Never Again: an investigation into the preconditions likely to predict genocide and their application to Sudan and Rwanda

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By

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Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp, which has turned my life into one long night, seven times cursed and seven times sealed. Never shall I forget that smoke. Never shall I forget the little faces of the children, whose bodies I saw turned into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky.

Never shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever. Never shall I forget that nocturnal silence which deprived me, for all eternity, of the desire to live. Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my soul and turned my dreams to dust. Never shall I forget these things, even if I am condemned to live as long as God Himself. Never.

Elie Wiesel
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Abstract

Genocide and politicide are recurrent phenomena in modern history, with forty-one cases occurring since 1955. Without a solution to this problem of genocide, this century looks set to be just as bleak as the last. This thesis is a step toward a better understanding of the preconditions and acceleratory factors that allow a civil war to develop into genocide or politicide. It identifies conditions under which governments or rival authorities choose a strategy of genocide during or following civil war. The approach this thesis adopts is that multiple conditions coming from both within and outside the country influence the likelihood that a civil war will develop into genocide. Each precondition, examined by this thesis, is interpreted in terms of its likely effects on authorities’ choices about whether to resort to mass killing in conflict situations. It applies the model to Rwanda and Sudan. This thesis proposes that states commit genocide when they cannot win at war or succeed in a position of power without the destruction of civilian populations. In order to overcome their position of weakness and extend their position of power a state or non-state power resorts to genocide/politicide. The model identifies the enduring characteristics of regimes and societies that are less time dependent, as well acceleratory factors, which have a more immediate effect on the escalation of the violent conflict/political upheaval into genocide.
Chapter One:  
The Century of Genocide

1.1 Introduction

"We thought it was 'Never again', but it has been again and again - over and over again - ever since... the innocent have been massacred and the perpetrators have walked away scot free."
- Benjamin Ferencz, chief prosecutor at the Nuremberg World War II war crimes trials, speaking in 1997

“A single death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic”. Stalin

“At the beginning of the world”, said Portuguese Jesuit, Manuel de Nobrega, in 1559, “all was homicide”. This sentiment, echoed a century later in Hobbes’s famous phrase, bellum omnium contra omnes, the war of all against all, alerts us to what historically seems to be a fundamental issue in human relations. The quest for human kind to move from that state of nature, to engage in the social contract and to form stable political societies has been continually hindered by exterminatory campaigns against civilians. While homicide is a word we except as an objective, legal label for murder, its counter part, genocide, distresses us deeply, for it seems to carry with it echoes of all the primitive, depraved tendencies of the human animal since it first walked upright.

Genocide is a word that has come to stand for the worst thing that human beings can do to each other and consequently carries with it such emotional weight that in Turkey even the very use of the word to describe the killing of the Armenians, in 1915, is an offence punishable by imprisonment. On the other hand, in France, to deny the killing of 1.5 million Armenians as an act of genocide is a crime.
More than half a century has passed since the adoption of the United Nations Genocide Convention, yet cases of states intentionally killing their own people continue to mount (Harff, 2003). Rhetoric comes easily for despite the United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948, and the international community’s vow, following the Holocaust, of ‘never again,’ genocide has been a recurrent phenomena in the post World War Two period, taking place on an horrendous scale in Cambodia and Rwanda, to name just two countries. The international community’s pledge of never again has become an unfulfilled promise. A more apt description than the oft chanted “Never Again” is, in fact, again and again, over and over again.

The list of victim groups during this "Century of Genocide" is long (Rummel, 1992). Some are well known, for example, Jews and Rwandan Tutsis. Others have been murdered in greater obscurity: Armenians, Gypsies, Bengalis, Burundi Hutus and Guatemalan Indians (Hinton, 2002, p. 1). These past atrocities, along with current crises such as the situation in Darfur, Sudan, make research on genocidal processes all the more important. Recent events reinforce the notion that violent conflict, including genocide, will be as prevalent in the Twenty First Century, as it was the last, unless there is a concerted effort to prevent its recurrence. What is startling, however, is not only how often genocide has occurred, but that when it has occurred it is so often uncontested. Not only have genocidal events yielded virtually no action or intervention by the international community and or major powers, like the United States, but such powers have, more often than not, refrained from condemning or even acknowledging that the crimes are taking place.

The persistence of genocide, the brutality where it does occur, and the failure of the international community to halt it has provoked interest and made imperative the development of measures to identify, prevent and halt instances of state sponsored mass murder.
1.2 Definition of Key Concepts and Terms

“We are in the presence of a crime without a name” Winston Churchill 1941

Before going further, a conceptual understanding of the word genocide is necessary. In order to examine cases of genocide we must first determine whether the atrocities committed were genocide. “A good definition”, argues Andreopoulos, “has a critical functional value: to assist in the detection of early signs of an impending crisis” (Andreopoulos, 1994, p. 3-4).

Genocide long predates the Holocaust of the twentieth century; the destruction of a people because of their identity has occurred throughout ancient, medieval and early modern history. However, it was not until the atrocity of the Holocaust that the word genocide was first used to describe such an event. The magnitude of the Holocaust meant no existing word would suffice; it would be a rare term, Power (2003, p. 42) stated, “that carried in it society’s revulsion and indignation”.

The term genocide was first coined, in 1943, by the Jewish Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin, in his book *Axis rule in Occupied Europe* (Lemkin, 1944, preface, dated November 15, 1943). He created the word genocide by taking its root from the Greek word ‘genos’, meaning race or tribe and the Latin word ‘cide’ meaning to kill. He defined genocide as a “coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating groups themselves” (cited in Schabas, 1999, p.2). During the Holocaust, in which every member of his family except his brother and himself were killed, he campaigned to have genocide recognised as a crime under international law.

The Genocide Convention was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948 and came into effect in January 1951. It contains an internationally recognised definition of genocide. Article Two of the convention defines genocide as "any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) Killing members of the group;

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”

The Genocide Convention of 1948 limits the victims of genocide to “national, ethnical, racial or religious” groups. The preliminary resolution included the destruction of political and other groups in its definition. Much of the subsequent U.N. debate over the legislation on genocide revolved around the question of whether political and social groups should be covered by the convention (Kuper, 1981). A number of countries, particularly the Soviet Union, which, because of the atrocities it perpetrated against the kulaks and other “enemies of the people”, feared accusations of genocide, argued that political groups should be excluded from the convention since they did not fit the etymology of genocide (Le Blanc, 1988). Such groups, it was argued, were mutable categories, and lacked the distinguishing characteristics necessary for definition; unlike membership in ethnic groups which was considered permanent. This clearly defies logic as religious groups were included in the definition. In the end, the clause on "political and other groups" was dropped from the final version of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

This omission has generated a great deal of debate. Many of the century’s bloodiest examples of state sponsored mass murder of civilians have been directed, not at ethnic groups, but primarily at political or class enemies. As currently stated, the U.N. Convention’s definition has difficulty accounting for such events as the Soviet liquidation of its "enemies" or the Nazi annihilation of tens of thousands of "lives not worth living" (that is, mentally challenged or mentally ill individuals, homosexuals, and communists.) The argument for the inclusion of the killing of political and other non-ethnic groups in definitions of genocide has resulted in prominent genocide scholar, Barbara Harff, creating the term politicide. Politicide refers to “events in which the victims are defined primarily in terms of their political position – their class, political beliefs, or organised opposition to the state and the dominant group” (Harff, 1992). Harff is
consistent with Fein (1993b, p.12) who reasons that “mass killings of political groups show similarities in their causes, organization and motives” to genocide.

According to Harff and Gurr, genocide is more of a social action, with victimized groups being identified by ethnicity, nationality or religion, whereas with politicide, the victims are identified by their political affiliation or opposition to the regime in power. In this study, as in Harff’s research and data set, genocide and politicide are studied together and combined empirically. In Harff’s view, genocide and politicide are “aspects of the same phenomena and need no separate theoretical explanation” (Harff, 2003, p.3). From a political perspective it may be effective to include political groups in the definition of genocide and in the international agreements designed to prevent it, however, in academic work clarity is paramount. For this reason, and to avoid problems over the use of the term, in this thesis genocide, politicide or geno-politicide will also be used to describe and distinguish individual cases. Many instances of mass killing are a mix of the two types, in which some groups are targeted based on political affiliation or activity, and some based on communal identity. The Khmer Rouge, for example, killed Buddhist Monks and ethnic Chams, Chinese and Vietnamese but also eradicated Cambodians living on the eastern border with Vietnam for fear that spies had infiltrated the region (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 309). In Indonesia, in the 1960's, both ethnic Chinese and members of the Communist party were slaughtered by the governing regime (Harff, 2003).

The Genocide Convention does not take into account the possibility that non-state actors can and have been perpetrators of genocide and/or politicide. The definition of genocide and politicide used in this thesis is expanded to include episodes that occur during civil wars, when a territorially based nationalist or revolutionary movement targets an ethnic or political group for destruction “in whole or in part.” This encompasses situations in which at least one party to a civil war systematically uses deadly force to destroy the civilian support base of its opponents. A definitive example of this is the atrocities perpetrated by Serb nationalists against Muslims in Bosnia between1992–93 (Harff, 2003).
Defining genocide remains a contentious issue for many scholars. Debate continues over what constitutes genocide and which events should be classified as such. There are those scholars who define it narrowly and those who use the word to describe a wide array of events. The use of the word genocide to condemn such diverse phenomena as abortion, dieting and urbanisation has led to the word genocide being “so debased by semantic stretch that its use stirs suspicion” (Fein, 1997, p. 95). The dilemma arising over the use of the word is best expressed by Michael Ignatieff: “Those who should use the word genocide never let it slip their mouths. Those who unfortunately do use it, banalise it into a validation of every kind of victimhood” (Ignatieff, 2005). Virtually everything but genocide is called genocide and those in the international community refrain from using the term for fear that evoking it would create a legal obligation to act.

Resolution of the definitional dilemmas which arise in this study requires that genocide be distinguished from other types of mass political violence. What distinguishes genocide from other crimes against humanity and war crimes is that these crimes do not require proof of intent, merely of the criminal action itself, such as mass murder. In 1992, during the war in the former Yugoslavia, the term ethnic cleansing frequently appeared in the media and non-governmental and governmental reports, sometimes used interchangeably with the word genocide. There is, however, an important difference between ethnic cleansing and genocide. The former seeks to ‘cleanse’ or ‘purify’ a territory of one ethnic group by the use of terror, rape and or murder in order to convince the inhabitants to leave, whereas genocide seeks to destroy the group by eliminating them altogether. In practice, ethnic cleansing and genocide are often closely associated, with ethnic cleansing often preceding or occurring as a phase in a burgeoning genocidal process (Gellately and Kiernan, 20 and Booth).

Having examined what genocide is and is not, the next step is to set out a clear working definition of the term to be adopted by this thesis.
1.3 Operational definition of genocide and politicide

The following definition is adopted by this thesis to identify historical and future cases for comparative analysis. Genocides and politicides are classified as:

*the promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by governing elites or their agents— or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities—that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, political, or politicized ethnic group* (Harff, 2003, p. 2)

Harff notes that this definition "parallels those developed by other comparative researchers" and deals with four major problems of the legal definition: the exclusion of mass murders that target political rather than ethnic, racial, or religious groups (which she calls politicides); the use of "mental harm" in the legal definition; the definition of "intent to destroy;" and "the possibility that nonstate actors can and do attempt to destroy rival ethnic and political groups."

The following guidelines will be used to help distinguish cases of genocide and politicide from other kinds of killings that occur during civil conflicts: (1) Is there complicity by the state (or, in the case of war, by either of the contending authorities) in actions undertaken that endanger human life? (2) Is there evidence, even if circumstantial, of intent on the part of authorities to isolate or single out group members for mistreatment? (3) Are victims members of an identifiable group? (4) Are there policies and practices that cause prolonged mass suffering? and (5) Do the actions committed pose a threat to the survival of the group? (Harff, 2003, p. 3)

1.4 The problem

Genocide and politicide are a recurrent phenomena, with forty-one cases of such episodes since 1955 (Harff, 2003). Evidence suggests these instances of mass killings often occur in the presence or aftermath of internal armed conflict. If violent conflict remains a problem in the Twenty First Century, then this century looks set to be just as bleak as the last.
With the exit of communism from the super power equation, and with the United Nations set free from the inhibiting effect of super power rivalry, it was believed by some, that in this global arena, peace and stability would prevail. This proved not to be the case. The end of the Cold War witnessed the emergence of new ‘hot spots’. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Block, and with it the re-emergence of previously homogenised geographical and ethno-national identities, had deadly consequences. Though, by the end of the 1990s and early 2000, figures suggested that the end of the cold war, the spread of democracy and the rise of United Nations peacekeeping was having some effect. The 2005 edition of Peace and Conflict (Gurr and Marshall, 2005) reported evidence of a sustained post-Cold War decline in armed conflicts within states and a growing capacity of states, acting singularly and multilaterally, to avoid and end internal wars.

The 2008 volume is not so optimistic: “New evidence, and a closer look at old evidence, suggests that if there was a global movement toward peace in the late 1990s and early years of the 21st century, it has stalled. Some positive trends are still evident but they are offset by new challenges. These challenges point to a conflict syndrome -- a collection of factors that often operate concurrently to undermine the stability of states and erode the foundations of human security” and acts as a “a sobering reminder of the resiliency of human temptation to use force to resolve disputes” (Gurr and Marshall, 2008). There was a sharp increase in the number of active armed conflicts, moving from 19 to 25 during 2005. This represents, not new conflicts, but the re-emergence of old conflicts. This trend, a resurgence of violence or repression that seemed momentarily resolved, is evidenced in Sri Lanka and Burma, and from Manhattan to Mumbai and Madrid civilians have been targeted in vicious terrorist attacks. Violent conflict is not easing; the problem is ongoing.

1.5 Genocide and conflict

There are many different kinds of conflicts, ranging from very mild cases, for example, in Switzerland, where German and French rivalries are real, but peaceful and limited, to cases with frequent, widespread violence. Inter-group conflict does not always manifest itself in violence, let alone genocide. It is not conflict in itself
that is problematic rather the way it is expressed, resolved, or managed. Conflict is an inevitable part of social behaviour and interaction. Conflict can be both damaging and destructive or productive: a force for social change. Even among violent cases, there is wide variation, ranging from examples with relatively few killings, such as the Basques in Spain, to the violence in Kenya, following the 2007 election, which claimed as many as 1000 lives, to open warfare with very heavy casualties, as in Sri Lanka, to outright attempts at complete extermination campaigns, as witnessed in Rwanda, in 1994.

Genocide almost always occur in the context of violent conflict and regime change. However, most violent conflicts do not develop into genocide. Harff’s definition that includes genocide and politicide yields a global count of 41 cases between 1955 and 2003 (see the table below in Figure 1).1 The Uppsala Conflict Data Program counts 232 armed conflicts since the end of World War II (Harbom and Wallesten, 2007) and there are some 284 threatened ethnic groups, as tracked by The Minorities at Risk Project. While genocide may make up a small percentage of conflict, what is alarming is the high number of fatalities. The twentieth century illustrates that the impact of genocide is many times deadlier than that of wars.

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1 These episodes are defined as such according to the operational definition of genocide and politicide ascribed to by this thesis and outlined in Chapter One.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Estimated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>4/76-4/92</td>
<td>1,800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7/62-12/62</td>
<td>9,000-30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>11/75-11/94</td>
<td>500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>12/98-3/02</td>
<td>70,000-100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>3/76-12/80</td>
<td>70,000-100,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bosnia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burma (Myanmar)</td>
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<td>Burundi I</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi 11</td>
<td>8/88-8/88</td>
<td>5,000-20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi 111</td>
<td>10/93-12/93</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
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<td>9/73-12/76</td>
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<td>1,000-10,000</td>
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<td>DR Congo (Zaire) 11</td>
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<td>4/94-7/94</td>
<td>500,000-1,000,000</td>
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<td>6/88-1/91</td>
<td>15,000-50,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sudan 111</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>4/81-2/82</td>
<td>5,000-30,000</td>
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<td>South Vietnam</td>
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<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>2/96-6/99</td>
<td>10,000</td>
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</table>

(Figure 1: Genocide and Politicide since 1955)
According to Rummel, six times as many people have died from democide (the murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder) than have died in battle.\(^2\) Rummel, whose study spans the entire twentieth century and includes colonialism, puts the death toll for state-sponsored mass murder at 262 million. His findings include 17 cases of democide, which caused more than one million deaths; see the table below in Figure 2.

### 20th century democides causing more than one million deaths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Est. Deaths</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1975–1979</td>
<td>2,035,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (KMT)</td>
<td>1928–1949</td>
<td>10,075,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (PRC)</td>
<td>1949–1987</td>
<td>77,277,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (Mao Soviets)</td>
<td>1923–1949</td>
<td>3,465,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonialism</td>
<td>1900–Independence</td>
<td>50,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Free State</td>
<td>1885–1908</td>
<td>est C20th 3,480,000 total of 10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1933–1945</td>
<td>20,946,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1936–1945</td>
<td>5,964,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1958–1987</td>
<td>1,503,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1945–1948</td>
<td>1,585,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1900–1920</td>
<td>1,417,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1948–1987</td>
<td>1,563,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) For example, government-sponsored killings for political reasons would be considered democide. Democide can also include deaths arising from "intentionally or knowingly reckless and depraved disregard for life"; this brings into account many deaths arising through various neglects and abuses, such as forced mass starvation. Rummel explicitly excludes battle deaths, capital punishment, actions taken against armed civilians during mob action or riot, and the deaths of noncombatants killed during attacks on military targets so long as the primary target is military, are not included as democide.
By comparison, international and civil wars have accounted for approximately 34 million battle deaths in the same period (Valentino, 2004, p.1).

If the cases examined are limited to cases that occurred in the second half of the Twentieth Century and fall under Harff’s definition of genocide and politicide, subscribed to by this thesis, the figure is still alarming. A cautious estimate puts the death toll of these 41 cases occurring since 1955, listed in Figure 1, at about fifteen million.

Ten countries are responsible for twenty-two of these episodes, just over half of the total count. An examination of the countries in which the episodes have occurred reveals a pattern of regional distribution, as illustrated in the map below. Of the episodes, eighteen took place in Sub-Saharan Africa; twelve in Asia; five in North Africa and the Middle East. Latin America experienced four episodes and Europe two. Furthermore, another pattern is evident: the regional distribution of the genocides and politicides corresponds with the global distribution of wealth. Onsets of genocide and politicide appear to cluster overtime as well. There are three main periods, since 1955, which include all but five of the forty-one episodes: the mid to late 1960s, the 1970s and early 1980s and the late 1980s and early 1990s.

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3 Those ten countries are Angola, Burundi, China, Indonesia, Iraq, Pakistan, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda and Congo Kinshasa (Zaire). Burundi and Sudan each have three episodes of genocide or politicide; all the others had two.
Before going further, it is important to look at the other ways in which states deal with rival minority, communal or ‘out’ groups. Authorities manage, regulate and exploit the differences, conflicts and cleavages that exist in the body politic they govern in vastly different ways. Contrary to simplistic myths of primordial, ‘tribal’ hatred, the episodes of genocide were not spontaneous expressions of bloodlust or inevitable, historical cataclysms but rather a strategic response to challenges of state security. While genocidal episodes are examples of large scale political violence they are also more than that. They are rational, calculated policy choices made by those in power to accomplish their most important objectives – to counter threats to their power (Valentino, 2004). The motive common to elites choosing a policy of genocide is “the destruction…of collectivities that challenge their claim to authority or stand in the way of an ideologically driven desire to create a society purified of undesirables” (Harff, 2003, p.70). Genocide is about obtaining and maximising power, regime consolidation and regime maintenance through the elimination of a threat. Genocide is invoked during times of state insecurity (Midlarsky, 2002) and is implicitly tied to the political and military dynamics of the conflict.
There are many societies with deep social cleavages, which do not have any violence. So it is how these differences are managed and exploited that is important. In theory, accommodation policies, such as multi-culturalism, entail equal treatment and respect of all ethnic groups. A more discriminatory policy approach is assimilation, where the group is induced (sometimes coercively) into abandoning its identity. At the other end of the spectrum are extremely oppressive policies such as apartheid in which the out-group is forced to live, work and reside in segregated, ghettoised or enslaved conditions. The strategies adopted can be aimed at different groups within the one state or one group can be subjected to more than one of these policies at any one time. The Irish Catholics were offered the choice of genocide or expulsion by Oliver Cromwell: they could go “To hell or Connaught”. Federalism is used to resolve conflict between linguistic communities in Belgium and consociationalism to deal with its religious groups. The policy options that authorities adopt for dealing with inter-societal conflict is illustrated in Figure 4.

### Strategies for the regulation of ethno national differences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>End/eliminate ethno-national differences</th>
<th>Mend/manage ethno-national differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Genocide - eliminate people</td>
<td>Control - manage people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration/assimilation: eliminate</td>
<td>Consociation: manage while</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relevance of ethnic differences</td>
<td>preserving ethnic differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic expulsion: eliminate people from</td>
<td>Arbitration: manage people impartially</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>territories</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial elimination: eliminate</td>
<td>Territorial management: manage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>people and territory through downsizing</td>
<td>people and territories – federalism or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>or resizing</td>
<td>decentralisation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 4: Strategies for the regulation of ethno national differences)
There have been serious, violent conflicts, as in South Africa (Horowitz 1991) or Northern Ireland (Ruane and Todd 1996, Gallagher 2000), that have moved in the opposite direction, away from warfare and extreme violence, toward accommodation.

At the time of writing, genocidal violence was still underway in Darfur, and the Congo, where civilians continue to be wounded, forcibly displaced, conscripted into militias, raped, and an estimated 5.4 million people have died as a result of the conflict, since 1998, remains on Holocaust Memorial Museum’s genocide warning list. The continuing presence of genocide merits ongoing consideration. Immanuel Kant’s “depravity of man” is a constant force to be contended with. It is naïve to assume that genocide will not occur in the future. By increasing our awareness of how and why genocide has occurred in the past enables, scholars and decision makers, to ascertain where and how it might occur in the future.

1.6 Objective
For many years now but especially since the devastating violence in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, historians, sociologists and political scientists alike have been struggling to develop coherent and comprehensive explanations for genocide and its near relations, such as politicide and ethnic cleansing. Genocide is inevitably accompanied by a depth of human suffering and an array of atrocities that appear to defy comprehension. According to Campbell (2001), most scholars, policy makers and government officials, to the detriment of those concerned, mistakenly perceive genocide as a ‘merely’ humanitarian issue and of little importance to the traditional concerns of a state's national security interests. The process of globalisation has rendered genocide and politicide a trans-national threat. The harm genocide causes does not remain within the boundaries of a state but rather has regional and global ramifications in areas, such as, security, political stability and economic prosperity by inducing huge refugee flows, disrupting economic relations and inflaming passions that fuel future conflicts, as evidenced by the impact of the Rwandan genocide on the Great Lakes region of Africa.
This study warrants serious consideration due to the catastrophic losses suffered by individuals, societies and nations, and the consequent undermining of the regional and international institutions and the international system on which they are founded. An analysis of genocide is imperative, as it is a crime which aims at killing those who are most innocent: civilians without arms, men, women and children unable to defend themselves. Genocide is arguably one of the most horrific crimes in the history of humankind and the worst crime that can be committed in the present international system, which “[if] left unchecked…eats away like a cancer at the structure of global society” (Campbell, 2001, p. 25).

This thesis is a step toward a better understanding of the preconditions and acceleratory factors that allow a civil war to develop into genocide or politicide. It sets out to explore the etiology of genocide and politicide. The theoretical objective of this thesis is to identify conditions under which governments or rival authorities choose a strategy of genocide during or following civil war, in hope that this research will enhance further understanding of the factors and conditions that determine a genocidal outcome in war. It is important to draw on the theories of armed conflict, since geno/politicides almost always occur in the context of violent conflict. The theories of ethnic and civil war, or revolutions and political instability, while important, alone do not provide adequate explanations, as they do not address the primary research question of this thesis: why some conflicts evolve into state sponsored mass murder. In essence, this thesis will ask: why do some intra-state wars turn genocidal while the majority do not?

