TWO-CHANNEL NEW ZEALAND TELEVISION:
AMBIGUITIES OF ORGANISATION, PROFESSION
AND CULTURE

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE
OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN SOCIOLOGY
AT THE
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

BY

J. FARNSWORTH

UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY
1989
ABSTRACT

The thesis is a sociological case-study of the two-channel television system in New Zealand from its inception in 1974 to the present day. It focusses in detail on the period 1974-80 when the two public channels were in direct competition with each other. The study examines three sets of issues and ambiguities which this competition threw up. One was the conflict between administrators and programme-makers over the best way to manage the severe ambiguities produced by this unusual mixture of state and market. The second concerned the attempts by programme-makers to pursue the production of programmes as they wished with minimal interference from either the state or other organisational bodies. The third concerned the kinds of programmes and schedules they produced, the types of potential public these constructed and the response of audience groups to these activities. Drawing on recent theoretical debates in the area of organisations, professions and culture, the study argues that it is the shifting relationship between all three areas which explains the development of television through this period.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Within broadcasting, my principal debt is undoubtedly to the former Chairman of the BCNZ, Hugh Rennie. Without his foresight, unhesitating approval and implicit support, this thesis would, literally, have been impossible to do. I am also very grateful to the Corporation Secretary, Ian McLean, for his ready assistance and encyclopaedic knowledge of corporation history, and to Dick Hereford, the Public Affairs Manager for his considerable help with the minutes. Also to Peter Fabian for facilitating my study of the files in the Harcourts Building. My especial thanks to Russ Sadler for his patient and illuminating explanation of complex broadcasting procedures and help in locating all the TV-1 materials. I am also very grateful to the frankness and frequent generosity of the large number of unnamed respondents to whom I spoke.

Outside broadcasting, I particularly want to acknowledge the unstinting and sympathetic assistance provided by Warren Mayne right up until his untimely death in 1987.

I am grateful to a number of supervisors for their help. In the early days, to Geoff Fougere and Kevin Clements, and particularly to Roger Dunbar who, despite his location in New York, has been a constant source of stimulation and support. Special thanks are due to Terry Austrin for his invaluable encouragement and his acute insights into the framing of sociological problems.

Lastly, I am indebted to Barbara Leete's impressively swift and efficient word-processing. And, in passing, to Brigitte Kirwan's coffee-shop, where more pages of this study have been produced than I should care to mention.
# CHAPTER CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abstract</th>
<th>iii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table of Contents</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

### CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

### CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Introduction
2. Television and Organisation Theory
3. Public Organisations, the State and Television
4. Television and Technology
5. Professions, Bureaucracy and Programme-Makers
6. Publics, Audiences and the Production of Culture
7. The Definition of Culture
8. New Zealand Literature
9. Conclusion

## PART TWO: TELEVISION FROM 1974-1980

### CHAPTER THREE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF TWO CHANNEL TELEVISION

1. Introduction
2. The New Broadcasting Structure: The Adam Report
   2.1 Detail of the New Broadcasting Structure
      2.1.1 Council Functions
      2.1.2 Common Services
      2.1.3 Transmission Services
      2.1.4 Other Features
   2.3 The Television Corporation Structure
   2.4 The Adam Committee: Summary
3. Working Parties and the Final Development of the Two Channel System
   3.1 Personnel
   3.2 News
   3.3 Engineering
   3.4 Finance
      3.4.1 Broadcasting as a financial totality
      3.4.2 Cost recovery
      3.4.3 Licence fee allocation
CHAPTER FOUR: 1974-76: LINKS BETWEEN PROFESSION, ORGANISATION AND CULTURE

1. Introduction 57
2. Programme-Makers and Professionalism 58
   2.1 Professionalism and Ambiguity 58
   2.2 Programme-Makers and Cultural Production 61
   2.3 Programme-Makers and Complaints 61
3. 1974-76: The Relationships in Operations 63
   3.1 The Programme-Makers Group 64
   3.2 Professional Self-Perception 68
   3.3 Producers and the New Channels 69
   3.4 The Development of Organisational Cultures 70
   3.5 Public Culture and the Cultivation of Publics 77
4. Summary 79

CHAPTER FIVE: THE PERIOD TO 1976: EMERGING ISSUES 81

1. Introduction 81
   1.1 Internal Organisational Pressure 81
      1.1.1 Financial Issues 81
      1.1.2 Transmission Extension 83
      1.1.3 Programme Issues 85
         1.1.3.1 Programme Scheduling 85
         1.1.3.2 Programme Content 86
      1.1.4 Inter-channel rivalry 90
   2. Summary 92

CHAPTER SIX: THE 1976 BROADCASTING ACT 94

1. Introduction 94
2. Chronology 96
   2.1 Outline 96
      2.1.2 Key Administrative Changes Prepared. July 1976-February 1977 97
3. Detailed Chronology 98
   3.1 Phase One 98
   3.2 Phase Two 101
   3.3 Phase Three 105
4. Implications 111
   4.1 Social Changes 112
5. Summary 115
   5.1 Profession, Organisation and Culture 115
   5.2 Implications Beyond 1976 119
CHAPTER SEVEN : MAXIMUM OPERATING INDEPENDENCE; 1977-80 120

1. Introduction 120
   1.1 Effects of the 1976 Broadcasting Act 120
   1.2 Structural Consequences of the 1976 Broadcasting Act 121
2. 1977-80 123
   2.1 Financial Pressures 123
   2.2 Financial Management 125
   2.3 Challenges to Professional Legitimacy and Autonomy 126
   2.4 Internal Occupational Conflicts 130
3. Summary 132

CHAPTER EIGHT : THE FULL TIME EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN AND THE 1979 RESTRUCTURING 134

1. Introduction 134
2. Background 135
3. The Centralisation of Control 138
4. 1979 Restructuring 144
   4.1 Summary of the Restructuring 150
5. Patronage Relations and Their Consequences 151
5. Conclusion 163

PART THREE : BROADER ISSUES AND TELEVISION TO 1989

CHAPTER NINE : HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND TELEVISION IN THE 1980'S 166

1. Introduction 166
2. Recent Organisational Changes 167
3. Origins of New Zealand Broadcasting Formation 168
4. The Development of Technology and Cultural Form in New Zealand 176
5. Television: Technology and Cultural Form 180
   6.1 Summary 194
7. General Summary 194

CHAPTER TEN : TELEVISION IN 1989 196

1. Introduction 196
2. The End of the State Monopoly of Broadcasting 197
3. New Zealand Television and Postmodernism 200
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX ONE : DOCUMENTS CONSULTED</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX TWO : ORGANISATION CHARTS</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

My original impulse to tackle the subject of television in New Zealand from 1974 onwards came from my own experience as a working broadcaster, particularly during the period from 1977-80. What, I wanted to know, had happened to me and my colleagues then; why was it such a turbulent and confusing period and why, after 1980, did a sense of vitality and urgency seem to have gone out of television production? To ask such questions, of course, is to invoke a kind of topos, whether it arises out of a sense of organisational experience (viz Larson, 1979) or out of the familiar sociological invocation of private troubles and public issues.

Perhaps inevitably, the questions I set out to answer are not the ones which, finally, are addressed in the thesis, although there is a relationship between them. Instead, they focus on three interlinked areas. First, how television is constituted as a specific kind of organisational activity; secondly, the role of producers or programme-makers both within this organisation and with the production of particular programme materials. Thirdly, and finally, the linkage of both these entities to the wider context of institutions and society.

The inter-relation of these three areas provides a very similar conceptualisation to a tentative one developed by Elliot and Chaney in 1969. Drawing on organisation theory and the sociology of art, they produced a parallel framework for the relationship between Organisation, Medium (occupational cultures) and Culture ('the society') in 'the social contexts of media production' (1969:365). As they observe, 'there are no water-tight boundaries between these areas' (1969:365) and what I have set out to examine is the tensions and ambiguities which arise both within and between them.

Within the organisation there have been two kinds of tension. One is a very central and continuing conflict between programme-makers attempting to maintain
their collegial, discretionary and often informal practices, and bureaucratizing administrators and managers intent on codifying and regulating organisational activities primarily in the interests of efficiency (see Crozier, 1964). Clearly, as will become evident, these are arguments over the most effective way to achieve a rather vague set of objectives: in a word, 'good' television. The other conflict is between two competing, partially-commercial television channels through the 1970's, and the differing organisational identities and cultures this produces.

Within the professional or programme-making area, the tensions emerge as the struggle of programme-makers to constitute themselves as a professional body with a significant area of autonomy separate from the state - but also to accommodate the different orientations of its members which threaten to endanger what Larson (1979) would describe as their joint professional project.

The area of social and cultural factors is the most difficult to summarise. It concerns, in one important way, the shifting construction and representation of regional, national, commercial and public service discourses through the production of specific television programmes and programme schedules. In another, it is about the reaction of various groups and publics to these representations, the unstable social context out of which these arise, and the consequences for the organisation, its constituent occupational groups and emergent cultural production.

Obviously, and as Elliot and Chaney recognise, one sphere overlaps almost continuously with another to crystallise - especially in New Zealand circumstances - into specific but seemingly temporary organisational and cultural configurations.

Unavoidably, this makes for a complex analysis, particularly given the additional hazard of interweaving a historical narrative out of a recent history which has, itself, been subject to a wide range of interpretations (see James, 1986, for example). The result, in terms of individual chapters, has been an alternation of thematic or sociological analysis and historical narrative, developed within a context of both American and English literatures.
The time-frame, as a period for study, suggests itself. The beginning of two-channel television, in 1975, arose out of a set of new national impulses contained in the Adam Report of 1973. This dual-channel blueprint reflected broader social changes, and the way these were worked out at a social and organisational level, up to the merging of two competing networks into a single corporation in 1980, forms a natural focus of attention. This is where the most detailed analysis is located, up to the end of chapter eight. Chapters nine and ten discuss these developments and describe more recent changes, from 1980 up to the present day, with the dissolution of the state monopoly of broadcasting on which the original organisational structure was premissed.

As a whole, the study is divided into three parts. The first, covering chapters one and two is introductory, and outlines the main conceptual dimensions of the study. The second contains the bulk of the narrative and the detailed descriptive materials, and runs from chapters three to eight. If it might be described, in some senses, as being written in a more realistic mode (White 1979), then the last part might be described as adopting a more ironising approach in reflecting on the broader social and cultural configurations which appear to emerge over time. This part includes chapters nine and ten, although in some ways it also includes the methodological appendix which extends the mode of commentary adopted in these chapters.

In more detail, after a review of the literature in chapter two, chapter three focusses in considerable detail on the way the Adam Report was translated into organisational form in 1975. Its emphasis is predominantly organisational. Chapter four picks up the linkages between profession, organisation and culture from 1974-76, concentrating on the role of the profession, while chapter five analyses some of the emerging issues which arose from programme-makers' control of the new corporations. Chapter six examines the 1976 Broadcasting Act, and especially the complex social circumstances which underpinned it. Again, each of these chapters,
and all those up to chapter eight, make intensive use of internal broadcasting
documents, amongst other materials, to establish a very detailed examination of the
events under discussion.

Chapter seven assesses the changes imposed by the Act and the consequences
for the relationship between administrators and programme-makers, and the way that
the balance shifted against production staff. Chapter eight looks at the role of the
newly-instituted full-time executive chairman as a charismatic institutional figure, and
his unexpected impact on the relations between administrators and programme-
makers. In particular, it examines the shifts across all three spheres outlined above
produced by the 1979-80 restructuring, and the formation of Television New Zealand
in 1980.

Chapter nine adopts a broader historical and comparative approach to assess
television briefly both in terms of Australian, British and American systems, and in
terms of New Zealand broadcasting history, to identify the relationship of cultural and
technological forces. It also advances the historical narrative from 1980-88. The
final chapter discusses some of the changes, under the deregulation of broadcasting in
1989, for television in terms of the themes which have been developed in earlier
chapters. Lastly, the methodological appendix provides a discussion of the
procedures and issues involved in dealing with the very extensive, if disorganised,
broadcasting documentation that was made available to me. It also takes up some
issues of representation posed by the problems of sociological analysis and historical
narrativization.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

1. INTRODUCTION

Literature on the media as organisational systems is notable more for its scattered and diverse nature than for its consistency (see Hirsch, 1977:14 and McQuail, 1987 on this point). In part this is a result of contradictory pressures from widely varying intellectual disciplines that treat various aspects of the media as instances of political economic theory (viz. Curran et al 1977) or as culture-bearing institutions within a sociology of culture framework (Petersen, 1975) or, alternatively, from within a critical theorist (Gitlin, 1979) or Marxist perspective (Murdock and Golding, 1977). In part, too, it arises from the fundamentally different organisational principles evident between English and American broadcasting models which are a consequence of the very different social systems in which they have emerged and which, in turn, have led to very different modes of theorising about them. (See Allen, 1986, Carey 1979 and Rowland and Watkins 1984, for examples of the commentary which these differences have prompted).

This poses a considerable problem for a study of New Zealand television in a context where there is no developed indigenous research tradition (Lealand, 1988a) and where the system itself is an amalgam of the Reithian English model and free-market American principles adapted by way of Australian influences. Nonetheless, this chapter sets out to review three areas of literature as they bear on New Zealand television in order to show how their approaches highlight some of the central tensions and ambiguities that have influenced the formation of this particular organisational arrangement.

The three areas under review are (1) aspects of organisation theory; (2) the sociology of the professions, and (3) the sociology of cultural production. In broad
form this follows Hirsch's (1977) three-level categorisation of occupations, media organisations as a whole, and interorganizational and institutional analysis.

This chapter's focus of interest within organisation theory is two-fold: on the relationship of the organisation to its institutional and market environment, and on the key question of bureaucratic and expert modes of organisation. This second focus naturally introduces the problem of broadcasters' attempts to professionalise themselves: to win and maintain control as an occupational group over the determination of their work without interference - in this case from other organisational groups. The success or failure of this strategy which, it is argued, flows from changes in the organisation's market or institutional setting then has clear consequences for the third area under review. Cultural production is strongly influenced by the degree to which mass communicators have discretion over their individual output, but also over the broader patterning of programme schedules. Obviously enough, the degree to which broadcasters match or articulate public tastes, perceptions or aspirations affects their own futures and so some attention must be paid to literature on the formation of publics and the differentiation of cultures. Lastly, all three areas need to be related to existing New Zealand literature with particular attention to work on television as an organisation and as a producer of culture.

Central, however, to the operation of broadcasting organisations is the key problem of uncertainty: how they can guarantee and reproduce a consistent output, or service, which in turn would support their own conditions of stability (Ettema et al., 1987). This is a paramount condition not just for broadcasting organisations but organisations as a whole, as a wide variety of commentators have acknowledged (see, for example, Meyer and Associates, 1978; Thompson, 1967 - and Morgan, 1986, for one review of the organisational literature). The characteristics of uncertainty will be explored later in the chapter, but the ability to control and manage it is crucial to the career both of broadcasting organisations and those occupational groups who can capture the right to determine its dimensions where possible. As a consequence, an
occupation's competence in this regard will determine its place in the social structure and the financial and status rewards which follow. The differences can be striking. Where Hirsch (1977) depicts the routinised process of American cultural production and implies that media professionals are, in effect, largely craft workers who remain subservient to the dictates of market mechanisms manipulated by organisational managers, Cardiff and Scannell (1987) paint a very different picture of BBC professionals. Here, through their pre-war success in representing a new sense of common purpose and national unity which also reproduced the existing social order, it tied them and the organisation firmly into an elevated position in the established social structure (1987:109):

'By the end of the 1930s the BBC had acquired the patina of tradition. It seemed as entwined with immemorial ivy as Oxbridge, the public school system (itself a recent but remarkably successful case of new wine in old bottles) or the Bank of England.'

In organisational language, the BBC constitutes an example of control over a resource (or, more accurately here, over a potential by virtue of its undefined symbolic possibilities) which is both uncertain and highly valued (or, in the market-based terminology of organisational literature, scarce). Clearly, other dimensions are also implicit in this illustration, to do with monopoly or, alternatively, conditions of deference, some of which will be discussed in due course. What is primary, however, is the role of uncertainty in the career of broadcasting organisations (Gitlin, 1984) and occupations, and it is this which forms the starting-point for the following discussion.

2. TELEVISION AND ORGANISATION THEORY

The sheer ubiquity of the media and their ambiguity of purpose has, in itself, sometimes been a source of confusion and even dismay to some researchers (e.g Rosengren, 1981) and which, in turn, has generated a wide array of explanatory approaches (see De Fleur and Ball-Rokeach, 1987 for one recent and extensive overview). The bafflement this variety and purpose can produce is perhaps best
typified by McQuail in what is generally regarded as the standard survey of the field (1986:306-7):

'These purposes are a mixture of the sacred and the profane, material and spiritual, the enduring and the ephemeral. The media are also inextricably tied in with questions of social control and order and with processes of social change. Sometimes they are about nothing in particular... While such objectives do not need to be in conflict or mutually inconsistent, there are usually considerable elements of unresolved contradiction and latent tension in media activity taken as a whole. Together with multiplicity of purpose goes ambiguity of meaning... It is not clear what media content can tell us about its own producers, about society, or about its audiences... the message of media theory seems to be that we might better regard media content as a unique cultural form...'

Ettema et al. take up the same theme of ambiguity in a wide-ranging review of the role of professional mass communicators but concentrate on the problem of selection of content within different media industries (1987:752):

'Network producers must select producers and series, and publishers must select authors and titles, that fit their markets. However, the criteria for selection, even in concentrated and relatively noninnovative industries, are not well defined. It is unclear who can generate content that meets market requirements. Further, it is not even clear what those requirements will be; consumer tastes seem unstable, even unknowable.'

It is this root ambiguity, however unclearly expressed, which provides the major instability for broadcasting as organisational form. A major theme of organisation theory is that all organisations attempt to routinise and stabilise their working practices (see, for instance, Cohen, March and Osen, 1972; Cyert and March, 1963; Lindblom, 1959; March and Olsen, 1972; March, 1981; March and Olsen, 1976).

Yet the key difficulty which this presents is that not all of what Harris (1980) terms primary productive practices can be readily differentiated, contained and replicated within a complex division of labour. This produces a fundamental bifurcation of organisational practice ordered around what Burns (1981) calls the distinction between the 'collaborative system' and the 'managerial structure.' As described by Reed (1985:128-129) the 'managerial structure' constitutes the 'various bureaucratic systems and regulations' imposed under conditions of impersonal
operation and which relies on 'formal control and coercive sanctions to secure routine compliance with its dictates.' Such a concept is very close to Weber's (1968) ideal type of bureaucracy. Likewise, Reed's description of the 'collaborative system' (1985:128-129) bears similarities to Weber's concept of expertise, being 'sustained by commitment, trust, and the habits of mind and conduct inculcated through the appropriate socialization processes.' In short, where bureaucratic systems rely on rigidity and predictability to accomplish stability within an organisation, expert, professional or collaborative systems rely on the application of common understandings, and the exercise of discretion to achieve the same end. They correspond to what Reed (1985:136) terms the instrumental and moral modes of action.

The need to maintain stability implies change taking place beyond an organisation's boundaries and it is the attempt to contain and manage this which produces not only these two broad systems but also the conflicts between them. As Crozier observes (1964:186):

'Every organisation, however, must continually adjust to some kind of change. It must be flexible. To achieve this vague but primary end, it must rely on individual and group ingenuity and cannot discourage it too much. The organisation must consider this goal when devising ways to impose conformity, since it is counter to the other primary goal, predictability. What will be the outcome of these two conflicting aims? Its environment, its goals, the kind of fluctuating reality to which an organisation must adjust, will be the most important factors to be taken into consideration in this perspective.'

Television, and media organisations generally, as indicated, are especially prone to this uncertainty (Ettema et al., 1987). Yet this environmental ambiguity may, in itself, vary along a number of dimensions (for example see Dill, 1958; Emery and Trist, 1965; Hall, 1982; Hickson et al, 1971; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Scott 1981 and Weick, 1979).

What remains undisputed, though, is that the ability of any sub-group's ability to maintain or enhance an organisation's stability reflects on its power or dominance within the organisation (Pfeffer, 1978; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, Pugh, 1969, and
Starbuck, 1976). Hirsch (1969, 1972, 1975) and Petersen and Berger (1971, 1975) have developed the application of this perspective within media industries (and see Turow, 1982 and 1984 a and b for studies of American television). This approach in general falls within contingency theory or a resource dependency perspective (see Perrow, 1979 or Pfeffer, 1981 for an elaboration) and it has enabled Engwall (1986) to argue that the control exercised over key resources has important consequences for newspapers' goal-setting and, subsequently, for their 'organisational drift' in the face of changing circumstances. What, precisely, these resources are for a newspaper or, for that matter, any organisation is more difficult to define (Mintzberg, 1983). In the first instance it is often taken to be financial but it may be any set of requirements necessary to completing an organisation's operational practices satisfactorily and which, consequently, may become sources of power when their acquisition is difficult or uncertain. Morgan (1986:159) lists 14 sources of power but also acknowledges that the concept of power is an exceedingly amorphous one, and difficult to define. (1986:363-364). For present purposes, the analysis offered by Crozier, which evolves from a Weberian formulation, is sufficient to highlight the relation of environmental uncertainty to bureaucratic managers and experts (1964:164):

'Comparing the competing claims of the different individuals and groups within an organisation, one can state that, in the long run, power will tend to be closely related to the kind of uncertainty upon which depends the life of the organisation.....As soon as the progress of scientific management or of economic stabilisation has made one kind of difficulty liable, at least to a certain degree, to rational prediction, the power of the group whose role it is to cope with this kind of difficulty, and of the people who represent it, will tend to decrease.'

This statement returns us once again to the opposition between instrumental and moral modes of action but also illustrates the constant encroachment of the rational or predictable i.e. the bureaucratic - on the domain of the discretionary - i.e. the expert or professional (Crozier, 1964:165):

'The invasion of all domains by rationality, of course, gives power to the expert who is an agent of this progress. But the expert's success is constantly self-defeating. The rationalization process gives him power, but the end results of rationalization curtail this power.'
If these remarks emphasise the contrasts between routinized and discretionary practices, they say little about the different goals and aspirations of experts and bureaucratic managers. Whereas the interests of managers are generally to the organisation as a whole, those of experts may be limited to their own professional projects (see, for example, Goldner and Ritti, 1967; Kaplan, 1965; Perrow, 1979; Pettigrew, 1973). While this has been a consistent theme within organisational literature (viz Perrow, 1979:50-57) it has important consequences for the relationship between managers and professionals, as Freidson observes (1986:168-169):

'While the professional employee has discretionary power and exercises it either to grant goods or services directly ... he or she has little control over the amount and type of goods and services available.... it follows from the fact that resource allocation, which influences both what can be done and how it can be done is everywhere the central power retained by management that is also the central source of conflict between the rank and file and management, whether management possesses professional qualifications or not.'

What bedevils this analysis is that, in some organisations, professionals are, to all intents and purposes, also the management. This is no less true of broadcasting (see Leapman, 1986, on the BBC for instance) and was certainly the case in New Zealand from 1974. Freidson provides two solutions. He argues first, that where professionals are also managers, there is still a fundamental division between managerial (and inherently allocatory) functions and employee functions (see Freidson 1986:149-155 for a detailed discussion and especially p.150) which distinguishes their formal roles and which distances managerial professionals from their colleagues on the basis of task differentiation. His second solution which, again, is relevant to this study is to point to the gap between Weber's ideal type of rational-legal bureaucracy and actual organisations staffed and controlled by professionals (and see Stinchcombe, 1959 for an earlier discussion) (1986:160):

'Studying doctors in an outpatient clinic, Goss (1961, 1963) advanced the idea of "advisory bureaucracy" to fit what she found. Studying lawyers in large law firms, Smigel (1964) employed the concept of "professional bureaucracy". Montague (1968) employed the term professional organisation for large accounting firms, as did Bucher and Stelling (1969) for hospitals and Scott (1965) for social agencies.'
These concepts are important in an organisation such as New Zealand television where professional involvement at all levels was high and where strictly formal definitions of bureaucracy were minimised.

Before turning to the nature of professional activity and self-definition which is clearly implied by Freidson's discussion two further issues need first to be dealt with: the role of technology in defining the professional task environment and the place of organisations in an institutional or state environment as opposed to a market setting. For reasons of clarity, the second issue is discussed first.

3. PUBLIC ORGANISATIONS, THE STATE AND TELEVISION

Much of the literature on organisations is directed towards them as market entities rather than public bodies (Ring and Perry, 1985; Wortman, 1979) which is problematic for organisations such as television which may be either private or public and certainly exist in both settings (McQuail, 1986). Much of this literature, moreover, is American in origin and frequently begins from quite different cultural assumptions to British or European work, particularly with regard to the growth of the post-war 'administrative science' movement in the U.S. (Thompson, 1956; Reed, 1985). The result, with media analysis, is that the alternative kinds of discussion which these perspectives produce is generally far from complementary or coterminous. Ettema et al.'s(1987) thorough discussion of the processes of American cultural production, for instance, undercuts its analysis by concentrating only on mass communications within market constraints, and while there has been a recognition of the distortion this neglect can produce (for example, Becker, 1984; Marchetti, 1989 and Turow, 1985), and an attempt to reconcile differing research traditions (e.g. Streeter, 1984 and Fiske, 1987), nonetheless there has been a continuing difference of emphasis.

Where American literature has not continued with an administrative science perspective on public sector settings or management (see, for instance, Allison, 1983;
Bower, 1977; Lindblom, 1979; Nakamura, 1980; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1979; Rainey et al, 1976; Whorton and Worthley, 1981) or adopted what Perrow (1979) calls a 'neo-institutional' approach (see, in particular, Meyer and Rowan, 1977 or Meyer and Scott, 1982) that has also been applied to the media sector (e.g. de Fleur, 1970; Ettema and Whitney, 1982), it has turned to a critical or Marxist perspective (viz Benson 1977a and b; McNeil, 1978; Perrow, 1979), an initiative which has been followed with studies of the media, most commonly from a political economy perspective (see Gitlin, 1983; Good, 1989; Jhally 1989; Molotch and Lester, 1973; Tuchman, 1978 and Turow, 1984a and b, 1985 as examples).

Marxism and critical theory has been equally influential in the development of a political economy of mass communications in England and Europe (for instance, Curran, 1986; Curran and Seaton, 1985; Garnham, 1979; Murdock and Golding, 1977 and 1978; Rosengren, 1981) and clearly accounts for the role of the state and the place of public regulation in the constraints on, and management of, media organisations. However, a political economy approach does not necessarily imply that these organisations are public bodies, merely that they operate in a political as well as an economic environment. For accounts of public broadcasting organisations the primary sources are English (e.g. Burns, 1964, 1969, 1977; Curran et al, 1977: Garnham, 1974; Hood, 1979; Scannell and Cardiff, 1982, 1987 - but see, for example, the European Journal of Communications, 1985-89, for recent European accounts), which indicate the nature of the complex, refractory and often ambiguous ties between the state and broadcasters through the mechanisms of social rather than directly economic control.

Finally, what these research traditions suggest is a number of dimensions within which television can operate. The economic environment may range from an effective condition of monopoly to a turbulent and competitive marketplace. At the same time, broadcasting organisations are faced with sets of constraints and control which may range from a mix of clear economic dependencies to broad, often implicit,
but nonetheless powerful social controls and moral ties. Given the uncertain nature of
the symbolic product of broadcasting, the way that these complex environmental
features are perceived and interpreted by organisational members will determine to a
large degree the relationship and conflicts between the managerial structure and the
collaborative system. However, this interaction is constrained by one further,
important factor: the technology of broadcasting.

4. TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY

To portray an organisation as being a combination of two opposed modes of
action (the instrumental and the moral, to return to Reed's (1985) phrase) is to
constitute it as a field of social forces. The problem which then arises is: how are
these forces arrayed or structured, and how are they internally organised in order to
actualise the productive work of an organisation? Engwall, (1986) argues that one of
the key dimensions which differentiates organisations from each other is their
technology (1986:328):

'... differences exist in the activity processes, or technology, of
organisations. These, like differences in the environmental state,
impose requirements on organisations.'

In support of this view he cites the work of Crozier (1964), Hickson et al
(1969), Thompson (1967) and Woodward (1965) from within an open systems model.
Morgan describes the linkage between Burns and Stalker's (1961) typology of
mechanistic and organic organisational forms (which echoes the instrumental and
modes of action noted above) and Woodward's findings where (1986:51-54):

'She showed that...different technologies impose different demands on
individuals and organisations, that have to be met through appropriate
structure. Her evidence suggested that bureaucratic-mechanistic
organisation might be appropriate for firms employing mass-
production technologies, but that firms with unit, small-batch, or
process systems of production needed a different approach.'

What these production tasks might be depended on both organisational and
departmental environments, as he pointed out with respect to Lawrence and Lorsch's
(1967) findings (Morgan, 1986:55):
'Production departments typically face task environments characterised by more clear-cut goals and shorter time horizons, and can adopt more formal or bureaucratic modes of interaction than sales departments. Research and development departments ...face even more ambiguous goals, have even longer time horizons and often adopt even less formalised modes of interaction.'

The problem facing many media organisations is, as McQuail (1987:145) observes, that they are 'both making a product and providing a service,' so they are faced with 'mixed goals.' This was fundamentally true of New Zealand television which both provided a public service as it simultaneously generated advertising income. Within newspapers, as Engwall (1978) found, it produced clear functional divisions to deal with various sections of the political and financial environment. This, in turn, produced sharp internal occupational differentiation and work cultures between four different groups: a news-oriented group, (journalists) a politically-oriented group (editorial and feature writers), a business group (management, administration, circulation and advertising) and a technically-oriented group (compositors, lithographers and printers). The differences between these groups then led to patterns of conflict which Engwall (1986) summarised as issues of flow, technology, publication and allocation.

The value of emphasising technology, then, is to show how it organises patterns of internal activity based on the demands provided by the broader environment and how these patterns are translated into practices that differentiate occupations and cultures and throw up sources of conflict and alliance around distinctive sets of issues. It is technology, therefore, which leads to the patterned mobilisation of social forces, themselves organised around patterns of bureaucratic and collective practices. As McQuail points out, Engwall's work is the most developed (indeed, the only extensive) application of these sets of organisational ideas within the media, and it is particularly useful as far as the present study is concerned, because New Zealand television has been one of the few in the world to incorporate such mixed goals as Engwall's Swedish newspaper organisation (Docherty and Barnett, forthcoming). The precise differentiation of functions that
television technology produces are considered in later chapters, but it is enough to point out here that Freidson's (1986) distinction of managers and professionals constitutes the basic division of instrumental and moral action. This is within the context of what Tunstall (1971) has described as 'non-routine bureaucracy', and the presence (McQuail 1986:144) 'of an above-average degree of compromise, uncertainty' and 'displacement of goals' by comparison with other types of complex organisation. How these affect the position of organisational 'experts' and their attempts to insulate themselves through professionalization is considered next.

5. PROFESSIONS, BUREAUCRACY AND PROGRAMME-MAKERS

One obvious and much discussed arrangement of social forces which corresponds to the division between management structures and collaborative systems is that between bureaucracy and professions. As a pair of linked ideas these have undergone considerable analysis (see Davies' (1982) review) but for reasons which will become clear, we need to treat them as useful but heuristic concepts. What the concepts enable us to do, however, is to elucidate some of the problems faced by occupations attempting to secure claims to authority and autonomy within particular work settings and how these relate to the problems faced by broadcasters as an occupational group.

Although Davies (1982) points to Scott (1966) as providing a particularly concise statement of the sources of conflict between bureaucrats and professionals, both she and Perrow (1979) acknowledge that the notion originally arose out of Parsons' (1954) analysis of Weber's description of bureaucracy as an abstract form. The problematic developed by Parsons was summarised into four major differences of practice and hence potential conflict by Scott (1966) that might be given as differences over rules, standards, supervision and demands for loyalty. From this has flowed a considerable body of research on the nature of these conflicts (see for example, Engel 1969, 1970; Miller, 1968; Scott, 1969; Sorensen and Sorensen, 1974;
Wilensky, 1974), or over the way professionals might be incorporated within bureaucratic or managerial contexts (for example, Etzioni, 1964; Galbraith, 1973; Litwak, 1961; Goldner and Ritti, 1967; Scott, 1965; Walker and Lorsch, 1970).

However, Davies illustrates how this relatively simple conflict model was widely conceived to be inadequate (1982:180-181) and argued that, in any case, professionals and bureaucrats co-operated quite satisfactorily under some circumstances, a point echoed by Perrow, (1979) and Zald (1972), amongst others. Over recent years the result has been a thorough reconceptualisation by theorists not only of the idea of profession itself (see, for instance, MacDonald and Ritzer's 1988, recent review) but of the antithetical idea of bureaucracy as a fixed, static form (Davies, 1982:181):

'They contest the assumption that organisations are reasonably autonomous, stable and equivalent across time and place. Instead, they propose that organisations are the outcome of struggles, reflect the social relations of society, and are thoroughly permeated by the inequalities and contradictions of that society.'

Likewise, Johnson, in arguing for the importance of understanding the relationship between professions and the state disposed of the notion that professions themselves are relatively stable sets of attributes (1982:207-208):

'The view that professionalization is not a single process with a given end-state also suggests that the relationship with changing state forms is in flux. This in turn gives rise to constant social ambiguity and ambivalence which under specific historical conditions may well be of crucial importance in the wider relations of class and state.'

Davies sums up the implications of this retheorising in a way which echoes Friedson's (1986) views quoted earlier (1982:188):

'All this is to suggest that there is no inexorable logic which turns an organisation into a 'bureaucracy' and constrains an aspiring occupational group to make 'professional' demands which bring it into conflict with bureaucracy.'

On the contrary, her arguments coincide with those of Larson (1977) in an American context, in seeing professions and bureaucracies as having common historical origins, and in seeing professions as attempting to translate their ascribed attributes (insofar as they possess them), through the mechanism of occupational
exclusivity, into achieved characteristics that bound both market and organisational context (viz Johnson, 1980; MacDonald, 1984; Portwood and Fielding, 1981).

What this discussion strongly suggests, then, is that both managers and professionals use organisations as arenas in which to contest their competing claims to authority (and, consequently, organisational dominance), and that these claims are based on the differing forms of rationality which derive from the technical requirements of their particular occupational areas. It is in these ways that the social forces within organisations are organised and articulated, and particularly so in the case of 'professional' organisations such as television, where organisational objectives are less clearly defined.

Nonetheless, this formulation says little about how professions are internally organised. As MacDonald and Ritzler (1988) point out, a Weberian perspective assumes that occupational groups attempt to assert exclusive control over a market for their services and which they then attempt to transform into social closure through persuading the state to grant them licences or credentials which, effectively, limit access to their occupational area (and see, for example, Larkin, 1983; MacDonald, 1985 and 1986; Starr, 1982). This constitutes an occupation's professional project (Larson, 1977) and an effort at continued social mobility which necessarily requires clear connections to social elites through the state (Fielding and Portwood, 1981). This requires, in turn, a combination of characteristics drawn from what Elliot (1972) describes as two types of professions: status professions (those that derive their position from their close relation to social elites) and occupational professions (those that derive their position and power from claims to expertise and technical competence). He argues that in England that there has been a widespread shift from status to occupational professions since the beginning of the nineteenth century driven primarily by the development of capitalism (1972:14-58). Johnson (1972, 1982) is largely in agreement but sets out a three-part model of professions of which the least powerful are the 'mediative' professions, whose role is most closely defined and
regulated by the state. Fielding and Portwood (1981) broadly concur but establish a typology of bureaucratic professions of which one key dimension is the profession's dependence on, or autonomy from, the state. The issue here is that where professions are unable to define and mark out a technical area of competence, they are weakly placed either to defend their exclusive domain or to demand state licensing without also suffering state regulatory interference, an issue which constantly dogged New Zealand broadcasters in the period under study.

It is precisely this problem which is faced by all broadcasting occupations (Elliot, 1977; Gallagher, 1982), and they have fared best when they can demonstrate close ties and clear deference to social elites, as Burns (1977) has shown at length. Burns (1977) has also shown the transformation of broadcasters from status to occupational professions under the clear protection of state regulation; indeed, it is the dismantling of this very regulation which has produced recent sharp warnings about the imminent demise of 'quality' television (viz Garnham, 1989;). But, where programme-makers have had to demonstrate evident technical control over the slippery interpretative processes of symbolic production, and usually in a market setting, they have generally been subject to some form of managerial interference or direction (see, for instance, Ettema and Whitney, 1982, Ettema et al, 1987). In this American context, Friedson (1986) has no hesitation in dismissing mass communicators' claim to regard themselves as a self-evidently professional body. Similarly, Christian (1977) has shown that U.K. newspaper journalists have had to abandon professional aspirations within a market setting.

It follows, then, that where broadcasters have been unable to make the transition from attributed (status) to achieved (occupational and technical) characteristics then, unlike the case of accountants (MacDonald, 1984), they have been unable to establish their acceptability as a new professional group which could then be used as the basis of social and legal closure (MacDonald, 1985). Given the shifting state and market conditions in which New Zealand television broadcasters
found themselves, this analysis suggests that they were likely to face considerable difficulties both in establishing their legitimacy as a profession and in claiming state protection without attendant state interference. Underlying this discussion is the question, typical of any professional body, of how to constitute an appropriate set of clients and how to constitute an adequate knowledge base with which to supply them to the exclusion of competitors. Put differently, this represents the problem of media audiences and the production of socially-sanctioned culture. This is the final element which needs to be examined of the three areas of discussion with which we began.

6. PUBLICS, AUDIENCES AND THE PRODUCTION OF CULTURE

If broadcasters could define an audience then this presented an opportunity to construct a body of symbolic (programme) material for it. The importance of this for broadcasters is emphasised by Gans (1963:322):

'It can be shown that the role of the audience extends beyond the creation and the contents of the mass media product, but affects the structure and culture of the mass media themselves....Every mass media creator, whatever his skill, is to some degree dependent on the validity of his audience image for his status and standing in the industry.'

From here, two dimensions of audience and culture can be identified. One extends from the conception of audience as an aggregate to audience as a socially-defined group (McQuail, 1986). The other is that culture can be produced for particular pre-existing publics (elite, popular or folk cultures) or, alternatively, for conglomerations of individuals defined by the differentiation of the cultural output (mass culture). Obviously, these are extreme simplifications as McQuail (1986) warns, and Clausse (1968) outlines some of the complexities which varying degrees of involvement and participation produce. For present purposes, however, it enables us to differentiate between enduring socially-organised, stratified elements of the social structure (publics) and collectivities brought into existence (e.g. as 'fans' or 'taste groups') by the operation of the media (Blumer, 1939; Mills, 1956). Clearly, this second definition more readily lends itself to redefinition as a market (see, for
instance, Ang, 1986; Chagall, 1981; Morley, 1980; Smythe 1977) on the basis of
different socio-economic profiles, tastes and preferences. In short, we can refer to the
distinction of public and market as alternative audience images. Where broadcasters
can identify given publics then they are in a position to fulfil the typical professional
role of 'serving' those publics and particularly in identifying themselves as part of
dominant social elites. The best developed models of this relationship exist with state
broadcasting organisations, whether in Britain, Europe or Japan for example, (Smith,
1973; Williams, 1974) which generally exist in a monopoly, non-market setting.
Under these conditions it is possible to organise even diverse publics into an image of
collective national unity as Cardiff and Scannell detail with pre-war BBC radio

'For the corporation they fulfilled, at one and the same time,
instrumental and idealistic intentions. They were idealistic in that they
sought to provide a fragmented audience with a common culture, an
image of a knowable community. They were instrumental in that they
were one means by which the BBC sought recognition for itself as a
member of the establishment.

As they argued elsewhere, this involved linked conceptions of elite culture and
nationalism (Scannell and Cardiff, 1982:167):

'This ideal of cultural enlightenment operated within a larger ideology
of nationalism, for the best meant the best of British.'

And, as they also pointed out this cultural ideal was constructed out of very
precise demands for the audience (Scannell and Cardiff, 1982:185):

'The whole concept of public service, of raising the level of knowledge
and taste, had rested on a set of expectations invested by the BBC in
"the great audience"...."If you only listen with half an ear, you haven't
a quarter of a right to criticise." Leaving the radio on all the time, as
background noise, was frowned on ....(and) both programme continuity
and programme-building (i.e. scheduling) were so arranged at first as
to inhibit lazy listening.'

These passages illustrate both the concept of professional calling or service -
helping listeners to better themselves - and a particular set of moral obligations that
broadcasters demanded which reflected and articulated given values within the
existing social system, albeit organised around particular elitist assumptions. Yet, as
Scannell and Cardiff illustrate, this audience image was ultimately inadequate and could neither contain the variety of uses for radio (as for example, a convenience, or a commodity, or a cheerful noise in the background) nor retain non-elitist sections of its audience - as symbolised by 'the drift to Luxembourg' by large numbers of working-class listeners (1982:186).

If this was the problem in a non-market, state monopoly arrangement, the problems faced by broadcasters in a competitive, market-driven environment are readily understandable. To buffer the sources of uncertainty surrounding the tastes and types of audience, Ettema et al. (1987) point to a variety of 'boundary spanning' devices and 'brokerage' systems employed by media organisations (and see Hirsch, 1972; Di Maggio, 1977; Cantor, 1979, 1980; Montgomery, 1981; Turow 1984 a and b). They also point to the relative prominence of other media occupations in defining audience characteristics (public relations bodies, advertisers, market researchers and media management personnel), although Pekurny (1982) points out that despite a variety of strategies, the industry is still not fully routinised, (and see Gitlin, 1983, for a vivid description of the unending problems this causes broadcasters).

Inevitably, this generates changes, not only in the relationships of various media groupings, but also in the kinds of cultural production which is undertaken. This shift from an institutional to an industrial framework where 'the need to find new products continually tugs against the attempt to make business stable, predictable and thus more manageable' (Ettema et al, 1987:754) alters the relationship between programme-makers and managers. In the U.S., networks minimise in-house production and contract out programme production to competing production houses, depend heavily on audience research (Gitlin, 1983) and work through formulas (Pekurny, 1982). The result is that, while producers may have considerable power in some creative spheres (Newcomb and Alley, 1983) they must 'work within, around and through' sets of organisational constraints (Newcomb and Alley, 1982) in the form of 'schedules, budgets, and other creative controls imposed by the networks'
(Ettema et al, 1987:754). Under these circumstances, programme-makers may opt to imbue 'some personal visions and values in a show' (Newcombe and Alley, 1982:69), but this is a different understanding to the sense of 'calling' noted above (and see Cantor, 1971, 1980). In brief, programme-makers, by reason of their different circumstances, diverse patrons, and restricted opportunities cannot so readily - if at all - organise national publics around sets of moral obligations which would enable them to articulate and so assume elite status characteristics. On the contrary, their industrial setting demands the production of mass or popular cultures differentiated by the construction of various markets for the consumption of the cultural products of broadcasting (Gitlin 1987). It is around this process, and how it is best conceptualised, that debate has arisen, and which is briefly reviewed in the next section.

7. THE DEFINITION OF CULTURE

The term 'mass culture' has a long history as Bennett (1982) outlines, but it is only with its conjunction with recent Marxist thought, and particularly the work of the Frankfurt School (viz Adorno, 1974; Horkheimer and Adorno, 1972; Marcuse, 1968) that it has gained its modern usage. As Bennett (1982) notes, it is very difficult to summarise the Frankfurt analysis succinctly, especially when it is confused with other broadly similar critiques. Amongst these, he mentions (1982:45) the left-wing popularity accorded to Benjamin's (1970) argument that the mass reproduction of cultural artifacts dispossessed them of their sacred, unique qualities. A more general version of the mass culture critique, however, is advanced by Ewen and Ewen (1982:262):

'The displacement of collective modes of living, work, ritual and sensibility makes room for the elaboration of a media panorama, consumed and understood by people individually. Ultimately, within a rising, universal marketplace, consumerism is the basic social relationship replacing customary bonds......It is secularized as the social form of a mass culture, of modernization. The universe of the commodity looms large with pain and promise over the consumer.'
McQuail (1986:65) indicates the commodity as being 'the main ideological instrument of this process' because 'fine art and even critical and oppositional culture can be marketed for profit at the cost of losing critical power.' To sustain this view, there has been considerable work to show how ideological and hegemonic processes (deriving from the work of Gramsci, 1971) operate to maintain the consent of subordinate classes to this form of continuing domination and exploitation by capitalist classes (e.g. Dunn, 1986; Hall, 1982; Gitlin, 1987; Good, 1989). However, as Kellner (1987:473) comments, it is not yet clear 'how television constructs and conveys hegemonic ideology and induces consent to advanced capitalism.'

