be said that in a complicated and perhaps unconventional manner, Wittgenstein avoided the self-deception of arrogance by interweaving an exacting ethical stance with rigorous self-scrutiny. The episode of apologizing for bullying is understandable as part of Wittgenstein’s more general view of himself, his actions and activities:

So long as he lived, Wittgenstein never ceased to struggle against his own pride, and to express doubts about his
philosophical achievement and his own moral decency. (Monk, 1990, p. 317)

The point of analyzing these examples is not to speculate about Wittgenstein's life but to show similarities and differences with more common strategies. Wittgenstein's apologies were not motivated by a sense of reduced standing amongst others but to make himself a better person. In contrast, the unpopular character Willoughby in Austen's (1811/1979) *Sense and Sensibility* indicates a concern about his standing in the eyes of others when he initiates an otherwise unnecessary and largely unwelcome visit:

"Why did you call, Mr. Willoughby?" said Elinor, reproachfully; "a note would have answered every purpose. Why was it necessary to call?"

"It was necessary to my own pride. I could not bear to leave the country in a manner that might lead you, or the rest of the neighbourhood, to suspect any part of what had really passed between Mrs. Smith and myself, and I resolved, therefore, on calling at the cottage, in my way to Honiton." (p. 293)

Such strategies may be required even when individuals are "brought down" by others and feel personally compelled to do something to restore other people's view of them (and, as a cynic might argue, reduce their own feelings of discomfort for selfish reasons). If the more complicated actions engaged in by Wittgenstein are relatively widespread in Western culture, then it offsets the view that people engage in forms of social restitution largely to reduce their own negative feelings (a problem that occurs with much of individualistic literature on personal reflexivity).

A final point that bears upon the complicated connections between feelings of pride, potential arrogance, character issues and reflexive
strategies is that although excessive modesty and humility for a transgression is not necessarily the best self-presentational strategy, admitting responsibility for an action and engaging in self-condemnation may help to restore normal relations. What is interesting about both examples from Wittgenstein is the incorporation of strategies promoting humility and modesty into a personal ethical framework that does not permit dishonesty and self-deception. This feature of Wittgenstein's example contrasts with an individual who can be described as setting high standards for himself and has built up a sizeable business for himself and his family. The point is that he anticipates the direct question of whether he feels proud and deflects it by what can be described as a linguistic turn within a personal ethical framework:

I've got no regrets. I've got two grandchildren working in the business. I've got my family. I have my butchery. Proud? I am very thankful. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 March 1992)

Again we confront limitations of possible engagement with the individuals concerned, but nevertheless the example is interesting because it suggests the potential to deny what others would probably confess: unless, of course, the individual concerned did not even smile when making the statement or talking about his achievements (i.e., what we would expect given the focus on the physiognomy of pride and the fact that every emotional experience has a characteristic expression).

To summarize, arrogant pride usually indicates an absence of the individual strategies to control the impulse towards an excessive statement or display that might avoid the charge or limit any damage in personal relations. This view of arrogant pride is also supported by indications of the
physiognomy of pride: the “expressive feel” of various constitutive statements, gestures, expressions, actions and postural aspects. The survey of examples suggests that many individuals feel uncomfortable exhibiting such features of potentially arrogant pride (i.e., as demonstrated by cases of “meek pride” as well as the potential for such reflexive control to lead to an absence of feelings of pride in some individuals’ lives). Two examples from Wittgenstein’s life illustrate how individuals may guard against pride by controlling it in situations where the emotion is not justified and also may use reflexive strategies to belittle oneself (i.e., with the aim of maintaining self-honesty). An example of Wittgenstein “dismantling” his pride was contrasted with the more self-centred strategy of being concerned about other people’s erroneous judgements and acting so as to reduce personal disquiet. The potential for individuals to describe pride as being “thankful” was also regarded as potentially dishonest especially where the characteristic positive facial expressions, gestures or posture of pride indicate feelings of pride (i.e., pride of the sort that an individual might confess to rather than deny).

6.2 Personal autonomy and sources of pride

The ability of individuals to recognize and to monitor themselves for potentially offensive expressions of pride indicates the importance of autonomous skills and abilities (i.e., skills and abilities with respect to emotions that some psychologists would prefer to emphasize by putting the prefix “self-” in front of numerous psychological verbs (e.g., Kaplan, 1986)). It is reasonable to describe many of the activities that lead to pride as
intentional although there seems to be no reason to assume that the overt aim is to produce the emotional experience. On Rosenberg's (1990) account, pride is not the product of a reflexive process because reflexive processes only occur "when people decide which emotions they do or do not wish to experience and proceed to produce these emotional effects" (p. 4). But similarly pride cannot be seen as the product of a nonreflexive process as defined by Rosenberg as an "internal state of arousal" that is experienced "spontaneously and without reference to intention" (p. 4). Accordingly, it is important to examine instances of pride in which individuals autonomously and intentionally alter social circumstances, their personalities or even their own bodies to reach particular goals, to maintain personal or social standards and to attain other desired outcomes. In other words, an account will be provided of the occurrence of pride in the performance of acts of reflexive agency which are not centred solely on the production or control of particular emotions (i.e., before the further issue and problem of the role of reflexive cognition is explored in chapter 7).

Pride, autonomy and infamy

Cases of pride often imply individuals' independence from other people as well as an ability to make robust judgements about their efforts and actions in relation to particular aims, goals and desired outcomes. But as noted in chapter 5, it is possible for individuals to engage in a kind of immoral autonomy (i.e., where pride is taken in actions that would be praised only by subcultural or fringe groups in a society). In such cases, the expression and
experience of pride is not necessarily arrogance even though it suggests a kind of defiant autonomy and disregard for normal conventions. The already-mentioned example of the individual who seemed to be proud of murdering his remedial teacher — based on testimony by other inmates that he was bragging about the murder — illustrates this point. Unfortunately, we can only guess what the accused student thought of the Crown prosecutor’s remark “You were quite proud of the fact, weren’t you?” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 10 April 1992).

Nevertheless, the example illustrates a lack of concern for other people which Elliott (1996) describes as typical of psychopaths (i.e., an apparent absence of guilt, shame or embarrassment). Possible connections between such examples of pride and the types of autonomy from usual conventions which are related to diagnoses of mental disorder and illness could be explored in more detail (see previous chapter). For example, we might extend Elliott’s account of psychopathy by considering the extent to which pride can exist independently of any possible instances of shame and guilt (and perhaps also whether such forms of pride can similarly be regarded as shallow and superficial). Although these questions will not be addressed, a useful point can nevertheless be derived from this brief consideration is that many of the forms of personal reflexivity described by Rosenberg are not exhibited by severely mentally ill or disordered people51.

51 However, it is possible for psychopaths to demonstrate Rosenberg’s (1990) point that individuals are constantly engaged in attempts to “produce intended effects on the minds of other people” (p. 8) through reflexivity and emotional display:

In addition to enabling one to conform to the emotional norms, emotional display serves as an important means for the attainment of one’s ends. A customer may feign anger in order to get better service in a restaurant. A person may display a sad expression in order to elicit sympathy from others. An individual may flash a friendly smile in order to obtain a loan. (p. 8)

Rosenberg argues that these features of everyday life are more important than the role-taking abilities and empathic reactions which psychopaths are said to lack.
It can also be argued that for every psychopathic individual who comes into contact with judicial systems there are many individuals who achieve in society without ever receiving this diagnosis. In this respect, it is quite possible that other personality disorders are also connected with examples of the perverse pride that some individuals take in being infamous or unpopular. For example, the following description is provided of a judge's autobiography:

In the foreword to “Judge for Yourself” he describes the day he retired in June last year. Normally when a judge retires they have a little ceremony in Leeds Crown Court, where a senior judge and other colleagues pay graceful tributes. In his case he was advised to spend his last day at Bradford County Court because no-one at Leeds could be found to speak for him. He records this without rancour or self-pity. He seems to regard his unpopularity as a subject for pride. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 6 July 1992a)

Although there is no evidence to suggest that the description of the judge as seeming “to regard his unpopularity as a subject for pride” is confirmed by any admission by him, the example is nevertheless indicative of many occasions when individuals can be described as “almost proud” of something that other people find objectionable. Moreover, the pleasure that such individuals take in their unpopularity and defiance of the good opinion of others does seem to accord with the way in which they represent themselves, the goals they are trying to achieve, and some form of judgement about what will upset or annoy others. In these respects, they may be seen to pursue an “identity project”, to borrow Greenwood's (1991) term, that puts them at odds with much of society.

In contrast to cases of pride that indicate autonomy from conventions, pride more commonly results from personal projects that may disregard
conventions or break less important rules. For example, Robert in Austen’s *Sense and Sensibility* achieves a particular outcome by supplanting the wishes of others. He is therefore described as:

... proud of his conquest, proud of tricking Edward, and very proud of marrying privately without his mother’s consent. (p. 345)

In another factual rather than fictional case, an individual saves a woman’s life but does so in a manner that is likely to raise official displeasure about the method used:

Karl Kingsley was proud that he had saved her life, but we knew the medical service would be furious. (Morgan, 1987, p. 283)

Both examples point to the potential to take pride in actions that are self-sufficient and independent, but are also likely to invite censure, criticism, or ostracism because of the way a particular end is achieved. Thus it is possible for individuals to experience a genuine pride in achieving a goal or outcome by potentially reprehensible means that would be unlikely to receive widespread approval (see next section for forms of autonomous pride which are based on legitimate means of overcoming social and economic disadvantages).

There are further ways in which forms of pride can be regarded as an autonomous emotion that is not merely the product of approbation (or internalized “reflected appraisals”). In particular, pride can be distinguished from vanity as Mary attempts to explain in *Pride and Prejudice*:

Vanity and pride are different things, though the words are often used synonymously. A person may be proud without
being vain. Pride relates more to our opinion of ourselves, vanity to what we would have others think of us. (p. 16)

On this account, vanity is concerned almost solely with attaining the attention of others or confirming a personal view of what others should think. Where it is the latter, vanity may also be indicated by a selfish attitude towards others without much in the way of reciprocal feeling. For example, Mr Willoughby in *Sense and Sensibility* states, as part of the explanation of his actions mentioned in section 6.1, that while he enjoyed the attentions of Marianne:

> But at first, I must confess, my vanity only was elevated by it. (pp. 294-295)

Genuine feelings of pride are therefore distinguished from personal boosts which are based on the sort of flattery that might not only be about a person's actions or appearance, but may also include favourable remarks about personal possessions or social associations. In this sense, partial vindication is provided for Cooley's (1902/1956) account of pride as the form that "social self-approval takes in the more rigid and self-sufficient sort of minds; the person who feels it is assured that he stands well with others whose opinion he cares for" (p. 232; although as we have seen there are individuals who seem to care little for the opinions of others).

Interestingly, if Willoughby were proud of his actions he would probably also have demonstrated an additional feature of personal autonomy: the tendency to engage in a personal defence when the source of pride is attacked by others (regardless of whether the form of pride is the result of breaking a rule or not). Accepting another's criticisms undermines pride as it entails accepting a lower or humbled position within a vague
hierarchy of status and everyday comparisons. An example connecting these two points can be found in an interchange between Adso and Brother William in Umberto Eco's (1983) *The Name of the Rose*:

"So we know nothing and we are still where we started," I said, with great dismay.

William stopped and looked at me with an expression not entirely benevolent. "My boy," he said, "you have before you a poor Franciscan who, with his modest learning and what little skill he owes to the infinite power of the Lord, has succeeded in a few hours in deciphering a secret code whose author was sure would prove sealed to all save himself . . . and you, wretched illiterate rogue, dare say we are still where we started?"

I apologized very clumsily. I had wounded my master's vanity, and yet I knew how proud he was of the speed and accuracy of his deductions. William truly had performed a job worthy of admiration, and it was not his fault if the crafty Venantius not only had concealed his discovery behind an obscure zodiacal alphabet, but had further devised an undecipherable riddle.

"No matter, no matter, don't apologize," William interrupted me. "After all, you're right. We still know too little. Come along." (p. 2-0-9)

Autonomy is indicated by people who angrily respond to any implicit or explicit challenge to the source or basis of their pride and, perhaps also, the way in which they express their self-satisfaction (although the individual will potentially look ridiculous if the challenge is reasonable). An autobiographical example illustrates the same point in relation to negative reactions and evaluations by other people:

I closed the door of his office slowly and turned back to face him. I was ready to kill him, but I was going to do it in private. I threw the consult slips on his desk.

You see them. I went into surgery because I thought I was as good as any man. I'm a good surgeon. I'm proud of it and I can take it. I didn't get through surgery by crying when things got tough. (Morgan, 1987, p. 286)
Although there are obvious limitations to the use of such examples, they nevertheless demonstrate a grammatical connection between pride and anger (or what might be called "angry pride" in some circumstances). This approach contrasts with individuals who might simply accept particular criticisms, attempt to achieve the approbation of others by engaging in different activities, or prefer the company of individuals who are more likely to offer praise and flattery.

In summary, personal autonomy is indicated when individuals seem genuinely to experience and to express feelings of pride despite the contrasting judgements and opinions of their society. Individuals who experience pride when they think of or talk about reprehensible actions may lack particular forms of personal reflexivity or reflexive emotions (which distinguish them from the types of thoughtful and considerate people emphasized by Rosenberg). It is also possible to find individuals who are proud of being unpopular and infamous or take pride in achieving a particular outcome by cleverly or deceitfully overcoming the wishes of others. However, the type of autonomy more commonly connected with pride is where individuals hold a convention-informed but robust and self-sufficient view of their actions. Such individuals do not therefore rely on approbation, recognition or flattery from other individuals and are often prepared to defend their actions and achievements from criticism.

Pride in personal projects and the role of confirmation, approbation and social comparisons

The previous section indicated that pride can occur when individuals exercise their skills and abilities without regard for societal conventions or
the expectations of other people. Although the notion of pursuing goals and outcomes in a self-sufficient manner does not correspond to Rosenberg's emphasis on reflexive agency, further examples of pride can be assembled that demonstrate the importance of personal autonomy to the achievement of specific personal projects (which may include identity projects). Moreover, given the potential for genuine feelings of pride to occur independently of social censure or approbation, it is worth examining the relations between "self-sufficient pride" and practices where people rely to some extent on forms of personal confirmation, approbation and comparison.

A "proud person" may be described as something who sets high standards for him or herself without prompting from other people. However, it is also possible that those standards may be so high that they never seem to be satisfied. An illustration of this point comes from Wittgenstein's life and the fact that high personal standards seemed to prevent and to delay the eventual public "display" of the *Philosophical Investigations*:

Up to a short time ago I had really given up the idea of publishing my work in my lifetime. It used, indeed to be revived from time to time: mainly because I was obliged to learn that my results (which I had communicated in lectures, typescripts and discussions), variously misunderstood, more or less mangled or watered down, were in circulation. This stung my vanity and I had difficulty quieting it. (PI, p. vi)

Thus as Monk (1990) notes: "if pride gave birth to his desire to publish, it also prevented his doing so" (p. 414). However, it should also be noted that when these expectations extend to other people they may have tragic consequences. For example, a judge described an individual who was jailed for five years for killing his son as "a proud man and a disciplinarian,
with high expectations of himself and those around him" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 10 October 1991). Perhaps the relevant point to draw in relation to personal autonomy is that although personal achievements often reflect the expectations of others, other people are irrelevant when an individual wants to exceed all expectations.

It is important to consider how people adopt the standards and expectations of others towards their own actions (i.e., the way in which they “take on” these expectations). Where the aim is to exceed existing standards, it is clear that such individuals will only occasionally allow themselves (and perhaps others) to feel satisfied. However, in a further example, an Australian boxer was described as feeling bad after losing an important fight for different reasons:

Fenech’s pride was badly hurt, not so much because he had lost a fight he was widely expected to win, but because he believed he had let all his fans down. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 1 March 1992)

If this account is accurate the interesting point is that the individual’s pride seems to be based on the expectations of his fans rather than any sense of slipping from his own high standards. In a similar vein, it is also interesting to infer the standards that individuals set for themselves from their actions and reactions in particular situations (i.e., even though the standard they set may be personal). This could include a closer examination of the circumstances in which individuals review life achievements and how they describe personally important standards and commitments. An example of the latter is indicated by an individual’s statement that he is “proud of being a good trade union member all his life” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 26
August 1992). In a different example, a singer is reported as saying that a retrospective album "has given her a great deal of satisfaction":

"I'm proud of it, without reservation," she said.

Laing said the album was compiled at a time of review in her life and it reflected this in its autobiographical nature. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 June 1991)

In both cases we are confronted with different examples of personal standards and projects that provide the individuals concerned with sources of pride. Although the former example represents an identity project and the latter is closer to a personal project, the positive evaluation is formed by the individuals concerned without being dependent on social practices of comparison, confirmation and approbation.

Since these standards and goals may seem to be private, it is possible that the related actions might be misunderstood (i.e., unless we were given a further indication of the way in which these people represent their own actions). The following example illustrates the complexity of these considerations and the way in which they combine to produce an overall propensity towards pride on a particular occasion:

The 24-year-old Canterbury player acknowledges that there have been tests when even he has been disappointed with some of his play, the first test against Australia in Sydney for example. But he believes he hasn't always been given the credit he deserves and that in most of the 13 tests in which he has now played he has had many moments of which he can be justly proud.

There was a try in his test debut against Wales in 1989, another against the Wallabies at Eden Park last year and then last year against France in Paris he gave what arguably was his most complete performance in a test. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 1 October 1991)
In another newspaper example, an athlete who finishes last in an Olympic marathon nevertheless states that he is proud of this “achievement”. On the basis of this reaction, he could reasonably be thought not to have considered himself a gold medal contender. In contrast, if an individual wished and realistically expected to win two gold medals\(^2\), then it would make sense for him or her to be relatively subdued on achieving the first medal and then much more pleased with and proud of the second. Although this reaction could be mistaken for arrogance it differs from the case of an individual whose win was not expected and who is therefore elated and perhaps even stunned at the result. For example, where an individual says of an unexpected and hard-fought win:

> It's my proudest moment in sport. There are thousands of Englishmen over here tonight and I'm just proud that we did our best for them. *Press (Christchurch, N.Z.)* 27 June 1992b

Thus, if there is an important point to be drawn out of these considerations it is that the sense of pride as an obligation to others as well as having high personal expectations is the pride of maintaining a standard rather than reaching an achievement standard (e.g., a special performance).

However, even where pride seems to be the expression of a private standard, goal or rule, an implicit comparison with others may suggest that it

\(^2\) For example, Gail Devers was a double-gold medal favourite in the 1992 Olympics but fell on one of the hurdles and therefore lost the opportunity (see section 5.1 for reactions to her subsequent actions). Although disappointed she still managed to take pride in finishing the event as the following reporter's account suggests:

> She winced. The pain was etched on her face. But she had finished. She was really proud of that. "I've got some bumps and bruises. I've had them before. I'll get over it." *Press (Christchurch, N.Z.)* 8 August 1992

Thus it can be said that completing the event and perhaps also according with the spirit of the event is obviously important to her (e.g., rather than the alternative reactions of getting angry with herself or sulking).
is actually a relational concept (i.e., the standard is private because it is not shared by others and also could perhaps be regarded as "higher"). But emphasizing the autonomy and self-evaluation of pride in terms of according with a personal standard should not be taken to the extreme that judgements about "how good I am" resemble the following conceptual distortion:

Imagine someone saying: “But I know how tall I am!” and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it. (PI, §279).

Although Wittgenstein's point is made in relation to rule-following and the private language argument it is relevant to analogous accounts of pride based on standards that are too high to be deemed reasonable. We may also add that it is worthwhile examining how individuals construct their standards, goals, images, and dreams over a considerable period of time so that the dispositions and judgements of an individual are better described as the product of a whole history from which their pride cannot be disentangled. This position is similar to a further Wittgensteinian remark about an incident of shame except that, in this case, we are examining the detail and justification of a proud occasion. Wittgenstein's point is that if an individual becomes ashamed of a particular incident (or even the intention behind it), the only real answer to what justifies the shame is "the whole history of the incident" (PI, §644). And, as the various cases of pride demonstrate, the ability to represent how individuals become emotionally committed to their own projects is a difficult task for both psychologists and the individuals involved. This task can only become more difficult when individuals' experiences are seen in isolation from important contextual
surroundings as well as their own personal history (see also chapter 7, section 7.1 for a treatment of "intense pride").

However, this brief examination of instances of pride based on personal projects and standards may also indicate how people attain autonomy in their personal judgements and reactions\(^{53}\): that is, to accord with wider constructions of pride while also being able to discriminate them from similar feelings about not-so-special personal achievements. In particular, the initial feelings of pride that occur when learning a new skill often fade as individuals improve so that remembering these early developments may not even produce happiness or satisfaction at a later stage. For example, a doctor’s initial pride in successfully performing a difficult task such as amputating a leg will quickly abate (Morgan, *The Making of a Woman Surgeon*, p. 143). Personal standards can be quickly developed and refined so that the pride connected with such “firsts” assumes less personal significance as other skills are learned (and challenges are confronted). Similarly, feelings very similar to pride may be produced when daydreaming about an actual or possible success or approbation in the process of attaining appropriate skills and competence in a new activity. However, these feelings are not regarded as pride since it is often thought that they should only provide encouragement on the way to the attainment of a larger goal\(^{54}\). This issue is illustrated by remarks in an interview with an actor about his role in a successful film:

\(^{53}\) This is the more conventional sense of pride where an individual states “I feel good when I’ve done something the way it ought to be done” in contrast to individuals who:

\[\ldots\] don’t care what they do or how well they do it. They get no pride at all from doing something right. (Wharton, 1987, p. 240)

\(^{54}\) For example, a man who reverses roles with his wife is described mastering some initial tasks in the following way:

The chook neighbour took the cheese and gave him a dozen eggs and a bag of chook manure. He was very proud of his achievements and felt he
Q. People say "Born on the Fourth of July" couldn't have been a hit without you. Do you agree?
A. I think what they mean is that it was pretty grim material. So it needed the extra leverage of a name star in the title role. Still, I'm very proud of it. It's the furthest I've gone out on a limb so far. But that's past history, and I don't want to dwell on it. It's a happy memory now. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 19 December 1990b)

The task of representing the development of personal goals, aims or standards should also focus on the cumulative effects and qualitative differences between later examples of pride and earlier feelings of increased competence.

To summarize, assembled examples of pride in personal projects demonstrate the apparent independence of such emotions from general standards. In extreme cases, proud individuals may have standards that are difficult to maintain and may involve high expectations of others (which contrasts with individuals who attempt to live up to others' expectations). Other cases of pride also imply personal standards and a type of robust judgement which is not dependent upon the approbation or confirmation that other individuals provide. It was also noted that "private" standards which can be inferred from expressions and displays of pride cannot vary too widely from reasonable social expectations and conventions. The individual basis of pride in a particular activity may also be made more intelligible by examining the "personal history" prior to an occasion of pride (which allows us to distinguish feelings connected with skill improvements and growing competence in a new activity from conventional instances of justified pride).

was really beginning to get the hang of this shopping business. (Press
Personal pride and the importance of overcoming social, psychological and bodily limitations

Consistent with the emphasis on personal autonomy, further assembled examples of pride suggest the theme of overcoming limitations: in particular, how legitimate feelings of pride are particularly strong in cases where a standard is reached (or maintained) through an effort or use of an ability which overcomes social, psychological and bodily limits (i.e., without necessarily breaking rules to achieve these ends and thus being proud of the deceit or cleverness involved). A good illustration of this theme is provided by the example of an individual who finally wins a school swimming competition in front of his "proud parents" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 January 1993). The relevant issue is that their pride is diminished slightly when they find that their son's usual competitors are both injured and unable to compete. Moreover, if their son also took pride in this achievement, it would be an opportunistic boost to his self-esteem because the win did not seem to occur through any increased effort or recent autonomous efforts.

(Christchurch, N.Z.) 5 December 1992)

55 There is a further sense of autonomy demonstrated in relation to cases where the personal effort involved. This consideration is important because although an individual may lose in a competitive situation, he may be said to do "himself proud with the quality of his resistance" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 12 July 1991). In relation to an individual's autonomous efforts, an appropriate question might be: "how do you know you've done the best you could?" Nevertheless, a general sense of pride is usually maintained as long as a team or individual makes a determined or spirited effort as the following example indicates:

Brave effort by Ireland deserved a better fate

... The All Blacks are held in high reverence by Mr Murphy and Ireland's coach, Ciaran Fitzgerald, and while they were not disparaging of the All Blacks' win, they were understandably gladdened by the dedicated performance of their own team.

"I'm very proud," Mr Murphy said. "There's an old saying that you don't win matches but you lose them. A little inexperience could have cost us the game, but there's something special about an Irish side which plays like that." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 1 June 1992)

This relationship between pride and effort is also implied by examples that tend to include support such as where the leader of an America's Cup Challenge stated: "defeat was hard to swallow, but New Zealand could be proud of its team and what it had achieved" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 2 May 1992b; cf. chapter 7, section 7.4 for the related issue of competing and vacillating emotions).
improvement of ability. In this case, it would therefore be difficult to defend a claim such as "I was solely responsible for the win" since pride would only seem to be justified if the swimmer had perhaps bettered his own performance in relation to the standard that his usual competitors represent.

An important issue raised by considerations of pride in competitive situations is how people cope with the barriers to competitive success. For example, competitions such as the Olympics rely on the myth that competitors are equal (a myth which is enhanced by a focus on cheating and drug use, for example, rather than disproportionate levels of preparation and financial support). Social and economic inequities usually create a situation in which individuals with the same talent but less support need to put in more effort to achieve the same results. However, the result may be more pride in a successful outcome as the following example of two New Zealand yachtswomen suggests:

They are especially proud of their achievements because their preparation was done virtually on the smell of an oily rag. As well as fitting in training between working hours they also had to roll up their sleeves and pitch in with the fund-raising.

But all that made their Olympic success taste so much sweeter. "There's a sense of satisfaction in beating fully-funded yachties who have been training full-time for a year leading up to the Olympics," said Egnot. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 30 October 1992)

A further example that supports this view is provided by the remarks of a London soccer team's coach upon winning the English F.A. Cup:

56 Moreover, a personal reflexive strategy of attempting to blame others for a personal lack of success or failure is unlikely to be successful as it will, eventually, confront wider conventions. For example, Faulkner (1929/1986) provides an example in the novel The Sound and the Fury, where one of the characters controls others in order to maintain a false view of herself mainly because she could not "bear that anyone such as her siblings could do something that she could not" (p. 232). Therefore, in contrast to "neurotic pride" which is based on "externalizing blame when full success is not achieved" (Yachnes, 1975, p. 27), the correct
"To say I am thrilled at winning is an understatement," said Mr Venables.

"Given the year we have had I would say it's been my greatest achievement. It's been a difficult year and a strain and has upset the players.

"It's fantastic for them and the supporters and I'm very proud today," he said, brushing aside tears.

Mr Venables would not talk about his future at the financially troubled club, saying: “I'm only concerned about enjoying myself today." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 May 1991)

The result in both cases is that overcoming social and economic obstacles during the course of achieving a successful outcome will make any victory all the more sweeter and, consequently, feelings of pride and other emotions more intense. There is considerable potential for further work to examine the ways in which pride is created by efforts to overcome obstacles to success in areas other than sporting and competitive situations.

Some of the limitations that need to be overcome for success to occur may also include individual changes in character (again probably with some help from others). This point is illustrated by an example of a former drug user and heavy drinker at 16 years who won an Olympic gold medal in the 100m breaststroke as a 21 year-old:

For a 21-year-old who can be, in his own words, near-suicidal, hyperactive and spiteful, it was a day for remembering those who helped put him back on the straight and narrow.

"Swimming was the path by which my life was turned around," Diebel told reporters after his shock win in an Olympic record time of 1min 1.50 sec. "I'm not proud of what I was, I'm just glad I met someone who could turn me around". (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 30 July 1992)

thoughts, judgements, and self-evaluation of proper pride are based on realistic comparison and testing against others.
Although this example suggests a possible study of the reasons why individuals can be embarrassed, ashamed, or "not proud" of who they once were, it is also indicates an increase in self-esteem. Individuals may effect personal changes that allow them to say "I'm proud of who I've become" and which contrast with more specific identity projects that require less effort. An example of the latter is the case of an SS Commander who was described as "proud of the fact that he managed the minimum height of 1.76m (5ft 11ins) to get into the Gestapo" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 2 May 1992a). Perhaps the second example is best understood as a case of pride because according with the entry standard was the means towards achieving the end of a membership of a particular elite group. Nevertheless, achieving the entry standard cannot be described an outcome that was achieved by any form of effort and personal change.

Some of the connections between character, pride and increased efforts are better described in terms of personal agency rather than reflexive agency, especially because achieving success in the cases examined involved more effort to overcome obstacles rather than changing oneself or accepting personal limits in relation to potential success (i.e., coping with the disappointing recognition that "I'll never be that good"). Where an individual does have the ability to succeed through effort, of course, it is reasonable to think that a self-disciplined approach along with "a modest demeanour is a good preparation for winning or losing in our culture" (Harré, 1986, p. 9). Although this appears to be the type of example of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition emphasized by Rosenberg (1990) in relation to emotion, pride does not necessarily occur only in relation to the reflexive control or embellishment of other emotions. It is also worth examining the types of effort that are required to overcome psychological
and physical barriers to success (a point which is also applicable to teams but will not be explored here). For example, the first Australasian to win a Winter Olympics medal remarked:

I wasn't feeling well before the second run. I was really dragging. That's why I feel very proud of myself. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 1 December 1992)

In this case, the individual concerned had to overcome the problems of an unsatisfying first run and did so with an improved performance. Moreover, the example is interesting because the feeling of pride did not depend on the confirmation or approbation of others (i.e., it is likely that the skier initially reacted to an indication of her improved time and position on the leader board). And despite the obvious support and coaching that it took to attain this level of competitive competence, still the feeling of pride is particularly strong because of an improved effort.

Cases of personal pride can occur in which individuals know that they are not competing equally with others and yet do ask to receive direct assistance and special consideration. A good illustration of overcoming a psychological and physical limitation and yet still achieving in a competitive activity is provided by the following case:

**Deafness no handicap to top science student**

Christchurch Polytechnic staff were initially a little reluctant to enrol a young deaf student in an advanced science course, but they need not have worried. She came top of the class. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 December 1992b)

Moreover, the important point is that the student concerned:
... does not believe deafness is any kind of handicap and is proud that she received no extra help or tuition during the course. (loc. cit.)

One issue that might impact on the consideration of this example is whether the individual concerned was congenitally and profoundly deaf or had more recently lost her hearing. If the latter were the case, she might be said to take pride in being able to maintain a standard despite the obstacles to education that the loss of her hearing would provide. In this respect, her example would be similar to another case in which an increased effort is required by an individual to maintain a personal standard and source of pride:

Now with RSI in his hands, restricted by his legs and with a heart problem, he can no longer write formal italic scripts but prides himself still on the legibility of his informal writing. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 14 March 1992)

These considerations are important because they highlight the ability of humans to set their own standards independently of others as well as to adjust to changes in skills and abilities that are caused by physical decline and impairment. Thus although the exercise of a skill previously for that individual as well as for others might seem to be a small achievement, nevertheless it is a reasonable psychological adjustment for individuals to be proud of the abilities they still maintain.

57 Interestingly, this example raises a number of questions about the importance of particular forms of language to the construction of pride, since it seems reasonable to argue that pride is a language-dependent emotion (although this case can only be used to indicate a topic of future investigation as well as a possible intermediate case between full language users and individuals without language). In the meantime a tentative conclusion on this issue is that asking whether the deaf can take pride in their actions and efforts without the use of "our" language to express it would be like doubting whether they can achieve success.

58 For different reasons it is also reasonable for individuals to be proud of other uncontrollable changes as in the case of an individual who is "proud of his stock of grey hair" (Kundera, 1992, p. 382) or a child who is proud to be tall for his or her age.
Interestingly, if many instances of pride rely on a judgement of what other people regard as justified, then it also seems reasonable to claim that many instances of pride do not rely on public display. For example, people can take pride in their bodies and have a reasonable sense of body image without necessarily being involved in direct practices of comparison or confirmation. Moreover, with regard to the complicated connections between reflexive agency and pride, a person's body may be regarded as an obstacle that prevents him or her from attaining a particular appearance and thus becoming the type of person they would like to be. In this respect, although Rosenberg (1990) argues that a "general way of affecting emotional experiences is to act on the body" (p. 11), he fails to consider the way in which people may use more radical methods to feel better about themselves. For example, one newspaper article describes a woman who underwent surgery, which some might regard as mutilation, in order to make her body more androgynous:

"I don't know what it was about me that made me go through the surgery," she says, "but I feel that my life started when I had it done. If you're not happy with your body, you can't be happy. Now I'm definitely more proud of my body. When I go to clubs, I wear catsuits and show it off." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 June 1992b)

59 Although the following example involves a limited element of display, the individual's pride is not dependent upon it:

When they made love in the semi-darkness of hotel rooms, he always stripped, proud of his physique, and walked naked around the room. She loved that body tanned by salt and wind, toughened by physical exercise, flexible, hard, harmonious. She observed him, contented, and caressed him somewhat absentmindedly, but with admiration. (Allende, 1988, p. 64)

60 That is, apart from the sort of social considerations that might lead an individual such as Jane Fonda to state that for years she "underplayed" her "assets" in order to be "taken seriously" before eventually deciding to state (and to show): "I'm all woman and proud of it" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 July 1990b).
While the results of this alteration and the motivation for it are not widely shared by other women, it is nevertheless intelligible as the result of the technological potential to alter the body (i.e., in combination with a personal view of a more desirable form). The example therefore demonstrates an extreme reflexive strategy of surgery to overcome perceived physical limitations and also shows that it can lead to an increase in pride and public display; that is, while still demonstrating a form of autonomy and independence from the judgements of others.

To summarize, pride is often more intense when a successful outcome involves extra effort, an improvement in an ability or use of a particular skill in order to overcome social, psychological and physical limitations. Examples of social barriers include impediments to equal competition such as support and funding, a point about individual agency which is applicable to many activities other than sport (and contrasts with Rosenberg's interest in emotion-related forms of reflexive agency). However, a limitation or obstacle to success may be psychological so that in order to attain personally and socially important goals individuals will need to overcome character problems or change an aspect of themselves. Pride can also be unexpectedly strong where individuals with psychological and physical limitations such as deafness or RSI are able, respectively, to achieve against hearing individuals and succeed without help or maintain a particular standard. People may also use the radical reflexive technology of surgically altering their body in order to achieve the kind of appearance that they might comfortably and proudly display to others.

61 Although a woman could compare herself, for example, with women twenty years younger and smile with pride (Allende, 1988, p. 174), reliance on display, "testing", and affirmation by the envious reactions of other women also suggests the emotion of vanity.
6.3 Acting, deception and denial

In this section, some connections and contrasts are highlighted between Wittgenstein's remarks on the difficulty of judging the genuineness of expressions of emotion and Rosenberg's (1990) emphasis on reflexivity in emotional display and identification. In particular, the issues of pretending to be proud and acting to deceive others are used to clarify an initially plausible claim by Rosenberg:

There is a fundamental difference between intentional efforts to convince others that we are experiencing certain emotions — a reflexive effort — and the inadvertent emotional impact that we may have on another person — a nonreflexive process. (p. 4)

Rosenberg argues that by being able both to embellish and to control displays of emotion, we are further able to accomplish personal projects, to maintain interpersonal relations and, potentially, to serve important social and cultural functions. However, in contrast to Rosenberg's theory, it will be shown that an emphasis on reflexive processes in emotional display and emotional experience cannot accurately represent overlapping cases of acting, deception, and denial in their social circumstances (i.e., the cultural, social and linguistic detail of cases of simulating and hiding pride).

**Acting and pride: everyday and refined forms of reflexive agency**

An initial point about the practice of acting and the circumstances in which it occurs is that its purpose in everyday life is primarily not to deceive people.
For example, one could imagine hearing the following piece of a conversation without realizing that it was being spoken by an actor:

> I too have something to be proud and happy about. I was the one who saved Torvald's life. (Ibsen, 1879/1992, pp. 12-13)

If we did not realize that an actress playing the part of Nora was saying these lines, we would not realize the nonsense of asking whether she is really sharing her pride or, at the very least, admitting to have felt proud of herself to another person. It would also not be appropriate for us to berate the actors for deceiving others and lying to themselves. Therefore, acting is better described as a set of skills and abilities in which an individual employs personal knowledge about emotions and their expressive features to create a convincing impression of particular emotions and character.