Internal wars have different causal mechanisms than instances of state sponsored, mass murder. Genocide and politicide are multi-causal phenomenon. No single theory will suffice to explain all instances of this kind of violence. A theory of why some intra-state wars evolve into genocide or politicide is developed, which centres on conditions existing in the domestic setting, as well as conditions which are external (regional and international) to the state in which the geno-politicide is committed. This theoretical framework will be tested through the study of two cases of genocide: Rwanda (1994) and Sudan (2003). These cases of genocide are analysed within their local setting, while simultaneously capturing them in their international context. After establishing the preconditions that have led to
episodes of genocidal violence in the past, a watch list of at risk countries can be developed. The purpose of this thesis is to provide a framework, for states, institutions and organisations like the UN and non-governmental organisations, which will enable them to develop effective genocide prevention mechanisms. Early action does not necessarily mean deploying troops, rather it means using tools of accepted conflict prevention and resolution. This can allow for international policy makers to have at their disposal the knowledge and tools to prevent the escalation of internal conflict into genocide. The application of a structural model to current armed conflicts can work as a guideline for policy decisions in genocide prevention, facilitating a more quantifiable approach to the problem. A structural focus inhibits the constraints occurring from a focus on short term political considerations, which can play important catalytic roles. This thesis takes a step toward a better understanding of the preconditions and acceleratory factors that allow a civil war to develop into genocide or politicide.

1.7 Methodology
The methodological approach employed in this study is a hybrid of critical qualitative and empirical analysis, drawing on evidence from scholarly and policy literature, governmental and non-governmental reports and databases in order obtain a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the stated problem: why some intra-state wars turn genocidal.

The analytic emphasis of the social science explanation, and its necessary mode of abstraction, can detract from the individual’s experience in genocide, leaving it devoid of an essential humanistic account. The immense everyday brutalities of the individual’s experience, while not recounted in this thesis, are not forgotten. Attempts to explain genocide often require understanding the perspective of the perpetrators, which can be viewed as callous or offensive by those who have lost whole families or even entire societies. “Yet to explain is not to condone” (Midlarsky, 2005, p. xv) and explanation is the first step towards prevention. Genocide is not an inevitable consequence, nor an unpreventable one, therefore, an understanding of it is paramount.
By examining individual cases of genocide since 1955, the thesis will analyse the causes, sequences and outcomes of these events. The year 1955 is chosen as a starting point for two reasons. Firstly, to avoid the inclusion of cases of genocide which are connected to World War Two and secondly, many cases of genocide happened in newly independent countries, and decolonisation started in earnest from the 1950s.

A comparative study of the chosen cases will be adopted in order to discover common patterns and differences, ultimately contributing to the existing body of knowledge on both genocide/politicide and conflict. To make a complete analysis of genocides and politicides since 1955 is beyond the scope of this study, so I have limited it to two case studies. Case studies are important for tracing the background and tracking the events of outbreaks of mass violence, as they allow for in depth knowledge of the societal and historical roots of the problem (Suedfeld, 2001, p. 52). Through comparative case studies, we can find out whether each occurrence of genocide is sui generis, or, alternatively, whether there are shared causal factors, enabling the application of a universal criteria for prediction and intervention.

Africa, the region out of which my case studies were selected, has had the highest number of genocides committed, since 1955. It is a logical area for testing theories of genocide given the prevalence of armed conflict and mass violence in this region. According to Harff’s *Table of Countries at Risk of Genocide/Politicide*, this region continues to remain at risk. Therefore, a study of genocide in this region is pertinent and will, to some extent, contribute to identifying countries at risk of genocide in the future.

The literature and experts referred to during the course of my thesis come from disparate academic disciplines and specialisations, which include political science, history, international law, genocide studies, anthropology, sociology, peacekeeping, military studies and human rights, and area studies.

The data used in this thesis will come from a number of different data sets and projects. Data sources include: Polity IV Database, for annual data on the
authority characteristics of all states in the international system; The Union of International Organisations; Group Discrimination and Separatism Indicators; State Failure Project, and the Correlates of War data set.

1.8 Thesis Structure

Chapter Two examines the debates in the literature, generating some theoretical inferences about the causes of genocide. The framework of the conditions which increase the likelihood of genocide is set out in the second half of Chapter Two. In the following two chapters this framework is applied to the case studies, Rwanda (Chapter Three) and Sudan (Chapter Four). Chapter Three and Chapter Four examine the patterns and origins of the genocide in Rwanda and Sudan, respectively. These chapters will first establish whether the mass killings are genocide, followed by an exploration of the conditions that exist which have enabled genocide to occur.

In light of the findings from the two case studies, Chapter Five reconsiders the major questions and objectives of this study and summarises the key findings of the research. Comparisons will be made between Rwanda and Sudan - the similarities and differences in the nature of the genocide and the causes of the genocide in these two countries.

The research findings will be discussed with reference to genocide prevention and the identification of at risk countries. Policy recommendations will be presented. The study concludes by briefly considering the continued importance of research into genocide and deadly violent conflict.
Chapter Two: Literature review and theoretical framework

“Genocide is not war! It is more dangerous than war!”
Lemkin (Quoted Power in 2002; 51).

“Dry up the human sea, in which the guerrilla fish swim” General Efrian Rios Montt, Guatemala, 1982.

2.1 Introduction

Policy and scholarly interest in genocide and mass violence has grown dramatically in recent years. The field of genocide studies was pioneered in the 1970s and 1980s but remained the interest of a select few scholars until the 1990s. Two major developments pushed genocide from the margins of academic scholarship to greater prominence within the social sciences; the end of the Cold war, which saw a new interest in international human rights, of which genocide and it associated atrocities is a part; and the genocidal violence in Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the failure of the international community to respond to such violence. Consequently, genocide and mass violence became a matter of high profile debate.

To date much of the literature on genocide has been written by historians or specialists of specific genocides who focus on the analysis of individual cases of genocide (For Armenia see, Hovannisian, 1992; Balakian, 2003. For Cambodia see, Chandler, 1988; Kiernan, 1996; Vickery, 1999. On Rwanda see, Des Forges, 1999; Gourevitch, 1999, Prunier, 1997; Dalliare, 2003). These include histories of the period of the actual genocide, histories of the after-effects of the genocide, usually for the targeted population but sometimes also for the perpetrators, and

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4 Notably Helen Fein, 1979; Leo Kuper, 1981; Irving Horowitz 1976; Ervin Staub, 1989;
perhaps most common, histories of the events and philosophies leading to the particular genocide under consideration.

While pertinent, such studies on their own do not explain why genocide, in general, occurs and how such atrocities can be prevented. Other comparative studies have created theories, which focus on a single primary precondition. The work of social scientists and historians have linked genocide to the advent of modernity (Bauman, 1989), radical, revolutionary and or racist political ideologies (Melson, 1992 and Weitz, 2003), totalitarianism (Horowitz, 1997), or the absence of liberal democracy (Rummel, 1994). Psychologists have focussed on the dehumanisation of the individual and the inaction of bystanders (Charny, 1982 and Staub, 1989, Waller, 2002). Sociologists have examined the societal conditions, which are necessary for the emergence of genocide (Horowitz, 1976, 1980; Kuper, 1977 and Fein, 1979). Quantitative cross national studies have been carried out by political scientists, such as Brabara Harff (2003) and Valentino and Huth and Krain (1997). The timidity, apathy, or outright complicity of foreign powers in the face of genocide has led to scholarly interest in the way the international community has responded to such violence (Barnett, 2002; Power, 2002).

In order to construct a truly comparative and comprehensive theory of genocide and the war and or regime crises, which accompany or precede it, the variables at play must be clearly identified and defined and the relationship between the variables set out and explored. A theoretical framework on genocide enables the identification of commonalties that extend beyond particular data to other comparable data. This moves the thought beyond the specific to the development of a range of general characteristics. A review of the literature reveals a host of different theories on the causes and conditions that have been linked to the onset of genocide. Different analysts accord varying importance to different groups of causal factors. The first half of this Chapter identifies these factors. These factors can be understood as structural, political, socio-psychological, socio-economic factors, and external factors, which include both international and regional dimensions. Following on from this analysis, the second half of this chapter establishes a framework of the preconditions that increase the likelihood of elites,
or those contending power, adopting a genocidal strategy in times of armed conflict and regime crisis. By examining the factors, which make genocide or politicide more likely to occur, this Chapter develops a model of the antecedents of genocide and or politicide.

2.2 Theories examining structural factors
Emerging from the literature are a number of theories, which examine structural considerations, such as the relationship between genocide and war, regime crises, power and impunity.

2.2a Armed conflict and genocide
Scholars of genocide and mass killing have increasingly recognised the relationship between armed conflict and genocide (Melson, 1992; Fein, 1992; Markusen and Kopf, 1995; Krain, 1997, 2005; Valentino et al 2003, Harff, 2003, Midlarsky, 2004 and 2005, Straus, 2007). While evidence is strongly suggestive of strong connections between war and genocide in no case does war simply cause genocide. However, genocide almost always occurs in the context of, or immediately following, warfare or violent political instability. More than one million Armenians were killed by the Ottomans during World War I. The Nazi regime annihilated six million Jews and five million Poles, Roma, homosexuals, political opponents, and others during World War II. The genocide committed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia was preceded by two wars: the Vietnam War, which was also fought in Cambodia and Laos, and a five year civil war. It was during the Iraq-Iran war that Iraq targeted its Kurdish minority. The murder of some 800,000 Tutsi and some 10,000 moderate Hutu, in Rwanda, occurred during a civil war between the Tutsi rebel army and the Rwandan Government forces.
2.2b Political Upheaval

Political upheaval is defined, by Harff (2003, p. 6), as “an abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawn state boundaries or defeat in international war”. Included in the list of political upheavals are major armed conflict, anti-colonial rebellions, coups, revolutions, decolonisation, and defeat in war. Political upheaval creates an environment more conducive to the use of state-sponsored mass murder by elites, as they often bring to power those with an exclusionary ideology (Fein, 1979; Harff, 1986 and 2003; Mazian, 1990). Krain (1997) argues that “the greater extent of political disruption the greater the opportunity for authorities to seek a “final solution” to present and potential future challengers”. Revolution provides the conditions for the coming to power of “ideological vanguards”. While revolutions have different ideological roots, commonality is found in the drastic and violent nature of the restructuring of the social order that takes place preceded by and accompanied with the redefining of the political and national community into the ‘nation’, ‘race’ or ‘class’.

Illustrated with reference to the Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, Melson, suggests that a fundamental internal revolution, followed by international war, is always a prerequisite for what he labels ‘total domestic genocide’. Melson defines revolution as “a fundamental transformation, usually carried out by violence, in [a] society’s political, economic, and social structures and cultural values and beliefs, including its reigning ideology, political myth, and identity”(1992, p. 32). Charles Tilly defines a revolutionary outcome, as “the displacement of one set of power holders by another” (Tilly, 1978, p. 193). Revolutions are social projects, which substantially restructure the political and economic systems of a nation. Such structural trauma generally involves the rise of radical leadership and opens the door to a radical redefinition of the community, or ‘recasting of the political myth.’ Groups previously regarded as merely stigmatised can be placed completely outside the moral realm of the new ‘in’ group. The need for internal cohesion in a time of fundamental transition creates the need for ‘enemies of the revolution,’ further encouraging the exclusion of whole groups (Melson, 1992, pp. 267 -271). A group already identified as ‘anti-people’, in terms of an internal
threat, is often then identified with an external enemy, because of the distribution of the group’s diaspora or simply through accusations of treachery.

Harff (1986, p. 167) finds that genocides and politicides result from “abrupt change in the political community caused...through violent conflict, when national boundaries are reformed, or when a war is lost”. The relationship between changing territorial boundaries and genocide must be examined. Of significance, is the signalling of state vulnerability associated with territorial loss in time of war. Territory can be used to protect the state, as a buffer zone between the state and its enemies. When that territory is lost, state weakness can be perceived by both defenders of the state and its external opponents. Under certain conditions that weakness can lead to elimination of internal “enemies” in order to buttress the newly vulnerable state (Midlarsky, 2005). The relationship between genocide and territorial expansion and decline is examined by Ben Kiernan. After surveying several cases of genocide, Kiernan argues that geographic diminution, whether real or perceived, often precedes or accompanies genocide. On the other hand, a regime’s project of territorial expansion, as was the case with Suharto, in East Timor, can render a similar genocidal outcome (Kiernan, 2007). Loss can occur not only through the transfer of territory or authority of a population from one state or group to another but also through massive loss of life through war, and through significant socioeconomic contraction.

As most cases of genocide and politicide take place during or around war, it is hardly surprising that there are many similarities between war and genocide. Several theoretical arguments have been proposed to explain the connections between war and genocide. Wars create an environment more conducive to the adoption of genocidal policies. It is in war that the normal rules of human interaction are suspended and the practice of violence is honoured and rewarded (Weitz: 2003, p. 56). According to Markusen and Kopf (1995), many of the psychological, organisational and technical factors and preconditions, which lead to war have the potential to lead to genocide. War legitimizes extreme violence: “aggrieved or opportunistic citizens feel licensed to target their neighbours” (Power, 2003, p. 91). War can also mask genocide, as Power argues, making it
difficult to ascertain whether what is taking place is a systematic campaign of elimination of civilians, consequently hindering diplomatic efforts (2003).

According to Melson, there are three primary reasons why war is the final trigger for genocide:

1. Wartime aggravates feelings of vulnerability and/or intensifies feelings of invincibility
2. Wartime permits states to become more autonomous and independent of domestic and foreign public opinion, thereby encouraging radical solutions to social and political "problems"
3. Wartime conditions may close off other policy options [such as expulsion], leaving genocide as a strong choice for an already radicalized regime (Melson, 1992, p. 273).

Before going further, it is important to distinguish between war and genocide. The main distinction between war and genocide is that war is primarily a violent conflict between two or more organised armed forces, whereas genocide is the deliberate targeting of civilians, often in the context of war, to eliminate them from existence. Genocide is distinct from war in that non-combatants are key targets; “genocide is about killing civilians based on their ascriptive categorical associations, not their actions in combat” (Straus and Knudsen, 2008, p. 7). The key difference lies in the nature of the enemy: in war, another state or armed force; in genocide, a civilian social group” (Shaw, 2007, p. 54).

To Lemkin the crime’s distinctiveness lay in the fundamental nature of its departure from the legitimate conduct of war” (Shaw 2007, p. 39). Lemkin compared genocide to legitimate war: Genocide is the antithesis of the Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine. This doctrine holds that war is directed against sovereigns and

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3 The Rousseau-Portalis Doctrine holds that wars are fought between states, not people. Rousseau wrote (the following passage is a quotation taken from Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, in Sir Ernest Barker (ed. in trans.), *Social Contract: Essays by Locke, Hume, and Rousseau* (London and New York, 1947; 1967 reprint used), pp. 173-78.): A state can have as its enemies only other states, not men at all, seeing that there can be no true relationship between things of a different nature ... The object of war being the destruction of the enemy state, a commander has a perfect right to kill its defenders so long as their arms are in their hands: but once they have laid them down and have submitted, they cease to be enemies, or instruments employed by an enemy, and revert to the condition of men, pure and simple, over whose lives no
armies, not against subjects and civilians. (Lemkin, 1943, p. 80). Lemkin’s understanding, however, is limited to legitimate war and does not address illegitimate war and asymmetrical warfare, which have both increased with ferocity in the past half century. The deliberate killing of civilians appears to have become a large part of the practice of warfare and is dominating the war strategies of many states, as evidenced in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Carl von Clausewitz famously described war as politics by other means and as Downes (2005, p.1) points out the targeting of civilians is often war by other means. This leads on to the next factor, identified in the literature, the nature of the warfare taking place, in particular guerilla warfare.

2.2c Guerrilla Warfare

Another structural factor to consider is guerrilla warfare, which unlike more conventional combat, requires a close relationship between civilians and the guerrilla combatants. Due to this, mass killing has become an attractive strategy for the ruling elite when challenged by guerrilla warfare (Valentino, 2004). The relationship between civilians and guerrilla armies, is explained by Mao Zedong (Tse-tung), who not only led the Chinese Revolution but was also one of history's most successful guerrilla strategists:

Because guerrilla warfare basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist or flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. Many people think it is impossible for guerrillas to exist for long in the enemy's rear. Such a belief reveals lack of comprehension of the relationship that should exist between the people and the troops. The former may be likened to water and the latter to the fish who inhabit it. (Mao Zedong (Tse-tung), quoted in Valentino, 2005, p. 198).

Unlike more conventional combatants, guerrillas often rely directly on the civilian population for logistical support. “Directly defeating a large, well-organized
guerrilla army can be extremely difficult”, stresses Valentino et al, “because guerrilla forces themselves usually seek to avoid decisive engagements with opposing forces” (Valentino, Huth and Bach-Lindsay, 2004). Civilian populations are largely defenceless and immobile. As a result, counterinsurgent forces often choose to target the guerrillas’ base of support in the population, which can in turn lead to the intentional killing of massive numbers of civilians, with the desired outcome of isolating and alienating the guerrillas from their civilian support (Valentino, Huth and Bach-Lindsay, 2004). Valentino et al (2004) argue that the likelihood of mass killing among guerrilla conflicts is greatly increased when the guerrillas receive high levels of active support from the civilian population and or when the insurgency poses a major threat to the regime.

Counter-guerrilla tactics have often sought to defeat guerrilla armies by selectively terrorising those within the local population suspected of supporting guerrillas. This often occurs in full public view and or in an intentionally gruesome manner, thereby, setting an example to other civilians of the consequences of collaborating with the insurgents. As Valentino et al illustrate such a tactic easily degenerates into indiscriminate killing campaigns against all civilians regardless of whether they are actually providing logistical support (Valentino, Huth and Bach-Lindsay, 2004). This association is evident in the particularly brutal counter guerrilla campaign instigated by the President of Guatemala, General Efrain Rios Montt, in his public vow to “dry up the human sea in which the guerrilla fish swim” (quoted in Richards, 1985, p. 95). His campaign to “dry up the human sea” cost the lives of 75,000 civilians in 18 months. Furthermore, in areas with the highest guerrilla activity, known as the Ixil triangle, approximately one third of the local civilian population were killed.

While the literature suggests that there is distinct relationship between war and genocide, and guerrilla warfare, in particular, war on its own does not provide an adequate explanation, other factors must be examined.

2.2d ‘Ancient Hatreds and Old Age Feuds’
The violence of World War Two and the Holocaust, which accompanied it, were, according to some observers characteristic of a throw back to ‘medieval barbarism’ or the breakdown of civilisation: the very essence of the Enlightenment project. Explanations offered in response to more recent events, such as those in the Balkans and Rwanda, have depicted the conflicts and atrocities committed as the resurfacing of age-old hatreds, most notably Robert Kaplan (1994). The simplicity of such approaches, which depict ethnic wars as an expression of primordial hatreds and, therefore, fixed, is evidenced in the article title: “The Wrath of Ages: Nationalism’s Primordial Roots” and also in George Bush Senior’s statement about Bosnia: Now, the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia is a complex, convoluted conflict that grows out [of] age-old animosities. The blood of innocents is being spilled over century-old feuds...Blood feuds are very difficult to resolve” (Bush, 1993). This is the approach most often adopted by the media in providing an explanation of such events; where it has become standard “journalistic fare to portray ethnic and tribal enmities in the former communist states as seething since time immemorial” (Snyder, 1993, p. 79).

In Rwanda, where the killings were at first pictured as frenzied and inevitable in nature, the literature convincingly demonstrates that the genocide was anything but, rather, it was of a systematic and institutional nature. Unfortunately, “Stereotype has shaped, to a large degree, informed commentary on the roots of the Rwandan genocide” (Straus, 2008, p. 518). This is not unique to Rwanda, argues Straus, but to African politics, in general, which is often reduced to tribalism. In direct contrast to these simplistic and distorted accounts of atrocities and genocidal events are the theories linking genocide with state power.

2.2e Powerful State theory

The development of a framework on genocide requires a significant examination of the issue of whether mass killing is committed by strong or weak states. Scholars have frequently sought to explain genocide from the perspective of state power. “Power kills”, argues Rummel (1995, p. 25), “and absolute power kills absolutely.” Rummel expands:
The more power a government has, the more it can act arbitrarily according to the whims and desires of the elite, and the more it will make war on others and murder its foreign and domestic subjects. The more constrained the power of governments, the more power is diffused, checked, and balanced, the less it will aggress on others and commit democide (1994, p. 1-2).

Leo Kuper (1981), the main founder of genocide studies, argues that it is the modern state’s monopoly of power over a territory which was, in reality, culturally plural and economically stratified, that created both the political desire and power to commit genocide against ‘out’ groups. Zygmunt Bauman’s *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1991) proposes that genocide is a product of modernity, not a throwback to a state of ‘savagery’. Bauman argues that the economic and social forms that characterise the modern era paradoxically structure action in such a way that individual agency becomes impossible. Accordingly, the combination of advanced technologies, modern bureaucratic social organisations and the utopian ideals, which are at the base of the modernity, made the Holocaust possible (Bauman, 1989). Developments in technology, such as; firearms; motorised transport; and organisation charts can all contribute to the increased efficiency of mass, bureaucratic, depersonalised killing (Baumann, 1991).

It would at first appear obvious that to commit genocide a state must have the strength to organise, misinform and destroy (Semelin, 2003, p. 2). However, a careful examination of the context in which genocidal events occur poses a significant challenge to strong state theory.

### 2.2f Weak States: Elite vulnerability and threat perceptions

Several writers, in response to the ‘powerful state’ theories, have pointed out that the perpetrators of genocide and politicide are less likely to be strong states than states that are threatened and factionalised as a result of war. A threat (fictional or real) coming from either within the state or from without, undermines the foundations of state power, placing those in power in a position of vulnerability (Melson, 1992; Midlarsky, 2004; Harff, 2003; Semelin, 2003). Rwanda serves as
an example for those who propose theories that it is ‘weak’ states, which commit genocide, as they cannot win at war or succeed in a position of power without the destruction of civilian populations. In order to overcome its position of weakness and extend its position of power a state or non-state power resorts to genocide. The Khmer Rouge in Cambodia perceived themselves to be a vulnerable and extreme minority and a potential victim of Vietnamese hegemony in the region: “Why must we move so swiftly?” Pol Pot asked “Because enemies attack and torment us. From the east and west they persist in pounding and worrying us” (Weitz, 2003, p. 155).

Midlarsky (2004) argues that changes in state security in a negative direction goes a long way in explaining genocide. As the security of the state diminishes the probability of violence against hapless civilians increases. This is illustrated by the Cambodian experience, prior to the Pol Pot regime, an exceptionally “morbid” period in Cambodian history (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 321). Cambodia was turned into a battleground of Vietnam and the United States. The five years preceding the geno-politicide witnessed a high rate of fatalities from the war, and indirect killing from starvation and disease. The American war was fought in Cambodia against the Vietnamese by air and ground troops. 100,000 Khmer civilians were killed by US air bombardments. The US bombing campaign, of 1973, was a contributor to the mass destruction and CPK recruitment (Kiernan, 1996, p. 22). This period also saw two coup attempts, which were synonymous with the purges. The first of the great purges was in the aftermath of the failed coup of September 1976. A second coup attempt in late 1977 led to a second purge. The Cambodian experience highlights the interconnectedness of state insecurity and upheaval, and genocide. Another element of this experience that needs to be explored further is identity construction.

2.3 Socio-psychological theories and genocide identity construction

An understanding of genocide requires an examination of the psychological conditions that allow human beings to develop the motivation to exterminate a whole group of people. Staub (1989) examines the causes of aggression in
society, and argues that natural adaptive tendencies can be manipulated for genocidal purposes. The basic human need for community and belonging, the relationship between individuals and the group, their desire to identify with the group, when combined with social/structural changes and increasing hardship can culminate in scapegoating and ultimately violence (Staub, 1989, p. 41-42).

If the group views itself as superior and the other inferior, or itself as weakened and the other to blame for that weakness, there is an enhanced chance that the violent tendencies toward members of the opposing group will surface (Staub, 1996).