One well-developed set of answers has been that it is through the appropriation and reconstitution of popular culture. This assumes, of course, that popular culture can be isolated as a distinct, pre-existent entity available for appropriation. As Bennett points out, the notion is derived from a variety of usages and, in the sense implied here he concludes, (1978:28) 'there is no such thing as popular culture,' but only a construction which operates within a whole set of other cultural terms and relationships ('elite', 'mass', 'folk' cultures). Nonetheless, Kellner argues that television narratives and images are inherently contradictory, 'reproducing the conflicts of advanced capitalist society and ideology' opening up spaces for the insertion of radical and 'emancipatory popular culture.' (1987:473), (and see Jameson, 1979; Wren-Lewis, 1983). Dunn (1986) discusses Debord's (1977) and Baudrillard's (1975,1981) attempts to theorise television as a metalanguage of consumerism that pacifies and dehumanises the spectator but concludes that the very intensification of this process may serve to produce detachment and resistance on the part of the viewer. This hardly equates to Kellner's emancipatory popular culture, but does leave the contradictory nature of television messages as an open question (and see, as further contributions to this debate, Browne, 1987; Carey, 1989; Cantor, 1987; Corcoran, 1987; Fiske, 1988), and the notion of how popular culture is to be conceptualised.
The starting point for this discussion was the relationship of television and its key occupational groups to its audiences, and how this was translated into the production of culture. Because the figure of the audience is such an amorphous concept, any analysis of it involves not only an analysis of how programme-makers may represent it to themselves, their organisation and patrons, but also an analysis of how the concept has been discussed meta-theoretically by researchers (in terms of 'elite', 'mass' and 'popular' cultures). Browne comments that the account of television discourse (and hence of medium and audience) is fundamentally different in the U.K. (largely as a result of the Birmingham Cultural Studies School - viz Gurevitch, et al, 1977; Hall et al, 1980; Hall and Jefferson, 1975) than it is in the U.S. (1987:586-587). As he points out, while British accounts are founded on the basis of a 'non-commercial' (and here he excludes ITV) public service system (1987:586):

'...The premise of the American, advertiser-supported system is grounded in a radically different relation between the form of the television text and the processes of economy and culture.'

If Browne identifies major differences between English and American television (and, equally centrally, see Williams 1974 for an influential analysis in terms of culture and technology) it is on the basis that they are fundamentally separate systems. The interest in the case of New Zealand is that these opposites were married during the period under study and in such a way that they shifted across all the main dimensions of organization, profession and cultural production outlined here. Before developing this point, however, we need to consider discussions in New Zealand literature of these areas.

8. NEW ZEALAND LITERATURE

New Zealand does not have a long-established social science tradition (Spoonley et al, 1982), nor an extensive development of media research (Wood, 1984), and most discussion follows international trends. As far as organisational and work literature is concerned, Perry (1982) traces and reviews the main lines of
thinking arguing, in part, that researchers have had to struggle to establish themselves as a noteworthy body in the face of a traditionalist and unreflective social order. Such work, he argues, has amounted to promoting critiques of this order or describing the fit between New Zealand organisations and transnational corporations. McLennan et al (1987) survey New Zealand literature from a perspective which seems to derive predominantly from classical management theory. Designed primarily as a teaching reference (1987:11) it sets out to illustrate key management principles by reference to New Zealand rather than foreign examples, and largely rearticulates current existing theoretical premisses within a local context. Broadly speaking, the same strategy is evident in other literature whether it derives from the administrative field (e.g. Gregory, 1982; Mascerenhas, 1984) or management literature (e.g. Inkson et al, 1985).

In terms of broadcasting organisations, the main study has been Gregory's (1970, 1982) analysis of New Zealand television from 1962-1973, although there have been a number of limited case studies of particular aspects of production such as news (e.g. Rimmer, 1975; Vintiner, 1976). Pauling (1984) provides an analysis of broadcasting policy. However, the main point of interest is Gregory's work (1979, 1982) which adopts an administrative science perspective to show who were key actors within television's first eleven years and the way that tensions developed between administrators, the broadcasting board, journalists and engineers at different stages (and see McLennan et al, 1987:164-167).

As far as the New Zealand media generally is concerned there have been a number of studies (Day, unpublished bibliography) although these range from the purely historical (e.g. Downey and Harcourt, 1976; Hall, 1980; Ross, 1971, for example) to broad survey assessments (e.g. Toogood, 1969, 1969-70) to organisational (Cleveland, 1970). Atkinson (1989) has developed a political economy critique (and see Simpson, 1984) but, as with organisational research, most of this work has only attempted to place New Zealand media within prevailing theoretical
discussion. One exception is Wood (1982, 1984) who has adopted an Althusserian critique in an effort to develop a cultural studies problematic. His work has arisen out of the project at Massey University to reconstitute the work of the Birmingham Centre for Cultural Studies, within the particular conditions experienced in New Zealand and primarily through the journal Sites. Wood attempts to show the linkage between the state, media institutions and cultural production, particularly by analysing the production of ideological hegemony through current affairs representations of the 1981 elections. His work is discussed in more detail in later chapters.

Another, and important exception, is Perry who has discussed not only the role of television in the production of culture but also the tensions in both cultural formation (1984,1989) and cultural (albeit mostly literary) analysis (1987). His relevance to the present study is evident in his definition of the social processes involved in the mounting of Telethon (1984:101):

'Television in general, and Telethon in particular, are culturally central phenomena. They presume the presence of, and are driven to locate, the middle ground of New Zealand life. But when things fall apart the centre doesn't hold, and Telethon is edging closer to basic lines of cultural cleavage and hence social controversy.'

Inherent in this statement is a concept, however fragile, of national unity organised around and produced by 'a tension between the communal and the commercial,' (1984:101). To articulate this cultural identity is to capture 'broad-based public involvement' but render it 'compatible with a system of organisational control and a strategy of professional dominance' (1984:91) and which indicates the same sets of ambiguities investigated by this study. What is striking here, of course, is that unlike Scannell and Cardiff's (1987) analysis of the BBC cited earlier, this cultural image is refracted through a commercial framework. It also depends on a dominant culture which is inverted from the English pattern so that it reproduces populist (or perhaps popular) culture as against the elite culture of the British model (Perry, 1984: 99; 1987).
9. CONCLUSION

In many ways, Perry's work brings us full-circle and returns us to the relationships between organisation, profession and cultural practices and production. In a sense it seems a long distance to have travelled from the arrangement of social forces within organisations to the articulation of particular cultural identities but, as this review has attempted to show, there are important and irremovable linkages, nonetheless. As it has also attempted to show, some of the intervening difficulties are as much metatheoretical as they are relational, a point which is made equally by Reed (1985) in his discussion of organisational theorizing, and Perry (1987) in his discussion of New Zealand theoretical tropes. Aside from the linkages between areas, however, and the ambiguities which these have generated, each area exhibits its own tensions. These range from the organizational problems of assessing and responding to the differences between market or institutional settings, or the conflicts between bureaucratic and professional modes of organising, to the problems of self-constitution of professions as coherent, authoritative occupational entities and the difficulties for media professionals in identifying and managing a clientele through the peculiarly elusive figure of the audience.

Beyond this, what we can point to is the fundamentally different sets of relationships which emerge between all these practices when television operates in a market as opposed to a state broadcasting setting. In a way, these alternatives are posed as heuristic devices, as a means of understanding how an organisation and a profession responds when it is placed in both settings simultaneously. Clearly, the New Zealand cultural setting in which this takes place is very different to the English or American environments from which they are drawn, and this is discussed in Chapter 8. For the time being, however, we can turn to see how the particular tensions of recent New Zealand television were set in place through the mechanism of the Adam Report in 1974.
PART TWO

TELEVISION FROM 1974-80
CHAPTER THREE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A TWO-CHANNEL TELEVISION SYSTEM

'The key to good broadcasting is good programming and the key to that is to concentrate on good programme planners and producers'.
R.O.Douglas. February, 1973

1. INTRODUCTION

The quote by Roger Douglas during the period in the early 1970's when he was Minister of Broadcasting is significant for two reasons. One is that it goes to the heart of a dichotomy which has continued to plague broadcasting - and television broadcasting in particular - in New Zealand since its inception: whether it should operate as a bureaucratic or a professionally-controlled system. In practice, there has had to be an accommodation between the alternatives, but the degree to which one has predominated over the other has had distinct consequences for every important aspect of its operation, from its structure to its performance and its programme output. How it has come to be organised in this hybrid fashion and the consequences, both internal and external, which flow from it form a major theme of the thesis.

The second significant reason is that, as the Labour Minister of Broadcasting, Douglas was very much in a position to impose the results of his analysis on Broadcasting as it then existed. The implications of his views are clearly defined in his statement: broadcasting should be primarily the preserve of programme-makers, and it was these implications which stood at the heart of the major reorganisation designed and carried out during Labour's one-term administration. Indeed, this reorganisation proved to be the most radical restructuring of television broadcasting since its introduction in 1960 both in terms of the shift in organisation and control within broadcasting, and in terms of the introduction of a second channel.

What these arrangements were to replace was a single, publicly-owned television system controlled by the New Zealand Broadcasting Corporation (the NZBC), a corporation which also ran public radio. This system, governed by the
publicly-appointed NZBC board, operated four stations in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Since the early 1960’s, the NZBC had pressed for a second channel, which had been consistently refused by the prevailing National government, (Boyd-Bell, 1985). It was not until the early 1970's that a Commission of Inquiry was established to assess tenders for a second channel from private and public applicants. The award of a warrant to a large private conglomerate was only overturned by the return to power of a Labour government in 1972 with a manifesto pledged to retaining broadcasting in public hands.

The focus of this chapter, consequently, is on the restructuring and its consequences for television: specifically, to examine the outcomes of attempting to reorganise a highly bureaucratic system so that it was managed and controlled by a group with a primarily expert/professional orientation. Also, to examine the tensions which the reorganisation introduced as far as internal groups were concerned and, too, with respect to its external, or environmental relationships.

The analysis begins with a description of the new structure which was set in place and the organisational arrangements which that entailed. It also looks briefly at their implications as far as the main external relationships within which television exists. It goes on to examine the way in which programme-makers were given control of the system and the tensions which this produced in terms of control over decision-making. Finally, it examines some of the problems with the reorganisation which were to form key issues and a basis of the next reorganisation in 1976.

2. THE NEW BROADCASTING STRUCTURE: THE ADAM REPORT

The new broadcasting structure came partly into force in December 1973 through a combination of the 1973 Broadcasting Act and the Broadcasting Act Commencement Order 1973. However, it was not until 1975 that both the newly constituted television corporations began operation. The detailed planning which led to their introduction was in three phases: the initial Government announcement in
January 1973; a Committee on Broadcasting, commonly known as the Adam Committee after its chairman, Professor Kenneth Adam, which produced, between April and July 1973, the general machinery needed to implement the government's proposals and, finally, groups of broadcasting personnel whose recommendations, mostly in the form of working party reports, were discussed by the newly-formed Broadcasting Council and, in one form or another, became the detailed operational arrangements for the Council and separate corporations.

The broadcasting structure and its implications are best summed up by the Adam Report (1973:6):

'The plan provided for the separation of the two television channels and radio into three independent public corporations and the creation of a new central body to provide common services for all three. The guiding principles in the proposed restructuring were those of decentralization, independence, and the introduction of competitive enterprise within publicly owned broadcasting services.'

It then sets out to emphasise why this objective is so central (1973:15):

'The structure seeks first to give independence to the corporations so they can present a real choice to the public in programme style and content. The structure aims next to guarantee independence in resources to allow the two TV services and radio all to set their own priorities and pursue their own improvement and development. By its design the structure is planned to extend independence from ministerial control and from indirect pressure exercised through close capital works supervision. In the individual corporations the structures outlined are shaped to promote creative independence by focussing the organisation on those who produce the programmes in the studios and on the stations. Finally, the structure pursues independence from the unitary, centralizing tendency, which gathers as much as it can into one place and one pyramid of power and resources, thus over-riding or neglecting the country's spread of talent and its regional variety.'

Many of these objectives also contain an implicit criticism of the existing NZBC order; nowhere more so, however, than its replacement of an administratively-dominated regime with one explicitly designed to favour programme-makers. The point is already made in the foregoing passage, but is made elsewhere equally strongly (1973: 14):

'In other words, the producer, who is the key figure in broadcasting, needs protection. He is not just an instrument of task performance. For him, a command which is authorative without being authoritarian is most appropriate.'
In elevating the position of producers, the Committee also observed that 'Programmes are seldom made to order. Not good ones, anyway' (1973: 14). In recognising this, the Committee sought to introduce as flexible and responsive a system as it could devise, remarking (1973: 14):

'Organisation is not an end in itself, but a dispensable means. It cannot afford in broadcasting to be either static or mechanical.'

What it envisaged was an organisation with the 'right climate of reference' with producers 'both creatively and technically efficient' supervised by 'heads who are both accessible and experienced in the programme field.' As it continued (1973: 12):

'It should be a two-way flow, free without being too free and easy. But the top administrative positions should be ideally filled by programme men who understand the true meaning of feasibility. The reluctance of staff to go through cumbersome working relationships to which the Committee has been referred again and again, has reduced productivity.'

It is perhaps necessary only to note that while the Committee increased the control of producers and programme-makers, it did so in a setting which implied a strong professional or craft orientation. There are references to norm-oriented over codified procedures and an acknowledgement that organisational structures should be fluid rather than precisely ordered. It also suggested a less obviously hierarchical arrangement and one which preferred the activation of common understandings over administrative regulation (1973: 12):

'We cannot stress too firmly our view that the complexities or modern programming ... require decisive action up to the moment of going on air or screen and indeed after that moment. Management, as such, cannot hope to interfere in news bulletins and its ability to do so in current affairs programmes is also limited.'

Clearly, its point of reference is to the execution of professional codes of judgement understood and exercised as much by operatives as by higher-level executives. As such, it is an explicit craft or professional formulation which depends on the idea that immediacy of decision at an operational level is critical to organisational performance. This notion of effectiveness of a group's occupational judgement is congruent with the idea of occupational control over an area of technical
expertise (viz Elliot, 1977). The Committee's assertion, in other words, is that only programme-makers are properly competent to judge programme decisions, especially in the heat of the moment, and that on these judgements stands the success of the organisation: it is, in short, an acknowledgement of occupational autonomy.

At the same time, it also implies the fundamental uncertainty underlying programme-making; to what ends, and for whom, are such programme judgements made? The notion of judgement in this context, implies the notion of a known or definable audience whose tastes, interests and satisfaction can be readily identified and fulfilled by the operation of professional expertise. Yet, as quoted earlier, the Committee indicated that good programmes are seldom made to order; nor, in that context or elsewhere does it attempt to define 'good' programming. The closest it approaches is to advocate the importance of interpreting New Zealand society (1973:8):

'There must be a will to assist and foster the New Zealand consciousness. There must be recognition and acceptance of the money this will involve. There must be operators' policies which are publicly stated and publicly examined.'

Elsewhere, however, the Committee's proclamations possess a more contradictory character. In commenting on the continuing mix of commercial and non-commercial objectives, which was inherent in the NZBC's operation and was to be extended under the two-channel system (in the guise of 'competitive enterprise' referred to earlier), the Committee remarked, somewhat uncertainly, that 'the wider aspects of public service broadcasting can be lost sight of in the struggle for revenue' (1973:18). It went on to declare, though, (1973:17):

'The assignment of a non-commercial role to both television services will therefore act as a constant reminder to them that they exist "to inform, to educate, and to entertain" and that their commercial activities are solely a means to an end.'

Put differently, there is a conflict of aims towards both public service and commercial ends - a 'mixed system' which the Committee hoped could be steered 'on a middle course between unfettered show business and the restrictive apparatus of the
The dilemma may involve a distinction between high and low culture, between professional or craft standards and commercial judgement, between self-regulation and close bureaucratic control of the work situation ... between using one's talent for a purpose and having them used for none except the survival or commercial success of the organisation for which the work is done.'

In the New Zealand context the Committee, in commenting on popular preferences with regard to radio and light entertainment, remarked that 'the audience has consistently divided with a large majority on the light side,' (1973:18) which had become a form of segregation. Mixed broadcasting objectives, it went on to argue, must therefore be beneficial in television (1973:18):

'Mixing the character of both TV channels and alternating their commercial and non-commercial programmes must have the effect of reducing this self-segregation and minimising the division of communicated experiences within the community.'

Viewers would be hard put to escape to 'the lightest option' but would run across alternatives, such as minority programmes, which would serve, 'because there will always be eavesdroppers, to introduce others to social and cultural experiences which are new to them' (1973:9). In a nutshell, television would be good for one. It was predominantly for these reasons that the Committee developed the organisational blueprint as it did. As the final NZBC Annual Report summed it up (1974:3):

'The report placed great emphasis on the independence of the corporations, competitive but complementary television programmes, a resurgence of radio, and efficiency and economy ... The committee also stressed the need for simple organisational structures with "lean" administration and the delegation of responsibility for programme decisions "as near to the actual operation as possible".'

The broad means to implement these policies were set out in the remainder of the report, which is outlined in the next section.
2.1 Detail of the New Broadcasting Structure

The essential structural details were designed to be uncomplicated. Each of the three corporations had a board consisting of a chairman and two other members appointed by the Governor-General on Ministerial recommendation. The chairman was appointed for 5 years, one member for 4 years and the other for 2 years to provide a continuity of experience and independence. All members were part-time appointments, and it was acknowledged that, as a consequence, the chairman's role, especially, 'would be a particularly responsible, busy, and onerous position' (1973:19). The three chairmen also sat as members of the Broadcasting Council along with three other publicly-appointed members: 'an independent chairman, deputy chairman and additional member' whose presence was to be 'a moderating and balancing element' (1973:23). In effect, they prevented the domination of the Council by the combined corporations (1973:24), although the Council chairman was intended to act as a consensus-seeker rather than a leader.

The Council's function was to agree a development programme, allocate licence revenues, draw up a 3 year budget incorporating the corporations' budget priorities, and undertake year-to-year planning (1973:23). Also present at Council meetings were to be the three corporation Directors-General, (see appendix 1), who could speak but not vote. Each Director-General was envisaged to be 'the key staff appointment' for a corporation (1973:20), and apart from the stipulation of a retirement age, no other limitations were placed upon how the appointment was made.

2.1.1 Council Functions

The Council had two primary functions: (1) the provision of 'overall development finance', and (2) the provision 'of common services', which left each individual corporation 'free to manage and operate its own service within licence revenue, its earnings by advertising, and any capital assistance for projects which Council may have assigned' (1973:25). However, all land and buildings were owned by the Council and rented out to the corporations.
The Council's financial role was sketched out in 3 pages. Each corporation was expected to prepare a 3-year financial programme, subject to annual review, which was to serve as the basis of licence fee appointment and decisions on borrowing requirements (1973:137) by the Council. The committee recognised that 'in an ideal situation' each corporation should be entirely independently resourced: 'sent on their separate ways with all their present needs and the assurance of earning enough on their own for a constantly expanding future' (1973:23). However, it argued that resources and capital were inadequate to do this: in fact, that a $24 million expansion programme for conversion to colour and second-channel coverage was required which demanded 'a phased development programme' (1973:23) that was centrally managed. Ironically, in those few remarks, the report encapsulated many of broadcasting's future conflicts: inadequate finance became a major site around which competing claims to management were organised, while the centralised development programme cut across the independent, competitive objectives of programme-makers.

2.1.2 Common Services

The provision of common services covered a number of different areas. First, the council was to retain centralised control of electronic data-processing and audience research, whilst acknowledging the possibility of limited special research (1973:27). Secondly, the Council was to act as a common negotiator not only with the respect to overseas broadcasting organisations, such as the Asian Broadcasting Union, but also in three other areas in which, in effect, it would maintain a monopoly. The first was overseas programme purchasing, to prevent cross-channel bidding which might drive the price of foreign programming up. Here, TV-1 and TV-2 were bound to an internal tendering system, but could indicate individual preferences for potential Council purchase which would then be assembled into a common list available for subsequent bidding. The second and third covered common negotiation for categories of news and sports material. With news, in particular, a non-editorial
manager was to be appointed to manage the gathering, but not the selection, of news, which was to be the prerogative of the rival news editors, working out of Avalon.

The third common service was advertising and programme standards. Essentially, this continued the role of the former New Zealand Broadcasting Authority 'to say what was permissible and what was not' including 'that phrase of a thousand meanings, a "proper balance in subject-matter"' (1973:29). While the Committee announced the intention to extend the codification of standards and to continue programme monitoring, it also emphasised that 'beyond finding and establishing patterns of performance and reporting it, the Council will not go' (1973:30). Most of the role of the judgement of standards, therefore, rested with programme-makers inside the corporations.

2.1.3 Transmission services

Besides these common services, the Council's other main role was control of the transmission facilities. As it emphasised early in the report, 'from the point outside the walls of the studio where the programme is made, all engineering from there to the audience is the control of BCNZ,' (1973:26). As a consequence, all non-studio engineering control was centralised within the Council's engineering section.

What transpired from the Committee's recommendations, then, was a system in which it was intended that Council staff provide a purely utilitarian and service function of for the pre-eminently active and dominant roles of the corporations.

The presence of the Council itself, however, also illuminated two other general principles of central concern to the Committee: responsibility and economy. As the report summed it up (1973:22):

'New Zealand is too small a country, broadcasting revenues are too slim for all the needed developments, and the public interest in the efficient use of those resources is too great, to permit any unnecessary duplication or waste of assets.'

In brief, maximum economy could be obtained through a managed, rather than a market, system. Although audience research or electronic data-processing facilities, for example, were readily available outside broadcasting, as were private programme
purchasing possibilities (as a later detailed offer to the Council from the Spectrum Group (1973) highlighted), the Committee indicated a clear preference for internal arrangements. Its statements on responsibility begin to provide an explanation. In proposing annual reports to Parliaments for each corporation, it commented that these organisations are 'creations of Parliament and servants of the public', as could be recognised not only through the licence fee system, but also was 'just as true ultimately of advertising revenues' (1973:22). More explicitly (1973:22):

'The corporations and the Council have a plain duty to exercise responsibility in making the optimum use of these public revenues in serving the public interest.'

However, since alternative economic methods received no obvious analysis, it is fair to assume that responsibility weighed more heavily in the balance than economy. The system, as noted earlier, was one of 'guided' competition; that is, one with clear social controls built into it.

2.1.4 Other Features

Having said that, the report allowed for two further features in the broad organisational structure. One was to recommend the abolition of any political dependence and the end of 'the confusion in the public mind' (1973:31) over the respective roles of the Minister and broadcasting. Remaining Ministerial responsibilities, such as the authorisation of major borrowing requirements, were left to the Postmaster-General.

The second feature concerned the employment and payment of staff. It advocated increased specialisation in production groups, salary scales outside the State Services (i.e. the public service) rates, promotion on merit, a single salary scale for all broadcasters and the introduction of contract employment, particularly at senior levels. It also urged the formation, following the Minister of Broadcasting's preference, of an all-encompassing Broadcasting Union (1973:13). It also dispensed with the idea of grievance machinery and appeals against appointment (1973:25). However, apart from emphasising that production personnel's salaries should be
raised, particularly over those of 'the supply team' in television, in contradistinction to the NZBC (1973:46), most of the proposals were to be the subject of protracted negotiation within the later Working Parties.

2.2 The Television Corporation Structure

Assigning a servicing and co-ordinating role to the Council was to emphasise the primary production role of the corporations. In this respect, the committee enunciated a set of guide-lines and principles which underpinned an essentially simple organisational design, and which was acknowledged to be schematic. Its principal elements defined a hierarchy running from the Board to the Director-General, with the Controller of Programmes as a 'deputy in all things' (1973:45). Both positions required programme-makers, and there was to be 'a close association' with producers and directors which underlined 'the correct relationship with both management with the "housekeepers"' (1973:45). The central concept, however, was one of a 'family tree' so that board members who, themselves, the Committee hoped, might 'in their time have broadcast', would 'move freely and without formality among the staff at any time', so that staff would know 'what they look like, where their special interests lay' (1973:45). The reason for this was clear (1971:45):

'Creative processes thrive on decisiveness, not on doubt, on warmth within the organisation, not negation, on communication inside for those who are charged with communication outside.'

The scheme was recognised to be appropriate only for a small organisation but was, nonetheless, expected to engender loyalty not only in the main centres but also in regional stations. In these latter places 'the key figure will obviously be the manager', but this would be someone with 'both programme and administrative experience' (1973:46). In this case, as elsewhere, though, the plan encouraged 'not professional managers but professional broadcasters who graduate to management' (1973:45).

Enlarging on the primacy of producers, the Committee set out the relationship between producers and financial management (1973:46):
Within the production-direction teams themselves, responsibilities must be clear and partial controls from outside disappear once a budget has been agreed as firm'.

This was because (1973:46):

'The producer is in a very real sense a patron but he is an intelligent one if he knows how his patronage is being exercised in terms of total cost to this employer.'

In other words, producers were to become the key personnel in the organisation who jointly arranged and controlled the corporation's financial direction on the basis of judgements about programme needs. In itself, it is a fairly clear statement of the dominance of professional expertise in determining organisational priorities, and is supported by a hierarchical structure which reinforced programme-makers' centrality in terms both of hierarchical control at all levels and a professional/craft ethos in its execution. It also emphasises the fact that a far greater degree of decision-making control was given at a lower organisational level. The Committee had explicitly criticised the long chain of command exercised in the NZBC before a programme idea was approved, preferring 'a short and decisive chain of command.' (1973: 44).

In total, the report devised a system in which producer-director dominance was emphasised, where promotion was based on merit, not long service, and which was 'lean and streamlined in its management profile.' (1973:44). It was expected to engender a high degree of rapid communication between levels and a sense of loyalty leading to programmes being seen as 'professionally acceptable' and receiving 'open encouragement' (1973:47):

'Original ideas must always in television carry an element of risk; that risk must be taken at the top. In the long run a nucleus of people, meeting, arguing, and collaborating, is the least wasteful method of producing programmes, not commodities.'

The final structure of the corporations, as given in the organisation charts (appendix one), differed to some extent to the Adam Report. Under the Director-General were five controller positions which represented the major organisational divisions: programmes, sales and marketing, programme services, engineering and
management services. Under each controller were a number of departmental heads which differed slightly between TV-1 and TV-2. Under the heads were supervisors or producers and then departmental staff. The Director-General attended monthly Board and Council meetings, while Controllers attended Board meetings to present monthly reports on their section. TV-1 and TV-2 differed in that TV-1 also established a Dunedin programme manager position, slightly lower graded than the controllers, and TV-2 an Editor of News (which, in TV-1, fell under the Controller of Programmes).

The Council framework was broadly similar (appendix one) in that four Controllers (of Engineering Services, Programme Services, Management Services and Finance) were responsible to the Council Secretary, along with a Personnel Manager and the News General Manager. As with the corporations, this was established during the Working party phase; indeed, the report was largely silent on the shape of the Council's structural divisions.

2.3. The Adam Committee: Summary

The Committee's report clearly introduced structural arrangements which preferred programme-making over administrative dominance. It did this by separating the television systems from the bulk of their administrative services, and by elevating production groups to control of the new corporations, which was the first time in New Zealand television that these groups had enjoyed such prominence. It also developed career lines which encouraged specialisation - particularly in separating television from radio programme-makers - and enabled television producers to rise to the top of the organisation. Previously, under the NZBC, former programme staff who had risen in the organisation had come exclusively from radio.

At the same time, the report cut across rigidly bureaucratic NZBC procedures by shortening the lines of command and introducing a mode of professional/craft organisation in the corporation's structures. It also encouraged notions of reward for merit; commonality over strict hierarchy, risk-taking and contract over purely career
employment. More problematically, it offered very limited and ill-defined alternatives to the established career structure and provided no clear recommendations on how duplications and inefficiencies between the services were to be avoided: all corporations, for example, contained many of the same administrative areas as the Council.

The report also allowed the retention of services, some of which maintained monopolies over key organisational dependencies, such as programme purchasing, but others which largely established internal monopolies within the system. In other words, corporations were obliged to purchase or hire these services - such as audience research - which might have been cheaper or more efficiently obtained outside broadcasting. More importantly, the common services established both control over, and limits to, the independence of the corporations. The Council's role also established the basis for sharp and often bitter competition - and division - over the allocation of costs and revenue: most particularly, over the allocation of key licence fee revenues.

In sum, while the report erected a principle of independence and production pre-eminence, it was only in terms of the difficult concept of guided enterprise - which then re-introduced ideas of management and control, and considerable ambiguity about precisely where, how and by whom that control might be exercised. The result was the creation of a hybrid system which had to attempt to manage two quite different key environments: a political one through ideas of responsibility and accountability to the state, and a market environment through the need to generate advertising revenue.

3. WORKING PARTIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TWO-CHANNEL SYSTEM

The first new television corporation to go to air was Television One on 1 April 1975. In effect, there was a period of approximately twelve months from the
formation of the Council to the emergence of the new networks, during which the
Council and the NZBC co-existed, often in the same buildings. The working parties
met mostly in the second half of 1974, being drawn from staff relocated in the
Council from the NZBC, or as new corporation appointments. In some cases,
particularly with finance staff, they were obliged to shuttle between the two bodies,
even after the formal demise of the NZBC to complete administrative matters.
Negotiations settled within the Working Parties were then presented to Council
meetings as recommendations. At the same time, the boards of Television One and
Two met to discuss the details of operational establishment.

As far as television was concerned, the working parties traversed the areas of
news, sport, programmes, advertising, audience research, Council functions,
engineering, personnel and finance. Generally, there was one representative from each
corporation and the Council - usually their respective heads - but sometimes with
other senior executives in attendance. Personnel discussions differed in that there
were a series of meetings and negotiations with the Public Service Association,
usually with 5 or 6 representatives on each side. At finance meetings either one or
two Treasury officials were also present.

Through the working parties and subsequent Council discussions a number of
issues emerged which defined both the precise shape of the new organisation
arrangements in terms of their outcome. Each of these is discussed in turn.

3.1 Personnel

The first issue to be resolved was the question of senior appointments where,
after negotiations with the PSA, agreement was reached that, for first appointments
down to third-level positions - generally, Heads of Departments, the recommendations
of the Directors-General applied, or of two Controllers for third-level positions.
Effectively, this enabled the Directors-General to control all key appointments within
the corporations. Much of the groundwork for this had already occurred, in fact: the
television Directors-General, Alan Morris and Alan Martin, were good friends (Martin had been the best man at Morris's wedding) and, on being appointed, in Australia, they went to Paradise Palms and planned details of the channels' operations down 'to whom we might appoint and what the gradings would be', as Alan Morris put it. According to Alan Martin these were, principally, 'a group of young, talented producers who were bubbling up but were trapped by the NZBC system.'

If these appointments were within their domain, the remainder fell within the strict guide-lines of a career service. The elements of this were negotiated at length with the PSA: 'long, boring, laborious discussion,' as a senior executive described it. The main features of these were contained in a letter to the PSA Secretary on 9 December 1974:

- recognition of association;
- protection of salaries and conditions;
- appointment of a restructuring grievance officer;
- a unified career service;
- appeal rights against appointments and transfers;
- the establishment of appointment committees;
- limitation of contract employment to 7.5% of total staff;
- controls on the nature, length and occupational categories of contract employment (i.e. largely limited to 'performing or creative' staff)
- no redundancies from the NZBC.

The unified career service, in particular, defined a controlled internal labour market. It consisted of two elements, as notes of a meeting of Council and PSA members on 30 September 1974 confirmed. One was that positions were advertised internally and filled from existing staff, unless 'there is a significantly better outside applicant.' The other was that applicants were treated as being of equal status, regardless of the corporation from which they came: in other words, corporations were tied to each other through their staffing arrangements. On top of that, the
combination of no redundancies and largely internal appointments was at odds with the idea of a lean administrative system, especially as a system-wide arrangement, and bearing in mind the report's criticism that the NZBC was already administratively top-heavy. The result was that there were plentiful accounts of 'horse-trading' and of accepting 'dead wood' along with desirable staff, or of the creation of numerous 'non-positions.' Both Radio New Zealand and the Council were particularly prone to this, especially where there were parallel administrative posts in different organisations. As one respondent remarked: 'I used to meet seven or eight people who all said they ran Computer Services, but I never knew who did.'

In effect, the agreements over staffing reintroduced a codified set of procedures which limited the discretion available to the Directors-General. As one of them observed: 'it was very difficult to move people and appoint people who we wanted' because, if they neglected established procedures 'we would lose on appeal and not get the staff we wanted.' This codification was further embedded in the adoption of the NZBC Staff Manual, which contained detailed rulings on shifts, allowances, working hours and other matters. The agreement of a unified career service also centralised broad control of personnel matters in the hands of the Council's Personnel Manager through delegation by the Council Secretary (Broadcasting Council Minute 74/10/3), as it had done with industrial negotiations on the corporations' behalf (BCM 74/8/16). Salaries, likewise, were centralised and codified and, indeed, adopted for pragmatic reasons: sections 30 and 58 of the 1973 Act obliged the four broadcasting bodies to consult with the State Services Commission on appropriate scales. As the Council Secretary commented (paper to BCM 74/8/16), if nothing was to be formalised 'every appointment or group of appointments ... will have to be subject of consultation with the State Services Commission regarding salaries.' So, to protect broadcasting's control over appointment the NZBC scales were adopted as legitimate in themselves. In any event, it is unlikely that the corporations could have offered an alternative: at this
early stage of their existence they had neither the staff nor the expertise to challenge
the broad personnel formulations nor the General Council claims to territorial control.
Essentially, they were able to influence detail rather than total policy.

In this respect, they succeeded to some extent with senior management gradings.

The positions of Controller in the corporations were all regraded, by way of
new appointments, at generally higher levels than their equivalent Council counter­
parts. The Controllers of Programmes for each channel were separated by a grade
from all other controllers and emerged marginally better placed than the equivalent
top Council position (the Controller of Engineering).

Below these positions, there was a pattern of senior executive placements,
which saw the establishment both of higher gradings and greater spans of control,
than equivalent positions in the Council. For example, the Controller of Programme
Services (a position responsible for all the key technical and production support
services in television) supervised, in TV-1, three Heads of Department graded
between G14-17, as against two supervised by the similar Council position, holding
grades between G13-16.

Within more general staffing it is worth noting that producers were the only
group who continued to set their own grading levels, through a Producers' Assessment
Panel.

As a whole, therefore, the distribution of positions reinforced the greater
weighting given to production over administration between the corporations and the
Council. Grading patterns and the distribution of personnel also highlighted the fact
that administrativeness leanness was to be found primarily in the corporations.

Besides the actual grading patterns it is important to recognise that the
restructuring also involved some marked occupational rearrangements. This had been
a matter of; great concern to the two Directors-General as TV-2's Director-General
recalled:
We sat in a room just like we are here and planned for; the next six months. We planned and drew diagrams and tried out structures and threw them away. We didn't want a repeat form of the structures in England or Australia, or in the NZBC.

This included, for example, the location at the ABC of:

'... all camera-men, floor managers and some others under the Engineering Department. Instead, we wanted them under production department control.'

This, in fact, occurred by redrafting film staff, formerly located at the bottom of a long chain under the NZBC's Controller of Programmes, to join studio operations staff under the newly-created Programme Services area. Likewise, television production departments, which had formerly been mingled with radio staff, (particularly with rural broadcasts, drama, news and current affairs), were separated and combined with formerly isolated departments such as documentary production. Presentation and promotions officers were also shifted to join a new Head of Presentations, Promotions and Publicity. This subsequently led to grading problems since the area lacked a coherent career structure. A clear career path was established from production staff up to the position of Controller of Programmes. In other areas, the corporations' Head of Finance was responsible solely for finance: even in the Council he lost control of a large stores section, which was moved to management services.

Indeed, the restructuring generally led to the simplification of the Council positions, even if no staff were lost in the process. For television, though, it clearly signalled new orientations: the primacy of programme priorities, as noted earlier, but also an emphasis on local as against overseas programmes, and internal as against external production. Moreover, the enhanced presentation area and sales and marketing department all indicated an increased priority as far as the public environment was concerned: it was to be a key factor in terms of winning public approval and support for new, often risky programme and presentation initiatives, and in generating revenue through advertising sales, against competition from a rival
channel. Both channels reflected these priorities in the broad similarities of their structural patterns.

3.2 News

If the structural arrangements reflected new and generalised priorities, the conflict in the news working party highlights the ideological positions and interpretative differences which were to emerge between administrators and programme-makers over the next five years. Essentially, these revolved around divisions between professional/craft understandings as opposed to adherence to specified and codified bureaucratic procedures. While they are most clearly illustrated by the news case, a testy letter from the Secretary of the Council, Keith Hay, to the corporation Directors-General on 19 March 1975 indicates that divisions were emerging in 'news, finance, sports and a number of other areas' over agreements on the common services. It was apparent, the letter stated:

'that either intentionally or through a lack of understanding ... attempts are being made to circumvent these agreements.'

Specifically, in a meeting on 25 March he referred to a meeting between the newly-appointed news heads and the Council news manager in February, where the television heads had abrogated previous agreements. The Secretary mentioned concerns over developing costs and explained that 'the Council had a responsibility' to ensure arrangements were on an 'economical, orderly and agreed basis'. The TV-2 head, on the other hand, thought that 'the statement could have been couched in broader terms.' In effect, these were to act as statements of position between the Council and the news heads: the Council emphasised procedure; the news heads rule of thumb, speed, common understandings, freedom of movement and friendly competition. The following extracts from the meeting notes indicate the differing positions:

'Both television news heads felt they should place their own satellite orders if they were on an ad hoc basis. They expressed a willingness for intercorporation liaison on this matter ... Again the NFM (the
Council News Film Manager) indicated this was contrary to the agreement reached and any variation would require approval of the Council and the Directors-General.'

'Mr Crossan (the TV-2 news head) expressed a desire to employ his own overseas correspondents. Again this was seen as being contrary to the Act and the agreement.

'Furthermore if necessary the television news heads felt they should be free to each cover the same incident, each with their own aircraft if necessary ... They felt there would be no competition if they could not have a freedom of choice as to method of coverage. Each had a common duty to dig news out.'

'There was a declared attitude by the television news heads of a willingness that there be mutual co-operation, Mr Crossan: "The hand of friendship is extended".'

The final agreements which emerged from the Working party saw the Council's role strictly defined as that of a limited provider of resources and information, generally available to offer services at the request of the news heads, and sometimes on a 24 hour-a-day basis. Over three meetings, the corporations gained virtually total control over the gathering, selection, organisation and presentation of news. As the October 1974 minutes had already rather lamely concluded:

'The role of the Council so far as News was concerned appeared to be restricted to organising news facilities at the request of the corporations.'

In that respect, a very broad area of discretion, on the grounds of editorial needs, was created over the demand for codification and deference to a higher authority. It is also worth noting that the agreement also confirmed the total separation, for the first time, of television and radio journalists, principally through the argument that these staff would quickly specialise and become identified with their own corporations.

3.3. Engineering

If news saw the imposition of professionalizing control in the corporations, then engineering saw the imposition of professionalised control in the Council. While each corporation retained its own engineering section, the Council engineers created a monopoly over their services, not only over the tasks they performed, but over the
materials that were to be appropriated for them. All planning, costing and
development was to be undertaken by Council engineers: there was to be no outside
tendering, no contracting, and no contractors or temporary staff. All diesel
maintenance, outside Avalon, became a Council function; corporation engineers were
to act as assistants to Council engineers on major installations; the corporations were
to pay for advisory and specialist services as needed and stores were to be organised
through a Council base store:

'The need for coordination, standardization of stock listing procedures
and standardization of spares wherever possible, with consequential
savings in specification writing and procurement time was stressed by
Mr Sharp' (the NZBC Acting Chief Engineer).

As a subsidiary point, it is worth observing that the language in which this is
expressed is very similar to that of Council administrators, with its emphasis on
coordination, codification and economy. As discussed in more detail elsewhere,
Council engineers shared common perspectives and understandings with
administrators in a way which differentiated them from a programme-making
ideology.

3.4 Finance

In this area there were three issues: the treatment of broadcasting as a financial
totality; the charging of Council services and the allocation of licence fee revenue.

3.4.1 Broadcasting as a Financial Totality

The key point, where this was concerned, was that there was a centralization of
financial procedures which invariably limited corporation independence. In
particular, it re-introduced a co-ordinated capital budget which functioned in tandem
with the corporations' operating budgets. In practice, this meant two things. One was
that a formula for repaying interest charges on loan moneys of approximately $14
million had to be found, where current and future loans (as projected by the Adam
Report) were likely to be unevenly incurred. Secondly, it entrenched the position of
engineers at the heart of the budget process, since they were primarily responsible for
the preparation and costing of the capital budget. Moreover, it was eventually agreed
that repayment of loan charges was a first call against existing revenue, which meant
that, from the corporations' viewpoint, their operating budgets, on which production
depended, was automatically limited by the cost of the Capital Expenditure
programme. Worse, from their perspective, they would be unable to control the
general costing of capital expansion, since that fell within the domain of the
engineers' technical expertise.

Perhaps curiously, there was, in fact, relatively little formal objection by the
corporations to this. The most probable explanation is that broadcasting was still
regarded, as Gregory (1985:77) terms it, as a capital expansion organisation, where
engineers dominated 'as the organisational heroes of the time.' In any case, further
capital expansion, merely to get TV-2 underway, was inevitable and it is likely that
the corporation felt themselves faced with no real alternative.

3.4.2 Cost recovery

It was quickly agreed that common service costs should be charged on a user-
pays basis (14 November 1974). In effect, however, this was to reinforce two other
trends. It was to introduce a set of internal monopolies for services which might easily
have been purchased more cheaply or effectively externally, and it was to site the
control of those costs within the Council and beyond corporation reach. When it is
borne in mind that the corporations could also not influence capital costs or wage
costs, through the imposition of the salary structure, it begins to become clear that
their chief area of discretion and control lay solely in the programme area, with strict
(if, at this stage, implicit) limitations on their real autonomy beyond it. What is more,
with a lean administrative structure, as senior executives subsequently argued, they
were weakly placed to challenge an increasingly established structure and were, under
any circumstances, often over-committed to fulfilling the demands generated by
increased programme production.
3.4.3 Licence Fee Allocation

The growing realisation of the importance of the precise allocation of licence fee revenue as the central source of funds outside the uncertainties of advertising income led to increasingly firmly-held divisions about an acceptable allocation procedure. On 13 November 1974, minutes from the Working party stated that:

'the licence fee revenue should be divided between the three corporations on the basis of need after meeting a first call for loan servicing charged.'

Briefly, Radio New Zealand demurred from the proposed split on the grounds that it was undercompensated for its public service functions and produced several alternatives at a meeting in February 1975. The differences between the corporations had first arisen, however, at the Council's January meeting and prompted the preparation of a report by the NZBC's Chief Accountant, Russ Sadler. By March, it had been joined by two further proposals from the television corporations, a detailed argument from RNZ, a Treasury recommendation incorporated in the Chief Accountant's report, a written commentary from the Minister of Broadcasting and a summation by the Council Secretary. In total, 5 proposals were considered by the Council.

Finally, a four-point recommendation was accepted which ignored the Minister's arguments and allowed RNZ a small surplus and TV-1 and TV-2 a small deficit. As Russ Sadler pointed out, this meant the formula should have been revised in the following year. It remained, in fact, in this form for several years.