More specifically, while determining which emotional reactions cannot be convincingly mimicked on stage and screen as well as in a normal flow of conversation, some relevant points can be made with regard to pride. For example, the "holding one's head high", pained expressions and self-important striding of the "puffed-up" proud person would probably require a sustained effort (so too would rapidly changing from pride to embarrassment or shame). It may similarly be difficult for both actors and those with less refined reflexive skills to convince us that they were experiencing the spontaneous glow of genuine pride or to sustain the appearance of being "beamingly proud" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 7 November 1992; i.e., enough, perhaps, for us to share their excitement). Disregarding these examples of intense pride, characteristic expressions of

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62 This is not to deny, however, that acting or role-playing (Greenwood, 1989) can be a source of new emotions, experiences and insights.
pride may be easier to act than other emotions because using the correct language takes precedence over less distinctive physical and physiological criteria (i.e., as a form of self- or other-evaluation). Since pride is often ascribed when people engage in particular actions and conversation-related activities, it may also appear to be a private feeling which accompanies these actions and, therefore, needs to be confirmed by the person concerned. For example, an individual may proudly display a “scrapbook of newspaper articles” about their prodigious chess-playing son (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 28 September 1991), another may wave a flag with pride and others “proudly report” a particular event (i.e., without necessarily using the words “pride” or “proud”). Thus in most circumstances pretending to be proud — affecting a proud display — may only involve uttering appropriate words or phrases with a positive expression.

As with many other emotions, there are a host of aims that people might want to achieve by simulating pride such as: to maintain social cohesion by appearing patriotic at a ceremony, to pretend to have a high opinion of another person, to encourage another person, to give the impression of being concerned about a personal standard, to appear to be a moral individual (Rosenberg, 1990), or to suggest that a close relationship exists between two people. However, while it may be easy to mimic the actions, facial expressions and statements appropriate to pride on stage and screen, it is more difficult to simulate the appropriate content of pride in everyday life. For example, whether pretending to be proud, to reveal a secret pride, or to express pride in another person it seems that pride is

63 Although Harré (1989) writes of an “indefinite hierarchy" of control over and use of "lower order" motivations and causes (to be examined in this section), he does not seem to mean the analytical complexities added, for example, by the case of an individual pretending to pretend to be proud (i.e., an actor in a play who is pretending to be proud). This example also
"realized" in conversation (perhaps more often than there are opportunities to express and share it). Thus when an individual displays or expresses his or her pride, we often ask why they felt proud or whether this information needed to be "spontaneously" revealed.

A slightly different problem when distinguishing cases of pretending to be proud in everyday life from a genuine occurrence of the emotion is the issue which has already been alluded to of a possible focus on a hidden, internal accompaniment (i.e., an underlying feeling or preceding intention). To examine the first issue, the importance attached to an underlying and compelling feeling is usually what makes psychologists object to the view that some emotions are temporary social roles (Averill, 1982). An added difficulty experienced by the "actor" in everyday life who wishes to manipulate or deceive others is that he or she is probably aware of this absence. Wittgenstein considered this question in a way that is relevant to cases of pride and which, incidentally, highlights the problem for Rosenberg of making too general a distinction between emotional display and emotional experience:

But wouldn't I say that the actor does experience something like real longing? (RPP I, §727)

and, more specifically:

does not seem to be adequately described as the use of human reflexive skills to "produce intended effects on the minds of other people" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 8). Unless the person had rehearsed a story to such an extent that he or she reacts in conversation as if the story is true. Either that or the person's pride is an illustration of Kemper's (1991) more general point that often in conversation with others, the:

... emotional result of playing one's part well, and of others playing their parts well, is one of deep satisfaction. (p. 314)
... the emotion consists in the bodily feelings, and hence can be at least partially reproduced by voluntary movements? (RPP I, §727)

Interestingly, Wittgenstein's "reply" is that it is not clear a priori that "whoever imitates joy will feel it" since "the mere attempt" to do something such as laugh or express pride, for example, "while one was feeling grief [might] bring about an enormous sharpening of grief" (RPP II, §321, brackets added; see chapter 7, section 7.4 for the issue of vacillating or conflicting emotions). Obviously, the example of controlling one emotion while pretending to have another is an added complication that will be considered in the next section. For the moment, Wittgenstein's point illustrates the fact that a genuine case of pride will have persistent features and, moreover, will be experienced in some respects as an uncontrollable or spontaneous feeling.

Consideration of the central role of physiological persistence in relation to genuine emotions and their absence when voluntarily reproducing the same movements also raises the issue of the role of an "intention" or "decision". That is, although we might use our acting skills to give the appearance of being proud (and then possibly even take pride in successfully exercising this skill), as normal emotional actors we cannot intend to feel pride or decide to feel pride. Rosenberg describes this fundamental difference between acted and genuine emotional experiences in the following manner:

I may be able to make myself look happy, but I cannot so easily make myself feel happy. (p. 10)

65 That is, a spontaneous experience of an internal state of physiological arousal without reference to intention which is, according to Rosenberg (1990), therefore describable as the product of nonreflexive processes.

66 Kemper (1993) connects the two concepts by emphasizing that "reflexivity operates also in decisions concerning emotional display, since the intention of display is to persuade others that one is experiencing a given emotion" (p. 49).
The phrase "deciding what to feel" may therefore mean that an individual has decided to experience particular emotions when previously he or she has prevented himself or herself from doing so (e.g., for reasons the person may not have been aware of such as not realizing that he or she could form particular relations with other people, engage in specific activities that might produce a desired emotion, or stop thinking in a way that prohibits experiencing and expressing a particular emotion). This issue highlights a central problem with Rosenberg's theory that attempting to achieve a particular goal is an intentional activity and may result in pride, but it need not be regarded as engaging in actions that were intended specifically to produce pride.

As suggested above, an individual's preceding intention to produce an emotion-like performance may also distinguish a case of "pretend pride" from one of genuine pride (i.e., assuming that the individual confesses at a later point). However, an intention to produce the appearance of a particular emotion does not guarantee that other people will be convinced since the internal relation between intention and effect is dependent on the "actor's" skill. But what is the nature of the skill that stage and screen actors have refined and which individuals in everyday life may also use? One suggestion is that this skill exploits the capacity of most socially competent individuals "to bring lower order motivations and even causes of action under motivations and principles of higher order" (Harré, 1989, pp. 257-258). In this case the motivations and causes of emotion can, to some degree, be brought under voluntary control even though the feeling "component" still seems to provide a causal limit (see next section for remarks on emotions and dissimulation). Thus an important aspect of
everyday acting may indeed involve manipulating and coaxing an involuntary "core" to some emotions (i.e., almost as if once in a particular "causal position" the relevant emotion mechanism should reliably come into play).

However, even actors do not manage to "cause themselves" to feel what they initially act: except perhaps in the sense that an acted emotion becomes real for other reasons. For example, expressions of pride in another person may be easy to mimic when an individual is strongly attracted to that other individual, but where similar feelings are absent considerable rehearsal might be required for the emotion to appear to occur spontaneously. Therefore we must be careful not to promote a model which, in its crudest form, reduces all cases of acting to the example of an individual poking him or herself in the eye in order either to simulate tears of grief or pride. The more appropriate but vague sense of individuals "causing themselves" to feel an emotion is the fact that at some point they must have had a similar experience that makes it easier for them to reproduce, to remember or to reconstruct (imaginatively or physically) the feeling of a particular emotion (Pl, §642). This seems to accord with Rosenberg's (1990) argument that in addition to acting on the body, we might also attempt to control the causes of emotions by controlling the stimulus events that give rise to particular emotion-evoking cognitions, thus producing "effects on one's thoughts directly" (p. 11). However, since few of these techniques would produce intense and persistent feelings of pride the conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that the relations

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67 It should be noted that Rosenberg does not claim that voluntarily engaging in an emotional display somehow makes the acted emotion more likely to occur as a genuine experience.
between reflexive and nonreflexive processes are far more complicated than Rosenberg's theory implies.

To summarize, Rosenberg (1990) argues that emotional displays are often manipulated in order to produce intended effects on other people. Although examples of pride that might be acted in the setting of a play, for example, involve a skill or skills of this form, there is a variety of potential outcomes that an individual might want to achieve by pretending to be proud in everyday life. But while it might be relatively easy to mimic the actions associated with pride, making the content of an expression appropriate to a particular setting or relationship might be more difficult. Faced with questions about the reasons for pride and the genuineness of the experience, it is possible that an individual might admit the intention to deceive or the absence of an appropriate feeling. The latter issue points to the importance of feeling and possibly something "causal" that is used, as strange as this sounds, by individuals to produce a particular emotional experiences.

The further distinction between concealment and denial

Although cases of pretending to have a particular emotion in the absence of appropriate feelings provide an important theme for analysis, a focus only on this form of emotional display in everyday life does not summarize the whole range of possibilities. In addition, there is the potential to use reflexive skills to mask an emotional experience by appearing calm or displaying a contrasting emotion. As Rosenberg notes:
Emotional concealment is as much a feature of emotional display as is emotional exhibition, and it plays an equally important part in enabling people to realize their objectives. (p. 9)

The causal issue appears again because in contrast to mimicking and acting particular emotions — or doing this to try to produce a genuine emotion — a person who is really suffering from an emotion such as grief is often not free to feel otherwise. In other words, even emotions such as pride can be described as involuntary because features such as intensity and duration are difficult to imitate and often very hard to suppress.

Pride also differs from cases of acting and deception because the intention is to keep the truth from other people and, in some cases, prevent any offence that expression of the emotion might otherwise cause. For example, pride often needs to be suppressed in particular social and religious circumstances and a confession is supposedly required in order to prevent individuals from selfishly standing out from others. More usually, it is important to conform to particular “display rules” (Reissland & Harris, 1991) so that another individual’s achievement is not undermined. And it may also be important to conceal pride for other reasons as indicated by the example of the individual who captured the Nazi Adolf Eichmann:

Malchin was justly proud of what he had done, but had to live for years with the strict anonymity imposed by a State which was not prepared to acknowledge official responsibility for the kidnapping, for fear of damaging relations with Argentina. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 28 May 1990)

Another situation involving the same individuals in an Israeli courtroom also seems to involve suppression of a feeling of pride:
"I looked at him and he looked at me and there was a short but unmistakable flicker of recognition," Malchin remembers. "And I said to myself; 'It was I who captured him, and the only person in this entire audience who knows who I am is Adolf Eichmann.'" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 28 May 1990)

These examples hardly represent all the circumstances in which pride may need to be concealed. But the last case does indicate another important point about pride: it is often very tempting for individuals to share their pride with others (i.e., unless the source of pride has become a source of embarrassment that an individual might eventually confess to others, or is otherwise relatively minor and not worth mentioning).

A variety of techniques and strategies may be used when individuals wish to conceal their feelings of pride for a variety of reasons. In this respect, although individuals may use methods such as gritting their teeth to control an expression of pride, one of the most obvious approaches is simply to deny any feeling of pride. But this can lead to situations such as the following from Shakespeare's (n.d./1992) *Troilus and Cressida* when everyone except the individual who denies pride, or claims not to have experienced it, notices a discrepancy between his words and actions:

Ajax. Why should a man be proud? How doth pride grow? I know not what pride is.

Agamemnon. Your mind is clearer, Ajax, and your virtues the fairer. He that is proud eats up himself; pride is his own glass, his own trumpet, his own chronicle; and whatever praises itself but in the deed, devours the deed in the praise.

Ajax. I do hate a proud man, as I hate the engendering of toads.

Nestor. [Aside] Yet he loves himself. Is't not strange. (Act 2, Scene 3, p. 616)
Apart from cases of self-deception, it is common to find that a denial of pride is not enough to override a relatively obvious reaction or other form of emotional "leakage" in conversation (e.g., such as being unable to suppress a smile).

And further cases of denying pride introduce added complications because they are similar to cases of acting mentioned in the previous section except for the fact that they conceal another emotion, judgement or thought. For example, we could imagine a stableman who is told: "Smith you've been with us 30 years . . . you should be very proud" to which he smiles and responds appropriately (cf. *The Wizard of Id*, Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 12 January 1992; Figure 8 in Appendix p. 699). This would seem to be a case of acting if Smith had no accompanying feeling of pride and was only appearing to be pleased so as not to upset those individuals who expect him to be happy. And it would be a case of concealment and (a kind of passive deception) if he let others keep this impression despite actually feeling disappointment and thinking: "I've spent my life in a litter box". With regard to Rosenberg's theory, the latter instance would not be regarded as a significant form of personal reflexivity because it could be described as "the inadvertent impact that we may have on another person—a nonreflexive process" (p. 4). Nevertheless, it is important to our sense of morality in Western societies that a failure to clarify the mistaken impressions of others may induce a feeling of guilt or the need to make some subsequent form of admission or confession. Thus while there are limited circumstances in which individuals make the claim "I don't feel proud", one reason examined here is to convince others that there really is nothing to be proud of.
The issue of denial and its potential to become dishonesty and self-deception has been mentioned already in regard to an individual who deflects talk of pride with the statement that he is "thankful" (*Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 March 1992). A similar example from the life of Wittgenstein about pride in being a Professor of Philosophy suggests a more direct admission about the feelings involved:

> I don't get any kick out of my position (except what my vanity and stupidity sometimes gets). (Monk, 1990, p. 415)

The point is that Wittgenstein does not deny working hard, attempting to maintain high standards, or striving for success. The denial is instead an important part of his attempt to control the feeling of pride (i.e., perhaps before it ever occurs or to reduce the number of future occasions when it may "leak out"). But such a reaction may also be seen as an inappropriate response to compliments and praise rather than a more dishonest form of denial and hypocritical modesty. This is the same comment made by Salinger (1963/1984) in *Seymour: An Introduction*:

> ... a confessional passage has probably never been written that didn't stink a little bit of the writer's pride in having given up his pride. (p. 24)

Too much humility may therefore be seen as an "over the top pride" (*Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 24 October 1990) because it is not denying an achievement, it does not license the claim that the individual concerned has no talent and makes no effort to succeed, nor does it mean that an individual's success was just a matter of luck. Although such denials may be made to indicate a commitment to higher values, such a denial should
never appear to resemble a case in which an individual is proud of his or her lack of pride, otherwise it is simply a complicated case of dishonesty.

In summary, reflexivity about emotions such as pride implies the need to control the expression of an emotion in order to conceal the truth from others or to avoid causing offence. In addition to physical techniques the most commonly used strategy when an individual is asked or accused of feeling proud is denial. In some cases, pride may nevertheless be obvious and can therefore be described as ‘leaking out’ or overriding any verbal denial. At other times, individuals may seem to agree with the remark ‘you should be proud’ even though they are concealing another emotion such as disappointment or a thought which, if voiced, would deny any reason for pride. It is possible, however, that the strategy of denial may be used in a dishonest manner so that it resembles false modesty or extreme humility. In that case, individuals may seem to take pride in their lack of pride because their remarks do not undermine any achievement or deny that their actions involved skill and effort. These examples further undermine Rosenberg’s contrast between reflexive and nonreflexive processes while also demonstrating the need to examine the detail of people’s actions and reactions in their social and moral surroundings.

6.4 Experiences and expressions of pride in relationships

In chapter 5, the institutions of family, work and education were argued to create particular forms of pride and frame expressions and experiences of the emotion by individuals. However, the constraints, obligations and
expectations that accompany other relationships were not presented beyond a superficial treatment of individuals who exemplify institutional aims. In this section, the aim is to describe and analyze further instances of pride without adopting and thus attempting to improve, test or reject sociological and social psychological theories of roles and reflexive role-taking (i.e., an account of the emotional demands that social situations and social roles impose and the willingness with which individuals adopt and attempt to accord with these demands (Rosenberg, 1990)). Instead, some of the relationships between people in which pride is felt and expressed will be explored through constitutive concepts of responsibility and involvement. Moreover, while the aim is not to develop or to complete aspects of Rosenberg's theory, the remarks below will expand upon two pervasive features of human interaction:

... the effort to understand the internal mental and emotional events of other human beings (usually called role-taking or empathy). (p. 8)

and;

... the fact that we are engaged constantly in efforts to produce intended effects on the minds of other people. (loc. cit.)

The main difference with Rosenberg's theory is that important psychological details of the way in which these two aspects of interaction are exhibited by people in relationships will not be translated into general theoretical terms.
Being proud of other people: the role of responsibility and involvement

A comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey of pride assembles examples of people's pride and its "objects" in order to represent the cultural and linguistic practices in which we create, control and enjoy specific emotions. However, despite the emphasis on pride occurring within specific practices, it is tempting to impose general theoretical schemes upon these examples or to restrict ourselves arbitrarily to a focus mainly on individuals and their decontextualized emotional and cognitive processes. The latter approach seems to be adopted by Weiner (1986) in the following relevant excerpt:

At times, when others perceived as within one's ego boundaries succeed, such as a spouse or an offspring, then pride is also felt. Further, success of larger entities with which one identifies, such as a sporting team or even one's country, might also generate pride. But in most instances pride is the direct result of a self-ascription for success. These personal attributes include ability and effort in the achievement domain, and personality and attractiveness in the affiliative domain. (pp. 249-250)

The obvious problem with Weiner's account is that he ignores the need to examine the different objects of pride such as "my countrymen", "my wife" or "my brother" as they are expressed and experienced in particular social relations (see chapter 7, section 7.2 for a critical account of pride as self-ascription for success). Thus by definition Weiner ignores important occasions on which pride is experienced in particular relationships that can be summarized in terms of responsibility and involvement as well as context-specific forms of expression.
A similar source of conceptual confusion is found in the view that different objects of pride come to have psychological significance through a psychological process of identification. In the worst case, a ridiculously self-centred view of pride in other people results in which the successes of a spouse or offspring are felt because they reflect on us as individuals. But if this were a common strategy then more individuals would cope with any envious thoughts of another's ability by coming to regard that person as their "own possession" (Murdoch, 1983, p. 123). Talk of self-inclusion seems more helpful where the concern is to stress the way in which the different objects of pride become included in an individual's thoughts, emotions and reactions. In a similar manner to Weiner, Lancaster and Foddy (1987) provide an analysis of cases in which individuals are proud of other people and also more abstract and material objects. However, they regard every object that an individual may be legitimately proud of as an instance of self-extension without clarification of the conceptual connections and practices involved. In other words, although it is possible to collect together every case of possible objects of pride such as an individual's nation, family, team, corporation, partner, child, or own achievements, they cannot all be explained by the same broad psychological process and social bond (i.e., in much the same way that an emphasis on identification in cultural and social practices was preferred to a psychological process of identification in chapter 5, section 5.3).

However, in a more reasonable move Lancaster and Foddy (1987) also admit:

... the specification of a particular role and to what degree a particular role entails perceived responsibility for a role-other is an empirical, not a theoretical question, although it may of
course be informed by analyses of the concept of responsibility. (p. 83)

Although an emphasis on roles is less important here, assembling examples of pride can achieve the same ends as an empirical investigation. For example, a relationship of responsibility is indicated by the pride that an individual expresses towards one of his officers:

The officer, Mr Tom Dempsey was fishing with a Fire Service officer, Mr Graeme Munro, when the accident happened shortly before midday, Chief Ambulance Officer Craig Wornwell said.

The men got to Mr Smith immediately and found he had no heartbeat and was not breathing.

They resuscitated him, but he had to be resuscitated again before services arrived.

. . . Mr Wombwell said he was "very proud" of Mr Dempsey's actions and said it was unlikely Mr Smith would be alive without his help. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 30 January 1992)

Although further important details are not available for analysis, it seems reasonable to argue that it is the Chief Ambulance Officer's responsibility for one of his officers that augments his pride: otherwise, he would probably express admiration or offer praise to his workmate. We can also speculate that the Chief Officer need not know his staff particularly well to still have the potential to be very pleased and proud of professionally related and generally laudable actions. Moreover, if we assume that the officer is not a relation or close friend, the example demonstrates how feelings of pride in another person can create connections that cut across usual role boundaries68.

68 It is quite possible that individuals may feel a connection with another person that they do not know personally but whose actions they are nevertheless "touched" by (Press, (Christchurch, N.Z.) 2 September 1990). This can be evident on occasions in which one witnesses a moral act by another person leading to the already examined statement that "sometimes one is proud of one's fellow creatures" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 August
The last point is indicated by other relationships defined by responsibility, for example, in which a teacher is proud of a student:

Superstar of violin quits centre stage
Sir Yehudi Menuhin, Kennedy's mentor, remains fiercely supportive of his plans.

..."He is a wonderful musician and that's something I take great pride in. My prayer is that his spontaneity will take an absolutely impeccable idealistic form." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 10 October 1992)

This is not to deny that such relationships may be sufficiently close so that the pupil may, on occasion, be proud of the teacher. Eco's (1983) The Name of the Rose provides a number of examples where Brother William's pupil Adso is proud of his master's intelligence and knowledge in both general and specific ways. For instance, he states:

I felt proud to be at the side of a man who had something with which to dumbfound other men famous in the world for their wisdom. (p. 7-4)

And, on another occasion the pupil thinks, but does not express:

I smiled, proud of his deduction. (p. 9-6)

Of course, this type of example may also be an exception because although the relation between the two individuals involves formal responsibilities it could also be said to resemble that of father and son (i.e., in contrast to the

1992a; see chapter 5, section 5.1). Such a form of pride in another individual therefore feels very real even though it is vague in perhaps confirming a certain faith in human beings to act graciously towards each other. Interestingly, it says little about how such considerations might occur for the individual who is the 'object' of pride. For she will probably act in a manner that is quite ignorant of the fact that a particular person who she does not know is proud of her actions. In other words, this seems to be the sort of case in which Cooley (1902) indicates that an individual such as Gail Devers probably acted out of only the most "vague and general" (p. 153) reference to the possible approbation of others.
ambulance officer who probably did not think specifically of the Chief Officer when reflecting upon his actions). Nevertheless, in many of these relations there is only a limited sense in which the individuals concerned could be said to be close because of differences in responsibility.

In contrast to relationships such as supervisor and worker, the example of teacher and student has more involvement than implied by responsibility considerations. It also suggests that the achievements of a pupil are, in part, the result of the teacher's own efforts and energy which, in addition, gives him or her the right to share in a successful or good outcome. Interestingly, individuals are often said to take a "special pride" in another's achievements due to the fact that they are the pupil's parent as well as their teacher or coach (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 24 June 1991). Personal involvement therefore is important to judgements of the role that an individual has played in another's success (as well as any pride subsequently experienced in relation to this role). When individuals are proud of another person it is usually parents, siblings and extended family members who celebrate and share in the victories and achievements of a family member. Two relevant cases are:

Ironically Hill's uncle, Stan (Tiny) Hill, an uncompromising All Black flanker and lock in the late 1950s, has been a source of encouragement form the day he joined rugby league.

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69 An obvious example is provided by the following account of a doctor's pride in a very young patient:

**Smile of a child rewards years of mental and physical exhaustion**

Shortly before lunch on this cold spring day, the little girl is visited by a friend. Professor Fred Shannon walks quietly into the room and smiles down at the small face. Two enormous indigo eyes gaze back. A certain invisible rapport has been built up during the past three months of care. "We are very proud of her. She has become a very special person. But if she pulls those out, she will be in trouble," Professor Shannon says as he carefully adjusts the wires and tubes which connect the small microcosm of humanity to the bank of medical technology above the incubator. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 28 August 1990)
"He's very proud of what I have achieved in league. His advice to me was to keep working hard, concentrate, and keep my feet on the ground." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 22 July 1992)

And, in an article which is based on an interview with the mother of a winning contestant:

For the first time in 22 years a Christchurch woman has won the New Zealand "Rose of Tralee" contest. Miss Sinead O'Hanlon, aged 20, was selected from either other regional finalists to represent New Zealand in the international contest to be held in Tralee, Ireland, in August. . . . Her daughter was "just over the moon" about the win. She had won on her humour, intelligence and poise. She must have been just what the judges were looking for, said Mrs O'Hanlon, who travelled to Auckland to be with her daughter for the contest. "We're very proud of her." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 June 1991 b).

The point is that in many cases family members are not directly responsible for what others within a family achieve, but nevertheless involvement and association seem to explain any spontaneous feelings of pride (see next section for pride and the forms it can take in other close relationships).

It is interesting to find that a broad sense of personal involvement that seems to entitle individuals to be proud of other persons and, more specifically, their achievements can also be used to override a lack of support and initial involvement. For example, an interview with the mother of the Prime Minister of New Zealand in 1991, Jim Bolger, revealed:

Proud as she is of her famous son, the Prime Minister's mum was unhappy about Jim entering politics. "I was really annoyed about it. I told him only a madman would be in politics. I always criticize them — that's my style. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 September 1991)
And a successful American actor indicates a lack of initial support for his acting in an interview:

What a teacher he would have made. And how his parents wanted him to be that teacher and how he fought gradually, quietly to educate them to understand he was going to be an actor.

"It was right up to the last minute. I'd studied drama at Brooklyn College and earned my Master of Fine Arts from Cornell and I was still saying I was going to teach. They expected it. But now, oh, they're so happy and so proud. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 9 January 1993)

A further example of a mentally handicapped man who accidentally completed a marathon instead of an 8 kilometre race indicates how even an unplanned achievement can be a source of considerable parental pride:

Art Pease, aged 23, stopped only once to walk and finished with an unofficial time of 4hr, 18 min and 23 sec. Pease’s father, Charles, blames himself for the mix-up.

. . . In the meantime, the gun went off and Pease, who happened to be in the marathon line, started the race with thousands of other runners. Pease’s parents contacted race officials, who spotted Pease at mile 16. “We were very proud. It was such an accomplishment,” Charles Pease said. “The doctor said he was in better shape than a lot of them in the race.” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 6 October 1990)

Thus personal relations have the potential to generate pride in another person through the quality of involvement in that person’s life: indeed, to such an extent that a sense of personal connection can override specific details of actual support, involvement or an initial lack of encouragement.

The potential of individuals to take pride in the achievements of others is prominent in families because of the persistent sense of emotional connection (i.e., despite the fact that adult sons and daughters will probably have lived independent lives for quite a while). Certainly there is a
widespread perception that the actions of children reflect on their parents as
the following letter to the editor indicates:

Sir, — During student orientation week our letter box was
flattened twice. On the evening after the second event three
very presentable young men called at the house, introduced
themselves, advised that they were responsible for the latest
disaster to befall the letter box and asked if they could make
restitution. The following Saturday morning successful repairs
were effected. Thanks are due to C, H and N from their
colleagues for doing something positive to combat the annual
anger that residents near the university usually feel at this time
of year. Their parents can be proud of their sons. They can be
proud of themselves. I am happy to record my thanks to them
for restoring my faith in the student generation — Yours, etc.
(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 20 March 1991)

Obviously, if the names of these individuals were publicly revealed it is likely
that their parents would be embarrassed rather than proud, even though the
example does suggest that the moral soundness of their upbringing. But the
example also provides evidence of one of the specific ways in which parents
and others in similar roles will both judge and feel that they will be seen as
responsible for their adult children's behaviour. Some indication of
involvement and a potential study of its role is provided by a further example
of an initial pride in bringing up a child to have particular values:

A Christchurch mother was thrilled to learn that her daughter,
aged five, had inherited her environmental concerns. Her
brother had spied her picking up rubbish in the school
playground every lunch-hour. Daughter's explanation was
that she loved tidying up after messy people. Her teacher told
her otherwise. The rubbish duty was punishment for her
incessant chatter in class. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 April
1992b)

The fact that the daughter disappoints on this occasion does not undermine
the initial and general willingness of individuals to take pride in the actions
and achievements of others which are regarded as good or exemplify their values.

In this respect, it is interesting to note that feelings of pride can be felt instantaneously without much recourse to what others think (i.e., the experience of pride in another is almost as direct as a personal achievement). The feelings of pride generated, potentially expressed to the person with whom an individual is connected and probably shared with others such as workmates and friends do not involve reflexive role-taking (i.e., in the same sense indicated by other expressions in close relationships; see next section). This account contrasts with the argument by Shott (1979) and others that pride cannot occur "without putting oneself in another's position and taking that person's perspective" (p. 1323). Of course, an expression of pride may be matched by others and, therefore, seem to undermine the pride that a responsible and involved individual will feel. For example:

Having dispatched our son (who was cast as a "main vehicle") to the front of the hall, we took our seats. This in itself was a little difficult because of the aforementioned crowd.

Glowing with pride I had announced to anyone who cared to listen that my son was starring as a "main vehicle".

"My son's in the school play," I told a colleague.
"What part has he got?" she asked kindly.
"He's a car," I said proudly.
"Not a speaking part?" she sniffed.
"Well he gets to toot!" I snapped at her departing back.

(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 August 1991)

Although the surveyed examples hardly constitute a thorough and rigorous discursive investigation, it nevertheless seems that reflexive role-taking is a poor way of capturing the variety of ways in which individuals incorporate what others will think about their role in another's success as well as the
way they react to the success of someone close to them. The notion of reflexive role-taking does not clearly represent the differences that separate individuals in a variety of circumstances who might be "pleased for you" from those who are genuinely "proud of you".

To summarize, examples of pride in other people were assembled and analyzed in terms of responsibility and involvement. The examination of the roles and practices in which other-directed pride is felt, expressed or shared with others was used to counter an individualistic focus on the inclusion of others within our "ego boundaries". Instead, responsibility for others indicates why individuals may state that they are "very proud" of their actions or achievements (i.e., rather than offering praise or feeling full of admiration). Moreover, where responsibility and involvement are involved it seems that the potential for another person to generate pride is increased. The most obvious example of responsibility and involvement occur in families where, it should also be noted, the willingness of parents to take pride in a child's actions seems to override any lack of support, encouragement or personal effort. And with regard to personal reflexivity, the potential for pride to occur involves considerations and forms of emotional attachment that are not well captured by the notion of "reflexive role-taking".

Pride in close relationships

Although examples of pride in others that are generated in work, family and other institutional relationships were examined in previous sections, it is also worthwhile examining the detail of pride as it occurs in close
relationships: that is, relationships between adults which are usually, but not necessarily, more equal and emotionally close than relationships involving responsibility. This section also goes beyond the earlier analysis of talk of a wedding day being the "proudest day of my life" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 14 November 1992) and marriage as "the best thing I ever did" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 July 1992). Further cases of pride will be assembled that highlight the effects that individuals intend to produce on others as well as the way in which the considerations of another person are incorporated in thoughts, feelings and reactions (i.e., without necessarily supporting Rosenberg's theory and its categories).

An important aspect of pride in close relationships that involvement does not seem to do justice to is the role of a sense of "ownership": despite the fact that it is difficult to see how anyone could "justly claim credit for 'owning' a person" (van Sommers, 1988, p. 17). For although pride in another person as a kind of "object" to be displayed is ethically suspect, an illustrative and potentially representative fictitious account of the painter Rubens may initially help to make this form of pride more understandable:

Anyway, another circumstance arose: at a time when his failures induced him to give up painting once and for all (at the same time as N was celebrating his first success), Rubens was seeing a very beautiful young girl, whereas his rival had married a woman so ugly that one look at her made Rubens speechless. It seemed to him that by means of this conjunction of circumstances, fate was trying to show him where his life's centre of gravity really lay: not in public life but in private, not in the pursuit of professional success but in success with women. And suddenly what only yesterday had seemed like a defeat now revealed itself as a surprising victory: yes, he would give up fame, the struggle for recognition (a vain and sad struggle), in order to devote himself to life itself. He didn't even bother to ask himself exactly why women represented 'life itself'. That seemed to him self-evident and clear beyond all doubt. He was certain that he had chosen a better way than his rival, wedded to a rich hag. In these circumstances his young beauty meant
not only a promise of happiness, but above all a triumph and a source of pride. In order to consolidate his unexpected victory and to give it a seal of irrevocability he married the beautiful woman, convinced that the whole world would envy him. (Kundera, 1992, pp. 313-314)

It is clear that the means of attaining a partner can involve considerable competition between individuals and hence talk of pride in achievements tends to be used in this domain. The example from Kundera's novel also suggests that the element of display to others is important although, as van Sommers (1988) notes, it is also worth noting that even with regard to relationships pride:

\[
\ldots \text{concerns the legitimacy of our claims to public regard: pride is a legitimately earned credit for what we own; vanity is based on the mere crude fact of possession. (p. 17)}
\]

One consideration that is relevant to the issue of reflexive processes is that the "proud display" of a partner may be primarily to make others envious. As such it may be regarded as a form of vanity because in part the display is only enjoyable when others react in this manner. In this sense, feelings of pride generated solely in the act of public display suggest an unequal, exploitative, or immature relationship.

However, other considerations are relevant to proud public displays of another person, or what can be described as the pride of being seen together with a person that an individual likes or loves. A public sense of pride is obvious where a person's private regard for another individual is manifest in and connected with a public display that recognizes the relationship. This point can be made in a negative manner by examining a contrasting relationship that is close but needs to be kept secret. In particular, the "mistress" of a married man remarks:
I wanted to be his official wife. I was very proud of him... it disturbed me that she could go anywhere with him and be accepted as though he were hers... When one loves a man one wishes to be seen with him officially. (van Sommers, 1988, p. 191)

She states that this recognition matters too much to her and too little to his wife, thus indicating a need for public recognition of the relationship. In this sense, we could also speculate that the connection between liking or loving the person that an individual is seen with has similar features to the expression of pride: namely, just as we are tempted to share an achievement with others, so also strong feelings of admiration for another person or attraction towards them can be most intense when we know that this relationship can be seen by and displayed to others. Whether such instances of pride can be best described in terms of attention that is self-reflected would be worth examining in more detail. However, for the moment it is enough to describe more features of pride in a close relationship by examining a further contrary example: there do not seem to be many instances of individuals who feel close to another person but do not want to display the relationship, either by appearing in public with the person or engaging in more specific acts such as spontaneously showing a photograph to another person.

Another issue that seems to have some bearing on reflexive processes is the fact that private expressions of pride help to create a particular intimacy. For example, in a surreptitiously recorded cellular phone conversation between a member of the British Royal family and his mistress, the latter stated: “I adore you. I'm so proud of you” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 14 November 1992). Such feelings of pride might
occur, of course, on many occasions that do not involve the possibility of displaying a relationship to others and, therefore, are not connected with a need for public recognition and acceptance. *Pace* Rosenberg, the point is that on many occasions, emotion-laden words are not always carefully chosen to manipulate another individual or to produce intended emotional responses for ourselves. However, there are intermediate cases. For example, an expression of pride in private by a recent acquaintance may indicate that a closer relationship is developing: hence the realistic description of an individual who reacts with "blushing embarrassment" when a woman he has recently met and who has been watching his motorcycle stunt work says:

I was so excited and proud of you. You were so brave. (Wharton, 1987, p. 137)

Again the details of pride demonstrate that individuals may choose to express emotions in particular ways at certain points in conversation, not because they intend to produce specific emotional effects but instead to achieve broader, more vaguely formulated goals. Acts of public display and recognition may therefore reaffirm the closeness of a relationship as well as the importance attached to securing the praise and approval of other individuals (e.g., such as family, friends and perhaps even the general public in some cases). This could also be called a form of psychological identification in contrast to more public ways in which a person is identified as being affiliated with another individual or individuals. The psychological issue in this case is simply that such

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70 Thus the term "emotional expression" is not subsumed within the general category of "emotional display" and nor is it connected with an "unintentional manifestation" of an emotion (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 4).
relations are not always immediately obvious since it would be unlikely that others would immediately recognize the significance of the connection for the person. The person may therefore need to explain the nature of the connection that he or she is proud of. For example, one case is that of an individual who identifies with the person he is named after and subsequently comes to admire him:

Among the many who mourned the recent passing of the former great All Black flanker, Kel Tremain, was Kelvin Tremaine Leahy, also a flanker and a member of the touring Ireland rugby team. Leahy takes his Christian names from the New Zealand forward and he is proud of that fact.

"Having taken his name for 26 years I identified myself so much with Kelvin Tremain that I looked into the name and into the person. I never saw him but I was tremendously impressed with what I read."