It is evident from much social science research that identity ties are historically constructed, as opposed to fixed primordial attachments. Accordingly, the ties and sentimentalities attached to identity can shift with changing circumstances (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 75). In situations of relative security the identity of an individual or group is not a matter of particular concern. In a state of insecurity, however, when a threat arises or is perceived as such, identity becomes politically salient. This is of particular importance when the threat is aimed against the identity akin to those in power. Fundamental to the genocide process is the survival strategy born out of real or perceived threats to group identity or security. From which the next logical step is paved: you either eliminate “the other” - or take the risk of being eliminated by them (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 76).

Theories of ethnic conflict range from primordial narratives of deep cleavages between people based on ancient antipathies to rationalist accounts of the instrumental employment of ethnically charged rhetoric by elites to mobilise the masses for murder. Valentino (2004, p. 17) asserts “unusually deep pre-existing social cleavages are neither sufficient nor universally necessary conditions for mass killing”. There are many ethnically, religiously, racially fractured societies where genocide does not materialise and “deep divisions, prejudice, and discrimination are fairly constant; genocide is not” (Straus, 2007, p. 481). Evidence suggests that ethnic/racial divisions and prejudice do not necessarily predate ethnic violence. In Rwanda, argues Straus, there was a fair degree of
integration, interaction and intermarriage across ethnic lines. Sekulic, Massey, and Hodson (2006) indicate that ethnic intolerance was not initially salient in the 1990s conflict in the former Yugoslavia, but rather became so after the war began. The shift was orchestrated by the Milosevic government’s elite manipulation of public images and events. A concept described as ‘crisis framing’ whereby at crisis moments “cleavages, real and imaginary, reassert themselves” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1997, p. 406).

The security dilemma, a concept often used in explaining inter-state war, is also appropriate in examining ethnic conflict and genocide. In conditions of ‘emergent anarchy’ when safety is no longer guaranteed, groups rationally mobilise in pre-emptive self-defense. This leads to a security dilemma as other groups mobilise against them. As stated by Lake and Rothchild:

…ethnic conflict is commonly caused by collective fears of the future. As groups begin to fear for their physical safety, a series of dangerous and difficult to resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them the potential for tremendous violence” (1998, p. 4).

The binary construction of identity produces a discourse focussing on ‘us’ and on ‘them’. The radical polarisation of the identity construction means that the affirmation of ‘us’ implies the destruction of ‘them’ – the enemy. In defence or construction of the ‘collective self’ the destruction of the ‘other’ becomes a necessity on the basis of fear, revenge or resentment. The feeling of fear, stemming from a rhetoric of threat (whether real or fictional), legitimates the destruction of the other. The assassin becomes the victim and the genocide/politicide is perpetrated in the name of group survival – kill or be killed (Semelin, 2003).

The bestialisation or dehumanisation of the enemy is another crucial step in the genocidal process. The demonisation of ‘the other’ as ‘insects,’ ‘cock roaches’ or ‘parasites’ allows for their extermination without the risk of this odious act incurring any moral problems for its perpetrators (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 76). “Whereas the dangerous threat conceptualisation makes the idea of genocide
credible, dehumanising the victim groups makes the actual genocide understandable and, therefore, its perpetration possible‖, argues Hiebert (2004, p. 10).

Semelin argues that a society regresses to a position of “panic about putative threats” (2007: 50, 92) in times of war when its leaders convince the population that national survival depends on the destruction of the enemy. Such anxieties are fuelled by these leaders or “identity entrepreneurs” - who believe that they are “victims of History,” humiliated by rival powers, resentful at their subordinate status, and determined to defeat their enemies, including one’s “own” people who are “traitors” and “betrayers” (Semelin, 2007, pp. 24-32, and 54). Semelin links psychology to politics: such leaders are given opportunities to purvey their delusional fantasies during moments of genuine social and political crisis when they have a ready audience (Moses, 2008).

2.4 Political Factors

Another set of factors which emerge from a review of the literature are political factors – factors relating to the nature of the political system, policies of militarisation or media censorship, and the ideological orientation of the political elite. One of the most important factors to consider is regime type. Research suggests that there is a strong relationship between the nature of the regime type and genocide

2.4a Regime Type

Studies show that democracies have killed substantially fewer of their own citizens than have other forms of government (Horowitz, Rummel 1994, 1995; Krain, 2005; Valentino et al 2004). Horowitz, goes as far as to call genocide the "operational handmaiden of a particular social system, the totalitarian system”. The best assurance against genocide, asserts Rummel, is democracy, as the degree of totalitarianism is concomitant with the severity of genocide. Rummel’s assertions on democracy are extremely important to an understanding of genocide.
Rummel (1994; 1995) discovered that, between 1900 and 1987, democracies killed about 160,000 of their own citizens, whereas non-democratic regimes killed almost 130,000,000 of their own people. Democratic institutions evidently reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, argues Harff (2003, p. 72), and “all but eliminate the risk that it will lead to geno-/politicide.”

The connection that Rummel posits between warfare and what he refers to as democide draws on his and others’ previous findings that democracies, for the most part, do not fight each other (Rummel 1983). Democracies create what Rummel described as an “oasis of peace” (1992, p. 47) and, therefore, are less likely to sanction mass murder. This assumption has been disputed by political scientists such as Bremmer (1992). Bremmer asserts that democracies do in fact go to war against non-democracies. This is recently evidenced in the United States invasion of Iraq. Other scholars (Churchill, 1997 and Stannard, 1992) have highlighted the role of democratic states in mass killing during the colonial period. They chronicled the destruction of indigenous populations in Australia and North America, respectively. It is beyond the chronological scope of this thesis to examine the role of democracies in killing indigenous peoples during colonisation.

While figures suggest that democracies are just as likely as autocracies to be involved in international wars, when it comes to internal wars evidence suggests that democracies are more pacific than non-democracies. Democracy impacts indirectly on the likelihood of a state adopting genocidal policies via its effect on the likelihood of internal war participation. Democratic states stand a better chance of avoiding internal wars, and consequently stand a better chance of avoiding the potentially deadly outcome of genocide.

Competitive elections allow dissidents or disaffected members of a polity to participate in politics, through conventional and institutional avenues and ultimately redress their grievances in a non violent way (Krain, 2005). By reducing the need of opposition groups for violent dissent, democracy has the potential to decrease the threat levels of the ruling elite. At the same time democracy constrains the elites when it comes to adopting repressive and violent
policy towards civilians as it makes such behaviour politically costly. A
democratic political system constrains leaders and redistributes power more
evenly in society. The threat of electoral defeat makes it costly to use violence
against one’s own people (Davenport and Armstrong, 2004, p. 538). Indeed, the
literature suggests that when the ruling regime perceive that they are threatened
they are more likely to violate human rights (Stohl and Lopez, 1984; Poe et al.,
2000; Davenport, 2004). To the contrary, sustained and regular interaction
between challengers and those in power, within a political and legal context, can
actually lead to compromise and accommodation (Karstedt-Henke, 1980; Krain,
2000b).

Multiple studies find a relationship between political instability and regime type.
Data from the Political Instability Task Force, updated through 2005, show that as
a category anocracies are more likely throughout the 1950–2005 time period to
have experienced instability. Pate’s analyses show that anocracies were more than
twice as likely to experience genocide/politicide events and nearly two and a half
times as likely to experience adverse regime change.

The outlook for political stability among different regime types is mixed.
Democracies have seen radical improvement in terms of resistance to instability.
This is despite the fact that the number of young democracies is relatively high.
Anocracies, although still more susceptible to instability than either autocracies or
democracies, have seen gains in resistance to instability in the post-Cold War era.
However, entrenched authoritarian regimes have not seen the same improvement
and seem resistant to whatever factors are leading to improvements in
democracies and anocracies.

There has been only one instance of genocide/politicide in a democratic state,
since 1955, in Sri Lanka in July 1989 (Harff, 2003, p. 61). This exception did
occur when the governing elite were under extreme threat from the Peoples
Liberation Front (the Janathā Vimukthi Paraguay (JVP)), who by mid 1989 were
close to military victory. The politicide, which followed was committed against
the supporters of the JVP.
While Rummel found that democracies kill their populations less often than non-democracies, Gurr (1994, pp. 361 – 363) shows that transitions to democracy often have murderous consequences. Outside pressure to democratise is sometimes blamed for engendering genocides and/or politicides. For example:

In Rwanda, outside pressure to democratize a minority dominated system led to majority rule which was highly authoritarian. Efforts to move toward greater minority representation then inflamed militants within the majority camp who were fearful of losing their power. This situation degenerated into genocide directed against the minority. Unfortunately, democratization was not a panacea in Rwanda, but rather a factor contributing to turmoil (Klinghoffer: 1998).

The State Failure Task Force reports “that full or partially democratic regimes were somewhat less likely than autocracies to face impending genocides or politicides”. It must be acknowledged, however, that young democracies often fail, and their failure can lead to genocidal episodes (Goldstone et al., 2000, p.14). This is what Mann describes as the dark side of democracy. ‘Murderous ethnic cleansing’ he argues is a perversion of democratic ideals and such violence is likely to occur in weakly institutionalised states undergoing democratic transitions.

In a democracy the inability to control the flow of information makes it difficult to construct “others” within society as enemies worthy of extinction. Genocide requires mass mobilisation of the population by a media, which publicly encourages people to endorse and join in state sponsored genocidal acts (Chalk, 1999).

2.4b Media openness

Essential to any study on genocide and the factors which enable it to occur is an understanding of the manipulation of the media to endorse and incite genocidal outcomes. Political actors control and regulate the media, allowing the degree of media openness. The role of the media in a country is a political factor because its influence is dependent on the political climate that it operates in.
The censorship and the manipulation of journalists by political elite through intimidation and bribery is common in autocratic regimes, as is stereotyping and sensationalisation common in news stories in countries with a history of conflict, in particular the emphasis and promotion of divisive stories which emphasise communal difference (find reference). Economically developing countries struggling to move from authoritarian, arbitrary rule to establish the democratic foundations of civil society are particularly vulnerable to genocide. Such societies have few competing media outlets, possess no tradition of independent media, lack deeply rooted professional standards for journalism and may endure a violent media culture that exhibits no sense of responsibility to society as a whole. Journalists in such societies are frequently manipulated and bribed by the dominant political faction (‘envelope journalism’). Good, highly trained journalists with professional standards are frequently subjected to threats and, in the wake of assassinations and beatings, may surrender to manipulation and intimidation by the purveyors of fear (Frohardt and Temin, 2003). In poorer states, often marked by low literacy rates, radio is the main means of communicating to the public, and therefore, the most important medium for influencing public opinion, whereas in wealthy states there is a myriad of media; and television, internet and print dominate (Chalk, 1999).

Chalk (1999, pp. 4-5) outlines five circumstances that are of particular importance to genocide:

1. introduction of a new medium of communication, such as radio;
2. the use of a completely new style of communication;
3. the widespread perception that a crisis exists;
4. a public with little knowledge of the situation from sources of information;
5. and a deep seated habit of obeying authority among the target audience.

It was during the Nazi regime in Germany that radio broadcasts were pioneered, to promote genocide (Chalk, 1999, p. 5). Obviously, the media, alone, does not make genocide happen but does facilitate and legitimate it, as evidenced in Rwanda. This is best explained by professor William Shabas: “Genocide is
prepared with propaganda, a bombardment of lies and hatred directed against the targeted group, and aimed at preparing the willing executioners for the atrocious tasks they will be asked to perform” (2002).

2.4c Discourse to destruction: the Ideological Orientation of the Ruling Elite

Lemarchand (2003), in his study of Cambodia, Bosnia and Rwanda discusses the importance of the ideological factor, which he categorized as either Marxist–Leninism, nationalism or a perverted vision of democracy. He points out, that ‘it is the reinterpretation …fabrication of myths peculiar to the history of these countries that allows this ideological graft on to the local to succeed’ (Lemarchand, 2003). For the ideologies to have a ‘profound’ impact on the masses, especially when their origins are foreign, “their language needs to be radically transformed and adapted to the local culture” (Semelin, 2003, p. 196).

Ideologies used by genocidaires are often built around themes of ‘purity’, racism, identity and security. The perpetrators of genocide commonly invoke the victims, whether they are political, ethnic or religious, as enemies of the state or regime (Harff, 2003). The labels used range from heretic, class enemy, “splittists”—the Chinese Communist term for Tibetans, Uighers, and other groups seeking autonomy, or anti-revolution and associated with colonial rule. In some instances, it was enough to be labelled as undesirable, asocial or standing in the way of “progress” for a group to be deemed expendable. “Exclusionary ideologies” argues Harff, “often use ideology as a motivating and mobilizing factor against perceived opponents of the regime” (2003, p. 58); a point Harff illustrates, with the Sadam Husein’s genocidal, al Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1987. The Iraqi elite were guided by an exclusionary ideology (Baath) that did not accept ethnic separation. Although originally secular, socialist and pan-Arab, Baath ideology became whatever Hussein’s clan decided was necessary to consolidate its power. ‘Kurdish political aspirations,” observes Harff, “had no place in these calculations” (2003, p. 58).
Other more obvious ideologically inspired geno-politicides include the Khmer Rogue. Pol Pot, in describing his quest for Utopia, said: “what is infected must be cut out. What is rotten must be removed. If we wait any longer the microbes …will rot us from within… The old ones who remain in place give birth to new ones, one or two at a time” (cited in Rummel, 2007, p. 180). To a certain extent, their ideology and policies were modelled on those of China and the Soviet Union under Stalin. However, the Khmer Rogue believed these two models were insufficient and Cambodia could improve upon them with the addition of an ideology of extreme nationalism. Ieng Sary claimed “The Khmer Revolution has no precedent. What we are trying to do has never been done before in history” (cited in Weitz: 2003, p. 149). Pol Pot, in 1978, described the project as “building socialism without a model”.

2.4d Militarized regimes: arming genocide

Studies have found that there may be a relationship between the degree of militarisation of a government and the degree of repression they adopt. McKinlay and Cohen (1975) found that military governments more likely to violate human rights. It is important to examine the role of arms in domestic political violence. Blanton (1999) analyses the relationship between arms imports and personal integrity rights. Little scholarly attention has been devoted to the role arms transfers play in domestic political violence. While arms have traditionally been perceived as a tool in a strategy to protect against an external security threat, arms however, have the potential to decrease the security of the individual.

Arms provide the means of carrying out violent repression and abuses by a government, enabling them to choose brutal actions for resolving their problems. Acquisition and the accessibility of arms make violent strategies more feasible. “When governments fear instability and loss of power, they make take advantage of arms supplies to repress and solidify their hold on power” though arms alone do not directly lead to repression. There is another aspect of arms to the genocidal outcome; where outside states continue to trade in arms with a country despite signs or mass killing on the horizon, which will be explored later.
2.5 External Factors

"I long for the day when we can say with confidence that, confronted with a new Rwanda or a new Srebrenica, the world would respond effectively." - Kofi Annan, Speech to the Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide, January 26, 2004.

Genocide may not have exclusively domestic causes. International or external factors can exacerbate domestic trends and undermine efforts to of a state to respond to conflict in a non-violent way. It is important to examine what it is about the international system, its institutions and underpinning ideals, which affect genocide, allow it to occur and at the same time have the potential to affect the course of genocidal policy, ultimately preventing it.

The tendency in the literature reviewed so far has been to focus on the conditions within the domestic setting. To focus solely on these is insufficient. Genocide is also the outcome of regional and international processes. All to often genocide is treated as a domestic humanitarian affair and in doing so is allowed to continue unnoticed. The repercussions of the crime of genocide inevitably affects immediate neighbours, as well as shaking the assumptions and institutions on which the international system rests.

Genocide is a crime intimately bound up with the Westphalian state system. Offshoots of this system, the United Nations, its institutions and other international governmental organisations were founded on the premise of Westphalian notions of the sovereignty of national governments. A tragic consequence of the doctrine of state sovereignty, according to Kuper (1981, p. 161) and Fein (1982, p. 26), is the misleading assumption that this doctrine has given the state the prerogative right to commit genocide within its borders. Kuper (1981) proclaimed against the “right of the sovereign state” to wage genocide within its own borders and condemned the complicity of states, including Western states, in practical and political support for genocide.
2.5a Failure of the international community to act

The history of the twentieth century is replete with instances of the international community’s stance of passivity and complicity in regard to genocide, massacres and gross human rights violations. Following the genocide in Rwanda there has been an increase in literature and reports which implicate those states which watch on, as complicit in the genocide. The works of Power (2003), Melvern (2000) and Gouvertich (2000) explore such a crucial area. However, the literature has to large extent, with the exception of Power, examined individual instances, in particular Rwanda. Power's, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide surveys the inability and unwillingness of the United States and other Western powers to effectively confront genocides, because sometimes they were too busy supporting them or (post facto) their perpetrators.

Any analysis of genocide must extend beyond that of the perpetrator or genocidal state to the other participants. Genocidal states need some form of international support or what Midlarsky calls an external permissive agent (2005, p. 212). He illustrates this point by examining the policies of Germany towards the Ottoman Turks, in World War I; the Vatican’s ‘neutral’ stance towards Nazi Germany and France’s support to Rwanda before and during the Genocide of 1994 (p. 211).

Some studies of the Jewish Holocaust, beginning with Arthur Morse's While Six Million Died (Morse, 1968) have highlighted Western passivity towards Hitler's extermination campaigns. Linda Melvern's A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide lambasted Security Council inaction in the face of the mass killings of Rwandan Tutsis and moderate Hutus. The inaction of the international community is examined in the critically acclaimed movie Hotel Rwanda, which brought this issue to a wider audience.

The kid-glove treatment accorded the Khmer Rouge's representatives to the General Assembly, after their genocidal reign had been ended by the Vietnamese, is indicative of political and diplomatic support of genocidal ideologues. Helen Fein (1994), writing after Bosnia and Rwanda, echoes Kuper when she says: “Abusive powers will continue to abuse as long as it works. The movement to change the taken for granted assumption that sovereignty implies indifference to
our neighbours’ crimes is still to emerge from gestation in images of mass flight, chaos, blood and death” (Fein, 1994, p. 5). Fein writes, however, that “genocide is preventable” for the very reason that it is usually “a rational act: that is, the perpetrators calculate the likelihood of success, given their values and objectives” (Ibid).

If, as Valentino (2004) asserts, perpetrators choose to pursue policies of state-sponsored mass murder because their ability to overwhelm civilian targets makes it a “useful” choice then interventions that support the targets (or oppose the perpetrators) may force perpetrators to change their calculations. According to Krain interventions of this nature force perpetrators to divert time and resources otherwise dedicated to a policy of genocide or politicide toward defence against the external challenge. Such interventions make state-sponsored mass murder a more difficult project fraught with even more serious military and/or political consequences than had existed previously. This, even if only temporarily, should stem the violence, especially if the genocidal policy is being carried out by "thugs" or "opportunistic bullies" who are unlikely to put up too much of a fight against an outside force (Mueller, 2000). The effect would be akin to throwing a wet blanket over an emerging fire - it could prevent the spread of and perhaps even lead to a cessation of the killing by raising the costs to the perpetrator of continuing the policy (Rothchild and Lake, 1998).

General Dallaire's shamefully ignored request to the UN for a more substantial military presence in Rwanda, in the face of the coming genocide, is indicative of such reasoning. Many now acknowledge that simply placing a well-equipped sizable force willing to oppose the perpetrator on the ground might have either prevented such killings or would have kept the killings from escalating. Recent re-evaluations of the situation in Rwanda in 1994 have suggested that Dallaire may have been correct, and that the genocide in Rwanda may have been averted or made less severe by a timely intervention to check potential perpetrators (Fein, 1998; Gourevitch, 1998; Des Forges, 1999; Power, 2002a; Krain, 2005).
2.5b Regional factors

There is another outcome of war, which warrants consideration: refugee flows and refugee communities. With the exception of Midlarsky, scholars of genocide fail to examine the relationship between refugees and the onset of genocide. History has shown that some of the largest refugee movements are directly connected to the genocidal policies of a government. Research by Schmeidl (2001, p. 81) affirms that extreme violence is a stronger variable for the cause of refugees than institutional human rights violations. People are less likely to flee their homelands because of civil and political rights infringements than from life threats. Schmeidl argues that genocide/politicide is the strongest predictor of refugee migration.

While genocide has been identified as a cause of refugees flows; refugees as a precondition for genocide is theoretically underdeveloped. Midlarsky, however, positions refugees as a significant indicator of socio-economic contraction and, when in large numbers, as a potential indicator of contraction of physical space and a strong provocation for genocide in their own right.

The intersection of “migration, ethno-religious identity, and social class” is, according to Midlarsky, “combustible” (2005). Competing for the same resources in a shrunken environment, refugees and ‘native’ populations can come to see each other as inevitable opponents in a contracting socioeconomic space (Midlarsky, 2005). Refugees sharpen an existential contrast with the ‘other’ (Jews as the anti-German), especially if the victims are, on the whole, wealthier and/or more visible than the majority. Introducing the element of social class in the context of refugees competing with the ‘other’, Hitler himself remarked, ‘our upper classes, who’ve never bothered about the hundreds of thousands of German emigrants or their poverty, give way to a feeling of compassion regarding the fate of the Jews whom we claim the right to expel’ (cited in Midlarsky, 2005, p. 89).

The ‘refugee warrior’ concept, a term coined by Astri Suhrke (1989), is important to understanding the relationship between genocide and refugees. Those refugees, which posed a military threat to the weakened sovereignty of the states from
which they fled are known as refugee warriors. Adelman describes a refugee warrior as having four characteristics. These are: first, the person is a refugee in the sense that the person, or that persons parents or even grandparents fled the geographical territory of their homeland; second, that person uses violent means aimed at overthrowing the regime in power in their homeland; third, the base for waging the violent conflict is normally located in refugee communities in a neighbouring state; and, fourth, the refugees are not fighting on behalf of their host state as surrogates of that state (Adelman, 1998).

From the literature a number of key factors can be drawn, which are of particular significance to understanding why genocide occurs. Of utmost importance to this thesis is the work of Helen Fein, Matthew Krain, Barbara Harff and Benjamin Valentino, Manus Midlarsky and Scott Strauss, which shows that genocide is most often committed by elites that are attempting to stay in power against those they perceive as threats to their dominance. In desperation, ruling authorities resort to genocide, as a defence of their most important goals when other strategies have failed. Any one casual variable does not fit neatly into the categories. To a degree the framework is compatible with the these factors identified in the literature review but it goes further than this and examines acceleratory factors.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

The second half of this chapter establishes a framework of the preconditions that increase the likelihood of elites, or those contending power, adopting a genocidal strategy in times of armed conflict and regime crisis. This thesis proposes that states commit genocide when they cannot win at war or succeed in a position of power without the destruction of civilian populations. In order to overcome their position of weakness and extend their position of power a state or non-state power resorts to genocide/politicide.

This chapter develops a model of the antecedents of genocide and or politicide, by examining the domestic and external factors, which make genocide or politicide more likely to occur. The approach this thesis adopts is that multiple conditions coming from both within and outside the country influence the likelihood that a
civil war will develop into genocide. Each precondition, examined by the thesis, is interpreted in terms of its likely effects on authorities’ choices about whether to resort to mass killing in conflict situations.

The first part of the model refers to enduring characteristics of regimes and societies that are less time dependent. The second part of the framework looks at proximate or accelerator factors, which have a more immediate effect on the escalation of the violent conflict/political upheaval into genocide.

2.7 Preconditions that increase the risk of elites adopting a genocidal strategy

2.7a Structural Factors

i) Armed conflict and political upheaval

Political upheaval, a concept that “captures the essence of the structural crises and societal pressures that are preconditions for authorities’ efforts to eliminate entire groups”, is the first point of analysis (Harff, 2003, p. 6). Political upheaval is defined, by Harff (2003, p. 6), as “an abrupt change in the political community caused by the formation of a state or regime through violent conflict, redrawn state boundaries or defeat in international war”. Included in the list of political upheavals are major armed conflict, anti-colonial rebellions, coups, revolutions, decolonisation, defeat in war.

Harff (2003) found that 24 genocidal episodes occurred during ethnic conflict, 14 coincided with revolutionary war, 14 with adverse regime change and 4 with reformation of state boundaries.

ii) The severity of armed conflict and political upheaval

In analysing political upheaval, as a precondition for genocide, a crucial element to examine is the magnitude of the upheaval. The more intense and persisting the conflict the greater the chance that it will turn genocidal, as the more threatened
the ruling elite the more willing they are to take extreme measures. If those in control are unwilling to use peaceful means of resolving conflict and they have exhausted other violent means they may resort to genocidal strategies.