3.5 Finance: Conclusion

What emerges from the process of licence fee allocation is not only the degree to which the corporations become tied to the Council and dependent on its centralised budgeting procedure, but also the close involvement at all stages of both the Treasury and the Minister of Broadcasting. As far as the Treasury was concerned, it could play a crucial role, not only in defining appropriate or desirable accounting practices, but
also in the degree of financial assistance or hardship it could directly or indirectly bring to bear. This was particularly so as far as the Capital Works budget went. This required approval by the Cabinet Works Committee both for the forthcoming twelve month period (1975/76) and for the four-year development programme (1975-79). In both cases, the Council discovered that a Treasury report had recommended declining the application for 1975/76 and revision of the 1975-79 programme downwards. (Attachments to BCM 75/19/8). Similarly, the Treasury made it clear in a letter on 4 April 1975, and at a meeting on 17 April, what its views on the appropriate financial structure for broadcasting should be, which were to facilitate 'rational decision-making.' As Council executives perceived it, this meant that there was no possibility of interest-free finance and 'no financial relief to the broadcasting structure as a whole' (paper to BCM 75/17/21). Capital expenditure up to $100,000 was agreed, but with conditions which emphasised close financial codes of practice and, until TV-2 was revenue-earning, 'financial surveillance' and a capital expenditure limit of $5000 per proposal.

In other words, not only was television explicitly linked to the Council and subject to varying degrees of financial control, so, too, was broadcasting as a whole to the Treasury. This is a self-evident instance of what Pfeffer and Salanak (1979) would describe as an external resource dependency; but it was more. Contained within the Treasury's requirements are assumptions which are, in substance, forms of social control based around the same notions of responsibility, economy and codification espoused by Council administrators. Obviously, the Council was also bound to general Government policy through the approval required for major capital works; the Treasury relationship illuminates the nature of the ties involved. It is also worth making the observation that, insofar as it appears here, the Treasury attitude clearly appeared as thrift-driven: broadcasting was expected to make good out of its own resources; all loans from Treasury 'will, as in the past, be interest-bearing' as would those from the Council to Corporations (barring TV-2 initially), at a suggested
rate of 8.5% (paper to BCM 75/17/21). The point is not taken further at this point but, along with some of the Adam Committee recommendations, it suggests the shape of a broader ideological or cultural perspective.

4. GENERAL SUMMARY

In the distance between the Committee on Broadcasting's proposals, and the final structure as it was implemented, there were important changes, with implications for the dominance of a production - or an administratively-oriented organisation. In effect, the corporations were clearly programme-making domains, of a kind which had not formerly existed in New Zealand. On the other hand, there were sets of ties and limitations embedded in the development of the structure which, if tested, and under different environmental conditions different to the corporations' establishment, were self-evidently resistant the degree of independence which programme-makers expected to possess.

4.1. Working Parties

Generally speaking, the working parties consisted of the Directors-General of each corporation, the Council Secretary and assistants drawn primarily from the NZBC. Obviously, the working parties were central decision-making bodies, and the majority of their recommendations were taken up by the Council. Yet, the television corporations, in particular, were disadvantaged. RNZ had expert advice and opinion it could call on: so did the Council administrators. In contrast, both television Directors-General operated with largely phantom staff: not until late 1974 were third-level appointees in place who could advise and support their respective heads. Both Directors-General, too, were expatriates and likely to be out of touch with the particular long-practised subtleties of local broadcasting politics. Furthermore, their expertise was - in line with their appointments - about production, while here they were expected to negotiate complicated logistical and organisational questions. At
the same time, they were attempting to establish new patterns and values against the
weight of precedence and experience of established NZBC procedures, whilst
surrounded by ex-NZBC personnel (and working out of ex-NZBC premises).

4.2 Summary

Under those circumstances, it is easy enough to see that, where there were
areas of uncertainty, those groups with the greatest resources (knowledge,
administrative support, social or organisational custom) would be likely to succeed.
The outcome is largely true in these circumstances. Where the Adam Report or the
Act was unambiguous, then there was little room for interpretation (with, moreover,
dubious or obviously inequitable decisions being later over-ruled by Council
members) so that operational details tended to reflect the production-orientated Adam
Committee recommendations. The news outcome is typical: news heads could, and
did, point to clear rules of practice to bolster their case (and news also illustrates the
support of third-level executives in redefining control boundaries in programme-
makers' favour).

On the other hand, where recommendations were ambiguous (as in the general
comments on personnel, or contract arrangements in the Adam Report),
administrators with expertise (in other words, control of a knowledge-base) could
translate that into centralised control of an administrative field.

Lastly, developing a Committee's recommendations into organisational
standard operating procedures employs a rule-based process and requires skills of
strict rule-based interpretation which falls squarely within administrative expertise.
Broadcasters' interpretative skills, on the other hand, involve judgement-calls and
value-interpretation organised around commonly-accepted normative standards. In
short, one should expect administrators to be better 'players' under these
circumstances: they were better placed to define ambiguity in their favour, and the
general shape of final structural details suggests this was, in fact, the case.
What emerges, then, perhaps unexpectedly, is that despite the clear encouragement given by the Adam Report to produce a new organisational system with new orientations and priorities, the final outcome suggests how an accumulated administrative knowledge-base could be mobilised to minimise incursions into established bureaucratic routines and practices. This transpired principally because the original Adam Report blueprint was sufficiently ambiguous, or ill-defined, to enable the reproduction of existing practices by skilled administrators within the new framework.

Seen from the opposite viewpoint, programme-makers possessed self-evidently inadequate resources, or knowledge about bureaucratic practices to define operational procedures in their favour. In many respects, the logic for the return to unified television system was embedded in the system even before the channels began transmission. In total, it can be seen as a salutary example of the process whereby superior administrative knowledge could be translated, in ambiguous circumstances, into administrative power (Crozier, 1964).
CHAPTER FOUR

1974-76: THE LINKS BETWEEN PROFESSION, ORGANISATION AND CULTURE

1. INTRODUCTION

If the claims advanced by broadcasting administrators revolve around traditional bureaucratic preoccupations of centralization, codification and careful monitoring of organisational processes, then these are confronted by the customary expert claims of broadcasters to special knowledge, autonomy and room for discretion in the pursuit of their craft. Laid out in this fashion, both positions appear abstract and isolated from each other. What motivates them in practice, and brings them into conflict, are the issues around which they evolve, and which are thrown up by shifts and changes in the organisational environment.

What this chapter examines are the bases for programme-makers' claims and how these are linked to broader social configurations. It also examines how these inter-relationships define the kinds of claims which, on the one hand, programme producers can make and, on the other, how this potentially influences the kind of cultural production which they create. It goes on to look specifically at the development of the two new channels and how they interpreted the Adam Committee blueprint in practice, and the problems which this subsequently began to throw up. These problems, inherent in the initial restructuring plan and becoming increasingly pressing over a relatively short time, were the issues around which the competing claims to competency emerged. In broad terms, they developed into two issues: financial and political, and it was the opposed claims to be able to manage these principal uncertainties which determined the progress of the two-channel system over the following four or more years.
2. PROGRAMME-MAKERS AND PROFESSIONALISM

2.1 Professionalism and ambiguity

The primary dilemma with broadcasting, as discussed in chapter two, is that it is non-routine, producing an ambiguous, constantly changing product. Television programmes are arrangements of symbols, essentially unstable, often contradictory in their meaning, and available to a variety of readings and misreadings (see, for example, Fiske and Hartley, 1978; Hall, 1980; Kellner, 1987, and Marc, 1987). This central ambiguity makes predictable and routinised production hazardous at best, at the same time as it divides and re-divides viewers on the basis of the irresponse to different programmes and programme-types. As Turow observes (1984:222):

'Simply put, there is no guarantee the audience will respond to new products as it responded to the old ones.'

Nonetheless, the problem of ambiguity remains undiminished, particularly in terms of the certainty of commanding large audiences on a consistent basis. As a result, this crucially affects the programme-makers' claims to competence and special skills, since the success of a programme cannot be fore-ordained.

However, as a number of commentators have pointed out, the occupational response to this problem is, in itself, ambiguous. Gallagher (1982:166) remarks that professional goals involve 'inexplicit and diffuse criteria to characterise "good television" or "good journalism"' while Tunstall, in a study of specialist correspondents asserts that 'uncertainty is inherent in both the news values and the degree of discretion in relation to news values' (1971:263). He argues, moreover, that journalism in particular lacks 'a clear core activity' (in Everett Hughes' terminology) and is, in effect, 'an indeterminate occupation' (1971:10). Elliot (1977:150) holds a similar view:
"Professionalism in media occupations therefore is an adapting to the dilemmas of role conflict by which skill and competence in the performance of routine tasks becomes elevated to the occupational ideal."

These routine tasks he defines as punctuality, meeting deadlines, objectivity and impartiality, arguing that these are strategies which (1977:150):

"are not only means of achieving professional status for the individual but means by which the organisation may hold its ground in the wider society".

As Gallagher sums it up, claims to professionalism (1982:163):

"represent, on the one hand, an occupational adaptation or response to the dilemmas of role conflict and, on the other, an organisational strategy to meet the demands of significant constituents in the environment of media institutions."

All this bears heavily on the ability of media professionals to define and manage a distinct area of occupational practices and knowledge without serious challenge. If this is important in terms of fundamental occupational activity it is far more so if a significant claim to control of an organisation is to be launched, and especially where that organisation holds a monopoly on the frequency spectrum. In brief, if producers not only have to establish themselves as a separate, autonomous occupation with rare skills, they also have to be able to assert their professional values as the only appropriate ones to control a central state organisation, and one, moreover, which will give them the right to control a monopoly over a key area of cultural and ideological production.

In many respects, as outlined, in the previous chapter, the Adam Committee attempted to confer a large part of that professional control. Yet, as noted above, it was to an occupation unsettled within itself. Even more so, in New Zealand: it was to an occupation which had been heavily controlled until then and was newer, smaller, less experienced and less specialised than its counterparts in many other countries, and therefore possessing less established and developed occupational procedures. In a phrase, media experts were considerably less expert than they might have been to confront the challenge which their new circumstances pushed towards them.
In contrast, British broadcasting, in particular, assembled many of the attributes of professional monopoly which, in Williams' words, amounted under Reith, to 'an authoritarian system with a conscience' (1962). Its elements were described by Elliot (1977:153):

'Professionalism, however, has links with high culture, especially in senses such as a mastery of technique, a style and cultivation, a hierarchy of taste, which have been most acceptable in British culture....It was one tactic by which the BBC was able to win its place as a central institution in the national culture and a particularly important one when the organisation's main constituents were the people and institutions of the 'establishment', the British status elite.'

Yet this occupational elevation was still due less to special knowledge and skill, as Fairlie (1959) points out, than in being able to balance its various political and cultural constituents. If broadcasting professionals make claims to leadership, then it is only with the continuing support of elites who, in turn, will expect a representation of their value systems and priorities, in other words of a particular moral order (Martin, 1984), for their continued support: in this case, the high culture to which Elliot refers. However, Coase, in his study of monopoly in British broadcasting, referred to a combination of forces, alongside Reith's initial influence, which has interesting implications for this period of New Zealand broadcasting (Coase, 1950:195):

'Had the Labour Party been in power at the time of the formation of the BBC; had independent broadcasting systems not been associated in the minds of the Press with commercial broadcasting and finance by means of advertisements; had another department, say the Board of Trade, been responsible for broadcasting policy; had the views of the first chief executive of the BBC been like those of the second; with this combination of circumstances, there would be no reason to suppose that such a formidable body of support for a monopoly of broadcasting would ever have arisen.'

Broadcasters in New Zealand were to lose their political patron; advertising was viewed differently; Ministerial responsibility for broadcasting shifted from department to department, and the views of the first Board chairmen were almost the reverse of Coase's description.
If there are conclusions to be drawn about broadcasters and professionalism, they can be reduced to two main points. One is that programme makers' claims are based around an imperfectly defined body of knowledge and practices; the other is that their legitimacy and status as organisational leaders depends on continuing linkages with external elite groups whose attitudes they must implicitly reflect (or broker, to use Hall's (1972) term) to provide in part, at least, the legitimacy which they cannot fully define for themselves.

2.2 Programme-makers and Cultural Production

While it is true that producers may depend on cultural and political elites to remain dominant in the medium, the relationship inevitably changes when television operates in a commercial environment. Here, producers must claim to be able to do two things: to create a market for their particular kinds of symbolic productions, and to produce legitimate - that is 'accurate' or 'faithful' representations of the society in which they operate. This second role appears similar to the claim to neutrality or impartiality but in fact it stands further examination.

2.3 Programme-makers and Complaints

If we adopt, for the moment, a ritual view of communication process then, following Carey (1975), communication becomes the 'symbolic process whereby reality is produced, maintained, repaired and transformed'. Television producers, in this view, become 'hucksters of the symbol' as Sahlin (1976;217) puts it or, to use Newcomb and Hirsch's formulation (1987:456-457):

'cultural bricoleurs, seeking and creating new meaning in the combination of cultural elements with embedded significance. They respond to real events, changes in social structure and organisation, and to shifts in attitude and value..... At each step of the process they function as cultural interpreters.'

The utility of this approach is that it portrays television as a distributor of symbols available for a variety of readings and responses - as Eng (1984), for example, has demonstrated with the apparently simple case of 'Dallas', but contained within several basic modes of interpretation which Hall (1980) terms 'dominant',
'oppositional' or 'negotiated'. Although this view, itself, has recently been challenged, (Scannell, 1989). If readings differ sufficiently, they may lead to sharp disagreement (Newcomb and Hirsch, 1987:465): 'if television threatens the sense of cultural security, the individual may take steps to engage the medium at the level of personal action. Most often this occurs in the form of letters to the network or to local stations, and again, the pattern is not new to television.'

Indeed not, but the point is crucial. New Zealand television receives a constant flow of popular feedback; receptionists keep a log of telephone calls, and there is a steady stream of correspondence. During 1975, Avalon was receiving letters at the rate of a thousand per week containing queries, complaints and, more rarely, praise. What is important is that only a tiny fraction of this feedback is translated into formal complaint. Of these, an even smaller number develop into substantial issues within the system, but it is these which may constitute a major challenge to producers' claims as legitimate and accepted cultural interpreters. If formal complaints continue to emerge at an unusually high level, it can affect not only professionals' standing but even the organisation's legitimacy. Essentially, this may occur because groups challenge producers' interpretive practices; Newcomb and Hirsch go so far as to see, in the US, special interest groups as 'representative of metaphoric "fault lines" in American society. Television is the terrain in which the faults are expressed and worked out.' (1987:466). From an organisational viewpoint, complaints are the costs produced by risk-taking and, ultimately, where the risks - or level of complaints are perceived to be too great - these offer the opportunity for administrators to argue for a redistribution of power so that they may impose predictability and efficiency for the sake of the organisation's survival (Turow, 1985). If programme-makers set out with an agenda, as was the case here, actively to pursue those forms of innovation, then they also draw the attendant risks.

In other words, the frequency and force of complaints is an interesting variable in the standing of media professionals, and so for television as a whole. That they may also reflect broader social changes (viz Hall, 1972) does not affect this
prophecy; rather, it illuminates the nature of the legitimacy on which broadcasting is founded. Furthermore, it suggests - as the customary view of broadcasting impartiality is less able to do - that any form of textual production by television whether current affairs or drama even, its formatting and scheduling is open to challenge under particular conditions.

2.4 Summary

Professional control is threatened by two problems. One is that the move from a state to a market setting raises the question of what constitutes appropriate production, and by whom that should be determined - and a mixed institutional setting, as in New Zealand, compounds these fundamental uncertainties. The other is that programme-makers' moral mission - their undertaking to represent New Zealand to itself - may deviate from socially accepted norms. If these draw persistent complaints then it may undermine their legitimacy and eventually even that of the organisation itself.

Both these conditions existed between 1975-1980 in varying degrees, and formed two important components of the pressures faced by television. Complaints were to form a constant series of issues in terms of broadcasting's political environment and were eventually to boil over and focus not just on individual issues, but on the legitimacy of the complaints procedure as a whole. On the other hand, financially, the increasing reliance on advertising revenue - i.e. the market - and the growing financial difficulties faced by broadcasting suggested economies better supplied by accountants than producers, but also different programme scheduling strategies which irritated viewers.

3. 1974-76: THE RELATIONSHIPS IN OPERATIONS

How did the relationships outlined above work under the conditions of the new two-channel system? This section looks at the role and status of programme-makers, particularly as defined by the leading occupation of producers and directors, and the
developinbg strategies of the two corporations in respect of the issues outline earlier. First, however, we ned to consider briefly what groups constitute programme-makers (and, by implication, administrators), within television.

3.1 The Programme-Making Group

To some extent, the terms 'programme-makers' and 'administrators' are loosely-defined categories (viz Gregory, 1979). Ettema et al (1987), for example, use the term 'mass communicators' to delineate a similar group of American production personnel.

Engwall (1978, 1986), however, develops a technological model as a way of diferentiating personnel within newspapers, and his approach is broadly applicable to television. Both media depend on a tightly-co-ordinated production cycle with a high degree of differentiation between groups to cope with the complexity and variability of the production flow (i.e. the publication of newspapers or the presentation of programmes). With television, the bringing programmes to air involves cycles of pre-production, production and post-production phases as programmes are planned, shot and assembled for transmission, on a daily, weekly, monthly or serial basis.

Around these phases is a quite differently-paced, largely non-cyclical work flow that involves three groups: administration (personnel, stores, records, accounting and related activities); engineering (either on capital works or with transmission) and sales and marketing (the sale of advertising time or merchandising of programmes).

The production cycle involves a core group which consists, according to programme type, of producers, directors, journalists, researchers, other creative staff (such as writers or musicians) and secretarial staff. As a programme evolves, it draws on a wider range of production personnel who vary according to the programme's particular demands (whether, for example, it is filmed or videotaped; recorded in the studio or on location; is pre-recorded or live; is non-fiction or fiction). This technical or craft assistance includes designers, wardrobe staff, graphic designers, studio crews,
technical producers, camera and sound operators, editors and various post-production personnel, amongst others.

This description readily suggests two broad groupings of personnel within television, based on differences in work pattern and time-frame. A cyclical work flow lends itself to the development of a broad occupational community, with many personnel thrown together for an intensive period, often with limited regard for a regular working week, in order to complete a common project (and see Burns, 1972; 1979). Administrative, sales and marketing, and engineering staff, however, more commonly work to a 40-hour week with a more ordered, routine work flow.

Consequently, programme-makers can be identified principally as the core programme production team. But, as indicated, this readily expands to encompass a number of related occupations. Within this arrangement, producers and directors stand as the leading figures (Burns, 1972) and, because their activities define the limits of programme-making activity, their role forms the focus of attention for the following discussion.

Producers and directors in the new structure were relatively small in number: the 1975 occupational listing names 22 producers on permanent establishment lists, as part of a total NZBC staff in excess of 3000. With the two-channel restructuring they represented 22 producers amongst a total television staff in early 1976 of approximately 1600 television employees. By 1979 there were 31 accredited producers out of a total television staff of 1665. In relation to general programme staff, they represented 8% (22/268) of 1976 staff and 11% (31/294) of 1979 staff, a growth of 36% over 3 years during a period in which programme numbers grew by 9% (268/294) and total establishment numbers by 4% (1596/1655). In terms of their place in the occupational hierarchy, they stood at the apex of the production process - planning, managing and co-ordinating the division of labour which resulted in the creation of programmes. They also became viewed as the top of two reference groups used by the Public Service Association in industrial negotiations. The craft
area, the Film Operations Group, was seen as the lower reference group. Both during the 1975-80 period, and beyond, producers led what one industrial negotiator termed as 'a charmed life - they were never seriously knocked back' which was one significant reason for their linkage as an upper reference point for other groups by negotiators. Producers' individual gradings were scrutinised by an independent Producers Assessment Panel which was responsible not only for accrediting production personnel as producers but also for enforcing the sole use of accredited personnel to direct or produce programmes. Accreditation itself might only occur after personnel, who were specially selected, had undergone a sometimes punishing training programme. On this they were expected not only to demonstrate sufficient technical skills and authority over a crew to assemble programme material, but also to display a vaguely-defined editorial sense. Invariably, this was a normative evaluation which involved instilling both a sense of mystique about what constituted producerial qualities, and a strong sense of loyalty to the producer ethic. In other words, they become part of an implicitly elite club within broadcasting who could - particularly within the 1974-79 period - look forward to rising to occupy top positions within the Corporation.

At the same time, they had to defend their position against several closely-related groups. There were three in particular: presentation directors (who were responsible for handling the presentation and transmission of completed programmers); news directors (who assembled and put to air all news bulletins), and commercial producers (who mostly assembled commercials to advertisers' instructions). Presentation directors were least threatening, since they were small in number and lacked any clear career-structure. Along with news directors, they were portrayed as primarily a craft or technical sub-group with little editorial knowledge, and a defence was generally mounted on those grounds. This was despite the fact that news directors were sometimes more proficient than programme directors in specific areas - principally live studio direction. Commercial producers' claims were
rejected on the basis that their creativity and management skill was 'at a significantly lower level', as a management memo put it. They controlled fewer staff, smaller budgets and needed to exhibit less 'creativity and flair'. Even the management memo clearly viewed some of these unsupported assertions as debatable, but the emphasis on the central mystique of creativity was unequivocal and, indeed formed a prime claim to a producer's or director's special status.

These were also generally supported by the Directors-General, themselves ex-producers, but also by the Television Producers and Directors Association (hereafter the TVPDA). Indeed, this association is further evidence of the move towards professionalism. It was limited, however, in several important ways.

(1) Producers did not have their own salary scale, but were merely ranged at higher points than other groups on the G (General) scale. Some other New Zealand professional groups, such as doctors, have their own specially elevated scales.

(2) The TVPDA did not represent producers at industrial negotiations; they were merely associated to the PSA, who made representations on behalf of all television occupations. This position worsened during the 1970's as the PSA adopted a more explicitly industrial stance, which excluded the TVPDA, who preferred to retain a Guild position in their negotiations. More than that, as a late 1980 memo emphasised, this relationship meant it was perceived by the BCNZ as just one amongst 'other craft groups on staff matters, eg Floor Managers Association, TPA's Association etc.'

(3) The TVPDA lacked any formal, institutional training scheme; there were (and are) no formal qualifications or extended means of training, or clear means of recruitment - and certainly none that the TVPDA can control beyond the bounds of television, (and see Larson, 1979, for the significance of this for the advancement of professional projects).
3.2 Professional Self-Perception

Regardless of the degree of professionalization by producers, it was backed by a professional ideology. Its key feature, as noted earlier, was a claim to autonomy. As expressed in a remit to a TVPDA meeting in August 1979:

'the ultimate responsibility for each local television production must lie in the hands of an assessed and designated producer...requiring of its organiser skills beyond the basic journalistic skills in the selection and editing of source material.'

Clearly, this is less than definitive about what these skills might be. Another TVPDA document refers to 'excellence, efficiency and originality.' Nonetheless, the TV-1 Director-General, in the text of an interview for the TVPDA's occasional journal, Voiceover, in 1975 provided more detail:

'. . .I think that every producer must have a strongly developed sense and be able to judge instinctively that a close up is called for or that a two-shot is going to punctuate or relieve the oppressiveness of too close a visual exchange.'

This statement, while it still retains the mystique of judgement, illustrates the key interpretative role of producers and, equally importantly, the sense that the producer works on behalf of the viewer, as a kind of visual or cultural advocate. Morris, in the same interview, expands on some other central ideological features:

'we are, or should be, committed to the principle that the programme's the thing. That's what we'll finally be judged on, that's what we're in business for.'

He also referred to the importance of 'raising standards' and the importance of reference to peers for a validation of a programme's worth (the TV-2 Director-General, in an interview for the NZ Listener (June 28, 1975), referred to the importance of international standing as part of television's development which suggests the local/cosmopolitan distinction raised by Gouldner, 1972).

In a press statement in August 1979, the TVPDA also emphasised the place of quality, and to their claim to represent the public interest. It is interesting to compare these professional claims to those Burns (1979) found at the BBC. As he indicated, there were three primary orientations to professionalism which could be summarised
(McQuail, 1983:119) as craft-oriented, (ie to a peer reference group), public organisation-oriented (to a cultural mission, or the public interest) and pragmatic (to ratings). Both of these first two orientation are clearly represented in these statements. The third was most clearly represented by the TV-2 interview noted above as an awareness of their strategy. In this context, however, these definitions are being offered as public statements of claims to special status. The TV-2 remarks refer to orientations within the occupation.

In short, New Zealand producers demonstrate professional aspirations in common with those of other countries. It is worth noting, though, that their claims are more explicitly aligned with public service or monopoly broadcasting than to the orientations noted by Cantor-(1971) in her study of American television producers. The point, again, however, is that her study is of orientations rather than claims.

3.3 Producers and the New Channels

Whatever the case, producers undoubtedly dominated the two new channels. As outlined in the previous chapter, this was principally through the control of key positions within a small, closely-knit organisational framework. They were supported by Corporation Boards who attempted to institute the Adam Report as fully as possible. As the TV-1 Chairman put it, 'Our Bible was the Adam Report.' Equally importantly, the two Directors-General assumed a role of paternal benevolence over the structures which they were predominantly responsible for creating and motivating. Alan Morris, in a letter to the Higher Salaries Commission in December 1975 summarised their role:

'Allan Martin of TV-2 and I were charged with the responsibility of establishing two new Corporations which in the event were quite dissimilar in structure, character and direction from the NZBC. We personally framed the infrastructure in almost complete detail, set production priorities and negotiated terms and conditions of employment with the PSA...Thus, because of the comparative lack of expertise in international terms of so many of our people, a major function in the role of the Director-General is as teacher and advisor from the factory floor upwards.'

If the Directors-General held a paramount position, there was little doubt that the Controllers of Programmes were also significantly powerful, through their control
of programme scheduling, as several respondents from both channels noted. Scheduling determines the audience for individual programmes and consequently affects the visibility and careers of producers and production staff; it also determines the placement and duration of advertising breaks and so influences the channel's financial performance, and the opportunities available to advertisers as well as sales staff. As one cynical TV-1 film services officer remarked in a 1978 memo:

'There is a feeling amongst some staff that there are not five Controllers but one Controller of Programmes and four assistants.'

The priorities of the Controller of Programmes could be transmitted rapidly through the channel, not only because of the centralization of key decisions in his hands, but also because each channel was small (TV-1 employed 860 staff in 1976; TV-2 approximately 680) and tightly knit, organised around the small-unit cluster of programme production. As a senior TV-1 executive observed, directives could travel from the top to the bottom of the Corporation and carry a response back up within the space of a week. In this sense, the organisations resembled the 'family' structure recommended by the Adam Report. In other ways, however, they diverged sharply and in ways which were reflected in their widely differing organisational cultures.

3.4 The Development of Organisational Cultures

TV-1 took over the Avalon facilities and Dunedin as its second station, which it turned into a specialist station, eventually producing mainly children's programmes. It also took over many of the experienced NZBC staff, largely as a result of geography: shifts to TV-2 would frequently have meant relocation for individuals. As a consequence, it began operations in fundamentally well-equipped brand-new facilities with a core of experienced administrative staff (the 'lean' administration recommended by the Adam Report). It had full national coverage at the outset, operated from a largely familiar base (Wellington) and contained the majority of its staff within one complex. Understandably, its older members, especially, tended to look on themselves as the natural successors to the NZBC; also, by virtue of being located in the political capital of the country.
TV2, on the other hand, began as a brand-new operation. Its base was Auckland, with Christchurch as a second operational centre, but with no particular division of programme responsibilities. Not only could it claim fewer television staff, but its facilities were, to some extent, cramped ex-radio headquarters. Certainly, operations were scattered across Auckland, on both sides of the harbour, in a variety of loosely-connected buildings. At its inception it had no broadcasting facilities whatsoever: seven major transmitters had to be imported over the first years of its existence to give 75% national coverage as Stage One of complete development, each coming on air one after the other.

The result was that, under a broadly similar framework, each channel evolved a very different strategy of development to ensure its survival. However, before turning immediately to these, it is important to list some of the other pressures and responses which emerged during the 1974-76 period. These could be summarised as: understaffing, technical shortages and malfunctions, high productions stresses and long working hours, and high intake of new staff. On the other hand, there was clear evidence of high morale, especially among production departments, and a feeling of enthusiasm, loyalty and sense of stake in the new structure. TV-1’s 1976 Annual Report to Parliament is quite remarkable for its vibrancy in what is normally an occasion for studiously grey prose (F.11, 1976:3):

‘With these problems solved, the corporation surged forward on a tide of creative and innovative broadcasting which in retrospect at the end of 12 months can only be described as astonishing. Any changes the future may bring to TV-1 will never obscure the achievement of its first year as a vintage one in the history of television in New Zealand.’

It went on to state that this was due to (F.11, 1976:3):

‘the executive and personnel, who were obliged to work very long hours in the arduous shakedown period and who demonstrated a morale and enthusiasm for their channel which was beyond praise.’

TV2’s report was more sanguine (F.12, 1976:4):

‘the enthusiasm of our staff in meeting the challenge of pioneering New Zealand’s second channel was evident with the start of our transmission in Auckland and Christchurch...’
In many respects, this process reflects what Schein (1985) regards as the key aspects of internal integration of new groups: the growth of relationships and sense of accomplishment. What was undoubtedly true was the wide degree and depth of commitment in a way which was altogether absent with the NZBC.

It is interesting to see how this process was fostered and shaped within Television One, and illuminates how internal departmental power influenced the channel’s image and strategies. As a series of Public Relations memos between 1975 and 1978 showed, it was an explicitly planned undertaking, which aimed to link external management and internal staff ideological control. Externally, TV-1 personnel began a process in 1975, a surged by the Information Services section, of addressing 40 groups and organisations, mainly in the Wellington area. Critical letters received 'polite and friendly' replies, which, one memo claimed, was sometimes turning criticism to television's advantage (without actually stating how). The media was also fed publicity information, particularly television critics, and members were invited to Avalon to meet 'executives, producers and personalities.' Internally, the memo acknowledged the importance of 'good internal staff relations', commenting that the Information Section was being used by 'various groups for advice, information and assistance with the preparation and release of information.' A weekly newsletter was initiated.

These same strategies, once introduced, were to endure and expand - externally, to reinforce a positive image; internally, to enhance staff co-operation. At the same time, the Information Services sought to extend its influence, in order to reinforce what it saw as the Corporation's objectives. It rejected the use of outside PR assistance - on which TV-1 had originally relied - and late in 1975 began to claim the sole right either to speak for, or to manage, all external contact on programme matters. Internally, it attempted to portray all television personnel as PR agents by implication:

'All members of the staff of Television One are responsible for, and are part of the Corporation's public relations.'
It recognised, however, that operational stresses were counter-productive, with staff appearing 'lethargic, bemused and negative.' Nonetheless, it pursued a "9th Floor" getting down to the "ground floor" policy, endorsing a proposal for a 'sounding-board group', where staff regularly met executives.

In a 1978 plan, it assembled a group of external and internal strategies. These supplemented existing initiatives with proposals for a regular Listener column, bi-annual Press conferences at Avalon involving metropolitan press critics, use of the newly-formed Programme Advisory Committees, wider deployment of television personalities, and a regular Director-General's lunch. Staff relations were to be enhanced by fortnightly get-togethers with the Director-General, seminars and 'devices for "keeping people busy"' between productions, and various improvements for top-down communication.

The importance of these suggestions was considerable. Television One received, as will be detailed in a later chapter, considerable criticism, particularly through the press and needed to maintain not only a defined, positive presence but to reduce the damage that continued criticism could cause morale. A majority of the proposals were, in fact, taken up. However, there are two points of interest here. One is that aside from the obvious control issues involved (see, for example, Dunkerley and Salaman, 1986; Salaman, 1979), the process of PR image construction, while it emerged out of an organisational culture that developed and defined itself against the NZBC, was a consciously constructed and marketed image. By an emphasis on responsibility and public service, it was implicitly addressing a broadly high culture audience. In the process, it was linking organisational culture to national culture. Moreover, it was - at least to some extent - manufacturing the organisational culture by the very effort of managing it. In short, this was an effort at internal and external representation of a particular set of values and understandings. On the one hand, these spoke to staff and informal groupings; on the other, they asserted a particular
external identity - which in turn would be re-absorbed and recycled by the staff of the channel from which it emanated.

The second point is that these proposals accompanied a claim for an increase in status (in the form of the creation of a new Public Affairs Department), with a corresponding dominance over allied groups (the presentation and publicity sections were depicted as undertaking largely technical functions). The claim was rejected (after Board level discussion), and for obvious reasons. This degree of management would have encroached on production discretion, and was at odds with producers' perceived right to represent their programmes as they wished. As it happened, producers took either little, or varying account of these management initiatives in promoting their productions. On the contrary, they continued to comment publicly not only about them, but about a variety of Corporation policies, earning increasingly stern rebukes and reminders of regulations; these, indeed, recalled that, at root, the overall broadcasting structure was still hierarchical despite the efforts to produce a sense of equality and informality. Nonetheless, the fact that a large number of suggestions were taken up indicates both the influence of the area, and the way in which it inflected the dominant programme ideology through its attention to important external pressures and sensitivities.

TV-2's culture was likewise inflected, although in a different direction. Its primary requirement - as clearly stated in its objectives (TV-2 Board Minutes, 29 July 1976) - was to increase its transmission coverage in order to increase its sales capacity. With a relatively small and indeterminate coverage, its advertising rates were inevitably lower, and it was unable to draw big, consistent national advertisers. This not only determined its strategy, it also affected the relationship amongst key departments (in sum, it elevated the position of Sales and Marketing), and shaped both its organisational culture and its cultural production which became, in effect, aimed towards a more generally mass or popular culture audience.
The cornerstone of the strategy was founded on regionalism - in explicit and conscious contrast to Avalon's national coverage. This had two dimensions. One was a specific conception of local community (NZ Listener 28 June 1975):

'Community. TV-2 will draw its character from a community approach, a deliberate regional integration, a direct response to people and a subtle Polynesian blending.'

This would involve 'a dialogue, a talk-back feeling' so that 'we will be showing people what's going on in their own backyard,' (NZ Listener 28 June 1975).

The other dimension involved parochialism (NZ Listener 28 June 1975):

'"In the 7 pm bulletin we will be unashamedly parochial" says Bruce Crossan, head of news and current affairs.'

This was also the stated aim of TV-2's Controller of Sales and Marketing, to take account of transmission coverage, but also to develop retail trade advertising. Previously, this had been estimated to account for 3% of all advertising. It was therefore considered to be a potential source of untapped revenue, and was confidently expected to generate considerable income. However, it involved an entrepreneuerialism and inventiveness both in promoting a channel without an established image, and in wooing established advertisers or creating a new market.

This policy, in essence, set the direction of TV-2, and was one which depended on piecemeal development of markets, communities and even the organisation's facilities around a concept of locality. It therefore also aimed to draw the maximum audiences to the channel as fast as possible to offset its coverage deficiencies. This, in turn, required favourable audience research. One of the eventual results, widely noted by commentators, was of the development of so-called 'snob-slob' programming between the channels. It also heightened conflicts and rivalries. To secure maximum advantage and to retain audiences through the effects of programme flow (Williams, 1975), TV-2 increasingly ignored common junction agreements (which enabled viewers to switch channels without missing part of a programme), attempted to by-pass complementary programming rules, and argued
vehemently for the right to choose its own Audience Research agency in preference to the Broadcasting Council's. TV-1 came to be viewed in some TV-2 circles as a big brother gifted with all the advantages; likewise, TV-2 was regarded at TV-1 as unreliable and dragging on the coat-tails of its financial success.

The differences, however, extend further. As one TV-2 respondent pointed out, they reflected local cultural identities:

'TV-2 was a product of Auckland. It reflected the city in its outgoingness and openness, unlike TV-1's institutional character...It worked out of Wellington - you know, that institutionalised city bureaucracy which spills over into programming, and into the journalists' retinue of contacts...Auckland, on the other hand, is different. It's innovative, adventurous, materialistic. There are no nuances. It's upfront. People are out to make a buck.'

In total, this set up a wide number of opposed categories into which TV-1 and TV-2 respectively fell: national/regional; centralised/diffused; high/low culture; public service/commercial; tightly/loosely co-ordinated and so on.

Yet, if this was one set of oppositions, there was a second set which cut across them. Both channels were clearly urban organisations, yet both were very conscious of rural constituents - TV-1 as part of national coverage; TV-2 because of the loud complaints of rural viewers who couldn't receive them. Yet their metropolitan location also signalled a switch in implicit priorities. TV-1, for instance, sought to establish a sense of national community, as a Public Relations memo argued:

'TV-1 must establish the NCTB approach. North Cape to Bluff - in that anything that's anything in New Zealand can be seen by everybody, only on TV-1 .... the community concept is fine - a sort of three-island network of the people'.

At the same time, it was important to establish an image of a national Corporation interested in the little people, and the little things.' Yet, simultaneously, it set its key national news bulletin - on which prime time evening programming conventionally depends - half an hour later than the NZBC at 6.30pm, in line with Melbourne research on metropolitan meal-times, while recognising that this would disadvantage rural viewers and generate complaints - which it did (TV-1 Board minutes, 1976).
3.5 Public Culture and the Cultivation of Publics

Overall, there was a shift from an implicitly rural to an urban audience. This is evident not only from the kinds of new local programmes which were produced: apart from news placement, both channels diversified, for example, into the previously untried areas of long-running soap operas, which emphasised urban and local values - one was set in a factory (TV-2's 'A Going Concern'); the other, TV-1's 'Close To Home' depicted a local suburban community. It was also evident in the crucial recognition (and celebration) of diversity (Boyd-Bell, 1985): there was an emphasis on difference, social variety, non-conformity, challenge and confrontation which can all be regarded as urban, metropolitan concerns (Tonnies, 1955; Frisby and Sayer, 1986) rather than provincial and traditional, hierarchical and authoritarian.

The challenge was mounted, for example, in a new children's programme, 'Gizago' which, apart from using a title which abandoned standard English in favour of a child's spelling, was fronted by an unkempt adult called Stu dressed in an untidy school uniform, who was widely accused of inculcating bad habits in younger viewers through his speech and behaviour. Programmes such as 'Edwards on Saturday' aimed, for the first time, to reproduce a sophisticated, late-night chat show format. This did away with the formerly implicit idea that there was a natural national bed-time of 11 pm when close-down arrived; it also began to introduce varieties of people and ideas not formerly countenanced by the NZBC, and provoked widespread controversy as a consequence (NZ Listener July, September 1975; NBR Investment Supplement, August 1977). Current Affairs programmes became far more extensive, especially on TV-1. They also became more openly confrontational, with sharp questioning by often young interviewers of established authority figures. Again, this continued to provoke wide public debate (Christchurch Press, 14 August 1976; NZ Listener June 1976).
These initiatives suggest something of Newcomb and Hirsch's (1987) idea of liminality, in the destruction of established boundaries (and see Bernice Martin's (1984) analysis on this point), yet they were also tied to an image or rhetoric of localness or community by each channel. In short, this combined set of values produced contradictory images which spoke to contradictory communities simultaneously in an effort to accommodate them. For example, TV-1's confrontational programme, 'Fair Go' was modelled on the urbane English programme, 'That's Life'. It tied together small-scale consumer complaints within an explicitly metropolitan framework, and also appealed to a deeply-held, traditional egalitarian ideology - the idea that everyone, regardless of station, has the right to reasonable treatment, or a 'fair go' in the New Zealand phrase. The same strategy is evident in 'Clobber Shop' - a reference to the Great New Zealand Clobbering Machine (Mitchell, 1972), but was, in fact, a short-lived complaints programme about television. 'Today At One', the mid-day half-hour magazine programme, initially appealing to a house-bound lunch-time audience became retitled 'Good Day' and attempted (unsuccessfully, in this case), to shorten its title to the familiar Kiwi greeting 'G'Day'. Nonetheless, it was indicative of the attempt to tie the local and rural to the metropolitan and national. So, too, in some ways, was the parodic figure of Fred Dagg, a laconic cow-cockie in gumboots who appeared on TV-1 current affairs programmes to lampoon national mores. This new diversity of programme-types reflected, in part, not only the new possibilities available to programme-makers, responding to the absence of close administrative controls under which they had previously worked, but also reflected their own backgrounds and pre-occupations. Anecdotal evidence suggests that a majority of programme-makers came from an urban background themselves. In fact, staff with a rural background or experience had to be actively recruited for such rural programmes as 'Country Calendar'. (Interestingly, this programme still became one principally aimed at townsfolk and had to be supplemented by a specialist farming programme which, as TV-1's
Director-General complained in a memo, was then scheduled in such away that farmers were rarely able to watch it despite its high agricultural reputation).

4. SUMMARY

1974-76 was the period which saw programme-makers rise to dominate the television system. What this chapter has set out to demonstrate is the complex set of linkages which their prominence revealed, and how this impacted on television's broader social setting. The key linkage, however, is between the risks and ambiguities inherent in television broadcasting and the claim by programme-makers - and particularly producers - to be able to manage this uncertainty successfully. What this chapter attempts to show is that the programme-makers set out to institute different strategies which were founded in perceptions of their environment as comprising both market and state elements. Each channel, in effect, emphasised either one element or the other: Television One adopted a more noticeably institutional stance, while Television Two adopted a more explicitly market orientation. Each of these strategies reflected both the resources available to them (facilities, plant, staff and location) and the regional ideology in which they were located. This combination of understandings and opportunities was then translated into the production of nationwide ideologies, reflecting the organisational ideologies out of which they arose (and, as indicated, were managed). In crude terms, these approximated to a high and a popular culture (although, in fact, the distinction is less clear - more especially for Television One) - when it is closely scrutinised. TV-1, in particular, appears to have worked to an agenda which was set by implication by its predecessor, the NZBC: it was an attempt by professionals to demonstrate the fruits of their expertise when freed from administrative control, and they attempted to pursue a number of objectives simultaneously (as the 1976 Annual Report to Parliament triumphantly announces) as a consequence.
Yet these strategies also bred conflicts in time between the channels: both channels were seeking the maximum commercial return from the advertising market both for revenue and to demonstrate their competence and credibility.

Once the initial strategy of each channel was formulated it did not alter markedly until the amalgamation of 1979. On the contrary, the intervening period served to heighten the differences and remove ambiguities at the same time as it intensified channel rivalries. This, in turn, served to undermine the claims to legitimacy and credibility which both channels sought to promote, and sharpened competition over access to internal resources and the allocation of state funding.

The second issue, which arose repeatedly from 1977-79, also began in this period. This involved the question of complaints about programmes, and how they should be resolved, both internally and publicly. Together, this issue, and that of channel rivalry, formed the two major political and social threats (or publication issues, as Engwall (1986) terms them), faced by television. These formed the basis for fresh claims from administrators to manage them where, they argued, professionals had failed. These, plus the intensifying financial issues, are the subjects which are taken up in following chapters.
CHAPTER FIVE

1974-76: EMERGING TENSIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

Chapter four set out the kinds of strategies and claims advanced by programme-makers in the creation of a competitive television system. The focus, however, was intentionally limited to the activities of the two corporations as producers of programmes. What this underemphasises is the rapidly developing tensions in the total broadcasting system. Some of these began to emerge as a result of the original structures produced by the working parties from the Adam Report, or from shortcomings of the Report itself. Others arose from the wider social and institutional setting in which television operated.

What this chapter discusses are two sets of issues. One has to do with the development of internal organisational pressures and tensions which, in turn, generated, the other: public discontent and political opportunities. Each of these is considered in turn. They are then related to the broader questions of organisation, profession and culture.

1.1 Internal Organisational Pressures

During the 1974-76 period, four major organisational dilemmas can be isolated, each containing a cluster of sub-issues. These were (a) financial issues; (b) problems of transmission extension; (c) presentation problems (i.e. problems of programme production and scheduling) and (d) interchannel rivalries.

1.1.1 Financial Issues

As outlined above, broadcasting worked, in effect, with two budgets. One was the year-by-year operational budget which incorporated all the normal matters of income and expenditure. Controls for this were delegated at different levels
throughout the corporations. The second budget was for capital expenditure - the Capital Equipment Programme (CEP). It covered major items of expenditure: studios, transmitters and major building projects or alterations. Amounts over $500,000 needed Ministerial approval and projected expenditure was vetted and approved by the Treasury and by the Cabinet Works Committee on the basis of 5-year plans which were scrutinised, again, on a yearly basis. Finance for the CEP could be borrowed from Treasury, but only by way of the National Development Loan account, at 10% interest. It was these loans which provided broadcasting with its major debt burden, amounting to $30.9 million by the end of the 1976 financial year, of which $16.9 million was borrowed during 1976 itself. With a tiny announced surplus of $220,000 in 1974-75, and $104,000 in 1975-76, it was widely recognised that broadcasting was faced with a severe problem of repayment, especially since its major capital programme was by no means complete (and see the NBR Investment Supplement, 26.3.75: 'Cost Will Be The Biggest Test').