... Leahy's brother, Ross, has a second name of Tremayn. "It is another variation. Dad loved the name perhaps because of the uniqueness of it, particularly in Ireland. As I grew up there was nobody called Kelvin and I was called Kevin or Melvin or Mervyn, but I'm definitely Kelvin and proud of it." *(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 15 May 1992)*

The fact that such forms of identification may occur quite early in an individual's life is also a topic for further investigation. For example, an individual expresses pride in the achievements of his ancestors and states that this is something that he was aware of very early in his life *(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 31 January 1992b; see footnote 36)*. Despite some interesting issues in relation to the formation and development of these forms of identification, it is their persistence and manifestation in other more idiosyncratic forms of pride in adult relationships that is of interest.

As the previous section indicated, the psychological and emotional detail of personal involvement is well illustrated by cases of pride that have not been examined in detail in the psychological literature. Instead, it is
more usual to find that the feelings generated in close relationships are
treated in terms of general theoretical notions of "internalization" and
"privatization". But the following examples should make it clear that the
manner in which considerations of other people's thoughts, emotions and
reactions come to be incorporated in our own is not an orderly process.
Moreover, although this incorporation can be idiosyncratic, one common
example is the way in which our culture allows us to talk of an individual
after his death. For example, there is the already mentioned case of a
policeman's widow who not only says that an award will provide "a source of
great pride" for herself and their daughters, but also that "her husband would
have been delighted to be recognised in the Honours List" (Press
(Christchurch, N.Z.) 19 December 1991). However, another example of an
individual who receives an award provides a better illustration of the way in
which the memory of a person can be evoked:

A Christchurch clothing designer, Miss Debbie Sweeney, would have loved nothing more than to share her triumph in
this week's Benson and Hedges Fashion Awards with her brother Carl.

... Her brother was foremost in her thoughts yesterday as the celebrations continued.

"He was one tremendous person and would have been so proud of me," she said. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 9 April
1992)

Similarly, after the sprinter Carl Lewis "shattered" the world 100 metres
record, he told reporters that "his dead father had watched the triumph and
would have been proud" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 27 August 1991; see
also accounts of vacillating emotions in chapter 7, section 7.4).

Although these examples are hardly a comprehensive rival to
reflexive role-taking studies and accounts of the privatization of the thoughts,
emotions and reactions of other people, they provide an interesting alternative to a general theoretical treatment. It is not necessarily an advantage to note that the importance of other individuals can be explained, for example, in terms of emotional enmeshment. However, it is possible that we might compare someone who is either capable of feeling spontaneous pride when seeing or hearing of the achievements of another person (or who thinks of a particular person being proud of him or her) with an individual who cannot. One purpose of such a comparison might be to explain the differences involved or, at the very least, to stimulate the investigation of effective techniques for creating greater emotional involvement between people. The preconditions for spontaneous pride in another person with whom a form of close relationship already exists might include: reducing levels of criticism, focusing less on failure, offering more praise, taking a more active interest in the other person's activities, and providing more direct support for that person. It is quite possible that the use of these techniques might increase the likelihood of spontaneously taking pride in the actions, achievements or even appearance of another person. Moreover, a further outcome might be that these techniques result in a kind of "automatization" of experiences and expressions of pride (see chapter 7 for an account of the "thoughtful immediacy" of pride). Also it is quite possible that the possibility of other unexpected emotions and thoughts might also be generated, although no claims are being made here about focusing on pride as the best means of improving emotional closeness in relationships.

To reiterate, where pride is experienced through public display of a partner it may indicate a form of vanity and could be described as a strategy designed to produce envy in others. More mature, equal and emotionally
close relationships, however, may create pride when individuals are simply seen with someone they admire or love. The latter purpose of display may also be related to the aim of achieving public recognition of the relationship. More private indications and expressions of pride in another person often suggest a close relationship or its development (although some of these forms of pride are also private in the sense that the nature of the closeness with another person would need to be explained). The problems of general theoretical treatments of cases of being proud of others or thinking of a specific person at a point of achievement were also explored. Finally, a brief account was provided of possible techniques for reflexively increasing the likelihood of spontaneous occurrences of pride in close relationships (or making a relationship emotionally closer).

6.5 Public identity, self-control, and the maintenance of privacy

There are many circumstances in which Rosenberg's theory-based categories of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition can also be countered by an examination of specific issues of public identity, honour and the maintenance of privacy. Accordingly, this section begins with examples of pride that highlight the importance of self-control and emotional self-regulation to the positive sense of a "proud person" (i.e., an honourable and dignified individual). The limits of using reflexive abilities to maintain pride and dignity are also explored in relation to public practices and personal misfortunes. The potential of extreme forms of reflexive control to lead to a form of paralysis and cold emotional independence is also
examined in a manner that adds negative detail to the account of pride in close relationships. The last section assembles cases of pride that suggest the theme of individuals who refuse to act and, moreover, to explain their actions in such a way that they are likely to remain private and unintelligible.

Pride and the role of self-control in maintaining dignity and privacy

A proud person is usually regarded as a moral individual who attempts to maintain high standards of conduct. He or she is often described as living by a particular code that most other people would consider to be too demanding. Although the sense of pride may therefore seem to be similar to arrogance, the main difference is a proud person seeks to maintain his or her high standards and autonomy while also considering other people. Moreover, a proud and honourable person is often characterized by a certain social reticence, poise, and quiet dignity even in the most trying particular circumstances. Interestingly, Murdoch (1983) challenges the persistent Aristotelian view of the “proud man” when she describes an individual who is like a Nazi war criminal emerging from prison:

... not exactly repentant but full of stoical wisdom, facing the truth, quiet and proud, acknowledging his acts as his own. (p. 556)

Thus although it may seem odd for a proud individual to be compared to a war criminal, the sense of pride connected with an honourable character is strongly connected in Western culture with independence, responsibility
and self-control (i.e., a person who does not blame others for his or her own misfortunes).

The self-control that manifests itself in the reticence of a proud person is obvious in situations where lesser individuals would not be able to resist the temptation to respond to insults in kind, to complain about obstacles, to boast to their rivals, or to avoid responsibility for their actions. The following newspaper example is relevant because it suggests the public nature of a dispute, the use of personal insults and the result when the insulted individual wins:

'Average sailor' beats big guns in late dash

Dickson and Koch sparred verbally after the opening race when the American labelled the new yachts "incredibly dangerous" and the people responsible for creating the new class "idiots".

Dickson responded to the 50-year-old industrialist by saying the yachts were a challenge to the sailing elite and were not designed to be crewed by average sailors.

Koch expressed his desire to settle the situation on the water and had his wish answered yesterday.

He won the water battle after racing past the Japanese boat on the windward second last leg and then caught the New Zealanders in the rundown to the finish line.

Asked if Jayhawk's win yesterday struck a blow for the average sailor, Koch gave a restrained response. "I was very proud and happy to win today," Koch told a news conference. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 8 May 1991)

This example usefully illustrates the notion of a "proud person" because of the way in which Koch avoids responding to personal insults and, more importantly, gives a "restrained response" when he may easily have gloated upon winning. Of course, it might be argued that if Koch's standards of conduct were so high he would not have engaged in any "verbal sparring" in the first place (see the section below on the role of pride in personal disagreements). In reply it may be said that the act of self-control exhibited
by Koch demonstrates how a proud individual may retain a sense of dignity after suffering personal insults: even though it is tempting to gain some form of revenge which would, in the act, lower him to the same "level" as his opponent.

Proud persons will therefore conceal their anger when they feel that they have been insulted and will also control the expression of pride in any victory over the same or similar opponents. The resulting attempt to maintain standards of conduct, perhaps conforming to a broader cultural view of the proud person, is not well captured by Rosenberg's remark that such individuals engage in emotional display in order to:

... persuade other that they are moral actors—that is, people who conform to the emotional norms of society. (p. 8)

But in this case, the control of emotion does not involve according with emotion norms so much as acting in relation to a laudable character type in Western society. The point is that the sense of pride and honour that is involved in such cases is far more complicated than suggested by its potential treatment as another instance of emotional self-control.

However, there are limits also to the use of self-control in some circumstances to maintain a sense of pride and dignity. These limits can be observed in situations where individuals fear the public discovery of their identity. This issue is demonstrated by the already mentioned experiences of gay people who serve in the American military under a policy that prohibits their employment (see chapter 5, section 5.2). The interesting point is that once they are "allowed to serve openly", it is predicted that there will be:
... an increase in pride and loyalty and a decrease in fear and stress when gays and lesbians no longer need to keep their identities secret. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 17 November 1992)

Whether this is because it would then be possible for gay people serving in the army to defend themselves against personal slights without fear of discovery or because their rights to work would be protected is an open question. Nevertheless, the example is useful because it shows there is little dignity in feeling compelled to keep a central or undeniable aspect of a person's identity hidden.

A further example of the limits that can occur in maintaining the character sense of pride after suffering insults, hiding an aspect of identity, or being wronged in some other demeaning way is the difficulty of controlling the emotions generated. In particular, there may be very little possibility of a quiet, private self-defence where there is no obvious "victory" for the individual concerned. For example, in an already mentioned example from Sense and Sensibility that was analyzed in terms of emotion standards (see chapter 5, section 5.4), Elinor suggests how the "triumph" of Willoughby's treatment of Marianne can be "cheated":

Whoever may have been so detestably your enemy, let them be cheated of their malignant triumph, my dear sister, by seeing how nobly the consciousness of your own innocence and good intentions supports your spirits. It is a reasonable and laudable pride which resists such malevolence. (p. 179)

Marianne's reply is worth repeating because it suggests that when the issue is suffering caused by being misled in love, a dignified response is impossible:
Pride, personal disagreements and pursuing private reasons to the point of unintelligibility

In the novel Immortality, Kundera (1992) describes an argument between two rivals that is relevant to the treatment of pride, honour and a refusal to act for personal reasons in Western culture:

The two rivals now care only about one thing: which of them will be recognized by the opinion of this small audience as the possessor of the truth, for to be proved wrong means for each of them the same thing as losing his honour. Or losing a piece of his own self. The opinion they advocate is itself not all that important to them. But because once they have made this opinion an attribute of their self, attacking it is like stabbing a part of their body. (p. 136)

This is the sort of occasion where it may seem difficult for individuals to "swallow their pride" without necessarily losing their honour or integrity (even though in many cases it is the only honourable, although unpalatable, course of action). Kundera also suggests that rivalry may prevent any resolution of personal disagreements:

Don't tell me that two men who deeply disagree with each other can still like each other; that's a fairy tale. (p. 136)

Whether it is possible for normal relations to be restored is, therefore, dependent on the depth of the dispute and the nature of the relationship.

Where two rivals are not even friends there would seem to be little reason to stop using the strategies mentioned in the previous section or, more simply, to continue to avoid the other person. However, it may be more relevant to emphasize the way in which forms of self-control and self-presentation usually prevent such an argument from occurring. For example, Kundera suggests:
Perhaps they would like each other if they kept their opinions to themselves or if they only discussed them in a joking way and thus played down their significance. (p. 136)

Thus if the issue around which the disagreement forms is deeply personal it may be especially difficult to avoid a "falling out" if there is no decisive way of determining whose opinion (or actions, etc.) is wrong.

A feature of pride in disagreements between people is the stubborn refusal to change an opinion or course of action because of their personal importance (i.e., because being proved wrong seems to have the consequence of being a lesser person). However, pride can also be apparent in an individual's commitment to a personal ethical position which, it should be noted, may have similar self-defeating consequences. For example, when the important attribute of an individual's self is his or her autonomy and independence, the value placed on this trait may lead the person (or persons) to refuse offers of charity and help (see section 6.2). This is despite the fact that an individual's partner or family may also suffer as a result of those actions, as the following example from New Zealand indicates:

Teachers believe family pressures are building and will worsen when the Government's benefit cuts come into effect.

"It's getting very difficult for parents who are very proud. It's going to put a lot of pressure on them," one teacher said. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 March 1991)

Nevertheless, as Atkinson and Trinder (1981) note in a study in the United Kingdom, the desire to maintain personal autonomy is quite common. Thus even when proud persons are entitled to help and it may seem self-defeating not to accept it, nevertheless they refuse in order to maintain their independence.
The theme of pride and a stubborn refusal to accept money due to the value placed on independence is also demonstrated by another example. In this case, the singer interviewed for an article realizes that the price of resisting commercialization would be too high. In particular, he notes his reactions after being offered money for the use of one of his songs in a film:

"They offered me 125 grand to use it. I can't turn down that kind of money. I used to have this very proud barrier. You look back at Woodstock. Did you see an advertising sign in the background? You didn't see a record or radio logo. But you have to move with the times," said Cocker, who is more willing to talk about money than most musicians. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 13 November 1992)

Although in this case the individual concerned has a considerable amount to gain by losing his "proud barrier", there are similar cases in which people maintain their position despite appearing ridiculous: that is, their refusal out of pride to complete, to initiate, or to respond to a social act such as offering help may also carry with it the possibility that the point of their activity will be regarded as stupid, offensive, self-defeating, eccentric, or even mad.

Indeed, by taking this potential form of reflexive agency to an extreme such individual actions may be unintelligible to other people because, in addition, the person refuses to offer an explanation. The following example, while not obviously representative, nevertheless illustrates the general potential for forms of reflexivity to be taken to extremes:

Professor Leal had dreamed of returning to his homeland the day the ship steamed away from the coast of Europe. Outraged by the Caudillo, he vowed never to put on a pair of socks until he knew Franco was dead and buried, never imagining how many decades would pass before his wish was fulfilled. His vow produced scales on his feet and created difficulties in his professional dealings. On occasion he had to meet with important figures, or was commissioned to
administer examinations in various schools, and his bare feet in the large rubber-soled shoes stirred a certain amount of prejudice. He was extremely proud, however, and rather than offer an explanation, he preferred to be considered an eccentric foreigner or a penniless wretch whose salary did not allow him to buy stockings. (Allende, 1988, p. 25)

By refusing to explain the reasons for an action because of a stubborn pride, a further interesting connection is established between pride and self-control. Namely, a type of privacy\(^{72}\) in which the actions of an individual have a personal meaning but are unintelligible, odd and ridiculous to others because of his or her refusal to provide a reasonable explanation.

To summarize, personal disagreements are often maintained because a public dispute turns on a personally important opinion, action or attribute. Moreover, because the need to maintain a particular relationship may not override the personal costs involved, it is unlikely that any of the disputants would admit that they were wrong (although the situation could be prevented by particular forms of self-presentation). If the attribute of self that is important to a person is independence, he, she or they may also refuse to accept any form of help or charity, even though this can be a self-defeating strategy. Where it is possible for persons to lower their "proud barrier" to a particular action, it is usually because they realize that it would be ridiculous to maintain this strategy. However, individuals may also decide to be unreasonable and persist with a particular form of reflexive

\(^{72}\) The only other intelligible example of a sense of honour or "secret pride" revealed by the survey is an example from *The Great Gatsby*. It is where Jordan remarks to Nick: "I thought you were rather an honest, straightforward person. I thought it was your secret pride" (Fitzgerald, 1926/1988, p. 168). The statement perhaps means "I thought you were secretly proud of this" and that it was honourable because Nick's rejection of the remark is revealing of the complicated conceptual relations one must consider: "I'm thirty... I'm five years too old to lie to myself and call it honour" (p. 168). This is not a secret pride that he would be lying to himself by calling honour, but rather a form of self-honesty which does not allow him to agree with her.
agency to the point that their public actions are unintelligible, odd and eccentric.

Summary

In this chapter, further surveyed examples of pride were assembled, analyzed and used to highlight the social, practical and individual limits of particular forms of personal reflexivity. Although similar themes to those in chapter 5 were identified, more detail was provided about the role of reflexive processes in relation to individual forms of emotional display, identification and experience in particular social contexts. A central aspect of Rosenberg's theory is that intentional attempts to display, to control and to produce particular emotions play a central role in people's lives as they attempt to achieve goals and to accord with emotional norms. However, Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory fails to capture many of the relevant cultural and linguistic details of pride. People who "suffer" from arrogant pride, for example, attempt to maintain particular standards in a manner which is thought by others to elevate them above other people (i.e., the form of reflexive agency they demonstrate is a refusal to engage with others). Rosenberg's theory also makes a sharp distinction between emotional display and emotional experience despite the fact that the "expressive feel" of the statements, gestures and postures that accompany particular forms of emotional pride may play an important role in preventing any social transgression.
It was also noted, *pace* Rosenberg, that the emotion of pride can occur as an unintended product of people’s intentional pursuit of particular aims, goals and outcomes which do not explicitly involve emotions. For example, persons can take pride in the cleverness with which they have deceived others to achieve a particular outcome. And the point is that people engage in a particular activity because they intend to achieve this goal: their actions are not predicated on or necessarily motivated by the intention to produce a particular emotion. An individual may also need to change his or her personality or body to achieve a particular aim, although the same point is relevant; achieving a particular outcome need not be redescribed as the intention to produce a particular emotion. In this respect Rosenberg’s sharp division between reflexive and nonreflexive processes is problematic as it pertains to emotional display. For example, my aim may be to produce an emotional effect on another person by pretending to have a particular emotion (i.e., by carefully choosing particular words or engaging in a particular type of emotional display). But on Rosenberg’s view the spontaneous internal experience of pride that I feel when I see that the result is successful is less important because this emotion must be the product of a nonreflexive process (i.e., it is not an emotion that I decided to produce and which I then proceeded to produce by using one or more of Rosenberg’s reflexive strategies).

Rosenberg’s focus on emotion also ignores the detail of the way in which emotions such as pride are expressed and experienced in cultural practices and interpersonal relationships. Reflexivity in relation to emotional display may cut across many of the finer judgements and distinctions we make about practices in which people may act, conceal or deny emotions like pride. Cases of deception may also shade into further forms of denial,
especially where the point is in part to curtail the normal expression in accord with normative expectations. In such cases, it may be tempting to think that a genuine emotion can be distinguished from an acted or dissimulated display by referring to an uncontrollable, physiological and experiential "core". But it is important to note that we might produce pride in ourselves by attempting to achieve an important goal or by being involved in the projects of someone with whom we are connected or for whom we are responsible. These examples demonstrate that much important cultural and linguistic detail is left out by relying on general notions of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition. For example, acknowledging that another person "would have been proud" in a particular situation as well as the spontaneous way in which pride in another person is experienced are both examples that add important detail to reflexive role-taking and internalization accounts. It should also be noted that acts of self-control may be used to adhere to a culturally informed sense of what a proud person should do to maintain his or her dignity. Moreover, if carried too far, the results of reflexive strategies may be effective in producing a kind of emotional coldness and indecisive paralysis in personal disagreements that should be regarded as self-defeating and ridiculous.
CHAPTER 7: Personal reflexivity, privacy and emotion: an account of reflexive cognition and the “thoughtful immediacy” of pride

Introduction

In the previous two chapters, Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory of emotion was critically analysed in terms that could be described as sociological and social psychological. If the assembly and arrangement of examples of pride accords roughly with traditional disciplinary lines, then it is appropriate to describe this chapter as addressing psychological issues. The psychological focus arises in relation to further aspects of Rosenberg's theory that still require critical scrutiny, including the relations between reflexive processes and nonreflexive processes; the potential to examine reflexive processes that focus on internal "constituent parts" and components of the self; the extent to which relevant forms of "reflexive cognition" are separable from their requisite emotions; and, the usefulness of revealing the neurophysiological grounding of specific emotions. The latter issue, in particular, is avoided by Rosenberg's unconvincing connection of reflexivity to intentional changes in emotional display and his reliance on a traditional account of the way in which reflexive processes are "involved centrally in emotional identification" (p. 4; Schachter & Singer, 1962). It is therefore important to provide a critical and reflexive account of the assumed importance of reflexive processes to the expression and experience of personal emotions.

The following sections also provide a Wittgenstein-inspired alternative to misleading theory-based representations of how we, as
individuals, are able to experience, talk about and act back upon our own private and "inner" emotional experiences. Section 7.1 provides an alternative to Rosenberg's account of emotional experience as a "realm of privileged knowledge" by using examples of pride to highlight the contribution of a unique personal history. The treatment of the private nature of emotions then shifts to the potential to describe other aspects of our emotional experiences such as their duration and "components". Section 7.2 provides a critical treatment of the cognitive nature of pride and its "thoughtful immediacy". An attempt is made to provide a positive alternative to Rosenberg's view that reflexive cognitive processes create particular emotions during acts of emotional identification (i.e., mainly because emotions such as pride would otherwise be described as spontaneously experienced "internal states of physiological arousal" which are the "products of nonreflexive processes" (p. 4)). Section 7.3 will then turn to unaddressed problems with Rosenberg's account of self-consciousness and emotion such as the questionable utility of identifying emotion components and underlying processes. Instances of pride are also assembled in order to criticize the ostensibly undeniable view that people are "unable to exercise direct control over their emotional experiences" (p. 10). Section 7.4 examines the prominence that Rosenberg places on cognitive interpretation in the identification of simultaneously occurring emotions or ambiguous states of arousal. Examples of pride are also used to consider exceptional cases of vacillating feelings in exceptional circumstances.
7.1 The limits, correlates and meaning of personal emotions

A persistent conceptual problem which can be found in Rosenberg's work is the view that individual experiences of emotion and their constituent components represent a realm of privileged knowledge. The Cartesian leanings of the "privileged knowledge" view have been exposed by social constructionists through the interpretation and application of Wittgenstein's "Private Language Argument" (§§242-306). Interestingly, when the Cartesian position is expressed in such statements as "only I know what I feel", it is clear that many psychologists still have difficulty accepting alternative representations of how it is possible for "me" to talk about "my feelings" (i.e., without invoking mysterious introspective abilities to explain how we label and explore our private feelings). However, the circumstances in which many Western individuals regard themselves as the owners, observers and final arbiters of the meaning of these internal "objects" can be described and demystified. In this process, we can examine the enduring relevance of Wittgenstein's points about private experiences which were suggested by assembling reminders of the use of first person psychological concepts.

The relations between intense emotions and a unique personal history

A good point to begin a critical analysis of personal emotions and related self-referential abilities is to examine intense emotional reactions. The main reason for considering such cases is that we are less likely to ask: what
private, inner accompaniment gives meaning to the outward expression? Because intense experiences usually have a characteristic expression and are more obvious to observers, we are not as strongly influenced by the notion that an inner process is investing these outer emotional displays with life. Another useful consequence is that any reliance on introspection is dismissed in tandem with the view that much of our first person psychological talk "represents a realm of privileged knowledge" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 3). Remarks such as Rosenberg’s about our experiences of an “internal world” go to the heart of problems “treated” by Wittgenstein in the Private Language Argument (PLA). Although the exact nature of the PLA will not be fully addressed, it can reasonably be described as a complicated series of philosophical remarks which have been used to inform and guide many social constructionist accounts of subjective and private experiences.

In this context, an already explored Wittgensteinnian remark about shame being justified by “the whole history of an incident” (PI, §644; see section 6.2) can be used to clarify the relations between an individual’s personal history and his or her private emotional experiences. In particular, intense feelings and expressions of pride are often intelligible to others only when the person concerned paraphrases a whole personal history (or context). In Arthur Miller’s play The Crucible, for example, Reverend Hale can be described as having “a unique sense of pride in at last being publicly called upon for his speciality assistance” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 September 1992). This sense of pride is personal, private and unique because very few other people may have a similar type of experience (i.e., pride in fulfilling a lifelong “identity project”). This form of pride is not necessarily private in the sense that it is incommunicable, rather it is the
circumstances and personal history that are unique. Moreover, a grammatical investigation is useful because the unique experience of a brief but "deep pride and satisfaction" is not as clearly nonsensical as Wittgenstein's analogous case in which it would seem odd to say: "for a second he felt deep grief" (P1, p. 174; or in the form relevant to this section "for a second I felt deep grief"). This is simply because such a sense of pride might be felt, for example, when an individual recognizes that he or she is about to fulfill a lifelong goal while simultaneously maintaining their poise.

The overall result of these considerations is that the personal significance of an expression or exhibition of pride might need to be explained to others despite the intensity of its expression and the use of appropriate words. In such cases, the background that makes an individual's experience unique, particularly intense, or personally important may not be immediately obvious to others (and thus would remain private and, potentially, be regarded as inappropriate to a particular context). Moreover, a focus on the depth of a person's feelings would ignore the feature of many people's proudest moments: that a special or rare life event is involved. For example, many individuals genuinely describe "getting married" as the proudest day of their life (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 July 1992). However, such examples might also support one of Rosenberg's (1990) points about the identification of emotion:

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73 This point similarly extends to cases where an individual, for example, is clearly "proud of being a good trade unionist all his life" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 26 August 1992). However, it is also relevant here that an individual can report being "very proud", a statement that says something personal and genuine, without necessarily "feeling proud" (i.e., an individual could be disappointed but nevertheless express pride in another individual; see section 7.4).
... the identification of internal experiences may be made by matching them to certain emotional scenarios or paradigms that are learned in the society. (p. 7)

Given many of the culture and institution specific instances of pride assembled in previous chapters, it is possible that people's reports of pride "may be based not so much on their actual feelings as on matching their thoughts, feelings, and behaviour with the emotional template provided by society" (p. 7). And we should also not ignore the extent to which cultural scenarios represented in stories, films and novels may inform and influence the emotions we identify (i.e., for ourselves or others).

But it is not necessarily the case that it is always "difficult to know whether one's internal experience corresponds to some objective, abstract definition of an emotion" (p. 5). Indeed, the distinction between pride and other positive emotions will seem to be an abstract task only when we attempt to produce a precise definition which will somehow cover innumerable instances of the emotion. Interestingly, Wittgenstein argues that debates about definition provide a distraction from a more important focus:

The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody knows whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible—though unverifiable—that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another. (PI, §272)

An attempt has been made to resist both temptations by using cases of intense pride without, it should be noted, accepting Rosenberg's further claim that problems do not arise with emotional identification when "the internal state is clear and unambiguous" (p. 5). For in such cases in which it
seems that "the physiological experience will play a more prominent role in the emotional identification", Rosenberg still wants to argue: "even here reflexive elements will make a contribution" (p. 5). The point is that it is difficult to resist the idea that anything other than an intense emotion must be a private experience (and even then Rosenberg still wants to retain a central role for some kind of self-directed process of identification).

However, if we allow ourselves to be seduced by Rosenberg's stage-setting, it will seem appropriate to examine how we use reflexive, cognitive processes to identify our emotions: especially when we picture people's attempts to identify correctly their emotional experience in social and physical isolation (i.e., when they do not appear to be participating in social, conversational and discursive practices). We should not object, for example, to Kafka's (1912/1961) description in *Metamorphosis* of an individual who suddenly feels "great pride" while lying alone and motionless in the dark. Moreover, it seems reasonable to think that such an individual could confidently and correctly use the word "pride" to describe his experience if, for example, another individual walked into the room and asked him "what are you thinking about?". However, Kafka's literary example might still seem to confirm the picture which informs Rosenberg's contrasting account of individuals immersed in their own private, emotional experiences:

Although people may appear to be referring to the same experiences when they use emotional terms, ultimately such internal experiences are unique and incommunicable. Just as there is no way to know whether my experience of thirst or pain or colour is the same as yours, so there is no way of knowing whether my experience of joy or loathing or interest is the same as yours. Each of us is encapsulated in his or her experiential world. (p. 5; cf. PI, §272 above)
In this manner, Rosenberg isolates the emotional experiences of individuals from the "weave of life" in which they learned the appropriate terms as well as from their own personal history (which makes it possible to talk of feeling the same or a very similar emotion)\(^7\). The result is an account of our emotion vocabulary that views it as a "language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand" (PI, §256; i.e., the position Wittgenstein engaged with and attacked in the PLA).

Wittgenstein's criticism of the view that emotion terms gain their meaning by reference to internal "objects" can be used to counter Rosenberg's theory (i.e., in accord with the position that a surview can be more important than an abstract philosophical argument or psychological theory). In the following remark it is clear that a detailed examination of the first person use of "frightened" helps to expose a philosophical prejudice:

We ask "What does "I am frightened" really mean, what am I referring to when I say it?" And of course we find no answer, or one that is inadequate. The question is: "In what sort of context does it occur?" (PI, p. 188)

Moreover, Wittgenstein remarks:

I can find no answer if I try to settle the question "What am I referring to?" "What am I thinking when I say it?" by repeating the expression of fear and at the same time attending to myself, as it were observing my soul out of the corner of my eye. In a concrete case I can indeed ask "Why did I say that,

\(^7\) In contrast, for example, another individual might have lived a life in which he or she had never been praised, learned skills for which extrinsic rewards were presented or not celebrated any significant personal achievements. In this case it might seem appropriate for that person to say "I don't know what it is like to feel pride" but this does not undermine our understanding of the criteria that might eventually allow us to say that now he or she is experiencing pride or something very similar (i.e., which may provide an opportunity for that person to learn the expression, to distinguish it from happiness and perhaps also say "Now I know I've felt the same emotion"; see chapter 8 for a treatment of relevant developmental issues).
what did I mean by it"—and I might answer the question too; but not on the ground of observing what accompanied the speaking. (Pl, lIix, p. 188; see section 7.3 for a complementary account of self-consciousness)

Therefore, instead of any self-referential process directed toward "constituent parts" (Rosenberg, 1990) of the self, Wittgenstein examines linguistic and bodily expressions of fear which an isolated individual could easily exhibit.

Although some forms of description seem to be maintained socially and thus might deteriorate through extended isolation, it is important to focus on the connection between prior "primitive" behaviour and more complicated, language-based descriptions. Wittgenstein therefore notes that although a cry "is not a description" at times it may seem to serve "as a description of the inner life" (Pl, p. 189). Despite this difference, he also suggests:

But there are transitions. And the words "I am afraid" may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed from it. (Pl, p. 189)

The combined result of these considerations is to reject a referential account of emotion as well as to challenge a related view of first person expressions of emotion such as "I am afraid". A further remark from Wittgenstein highlights the latent philosophical prejudice operating in relation to these and other cases: "why should it always be a description of a state of mind?" (Pl, lIix, p. 189).

Clearly, Wittgenstein admits the possibility of describing an experience — as well as, presumably, components or aspects of it — but adds the proviso:
Describing my state of mind (of fear, say) is something I do in a particular context. (Just as it takes a particular context to make a certain action into an experiment). (PI, p. 188)

It is worthwhile combining this potential to offer insights into a personal and private experience — to use familiar psychological expressions in different language-games and even to invent new language-games — with a surview of pride: that is, so long as the result does not support Rosenberg's view that the connection between particular emotion words and private experiences must be forged by a form of self-directed cognitive process. Explanatory recourse to such mythical processes will be critically examined in the next section.

In summary, some cases of intense pride may be private because in order to understand their personal significance, the individual concerned will need to communicate something of his unique context or personal history. It is also possible that an individual may correctly identify an emotional experience by referring to cultural scenarios and "emotion templates". Unfortunately, Rosenberg also argues "I can never know whether my experience of pride or happiness is the same as yours" presumably because every private experience is unique and not completely communicable. The Wittgensteinian reply is to question whether the detail of emotion word use in particular contexts has been misrepresented (e.g., we can examine how individuals normally talk of "my experience of the same feeling"). Wittgenstein also denies that every first person expression of emotion is a description of a state of mind, but still allows that we can provide more detail about our experiences.
The identification and expression of emotion

The previous section demonstrated the stage-setting required by Rosenberg to make reflexive processes seem important to many complicated, language related emotions. The picture of emotions as private and incommunicable states paints us into a conceptual corner in which pre-existing experiences need to be connected with the appropriate emotion terms. On Rosenberg's view, reflexive processes are cognitive and they create specific emotions when individuals correctly respond to the identificatory demands of society (see section 7.2 for a further account of the "cognitive" and "thoughtful" aspects of pride). Rosenberg therefore concludes:

... people not only experience internal states of perturbation but also take these internal states reflexively as objects of their own cognitions. The active interpretive process that is an outgrowth of human reflexivity is as important as the internal state of perturbation itself in the identification of the emotion. (p. 7)

Interestingly, Wittgensteinian alternatives may be equally unpalatable because emotions such as pride seem to be regarded as inseparable from a community's linguistic practices. As the burden is placed on psychologists inspired by Wittgenstein and others interested in discourse to account for individual variations in our abilities to reflect on and to explore these "internal objects", the detail of pride will be used to address these issues.

Although the view that the words in our emotion vocabularies function as labels for internal experiences has been rejected, it is important to provide an account of how it is possible for individuals to identify, to describe and to explore their emotions. For example, Rosenberg suggests that one possible reason "why it may be difficult to label an emotion
accurately is that the language may not provide an appropriate term for it" (p. 5). Fortunately Wittgenstein considers this issue in a manner relevant to pride and the way in which we might struggle to apply these words to ourselves:

Suppose I were choosing between the words "imposing", "dignified", "proud", "venerable"; isn't it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio? (PI, p. 139)

Wittgenstein's response is:

No: the fact that one speaks of the appropriate word does not show the existence of a something that etc. One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like something just because one can find a word appropriate; because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on. (PI, p. 139)

When these terms are used in the first person, it is important to note that they will have an appropriate context and, moreover, that their use may serve many functions in relation to other people. For example, a legitimate expression of pride by an individual may inadvertently be seen as a put down by another person and so on. Thus we need not regard the use of emotion and related words as choosing between more or less appropriate pictures of an internal experience since some prior history of self-positioning is usually involved.

However, it should be noted that the choice of particular expressions may have a particularly complex "feel" as well as specific personal and practical consequences. For example, our motives, judgements, character or morals might be misunderstood in some cases while in others, we might simply feel irritation when another person uses an emotion word in an odd
or unconventional way. An indication of the power of words to express and shape an experience rather than merely to identify and to describe "states" is indicated by a further Wittgensteinian remark:

The familiar physiognomy of a word, the feeling that it has taken up its meaning into itself, that it is an actual likeness of its meaning—there could be human beings to whom all this was alien. (They would not have an attachment to their words.)—And how are these feelings manifested among us?—By the way we choose and value words. (PI, p. 218).

So the problem is not necessarily the uncertainty of knowing "whether one's internal experience corresponds to some objective, abstract definition of an emotion" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 5). For it is clear that many activities and outcomes are achieved by using particular emotion and emotion-related words in the first person: hence, the importance of language in this account in contrast to Rosenberg's fixed focus on emotional display. Recognition of these acts of linguistic positioning is also a possible reason why Wittgenstein mentions at the start of the PLA that "if language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgements" (PI, §242; see section 7.4)).

However, psychologists mostly examine the way in which individuals express their emotions and identify them to others in order to determine the nature of the abilities used in the language-game of describing personal feelings (e.g., such as those experiences that have either just happened or occurred recently). But is it possible to give a positive Wittgensteinian account of the individual differences that people undoubtedly exhibit in the identification and expression of emotion? One possibility is to imagine that the following remark is about an individual who wants to tell another person
about wishes and intentions that make an earlier emotional reaction intelligible:

Why did I want to tell him about an intention too, as well telling him what I did?—Not because the intention was also something which was going on at that time. But because I want to tell him something about myself, which goes beyond what happened at that time. (PI, §659)

If we accept this possible extension of Wittgenstein’s remark, the important point is then:

I reveal to him something of myself when I tell him what I was going to do.—Not, however, on grounds of self-observation, but by way of a response (it might also be called an intuition). (PI, §659)

This is an indicative account of the type of revealing language-based skills which are exemplified by the plausible use of expressions such as “I really felt like saying . . .”, “I could have then gone on to. . .”, and “at the time it struck me that . . .”.

However, while Rosenberg wants to emphasize the cognitive nature of the reflexive processes involved, an alternative is to stress the language-based skill of autobiographical redescription. An example of the linguistically skilled potential to clarify the personal significance of an emotional reaction and its context is evident from the following interview excerpt:

People say “Born on the Fourth of July” couldn’t have been a hit without you. Do you agree?

I think what they mean is that it was pretty grim material. So it needed the extra leverage of a name star in the title role. Still, I’m very proud of it. It’s the furthest I’ve gone out on a limb so far. But that’s past history, and I don’t want to dwell on it.
It's a happy memory now. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 19 December 1990b)

This example is interesting because it suggests that exact replies to questions in spontaneous conversation need not have been practised (i.e., the specific words or phrases, for example, in a prior monologue). Also the individual's first person expression of pride, present positive tone of voice and other features of his behaviour are explained by the fact that it is a "happy memory" (although the issue of the extent to which this pride is caused by a prior experience or is being reconstructed is difficult to answer). Moreover, while there is some indication of the possibility that "motivational factors may affect emotional labeling" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 5), the individual's presumed determination not to be preoccupied by a pleasant memory also indicates that context and conversation based forms of re-evaluation and self-presentation are always present.

