EU Normative Socialisation in its Eastern Neighbourhood:

Democratisation in Armenia through the European Neighbourhood Policy

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in European Studies

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Abstract

The EU, over time, has garnered international recognition and acclaim as a successful agent of democratisation in third countries. The transitions of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the 1980s coupled with the recent Eastern enlargements of the EU into erstwhile communist space attest to the success of the EU in fostering tangible democratisation. However, as the EU rapidly approaches its institutional capacity, questions remain as to its viability as an agent of democratisation in the post-enlargement setting where the EU can no longer offer full membership as an incentive for political and economic reform. This thesis attempts to examine the viability of the EU as a democratic facilitator in the post-enlargement setting, through examination of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), a policy described by the EU as ‘everything but institutions’. Two mechanisms of normative transfer relative to the ENP were identified in the literature: conditionality, where the EU attaches incentives for successful political and economic reform, and socialisation, a newer notion whereby norms are transferred through increasing and deepening interaction with domestic actors. It was ascertained that in the context of the ENP, socialisation represented the dominant mechanism for normative change; conditionality was still utilised as a mechanism, however its scope had greatly reduced. To illuminate the phenomenon of EU democratic promotion, the case study of Armenia was chosen, a small but politically intriguing state in the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood which had experienced (as is the case with the majority of post-Soviet states) stagnation and regression of the democratisation process since independence. Two facets of the EU’s democratisation strategy inherent in the ENP were chosen as empirical research areas: free and fair elections and interaction with domestic civil society organisations (CSOs). Free and fair elections offered evaluation of the conditionality aspects of the ENP through examining the 2008 Armenian presidential election. Interaction with domestic Armenian CSOs presented a rich phenomenon to examine the impact of socialisation in the ENP through utilising a case study examining four democratically minded NGOs. Ultimately, this thesis contends that through the ENP, the EU can no longer effectively wield conditionality as a viable mechanism of normative change and currently lacks the tools or a suitable environment to initialise normative transfers through socialisation. Consequently, it is argued that the EU has had little effect in facilitating democratisation in Armenia since the advent of the ENP.
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................... 1

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... 2

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations .............................................................................. 7

List of Illustrations and Tables ....................................................................................... 8

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 10

  Research Questions and Methodology ....................................................................... 13
  Research Objectives and Research Questions .......................................................... 14
  Research Design and Methodology ............................................................................. 16
  Data Collection Methods ............................................................................................. 18
  Case Studies ................................................................................................................ 20
  Validity Concerns ....................................................................................................... 20
  Delimitations .............................................................................................................. 21
  Terminology and Definitions ..................................................................................... 22

Chapter 1: Conceptualising the EU’s interaction in its Eastern Neighbourhood: A Theoretical Overview ......................................................................................... 28

  Theories of Democratisation ....................................................................................... 29
  The Traditional Approaches ....................................................................................... 30
  The Diffusion Approach ............................................................................................. 32
  Theories of Democratisation: Summary ..................................................................... 33

  Theoretical Framework ............................................................................................. 34
  Coalition Mode for External Assistance of Democratisation ....................................... 34
  Political Conditionality ............................................................................................... 41
  Normative Socialisation .............................................................................................. 45
  The ENP: Socialisation and Conditionality ................................................................ 50

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 52

Chapter 2: Converging Trajectories: The Evolution of the EU’s Normative Policy and the Path of Democratisation in Armenia ................................................................. 54

  EU Branch of Literature ............................................................................................ 55
  Historical Overview: The EU as an Agent of Democratisation .................................... 55

  Democratisation and the ENP .................................................................................... 57

  Summary ..................................................................................................................... 60

  Armenian Branch of Literature ................................................................................. 61
Armenia’s Democratisation Trajectory ................................................................. 61
Armenian Cultural Heritage: A European Nation? .................................................. 65
Armenian Diaspora .................................................................................................. 66
Geopolitics of Armenia ............................................................................................. 67
Summary .................................................................................................................... 70
EU-Armenia Branch of Literature ........................................................................... 70
EU-Armenia Relations: Advent of the ENP .............................................................. 70
EU-Armenia: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement ............................................ 71
EU-Armenia: European Neighbourhood Policy ....................................................... 71
EU-Armenia: Eastern Partnership ............................................................................ 72
Summary .................................................................................................................... 73
Mapping the ENP: Examining the Official Documents ............................................ 74
Strategy Papers ........................................................................................................ 74
Armenian Country Report and Action Plan .............................................................. 75
Progress Reports ...................................................................................................... 78
Summary .................................................................................................................... 79
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 80

Chapter 3:  The Visible Democracy: EU Promotion of Free and Fair Elections in Armenia... 82

The International Dimension of Free and Fair Elections ........................................... 83
Historical Context of Elections in Democracy ......................................................... 83
International Constraints of Election Promotion ..................................................... 85
Summary .................................................................................................................... 86
The EU’s promotion of Free and Fair Elections ....................................................... 87
Historical Context of the EU’s Promotion of Free and Fair Elections ....................... 87
EU Promotion of Free and Fair Elections in Armenia: Evaluating the ENP ............... 89
Prescribed Reform: Electoral Code ......................................................................... 89
Prescribed Reform: Electoral Administration ............................................................ 90
Summary .................................................................................................................... 91
Case Study of the 2008 Armenian Presidential Election ............................................. 92
OSCE EOM Report: Overview ............................................................................... 95
OSCE EOM Report: Electoral Code ....................................................................... 96
OSCE EOM Report: Electoral Administration .......................................................... 97
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 101
Chapter 4: The Grassroots Philosophy: The EU’s Interaction with Civil Society Organisations in Armenia

Civil Society and Democratisation
International Promotion of Civil Society
Summary
EU Democratic Promotion and Civil Society
Civil Society Promotion in the ENP
Summary
Case Study: EU Interaction with Four Armenian NGOs
NGO-A
NGO-B
NGO-C
NGO-D
Thematic trends of EU interaction with NGOs in Armenia
Conclusion

Chapter 5: The EU’s Influence on Democratisation in Armenia: Tangible Rewards or Paper Tiger?

Political Conditionality
Measuring Political Conditionality
Summary
Normative Socialisation
Measuring Normative Socialisation
Summary
EU and the Coalition Mode
The Eastern Partnership: The Great Hope?
Assessing Impact: Democratic Improvement or Stagnation in Armenia
Contextual Variables
Recommendations
Conclusion
Research Questions
Thesis Summary
Limitations
Future Study
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 156
  Scholarly Sources ......................................................................................................................... 156
  Working/Conference Papers ......................................................................................................... 168
  Institutional Documents .............................................................................................................. 171
  Online News Sources ................................................................................................................ 173
Appendices ...................................................................................................................................... 175
  Appendix A: University of Canterbury Human Ethics Approval .................................................. 175
  Appendix B: Questionnaire for interviews with Armenian NGOs ............................................... 176
  Appendix C: Democratic Ratings Data for Armenia ................................................................. 177
    Freedom House ......................................................................................................................... 177
  Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009 ...................... 179
### List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>ENP Action Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>Baku to Ceyhan Oil Pipeline</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEC</td>
<td>Armenian Central Election Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEE</td>
<td>Central Eastern Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIS</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Civil Society Forum</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>EOM</td>
<td>Election Observation Mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICCPR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>Inter-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IYC</td>
<td>It's Your Choice NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KAB</td>
<td>Kars-Akhalkalaki-Baku Railroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NK</td>
<td>Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEC</td>
<td>Armenian Prescient Election Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEM</td>
<td>Single European Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States</td>
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<td>TEC</td>
<td>Armenian Territorial Election Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
List of Illustrations and Tables

**Figure 1:** The three approaches offered by Jacoby in relation to international modes of external influence

**Figure 2:** The Coalition approach as utilised in this thesis with regards to EU promotion of democracy in Armenia

**Figure 3:** Variables of political conditionality

**Figure 4:** Variables of normative socialisation

**Figure 5:** The ENP in action: The logic and strategies of the democratisation policy embedded in the ENP

**Figure 6:** Map of the Southern Caucasus

**Figure 7:** EU interaction with the four NGOs examined

**Figure 8:** Measurements of Conditionality vis-à-vis the 2008 Presidential Election

**Figure 9:** Measurements of Socialisation vis-à-vis the EU’s interaction with CSOs

**Figure 10:** Freedom House ratings for Armenia (1991-2010)
Introduction

As the 20th century has waned into the 21st century, the European Union (EU) has emerged as a viable and enthusiastic normative power in the post-Soviet international system. Initially conceived as a post-World War II coal and steel community comprising of six member states (known as the European Coal and Steel Community), European integration has progressed at a formidable pace of deepening and widening resulting in a twenty seven member union with strong international economic and political presence. Additionally, the EU exerts symbolic and normative power through a strong identification with the perceived tenets of European success, namely economic liberalisation coupled with adherence to democracy, human rights and rule of law.\(^1\) Subsequently, the EU has gradually developed a self-perception as a legitimate normative authority in the international system, which explains the strong emphasis and focus on political reform in third countries, such as the transitioning states born from the collapse of the Soviet Union.\(^2\) It can be argued that the EU now represents the largest exporter of norms outside of the United States, employing a strategy of gradually rebuilding the world in their own image, or in other words Europeanising the rest of the world.\(^3\) While the actual results might not be as profound as the terminology suggests, the EU has become an important and salient actor in the international system; one that provides massive implications in the democratisation trajectories of transitioning states. The evolution of the EU as a normative power has coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transitioning of erstwhile Soviet space from the ideology of communism towards Western models of democracy. Given the geographic proximity and the geopolitical importance of the post-Soviet states bordering the EU, the Eastern Neighbourhood of the EU represents a potentially fruitful region for furthering the EU’s normative agenda.

Of all the emerging or re-emerging states born from the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia represents perhaps the most peculiar and unique case. Armenia has a rich and prominent cultural awareness; an awareness that spans as far back as antiquity and has remained mobilised amongst its people, largely due to the domination and torment suffered at the hands of other invading empires and states. As Kapuściński, in his seminal work Imperium observed, in Armenia, time is measured in millennia, not centuries. Despite this rich cultural legacy which has fuelled the cohesion of the Armenian nation, the Armenian state up until the fall of the Soviet Union had experienced some sixteen centuries without statehood. Add the recent memories of the purported 1915 Armenian genocide at the hands of the Ottoman Empire, the 70 years of Soviet domination that followed, and the war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK); it is fair to argue that Armenia has traversed a burdensome path towards independence and self-determination. Armenians are defiantly and proudly a Christian nation, they have a homogenous population, identify closely with European civilization, have a large European based diaspora, and since 2006 are more closely linked with Europe through the initiation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Yet, despite the optimism for democratisation in Armenia, the infancy of independence coupled with the realities of transitioning from a Soviet system to a Western one greatly reduces the prospect for successful democratisation in Armenia, in the near future at least.

This thesis examines the convergence of two phenomena: the EU as a democratic facilitator with the development of Armenian democratisation. In the wake of the latest enlargement of the EU which resulted in the integration of ten new members, the EU’s neighbourhood has expanded to the peripheries of Europe, incorporating a number of states from the erstwhile Soviet Union. Subsequently, states such as Armenia have experienced a substantial increase in interaction with the EU, including interaction related to the EU’s democratisation ethos and policies. However, despite the prior successes of EU democratic facilitation, the newer policy personified by the ENP does not dangle the incentive of membership, perhaps the greatest single factor for their previous democratic achievements, which casts doubt over the likely prospects for successful democratisation in its Eastern

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Neighbourhood.\(^7\) Armenia, as evident in the majority of post-Soviet states, has failed to harness the democratic enthusiasm exhibited at the fall of the Soviet Union and has gradually reverted back towards an entrenched authoritarian system.\(^8\) Therefore, the EU’s democratic policies face a difficult setting for democratisation, exacerbated in Armenia’s case by on-going conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the Soviet legacy, the rise of influential oligarchs, the importance of the diaspora, the difficulty of undertaking multiple simultaneous transitions, and the prevalence of widespread public apathy.\(^9\) This thesis analyses and tests the EU’s impact in Armenian democratisation since the advent of the ENP in 2006. The empirical research focuses on two salient areas of democratisation: elections, through examining the 2008 Armenian presidential election; and civil society, through examining EU interaction with democratically-minded civil society organisations (CSOs), specifically non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Ultimately, this thesis aims to postulate and determine whether democracy can be exported from an international entity such as the EU to a transitional state such as Armenia in a post-enlargement era where membership is no longer dangled as an incentive for successful political reform.

Structurally, this thesis is developed over seven chapters. The *Introduction* combines the opening remarks with a section outlining the research questions and methodology. The latter section examines the key methodological aspects of this thesis with an outlining of the research questions, research design, data collection methods, case studies, validity concerns, delimitations, and the terminology and definitions. Essentially, the *introduction* provides a structural layout or framework for this thesis. *Chapter 1 provides* an in-depth look at the theoretical literature eminent in the democratisation discourse and constructs a theoretical framework to examine EU promotion of democracy in its Eastern Neighbourhood, specifically Armenia. The chapter develops an overarching model informed by the work of Jacoby and illuminated through engagement with the theoretical literature from the political conditionality and normative socialisation fields of international relations. *Chapter 2 examines and engages* with the prominent scholarly literature related to the contextual aspects of this thesis, namely the historical development of the EU as a

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\(^8\) Ishkanian.

\(^9\) Ibid.
democratic agent and the positioning of democratisation in the ENP, the trajectory of Armenian democratisation coupled with a number of supplementary factors (identity, diaspora and geopolitics), the progression of the EU-Armenian relationship since 1991 Armenian independence, and lastly in light of the literature review, the evaluation of the official documents of the ENP. Chapter 3 and 4 represent the two empirical chapters of this thesis which intend to highlight the phenomenon of EU promotion of democratisation in Armenia. Chapter 3 examines the EU’s role in promoting free and fair elections in Armenia. Specifically, the 2008 Armenian Presidential Elections are utilised as a case study and are closely scrutinised in relation to the pre-election recommendations and post-election critique offered by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CoE). Chapter 4 evaluates the EU’s interaction with CSOs, specifically NGOs, through offering a case study of four democratically minded Armenian NGOs. Four thematic trends apparent in the case study are identified and posited. Chapter 5 acts as a bridge-chapter reconnecting the empirical evidence of chapters four and five with the theoretical framework of Chapter 1. The empirical findings of the previous chapters are re-evaluated specifically in relation to the outlined measurements for political conditionality and normative socialisation. Lastly, consideration is given to the viability of the theoretical framework in explaining EU action, the potential role of the Eastern Partnership (EaP), the impact of the ENP on democratisation in Armenia as well as offering a number of recommendations. The Conclusion presents the finishing remarks for this thesis with a specific section re-examining the research questions as well as sections pertaining to the limitations of the study and paths for future study.

**Research Questions and Methodology**

This section examines the research questions and methodology which structurally drives this thesis. First, the format of this section begins with examination of the research questions deemed crucial to evaluating EU democratic interaction in their Eastern Neighbourhood through the evaluation of Armenia. Second, the research design and methodology utilised in this thesis will be examined in light of the research questions. Third, an outline and justification of the data collection methods employed in the thesis will be
developed. Last, a section comprising of validity concerns, delimitations and terminology will complete the research questions and methodology section of the introduction.

Research Objectives and Research Questions

This thesis focuses specifically on EU promotion of democratisation, as stipulated in the ENP since the year 2006, by utilising Armenia as the primary case study. The primary research objective for examining democratisation in Armenia via the external influence of the EU is to evaluate whether democratisation can be exported and whether the EU is still an effective agent of democratisation in the post-enlargement era of the ENP. This thesis also touches on a number of secondary research objectives which include examining democratisation in the post-Soviet context, the geopolitical dimensions of democratisation and the effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Armenia represents a viable case study as the signing and implementation of the ENP since 2006 has resulted in closer interaction between the EU and Armenia in the field of democratisation. Through utilising Armenia as the primary case study, this thesis intends the research to be applicable to the broader context of EU promotion of democratisation in their Eastern Neighbourhood (specifically the Eastern members of the ENP, namely: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and the non-ENP post-Soviet states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

In order to achieve the research objectives, the overarching research question asks: How has EU interaction with Armenia as stipulated in the ENP impacted on democratisation (specifically, EU promotion of free and fair elections and EU interaction with domestic CSOs) since 2006? Examination of the research question will be aided by utilisation of a modified version of the coalition approach pioneered by Wade Jacoby (with additional use of the conditionality and socialisation literature). The specific areas of free and fair elections and interaction with CSOs represent the dominant empirical fields of inquiry in this thesis related to democratic interaction. The year 2006 is chosen as the start time for evaluation as it coincides with the beginning of the implementation process of the ENP in Armenia. To narrow and supplement the research question, a number of sub-questions are employed.

The first sub-question asks: How has the EU exported democratic norms in their neighbourhood prior to the 2005 ENP? The first sub-question examines EU interaction in the
wider context of the EU’s neighbourhood prior to the ENP which enables greater clarity when examining the effect of the ENP on democratisation. Historical understanding of the EU’s evolution into an international democratic agent is paramount when attempting to understand the motives and rationale that guide the EU’s neighbourhood policy. Consequently, this sub-question is EU-centric in scope. Furthermore, historical interaction between the entities of the EU and Armenia also warrants closer inspection under this sub-question in order to illuminate the progression of contemporary relations and policies between the two entities since cordial relations began in 1991.

The second sub-question asks: What has the trajectory of democratisation in Armenia looked like since the 1988 Karabakh movement and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union? Similarly to the first sub-question, the second sub-question examines historical factors judged important to the thesis; particularly the phenomenon of democratisation in Armenia since the fall of the Soviet Union up until the advent of the ENP. The Karabakh movement refers to the initial democratisation movement and denotes a necessary starting point when examining democratisation in Armenia given it represents the first popular movement for democracy in Armenia and coincided with Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika policies. Furthermore, it is argued that Armenia’s experience of democratisation since independence affects the implementation process and direction of EU policies.

The third sub-question asks: How does the external (non-EU) geopolitical environment of Armenia in the Caucasus shape EU democratic facilitation? This sub-question examines the influential and uncertain geopolitical environment of the Caucasus which dramatically influences external actors’ interests and interaction with Armenia. Due to the broad and complex nature of this sub-question, two further sub-questions are required to narrow the initial question: how does the close relationship Armenia shares with Russia affect EU democratisation initiatives and how does the extensive Armenian diaspora impact on EU democratisation initiatives? Russian influence and Armenian diaspora are considered the most important geopolitical factors which impact on the EU’s democratisation efforts. It is acknowledged that other external actors such as the United States also have strong geopolitical influence in Armenia, but this influence impacts less on democracy and more in the realm of security and defence.
The last sub-question asks: what specific reform is prescribed in the ENP? The last sub-question initially examines the specific reform outlined by the EU in the official documents of the ENP in relation to democratisation. However, two of the reform areas prescribed in the ENP official documents have been chosen as the specific empirical topics for this thesis; EU promotion of free and fair elections and EU interaction with CSOs. Therefore, the fourth sub-question requires two further sub-questions: how has the EU promoted free and fair elections in Armenia through the ENP and how has the EU engaged with CSOs since the implementation of the ENP? Concisely, free and fair elections were selected as they are frequently mentioned in official documents and represent a visible marker of democracy, while CSOs were selected due to their perceived importance in democratisation and the perceived role the EU has in promoting and interacting with CSOs.

Ultimately, the research question and sub-questions have been formulated in order to account for the dominant factors affecting EU promotion of democratisation in Armenia. The questions take into account salient historical, social, geopolitical and EU-centric factors which play both singular and interrelated roles in the democratisation process. In relation to thesis structure, the first three sub-questions are in-part answered in Chapter 2 but also receive attention intermittently throughout the subsequent chapters. The fourth sub-question is answered through two chapters focusing on free and fair elections (Chapter 3) and interaction with CSOs (Chapter 4).

**Research Design and Methodology**

Given the relative micro-nature of the study, a qualitative approach is judged as the appropriate methodology in examining the influence of the ENP on democratisation in the Eastern Neighbourhood through engaging with the case of Armenia. Quantitative data is utilised in this thesis (albeit as a minor indicator) through the examination of Freedom House’s Democratic ratings in order to further illuminate the EU’s impact on democratisation in Armenia. Indeed quantitative methods are more likely produce data which is rigorous and objective as well as increasing the ability to produce generalisations. However, it is also argued that producing and acquiring quantitative data in social science presents a number of issues, for example, the problem of assigning a figure to subjective matter which drains the data of its variety, richness, and individual character. Thus, while
this thesis relies predominately on the collection and analysis of qualitative data, quantitative data is utilised as a supplementary tool. It is acknowledged that there are inherent difficulties in pursuing qualitative-centric research, such as identifying cause-and-effect relationships and producing impartial conclusions and generalisations. As Myers stated:

qualitative studies are tools used in understanding and describing the world of human experience... since we maintain our humanity throughout the research process, it is largely impossible to escape the subjective experience, even for the most seasoned of researchers. ¹⁰

However, in adopting a qualitative approach the research aims to increase the validity of collected data through triangulation by utilising multiple data collection methods, multiple data sources and a range of scholarly theories. ¹¹ Therefore, this research adheres to the post-positivist school of thought which holds that human knowledge is not based on unchallengeable rigid foundations but rather that knowledge is conjectural and should be viewed in circular and hermeneutic terms. ¹²

The research design espouses a theoretical approach using a framework based on the coalition mode for external assistance to democratisation as proposed by Wade Jacoby. Additionally, the theoretical approaches of political conditionality and normative socialisation developed by prominent scholars including Schimmelfennig, Checkel and Kelley will be employed in order to further illuminate the coalition mode. The utilisation of these theories is extensively examined in the Chapter 1 which attempts to connect the theories of conditionality and socialisation under the umbrella of the coalition approach in regards to EU promotion of democratisation in its Eastern Neighbourhood. Thus, the theoretical chapter offers a theoretical based literature review and the creation of a parsimonious framework to critique democratisation in Armenia. Subsequently, as this research utilises a theoretical approach, deductive reasoning will be employed as the structural logic of this

thesis; starting with the coalition mode and concluding with Armenia as the test case study. Furthermore, this study employs a longitudinal design as it evaluates EU interaction in Armenia in the scope of democratisation since 2006.

Data Collection Methods

Given the contemporary nature of the thesis topic, information gathered from primary sources accounts for the crux of data examined in this thesis. Furthermore, as already mentioned, the majority of the data collected is qualitative in scope with some quantitative data used as an auxiliary data source. Two data collection methods are predominately used: semi-structured interviews and the archival method of document analysis.

Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with key informants identified as instrumental in the democratisation process in Armenia. Four, hour-long interviews were undertaken with respective officials of local democracy-orientated NGOs from Armenia during a month long field-trip to Armenia. Two of the NGOs had progressive or long-standing ties with the EU and two had regressive or minimal ties. Interviews were sought with members of the European Commission Delegation to Armenia. However, after a number of informal meetings, semi-structured interviews with Delegate Officials never eventuated due to their busy schedules. Semi-structured interviews produce limitations for data collection given the reliance on the interviewer’s skill in engaging and building a rapport with the participant as well as the difficulty in repeating and generalising across interviews. Wengraf describes semi-structured interviews as “high-preparation, high-risk, high-gain, and high-analysis operations”\(^\text{13}\) which require the right conditions to yield rich and viable data. However, in relation to this thesis, a semi-structured format was judged as the most-appropriate form of interview due to the ability to ask open-ended questions and the opportunity to engage in conversational discussion and debate with the participants.\(^\text{14}\) Furthermore, semi-structured interviews were identified as being an invaluable tool in acquiring reliable and comparative qualitative data. All data collected from the interviews was recorded via voice recorder,

\(^{13}\) Tom Wengraf, *Qualitative Research Interviewing: Biographic Narrative and Semi-Structured Methods* (London: SAGE, 2001), 5.

then once transcribed, the interview transcripts were sent back to the key informants for review. Additionally, it should be acknowledge that all the interviews were conducted in English, which in each case did not represent the mother-tongue of any of the participants. This poses potential limitations on the participants’ level of understanding and ability to answer the questions fully.

*Archival method*

The archival method of document analysis was employed in order to analyse a number of official documents produced by the EU in relation to the ENP and Armenia. The key documents identified were: first, the initial official document of the ENP, the 2004 *European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper* which outlined strategies and goals of the ENP in a broad scope specific to the region rather than individual countries. Second, two Armenian specific documents, the *Armenia: Country Strategy Paper 2007-20013* which examined the political environment of Armenia and the objectives of EU interaction in Armenia, and the *EU-Armenia Action Plan (AP)* which outlines the formal framework for EU-Armenian relations. Third, yearly assessment documents known as *progress reports* which provided updated information on the successes and failures of the implementation process of the ENP in Armenia. Lastly, a number of EU commissioned documents, IGO reports, NGO reports and observer reports act as auxiliary sources in evaluating the successes and failures of the ENP implementation process. The archival method allows for coherent document and policy analysis in the scope of EU interaction in Armenia. Importantly, as the EU has a high output of documents regarding their policies, the archival method is a necessary tool in examining EU action. Additionally, the official documents of the EU will be analysed by evoking an interpretive analysis focusing on context of the documents in relation to democratisation.

Given the difficulty of undertaking interviews with EU officials, the archival method presents a viable alternative which, coupled with the semi-structured interviews, allows for in-depth analysis of EU interaction in Armenia in the scope of democratisation.
Case Studies

This thesis relies heavily on case study based research to test and evaluate the research questions. Firstly, Armenia represents a meta case study (or macro case study) which is examined in order to illuminate the EU’s democratisation strategy in their Eastern Neighbourhood. Additionally, two further micro-case studies are employed in this thesis in order to illustrate the phenomenon in question and provide empirical evidence. A case study of the 2008 Armenian presidential election is engaged in Chapter 3 in order to examine the influence of the EU in the realm of free and fair elections. A case study examining the EU’s interaction with four democratically-minded NGOs in Armenia is utilised in Chapter 4 in order to evaluate the level of interaction between the EU and CSOs. As Yin argues, case studies allow the researcher to account for contemporary phenomena within real-life contexts as well as producing a more complete analysis and identifying commonalities.\(^\text{15}\)

Validity Concerns

The research and formulation of this thesis has presented a number of validity concerns which potentially hinder the robustness of the results. Firstly, it is acknowledged that there are inherent issues with conducting semi-structured interviews with key informants. Although semi-structured interviews are undoubtedly a strength of the research, it is noted that collected data from the interviews may be subject to inaccuracies from interviewer or participant, as well as possible discrepancies in the transcription process.\(^\text{16}\) Secondly, the small number of participants in the interview process reduces validity due to the inability to collect a larger and wider set of information. Furthermore, the small number of interviews reduces the potential for the triangulation of data.\(^\text{17}\) Thirdly, the inability to undertake interviews with members of the European Commission Delegation to Armenia and the government of the Republic of Armenia inhibited the validity of the thesis as acquiring an official response from the two major actors involved in the crux of this thesis research would have undoubtedly increased credibility. Fourthly, the inability to observe the 2008 presidential election in Armenia in person, within the context of being free and fair

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 22.
elections, is an obvious validity concern. Additionally, in the absence of primary fieldwork, the use of documents from international observers, the EU, domestic NGOs, and governmental sources produces issues with credibility of information.18 Lastly, the contemporary nature of this thesis can also be identified as a validity concern. Given the instability of the Armenian government and their position in the precarious Eurasian geopolitical sphere, it is difficult to evaluate the general direction and implementation of EU democratic policies. For instance, the initiation of rapprochement between the Armenia and Turkish governments (which has serious ramifications for the democratic process and EU influence), although announced in September 2009, has yet to manifest itself in observable action and may take years due to the anti-Turkish public opinion and the difficulty of reconciling the Armenian genocide.19 Additionally, the proposed Association Agreement (AA) as a result of the initiated EaP by the EU could potentially alter the nature of EU-Armenian relations and democratisation strategies in the future.20 However, while this thesis attempts to adequately account for the EaP, the actual concrete manifestation of the EaP has remained veiled and difficult to assess to date.

Delimitations

Due to the broad nature of EU interaction in Armenia, this thesis employs a number of delimitations in order to preserve the viability and integrity of the research. The first delimitation is that this thesis intends to only review the democratic aspect of the EU’s normative agenda evident in the ENP. The remaining EU normative principles of human rights, rule of law and market economy transition, while related to democracy, are not considered due to the narrower scope of this thesis. The second delimitation places the scope of this thesis on EU interaction in Armenia. While references are made to other states experiencing EU interaction through the ENP, this occurs solely in order to further illuminate the process of EU interaction in Armenia. Furthermore, democratisation in Armenia will be examined solely in the context of interaction with the EU and not in relation to other foreign

donors such as the United States, IGOs and International NGOs (such as the Soros Institute). A final delimitation will be that EU facilitation of democratisation in Armenia will only be considered and analysed since 2006. Indeed, this thesis places great weight in the historical experience of both the EU and Armenian nation; however, historical analysis is utilised as a supplementary or guiding force rather than a primary research field.

**Terminology and Definitions**

The topic of EU promotion of democratisation in Armenia involves abstract concepts and ideas, few of which have consensual operational definitions. For instance, the definition of democracy is a highly contested subject within political science but remains a cornerstone of this thesis’ field of inquiry. Furthermore, this thesis utilises a number of colloquial and acute terms related specifically to the EU and Armenia. Therefore it is necessary to provide a section outlining the key terminology and definitions of the concepts and language central to this thesis.

**Democracy**

Engaging with the historic and perpetual debate surrounding the definition of democracy would be beyond the scope of this thesis. Although democracy represents a central notion of this thesis, entering into the debate on what constitutes a democracy would be counter-productive. Therefore, this thesis adheres to a neither a maximalist nor a minimalist definition of democracy but rather evokes a middle-ground definition of democracy based on popular participation and electoral integrity. Dahl’s seven minimum conditions for democracy provides a parsimonious framework of democracy which this thesis adheres to as it places great importance in the electoral process, citizenry rights, freedom of speech and freedom of civil society.\(^{21}\) Such a definition fits with the two central investigation points of this thesis in relation to democracy in Armenia: free and fair elections and civil society engagement.

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\(^{21}\) Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, p.11; The seven conditions are: 1. Control of government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in public officials. 2. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon. 3. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 4. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government. 5. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined. 6. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law. 7. Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.
**Democratisation**

Democratisation, similarly to democracy, evokes a number of contested definitions and theories. As further explored in Chapter 2, this thesis forgoes traditional theories of democratisation as they do not effectively account for the influence of external actors.\(^{22}\) Additionally, the emerging diffusion school of democratisation, while sufficiently accounting for the importance of external actors, does not account for the importance of domestic actors on the ground.\(^{23}\) Therefore, this thesis employs a concept of democratisation focused on the role and influence of external actors posited by Wade Jacoby which argues that external actors engage with minority traditions to set up coalitions for which to transfer democratic values.\(^{24}\)

**Free and Fair Elections**

Free and fair elections lack a consensual and uniform definition in the international community. States and other international actors who actively engage in election promotion tend to judge on elections related to specific and often disparate definitions. Goodwin-Gil has emerged as the most prominent scholar in the free and fair debate where he argued that “attention should be paid to those specific obligations in the matter of elections already assumed by States, and to the equally accepted political human rights that may reasonably be linked thereto.” Subsequently, his definition of free and fair elections relies on the substance of accepted international conventions and the legal mechanisms of human rights such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the rules of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). However, Goodwin-Gil aside, free and fair elections remains a concept which is difficult to narrow into a working model or definition.