The reasons for the loans were straightforward: they were to pay for second channel transmission coverage (expected to be 75% of the country by 1977), completing the switch from monochrome to colour transmission, major studio development for TV-2 in Auckland, and the completion of TV-1's Avalon facilities. While the Chairman claimed that the original funding by Labour and the Treasury was 'inexpert' (The Evening Post 13.10.76), it was evident that broadcasting was severely underfunded (and see the Parliamentary debate on this point, NZPD 1976:4396,4406 and 4409). Nonetheless, it enabled National to criticise broadcasting for overspending.

Financial issues, therefore, emerged in two tiers, reflected in the budgetary process. One, the CEP, reflected the problems of capital expenditure and the linked question of a key resource dependency, closely controlled by a public sector agency, which constantly demanded thrift, tight financial management and detailed information flows in return for access to its monopoly of loan finance, (BCM 75/16/8;
These pressures fed into the second tier of financial issues which concerned three linked questions of (i) debt servicing; (ii) allocation procedures, and (iii) monitoring procedures. Because these were constantly in a state of irresolution, tension and ambiguity, coupled with genuine liquidity problems, it enabled administrators to claim a state of crisis which only they could resolve by (i) an access to and understanding of the activities and attitudes of external financial agents; (ii) technical skills (of centralised management, monitoring and financial control procedures) to solve severe and apparently deadlocked problems. In short, they argued to be able to reduce the acute financial uncertainties by an appeal to established occupational skills reinforced (in the case of the new Chairman and Board members) by expert figures drawn from a wider professional/managerial community beyond broadcasting.

### 1.1.2 Transmission Extension

This second issue was linked to the first. The availability of loans directly affected the rate at which transmission coverage could be extended, as noted. The reduction in the CEP demanded by the Treasury therefore affected broadcasting - and primarily TV-2 - in two ways. First, it limited advertising income to the speed at which new audiences could be brought into being - and which had consequent effects on the level of marketing rates and advertising strategy. Secondly, it fuelled the debate over complementary programming: although the channels were meant to programme competitively, if a popular programme was shown on TV-2, it provoked protests from the 25% of the population which could not receive it.

In turn, these two consequences generated particular kinds of entrepreneurialism. TV-2 became noted, and criticised, for inventive schemes to capture advertisers: respondents mentioned, amongst others, the Million Dollar Club which admitted large advertising account holders to a club distinguished by its special privileges, and the Rubber Rate Card which, it was alleged, was a scheme whereby advertisers were sold audiences in marginal or even non-existent transmission areas.
On the other hand, it encouraged pressure for interim television coverage through privately-funded translators. Televiewers Associations developed throughout the country (The Christchurch Press 15.7.75) pressing for low-cost translators which they would fund themselves. This also generated direct political pressure that led to meetings between MP's and the Broadcasting Council, and eventually to a scheme which saw interim systems approved for a number of provincial centres built to broadcasting engineers' strict specifications (BCM 76/9/4; 76/10/16). This was to be an important development: metropolitan centres were, generally, the first to receive coverage but provincial centres often represented politically marginal seats which could hold the key to electoral change. Moreover, provincial seats were increasingly becoming the preserve of the National Party (Levine, 1979:91-93). This prompted considerable political pressure for the extension of transmission over other broadcasting priorities.

In general, while transmission did not provoke major discussion at the Council level, it did with the TV-2 Board (TV-2 Board minutes) and it was to have long-term consequences for priorities.

At the same time, it underscored the presentation issue - and hence the state/market ambiguity about the best form of provision of services. If viewers could not see preferred programmes, then they were also unlikely to see the benefits of a purportedly market arrangement for broadcasting. Consequently, the uneven of provision of transmission facilities fed into pressure for an even allocation of other (programme) services nationally. There is one other interesting subsidiary point. This was that the demand was for the provision of service, not for the perceived cultural quality of the service. The demand was for access to TV-2, virtually regardless of whether what it screened was good or bad. As Mayne commented, on the higher degree of coverage demanded of radio than television in New Zealand (1985:27):
'Conclusion: physical signal coverage has always been more highly regarded than the content of the transmission.'

In sum, then, if transmission issues were driven by financial issues they, in turn, influenced matters of publication or presentation.

1.1.3 Programme Issues

Two kinds of issues developed within this area: one was to do with programme scheduling; the other was to do with programme content.

1.1.3.1 Programme Scheduling

The key issue with scheduling was complementary programming. Channels were regulated to prevent the running of like-against-like; yet the definition of similarity was left up to each corporation. Two problems emerged. Despite a committee charged with avoiding programme clashes, there was still dispute over how the categories were organised (BCM 75/17/14). There was also criticism over common junctions - occasional common programme starting-points on the channels which enabled viewers to switch without missing the start of the opposition's programme (BCM 74/11/9; 75/20/37; 75/24/7). Criticism was both internal and external, and widespread (Boyd-Bell, 1985:149).

At root, all the disputes - over complementary programming, common junctions, inter-channel rivalries (see below) and the question of whether popular programmes should only run nationally (on TV-1) involved the same ambiguity: state or market provision. Programme-makers were neither free to pursue a purely market policy - to schedule programmes to draw the greatest possible advertising revenue, regardless of other considerations, as in the American or Australian model (Browne, 1987; Windschuttle, 1985). Nor were they free to invoke a special understanding of the public interest, as in the British model (Garnham, 1973). What they were, in fact, obliged to do, was to shuttle between the two models, constantly threatening to upset one or both sets of clients. As a result, they could neither appeal to, nor accommodate, the interests of a particular elite on the basis of public service provision.
as, for example, with the BBC; nor could they create a hierarchy of market priorities and judgements over which they could assert control.

If they could never fully satisfy the demands of cultural or advertising patrons, nor could they fully develop an occupational mission: the claim to interpreting and articulating notions of a New Zealand culture and identity was always undercut by ratings and scheduling priorities.

This led TV-2, for example, who were always more vulnerable to financial pressure, to try to combine these antithetical elements. One typical strategy was to produce cheap local talent quests ('Opportunity Knocks', 'Smile' and 'Ray Colombus Presents'), or various low-budget, socially responsible, audience participation shows, ranging from current affairs ('Friday Conference') to Telethon.

Yet, these pressures were to produce evidence of intra-occupational conflict (as will be shown) and was translated into the status hierarchies of 'older brother-younger brother' channels.

1.1.3.2 Programme Content

Issues over programme content can be summarised as issues over moral judgement (programme standards), which mostly involved producers, and over the claim to independent professional judgement (the question of bias), which generally involved journalists.

The first issue mostly concerned foreign programmes: series such as 'The Box' (an Australian soap opera), were criticised as immoral, unnecessarily depicting sexual scenes. Often, there was a linkage established, as in the case of 'The Box', between immorality and commercial income, which harks back to the dilemma over professional judgement, and its implicit appeal to two different clientele.

The second issue, of professional judgement, had two aspects and needs to be treated at more length. One concerned the question of professional competence and self-monitoring, especially in the news and current affairs area; the other, the political
capital which critics could generate thereby. In effect, these intermingled much of the
time, and will treated as one here.

At root, the problems concerned the dilemma of how to develop adequate
programme-making skills rapidly under difficult operational conditions. It was
emphasised by the fact that radio and television journalists had only been operating as
separate occupational groups since 1974, and were still in the process of constructing
their own specialist occupational identity (and see Tunstall, 1971, on how this might
be established). However, the problem was far from isolated to journalists, as three
TV-1 memos in 1975, 1976 and 1977 underline. As an ex-ITV senior producer
commented in late 1975 of producers and directors (TV-1 memo, 21.11.75):

'It is, I fear, still the day of the talented amateur and we must ensure
that professional attitudes are insisted on by demanding higher
standards...There is a need for basic training and re-training in this
area.'

A departing producer observed in a report (TV-1 memo, 11.10.76):

'...I worry that there is so little training for Directors. I am distressed
to see that there are still Producers and/or Directors who seem to
avoid passing on knowledge or helping trainees, and I can only
rationalise this by thinking that these people live in fear of being
eclipsed by the "Young Hopefuls".'

A senior BBC producer seconded to be Head of Information Services
commented in 1977 (TV-1 memo, 29.8.77):

'As I start to develop our production plan for next year I'm brought
face to face once more without major problem - the chronic shortage
of good producers and directors...In my view we should be
intensifying our concentration on recruitment and training in the
coming couple of years. 1978 and 1979 ought to be the years in
which in the Information area we try to remedy our greatest
weakness - the shortage of creative, talented, thinking, ideas-full
producers.'

It is worth bearing in mind that these comments are about staff in TV-1, which
generally inherited the more experienced personnel in the 1974 restructuring. The
problem was often more critical with TV-2. Invariably, then, these deficiencies were
remedied in a way which came close to on-air training. Extracts from the TV-1 Network Editors' log in mid-1976 are illuminating in this respect (2.6.76):

'Telecine operator with only two days experience in CR4 failed to roll lead item and caused 15 seconds delay after intro. Failed to show film after she'd rolled it. TP hit show button. Failed to roll and show film on Parliamentary Select Committee. Dougal [Stevenson, the newsreader] left on cam for 15 second delay again. Failed to have B-Roll cued up in time. Trainee sound op failed to play sound tape and as next film was on same reel had to show 45 seconds mute film.'

At times, however, problems could develop into questions of damaging professional credibility. An internal memo from the Director-General on a Chilean story carried on TV-1's 6.30 news is illustrative (TV-1 memo, 20.9.76):

'I am extremely angry about this whole affair. The fact that we used an unauthenticated film clip is bad enough. At best this is evidence of unprofessional research, at worst the unbridled misuse of our programmes for political ends. Then having reassured the Ambassador that we would issue an apology and for that correction to have been "forgotten" is not only quite incredible but from a Chilean viewpoint sinister in the extreme...What causes me the gravest disquiet is that we can be accused of being amateur and intransigent at a time when we are doing all in our power to represent ourselves as fair-minded and professional.'

The same point about objectivity was made in another TV-1 memo, which cited 7 instances of imbalance raised by a sympathetic viewer. The memo concluded 'that we do have a case to answer' (TV-1 memo 30.8.76).

Coupled with these shortcomings was the intermixing of news and current affairs which sometimes made it hard, in the words of the Head of Programme Standards, to distinguish what was fact and what was opinion (BCM 76/7/21). This generated continuing debate over what, indeed, was fact and what comment (BCM 75/25/20; 76/7/21; 76/8/23; and see TV-2's gnomic remark in their 1976 Annual Report that 'what constitutes news is a subjective judgement',F.12:4).

Externally, these difficulties supplied sufficient ammunition for political attacks to be mounted, especially on news and current affairs programming. These became widespread from the time of the 1975 General Election, and were generated
principally by Robert Muldoon, then Leader of the Opposition. The attacks were on two fronts. One criticised the duplication of news services - particularly the presence of a camera crew from each channel to cover press conferences and political events. The other attacked the independence of news journalists. At heart, these reiterated, on numerous occasions, the criticism that programme-makers represented their own political interests and not the broader public interest in their framing of events. The following press release (3.5.77) by the Prime Minister on TV-1's 'Dateline Monday' current affairs programme is typical of the accusations:

'He says the programme made no attempt at a balanced presentation but was simply an "undisguised attack on the government and myself" with no attention whatsoever given to a contrary viewpoint.'

Mr Muldoon says its no wonder the public is getting sick and tired of "this blatant political propaganda" and that the credibility of television news and current affairs has sunk to an all time low.'

These charges drew on, and echoed, a strong vein of popular sentiment, as indicated by this letter to the NZ Listener (20.11.76):

'So TV journalists and interviewers have expressed concern that proposed legislation may...inject political bias into news and current affairs programmes.

As TV staff have had a monopoly on drip-feeding their own brand of bias into such programmes in the past, I am not surprised at their concern.'

Aside from direct criticism, the Prime Minister also featured in some highly public confrontations with interviewers, which aroused sometimes heated public debate. One of the most notable was a current affairs interview with Simon Walker, about the allegedly ominous presence of Russian submarines in the Pacific, which developed into a struggle to control the interview agenda, with the Prime Minister's repeated refusal to answer questions as they were put to him. This provoked intensive media commentary (see, for example, the Christchurch Press, 29.5.76; 31.5.76; 1.6.76; 2.6.76) and viewer reaction (TV-1 reported its switchboard to be overloaded,
registering in excess of 1000 callers, 324 of them supporting the interviewer's stand - the Christchurch Press 2.6.76).

By the time of the Broadcasting Bill the Prime Minister was able to refer to broadcasters as 'demented hens' and 'trendy lefties', themes which were taken up by conservative media elements (such as the conservative Catholic newspaper, The Tablet, November 1976).

As with the question of scheduling, then, the issues of a professional monopoly of judgement and representation of the broad public interest were called into question, both inside and outside broadcasting. The clear implication was that if professional self-monitoring was defective it needed to be regulated. Two methods were proposed: (a) codification, in the form of specific regulations and programme standards, controlled by the Board or Council judgement; (b) social controls, in the form of internal journalism training supervised by the Council. Moreover, these shortcomings were used to argue that a single, co-ordinated, centrally-controlled news service was more representative of the public service than the duplicative, divisive, discretionary activities of the existing arrangements. In this way, occupational and partially organisational deficiencies were translated into sources of demand for closer control in the form of administrative dominance.

1.1.4 Inter-Channel Rivalry

Although competition was largely expected to be confined to a battle over what was screened, and when, it shifted rapidly to other areas. Some examples can be mentioned. One was over access to resources and facilities. An early, celebrated example was over the refusal of one channel to loan a visiting film-crew from the other a light-bulb, which consequently obstructed a film-shoot. Likewise, a refusal by one channel to organise for an exchange of cumbersome Outside Broadcast vans with the other led to the two trucks passing each other on the mountainous Rimutakas en route to their venues, 200 miles apart, in each others' centres at Wellington and Auckland.
More importantly, a dispute arose when TV-2 attempted to charge TV-1 exorbitant rentals for video-tape recording and transmission time - normally given free - at double the rate it charged outside hirers, on the grounds that the exchange of these facilities was very unevenly in TV-1's favour (TV-2 letter, 9.9.75; TV-1 memo, 17.9.75).

Although this problem was resolved, it illustrated the problem of inter-service charging and the hostility which could rapidly be generated over differences in working procedures that arose from divergences in organisational cultures. Both respondents and outside commentators reported that these attitudes extended to staff loyalties (one news respondent remarked that staff who were found out when they were in the process of switching channels 'earned 15 lashes'). Generally, it was accepted that a rhetoric of apparent internal co-operation and efficiency contrasted with the disorganised, conflictual and ad hoc approach, especially as adopted by TV-2 (Mayne, 1985).

At a more senior level, there were also official disputes. One concerned the merits of internal market research over private commissioning where, after considerable disagreement (BCM 76/2/15; 76/12/6; 77/3/21), it was resolved to retain the BCNZ unit.

These attitudes bred inter-channel rivalries which extended beyond the more gentlemanly competition expressed by the respective Directors-General at the channels' outset. Rather, they were exposed in press leaks designed to damage the opposition's credibility, but which also tended to fuel a public impression of mismanagement and infighting (TV-1 memo, 20.5.75).

Fundamentally, these conflicts revolved around the same state/market ambiguity. Each organisation was tied to the other through the Council and by layers of administration, but was also obliged to compete with it. Under these circumstances, it was constantly unclear, at every level of organisational functioning, where competition ended and co-operation began, and on what grounds.
These arrangements also reflected, however, the structural reproduction of conflict, and hence the patterning of specific areas of power between programme-makers and administrators that was created in the original 1974 restructuring. Arrangements which suited administrators, such as the centralised management of services and resources (particularly through the Council's support services), invariably brought programme-makers into direct conflict with each other through the structural configurations to which they were obliged to conform. Consequently, they were constantly faced both with the public contradictions of state and market and the more private contradictions of bureaucracy and market.

2. SUMMARY

At root, the sets of pressures generated in the process of television operation undermined professionals' claims to authority and competence. The state/market ambiguity inherent in the two-channel complementary/competitive arrangements fragmented the promotion of collegiality and the idea that the profession as a whole represented the public interest. At the same time, an insecure grasp (as an occupation) of technical skills, left it vulnerable to accusations not merely of incompetence but of serving occupational or interest-group ends rather than national needs. On the other hand, the financial difficulties which were rapidly emerging enabled administrators to claim the advent of a crisis which only they were in a position to manage by the application of administrative competencies.

However, this was not to emerge until 1976. Nor were the most intense rivalries, which did not surface until the later 1970s (see chapters seven and eight). On the contrary, during this period, there was a sense of discover, excitement and innovation amongst programme-makers, coupled with the development of the 'family' loyalties prepared for by the Adam Report. As Gregory summed it up (1985:32):

'There quickly emerged, however, a consensus among broadcasters that they were now relishing an atmosphere of creative purpose such as they had not previously experienced.'
In this light, emerging organisational strains could be interpreted as the inevitable growth pains inherent in a new and untried system. Moreover, ones which, given time, would resolve themselves within the boundaries of the new relations of power. Understandably, this view minimises the wider social setting within which broadcasting operated, and the powerful role of the state in defining the shape of organisational and professional arrangements. The interlocking set of relationships which these factors involved became evident in the struggle over the 1976 Broadcasting Act and form the subject of the next chapter.
CHAPTER SIX

THE 1976 BROADCASTING ACT

1. INTRODUCTION

The period from 1974 to 1976 had seen the ascendancy of programme-makers under the decentralised three-corporation system. The twelve months of 1976 was to emerge as the first serious challenge to their domination with the re-assertion of claims by administrators to control of the organisation for its general benefit. The claims and strategies promoted by administrators through this period were to persist well beyond it, and formed the basic framework for the 1979 reorganisation which finally amalgamated the two television channels. Yet both the pressures and the available responses within broadcasting were largely shaped by two factors. One was the return to a more explicitly centralized, single-corporation form of structure, with the three corporations reduced to service arms of the new Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand (the BCNZ). The second was the loss of the corporations' political patron. In November 1975, the Labour Government was heavily defeated in the general election by a National Party opposition which came to office with a policy aimed at re-centralizing and more closely controlling broadcasting, and with an openly hostile party leader. In short, programme-makers lost a patron where administrators gained one, a situation which was not to change until 1984 when Labour regained power.

The heart of National's plans lay in the introduction of the 1976 Broadcasting Act. Yet its preparation and passage caused, without any doubt, the greatest period of turbulence and conflict in the history of New Zealand television. As a result, this episode highlights the range and strength of opinions held both inside and outside broadcasting about the shape and direction of television. It also highlights the linkages and tensions between different internal groupings and their relationships to
broader external communities of interest. While the patterns which emerge are similar to those discussed in earlier chapters, the period emphasises the diversity of viewpoints which were held about broadcasting and the problems broadcasters encountered of mobilising them in support of their own particular claims. The period also highlights how the perception of external dependencies shaped the internal organisation of opinion towards certain decisions.

This chapter acts, then, to review some of the arguments and observations which have been laid out in earlier chapters, especially with regard to the kinds of claims advanced by professionals and administrators to be able to manage the complex uncertainties generated both by television and by New Zealand television production in particular, with its unusual mix of state and market provision. 1976 illustrates the nature of these complexities and how each major internal grouping offered solutions based on their occupational perceptions and organisational positions to manage and contain the uncertainties television faced through structural and resource decisions.

Because of the complexity of this period, the chapter begins with an introductory chronology which lays out the fairly intertwined sequence of events that occurred between November 1975 (the election of the National Government) and December 1976 (the passing of the Broadcasting Act). These fall into three phases that mark out structural and administrative changes which were put in motion. Each is then described in greater detail, in order to give some sense of the shifting and fluid nature of the debates as they evolved. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the relationship between the internal and external pattern of issues which emerged throughout 1976 and their consequences for the competing claims for control of the new structure.
2 CHRONOLOGY

2.1 Outline

Broadly speaking, there are three identifiable phases evident in the events which led up to the passing of the 1976 Broadcasting Act. It is important to note, however, that these constituted by no means the only activity in broadcasting during the period. The channels obviously continued to produce and transmit programmes, and the consequences of some of these inevitably fed into the restructuring debates. The relationship between the two can be gauged by the fact that, while on average, the Broadcasting Council listed thirty-three committee minutes per meeting, those concerned directly with restructuring constituted only ~9 for the whole year - less than 5% of the year's official business. Obviously, these minutes were, individually, of considerable importance in terms of the organisation's shift of direction.

The three phases themselves are as follows:


This phase began with the revival of the position of Minister of Broadcasting. It covered the period over which the Broadcasting Council offered advice, formulated by short-term working parties, on the kinds of changes which could be undertaken with the proposed Broadcasting Bill. By May, all the reports, with the exception of one on News Rationalization, had been presented.

2.1.2 Key administrative changes prepared. July 1976 - February 1977

While, to some extent, these changes were separate to specific provisions in the Bill, they took up directions implicit in it, and in its sponsorship by the new Government. The phase began with the appointment of a new Broadcasting Council chairman who oversaw the development of tighter planning and management control. It ended on their introduction at the first meeting of the new BCNZ Board in the New Year. Perhaps ironically - and certainly unexpectedly - the chairman died within three weeks of this meeting.

This was undoubtedly the most complex phase of the three and began with the public announcement of the Bill's contents. This drew a sharp and growing staff reaction, co-ordinated by the Public Service Association (the PSA), which was intensified by the Bill's introduction to Parliament in October 1976. This culminated in television blackouts later in the month, and the renewal of opposition with the Bill's return to the House after a month of Select Committee hearings. Throughout this period, and especially when industrial action was contemplated, there was a considerable amount of political and public debate. Following three lengthy Parliamentary debates in November and December, the Bill's readings were completed on December 3.

What becomes clear on examination is that each stage of this period represents a specific stage in the struggle of both broadcasting groups to capitalise on their relative positions. The first stage is essentially a defensive one on the part of programme-makers, anxious to maintain their existing power. This they do by arguing either for the status quo (and the term 'status quo' itself gains considerable prominence in the briefing papers), or for a position as close to it as possible, but which also conforms to stated Ministerial requirements.

The second stage prepares for the advancement of administrators. This was backed by an understanding of the Government's preferences, the impending changes in the Council's membership - already instituted in part by the replacement of the Chairman and the presence of three future Board members as regular observers - and knowledge of the Bill's contents. It was also fuelled by the continuing conflicts between the corporations and Council departments over a variety of liquidity and debt problems. In contrast to these two internal stages, the third stage represented the programme-makers' plea for support from its constituency and the confused, divisive nature of the response it drew.
Overall, however, these stages mark the shift from clear professional control to growing administrative dominance entrenched in several key provisions. The stages themselves are given in more detail as follows.

3. DETAILED CHRONOLOGY

3.1 Phase One


After the appointment of the Minister of Broadcasting in November 1975, it was unclear what kind, or even what degree, of restructuring was contemplated. This was not to become clear until the New Year, following briefings with the Minister in December and January. On January 22, the Chairman of TV-2 reported to his Board on the general shape which was emerging after a meeting with the Minister. This outlined the relationship between the Government and Broadcasting (TV-2 Board paper, January 1976):

"He, as well as other Ministers, is under really heavy pressure from R.D.M. (the Prime Minister, Robert Muldoon), to make savage cuts and I gather specific criticisms have been pointed at Broadcasting...R.D.M. is being very hard-nosed with everyone."

However, the meeting seemed to reveal a cautiously optimistic outlook:

"Overall, I came away with the feeling that he is impressed with the new structure, its morale and performance. That he wants to make the minimum of change but political pressures will require minor surgery... We have got an excellent and sympathetic Minister but we are not yet out of the woods."

The primary Government concern was also indicated:

"He agrees the main issue is the central control but he has no intention of disturbing the independence of the three separate identities."

Aside from this issue, they also touched on the question of an independent complaints committee, the duplication of news broadcasts (which was described in a note to the TV-2 Director-General as 'apparently a hot issue in Caucus and Cabinet'), and the difficulties of complementary programme scheduling. For his part, the Chairman emphasised the importance of independence to the Minister and added:
'that he should watch Council carefully for any re-emergence of the old NZBC attitude to costs.'

After verbal briefings and general proposals from senior executives and the corporation chairmen, the Minister issued a formal request a month later for advice. The specific items were read directly into the first Council meeting minutes of the year, on February 25, 1976. His letter revealed the extent to which the framework for review had developed. Stressing the urgency of a financial review, to which the Treasury would also contribute, he outlined what the focus of the advice should be (23/2/76):

'These changes will be designed to introduce a greater measure of control and co-ordination within public broadcasting...Particular attention should be given, in the light of Government's policy, to the powers of the Council as the central organisation of the broadcasting structure with special reference to its financial authority, its regulatory powers, its staffing responsibilities and its relationships to the Minister.'

As a result, the Council set up a number of working parties which were to produce reports between April and May in answer to specific questions which were raised (BCM 76/1/36). The most wide-ranging of these, dealt with by the corporation heads and the Council Secretary, covered finance, staff ceilings, terms and conditions of employment and proposals for structural changes. Two others concerned the rationalization of the news, and personnel matters.

The key report, however, was from the Chief Executives and recommended two alternatives on the shape of prime structural reforms. No agreement could be reached at the March Council meeting and it was not until the April meeting that a compromise was arrived at. This involved a combination of Proposal A, (essentially the status quo position) and Proposal B (which proposed a single, dominant Broadcasting Board), and represented, finally, the best judgement of Council members on how to reconcile corporation demands for continuing independence with stated Government policy of establishing a single Board. In this sense, the conflict between the administrators' positions - to centralize broadcasting under a single Board - and programme-makers' to maintain the status quo, was simply translated to the Council level where it was resolved, albeit imperfectly, through the divided loyalties,
expressed in individual papers, by members to their political patrons and the values of the present system. The advice to the Government was for a central Board, the BCNZ, but with partially-independent corporations which still managed their own programme production and financing. This position was to be reshaped and re-defined over the next months.

By April, the recommendations on complementary programming and news rationalization were still unresolved. After considerable debate, the complementarity issue was left over to the Minister for his decision (BCM 76/3/36). The News Rationalization Working Party had produced a majority and minority report which, once again, reflected a division between the status quo and a more centralised arrangement. Interestingly enough, though, the composition of the working party was very similar to 1974, producing the divisions between an ex-NZBC administrator (in a strongly-defended minority report) and corporation news chiefs (the majority report, recommending the existing competitive system). After an inconclusive discussion in April it was reviewed at a special May meeting, but was finally held over on the grounds that its recommendations were so sufficiently unclear as to confuse the Minister.

In the event, a dual news proposal was flatly rejected by the Cabinet in spite of the Minister's advocacy (The Evening Post 24/6/76) and news executives were obliged to present a single news service plan which, in itself, was to provoke further dispute.

What this outcome indicates was the existence within the Government itself of two strands of opinion towards broadcasting. One, which appeared to be conservative, authoritarian and, to some extent, populist, attempted to enforce the strictest possible control on broadcasting, in keeping with the old NZBC tradition, and was advanced largely by the Prime Minister and two ex-Ministers of Broadcasting sitting on the Cabinet's Communications Committee. The other, which was more liberal, fluid and accommodating of the existing arrangements, was most clearly
represented by the current Minister of Broadcasting, Hugh Templeton. In the short term, then, the political climate for broadcasting reflected the dominance of one group over the other on particular issues, such as the shape of news rationalization. However, the broader social cleavages which these two positions suggest are left over to chapter nine for discussion.

Apart from the news rationalization, all the reports were submitted as requested by May 1976. They were considered by a Cabinet Committee on Communications, which contained two former Ministers of Broadcasting, and were reformulated as policies for drafting into the Broadcasting Bill that was announced in late June 1976.

While the submission of reports brought this phase to a close it formed, in fact, a prelude to the next phase which began with the arrival of a new Broadcasting Council chairman.

3.2 Phase Two
(Preparation for key administrative changes. July 1976 - February 1977)

The arrival of Ron Jarden as the new part-time Council chairman heralded the beginning of two major changes of direction. One was financial reform. The other, which was linked, concerned new management and planning procedures. This was underlined by the pending replacement of three Council members by Board members in 1977 with extensive business backgrounds. Jarden himself ran a successful Wellington stockbroking firm.

The potential for financial reform was already evident. Both the capital development programme and the year-to-year operating accounts were under considerable strain. By the end of the 1975-76 financial year, broadcasting had borrowed $30.9 million for capital expansion (largely, to extend TV-2's transmission coverage) which was incurring $2.89 million of interest charges annually (Annual Reports to Parliament F.3, 1976). This had to be repaid from an annual income of $56
million and by 1976 it was becoming clear that even the interest repayment, let alone the loan, was becoming unmanageable. On the other side of the balance, only TV-1 was producing an excess of income over expenditure: all other branches of broadcasting remained in varying degrees of deficit. In any event, a rising inflation rate meant that while income rose 21% over 1976, expenditure rose by 25% (Annual Reports to Parliament F.3, 1976). The result was to intensify the debates over most components of shared-service and inter-corporation costs, but most particularly over the allocation of Licence Fee revenue, which became the subject of repeated dispute (at the Council level see BCM 76/3/33; 76/6/12; 76/6/15; 76/6/23; 76/6/29; 76/8/6; 76/8/11). By April 1976, TV-2 was asking for an increased overdraft to ease its liquidity problems (BCM 76/6/13) while, by July, the Council itself faced acute liquidity difficulties (BCM 76/7/29), as it did again in October when it was owed $7.2 million of outstanding corporation repayments for various shared-service and intercorporation charges. Added to this were continuing dilemmas over the amount of advertising time that should be available per week; constant problems over complementary programming, and a long-running wrangle instigated by TV-2 over its right to commission external rather than internal audience research.

Under these conditions there was ample opportunity to claim that broadcasting was in a state both of financial crisis and internal disarray, and to call for financial and management measures as remedies. This was precisely the strategy which the new Chairman adopted at his first meeting in July. As the Council minutes noted (BCM 76/7/29):

'The Chairman commented that the broadcasting system was facing a liquidity crisis and if operating costs could not be met, the alternative was a greater involvement in control by Treasury.'

At the same meeting, he announced plans for long-range planning for the next ten years, calling for reports from the corporations as well as reviews of current management planning and information provision, and the state of computing needs. By September a Co-ordinating Committee on Management Planning had been
established, with representatives from each broadcasting branch and an external management consultant (BCM 76/8/2). The Chairman also tabled a summary sheet of financial information (BCM 76/8/3):

'...which showed that the total cash of $4 million [available] at 1.4.75 would be reduced to $0.785 million by 31.3.77. He said that this indicated a disturbing trend.'

He then revealed that he had approached the Prime Minister in writing to propose the reclassification of the Government loans as capital grants. He reiterated the need 'to act responsibly' in 'a crisis situation' adding that it was necessary 'to demonstrate that the broadcasting house was in order' when applying for a licence fee increase (BCM 76/8/3). Later in the same meeting it was revealed that the incoming BCNZ Board would set budgets from 1977 onwards for each of the proposed divisions (BCM 76/8/9) - a right previously retained by the corporations - under 'a cohesive management plan' with 'new definitions of targets and objectives' (BCM 76/8/8).

Clearly, the shift away from corporation discretion to central oversight was to be attained by claiming crisis conditions which demanded immediate attention. This was to become a common strategy over the next three years. It was also achieved by an appeal to the interests of the system as a whole. This was couched at several levels: the notion of financial (and hence organisational) crisis which could only be managed by administrative and accounting expertise, championed by a self-evidently successful financial figure who was backed by Government policy, supported by management review teams and supplied by administrators' data. It also spoke to the relief of a pressing external resource dependency (Treasury control of capital funding) by the development of a fresh initiative (the capitalisation of loan finance) set in motion by a bold approach past the Minister of Broadcasting directly to the Prime Minister (who was also Minister of Finance, and an acknowledged acquaintance of Jarden's). It also appealed to the general issue of broadcasting independence by raising the threat of external control by Treasury if this course of
action was not rapidly pursued. That this was regarded as a genuine threat had already become evident at a TV-1 Board discussion a year before, in September 1975, (TV-1 Board minutes, 1975). In short, pressures and uncertainties were translated into forms of control, reorganisation and moral urgency (in the language of 'responsibility' and 'order') which favoured co-ordinated administrative procedures over the conflictual, discretionary claims of programme-makers.

The process was advanced by the introduction of the detailed structure for the BCNZ (BCM 76/11) in November 1976. This provided for a central BCNZ Board which controlled 5 divisions (the three renamed corporations, a Central Services Division, and a Secretary's Division). The last two divisions were to split the administrative functions into a day-to-day service (the CSD) and a forward planning division (the Secretary's division). The corporations, as divisions, would be overseen by a separate Standing Committee which replaced their Boards and consisted of the current corporation chairman, one Board member from the BCNZ Board and the Service's Director-General. The Directors-General would also sit on a Board of Management (BOM) which would act as a regular filtering and advisory body to the Board. Overall financial monitoring was taken over by the CSD, as was general staff co-ordination between the Services. On top of this, a permanent Finance sub-committee of the Board was created in November, comprising the three new businessmen Board members, and which was to develop financial advice from data supplied 'from financial executives' (BCM 76/11/6).

Because the Broadcasting Bill was not passed until December, these proposals were not introduced until the first meeting in February 1977. Besides the new structure, the meeting also introduced a number of other changes which reinforced the move to centralization. Amongst them, six Board sub-committees were established, and information flows to these were re-routed, streamlined and improved. Above all, a central principle which had emerged intermittently was clearly enunciated: the objective of total independence from Treasury control by the 1977-78 year. This was
to require, for the first time, expenditure cuts, as had been canvassed in a lengthy discussion in December (BCM 76/12/5):

'Mr Stannard said... There had to be cost savings - an increase in licence fees or advertising income was not enough. In his experience, the product would not suffer in a time of financial stringency... Mr Stannard said that the primary objective was for the Corporation to live within its income.'

This was a very different emphasis from that of the preceding years. It reflected not only new priorities, but new Board membership, new ties between Board members and the executives who would advise them, and new emphases based on the concept of broadcasting as a single unified unit. It also indicated that independence was to be seen as a concrete, achievable goal and one founded on financial principles rather than as a self-evident, inalienable right. Once again, these definitions reflect the emergent claims of an administrative/management perspective which was now in a position to advance its claims through domination of some of the key structural elements of the new system. The emphasis on cost control was, in fact, to become a central theme over the 1977-79 period.

3.3 Phase Three: Political and Public Perceptions
(Debate over the Broadcasting Bill, June 1976-December 1976)

Political criticism bore on two major points, which reflected the internal pressures discussed above. These were: (i) administrative and managerial shortcomings, and (ii) questions of professional legitimation and public accountability. Both of these themes have been touched on before, but the focus of this section is to show how internal problems were translated into a political programme, which then shaped the public debate over broadcasting throughout 1976, and particularly during the Broadcasting Bill debates.

The key shortcomings, as perceived by National, were best summarised by the Minister of Broadcasting at the introduction of the second reading debate (NZPD 1976:4388):
"The review we undertook confirmed that there had been a marked expansion in staffing; it confirmed a lack of financial guidelines, financial goals, central accounting, and budget objectives; and certainly a lack of capital funding and a complete failure to accept that cash-flow problems were likely to emerge. These problems have ended up at the moment with the system technically bankrupt, unable to pay its interest charges, and in difficulty with salary bills. In effect - and we must pick this up - a single corporation with overall management responsibilities would have handled the problem much better."

He also pin-pointed the values which the Government was intent on emphasising (NZPD 1976:4387):

"It seemed useful and sensible to set out the principles on which broadcasters traditionally operate, particularly impartiality, integrity, good taste, and balance. It seemed sensible to emphasise the importance to professional broadcasters of operating under a statutory corporation."

These values were echoed by Barry Brill, National's Chairman of the Select Committee who, in the Bill's first reading, expressed the second Government theme (NZPD 1976:3037):

"The Broadcasting Council is at present the only state corporation for which no Minister is responsible. Members of Parliament, representing their electorates, can ask questions on behalf of those who own the corporation, and be informed that the Minister cannot answer because the information is not available from the Corporation. It is not available to its own shareholders...These are matters for which this Parliament can be accountable only if the Corporation in turn accounts through the Minister."

Although this represented National's two-fold analysis of broadcasting, members linked the themes together, loosened the frames of reference and vivified their claims in an effort to mobilise popular support for the Bill's proposals. At heart, the claims attacked broadcasters' financial competence and professional legitimacy.

However, reaction to the Bill's contents was evident even before the Bill's official announcement on June 22. A week earlier, Christchurch broadcasters were reported to have reacted angrily to the broad plans in a pre-release briefing with the Minister of Broadcasting (The Dominion 15.6.76). The formal announcement itself marked the first in a series of often confused stages through which the debate passed. After the announcement, where the plan for a single Board was outlined, and new Board members were introduced (The Evening Post 22.6.76), there was growing reaction. The Association of Broadcasting Journalists (the ABJ) cautiously deplored the statement on the same day (The Evening Post 22.6.76). Over the following week
there was a vote by Christchurch and Wellington PSA members, led by the ABJ, for industrial action (The Evening Post 24.6.76) and possibly a strike. The Auckland Star (24.6.76) reported signs of production staff resignations which was followed by a threat to blackout segments of forthcoming Olympic Games broadcasts (The Dominion 26.6.76; The Press 28.6.76) This threat produced a split in PSA ranks, with Wellington-based staff (i.e. mostly non-Avalon or TV-I members) rejecting the idea at a meeting, and urging the PSA to protect their conditions of employment by holding talks with the Minister.

This hiatus marked the end of the first stage, a little over a week after it had begun. The second stage was in August. In between, the Council Secretary, Keith Hay, had publicly outlined broadcasting's financial problems in a report that emphasised borrowing of $30 million in 2 years (The New Zealand Herald 9.7.76). The second stage, however, repeated the division between television staff outrage and internal PSA staff differences. 350 staff, mostly from TV-1, paid for a half-page press advertisement ('A Backward Step for Broadcasting') opposing centralization (The Dominion 10.8.76) while, at the end of August, the Wellington Action Group - an association of the Council's administrative and engineering staff - announced its formation, and its opposition to direct action. It also opposed any possible plans for redundancies, but not the restructuring as it had been announced. Nonetheless, the PSA broke off talks with the Government, claiming some confidential proposals were unacceptable, and that the 'the general tenor' was a return 'to the old NZBC' (The Dominion 31.8.76). By this time, there had been mixed press reaction, ranging from approval for the existing system's performance (The Dominion 28.7.76) to outright condemnation ('Let Them Eat Pavlova' The New Zealand Herald 10.7.76). A readers' poll by The Evening Post suggested strong opposition to the threatened blackout, mainly on the grounds that it was irritating and pointless.

In September, in the last stage before the Bill's introduction to Parliament, the PSA inserted a large press advertisement, 'A Giant Step Backwards' which
highlighted the connections between the present restructuring plans and the old NZBC arrangements. The PSA also emphasised the responsibility of its action and its opposition to 'monopoly' and political control (The Dominion 27.9.76). This drew criticism from Government Ministers that broadcasters could not consider themselves an 'elite of employees' unaccountable to Parliament - a view voiced more mutedly by the Council Chairman himself. In early October he gained wide publicity by releasing details of broadcasting financial problems - the 'Sink or Swim' crisis as it was termed (The Evening Post 13.10.76).

What became evident through this period was an attempt by both major broadcasting groups to test the waters of public opinion before the beginning of Parliamentary debate. The revelations by the Council secretary and the chairman emphasised the urgency of broadcasting's financial problems (and implicitly the need for responsible management available through the centralising solutions proposed by the Government). The PSA emphasised the moral responsibility of its actions. In other words, both groups appealed to different conceptions of the public interest and attempted to organise, consequently, different publics around each broad claim. Simultaneously, there was a gradual coalescence and mobilisation of internal groups around the crystallisation of the issues themselves.

The Bill's first reading on October 13 signalled the most intensive stage of public debate. It was here that National's central claims were set out, with the addition of the accusation (NZPD 1976:3048) that broadcasting freedom meant only, in effect, 'the freedom to write cheques'. This claim was repeated during the debate on the Select Committee Report on November 30. By the second reading on December 1, these claims were broadened to become charges of 'massive expenditure by broadcasters who were now seen as intent on making "political capital" out of their circumstances' (NZPD 1976:4396). They were, by implication, 'stirring' - creating public discord - and were said to be opposed to the clauses of 'good taste and decency' (NZPD 1976:4396 and 4404). Moreover, they were accused of indulgence,
extravagance and of being overstaffed and overpaid (NZPD 1976:4408). The point was colourfully summarised, with regard to news, by the Member for Eden (NZPD 1976:4409):

'I emphasise that when one actually counts the words the news broadcast represents only half a page of newspaper content - and it takes 338 people to produce it.'

Programme-makers' counter-claims had revolved around the imposition of political censorship and control, but what this and similar media commentary (see, for example, The Christchurch Press, 13.6.76) illustrates is that they were effectively marginalised and presented either as irresponsible, uncontrollable spendthrifts, or else as deviants - opponents of the established moral order. As the member for Eden remarked (NZPD 1976:4407):

'...it requires the observance of good taste and decency - and by crikey that is necessary in some areas of broadcasting.'

In spite of these criticisms, the PSA Central Committee pledged itself to direct action on October 18, (PSA Newsletter, No. 2, 1976). This was followed by stopworks and prime-time blackouts on TV-1 and TV-2 (Otago Daily Times 23.10.76, The Christchurch Press 27.10.76, The Dominion 27.10.76). Preceding the TV-1 blackout, a full-page broadcasters' advertisement was inserted in The Dominion which carried a banner headline proclaiming 'We're not doing this to you, we're doing this for you.' This produced negligible public support and indifferent public reaction, apart from some unenthusiastic television reviews, such as a satirical commentary on the look of the blank screen in The Christchurch Press (29.10.76). On October 29 the PSA's Wellington sub-group passed a narrow vote of no-confidence by 154-131 on the PSA's actions, from which radio broadcasters immediately dissociated themselves. The direct action also drew criticism from both the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. Also during this period, staff action resulted in TV-1's Director-General having to read the network news himself one evening (Boyd-Bell 1985:151) which, for the first time, publicly created distance between the channel's management and staff.
By this stage, the main areas of contention had become clear and formed the principal representations to the Select Committee Hearings. These revolved around a small number of the Bill's 99 clauses. The most disputed of these (clause 20) required the new corporation to have regard to government policy - and was strenuously opposed on the grounds that it conferred direct political control over broadcasting. It was frequently linked with a group of clauses (25, 67, 68) which removed decisions on public complaints from programme-makers' hands and placed them, in the final instance, with a new Broadcasting Tribunal.

There was also opposition to new programme standards which were to be 'generally acceptable to the community' (NZPD 1976:3034), and to several clauses (39, 40, 97) which limited discretion over recruitment and employment. None of these clauses were removed, although some were considerably amended, during the debate.

The Bill received 80 submissions, 35 of them presented orally (NZPD 1976:4306), with representations from all sections of broadcasting. Within Parliament, its progress encountered stiff resistance with long debates at each stage of its progress, and divisions being taken on each key clause during voting. In all, the Broadcasting Bill occupied 105 pages of Hansard and was considered to have produced the most intensive and exhausting Select Committee hearings in some members' experience, (NZPD 1976:4300-4320). Nevertheless, it completed its final reading on 3 December in spite of opposition from a meeting of almost 1000 people in the Wellington Town Hall led by broadcasters and academics where, it was asserted 'the guts will go out of broadcasting' if the Bill was passed (PSA Newsletter, December 1976). The Act came into being on February 1, 1977.