The main issue is that talk of autobiographical memories presumably "laid down" by experience and open to re-evaluation seems to undermine a focus solely on linguistic skills and language-games of exploring and improving the identification of particular emotions (i.e., the fact that once individuals have mastered the use of particular words to express their recent and past experiences this may shape what they subsequently remember). In addition, recognition of this point seems to invite a connection with such specific forms of cognition as intention, inference, memory, attention, perception and evaluation when they are "brought to bear upon the self as an object" (p. 3). It would not be convincing in many cases if, for example, an individual said "I have forgotten whether I felt proud or not" in response to
a specific question. Wittgenstein similarly explores the general view that a connection can be made between emotion words and an experience "precisely by the concentration of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion between the sign and the sensation" (PI, §258). And again Wittgenstein's clarification is insightful:

But "I impress it on myself" can only mean: this process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. (PI, 258)

In the absence of surrounding practice, context and conventions "whatever is going to seem right to me is right" which "only means that here we can't talk about 'right'" (PI, §258). Thus it is important not to focus solely on self-directed forms of cognition to understand how the identification and expression of emotional experiences can be refined and then persist in a dispositional sense.

The importance of according with convention does not stop individuals such as Rosenberg from arguing that there is a crucial cognitive process that connects emotional expression and identification. As already noted, Rosenberg presents this view because he believes that emotions would otherwise be regarded as directly experienced, undifferentiated patterns of physiological arousal. Although we have been talking about language-games and the potential to provide revealing detail to a description of a recent or past experience, psychologists do not merely want

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75 It is also worth noting the following remark:

"Imagine a person whose memory could not retain what the word 'pain' meant—so that he constantly called different things by that name—but nevertheless used the word in a way fitting in with the usual symptoms and presuppositions of pain"—in short he uses it as we all do. Here I should like to say: a wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism. (PI, §271)
to describe a language-game: they want to say something more specific about the ability that supposedly allows us to make the transition from private feelings (or accompaniments) to public language. Rosenberg argues that reflexive processes play a role in supposedly immediate, non-thoughtful reactions because "an emotion represents the application of the individual's cognitive processes to his or her internal states of arousal" (p. 4; i.e., a restatement of Schachter and Singer's (1962) view of emotion in terms of reflexive processes).

However, a study by Stepper and Strack (1993) lends support to the idea that the expression and identification of pride is not always cognitively mediated (i.e., based on a kind of reflective judgement, self-directed attention or inference from my behaviour in relation to a undifferentiated state of physiological arousal). Stepper and Strack's experiment unobtrusively manipulated the posture of individuals as they carried out tasks, received feedback and subsequently reported their levels of pride. Experimental subjects were asked to identify the level of pride that they felt on a scale of 1 (not at all proud) to 9 (very proud) when they received feedback that their results on a task were above average. Unfortunately, the study did not ask individuals to describe features of their experience of pride and did not examine whether the experimental requirement to identify a level of pride provided a further opportunity to express and experience pride (thus demonstrating that expressions of pride are not always occasions of identifying an emotion for oneself or others). Nevertheless, the crude numerical measure of pride indicates that:

... people feel prouder if they assume an upright posture as compared with a body position in which the upper part of the body is bent over, regardless of their assumed posture at the
time they completed the task for which they received favorable feedback. (p. 215)

The relation between the postural expression of pride and the intensity of emotion people identify in such experimental situations therefore seems to provide an example where:

\[
\ldots \text{feelings can be influenced by sensory input without cognitive interpretation. This suggests that a person does not need to know the meaning of a bodily reaction to have a feeling. (p. 218)}
\]

\textit{Pace Rosenberg and consistent with the Wittgensteinian emphasis on the immediate "expressive feel" of particular gestures and words, it is reasonable to argue in this case that the feelings of pride "are 'immediately given' to the individual and have a distinct phenomenal quality" (p. 218). Thus it is not necessarily the case that cognitive mediation between a diffuse physiological feeling and information from the social context is needed in order to "create" the specific emotion that we correctly identify for others (and ourselves). An indication has instead been provided of an alternative responsive-relational account which does not need to "explain" how we "know" that this meaningful "private feeling" is to be distinguished from other emotions.}

\textit{In summary, the possibility that it is difficult to identify emotions because, in some cases, appropriate words are lacking was examined through Wittgenstein's remarks about pride and related types of identification. Although it may be tempting to regard emotion words that we may have difficulty using appropriately in our own case as pictures, it was suggested that it is better to view them as culturally provided tools. It is also possible to reveal related intentions, wishes and thoughts to make a}
particular emotional reaction more understandable by way of a particular type of linguistic response. Even if we only examine simple examples of individuals identifying and expressing their emotions, it is not always necessary to say that self-directed cognitive processes must be involved (i.e., although focusing only on discourse or speech-acts also seems to miss something important about the emotions). Stepper and Strack's (1993) admittedly simplistic empirical work indicates how a Wittgenstein-inspired alternative study of pride might be conducted (i.e., by challenging the need to offer an explanation of how "we know what we feel"). Thus an experience of the distinct phenomenal feel of pride — the physiognomy related to word choice, expressions, gestures and posture — can occur without the mediating processes of cognitive interpretation that Rosenberg argues are necessary to the correct identification of all emotions.

The duration of pride and some remarks on experiencing its "components"

The interest in exploring individuals' capacities to identify and express particular emotions as well as to reveal related thoughts, judgements and intentions naturally leads to further questions. In particular, it is interesting to focus on more detailed descriptions of the features of the experience of emotion itself. Obviously, the conversational nature of many of these activities may seem to undermine the focus on what is occurring within the individual (i.e., the cognitive processes that make it possible for us to express and identify particular emotions). But it is an oversight for any perspective not to examine the possibility of further language-games driven by the sort of questions that psychologists ask about the duration of
emotions, experiences of particular "components" and the use of information about physiological correlates.

Although a vocabulary exists to report the intensity of pride and, in some cases, to describe aspects of the emotion that imply access to a realm of privileged knowledge, other investigable aspects of pride seem to be less commonplace. For example, although some people are better than others at articulating their emotions as well as related thoughts, memories and intentions, precise reports about the duration of emotion do not form a natural part of many conversations. Faced with the possibility of this slightly odd way of describing emotions which can be contrasted with characteristic expressions of emotion, it is possible to conduct a grammatical investigation (i.e., rather than imagining what it is that we do in such situations). For example, we can examine the relevance of expressions like "he was depressed the whole day", "he was in great excitement the whole day" and "he has been in continuous pain since yesterday" (PI, p. 59) by substituting the word "pride" for the "mental states" involved and also putting these expressions in the first person (i.e., to see what sounds odd in comparison to surveyed examples from our existing language-games).

The following case suggests one sense of the duration of pride that might provide the basis for a more specific study. In Kundera's (1992) novel *Immortality*, an individual's pride in being part of a widely advertised news team suggests an experience of pride that lasts more than a day:

At about the same time, the imagologues were launching a campaign on behalf of his radio station and huge posters of the editorial team were appearing all over France: they were pictured in white shirts with rolled-up sleeves, standing against a sky-blue background, and their mouths were open: they were laughing. At first, he walked the streets of Paris filled with pride. (p. 160)
In the example, the individual is described as experiencing "a week or two of immaculate fame" before another individual undermines it. What is interesting is that the example indicates an upper limit for the duration of a distinct positive emotion. However, several questions remain unanswered such as whether the normal time-course of pride one or two weeks before a form of "habituation" (Stepper & Strack, 1993) occurs; does the expression of pride become dispositional and postural as in arrogant pride (see section 6.1); or are feelings of pride eventually undermined by other negative events (as occurs in the cited example)? It is possible that the feeling is thought to persist because of a constant anticipation of favourable recognition or, perhaps, the opportunity to tell another person why he looks so happy. Further investigation would be useful to establish a maximum duration of pride and whether, for example, it is closely related to feelings of high confidence, optimism and increased self-esteem.

However, one difficulty with examples such as "for weeks I walked the streets with pride" is that asking about the duration of the emotion seems to request a report on a private accompaniment of relevant actions and gestures (or invite a study of relevant correlates). In this sense, it is like referring to a beetle in a box that no one else can see (cf. PI, §293) and which will also exist for only a certain amount of time (although our estimates of its existence may improve with experience). Therefore, in the following cases of pride we might expect that the individuals concerned could identify their emotion as pride and comment upon its intensity.

The Brian McCaffreys returning from a shopping expedition (it was Saturday) had met Father Bernard who had proudly announced his destination. Gabriel was at once anxious, with this excuse, to 'drop in' and catch an glimpse of the famous girl. The news that John Robert Rozanov's grand-daughter
was installed at the Slipper House was the talk of the Institute. (Murdoch, 1983, p. 250)

and:

A distinguished Indian composer, Ananda Shankar, is touring New Zealand with his 22-member troupe performing Indian dance in a modern form. During an interview with a colleague he proudly produced a photograph of his wife, Tansuree, the troupe's choreographer. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 23 September 1992)

But we would probably not expect an accurate account of the duration of the feelings that accompany the large variety of actions that can be performed "with pride". It would clearly be useful to have more examples of the usual time-course of pride in order to examine how opportunities to express pride relate to the intensity and duration of the experience. It is also possible that a diary based study, for example could provide this information although it is possible that cultivating an awareness of the duration of proud feelings might undermine the spontaneity of the emotion (see section 7.3). For example, if we asked individuals in the cases above at various intervals after their experience "do you still have a feeling of pride now?", it would probably interrupt the normal flow of conversation.

Another approach might be to examine the relation between the feeling and its expression because the possibility of control allows for a partial discrepancy between feeling and expressive actions. For example, it is interesting to speculate as to whether the feeling of pride might not last as long and have the same personal consequences if it is not expressed. Is there any support for the notion that the duration of pride may be cut short by the inability to express spontaneously in words, gestures or actions the initial feeling? Stepper and Strack's (1993) limited experimental
investigation of this issue suggests that people who do not adopt an upright posture — through an unobtrusive manipulation — as they receive positive feedback about a better than average performance will not “feel prouder”. Indeed, their study seems to indicate that “inhibition of the appropriate bodily expression [of pride] had a stronger effect than its facilitation” (p. 216, brackets added). It is possible that a future study could examine the duration of pride depending on whether it is expressed, shared or displayed (e.g., with or to another person) as well as those occasions when there is no one else to celebrate with.

There is also the possible investigation of the time-course of pride: a phrase which suggests the onset and phenomenal quality of particular emotion components. In contrast, Harré (1986) argues with respect to pride: “there does not seem to be a distinctive bodily feeling” since “the somatic component seems to be derived from culturally idiosyncratic displays of this emotion” (p. 9). But the following example of the onset of pride indicates a feeling that infuses the whole body (i.e., rather than what is apparently only on the “surface”) and is distinct from happiness:

I asked for another day, searched my card files, and came back to the office glowing with pride. I had found a clue, an almost invisible clue, but that's how Sam Spade works. Nothing is trivial or insignificant to this eagle. (Eco, 1989, p. 399)

As with other expressions such as “swollen”, “puffed up” or experiencing “a burst” of emotion used when describing pride, it is important not to regard the pictures that they conjure in quasi-factual terms. However, while the terms are not necessarily about physiological and sensation components, some grammatical insights are available. For example, a feature that distinguishes the emotions from bodily sensations is that most are neither
localized nor diffuse. So to alter a remark from Wittgenstein, no one reports feeling pride "even in their fingertips" (cf. RPP I, §836; RPP II, §148)). Thus it is not difficult to see why we could not expect a localized or physiologically accurate answer to such questions "where is the glow?" and "what are its components?" (see section 7.3 for the sense of a related, biological substratum).

However, there seems to be considerable variation in the abilities of individuals to provide a description of the experience of pride that goes beyond the accompanying symptoms (e.g., smiling, erect posture, exaggerated movements, increased heart rate, etc.). In this sense, physiological correlates and pictures of the bodily processes that underlie the feeling of pride are less important than an investigation of expressions such as "I remember the occasion with a tinge of pride" (i.e., along with the creative use of other concepts such as tone and colouring from other language-games). Moreover, while there are physiological, time-course aspects to many emotion syndromes that can be empirically examined, we are not asking for a report of the type that may be made more accurate by focussing on a particular correlate (e.g., increased heart rate). For in the case of pride, the way in which the experience persists cannot be defined solely by reference to a physiological symptom or criterion. To offer one example, the statement, "I'm still proud of my achievement" does not mean that the feeling has persisted for three years: it simply shows that this feeling of pride has become part of an broader autobiographical narrative76. It may be more useful, therefore, to examine the time-course of emotion from its initial occurrence as a "glow" through occasional "bursts" upon

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76 Such a remark also indicates that the values of the individual concerned have not changed in relation to a previous activity or achievement (see section 7.2 for the relevance of this remark).
reminiscing to the "proud smile" when asked by others about a personal achievement years later.

To summarize, the lack of obvious vocabulary for describing the duration of emotions such as pride may be alleviated by a grammatical investigation of relevant examples. Pride may, in some cases, be described as persisting for weeks and seem to accompany a large variety of actions and reactions. It was also noted that an experience of pride may be truncated and less intense when an individual is unable to engage in normal expressive statements, actions and displays. Apart from this aspect of pride, it still seems easier for individuals to state what emotion they feel than to provide an accurate description of how long the feeling component lasts. But an account of the duration of pride could also include an analysis of such phrases as "glowing with pride" and the way in which they contrast with sensation descriptions. Although an exploration of the physiological accompaniments of pride seems to be a useful direction for future research, improving the accuracy of our descriptions of pride's time-course and localizing its components screens more fundamental conceptual problems from view without solving them.

7.2 The "thoughtful" nature of pride and its cognitive aspects

One of the more complicated problems when dealing with pride and its embodied features is the nature of ostensibly related cognitive processes77.

77 An important general point about cognition made by Harre and Gillett (1994) is worth repeating before beginning the more specific project of examining "thoughtful" and "immediate" aspects of pride:
In particular, a rejection of Rosenberg’s account of reflexive processes seems to rule out an explanatory focus on cognitive components in every case (cf. more complicated accounts by Ellsworth (1991), Kaplan (1986), Lewis (1993), Weiner (1986)). Moreover, pride is an emotion which challenges Rosenberg’s strict distinction between emotions based on reflexive processes or nonreflexive processes. However, while emotions like pride can be experienced, expressed and “known” immediately without mediating cognitive processes, it would clearly be nonsensical to deny that it is a “thoughtful” or “reflective” emotion (i.e., apart from the sense in which arrogant displays show a thoughtless lack of concern for other people). Accordingly, further first person examples of pride are assembled in this section along with relevant Wittgensteinian and social constructionist remarks in order to investigate how pride is “thought” and “felt”.

The cognitive nature of pride: conversational stance or self-evaluation?

A variety of pictures of pride’s nature can be found in the discourse of Western culture. Payne (1960) describes pride as “the soul confronting itself in a mirror, overjoyed at the recognition” (p. 1). Philosophers similarly emphasize a kind of personal reflection except they usually avoid any mirror metaphor and its suggestion of an internal Cartesian Theatre. For example, Isenberg (1980) prefers to discuss pride in the following way: “to pride yourself on a quality means something more than just to have that quality: it implies at least a reflection upon it” (p. 355). There is also another potential

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The word cognition has come to be the generic term for all kinds of higher level activities, many of which could not reasonably be identified as “thought.” (p. 81)
confusion that emerges from the notion of reflection and the unique grammatical status of "to pride oneself" — in the ordinary rather than Wittgensteinian sense of grammar — as a reflexive verb. The result of the potentially misleading "surface grammar" (PI, §664) of both expressions is that pride may seem to be a mysteriously self-directed, self-evaluative emotion: pride somehow points back towards the person experiencing it in a way that strangely mimics the way in which other emotions are directed at other people, objects, or events.

Given the critical treatment of the realist-cognitive ontology in chapter 2 and Wittgensteinian criticisms of reflexive processes in the previous section, a social constructionist, discursive account seems appropriate. However, emphasizing the public and linguistic nature of an individual's emotions seems to create a problem when accounting for similar reactions in social isolation. For example, in a position that is arguably close to social constructionism, Chakrabarti (1992) notes that pride "is impossible for a solitary individual" (p. 37). Chakrabarti's reason for making this claim is not to argue that pride cannot occur in social isolation, but rather that the possibility of the "self-ascription" of pride is dependent on a linguistic community. In this respect, Chakrabarti's position seems to accord with Rosenberg's broader focus on reflexive processes "stemming from social interactional experiences" (p. 4). But in contrast to the creative role for cognitive processes in acts of emotional identification, social constructionists argue that "subjective cognitive behaviour is and could be nothing but a privatized variant of public speech behaviour" (Harré, 1989, p. 167).

However, the problem remains as to how the cognitive detail of the pride is to be explained by focusing on social and public discourse. An
indication of the social constructionist perspective on emotions such as pride is provided by Harré’s (1989) emphasis on:

... the social uses of language and their privatized derivatives that we call ‘thought’ and ‘emotion’. (p. 167)

Harré and Gillett (1994) also suggest that people anticipate:

... specific normative judgements about their behaviour and character. This aspect of subjectivity introduces a special set of considerations into the kinds of thought and awareness that can inform a person and their experience. The normative framework builds implicit habits of reflection on the significations one uses in certain contexts but also encourages the self-reflexive adoption of the subjectivity of the other in one’s framing of one’s thoughts. (p. 177)

However, apart from these general remarks about “implicit habits of reflections on the significations on uses in certain comments” and also that “emotional feelings ... are to be treated as private or sotto voce judgements” (p. 147), the only account to provide any detail on behalf of the privatization view of pride is offered by Mead (1934).

In particular, Mead describes a case in which an individual is called upon to throw a ball so that when “he fulfils his duty and he may look with pride at the throw he made” (p. 175). The point is that the “I” is somehow aware of and feels the pride of a successful throw only after the “me” has done it. It is important to note that these are conversational stances which, as individuals, we adopt in a manner that can subsequently shape, change and solidify both the expressive form and time-course of particular emotions. Moreover, the notion of shifting between “I” and “me” conversational stances over time is preferable to a picture of self-evaluation which, at its most extreme, suggests that one localized area of the brain seems to be
"evaluating" the actions of a person as represented in another neural location. Although an updated version of Mead’s account will not be developed here, pride seems to occur by a retrospective rather than simultaneous form of evaluation (i.e., in which "I" complete an individual or social activity directed towards or carried out by "me").

In the absence of a rigorous exposition of Mead’s perspective, an account based on surveyed examples of pride and Wittgensteinian remarks will be preferred. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, a critique of the social constructionist emphasis on thought and emotion as privatized conversation should help to produce more refined non-cognitivist accounts of pride.

Criticism is based, in particular, on Wittgenstein’s recognition that:

‘Talking’ (whether out loud or silently) and ‘thinking’ are not concepts of the same kind; even though they are in closest connexion. (PI, p. 217)

Perhaps many social constructionists would agree that pride is not a private saying of “I did well”, a kind of privatized and linguistic “patting oneself on the back” or an unspoken monological accompaniment to many activities. Similarly, discursive psychologists would probably not think that all of “thoughtful” aspects of pride could be accounted for in terms of public or private “reflexive speech-acts”78. However, the “self-evaluation” and “self-praise” of pride may seem to differ from other forms of reflexive and linguistic activity because it is internal, more immediate and “automatized”. In other words, the self-referential activity in the case of pride is more immediate,

78 For example, those “reflexive speech-acts” (Hacker, 1990) introduced in chapter 2, section 2.2 and described by Wittgenstein as the fact that:

A human being can encourage himself, give himself orders, obey, blame and punish himself; he can ask himself a question and answer it. We could even
internal and hidden than such ostensibly comparable reflexive speech acts as being angry with oneself. Thus it may appear to both cognitive and social constructionist psychologists that pride is not a linguistic or physical form of self-reference — as when an individual hits him or herself as a form of self-punishment — but what might be called a form of mental self-reference: an evaluation of oneself that generates subsequent feelings.

However, while it may be tempting to picture pride as the product of a self-evaluative mental or cognitive process, we can challenge the cognitivist emphasis on mediating reflexive processes and the argument that pride is "the direct result of a self-ascription for success" (Weiner, 1986, pp. 249-50; i.e., the view that there is a feeling that would not become pride without a form of automatized, self-ascription). Interestingly, social constructionists would probably reinterpret Weiner's "self-ascription" component of attribution theory as private versions of formerly public and conversation-based claims about responsibility, effort, ability or an individual's involvement with other people. Minus the confusing pictures of mental processes evoked in cognitive accounts, the social constructionist perspective may not be diametrically opposed to some aspects of attribution theory. For example, Weiner himself notes that attributing success to a personal effort or ability will only "augment" and "influence" self-esteem (i.e., rather than that "self-ascription" for success causes pride).

Moreover, discursive psychology will also need to provide some account of how an immediate and apparently automatic reaction of pride (e.g., to a compliment or completion of a task) can embody prior judgements and experience (in order to avoid repeating Rosenberg's distinction

Imagine human beings who spoke only in monologue; who accompanied their activities by talking to themselves. (PI, §243)
between reflexive and non-reflexive processes). Many of Wittgenstein's remarks about such cognitive phenomena as "grasping-in-a-flash" and "seeing as" could therefore be extended to provide a positive, alternative account of pride (i.e., to provide an account of the embodiment of these abilities and reactions without taking the further step of making them dependent on inner processes and complicated physiological accompaniments). Following sections will therefore attempt to build on Wittgenstein's remarks in a manner that may yet prove consistent with the discursive turn of the "second cognitive revolution" (Harré & Gillett, 1994).

To summarize, the view that pride is a "privatized derivative" of social and conversational practices was examined. It was noted that pride is not simply a self-directed public behaviour or privatized social conversation (e.g., the reflexive speech-act of self-praise or a kind of "self-ascription"). Moreover, since Wittgenstein notes that "talking" (whether silently or out loud) and "thinking" should not be conflated, there seems to be some room to argue that pride is an "automatized" and "truncated" expressive form of conversation-derived, retrospective emotional reaction. When misleading pictures of "mental processes" are also rejected, supposedly competing cognitive and social constructionist accounts may be combined in a position which regards pride as a positive and specific expression of responsibility, effort and ability claims. It is also important to provide an alternative account of cognitive self-evaluation that allows for the fact that evaluations and judgements can become "embodied". A position that regards pride's cognitive aspects in terms of a conversational stance might build on Wittgenstein's approach to similar "cognitive abilities" of "seeing as" and "grasping-in-a-flash".
Some clarification on the issues of thoughts causing and "colouring" particular emotions

One of the problems demonstrated by Weiner (1986) and other cognitive psychologists is a willingness to confuse the logical necessity of internal, conceptual relations with the discourse of causal determination between objects. More specifically, an ongoing problem in emotion research has been the temptation to see the internal relations between cognition and emotion as suggesting a potential investigation of the causal relations between levels of neurophysiological objects or processes (see chapter 2, section 2.3). Remarks such as the following may be another of showing that many psychologists already engage in conceptual-discursive investigations in order to prevent confusion in psychology:

... it may be more appropriate to see emotion and cognition as intimately related and perhaps separate aspects of the same phenomenon. (Strongman, 1993, p. 144)

It is clear from the previous section that misleading pictures of the role of particular "mental processes" can very easily appear in summaries of empirical work on emotion. It is therefore worthwhile exploring the conceptual-discursive detail of pride: especially where a survey achieves a survey of the relations between cognition and emotion.

Given the potential for logical and causal determination to be confused, it is not surprising that some theorists seem to have empirically discovered what Wittgenstein describes. For example, although Ellsworth's (1991) cognitive appraisal theory is an improvement on Weiner's claims about attributions augmenting and influencing emotions, it is unclear whether the more refined analysis has empirical support (i.e., about the
mechanisms that underlie and produce particular emotions and which allow some emotions to change more quickly to others). If we examine the problem in conceptual terms, it is possible that Ellsworth has made the mistake of thinking that the notion of a thought (or type of cognition) being coloured by an emotion is the same as the concept of the same thought causing an emotion. In contrast, Wittgenstein suggests that a regretful, sad or angry thought is not simply one that causes me to experience regret, sadness or anger, but one I think \textit{with} that emotion (RPP II, §§160, 161; although a feeling of pride might be the general outcome of a host of more specific thoughts). However, while Wittgenstein’s remarks seem to support Rosenberg’s view that “we do not simply ‘feel’ an emotion; we also ‘think’ an emotion” (p. 5), nevertheless it is still the case that the relevant cognitive aspects of pride are not separable from the emotion in any clear sense.

Appraisal theory may be, to paraphrase a relevant Wittgensteinian criticism, a misguided attempt to determine and perhaps separate “what does the accompanying from what is accompanied” (RPP II, §161). Without recourse, for the moment, to other relevant underlying somatic aspects of emotion (see below and section 7.3), it does seem difficult to argue that cognitive appraisals or some similar type of thought is not involved in the production of an emotion. Perhaps in this respect Cooley (1902/1956) was partially correct when he argued “the thing that moves to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves”: although it is not necessarily the case that pride is caused by “the imagined effect of this reflection upon another’s mind” (p. 184). Emotions such as pride therefore seem to become problematic because of the combined logical pull of two points: first, that the cause of pride must reside in an individual because pride can occur when “no one else is looking” (Shott, 1979)) and, secondly,
that pride cannot be a "thoughtless" reaction. The result seems to lead to the conclusion that particular thoughts or cognitions must causally determine pride.

However, one way out of this conceptual corner is to examine the possibility of acting otherwise. As Kemper (1993) notes, it is also possible to attempt to change (or encourage) emotions such as pride and their related feelings:

... by changing the determinants of the feeling—mainly the mental construction or appraisal that gave rise to the feeling, but also including such underlying somatic elements as muscle tone and heart rate. (p. 48)

Rosenberg (1990) similarly notes that one of the reflexive strategies by which one can "arouse the desired emotion-evoking cognitions" — apart from attempting to "control the stimulus events that are responsible for the emotional experiences" — is "to produce effects on one's thoughts directly" (p. 11). But it is likely that we would confront limits that seem to be causal in this task and also, that empirical evidence will be required to supplement our intuitions. For example, Rosenberg (1990) argues that disappointment about a personal failure might be changed by displacing the "thoughts that are responsible for it with pleasant thoughts that generate a preferable emotion" (p. 11). But even if there were no negative emotion to get in the way of an attempt to produce a positive emotion, it is far from clear how thinking the "pleasant thoughts" of pride would generate a genuine feeling of self-satisfaction, especially in the absence of a personal achievement. If "I intend to feel pride" were a meaningful phrase in our emotion vocabulary, an appropriate technique would seem to be required in order to manifest the emotion. Such a technique might be setting a modest goal, fulfilling the
criteria for its achievement in action and then celebrating or accepting praise from others. The result may not help psychologists to provide a causal explanation of pride but may nevertheless provide techniques to encourage the sort of thoughts and actions that could still be described as likely to produce a spontaneous experience of pride (cf. Greenwood (1991) in section 3.2).

To reiterate, while conceptual-discursive accounts suggest that thoughts or cognitive processes are a logical determinant of emotions such as pride, it is far from clear whether cognitions can be regarded as the causes of emotion. Rather than self-evaluative cognitions or thoughts causing emotions it was suggested that cognition is an inseparable aspect of emotion (i.e., as indicated by Wittgenstein's remark that we often think particular thoughts with an emotion). Moreover, the "cognitive aspect" account is supported by Wittgenstein's general view that it is unhelpful to try to separate an emotional action or reaction from its inner "mental accompaniments". Moreover, without its emotional aspects pride would only seem to be judgement or "mechanical reflection of ourselves". A more useful approach to emotion and its "cause" or "causes" may therefore be the difficulty of attempting to produce pride by thinking positive or proud thoughts. Although such an approach would probably contribute little to the type of causal explanation of emotion that psychologists seek, it would improve our understanding of the practical means by which a spontaneous occurrence of pride might be encouraged and eventually produced.
An account of the “thoughtful immediacy” of pride

Although conversational and cognitive aspects of pride have been examined, some further remarks about the occurrence of pride are warranted. For it remains to show how pride is often an immediate emotional reaction without implying that this immediacy is the result of a nonreflexive and “thoughtless” process. As the following section will show, appraisal theorists emphasize the complexity of emotions such as pride and attempt to summarize the details of empirical investigations (i.e., the sequence by which embodied appraisals produce emotions). In this section, an alternative account of the “thoughtful immediacy” of pride will be presented in accordance with relevant Wittgensteinian remarks and details already accumulated about pride (i.e., considerations of previous skills, situations and experiences as well as the way in which the emotional reaction itself may stimulate further thoughts, expressions and actions).

An ideal example of pride for an individualized, cognitive account will, despite its social and cultural surroundings, present us with an immediate and even surprising “instinctive reaction”. The following, already mentioned newspaper report of the visit by a New Zealand Prime Minister to an Expo pavilion in Spain indicates how spontaneous emotional reaction can be evoked:

Jim Bolger will hear the New Zealand pavillion before he sees it. The floating cry of a gannet wafts across the dry Seville air. Then his eyes will focus on the rockface. It is strewn with fake guano from the mechanical gannets and surrounded by a rockpool. A burst of pride will stir in the Prime Ministerial breast, as it does in any New Zealander lucky enough to travel to what is exactly the opposite side of the world. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 25 June 1992)
And the basis of this description in the reporter's own experience is suggested in further remarks:

Among the Spaniards, word is filtering out that this little country, Nueva Zelanda, is rather special. They have a word for it: *duende* — something which is vivid yet dark, and has soul and depth. It is something captured in a gull's cry and a replica cliff-face which New Zealanders have every reason to be proud of. (*loc. cit.; cf. section 5.1*)

In contrast to other examples of pride, expectations based on widely shared cultural scenarios do not seem to prefigure the emotional experience in cases like this. Rather, the pride and excitement involved seem to be produced by recognition of something personally familiar receiving positive attention in a foreign setting. In this regard, the example accords with Cooley's (1902/1956) account of three elements involved in the occurrence of pride:

... the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride. (p. 184)

Scheff's (1990) updated account of pride similarly implies that the emotion is caused by the perception of positive evaluations of the self. Thus it could be said that this example of pride involves an immediate judgement that other people are positively regarding something with which a particular group of people could claim a personal connection (although it is important to note that imagination involving potential situations or conversations may also be relevant cognitive activities).

It should be clear that a great deal of stage-setting is required for such a spontaneous emotion. But despite the obvious importance of
cultural "training" and personal experience, few convincing accounts have been offered of the way in which previous judgements, evaluations and values contribute towards the potential occurrence of particular forms of pride. In the example offered above there are clearly environmental cues which indicate the importance of other people and familiar settings. Nevertheless, cognitivists are likely to argue that without the mediation of particular cognitive mechanisms the occurrence of a "burst of pride" will not occur. This approach has led to a focus on gathering detail about the sequence in which an emotion is produced (e.g., after perceiving the familiar cry of a gannet in a foreign setting and interpreting what it represents). Cognitive psychologists argue that thoughts, thought patterns, appraisals, images and imagined conversations are sometimes sufficient to start the process by which a full manifestation of the syndrome of pride may eventuate.  

Examining the reaction in greater detail seems to create gaps in our knowledge so that further stages in the sequence of an emotion syndrome are required. Kaplan (1986), for example, attempts to draw out the causal chain still further by positing a self-perception which leads to a self-conceptualization which then produces the self-feeling. An account that is more convincing in its detail is Ellsworth's (1991) appraisal theory description of the sequence from stimulus to interpretation to emotion to behaviour. Unfortunately, Ellsworth also relies on a mixed mechanistic and computational metaphor:

\[ ... \text{many emotion experiences may be immediate and complete: in appraisal terms, all the appraisals are made in an} \]

\[ 79 \text{Greenwood (1991), for example, suggests that the ideal of many contemporary cognitive scientists is the explanation of human actions in terms of psychologically internalized rules which, given appropriate environmental inputs, are sufficient to generate human actions.} \]
extremely rapid sequence and the subjective experience is much the same as we would expect if the underlying process where the firing of a complete program. (p. 155)

Thus while Ellsworth (1991) does allow that emotional experiences can follow other sequences (see section 7.4), there is still the temptation to view related "cognitive mechanisms" in mechanistic terms.

Fortunately, we need not be pushed by the momentum of our own experiences of immediate emotions towards the view that pride is the product of mechanisms analogous to a computer program (i.e., that individuals can be regarded as special kind of biological computer that is programmed by representations and traces of previous experiences). An alternative Wittgensteinian view can be offered by examining a relevant cultural example: the HAL 2000 computer in Stanley Kubrick's (1968) film 2001: a Space Odyssey. In the film, an interviewer of one of the astronauts is tempted to say that HAL the computer experiences pride:

Mr. Amer: In talking to the computer one gets the impression that he is capable of emotional responses. For example, when I asked him about his abilities I sensed a certain pride in his answer about his accuracy and perfection. Do you believe that HAL has genuine emotions?

Dr. Poole: Well he acts like he has genuine emotions. Of course he's programmed that way to make it easier for us to talk to him. But as to whether Hal has real feelings is something I don't think anyone can truthfully answer.

The serious point to emerge from what may appear to a frivolous, fictional example is a perspective that is not unlike Wittgenstein's: the fact that computers may begin to "behave" like human beings in some respects (i.e., without doing all of the usual activities we describe as acting emotionally, having private thoughts or demonstrating intentional behaviour), should not
invite the claim that many individuals occasionally act like machines (cf. PI, p. 178). In other words, the programme analogy invites us to consider a restricted view of individuals as constituted by mechanisms in order to preserve a metaphor, rather than to understand the more complex features of particular emotions. Thus if an individual's reactions resemble the running of a computer programme it does not imply that a fundamental similarity has been discovered.

Instead, the issue involved here is a more specific version of the clash between rule-following accounts and causal explanations mentioned in chapter 2, section 2.2. In particular, the problem is that once a rule is known or mastered it may be regarded as playing a causal role in relation to subsequent patterns of action, physiology and even brain function. For example, Lewis (1993) argues that pride generally requires that "the organism make a comparison or evaluate its behaviour vis-à-vis some standard, rule, or goal" (p. 88). In each case, it might be thought that the real interest is in what is happening privately and internally: that is, the way in which rules may be embodied in the frontal cortex where they exert some influence on the more basic emotion dispositions, evaluations and appraisals (e.g., in the limbic system). But the major problem is that this account makes us try to deny that a change in an internal mechanism has occurred as the result of some experience, knowledge, judgement, learning or reflection. The overall point is that a convincing account is required of the contribution of previous experiences and activities beyond, for example, the notion of emotional habituation when mastering new skills.

A contrasting positive Wittgensteinian position is needed that can pave the way for a more convincing discursive account. Such a position is suggested by Shanker's (1993) remarks about analogous cases of rule-
following and reactions that occur in the mastery of rule-governed techniques. In particular, Shanker notes that although behaviour may appear to become "automatized", this automatization still "does not entail that these actions have become involuntary" (p. 234). However, it should be noted that a position is not being developed which is capable of being incorporated, for example, within a cognitive-behavioural approach, such as Beck's (1997) in which challenging a person's self-talk is supposed to produce further changes in the way that individuals think and, eventually, react (i.e., the "schemata" and related "automatic thoughts" that need to be changed in order to control negative emotions and promote dispositional improvements). Instead, the sort of account of interest is where an individual experiences pride when they are "struck by" the praiseworthiness of an action or "see something as" special. Perhaps the closest example of relevant work from a cognitive-behavioural perspective is therapeutic approaches to encourage specific positive emotions and thus to improve self-esteem (a possible task but one that is not directly relevant to this investigation).

The important Wittgensteinian point which can be extended to the example of pride is that rather than talk of the underlying mechanisms of different forms of "seeing as", we could instead say that the "substratum of this experience is the mastery of a technique" (PI, p. 208). It is therefore not a distortion of Wittgenstein's point to apply the following specific remark to the immediate cognitive accompaniments of pride:

It is only if someone can do, has learnt, is master of, such-and-such, that it makes sense to say he has had this experience. (p. 209)
Thus although it may seem important to clarify the exact sequence by which emotions such as pride occur, it is also worthwhile examining how representing, according with and even surpassing particular rules, standards and goals can be accounted for in terms of the contribution made by prerequisite activities. Although the contribution of this mastery in practice may result in various unexpected changes in expression and reactivity, we should not feel compelled to summarize possible internal and embodied changes in terms of cognitive appraisals or mechanisms. Instead, we should examine how participation in discursive practices may result in dispositions to react in particular ways precisely because previous judgements, views and values have not changed. Thus supposedly immediate and nonreflexive processes may involve a background of thought, judgement and reflection of which we may not be aware until it is challenged by others or we re-evaluate ourselves, our past actions and achievements (see chapter 6 for examples of pride based on the recognition of personal change).