**Civil Society**

Civil society as a concept has been debated heavily by philosophers since antiquity. However, civil society’s contemporary relevance to democratisation owes to the dissidents from the authoritarian countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America who identified civil

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\(^{24}\) Ibid.
society development as an avenue for breaking authoritarian rule and the Americanisation of the debate through the popularised work of Putnam. Subsequently, for the interest of this thesis, a modern conceptualisation of civil society developed by Linz and Stepan is utilised. Linz and Stepan define civil society as “that arena of polity where self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.”

Socialisation

The term socialisation is used in a number of scholarly disciplines to refer to the process of inheriting norms, customs and ideologies. In the context of the EU, socialisation refers to an emerging body of scholarship which examines the “conditions under which, and mechanisms through which, institutions in Europe socialize states and state agents, leading them to internalize new roles or group-community norms.” Essentially, socialisation describes an agent’s transformation from following a logic of consequences to following a logic of appropriateness. Socialisation is judged in this thesis as representing an explicit component of the ENP, which through increasing interaction with third countries, the EU is attempting to socialise these countries with EU norms and values.

Conditionality

Conditionality purports a mechanism where states or organisations attach certain conditions to the offering of incentives such as financial aid and economic cooperation. In the context of the EU, the incentives of its neighbourhood policies are conditioned with political and economic reform in the recipient countries. Through incrementally offering trade agreements, cooperation and association agreements, aid, diplomatic recognition and eventual EU membership, the EU is employing a type of political conditionality in relations

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with third countries. Conditionality is examined in this thesis as an observable component and supplementary force of the ENP.

**Minority Traditions**

Wade Jacoby coined the term *minority traditions* in reference to domestic movements, parties, or subsets of state officials who have pursued, but never achieved, some specific institutional solution to an important political problem. Minority traditions can be a mixture of state or CSOs with whom the international actor shares common interest or ideology. In relation to democratisation, Jacoby argues that external actors engage and set up coalitions with like-minded minority traditions in order to transfer democratic values. It is argued that minority traditions are more or less interchangeable with the concept of transgovernmental actors developed in Freyburg’s (et al) democratic governance work.

**EU Normative Power**

The idea of the EU as a normative power owes to the scholarship of Duchêne who defined the EU as a “civilian power” based on economic and political means rather than military strength. The concept of the EU as a civilian power has gradually evolved to the notion of normative power which expanded and deviated from Duchêne’s original work to represent an ethos based on intangible objects such as culture, ideology and institutions. In this sense, the EU’s normative identity and ethos are founded upon the principles of Europeaness; that is, strict observance of democracy, human rights, rule of law and market economy principles. Given the broad literature on the EU’s normative identity and power, delineating a definition is difficult but receives further examination in Chapter 2.

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30 Ibid.
33 Manners.
34 Pace.
EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood

The use of the terminology Eastern Neighbourhood describes the geographically Eastern members of the ENP, namely; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Eastern Neighbourhood has been coined essentially to delineate between two geographically and politically distinct regions of the ENP, the Mediterranean states of the South and the former Soviet states of the East. Furthermore, although membership is not an explicit component of the ENP, the Eastern Neighbourhood may one day be eligible for EU membership whereas the Mediterranean members have no potential for future membership.35

EU’s Post-Enlargement Era

The term post-enlargement era, coined by this thesis, refers to the period directly after the latest secession of states to the EU in 2007. Many commentators contend that the recent explosion of the EU from 15 members to 27 in the space of three years represents the operational limits of the EU’s current institutional design.36 Yet it should be recognised that a number of states remain potential candidates for EU membership the near future (i.e. Croatia, Iceland, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, all whom have accession strategies in place). Subsequently, the potential for further enlargement is reduced solely to states with signed accession treaties excluding states incorporated in the ENP. Thus, the post-enlargement era is important in the context of EU promotion of democracy as it represents an era where membership can no longer be dangled as an incentive for democratisation.37

Oligarch

Oligarchy in the traditional sense of the word refers to a system of government where power resides in a number of small elites. However, in the post-Soviet context, oligarch refers to a business magnate who during the breakup of the Soviet Union has acquired

37 Andrew Rettman, “EU Unlikely to Expand into Post-Soviet East in Next Decade”, EU Observer.
substantial wealth and subsequently wields political power.⁳⁸ Oligarchs have become notable political actors in the post-Soviet context where their business interests often merge with political aspirations. Oligarchs are noticeable in all post-Soviet states where their wealth and influence goes relatively unchecked by the government.

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Chapter 1: Conceptualising the EU’s interaction in its Eastern Neighbourhood: A Theoretical Overview

This chapter outlines and develops a theoretical framework to explain and evaluate the EU’s promotion of democratisation in its Eastern Neighbourhood and more specifically Armenia. Through critically engaging with a number of prominent scholars in the field of European Studies and democratisation, this chapter offers a multi-faceted theoretical framework built on the notion that the EU’s external promotion of democratisation in the post-enlargement era is orientated towards facilitating closer interaction with domestic actors (state and non-state) of third countries. Initial consideration is given to the traditional and salient theories of democratisation from the broader spectrum of international relations. Three traditional theories (the modernization approach, the transition approach and the structural approach) and one contemporary theory (the diffusion approach) receive examination in relation to EU facilitation of democratisation. While these theories remain somewhat peripheral to the crux of this thesis, they provide important contextual and supplementary reference.

Thereafter, a theoretical framework for evaluating democratisation through EU action guided by the ENP is developed through evoking the scholarship of Jacoby. Jacoby offers a meta-theory which incorporates the work of a number of prominent EU-centric and post-Soviet democratisation scholars in a unified theory. Jacoby’s coalition mode is expanded to fit the ENP through illumination of the scholarship on political conditionality and normative socialisation. Political conditionality is examined through evocation of the work of Schimmelfennig, Sasse and Pridham with specific evaluation its place in the ENP (and coalition mode) and the delineation of four measurements of effective conditionality strategies. Normative socialisation is examined through engagement with the work of Checkel, Schimmelfennig and Kelley with assessment of its role in the ENP (and coalition mode) as well as the demarcation of three measurements of effective socialisation. The theoretical framework developed in this thesis aims to offer a parsimonious paradigm for which EU facilitation of democratisation in Armenia can be effectively tracked and evaluated.
Theories of Democratisation

The traditional (post-WWII) scholarship on democratisation generally distinguishes three theoretical approaches: the modernization approach, the transition approach, and the structural approach. These approaches originated in the 1960s and 1970s where the popular movements in Latin America conjugated with the decolonisation movements in Africa and Asia resulted in unprecedented levels of democratisation in the international system. Indeed, this unparalleled increase in democratisation became popularly known as the third wave of democratisation; the first wave representing the democratisation movements in of the early 19th century in the USA and Europe, the second wave commenced in the wake of WWII embodied in the democratisation movements of post-War Europe. In the post-Soviet setting, a number of scholars have posited that the emergence of new (potentially democratic) states may represent the start of a fourth wave, the widespread transition from communism to democracy. However, the fourth wave discourse has remained on the periphery of democratisation scholarship given the fractured transitions of post-Soviet states to date. While Huntington’s waves of democratization was produced significantly after and somewhat beyond the scope of the three traditional theoretical approaches (acting as a precursor to the diffusion approach), it nevertheless frames these approaches particularly well within the contextual setting of the 1960s and 1970s, a period of notable democratisation on a global level. Potter argued that the three traditional democratisation approaches represent general branches as “there are a large number of different explanations by authors between whom there can be important theoretical differences” which remain linked by overarching ideas about democratisation. Furthermore, Potter noted that:

between these three general approaches are certain shared interests... each approach, then, does not offer a totally different type of explanation from the other two, but the emphasis of each is certainly different.

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42 Ibid., 11.
The Traditional Approaches

The *modernization approach* pioneered by Lipset during the 1960s argued that democracy is directly related to a state’s socio-economic development and level of modernization.\(^{43}\) Therefore, through modernizing and raising the socio-economic development in a state, the greater chance that state has at implementing democracy. While detractors have pointed out inherent problems and limitations of modernization theory,\(^{44}\) the fundamental assertions of Lipset’s theoretical insight has proved resilient as socio-economic development (most notably economic development) remains a cornerstone of the majority of democritisation theories.\(^{45}\)

The *transition approach* proposed by Rostow emphasized the importance of political processes and elite initiatives to the process of democritisation.\(^{46}\) There is a standard route all countries travel in the democritisation process which begins with a phase of national unity, then moves on to a phase of political struggle, leading to a phase of decision (or first transition), and finally resulting with the babituation phase (the conscious adoption of democratic principles).\(^{47}\) Thus, the transition approach emphasises the importance of political choice and strategy during the transition phase. As Grugel wrote, democracy is not “a question of waiting for economic conditions to mature or the political struggles unleashed by economic change to be one,”\(^{48}\) but rather democracy is an intentional action pursued by elites and state-level actors.

The *structural approach* put forward by Giddens argues that democritisation is a result of shifting power structures.\(^{49}\) In essence, the particular interrelationships of certain structures of power (economic, social and political) over history provide constraints and opportunities

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\(^{43}\) Ibid.

\(^{44}\) Critics of the modernization approach argued that modernization and economic prosperity is not necessarily a guarantor of democracy (i.e. Singapore). Additionally, the modernization approach relies heavily on quantitative data which overshadows other variables such as elite power and internal power structures. See Barbara Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democritisation after Twenty Years,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 2, no. 115-44 (1999). And, Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” *World Politics* 49, no. 2 (1997).


\(^{46}\) Potter, 11.

\(^{47}\) Ibid., 14.


\(^{49}\) Potter, 11.
to drive a state along a “historical trajectory” towards a liberal democracy. Welzel noted that structural theories of democratisation ponder the development of democracy as a function of a society’s prevailing structural properties such as its level of economic development, its internal social or ethnic divisions or its position in the world economy. Thus, the basic premise of the structural approach to democratization is that particular interrelationships of certain structures of power, as they gradually change through history, provide constraints and opportunities that can influence the nature of elite choices.

Traditional democratisation theories have tended to focus on the pre-requisites required in implementing democracy, the role of elites, and internal power structures without considering the impact of external actors. Certainly, traditional democratisation theories can reveal why certain states effectively democratise and others do not. Furthermore, characteristics of EU external and internal democratic promotion can be identified within traditional theories. As Schimmelfennig and Scholtz observed, “recent studies of EU democracy promotion... generally adhere to the agency-orientated approach of the transition theory... [with] the EU conceived of as an additional actor in the transition process.” However, traditional theories tend to reveal little about the transition itself or the role of external actors in fostering transition. As Whitehead argued, outside a small number of cases (in South America), generally the international dimension has played a prominent role in democratisation and to posit otherwise would be “seriously misleading.”

Traditional theories of democratisation have remained entrenched in their foundations which seems inept at explaining the phenomenon of democratisation in the post-Cold War setting where international actors actively pursue roles as democratic facilitators. Subsequently, in the context of EU promotion of democratisation through the ENP, traditional theories have remained largely peripheral in the EU related democratisation scholarship.

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50 Ibid., 18.
52 Gleditsch and Ward: 911.
The Diffusion Approach

In the wake of the United States foreign policy of exporting democratisation in recent years, the diffusion discourse on democratisation has gained notable scholarly attention in the last decade. Diffusion refers to the process of spreading utilised in anthropology as the transmission of elements or features of one culture to another. Therefore, the literature on democratic diffusion stems from the inability of traditional theories of democratisation in explaining how the democratisation process eventuated. Diffusion theorists argue that international factors play a prominent role in democratisation as transitions are not random occurrences but stem from changes in the external environment. Gleditsch and Ward argued that the “temporal and spatial clustering in democracy and transitions suggests diffusion, or enduring, cross-boundary dependencies that influence the development and persistence of political institutions.”

Ambrosio argued that the causal mechanisms of diffusion are likely a mixture of demonstration efforts, perceptions of momentum for regime change, symbolism and fears of international isolation. Causal mechanisms are utilised through the influence of external actors such as NGOs, states and international organizations like the EU.

Beissinger examined the colour revolutions to illustrate the importance and prevalence of diffusion in democratisation. Concisely, the colour revolutions were purportedly a democratic wave spreading across post-Soviet space replacing authoritarian regimes with functioning democracies. Starting with the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia in 2000 as the ignition, Beissinger argued that revolution spread to Georgia in the 2003 Rose Revolution, then Ukraine in the 2004 Orange Revolution and finally to Kyrgyzstan with the 2005 Tulip Revolution. Through the influence of external actors (most notably George Soros’ Open Society Institute), the colour revolutions spread in a modular fashion with each revolution building on the previous successful revolution. Whether the colour revolutions represented a democratic wave is widely disputed with most scholars arguing that the

57 Gleditsch and Ward: 912.
58 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
revolutions signified authoritarian transformation rather than democratic gain. Ultimately, as Way argued, “the color revolutions illustrate both the prevalence of diffusion and the potential limits of its impact on political change.” In relation to EU democratic action, the diffusion discourse has tended to examine other international actors (such as the United States) role in democratisation without explicit evaluation of the EU. Kubicek noted that conceivably the EU has had a part to play in diffusing democracy to their neighbourhood on some level but this has not spread to other geographic neighbours such as Ukraine. Additionally, the diffusion discourse “overlooks the demands/preferences of human agency (especially those of elites who may have no interest in democracy)” as well as neglecting “the agency and intent of international actors, which can vary from case to case.” Jacoby argued that the diffusion literature is adept in exhibiting that the institutional choices of states often affect the choices of their neighbours without accounting for the role of external influences on the ground. Furthermore, diffusion studies remain unable to explain how change occurs as it is built on two major assumptions: that institutions remain much the same as they spread from place to place and that the key dependent variable is the elite decision to adopt (or not) a particular innovation.

Theories of Democratisation: Summary

In examining EU facilitation of democratisation through the ENP, traditional theories of democratisation and the diffusion approach fail to effectively account for the external influence of the EU. The traditional approaches offer insight into what pre-requisites are required for effective democratisation and the role of elites but fail to adequately explain the increased influence of external actors in the post-Cold War period. The diffusion discourse on democratisation is largely born out of the inadequacies of traditional

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63 Borzel and Risse utilise the term diffusion in exploring the transformative power of the EU in spreading ideas. However, their definition of diffusion differs from the democratisation literature as they are concerned with normative transfers related to the EU (internally and externally) rather than specific democratic diffusion. See Tanja A. Borzel and Thomas Risse, "Transformative Power of Europe: The European Union and the Diffusion of Ideas," in *Working Paper NR. 1* (Free University of Berlin, 2009), 3.
65 Ibid.: 272.
66 Ibid.
68 Ibid.: 634.
democratisation theories in explaining external influence. However, the diffusion approach has limitations in relation to EU promotion of democratisation because it does not account for the intent of agents involved, the role of external influences on the ground, and it cannot explain how change occurs. Therefore, this study utilises EU-centric literature in an effort to conceptually illuminate the EU promotion of democratisation in their Eastern Neighbourhood through examining the case of Armenia. Subsequently, a theoretical framework guided by salient literature on EU democracy promotion will be extensively developed.

Theoretical Framework

Coalition Mode for External Assistance of Democratisation

This study utilises the coalition approach for external assistance of democratisation as proposed by Wade Jacoby in his 2006 review article Inspiration, Coalition and Substitution as the overarching framework for examining EU facilitation of democratisation in Armenia. Jacoby does not present a new theoretical approach to democratisation; rather he examines prominent scholarly works related to the EU’s promotion of democratisation, post-Soviet transformations, and democratisation in general, in an attempt to develop an all-encompassing model (or meta-theory) on the dominant paradigms relating to external influence and democratisation. Subsequently, Jacoby identified three modes of external influence (in relation to democratisation) salient in the literature. Firstly, an inspiration mode, “in which ideas flow from outside to inside and concern either the end state of particular institutional or policy reforms or how to execute such reforms.” Inspiration style strategies have been an extensively employed method in the post-Soviet setting; built on an

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69 Ibid.: 623.


assumption that domestic actors will look abroad in an effort to emulate the experiences of successful democratic and economic entities (i.e. the United States or EU Member States). The inspiration approach resonates with the diffusion discourse which holds that a state may have a “psychological drive to copy a successful neighbour.” However, the inspiration mode has been criticized as being too ineffective and generating only superficial democratic reform. Examples of failed inspiration strategies included the newly independent states of the FSU which were not involved in accession strategies with the EU, such as the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia. These states, rather than experiencing close interaction with the EU and other international actors, were prompted into to reform solely through inspiration style promotion. Essentially, the inspiration strategy is built on the logic that institutional change is innate to the reforming country. Secondly, Jacoby identifies a substitution mode, where “external actors attempt to promote and execute specific reforms on their own.” Substitution approaches tend to occur in post-conflict settings where a strong international presence allows for one-way implementation of democratic reform without consultation or cooperation with domestic actors. Examples of substitution include the post-conflict settings of Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq where the strong presence of the international community (most notably NATO in the Balkans and the United States in Iraq) has enabled one-way democratic promotion by external actors. Whitehead noted that of the established democracies in 1991, almost two thirds of them originated through imposition of democratic institutions from an external actor. However, whether one-way democratic facilitation via external actors is still a viable strategy is widely disputed. Many scholars and domestic commentators argue that implementation of alternative democratisation strategies (i.e. bottom-up or horizontal democratization) are more practical in the long-term. Finally, Jacoby identified and expanded on a coalition mode where “outside actors strive to influence the choices of existing domestic actors with whom they

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72 Kubicek: 272.
74 Ibid.: 630.
75 Whitehead, 8.
have a much deeper engagement.”\footnote{Jacoby, “Inspiration, Coalition, and Substitution: External Influences on Postcommunist Transformations,” 629.} Essentially, external actors try to formulate a coalition with domestic actors which Jacoby terms minority traditions. Minority traditions refer to “domestic movements, parties, or subsets of state officials who have pursued, but never achieved, some specific institutional solution to an important political problem.”\footnote{Ibid.} Thus, minority traditions can be a mixture of state or CSOs with whom the international actor shares common interest or ideology.

Jacoby argued that the coalition mode is the “hardest to see with the naked eye”\footnote{Ibid.: 631.} yet is implicitly present in a number of studies “that, unfortunately, are not self-conscious about it.”\footnote{Ibid.} Additionally, Jacoby noted that “in postcommunism external actors have rarely made substantial and sustained contributions without an implicit partnership with domestic actors.”\footnote{Ibid.: 643.} At the heart of the coalition approach is the assumption that external influences penetrate and take hold when they best connect with domestic processes and not when they act independently. As Jacoby explained, the coalition approach places greater agency with domestic actors, albeit like-minded domestic actors with whom the outsider directly interacts.\footnote{Ibid.: 629.} Furthermore, as empirically evident in the democratisation literature, “external influences can almost never have any real purchase unless they operate in tandem with domestic influences.”\footnote{Ibid.} Therefore, the coalition approach implies that effective external influence of democratisation needs a synergy of international and domestic actors.

Essentially, external actors act as the cement that unites the domestic actors that share their reform preferences. Thus, utilising a coalition approach can change the time horizons of the EU’s insider partners, help win over the undecided as future allies, and deter their domestic opponents.\footnote{Ibid.: 647.} The mechanisms of the coalition approach through which external support is channelled go beyond mere subsidies and financial backing in favour of developing in-depth relationships with like-minded domestic actors, be it in the state apparatus or civil society sector. Subsequently, the coalition mode fits somewhere in between the two extremities of the inspiration and substitution approaches as it requires an
active role of both external and internal actors (see figure 1). Furthermore, the three modes offered by Jacoby resonate with the salient literature related to external influence (on a broader international level) in democratisation as the major dynamics identified in the literature fit adequately within the three modes, as illustrated in figure 1.86

Consequently, the coalition approach does not exclusively represent a top-down or bottom-up approach but rather straddles both approaches. For instance, the coalition approach retains a top-down philosophy in the sense that the general direction of reform is prompted via an external actor but also evokes the logic behind bottom-up approaches as it places greater agency with the domestic actors in the recipient state. Such an approach reverberates with the emerging scholarship on EU promotion of democratic governance via sector-specific cooperation pioneered by Freyburg et al.87 Freyburg argued that EU interaction with ENP recipient states does not adequately fit in the top-down or bottom-up direction of democratisation but rather in what she terms the horizontal direction of democratisation.88 Concisely, Freyburg argued that democratic reform starts beyond the state level at the sectoral level (functional and technical areas that lie beyond the government level in the sub-units of administration) which is accessed by the EU via transgovernmental policy networks.89 Transgovernmental policy networks are built on interaction via association agreements, country strategy papers, ENP action-plans, and on issue specific agreements.90 Thus, it can be argued that the transgovernmental actors illustrated by Freyburg represent similar actors to the minority traditions mentioned by Jacoby in the coalition mode. The democratic governance work offered by Freyburg illustrates the growing scholarship placing EU democratic promotion as neither a top-down nor a bottom-up strategy but as a synergy of the two or as Freyburg terms horizontal democratic promotion.91

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87 Freyburg, Skrøka, and Wetzel.
88 Ibid., 3–4.
89 Ibid., 7.
90 Ibid.
91 As well as Freyburg see NCCR Democracy, Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century: Synthesis of Research Results (NCCR, 2008).
Placing EU external promotion of democratization within the three modes offered by Jacoby is challenging given that more than one mode is often in play in any given case. Traditionally, EU democratic interaction has taken the form of a mixture of inspiration and coalition. Inspiration has been utilised as the EU has traditionally presented itself as a credible and successful democratic and economic entity. Due to the numerous historical examples of successful democratic facilitation at the hand of the EU, external states are expected to view the EU member states with inspiration and a wish to emulate them. Coalitions have been utilised by the EU in varying degrees since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. In certain states, the elites were more than willing to pursue EU integration (i.e. Czech Republic) but in other states (i.e. Slovakia) the EU required greater influence through forming coalitions with compatible minority traditions. A way of conceptualising the varying strengths of coalitions the EU pursue with their neighbourhood is to evoke the work

93 Ibid.
of Timus which argued that the EU operates as an atomic system.\textsuperscript{94} Essentially, the EU represents an “epicentre that directly and indirectly spreads its values and practices”\textsuperscript{95} which gradually wanes the further the state from the centre of the EU. Thus, during the 2004 enlargement process, the CEE neighbourhood experienced strong coalitions with the EU while states now integrated into the ENP experienced weaker coalitions (now through the ENP they experience stronger coalitions). In terms of pursuing a substitution approach, the EU has yet to reach a level of military capacity to utilise an effective substitution strategy. The EU’s growing capabilities in the domain of conflict-prevention and security posits an opportunity in the future to adopt a substitution approach.\textsuperscript{96} Subsequently, this study argues that EU external action through the ENP is most effectively represented in the coalition mode for external influence of democratisation. The argument here is that the ENP is orientated towards improving external actor effectiveness in promoting democratisation through interacting with the both the state apparatus and domestic non-state actors. In essence, the EU is pursuing a coalition approach as it has failed to effectively pursue an inspiration approach and lacks the capabilities for a substitution approach. However, a threatening element to the effectiveness of the coalition approach in the context of the ENP in the Eastern Neighbourhood is that coalition approaches have worked well when outsiders wield the carrot of membership in a regional organization. Traditionally, the driving force of the EU’s facilitation of democratisation has been built on offering the incentive of membership which was successfully dangled during the previous neighbourhood transitions of the past thirty years. When states have had no potential for membership in a regional organization, coalition approaches have tended to languish: Jacoby illustrated this point by identifying the Barcelona process in the Mediterranean, the IMF in Russia and the United States in Ukraine as examples of coalition failure.\textsuperscript{97} Thus, the EU’s pursuit of the ENP in the post-enlargement era warrants conceptualisation as a new model which aims at the same normative assimilation of historical policies without the need for a golden carrot.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
Figure 2 illustrates the way this study proposes to utilise the coalition model in the context of EU interaction in Armenia through the ENP. Essentially, for examination in this thesis, EU interaction in Armenia has been broken in to two facets: state (or elite) interaction and domestic civil-society engagement. Firstly, state interaction will be illuminated through examination of the literature on EU political conditionality in the context of the post-enlargement era. Despite the less attractive incentives on offer in the ENP compared with previous neighbourhood policies, political conditionality is still wielded by the EU as a strategy for facilitating normative transformation. Primary research focusing on the EU promotion of free and fair elections in Armenia will be conducted (in chapter 3) to further illustrate the aspect of state interaction as prescribed in the ENP. Free and fair elections have been chosen as they constitute a condition explicitly stated in the ENP and are a visible indicator of democratisation. Secondly, domestic interaction through civil society engagement will be considered in light of the scholarship examining the normative socialisation efforts of the EU in external countries. In light of the ineffectiveness of solely pursuing political conditionality in the ENP, the scholarship on EU socialisation of third countries has become vibrant in recent years. Primary research focusing on EU interaction with CSOs (domestic NGOs) in Armenia will be utilised (in chapter 4) to advance the understanding of domestic interaction facet of the coalition approach. Examination of domestic NGOs presents a unique angle to the analysis because NGO formation has traditionally been seen as vital for the creation of a civil society (and democracy) and the EU actively pursues close ties with a number of Armenian NGOs. Importantly, the conditionality and socialisation discourses are not mutually exclusive and should be viewed as interrelated in the context of the ENP and the examination of free and fair elections and interaction with domestic NGOs. Thus, the coalition approach is utilised as a way of connecting both conditionality and socialisation efforts of the EU in a singular model which charts the new form of EU democratic facilitation in the post-enlargement era (see Fig.1).

98 Hadenius and Uggla argue that ‘making civil society work’ is a question of ‘socialization into democratic norms . . . it is a matter of changing popular norms (or mentality)’ (1996: 1622–23). Civil society organizations, and NGOs in particular, are thus seen as the institutional vehicles for effecting the democratic transformations of developing societies into modern, liberal societies.
Political Conditionality

The EU has traditionally employed political conditionality when attempting democratic (and normative) facilitation of their neighbourhood and developing countries. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier simply posited that conditionality is the key element of what they call an “external incentive model,”99 whereby the EU reinforces predicated reforms by offering rewards or incentives. Although conditionality has been a facet of EU interaction with external states since the 1970s, the formulation of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993 has enabled conditionality to become a powerful instrument for assisting democratisation outside of the EU. Pridham argued that the Copenhagen Criteria altered the scope of EU conditionality from a “bland and formal democracy criteria”100 to a dynamic and multidimensional criteria focusing on not only democracy but also economic, human rights, rule of law as well as certain anti-corruption and state capacity measures. The utilisation of

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conditionality by the EU represents a form of asymmetrical interaction whereby the EU sets the agenda and holds the power on whether incentives are transferred to recipient countries or not. The alleged\textsuperscript{101} successful normative assimilation of the CEE under the conditionality outlined in the Copenhagen Criteria has given credence to the notion of the EU as a legitimate democratisation agent. However, the majority of scholars argue that successful normative assimilation of EU neighbourhood has occurred largely due to the incentives on offer, most notably membership rather than the overarching strategy of conditionality. As Pridham argued, “the dynamics of accession are decisive in driving forward compliance by candidate countries.”\textsuperscript{102} Examining the case of Romania, Pridham illustrated the limitations of conditionality even when membership was granted as Romania has experienced repeated conditionality failures “due to a marked gap between government rhetoric and government action, problems of administrative incapacity and intrinsic difficulties over some of the conditions.”\textsuperscript{103} Therefore, although the tool of conditionality has been visibly effective (in the short-term at least) in formulating democratic transition, it is not without its limitations which become more obvious and troublesome in the post-enlargement context of the ENP.\textsuperscript{104}

In the context of the ENP and the post-enlargement era of the EU, conditionality has been widely criticised as no longer an effective tool of democratic facilitation. Seemingly, the successful toolkit of conditionality loses its power in the case of the ENP as membership is no longer offered as an incentive for economic and political reform. Subsequently, adherence to the conditions demanded by the EU becomes less attractive for partner countries.\textsuperscript{105} Sasse termed the lack of incentives associated with the ENP as a form of conditionality-lite as the “main elements of conditionality – the incentive structures, the consistency and credibility of the conditions, an underlying power asymmetry and the adoption costs - are all lower, weaker, vague and in flux within the ENP.”\textsuperscript{106} Conditionality is

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{101} According to Pridham the normative transformation of CEE countries has been superficial.
\bibitem{102} Pridham, “The Scope and Limitations of Political Conditionality: Romania’s Accession to the European Union.” 347.
\bibitem{103} Ibid.
\bibitem{106} Sasse.
\end{thebibliography}
still perceived by the EU as an important component of their external action and is subsequently evident in the official documents of the ENP, albeit a modified version of the traditional conditionality.\(^{107}\) However, the vague and restricted incentives on offer in the ENP are matched by perceived high implementation costs given that the ENP deals with predominately authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states. As Schimmelfennig argued, non-democratic regimes may not buy into the ENP because strict adherence would require their leaders to reform themselves out of power.\(^{108}\) However, as illustrated in Slovakia, non-compliant non-democratic regimes can be overcome through appealing to the opposition; whether the ENP incentives are able to galvanise oppositions of authoritarian regimes is questionable. Ultimately, this thesis argues that utilisation of conditionality in the context of the ENP cannot be considered a viable strategy alone (despite EU rhetoric); more than likely conditionality has a role in democratic facilitation but as a complimentary force to the wider ENP strategy and no longer as the crux of EU foreign policy.

Despite the dominant questions surrounding the effectiveness of conditionality in the context of the ENP, it nevertheless requires consideration in relation to the coalition approach and Armenia. Jacoby noted that conditionality makes up an essential part of the coalition mode where inducements can be conditional on what the external actor deems desirable behaviour. Thus, such conditionality can help minority traditions favoured by outsiders gain the upper hand over domestic opponents. In the context of Armenia, the ENP signified the first instance of EU conditionality in Armenia as previous policies focussed on inspiration forms of democratic promotion. Conditionality is explicitly mentioned in the ENP AP for Armenia, however, in reality, conditionality takes a far weaker form than previous neighbourhood policies. Solonenko in examining the impact of the ENP in Ukraine argued that realistically, “the only long-term potentially attractive incentive currently on the table is that of the deep free trade area (possibly manifested in the form of an AA).”\(^{109}\) Undoubtedly, the prospect of economic improvement associated with the ENP is seen as a significant incentive regardless of a lack of a golden carrot such as membership in the EU. Furthermore,
as Armenia is relatively more democratic than other ENP states, the high adoption costs associated with the ENP may be less problematic than in highly entrenched authoritarian regimes. Whether the EU can effectively pursue conditionality based interaction through the ENP is debatable, however, it remains an explicit component which warrants examination in Armenia under the umbrella of the coalition approach.