What emerges from these events is the development of two broad camps which attempted to marshal support around several shifting and sometimes indistinct issues. The key claims advanced by the Government and its supporters were the need for accountability (to Parliament, principally), centralization and tighter financial
management, allied to an insistence on loosely-defined moral standards. Broadcasters argued primarily that the Bill was a move to direct political intervention and signalled a return to an old, discredited NZBC system. Both sides appealed, then, to the public interest, but in different terms. The evidence suggests, however, that a crucial point was reached with the decision to adopt strike action which was seen both to isolate broadcasters and to split their ranks. In some circles (both inside and outside broadcasting), direct action appears to have been regarded as slightly improper. As the Christchurch Press commented, journalists should be concerned with 'conveying news' not with the new administration, and they should not let 'agitation' over 'unconcluded changes' lead to their own forms of 'political interference' or 'a reluctance to do their job for their audience' (29.6.76).

4. IMPLICATIONS

The Christchurch Press commentary is interesting because it signals the public transgression of a social boundary by broadcasters. The sense of impropriety it articulates was also evident within broadcasting as a whole, (as indicated by branch responses in the PSA circulars in July and August 1976). In practical terms, it marks a dividing line between the traditional role of broadcasters as anonymous public servants - a role which had been developed primarily within radio (Gregory, 1985) - and a new perception of broadcasters as, potentially, independent social critics. In one way, this indicated an emergent sense of independence or professional autonomy. In another, it brought to light a previously unrecognised element in the construction of the moral order: a widespread assumption of paternalism - that public servants should adopt an attitude of deferentiality and avoid criticising or confronting their political masters, (Cleveland, 1980). To do so - to be confrontational, questioning or merely non-acquiescent in a society which a number of commentators have viewed as deeply authoritarian (Baldock and Lally, 1974; McLaughlin, 1976) - was to invite being labelled as a deviant: as a 'stirrer' or 'radical' as, in fact, broadcasters were.
4.1 Social Changes

Although the Government was able increasingly to portray broadcasters as outsiders to the social order, this tension itself reflected a growing sense of social cleavage in New Zealand, (viz Newcomb and Hirsch's (1987) observation about public complaints as indicative of the moral 'fault-lines' in a society). It was signalled by often harsh parliamentary criticism which reflected widely-held conservative views, many of which had been tapped in National's return to power (viz Levine, 1979; Clements, 1982). Jock Phillips, in an editorial for the NZ Listener identified some of the key patterns which were becoming evident, and pin-pointed the ideology of the 'ordinary bloke' in a commentary which is worth quoting at some length (11.9.76):

'In the past few years, a large number of New Zealanders have emerged who do not fit the "ordinary bloke" image and it is precisely for this reason that the stereotype has been hauled out for political purposes. New values and habits have arisen. A society of visible diversity has replaced the older homogeneity.'

He also indicated a second source of unrest which was less easily accommodated - 'the rise of an urban culture' (NZ Listener 11.9.76):

'A majority of us now live in large cities, and cities always encourage pluralism and difference...Suddenly we are faced by new voices - HART, SPUC, WEL, CARP. And city growth creates new opinions and habits. Affluence itself challenges the old values of thrift and hard work, and produces new habits of corruption.'

He contrasted these celebrants of diversity with the characteristics of the typical 'ordinary bloke':

'The "ordinary bloke" is, of course, male and strictly heterosexual. He follows rugby, drinks beer and believes in the Protestant ethic of hard work, thrift and material progress. He is modest, respectful of authority and suspicious of self-appointed experts and rowdy protestors.'

Then, in a section which seems to echo the Adam Report, he draws the contrasts together:

'The range of voices is exciting. It makes for a dynamic society, one that is mature and progressive. But for a country used to homogeneity and social harmony, such pluralism is disturbing. It is bound to lead to some social strife.'
The clear parallels between this commentary and the social turbulence surrounding broadcasting are self-evident. The National Party represented an increasingly rural and provincial constituency with what were to become decreasing urban connections (Levine, 1979). Its espoused values, as regards broadcasting, closely fit the 'ordinary bloke' ideology. Programme-makers, meanwhile, with the patronage of the Labour Party, clearly represent - both through their own strategies, statements and the expressed aims of the Adam Report - a largely urban patronage.

Equally importantly, Phillips suggests a linkage between them and an emerging, diverse, loosely-allied set of groups, - and a linkage that was all the more likely because these alliances and allegiances cut across traditional lines (and see James, 1986). However, such groups, precisely because they were emergent, were difficult both to identify and to appeal to as potential cultural patrons.

The editorial also implies that a flight to older values was underway: a return to the security of homogeneity and ordered authority. In a sense, the restructuring designed by the Government was equally a retrenchment: it attempted to secure a centralised, hierarchical organisational form that operated according to accepted, hierarchically-regulated understandings both administratively and culturally. It emphasised thrift, financial control, ordered management (with its implications of deference to authority) and stressed a return to traditional practices: it was for these reasons that programme-makers claimed a reversion to 'Aunty NZBC.' In most respects, it was intended to be. These values, as detailed, were also espoused to a large extent by administrators themselves and highlights the linkages between them and their political patrons and the broader social groupings on which this political support rested.

Beyond that, there was a fundamental uncertainty about exactly which section of broadcasting were its professional representatives; claims were advanced and publicised most visibly by journalists, not producers; not by the TVPDA but by the
PSA. In other words, it blurred the identification of a coherent, collegiate body which could underpin claims to professionalisation (Johnson, 1972).

However, we need to recognise the complexity of the decision to adopt direct action. In one respect, it may have highlighted an aspect of broad moral order; in another, it emphasised the differences, as noted above, between radio and television, with television personnel being viewed in many radio quarters (as respondents commented), as upstarts, johnny-come-latelies or, in Johnstone's (1968) term, 'Flash Harries.' In other words, there was a sense not only of a social cleavage, but also of an organisational one (and an awkward one in terms of implied status differentials). At the same time, it raised a paradoxical occupational issue. Strike action, as the NZ Listener noted in an editorial, particularly when organised within the framework of the PSA, had strong connotations of union or class struggle (20.11.76):

'The recent stoppages could only have harmed the broadcasting cause, and invited the thought that a collective impulse to inflict wounds on oneself is an unconscious form of class subservience in any dispute with authority.'

This position was difficult to reconcile with the professionalising aspirations of an occupation founded on a claim to advocacy of the whole public interest (Johnson, 1972). In short, it suggested a sharp contradiction between these actions and the successful pursuit of ascribed or status characteristics undertaken by most professions (Elliot, 1972; MacDonald and Ritzler, 1988). As a whole, then, these events brought together a constellation of issues which ranged around the inter-relation of profession, organisation and culture.

From the point of view of programme-makers as a professionalising occupation, however, these questions were crucial. In effect, they became locked into a battle with the state to constitute an appropriate moral order. More than that, to construct such an order successfully was also to construct their own place in it. Indeed, it was to construct a coherent idea, and hence practice, of what a media profession might be in a New Zealand (and which, in the light of the Christchurch Press comments, might contradict prevailing notions of an appropriate occupational
practice in other branches of the media). To lose this battle, as they did, was to damage this particular occupational self-constitution and, consequently, the production of an internal moral order (or discourse) around which an otherwise diffuse occupational membership could crystallise. In a way, then, this period was an attempt to construct both a public and an occupational self-identity. In this case, it was advanced by one particular element in the occupation (predominantly by well-organised Avalon programme-makers) on behalf of less engaged members.

1976, then, saw an attempt, albeit a defensive one, to create three things: first, a public organised around a notion of a particular moral order; second, a relationship with the state based on this same insistence and, third, an internal occupational order, also constructed from these discourses.

In a sense, the breadth of this undertaking suggests something of the threat which many programme-makers saw themselves faced with. This is reflected in the passage of events over the year. What began with the initial cautious optimism of the TV-2 chairman about managing and minimising change in an organisational context was transformed, within nine months, into a major (and in some ways unprecedented) national dispute. In effect, a conflict between programme-makers and administrators over the definition of what constituted the key organisational issues and solutions, (for example over the differing proposals for single or separate corporation boards) was translated into a struggle between programme-makers and the state over (in part), definitions of the moral order. Clearly, programme-makers markedly expanded the area of contestation but only to produce, in both their organisational and public spheres, increasingly unified and powerful opposition and increasingly fragmented support.

5. SUMMARY

5.1 Profession, Organisation and Culture

It should be clear by now that producers' claims both to organisational dominance and to professionalisation were revealed to be vulnerable for a number of
reasons. Externally, they faced the twin ambiguities of a disorganised, shifting clientele and the problem of how to reconcile the different demands of state or market provision. Internally, they suffered from an inadequate degree of occupational specialisation that undermined their claims to a professional monopoly of knowledge and judgement, coupled with a diffuse occupational identification. Their administrative opponents had powerful, organised political patronage, simple and clearly identified objectives around which they could mobilise their occupational expertise based on the organisational difficulties thrown up by a combination of environmental pressures and programme-makers' activities.

1976 emerged as the fulcrum for change precisely because of its delicate balance of pressures and opportunities and was reflected in the degree of organisational and social debate which it generated. Broadcasters were caught in the moment of change where the alternative resources of power, as defined by Johnson, were crystallised (1972:43):

'It is only where an occupational group shares, by virtue of its dominant class or caste, wider resources of power that such an imposition (of the profession's definition of the producer-consumer relationship) is likely to be achieved, and then only where the actual consumers or clients provide a relatively large, heterogeneous, fragmented source of demand. The polar opposite of this situation is where there is a single consumer - a patron who has the power to define his own needs and the manner in which he expects them to be catered for.'

These polar opposites formed, in effect, the fulcrum experienced by programme-makers. Broadcasting was still developing its advertising market component - the heterogeneous, fragmented publics or sources of demand defined by Johnson. Yet it was bound to a powerful, unitary patron (represented by the Government and public agencies) which controlled its key dependencies - the licence fee level, staffing determinations and regulatory conditions. 1976 marked the tensions which emerged in the attempt at the exchange of patronage: not just from one cultural grouping to another, but from one form of income dependency to another. In this period, income tipped 54:46% in favour of advertising over licence fee revenue and was to move rapidly in that direction in ensuing years. In short, it
was to weaken organisational dependence on the level of state provision in ways which would, inevitably, affect other aspects of its performance. The opportunities presented by this foreshadowed independence also explain the determination reiterated, unusually, in two separate sets of minutes, to seize it as quickly as possible, by sloughing off the debt burden. However, this decision was made for explicitly organisational, not occupational, reasons. And, to the extent that it was advanced by administrators and managers, it elevated their claims to organisational dominance based on the application of a monopoly of knowledge necessary to complete the project.

Broadcasting professionals claims, on the other hand, were largely aimed at freedom from social control which, in many respects, did not affect the organisation's direction or dependencies in any immediate form. In this way, administrators could rightly claim to serve the organisation's interests better than the generalised objectives of broadcasting professionals. It was for these reasons, through their social and political linkages, as indicated, that financial and cultural patronage was more successfully managed by administrators than programme-makers in the context of a social climate of incipient conservativism.

At a more general level, it is possible to see the implications arising from the shifting balance of control between administrators and programme-makers. Administrators were able to increase the cogency of their claims partly because of the consequences of a key leadership appointment in the form of a new business-oriented chairman. At one level, this was obviously a result of political patronage; at another, the demands made by the new chairman called on the bureaucratic knowledge-base commonly possessed by administrators. Although this was in order for the chairman to retain organisational autonomy it involved a move towards centralised management, as discussed above. More than that, it depended on redefining the principal organisational problem as financial. This, unlike the question of programme production, was a far less ambiguous dilemma, and one, in principle, at least,
amenable to established bureaucratic practices. Claims of crisis merely reinforced the urgency of applying accepted (and self-evidently appropriate) solutions. Beyond that, administrators were well-placed, both through the areas of control they had staked out in the 1974 working parties, and through the limitations and obstacles these placed on programme-makers to manage the accumulating financial difficulties. In short, administrators, not programme-makers, controlled much of the rate and extent of major expenditure.

On the other hand, programme-makers lost control for several reasons. In part, their demonstrated inexperience displayed a failure to entrench and reinforce control over their technical definition and management of a knowledge-base. They also alienated some external publics (for example, conservative viewers worried about moral standards), while being unable to organise alternative publics as markets or collectivities from emerging but fragmented urban groups. Moreover, they were unable to organise broad occupational or union support because of occupational hostilities between radio and television broadcasters, (and the internal divisions within broadcasting as a whole.

In other words, programme-makers' original and defining moral mission depended on its recognition and approval either through the existence, or the creation, of a sympathetic public. Yet, it is possible to argue that television's base in major metropolitan centres isolated its practitioners from provincial attitudes, while they failed to find or address a sufficiently identifiable metropolitan publics. This suggests that both channels' strategies - and particularly TV-1's - in their representation of national community, as indicated in chapter three, failed to crystallise into recognisable realities for those communities who were central in helping to return a government that was to become an antagonistic patron to broadcasters.
5.2 Implications Beyond 1976

The organisational features and occupational standpoints which became evident during this period were to remain relatively unchanged over the next three years. Administrators were to entrench their dominance by an increasingly elaborate set of regulations and controls based around claims of recurring financial expediency. Broadcasters' professional legitimacy was to continue to be under intensive internal and external attack which, in turn, was to reduce their discretionary capacities and lower occupational morale and co-operation. The linkages of political and cultural patronage were to remain unchanged with the National Party's retention of power through the 1978 election. Indeed, the only major difference from 1977 onwards was the alterations to broadcasting's structural arrangements effected by the appointment of its first full-time, executive Chairman. Nonetheless, his appointment eventually helped to accelerate the processes already underway and which culminated in the 1979 restructuring. These are the developments covered in the next chapter.
CHAPTER SEVEN

MAXIMUM OPERATING INDEPENDENCE: 1977-80

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the trends which were implicit in the 1976 Broadcasting Act, but which were also initiated by the original structuring of the two-channel system. First, it summarises the implications of the 1976 Act for this period; secondly, it describes their consequences for the period from 1977-80, with the increasing dominance of administrative concerns over programme-making matters. Finally, it briefly summarises the broader trajectories that shaped the development of broadcasting over the period since 1974.

1.1 Effects of the 1976 Broadcasting Act

There is little doubt that broadcasters recognised the loss of influence they suffered under the 1976 Act. They voiced concerns over two principal matters. One was the importance of maintaining the fragile creative environment fostered by the 'family' concept of channel management (TV-1 Controllers' submission to the 1976 Broadcasting Bill Select Committee; TV-1 Board minutes, 1976). The other was the related concern over the equally imprecise question of morale. Senior and experienced staff, some of whom had been attracted from overseas in 1975 did leave - and continued to do so from 1977 onwards. However, it is impossible to determine accurately what proportion of broadcasters as a whole they represented, or whether they were a significant fraction. Turnover figures for different occupational groups for 1977-80, for example, are too crude to indicate any noticeable change. Nor is it possible to measure accurately the impact of departures on TV's creative climate, although Gouldner's (1957) categories of cosmopolitan and local suggest one means of assessment.
Briefly, Gouldner proposes six sets of orientations within any occupation, ranging from cosmopolitan - those members who, at one extreme, judge their work solely in terms of peer assessment and approval on a national or international basis, to locals - members who orient themselves wholly in relation to their local institution or environment, at the other. In a New Zealand context, cosmopolitan programme-makers would be those most likely to leave the organisation if their occupational autonomy was threatened, while those with less exacting demands, or less options - i.e. locals - would be more likely to remain. Although the evidence is weak, it suggests that cosmopolitan programme-makers did, in fact, migrate (albeit unevenly) elsewhere either inside (to public relation or expanding film or video companies (Mayne 1985b,c) or outside New Zealand.

1.2 Structural consequences of the 1976 Broadcasting Act

The Broadcasting Act produced 2 kinds of structural changes. (a) There was a restriction of programme makers' autonomy, and (b) there was an expansion of managerial procedures which were embedded in the new organisational form (and which are outlined shortly). There was, however, a further consequence, which is discussed in the next section. Namely, the structure was an accommodation, or negotiated agreement, between the two dominant broadcasting groups. As a result, it attempted to effect an amalgamation between hierarchical and collegial arrangements in terms of the new grouping of committees, routing of decisions and location of decision making-centres. Equally importantly, these contradictory forces produced a key ambiguity in terms of the site of final organisational authority. This lay in a gap between policy formation and its execution. In other words, programme-makers attempted to exploit the inevitable distance between decisions of lay Board members, often shaped by the advice of administrators, and their interpretation in practice. This advantage only continued providing two conditions were fulfilled: one was that programme-makers remained united, both within and across channels; the other was
that the void between policy and practice remained unfilled. In fact, neither remained unchanged. Internal occupational tensions increased markedly, and the void was filled, within three months, by the appointment of a full-time executive chairman, as discussed in the next chapter.

(a) The restriction of programme-makers' autonomy was defined primarily by two new bodies. These were an internal Complaints Review Committee and an external Broadcasting Tribunal. Together, they imposed potentially new definitions of what might constitute legitimate or appropriate programme materials against the previously undefined discretionary latitude of broadcasters.

(b) The expansion of administrators' control can be rapidly summarized. All lines of control were drawn into an explicitly hierarchical arrangement, with departments referring upwards through the Director-General (sitting on the Board of Management), to the Broadcasting Board on all major questions, not just those concerned with inter-corporation functioning, as before.

Aside from a hierarchical structure there was a bureaucratization and centralization of broadcasting functions. Principally, budget setting, controls and monitoring were centrally directed on information supplied by the Central Services Division (the CSD). This included setting broad objectives, allocation between services, the relative proportion of capital to operating expenditure, approval for major departmental budget levels within the services and setting spending levels for individual executives. Clearly, this still kept considerable discretion within the services (such as the mix of budgets and the proportions between, for example, local and overseas programme expenditure), but the balance was shifted towards monitored, regulated and centralised control.

The same shift was evident with financial monitoring which became both more detailed and more intricate. Forecasting became more extensive and report-scheduling, managed by the BCNZ Secretary, more complex, with reports being routed first to the Board of Management, then to the Board and on to sub-committees.
when required. Some administrative functions were also centralised - most notably, control of personnel management, but also legal matters.

To sum up, then, the organisation was increasingly driven by two central issues. One was the question of financial accountability; the other more generally revolved around programming policy and the notion of professional legitimacy and autonomy. Financial accountability concerned how the budget was balanced, which area was to bear the costs, and who was to determine this policy; programming policy revolved about the question of what should be shown, at what times and by whose authority. In effect, however, some financial implications flowed into the programming area. On the one hand, for example, budget levels would increasingly determine programming strategies (in terms of scheduling and provision of local versus overseas content, and also first-run versus repeat broadcasts); on the other, the notion of accountability would determine the notion of broadcasting as a symbolically responsible organisation, as signified by its programme content. Clearly, what gave these issues urgency was that the broader social, political and economic setting was unstable and was to remain so.

If these were the two primary issues emerging from the 1976 restructuring we next need to trace how their logic developed over the period from 1977-79. Because these trends have already become relatively identifiable, the central purpose of the following sections is to pin-point and summarise major developments.

2. 1977-80
2.1. Financial Pressures

The severe financial difficulties faced by the BCNZ over this period were prompted by three major external factors.
(a) A static licence fee. Revenue from this source rose only to the extent that there was a shift from monochrome to more costly colour licences by viewers. From 1977 to 1980 this shift was uneven and unpredictable (BCNZ Annual Reports, 1977-
Extra income could only come, therefore, from advertising or marketing revenue. This, in turn, increased pressure to expand commercial programme scheduling strategies, which emphasised audience size over minority programming.

(b) High inflation and fixed costs. Sharply rising and unpredictable rates of inflation between 1976 and 1977 led to an inflation rate of 13.65%. Likewise in 1978-79, costs rose by 17.6%, but such was the uncertainty over the degree of future inflationary trends, that there was considerable confusion over how a 1979/80 rate should be set (papers to the Finance Planning Committee and CE 17/11). At the same time, some major expenses, such as salaries and wages fixed by regulation, were beyond the BCNZ's control. In 1976-77, for example, these increased by 17.5%.

(c) Conversion of loan finance to capital. In 1977, the Government finally agreed to convert existing National Developmental loans of $38,900,000 into broadcasting assets on the understanding that, from henceforward, broadcasting would live within its income and fund all future developments from operating surpluses. This was a key provision because of a very sizable capital expansion programme which still had to be undertaken.

Consequently, the Corporation was faced with balancing continued demands for coverage with the re-division of predicted available finance between programming-making and capital extension claims.

The corporation also continued to face acute forecasting and monitoring problems well beyond this period. Combined with external financial uncertainties, they produced conditions of intermittent crisis. Not surprisingly, then, budget-setting involved a series of trade-offs based on judgements of public and political pressures for coverage extension against the demands of the service for production finance.

The upshot of these three economic pressures was a set of highly uneven financial results. An operating deficit of $105,000 in 1975 increased to $2.6m in 1976. However, the Corporation returned a surplus of $4.2 million in 1977, but a deficit of $1.4m in 1978, and then a surplus of $3.8m in 1979.
2.2 Financial Management

These financial pressures prompted urgent calls to impose cuts and restrictions. Generally, these were introduced by financial administrators and then somewhat modified after strenuous objections by the two channels (papers to the 1978 Board minutes). They also led to the growth of controls primarily to manage internal financial uncertainties, particularly with programme-making. The Board minutes detail, on numerous occasions, how the combination of internal and external ambiguities produced debates, sometimes sharply polarised, over tighter management and improved centralised information flows. These appeared, over the three years, in March, August and November 1977, February, June, September, October, November, December 1978 and February, April, July 1979 (BCM 77/4/17; 77/7/4; 77/7/11; 77/10/11; 78/1/4; 78/5/5; 78/8/9; 78/9/6; 78/10/11-12; 78/11/4; 79/1/5a; 79/3/12; 79/6/6; 79/6/7). Almost invariably, they were based on sudden changes in broadcasting's financial position. So, for example, where the services were congratulated for turning a deficit into a surplus in September 1978 (BCM 78/8/9), by October, the chairman was demanding 'either wholesale cuts or immediate retrenchment' to save up to $1m urgently (BCM 78/9/6).

Although the cuts affected all areas of broadcasting, they also worked to restrict the discretion available to programme-makers, despite efforts to protect themselves. In general, cuts affected either staff levels (the BCNZ imposed a 5% 'sinking lid' staff reduction: BCM 77/5/33; 77/8/10; 79/7/28) or general service budgets.

While these moves were undoubtedly in response to financial threats, it is also important to recognise that they were also the product of shared ideological perspectives. The Board had already emphasised the need to live within its income well before the capitalisation of loan finance. As the BCNZ chairman later commented (Cross, 1988: 39):
'I had detected the need for broadcasting to present itself as a social welfare case; my strong preference was to stand on our own feet, even if it hurt. The deputy chairman, Jim Freeman, felt just as strongly.'

He went on to add (Cross 1988:40):

'Our basic money management was pure Micawber: to spend less than you earn is happiness'.

In simple terms, this is a pure expression of the puritan ethic based on concept of thrift, denial and self-discipline, all of which have been indicated in earlier chapters. It was also sharply at odds with the outward-looking, expansive views of both the Adam Committee and programme-makers.

2.3 Challenges to Professional Legitimacy and Autonomy

Challenges to programme-makers' control were mounted on two main fronts. One was over the question of public complaints about programmes. The other was an effort to manage the environment of public opinion or, to put it differently, the definition of public discourse and cultural production. In turn, this meant the management and control of what were perceived to be unruly broadcasters, (Cross 1988). Invariably, this management turned on judgements about what constituted acceptable public expression and also the consequences of exceeding these boundaries in terms of the response of the broadcasting's political patron, the National Party. What also becomes clear throughout this period is that the reconstitution of the Board membership and ties to the particular services, shifted Board ideological leanings away from programme-makers and towards the managerial views of administrators and the newly-arrived business contingent on the Board.

The attempt to contain and manage professional discretion had four strands. These were attempts: (1) to impose an unambiguous hierarchical chain of command on programme-makers; (2) to improve codified procedures on editorial questions; (3) to impose consistent socialisation to organisational values, primarily through journalism training; (4) to introduce more clearly defined financial controls. This last
aspect has been discussed above, but it takes on a particular significance here insofar as tightened financial scrutiny often appeared to be the only option to non-programme-makers under the ambiguous circumstances of programme production.

In this sense, it became a trade-off or a symbolic substitution for production values and practices which could not be so readily pin-pointed and regulated. The point was made explicitly in a later report to Parliament (BCNZ Annual Report, 1985):

'while a sound productivity target has been set, establishing useful measures of performance has proved difficult for production quality and creativity.'

However, it was the struggle which developed over the handling of public complaints about programmes, and the subsequent organisational pressure for increased journalism training, which most fully illustrates the differing perceptions and positions of programme-makers, administrators and the Board, during this period and symbolises the four management strands noted above.

Complaints themselves rose sharply from 1977 onwards with the introduction of new procedures under the Act. More importantly, their resolution became a focus for differing interpretations about the representation of contentious events. There are two related matters in this regard.

One was that the 1975-78 period of National's administration was widely acknowledged to be a particularly turbulent and controversial one (James 1986). Journalists, in particular, were exposed to contested definitions of the social order and were readily exposed to charges of bias and misrepresentation (Garnier, 1978). The traumatic upheaval over the Contraception, Sterilisation and Abortion Bill of 1978 is just such an instance (Geiringer, 1976; BCM 78/6/12-13).

The second matter was that individual complaints could be used to mobilise support for an internal redefinition both of the representation of events and of the discursive latitude which should be available to programme-makers, and particularly to journalists. With an increased stream of potential events, more opportunities
invariably arose. Thus, while from 1975 and 1976, 3 complaints were discussed at
the general Council level, this number more than doubled following the 1976 Act. In
1977, complaints were discussed on ten occasions; in 1978 on 14 occasions and in
1979 on 15 occasions. Moreover, both the number of multiple complaints discussed
on each occasion rose (BCM 78/10/26;79/1/28-32) and the length of time devoted to
complaints.

Complaints were the evidence needed to support claims that broadcasters were
either incompetent or partial in their presentation. In this respect, the chairman's
comment were typical (Cross, 1988: 34-35,57):

'The serious deficiencies of the programme were in my view an
outcome of a lack of journalist training and grounding within
television; some sympathy had to be extended to those inexperienced
performers who were trying to use the medium without a strong
framework of professional control and direction.'

While this did lead to the introduction of increased training and a Code of
Practice in 1978, (Wood, 1984) this had always been the preference of programme-
makers (letter from TV-1 Head of Information Programmes to the chairman, 7.11.77).
On the other hand, it diminished their overall authority and developed an increasing
public perception of broadcasting timidity or disharmony (NBR 11.4.79; Mayne,
1978; BCM 77/11/6).

Yet there is less evidence that this restricted actual operational procedures
greatly. The reason lies once again, in the autonomy created by the occupational
control of a key ambiguity. With a dispute about the prime-time current affairs
programme, 'Dateline Monday' for example, TV-1's Director-General rejected the
Complaint Investigating Committee's recommendations that both sides of an
argument should always be presented in the same programme, and that programme-
makers should work from a written brief (paper to the BCNZ Board: BCM 77/10/4):

'In my experience written briefs have nothing to do with the realities of
programme production. That a programme will treat of this or that...is
determined by the appropriate people from the Controller of
Programmes' demands. I have never seen a written programme brief in
the ABC, BBC or ITV.'
The point here, as elsewhere, was that the immediate circumstance of production dictated appropriate editorial decisions: they were variable and not subject to detailed regulation from one case to the next. These arguments were accepted and the recommendations dropped.

In summary, there was a point, defined by the area of ambiguity, beyond which external occupational control could not be extended. Indeed, the degree of tension which the complaints procedure generated eventually led to a complete refusal by the ABJ, supported by the PSA, to comply with it. After some tense meetings between the different parties, a joint review committee was established to find a compromise arrangement (BCM 78/5/21; 78/6/13; 79/5/15).

However, it is worth noting that some direct controls were eventually instituted. These arose from alleged overspending by TV-1 on an expensive historical drama series, 'The Governor', (Boyd-Bell, 1985; Gregory, 1985). After this became the subject of a major public dispute, orchestrated by the Prime Minister, it became the focus of a detailed inquiry by Parliament's primary financial investigatory body, the Public Expenditure Committee. This produced recommendations for tighter accounting control that were adopted by the Board (BCM 77/8/8; 77/9/3f). Thereafter, budget officers were introduced for all major production areas, and a series of weekly commitment diaries was instituted (TV-1 memo, 1.6.77). All major series, costing in excess of $100,000, became subject to close scrutiny and final approval by the Board.

In total, the evidence on the control of professional autonomy and financial issues suggests a clear shift of control. Where there were defined or identifiable areas of operation - generally to do with financial and managerial questions - administrative control was slowly extended by the alliance of ideological interests between dominant fractions of the Board, top administrators and the Board chairman. Where there were areas of ambiguity or uncertainty, then programme-makers were able to maintain control of the production areas with which they were concerned.
2.4. Internal Occupational Conflicts

Nonetheless, the solidity of the programme-makers' position was undermined by growing internal friction that emerged through intensified inter-channel rivalries and intra-channel conflict. Cross described how the rivalries developed (1988:41):

'the channels indulged in the worst aspects of American or Australian competition. They played tricks with their schedules to 'hold' viewers, a favourite one being to over-run for about five or six minutes past an agreed common junction with the other channel, thus preventing, or at least discouraging their viewers from switching. Programmes of social and cultural value were finding it increasingly hard to find a place in the evening schedules because each channel was afraid of 'losing' its audience to the other.'

Mayne commented (1985a):

'All this difference in style accentuated the growing gulf between One in Wellington and the Auckland orientation of SPTV - One network seen by its opposition as run by self-satisfied stuffed shirts, the other perceived as the province of the fast-buck wide boys.'

These circumstances provided the opportunity for further Board and administrative appropriation of control organised around appeals to both the organisational and the public interest.

Amongst these, Boyd-Bell (1985:151-2) reported a shift from competitive to complementary programming, listing the introduction of a prime-time quota for NZ programmes which were prohibited from competing against each other, and the stipulation that 'programmes of substance' should also not compete against one another. Three evening 'common junctions' were established to aid viewers shift between channels, and transmission hours were cut or extended by the Board, not by service decisions. There were also increasing attempts to determine programme placements, the level of repeats and advertising content at Board level (BCM 77/7/14; 78/8/21; 78/8/23 ), and even to demand more golf and sports programmes (BCM 78/3/33). Clearly, these initiatives limited the discretion available to either channel to determine its own strategy, or to resolve the conflicts of public service and commercial demands internally.
If this constituted the development of sharp cross-channel practices, there was also considerable disharmony within each organisation. TV-2, especially, suffered from severe regional production conflicts between departments and between centres (NBR 2.11.77), which reflected the pressures of fragmented resources, inadequate income and an ad hoc management style. These elements generated the development of departments as individual fiefdoms with limited communication and produced sharp disagreements, which led to the departure of departmental heads (Cross, 1988; Mayne, 1984a and pers. comm.). It also lowered morale, as reflected in the production of two virulent underground newsletters: 'Durex Academy' and 'Kitsch-TV'.

There were also tensions between technical and production staff. 1977 saw the first strikes in broadcasting history, first by Production Secretaries and then by the film operators group, over wages and conditions. This was largely an outcome of the unrelenting pressure, noted earlier, to expand production with inadequate resources and inexperienced staff, (TV-2 minutes, 1975-77).

It seems reasonable to argue that the limitations on programme-makers' discretion described in earlier sections intensified the particular circumstances of conflict and competition indicated here. These developments, however, had a two-fold effect. On one hand, they reduced the internal unity and 'family' loyalty which had been a feature of the 1974-76 period. On the other, they provided sufficient evidence not only for Cross's claim for the need for restructuring, by pointing to the destructive consequences they produced, but they also encouraged the potential for organisational allegiances based on a commitment to television as a whole rather than to individual channels. This, indeed, formed part of Cross's explicit strategy for restructuring, as discussed in the next chapter.
3. **SUMMARY**

The two major trends which emerge from this period are the development of increasingly close financial and administrative management and the attempt to expand formal and social controls over cultural production. Programme-makers' authority and autonomy were diminished externally and internally.

This came about externally through their continued depiction as potential deviants to a social order defined by their patron as thrift-driven and self-disciplined. It did so organisationally by the allied perspectives of CSD administrators and dominant elements of the Board. Internally, occupational authority was eroded by disintegration of the notion of 'family' loyalty, falling morale, sharp disputes and rivalries, and departures by more 'cosmopolitan' members.

It is not difficult to see that these trends developed, in part, out of the implications in the original structuring of broadcasting under the Adam Report. Administrators expanded their dominance through claims to be able to control key financial ambiguities through the application of a specific knowledge-base. They were able to do this because they were well-placed, as a result of their initial bureaucratic manoeuvring, with the very first working parties in 1974-75. This placement, itself, was a consequence of their particular knowledge-base, as suggested in chapter three.

Yet the very context in which they advanced these claims was ideologically-structured, through the arrival of a sympathetic political patron. This patron, through the considerable power available under conditions of state monopoly control of broadcasting, could influence several important areas: the ideological climate (of thrift and conservative management); the key pressures facing broadcasting (which moved from issues of cultural representation under Labour to financial management under National); central appointments (of the chairman and business expertise to the Board), and even an appropriate moral structure (which emphasised the hierarchical
and the implicitly paternal - an issue discussed in the next chapter - over the collegial and implicitly egalitarian or informal).

Inevitably, these influences were experienced, often acutely, as stresses and conflicts within the working conditions of television, as indicated. It also suggests how the moral mission articulated by programme-makers began to disintegrate, as their authority and discretion disappeared. At the same time, these processes and trends are part of a negotiated social order, and the role of the chairman, explored in the next chapter, suggests something of the unexpected opportunities and dimensions such negotiation, can throw up.

Indeed, the particular presence of Ian Cross disrupts the emerging narrative of a gradual shift of power, by introducing some new features into the framework of broadcasting which were a consequence of one particular and powerful individual's attempt to capture the administrative machinery. Sociologically, one of the points of interest this suggests is the conceptual tension between individuals and social groups as useful analytical categories. Organisationally, it sharpens the analysis of expert-bureaucratic interaction.
CHAPTER EIGHT

THE FULL TIME EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN AND THE 1979 RESTRUCTURING

'Television means so much to New Zealanders because it is virtually the only means of our achieving any sense of community as a country.'

Ian Cross, NZ Listener, July 5 1975

1. INTRODUCTION

How is one to consider the role of the first full-time executive chairman? To date in New Zealand literature there appears to have been division both about his role and his intentions. To a large extent, his power lay in his exploitation of the opportunities of a highly unusually position which enabled him both to create policy and to execute it. In some senses, these contradictions are summed up in the ambiguous title of his recent autobiography, The Unlikely Bureaucrat (1988), which hints at the uncomfortable combination of entrepreneur and visionary individualist with that of faceless executive and functionary, which he develops within the book.

Yet, in a very real sense, the ambiguities articulated by Cross were also those facing broadcasting as a whole and, indeed, are emblematic of some fundamental organisational dilemmas. His method of resolving them, as should become clear, was to impose what he saw as the most appropriate direction for broadcasting by drawing most of the key lines of influence into his own office. The result was to raise questions over whether the chairman had become 'a benevolent dictator', 'the most powerful broadcasting head in the western world' (NZ Listener 10.3.79) or 'a czar-supremo' (TV-2 chairman, quoted in Cross, 1988: 59).

Underlying these charges is a sense of a charismatic leader attempting, single-handedly, to solve complex organisational problems. Consequently, it produces two natural focii of attention which are developed through this chapter. First, it identifies how Cross utilized existing organisational and social tensions to develop the inherent authority of his office. Secondly, it discusses how this process introduced, counter-intuitively, informal means of organisational control behind the proliferation of
centralised, managed and codified arrangements on the one hand, and how it affected the pattern of cultural production through scheduling and programme production on the other. This emerges, in particular, through discussion of the restructuring in 1979 which saw the merger of TV-1 and SPTV (TV-2) into the consolidated body known as TVNZ.

What is unusual throughout this account, however, is the existence of an apparently charismatic figure not at the birth of an organisation, as is more customary (and both Reith in England and Shelley in New Zealand (Gregory, 1985) are typical examples), but at a later stage of its existence. Unavoidably, this places strict limits on the sphere of discretion available to such a figure, as a frustrated Cross found for himself (1988: 164):

'...as Chairman and Chief Executive, with management teams supposedly reigning over the whole organisation, I found that the state service conditions of employment involved a complexity of rules, regulations and procedures that really added up to a mutual assistance pact between management and staff to maintain the status quo. Ambition and hard-driving leadership were not encouraged.'

The consequences of this conflict are explored later in the chapter but, before turning to look at how Cross utilised the chairman's office, some indications need to be given as to how such an unusual figure became head of the broadcasting system, and the basis on which his charismatic appeal was founded.

2. BACKGROUND

Much of Cross's background was in writing: he was a well-known novelist, and had later turned to journalism, including taking up a journalism fellowship at Harvard. Yet, by his own admission, many of his activities had an apparently driven and almost visionary quality which he symbolised in the persona of an intuitive inner voice he has called Jeeves (1988:5-6). After a period in public relations at Feltex, he was appointed to edit the Listener in 1973, which 'satisfied that religiosity more than anything I had done for a long time' (1988: 6).
On the face of it, this was an unusual background from which to ascend to the chair of the country's broadcasting systems four years later. He appeared to have relatively little business management, bureaucratic or broadcasting experience in his favour. Yet, on the other hand, he was widely seen to have revitalised and improved the Listener and, as its editor, had been involved with the upper administrative structures of broadcasting to which the Listener was attached. In a sense, then, he appeared to have married aspects of the state and the market - at least in an entrepreneurial form - in this role. Also, his Listener editorials on broadcasting made his own views well-known. A year before his appointment as chairman, for example, he set out his views on the 1976 broadcasting changes (N.Z. Listener 10.7.76):

'Broadcasters cannot be their own judges and juries on what they do: they must be under a controlling body which ensures that they serve the public interest and their own best standards. If, however, broadcasters are made to feel that they are subservient to an administrative class which exercises only negative control over their activities, their present morale and drive will fade away.'

In short, the Listener acted as a platform which his activities and attitudes could be gauged. And, in many ways, they appeared to fulfil the contradictory criteria required of a powerful chairman. Cross, as a bureaucratic entrepreneur with a creative background, and views not unsympathetic to the Minister of Broadcasting (N.Z. Listener 29.5.76; 10.7.76), offered the prospect of reconciling the incompatible demands of managed independence: the restraint on organisational autonomy coupled with a degree of creative licence.

However, this position was, also, and primarily, an appointment to control a state monopoly, and in this respect Cross fulfilled these necessary requirements, too, insofar as there was an attempt by the new Government to reassert or extend state social control through the new Act. The clearest way this can be illustrated is by pointing to the way in which Cross adopted an inherently paternalistic mode of authority (as a 'benign dictator') that coincided with the puritanical and deferential style of management of broadcasting noted by a number of commentators (Cleveland, 1980; Gregory, 1985; Johnstone, 1968). Cross illustrates both the
puritanism in his own approach (viz 1988: 240 for example) and evidence of deferentiality, in this case with the Prime Minister (1988: 83):

'Our exchanges dealt at first with the licence fee issue, and he proceeded to examine me as though as I was a student at an accountancy tutorial. My only defence against that after a few minutes was to fail myself on the spot...when a cap, however disguised, should be in my hand, my mind retreats into distracted vagueness.'

In summary, Cross's appointment was at the intersection of, and as the expected resolution to, a number of tensions. These centred principally around the questions of administrative control and organisational autonomy but also around an authoritarian social control and a loosely-organised sense of creative (or professional) freedom, all of which could, in some sense, be seen to be embodied in Cross's unconventional background.

In a wider sense, these pressures point again to the fundamental organisational dilemmas discussed in earlier chapters. In this context, they emerge as the conflict between what Perrow refers to as the particularistic and the universalistic (1979: 3-12), or between individual and group categories and its bureaucratic rationalisation (Crozier, 1964: 299-300), in which Cross occupied a focal position. In an important sense, his role illustrates how Weber's (1947) ideal type of bureaucracy always under-represents actual organisational complexities. These crystallise into particular images and configurations of organisational form which are, in effect, shifting and incomplete. Here, for example, one could not easily predict someone of Cross's background readily filling this position nor, as will become evident, the consequences in terms of the patronage relations, which flowed from it. In short, where the richness of bureaucratic form is distilled into images, those images are necessarily static representations of the confluence of particular social forces (Reed, 1985).

If these were the circumstances under which the role and its incumbent came into being, they do not indicate how Cross enlarged and developed the authority of
the office. How he undertook this, in the face of a rationalizing organisation, is explored next.

3. THE CENTRALISATION OF CONTROL

It is difficult to dispute the evidence that control was increasingly channelled into the chairman's office. The new direction was evident from the long and intense discussion of objectives at his first Board meeting. At that meeting, during a discussion which excluded the Directors-General, and which was marked 'confidential' and held separately to the main minutes, he accepted (BCM 77/5/4) that:

'He had been made aware of members' thinking and appreciated that, in the ultimate, confirmation of any action he took could be refuted. He realised that consultation was imperative but there would be occasions when he had to respond without prior consultation.....even though members might disagree with that response.'

With Board consent, he replaced the Board of Management, with a Chief Executives Committee which, unlike its predecessor, was presided over by the chairman. He also chaired the finance subcommittee of the Board which by 1978 had evolved into the Finance and Planning committee. In this way, he gained access to, and influence over, the two major advisory committees to the Board which shaped the flows of information to, and policy from, the organisation's central decision-making area. He also abolished the proposed Secretary's Division, which was intended to develop management policy; its functions were effectively subsumed by the Finance and Policy committee and later efforts, principally by the Secretary, to resurrect it were rejected (BCM 78/9/15).

The key point which emerged from the changes was that the chairman was able to monitor all aspects of the organisation's activities and influence its direction. Former Board members and executives also recall his influence over the selection and short-listing of key appointments. If the chairman's influence waxed, that of the Board appeared to wane, with reports by respondents of the pre-ordering of the
agenda to manage for desired outcomes. This was precisely mirrored by, and culminated in, the comments of the Commission of Inquiry on irregular contractual arrangements (Jackson Report 1984:66):

'16. We have been told that Board members were not provided with either the interim or final report of the Internal Inquiry, but were merely given a "resume" by the Chairman, Mr Cross, at the Board meeting on 16 August 1983. This we find a most unusual and an almost cavalier approach by Mr Cross to his Board. We have seen a memorandum which we are told was attached to the papers presented to the Board at that meeting but the agenda has no reference to the matter and minutes record nothing on it.

17. Even more surprising was the advice to us by the Chairman that no Board member asked for or received a copy of the report although we were told that one was available at the meeting. In a situation where the problems of TVNZ were, at that very time, the subject of the public debate which eventually led to this Commission of Inquiry, we find the Board response to its Chairman's report on the Internal Inquiry remarkable to say the least and a quite unprecedented reaction for any board in the experience of the members of this Commission. We wonder whether the response would have been different had the Board been chaired by an independent non-executive person.'

At the same time as he gained control of the principal channels of access to the Board, there is evidence that he developed separate and informal systems of control. The Jackson Commission noted that by 1984, all 9 top BCNZ executives were directly responsible to the chairman. However, a number of senior management executives pointed out that Cross 'had a group of cronies who surrounded him' as one of them put it, and which had emerged since the beginning of his chairmanship. It was produced by the existence of two groupings in the administrative area (latterly the Central Service Division). Cross as editor of the Listener had been an intermittent attender of Broadcasting Council meetings of senior executives run by the Council secretary. He appears finally to have been excluded. As a senior executive commented, when he became chairman, 'he needed support and had to create a separate group for himself.' While the Broadcasting Council grouping 'would normally have advised him, under the circumstances he was obliged to gather others.' Added to that, he was impatient of bureaucratic procedures. As a respondent observed:
'He didn't have much confidence in many of his executives - he wanted really, to be 'hands on'. He was always against the red tape and bureaucracy and in fact was "anti-establishment" - something of a maverick, but with very high principles.'

Another senior executive remarked that Cross 'tended to go by an upfront image and judge on charisma'. As Cross himself put it in his autobiography:

'I also went out of my way to demonstrate my friendship with advertising people I had worked with in my Feltex days, reasoning that if I, as chairman plunged into the revenue game, spouting Harvard Business School bromides, executives had little choice but to follow.'