To reiterate, a central problem with pride is that it is often occurs in an immediate and spontaneous manner but cannot be described as "thoughtless". In some cases, it may appear that the precipitating thought or cognition is the imagined positive reactions and judgements of other people. However, since most cognitive accounts focus on the representations sufficient to generate specific emotions, they fail to provide a convincing account of the contribution of previous knowledge and mastery of relevant rules as well as the ability to attain or surpass related standards and goals. A popular response has been to examine the reaction of pride in greater detail, breaking down particular elements from stimulus, perception and interpretation to the eventual production of the full emotion. For
example, Ellsworth argues that her appraisal theory still allows the complete syndrome of pride to be the product of an automatic underlying process. A Wittgensteinian rejoinder is that such a view invites us to think that an individual is acting like a computer without being able to infer any fundamental similarity. Moreover, when the actions and emotional reactions of an individual follow mastery of a rule, standard or goal, any supposedly automatized reaction does not entail that the actions are involuntary. A possible alternative to the emphasis on a "cognitive substratum" is to examine the requisite practical actions, experiences and learning required for individuals to "see" or "grasp-in-a-flash" that their actions favourably compare with a standard, rule, goal or intended outcome. It was suggested that a previous history of thought, reflection and evaluation in an activity may contribute towards an automatized, immediate and dispositional reaction because there is no compelling need to re-evaluate existing views and values.

7.3 Self-consciousness, emotional control and the underlying neurophysiology of pride

Although reflexive cognition has been explored in recent sections, it is important to examine the use and limits of individual perception and attention when they are "brought to bear on the self as an object" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 3). In particular, it is interesting to examine the way in which recent technology seems to provide the means not only to "observe" the neurophysiological processes that underlie our emotional experiences, but also to suggest the potential for more direct means of emotional control.
Despite the supposed limits of discourse based approaches to contribute to these topics, examples of pride are assembled in order to clarify remarks made by Rosenberg and others about the role and limits of self-consciousness. The section therefore begins with a critical account of Rosenberg's suggestion that self-consciousness about emotion is mostly "detached self-observation". The possibility that increasing self-consciousness can be useful in some circumstances is examined along with the practical uses of recent technology which reveals the neurophysiological mechanisms underlying many emotions. And, finally, an assessment is provided of the notion that these recent studies provide the possibility of more direct control over our emotions through the "other general way of affecting emotional experiences [which] is to act on the body" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 11).

Self-consciousness, emotion and the "picture" of detached self-observation

A number of examples have already been presented of individuals who, when expressing pride or receiving praise from others, feel conspicuous (i.e., they have a distinct sense of themselves as the objects of others' attention and are sensitive to the possibility of social evaluation even if others are absent). In a sense this is one broad example of Rosenberg's argument that:

As a result of social interaction and communication, the human being comes to take itself as the object of its own cognitive and agentive processes. (p. 11)
But despite the potential to offer a general account of consciousness and self-consciousness, Rosenberg has a more specific emphasis on personal reflexivity in relation to emotion:

The person becomes a detached observer of the many elements that constitute the self, both external and internal. Among the most important internal elements are those states of physiological arousal that form the foundation of the emotions. (p. 11)

Since we have already rejected some of the other forms of reflexive processes in relation to emotion (e.g., cognitive processes underpinning emotional identification), it is possible to address problems with Rosenberg's general position. This treatment is timely because the picture of detached self-observation has a certain amount of plausibility in experience: that is, we do talk about emotions as "things" that we "have" and which can be examined, explored and personally experimented upon.

However, an obvious problem with this type of account is how we are misled by related pictures of experiences such as self-consciousness and acting. For example, Bates (1991) is tempted to say that when actors simulate emotions they use a kind of "metaconsciousness" in which "one part is possessed, the other observes and controls" (p. 12). In addition to an implied localization of abilities, Bates' picture hardly seems to capture the experience of acting let alone ordinary experiences of intense emotions. It is obvious that individuals can report depersonalized feelings of observing themselves especially when, for example, an emotional "performance" seems to be automatic. But it is more relevant to emphasize those occasions when we are immersed or engaged in an activity in which case:
the subject—we want to say—does not here drop out of the experience but is so much involved in it that the experience cannot be described. (PG, p. 156)

If we wanted to apply the point to acting, our interest in emotion would more likely be those occasions when an individual can be said to "lose herself" in an emotional performance rather than take a "side-long glance" at how well she is doing (i.e., since in such a case the individual might not be able to adequately describe her changing emotion "objects" at the time or later). Thus if we look at actual linguistic practices, there seems to be little use for the "detached self-observation" picture especially if it invites the use of such phrases as "I'm aware that I'm pretending to have an emotion"80.

On the view adopted here, emotional self-consciousness is not to be equated with every normal experience of emotion in the same way that every first person expression of emotion is not a description of an inner experience (although this language-game is always a possible variant activity that has its own uses and conventional limits). Wittgenstein does acknowledge that self-observation may be part of practising a particular technique such as where an actor focuses on an expression "so as to direct his action accordingly". (Z, §591). Nevertheless, the feeling that emotions are private, inner objects which can be described by directing our attention towards them should be regarded as a picture attached to a practice that is not a central part of the "weave" of our lives. As Wittgenstein observes in a remark that is not merely restricted to individuals practising their emotion displays:

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80 It is also possible that there are gaps and biases in an individual's emotional self-knowledge, but the aim of this section is to examine cases of self-consciousness that are not so obviously dependent upon social practices of evaluation or comparison. For example, the
(There is no ground for assuming that a man feels the facial movements that go with his expression, for example, or the alterations in his breathing that are characteristic of some emotion. Even if he feels them as soon as his attention is directed towards them.) ((Posture.)) (PI, §321)

Thus it is unlikely that stopping during the experience of an emotional syndrome and turning attention toward aspects of the experience then or soon afterwards will contribute anything to our understanding of emotion. Moreover, the experience of an internal physiological component need not be viewed either as a kind of conscious pointing to an experience or as an experience of having conscious attention "pulled" by internal physiological accompaniments.

Further conceptual ammunition for a Wittgensteinian attack on this specific self-directed cognitive process can also be gained by extending relevant remarks on expectation to self-conscious reports about emotion. For Wittgenstein investigates "in what other way, in what other sense" would it be possible to describe the expectation that a person expressed in their behaviour (PI, §452). More specifically, Wittgenstein's point is that:

... to say that someone perceives an expectation makes no sense. Unless it means for example, the he perceives the expression of an expectation. (PI, §453)

By following this line of argument Wittgenstein concludes:

To say of an expectant person that he perceives his expectation instead of saying that he expects, would be an idiotic distortion of the expression. (PI, 453)

emphasis is on what an isolated individual might learn from examining his or her emotions for the first time on a reflective surface.
The main point for us is that by extending this line of argument to cases such as "I feel proud" the result is a similar conclusion that it would be an "idiotic distortion" to say of the individual who expresses this experience that he or she must perceive his or her feeling.

Wittgenstein's recognition that "my own behaviour is sometimes—but rarely—the object of my own observation" is also a point "connected with the fact that I intend my behaviour" (Z, §591). Does this point extend to those occasions emphasized by Rosenberg when reflexivity involves the intention to feel particular emotions? Rosenberg hints that self-consciousness about emotion does not always occur when using the skills of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition: "in engaging in this mental self-manipulation, I may be fully conscious of what I am doing" (p. 11). While it is also reasonable to think that reflexive techniques could become automatized and dispositional, a less obvious corollary is that intentional projects to produce particular emotions will encourage expectations about what will eventually be felt. But more normally it is our behaviour that is intended but not concomitant emotional reactions. The difficult point to grasp about emotion is that in most cases we will not be self-conscious about particular emotional behaviour until it surprises us (see section 7.4). It is only in such cases that we may then react in ways that might be described as an attempt to "reflect on these (internal) states" and to "try to determine their nature" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 11).

When unexpected emotional reactions do occur, some measure of experimentation and further activity is more likely to be involved than reflection per se. For example, people use techniques to catch and correct

81 That is, beyond the general sense in which Rosenberg implies that we are often not aware that changing our own or others' emotions is the point of many of our activities.
themselves in a similar manner to those occasions when an emotion stops or changes because the person has realized that his or her initial reaction was mistaken or unfounded. Moreover, many therapeutic practices involve an individual becoming conscious of particular situations and thoughts that precede a particular emotional reaction as well as the onset of a particular emotion. But it is important to recognize that any subsequent individual practice is not the detached observation of external behaviour or, more problematically, perception of internal components (except perhaps where the former means viewing a videotape of emotional reaction or managing to catch my emotional reaction in a mirror). Instead, when an emotion is unexpected, unwanted or at odds with an individual's broader intention or goal, any self-consciousness or reflection cannot be separated from the fact that the individual concerned behaves differently. In practice, self-consciousness is very much connected with practices in which the course, intensity or content of a particular emotion is interrupted in order to allow for other possible actions and emotions\(^{82}\).

To reiterate, several pictures connected with the notion of detached self-observation of emotional "objects" were examined. Although there are a variety of circumstances in which people feel that they can observe their "internal states" in an uninvolved way, Wittgenstein notes that self-consciousness — especially linguistic self-commentary — usually occurs as an exception to the usual weave of life. Wittgenstein's remarks can also be used to attack the picture of detached self-observation by showing that related phrases such as "I perceive my feeling of pride" are an idiotic distortion of first person expressions and their use. In another extension of

\(^{82}\) A related point to be explored elsewhere is that although self-consciousness may fade, for example, as a technique of controlling a particular emotion is mastered, we need not picture
Wittgenstein’s remarks it was noted that since we are involved in our actions and intend much of our behaviour, we are more likely to be aware of our emotions when they conflict with a broader goal. It also may be the case that what we would probably become aware of in many cases of self-consciousness is an emotion-related reaction which does not accord with current expectations. In practice, an individual’s attention to their behaviour is essentially an attempt to act differently by interrupting or altering the course of an emotion syndrome. Since these actions are likely to be in accordance with other practical aims it is inappropriate to describe the individuals involved as detached “observers”.

Some useful consequences of increasing the self-conscious awareness of emotion syndromes and components

Although it is tempting to view self-consciousness about emotion syndromes and components as a form of detached self-observation, such detachment implies an interruption to a normal emotion (i.e., which could be seen as an individual’s disengagement from normal socially oriented practices). In this respect, self-consciousness needs to be examined as something other than a form of inwardly directed perception. But do any alternative positions get beyond potential Wittgensteinian criticisms while also accounting for the detail of individual manifestations, differences and changes in emotional self-consciousness?

In contrast to cognitive accounts, a discursive approach will not draw on tacit pictures of socially and physically isolated individuals in order to

this progression in every case as the “passage from conscious mental to unconscious cerebral guidance or control” (Shanker, 1993, p. 234).
promote an interest in “mechanisms that do not have an interpersonal engagement in discourse” (Harre & Gillett, 1994, p. 177). In this respect, the discursive approach to emotional self-knowledge seems to be consistent with Wittgensteinian remarks and helps to steer psychologists away from studies of individuals’ embodied “habits of reflection”. Moreover, an orientation towards discourse will make it clear that instances of self-consciousness in conversational practices can also include an awareness of possible personal feelings about activities presently engaged in. For example, an interview with two American soldiers indicates one individual’s awareness about a potential future view of a difficult job:

Back at the sports stadium which is the Marines’ forward base, I ask how they feel about their mission after four weeks. Do they think America should be sorting out its domestic problems before getting into foreign wars? “Hey,” says Obie, “Bums on the street back home never did nothing for me. They screwed up their own lives, but the people here they was born screwed up.”

“So you’re proud of what you’re doing in spite of the bitching.”

“Soldiers always bitch,” says Mike Taylor. “Way I see it, this is a hellachin’ place right now, but I know in 10 years I’ll look back and be proud of what I’ve done.” (Christchurch Press, 18 January 1993)

This assembled reminder of an instance of self-consciousness is interesting because it is exemplifies individuals who have an expanded “discursive context within which to negotiate and elaborate their responses to life events” (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 175). This example also conforms to a further general aspect of Harré and Gillett’s (1994) account:

As human beings extend their discursive skills (not merely the verbal expression of those skills), so they expand their consciousness; that is, they extend the range of matters to
which they can attend and of which they can be aware. (p. 175)

In this case, the communicated awareness that an individual will eventually feel proud of a unpleasant task may also be regarded as an intelligent and possibly mature strategy for coping with a task in the present.

The above example also illustrates how forms of self-conscious commentary can expand the possibilities of emotion-related actions in useful directions and especially in relation to unpleasant or unwanted emotions. For example, individuals who lack awareness about particular emotions such as anger are often less able to control their emotions and use more productive discursive skills. The mastery of such statements as "I'm aware that I'm starting to boast" can also provide a useful discourse of self-commentary for other people. For example, the statement may function as a warning about a potential social infraction in the same way as the expression "I'm beginning to feel really angry" (and thus be closely related to the ability to "catch oneself" experiencing a particular emotion (see section 6.1)). In addition, some common emotion-related expressions give the impression that self-consciousness has been extended to include processes which we cannot be directly aware of. The phrase "I'm feeling a burst of adrenalin" is an already mentioned example of the more complicated technology-dependent forms of emotion vocabulary that Western cultures seem to be developing (cf. Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 153).

Despite the apparent contribution of psychological studies in relation to adrenalin, our increasing knowledge of underlying features of emotional experiences does not entail that we have extended our senses to be directly

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83 This is not to deny that excessive self-consciousness is likely to prevent action in some circumstances and may in others result in self-undermining statements.
aware of physiological events occurring in our respective adrenal glands. Accordingly, self-commentaries informed by psychological studies are likely to be useful only where they allow others to understand and predict a person's behaviour in an everyday sense. Curiously, similar accounts have been suggested for the treatment of processes of self-conceiving and self-feeling but without exploring the exact nature of their assumed "embodiment". For example, Kaplan (1986) argues that these reflexive processes are not capable of being "directly perceived" by the individuals who experience their products. Another way of stating this view is that we only have conscious access "to the results of mental processes, but not the processes themselves" (Dennett, 1979, p. 165). We therefore seem to be pushed towards typical accounts of the processes underpinning self-consciousness and emotion localized in particular areas of the brain. For example, Goleman (1995) demonstrates this subtle conceptual slide when he argues that normal emotional control is based on the fact that "neocortical circuits are actively monitoring the emotion" (p. 47; i.e., it is such underlying processes which provide, in many cases of improved emotional awareness, "a first step in gaining some control" (p. 47)).

Since the aim here is to achieve some understanding of the processes involved in producing the characteristic physiognomy of pride, it seems that current technology can be said to extend some forms of self-awareness about "components" beyond normal limits. However, examining those features of emotions such as pride which cannot be "directly perceived" may still serve no useful purpose. One reason is that these correlates may not map onto the criteria that we use to express pride in everyday life: a point which is reflected in the fact that referring to the symptoms of emotions in conversation often imparts little relevant content.
For example, if another person asked me if I felt proud it would seem odd for me to reply "I'm not sure but I can say that my chest is expanded and my posture is upright". Another way of conceiving self-consciousness about the components of emotions and its limited usefulness is to imagine an individual who engages in an activity that produces pride, but is not aware that his or her brain is being scanned (i.e., the scanning would probably need to be unobtrusive because it would seem to be difficult to know that a real-time brain image was being generated while simultaneously engaging in an emotion-producing activity, unless perhaps I was excited about seeing the neural basis of my excitement). Again we would not say that being able to see real-time images of the brain processes responsible for particular emotion components was an instance of directly perceiving the processes which could only be experienced before as products of the processes.

Some studies do, of course, highlight the brain mechanisms and functional relations responsible for pride (e.g., Stepper & Strack, 1993; Weisfeld & Beresford, 1982). While the speculative comments provided here about underlying mechanisms are a matter for welcome neurophysiological criticism and correction, there is little relevant information to function as a guide. It therefore seems possible that a functional MRI brain scan, for example, might provide enough fine-grained detail to make interesting distinctions between pride and other emotions (as well as to localize relevant processes). But in this case the extension of self-consciousness about pride and its components is only useful, according to such "visionaries" as Carter (1989), when they provide the basis for more precise psychoactive interventions. Following on from the conclusion of the previous section, it seems reasonable to argue that any "extension" of self-consciousness to underlying mechanisms must also provide "more direct"
means of producing the desired emotion (although as the next section will show this reintroduces the issue of how we could make ourselves spontaneously feel emotions such as pride).

In summary, self-consciousness about emotions and their components was explored by examining a wider "diet" (PI, §593) of discourse-dependent forms of self-commentary. More specifically, it was noted that an individual's awareness that he would probably feel proud of an unpleasant duty at a later point could also be construed as a useful, discursive coping strategy. Other forms of self-commentary that accompany emotional experiences may also be useful when they help others to understand an individual's feelings and judgements as well as to predict his or her actions. But a focus on discourse seems to avoid making precise statements about embodied processes of self-conceiving and self-feeling which cannot be "directly perceived". In response it seems that there is little pragmatic value in the view that self-consciousness can be extended in a useful manner by empirical studies of the correlates of emotion components. Moreover, while brain scan studies may localize the mechanisms and functional relations that underpin our experience of emotions like pride, it was again argued that this "extension of consciousness" would only prove useful where it allowed more precise or "direct" interventions to produce a desired emotion.

The neurophysiological grounding of emotions and the difficulty of producing pride

Continuing with the topic of self-consciousness and emotion components, it is worth noting one of Rosenberg's forms of reflexive agency in relation to
emotional experience. In addition to the emotion-producing strategy of thinking particular thoughts, Rosenberg argues that individuals may also use the “other general way of affecting emotion experiences [which] is to act on the body” (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 11; brackets added). Moreover, in an interesting analogue of the “direct perception” of components argument, an important aspect of Rosenberg’s reflexive theory of emotion is the view that since people are:

... unable to exercise direct control over their emotions, [they] adopt the strategy of attempting to control the causes of these experiences. (p. 10, brackets added)

However, while a wealth of information is available about the neurophysiological and physiological processes that “ground” many emotions and emotion-related skills, it is difficult to see how our present knowledge of localized processes could help an individual to produce specific emotions such as pride. Faced with the possibility of relevant research but no precise detail, it may seem that there is little a conceptual-discursive account could contribute.

However, there are some unexpected conceptual-discursive insights into the “mechanisms” underlying pride which can be assembled and used to direct further inquiries. Many of the examples to be examined below invite similar types of individual comparison to those found in studies where the aim is to highlight the neural basis of individuals’ differing degrees of self-awareness about their emotions. Cases to be mentioned below are the equivalent for the practice of “creating” genuine feelings of pride as brain scans are to an understanding of alexithymic individuals. The first of these examples is suggested by Wittgenstein’s exploration of a minimum
requirement for the possibility of feeling positive emotions such as pride. In particular, Wittgenstein remarked: "joy goes along with physical well-being, and sadness, or at least depression, often with being physically out of sorts" because it is surely true that such a positive emotion "would not happen if I were feeling unwell" (RPP II, §324)84. The point is useful because this basic requirement would need to be addressed before any attempt to produce a spontaneous experience of a specific positive emotion such as pride could succeed.

Wittgenstein's point also allows for recognition that physical discomfort, tiredness and negative emotions all limit the likelihood of pride occurring (cf. examples of mixed emotions in the next section). For example, at a press conference John McEnroe indicated his expectation that he would feel a sense of satisfaction and pride in the future after a physically draining series of performances:

The American was beaten in straight sets, 6-4, 6-2, 6-3, in the men's singles semi-finals by compatriot Andre Agassi on Saturday, but said later he felt encouraged by his achievements.

"I'm really happy with this tournament. It's hard to feel that good about it right now but I know I'll feel proud of it soon." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 6 July 1992b)

It is not unusual for individuals to anticipate a future sense of satisfaction in an achievement which, at the present is obscured by tiredness but is likely to occur once an individual has recovered. Similarly, emotions such as disappointment and depression are likely to prevent pride from occurring (although there are numerous sporting examples of coaches and others expressing their pride, a positive judgement or evaluation, despite a very

84 More generally, Wittgenstein also noted that this point should not necessarily be
disappointing loss). In the latter case, it is clear that expressions such as "hold your head high" and statements of praise serve primarily to alleviate the disappointment of individuals who have produced their best but have still found that it is not enough to win (i.e., they are not techniques for producing pride).

Another relevant example of a reflexive attempt to produce desired positive emotions by a form of physiological intervention is the use of drugs by individuals who are troubled or lack self-esteem. Although the following case has already been mentioned in relation to pride in a personal change, it is also relevant here as an example of the difficulty of producing pride by direct neurophysiological intervention:

**Former drug user gets a golden high**

He did drugs, he drank heavily, he was thrown out of school. At 16, Nelson Diebel was an American dream going horribly wrong.

On Monday Diebel got the biggest high of his life when he stepped up to collect the Olympic gold medal in the 100m breaststroke.

For a 21-year-old who can be, in his own words, near-suicidal, hyperactive and spiteful, it was a day for remembering those who helped put him back on the straight and narrow.

"Swimming was the path by which my life was turned around," Diebel told reporters after his shock win in an Olympic record time of 1min 1.50 sec. "I'm not proud of what I was, I'm just glad I met someone who could turn me around." *Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 30 July 1992.

The relevant point in relation to this example is that of the types of "self-medication" presently available to us, habitual use of alcohol and other drugs is not an effective means of increasing self-esteem or resolving personality problems. Moreover, although the example appeals to the notion that emotions such as pride involve a "natural high", it is interesting to construe as an issue of "causation, nor empirical concomitance" (RPP II, §324; see Part 1,
regard the use of alcohol as ostensibly providing a physiological equivalent of the feelings of enhanced status, confidence and excitement that accompany pride. The obvious problem is that in order to feel good about oneself or to experience pride, it is not enough to use alcohol or other drugs (i.e., since the feelings of increased confidence or happiness involved only provide a temporary substitute for more stable and enduring feelings of self-regard, competence or achievement)\textsuperscript{85}.

There are no direct ways of altering the brain in order to produce pride, but there are some indications of specific neurophysiological correlates and particular mechanisms that ground normal experiences of pride (i.e., rather than general happiness, joy or elation). Empirical work by Stepper and Strack (1993) is relevant here because they argue that their methodology based on unobtrusive manipulations makes it possible to:

\begin{quote}
\ldots winnow the mechanisms underlying the influence of body posture on subjective experiences and eliminates the possibility that interpretations of a posture as expressive of a given emotion guide inferences based on internal states. (p. 215)
\end{quote}

In Stepper and Strack's case, the mechanism is the possibility of adopting an upright posture at the same time individuals receive positive feedback about a task. The study did not, however, examine any other spontaneous expressions of pride such as a smile or gestures that might seem to facilitate the emotional experience. Interestingly, while Stepper and Strack note that the "inhibition of the appropriate bodily expression of the emotion had a

\textsuperscript{85} It is possible that future localization research may one day make available a quite specific intervention which can be used to create a sense of self-worth or feelings of pride. But it is an open question as to whether we would want to use more precise psychoactive interventions to produce such feelings, especially if there were no actual achievements involved to provide an ongoing source of pride.
stronger effect than its facilitation" (p. 216), it is also important to mention their further conclusion: "to feel proud, it is not sufficient to adopt an upright posture" (p. 219).

There are no specific drugs, forms of physical effort, postural manipulation or bodily agitation that might by themselves produce something resembling a sincere report and experience of genuine pride. In agreement with the earlier account on the cognitive aspects of pride, Stepper and Strack suggest that the:

\[ \ldots \text{joint occurrence of bodily changes and the activation of the appropriate cognitive contents are likely to provide the optimal conditions for a full-blown emotional experience.} \] (p. 215)

It therefore seems possible that further interesting results applicable to specific emotions might emerge from our expanding "knowledge of the substratum, particularly the localization, of cognitive processing" (Scherer, 1992, p. 140). Brain scan studies might, for example, reveal the neurophysiological basis of these differences in much the same way as researchers have demonstrated the difference between the Duchenne smile and a genuine smile (Carter, 1998). And in the case of pride, relevant areas of brain function identified by blood flow or electrochemical activity could even suggest the type of "core mechanisms" responsible for generating pride (e.g., in the complicated relations between the cortex and limbic system). In this respect, studies of the "nature and temporal unfolding of these processes" (Scherer, 1992) would at the very least confirm the intuition that it is unwise to adhere to Rosenberg's (1990) simplistic distinction between reflexive and nonreflexive processes.
For the moment, it is almost impossible to make any exact remarks about what I dubiously describe as the "mechanisms" underlying pride as well as to discuss possible forms of direct manipulation beyond textbook generalizations about positive emotions. Despite these limitations, one indication of a broad and basic "mechanism" of pride is suggested by an assembled example:

"When you grind up the rocks, or clays to make paint pigments, you think about where they came from and the feeling of place is very strong. You keenly identify with your materials. They're part of you. You've found them, ground them, prepared them, and used them.

"It's the same with flax. It must feel like a farmer feels when he gets his wool bales. There's a sense of pride and achievement in doing it and it's certainly a whole different ball game to going into a shop to buy a few tubes of paint. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 19 March 1992b)

A possible study of the underlying "mechanisms" of pride might focus on an individual's positive involvement and focused attention upon a particular task and its grounding in subtle neurophysiological changes. This same "mechanism" of involvement might also underlie personal and asocial tasks where attention, effort and care are important in producing a focused and specific positive feeling. Moreover, the unconscious nature of this "mechanism" might be revealed by the fact that individuals do not intend to get upset when the object that is their "pride and joy" is, for example, irreparably damaged or destroyed (i.e., the depth of the resulting reaction can often be a surprising indication of the importance of a particular object). Thus a future neurophysiological study might use brain scan technology to reveal some of the subtle changes that ground the disposition towards particular emotions (i.e., potentially over longer periods of time than is available for most contemporary brain scan studies).
To summarize, although there are few studies of the neurophysiological "mechanisms" that underlie pride, several examples were assembled in order to indicate possible future research directions but not this one. In particular, it seems that it is more likely for spontaneous experiences and expressions of pride to occur when individuals are in good health and are not preoccupied by tiredness or negative emotions. However, the use of such imprecise forms of psychoactive self-medication as alcohol is unlikely to be an effective, long-term substitute for genuine pride and healthy self-esteem. But it is possible that future brain scan studies might show areas in the brain that could be manipulated by psychologists to produce a very good imitation of the feeling of pride. Such studies may also provide more detail about some of the "core" neurophysiological mechanisms of particular emotions that we are tempted to describe in causal terms. Future empirical work might also reveal brain structures and mechanisms that underpin our attachment to particular objects and which have the potential to generate other emotions (e.g., when an individual's "pride and joy" is damaged or destroyed).
7.4 Vacillating emotions and the problem of ambiguous feelings

It was noted earlier that Rosenberg allows reflexive processes to play an important role in the genesis even of "instinctive" emotions because the identification of particular emotions is thought to be "a joint product of organismic and reflexive processes" (p. 4). Although this point has been addressed in previous sections, Rosenberg generalizes his account of emotion in such a way that many ordinary emotional experiences are treated as uncertain exceptions to cases where there is strong physiological arousal:

One reason why interpretive factors play such a prominent role in emotional identification is that the internal state of arousal is so often ambiguous. (p. 5)

The result is that Rosenberg does not provide an adequate treatment of the topic of vacillating emotions and the important role that people's introspective abilities are supposed to play in the expression and description of their "state". Moreover, the possibility of rapid shifts between different emotions, the ostensible coexistence of contradictory emotions and the problem of how to understand and to express ambiguous feelings are further topics that require detailed investigation. The treatment of these issues will again be rendered manageable by focusing on specific surveyed examples of pride.
Vacillating emotions and their unique circumstances

There are a number of reasons why vacillating emotional reactions and experiences are worth examining. Vacillating emotions often involve quick changes between feelings and forms of expression that may ordinarily be regarded as contradictory and thus incapable of being combined. In this respect, talk of vacillating emotions also seems to confront conventional limits on the expression and time-course of particular emotions. Moreover, since vacillating emotions tend to occur in unique public and personal circumstances, it is difficult to understand exactly what the person concerned is experiencing. Finally, it is difficult to capture the dispositional potential that many people have to experience vacillating emotions in unique circumstances.

Even with psychological concepts such as pride, there is a strong tendency to regard our emotion vocabulary as referring to discrete and private states. However, while we clearly cannot model the variety of acts performed by use of the word "pride" in such a narrow way, it is not surprising that a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey of pride will eventually raise the issue of shifts from one emotion to another. An interesting example for analysis is that of a cricket player in a test match who achieved a world record but was initially angry at his failure to reach a personal goal of 300 runs:

Martin Crowe and Andrew Jones combined for the most prolific partnership in 114 years of test cricket, but both experienced mixed emotions as they reflected upon their achievements at the Basin Reserve yesterday.

Understandably proud of their 467-run third-wicket stand, Crowe (299) and Jones (186) will long reflect on the shots which cost them significant individual milestones.

... "I'm not really disappointed," said Crowe afterwards.
"I was a bit angry to start with but settled down and I'm really proud of what's happened today between Jed (Jones) and myself. It was brilliant stuff." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 4 February 1991)

In addition to indicating the time-course of pride, its reflective nature and the negating effect of other negative emotions, the example indicates how individuals experience, describe and express vacillating emotions (see next section for more obviously "mixed" emotions). Moreover, this instance of pride and anger suggests the way in which people adopt what could be called a conversational stance towards their own emotions through statements such as "I'm not really disappointed" in order, for example, to stop recurrent thoughts of failure.

In relation to the latter issue, it would be interesting to procure more detail about the way in which an individual might find his (or her) feelings of pride being undermined, for example, by persistent, angry thoughts (in contrast to examples already provided where an individual may eventually feel pride after overcoming a more general sense of tiredness or disappointment). In the above example, the thought that could intrude upon a sense of pride and thus lead to a vacillating emotional experience with anger is: "it would have been great to get 300" (loc. cit.). A further remark by the same individual is also useful because it suggests a potential study of the novel expressions to make the experience of vacillating emotions intelligible to others:

"I would say it's a bit like climbing Everest and pulling a hamstring in the last stride," he said. (loc. cit.)
The example indicates how poetic comparisons and the ability to provide insightful descriptions of previous emotional experiences might be explored as part of the general topic of emotional literacy. Moreover, this creative facility with language allows us to capture unique emotional experiences and convey something of the experience to others (i.e., rather than a reflexive and cognitive process). Thus it would be interesting to conduct a further study of how new expressions are invented and novel language-games arise to supplement and extend the existing “cultural scenarios”, “emotion templates” (Rosenberg, 1990) and vocabularies of a linguistic community.

The lack of conventions about what to say in such cases is also reflected in an absence of prescriptions about what to feel in exceptional circumstances. For on some occasions it is obvious that negative and positive emotions do not actually coexist because the specific words that are used do not override our estimation of the person’s embodied feeling and judgement (e.g., where individuals express their pride while clearly feeling disappointment). But cases such as the following are more difficult to understand because both emotions seem to occur:

Teariki Maurangi’s heart was bursting with pride and grief yesterday. Late yesterday afternoon he helped police and volunteers search for the body of his 14-year-old adopted son, Ted.

Ted Maurangi was swimming with other children off the Panmure Wharf in the Tamaki Estuary late yesterday afternoon when one of the younger children was caught in a current.

Ted swam to his aid and moments after passing the youngster to safety, he was swept under in the strong current caused by the outgoing tide.

... An emotional Mr Maurangi, aged 52, said he was immensely proud of his son.

“He gave his life for someone else. I was really proud of what he did, saving someone else’s life.” (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 2 January 1993)
Although the problem with this type of example is that a more in-depth conversational engagement with the subject is not possible, the potential exists for a more detailed description of the experience. Until such a study is undertaken, we can only conclude that being able to state to others "I was really proud of what he did, saving someone else's life" while experiencing obvious grief is at the limits of our understanding of the usual expressive possibilities of emotion.

Nevertheless, the possibility that emotions such as grief and pride are not mutually exclusive is suggested by another example.

Warren Ruscoe, a Christchurch chef who last week admitted a charge of aiding and abetting the suicide of his tetraplegic friend, has told the British press it was the bravest thing he had done.

In an interview with the "Sun", a mass-circulation daily newspaper, he said he was grief-stricken but proud of what he had done.

..."I have never met — and will never meet again — anyone with the strength Greg showed," Ruscoe was quoted as saying.

"He had always been a man so full of life and vigour but now he was a virtual vegetable. Greg asked me to help him take his life and I knew I had to do it.

"Despite my terrible grief I am proud of what I did for my best mate. He asked me to put him out of his misery and I did." (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 2 December 1991)

Even though the example suggests Ruscoe is now proud of his earlier actions, still we need to be clear about how the usual expression and perhaps some feeling of pride is possible in such circumstances (i.e., despite a "substratum" of grief). For it is possible that sharing the judgement of oneself or another person through talk of pride might serve to focus and sharpen an experience of grief. Thus rather than altering an existing emotion to express another feeling, it might be difficult even for the
individual concerned to clarify whether they were overwhelmed with tears of 
grief or tears of pride (see also chapter 6, section 6.4).

In such exceptional cases, the possibility of closely examining the 
emotional and expressive possibilities that may even surprise the 
individuals experiencing them is extremely limited. Nevertheless, although 
it may seem to the individual as if he is simply overwhelmed with too much 
emotional “information” to offer a detailed description, an understanding of 
the time-course of grief and the possibility of feeling pride may be improved 
by an introspective description. For example, Ellis (1991) describes her 
own experiences of accepting an award and then feeling grief when she 
thinks of her deceased husband. In contrast to cases examined above 
where it is difficult to determine whether the individuals concerned actually 
felt the pride they expressed, Ellis notes that the feeling of grief did not 
persist: “but as soon as I started to talk to people, the pride returned” (p. 36).
The situation is obviously made more complicated by the fact that the 
distraction and praise of others may play a crucial role in cutting short an 
individual's grief. Nevertheless, Ellis' point is important because it shows 
that specific ways of expressing pride may allow an individual to switch in 
rapid succession between at least two emotions (and possibly more).

To summarize, cases of vacillating and contrasting emotions 
challenge our understanding because they often occur in exceptional 
circumstances. Individuals may vacillate between emotions such as pride 
and anger or pride and grief when, for example, particular thoughts intrude 
(i.e., in contrast to expressions of pride that only occur after recovering from 
disappointment or tiredness). Moreover, our emotion vocabulary cannot 
capture such unique experiences because emotion words seem to refer to 
discrete states (i.e., in acts of emotional description or expression).
Contradictions between the use of emotion words and an overarching feeling can be resolved by recognizing that different expressive modalities are involved. But individuals may also need to make creative use of poetic comparisons in such circumstances in order to be understood by others (i.e., when they describe what they initially experienced and expressed). *Pace* Rosenberg such comparisons do not need to be described as the reflexive identification and exploration of ambiguous states of physiological perturbation. In other cases, the fact that expressions of pride may also sharpen emotions such as grief may make it difficult to distinguish between tears of pride and tears of grief. Nevertheless, a more detailed investigation should provide a discursive basis for possible studies of the mechanisms that ground shifts between two (or more) emotions.

Some remarks on the skill of describing “mixed” emotional experiences

Although Rosenberg’s general theory of emotion and its connections with Schachter and Singer’s (1962) cognitive account have been critically examined, a number of further remarks should not escape scrutiny. For example, Rosenberg argues that there are many occasions when our emotions are ambiguous or mixed. While this leads to the erroneous conclusion that “it is not surprising that reflexive actors are so often uncertain about what they are feeling” (p. 5), a further specific claim can also be questioned through more unexamined instances of pride:

When different emotions are experienced simultaneously, it may be difficult to dissociate them and to identify their respective natures. (p. 5)
In an extension of the previous section it is possible to examine those occasions upon which individuals talk of mixed emotions and, moreover, are often capable of providing detail that might provide the basis for further studies by individualistically oriented empirical psychologists.