Measuring the effectiveness of the ENP in relation to political conditionality (through examination of the 2008 presidential election) in Armenia will be developed via the utilisation of four salient measurements in the literature: conditions, incentives, credibility, and costs (see figure 3).\textsuperscript{110} Conditions are evaluated in relation to their level of determinacy; that is the level of clarity and formality of ENP rules and conditionality. Effective conditions are born out of clear determinacy as target states know exactly what is required to get rewards; ineffective conditions result from vague and ambiguous determinacy where target states are unsure of the implications of rules.\textsuperscript{111} Incentives are examined with regards to the speed, type, and size of tangible rewards on offer in the ENP. Traditionally effective incentives have included EU membership and stronger integration; ineffective incentives have included financial aid and social incentives.\textsuperscript{112} Credibility is measured through evaluating the level of credibility attached to the ENP by recipient actors, focusing on the EU’s bargaining power and leverage over the recipient actor. Effective credibility owes to the perceived likelihood of the EU fulfilling its promises or threats; ineffective credibility stems from the perceived non-credibility of the EU in fulfilling promises or threats.\textsuperscript{113} Costs are assessed through examining the perceived consequences of implementing the ENP for the recipient regime. Effective costs relate to a minimal threat to the incumbent regime from implementation of ENP conditions; ineffective costs relate to a perceived destabilising threat of reform for the incumbent regime.\textsuperscript{114} Therefore, it is argued that successful conditionality strategies in the past have been built on a positive perception from the recipient state in regards to the clear understanding of conditions, the adequacy of

\textsuperscript{110} See Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," \textit{Journal of European Public Policy} 11, no. 4 (2004).

\textsuperscript{111} Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," 672.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.: 673.

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{114} Ibid.: 675.
incentives on offer, the credibility of the institution, and the low implementation costs. Instances where one or more of these variables are perceived as negative are likely to result in ineffective conditionality or conditionality-lite strategies.

Figure 3: Variables of Conditionality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Ineffective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Conditions</em></td>
<td>Clear determinacy</td>
<td>Vague determinacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Incentives</em></td>
<td>EU membership</td>
<td>Smaller tangible and all social incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Credibility</em></td>
<td>Credible promise</td>
<td>Non-credible threats or promises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Costs</em></td>
<td>Power preservation</td>
<td>Threat to regime</td>
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**Normative Socialisation**

The burgeoning literature on the socialising effects of international institutions owes to the work of Checkel, Schimmelfennig, Kelley (and others)\(^{115}\) who have pioneered a framework on how institutions (most notably the EU) utilise socialisation in an effort to further policy (and normative) transfer. Explicitly, Checkel identified the “conditions under which, and mechanisms through which, institutions in Europe socialize states and state agents, leading them to internalize new roles or group-community norms”\(^{116}\) as the driving theme of his inquiry. In other words, socialisation in the context of the EU implies “multiple personal and institutional contacts, which inevitably serve as a mechanism of Europeanization.”\(^{117}\)

Adhering to a classical definition of socialisation defined as a “process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community”, Checkel argued that in adopting community rules, socialisation entails that an agent switches from following a *logic of consequences* (where an agent’s choice is rationally selected based on their calculations of expected consequences) to a *logic of appropriateness* (where an agent’s sees action as

115 The special issue of International Organization 59, Fall 2005 provides a good starting point for the literature on socialisation in the context of the EU  
116 Checkel: 802.  
117 Mungiu-Pippidi, 15.
based on identities, obligations, and conceptions of appropriate action). Checkel identified three mechanisms of socialisation: strategic calculation, role playing and normative suasion. Strategic calculation stems from rationalist social theory and subsequently actors are viewed as “instrumentally rational” as they cautiously calculate and seek to capitalize on given interests, adjusting their behaviour to the norms and rules favoured by the international community. Schimmelfennig added that socialisation requires effective incentives (typically membership) which make it rationally beneficial for recipient states to internalise EU norms. However, strategic calculation as a strategy by-itself is inadequate to socialise an agent (it is generally utilised in conjunction with political conditionality strategies); subsequently strategic calculation alone cannot facilitate a switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness. Role playing as a mechanism of socialisation has roots in organization theory and cognitive/social psychology. Actors are viewed as “boundedly rational” and organization and group environments trigger the creation of roles appropriate to particular settings. Morrissey noted that agents learn a specific role by “acquiring the knowledge that enables them to act in accordance with expectations in order to protect their reputation – irrespective of whether they like the role or agree with it.” When role playing occurs, the shift from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness has begun. Normative suasion born out of the school of international relations based constructivists holds that “communicatively rational social agents do not so much calculate costs and benefits, or seek cues from their environment.” Rather, these agents present arguments and try to persuade and convince each other that their interests and preferences are open for redefinition. Thus, when normative suasion occurs, actors intentionally and reflectively internalise new understandings of appropriateness. Ultimately, in formulating this framework, Checkel is attempting to connect rational choice theories with social constructivism into a compact and relevant model for socialisation. Therefore, while the three mechanisms originate from

118 Checkel: 804.
121 Checkel.
122 Ibid.: 810.
124 Checkel: 812.
different theoretical perspectives they can be argued to occur incrementally in the process of socialisation. As Morrissey noted, “socialisation (long-lasting changes) becomes deeper and more stable as one moves from incentive-based (behavioural adaptation) to normative mechanisms (belief alteration).”

Adaptation of the socialisation literature in relation to EU action (until recently) has tended to focus on internal socialising efforts rather than the socialisation of external actors. However, in the post-enlargement era, EU external action as typified by the ENP is widely viewed as an active attempt of socialisation of external partners. An obvious limitation with examining socialisation is the lack of concrete measures on offer (see figure 4). Nevertheless, Kelley argued that “the tools of socialization under enlargement are also evident in the ENP’s structure of processes and dialogues between the Commission and ENP countries, the engagement with domestic actors and the use of social influence.” Kelley cited the emphasis on *soft diplomacy* in the ENP through interaction based on specialised dialogues, action plans, annual progress reports and a general orientation towards close interaction as the major socialising tools utilised by the EU in their new neighbourhood.

For Kelley, while the ENP in many aspects represents a diluted version of the previous enlargement policy (and hence focused on adaptation of norms); it also introduces a more novel approach of learning (through socialisation). Learning in this sense constitutes an approach which is more strongly orientated towards socialisation than the traditional tool of conditionality. Whether the learning capacity of the ENP can facilitate a switch from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness is hard to assert. Examining the socialising the ENP to date offers insight into the effectiveness of the EU in utilising socialisation-based strategies. In examining the ENP in relation to Ukraine, Solonenko noted that the ENP has made progress in the application of socialisation. For instance, Solonenko illustrated that the interaction between EU and Ukrainian officials has altered notably since the ENP was signed with an increase in consultations, sub-committees, informal channels, inter-parliamentary cooperation and educational cooperation. Therefore, as evident in the

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125 Morrissey: 6.6
127 Ibid.: 40.
128 Ibid.: 41.
129 Solonenko, 29.
130 Ibid., 29-30.
Ukraine, ENP socialising efforts to date have tended to be limited to strategic calculation and role playing with ENP initiatives focusing on incentive based socialisation (strategic calculation) and the adoption of roles through increased interaction (role playing).

Normative suasion represents a final step in the process of effective socialisation which can only occur over time through the deepening of interaction between the EU and domestic actors. Kwarciak and Panainte argued that adopting the normative suasion tool requires the EU to abandon their rigid normative framework and embrace the expertise of the locals through mutual persuasion. Ultimately, while the ENP is heavily entrenched with the language of socialisation, successful implementation and tangible results in recipient states are unlikely to be observed in the short-term. As Kelley noted, the strategy of socialisation is seen as a long-term policy whereas conditionality has a short-term scope.

Socialisation is immediately relevant when examined under the umbrella of the coalition mode for external assistance of democratisation. The maxim of the coalition approach is that effective external facilitation of democratisation occurs when external actors set up coalitions with domestic actors called minority traditions. Similarly, domestic actors are seen in the socialisation literature as a key component of the EU’s socialisation strategy. As Kelley examined, “the ENP strategy is building relationships through frequent interaction with domestic political actors... the EU commission co-operates with domestic NGOs and funds the development of civil society... the EU aimed [when negotiating action-plans] to align with reform-minded forces within the countries.” Thus, socialisation presents itself as a necessary tool of the coalition approach. Jacoby did not explicitly reference socialisation as an instrument of the coalition approach but it is implicitly evident throughout his work. For instance, Jacoby noted that “beyond mere subsidies, outsiders have other tools to strengthen like-minded reformers and thus increase the chance that the reformers will endure.” In regards to Armenia, as evident in Ukraine, EU socialising efforts are likely orientated towards increasing dialogue and interaction in general with Armenian political actors. Examination of EU interaction with CSOs is intended to illuminate the major

133 Ibid.
socialising efforts the EU pursues in Armenia through the ENP. Undoubtedly, an increase of interaction between the EU and political actors in Armenia (whether state or CSOs) is a major priority of the ENP strategy paper. Thus, while difficult to measure and observe, socialisation is viewed as a discernible and long-term component of EU interaction in Armenia through the ENP.

To measure the impact of socialisation in Armenia through the ENP, this thesis utilises a number of measurements offered by Schimmelfennig related to socialisation from a constructivist viewpoint (see figure 4). Subsequently, this thesis forgoes examination of the rationalist variables of socialisation such as incentives, credibility and costs (largely covering the strategic calculation mechanism). It is argued that constructivist variables require greater evaluation in relation to Armenia as the rationalist approach relates more closely to older political conditionality strategies of the EU; it is argued that EU interaction with CSOs in Armenia is more connected through generating closer interaction rather than conditionality based interaction. Schimmelfennig offered three variables related to the effectiveness of socialisation (see figure 4): legitimacy, identification and resonance. 

**Legitimacy** measures the perception from target actors as to whether the EU itself complies with the norms they promote and whether they promote them on a consistent basis. Effective legitimacy would result in a perception that the EU strongly adheres to their normative core when interacting in Armenia; ineffective legitimacy would result in a negative perception that the EU is compromising their normative core in favour for other interests. **Identification** measures the extent to which the target actor identifies itself with the EU and the promoted norms. Effective identification occurs when there is a close ethos and world-view between the actor and the EU; ineffective identification occurs when the target actor has an alternative (or conflicting) ethos and world-view to the EU. **Resonance** measures the extent to which the domestic institutional setting of the recipient state matches the normative promotion from the EU. Effective resonance occurs when EU rules/norms tie in with existing or traditional domestic rules/institutions; ineffective

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137 Ibid., 61.
resonance occurs when EU rules/norms conflict with existing or traditional domestic rules/institutions. Essentially, actors which have a positive perception of the EU in relation to legitimacy, identification and resonance, are likely to be salient agents for EU socialisation (through role-playing and normative suasion). Actors which have a more negative view of the EU are likely to be reduced to interaction based on strategic calculation.

Figure 4: Variables of Socialisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Ineffective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Democracy and human rights</td>
<td>Conflicting Interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Similar ethos and world-view</td>
<td>Opposing ethos and world-view</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resonance</td>
<td>Compatible domestic rules</td>
<td>Contradictory domestic rules</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ENP: Socialisation and Conditionality

The majority of studies on the ENP in relation to democratisation refer to socialisation as the major (or only) mechanism for policy transfer. Conditionality, the successful and widely heralded tool of previous neighbourhood policies has been seemingly confined to the sands of time. Traditionally, conditionality and socialisation have been seen as alternative ways of facilitating a change in norms. However, it is argued that both socialisation and conditionality are relevant in the scope of the ENP and might be seen as mutually reinforcing aspects (see figure 5). Sasse noted that socialisation in the context of enlargement had been conveyed as “reinforcing the implementation of conditionality or extending a streamlined international approach into policy areas outside the formal remit of

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Figure 5: The ENP in action: The logic and strategies of the democratisation policy embedded in the ENP
conditionality.”¹⁴¹ That is, while it may have a weaker impact, socialisation acts as a supplementary force to conditionality. However, in the context of the ENP, perhaps as a democratic facilitator, socialisation can now be argued as representing the appropriate and dominant strategy of the ENP. Conditionality is explicitly evident and constitutes an important component of the ENP; however, it can no longer be successful without stronger efforts in socialisation. Thus, by utilising the mechanisms of socialisation and conditionality, it is argued that the EU, through setting up coalitions with domestic actors in Armenia, is employing a coalition approach for the external assistance of democratisation.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the major theoretical literature related to EU promotion of democratisation. The initial section examined the pertinent theories of democratisation largely born from the decolonisation movements in Africa and Asia and more recently from the democratisation patterns of the post-Cold War era. Three traditional theories were identified: the modernization approach, the transition approach and the structural approach. However, the traditional theories were deemed peripheral to this study because they revealed little about democratic transition and the impact of external actors. A further approach, which has gained popularity in recent times, the diffusion approach, based on the notion that international factors play an important role in democratisation, was considered. However, the diffusion discourse was deemed ineffective in explaining EU facilitation of democratisation due to its inability to account for the role of external influences on the ground and the nature of institutional change itself. In light of the inability of the salient theories of democratisation in the broader international literature to adequately account for EU promotion of democratisation, this chapter examined the theoretical literature related specifically to EU promotion of democratisation. Subsequently, a theoretical framework guided by Jacoby’s coalition mode for the external assistance of democratisation was developed. The central maxim of the coalition approach was that in order to transfer democratisation, international organisations like the EU seek out like-minded actors (called

minority traditions) in ENP recipient states and form coalitions with these actors. Jacoby’s coalition approach represented a meta-theory which built and collated on the work of a number of prominent scholars into a unified model. In order to illuminate the theoretical framework further in the context of the ENP, the scholarly literature on political conditionality and normative socialisation was engaged. The political conditionality literature held that the EU traditionally fostered democratisation through conditioning the incentive of membership with political and economic reform. However, in the context of the ENP, conditionality was argued as serving a less significant role as previous neighbourhood strategies given the lack of a golden carrot. The normative socialisation scholarship argued that the EU facilitated a transfer of norms through increasing multiple personal and institutional contacts with domestic actors in order to facilitate a psychological change from a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness. In the context of the ENP, socialisation was argued as representing the dominant strategy as the democratic objectives were orientated towards a long-term scope rather than the short-term scope of conditionality. Ultimately, it is argued that the EU’s facilitation of democratisation in their Eastern Neighbourhood through the ENP is built on the concept of interacting with like-minded domestic actors through utilising a strategy of normative socialisation with political conditionality acting as a secondary tool.
Chapter 2: Converging Trajectories: The Evolution of the EU’s Normative Policy and the Path of Democratisation in Armenia

This chapter examines the contextual and broader themes deemed imperative to examining EU facilitation of democratisation in Armenia. Therefore, a literature review focusing on the historical trajectories of the EU’s normative policy and Armenian democratisation is employed. Additionally, examination of the EU-Armenian democratic dynamic, in terms of the geopolitical environment of the Caucasus and the official documents of the ENP, requires evaluation. Examining the literature on EU foreign policy and democratisation in Armenia differentiates a number of salient themes that warrant consideration in this chapter. Structurally, this chapter examines four major branches of literature. Firstly, an EU specific branch of literature which encompasses two sections focusing on historical contextualisation of the EU as a democratic facilitator and the role of democratisation in the ENP. Secondly, an Armenian-centred section (beyond the scope of the EU) of literature covering examination of Armenia’s democratisation, including consideration of Armenia’s cultural heritage, the Armenian diaspora and the geopolitical environment of the Caucasus. Thirdly, a section which connects the literature on the EU and the literature on Armenia through examination of EU-Armenia relations in the context of the ENP and the Eastern Partnership. Lastly, in light of the literature review, the ENP will be more extensively reviewed through examination of the official documents produced by the EU in relation to the ENP. Ultimately, while the literature reviewed provides a detailed glimpse at the intricacies of the EU-Armenia partnership and the process of EU promotion of democratisation in Armenia through the ENP, there is a noticeable gap between the scholarly literature, official documents, and actual EU action on the ground, which this thesis intends to bridge in the forthcoming chapters.
EU Branch of Literature

Historical Overview: The EU as an Agent of Democratisation

Normative values such as democracy and human rights have become synonymous with contemporary EU foreign policy as EU action is heavily entrenched in the symbols and language of their ostensible normative core. As Pridham observed, the notion of the EU as a democratic facilitator has gained widespread acceptance and acclaim in recent years.\(^{142}\)
Pace argued that the EU’s pursuit of democratic facilitation stems from their self-perception as the legitimate “norms entrepreneur”\(^{143}\) in the international community. In other words, as Haukkala argued:

the EU envisions itself as the ‘normative hegemon’ of Europe and subsequently acts accordingly through utilising its economic and normative power to build highly asymmetrical bilateral relationships that help facilitate an active transference of its norms and values.\(^{144}\)

Essentially, the EU has gradually developed a policy of rebuilding the world in their own image (starting with their neighbourhood); this ethos transcends all levels of foreign policy whether it is economic, political or security and defence orientated action. As Koskenniemi observed, the EU tends to universalise the region, that is, not to think of “Europe in merely local terms, but generalized into a representative of the universal.”\(^{145}\)

The idea of the EU as a normative power\(^{146}\) has gained scholarly attention in the post-Cold War era where interaction based on intangible objects such as culture, ideology and institutions is seen as a viable strategy.\(^{147}\) Manners described the EU as an international actor which diffuses rules and values in international relations through non-coercive


\(^{143}\) Pace: 667.

\(^{144}\) Haukkala: 1601.

\(^{145}\) Koskenniemi: 114.

\(^{146}\) The EU has alternatively been called a civilian or soft power; both of which have influenced the idea of the EU as a normative power. Duchene built the concept of civilian power on the idea of pursuing the normalisation of international relations by dealing with international problems within the sphere of “contractual politics” (see Duchene, 19.). Nye built the notion of soft power on the idea that international relations could be pursued through cooptation, multilateral cooperation, institution-building, integration and the power of attraction (see Joseph Nye, “Soft Power,” *Foreign Policy* 80, no. Fall (1990)).

\(^{147}\) Manners: 235.
action.\textsuperscript{148} In this sense, the EU’s normative identity and ethos are founded upon the principles of \textit{Europeanness}; that is, strict observance of democracy, human rights, rule of law and market economy principles.\textsuperscript{149} Primarily, these values formulate the normative agenda the EU pursues through interaction with its neighbourhood. However, it can be argued that the EU’s strong normative identity stems from the innately European foundations of concepts such as democracy and human rights.\textsuperscript{150} For instance, the conceptual heritage of democracy can be tracked as far back as Greek (democracy) and Roman (code of laws) antiquity while modern conceptualisations of democracy emanate from the European Age of Enlightenment.\textsuperscript{151} Consequently, the EU has entrenched itself heavily in the normative values that are perceived as being inherent in European history and identity.\textsuperscript{152} With regards to specific EU action, Pridham noted that despite an implicit adherence to democratic principles from the onset, the EU did not engage in concrete democratic facilitation and consolidation until the membership applications of Greece, Spain and Portugal in the late 1970s and early 1980s.\textsuperscript{153} These states were prompted into democratic change from military dictatorships through the incentives of integration and membership to the European Economic Community (EEC). Through incrementally offering trade agreements, cooperation and association agreements, aid, diplomatic recognition and eventual EU membership, the EU employed a strategy of \textit{political conditionality} in relations with third countries.\textsuperscript{154} Youngs argued that EU conditionality has tended to be positive through offering carrots (as reward) and withholding carrots (as punishment) rather than wielding a “big stick.”\textsuperscript{155} In the post-Cold War setting, the EU expanded its normative agenda into the Central Eastern European (CEE) region, culminating in the 2004 and 2007 enlargements which facilitated the democratisation of a large portion of the erstwhile communist countries (10), again through the incentives of integration and membership to the EU.

\textsuperscript{148}Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{149}Pace: 667. \\
\textsuperscript{150}Wilhelmus Antonius Arts, Jacques A. Hagenaars, and Loek Halman, \textit{The Cultural Diversity of European Unity: Findings, Explanations and Reflections from the European Values Study} (Leiden: Brill, 2003). \\
\textsuperscript{151}Anthony Pagden, \textit{The Idea of Europe: From Antiquity to the European Union} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). \\
\textsuperscript{152}Arts, Hagenaars, and Halman. \\
\textsuperscript{153}Pridham, \textit{Designing Democracy in the Eastern Neighbourhood}, 29-32. \\
\textsuperscript{154}Smith: 254. \\
Notwithstanding the strong entrenchment of EU action in the language and symbols of their normative values and the relative democratic successes of previous neighbourhood policies, sceptics argue that the EU is primarily concerned with economic gains rather than strictly adhering to an altruistically motivated normative ethos. This argument holds that despite the overwhelming normative rhetoric associated with EU action, the EU remains a self-interested actor which develops policy specifically for the advancement of the EU. Subsequently, much of EU policy with third countries is economic in scope, specifically economic integration based on free market liberalisation. Democracy, human rights and rule of law are attached to the dominant economic policy but remain secondary in importance and are seen as by-products of successful economic transition. For example, scholars and political commentators have often alleged that the EU is willing to compromise their normative values in order to strengthen or maintain economic relations. Ultimately, traditional EU interaction with third countries has remained an elite-driven process with little or no consideration for interaction via public engagement. Therefore, an issue when examining EU interaction with third countries in relation to democratisation is differentiating between self-serving rhetoric and actual intent.

Democratisation and the ENP

Officially, the EU states that the ENP is an endeavour at creating a ring of friends in their immediate neighbourhood through extending the benefits of economic and political cooperation. In the official EU document *A secure Europe in a better world*, the EU stated that “it is in European interest that countries on our borders are well-governed” as neighbours that are engaged in violent conflict or experience high levels of instability and organised crime pose problems for Europe. Scott argued that the ENP epitomises the new EU geopolitical vision in which the EU projects soft power beyond its territory. In other

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160 A secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy, 2003; p.8
161 Ibid 7
words, the ENP strategy is an enterprise by the EU to encourage its neighbours to come to understand and emulate the ideas underlying its structural power (i.e. EU norms and values).\(^{163}\) Yet, where previous neighbourhood policies offered the golden carrot of membership as an incentive for implementing EU norms, the ENP does not offer such incentives. Schimmelfennig hypothesised that “the level of democracy in the neighbouring countries of the EU increases with the size and the credibility of the EU’s conditional incentives.”\(^{164}\) Thus, in the context of the ENP, the size and credibility of the EU’s conditional incentives are far smaller than under the policy of enlargement.

Former president of the European Commission Romano Prodi alluded to the ENP as “everything but institutions”\(^{165}\) as the ENP is an attempt to facilitate the same normative shift witnessed in the past while offering significant carrots which fall short of membership. Tangible rewards offered in the ENP range from development aid, inclusion in European-based initiatives and potential integration into the Single European Market (SEM).\(^{166}\) Specifically to democratic facilitation, Raik argues that the ENP represented a weaker mechanism than enlargement not only in terms of tangible rewards but also in symbolic significance.\(^{167}\) The success of enlargement was not purely built on the strong appeal and high credibility of membership but also because of the symbolic importance garnered from the notable successful assimilations of the past (Greece, Spain and Portugal for example). Indeed, the symbolic substance of the ENP does not have the same weight associated with the sweeping accessions of previous enlargements. Subsequently, the response of participating states has tended to be far more subdued and pragmatic than optimistic and idealised. Nevertheless, Raik contended that despite the weaker nature of the ENP, there is capacity for promoting democracy within the framework of the ENP, especially with the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) which guarantees greater financial commitment to the ENP members compared to the previous instrument

\(^{163}\) Pace: 667.
\(^{165}\) Haukkala.
\(^{166}\) Sasse, “The ENP Process and the EU’s Eastern Neighbours: Conditionality-Lite, Socialisation and Procedural Entrapment.”
TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States). Furthermore, the ENP, while appearing as an overarching regional initiative, fundamentally operates through bilateral-based agreements known as APs. The EU’s neighbourhood is a heterogeneous region with a clear East versus Mediterranean divide coupled with the fact that individual states are at different stages of development and democratisation (as well as future membership prospects). Thus, by adopting a bilateral based approach, the EU envisions being able to tailor the ENP through the utilisation of APs designed to fit each specific state.

In scholarly circles, the ENP has received far more criticism than praise. Smith argued that there is a “ghost of enlargement” which haunts EU relations with its neighbours. The successful enlargements of the EU over time have “not gone unnoticed” by the current crop of neighbourhood countries. That is, states situated on the EU periphery which experience political and economic instability tend to view EU accession as something of a quick-fix for alleviating their problems; through the associated economic and social benefits of EU membership. However, as membership is not offered as an incentive in the ENP, the EU loses the key leverage which fuelled the previous neighbourhood’s swift democratisation. Yacoubian cited the ineffectiveness of the Barcelona Process as an example of the difficulty of implementing policy in the EU neighbourhood when offering incentives significantly less appealing than membership. In other words, the ENP resembles a long list of measures for a few concrete rewards that may improve the state in question, but certainly not as profoundly membership would. Additionally, Raik criticised the ENP as it is vigorously seeking implementation of democracy which requires social and economic upheaval in the neighbourhood states, heightening chances of: instability, economic collapse, competition amongst elites and in some cases exacerbation of civil conflict. Thus, by accepting the terms of the ENP, states are essentially doomed to stay in

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168 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
174 Raik.
a state of asymmetrical interdependence with the EU; restricting the self-determination of ENP states in favour for assimilation to EU norms and values.\textsuperscript{175} Emerson, in his evaluation of the ENP after two years of operation, argued that the ENP has not lived up to its billing and it is already time to consider an \textit{ENP plus}.\textsuperscript{176} For Emerson, an ENP plus would entail four facets:

- an advanced association model for the bale and willing partner states;
- a strengthening of regional-multilateral schemes;
- an upgrading of the standard instruments being deployed and;
- the offer of an ‘ENP lite’ model for difficult states or non-recognised entities.\textsuperscript{177}

As Sasse observed in examining the ENP in relation to Moldova, ENP normative assimilation has been difficult in Moldova due to high levels of instability, lack of economic progress and persistent conflict with the disputed territory of Transnistria (comparable to disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh for Armenia).\textsuperscript{178}

\textbf{Summary}

In summary, over time the EU had evolved into an effective agent of democratisation by offering the incentive of membership in return for economic and political reform (known as the process of enlargement through the mechanism of conditionality). However, in the scope of the latest enlargement, membership is no longer offered as an incentive for normative assimilation in the EU’s neighbourhood. Therefore, in the context of democratisation in Armenia, the potential impact of the ENP cannot be expected to reach the levels of reform experienced with similar states under previous neighbourhood policies. Ultimately, the noted detractions associated with the ENP are likely to hinder the credibility and productivity of the EU’s facilitation of democratisation in Armenia and the wider Eastern Neighbourhood.

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\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.: 39.
\textsuperscript{177} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{178} Sasse, “The ENP Process and the EU’s Eastern Neighbours: Conditionality-Lite, Socialisation and Procedural Entrapment.”
Armenian Branch of Literature

Armenia’s Democratisation Trajectory

The trajectory of democratisation in Armenia can be traced as far back as the brief establishment of the Armenian Republic between 1918 and 1920; a period of post-genocide Armenian self-determination prior to Soviet encroachment. Ishkanian noted that the revolutionaries espoused ideas of freedom and democracy propelling the signing of the United Armenia act in 1919, formally recognising Armenia as a democratic state.\(^{179}\)

However, the initial sanguinity of the young revolutionaries was replaced with the harsh realities of Soviet domination which suppressed liberal thought in Armenia for 70 years. Nevertheless, Armenians responded to the *glasnost* period of the Soviet Union with widespread democratic optimism. Ishkanian noted that the Armenian independence movement, widely known as the *Karabakh* movement, gained notable momentum in 1988 with strong democratic enthusiasm turning many “apathetic citizens into social activists.”\(^{180}\)

However, when independence eventually came to Armenia in 1991, the prospects and enthusiasm for democratisation had waned considerably.

Two initial events are argued to have suppressed democratic development in Armenia: the war with Azerbaijan over the disputed NK territory and the 1988 Spitak earthquake. The NK war ensued from 1988 to 1994, ending when a cease-fire was signed; however, no peace treaty has ever been ratified and the conflict is often referred to as a *frozen conflict* which could thaw at any time.\(^{181}\) The aftermath of the war revealed the full extent of the treachery with allegations of grave violations of war on both sides. As many as 25,000 people perished during the conflict with casualties running as high as 100,000 people, while the number of internally displaced people and refugees peaked at over 100,000.\(^{182}\) Subsequently, Armenian relations with Azerbaijan have typically been tense and the border between the countries has remained closed since the onset of violence. Ishkanian posited that when a war results in ethnic cleansing, masses of refugees and hatred between two peoples, there is little time

\(^{179}\) Ishkanian, 5.

\(^{180}\) Ibid., 1.


for public optimism towards democracy.\textsuperscript{183} Coinciding with the beginning of the NK conflict was the 1988 Spitak earthquake which devastated Armenia killing 25,000 people and accounting for roughly US$ 3 billion in clean-up costs, coupled with the immeasurable costs associated with large scale natural disasters.\textsuperscript{184} The impact of the Spitak earthquake has endured into present-day Armenia; most notably in the settlements surrounding Spitak in the north of the country which have yet to be rehabilitated to their pre-earthquake standard.\textsuperscript{185} Ultimately, the lasting effects of the NK war together with the impact of the Spitak Earthquake rapidly altered Armenia from a setting of public optimism towards democracy to a setting of widespread apathy.

While the impact of the NK war and Spitak earthquake hindered initial democratisation efforts in Armenia, a number of pervasive and interrelated factors have broadly hampered Armenian democratisation since 1991 independence: specifically, a strong Soviet legacy, the rise of politically charged oligarchs, the difficulty of undertaking simultaneous transitions, a local scepticism towards international actors, and persistent widespread apathy. Armenia, as evident with the majority of post-Soviet states, has experienced a Soviet hangover where attempts to foster democratisation have failed causing a reversion to previous forms of authority.\textsuperscript{186} Hale coined the term “patronal presidentialism”\textsuperscript{187} (alternatively known as clanism)\textsuperscript{188} to describe the post-Soviet system of governance where power resides overwhelmingly in a directly elected president who exerts not only formal power, but also immense informal power that is based on pervasive patron-client relationships and machine politics.\textsuperscript{189} A noticeable product of the patronal presidentialist system in post-Soviet states is the rise and consolidation of politically charged oligarchs. The term oligarch has been applied to the post-Soviet era to describe groups or individuals who have accumulated large amounts of wealth during their countries Soviet transition and subsequently exert

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{ishkanian} Ishkanian, 8.
\bibitem{lukin} Alexander Lukin, "Electoral Democracy or Electoral Clanism? Russian Democratization and Theories of Transition.,” \textit{Demokratizatsiya} 7, no. 1 (1999).
\bibitem{hale2} Hale: 307.
\end{thebibliography}
tremendous political influence. In the context of Armenia, Freire and Simao argued that the presence of politically influential oligarchs illustrates an aspect of the Soviet legacy which perpetuates an economy of shortage (also known as an economy of favours) leading to widespread nepotism, corruption and a weak civil society; which all hinder the prospects of democracy. For instance, Armenia’s incumbent president Serzh Sargsyan is widely condemned by political commentators as being an oligarch enabler as his grip of power relies heavily on oligarchic support and funding, notably from Armenian business magnate and aspiring politician Gagik Tsarukyan. The inability to break from the pervasive economy of shortage illustrates the difficulty of undertaking simultaneous and multiple transitions relating to economics, politics, and nation building as prescribed by the Washington Consensus. Freire and Simao agreed that shock therapy, rather than successfully resulting in a functioning market economy, illustrated that post-Soviet transition is not an easy-fix but a complicated and burdensome task. Nevertheless, Armenia had experienced impressive growth in recent years resulting in the use of the label Caucasian tiger amongst economists. However, despite encouraging economic growth (likely to be reduced given the global economic slowdown which strongly affected Armenia) other facets of transition still require rigorous attention. On-going allegations that the acquired wealth from the economic progression has been unfairly distributed attest to the multi-dimensional transition required in Armenia. In the end, the multiple forms of stagnation experienced in Armenia have fuelled a growing public scepticism towards democratisation in general, and the role of international donors in promoting and facilitating democracy. Ishkanian observed that many Armenians, whether politicians, civil society officials or members of the general population tend to view the majority of

190 Guriev and Rachinsky.
194 Freire and Simao: 3.
196 Zaven Sargisan, Economic Condition of Armenia; Depreciation of USD and Varying Impacts; USD ($) Volatility; Political/Economic Comparative Analaysis; Conclusion and Recommendations (University of Utah, 2010).
international action as rhetoric and in some cases neo-imperialism. Therefore, garnering domestic legitimacy is an immediate hurdle the EU has to overcome in pursuing the ENP in Armenia. Ultimately, the elements portrayed above perpetuate widespread apathy which exists amongst the majority of the Armenian public in regards to democratisation. As one key informant conveyed, the general public no longer care about the promise of democracy, they have heard it all before. Shakaryan illustrated the lack of trust in Armenia amongst the general population through quantitatively showing that the majority of Armenians perceived politicians and civil servants to be dishonest. Furthermore, Shakaryan’s survey highlighted distrust of the government in terms of corruption, police and judicial courts. Ultimately, widespread apathy hinders a state’s social capital which in turn threatens the functionality and development of democracy and democratisation.