In sum, an entrepreneurial instinct, coupled with an urge to intervene as he felt appropriate, engendered a blurring of accepted hierarchical arrangements. As an executive remarked, these:

'cut across lines of communication to the Secretary and created suspicion: "No one knows who reports to whom. Why is so-and-so seeing them and not going through me as he should?"'

This also reinforced a sense of favouritism. On the one hand, respondents pointed to the elevation of a number of individuals of sharply varying competence (and see the Jackson Report, 1984 for further elaboration of this point), while, on the other, he rebuffed or avoided executives who challenged him. Despite the references to Cross's charismatic intentions, however, it is important to add that there was doubt expressed by respondents over his actual leadership. A senior executive summed it up:

'His method was to do things by direction rather than by leadership...I remember seeing him waiting outside Ron Free's door [a former Director of Finance and senior member of the CSD] to see him. He was hopping from one foot to another on all of his 6 foot 6 frame. He said to me "could you just go in and tell him I'd like to see him." He couldn't go in because, in some ways, he was an intensely shy man. A leader would have just walked in and said "Hi, Ron, how's it going?" But he couldn't.'

If there were doubts over his leadership skills, there were, too, over his charismatic appeal. The opposition by programme-makers to the restructuring plans has already been noted but a senior programme executive commented further that he found Cross to be 'dissembling':

'you never knew where you stood. It was his PR background - at Feltex. He was never a working broadcaster. He hadn't been through all the pain
and sweat and the deadlines. He'd done a few Column Comments and thought he was one. In fact, he liked PR people around him.

As discussed by Longer and Kanungo (1987), one of the fundamental attributes of a charismatic leader is unqualified assent to his or her insights based on recognised expertise. The evidence suggests this was absent. Consequently, damning as these comments appear, they do demonstrate that, as chairman, Cross fitted comfortably neither the administrative nor the programme-making groups and that he attempted to develop informal, often directly interventionist procedures and to cultivate organisational relations based on personal loyalties rather than the formal attributes of office. In Weberian terms this marks a shift away from a bureaucratic type towards a more patrimonial system of organisation. This point, and the considerable consequence which flow from it, are pursued later in the chapter.

Nonetheless Cross, as described, wielded very sizeable influence within the organisation. He derived the legitimacy for this primarily from claims to be acting in the larger organisational interest rather than the furtherance of departmental goals. His successful regulation of, and call for, increased journalism training in the aftermath of a major internal conflict in 1978, initiated by a serious complaint from the Prime Minister, is typical (Cross, 1988:34):

'My argument was that the corporation needed time to clean up its own house and could not do this if by public disclosures it pulled down the roof over its head. The serious deficiencies of the programmes were in my view a lack of journalistic training and grounding. This the corporation had to supply before the broadcasting stick was applied to it.'

Early in the 1979 restructuring he used the proposal of the sale of one channel by the Treasury and Cabinet to justify sole control of the organisation's response (Cross, 1988:65):

'for this reason....their consideration by the corporation were kept confidential to myself and one executive and together we worked furiously to jump on the idea.'

In short, Cross attempted both to speak for, and act on behalf of all the organisation's interests, accumulating power in order to do so. Externally, this amounted to an attempt to manage both financial and publication ambiguities by
securing the information and the response in his own hands. He was explicit about this strategy in securing the 1979 restructuring when he claimed strong general staff support for his changes based on submissions and meetings to which he alone was privy (Cross, 1988:42 and 51; Mayne, 1978). As a result, he was able to capitalise on the growing existence of internal corporate divisions (and see Cross, 1988:41-42, 51-58 on his analysis of TV-1 and TV-2 rivalries; Mayne, 1978 for another, largely similar account). Moreover, he could bind this to a claim for the urgency of organisational reform in the public and organisational interest based around alternatives which he could shape through his access to, and control over, the sources of policy formation and execution, and internal information flows.

At a more general level, Cross's chairmanship highlighted several important structural features.

1. An executive chairman could exploit the tension between administrators and programme-makers which existed in their contradictory sources of advice to the Board.

2. An executive chairman could also exploit the competitive rivalries between the two television channels which, as above, could not themselves offer consistent advice to the Board. In other words, the office could exploit two key areas of ambiguity which related to the ordering of state versus market-driven activity and administratively-regulated versus discretionary, socially-controlled operation.

3. As a chairman and as chief executive, the office both dispensed and executed policy. As Cross remarked on his decisions to develop a studio in Parliament (Cross 1988:107).

'These moves by me [as an executive] created pressures on the Board which I received as chairman and felt compelled to act upon.'

In effect, the position became answerable to no-one except the political patron which instituted it and it is unsurprising to find that this joint role was not finally removed until the Labour Party's return to office.
4. The joint role also encouraged the development of informal sources of control and of individual loyalty which circumvented the existing organisational structure. Paradoxically, then, it reintroduced discretionary areas of control at just the same time as the organisation was codifying and reinforcing its formal operational procedures.

5. While it advanced administrators' aim by the centralisation of management and the reintroduction of hierarchical systems through the 1979 restructuring, in effect it merely shifted the balance of control to a new arrangement of formal and informal forces organised around the fulcrum of the Chairman's office (NBR 11.4.79; 18.4.79).

6. In broader terms, it produced a more flexible management of broadcasting's environment, since the re-introduction of discretion enabled rapid changes to be made to the balance of public service and commercial demands by concentrating information and responses in the chairman's office.

   In effect, then it concentrated all key aspects of the organisation into the office of the chairman, both its financial priorities and its claims to legitimacy flowing through the same individual. As the NBR (11.4.79) reported:

   'He argues "why I seem to be taking more power is that I'm the first widely known spokesman for broadcasting since God knows when."'

   Yet this concentration of control was vulnerable to the same challenges which administrators had made of programme-makers: where there were any failures or discrepancies, particularly over financial questions, as was to be the case, administrators could claim the need for regulation and monitoring. Inevitably then, the success of the challenge would determine the position and power of the chairman's office. In short, the same primary organisational dilemma for broadcasting could and did re-emerge in a fresh context: the proper extent of discretion or control under conditions of ambiguity. How these discrepancies emerged and were addressed is the subject of the next section.
4. 1979 RESTRUCTURING

The 1979 restructuring ended the system of competitive television initiated by the Adam Report in 1973. As such, it spelled the end of the principal of 'maximum practicable independence' of the 1976 Act, and the notion of 'guided' competition between two separate channels. The replacement under the wing of the BCNZ, was a single corporation, dual-channel network re titled Television New Zealand (TVNZ) which espoused the concept of 'co-operative enterprise.' (Gregory, 1985:99).

To some extent, the pressures which contributed to the restructuring have been traversed in earlier sections. What is important here is how they were interpreted, principally by the Board chairman, as the prime mover of the negotiation, both as a set of urgent claims, and as opportunities for fresh solutions, which attempted to resolve the besetting issues of finance and publication, at the same time as they reinforced the chairman's own position.

Fundamentally, the restructuring reinforced explicit state monopoly control of broadcasting. Consequently, it returned to an approach, as with the earlier NZBC system, of managing all its key dependencies and resources through a single, centralised organisational form. Gregory gives this summary of the structural rearrangements (1985:99):

'TVNZ comprised a production service, providing local programmes for each channel, and a network service which schedules programmes on both TV-1 and TV-2, makes overseas purchases and arranges advertising. The "rationalization" would save operating costs by reducing the duplication of resources and effort built into the previous structure.'

Boyd-Bell commented (1985:153):

'For the viewer there were obvious gains in the complementary scheduling of programmes on both channels, a reduction in the head-on ratings battle, and the return of some minority interest programmes to prime time rather than the late night and Sunday afternoon ghettos. For the system there were advantages in the hoped-for reduction in some aspects of public and political criticism. There was real financial advantage in attempting a fifty-fifty audience split over both channels, thereby maximising commercial revenue from advertising.'

In brief, then, the changes appeared to resolve the contradictions of public service and commercial objectives by dispensing with cross-channel competition and
by using the extra income derived from an even advertising split (as opposed to the existing 66/34 TV-1 TV-2 split, (The Dominion .26.1.79)) to broaden the range of programmes.

The plan, as developed, appears to have been entirely Cross's initiative (Cross, 1988). It was conceived in 1978 and developed in secrecy over the 1978-79 summer break (Cross, 1978 and pers. comm.). In stressing the urgency of its implementation he made three further claims beyond those outlined above. One was the implicit threat of the sale of one channel to private television interests (Cross 1988: 57,65), which was proposed by the Treasury and later promoted by the Prime Minister in a series of press articles. The second and the third were related: a claim to represent the unarticulated public, and the unarticulated organisational, interest. The public interest, he claimed, came as a result of listening to ordinary New Zealanders as he travelled the country, working as 'a diligent populist' (NZ Listener 10.3.79):

'He uncovered a consensus. But the action was not finally based on the bulk of viewer complaint alone. It was based on his experience as chairman, acting constantly as a fireman in alarms between the two channels.'

The organisational interest was constructed in the same way: on the basis of internal staff submissions about the future of broadcasting, which, utilising the authority of the position of chairman, he interpreted as support for his scheme, (Cross 1988:51):

'The intelligence of the submissions was impressive. They showed the sound character and decency of broadcasting, especially among engineering and craft groups. It was this service and those people which made broadcasting. Nothing should be allowed to discredit them.'

In other words, he developed the notion of a dual constituency which, combined with the urgency of privatisation and the difficulties of the existing system, constituted a powerful rationale for instituting change. Moreover, the organisational constituency cut across existing loyalties within the channels and appealed to the elements within CSD (especially the engineering groups) which by-passed the
explicit need for support from administrators. Taken together, these elements constituted a previously untapped set of alliances drawn out by the chairman's control of a previously unexploited source of knowledge and by an appeal to the authority of his position.

However, it is an indication of the close balance of power between administrators and professionals that the proposal was finally adopted only after an exhaustive discussion and the final exercise of the chairman's vote (Cross 1988:61; respondents' interviews). Intrinsically, of course, with its commitment to management and centralisation, the new plan favoured administrative dominance. More than that, it introduced a different ideological framework which was acknowledged in the departure of the two standing committee chairman, who were also represented the remnants of Labour-appointed Board. As the TV-1 chairman, Dick Collins, put it (The Dominion 9.3.79):

'The restructuring is not the system I have operated under. I was appointed to establish an independent corporation for TV-1 and I have carried on because the service was still independent. Now it's back centralised as under the N.Z.B.C.'

In fact the negotiations involved a more complex distribution of power than the statement indicates. The principal changes involved (and see Gregory, 1985):

1. a shift of production control to Auckland and a centralisation of network control in Wellington. This, in effect, cut across the loyalties of production staff to particular channels.

2. an intermediate line of control from the Director-General of Production Services to the heads of production departments through a Controller of Production Planning and Development. This was in contrast to the direct line of control from the Director-General to regional station managers.

3. The amalgamation of all currently separate news, current affairs and sports areas under one Controller responsible directly to the Director-General of the Production Service located in Auckland.
4. The re-introduction of regional news with the appointment of regional news editors and producers responsible to the Controller. These arrangements produced a number of tensions. Not only were producers distanced from direct representation to the Director-General, but they were expected also to make 'bids' to the Controller of Programmes over where their programmes might be scheduled. The TVPDA argued, unsuccessfully, that (The Evening Post 12.5.79):

'Production Departments should decide what productions they wish to make and they should be serviced by the service Departments who would supply finance, manpower etc. We are worried that it will end up the other way round.'

As will be discussed, this was not altogether to be the case. The other conflict they faced was that production and technical resources were controlled by the regional managers, who also enjoyed direct access to the new Director-General. Consequently, programme-makers faced a number of checks to their discretion over programme production, requiring vetting, organisation and scheduling by other agents before production could be approved.

The re-organisation of news services highlighted one key conflict with the shift of news to an Auckland base under a former TV-2 head, and which exposed the continuation of inter-channel rivalries. The action itself raised an outcry (NZ Listener 6.10.79), principally from TV-1 staff, on the grounds of political interference (Gregory, 1985). More centrally, it indicated that the differences between two different organisational centres was not resolved, and was fought out largely through attitudes to the redistribution of TV-1 and TV-2 staff in the new system. In crude terms, the difference can be reduced, as discussed in earlier chapters, to a contrast between a public service versus an entrepreneurial ethos (viz NZ Listener 19.5.79; The Dominion 9.10.79) and was mainly expressed by programme-making staff. Working practices, as such, were not particularly an issue. Rather, the tension was exerted through symbolic and affiliative dimensions (Mayne, 1984). There were, for example complaints from within both channels about the loss of TV-1's logo, and TV-2's 'eye' symbol, the jingles and the close-down kiwi cartoon (latter transferred to
TVNZ). Indeed, this same character and his/her cat were depicted in an unscreened cartoon shedding a tear over graves marked with TV-1 and TV-2 logos, before driving off in a hearse bearing a TVNZ number plate.

The confirmed persistence of these loyalties is worth commenting on. That they did persist is unequivocal (Mayne, 1985:29):

'Behind the scenes, the ghosts of SPTV and Television One are still locked in battle as Auckland and Wellington vie for position and television decision-makers can, by rough rule of thumb, be classified into categories reflecting the rival attitudes to television of the pre-1980 era.'

This conflict, and its affilative divisions, were also to feature in the 1984 Commission of Inquiry (Mayne, 1984). However, their implications - which were considerable - are left over to the next section. If the restructuring divided staff loyalties and dismissed the direct control of programme makers, it is also consolidated the power of the chairman. As Edlin commented (1979:6):

'...his organisational structure, by creating a horizontal division in place of the present vertical split, will leave a vacuum at the top executive level which Cross inevitably must fill. By creating two horizontal levels, each with separate functional responsibilities, an overlord is made necessary to determine priorities and to co-ordinate the activities of the two divisions.'

In effect, this produced wide discretionary latitude in order to respond to rapidly fluctuating external pressures. But, given broadcasting's close relation to the state as a whole, it raised the question of vulnerability to 'political abuse'(Edlin, 1979a:6); especially when there were known to be political priorities for broadcasting development - notably the extension of transmission services to provincial electorates (NBR 11.4.79). The further implications of this discretionary latitude have been discussed by Gregory (1985:105-112) and will be dealt with at greater length in the next section.

One last major consequence of the restructuring was the new shift of direction signalled by the appointment of top executives. 'The team...consisted largely of TV-2 executives' which, according to Cross, 'had demonstrated a far greater affinity with its New Zealand audience' (Cross, 1988:106). It also exhibited, as noted, a strongly
entrepreneurial bias, based on sponsorship, contradeals and marketing that 'had a strong element of hucksterism' (Cross, 1988:56), although some commentators observed that this approach gave it 'a mana out of proportion to its financial contribution,' (Mayne, 1985:29). What it also did, of course, was to reinforce the conflict between public service and commercial objectives within a new framework. Mayne (1985:29) makes the point explicit:

'Like its predecessor networks, TVNZ opted for expedient methods of broadcasting the local presence on-screen, hence the initial obsession for live sport and live entertainment - both relatively cheap forms of local production yielding more on-screen minutes to the dollar than drama or the like. And both these forms of production lend themselves to entrepreneurial and sponsorship deals.'

There were, in fact, three reasons for this strategy. One was an attempt to increase local programme presence as part of the new emphasis on the public interest. The second was a shortage of operating funds, as indicated and now with an extra burden in the form of heavily expanded regional news resources (TVNZ Production Plan, 1980; NZ Listener 10.2.80) The third was the limited availability of production expertise. As the Director General of the Production Services commented (NZ Listener 16.2.80):

'Production expertise, already depleted by a slow but steady exodus overseas, will be spread even more thinly. "A lot of people with limited production experience will be getting big chances" says Martin.'

This point bears further comment. The restructuring appears not only to have highlighted the loss of experienced staff, it also indicated the existence of severely depressed staff morale (NZ Listener 16.2.80). A planned total staff walk-out at an early address by the BCNZ chairman on the restructuring at Avalon failed when only programme staff departed and other personnel remained (The Dominion 22.5.79; Cross, 1988). The ABJ itself was split and there were reports of losses of staff (The Dominion 26.5.79; Cross, 1988). The degree of unity shown in 1976 by programme-makers disintegrated not only because of the growth of the internal
organisational pressures and appeal to alternative allegiances, but also because programme-makers were unable to mobilise public support. There were at least two reasons for this: (a) externally, the reorganisation was not such an explicitly public and legislative act as 1976; (b) internally, the potential threat of job-loss had been specifically excluded as a restructuring issue (Edlin 1979a,b), weakening the basis of potential widespread support for a public campaign.

4.1 Summary of the Restructuring

The restructuring demonstrates both the internal shifts and external or public consequences of the perceptions and control exercised over key ambiguities. At root, the reorganisation was an attempt to solve all broadcasting's major pressures simultaneously by introducing forms of routinisation and stability through the extinction of cross-channel competition and the reintroduction of the contradictory aims of a managed commercial environment and an emphasis on public service priorities through complementary, broad-based, New-Zealand oriented scheduling.

Its effects, ironically, were merely to reintroduce contradictions in different organisational areas. Routinisation limited programme-makers' discretion and led to the loss of experienced staff and the restriction of local content production. Financial pressures re-emphasised the conflict of scheduling by elevating entrepreneurial priorities at the same time as efforts were made to reintroduce minority programme choice. Programme-making staff lost occupational discretion in the allocation of programme production and scheduling at the same time as discretion increased at the level of the Board chairman. In brief, neither the routinisation-discretion problem nor the commercial-public service problem was resolved; rather, both were rearranged with the tensions reorganized to produce greater decision-making control in the chairman's position.

These, in turn, affected the production of culture which reflected existing entrepreneurial ambitions but which were now elevated to a confused public service-
commercial form of output which was expressed through a high volume-low cost strategy which, by virtue of its available resources and limited expertise, was bound in general to be more cautious and less adventurous. In this sense, the risk-taking aspirations of the Adam Report were exchanged for a form of cultural management; certainly, there were no claims offered in any announcement of the new system to extend production boundaries. The Director General of Production Services' remarks in this light were revealing in that his 'short lecture [on the changes] doesn't exactly bubble with optimism' (NZ Listener 6.10.79).

These changes aside, there is one other major consequence of the restructuring to be dealt with. This charts the shift of organisational control from formal to informal means and is discussed in the following sections.

5. RELATIONS OF PATRONAGE AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

These first emerged in TV-2, primarily through the pressure to develop markets as rapidly as possible, combined with the need to innovate intensively, in order to create an identity and a set of programmes that legitimated it as a separate public service entity to TV-1. Simultaneously, it possessed a lean administration with limited accounting, monitoring or financial controls. Moreover, a sizeable proportion of its staff, particularly in the programme area, were new, often young and with minimal administrative experience. Respondents recalled numerous anecdotes about ill-considered or ambiguous decisions where resources or facilities were committed then revoked, where basic paperwork remained incomplete or contractual obligations were misunderstood and where administration was only partially undertaken, even for major projects. This, coupled with a programme-making ideology which viewed the task of administration as pedantic or secondary to the purpose at hand (see the Public Expenditure Committee (1977) findings) provided
conditions for the emergence of characteristics similar to Weber’s (1947) concept of patrimonialism.¹

The key linkages lay in the acquisition of direct programme sponsorship to develop particular projects under conditions of strong, often personal allegiance to projects or project leaders which was heightened by sharp inter-departmental rivalries. In short, individual producers were able to acquire extra-organisational resources which they could dispense as a means of patronage either to broadcasting staff or to potential performers. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to ask why this affected only certain programme areas, and only TV-2.

In fact, the answers have already been partly suggested amongst the pre-conditions to patronage. TV-1 did not face such intense demands for income; many areas of staff - particularly in current affairs and information programmes were strongly opposed to the notion of sponsorship; many staff, being drawn from the NZBC, were strongly imbued with a more disinterestedly corporate ethos which they passed on to new recruits. Administrative controls were, although tightly stretched, well-developed and more closely tied to NZBC procedures through continuity of staff and proximity to the BCNZ control centres. There was, in any event, a more co-ordinated, coherent sense of inter-departmental co-operation or understanding reinforced by the close spatial relationship of the Avalon building and the broader political and public service ethos of the Wellington region, as opposed to the decentralised Auckland outlook indicated in earlier chapters.

In brief, the opportunities were available in Auckland where they were not in Wellington. Even in the development of TV-1’s major (and highly controversial) series, ‘The Governor’, the eventual decision by the producer to abandon his key

¹ Patrimonialism is a concept which Weber (1947) refers to as a monarchical form. It is, therefore, more properly a state form rather than a bureaucratic form - and little discussed, in either case, by Weber or other commentators (Collins, 1986). Nonetheless, the general notions of the particular financial ties and informal relations to a leader are useful here and applied, in the absence of more developed discussion, as the best available means of highlighting an unusual set of relationships.
administrative control instrument, the forward budgeting system, a decision which contributed significantly to cost overruns, was not translated into emergent forms of patronage. Significantly, the events of 'The Governor' are invariably treated as isolated to the period in all available respondent and organisational narratives. In contrast, with TV-2, similar features are more commonly viewed as signifiers of TV-2's 'character' (Mayne, 1984:16):

'SPTV was Auckland - and branch office Christchurch - with all the razzamatazz and rogue disrespect that sums up "Aucklandness" in the self-esteem of all true isthmus-dwellers.'

That the Entertainment department in TV-2 became the principal focus for patronage is straightforward. Entertainment programmes are generally the most closely entwined with performers and client companies of any in broadcasting, by virtue of their demand for skills and finance beyond the organisation's own resources. More than that, most programme-makers develop patterns of allegiance based primarily on the collegial organisation of the occupation (where under the uncertain conditions of production, programme-makers with similar sympathies or perspectives are likely to attempt to continue to work together). And it is the development of these close informal relations which, in the presence of external patrons, provides the conditions for nest-feathering (Perrow, 1979) or patrimony to emerge.

In the Entertainment area, financial relations to outside agencies in the form of sponsorship, contradeals, gifts or other inducements being commonly greater and more widespread than in many other departments, act as essential lubricants for a show's success (such as the provision by companies of large and attractive prizes in quiz shows). Invariably, this produces a form of environmental dependence for a broadcasting organisation (Turow, 1984), but also a source of ambiguity between agency, organisation and producer over how, and by whom, transactions are to be controlled. For programme staff it presents opportunities to gain additional status, power or resources (though, generally, money). For performers, it is the opportunity
for status or exposure and pursuant career enhancement through television appearances - or, at its extreme, the development of a casting couch mentality.

Two conditions exacerbated these features in New Zealand. One was the virtual creation of a light entertainment industry as a small, tightly delimited market under the two-channel system and particularly in the talent quest area. As the TV-1 Director-General remarked in an interview (NZ Listener 15.2.75:14):

'One wonders, however, if New Zealand is a light entertainment country except in certain specialist areas....It has no tradition, like the end-of-the-pier and music hall comedians in England. Here television has been the leader. Kevan Moore's shows in Auckland and "Popco" in Christchurch led to local live venues springing up, and now the brewery people have started an entertainment circuit. Create the vehicle and you get the trade.'

The second was the importance of television as a monopoly, particularly from the time of TVNZ's establishment, as the Commission of Inquiry commented (Jackson Report 1984:53):

'The television network in this country is a monopoly. It is also the best medium for professional stage performers to be publicly seen. Should an artist be refused access to television he or she is effectively debarred from exposing his or her talent to the best advantage. The "That's Country" show is currently rated the top television production in its class and country and western entertainers would consider exposure on that programme to be an essential step in the promotion of their artistry.'

It was a conjunction of the factors outlined above in the "That's Country" series which led to a major, highly public debate in 1983 after two entertainers were dismissed amidst considerable controversy. This was followed by an internal inquiry which failed to stem continuing public debate and criticism and finally led to a Government-instituted Commission of Inquiry that reported in April 1984, (under the title of the Jackson Report).

However, it was the ability of the Entertainment department to enforce monopoly control over the labour market of entertainers which produced silence from potential informants to the Commission of Inquiry. Indeed, the commissioners commented directly and somewhat laconically on the relationship between the artists involved and Trevor Spitz, the show's producer (Jackson Report 1984:63):
'The parade of entertainers at the Christchurch hearing, all entirely supportive of Mr Spitz and all dependent on the goodwill of Mr Spitz for their continued employment on the "That's Country" show, left the Commission wondering whether this Mr Spitz is larger than life.'

The Commission was not slow in pointing out other obstacles which faced prospective witnesses, both inside and outside broadcasting, that hampered the production of evidence to the extent that, finally, only one television producer was prepared to give clear and damaging testimony (Jackson Report 1984:63):

'In effect any persons wishing to give evidence to the Commission against the Corporation or its management employees, had to - one, risk the ire of their peers - two, meet their own legal costs or proceed without counsel - three, face the inevitable torrid cross examination from three or more sources, all funded by the Corporation. Any employee who chose to challenge the authority of, or even criticise a senior executive, ran the risk of having a closing of ranks against him or even his contract terminated, or at least not renewed. In all the circumstances perhaps it is little wonder so few came forward.'

Perhaps ironically, the sole hostile witness, a former TV-1 producer, suffered just such consequences as those indicated by the Commission (Mayne, 1984:17):

'Kemp is now reported to have been given a poor personnel assessment (by a panel including some of those whom he had criticised) and no longer has any programmes to produce in entertainment. He had to pay his own legal and incidental costs...'

The reason to dwell on this organisational aspect is because of the light it throws on the tension between state and commercial orientations on the one hand, and its relationship to the tension between administrative and professional ideologies on the other hand. The former Chairman's comments in his recent book are illuminating in this respect (Cross 1988:211):

'The idea that such a productive group of people should be kneecapped by the corporation for some carefree sloppiness of administration was quite out of the question; the (Corporation) board accepted that it was essential that the spirit of the department should be maintained even as administrative disciplines were put in place.'

As all parties agreed, "That's Country" was a highly successful programme locally and also internationally, having been sold to the United States for over $1 million (Cross, 1988:211), a very considerable sale in TVNZ's terms at the time. The difficulty lay precisely in how 'the spirit of the department' was to be maintained
within administrative requirements. Cross amplified his own view later (Cross, 221-222):

'The Commission apparently could not understand that a light rein is sometimes required to maintain the creative drive of highly individualistic people who are producing good results.'

To pursue this kind of solution, however, prohibits, almost by definition, administrative codification, and hence the 'administrative disciplines' which he claimed were to be instituted.

If this retained the central ambiguity on one level - how to give programme-makers freedom without giving them autonomy (or enabling them to invoke the same discretionary claims which this degree of liberty invariably permitted them to do), it did so on another level, too. Several of the Commission of Inquiry's most damning criticisms were aimed at broadcasting's central leadership, in other words, at Cross himself and are worth quoting at length (1984:64-65):

'10. All of these matters lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the top management of TVNZ is lacking in administrative skills and the capacity to remedy ills. It has allowed a system of delegation and non-intervention to run riot to the extent that the organisation is controlled by producers and trained artists, very skilled in the artistic field, but who, on the evidence are ill-equipped to attend to business and administration matters. Mr Martin's blind support of producers and of the Head of Department and his lack of supervision of delegated tasks led to his ignorance of what was going on in major areas of TVNZ."

We thought that some of the top executives were somewhat vague or at least uncertain of their job specification, which was not clearly defined in any document. A problem seems to be that in staffing the Corporation with artists instead of administrators, the incumbents are unsure of their functions...

12. The Corporation's organisation chart submitted to the Commission shows the lines of communication and authority of these top executives with 9 persons directly responsible to the Chairman. The Commission did not examine the management structure in depth but the information received by it and the evidence given left us in no doubt that either the structure was fundamentally wrong or the people were not equipped or sufficiently competent to perform satisfactorily within it, or both.

Two points need to be made. One is that the majority of top positions were filled by ex-TV-2 executives and programme staff, and certainly all those subject to intensive criticism by the Commission (Mayne, 1984a).
Secondly, the majority of these executives reported directly to Cross. What this did, in effect, was to tie together two organisations' arrangements which supported each other in a structure that, implicitly at least, reinforced the patron-client relations inherent in the earlier TV-2 organisation. As a consequence, this patronage became embedded at the pinnacle of the organisation structure, a hierarchical structure which - although created for putative reasons of efficiency - had in effect, been subverted through the complementary discretionary requirements of both chairman and executives.

This in turn, reveals, the highly unusual organisational transformation which had been effected to meet the demands of public service and commercial operation: it enabled the continuance of forms of discretionary activities underneath a veneer of administrative scrutiny, thereby fulfilling both requirements simultaneously within the maintenance of a monopoly framework. In a very real sense, this is a form of organisational aberration, since it suppressed the regulatory and monitoring functions of the corporation. Yet it served to ameliorate the considerable and contradictory demands of state and commercial requirements. How enduring the drive for professional autonomy and discretionary was can be gauged from the Commission's description (1984:25):

'Mr Martin, Director-General of TVNZ, said in evidence that TVNZ's management and organisational policy is based on the belief that TV functions best when responsibility is delegated as closely as possible to the programme makers and those who must employ and monitor the administrative framework. We would not accept, nor we hope would senior BCNZ management, that this philosophy relieves those in higher office from the responsibility of ensuring that adequate administrative checks and balances are in force and that the controls are in fact working.'

In actuality, the lack of scrutiny also affected areas beyond the Entertainment Department. One was Sales and Marketing where the Controller, another TV-2 executive, was criticised for highly improper commercial dealings with an ex-TV-2 producer over the making of an advertisement (Jackson Report, 1984:46-49). A second was the employment of, and administration over, contract staff with the
obvious implication that the short-term hireage which took place contributed to the enlargement of patrimonial authority (Jackson Report, 1984:23-24, 42-43).

Interestingly, the Commission, an appointment of two accountants, made a major recommendation that TVNZ should be reorganised into a public limited company. The irony, of course, is that while that adequately reflected commercial concerns and emphasised accounting and financial priorities, it ignored television's public service dimensions, as Cross readily pointed out (1988). The recommendation was quickly dismissed although subsequently, as recent events have shown, this has been the direction in which TV has moved with its incorporation as a limited company in late 1988.

The importance of the Commission of Inquiry, and the issue of patron-client relations, is to highlight the linkage between state and commercial demands, and between programme-makers and administrators' relationships in a way which enabled programme-makers to maintain, in spite of structural change, a submerged but implicitly powerful position by virtue of their control of a key ambiguity: the production process. This emerged throughout Commission of Inquiry's report and was reproduced in the continuing conflicts between administrators' and programme-makers' roles as one submission illustrates (Jackson Report 1984:68):

'Mr Simpson on behalf of the PSA in his final submission said "It is no secret within television that there are certain 'no go' areas which the accounting and personnel systems cannot penetrate. This is because producers called to account for irregularities complain, through their Heads of Department, to the Controller and the Director-General, secure in the knowledge that they will be backed up to the full provided they can convince their Head of Department". He went on to say - "those within the structure who challenge this method of operations are given short shrift". What we have seen and heard leads us to agree with that view.'

This led, as the Commission of Inquiry commented, to 'a lack of accountability' and led to a series of conflicts between programme-makers and administrators throughout the organisational structure, (such as that between the relative authority of local station managers and programme producers (Jackson Report, 1984:65). Behind this lay the continued claim to the professional control of
ambiguity which, in essence, is no different to that raised in the Adam Committee some ten years earlier, (Jackson Report 1984:68):

'Various persons from the Director-General down were careful to support the theory that the total control (including financial) of the shows must be left in the hands of the producer. Each producer is supported by a TPA (Television Producer's Assistant) and from what we heard neither had little if any business or accounting training.'

What this enabled, in effect, was the creation of a space where professional autonomy was largely absolute, while the actual production of programmes was underway. Money, resources and facilities could come under the control of professional authority for the duration of a programme's life (Jackson Report 1984:66), while the ambiguities involved in the production process - the professional preserve - continued to be managed. It was around this mystique that professional authority, and ultimately the organisation structure, albeit in an aberrant form, rested.

At root, what the arrangement typifies is the institution of an informal, occupationally-based form of control which operated through the satisfaction of two implicit sets of interests. One was the chairman's aim to co-ordinate and exercise broad control through his own office outside, or at least in tandem with, formal structural arrangements. For this to operate satisfactorily meant eluding or sidelining administratively-codified monitoring procedures. This was in order to gain the discretionary latitude he clearly felt to be necessary in advancing the organisation's interests. (Cross, 1988). The other, and similar, goal was to retain sufficient discretion necessary to maintain control over the production process. This arrangement involved an implicit exchange: producers lost control of overall, explicit organisational direction through new structural arrangements which favoured administrative domination. Yet this abandonment of the most public and formal dimension of programme-makers' control reinforced their influence over informal procedures, as noted. Ironically, then, administrators gained formal control as programme-makers strengthened their informal control, both processes taking place about the fulcrum of the chairman's office.
Nonetheless, informal control diminished overall power for programme-makers who had, after all, enjoyed both formal and informal control in 1975. The process of loss, however, was unevenly shared between different groups of professionals. It rewarded principally those with an 'entrepreneurial' orientation, who generally came from TV-2, over those with a more public-service outlook. As Cross put it (1988:56):

'One could understand what made TV-2 tick, however. Their marketing style had a strong element of hucksterism which manifested itself in audience claims that would not withstand too much analysis, and promotions notable for their sheer trumpery, cavalier exuberance and a tongue-in-cheek playfulness.'

Mayne commented in an overview of the period (1984:12):

'SPTV, meanwhile had already been forced by its competitive weakness to woo advertisers through sponsorship and other incentive deals; with the overall finances of the BCNZ becoming ever shakier, such entrepreneurial revenue-earning techniques became fashionable, giving the SPTV management a mana out of all proportion to its financial contribution...'

If we return to the distinction between cosmopolitan and local orientations, there is a case for arguing that the new structure elevated locals: those who were content to not to contest the formal and public direction of the organisation but remained, nonetheless, within its career structure. Cosmopolitans, on this formulation, were likely to be those who either left the organisation, or who were bypassed in the reallocation of the key positions. Put another way, the consequences of professionals' inability to retain autonomy over the definition of their professional project - over what constituted the boundaries of professional knowledge (the innovative, exciting programming of the Adam Report) - meant they were likely to leave or be overlooked under the new imperatives of entrepreneurship which, since it was organisationally-defined was, by definition, externally imposed. As Barnett and Docherty comment in a British Broadcasting Research Unit study of New Zealand television (forthcoming):
'What was missing, in short, was that vital component of the public service television system which promotes television's cultural richness into the years beyond the present - the ability to take risks.... One retiring Executive mourned the passing of people in TV "with visions of innovation and quality".'

In that sense, the entrepreneurship of "That's Country" was of a financial rather than a professionally-defined nature. It reproduced a conventional foreign format to represent a variant of American popular culture - country music sung by New Zealand stars (and see Novitz and Willmott (1989) for one commentary on the cultural significance of this) - which it sold to southern US television stations. On that reading, its professional content was conventional with an appeal to a conservative, traditional audience segment (country music lovers) and an entrepreneurialism founded primarily on the success of its overseas sales. Consequently, then, the diminution of professional control also reflected a restriction of programme range through the elevation of local priorities which accorded with dominant priorities of administrators and the chairman (in other words, organisational priorities over cosmopolitan preferences).

There is one further and final way of considering these matters which is in terms of Jamous and Pelloile's (1972) distinction between technical competences and social values. It is the tension, as Atkinson puts it, 'between the tacit and the technical (often expressed as "scientific")', (1983:238). The importance in this context is that the distinction enables us to identify the technical as the interaction with the unknown: the 'virtualities' as expressed as by Jamous and Pelloile (1972). While the discovery and articulation of these virtualities can define professional practices through the operation of new or developing competences, it also endangers the profession's unity and area of dominance by the extension of its knowledge. It is balanced, therefore, by a defensive posture of tacit agreement: the profession attempts to maintain its ideological coherence and internal agreement by emphasising the necessary mystique - which only its members possess by virtue of professional membership - over the operation of codes of judgement through professional experience. This argument seems to parallel that of professional broadcasting, where
there was an apparent abandonment of the boundary-defining activities of professional knowledge in favour of an assertion of social values - the tacit knowledge - inherent to the profession.

If this is the case - and the evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive - then the 1979 restructuring marks a particular social moment when one formation, and one concomitant disposition of the profession, is deposed by another, more defensive formation, with a subsequent alteration in organisational membership (where members, according to Hirschman, 1982, may exit, voice or show loyalty), and sets of publicly articulated claims. At the same time, it combines with a broader organisational posture which emphasises social values of restraint, responsibility, and close fiscal management. Simultaneously, it also combines an implicit exchange which establishes acknowledged, if limited, areas of mutual discretion between chairman and profession in the shape of informal control processes revealed by the Commission of Inquiry. The profession, in short, cements its internal occupational control at the moment it loses control of its organisational role and does so in terms which involve both an implicit rearrangement of professional orientations and, by extension, a rearrangement of cultural production and priorities (which will from thenceforward emphasise the conventional and the known over the hazardous and the contestable).

Yet to adopt this posture is to conceal the nature of professional activity, as programme-makers did in this context. The arrangement, as it developed, had the sense of an implicit compact which, in contrast to the competitive conditions of the market, could not stand close inspection. And, indeed, it was from the small but developing market, organised initially around advertising and a tiny film industry (Report of the Steering Committee, 1988; Royal Commission Report, 1986) and finally articulated in the contest for the third channel, that fresh demands for access and examination were to come increasingly during the 1980's (May, 1985; Mayne, 1984b; 1985c).
6. CONCLUSION

This chapter, necessarily, has covered a great deal of ground. What it has sought to describe is the existence of a number of contradictory forces and the unpredictable consequences which flowed from them. On the one hand there is evidence of the classic bureaucratic strategy to rationalise, centralise and universalise organisational management with unavoidable consequences for the collegial association of programme-makers. On the other, there is the powerful creation of the chairman's office which, while it moves in tandem with administrative centralising strategies, cuts against them in creating informal ties and, broadly speaking, quasi-patrimonial sets of relations that favour some groups of programme-makers.

The importance of this, in terms of organisation theory, is to mark the bureaucratic limits imposed on charismatic leadership (however ably it is undertaken) such that it is forced to work against other prevailing organisational currents and can attain domination only through irregular, informal and unusual channels. This degree of dominance is achieved by pursuing another classic bureaucratic strategy of gathering together a group of followers, but with the unforeseen consequences for organisational actors, of developing highly dubious patron-client relations (that Perrow (1979) dubs nest-feathering) in the context of the small, monopolised labour market of entertainment programmes. The revelation of these activities served, in turn, to tighten bureaucratic rationalization further through the mechanism of an external Commission of Inquiry.

At the same time, this sequence of events raises a further point of interest for organisation theory. Generally, as Perrow argues, organisations move from traditional to rational-legal forms of bureaucracy (1979). Here, on the contrary, there was a distinct attempt to move, at least in part, in the reverse direction: from the universalistic to the particularistic. The explanation for this lies partly with the ambiguous demands placed on, and arising from, a central culture-producing
organisation, as discussed in earlier chapters. But a part of the explanation lies beyond the organisation itself.

Broadcasting was part of a highly-developed and closely-managed small national economy directed by the state (Mascerenhas, 1982). As Gregory (1985) and Wood (1984) describe it, broadcasting itself displayed a hierarchical, authoritarian and paternal pattern of management throughout its history. Yet the new structures instituted in 1974 upset this pattern with their emphasis on innovation, autonomy and collegiality. In an important sense, then, the return of a conservative government in 1975 signalled an attempt to recapture, through the mechanisms of the state, the earlier pattern of social and formal control of which Cross's appointment was a part. Under the conditions of a managed economy with the protections from the competitive conditions of the free market, it presupposed a reversion to a traditional bureaucracy with its extensive social control implications (viz Baldock and Lally, 1974). However, television's operations were increasingly embedded in a competitive market and, in a way, Cross's attempt to manage it (through the 1979 amalgamation) merely underlined the contradictions which this produced. It was also symptomatic of the pressures being placed on the national concept of managing markets and their concomitant social management, which were swept away with the Fourth Labour government in 1984 (Boston and Holland, 1987). While this led to deregulated national and media markets, it also dismantled the prevailing systems of social and state control and the ideological patterns which accompanied them. (And these developments are discussed in more detail in the next chapter). It is not surprising, then, that these patterns coincided with Cross's leaving office.

The point to arise from this is, of course, that traditional bureaucracy in the form described here can only be maintained within a larger, but similar, ideological and institutional framework. With its dissolution, or rearrangement, prevailing patterns of hierarchy, authority and paternalism are harder, if not impossible, to maintain. In a sense, then, Cross's incumbency might be seen as a holding-pattern,
symbolic of a larger set of national practices and beliefs which were increasingly out of step with emerging international and technological pressures. Some of the implications of these pressures are discussed in the next chapter.
PART THREE

BROADER ISSUES AND TELEVISION
TO 1989
CHAPTER NINE

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW AND TELEVISION IN THE 1980's

1. INTRODUCTION

From 1980-89, Television New Zealand experienced a relatively stable organisational structure which was not subject to the same large-scale restructuring as the previous six years. It was, however, threatened with the disappearance of its monopoly of the frequency spectrum through the introduction of private television. Indeed, the passing of the 1989 Broadcasting Bill, the development of satellite systems and the introduction of the private Television 3 network ensured that public television would be faced with considerable, well-organised competition and a deregulated environment previously unknown in New Zealand broadcasting history (Farnsworth, 1988). Between 1960 and 1989, however, it had faced two main pressures: continuing uncertain financial pressures which had increased its dependence on advertising revenue (Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1986; Tribunal Report, 1987), and attacks on its two-channel broadcasting monopoly by private interests (Boyd-Bell 1985). Internally, there has been a continuation of public service - commercial tensions. More recently, these have been intensified through external demands for significant levels of Maori programming (Fox 1988, Royal Commission on Broadcasting, 1986), but also by the demands of a variety of minority social groups (Farnsworth, 1988) and other interests (Maharey, 1988) critical of Television New Zealand's prevailing commercial and public service arrangements.

This chapter assesses the developments between 1980 and the beginning of 1989 in terms of the tensions and ambiguities which have been outlined in earlier chapters. It also presents a broader historical context within which television and, in fact, broadcasting as a whole, has developed in New Zealand. Using Williams' (1975)
concepts of culture and technology it also aims to show briefly how these developed locally in comparison to the circumstances in Britain, the U.S. and Australia.

Lastly, given the extreme rate of change which has over-taken the New Zealand broadcasting media during 1989, some consideration is given in the following chapter, to the impact of deregulation on the television sector. In particular, it discusses some cultural issues to do with the recent debate over post-modernism and how these might be integrated into the themes which have been developed throughout the thesis.

2. RECENT ORGANISATIONAL CHANGES

In late 1988, Television New Zealand undertook a series of managerial reforms initiated by its transformation into a State Owned Enterprise. These involved a reduction in its administrative overheads and staffing and a reduction and redeployment of its programme and production activities. In essence, these shifted scheduling and production to a more overtly commercial stance in readiness for private competition: several programme areas, e.g. drama, documentaries and information programmes, were heavily cut back in favour of external, commissioned productions; national news and current affairs expenditure was boosted. Auckland production was shifted to new, technologically sophisticated facilities and new links were established to major foreign networks and satellite broadcasting companies. In tandem with these moves to promote high-profile programme genres, scheduling was reorganised to traverse the key prime-time period of 6.00p.m. to 10.00p.m. with the placement of national news at 6.00p.m., a controversial current affairs programme at 6.30p.m., and a general news and current affairs programme from 9.30-10.00p.m. Television One was explicitly promoted, until 1989, as the information channel, and Television Two as the entertainment channel in a way which echoes the competitive arrangements of the 1970's and suggested a very loosely attempted elite/mass culture division of the audience (and see Lealand, 1988a).
All of these strategies were aimed to protect Television New Zealand's position in an increasingly competitive market environment, but they also re-ordered the continuing conflict between commercial and public service objectives. 'Quality' programming which drew small audiences, the problem of maintaining varied, high-cost local programming and of serving minority audiences all cut against Television New Zealand's ability to maximise advertising income, especially in circumstances where none of its competitors were similarly constrained. It is the consequences of this deregulated framework which has led to growing pressure, primarily organised by professional interests (Lealand, 1988, Mayne, 1985e), for local quota regulations. Whether or not these are imposed, however, they will only ease, and not remove, the fundamental conflict of objectives.