One of the most interesting points about talk of mixed emotions is that although intense emotions are not always involved, the uncertainty is not so much about the experience and how it could be described so much as the appropriate term to use (i.e., with all its potential social and personal consequences). Indeed, in many cases individuals use highly conceptual and skilled expressions to communicate their feelings and judgements in particular circumstances. For example, an individual might not only demonstrate but also express with words their "excitement and pride" (Dick, 1990, p. 124). In such cases, we would not say that their "mixed experience" is ambiguous because the individual concerned should really choose between one feeling or the other: as if it makes sense to say "either you are excited or proud because you cannot be both". Rather, a report of this type would provide the basis for us to infer that the individual concerned is not used to getting things right and, moreover, is often not at ease in social situations.

A grammatical investigation and detailed description can help to understand cases in which emotions are not discrete experiences or syndromes. The following account written by the mother of gifted young chess player illustrates the discursive skills involved in articulating mixed emotions:

Recently my son, Luke McShane, aged eight and a half, won the world under-10 chess championship held in Duisberg, Germany. He became the youngest international Chess
Federation master in the history of the game.

...I felt a mixture of pride and shaky alarm when I saw his little face smiling obligingly from most of the daily newspapers. In several reports he was described as a "prodigy" and the story linked with that of 13-year-old Ganesh Sittampalan, who is a "mathematical prodigy", and has just been awarded a first-class honours degree. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 25 July 1992)

The apparently immediate reaction of the mixture of pride and "shaky alarm" is clarified in a further remark:

I am ridiculously proud of him, of course, but I do worry about where it goes from here. As his life becomes more complex, the pressure must start to increase. But he has to be allowed to see it through. All I can usefully do is show him some of the other interesting moves life has to offer. (loc. cit.)

An interesting point to emerge from this example is how important the need to adopt a conversational stance is to the emotions that an individual will express and describe. In other words, an individual in such circumstances will not necessarily explore their "internal state of physiological arousal" even though "it may not be clear which of several possible emotions one may be experiencing" (p. 5). Instead, it is more likely that an individual will think through the issue, perhaps in a manner that is not dissimilar from adopting the conversational stances of other specific individuals, before coming to a particular decision (e.g., deciding that there is no need to worry about other people's expectations).

In such a case it is also possible that the physiological agitation and excitement of recognition may easily change to alarm and nervousness upon further reflection or conversation with others. Again this may seem to indicate the point at which an explanation of underlying mechanisms responsible for possible mixed emotional possibilities could be offered.
Interestingly, Ellsworth (1991) attempts just such a move on the basis of an analysis of the "logic" of vacillations between strongly felt emotions to an attempt to reveal underlying mechanisms. In particular, she argues that the possibility of experiencing different emotions in relatively quick succession is dependent upon the appraisals that generate emotions: "as a person's appraisal of the situation changes, so will his or her emotion, gradually or suddenly depending on the speed of the appraisal change" and also perhaps "on the number of appraisals they have in common" (p. 147). However, it is more appropriate to think that Ellsworth merely offers a new vocabulary with which to talk about such emotion "mixtures", "blends" and "shifts", and is not making a fundamental discovery about the underlying similarities between particular emotions. Ellsworth is therefore premature in speculating about the role of cognitive appraisals before more examples of the discursive contexts and skills involved in talk of mixed emotions can be assembled (a point which is relevant to many cognitive summaries of observed emotional and behavioural minutae).

To reiterate, on Rosenberg's view talk of mixed emotions may seem to require that we identify and clarify the nature of otherwise ambiguous feelings. But it is obvious that describing and expressing "excitement and pride" or "pride and shaky alarm" involves the creative use of highly conceptual expressions (i.e., the emotion words involved do not function merely as labels for discrete states). Moreover, our response to complicated emotional reactions is often less about exploring an "inner state" and more obviously related to a conversational stance and the need to decide upon a possible course of action (i.e., the demand to identify what is felt may have other obligations, costs and consequences). The investigation of the "logic" of such emotion mixtures may potentially be replaced by empirical
investigation of a common foundation of physiological agitation that may be enhanced by particular thoughts. Alternatively, Ellsworth suggests that similar underlying appraisals may facilitate particular quick transitions between emotions or emotion blends. However, it would seem to be wise to analyze more examples of the discursive contexts in which such mixtures are expressed and described before collecting more empirical detail.

Improving the “self-measurement” of ambiguous feelings

A final point of Wittgensteinian criticism of Rosenberg's account of reflexive and nonreflexive processes is the emphasis placed on the cognitive identification of supposedly common ambiguous states:

Ambiguity may exist because there is no touchstone by which an internal experience can be measured confidently. (p. 5)

It is interesting from the point of view of Wittgenstein's work and, to a lesser extent, the discursive studies based upon his remarks that Rosenberg uses the word “measure” in relation to an “internal experience”. While the aim is clearly not to adopt a form of general scepticism, Rosenberg expresses a common prejudice that it is important to be able to say how an individual “knows” exactly which emotion they are experiencing (see section 7.1 for a Wittgensteinian account of the “cognitive processes” that are supposedly involved). In place of Rosenberg's theory we may emphasize the rule-following nature of our use of emotion expressions and, more specifically, those situations in which the “self-measurement” of ambiguous feelings may be improved.
At many points in the remarks which constitute the PLA, Wittgenstein notes of such ostensibly private experiences as pain, emotion and sensation that "it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself" (PI, §246). At another point Wittgenstein also explores another relevant possibility that:

... if anyone said "I do not know if what I have got is a pain or something else", we should think something like, he does not know what the English word "pain" means; and we should explain it to him.—How? Perhaps by means of gestures, or by pricking him with a pin and saying: "See, that's what pain is!" This explanation, like any other, he might understand right, wrong, or not at all. And he will shew which he does by his use of the word, in this as in other cases. (PI, §288)

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein's remarks might seem to leave open the possibility of doubt when an individual is not experiencing an internal state that is "clear and unambiguous" (Rosenberg, 1990, p. 5). To put the issue in Wittgensteinian terms, we need an account of emotional expression and identification in circumstances where other people would also struggle to describe what I was feeling (i.e., because I was not exhibiting the behaviour characteristic of any particular emotion).

A psychologist inspired by Wittgenstein's work would probably reply that the words I use to describe my private experiences must be the same for other people (i.e., the same way in which a "private exhibition" must be the same as an exhibition for other people (PI, §311)). However, Wittgensteinian arguments will not be repeated against Rosenberg's erroneous view that "there is no way to know whether my experience of joy or loathing or interest is the same as yours" (p. 5; see section 7.1). For despite the good reasons why Wittgensteinians and others avoid the expression "I know what I feel", Rosenberg is obviously appealing to those
situations in which we are not certain of our feelings. Clearly, when an individual cannot describe what they feel, their inability to provide a precise description on a particular occasion does not entail that they are constantly in error about their feelings. Moreover, it would not help to examine individuals who may be described as alexithymic because they "lack words for their feelings": that is, people who "seem to lack feelings altogether because of their inability to express emotion" (Goleman, 1994, p. 50). In other words, we are not interested in cases of individuals who cannot express emotions like pride because of a general deficit that would be difficult to improve or refine.

Rather than focus on the general absence of an ability, the issue here centres on rules for the use of emotion words — what Harré and Gillett (1994) refer to as an "emotionology" — that most adult people in a culture will have already mastered. More specifically, the aim is to examine problems the rules governing the first person use of emotion words to identify and express emotions. In this respect, it is fortunate for the purposes of this study that Harré and Gillett examine the use of "the word proud (of someone)" (p. 150) to test the four conditions of their "emotion theory" which, they argue should "exhaust the rules for the use of emotion words" (p. 148). If we circumscribe their position by examining only those occasions when we use the word "proud of myself" the most relevant conclusion they offer is that while "there is perhaps a diffuse bodily feeling" (p. 150) more weight is placed on the other conditions: characteristic display, embodied expression of a judgement and the social act performed by an emotional display.

86 In contrast to Harré and Gillett, however, the aim is not to "abstract the local theory of emotion" by "making explicit the rules and conventions for the use of the expressions of that vocabulary" (p. 148; see chapter 1, section 1.3, p. 80 for the Wittgensteinian argument against emotion-related rules forming a system and also section 8.1 for added criticisms of the view that developing forms of personal reflexivity involves learning a theory).
Harré and Gillett’s analysis therefore places a stronger emphasis on judging one’s own behaviour in relation to the criteria for a particular emotions than Rosenberg’s argument that “if the nature of the internal experience is ambiguous, as is frequently the case, people will use other information to determine what they are feeling” (p. 5). It is also interesting to speculate whether Rosenberg’s remarks are adequate in relation to “knowing that I feel proud” because a judgement and specific choice of words is more important than “a certain diffuse bodily feeling the biochemical basis of which a neurophysiologist might research into” (Harre & Gillett, 1994, p. 149). It is at this point that we may return to the notion of improving “self-measurement” of a diffuse rather than ambiguous emotion. And in a point that demonstrates the potential of personal reflexivity to obfuscate representations of psychological concept use, the term “self-measurement” and any similar expressions should be avoided (e.g., we might easily have said “self-application” of the rules for emotions words)\(^87\). Instead, the notion of emotional literacy is more appropriate because it emphasizes the importance of learning highly conceptual distinctions in a very practical form of cultural training. As already argued, the physiognomy of the words, posture, displays and gestures appropriate to pride are “more precise and distinguished” than the “felt physiological state” which should not be our focus because it is “diffuse and indeterminate” (Harre & Gillett, 1994, p. 150).

Harré and Gillett’s focus on the physiognomy of pride and the importance of judgement to this emotion is clearly preferable to an

\(^87\) If this account sounds ridiculous, it is worth noting that Rosenberg explicitly describes Schachter and Singer’s (1962) position in the following way:

The emotion represents the application of the individual’s cognitive processes to his or her internal states of arousal. (p. 4)
application of Rosenberg's general theory. For on the latter view, pride does not have a strong physiological state of arousal and is therefore destined always to be an ambiguous internal experience without any possibility of improving its measurement. While this generalization of Rosenberg's view to pride may appear disingenuous, he does not seem to consider the possibility that individuals might fall back on more specific sensation descriptions if they were uncertain about their feelings (e.g., they might describe an initial burst of positive emotion which did not become the full emotion syndrome of pride or, in another case, exhibit a shy attempt to display an object, etc.). Such situations provide an opportunity to master an appropriate emotion vocabulary although it is also possible that an individual who did not know exactly what he was feeling in a particular situation might also judge his own emotions by using sources of knowledge about emotion such as personal "confessions" from autobiographies, novels and films. In that case, an individual's ambiguity might also arise out of a discrepancy between specific expectations about occasions upon which he would experience pride — such as an award ceremony — and his subsequent reaction (e.g., either the strength of his feeling or the timing as when an earlier imaginary anticipation produces a stronger reaction than the actual receipt of an award at the ceremony). In other words, an individual might expect to feel proud of herself at an award ceremony only to discover that she does not have strong feelings when the event finally occurs. Although Harré and Gillett do not explore these issues, they are worth examining because the ambiguity seems to involve considerable deliberation about a discrepancy between an expected reaction and actual feelings. In other words, more detail is provided of the way in which individuals learn to apply the rules that constitute a relevant "emotion theory"
and learn appropriate judgements about when not to choose the word "pride" to describe their feelings.

In summary, Rosenberg argues that many instances of emotion require constitutive reflexive and cognitive processes because otherwise the person's feelings will be ambiguous. More specifically, he suggests that ambiguity occurs when the internal state is not clear and strong enough "to measure". However, on Wittgenstein's view whether "I know that I feel pride" or any other kind of internal state will be determined on the basis of my correct use of the word to express my feelings in accord with shared criteria. Moreover, Harre and Gillett's analysis of the rules that constitute pride's "emotion theory" was used to show that pride can be felt and expressed with confidence despite the fact that it has a "felt physiological state" which is "diffuse and indeterminate". Since uncertainty about pride must have its basis in other considerations, it was suggested that a discrepancy between expectations in relation to particular situations and subsequent experiences could make it difficult to employ particular emotion terms with confidence. However, while individuals may be "unsure" or ambiguous about their feelings of pride due to a lack of specific experience, it would be worth examining in more detail how people improve their judgements about when not to employ the word "pride" to describe their feelings (i.e., despite their own expectations or the demands of a situation).
Summary

In this chapter, a number of recurring conceptual difficulties about emotion in Rosenberg's reflexive theory were highlighted and addressed through the detail of pride. Several broad themes needed to be examined in detail in order to provide a critical and reflexive treatment of Rosenberg's reflexive theory of emotion. In the first instance, examples of intense and deeply felt pride were examined in order to counter Rosenberg's mistaken description of emotions as private states. However, an analysis of examples of personal pride did suggest intense expressions of the emotion may still be private because their personal significance may need to be explained to others. The examination of pride and a unique personal history led to a treatment of other cases of the identification and expression of pride which also contradict Rosenberg's view that all emotions are private and incommunicable states. Pace Rosenberg it was argued that the demands of others to identify an emotion and provide more detail are often satisfied by a type of revealing description about myself which may include related intentions and wishes at the time (i.e., without necessarily requiring further explanation in terms of reflexive cognitive processes). It was also suggested that experiences of the distinct phenomenal feel of pride involving word choice, expressions, gestures and posture can occur without the mediating processes of cognitive interpretation argued by Rosenberg to be necessary to all acts of correct emotional identification. The conceptual-discursive survey was also used to reveal details about the time-course of pride and the localization of its components and an important contrast between the expression and description of emotions.
Further criticisms of Rosenberg's theory centred on the problem of being able to use traditional notions of cognitive processes to account for the thoughtful and immediate nature of pride. In this respect, a discursive account of pride as a form of private conversational stance or *sotto voce* judgement was preferred to an explanation focusing on a cognitive or "mental process" or self-evaluation. Additionally, while Rosenberg rightly argues that we do not just *feel* an emotion we *think* it, it is also possible for a Wittgensteinian approach to show how relevant forms of "seeing as" can be "coloured" by emotions. Moreover, although an implication of Rosenberg's theory is that thinking "proud thoughts" might be an effective strategy to produce pride, it is clear that setting a goal and achieving it is a more useful strategy. An attempt was also made to show the possible direction for an account of the immediacy of pride (i.e., an account that would bridge Rosenberg's arbitrary division between emotional expressions and reactions which are, respectively, the products of reflexive and nonreflexive processes). It was argued that previous judgements, values and views may become part of an embodied, dispositional reaction through the type of automatization involved in other rule-following skills. Thus an immediate reaction of pride may embody previous judgements without necessarily implying that the requisite "cognitive mechanisms" have passed from conscious control to cerebral control.

Consideration of the "thoughtful" aspects of pride led to the further issue of self-consciousness about emotion syndromes and relevant components as well as our limited awareness of underlying neurophysiological "mechanisms". In contrast to Rosenberg's view that personal reflexivity involves the detached self-observation of emotion, it was argued that we are often too involved in our intentional activities to allow
such a perspective. Moreover, we are likely to be conscious of our emotions only in circumstances where unpleasant or unwanted emotions conflict with broader intentions and goals (and thus self-consciousness is intimately related to the activity of interrupting a particular emotion in order to allow other possible emotions and actions). It may appear possible to "extend" out limited self-consciousness about emotions to underlying neurophysiological "mechanisms" by employing new technology. However, even though there is the potential to gain access to previously inaccessible processes, a useful practice would only seem to result where such investigations led to more precise psychoactive interventions. This possibility raised the issue of the difficulty of producing pride by existing, "indirect" methods such as alcohol and drugs (i.e., Rosenberg's second general way of affecting emotional experiences by acting on the body). In addition, we need to ask whether we would really want to be able to produce pride-like feelings in the absence of any real achievement.

Many of these points were also confirmed by exploring the topic of vacillating, mixed and ambiguous emotional experiences. Although the first issue is largely ignored by Rosenberg, the survey approach supplied some interesting cases of individuals vacillating between anger and pride as well as pride and grief. Since vacillating emotions often occur in unique or extreme circumstances it was suggested they may not be well understood by other people (i.e., it is difficult to understand how an individual could experience two contrasting emotions at once unless we distinguish particular modes of expression). Although it was noted that some linguistic expressions of pride may sharpen an emotion such as grief, it is also important to examine instances of quick shifts between two (and possibly more) quite different emotions. The topic of mixed emotions then suggested
the potential of people to augment a shared “emotionology” with creative expressions and poetic comparisons. Although experiencing mixed emotions may indicate the important role played by cognitive interpretation of a diffuse physiological state, this central aspect of Rosenberg’s theory was also undermined by showing how people express and improve their “self-measurement” of pride. Thus removing ambiguity about pride relies greatly on good judgement about when to use the word in accordance with its specific expressive feelings and the shared rules and criteria of the appropriate “emotion theory” (and less on particular inferences and personal expectations).
CHAPTER 8: Personal reflexivity and emotional development: does participation in cultural and linguistic practices transform pride’s “organismic foundation”?

Introduction

In order to be comprehensive, critical and reflexive, any account of personal reflexivity must eventually engage with many of the developmental issues alluded to in previous sections. Otherwise, we would again follow Rosenberg’s “lead” by, in this case, assuming that an unproblematic, coherent account will emerge from the literature. Interestingly, while Rosenberg offers only a general and sociologically based perspective on emotional development, his position might be seen as broadly consistent with social constructionism:

As a result of social interaction and communication, the human being comes to take itself as the object of its own cognitive and agentive processes. (p. 11)

However, while Rosenberg argues that “reflexive processes, stemming from social interaction experiences, are of particular interest to the sociologist” (p. 4), his emphasis on reflexive agency and cognition in emotional display, identification and experience is quite different from the discursive focus of social constructionism. These differences in emphasis are compounded by Rosenberg’s undeveloped suggestion that reflexive cognition is the most important developmental aspect of his “central message”: 
... reflexivity works a fundamental change in the nature of human emotions. Once the internal state of arousal comes to be "worked over" by these reflexive processes, they acquire a totally different character. The emotion comes to be mixed with elements that are separate from the physiological experience. (pp. 3-4)

Instead of detailing the differences between social constructionist and cognitivist positions, an initial question is whether a Wittgensteinian survey could provide the basis for a critical account of the development of personal reflexivity and emotion? And, more specifically, can it highlight problems with Rosenberg's theory-inspired categories while also exploring developmental issues which were mentioned briefly in previous sections? This includes issues that may now be explicitly addressed such as: the possible early development of a sense of family pride, personality changes over the course of an individual's life, emotions that indicate personal identity projects, the expression and exploration of new emotional experiences, and the long term effects of participation in discursive practices that lead to embodied and seemingly automatized judgements.

In the following sections, further problems with Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory will be highlighted for several reasons. Firstly, Rosenberg presents no developmental evidence to support the view that "the foundation of the emotions is basically organismic but that human reflexivity transforms the nature of the emotions radically" (p. 3). Also the crucial role of discourse is missing from Rosenberg's account (even though addressing this deficit might seem to entail uncritically adopting a social constructionist approach). Moreover, self-conscious emotions seem to develop in a manner that is not consistent with Rosenberg's central tenet that recognizable human and personal emotions emerge only through intentional efforts to produce or to alter related external and internal features.
of the “self”. Section 8.1 therefore begins with an examination of the shared emphasis on personal reflexivity by Rosenberg and social constructionists, but “tests” their respective general hypotheses about the centrality of emotion to personhood through examples of pride. In a similar manner, the highly conceptual nature of older children’s understanding of other people’s emotional lives is subjected to critical scrutiny. Section 8.2 provides an alternative to Rosenberg’s internalization account of reflexive cognitive processes which come to be mixed with and eventually transform internal states of arousal. The potential for children to “self-create” emotions such as pride is examined along with the closely connected notion that privatization is responsible for socially significant developmental changes in emotional expression and experience. Also presented is an alternative to Rosenberg’s view that embodied cognitive changes are crucial to the diversification of emotions such as pride from more basic states. Section 8.3 broaches further issues of cultural training and young children’s forms of emotion and personal reflexivity. Examples of significant events in the early understanding and development of pride will be presented along with the supplementation of early forms of emotion-related reflexive agency and cognition. The final section also includes a brief account of prerequisites of pride and reiterates the importance of non-reflexive agency to many significant personal developments.
8.1 The significance of reflexive understanding and abilities for forms of personal reflexivity

Many individuals at the beginning of adolescence can be described as having developed the foundation for future adult emotions and concerns. In other words, despite participating in "childish" identity projects, playing limited roles within particular societal institutions and engaging with different culturally-available texts there are more similarities between the emotional lives of adults and young adolescents than young adolescents and infants. Given the interest in reflexive and critical studies, it is important to represent clearly the cultural and discursive practices in which older children manifest a practically oriented control and understanding of their own and others' emotion-related actions. In addition, we should consider the challenge of Rosenberg's ostensibly reasonable view that being able to regulate emotions is crucial to becoming the type of person who can maintain forms of interpersonal interaction, pursue his or her own personal goals and also avoid many of the coercive, controlling and punishing institutions of Western societies.

Older children's understanding of their own and others' forms of emotion and personal reflexivity

It is interesting to note that Rosenberg and social constructionists such as Harré share a common and broad emphasis on forms of personal reflexivity. Harré's (1983) treatment of personal development, in particular, focuses on:
three central aspects of human psychology, consciousness, agency and identity, and above all their reflexive forms, self-consciousness, self-mastery and autobiography. (p. 20)

Although Harré and Gillett (1994) have subsequently confirmed the importance of this general focus within their discursive account of personal development, we may ask whether emotion should be central to their account (i.e., as Rosenberg implies). Interestingly, if we strictly adhered to Rosenberg's reflexivity and emotion theory many older children's mental disorders and illnesses could theoretically be traced to deficits of reflexive agency or reflexive cognition. However, a rival argument is that Rosenberg's general position not only simplifies many complicated psychological problems, but also ignores mental health problems which stem from a lack of emotion (i.e., individuals who have problems maintaining interpersonal relations, making particular judgements and being motivated to avoid coercive, controlling and punishing institutions because of emotional deficits (see Goleman (1996) for examples)).

These issues point to an obvious problem with Rosenberg's theory as a representation of mainstream and marginalized people in Western societies. The theory not only fails to account for the range of person types in different communities, but also suggests that there is too much concern with making the theoretical emphasis on the overall category of "reflexive processes" work. Rosenberg seems to recognize the limitations of this focus in relation to various individual aspects of emotion when he explores the connections between our forms of personal reflexivity and similar examples of self-referential skills demonstrated by others. For example, he argues that a focus on such phenomena as reflexive role-taking and empathy has led social psychologists to overlook the fact that "people also are engaged
in efforts to produce intended effects on the minds of other people" (p. 8). Rosenberg therefore suggests that these attempts to "alter the contents of others' minds" are engaged in for a variety of purposes, not all of which can be described as self-centred:

We may do so for our own benefit, for the benefit of the listener, for the benefit of a third party, or even for the benefit of some abstract cause. (p. 8)

Nevertheless, we need to examine how the practical mastery and experience of various forms of individual control and embellishment of emotion relate to an understanding of others as reflexive and emotional actors.

At this point, surveyed examples of pride can be assembled to counter the conceptual problems of Rosenberg's theory and also provide reminders of reasonable directions for a conceptually-aware and discursively oriented psychology. One point that Rosenberg explicitly makes is that particular consequences attend older children's realization that they can deceive other people as well as be deceived by them. In particular, Rosenberg argues that the cost of reflexivity in the domain of emotional display is doubt about what others are experiencing (a line of thought that is perhaps accompanied by an occasional feeling of being manipulated). It is also possible, of course, that without personal experience of engaging in particular types of deception we might have less awareness of the extent to which another person could deceive us. In this respect, it is difficult to know whether pride affords a sufficiently rigorous evaluation of the general strengths and weakness of Rosenberg's theory (i.e., in relation to other relevant emotions). For example, it seems unlikely
that many older children spend a great deal of time having highly conceptual doubts about the appropriateness of others' feelings on the basis of their own experiences of deceiving others (e.g., by pretending to feel proud). Nevertheless, if children can develop such a generalized suspicion it is more relevant to a psychology of personal reflexivity than the abstract and ostensibly philosophical concern about how we come to view our emotions as private objects (i.e., the further doubt that "I cannot know what you really feel" which is not specifically connected to a consideration of deceptive skills and other relevant forms of developmental stage-setting (see sections 8.2 and 8.3)).

A more useful point mentioned by Rosenberg is that the "process of social learning" involves the "development of expectations regarding the causal connection between stimulus events and emotional outcomes" (p. 6). While a different view of expectations and "emotion theories" was presented in the previous chapter, the relevant point is Rosenberg's view that:

\[ \ldots \] people do not have to undergo these experiences themselves or even to observe them in others, in order to learn the expected connection between the event and the emotion. (p. 6)

While there are good reasons for thinking that learning about pride involves more than learning about causal connections between events and emotions, Rosenberg suggests that information about emotion is "transmitted clearly through movies, television, and other mass media as well as through interpersonal communication" (p. 6). Whether many of the examples assembled in Part 2 are accessed by older children and contribute towards their understanding of pride would be worth exploring in future research. An additional source of information about appropriate
conduct may be many of the narratives available within a linguistic community which, in their various forms, are used by older children to further their understanding of emotion-related issues. Children's engagement with particular narratives and vocabularies might provide opportunities to teach important conceptual distinctions and allow them to clarify aspects of everyday usage. For example, Wharton's (1987) novel *Pride* provides a plausible account of a child's experience of being told by a Catholic school teacher that he is guilty of the sin of pride (because this is supposedly the motivation behind his failure to attend to a lesson). This exchange then prompts the following "lesson" from his father:

"There's all kinds of pride, Dickie. There's real pride, like being proud of good work, like when we do a good job building a porch. Then there's false pride like when you think you're better than somebody else for no good reason; that's the sin one. Then there's the lion's pride, his family."

"Gee! I like the idea of a family being a pride. Let's call our family a pride. I'd be proud of our pride and I bet it wouldn't be a sin at all."

"Probably just the opposite of sin, Dickie. I hope we can always be proud of our family." (p. 168)

Attempts to understand particular vocabularies, narratives and stories within a culture are not the only means by which children learn about emotions like pride. Nevertheless, particular texts and forms of instructions may raise questions that provide an opportunity to learn more about the reasons for many everyday conceptual distinctions.

When examining the detail of Rosenberg's theory for developmental implications, another emergent issue is whether older children's adult-like emotional expectations should be described as "part of a broader system of 'emotional logic' that people develop in the course of socialization" (p. 6).
This point is worth exploring in relation to personal reflexivity because a parallel can be found between Rosenberg’s theory and the social constructionist position. A common issue is the temptation to view the “system” of concepts that older children master as similar to a theory. Harré (1983), for example, adopts the following position on persons in order to tie together self-consciousness, self-mastery and autobiography in the following “one, very general, empirical hypothesis”:

A person is not a natural object, but a cultural artefact. A person is a being who has learned a theory, in terms of which his or her experience is ordered. (p. 20).

This position has been endorsed and extended by Harré and Gillett (1994) to include the “emotion theories” that people learn about pride as well as its complicated cluster of concepts and relevant judgements (see section 7.4). Greenwood (1991) seems to have independently argued for a similar position in which the use of highly conceptual terms like pride, shame, or guilt can be described as the application of “intersubjectively-agreed theories about how . . . psychological states are expressed in human action and discourse” (p. 109). However, the most relevant and interesting point about these person and emotion “theories” from the perspective of a comprehensive survey is that we could see how complicated metaphorical expressions, culture-specific concepts such having a soul, the use of the expression “I pride myself on . . .” and pictures immanent in our language all combine to create our widely shared Western sense of having a persistent and autonomous “self” which experiences particular emotions.

Despite the emphasis on the notion of a soul, a relevant “theory” need not be represented in abstract forms or encountered only in formal religious education. For example, a song by the popular British musical group Oasis about an individual making sense of his life contains the line: “As they took his soul, they stole his pride”. The extent to which older children
For the moment, pride serves the useful purpose of clarifying both Rosenberg's theory and "testing" the social constructionist "general empirical hypothesis". Both accounts use the notion of theory in a manner that could be explored as cultural differences in the use and mastery of particular clusters of concepts and emotion ideologies. But both perspectives also imply that the theory involved forms a system which can be represented in its entirety (i.e., even though it seems to be learned in a piecemeal fashion; cf. Part 1, chapter 1, section 1.3). Presumably a theory-based understanding of others is not quite the same as an inference about your emotional reaction or expression based upon my experience. Otherwise, the result might be the view that we only know of other people's states of mind from a reflexive comparison with "our own case" (Z, §225).

As Wittgenstein illustrates with an example of perceiving the emotional facial expressions of another person, it would be ridiculous to think that seeing the emotions in another's face is dependent upon looking "into yourself in order to recognize the fury in his face" (Z, §220). The point is relevant because it is better to think that another person's facial expression of emotion is "there as clearly as in your own breast" (Z, §220). The result is a change of emphasis from theory-informed inferences which use, in this case, older children's own (probably asymmetric) reactions to an examination of immediate reactions and relational experiences. An alternative view of emotion is therefore favoured in which reactions are "absorb" these expressions by repeating the discourses of popular culture and then perhaps actively use them at a later point to understand themselves and others could be explored in future studies.

89 When applied to ourselves this knowledge can be described as the "intensional contents and intentional object of the theories that do inform our perception and inferences" (Greenwood, 1991, p. 143; this latter account seems to be closer to the "theory of theories of mind" approach whereby adults' and older children's understanding of others' private states is regarded as theory-like).
embodied and immediate while also viewed as language-dependent and relational experiences.

The main point is that it is misleading to represent older children's highly conceptual and highly skilled negotiation of emotional and related interactions as the mastery of person and emotion theories. Moreover, in a criticism directed at Rosenberg's account, it is not particularly useful to translate these cultural "theories" into talk of the relative importance of reflexive and non-reflexive processes. Rather, it is important to examine forms of self-consciousness, self-mastery and autobiography as they develop in relation to particular emotions. An example of a culturally available text\textsuperscript{90} indicates the intertwined nature of such "emotional literacy" with the skills and understanding supposedly captured by the notion of personal reflexivity. In particular, the following exchange from Harper Lee's (1960) *To kill a mockingbird* provides a rule that the older child in the story uses to guide his conduct:

"Wonder why he never goes huntin' now," I said.
"Maybe I can tell you," said Miss Maudie. "If your father's anything, he's civilized in his heart. Markmanship's a gift of God, a talent — oh, you have to practice to make it perfect but shootin's different from playing the piano or the like. I think maybe he put his gun down when he realized that God had given him an unfair advantage over most living things. I guess he decided he wouldn't shoot till he had to, and he had to today."
"Looks like he'd be proud of it," I said.
"People in their right minds never take pride in their talents," said Miss Maudie. (p. 104)

The rule is then applied in subsequent discourse in a way that is difficult to analyze in terms of the relative importance of different reflexive and non-

\textsuperscript{90} That is, a text older children might have read and understood but which is not necessarily used by them as an explicit guide to action.
reflexive processes:

When we went home I told Jem we’d really have something to talk about at school on Monday. Jem turned on me.

"Don’t say anything about it, Scout," he said.
"What? I certainly am. Ain’t everybody’s daddy the deadliest shot in Maycomb County."
Jem said, "I reckon if he’d wanted us to know it, he’d a told us. If he was proud of it, he’d a told us."
"Maybe it just slipped his mind," I said.
"Naw, Scout, it’s something you wouldn’t understand. Atticus is real old, but I wouldn’t care if he couldn’t do anything — I wouldn’t care if he couldn’t do a blessed thing."
Jem picked up a rock and threw it jubilantly at the carhouse. Running after it, he called back: "Atticus is a gentleman, just like me!" (p. 104)

Focusing on the older child, Jem’s remarks centre on the consideration that if their father “was proud of it, he’d a told us” (p. 104) and also involve a specific culturally derived identification of his father's actions as those of a “gentleman”. If this fictional interchange is broadly indicative of naturalistic examples of discourse about pride between children of different ages, the broad point to emerge from a cursory analysis is that children’s developing understanding and control of their own and other’s emotions is closely tied to available forms of cultural and linguistic positioning.

To summarize, a superficial similarity between Rosenberg’s reflexivity theory of emotion and Harré’s social constructionism is their shared focus on such forms of personal reflexivity as self-consciousness, self-mastery and autobiography. However, Rosenberg’s exclusive focus on reflexive processes in relation to emotion seems to ignore mental illnesses and disorders which involve emotional deficits. An additional problem for Rosenberg is the dubious utility of being able to translate many complicated emotion-related exchanges in everyday life into the vocabulary of reflexive
agency and reflexive cognition (i.e., as they relate to changes in emotional display, identification and experience). Moreover, even though Rosenberg's view that people learn a system of "emotion logic" seems to resemble Harré's emphasis on individual mastery of person and emotion "theories", both approaches fail to represent the highly conceptual and skilled nature of older children's pride-related discourse. This point was illustrated with an example of the type of emotional literacy and self-control that might distinguish the conduct of an older child from that of a younger sibling.

**Emotional independence, personal projects and the pride of older children**

The issue of emotional independence is also important to an examination of many older children's highly conceptual and skilled interactions with parents, siblings, peers and others. Here the notion of emotional independence is meant to cover those cases of pride in which children use a variety of techniques to establish the independence of their actions, emotions and judgements from significant others. For example, further assembled examples show that older children often take pride in projects which do not accord with the expectations of parents and the ideals of institutions (cf. the treatment of personal autonomy and pride in chapter 6, section 6.2). An obvious cultural instance is the cartoon character Bart Simpson and his exclamation, on a popular children's poster, "underachiever and proud of it" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 11 May 1992). Although it is debatable whether many older children actively use such fictional characters to guide their own values, actions and personal narratives, the example is still relevant to the development of emotion-
related forms of self-consciousness, self-mastery and autobiography. In particular, the implied unwillingness of many older children to accord with wider expectations can be regarded as an early instance of intentional reflexive positioning and resistance.

However, despite the fact that such identity projects can be regarded as intentional behaviour, the personal agency involved is not necessarily accompanied by extensive self-knowledge. For example, a child who rebels against particular institutions, practices, and rules may not have a clear idea of the point of their resistance (i.e., an alternative identity project). Pride may be experienced and expressed in the pursuit of projects which are motivated by an older child's view of who he or she is not and what he or she does not want to do. It is perhaps only later that an early reaction may be reformulated and re-evaluated in a person's ongoing autobiography. In one example a woman talks about what she did as a 12 year old in a manner that suggests a sense of continuity. According to the interviewer, she "says with some pride that she was 'never properly socialized as a female' - that is, not taught she couldn't do things" (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 November 1992). It would be worthwhile conducting a more thorough discursive investigation of the relations between the experience of pride and the more global form of positive self-regard described as self-esteem91.

In lieu of a possible investigation, specific ways in which the content of older children's pride is fashioned by self-positioning against societal norms and practices can be sketched. We could examine how the independence of older children's emotions from other people's judgements

91 Some of these strategies might, of course, be constructed on an immature and unrealistic basis. For example, Faulkner (1929/1986) provides an example in the novel The Sound and the Fury, where one of the characters controls others in order to maintain a false view of herself mainly because she could not "bear that anyone such as her siblings could do something that she could not" (p. 232).
and evaluations becomes established within such institutions as family and school. The following example invites some speculation and analysis about relevant forms of positioning:

Claire, a 12-year-old girl of Hamilton has always been "pretty level-headed", according to her father, Steve. So when an intruder broke into their Claudelands home early on Sunday Steve, who did not want the family's surname known, knew Claire would stay calm.

... Steve kept the intruder talking and she called for help.

... Steve said the intruder wasn't aggressive and at one point asked them to call a taxi for him instead of phoning the police.

"We have talked about the possibility of this sort of thing happening. Now having had the experience it's given us some sort of basis in case it happens again."

He's also proud of his daughter.