To ascertain what it is about political upheavals that increase the risk of genocide within a state requires the analysis of the following factors: the nature of the conflict from which the genocide/politicide developed; and the magnitude of political upheaval. The nature of the conflict: the parties to the dispute; issue (the underlying causes of the conflict); intensity of the conflict (measured in the number of fatalities and duration), can influence whether a political upheaval becomes genocidal.

This thesis proposes that the greater the magnitude of political upheaval during the years preceding the onset of genocide/politicide, the more likely that armed conflict situation would lead to war. The magnitude of political upheaval is measured by how many instances there have been of political upheaval, prior to the genocide.

*Risk of genocide Open conflict in the 15 years preceding the genocide:*

High: High or very high; continuing or escalating

Low: Low, medium, ended; low and continuing

**iii) Military victory or mediated settlement**

The way in which a war ends may affect the likelihood of genocide or politicide occurring. A military victory, as opposed to a negotiated or mediated settlement, may increase the likelihood of genocide/politicide occurring in the post-war phase. A military victory enables the winner to set the terms of the postwar period, which may include punishing the losing side by eradicating them (Licklider, 1993). If the war is ongoing then it can act as a smoke screen for indiscriminate murder. However, if genocide or politicide followed attempts at
conflict management and or the reaching of a settlement, as was the case in Rwanda, this pattern must be accounted for. Factors that need to be considered are the nature of the parties involved; the attitude of the parties to the conflict management process and if an agreement was reached; the terms of the agreement; the support by the parties for the agreement and the implementation of the agreement – including how it was to be enforced. This thesis proposes that where the war is ongoing or ended by a military victory then there is a higher risk of genocide than if the armed conflict was resolved through a mediated settlement.

Risk of genocide | How the armed conflict ended:
--- | ---
High: | military victory; war ongoing
Low: | mediated peace settlement

iv) Guerrilla warfare or armed separatist movement

The type of warfare is important in assessing the likelihood of genocide and politicide. Paul Huth, Benjamin Valentino and Dylan Balch-Lindsay (2008) conclude that mass killing is more likely during guerrilla wars than any other kind of armed conflict. The important aspect of guerrilla warfare to this thesis is the military threat posed by the guerrilla army. In order to assess this threat three factors must be taken into account: the number of guerrilla armed forces; the number of fatalities suffered by the government forces; and the success of the guerrilla campaign in advancing on government territory and or the destruction of government property. The greater the threat posed by the guerrilla armed forces the higher risk of a conflict developing into genocide/politicide.

Risk of genocide | Guerrilla warfare or armed separatist movement:
--- | ---
High: | yes
Low: | no
v) Prior Genocides: a culture of impunity

Of the forty-one countries that experienced genocide or politicide since 1955, ten experienced multiple episodes. This thesis asks if the risk of a new genocide/politicide occurring is more likely in countries undergoing political upheaval that have had a prior case of genocide/politicide. This concept, described by Fein (1993) as a repeat offender phenomenon, is explicable by the following three factors. Firstly, in states, which have committed genocide before the elite become habituated to mass killing as a strategic response to state security challenges. Secondly, the successful uses of violence to seize or maintain power establishes agencies and dispositions, which rely on repression in future conflicts. Furthermore, targeted groups are rarely destroyed in their entirety the first time. A country is at higher risk of genocide if there is a prior genocide or politicide in the same polity that went unpunished or is denied. Organisers of mass killings have in the past entertained few doubts that they could literally get away with murder - a perception intensified by the indifference or passivity of the international community.

Risk of genocide Genocides and politicides since 1955:
High: By current regime or its predecessors
Low: No prior genocides

2.8 Political factors

Two other factors of utmost importance to understanding genocide are the ideological commitments, or underpinnings, of the elites and the extent of democratic constraints on elite actions.

2.8a Exclusionary ideology

Those in power usually have many options for dealing with opposition groups. The ideological orientation of the ruling elite is an important determinant in how
the elite will respond to conflict and challenges to their power. The ideological discourse propagated by those in power, offers a ‘reading’ of the situation; ‘designates’ a threat; and calls for collective mobilisation to alleviate the situation, during times of serious crisis. An exclusionary ideology is defined as a belief system that “identifies some over riding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute or eliminate certain categories of people” (Harff, 2003, p. 63). An exclusionary ideology is defined to include the following: adherents of strict variants of Marxist-Lennism; rulers of Islamic states governed on the basis of Shari’a law; proponents of rigid anti-communist doctrines; regimes which advocate ethnic and ethno-national superiority or exclusivity; and those which advocate strict secular nationalism. The likelihood of genocide or politicide occurring is increased when the ruling elite holds an exclusionary ideology.

**Risk of genocide**  **Exclusionary ideology:**

| High: | Yes |
| Low:  | No  |

### 2.8b Regime type

This thesis proposes that a state, which maintains democratic governance in the face of political upheaval, is less likely to commit geno-politicide than autocratic regimes. Autocratic regimes are more likely to engage in severe repression of oppositional groups. While full democracies rarely fail, it is interesting is to examine whether states, which are anocracies or are in the transition to democracy - are more or less at risk of genocide than autocratic regimes. Anocracies are countries whose governments are neither fully autocratic nor fully democratic. Included are countries undergoing transitional democracy or countries whose central governing body has collapsed or lost control of its major territory.

**Risk of genocide**  **Regime type:**

| High: | Autocracy or anocracy |
| Low:  | Democracy |
2.8c Low media openness

Popular media is an important element in genocide and politicide, as the spread of hate propaganda through the general population mobilises the violence required for genocide and reinforces motivating beliefs. States with no tradition of an independent media, a lack of deeply rooted professional standards for journalism and a violent media culture, which exhibits no sense of responsibility to society as a whole, will be at greater risk of experiencing genocide or politicide at times of political upheaval, than states with more respect for the free flow of information and an independent press (Chalk, 1999).

The Press Freedom Index is an annual ranking of countries by Reporters Without Borders, based upon an assessment of countries press freedom records. The Reporters Without Borders take into consideration the following four factors, which are also relevant to an analysis of the role of the media on genocidal outcomes:

1. The plurality and diversity of the media including diversity of the ownership of the media
2. censorship
3. content creating fear
4. threats, imprisonment, physical attacks against journalists

Media openness is measured by a countries ranking on the Press Freedom Index. Countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk of genocide</th>
<th>Media Openness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.9 Ethnic and Religious Factors

Research has identified ethnic and religious cleavages in a society as a precondition of civil war (Rabushka, 1972; Kuper, 1981; and Gurr, 2000). Of the genocides and politicides, since 1955, two thirds were preceded by, or occurred during or shortly after, ethnic conflict. There are different linkages between communal diversity and division and geno-politicide, which need to be explored.

This study will ascertain which patterns of ethnic diversity and ethnic discrimination are linked with geno-politicide. This thesis will examine two variables, which may increase the risk of an elite adopting genocidal strategies: the ethnic character of the ruling elite and active discrimination.

2.9a The ethnic character of the ruling elite

Ethnic heterogeneity, alone, is not a precondition of genocide and politicide. Empirical research by Krain (1997) and Harff (2003) found that ethnic fractionalisation was uncorrelated with the onset of genocide. Of significance, however, is elite ethnicity, and ethnic representation of the governing elite. Ethnicity becomes salient when elite politicians over represent a particular ethnic group. Where the political elite of a country is mainly or entirely made up of one ethnic group then ethnic heterogeneity is more likely to lead to genocide and politicide. There are two possible consequences of the elite disproportionately representing one segment in a heterogeneous society, which may have genocidal outcomes. The group, which is grossly under-represented, challenges the elite. If threat perceptions are important, as this thesis proposes, then the narrower the ethnic base of a regime the greater the risks of a conflict becoming genocidal. Interethnic disputes are often over access to political power.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk of genocide</th>
<th>Ethnic makeup of ruling elite:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>single ethnic/communal group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>multiple ethnic/communal groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.9b Severe Political and or Economic Discrimination

The differential treatment of certain groups increases the salience of group identity and its mobilisation for action. The pattern which emerges within states that experience genocide is a high level of discrimination or exclusion of a communal group, which leads to rebellion and then the governing elite responding with more repression and eventually mass killing. It is important to elucidate whether a state has a history of overt officially sanctioned racism or discrimination.

If a minority is targeted for severe economic and political discrimination then that group is at greater risk of being subjected to genocidal policies. Groups that are marginalised are at greatest risk, as they are easily identifiable as ‘different’ and easier targets for scapegoating and dehumanisation. A list of discriminated minority groups allows for the identification of possible target groups when assessing the risk of genocide or politicide in a country. The thesis proposes that if there are minority groups under severe political and or economic discrimination then the risks of genocide against this group increase.

Discrimination in a country can be measured on five levels.

1. No discrimination: no groups facing or suffering from substantial under representation due to past discrimination, for example, the Scots in the United Kingdom.

2. Remedial: Groups under represented due to past discrimination, but there are currently remedial policies to address this, for example, the Maori in New Zealand.

3. Historical Discrimination: Same as above but the government is not doing anything to remedy the under-representation.

4. Societal Discrimination: The existence of social practices, by the dominant group which substantially discriminates against a group or groups.
5. Official state discrimination: officially sanctioned discrimination whereby public policy actively discriminates against a group or groups. This can be further assessed by breaking it into political discrimination – the extent to which group members are barred from political participation, access to elite positions, and or recruitment into the civil service or military positions and economic discrimination – the extent to which groups are systematically excluded from economic opportunities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genocide risk</th>
<th>Officially sanctioned discrimination against one or more minorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High:</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.10 Economic factors

It is important to ask whether a relationship exists between a country's level of economic development and genocide. Research suggests that there exists a relationship between poverty and armed conflict but does it increase the risk of a state in political upheaval developing into genocide/politicide. Countries with low levels of economic development (measured by quality of life indicators such as infant mortality) are associated with genocide and politicide. Genocides are more likely to happen in poor countries and regions. According to Freeman (1991, p. 188) the economic expectations of a people may “lead to rebellion and ruthless repression”.

2.10a Low Economic Development

Harff initially considers infant mortality as a potential factor but then discards it once she determines that "infant mortality (and the basket of quality-of-life indicators it represents) has no independent effects on the odds of geno-politicide once a state failure has occurred." Harff does acknowledge, however, that infant mortality serves as a significant indicator of state failure. Given that geno-politicides usually do occur within states in conflict, but that such events may
occur shortly after a state failure or conflict first occurs, infant mortality and other factors pointing toward state failures should be closely tracked.

**Genocide risk**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genocide risk</th>
<th>Level of economic development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low economic development (high infant mortality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High economic development (low infant mortality)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While these internal effects of poverty are important, they are not sufficient in resolving the problems presented by this thesis. What is paramount, is the “weakness of many states in the world economic system” and how external actors react to these marginalised states when they are experiencing political upheaval. Economic interests cloud the judgment of potential interveners within the international system. A country’s status, in the international arena, can impact on the evolution of genocide. This brings us to the next important phase of the model: external factors. As the above variable indicates the study of genocide must look beyond the immediate boundaries of the state in which it is committed.

### 2.11 External factors

#### 2.11a Economic and political interdependence

Harff, in examining the international context of genocide, highlights the importance of economic and political interdependence in attempts by leaders to commit genocide: “the greater the degree to which a country is interdependent with others, the less likely its leaders are to attempt geno-politicides” (Harff, 2003, 65). Two variables are used to measure the economic and political interdependence of a state: trade openness and membership of intergovernmental and regional organisations.

**Trade openness** is measured by the proportion of imports and exports within the GNP. The salience of this factor is the idea that trade openness indicates a country’s connectedness to the international economic arena and, thus, its
dependency on it. States less open to trade are less connected to the international system. To the contrary, a country with a high degree of trade openness is less likely to engage in grave violations of human rights, fearing an international response. Also, such a country is more likely to enjoy a reliable flow of resources that can be used to solve political crises peacefully.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genocide risk</th>
<th>Trade Openness2004 (imports + exports as percent of GDP, indicating international engagement)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>Very low (20 or less)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High (40 or more)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Countries with a greater than average membership of intergovernmental and regional organisations would be subject to greater influence and get more political support when facing internal challenges. Arguably, authorities in countries with a below average membership are more likely to resort to geno/politicide.

Risk of genocide membership of intergovernmental and regional organisations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High:</th>
<th>low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low:</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following diagram summarises and outlines in schematic form the preconditions for genocide.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Countries at Greater Risk</th>
<th>Countries at Lesser Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Genocide</td>
<td>Prior genocide post 1955</td>
<td>No prior genocide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Upheaval</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War ended</td>
<td>Ongoing or military victory</td>
<td>Mediated settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Orientation of Ruling Elite</td>
<td>Exclusionary Ideology</td>
<td>No exclusionary Ideology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Character of Ruling Elite</td>
<td>Represents a ruling minority</td>
<td>Represents most or all of ethnic groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active political and economic discrimination</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>Autocracy or anocracy</td>
<td>Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media Openness</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Factors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership in Regional and Intergovernmental Organisations</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Openness</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 5: Preconditions for genocide)
2.12 Acceleratory Factors

In addition to the background conditions that make genocide more likely are the proximate causes or short-term accelerators. Acceleratory factors increase the level of significance of the background conditions and accelerate/escalate a crisis. In addition, one-off trigger events such as killing of a significant leader or a natural disaster can seriously escalate and push a regime over the edge. These catalytic factors have the potential to transform armed conflict/political upheaval into genocide and are relevant when the preconditions, in Figure 5, already exist.

2.12a Internal accelerators

i) An increase in hate propaganda and hate crimes

Hate propaganda is used to vilify the victim group. Leaders and public media encourage or commit hate crimes and hate speech, polarising society and driving groups apart. This may start with statements by political leaders/prominent people that express support for racial or an ethnic superiority, dehumanization and demonisation of minorities, the public scapegoating of groups associated with wealth, status, power, colonial power (real, fictional or historical), the condoning or justification of violence against a minority and moves on to calls for murder.

ii) Compulsory visible identification of targeted groups through classification and symbolism.

Groups are classified and names or symbols are assigned to people based on their belonging to this ethnic, religious, political or communal group. This can include the use of dress, colour, badges, and identity cards indicating ethnicity. Members of victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols. This process, which allows for potential victims of genocide to be the identified and separated out because of their identity, can lead to physical segregation, for example into ghettos or concentration camps and it makes it easier to draw up death lists.
iii) An increase in life integrity violation by government or government-supported groups against targeted groups

An increase in life integrity violations of a particularly vulnerable group can serve as indicator that genocide is imminent. Violations include, rape, torture, disappearances, forced population transfer, destruction of property, destruction of food supply, denial medical treatment, segregation. It is of particular concern when these life integrity violations are committed with impunity.

iv) Increased militarisation and the arming of militias

Expansion of the army, re-equipping of the army, an increase in the import of weapons, training of paramilitary groups and the arming of sections of the civilian population. This increases the chances of more perpetrators and of more people being killed for allows for genocide to be carried out at a wider level of society, especially concerning when it occurs in the name protecting the regime or is racially motivated.

v) Deterioration of government capacity brought about by fragmentation /competition within the governing elite or a change in the power sharing arrangement

Intense factional contention within the elite is an indirect or accelerating condition that, in the presence of structural risk factors, increases the likelihood of genocide. Elections, the signing of peace accords, are examples of events that can change the balance of power and potentially trigger genocide.

vi) Economic crisis or decline

A political and or military crisis is often intensified when the state is faced with an economic crisis; whereby, the already fragile state is threatened from another front. Therefore, this thesis examines whether an economic decline preceded the genocide or politicide.
2.12b External Accelerators

i) External patron and indifference of the international community

Tolerance and/or complicity, of the ruling elite’s increasingly repressive behaviour, by a foreign power or foreign powers can make genocide/politicide more likely. Outside powers can offer a diplomatic guarantee of impunity and or military and financial means with which those in power can commit geno-politicide. The continued trade in arms despite increasing severity of human rights violations and violence towards civilians, is one such example.

ii) Threats of external involvement against government elites not backed by action

If state-sponsored mass murder has already begun, it is likely that the perpetrators have already evaluated the international context and decided that there is a degree of permissiveness sufficient to allow them to commit genocide or politicide without consequence (Harff, 1986, p. 168). If the credibility or resolve of potential interveners is viewed as low then there less deterrent for the elites (Carment and Rowlands, 1998; Rothchild and Lake, 1998). Interventions that directly challenge the perpetrator by acting against them, or for the target, clearly signal the credibility and resolve of interveners.

iii) Politically active kindred group

The belief that there is a strong tie between the domestic and external foes is crucial in the decision by those in power to eliminate a collective group – perceived or represented as the threat. Support by kindred groups living outside the state can impact on the magnitude of the armed conflict and political upheaval. Does the targeted group hold power in neighbouring states?

iv) Increase in refugee and internally displaced persons flows

The presence of refugees heighten threat perception of the ruling elite if the refugees are the same group as the targeted minority or ‘enemy.’ A militant
refugee community in a neighbouring country is often an additional threat dimension. A neighbouring state where a persecuted or marginalized group sought refuge can become a base for invasion.

The following framework sets out the factors which are preconditions that increase the risk of genocide in a country, see Figure 6. These factors will be examined in relation to Rwanda and Sudan in the case studies that follow in chapters three and four.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political upheaval</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High or very high, ongoing or escalating armed conflict and regime crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Guerrilla warfare</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in guerrilla warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prior genocides and politicides</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existence of earlier geno-/politicides</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current regime or its predecessors committed genocide, that went unpunished or is denied</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Autocracy or Anocracy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>partial autocracy or partial democracy because mixed regime types are inherently unstable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Exclusionary ideology of the ruling elite</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The promotion and adherence to a belief system that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain categories of people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low media openness</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low level of media independence and openness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governing elite are represented by a single ethnic, communal, regional group</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low economic development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>measured by a high rate of infant mortality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Factors</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low interdependence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both trade openness and the rate of membership in regional and international organisations are low.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>External Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low interdependence</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>both trade openness and the rate of membership in regional and international organisations are low.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Figure 5: Framework of preconditions for genocide)
This thesis will also look out for the existence of any of the following acceleratory factors and examine the relationship they have with the preconditions mentioned above.

**Internal accelerators**

- An increase in hate propaganda and hate crimes
- Compulsory visible identification of targeted groups through classification and symbolism.
- An increase in life integrity violation by government or government-supported groups against targeted groups
- Increased militarisation and the arming of militias
- Deterioration of government capacity brought about by fragmentation/competition within the governing elite or a change in

**External accelerators**

- External Patron and Indifference of the International Community
- Threats of external involvement against government elites not backed by action
- Politically active kindred group
- Increase in refugee and internally displaced persons flows
Chapter Three:

Rwanda

“We owe respect to the living; to the dead we owe only truth” (Voltaire)

“When I came out, there were no birds... There was sunshine and the stench of death.”

(Survivor of the Rwandan Genocide)

3.1 Introduction

On April 6 1994, the president of Rwanda was assassinated. Two rockets were fired that struck down his plane. All on board, including the president of Burundi and many top advisors to the Rwandan administration, were killed. This event became the catalyst for one the greatest calamities of our age. Following the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana (who had ruled Rwanda for 21 years), a campaign of violence ensued in which at least 800,000 Tutsis and 10,000 Hutus were killed. The killings continued until the rebel army, the Rwandan Patriot Front (RPF), took control of the country, ousting the genocidal regime from Rwanda, on July 17 1994, and ending the genocide (Des Forges, 1999; Power 2002; Prunier, 1995).

The genocide of the Tutsi, in Rwanda in 1994, by the Hutu extremist state, is the most rapidly executed genocide recorded. It surpasses that of the Holocaust, not in numbers but in the sheer speed with which the Tutsi were executed. In 1994, between the second week of April and the third week of May, the Rwandan Tutsi suffered “one of the highest casualty rates of any population in history” (Prunier, 1995, p.261). The decimation of the population was led by the military and National police (gendarmes), with civilians, in particular the militia

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6 There was no investigation and to this day there is no certainty over who is responsible for the attack.
(interahamwe), as active participants. Rape and mutilation often preceded the deaths of Tutsi. Victims were treated with incomprehensible cruelty and sadism.

The tragedy and the totality of genocides, such as the one in Rwanda, where as one survivor expressed it “there is nothing there. Everything is killed” - where the very word ‘survivor’ itself is suspect (in Jones, 2004, p.135), compels any thinking human being to ponder the question of how this could possibly have happened and to try and grasp the nature of events that could possibly have lead to it? In human terms, the Rwandan genocide is, perhaps, the most sickening and most chilling example of our imperfect nature, but, in academic terms, it provides the perfect case study. In Rwanda, unlike many other cases, it is now almost universally accepted, with the exception of the perpetrators and their most ardent supporters, that what took place, during the 100 days, was genocide. It is one of the cases most easily identified as genocide. Before delving into the conditions and causes detailing the events that lead to the genocidal violence in Rwanda, the nature of the genocide must be examined and assess why it is actually defined as genocide.

3.2 The genocide

The genocide was primarily directed at Tutsi (who comprised about 15% of the population) and perpetrated by the Hutu (about 85% of the population). The Hutu regime labelled all Tutsi, men, women and children, as enemies to be killed. It was secondarily directed at anti-Habyarimana government and opposition members, Hutu who opposed the extremists, human rights activists and journalists critical of the regime. In fact, anyone who wouldn’t participate in the genocide was also targeted and killed. The genocide was countrywide and was not focussed on one locale, though there was some regional variance in start time. The first five weeks of genocide were the most intense with the most fatalities occurring during this period (Straus, 2006 and 2008).

When assessing whether genocide has occurred, what must be taken into account is whether the actions committed pose a threat to the survival of the group. The

7 These figures are not exact, as the Twa made up 1% of the population, but are used in all reports and literature on Rwanda.
violence against Tutsi was exterminatory and in this respect was successful. An extremely high percentage of Tutsis were killed as a percentage of the pre-existing Tutsi population. Between 75 and 80% of all Tutsi residing in Rwanda before the genocide were killed (Straus, 2006). There was a high degree of direct killing in Rwanda; where Tutsi were found they were killed, and relatively little forced displacement, as was the case with other genocidal violence, such as Yugoslavia or Darfur.

The literature clearly dispels the “spontaneous action from below” thesis (Alvarez, 2001; Des Forges, 1999; Lemarchand; Straus, 2006 and 2009). “Rwanda’s genocide was not a simple matter of mutual hatred between tribes erupting into irrational violence. Neither were the mass killings the result of a huge and sudden outpouring of rage on the part of Hutus following the murder of their president” (Keane, quoted in Alvarez, 2001, p.83). The violence was top down, systematic, intentional and state driven” (Straus, 2007, p.523). The new Hutu extremist government sworn in after the plane crash had spent several months preparing death lists, importing tens of thousands of machetes and other weapons, and disseminating anti-Tutsi, hate propaganda. The genocide was planned, promoted, organised and carried out by state officials, who used the state apparatus and the media to carry out the genocide (Alvarez, 2001; Des Forges, 1999; Lemarchand; Straus, 2006, 2007 and 2008).

Of significance to the Rwandan case is the degree of civilian mobilisation and participation in the acts of violence. The number of Rwandans that directly took part in the genocide is subject to much debate. Straus, who carried out wide-ranging field research in Rwanda and interviewed convicted perpetrators, estimates the figure to be about 200,000. “Even though soldiers and militias often were involved in killings of the greatest magnitude, ordinary civilian men were probably more numerous in the perpetration of the genocide than were soldiers and militarily trained militias” (Straus, 2006, p.44). The largest massacres at churches, schools, and other public location where large numbers of Tutsi had gathered were largely committed by government militias and soldiers (Ibid).
The events in Rwanda clearly fit with the operational definition of genocide adopted by this thesis, that 1) there was complicity by the state (or, in the case of civil war, either of the contending authorities) in actions undertaken that endanger human life; 2) evidence, even if circumstantial, of intent on the part of authorities to isolate or single out group members for mistreatment; 3) victims members of an identifiable group; 4) there are policies and practices that cause prolonged mass suffering; and the actions committed pose a threat to the survival of the group.