Undoubtedly, the democratisation experiment for Armenia since independence has suffered from serious democratic constraints. However, comparatively to the majority of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) which have gradually reverted back to authoritarian systems, some discernible democratic gains have occurred in Armenia. Ishkanian argued, “democracy building [in Armenia] did succeed in establishing the formal institutions and practices associated with democracy” regardless of the failures in ensuring free and fair elections and reduction of corruption. Examining the democratic ratings from the think-tank Freedom House illustrated that Armenia is classified as party free (or a pseudo-democracy) with an overall democratic score of 5.39 (7 being the worst score, 1 the best score) for 2010; however, Armenia has experienced a noticeable decline in democratic rating over the last decade (Armenia scored 4.79 in 1999). Freedom House, in their Nations in Transit publication, argued that Armenian democratic development has been hampered by an absence of effective checks and balances, concentration of power in the presidency and a centralised system of government. Nonetheless, the 2007 parliamentary elections were widely heralded by international observers (such as the OSCE and CoE) as an illustration of democratic progression in Armenia as the elections on the

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197 Ishkanian, 1.
198 Interview with NGO-B
200 Ibid.: 265.
201 Ishkanian, 154.
203 Ibid.
whole were conducted fairly and freely. However, as Zulueta-Fulscher argued, “parliamentary elections are no guarantee that presidential elections will enjoy the same fare... the Armenian parliament enjoys only limited power.” Indeed, initial optimism for the 2008 Armenian presidential election did not come to fruition as a number of pervasive undemocratic violations were identified resulting in civic unrest and the deaths of eight people on March 1st 2008. Ultimately, the March 1st riots conjugated with a catalogue of human rights violations over the last decade illustrated the invasive authoritarian characteristics of the Armenian state, which perpetuated widespread apathy amongst Armenian citizens (manifesting in a total lack of trust in the government).

Armenian Cultural Heritage: A European Nation?

Despite the geographic location of Armenia on the frontiers of Europe in Eurasia (or the northern Middle East, depending on geographic opinion), there remains scope for Armenia to be considered a European nation. Freire and Simao argued that Armenians share historical and cultural ties with Europe as well as possessing a significant diaspora population within the EU borders. Mkrtchyan identified language as a common bond between Armenia and Europe as the Armenian language belongs to the Indo-European family of languages. Certainly, the Indo-European branch of language is broad and a common language ancestry hardly constitutes salient historical ties. Nevertheless, Mkrtchyan argued that the placement of the Armenian language within the broader family of European languages allowed Armenians to conceive of themselves as European. Furthermore, Armenian theatre and architecture draw strong influence from Hellenic culture. The Greek tragedies were absorbed into Armenian culture and re-written by Armenian play-writers and artists, enabling them to become national classics. In terms of architecture, Mkrtchyan identified the temple of Garni (a national symbol) as evidence of a strong Hellenic influence on Armenian architecture. Religiously, Armenia’s state religion (practiced by 97% of the population) is a loosely attached branch of Eastern Orthodoxy (but

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207 Freire and Simao: 13.
208 Lilit Mkrtchyan, "Europeans and Armenians: Common Cultural Identities," (Palacky University, 2009).
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
entirely autonomous) known as the Armenian Apostolic Church. The Christianity factor is a double-edged sword; in one sense it brings Armenians religiously closer to Europe (given the shared Judeo-Christian history and legacy) than other ENP states such as neighbouring Azerbaijan, yet in another sense, it generates issues surrounding implementation of democracy and human rights (given the traditional nature of the religion). Ultimately, there is potential for Armenians to identify with Europe (and therefore the EU), as their historical and cultural legacies clearly illustrate close ties with European entities. As the former minister of foreign affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Vartan Oskanian, stated in 2005, “Armenia is Europe, that is a fact, it’s not a response to a question.”

Armenian Diaspora

Armenia possesses a significant diaspora stretching as far as the United States, Argentina and Australia. Gyulumyan noted that over the last century, the population of Armenians living outside Armenia has significantly exceeded the population permanently living in Armenia (unique in the post-Soviet setting). In terms of European diaspora, Gyulumyan observed that while the major Armenian diaspora centres lie outside the EU (predominately in Russia and the USA), France has a sizeable Armenian population with which Armenians remain continually engaged. The Armenian diaspora operates comparably to the Jewish diaspora, with strong emphasis on maintaining ethnic and cultural identity as well as retaining close links with their homeland. Subsequently, the Armenia government has utilised the Armenian diaspora significantly since independence through implementing diaspora strategies (i.e. setting up the diaspora ministry) which encourage remittances and investment from abroad via the diaspora. In relation to the prospects of democratisation, there has been an underwhelming discourse connecting diasporas with democratisation. Freire and Simao posited that the diaspora is a potential “blocking agent” towards

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215 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
218 Frieire and Simao: 4.
democracy because the diaspora projects an ideal of Armenia as a nationalistic, victorious and militarily strong state (evident in diaspora financing of the NK conflict) rather than a state adhering to the principles of democracy. However, despite the strong nationalistic stance of the Armenian diaspora, the diaspora could be utilised as an agent of democracy most notably through what Gamlen terms “diaspora networking”219 where skill and knowledge transfers occur, possibly allowing for the free flow of democratic ideas (if effectively utilized by the EU). Koinova argued that “if diaspora communities are socialised with democratic values in Western societies, they could be expected to be sympathetic to the democratization of their home countries.”220 In examining the potential of the Armenian diaspora as an agent for democratisation, Koinova posited that the diaspora could “filter international pressure to democratize post-communist societies by utilizing democratic procedures to advance unresolved nationalist goals” (most notably the NK conflict).221 As with other prominent diasporas, the Armenian diaspora effectively operates a traditional lobby (most notably in Washington, but also in Brussels) in an effort to further Armenian interests. The most notable Armenian EU lobby is the European Armenian Foundation which explicitly aims to acquire greater foreign aid, generate support for the Armenian point-of-view in the Karabakh conflict, and receive recognition for the Genocide.222 However, given the limited scope for NK recognition in the international community, the Armenian diaspora currently has reduced incentive for actively promoting democratisation.

Geopolitics of Armenia

As a foreign policy actor, Armenia, while optimistic towards European integration (not as enthusiastically as Georgia under Saakashvili), retains strong relations with Russia. Nuriyev argued that Armenia pursues a “special alliance”223 with Russia as a safeguard (or security guarantor) against hostile relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan. In the wake of the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the cooling of relations between Russia and the Islamic dominated Azerbaijan, Armenia remains the last ally of Russia in the geopolitically important

221 Ibid.
223 Nuriyev, 5.
South Caucasus region. Hale argued that Russia is actively seeking to reclaim geopolitical influence in its former territories as a bulwark against the chain-reaction accompanying the colour revolutions which threatens the authoritarian position of Putin. Therefore, maintaining strong relations with Armenia is imperative to Russia; illustrated with the announcement on February the 10th 2009 of a $500 million stabilisation loan from the Kremlin to Yerevan which some online commentators have argued comes with attached conditions, such as the possible creation of a “rouble zone.” As evident in Belarus, the maintaining of close ties with Moscow can hinder the influence of EU interaction, regardless of the carrots on offer. The perceived Belarusian Miracle threatens the EU’s self-perception as having an economic and normative monopoly in Europe, as in particular cases, Russian influence counter-balances EU asymmetrical encroachment effectively. However, given the gradual waning of Belarus-Russia relations, resulting in economic hardship in Belarus, perhaps Russian support may only supplant EU initiatives in the short-term.

A further geopolitical issue constraining democratisation and transition in general is Armenia’s precarious position in the regional environment of the Caucasus (see figure 6). Due to the war with Azerbaijan over NK, Armenia has become isolated as a result of the border closures with Azerbaijan and Turkey, conjugated with on-going frosty ties with Georgia. The blockade at the hands of Azerbaijan and Turkey threatens not only Armenian democratisation but also their effectiveness as a state, as the isolation stemming from the blockade limits the potential of Armenia in several key areas. Firstly, the lack of cordial relations with these states hinders the economic potential of Armenia as it cannot effectively trade with two neighbouring states which handicaps Armenian development (as much as 30% of GDP is lost due to the blockade). Secondly, Armenia has been excluded from major regional projects such as the Baku to Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the Kars-Akhaltsikhe-Baku (KAB) railway which offer handsome rewards (particularly transit rates) for the other participating states. Thirdly, the hostile relations prevent Armenian

224 Hale: 307.
227 Natalie Tocci and others, “The Case for Opening the Turkish-Armenian Border,” (Trans-European policy studies association, 2007), 1.
228 Frieire and Simao.
rapprochement: with Turkey over the 1915 genocide and with Azerbaijan over the NK conflict, which ultimately fuels the nationalistic sentiments of the Armenian elites, general population and diaspora. The potential of the EU to reconcile Armenian-Azerbaijan (and Armenian-Turkey for that matter) relations rests on convincing Turkey to firstly acknowledge the Armenian genocide of 1915 and secondly to act as a broker rather than propagator in the NK conflict. Tocci argued, “The EU could contribute greatly to incentivize and support these successive steps by making an effective use of its accession process with Turkey and the inclusion of Armenia in the European Neighbourhood Policy.” While there is potential for the EU to facilitate reopening the Turkish-Armenia border through the on-going normalisation of relations, the issue of NK is complex and likely difficult to solve given the zero-sum approach of both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Figure 6: Political Map of the South Caucasus

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231 Tocci and others, 3.
Summary

Armenia’s experience of democratisation during the first two decades of independence has repeatedly faltered due to a number of pervasive and subsidiary factors which perpetuates authoritarianism and widespread apathy. Furthermore, the geopolitical influence from the close ties Armenia share with Russia, their precarious position in the Southern Caucasus region, and the influence of the Armenia diaspora, further hinders democratic development. Ultimately, despite the development of progressive relations with the EU, Armenia democratisation has abated due to the difficult transition from the pervasive Soviet system where democratic gains can only occur in small steps rather than giant leaps.

EU-Armenia Branch of Literature

EU-Armenia Relations: Advent of the ENP

There are three distinguishable phases of EU-Armenian relations: the beginning of bilateral relations in 1991, the signing of the partnership and cooperation agreement (PCA) in 1996, and the signing of the ENP in 2005 (which has expanded with the EaP). Dialogue and interaction between the EU and Armenia has gradually deepened since Armenia declared independence in 1991. The EU was one of the first institutions to offer developmental aid to Armenia after its independence, signifying intent to foster cordial relations. For instance, during the period 1991-2000, the EU provided Armenia with national grants that amounted to €280.33 million and a further €86 million in loans. Additionally, the EU is Armenia’s largest trading partner accounting for roughly 40% of all trade, including key markets for Armenian machinery, agricultural products and chemicals. Comparably, Russia accounted for approximately 21% of all trade. Therefore, the EU is already a crucially important entity for Armenia in terms of trade and development aid, which is likely to increase in the future given the scope for further deepening with the proposed AA.

233 European Union, European Neighbourhood Policy: EU/Armenia Action plan, 2005
EU-Armenia: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

Official contractual relations did not commence until 1996 with the signed PCA which was implemented in 1999. The major goals of the PCA were sustaining political dialogue in foreign policy and mutual interests, cooperating against drug trafficking and harmonisation of economic and commercial fields.²³⁵ Within the framework of the PCA, during the Swedish turn of presidency in February 2001, ties between the EU and Armenia were solidified through the undertaking of a high level EU mission to the Caucasus (headed by CFSP chief Javier Solana and Commissioner Chris Patten) with the objectives of initiating dialogue on moving towards a more effective EU policy for the Southern Caucasus.²³⁶ However, despite the signed PCA and increase in interaction between the EU and Armenia, Armenia and the wider Southern Caucasus remained largely peripheral to the EU’s geopolitical sphere of interest (up until 2004). Subsequently, the original draft of the ENP did not include the Caucasian states despite the importance of the region geopolitically. Only after the Rose Revolution in Georgia, and the consolidation of the European orientated Saakashvili in power, did the EU make the necessary amendments to the ENP to include the three Caucasian states of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.²³⁷ Freire and Simao argued that a major factor for the EU incorporating the Caucasus within the ENP framework are the security concerns with the separatist movements in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh); the 2008 conflict between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia illustrated the volatile setting of the Caucasus.²³⁸

EU-Armenia: European Neighbourhood Policy

The ENP has been implemented in Armenia through the adoption of the EU-Armenia AP in November 2006 for a period of five years. Implementation of the AP has been aided by yearly reviews which aimed to maintain an effective policy through evaluation of successes and failures of the implementation process. To date, the ENP has been welcomed with greater enthusiasm in Armenia comparatively to United States funded initiatives largely due to the possibility (no matter how small or distant) that Armenia could one day become a

²³⁷ U.S. Agency for International Development
²³⁸ Freire and Simao: 14.
member of the EU, whereas Armenia cannot join the United States. For instance, in a 2007 public opinion poll, 80% of respondents said they would be in favour of Armenian integration into the EU at some point in the future. Additionally, another public opinion poll conducted in 2005 illustrated that 72% of Yerevan residents saw Armenia’s future with Europe rather than Russia. Despite public optimism and orientation towards European integration, there is a burdensome path ahead for the ENP to traverse before tangible rewards in relation to democratisation come to fruition in Armenia. Freire and Simao contend that economic benefits will likely play an important role in mobilising the population and political elites for reform. Ultimately, the democratisation process runs the risk of being jeopardized and even aborted if economic development is not translated into improvement of social conditions, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Subsequently, much of the ENP AP for Armenia is economic in scope with strong focus on macroeconomic reform. Milcher and Slay posited that economically, the ENP attempts to reduce trade restrictions through introducing legislation approximation and convergence with EU standards with a view of ENP recipient states accessing the single market in the future. In other words, Armenia has to undergo a process of specific economic reform before preferential access to the SEM is an option. Despite Armenia’s impressive economic growth in recent years, the global economic crisis coupled with the economic constraints associated with the border closures with Turkey and Azerbaijan reduce Armenia’s single market ambition to a long-term strategy.

EU-Armenia: Eastern Partnership

EU-Armenian relations are likely to deepen further in the near future given the fruition of the long debated EaP. In a nutshell, the EaP signals the enhancing of ties between the EU and their Eastern Neighbourhood with the intention of counterbalancing the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) which incorporates the ENP recipient states from the Mediterranean. The EaP had been strongly pushed by Poland (with Swedish cooperation and consultation with Germany, United Kingdom and Denmark) who has seemingly taken up the mantel of

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239 Interview with NGO-D
241 Ibid.
242 Freire and Simao: 16.
being the loudest voice of the CEE countries whom joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Cianciara argued that the EaP represents the first major Polish initiative which has a chance of becoming successfully ratified by the EU.\textsuperscript{244} For Armenia, the potential of closer ties through the EaP is seen by many as far more concrete comparatively to the incentives currently offered in the ENP. The objectives of the EaP include visa facilitation (with the prospects of visa-free movement), a free trade zone for services and agricultural products (included a fixed date for the creation of a free trade area) generated through the signing of an AA, as well as increased cooperation in the fields of environment, transport and border control.\textsuperscript{245} Therefore, the EaP essentially represents the culmination of the promises and rewards tabled in the ENP for successful implementation of ENP policies.\textsuperscript{246} Subsequently, comparatively to the UfM, the creation of an Eastern Partnership does not supersede the overarching ENP but rather compliments it through offering tangible rewards noticeably missing in the initial ENP. The timetable for the implementation of the policies and measures tabled in the EaP is somewhat ambiguous and uncertain. Concrete initiatives are likely reliant on the signing of an AA between the EU and Armenia, negotiations for which began mid-2010 and are likely to continue deep into 2011.\textsuperscript{247} Ultimately, the ineffective adoption of the EaP highlights the lack of cohesion within the EU in relation to dealing with countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood.

\textbf{Summary}

In summary, the progression of EU-Armenian relations has undoubtedly advanced since Armenian independence, most notably with the signing of the ENP AP. The EU represents an important financial donor and the most important trading partner for Armenia coupled with a positive perception of the EU amongst Armenian citizens. However, tangible progress in Armenia via the ENP is likely reliant on measures inherent in the EaP which would provide concrete incentives for Armenian normative assimilation. Nevertheless, there is scope for further deepening of the EU-Armenian relationship in the coming years given the converging trajectories of EU policy and Armenian democratisation.

\textsuperscript{244} Cianciara.
\textsuperscript{245} Ibid.
Mapping the ENP: Examining the Official Documents

Since inauguration of the ENP with the ENP Strategy Paper on the 12th of May 2004, a plethora of official documents pertaining to the EU’s strategies and goals for interaction with the wider ENP region, and Armenia specifically, have been published. In all, this project identified as many as thirty official documents which closely relate to the ENP and Armenia. These official documents can be categorised into the following groups: official strategy papers (four) which are broad in scope and concern the strategy of ENP implementation on a multilateral level, the AP and country reports (three) which are bilateral documents specifically focusing on the ENP in relation to Armenia, progress reports (three) which provide updates and critique on the ENP implementation process in Armenia, and a miscellaneous category of documents (twenty) which examine a broad spectrum of topics ranging from ENPI financing, public opinion, the economic crisis, and security and defence. In the scope of EU promotion of democratisation in Armenia, the strategy papers, the APs and country reports, and the progress reports require thorough scrutiny while the remaining documents offer supplementary information.

Strategy Papers

As stated above, the strategy papers outline official EU strategies and objectives in the ENP on a broad regional level. Additionally, given the multilateral scope of the strategies and objectives outlined in the strategy papers, deciphering concrete intent and action is often a troublesome task. In a nutshell, the strategy papers present a vague set of documents which outline the general philosophy and agenda with which the EU intends to engage with their neighbourhood. In relation to democratisation, the strategy papers outline the EU’s commitment to fostering democratisation in their neighbourhood in broad terms without offering concrete policies or strategies. For instance, in the 2004 ENP Strategy Paper, democratic related issues are addressed predominately in the section titled Commitment to Shared Values which constitutes a minor portion of the document. Furthermore, the elaborated section merely illustrates democracy as a core foundation of the EU and proclaims a commitment of the EU to actively promote their collective values in their neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the ENP strategy paper explicitly acknowledges strengthening

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European Commission.
democracy, respect for human rights, and support for the development of civil society as the major facets of its democratic objective in the ENP neighbourhood.

Given the apparent subordinate role for democracy, the strategy papers are strongly entrenched in economic issues (such as trade and the internal market) with sections also examining energy cooperation, transport and environmental policy. The normative core synonymous with EU action is implicitly referenced throughout the document but does not receive the same depth of attention. As Johansson-Nogués argued:

> across the board the pledges for normative reform are kept in a very general language and without specifying what exact measures in terms of democracy, human rights and liberties should be taken by partners in order to obtain new privileges from the EU. 

However, in the 2007 strategy paper *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy*, democracy received further attention with the announcement of the governance facility which allocated €50 million towards the “partner countries that have made the most progress in implementing the governance priorities agreed in their Action Plans, particularly those related to human rights, democracy and the rule of law.” Ultimately, the strategy papers provide a general overview of the ethos and philosophy of EU interaction in the ENP region without actively describing what interaction will look like. Additionally, democracy and other normative related issues are of secondary relevance to more salient economic issues.

**Armenian Country Report and Action Plan**

The Armenian country report and AP are EU bilateral based documents which outline the EU’s strategy for Armenia during the period 2006-2011. The country report produced in March 2005 acted as a pre-cursor to the October 2006 EU-Armenia ENP AP which formalised much of the country report into an official strategy. Subsequently, this thesis examines the AP in greater depth as it represents the driving force of ENP implementation and orientation. Officially, the AP focused on “issues related to political cooperation and the

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249 Ibid.
250 Johansson-Nogués: 189.
CFSP” through the contribution of the European Commission and the High Representative to the Caucasus Peter Semneby in liaison with the Armenian government. Concisely, the AP serves as the unequivocal agenda-setting and criterion instrument for formalising EU relations with the states incorporated in the ENP. Whereas the broader strategy papers treated democratisation with an indistinct prose, the EU-Armenian AP was designed to offer more concrete strategies and objectives for democratisation in Armenia. Examining the EU-Armenian AP, the EU identified eight key priorities for Armenia: one which related directly to democratisation and three other priorities which have implications for democratisation (namely human rights, economic and legal orientated reform priorities). *Priority area 1* of the EU-Armenian AP represented the democratic aspect of the ENP, with the explicit aim of *strengthening of democratic structures, of the rule of law, including reform of the judiciary and combat of fraud and corruption.* Furthermore, priority area 1 expanded to include ten concrete objectives in Armenia related to democratisation. It is necessary to cite at length each of these objectives:

- Ensure proper implementation of the Constitutional Reform providing better separation of powers, independence of the judiciary and functioning of local self-government;
- Develop the Human Rights Ombudsman institution in accordance with the “Paris Principles” based on UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of December 1993;
- Ensure that the electoral framework is in full compliance with OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections, by amending the electoral code and improving electoral administration in line with OSCE/ODIHR and CoE Venice Commission recommendations (during 2006);
- Following the reform of the Constitution (concerning separation of powers, independence of the judiciary), develop/adapt laws for the status of judges, the judiciary and the Council of Justice accordingly (during 2006).

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253 Ibid.
• Following the reform of the Constitution (concerning separation of powers, independence of the judiciary) develop/adapt laws for the Procuracy in order to enhance procedures aimed at independence, impartiality, appointment and promotion of prosecutors, as well as the scope of their powers;

• Ensure that the status of the Council of Justice is independent from the legislative and the executive branches and that the Council can guarantee the independence of the judiciary and is the only and final instance with regard to issues related to the activities of judges and magistrates (during 2006);

• Improve the legal and particularly free legal aid system by improving and strengthening the system of advocates and develop a school of professional practice for young graduates in law;

• Establish administrative courts;

• Review progress made in the implementation of the national Anti-Corruption Strategy through the implementation of the corresponding Action Plan and ensure active participation of civil society and business representatives in monitoring implementation (during 2006);

• Evaluate the process of introduction and formation of the civil service system and ensure continuous improvement of the civil service system in accordance with European norms and standards (during 2006). 254

The ten democratic objectives for Armenia illustrate a diverse democratic approach which is focussed on alignment of existing democratic structures towards European standards rather than the full-blown implementation of new democratic institutions and measures. Despite the more concrete focus on democracy in the AP, the objectives listed still remained somewhat ambiguous. As Comelli and Paciellio observed, the objectives and priorities of the APs are:

254 Ibid.
imprecise, cautious and not specific in policy-operational detail, particularly with regard to political and social issues... they are not supported by clear indications of the incentives offered to the partner states and on what conditions... they provide no specific date or modalities for implementation. ²⁵⁵

Furthermore, promotion of civil society is noticeably lacking despite the explicit acknowledgement of building civil society as a specific commitment in the ENP strategy paper. Although implicitly mentioned regularly in the AP, the lack of tangible objectives specifically related to civil society is a glaring omission. Despite more precise and concrete recommendations in relation to facilitating democratisation in Armenia, the AP remains similarly entrenched (as the strategy paper) in economic orientated strategies and objectives. For instance, of the eight priorities listed in the AP, three are strongly economic in scope ranging from sustainable development, private sector-led growth and convergence of economic legislation. ²⁵⁶

Progress Reports

The EU utilises yearly progress reports to evaluate, critique and adjust the objectives of the ENP in Armenia related specifically to the AP. Canvassing the three progress reports issued for Armenia (a 2007, 2008 and 2009 yearly report) paints a scenario where democratic reform has remained stagnated in the implementation stage with some notable failures per the original goals of the AP. The political and social fallout from the problematic 2008 presidential election features heavily in all three documents (exacerbated by problems endemic from the economic slow-down in the 2009 progress report). The 2007 document noted that “the conduct of the February 2008 presidential elections raised concerns, in particular the state of emergency that was introduced in their aftermath”²⁵⁷ and the 2008 document added that:

²⁵⁵ Michele Comelli and Maria Cristina Paciello, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the ENP for the EU’s Southern Parties (Brussels: European Parliament, 2007).
²⁵⁶ European Commission, “EU Armenia ENP Action Plan”.

While the 2008 presidential election constituted the major critique of the progress reports, further concerns of democratisation were identified as the implementation of the anti-corruption strategy, amendments to local self-government and safeguarding judicial code. Despite the conspicuous difficulties of Armenian democratisation during the implementation process of the ENP, the general tone of the progress reports has remained positive and optimistic. For instance, the 2007 and 2008 progress reports noted that good progress had been made in judiciary reform, administration of elections and the Ombudsman Institution, while the 2009 report added that some steps had been taken to improve the “legislative framework in the area of anti-corruption”\footnote{Ibid.} as well as improvements in civil society involvement and local democracy. However, although the optimistic tone of the reports, actual democratic reform with tangible results cannot be deciphered from the text. Progression of the ENP in relation to democratisation appears to be solely focussed on advancing the implementation process within a long-term scope of improving democratisation in Armenia.

Summary

Examining the official documents related to the ENP in the context of democratisation in Armenia produced some interesting observations. Firstly, the three major types of documents examined (strategy papers, AP and progress reports) are strongly economic in focus with democratisation and other normative principles relegated to secondary importance. Such a finding resonates with the perception (examined in the first section of the chapter) of the EU as an economic-first actor camouflaged in normative rhetoric. However, others argue that the EU employs logic of economic reform as a catalyst for democratisation, and argue accordingly that for successful democratisation in Armenia, and the wider ENP region, economic reform is an imperative requirement. Secondly, where
examined in the documents, democratisation is treated in an ambiguous and vague manner; it is difficult to interpret actual intent from rhetoric. Although the AP provided a list of more concrete objectives related to democratisation, the objectives lacked *policy-operational detail* such as a clear implementation framework, specific timeframe details, or a clear connection between the incentives on offer and the political and social reform required.\(^{260}\)

Thirdly, the documents are inconsistent and lack a streamlined policy strategy in relation to democratisation. Despite all of the documents and strategies falling under the umbrella of the ENP, noticeable differences between the ENP strategy papers, the AP and the progress reports can be discerned. The policy related to promoting civil society in Armenia is an example of this as it receives notable reference in both the strategy paper and progress reports but is conspicuously omitted from the AP. Regardless of the inherent difficulties in evaluating EU democratic facilitation through the ENP, there is an observable interaction between the EU and Armenia related to democratisation which requires greater scrutiny in the forthcoming chapters.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined four thematic branches of literature essential to the topic of EU facilitation of democratisation in Armenia. The first branch examined EU specific literature on the historical context of EU promotion of democratisation and democratisation in relation to the ENP. Gradually, the EU has become a credible democratisation actor in the international community and has developed a self-perception as a legitimate norms entrepreneur. Despite EU membership no longer being offered as an incentive for normative assimilation, the ENP aims to facilitate the same normative transformation as previous policies. However, the literature reviewed presented a sceptical outlook regarding the likely effectiveness of the ENP given the EU’s loss credibility as a democratic agent coupled with the vagueness of incentives on offer in the ENP. The second branch reviewed Armenian-centric literature in relation to democratisation. Although many Armenian citizens responded to the collapse of the Soviet Union with democratic optimism, Armenia experienced a couple of initial democratic pacifiers (the NK war and the Spitak Earthquake)

\(^{260}\) Comelli and Paciello.
and a number of pervasive democratic constraints (Soviet legacy, oligarchs, simultaneous transitions and widespread apathy). Thus, democratisation has stagnated and even reverted in the period since independence leading up to the ENP. Further variables judged important to the democratisation process were: the Armenian diaspora which conceivably could be utilised as a tool for democratisation through knowledge transfers, the Armenian cultural heritage which has strong European roots resulting in a popular perception in Armenia as being European, and the geopolitical situation with the multiple border closures with Turkey and Azerbaijan and the maintenance of strong Russian relations. Ultimately, Armenia survives in a precarious environment which tends not to be conducive to democratisation; whether EU interaction through the ENP can supersede these constraints in promoting democratisation is difficult to assert. The third branch of literature connected the literature on the EU and Armenia through examining the EU-Armenian relationship. Relations between the EU and Armenia have remained cordial and progressive since Armenia independence, with the EU now an important partner in terms of economics and politics. The EU is the most important partner for Armenia in terms of trade and development aid while the advent of the ENP (and EaP) posits scope for greater interaction and deepening of relations. The last section extensively examined a number of EU official documents related to the ENP and Armenia. The documents judged crucial to evaluating democratisation in Armenia were the broad regional strategy papers, the bilateral AP, and the yearly progress reports. Examination of the documents illustrated the ENP as a policy orientated towards economic reform first and foremost with democracy and a number of additional areas receiving secondary attention. Furthermore, interpreting concrete democratisation strategies and policy prescribed by the ENP was difficult given the ambiguous and vague nature of the official documents coupled with the lack of a streamlined strategy. Nevertheless, there is an observable interaction between the EU and Armenia in the scope of democratisation which warrants further evaluation (through looking at free and fair elections and civil society engagement in the subsequent chapters). Overall, the literature review coupled with the ENP documents revealed a noticeable gap in the examination of EU facilitation of democratisation through the ENP in Armenia. Thus, by connecting the literature reviewed with the primary research on Armenia, this thesis aims to fill the gap.
Chapter 3: The Visible Democracy: EU Promotion of Free and Fair Elections in Armenia

This chapter examines the EU’s promotion of free and fair elections in Armenia through evaluation of the 2008 presidential election. Elections represent what this thesis calls the visible democracy as they have become an overt and salient component of international democratic promotion strategies (and observable in the EU’s ENP). Subsequently, this chapter explores three themes inherent in EU electoral promotion: firstly the contextual development of free and fair elections in the post-Cold War era, secondly the entrenchment of elections in EU foreign policy and ethos, and lastly the evaluation of a case study, the 2008 Armenian presidential election. The first section examines the rise of free and fair elections as an indelible facet of international democracy promotion which is tempered by two restricting factors: the lack of consensual definition and the constrictions of international law. The second section assesses the EU’s rise as a democratic agent with their strong adherence to electoral reform and election observation; which is noticeably lacking in the democratic policy drafted in the ENP. Subsequently, this thesis examines the prescribed reform in the ENP, outlined in the Armenian AP (namely electoral code and electoral administration reform) with consultation of a number of documents and recommendations produced by the OSCE and CoE. The last section offers a case study to evaluate the impact of EU initiated electoral reform in Armenia through examining the 2008 presidential election. The EOM report produced by the OSCE is utilised extensively in evaluating the Armenian presidential election in regards to: firstly, free and fair standards, and secondly the more specific areas of electoral code and electoral administration reform. Additionally, an EOM report from the It’s Your Choice (IYC) NGO coupled with interviews with key informants from CSOs will be used to contextualise and offset the results of the OSCE report. It is argued that examining the electoral performance of Armenia provides a rich phenomenon in which to test and evaluate the ENP’s democratisation policies given the prevalence of elections in the international system, in the legal framework of the EU, and in the democratisation trajectory of Armenia.
The International Dimension of Free and Fair Elections

Historical Context of Elections in Democracy

In the post-Cold War international setting, elections have widely become endorsed as a viable democratic measurement by the international donors’ actively promoting democracy in transitioning states. As Nevitte and Canton observed, elections have been extensively utilised as “benchmarks”\(^261\) and “litmus tests”\(^262\) in evaluating democratic transition of post-Soviet countries. Subsequently, election observation in democratising states by a variety of international actors (states, IGOs, NGOs) has become *en vogue* in the international setting in order to judge, evaluate and report on the undertaking of elections vis-à-vis their chartered electoral standards. However, the link between functioning democracy and free and fair elections goes deeper than the post-Cold War context as utilisation of elections as a facet of democracy is inherent in modern conceptualisations of democracy. Elections permeate the democratic literature as an indelible component of democracy whether evoked in relation to minimalist conceptions or deeper maximalist conceptions of democracy.\(^263\) Indeed, the legitimacy of the electoral process is now judged internationally as a universal pre-requisite of a functioning democracy.\(^264\) Yet, as Pastor argued, “democracy should be more than free and fair elections, but it cannot be less.”\(^265\) Bratton\(^266\) added that election promotion strategies should steer a middle-course between to two fallacies of electoralism (half-way transition driven by the incumbent regime through emphasising elections)\(^267\) and anti-electoralism (an assumption that elections never matter for democratisation).\(^268\) Therefore, external promotion of democracy cannot be based solely

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\(^{262}\) Ibid.


on free and fair elections but incorporate a range of strategies that view democracy with a broader scope.