"She did a darn good job," he said. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 18 February 1992)

The reason for assembling this example is not to examine the role of the media in promoting and maintaining the ideal of a good daughter, but to speculate as to whether such parental pride and praise is always accepted by older children in a manner that "we" would regard as mature. Although it is not mentioned in the example, it is possible that Claire places more importance on the reactions and possible evaluations of friends and other people (i.e., besides her parents). Establishing a form of emotional and evaluative independence seems to mirror, at least in the case of emotions like pride, an increasing discomfort with parental praise (i.e., because older children no longer wish to be positioned willingly as children by the praise of their parents). A relevant study here might be the increasing importance that peers and friends play in creating and maintaining older children's identities, emotions and judgements.
This point may be shown more clearly with another instance of the emotional consequences of the decreased importance that older children place on parental praise. In an example from Allende's (1988) *Of Love and Shadows*, the children of a family are proud of their father who works as a clown (and it is assumed here that their pride remains at least until they are a little older because of their continuing interest). However, their mother’s contrasting embarrassment eventually leads her to refuse to allow them to see him perform as they get older:

The children would note their mother's worried and impatient eyes, her briskness as she waited on her husband, her apprehension as she watched over those meetings to fend off any impertinence. Honor your father; the Old Testament said; the father is the pillar of the family. And that was why they were forbidden to call him Bosco the Clown, or to talk about his work; don't ask questions, wait till he feels like telling you. When they were little — when Hipólito was shot from a cannon from one end of the tent to the other, landing in a net amid the reverberation of gunpowder and flashing an uneasy smile — and once they had survived their fright, the children could feel proud of him, because there he soared like a hawk. Later, though Digna did not allow them to go to the circus to see their father declining in pitiful pirouettes. (p. 33)

Even older children may therefore fail to understand why their pride on a particular occasion contrasts with the reaction of another person. Moreover, the example indicates that older children do not necessarily engage in an explicit form of reflexive role-taking to understand the feelings and judgements of a significant other (i.e., a form of reflective speculation about the reasons and issues involved or, to use Mead’s (1934) terms to include interactions with non-significant others, that they adopt the attitude of a generalized other towards their evaluations of themselves and others)\(^2\).

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\(^2\) According to Harris (1989), to be able to imagine and correctly ascribe an emotion to another person, an older child will need to imagine that the individual imagines the approval or disapproval of some important person. Harris argues that an older child understands another
Clearly, a contrasting reaction of a parent has the potential to interrupt an older child's positive emotion and possibly produce a subsequent sense of embarrassment or shame (see next section). But perhaps the most interesting general point to emerge from this admittedly brief analysis is that fully understanding a significant other's contrasting reaction will usually entail conforming with his or her evaluation and values (i.e., unless other arbitrary discursive strategies are then used to undermine the judgement of the other person or persons).

The realization that understanding others has the potential to create shared evaluations and, therefore, similar dispositions, is important to an account of pride. More specifically, the survey approach reveals developmentally important discursive practices in which children begin to match the adult mastery of relevant clusters of concepts (i.e., with resulting implications for emotion, self and identity). Interactional disjunctures, such as the one mentioned above, challenge the view that there is a complete system or theory of concepts of which older children have mastered most of the important fragments. Moreover, they help to reveal some of the discursive practices and institutions that hold in place adult (and possibly male, white and middle class) power to view "our" concepts, judgements, and considerations as right. Representing the learning that is required from "our" point of view is a difficult task since it may seem as if children's conversational skills and activities should naturally develop in the direction of our practices. For example, as Harris (1989) notes, an important part of the judgements and considerations of older children is that they:

person's feelings of pride when he or she thinks: "I can imagine how Jack will feel when he imagines how his mother will feel" (Harris, 1989, p. 94). However, from the point of view of a
... gradually appreciate that people's emotional lives are not only regulated by the consequences of their actions, but also by an awareness of the emotions that other people will express towards those actions and their consequences. (p. 81)

The argument here is that we should take this question one step further to examine specific discursive practices in which older children exemplify the fact that "someone’s commitment to the discourse involves a relinquishment of freedom at a certain point but a consequent attainment of an ability that otherwise they would not have" (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 116). This issue is more complicated than a brief examination of older children who do not react positively to praise, for example, because of a long history of negative interactions with parents, siblings, peers and others.

In summary, further examples of pride were assembled to provide the basis for an exploration of the emotional independence displayed by many older children. It was noted that expressions and experiences of pride by older children can be a reaction to the demands of parents and institutions rather than the self-conscious pursuit of an alternative identity project. The significance that particular occasions of pride will eventually assume in autobiographical and self-esteem terms is also mediated by more specific and subtle reactions. For example, it seems important for children to resist the praise of parents in order to develop their own distinct and "non-childish" emotions and evaluations. The relational aspect of such resistance is also indicated by the fact that the disapproval of a parent may not be the subject of explicit and reflexive "role-taking". In such cases, understanding may seem to entail adopting the values of parents, other people and even discursive-relational approach it is not essential that a child's understanding of another's private thoughts, evaluations and feelings must be expressed in such convoluted terms.
institutions in a manner that suggests children's growing refinement towards "our" views and values. But it is also important to recognize that children's practical mastery of pride-related discourse and judgements both constrain and enable in ways that are worth further investigation.

**Further examples of emotion-related information and its practical mastery**

An important feature of individual development highlighted by the conceptual-discursive approach is that older children's mastery of the cluster of concepts surrounding pride is closely tied to practical demands and skills. We have already seen how discursive asymmetries between the reactions of other "reflexive agents" and the evaluations and feelings of older children create possibilities for personal change and development. As already noted, a number of theorists have viewed these developments in terms of their costs. For example, Harris (1993) seems to concur with Rosenberg's (1990) general position and its developmental implications:

... once the privacy of others' emotions is understood, the child can begin to wonder about the authenticity of other people's professions of happiness, fearlessness, or love. (p. 241)

An older child may, for example, doubt whether someone really is proud when they use the word, although such doubts should not merely be taken to indicate a cynical attitude. For it is possible that a child will speculate whether an adult or another child really is "pretending to be proud", boasting of something that they really did not do, or proud of something that is not particularly special. However, Rosenberg's general emphasis on scepticism
should be rejected and in so doing it is possible to explore other practical ways in which children demonstrate the importance of discourse-dependent forms of personal reflexivity in relation to their own and other's emotions.

A challenge to the general view that recognition of the privacy of other people's emotions entails uncertainty about the genuineness of their feelings can be achieved by examining the relations in many practices between relevant considerations of other reflexive actors and a child's own reflexive skills. Some of these issues may suggest interesting extensions of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following, judgements, language and privacy (i.e., without necessarily producing a Wittgensteinian developmental theory; cf. Jost, 1995). For example, Reissland and Harris' (1991) study of the display rules involved in the expression of pride provides a relevant example of how older children are brought to consider the mismatched nature of competition with a younger child. The study suggests that older children are trained to engage in self-control when expressing their pride and thus drawing the attention of an adult to a particular achievement in a manner that can be described as the mastery of a rule-governed technique. The adult view of children's age-related abilities of children is therefore used to judge appropriate claims to competitive success and to create particular opportunities in which appropriate evaluative feelings of pride can be expressed\(^{93}\). Thus we can understand why older children are able to recognize "that another child's pride might mean that the best way to help

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\(^{93}\) Another example of the practices in which children's experiences and expressions of pride are located is in Lewis Carroll's (1865/1973) *Alice in Wonderland*.

"And that's the jury-box," thought Alice; "and those twelve creatures," (she was obliged to say "creatures," you see, because some of them were animals, and some were birds,) "I suppose they are the jurors." She said this last word two or three times over to herself, being rather proud of it: for she thought, and rightly too, that very few little girls of her age knew the meaning of it at all. However, "jurymen" would have done just as well. (p. 176)
them deal with their tears is not to call undue attention to them" (Goleman, 1996, p. 105), without necessarily requiring that they articulate the basis for these considerations in terms of explicit rules (e.g., after specific training by another person in a manner that can be captured by a comprehensive theory of rules and emotional development).

Rather than detailing the issues raised by pride in relational interchanges, it is more relevant to examine older children's experiences of privacy. For example, in addition to the creation of privacy through controlling the expression of pride, it is also possible for a sense of privacy to be experienced when an adult misunderstands a child's remark (i.e., because a relevant emotional expression is not taken up by another person or persons). Moreover, in the following example a power imbalance in the relationship between Brother William and his pupil Adso prevents the latter from providing clarification:

"Very well," William whispered to me, "so another door does exist, but we are not to know about it." I smiled, proud of his deduction, and he scolded me: "And don't laugh. As you have seen, within these walls laughter doesn't enjoy a good reputation." (Eco, 1983, p. 9-6)

An interesting aspect of this example is the sense in which an older child may "know" that he feels pride and yet he (or she) is not able to clarify an adult's mistaken impression (e.g., perhaps even when that person is the object of his pride). Thus on many occasions, older children may not have the opportunity or power within a particular relationship or institution to challenge the way in which their actions and reactions are positioned.

In relation to the issue of the practical mastery of emotion-related information it is also worth mentioning other issues for further investigation.
As already mentioned in relation to the excerpt from *To kill a mockingbird*, successfully exercising self-control of particular emotions can, in turn, lead to the possibility that an older child can be proud of this ability (i.e., older children can take pride in the fact that they have attained or exceeded a particular standard of conduct for individuals of the same age). Accordingly, there is the possibility that new emotion-related skills may themselves be positively evaluated and thus, generate new emotions and notions of identity. But it is also worthwhile exploring the possibility that negative evaluation of a child’s current and past conduct may generate emotions of embarrassment and shame. It is clearly beyond the present account to analyze in detail many of the possible connections between pride and feelings of embarrassment or shame. Nevertheless, it is interesting to speculate that some form of active reparation may need to be made before an emotional or more general sense of pride can be restored.

In summary, further examples of the practical and discursive relations between knowledge of other people’s emotions and relevant individual reflexive abilities and experiences were examined. A critical view was adopted of Rosenberg’s argument that older children’s understanding of other people’s abilities to keep their feelings private results in general doubt about the genuineness of people’s emotions. Instead, assembled examples of pride suggested that older children’s understanding of others as reflexive actors is closely wedded to rule-governed actions and particular discursive skills (i.e., examples of self-control and alternative expressions of emotion). It is also possible that older children may not have the opportunity to clarify what they were in fact thinking or feeling because of the power of adults to control conversation. Lacking the opportunity to express private feelings especially when the emotions of an older children are misunderstood may
provide further practical information about emotions that could feed back into subsequent interactions (e.g., pride in an individual's self-control or maturity on a particular occasion). It was also noted that practically oriented knowledge of the reactions of others might also create the possibility of shifts from pride to embarrassment or shame.

8.2 Personal development and growing emotional autonomy

To this point an attempt has been made to represent developmental aspects of presumably central emotion-related forms of personal reflexivity. Examples of pride have been surveyed in order to counter the developmental implications of Rosenberg's theory of emotion. These surveyed examples have been assembled in a manner that is consistent with Wittgenstein's philosophical method and remarks, while also acknowledging that Wittgenstein was not doing "child psychology" (RPP II, §337). The power of these remarks, at least in this section, comes from their ability to help disentangle problems that arise in two prominent developmental perspectives. The first position is the social constructionist account of privatization (Harré, 1983; Harré & Gillett, 1994; Shotter, 1993c, 1997; Wertsch, 1993) in which a number of connections have been forged between Wittgenstein's philosophy and Vygotsky's psychology. The second perspective is cognitive and focuses on the role played by processes such as memory, perception, attention, evaluation, abstract reasoning, analysis, synthesis (Rosenberg, 1990; see also Lewis, 1994; Stipek, 1983; Stipek, Recchia, & McClintic, 1992) in the creation and diversification of emotions.
(i.e., the internal changes that occur when these processes become "self-directed" and thereby transform, possibly in a hierarchical manner, more "basic" emotional and cognitive processes). The aim of this section is not to make the social constructionist account fulfil its obvious potential in relation to pride, but rather to avoid the conceptual problems of both privatization and internalization accounts.

**Autonomy and the "self-creation" of complex emotions**

Previous sections have indicated specific ways in which older children's identity projects and other forms of positioning change the experience, content and expression of pride. Instances of pride that should be regarded as relatively late developmental achievements also require earlier changes to, or radical transformations of, a widely shared biological potential. However, before internalization theories and their focus on internal developmental changes can be evaluated, it is important to examine in detail the view that complex emotions such as pride should be described as "self-created" (especially as this position is not entirely incompatible with some versions of social constructionism).

A common position on social and reflexive emotions such as pride, shame and guilt, which can be traced back to Cooley and Mead, is described by Kemper (1993):

...since role taking or reflexivity is proactive, it empowers the individual as an agent in the self-creation of his or her own emotions. (p. 49)
Other sociologists and psychologists have similarly attempted to account for the reflexive features of emotions such as pride, shame and guilt in a manner that is broadly consistent with Rosenberg's theory (or at least Rosenberg's implied developmental account). Harris (1989), for example, argues that reflexive emotions occur when the internalized "roles" of actor and observer continue to feed off one another in a recursive fashion. However, it is important to tread warily when theorists argue that pride can occur "when no one else is looking but oneself" because children have developed an "internal or internalized audience" (Shott, 1979, p. 1236; Harter & Whitesell, 1989, p. 93).

The position to be developed here is that younger children's expressions and experiences of pride do indeed develop in a manner that is self-created (but not because we have appropriated another person's or an institution's "role"). Both young children's greater participation in cultural practices and their developing autonomy from significant others increase social demands and drive the development of new standards of skill and emotional literacy (as illustrated by the fact that it is more difficult for older children to secure parental pride and praise for the same or similar achievements and moral actions as they get older). The main difficulty in providing an account of older children's potential to create forms of individual and idiosyncratic pride is that two contrasting points need to be reconciled. These are older children's growing enmeshment in further social relations and the concurrent emergence of more complicated judgements, thoughts and emotions. In contrast to this general division between social and individual foci, it is more useful to speculate whether the focus on socially constrained but individually-embodied reflexive skills can bridge this gap. More specifically, we may ask whether examples of pride
may indicate whether self-consciousness, self-mastery or autobiography is the most relevant form of personal reflexivity to focus upon. It is another matter to determine if the position is useful in accounting for the development of pride and what social constructionists prefer to describe as the creation of private and individual psychological space from public-collective practices.

An emerging consensus from recent studies is to describe pride as a self-conscious emotion (Lewis, 1993) rather than the product of a particular type of self-evaluation (see next section). With regard to this contemporary issue, a useful remark can be found in the early work of Mead (1934):

... self-consciousness, rather than affective experience with its motor accompaniments, provides the core and primary structure of the self, which is thus essentially a cognitive rather than an emotional phenomenon. (p. 173)

Although some aspects of Mead's account can be challenged, his point is relevant to a broad discursive treatment of pride, the self and self-consciousness. In particular, the notion of self-consciousness as a cognitive phenomenon can be taken to suggest a child's developing discourse-informed ability to comment upon the relevant features of their experience. The term "cognitive" therefore suggests judgements and thoughts that have been appropriated on the basis of participation in relevant cultural practices, rather than a representation or idea of the self that must be present before self-evaluation can occur94. To put this point in another way, it is important

94 The conception of "cognition" of relevance to pride is therefore broader than Rosenberg's view of developmentally pre-existing cognitive processes such as memory, perception, attention, evaluation, abstract reasoning, analysis and synthesis which are eventually "brought to bear upon the self as an object" (p. 3; and which might seem to afford a focus on internal levels of processes rather than different abilities as manifest in social practices). Central to Rosenberg's argument is not just the view that "if people have memory, they can remember the self" (p. 3) but, more specifically, the argument that these processes will
to examine how an individual who "has a self" and is capable of "self-affirming emotional experiences" develops this "structure" by participating in relevant practices.

An alternative is to examine how pride emerges in discourse-laden expressions which are reacted to by other individuals and, usually, refined in accordance with relevant expressive norms. Unfortunately, the survey provides few examples of the variety of activities in which younger children have the opportunity to experience pride when they are by themselves. Probably the best illustration of this is Harris' (1989) description of children's gestures, vocalizations and reactions as they perform gymnastic feats by themselves without the potential for parental approbation. In accord with a social constructionist perspective, forms of pride in younger children do seem to involve characteristic expressions and displays which are primarily directed toward securing the actual or possible attention of other people. However, with regard to the issue of self-consciousness and development, a contrasting example implies a child who feels proud of something but who is also uncomfortable with the attention she might receive:

This day the child had brought a tight little nosegay of pinks, white ones, with a rim of pink ones. She was very proud of it, and very shy because of her pride. (Lawrence, 1915/1974, p. 254)

Shyness may provide a contrast to the usually confident public displays connected with pride in younger children because they represent alternative...
"individual histories of participation in the relevant discourses" (Harre & Gillett, 1994, p. 175). This example supports the view adopted in the previous chapter that the experience of pride is inseparable from an awareness of, potentially or actually, being the object of another person's attention (i.e., which persist into adulthood in more complicated ways).

Pride is therefore experienced when young children engage in activities in isolation and react positively when they perform well or think they have done something that is special. Consistent with the account already offered, it is reasonable to think that particular gestures and phrases will also occur such as "I did well", "look at me" or an emphatic "yes!". However, it is also possible for adults and other children to ridicule the achievements of younger children in competitive, moral and skill-improving situations. Recalling the example of Jem and Scout in section 8.1, while a younger child may want to boast about her father's ability at school, her brother regards this potential boast as childish. Another relevant example from Carroll's (1865/1973) Alice in Wonderland suggests that younger children may be more susceptible to comparisons with others (although we have to imagine, in this case, that a Mock Turtle is another child):

"We had the best of educations — in fact, we went to school every day —"  
"I've been to a day-school, too," said Alice.  
"You needn't be so proud as all that."  
"With extras?" asked the Mock Turtle, a little anxiously.  
"Yes," said Alice: "we learned French and music." (p. 155)

experiences" do not "account for the origin of the self, or of the self-feeling which is supposed to characterize such experiences" (p. 173).
This segment seems to be based on a close examination of young children's conversations because a conversational move by the Mock Turtle sounds very much like the possible reaction of another child: namely, after inquiring about the availability of different "extras" the Turtle concludes: "Ah! Then yours wasn't a really good school" (p. 155). Although the conclusions based on this example are limited, it does seem reasonable to argue that feedback will help young children to distinguish outcomes that "are worthy of praise" from those that only "seem to be special". In this way, younger children do not just learn to feel proud or to use the word in appropriate circumstances, but engage in actions and master skills that provide opportunities for them to have self-affirming and developmentally significant emotional experiences.

To reiterate, younger children can be said to create emotions such as pride without engaging in specific or general forms of "reflexive role-taking". Instead of describing pride in terms of an internalized role or audience, an account was provided of the increasingly autonomous participation of children in discursive practices with attendant psychological changes. Of the three aspects of personal reflexivity mentioned by Harré, self-consciousness was emphasized in relation to pride and argued to be the most important to understanding personal development (i.e., rather than a focus exclusively on "reflexive affective experiences" or self-directed cognitive abilities). Mead's potentially misleading view that the self is a cognitive rather than emotional phenomenon was distinguished from Rosenberg's less discursive sense of reflexive cognition. Two examples of relevant discourse-based skills were examined in order to show that pride involves an awareness of the actual or potential approbation of others in comparative, moral, skill-improving and competitive practices. Thus pride
can be regarded "self-created" by younger children's active and thoroughly discursive participation in increasingly demanding linguistic and cultural practices.

The advantages and disadvantages of a "privatization" account of pride

The treatment of pride in the previous section complements the observational and conversation-based inference that younger children have "a vivid image of themselves as agents who may or may not live up to moral standards" (Harris, 1993, p. 97). However, at this point we need to engage with the different theoretical perspectives of social constructionism and cognitivism to begin to address the developmental limitations of Rosenberg's theory. Although the next section will examine relevant forms of reflexive agency in relation to pride, the main focus here is on social constructionists' extensions of Wittgenstein's PLA and account of rule-following to counter the cognitive account of personal emotions and private experience. The latter perspective is exemplified by Rosenberg's view that particular adult emotions are only possible because basic "internal states of arousal" come "to be mixed with elements that are separate from the physiological experience" (Rosenberg, 1990, pp. 3-4; i.e., socially derived, self-referential and higher-order cognitive processes). The advantages and disadvantages of an alternative privatization perspective will also be highlighted in relation to important features of pride.

One of the advantages of focusing on the social process of privatization is that it helps psychologists to avoid the Cartesian, dualistic picture that accompanies the notion of internalization (see Wertsch, 1993). In particular, it destabilizes the central view that an internal, embodied
change must not only accompany but underlie developing individual abilities to understand and to accord with the rules governing particular discursive and cultural practices. Although the privatization perspective may only seem to be attacking a metaphor, psychologists who have engaged with Wittgenstein's philosophy, or Vygotsky's supposedly compatible developmental psychology, have no desire to support a general division between "outer behaviour" and "inner processes". Social constructionists, in particular, use Wittgenstein's philosophical remarks about the possibility of a private language and related rule-following abilities in order to resist the outer-inner picture (i.e., regardless of whether we are talking of mastering concepts in mathematics or correctly using an emotion word in the first person). This is not to deny many of the phenomena that can be broadly grouped under the category of cognition and which might be divided into higher and lower processes. Rather, a particularly narrow view of cognition is opposed which, due to its unquestioned reliance on the outer-inner picture, introduces a distinction where it is most likely to provide a misleading account of the predominantly linguistic extension and refinement of particular emotion "dispplays". Rosenberg exemplifies this mistaken view in his already mentioned, reflexive-cognitive account of people's abilities to identify and describe the supposedly private, inner referents of emotion words. The point here is that because the use of emotion words is rule-governed, Wittgenstein's arguments can be used to disabuse psychologists of the view that mastering a rule entails some form of hidden, internal change to young children's dispositions to monitor their own behaviour and interpret social situations (e.g., a young child's reaction to his or her own performance or parental praise along with what he or she then identifies as the subsequent feeling).
Several critical points can be combined against misleading cognitive accounts which emphasize the internalization of rules without a convincing account of language use in conversational and cultural activities. We have already examined Mead's criticism of accounts that emphasize "self-feelings" such as pride and also their underlying processes of self-evaluation, but which fail to account for the development of the self. The criticism is again relevant because many accounts of pride appeal to a narrow sense of cognition as an embodied representation of a rule. For example, Lewis (1993) argues that the standards, rules or goals (SRGs) of particular cultures are "transmitted to children and involve their learning of, and willingness to consider these SRGs as their own" (Lewis, 1993, p. 364). However, the problems of an outer-inner division begin to appear when Lewis suggests:

The standard can be external, as in the case of parental or teacher sanction or praise, or it can be internal, as in the case of the child's developing its own standards. (p. 234)

Moreover, it becomes apparent in the further remarks about the development of young children's abilities to compare their behaviour against standards, goals and rules when a form of self-evaluation or "inner comparison" is emphasized. For example, Stipek et al. (1992) pursue this point through to the conclusion that pride requires "the ability to represent a standard of performance and to compare one's performance to that standard" (p. 318).

The salient effect of the outer-inner division, in the case of pride, is to shift attention to hidden "components" and cognitive precursors which social constructionists would rather conceptualize in terms of privacy. For
example, Lewis (1993) argues that pride and other similar emotions do not have a "clear cause-and-effect pattern" with the result that "no event that can be used consistently as an elicitor ... [of] self-conscious emotions" (p. 366, *brackets added*). Moreover, Lewis (1993) suggests that pride is very much dependent upon the way in which a child interprets events (i.e., the way a child sees his or her actions or self in relation to particular standards, rules or goals). This is consistent with Stipek et al.'s (1992) account:

- In both the achievement and the moral domains, an internalized set of standards begins to develop soon after children are able to represent standards and rules cognitively and to recognize that others' approval and disapproval is contingent upon meeting standards. (p. 76)

However, privacy is an issue because cognitivists realize that pride and similar emotions are "likely to require classes of events that can only be identified by the individual themselves" (Lewis, 1993, p. 563). In order to avoid these problems, social constructionists favour a public-private distinction and note that much of our thought is previously public conversation that becomes "internal" or private because it is "spoken" *sotto voce* (Harré & Gillett, 1994; i.e., in a form that is not meant to be said "out loud").

It should be clear from previous sections that it is of little utility to us to say that pride is a reflexive speech-act directly analogous to being angry with oneself, so it is not surprising that it similarly makes little sense to say that pride is a *sotto voce* reflexive speech-act (see chapter 7). Social constructionists instead present a more complicated picture in which the fact that "people tend to take normative attitudes to their own dispositions and responses" should be regarded as *sotto voce* copies or appropriations "of
the responses that others make to an actor’s responses” (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 117). An illustration of a more complicated “privatized conversation” account of pride is Harris’ (1989) description of the tendency of younger children to:

... ruminate about what will happen at home and imagine the praise that this success will earn from their parents. As a result of this imaginative anticipation, children savour the pleasure — or pride, as we may call it — that such approval arouses. (p. 93)

Imagination may be regarded as a private experience in which children are preoccupied by conversations and interactions that they have with other people who are not present. And a significant feature of such imagined outcomes is that the child will often give himself or herself the best lines and outcomes, so to speak, in their imagined conversations. Also it is likely that as children develop, conventions about remaining quiet and claiming achievements appropriate to their age and abilities will combine to change the public form and private content of any “childish” fantasies.

Although Harris provides an plausible example of a more complicated account of private cognitive processes, other problems with the privatization perspective seem to stem from the incorrect appropriation of Wittgenstein’s philosophical remarks by psychologists. In particular, while it is appropriate for social constructionists to argue that young children copy and adopt public discourse and then use this to structure their reactions and activities, the view of thought as a private or internal conversation with oneself that young children can continue sotto voce is adhered to because it is crucial to the potential intelligibility of private experiences. In other words, it is only because the sotto voce instances of pride-related emotion and judgement are based on public forms that accord with appropriate rules, “theory of
emotion", or "emotionology" (Harré & Gillett, 1994) that we are able to understand children's private versions. Moreover, on this view relevant "cognitions" are hidden, but still potentially intelligible to others, in the same way that individuals may choose to keep their thoughts, feelings and judgements secret\textsuperscript{95}. Contrasting with this view of the collective or public and private distinction, cognitivists rely on an outer-inner division which privileges "inner" developments and transformations (and therefore need to rely on reflexive cognition to make the move from private experiences to intelligible public conversation).

These contrasting positions can be illustrated by analyzing Lewis' (1993) already cited view that a standard can be "internal, as in the case of the child's developing its own standards" (p. 234). If we extend this view of standards to other rules – including rules for the use of particular psychological concepts – then the case is analogous to one mentioned by Wittgenstein in relation to private experiences:

Imagine someone saying: "But I know how tall I am!" and laying his hand on top of his head to prove it. (PI, §279)

The point is that such a private definition does not connect with the public practice in which people's heights are measured and compared (i.e., practices in which people demonstrate that they know what the concept "tall" means). Similarly, although a younger child may have a proud reaction

\textsuperscript{95} On the privatization view it is not particularly useful to trace how such internal, private and perhaps idealized conversations emerge from prior cognitive abilities (e.g., such as a form of basic anticipation, memory, images etc.; see Gadenne (1989) in Part 1, chapter 2, section 2.3 for an example of a misleading emphasis on basic cognitive processes). The main reason not to focus the developmental account of pride and self-evaluation on prior forms of internal representation of a standard, rule or goal is the failure of this cognitive approach to account for the younger child's changing discursive engagement with and disengagement from particular cultural and linguistic practices. Accordingly, there is no need to think that previously existing, discrete cognitive abilities create the self when a child begins to evaluate, remember and think about him or herself.
there are conventional limits to the potential for an individual to create their own "internal standard". The same argument applies to other rule-governed practices and, perhaps, also to "private goals" (e.g., which might be regarded as primitive "identity projects"). Social constructionists quite rightly avoid a restricted sense of cognition in which internal processes are severed from their relevant manifestation collective-public practices.

However, while "self-ish" thought and emotion are privatized versions of public forms of language and display (Harré, 1989), a disadvantage of the privatization account is that there are few references to relevant neurophysiological changes. Accordingly, Harré and Gillett (1994) have attempted to rectify the lack of information about the way in which self-conscious rule-following and, more specifically, "words operate to fulfil their cognitive role and to organize brain function" (p. 82). Unfortunately, by reinterpreting existing studies of the brain as the "physical medium in which mental content is realized and plays a part in the discursive activities of individuals" (p. 81), it is possible that the worst aspects of the internalization account may be let in by the back door. For example, it may seem reasonable to attempt to localize the cognitive processes responsible for the development of emotions such as pride because these must be the "elements that are separate from the physiological experience" (p. 3)

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96 However, there should be plenty of room in the social constructionist account for children to adopt idiosyncratic forms of expression, to make mistakes and even to break rules intentionally. With regard to children's pride, for example, a rule might be indicated by such specific terms as "mum said tidying my room is good". Although these rules are likely to be widely shared there may also be particular differences, for example, with other families. A young child may therefore suspect that his or her parents are imparting rules, standards and goals that are not generally adhered to by others within their wider community. However, if the aim is to master a discursive practice and related skills then it is important for children not to question the appropriateness of a particular rule, standard or goal. A future study could examine how this "cultural training" relies on parents to provide discursive possibilities to promote children's developing values in a manner that will allow them to accord with a wider community.
described by Rosenberg (1990)\textsuperscript{97}. While this issue will be examined in the next section, for the moment it is important to note that clearer accounts are emerging of what it means to act according to a collective or public rule, standard or goal. It has already been noted that the criteria for acting according to a rule, standard or goal cannot be replaced by “one-way” physiological correlates (see Part 1, chapter 2). With respect to pride, it is more important to investigate how:

... in order to be self-consciously acting according to a rule, the actor must not only know the rule, but he or she must be reflexively knowledgeable about its nature, that is they must . . . know how to justify their application of it if challenged by others to do so, and how to correct their behaviour to accord with it if shown by others to be wrong. (Shotter, 1993c, p. 69)

With regard to a potential account of pride and its self-affirming features, it is encouraging to find Shotter (1993c, 1996) arguing that our “inner lives” are not nearly as orderly, logical and fixed in their construction as some versions of the privatization view would have us believe. However, we still need to provide an account of the manner in which specific neurophysiologically grounded features of emotions such as their time-course, duration and intensity are affected by participation in specific discursive practices.

To summarize, an advantage of the privatization account is that it avoids the outer-inner dualism of cognitive theories of personal and emotional development. In contrast, cognitive accounts that focus on internalized standards and inner comparisons are deeply suspect. Because social constructionists have engaged with Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-

\textsuperscript{97}It is worth noting that Rosenberg describes the separate “physiological experience” as reactions which:

... are chiefly products of the autonomous nervous system and of the activities of certain portions of the brain. (p. 3)
following and PLA, they prefer to focus on the distinction between public and private conversational practices. This distinction allows them to argue that private thoughts, feelings and judgements can be intelligibly revealed by younger children because they have been appropriated from correct or collective-public discourse (i.e., in contrast to the cognitive view of hidden and unpredictable cognitive "elicitors" of self-conscious emotions). Harris' account of pride was also used to illustrate how children's sotto voce judgements and feelings can be regarded as privatized conversations that children have when they engage in activities by themselves. However, the privatization account has the disadvantage of suggesting that all psychological experiences are derivatives of public forms of language and display. While recent accounts of discursive activities and brain function suggest the potential to privilege studies of internal changes that ground instances of younger children acting according to a rule, standard or goal, we still need to examine how discursive participation has idiosyncratic effects on specific neurophysiological features of pride.

The diversification of emotions and the example of pride

Although the point of a survey is not to use survey examples to choose between theoretical positions, from a Wittgensteinian perspective conceptual errors in any account of pride need to be identified and disentangled. The previous section provided some reasons why a social constructionist account based on a public-private distinction is preferable to a cognitive outer-inner framework. But despite the insights of the privatization account, social constructionists have not specifically addressed
the way in which children's discursive participation is related to neurophysiological changes. In contrast, cognitive psychologists stress the developmental role that internal, cognitive changes play in creating pride from the prerequisite emotion of happiness or joy. The aim of this section, therefore, is to detail the effects that young children's active and reflexive participation in discursive practices have on features of emotion that are seen as prime candidates for neurophysiological explanation (i.e., intensity, time-course and duration).98

When internalization and privatization accounts are applied to pride, both positions say little about developmentally significant aspects of its display, expression, identification and experience. Although Rosenberg's theory suggests relevant forms of reflexive agency, he fails to leave sufficient room for pride (and presumably, shame and guilt) in the distinction between emotions that are the result of reflexive or nonreflexive processes. Because these emotions are not the product of specific intentions or decisions about what "I want to feel", Rosenberg categorizes them as nonreflexive, immediate and spontaneous reactions. However, pride does not seem to be a good example of an emotion that is created when young children attempt to control their emotions, or produce others, by "changing either the immediate external situation, or the thought processes sustaining the emotion" (Harris, 1993, p. 241). The main focus should therefore shift to the role of reflexive cognition in the creation and diversification of emotions such as pride from more simple internal states of physiological arousal (e.g., happiness). However, if the arbitrary categorical distinction between

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98 Whether an account is still required that focuses on correlates of important changes in the expression and experience of pride or "the microconsequences of consecutive, cumulative changes" (Scherer, 1993, p. 154), depends on the extent to which brain scan studies, for example, are needed to tell us more about why pride is not merely the development result of brain maturation.
reflexive and nonreflexive processes is dropped, there is no reason to think that many of the skills that Rosenberg categorizes as instances of reflexive or non-reflexive agency cannot be used to account for the development of pride.

Given this shift of focus, an initial point to emerge from observations in the empirical literature is that younger children's pride is often experienced and expressed in relation to significant others. In particular, Harter and Whitesell (1989) note that when younger children talk about pride an important part of the experience is that "significant others were proud . . . of the self" (p. 95). The point is consistent with Harris' account of rumination and pride in the previous section and is useful because it suggests how pride "diversifies" from happiness through opportunities to express pride to another person that encourage further thoughts and conversations (i.e., imagined or anticipated responses). For example, the excitement and anticipation related to pride seem likely to persist, given no other interruptions or negative events, until an achievement or positive outcome can be shared with another person. This sharing of an experience may, in some cases, also focus on the specific display of an item such as a certificate or painting and be met by a parent with praise, a reward or an affectionate touch. These points are worth mentioning because they are likely to focus the expression of emotion and make the experience of pride more intense. They also contrast with the effects of parental criticism and rejection as well as the disappointment of a young child who is not able to share an achievement with a "significant other".

The emotional experience of pride may also be attenuated because the relevant achievement is not particularly special. As already noted, both the expression of pride and proud displays of a particular outcome may
need to be controlled by the child in order to avoid parental, sibling or peer criticism. In this form of cultural training, children will develop a refined sense of the possibilities for praise and reward in a given situation as well as sources of conflict that may occur when their concern is only to secure the approbation of peers. There is also the possibility that proud claims and boasts may be embellished for the sake of peer approval. In this respect, it is worth recalling the example from *To kill a mockingbird* and, more specifically, the younger sibling’s realization that her father’s skill with a gun will provide a topic to boast about at school. The point is that these examples help to establish the extent to which experiences and expressions of pride in younger children are dependent upon the positive evaluation of others. The relevant form of privatized discourse is one that might be expressed as the fact that “others will be proud of me” rather than a robust sense in which “I have done well” and, therefore, can be of “proud of myself”.

The latter issue, in particular, provides an opportunity to discuss further aspects of the “late occurrence” of pride due to its dependence on discourse. A relevant point is that when children use the word pride to express their emotions, they create discursive positions that usually reflect a shared understanding (see chapter 7). Relevant forms of positioning which are created when children use the word “pride” in particular circumstances include the relations of a child to adults and other children as well as claims of personal effort and ability. Of course, what younger children claim to be proud of may indicate what they do not understand (i.e., rather than an experience of an idiosyncratic form of pride that accords with a private rule, standard or goal). Seidner, Stipek, & Feshbach (1988), for example, suggest that a child’s statement “I felt proud when my uncle got married” — which was presumably offered in reply to the question “can you tell me when
you've felt pride" — is a cognitive error (i.e., rather than a legitimate expression of pride). The main reason they cite for describing the example as an error is that an appropriate reason for using the word pride in such a situation is not "because it felt good and I was happy" (i.e., in contrast to "I was the one who brought them together"). However, if we wanted to analyze the nature of the error in discursive terms it could be said that this child's mistake was that he (or she?) positioned himself in a narrative which would normally have a number of practical and personal consequences. For example, it is reasonable to think that if the uncle decided to annul the marriage almost immediately afterwards, some measure of embarrassment, shame or disappointment would probably occur.