3.3 Structural Factors

3.3a Political Upheaval and War

A history of political upheaval, including abrupt and violent regime change, revolution and armed conflict are associated with genocide and an analysis of Rwanda shows such a history of political upheaval. In 1959, colonial rule in Rwanda ended. The five years that followed were a period of extreme political upheaval, resulting in the exile of thousands of Tutsi. From November 1959 to September 1961, there was a revolution in which the Hutu seized power, resulting in the abolition of the Tutsi monarchy and the proclamation of a Hutu dominated republic. This saw an explicit reversal of the structure of political domination that existed under colonial rule, where Tutsi were the favoured group. This transition was supported by the Belgian authorities, who hastily gave up their indirect rule of Rwanda, bringing Rwanda to national independence. Uvin explains: “In the name of a suddenly discovered attachment to representative structures as well as out of fear of the more radical (leftist, anti colonial) Tutsi elite, [the former colonial power] had switched their favour to the Hutu” (Uvin, 1999, p.256). The aim of the revolution was to “end the hegemony of the Tutsi minority…and in doing so free the Hutu masses of the shackles of the Tutsi-dominated monarchy” (Lemarchand; p. 5). The tone of the revolution was populist and anti-feudal, with an ethnic underpinning.

An examination of the violence during this period is essential to understanding the events of 1994. There were three stages of the revolutionary violence. Firstly, there was localised anti-Tutsi violence, in late 1959, accompanied by small pogroms. This activity was specific to some provinces (Uvin, 1999, p. 256). The
violence resulted in the death of hundreds of Tutsi and the first main refugee flow. The second phase followed elections in 1960 and 1961, which resulted in a massive victory by the Parmehutu, a radically anti-Tutsi group. This victory was followed by the overthrow of the monarchy and the second large outflow of Tutsi, particularly those who had held positions of power, ensued. The next stage of violence was small guerrilla assaults by Tutsi refugees, largely those who were attempting to return, from bases in Burundi and Uganda. These incursions by refugees, known as *inyenzi* (cockroaches), came to an end in 1967.

The response to these guerrilla activities was mass killings of Tutsi in Rwanda. During this time about half the Tutsi population of Rwanda fled, which corresponds with about 9% of the total Rwandan population (Prunier, 1995 and (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, 1996; and Kiernan, 2008, p.557). The Hutu revolution, by forcibly displacing some 200,000 Tutsi, who sought refuge in neighbouring states, planted the seeds of the refugee warrior militancy that gave birth to the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) in the 1990s. A second element of the revolution that impacted on future events was the association of the revolution as anti-feudal, anti-colonial and democratic, and with it, the depiction of ‘the enemies of the revolution’, namely the Tutsi, as the opposite. In Rwanda, argues Lemarchand (2002), “as in Nazi Germany the roots of genocide are traceable to the lethal combination of revolution and war, each contributing to redefine the victims as "the enemies of the nation", and thus shifting the blame away from the perpetrators to the victims.”

*Political Upheaval:* yes – high degree of political upheaval, with armed conflict escalating

*Risk of genocide:* high
3.3b Guerrilla Warfare

In Rwanda the relationship between war and genocide is central to an understanding of the subject. In the immediate years preceding the genocide there was a civil war in Rwanda. There were two primary phases to this war. From 1990 to 1993, the civil war was fought between the Tutsi dominated rebels and the Hutu led government forces. The RPF fought a guerrilla war against the Rwandan government. According to Human Rights Watch the Government identified the Tutsi as "accomplices" providing "cover" for the invaders (HRW, 1993).

The fighting was ended by a peace agreement, the Arusha Peace Accords, signed in August 1993, but following the assassination of the Rwandan President, the civil war resumed. It was during this second phase of the war that the genocide took place. The wartime environment was a central rationale for the mass killing of Tutsi civilians, who, due to their ethnicity alone, were all labelled wartime enemies and rebel accomplices (Des Forges, 1999 and Reed, 1996).

The Rwandan Patriotic Army, mainly drawn from Tutsi refugee families living in Uganda since the early 1960s, also included both Hutu and Tutsi refugees from other neighbouring countries. Its political wing, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), claimed it sought plural government and not Tutsi domination of Rwanda. The rebel army's strategy, developed after reported leadership infighting in 1990, was not to pursue military victory but rather to seek limited advances into Rwandan territory, as leverage for a negotiated settlement with Habyarimana. Only after the Hutu-initiated genocide of 1994 did the RPA change its goal to seeking the violent seizure of the government in Kigali. The RPF grew out of nearly 40 years of exile, in mostly Eastern and Central Africa, Europe and North America (Reed, 1996, p.479).

In October 1990, under the banner of the Rwandan Patriotic Front, Tutsis, living exile in Uganda and other neighbouring countries invaded Rwanda. In response the Rwandan government staged a fake attack on Kigali. This was intended to frighten the Hutu majority into supporting the war effort and, according to
Melvern (2004), encourage the reporting of suspected RPF sympathizers among the Tutsi. More than 10,000 people were arrested. Direct killing of Tutsi also followed, including the use of grenades to kill Tutsi, and according to witness testimony orders from the para-commando for ethnic cleansing of Bahima village. At least 348 civilians were killed in the first 48 hours (Melvern, 2004, p.14-15). Ten days after the invasion, local officials in Kibilira were told to kill the local inyenzi and burn down their homes because of the threat of the RPF offensive.

The first RPF invasion was considered a failure. However, in January 1991, under their new leader, Paul Kagame, the RPF improved their strategy and prowess. Kagame was “a truly impressive leader” – a military tactician of enormous talent” (Melvern, 2004, p. 19). A highly successful guerrilla fighter who trained at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA, he believed that the only way to destroy Rwanda’s “rotting regime” was with classic guerrilla warfare. On his arrival, Paul Kagame began to reorganize his forces, which had been reduced to less than 2000 troops, and decided to develop a guerrilla style war in the north of the country. He pulled his forces back into Uganda and then moved them into the forested Virunga mountains. The RPF spent two months in this area, without engaging the government forces. This time was spent rebuilding the army. On 23 January 1991, the RPF captured Ruhengeri, a town in the North, freeing numerous political prisoners and capturing a large amount of weapons and equipment, before retreating back to the forests that evening. However, these actions only caused Habyarimana to increase his resistance to the RPF and its sympathisers. By early 1991 the RPF had grown to 5,000, by 1992 it had reached 12,000 and by the time of 1994 genocide numbered 25,000. The RPF made rapid advancements over the north and east of the country and the new government was forced to flee from Kigali to Gitarama, due to RPF advancements. This civil war lasted until Habyarimana government signed the Arusha Peace Accords with the RPF in 1993. Even with the peace agreement, a climate of fear and insecurity blanketed the country.

Having been attacked by the RPA since 1990, the security of the Hutu government in Kigali was under threat. The Habyarimana government, already facing economic problems, was seriously threatened. This external Tutsi threat
was crucial to the promotion and popularisation of an ideology which depicted Tutsi as a menace, coming from both within and from without the country, who were plotting to take power. Losing the war with the RPF was associated with the destruction of Hutu power, and, therefore, the destruction of the Tutsi was a means of protecting the existing Hutu power structure (Semelin, 2003, p.194). In Rwanda, a climate of fear prevailed. Hutus knew of massacres that Tutsis had carried out against Hutus in Burundi. In a climate of conflict, suggests Straus, it was not unreasonable to wonder, “Am I next? Who are the enemies? The RPF? My Tutsi neighbours?” With the Hutu government at war with the RPF, war against the RPF quickly transformed into war against Tutsis. War provided the rationale for killing and legitimized it. It also brought a level of training and organization to the violence that would otherwise have been missing.

The civil war began again on April 7, 1994 after the assassination of President Juvenal Habyarimana. Habyarimana's assassination opened a gap in authority. Hardliner Hutus stepped into the power vacuum and took advantage of the insecurity of the people to make extreme violence the de facto policy.

**Guerrilla warfare:** yes – RPF against the Rwandan Government forces

**Risk of genocide:** high

### 3.3c Prior Genocide – a culture of impunity

The 1994 genocide was not the first in Rwanda’s history. Genocide was committed against the Tutsi by the Hutu led state between 1963 and. Harff puts the death toll at between 12,000 – 20,000 1964 (2003, p.60). One of the leaders of the 1963 genocide, Theoneste Bagosora, would often quote the then President Kayibanda who warned the “Inyenzi” (cockroaches) invaders: “Some of you are causing trouble for your brothers who are living in peace in a democratic Rwanda…and suppose you take Kigali by force how will you measure the chaos
of which you will be the first victims… it will be the total end of the Tutsi race” (quoted in Malvern, 2004, p. 9).

There are similarities in the killing patterns of the genocide in 1963 and the genocide which followed 30 years later. Of note is the disposal of the dead bodies in the Nyabarongo River. The disposal of bodies in the Nyabarongo River was of symbolic significance. The river was seen to flow in the direction of the Horn of Africa, where the Tutsi supposedly originated from. The Tutsi were constantly referred to as foreigners, both in the lead up to and during the 1994 genocide, and the river became a symbolic means of sending these ‘foreigners’ back to where they came from (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 60).

The international spotlight briefly shone on Rwanda, following the genocidal violence in 1963. British philosopher Bertrand Russell described the genocide of 1963 as the most horrible and systematic extermination of a people since the Nazi extermination of the Jews. Journalists at the time made similar comparisons (Melvern, 2004, p. 9). The attention, however, was short-lived and Rwanda slipped quickly back into obscurity. Unfortunately, with this genocide, as with many others, it went unpunished and it was never officially acknowledged as genocide (Melvern, 2004). This lack of consequence for the perpetrators of genocidal violence and other human rights violations was to continue in Rwanda’s history and ultimately have devastating consequences.

Massacres of Tutsi occurred, without consequence, in the four years preceding the genocide of 1994. The first took place in 1990 in direct response to the invasion by the RPF. After the first massacre in October 1990, there were a further 15 massacres. Of particular severity were the episodes in January 1991, February 1991, March 1992, August 1992, January 1993, March 1993 and February 1994. According to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report released in 1993, the government killed approximately 2,000 Tutsi between 1990 and 1992, “some singly or in small groups, others in massacres that took hundreds of lives at Kibilira, Bugesera and in northwest Rwanda” (HRW, 1993).

The report also found the government arrested or detained without charge at least 10,000 Tutsi and members of the political opposition, during the same period.
Many of whom were tortured and held incommunicado in military camps rather than in regular prisons (HRW, 1993). The massacres of the early 1990s were ‘dress rehearsals’ or ‘test runs’ for what the Hutu themselves described as the “final solution” (Gourvetich, p.140 and Adelman, p.31). As Des Forges stresses: conspirators grew bolder; acting within a “culture of impunity” (Des Forges, 1999, p. 42).

**Prior genocide:** yes, in 1964 against the Tutsi

**Risk of genocide:** high

### 3.3d Military Victory or Mediated settlement?

For those that argue a military victory, as opposed to mediated settlement, increases the likelihood of a war developing into genocide, Rwanda presents a complicated picture. The Arusha Peace Accords had a significant impact on events that led to the genocide in 1994 and were a fundamental acceleratory factor of the Rwandan genocide. In an assessment of the peace process in Rwanda, Kuper highlights the complicated and delicate nature of peace negotiations and how “mediators sometimes inadvertently provoke the very tragedies they seek to prevent” (1996, p. 221).

On 4 August 1993, a peace agreement, the Arusha Accords, was signed between the RPF and the Rwandan Government. The culmination of 14 months of negotiation and mediation by Tanzania, in conjunction with OAU, France, Belgian and the US, the agreement was hailed as a triumph of diplomacy. The comprehensive settlement provided a new system of government for a new Rwanda; moving Rwanda from presidential system of governance to a multiparty parliamentary one. Power was to reside with a Council of Ministers and no longer with the President. The President was a figure head whose power was second to that of the Prime Minister. The rule of law, human rights, political pluralism and national unity were lauded as the guiding principles that this new Rwanda would be governed by.
At the time of signing, many considered the Arusha Accords to be “the best peace agreement in Africa since Lancaster House” (Adelman and Surkhe, 2000, p.142), but it failed miserably in its implementation. The Accords demonstrate, in an almost unprecedented way, the responsibility of third parties, once involved, to maintain their full commitment to seeing the process through, and that until implemented the conflict resolution process is not complete. In some cases, “partial efforts” may in fact be “worse than no efforts at all” (Stettenheim, 2000, p. 236). By failing to give the extremists a steak in the new government, the Accords broke a “fundamental tenet of conflict resolution” (Stettenheim, p. 234). Ultimately, the extremists were not neutralised and would play a significant role in the breakdown of the peace process.

In retrospect, Herman Cohen, US diplomat at the time, suggests that alternatively a more sustainable solution would have been to “condemn the RPF” (2000, p. 177). Cohen asks somewhat repentantly: “Looking back to the first day of the crisis, 1 October 1990, why did we automatically exclude the policy option of informing Ugandan President Museveni that the invasion of Rwanda by uniformed members of the Ugandan Army was totally unacceptable, and that the continuation of good relations between the USA and Uganda would depend on his getting the RPF back across the border?” (15).

There were five significant features of the new Accords that threatened the power of the Hutu elite and pushed them further on a genocidal trajectory. Under the new accords, the presidential system, which had favoured Hutu power, was to be replaced by a system which promoted pluralisation. In place would be a parliamentary system. Opposition parties were to be favoured under the new system. However, the extremist Hutu party, the CDR, that had already began arming and training the interhamawe, were to be completely excluded from the transitional system. Prunier argues that the Arusha Accords threatened the “sociological majority” principle of the 1959 revolution, which was based on the premise that the ethnic majority, who in Rwanda were Hutu, would always hold political power (1995). Under this system established by the Accords, the ruling party, Mouvement Revolutionnaire National Pour le Developpement (MRND), would be allocated one third of the parliamentary seats, rendering it a minority
party, and its extremist wing no seats at all. Under a multiparty democratic system, such a change could have a huge impact on the power of the Hutu elite. The agreement also removed the extremists’ control over the military. Not only were there changes to the political system but, furthermore, the military structure was amended. Under the new power sharing arrangement, the army would comprise of 40% RPF, with command positions split evenly between the RPF and Government forces. Also of significance, the ambitious Accords went as far as including the right of return of all Rwandan refugees. The peace agreement required the right of return to Rwanda for all Tutsi refugees from Uganda and other neighbouring countries. The repatriation of mainly Tutsi refugees, and the fact that those who had left within the prior 10 years could get back their property, would engender a dramatic change in the Tutsi demographic. There was to be no amnesty for previous human rights violations; anyone, even the President, was now open to investigation and prosecution. Additionally, the Accords sought the removal of the ethnic designation on identity cards. Any gains Tutsi garnered under this new system and those made by an RPF military successes were to be “nullified by the act of genocide” (Midlarsky, 2005, p.166).

The CRD is an archetypal example of ‘spoilers’ in a peace process. Spoilers as defined by Stedman are "...leaders and parties who believe the emerging peace threaten their power, world view, and interests and who use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it" (...) According to Clapham, the CDR and the interhamwe saw the negotiations as a façade to build up their support. This is evidenced in a statement made by the leader of the CDR, who suggested that the “extermination of the Tutsis would be the inevitable consequence…of the implementation of the Arusha Accords” (quoted in Scorgie, 2004, p. 72). For the CDR there was never a vision of co-sharing.

Mediated peace agreement: yes – Arusha Accords mediated in 1993, 9 months before the genocide

Risk of genocide: low
3.4 Political Factors

3.4a Regime Type

The first republic, following the revolution, was the Kayibanda regime (1962 – 1973). This was a repressive dictatorship, which chased out or killed most of its opposition, including not only Tutsi but also opposition Hutu politicians. Anyone who did not join the Parmehutu was defined as an enemy (Uvin, 1999, p. 257). Kabyibanda asserted in a speech that “[a] proliferation of political parties would distract the population, render the progress of the country rather incoherent and lead to harmful stagnation of the nation” (quoted in Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, 1996, p. 4). People couldn’t even move house without permission. In this new Rwanda, ushered in after the revolution, Tutsi faced severe discrimination.

The Second Republic under general Habyarimana (1973 -1994) was a military dictatorship. Described as ‘bloodless,’ the Habyriarmana coup was anything but; an estimated fifty-five people closely associated with the old regime were murdered, by poisoning, or they were beaten to death with a hammer, following arrest and imprisonment. Fearing that the blood of his predecessor could cause him harm, Habyrimana had Kayibanda and his wife starved to death (Prunier, 1988, p. 82). Also murdered were 700 soldiers from the national army. They were killed for retribution or to eliminate witnesses, to prevent the atrocities of Habyrimana’s regime being exposed (Melvern, 2004, p. 11).

The legal system, while independent, was imbued with a culture of impunity, and corruption was rife. Farcical elections would take place with Habyarimana winning 98% of the vote. Habyarimana “went on to create one of the most rigidly controlled countries in the world” (Melvern, 2004, p. 11). Rwanda was a one party state, where all other political parties were banned. Every Rwandan, including babies, had to be a member of Habyarimana’s party, the MRND, formed in 1974. The role of the party in everyday life was invasive - no one could move house without telling the party and distribution of subversive materials or insulting the president were punishable with long prison sentences (Melvern, 2004; 11).
The perception of Habyarimana by outsiders was of a good economic manager and an ardent catholic, whose lifestyle lacked the excesses of many of Africa’s other dictators of the time (Mlevr, 2004: 11). While extremely dictatorial, Rwanda under Habyarimana was relatively politically and economically stable. However, in the late 1980s the economy began to fail. President Habyarimana became increasingly authoritarian and support for the regime began to fall. The regime’s grip of absolute power began to look increasingly untenable. Support for political reform, democratisation and opposition to the Habyarimana regime came from Tutsi from all over Rwanda and from Hutu from regions other than Habyarimana’s home region in the North West.

In response to the burgeoning opposition movement and outside pressure, Habyarimana made some concessions, including the legalisation of other political parties. One party rule ended in Rwanda in 1991, under pressure from France. What followed was the emergence of several opposition parties. These new political parties were an additional threat to that already faced by Rwanda’s ruling elite from the RPF.

3.4b Democratisation

Democratic reform can present a potential threat to those groups whose power rests on their having exclusive control of the state and markets (Reed, 1996, p. 480). This ‘dark side of reform’ is exemplified in the Rwandan tragedy, where premature democratisation ultimately ended in tragedy. Excessive democratisation in weak states leads to challenges, asserts Tilly (2007). Tilly argues that during periods of threat state cohesion should take precedence over democratic liberties. This challenges the orthodoxy that democratisation is a necessary positive strategy for peaceful conflict resolution. Ugandan President Misenvi was likely correct when he told foreign journalists in October 1993, following the bloody coup, “that he did not believe Burundi was ready to adopt a Western style democracy. The Rwandan experience echoes this sentiment. As Harff argues, “in a country torn apart by communal bloodshed stability may come at a price namely minority rule
or at best a carefully engineered power sharing agreement prior to any more conventional democratic formula” (2001, p. 91).

In Rwanda, the ruling administration was dominated entirely by northern Hutu. With reform, parties emerged with mixed membership, both ethnically and regionally. There were parties with Hutu from the south and central regions and parties with both Hutu and Tutsi members. The northern Hutu had the most to lose from a Tutsi rebel victory, but they had almost as much to lose in terms of power, prestige and wealth from genuine political pluralisation, since they represented only a minority of Rwanda's Hutu. According to Lemarchand, “[f]or the first time since the Hutu revolution of 1959, the circumstances were ripe for a strategic alliance between the enemies from within and those from without” (2009, p. 487).

Authoritarian or anocracy: anocracy

Risk of genocide: high

3.4c Media Openness

During genocide and in the lead up to it, propaganda campaigns and fabrications about the targeted group are used to justify genocidal acts. These campaigns are run through the media. With no independent media, which can serve as a structure to deter genocide, the elite have easy access to the majority of the population. In Rwanda, to ensure widespread dissemination of calls to ethnic violence, prominent figures from the President's circle set up the media to promote ethnic hatred and fear. Radio Rwanda, the state broadcaster, was the only radio station. Kamilindi, a Rwandan journalist of 20 years, who stopped working during the genocide, due to intimidation, said: “Radio Rwanda was the voice of authority, and authority is respected in Rwanda. People are raised and taught to take what they hear on the radio as gospel truth” (Kamilindi, 2007, p. 136). Radio-Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) was the “mouth piece” of the Hutu elite and a “means to propagate” their ideals and encourage genocide and the war
against the Tutsi dominated RPF (Kimilindi, 2007; 110). According to Gaspard Rwamulinda, who murdered Tutsi during the genocide, ‘[t]he radio was telling us to do it. So were the leaders. Our Mayor was very clear. He directed us. I killed eight people. I killed people I knew did not deserve to die. It was that simple’ genocidaire (Rwamulinda, 2010). Tragically, “[n]o one succeeded in combating these hate media in Rwanda. They were very powerful and entrenched with those who held power” (Kimilindi, 2007, p.137). The Minister of Information, Faustin Rucogoza, who failed in his efforts to close down and sanction the extremist hate media outlets, was one of the first assassinated by the *interahamwe*, on the morning of April 7 1994.

Radio broadcasts in particular and the media in general, exercised great influence over the Rwandan population. The saturation of radios in Rwanda was 25 per 100 persons by 1992. RTLM broadcasts were relayed to all parts of the country through a network of transmitters owned and operated by the government. To emphasize the impact of Rwandan media on the genocide, Des Forges wrote: Some 66 per cent of Rwandans are literate and those who knew how to read were accustomed to reading for others. In many cases, the written word was underscored by cartoons, most of which were so graphic that they could not be misinterpreted. (Des Forges,1999).

However, the general census of the population conducted on 15 August 1991 indicates that: 'The population that cannot read nor write represents 44 per cent of people who are more than six years.' In other words, only 56 per cent of the population could read and write in 1991. The same general census adds: 'In comparison to 1978, this represents a decrease of 13.4 per cent, since the illiteracy rate was 57.4 per cent for the entire country.' Des Forges, literacy figure suggests that there had been a change of 10 per cent between August 1991 and 6 April 1994.

A mimeographed, anonymous document found in Rwanda after the genocide, described propaganda techniques for genocidists and includes a detailed analysis of Roger Muccielli’s book *Psychologie de la publicite et de la propaganda*, published in Paris in 1970. The document recommends a particular technique that
is calls “accusation in the mirror”, whereby the “party which is using terror will accuse the enemy of using terror”. This technique was evidenced in Rwanda, for example in the claim, broadcast on RTLM, that “the objective of the Tutsis is obviously to exterminate the Hutu, the majority mass”.

A 1992 issue of *Kangura* states: “Find out again your ethnicity because the Tutsi have taught you not to recognise it… Know that a proud and bloodthirsty minority mixed with you in order to dilute you, divide you, dominate you, and massacre you… The nation is artificial but ethnicity is eternal.” The *Kangura* newspaper was the most well-known example of Government-sponsored hate propaganda. From April 1991, the newspaper with a circulation of approximately 10,000 was printed free of charge by the National Printing Press. Rwanda Armed Forces, Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, head of Military Intelligence, personally assisted in the distribution of the newspaper in Kigali. The newspaper repeated calls by the authorities for the elimination of the Tutsis. It carried the warning: “Let us learn about the Inkontanyi plans and then let us eliminate every last one of them”. Closely, linked to propaganda and the language of genocide is the ideology of the elite.

*Low media openness: yes*

*Risk of genocide: high*

### 3.4d Ideology of the Ruling Elite

The use of exclusionary ideology and the construction of identities in terms of “us” and “them” to accentuate differences was an important factor in the Rwandan genocide. Also of significance was the depiction of the targeted group, the Tutsi, as dangerous and disloyal, as a threat and as unworthy or inferior so as to justify action against the group. The ideology that underpinned the genocide in Rwanda was one of racial supremacy, whereby the Hutu were supreme. The extreme version of this ideology culminated in genocide. The ideology developed and
promoted by the Hutu extremists was based on a particular history of ethnicity - the Hamitic thesis, a populist and racist version of Rwandan history, which suggested the Tutsi were of alien origins and did not belong in Rwanda.

An ideology of hatred began to grow based on the presumed Hamitic origins of Tutsi. A 1993 issue of Kangura stated:

“A cockroach can not give birth to a butterfly. It is true. A cockroach gives birth to another cockroach…The history of Rwanda shows that a Tutsi stays exactly the same, that he has never changed. The malice, the evil are just as we knew them in the history of our country” (Quoted in Des Forges, 1999, p. 73).