The strong emphasis from international actors on electoral reform in the post-Soviet context stems from a number of interrelated international factors. Firstly, democracy has become the legitimate form of government in the international system; IGOs are dominated by democratic states, fostering a clear democratic ethos and world-view reinforced by a democratic hegemon in the United States. Secondly, changes to the international system have allowed for the greater role of IGOs and NGOs in democratic promotion which perpetuates the ethos of electoral reform through monitoring and promoting elections on the ground. Lastly, the rise of EOMs illustrates a gradual erosion of state sovereignty where global interconnectedness makes states more porous to international influence. The international community's promotion of electoral reform is built on the philosophy that free and fair elections are a visible marker of democracy; in other words, a symbolic ritual of democracy in action. Furthermore, elections represent a way of legitimising the democratisation process to the general public (and the international community for that matter) through allowing for public participation and input. Consequently, as Schelder argued, perceived legitimacy is also the major reason authoritarian regimes have widely embraced elections (electoral authoritarianism) in the last twenty years through essentially practicing “democracy as deception” in order to effectively retain power and international credibility (hence the significant rise of pseudo-democracies in the same time-frame). Nevertheless, Elkilt noted that the role of voters “should not be forgotten,” as many studies over-emphasise the role of elites and their behaviour in the progression of electoral reform in transitioning states. Essentially, through meaningful participation in

270 Ibid.: 545.
271 Ibid.: 546.
elections, voters are expected to develop a “normative commitment to democracy.” That is, free and fair elections allow for effective political participation of the masses which in turn strengthens a state’s social capital. Conversely, fraudulent and unfair elections have the opposite influence through generating public apathy and distrust in the government.

To what extent international actors can facilitate free and fair elections is widely debated. Indeed international presence during elections through observation missions is likely to improve credibility and deter unfair practices as well as providing technical assistance. However, strong emphasis on electoral reform and observation can lead to international actors unwittingly facilitating democratic violations through legitimising undemocratic regimes.

**International Constraints of Election Promotion**

Despite an overt eagerness of the international community and an array of international actors to facilitate free and fair elections in transitioning states; international actors lack a consensual (and sometimes incompatible) strategy related to free and fair elections. As Elkilt pointed out, the phrase free and fair elections is an insubstantial concept as there exists no universal definition or standard on what constitutes a free and fair election. Regardless of a lack of universal acceptance or definition, free and fair elections have become an important component of international democracy promotion due to the numerous international bodies which continually monitor elections, namely the United Nations, the OSCE, and the EU, “whose pronouncements on whether and election is ‘free and fair’ carry much weight in determining an electoral event’s legitimacy.” Few scholars have attempted to conceptualise (or universalise) what constitutes a free and fair election though Goodwin-Gil has emerged as a leading scholar in the free and fair debate in which he

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276 Ibid.
278 Ibid., 140.
280 Schelder.
281 Elkilt.
attempts to define free and fair elections through placing international legal mechanisms at the centre. Goodwin-Gill argued that “attention should be paid to those specific obligations in the matter of elections already assumed by States, and to the equally accepted political human rights that may reasonably be linked thereto.” However, conceiving free and fair elections within the framework of international law is difficult and troublesome. International law operates under the explicit principle of sovereignty of state and since elections operate on a domestic level, developing a binding resolution on what free and fair elections should look like perhaps compromises the essence of international law. However, as Aliyu pointed out, “states are under International Obligation to comply with international standards as enshrined under various treaty obligations” including the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) and International Convention on civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR). Therefore, notwithstanding the explicit adherence of the international community towards free and fair elections as an ineffaceable component of democracy; ensuring proper conduct in elections is far more difficult given the philosophy of international law that holds that states have an indissoluble right to sovereignty.

Summary

It was noted that due to a number of interrelated factors inherent in the post-Cold War international system, free and fair elections had become a widely heralded benchmark of a functioning democracy utilised by the international community. The gradual rise of democracy as a norm of the international community, the increased agency of IGOs and NGOs related to electoral reform, and the rise of EOMs, were all judged as catalytic factors for the adoption of strong election advocacy by international actors. Elections were attributed as being an important component of democracy because they represented a visible marker (or symbolic ritual) of democracy in action where participants developed a normative commitment to democracy. However, international promotion and facilitation of free and fair elections suffered from a number of issues: a lack of a consensual definition amongst international democratic agents, and the positioning of elections against the

285 Ibid., 101.
principle of sovereignty inherent in international law were identified as the two major constraints. Nevertheless, elections remain a deep-seated component of democratisation strategies implemented by international actors in transitioning states.

The EU’s promotion of Free and Fair Elections

Historical Context of the EU’s Promotion of Free and Fair Elections

As discussed extensively in Chapter 2, the emergence of the EU as a democratic agent coincided with the rise of democracy as a norm of the international community. Progressively, the EU has fused their democratic development with a strong identification with free and fair elections as a necessary facet of a functioning democracy. Subsequently, promotion of electoral reform has been heavily entrenched in EU external strategies of democratic promotion and the EU has become a notable election observation actor. For instance, the notion of free and fair elections as a component of democracy is notably evident in the legal framework of the EU with explicit representation in the EU treaty, Copenhagen Criteria and the ENP. Furthermore, the EU has actively participated in over 100 EOMs (60 since 2000) since the first EU mission in Russia during the 1993 parliamentary election. Meyer-Resende noted that the EU’s election observation logic altered in the latter 1990s with a move towards the OSCE’s methodology of election observation which deviated away from solely Election Day observation to a long-term strategy with a broader scope. Thus, the new election observation strategy coupled the longer mission scope with consideration of political context, media conduct, polling/counting scrutiny, and the post-election process. Therefore, the EU over time has arguably become one of the most prominent free and fair elections advocates in the international setting through actively engaging in election observation and promotion in third countries.

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292 Ibid.
293 Ibid.
Notwithstanding the prominence of free and fair elections in the legal framework of the EU (including the ENP) and the emergence of the EU as a credible election observation actor; in the scope of the ENP, the EU has adopted an alternative and far more modest strategy. Firstly, despite free and fair elections being an explicit component of the ENP, the EU has rarely sent an EOM to an ENP member state (only Lebanon in 2005 to date). This is due to a legal requirement of the EU to be invited by a state to observe elections which coupled with the lack of binding resolutions on elections in international law allows recipient states to refuse EOMs based on their right of sovereignty. Subsequently, the EU does not incorporate the ICCPR standards, widely utilised as a benchmark in their EOMs, into the ENP AP’s (despite ratification or accession of the ICCPR in all ENP states). Secondly, when mentioned in the ENP documents, elections receive vague reference (tends to be strongly rhetorical with little concrete information) and differ in importance from country to country. For instance, Meyer-Resende observed that there is a clear Eastern Neighbourhood versus Mediterranean divide in the way the EU interacts with ENP states in regards to elections and electoral reform. The EU has remained focussed on the electoral performance of the Eastern Neighbourhood while projecting a nonchalant stance with the Mediterranean members. Thus, the EU forgoes the multilateral and systematic approach to free and fair elections observable with other third countries (Cotonou countries for example) and employs a more bilateral-based approach in the ENP. Lastly, the EU through the ENP does not monitor or implement policy related to elections autonomously. Rather the EU cooperates with a number of IGOs (OSCE and COE particularly) in formulating their monitoring and implementation strategies. Particularly in the Eastern Neighbourhood, the EU relies heavily on the reports of the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) who rigorously observe elections (which in turn influences the direction and nature of EU policies). Ultimately, as Meyer-Resende argued:

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294 Meyer-Resende, EU Election Observation: Achievements, Challenges.
295 Ibid.
296 Santa-Cruz.
297 Meyer-Resende, EU Election Observation: Achievements, Challenges.
as in the European Neighbourhood, the EU tends to be generally weak in promoting elections in countries which it deploys no EU EOMs, because it lacks detailed analysis to promote concrete steps in the practice of holding elections.\textsuperscript{298}

EU Promotion of Free and Fair Elections in Armenia: Evaluating the ENP

As mentioned previously, free and fair elections represent a discernible component of the democratisation areas of the ENP and are mentioned in an array of documents ranging from the broad strategy papers, the ENPI strategy papers to the Armenian AP. Furthermore, elections represent a form of conditionality as the rewards and incentives on offer in the ENP are conditional to the successful implementation of the political (and economic) reform chartered in the AP. As evident with the ENP’s governance facility,\textsuperscript{299} free and fair elections constitutes one of a number of indicators used to adjudicate sufficient progress for a state to access the incentives on offer. In the Armenian AP, the prescribed electoral reform was agreed to entail:

Ensure that the electoral framework is in full compliance with OSCE commitments and other international standards for democratic elections, by amending the electoral code and improving electoral administration in line with OSCE/ODIHR and CoE Venice Commission recommendations.\textsuperscript{300}

Breaking down the prescribed reform produces two salient areas that warrant evaluation related to free and fair elections in Armenia. Namely \textit{amending the electoral code} and \textit{improving electoral administration} in relation to the OSCE and CoE recommendations which are expanded on below.

Prescribed Reform: Electoral Code

The proposed alterations to the electoral code of Armenia offered by the OSCE/CoE were outlined in the \textit{Draft Law on Changes and Amendments to the electoral code of the Republic

\textsuperscript{298} Ibid., 20.
\textsuperscript{299} The Governance Facility will provide additional EU support, on top of the EU funding amounts already allocated for those countries. This support will acknowledge and support the work of those partners who have made most progress in implementing the agreed reform agenda set out in their Action Plan. The assessment included in the Annual ENP Country Progress Report will provide the basis for the annual allocation decisions. It will support key elements of the reform agenda, helping reformist governments to strengthen their domestic constituencies for reform. The Commission intends to devote an amount of €300 million over the period 2007-2013 (European Commission, \textit{Principles for the Implementation of a Governance Facility under ENPI} (2006).)
\textsuperscript{300} European Commission, “EU Armenia ENP Action Plan”.}
of Armenia. The alterations were agreed upon by members of the CoE, the OSCE and the Republic of Armenia and related to the existing electoral code of Armenia adopted May 2005. The legally ratified 2005 electoral code laid out 142 articles of law ranging from electoral rights, pre-election campaigns, electoral commissions, voting procedures, ballot counting and so on. Subsequently, the OSCE/CoE recommendations aimed to amend the perceived undemocratic and weaker aspects of the electoral code in line with Western standards. The agreed draft law on changes and amendments to the electoral code offered 100 suggested amendments encompassing mundane aspects like minor rewording of articles to more substantial changes such as altering electoral procedures. The Final Joint Opinion issued by the OSCE/CoE and government of Armenia noted that:

the amended Code contains a number of improvements, including the improved status of proxies, additional safeguards for the integrity of the vote and election materials such as signature requirements and clarification on distribution of election commissions.

However, the document also pointed out on-going concerns with the electoral code such as clarification of the president’s role in approving the Central Election Commission (CEC), the stamping of ballot envelopes, the approval of preparation and printing of ballots and the complaints and appeals procedures. Ultimately, the prescribed electoral reform offered by the OSCE can be described as minimal or “cosmetic” in relation to the existing electoral code adopted in 2005 with alterations focussing on minor and subsidiary elements of the code. Thus, the electoral code remained largely the same in substance as the inaugurated code from 2005.

Prescribed Reform: Electoral Administration

The second salient reform priority related to free and fair elections in the Armenian AP was the improvement of electoral administration. Electoral administration relates to electoral code reform in general but was judged by the EU as an important component in its own

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302 Ibid.
303 Ibid.
304 Ibid.
right. Indeed, electoral administration constituted a significant chunk of the Armenian electoral code and the subsequent OSCE/CoE electoral code recommendations. In the wider CoE Venice Commission electoral reform strategy, it was noted that in “states with little experience of organizing democratic elections, the impartiality of the electoral administration cannot be taken for granted.”  Thus, it is necessary for emerging states to employ independent electoral commissions as a guarantee of impartial electoral management. Furthermore, electoral law should provide a three-tier commission structure with a national electoral commission, regional (or district) electoral commission and a local electoral commission. Additionally, the number of commission members nominated or appointed by the government should be very low (and adequately balanced by opposition nominations), commission members shouldn’t be appointed by the same institution but a mixture of institutions (even non-political) which are perceived as being neutral. The goal of a democratic electoral administration is the transparency and impartiality of the commission. Therefore, in the recommendations offered by the OSCE/CoE, the electoral administration was judged as being an improvement on previous draft amendments, particularly in relation to distribution of tasks within election commissions and the training and recall of election commission members. However, concerns were raised as to the neutrality of the CEC given the perceived significance of the Armenian President in selecting the CEC commissioners.

Summary

Although the EU has garnered a credible reputation as a consistent election observer in the international setting with free and fair elections placed as an indelible component of their democratic strategy, the ENP is best summarised as a soft policy in relation to promoting electoral reform in Armenia. Elections receive recognition as a priority of Armenian democratisation in the Armenian AP; however the prescribed reform is considerably narrowed from promoting free and fair elections in the strategy papers to solely

307 Ibid.
308 Ibid.
implementation of the OSCE/CoE recommendations related to electoral code and electoral administration in the AP. Examining the recommendations further illustrated the modest targets set for electoral reform in Armenia. Corroborating the EU documents vis-à-vis the OSCE/CoE documents implied a general acceptance that the 2005 Armenian Electoral was generally acceptable and in line with Western standards with the prescribed reform focussing predominately on alteration of the electoral administration. This contrasts with the ambitious (albeit somewhat rhetorically ambitious) stance of the ENP strategy papers and EU democratic interaction in general which focussed on more substantial democratic reforms. Nevertheless, no-matter how minimal or rudimentary, electoral reform represented the sole concrete (and conditional) reform area of the AP related to democracy. As Borzel observed, “input-related objectives are represented only marginally and in a more or less formal way by the requirement to improve the electoral code.”

Thus, the EU has made “timid use of positive and negative incentives” in formulating concrete democratic reform in Armenia personified by the electoral reform prescribed in the AP.

Case Study of the 2008 Armenian Presidential Election

This thesis utilises the Armenian presidential election of 2008 as the primary case study in evaluating the freeness and fairness of the elections in Armenia within the context of the electoral reform prescribed in the Armenia AP. The 2008 elections denoted the fifth presidential election undertaken in Armenia since the inaugural elections in 1991. However, not only does Armenia lack a rich history of democracy, the progression of elections since independence has not resulted in any marked improvement. For instance, it is widely accepted that the very first elections in 1991 resulting in the popular endorsement of Levon Ter-Petrosyan as President of the newly independent Republic of Armenia were the most free and fair to date. As one interview participant conveyed, “91 were also not good but at least in 91 the winner would be the winner in any election... the winner was not disputed...
further presidential elections were very bad because you know those cases the winner was not fair." 314 Indeed, all of the major democratic ratings indexes illustrate a downward progression of democratic score for Armenia since the inaugural elections especially in electoral conduct and reform. 315 As discussed in Chapter 2, the regression of democratic elections has propagated the erosion of public trust of the government and democratisation process in Armenia. Nevertheless, approaching the 2008 elections, Armenia had experienced a period of notable stability of rule under Kocharyan (since 1998), which successfully withstood the colour revolution wave where other lame-duck regimes collapsed (such as Shevardnadze in Georgia), largely due to the sufficient popular legitimacy of the Kocharyan regime in Armenia. 316 Furthermore, the 2008 elections were significant as Kocharyan abided by the constitution and did not seek re-election for what would have been an unconstitutional third consecutive term, giving way to his successor in the then Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. 317

The 2008 Armenian presidential election took place on the 19th of February with the electoral campaigns commencing a month earlier on January 21st. 318 Although officially there were nine candidates contesting the presidency, the elections were widely perceived as a two-horse race between the incumbent Kocharyan’s replacement Sargsyan and the former President Ter-Petrosyan. 319 The election results were officially ratified on the 24th of February; Sargsyan amassed a clear majority with 52.82% of the vote with Ter-Petrosyan second with 21.50% and a third candidate Artur Baghdasaryan collating 17.70%. 320 However, in the immediate aftermath of the election results, Ter-Petrosyan’s supporters mobilised (with the consent of Ter-Petrosyan) at the Republic Square to protest the alleged fraudulent nature of the elections through initially demanding a recount and eventually

314 Interview with NGO-B
315 See Appendix C
316 Hale.
insisting on a new election. At the outset, the daily protests were peaceful and largely uneventful, but on March the 1st they turned violent when police and army forces dispersed crowds through the use of force, resulting in eight deaths, a number of injuries, and over 100 arrests. The resulting political fallout from the election protests saw Kocharyan initiate a twenty day state of emergency as well as the banning of future demonstrations and the censoring of media coverage of the protests (save for governmental and state media releases). In the end, despite widespread condemnation from local and international actors over the civil unrest, the Armenian government under the Presidency of Sargsyan re-solidified their grip on power and Armenia more or less returned to the stability experienced under the consecutive Kocharyan regimes. Ultimately, the 2008 presidential election in Armenia, and resulting aftermath, appeared to have reinforced the status quo identified in the literature; that Armenia rather than improving democratically is regressing deeper into authoritarian rule as the use of governmental force to disperse demonstrations as evident in the 2008 presidential election was largely unprecedented in Armenia’s post-Soviet history.

Despite the glaring violations of human rights in the immediate post-election setting by the Armenian government, the EU and OSCE were initially complimentary as to the conduct of the elections. As discussed in Chapter 2, the Presidency on behalf of the European Union released a statement applauding the Armenian government for practicing a “competitive presidential election” conducted “mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards.” However, the initial optimism and praise espoused by the EU (and other election observers) waned noticeably in the wake of the election protests and civil unrest. Subsequently, this thesis examines the electoral reports of the OSCE EOM and the documents offered by the EU released in the aftermath of the civil unrest in order to

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322 Alexandros Petersen, “[Comment] a Chance to Resolve Karabakh”.
326 Abrahanyan, "Observers’ Verdict: International Standards Met".
328 Ibid.
judge the freeness and fairness of the presidential election. Furthermore, counter-balancing the EU/OSCE adjudication, this thesis also examines the election report of the IYC NGO as well as the opinions of several NGOs, in order to provide triangulation and an alternative perspective to corroborate the freeness and fairness of the presidential election.

**OSCE EOM Report: Overview**

The OSCE’s ODIHR produced five documents pertaining to the 2008 Armenian presidential election. In the scope of this thesis, the last report published on the 30th of May 2008 receives the strongest consideration given that it was produced some time after the civil unrest and is the most comprehensive document. The document extensively evaluated the electoral process in Armenia through observation of electoral administration, voter and candidate registration, the election campaign, the media, voting and counting, and the post-election period. The general tone of the document remained strongly neutral and observational with a number of positives and negatives highlighted. The second paragraph of the executive summary outlined that:

> While the 2008 presidential election mostly met OSCE commitments and international standards in the pre-election period and during voting hours, serious challenges to some commitments did emerge, especially after election day. This displayed an insufficient regard for standards essential to democratic elections and devalued the overall election process.

The report noted that a major undermining issue for the elections was the lack of public confidence in the election process, despite overt reassurances from state officials of the publics’ right to freedom of choice and the legal safeguards protecting the elections against violations. Other negative facets of the election were judged as being deficiencies in the vote count related to transparency and accountability, the open campaigning for Sargsyan by local government officials, noticeable media bias towards Sargsyan, inconsistencies with polling stations and the disregarding of a number of election complaints by the CEC. Conversely, the report noted that positive elements of the election were visible in the CEC.

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330 Ibid.
providing a “permissive campaign environment,” the tabulation of the results by the Territorial Election Commissions (TEC) was performed sufficiently, and the electoral code and electoral administration on the whole were perceived to have been implemented at an acceptable level. As the electoral code and electoral administration constitute the focal points of prescribed ENP reform in Armenia, they receive elaborated examination here.

**OSCE EOM Report: Electoral Code**

The OSCE EOM report assessed the electoral code of Armenia as “providing a sound basis to conduct democratic elections.” The major issue was identified as the lack of sufficient political will to implement the recommendations offered by the OSCE and CoE. Thus, the general observation made by the OSCE EOM was that the electoral code of Armenia, at least in principle, was adequately in line with democratic standards. However, examining the document in more depth offers a more substantial critique regarding the implementation of the electoral code related to the presidential election. For instance, an amendment to the electoral code in which citizens could vote from their place of actual residence (rather than their legally registered residence) was implemented inadequately. The report noted that “the process of reregistering according to ‘actual residence’ was not sufficiently transparent.” Furthermore, “little information on this option was provided to voters and data requested by the OSCE EOM was not given in a timely manner.” Another electoral code concern raised in the report was the enforcement of the prohibition of inducements (money, goods, or services) from candidates to citizens in order to buy votes. The report noted that OSCE “interlocutors frequently expressed concerns about the secrecy of the vote, and alleged widespread vote-buying and multiple voting through impersonation of voters.” While the majority of allegations could not be corroborated, vote-buying schemes were uncovered in the villages of Vardablur and Bazum, perhaps scratching the surface of greater violations. Further electoral code violations were identified in the equality of electoral campaign funding and capabilities, the open campaigning by governmental officials for Sargsyan, minor media violations (such as non-prime-time airing for non-Sargsyan candidates), the lack of formalisation of complaint procedures, and notable

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331 Ibid., 1.
332 Ibid.
333 Ibid., 6.
334 Ibid.
335 Ibid., 8.
discrepancies of the vote counting and re-counting procedures; all of which should have been legally prohibited through enforcement of the electoral code.\textsuperscript{336} Conversely, the report highlighted a number of positive observations related to the functioning of the electoral code. Namely, the adequate training of PEC members in vote counting and protocol completion procedures, the overall transparency of the CEC’s technical organisation of the election, and the compliance of public media with electoral code provisions for equal share of air time for candidates’ campaigns.\textsuperscript{337}

Overall, the critique of the electoral code by the OSCE EOM illustrated that fundamentally the electoral code was a democratically sufficient document. However, the implementation and adherence of the document by the Armenian government and electoral commissions were far from transparent and democratic. The high number of electoral code discrepancies highlighted in the EOM report, although not glaring or blatant violations, nevertheless illustrated the unwillingness (or lack of political will) of the government to enforce the electoral code in its entirety and without bias. As the EOM recommendations argued, the electoral code should be amended thoroughly in line with the previous OSCE/CoE recommendations which still remain valid in the Armenian electoral setting.\textsuperscript{338}

**OSCE EOM Report: Electoral Administration**

The EOM report observed that the electoral administration of the Armenian presidential election provided the majority of serious electoral violations. Indeed, as discussed previously, the electoral code explicitly accounted for provisions to provide an impartial and transparent electoral commission. However, as illustrated in the electoral code critique, legal provisions do not necessarily guarantee fair practices in the Armenian and post-Soviet contexts. Thus, the EOM report noted that while the CEC and TEC’s “appeared well-organized”\textsuperscript{339} and operated overall in a transparent manner, serious inconsistencies were identified in the handling of election disputes and complaints. The report noted two major violations: firstly in dealing with pre-election complaints and appeals and secondly the handling of complaints in the post-election period. In the pre-election setting, the CEC was accused of failing to sufficiently establish, on a number of occasions, whether complaints

\textsuperscript{336} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{337} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{338} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{339} Ibid., 5.
had a factual basis. The EOM report cited an example where a complaint was made against Sargsyan’s use of his position as Prime Minister to actively campaign through creating a working group in the Government Staff Department.\(^\text{340}\) However, the CEC formally rejected the complaint without “addressing the substance of the case”\(^\text{341}\) which contravened Article 22.1 of the Code. In the post-election setting, the EOM observed the greatest volume of violations by the electoral administration. In the report, it was noted that 19 serious complaints were filed with the CEC, most of which were not heard in an open session and were consistently discharged without comment or justification.\(^\text{342}\) An example alluded to was that of presidential candidate Baghdasaryan who “provided details of cases where PEC members were forced to leave several polling stations and claimed that during their absence ballot stuffing had occurred.”\(^\text{343}\) Additionally, the handling of complaints suffered from “ambiguous legal provisions”\(^\text{344}\) born from the dual-jurisdiction of the CEC and the Administrative Court in adjudicating complaints.

Overall, similarly to the critique offered on the electoral code, the electoral administration observed in the 2008 Armenian presidential election appeared on the surface to operate democratically and transparently. However, once examined more extensively, a number of undemocratic and governmentally biased procedures were observed. The major issue was with the CEC’s handling of election complaints and appeals; the general view was that the CEC did not investigate complaints substantially enough and essentially facilitated biased and unfair practices by Sargsyan and his supporters. Thus, while exhibiting transparency in a number of areas, the electoral administration failed critically in ensuring “an effective remedy”\(^\text{345}\) for candidate complaints as prescribed in Article 32(1). Subsequently, the concluding recommendations offered by the OSCE argued that “the electoral code should oblige the CEC to establish clear factual findings on every complaint”\(^\text{346}\) and the CEC should be held accountable for their findings.

\(^{340}\) Ibid., 17.  
\(^{341}\) Ibid.  
\(^{342}\) Ibid.  
\(^{343}\) Ibid., 21.  
\(^{344}\) Ibid., 26.  
\(^{345}\) Ibid., 25.  
\(^{346}\) Ibid., 32.
OSCE EOM Report: Summary

Examining the OSCE EOM report offered some encouraging assessments of the 2008 Armenian presidential election which subsided under notable and glaring deficiencies largely evident in the implementation and enforcement of the electoral code and the transparency of the CEC. Similarly, the EOM report collated by the largest participating domestic NGO, the IYC organisation, corroborated many of the findings of the OSCE EOM. Notably, the IYC report painted a less optimistic picture of the presidential election than the OSCE report in which the IYC “observed a series of violations, shortcomings, inaccuracies, and other concerning facts which to a certain extent cast a shadow on civil society’s expectations about democratic elections.” Documented election abuses included “cases of illegal voting... case of illegal campaigning... influence of voters’ free will... imbalanced power distribution... violations of the electoral procedure” to name but a few. In relation to electoral law, the IYC report noted that lack of sufficient amendments to the electoral code resulted in unequal power distribution. However, the electoral code evident in the 2008 elections was an undeniable upgrade (despite inefficiencies) from the old code. With regards to electoral administration, the IYC criticised the unbalanced selection process of the electoral commission’s which comprised of too many governmental officials leading to a lack of impartiality of the CEC and TEC. Subsequently, notable offences occurred with the appeals procedure before, during and after the elections. Overall, the IYC’s summarised findings were that the 2008 Armenian presidential election suffered greatly from a lack of public trust which needed rectifying through garnering “serious electoral code improvements combined with sincere political will of governing bodies,” conclusions which mimicked the general findings of the OSCE EOM report.

Further evaluation and opinion of the 2008 elections was sought through interviews with key informants from democratically minded NGOs in Armenia. Overwhelmingly, the interview participants portrayed a negative perception of the elections, especially in relation to the role of the EU. As one interview participant argued, the “EU actually played a very

348 Ibid.
349 Ibid.
350 Ibid.
351 Ibid.
negative role... in supporting our government to falsify elections” through legitimising the elections and the government by affording praise in their initial election reports. Another participant noted that the “presence of international monitoring missions is now a mechanism to legitimise the fraud... international institutions after this presidential elections are completely disregarded.” A major criticism was judged as the short term scope of election monitoring and implementation of electoral reform which in the opinion of the interview participants should have been undertaken years before the elections, not months. Ultimately, despite their perception of glaring inefficiencies in the presidential election, the NGO key informants felt elections were a key component of the democratisation and an avenue for the EU to facilitate democratic gain. As one participant argued, “average people know about elections, so that is something EU should take very seriously, if really interested in promoting democracy, if not, no need to advise.”

Cross-referencing the election observation reports of the OSCE with the prescribed electoral reform of the Armenian AP offers some form of critique regarding the effectiveness of the ENP in fostering electoral reform. As examined previously, the Armenian AP explicitly identified electoral reform of the electoral code and electoral administration in line with the OSCE/CoE standards as the only priority area related to elections. Thus, through examining the OSCE EOM reports, the IYC’s EOM report, and the interviews with key informants, one can judge the effectiveness of EU policy so far. In relation to electoral code, it can be argued that fundamentally the document provided a sound basis for conducting democratic elections. However, there appears to be a notable lack of political will to fully implement the electoral code amendments offered by the OSCE/CoE which perpetuates a continuity of electoral violations inherent in the post-Soviet setting. With regards to electoral administration, it is clear that the formulation and operation of the election commissions constituted the greatest electoral violations. The various electoral commissions suffered from a lack of impartiality with a strong and unfair bias towards the incumbent regime. Nevertheless, despite the major issues with the appeals system, the electoral administration made some strides (albeit baby-steps) towards functioning more democratically.