When we begin to examine the role of emotion words and their place in wider clusters of concepts and available discursive positions, it is also important to examine ways in which adopting particular discursive forms will affect the expression and experience of pride. A younger child's recognition that a parent will be proud of his or her actions or a particular outcome, rather than merely be pleased or happy, lessens the need for a specific parental presence. Moreover, whether pride is used in either the copied and self-directed third person sense or spontaneously and correctly in the first person, mastery of relevant discourses must substitute for more physical forms of emotional expression. For example, mastery of the appropriate discourse means that a younger child will not need to use more physical and "childish" gestures and displays to draw another person's attention to a special achievement (e.g., in a manner analogous to gestures that deaf children may continually need to draw attention to achievements and positive outcomes even when they are older). Consistent with Wittgensteinian perspective, section 8.3 will examine further details
surrounding the possibility that younger children's mastery of appropriate emotion discourse works to extend and to substitute for related speech-acts, gestures and displays.

In summary, early instances of pride are often represented by children in terms of how a significant other was proud of them before the later development in which they are proud of themselves. Nevertheless, it is important not to overestimate the appropriate psychological surroundings in which forms of pride occur. This point was demonstrated by the fact that some children's uses of pride that do not involve their parents still require correction because they would clearly not experience the opposite of pride if circumstances turned out to entail personal embarrassment. Thus, use of the discourse appropriate to the words "pride" and "proud" can become a powerful organizer of a younger child's reactions by extending or replacing other more "primitive" gestures, expressions and displays.

8.3 Cultural training, supplementation and emotional development

This last section will address remaining issues in order to complete the critical and reflexive treatment of Rosenberg's reflexivity and emotion theory. Again surveyed examples of pride are assembled in order to highlight problems with the "internal logic" of the theory and its extension to developmental issues. Consistent with the recognition of the strengths and limits of this approach, examples are presented as a resource with which to resist the generalizing tendency of theory construction. However, the approach also has a positive role of suggesting possible directions for future
discursively oriented research. Although the result could be seen as an attempt to make a social constructionist account of development work, the aim is to be critical of any approach in psychology that has the potential to misrepresent significant events in the development of very young children's emotions and forms of personal reflexivity (i.e., particularly with regard to supplementation and cultural training).

Significant events in the early understanding and development of pride

Although the project of distinguishing the relative developmental importance of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition is an intellectual activity of suspect worth, engaging with the detail of relevant theories can achieve some clarity. For example, the following remark by Rosenberg is consistent with the importance attached to cognitive development by Lewis (1993), Stipek (1992), and Stipek et al. (1993) in the sense that it helps us to understand the significance of general doubt as a developmental achievement:

Emotional display may cloud interpersonal relationships with doubt and suspicion. It is probably for this reason that the emotional expressions of nonself-reflexive organisms hold such an inordinate appeal for human beings. When a dog barks joyously at our return or when a young child flings its arms affectionately around our necks, these expressions are doubly precious because we know them to be genuine. The dog or the child is not putting on an act or presenting an emotional facade. Knowing that animals and young children lack the capacity for reflexivity we are aware that their emotional expressions represent their emotional experiences accurately. (p. 10)
Criticisms of Rosenberg's account not only centre on his need to maintain rigid distinctions between his categories of reflexive and nonreflexive (or nonself-reflexive) emotion-related activities\textsuperscript{99}, but also on the main contentious point that the early developments that provide the basis for pride and forms of personal reflexivity are primarily cognitive. For it seems reasonable to think that the notion of reflexive agency must also have prerequisites in the intentional and nonself-reflexive activities of very young children.

A counter to both Rosenberg's theoretical points comes from an example of a young child's account of her actions which not only reflect positively on her\textsuperscript{100} but also evoke a positive parental evaluation:

A Christchurch mother was thrilled to learn that her daughter, aged five, had inherited her environmental concerns. Her brother had spied her picking up rubbish in the school playground every lunch-hour. Daughter's explanation was that she loved tidying up after messy people. Her teacher told her otherwise. The rubbish duty was punishment for her incessant chatter in class. \textit{(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 April 1992b)}

The example, presented under the article title of "Not so proud", provides useful material for analysis. For in contrast to Rosenberg's emphasis on the genuine emotions of children and animals, it is clear that children can

\textsuperscript{99} Although the relevant remark from Wittgenstein to assemble at this point might be the following, it is important to reiterate that we want to examine the implications of more passive discrepancies between emotional experience and expression in relation to pride:

Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of an unweaned infant is not a pretence?—And on what experience is our assumption based? (Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one.) \textit{(PI, §249; see PI, §250 for a similar remark about the "surroundings" that are missing for a dog to be able to provide a "real simulation" of pain).}

\textsuperscript{100} It would have been possible to write "her self" here as some developmental psychologists have in relation to pride (i.e., that a child knows that a significant other or audience is proud of "the self"). However, the expression has the potential to mislead through its implication of a reified object. An alternative is to examine the discursive practices and grammatical forms that lead Stipek et al. (1992) to note that "a concept of the self as a distinct entity . . . is necessary for a child to engage in self-evaluation" (p. 1).
engage in forms of passive deception because in this case the child has given an explanation which is based on limited knowledge about what her mother wants to hear rather than on what actually happened. It is not necessarily a skilled deception nor is it particularly malicious (unless, perhaps, some imitation of the normal expressive forms of pride was included in the child's response such as smiling, excitement and adopting an expansive posture). In this case, it is worth noting that the parent's negative evaluation provides an opportunity for a child to learn in a quite practical way about events that will legitimately make her mother happy or proud. In other words, while she may not necessarily learn that there are greater rewards for being honest or moral, a more likely and pragmatic lesson is that parental praise is not always secured by simply telling them what they want to hear. Such experiences are a practical prelude to the more complicated judgements that are such an important part of older child's expressions and experiences of pride (and would, in relation to the above example, probably include an awareness that any form of intentional deception in making a false or unjustified "proud claim" about an achievement would need to be far more cleverly planned).

The developmental significance of such interactions and their implications for the development of privacy is described by Harris (1993) in slightly different terms:

... children may first need to create a discrepancy between what they actually feel and what they express to others in order to start to conceptualize that discrepancy\(^{101}\). (p. 240)

\(^{101}\) Such discrepancies may also provide opportunities for the approval of parents to act as confirmation of a child's personal success rather than to be a more direct cause of a pride-like positive reaction.
However, on Rosenberg's account there is little use in examining the results of young children's inadvertent emotional impressions or effects on others because they "are not the products of human reflexivity and do not represent expressions of emotional display" (p. 8). As already mentioned, the term expression is preferred because of the important connection with particular discursive forms and, additionally, the need to make appropriate conceptual connections. A relevant example of the type of event that can be significant in the development of an understanding of pride in oneself and others is a pre-school child who proudly shows off the stamps for being good and who then says of an adult's tattoos:

That man must have been really good today, he's got stamps all over his face and hands. (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 26 August 1992)

This example could easily be interpreted as an instance in which the young child sees the tattoos of an adult as stamps and therefore generalizes a concept. However, this might tempt us toward a cognitive explanation of an opportunity to learn the rules of a concept — and thus curtail the usage based on a form of generalization — rather than allow us to focus on the role of the parent's correction in its discursive practice. An alternative view is that if the parent corrects this mistake and, as a result, refines the meaning of the relevant words for the child we need not focus on cognitive processes in order to examine the possible change to his or her understanding of the social world. The point is that the "knowledge" a very young child will eventually master in order to understand and express pride is not capable of being secured merely by experience, but must instead be founded on
according with conventional conceptual distinctions in the relevant discursive practice.

This analysis of the importance of according with cultural and societal conventions in order to be able to understand pride-related practices also applies to correct discursive expressions of pride. Although this might seem to be an issue about the use of particular words, it is possible to imagine a child who was brought up in an environment where his or her similar errors were not corrected by an adult. This possible lack of discursive participation allows us to address a further problem with accounts of cognitive changes that underlie the practical mastery of an appropriate rule-governed vocabulary of pride. In particular, because Rosenberg eschews any ascription of reflexive agency to very young children, by implication reflexive cognition must play the most important developmental role. However, while it is possible that reflexive cognition includes other considerations of personal effort and ability such as those described by attribution theory (Weiner, 1986), it is not particularly relevant to examine the extent to which children use other people's reactions to judge whether pride is the appropriate word to identify the emotion that a child is experiencing.

A more pressing problem is the temptation to distinguish between the experience of pride — whether it is described as the result of self-evaluation or not — and the ability to express the emotion correctly in words. Weiner (1986) for example, insists that:

... very young children experience the same emotional reactions to personally caused events as do adults, even though the specific label of pride might not be attached to their reactions. (pp. 133-4)
From a social constructionist perspective, our concern should be to detail the development of pride without explanatory recourse to underlying cognitive changes (i.e., a form of self-evaluation in relation to a standard, rule or goal that produces the reaction of pride or a reflexive cognitive interpretation that is crucial to the identification and expression of the emotion). Interestingly, a complementary criticism offered by Wittgenstein about a similar treatment of the development of hope seems to address the cognitive accounts of both Weiner (1986) and Stipek et al. (1993). In particular, Wittgenstein is critical of examining when “child really begins to feel hope” in terms of “an inner process” (Z, §469) primarily because such speculation quickly invites the further question: “how do we know what we are talking about at all?” (Z, §469). Wittgenstein’s point seems to be that we already have the criteria for judging the genuine occurrence of hope in a young child’s life and similarly we ascribe pride to children who may or not use the word itself without wondering what is going on inside his or her head. By implication, we should not redescribe our extension of the words “hope” and “pride” to young children by focusing on “inner processes” which presumably help to draw a connection between outer words and inner, already existing experiences. Rather, in discursive terms it is more useful to examine the way in which the words “I feel proud” can become a significant discursive extension of other words, expressions and displays once they enter a young child’s growing expressive repertoire.

The temptation to ascribe emotions involving complicated judgements and forms of expression to younger children does not entail that their experiences are the same as cases of pride in older children and adults. The grafting of language onto an expressive action is crucial and there clearly needs to be more study of significant events in very young
children's ability to participate in discursive practices. Moreover, as Wittgenstein notes, it is inappropriate to remark of a child “today she hoped for the first time” since it is clearer to say “Today he said ‘I hope’ for the first time” (RPP II, §15). If this distinction seems pedantic, it is worth noting Weiner's mistaken view that being able to use a word like “pride” for the first time, allows young children to “let adults in” on a previously private experience. In contrast, an approach based on a survey of pride suggests that it does not make sense to talk of a very young child's or infant's private experience prior to correct participation in discursive practices.

In another relevant point which undermines a focus on pre-linguistic experiences or prior cognitions, it is still possible to provide an account of the type of “thoughtful” or “reflective” development that only seems to be explained in cognitive terms (see Part 1, chapter 2, section 2.3 for Wittgenstein's remarks about the summarizing role of explanations which focus on different unconscious mechanisms). More specifically, we can adopt Wittgenstein's view of early cognitive activity by viewing it as a “prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of thought” (Z, §541). On this view, any activities and reactions which seem to provide the basis for eventual linguistic extension and possible replacement in appropriate first person expressions, can be regarded in a third person sense as ascriptions of psychological concepts in “reference to a mode of behaviour” (RPP II, §230). The relevant point with regard to the word “pride” as an expression of an emotion can then be made that it is “not until it finds its particular use in the first-person does it acquire the meaning of mental activity” (RPP II, §230)\textsuperscript{102}. In contrast to Stipek et al. (1992), the result is not to regard pride

\textsuperscript{102} It is also worthwhile stressing a Wittgensteinian view of first person emotion expressions by children that these words should not be regarded as meaningful because the individual concerned has successfully pointed to “myself or some component of my behaviour” (BB, p.
as "a natural consequence of the development of [children's] cognitive processing abilities" (pp. 16-17, *brackets added*). Instead it is important to examine how the full employment of the word "pride" develops in relation to other concepts in the cluster and also with regard to specific appropriate judgements, actions and gestures.

In summary, Rosenberg's view that young children lack reflexive abilities and, accordingly, that their emotional expressions represent their experiences accurately was critically evaluated. Details about the development of pride were used to show that passive forms of deception may still be evident in children. Moreover, inadvertently created discrepancies between the reality of a child's emotions and his or her actions and achievements provide significant opportunities to learn more about the means by which parental praise may be properly secured. Other similar mistakes and errors should also be corrected in practice by individuals who have mastered the appropriate concepts and practices. The evidence of mistaken "generalizations" and the view that very young children have private prelinguistic experiences make it tempting to think that the development of reflexive cognition in the form of self-evaluation (Stipek et al., 1993) or cognitive interpretation in the identification and expression of emotions (Rosenberg, 1990) is crucial to the emergence of pride. However, Wittgenstein's alternative view was used the highlight the irrelevance of referring to internal processes or mechanisms to account for the connection between an ostensibly pre-existing emotion such as pride and the "label" that the word provides. Instead, it was argued that although pride does not fully emerge until it is appropriately and conventionally employed in the first

\[67; \text{see Figure 7, Appendix p. 696 for a relevant picture of first person self-referential pride). This is not to deny the function of other expressions such as "I did well" or "look at me" which}\]
person, important prerequisites of pride can be described in cognitive terms only in the restricted third person sense in which they refer to "modes of behaviour".

**Supplementation, early forms of reflexive agency and the prerequisites of pride**

It should be clear from the previous section that processes of supplementation play an important role in the creating the view that very young children have experiences and reactions which we will eventually help them to articulate. The notion of supplementation is also central to a cultural training and privatization-of-public-discourse account of the emergence and diversification of personal emotions (Harré, 1983; Harré & Gillett, 1994). Of course, the creation of an appropriate general theory has been avoided to this point in favour of assembling relevant examples of pride from our everyday discursive practices. The most obvious reason for avoiding a theoretical account is provided by Rosenberg's example of the negative effects that theory-derived categories can have on our understanding of the expression and experience of particular emotions. For example, Rosenberg's categorical distinction between reflexive and nonreflexive organisms resembles other unhelpful theoretical binaries of social and individual phenomena or non-basic and basic emotions (for an account of the latter see Ortony & Turner (1990)). In this last section it is therefore possible to speculate generally about the extent to which supplementation pervades theoretical and practical accounts of infant

may be used to invite or draw the attention of others to a child's skills, abilities or achievements.
development towards forms of emotion and personal reflexivity that are more recognizable, acceptable and natural to "us"\textsuperscript{103}. More specifically, since an argument against a view of cognition and experience divorced from forms of linguistic expression and behaviour in very young children, it is important to illustrate any relevant forms of supplementation in relation to prerequisite forms of reflexive agency and pride (in particular, intentional behaviour that leads to emotional reactions that resemble pride but which cannot be described as reflexive).

An obvious indication of the motivation of adults to supplement young children's actions is the potential for parental pride to reach levels that seem out of proportion to any actual achievement (and, as noted in previous sections, also susceptible to comparisons and criticism; see chapter 6, section 6.4). But as Dickens (1838/1978) remarked in Nicholas Nickleby "the pride of a mother in her children" cannot be a sin because it is "a compound of two cardinal virtues—faith and hope" (p. 153). More extreme forms of optimism also receive popular attention as in the case of a:

\ldots proud London father [who] bet £100 ($344) that his [three year-old] son will be the next British men's singles champion at Wimbeldon. (*Press* (Christchurch, N.Z.) 8 June 1992; *brackets added*).

It is reasonable to think that there must be widespread variation in the

\textsuperscript{103} The supplementation account is therefore important in providing a middle ground between positions which have been described by Gergen (1995) as the effects of dualism and have arguably:

\ldots supported the creation of a discipline in which individuals are viewed both as systems affected by mechanistic bodily emanations and as self-regulating agents replete with self-awareness and the capacity for moral responsibility. (p. 361)

With regard to pride, the former position is exemplified by Lewis' (1994) account of the early development of pride in the complicated self-organizing "system" of an infant, while the latter
energy and interest that parents invest in encouraging and celebrating their children's achievements (perhaps connected with the practices of particular cultural and historical contexts). However, in place of an account of cultural variations in the supplementation demanded by person and emotion "theories" and ideologies, it is worth asking whether the tendency of parents to look for the smallest signs that their child is special or gifted reflects the broader tendency of adults to regard as significant those occasions when very young children start to act more like "us".

The conceptual-discursive survey of pride reveals a number of relevant examples of supplementation in relation to those activities and reactions that provide the prerequisites for the later development of pride. For example, a photograph caption attached to a newspaper article describes a five year-old boy as "proudly standing" beside his mother who has just graduated with a university degree (Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 5 December 1992b). Obviously, many younger children can be described as proud of another person in the sense that they have something positive to tell other people. But this supplementation seems to involve positioning a child as a supportive son or daughter, regardless of whether they are genuinely interested or not. It is more usual to find that the positioning involves a sense of the child as a moral agent capable of encouraging others or as an autonomous agent who can compete against others in skill-oriented tasks. Such supplementation is apparent when younger children clearly would not succeed against an older child without parental

position is more likely to be found in everyday supplemented commentaries on the complicated behaviour and "inner lives" of very young children.
manipulation of the situation in which they are able to improve their skills (Reissland & Harris, 1991).\footnote{In addition, it is often the case that significant others simply choose not to challenge the actions of a younger child as in the following:}

However, children’s actions are also supplemented by adults when there is a legitimate individual achievement. For example, the phrase “she’s so proud of herself” is used to stress that a child was responsible for and pleased with a particular achievement (i.e., the child’s actions have not been supplemented). Moreover, while a prerequisite for pride is the fact that a child achieves success without assistance, an important psychological “surrounding” is that anger may occur if, for example, a sibling helps a young child to do something that he or she can do for himself or herself. In a further variation, it is also common to find that when a very young child or infant stares at a significant other, they can be described as proud or arrogant. For example, asking parents about instances of pride in their child can elicit such statements as: “Oh yes she looks straight through me when I ask her to do something!” Very young children may also have their feelings of pride embellished, completed or created by adults and siblings in other ways. For example, a child may only need to display something to a parent or smile while engaging in an activity to receive a commentaries such as “now she’s thinking I’ll do this” or “look at me I can walk” and so on. The point is that adults have a natural tendency to evoke pictures of private prelinguistic feelings and instances of saying and thinking to oneself even though this discourse has little support.

Miss five-year old was proud of her efforts in presenting Grannie with an Easter present — a tiny chocolate egg the size of a thumbnail. Grannie duly popped it in her mouth before seeing the accompanying note. Happy easter, it read. This is for you and Grandad to share. Grannie reconciled her guilt with the knowledge that she did not have the surgeon’s skill required to halve such a tiny morsel. \textit{(Press (Christchurch, N.Z.) 21 April 1992a)}
In relation to the issue of personal reflexivity and early forms of non-emotion focused developmental activity, Harris (1989) has argued on the basis of empirical work that “four- and five-year-old children see people chiefly as agents who pursue their own goals, and feel happy or sad depending on whether those goals appear to be realized” (p. 81). However, it also appears that children between the ages of two and five years have only a vague understanding of the reasons why they should not, on some occasions, share personal and other proud events with others. Harris (1993) therefore notes that younger children “do not anticipate that someone acting righteously will feel satisfied or proud at having resisted temptation” (p. 239). Instead, most examples focus on what Thompson (1989) describes as a growing association between internal causality and feelings of pride (or what could instead be described as the physiognomy of mastering activities and sharing an achievement or positive outcome with significant others and which usually involves such characteristic expressions as an erect posture, head up, smiling, looking at a project, drawing the attention of a parent to something, pointing at a particular outcome and applauding, as well as other positive non-linguistic expressions (Alessandri & Lewis, 1993; Stipek et al., 1992). Smiling, facial expressions, posture, and the orientation of an infant’s head all provide important prerequisites of pride when young children attend to activities and begin to seek the approbation and attention of others. Interestingly, displays of contrasting reactions may also provide a means of controlling emotions and therefore function as an important prerequisite to more obviously emotion-centred and intentional instances of reflexive agency. For example, Thompson (1989) notes that an early strategy children use to control their emotions is to look away and thus direct their own attention elsewhere.
Another feature of pride that is different for very young children is described by Stipek et al. (1992): “lacking a concept of self, the implications of praise for personal competence would be lost on an infant” (p. 19). For example, praise offered by others is not the type of more complicated cause of pride that occurs in social situations with older children, but may still be incorporated as something that young children anticipate and imagine when performing activities by themselves and which may also lead to emotional effects that are more persistent than the fleeting happiness of very young children (Stipek, 1983). Accordingly, while Stipek et al. note that they would not expect “to observe approval-seeking behaviour before children approach to age of 2 years” (p. 19), advocates of the “early pride” view adhere to a position that is similar to Sroufe's (1979) argument that the affective expressions of mastery or “effectance” pleasure do not alter much. Instead, what does change are the conditions under which these affective expressions are evoked as well as their personal meaning for the actor. Faced with this alternative to Rosenberg's emphasis on the developmental importance of emotion-related forms of intentional activity and the view of pride as a late, discourse-dependent reaction, a useful technique may be to examine the opposite of supplemented talk of pride with young children and infants. For example, Lewis (1993) suggests that:

... infants show interest when setting about to solve the problem; surprise and joy at the point of discovery; and loss of interest and distress when they have completely mastered the task. (p. 231)

105 The "early pride" view is characterized by Weiner's (1986) remark that an infant's delight at taking their first step demonstrates that they "can indeed experience 'pride'" (p. 134).
When the opposite to pride seems to indicate boredom and inactivity rather than more complicated notions of embarrassment or shameful avoidance, it makes it easier to understand the significant role that pride-like reactions have in children's early development. However, while it might be tempting to discard cultural training and linguistic supplementation in favour of a focus on increasingly complicated and refined neurophysiological and physiological changes, it is of little use to trace the development of increasingly pride-like emotional reactions that children exhibit in their intentional, agentive and attention-seeking actions in neurophysiological terms. As Wittgenstein notes, it may be better to dismiss the notion that all important psychological changes have a correspondingly systematic physiological changes (see Z, §§610-611). Thus rather than look for the basis of important changes in the biological and neurophysiological "system" of the infant, it is better to examine how the reactions of parents and others build unsystematically on children's "primitive" emotions and intentional activities (including those practices in which positive emotions are a means of improving skills rather than an end towards which activities are consciously directed).

In summary, the emergence of pride in supplemented interactions was examined in a manner that included the training and correction by parents that is crucial to very young children's emerging understanding and expression of pride. This section avoided a focus on pre-existing experiences and prior cognitions to highlight instead the importance of prerequisites of reflexive agency in early pride-related discursive interactions. Although there are a number of active and passive ways in which adults and others may supplement very young children's pride-related forms of understanding and expression, children also demonstrate
active and passive ways of responding to themselves and others. While many of these actions cannot be described as forms of reflexive agency in Rosenberg's restricted sense of adults who intend or decide or display or experience particular emotions, it is important to examine such prerequisites as skill improvements which are motivated by pride-like feelings and the control of emotions by directing attention elsewhere. In other words, it is important to examine how the prerequisites of forms of reflexive agency and pride-related expressions develop, despite the conceptual distortion provided by theories such as Rosenberg's.

Summary

Chapter 8 continued the critical treatment of Rosenberg's reflexivity and emotion theory by exploring several general and vague remarks that do not substitute for a convincing developmental account. Rosenberg's emphasis on intentionally emotion-centred and reflexive processes was contrasted with Harre's "general empirical hypothesis" that self-consciousness, autobiography and self-mastery are cultural artefacts which are produced when individuals actively learn appropriate person and emotion theories. The notion common to both accounts that our person and emotion concepts form a theory-like system was "tested" by examining the highly conceptual and skilled instances of understanding and expressing pride in children's discursive activities. An example of interaction between an older child and a younger sibling was used to demonstrate the difficulty of a broad account of the relations between children's conversation-based instances of personal reflexivity and their understanding of other people's potential to
use reflexive skills to engage in emotional deception and manipulation or to keep thoughts and feelings private. Moreover, examples of pride reveal some of the discursive techniques that older children use to establish the independence of their emotions and judgements from familial and institutional expectations. Thus it is important to represent the complicated connections between older children's active participation and practical mastery of the cluster of concepts surrounding pride with the skills, considerations and characteristic expressions that make pride a late developmental occurrence.

Section 8.2 presented examples of pride in relation to younger children and explored problems with privatization and internalization accounts of emotional and personal development. On the privatization view, it seems reasonable to regard pride as an emotion that is "self-created" through increasingly private, imaginative and idiosyncratic appropriations of conversations with peers and adults. In contrast, Rosenberg's theoretical emphasis on the intentional embellishment or control of particular emotions suggested that pride, shame and guilt should be regarded as the products of reflexive cognition. Consistent with an internalization account, Rosenberg emphasizes the way in which physiological arousal comes to be mixed with separable cognitive aspects. Interestingly, some social constructionists are also concerned with internal changes in brain function that occur when young children attempt to self-consciously accord with particular rules, standards and goals (i.e., despite their Wittgenstein-based preference for a public-private distinction). Specific examples of pride were assembled to demonstrate the important role that younger children's participation in discursive practices have on the intensity, duration, time-course and experiential features of their emotions.
Moreover, these examples suggest that the diversification of pride from happiness occurs because of particular forms of participation in relevant discourses and practices (e.g., using the word "pride" in particular circumstances may extend or replace other more "primitive" forms of display, etc.). Thus the development of pride should be regarded as the result of participation in particular discursive and cultural practices, rather than as a natural consequence of children's developing reflexive cognitive abilities.

Section 8.3 examined further instances of pride mainly by parents as they supplement and encourage the expressions and activities of very young children. In contrast to the importance attached by Rosenberg to reflexive cognition and reflexive agency, significant early events in the reflexive cognition and reflexive agency, the development of pride and the potential for other "selfish" or "selfless" forms of personhood are not necessarily the results of a self-referential and intentional focus on emotions. Children may engage in forms of passive deception by giving parents the mistaken impression that they were personally responsible for a particular positive event or outcome. Also very young children's understanding of the means by which adult praise and approbation can be secured may rest on mistaken generalizations from their own experiences. It was argued that these and other mistakes provide important opportunities for children to receive a very practical kind of cultural training about pride and related considerations. The correct use of the word "pride" and its related cluster of concepts by young children is therefore developmentally important where it substitutes for or replaces other forms of display and approval-seeking action. The contrasting notion that underlying cognitive representations of rules are important prerequisites of pride was redescribed as instances in which cognitions refer to "modes of behaviour"
and the primitive precursors of thought (i.e., a third person ascription to young children rather than use of a relevant psychological concept in the first person). Finally, although the view that experiences of pride can occur before it can be correctly expressed in language was rejected, the pride-like emotional reactions of infants provide an important reminder of the role of non-reflexive forms of human agency and intentional activity to personal development.

CONCLUSION: PARTS 1 & 2

If a survey-based reconsideration of self-referentiality and its variety of meanings is to achieve clarity, psychological reflexivity needs to be distinguished from personal reflexivity. This distinction helps to highlight the nature of surrounding debates and to provide a framework in which respective issues can be appropriately examined at their respective "levels". Part 1 therefore focused on the limits and consequences of reflexive studies in psychology mainly as they are pursued by social constructionist, discursive and critical psychologists. Although it was not argued that any one philosophical perspective should provide the basis for this reconsideration of reflexivity, the same social constructionists who emphasize the virtue of reflexivity in research, theory and practice also tend to derive inspiration and encouragement from the later philosophy of Wittgenstein. It is perhaps because many of these same psychologists also recognize the necessity of working within linguistic and cultural practices to achieve a critical perspective that there seem to be considerable similarities between their reflexive activities and Wittgenstein's later philosophical
achievements.

However, Wittgenstein's remarks and methods cannot be equated with radical forms of psychological reflexivity without losing something important. In particular, the distinction between the different tasks of philosophy and psychology is blurred if we consider the relevance of the former is equal only to its appropriated uses by the latter. An alternative view is that an "outside" status for philosophy needs to be retained in order for remarks such as Wittgenstein's to continue to offer useful reconsiderations of central concepts in psychology. In other words, for Wittgenstein's philosophy to have enduring relevance to psychology, a conservative view of his influence on the discipline needs to be adopted. Still it is tempting to think that Wittgenstein's philosophical work is especially useful when it seems to provide the basis for radically new theories and methods in psychology (i.e., to subsume Wittgenstein's remarks when we engage in wide-ranging critical and reflexive investigations). However, it is more productive to regard Wittgenstein's remarks about psychological concepts, psychology and relevant cultural practices from *Philosophical Investigations, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, On Certainty* and *Culture and Value* as internal comparisons and analogies that help psychologists find their way around and eventually work through the central conceptual problems of their discipline: that is, if psychologists are prepared to take the time to engage with a perspective in which it is crucial to recognize the asymmetry of theory and background. Thus, although psychological reflexivity is highlighted as a central and laudable feature of psychological investigations, it is also important for psychologists to accept that psychology cannot generate the answers to all of its conceptual problems from within.
One of these central conceptual problems is the ostensibly reasonable emphasis placed on the reflexive "powers" of persons mainly, but by no means exclusively, by social constructionists. Many of the issues critically examined in Part 1 in relation to personal reflexivity such as the role of causal explanation and the aim of building complete theories could, of course, have been generated by specific studies of psychological phenomena. Moreover, since it would be ridiculous for psychologists to deny their own manifestations and experiences of personal reflexivity such as self-consciousness, autobiography and self-mastery, it was noted that an awareness of these possibilities in psychology may be used to challenge and to improve many aspects of psychology as a discipline. Nevertheless, these broader reflexive considerations are not essential to the task of achieving clarity about uniquely human phenomena. Thus while a reflexive study of the social constructionist emphasis on personal reflexivity could have been undertaken, it seemed more important to demonstrate the relevance of Wittgenstein's method by providing a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey of a particular, underexamined psychological phenomenon.

It is also important to note that a difference between the practice of engaging in a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey and the goal of achieving a Wittgensteinian survey is demonstrated by the example of psychological reflexivity. In particular, a survey of the concept reflexivity as it appears in metapsychological and metatheoretical debates will not, on its own, provide clarity (i.e., in the same way that Wittgenstein used analogies to understand practices such as mathematics but used surveys of psychological concepts to assemble reminders of our linguistic activities and to highlight the sources of philosophical prejudice). Similarly, a theory-first
approach to a particular psychological phenomenon would place more interest on describing the differences between the theories and articulating the basis of our own philosophical, moral and methodological preferences. For example, articulating the differences between social constructionist accounts of personal reflexivity and the theory that provided the critical focus for Part 2 — Rosenberg's (1990) reflexive theory of emotion — would not help to show psychologists how they can avoid many of the pathways to conceptual confusion and disguised nonsense. In contrast, a comprehensive conceptual-discursive surview of a concept like pride can reveal a great deal of information that we are not able to represent accurately with existing theories or empirical studies (despite the fact that we understand and use many of these expressions in a practical, everyday sense to negotiate our relations with other people). The aim of a surview is to render surveyable the clusters of concepts and criteria of a particular everyday psychological concepts as they are manifested in the judging and feeling practices of this culture and others. A surview of a particular cluster of concepts as in its relevant linguistic and cultural practices should not be regarded as the equivalent, for example, of a general, “complete” or integrated theory; nor should its sole aim be regarded as engaging with “higher level”, metatheoretical debates about the role and significance of causal accounts or explanatory theory. Thus although it is possible to upset such theories and their related categorical distinctions from the “level” of a comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey, it is important not to replace metanarratives with the “jargon” of a metavocabulary.

Moreover, there are a number of reasons why a surview of pride will resemble the results of a reflexive study in psychology but should not be viewed in this manner (or be regarded as philosophical psychology). One
reason is that a conceptual surview assembles reminders of the use of a psychological concept in such a way that it reflects a shared understanding and provides a non-theoretical resource (i.e., a source of clarity that psychologists and other may return to). Psychologists, philosophers and others may therefore contribute to this resource using all forms of culturally-available media. In this respect, it may appear as if Wittgenstein’s method can be used in psychology even though it has been made clear that phrases such as “a Wittgensteinian practice inserted into psychology” require clarification because they will otherwise be “knots in our thinking”. A surview also resembles a reflexive study because its specific examples are used to counter general theories within psychology. In this case, Rosenberg’s reflexive and emotion theory was chosen because it contains a number of conceptual errors that need to be challenged (i.e., at many points Rosenberg offers misleading remarks of a type that Wittgenstein addressed directly in the Private Language Argument). Finally, to offer a point that is critical of a survey as a method that will compete directly against other approaches within psychology, a surview of pride may only seem to be revealing because its features and linguistic forms have not been clearly charted.

The results of the comprehensive conceptual-discursive survey of pride are therefore closely related to social constructionist, critical and discursive studies in psychology, but the aim was not to provide an example of a defensible social constructionist account. Where possible, examples from novels, newspapers, film, autobiographies and other media were surveyed and arranged into criss-crossing themes in Part 2 in a manner which was not always in accord with a social constructionist conceptualizations of personal reflexivity. For example, there was a certain
amount of sympathy for Rosenberg's implied criticism that social constructionism does not recognize emotions and their constituent cognitive and bodily components as the central focus of the uniquely human potential for intentionally self-referentially activities. However, the cluster of concepts surrounding pride does not map neatly on to the categories of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition as they radically transform the "organismic foundation" of emotional display, identification and experience. Also there seem to be many exceptions to Rosenberg's view that people who use strategies to change their own thoughts and bodies will be able to achieve social and personal standards, rules and goals while managing to avoid many of the coercive and punishing institutions of society through emotional self-regulation. Thus it was important to extend the categories of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition to challenge their individualistic assumptions and to indicate wider political and cultural forces at the limits of individual agency and comprehension.

Rosenberg's (1990) reflexivity and emotion theory therefore provided a good focus because of its initial plausibility, its multidisciplinary orientation toward emotion and its challenging re-presentation of the role of emotions in Western life and culture. Considering the central role of discursive forms of reflexive agency and reflexive cognition, a focus on emotion does suggest important gaps in the social constructionist account of the self-referentiality of persons (and some of their emotions and emotion-related activities). For example, the inclusion of power issues as well as explicitly considering the background to our foreground discursive practices is an important adjunct to a focus on language. It is also important to recognize the limits of personal reflexive processes in relation to personal, social and cultural change and to highlight the contradictory freedom of forms of emotional control, alleviation
and distraction. *Pace* Rosenberg, it was also noted that in some circumstances, forms of personal reflexivity may lead to a paralysis of action and, on other occasions, dissuade individuals from engaging in collective ethical and political action. All of these points emerged from the surview of pride and provide a resource for multidisciplinary exploration in future theoretical and empirical work; providing that any resulting work is not seen as replacing or devaluing the surview from which it is derived. No general theoretical summary of pride should therefore be offered although there are many potential investigations of the interrelations between the experience and expression of emotions such as pride and the linguistic and cultural practices that surround them. It is important to reiterate that examples were assembled within the broadly grammatical sense of persons in the first, second, and third person in both singular and plural forms. It therefore seems reasonable to argue that the example of a surview of pride demonstrates both the relevance and limits of Wittgenstein's later philosophy to studies in psychology which explicitly aim to be critical and reflexive. Of course, it remains to be seen whether other "post-Wittgensteinian" studies can similarly break new ground by collecting examples of the discursive detail of our lives (of whether they will, at some stage, become the targets of Wittgensteinian reconsideration). Nevertheless, the work of Part 2 demonstrates that a surview approach can assemble important reminders of how people work within cultural and discursive practices to control, to embellish, to endure and, in some respects, to create their own and others' emotions.
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Figure 1. A portrayal of pride as a woman on a horse by Heinrich Aldegrever (1502-1555) in Payne (1960) which contrasts with earlier images of pride as a male rider.
Figure 2. Queen Superbia illustrating gender and culture-specific portrayals of pride in Payne (1960)

Pieter Bruegel the Younger (1564-1637) seems to have been alone in depicting the pure horror of pride. There is the inevitable woman contemplating herself calmly in a mirror, but she is surrounded by fantastic siege engines and leering griffins determined on her destruction.
Figure 3. An example of an elevated sense of national pride in a foreign location from Rose (1985)
Figure 4. Two plates from Darwin's (1872) *The Expression of Emotion in Man and Animals* which depict "Monomania of Pride"
Figure 5. An example of new forms of reflexive positioning and individual "expressions" of group pride
Figure 6. A depiction of pride by Vipper (1994) which captures the sense of elevated ego and expressive physiognomy of feeling “puffed up”
Figure 7. A picture of the first person expression of pride with an additional, superfluous self-referential aspect.
Figure 8. "Wizard of Id" cartoon by Parker from (Christchurch Press (Christchurch, NZ) 12 January 1992).