What this account does not explain, though, is the mix of commercial and public service elements which, as noted in the Adam Report (1974) and by Barnett and Docherty (forthcoming), is peculiar to New Zealand. The next section considers the political, economic and cultural factors which have led to the formation of the particular New Zealand television environment and also, more generally, to the specific arrangements of the media sector as a whole.

3. ORIGINS OF NEW ZEALAND BROADCASTING FORMATION

Mundy (1982) in a comparison of early United States, United Kingdom, and Australian broadcasting systems, discusses the differences between the British system of 'public service' state regulation and control and the American practice of minimal involvement under a 'free enterprise' arrangement. Between these two extremes he places the mixed Australian system with its 'supportive, regulatory and limited involvement of the state' (Mundy, 1982:283). These differences he explains (Mundy 1982:281) by:
'...the relations between elements of the ruling class which are ultimately responsible for political 'outcomes', such as these different arrangements for the control of broadcasting and it is, principally, the nature of the class struggle between fractions of the ruling class which dictates the mode of state intervention...'

Following Williams (1975) and Nairn (1977), he argues that the recent development of English national culture emerged from the existence of a well-developed communications network spread over a small geographical area, and 'the hegemonic alliance between finance capital and the patrician aristocracy which formed the "unusually compact ruling class" and contributed to the character of the British state' (Mundy 1982:293). While these conditions were mostly absent in the United States, so were they in Australia (Mundy, 1982:297):

'which had been federated for only one generation, was not characterised by a unified ruling class and had a profoundly ambivalent attitude to national culture, due to its ex-colonial status.'

Instead, an initially weak media industry was developed by the penetration of American capital, with only loose regulation by the state. Its public service sector, under the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, was promoted primarily by 'rural capital, as represented by the Country Party', to provide services to remote areas, and by a small, urban, cultural elite (Thomas, 1980) which linked pastoral capital 'with the Imperial connection', so that 'Australian Broadcasting was articulated with both these interests', (Mundy 1982:296).

This framework is helpful for understanding the development of New Zealand broadcasting. Unlike Britain, it is a geographically awkward country that is difficult to link with a communication network, nor does it have a single nationally-unified patrician ruling class (Gibbons, 1981; Gregory, 1985). On the other hand, its development has been different to Australia and two recent accounts, by Wood and Gregory, are useful in understanding how this came about.

Wood argues (1984:55) that early New Zealand with its:

'predominantly rural, dispersed economy - characterised by small capital with low levels of industrialisation and urbanisation - was regulated by a centralised and interventionist state.'
In essence, the state acted prior to 1900 to promote all forms of national communications which it was beyond the means of small capital to do by itself. Yet, until the late 1920's it acted only in a regulatory role (Hall, 1980) in a way which controlled the activities of small operators.

Post-1930, the state appears to have acted more directly, not only to regulate but actually to constitute its subjects, in a sense. Although Wood (1984:58) and Gregory (1985:15-18) differ on the date, they both agree that the state took over control of radio 'in the public interest' which, Wood asserts, enabled the ideological identity of 'the people' to be invoked to legitimate the Government's actions (1984:58). This appeared entirely reasonable at the time, as Gregory notes (1985:16), and particularly with the election of a Labour Party in 1935 committed to centralised intervention on behalf of the workers, small manufacturing capital and the small farmer class who supported it (Wood, 1984:60, but see similar accounts in Gibbons, 1981; Martin, 1982 and Olssen, 1981).

Its reasonableness was grounded in a cautiousness towards the potential social hazards and deviance which a widespread private radio system was perceived to represent, and which enabled Gregory to identify specific cultural orientations (1985:16):

'Caution may have been politically expedient; in a strongly Calvinist society it was strongly desired.'

This attitude, he argues, enabled the controversial and hazardous political process to be largely contained by broadcasting live parliamentary debates which thereby produced a manageable representation of political conflict within the limits of the Westminster model (and see Smith (1976) for a similar British analysis). It also enabled the process of Government to be perceived as separate and superior to the parliamentary bear-pit, working 'unhindered by public debate and disputation' (Gregory, 1985:16). Yet this simultaneously inscribed the operations of the state (the 'cabinet and departmental machinery') as paternalist, authoritarian (Gregory 1985:16)
and constitutive of the national identity, as is evident in this elision by the Minister in Charge of Broadcasting (quoted in Lipson 1948:482):

'This Government is certainly going to see that broadcasting is controlled by the people...we, the people, the representatives of the people are going to control broadcasting...'

A fuller historical summary of radio's development is given later in the chapter, but it is sufficient to note at this point some of the cultural implications of this form of state control. One is to indicate the absence, as Gregory himself does (1985), of a critical intellectual fraction who might have mobilised either opposition to this particular form of state ideological hegemony or to attempt alternative constructions of national identity - a role which Perry (1987) and Eldred-Grigg (1987) argue they were not to undertake successfully until a considerably later period.

A second implication arises from the apparent contradiction between the paternalism and authoritarianism of the state (and see Wynn, for a view of the state as 'strongly disciplinary and paternalist' in the interests of 'order, efficiency and control' (1984:115)), on the one hand, and the widespread ethos of egalitarianism on the other (Baldock and Lally, 1974; Pearson and Thoms, 1983). As Griffen remarks, the 1930's saw a conjunction of these seemingly countervailing tendencies so that it became 'the time when Government advanced social levelling' to a significant degree (1986:122). However, the exact nature of this relationship appears unresolved in recent discussion. Various commentators, for example, have linked an egalitarian ethos to a strongly dominant lower middle-class (for example, Olssen, 1981), or to the petit bourgeoisie, in tandem with a small haute bourgeoisie class (Gibbons, 1981). However, Griffen (1986), following Pearson and Thorns (1983), argues that an ideology of community and individual opportunity blurs the clarity of this relationship while retaining an impression of social homogeneity. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests an uneasy (and unclear) relationship between these two classes and one which, under given circumstances, enabled them to dominate different occupational strata (Gibbons,
1981, for example, suggests the lower middle-class capture of the state school system, and an early gentrification of the universities).

Whatever the case, widespread state intervention combined with an unusual combination of paternalism and egalitarianism formed a powerful means of social control. Gregory notes that Shelley himself was not immune from it, having to deny he was leading the country 'out of the wilderness of lowbrow entertainment into a highbrow promised land' (quoted in 1985:24). If this led to extensive deference and caution towards their political masters from all forms of the media up until the 1970's, their political masters were, simultaneously, displaying powerful signs of egalitarianism as a way of conforming to the electorate's expectations (Cleveland, 1980). This point is taken up again later in the chapter.

On the whole, then, and with the apparent absence of any strong sub-cultures (Gibbons, 1981), apart from those of Maori groups (Parsonson, 1981), there seems to have developed a pervasive sense of homogeneity in New Zealand (see Sinclair's (1960) contemporary description and apparent concurrence with this attitude, for example). James describes its general cultural expression up to the 1970's as Imperialist and 'timid, dull, unimaginative and unproductive' (1986:20), a set of criticisms which echoes those of the developing post-war intellectual and artistic middle class (Eldred-Grigg, 1987; Gibbons, 1981; Perry, 1987).

Nevertheless, this homogeneity masked sets of fissures and cleavages both within pre-war (Ollsen, 1981) and post-war society Dunstall (1981:424), for example, lists pressures based on sex, age, cultural origins and aspirations, while Shuker (1989) has recently outlined the moral panic created by emerging youth groups in the 1950's and 1960's.

Yet, it was not until the 1970's that clear evidence of widespread social change emerged to upset existing and widely-held assumptions about prevailing social patterns. In one account, Ovenden summarises this change (1980:59) as:
'...the movement from producing to servicing industries, the growth of city life and environments, increases in higher education, the emergence of value-laden issues having to do with the preservation of the environment, and changes in sexual and social mores.'

This period also saw the expansion, according to a number of commentators, of the educated middle-class (Ovenden, 1980; Clements, 1982). As Dunstall (1981:406) summarised the pattern by the 1970's:

'It in the trend away from farming (and possibly from urban manual labour) towards white-collar occupations, New Zealand showed signs of becoming a post-industrial society, characterised by a service economy, by the pre-eminence of a professional and technical class, and by "the centrality of theoretical knowledge as the source of innovation and of policy formation for the society", (Bell, 1973:12-26).'

It was also this expanding educated middle class which Perry sees as receptive to the artistic critique, noted above, of New Zealand egalitarianism, such that they 'have appropriated the thesis that New Zealand culture and social life are deeply flawed in order to affirm the rightness of their [own] social claims' (1987:173). In some accounts, then, this produced two discourses, or one discourse with two strands: contrasting notions of a metropolitan, liberal, elite and heterogeneous community with that of a small-town, egalitarian, hierarchical and homogeneous community (see Eldred-Grigg, 1987, for another elaboration of these images; Martin, 1984, summarises broader sociological parallels which such contrasts suggest).

Apart from these changes, there was also a significant concentration in the formerly dispersed fields of private media ownership (Cleveland, 1980). The number of newspapers had dwindled from 67 in 1910 to 33 by 1980, with 70% of these controlled by three monopolies (Simpson, 1984).

Because this concentration produced, for the first time, the capital necessary for national networking, the 'mass media bourgeoisie' could challenge the state's monopoly of broadcasting, which had originally been legitimated in terms of its intervention on behalf of 'a capitalist society based on small property' (Wood, 1984:76-77). It was this factor which led to bids by private conglomerates for both
the second and third television channels (Boyd-Bell, 1985; Gregory, 1985; Wood, 1984).

Under these circumstances, public broadcasting faced increasing pressures. One was an increasing difficulty in representing a neutral ideology (Simpson, 1984; Wood, 1984) by appeal to a middle ground, which was reflected in part by the rise in complaints during 1977-80. Another was the mobilisation of populist pressures, particularly by a charismatic National Party leader. According to James (1986), this drew on the older community of discourse, noted earlier, which emphasised the virtues of close, parochial and egalitarian relations and was focussed against broadcasting, and against journalists in particular (Garnier, 1978). A third pressure, which recalls the complicated class relationships noted earlier, and was also strongly represented in the National Party, was for the strengthening of paternal social control which was transmitted through regulation and Board appointments and embedded in a centrally controlled, managerially-oriented organisational structure, (Simpson, 1984). These demands have been traced by Simpson through the continued dominance of business and political elites on the NZBC and BCNZ boards at least until 1982, who describes them as 'an example of elite hegemony at work' (1984:219).

It was in the face of these pressures that professional groups attempted to organise themselves. As discussed in earlier chapters, both television journalists and producers had only recently formed themselves into specialist professional groupings (Wood, 1984:95), were generally young and inexperienced (viz Campbell and Cleveland, 1972; Lealand, 1988b) with often very limited technical or production skills, (Johnstone, 1968).

Wood goes on to argue that they managed these pressures, and particularly those represented by the state, by 'the development of media professionalism' (1984:100), which he defines as cohering 'around a corpus of discursive practices' (1984:99) that emphasise codes of 'balance' and 'neutrality'. He goes on to argue that this is (1984:189):
'a process of cultural incorporation, winning that consent which makes existing forms of domination seem both natural and legitimate'

and that the process of textual organisation and representation, especially through news and current affairs programming, embeds a form of ideological hegemony that enables broadcasting to function 'as an ideological state apparatus.' (1984:189).

The evidence reviewed so far, of course, suggests a more complex picture. First, that inside broadcasting there was, in contrast to Wood's implication, a continuing process of negotiating the social and ideological order, which was cross-cut by the organisational setting and internal coherence of particular groups. Secondly, that determining and representing an effective ideological hegemony was an uncertain and confused process, and one which had to account for specific cultural factors. Programme-makers were confronted, on the one hand, with a long-standing traditional ideology, reinvoked by the Prime Minister's populism, which emphasised a non-specialist, sociable, mateship-based, 'she'll be right' ethos (McLennan, 1988; Perry, 1982). On the other hand, there was an ideology expressed through the business and administrative fraction (Smith, 1962) which stressed the importance of hierarchy, centralization and close management control. Neither was conducive to the formation of an autonomous specialist occupation. Under these circumstances, without forfeiting the notion of a dominant ideology, the definition of an ideological state apparatus seems a limited, over-resolved image to capture the cultural and organisational conflicts surrounding television, particularly during this period.

The point at issue is that controls and regulations were imposed from 1977 onwards in an increasing effort to make programme-makers conform to the prevailing dominant social order, even where elements of that order were internally self-contradictory (James, 1986). However, programme-makers did not constitute, in themselves, the broadcasting system, as implied by Wood (1984). On the contrary, the chairman attempted increasingly to speak for them, and to act as a paternal representative, both encouraging and publicly criticising their activities (Cross, 1988),
while, for their part, programme makers attempted to pursue a very different professional mission, largely as laid out in the Adam Report.

For present purposes, though, the point is clear. The development of broadcasting in New Zealand is similar to, but not the same as, Australia. One difference emerges through the relationship of geography and capital. While both countries experienced difficult terrain and a small population, in Australia this was overcome by the influx of United States capital. Because this did not occur in New Zealand, it became the prerogative of the state to intervene. While this extended its dominance, it also placed considerable financial burden which enabled local capital, through the application of pressure, to play an important but subordinate role in the development of broadcasting's cultural form.

This was reinforced by a second difference. This was the existence of a more cohesive, dominant state than Australia. While it retained the same colonial, Imperialist connections as its counterpart, it also represented the ideology of the dominant class fractions, as indicated, which controlled it. It was only with the widespread social reorganisation of the 1970's that this settled social order came under serious challenge.

To make these points clearer however, they need to be pursued in greater detail and with more clarification of a historical perspective.

4. THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL FORM IN NEW ZEALAND

Williams draws out the central relationship in the introduction of broadcasting as follows (1974:32):

'The key factor...was that the directing impulse came from the manufacturers of broadcasting apparatus, and especially of receivers. Yet because of the general importance of radio telephony there was always another kind of pressure, from political authorities: questions of the security and integrity of the nation-state were implicitly and at times explicitly raised...'
These two forces were equally present in New Zealand. As elsewhere, with the introduction first of radio (Hall, 1980) and then television (Gregory, 1985), there was a conjunction of amateur operators and small entrepreneurs which subsequently drew down widespread government regulation on the basis of protection of the public interest. For both media it led to the institution of a powerful form of public authority. With radio it led to the establishment of the privately-operated Radio Broadcasting Company from 1925-1931, and subsequently to various forms of state control (Sullivan, 1987), while television began under the public ownership of the New Zealand Broadcasting Service before its reincorporation as the N.Z.B.C. in 1962 (Gregory, 1985). More importantly, the tension between these two pressures influenced the shaping of broadcasting's organisational form through the characteristics of its cultural form.

In radio, the clearest expression of this relationship emerges with the introduction of the ZB commercial stations in 1936-1937 under the National Commercial Broadcasting Service and the community stations from 1949. Until that time, the conflicting objectives of state arrangement and commercial development had been the subject of continuing and sometimes volatile strains, as illustrated by the notorious Government jamming of 1ZB (Hall, 1980 and see Wood, 1984). With the separation of the YA and ZB systems, an arrangement which still persists, these tensions abated, but created distinct cultural arrangements in the process. As Sullivan (1987:30) commented:

'The ZB's were entertaining, exciting and determined to bring happiness and make a profit in the community they served'

ZB stations were a national network of metropolitan stations which carried advertising, in contrast to the YA network which was national and non-commercial. In effect, the arrangement created a split between high culture and popular culture broadcasting forms. The ZB network (and later commercial extensions) rapidly gained large audiences for its innovative, locally responsive and entertainment-oriented programming. The YA's and particularly the later YC Concert stations
offered a strongly Reithian schedule mainly of talks, plays, lectures, serious and 'light' music (Hall, 1980). Harcourt and Downey (1976:106) comment that the respective directors of the services, Professor James Shelley and Colin Scrimgeour, reflected this contrast:

'To Shelley broadcasting was a sacred trust. To Scrimgeour it was a medium for personal contact, for reaching out to embrace the common man.'

Nonetheless, these arrangements reflected the emergence of a small, well-organised, high culture elite on the one hand, who have remained sufficiently organised even to the present day to prevent any commercial intrusion on their schedules (through the Friends of the Concert Programme, for example). On the other, the ZB and X station arrangements produced a form of small-scale popular capitalism which merged a powerful sense of regional identity with the interests of local retailing. The extent to which this was true is illustrated by Hall's description of the development of a local symbol, the dairy cow on Waikato's 1XH station. Introduced as an anonymous cow on the breakfast session it was named 'Mooloo' by a child and became the mascot for Waikato's provincial rugby fixtures, eventually becoming 'a pivot of its defence' of the Ranfurly Shield from 1952 (Hall, 1980:179). As a promotional device it drew gratitude from the local Chamber of Commerce, and suggests a symbolism which effectively wedded local sentiment, regional identity through the dominant cultural form of rugby, and small-scale, provincial capitalism by means of the organisation of the broadcast medium.

Nonetheless, these arrangements functioned within a highly regulated framework, which closely conforms to Williams' analysis of community broadcasting (1975:36). This was particularly evident with news: no independent service existed in New Zealand until 1962. Instead 'news' as such was transmitted as a strictly controlled Government outlet with minimal broadcasts. These mostly carried state press releases, cribbed newspaper stories, BBC wire cables and rural stock prices (Sullivan, 1987) which reflected the combination of pressures from the state
(Gregory, 1985), the interests of the press - themselves closely allied to succeeding conservative Governments - and rural capital. In short, the same sets of dominant interests noted earlier were rearticulated in the shaping of the news service.

Nonetheless, it also exemplified the operation of a profoundly paternalistic state, an aspect of which Wood (1984) in his generally Althusserian account, takes insufficient notice. This factor is highlighted by Gregory and is best illustrated by the 13-year Directorship of James Shelley, an avowed Reithian who insisted 'that what was broadcast had to be the best available' (Gregory, 1985:24).

This enabled him to develop a concept of professionalism, especially in radio drama, by his insistence on high standards, his own prominence in New Zealand cultural and social elites, his linkage to Imperialist elite values and, indeed, his own competence as a performer (Collins, 1967:119, quoted in Gregory:1985 36):

'you knew his was the voice of authority, of learning, of experience.'

If these values underlined a high culture service, then the paternalism it advanced, supported by the impact this acculturation had on the Government's vote-catching (Gregory, 1985:28-29), also shaped the formation and limits of community services. Local radio was to be 'an instrument for developing the cultural life, artistic endeavour and civic consciousness of towns and districts' (Shelley, quoted in Hall, 1980:178). In essence, this was a policy of quietism and implicit social control, which was aided by the absence of a news service. It was certainly not intended to enable a popular voice to establish its own identity and possibly, therefore, its own forms of dissent.

These arrangements are important for the impact they were to have on television. At the broadest level, cultural form was shaped by the pressures of dominant class fractions articulated through the organisation of party politics and represented through the separation of high and popular cultures organised and regulated by a paternal state. The authority for these arrangements was drawn from social elites who, themselves, drew on the authority of superior cultural forms of
British Society, and particularly on a BBC model adapted and modified for New Zealand circumstances. Organisationally, the cleavage of high and popular culture also separated the conflicting objectives of commercial and public service objectives. Yet, still, it created hierarchies with an implicit superiority, based on cultural authority, of public service over commercial services, which extended to sections of the staff (Hall, 1980:114):

'...in the National Service engineers and technicians called the tune; in the Commercial Service, programmers and announcers, or "personalities". "You can't do that" prevailed in one case; "we are going to do this" (previously unheard of though it might be) in the other.'

More even than that, a notion of professionalism was linked to the administrative hierarchy, via Professor Shelley, and to the cultural elite. It was also subservient to it. And with the absence of a news service it also explicitly excluded journalists who, until 1962, did not, to all intents and purposes, exist (Sullivan, 1987).

5. TELEVISION: TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURAL FORM

Television's introduction in 1960 reproduced the same elements as radio. There was initial pressure from local manufacturers, in the 1950's, anxious to avoid the end to the boom in radio receiver sales; the generation of strong popular demand through well-publicised travelling demonstrations; the production of a core of amateur technical enthusiasts through Auckland's Seddon College and the dilatoriness of the state to commit itself (Boyd-Bell, 1985:61-72).

With its eventual introduction, television again reflected the tensions between commercial pressures and the integrity of the nation-state (Williams, 1975:32). Both of these were evident in the wide range of opinion held within the returning conservative National Party in 1960 and were finally expressed as a compromise which introduced a public corporation that carried advertising and could institute private radio stations (Gregory, 1985). At the root of this arrangement was the formidable problem of cost: rural and provincial regions demanded transmission
coverage which it was beyond the capacity of local capital to provide (Wood, 1984). Advertising both satisfied small capital and defrayed some of the costs of publicly-financed coverage; television was therefore, in every sense, a pragmatic decision as Gregory points out (1985:39-41). Yet the very absence of real public discussion (Gregory 1985:41) also blurred the cultural arrangements which it was expected to fulfil. Most prominently, television's technological form: its complexity and its cost embedded the commercial/public service dichotomy at the centre of its operation. These two factors also served to distance it from local community: television in New Zealand has always been a primarily metropolitan institution. However, while it initially represented the same imperial and paternalistic motivations as radio with, for example, the highest level of British programme imports in the world during the 1960's (Boyd-Bell, 1985), television also reflected the same tensions as radio before the cultural separation of the YA and ZB networks. Outside the organisation, the result has been, until the recent deregulation of broadcasting, a continual flip-flop of objectives with growing private pressure for second, and subsequently third-channel, ownership (Boyd-Bell, 1985). Notably, private applicants for the third channel made it clear that their ability to provide nationwide coverage was dependent on piggybacking established public transmission facilities (Mayne, 1986).

Within the organisation, prior to the Adam Report, it led to continuing tensions with unclear and shifting boundaries between high and popular cultural programming. Most obviously, this led to a predominance of foreign programme scheduling at the expense of local production development. Again, as with radio, this led to the dominance of administrative priorities of engineering and technical extensions over programme demands, (Hall, 1980; Gregory, 1985). Because, incidentally, of broadcasting engineers' monopoly of technical knowledge, and a difficult terrain, it led to the development, as several respondents noted pointedly, not just to a good service but to a supremely excellent and highly expensive service.
These priorities implied loosely high culture arrangements which, as with the YA system, was widely depicted as dull and unadventurous. It also led to popular pressure, organised around television producers, for increased local production. Again, cost and technological specialisation contributed to its low visibility. As the programme-maker Ian Johnstone commented during this period (1968:27):

'I am always amazed at the technical complexity of television...The contrast with radio, where two men can keep a station on the air for twelve hours at a stretch, is marked. It takes a team of about 15 experts to man a transmission shift...The achievement of an evening's transmission without mishap is a nightly miracle.'

This made staff 'almost certainly the cheapest element in television' but with local production being 'the Cinderella of television' the result was inadequate support for production development (1968:24-27). As a consequence, specialisation was low and the turnover of experienced staff high, increasing internal tension and pressures for change.

The same relationship existed between journalists and administrators, as Gregory (1982) has detailed, but with news and current affairs journalists attempting to develop alternative representations of public events to official Government accounts. As with producers, journalists were hampered by a low degree of professional autonomy and specialisation (Gregory, 1982).

These tensions were exacerbated not merely by highly codified administrative arrangements as discussed both earlier, and by Gregory (1985), but also by organisational and cultural hierarchies. Tunstall (1971) points out that journalists exhibit a low degree of formal hierarchy as does Elliot (1977) about other programme-makers. Yet both groups cut across clearly differentiated and stable hierarchical organisational patterns within New Zealand television (viz. Johnstone, 1968). Equally importantly, their attempts to develop professional autonomy cut across notions of professionalism developed within national radio, but which was subservient to the existing organisational precepts of hierarchy and deference to (administrative) paternal authority. Television programme-makers did not conform to
these pressures; as Johnstone (1968) points out, they were generally young and, as Gregory notes, journalists, in particular, tended to challenge concepts of authority as part of their professional ideology (1985).

In these ways, the existence of programme-makers challenged the existing order and could appeal to popular demand for local programming. However, because of this tendency to represent, however loosely, a sense of popular culture, they also invoked a further cultural hierarchy within the broadcasting organisations themselves, which once again, also hearks back to the technological requirements of television. Johnstone (1968:33) frames it as the difference between high culture radio and popular television:

'There is considerable rivalry between the two. Television tends to regard radio as the millstone around its neck. Radio looks on television as a "Flash Harry"; gimmickry and pseudo-broadcasting. There are basic differences...it is reasonable to expect a radio man to have quite a lengthy working life. This is not so in television. Those with overseas experience speak of men of 40 and over being regarded as "squeezed out as lemons", no longer able to keep pace with the medium.'

To summarise, the conflict between commercial and public service objectives also compounded opposed sets of cultural and ideological differences, raising profound ambiguities about the organisational structure and forms of representation which a television network should embrace. Invariably, these ambiguities, activated by the expense of the medium, which would not allow for the separation of objectives as in radio, could only return to cost as the one clear determinant for decision-making. In other words, apparently pragmatic initiatives in introducing television - national coverage and commercial pressures - were the determinants of cultural form. In turn, these were the determinants both of organisational and occupational formation and consequently of the development and management of representational modes in the shape of programming and production strategies.

The comparison of radio to television, then, reveals not only the continuities of cultural articulations but also the contrasts which, as indicated, are founded on technological differences. It explains radio's continued stability of broad
organisational form and the constant changes within television which led the former chairman, Ian Cross, to dub it 'the battered baby of broadcasting.' Moreover, these differences also explain radio's steady bureaucratization (Cross, 1988) since administrators, as discussed, were the guarantors of social order both by their linkages and by the similarity of their values to those of dominant elites (Simpson, 1984).

Programme-makers, on the other hand, could make no such similar claims with success. On the contrary, having been linked with popular aspirations, they actually forfeited that possibility to a large extent. And, as discussed, they inherited contradictory, disorganised support.

The professional claim to dominance, however, was based on a claim to represent all aspects of the cultural spectrum by invoking the broader concept of the public interest. This, in itself, is a relatively well-known strategy, as Burns (1977) describes it, for example, when he notes the move within the BBC from public service to professionalism. To invoke this notion as a body, however, programme-makers depended on one key condition: the existence of a transmission network. Prior to 1968, no such network existed in television. Instead, programmes were generally transported down the country for replay in the four metropolitan centres (Boyd-Bell, 1985). While this heightened a sense of locality and provincialism it proved little tangible advantage for the television professions over press or radio outlets. With the institution of a microwave transmission network, though, a national news service became possible and programmes could be broadcast instantaneously throughout the country. Programme makers were also consequently, put in touch with each other and could identify themselves as part of a national as opposed to a local service. As a result, editorial power - cultural decision-making control - became centred in their hands because of the magnified consequences of their acts on a national basis. These consequences were redoubled by the fact that, at this stage, much programming was live, given the inadequacies of current video recording development (Armes, 1988). Programme-makers were, then, the only group able to control the medium's
immediacy and liveness, which partly explains both the Adam Report's emphasis on this quality and Johnston's (1968) observation that practitioners 'were squeezed out like lemons' by 40: it was in fact, a tricky, high-pressure business.

These occupational advances were brought about by technological changes, and were reinforced by internal occupational developments: principally, the formation of the TVPDA in 1968. They also highlighted another aspect: how the profession's new authority might be maintained. Browne (1987) points out that the concept of 'network' is not only a physical entity, it is also a metaphorical figure, which represents the joining of socially and geographically disparate social formations into one common, national voice. This is represented as the authority of the public interest that may also weave in 'the interaction of audience and advertiser' (Browne 1987:592):

'The discursive authority, then, that generates and sustains television seriality is, in an extended sense, the complex, dispersed figure of the network, and as such is extended in space to the subjects that it addresses and is extended in time to cover the habitual socially formulated requirements of subject maintenance.'

In brief, it gave producers the opportunity to manage the production of what Anderson (1983) describes as 'imagined communities'. This is the sense which individual viewers (or readers of newspapers) have of sharing a simultaneous common experience with thousands or millions of invisible others in a 'mass ceremony' that is 'incessantly repeated at intervals throughout the calendar' (1983:39).

The almost sacred implications of this power arise precisely because broadcasters alone control the monopoly of knowledge about what other parts of this discursive network might value or wish to have articulated. In this sense, they are guardians of a public interest (over what is morally appropriate, symbolically safe or collectively approved).

Yet, this autonomy is only vouchsafed by some degree of separation from the state. Given the tight social controls imposed in New Zealand, programme-makers consciously sought to expand the hitherto under-utilised commercial possibilities of
television. As Perry observes, it was an attempt to balance 'the communal and the commercial' which he sees as most vividly symbolised in the production of Telethon (1984:101).

The attempt to accomplish this was through conscious changes in scheduling patterns and, from 1975 onwards, with the introduction of commercial symbols - via Australian and British commercial models, in terms of image, marketing and presentation.

These were enthusiastically endorsed (NZ Listener, 12 July 1975) as new forms of self-advertisement explicitly designed to capture advertisers under new competitive conditions. So, for example, TV-1 in its opening programme emphasised its connections to other national commercial networks - no longer the BBC; it reinforced its presentation, publicity and marketing sections; introduced departmental heads from Australian commercial networks (notably Bill Munro, the Controller of Programmes), and openly embraced commercial virtues with such enthusiasm that it produced intense public criticism and a review by TV-2 of its own introductory commercial strategy. In total, these changes represented a shift of emphasis rather than anything more radically commercial. However, they represented an attempt to build a pattern of professional authority based on the twin concepts of network and commodity. This was enhanced by their ability to introduce new programming forms organised around their commercial potential. Principal amongst these were the introduction of Australian and American soap operas, unknown on New Zealand television prior to 1974, which were scheduled in new afternoon slots to woo advertisers for shift-workers and women working at home.

In fact, the shift towards commercial patterns of programming masked a number of complex processes. It may have served to provide a fresh footing for the establishment of a strong sense of autonomy and authority, but it was also a symbolic turning-away from established routines and practices - a form of defiance, almost, or deviance in the face of national paternal authority. In that sense, with its links to the
state, it was an internally contradictory strategy. Moreover, as a 'culturally central' phenomenon, in Perry's phrase, television seeks to locate and represent 'the middle ground of New Zealand life' (1984:101). Yet, as he also acknowledges, such ground is inherently unstable insofar as it represents popular culture, because its relation 'to the dominant social order is characteristically a complex pattern of opposition, accommodation and evasion' (Perry, 1989:139), which is hardly a promising footing on which to develop a consistent sense of authority.

In other words, an attempt to found a separate sense of authority and autonomy through these symbolic means involved a complicated and ambiguous set of relations. These were hardly resolved, as we have seen, with the return to a managed environment, with fresh tensions emerging between a paternalistic chairman and confrontational programme-makers. On the contrary, the move to a more commercial footing released new issues and problems.


The return to a managed environment had several important consequences. Externally, it re-awakened pressure from local capital for private television. This came predominantly from two rural newspaper consortia whose revenue had increasingly come under threat from the growth of television advertising (Tribunal report, 1985; Boyd-Bell 1985:186). In the short-term this increased the pressure for centralised BCNZ management since, for example, one leading proposal, which received considerable if fluctuating Government support, advocated privatising one channel (Boyd-Bell 1985).

The alternative was the development of a third channel, a proposal supported by the Government's Communication Advisory Council in 1982, but rejected partly because of the $60 million cost of establishment and of reorganising a tightly-packed frequency spectrum (Royal Commission Report, 1985), and partly because of an anticipated backlash from rural electors denied access to the new channel (Boyd-Bell,
The final arrangement, broadly agreed to by both political parties, was for 'a regionally-based, privately owned third channel' (Boyd-Bell, 1985:189). It was this agreement which led to the end of the public monopoly of broadcasting but also foreshadowed broader changes - principally, the international growth of new media systems such as satellite broadcasting, but also the dismantling of the import licensing system (Boston and Holland, 1987), that had contributed heavily to the dominance of the state in New Zealand society (Oliver, 1979). These changes, in themselves, have clearly signalled major shifts in New Zealand's relationship to other nation-states which are beyond the scope of this analysis. More pertinently, however, they indicate a shift in broadcasting from the paternalistic, public responsibility pole towards an American 'public freedom' deregulatory and commercial ideology (Williams, 1975) which, in itself, underpins a shift from a local, culturalist small-capital perspective to a multi-nation industrial policy as a number of recent commentators have argued (Mattelart, 1986, Hoffmann-Riemm, 1986; Maharey, 1988).

Underlying these movements was a re-ordering of the tensions between public service and commercial objectives with a conflict which shifted from within broadcasting (and radio was also increasingly exposed to the same privatising pressures - see Gregory, 1985; NBR 17.6.85, and particularly Mayne, 1985 on cross-media ownership), to the context of an emergent media industry. This was perhaps best illustrated by the simultaneously sitting of the Broadcasting Tribunal to award a private, third channel to one of four competing conglomerates, and the hearings of the Royal Commission on Broadcasting and Related Telecommunications to determine the future shape of the public interest in an implicitly non-monopoly context.

What the two sets of deliberations emphasised was the ambiguous bases on which a new allocation of broadcasting goods might occur. Generally speaking, these polarised between the provision or acquisition of services based on the ability to pay (argued by the Treasury and supported by the presiding Government Officials Committee as the framework for new legislation), or based on some form of
acknowledged right or need (which has led, for example, to the retention of two public television channels, the YC radio network and the introduction of a Broadcasting Commission to support New Zealand-made or non-commercial production).

Once again, it is possible to argue, that the third-channel decision represents, even with a commercial channel, the same contractory mix of political and commercial tensions implicit in the demands made by a protectionist (or paternal) and interventionist state. Thus, while the third channel is privately-owned, its warrant-holders were the only applicants comprised of small rather than big business interests (NBR 17.6.87); while privately-owned it was still required to cover all regions of the country; while operating as a national carrier, it will come under competition from limited coverage satellite companies in 1989 that are jointly-operated by the public television system; that, despite being a private operator it was required to schedule for all significant minority and ethnic groupings in a broadly parallel fashion to TVNZ; that on latest anecdotal evidence, it intends to flout those regulations.

Clearly, the move to deregulation has been the principal development in the 1980's. However, it has also been connected with the development of a market for professional services. This emerged primarily through the introduction of the two-channel competitive system which initiated a high demand for the production of advertisements, coupled with a successful campaign for restrictions on imported commercials (BCM 74/4/11). The resultant boom has received little attention, but it is evident that a previously tiny film and video sector has mushroomed. Between 1974 and 1985 an estimated 13 companies have grown eleven-fold to 142 production houses (excluding third-channel contenders), mostly located in Auckland (NBR 28.2.75; Mayne, 1985b). Throughout the same period, the state-backed Film Commission introduced in the 1970's also encouraged the development of private film-making (and see the New Zealand Film and Video Yearbooks 1984-87 for estimates of the size and range of services), while there also appears to have been an
extension of a non-state labour market for journalists with the growth of public relations (see Lealand, 1988b for some indirect evidence in terms of journalists' perception of opportunities). In short, during the 1970's and 1980's there was the development of a substantial private and public professional market.\footnote{Recent figures give an estimate of approximately 150 independent producers and directors and over 600 technicians. Nine production houses can produce completed television programmes while a further 15 are regular suppliers of television material in a market with an assessed annual turn-over of $40 million in 1988 (Steering Committee Report, 1988).} One significant aspect of this emergence was that in terms of Hirschman's (1982) categories of exit, voice and loyalty, it was now possible to exit under unsatisfactory circumstances and remain in New Zealand (Johnstone, 1968 and Edwards, 1969 outline the restricted alternatives under the NZBC's monopoly labour market).

In terms of the distinction discussed in earlier chapters between professionals' cosmopolitan and local orientations, it suggests that cosmopolitans were more likely to take the risks and opportunities of the private market and locals to remain in the public system. There is some limited support for this proposition. First, two main professional bodies emerged with the continuance of the TVPDA, primarily representative of public television, and the newly-formed Independent Producers and Directors Guild (the IPDG) which represented private film and video industry members. Secondly, the TVPDA emphasised the security of the state system for its members, while the IPDG attacked the Corporation as 'stultifying' where there was a 'fixed level of competence, imagination and ability. The programmes are unescapably locked into this closed circuit of creativity.' (quoted in the Royal Commission Report, 1985:185) Thirdly, there was wide, implicit, acknowledgement that many of the most adventurous professionals had left the Corporation. As Mayne (1984a:37) commented, these were

'...the people who used to be the movers and shakers in their own right inside State Television. But for various reasons they've moved out or shaken themselves loose. These are the fellows who will be putting each
other's past careers in TVNZ on the line when the blood-letting for warrants starts in earnest...'

Finally, the IPDG launched a major New Zealand quota campaign in 1985 which re-articulated one of the primary statements of professional mission for programme-makers (NBR 7.10.85): the production of New Zealand material in order to forge a sense of local identity. As noted in other places, this re-invokes the notion of professional practice for the public benefit and reflects a cosmopolitan orientation in so doing.

Clearly, the available evidence is suggestive rather than conclusive. Yet there is one further point to be made from the pattern of departures precipitated by the expansion of managed BCNZ control. This was a clear cleavage of loyalties between competitors for the third channel based on pre-existent TV-1 and TV-2 loyalties. As Mayne (1984b) points out, Northern Television recruited a significant number of ex-TV-1 high-level personnel; TV-3 recruited ex-TV-2 personnel. The warrant was eventually awarded to TV-3 on the basis of its community-based, small shareholding structure (Tribunal Report, 1987), a decision which reproduces the same pattern of small capital, regional ideology observed earlier in the chapter and which, as discussed, was developed by and identified with TV-2 under initial competitive arrangements from 1974.

The last consequence of the re-imposition of monopoly management concerns scheduling and programming patterns. As noted earlier, these have divided increasingly along information/entertainment lines for TV1 and TV2 respectively, a finding with which Lealand (1988a:45) agrees. He adds that this may have divided older and younger viewers (1988a:45), but it also suggests a crude high/mass culture division based, on the simplest reading, on respective education-levels of viewers for TV-1 and TV-2.

A second shift from 1980 was in the nature of local production. This was in two directions. One was heavily towards screening on TV-1, the 'information' channel (Royal Commission Report 1986:204) and away from TV-2. The second was
an emphasis on maintaining local content through 'compiled output' - overseas material introduced by New Zealand presenters - and through expanding cheap, high output production and repeats (e.g. news, information programmes and entertainment over drama and documentaries). This, to some extent, reinforced the shift to TV-1 since much of it was, apart from the one category of entertainment, information-oriented, (Royal Commission Report, 1986). While The Royal Commission commented that, overall, New Zealand content had remained static at about 25% of total transmission time since 1972 (1986:205), the Committee for a Code of Minimum Standards from which the figures were drawn indicated a decline since a peak of 34% in 1976 (Noonan, 1984:27). For comparison, the BCNZ's revenue had shifted from a ratio of 52% to 43% in favour of advertising revenue in 1976 to a ratio of 77% to 16% from advertising income (Royal Commission Report, 1986).

Underlying these changes were two trends in representational practice. The major one was explicitly commercially driven, and involved the re-conceptualisation of audiences as target groups. This had been noted in 1979 (NBR 14.3.79), but it was developed through the release of sophisticated audience profiles for advertising agency customers. As Mayne (1986:20) pointed out:

'Pinpointed in the king-sized brochure were "the working woman, the new man, the Maori renaissance, prime lifers and new haves", groups whose growing social clout and purchasing power are lauded by TVNZ.'

From these, essentially appropriated social groupings and types, TVNZ went on to suggest the basis for the reconstruction of individual identity (quoted in Mayne, 1986:20):

'It's not only that marketers and advertisers owe women a more realistic depiction of themselves...the fact is that it is becoming commercially suicidal not to...'

In turn, these constructed types suggested broader social cleavages (Mayne, 1986:20):
'In discussing the new haves, TVNZ's sales and marketers did not pull any punches: "The traditional New Zealand egalitarian society is on the way out...Rising affluence on the upper level and increasing hardship below is splitting a once homogeneous society.'

The information/entertainment division, then, again underpinned an attempt to construct a broadly high/mass culture split. But, interestingly, it is was one that was entirely predicated on a commodification of the audience intended to produce a 40/60 break of audience share with maximised revenue extracted by grouping older, higher spenders on TV-1 against more numerous, generally younger, poorer audiences on TV-2. At the same time, this division also indicated the nature of the cultural elite to which TV-1 appealed by the shape of its more literate, information-oriented programming. Scheduling, too, was organised to exploit the growth of broad social cleavages which, in principle, cut against traditional public service objectives and ideologies.

Some of these strategies, it should be noted, were developed in 1986 and were significant because they represented new initiatives in the recent post-Cross era. Here, the discourse about managing broadcasting in the public interest was abandoned and replaced with a discourse that emphasised notions of limited competition (which was, nonetheless, still centrally managed), and where TV-1 and TV-2 were given a semblance of autonomy and individual control. Although this arrangement appeared less paternal and deferential it was, to some extent, because those patterns of domination have been replaced by internalised social controls directed not towards programming but towards economic objectives.

In general, therefore, the movement towards a more explicitly commercial orientation was evident both inside and outside the public system. Equally evident was the ambiguities which these shifts produced. Thus, commercial policies appeared to have split local production by emphasising overseas sales potential for expensive drama and documentary production (Noonan, 1984; Mayne, pers. comm.) but to have
encroached unevenly on cheaper local production (programme-making respondents claimed to be highly alert both to their programme ratings and scheduling placement and, with children's programmes, to the pattern of programme content and surrounding advertising). Likewise, there is ambiguity over attempts to introduce 'scheduling-driven production' where programmes are developed to fill specified time-slots for the benefit of commercial objectives (Mayne, 1986).

6.1 Summary

1980-1988 saw two general strategies: one, leading up to the resignation of Ian Cross as Chairman in 1986, emphasising a closely-managed, centralised control of TVNZ's monopoly: the other, from 1986 onwards, more openly exploiting and articulating commercial priorities within a limited form of decentralised competition between channels, and predicated on the anticipation of a deregulated media industry. Both periods have seen the increased dominance of internal administrative and managerial sub-groups, first in tandem with the full-time chairman and subsequently advancing their position under the new part-time chairmanship of Hugh Rennie, by the rationalisation of administrative and staffing areas following the Jackson Report criticisms. This was further secured by the pressure to counter private television competitive moves by instituting broad commercial priorities which extended into the representational practices of scheduling and production, and by the rationalisation or 'down-sizing' recently undertaken following the BCNZ's shift to State Owned Enterprise status.

7. GENERAL CONCLUSION

This chapter has discussed the relationship between national social and cultural patterns and the development of broadcasting services. More specifically, following Mundy (1982) and Williams (1974), it has been an attempt to assess the relationship between technology and cultural form. As indicated, the sheer cost and
specialisation inherent in television, particularly given the difficult geography of New Zealand, has limited available cultural options and primarily those to do with commercial or state priorities. On the other hand, peculiarly New Zealand cultural formations have been decisive in determining not only the mix of commercial and public service priorities but also the degree of 'openness' on social controls available within the system and the pattern of authority. These cultural formations have, in turn, therefore, also shaped the opportunities for cultural producers in terms of the representational forms which different state and (increasingly) market patrons have encouraged or opposed.
CHAPTER TEN

TELEVISION IN 1989

'Okay, no more Mister Nice-Guy! WATCH OUT COMPETITORS!!'

...Cartoon in Networks - TVNZ magazine No. 3, 1989.

1. INTRODUCTION

As the quotation suggests, the new TVNZ which emerged as a State Owned Enterprise was a very different being to the ambiguous body which disappeared at the end of 1988. As a memo from the Director-General in late 1988 asserted, 'profit will be the overriding driving force behind all we do' (no. 898, 11.8.88). And, to underline TVNZ's new lustily, aggressive profile, he made the point more explicitly in a recent address to advertisers (Televiews 12.9.89: 13):

'If I can introduce myself to you again now, I'd say, "Hello, I'm Julian Mounter, Chief Executive of a private company with a balance sheet of around $300 million. Healthy profits which pay shareholders excellent dividends..."'