Adjudicating the success or failure of the EU’s policy related to free and fair elections in

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352 Interview with key informant from NGO-A
353 Interview with key informant from NGO-B
354 Interview with key informant from NGO-A
Armenia greatly depends on definition and scope. On the one hand, the reform criteria prescribed in the Armenian AP was very narrowly defined and offered only modest reform objectives. Subsequently, within the narrow scope of the Armenian AP, the 2008 presidential election represents some level of success as progress was achieved in both prescribed reform areas. However, on the other hand, examining the presidential election through a broader evaluation scope offers a contrasting assessment. Evidently, the presidential election, despite emitting the characteristics of a free and fair election on the surface, was conducted unfairly with a strong institutionalised bias toward the incumbent regime and Sargsyan. Furthermore, reform of electoral code and electoral administration was only superficially apparent. Thus, one could argue that this signifies a failure of EU policy in promoting free and fair elections. Moreover, the EU promotion of free and fair elections suffered from the inability of the EU to utilise their EOM tool in Armenia and the wider ENP. Having a stronger EU presence during the election without relying on the EOMs of other institutions would have solidified the ENP’s implementation of electoral reform and given them clearer indicators on the progression of reform. In the end, the noticeable failings of the ENP in providing free and fair elections in the 2008 presidential election illustrated the difficult international environment related to promoting elections in external countries as a number of interrelated factors clearly hindered the EU’s ability and power to facilitate change in Armenia.

**Conclusion**

This chapter tracked the emergence of electoral reform as a bastion of international democratic promotion in the post-Soviet international context and the subsequent emergence of the EU as a prominent facilitator and observer of elections. It was noted that elections have been widely utilised by international actors as a necessary benchmark for democracy. Elections were viewed as an important component of democracy because they represented a visible marker (or symbolic ritual) of democracy in action which in turn developed a normative commitment to democracy amongst the participants. Conversely, fraudulent and unfair elections were argued exacerbated public apathy and mistrust of democratisation. International promotion of free and fair elections had suffered from a lack
of consensus on defining free and fair as well as an uneasy relationship between international law and a state’s right of sovereignty which restricted the power of international actors in facilitating electoral reform. Examining the progression of the EU’s democratic agency illustrated a growing international prominence in advocating free and fair elections in third countries and actively monitoring and observing elections through EOMs. Furthermore, the concept of free and fair elections permeated through the legal framework of the EU with explicit mention in treaty documents and numerous foreign policies. However, in the context of the ENP, the EU pursued a far more subtle and reduced role in facilitating electoral reform. Indeed, prescribed electoral reform in the Armenian AP was narrowed to implementation of the OSCE/CoE recommendations related to electoral code and electoral administration. This chapter examined the 2008 Armenian presidential election in order to adjudicate on the implementation of electoral reform. Utilising the OSCE EOM report and a number of auxiliary sources, it was ascertained that the presidential election, while exhibiting a number of positive traits, was on the whole conducted unfairly with a strong bias towards Sargsyan and the incumbent regime. Examining the two reform areas prescribed in the AP (electoral code and electoral administration), both were judged to have improved from previous elections, but while superficially imitating democracy, serious violations were identified. In relation to the electoral code, there was a general lack of will to fully implement or adhere to the recommendations offered by the OSCE/CoE while with regards to the electoral administration there was a lack of transparency (notably with the election complaint procedures) through showing clear bias towards Sargsyan. Ultimately, it was argued that measuring the success of the ENP in promoting free and fair elections came down to scope and definition. A narrow definition and scope as evident in the AP suggested that the EU had been successful in achieving the goals they set out for Armenia. However, examination through a broader scope suggested that EU policy had little effect on Armenian elections as they still remained largely undemocratic. The inability of the EU to foster tangible results in Armenia (in the short-term at least) was argued stemmed from the inability to send an EOM in Armenia coupled with the inherent problems related to promoting elections in the international setting.
Chapter 4: The Grassroots Philosophy: The EU’s Interaction with Civil Society Organisations in Armenia

This chapter expands on the EU’s promotion of democracy in Armenia through examining the interaction between the EU and domestic CSOs in Armenia. The term *grassroots philosophy* is utilised because civil society promotion is judged as a way of empowering bottom-up movements for democratic change. Structurally this chapter is developed in three sections. The first section examines the broader context of civil society promotion, tracking its development from initially being a peripheral concept to eventually a fundamental component of the democratisation discourse, coupled with an overview of civil society’s place in the context of international democratic promotion strategies. The second section assesses the EU’s role in civil society promotion; their gradual embracing of the concept in their democratic strategies and civil society’s place in the ENP. The last section utilises a case study which aims to elucidate the EU’s interaction with CSOs in Armenia. Four democratically minded NGOs are examined in order to gage the level of EU interaction with CSOs. Subsequently, four thematic trends are identified through inspection of the case study which offers a snapshot of the nature of EU civil society promotion in Armenia. Ultimately, it is argued that EU interaction with CSOs in Armenia represents a rich phenomenon for which to critique the EU’s democratisation strategy inherent in the ENP given the perceived importance of civil societies in democratisation.

Civil Society and Democratisation

The term *civil society* can be traced as far back as antiquity, discernible in the work of Aristotle (and others) whom used it to describe a “social order of citizenship, one where men (rarely women) regulate their relationships and settle their disputes according to a system of laws; where civility reigns, and citizens take an active part in public life.”\(^\text{355}\) However, civil society, until recently, has remained on the periphery of democratisation.

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scholarship. Although civil society has received ample philosophical scrutiny over the centuries from notable political philosophers such as Locke, Hegel, Marx and Gramsci (to name but a few), since the late 1980s the concept has become an increasingly important topic in the democratisation discourse, largely due to the work of intellectual dissidents from the authoritarian countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America whom identified civil society development as a necessary avenue for breaking authoritarian rule. Furthermore, civil society has remained a focal point of the democratic debate with the rise of the neo-Tocquevillian (alternatively known as the Americanisation of the civil society discourse) school of thought influenced by the work of Putnam (Fukuyama and Diamond are notable contributors as well) who argued that democratic government is strengthened when it faces a vigorous civil society. Subsequently, given the intellectual heritage of civil society, formulating a consensual definition is somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, a general understanding of civil society as utilised in the post-Soviet setting can be delineated from the literature. This thesis uses the definition offered by Linz and Stepan which defines civil society as “that arena of polity where self-organizing groups, movements and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values, create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.” In other words, civil society represents a third sector between the political and business sectors where organised bottom-up activity can originate and take hold.

The contemporary democratic literature generally views civil society as playing a positive and significant role in both democratic transition and democratic consolidation. In relation to democratisation, Diamond argued that civil society serves an important function in mobilising pressure for political change through creation of organised social groups such as student groups, women’s groups, farmers’ organisations, NGOs, trade unions, think tanks and the media. How such mobilisation is manifested varies from state to state and can be rapid such as in the Philippines or more measured as in South Africa. Additionally, civil

356 Ibid.
357 Ishkanian, 11.
359 Step and Linz, 7.; Also see a similar definition in, Cohen and Arato, IX.
society is believed to play an important role in consolidation of democracy through checking
the abuse of state power, preventing authoritarian reversion, advocating wider citizen
participation and enabling public scrutiny of the state. As Carrothers argued, through the
strengthening of civil society, “democratic forms could be transferred into democratic
substance.” However, civil society formation cannot guarantee a successful
democratisation transition or a functioning democracy alone. As evident in the literature, a
number of studies have identified that civil societies are often fragmented, unorganised,
uncooperative and weak. Nord posited that “civic activism may well be the bedrock of
democratic life, but not all civil societies, however dense and vibrant, give birth to
democratic polities.” Thus, while a strong civil society can breed democratic practices, it is
important to realise that civil societies are neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but
rather dependent on the “wider political context.”

International Promotion of Civil Society

The emergence of civil society promotion as a bastion of international democratic
promotion strategies owes to a number of factors emergent in the post-Cold War
international setting. Predominately this has been facilitated by the rise and adoption
amongst international actors (notably the United States and the Bretton-Woods
Institutions) of the neoliberal paradigm embodied by the Washington Consensus which
was largely built on the notion of reducing a state’s control through privatization of both the
economy and social service delivery. Subsequently, under a neoliberal system, the state
primarily fulfils the roles of maintaining domestic order and external stability; a complete
transformation from the Soviet system based on totalitarian state control.

362 Ibid.
364 For literature conveying negative relations between civil society and democracy see Sheri Berman, ”Civil
Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997), Philip Nord,
”Introduction,” in Civil Society before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe, ed. N Bermeo and
Bebbington, Reluctant Partners? Non-Governmental Organization, the State and Sustainable Agricultural
365 Nord, xvi.
367 Ishkanian, 13.
368 Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, ”Cities and Geography Of ”Actually Existing Neoliberalism”," in Spaces of
Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe, ed. Neil Brenner and Nik
369 Howell and Pearce.
factors have supplemented the rise of civil society promotion. Firstly, the ineffectiveness and frustration of Western donors with dealing solely with state-led actors in transitioning states has prompted the rise of alternative strategies which deal with non-state actors of civil society. Secondly, through the growing emphasis on democracy promotion by the international community (most notably the United States); US democratic strategies have tended to strongly advocate greater civic participation and good governance. Thus, the democratic strategies pursued by Western donors are built on the philosophy that democracy requires a vibrant and autonomous civil society coupled with an effective state capable of balancing the demands of different interest groups. However, in practice, the majority of civil society promotion strategies implemented by international actors have suffered from a narrow scope which has tended to equate civil society solely with NGO formation. Indeed, civil society promotion through the proliferation of NGOs owes to the “forces of political and economic neoliberalism as mediated through financial institutions, states, and international donors” which has allowed for widespread funding of NGOs since the 1980s; a phenomenon which Ishkanian calls the NGOization of civil society. The proliferation of NGOs has undermined civil society development as many NGOs exist purely in the pursuit of acquiring international funding, often called capital darlings. Subsequently, civil society cannot be simply built with NGOs and requires an array of actors and organisations, something which international actors are starting to account for in their recent democratic and civil society promotion strategies. Thus, two decades of international democratic promotion focussed on civil society strengthening has illustrated that civil society promotion is not a quick fix or guarantor of democracy, but rather a complicated arena which requires long-term investment rather than short-term impulses.

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370 Ishkanian, 13.
371 Ibid.
373 Ibid.: 14.
374 Ishkanian, 18.
375 Ibid., 27.
Summary

Although the concept of civil society has its roots in antiquity, it has remained on the periphery of the democratisation scholarship until the late 1980s. Through the work of intellectual dissidents from authoritarian states and the Americanisation of the debate, civil society promotion has become an indelible component of the recent democratic literature. Proponents hold that civil society promotion play an important role in mobilising pressure for change and can effectively check abuses of state power through advocating wider citizen participation. The strong emphasis of civil society promotion by international actors was traced to the neoliberal philosophy inherent in the US’ foreign policy which had permeated to other influential international actors. However, a strong orientation by the international community towards NGO formation has led to the NGOization of civil society which resulted in a rise of ineffective NGOs known as capital darlings. It was noted that in the two decades since implementation of civil society promotion strategies, international actors have failed to facilitate functioning democracies and vibrant civil societies in the states of the FSU (save for the Baltics). Nevertheless, civil society promotion remains an ineffaceable component of democratic strategies initiated by Western donors as there remains a strong faith that connects civil society promotion with a functioning democracy.

EU Democratic Promotion and Civil Society

The EU as a democratic actor in the international arena has dabbled with the ideology of civil society strengthening as an important component of a successful democratic transition. However, as opposed to United States initiatives which had strongly promoted civil society since the early 1990s, the EU has gradually evolved its democratic policies to incorporate measures related to civil society strengthening and NGO formation. Indeed, EU interaction with third countries has tended (and largely remains orientated towards) to be characterised by building strong relations with state and elite actors within the recipient countries with less engagement with non-state actors. Furthermore, although the EU, since the late 1990s, has openly identified civil society as a key area of their democratic

377 Gillespie and Youngs.
strategies, actual allocation of funds towards civil society promotion has remained minuscule in relation to both: the United States, and as a percentage of total EU assistance. For instance, examining the financial assistance given to Belarus between 1998 to 2004, while the EU’s total financial contribution to Belarus more than doubled the contribution of the United States, their contribution to civil society was more than four times smaller.\(^{379}\) Additionally, civil society assistance accounted for approximately 5% of total EU assistance while United States channelled 50% of their total assistance towards civil society.\(^{380}\) Thus, while there is an acknowledgement and some assistance towards civil society promotion by the EU, in reality actual commitment has fallen short of the United States’ as the EU remains strongly focussed on interaction with state and elite actors.

The EU institution that predominately deals with foreign civil society promotion and investment is the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which was founded in 1994 for the purpose of promoting human rights, democratisation and conflict prevention in the international setting. The EU has utilised the EIDHR framework when dealing with civil societies due to the flexibility of the institution compared to the other more rigid institutions and policies.\(^{381}\) The greater flexibility allows for more independence from national governments in recipient countries as the EIDHR can engage with a wider range of actors including CSOs such as NGOs, labour unions, political foundations and interest groups (to name but a few).\(^{382}\) However, the flexibility exhibited with the range of actors the EIDHR can interact with is not replicated with how the EIDHR is administrated as its impact in promoting civil society to date has been widely criticised because it lacks suppleness in its administration.\(^{383}\) Subsequently, EIDHR initiated policies have endemically suffered from long lead times, ineffective relationships with capital-orientated NGOs, a lack of reform despite criticisms, and a constant undermining by host governments due to its perceived weaknesses.\(^{384}\) The ineffectiveness of the EIDHR in promoting civil society coupled with the complex and diverse instruments and policies related to democratic

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\(^{379}\) Raik, "Promotin Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU's Policy Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood ", 16.  
\(^{380}\) Ibid.  
\(^{381}\) Ishkanian, 27.  
\(^{382}\) Ibid.  
promotion illustrates the wider difficulties of the EU as a democratic actor given that it often struggles to homogeneously project “the European approach.” That is, the EU lacks a specific democratic vision resulting in a “scattered and ad hoc approach” which is highlighted glaringly in their civil society promotion strategies.

Civil Society Promotion in the ENP

The EU’s engagement with civil society as a facet of their democratic promotion in the ENP represents a double-edged sword. On the one edge (particularly evident in the strategy papers) development of civil society is ostensibly enlisted as a major priority of the ENP along with the other key areas of human rights, democratisation and economic reform. For instance, the ENP strategy paper identified “support for the development of civil society” as a key component of the shared values the EU aims to uphold in their interaction with third countries. However, on the other edge, explicit civil society strategies are conspicuously missing from the Armenian AP (and the AP’s for the other Eastern Neighbourhood countries) with greater emphasis placed on electoral reform and anti-corruption measures. Certainly, civil society interaction receives citation as an important avenue in promoting the anti-corruption priority, as well as in relation to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in relation to environmental policies. However, where civil society is mentioned in the official documents does not coincide with any concrete policy or action. Subsequently, civil society development is not treated as an ends but as a means to improve and implement other policy areas. The notable absence of civil society development policies in the AP stems from the intergovernmental nature of the AP negotiations which was conducted predominately between the EU and Armenian government. As Rommens observed, the nonexistence of civil society promotion in the ENP APs illustrates “the stress put on democratization and civil society empowerment at the highest level of policy making is not being translated into concrete terms.”

386 Raik, "Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU's Policy Towards the Eastern Neighbourhood”, 19.
388 European Commission, “EU Armenia ENP Action Plan”.
The absence of policies related to civil society promotion in the Armenian AP does not necessarily represent a total absence of civil society engagement, although it does illustrate a regression in scope from the earlier strategy papers. Nevertheless, civil society interaction through a number of alternative paths continues to occur in Armenia. Firstly, through the EIDHR instrument, a number of NGOs in Armenia have cooperated closely with EU actors on specific projects ranging from education-based initiatives, anti-corruption programmes, and general monitoring tasks. The EIDHR while operating outside the ENP should not be treated as an exclusive policy but rather as a reinforcing and complimentary tool for the ENP. Additionally, EIDHR civil society initiatives receive funding allocation in the ENPI country papers (and strategy and indicative papers too) with civil society promotion identified as a sub-priority of the wider support for strengthening of democratic structures and good governance priority area. Secondly, the EU has actively sought to increase the dialogue and interaction between themselves, state actors and CSOs through the active promotion of closer cooperation, as observable in the EaP. An example of the closer cooperation signified by the EaP is the Civil Society Forum (CSF) which aims to “promote contacts among civil society organisations and facilitate their dialogue with public authorities” amongst the states incorporated in the purported Eastern Partnership. In developing the CSF, the EU acknowledged that “on-going reforms [in ENP East partner countries] require stronger participation of civil society to enhance oversight of public services and strengthen public confidence in them.” Thus, the CSF represents concrete action by the EU in relation to utilising and strengthening civil societies in ENP partner countries. Furthermore, as previously stated, the Eastern Partnership should be treated as a complimentary force to the ENP, not as an alternative or counter-productive force.

Summary

Similarly to the US and other international actors whom have embraced civil society promotion as an important facet of democratic promotion in the last two decades, the EU

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393 Ibid.
(albeit somewhat less overtly than the US) too has incorporated civil society promotion strategies into their external democratic policies. Indeed, civil society promotion as a percentage of total financial assistance offered by the EU to transitioning states has remained minuscule with greater emphasis on electoral and anti-corruption reform. Furthermore, the instrument predominately utilised for civil society promotion and interaction (the EIDHR) has been widely criticised for being an ineffective actor which highlights the EU’s scattered and ad-hoc approach to democratisation. Examining the role of civil society in the democratic reform prescribed by the ENP further illustrates the lack of concrete policy related to civil society engagement. Despite civil society being identified as an important component in the strategy papers, it is noticeably missing in the AP’s which remained intergovernmental in scope. However, civil society interaction and promotion occurs in Armenia through EIDHR initiatives and the CSF which are intended to compliment the on-going democratic reform being implemented in Armenia through the ENP. Subsequently, despite inexplicit reference in the AP, civil society interaction and promotion by the EU in Armenia presents an observable and examinable phenomenon.

**Case Study: EU Interaction with Four Armenian NGOs**

Civil society development in Armenia, similarly to other post-Soviet states, has been fractured, undemocratic, and superficial. Ishkanian argued that the “emancipatory vision of civil society envisaged by dissidents and activists”\(^{394}\) never materialised in Armenia where civil society development has largely resulted in a proliferation of “professionalized advocacy and service delivery NGOs.”\(^{395}\) That is, the NGOization of civil society at the hands of international donors has created an inefficient and indolent civil society in Armenia. Subsequently, although the number of Armenian NGOs peaks at around 4,000, as few as 500 actively engage in civic activism (which constitutes the vibrant core of Armenia’s civil society).\(^{396}\) Additionally, through close interaction with Western donors, NGOs have been socialised with new knowledge and practices inherent in Western systems.\(^{397}\) However, while embracing Western structures of civil society, organisations have continued to draw

\(^{394}\) Ishkanian, 34.
\(^{395}\) Ibid.
\(^{397}\) Ishkanian.
on older knowledge and patterns of behaviour intrinsic to the Soviet system. Thus, Western civil society promotion strategies in Armenia have suffered from narrow scope and from ethnocentrism; leading to fractured civil societies and the proliferation of ineffective NGOs which has thwarted natural political growth. As Hann observed, ethnocentric democratisation strategies have generated “an abortion of local processes of change” which compromises the true essence of civil society: “the freedom to imagine the world could be different.” Ultimately, the EU’s emergence as a democratic and civil society promotional actor in Armenia faces similar issues (as US civil society strategies) of ethnocentrism and narrow policy definition.

This thesis employs a case study to illuminate the EU’s interaction with CSOs in Armenia. The case study comprises of four democratically orientated NGOs in which officials from each were interviewed during fieldwork in Armenia. The four NGOs examined experience different relationships with the EU: one has progressive ties, one has long-standing ties, one has intermittent ties, and the last one has very little to do with the EU (see table). Thus, the primary research intends to provide an impartial view on EU interaction as a cross-section of CSOs in Armenia have been examined. Analysis of the EU’s interaction with NGOs will be broken up into five sections. The first section examines historical interaction (i.e. prior to the ENP process) between the NGO and EU. The second section covers interaction between NGO and EU born out of the ENP process. The third section evaluates the likelihood for future interaction between the NGO and EU with consideration of the proposed EaP. The fourth section assesses the nature of the interaction between the NGO and EU outlined in the previous three sections. The last section briefly examines the NGO’s relations with other international actors comparatively to their interaction with the EU. The case study is utilised in order to identify thematic trends inherent in the EU’s interaction with CSOs; a way of illuminating the nature of socialisation-based interaction in the ENP setting.

400 Ibid.
401 All quotations used in the Case Study section stem from interviews undertaken with NGOs in Armenia. Due to the number of quotations they are not individually cited in the text. The interview questionnaire is located in Appendix B
**Figure 7:** EU interaction with the four NGOs examined in the case study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>NGO-A</th>
<th>NGO-B</th>
<th>NGO-C</th>
<th>NGO-D</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with EU</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Intermittent</td>
<td>Minimal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical EU cooperation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP cooperation</td>
<td>Monitoring with some critique</td>
<td>Critical with some monitoring</td>
<td>Minor role</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future EU cooperation</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Likely</td>
<td>Unlikely</td>
<td>Uncertain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction with other international donors</td>
<td>INGOs United States United Kingdom</td>
<td>INGOs United States</td>
<td>INGOs Netherlands CoE OSCE</td>
<td>Netherlands CoE</td>
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</table>

**NGO-A**

The first NGO examined (NGO-A) operates predominately in the field of corruption as an advocate and agent for the implementation of anti-corruption measures in Armenia. These measures on a basic level acquaint to transparency and accountability of the political structures in Armenia with specific focus on elections, political parties, public procurement, environment, and obligations of Armenia in relation to international anti-corruption conventions (i.e. CoE conventions, UN conventions etc.). NGO-A has been active in Armenia for nearly a decade and while reliant on support and funding from international donors, they claim to maintain a strong level of autonomy. Furthermore, NGO-A upholds a strong level of activism through a high output of reports, raising public awareness through demonstrations, organising education programmes and through project collaboration with international actors.
Historical EU Interaction

Historically, NGO-A experienced minimal interaction with the EU prior to the drafting of the ENP. When asked as to why there was no historical interaction with the EU, the interview participant responded that while they had no interaction with the EU prior to 2006, a number of NGOs:

- tried to be a part of the planning process and be part of the drafting process... but they didn’t succeed because the government and EU were very close... and resistant to civil society.

ENP Interaction

NGO-A has had an increasing level of involvement with the EU since the drafting of the ENP and the subsequent implementation process. The increase in interaction between NGO-A and the EU is related to an overlapping of the ENP AP’s anti-corruption priority and NGO-A’s specialisation and expertise in regards to corruption and transparency in Armenia. The interview participant noted that “why we are involved in the ENP is... because it has eight anti-corruption measures for two-plus years... [so] we are doing monitoring.” However, the interaction goes beyond mere monitoring as NGO-A has expanded its involvement into “issuing shadow reports and alternative reports on how Armenia is meeting or not meeting ENP obligations in our field.” Additionally, the interview participant for NGO-A noted how their officials “have been to Brussels and Strasbourg several times to meet with the respective representatives of European structures to talk about problems and to talk about the process of the ENP.” Through the interaction with the EU, NGO-A ultimately aims to provide a transparent and expert opinion different from that of the “Armenian government and European structures, to alarm on what we find very critical... the developments in Armenia.”

Future EU Interaction

Future cooperation between NGO-A and the EU is seen as a strong likelihood given the proposed EaP and the implementation of regular CSF’s. Indeed, NGO-A identified the EaP as potentially a positive outcome for civil society as “the EU is trying to be more open to civil society.” Furthermore, the formation of the CSF as a precursor to the implementation of the
EaP is also seen as a positive move and a “logical continuation of the ENP.” As the interview participant conveyed:

with the Civil Society Forum under the Eastern Partnership they are already more open... I had been invited to the event in Prague [May 2009] and then a meeting in Yerevan where we had the troika, the current, previous, and future European presidencies... so at least formally they welcome civil society participation in the new program at the very highest level.

Nature of EU interaction

The major type of interaction experienced between NGO-A and the EU to date has been cooperation based on NGO-A monitoring the progression of the ENP specifically in relation to corruption in Armenia. Interaction through meetings and forums also constitutes a large proportion of interaction. However, there has been no interaction in terms of EU financed joint projects yet. When asked about the nature of interaction between NGO-A and the EU, the interview participant felt that the EU “recognise us as an actor, they recognise us as an opinion leader... so we are known.” However, NGO-A perceived the EU as interacting with the government as equal partners (or stakeholders) and CSOs as secondary or auxiliary actors. As the interview participant portrayed, CSOs are:

never taken very seriously... no serious dialogue and no acceptance of criticism... it’s just to mark the box and that’s it... but this is symptomatic not only for ENP, the government in our country is very hostile to civil society participation.

Interaction with other international actors

NGO-A maintains strong relationships with a number of international actors other than the EU. For example, NGO-A cooperates closely with international NGOs (INGO) such as Soros’ Open Society Institute (OSI) and Transparency International. Furthermore, NGO-A sustains strong links with bilateral actors such as the US, UK and Switzerland. NGO-A also upholds ties with IGOs such as the World Bank, COE and the OSCE. To date, NGO-A has interacted with other international actors on a far greater level than with the EU, with all of their official projects involving at least one international actor other than the EU.
Summary

NGO-A has experienced a notable increase in interaction and relations with the EU since the beginning of the implementation stage of the ENP AP (since 2007). Prior to the ENP, NGO-A had minimal ties with the EU and stronger interaction with other international actors such as INGO’s and bilateral actors. Although NGO-A was largely excluded from the drafting process of the AP, they have been utilised by the EU in a monitoring role related to the prescribed anti-corruption measures outlined in the AP. Additionally, NGO-A has attempted to provide alternative and critique-based reports, offering expert advice on the shortcomings of the ENP’s anti-corruption policies. In relation to future EU interaction, NGO-A is actively involved in the on-going EaP civil society initiatives (such as the CSF) with a high probability of future interaction and cooperation. However, despite the growing interaction between NGO-A and the EU, scepticism remains as to the EU’s role in Armenia and the role for CSOs in the implementation of EU policies. NGO-A felt that the EU acknowledged their expertise in relation to corruption in Armenia, but felt they were not taken as seriously as governmental actors and were relegated to a secondary importance. As the NGO-A interview participant observed, “it’s not because EU is above and we are at the bottom, but it is because EU and government... [they] would not accept us as equal partners.”

NGO-B

The second NGO evaluated (NGO-B) represents one of the oldest established NGOs in Armenia with over fifteen years of operation. NGO-B works primarily in the area of media: specifically in relation to government legislation related to the media, the international context of journalism (including strong regional focus), media self-regulation, the role and place of media in civil society, and civil society as an important institute for democratisation. NGO-B undertakes a variety of activities concerned with free media advocacy in Armenia, ranging from collaboration in joint-projects with international donors, publishing reports, organising conferences, running education programmes, and the on-going monitoring of media.
Historical EU interaction

*NGO-B* had maintained cordial ties (with varying levels of interaction) with EU related institutions since their inception in the mid-1990s. The interview participant recalled two projects undertaken with the EU institution TACIS related to monitoring the media during the 1996 Armenian presidential election and an unspecified second project on a broader regional level. Furthermore, the interview participant attributed *NGO-B’s* early growth to the financial support of the EU, as stated, “I can say that as an organisation we developed due to this [EU] support, and in that period we also were participating in most of the events in Brussels about NGO involvement and democratisation.” However, aside from the two TACIS collaborative projects, since 1998, no other projects were undertaken with the EU up until the beginning of the ENP process.

ENP Interaction

*NGO-B* has been involved in the ENP process from the very beginning, although at varying levels of involvement. For instance, the interview participant noted that “sometimes we were involved on official level consultations or sometimes not, we never looked at it, we were always providing our ideas, our suggestions.” Since 2005, *NGO-B* has been involved with the ENP in terms of monitoring and providing assessments which were used to formulate the AP. In relation to the implementation stage of the AP, *NGO-B* has undertaken both a monitoring and critical role related to the ENP in Armenia. As the interview participant noted:

> there are many others that are doing the advisory role, we are doing critical, I would say that this specific approach comes from understanding that by now ENP was not effective... our assessment we have to criticise it to encourage more responsible attitude from the European Union.

Future EU Interaction

Future interaction between *NGO-B* and the EU is seen as a distinct probability. Similarly to *NGO-A*, *NGO-B* is involved with the EaP and CSF initiative which is seen as a re-deepening of interaction between the EU and CSOs. As the interview participant portrayed, “we have some very modest hopes that with the Eastern Partnership, things will change back again [to
pre-ENP style of interaction] and there will be some independent channel of cooperation between European Commission and civil society, first of all the Civil Society Forum.” Furthermore, NGO-B believed the CSF would shed light on “what role we will play, whether it will just be attachment to official relations with no separate voice... this will be important watchdog for monitoring our programmes within the policy.” Thus, future interaction between NGO-B and the EU likely rests on the EU’s vision and role for civil society, with a clear need for clear separation between civil society and government.

**Nature of EU interaction**

The nature of interaction between NGO-B and the EU has varied over time, from an initial relationship built on project collaboration to a relationship based on monitoring and critique-based roles within the ENP process. At the very least, interaction has occurred regularly between the two entities through meetings, forums and collaboration. In relation to a distinct distribution of roles between the EU and CSOs, NGO-B argued that:

> it depends on how the organisation sees itself... the organisations that are minor or junior partners, they depend on funding so they try to do whatever European Commission likes, in this case of course they cannot be equal, but if organisation has its principles and a very strong positions and never conditions its activity... in this case we have an equal partnership.

However, according to the interview participant, the majority of NGOs in Armenia suffered from uneven partnerships due to financial necessity. Furthermore, there was a perception from NGO-B that the EU strongly underutilised and underestimated the potential role of civil society in Armenia. The interview participant noted that “without responsible and independent NGOs here you cannot assess the situation properly... [but] to secure success and good relations with the big partner [the government] they sometimes sacrifice the other partners [civil society]. “

**Interaction with other international actors**

NGO-B maintains links with an array of international actors ranging from project collaboration with a number of INGOs (most notably OSI), IGOs such as the OSCE and CoE, and bilateral actors such as the US and UK. The majority of NGO-B’s projects have occurred
due to INGO collaboration and assistance, while their interaction with IGOs and bilateral states occurs on a similar level to interaction with the EU.