The core of this ideology and the discourse surrounding it are best exemplified in the words of Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, the military officer in charge of the elite forces when the genocide began: “The Tutsi never had a country of their own to make themselves into a people… They are people who came to Rwanda and were naturalised” and with “arrogance and pride” they imposed “their supremacy on the Hutu of Rwanda”. He continues: “the Tutsi were proud, arrogant, tricky and untrustworthy and were convinced that the only good Tutsi was a Tutsi in power”. The Hutu, he argued in comparison, were “modest, honest, loyal, independent and impulsive” (Melvern, 2004, p. 3).

*The Ten Commandments of the Hutu*, published in Kangura, in December 1990, was a manifesto against Tutsi that clearly set out behaviour expected of Hutu. Like “Hitler’s Nuremberg Laws or the Bosnian Serbs’ 1992 edicts, “these commandments,” argues Power, “articulated the rules of the game” (2003, p. 338). For example, the commandments defined any “Hutu who marries a Tutsi woman; befriends a Tutsi woman; employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or concubine” as a “traitor”. They also declared: “Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group”. Particularly chilling is the eighth commandment, which states: “The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi”.
In a letter dated 21 September 1992, the General Staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces ordered that an extract from a commission report be circulated among the troops. In the extract the primary enemy was defined as: "The Tutsi from inside or outside the country, who are extremists and nostalgic for power, who do not recognize and have never recognized the realities of the Social Revolution of 1959, and are seeking to regain power in Rwanda by any means, including taking up arms." The secondary enemy was defined as: "Anyone providing any kind of assistance to the main enemy". The document specified that the enemy was being recruited from within certain social groups, notably: "the Tutsi inside the country, Hutu who are dissatisfied with the present regime, foreigners married to Tutsi women..." In the document, the enemy was also accused of "the diversion of national opinion from the ethnic problem to the socio-economic problem between the rich and the poor" (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 1998).

The extremism is evidenced even in popular music, for example, singer Simon Bikindi’s lines: “I hate them and I don’t apologize for that. I hate them and I don’t apologize for that. Lucky for us that they are few in number” (Quoted in Des Forges, 1999: 83).

3.4e The Arming of Rwanda – a military regime

By the start of 1994, Rwanda was awash with arms and while other sectors were collapsing, the military was expanding. There was a massive increase in the army, from 3000 to 40,000 soldiers, between 1990 and 1993 (Cohen, 2007, p. 31). While the quantity of arms should have been a concern, and the nature of the distribution of arms should have sent the alarm bells ringing, apprehension at rapid militarisation was kept to a minimum because the government was in a war with the RPF. War can act as a smoke screen for genocide and in Rwanda this was no exception.

The preparations for genocide occurred in a civil war and nations engaged in a civil war will naturally see an expansion of the military. However, as Stephen Goose and Frank Smyth of Human Rights Watch point out, the “proliferation of
weapons in Rwanda expanded the conflict... Their wide availability helped Hutu extremists carry out their slaughter on a horrendous scale” (1994). Michael Klare wrote, in The Observer, a year after the genocide “Although the vilest images from last year are of massacre by machete, it is important to remember that Rwanda’s government was backed in its tyranny by a formidable armoury provided by the West” (in McNulty, 2000). An arms embargo was not imposed on Rwanda until a month and a half into the genocide.

Rwanda became the third largest importer of weapons in Africa, in the three years from October 1990, despite being one of the poorest countries in the world. In the three years preceding the genocide, Rwanda spent $US 112 million on weapons and tools. Melvern questions how an impoverished nation like Rwanda could afford it. The answer, she proposes, is “straightforward”. The money came from international backers, including international institutions, the World Bank and the IMF and powers such as France, Germany, Belgium and the US. Large-scale projects to import tools into Rwanda began in 1993. There were eighteen separate deals to import agricultural/gardening tools and machetes in to Rwanda. Many of the companies that were now importing tools into Rwanda had no such imports in 1991 and 1992. Tools included saws, spades, machetes, knives, axes, hoes, hammers, and shears. To understand the magnitude of the tool imports an examination of machetes is illustrative: in 1993 alone, 581,175 kilos of machetes costing US$ 725,669 were brought in. There was a new machete for every third male in Rwanda) (Melvern)

Not only was France financially supporting Rwanda’s rapid militarisation but she was also involved in the actual supply of arms. In 1991 and 1992, France sent $US 6 million in arms, and in 1993 alone $US4 million worth of armaments were provided.

The Human Rights Watch Arms Project report concluded: Much of the killing was carried out with traditional weapons and farming implements… however, the security forces often finished off the survivors seeking refuge in churches, stadiums or school buildings with automatic rifles and grenades”(1994)
3.5 Economic factors

“Economic tensions on their own do not create genocide” (African Rights, 1994, p. 14), however, the state of Rwanda’s economy and the impact of this on its people is important. During the period, 1970-79, Rwanda’s GDP grew by an impressive annual average of 4.7%. However, it slowed to 2.2% in the years 1980-88, and fell further in the early 1990s (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1995). By 1993, GDP per capita was an estimated US$200, compared with US$330 in 1989, which signifies a 40% drop in only four years. This dramatic decrease coincided with a 50% fall in foreign earnings from coffee, Rwanda’s key export.

External debt for Rwanda culminated in 1992 at US$873 million from US$189 million in 1980. In 1989 the value of imported goods was three times higher than the value of goods exported, a consequence of the decline in Rwanda’s terms of trade, which fell by 47% between in 1980 and 1987.

Rwanda was ranked 21st lowest by Human Development measures in 1990, see figure 7 for the indicators. This rank is based on statistics from the years 1985 – 1987. Life expectancy during this time was 49 years. The infant mortality rate in 1993 was 119.4 deaths/1,000 live births.

*Economic development:* low (high infant mortality)

*Genocide risk:* high
Before the civil war Rwanda was facing severe socio-economic problems. A number of factors had a negative impact on the economy including: land shortage, very high population growth, limited industrialisation, its landlocked situation, high prices for imported goods, regular famine, high youth unemployment. “During Habyarimana’s rule, almost everyone was working in agriculture, the degree of urbanisation was the lowest in the world”. Long before the 1990s, writes Uvin: “life in Rwanda had become devoid of hope and dreams for the large majority of people: the future looked worse than the already bad present. Peasant life was perceived as a prison without escape in which poverty, infantilisation, social inferiority and powerlessness combined to create a sense of personal failure” (Uvin, 1998..)
3.6 Ethnic Factors

Straus (2009) says that ancient tribal hatreds and ethnic animosity do not really explain the Rwandan genocide. He argues that this explanation leaves too many questions unanswered. Ethnicity mattered in the Rwandan genocide, but not in the most obvious way. Looking to longstanding ethnic prejudice, as an explanation for the events in Rwanda will not provide a satisfactory explanation. In general, Hutus did not kill Tutsis because of a long deep-seated hatred. Certainly, the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi predated the conflict, but this awareness was not marked by antipathy and hatred between groups (Straus, 2006 and 2009).

Ethnic violence in itself did not cause the genocide, though ethnicity was a salient cleavage. The Hutu and Tutsi did not fit the classic model of deeply divided ethnic groups. The two groups spoke the same language, practiced the same religion, and lived in the same neighbourhoods. Intermarriage was also common between Hutu and Tutsi. However, Rwanda does have a history of political ideologies based on ethnicity and race. Critical to an understanding of the violence and repression that has marred Rwanda’s recent history is the colonial and independence periods.

The Hutu and Tutsi identities were racialised and deemed immutable by the Belgian administrators. During the colonial period identity cards, introduced by the Belgians in 1930, identified Rwandans along ethnic and racial lines. The Tutsi were favoured by the German and Belgian administration as the superior race and were privileged with positions of authority. Straus argues that some writers have placed too much emphasis on the role of colonialism: “Some consumers of this history attribute too much blame, in my view, to colonialism.” He concludes, nonetheless, that “colonialism did have an impact”. Colonial rule altered the meaning and salience of ethnicity: what it meant to be Hutu or Tutsi. “The colonial experience racialised and hardened previously more fluid and complex identities”, argues Straus (2006, p. 46) and to some extent, the Rwandan population began to adopt this colonial perception of themselves.

According to Lemarchand “ethnic identities are not pure invention” Hutu and Tutsi “are not figments of the colonial imagination”, rather these “identities have
been invested with a normative load which they did not have before colonialism”. The colonial system took “advantage of these relations by making them more rigid [and helped] “intensify the antagonism between the privileged Tutsi And the disadvantaged Hutu” (Nzongola: 64).

From 1926 – 1957, Hutu were opposed to Tutsi, predominantly for reasons of political domination, of which the Tutsi were the ‘dominant’ or ‘superior’ group. Between 1957 and 1994, despite the change to this hierarchy, the Hutu still remained vehemently opposed to the Tutsi.

“While not all Tutsi were wealthy and powerful under colonial rule, almost no Hutu were, and most Hutu suffered greatly from the increased demands imposed upon them” (Uvin, 1999: 255-256). This power imbalance resulted in a struggle for independence, defined largely in ethnic terms, whereby the politics of decolonisation was also characterised in this way. Ethnic cleavages played an important role in the fierce competition for state power.

“When ever [the] elite was threatened”, argues Uvin, “it exacerbated ethnic divisions to thwart democratization and power sharing” (Uvin, 1999: 253). At a public level there existed an institutionalisation of prejudice, the radicalization of animosity, routine violence and the moral exclusion of a people, which allowed for, firstly, their social death and then their physical death.

### 3.6a Ethnic Character of the Ruling Elite

What Rwanda shows is the importance of the ethnic character of the ruling elite and its fragile grip on power. President Habyarimana was a northern Hutu. As a result, since 1973, this group had controlled political patronage and dominated the civil service, the key source of wealth and power in Rwanda, as in many developing countries. Their position of privilege was maintained through institutionalised discrimination. There was a smaller group of elite within the larger circle: the akazu or ‘little house’. The divide was not just between Hutu and Tutsi but also within Hutu, between the Hutu from the North and those from Southern Rwanda. In the North there was little intermarriage between Tutsi and Hutu, unlike in the South. Northern Hutu viewed the southerners as ‘other’
because of their close ties with Tutsi. This perception, argues Midlarsky is what probably “inspired the northern dominated government to unleash especially severe genocidal action in the south of Rwanda” (2005, p.176). Moderate Hutu from this region were also targeted “You understand that when the majority is divided, the minority becomes the majority” (Midlarsky, 2005, p.176). Political upheaval, the civil war, peace negotiations and the conditions which it promoted, in particular, multi-party governance, had the potential to erode ethnic exclusivity and the power this gave the northern Hutu elite, in particular the akazu.

3.6b Policies and Practices of Discrimination

Past and present patterns of discrimination against members of a group, with significant socio-economic disparities and a pattern of deliberate exclusion from economic resources and social and political life increases the likelihood of a group being targeted for genocide. The Tutsi in Rwanda faced discrimination on a number of fronts. They were subjected to institutionalised discrimination from the beginning of Hutu power. Following the dramatic reversal in their status after the Hutu revolution, and with it the reprisal killings, the socio-political position of the Tutsi continued to decline, even once the violent persecution subsided. Tutsi were relegated to the status of ‘second class citizens’. All Tutsi were removed from public office and their enrolment in the public education system was curtailed. Perhaps most importantly, the government continued, via official literature and the public education system, to characterize the Hutu/Tutsi divide as racial in nature, not ethnic. The purpose of this distinction was that, via a “racial” differentiation, Tutsi could be characterised as alien, non-indigenous, and thus not genuine Rwandan nationals, where as ethnic differentiations could perceivably exist within a single national identity. Under Kayibanda, domestic Tutsi were viewed not as Rwandan citizens by the Hutu government, but as domestic aliens to be tolerated; aliens who participated in civil life, yet were removed from the political sphere and from its corresponding rights and protections.

Under Habyarimana, the Hutu/Tutsi divide was reclassified by the government as “ethnic,” not racial, and the moratorium on Tutsi government participation was lifted, though Tutsi participation in government remained low. Quota systems
were established for ethnic participation in education and public sector jobs which attempted to proportionally distribute participation between the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups. In his stated quest to redress historical wrongs, Habyarimana committed the government to a policy of “reconciliation.” However, a reclassification of the Hutu/Tutsi differentiation from racial to ethnic was not equivalent to a repudiation of the differentiation itself, and discrimination was still prevalent in society and policy. Although the “Tutsi” were defined by the state as an ethnic minority, they were denied recognition as a protected minority and remained conspicuously absent from elected offices. Some vestiges of the old regime remained codified as well, such as the law that Hutu military officials were not allowed to marry Tutsi women. Despite years of relative peace following the formation of the Second Republic, Habyarimana’s goals of reconciliation ultimately failed. Hutu/Tutsi differences remained codified in law. Under Habyarimana’s regime “there would not be a single Tutsi burgomaster or prefect, there was only one Tutsi officer in the whole army, there were two Tutsi Members of Parliament out of seventy” (Prunier, p.258). There also existed a pattern of regional discrimination and power concentration, notably the northern prefectures. (Straus, The Order of Genocide. Cornell University Press. p. 23)

When Habyarimana’s government began the transition to a democratic system in the late 1980s, it was, perhaps, inevitable that divisions would manifest once again along Hutu/Tutsi lines.

Ethnic classification on ID Cards in Rwanda, instituted by the Belgian colonial government and retained after independence, was central in shaping, defining and perpetuating ethnic identity (Fussell, 2001). This was a significant factor, according to Fussell (2001), in facilitating the speed and magnitude of the genocide. Once the 1994 genocide in Rwanda began, an ID card with the designation "Tutsi" spelled a death sentence at any roadblock.

3.7 External factors

Harff, in examining the international context of genocide, highlights the importance of economic and political interdependence in attempts by leaders to commit genocide: “the greater the degree to which a country is interdependent
with others, the less likely its leaders are to attempt geno-/politicides” (Harff, 2003, 65). Trade openness in Rwanda, in 1993, measured by the proportion of imports and exports within the GDP was low, at approximately 14%. The salience of this factor is the idea that trade openness indicates a country’s connectedness to the international economic arena and, thus, its dependency on it. States less open to trade are less connected to the international system.

There are a number of other external factors that influenced the genocidal outcome of the conflict in Rwanda. Upheaval and the presence of a large politically active or militant refugee presence, which shares the identity of the target group, in neighbouring states can have a spill over effect and incite or accelerate genocide.

Events in neighbouring Burundi played an important part in the events that occurred in Rwanda. Of significance is the assassination of Burundi’s first Hutu president by the Tutsi dominated army. In Burundi, unlike in Rwanda, the Tutsi stayed in power following independence to the exclusion of Hutu. Burundi’s social structure paralleled that of Rwanda but in Burundi the Tutsi had clung to power. Melson suggest that the Burundian leaders of the Tutsi dominated army had “learned the lessons of the Hutu led revolution of 1959 only too well and were determined to prevent the rise of a Hutu ethnocracy in Burundi” (Melson, 1992, p. 332) The mass murder of Hutu in Burundi in 1972 by the Tutsi dominated military regime, with as many as 100,000 dead, resulted in the escalation in killing of Tutsi in Rwanda (Kiernan, 557). The power balance moved, in 1993, with multi-party elections that brought to power a Hutu government. The assassination, which took place in October 1993, and the killings of Hutu that ensued, were “rich material for the extremists in Rwanda” who used it as ‘evidence’ that the Tutsi led by the RPF would return to Rwanda to reassert their historic dominance over the Hutu. The assassination was broadcast on RTLM and was depicted as a plot by Tutsi to eliminate Hutu and to gain control of the entire region (Melvern, p. 72). At a rally in the days following the death, Karamira, a Hutu extremist leader in Rwanda, stated “we can not sit down and think that what happened in Burundi would not happen here,” the “enemy” he asserted “was everywhere.”
3.7a Exile and Refugee communities

Another significant regional influence was the presence of Tutsi refugees in the countries neighbouring Rwanda (Midlarsky, 2005 and Mamdani, 2001). Mamdani looks beyond the political boundaries of ‘Rwanda’ and puts the history of Rwanda in a regional context, examining the behaviour of the perpetrators from this perspective. By 1962 there were 120,000 Tutsi refugees, who had fled Rwanda in response to post-revolutionary violence; two years later there was an estimated 330,000. The refugees “constituted an element of structural insecurity, especially since the communities of Tutsi refugees never accepted exile as a fait accompli - on the contrary they always claimed…their right to return” (Sellstrom and Wohlgemuth, 2001 or 1997, p. 3). From bases in Burundi and Uganda, guerrilla assaults were mounted by Tutsi refugees, who were attempting to return. A large number of Rwandan Tutsi in exile received training in guerrilla warfare in Uganda. The Ugandan National Resistance Army (NRA) recruited anyone who was willing to fight, regardless of ethnicity. The presence of refugees “grievously accentuated the dimensions of loss” (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 164) and heightened the threat perceptions of the ruling elite in Rwanda. The civil war and RPF advances, beginning in late 1990 saw as many as 80,000 Hutu in Rwanda displaced. By 1992 the figure had grown to 350,000 and by 1993 the number of internally displaced in Rwanda reached 950,000 (Mamdani, 2001, p. 205). The civil war, and the displacement that went with it caused widespread hunger and starvation. Faced with dislocation and deprivation, argues Mamdani, memories of the Tutsi monarchy, their position of superiority and the 1959 revolution, were easily invoked amongst the poor Hutu. Hutu Power took advantage of the increased destitution, displacement and the fear that went with it. Many of the internally displaced Hutu were recruited into the militias.

Genocide is a strategic, rational decision or policy choice by those in power or those contending power. Genocide, as was the case in Rwanda, was planned, premeditated, a policy option advance their agenda and maintain their grip on power. For this reason the actions of outside actors, as country progresses a long a genocidal path must be considered. Other actors intervene to make genocide a more or less likely option. As Lemarchand aptly points out “[c]ertainly no one
familiar with the extent of French complicity during the Rwanda bloodbath, or indeed with the extraordinary indifference of the international community…can avoid the conclusion that the organizers of the killings entertained few doubts that they could literally get away with murder” (Lemarchand, p. 20).

The actions, and lack of action, of international actors had devastating consequences in Rwanda. These however, are overwhelmingly problems with the response, after the outbreak of mass violence, rather than an underlying precondition. An examination of the response of the international community to the Rwandan genocide is beyond the scope of this thesis, but some of the main issues will be discussed. Dallaire:

"Let there be no doubt: the Rwandan genocide was the ultimate responsibility of those Rwandans who planned, ordered, supervised and eventually conducted it… Next in line when it comes to responsibility are France, which moved in too late and ended up protecting the genocidaires and permanently destabilizing the region, and the U.S. government, which actively worked against an effective UNAMIR and only got involved to aid the same Hutu refugee population and the genocidaires, leaving the genocide survivors to flounder and suffer (515).

The role of France, the US and the United Nations is worthy of examination and this thesis will touch upon this. Firstly, France had 600-1000 troops in Rwanda beginning in 1990. The Rwandan army at this time had only 3000 men, of which only 2000 were competent fighters. Arguably, the French presence stopped the RPF offensive reaching Kigali, in February 1993. Secondly, military aid and troop training supplied by the French to the Rwandan Army is of importance. While arms had been continually supplied, there was an rapid escalation in supplies, after February 1993, up to twenty tons of arms and ammunitions were coming in a day. Furthermore “French soldiers on the ground were assisting in combat, in interrogating the military prisoners, and in enforcing control measures on the civilian population” (Des Forges, 1999, p. 68).

The use of the term genocide was desperately avoided and there was among the Clinton administration at the time an “extreme aversion to US military
involvement”. This was due to some extent to the ‘Somalia effect’. Less than a year before, in a disastrous peacekeeping mission in Somalia, American soldiers were killed and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu. Following this, the US “vowed never to return to a conflict it couldn't understand, between clans and tribes it didn't know, in a country where the US had no national interests”. There was, as Power argues “no appetite for deploying troops in a risky situation in Central Africa. Nor did UN officials want to expose peacekeepers to increased risk after Somalia”. Midlarsky, “When salient embarrassing events such as the Somalia intervention occur, the probability of immobilizing even potential great power interveners increases” (Midlarsky, 2005, p. 392). Thereby increasing the risk of genocide. “When faced with causalities to their forces, the international peace keepers would withdraw, allowing the extremists a free reign to scuttle the Arusha Accords, or to do far worse” (Ibid). Since forceful action was off the table, American officials did not want the term “genocide” used—despite overwhelming evidence that genocide was indeed occurring in Rwanda.

Power (2002) argues that inactivity came from a lack of political, moral and imaginative effort and will and it was not as some argue a matter of ignorance, or the belief that what was taking place was a continuation of the civil war between the RPF and the RAF. Dallaire supports this argument:

A representative of one major power came to me within the first weeks of the genocide and said quite clearly that, after doing an assessment, they had decided that they were not going to come and stop the carnage…. This representative said, 'You know, this country is of no strategic value. Geographically, it provides us nothing. It's not even worth putting a radar station here’’

Doing nothing, as was the case in Rwanda, “merely allows the killing to continue unabated, and may even escalate it by signaling apathy or consent” (Valentino). Neutral interventions do not appear to have much of an ameliorative effect, and might also exacerbate the killing, as the establishment of "safe areas" in Bosnia and Rwanda demonstrated (Power, 2002a).

As Des Forges(1999) and Power (2002a) point out General Dallaire may have been correct, had his infamously ignored request to the United Nations for larger
military presence been acted upon, the genocide may have stopped or been made less severe by a timely intervention. In retrospect, many policymakers, including President Clinton, have admitted that this was a crucial error, and that early action was necessary.
Chapter 4:
Sudan

4.1 Introduction

“Kill all the blacks,” “Kill all the slaves”

April 2004 marked the ten year anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda. The commemoration of the 800,000 Rwandans whose lives were lost was also a reminder of the failure of the international community to act to stop this atrocity. This date was also marked by reports that genocide was underway in the Darfur region of Sudan and had, in fact, been underway since late 2003. On the 7th April of that year, UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, expressed his sense of foreboding about the imminent threat of genocide in the Darfur region of Sudan. While debate raged over the word best fit to describe the events in Darfur, thousands died and thousands continue to die. Six years later genocidal violence in the Darfur region of Sudan persists, and the international community has yet to reach a consensus on how best to act.

The situation in Darfur has been characterised by numerous terms, such as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, an ambiguous genocide, a counter-insurgency campaign, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Regardless of the term used to define the situation in Darfur, massacres, systematic rape, aerial bombardment and torching and looting of villages have claimed the lives of up to 400,000 black Sudanese and continue to claim more lives, as well as heightening insecurity in the region (John Hagan and Alberto Palloni, 2004: Reeves, 2007 http://www.sudanreeves.org/Article181.html). The past three years has seen changes in the dynamics of the conflict ‘but there has been no dramatic or sustained improvement in security for civilians’ (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p.
29) and an almost total lack of accountability for the genocidal crimes that have taken place allows it to continue.

4.2 The genocide

Large-scale attacks on civilian populations in Darfur have now been occurring for over six years. This thesis will focus on state sponsored violence that took place in the Darfur region of Sudan, between 2003 and 2005. Darfur’s six million people are around one fifth of the total Sudanese population. Darfur’s population before the violence began in 2003 was about 6.5 million and an estimated 300,000–400,000 civilians have been killed since then. The primary target of the violence in Darfur was and continues to be the Black Africans. Darfur is home to three large black African tribes: the Fur, the Massaleit, and the Zaghawa (population size is 800,000, 185,000 and 190,000 respectively). The genocide victims belong to these three groups Straus, 2006).

There are three clear distinguishing characteristics between victims and perpetrators of the genocide in Darfur. First, the Janjawed and Sudanese Government leaders and soldiers are Arab and define themselves as such and their victims are members of three non-Arab African tribes. Second, the killers are frequently lighter skinned and they routinely use racial epithets about ‘blacks’ and ‘slaves’ to describe those they kill. Third, the Janjaweed are predominantly Nomadic herdsmen as opposed to the sedentary farmers, which the victim (Straus, 2006, p.5).