Elsewhere (Networks 1, December 1988), he defined TVNZ's four new objectives as 1. 'Beat the hell out of the opposition'; 2. 'Hack back even further on production costs'; 3. 'Exploit new markets for what...is bound to be an increasingly fragmented market', and 4. look for co-productions and facilities sharing deals.

Some of the consequences of these policies have been the establishment of sub-companies (both the Avalon Studio complex and the transmission section are now separate profit-generating facilities (Networks 13, July 1989; Networks 19, September 1989); the 'globalisation' of TVNZ through the acquisition of overseas television interests (Networks 13, July 1989); the marketing and distribution of video footage (Networks 18, September 1989), and the commodification of programme materials such as 'Gloss' and the kiwi cartoon figure (Networks 13, July 1989).

These new strategies serve to introduce the two themes of this brief, final chapter. Both arise from the dissolution of the state's monopoly of broadcasting. One
examines the consequences this has had, or is likely to have, on the patterns or arrangements which have been discussed at length in earlier chapters. The second is an assessment of the possible consequences of internationalisation, introduced by the expansion of existing image markets, on the production of culture, and are discussed under the heading of postmodernism.

Both themes arise from the fact that most of the original assumptions which have informed debates about television and cultural production have been turned upside down with the arrival of deregulation. The BCNZ's activities have, in a sense, been dispersed throughout a rapidly expanding television sector; there appears to have been a collapse in the managed importation of international cultural materials by the BCNZ, through the process of deregulation, and public service provision and commercial television have been relegated to different cultural arenas. In general, the state's centralised management of cultural production, the debates and the production of publics which went with it have been dispersed or are being largely re-constituted; in other words, the end of the state's broadcasting monopoly has had fundamental consequences. What follows is a brief resume of some of the new features as they have evolved to November 1989.

2. THE END OF THE STATE MONOPOLY OF BROADCASTING

TVNZ's changes have been in anticipation of deregulated competition from satellite, cable, TV-3 and community television contenders, with Julian Mounter estimating 38 possible contenders in September 1989 (Televiews 12.9.89: 13). Although he anticipated only a possible eight continuing competitors in urban centres, two consequences flow from it. One is a new set of programming strategies primarily aimed to capture the prime-time market with the placement of news, current affairs and games shows in the early evening. These have 'already been able to boost audience levels and 60% of New Zealanders are now watching television between 7 and 7.30 each night', figures 'we haven't had for a long time' (Televiews, 12.9.89: 14).
It is combined with a concentration on 'quality' local programmes placed in prime time that saw over 50% of the top 30 programmes listed as local programmes in August and September 1989 (Televiews, 12.9.89: 14).

The second consequence has been the rationalisation and casualisation of labour. As a late September 1989 bulletin announced (Networks 19, September 1989) announced, there has been an introduction of a job evaluation and performance planning and assessment system (PPA):

'In future, employees will be paid according to their performance, skills and knowledge, rather than on the basis of year by year progression through a number of grades.'

This arrangement advances plans originally developed through the private television and video sector for a large pool of casual skilled labour with an estimated drop-out rate of 15% per year (ITVA Film and Video Training Conference, July 1986; October, 1987). It parallels the established floating labour pool in the film industry (The Data File, annually updated) which moves, as work becomes available, between New Zealand, Australia and the U.S. (John Barnett, pers. comm.) As Barnett observed, this tendency is certain to spread to television, initially through advertising production (guest editorial in Networks 18, September 1989):

'In an increasingly international marketplace and specifically under CER, New Zealand looks more and more like one market and manufacturers and advertisers often view that market as homogeneous.'

Does this internationalization in the form of 'globalisation', programme flows and diffusion of labour markets suggest an inevitable one-way flow of traffic into New Zealand with the domination of U.S. television and the introduction of 'wall-to-wall Dallas' (Nordenstreng and Varis, 1974; Varis, 1984)? Tracey, in a recent article, suggests not, arguing both that 'the structure of distribution is far more complex than has been allowed for' and for the persistence of 'wealthy public broadcasters' (1988: 14 and 22-24). This point will be considered further in the context of postmodernism but it raises the question of the status, under new market conditions, of public broadcasting in New Zealand.
Briefly, it appears to have been relegated to the new Broadcasting Commission. This body, funded from the licence fee (renamed the Public Broadcasting Fee), disburses money to individual and worthy projects. However, its latitude is strictly limited by the proviso that projects need to have gained screening approval from a television channel (Norrish, 1989). On the other hand, it assumes the ambiguous role formerly held by TVNZ. As Merwyn Norrish, the Commission chairperson, pointed out (Norrish, 1989: 29):

'What the instructions to the Commission boil down to is that the Commission is required to encourage the development of local content on television in terms of both quantity and quality, and in terms of social responsibility. We are talking about the need for what is done to be well done...in terms of...quality in concept, scripts, people...that are not merely worthy, but stand to be popular with or make a lively impression on a target audience...'

If this sounds very much like the Adam Report of 1974 then it suggests that the Commission has been visited with the same dilemmas that previously plagued TVNZ. The only difference is that it is also bound to fund those programmes which will be broadcast by commercially-driven channels. In this way, although it reproduces the public service-commercial conflict, it does so under the clearly dominant profit objectives of commercial broadcasting.

Under these conditions, there is some doubt whether this supports Tracey's (1988) conclusions about the diversity of television's cultural form, or those of Perry's (1989: 139) about the potential of popular culture in New Zealand:

'Popular culture's relation to the dominant social order is characteristically a complex pattern of opposition, accommodation and evasion; it is an index of suppressed possibilities as well as a means of securing consent.'

Yet, to suggest this possibility is to raise the problem of shifts in representational practices and, in turn, their relationship to changes in the political economy of television. In short, it introduces the question of postmodernism and its role in the internationalization, commercialisation and increasing saturation of visual images heralded by deregulation and the impact of new communications technologies. This issue is dealt with next.
3. NEW ZEALAND TELEVISION AND POSTMODERNISM

Even since the introduction of competition for advertising between two channels there has been a gradual re-conceptualization of audiences as target groups, as noted in the last chapter. While this led to a strategy in the mid-1980's of developing an information/entertainment split between TV-1 and TV-2, with a recognition of certain public service constraints (avoiding the placement of similar or local programmes against each other), these boundaries and distinctions have been erased since 1989. Now, for example, in the interests of fulfilling purely commercial criteria, TVNZ is indifferent to running one local entertainment programme against another, ('Saturday Live' against 'It's In the Bag'). Although this divides urban from rural audiences and slightly younger from slightly older, the self-evident purpose of such scheduling is to meet the competition from other forthcoming broadcasting audiences. But this prospect, in itself, opens up the possibilities and consequences of the endless textuality of television discourse and its implications for the production of identities, subjects and spectators.

This arises in the context of what Wilcox (1985) terms 'consumer culture.' While Wilcox considers New Zealand society as a whole, this discussion limits itself to the implications for television and the degree to which it is discernible as a postmodern phenomenon. Wilcox summarizes postmodernism's features as (1985: 344-345):

"...organised around the constitutive features of a new depthlessness and a whole new culture of the image and the simulacrum: in fiction...we find the eclipse of the subject, "decentered" narrative modes, the "blank parody" or particle, the prevalence of surfaces rather than depths (or multiple surfaces of intertextuality), discourses and textual play replacing older modernist depth models with their implied dialectic of essence and appearance, latent and manifest, alienation and disalienation."

Under the conditions of a deregulated broadcasting environment New Zealand television appears ripe, with the anticipated introduction of numerous transmission outlets from satellite, national broadcast and cable sources, plus the existing
circulation of images from film and video production, to reproduce the features that Wilcox imputes to other centres of late capitalism. In these societies there is a saturation of the image which, Baudrillard (1981) argues, leads to an irrevocable cleavage between the social - the arenas of interweaving discourse (here, through the television screen) - and the silent majority, the mass of viewers who cannot be retrieved except through their endless (and futile) construction and reconstruction as coherent social entities by the discourse in the social. Debord (1968) argues that this saturation produces the image as 'the final form of commodity reification.' In short, it dissolves social groups qua social groups into consumers grasped and constructed as images produced through the television apparatus and who are unavailable to representation except through the image. The consequences of this may be profound.

Ann Kaplan, in discussing some of these with regard to MTV, the 24-hour satellite rock video channel, (which, in some ways, represents the furthest extension of these developments) and points out that (1989: 53):

"The 24-hour flow is partly responsible for effacing the original address to specific, delimited youth rock audiences. MTV gathers up into itself the history of rock and roll, rendering the originally distinct subject positions merely nostalgic reflection on earlier periods.... popularising and trivialising them into a common "pop" dimension; and then flattening them out into one continuous present."

In this way, both coherent historicization disappears and distinctive communities of address. The process of pastiching to which she and Wilcox refer also collapses distinctions between elite and popular cultures as part of its decentering effacement of boundaries (Baudrillard, 1983). The final outcome, these commentators argue, is the positioning of the subject in a perpetual state of hungering after psychological plenitude which is constantly promised and constantly deferred, by the endless textuality of television production. Kaplan is, clearly, concerned with one segment of television, but the analysis has general application, given the endless seriality of television as a whole (Browne, 1987).

It is easy for such a summary, as White (1987) writes of his own summary of Foucault's work, to sound like an almost alarmist and reactionary compression of
recent theory. Yet how far can be applied to New Zealand and what other features of postmodernism does it expose?

Wilcox, in 1985, was dubious that New Zealand even fulfilled sufficient conditions to be considered a postmodern society (1985: 348):

'One might argue...that with its small population, its declining economy, its high cost of consumer goods, its two television channels, its small number of FM stations (not to mention satellite dishes) and its relative paucity of billboards, New Zealand is not properly a consumer society nor an image/media saturated society. Nor is it, with its pastures full of sheep, a properly postmodern culture...'

Leaving aside some of the economic and broadcasting changes since 1985 (Boston and Holland 1987; Radiocommunications Bill, 1989), how could we resolve the question? Briefly, and considering only television, New Zealand is rapidly moving towards a circulation of images equivalent to other Western industrialised nations. On the basis of numbers of television sets per household, penetration of colour sets, penetration of video recorders and average weekly programme hours, New Zealand is broadly comparable to many European states (it has, for example, more video recorders, per head of population, than France but less than the GDR; fewer programme hours per week than the GDR but more than France - at least according to Screen Digest, February 1989, from which these comparisons are drawn). It also has a comparable consumption of films (Screen Digest, April 1989).

But we need to consider more than sheer volume, and look at the construction of images. At a level of general circulation of images within programme scheduling there has been, as noted, an encroachment of purely commercial strategies. These have produced the phenomenon of endless textuality (and associated deferrals of satisfactions) through the growth of advertising time (and the endless appeal of advertising strategies viz Kaplan, 1987); the endless serialisation of soap operas (viz Allen, 1986) whether produced internationally ('Dallas', 'Falconcrest', 'Neighbours', 'Coronation Street') or locally ('Gloss'); the open-ended narrativization of news discourses (Fiske, 1988), more recently, of certain quiz shows ('Sale of the Century'), and even the expanding process of 'stripping' where certain types of programmes (and
notably mini-series) are run night-by-night to capture a particular audience-type (‘Dr Who’, ‘Mash’). In fact, even a cursory analysis of recent television schedules shows an astounding degree of seriality on the part of TVNZ’s two channels. Of the 53 programmes screened on the week ending on Friday September 29, 1989, for example, 47% (25) were serials repeated on a daily basis (varying, for instance, from ‘Aerobics Oz Style’ to ‘Holmes’ current affairs). Only two programmes, both feature films, were non-repeating (although, ironically, one of them, ‘Oh God; Book II’ was, in fact, a film serialisation). A similar distribution of programme types was represented three weeks later on Wednesday October 18.

Even within the construction of individual programmes the development of postmodernist discourse is evident. Following commentators on the postmodern (viz the articles in Foster, 1983), we need to look for the play of surfaces, or depthlessness; the decentering of the subject and the dispersal of the notion of essence, and the construction of the subject by the television apparatus. To take the last item first, we need look no further than quiz shows and entertainment programmes (and see Fiske, 1987) for the constitution of a specifically television event. In other words, events which would not exist if they were not constructed by television. In the process of construction, they also constitute the events as subjects, whether as individuals (as in ‘Sale of the Century‘ or ‘Saturday Live’), or as putative social groups (‘Top Town’), who represent themselves or their communities only through the trope of consumption. Perry (1984; 1989) has extended this form of analysis to the signifying strategies of recent Telethons.

Where television represents the ‘real’ or events outside itself, postmodernist strategies are often still evident. Wood (1984) has analysed the way that election candidates and the community are reconstituted as spectacle, dissolving their links with any ‘real’ community in a way which recalls Baudrillard’s (1981) critique of the discourse of the social. So, too, does the persistent use of opinion polls on current
affairs programmes to represent the electoral popularity of political parties, public issues or individual office-holders. (Baudrillard, 1981: 31-36).

To illustrate these postmodern processes further we can briefly consider two examples. One is the New Zealand soap opera 'Gloss' which indicates by its name the notion of the mirror play of surfaces, and the gaze (Lacan, 1979). Like most soap operas it is inherently placeless, endlessly defers narrative or emotional closure, and is constituted around a medium that itself depends on the circulation and consumption of images (a high fashion magazine). It is, in other words, a simulacrum - a copy with no identifiable original. It is also pastiche - invoking and playing with the tropes of other, similar highbrow soaps (eg 'Dallas' or 'Falconcrest') - but which forestalls the positioning of the spectator that would ironise this activity and turn it into parody.

Obviously, this analysis could be greatly extended, but a second example is illuminating insofar as it also serves to suggest some of the limitations of postmodernism, or of postmodern analysis. 'Sale of the Century' displays several postmodern features: it is organised around the maximum display of consumption by its competitors; it evokes a constant deferral of plenitude in the parade of objects possessed or rejected by contestants; it is decentered by the impression it gives of an (invisible) audience and by being unlocateable - despite the host's nightly farewell to some obscure regional area of New Zealand. And so on. In contrast, 'It's In the Bag' retains marks of modernity despite being a quiz show. It has an identifiable location (eg Tokoroa or small provincial towns), it displays and interacts with a distinct local audience who respond positively to their self-identification. Each show is shot within the confines of the community's locale (the local town hall or auditorium) and, in doing so extends an identifiable sense of social and broadcasting history: the series began as a radio show in the 1950's. In brief, it contradicts postmodern tendencies by its assertion of locale, community, identity and self-presence. So do other programmes (eg 'Fair Go', 'McCormick Country', 'Country Calendar', 'Wild South' or 'Kaleidoscope'), many of which implicitly privilege a notion of national identity.
Simon During identifies phenomena such as these as being part of a strategy of post-colonialism which he describes as 'the name for products of the ex-colonies' need for an identity granted not in terms of the colonial power, but in terms of themselves,' (1985: 369).

During argues that a post-colonial identity can only be produced by 'a self-reflective and intellectual discourse' which articulate certain specifiable national attributes 'as a resistance to postmodernism' (1985: 372, 376). Such a singular discourse, of course, activates another form of representation that may simply disenfranchise the subjects of its discourse ('ordinary New Zealanders') just as effectively as the postmodernist discourse it is resisting (a point made indirectly by Eldred-Grigg, 1987). The point is not pursued here. Instead, it is enough to note that this post-colonial discourse is vitiated by its insertion into the stream of discourses which constitute postmodernism: it becomes merely a text amongst texts.

Yet, in a sense, it resolves the problem posed by Wilcox. The question is not whether New Zealand is or is not a postmodern society but, rather, how we are to assess the contradictions of (at least) two antithetical discourses (and see Fox, 1988 on the problems, for example of articulating a specifically Maori discourse). Their relative dominance is an indication of the social formations on which their respective discourses are grounded (viz Perry, 1987) and form a conclusion to this section.

We have already seen in earlier chapters how programme-makers as part of their self-constitution as a professional community articulated an image of national identity. As with most professionalising occupations they emphasised their disinterestedness by involving a notion of public service and attempted to gain a degree of occupational shelter through the state by way of regulation and a monopoly over television broadcasting rights. Inherent in these strategies, however, were sets of unresolvable ambiguities which saw the gradual dominance of administrators and managers within the state system and the development of an alternative professional
private sector which finally emerged to challenge the state system with the Tribunal hearings for a third channel warrant in the mid-1980's.

Central to programme-makers' strategies, whether public or private, has been the notion of national voice, or identity which, if achieved, would have led to what Anderson (1983) terms the construction of an imagined community. However, the development of new communication technologies and the world-wide pressures towards market-driven deregulation (Padioleau, 1987) have undermined cultural boundaries (and hence existing imagined communities) in favour of what Matterlart et al. (1984) describe as world-wide image markets. Under these conditions, broadcasting becomes just another industrial sector, except on a multinational scale. Consequently, New Zealand programme-makers face the same kinds of difficulties as Ettema and et al's (1987) American mass communicators. Their appeal to public service is marginalised with the shift of public service functions to the new allocative body, the Broadcasting Commission (Christchurch Press: 19.9.89); their claim to produce innovation and excellence is marginalised by the displacement of local production functions to semi- or wholly-independent production units and is, anyway, subjected to international competition for scheduling purely on the grounds of satisfying consumer groups through the ratings. Their claim to superior judgement of audience demands - to the management of organisational uncertainty - is, like their other claims, culturally-based and therefore vulnerable to the alternative claims of bureaucratic specialists (eg sales and marketing personnel, market researchers or programme suppliers and distributors) where judgement is on the basis of profit-maximisation (as it is for TVNZ (Director-General's memo 11.8.88, no. 898), and will be for all other channels).

Consequently, the disappearance of the state monopoly of television broadcasting has meant the disappearance of programme-makers' claims to professional status based on cultural advocacy. It also means the diminution of a post-colonial discourse within postmodernism, but with the corollary that it also
inserts a set of contradictions and tensions at odds with the totalising tendencies of postmodern discourse.

Finally, however, what this discussion attempts to provide is a linkage between shifts in institutional practices and cultural discourses. In a sense, recent developments have illustrated the reorganisation and rearticulation of a set of familiar tensions: economic and cultural imperatives articulated by and distributed within a given institutional framework. This, properly, brings us back to the initial sets of tensions and ambiguities with which the study began but sees them now displaced and reworked within the context of a media sector or industry, rather than just through the original organisational form.
METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

1. INTRODUCTION

In presenting a methodological appendix, particularly of a qualitative study, there is a sense of the researcher 'coming clean' - stepping out from behind an often invisible persona to reveal how his or her materials were collected and organised. This has been particularly so recently with the reaction to the unruffled pronouncements of methodological 'cookbooks' in favour of accounts of 'what really happened' (Bell and Newby, 1977; Bell and Roberts, 1984; Bryman, 1988, for example). My account largely follows this recent tradition, primarily because it appears the most illuminating route to follow, and may highlight methodological difficulties rather than merely deferring to methodological authorities.

However, this approach raises some further questions and so this account falls into two sections. One describes the fieldwork process and some of the issues and problems which arose. The second briefly takes up some more general problems to do with the historical nature of my materials and with the problem of representation which they pose.

2. ACCESS AND FIELDWORK

The bulk of data collection took place between 1986 and 1989 and, as will be obvious from the text, involved not only interviews, magazine and newspaper articles, published reports, histories and academic articles (of which some of the most useful emerged during the last four years), but also extensive use of broadcasting files. This last category was, clearly, central to any detailed account of the period; it was also the most difficult to obtain, and some explanation of how I gained access may be helpful, especially in view of the emphasis it has received in methodology texts (Brown et al., 1976; Bell and Newby, 1977), and the paucity of local accounts.
2.1. Access

My problem was both obvious and fairly typical. My research depended on the detailed data available through potential respondents within broadcasting and from what I imagined to be extensive corporate documentation. Both, and more particularly the latter, required top level permission, especially since few organisations, and no broadcasting ones anywhere around the world, as far as I was aware, were amenable to researchers fossicking at random through their recent records. (See Leapman, 1987, for example).

My initial attempt to gain access was by a direct contact with the newly-appointed Director-General of TVNZ, Julian Mounter. He immediately rebuffed my request for access even to the BCNZ board minutes for 1979. This might well have proved the end of the matter, and the pursuit of this topic, if it had not been for a combination of fortune and existing contacts within broadcasting.

In brief, the Chairman of the Board's wife, in her role as speech-writer for the Deputy Prime Minister, needed some material on a Christchurch Theatre for a speech on its tenth anniversary. As a newspaper reviewer in Christchurch, I was readily placed to supply this through a common acquaintance who was also a friend of the Chairman. Suffice it to say that the execution of a favour, and the mutual acquaintanceship, vouchsafed my reliability and, in a brief interview with the Chairman, Hugh Rennie, I was generously granted all the access and help I required, possibly short only of some confidential minutes which, he said, even he had not seen. This outcome seems to conform to the recommendations by other researchers about the patterns and value of opportunism (Crompton and Jones, 1984; Van Maanen and Kolb, 1985). However, it also conforms to Burns' (1977) and Schlesinger's (1980) access experiences with the BBC.

Subsequently, as other researchers have found (see Schlesinger, 1980:347-352 on the BBC), there were further blocks within the organisation itself. Two are worth noting. One related to the extraordinary remote-control influence wielded by the
recently-departed ex-Chairman, Ian Cross. In particular, two powerful executives appeared to act in deference to his sentiments, discussing my activities with him and operating a shifting screen which revealed or deflected information about documents or evidence that touched on recent activities. Interestingly, this atmosphere of caution and surveillance which was very evident up to the beginning of 1987 was largely dispelled by the time of a return visit in late 1987, but coincided with a definite sensation that the period up to 1980 had suddenly been relegated to history rather than being still current. Simultaneously, while this improved my access and decreased the caution of interviewees, it produced a new problem of nostalgia amongst respondents, who sometimes tended to simplify the complexities of past events.

The second obstacle was the state of the data. Papers to the BCNZ Board minutes were sometimes absent or mislocated. All the documents for TV-1 and TV-2 were missing; through the very kind assistance of a former executive, TV-1's were finally traced to the basement at Avalon's television centre, stored in eight large paper-cup cartons. They were chaotic, uncatalogued and incomplete. However, they did contain some TV-2 records (most of which are still undiscovered) and, with the BCNZ materials, amounted to several hundred thousand pages of rich data.

2.2. Fieldwork

The major fieldwork fell into three main phases. I did pilot work and initial interviewing in Wellington in August 1986, undertook the main bulk of research through the summer of 1987-88 in two bursts, with a further trip to Auckland in May 1988. I completed data collection in November-December 1988 with a final visit to Wellington.

During the initial ten-day pilot research period in August 1986, I attempted to assess the state of available materials as well as doing preliminary interviewing with as many, and as varied, respondents as I could manage.
However, it was the second research visit in 1987-88 which formed the backbone to my internal organisational data collection and coincided with the arrival of the missing TV-1 materials. In total, I spent approximately seven weeks, before and after Christmas, sorting and analysing documents, interviewing respondents both about their own activities and, in many cases, about how to interpret the documents and, lastly, in acting as a sociological observer. This last activity deserves some comment.

I had worked in television myself from 1977 up until 1984, which made me aware that, in some respects, that the organisation in which I was now participating as a researcher was different to the organisation in which I had once worked, and was studying. To confuse the (recent) past with the present was to confuse one of the objects of study: the process of change, so I felt obliged to treat them conceptually as at least slightly different constructs. Nonetheless, acting as an observer enabled me to observe how the daily organisational social order was accomplished within structures that, broadly, I had experienced myself. Second, it enabled me to compare my experiences - and more importantly my degree of recall - from the self-reflexive position of a researcher, with that of respondents still engaged with the on-going management of organisational practices and discourses (and see Schatzmann and Strauss, 1973; Silverman, 1985; Turner, 1988 for a discussion of some of these issues).

Through this period of engagement and analysis I tended to work extremely intensively, transcribing interviews, writing extensive notes and reflecting endlessly upon unexpected linkages and tentative patterns. To borrow Turner's (1988) dictum, to look closely is to be surprised, and I was, sharing the stimulation and exhilaration which he and Glaser (1978) describe in the cycle of observation-analysis-theorising, and which made regular fourteen- or fifteen-hour days a relatively painless experience.
The Auckland trip in May 1988 was primarily to expand my SPTV (TV-2) materials, and the final visit in November-December 1988 enabled me to re-interview, re-check tentative conclusions and sample the new winds of change, prior to TVNZ becoming an S.O.E., and to immerse myself again in the voluminous documentation.

2.3. Analytical Procedures

Faced with a mass of discontinuous data and a variety of oral and published accounts, often in sharp conflict with each other (see Cross, 1988 and Mayne, 1984 and 1985, for example), how were these to be synthesized into one relatively consistent account? In part, it involves a recognition of the processes of narrativization and metadiscourse, that regularize irregular discourses, and which has been most usefully discussed by White (1973, 1981, 1987). This is taken up in a later section. Beyond that, there are a number of methodological procedures which attempt to establish the validity and reliability of data (Bryman, 1988; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Silverman, 1985; van Maanen, 1979) and what follows is a discussion of amalgamating data and methodology in my own circumstances.

In essence, I followed a procedure which has been described as well by Turner (1988) as anyone, and which he summarises as a combination of analytic induction and grounded theory (although Bulmer and Burgess, 1986, see them as separate activities). Some examples will illustrate the process.

Certain events could be established and certain categories verified by reference to published data and written decisions. Principally, these consisted of Board decisions which produced changes in sets of organisational activities that were independently observable, (such as changes in financial data supplied to the Board), or were internally logically consistent (for instance, repeated and escalating demands at different Board meetings for 'referral-up' by staff members).

In these ways, whole and detailed sequences of events could be tracked and confirmed by, for example, plotting the passage of particular items or issues as they
occurred at programme or production meetings, went through Heads of Department meetings, were incorporated or revised in papers prepared for the television boards; as they were re-worked for the higher BCNZ Board sub-committees; were re-presented as background papers for the BCNZ Board and appeared as minutes of Board meetings.

What these documents represent, however, are certain forms of distributed discourse: channels which contained certain kinds of information available in different settings for different participants' use. But the sense of these documents was limited in two ways. First, they did not reveal in themselves how they should be read; in other words, they needed interpretation, preferably by participants, for their contextual sense. Secondly, many documents - and especially Board minutes, as respondents constantly reminded me - were intentionally obscure or misleading, in order to fulfil a variety of organisational purposes. For these reasons, former participants became essential as sense-making guides to the documents. They could indicate, for example, how specific minutes might act as index to interpretation. So, at its most simple, minutes marked 'confidential', or actually missing from files, were clearly deemed more sensitive. Intensity of discussion could be partially gauged by the sheer length of an individual entry or the difficulty of the minute-writer in massaging a sharply-polarised and heated discussion into the opaque terminology of surrounding items. Sometimes, verbatim hand-written notes existed to check the relationship of formal to recorded accounts.

On the other hand, interviews with participants were invaluable for revealing assumptions and shared frameworks. I could never have understood, for example, whether or not a change of advertising systems reflected - as it appeared to - a victory of one channel over the other in the TVNZ amalgamation without knowing from a working part participant that both channels' experts had agreed the changes were self-evident and overdue. This particular example can be extended. Only a participant could reveal the intense jockeying for position which working party membership represented in terms of future careers (to the extent of near physical assault on one
over-heated occasion). These examples should illustrate both the specificity and significance of members' understandings and accomplishment of organisational practices which problematises global accounts of organisational or occupational history.

At the same time, these existing materials, plus some fairly haphazardly-generated statistical data (itself a consequence of the shortage of administrative staff during the 1970's), permitted another level of analysis. This allowed the incorporation of quantitative data (for instance, in the form of crude occupational categories, turn-over rates of personnel, broad wage relativities and so on) and for a re-reading of other documents. Thus, by coding every Board minute from 1974 onwards, for example, it was possible to see 'waves' of decisions or discussions of particular issues over time that could serve to corroborate the intensification of, or conflict over, certain debates. This was true of the issue of journalists 'independence' or 'objectivity' during the late 1970's, which could be matched with contemporary news accounts and the later memoirs or memories of participants (e.g. Cross, 1988). As a result, it was generally possible to interweave qualitative and quantitative materials, although always within an interpretative context (see Silverman, 1985; Yin, 1984).

2.4. Interviews

If participants were invaluable sense-making guides to reading documents, they were a hazardous source of first-hand information. This was for two main reasons. One, some were prone to recall the most vivid and intense events, often at the expense of the dull, but vital, background details in which these were embedded. Two, memories were unreliable - sometimes intentionally so - and vulnerable to understandable lapses in describing incidents that might have occurred at any time from 4 to 15 years earlier. Most commonly, sequences of events were scrambled or
ascribed to wrong periods, sometimes years astray, motives were attached to innocent individuals and post-hoc justification was substituted for actuality.

So, for example, I learnt of plots during the 1979-90 TVNZ amalgamation, to enthrone or unseat candidates for the top current affairs posts - but they were inconsistent, uncorroborated and lacking sufficient independent reference points to be usable. More unusually, I was told by reliable informants of the endeavours of TV-2 executives who, allegedly, had the silver nitrate coating from used filmstock stripped off and refined down into silver ingots which could subsequently be seen on their desk-tops. This was flatly contradicted by a knowledgeable non-TV-2 respondent. This particular example is interesting because of the difficulty it illustrates in confirming informal accounts. Stories of irregularities within TV-2 circulated when I was employed in television and during my research. Yet, in the end, these might best be viewed as another signifier of the intense competition between channels and the communal identifications which these stories symbolised within organisational and occupational cultures (Putnam and Pacanowsky, 1984). Interviews, then, were useful but problematic, and my best solution to employing them is to refer to Silverman's remarks (1985:171):

'.....we can treat such responses as displays of perspectives and moral forms. Finally, such a position is intrinsic to Garfinkel's (1967) argument that accounts are part of the world they describe.'

In all, I interviewed 40 respondents, a number of them on several occasions. While they were drawn from all areas of broadcasting: administrative, production, engineering and technical; TV-1 and TV-2; Board and employee; external commentators and related groups. My process of selection, following Silverman (1985), was on the basis of the illumination which individuals could bring to bear, rather than on their statistically representative significance. The interviews were long (approximately two hours per session) and generally loosely-structured around particular themes or issues. Yet, as Dunkerley emphasises, such interviewing is inherently subjective, and where its content is historical, it must, as already indicated,
focus on the social and cultural construction of values (1988:89-90). In this way it arrives on the same footing as historical documents, as a complex form of socially-constrained discourse.

3. THE PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION

One last matter needs to be raised. Beyond the questions of fieldwork and analysis, this study is also involved with the production of a cultural critique. As Marcus and Fisher define this, it does so (1986:154):

'by raising questions about cultural hegemony and how meaning structures are formed and negotiated by competing segments in a society.'

Yet to do so is also to implicate the study itself in the construction of cultural meanings. At root, this parallels the way in which Perry (1987), and Eldred-Grigg (1987) describe members of an intellectual class producing an account which constitutes, in effect, the construction of a particular kind of symbolic New Zealand identity (and see Anderson's (1983) incisive account of how this could not be otherwise). Inevitably, then, this raises the problems of representation and legitimacy - aspects of what Marcus and Fisher refer to as the crisis of representation in the human sciences (1986:1-16).

In the present case, this raises the question of the accounts's construction: how does it ground its own representational practices, and hence its appeal to legitimacy? In an important sense, this account is no more 'truthful' than any other (and see Bryman, 1988: 2 on this point, in particular). It is and, indeed, cannot avoid being, a literary construction. Most accounts implicitly appeal to a notion of truth, or the real, yet if recent literary theory demonstrates anything, it is that there is no final truth nor transcendent reality (Derrida, 1976; Atkins and Johnson, 1985). Rather, as with all such accounts, this is unavoidably a literary device, a discourse, constrained by the rules of composition and rhetoric and bound to produce its own tropological strategies (Atkins and Johnson, 1985; Miller, 1979; White, 1987). It is a social text, produced
within a horizon of social meanings and by the limits of authority that surround the production and presentation, in this case, of a doctoral thesis.

Under these circumstances, a brief word about the literary strategies I have employed might be in order. Generally speaking, the text moves between two modes of address: the realistic and the ironic (White, 1973). The realistic mode involves those sections which develop a narrative and are gathered mainly under Part Two of the study. They are organised chronologically and are more intensively organisational in focus. The ironic mode is more detached, thematic and discursive and is developed in Part Three with an emphasis on cultural discourses. However, these are not mutually exclusive categories. Rather, there is a degree of oscillation between them, as will be evident from the text. In part, this marks the production over time of the text as a text; in part it is an attempt to acknowledge the 'intractable contradiction', in the materials and theoretical perspectives that need to be brought into conjunction, (Marcus and Fisher, 1986:12-15).

How does this illuminate the conditions of adequacy for this study? As various commentators point out, social science studies cannot appeal to a general notion of authority, nor to a special status as science (Silverman, 1985; White, 1981, 1987). Moreover, this particular study is subject, through its historical dimension, to the interpretative problems of narrative, (Marcus and Fisher, 1986) and the reconciliation of the process of emplotment with those of argument and ideological implication (White, 1973). How, in brief, can we accede to the 'reality' of the narrative and attest to the sufficiency of a representation which, as discussed with other accounts of a New Zealand intellectual class, is merely one account among others? White (1987) discusses Ricoeur's philosophy (1978) as suggesting one solution. Ricoeur argues that human actions themselves have the structure of texts - moreover, they have the structure of narrative texts. Accepting this, the adequacy of representation becomes self-evident (1987:54):

'Since these actions are in effect lived narrativizations, it follows that the only way to represent them is by narrative itself. Here the form of
discourse is perfectly adequate to its content, since the one is narrative, the other what has been narrativised.'

White, however, (1987:55) hesitates to concur, arguing there is an irremovable equivocation about what constitutes history itself because of the awkward division between 'past' and 'present' - which reproduces, in one way, the sensation I noted above of the 'present' becoming the 'past' during fieldwork.

Two other possibilities suggest themselves. White, drawing on Gadamer (1979) and again on Ricoeur, suggests that the investment of events with meanings, their 'troping', in fact, involves an interpretation or 'translation' from one discursive community (who lived the events to be represented) to another (who represent them). He continues (1987:49):

'When this individuality-in-community is established across a temporal distance, the kind of knowledge-as-understanding produced is a specifically historical knowledge.'

In simple terms, this is the practice of social science as revelatory and, indeed, enables any account to be assessed in terms of 'the meaning, coherence or significance' of its tropological procedures. Unavoidably, however, it still does not resolve how one account is to be preferred to another except in literary or discursive terms which, as Derrida shows (1978) reintroduces problems of authority and legitimacy since, finally, these depend on a set of cultural assumptions (and see Foucault, 1977; Harland, 1987).

The other alternative is discussed by Kaplan (1987:29-30) who adopts the strategy of acknowledging her situation in academic, cultural and gender discourses and argues that these constitute metacritical reading formations which she brings, particularly as a gendered subject. These, she argues, produces a sense of difference which valorises her account of music television (as an implicitly cultural critique) as one based on an oppositional and resistive reading. As above, this argument is vulnerable to a radically deconstructive analysis based, as it is, on an implicit privileging of a coherent, centred subject. (Atkins, 1983; Derrida, 1976).
Under these circumstances, the best available strategy appears to be a provisional one: the purpose of this study is not to resolve the crisis of representation but rather to activate a process of interpretation which, within the constraints discussed above, reproduces the understandings of one discursive community - that of broadcasting - within the framework of another - a sociological community. It adopts a metacritical stance towards its materials by attempting, as I have done here, to acknowledge its own assumptions, and by emphasising the processual and refractory nature of the discourses it examines.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Carey, J.M. (1975) 'Culture and communications', Communications Research April.


Clausse, R. (1968) 'The mass public at grips with mass communication', in International Social Science Journal 20, 4: 625-643.


Edlin, B. (1979a) 'Cross makes TV's top cat a political post', National Business Review April 11.


*European Journal of Communication* 1985-89.


Mayne, W. (1985d) 'TVNZ: Once one is two; twice two is one', National Business Review 10 June.

Mayne, W. (1985e) 'One, two, three, x five = four?' On Film 2, 5: 30-31.


Reports of Television Corporation One presented to the House of Representatives F.11, 1974-76. Wellington: Government Printer.

Reports of Television Corporation Two presented to the House of Representatives F.12, 1974-76. Wellington: Government Printer.


Richardson, C. 'Video Wars', OnFilm 1, 1: 33-34.


Thompson, J.D. (1965) 'On building an administrative science', *Administrative Science Quarterly* 1, 1: 102-111.


Turow, J. (1985) 'Cultural argumentation through the mass media: a framework for organisational research', *Communication* 8: 139-164.


PERIODICALS CONSULTED

Management Magazine
National Business Review (NBR)
The Christchurch Press
The Dominion
The Evening Post
The Listener
The New Zealand Herald (NZH)
The New Zealand Listener (NZ Listener)
The Otago Daily Times

BROADCASTING PUBLICATIONS

Broadcaster (PR newsletter)
Networks (Internal staff journal)
Televiews (Publication to advertisers)
TV Kiwi (Internal staff magazine)
### APPENDIX ONE

**DOCUMENTS CONSULTED**

**COMPLETE BROADCASTING FILES**

**RECORD OF COMPLETE MINUTES**

#### BC OR BCNZ

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Minutes and Associated Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Minutes and Associated Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Minutes and Associated Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Minutes and Associated Papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Minutes and Associated Papers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### TELEVISION ONE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Minutes and Papers</td>
<td>Aug-Dec 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Minutes and Papers</td>
<td>Jan-Jul 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jul-Sep 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct-Nov 1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Minutes and Papers</td>
<td>Feb-Mar 1978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Minutes and Papers</td>
<td>Jun-Aug 1978</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### TELEVISION TWO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975-79</td>
<td>Minutes; Some associated papers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-80</td>
<td>Various papers; memos; internal Correspondence; Reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**COMBINED DIRECTORS-GENERAL MEETINGS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975/76</td>
<td>Minutes</td>
<td>Jan 1975-Dec 1976</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**BOM/CEC**

1977  Minutes and Papers  Apr-May 1977 incomplete
      Minutes and papers  Jun-Aug 1977

**FINANCE & PLANNING COMMITTEE**


---

**TV-ONE ARCHIVES**

(NB There is only one file for any entry for which no number of files is given)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>No.Files</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BOX ONE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>A.E. Morris</td>
<td>Jan-Dec 76</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCNZ</td>
<td>Papers and Minutes</td>
<td>Jan-Dec 77</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr-Dec 78</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZBC/BC</td>
<td>Working Party</td>
<td>74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOX TWO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence</td>
<td>Oct-Mar 74-75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr-Dec 75</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Dec 76</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Mar,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jun-Dec 77</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Mar 78</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 76</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Select Committee and</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review on Broadcasting:</td>
<td></td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other files</td>
<td>Royal Tour</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Legal/general</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOX THREE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV-1 Corporation/Standing Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr 74-Jul 75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minutes and Papers</td>
<td>Aug-Dec 75</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Dec 76</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Nov 77</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined Directors-General meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOM/CEC</td>
<td>Minutes and Papers</td>
<td>Jan-Nov 77</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>No. Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other files</td>
<td>TV-2 Correspondence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TV-1 Open Day</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TV-1/2 Studios</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABU Sports Working Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOX FOUR</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV-1 Controllers' meetings</td>
<td>1975-1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVNZ Controllers' meetings</td>
<td>Feb-Oct 80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complementarity meetings</td>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCNZ Finance and Planning Committee</td>
<td>Nov 78-Ju 79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jun-Dec 79</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb-Sep 80</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVNZ CIP Fund</td>
<td>Mar-Dec 80</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOX FIVE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCNZ Programme Policy</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCNZ Correspondence</td>
<td>Jan-Mar 78</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Apr-Nov 79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jan-Nov 80</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey Enquiry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grey Costs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence with Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence with News</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamilton Advisory Committee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actors Equity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Musicians', Writers Guild</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avalon Creche</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Correspondence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>Finance, staffing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOX SIX</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV-1 Standing Committee Minutes and Papers</td>
<td>Feb-Dec 78</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Feb-Nov 79</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Board TV-1 Budgets</td>
<td>1978-1979</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>1979-1980</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Various Departmental finances (detail)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence General from 1978</td>
<td>1978-1981</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Club</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas Visits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Programmes Meetings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correspondence Various</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auckland station</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCNZ Heads of Department Reports</td>
<td>Nov 80-Nov 81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other files</td>
<td>QE II Arts Council</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>No. Files</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOX SEVEN</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV-1 Controller</td>
<td>Engineering Management Services Sales and Marketing Programmes Programme Services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Departmental</td>
<td>Current Affairs Information Services Drama Finance Entertainment Sales and Marketing Sport</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other files</td>
<td>TVODA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOX EIGHT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TV-1 Formal Complaints</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous (Mostly presentation, publicity)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunedin visit Queenstown Thomas Case (Arthur Allan) Contracts copies for Alan Morris NZBC Restructuring</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX TWO

ORGANISATION CHARTS
STRUCTURE OF THE COUNCIL AND THE CORPORATIONS

Broadcasting Council of New Zealand

Chairman TV-1

Chairman TV-2

Chairman RNZ

Chairman BCNZ

Deputy Chairman BCNZ

BCNZ Member

Secretary

D-G TV-1

D-G TV-2

D-G RNZ

TV-1 Member

Chairman TV-1

TV-1 Member

Television Service One

Director-General TV-1

TV-2 Member

Chairman TV-2

Television Service Two

Director-General TV-2

TV-2 Member

RNZ Member

Radio New Zealand

RNZ Member

Chairman RNZ

RNZ Member

Director-General RNZ
**Television Organisation - from NZBC to TVNZ - 1975 to 1986**

1975: (Broadcasting Act 1974) NZBC restructured into individual corporations: TV1, TV2, RNZ and Broadcasting Council. Broadcasting Authority (standards etc) absorbed into Broadcasting Council.

**TV1**: Operating from Wellington and Dunedin.

- **Director-General**
  - Controller of Programmes
    - Programme Planning & Purchasing
    - News & Current Affairs
    - Information Programmes
    - Entertainment
    - Drama
    - Presentation, Publicity & Promotions
  - **Controller of Sales and Marketing**
    - Sales
    - Advertising Traffic
    - Commercial Production
    - Marketing Services
    - Merchandising
  - **Controller of Programme Services**
    - Film Services
    - Design Services
    - Production Facilities
  - **Controller of Engineering**
    - Engineering
    - Technical Maintenance
  - **Controller of Management Services**
    - Finance
    - Office Services
    - Personnel Services
    - Information Services
  - **Programme Manager, Dunedin**

**South Pacific Television (TV2)**: Operating from Auckland and Christchurch.

- **Director-General**
  - Controller of Programmes
    - Programme Purchasing, Sales & Service
    - Information Programmes
    - Entertainment
    - Drama
    - Presentation & Publicity
  - **Editor of News**
  - **Director of Sales and Marketing**
    - Sales
    - Sales Administration
    - Merchandising
    - Marketing Services
  - **Controller of Programme Services**
    - Film Services
    - Design Services
    - Production Facilities
  - **Controller of Engineering**
    - Engineering Planning
    - Technical Maintenance
  - **Controller of Management Services**
    - Finance
    - Executive Services
    - Personnel Services
    - Property
    - Administration
1980: TV1 and TV2 amalgamated into Television New Zealand (amended Broadcasting Act)

Production Service and Network Service, one service to make programmes and the other to broadcast them.

Director-General, Production Service

Controller of Programme Production
- General & Special Interest Programmes
- Entertainment
- Drama
- Documentaries & Features
- Childrens Programmes

- Controller of News, Current Affairs & Sport

- Controller of Programme Services
  - Film Services
  - Design Services
  - Production Facilities

- Television Managers: AK, WN, CH, DN

- Controller of Finance, Auckland

- Head of Personnel Services, Auckland

Director-General, Network Service

- Controller of Programming
  - Programme Planning & Purchasing
  - Presentation, Publicity & Promotions

- Controller of Engineering
  - Engineering
  - Technical Maintenance

- Controller of Finance, Wellington

- Head of Personnel Services, Wellington

- Director of Sales and Marketing
  - Sales
  - Sales Operations
  - Marketing
  - Merchandising