**Summary**

*NGO-B* has sustained varying levels of interaction with the EU since their inception in the mid-1990s. Prior to the ENP process, the EU and *NGO-B* interacted on two collaborative projects and EU funding and grants were seen as an important facet of *NGO-B*’s growth and sustainability. However, from 1998 to 2005, *NGO-B* and the EU interacted sparingly with ties re-strengthening again since the beginning of the ENP process. Subsequently, *NGO-B* undertook a monitoring and critical role related to the drafting and implementation of the Armenian AP, specifically linked to the media aspect of the ENP. In terms of future interaction, *NGO-B* has been involved in the EaP and CSF initiative, although they remain somewhat reserved about future prospects for interaction given their disillusionment with the ENP process. In regards to the nature of interaction, *NGO-B* argued that the ENP represented a regression for EU interaction with civil society due to the strengthening of ties with the Armenian government (at the expense of CSOs). The EaP was seen as an opportunity to reopen interaction with CSOs separately to the government. Furthermore, there was a perception that many NGOs in Armenia fell into unequal (or asymmetrical) partnerships with the EU due to their financial needs. However, *NGO-B* felt as they have not been reliant on EU funding (at least since their initial years of operation) and interact with a number of other international actors, they could effectively remain equal partners with the EU.

*NGO-C*

The third NGO evaluated (*NGO-C*) chiefly deals with issues of religious tolerance and freedom of consciousness in Armenia. Although Armenia is majorly Apostolic, *NGO-C* contends that the government has shown a tendency to incite religious intolerance through overtly favouring the Apostolic church over other minority religious groups such as Jehovah’s Witness and Islamic groups. *NGO-C* has operated as a civil society actor in Armenia for more than a decade. The major activities undertaken by *NGO-C* include establishment of a scholarly journal, monitoring of media for signs of religious intolerance,
organising educational programmes, the filming of documentaries, and the undertaking of general public awareness campaigns.

**Historical EU interaction**

Up until the ENP process, *NGO-C* had no ties or interaction with the EU. *NGO-C* cited “commonness... on a very low level” as the major reason for the lack of interaction. Furthermore, *NGO-C*’s interview participant noted that they did not seek contact or funding from the EU because:

> we didn’t feel it was a priority... as our main goal was human rights... we felt that there are topics and problems and issues in Armenia that need a bit more attention, than for example than the ones dealing with [the] EU.

**ENP Interaction**

During the ENP period of interaction between the EU and CSOs, *NGO-C* did experience closer interaction through collaboration with the EU on a joint project related to the 2007 parliamentary elections. Through a grant offered by the EIDHR instrument, *NGO-C*, with the cooperation of the EU, produced a handbook related to the electoral code. The interview participant noted that the collaborated project was intended as “a training kit and a guide for the electoral actors, for example proxy observers... even polling station members, and commission members... it was designed to be multi-functional.” However beyond the 2007 parliamentary elections, *NGO-C* did not interact or cooperate at all with the EU during the drafting or implementation stages of the AP.

**Future EU interaction**

*NGO-C* seemed unlikely to foster any close links with the EU in the near future due to their on-going cooperation with a number of other international actors. Furthermore, *NGO-C* maintained the belief that their objectives and the objectives of the EU were presently incompatible as “they deal with for example, post-Soviet issues... with issues referring to developing countries... on a very operative level and they need kind of close look and kind of close public control.” Additionally, there was no acknowledgement or indication from *NGO-C*
C related to the possible increase in interaction between the EU and CSOs through the EaP and CSF initiatives.

**Nature of EU interaction**

Given that NGO-C has rarely interacted with the EU and has cooperated on a sole project, deciphering the nature of their interaction is difficult. In response to EU interaction with civil society in Armenia, the interview participant noted that “I am not very sure I know more than a couple NGOs dealing seriously with the ENP... I have even less confidence if I have to remember the results of their activities.” Additionally, NGO-C criticised the effectiveness of EU policy in filtering down to the public consciousness of Armenians as “the agenda with [the] EU is not kind of institutionalised, because the more formal... professional level, some professional framework, it is hardly a remarkable place in public agenda.”

**Interaction with other international actors**

NGO-C interacts and cooperates closely with a number of international actors ranging from close ties with IGO’s such as the OSCE and CoE, interaction with INGOs (particularly OSI) and interaction with bilateral actors such as the Netherlands. Aside from the sole joint project with the EU, NGO-C interacts and cooperates far more closely with international actors other than the EU.

**Summary**

Since inception over a decade ago, NGO-C, despite being an active actor in Armenian civil society, has rarely interacted with the EU. The joint project undertaken between the EU and NGO-C during the 2007 parliamentary elections seemingly represents an anomaly rather than a signal of progressing ties. The lack of interaction between these two entities is partly down to a conflicting world-view and ethos and the lack of interaction by the EU with CSOs. Future interaction between NGO-C and the EU, even with the possibility of greater civil society focus from the EU (through the EaP), seems unlikely. In terms of evaluating the nature of EU interaction, NGO-C insinuated that EU action to date has been ineffective and beyond the scope of public opinion.
NGO-D

The last NGO examined (NGO-D), principally works in the field of democratisation and human rights through the promotion of grassroots initiatives. NGO-D’s major activity concerns education (particularly civic education) through the recruitment of volunteers (mainly students) with a strong emphasis on highlighting the values of citizenship, democracy and human rights. Thus, NGO-D attempts to promote civic activism amongst young people in Armenia with orientation towards public-policy: especially education and social policy. NGO-D has existed as an actor of civil society for more than a decade and was founded by a wealthy member of the Armenian diaspora. Additionally, to the education and civic activism programmes, NGO-D produce publications pertaining to democracy and human rights issues in Armenia, civic participation in public-policy, and project cooperation with other domestic CSOs and international actors.

Historical EU interaction

In the pre-ENP setting, NGO-D essentially had no relations or interaction with the EU. This is partly due to NGO-D’s grassroots focus and their financial sourcing from the Armenian diaspora which occurred beyond the scope of the EU.

ENP interaction

NGO-D has experienced a minimal increase in interaction with the EU since inauguration of the ENP in Armenia. Interaction based on a forum-style approach with a number of Armenian CSOs, constituted the majority of their interaction with the EU. NGO-D noted that this interaction occurred “maybe twice a year” and usually concerned “democratisation and human rights issues that we contact, usually there are offices in Armenia that we are directly in contact with but sometimes delegations from Brussels.” In regards to participating with the EU in relation to the drafting and implementation of the AP, NGO-D has had no interaction with the EU.

Future EU interaction

Future interaction between the EU and NGO-D, despite minimal interaction to date, is a possibility. The NGO-D interview participant noted that:
maybe in the future we will look also for funding from the EU but it is also a little bit hard because... the funding has conditions... the input of the local organisation ends up being about 20% which not everyone can afford.

Additionally, in regards to the prospect of interaction through the proposed EaP, the interview participant remained cautious stating “I don’t know whether it will happen, I cannot see whether anything is going to change in that sense.” NGO-D remained open minded at the prospect of forging closer ties with the EU in the future given their preference to EU based initiatives over US based ones which were seen as “short term... [and not] investing in institutional development.”

Nature of EU interaction

Due to the relative minimal interaction between NGO-D and the EU to date, again it was difficult to analyse the nature of EU interaction. Nevertheless, in the bi-annual instances that interaction occurred between NGO-D and the EU, the interview participant noted that “we participate and express our ideas, some of them are accepted, other times they say nothing, they just listen... they support organisations that are very neutral.” Additionally, NGO-D felt that the EU often treated the government as an equal partner while CSOs were relegated to a secondary importance. As the interview participant observed:

they are [EU] investing a lot of money in Armenia but I think they are not following it up in a good way... especially project support to the government... I have heard many criticisms from CSOs that it’s not really going towards the point.

Subsequently, NGO-D holds the view that the EU are not primarily interested in democracy and human rights; there is “more focus on the economic side and economic cooperation... human rights side and democratic development... these kind of things come as second or maybe third priority.”

Interaction with other international actors

NGO-D predominately interacts with bilateral actors from within Europe, such as NGOs from the Netherlands and Switzerland. Additionally, NGO-D maintains ties with the CoE. However, NGO-D sustains its strongest ties with Armenian based CSOs. This is partly due to
being founded and funded by a member of the Armenian diaspora, which is a source of much of their funding and grassroots ethos. Nevertheless, NGO-D still interacts with other international actors on a far greater level than it interacts with the EU.

Summary

NGO-D has experienced minimal ties with the EU since their formation over a decade ago. Although no project cooperation has occurred to date, NGO-D and the EU have interacted through forum-style meetings (with other CSOs) approximately twice a year since the ENP process began. However, NGO-D felt that while the EU seemed open to working with CSOs on the surface, their concerns were rarely represented in actual policy change. Nevertheless, NGO-D would not rule out the possibility of working with the EU in the future given their preference for EU strategies over US initiated ones. Furthermore, NGO-D acknowledged the impending EaP and CSF initiatives, but remained less optimistic as to the chances of improving civil society interaction with the EU. NGO-D held a pervasive view that because of the EU’s close ties with the Armenian government, democracy and human rights initiatives were being compromised in favour for economic related initiatives.

Thematic trends of EU interaction with NGOs in Armenia

Examining the four NGOs of the case study presents a number of thematic trends identifiable in the relationship between the EU and CSOs in Armenia. Certainly, on the surface, there seems to be an upward trend of interaction between the EU and CSOs since the beginning of the ENP process. Of the four NGOs examined, two experienced increased interaction with the EU during the ENP process, a third NGO maintained their pre-ENP established relations with the EU; the last NGO experienced only a minimal increase. This visible increase reflected the greater propensity of EU interaction in Armenia since the signing of the ENP. Interaction based on monitoring or advisory roles, forum-style settings, and a lesser role of project collaboration constituted the bulk of EU interaction with the CSOs examined. However, despite the apparent increase in interaction with CSOs, the nature of EU interaction through the ENP had noticeably shallowed (i.e. became less substantial) from pre-ENP interaction. Four thematic trends were identified in the case study which provides a snapshot of EU interaction with Armenian CSOs.
Firstly, an observable theme was that the ENP represented a regression in how the EU treats CSOs. All four NGOs conveyed (albeit at varying degrees) a feeling that the EU treated CSOs as inferior to government actors. The government was seen as an equal partner and subsequently had a far greater role in formulating the AP. Although CSOs cooperated with the EU on the AP, their voice was muzzled comparatively to the government. This contrasted from the pre-ENP interaction perception that CSOs were on an equal plane with government actors.

A second identifiable theme in the case study was the criticism of the EU’s democracy and human rights intention in Armenia. The general perception of the NGOs examined was that the EU was prepared to compromise their democracy and human rights policies in favour for their more salient economic and strategic policies. The ENP was adjudged by the key informants as being an unmitigated failure in its normative areas which severely hindered the credibility of the EU amongst domestic CSOs.

A third theme delineated in the case study was the stronger levels of interaction between Armenian CSOs and other international actors comparatively to the EU. All four NGOs cooperated closely with international actors, especially INGOs (OSI being the most active), IGOs (predominately OSCE and CoE), and bilateral actors (United States, Netherlands...). Interaction with other (non-EU) international actors generally occurred on a far greater level than their interaction with the EU. Subsequently, the NGO’s tended to portray greater confidence in other (non-EU) international actors given the more substantial interaction and their greater equality in the collaboration and decision-making process.

A last theme clearly demarcated in the case study was the potential benefits of the EaP, particularly the CSF initiative. Three of the NGOs were optimistic that the EaP would install a greater role for CSOs in cooperating with the EU; cooperation that was experienced prior to the ENP. The CSF events in Prague and Brussels were identified as positive steps in reintroducing CSOs into the framework of the ENP; at the very least it illustrated an acknowledgement of civil society which had been noticeably absent during the earlier ENP process. However, scepticism remained as to whether the EaP represented actual concrete intent or merely further rhetoric.
Overall, the case study examining EU interaction with CSOs in Armenia illustrated a tenuous relationship. While the volume of interaction had increased, favouritism towards the government and the economically driven agenda of the ENP, coupled with the greater activity of other international actors, suggested the EU currently interacts inefficiently with civil society. Potential for more thorough interaction through the proposed EaP could perhaps improve the role of CSOs. However, such hope was attached with realism and scepticism by the examined CSOs.

**Conclusion**

This chapter examined EU interaction with CSOs in Armenia vis-à-vis the democratic policies inherent in the ENP. It was ascertained that the notion of civil society as a component of effective democratisation was born out of the work of intellectual dissidents from Eastern Europe and Latin America who posited civil society development as a necessary avenue for breaking authoritarian rule. The Americanisation of the debate through the work of neo-Tocquevillian scholars such as Pridham and Diamond further popularised civil society as an ineradicable component of the democratisation discourse. Essentially, a vibrant civil society was argued to facilitate efficient democratisation through mobilising pressure for political change and consolidated democracy through checking abuses of state power. Additionally, the strong adherence towards civil society promotion was also embedded in the neoliberal philosophy which guided international democratic promotion strategies (particularly the US) in the post-Soviet setting. However, international strategies had often been criticised for narrow definitions of civil society leading to the NGOization of civil society through the widespread proliferation of internationally funded NGOs (capital darlings) in transitioning states. The EU had embraced civil society promotion more gradually than other international actors with a less systematic and more ad-hoc strategy to date, generally through the EIDHR instrument. In regards to the ENP, while civil society was explicitly mentioned as a facet of EU democratic policy in the ENP strategy paper, civil society was conspicuously reduced in the Armenian AP. To illuminate the relationship between the EU and Armenian civil society, four NGO’s were examined in a case study. The NGO’s had varying relationships with the EU ranging from progressive and positive relationships to
minimal and non-existent ones. Four thematic trends were identified in the case study. Firstly, since inauguration of the ENP, the EU had relegated CSOs to a secondary actor behind the government. Secondly, the EU was perceived as often comprising their democratic goals in favour for more salient economic goals. Thirdly, comparatively to other international actors involved in civil society promotion, the level of interaction between Armenian CSOs and the EU occurred on a far lesser level. Lastly, CSOs were optimistic that the proposed EaP would allocate a greater role for civil society in implementing EU and ENP policies. Ultimately, despite an expressed adherence towards civil society promotion by the EU, the case study illustrated a fractured and ineffective relationship, which at its current level of interaction seems inept for effective civil society development and improving democratisation.
Chapter 5: The EU’s Influence on Democratisation in Armenia: Tangible Rewards or Paper Tiger?

This thesis produced and utilised a theoretical framework, enlightened by the coalition approach offered by Wade Jacoby, in order to illuminate the phenomenon of EU democratic promotion through the ENP in the Eastern Neighbourhood (specifically through the case of Armenia). It was argued that the EU’s democratic promotion in its Eastern Neighbourhood was facilitated through setting up coalitions with minority traditions (or like-minded actors, both within the state and civil society) which allowed for normative transfers. Two mechanisms of the coalition mode (and ENP) were identified: political conditionality and normative socialisation. Conditionality represented the traditional tool of democratic promotion utilised by the EU; through conditioning the offer of membership in the EU with political and economic reform as prescribed in the Copenhagen criteria. Indeed, conditionality proved highly successful during the Eastern enlargements of 2004 and 2007. Yet conditionality was conspicuously reduced in the ENP due to the removal of EU membership as an incentive for political and economic reform. On the other hand, socialisation, as a mechanism for normative facilitation, represented a newer school of thought where institutions transferred norms and values though generating multiple personal and institutional contacts with states and CSOs in an effort to internalise new roles and norms. Gradually, relations between the socialising agent (EU) and a target actor would traverse from a relationship based on strategic calculation, to active role playing, and eventually normative suasion where internalisation of roles and norms would be complete. It was argued that under the ENP, socialisation represented the most prevalent mechanism for normative change, with conditionality relegated to a supplementary tool. To expand the theoretical framework, the case study of Armenia was chosen given the perceived potential of the EU to foster salient democratisation reform there through the ENP. In order to evaluate the conditionality aspect of the ENP, promotion of free and fair elections during the 2008 presidential election was analysed. To assess the socialisation facet of the ENP, EU interaction with CSOs was examined. Subsequently, this chapter reconnects the theoretical
framework and measurements of conditionality and socialisation presented in Chapter 1 with the empirical research examined in Chapters 3 and 4.

**Political Conditionality**

A case study of the 2008 Armenian presidential election was employed to examine and illuminate the political conditionality mechanism as exhibited in the ENP. It was ascertained that on the surface, the presidential election was conducted in a free and fair manner which resulted in notable international praise (including from the EU). However, once examined more thoroughly, the presidential election exhibited a number of biased and unfair practises by the Armenian government. Through the assessment of official election reports offered by the OSCE (with considerations of the alternative IYC report and data collected from interviews with NGO key informants) it was illustrated that violations occurred in relation to implementation of the electoral code, in the formation of the electoral administration, with regards to the impartiality of the complaints procedure, and an observed general bias towards the incumbent regime. The March 1\textsuperscript{st} civil unrest further exacerbated the unfairness of the elections and highlighted the institutionalised undemocratic practises of the government. Overall, it was argued that the EU had little impact in facilitating substantial electoral reform, as the 2008 presidential election illustrated continuity with previous elections. Indeed, this thesis argued that the EU’s policy related to electoral reform (prescribed in the Armenian AP) suffered from attenuation where policy focussed solely on electoral code and electoral administration without consideration of contextual factors such as the flawed electoral history and the widespread apathy amongst Armenian citizens. Furthermore, the inability of the EU to utilise their vaunted EOM mechanism and their subsequent reliance on partner IGOs (OSCE and CoE) greatly reduced the capabilities of the EU in facilitating concrete reform. Ultimately, EU policy endured insufficient leverage which resulted in ineffective implementation of the prescribed ENP electoral reform by the Armenian government.

**Measuring Political Conditionality**

Revisiting the measurement variables offered in Chapter 1 provides a clearer evaluation of the effectiveness of political conditionality in the context of the ENP and Armenia. Thus, the
four variables (conditions, incentives, credibility, costs) offered in the literature are examined here specifically in relation to the 2008 presidential election (see figure 8).

**Conditions**

The explicit conditions in the AP related to electoral reform were stated as ensuring “that the electoral framework is in full compliance with OSCE commitments... by amending the electoral code and improving electoral administration.” The conditions outlined seemed to exhibit clear determinacy as the Armenian government were given two clear objectives: amend the electoral code and improve the electoral administration as prescribed in OSCE/CoE recommendations. However, greater examination of the recommendations clouded the determinacy, as what was meant by *amending the electoral code and improving electoral administration* lacked concrete explanation and suffered from vague and ambiguous language. The unsuccessful implementation of the prescribed reform attested to the obfuscated determinacy. Overall, it is argued that in relation to electoral reform, the conditions outlined in the AP were partially effective; the AP conditions exhibited clear determinacy but inclusion of the prescribed OSCE/CoE recommendations hazed the determinacy of the conditions.

**Incentives**

The incentives specifically offered for electoral reform were manifested in the ENPI governance facility which rewarded a states “progress in implementing the agreed reform agenda set out in their Action Plan.” As much as €300 million was earmarked by the EU as available for the whole ENP region with a maximum of €50 million for a single state. Assessment of country performance was to be judged through the yearly progress reports, however the exact amount on offer for successful implementation remained absent from the official documents. Certainly, the incentives offered for successful electoral reform, coupled with the vague incentives associated with the ENP in general, failed to replicate the level of incentives on offer in previous neighbourhood policies (i.e. full EU membership). Indeed, the governance facility as an incentive for political reform lacked adequate size, suffered from an uncertain payment procedure, and had vague indications on the actual

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402 European Commission, “EU Armenia ENP Action Plan”

403 European Commission, "Principles for the Implementation of a Governance Facility under ENPI"
financial reward on offer. Subsequently, it was argued that the incentives on offer for electoral reform were ineffective: as the type, size, and speed were noticeable reduced from previous successful conditionality strategies.

**Credibility**

Credibility was harder to measure than conditions and incentives in the context of the 2008 Armenian presidential election given the lack of accessibility to relevant sources of information. However, it is argued that the superficial implementation of the electoral reform chartered by the OSCE/CoE as prescribed in the ENP illustrated the Armenian government’s perceived lack of credibility in the EU to wield punishments or withdraw incentives. Certainly, the EU’s initial vocal support of the 2008 presidential election coupled with their inability to condemn the government’s role in the March 1st riots illustrated the EU’s unwillingness to utilise punishments, which in turn reduced their credibility with the Armenian government. Furthermore, the notable lack of payment of incentives from the governance facility for successful political reform further reduced the EU’s credibility as the incentives they offer in the future are likely to be taken less seriously. However, the close cooperation between the EU and Armenian government related to economic and security issues maintained the EU’s credibility as an important partner (albeit as an economic partner) to Armenia. Overall, it is argued that the EU’s credibility with the Armenian government, while not totally ineffective, is positioned more closely to ineffective than effective after the progression of the 2008 Armenian presidential election where the EU ineffectively utilised rewards and punishments.

**Costs**

It is argued that in general, the perceived cost of full democratisation for the incumbent Armenian regime was the possibility of reforming themselves out of power; illustrated by their reluctance to embrace sweeping democratic reform. Although the conditions related to electoral reform prescribed in the AP were argued as being minor (or cosmetic) and narrowly defined, there was nevertheless a perceived threat from the incumbent regime as to the potential destabilising effects of the prescribed electoral reform; notably a power threat from opposition candidate Ter-Petrosyan. Evidence of this can be found in the fact that the government overtly and systematically undertook a number of electoral violations
in order to guarantee and maintain their grip on power. Overall, it is argued that the costs inherent in implementing the electoral reform of the AP in Armenia for the incumbent government were not wholly ineffective. However conjugated with a general fear of the associated costs of democratisation by the incumbent regime, the costs were judged as only being partially ineffective.

**Figure 8:** Measurements of Conditionality vis-à-vis 2008 Presidential Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Effective/Ineffective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conditions</strong></td>
<td>Electoral code and Electoral Administration</td>
<td>Partially Effective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Incentives</strong></td>
<td>Governance Facility</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Credibility</strong></td>
<td>Lack of punishment for March 1st riots, vague incentive payment</td>
<td>Partially Ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs</strong></td>
<td>Destabilising threat</td>
<td>Partially Ineffective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Summary**

Examining the four measurements in relation to effective conditionality strategies illustrated the ineffectiveness of conditionality related to the ENP’s prescribed electoral reform in Armenia. It can be argued that the EU did not score effectively in any of the measurements, with the lack of incentives the most glaring limitation. Conditions, although identifiable and clearly stated in the AP, became clouded when expanded by the OSCE/CoE recommendations. Incentives were conspicuously smaller than previous neighbourhood policies as the size, type and speed of incentives on offer for electoral reform were on the whole ineffectively conveyed by the EU. Credibility of the EU was judged as being reduced given their inability to punish the Armenian government for the March 1st riots and their lack of concrete fulfilment of promised incentives. Costs were assessed as being perceived by the incumbent regime as strong enough to destabilise their grip on power without being a major threat to their power. Ultimately, examination of the measurements illustrated the EU’s inability to utilise an effective conditionality-based strategy in Armenia during the 2008
presidential election. Conditionality is still observable but the resulting reform appears far less substantial than previous strategies, which were anchored with the offer of EU membership. The findings of the case study seemingly corroborated the wider scholarly adjudication of the ENP; that the offer of subordinate incentives undermines the EU’s normative goals for its Eastern Neighbourhood. Whether the promise of greater incentives through the EaP can supplant the ineffectiveness of the conditionality aspect of the ENP to date is questionable given the continued inability of the EU to dangle the incentive of EU membership. Therefore, it is argued that the EU’s policies related to electoral reform and democratisation in general represent what Sasse termed conditionality-lite; a less effective version of traditional conditionality which depreciated in all the four measurements examined.

Normative Socialisation

In order to expand on the section of the theoretical framework pertaining to normative socialisation, EU interaction with CSOs in Armenia was assessed. Through the employment of a case study which examined four democratically-minded NGOs, it was judged that the EU’s interaction with CSOs had increased since inception of the ENP, but the nature of interaction had not deepened (and in some instances had regressed). Four thematic trends were identified in the case study. Firstly, the EU treated CSOs as inferior to the government. Secondly, the EU was perceived to comprise their democratic goals in favour of more salient economic goals. Thirdly, Armenian CSOs interacted with other international actors generally on a far greater level than with the EU. Lastly, the EaP was seen as an opportunity for the deepening of interaction between the EU and CSOs. Overall, it was argued that in the scope of the ENP, the EU interacted ineffectively with CSOs in Armenia. Despite explicit inclusion of civil society in the ENP strategy paper, the importance of civil society narrowed considerably to merely an auxiliary presence in the AP. However, the potential opening of civil society participation in the ENP signified by the EaP process, notably through the CSF, illustrated possible intent on the behalf of the EU to invest greater responsibility in CSOs in Armenia in the future.
Measuring Normative Socialisation

Re-examination of the socialisation measurements offered in Chapter 1 within the context of EU interaction with CSOs provides further scrutiny related to the socialisation aspect of the ENP. Subsequently, the three measurements formulated by Schimmelfennig are assessed here: namely legitimacy, identification, and resonance (see figure 9).

Legitimacy

It was clearly illustrated in the case study that amongst the NGOs examined, the EU was perceived poorly in relation to legitimacy. The examined NGOs widely believed that the EU consistently compromised the normative aspects of their policy in Armenia in favour for economic and strategic goals. Furthermore, the majority of NGO respondents argued that the EU did not care about democracy or human rights in Armenia; the strong identification of the EU with normative values was judged as purely rhetoric, with little observable concrete action. An example conveyed in the interviews was the failure of the EU to condemn the Armenian government's actions in the March 1st riots, which greatly hampered the EU's legitimacy amongst Armenian CSOs. Therefore, it is argued that the EU, from the perspective of Armenian CSOs, suffered from illegitimacy as there was an observable gap between their normative projection and their concrete action on the ground.

Identification

The examined NGOs illustrated a strong identification amongst CSOs in Armenia with the normative values that the EU projects. All of the NGOs identified robustly with democracy and human rights, thus exhibiting a comparative world-view and ethos with the EU. However, a number of the NGOs did not identify strongly with the EU as an institution or as a positive vehicle for democracy and human rights in Armenia. Membership in the EU was widely judged by the NGOs as a potential positive outcome of EU interaction, although realistically this was seen as a long-term aspiration. Ultimately, it is argued that CSOs in Armenia strongly identified with the normative values of the EU (i.e. democracy and human rights) rather than with the EU institution itself. Thus, the EU experienced both positive and negative identification amongst CSOs in Armenia.
Resonance

In relation to the resonance between the normative approach of the EU and the domestic institutional design of Armenia’s civil society, the case study illustrated, on the whole, ineffective resonance. It was observed that the Armenian government strongly constrained and regulated CSOs in Armenia. This affected the ability of CSOs to effectively interact with the EU (on a level playing field) as well as adopt and internalise the normative aspects of EU policy. Thus, the lack of autonomy of the Armenian civil society hindered the effectiveness of the EU’s normative policies related to democratisation and human rights. Additionally, the EU’s interaction and policies aimed toward civil society suffered from ethnocentrism as the EU did not adequately account for the domestic civil society setting in Armenia. Overall, it is argued that the EU’s policies and norms suffered from ineffective resonance with Armenian CSOs.

**Figure 9:** Measurements of Socialisation vis-à-vis EU interaction with CSOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Case Study</th>
<th>Effective/Ineffective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legitimacy</strong></td>
<td>Perceived gap between normative core and concrete action</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identification</strong></td>
<td>Strong identification with EU norms; small identification with the EU as an institution</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Resonance</strong></td>
<td>Conflict between EU norms/policies and domestic institutional design of Armenian civil society</td>
<td>Ineffective</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Summary

Evaluation of the three measurements for a viable environment for undertaking socialisation illustrated that the EU’s interaction with Armenian CSOs has yet to reach an effective setting for productive socialisation. Indeed, the EU failed to score effectively with either the legitimacy and resonance measurements, while achieving moderate success with regards to identification. In relation to legitimacy, Armenian CSOs strongly viewed the EU as an illegitimate actor given the perceived favouritism of their economic and strategic goals at the expense of their normative values. In terms of identification, Armenian CSOs identified strongly with the normative core of the EU (namely democracy and human rights) but not with the EU as an institution. Lastly, with regards to resonance, it was argued that the EU’s norms and policies in Armenia did not effectively resonate with the domestic setting; Armenian civil society was hindered by a lack of autonomy while EU policies suffered from ethnocentrism. Subsequently, the EU currently lacks the ability to utilise socialisation-based strategies when interacting with Armenian CSOs as their relationship is not built on effective legitimacy, identification and resonance, but rather widespread distrust and scepticism. Therefore, Armenian CSOs remain strategically calculated towards the EU; interaction on the whole tends to occur when it is strategically beneficial to the recipient actor. Role playing perhaps occurs between the EU and the NGOs that they more closely interact with (i.e. NGO-A and NGO-B). However, whether internalisation of EU norms can result from such role playing is questionable. In terms of normative suasion, the lack of a suitable environment coupled with the shallowness of EU interaction with CSOs has resulted in no observable internalisation of EU norms or policies in the examined case study. However, given the long-term scope of socialisation strategies and the likely deepening of interaction between the EU and Armenian CSOs through the EaP, one can posit socialisation becoming more apparent in future interaction.

EU and the Coalition Mode

In light of the in-depth examination of the conditionality and socialisation facets of the ENP, coupled with the general observations related to EU promotion of democratisation in Armenia, the general maxim of this thesis, that the EU is employing a coalition approach for
external assistance of democratisation seems tenuous at best. Certainly, evaluation of the
democratisation scholarship related to the EU attached with examination of the official
documents of the ENP strongly projected the EU as pursuing a philosophy and strategy
innate to the coalition approach. For instance, conditionality-based strategies were
identified in relation to democracy (and electoral reform) in the Armenian AP; socialisation-
inspired strategies were observed in the EU’s efforts to foster closer ties with domestic actors (state and non-state). However, through closer examination of free and fair elections
and EU interaction with CSOs, it was argued that EU democratic policies in the ENP were on
the whole inefficient and lacking in tangible results. Thus, superficially the EU appears to
project a democratic strategy built on the logic of the coalition approach, however once the
surface is scratched, a weak and inefficient policy is observable. A reoccurring theme
throughout the research has been the EU’s strong economic scope in the ENP; that
democratic and human rights aspects of the ENP are often treated as secondary facets
behind economic relations. The findings of this thesis tend to solidify such a claim, as
democratic issues appear to be routinely compromised in order to maintain and strengthen
economic ties. Additionally, the results apparent in this thesis evoke a widely heralded
phenomenon endemic with EU foreign policy; the capability-expectations gap.404 Concisely,
the capability-expectations gap argued that there is an observable gap between what the
EU as an actor aspires to achieve and what they can actually achieve; in other words EU
policy and action suffers from inherent limitations born from their reliance on consensus
politics.405 In relation to the ENP, as observable in the official documents, the ENP emits an
ambitious policy for facilitating functional democratisation, which according to the results of
this thesis, far outreaches the capabilities of the EU to successfully facilitate stated
ambitions. In other words, the EU is rhetorically strongly committed to facilitating
democratisation in Armenia which is not observable in the concrete policies in place on the
ground which have been noticeably narrowed in scope and definition from the initial
strategy papers.