The killings were carried out by the Government troops, in tandem with the Janjaweed (Arab militia). A Human Rights Watch (HRW) report aptly points out ‘[c]onflicts such as [the one, in Darfur] which appear to revolve around land and livestock, enable the government to claim the fighting is “inter-tribal and not their responsibility. However, as in so many cases, the facts show the government agents were involved in the attack. The Government’s failure to protect civilians and bring perpetrators to justice is not a passive failing, it is systematic policy” (Human Rights Watch, 2007 p. 40).
According to Straus, there is “considerable evidence that the militia, army and air-force act in a coordinated fashion” (2006, p. 43), which dispels those who argue that it does not fit the definition of genocide. The events in Darfur do fit the definition of genocide. In 2004, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bertrand Ramcharan, issued a report, *Situation of human rights in the Darfur region of the Sudan*. It characterized the situation in Darfur by the following: “(a) repeated attacks on civilians by the military forces of the Government of the Sudan and its proxy militia; (b) the use of indiscriminate aerial bombardments and ground attacks on unarmed civilians; (c) the use of disproportionate force by government and Janjaweed forces; (d) that the Janjaweed have operated with total impunity and in close coordination with the forces of the Government of the Sudan; (e) that the attacks appear to have been largely ethnically based with the groups targeted being essentially the Zaghawa, Masaalit and Fur tribes, which are reportedly of African origin […]; (f) the pattern of attacks on civilians includes killing, rape, pillage, including of livestock, and destruction of property, including water sources; and (g) that there has been massive, often forced, displacement of much of the population of Darfur” (2005, p. 22-23). The High Commissioner for Human Rights went on to say: “[t]he patterns of violence point to an intent on the part of the Sudanese authorities to subjugate those populations perceived to be providing a support base for the rebels. In some instances, there were reports of actions by the Government of the Sudan and the militia to prevent the populations from crossing international borders” (2005, p. 23).

United States’ State Department officials concluded that there was close coordination between the Government and the *Janjaweed*. Former Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated in his testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “There was a coordinated effort, not just random violence…The government of Sudan and the *Janjaweed* bear responsibility (2004).”

Reportedly, militia leaders admit they take orders from the Government and Government soldiers and militias frequently sleep in the same camps. In an interview, by the Aegis Trust, a former militia member who had defected said “Firstly, we send a group to survey, to find out about if there are people in the
village or not. Then the next step is to attack the entire village after surrounding it. We have to know whether there are people who are able to fight or not. If not, we will burn down the entire village….The orders come directly from the Government, and they are to wipe out the entire village completely. The Government will give the order to commanders and these commanders give orders to us…They give you a camel worth 2m Sudanese pounds. They tell you this camel is for you, and you will be on a monthly salary of 500,000 Sudanese pounds‖ (Aegis Trust, 2006).

The Physicians for Human Rights conclude that:

"[b]y eliminating access to food, water and medicine, expelling people into inhospitable terrain and then, in many cases, blocking crucial outside assistance, the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed have created conditions calculated to destroy the non-Arab people of Darfur. By eliminating access to food, water and medicine, expelling people into inhospitable terrain and then, in many cases, blocking crucial outside assistance, the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed have created conditions calculated to destroy the non-Arab people of Darfur" (2006, p. 1).

According to a HRW report (2007) on one particular attack in the town of Saraf Umra, which killed hundreds of civilians and displaced 10,000, eyewitnesses saw the police officer in charge of Saraf Umra distributing weapons to militia during the attack. They also reported that other members of Sudanese security forces were actively taking part. This example is not unique and reports from a number of organizations, which interviewed refugees who fled to camps in Chad confirm the direct involvement of Government forces as well as the use of militia supported by Government.

The Government of Sudan “exploited tensions in the region”, connected largely to land shortages, desertification and water shortages and mobilized thousands of “desperately poor men, most of whom identified themselves as Arabs, in to militias, whish went on to commit widespread atrocities. “Although the mission accepts that there are complex tribal and resource dimensions permeating the current conflict, it considers that there are other powerful undercurrents rooted in
the systematic marginalization of certain groups” (UNOHCHR, 2004, p. 21). Flint points out, however, “[it] can not be stated too often that the majority of Arab tribes in Darfur have refused to join the government’s war in Darfur, despite blandishments, threats and inducements” (Flint, p. 1).

The violence in Darfur is characterised by mass forced displacement, killing of men, women and children, mass rape of women and girls and destruction of villages, as well as the villagers’ means of survival. Many of the deaths are attributable to malnutrition and disease, which stands in stark contrast to Rwanda, where death was predominantly the result of direct killing. This thesis has established that what took place in Darfur, 2003-2005 was genocide, the next phase is to establish why and what led the elite to commit genocide.

4.3 Structural Factors

4.3a Political upheaval

Since independence in 1959, Sudan has seen only 11 years of peace. The Government waged a war in the South for more than 30 years, which cost the lives of an estimated 2 million people (Straus, 2006, p. 45). Bordering nine countries Sudan has also experienced violent cross border conflict with most of these countries. It has been both a victim and cause of “instability that has rocked the Horn of Africa” (Natsios, 2006, p. 25). Not only has the country been plagued by war but also successive regime change.

4.3b Regime crises

A Military coup, led by General Ibrahim Abboud, overthrew parliamentary democracy in 1958. The Constitution was abrogated and opposition political parties were suppressed. This military dictatorship was in place until October 1964. What followed was a “succession of ineffectual civilian combinations” (1989, p. 52) of multiparty government until 1969 when there was a communist coup d’etat. The coup d’etat failed and was followed by a one party military dictatorship, under Colonel Ja’afar Nimeiri, which lasted until April 1985. During this period, all political parties were declared illegal. The Nimeri regime survived an attempted coup in 1970 and prevented another coup the following year. It was
eventually toppled, in 1985, when Sudan returned to civilian multiparty government, which, after only two years, was “cracking at the seams” (Khalid, 1990). The current Salvation regime came to power in 1989, ousting the only elected government in Khartoum. Sudan’s history from independence until 1989 was riddled with regime crises, a factor common to countries who have suffered from genocide.

4.3c Armed Conflict

i) War in the South

The first civil war began, in 1955, shortly before independence. The war continued until 1972, when a peace agreement was reached between the rebels and the government in Addis Ababa. The Addis Ababa agreement gave the South its own regional government (Human Rights Watch, 2003, p. 130). Despite the Addis Ababa Agreement, autonomy in the South was more rhetoric than reality and any development in this area was curtailed, with the dissolution of the southern regional government, in 1983 (ibid.). An underlying cause of the civil war, which resumed again in the 1980s, was the economic and cultural gap between the Muslim, Arab inhabitants of the central northern regions, whose elites had state control since independence, and the non-Arab, largely non-Muslim peoples of the South. Southerners faced constant discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity and religion; and the southern region was marginalized economically. This pattern of armed conflict driven by uneven regional development and discrimination at the expense of the hegemonic North is also evident in the Western region, particularly Darfur.

Straus (2006), highlights a more proximate link between the violence in Sudan and the war in the South: the gradual ending of this war, starting with negotiations in 2001 through to an agreement and an end to the civil war, in 2005. There are two aspects of note, one, the impending peace agreement had the potential to diminish both the power and territorial size of the Government of Sudan; and two, it alienated the Darfurians, who were completely left out of the negotiations. Black Africans in Darfur, argues Straus, “worried about the future in post-war Sudan” (2006, p. 46).
ii) In the Darfur region:

For several decades, the region has been affected by intermittent bouts of conflict. These were often fought over water sources and grazing in the dry season, problems caused by increased desertification and drought. Land disputes occurred between the Arab pastoralists and the agricultural communities. Conflict over resources between the nomadic Arabs and the sedentary Africans increased in intensity during the 1970s and 1980s, due to desertification resulting from severe droughts in the early 1970s (Igiri and Lyman, 2004, p. 8).

With the introduction of automatic weapons into the disputes, the late 1980s saw an increase in the number of fatalities in the conflict. A devastating and prolonged drought in Darfur, during the mid 1980s, incited armed banditry, whereby many pastoralists who lost their livestock during the drought, restocked their herds by raiding others (Straus, 2006, p. 5; and HRW, 2007).

Policies at the national level, argues Straus (2006), impacted on the conflict in Darfur. Conflict in Darfur soon developed from competition for resources to large-scale warfare, due to the involvement of the national Government, in Khartoum. Northern leaders, asserts Straus, “supplied weapons to local Arabs and promoted Arabs in local government positions, thereby, increasing Arab power and leverage in the region and marginalising black Africans” (2006, p. 5).

Of particular importance to decisions by elite to adopt genocidal strategies is the threat that they are faced with (real or perceived) to their position of power. In Sudan the Government faced increasing threats to their power and feared they would lose their power in the Western region of Sudan.

According to Human Rights Watch, hostilities broke out in West Darfur in 1998 when Arab nomads began moving south with their flocks earlier than usual. This conflict, while minor, compared to what was to come, saw the displacement of 5000 Masalit into Chad, 60 villages burnt down and 69 Masalit and 11 Arab killed (HRW, 2004). The conflict that followed in 1999 was even ‘bloodier’, with many
hundreds killed, including a number of Arab tribal chiefs. A reconciliation conference held in 1999 agreed on compensation for Masalit and Arab losses but what followed was the arrest, imprisonment and torture of many Masalit intellectuals and notables, as in the towns as government-supported Arab militias began to attack Masalit villages; a number of Arab chiefs and civilians were also killed in these clashes (HRW, 2004). From there on, violence in the region steadily rose.

iii) Guerrilla Warfare

In 2003, two Black African groups, in Darfur, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), launched an armed rebellion against the Sudanese state - accusing the government of oppressing non-Arabs in favour of Arabs, and Darfur in particular.

These groups justified their action as a counter-marginalization movement; “they claim to take up arms to fight against the legacy of decades of discrimination for more political power and a share of Sudan’s $1 million-per-day oil revenue” (Wax, 2004). Valentino points out that “mass killing is most accurately viewed as an instrumental policy – a brutal strategy designed to accomplish leaders’ most important ideological or political objectives and counter what they see as their most dangerous threats.” (Valentino, 2004, p.3). According to Human Rights Watch (2004, p. 10), the Darfur rebels “pose a far greater menace to their hold on office than the rebellion [in the South] …ever did”. The JEM, was predominantly made up of Zaghawa. The Government response in Darfur, is to large extent, a response to the perceived threat of the Zaghawa. The guerrilla warfare waged by these groups was seen by those in Khartoum as a means of coming to power, as the Zaghawa had in neighbouring Chad. Dagne, argues that “the JEM and SLA gained the upper hand in 2003 in initial phase of the conflict as they enjoyed the support of the local population, as well as that of some officers in the Sudanese army” (Dagne, 2005, p. 6). By mid 2003 the Khartoum’s regular military forces were regularly defeated by Darfur insurgency groups. Which meant the regime resorted to the classic counter insurgency strategy of destroying the civilian base of military resistance in the region, through scorched earth tactics, which systematically targeted civilians. Attacks on government installations were
considered an attack on the Arab leadership, which was at the same time facing threats from other regional groups. In addition, Valentino (2004) also attested that “a ‘final solution’ is chosen when leaders believe that their victims pose a threat that can be countered only by removing them from society or by permanently destroying their ability to organize politically and militarily” (Valentino, 2004, p. 5).

In response, the government mounted a campaign of aerial bombardment supporting ground attacks by an Arab militia, the Janjaweed. At the time of the genocide the Janjaweed numbered more than 20,000 men. The attack on Al-Fasher airport in April 2003 in which 70 government soldiers were killed as well as the destruction of helicopters and planes led to an increasingly severe response from the Government. The Janjaweed was used to suppress rebellion in Darfur, which arose in reaction to increasingly discriminatory development policies; what followed was a policy of genocidal proportions.

**Political Upheaval:** yes – high degree of political upheaval

**Risk of genocide:** high

**Guerrilla Warfare:** yes

**Risk of genocide:** high

### 4.3d Prior genocide/politicides

Sudan is one of the few countries which have had more than two genocides. The two prior genocides were in 1956-1972, with a death toll of 400,000 – 600,000 and between 1983 and 2001, with the killing estimated at 2,000,000 (Peace and Conflict, 2005, p. 58). The first genocide, which started in October 1956 and ended in March 1972, was carried out by the northern Muslim-Arab dominated Government to suppress mostly non-Muslim Africans who support a secessionist movement in the South. The second genocide in Sudan targeted secessionist, non-Muslim southerners and Nuba for destruction by indiscriminate military attacks,
massacres by government-supported tribal militias and government-induced privation and population displacement.

Between 1998 and 2002, 5,000 people were killed and 40,000 homes destroyed by Government sponsored militias, in Darfur. One attack in May 2002, killed 17 and destroyed 600 homes; in September of that year 15 were killed; and in December 35 killed and 28 injured (Austin and Koppelman, 2004, p. 24).

Also evident is an increase in human rights violations in the years preceding the genocide in Darfur, in particular, the government’s manipulation of the justice system and its security forces to persecute the people of Darfur. In May 2001, the Sudanese government used the National Security Emergency Law to suppress possible Darfur uprisings under the guise of trying acts of banditry and possession of weapons, as well as “anything else considered a crime by the Governor of the State or the Head of the Judiciary” (United Nations Special Rapporteur, 2003). The clamp down on the possession of weapons only applied to Fur communities, and Arab nomadic groups were excluded from this, leaving the Fur communities defenceless. Indicative of the systematic human rights abuses is the increase in torture and the use of the death penalty. According to the World Organisation against Torture, between March 2002 and March 2003 there was an increase in the use of the death penalty. In this period, 19 were executed, with 133 awaiting execution, and nearly all occurred in Darfur (2005, p. 16).

Prior Genocide: yes: 2 prior genocides, since 1955

Risk of genocide: high

4.4 Political Factors

4.4a Regime Type

Sudan is ruled by the National Islamic Front (NIF), an Islamist regime under the leadership of General Omar al-Bashir, and he, along with nine Arab Muslim leaders, make up the Group of Ten, which forms the Salvation Regime. The
Group of Ten is an alliance between the military junta and the National Islamic Front (Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, 2001). The NIF has its powerbase in the primarily Arab and Muslim north of the country. Sudan is a ‘theocracy’ or an ‘autocracy’ and has been described as ‘predatory state’ (Thi Quach 2004, p. 11). This is evident in the action of the NIF, who within weeks of coming to power had closed down the free press, tortured or disappeared opponents and critics of the regime in "ghost houses", and banned any open assembly or public expression of opposition to the new regime. The only legitimate political party recognized was the NIF (Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban), 2001, p. 1). It was at this point, in 1990-91, ‘that the world began to take notice that this was no ordinary militarist state’ (Ibid). Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch published lists of the ‘ghost house’ detainees and a campaign was launched to put pressure on the Bashir-Turabi alliance to release these political prisoners and to stop their policy of state torture. The Sudan Human Rights Organisation was abolished in early in 1993 and many of its most active members were forced into exile. The NIF sought to create an Islamic state. After crushing dissent the regime began a policy for the implementation of an aggressive and sustained Islamisation and Arabisation of Sudan, which continues today (Ibid).

**Autocracy:** yes

**Risk of genocide:** high

### 4.4b Exclusionary Ideology

Sudan is governed by an ideology of Arab supremacy, which dictates the superiority and supremacy of the Arab race in Sudan (Straus, 2006, p. 5). Arab leadership is considered untouchable. Arab supremacy is an ideology that perceives and defines Arab beliefs and way of life as superior to all others, deeming those who are not Arab, as inferior. As an ideology, it calls for Arab dominance in all areas of life, including social, political, cultural, judicial, and economic. The pursuit of Arab dominance is at the expense of non-Arabs. According to Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, the Sudanese regime had already
“instituted a number of measures that had steered it along the path of politicised Islam” (2001, p. 1), before the Islamist coup of 1989. In 1983, General Ja'afar Nimeiri declared that Shari'a was to be the sole law in force in the Sudan, thus Islamising a basic state institution (Warburg, 2003, p. x). By 1985, the application of *hudud* punishments, for example amputations of hands and feet for theft, had reached over 200 in number, as Courts of Prompt Justice carried out the state Islamic law. In the late 1980s, the ‘Arab Gathering’ was established, with a supremist ideology that alluded to the killing of lesser non-Arabs and the looting of their farms.

Under the ideology in Sudan, the Arab race is credited with civilisation and black Africans, in contrast, are depicted as slaves (Flint and de Waal, 2005). A guiding aim of the NIF is to return society to 7th century Islam under its Civilisation Programme. Under Article 126 of the Penal Code, introduced in 1991, the government legalised the annihilation of populations they regarded as obstructing an agenda of Islamisation (Miller, 1996 and Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1993). Accordingly, indigenous forms of Islam were rejected and the adherents decried as apostates.

Sudan’s radical National Islamic Front military regime uses Islam as a justification for the atrocities it commits on civilians, primarily in the Nuba Mountains in central Sudan and throughout the provinces of southern Sudan and Darfur. The current regime is attempting to ‘Islamise’ and ‘Arabise’ both ‘black’ Muslims, and ‘black’ animists and Christians. By declaring jihad, and instituting a fundamentalist Islamic government with Islam as the state religion, the war being in Sudan has boiled down to a struggle over religious freedom, race and political rights (Deng, 2001).

The presence of an exclusionary ideology in a time of crisis can help to differentiate the threat of genocide from other forms of conflict. It is an important factor in a genocidal risk assessment. When an exclusionary ideology exists and civilians are being systematically targeted during a conflict, the situation should be described as *genocidal* regardless of whether a consensus is reached about whether it is genocide or not. In Sudan the violence was taking place in the
context of exclusionary ideology – a pattern which increases the likelihood of genocide taking place.

*Exclusionary Ideology: yes*

*Risk of genocide: high*

### 4.4c Low Media Openness

Human Rights Watch reported that from 2001, there was a reported increase the suspension of publications by the regime, the detention of journalists and pre-publication censorship. The National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) have sweeping powers granted under the 1999 National Security Forces Act (NSFA) to control the content of the country’s media, and engage in direct pre-print censorship of newspapers (Human Rights Watch, 2009, p. 10). The Ministry of Defence is the only source which can write on Government policy in the Darfur region. In conjunction with the 1999 National Security Forces Act (NSFA) Sudanese authorities rely on the 2004 Press and Publications Act, to control the country’s media and censor newspapers that report on any politically sensitive issues, including the work of the International Criminal Court, developments in Darfur, and human rights concerns (HRW, 2009, p. 12). These laws severely restrict journalists’ ability to report independently. In 2003, Sudan was ranked by Reporters without Borders as 142 on its Media Freedom Index (142). The use of these laws to control, restrict and harass journalists and the media is in violation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Sudan is party.

*Low media openness: yes*

*Risk of genocide: high*
4.5 Ethnic and Religious Factors

Ethnic distinctions in Darfur are highly politicized and complex. Initial reports and analysis suggested that genocide was being committed by Muslims against Christians and animists. The genocide in Darfur is not, “a case of religious persecution, since the killers as well as the victims of this genocide are Muslim” (Kristof, 2006). The majority of Darfur’s six million residents are Muslim. Darfur is populated by some ninety tribes and is described by Power (200?), as an ethnic “kaleidoscope” (ibid). “To a visitor, Darfurians appear indistinguishable” (Power). Groups in the region have historically identified themselves as Arab and Non Arab. Prunier argues that descriptions of Arabs killing Black Africans is over simplified. There has been intermarriage between tribes and “it’s hardly accurate to talk about Arabs killing Africans when they’re all Africans” (quoted in Kristoff, 2006).

While competition and conflict among the tribes is nothing new, tribal leaders customarily resolved these disputes, and their decisions were respected by the authorities in Khartoum. These conflicts were fought for economic and not ethnic reasons. Of importance is the ways in which the Sudanese government have manipulated ethnic tensions serving to polarize much of the Darfur population along ethnic lines. For Prunier (2005), the growing Arabism of Khartoum has fuelled a racial politics that interacts in complex ways. The government continues to stoke the chaos and, in some areas, exploit inter-communal tensions that escalate into open hostilities, apparently in an effort to "divide and rule" and maintain military and political dominance over the region” (Human Rights Watch, 2007).

4.5a The Ethnic Character of the Ruling Elite

State is controlled by Islam from the North. The NIF consolidated its hold on the state, in 1989, asserting control of financial institutions and purging the army of non-Islamists (Fluehr-Lobban and Lobban, 2001 and Totten, 2008). The Government of Sudan is dominated by Arab Muslim elites from the Khartoum
and Northern region of Sudan. The northern region (where Khartoum is located) comprises just over five percent of the population of Sudan; however, it controls almost all of the country; its resources, wealth, political power (Totten et al, 2008, p. 471). All Sudanese Presidents and Prime Ministers are from the North, as are most of those in positions of power (ibid.).

**Elite ethnicity:** yes, Arabs from the Northern regions dominate

**Risk of genocide:** high

### 4.5b Severe Economic and Political Discrimination

The Government of Sudan discriminates against the peripheral regions and Non-Arab populations. In the Peace and Conflict Report 2005 (Gurr and Marshall, 2005), Sudan was ranked as having active government policies of political and economic discrimination against minority groups who comprise at least 10 percent of the population. According to Thu Thi Quach ‘[s]tructural violence, in the form of pervasive discrimination, marginalization and inequality, created resentment and resistance that triggered overt violence’’ (2004; 1). Discrimination along ethnic lines, marginalization of the African tribes from the central government power, and uneven distribution of national wealth has a long history in Sudan and is a significant contributing factor to the violence in Darfur, as well as the civil war in the between the north-south (Wax, 2004, p. 9).

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, following his mission to Sudan and the border refugee camps in Chad, in 2004: “The sense of injustice, discrimination and marginalization was so deep amongst refugees and IDPs that it cannot be ignored. Both refugees and IDPs felt that they were being persecuted for belonging to certain communities. They expressed a lack of confidence in the objectivity and fairness of government structures in paying due attention to their concerns” (2004, p. 21). Uneven development, during the colonial era, between the North and the South, whereby the North developed at a faster rate, has had a significant impact on future relations, not only
between the North and South but also other regions of Sudan. Independence favoured the Northerners over the peripheral populations due to their generally better educational level. The central government was established in the North, in the region of Khartoum and from the offset required the resources of the regional areas for power. It was dependent on the recruitment often forced of people from the southern and western areas and of resources, of which oil later became crucial importance (Khalid, 1990, pp. 39 – 62).

Darfur is sorely undeveloped and requests for assistance for underfunded and often non existent roads, schools go unheard. The discrimination and neglect of Darfur is evidenced in the high infant mortality figures of the region. In the West 122.5 (boys) and 104.2 (girls) die per 1000 live births compared to the North 101.1 (boys) and 88.8 (girls). The difference can be accounted for by inadequate health facilities and trained medical personnel in the region (Totten, 2009, p. 564). “The entire State of Western Darfur has two medical specialists in the field of obstetrics and gynaecology, one in Geneina and the other in Zalengay. They are to serve a population of 1,650,000 aided by a few medical students who visit the area for training” (Totten, 2008).

The pattern is not unique to Darfur. In Southern Sudan, 60% of the population is non-Arab and 30% are non Muslim yet the government continues to insist that the language is Arabic and the state religion be Muslim. Furthermore, black Africans in Southern Sudan have historically been denied equal treatment and political rights or freedoms because of race (Totten, 2008).

*State sanctioned economic and political discrimination: yes.*

*Risk of genocide: high*
4.5c Low Economic Development

Poverty in Sudan was, and still is, widespread, according to a 2007 joint World Bank-UNDP findings, about 60-75% of the population in the North and 90 percent in the South is estimated to be living below the poverty line of less than US $1 a day. Development has been very uneven and favoured the North, in particular around Khartoum. Investments and services are concentrated in and around Khartoum state growth, where it occurred was not broad-based. Besides Khartoum state, the infrastructure (roads, railways, power and water) is either non-existent or underdeveloped across the country. Human Development indicators for 2003, the year that the genocide in Darfur started, are indicative of low economic and human development. In 2003, 40% of the population were illiterate and the infant mortality rate was 64 deaths per 1000 live births.

*Economic development:* low (high infant mortality)

*Genocide risk:* high

4.6 External Factors

Trade openness, in Sudan, in 2003, by the proportion of imports and exports within the GDP was very low, at approximately 7 percent. The salience of this factor is the idea that trade openness indicates a country’s connectedness to the international economic arena and, thus, its dependency on it. States less open to trade are less connected to the international system.