405 Ibid.
The Eastern Partnership: The Great Hope?

The enigmatic EaP holds weight as an important component for the success or failure of the ENP. Both of the empirical chapters examining elections and civil society posited an important role for the EaP in improving the ENP’s democratisation strategy and policies. Concisely, the EaP as a policy, arguably represents a collection of more tangible incentives than originally offered in the ENP, namely the deepening of economic ties through the signing of an AA (i.e. the creation of free trade relations), the increasing of political ties and interaction with both governmental and non-state actors, and greater representation of the Eastern Neighbourhood region in EU foreign policy. However, the initial optimism of swift implementation of the EaP, as experienced with the UfM under the French presidency, has yet to come to fruition. Although concrete progression of the EaP can be identified, the Polish turn of presidency is seen as the earliest and most likely opportunity for full ratification. Ultimately, it appears that the bulk of the ENP’s normative strategies and policies in their Eastern Neighbourhood hinge on the success of the EaP. However, whether the EaP represents an improved set of incentives and policies or simply a rebranding of the ENP, only time will tell. The initial critique points to the latter, as the majority of the Eastern Neighbourhood states remain sceptical and subdued towards the EaP as the implementation costs remain too high and the incentives remain too low.

Assessing Impact: Democratic Improvement or Stagnation in Armenia

While the general evaluation of the ENP in relation to promoting democratisation in its Eastern Neighbourhood, particularly Armenia, has been negative with a number of criticisms, has the EU’s involvement, no matter how inefficient their policy may be, resulted in any democratic change? Examining the democratic ratings offered by the think-tank Freedom House provides some level of evaluation as to whether the ENP has influenced the path of democratisation in Armenia. Although subjective democratic ratings such as Freedom House invoke inherent limitations, they nonetheless receive sufficient credibility.
amongst scholars as a viable measurement of democracy and democratisation.\textsuperscript{406} Two rating systems offered by Freedom House warrant examination in relation to Armenia: firstly the Freedom in the World ratings for political rights and civil liberties, and secondly the Nations in Transit ratings for electoral process, civil society and democratic rating. The Freedom in the World ratings represents the traditional Freedom House rating which is comparable across all the states in the world while the Nations in Transit ratings offer more acute and specific ratings for transitioning states (particularly post-Soviet states).\textsuperscript{407}

Examining the trajectory of all five ratings in relation to Armenia illustrated, on the whole, a negative progression of democratisation (save for civil liberties rating, see \textit{figure 10}). The Freedom in the World Political Rating progressed from a low rating of 3 for 1993 and 1994 to a high rating of 6 from 2009 to 2010 while the civil liberties rating stagnated at 4 from 1993 to 2010. The Nations in Transit ratings provide more in-depth and precise ratings for Armenia but only offered ratings as from 1997. Nevertheless, similarly to the Freedom in the World ratings, the Nations in Transit ratings, on a whole, exhibited a negative trajectory. The overall democracy rating regressed from 4.7 in 1997 to 5.39 in 2010, the electoral process rating fluctuated from 5.5 in 1997 to 5.75 in 2010, and the civil society rating slightly regressed from 3.5 in 1997 to 3.75 in 2010. In relation to the advent of the ENP in 2005, a negative trend related to democratisation is observable with regression of ratings for democratic rating, political rating, and civil society rating with stagnation of electoral rating and civil liberties rating. However, the 2008 presidential election seems the obvious catalytic element for the negative ratings experienced post-2008. Nevertheless, the collection of Freedom House Ratings illustrated the gradual worsening of Armenia’s democratisation path since the initial post-independence years. In other words, Armenia has progressed from being on the cusp of being classified as a free democracy in 1993 to being classified as a partly-free authoritarian state in 2010. Thus, rather than condemn the ENP as a failure, the ratings illustrated a longer and more entrenched inclination which has occurred beyond the scope


\textsuperscript{407} See Appendix C
of the EU’s interaction in Armenia. Certainly, given the lack of capabilities available for the EU to thoroughly implement the ambitious and rhetorically entrenched ENP strategy papers, perhaps as it currently stands, the EU has no real impact in Armenia in terms of facilitating democracy. Thus, the democratic ratings offered by Freedom House seemingly corroborate the findings of the thesis; that currently the ENP does not have the incentives to effectively utilise conditionality-based strategies and does not interact strongly enough with minority traditions to effectively wield socialisation-based strategies. Therefore, in the short-term at least, Armenia’s democratic progression is likely to continue to stagnate and regress given the apparent lack of impact of the EU to foster democratic gains since the implementation of the ENP commenced.

**Contextual Variables**

The observed and argued inability of the EU to facilitate democratic change in Armenia since implementation of the ENP relates back to the examined contextual variables outlined in Chapter 2 (also concerning the research sub questions one, two and four). The results of this thesis add weight to the notion of Armenia experiencing a Soviet hangover as a number of pervasive characteristics of the Soviet system seemingly halt Armenian progression towards achieving functional democratisation. Certainly, EU policies have languished in Armenia due to a number of these factors: the widespread corruption endemic in the Armenian government (illustrated by the unfair practices of the 2008 presidential election), the political importance of powerful Oligarchs which strengthens authoritarian procedures, the unbalanced economic growth which exacerbated the gap between rich and poor, the scepticism of both the public and civil society towards international actors, and lastly and most glaringly, the widespread apathy of Armenian citizens which transcends and hinders all facets of democratisation in Armenia. Whether the EU can penetrate the Soviet hangover through continuing to pursue the policies outlined in the ENP is reliant on their ability to wield their mechanisms of normative change (socialisation and conditionality) more effectively, coupled with a strong commitment from both the Armenian political elites and the general population. However, the on-going importance of Russia: as a long-time ally, a security guarantor, a financial donor, and a trusted partner, is likely to undermine the
potential for democratic gains in the future. Perhaps the most powerful tool for kick-starting effective democratisation in Armenia is the diaspora, given their importance culturally and financially to the Armenian state. Utilising the diaspora as a mechanism for normative change would represent a fruitful avenue for internalising democratic norms in Armenia; however given the strong focus of the diaspora towards the issues of genocide and Nagorno-Karabakh, democratisation is likely beyond their current purview. Ultimately, the ineffectiveness of the ENP as a democratic facilitator conjugated with the pervasive democratic constraints experienced by Armenia place great doubt over the ability of the EU to progress democratic reform in Armenia; only strategies based on long-term time-scales and less ambitious objectives are likely to have any chance of tangible successes.

**Recommendations**

Emanating from the generalisation of this thesis, that currently the EU is an ineffective democratic agent in Armenia and their wider Eastern Neighbourhood, a number of recommendations can be made as to the avenues available for the EU in formulating a more effective and relevant democratic policy. Firstly, as enlargement is no longer a viable strategy for promoting normative transfers in third countries (in the near future at least), the EU has to embrace a more consolidated and long-term approach which focuses on small and gradual gains rather than the sweeping reform associated with previous policies. The widespread criticism levied at the ENP since its 2005 implementation and the lack of observable tangible results corroborates the need for a long-term and consolidated approach. Democratisation in Armenia cannot be expected to occur over-night, there are too many salient variables impacting on the democratic trajectory. Secondly, given the importance of economic reform and cooperation in EU policy and action, democratic and normative related strategies and policies should be linked more closely with economic initiatives in order to piggy-back or bandwagon off the salient economic strategies and goals. Although implicitly evident in the ENP strategies, too often economic integration has occurred beyond the scope of the normative commitments explicitly expressed in the official documents. In other words, the relegation of democratic and normative policies to secondary importance in the ENP undermines the EU’s ability to foster democratisation.
gains in Armenia. Thirdly, the use of conditionality-based strategies cannot expect to produce similar results as previous strategies which attached the incentive of EU membership. Potentially conditionality still has a positive role as a normative mechanism. However, the conditions require clearer determinacy for the target actor as to what reform is actually required to receive incentives. The incentives on offer need improving in terms of: size, the speed of payment, and the type of incentives on offer. The credibility of the EU needs strengthening in the wake of their inability to wield punishments and rewards. And the costs for the state to implement EU policies should not threaten the power-base of the elites. Fourthly, utilisation of socialisation-based strategies likely represents the most fruitful avenue for EU democratic facilitation in the post-enlargement era. The EU needs to persevere with generating an environment with domestic actors in their ENP recipient states suitable for undertaking socialisation. Subsequently, the EU needs to invest in fostering higher levels of interaction based on joint project collaborations, forum-style cooperation and interaction; attributing greater roles and weight to domestic actors in policy formation and implementation, and providing a greater presence on the ground in these states. Furthermore, it is apparent that the EU should embrace and invest more trust in CSOs; CSOs represent an important catalyst in furthering democratisation movements in transitioning states as they provide rich avenues for grassroots initiatives. Ultimately, this thesis argues that the ENP is not necessarily a lost strategy for facilitating democratisation in Armenia and the Eastern Neighbourhood; the skeleton of an efficient strategy exists but it requires refining in line with the proposed recommendations above, as well a realisation that democratic gains in transitioning states require long-term gradual reform rather than shock-therapy inspired immediate transformation.
Conclusion

Research Questions

This thesis posited one overarching research question and a number of research sub-questions in order to illuminate and assess the EU’s promotion of democratisation in the Eastern Neighbourhood, as stipulated in the ENP, since the year 2006, by utilising Armenia as the primary case study. The research questions drafted stemmed from the primary research objective of examining whether the EU was still an effective agent of democratisation in the post-enlargement era coupled with a number of secondary objectives which included examining democratisation in the post-Soviet context, the geopolitical dimensions of democratisation, and the effectiveness of EU foreign policy. Armenia was employed as the primary case study given the notable strengthening of ties and interaction in the wake of the ENP, conjugated with an underwhelming scholarship examining Armenia as a primary research subject. Additionally, through utilising Armenia as the primary case study, this thesis intended the research to be applicable to the broader context of EU promotion of democratisation in the Eastern Neighbourhood and the non-ENP post-Soviet states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan).

This section of the conclusion revisits the research question and sub-questions in order to offer concise summaries of the findings presented in the thesis. The four research sub-questions are firstly re-examined in light of the research conducted in this thesis. The first three sub-questions are contextual in nature focussing on historical and geopolitical variables related to the phenomenon of EU promotion of democratisation in Armenia. Subsequently, these three sub-questions were predominately examined in the literature review undertaken in Chapter 2 but were also regularly revisited throughout the remaining chapters. The fourth research sub-question represented the empirical crux of this thesis; the examination of the reform offered in the ENP with specific examination of free and fair elections and EU interaction with Armenian CSOs. Subsequently, the two specific sub-sub-questions of the fourth research sub-question were examined in separate chapters (four
and five). Lastly, the overarching research question is revisited and is built upon the sub-questions in order to provide general insight into the overall essence of this thesis.

In relation to the first sub-question,\textsuperscript{408} it was identified through the literature review that historically the EU exported democratic norms to its various neighbourhoods largely through the process of enlargement. Through utilising the strategy of conditionality, membership in the EU was offered as an incentive for a state to fully implement the political and economic reform prescribed in the Copenhagen Criteria. Indeed, enlargement proved a successful mechanism for democratisation with notable successful transitions ranging from Spain, Portugal and Greece in the 1980s to the ten CEE post-Communist states in the mid-2000s. However, it was ascertained that enlargement, as a mechanism for democratisation, had reached its limits as a viable strategy given the EU’s hesitation (and inability) at offering membership to the Eastern Neighbourhood as an incentive for implementing the political and economic reform prescribed in the ENP.

The examination of the second sub-question\textsuperscript{409} illustrated that democracy, although not a new phenomenon for Armenia, gained notable momentum in the latter years of the Soviet Union due to the thawing which emanated from the Glasnost and Perestroika policies. The Karabakh movement embodied a combination of nationalism, democratisation and self-determination amongst the Armenian populous. However, the two initial events of the NK war with Azerbaijan and the Spitak earthquake quickly supplanted widespread democratic optimism with the realism of post-Soviet transition. Additionally, longer more pervasive democratic constraints were experienced in the form of a Soviet hangover where the Armenian independence was unable to supersede the Soviet characteristics which had governed them for 70 years. Characteristics of the Soviet Hangover were identified in: the entrenchment of a patronal presidentialism system where power resided overwhelmingly in one person, the emergence of politically charged oligarchs who wielded tremendous economic and political influence, the strain and stagnation born of undertaking multiple transitions simultaneously (economic, political, nation-building etc.), the distrust and scepticism of external international actors amongst Armenian elites and general

\textsuperscript{408} How has the EU exported democratic norms in their neighbourhood prior to the 2005 ENP? \\
\textsuperscript{409} What has the trajectory of democratisation in Armenia looked like since the 1988 Karabakh movement and subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union?
populations, and the widespread apathy of Armenian citizens which hindered popular grassroots movements for democratisation. Thus, it was argued that Armenia, after early democratic gains in the initial independence era, suffered from stagnation and regression of the democratisation process which reinforced and further entrenched the pervasive characteristics of the Soviet Hangover.

Consideration of the third sub-question revealed that Armenia was situated within a volatile and geopolitically important region of the Caucasus; a geographic region where the power and influence of the West, Russia and Iran converged. Additionally, the Caucasus signified a region with a number of on-going ethnic conflicts; notably for Armenia, was the frozen conflict with Azerbaijan over the contested territory of Karabakh which resulted in the de-facto sovereignty of NK under Armenian supervision and the border closure between Armenia and Azerbaijan (which also resulted in border closure with Turkey, although normalisation of relations is likely to result in this border reopening in the near future). The border closures with Turkey and Azerbaijan hindered Armenian growth substantially given the loss of inter-state trade and the exclusion of Armenia from significant foreign projects such as the BTC pipeline and the KAB railway; coupled with the reinforcement of nationalistic and imperialistic sentiments of the Armenian elites and diaspora towards the issues of the 1915 genocide and NK war. Subsequently, the geopolitical environment encompassing Armenia and the Caucasus has hindered the potential and effectiveness of the EU’s democratic strategies in Armenia, as the environment resultant from the conflictual nature of the Caucasus is hardly conducive to implementing democratisation policies.

Additionally to the third sub-question the first of two sub-sub-questions ascertained that the influence of Russia was counter-productive to the democratisation process in Armenia given Russia’s overt reclamation of influence in their former colonial territories in the wake of the colour revolutions. Russia exerted strong influence over Armenia: firstly as a security guarantor against the hostilities Armenia has experienced with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and secondly as a financial donor to Armenia. The close partnership between Armenia and Russia threatened the possible impact of EU policies, as Russia represented a solid alternative to the EU as both a financial donor and political partner for Armenia (as

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410 How does the external (non-EU) geopolitical environment of Armenia in the Caucasus shape EU democratic facilitation?
411 How does the close relationship Armenia shares with Russia affect EU democratisation initiatives?
illustrated with Russian support of Belarus). However, the strong trade partnership between Armenia and the EU coupled with a salient European cultural identity amongst Armenians ultimately threatened the long-term importance of Russia to Armenia and the likely emergence of the EU as the most important future partner to Armenia in terms of political and economic cooperation. The second sub-sub-question posited that the Armenian diaspora which stretches as far as the United States, Argentina and Australia, as well as far surpassing the population of the Armenian state, played a crucially important role in the state-building process of Armenia given its importance as a financial resource (through remittances) and as a beacon for international recognition (through lobbying). However, in relation to democratisation, the general consensus posited the role of the Armenian diaspora as a potential blocking agent due to orientation of the diaspora’s interests towards issues such as the 1915 genocide and the Karabakh question. The Armenian diaspora had traditionally formulated and promoted a shared vision of Armenia as a nationalistic and powerful state in the Caucasus; rather than advocating greater democratisation. Yet it was argued that the diaspora potentially represented the strongest avenue for improving democratisation through the creation of diaspora networks that would allow for the flow of democratic norms. Given the unlikely settlement of the issues surrounding the recognition of the Armenian genocide and the NK war in the near-future, the role of the diaspora was argued to likely remain a negative influence towards promoting democratisation.

Examination of the fourth sub-question, through the examination of the most important official documents related to the ENP (namely the strategy paper and AP), illustrated that the majority of reform prescribed for Armenia was economic in scope. Normative values such as democracy and human rights received sporadic attention, ranging from strong rhetorical presence in the strategy papers to narrowed representation in the AP. Of the eight key priorities for Armenia stipulated in the AP: one was related directly to democratisation and three other priorities had implications for democratisation (namely human rights, economic and legal orientated reform priorities); while economic related issues saliently constituted three of the eight key priorities. Expanding the key priority related to democratisation painted a vague and ambiguous policy lacking in policy-

412 How does the extensive Armenian diaspora impact on EU democratisation initiatives?
413 What specific reform is prescribed in the ENP?
operational detail and tangible goals for the reform prescribed. Furthermore, the
democratisation strategy was orientated towards aligning existing democratic foundations
in Armenia towards European standards rather than concrete upheaval. The first of two sub-
sub-questions identified elections as a key area in the context of the EU’s promotion of
democratisation in Armenia given their place as a bastion of international democratisation
strategies and their importance in EU democratisation policy. Elections were judged as
being a visible marker of democracy; creating a normative commitment to democracy for
the participants. EU policy for free and fair elections in Armenia as outlined in the AP
amounted to amending the electoral code and improving electoral administration in line
with the OSCE/CoE recommendations. The prescribed reform was adjudicated as being
minor and without consideration of contextual factors. Utilising the 2008 Armenian
presidential election as a test case study, it was argued that the ENP initiatives had little
effect in improving the freeness and fairness of elections in Armenia due to a number of
pervasive election violations undertaken by the Armenian government. The inability of the
EU to undertake conditionality-based strategies coupled with the lack of EOM capabilities
rendered the EU’s electoral policy ineffective. The remaining sub-sub-question illustrated
civil society promotion as an important component of functional democratisation in the
neoliberal philosophy inherent in the United States’ democratisation strategies, also
identifiable in the EU’s policies (albeit less overtly). Essentially, civil society promotion aided
democratisation through mobilising popular pressure for political change and allowing for
grassroots initiatives (bottom-up activity) to thrive and take-hold. The EU’s promotion of
civil society was argued as embracing less systematic and more ad-hoc strategies, generally
through the EIDHR instrument. In regards to the ENP, while civil society was explicitly
mentioned as a facet of EU democratic policy in the ENP strategy paper, civil society was
conspicuously reduced in the Armenian AP. Examination of a case study of four
democratically-minded NGOs illustrated the EU to be inefficient at interacting with CSOs;
four thematic trends were identified. Namely that the EU predominately interacts with
government actors, the EU often compromises democratic and human rights policies to
further salient economic goals, other international actors are more active with the
Armenian CSOs than the EU, and lastly the EaP is judged as an important step in improving

414 How has the EU promoted free and fair elections in Armenia through the ENP?
415 How has the EU engaged with CSOs since the implementation of the ENP?
relations and interaction with CSOs. The lack of in-depth interaction between the EU and CSOs coupled with the perceived inefficient legitimacy, identification, and resonance of the EU from CSOs presented an environment that was not viable for undertaking socialisation-inspired strategies.

In re-examination of the over-arching research question, this thesis ultimately argued that while the EU on paper and rhetorically appeared to pursue a democratisation strategy in the ENP built on the logic of the coalition approach, in reality their democratic strategies were inefficient, government-centric, economic in scope, and failed to effectively utilise the conditionality and socialisation mechanisms. A widely heralded phenomenon was evoked to offer some form of explanation; the capabilities-expectations gap, where the EU’s intent and expectations for promoting democratisation in the Eastern Neighbourhood far outreached their capabilities to effectively do so. Additionally, it was argued that the EU as an agent of democratisation was unable to penetrate the pervasive forces inhibiting democratisation; the Soviet Hangover, the salience of Russia, and the general trajectory of democratisation in Armenia. Examination of the Freedom House Freedom in the World and Nations in Transit ratings corroborated the worsening progression of Armenian democratisation, a phenomenon which began in the initial independence era and continued through ENP implementation. Consequently, whether the ENP could halt and reverse the on-going trend of democratisation in Armenia was questionable in the wake of the empirical evidence.

**Thesis Summary**

In positing the phenomenon of EU promotion of democratisation in its Eastern Neighbourhood (through engaging with the case study of Armenia), this thesis has explored: the theoretical foundations of democratisation and the external promotion of democratisation by international actors; examined the literature on the EU’s democratic promotion and considered the salient contextual factors concerning democratisation in Armenia; conducted primary research in two areas of democratic promotion (free and fair elections and interaction with domestic CSOs) since 2006?

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416 How has EU interaction with Armenia, as stipulated in the ENP, impacted on democratisation (specifically, EU promotion of free and fair elections and EU interaction with domestic CSOs) since 2006?
elections and interaction with CSOs); and lastly presented a critical section reconnecting the theoretical framework with the empirical research. The EU, despite credibility in the international system as an effective agent of democracy, has lost much of its effectiveness in the ENP due to the inability of the EU to wield the incentive of membership as a reward for political and economic reform. The sweeping reform associated with the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the CEE former communist states has not been replicated in the ENP with democratic stagnation and reversion the observable trend amongst recipient states. Indeed, in the case of Armenia, despite a litany of positive rhetoric from the EU, the democratic trajectory has regressed, following a trend which traces back to the fall of the Soviet Union.

The two empirical areas of research (free and fair elections and interaction with CSOs) illustrated the ineffectiveness of the ENP. In relation to electoral reform, the reform prescribed in the ENP was argued as being too vague and cosmetic, lacking policy-operational detail which consequently led to ineffective reform in the 2008 presidential election. In relation to civil society interaction, the EU, while increasing interaction with CSOs, failed to deepen interaction to a point where socialisation strategies could take hold and prosper. The two empirical case studies illustrated the decline of conditionality as a successful normative mechanism (as evident in previous strategies) and the unproductive utilisation of the socialisation mechanism for normative change. Ultimately, it was argued that the ENP was unable to supplant the pervasive trends inherent in the post-Soviet transition and in reality had little effect in shaping Armenian democratisation, in the initial stage of the ENP at least. However, in the opinion of this thesis, the ENP represented a potentially salvageable policy as the skeleton of a viable policy existed. It was argued that in the absence of enlargement and the offer of membership, the EU would be well served to embrace a long-term policy with far smaller objectives than previous policies. Furthermore, revision and alteration of the way the EU utilises its normative mechanisms is paramount. In the case of conditionality, recognition of its limitations in the post-enlargement setting is crucial. Although conditionality is unable to replicate the successes of previous democratic strategies, it remains a viable mechanism if the EU more clearly outlines the determinacy of the conditions, the structure of the incentives and narrows the perceived costs of reform for the target actor coupled with remaining a credible democratic actor in the Eastern Neighbourhood. With regards to socialisation, it is argued that socialisation-based strategies represent the most fruitful avenue for EU normative assimilation in Armenia. Indeed,
democratic gains very rarely occur without some underlying grassroots movement, which socialisation based initiatives could promote and facilitate. However, perseverance and generation of a permissible environment for socialisation is paramount to future success. Therefore, the EU needs to foster greater levels of interaction with democratic actors (whether governmental or CSOs) as well as presenting themselves as a legitimate, identifiable and resonating actor. In the end, it was argued that perhaps the EaP represents an attempt by the EU to kick-start or even salvage the ENP from the depths of inefficiency, a last shot at fostering democratic gains in the Eastern Neighbourhood and Armenia through the ENP.

Limitations

This thesis openly acknowledges a number of limitations which impact on the robustness of the results. Firstly, the examination of solely Armenia presents a limitation. It is strongly argued that Armenia represents not only a viable case study but a novel and important one too. However, the utilisation of a single case to examine EU promotion of democracy limits the applicability of the results with the rest of the Eastern Neighbourhood, as no comparisons are made with other states. Armenia is also less important to the EU than relatively bigger or geographically more important states, such as Ukraine and Belarus. Therefore, it is assumed that the EU is likely to attribute higher priority to democratic reform in these states. Secondly, several limitations are born from the data collection methods employed in the empirical chapters. In the case of examining the 2008 presidential election, the validity of the results are hindered in the first instance because primary attendance was not possible and in the second instance because the data relies heavily on the opinions of EOMs. It is strongly argued that the results presented in the elections chapter offer valid insight into the EU’s promotion of democracy through the ENP. However, the sturdiness of the results pertaining to the 2008 Armenian presidential election cannot be guaranteed. In the case study examining EU interaction with CSOs, the sample-size reduces the validity of the results. The case study examined four democratically minded NGOs; this thesis acknowledges that this is a small sample-size given that hundreds of NGOs operate in Armenia. While the results cannot be claimed to be representative (rather
offering a snapshot of the phenomenon), through the research process, great care was
given to choosing NGOs with high levels of activism and output as well as operating within
the scope of the ENP. Thirdly, the choice of case studies to empirically test the theoretical
framework produces limitations. In relation to testing conditionality, the case study solely
looked at electoral reform, one of a number of components related to democratisation. As
evident in the Armenian AP, elections represent one of ten concrete objectives related to
conditionality. Although elections were argued as being the most salient democratic
objective in the ENP, it nevertheless represented only a small percentage of the larger
democratic policy. In regards to socialisation, the examination of civil society limited the
robustness of the results. It is argued that civil society potentially presents the most fruitful
avenue for successful socialisation projects; however in the context of Armenia, civil society
was largely treated as a secondary actor. Subsequently, examining the socialisation effect of
the ENP amongst governmental actors would have likely produced richer data and results.
Lastly, limitations arise in the fact that the EaP has remained enigmatic and difficult to
assess and track. As widely stated in this thesis, the EaP potentially represents a more
tangible upgrade of the languishing ENP. However, given the indefinite process of the AA
negotiations and the masked reception of the EaP by recipient states, predicting future
trends is extremely difficult and limits the ability to formulate robust conclusions. Overall,
this thesis argues that it provides a snapshot of the phenomenon of EU promotion of
democracy in its Eastern Neighbourhood through engaging with Armenia. Although this
thesis cannot claim representation of the results, the case studies intend to illuminate the
theoretical framework and offer adjudication of the EU’s democratic policies exhibited
through the ENP.

**Future Study**

As the limitations clearly demarcate, this study barely scratches the surface of the rich
phenomenon that is the EU’s role as an agent of democracy. Yet, as argued previously, this
thesis maintains the applicability of Armenia as a case study for testing the EU’s democratic
strategies (such as the ENP). Additionally, the theoretical framework utilised in this thesis is
argued as being a relevant and viable model for which to evaluate EU democratic
interaction in its Eastern Neighbourhood through the ENP. Subsequently, this thesis offers advice for future studies which tackle similar topics as to the ones covered in this thesis. Firstly, in relation to examining conditionality, the 2013 Armenian presidential election would provide the most effective yard-stick in which to measure democratic gain through conditionality. The 2013 elections would mean that the ENP would have been in operation for approximately seven years, the EaP for four years and possibly a signed AA in place as well; ample time for which to effectively critique EU policies. Furthermore, given the lessons learned from the 2008 presidential election, the 2013 Elections would offer the EU a chance to implement more practical reform and strategies framed by the EaP. Secondly, with regards to socialisation, future studies would be well advised to examine the EU’s socialisation strategies incarnate in the CSF. The interaction born from the CSF seems the perfect kind of arena to observe the mechanisms of socialisation as CSOs remain perhaps the most susceptible target actors for the EU. Future case studies investigating CSF participant NGOs could more effectively evaluate socialisation than was possible in this thesis, particularly given the infancy of the CSF at the time of field-work for this thesis. Undoubtedly, the EU democratic discourse is rapidly illuminating the phenomenon of Neighbourhood Europeanization with the topic becoming en vogue in foreign policy studies. Therefore, while the fog gradually subsides around this topic, scholars and researchers should not forget the importance of history or the influence of context which ultimately mould and guide actual democratisation at a far greater magnitude than current EU policy can. Overestimating the EU’s capabilities in fostering normative change in its Eastern Neighbourhood should be left solely to the rhetoric inherent in EU policy; rather EU policy should be evaluated through a broader and relativistic scope which solely critiques concrete EU action.

\[417\] Much of the new scholarship on Neighbourhood Europeanization which has emerged in 2010 has not been reviewed for this thesis given the time-frame of research. See Andrea Gawrich, Inn Melnykovska, and Rainer Schweickert, “Neighbourhood Europeanization through ENP: The Case of Ukraine,” Journal of Common Market Studies 48, no. 5 (2010).
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Appendices

Appendix A: University of Canterbury Human Ethics Approval

Ref: HEC 2009/LR/63

10 August 2009

Nicholas Smith
NCRE
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY

Dear Nicholas

Thank you for forwarding to the Human Ethics Committee a copy of the low risk application you have recently made for your research proposal “EU normative socialisation in Armenia: Democratisation through the ENP”.

I am pleased to advise that this application has been reviewed and I confirm support of the Department’s approval for this project.

With best wishes for your project.

Yours sincerely

Dr Michael Grimshaw
Chair, Human Ethics Committee
Appendix B: Questionnaire for interviews with Armenian NGOs

1. In what areas has your organisation maintained ties with the EU? What is your personal role in this interaction?
2. How often did your organisation interact with the EU prior to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) before 2006?
3. Is there greater interaction between your organisation and the EU since the drafting of the ENP in 2006?
4. How often does your organisation interact with the EU since 2006? What sort of interaction takes place?
5. How do you see the distribution of roles between your organisation and the EU?
6. In your opinion, does the process of ‘Europeanisation’ (defined as becoming more European like) take place in Armenia? What is the role of the EU in this process?
7. Overall, would you say that since the ENP, the EU has made a greater effort to engage with Armenian domestic actors such as NGOs?
8. What specific projects has your organisation been involved in with the EU?
9. Overall, how would you perceive the EU’s involvement in Armenia in relation to democratisation since the advent of the ENP?
10. How do you feel the Armenian public perceives EU interaction with Armenia? In relation to state, civil society and the public?
11. The EU offers certain incentives in the ENP for Armenian cooperation but no membership, how would you comment on this?
12. The 2008 Armenian parliamentary elections were commended by the EU for making visible strides in relation to free and fair elections? How would you comment on this?
13. Finally, how do you perceive the future for Armenia in relation to the following topics: Democraisation
Asian integration
Nagorno-Karabakh
Russian Relations
Appendix C: Democratic Ratings Data for Armenia

Freedom House

Freedom House’s *Freedom in the World* ratings for Civil Liberties (CL) and Political Rating (PR) range from 1 to 7: 1 represents the most free and therefore a fully democratic state, 7 represents the least free and signifies an autocratic state.

**Armenia’s *Freedom in the World* Political Rights and Civil Liberty Score, 1991-2010**

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Freedom House’s *Nations in Transit* ratings for Electoral Process (EP), Civil Society (CS) and Democratic Rating (DR) similarly range from 1 to 7; however greater sensitivity is applied as the rating incorporates two decimal places.

**Armenia’s *Nations in Transit* ratings for Electoral Process, Civil Society and Democratic Rating Score, 1997-2010**

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Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2009

“The Polity Score captures this regime authority spectrum on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). The Polity scores can also be converted to regime categories: we recommend a three-part categorization of "autocracies" (-10 to -6), "anocracies" (-5 to +5 and the three special values: -66, -77, and -88), and "democracies" (+6 to +10).”418

Armenia’s Polity IV Project Democratic Score, 1991-2009

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