Of direct relevance to the genocide in Darfur are a number of other external/regional factors that need to be examined. If as Valentino suggests mass killing is an instrumental policy – a brutal strategy designed to accomplish leaders’ most important ideological or political objectives and counter what they see as their most dangerous threats” (Valentino, 2004, p. 3) then Chadian connection is important aspect of this perceived threat. The role of Chad in
Darfur illustrates the impact of external regional actors on genocide. The government of Chad has been accused of inciting and aiding the rebels in Darfur, as the Darfuri population has the same ethnic background as the Chadian leadership (Straus, 2006). The JEM appears to have received support from Chad, and some captured rebels were found to have Chadian identification and arms. According to Human Rights Watch, Darfur has traditionally been a staging base for Chadian coups and insurgencies (2004, p. 10). The President of Chad Idriss Deby, a Zaghawa, came to power in 1990 through a Darfur based insurgency (Ibid.).

The report, argues further, that Darfur’s rebel groups appeared to have the support of the Chadian Zaghawa community. Support for the rebels came not only from Chad but the Darfur rebels fighting the government of Sudan allegedly were given military training in Eritrea, according to the Eritrean opposition. These factors heightened the threat perception of the Sudanese Government, who felt their control over Darfur region was threatened.

A culture of impunity has arisen in Sudan because of the continued support of Sudan by some powers, and due to the lack of consequences for the vast human right violations and genocide in the South. International support for Sudan comes from the League of Arab States, which is sympathetic to the Northern government. What Doane sees as most ironic, however, was the membership of Sudan on the UN Human Rights Commission. The acceptance of such an abusive government “reveals the extent to which the world has turned a blind eye to the genocidal actions of the government of Sudan” (Doane, 2004, p. 6).

The continual trade in weapons with Sudan during the genocide contributed to the genocidal violence. The sale of weapons to the Sudanese government and state sponsored militias came from Bulgaria, China, Russia, Iraq, Iran and Former Soviet Republics. Russian ambassador to Khartoum congratulated Sudanese government for “reinforcing freedoms”. A report by Amnesty International, based on testimony from hundreds of survivors, along with commercial documents and UN arms trade data concluded:
- Military aircraft and components sold to Sudan from the Russia, China and Belarus, with helicopter spare parts from Lithuania, despite repeated use of such aircraft to bomb villages and support ground attacks on civilians;
- Tanks, military vehicles and artillery transferred to Sudan from Belarus, Russia and Poland, even though such equipment has been used to help launch indiscriminate and direct attacks on civilians;
- Grenades, rifles, pistols, ammunition and other small arms and light weapons exported to Sudan from many countries, but mainly China, France, Iran and Saudi Arabia;
- The recent involvement of arms brokering companies from the UK and Ireland attempting to provide large numbers of Antonov aircraft and military vehicles from Ukraine and pistols from Brazil (Amnesty International, 2007)

As Jan Egeland, UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, stated: “the only thing in abundance in Darfur is weapons. It’s easier to get a Kalashnikov than a loaf of bread (2004).”
Chapter 5

Conclusion

‘Never Again’: turning the rhetoric of genocide prevention into a reality

"Can I see another's woe, and not be in sorrow too? Can I see another's grief, and not seek for kind relief?" -- William Blake

A destruction that only man can provoke, only man can prevent. --Elie Wiesel

5.1 Introduction

Genocide is not something that happens over night. It is not something that happens spontaneously. Genocide is not something that happens without warning. This thesis shows that it is, in fact, a deliberate strategy; a policy employed by elites or those contending power, often to stay in power. The effects of genocide are felt beyond the borders of the affected country as it negatively impacts the safety and security of people in neighbouring areas. The political radicalism surrounding genocide is not usually confined within borders either. Whatever social, political, and economic instabilities allow the implementation of genocide as a policy in one area are likely to link, possibly even directly, factions and groups beyond the zone of current perpetration to populations within it. In this same vein, its course is influenced by actions and events occurring from outside the State, by regional actors and those in the wider international community. The impact of genocide on future generations is truly enormous and the repercussions of this “odious scourge” on human kind are, at times, incomprehensible. But we cannot allow the enormity of the problem to overwhelm us. Indeed, it is the very enormity of the problem that makes it imperative that we resolve it.
With genocide the very State which is responsible for protecting its citizens becomes their killer, and the potential victims can only turn to others to seek protection. Following the Second World War, during which some 12 million people were systematically murdered by the Nazi regime for reasons of their ethnicity, sexuality or political affiliations, the need to prevent genocide and punish those responsible for it was at the forefront of the international community.

In the aftermath of the War, genocide became a crime under international law in the 1948 Genocide Convention. Under the Convention, it is a crime not only to commit genocide, but also to plan or conspire to commit genocide, incite or cause other people to commit genocide or be complicit or involved in any act of genocide. As the Genocide Convention has the status of customary international law, it binds all States, regardless of whether or not they are an actual signatory (United Nations and Genocide Prevention website, 2010).

Despite the Convention, massive atrocities have occurred since – including the 1994 genocide in Rwanda and the genocide in Darfur - which have underscored the international community’s failure to make the prevention of genocide a reality.

Genocide is a crime rooted in the intolerance of a group (ethnic, racial or religious or other) – different to your own. Of paramount importance to an understanding of genocide, and which is clearly evident in the cases of both Rwanda and Darfur, is that the conflicts rarely emanate from the real or perceived differences among these groups, but from the political and economic inequities associated with these differences. In multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies, different groups do learn to live together in peace. Democratic ways are developed to share resources and power, to manage differences peacefully and prevent violence. However, in times of political or economic upheaval and crisis, and in an environment which lacks the institutional mechanisms of democracies, trust between communities begins to weaken and is replaced with fear and prejudice (United Nations and Genocide Prevention website, 2010). The manipulation of these fears and prejudices, for political reasons by governments, can lead, as Rwanda aptly illustrates, one group to turn against another group who they had previously lived with side by side and in some cases known intimately.
Even then, such hostility rarely leads to genocide. Several other factors must come together before genocide becomes more likely.

5.2 Factors contributing to genocide

This thesis identifies several factors that come together for genocide to become a reality. These conditions were tested and applied to Rwanda and Sudan. The results of this analysis is depicted in figure 9.
### Preconditions for Genocide: Sudan and Rwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>Rwanda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>(No. of risk factors)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structural Factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior Genocide</td>
<td>Yes - two (19 and 1964)</td>
<td>Yes (1964)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Upheaval</td>
<td>Very high</td>
<td>Very high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla Warfare</td>
<td>Yes – JEM and SLA</td>
<td>Yes – RPF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusionary Ideology</td>
<td>Yes: Islamic supremacy</td>
<td>Yes: racist nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No (anocracy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low Media Openness</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnic Factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active, state sanctioned discrimination</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governing elite represented a single ethnic, regional group.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Factors</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sudan</strong></td>
<td><strong>Rwanda</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low International Interdependence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Figure 8: Preconditions for genocide: Sudan and Rwanda)*
The research found that these factors are cumulative and interconnected and lead the ruling elite to commit genocide. Evident from the research is that there are a number of acceleratory factors which impact on the preconditions. For this reason it is important to explore the inter-connected nature of the causes of genocide. The outcome of this research suggests the following causes:

i) The country is at war or there is a lawless environment in which massacres can take place, unnoticed, in the smoke screen of war. The atrocities are not easily documented and distinguished as genocide, as Power points out in Rwanda, “the simultaneous war and genocide confused policymakers who had scant prior understanding of the country. Atrocities are often carried out in places that are not commonly visited, where outside expertise is limited. When country-specific knowledge is lacking, foreign governments become all the more likely to employ faulty analogies” (Power, 2001). A wartime environment justifies more extreme measures and military solutions to social problems. It also justifies increased militarisation, military expenditure and creation of civilian militias, as evidenced in both Rwanda and Sudan.

ii) There must exist a capacity by the perpetrator to carry out genocide. Both Rwanda and Sudan illustrate the role of arms in genocide. Arms are of importance for two reasons. Of importance is the sudden increase in armed groups or increased militarisation. The proliferation of arms, in a context of emergency security laws, which erode civil rights and liberties, is dangerous. This, along with the preparation of local population to commit killing of civilians, may suggest a trajectory towards perpetration of genocide. The formation of armed groups/ militias who have the support of the State and carry out genocidal acts on their behalf, was evident in Rwanda with the interhamwe and in Sudan with Janjaweed.

iii) Of particular importance, which both Rwanda and Sudan illustrate, is if the war being waged is one between the Government and rebels and follows a pattern of guerilla warfare. In such cases, the civilians who share the same identity of the
rebels may be targeted and defined as enemies of the state or supporters of the guerillas.

iv) Countries with a totalitarian or authoritarian government, where only one ethnic/regional/communal group controls all power are more at risk of genocide. This was applicable to Sudan and still is. With Rwanda, the situation was more complicated. Rwanda has a history of totalitarianism but, in the immediate years before the genocide, was in the process of democratic reform. Rwanda highlights how the introduction of electoral competition into divided societies can heighten the prospect of conflict, particularly where the elite are in a position of perceived or real vulnerability. Democratic reform, multi party politics, electoral competition, while essential to peace in the long term, can and as was the case with Rwanda pose a threat to the ruling elite in the transition period.

v) One or more national, ethnic, racial, religious, or political group is the target of discrimination or is made a scapegoat for the serious social or economic problems facing the country. Both Rwanda and Sudan have a history of political and economic discrimination and marginalisation of the targeted groups. Discrimination and inequality are important for two reasons. Inequality often drives the political upheaval: whether it be revolution, insurgency or guerrilla warfare, which threatens the exclusive power of the ruling regime who may then adopt a genocidal policy as away of suppressing this threat, ultimately, targeting those civilians who are associated/kin groups of the armed group, the Tutsi in Rwanda and the Fur, Zaghawa and Massalit in Darfur. Secondly, groups which face targeted discrimination are more vulnerable to becoming victims of genocide, as they have no political power and there may be no legal safeguards to protect them. In fact, the discrimination may be institutionalised.

Serious discriminatory practices against members of a particular group can include: compulsory identification, permission required for social activities, such as marriage, the systematic exclusion of the group from positions of power, the army, employment in state institutions, from education.
Explicit justification for such discrimination may occur through an ideology that elevates the status of the majority group or those identified with the ruling elite and perpetuates and promotes the discriminatory practices.

vi) The ruling elite have adopted and promote an ideology that identifies some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to restrict, persecute, or eliminate certain groups of people and that also signifies or defines a certain group as less than human. It “dehumanizes” members of this group and justifies violence against them. Messages and propaganda supporting this belief are spread through the media. In countries with tight state control over the media this is able to happen more easily and the media is used as the ‘mouth piece’ of the elite and, therefore, its ideology.

vii) There is a growing acceptance of violations of the targeted group’s human rights and a history of genocide and discrimination against them. Where the elite operate in a context of impunity, genocide is more likely. One of the lessons of history that has yet to sink in is that unpunished crimes can provide a precedent for later crimes. In the words of Hitler, who in 1939, addressing a group of Nazi leaders and Wehrmacht generals, said, “Who, after all, speaks today about the annihilation of the Armenians?” Akhavan (2001, p. 13) argues that “the long term consequences of such a culture of impunity cannot be underestimated. The failure to uphold elementary international norms has created a political climate in which extermination, deportation, and wanton destruction lies within the range of viable conduct”. Evident in both Rwanda and Sudan was an increase in life integrity violations of the targeted groups, those groups already alienated and vulnerable through systematic discrimination. Violations included, rape, torture, disappearances, forced population transfer, destruction of property, destruction of the food supply. It is of particular concern when these life integrity violations are committed with impunity. Particularly, evident in Rwanda witnessed was an increase in hate propaganda and hate crimes against the Tutsi, including the compulsory visible identification of targeted groups through classification and symbolism. This process allowed for the easy identification of Tutsi and a quicker more efficient execution of the genocide through death lists and check points. In
Rwanda and Sudan, both countries had experienced prior genocide which had gone unpunished and to a large extent unnoticed by the international community.

**viii** Both Rwanda and Sudan highlight the way in which external factors, forces and actors can impact on genocide. The more closed off a country is from other actors in the international community, both politically and economically the more likely genocide will occur unnoticed and without serious repercussions. The critical question, Harff, proposes, “is whether states and international organizations do in fact engage in preventive actions in the early stages. What counts is the political will to engage” (Harff, 2003, p. 70). Tolerance and/or complicity, of the ruling elite’s increasingly repressive behaviour, by foreign powers can make genocide/politicide more likely. Outside powers can offer a diplomatic guarantee of impunity and or military and financial means with which those in power can commit geno-politicide. The continued trade in arms despite increasing severity of human rights violations and violence towards civilians, as occurred in both Rwanda and Sudan, is one such example.

There are other ways in which outside actors and forces can impact on a trajectory of genocide. The belief that there is a strong tie between the domestic and external foes is crucial in the decision by those in power to eliminate a collective group – perceived or represented as the threat. The refugee dimension in Rwanda, illustrates this, as does the military and financial support Darfur rebels received from the Chad government. The extent to which support by kindred groups/diasporas living outside the state can impact on the magnitude of the armed conflict, threat perceptions of the elite and ultimately genocide, raises interesting questions, which require further exploration.

As evidenced from the research the factors identified above are cumulative, interconnected, and lead governments or rival authorities to choose a strategy of genocide during or following civil war. The relationship between the different factors and the behaviour and decisions of the governing elite is illustrated in the diagram in figure 9, below. The Taskforce for Genocide Prevention emphasises the importance of leadership: “The difference comes down to leadership. Mass atrocities are organized by powerful elites who believe they stand to gain from
these crimes and who have the necessary resources at their disposal. The heinous crimes committed in Nazi-occupied Europe, Cambodia, and Rwanda, for example, were all perpetrated with significant planning, organization, and access to state resources, including weapons, budgets, detention facilities, and broadcast media” (2008).

The question then, is what motivates the leadership. This underlying motivation may have political, economic and security elements, but at its heart is power. Grievances over the inequitable distribution of power and resources appear to be a fundamental motivating factor in the decision to commit genocide. That same inequality, considers the Taskforce for Genocide Prevention, “may also provide the means for atrocities to be committed. For example, control of a highly centralized state apparatus and the access to economic and military power that comes with it makes competition for power an all-or-nothing proposition and creates incentives to eliminate competitors” (2008). This dynamic was evident in Rwanda and is a serious cause of concern for Burma, today. A country like Burma, which has its first election in 20 years, planned for 2010, a culture of impunity, extreme human rights violations, a history or authoritarianism and militarism, an extremely controlled and closed off media and ongoing armed conflict, should be of considerable concern to the international community.
(Figure 9: the relationship between different factors, the behaviour and decisions of the governing elite, and a genocidal outcome)
5.3 Future research

A natural next step in the research would be to identify a country, which has a number of the preconditions identified above and then look for entry points for prevention. An examination of Burma or Afghanistan, two countries identified by Harff as being at risk of genocide in her 2009 analysis, would be a good place to start (in Gurr, 2010, p.6). Gurr suggests, “[w]hat is needed is a close examination of past, current, and future international policies toward each of these countries, with assessments of whether and how different modes of engagement mitigate armed conflict and change the underlying potentials for genocidal violence” (2010, p.6). This would allow policymakers, researchers, and those in the international community to understand how the elite in the countries respond to the various external actions and threats. Growing awareness of how strategies, whether they are diplomatic, political, economic or military, may help or harm efforts to prevent genocidal violence is crucial.

An interesting study would be an analysis of cases where conditions were ripe for genocide but where it did not occur; where a strategy of prevention may have actually worked. As Gurr, points outs “[l]ogically we cannot say that a genocide or mass political killing has been prevented, because we can never know for certain whether targeted violence aimed at eliminating an ethnic, religious, or political group would have occurred in the absence of preventive actions. But we can say that some combination of international actions mitigated the conditions that elsewhere have led to genocide” (2010, p. 1). By examining successful international engagement in a situation that contained a number of preconditions for a genocidal outcome, lessons for future engagement can be learned.

5.4 Policy implications from the research: the responsibility to prevent.

The possible responses to genocide fall under two broad categories: halting genocide, when it is already in progress; and preventing it, when conditions exist, which make genocidal violence possible. Staub states it is “necessary to develop a conception of when action is needed, what kind of action, who is to perform these
actions, and a related system of initiating and performing action” (Staub, 2000, pp. 375 – 376). A lot of discussions focus on whether or not outside actors should intervene in a country that is committing acts of genocide against its people. As both Rwanda and Sudan show us, unfortunately, outside actors often do not react fast enough or in a sufficient manner, the onus therefore should be on prevention. The first step is to recognise when genocide is taking place, but more importantly, recognise the steps that lead to genocide, the variables that make genocide more likely and in doing so prevent the deaths of thousands of civilians. The United Nations Special Adviser to the Secretary General on the Prevention of Genocide, in a statement at the anniversary of the Genocide Convention, called upon States to “implement the preventive aspects of the Convention and to support efforts to prevent massive and serious human rights violations that could lead to genocide” (2009).

An important component of genocide prevention is identification, gathering information and the establishment of an early-warning system. Early warning is defined by the UN Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, as the collection, analysis and communication of information about escalatory developments in situations that could potentially lead to genocide, crimes against humanity or serious war crimes. It is worth noting however, as Iqbal Riza, former UN Chef de Cabinet, did, “We did not give the information [the warning of impending genocide in Rwanda] the importance and the correct interpretation it deserved. We realized only in hindsight” (Riza, 1999). Any effective response to genocidal violence requires the influence and power of the international community to be wielded. It requires political will for, if early warnings fall on deaf ears, then the consequences can be incalculable.

5.5 Prevention

The Genocide Prevention Taskforce goes to the heart of the need for early intervention – “not only [is early prevention] the preferred course of action in strategic, resources, and moral terms; we also believe that engaging early can successfully obviate the need for a much more difficult crisis response at a later stage” (2008). Though, as they argue this is no easy task and requires serious long
term investment. “Seizing on opportunities to prevent mass atrocities requires a comprehensive approach, breaking through bureaucratic silos to draw on a wide array of analytical, diplomatic, economic, legal, and military instruments and engaging with a variety of partners” (Genocide Prevention Taskforce, 2008).

By understanding what leads elites down a trajectory of genocide those who study genocide can identify points to intervene before it has got to the point of ‘no return’ - an understanding of common features of genocide that often emerge early in the process before it is actually underway. This thesis presents some ideas for preventing genocide, by looking at how to counter the conditions that lead to genocide. It is in no way an exclusive list.

5.5a Poverty reduction

As this thesis established genocide most often takes place during and in the aftermath of violent conflict and regime crises, and that these factors are most prevalent in countries with low economic development and limited or discriminatory economic opportunities for its citizens. Where the gap of economic equality is greatest and inequality is at the expense of a particular targeted group then serious consideration must be given to poverty. Poverty reduction, therefore, is a necessary component of genocide prevention, in the sense that it is crucial to the prevention of regime crises and armed conflict that often precede it.

It is not economic deprivation, itself that is a cause of armed conflict and genocide. If it were there would be a lot more bloodshed but as Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group said: I don’t think anyone needs to be persuaded now about the existence of a basic interrelationship between poverty and conflict, captured in the familiar mantra that there can be no security without development, and no development without security” (2009, p. 1)

Economic growth, alone, is not the answer. Where economic growth does occur it must be widespread, accountable, with conflict sensitive approaches to
development assistance and economic development, such as programmes that focus on the reintegration of ex-combatants into employment.

5.5b Early intervention in armed conflict

Research has shown that protracted civil wars are at risk of parties to the conflict, especially, but not exclusively, the government, resorting to genocidal violence to eliminate their opponents' supporters. Considering this, an important aspect of prevention is early intervention in the early stages of internal warfare. The prevention of armed conflict, was the first point in Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s five-point plan for preventing genocide. Where armed conflict has already broken out, then the protection of civilians, must be central to any intervening and de-escalating strategies.

The diplomatic, political, and economic instruments brought to bear in the prevention of armed conflict must focus on rebels as well as governments. Both sides are likely to need inducements, and the threat of loss of international support, to reach ceasefires and negotiate their differences. Both sides are likely to need security guarantees and promises of longer-term economic assistance to reach and implement settlements. There are many case and comparative studies of the international stratagems that can help de-escalate civil wars and get participants to negotiate binding agreements.

5.5c Combating a culture of impunity

Accountability for past violations, independent judiciary, legislative protections and an independent human rights institution can all go some way in countering impunity and preventing future violations. “International condemnation of abusive practices irrespective of national interest of course is a prerequisite to effective action”, asserts Harff, (2003a, p.10). Power and resources must be distributed in a fair and equal way based on fundamental principles that protect the basic rights of citizens and with a strong commitment to the rule of law. For example, argues Harff, “promoting the observance of minimal human rights standards and the practice of inclusiveness should continue to be on the policy agenda of
governments and organizations that care what happens in countries such as Burma and Burundi” 2003, p. 72).

The realisation of international human rights law can go some way ensuring that vulnerable peoples are better protected and gross violations do not go unpunished. A country’s national sovereignty cannot be used to shield people who wantonly violate the rights of their fellow human beings.

5.5d Media

The media plays a role in genocide and, therefore, an important one in its prevention. Not only is an open and free media important to the prevention of genocide but also a responsible one. These characteristics can ensure that both citizens and governing elites are well informed and the government more accountable. Integrity of information, independence from state control are essential to promoting healthy political dialogue. It is also important that the media develop a sense of ethical responsibility, supporting the rule of law and de-escalating intergroup conflict where it arises.

5.5e Democratic reform

Democratisation presents a complicated picture. It is critical that governance arrangements remove the mentality of zero-sum, winner-take-all politics that drive impulses to demonize, exclude, and exterminate. Where democratic reform does take place, the focus should be on increasing electoral cooperation rather than competition and to ensuring that electoral systems produce democratic actors. Attempts to force democratization prematurely have proven problematic. Such efforts, as was the case in Rwanda, often fail. However, as Harff, rightly points out, “those failures usually prompt efforts to redesign and rebuild democratic institutions. Once in place, democratic institutions—even partial ones—reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and all but eliminate the risk that it will lead to genocide/politicide” (2003, p. 71).
5.5f Healing and Reconciliation

Healing and reconciliation, is a relatively new approach to preventing violent conflict and breaking cycles of ongoing violence. The psychological wounds of past victimisation, discrimination and violence need to be addressed. Addressing the psychological needs of victims “make it less likely that victims engage in unnecessary ‘defensive violence’. Healing, posits Staub, makes reconciliation possible (Staub et al, 2005, p. 300). One aspect of reconciliation and healing is learning about the influences which lead to the genocide.

Where reconciliation, rehabilitation and reform take place, whether it be political, judicial or economic, combating racism, discrimination and intolerance must be a central focus of these developments. As the UN Special Adviser said: "we must work to eradicate all kinds of discrimination and promote tolerance, respect for cultural and ethnic diversity and discourage anything which tends to strengthen identity-based division"

5.5g Conclusion

This thesis has sought to determine the conditions that make genocide more likely. Of utmost importance, in determining whether upheaval will develop into genocide, are the characteristics of the political system, of the elites, and structural conditions, a propensity to extreme violence and genocide, impunity and the nature of the conflict. These factors, more so than low economic development and ethnic or societal cleavages, are what count. Ethnic and societal cleavages and poverty, however, do matter, especially when an authoritarian elite is faced with a power struggle. It is the salience of these factors and the deliberate use of these by the elite to manipulate public opinion that lies at the heart of an understanding of genocide.

Tackling the underlying social, economic and political conditions that contribute to genocide is no easy task. It requires a long-term strategy and efforts that require sustained investment of resources and will. The model established in this thesis
can be used to identify potential victims, minorities and political opponents at risk of being targeted for destruction and determine countries where those in power are more likely to adopt a genocidal strategy, during or in the aftermath of political upheaval. Engaging early in high-risk situations should save more lives, at less cost, than responding once the killings are already underway. Understanding the way genocide occurs and what motivates elites, and learning to recognize signs that could, in a certain environment, lead to genocide are important in turning 'Never Again' from rhetoric into a reality.
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